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Santa Barbara

There is No Integration Here:

Motivations of Far-Right Voters in Germany

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requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

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by

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March 2020

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ABSTRACT

There Is No Integration Here: Motivations of Far-Right Voters in Germany

by

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Under what conditions do individuals opt out of the political mainstream and vote for the far-right? Results of recent European elections seem to defy the expectations of the literature, as the far-right gained a large share of votes despite relatively "normal" economic conditions and the stability of institutional constraints. In this dissertation, I focus on the demand-side to uncover why some people with anti-immigrant attitudes vote for the far-right but others with similar attitudes do not when supply-side conditions are held constant. I argue that what separates these voters is *how* immigrants are perceived as incompatible with the host society. Specifically, I argue that individuals who have populist far-right attitudes and who deem immigrants as "other" because they are not integrated are more likely to vote for the far-right than are those who do not. I develop and test this hypothesis using original survey data collected in Germany. The multivariate quantitative analyses show that the far-right AfD vote is associated with the belief that immigrants are not integrated and a lack of confidence in Chancellor Angela Merkel. Analysis of open-ended responses of AfD voters confirms these findings. AfD voters say that they think immigrants are forging "parallel societies" and that they are concerned about the long-term impact of immigrants in Germany. AfD voters place

blame on both immigrants themselves, who they perceive as not integrating, as well as on Angela Merkel, who they blame for allowing immigrants into the country. By uncovering the underlying motivations of "less extreme" far-right voters, the findings of this dissertation provide a greater understanding of the mainstreaming of the far-right and its electoral success in western societies with immigrant populations.

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Chapter I. Introduction

Sociopolitical challenges driven by increased economic integration and migration have given rise to increasing levels of discontent across western liberal democracies creating a crisis of democratic representation. The shift toward liberal socio-cultural values has provided an opportunity for reactionary forces to rise, including contemporary far-right political parties. These parties seem to offer an alternative to mainstream politics as part of a larger "silent counterrevolution" (Ignazi 1992) against the processes of globalization and multiculturalism. With only a few exceptions, parties on the far-right have seen electoral gains across the European Union since 2000.[1] Considered disparately, the power of these parties is somewhat muted as no far-right party has won an outright majority. Collectively, however, these developments threaten to erode the post-war liberal democratic order of Europe as public discourse polarizes, governing coalitions become more difficult to form, and voter alignments destabilize. These developments underscore the urgency of research that can identify the underlying motivations of far-right voters.

Scholars studying the far-right seek to explain the variation in the emergence and popularity of far-right parties cross-nationally, focusing on the structural and institutional conditions that allow parties to emerge (the supply side) and the cultural-economic grievances that drive electoral success (the demand side). On the supply side, scholars have identified the electoral and party factors that shape electoral success for far-right parties. On the demand side, previous research has focused mostly on identifying the individuals who are most likely to vote for the far-right. These individuals are characterized most simplistically as

[1] The exceptions to this generalization are Spain, Portugal, and Malta.

"extremists"[2] or as "neo-Nazis." However, the resurgence of support for far-right parties since 2000 does not come only from this group. To date, little research has focused on why individuals who hold "less extreme" attitudes vote for the far-right.

Supply-side arguments focus mostly on the nature of electoral systems and parties and argue that the rise of the far-right is an elite-driven, top-down process. Nevertheless, electoral rules that stifle the ability of smaller, extremist parties to succeed remain in place, as do strong moderate governing coalitions in most of Europe where far-right parties have risen in recent years. The stability of these factors implies instead that the rightward shift is a bottom-up process driven by changes in demand from voters as well as the more effective use of mobilization strategies. However, the data and methods employed by scholars studying the far-right often do not allow for a study of this nature.

The recent wave of continued electoral success of the far-right across Europe indicates that these parties are no longer "flash parties" (Fennema 1997) that rise and fall suddenly, nor are they "single-issue" (Mudde 1999) "anti-immigrant" parties (Fennema 1997; van der Brug, et al. 2005) supported exclusively by the "losers of modernization" (Betz 1994) that hold nativist, populist, and authoritarian views that are considered "extreme." Indeed, exit polls reveal an increasingly heterogeneous cross-class coalition of voters who seem to share a majority of characteristics with voters for mainstream political parties. The growing similarities of voters for far-right parties for voters for mainstream parties are puzzling given

2 By "extremists," I mean the people who are fervent supporters of the far-right. These indvidiuals may exhibit physical traits of neo-Nazis, such as shaving their heads or getting swastika tattoos. Put simplistically, I consider people to be "extreme" if they participate in large public events supporting their ideology, which following in part Southern Poverty Law Center, I consider to be in favor of racial purity. See Southern Poverty Law Center: https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/neo-nazi.

the expectations of the literature which expect the voter base of the far-right to be relatively homogeneous and small.

Structural conditions such as electoral rules and historical legacies have long limited both the likelihood of electoral success and the appeal of the far-right to voters. Although grievances concerning the economic and cultural impact of immigration have long been prevalent, they seem to be more salient in the contemporary politics of advanced industrialized states. This has led both academics and the media to theorize that immigration, particularly at the massive scale seen in the 2015 refugee crisis, is to blame for the recent uptick in the success of far-right parties across Europe seen in the elections held since 2015. This is reinforced in the literature by scholars of the far-right who demonstrate that no far-right party has been successful without mobilizing anti-immigrant attitudes (Ivarsflaten 2008) and have consistently found a positive correlation between anti-immigrant attitudes and far-right voting behavior (Lubbers & Scheepers 2002, van der Brug et al. 2005, Norris 2005, Ivarsflaten 2008, Rydgren 2008). However, anti-immigrant attitudes do not automatically translate to support for the far-right (Golder 2016), and there is no clear model of the process of how, given the trigger of increased immigration, individuals who previously voted for mainstream parties come to vote for the far-right.

Indeed, the simple hypothesis that the far-right will gain more voters as the percentage of the population with anti-immigrant or other far-right attitudes rises does not stand up to empirical scrutiny. Cross-national surveys such as the European Social Survey and European Values Survey have consistently demonstrated that a majority of individuals in society have nativist, authoritarian, and populist attitudes. However, despite the apparent widespread demand, far-right parties have received only a small percentage of these votes over time,

implying the presence of some intervening factors. Blinder et al. (2013) argue that in contexts in which there are not strongly held social norms against expressing prejudice, people are more likely to reveal nativist attitudes and to act on them by voting for the far-right. However, there is little understanding of the formation and nature of these individual attitudes and how they may interact within varying contexts on the ground. Most studies continue to rely on regional or national survey data, which can provide only a glimpse of how these individual attitudes form and translate to votes for the far-right for some people and not for others.

How these receptive contexts—the localities in which the far right is most successful—develop, and how their features shape individual voter behavior warrants further study given the geographic dispersion of the vote that defies traditional explanations in that far-right voters are not simply found in regions with high levels of unemployment (Lubbers & Scheepers 2002, Arzheimer & Carter 2006) or with large immigrant populations (Mudde 2007). Indeed, norms against expressing prejudice and the degree to which they constrain individuals are likely to vary both across and within countries, further complicating consistent measurement of attitudes of far-right voters in different contexts, which are already difficult to capture given the relatively small number of far-right voters.

The findings of Blinder, et al. (2013) reinforce the well-known issue of social desirability bias in studies of far-right voters. Depending on the normative context, individuals are sometimes reluctant to reveal their beliefs publicly. This inclination is especially likely in studies of voter behavior, in which revealing the party or candidate one voted for maybe in itself taboo. Due to social desirability bias and because they are a hard-to-reach population, far-right voters are often underrepresented in public opinion surveys due to difficulties in recruiting an adequate sample size (Hooghe & Reeskens 2007). In addition to the issue of

social desirability bias, far-right voters are less likely to participate in a public opinion survey due to various factors, including the geographic distribution of far-right voters outside of population-dense areas, lower levels of education and socioeconomic status, as well as high levels of general distrust among far-right voters (Hooghe & Reeskens 2007).

Beyond this response issue, cross-national surveys are also subject to measurement issues. The use of these data and the models employed make implicit assumptions about the relative equivalency of far-right parties across countries, which is problematic as some parties may, for example, have more explicitly racist platforms. As Hooghe and Reeskens (2007) demonstrate, this may lead to greater underrepresentation of voters for some parties than others in the sample given the higher likelihood of respondents who underreport their vote. This lack of equivalency across contexts makes it difficult to make valid inferences about the factors related to far-right voting. The use of cross-national or national data in studies of far-right voters hides subnational variation which calls the usefulness of theories derived from these data into question (Golder 2016).

The use of cross-national or even national-level data to study far-right voters, a population that is not evenly distributed across constituencies, may introduce biases that limit the ability of researchers to draw valid inferences from the data, as other studies of highly concentrated and hard-to-reach populations have shown (Lasala-Blanco, 2014). Despite this fact, cross-national surveys remain prevalent throughout the literature, for they enable scholars to pool a large enough sample of far-right voters to allow for analyses to reach levels of statistical significance.

Studying "less extreme" voters

A study of why less "extreme" individuals vote for the far-right and how they make sense of their vote is relevant for several reasons. First, such a study sheds greater light on the heterogeneity of the far-right voter bloc beyond the "typical" voter identified by large-N cross-national studies and aims to explain how these "less extreme" voters come to vote for the far-right, a process that remains unclear in the existing literature. Second, it allows for a deeper understanding of the sequencing and relative weight of the variables found in macro-level studies to be positively correlated with far-right voting. Finally, it allows for a study of how far-right success is determined by the interactive, rather than the isolated effect of both supply and demand-side factors.

This dissertation overcomes the limitations of previous research by taking a new approach that allows for the systematic study of voter behavior from the perspective of the voters themselves. Using methods designed and tested in preliminary fieldwork as part of the European Cities and Neighborhoods Survey (Lasala-Blanco, et. al 2017), this dissertation seeks to identify the factors associated with votes for the far-right.

Findings

In this dissertation, I focus on the demand-side to uncover why some people with anti-immigrant attitudes vote for the far-right but others with similar attitudes do not when supply-side conditions are held constant. I argue that what separates these voters is *how* immigrants[3] are perceived as incompatible with the host society. Specifically, I argue that individuals who

[3] I use the term immigrants here to fit in line with the general use of "anti-immigrant attitudes," but this term can be used interchangeably with any terms which describe non-ethnic and/or cultural natives. The main focus of far-right activities against subgroups is immigrants, while measures used to operationalize attitudes against an outgroup often contain solely immigrants. However, other outgroups that fit into the nonethnic and/or cultural native group can also include any minority group, whether native or not.

have populist far-right attitudes and who "other" immigrants based on the perception that they are not to integrating are more likely to vote for the far-right than those who do not. My argument is contingent upon an immigration shock like the one seen in the 2015 refugee crisis. I develop and test this hypothesis using original survey data collected in Germany.

The quantitative analysis of the German survey data demonstrates support for my hypothesis. I find that anti-immigrant attitudes coupled with populist anti-establishment attitudes are associated with votes for the far-right. In the case of Germany, distrust in Chancellor Angela Merkel is the strongest and most significant predictor of voting for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). However, given Angela Merkel's strong association with allowing refugees into Germany in 2015, it is unclear whether the finding that distrust in the Chancellor captures attitudes against the office, Merkel as the individual, or Merkel's political decision to welcome refugees. The findings shared in Chapter V using quantitative analysis indicate that the measure of confidence Merkel is more so an assessment of her immigration policy than an indicator of anti-establishment attitudes writ large. The answers respondents give to open-ended questions in Chapter VI further support the idea that views of Merkel are associated with her role in immigration policy.

In the qualitative analysis, I examine and summarize the findings of open-ended questions asked of the entire sample. I also summarize the findings from an additional set of questions asked as an addendum for those who said they had voted for the AfD. Through this analysis, I further illuminate which attitudes and beliefs distinguish far-right voters from non-far-right voters. In short, I find evidence showing that AfD voters are concerned about Merkel's decision to welcome immigrants to Germany in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis. Concerns about immigrants seem to be mostly about the lack of immigrants' willingness to

integrate/conform to German ways of life in addition to an association of immigrants with crime. Collectively, the findings I present demonstrate that views of immigrant integration and populist anti-establishment attitudes are associated with vote choice.

Overview of the Dissertation

This dissertation focuses on the demand-side of voter behavior to explore how anti-immigrant attitudes and populist anti-establishment attitudes are related to support for the far-right. Using original survey research of all eligible voters and AfD voters, I test the proposition that individuals who have populist far-right attitudes and who "other" immigrants based on the perception that they are not willing to integrate are more likely to vote for the far-right than those who do not.

In Chapter II, I explore the theories outlined in the literature about the optimal conditions for far-right political party success and which attitude and beliefs at the individual level have been found to predict votes for the far-right. I focus on the gaps in the literature, demonstrating that nearly all existing studies either focus on supply-side factors or imply that only extremists vote for the far-right. I discuss the limitations of existing work, which are unable to study "less extreme voters" due to their reliance on cross-national and small-N data of far-right party leadership.

In Chapter III, I develop my theory of what separates those who vote for the far-right from those who do not, controlling for anti-immigrant attitudes and supply-side conditions. Drawing on the relevant literature, I argue that individuals who have populist far-right attitudes and who "other" immigrants based on the perception that they are not integrating are more likely to vote for the far-right than those who do not.

In Chapter IV, I provide an overview of the German survey data (n=460) collected in the Fall of 2018, describing the sampling, questionnaires, and plan of analysis for the dissertation.

In Chapter V, I test my hypothesis about views of immigrant integration against competing demand-side theories of far-right voter behavior using quantitative analysis. The results of the regression models largely replicate the findings of other scholars who find that anti-immigrant attitudes and distrust in politicians are associated with votes for the far-right. My findings add to this body of work by looking at beliefs about immigrant integration, an underexplored determinant of anti-immigrant attitudes. I test this measure against competing measures of anti-immigrant immigration and find it is a stronger predictor of votes for the far-right. This finding, along with the finding that distrust in Merkel is a significant driver of votes for the AfD, support my argument that votes for the far-right are most likely found among those who have populist anti-establishment attitudes and think that immigrants are not integrated

In Chapter VI, I examine whether these findings are consistent with the respondents' answers to open-ended questions. I look at questions that ask about motivation for vote choice, deeper concerns about immigrants, and frustration with the government and political elites. The findings based on the open-ended responses analyzed in this section lend further support to my hypothesis.

Chapter VII concludes by discussing the limitations of this dissertation as well as the implications of this dissertation for future studies of far-right voter behavior, anti-immigrant attitudes, and hard-to-reach populations. The chapter also offers some thoughts on how attitudes toward immigrants may form and suggests avenues for future research.

Chapter II. Theory: Views of Immigrant Integration and Populist Anti-Establishment Attitudes Lead to Far-Right Votes

The Puzzle: Explaining Votes for the Far-Right

The study of the contemporary far-right has long been dominated by the idea that the far-right is an anomaly of modern western liberal democracies. Building on theories of modernization and change advanced most prominently by Inglehart (1977), preeminent scholars of the far-right such as Pierro Ignazi (1992), Hans-Georg Betz (1994), and Herbert Kitschelt (1995) argued that far-right parties could only be successful during out of the ordinary circumstances, such as profound periods of economic crisis or socio-cultural change. Theorizing that the far-right would draw its voters from those most acutely impacted by these developments, these scholars sought to identify the social bases of support. Collectively, they advanced what became known as the "losers of modernization" theory.[4] In short, this theory implies that the far-right receives votes through one of two means. Driven by discontent, some people vote out of protest. Others, driven by an intellectual rigidity related to a larger authoritarian disposition (Adorno, et. al 1969) vote in support for the party.

More contemporary works apply modernization theory as an explanation for the more recent rise in far-right support, such as Ingelhart's (2018) *Cultural Evolution*, which points to diminishing job security and rising inequality as the causes of change. Those who have been most impacted by these developments—those who feel the least secure—Inglehart argues, are those most likely to support authoritarian movements and parties. In his 2019 work with Pippa Norris, modernization theory is extended again to demonstrate that this shift is largely

[4] Although each of the aforementioned scholars advanced their theories in this vein, the phrase is attributed to Betz (1994).

generational and that those in older generations are those most prone to the so-called authoritarian reflex.

This and other evidence from this line of research continues to build on the well-established finding that the social base of the far-right is male, either relatively young or old, of moderate education, and concerned about immigrants and immigration (Arzheimer 2011). These individuals, proponents of modernization theory argue, are those most impacted by socio-economic change and thus those most likely to direct their insecurity toward authoritarian behavior. From the perspective of this scholarship, the far-right has a restricted supply of potential voters who transfer their support to a far-right party when triggered during periods of extreme uncertainty; or in other words, when demand-side grievances are sufficiently high. During "normal" conditions, the expectation is that demand should be low. When demand is low, the expectation is that the far-right will only receive votes from extremists, who vote for the party solely due to their support of party ideology.

Though theoretically sound, this line of research has not held up to empirical scrutiny. Large-scale surveys of attitudes and political behavior such as the Eurobarometer, European Social Survey, and European Voter Study, as well as national studies such as the German Longitudinal Survey and British Election Study, have consistently demonstrated that the three core features of far-right parties: nativist, authoritarian, and populist attitudes (Mudde 2007, 2016) are widespread in the population (Mudde 2016). However, far-right parties tend to only receive a small fraction of votes in Europe and other places, despite the seemingly high demand. Given the widespread nature of these attitudes and the lack of far-right support during times of crisis, a new wave of scholars was motivated by why the far-right was not successful despite a generally fertile breeding ground (Mudde 2016).

In response, scholars such as Pippa Norris (2005), Terri Givens (2005), and Elisabeth Carter (2005) advanced arguments that highlighted the role of supply-side factors to explain the divergence in the success of far-right parties given the relatively high demand across contexts. This line of work focused on explaining why despite widespread nativist, authoritarian and populist attitudes in the population, some far-right parties performed better electorally than others. Collectively, the findings from this renewed focus on the supply-side emphasized the importance of PR systems with low electoral thresholds (Norris 2005, Givens 2005), the availability of ideological space on the far-right (Norris 2005, Carter 2005, Givens 2005), a party ideology of ethnonationalism and populist antiestablishment rhetoric (Rydgren 2004), and a strong cohesive internal party organization (Carter 2005, Norris 2005).

This strain of literature provided a good understanding of the political opportunity structures and the party choices that help explain why the far-right is successful in some places and not others. It highlighted the role of national context and party positioning on key issues to help explain why some far-right parties can gain a larger following than others. Nevertheless, the interpretation is wanting, because it, like the argument of earlier demand-side scholars, studies one side of the puzzle in isolation from the other.

On the one hand, demand-side scholars argue that the support for the far-right is inherently limited during "normal" times and will rise only during extraordinary circumstances of economic crisis or socio-cultural change. On the other hand, supply-side scholars recognize that far-right attitudes are pervasive and not limited to "normal" times. Instead, supply-side scholars argue that the success of a far-right party will be limited by the existence of key institutional variables such as PR systems with low electoral thresholds and bans on hate speech.

Thus, both sides fail to identify the process by which potential far-right voters can be mobilized during relatively "normal" times and in political systems that constrain opportunities for far-right parties. Considered as a whole, the literature about the far-right has identified the conditions under and institutions in which the far-right is likely to succeed. The existing literature, however, is unable to sort out why some people vote for the far-right and others do not among individuals who, on the demand side, share anti-immigrant attitudes, and on the supply-side, electoral and party level variables are held constant.

Scope Conditions of the Argument

In this work, I focus on the perspectives of voters to identify the motivations of individuals who opt out of the political mainstream and vote for the far-right. Previous research has mostly focused on identifying the people who are most likely to vote for the far-right. These individuals are characterized most simplistically as "extremists," or as "neo-Nazis." Nevertheless, the resurgence of support for far-right parties around the world does not come only from these individuals. Research has not focused on those who do not ascribe to the "extremist mold.[5]" Here, I focus on the "less extreme" voters and argue that the process by which these individuals are mobilized is dependent upon both supply (political party competition and party rhetoric) and demand (individual voters) conditions.

Below, I highlight supply-side theories that describe the context in which a far-right party emerges, the positions it takes, and how it frames issues. Here, I lay out the existing conditions that I believe are important to the formation of a far-right party itself. By

5 By "extremists," I mean the people who are fervent supporters of the far-right. These individuals may exhibit physical traits of neo-Nazis, such as shaving their heads, or getting swastika tattoos. Put simplistically, I consider people to be "extreme" if they participate in large public events supporting their ideology, which following in part Southern Poverty Law Center, I consider to be in favor of racial purity. See Southern Poverty Law Center: https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/neo-nazi.

highlighting these attributes, I intend to "set the stage" by describing how I think the most recent far-right parties in Europe have come to fruition.

These conditions, however, do not explain how the party attracts voters. I argue that the institutional variables, such as PR systems with electoral thresholds and the banning of hate speech, which supply-side scholars pointed to as constraints on the far-right to achieve success, have failed as sufficient explanations. Even with these institutional features and others in place, far-right parties have seen a wave of electoral success across Europe in recent years. If the features theorized to constrain the success of the far-right were correctly identified, far-right parties should have had very limited, if any, success in countries where these variables are in place. Instead, practically every European country now has an established far-right party that has made substantial gains at both the national and local levels in recent years.

Supply-Side Conditions for Party Emergence

To understand how far-right parties emerge, I draw on classic works like Ignazi (1992, 1996) and Betz (1993), who argued that for the far-right to win votes, ideological space must be available on the left-right spectrum and voter loyalties to political parties must be sufficiently weak. These conditions must be met for any new and/or smaller party to siphon voters from other political parties. In the case of a far-right party, space must be available on the right end of the political spectrum. I add to this notion as I think that this occurs when traditional/preexisting parties move toward the center and become increasingly moderate on key issues, particularly socio-cultural issues. In this way, I argue that this space becomes available when mainstream parties converge, as Kitschelt and McGann (1995) theorized.

Party loyalties must be sufficiently weak for the far-right to gain votes. To characterize the most recent voters for far-right parties in Europe, they must be willing to cast their votes

for a different party than they had in the past, or, in institutional contexts that permit multiple votes, voters be willing to split their votes. When party identification and loyalty are strong, far-right parties are unlikely to pick up voters beyond their extremist base. This is because voters are too attached to their traditional, and often more moderate parties. Weaker party identification and loyalty seem to describe current European publics well, as new parties have emerged and voters have changed their party preferences from one election to the next more so than in the past.

Following Mudde (1999, 2007) and others, immigration has become a salient issue in society and far-right parties have been able to take ownership and assert themselves as the party to handle the issue in Europe. Far-right parties have framed immigration negatively, which tends to be substantively different from the frame presented by the mainstream party or parties in Western Europe. This frame has been "copied" by other parties, but other parties do not seem to be seen as having ownership of the issue of immigration. Instead, as Mudde (2007) has pointed out, far-right parties are often preferred over the other party that has taken up the issue. This legitimizes and strengthens far-right parties.

Party rhetoric: how parties take on and frame pertinent issues, is also important. Kitschelt and McGann (1995) argued that to be successful, far-right parties must take on a pro-market ideology as well nativism. Instead, the latest wave of far-right parties are more in line with Mudde (2007), and Rydgren (2004). Mudde (2007) argued that far-right parties blur their economic strategy, while Rydgren (2004) argued that the far-right's "new winning formula" is a combination of ethnonationalism and populist antiestablishment rhetoric. Economic policies may be a feature of the far-right parties' platforms in Europe, but they are not central. Instead, contemporary far-right party rhetoric is characterized by nativist sentiments often coupled with

populist anti-establishment rhetoric. With this rhetoric, the party places blame on the establishment for problems associated with immigration and immigrants.

The context in which a far-right party emerges, the positions it takes, and how it frames issues, particularly immigration, are the supply-side conditions that set the scene for how contemporary far-right parties in Europe have formed. But these components are not new. My contribution to the literature on far-right voters focuses on the demand-side and builds on seminal theories of social identity. I add to these theories by showing that how a far-right party is perceived, and its ability to attract votes is dependent on the attitudes of its would-be supporters. Like other scholars, I focus on how anti-immigrant attitudes are related to votes for the far-right. I go beyond the simple correlation and demonstrate that how immigrants are perceived by an individual is an important predictor of whether he or she will vote for the far-right.

Supply-Side Arguments Cannot Explain the Success of Far-Right Parties since 2015

The body of research on far-right voting behavior has shown that anti-immigrant attitudes are necessary, though not sufficient alone, to predict votes for the far-right. This work seeks to explain why, despite the relatively widespread existence of anti-immigrant attitudes documented by Mudde (2016) and others, only some people vote for the far-right while others with similar attitudes do not. Supply-side scholars have done a great job of laying out the conditions for a far-right party to emerge. In doing this, they have isolated the institutional factors which limit the ability of a far-right party from winning votes. These scholars have also studied how particular frames used by a far-right party may garner votes from some people but not others. What they have not done is sort out why, when these conditions are held constant, some people vote for the far-right and others do not.

My work is motivated by the more recent wave of scholarship on the far-right that seeks to identify how, despite the widespread existence of anti-immigrant attitudes, the far-right has seen only limited electoral success. My work is in line with the newest wave of far-right scholarship, which seeks to explain the resurgence of support for far-right parties beginning in 2015. The latest round of research emerged in response to the rise in electoral support of far-right parties across Europe. In recent years, many far-right parties have made it to the final round of elections, won executive offices, and become official opposition parties. In Germany, support for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) increased from by nearly 8 percentage points from 2013 to garner 12.6 percent of the party votes and become the official opposition party in 2017 (*Der Bundeswahlleiter*). Although some parties have not seen widespread electoral success, they have been able to wield other forms of power. This has been the case in places such as the UK, where UKIP helped orchestrate the successful referendum vote to leave the European Union.

If the supply-side arguments about the institutional constraints were sound, the institutional "breakers" such as PR electoral systems with thresholds, multi-stage elections, and bans on hate speech, should have prevented any sizable uptick in support for the far-right. These "breakers" should have continued to hold even when the system experienced shocks like the large-scale migration seen with the onset of the 2015 refugee crisis. Still, they did not. Given this, there is a need to go beyond the supply-side explanations which focus exclusively on party and system-level variables. To explain the most recent rise in support for far-right parties, a greater focus on the demand-side is necessary.

The rise in support for far-right parties following an immigration shock in 2015 seems to support traditional demand-side explanations, which argue that support for far-right parties

will expand under extraordinary socio-economic changes. The influx of millions of immigrants with the refugee crisis seems to fit the mold prescribed by these theories. When profound change occurs, the far-right is theorized to be more successful than during normal times. However, the process by which support for the far-right increases during these times remains is unclear. It may be that latent attitudes against immigrants are activated due to this uptick in immigration. Alternatively, it may be that the number of people who have anti-immigrant attitudes has increased. Both lines of reasoning assume that anti-immigrant attitudes more or less automatically translate to votes for the far-right.

This is a poor assumption to make. Indeed, as Mudde (2016) pointed out in his review of the literature, many people have anti-immigrant attitudes, but they do not all translate these attitudes into a vote for the far-right. It remains unknown what separates individual voters who have anti-immigrant attitudes into those who vote for the far-right and those who do not, particularly when supply-side conditions are held constant. If latent anti-immigrant attitudes are activated and thus, more people vote for the far-right, why are some people who have anti-immigrant attitudes still held back? Similarly, if the overall number of people who subscribe to anti-immigrant attitudes increases, why still do some who have these views not vote for the far-right? Not addressing this issue is a major blind spot of the demand-side literature.

Argument: Perception of immigrants as unwilling to integrate coupled with populist anti-establishment attitudes leads to a protest vote

In this work, I focus on the demand-side to uncover why some people with anti-immigrant attitudes vote for the far-right but others with similar attitudes do not when supply-side conditions are held constant. I argue that what separates these voters is *how* immigrants[6]

6 I use the term immigrants here to fit in line with the general use of "anti-immigrant attitudes," but this term can be used interchangeably with any terms which describe non ethnic and/or cultural natives. The main focus

are perceived as incompatible with the host society. I depart from economic grievance theories, which pin anti-immigrant attitudes on economic competition between natives and immigrants. Instead, my argument builds on cultural grievance theories.

Othering: Definition, Causes, and Forms

In economic grievance theories, individuals compete for material resources, whereas in cultural grievance theories, individuals compete for identities. Cultural grievance theories of anti-immigrant attitude formation are derived from Tajfel and Turner's (1979) classic formulation of social identity theory. Social identity theory posits that individuals tend to identify with those like them. Due to an inherent need for positive self-affirmation, individuals perceive their group positively and others negatively, separating people into in-groups (us) and out-groups (them).

Tajfel and Turner (1979) proposed three mental processes for the creation of in and out-groups. The first process is social categorization, whereby people are sorted into bins to identify as well as understand them. Second, through social identification, individuals adopt the identity of the group they have placed themselves in. As part of this step, individuals adopt behaviors that are the norms of their in-group. Finally, individuals compare themselves as part of their in-group to the out-group. To maintain a level of self-esteem, one's group must be viewed more favorably than the out-group. Members of the out-group are viewed as "other" based on their group membership.

Social identity theory forms the basis of cultural grievance theories of far-right voter behavior. Within the cultural grievance literature, prejudice toward an outgroup is at the core

of far-right activities against subgroups are immigrants, while measures used to operationalize attitudes against an outgroup often contain solely immigrants. However, other outgroups which fit into the nonethnic and/or cultural native group can also include any minority group, whether native or not.

of anti-immigrant attitudes. Prejudice or "otherness" is thought to be driven either by ascriptive differences, such as differences in race and religion, or more generally by perceptions of threat to national identity.[7] In the first form, physical differences are markers of difference that drive an individual to categorize people as not belonging to one's in-group. In the second form, differences need not be physical. Instead, differences are perceived based on forms of behavior. When behaviors are perceived as different from those practiced by their in-group, individuals categorize people exhibiting these different behaviors as belonging to an out-group.

Drawing on these ideas about the origins of prejudice and experimental evidence offered by Choi, et al (2019), I argue that what separates far-right voters from other voters with similar anti-immigrant attitudes is how each group perceives immigrants. For this study, I assume that there are two types of othering that are mutually exclusive. I assume that people with anti-immigrant attitudes view immigrants as "other" through one of two forms. First, some people view immigrants as "other" based on the race/ethnicity of immigrants. This is akin to the idea that prejudice is based on ascriptive characteristics. A second form of "otherness" that is based on cultural forms of expression, such as adherence to the law, notions of gender equality, and language. Like the second notion of how prejudice forms in social identity theory, I argue that how immigrants do or do not practice cultural norms belonging to the host culture shapes views held by natives.

Religion may be a component in either form of "othering." In the first form related to ascriptive characteristics, religion may be seen as a defining, unchangeable characteristic that may also prescribe race or ethnicity. In the second form related to behavior, religion is more akin to religiosity, or the degree to which one adheres to religious forms of expression which

[7] See Hainmueller & Hopkins 2014 for a more extensive review of this literature.

can range from secular to orthodox.[8] When "otherness" is defined by how one acts, religion can be a defining characteristic of the "other" in societies in which secularism is the norm and religion is a part of the private, rather than the public sphere.

Two Different Perceptions of Immigrants as "Other"

Individuals who have anti-immigrant views in the first form of othering view immigrants as inherently different due to their race/ethnicity (and perhaps, religion). These distinctions are viewed as immutable and thus, unchanging. When people perceive immigrants as different based on how they look, acting on anti-immigrant attitudes by voting for a far-right party is conceived as an expression of ethnic prejudice for people who live in societies with norms that have stigmatized it as such. Put simply, voting for a far-right party would be decidedly racist, and thus an extremist form of behavior for people who view immigrants as other based on their ascriptive characteristics.

As Blinder and his colleagues (2013) have shown, expressing racist behavior is discouraged throughout Western societies, particularly in places with a history of racist regimes. Given this, voting for a far-right party in Western society would be viewed as racist and thus unacceptable by people who "other" immigrants in this first form related to physical differences. I categorize the people who vote for the far-right despite this acknowledgment as extremists. Those who conceive of immigrants in this way but who do not vote for far-right, I argue, are held back based on the acknowledgment of anti-prejudicial societal norms and feeling averse to act on these beliefs.

[8] While this is not essential to my argument, I suggest that people who do not have anti-immigrant attitudes still may "other" immigrants but in a way in which they celebrate the aspects of immigrants that make them different, rather than view them critically.

In the second form, individuals view immigrants as "other" based on how they act. This group of people view immigrants as the "other" based on, as Choi and his coauthors (2019) aptly put it, "qualities that are considered to be under the control of immigrants' themselves, such as immigrants' behavior and the degree of cultural integration" (Choi, et al. 2019, 16275). I theorize that it is not a perception that immigrants are inherently *unable* to assimilate into the host society as others, such as Huntington (2009) have theorized.

Instead, I argue that far-right voters, in general, think that immigrants are in the process of forging or already live in "parallel societies" separate from the native population. I argue that this belief that immigrants are not willing to acculturate usually takes on a general form, however, I hypothesize that criminal behavior on the part of immigrants is seen as especially damning by those who "other" immigrants for their seeming lack of adherence to standard acceptable behavior.

Coupling Views of Immigrants with Populist Anti-Establishment Attitudes

When people conceive of immigrants as unwilling to integrate, I argue, they are more likely than those who do not conceive of immigrants as "other" or those who "other" immigrants in the ethnic form, to cast a vote for a far-right party. Acting on these attitudes formulated as such is not seen as a prejudicial form of expression by the people who hold this view. Instead, they view it as a rational form of expressing one's preferences in the political arena. For this group, immigration must be a sufficiently high concern to be acted upon in this way, but it need not be one's sole concern. The conception of immigrants as "other" based on how they act is a necessary condition for voting for the far-right, yet it alone is not a sufficient condition.

Instead, when coupled with populist anti-establishment attitudes, I argue that individuals who other immigrants based on their actions will vote for the far-right as a protest vote. This will happen in a system in which the mainstream parties have converged on key issues, particularly on immigration, and individuals use their vote as a means to express their frustration with policymaking by the traditional parties. This theory builds on those long-advanced in the literature that discontent motivates voters for the far-right (Ignazi 1992, Betz 1994, Kitschelt & McGann 1995), but departs from conceptualizations of a protest voter as those, who as van der Brug and his colleagues put it "cast their vote *not* to affect public policies, but rather to express disenchantment with the political system or with the political elite" (van der Brug, et al. (2000, 83).

I define the protest vote as a vote that is expressively motivated "against all other parties" but *also* has an instrumental component as a vote against the policies of mainstream parties and politicians. Unlike van der Brug and his colleagues, I do not think of a protest vote as a vote solely *against* something. Instead, I think that it can also be *for* something. Defined this way, I add a positive policy dimension to the conceptualization of the protest vote. Rather than a vote purely against the elites themselves for the sole sake that they are the elites, I add that a protest vote can also be against the policies associated with the elites. In the case of supporters of far-right parties, people cast a vote intending to make a stand against elites and the policies elites have created concerning immigration and immigrants.

Hypotheses

I hypothesize that–controlling for demographic characteristics and competing attitudinal variables– individuals who categorize immigrants as "other" based on a perception that they are unwilling to integrate into the majority society are more likely to vote for the far-

right than people who do not view immigrants in this way. I hypothesize that perceiving immigrants in this way is necessary, but not sufficient to predict far-right voter behavior. Instead, I argue that a greater likelihood of voting for the far-right will occur when this perception is coupled with populist anti-establishment attitudes. When these two conditions are met, I argue that individuals use their vote as a protest vote against the establishment as well as its policies, particularly those on immigration.

I lay out how I operationalize these hypotheses in the analysis chapter. In sum, I show that many people have anti-immigrant attitudes in my case study of Germany, yet some vote for the far-right while others do not. Thus, the simple explanation from the demand-side does not hold. To explore this, I look at a mix of both closed and open-ended responses which measure rationalizations of discrimination against immigrants, motivations for party vote choice, and confidence in political institutions and politicians. I control for demographic predictors of far-right voting and describe the motivations and beliefs shared by those who do not fit the far-right "mold:" women, the well-educated, the middle-age, and the relatively wealthy. Coupled with the larger-N data tests, the open-ended qualitative data adds a richness to my explanation.

Summary

The contemporary study of the far-right has given us a clear understanding of the "typical" far-right voter. It has also given us an understanding of the cultural components of identity that are meant to be a major contributor to the formation of anti-immigrant attitudes. Nevertheless, a gap remains between those working on these topics. This work fills these gaps by seeking to uncover why, despite the relatively widespread existence of anti-immigrant attitudes in western societies, only some people vote for the far-right while others with similar

attitudes do not. It argues that supply-side variables meant to limit the ability of the far-right to win votes have failed. My main argument is that what separates far-right voters from other voters with similar anti-immigrant attitudes is *how* immigrants are perceived in relation to the host society.

I argue that people who view immigrants as "other" due to not changing their behaviors and adapting the cultural habits of the host society are more likely to vote for the far-right than those who "other" immigrants based on immutable characteristics such as race/ethnicity. I hypothesize that this is a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient to predict one's likelihood of voting for the far-right.

When coupled with populist anti-establishment attitudes, individuals with this conceptualization of immigrants I argue, are more likely to vote for the far-right controlling for sociodemographic characteristics such as age, education, and socioeconomic class. Acting on these attitudes formulated as such is not seen as a prejudicial form of expression, but instead a rational form of expressing one's preferences in the political arena.

I argue that a vote for the far-right party is a protest vote that expressively motivated "against all other parties" but also has an instrumental component as a vote against the policies associated with elites, particularly immigration and immigrants. My argument helps explain why individuals cast votes for the far-right despite institutional constraints such as electoral thresholds and anti-hate speech laws which limit the ability of the far-right to both recruit voters and enter government (Norris 2005, Carter 2005, Givens 2005).

My focus is on Germany, but this work contributes to both the far-right voter behavior and anti-immigrant attitude formation literature by offer insights into far-right voters and how their votes are justified. Building on the insights of other survey-based research, this study adds

to our understanding of the "otherness" of immigrants and how this translates to behavior. By studying different forms of "otherness" and showing that they are associated with different forms of voter behavior, this work provides support for a more thorough consideration and examination of the causes and consequences of increasing multiculturalism in democratic societies.

This work paints a picture of a society divided by perceptions of difference. Individuals who "other" immigrants for their lack of integration to the native society are likely voters for political parties that can effectively create a frame of fear about a multicultural future. These messages of the contemporary far-right depart from the racial/ethnic formulations of the past, which are now portrayed as racist and incongruent with Western society. Instead, voters for far-right parties may be characterized by what they view as legitimate concerns over what their societies act (and not necessarily *look*) like, and the rate at which changes are occurring. In this way, this work contributes to our knowledge about the motivations of far-right voters and adds nuance to the finding that anti-immigrant attitudes are associated with a vote for the far-right.

Chapter III. Explanations for Far-Right Success and Voter Behavior

The study of the far-right can be divided into two strains of literature: the supply-side and the demand-side. Supply-side studies focus on the variance across far-right party success across time and geographical contexts. Studies on the supply-side focus on the political opportunity structure, defined as the opportunities and constraints, as well as the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). The political opportunity structure is shaped by electoral rules, the nature of the party competition, and the media. Demand-side studies seek to uncover and test the significance of underlying factors thought to drive support for far-right parties. Demand-side studies focus on the economy, culture, and protest votes. In this chapter, I provide an overview of supply-side explanations first, then turn to demand-side explanations.

Supply-Side Explanations

This section provides an overview of the arguments for the role of supply-side explanations, which focus on political opportunity structure and party choices. The political opportunity structure is electoral rules, the nature of the party competition, and the media. The choices parties make within this environment, such as leadership roles and ideology, shape the ability of the party to attract voters.

Although supply-side explanations have become more prominent in research on far-right parties more recently, when considered in isolation from demand-side explanations, they remain inherently limited in their explanatory power. Supply-side arguments are not able to explain not differences in the surge in far-right votes across contexts. They are also not able to explain the most recent wave of far-right success since 2016 in elections held across Europe. In many elections since 2016, parties saw their vote shares rise substantially despite the

continual constraint of the institutions. Despite these weaknesses of supply-side arguments, I overview supply-side literature here to provide an understanding of the context within which far-right voters view and interact with political parties in the electoral market.

Political Opportunity Structure: Electoral Rules

Electoral rules such as how votes are translated to seats impact how far-right parties win votes at the various stages of coming to power: the nomination, the campaign, and the election stage (Norris 2005; Givens 2005). As noted by Lijphart (1994), institutional features collectively determine the degree to which an electoral system is proportional or majoritarian. In less proportional systems, smaller parties like the far-right are at a significant disadvantage given the strategic behavior of voters, who, according to instrumental models of voting, are less inclined to "waste" their vote for a smaller party over a larger party as they anticipate the constraints of electoral rules (Duverger 1954; Downs 1957).

However, the evidence about the extent to which electoral systems constrain far-right party success is mixed. Although some scholars have found that disproportional systems inhibit the success of the far-right (Norris 2005; Givens 2005), others have found that they may have no significant effect (van der Brug et al. 2005, Arzheimer & Carter 2006, Arzheimer 2009). These mixed results may be due in part to differences in structural governance among countries, as each of these studies uses national, rather than local, election data. The use of national election data facilitates comparative analysis, however, it obscures the possibility of how multiple elections, such as regional elections in federalist systems, or presidential elections in mixed systems, may also impact the vote for the far right. Regional factors may play a larger role in shaping the vote for the far-right than current research can grasp. Indeed, the second-order election thesis (Reif & Schmitt 1980) argues that people may vote for the far-

right in secondary, in this case, regional elections, but not necessarily national elections. This thesis is often not considered in studies of the far-right beyond scholars who look at local parties, such as the Vlaams Belang (formerly Vlaams Blok) in the Flemish region of the Netherlands and Belgium (Lubbers, et al. 2000).

As recent electoral evidence implies, electoral rules that shape the proportionality of the system may have a minimal role in explaining whether votes for the far-right are "wasted." As Golder (2016) argues, a vote for the far-right is no longer considered a "wasted" vote for many voters given the increasing size of the parties as well as their rising role in government. Beyond the ability of the far-right to enter government, voters may also be influenced by the success of other far-right parties elsewhere. The success of the far-right in another country may also diminish the idea that a vote for the far-right is "wasted".[9] Further, as expressive models of voting behavior find, voters are not solely motivated by rational calculations about the possibility of the party gaining power. Instead, they are also motivated by the intrinsic value of casting a vote (Brennan & Buchanan 1984). Golder (2003) demonstrates that for far-right voters, in particular, voters are less instrumentally motivated, and instead derive psychological benefits from casting a vote for the far-right that outweigh strategic calculations, a theme highlighted by scholars who study protest votes for the far-right, which is discussed in greater detail in a later section of the literature review.

9 A counterargument is that the success of a far-right party in a similar state may have an inoculating, rather than contagion effect. Anecdotal evidence from the French presidential election following the US presidential election lends support to this notion. However, the French electoral system, as a mixed presidential and parliamentary system with different electoral cycles may be a unique case. In addition, the within-case example of Austria, which elected a former Green president in December 2016, yet the following October, almost two-thirds of the electorate cast a ballot in support of parties on the far right (the ÖVP and FPÖ). While this case may too be the result of election timing, the timing of the Austrian election in October, just three weeks following the German parliamentary election, further supports the idea that the success of the far-right in one state may indeed have a contagious effect.

Electoral rules play some role in shaping the behaviors of voters. However, ultimately their role is muted when other contextual factors are controlled for, as Arzheimer (2009) demonstrates in his study of the far-right in Western Europe. However, it is important to note, as he does, that the variance in the degree of proportionality across systems is limited, as many European systems are proportional.[10] This limited variation which, in effect, holds electoral rules almost constant across cases, implies that electoral rules have a narrow role in explaining the difference in far-right electoral success across contexts, not only in how votes are allocated to seats but also in how voters make strategic considerations in making their party choice.

Political Opportunity Structure: Party Competition

Theories of party competition examine the interaction between far-right parties and other parties within the larger party system to account for the success of the far-right. Four key areas are studied: (1) the space that is available for new parties in the party system, (2) how parties position themselves ideologically on a left-right spectrum, (3) the issues parties make salient and take ownership of, (4) and the degree to which other parties coordinate with one another.

The first area of study begins with the fundamental question about whether new parties can siphon voters from other parties. If voter loyalties are strongly tied to other parties, newer parties may only be able to garner support from new voters or people who have not previously voted, thereby capturing only a small part of the electorate. A great deal of evidence from the literature supports that this has been the case for the far-right in the past (see Ignazi 1996, Betz

[10] Arzheimer (2009) notes that France is one exception in the countries included in the estimation of the model. Also excluded is the UK, which as a SMD FPTP system, does offer substantial variation in the proportionality of electoral systems. The UK, however, was excluded from the analysis given the lack of far-right (or Extreme Right in Arzheimer's terms) voters (which was then the BNP, not UKIP) within the Eurobarometer data sets during the 1980-2002 period examined.

1993), while recent exit polls conducted in the 2016-2017 election cycle indicate that it remains so. However, these exit polls also show that many far-right voters are "switchers," or people who previously voted for another party (Blicke, et al. 2017). Some scholars point to greater electoral volatility as the motivating factor behind these votes for the far-right (Gallagher et al. 2005; Mair 1997), however, this line of reasoning no longer seems to hold, as the far-right parties are no longer "flash parties" (Norris 2005) that come and go in one election cycle. Instead, many contemporary far-right parties have persisted through multiple election cycles, such as the FPÖ in Austria and the National Front in France.

The second area of study of party competition is concerned with how other parties place themselves on the left-right ideological spectrum, arguing that far-right parties fill an opening in the ideological space left by other parties. Ignazi (1992) argues that polarization must precede convergence, however, within the literature most scholars agree with Kitschelt and McGann's (1995) thesis that ideological convergence among the mainstream political parties provides electoral opportunities for the far-right. However, the evidence is mixed about whether mainstream party convergence per se supports the far-right (Carter 2005), hurts it (Arzheimer & Carter 2006), or has no effect (Norris 2005). Other studies pinpoint the success of the far-right by focusing more directly on which parties are converging. Some studies look specifically at whether a centrist position has been taken by the largest right-wing competitor (van der Brug et al., 2005), while others study the role of parties on the left, such as Social Democratic parties. Berman (2017) argues that the far-right has taken on tenants of the ideology abandoned by the left as it became increasingly centrist. She argues that the rise of the right is due in part to the death of the left, as she notes that Social Democratic parties and other center-left parties have witnessed a decline in electoral support that has occurred

concurrently with the rise of far-right parties. Berman attributes this shift to how the left took on new changes, arguing that the left either embraced social and cultural change too wholeheartedly, promoting cosmopolitanism over a shared sense of national pride and purpose or failed to address these concerns entirely. From this perspective, the rise of the right is a reaction to the strategies of the left, which has left behind its voters due to its inability to adequately respond to their concerns.

The inability of mainstream parties, particularly the Left to take ownership of and make political issues salient is a third strain of the party competition literature. This body of work emphasizes the role of issues in shaping the electoral preferences of voters. Scholars writing about issues argue that the far-right will gain more voters when the issues it highlights, particularly immigration and crime, are (1) highly salient in society, and (2) a far-right party can claim ownership over them.

When the far-right takes ownership of salient issues, the far-right may also do well as other parties "copy" it, because this increases the legitimacy of both the party and the issue. The act of "copying" may help raise the appeal of the far-right when as Jean-Marie Le Pen (Marie Le Pen's father) proclaimed, "voters prefer the original over the copy" (Mudde 2007; 241). However, in some cases, this truism may not hold, when mainstream parties can more effectively assert their claim over typical far-right issues, as evidence from the UK, the Netherlands, and Hungary demonstrates (Mudde 2007).

Whether the far-right gains or loses when mainstream parties co-opt its issues seems to be explained by the degree to which the far-right has ownership and is considered the appropriate party to “handle” particular issues (Mudde 1999, 2007). To determine how voters gauge which party is most suited to handle particularly salient issues, studies ask voters which

issues they think are most important and which party they think is the most competent on a given issue. In Austria, Ahlemeyer (2006) and Müller (2002) find that survey respondents were most concerned about immigration and that the ÖVP's 1986 call to claim "Vienna for the Viennese" strengthened the FPÖ, which was deemed more competent. However, in the most recent Austrian election, it seems less likely that the FPÖ has retained ownership of the immigration issue. The share of the votes split between these two parties implies that the ÖVP's anti-immigrant stance allowed it to gain a share of the votes that would have otherwise gone to the FPÖ. Given that the ÖVP took on many of the same issues, but to a lesser extreme than the FPÖ indicates that it is not the issues themselves, but how parties position themselves on these issues.[11]

The final area of research in the literature on party competition moves beyond how other parties adapt or disavow the issues advanced by the far-right to examine how the other parties coordinate against the far-right in the so-called *cordon sanitaire*. The other parties often claim that they will not cooperate with far-right parties both during and after elections, by issuing a joint denouncement, pledging to not form a government with the far-right as part of a coalition, or pledging to box the far-right out of the policymaking process. Givens (2005) argues that when the other parties take actions such as these, the far-right will have difficulty attracting voters. However, there is little empirical evidence either for or against this claim that ostracizing the mainstream parties hurts the far-right, as an expert study conducted by van der Brug and van Spanje's (2007) found that it has little effect on the electoral success of the far-right in national elections, and so far, the degree to which this occurs at the local level has not been examined.

[11] The results of the 2017 German parliamentary election also reflect that this may be the case, given the rollback of pro-immigration/refugee policies previously advanced by Merkel's CDU/CSU coalition.

This finding might be explained by the alternative theory, that ostracizing other parties may support the far-right. Indeed, ostracizing the far-right may have the unintended effect of increasing the support for the far-right, as it legitimizes and invigorates potential far-right voters who believe that there is little to no differentiation between the other parties and that the far-right offers a viable alternative to the mainstream. Voters may also think that the actions of the other parties to collude against the far-right are antidemocratic, which may intensify existing grievances voters have against the mainstream elite parties. Voters may view the *cordon sanitaire* as a move to block the will of the supporters of the far-right which in turn, may drive them to vote for the far-right.[12] This alternative explanation posits that research needs to determine when the *cordon sanitaire* occurs and whether it has a positive or negative effect on the potential supporters of the far-right, and to determine whether this coordination against the far-right also takes place at subnational levels of party competition. If parties do work to actively coordinate at the local level against the far-right, the potential effect of either suppressing or invigorating potential far-right votes may have implications for how voters cast ballots in local elections, as voters might be more or less likely to vote for far-right. In turn, the presence (or absence) of far-right party elected representatives can raise (or lower) the legitimacy of the platform of the party and demonstrate the ability of the party to win (or lose) elections.

From the literature on party competition, it is clear that space must be available for a far-right party to enter the party system, just as is the case for any newer or smaller party in any system.

12 These beliefs were captured in preliminary research conducted in Stockholm (Lasala-Blanco, et. al 2017) in August 2017 in response to the question: *Some people think that voting for the Sweden Democrats is a wasted vote given that the other parties have pledged not to work as part of a coalition with them. What do you think about this?*
These beliefs were voiced by people who did cast a ballot for the far-right party, the Sweden Democrats, as well as other parties in the 2014 election.

What seems to differ based on context is the degree to which other parties have converged on both ideology and issues, and how the far-right positions itself as substantially different from the other parties. As far as the strategies and actions other parties take to coordinate against the far-right, the empirical findings are mixed. The far-right may reap gains from coordination against the party, as this move may intensify grievances against the mainstream parties and embolden potential voters for the far-right as it legitimizes the position of the far-right as a true alternative to the mainstream parties. Ultimately, theories of party competition require further empirical testing across a wider range of cases. More importantly, a deeper understanding of exactly how voters react to this behavior at the elite level is necessary to uncover the effects of party competition not only in creating a space for the far-right within the party system and how voters themselves may drive this process.

Political Opportunity Structure: Media

The role and the effect of the media on far-right parties and voters remains relatively understudied despite the preeminence of the media in studies of public opinion and voter behavior in general. In the literature on far-right parties, studies mainly point to the ability of the media to help increase the saliency and ownership of issues advanced by the far-right, particularly on immigration and crime. Even if the media does not cover the party directly, simply covering these issues may lead to an increase in far-right support as studies in the Netherlands (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart 2007) and Belgium imply (Walgrave & de Swert 2004). When the media covers the party directly, it can help the party to further disseminate their message beyond their organization and financial reach (Ellinas 2010). Whether the far-right profits more from positive or negative coverage has not been empirically tested systematically at the country level.

At the individual level, positive coverage may help the party, as implied by the evidence from an Austrian a 1990s study of readers of *Die Neue Kronen Zeitung*, a tabloid that advanced the issues of the FPÖ and cast the party as the "voice of common sense on these issues" (Mudde 2007; 250). The study in Austria found that the readers of the tabloid reported "'stronger empathy'" with the FPÖ than the rest of the population (Plasser & Ulram 2003: 35, as cited in Mudde 2007; 250). Although studies such as these cannot measure voter behavior directly, they imply that positive coverage, especially in the tabloid press, may help the far-right. However, these studies are limited to determine whether readers of the tabloid were already more likely to be FPÖ supporters given the non-random exposure to the tabloid that imposes a selection effect.

Studies that consider coverage by the mainstream media find disparate effects. Positive coverage may help the far-right by demonstrating its political viability and legitimizing its agenda (Golder 2016). This seems to be especially true in cases in which the media is aligned with or owned by, leaders of the far-right, such as the media under Berlusconi as Biorcio (2003) demonstrated in his study of the Lega Nord in Italy. But negative coverage may also help the cause of the far-right as it can embolden party leaders to denounce the media as the elite or establishment (Mudde 2007; 251. This then aids the far-right in its anti-elite message which may galvanize its supporters.

Although relatively little research has been conducted on the use of social media and other non-traditional media outlets by far-right parties and their voters, it is an increasingly important area of research. Though seemingly all political parties have begun to utilize social media as a tool for mobilizing voters, far-right parties seem to be particularly adept. By allowing for the direct dissemination of information from the party, social media helps far-

right parties get it their message out without relying on coverage from mainstream media outlets. The direct link of the party to the voter also helps the party further cultivate a populist image as the true voice and representative of the people, while also fostering a community of supporters online that can be a mobilizing structure for further action. In this way, the social media strategy of the contemporary far-right can be seen as an extension of the political propaganda that has long been an important feature of the far-right, which works to carefully craft images of the party and its leaders to the public.

Existing empirical evidence finds that far-right parties have a greater presence on social media than mainstream parties. Drawing on Germany as a case, analyses of social media posts during the height of the September 2017 German Bundestag election found that the far-right party, the AfD accounted for both greatest proportion of election-related tweets (Neudart, et. al 2017) and Facebook posts (Davidson & Lagondy 2017) compared to the other parties. As Davidson and Lagondy (2017) show in their analysis, the AfD engages a wider audience than other parties by publishing more content, gaining more likes, and having its content shared more than all other parties combined. Tracking individuals to determine if this activity is driven by a small number of users, they find that the AfD has both more users in absolute terms, as well as more active members (Davidson & Lagondy 2017). These data cannot directly measure the degree to which social media contributed to the electoral support for the AfD, however, it demonstrates the proficiency of the party in utilizing social media as a powerful tool in mobilizing support at the grassroots level, despite its relative youth and lack of resources compared to mainstream parties.

Social media has proved to be a powerful tool for far-right parties, however, the role of social media in supporting far-right causes and parties has come under increased scrutiny in

the wake of the 2016 US election and 2017 French Presidential Election in which bots were found to help spread “fake news” (Issace & Wakabayashi 2017). Whether distributed by bots or by live people, "fake news" has become a key concern for many contemporary western democracies not only during election cycles but also in everyday life. In Germany, the dissemination of a selfie taken by Anas Modamani, a Syrian refugee with Chancellor Angela Merkel was posted to Facebook, where it was initially projected as a positive image of refugee policy (Eddy 2017). Later, despite Modamani’s request to remove it, the image was widely circulated by other users in posts in connection to the attacks in Brussels, the Berlin Christmas market attack, and other prominent stories (Eddy 2017). Modamani sought an injunction against Facebook, in which the court found in favor of Facebook in February 2017 (Eddy 2017).

This, in turn, helped lead to support for the passage of the Network Enforcement Act (*Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz*) that aims to stop the propagation of illegal content. This act applies the German law that restricts “incitement to hatred” (*Volksverhetzung*) to social media companies like Facebook, charging them to flag and remove hate speech from its platform, or face fines of up to €50 million (Lomas 2017). The passage of this act speaks to the power of social media as a tool for the widespread dissemination of information that has the potential to shape public opinion and impact support for issues and electoral support for the far-right. However, the extent to which this act will be enforced and the degree to which companies like Facebook can actively screen for this material remains to be seen. For parties and voters of the far-right, it also remains unclear whether this act can effectively censor published content on key issues of immigration and crime that may be viewed as hateful by others.

Considered collectively, the available evidence finds that traditional media may either help or hurt the far-right, and the degree to which it does so is dependent upon the ability of party leadership to capitalize on the opportunities media provides, especially when it comes to asserting ownership over the issues raised by the media. On the other hand, the far-right seems to have a better understanding of how to use social media as a powerful tool to raise awareness for its key issues, that in turn, may cultivate a grassroots following that can translate into electoral support.

Party Choices

The political opportunity structure provides the space for the far-right to operate, however, the degree to which the party can capitalize on the opportunities provided is dependent upon the choices it makes to form their organization and shape their ideology.

Party Choices: Party Organization

Party organization theories focus on the structural components of the party both internally and externally. Externally, parties that can successfully couple both breadth (national coverage) and depth (local embeddedness) are theorized to be the most successful, given their reach and hold on a substantial number of potential voters. The organizational ability of the party to run candidates in multiple districts is directly related to its ability to be successful on a national level (Mudde 2007). Put simply, a far-right party cannot win where it does not run. Beyond this basic coverage, a strong internal party organization seems to help the far right, as it projects cohesion and stability to both other political parties and to potential voters, both of whom must be convinced of the seriousness of the far-right party (Mudde 2007). Indeed, professionalism and competency of the far-right are essential to winning voters initially, especially if voter demand is driven by discontent with the behavior of other parties. If internal

disagreements are publicized and the party lacks a common message, the party may sow doubt and confusion among potential voters and ultimately lose their vote.

Although numerous studies demonstrate that a strong party organization helps the far-right succeed (Lubbers & Scheepers 2002, Carter 2005, Norris 2005), Mudde (2007) notes that empirical evidence is mostly anecdotal, based on either expert studies (Norris 2005) or limited case studies (Carter 2005). Further, these studies tend to be focused on the internal agreements and decisions made by party "elites,"[13] which provides little understanding of how the organization of the party base and how they are mobilized to support the party.

Only a few studies have examined the processes by which far-right voters are mobilized to the party. David Art's (2011) analysis of 12 Western European states makes a compelling, generalizable case for the role of the different types and the number of activists the far-right can recruit as fundamental to the success of the far-right. Art (2011) argues that far-right parties will be most successful when they can draw on a large base of moderate, rather than extreme party supporters. The degree to which far-right parties can do this is determined by the historical legacies of the state and the reactions to the far-right from mainstream parties and society at large (Art 2011, Klandermans 2005, 2016).

Drawing on extensive interviews with party activists, both Art (2011) and Klandermans (2005, 2016) find that historical legacies of extremism (such as Fascism and Nazism) breed a hostile social climate in which a far-right party faces the *cordon sanitaire* from mainstream parties and individuals may lose their jobs or be physically threatened for supporting the party. This has been the case for places like Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium, where

[13] I use the term "elites" here in the more traditional sense that party leaders are "elites," rather than in the way "elites" are defined within populism as "the corrupt" and/or "the establishment," which refers to mainstream politicians and parties, not far-right party leaders.

recruitment into far-right parties was limited solely to extremists. In each study, Germany proved to be the weakest case for the mobilization of far-right voters, despite the existence of sufficient demand. As Klandermans (2016) summarizes, a far-right party in Germany "was so much burdened by the past, and the political and legal opportunities were so limited that it was hardly possible to turn that potential demand into a viable movement" (Klandermans 2016; 240).

These findings demonstrate the severe ways in which supply-side factors constrain the potential of individual involvement in far-right parties and highlight the difficulties with attracting a large base of supporters beyond extremists. From the work of Art (2011) and Klandermans (2005, 2016), we have a clear understanding of how activists come to be involved in far-right parties, but less is known about how more causal supporters came to be far-right voters, particularly in climates with a national subculture hostile to the far-right.

Drawn from the intensive study of far-right activists, the work of Klandermans (2005, 2016) offers some ways in which "less extreme" individuals may become involved with the far-right in one of three ways, through (1) continuity, (2) conversion, or (3) compliance. The first refers to membership as a natural part of political socialization, while conversion refers to a break from the past, usually catalyzed by a critical event that tops off growing dissatisfaction. Finally, compliance refers to a situation wherein people become activists for the far-right "more or less despite themselves," usually through persuasion by family or friends (Klandermans 2016; 241). For more casual supporters, conversion and compliance seem more likely, but there is little understanding of how these processes may occur.

The findings of Klandermans (2005, 2016) and Art (2011) in their studies of far-right activists imply that the mobilization of far-right voters is especially difficult in national

contexts that alienate far-right parties and their voters and occurs through different processes. Klandermans (2005) offers some insight, but ultimately, there is little understanding of how "less extreme" voters, particularly individuals who previously voted for another party or did not participate in politics, can be effectively mobilized to vote for the far-right. Further, as comparative cross-national analyses, the works of Art (2011) and Klandermans (2005) do a good job of highlighting the importance of the national-level factors of historical legacies and institutional constraints but are unable to identify how these factors may be influenced by or interact with specific conditions at lower levels of aggregation, such as local constituencies.

Ultimately, there is little understanding of how far-right parties drive voters to the party beyond individuals in the population whose "extreme" views make them the most susceptible to the tenets of the far-right. Arguments detailed more in the next section from the demand-side argue that the far-right gains voters during extraordinary circumstances such as periods of economic or socio-cultural crisis, however, these arguments also provide unsatisfactory explanations, because they are not able to identify the processes by which "less extreme" voters become far-right voters during relatively "normal" circumstances. Considered collectively, theories of party organization seem to be more adequately suited to explain how the far-right sustains voters over successive elections, as they provide little explanation for the value of a strong organization in driving and converting voters to the party initially.

Party Choices: Ideology

Early studies of far-right ideology argued that the far-right is most successful electorally when it strikes a perfect balance between its nativist anti-immigrant stance and its economic strategy. The classic formulation of this theory was advanced by Kitschelt and McGann (1995) who argued that the far-right is most successful when it combines a nativist

stance with a pro-market ideology. However, the empirical findings to support this claim have been mixed. At the party level, expert studies that examine the degree to which far-right parties take this position show that parties intentionally blur their economic strategy (Mudde 2007). Indeed, parties on the far-right take disparate stances on the economy but share economic nationalist rhetoric. As more contemporary studies argue, the nativist ideology and agenda seem to be the common ideology that runs through all far-right parties and attracts their voter base (Mudde 2007).

Limitations of Supply-Side Theories

With a focus on the party system and party organization, theories from the supply-side approach provide a good theoretical framework to shed light on the conditions under which far-right parties are more likely to emerge and come into power. However, by only looking at the structural factors that make it more likely for far-right parties to perform well in elections, supply-side studies cannot explain the variance in electoral success when these factors remain relatively stable. The most recent wave of far-right electoral success demonstrates this point, as parties made substantial gains across Europe despite electoral systems that are predominantly proportional, the shared placement to the right of all other parties, and campaigns run on similar issues. Although the degree to which mainstream parties coordinated against the far-right varied to some degree, it was not substantial, as the mainstream parties in all elections worked collectively to limit the ability of the far-right to be successful.[14]

Political opportunity structures are an important consideration to understand how the far-right emerges, but as Mudde (2007) notes, the components of the political opportunity

[14] Perhaps one noted exception was the 2017 Austrian parliamentary election in which the ÖVP, newly imagined by its young leader, Sebastian Kurz, actively worked to court FPÖ voters to his party by offering a diluted form of the proposals of the FPÖ.

structure that facilitate space for smaller and/or newer parties like the far-right also create openings for other parties. More research on how other factors, like the media, vary across contexts is necessary to understand why the far-right can reap larger gains from this shared opening and how these contextual effects help the far-right more in some places than in others. Although the strength of far-right party organizations across Europe certainly varies considering the number of years in existence, the number of local party outposts, and degree of internal coordination among other factors, ultimately as noted earlier, party organization theories seem to be more important in explaining success over time rather than success at the outset. Further, in the literature on party organization, more attention seems to be paid to the role of internal organization, rather than external organization. While there has been some development to identify the conditions under which individuals become activists for the far-right, there is a lack of study on the processes by which individuals, particularly those who are "less extreme" are mobilized to vote for the far-right. Demand-side arguments detailed further in the next section favor out of the ordinary circumstances such as great economic or socio-cultural change as an explanation for why the far-right gains a larger share of voters beyond its "extreme" base, yet this theory is also wanting. This is because it fails to consider the potential impact of local contextual factors on influencing vote choice, and more broadly, fails to identify the exact processes and mechanisms that mobilize "less extreme" to vote for the far-right.

Ideology remains a frequently noted cause of the inherent success of the contemporary far-right, as parties have been seemingly successful in casting off neo-Nazi or fascist overtones through gradual moderation. Nevertheless, there is little variance in the contemporary far-right, as virtually all far-right parties exposed anti-immigrant rhetoric and advocated for policies to

both restrict migration and limit the freedoms of immigrants in the elections held in 2016-2017, yet party performance varied. Indeed, all far-right parties combined some form of what Rydgren (2004) submitted as the "new winning formula" of ethnonationalism and populist antiestablishment rhetoric, however the degree to which common party ideology was receptive among voters differed both across and within European cases.

Ultimately, supply-side theories help provide some insight into the conditions under which the far-right is more likely to win votes. However, these explanations are limited in their ability to understand the underlying motivations of voters for the far-right and how these motivations may be generated by or interact with some other factors within a particular context. Indeed, while supply-side theories can help understand the conditions under which far-right parties are more likely to be successful, particularly in gaining an initial presence, these explanations do not explain why parties gain support from voters in the first place, particularly from individuals who are less susceptible to their tenets than the "extreme" base of the far-right. Supply-side theories are limited in their ability to explain this initial support given the shared assumption that demand for far-right parties is already present. By assuming this, how demand develops, how it drives the creation of far-right parties, and how parties themselves play a role is excluded from the analysis. Instead, a greater focus on how supply-side conditions interact with the grievances that generate the "demand" for far-right parties is necessary to understand the motivations of voters for the far right.

Demand-Side Explanations: Grievances

Demand-side explanations emphasize the grievances that drive support for far-right parties. These grievances are studied at both the macro and micro-levels and are summarized as (a) economic, (b) cultural, and (c) anti-establishment. Economic explanations focus on the

social bases of the far-right, the potential impact of economic crises in expanding the number of far-right voters beyond its base, and the role of immigration and immigrants in perceptions of the economy. Cultural explanations focus on the formation and development of anti-immigrant attitudes thought to arise from the perceived threat immigrants pose to national identity and values. Theories that examine the role of anti-establishment attitudes often draw on economic and/or cultural explanations to focus on how attitudes against elites develop and drive discontent with mainstream politics. Existing research often is restricted to testing the theories in isolation from one another, or when these causes are interacted, they are done in an additive manner that cannot determine the causal sequencing or the relative weight of each factor.

Economic Explanations

Over time, a series of explanations that rely on the role of economics has emerged within the literature on far-right voting. The first strain of literature sought to identify the social base of far-right support, which was theorized to be the sectors of society that were the most impacted by economic globalization and the growing emphasis on socio-cultural values identified by Inglehart (1977). The arguments offered by Ignazi (1992), Betz (1992), and Kitschelt and McGann (1995) implied that the social base of the far-right was limited to the petit bourgeoisie during "normal" economic times and would expand during times of economic crisis.

Ingelhart's (2018) *Cultural Evolution* extends this theme into the present, pointing to diminishing job security and rising inequality as the specific changes that have occurred in the contemporary era. Those who have been most impacted by these developments-those who feel the least secure- Inglehart argues, are those most likely to support authoritarian movements

and parties. In his 2019 work with Pippa Norris, modernization theory is extended again to demonstrate that this shift is largely generational and that those in older generations are those most prone to the so-called authoritarian reflex.

The second strain of literature focused on empirically testing the implications of the theory that economic crises increased the support for the far-right beyond its otherwise homogeneous base. However, perhaps due in large part to the imperfect measures and the lack of appropriate data, analyses of the role of economic crisis fell short of the expectations of the "losers of the modernization" theory, and the exact role of economic crises in stoking support for the far-right remains unclear.

The third strain of literature sought to explain the inconsistent findings of contextual and individual-level economic analyses, by incorporating the role of immigration and immigrants on the economy into their theories and models. Drawing on realistic conflict theory (Campbell 1965), studies conducted by Jackman and Volpert (1996), Arzheimer and Carter (2006), and Lubbers and Scheepers (2002) include levels of unemployment as a proxy for competition between natives and immigrants. However, like those who used measures of unemployment before them, the analyses of this line of scholarship report disparate findings. While there has been some theoretical development that implies the inclusion of measures of perceptions of the cause of unemployment (Golder 2003), relative deprivation (Lubbers & Scheepers 2002), and the threats immigrants pose to individuals and the national economy (Sniderman, et al. 2004) to help account for these inconclusive results, ultimately, empirical models that include unemployment are difficult to interpret. This is because unemployment is included in models as a measure of a variety of different indicators, including the social class of individuals, the occurrence of an economic crisis, and as a proxy for job competition

between immigrants and natives. Ultimately, it is difficult to interpret the results of analyses given that unemployment is used as a workhorse measure in empirical models of far-right voting.

The last strain of literature advanced most prominently by Dancygier (2010) addresses this concern about the use of measures of unemployment. She argues for the necessity of considering whether immigrants are primarily economic migrants or asylum-seekers, as well as the degree to which the state controls the allocation of key resources such as housing and employment in our theories and models. Although her argument is primarily rooted in explaining anti-immigrant attitudes, it is an important contribution to the study of the far-right, as it implies that far-right parties profit when they can effectively stoke these beliefs and convert them into votes.

Modernization and the Social Base of the Far-Right

Earlier explanations that favored the role of economics asserted that support for the far-right was inherently low and had initially risen as the result of the move away from the material dimension and increased emphasis on the socio-cultural dimension of politics identified by Inglehart (1977). Collectively, scholars such as Pierro Ignazi (1992), Hans-Georg Betz (1994), and Herbert Kitschelt (in collaboration with McGann, 1995) theorized that support for the far-right was part of a “silent counterrevolution” (Ignazi 1992) against the increased emphasis on socio-cultural values. They argued that far-right voters were those more acutely impacted by the forces of globalization and sought to identify which sectors of society made up the social base of support for the far-right. This line of research argued that the "losers of modernization" (Betz 1994) were the petit-bourgeois: individuals who were employed in professional or

managerial roles or were small shopkeepers, who were most likely to be impacted by the processes of globalization (Ignazi 1992, Betz 1994, Kitschelt & McGann 1995).

This social base was predicted to be relatively small and homogeneous and was anticipated to expand to other social classes only under extreme circumstances such as large-scale economic crisis or other socio-cultural change. However, this theory has not held up to empirical scrutiny, as scholars such as Norris (2005) and Ivarsflaten (2005) have consistently shown that the electorate of the contemporary far-right is a heterogeneous cross-class collation of individuals with divergent economic positions and interests. While this finding has led some scholars (Norris 2005) to posit that far-right parties are either a mere consequence of growing partisan dealignment as conceptualized by Dalton and Wattenburg (2000) or that they are "single-issue" (Mudde 1999) "anti-immigrant parties" (Fennema 1997) that mobilize voters on immigration and anti-immigrant attitudes alone. Both theories imply that no consistent far-right base built on class exists. Instead, building on the "losers of modernization" theory (Betz 1994), voters are expected to drift to the far-right during sudden events, such as economic crises.

Economic Crisis

Drawing on the historical example of the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany, perhaps the most long-standing theory about the rise of the contemporary far-right is as Kitschelt and McGann (1995) aptly state, "a revival of fascist and national socialist ideology in the midst of an economic crisis with high unemployment" (Kitschelt & McGann 1995). Thus, many studies have included measures of unemployment in their models of far-right voting behavior, but the findings are mixed. Some studies find that unemployment helps the far-right (Jackman & Volpert 1996), that it hurts them (Arzheimer & Carter 2006), or that it has no effect (Lubbers

& Scheepers 2002). Similarly, while some anecdotal evidence from cases like the United States and the Tea Party faction of the Republicans seem to indicate that the far-right will gain a larger following during times of economic crisis, other cases such as Podemos in Spain or Syriza in Greece imply that parties on the left, rather than the right, will rise as these parties did during the 2009 Eurozone crisis. Additionally, the most recent wave of support for the far-right seen in the 2016 and 2017 elections held across Europe occurred following, rather than during, the Eurozone crisis.

The evidence seems to be mixed as to how the far-right gains a larger following beyond the social base identified by the scholars that advanced the "losers of modernization" theory (Ignazi 1992, Betz 1994, Kitschelt & McGann 1995). One explanation is that the disparate empirical results of studies that link unemployment to far-right voting may be driven by the availability of data at different levels of aggregation, which in turn, influence the modeling strategies that can be suitably employed. Studies that use data on unemployment at high levels of aggregation such as the country level, or even at levels of large subnational units, may find a positive correlation to far-right votes. However, by failing to consider individual information, these studies may not allow for valid inferences to be drawn.

Arzeheimer (2011) demonstrates this issue with the prominent historical example in Weimar Germany in which levels of unemployment are positively correlated to support for the Nazi party. At the national level, support for the party rose as unemployment levels increased. However, at lower levels of aggregation, such as the state (*Länder*) or district (*Kriese*) levels, the relationship was negative. As Arzheimer (2011) summarizes in his analysis of the works of Falter and his coauthors (1985) as well as Falter and Zintl (1988), in the case of Weimar Germany, it appears that the state of the economy, measured by the level of unemployment did

indeed play a role in the rise of the Nazi party, but through a different mechanism. Its seems that it was not the case that individuals who were themselves currently unemployed voted for the Nazi party; rather, it was those who were (presently) employed whose propensity to support the party increased as economic conditions worsened (Falter, et. al 1985, Falter & Zintl 1988). These findings highlight the difficulties associated with using unemployment levels as a measure of economic conditions in studies of far-right voting and caution the need for careful interpretation.

Beyond the issue of interpretation of the measures employed, another explanation for the apparent weakness of economic crises in increasing support for the far-right might be the extent to which far-right parties can assert their expertise on economic issues over more credible claims by mainstream parties. Golder (2016) argues that an economic crisis may hurt, rather than help, the far-right. He posits that this is because an economic crisis increases the salience of the economic dimension of the political cleavage structure which, in turn, hurts far-right parties due to their lack of credible expertise in this area.

This assertion by Golder (2016) rejects Kitschelt and McGann's (1995) classic claim that the far-right's "winning formula" must include a neoliberal economic position, as many far-right parties do not take prominent neoliberal economic positions nor are their economic positions a core feature of their ideology (Mudde 2007, 119). Instead, nativism is central to the economic program of the far-right, as economic grievances are framed within the context of immigration by the far-right. This frame directs the economic positions the far-right takes, as it works to promote the national economy "at the service of the natives" (Mudde 2007; 125). Within this frame, party-positioning on economic issues is merely a reflection of the emphasis on the cultural, rather than economic dimension.

Immigration and Economic Grievances

Considered collectively, this evidence of far-right party positioning and electorate composition indicates that economic grievances are only prominent when framed as part of the larger issue of immigration. Within this understanding, more recent economic explanations for far-right voting have relied heavily on the supposed role of immigrants as the outgroup on which blame is placed for economic problems. To study this link, scholars draw on realistic group conflict theory (Campbell 1965), which claims that in times of scarcity, groups will compete for limited resources. Members of the ingroup (natives) blame the outgroup (immigrants) for the problems. Far-right parties capitalize on this notion and expand it through their propaganda and rhetoric in which they claim that immigrants take native jobs.

To empirically examine the claim that economic grievances drive far-right support at the macro-level, scholars tend to examine contextual economic variables like the level of unemployment, which they use as a proxy for competition between natives and immigrants. The theory follows that when unemployment is high, far-right parties offer a place for aggrieved natives who cast blame on immigrants. However, as stated earlier, the evidence supporting this relationship is mixed, as some studies find that unemployment helps the far-right (Jackman & Volpert 1996), that it hurts them (Arzheimer & Carter 2006), or that it has no effect (Lubbers & Scheepers 2002).

The simple theoretical model is not able to account for these disparate findings, meaning that unemployment alone may not be a sufficient measure. Golder (2003) argues that voters' perceptions about the cause of unemployment are an important consideration, as far-right party support may rise when voters think that unemployment is due to immigrants, but not when it is part of a natural economic cycle. Golder's claim is supported by his finding that

unemployment helps the far-right only when immigration is sufficiently high. However, this theory has not been adequately tested further by others, due to the lack of public opinion data that include survey questions that seek to determine why the respondent thinks there is unemployment.

Another explanation is that rather than direct loss, it is the perception of loss and feelings of relative deprivation that also generates economic grievances that can be exploited by the far-right. Understanding if immigrants are perceived as a threat to the national economy or one's situation, is an important consideration that is not captured in simple cross-sectional analyses. Using multi-level analysis, Lubbers and Scheepers (2000) overcome this empirical problem by analyzing both the individual and contextual factors that influence far-right voter behavior in their case study of the *Republikaner* in Germany. They include measures of both contextual unemployment, individual unemployment, as well as perceptions of deprivation, both in the present and in the future. Their findings indicate that perceived present deprivation has a greater effect size than expected future deprivation on voting for the *Republikaner*, but the effect size is reduced when political attitudes are controlled for. Despite theories that imply that the far-right will be more successful when unemployment is high, contextual unemployment is found to have a strong and negative effect on the vote. Instead, the change in the unemployment rate, rather than the simple rate does have a significant effect that increases the likelihood of far-right support. Although instructive, these findings must be considered within the scope of the study, which examined a smaller, more regionalized party in local, rather than national contests. Small sample sizes and limited data availability restricted the study of *Republikaner* voters to only former West Germany (n=153) using a pool of voters from the 1991, 1992, and 1996 elections, which, while instructive are problematic for greater

generalization given the lack of former East voters and the historical proximity to the reunification of Germany.[15]

These data limitations restrict the ability of this study to understand if individuals perceive immigrants as economic threats to them individually, to the country, or both. Through embedded experiments in the Netherlands, Sniderman and his coauthors (2004) shed some light on this issue, finding that an individual threat, rather than a collective economic threat are more predictive of anti-immigrant attitudes. Occupational status is neither substantially nor statistically significant in predicting prejudicial attitudes, which adds further evidence that one's economic perception rather than class, is a greater predictor of far-right voting. These findings are instructive in helping to uncover the correlates of far-right voting, however, it is important to note that the dependent variable in these analyses is prejudicial attitudes, not a vote for the far-right party.[16]

Given these findings, unemployment is ultimately a problematic measure for capturing both direct and perceived economic competition between natives and immigrants, as it is used under the assumption that jobs have been lost as the direct result of migrant labor. It does not capture jobs lost due to other forces of globalization, nor does it capture economic loss more broadly, such as financial loss that may be the result of changes other than employment status. Ultimately, the findings of this strain of literature indicate that economic grievances can only be effectively mobilized into support for the far-right within the context of immigration.

15 Historical proximity to the reunification of Germany is particularly important to note here as many factors differ between the Republikaner and more contemporary far-right parties like the AfD. While immigration and the economy were key issues in the 1990s as well, these problems were more internal issues, as the country dealt with combining economies and internal migration across the former border. The limitation to only former West Germany may obscure fundamental differences between former Easterners' support for the party as voters may have perceived these issues differently.

16 In this study, Sniderman and his coauthors measure prejudicial attitudes toward ethnic minorities, not immigrants per se, by including measures of hostility toward specific ethnic groups. Thus, a distinction between ethnic minorities, who may be immigrants or native-born is not made.

However, these findings may be due in large part, to the fact that every far-right party has made the explicit connection between economic distress and immigration through statements like "eliminate unemployment: stop immigration!" (Betz 1994). The connection drawn between immigration and declining economic conditions by far-right parties thus makes it difficult to parse out the independent effects of immigration from the sole impact of the state of the economy.

Immigrant Type and Resource Distribution

In the studies highlighted above, far-right voters are assumed to be the "typical" far-right voter described by the "losers of modernization" theory (Ignazi 1992, Betz 1994, Kitschelt & McGann 1995). The economic grievance story told at the individual level thus describes an individual likely to be in economic competition with immigrants. Nevertheless, this may not be the case when immigrants seek jobs that require greater skills. More broadly, immigrants are assumed to be economic immigrants who immediately seek jobs and can legally apply for them within a state.

However, migrants are not exclusively economic immigrants, and natives may not perceive immigrants as competing for jobs, but other resources. Dancygier (2010) illustrates these considerations by considering the types of immigrants and economies to which they migrate. She argues that noneconomic migrants such as those who arrive as asylum-seekers or based on family reunification are more likely to put stress on the local and national economy than other migrants. She argues that in statist economies in which the state controls the allocation of key resources like housing, employment, and other services, the native population is incentivized to advocate for its share over that of the immigrant population. Following this theory, far-right parties may receive votes from natives who think that immigrants are

receiving "more than their fair share" of these resources—and that either "people like them" should receive more (i.e. welfare chauvinism), that the state does not have enough resources to share or some combination of both of these sentiments. In turn, these beliefs generate anti-immigrant attitudes, which may then translate to voter support for the far-right.

Dancygier's theory indicates the necessity of considering the type of immigrants, particularly within the current context of the refugee crisis in Europe. Indeed, members of the native population may not perceive refugees as competition for jobs, particularly given the restrictions placed on the refugee population that limit its ability to work until several conditions, such as language proficiency and other requirements are met. Instead, as Dancygier's theory indicates, the far-right may exploit notions that immigrants, particularly refugees, receive a share of state benefits that should go to natives instead.[17] These beliefs may be strong even in instances in which the government has increased the distribution of social benefits to the native population, implyuing that this belief deeply resonates with voters despite the state's continued or expanded benefits in favor of natives. [18] The implication of Dancygier's theory implies that how natives perceive the nature and extent of the supposed economic threat imposed by immigrants matters and is a necessary consideration for the study of far-right voter motivations.

Summary of Economic Explanations

[17] The far-right seems to capitalize on this notion in its propaganda, as seen in examples from the Sweden Democrats, which in an October 11, 2017 tweet distributed an image of an older individual's hands with text that read "Illegal immigrants receive dental care for 50 kr [about $6] while pensioners pay full price" and later on October 19, distributed a tweet that read: "The government continues with dental care for 50 kr for illegal immigrants."

[18] An example of this can be seen in Germany under Merkel's CDU/CSU coalition, which has vastly expanded tax benefits and pensions despite the great cost of its large resettlement program. Source: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cdu-frustrated-by-angela-merkel-s-shift-to-left-a-1173160.html

Ultimately, the implications of the work on economic grievances for far-right voting are that the social base of the far-right is not limited purely to the "losers of modernization" (Betz 1994), as more contemporary empirical evidence finds that the far-right is a heterogeneous group that expands beyond the petit bourgeoisie (Norris 2005, Ivarsflaten 2005). It is unclear as to what factors might be responsible for the expansion of this base, as it does not seem to be the result of economic crisis as previously theorized (Iganzi 1992, Betz 1994, Kitschelt & McGann 1995), meaning that perhaps a rise in the level of immigration and immigrants, as implicated by the "single-issue party" (Mudde 1999) thesis may be responsible for the enlargement of the far-right beyond its base. This implication, along with greater theoretical development of the factors responsible for the rise in anti-immigrant attitudes offered by Sniderman and his coauthors (2004) and Dancygier (2010), as well as the empirical work by Lubbers and Scheepers (2002) that utilizes multi-level analysis, indicates that perceptions of immigrants and their role, along with local contextual variables of economic health should be considered by studies that seek to identify the individual motivations of far-right voters and the processes through which they are mobilized to vote for the far-right.

Cultural Explanations: Anti-Immigrant Attitudes

In contrast to economic grievance theories that perceive groups as in conflict over scarce resources, cultural grievance theories build on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979), which posits that individuals tend to identify with those like them and that they perceive their group positively and others negatively due to an inherent need for positive self-affirmation. In this context, anti-immigrant attitudes are seen as the main explanatory factor for far-right voting behavior. These attitudes may be galvanized, that is, exist

disproportionately among those already predisposed to oppose immigrants, or they may be mobilized, that is, developed by those who initially did not hold anti-immigrant views.

A great deal of literature explores the variables thought to lead to anti-immigrant attitudes, such as (1) ascriptive differences like race and religion between immigrants and natives as well as the (2) perceived threat of immigrants to national identity.[19] More recent work such as that of Choi, Poertner, and Sambanis (2019) attempts to tease out which of these factors seem to be more at play through the use of a large-scale field intervention. In a randomized trial across 28 cities in 3 German states, bystanders at a train station were exposed to one of the following: a woman with an immigrant appearance wearing a hijab, the same woman not wearing a hijab, the same woman wearing a Christian cross, or a woman with an ethnic German appearance (who serves as a control). Bystanders at train stations are exposed to several situations with either the immigrant woman (in her various forms) or the German woman. These situations include the violation of the social norm of littering, speaking on the phone in Arabic, and dropping some fruit. Through exposure to these scenarios, the study concludes that cultural integration signaled through a shared social norm (not littering) mitigates bias against immigrants. It also implies that cultural integration signaled through a shared faith (wearing a Christian cross rather than a hijab) does not have the same mitigating effect. Considered collectively, these findings lend some support to the notion that shared behavior, rather than shared ethnic and/or religious characteristics may mitigate natives' bias against immigrants.

The Choi, et al. (2019) study makes a significant contribution to sorting out what it is exactly about immigrants that play a role in shaping natives' anti-immigrant attitudes.

19 See Hainmueller & Hopkins 2014 for a more extensive review of this literature.

However, within the literature on far-right voting, less thought is given to how these attitudes develop, and more emphasis is placed on how far-right voting correlates with immigration levels at the macro-level and anti-immigrant attitudes at the micro-level. Scholars have consistently shown that a relationship between these variables and far-right voting exists, however, relatively little work has sought to uncover exactly how anti-immigrant attitudes translate to votes for the far-right.

Ascriptive Differences

The first strand of the literature looks at how immigrants may be perceived as a threat due to ascriptive differences compared to the native group. The "ethnic backlash" thesis argues that anti-immigrant sentiment may be rooted in race/ethnicity (racism) and/or country of origin (nativism). Though not always treated as two distinct concepts theoretically, racism and nativism are often accounted for in macro analyses that measure the relationship between immigration levels and far-right voting at the national level. Studies employ different measures, including the number or percent of foreign-born (Golder 2003), new immigrants (Lubbers 2001), asylum-seekers (Lubbers 2001), or the minority population (Mudde 2007). Some studies find a positive relationship between these variables and far-right support (Golder 2003, Lubbers 2001), while others find a negative correlation (Mudde 2007), implying that a clear relationship does not exist. When examined jointly, these measures can provide some insight into the type of population (minorities, immigrants, or refugees) related to far-right votes. Including each of these measures in her analysis of 8 European countries[20] and Israel, Norris (2005) finds that none are significantly correlated with the percentage of the vote for the far-right.

20 The European countries Norris includes are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland.

These findings at the national level demonstrate that the theory that the perceived threat of mass immigration itself drives far-right voting has weak support. However, studies consistently demonstrate a positive and significant relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and the vote for the far-right at the individual level. In her comprehensive cross-national study, Norris (2005) creates measures of negative attitudes towards immigrants, refugees, multiculturalism, and economic equality by combining questions drawn from the 2002 European Social Survey to assess the relationship between these attitudes and far-right voting at the individual level. These predictors all prove statistically significant, yet the relationships are weak, and for the measure of negative attitudes toward immigration, run in the wrong direction.[21]

Neither these aggregated cross-national measures nor the measures of individual-level attitudes directly capture the race or religion of individuals entering each country. To do this, national-level data that reports country of origin may be used to provide some insight; however, the use of these data also would have to make assumptions about race and religion given that these variables are also not often captured. Ultimately, analyses of this nature do not directly assess the differences in race and religion theorized to impact far-right voting because they lack survey questions that permit direct measurement of ethnicity and race.

However, this may not be problematic given the findings from national studies. Although anti-immigrant attitudes may be limited to specific outgroups who look a certain way or practice a particular religion, the findings of the literature imply that ethnocentrism, a

[21] Beyond these weak and disparate findings, it is important to note that the questions Norris uses for her indices often combine economic measures of perceived immigrant impact which dilutes a clean measure of the cultural impact of immigrants. Indeed, only the multiculturalism scale, which includes questions that ask about preferences for religion and shared customs and traditions, begin to tap into the cultural impact of immigrants. See Norris (2005) Table 8.2, for the full questions used in the indices.

"generalized predisposition toward out-groups" (Hainmueller & Hopkins 2014; 233) seems to be central in explaining anti-immigrant attitudes despite differences in race/ethnicity or country of origin as evidence from Italy (Sniderman, et al. 2002) as well as the U.S. (Kinder & Kam 2009) show that anti-immigrant attitudes seem to hold across different groups.

Threats to National Identity

The second strand of the literature aruges that rather than the perceived threat of general mass immigration of people who look or worship differently, natives may instead perceive immigrants as a threat to national identity. Existing research often examines notions of national identity such as language, religion, and customs and traditions given the availability of measures of these concepts from cross-national surveys, such as the European Social Survey, which since 2002, has included a special module of questions related to immigration. Sides & Citrin's (2007) analysis of these data implicates the potency of cultural and national identities in contributing to anti-immigrant attitudes; however, their measures of these concepts derive from survey questions that are limited in their ability to capture national identity.[22] Indeed, existing research is limited in its understanding of how perceived threats to national identity drive anti-immigrant attitudes, given the difficulty associated with capturing this notion, especially when it may a racial or ethnic national identity.[23]

22 The authors employ a survey questions that asks: "It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions" as a measure of support for an "ethnic definition of nationhood" and a measure of preference for national authority which scales support for policymaking at the national, as opposed to the EU level. These are weak measures of the concept of national identity, and other questions that tap into religion and distinct education systems were not employed.

23 Beyond the lack of a measure of race/ethnicity in cross-national studies, studies that use national census data are also limited as they also often do not include questions on race or ethnicity. For example, neither the German (https://www.zensus2011.de/EN/Home/home_node.html) nor Swedish (http://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/population/population-composition/population-statistics/#_Tablesandgraphs) census bureaus keep these statistics, which in part, drives researchers to employ other indicators such as the number of immigrants, asylum-seekers, or foreign-born as measures of non-native groups. Other measures captured by these censuses include the country of birth for the parents of individuals.

Thus, while theoretically immigrants are thought to be a threat to the national identity, which specific aspects of their identity that are perceived by natives as threatening is less clear. To examine the underlying antecedents of anti-immigrant attitudes, studies often juxtapose cultural concepts with economic ones that can examine which factor is more prominent, as Sniderman and his coauthors (2004) do. However, the concepts of culture employed are relatively vague, and capture threats to national culture broadly.[24] Though useful in gaining an understanding of the relative importance of cultural threats compared to the economic or crime-related threats ascribed to immigrants, no study has delineated what it is exactly about immigrants that seemingly threatens national identity and how that relates to far-right voting in Europe given the lack of survey questions that examine notions of national identity.

Evidence from the United States provides some understanding of what these aspects might be. Developing different conceptions of national identity, running on a scale from ethnocentric to assimilationist Schildkraut (2005) tests these measures using survey data from the General Social Survey and focus groups on respondents' preferences for immigration levels. She finds that individuals with both more ethnocentric and more assimilationist views are both restrictionist in their preferences for immigration, implying that both ascriptive differences and the perception of a threat to national identity are equally important. To tease out these concepts further, Wright and his coauthors (2012) argue for the inclusion of measures of both ethnic and civic identity. Building on these works, to measure what aspects of immigrants are culturally threatening, future studies might employ open-ended questions that

[24] The questions Sniderman, et al. (2004) compare are: (1)"I am afraid of increasing violence and vandalism in my neighborhood by ethnic minorities." (2) "I am afraid that my economic prospects will get worse because of ethnic minorities." (3) "I am afraid of increasing violence and vandalism in Dutch society by ethnic minorities." (4) "These days, I am afraid that the Dutch culture is threatened by ethnic minorities." (5) "I am afraid that the economic prospects of Dutch society will get worse because of minorities."

ask what it means to be a given nationality of natives and compare it to their responses to an open-ended question about why they think immigrants have not integrated.

Ultimately, studies of both the ascriptive characteristics of immigrants and the perceived threat they pose to national identity are limited given the lack of clearly defined measures of these concepts. While there is limited support for the impact of immigrants at the national level in driving far-right votes, at the individual level, anti-immigrant attitudes held among individuals seem to correlate positively with far-right party votes. However, how these anti-immigrant attitudes are measured remain problematic, as they often combine measures of the perceived economic impact of immigrants with cultural measures that make them difficult to parse out whether anti-immigrant attitudes are driven by one factor over the other.

Explaining Attitudes and Behavior

There is considerable debate about how anti-immigrant attitudes form, but scholars have consistently shown that a positive correlation between anti-immigrant attitudes and far-right voting exists at the individual level (Lubbers & Scheepers 2002; van der Brug, et al. 2005; Norris 2005; Ivarsflaten 2008; Rydrgen 2008). However, there is little understanding of how these attitudes are related to far-right voting behavior. Indeed, not all individuals with anti-immigrant attitudes vote for far-right parties.

One explanation may be that although voters have negative attitudes toward immigrants, they do not vote for the far-right because they think that the party has a small chance of electoral and or policy success. Blinder and his coauthors (2013) argue instead that this can be explained by social norms against prejudice and discrimination. They theorize that in many contemporary Western societies, social cues motivate majority-group members to control discriminatory thoughts. Their findings from studies of Britain and Germany support

this claim, indicating that while many individuals may hold negative attitudes toward immigrants, only those who are not socialized to adhere to the norm against prejudice will act on these attitudes and vote for the far-right. In their study, the social norm against prejudice is heightened in places in which the far-right has been historically connected to extremism. They account for the relative weakness of the far-right in Germany compared to other Western European countries due to the legacy of Nazism. Still, this social norm should not be constrained by history alone, but by individuals' normative local context as well.

As Golder (2016) aptly points out, this norm and the degree to which it constrains individuals is likely to vary both across and within countries, which makes the consistent measurement of anti-immigrant attitudes difficult. Also, and more importantly, this finding reinforces the well-known issue of social desirability bias in studies of anti-immigrant attitudes and far-right voter behavior. Dependent on the normative context, individuals are incentivized to not publicly reveal their beliefs. This issue is especially ripe in studies of voter behavior, in which revealing the party or candidate one voted for maybe in itself taboo. Finally, this bias is especially important to consider given the widespread use of voter surveys across the literature on the far-right. As Golder (2016) notes, although some techniques such as randomized responses, list experiments, and endorsement experiments (Blair 2015) have been developed to address these issues, they have not been widely adopted nor have they been resolutely shown to demonstrate any differential responses.

Although the formation of anti-immigrant attitudes and their nature tends to be studied in isolation, they ought to be examined together given the importance of these attitudes in seemingly accounting for far-right voter behavior. While studies consistently find a positive correlation between anti-immigrant attitudes and voting for the far-right at the individual level,

a satisfactory explanation for how these attitudes translate to votes has yet to be provided. The most likely explanation from the literature on anti-immigrant attitude formation seems to be the degree to which anti-immigrant attitudes are held by the population.

This view implies that several intervening variables may theoretically be at work that may increase the saliency of anti-immigrant attitudes to a level sufficient to induce a vote for the far-right. First, the media may influence anti-immigrant attitudes if they tend to portray immigrants stereotypically, as evidence from American studies on Latinos indicates (e.g., Valentino, et al. 2013). Second, immigration may be an issue that can destabilize voter alignments in line with the "flash party" theory (Fennema 1997) as Messina's (1989) study of Britain implicates, which finds that when salient, immigration can mobilize voters who lean left toward parties on the right.

However, studies of far-right voting submit that ideology, rather than the immigration issue alone may play a greater role in motivating (or constraining) votes for the far-right. Numerous studies show that voters for the far-right consistently place themselves on the far-right end of a left-right scale (Betz 1994), while multivariate analyses find that ideology is the most important variable in explaining votes for the far-right (van der Brug, et al 2005, 2010; van der Brug & Fennema 2003). These results imply that ideology may play a role as either a constraint or motivation for the formation of anti-immigrant attitudes and behavior of voting for the far-right.

Third, party cues should be included in models of both anti-immigrant attitude formation and far-right voting, for they may play a role in reinforcing and invigorating anti-immigrant attitudes by casting blame on immigrants for issues like crime and security, which far-right parties, in turn, take ownership of. Fourth, the role and strength of partisanship remain

woefully understudied in mediating or influencing anti-immigrant attitudes and behavior, as does partisanship given its proximate role in explaining voter behavior. Finally, factors that vary within the local context may increase the saliency of anti-immigrant attitudes, yet remain underspecified and undertheorized despite the development of the contact-threat literature on the role of proximity in explaining anti-immigrant attitude formation. How these factors all interact at the local level and how these attitudes translate to far-right voting remains understudied.

Political Disenchantment: Protest Voting

Beyond their emphasis on economic and cultural grievances against immigrants, far-right parties also work to frame themselves as clear alternatives to the status quo and appeal to voters who are disenchanted with politics. The protest vote literature theorizes that individuals vote for a far-right party as a form of negative protest that has less to do with the parties' policy positions or ideology and more to do with the faults of other more mainstream parties. Protest votes are considered in two forms: either system protest or against political elites (Bergh 2004). Protest votes against established political elites are prevalent in the literature on populist parties and are motivated by a goal of demonstrating discontent with elites (Fennema & Maussen 2000; Rydgren 2004). Although feelings of discontent or resentment have long been theorized to provoke votes for the far-right, earlier studies such as those advanced most prominently by Betz (1994) but also by Ignazi (1992) and Eatwell (2003) lacked clear measures of the concept of the protest vote.

Ultimately, despite the advancements in the literature, the protest vote remains poorly conceptualized and measured to the point that the term as it exists is devoid of meaning. As it stands, a protest vote is conceptualized in line as neither an instrumental nor an expressive

form of voter behavior. Instead, it is seen as a vote cast by an individual who does not care about ideology, policy, or the possibility of seeing his or her party gain power. Further, the measurement strategies from the literature are unable to identify the psychological benefit a voter is expected to gain by casting a protest vote. Ultimately, the lack of conceptual clarity and measurement of discontent, particularly in the form of a protest vote, has contributed a great deal to the inability of empirical studies to uncover the main factor behind the decision of individuals who previously voted for other parties to opt-out of the mainstream or for non-voters to opt into the political system.

Definitions of the Protest Vote

The majority of the theoretical development of the concept and measurement of the protest vote was done by Wouter van der Brug and his colleagues during the early 2000s. In their collective works, van der Brug and his colleagues define a protest vote as neither ideological nor policy-oriented; instead, it is motivated by an intent to demonstrate discontent with the political elite by voting for a party that is an "outcast in the political arena" (van der Brug, et. al., 2005, 541; van der Brug et al., 2000; van der Brug & Fennema, 2007). With this goal in mind, voters who cast ballots for a far-right party do not necessarily support the policy positions of the party but vote for the party because it represents a "none of the above option" that rejects other political parties (Norris 2005).

Although some scholars such as Wert and his coauthors (2013) theorize that underlying economic motivations are causally prior to political dissatisfaction, the protest vote hypothesis need not include an economic component. Even though economic considerations may be a contributing component to political dissatisfaction, they are not a sufficient condition within the theory of the protest vote. Indeed, within the protest vote literature, three formulations of

negativity are summarized by Norris (2005): (1) displeasure with government performance on salient issues, (2) intolerant attitudes, alienated feelings, or a lack of social capital, or (3) deep disaffection with the political system and a lack of confidence in democratic institutions.

The first formulation argues that far-right party voters may vote for the party in large part due to their stance on salient issues like immigration. The second relates to the "revolt against modernity" thesis formulated by Betz (1994) and is drawn in part from the Durkheimian notion of social disintegration. People who are more socially isolated can be considered the "losers of modernity" (Betz, 1994) and may be more likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties because they offer a form of integration largely due to their nationalistic (Lubbers & Scheepers 2007) and nostalgic appeal (Kornhauser 1960) that harken back to the "good old times" (Werts, et al., 2013).

Empirical evidence for the first two specifications of the protest vote hypothesis remains mixed. Some studies find little support for the protest vote hypothesis (van der Brug, et al 2000), yet scholars studying the populist radical right find that the protest component explains at least some of the variation in vote choice (Mudde, 2007; Lubbers, et al., 2002; Ivarsflaten 2005). This variation is due in large part to the specifications of the variables included in cross-national and single-country case studies. For example, van der Brug, et al. (2000) use the propensity to vote for the party as the dependent variable, rather than the reported vote, while others look at examine feeling thermometer scores toward far-right parties (Ferwerda 2017). These measures can be instructive in understanding public perceptions toward the far-right, but cannot examine actual voter behavior. Indeed, voters may be sympathetic to the issues promoted by the far-right, but may not actually cast a vote for the party on election day. Further, studies of protest voting often fail to measure any direct

indicators of dissatisfaction at the individual, national, or regional level with politics, levels of trust, or feelings of alienation. These studies thus cannot resolutely reject the possibility of a protest vote in explaining far-right party votes when these measures are not included.

The third specification of the protest vote theory, that a vote for a far-right party represents a deep-rooted disaffection against the political system and a lack of confidence in the democratic system is mainly examined by scholars studying populist radical right parties. A protest vote may take two forms: a "system protest" directed against the political system or an "elite protest" aimed at specific political elite(s) (Bergh 2004). The relationship between the voter and the party also varies. A party may receive a vote because a voter wishes to "exit with voice," i.e. leave their traditional party and punish it by rewarding another party (Kang 2004). Conversely, the party may receive a vote because it supports the voters' preferences on some issues. This "support voter" model stands in contrast to the "protest voter," who votes for the party as a vehicle to punish other parties, or to push other parties in a desired direction. Indeed, as Kedar (2005) finds, in party systems in which coalition formation is likely, voters may vote for an extreme party as a means to get closer to their preferred outcome and further away from a watered-down policy.

Measurement Issues of the Protest Vote

To operationalize these concepts, most studies measure a protest vote by proxy, looking at individual attitudes rather than their motivations per se. These studies (such as van der Brug et. al 2000; van der Brug & Fennema 2003) identify "protest voters" as those that have negative attitudes about the political system and/or political elites and non-traditional parties. However, studies that employ these measures can only identify correlational relationships between dissatisfaction and vote choice, which may not be causally related. Indeed, individuals may

cast votes for parties despite, rather than due to, feelings of disaffection. To capture voter motivations, open-ended questions that seek to probe voters' deeper motivations are used. Ignazi (2003) draws on the 2002 French elections to look at voters' placement on a right-left scale, arguing that those that are "ninists" (neither right nor left) cast their vote for the far-right as a vote against all existing parties. Similarly, an analysis of the FPÖ electorate in 1990s Austria reveals that party voters sought to "send a message" or use the party as a "new broom" to dust off national politics (Ignazi 2003; 119).

Large-scale survey data can provide some insight by examining the correlation between negative attitudes/low trust in government institutions and/or political elites and far-right voting, however, it is more difficult to make a compelling case that asserts a causal claim connecting these attitudes to voter behavior. Correlational analysis of this nature provides a good basis, but to understand more directly the reasoning behind the party vote, open-ended questions, such as those posed by Ignazi (2003), as well as interviews and focus groups can be more instructive to uncover how voters themselves rationalize their behavior.

Additionally, the majority of studies focus on individual attitudes of distrust and disapproval targeted at specific political actors rather than at democratic institutions as a whole. However, to fully capture the notion of protest voting within the European context, measures of political distrust and disapproval must be taken at multiple levels, to capture dissatisfaction with individual politicians, parties, national politics, and the EU.

As the EU has grown in size and scope, more recent studies have shown Euroskepticism to be a major component of the radical right's agenda both in Western and Eastern Europe and a thus a predictor of party support (Mudde, 2007; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Van der Brug et al., 2005; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007). As one of the few studies to resolutely test the protest vote

theory as a protest against the European Union, Werts, et al. (2013) find evidence to support the notion of Euroskepticism as an explanatory factor for vote choice beyond the ethnic threat and political elite distrust explanations. However, this framing of EU protest does not allow for a full specification and measurement of the concept due to differences in measurement, which varies as either distrust of the EU Parliament for some time periods, the belief that EU unification has gone too far for others, or a scale for the extent to which one prefers the sovereign nation-state rather than the EU to decide on politics. As reported by the authors, these measures are correlated with one another at low levels, indicating that they may not measure the same construct of EU protest. Further, these measures do not allow for capturing general support for the EU distinct from the European Parliament, or as in comparison to support for the national government. These differences create problems that make it difficult to adequately capture dissatisfaction with the EU. Parties on the right often portray the EU as an infringement of national sovereignty and a threat to national identity, but the degree to which they do so varies. Instead, a cleaner measure, such as the level of confidence in the EU as an institution should be utilized in studies along with other national institutions to allow for an adequate comparison.

Lack of Conceptual Clarity of the Protest Vote

Ultimately, the protest vote literature suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity as to what a "protest vote" is. Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie's (2000) define a protest vote as "*a vote primarily cast to scare the elite and a vote that is not policy-driven*" and thus by "*definition, protest voting only occurs when political attitudes are of minor importance*" (van der Brug, et al. 2002, 4; italics in original text).

In addition to ideological and policy proximity, the authors also test the hypothesis that the size of the party does not increase its electoral attractiveness, or in other words, that "pure" protest voters do take the size of the party, and thus its ability to enter government under consideration. They find that as far-right parties grow, they are considered more attractive to voters. However, the measures employed by van der Brug and his coauthors (2005, 2010) of the protest vote are ultimately crude measures of the concept.

In this limited form, a "protest vote" is defined as a completely irrational vote, i.e. cast by a voter who does not care about ideology, policy, nor the possibility to see his or her party gain power. This definition is limited to such an extent that it renders the concept almost meaningless. Instead, we should expect that if a voter casts a ballot in protest of the political system, mainstream politics, or parties, it should be, at least in part, motivated by policy preferences *against* what the system supports. Indeed, even in the form offered by van der Brug and his coauthors (2005, 2010), it is a vote *against* all other parties, which must necessarily be seen as a vote *for* or in support of, the far-right party.

Ultimately, I argue that the lack of conceptual clarity of what a protest vote is and how it should be properly operationalized is largely responsible for the null findings reported in the literature. The use of weak indicators has contributed to the inability of multivariate studies of far-right voter behavior to uncover the sequencing and relative weight of the factors that motivate individuals to vote for the far-right, particularly those who previously voted for other parties or did not participate in politics. To develop a theoretical framework to study the protest vote, more in-depth study of the voters themselves is necessary. One way to do this is to ask far-right voters who say they cast their ballot for the far-right in protest more what they mean by "protest." Gaining a greater understanding of what this concept looks like from the

perspective of the voters themselves can help lead to better measurement of the concept in large-scale studies of voter behavior.

Chapter IV. Data and Methods

Introduction

To test the hypothesis described in the previous chapter, I collected an original sample (n=460) from October-December 2018 of adults over age 18 residing in five electoral districts in Germany that varied in their levels of unemployment, size of the foreign population, and size of the refugee population. The first section of this chapter describes the goal and design of the sampling and its stages. The second section provides an overview of the questionnaires and measurement and the third section summarizes the analysis plan.

Case Selection: Country

This study takes Germany as its case. The 2017 parliamentary election saw the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) enter parliament, becoming the first-far right party to do so since the fall of the Nazi Party. In so doing, the relatively young AfD, founded in 2013, became the first far-right party to gain a substantial national electoral base despite constitutional restrictions and a historical legacy that demonizes far-right parties. The selection of Germany and the AfD allows for the collection of data in which the far-right party is held constant, thereby overcoming difficulties in cross-national studies in which party platforms and rhetoric vary across cases. Moreover, the national response to the Eurozone crisis and the large influx of refugees make Germany a case ripe for understanding the interaction of economic factors and notions of identity-making and transformation given increased migration and public debate on the role of Islam in German society. Finally, the vestiges of two Germanies and the divisions real or imagined it sowed, as well as the federal system of governance, introduces subnational variation to explore in the study.

Problems with National Probability Samples

Existing national survey probability-based surveys, such as the Eurobarometer, European Social Study, or the European Election Study usually draw approximately 1,000-1,200 respondents from each member country using a national sampling frame. Based simply on the size of the far-right vote alone, such sample sizes will capture only a small number of far-right voters. Other impediments to obtaining a sizable number of right-wing voters include the geographic distribution of far-right votes, social desirability bias, as well as the lack of willingness of respondents to answer questions about their vote choice more generally. Far-right voters are often concentrated in smaller geographical pockets rather than distributed somewhat evenly across an entire country. Beyond the suggestion of the literature, these issues were identified during preliminary fieldwork (Lasala-Blanco, et. al 2017). To help overcome these issues and collect a sizeable sample of AfD voters, surveys were conducted in the Fall of 2018 in five electoral districts in Germany: Marzahn-Hellersdorf (Berlin), Dresden I and Dresden II-Bautzen II (Saxony), Augsburg Stadt (Bavaria), and Hanau (Hessen).

A sampling method that used some enumerated method, such as a party member or leadership list was not practical due to the aim of the study to understand motivations of more casual, "less extreme" supporters for far-right parties as a leadership list would represent those most committed to the party. Similarly, due to anonymity in voter's choices in elections, no list of voters for any particular party could be made available for selection, nor were any data such as a household registry available to the public from the German Census or some other institution (Zensus 2011). In the absence of any reliable enumerate basis, this study relies on the predictive power that arises from randomization similar to work done in developing countries. However, the degree to which the representativeness of the sample can be calculated is limited to only a comparison between district statistics and the sample, a multistage

probability design with random areas selected within electoral districts, random starting points, and random selection of households was used to make the sample as representative as possible.

Population of Interest

Given hypotheses about characteristics of the local context in motivating votes for the far-right, the sampling aimed to give voting-eligible individuals in electoral districts a relatively equal chance of inclusion into the sample. The goal was to capture individuals who had voted for the AfD, other parties, and non-voters in order to compare their vote (and non-vote) choice reasoning under similar socio-demographic conditions. The sampling assumed that given that relatively high percentages of AfD voters resided in the selected electoral districts according to the official electoral record (*Der Bundeswahlleiter*), a sample collected using random procedures within these areas would represent the universe of individuals of interest while controlling for socio-demographic characteristics at the electoral district level.

The sample was drawn using a stratified multi-stage random design described broadly here and in more detail in the following sections and the Appendix A. The first stage was purposive while the succeeding stages were probability-based. During this initial stage, electoral districts where the AfD won more than 13.7 percent (districts in the seventieth percentile or higher nationally) of the second votes according to the Federal Returning Officer (*Der Bundeswahlleiter*) were purposively selected due to their political-historical background and to vary on socio-demographic characteristics identified in the literature as influential for far-right success: the percent of the population unemployed, the size of the foreign-born population, and the size of the refugee population. In the second stage, the electoral districts were clustered, and areas or neighborhoods were randomly selected as primary sampling units (PSUs). At the third stage, a random start point within the PSU was selected. In the fourth

stage, households were selected using a random walk procedure in which interviewers followed a random number formula that varied depending on the housing density (single-family homes or apartments). In the fifth stage, if an adult was present in the household and had time to complete the interview, they were selected and surveyed. If an adult did not have time to complete the interview or if an adult was not present in the household and the mailbox for the household was accessible, a letter with a description of the study and a link to take the survey online anonymously was delivered.

First Stage: Selection of Electoral Districts

The sampling strategy intentionally did not seek to recruit respondents at AfD party rallies, protests, or other events, as doing so would have biased the sample toward individuals who actively work on behalf of the party. Although work conducted of this nature helps examine the activist base of the far-right (Art 2011), I was interested in capturing the motivations of more "typical" voters. Local electoral districts (*Wahlkreisbezeichnung*) within cities and towns were selected as research sites using the results of the 2017 Bundestag election available from the German Federal Returning Officer (*Der Bundeswahlleiter*). These data provide the percentage of votes cast for each party, both in first votes—the vote for the candidate—as well as for the second vote—the vote for a party list at the district level. The second vote for the party list was used to measure support for the AfD due to two key considerations. First, the vote is considered a purer form of party support than the first vote because it directs the relative strength of the parties in the Bundestag. Second, it minimizes the impact of local candidates' characteristics in influencing voting choice. Figure 1, below, shows the distribution of second votes for the AfD across the 299 electoral districts, with darker colors representing higher shares of second votes for the AfD.

Figure 1: AfD Second Votes by Electoral District



Sources: German Federal Returning Officer. Map made with ArcGIS.

To examine how the AfD has won votes across varied local contexts, I first selected electoral districts in which the AfD won greater than 13.7 percent of the votes, which represents districts that were in the seventieth percentile or higher of AfD second votes in the 2017 election. The cut point of the seventieth percentile was used to ensure that a sizeable number of AfD voters could be reached in these areas and be included in the sample. Next, I purposively selected electoral districts from this subset of all of the districts to vary on the factors identified in the literature as influencing far-right success: the percent of the population

that is unemployed, the percent of the population that is foreign-born, and the number of refugees, approximated by the number of refugees enrolled in integration courses. These data are available for each district via the Regional Statistical Database for Germany (*Die Regionaldatenbank Deutschland*) and the Federal Bureau for Migration and Asylum (*BAMF: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge*) respectively.[25] Table 1 reports summary statistics of these variables for the 299 electoral districts.

Table 1: Electoral District Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
AfD Second Vote Share	299	12.76	5.46	4.94	35.46
Percent Foreign Population	299	10.11	5.40	1.20	31.40
Proxy Number of Refugees	257	1681.61	3093.26	17.00	13538.00
Percent Total Unemployment	299	6.12	2.43	2.00	14.10
East	43				
West	256				

For the ease of comparison and selection, cut points were determined for each variable with a 1-5 value, in which 1 is the lowest and 5 is the highest. A value of 1 was assigned to a value if it was in the twentieth percentile for the values which the variable took, a 2 if it was the fortieth, and so on. On Table 2 below, a low score represents a value of either 1 or 2 (variables in which the values are in the fortieth percentile and lower), while a high score

25 Data describing the placement and/or settlement of refugees are not publicly available at the district level. However, the BAMF provides enrollment figures in integration courses for each city, which can be generally matched to electoral districts. Not all districts were matched, given that there are 299 electoral districts and 415 *Wohnort Kreis* provided by the BAMF. This measure serves as a good proxy for the number of refugees in a district since German law which requires all individuals seeking asylum to enroll in an integration course. The data approximates the total number of refugees, not the percentage of the population, however, this is a suitable measure since the population of each electoral district is held relatively constant following the Federal Elections Act. This act stipulates that the population of a given constituency should not deviate from the average population of all constituencies by more than 15 percent in either direction, and when the deviation is greater than 25 percent, the boundaries are redrawn (*Der Bundeswahlleiter)*.

represents a value of either 4 or 5 (variables in which the values are in the eightieth percentile or higher). The value ranges for each variable, are reported below in Table 2.

Table 2: District Variable Cut Points

Value	1 (20%)	2 (40%)	3 (60%)	4 (80%)	5 (100%)
Percent Total Unemployment	<3.70	3.71-6.00	6.01-7.10	7.11-9.4	>9.4
Percent Foreign Population	<5.76	5.76-9.4	9.41-11.8	11.81-17.42	>17.42
Proxy Number of Refugees	<239	240-501	502-951	951-4161	>4162

Five districts were selected based on the combinations of key factors as summarized in Table 3. In Table 3, the values in parentheses denote the percentile for each variable among the 299 electoral districts.

Table 3: District Selection Factors

District	AfD Second Vote 2017	East /West	Percent Total Unemployment	Percent Foreign Population	Proxy Number of Refugees
Marzahn-Hellersdorf, Berlin	21.62 (91%)	East	9.4 (86%)	6.6 (26%)	9,195 (Berlin total) (99%)
Dresden II – Bautzen II, Saxony	23.29 (94%)	East	7 (67%)	6.8 (28%)	123 (2%)
Dresden I, Saxony	23.08 (93%)	East	7.1 (68%)	4.0 (13%)	874 (12%)
Augsburg (Stadt), Bavaria	13.82 (73%)	West	5.4 (43%)	18.4 (92%)	1,583 (77%)
Hanau, Hessen	14.08 (75%)	West	4.7 (33%)	16.1 (87%)	1,691 (62%)

District Selection: Background and Characteristics

Beyond how they vary on the factors described above, these electoral districts were selected for their political-historical contexts and the ability to logistically carry out the sampling. The next section provides further details and background for each district.

Site 1. Marzahn-Hellersdorf, Berlin

I selected Marzahn-Hellersdorf, Berlin for several reasons, principally for the district's location in the national capital and its high rate of AfD voters. As a less-advantaged district within the capital, Marzahn-Hellersdorf is an electoral district in the former East with many vestiges of the Communist past, most notably, its Soviet-era large apartment buildings and the strength of *Die Linke* (The Left), a political party founded by former East German Communist Party leaders. The foreign-born population of the district is very low at only 6.6 percent of the population as of December 2015 (*Der Bundeswahlleiter*), falling within the twenty-sixth percentile nationally. This percentage is among the lowest in the 12 districts of Berlin after Treptow-Koepenick (3.3%) and Lichtenberg (6.3%), and is much lower than the city average, which is known for its "Multi-Kulti" multiculturalism as 18.4 percent of residents are foreign-born (*Der Bundeswahlleiter*). Similarly, the district has some of the highest levels of unemployment at 9.4 percent, falling in the eighty-sixth percentile across all 299 electoral districts (*Der Bundeswahlleiter*). Beyond these characteristics, Marzahn-Hellersdorf makes for a compelling place to study voters and supporters of the AfD due to the Eastern district's strong connection to the Communist past as well as its historical support for *Die Linke* political party, a successor to the East German Communist Party. In Marzahn-Hellersdorf, *Die Linke* received 26.1 percent of the second votes in the 2017 federal election, ranking third among all 12 Berlin districts, whereas the AfD 21.6 percent of the second votes, the highest percentage among all 12 Berlin districts.

Given these data and the connection between *Die Linke* and the Communist Party, I selected Marzahn-Hellersdorf with the aim of sampling voters for the far-left *Die Linke* so that I could compare their attitudes with voters for the far-right AfD despite their living in similar socio-economic conditions at the electoral district level. I also sought to include, if possible, individuals who had previously voted for *Die Linke* and had more recently voted for the AfD despite the parties' positions on opposite ends of the political spectrum.

Site 2. Dresden I And Dresden II-Bautzen II, Saxony

An electoral district in Saxony was selected for several reasons. First, Saxony was the first state where the AfD won representation in a state legislature (*Landtag*) in October 2014. By including a district in the state, I sought to recruit early supporters of the AfD into the sample, seeking to capture individuals who had voted for the party before the height of the refugee crisis in 2015 and the shift in the party's rhetoric on Islam, immigrants, and refugees. Second, I also wanted to include a Saxon district to be able to study the potential impact of leadership in generating votes for the AfD since Saxony is the home state of the former AfD party leader, Frauke Petry, who stepped down from the post following the September 2017 election. Finally, I also wanted to include at least one electoral district in Saxony because this is where the far-right movement Pegida (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West) was founded in October 2014. AfD party leadership initially sought to distance themselves and the party from Pegida due in some part to the group's racist tone and radical behavior, explicitly forbidding party leadership from public association with Pegida.[26] However, under new leadership, the AfD grew closer with the movement and cemented its affiliation with Pegida with public sponsorship and party leadership in attendance during

26 See thelocal.de for more on the AfD's official sanction of its members for engaging with Pegida: https://www.thelocal.de/20170509/afd-and-anti-islam-pegida-group-hold-side-by-side-rallies-for-first-time

widespread protests in the summer of 2018 in Chemnitz following the death of Cuban-German by an asylum seeker.[27] My aim in including a Saxon district, especially one in which Pegida had a strong presence, was to explore the extent to which Pegida had mobilized voters for the AfD in Saxony, whether this was a principal pathway through which the AfD won voters in Saxony, and how knowledge of Pegida and support for the AfD more generally differed outside of Saxony.

I originally selected Chemnitz as the Saxon field site but replaced it with Dresden following the widespread protests in Chemnitz in late August 2018. The week-long protests were anti-migrant and quickly turned violent. Due to my aim in recruiting more casual, less-extreme voters for the AfD, I dropped Chemnitz out of concern about the potential for a demonstration effect following the August 2018 protests which I thought may have had an impact on respondents' ability to correctly recall their vote choice from the 2017 election as well as a more general concern about the potential radicalization of respondents as a result of the protests. In addition to this potential bias, I was also concerned about the ability to safely conduct in-person interviews in the wake of these events, particularly in light of how members of the press, and generally people asking questions were treated by the protestors following reports of physical attacks on members of the press by protestors evoking "*die Lügenpresse*," a pejorative term used by the Nazis and repopularized by Pegida meant to discredit the news-press (Reuters 2015).

I selected Dresden due to its similar socio-economic characteristics and local political context in comparison with Chemnitz. However, unlike the single-district of Chemnitz, the

[27] For more on the joining of AfD and Pegida, see Daily Sabah Europe: https://www.dailysabah.com/europe/2018/08/29/far-right-afd-anti-islam-pegida-to-rally-after-violent-protests-in-western-germany

city of Dresden is split into two electoral districts by the Elbe River: Dresden I, which encompasses *Altstad*t, the historic city center and urban neighborhoods, and Dresden II-Bautzen II, which includes *Neustadt*, a neighborhood with younger, more liberal residents as well as more suburban neighborhoods beyond the city center. I chose to include both electoral districts in Dresden into the sample to increase the variation in the electoral districts selected. Dresden II-Bautzen II contains a smaller number of refugees and a larger foreign population than Dresden I, while the unemployment rate and vote for the AfD are almost identical in values for both districts, which provided the opportunity to control for these characteristics. Table 4 below shows how the two Dresden districts compare to one another and the originally selected Chemnitz district.

Table 4: Saxony Electoral District Selection Factors

Selection	District	AfD Second Vote 2017	East/ West	Percent Total Unemployment	Percent Foreign Population	Proxy Number of Refugees
Saxony Original	Chemnitz	24.3 (95%)	East	8.2 (78%)	6.9 (30%)	239 (36%)
Saxony New	Dresden II–Bautzen II	23.29 (94%)	East	7 (67%)	6.8 (13%)	123 (8%)
Saxony New	Dresden I	23.08 (93%)	East	7.1 (68%)	4 (28%)	874 (73%)

Dresden is similar to Marzahn-Hellersdorf with its low levels of foreign-born individuals in the population and is above the national average in levels of unemployment, but Dresden has received very few refugees compared to the national average. These conditions create the opportunity to study the impact of high unemployment and low foreign-born individuals while controlling somewhat for higher levels of refugees. Dresden is also the birthplace of Pegida, which has held weekly rallies in the city since its founding in October 2014 and has been able to attract a large number of "ordinary" citizens but has had

limited success in recruiting members outside of Saxony (The Local DE). Including Dresden, with its links to Pegida provided the potential to include some of the voters for the AfD theorized to be "more extreme" voters into the sample, who I planned to compare with voters who were more moderate or "less extreme" from Dresden as well as the other cities. By selecting Dresden, I aimed to include into the sample individuals with different pathways to the AfD, as I assumed that although some voters in Dresden may have been exposed to and perhaps mobilized to vote for the party through Pegida, others outside of Dresden in the other research sites may not have even heard about Pegida.

Another factor that made Dresden a compelling field site was the high number of attacks on refugees recorded in the city. Based on a 2014-2015 dataset collected by Beneck and Strasheim (2016), Dresden has the second highest number of total attacks, defined as both violent and non-violent, on refugees after Berlin (Bencek & Strasheim 2016). This indicates to me that how Pegida has politicized the presence of refugees in Saxony may have played some role in motivating these attacks and perhaps in turn, motivated vote for the AfD.

Finally, Dresden is the old capital of the principality of Saxony, which has a rich regional subculture that is quite conservative and where the old far-right party the NPD has been successful in the past. With a large rightist subculture that ranges from local "concerned" citizens to skinhead groups, I selected Dresden with the goal of capturing a sizeable sample and the wide range of potential AfD voters, including those who are more "extreme." Compared to the other electoral districts, I thought that Dresden was the best place to capture a large sample of "extreme" individuals to compare to the more "moderate" individuals expected to be included in the sample from the other electoral districts.

Site 3. Augsburg

Given my interest in understanding "less extreme" voters for the far-right, with a particular focus on how individuals who previously voted for other parties came to vote for the AfD, I wanted to include a Bavarian case to study AfD voters who had previously voted for the Christian Socialist Union (CSU). In addition to its national leadership position with the CDU (Christian Democratic Union), the CSU has held state-level leadership in Bavaria as the majority party in the state diet (*Landtag*) for almost each term since the party's founding in 1946. Despite its strong regional, as well as national power, national electoral polls from the 2017 federal election demonstrated that the CSU had lost voters to the AfD (Zeit Online). My primary motivation in including a Bavarian case was to seek to understand why seemingly "moderate" individuals would vote for the AfD since they also have the more "moderate" alternative of the CSU, with its similar strict stance on refugee policy and robust power that allows it to affect both national and state-level policymaking.

My particular interest was to compare attitudes among AfD and CSU voters, so I excluded Bavarian electoral districts on the Austrian or Czech border following the government crisis that occurred in July 2018[28] between the CDU and CSU over threats from Horst Seehofer, former German Interior Minister and CSU leader, to conduct strict border checks along the Bavarian/Austrian border to control the "influx" of refugees entering Bavaria. I excluded these electoral districts from consideration due to my concern that this crisis may

28 Seehofer threatened to conduct strict border checks along the Bavarian/Austrian border in order to, he argued, control the "influx" of refugees entering Bavarian. In short, this lead to a governmental crisis, wherein Seehofer threatened to resign from Merkel's cabinet, a meeting of EU leaders regarding the Dublin Protocol (which permits free movement across EU borders), a drop in confidence in the governing coalition (comprised of the CDU, CSU, and Social Democrats), and approximately a 2 percentage point increase in support for the AfD according to the weekly polls. For a more detailed overview of the crisis, see the NYTimes article: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/opinion/germanys-political-crisis-has-just-begun.html.

have had an effect on general attitudes toward the CSU and vote recall from the 2017 federal election among residents in border regions, particularly since the field period was planned for November 2018, weeks after the Bavarian state election.

Due to its distance from the border, relatively high percentage of second votes for the AfD, its socio-demographic characteristics, and proximity to Munich, I selected Augsburg as the Bavarian electoral district for the sample. Augsburg is within commuting distance of Munich and has the highest percentage of foreigners in the population of the selected districts, falling into the ninety-second percentile nationally. Unemployment is more moderate at the 5.4 percent rate, which is only in the forty-third percentile nationally, whereas the proxy number of refugees in the population is quite high, particularly for a city the size of Augsburg, falling into the seventy-seventh percentile nationally. As a city about 71 km (44 miles) away from Munich through open fields by train, the inclusion of Augsburg also introduced more variance as it is a smaller, rather than large urban electoral district like Berlin and Dresden into the sample.

Site 4. Hanau, Hesse

I selected Hanau, Hessen as the final research site for how its socio-demographics compared to the other selected districts and my desire to include a Western district into the sample to better understand why Westerners vote for the AfD due to the party's far greater presence in the East. Hanau is a suburb about 27 km (17 miles) outside of Frankfurt and contains areas that are both urban and suburban. The percent of the foreign-born population is quite high, at 16.1 percent, which is in the eighty-seventh percentile nationally and is the second-highest in the sample. The unemployment rate at 4.7 (the thirty-third percentile nationally) is the lowest in the sample, whereas the proxy number of refugees is somewhat

high at 1,691, representing the sixty-second percentile nationally. Although somewhat similar to Augsburg in terms of these socio-demographic characteristics, the success of the AfD in Hanau is especially puzzling since it is close to Frankfurt, a global financial city with a foreign-born population of 31.4 percent. As mentioned previously, the results of the regression analysis on the district-level characteristics to explain the variance in AfD vote share imply that the AfD should not do as well in areas where a larger percentage of the population is foreign-born compared to areas with smaller foreign-born populations. In sum, I selected Hanau to introduce another suburban district, provide more variation in the sample with respect to the sizes of the foreign-born and refugee populations, and include a Western district.

Electoral District Clustering, Random Walk Model, and Household Selection

After the electoral districts were selected, I then clustered areas within each electoral district to create the primary sampling units (PSUs). In this second stage, clusters were drawn using a variety of methods depending upon the availability of micro-level data that delineated geographic boundaries for subunits of each electoral district. For more information on how the clusters were drawn as well as maps showing the delineations, see Appendix A. In the third stage, PSUs within the electoral district were randomly selected. For this survey, I used a random walk model.[29] A random start point was selected using a random formula and

[29] I drew the sample using random walk procedures to obtain a somewhat representative sample of AfD strongholds. Since there was no publicly available list of addresses, households were selected using a random walk. This is a norm in survey research when no public data frame (list of addresses in this case) is available. For more on this and some examples, see the Gallup World Poll (https://news.gallup.com/poll/105226/world-poll-methodology.aspx) and Pew Research Center (https://www.pewresearch.org/methods/international-survey-research/survey-mode-and-sample-design/). In addition, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, there are issues with nationally representative samples (which mostly draw their samples using phone numbers in developed countries). The few studies which use in-person interviews, such as Art 2011 and Klandermans & Mayer 2006, use a snowball sampling method as well as approaching potential interviewees at meeting places. However, these studies focus on party activists/leaders, rather than just plain, non-activist voters. I used the random walk method to overcome the issue with the national samples, which only capture small numbers of far-right voters; as well as the issue with the smaller samples, which only draw on party activists and leaders, whose motivations for voting/strength of partisanship/ are presumably different from those who are just voters.

interviewers proceeded along the path direction selected. In the fourth stage, households were selected. To select households, interviewers followed a random selection formula that varied depending on the density of the housing within the PSU and was altered as the housing type changed.[30] For more information on the random walk model and household selection, see Appendix A.

Selection of Respondent

Fieldwork took place in the evenings during the weekdays (Monday-Friday) from approximately 4:30 pm to 8:30 pm. During weekends, fieldwork took place from around 12 noon to 6 pm. Once a household was selected, interviewers were instructed to ring the bell[31] and introduce themselves and the study if an adult answered the door.[32] If an adult did not answer the door, the interviewer asked to speak to one. Potential respondents were assured of their anonymity and provided the option to answer the questionnaire immediately in-person or online through a secure, anonymous link. If the individual was present and had time to complete the interview, they were selected and surveyed; if an adult did not have time to complete the interview or if an adult was not present in the household and the mailbox for the household was accessible, a letter with a description of the study and a link to take the survey

30 The random selection formula for households if the housing block contained mostly single houses on both sides of the street was to select the third house, then the fourth, then the first, then the third and repeat going on both sides of the street. The random selection formula for households in blocks with mostly apartment complexes was dependent upon the size of the building. If the building contained fewer than 20 households, every fifth apartment would be selected; between 21-100 households every seventh apartment; more than 100 household every tenth apartment. The number of households in a building was calculated based on the number of name placards (bells to ring) there were on the front of the building.

31 Bells were present even in areas with single-family homes in each of the field sites. In Germany, bells tend to be on single family homes on small gates prior to entering the property.

32 The pitch script was the following: “Hello, my name is X and I’m a student at X working with the University of California. We are conducting a study of political and other attitudes of people in your city and we would like to include your household in the study. You were selected at random and everything you tell us will be completely anonymous and confidential. We’re talking with residents in CITY and would like to ask you some questions on a confidential basis.

online anonymously was delivered.[33] A copy of this letter in English and German is available in Appendix B.

Respondent selection varied based on the method of contact. The individual who answered the door and consented was selected for the interview.[34] When no one was home at a door interview, a letter was left addressed to the residence to take part in the online survey and the respondent self-selected himself or herself to take part in the survey. For street intercepts, individuals were selected for interview based on a random formula. When the selected respondent was chosen in some street intercept, sometimes a friend or family member with the selected respondent also wanted to take part in the survey. In less than 3 percent of the entire sample (14 cases of 7 two-person groups), this individual was also consented and took the survey. Individuals who were present and did not consent to take the survey and refused to take the letter with the online survey link were considered a hard refusal and counted as such. This was recorded on the daily logs used to calculate the response rate interviewers kept for each PSU map area.

In some cases, particularly in Marzahn-Hellersdorf, interviewers were unable to reach a large number of selected households in-person and could not gain access to buildings to deliver the letter. In these cases, interviewer teams were instructed to have the strongest interviewer make the pitch over the intercom to the selected households. When this was repeatedly

[33] While there may be some bias introduced due to lack of internet access, this is considered to be small since 90 percent of the German population is reported to use the internet at least every day (DeStatis).

[34] When more than one person answered the door, the person who talked to the interviewer first was selected to take part in the survey. This method also introduces some small bias into gender composition of the sample, as generally, men were more likely to answer the door and speak to the interviewer first. Selection of the individual who opened the door was done due to the restriction on capturing respondent personal information per GDPR regulations. To have randomly selected an individual, a household list of all of the people who lived in the house would have been created. When the randomly selected person was not home, to make an additional contact attempt, the name (last name as written on bell) and address would have had to have been collected. Per UCSB IRB regulations, this was not possible.

unsuccessful after several attempts, interviewers in these situations were authorized to randomly approach individuals within the immediate vicinity of the buildings and the boundaries of the map area using a selection formula.

Interviewers were instructed to count the number of individuals passing the street or in a park for five minutes, take the raw number and divide it by 12, with the rationale that interviewers would recruit for a whole hour (as 60 minutes divided by 5 equals 12). When this number was 24 or below, interviewers were instructed to approach every second individual; when this number was between 25-199, interviewers were instructed to approach every fifth individual. Interviewers were then instructed to ask if these randomly-selected individuals lived within the immediate area as their first question before pitching the survey. Although this selection process using intercepts may have introduced some bias into the dataset, the extent of this bias is limited and documented in Appendix A.

Instrument: Survey Questionnaires

The main questionnaire used in this study was based in large part on the European Cities and Neighborhoods Survey (Lasala-Blanco, et al. 2017) created for the August 2016 Berlin sample. Changes made to this questionnaire as well as a reassessment of the original questions were translated into German and back-translated into English by native speakers of German who were also bilingual fluent English speakers. Questionnaire revisions took place after issues were uncovered during training and pretesting with the interviewing team. Many of the questions were used previously in 2016, however, the entire questionnaire was read through with each team in each city as part of training. Each interviewer practiced doing the interview with a partner and supervised by a more experienced interviewer. After all revisions were made, the questionnaires were finalized in German and printed for fieldwork.

Two questionnaires were used for interviewing. The first standard questionnaire comprised of 46 questions covered voting history, attitudes toward immigrants, confidence in political institutions, and demographics. Survey respondents who reported a vote for the AfD in a federal or state election or said that they intended to vote for the AfD in the next election during the in-person interview were asked an additional set of 25 questions to further probe how they initially came to learn about and eventually vote for the AfD. The complete questionnaires in English and German are included in Appendix B.

Online respondents were not asked the additional set of questions for the AfD due to concerns about the length of the survey and constraints on time, as previous versions of the questionnaire used for the European Cities and Neighborhood Survey (ECNS) demonstrated that online respondents had a lower rate of completion compared to the in-person sample.[35]

Response Rate

During fieldwork in Germany, interviewers kept a daily report where they recorded information to calculate the response rate and a qualitative description of the area. Interviewers noted during the time in the field as well as at the end of the day report to the Field Director the reasons for non-successful interviews, which included refusals to participate, termination before completion, or (if applicable) the extra set of questions, or respondent unavailability. Table 13 in Appendix A reports the raw data (total Ns) of the number of attempted interviews and response codes. Table 14 in Appendix A reports the completed interview sample sizes and response rates of each method by electoral district in addition to an average for the entire sample.

35 The online sample for this study had only a 43 percent completion rate, with only 27 out of the 62 respondents who began the survey completing it. For the in-person sample, only 4 out of the 420 in-person respondents who began the survey were not asked all of the questions of the interview for a completion rate of 99 percent.

As shown in Table 14 in Appendix A, the response rates varied across electoral districts and mode. The response rates for the online surveys were especially low, ranging from far below one percent in Dresden II-Bautzen II to about 2 percent in Augsburg and Hanau. Doorstep interviews had much higher response rates in each district, with an average of 25.8 percent across all of the electoral districts surveyed. The street intercept method had the highest response rate at 42.5 percent in Marzahn-Hellersdorf, Berlin and 68.75 percent in Dresden II-Bautzen II. Many street intercepts were completed in Berlin due to the difficulty in gaining access to large apartment buildings to reach potential respondents at the door. When interviewers selected a household, but no one was home, they attempted to leave a letter inviting a resident to partake in the survey online. When interviewers could not access a mailbox or a door to deliver this letter, these missed attempts were recorded as "unable to locate" on the table. This occurred on average across the five districts 14.65 percent of the time. The overall response rate across all districts and all survey modes including "unreachables" was 15.9 percent.

Interviewer Team and Quality Control Measures

To recruit interviewers, I advertised with local universities for both undergraduate and graduate students who resided in and around the electoral districts I planned to visit. In total, 34 students were recruited. All interviewers were native speakers of German and paid for their work. Since sensitive topics about ethnic minority groups were asked, only interviewers of German ethnicity were recruited to join the team. This was done in an attempt to reduce the possibility of social desirability bias on behalf of the respondents when answering questions about minority groups if the interviewer were to be of a minority background himself or herself.

Each interviewer team had one day of training (approximately 6 hours), which provided an overview of the goals of the project and sampling. Special emphasis was placed on the importance of following the sampling protocol to ensure that a random sample was collected. The questionnaire was discussed by the whole team and practiced in German in pairs. In Berlin, I met extensively with an advanced master's student before the training day to have a German speaker help lead the training. In Dresden and Hanau, another interviewer who had served in Berlin helped lead the training. In Augsburg, I worked with a more advanced master's student before the training to have a German speaker help lead the training as I did in Berlin.

The total number of interviews by interviewer is available in Table 12 in Appendix A. It should be noted that Interviewer 6, who completed 70 interviews, served as an interviewer in Berlin, Dresden, and Hanau. Interviewer 29 also served in both Berlin and Dresden.

Several quality control measures were used to check the survey procedures, including supervisor accompaniment and visual consistency checks to ensure overall adherence to the fieldwork plan. During fieldwork, either I or an experienced interviewer accompanied a randomly selected interviewer to ensure that the proper selection methodology and pitch was completed by the interviewer in 39 percent of the interviews (N=175 surveys). In the cases in which I was present, I was introduced by the interviewer and excused myself once the interview began (in German).

In some cases, interviewers who had served in Berlin (the first city where fieldwork took place), conducted interviews in Dresden and Hanau as well. In addition to this quality control measure, I undertook visual consistency checks of all of the procedures after each field day, reviewing the survey sheets for accuracy, logical issues, pattern response, and missing

data. Finally, while cleaning the dataset, I also checked for these issues in addition to errors made in coding.

Selection Biases

Given my hypotheses about the potential impact of electoral district and neighborhood contexts in motivating vote choice and feelings toward immigrants/refugees, the goal of the sampling plan was to collect a sample that included different neighborhoods within the electoral district (*Bundestagwahlkriese*). In the design and implementation of the sampling, a social desirability bias in not reporting a vote for the far-right or even participating in the study at all may have been introduced, as Blinder and his coauthors have shown in their analyses of surveys of far-right voters (2013). The extent to which social desirability bias was introduced is unknown due to the inability to estimate this with any precision.

Though the in-person intercept mode, especially in Berlin where the intercept sample was large, may have introduced some bias into the dataset, I believe the extent of this bias is limited due to the similarities between the sociodemographic and voting data collected for the sample and the average official statistics for the electoral district reported by the state of Berlin. Further details about how the sample compares to official statistics for each of the electoral districts are summarized in Appendix A.

In addition to the use of in-person intercepts, some bias may have been introduced through the use of a random walk model and the instruction to interviewers to call on selected homes. In particular, one concern is that selected individuals only had the potential to become a part of the sample if they were present when interviewers called on their home. In the design, one callback in the form of a letter was planned. This letter provided an overview of the project, assurance of confidentiality, IRB required information (a telephone number of people to

contact if they had questions/concerns about the usage of their data), and a link to take the survey online through an anonymous link.[36]

In the field, interviewers were trained to treat soft refusals as such. After attempting to convert these soft refusals into completions, interviewers treated this soft refusal as a callback and provided the individual with the letter. If no one answered when interviewers called on a home and a mailbox or the door for the home was accessible, interviewers left the letter in the mailbox or under the door of the randomly selected household. Unfortunately, an additional callback in the form of a return in-person visit by interviewers was not conducted in compliance with European Union Data Protection Laws. To comply, the UCSB IRB required that no identifying information be collected. Other surveys that use lists of phone numbers that are stripped of identifiers do not face problems with keeping track of respondents for callbacks, however. My survey faced this issue due to the random walk model used to reach potential respondents because last names, which are identifiable data, rather than apartment numbers, which are somewhat more anonymous, are used to identify homes in Germany.

In the randomly selected households in each city, last names were listed on each bell (buzzer) to both apartment buildings as well as single-family homes. Keeping track of these names in such a way as to track those reached and those to callback was not possible per the GDPR regulation. Despite this regulation, as detailed earlier, response rates at doors were relatively similar across the electoral districts, thereby providing some assurance as to the ability of the team to recruit a representative sample.

Of greatest concern to the validity of the study is the introduction of a social desirability bias, which could take the form of not revealing one's attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors to

[36] See Appendix B for English and German version of letter.

interviewers. Despite social norms that encourage privacy in voter behavior and attitudes toward immigrants that seem to be somewhat higher in Germany than in other Western contexts[37] 296 out of the 361 respondents (82 percent) who reported voting in the 2017 federal election acknowledged their vote choice, with 43 reporting a vote for the AfD with either the first and/or the second vote, while a total of 52 reported voting for the AfD in either in the most recent state and/or federal election (18 percent of the entire sample). Table 9 and 10 in Appendix A show the differences between the reported party votes for both the first and second vote for each district and the official statistics from the Federal Returning Officer (*Der Bundeswahlleiter*).

The sample collected differs from the official statistics in a few ways. First, the sample over captured people who said that they voted in the September 2017 federal election. This overcapture varied across the electoral districts sampled, from a low of 6 percent in Marzahn-Hellersdorf, Berlin to 15.1 percent in Augsburg. In each district, fewer AfD voters were included in the sample than were reported by the Federal Returning Officer. The samples collected in Marzahn-Hellersdorf and Hanau were the closest to the known vote share (within 1 percent) for the AfD in both first (candidate) and second (party) votes whereas the sample collected in Dresden and Augsburg underrepresented AfD voters by about 10 percent. The sample also overrepresents known Green voters for both first and second votes as well as Left voters for first votes.

Social desirability bias in revealing one's attitudes toward immigrant and refugee groups may limit the ability of this study to make meaningful interpretations of the data. In the

37 See for example, response rates in Germany compared to other EU countries in the European Social Survey, where Germany has the lowest response rate of all countries surveyed: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/deviations_8.html

survey, respondents were asked to provide a score on a feeling thermometer ranging from 0 to 100, where 0 means the most uncomfortable and 100 means the most comfortable for how comfortable they would be if they moved to a neighborhood where their neighbors were mostly some ethnoracial groups (Eastern European, Turkish, Black, Asian, Syrian, Muslim; see F21). About 88 percent of the sample, or 403 out of 460, gave a response when asked about how they felt about some immigrant groups using (F21), a higher percentage than those who revealed their vote choice. The mean score of the average of all of these comfort measures toward ethnic minorities combined was 55.

To further analyze this potential bias, I coded the percentage of each score in 25th percentiles. The number and the corresponding percentage of respondents who gave scores for each range are shown in Table 5 below. The distribution and mean of the average scores indicate that respondents were willing to share negative responses, as one would expect a higher average score and a greater number of high scores if respondents were afraid to provide low scores.

Table 5: Distribution of Scores for Average Comfort with All Ethnic Minorities

Score	N	Percent
0/41.67	110	26.57
41.68/50.0	119	28.74
50.1/71.33	82	19.81
71.34/100	103	24.88
Total	414	100

To further investigate whether questions about attitudes toward immigrants were subject to a social desirability bias, I looked at similar questions and compared responses asked by the World Values Survey WVS) in Germany. Respondents are asked to mention which groups from a list they would not like to have as neighbors. In the German WVS sample,

smaller percentages of respondents in the sixth wave (2010-2014) mentioned that they would not like to have people of a different race (14.8%), immigrants/foreign workers (21.4%), people of a different religion (14.1%), or people that speak a different language (13.4%).[38] Although the question type, time frame, and sample (five electoral districts versus a national sample) are different, these findings from the WVS provide some evidence that respondents in the present study were slightly more willing to answer questions about their attitudes towards immigrant groups than were respondents in other surveys like the WVS. This comparison implies that the extent to which social desirability bias is introduced in my sample is limited.

Plan of Analysis

The research question motivating this work is: under what conditions do individuals opt out of the political mainstream and vote for the far-right? The research question motivating this work is: under what conditions do individuals opt out of the political mainstream and vote for the far-right? In my analysis I follow Lieberman (2005) in combining quantitative and qualitative analyses. Using mixed methods, the approach of this work is twofold. First, in Chapter V I use a quantitative approach to understand which factors mediate or heighten the likelihood of an individual casting a vote for the far-right party. Second, in Chapter VI, I use a qualitative approach to corroborate the findings of the quantitative analysis and further understand what separates far-right voters for voters for other parties. Coupling these two approaches, I seek to trace what motivates people to vote for the far-right and to understand how they make sense of, rationalize, and justify their right-wing support.

38 Variables V37 (different race), V39 (immigrants/foreign workers), V41 (different religion), and V44 (different language) from Wave 6 (2010-2014) of the World Values Survey. From: Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.). 2014. World Values Survey: Round Six - Country-Pooled Datafile Version: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp. Madrid: JD Systems Institute.

Chapter V. Integration and Modeling the Far-Right Vote

In this chapter, I test the hypothesis that individuals who have populist far-right attitudes and who "other" immigrants based on the perception that they are not integrating are more likely to vote for the far-right than those who do not. I test this hypothesis against the competing demand-side theories of economic grievances, ascriptive differences, and protest voting. Below, I lay out how I operationalize these concepts.

I run several regressions to test the competing hypothesis against my own using two sets of models. The first set predicts the likelihood of an individual reporting a vote for the far-right versus another party. The second set predicts the likelihood of the respondent ever voting for the AfD in the future. Several controls at the individual-level are included in both sets of models as a robustness check of the findings. I test the robustness of my findings to see whether as Arzheimer (2011) has shown, my results still uphold among those who not men, those who are only relatively young or old, and those with a moderate education.[39]

In a simple model of the key measures of attitudes toward immigration and immigrants related to my hypothesis, I find that the belief that immigrants are not integrated and a preference for decreasing the level of immigration is both positively and substantively related to a reported vote for the AfD in any election. I progressively add variables from this simple model to include measures of trust. In this second model, low levels of trust in institutions are also significantly related to a vote for the AfD. I next add in measures of trust in Chancellor Angela Merkel and sociodemographics to the models. When the measure of trust in Merkel is

[39] Arzheimer (2011) also documents that most studies also show that voters for the far-right have usually moderate to lower income. When running a simple model of just these socio-demographic characteristics, I find sex is the most significant predictor when all of the other SES variables are included in the model. I exclude a measure of income from the models presented in this chapter due to the large number of respondents who refused to answer this question in the survey (86/460 or 19 percent). However, when I include this variable my findings are in line with the literature as voters for the AfD tend to be of lower or moderate income.

added, a preference for lowering the level of immigration is no longer significant. Instead, a belief that immigrants are not integrated, distrust in Merkel and being male are the statistically significant predictors of a reported vote for the AfD.

In the second set of models, I employ the same independent variables to predict how likely the respondent would ever for the AfD, using OLS regression. The results of these models differ from the first set of models. In the full model to predict ever voting for the AfD, a preference for decreasing the level of immigration remains significant as does distrust in the press. The belief that immigrants are not integrated and distrust in Merkel, like in the first set of models, are both significantly associated with the likelihood of the respondent ever voting for the AfD. Taken together, the results of both sets of models lend support to my argument about immigrant integration and attitudes toward elites concerning their handling of immigration policy. Still, what Merkel represents and how low levels of confidence in her can be interpreted warrant further investigation. I investigate the measure of Merkel through the discussion of the models below. I also investigate the Merkel measure in the following chapter focused on the qualitative findings in which I examine the open-ended responses to questions that probe attitudes toward her and integration more deeply.

Data and Measures

I use the dataset described in the Data and Methods chapter to test my hypothesis. As outlined in the theory chapter, my hypothesis is that controlling for demographic and various measures of trust, individuals who categorize immigrants as "other" based on a perception that they are not integrating to the majority society are more likely to vote for the far-right than people who do not view immigrants in this way. I hypothesize that perceiving immigrants in this way is necessary, but not sufficient to predict far-right voter behavior. I argue that a greater

likelihood of voting for the far-right occurs when this perception is coupled with populist anti-establishment attitudes such as a lack of confidence in the government and politicians. When individuals view immigrants as not integrating and have populist anti-establishment attitudes, I argue that individuals use their vote for the far-right as a vote against the establishment and its policies, particularly immigration policies.

To test this hypothesis, I run a series of models. In the first set of models, the dependent variable is a reported vote for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in a previous election using the sample of people who reported voting in either the 2017 Bundestag election.[40] A reported vote for the AfD in any election (either state or federal in any year and first candidate vote or second party vote) is "1" whereas a reported vote for another party or not revealing which party the respondent voting for is "0."[41] Respondents who have voted for the AfD at any point with any vote are coded as "1" regardless of whether they voted for another party in addition to the AfD (i.e. second party vote was for AfD but first candidate vote was for another party).[42] In the second set of models, the dependent variable is a likely vote for the AfD in the future. This is a continuous measure where "0" is an answer of never, "1" is unlikely, "2" is maybe, "3" is

40 In the analyses presented in this chapter, 99 respondents of the 460 surveyed are excluded since they reported that they did not vote in the 2017 Bundestag election. 71 respondents said that they did not vote in the election, and 28 respondents refused to answer about whether then voted at all. This reduces the analytic N size.

41 Respondents who reported that they voted in the 2017 Bundestag election but who did not reveal which party they voted for are coded as "0" for this dependent variable. 54 of the 460 respondents to the survey said that they voted in the 2017 Bundestag election but did not reveal their party votes. These 54 respondents were included into the models helped to increase the number of observations. When I coded the dependent variable differently so that these observations were excluded in the models, the results did not significantly change.

42 A respondent saying that he or she voted for the AfD with their second (party) vote in the 2017 election and a different party with their first (candidate) vote accounts for only 11/50 respondents, or 22 percent of the cases. A respondent saying that he or she voted for the AfD with their first (candidate) vote in the 2017 election and a different party with their second (party) vote accounts for only 7/50 respondents, or 14 percent of the cases.

likely, and "4" is very likely.[43] For the dependent variables and the independent variables I discuss below, the full question wording of each measure is included in the Appendix B.

Building on social contact theory, my argument centers on the idea that people who "other" immigrants because they think they are not integrating are likely voters for the far-right. To capture this concept, I use an open-ended survey question that asked respondents "Can you think of any immigrant group that has NOT integrated here in Germany?" Respondents either said no, that they thought immigrants do integrate (40.7%), named a particular immigrant group as not integrating (49.6 %), that they thought immigrants in general do not integrate (9.8%). The survey question probed respondents to name a particular group. Turks were the most common group explicitly mentioned (11.7%), followed by Muslims (8.5%), Arabs (5.9%), and Africans/Blacks (2.8%). Other smaller immigrant groups collectively account for another 13.9 percent.

As discussed in the theory chapter, my hypothesis is about immigrant groups generally, rather than specific immigrant groups of a particular ethnicity, religion, or immigration status, or generation. As the responses to the question indicate, I must acknowledge that differentiation between immigrant groups does occur. However, the affirmative responses to this question, whether they are about a particular group or about immigrants in general, imply the sizable presence of perceived "otherness," the failure or inability of immigrants to fit into the German nation. For the analysis I created a dummy variable (Immigrants Not Integrated), coded "1" if the respondent named (any) group or said generally no immigrant groups integrate and "0" if the respondent did not name a group or said more generally that they thought everyone was integrated.

[43] The question wording for this variable is: "What is the likelihood of you ever voting for the AfD?" with the close-ended responses as above.

I test competing hypotheses about anti-immigration and anti-immigrant attitudes against my hypothesis about views of immigrant integration by including a series of other measures. A great deal of literature has shown that individuals who are concerned about immigration at the country level are more likely to vote for the far-right than those who do not express this concern. I capture attitudes toward immigration using two different survey items.

The first measure is any mention of immigration in the open-ended question asked at the beginning of the survey of what respondents thought was the biggest problem in Germany today. Responses were hand-coded and sorted into the most mentioned issues. Responses such as "immigration," "too many immigrants," "migration," and "refugees" were coded as related to immigration. Collectively, concerns about immigration were the most mentioned problem and accounted for 28 percent of the responses to the question. Any mention of immigration was coded as "1" and mentions of other problems were coded as "0."[44] The second measure of attitudes toward immigration is also coded as a dummy variable. Interviewers asked respondents whether they wanted immigration decreased, kept at the same level, or decreased. I coded those who said that they wanted the level of immigration to decrease as "1" and those who said they wanted to immigration level to increase or be kept at its present level as "0."

As scholars studying the far-right have repeatedly shown, negative attitudes toward immigrants and a fear of immigrants are strong predictors of votes for the far-right. I include two separate measures of anti-immigrant attitudes and one measure of fear of immigrants. A measure of intolerance toward out-groups is based on six survey items that ask respondents

[44] The question wording for this variable is: "What do you think is the biggest problem facing Germany today?" The probe interviewers were instructed to say to the respondent if he or she could not answer was: "If you could fix one thing, what would it be?" The other categories mentioned by at least five percent of respondents included "politics, government, politicians," "unemployment," "poverty, inequality," "social/public services," and "the AfD, far-right populism."

about their comfort with living in a neighborhood where their neighbors were mostly "Eastern European," "Turkish," "Asian," "Black," "Muslim," and "Syrian."[45] The response options are numeric, ranging from 0 if the respondent said they were very uncomfortable or 100 if he or she was very comfortable As discussed in the theory section, my focus is on immigrants generally to include non-ethnic and or non-cultural outgroups of any immigration status (i.e. refugee, asylum-seeker, any generation immigrant). This focus justifies combining the specific out-groups for my analysis. When the six items are factor analyzed, the different items are found to represent a single dimension, with Cronbach's alpha equal to 0.93. I combined the scores provided by the respondent for each group in a new variable to represent an average across all minority groups.[46] This variable also ranged from 0 to 100 and had a mean value of 55 across all respondents.

As has been demonstrated by Fitzgerald, et al. (2017) and others, crime is a critical issue in the formation of attitudes toward immigration. The logic of this belief is that an increase in immigration leads to an uptick in criminal activity. This belief tends to be stoked by the media and by far-right parties, particularly in Germany where, as Hestermann (2019) has shown, the AfD distorts coverage of criminal activity committed by immigrants to make it seem as if immigrants are disproportionately responsible for crime. This, in turn, as Michele

[45] The full question wording for this question was: "If you were to move to a different neighborhood, how comfortable on a scale of 100 to 0 in which 100 means very comfortable and 0 means very uncomfortable, would you be living in a neighborhood where your neighbors were MOSTLY…" with the groups described above in addition to "German" as a category. Respondents were also shown a show card with a feeling thermometer for this question.

[46] Average scores were created using the scores given for any or all of the groups respondents for which respondents provided a score. If a respondent did not provide a score for a particular group/groups, the average was calculated with that item missing. For example, if a respondent did not give a score for one group, the average was calculated across the other five groups rather than counted as a "0" for the sixth group. This was done in an effort to increase the number of observations in the models. The number of respondents who refused to provide a score for any of these groups was 46. The number of respondents who refused to give a score for the specific groups are as follows: Turkish (57), Asian (67), Black (66), Muslim (64), Syrian (71). When I exclude those who refused to provide a score for some groups from the model and decrease the number of observations, the results do not change.

Gelfand (2019) argues, leads people who feel threatened to be more likely to vote for far-right parties and leaders who stir up fear and say that they alone can fix it. I consider the belief that immigrants cause crime to be an indicator of fear of immigrants. To capture this fear, I coded as "1" any mention of immigrants being associated with crime when respondents answered a series of open-ended questions about immigration.[47] I coded as "0" when immigrants and crime were not brought up in any or all of these open-ended responses.

A great deal of scholarship has been devoted to examining the contact and threat hypotheses. The contact hypothesis posits that increased contact and diversity lead to positive attitudes toward out-groups, while the threat hypothesis posits that greater interaction leads to the formation of negative attitudes. I test the contact and threat hypotheses with one survey item that asks how often respondents interact with immigrants. This variable is a continuous measure where "0" is very often or a self-volunteered response of every day, "1" is often, "2" is sometimes, "3" is not very often, "4" is never or a self-volunteered response of "there are no migrants here."

Attitudes toward immigration and immigrants are often featured most prominently by demand-side scholars studying votes for the far-right. However, the protest vote literature theorizes that individuals vote for a far-right party as a form of negative protest that has less to do with the parties' policy positions or ideology and more to do with the faults of other more mainstream parties. As Norris (2005) summarized, the protest vote literature formulates negativity as: generally intolerant attitudes, alienated feelings, or a lack of social capital, or as a deep disaffection with the political system and a lack of confidence in democratic institutions.

[47] The questions I used to code this variable are as follows: when the respondent said immigration was the biggest problem in Germany (Q2) and said crime in the follow-up why (Q3), immigration was mentioned as the biggest problem in their neighborhood (Q19) and said crime in the follow-up why (Q20), and/or mentioned crime as a reason (Q26) for thinking that immigrants are not integrated in Germany (Q25).

Displeasure with government performance over key issues is a third formulation, which I examine in the qualitative analysis chapter with open-ended responses about how respondents think Germany is handling the integration of refugees.

I include measures of two formulations of protest voting in the models. Alienated feelings are captured in the variable "Trust No One." This variable was created based on the open-ended response provided to the question: "When it comes to information about politics in this country, whose opinion do you trust the most and whose do you trust the least?" Respondents who said "no one" or "myself" were coded as "1" while respondents who named someone or something like a form of media were coded as "0." For the purposes of this study, I assume that people who said that they trusted no one or only themselves to be a good proxy of feelings of alienation.

The second formulation of protest voting is about disaffection with the political system and/or a lack of confidence in political institutions. I capture these feelings using a series of survey questions. Similar to the level of comfort toward ethnic minorities question, respondents were asked to assign a numeric score between 0 and 100 about confident they were in several institutions, where 0 meant no confidence and 100 meant total confidence. Five items ask respondents about their confidence in institutions including the local government, parliament, the legal system, political parties, and the European Union. I factor analyzed these items and combined them (Cronbach's alpha = 0.88) to create a score that is an average across all six institutions.[48]

48 Average scores were created using the scores given for any or all of the institutions respondents for which respondents provided a score. If a respondent did not provide a score for a particular institution, the average was calculated with that item missing. For example, if a respondent did not give a score for one institution, the average was calculated across the other five institutions rather than counted as a "0" for the sixth group. This was done in an effort to increase the number of observations in the models. The total number of missing observations from the combined average variable is 8. The number of respondents who refused to give a score

Separately, I include measures of trust in the police, the press, and Chancellor Angela Merkel. As scholars such as Meaney and Schaefer (2018) have shown, the police are often sympathizers of the far-right, an association that seems to be especially prevalent in Germany. Evidence of this connection is seemingly apparent in incidents similar to the Chemnitz protests in August 2018, when the German police leaked an arrest warrant containing the full name of the immigrant suspect in the murder of a German man. The arrest warrant was subsequently tweeted out by the founder of Pegida (the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) and launched what Kate Connolly of The Guardian called "groups breaking off into smaller mobs and hunting foreigners through the city streets in riots" (Connolly 2018). As a result of this incident and other apparent links between the police and the AfD and Pegida, many Germans increasingly use the term "Pegizei" to describe the police, combining *Polizei* and Pegida. Due to the perception of a close association of the police to the far-right, I include a measure of trust in the police into the models. As with the other confidence variables, the measure is numeric, from 0-100 where 0 is no confidence and 100 indicates complete confidence.

The term "fake news" only came into use in recent years after popularization by Donald Trump, in Germany *die Luegenpresse*, meaning "lying press," was also used to describe the same phenomenon by the Nazis during National Socialism. The term was revitalized by Pegida beginning in 2014 and 2015 as an accusation against the media of not telling the truth about crimes committed by immigrants (Griffing 2017) and was subsequently used by the AfD (BBC 2020). Given this association, distrust in the press should be related to

for the specific institutions are as follows: Police (16), Legal System (17), Local Government (51), Political Parties (22), European Union (31). When I exclude those who refused to provide a score for some institutions from the model and decrease the number of observations, the results do not change.

votes for the AfD. I include a measure of confidence in the press into the models, and as with the other confidence variables, the measure is numeric with a range of 0-100 where 0 indicates full confidence.

I include a measure of confidence in Chancellor Angela Merkel on the same 0-100 scale. Due to her long tenure in office as Chancellor since 2005, Merkel is seen as a figure of the establishment. However, her decisions to open Germany's border during the 2015 refugee crisis and her subsequent handling of immigration and integration also intimately tied her to issues about decisions about immigration.[49] Indeed, Merkel has been repeatedly depicted in posters by supporters of the AfD and Pegida in a burqa has been called *Mutti Multikulti* or "multicultural mom" (BBC 2020). Similarly, "migration politics" is often deemed *Merkels Migrationspolitik* in a way that is analogous to how in the U.S. the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 is often called "Obamacare" given President Barack Obama's connection to the act. In addition to connecting her to immigration, the AfD rallies its supporters to chant "Angela Merkel must go" at public events and supports websites with the same slogan.[50] Other surveys that include measures of confidence in Merkel among Germans also indicate that views of her seem to be related to her role in immigration. For example, in 2014 before the wave of migration into Germany, a Pew Research Center survey found that 81 percent of Germans said they had confidence in Merkel, compared to only 68 percent in 2018.[51]

49 Merkel made two decisions in August/September 2015 that refugees and immigrants to come to Germany. She first temporarily suspended an EU law that required asylum seekers to return to the country they entered and then relaxed the border with Austria to let more refugees enter Germany. As a result, more than 1.4 million asylum seekers, or nearly half of all applicants across the EU, entered Germany. See CNN for more background on Merkel's role in the refugee crisis: https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/06/europe/angela-merkel-migration-germany-intl/index.html

50 Original German of this phrase" "Angela Merkel rücktritt jetzt" or "Angela Merkel muss weg" See also: https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/2175950/merkels-exit-leaves-germanys-far-right-afd-struggling-hate-figure

51 Data retrieved from Pew Research Center's Global Indicators Database: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/database/indicator/29/.

Thus, the measure of confidence in Merkel is not a clear operationalization of a single concept. It can measure either a lack of confidence in Merkel as a member of the political establishment or it can be a measure of dissatisfaction with Merkel and her handling of migration issues, or it can be capturing elements of each.

Finally, I also include several socio-demographic variables in the models. I include a variable of unemployment, which is coded as "0" if no one in the household experienced unemployment in the previous two years, "1" if someone in the household other than the respondent was unemployed during the same time frame, or "2" if the respondent said he or she was personally unemployed in the past two years. I use this measure of unemployment as a measure of the social class of individuals, not as a proxy for job competition between immigrants and natives nor an indicator of economic crisis, as others such as Golder (2003) and Sniderman and his coauthors (2004) have done. I include this variable as a means of testing whether far-right parties draw votes from a social class of people of a lower or moderate social class.

I also include sex, age, and university education as additional indicators of socio-demographic status to see how the results of my models perform relative to the work of others who find them to be associated with the vote for the far-right. Sex is coded as "0" for females and "1" for males, while age is a numeric variable with a range of 18-93 in the sample.[52]

Full question wording for each survey year is: "Now I'm going to read a list of political leaders. For each, tell me how much confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs - a lot of confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence, or no confidence at all: German Chancellor Angela Merkel." Confidence combines "a lot of confidence" and "some confidence" responses. No Confidence combines "not too much confidence" and "no confidence at all."

[52] Previous research summarized by Arzheimer (2011) and others has shown that the relationship between age and the vote for the far-right is nonlinear. Those who are relatively young and old are usually found to be more likely to vote for the far-right. In the models presented below, I include a numeric variable for age. I also ran the

University education is coded as "1" for respondents who reported that they had obtained a bachelor's degree or higher as their highest level of education. Those whose highest level of education was less than a bachelor's degree or were current students were coded as "0." The categories of education in the German system are included in the survey questionnaire in Appendix B, as are the question wording of variables included in the analyses discussed below.

Results and Discussion of Models to Predict Reported AfD Vote in Any Election

To demonstrate the results, I present tables that contain the coefficients of a series of logistic regressions. I use logistic models because the dependent variable is dichotomous. Due to the difficulty in interpreting logistic regression results beyond their significance and whether the independent variable has a positive or negative relationship to the outcome variable, I also calculate and present marginal effects. Table 6 presents the results of unweighted[53] logistic regressions in which all districts are pooled and in which the dependent variable is a reported vote for the AfD in any election.

Model 1 is a basic model that includes key measures of attitudes toward immigration and immigrants. The coefficient for immigrants not integrated is positively signed and statistically significant as is a preference for decreasing the level of immigration. The measure used to operationalize fear of immigrants, that immigrants cause crime, is not statistically significant nor is a belief that immigration is the biggest problem in the country, contact with immigrants, nor comfort with ethnic minorities. Taken collectively, the results of the model show that the belief that immigrants are not integrated and a preference for decreasing the level

models with age as a categorical (young, middle age, old) as well as an age-squared variable. The results do not change; age in any of these forms is also not statistically significant in the models.

53 The data are unweighted due to the sampling design. The electoral districts are roughly equal in size, as is prescribed by the German electoral commission.

of immigration are greater predictors of votes for the far-right than competing explanations. The results of the model show no support for competing explanations about the prevalence of immigration as a national issue, a fear of immigrants, the contact or threat hypotheses, nor intolerance toward out-groups in driving votes for the far-right. One interpretation of these results in the case of Germany is that the scale of immigration has caused some unease among people as they think that immigration is happening too quickly, that groups cannot integrate into the German culture. I investigate whether this interpretation is warranted in the qualitative chapter by examining the open-ended comments respondents gave for why they thought the level of immigration should be decreased and what they thought about how the integration of immigrants was going in Germany.

Table 6: Predictors of Reported AfD Vote in Any Election

	(1) Logit coeff	(2) Logit coeff	(3) Logit coeff	(4) Logit coeff	(5) Logit coeff
Attitudes Toward Immigrants/Immigration					
Immigrants Not Integrated	1.040*	1.064*	1.068*	1.474*	1.492*
	(0.487)	(0.503)	(0.543)	(0.689)	(0.750)
Decrease Immigration Level	1.728**	1.365**	1.110	1.106*	0.908
	(0.482)	(0.525)	(0.573)	(0.541)	(0.575)
Immigration Biggest Problem	0.496	0.451	0.417	0.881*	0.808
	(0.375)	(0.386)	(0.403)	(0.445)	(0.472)
Immigrants Crime	0.613	0.499	0.249	0.812	0.572
	(0.445)	(0.464)	(0.457)	(0.513)	(0.510)
Contact with Immigrants	-0.0291	0.00958	0.00625	0.143	0.0912
	(0.137)	(0.144)	(0.154)	(0.184)	(0.192)
Comfort with Ethnic Minorites	-0.0131	-0.00270	-0.00381	-0.00505	-0.00462
Objects of Confidence	(0.00821)	(0.00808)	(0.00849)	(0.00989)	(0.0104)
Confidence in Institutions		-0.0312*	-0.00414	-0.0266	0.00219
		(0.0155)	(0.0208)	(0.0162)	(0.0233)
Confidence Press		-0.00502	0.000702	-0.00931	-0.00551
		(0.00872)	(0.00930)	(0.00930)	(0.0103)
Confidence Police		0.00594	-0.00200	-0.000241	-0.00668
		(0.0103)	(0.0118)	(0.0136)	(0.0153)
Trust No One		0.174	0.0850	0.00222	0.0303
		(0.407)	(0.422)	(0.478)	(0.504)
Confidence Merkel			-0.0316**		-0.0300*
Socio-Demographics			(0.0111)		(0.0123)
Household Unemployment in Last 2 Years				0.841*	0.863*
				(0.393)	(0.420)
Sex				1.821**	1.742**
				(0.489)	(0.506)

Age				0.00146	0.00789
				(0.0149)	(0.0154)
University Education				0.402	0.269
				(0.448)	(0.474)
Constant	-3.249**	-2.248*	-1.861	-4.029**	-4.110**
	(0.828)	(0.975)	(1.003)	(1.483)	(1.447)
Observations	280	272	271	254	253
Pseudo R-squared	0.2038	0.2491	0.3020	0.3537	0.3916

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.0

Model 2 adds to the simple model measures of confidence in governmental institutions, the press, the police, and the measure of social alienation related to the protest vote "trust no one." The belief that immigrants are not integrated and a preference for decreasing the level of immigration remain positively signed and statistically significant, while the other measures of attitudes toward immigration and immigrants remain insignificant. The measure of confidence in institutions is negatively signed and statistically significant. The significance demonstrates support for the one formulation of the protest vote, that votes for the far-right are related to disaffection with the political system and/or a lack of confidence in political institutions. There is support for this formulation of the protest vote, but not another formulation concerning alienation, as the "trust no one" measure is not statistically significant. The results also do not show support for the association between the press, which has been sometimes deemed die *Luegenpresse*, nor the Police also sometimes deemed *Pegizei*. As a whole, the second model adds to the interpretation of the scale of immigration and find that deep disaffection and a lack of confidence in political institutions are also associated with votes for the far-right AfD in Germany.

In the third model, I add the measure of confidence in Merkel. As discussed previously, this measure may be picking up a lack of confidence in Merkel as a member of the political establishment or dissatisfaction with Merkel and her handling of migration issues. The belief that immigrants are not integrated remains statistically significant, but other than this when confidence in Merkel is added to the model, several things change. First, this model does a better job of explaining the variance in the sample as the pseudo r-squared increases. Second, distrust in political institutions and a preference for decreasing the level of immigration lose

statistical significance. The confidence measure of Merkel is negatively signed, meaning that low levels of confidence in Merkel are associated with the vote for the AfD, and is statistically significant.

These changes indicate that confidence in Merkel is highly related to the vote for the AfD and that levels of confidence in Merkel are correlated with a preference for decreasing the level of immigration as well as confidence in political institutions. Indeed, these variables are correlated: confidence in Merkel and a preference for decreasing the level of immigration are correlated (r =.43), while a lack of confidence in political institutions is correlated even more highly with confidence in Merkel (.68). Thus, the details of the models and the correlations indicate that levels of confidence in Merkel are related to both levels of confidence in institutions as well as immigration policy. The stronger correlation between the institutions and Merkel should be interpreted with some caution, as the measures for each were taken in the same battery of questions.

To better understand the role that confidence in Merkel plays, I remove the measure of Merkel in Model 4 and add in the socio-demographic measures. I add in the socio-demographic measures here to test how these variables contribute to the vote for the AfD and to see whether these variables mute the effect of the immigrant integration variable.[54] The belief that immigrants are not integrated remains statistically significant, and in line with the body of work on far-right voters, household unemployment in the previous two years and being male are both positively and significantly associated with the vote for the AfD. A preference for

54 As noted earlier, I exclude a measure of income from the models presented in this chapter due to the large number of respondents who refused to answer this question in the survey (86/460 or 19 percent). However, when I include this variable my findings are in line with the literature as voters for the AfD tend to be of lower or moderate income.

decreasing the level of immigration becomes significant at the 0.05 level in this model, whereas in the previous models it was significant at the 0.01 level, which lends evidence to support the notion that the socio-demographic measures may play a larger role in driving votes for the AfD. With the measure of confidence in Merkel excluded from the model, a preference for decreasing the level of immigration becomes statistically significant again but the measure of confidence in institutions does not. This lends support to the notion that attitudes against Merkel are likely more indicative of her immigration policy than her as a figure of the political establishment, an idea I study more in the qualitative chapter using the open-ended comments of respondents. Finally, in Model 4, saying that immigration is the biggest problem facing Germany today is also positively signed and statistically significant. It is not clear why this measure was not significant in the earlier models also without the confidence in Merkel measure.

When the measure of Merkel gets added back into the model in Model 5, saying immigration is the biggest problem is no longer significant. In Model 5, as expected, the belief that immigrants are not integrated, a lack of confidence in Merkel, the experience of unemployment in the household in the previous last two years and being male are associated with the vote for the AfD. The pseudo r-squared is 0.39, meaning that the model performs well in capturing the variance in the sample. In both Model 3 and Model 5, in which measures of Merkel are included, the preference for decreasing the level of immigration loses statistical significance. These results provide further support for the notion that it is Merkel's pro-immigration stance, rather than her role as a member of the political establishment, that drives the results.

Because logistic coefficients are difficult to interpret, Table 7 reports the marginal effects as predicted probabilities of the statistically significant variables in Model 5 at different values when all predictors are held at their means. In this table, the numbers report the values at which the variables are statistically significant predictors of voting for the AfD. Not all values of each variable are statistically significant.

Table 7: Marginal Effects of Likelihood of AfD Vote in Any Election

	Predicted Probability
Immigrant Integration	
Immigrants are Integrated	0.03
Immigrants are Not Integrated	0.13***
Change 0-1	0.10
Confidence in Merkel	
1. No Confidence	0.23*
10	0.37*
30	0.16
40	0.04
50	0.07
70	0.05
80. Confidence	0.02
Change 0-80	+0.21
Change 10-80	0.35
Household Unemployment in Last 2 Years	
No One in the household	0.07*
Someone else in household	0.07
Respondent	0.37±
Change 0-2	+0.30
Sex	
Female	0.03*
Male	0.17**
Change 0-1	0.14
Observations	184

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ± 0.10

Note: The values shown are the marginal effects as predicted probabilities.

at different values when all predictors are held at their means.

Overall, the results demonstrate strong support for the hypothesis that views of immigrant integration are associated with votes for the far-right. The belief that immigrants are not integrated achieves the highest level of statistical significance at the 0.01 level compared to the other predictors of votes for the AfD. Substantively, when all of the other predictors in Model 5 are held at their means, people who believe that immigrants are not integrated are 10 percent more likely to vote for the AfD than someone who thinks immigrants are integrated (13 percent versus 3 percent). Levels of confidence in Merkel are also strongly related to the vote for the AfD. Holding other variables constant, someone who gave a score of 0 has a 23 percent predicted probability of voting for the AfD, while those who give a score of 10 have a predicted probability of 37 percent. These predicted probabilities are significant at the 0.05 level. When scores of confidence in Merkel are higher than 10 (marked at 30 on the table as this was the next provided score by respondents), the respondent is neither statistically nor substantively predicted to vote for the AfD when all other variables are held at their mean values.

Table 7 also demonstrates that sex is positively and significantly associated with the probability of voting for the AfD. As shown on the table, men are 14 percent more likely than women to vote for the AfD (17 percent versus 3 percent) holding other variables constant. The association with unemployment and the vote for the AfD is less clear. The model predicts that respondents who have been unemployed in the previous two years have a 37 percent predicted probability of voting for the AfD, compared to only 7 percent among those who report being employed. However this finding should be interpreted with some caution given that being unemployed is only significant at the 0.10 level, whereas experiencing unemployment is

significant at the 0.05 level. The change in significance is likely due to the small number of respondents who report being unemployed, as only about 10 percent reported that they were unemployed over the last two years.

The values reported in Table 9 only reveal the individual impact of each variable on the predicted probability of voting for the AfD. Figure 2 depicts the relationship between the key variables related to my hypothesis: the belief that immigrants are not integrated, confidence in Merkel, and the vote for the AfD. The solid line denotes the predicted probability of voting for the AfD when the belief that immigrants are not integrated is held at different levels of trust in Merkel and all of the other variables are held at their means. The lighter space surrounding the solid line are 95 percent confidence intervals. When the confidence interval marking falls below the solid line at 0 on the x-axis, this denotes that the relationship is not statistically significant at conventional levels. The y values do not extend past 80 as this was the highest score provided for confidence in Merkel among the respondents.

Figure 2. Average Marginal Effects of Belief that Immigrants are Not Integrated at Levels of Confidence in Merkel on Predicted Probability



As Figure 2 shows, the predicted probability of voting for the AfD among people who think immigrants are not integrated is highest when levels of confidence in Merkel are less than 20. When scores are greater than this, except for a score of 50, the predicted probability is not statistically significant as the plotted confidence interval falls below the zero line. A score of 50 falls within the bounds of the confidence interval most likely due to the tendency of many respondents to provide a score of 50 on the 0-100 feeling thermometer scale. The prediction depicted in the figure is that those who give a score of 50 for Merkel and believe that immigrants are not integrated are a little more than 10 percent likely to vote for the AfD. This is low compared to those who think the same about immigrants but give a score of 0 or 10 for Merkel. When all of the other variables are held at their means, people who think

immigrants are not integrated and give a score of 0 or 10 for Merkel who are about 25 percent likely to vote for the AfD.

Considered as a whole, the results of the analysis lend strong support to the hypothesis that what people think about immigrant integration is associated with votes for the far-right. However, my hypothesis that beliefs about immigrant integration alone are not sufficient to induce votes for the far-right is not fully supported by the evidence. The measure of immigrant integration is highly statistically significant in each iteration of the models and has a strong marginal effect. These two indicators imply that the belief that immigrants are not integrated alone is sufficient to induce votes for the far-right. However, the results shown in Figure 1 lend support to my notion given that when the belief that immigrants are not integrated is combined with low levels of trust in Merkel, the predicted probability of voting for the AfD radically increases. In the next section, I explore whether these same relationships are present among those who say they would likely ever vote for the far-right in the future.

Results and Discussion of Models to Predict Likelihood of Ever Voting for the AfD

The main goal of this research is to investigate why people vote for the far-right. However, I am also interested in who says they are a likely voter for far-right parties, as this group represents some potential vote share for the AfD. As discussed in the literature review, an individual saying he or she favors or would vote for the far-right party is different than actually voting for the party come election day. Still, due to my auxiliary interest in examining likely voters for the far-right, I also model how likely it is for respondents to say they would ever vote for the AfD in the future. In these models, the dependent variable is a likely vote for the AfD in the future. This is a continuous measure where "0" is an answer of never, "1" is

unlikely, "2" is maybe, "3" is likely, and "4" is very likely.[55] Since the dependent variable is continuous, I use OLS regression and the predictor variables are the same as in the previous logit models. These models include more observations than the logit models in that respondents answered the question about their likelihood of ever voting for the AfD than did those who reported their vote choice. Each model reported in Table 8 includes the same set of predictor variables for each model and is numbered the same as in the logit models.

As was the case in the logit models, in each iteration of the OLS models to predict the likelihood of ever voting for the AfD, the coefficient for the variable that captures the belief that immigrants are not integrated is positively signed and statistically significant. In the first through fourth models, this variable is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, while in the fifth model with the full set of predictors, it is significant at the 0.05 level. Taken collectively, the OLS models lend provide support for my main prediction: people who think immigrants are not integrated are more likely to vote for the far-right. Similar to the logit models, low levels of confidence in Merkel are also significantly associated with the likelihood of ever voting for the AfD.

[55] The question wording for this variable is: "What is the likelihood of you ever voting for the AfD?" with the close-ended responses as above.

Table 8: Predictors of Ever Voting for the AfD

	(1) OLS coeff	(2) OLS coeff	(3) OLS coeff	(4) OLS coeff	(5) OLS coeff
Attitudes Toward Immigrants/Immigration					
Immigrants Not Integrated	0.331**	0.353**	0.314**	0.347**	0.316*
	(0.118)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.124)	(0.126)
Decrease Immigration Level	0.731**	0.583**	0.508**	0.617**	0.545**
	(0.128)	(0.122)	(0.124)	(0.127)	(0.132)
Immigration Biggest Problem	0.231	0.183	0.165	0.271	0.243
	(0.159)	(0.166)	(0.163)	(0.177)	(0.174)
Immigrants Crime	0.347	0.318	0.263	0.361	0.308
	(0.219)	(0.216)	(0.214)	(0.222)	(0.220)
Contact with Immigrants	0.00388	0.00390	0.0165	0.0225	0.0245
	(0.0505)	(0.0509)	(0.0503)	(0.0562)	(0.0555)
Comfort with Ethnic Minorites	-0.00546*	-0.00138	-0.00171	-0.000644	-0.000824
Objects of Confidence	(0.00281)	(0.00282)	(0.00284)	(0.00291)	(0.00293)
Confidence in Institutions		-0.00897	-0.000398	-0.00760	-0.000187
		(0.00497)	(0.00575)	(0.00498)	(0.00577)
Confidence Press		-0.00867**	-0.00687*	-0.00756*	-0.00636*
		(0.00283)	(0.00276)	(0.00295)	(0.00295)
Confidence Police		0.00651	0.00427	0.00481	0.00310
		(0.00354)	(0.00344)	(0.00370)	(0.00357)
Trust No One		0.0420	0.00429	0.0154	-0.0136
		(0.142)	(0.141)	(0.144)	(0.143)
Confidence Merkel			-0.00861**		-0.00709*
Socio-Demographics			(0.00303)		(0.00320)
Household Unemployment in Last 2 Years				-0.0110	0.0163
				(0.103)	(0.102)
Sex				0.229	0.190
				(0.122)	(0.123)

Age				-0.00311	-0.00151
				(0.00371)	(0.00362)
University Education				0.0563	0.0237
				(0.130)	(0.126)
Constant	0.331	0.633*	0.748*	0.536	0.578
	(0.210)	(0.295)	(0.291)	(0.326)	(0.327)
Observations	323	312	311	292	291
R-squared	0.209	0.276	0.299	0.277	0.292

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Although still supportive of my hypothesis, other variables are also statistically significant at conventional levels in all of the models, including in Model 5 with all of the predictors. A preference for decreasing the level of immigration is significant at the 0.01 level and is positively signed. Not only is this measure highly statistically significant, but it is also substantively significant. Those who express a preference for decreasing the level of immigration rather than saying that it should stay the same or increase are more likely to say they would vote for the AfD. This finding can be interpreted that concerns about the level of immigration-a key rallying point of the AfD with their calls to close Germany's borders and deport current immigrants-is a principal concern among those who say they are likely to vote for the AfD. However the fact that this measure was not significant in the logit models predicting reported votes for the party indicates that it is not necessary to explaining votes for the AfD. The same can be said about a lack of confidence in the press. In each of the models presented in Table 8, a lack of confidence in the press are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better. Though not entirely conclusive, this finding implies that likely voters for the AfD may have some anxieties about the quality and validity of the information shared by the media.

As in the logistic regression models, the results of the OLS models show no support for competing explanations about the prevalence of immigration as a national issue, a fear of immigrants, or the contact or threat hypotheses. In the first model of Table 8, there is some support for the notion that intolerance toward out-groups due to race/ethnicity or religion as captured in the comfort with ethnic minorities measure may play a role in driving votes for the far-right when only the immigration and immigrant predictors are considered. However, this variable loses significance when the confidence measures in institutions, the press, police,

and "trust no one" as well as the socio-demographic measures are included in the model. Similarly, there is little support for the association between the police and the far-right, as well as the protest vote formulation concerned with a lack of confidence in political institutions, as neither measure is statistically significant in any model. The same can be said about the protest vote formulation about alienation: the "trust no one" measure is not statistically significant in the models.

As in the logistic regression models, there is strong support for the role of confidence in Merkel and the belief that immigrants are not integrating in each model shown in Table 8. In the final model with all of the predictor variables, the Merkel measure's coefficient shows that the likelihood of ever voting for the AfD increases by 7 percent for each 10-point decrease in the level of confidence in Merkel on the 0-100 scale when all of the other measures are held constant. The strength of the belief that immigrants are not integrated is even greater. Those who have this belief are 32 percent more likely to say they would ever vote for the AfD compared to those who think immigrants are integrated. Taken together, this lends strong support to my central hypothesis regarding views about immigrant integration and attitudes toward Merkel.

Summary

In one sense my findings largely replicate the findings of other scholars who find that anti-immigrant attitudes and distrust in politicians are associated with votes for the far-right. My findings, however, add to the body of work by looking at beliefs about immigrant integration, an underexplored measure of anti-immigrant attitudes. I tested this measure against competing measures of anti-immigrant immigration and find it is a stronger predictor

of votes for the far-right. This finding, along with the finding that distrust in Merkel is a significant driver of votes for the AfD, supports my argument that votes for the far-right are most likely found among those who have populist anti-establishment attitudes and think that immigrants are not integrated.

However, there is more nuance to be explored. In some of the models, distrust in Chancellor Angela Merkel is the strongest relative predictor of votes for the AfD. As shown above, when the measure of confidence in Merkel is included in the model, the preference for decreasing the level of immigration is no longer significant. This lends support to the idea that a lack of confidence in Merkel is more an assessment of her immigration policy than an indicator of anti-establishment attitudes writ large. In the next chapter I further investigate the findings about Merkel as well as attitudes toward immigrant integration by analyzing relevant comments and observations offered by the survey respondents.

Chapter VI. Integration and Personal Explanations for Far-Right Voting

In this chapter, I examine open-ended comments respondents provided to the questionnaire and AfD voter addendum to interpret the quantitative findings. I look at responses to questions that ask about motivation for vote choice, deeper concerns about immigrants, and frustration with the government and political elites. The statements offered by the respondents confirm my interpretation of the quantitative analyses and provide further support for the hypothesis that AfD voters view immigrants as not integrating and lack confidence in Merkel due to her handling of immigration policy. The explanations from AfD voters show that they are generally concerned about immigrant integration and that they place blame for the ills of immigration on Merkel more so than do voters for other parties. When asked explicitly about why they voted for the party, AfD voters largely say that they voted for the party in protest against current politics and often explicitly refer to Merkel and her immigration policies.

Throughout this chapter, I offer illustrative quotations grouped by theme to show the attitudes and beliefs that separate far-right voters from non-far-right voters in my sample. To analyze the qualitative results, I read through each open-ended question related to the topics of immigrants, immigration, confidence, and justifications for vote choice. I grouped responses into categories based on the content of the respondents' answers. The quotations shared in this chapter are meant to be illustrative of the larger themes I found in the respondents' remarks—the quotes are not representative of a lone respondent. The quotations I have included provide a greater richness about the role views of immigrants play in informing voter behavior and how respondents blame Merkel for issues with immigration.

Unless otherwise noted by parentheses next to the description of the individual, the quotations are from an AfD voter.

I organize this chapter in two sections. In the first section, I analyze questions related to views of immigrant integration. In the second section, I look at exposure to the far-right party and probe motivations and justifications for voting for the party to test the protest voting component of my hypothesis.

Views About Immigrant Integration

In this section, I look at the answers respondents volunteered as part of their explanation of how comfortable they were with the prospect of living with immigrants and their views about immigrant integration. I find evidence to indicate that individuals, and AfD voters, in particular, are concerned about immigration and the lack of integration by immigrants. AfD voters express their concern about the societal impact of Chancellor Angela Merkel's decision to welcome immigrants to Germany in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis. The findings of this section provide further support and build on the findings from the quantitative analyses that a belief that immigrants do not integrate is associated with a vote for the far-right. Respondents raise concerns about the lack of immigrants' assimilation into German ways of life. Many respondents say that immigrants are creating "parallel societies" separate from German society.

This idea is supported by the explanations participants gave when assigning scores to denote their level of comfort with the prospect of living in communities with ethnic minorities and whether they thought any groups were not integrated in Germany. Although both voters for the far-right and voters for other parties and non-voters raise concerns about immigrants

and immigration, I find that voters for the far-right raise more concerns about how integrated a particular individual or group is. This seems to be a primary concern of voters for the far-right and only a tertiary concern for voters for other parties and non-voters.

Level of Immigrants' Integration

Concern about the level or degree of integration of individual immigrants or immigrant groups among AfD voters often took a general form in which no specific behaviors/practices were mentioned nor were any specific groups. Respondents provided scores about how comfortable they would be if they were to live in a neighborhood in which mostly ethnic minority groups lived. Respondents often volunteered additional justifications to help explain their answers. Many AfD voters said that their level of comfort is dependent on how integrated a particular individual or group is:

> Middle-aged woman in Dresden: *"It depends how integrated these groups or people are. For a clear decision you have to differentiate very strongly."*
>
> Older man in Hanau: *"They all need to become Germans first and assimilate."*
>
> Older woman in Dresden: *"It all depends on the people. If they are integrated, then I would feel comfortable."*
>
> Older man in Dresden: *"It doesn't matter which ethnic group my neighbors are as long as they behave orderly and they try to integrate and try to conform."*
>
> Young Russian-German man in Berlin: *"[I am comfortable if] they are well-integrated…[the other groups] they all do not integrate; us Russian Germans, we do integrate."*

These statements reflect the concern AfD voters have about immigrant integration. Many AfD voters justification of their view of immigrants depends upon immigrants' degree of integration and how they conform to German society.

This sentiment is echoed in the quotes from AfD voters interviewed by journalists. Reporting on the support for the AfD in Görlitz, Saxony near the Polish border for the Atlantic, Schultheis finds that many residents are frustrated with how immigrants behave (Schultheis 2019). Christina Lachmann, an older woman who supports the AfD shared that she thought refugee children and their families don't respect the public park by keeping it clean. She explains her opinion saying that refugees have a "different mentality," and "What they do at home, what they do with their families, that doesn't concern me—that's their problem. But on the streets, they need to adjust to us" (Schultheis 2019). Beliefs such as hers lend further support to the notion that AfD voters are concerned about how immigrants integrate and conform to the societal expectations AfD voters think exist in German society.

Respondents were asked to rate their level of comfort toward each minority ethnic group, but most respondents gave the same score for each group. Most AfD voters spoke about immigrants generally, while some referenced specific groups when discussing how comfortable they would be if they lived in neighborhoods with mostly ethnic minority groups. One of the most common justifications AfD respondents gave for different scores toward particular groups was that their level of comfort was dependent upon how assimilated they perceived the immigrant groups to be:

> Older man in Berlin: *"Turks, Muslims, Blacks need to assimilate, need to adapt our habits."*
>
> Middle-aged man in Dresden: *"Asians we know from the past; Turks have not all integrated although they have been here for a long time; [I] like the Asians; Muslims have too many children and one never knows what is up with them."*

In the statistical models presented in the previous chapter, comfort toward ethnic minority groups is not a statistically significant predictor of reported votes for the AfD when the "not

integrated" variable is included in the model. From the beliefs voiced above, the reason for this seems to be due to the fact that respondents justify their level of comfort toward ethnic minority groups based on how integrated into Germany they perceive immigrants to be.

Immigrants Do Not Integrate and Create "Parallel Societies"

Many AfD voters voiced similar concerns about the behavior of immigrants in response to a question that asked them to explain their opinion about integration. The initial question asked respondents: "Can you think of any immigrant group that has NOT integrated here in Germany?" In the entire sample of respondents (n=460), nearly 60 percent named a group of immigrants or said more generally that they thought all immigrants did not integrate. About 40 percent of the respondents did not name a group or said that they thought immigrants did integrate.

A follow-up question asked them to explain their opinion about why they thought that immigrants were not integrated. If respondents could not answer the question, the interviewer was instructed to probe them with: "Is it because of: how they dress, their political values, social attitudes (for example, homosexuality), their work ethic, language skills, or something else?" Both AfD voters and as non-AfD voters surveyed said that that they thought immigrants do not integrate, but the reasons they gave for why they thought immigrants were not integrated were somewhat different.

Among the people that said that they thought immigrants are not integrated, about 30 percent of respondents (n=61) said that they thought immigrants do not *want to* integrate. Other respondents pointed to culture or customs (19%, n=38), criminal behavior (14%, n=28),

language (10%, n=21), religion (8%, n=16), attitudes toward women (7%, n=15), or something else (11%, n=23). AfD voters voiced this view about an unwillingness to integrate quite simply, saying things such as immigrants "do not want to integrate," that immigrants "do their own thing," or that immigrants "bring their culture with them and do not want to adapt." Other ideas from AfD voters about why they thought immigrants did not want to integrate focused on their behavior:

> Middle-aged man in Berlin: *"[Arabs, all foreigners] they bring their culture with them and do not want to adapt."*
>
> Young woman in Berlin: "*[Syrians, others they don't integrate because of] the way they behave, what you see and hear."*

AfD voters seemed to voice this belief more so than voters for other parties, but this belief was not only voiced by AfD voters. Voters for other parties also expressed this view, such as an older woman in Dresden who voted for CDU with both votes who said: "[immigrants] *they just hang out/around together; they do not want to integrate/to adapt."* The qualitative evidence adds more nuance to the quantitative findings of the last chapter, in which a belief that immigrants do not integrate is associated with the vote for the AfD. The qualitative responses demonstrate that these beliefs are not exclusively held by AfD voters. Instead, it appears that some other factor must be at work to eventually lead to a vote for the AfD. As demonstrated in the quantitative analyses, this other factor is most likely a lack of confidence in Merkel over her handling of immigration policy. I explore beliefs for other questions related to Merkel in the next section of this chapter.

As stated in the previous chapter, many respondents named a particular group that they thought was not integrated. Statements about a lack of integration generally as well as

comments that these groups have segregated themselves into distinct neighborhoods were mentioned frequently by AfD voters:

> Older man in Berlin: *"Turks and Arabs are badly integrated; [they] live in a parallel society."*
>
> Middle-aged man in Dresden: *[Turks are not integrated] one can see it in Kreuzberg (Berlin) how they created their own parallel world."*
>
> Middle-aged woman in Dresden: "*[Muslims are not integrated] parallel societies are building up; no integration is taking place."*

These quotes imply that AfD voters believe that immigrants do not integrate and that they form their own societies separate from German society. AfD voters often give as an example the Turks and Turkish neighborhoods, who they often mention as living in "parallel societies."

Respondents with this concern about integration sometimes offered their beliefs as to why they think immigrants do not or do not integrate. Some reasoned that self-segregation is a part of human nature, such as one middle-aged man in Dresden: "*It is in the nature of humans that they came together with other people who are similar to them,"* yet he expressed concern that ghettoization was occurring for "*every group that consists of more than five percent of the society; [there is a] building of communities.*"

From their comments, it appears that there is a fear among AfD voters that newer immigrant groups will also not integrate and form ethnic enclaves that create cultural distance between groups in society. Taken as a whole, the statements like these on immigrant integration denote a fear or dislike of segregation. AfD voters seem to believe that new immigrant groups will become like the Turks, who they see as already living in a distinct society separate from German society.

Incompatibility with German Culture

In the quantitative analyses, discomfort toward ethnic minorities in general using the combined score were not significantly associated with the vote for the AfD. However, the justifications from some of the AfD voters demonstrate that there may be some higher levels of discomfort among AfD voters with people who are Muslim or from the Middle East. AfD voters tended to say that they viewed the lifestyles/culture of immigrant groups as incompatible with the native culture more so than other groups:

> Middle-aged woman in Dresden: *"[Muslims are not integrated...there is] no integration, forced marriage, not compatible with our values."*
>
> Young man in Hanau: *"[mostly people out of Muslim countries are not integrated, they] have a different culture, mentality is different, [they are] predominantly Anti-Semitic, and very patriarchal."*

About 18 percent of respondents blamed culture or customs and seem to view immigrants as inherently unable to integrate due to their cultural heritage as Huntington (2009) argued. These respondents pinpointed perceived "Muslim" behaviors that are mostly cultural rather than religious. This perception that Muslims are unable to integrate into western societies seems to support Adida, Laitin, and Valfort's (2016) central thesis. However, just as the authors argue, it is likely the case that both immigrants and natives contribute to failed cases of integration. Based on the respondents' explanations, it is not clear which is the cause.

Immigrants and Crime

In the quantitative analyses, the association between immigrants and crime was not statistically significant in the models to predict reported or likely future votes for the AfD. However, beyond cultural characteristics, crime was also raised as an issue by 14 percent

(n=28) of the respondents who said they thought immigrants were not integrated and justified why (n=202). Concern about crime was also usually brought up in relation to respondents' level of comfort as well:

> Middle-aged woman in Dresden: *[North Africans are not integrated based on my] lived experience and from media. North Africans are most likely to commit criminal offenses, because of their low education, thus they can't fulfill requirements for a good integration"*
>
> Older man in Berlin: "*[Afghans, Chechens] they're all criminal; they stay amongst themselves, speak Russian with each other, even though they came to Germany right after the reunification [referring to the reunification of East and West Germany]"*
>
> Older man in Berlin: *"[Africans and Afghans are not integrated] they cause the spread of murders and homicides and more police operations."*

Explanations like these reflect the tendency seen in the survey answers among many respondents, and AfD voters especially, to associate immigrants with crime. As work by Herstermann[56] has shown, the AfD distorts coverage of criminal activity committed by immigrants in Germany to make it seem as if immigrants are disproportionately responsible for crime. On its Facebook pages, the AfD often releases criminal reports of crime committed by immigrants on German natives. Interviewees who bring up the connection between crime and immigrants tend to be AfD voters. This may be because, as Michele Gelfand (2019) argues, that people who feel threatened are more likely to vote for far-right parties and leaders who stir up fear and say that they alone can fix it.[57]

Conducting interviews with AfD voters, journalists also pick up on the tendency of AfD voters to blame immigrants for crime. The connection between criminality and

[56] See August 2019 Deutsche Welle article for more: https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-far-right-afd-fuels-xenophobia-with-distorted-crime-figures-study/a-49891306

[57] For more see Gelfand in the Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jan/02/authoritarian-leaders-people-safe-voters

immigrants seems to be brought up in particular by men, who especially cite crimes immigrants perpetrate against German women. Reporting for the New York Times, one man Bennhold interviews in Ebersbach-Neugersdorf, Saxony, says that he is upset about "young male migrants stabbing and raping 'our women'" (Bennhold 2018), while others report attending the large-scale marches in Chemnitz following the murder of a German man by an immigrant. From the comments of the respondents of the survey and journalistic accounts, however, it is unclear whether these AfD voters have this opinion about immigrants and crime only due to media coverage promoted by the AfD or other outlets.

Worries about crime and immigrants are raised by many respondents, however, when compared to the other predictors in the quantitative analyses, the belief that immigrants are responsible for criminal activity is not a significant predictor. Thus, the analysis of both the qualitative and quantitative results lend support to the idea that concerns about immigrants and crime are not primary concerns. Instead, criminal activity by immigrants seems to be indicative of a failure to integrate to societal norms and culture more generally.

How Non-AfD Voters View Integration

Although voters for the far-right voiced their concerns about immigrant integration, they were not the only individuals who are concerned about immigrant integration or pinpoint specific ethnic groups or practices as evidence that immigrants do not integrate. Non-AfD voters, however, did not raise these concerns frequently, and when they did, mostly characterized perceived differences as more generally about individuals' demeanor or personality rather than actions related to integration:

> Young man in Berlin (voted for *die Partei*[58] with both votes): *"It really depends on the people; from my own experience I can say that it doesn't matter what nationality someone has; if they're nice people, they're nice people; if they're idiots, they're idiots."*
>
> Older woman in Augsburg (voted for CSU with both votes): *"It depends on people, there are scumbags here and there."*
>
> Older woman in Hanau (voted for SPD with both votes): *"It depends on the individual, there are bad and good people everywhere."*
>
> Young man in Dresden (voted for SPD with first vote, the Left with second vote): *"In every culture there are good and bad people. As long as I am being treated fairly, I also treats others fairly."*

When concerns about immigrant integration were raised, non-AfD voters were also apt to say that immigrants *want* to integrate, and that the lack of integration was due to forces outside of an individual immigrant's control, placing blame on variety of factors, including the government, cultural differences, and the experience of war, among others:

> Young man in Berlin (voted for SPD first vote, CDU second vote): *"[there are] problems on both sides, the migrant and the government side, both have to work together to achieve integration."*
>
> Middle-aged man in Dresden (voted for FDP with both votes): *"Migrants must want to adapt, but because of cultural Muslim background it is hard for them."*
>
> Middle-aged man in Dresden (voted for Green Party with both votes): *"not based on nationality, maybe people with trauma because of war in their country of origin or their flight because of the trauma it is more difficult for those people to integrate themselves."*

People who vote for parties other than the AfD seem to have more sympathy about why immigrant integration is not happening. Non-AfD voters tend to think that integration is

[58] Die Partei is a satirical party and is the *Partei für Arbeit, Rechtsstaat, Tierschutz, Elitenförderung und basisdemokratische Initiative*, known in English as the "Party for Labor, Rule of Law, Animal Protection, Promotion of Elites and Grassroot-Democratic Initiative." For me see about the party, see Deutsche Welle: https://www.dw.com/en/things-to-know-about-germanys-satirical-party-die-partei/a-40370231

indeed happening, but that the process is slow and will take time. They also tend to applaud the efforts undertaken by the government to integrate people and assert that integration does not mean full assimilation into German society. Instead, for the most part, they tend to be in favor of a "Multikulti" or multicultural society.

Summary of Immigrant Integration

Considered as a whole, the analysis of the qualitative responses about immigration integration and comfort with immigrants lends support to the theory that voters for the far-right are more concerned about the degree to which immigrants have integrated. Far-right voters are not the only group that state these concerns but are more apt to have these concerns and blame immigrants for not integrating. Concerns about immigrants seem to be mostly about the lack of immigrants' willingness to integrate/conform to German ways of life. As a whole, these findings support the theory that part of what separates far-right voters from others is their concern about immigrant integration.

Why Do People Vote for The Far-Right?

In the following sections, I look at exposure to the far-right party and probe motivations and justifications for voting for the party to examine support for the protest vote component of my hypothesis. As I highlighted in the literature review chapter, the standard definition of the protest vote advanced by van der Brug, Fennema, and Tellie (2000) in the literature on far-right voters is "*a vote primarily cast to scare the elite and a vote that is not policy-driven*" and thus by "*definition, protest voting only occurs when political attitudes are of minor importance*" (van der Brug, et al. 2002, 4; italics in original text). I argued in the theory chapter for an alternative definition. I argued that a protest vote is a vote expressively

motivated "against all other parties" but *also* has an instrumental component as a vote against the policies of mainstream parties and politicians.

The proffered explanations of AfD voters lend support to my hypothesis that the far-right vote is the form of a protest vote I describe. Rather than a vote purely against the elites themselves for the sole sake that they are the elites, the protest vote can also be against the policies associated with the elites. AfD voters say that they voted for the party out of protest, dissatisfaction, or a need for change, sometimes citing other political parties, Chancellor Merkel, and her immigration policies specifically. Many of the AfD voters surveyed say that they voted for the party in protest and mention Merkel and her immigration policies explicitly.

Like in the previous section, I read through responses AfD voters gave for in the main questionnaire for their choice, the explanations about why they thought immigration was the biggest problem, levels of trust, as opinions about Merkel. I also read through the responses to the extra set of questions asked of AfD voters in the addendum which further probe vote choice reasoning. I read through these responses and categorized them into groups based on the content of their answers. For example, the four categories I created for the open-ended question about why people voted for the AfD asked in the addendum were refugee politics, protest/lack of trust in other parties, agreement with the party platform, and a category of "other" for responses that did not fall into these general categories.

Protest Votes

Questions related to vote choice reasoning and how people came to vote for the far-right demonstrate that most AfD voters first became voters for the party in the September 2017 elections. Only about 20 percent (n=10) of the AfD voters who answered the extra set

of questions (n=52) said that they voted for the party in the first national election that the party was on the ballot in 2013.[59] Most AfD voters are "switchers," and said that they formerly voted for the CDU or the Left, though some voters who said that they had not voted previously for reasons other than their eligibility. Concerns about other political parties focused mainly on the CDU and its movement away from the right, while concerns about immigration were mainly concerning the influx of immigrants and refugees since 2015.

Examining the reasons that respondents gave for the open-ended question[60] of why they voted for the AfD, I find that many AfD voters said that they voted for the party out of protest, dissatisfaction, or a need for change. About 40 percent of AfD (n=17)voters who answered the question in the AfD addendum (n=44) said they voted out of protest compared to about 23 percent (n=10) who said they voted for the party because they agreed with their platform, 23 percent (n=10) who stated "refugee politics" and about 16 percent (n=7) who gave a response not clearly grouped into one of these categories such as "they do things differently." Although I categorized these reasons into separate groups, the three major groups all converge on themes of discontent, protest, or anger about immigration, and opposition to mainstream parties and politicians. Respondents who said they voted in protest said that they viewed the AfD as a true "alternative" to other parties and that a vote for the AfD reflected their opposition to other parties as well as support for the AfD's policies.

> Older man in Dresden: *"[I voted for the AfD] because it was the only way to express one's dissatisfaction with current politics."*

[59] Only 2 of the 52 AfD voters in the sample were not old enough to vote in 2013. The rest of the AfD voter who voted for the party in 2017 were eligible to vote for the party in 2017 but did not.
[60] This question was asked in the initial questionnaire. The question wording was: "Why did you vote for this party (these parties)?" The instruction for interviewers was: "When the first and second vote are for different parties, note both."

Older man in Hanau: *"[I voted for the AfD because] I like their program; they dare to speak the truths that most people do not speak."*

Middle-aged man in Berlin: *"[I voted for the AfD out of] protest, in my opinion they're the only ones telling the truth."*

In the previous chapter, the results of Model 2 to predict reported votes for the AfD showed that lower levels of confidence in political institutions were associated with the vote for the party. However, when a measure of confidence of Merkel was added to the model, confidence in political institutions was no longer statistically significant. Respondents' reasoning about why they voted for the AfD reveal a deep-seated frustration with other political parties and immigration policy, as respondents said:

Middle-aged man in Dresden: *"[The AfD] they are not Nazis but a protest against the* altparteien *[establishment parties]."*

Middle-aged man in Berlin: "*[I voted for the AfD out of] protest. Problems with security, migration, lack of people working in healthcare."*

Older man in Dresden: *"Currently, despite all its contradictions, this party is the only alternative to an incompetent policy."*

Older man in Berlin: *"[I voted for the AfD because] it's the only party that represents what I believe in, I'm sorry but what Anja (Angela Merkel) is doing there, the earlier she's gone, the better."*

Angela Merkel and the CDU are brought up repeatedly by the interviewees, particularly those who said that they used to vote the CDU, Merkel's party. When asked to explain why they now vote for the AfD,[61] prior CDU voters declared:

[61] This question was asked in the AfD addendum. The first question was: "Did you vote for a party other than the AfD in previous elections?" The interviewer noted no or yes and noted the other party the respondent said he or she voted for in previous elections. The next question if the respondent responded yes was: "Why did you change your vote from [Q12 PARTY]? *Probe if necessary: was it about leadership, policies, or something else?*

Middle-age man in Dresden: *"[the other parties] they have become too similar; there is no contrast between them anymore."*

Middle-age woman in Dresden: *"the CDU has moved to the left, the AfD is like the CDU 10 years ago."*

Older man in Hanau: *"[the CDU] they moved left; they do not care about regular citizens anymore."*

Middle-aged man in Dresden: *"[the CDU] has become too leftwing; Merkel is consumed by power."*

The explanations offered by these AfD voters demonstrate support for an alternative hypothesis from the finding of the quantitative analyses that that confidence in Merkel is an indicator of her immigration policy. Instead, they are indicative of partisan realignment as AfD voters say that they perceive the party as on the right whereas the CDU has moved to the left since Merkel became its leader. This perceived movement of the CDU to the left may, however, be due in large part to its open-door immigration policy rather than other policies. Thus, concerns about immigration and blaming Merkel and her party the CDU may still be the ultimate driver of why the confidence in Merkel measure in the quantitative analysis was both substantively and statistically significant. I explore the connection between Merkel and immigration further in the next section.

Merkel and Immigration

As the analyses in the previous chapter indicated, confidence in Merkel appears to be more associated with her immigration policy than her role as head of the CDU and/or government. From the justifications they provide, frustration toward Angela Merkel is linked with her immigration policy in the minds of many AfD supporters. One older man in Berlin exemplified this connection best when explaining why he thought immigration was the biggest

problem in Germany. He blamed Angela Merkel for the influx of refugees and subsequent crowding of public services:

> *"Merkel has to go, she brought one million people here, she wanted the Nobel prize for good-heartedness. [Now] there's not enough of everything: doctors, teachers, everything. Even at Kaufland[62], and I say that with a smile, I don't have to complain, but for my favorite fish I have to go to Selgros[63] now, because of the Syrians, they also like Mediterranean food, so there's no gilthead at Kaufland anymore."*

Statements like these were repeated by other AfD supporters, who repeatedly connected Angela Merkel to immigration. As one young man from Augsburg said when asked to explain his reasoning behind why he thought the level of immigration should decrease: "Opening the borders 2015 was a mistake, because of Merkel Europe is divided, [immigration] is enough, [the] capacity is reached." Another AfD voter, an older man in Berlin said when asked about who he trusted the most in the country[64] that he "trusted Merkel for many years, but with her refugee policy she has really dropped the ball."

Contempt for Merkel and Other Political Parties

About fifty percent of those who said they voted for the AfD in any election said that immigration was the biggest problem facing Germany. However, when asked why they voted for the AfD, most respondents said that they supported the party platform and see the party as an alternative to other political parties. The AfD party platform focuses mainly on expanding measures against immigration, including the elimination of the right to asylum, the return of migrants to their country of origin, and the elimination of public funding for assistance to

62 Kaufland is a grocery store.
63 Selgros is a grocery store.
64 The question wording for the question about trust was open-ended and was the following: **"**When it comes to information about politics in this country, whose opinion do you trust the most and whose do you trust the least?"

migrants in favor of humanitarian aid to countries in North Africa and the Middle East (Deutsche Welle 2017).

Although the party platform is explicitly anti-immigration, it is interesting to note that of the 34 AfD supporters who answered the question of why they started voting for the AfD over another party in the initial questionnaire[65], only one made explicit reference to immigration. This finding indicates that while immigration is a key concern for supporters of the AfD, this concern alone did not seem to be sufficient to motivate vote. Instead, many voters for the party said that they ultimately voted for the AfD due to their disdain for other political parties, Merkel, and the immigration policies enacted under the governing coalition led by Merkel.

Analysis of the open-ended responses about when AfD voters first heard about[66] and considered voting for the party[67] support the notion about contempt for Merkel and the immigration crisis implicated by the quantitative findings. Some AfD voters said that they first heard about and considered voting for the party when they, as one middle-aged man from Hanau said, "realized that Merkel has to leave," while a few others talked about Pegida, the anti-immigrant group. A middle-aged man from Berlin said that he learned about the party "through Pegida demonstrations" which he said, "showed how AfD had already become relatively mainstream." Others said more general times of sympathy for the party such as one

65 The question wording for this question was: "Why did you vote for this party (these parties)?" The interviewer's instructions were: "when the first and second vote are for different parties, please explain why for each party."

66 The question wording for this question was: "When and how did you first hear about the AfD?" The probe interviewers were instructed to ask if the respondent has difficulty answering was: "Was it through a friend, social media, a group you were a part of, or something else?"

67 The question wording for this question was "When and why did you first think about voting for the party?" The probe interviewers were instructed to ask if the respondent has difficulty answering was: "What was it about the party that attracted you to it, was it a party leader, a particular policy, or something else?"

older man from Berlin who said he thought about voting for the party "when the situation got worse," referring to the refugee crisis.

AfD voters' reasoning about why they voted for the party or ultimately voted for the party,[68] with only a few exceptions, can all be categorized with a concern about Merkel's refugee politics, agreement with the AfD's position on immigration, or general protest and a lack of trust toward the other parties. In these explanations, many explicitly mentioned Merkel and her policies. Disdain for Merkel and her policies were voiced by many respondents, like one older man in Dresden who said he voted for the AfD because he "want[s] a political party which has a position in opposition to the leader's party." This was echoed by a middle-aged woman in Dresden as well, who said she voted for the AfD because "it's the only alternative to the policy of Merkel's policies that I oppose."

The lack of diversity in their justifications provide further evidence to support the idea that votes for the AfD can be characterized as a protest vote against Merkel and her immigration policy. Most AfD voters said that they first learned about and thought about voting for the party as they began to associate the 2015 influx of immigrants and what they see as the ills of immigration with Merkel, further supporting the notion that levels of confidence in Merkel are connected with her immigration policy.

Rejection of Neo-Nazi and Extremist Descriptions

In this section, I look at questions that ask whether respondents think that the AfD is extremist or neo-Nazi. I find that voters for the AfD consider their vote and association with

[68] The question wording for this question was: "Can you tell me more about why you decided to vote for the AfD? What was your main motivation?"

the far-right party as acceptable within social norms. When the possibility that others view members of the AfD as extremists or neo-Nazis was raised, supporters of the AfD largely dismissed this claim entirely, while others said that this was only a very small sect of supporters and that extremists could be found in any party. Together, the open-ended responses below lend support to my argument that votes for the far-right can be considered protest votes against the policies of the establishment, which in the case of Germany, are the immigration policies of Angela Merkel.

The results of the quantitative chapter and the analysis of the comments in this chapter show that concerns about immigration, immigrants, and distrust in politics/politicians, particularly Chancellor Angela Merkel, are associated with the vote for the AfD. Still, about half of the sample said that they want the immigration level to be decreased and gave a score of 50 or less in their level of trust in the Chancellor, only 17 percent (n=52) of the sample who reported their vote choice (n=312) said that they have ever voted for the AfD in any election. To further understand what may explain this gap between attitudes toward immigrants and Merkel and voter behavior, supporters of the AfD were also posed this question: "Some people say that the AfD is a party of extremists or neo-Nazis. What do you think?"

AfD voters either dismissed this claim entirely or recognized that while there were some extremists, this does not constitute the entire party. In explaining this belief, respondents made some concessions that while there were, of course, some extremists, implying that any political party or group would have extremists, but that these individuals are not like them, nor do they constitute the majority of party supporters: Respondents voicing this belief often cited the AfD's rules against extremism saying things like:

> Middle-aged woman in Dresden: *"That is wrong. Of course, extremists or Nazis cheat their way into the party, but that's rather disturbing. Most people in the party are highly educated."*
>
> Older man in Berlin: *"They are not, not everybody who thinks there are too many [immigrants] is a fascist."*
>
> Middle-aged man in Berlin: *"if they were extremists, they would be forbidden."*

The explanations of the respondents to the survey are largely similar to what journalists have found when speaking to AfD voters. In an article on AfD voters in Görtlitz, Saxony near the Polish border, Schultheis reports that many AfD voters reject that all people who vote for the AfD are extremists. One woman who voted for the AfD indicates that neither she nor other party supporters can all be neo-Nazi extremists, saying "More than 40 percent of the people in this city voted for the AfD, do people think they're all monsters?" (Schultheis 2019) Indeed, the AfD party itself rejects the neo-Nazi or extremist label and has worked hard to present itself as non-extremist in many ways. It has distanced itself from Pegida (Weisskircher 2018), disbanded youth groups after they became a hotbed of extremism (Deutsche Welle 2018), worked to it root out extremism after the Chemnitz marches (Leber 2018), and has pushed out party leadership that has said words or done actions associated with Hitler (Javed 2018).

From the statements of AfD voters, it clear that they also reject these labels or associations with the party. However, since this question about labeling was only asked of AfD voters, it is not exactly clear whether social control actually distinguishes AfD voters from others.

Rejection of the AfD by Others

Although it is not a perfect comparison since the question was not asked of the whole sample, explanations from respondents about why they would never vote for the AfD imply that non-AfD voters do largely associate the party with extremism and neo-Nazism. Non-AfD voters who said they would never vote for the AfD were asked to explain why.[69] Over 80 percent of the total sample who answered the question (n=344 out of 422) responded that they would "never" or that is was "unlikely" that they would ever vote for the AfD. When asked to explain their stance, about 31 percent who answered this question (n=50 out of 163) and cited the party's connection to right-wing extremism, Nazism, or German history. These respondents expressed concerned about what they perceived as the party's connection to extremism and a fear of its return, as one young woman in Dresden voted for the SPD with both votes exemplified: *"[The AfD is a] Nazi party…National Socialism should not be repeated."* Others expressed some sympathy to the AfD's platform, but were also fearful of the idea that a party similar to the Nazi party would take root, such as one young man in Hanau who voted for the Left with both votes said: *"[the] principles of the AfD are too close to those of Nazis, [they] might have good topics but a bad approach."*

Other major reasons offered included general disagreement with the party's program (25%, n=41), the perception that the party had no clear program (12%, n=20), or the party's xenophobia, racism, and intolerance (7%, n=11). Other reasons not in these categories accounted for 25 percent (n=41) of the answers. It is telling that the perception that the party was racist was only expressed by a relatively small portion of the sample, while the party's

[69] The question wording for these questions were: "What is the likelihood of you ever voting for the AfD?" The follow-up question was: "Why is it that you would [RESPONSE ABOVE] vote for the AfD?"

perceived connection to Germany's past of Nazism was the most frequently mentioned reason to not ever support the party.

From the comments, it appears that for the people who say that they were unlikely to or would never vote for the AfD that voting for the party would fall outside of what *they* perceived as acceptable behavior in social society. At the same time, the statements by the supporters of the AfD lend support to the idea that supporters for far-right parties do not view their votes for the party as falling outside the scope of acceptable behavior. Instead, many AfD respondents surveyed seemed to see their votes as vital to democratic processes and they view their votes as a way to voice opposition to the current government, its leaders, and its policies.

Summary

The content presented in this chapter add a richness and confirm the finding of the quantitative analyses that support for the far-right party is associated with a belief that immigrants do not integrate into the host society. The results of the quantitative analysis demonstrated that low levels of confidence in Merkel are more a measure of dissatisfaction with her handling of immigration policy than with her as a member of the political establishment. The analyses of the open-ended questions provide further evidence to support this notion. AfD voters say that they vote for the party in protest to make a stand against elites, particularly Angela Merkel, and the policies she has created concerning immigration and immigrants.

Respondents place blame on Merkel for welcoming refugees and other immigrants into Germany beginning in 2015. She has paid a political price for this decision. AfD voters

do not raise concerns about the the short-term impact of the influx of people to reduce services. Instead, they raise concerns about the longer-term impact of immigrants in Germany who they perceive as forging their own separate "parallel societies." In this way, the findings of this chapter demonstrate how, in the minds of AfD supporters, the perceived ills of the influx of immigration are placed both on the immigrants themselves, who they perceive as not integrating, as well as on Angela Merkel, who they blame for initially allowing immigrants into the country.

However, the open-ended comments revealed that there is more nuance to the relationship between beliefs that immigrants are not integrating and a lack of confidence in Merkel. The perception that immigrants are unwilling to integrate and conform to the native society is related to votes for the far-right. However, this perception is not exclusively held by those who become eventual supporters for the far-right. Instead, the likelihood of becoming a voter for the far-right seems to increase among those who, in addition to having these views on immigrants and immigration, are also frustrated with government policies and leadership. There is a final component that the quantitative analyses were not able to capture revealed through the qualitative analysis. Voting for the far-right seems to be conceptualized by supporters as a vote that is not racist or somehow deviant of regular social behavior. Instead, those who vote far-right frame their vote positively and as a call for supporting change in the political arena.

Chapter VII. Conclusion

This dissertation focused on the demand-side of far-right voter behavior to investigate why some people with anti-immigrant attitudes vote for the far-right while others with similar attitudes do not when supply-side conditions are held constant. To do this, I hypothesized that what separates these voters is *how* immigrants are perceived and whether they are viewed as incompatible with the host society. I argued that individuals who have populist far-right attitudes and who think immigrants do not integrate are more likely to vote for the far-right, than those who do not. In Chapter V, I tested this hypothesis against competing hypotheses using multivariate analysis of survey data collected in five German electoral districts. I found the belief that immigrants are not integrated is a strong predictor of votes for the AfD, as is distrust in Merkel. In Chapter VI, I examined whether these findings are consistent with the respondents' own explanations by analyzing answers to open-ended questions. These answers about motivation for vote choice, deeper concerns about immigrants, and frustration with the government and political elites, provide additional support for my hypothesis.

By identifying why individuals with "less extreme" views vote for the far-right, the results of this study are of interest to political scientists, policymakers, and the public. The findings indicate that the influx of immigration and the pace of integration seem to be driving people to the far-right.

Limitations

No study is without limitations. In this dissertation, I relied heavily on the survey data I collected in Germany during the Fall of 2018. Although I had learned many lessons while conducting similar fieldwork in the UK, Sweden, and Germany in the years before conducting fieldwork for the dissertation, there are, of course, many things that could have been done to improve the quality and quantity of the data.

First, a larger sample and fieldwork in more diverse areas around Germany would allow samples large enough across multiple areas with different characteristics in order to study contextual effects. Yet time, resources, low response rates, short days, and cold weather made it difficult to collect large samples in each electoral district. Due to this, I devoted more resources to Marzahn-Hellersdorf and Dresden I and Dresden II-Bautzen II, the electoral districts where sizable samples AfD voters were known to reside. I chose the four electoral districts included in this dissertation based on how they varied on influential factors in predicting the vote share, but of course, it would have been better to introduce even more variation at the electoral district level. I particularly wish that I had been able to do more research in Western cities and areas that were more rural, as my sample is mostly Eastern and urban.

Second, while many respondents felt comfortable enough to report their vote choices with the surveyors, about 18 percent did not. Given my experience working in other countries and looking at how response rates in Germany compare with other countries in large-scale surveys conducted by Pew, the European Social Survey, and others, lower response rates and higher "don't know" and refusals to questions seem to be the norm in Germany. I am confident that the face-to-face method yielded a higher response rate than a phone sample would have. But I also acknowledge that as many other scholars have shown, mode effects are present in the data. Mode effects may be particularly potent among the Berlin sample, where, due to low response rates, interviewers were authorized to conduct interviews using a street intercept sampling method rather than exclusively knocking on doors. Had more time and resources been available, I would have also liked to contact selected respondents to try to recruit them into the sample rather than just leaving the invitation to take the survey online.

Third, as with any self-reported data, there are several possible biases in the data. It appears that many respondents felt confident to express themselves unabashedly to interviewers, yet selective memory, exaggeration, and social desirability bias are certainly present to at least some extent in the data. However, I am confident that the data collected and presented in this dissertation do not depict only the most extreme, protest-going, flag-waving neo-Nazi far-right supporters. Nor are the most ardent on the other end of the ideological spectrum the only people captured in the sample.

Implications and Future Research

In this dissertation, I argued that how individuals "other" immigrants is important for understanding why, when supply-side conditions are held constant, some individuals with anti-immigrant attitudes vote for the far-right while others do not. I proposed that this perception of otherness, one based on seemingly changeable behaviors, is what separates those who vote for the far-right and those who vote for other parties among people with similar anti-immigrant attitudes.

I argued that supply-side theories are not sufficient in themselves to explain the contemporary rise in support for far-right parties. My findings add to demand-side theories and the literature focused on cultural grievances and protest voting. My results show that views of immigrant integration, rather than simply anti-immigrant attitudes writ large, are associated with the vote for the far-right. The belief that immigrants do not integrate is not exclusively held by far-right voters. Only when this belief is coupled with anti-establishment attitudes toward politicians does the belief translate to a vote for the far-right.

The qualitative analysis demonstrates that voting for the far-right is conceptualized by supporters as a vote that is not racist or somehow deviant of regular social behavior. Instead,

those who vote far-right frame their vote positively and as a call for supporting change in the political arena. Thus, most far-right voters are more aptly deemed, as Hochshild (2016) puts it "strangers in their own land" rather than neo-Nazis. Supporters of the AfD and other parties alike hold views that some may consider racist. This work demonstrates that what separates these groups of voters is how they view immigrant integration and whether they place blame on politicians for the ills of immigration.

As waves of migration continue, othering is likely to persist and pose obstacles to the stability of democratic states. With respect to Germany, this dissertation makes the case that governments have agency in how societies react to migration waves. Had Merkel not welcomed over a million refugees to Germany beginning in the summer of 2015, it is very likely that the AfD would not have risen so precipitously. Although the German state has implemented a wide range of activities including language and job training to acculturate immigrants, it seems that at least to a portion of the population, these activities are seen as insufficient or inefficient.

To reduce the formation of the view of othering based on perceived changeable behaviors, states will likely need to do some combination of the following. States can attempt to limit the influx of immigrants that come at any one time to help limit the perception among natives that the state capacity is too overwhelmed to acculturate large numbers of immigrants. In Germany, refugees were confined to mass camps for several months if not longer and had to demonstrate German language mastery prior to receiving a work permit. States can relax work and housing restrictions like these to allow immigrants, particularly refugees, to work and live among natives sooner. These steps can help limit the spread of the belief that

immigrants are different due to their behaviors as at least some immigrants are able to acculturate faster.

To widen the perception that immigrant cultural behaviors should be celebrated rather than admonished, the state can undertake campaigns and promote programs that pair immigrants with natives in friendship groups to help celebrate multiculturalism. These steps, however, are not likely to automatically change the minds of people who view the "otherness" of immigrants as bad. Understanding why some people view the "otherness" of immigrants as inherently bad requires a deeper understanding of how attitudes and beliefs about immigrants are formed.

Untangling how attitudes and beliefs about immigrants are formed requires more research. One way to do this for future researchers is to utilize cross-national survey data that compares political parties which frame immigrants differently. Another way is to use a cross-national panel study of individual attitudes over time. A third way is to use pre/post survey data in combination with experimental data to measure the effect of different advertisements on individuals' attitudes. One way that attitudes about immigrants may be formed is through a top-down model. In this model, far-right parties frame, and individuals accept, immigrants as "other" due to their unwillingness to alter perceived changeable behaviors or cultural practices. Concerning Germany, this may be how some individuals think, as the AfD has run many ads that convey this notion. For example, the AfD has framed immigrants and refugees in Germany, who are mostly Muslim, as "other" through rhetoric and advertisements. The party has put out ads with statements like "Islam does not belong to Germany" and has depicted Islamic cultural attributes, such as the consumption of pork and the wearing of burkas, as non-German. Natives may interpret these messages as implying that immigrants

have the *ability*, but not the *willingness*, to eat pork and wear a bikini which would be more in line with traditional German culture.

In addition to these cultural components of identity, frames that connect immigrants to crime, particularly violent crimes such as the rape of young women or terrorist attacks, are put out by many far-right parties. This connection of immigrants to crime seems to be especially prevalent in Germany, where press releases by the AfD have been found to disproportionately focus on crimes committed by foreigners and thus distort the share of crimes perpetrated by immigrants versus natives (Deutsche Welle). Readers who consume these stories may interpret criminal behavior on the part of immigrants to be evidence that immigrants are not willing to adhere to non-violent forms of behavior, and thus view them as unwilling to follow the norms of the host society.

In other words, I argue that this perception of "otherness" may be based on the interactive effect of both the political party, which runs these ads, and the base of individuals which is susceptible to this form of messaging. Individuals who are susceptible to this messaging accept it and may vote for the far-right. Other people, who do not "other" immigrants and more open to multiculturalism, reject this form of messaging, and instead view it as evidence that their society needs to be more welcoming and accepting of other cultures and their forms of expression.

A third, more extreme take, may be a perception that there should be no cultural differences within a society and that acculturation/assimilation must be forced by the state, which seems to be the French model of immigration management. In the German context, people who support this last view may be viewed as extremists and may support the far-right out of fear of or aversion to multiculturalism. Building on the work of Goodwin and his

coauthors (2018) as well as Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010), future researchers can conduct survey experiments to see if there are any observable effects on attitudes toward immigrants after subjects are presented with vignettes that frame immigrants negatively or positively.

In addition to a "top down" model, a second model about how different views of "otherness" may form proposes that socialization largely shapes how individuals conceive of immigrants and their relationship to the native society. Socialization comes in many forms, but I think two forms are especially important for future scholars to study: 1) experience–living, working, or attending school in multiethnic environments, and 2) notions of citizenship prescribed by the state. Individuals who grow up in, or are generally used to, a multiethnic environment may be more likely to develop either positive (i.e., respectful and celebratory notions of difference) notions of how immigrants are different from, or not different from (i.e. not "seeing" race/ethnicity and cultural habits) natives. Building on the large body of literature that examines the contact/threat hypothesis (i.e. Sniderman, et al 2004, Rydgren and Ruth 2013), it may be that natives who are regularly exposed to immigrants are less likely to view immigrants as "other" generally, or that this "otherness" may be viewed as a difference concerning race/ethnicity. Additionally, it may be that in areas in which immigrants and natives coincide that immigrants are more likely to adapt to the native culture and thus not be seen as different by the natives, particularly over multiple immigrant generations.

There may be multiple, and perhaps, convergent paths to how people come to form these notions about "otherness." Indeed, how individuals come to view immigrants may not be limited solely to their exposure to advertisements, experiences with immigrants over time, nor how they were socialized by the state or by their parents. Future research should explore

these paths and others to better understand the formation of anti-immigrant attitudes and how they relate to far-right voter behavior.

This dissertation also has implications for future research of hard-to-reach populations. Building on the methods developed by Lasala-Blanco (2014) to study Latinos in the U.S., the procedures I used to collect a sizable sample of far-right voters in Germany, a country with relatively low response rates compared to other developed countries, were successful for the most part. Targeting areas known to be inhabited by far-right voters from electoral data and engaging respondents face-to-face with young, thoughtful interviewers are effective strategies for conducting surveys of far-right voters.

The recent wave of far-right electoral success across Europe has already changed the nature and course of politics as usual and will continue to do so, even in places in which the far-right has not been successful. The presence of these parties has altered coalition formation, affected party cohesion, shaped national discourse, and had a substantial impact on policies. Voter alignments have shifted, and individuals beyond those with just "extreme" views have increasingly voted for the far-right. Like other political parties, far-right parties can attract voters from more than just one segment of society.

Growing numbers of supporters and advocates for far-right parties have interacted with one another, evidenced by examples as diverse as the far-right political group, Identity and Democracy, in the European Parliament, to the AfD hiring the Texas-based Harris Media agency that helped elect Donald Trump[70], to Pegida's (the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident) expansion from Germany to across Europe.[71] How mainstream

[70] For more on this, see the story reported in Der Spiegel: https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/u-s-ad-agency-boosts-right-wing-populist-afd-a-1164956.html.

[71] For more on Pegida protests held across Europe, see: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-protests-germany/anti-islam-movement-pegida-stages-protests-across-europe-idUSKCN0VF0P4.

political parties react to the expansion of far-right politics will have important repercussions. Their reactions will determine whether the far-right will spread to other countries in some cases, and in others, will determine if far-right parties will become governing parties with the ability to shape policies and priorities for generations to come.

Supplementary Tables and Figures

Table 9: First (Candidate) Votes Sample and Official Statistics Comparison by Electoral District

	1. M-H	2. Dresden I	3. Dresden II	4. Augsburg	5. Hanau
1. AfD sample	20.0	12.3	11.5	4.5	11.8
1. AfD official	20.6	22.4	22.3	13.3	12.8
AfD Diff	**-0.6**	**-10.1**	**-10.8**	**-8.8**	**-1.0**
2. CDU sample	18.8	28.8	29.5	-	26.5
2. CDU official	22.3	24.6	25.5	-	35.3
CDU Diff	**-3.5**	**4.2**	**4.0**	-	**-8.8**
3. CSU sample	-	-	-	20.5	-
3. CSU official	-	-	-	34.8	-
CSU Diff	-	-	-	**-14.3**	-
4. Green sample	23.5	34.2	27.9	29.5	26.5
4. Green official	3.2	6.5	8.6	13.9	6.1
Green Diff	**20.3**	**27.7**	**19.3**	**15.6**	**20.4**
5. Left sample	8.2	1.4	8.2	2.3	2.9
5. Left official	34.2	21	17.5	8.5	5.8
Left Diff	**-26.0**	**-19.6**	**-9.3**	**-6.2**	**-2.9**
6. SPD sample	16.5	8.2	13.1	13.6	26.5
6. SPD official	12.6	13.2	11.1	19.3	30.4
SPD Diff	**3.9**	**-5.0**	**2.0**	**-5.7**	**-3.9**
7. FDP sample	4.7	11.0	3.3	2.3	2.9
7. FDP official	3.5	7.5	7	6.1	6.4
FDP Diff	**1.2**	**3.5**	**-3.7**	**-3.8**	**-3.5**
9. Other sample	8.2	4.1	6.6	6.8	2.9
9. Other official	2.6	4.2	8	4.2	3.1
Other Diff	**5.6**	**-0.1**	**-1.4**	**2.6**	**-0.2**

Refusals sample	17.1	14.3	9.5	21.2	12.0
Turnout sample	75	89	92	88	80
Turnout official	69.3	78.6	79.3	72.8	75.6
Turnout Diff	**6.0**	**10.2**	**12.6**	**15.1**	**4.4**

Table 10: Second (Party) Votes Sample and Official Statistics Comparison by Electoral District

	1. M-H	2. Dresden I	3. Dresden II	4. Augsburg	5. Hanau
1. AfD sample	20.7	14.5	12.3	4.9	16.1
1. AfD official	21.6	23.1	23.3	13.8	14.1
AfD Diff	**-0.9**	**-8.6**	**-11.0**	**-8.9**	**2.0**
2. CDU sample	15.9	21.7	21.1	-	19.4
2. CDU official	20.9	24.4	23.1	-	29.6
CDU Diff	**-5.0**	**-2.7**	**-2.0**	-	**-10.2**
3. CSU sample	-	-	-	19.5	-
3. CSU official	-	-	-	31.8	-
CSU Diff	-	-	-	**-12.3**	-
4. Green sample	13.4	18.8	21.1	26.8	9.7
4. Green official	4.1	7.7	9	12.4	8.6
Green Diff	**9.3**	**11.1**	**12.1**	**14.4**	**1.1**
5. Left sample	24.4	17.4	17.5	9.8	19.4
5. Left official	26.1	17.1	17.3	9	7.6
Left Diff	**-1.7**	**0.3**	**0.2**	**0.8**	**11.8**
6. SPD sample	12.2	4.3	14.0	12.2	25.8
6. SPD official	14.5	10.6	9.7	15.9	23.5
SPD Diff	**-2.3**	**-6.3**	**4.3**	**-3.7**	**2.3**
7. FDP sample	4.9	15.9	5.3	4.9	9.7
7. FDP official	5.3	10.3	9.6	10	11.5
FDP Diff	**-0.4**	**5.6**	**-4.3**	**-5.1**	**-1.8**
9. Other sample	8.5	7.2	8.8	9.8	0.0
9. Other official	7.3	7	8	7	5.2
Other Diff	**1.2**	**0.2**	**0.8**	**2.8**	**-5.2**
Refusals sample	18.6	16.7	12.5	24.6	10.9

Turnout sample	75	89	92	88	80
Turnout official	69.3	78.6	79.3	72.8	75.6
Turnout Diff	**6.0**	**10.2**	**12.6**	**15.1**	**4.4**

Table 11: Sample Demographics

Male	53%
Female	47%
18-34	32%
35-59	33%
60+	35%
Average Age	49
Foreign-Born	10%
Native Born	90%
University Education	41%
No University Education	60%

Table 12: Number of Interviews by Interviewer

Interviewer	N	Percent
1	8	1.85
2	5	1.15
3	9	2.08
4	20	4.62
5	1	0.23
6	70	16.17
7	2	0.46
8	11	2.54
9	4	0.92
10	26	6
11	5	1.15
12	3	0.69
13	24	5.54
14	13	3
15	16	3.7
16	12	2.77
17	23	5.31
18	4	0.92
19	23	5.31
20	4	0.92
21	19	4.39
22	21	4.85
23	5	1.15
25	8	1.85
26	6	1.39
27	4	0.92
28	24	5.54
29	26	6
30	2	0.46
31	8	1.85
32	6	1.39
33	8	1.85
34	13	3
Total	433	100

Table 13: Sample Size and Response Rate Raw Data

Electoral District	N Total Door Knocks	N Door Hard Refusal (no letter)	N Door Mailings	N Not in No Mail (could not leave letter)	N Intercept Approach	N Intercept Hard Refusals	N Intercept Mailings
Marzahn-Hellersdorf	464	112	273	43	263	141	128
Dresden I	555	159	277	146	-	-	-
Dresden II-Bautzen II	487	129	202	99	16	5	0
Augsburg	522	85	344	42	-	-	-
Hanau	512	145	245	83	-	-	-
Overall	2,540	630	1,341	413	279	146	128

Table 14: Response Rate by Electoral District Percentages and Survey Type Total Attempts

	Marzahn-Hellersdorf		Dresden I		Dresden II-Bautzen II		Augsburg		Hanau		Overall	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Doorstep Interviews	44	4	87	13	82	15	54	10	54	10	321	10
Intercept Interviews	100	9	0	0	11	2	-	-	-	-	120	4
Mail Surveys	4	0	12	2	2	0	9	2	1	0	28	1
*****												
Total Respondents	148	13	87	13	95	18	63	12	55	10	448	13
Total Refusals*	917	83	436	65	336	63	419	80	390	74	2498	74
Unable to locate	43	4	146	22	99	19	42	8	83	16	413	12
Total Attempts	1108	100	669	100	530	100	524	100	528	100	3359	100

*Total Refusals: includes hard refusals at door, door mailings left, intercept hard refusals, intercept mailings

Appendix A. Data and Methods Technical Appendix

Sample Design

Clustering of Electoral District

After the electoral districts were selected, I then clustered areas within each electoral district to create the primary sampling units (PSUs). These clusters were drawn using a variety of methods dependent upon the availability of micro-level data that delineated geographic boundaries for subunits of each electoral district. In Marzahn-Hellersdorf, Berlin, data on party vote, turnout, and demographics were available at the postal voting district level (*Briefwahlbezirke*) from the official statistics website of Berlin and Brandenburg (*Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg*). These areas are quite small, as seen in Figure 1 below, and were used as the PSUs for the sampling in Marzahn-Hellersdorf. For this district, I randomly selected 21 out of 114 postal voting districts. In the other cities, postal voting district level data delineating boundaries and/or describing the socio-economic characteristics of the area were not publicly available, so other methods had to be used.



Figure 3: Postal Voting Districts (Briefwahlkriese) within Marzahn-Hellersdorf, Berlin

For the Dresden sampling, I used the city website's GIS mapping feature to download and map data at the federal electoral district (*Bundestagwahlkriese*), city district (*Stadtbezirke*), and electoral ward (*Wahlbezirk*) levels as seen in Figures 2, 3, and 4 below respectively. The electoral wards shown in Figure 4 were used as the PSUs for the sampling in Dresden I and Dresden II-Bautzen II. To select the electoral wards to include in the sample, I randomly selected electoral wards (see Figure 4) within each city district (see Figure 3) in both Dresden I and Dresden II-Bautzen II (see Figure 2). For Dresden I, a total of 11 electoral wards were selected and included in the sample, whereas a total of 12 electoral wards were included in the sample from Dresden II-Bautzen II as PSUs.

Figure 4: Dresden I (159) and Dresden II-Bautzen II (160) Federal Election Districts (Bundestagwahlkriese)



Figure 5: Dresden City Districts (Stadtteile)



Figure 6: Dresden Electoral Wards

For both Augsburg and Hanau, no data that mapped electoral boundaries was publicly available. Instead, I drew clusters according to the boundaries set by the districts within each city. Due to the large size of the city districts in both Augsburg and Hanau, I divided the city districts further to draw relatively similar areas in size to the PSUs used in Marzhan-Hellersdorf and Dresden. In Augsburg, I obtained electoral data at the city district (*Stadtbezirke*) level, shown as the numbers and in red on Figure 3 from the city of Augsburg. Next, I matched each city district (*Stadtbezirke*) to the Planning Area (*Planungsräume*) according to the map displayed as Figure 6.



Abb. 1: Stadtbezirke und Planungsräume

Figure 7: Augsburg Planning Areas (Planungsräume) and City Districts (Stadtbezirke)

Then, I randomly selected 10 out of the 16 Planning Areas to include in the sample. With the planning areas selected and the city districts matched to them, I then randomly selected one city district from each of the planning areas for and mapped the boundaries of each district in Google Maps as shown on Figure 6 below.



Figure 8: Augsburg City District of Antonsviertel. Source: Google Maps.

Since many of the city districts were still quite a bit larger than the PSUs used in Marzahn-Hellersdorf and Dresden, I further divided the larger city districts by drawing subdivisions along major roadways. Figure 7 shows a typical map with these subdivisions drawn, which served as the PSUs for the field sites in Augsburg. A total of 10 city districts were selected and included in the sample. Following the subdivision of the city districts, I next used satellite view in Google Maps to zoom in on the area and create the map used by interviewers. Figure 8 shows a typical zoomed in map used by interviewers in Augsburg with the boundaries of the subdivision drawn.

Figure 9: Augsburg City District of Antonsviertel with subdivisions drawn. Source: Google Maps.

Figure 10: Area 2 of Augsburg City District of Antonsviertel with subdivisions drawn. Source: Google Maps.

I used a similar clustering strategy in Hanau with the city district and neighborhood maps available from the city of Hanau website. In Hanau, neighborhoods (*Stadtbezirke*) within each city district (*Stadtteile*) were used as PSUs. To select the neighborhoods to include in the sample, I randomly selected neighborhoods (see Figure 9) within each of the city's ten districts (see Figure 10). A total of 7 neighborhoods within the city's 10 districts were selected and

included in the sample. As with Augsburg, I zoomed in on the city district using Satellite view in OpenStreet Maps to create the map of the area used by interviewers as shown in Figure 11.



Figure 11: Hanau City Boroughs (Stadtteile) marked with shades of the same color with Districts (Bezirke) marked with numbers. Source: City of Hanau.



Figure 12: Hanau District (Stadtteil) City Center with neighborhoods (Stadtbezirke) marked with numbers and colors. Lines denote city streets. Source: City of Hanau.



Figure 13: Hanau District (Stadtteil) City Center with blocks numerated and outline of city district in red. Source: City of Hanau and OpenStreet Maps.

Random Selection of Starting Point

Once the PSUs were selected, a random start point was selected using a random formula[72] that determined the starting point as either the Northwest, Northeast, Southwest, or Southeast area with the PSU. Interviewers in teams of 2-3 were assigned a map of the PSU that clearly delineated the boundaries of the area, their starting point, and direction in which they would walk. Interviewers were instructed to continue their walk in the randomly selected direction and to mark their route on the provided maps. Once interviewers had exhausted the random direction, they were instructed to flip a coin to determine which street or block to survey next within the map area.

Household Selection

To select households, interviewers followed a random selection formula that varied dependent on the density of the housing within the PSU and was altered as the housing type changed. The housing type was determined prior to the arrival of the interviewers in the area using Google Satellite, ArcGIS, and/or OpenStreet Maps and marked on the map for the interviewers. Once interviewers reached the field site, they called in to me and confirmed the housing type and random selection sequence they would follow prior to the start of fieldwork.

For areas with apartment complexes, interviewers selected households according to the number of households in each building. To determine the number of households within each building, interviewers counted the number of name bells on each building, where each name was assumed to be comprising one household. In apartment buildings with fewer than twenty households, interviewers were told to select every fifth household. In buildings with 21-100

72 The random start point was not determined by interviewers. I determined the random start point using the "random" formula in Excel input as North vs. South, East vs. West to create NW, NE, SW, SE as the start point. I then marked this location on the map I provided to interviewers.

households, they were instructed to select every seventh household. For buildings with more than 100 households, interviewers were instructed to select every tenth household. If the areas contained mostly single-family homes, duplexes, or similar housing types, they were instructed to use the following sequence to select households on both sides of the street: 3, 4, 1, 3.

Appendix B. Survey Materials

i. Project Information Sheet

ii. General Questionnaire

iii. AfD Addendum Questionnaire

iv. We Missed You Letter

v. Random Selection

i. Project Information Sheet

University of California Santa Barbara
POLITICAL SCIENCE

Umfrage zu Städten und Nachbarschaften

PROJECT INFORMATION SHEET

Title of Study: European Cities and Neighborhoods Survey

Open Date: August 2018 **Close Date:** August 2019

Time (duration): Approximately 15-20 minutes

Brief Description of Study:
Each participant will be asked to complete a short questionnaire regarding their views on their interactions with other city residents and political participation. Basic demographics will also be collected to ensure a random and representative sample and weigh the data.

Participation Criteria
European nationals over 18 years of age may participate in this study.

Location
Participants will be given the questionnaire outside their homes/apartment buildings and asked to complete it on the spot or online at a later time.

Researchers:
Shannon Schumacher, PhD Candidate (University of California, Santa Barbara)
Prof. Amit Ahuja (University of California, Santa Barbara)

Questions?
You may email Shannon Schumacher at shannonschumacher@umail.ucsb.edu if you have questions. Please include the Study Name in the subject line of the email. If you have any questions regarding your rights and participation as a research subject, please contact the Human Subjects Committee at +1 (805) 893-3807 or hsc@research.ucsb.edu. Or write to the University of California, Human Subjects Committee, Office of Research, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-2050.

The entity responsible for the use of your Study Data (i.e., responses to political attitudes) is: Regents of the University of California, on behalf of its Santa Barbara location. Contact Jennifer Lofthus Policy Coordinator & Deputy ADA Compliance Officer at +1 (805) 893- 7025 or Jennifer.lfthus@vcadmin.ucsb.edu. Or write to the Policy Coordinator, University of California, Santa Barbara, Office of the Vice Chancellor for Admin Services, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-2033.

ii. General Questionnaire

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POLITICAL SCIENCE

City and Date: _____

Surveyors: _____

Umfrage zu Städten und Nachbarschaften

Part 1: Politics. ***Please circle your answers.***

Q1. How long have you lived in the city?

Q2. What do you think is the biggest problem facing Germany today? *(If you could fix one thing, what would it be?)*

Q3. Why do you think that? Can you explain your opinion?

_____

_____

Q4. Are you interested in politics? Yes No [SKIP TO Q6]

Q5. Please describe briefly as best you can when and how you first became interested in politics. *(Was it during childhood? Was it due to some specific social or political event? Did a political candidate inspire this interest?)*

Q6. [IF NO to Q4] Why do you think you are NOT interested in politics?

Q7. Did you vote in the last federal elections in September 2017?

Yes, I voted No, I was ineligible to vote No, I didn't vote

Q8. Which party did you vote for in the last FEDERAL elections with your FIRST vote? And which party with your SECOND vote?

First Vote: SPD CDU CSU FDP Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Die Linke

AfD Other:_____

Second Vote: SPD CDU CSU FDP Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Die Linke

AfD Other:_____

Q9. Why did you vote for this party (these parties)? [WHEN THE FIRST AND SECOND VOTE ARE FOR DIFFERENT PARTIES, NOTE BOTH]

First Vote: _____

Second Vote:_____

Q10. Did you vote in the last State Election [WHEN NO, SKIP TO Q13]

Yes, I voted No, I was ineligible to vote No, I didn't vote

Q11. Which party did you vote for in the last STATE elections with your FIRST vote? And which party with your SECOND vote?

First Vote: SPD CDU CSU FDP Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Die Linke AfD Other:_____

Second Vote: SPD CDU CSU FDP Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Die Linke AfD Other:_____

Q9. Why did you vote for this party (these parties)? [WHEN THE FIRST AND SECOND VOTE ARE FOR DIFFERENT PARTIES, PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY FOR EACH PARTY]

First Vote: _____

Second Vote:_____

Q13. When you think of past elections, how many times have you voted for [PARTY OF Q8]?

Every election For most elections Only for a few elections

Only at the last election I usually do not vote

Q14. Why did you vote for this party (these parties)? [WHEN THE FIRST AND SECOND VOTE ARE FOR DIFFERENT PARTIES, PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY FOR EACH PARTY] _____

_____

Q15. What is the likelihood of you ever voting for the AfD?

Never Unlikely Somewhat Likely Likely Very Likely

Q16. Why is it that you would [RESPONSE ABOVE] vote for the AfD?

_____

Q17. When it comes to news about current events or politics, which newspapers, programs, or sources did you consult in the last two months?

Q18. When it comes to information about politics in this country, whose opinion do you trust the most and whose do you trust the least?

The most: _____ The least: _____

Part 2: Community Life. These questions concern life in your neighborhood and in Germany. *We would like to remind you that all answers are confidential.*

Q19. What do you think is the biggest problem in your neighborhood today? *(If you could fix one thing, what would it be?)* _____

Q20. Why do you think that? Can you explain your opinion?

_____

_____

Q21. If you were to move to a different neighborhood, how comfortable on a scale of 100 to 0 in which 100 means very comfortable and 0 means very uncomfortable, would you be living in a neighborhood where your neighbors were MOSTLY:

German: _____ Eastern European: _____

Turkish: _____ Asian: _____

Black: _____ Muslim: _____

Syrian: _____

Comments:

_____

_____

_____

_____



Very comfortable

Neutral

Very uncomfortable

Q22. How often do you have contact with migrants?

Never Rarely Occasionally Often Very Often

There are no migrants here [DO NOT READ]

Q23. [IF YES Q22] Where have you interacted with migrants? *At work/school, apartment building, organization, parks, shops, or somewhere else?*

_____

Q24. [WHEN YES Q22] How have these experiences with migrants been? *Have they been mostly positive, mostly negative?* **[PROMPT FOR EXAMPLE.]**

_____

_____

Q25. Can you think of any immigrant group that has NOT integrated here in Germany? [WHEN NO SKIP TO Q27] _____

Q26. Why do you think that? Can you explain your opinion? (*Is it because of: how they dress, their political values, social attitudes (for example, homosexuality), their work ethic, language skills, or something else?*)

_____

Q27. Do you think immigration into Germany should be:

Kept at its present level Increased Decreased DK

Q28. Why do you think that? Can you explain your opinion?

_____

Q29. Some people think that the government should provide some assistance to asylum seekers/refugees. Which type of assistance if any, do you think they should receive from the government?

_____

Q30. What is your opinion of the way Germany is handling the integration of refugees?

_____

_____

F31. These next questions ask about how much confidence you have in a number of institutions. How confident are you in:

a. Local Government: _____

b. The Bundestag: _____

c. The Legal system: _____
(someone would get a fair trail or sentence)

d. The Police: _____

e. Political Parties: _____

f. The European Union: _____

g. The Chancellor:



Can you explain your answer? Please enter your answer in the box on the right.	

Section 3: Background Information. *Your opinion represents your neighborhood. It is VERY important you answer these questions; they are all confidential and will be used only for weighting purposes.*

Q32. In what year were you born? _____

Q33. What is your occupation?

_____

Q34. What is your average monthly household income? *(Your household includes all the people who lives with you.)*

weniger als € 500	€ 500 – 1 000	€ 1 000 – 1 500	€ 1 500 – 2 000
€ 2 000 – 2 500	€ 2 500 – 3 000	€ 3000 – 4000	€ 4000 – 5 000
€ 5 000 – 8 000	mehr als € 8 000		

Q35. Have you or anyone in your household been unemployed in the past two years?

Yes, I have	Yes, someone in my household	No,no one in my household

Q36. What is the highest grade in school that you finished? Circle your answer.

A. Doktortitel B. Master/Diplom/Magister C. Bachelor D. Studium ohne Abschluss

E. Berufsschulabschluss F. Abitur G. Fachhochschulreife H. Mittlere Reife

I. Hauptschulabschluss J. Grundschule K. Keiner

Q37. What is your postal code? *(We need this information to weigh the data by your neighborhood's demographic)* _____

Q38. Are you a member of any associations/organizations? Yes

No

Q39. [WHEN YES Q38] Which? [PLEASE LIST]

_____

Q40. What is your sex? männlich weiblich

Q41. In which city and country were you born? [NOTE IF GDR]

Stadt: _____ Land:

_____

Q42. If you were born outside of Germany, how old were you when you permanently moved to the Germany? _____

Q43. Where were your parents born? *(City, Country)* **[NOTE IF GDR]**

Mother: _____ _____ Father: _____ _____

Stadt Land Stadt Land

Q44. Are you a citizen of Germany?

Yes, only a German citizen Yes, a German citizen and a citizen of another country: _____ No, only a citizen of another country: _____

Q45. For your, what does it mean to be German? *Probe if necessary: ethnicity, language, citizenship, etc.*

_____

_____

Q46: One last question: If there were a federal election tomorrow, which party (parties) would you vote for?

SPD CDU CSU FDP Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Die Linke AfD Other:_____

Thank you! Your opinion is very valuable for our study!

University of California Santa Barbara
POLITICAL SCIENCE

Umfrage zu Städten und Nachbarschaften

City and Date: _____

Surveyors: _____

P1. Community Issues, Party Response

F1. How long have you lived in [COMMUNITY NAME]?

F2. What do you think are the major issues facing people in [NEIGHBORHOOD NAME]?

F3. Which of these issues are of special concern to you personally?

F4. What do you think should be done about these issues?

F5. What does the AfD say it will do about [LIST CONCERNS ABOVE]?

F6. What about the other parties, what do they propose?

F7. Do you think the AfD is better or less equipped to deal with these issues? Why is that?

F8. [IF NOT ADDRESSED ABOVE] Immigration/Refugees **Is immigration an issue in this community?**

F9. [IF YES] How does it affect you personally?

F9. [What is about immigrants/refugees that is an issue?
[PROBE IF NECESSARY: Is it the *number* of refugees coming here (differentiate between city v. state v. country), the way immigrants/refugees *act* (social customs), their *use of government resources* (inability to work, government provided asylum centers), their *values and/or religion* (role of Islam in society)]

F10. What should Germany do with the refugees that have arrived here?

P2. Politics and Voting
TRANSITION: Now thinking about politics and voting…. REMEMBER THAT YOUR RESPONSES ARE ANONYMOUS.

F11. When and how did you first hear about the AfD? *Was it through a friend, social media, a group you were a part of, or something else?*

F12. When and why did you first think about voting for the party? *What was it about the party that attracted you to it, was it a party leader, a particular policy, or something else?*

F13. Can you tell me more about why you decided to vote for the AfD? What was your main motivation?

Did you usually/normally vote in previous federal elections?

[IF NO] Why didn't you usually vote?

[IF YES] Which party did you usually vote for?

F14. Did you vote for a party other than the AfD in previous elections?

No, just the AfD. Yes, other party: _____

F15. [IF YES TO F12] Why did you change your vote from [F12 PARTY]? *Probe if necessary: was it about leadership, policies, or something else?*

F16. Did you see any of the campaign ads/posters put up by the AfD around the city or online during the election?

F17. [IF YES F14] Where did you see them? Which ones (*What were some of the images/slogans that you remember?)*

F18. Now thinking generally beyond the election. Have you seen any AfD content online?

Yes, I have seen some AfD content No, I haven't seen any content

F19. [IF YES F17]. Where did you see this content? *(the AfD Facebook page, a friend's Facebook page, Twitter, or somewhere else?)*

F20. Have you attended any rallies or demonstrations supported by the AfD?

F.21 What is your opinion of Pegida?

F22. Some say that the AfD is the party of extremists, or neo-Nazis. What do you think about that claim?

F24. One last question. What do you think about the government's monitoring of the AfD?

iv. We Missed You Letter

University of California Santa Barbara
POLITICAL SCIENCE

Umfrage zu Städten und Nachbarschaften

Fall 2018

Dear Resident of [CITY],
We are sorry we missed you! We visited your home earlier because you are part of a representative group of Stockholm residents selected to participate in the **European Cities and Neighborhoods Survey**, an academic endeavor conducted by the University of California and the University of Arizona in the United States.
You are receiving this letter because a group of researchers have traveled from the United States to interview members of your community. Unfortunately, you were not home when they came to ask if you would be willing to participate in this study.

The purpose of this research project is to understand how city residents think about important issues such as political participation, recent elections, their community and neighborhood. Along with Berlin, nine other cities—London, Leicester, Sheffield, Bradford, Stockholm, Berlin, Dresden, Munich, and Frankfurt —are included in the study.

If you would like to participate and contribute to this research project, simply follow the link:

https://tinyurl.com/ecns2018

The opinions and information expressed by each participant will be confidential; the results will not identify anyone by name or address. The data and analysis will be supervised by Professor Amit Ahuja of the University of California and Shannon Schumacher, a PhD candidate at the University of California.

Your participation would be greatly appreciated and is vital to the success of this study because we have only a few respondents to represent the views from your locality. Your opinions will help researchers get a full picture of what Berlin residents think about important political and social issues in comparison to residents of similar neighborhoods in the other cities.

Please help this important academic endeavor by filling out the survey.

We hope to hear from you soon!

Sincerely,

[digital signature here]
Shannon Schumacher
University of California, Santa Barbara

Questions?
If you have any questions about this research project or if you think you may have been injured as a result of your participation, please contact: Shannon Schumacher at shannonschumacher@ucsb.edu or Professor Amit Ahuja at aahuja@ucsb.edu. If you have any questions regarding your rights and participation as a research subject, please contact the Human Subjects Committee at +1 805 893-3807 or hsc@research.ucsb.edu. Or write to the University of California, Human Subjects Committee, Office of Research, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-2050.
The entity responsible for the use of your Study Data (i.e., responses to political attitudes) is: Regents of the University of California, on behalf of its Santa Barbara location. Contact Jennifer Lofthus Policy Coordinator & Deputy ADA Compliance Officer at +1 (805) 893- 7025 or Jennifer.lfthus@vcadmin.ucsb.edu. Or write to the Policy Coordinator, University of California, Santa Barbara, Office of the Vice Chancellor for Admin Services, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-2033.

University of California Santa Barbara
POLITICAL SCIENCE

Umfrage zu Städten und Nachbarschaften

Random Selection

The Field Supervisor will mark your starting location and direction on the map with an X. Please trace your route and mark the number of households you knocked on the map.

1. How to Choose Households:
If the block contains **mostly houses** use the following sequence on both sides of the street (or one side if both sides are not within the boundary):

3, 4, 1, 3

If the block contains **mostly apartment complexes**, follow the selection below:

Apartment building with fewer than 20 households: select every **5th** apartment

Apartment building between 21-100 households: select every **7th** apartment

Apartment building more than 100 households: select every **10th** apartment

The Field Supervisor may authorize a different sequence depending on the neighborhood. Please make sure to describe the type of housing when you check in at the beginning of field work.

2. How to Choose Subjects for Street Intercepts (once you choose a random intercept):

Count for 5 minutes, after 5 minutes, take the raw number and multiply it by 12.
Rationale is that interns will recruit for a whole hour.
Thus, 60 minutes divided by 5 = 12.
Formula to choose is below:
x= 500; approach every 20th person at the site
x= 499-200; approach every 10th person
x= 199-25; approach every 5th person
x= 24 or below; approach every 2nd person
The randomly chosen subjects will be approached with study pitch and then if subject agrees to participate, he/she will be interviewed. Ask if subject is a resident of the neighborhood as part of study pitch before beginning the survey. *Only residents of the neighborhood are eligible to take part in the survey.* All others are ineligible and should NOT be included in the number of people approached.

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