Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America
Author(s): David Pion-Berlin
Reviewed work(s):
Source: *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Oct., 1992), pp. 83-102
Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/422098
Accessed: 24/07/2012 16:28

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Comparative Politics.*

http://www.jstor.org

Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America

David Pion-Berlin

The influence of the armed forces upon the emergent democracies of South America is a subject that is gathering attention within the scholarly community. The completed transition to democratic rule has necessarily shifted the center of focus from military regimes to civil-military relations.[1] While relations between soldiers and citizens have long been of concern to social scientists, the recent political changes sweeping the South American region raise especially intriguing and interrelated questions for the political-military analyst. To what extent do contemporary relations between the military and government transcend the cyclical and self-destructive patterns long observed in Latin America? How would we know if the transition has already heralded in a new era in civil-military relations or if it is simply prefiguring a reversion to the past? Phrased differently, how should we evaluate the behavior and motives of the armed forces situated within these new democratic societies?

Recently, both the terms upon which power has been transferred from military to civilian hands and developments subsequent to the transfer have prompted anxiety among scholars about the capacity of these new and fragile democracies to exert control over the armed forces.[2] In certain cases, foundational constraints imposed by authoritarian legacies and the transition process have conferred upon the armed forces substantial influence over the nascent democratic governments. Such indicators reinforce the view that there is greater continuity than discontinuity in military behavior between the pre- and postauthoritarian periods. If the armed forces have left office but not abandoned their centers of power, then the transfer of authority from military to civilian hands is more superficial than real.[3] At worst, the formal departure of the military from power might represent, not the end of a political cycle, but rather its continuation. At best, democratic rule would be severely limited, subject to military supervision, moderation, or arbitration.

However, the empirical evidence (as will be shown) has not always supported the champions of continuity. The armed forces have not prevailed in every instance. Though the fear of a coup d'état still lingers, the military has not always been able to convert this fear into a convincing weapon of intimidation against the new regimes. Moreover, it is by no means clear that, if given the opportunity, the military would prefer to assume the burdens of political management which it had undertaken in decades past.

Few would argue with the assertion that the armed forces still retain power despite having yielded control of the state back to the democratic forces. But power remains as elusive a phenomenon as always. Undeniably it is there, but how is it expressed, and towards what purpose? Military aggressiveness is deceptive. Though provocative, intimidating, and perhaps disruptive, it is not necessarily destructive. Recent trends suggest that the military may be more interested in carving out a respected political niche within the democratic order than in overturning it. In certain instances, military action seems designed mainly to restore

professional pride and integrity rather than to seek political domination.[4] In other instances, military action seems praetorian, breaking the democratic rules of conduct to usurp civilian authority. In sum, the power and ultimate objectives of the armed forces of South America vary, ranging from a modest defense of corporate interests at one end to aggressive confrontations with the state at the other.

This study will focus on one particular aspect of military power, military autonomy. Autonomy, as used in this study, refers to an institution's decision-making authority.[5] It will first be argued that generalizations about the armed forces in the postauthoritarian order are sure to mask critical differences in the degree to which the military is willing and able to defend perceived prerogatives. To specify the factors that might contribute to these differences, we will organize the data on military autonomy by country and decision site. The countries under study are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Peru. The decision sites range from military education to intelligence gathering to human rights. We surmise that autonomy will be some function of both the national political context and the location of a decision site along the professional-political continuum. In theory, the armed forces should be able to exert greater control over their internal decisions and less control over ostensibly political ones. Even so, there will be exceptions to this rule, since for reasons of perception and self-interest professional-political boundaries are often violated by both sides.

It is also hypothesized that the armed forces will attempt to enforce their discretion for a variety of purposes. In some instances their motives are defensive, aimed at protecting the military institution from political intruders. In other instances their motives are offensive, intended to expand their prerogatives while limiting those of the government. Defensive and offensive projects should have different implications for civilian control, and these will be examined in the conclusion.

Theoretical and Historical Perspectives on Military Autonomy

The term military autonomy has not been used with great clarity. While it refers broadly to the relative independence with which the armed forces behave, often gone unnoticed is the fact that there are both institutional and political dimensions to the military's behavior. The distinction has been obscured, resulting in confusion about the ultimate objectives of military power.[6] Institutional autonomy refers to the military's professional independence and exclusivity. In the interests of its own professional development, the military asserts its corporate autonomy by maintaining a "sense of organic unity and consciousness" that set itself apart from lay institutions.[7] The armed forces' special status as experts in the management of violence, their restricted entrance, rigorous training, hierarchy, and rules of conduct distinguish them from those outside their field. Barros and Coelho have argued that autonomization is a natural consequence of professional evolution in any organization, including the armed forces. They add: "It is possible to think, then, particularly in the case of military organizations, of *degrees of autonomy* of the organization, rather than *levels of professionalization* of the military occupation."[8]

As it becomes more acutely aware of its own professional powers, the organization throws up barriers and increases its distance and relative insulation from the outside world. In this respect, boundary maintenance is a normal and even desirable component of military

professional advancement. It is the professionally underdeveloped military whose borders are permeable, often prey to destructive social or political influences. Such conditions pertain to the praetorian environments of unstable, Third World societies.

Military political autonomy, on the other hand, refers to the military's aversion towards or even defiance of civilian control.[9] While it is part of the state, the military often acts as if it were above and beyond the constitutional authority of the government. The degree of political autonomy is a measure of the military's determination to strip civilians of their political prerogatives and claim these for itself. As the armed forces accumulate powers, they become increasingly protective of their gains. The more valuable and entrenched their interests are, the more vigorously they will resist the transfer of control over these to democratic leaders. Latin America offers no confirmation of Huntington's assertion that there is an automatic identity between corporate autonomy and political subordination.[10] To the contrary, corporate autonomy and submission to civilian control may be inversely related to one another.

Put differently, autonomy can be either an offensive or a defensive weapon in the hands of the military. Offensively, its purpose is ostensibly political: to limit the government's prerogatives by strengthening the military's own decision-making powers. Rather than lose sight of its professional boundaries, the military tests its outer limits by challenging the government for influence or even control over certain policy matters. Defensively, its goal is more institutional, a means by which the military guards its core professional functions against unwanted interference by "outsiders." It protects itself from "excessive" political meddling, which it believes may interfere with the goals of professionalization and modernization.[11]

Offensive projects are familiar in Latin America. Rather than relegating themselves to subordinate positions within the political framework, the "new military professionals" of the 1960s and 1970s expanded their spheres of influence to absorb functions previously performed by what were perceived as less capable civilian governments.[12] As the role-expansive army enforced the institutional boundaries between it and civil society, it also expanded the limits of its political influence, up to and including the conquest of state power.[13] This double movement of self-enforced isolation and enlargement of political influence today evokes fears of corporate autonomy.

Although designed to protect core interests and values, defensive projects may promote either aggression or insularity. At the turn of the century autonomy allowed the Latin American armed forces to turn inward, preoccupied as they were with the challenges of professionalization. Advances were made in recruitment, training, procurement, and the development of a hierarchical system of rank and promotions, all of which contributed to the military's more confident self-image. It fancied itself a society in microcosm: the ideal model of efficiency, equality (of opportunity), and technological and organizational sophistication. By contrast, the political system seemed undeveloped: conflict-torn, inefficient, incompetent, and unable to resolve the major problems afflicting society.[14] While the contentious and partisan nature of the democratic process was loathsome to an institution which fashioned itself as well-ordered and truly national in character, the armed forces generally kept aloof from politics during the early 1900s. By the 1930s, however, the military had become more assertive, lashing out at civilian governments for allegedly interfering in its internal affairs and subverting professional standards of conduct to serve partisan ends. Military intervention in this era was generally corrective in nature, designed

to supplant "meddlesome" politicians with those who would respect professional boundaries, after which the armed forces returned to the barracks. In this respect, the military coup was a short-term, interim, defensive measure.

While a reversion to offensive, long-term authoritarian rule can not be ruled out in Latin America, it seems that the contemporary period is also witnessing new forms of military defensiveness. The armed forces may not desire to undermine democratic institutions so much as to secure corporate advantages within them. As Samuel Finer once observed, even when the armed forces profess a strong antiregime sentiment, sentiment does not make a program. Rather than intending to weaken the regime, the military may simply be expressing a "desire for isolation, for self-governing autonomy inside its sphere."[15]

Undoubtedly, most Latin American armies are guided by both institutional and political objectives. However, the presumption that current military pressures, threats, and defiance are *all* opening moves in a larger strategy of destabilization seems unwarranted for two important reasons. First, a return to authoritarian rule is not necessarily in the corporate interests of the armed forces. Many military officers would prefer to disassociate themselves from the authoritarian legacy. The failed policies and immoral practices of military governments in South America directly harmed the military institutions themselves. Military incompetence, self-aggrandizement, and repression while in office contributed not only to an unprecedented repudiation of the profession by civil society but also to a crisis of identity among many in the officer corps as well.[16] Consequently, military stature, unity, and self-confidence declined measurably in countries like Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay by the time power was transferred to civilian hands. Anxious to protect themselves from the divisive and corrosive influences of political office, military institutions have since practiced coup avoidance.

Second, the armed forces no longer coalesce as easily around common ideological themes as they once did. Indeed, there is a greater diversity of positions within the officer corps and between services about the proper function of the armed forces in society, as well as genuine uncertainty over the institution's primary missions. Old security fears of Communist subversion, which hitherto served as a focal point for military coalescence, have been rendered nearly obsolete by dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. The receding threat has undermined one of the central premises of the national security doctrine: that only a permanent military vigilance in and outside of government could render the nation impenetrable against its international foe. Now, there are fewer justifications for a return to the garrison state than in decades past. Officers are more reticent to take on the dual role of soldier and politician and more likely to acknowledge that there are boundaries between professional and political conduct. That is not to say, however, that the military and government have not and will not continue to dispute those boundaries. Professional-political lines are drawn in sand, not concrete, and these can still shift with the prevailing winds. But neither should it be said that the armed forces have been uniformly willing or able to achieve autonomy over all defense-related functions. The military's actual influence varies considerably, as will be shown below.

Variations in Military Autonomy

If we accept that there are professional and political dimensions to autonomy as well as offensive and defensive military projects, then any empirical investigation must be sensitive to the variance with which military power expresses itself. It should not be presumed, for example, that prerogatives are constant across either countries or functions. The military may have full authority over some decisions, shared authority over others, and little or no authority over still others. Defense-related issues first must be disaggregated and then arrayed across the professional-political continuum to know precisely what the variations in military autonomy have been during the postauthoritarian period.

Data on military autonomy have been collected for five of South America's democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Peru, and Chile. These countries were chosen for study precisely because they have all recently emerged from long periods of authoritarian rule. They share the legacies of military dictatorship and the ongoing struggles to rebuild democratic institutions, processes, and programs. None has completed this rebuilding process. Thus, any comparisons between this set of countries and the more established democracies of Venezuela and Colombia are bound to be misleading. However, comparisons within this set may reveal the way in which contextual factors have or have not modified relations between civil and military elites.

Country-specific data pertain to different though occasionally overlapping decision sites. Included are the areas of senior and junior level personnel decisions, force levels, military education, doctrine, reform, and budgets, arms production and procurement, defense organization, intelligence gathering, internal security, and human rights. These functions were chosen because they are critical to defense and/or reflect points of contention between the government and the armed forces. For each site, levels of military autonomy were ranked ordinally, on a scale of low, medium, or high. Given the limitations of the available evidence, this scaling device was in fact the most appropriate for the task. There simply were no numerical equivalents for many of the variables, nor would a more refined scale be necessary since only five countries are being compared across twelve issue areas. The following are descriptions of and justifications for inclusion of the categories as well as the ordinal levels of comparison.

Personnel Decisions Promotions, retirements, and appointments help to shape the professional and ideological direction of the armed forces. Levels of autonomy pertain to the amount of discretion the military enjoys in making personnel decisions. At lower ranks, discretionary powers are considerable and vary little from country to country. At higher ranks, however, control varies. If the military establishes its own lists of promotions and retirements subject only to presidential ratification, then autonomy is high. If the military nominates two or more officials for each position, subject to a presidential choice and senate confirmation, then autonomy is lower. If the president can either approve, reject, or independently recommend, then military autonomy is lower still.

Force Levels Generally, the Latin American armed forces prefer a larger force to a smaller one to justify greater budgetary shares and maintain advantages over other armies in the region. Democratic governments would prefer small, less costly forces which would

acknowledge the priority attached to diplomatic solutions to regional tensions. Thus, autonomy is simply a measure of whether total force levels have increased, declined, or remained the same during the democratic period.

Military Education and Doctrine The military also wants exclusive control over the socialization of its recruits. Proper indoctrination insures a greater *esprit de corps* among the rank and file. Educational lessons are reinforced by the closed, disciplinary, and conformist nature of the military institution. The armed forces would rather enforce this cloistered learning environment than expose its soldiers to the unpredictable and divisive influences of civil society and civilian universities. Military autonomy is highest where it can prevent civilians from teaching courses within the military academies or superior war colleges (or at the very least control the intellectual content of their courses), prohibit the transfer of soldiers from military to civilian institutions of higher learning, and inhibit civilians from tampering with cherished security doctrines. Military autonomy is lowest where civilians can develop their own curriculum, where officers are required to take courses outside the confines of the military barracks, and where civilians have had success at redefining the military's central defense/security doctrines.

Military Reform The armed forces desire discretionary authority in such areas as redeployment of troops, operational transformations, upgrading of weaponry systems, and reorganization of research institutions and training procedures. Reforms in any of these areas can easily alter the balance of power between the separate services, operational units, or individual commanders. Those with entrenched interests and the most to lose from change will vigorously resist any government-initiated reforms. If there is to be reform, the armed forces would prefer to be masters of their own designs. Where civilians are unable to influence the reform process, military autonomy is at its highest. Lower autonomy would pertain where the military and civilians jointly draft reform proposals and submit them to military consideration, and autonomy would be lower still where the civilian defense ministry devises and enforces its own reorganizational plans.

Military Budgets It is obviously in the interest of the armed forces to obtain and maintain larger defense budgets. However, civilian leaders confronted with scarce economic resources, fiscal restraints imposed upon them by international lenders, and pressures from constituents competing for diminishing shares would prefer to reduce military budgets when possible—and where such a move would improve their political position. Hence the defense budget is often a point of contention between the two sides. Actual, annual disbursements of defense funds and military allotments as a percentage of central government expenditures provide a measure of military autonomy in this area.

Arms Production and Procurement It is to the advantage of the military to have full control over the domestic production of defense-related goods. Where the military owns, manages, and regulates a complex of state-subsidized arms industries, it can reduce its reliance upon uncertain foreign suppliers and also lower its dependence on the good will of the government to facilitate arms transfers from abroad. The more dependent the nation

becomes on the domestic production of arms for its employment, the more influence the armed forces can wield over the allocation of national resources and the setting of defense priorities. For these very same reasons, democratic leaders would prefer to either privatize the arms industry and/or bring it under direct civilian control. Autonomy is at higher levels where defense industries remain in the hands of the armed forces and at lower levels where some control is transferred to either the state or society. If for whatever reason the armed forces have not established their own defense industries, then they must purchase their arms from abroad. Where the military can procure all the weapon systems it desires, then it has greater levels of autonomy. Where the government effectively blocks the purchase of certain goods, then autonomy is lower.

Defense Organization Political influence is often channeled through and mediated by institutions. The organization of relations between government and military institutions can affect the effectiveness with which the armed forces peddle their influence with the political authorities and likewise modify the government's capacity to resist such influence. Executives prefer bureaucratic layers between themselves and the officer corps in order to eliminate the latter's direct channels of access. They also prefer their authority to be centralized in a single, civilian-directed defense ministry, as opposed to separate, military-supervised army, air force, and navy ministries. Where civilians control a single defense ministry, military autonomy is at its lowest. Where a military-supervised defense ministry or separate branch ministries under civilian control exist, then military autonomy is higher, and it is higher still where cabinet-ranking military ministers run their own bureaucracies.

Intelligence Gathering In the hands of the armed forces, intelligence gathering became a powerful component of the state's security apparatus during the periods of authoritarian rule. Although the military also has legitimate defense-related reasons for collecting information, democratic governments would prefer that such tasks be managed and performed by civilians. In fact, all advanced industrial democracies have government-controlled, intelligence-gathering agencies. Military autonomy is limited to the extent that intelligence is conducted under the auspices of a single, government-controlled agency. Military autonomy is obviously enhanced where it can supervise its own operations.

Internal Security In the 1960s, the armed forces moved from preoccupation with external defense to concern over internal subversion and insurrection. Even with the demise of guerrilla forces in Latin America, the militaries remained convinced that domestic security threats still lingered and that only they could guard the "institutional order of the republic" from public disturbances. In some instances this self-proclaimed right of intervention was codified into laws which democratic governments have since sought to amend or overturn. Autonomy is greatest where the armed forces are able to determine the scope, frequency, and intensity with which they involve themselves in the nation's internal security affairs. Autonomy is lower where governments are able to place certain limits on these activities, and lower still where military intervention is either proscribed or accepted only as a last resort.

Human Rights Under authoritarian rule, military courts claimed dominion over all offenders, soldiers and civilians alike. With the return to democracy, the issue has been whether officers could be brought to justice in civilian courts for having committed human rights offenses during times of peace. While such transgressions in certain instances violate military codes of conduct, civilian prosecutors have argued that officers are citizens first and therefore subject to the higher laws of the land and of the international community. The armed forces dissent, arguing that, if violations occurred at all, they took place during counterinsurgency wars and hence fall under their own jurisdiction. To the extent that the military has successfully immunized itself from all judicial prosecution, then military autonomy is higher. Where the armed forces have been initially subject to civilian prosecution but have subsequently overturned court decisions, then autonomy is lower. And autonomy is lowest where the military has been forced to comply fully with civilian laws.

Findings and Interpretation

Country Averages Table 1 presents the findings on military autonomy for the five countries under review. The data are revealing in several aspects. First, they indicate that military power in the postauthoritarian era is by no means uniform, varying by country and by issue area. The armed forces are weaker in Argentina, Uruguay, and Peru than in Brazil and Chile. Once disaggregated by function, it is also clear that autonomy is greater in certain areas and less so in others. On the one hand, the armed forces exhibit firm control over education, doctrines, and reform. On the other hand, they have much less control over budgets, force levels, and defense organization. Second, it is evident that there are patterns to the variations. First we will consider explanations for differences in country averages, followed by an appraisal of issue-specific variations.

Country averages correspond rather well with three interrelated variables: military regime performance, military cohesion, and the transitional path to democratic rule.[17] Bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes that performed well were better able to guard the military against political divisiveness. Though ideological and personal rivalries existed, they were contained below the surface and did not prove to be especially harmful to the institution. With their relative prestige strengthened as a consequence of policy successes, the armed forces were in a position to guide the transfer of power to civilian hands and to secure important advantages once the new democratic administrations were installed.[18] By way of contrast, armies which failed to govern effectively suffered professional setbacks as well. Policy failures left the officer corps wounded, conflict-ridden, and demoralized. The exhaustion of having served poorly in office weakened the military's capacity to control either the transition or events subsequent to the transition.

Brazil's generals are credited with having engineered a hugely successful experiment in state-led capitalist development between 1968 and 1979. The logic of economic success dictated that the groundwork for political change could be confidently laid early on, and it was. Liberalization preceded democratization by more than a decade. Though the substance, pace, and intensity of the changes were affected by pressures from below, the armed forces managed the transition rather well.[19] Thus, the Brazilian armed forces remained a significant

Table 1 Military Autonomy by Country and Issue

	Argentina	Brazil	Uruguay	Peru	Chile[a]
Senior Level Personnel Decisions	L	H	M	L	M
Junior Level Personnel Decisions	H	H	H	H	H
Military Force Level	L	H	L	L	-
Military Education	H	H	H	M	H
Military Doctrine	H	H	H	M	H
Military Reform	M	H	M	H	H
Military Budget	L	H	L	M	-
Mil. Production or Procurement	M	H	M	M	H
Defense Organization	L	H	M	M-H	L
Intelligence Gathering	L	M	M	H	H
Internal Security	L	M	H	M	H
Human Rights	M	H	H	H	H
Comparable Averages[b]	L	H	M	M	H

[a] Because Chile has just recently completed the transition to democratic rule, there is insufficient data on some variables.
[b] These are relative, not absolute figures that are designed to show the levels of autonomy for each country in relation to the others.

political power well after the elections of March 1985 and have maintained very high levels of autonomy.

In Chile, the "Chicago boys" managed to lower inflation to single digits and achieve consistently high growth rates between 1976–1980 and 1984–89. This program—the purest application of free market doctrine in South America—fell somewhat short of the Brazilian "miracle" owing to the economic crisis of 1981–83. Nonetheless, success is evidenced by the fact that the military's economic program and principles have been left virtually intact by its democratic successors. Military cohesion has certainly benefitted from government performance. In addition, General Pinochet has kept his soldiers in line through his adroit manipulation of promotion and retirement regulations.[20] A very confident military leadership rewrote the Chilean constitution in 1980, rendering its powers to oversee the transition virtually unalterable. However, while the Chilean armed forces set the rules for disengagement, they could not fully control the pace or outcome of the transition. The stunning defeat of Pinochet's referendum in November 1988, followed a year later by the

victory of the opposition in presidential elections, dealt unexpected blows to Pinochet's strategy. Yet neither defeat was enough to prevent the military from gaining wide margins of influence within the new democratic order. Military autonomy in Chile is high, but perhaps not as high as in Brazil.

Uruguay and Peru, the two countries experiencing moderate levels of military autonomy, shared similar authoritarian legacies and transition. In both cases, previous military governments suffered the consequences of poor economic performance and declining legitimation. The Peruvian recession of 1974–1977 combined with the popular rejection of the more conservative policies of the second revolutionary government left the armed forces isolated, weakened, and divided. Fortunately for the armed forces, however, they were quick to recognize their own quandary and prepared for disengagement early enough to salvage some degree of respect upon their return to the barracks.[21] In Uruguay, the military was wounded but not vanquished by the popular rejection of its proposed constitution of 1980. It still managed to joust with the civilians over the terms of the transition, while enacting a last minute set of constitutional amendments designed to preserve its security prerogatives in the new democratic order.[22] Neither military could singularly control the transition, but they did comanage it, thus preserving some leverage over the new governments.

Finally, the lower levels of military autonomy in Argentina can be attributed to the combined effects of the junta's performance failures, the devastation of military morale after the Malvinas defeat, and the resultant loss of all powers to set the pace and terms of the transition to civilian rule. Performance had been ruled unsatisfactory even within the narrow set of indicators chosen by the regime itself. This weakened the confidence of the PRN government and promoted internal divisions within military ranks. Fatally divided by 1981, the regime could not agree on a strategy of either renewed repression or political liberalization. Faced for the first time with a vocal and mobilized opposition, the Galtieri government sought a new unifying theme in the Malvinas invasion. Through defeat in that war, the Argentine armed forces were rendered a terrible weakened organization, unable to speak with one voice or exert any real influence over the process of redemocratization.[23]

While the aforementioned foundational constraints go a long way toward accounting for differences in average levels of military autonomy by country, they do not adequately explain within-country variations by issue area. In Table 2, the twelve issue areas have been arrayed by levels of autonomy and along a continuum of decisional sites, from the more professional to the more political. Organized in this fashion, it becomes clear that there is some association between autonomy, on the one hand, and an issue's position on the professional-political continuum, on the other. The following explanations acknowledge the general influence of professional and political decision sites but go beyond them to suggest more specific reasons for variations in autonomy.

The Military Professional Sphere of Influence Military control over internal or core professional functions is, on the whole, considerable. Institutional reforms and the socialization and promotion of junior officers are prerogatives which have been preserved and protected from outside interference.[24] This pertains where the military emerged from the transition in a weakened position (Argentina), indicating that the closer a prerogative is situated to the institution's professional "center," the more vigorously it will be defended.

Table 2 Defense Issues, Military Autonomy, and the Professional-Political Continuum

		Professional	Professional-Political	Political
LEVELS OF AUTONOMY	High	• Junior Level Personnel Decisions • Military Doctrine • Military Education • Military Reform		• Human Rights
				• Internal Security
	Medium		• Arms Production/Procurement	• Intelligence Gathering
			• Military Budget • Defense Organization	
	Low	• Force Levels	• Senior-Level Personnel Decisions	

It has proven to be especially difficult to undo the effects of long-term indoctrination within the closed environment of the barracks. So long as education is confined solely to military academies, soldiers are unlikely to be sufficiently exposed to alternative points of view or to develop a higher tolerance for intellectual debate and dissension. But with very few exceptions democratic governments of Latin America have been unable to compel officers to attend the civilian universities. In Argentina, a government recommendation that officers with the rank of captain or higher do civilian postgraduate work was never implemented, nor were suggestions that the curricula at military colleges be reformed. In Peru, Brazil, and Argentina, civilians both take and offer courses at the superior war colleges. But the intellectual content of these courses is carefully controlled by the armed forces, and the screening process insures that those professors who are selected are often as conservative as their military counterparts, if not more conservative.[25]

The military's control over lower level promotions (defined here as those below the rank of colonel) is not surprising. Criteria for advancement are well-established and dictate that promotions be made according to seniority and merit. Where the military departs from these formalities, it does so at its own discretion. Having learned from the fatal errors of past presidents who tried to politicize the military rank and file, political leaders prefer not to involve themselves in such decisions.[26]

Military reform is a different matter, however. Governments would like the armed forces to undergo certain reforms which would improve the cost effectiveness of defensive operations and facilitate greater interservice cooperation with national defense policy. But they have been largely unable to overcome institutional inertia and opposition.[27] To reform is to call upon the armed forces to abandon ingrained patterns of behavior which for decades have served their members well on an individual level regardless of how irrational they may have been on an institutional level. Personal and branch rivalries over scarce resources complicated the quest for unification and rationalization of military functions. Weapons systems, intelligence agencies, and research centers were assets to be jealously guarded and preserved in their historic forms, not handed over to the defense ministry to be abolished, transformed, merged, or reassigned for the good of the whole. The willingness of the three forces to adapt to new patterns of cooperative interaction has lagged behind civilian desires for military transformation.

The one surprising finding in the professional sphere has been the ability of civilian governments to reduce force levels. In Argentina, the decline in military personnel for all forces combined equaled 49 percent between 1983 and 1987. In Peru, overall defensive forces were reduced from 135,500 in 1983 to 113,000 in 1987 (16.7 percent), and in Uruguay by 11 percent during the same period.[28] Reductions in military size have been justified on political, economic, and military grounds. Politically, intraregional tensions have markedly subsided since the return to democratic rule. Diplomatic initiatives have replaced military balance as the principal mechanism of conflict avoidance between neighboring states. Economically, these underdeveloped societies can ill afford to sustain large armies. And militarily, new forms of technologically superior combat call for the integration and streamlining of combat units.

Many career-minded officers have been persuaded by these new realities and thus have not contested the change. Others have resisted, fearing the loss of personal power and privileges. Such resistance could explain why the Brazilian armed forces expanded during

the democratic period. That other governments have prevailed despite such resistance makes these force reductions appear all the more impressive.

The Professional-Political Gray Zone The gray zone defines that murky middle ground between military and civilian authority where issues have both professional and political content. While all the functions at this decisional site are defense-related, at issue is who shall have decision-making powers. The finding (see Table 2) that since the transition to democratic rule levels of military autonomy in the gray zone have not been especially high is reassuring to governments struggling to establish wider spheres of influence.

Decisions about the allocation of governmental resources necessarily have a political content. For this reason, arms production, procurement, and military budgets were included in the gray zone. The two countries with sizable military industrial establishments are Argentina and Brazil. Brazil's armed forces have developed the largest and most sophisticated arms industry in the third world, equipping not only itself but other nations as well. This industry is supervised by IMBEL a state-owned company run by the ministry of the army. And the Brazilian armed forces also have their own program in nuclear research and production. In Argentina, the armed forces have for years had controlling shares in *Fabricaciones Militares*, a large state-subsidized conglomerate with thirteen separate industrial complexes that produce or coproduce, among other items, armored vehicles, antiaircraft missiles, and submarines. However, many of these firms have since been privatized under President Carlos Menem. Consequently, the military has lost some control.[29] The arms industry is considerably smaller in Chile, but nonetheless remains under the auspices of the military. Those countries that do not produce their own weaponry rely on procurement. In Uruguay, the army has been able to purchase what it wants, but the navy and air force have not and are ill furnished with supplies.[30] And in Peru arms imports were restricted by the Garcia government.

The general pattern seems to be that, where domestic arms industries have been efficient, more or less self-sustaining, and important earners of foreign exchange, the military has retained higher levels of autonomy. Where such industries are poorly run and heavily subsidized, governments under fiscal pressures have reduced their defense spending burden by seizing control of these firms or selling them off.

In three of the five cases under review, central government expenditures on defense have declined. Defense expenditures plummeted by 40 percent in Argentina between 1983 and 1986, representing the world's largest reduction in military spending for any country whose total defense budget exceeded $100 million. In Uruguay, military personnel at all ranks suffered real declines in salaries between 1985 and 1989, while the defense budget overall fell from 4.38 to 2.01 percent of GDP in the same period. In Peru, the Belaúnde Terry government conceded greater budgetary shares to the armed forces, only to have its policy reversed by Alain Garcia. Only in Brazil has the armed forces been able to maintain consistent (though modest) increases in their budget. This trend was especially troubling to the Argentine officers, who complained that they were losing the advantage to their perennial foes. It is significant that for nearly four years Alfonsín persisted with defense cuts despite considerable opposition from within the military.[31]

The battle over production, procurement, and budgetary allotments underscores the

importance of the transition to democratic rule, the determination of democratic governments to set their own agendas, and the sacrifices that economic depression and fiscal austerity have imposed on all interested parties. The armed forces' departure from office has reduced their control over budgetary shares. Now, civilian leaders assume the option of weighing defense allotments against other priorities. While higher military salaries will no doubt yield greater military compliance with civilian rule, that may come at the expense of deficits which reduce confidence among international lenders. The structural problems of economic stagnation, inflation, and indebtedness have, ironically, worked to the advantage of civilian control by forcing military leaders to accept the hard economic choices. In decades past, the fear of military reprisals would have been sufficient to shift funding priorities in favor of defense. This is no longer the case.

Civilians have had even greater success at restructuring the defense organizations which link the government with the armed forces. Separate branch ministries (army, navy, air force) have been replaced by single ministries of defense in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Peru; civilians have been appointed as heads of these ministries in Argentina and Chile; and military commanders-in-chief have been downgraded to chiefs of staff of their respective forces in Argentina. By inserting an additional bureaucratic layer between the executive branch and the armed forces, such changes have at least formally limited the military's direct access to the president.

It is unclear in some instances whether reorganization has, as of yet, actually altered traditional modes of conduct. For instance, Italo Luder, former Argentine defense minister under Carlos Menem, resigned in protest over the fact that senior military officers were excluding him from their private meetings with the president. And the separate services have resisted ceding power to the single Peruvian defense ministry created in 1987.[32] Although legally civilians can head the new defense ministries in Uruguay and Peru, in practice these positions have been offered to active and retired military officers. Still, these combined bureaucratic reforms should not be discounted, as they lay the institutional foundations for greater civilian control.

Why have civilians been able to achieve institutional reorganizations of this kind? First, it is generally a constitutional prerogative of the president to reshape his ministries as he sees fit, albeit occasionally with congressional approval. Second, "gray zone" reorganizations of this sort are less risky and costly to the armed forces than are internal reforms. Defense ministries, for example, do not depend upon the elimination of military installations or personnel. Third, career-minded officers who advocate modernization welcome the greater centralization of power that characterizes the single defense ministry and believe that this will facilitate the integration and coordination of military units.

Decisions governing the promotion and retirement of senior officers also are made along the thin line between the professional and the political. In theory, rules are designed like a system of checks and balances to prevent either side from abusing its powers at the expense of the other. Ideally, these rules should allow for the coparticipation of officers and the chief executive in these kinds of personnel decisions. The actual distribution of authority, however, varies from case to case.

Civilian leaders have had greatest discretion during the early moments of their terms of office. Almost without exception they were able to remove hardline obstructionists and replace them with softline *aperturistas* whose firmer loyalty to the democratic process

helped to stabilize the new governments. Within a year of assuming office, President Alfonsín in Argentina had expelled the entire officer corps at the rank of general which had served the PRN dictatorship. Notwithstanding the complaints and defiant gestures of the military itself, Uruguayan President Sanguinetti replaced hardliner General Julio Cesar Bonelli, head of the strategic first military region, with a softliner and restored military status to a number of officers who had been purged by the dictatorship for their political views. And in Peru, Alain Garcia retired the chief of the armed forces joint command in September 1985 for his complicity in a massacre of Peruvian peasants and also sacked top army and navy commanders for their disloyalty.[33]

Apparently, it is less risky for executives to make personnel decisions of this sort during the immediate postauthoritarian phase of rule. At that juncture, a strong case can be made that the new administration must be able to complete the transition to the new order and can do so only by eliminating the vestiges of the old. Second, the president is at the peak of his powers, having freshly emerged from electoral victory and enjoying widespread legitimacy. Still, the rules of promotion and retirement in the postauthoritarian era have generally preserved for the civilian heads of state important margins of authority throughout their tenure in office. For instance, all the presidents of the newly democratized states choose their most senior armed forces commanders. While in Brazil this is a mere formality, since the president can only approve names preselected by the armed forces themselves, this is not the case elsewhere. In Argentina, the president can reject military nominees or recommend his own alternatives. In Chile, the president has the power to reject military nominations but not to propose his own. And in Uruguay, the president may choose between two candidates for each top level post. Civilian authority has also been extended to the legislative branch. Except for Brazil and Chile, the senate has the power to approve or reject presidentially selected commanding officers *and* military selections of mid-ranking officers. Presidential vetoes of senatorial decisions are subject to legislative overrides.

The Political Sphere of Influence It is difficult to isolate issues which are purely political in character. Included here are those issues which perhaps have the strongest political content. The first involves human rights and the judicial system. In four of the five cases, the military has insulated its officer corps from judicial prosecution for past human rights offenses. In Uruguay, military pressure forced the government to grant amnesty to officers of every rank for any wrongdoing. An intimidated public ratified the measure two years later. In Brazil and Chile, self-amnesties have been imposed, and the armed forces have refused to allow any of their subordinates to appear before civilian magistrates.

Typically, the military argues that civilian courts have no jurisdiction over infractions committed during times of "war." Legal boundaries aside, the South American militaries have fiercely resisted the courts because ultimately they fear that indictments against even a handful of officers could easily implicate others along the chain of command, dragging the entire institution down in the process.[34] From this angle of vision, human rights trials constitute attacks on the corporate integrity of the military. They also represent a repudiation of military practice, since officers perceive their counterinsurgency campaigns to have been well-fought and honorable and in the best interests of the nation. The armed forces' self-bestowed immunity from prosecution has weakened the independent powers of the

judiciary and placed armed forces personnel above the law. The failure of governments to bring officers to justice for human rights violations is perhaps the single most serious obstacle to full democratic consolidation, because it effectively immunizes soldiers against prosecution, thus reducing the costs to repression in the future.

Levels of military autonomy with respect to internal security have been moderate to high. Here, a distinction must be made between law and practice. According to Article 142 of the new Brazilian constitution, one purpose of the military is to "maintain law and order" *upon the authorization of the government.* Legally, this marks an improvement over earlier constitutions which granted the military sole discretion. Practically, however, the armed forces have sanctioned their own intervention in domestic affairs to curb agrarian reform or to crush labor strikes.[35]

In Uruguay, the military is the principal guarantor of the *buen orden* (proper order) and reserves the exclusive right to remove the constitutional government should that order be threatened. The Peruvian case raises the question of direction of influence. Since the transition to democratic rule in 1980 the armed forces have had the power to maintain public order, appoint officials, and suspend constitutional guarantees in more than a dozen provinces affected by the terrorist activities of Sendero Luminoso. Yet these powers were delegated to it by the constitutional authorities. The military has prosecuted the war against the guerrillas at the prodding of the democratic governments and only with great reluctance. Most Peruvian officers believe that their principal mission has been and continues to be to protect Peru's borders against external transgressions by Chilean or Ecuadorian troops, not to engage in counterinsurgency operations against their own people. The fact that they are embroiled in an internal war attests to the governments' capacity to designate the military's defense and security missions. Likewise, in Argentina the government has had success in redefining the military's mission, although in the direction of less internal intervention rather than more.[36] And in Chile, internal security still lies within the purview of the armed forces.

Finally, the record is mixed on intelligence gathering. On the one hand, this function has been centralized and placed under civilian auspices in both Argentina and Brazil. Although the armed forces continue to collect information, their operations fall under the umbrella of government-supervised central intelligence agencies. On the other hand, the Argentine Servicio de Inteligencia del Estado (SIDE) and the Brazilian Serviço Nacional de Informações (SNI) must in many instances rely on more experienced military personnel to carry out their functions. Military operators may balk at political orders or even use their positions to spy on the government itself. Thus, it is not always clear whose interests such organizations are dedicated to defending.

For example, in Brazil it is uncertain whether the president, Fernando Collor de Mello, can fully restrain agencies long regarded as "states within a state."[37] In Peru and Chile, where intelligence is gathered by separate branches of the armed forces, there is no central clearing-house for information and hence no civilian control. This is also true of Uruguay, although there the army's defense intelligence service must now report twice a month to the ministry of defense. In sum, due to deficiencies in civilian expertise and to the difficulties of dismantling an authoritarian infrastructure of intelligence, vestiges of the militarized state remain.

Conclusion

This study reveals that military autonomy is a complex phenomenon that defies simple terminology or explanation. Although undeniably the armed forces remain significant political actors in the postauthoritarian period, their power is neither limitless nor uniform. There seems to be a ceiling to power above which the armed forces prefer not to go or can not go and below which they desire to extend their influence within the democratic order, varying according to context and issue area.[38] Dire warnings about aggregate military power in the new democratic era in South America are misleading because they are too general: they disguise variations in the achievements and likely objectives of separate military establishments.

The armed forces appear to have had greater success in guarding "core" professional functions than those lying more on the "periphery." Levels of military autonomy over functions perceived to be clearly internal to the profession are higher; levels are lower where functions are situated either in the gray zone between professional and political spheres of influence or within the political sphere itself. Exceptions to this rule were discovered for the issues of force levels, human rights, and internal security, where military autonomy was either much lower or higher than expected. While the general pattern seems to have warranted the conceptual distinction between institutional and political fields of autonomy, other influences must be noted.

First, there exists a perceptual gap between the military and government. The two sides have different angles of vision, which has sometimes obscured the boundaries between their respective spheres of influence. Because they perceive their professional reputations to be at stake, the armed forces have obstructed judicial proceedings even though civilians contend these lie squarely within the political realm. Similarly, the armed forces (and army in particular) have not entirely abandoned the view that internal security lies within their purview, while the democratic leaders believe such operations fall under the auspices of the police and internal security forces. As a consequence, the military has been willing to encroach upon civilian authority more readily in these areas. Where governments have successfully resisted these advances, levels of military autonomy have been lower. Where they have not, autonomy has been higher.

Second, there are costs and benefits to any political action, suggesting that the calculation of risk must also be factored in any explanations about military autonomy. Where civilians surmise that the benefits to challenging the armed forces for discretionary authority outweigh the costs, such a challenge will often be mounted. If successful, the government can widen its sphere of influence within the professional-political gray zone. Consequently, during the early phase of their administrations a number of South American presidents retired senior officers over the objections of the armed forces. They calculated that the risks were lower at a time when their political powers and legitimacy were at their peak. Conversely, the political sphere is not necessarily sacrosanct to the armed forces. Where the military finds an advantage to be gained at minimal cost, it may be willing to violate the boundaries between the professional and political spheres.

But the evidence suggests that the armed forces have either been unwilling or unable to extend their sphere of influence over some important "parcels of political territory." While a reversion to past practices of military intervention can not be discounted, data used in this

study do not support the view that South America is simply experiencing another "turn of the political cycle." The discontinuities with the past are too many to exclude the possibility that South America may be breaking new political ground. What the evidence does indicate is that the purposes towards which military power is exercised may differ. Where institutional autonomy prevails, the military's project is likely to be more defensive, aimed at minimizing outside interference in "core" professional matters. In this instance, autonomy would be fully compatible with civilian control. Having discretion over a narrower set of functions sharpens the boundaries between professional and nonprofessional spheres of influence, retards civilian meddling in the internal affairs of the armed forces, and guards against military "trespassing" on government turf.[39] On the face of it, civilian control should not be adversely affected by boundary maintenance of this sort.

Where political autonomy prevails, the objectives of the armed forces may be offensive, designed to test the outer limits of their powers while reducing those of government. The military-nonmilitary distinction will fade in the mind of an officers corps riveted by political power. Civil-military boundaries are either obscured or redrawn so that governmental latitude is narrowed. Pushed to its logical consequence, military political autonomy could seriously weaken not only the democratic process and institutions, but public confidence in democracy as well. In sum, whether military autonomy has a beneficial or adverse affect upon civilian control depends upon the kind of control the military desires and can achieve. And whether or not civilians ultimately consolidate their power over the military also depends upon their capacity to strike the delicate balance between limiting the military's political reach without impairing its professionalism.

NOTES

1. Evidence of this shift can be found in Augusto Varas, ed., *Democracy under Siege: New Military Power in Latin America* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989); Louis W. Goodman, Johanna S. R. Mendelson, and Juan Rial, eds., *The Military and Democracy: The Future of Civil-Military Relations in Latin America* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1990); Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Claude Welch, Jr., *No Farewell to Arms?* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987).

2. For an overview of confining conditions in South America as a whole, see Felipe Agüero, "The Military and the Limits to Democratization in South America," in Guillermo O'Donnell et al., eds., *The New Latin American Democracies: Problems in Transition and Consolidation* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, forthcoming). On Brazil, see Guillermo O'Donnell, "Challenges to Democratization in Brazil," *World Policy*, 5 (Spring 1988), 281–300. On obstacles to change in Peru, see Marcial Rubio Correa, "The Armed Forces in Peruvian Politics," in Varas, ed., pp. 35–45.

3. This position is best expressed by Alain Rouquié, "Demilitarization and the Institutionalization of Military-Dominated Polities in Latin America," in Abraham F. Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch, eds., *Armies and Politics in Latin America*, rev. ed. (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986), pp. 444–477.

4. The military rebellions in Argentina between 1987 and 1990 are cases in point. However destabilizing these rebellions may have been, they were generally motivated not by a desire to undermine the constitutional order so much as to resolve the professional crises afflicting their institution. See David Pion-Berlin and Ernesto López, "A House Divided: Crisis, Cleavage and Conflict in the Argentine Army," in Edward C. Epstein, ed., *The New Democracy in Argentina: The Search for a Successful Formula* (New York: Praeger, forthcoming).

5. The literature on military autonomy in particular is sparse. See Felipe Agüero, "Autonomy of the Military in Chile: From Democracy to Authoritarianism," in Varas, ed., pp. 83–96. There is a more plentiful scholarship on military state autonomy. For example, see Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Ellen Kay Trimberger, *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats*

and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1978); and Peter S. Cleaves and Henry Pease Garcia, "State Autonomy and Military Policy Making," in Lowenthal and Fitch, eds., pp. 335–366.

6. Augusto Varas' usage of the term is poorly specified. He incorrectly assumes that all expressions of professional military autonomy are harmful to civilian control because they indicate greater increments of political power for the armed forces. See Varas, ed., p. 3.

7. Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957).

8. See Alexandre de S. C. Barros and Edmundo C. Coelho, "Military Intervention and Withdrawal in South America," in Lowenthal and Fitch, eds., p. 439.

9. Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalism and Political Power* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972); and Guillermo O'Donnell, "Modernization and Military Coups: Theory, Comparisons and the Argentine Case," in Lowenthal and Fitch, eds., pp. 96–133.

10. See Samuel Huntington, "The Professional Military Ethic," in Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennett, eds., *The Political Influence of the Military: A Comparative Reader* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 47–51.

11. This is similar to the concept of internal autonomy, where the military tries to prevent political interference by governments in its internal affairs. See Barros and Coelho, p. 440.

12. Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 47–68.

13. Armies with role-expansive views define their functions within the widest permissible range of action, obscuring legitimate boundaries between military and nonmilitary activities in order to justify political intervention. See J. Samuel Fitch, "Military Professionalism, National Security and Democracy: Lessons from the Latin American Experience," *Pacific Focus*, 6 (1989), 99–147.

14. See Frederick Nunn, *Yesterday's Soldiers: European Military Professionalism in South America, 1890–1940* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), p. 250.

15. See Samuel Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p. 47.

16. On public repudiation of the military in Argentina, see *Latin American Weekly Report*, Aug. 16, 1985, p. 10; and Walter Little, "Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Argentina," *Government and Opposition*, 19 (Spring 1984), 207–224.

17. The argument that serious economic difficulties caused or reinforced disunity in the military and that these factors hastened the transition to democracy is made by Edward Epstein, "Legitimacy, Institutionalization and Opposition in Exclusionary Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes: The Situation of the 1980s," *Comparative Politics*, 17 (October 1984), 37–54. On paths of transition and their presumed effects on emerging democracies, see Alfred Stepan, "Paths toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations," in Guillermo O'Donnell et al., eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 64–84. The more general influence of authoritarian rule upon the emerging democracies is explained in Karen L. Remmer, "Redemocratization and the Impact of Authoritarian Rule in Latin America," *Comparative Politics*, 17 (April 1985), 253–275.

18. Scott Mainwaring and Donald Share, "Transitions through Transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain," in Wayne Selcher, ed., *Political Liberalization in Brazil* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 175–215.

19. Maria Helena Moreira Alves, *State and Opposition in Military Brazil* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985).

20. See Genaro Arriagada Herrera, *The Politics of Power: Pinochet* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp. 102–169.

21. See Julio Cotler, "Military Intervention and 'Transfer of Power to Civilians' in Peru," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), p. 171.

22. See Luis Gonzalez, "Uruguay, 1980–81: An Unexpected Opening," *Latin American Research Review*, 18 (1983), 63–76; Martin Weinstein, *Uruguay: Democracy at the Crossroads* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 74–112; Charles G. Gillespie, "Uruguay's Transition from Collegial Military-Technocratic Rules," in O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, eds., *Latin America*, pp. 173–195.

23. Andrés Fontana, "Fuerzas Armadas, Partidos Políticos y Transición a la Democracia en Argentina," Kellogg Institute Working Paper 28 (July 1984), pp. 1–38; David Pion-Berlin, "The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina, 1976–1983," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 27 (Summer 1985), 55–76.

24. Nordlinger classified, as affairs internal to the military corporation, educational and training curriculum,

assignments and promotions of all but the most senior officers, and defense strategies. See Eric Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 71.

25. The author has direct knowledge of the workings of the Argentine Escuelo Superior de Guerra, as a result of several visits made there in August 1989. Frank McCann, Jr. provided the author with information about the Brazilian Command and General Staff School. On Peruvian military education, see Victor Villanueva, *El CAEM y la Revolución de la Fuerza Armada* (Lima: Campodónico Ediciones, 1972).

26. Perhaps the two greatest tragedies of civilian interference occurred during the presidencies of Hipólito Yrigoyen in Argentina (1928–1930) and João Goulart in Brazil (1961–64). Reckless, overt meddling in the institutional affairs of the armed forces resulted in the overthrow of their respective administrations.

27. Argentine defense ministers Raúl Borrás and Roque Carranza made repeated calls for the unification and coordination of military operations to overcome the problems experienced in the Malvinas War. These proposals were generally well received by the chiefs of staff but met resistance from other officers in the command structure. See *Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Latin America (FBIS-LAT)*, Mar. 5, 1984, pp. B2–B3; Oct. 2, 1985, pp. B2–B3; *Latin America Weekly Report*, Oct. 25, 1985, p. 1.

28. Figures on force levels compiled from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, 1983–1984, p. 127, and 1988–1989, p. 227.

29. Information on Brazilian and Argentine arms industries can be found in John Keegan, *World Armies*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 24–25, 76–79.

30. Adrian English, *Regional Defense Profile Number 1: Latin America* (London: Jane's Publishers, 1988), p. 270.

31. Data on defense spending as a percent of GDP and central government expenditures, for these five countries, was found in James W. Wilkie, ed., *The Statistical Abstract of Latin America* (Los Angeles: UCLA, 1989), p. 262. Supplementary information on Argentina was found in Gerardo P. Gargiulo, "Gasto Militar y Política de Defensa," *Desarrollo Económico*, 28 (April-June 1988), 96. Salary information on the Uruguayan defense forces is cited in Juan Rial, "Las Fuerzas Armadas en los Años 90: Una Agenda de Discusión,' *Sociedad de Analisis Político* (Montevideo, 1990), pp. 39–40.

32. The author is grateful to Dan Masterson for this observation about the Peruvian military.

33. Argentine personnel changes are described in *Latin America Weekly Report*, Mar. 15, 1985, p. 9; data on Peru are from *FBIS-LAT*, Sep. 16, 1985, p. vi; changes in Uruguay are reported in the *Latin American Southern Cone Report*, May 24, 1985, p. 1.

34. This fear naturally follows from the fact that atrocities were often undertaken collectively, with soldiers entering into *pactos de sangre* (blood pacts) and oaths of silence about their wrongdoing.

35. See *1988 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Brazil*, reprinted in *FBIS-LAT*, Dec. 5, 1988, p. 44.

36. Insights on the Peruvian military mission were provided by Dan Masterson in conversations with the author. On the exclusion of the Argentine military from internal security functions, see República Argentina, "Ley De Defensa Nacional," *Boletín Oficial*, Sección la (May 1988), 4.

37. See Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, pp. 13–29.

38. Evidence that such a ceiling of military power exists lies in the fact that the military has not intervened to overturn democratic governments during the worst economic depression in Latin American history. See Irving L. Horowitz, Militarism and Civil-Military Relationships in Latin America: Implications for the Third World," *Research in Political Sociology*, 1 (1985), 93.

39. This point corresponds to Samuel Huntington's discussion in *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957). We would depart from Huntington in arguing that civilian control and boundary maintenance do not render the armed forces politically inert, but rather limit their political reach.