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Authors

BARICH, RACHEL ROSEMAN
BIELBY, DENISE D

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This study investigates the relationship between individuals' expectations for marriage and their beliefs about the social world. Drawing on the neoinstitutionalist perspective and employing a repeated cross-section design, this study analyzes survey data on young adults from 1967 and 1994 to examine the relationship between attitudes about social relationships and marriage expectations, stability and change over time in marital expectations, and changes in institutionalized notions of marriage. We find evidence of both stability and change in marriage expectations and that cultural notions of marriage differ for men and women. Overall, this study provides support for the contention that marriage expectations are formed within an institutional context that is influential in shaping individual strategies of action.

Rethinking Marriage

Change and Stability in Expectations, 1967-1994

RACHEL ROSEMAN BARICH

DENISE D. BIELBY

University of California, Santa Barbara

Contemporary society offers a considerable array of relationship and marriage choices. Although most individuals continue to marry and have children, rates of cohabitation and marriage dissolution continue to increase as fertility rates decline. These phenomena point to changes in the nature of personal relationships and the social structures underlying those relationships in late twentieth century America. Some scholars decry the existence of these trends, prophesying the end of marriage and American society as we know it (Popenoe, 1993; Smelser, 1980). Others point to the fact that people in the United States continue to marry at high rates. For example, in 1990, 95% of women and 94% of men aged 45 to 54 had been married at some point in their lives (Ahlburg & De Vita, 1992). Regardless of perspective, scholars recognize that decisions to marry occur within a context that promotes certain understandings about the nature of relation-

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ships and the institution of marriage. Before individuals marry, they create for themselves images of what marriage is like and expectations for what they hope to gain by marrying. This study focuses on those expectations, on what ideas and expectations people carry with them about marriage, before they ever reach the stage at which marriage becomes a possibility.

CHANGES IN MARRIAGE-RELATED ISSUES FROM THE 1960s TO THE 1990s

Important changes have occurred in the social contexts in which people today make decisions to marry compared to 25 years ago. Demographic changes in marriage and divorce rates, age at first marriage, and rates of cohabitation all reflect the differences in these contexts (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1994). Rates of marriage have declined among all racial groups in this country: In 1993, 64% of White adults were married, down from 73% in 1970; 43% of African American adults are married now compared to 64% in 1970; and among Hispanics, 60% are currently married compared to 72% 20 years ago. At the same time, divorce rates have risen: Between 1970 and 1993, the number of individuals who reported their marital status as divorced went from 4.3 million to 16.7 million, representing 9% of the total adult population in the United States.

Some of the overall change in marriage rates reflects two other trends as well. The first involves the trend among both men and women to delay entry into first marriage. Since 1956, the median age at first marriage has been rising, from a low of 22.5 years for men and 20.1 years for women to 23.2 for men and 20.8 for women in 1970, to the highest levels of this century, 26.5 for men and 24.5 for women in 1993 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975, 1994). The second trend involves couples who choose to live together without being married. In 1993, there were 6 unmarried couples for every 100 married couples, compared to only 1 such couple per 100 married couples in 1970.

These changes speak to how individuals are choosing to organize their personal lives today compared to 25 years ago. People today do marry; however, they marry later, they may experience a period of cohabitation prior to legal marriage, and many will face the prospect of divorce at least once. Young people are aware of these trends and must decide how to arrange their personal relationships in light of them. The question remains as to whether these trends have a significant impact on their marriage expectations such that people today actually understand marriage differently than they did in the past.

THE NEOINSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE ON MARRIAGE

According to the neoinstitutionalist perspective,¹ "institutions do not merely reflect the preferences and power of the units constituting them; the institutions themselves shape those preferences" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 7). Through custom, law, or other social traditions, institutions exist prior to and outside of the desires of individual constituents and are "not traceable to the conscious efforts of specific social groups" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 8). Institutionalization itself is seen as a process in which certain social relationships and actions gradually come to be taken for granted. Institutions are built upon shared cognitions that define "what has meaning and what actions are possible" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 9).

Neoinstitutionalists deemphasize actors' deliberate construction of social arrangements to achieve desired outcomes. Instead, institutions are composed of taken-for-granted expectations about social relationships. From this perspective, individuals' choices and preferences must be considered within their cultural or historical framework, and such choices are not universal or unchanging. Institutions are self-sustaining. "Institutions do not just constrain options: they establish the very criteria by which people discover their preferences" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 11). Thus people choose actions because they offer socially constructed and institutionalized paths for solving certain social and individual needs.²

Neoinstitutionalist theory has yet to be applied fully to marriage. Its proponents have, however, theorized about the nature of the self and the role of love, suggesting how an institutionalist model of marriage might be formulated. For example, Meyer (1986) proposes that the modern self is a socially constructed entity and is itself institutionalized. As the life course of the modern, public self becomes increasingly institutionalized through age-graded activities and role sequences, the private self also becomes increasingly institutionalized. As Meyer (1986) explains:

Of course, the institutionalization of the self is accompanied not only by required choices but by available lists of reasons, motives, and aspirations that are equally institutionalized. (p. 205)

In contemporary society, the fact that people marry and the explanations they give for their choices are mediated by the nature of the institution of marriage. Thus the understandings or expectations that we attach to marriage—that it is justified by love (Blumstein & Schwartz, 1983; Feldberg & Kohen, 1976; Goode, 1959/1972; Spaulding, 1970; Stone, 1985; Swidler, 1980), that individuals choose from a "field of eligibles"

who are similar to themselves (Nye & Berardo, 1973/1975), that decisions are made to increase one's "utility" (Becker, 1974; England & Farkas, 1986)—are functions of the parameters and rules ordained by society and taken for granted by individual members. To a considerable extent, our private lives are structured and influenced by public will.

Like earlier theorists (Blumstein & Schwartz, 1983; Feldberg & Kohen, 1976; Goode, 1959/1972; Spaulding, 1970; Stone, 1985), neo-institutionalists recognize the centrality of romantic love to contemporary notions of marriage in our culture. Ann Swidler's (1980) scholarship in the neoinstitutionalist tradition argues that the mythology surrounding love is crucial to all societies in that it helps resolve the tensions between individual preferences and social demands. Love, in this understanding, provides us with a motivation for taking our place within the social structure—because we love our spouses and our children we are willing to labor for money to support them, build institutions to educate them, and pay taxes to ensure their health and safety.

Swidler recognizes that notions of love must fit within the constraints of a given society's institutionalized vision. Love may change over time, and Swidler notes a growing ambivalence toward the traditional love mythology. The tensions that she describes account for new needs, desires, ideas, and expectations of modern individuals. Love is still crucial: Love serves as the backdrop for any discussion of marriage and marriage expectations in America, focusing our imaginations and reflecting our underlying motivations for seeking personal relationships. However, the type of love depicted in the traditional love myth is no longer desirable, because it no longer fully fits the expectations we have for ourselves or the social structures in which we conduct our lives. As Feldberg and Kohen (1976) note, "High rates of marriage and remarriage indicate not the success of the family, but the strength of the ideology and of the desire to get what the ideology promises" (p. 158).

In sum, the neoinstitutionalist perspective on marriage contends that strong taken-for-granted assumptions within institutions influence us in important ways. Both notions of the self and love exist within an institutional framework, and individuals' understandings of themselves and the value of love are rooted in these frameworks. Thus marriage and one's perceptions about marriage are socially constructed, but they do not fully appear to be so. Our sense of cultural norms creates a set of understandings about how marriage should be, understandings that are used to create strategies of action or feasible scripts that we can invoke in setting a course of action.

THE "TOOL KIT" METAPHOR FOR CULTURE'S INFLUENCE ON ACTION

Swidler's (1986) metaphor of the cultural "tool kit" suggests a mechanism to explain institutional influence, that is, how we come to accept taken-for-granted beliefs and use public discourse from the wider social context to determine action. Composed of "symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems" (p. 273), tool kits delineate "strategies of action," ways of acting that "incorporate, and thus depend on, habits, sensibilities, and views of the world" (p. 277). Action is determined by common sense, as if what one does is only natural, and in periods of cultural stability, when lives are "settled," "culture is intimately integrated with action" (p. 278).

However, embedded within the tool kit is the potential for institutional change, including changes in notions of self, love, and marriage. For example, culture, via institutions, provides only a limited set of common sense strategies of action, a limited repertoire from which people are able to draw out elements when actually interacting with the world. Moreover, "even when they lead settled lives, people do active cultural work to maintain or refine their cultural capacities" (p. 278). Furthermore, in periods of social transformation, when lives are unsettled and culture's direction on strategies of action is loosened, "ideologies—explicit, articulated, highly organized meaning systems (both political and religious)—*establish* new styles or strategies of action" (p. 278).

The period in which our study is conducted, 1967 to 1994, coincides with the rise of the feminist movement and encompasses significant ideological shifts in perceptions of gender role beliefs about men's and women's rights, responsibilities, duties, and expectations (Thorne & Yalom, 1992; Thorton, 1989). Initially, these changes were exogenous to the institution of marriage; subsequently they legitimated change in women's roles and offered alternatives to traditional familial arrangements. According to neoinstitutional theory, cultural myths and ideologies that sustain institutions change as institutions transform. Moreover, as institutions change, established ideologies should become decoupled from strategies of action. Our study explores how demographic and ideological changes associated with this period shape understandings of marriage, providing a means to open the tool kit used for decisions about marriage. We rely upon the attitudes of young adults about social relationships as legitimate discursive expressions of their beliefs about this institution. By analyzing groups of individuals entering adulthood separated by a span

of 27 years, we gain insight into how cultural change has altered the nature of people's expectations about marriage.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Our study explores issues derived from neoinstitutional theory, but it is not a formal test of that perspective, an issue we return to in the conclusion. Nevertheless, we are able to pose several hypotheses suggested by neoinstitutionalist approaches to the family. First, we expect that public discourse about social and cultural issues that occurred between 1967 and 1994 affected expectations about what is associated with successful marriage. Specifically, we anticipate shifts over time in the relative ranking of particular cultural notions by which marital success is evaluated by young adults. We hypothesize that expectations associated with the romantic ideal such as love and affection and companionship retain importance over this period, indicating the persistence of the traditional love mythology as a strategy for action. On the other hand, shifts over this period in the relative importance of other expectations such as economic security, children, and sexual activity would indicate modifications in other myths traditionally used to guide participation in the institution of marriage. It remains to be seen if those modifications are substantial enough to suggest an uncoupling between the traditional love mythology and strategies of action.

We also hypothesize that women's expectations about marriage changed more and in different ways than those of men.³ The social change of the last 27 years had a differential impact on women, opening up previously foreclosed opportunities to combine marriage and child bearing and rearing with employment. Indeed, there is ample scholarly evidence suggesting that women perceived those opportunities and pursued new strategies of action based upon shifting expectations about marriage, but that they also encountered a "stalled revolution" because of the "lack of social arrangements that ease life for working parents and men who share the second shift" (Hochschild, 1989, p. 13).

In addition to anticipating change in expectations about marriage, we also anticipate shifts between 1967 and 1994 in beliefs that underlie those expectations. Individuals adapt to social change that disrupts their lives by modifying their beliefs about appropriate strategies of action. Given the widespread social change in gender and family roles between 1967 and 1994, we expect attitudes of contemporary individuals relating to gender roles, family, and sexuality to differ from those of their earlier

counterparts. Men and women were not equally affected by changing gender roles, so we also anticipate that changes in attitudes associated with expectations for marriage over time will differ by gender.

METHODOLOGY

THE SAMPLE

We used a repeated cross-section design to analyze responses to parallel student surveys collected in 1967 and 1994. The surveys focused on respondents' expectations about marriage as well as their understandings of related issues. The first wave of data came from a survey conducted by the late Dr. Charles Spaulding of the University of California, Santa Barbara, as part of a larger project documenting associations between values, marital role expectations, and personality tendencies across the life span (Spaulding, 1982). In the first part of the project, an extensive questionnaire was distributed to all students enrolled in a required English course during the winter and spring quarters of 1967, 1968, and 1969. The surveys had a return rate of 67%, yielding just over 4,000 completed surveys. We randomly chose a subsample of 300 questionnaires from a numbered list of the completed questionnaires from spring 1967, and we excluded the three respondents who were married, resulting in a sample of 297.⁴ In order to provide comparable samples, we selected a new sample in spring 1994 that matched Spaulding's original sample as closely as possible. From comparable English courses, we chose 20 sections out of the 34 being offered in spring 1994. In all, we collected 346 questionnaires, of which 345 were usable, for a response rate of 99% in 1994.

With some notable exceptions, the demographic composition of the student population remained similar over the period of study. Our respondents from both waves are largely single (99% for both years), young (the average age of respondents was 18.5 years in 1967 and 18.7 years in 1994), and relatively affluent, with over four fifths of each sample from middle or upper class families (see Table 1). The percentage of respondents from households headed by a parent or guardian employed in a professional or managerial occupation was 83% in 1967 and 86% in 1994. Women constituted 61% of each sample. However, the racial and ethnic composition of the samples is significantly different across years (98% White in 1967 and 78% White in 1994). Also, the religious affiliations of these

TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics for All Variables

Variable	Range	<i>Means and Standard Deviations</i>		<i>Proportion Variance Across Years</i>
		1967 (N = 297)	1994 (N = 345)	
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES				
AGE (respondent's age)	17-27	18.463 (0.786)	18.687 (0.707)	0.022***
DEGREL (degree of religiosity)	1-4	2.515 (0.959)	2.209 (0.964)	0.025***
CITY (living in area with 200,000 to 1 million)	0-1	0.180 (0.385)	0.342 (0.475)	0.033***
FEMALE (respondent is a woman)	0-1	0.606 (0.489)	0.606 (0.489)	0.000
WHITE (respondent is White)	0-1	0.976 (0.152)	0.778 (0.416)	0.086***
CATHOLIC (respondent is Catholic)	0-1	0.168 (0.375)	0.288 (0.453)	0.020***
PROTEST (respondent is Protestant)	0-1	0.505 (0.501)	0.134 (0.341)	0.162***
JEWISH (respondent is Jewish)	0-1	0.054 (0.226)	0.093 (0.291)	0.006*
RELNONE (respondent claims no religion)	0-1	0.178 (0.384)	0.360 (0.481)	0.041***
RELOTH (respondent claims another religion)	0-1	0.094 (0.293)	0.125 (0.331)	0.002
PROF/MNG (respondent's parent is a professional/manager)	0-1	0.832 (0.375)	0.864 (0.344)	0.002
MARRIAGE EXPECTATIONS				
A respected place in the community	1-11	2.510 (2.003)	2.668 (2.062)	0.002
Healthy and happy children	1-11	8.459 (2.132)	7.493 (2.768)	0.036***
Companionship	1-11	8.086 (2.307)	8.706 (2.047)	0.020***
Personality development	1-11	5.288 (2.642)	5.732 (2.601)	0.007**
Amount of love and affection	1-11	9.582 (1.834)	9.697 (1.732)	0.001
Economic security	1-11	4.723 (2.460)	6.000 (2.542)	0.061***
Satisfactory sexual relations	1-11	6.747 (2.373)	5.595 (2.225)	0.059***
Emotional security	1-11	6.764 (2.522)	7.612 (2.160)	0.032***
Moral and religious unity	1-11	4.671 (3.108)	3.854 (3.020)	0.017***
Common interests and activities	1-11	5.661 (2.620)	5.691 (2.338)	0.000
Maintenance of a home	1-11	3.538 (2.197)	3.020 (1.667)	0.018***

(continued)

TABLE 1 Continued

Variable	Range	<i>Means and Standard Deviations</i>		<i>Proportion Variance Across Years</i>
		1967 (N = 297)	1994 (N = 345)	
ATTITUDE SCALES				
ROMS (Romanticism scale)	1-5	2.406 (0.633) [0.637]	2.565 (0.778) [0.679]	0.012***
SEXAS (Sexual Permissiveness With Attachment scale)	1-5	3.001 (1.231) [0.948]	3.836 (1.023) [0.924]	0.121***
SEXNS (Sexual Permissiveness With No Attachment scale)	1-5	2.543 (1.029) [0.848]	2.577 (1.081) [0.891]	0.000
TFCS (Traditional Family Concepts scale)	1-5	3.943 (0.743) [0.280]	2.291 (0.987) [0.754]	0.467***
FEMS (Feminism scale)	1-5	2.230 (0.625) [0.173]	2.893 (0.728) [0.552]	0.191***

NOTE: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses; for attitude scales, Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficients are shown in brackets.

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

samples differed. The sample was 50% Protestant in 1967 but was only 13% Protestant in 1994, and the proportion of Catholic students increased from 17% to 29%. Because the proportion of students who are Jewish or claim another religion has not changed significantly across this time period, the most likely reason for the decline in Protestant students is the rise in the religiously unaffiliated (from 18% in 1967 to 36% in 1994). These changes indicate an increasingly diverse student population at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Despite the shift in religious affiliation and the increase in the racial and ethnic mix of the student population, the university remains homogeneous. As it was in 1967, the student population in 1994 was predominantly White, young, and middle to upper class. Finally, because we are interested in expectations about marriage, we excluded for analysis those who had been or were currently married.

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

We began with the questionnaire that Spaulding used in his earlier research to develop the survey instrument for 1994. For replication, we included the following categories of information: demographic characteristics, relationship histories, the question about marriage expectations,

and questions related to Spaulding's scales for political and economic conservatism, religious orthodoxy, romanticism, hang-loose ethic, sexual permissiveness, traditional family concepts, feminist attitudes, and alienation. In all, the 1994 survey contained 85 of Spaulding's original questionnaire items, and they appeared in the same order as they did in the original survey.

We used ordinary least squares regression to determine the impact of respondents' social and cultural beliefs on their expectations about marriage. Two models are estimated for each dependent variable:

Model 1: Expectations = Demographic Variables

Model 2: Expectations = Demographic Variables + Attitude Scales

Two dependent variables, the importance of amount of love and affection and the importance of economic security, are constructed from a measure of expectations about marriage. Respondents were asked to provide a ranking among 11 standards of family success that they would most like to achieve as part of their marriage (see Appendix 1 for the full text of this question). Because none of the respondents were married, the 11 items indicate only what these individuals might expect out of marriage. In addition to importance of amount of love and affection and economic security, items include healthy and happy children and maintenance of a home. The two variables we retained for analysis were theoretically relevant to our application of neoinstitutional theory. The importance of amount of love and affection reflects the ideology that people marry for love, and the importance of economic security captures the relevance of instrumental strategies of action in the decision to marry.⁵

Independent variables were added in groups to determine both the direct effects of demographic variables on marriage expectations and how those effects are mediated by individual beliefs. The first group of variables contain demographic measures, including age, gender, race, and religion.⁶ Central to our analysis is a second group of variables measuring beliefs and values. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with statements belonging to several dimensions on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Using factor analysis,⁷ we created attitude scales by averaging together the scores for the items measuring each construct. We included five attitude scales in our analyses. These were: Romanticism scale (agreement with the concept of romantic love); Sexual Permissiveness With Attachment scale (acceptability of increased levels of sexual contact given emotional commitment to the partner); Sexual Permissiveness With No Attachment scale

(acceptability of sexual encounters when there is no commitment between the partners); Traditional Family Concepts scale (agreement that the wife should be primarily a mother and homemaker and that the husband should be the main breadwinner); and a Feminism scale (agreement that women should be primarily career women and that the wife should control the family budget) (see Appendix 2 for a list of the component items for each scale).

FINDINGS

CHANGE OVER TIME IN MARRIAGE EXPECTATIONS

The overall ranking of the means for the 11 marriage expectations are remarkably similar in 1967 and 1994. Table 1 indicates respondents overwhelmingly identify love and affection as the most important element of marriage, and its ranking relative to the other 10 expectations does not change over the 27-year period we surveyed. The ranking of the three least important expectations also remains stable: moral and religious unity, maintenance of a home, and a respected place in the community are consistently ranked ninth, tenth, and eleventh.⁸ Although individuals consider these important, when respondents are forced to place them relative to other factors, these three measures are consistently considered less significant.

Although there is considerable consistency among the highest and lowest ranked expectations, a few shift in relative importance between 1967 and 1994. The expectation for children, which ranked second in 1967 (with a mean of 8.5), dropped to fourth in 1994 (with a mean of 7.5). At the same time, companionship and emotional security increased from third and fourth, respectively, in 1967 to second and third in 1994. Thus it appears that contemporary respondents believe that personal fulfillment is now relatively more important than other considerations, and children, although still important, are no longer one of the foremost expectations of marriage. In 1967, economic security was ranked eighth overall (with a mean of 4.7); in 1994, it moved to fifth in importance (with a mean of 6.0) at the expense of sexual relations. This outcome may be the consequence of an increased societal preoccupation with economic uncertainty; in that context, economic security gains value. At the same time, premarital sex and cohabitation are now more prevalent, minimizing the need for marriage as the primary site for sexual activity.

TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics for Marriage Expectations, by Gender and Year

Variable	Women			Men			Hypothesis Test for Gender by Year Interaction (t statistic)
	Means and Standard Deviations		Proportion Variance Across Years	Means and Standard Deviations		Proportion Variance Across Years	
	1967 (N = 180)	1994 (N = 209)		1967 (N = 117)	1994 (N = 136)		
A respected place in the community	2.056 (1.618)	2.447 (1.877)	0.012**	3.219 (2.322)	3.007 (2.284)	0.002	1.856*
Healthy and happy children	8.601 (1.908)	7.351 (2.809)	0.062***	8.237 (2.432)	7.711 (2.698)	0.010	-1.781*
Companionship	7.961 (2.273)	8.553 (1.973)	0.019***	8.281 (2.356)	8.941 (2.143)	0.021**	-0.192
Personality development	5.506 (2.480)	5.962 (2.704)	0.008*	4.947 (2.856)	5.378 (2.400)	0.007	0.060
Amount of love and affection	9.865 (1.613)	9.899 (1.552)	0.000	9.140 (2.065)	9.385 (1.943)	0.004	-0.736
Economic security	4.230 (2.237)	5.966 (2.402)	0.122***	5.491 (2.601)	6.052 (2.752)	0.011	2.914***
Satisfactory sexual relations	6.624 (2.396)	5.389 (2.146)	0.069***	6.939 (2.336)	5.911 (2.313)	0.047***	-0.554
Emotional security	7.067 (2.340)	7.875 (2.159)	0.031***	6.289 (2.726)	7.207 (2.106)	0.035***	-0.293
Moral and religious unity	5.124 (3.082)	4.024 (2.979)	0.032***	3.965 (3.028)	3.593 (3.074)	0.004	-1.468
Common interests and activities	5.500 (2.538)	5.606 (2.286)	0.001	5.912 (2.735)	5.822 (2.418)	0.000	0.486
Maintenance of a home	3.500 (2.169)	2.981 (1.639)	0.018***	3.596 (2.249)	3.081 (1.715)	0.017**	-0.013

NOTE: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

For 2 of the 11 marriage expectations, there were substantively and statistically significant changes for women between 1967 and 1994, but not for men (see Table 2). The most notable is the increase in women's ranking of the expectation that marriage should bring economic security, which increased from ninth in importance with a mean of 4.2 to sixth in importance with a mean of 6.0, whereas there was no statistically significant change in men's ranking of this expectation. The gender-by-year interaction was also significant for expectations about healthy and happy children, which declined in ranking for women (from second with a mean of 8.6 to fourth with a mean of 7.4) but showed no statistically significant change for men. These year-by-gender interactions suggest that the women's movement and other cultural changes have had a differential impact on women in particular areas: women today have been granted greater autonomy from the role of mothering (Cohen & Katzenstein, 1988) and have taken greater interest in issues of work and economy than in the past. However, these changes have not impacted men in the same way.

In sum, these findings suggest that expectations for marriage, while substantially stable, have changed somewhat over the last quarter century, especially for women as a result of shifting social and cultural ideologies. We explore next how these expectations are tied to beliefs that shape strategies of action available in contemporary cultural repertoires.

CHANGE OVER TIME IN ATTITUDES

Table 1 reveals shifts between 1967 and 1994 in beliefs associated with the institution of marriage. Attitudes about romance strengthened significantly (from a mean of 2.4 to 2.6), although for the most part respondents in both years do not espouse exceedingly romantic visions of the world (a score of 3 is neutral). At the same time, sexual experience before marriage with a partner to whom one is attached became more widely accepted (the mean changed from 3.0 to 3.8, an increase of over two thirds of a standard deviation), while beliefs in traditional family concepts declined markedly (the mean dropped from 3.9 to 2.3, roughly 2 standard deviations), indicating an undoing of the vision of marriage as one where the husband is the breadwinner and the wife remains exclusively a homemaker and mother. Finally, 1994 respondents were much closer to neutral on women being primarily career oriented (with a mean of 2.9), whereas this attitude garnered significantly more disagreement in 1967 (when the mean was 2.2, a change of about 1 standard deviation). In general, contemporary respondents indicate slight disagreement or neutrality regarding romanticism and sex without attachment. In addition, there is growing acceptance

TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics for Attitude Scales, by Gender and Year

Variable	Women			Men			Hypothesis Test for Gender by Year Interaction (t statistic)
	Means and Standard Deviations		Proportion Variance Across Years	Means and Standard Deviations		Proportion Variance Across Years	
	1967 (N = 180)	1994 (N = 209)		1967 (N = 117)	1994 (N = 136)		
ROMS (Romanticism scale)	2.356 (0.614)	2.467 (0.753)	0.006	2.484 (0.656)	2.716 (0.795)	0.024*	-1.048
SEXAS (Sexual Permissiveness With Attachment scale)	2.693 (1.185)	3.825 (0.994)	0.213**	3.474 (1.151)	3.853 (1.070)	0.028**	4.247**
SEXNS (Sexual Permissiveness With No Attachment scale)	2.179 (0.864)	2.477 (1.050)	0.023**	3.103 (1.013)	2.730 (1.113)	0.030**	4.097**
TFCS (Traditional Family Concepts scale)	3.928 (0.707)	2.057 (0.968)	0.543**	3.966 (0.798)	2.652 (0.907)	0.370**	-4.002**
FEMS (Feminism scale)	2.249 (0.617)	2.963 (0.783)	0.202**	2.201 (0.640)	2.787 (0.625)	0.177**	1.167

NOTE: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$.

of sexual permissiveness with attachment, changing roles for women, and the breaking down of traditional gender roles. As discursive expressions of beliefs about marriage, our respondents' attitudes are consistent with much of the literature that chronicles shifts in social and cultural ideologies across this time period.

When we consider how beliefs vary by gender and by year (see Table 3), we see that the social and cultural change of this period affected men and women differently. In the area of sexuality, although both men and women in 1994 were more permissive than their 1967 counterparts about premarital sex in the context of emotional attachment, women increased in their agreement with this belief much more than did men. And, in terms of being accepting of sexual activity in the *absence* of emotional connection with one's partner, beliefs of men and women shifted in opposite directions, with women becoming more accepting (with the mean increasing from 2.2 to 2.5) and men becoming less accepting (with the mean decreasing from 3.1 to 2.7). Men are still more permissive than women, but the gap was substantially smaller in 1994 than in 1967.⁹ As we turn to changes in beliefs about gender roles, we again see significant change across genders. There was greater change over the 27-year period among women than among men on the Traditional Family Concepts scale (a move from 3.9 to 2.1 for women versus 4.0 to 2.7 for men); although both groups have become much less tied to the image of the husband-as-breadwinner and wife-as-homemaker, women are eschewing that image more strongly. And among both men and women, there is a similar increase in support for women working as measured by the Feminism scale: an increase from a mean of 2.2 to 3.0 for women and from 2.2 to 2.8 for men. Overall, the beliefs of both men and women have been affected by the cultural and social changes of the past 27 years, but not always in the same way. They have converged in areas such as sexual permissiveness but grown farther apart in the area of traditional family roles.

THE IMPACT OF ATTITUDES ON MARRIAGE EXPECTATIONS

Regression analyses assess the relative impact of demographic traits and beliefs on expectations about marriage. Table 4 reports the regression results for both amount of love and affection and economic security. To assess the effects of differences across year, we include a dummy variable for year (1 = 1994) for each of the models. We also include a dummy variable for gender (1 = female) to evaluate differences between men and women. The models for amount of love and affection include interactions between year and the Romanticism scale (ROMS) and between gender

TABLE 4
Determinants of Marriage Expectations Regarding "Amount of Love and Affection"
and "Economic Security" (Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates)

Variable	Amount of Love and Affection						Economic Security					
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 1			Model 2		
	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error		Parameter Estimate	Standard Error		Parameter Estimate	Standard Error		Parameter Estimate	Standard Error	
INTERCEPT	10.663***	1.886		9.938***	2.024		9.252***	2.620		1.309	2.957	
AGE	-0.083	0.097		-0.067	0.097		-0.078	0.135		-0.047	0.133	
DEGREL	0.057	0.095		0.065	0.098		-0.402***	0.132		-0.292**	0.135	
CITY	-0.389**	0.169		-0.362**	0.169		0.193	0.235		0.100	0.232	
FEMALE	0.541***	0.152		-0.319	0.405		-1.092***	0.305		4.386***	1.547	
WHITE	0.151	0.225		0.139	0.230		-1.134***	0.313		-1.020***	0.316	
RELOTH	-0.205	0.260		-0.100	0.261		-0.644*	0.362		-0.601*	0.358	
PROTEST	-0.123	0.206		-0.109	0.207		-0.422	0.286		-0.393	0.283	
JEWISH	0.022	0.313		-0.046	0.313		0.491	0.435		0.398	0.430	
RELNONE	-0.156	0.238		-0.059	0.243		-0.568*	0.331		-0.434	0.334	
YEAR (1 = 1994)	0.272*	0.163		1.273**	0.580		0.278	0.333		3.593***	1.322	
YEAR × FEMALE	—	—		—	—		0.976**	0.407		-3.847**	1.717	
ROMS	—	—		0.404**	0.177		—	—		0.023	0.150	
SEXAS	—	—		0.242***	0.080		—	—		0.101	0.110	

SEXNS	—	—	-0.428***	0.116	—	0.254**	0.115
TFCS	—	—	0.080	0.086	—	1.215***	0.291
FEMS	—	—	-0.207**	0.105	—	0.457***	0.145
YEAR × ROMS	—	—	-0.422**	0.214	—	—	—
FEMALE × SEXNS	—	—	0.339**	0.140	—	—	—
YEAR × TFCS	—	—	—	—	—	-0.715*	0.368
FEMALE × TFCS	—	—	—	—	—	-1.326***	0.383
YEAR × FEMALE × TFCS	—	—	—	—	—	1.123**	0.478
R^2	0.043	—	0.084	—	0.132	0.185	—
Overall F^a	2.710***	—	3.171***	—	8.299***	7.029***	—
No attitude	—	—	5.237***	—	—	4.929***	—

NOTE: The reference category for these models is 1967 (YEAR = 0) and men (FEMALE = 0). AGE = respondent's age, DEGREL = degree of religiosity, CITY = living in area with 200,000 to 1 million, WHITE = respondent is White, RELOTH = respondent claims another religion, PROTEST = respondent is Protestant, JEWISH = respondent is Jewish, RELNONE = respondent claims no religion, ROMS = Romanticism scale, SEXAS = Sexual Permissiveness With Attachment scale, SEXNS = Sexual Permissiveness With No Attachment scale, TFCS = Traditional Family Concepts scale, FEMS = Feminism scale.

a. F test of the hypothesis that all attitude scales simultaneously have no effect.

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

and the Sexual Permissiveness With No Attachment scale (SEXNS); the models for economic security include a three-way interaction for gender, year, and the Traditional Family Concepts scale (TFCS).¹⁰

Amount of love and affection. The majority of respondents ranked amount of love and affection as the primary expectation they had for a potential marriage. The regression results indicate that when one considers only demographic variables (Model 1), there are significant differences by gender. Women in 1967 rank amount of love and affection approximately half a point higher than men in 1967 ($b = .541, p < .01$). The marginally significant coefficient for year ($b = .272, p < .10$) indicates that respondents ranked amount of love and affection about one fourth of a point higher in 1994 than in 1967, controlling for differences in the demographic composition of the sample across the two time periods. The absence of any gender by year interaction¹¹ indicates that gender differences in the ranking of expectations about love and affection are constant across years.

Model 2 shows significant relationships between attitudes and expectations about love and affection in marriage, although these effects are contingent upon both year and gender. In 1967 there is a strong relationship between beliefs about romance and expectations about love and affection in marriage, with the rank increasing by about 0.4 for each one-point increase in the romance scale ($b = .404, p < .05$). However, by 1994, expectations about love and affection in marriage have become completely uncoupled from beliefs about romance (the significant interaction of YEAR and ROMS of $-.422$ completely offsets the main effect of ROMS).¹² Thus in 1994, the belief in highly romantic notions such as love at first sight no longer appears to impact one's desire for love and affection in marriage. By 1994, the expectation that love should exist in marriage is embraced regardless of respondents' beliefs about romantic ideals.

Among men, those who find sex without emotional attachment acceptable are significantly less likely to rank amount of love and affection as an important expectation about marriage ($b = -.428, p < .01$). However, there is no such relationship among women, with the FEMALE (respondent is a woman) by SEXNS interaction almost completely offsetting the main effect ($b = .339, p < .05$). That is, for women, amount of love and affection is an important aspect of marriage in both time periods, and its importance is unmediated by any beliefs about sexual permissiveness.

The gender by attitude interaction also implies that the main effect of gender reported in Model 1 is actually contingent upon respondents'

attitudes toward sex without emotional attachment. There is no gender difference in expectations about love and affection among respondents at the traditional end of the attitude scale (at SEXNS = 1, the interaction offsets the nonsignificant main effect of gender), whereas among those most accepting of sex without attachment, men have substantially lower expectations regarding love and affection in marriage than do women (at SEXNS = 5, the predicted difference between women and men is 1.4). In short, it is not gender per se that differentiates men's and women's expectations about love and affection in marriage, rather, it is the interaction of gender with beliefs about permissive sex.

Two other attitude scales also significantly impacted one's ranking of amount of love and affection, but here the effects are the same across time and gender.¹³ Those approving of sexual relations when one has an emotional attachment to one's partner tend to rank amount of love and affection higher ($b = .242, p < .01$). And those holding highly feminist views as measured by the Feminism scale tend to rank amount of love and affection lower ($b = -.207, p < .05$).

Economic security. To expect economic security out of marriage implies rational consideration; the higher one ranks the importance of economic security in a marriage, the more one might take into account considerations that focus on instrumental rather than expressive concerns. Model 1 indicates that there are differences across gender and year in the ranking of economic security. Men in 1967 and 1994 rank this expectation about equally (the coefficient for YEAR is nonsignificant); women in 1967 rank economic security much lower than men in 1967 ($b = -1.092, p < .01$ for FEMALE), and by 1994, women's ranking increases approximately to the men's level ($b = .976, p < .05$ for YEAR by FEMALE). However, Model 2 reveals that all these effects are mediated by the Traditional Family Concepts scale, a scale that focuses on respondents' agreement with the traditional images of the husband as breadwinner and wife as homemaker. Figure 1 depicts the impact of belief in traditional family concepts on the ranking of economic security, by time and by gender.¹⁴ The strongest impact of traditional family concepts is among the 1967 men: 1967 men who did not hold very traditional attitudes ranked economic security low, whereas 1967 men who did strongly ascribe to traditional attitudes about gender roles ranked economic security high ($b = 1.215$). At the same time, women's views in 1967 on traditional family concepts did not substantially impact their ranking of economic security ($b = -.111$); 1967 women ranked economic security the same, regardless of their attitudes toward traditional family concepts. By 1994, the rela-




Figure 1: Importance of Economic Security

tionship between beliefs about traditional family roles and expectations about economic security in marriage had become nearly identical for men and women (the slope is .297 for women and .500 for men). As can be seen in Figure 1, gender differences in the slope shift, suggesting that the social changes occurring between 1967 and 1994 have had the most impact on men. For men in 1967, there was a strong relationship between one's traditional family concepts and the ranking of economic security; for both men and women in 1994, there was only a modest relationship between traditional family concepts and economic security. In other words, by 1994 men considered economic security to be a relatively important expectation in marriage whether or not they subscribed to traditional beliefs about family roles, whereas traditional men in 1967 placed a good deal of importance on economic security through marriage.

Several other attitude scales also had significant impact on one's ranking of economic security, although these impacts were similar across time and gender.¹⁵ Individuals who are permissive of sexuality without a strong emotional attachment rank economic security higher ($b = .254$, $p < .05$), and individuals who agree with the ideals measured by the Feminism scale also rank economic security higher ($b = .457$, $p < .01$). Each of these beliefs may be related to a tendency to take a more

instrumental approach toward social relationships. There are also two ascribed characteristics that impact the ranking of economic security apart from an effect due to the attitudes or beliefs one holds: More religious people, as measured by degree of religiosity, rank economic security lower ($b = -.292, p < .05$), and Whites also rank economic security lower as an expectation for marriage ($b = -1.020, p < .01$).

DISCUSSION

This study examined patterns of association between young unmarried adults' social and cultural beliefs and their marriage expectations in 1967 and 1994. The neoinstitutionalist perspective was engaged as a framework to understand the relationship between attitudes as legitimate discursive expressions about the institution of marriage and visions of successful marital outcomes. According to neoinstitutional theory, cultural shifts "unsettle" lives and alter pervasive myths that individuals use to legitimate their participation in social institutions. Over time, as individual action and beliefs decouple from prevailing myths, alternative strategies of action emerge, modifying institutions that delimit possibilities for action. The 27-year period covered by this study encompassed fundamental cultural shifts in gender role expectations outside and inside the institution of marriage. Moreover, men and women experienced different degrees of cultural disruption during this period, yielding differences in their respective visions of a future marriage.

BELIEFS SHAPE EXPECTATIONS

In general, attitudes affect expectations in patterned ways that are consistent with the contention that wider social discourse influences how one understands the institution of marriage. Beliefs associated with the expectation for amount of love and affection suggest that in general love and affection in marriage are positively tied to beliefs in romantic ideals and sexuality in the context of emotional attachment, and are negatively tied to sexuality without emotional attachment and feminism—an image suggesting that marriage is considered a haven, the place of romantic expression, physical attachment, and nurturing, particularly as done by women. However, these understandings varied considerably across time and by gender. There is a difference between men and women in the relevance of sex without attachment. For men this attitude reduced the

importance of love and affection as an expectation for marriage. For women, the ranking of love and affection was unaffected by their attitude about sex without commitment. That is, for women this attitude is decoupled from their expectation for love in marriage; women expect love and affection to be a part of marriage, regardless of their acceptance of noncommitted sex. There is also a decoupling over time between attitudes and expectations; belief in romanticism had an impact on the ranking of love and affection in 1967, but had essentially no effect in 1994. This decoupling suggests that contemporary young adults no longer accept the traditional myth that love and affection in marriage can be achieved only with a single true love.

Our findings regarding beliefs in traditional family roles and expectations about economic security in marriage suggest that economic security has become a pervasive instrumental expectation for marriage, one that focuses on "maintaining the physical and social integrity of the family" (Melton & Thomas, 1976). However, the reasons may differ for men and women. The three-way interaction for gender, time, and traditional family concepts clearly indicates how shifts over time in social discourse affected beliefs that impact expectations for marriage. For both men and women across time, economic security was only of modest importance; economic security ranks in the middle of the 11 expectations. However, this expectation interacts with attitudes about traditional family concepts, indicating that the social scripts for men and women in 1967 were quite different, whereas by 1994 they were essentially the same. In 1967, men who were strongly committed to the role of husband-as-breadwinner were very concerned with economic security in marriage. In 1994, all men, regardless of their agreement with traditional gender roles, were concerned about economic security, just as women were in both 1967 and 1994. This shift suggests that changes in gender roles fostered by the feminist movement may have altered how men view economic security in marriage. Men in general are now concerned with financial well-being in marriage, not just those men invested in enacting the family provider role. Faced with increasing economic uncertainty in a context where women's roles have changed, contemporary college-age men are more accepting of the contributions their future spouses will make to family economic stability than were their counterparts 27 years ago.

We also found that those who are more accepting of sexual permissiveness without intimacy and individuals who believe wives should pursue careers and manage family finances rank economic security in marriage more highly. This is true for both men and women, across time. These

findings suggest that apart from the social and cultural changes between 1967 and 1994, there is a consistent tendency for those with an instrumental orientation toward social relationships to place greater importance on economic security in marriage.

Each of the links between social beliefs and marriage expectations described above represents a specific way of seeing the institution of marriage. As one's beliefs about the social world develop, one begins to use those beliefs to gain some understanding of marriage and to weigh what one would want out of marriage. However, it is important to understand that these beliefs are not mutually exclusive: one might hold several of them, perhaps in conflicting ways. Individuals must balance the claims of different social discourses, and this seems to have become even more difficult in recent years as understandings about family life and gender roles undergo change. As these claims contradict each other or suggest alternate visions, many individuals find themselves changing their expectations of what they want out of marriage.

CHANGING EXPECTATIONS

Although there are important shifts in rankings of marriage expectations between 1967 and 1994, overall there is considerable stability over this period. If one considers the rankings in sets, the same four expectations (amount of love and affection, healthy and happy children, companionship, and emotional security) are consistently ranked high. Similarly, moral and religious unity, maintenance of a home, and a respected place in the community are consistently regarded as least important. The stability of these sets suggests that expectations are strongly embedded in cultural myths about marriage. That is, marital expectations are highly institutionalized and are not strongly (or at least immediately) influenced by social change. Neoinstitutional theorists Swidler (1980) and DiMaggio and Powell (1991) refer to the high cost of cultural retooling—once we have acquired a set of symbols, values, myths, or beliefs that allow us to construct certain strategies of action, it is very difficult to change those strategies. The high cost of cultural retooling may account for the observed stability over time in the most and least important expectations for marriage.

However, when the ranking of marital expectations are compared by gender and by year, some of the changes are more substantial among women than among men. Economic security increased and healthy and happy children decreased in importance among women, but not among

men. This finding parallels Hochschild's (1989, p. 12) contention that while "women are departing more from their mother's and grandmother's way of life, men are doing so less." This suggests that social change in the last 27 years has had a differential impact on men and women and that women are finding it easier to "retool." As new myths and symbols legitimate change for women, women use those myths and symbols to develop new strategies of action. Although they are not abandoning old expectations, contemporary women are reordering and reemphasizing their importance to their lives.

RANKING LOVE

For both men and women across the period of study, the expectation that love is a part of marriage was exceedingly strong. Amount of love and affection garnered the top ranking for a majority of the respondents. Overall, the most conclusive evidence in this study is that love is exceedingly important to conceptions about marriage. Love continues to stand alone, almost as an *a priori* element of marriage in our culture, despite the social and cultural change of the last quarter century.

Many social theorists have discussed the connection between love and marriage for Americans in the twentieth century. From early functionalist theorists to more current neoinstitutionalists, love is an element in any discussion of marriage. Earlier theorists simply put the two together; where there is love there will be marriage. Later theorists argue that this notion of love changes across time and that the current conceptualization is a part of contemporary understandings of self, work, and marriage (see Swidler, 1980). Our findings confirm the importance of love as an expectation for marriage, supporting the claim that the institutionalized image of marriage contains a vision of love.

GENDER DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES

According to the regression results, except among those who strongly disapprove of permissive sex, women consistently rank amount of love and affection higher than men do. In contrast, gender differences in ranking of economic security that existed in 1967 had largely disappeared by 1994 (as seen in Figure 1). This suggests that there is a consistent gender effect in the rankings of expressive expectations as opposed to instrumental ones. Women, as a group and over time, are bringing to expressive expectations something that men are not, and this is apart from

any of the other attitudes we included, such as romanticism or feminism. This finding indicates that women learn to funnel their expectations about relationships into desires for love and emotional security and that this lesson still persists despite all of the changes in social and economic norms that have occurred over the last 27 years. On the other hand, by 1994 no distinctions remain between men and women regarding instrumental concerns. Gender does not play a significant role today in determining how one views the importance of the economic security expectation.

Thus it appears that socialization remains different for men and women, affecting what they come to believe about love, despite recent changes seen in women's roles and opportunities. Because women in this study were actually less romantic on average than the men as measured by the romanticism scale (as seen in Table 3), women are different than men in their expectation that marriage will provide love and emotional security (although both men and women consistently rank love and affection higher than any other aspect of marriage). In our view, this implies that the institution of marriage provides a differing array of reasons, aspirations, and motives to men and women in their conceptualization of marriage.

CONCLUSIONS

We relied on the neoinstitutionalist perspective to frame our empirical investigation of change in expectations about the institution of marriage over the last 27 years, a historical period marked by ideological shifts regarding gender role arrangements, responsibilities, rights, and privileges, and changes in life-style choices such as household arrangements, age at first marriage, fertility, cohabitation, and sexuality. Our challenge theoretically was to simultaneously account for change in social context and social discourse, personal beliefs and attitudes, and individual strategies of action, while at the same time anticipate both institutional stability and transformation. Although our study did not directly test propositions derived from neoinstitutionalist theory, as a perspective it has proven to be uniquely suitable for interpreting how the social and cultural "unsettlement" of the last quarter century has altered expectations about the institution of marriage. Thus the theoretical importance of our work lies in its exploratory nature. By placing marriage within its institutional framework, we began to uncover the nature of the discourse around marriage and why those images are so persistent over time. We attempted

to create a map of the contemporary cultural tool kit for marriage by examining how individual attitudes influence marriage expectations among unmarried young adults. By relying on repeated cross-sectional data, we were able to explore how this map has changed over time.

The neoinstitutionalist perspective guided us to focus on two marital expectations in particular, amount of love and affection and importance of economic security, and in doing so allowed us to highlight the complex institutional change that has occurred during this period. With love and affection persisting as the top-ranked expectation of marriage, it is clear that at least a subset of traditional cultural myths has been retained as guides to marriage among contemporary young adults. On the other hand, the increased importance of economic security reveals that more pragmatic, instrumental notions now also guide young adults' strategies for action regarding marriage. This complex cultural repertoire of enduring ideological ideals and contemporary pragmatic agendas provides insight into the profound variation seen in contemporary marital arrangements. Furthermore, the gender differences in attitudes as determinants of marital expectations further reveal that we should in all likelihood anticipate continuing shifts in the institution of marriage.

Overall, the present study suggests directions for future research in this area. Analyzing marriage from the neoinstitutionalist perspective is useful in providing mechanisms for understanding both stability and change in visions of marriage. Our findings about consistency of marriage expectations over time suggest that institutions have long-lasting effects on definitions of marriage. Variation in expectations over time also indicates that there can be changes in the nature of the institution. Contemporary society is different from that of the late 1960s, and this is reflected in the differences in what is considered important when one thinks about marriage; however, much has remained the same and this is also reflected in the data.

It would be useful to focus future research on determining the map of the cultural tool kit for marriage more specifically. First, further research should explore what defines the tool kit. Improved measures of both expectations and attitudes might yield more definitive results. Further refinement of the contents of attitudes about work, family, gender roles, love, and marriage should be a part of that effort. Second, further work using qualitative research designs that would allow individuals to be more expansive in their accounts would be fruitful. Third, the finding for gender provides a clear direction for further work. Our study underscores that there are discourses shared by women that are different than those shared

by men; illuminating those differences would provide a fuller picture of the institution as well as the strategies of action for these groups. In the same vein, our study was unable to address how expectations differ for members of different racial, ethnic, or class backgrounds. Although differences in life experiences could be expected to differentially shape expectations about marriage, only systematic exploration will reveal how fully expectations are institutionalized.

Marriage is a relatively stable phenomenon in this society, but we still cannot say why it is that most people choose to marry. Our findings provide some clues, but the bigger picture of the interplay between individuals and institutions still eludes us. As more varieties of chosen actions in this area, including, for example, living together as a permanent alternative to marriage, divorce and remarriage cycles, and homosexual unions, continue to increase, we should anticipate the possibility that there may be many different ways this interplay happens. Rather than simply arguing that individuals choose to make these decisions in a vacuum, discovering the context in which these decisions are made helps us understand why people act as they do.

APPENDIX 1

QUESTIONNAIRE ITEM MEASURING RESPONDENTS' MARRIAGE EXPECTATIONS

Below are listed a number of standards by which family success has been measured. Please rank order these in accordance with your feeling of how important they would be to you in relation to a family resulting from your marriage. Insert "1" in the blank in front of whichever of the eleven is the most important to you, "2" before the next most important item, and so on down to "11" for the one that is the least important to you.

- _____ A respected place in the community
 - _____ Healthy and happy children
 - _____ Companionship
 - _____ Personality development
 - _____ Amount of love and affection
 - _____ Economic security
 - _____ Satisfactory sexual relations
 - _____ Emotional security
 - _____ Moral and religious unity
 - _____ Common interests and activities
 - _____ Maintenance of a home
-

APPENDIX 2

COMPONENTS OF ATTITUDE SCALES

ROMS: Romanticism Scale

To be truly in love is to be in love forever.

Love is an "all or nothing" feeling; there is no in-between.

When one is in love, the person whom s/he loves becomes the only goal of his/her life. One lives almost solely for the other.

There is only one real love for a person.

True love is known at once by the people involved.

SEXAS: Sexual Permissiveness with Attachment Scale

Full sexual relations are acceptable for a man before marriage if he feels strong affection for his partner.

Full sexual relations are acceptable for a woman before marriage if she is engaged to the man.

Full sexual relations are acceptable for a man before marriage if he is engaged to the woman.

Full sexual relations are acceptable for a woman before marriage if she feels strong affection for her partner.

SEXNS: Sexual Permissiveness with No Attachment Scale

Fooling around is acceptable for a man before marriage even if he does not feel particularly affectionate toward his partner.

Full sexual relations are acceptable for a woman before marriage even if she does not feel particularly affectionate toward her partner.

Full sexual relations are acceptable for a man before marriage even if he does not feel particularly affectionate toward his partner.

Fooling around is acceptable for a woman before marriage even if she does not feel particularly affectionate toward her partner.

TFCS: Traditional Family Concepts Scale

In my marriage, I want the wife to be first of all a mother and homemaker.

In my marriage, I want the husband to be the chief breadwinner for the family.

FEMS: Feminism Scale

In my marriage, I want the wife to be primarily a career woman.

In my marriage, I want the wife to budget and supervise the spending of the family income.

NOTES

1. Neoinstitutionalism has its origins in the institutionalist theory of Philip Selznick and his associates, which emphasized the functional aspects of institutions and the intended and rational interests of actors within them (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). The interaction of institutional actors was guided through values, norms, and attitudes; consequently, socialization and commitment were central processes in the attachment of individual to institutions. Family scholars reflecting this perspective include Sirjamaki (1964) and Koenig and Bayer (1966). Both "old" and "new" institutional theory agree that institutionalization constrains organizational rationality, but the new institutionalism emphasizes different sources of constraint, including the stability derived from institutional legitimacy and the power of unspoken understandings shared among actors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 12). Neoinstitutionalism views conflict as peripheral to institutional consequences, and social routines, scripts, and schemas, as central guides to action within institutions. Consequently, habit and practical action, as well as attribution, are central to ongoing participation within institutions.

2. Early work by family scholars such as Burgess and Locke (1945) anticipated the contribution of neoinstitutional theory. In observing the changing locus of the family, from that institutionalized in law to a companionship form based on mutual affection, sympathetic understanding, and comradeship, Burgess and Locke underscored the relevance of social practice as the basis for the contemporary family. Interestingly, Burgess and Locke's reformulation raised concerns that marriage and the family were no longer institutions (see Popenoe, 1988, p. 39). In contrast, neoinstitutionalism's focus upon scripts, schemas, and shared understandings reveals how the family as an institution accommodates change in social behavior such as remarriage, blended families, and single-sex marriages (cf. Cherlin, 1981).

3. Although feminist theory would also argue that there are differences by race and class, our data do not allow us to explore these possibilities.

4. Initial analyses also included a sample drawn from spring 1969. Few significant differences were found between the 1967 and 1969 subsamples. For ease of presentation, we retained only one subsample—the cross-section of responses that was drawn from spring 1967 to use as our comparison.

5. Note that for ease of presentation, the ranking scores have been reversed. For example, in recoded form, a score of 1 is assigned to the expectation considered least important and a score of 11 indicates that the expectation is most important. Thus a high mean score indicates that the expectation was generally considered very important.

6. Earlier analyses included measures of respondents' relationship experiences. These variables were not significantly predictive of marriage expectations and were dropped from subsequent models.

7. We factor analyzed each set of measures in order to confirm which set reflected distinct underlying constructs, using principle component factor analysis with an oblique (promax) rotation. Cronbach's alpha coefficients for the belief scales are reported in Table 1.

8. We see a significant difference across time in the means for moral and religious unity and maintenance of a home (Table 1), but the position of these measures within the rankings does not change over time.

9. Thus the overall result for the SEXNS scale in Table 1 that showed no change masked a positive change among women and a negative change among men.

10. In earlier models, we included all two-way interaction terms for gender and attitudes and for year and attitudes. We included in our final models only those interactions that were

statistically significant and substantively interesting. We also estimated models that included all three-way interactions between year, gender, and the attitude scales. Again, we included in the final analyses only those three-way interactions that were significant.

11. Supplementary analyses show this interaction is not statistically significant.

12. The interaction also indicates that the effect of year is contingent on attitudes regarding romance. The increase in the ranking of amount of love and affection between 1967 and 1994 was limited to those who are least accepting of the romantic ideal of love. Among those who subscribe to that ideal, the ranking of expectations about love and affection in marriage was high in both years.

13. Earlier results showed these interactions were not statistically significant.

14. The predicted values were calculated at the following levels for each of the other independent variables: 18.5 years old, rank 2.349 on degree of religiosity, live outside a major city, are White, Protestant, and score at the mean for each attitude scale other than Traditional Family Concepts scale (TFCS).

15. Supplementary analyses show these interactions are not statistically significant.

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