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In the crosshairs : explaining violence against civilians

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In the Crosshairs: Explaining Violence against Civilians

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Lindsay L. Heger

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2010

The dissertation of Lindsay L. Heger is approved, and it is acceptable

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VITA

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

In the Crosshairs:

Explaining Violence against Civilians

by

Lindsay L. Heger

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, San Diego, 2010

Professor Barbara F. Walter, Chair

My dissertation investigates the factors that explain when groups are most or least likely to target civilians. While civilians are a particularly appealing target because they are easy to attack, many groups go to great lengths to avoid them. Thus, the question motivating my research is: given the potential windfalls implicit in civilian attacks, why do some organizations target them while others do not?

In this project, I take a two-step approach to answering this question. I begin by looking at what targets groups are likely to attack given the government from which they wish to gain political concessions. Based on a coercive model of violence, I argue groups attack those segments of society that apply the most pressure on a government. In general terms, the most influential segments of society for any government are its minimum winning coalition and selectorate. After surveying the literature on a large number of different regime types, I conclude that civilians face the highest risk of being attacked in

democracies because, unlike forms of non-democracy, the minimum winning coalition and selectorate in democracies are composed of civilians.

The second step, and the bulk of this project, examines civilian targeting within democratic contexts. To address variation within democracies, I argue that violent groups are most likely to attack civilians when doing so does not hurt their supporters or undermine the support they receive from the larger population. Although attacks on civilians are easy to execute and democratic political institutions encourage such attacks, these attacks impose high costs (often in the form of government repression) on the segment of the civilian population that supports the violent group. In addition, attacks on civilian supporters may alienate some of the group's supporters who will not back a group that targets innocent civilians. Losing civilian supporters is problematic for violent organizations that draw heavily from community-level alliances for operational success and political leverage.

My theory identifies and explores three unique conditions that make groups more or less likely to attack civilians within democracies. First, when a violent group runs for political office, a community can punish the group. Consequently, groups with political wings temper their violence by attacking civilians less often. Secondly, when a terrorist group provides goods and services throughout neighborhoods for its supporters, it offsets the costs associated with violence on civilian targets. Compared to groups that don't distribute resources, provider groups are more likely to target civilians because the consequences are not as dire. Finally, when a terrorist group draws support from a highly segmented part of the population, it is easier for the group's enemies (usually government authorities, but a group's enemies may also include other violent groups) to repress and intimidate the group's supporters. When this occurs, groups are less likely to attack civilians because their support base suffers more costs from reprisals. Each condition emphasizes the same innovative contribution: civilians matter, and not just as collateral damage. They matter because violent groups rely on them and, as a result, they affect the type of violence groups pursue.

I test my theory using large-N statistical analyses and detailed case research. My empirical work presents new data on terrorist groups, including their political (non-violent) and redistributive activities. Using this data, I test my claims using a cross-national dataset of attacks over the last forty years. My case research focuses on the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland. The case of the IRA demonstrates how involvement in politics decreases the odds a group will attack civilians.

Chapter 1

Introduction

What factors encourage violent groups to attack innocent civilians? Some groups do so frequently while others rarely, if ever, use this strategy. From a logistical standpoint, attacking civilians is extraordinary appealing. They congregate in open and easily accessible areas (e.g., markets, restaurants, and public events), thereby decreasing the costs of planning an attack. Additionally, violent operatives face few risks since civilians, for the most part, are not armed and the chances of violent engagement after an attack are extremely low.

Despite these benefits, a number of groups deliberately choose not to attack civilians. Data on the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA or, more commonly, IRA), a group dedicated to the total withdraw of British authority in Northern Ireland, indicate that the IRA attacked civilians only 6 percent of the time throughout its lifespan. Over 65 percent of IRA attacks targeted the government including heavily barricaded police stations and armed military personnel. The Basque Fatherland and Freedom Movement (ETA) in Spain is similar.[1] ETA has targeted civilians only approximately 4 percent of the time and, like the IRA, has an established history of attacking government officials, police, the military, and state institutions.[2]

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[1] Many groups, including the IRA, inflict a large amount of collateral civilian damage. This analysis pertains to terrorists' intended targets, rather than their unintended victims

[2] Data on PIRA and ETA attacks span 1968-2007 and are from the Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) from the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. Accessed at www.tkb.org, various dates 2006-2008.

ETA and the IRA are on one extreme. Some groups attack civilians regularly. Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), for instance, targeted civilians in over 80 percent of their attacks through 2007. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) did so nearly 37 percent of the time and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party in Turkey) targeted civilians 27 percent of the time.

In addition to differences across organizations, when a group does attack civilians there is often a great deal of variability across time in that group's use of this strategy. For instance, Hamas, well-known for its attacks on Israeli citizens, has not always pursued this strategy with intensity. Graph 1.1 shows Hamas' civilian attacks from 2001-2006. In 2002 Hamas attacked civilians less than 65 percent of the time, but in 2005 that number rose to over 95 percent.



These divergent outcomes, both across groups and across time, are perplexing for several reasons. Most obviously, civilians are easy targets. All groups mentioned above, Hamas, the PIJ, the IRA, ETA, the PKK, and LeT operated in the same time period, so broad temporal effects, such as a universal acceptance or rejection of civilians as legitimate targets, are likely insignificant. Furthermore, all of these groups are driven by nationalistic political goals. Although the specifics of each group's nationalist agenda differ, generally speaking these organizations are dedicated to eliminating the influence of a government that they argue exerts unjustified influence throughout a specific geographic space. Ideological differences cannot account for the divergence between these groups' targeting profiles.

Thus, the motivating question for this project is: what factors encourage or discourage attacks on civilian targets? Related, can the same factors that explain cross-group variation also explain variation over time within groups?

In this dissertation project, I take a two-step approach to answering this question. I begin by looking at what targets groups are likely to attack given the government from which they wish to gain political concessions. Based on a coercive model of violence, I argue groups attack those segments of society that apply the most pressure on a government. In general terms, the most influential segments of society for any government are its minimum winning coalition and selectorate. After surveying the literature on a large number of different regime types, I conclude that civilians face the highest risk of being attacked in democracies because, unlike forms of non-democracy, the minimum winning coalition and selectorate in democracies are composed of civilians.

The second step, and the bulk of this project, examines civilian targeting within democratic contexts. I examine these attacks for several reasons. First, intellectually this is a curious set of cases. Despite the strong influence of political institutions, rates of civilian targeting vary quite a bit even for groups within democracies. Second, focusing on groups operating against democracies is important because this is where the bulk of attacks on civilian targets take place. Third, to conduct a rigorous analysis it is important to control for a target's value across different violent groups. To the extent that institutions determine the value of targets, controlling for their affect is important. For instance, I argue that killing civilians in a democracy inflicts higher costs on democratic leaders than the same action in a dictatorship. If the same group faced two different opponents, one democrat and one autocrat, civilian attacks are inherently more valuable against the democrat who relies on civilian support for his or her place in office. Controlling for regime type, then, eliminates these differences. Finally, the lessons learned from this set of cases allow researchers to build a more general model of unconventional conflicts, something I discuss further in the conclusion.

To address variation within democracies, I argue that violent groups are most likely to attack civilians when doing so does not hurt their supporters or undermine the support they receive from the larger population. Although attacks on civilians are easy to execute and democratic political institutions encourage such attacks, these attacks impose high costs (often in the form of government repression) on the segment of the civilian population that supports the violent group. In addition, attacks on civilian supporters may alienate some of the group's supporters who will not back a group that targets innocent civilians. Losing civilian supporters is problematic for violent organizations that draw heavily from community-level alliances for operational success and political leverage.

My theory identifies and explores three unique conditions that make groups more or less likely to attack civilians within democracies. First, when a violent group runs for political office, a community can punish the group. Consequently, groups with political wings temper their violence by attacking civilians less often. Secondly, when a terrorist group provides goods and services throughout neighborhoods for its supporters, it offsets the costs associated with violence on civilian targets. Compared to groups that don't distribute resources, provider groups are more likely to target civilians because the consequences are not as dire. Finally, when a terrorist group draws support from a highly segmented part of the population, it is easier for the group's enemies (usually government authorities, but a group's enemies may also include other violent groups) to repress and intimidate the group's supporters. When this occurs, groups are less likely to attack civilians because their support base suffers more costs from reprisals. Each condition emphasizes the same innovative contribution: civilians matter, and not just as collateral damage. They matter because violent groups rely on them and, as a result, they affect the type of violence groups pursue.

This chapter is organized into four major sections. The first introduces my argument in more detail. In this section I address major theoretical concepts and provide a brief outline to the project's theoretical mechanisms. The final sections describe the research design, broad contributions, and the dissertation's outline.

Argument

My argument begins by addressing the political rational behind targeting civilians. While attacking noncombatants (civilians) is damaging for a number of reasons, for democratic governments these attacks are particularly harmful from a political perspective. They apply pressure directly on voters who, in turn, are capable of replacing policymakers and voting on policy outcomes. Yet it is because democratic political institutions empower civilians that they are attractive targets. This does not mean that groups gain political leverage from *only* attacking civilians. However, democratic institutions are unique insofar as they mandate a nontrivial portion of political responsibility to civilians and, in doing so, violent organizations gain political leverage from attacking them. Consequently, I argue that civilians face a higher risk of being attacked in democracies compared to other regime types.

However, I assert that attacks on civilians within democracies are not entirely contingent on the political leverage groups gain with the sitting government. I argue what a group chooses to target is strongly influenced by its relationship with a civilian base of support. This part of my argument flows from two ideas: terrorist organizations rely on supporters from local populations and civilian targeting imposes high costs on the group's backers whose support they cannot operate without. In this section, I develop these ideas and introduce the mechanisms behind three key findings in this project. The mechanisms I identify apply to cross-group comparisons and characterize the dynamic relationship between any one violent terrorist group and their supporters over time. Prior to that, however, I begin this section by discussing the groups relevant to my theory.

The Relevant Groups

The theory, argument, and findings in this project relate to politically-motivated non-state organizations that use violence as a means of coercing a government. All these organizations have political objectives.[3] In accordance with Clausewitz (1976), I assume violent acts perpetrated by these organizations are intended to influence some political outcome. Violence is a means to some political end. The form of a group's violence, from

[3] See Crenshaw 1981, Lake 2002, and Kydd and Walter 2006 for definitions and a discussion of groups' political motivations.

whom it is used against to how and when it is employed, reflects the group's political context. In many ways, a group's political incentives and motivations are revealed in who or what it chooses to attack.

All groups in this analysis are non-state actors. States can (and many do) attack civilians, but I do not describe their motivations or constraints in this project.[4] The non-state actors I discuss here range in size from small groups of like-minded individuals (e.g., the Environmental Liberation Front) to large-scale operations that resemble states (e.g., Hezbollah). While some of the groups in this analysis are large and have many resources, none are capable of exerting force over a government such that it would succumb to the group's demands. Instead, all must rely on violence as a tool of coercion, something I describe in more detail in Chapter Two.

Many organizations in my analysis are commonly referred to as terrorist groups because they target civilians. However, the theory does not apply to only terrorist organizations. Insurgent groups and rebels face similar incentives; all are politically-motivated and rely to a certain degree on outside support. To the extent that they all choose whether to target civilians, all these groups face similar constraints and incentive structures. This project is not intended to shed light on the normative or technical differences between insurgents, rebels, freedom fighters, or terrorists. In fact, groups analyzed in subsequent chapters fall into a number of different categories. For instance, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia, the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, and the Communist Party of Nepal (also known as the Unified Communist

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[4] For a description of differences between non-state actors and states as regards the targeting of civilians, see Eck and Hultman (2007).

Party of Nepal-Maoist) are commonly referred to as insurgents. Groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, the IRA, and the PKK in Turkey share many traits with the insurgents (i.e. they are large-scale groups involved in protracted conflicts and regularly engage(d) government forces in direct confrontation), but have been referred to as both insurgents and as terrorists. The smaller and more unconventional in their tactics, groups seem to become "terrorist" organizations (e.g., al-Qaeda, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, or Lashkar-e-Taiba). Throughout this project I refer to the applicable non-state groups as violent groups, organizations, and terrorists. I primarily use the latter in the context of an organization actively engaging civilian targets.

For this analysis, one way in which the difference between groups that are commonly deemed insurgents versus terrorists may matter is in the degree to which each relies on civilian supporters. Insurgents usually come from large organizations with extensive bases of civilian support and resources. Terrorists tend to be from smaller groups with fewer resources and supporters (although there are more than a handful of exceptions to this generalization). This difference matters insofar as groups that rely more heavily on civilian supporters are more constrained in their targeting choices. Theoretically, there are reasons to suspect that every group relies on outside support from civilians. (I describe these reasons below and in more detail in Chapter Three.) While there is no way to empirically measure reliance I use proxy measures to control for its affect when appropriate.

Finally, the theory in this analysis is intended to refer to intentional attacks on civilians. Thus, by attacks on civilian targets I refer to those in which a terrorist group deliberately chooses to place civilians in the crosshairs rather than instances where attacks mistakenly harm civilians. Eck and Hultman's analysis (2007) suggests the importance of clarifying the intentionality of violence as not to make inappropriate comparisons. Intentionally targeting civilians is a different strategy compared to an attack that accidently harms them. As laid out in Chapters Two and Three, my argument applies to groups that deliberately attack civilian targets. In Chapter Five's qualitative analysis I explore this issue further by analyzing the impact of unintentional deaths on a group's support base.

Bargaining for Support: Terrorists and Local-Level Supporters

Within the context of democratic regimes, this dissertation argues that terrorists' behavior is shaped by their relationships with members of local communities. As previously mentioned, this is axiomatic for different types of violent actors. Many groups, including insurgents, guerillas, and gang members that attempt to evade capture by authorities rely heavily on non-member supporters from local communities.[5] Successfully developing inroads with local communities allows groups to blend in, thus enabling the group to operate clandestinely.

But blending in is not the only logistical reason a violent actor needs backing within local communities. Supporters play very active roles in maintaining organizations and ensuring successful attacks. Community members provide safe houses for group members, channel resources into and out of the organization, and provide vital information for successful operations. As a group's support base grows, so do its alternatives for safe havens, its resources, and its information.

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[5] Readers interested in how this insight applies to other non-state actors should see Akerlof and Yellen (1994) who discuss gang behavior in light of community preferences.

When violent actors have political agendas, as do terrorists, community support provides an additional benefit that is political in nature. As a group's support base increases, so do its odds of gaining concessions from policy makers. Since all groups in this analysis exist in democracies, more supporters means more voters to push policy outcomes closer to the group's idea. This is an especially powerful motivation for groups with political wings that rely on civilian support to win seats in legislatures or around executive cabinets.

Yet the incentive to attack civilians is at odds with the need for a community's support. Targeting civilians both exposes a group's supporters to direct harm and can impose high costs on local communities. These costs come from three sources: countermeasures and reactions, risks inherent to the targeting choice itself, and moral imperatives to ensure civilians' safety. In Chapter Three I describe specific examples of each of these sources from a variety of conflicts. When terrorists attack civilians, their community supporters bear these burdens. At the margin, then, as the costs associated with supporting terrorism outweigh the ideological or strategic benefits, individuals are driven to withdraw their support.

This point is worth emphasizing because it differs from the current literature. Local supporters can and do withdraw their backing, and hearts and minds counter insurgency strategies take advantage of this fact. By appealing to local populations, countermeasures undermine a rebel's stronghold within a local population. In turn, rebel organizations fall as individual community members inform authorities of their whereabouts and group members themselves are lured away from the violent organization. These lessons are evident in two contemporary conflicts. In Vietnam, President Johnson advocated hearts and minds efforts, referring to them as the best hope. "We must be ready to fight in Viet Nam, but the ultimate victory will depend upon the hearts and the minds of the people who actually live out there. By helping to bring them hope and electricity you are also striking a very important blow for the cause of freedom throughout the world."[6] The second and perhaps clearest example of hearts and minds success comes from the British experience in Malaya (Stubbs 1989). By providing land and tools to villagers, British forces successfully undermined the rebel members of the Malayan Communist Party. In each instance, appeals to local populations dealt a strong blow to clandestine groups who relied on locals for cover and resources.

Actors lose crucial supporters if their violent strategies impose too heavily on local communities. As it becomes more costly to support the organization (i.e. when the organization targets civilians), violent groups lose community backing. Consider one telling example from Northern Ireland. In 1987, the IRA attacked a war memorial in Enniskillen, Northern Ireland. The dead and injured numbered over seventy, and included women and the elderly. The devastation to civilian targets set the IRA struggling to regain its momentum. Community members shut their doors to IRA operatives. Analysts noted that the IRA's target choice brought "a strong wave of revulsion", and support for the IRA plunged as a result.[7]

The Mechanisms

The outcome I seek to explain is why some groups attack civilians while others do not. As previously stated, I begin by explaining this outcome as a function of a

[6] See www.americanpresidency.org, accessed 8/12/2008.
[7] McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney, Thornton, and McVea. 2007. Page 1096.

government's characteristics. Different political institutions create different "pressure points" across regimes. I argue that groups strategically choose their targets to maximize their ability to pressure policy makers. Civilians are more likely to be targeted in democracies because of the pressure they can apply on politicians via democratic political institutions.

The fact that not all groups engage civilian targets even within democracies suggests that civilian targeting is costly in unobvious ways. To this point, I describe the relationship between a group and its civilian support base, and how attacking civilians threatens that relationship. I identify three mechanisms that make some groups more sensitive to the effect of their targeting decisions on local populations.

First, the easier it is for community members to punish violent groups for their actions, the less likely groups will attack civilians. Instead, violent groups might use nonviolent options or concentrate attacks on non-civilian targets such as government forces, military installments, or police patrols. In the same way voters may be turned off to a candidate that uses negative advertising, violent groups suffer when they attack civilians. But how do communities punish terrorist groups? There are a number of possible alternatives. For instance, civilians might shut their doors to operatives seeking shelter. They could give authorities information about operative's plans and whereabouts. They could not lend logistical assistance to group members planning an attack. They could lend their support to one of the group's competitors. They could choose not to vote for politicians backed by the organization. In theory, all these options exist for all communities. In practice, however, many of these options are off the table because some groups use coercive force to ensure community compliance. Groups may not give a community member the option of shutting his or her home to operatives; if the individual resists the group can use violence to force the issue. What distinguishes an organization's incentives to attack civilians is whether or not communities ***can*** punish (meaning civilians have a punishment option that groups are unable to coercively affect).

In order to assess the plausibility of the punishment mechanism, I analyze target selection and voting returns. I choose to look at elections as a way in which communities punish groups because data on election returns is easily accessible (in comparison, data accounting for the number of times individuals didn't allow terrorists to use their homes as safe havens or the frequency with which community members gave information to authorities is nonexistent) and because politically active groups are dependent on support from communities that cannot be coercively obtained. Thus, politically active groups are both highly dependent on community support *and* communities can punish these groups for cost-imposing behavior. To inflict punishment, communities can vote against a group's political candidate. Despite some instances of voter fraud and intimidation at the polls, in general the elections held in states with lengthy democratic histories (which characterize all those included in this analysis) are fair and free from intimidation. When terrorist groups participate in elections, I argue the group is less likely to attack civilians.

Second, violent organizations that distribute resources are more likely to target civilians compared to those that do not distribute resources. Like states, many terrorist organizations provide public goods and services to local populations, often developing substantial benign wings dedicated to these efforts. There are a myriad of reasons that explain what provokes a group to provide services. For some, providing services generates a basis for support among a local population (this seems likely in the case of

Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers). Other groups were founded as service providers for populations in dire need (Hamas fits this description). Regardless of the reason, service provision establishes a significant bond between communities and providing organizations. Two organizations famous for providing goods and services, Hamas and Hezbollah, distribute medical aid, education, housing, welfare, and even trash collection within the areas from which they draw support. Although few other violent groups compare in scale to these two, many contribute to local populations in this manner. Many of these goods and services are essential for populations that state authorities either cannot reach or choose not to serve. Most importantly, these goods and services generate a solid base of support for the provider. By providing benefits to civilians in neighborhoods, terrorist organizations increase the opportunity costs for individuals considering withdrawing their support or undermining the organization by leaking information to authorities. Consequently, when groups provide goods and services, they have the leeway to target civilians and, thus, impose higher costs on their support base.

Third, when governments can easily repress a terrorist group's supporters, civilians are less likely to be attacked. Governments are most likely to repress when they can easily distinguish their supporters from the terrorist's supporters. Consider a government's strategic options vis-à-vis its own support base. Ideally, government officials prefer to repress or impose restrictions ***solely*** on those who support the terrorist organization so they minimize the impact on their own supporters. However, when different groups live side by side, discriminately applying counter-measures can be impossible. For this reason not all governments will react identically when terrorists threaten civilians. A terrorist group's community support base is most likely to suffer high costs at the government's hand when state authorities can easily distinguish their own supporters from the terrorists. Geographic isolation or perceivable ethnic differences, for instance, may contribute to a government's ability to discriminate friend from foe. For a terrorist group, attacking civilians is less likely the more isolated and easily distinguishable its support base is.

All three mechanisms demonstrate the links between communities of ordinary civilians and violent groups. These ideas generate a new view of the nature of non-state actor's violence, one that is determined in large part by the willingness of community members to support organizations whose violent activities have hefty consequences.

Research Design and Data

This dissertation employs a mixed method approach to test the arguments put forth.[8] I conduct two large-N analyses of terrorist incidents that occurred during the last five decades. The first, which tests my argument democracy and civilian targeting, includes attacks by several hundred organizations worldwide. In the second I test my theory about groups and their support bases on incidents perpetrated by organizations identified as "terrorist" by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. These include some of the most lethal organizations from a large number of countries around the world.

Throughout I focus on terrorist incidents perpetrated by groups, rather than individuals (such as the Unabomber), for two reasons. First, groups pose a larger threat. It stands to reason that organizations have greater capacity to orchestrate sophisticated attacks that incur large death tolls and are part of a sustained campaign of terror. While it

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[8] See Lieberman (2005) on mixed methods approaches.

is impossible to quantify this empirically-a large share of data on attacks do not identify a perpetrator and, thus, could be attributable to either an individual or a group-historically the most brutal attacks have all been conducted by groups (for instance: al-Qaeda and 9/11, Aum Shinrikyo and the Tokyo subway bombings, Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Kenyan embassy bombings, Hezbollah and the Beirut barracks bombing, and Lashkar-e-Taiba and the 2008 Mumbai attacks). Second, groups are more likely to rely on communities. One-man operations are easy to manage clandestinely. Groups, however, are threatened by members leaking information because they are subject to managerial discretion in order to coordinate actions. The demands that must be met to successfully operate a group mean a certain level of community involvement (or, at a minimum, willingness to conceal local knowledge about the group).

To conduct my first analysis, I test for correlation between a series of regime-type variables derived from two sources and my dependent variable, civilian attacks. For the second, I test for correlation between civilian attacks and a group's non-violent activities and the concentration of its support base (the three mechanisms described previously). Variables regarding groups' nonviolent activities, goods provision and electoral participation, I gathered from case descriptions, expert analyses, and government intelligence reports about individual groups. The last variable, support concentration, identifies cases where government agents should be able to easily suppress a violent group's supporters. For this I use data from the Minorities at Risk project, which identifies how concentrated a minority group is within an urban or rural area. I also use a number of control variables related to the conflict and organization specifically.

The empirical findings substantiate my theoretical claims. First, groups that attack democracies are highly more likely to target civilians. This finding is robust to a large array of different specifications. Furthermore, I find evidence that transitions toward democracy also induce groups to target civilians. Secondly, I find that civilian attacks are more likely when groups distribute goods and services and when their supporters live in integrated areas. Civilian attacks are also less likely for groups that run political parties.

To more clearly verify the causal links between terrorist groups and community members over time, I compare changes in my key independent variables and the resulting targeting patterns for the Irish Republican Army. The IRA case explores how provision of goods and services to communities and electoral participation changed the IRA's violent behavior. The bulk of this analysis focuses on the IRA's transformation into a political party and how that change provoked fundamentally different patterns of violence over time. Process tracing reveals the links between IRA violence and political participation. For instance, my description of the IRA in Chapter Five demonstrates how communities in and around Belfast used the electoral mechanism to punish the group after its attacks targeted and killed noncombatant civilians. The narrative in this case is designed around the causal mechanisms and not the outcomes. Thus, rather than telling the story of the IRA, I describe the punishment mechanism as it relates to the Irish case specifically.

Broad Contributions

I address the project's broader contributions here, and more specific contributions in the conclusion. Theoretically, the analysis expands our understanding of violence in two significant ways. First, the insight gained through strategic analysis further silences those who argue that terrorism is irrational and, therefore, a unique form of political violence. The tendency to black box terrorist groups into an irrational, insane, or illogical part of the geopolitical landscape is unwarranted. While their tactics may be unconventional, they are subject to very real political incentives and limitations. The evidence and discussion in this project demonstrates that terrorist groups' violence reflects these factors and that groups respond rationally.

While my project provides evidence supporting the claim that attacks on civilians are the result of interactions between governments and terrorist groups, it goes one step further by accounting for the relationship between terrorists and their civilian supporters. By doing so my project adds local populations to this list of important factors that determine a group's strategy. My analysis reveals that the character of the dependency between terrorist groups and civilians can be explored through tactical evaluation.

Outline of Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into four substantive chapters (not including the introduction or conclusion). Chapter Two describes my argument about regime types and civilian targeting. In that discussion I address terrorism as a form of coercive violence intended to shape policy outcomes and discusses why democratic political institutions encourage coercive violence against civilian targets. Chapter Two also includes the empirical analysis of my arguments in which I find strong support for my theoretical claims.

Chapter Three lays out my theory about groups and their civilian supporters in detail. I begin by discussing the central actors: terrorist groups, governments, and community members. I explain each actor's benefits and costs to establish the basic parameters driving their decisions. I use these insights to discuss violence and its implications for the relationship between terrorist groups and communities. A substantial portion of the discussion focuses on why terrorist groups need community support and how attacks against civilians impose high costs on communities. I conclude this section by deriving three hypotheses about when terrorist groups are likely to attack civilians

Chapter Four tests the hypotheses above. I introduce each variable used in the analysis and explain how it relates to the theoretical constructs from Chapter Three. I introduce two variables I collected on terrorist groups for this project: goods distribution and political participation. These two variables are described in detail. Using logit analysis, I test the relationship between my independent variables and civilian attacks over the last forty years. The findings are robust and support my expectations. Goods provision is positively related to civilian attacks, political participation is negatively related to civilian attacks, and segregated support base is positively related to civilian attacks. Additionally, I report interesting results for a host of control variables including financing type, group size, and group ideology.

Chapter Five presents a detailed case study of the IRA in Northern Ireland to examine the causal mechanisms in more detail. I trace the history of the IRA, paying particular attention to the IRA's relationship with communities in and near Belfast. This case examines each implication, but focuses primarily on the punishment mechanisms. I argue that as the IRA began pursuing votes for Sinn Fein representatives, it killed fewer civilians. When the IRA did attack civilians, voters in Northern Ireland punished the organization by electing non-Sinn Fein representatives and voting some prominent Sinn Fein members out of office.

Chapter Six concludes by summarizing the arguments and findings. In this chapter I also lay out the major theoretical and practical implications of the argument and explain why this study is a novel take on a growing field of literature on unconventional conflict and terrorism. The last section lays out questions and research agendas related to this project that remain open for investigation.

Chapter 2

Terrorizing Democrats: Political Institutions and the Decision to Attack Civilians

In this chapter I develop and test my theory about the relationship between political institutions and the likelihood that violent groups will attack civilian targets. I argue that terrorists strategically target those individuals and groups most likely to pressure politicians into granting policy concessions. Because groups script their attacks in order to maximize the chances of policy concessions, they are sensitive to the political institutions that define and delegate a government's power. Consequently, I argue that because democratic institutions empower civilians they also make them attractive targets.

For the purposes of this chapter, I assume a model of violence in which the violent group maximizes its coercive influence given the constraints and incentive structure of its enemy. Comprehending this dynamic is a necessary first step toward understanding an organization's strategy. In subsequent chapters, I add complexity to this argument by describing alternative constraints groups' face, some of which make civilian targeting highly unlikely.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section I outline my theory of violence. I explain the strategic incentives groups face and how political institutions shape those incentives. My theory draws from a literature developed in comparative politics which outlines the important functions of a selectorate and minimum winning coalition within any given political establishment. I examine this literature and, drawing from its insights about democratic regimes, I explain why violent groups have positive incentives to attack civilian targets in democracies compared to all other regime types.

The next sections identify testable hypotheses and alternative arguments. The fourth section describes my data and methods, and the fifth section explains my results. The final section concludes.

Theory

For the groups in this analysis, violence is political. It is designed to influence the policy process and, when effective, leads to policy outcomes aligned with an organization's ideals. In 2004 Farouk Kaddoumi, leader of al-Fatah in Palestine, identified the relationship between violence and politics for his organization, noting that "resistance is the path to arriving at a political settlement."[9] Violent groups and the governments they target are involved in a bargaining process in which violence is used to gain political leverage and, ultimately, policy concessions. But how does this process work and how does it affect whether or not a group targets civilians?

This chapter describes violence, what Kaddoumi referred to as "resistance", as involving two central actors: the violent group and the government from which it demands concessions. This is a simple view of highly complex system. The terrorist group and the government are neither unified actors, as I assume here, nor are they the only important actors. In fact, Chapters Three through Five examine what happens when I account for a terrorist group's civilian support base. The findings in those chapters suggest that this segment of individuals is highly influential in determining targeting decisions. However, in this chapter I focus solely on terrorist groups and governments as a way of understanding the political benefits inherent in attacking civilians. To that end, I

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[9] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/11/11/uarsucc.xml. Accessed on 1/9/2006

begin by describing how groups use violence in order to draw policy concessions from government authorities.

Coercive Violence

Terrorism is a form of coercive pressure. Coercive pressure, in contrast to brute force, depends on a group's ability to inflict costs on an enemy. Coercion works when a group uses violence (albeit often infrequently) such that those in government are compelled to design political outcomes to lessen the violent threat. Coercion changes actor's motivations, but not by overwhelming them. Brute force, on the other hand, works when one is stronger than one's adversary. Force compels policy change because the weaker opponent has no choice. Coercion alters policy because one side prefers to avoid attacks in future periods.[10] Terrorist groups, being small and relatively resource-poor compared to the governments they target, depend entirely on their violence to induce policy change through coercion. Even for relatively large groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the FARC in Colombia, coercive violence is necessary because they are in no way capable of overpowering a government through force.

Coercive violence requires perpetrators pay close attention to the nature of their attacks. Why does this matter? Coercion requires nuance and careful planning in order to fully exploit an enemy. Shelling (1966) argued that, "the coercive use of power to hurt…is the very exploitation of enemy wants and fears…To exploit a capacity for hurting and inflicting damage one needs to know what an adversary treasures and what scares him."[11] Terrorist groups design attacks to exploit these vulnerabilities. Insofar as

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[10] For a complete discussion about the differences between brute force and coercion, see Shelling (1966).
[11] Shelling (1966). Page 3.

targeting is concerned, organizations deliberately choose targets based on a government's weaknesses and pressure points. In order to understand and predict civilian targeting it is necessary to understand the conditions under which attacking civilians achieves these ends.

I argue that political institutions, and specifically the way political institutions distribute power amongst segments of society, determine the attractiveness of targets for terrorist groups (i.e. political institutions determine what pressures government officials). Institutions are important because they characterize the structure, function, and composition of a government. Civilians are attractive targets when institutions make them valuable vis-à-vis the political process. As I show below, this occurs in a variety of ways and is most evident in democratic systems.

Why Democratic Political Institutions make Civilians Likely Targets

Democracies mandate a significant degree of control of political processes to a citizen electorate. This electorate votes on policy and policymakers, processes that are the hallmark of a democratic system. Regarding these important functions, Dahl (1971) wrote that, "…a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals."[12] Echoing this sentiment, Schmitter and Karl (1991) noted that, "Citizens are the most distinctive element in democracies. All regimes have rulers and a public realm, but only to the extent that they are democratic do they have citizens."[13]

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[12] Dahl (1971). Page 1.
[13] Schmitter and Karl (1991). Page 77.

In mandating the vital role played by a citizen electorate, democratic institutions make civilians attractive targets for two reasons. First, because democratic instructions empower a citizen electorate to select officeholders, attacking civilians directly threatens policymaker's tenure. Violence against civilians demonstrates that those in authority are incapable of providing adequate protection. The electoral mechanism enables civilians to punish officeholders when this occurs. While there are some limits to this argument, civilians probably do not reasonably expect political authorities to entirely eliminate the threat of terror, attacks can be intentionally designed to successfully demonstrate officials' inabilities. But doing so means that groups must necessarily target civilians in costly ways that defy a government's protective measures. Flying planes into buildings or blowing up a train, apart from the shock value, accomplish this because government structures (for instance, the Transportation Security Administration in the United States) are intended to mitigate the risk of these attack modes. By demonstrating the failure of policymakers to provide protection, violent attacks on civilian targets give the citizen electorate incentives to remove those in power. This, in turn, gives policymakers incentives to design policy outcomes such that the threat of attack is minimized.

The second reason democratic institutions make civilians attractive targets is because responsibility for policy outcomes is often directly in the hands of civilians. In his "Letter to America" Osama bin Laden justified his attacks on American citizens in these terms: "The American people are the ones who choose their government by way of their own free will; a choice which stems from their agreement to its policies…The American people have the ability and choice to refuse the policies of their Government and even to change it if they want."[14] Since democratic institutions give civilians the power to vote their preferences, groups attack civilians to coerce them into voting for policy outcomes that eliminate the threat of future attacks. Unlike the first reason, this logic does not depend entirely on demonstrating the incompetence of political authorities. Attacks adhering to this logic will not necessarily signal that government authorities have failed. Instead, groups can achieve policy change via this mechanism simply by imposing costs on the civilian populations. Violence can be crafted to minimize costs. Attacking civilians in markets, restaurants, and at public gatherings serve as good examples.

Although not addressed beyond here, one interesting and related research opportunity might flush out the conditions under which a group is likely to attack civilians in order to undermine political authority versus imposing costs as cheaply as possible on a citizen electorate? In other words, when do groups plan for something akin to 9/11 instead of blowing up a crowded grocery store? Most basically, the answer probably has something to do with resources. To execute the former groups must devote resources to overcoming any protections a government has in place. For this reason, groups with very few resources may not be able to carry out these types of attacks. A group's choice of attack mode may also have to do with its estimate of civilian's confidence in the security measures of their government. If civilians are uncertain of their level of protection, attacking them when they expect to be protected may only serve to elect a more hawkish government that imposes more security measures but does not necessarily grant the group any policy concessions. On the other hand, attacking where

[14] Bin Laden, Osama. 2002. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver/print. Accessed 12/2009

civilians feel very confident that they are protected may leave government officials with few alternatives other than to grant some concessions.

Despite exactly *how* groups attack, my theory predicts that democratic institutions give groups incentives to target civilians. This does not mean that other targets are not valuable or that they will not be attacked. Nor is it the case that I am arguing that civilians will always be the highest priority target in democracies. Rather, my argument is that compared to other regime types, civilians are more likely to be attacked in democratic political systems. To establish this claim, the next section surveys non-democratic institutions.

Civilian Targeting and Non-Democratic Institutions

In this section I address the following question: are there other types of political arrangements that concurrently empower civilians and make them attractive targets for political violence? In order to clearly assess that possibility, I discuss a literature in comparative politics that identifies significant segments of power for every regime. Democratic institutions place civilians in these segments and I use this identification to compare non-democratic institutions and evaluate whether or not civilians are also at risk in different types of non-democracies.

Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003) argue that political institutions consolidate power in the hands of two significant segments of society: the selectorate and a government's minimum winning coalition. The selectorate is the group of individuals with the power to select and remove policymakers. In democracies, for instance, this group of people is all eligible voters. The minimum winning coalition (MWC), drawn from the larger selectorate, is the group of individuals whose support is necessary for the tenure of the government in power and whose preferences determine government policy.[15] Governments set policy outcomes such that they reflect the preferences of its MWC in order to secure their position in power.

Drawing from the analysis in the section above, it is easy to refocus the description of how democratic institutions make civilians attractive targets in terms of the selectorate and MWC's influence on policy makers. Recall that there were two ways in which democratic institutions made civilians attractive targets. First, by attacking civilians groups use the power institutions vest in voters to undermine the political authority of elected leaders. Second, by attacking civilians groups impose costs directly on those responsible for policy outcomes. In the first case, because civilians are in the selectorate and MWC, attacking them creates incentives for voters to favor alternative leadership, thereby threatening the tenure of sitting officials. One common interpretation of the 2004 Madrid train bombings follows this logic; the bombing, which preceded national elections by several days, led to the ousting of that country's political leadership because of its connections with the Iraq war. In the second case, because democratic policy flows directly from the preferences of the MWC, attacking civilians is a logical strategy to impose costs directly on those responsible for policy outcomes.[16]

Reframing the discussion about civilian targeting around these concepts, the selectorate and MWC, is attractive because it allows for cross-regime comparisons. To that end, the pertinent question is which political institutions incorporate civilians as parts

[15] The minimum winning coalition and selectorate concepts are developed further in Roeder (1993), Shirk (1993), and Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003).

[16] Although terrorists do not know exactly who is a member of a democrat's MWC, since the MWC of democrats is fairly large (often a majority of the citizens) it is reasonable to assume some positive belief on the part of terrorist groups that by attacking civilian targets they are imposing costs on at least some included in the MWC.

of the selectorate and MWC? When civilians are incorporated, they are attractive targets for reasons similar to those outlined above for democracies.

In general, non-democratic institutions do not mandate a government selected by a citizen electorate. While non-democracies tend to focus political power in a small cadre of leaders, how those leaders achieve and sustain a monopoly of control varies quite a bit. Some remain in power based on their ability to forcibly exercise a monopoly of control over the population (dictators or some military regimes), their birthright (monarchies), or their party's ability to coerce and exercise complete control over the political process (single-party regimes). To be certain, I evaluate different types of non-democracies because large differences exist between different non-democratic forms. Barbara Geddes asserted a similar argument about stark differences in non-democratic institutional configuration:

> Different kinds of authoritarianism differ from each other as much as they differ from democracy. They draw on different groups to staff government offices and different segments of society for support. They have different procedures for making decisions, different characteristic forms of intra-elite factionalism and competition, different ways of choosing leaders and handling succession, and different ways of responding to society and opposition.[17]

To assess the impact of non-democratic institutions, I examine the varieties of non-democracies explored by Geddes. Specifically, she identifies three types of non-democratic regimes: military regimes, single-party regimes, and personalistic dictatorships. Military regimes, such as that in Argentina after Isabel Peron was deposed in 1976, are run by high-ranking military officials and are particularly sensitive to internal splits in the military elite. Single party regimes (e.g., the PRI government that led

[17] Geddes (1999). Page 4.

Mexico for much of the 20th century) are distinguished by one party's access to and control over policy decisions. Personalist regimes rely on the whims of one leader who maintains party or military support. This leader of this regime is frequently referred to as a dictator and this type of regime relies heavily on foreign assistance as a result of commonly pursuing isolationist policies. Iraq under Saddam Hussein (1979-2004) exemplifies this type of regime.

Geddes (1999) analyses the characteristics of these regimes, including general conditions under which they tend to fail. Based on that analysis, in none of the regime types are policy outputs generated from a MWC comprised of private civilians. Instead, the MWC is comprised of a small cohort of elite officials within the ruler's party, the military, or that share kinship ties. In each case, this small elite group defines the policy outcomes for the regime. Thus, targeting private civilians is unlikely in each of these cases if groups wish to impose costs directly on those responsible for policy outcomes.

It is also unreasonable to expect that in these regimes civilians will be targeted because of their ability to pressure the leadership via some role in the selectorate. The only exception to this may be single-party regimes, as civilians sometimes vote in elections in these regimes. However, because one party is frequently the only option in elections, it is unlikely that this mechanism provides positive incentives for groups to attack civilians in hopes that their vote will change the leadership. Overall, my assessment suggests that only in democracies do violent organizations stand to gain significant political leverage by attacking civilian targets.

Civilian Targeting and Transitioning Regimes

Up to this point I have assumed that all violence takes place in regimes with consolidated political institutions where the regime type is stable and the institutional configuration is established. What happens when a state's political institutions are in flux, such as when a state is in a transitioning phase? As contemporary Afghanistan and Iraq exemplify, regime transition is associated with a large degree of violence, much of which is directed at civilian targets. Since very few political institutions persist during a regime's transition, sometimes none at all, it is unlikely that they exert much influence over the likelihood that civilians will be attacked. There are, however, two reasons related to the process of political transitions that civilians might wind up deliberately in the crosshairs.

First, groups may attack civilians when they anticipate that civilians will play a significant role in the political process. During transitions, groups may formulate their attacks based on the institutions they expect to be in place once the transition takes place. In doing so, violence undermines the ability of politicians to establish their control through newly-created institutions. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that in states undergoing democratic transitions, violent groups will target civilians. In the run up to the March 2010 election in Iraq, groups launched rockets and used suicide bombings to disrupt the electoral process. Similar occurrences of violence took place in the 2009 Afghani elections provoking President Hamid Karzai to assert that, "The Afghan people dared rockets, bombs and intimidation and came out to vote."[18] In both instances, groups attacked civilians as means to weaken recently established democratic institutions and

[18] Graff and Burch. Reuters April 2009.

gain concessions from policy makers who rely on those institutions for their political positions.

Secondly, in all transitioning regimes civilians may be targeted to challenge a government's ability to secure monopoly control. In order to consolidate political institutions, all governments must establish a monopoly of control over the state's population. For political leaders establishing a monopoly of this sort means controlling the state's security apparatus, including the military and local police forces. While controlling these institutions is necessary for all governments, it is a particularly acute problem for transitioning regimes with no history of interactions between security forces and the population. Because civilians lack information about the security forces' ability to control a violent threat or what they may do in response, attacks on civilian targets destabilize perceptions of the regime's control over security. Attacking civilians as they interact with security personnel, such as civilian applicants to police positions, is a particularly harmful way of undermining a regime's control over security.

Implications and Hypotheses

I began with the assertion that violent groups strategically pick their targets by maximizing the likelihood that political leaders will grant them concessions. I argued that political institutions determine the attractiveness of targets (civilians) by empowering them in regard to the political process. One way of conceptualizing political authority is in terms of a regime's selectorate and minimum winning coalition, the groups responsible for picking political leadership and the group whose preferences directly translate into policy. When civilians are included in either of these two influential groups they are attractive targets for violent organizations.

I draw several hypotheses from my analysis of the selectorate and minimum winning coalition of different regimes. Primarily:

H1: Compared to attacks that take place in all types of non-democratic states, in democracies civilians are more likely to be targeted.

Because democratic policy and office flow directly from the preferences of citizen voters and no comparable mechanisms exist in any non-democratic regime types, civilians face a higher risk in democracies than in non-democracies.

My theory also suggests that groups in transitioning regimes have several incentives to attack civilians, particularly when the regime is transitioning into a democracy. The theory does not shed light on whether more or fewer attacks on civilians will occur in these regimes compared to democracies. However, in comparing different types of regime transitions, the theory implies the following:

H2: Democratic transitions are more likely to be associated with attacks on civilians compared to all other types of transitions.

If my argument about the relationship between democratic institutions and civilian targeting is correct, a similar dynamic should exist in non-democratic regimes. In each type of non-democracy members of the selectorate and MWC often hold some political position. Thus, it is likely that attacks in these regimes will be disproportionately targeted against government targets.

H3a: Compared to democracies, attacks in states with military regimes will disproportionately target members of the military government.

H3b: Compared to democracies, attacks in states with personalist regimes will disproportionately target members of the government.

H3c: Compared to democracies, attacks in states with single-party regimes will disproportionately target members of the government.

Alternative Arguments

There are a series of other factors that might explain a group's willingness to attack civilians. These are applicable to my argument above and to the argument I make in Chapter Three. One alternative is that certain group types are more (or less) willing to attack civilians. A group's type is defined by its ideological goals. In a 1998 study, Drake argued that ideology acts as a filter to a group's targeting strategy. Terrorist groups are driven by some ideological context, such as nationalism or socialism, which provides the basis for selecting and justifying targeting choices. Drake asserts that ideology provides, "an initial motive for action and…a prism through which [terrorists] view events and the actions of other people…[it also provides] an initial range of legitimate targets and a means by which terrorists seek to justify attacks, both to the outside world and to themselves."[19] His research, qualitative in nature, describes why separatist groups like the Kurdistan Workers' Party attack targets associated with a foreign occupier, such as Turkish troops, civilians, or authorities.[20] While group type may be an alternative explanation for civilian targeting, it does not necessarily rule out the theory I present in this project. To the extent that it does matter, I control for its effects when appropriate.

A second alternative explanation focuses on the incentives a government provides for a group to attack civilians. If, by virtue of a government's actions, civilians become more attractive or easier to access, then groups may be more willing to attack them. For

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[19] Drake (1998). Page 1.
[20] Robert Pape's (2003; 2005) subsequent theorizing that terrorists use suicide tactics as a way of inflicting significant costs on an occupying force support Drake's notion of nationalist organizations.

instance, counter measures can make civilians easier or harder to attack. A significant literature developed about terrorist groups substituting away from more expensive tactics, towards cheaper alternatives. Chief among these theories, Enders and Sandler (1993) argue that when officials bulk up security by adding metal detectors, bomb-sniffing dogs, or biometric identification at a location, the cost of attacking that location rises. Data limitations make controlling for cross-country differences in counter terror measures impossible. However, in the case study in Chapter Five (and in the theory section of Chapter Three) I describe the effect that government reactions have on the likelihood of civilian targeting.

A different line of reasoning argues that civilians are targeted when groups are weak. Organizational strain and weakness comes in many forms. For instance, an organization may suffer from internal divisions due to members with heterogeneous preferences. When counter-measures thin the ranks of terrorist groups by incentivizing moderates to leave, the remaining membership becomes increasingly extreme. Consequently, the violence becomes more extreme, reflecting the median member's preference (Bueno de Mesquita 2005). Alternatively, an organization may be weakened after unsuccessful battles. Hultman (2005) argues that insurgents attack civilians in desperate situations, when battlefield asymmetry favors the government. She suggests that this dynamic is the result of an extreme party's "willingness to win at any price," and that attacking civilians is the best (most costly) way of demonstrating that the losing party in the conflict intends to continue fighting despite disastrous battlefield outcomes. Unfortunately, data limitations make comparing and controlling for the extent of intra-organizational dissent or organizational weakness impossible. As a way to control for some of these effects, my comparative analysis utilizes a proxy measure of inter-group competition to account for some of these issues (see below for the full discussion of this proxy). In addition, my case research in Northern Ireland addresses the heterogeneous preferences issue directly (see Chapter Five).

Finally, a group may be more likely to attack civilians based on its resource allocation. Weinstein (2008) asserts that rebels target civilians indiscriminately based on the initial conditions insurgent leaders face. Heavily influenced by the state building literature, Weinstein shows that some rebel groups are like short-term bandits. When natural resources or external funding makes them resource-rich, rebels are less likely to rely on civilians and more likely to target them indiscriminately. When rebels are resource-poor, they cut bargains with communities in order to maintain the organization's integrity. These rebels target selectively and are not prone to indiscriminate civilian attacks.

Wienstein and I agree on many fundamental issues. We both attribute a great deal of significance to local communities for their role in sustaining violent groups. We both argue that civilians can be strategic in determining which side in a conflict receives their support (I describe this argument in more detail in the next chapter). However, our assumptions about the nature of violence differ. For Weinstein, insurgents attack civilians for the sake of maintaining adherence to and resources for the organization. I assume that violence is intended to pressure a government and compel policy change.[21] As a result of this difference, I assume civilians are always attractive targets and are such for reasons

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[21] Compelling policy change and maintaining internal coherence are undoubtedly related. In chapter three's large-N analysis, I attempt to control for Weinstein's (2007) findings by using a variable for financing methods.

completely unrelated to the discipline or resources of the organization. Attacking them has political benefits and can be an important factor in why one side in a conflict wins (Downes 2008). To the extent that outside funding does positively influence incidents of civilian targeting for any reason, I control for it when appropriate.

Data and Methods

To test my theoretical claims, I use data on attacks from the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). The dataset, named the Terrorism Knowledge Base (hereafter referred to as MIPT-TKB), records terrorist incidents from 1968-2007.[22] The unit of observation is a violent attack. For instance, the 9/11 attacks in the United States are listed as three separate attacks taking place in New York (Trade Center Towers), Washington (Pentagon), and Shanksville Pennsylvania (diverted United Airlines flight 93).

I choose MIPT-TKB for several reasons. First and most importantly, MIPT-TKB's definition of terrorism is appropriately inclusive. MIPT-TKB does not limit its attacks to only violence against particular targets. According to MIPT-TKB, terrorism is:

> Violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. All terrorist acts are crimes. Many would also be violation of the rules of war if a state of war existed. This violence or threat of violence is generally directed against civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will

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[22] The dataset existed online at www.tkb.org. I accessed the data multiple times from 2004-March 2008 at which point it was removed in order to be combined with the Global Terrorism Database (see GTD, START/CETIS 2008). At this time, the combined datasets are not available. For those interested in accessing the TKB data, it is available from two sources. First, the incident data can be found at the Lawson Terrorism Information Center (http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/incidentcalendar.asp). Second, most of the MIPT's data on all group-level attributes of perpetrators (called TOPS) is available through the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism's website at http://www.start.umd.edu/data/tops/.

> achieve maximum publicity. Unlike other criminal acts, terrorists often claim credit for their acts. Finally, terrorist acts are intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage of the cause, having long-term psychological repercussions on a particular target audience. The fear created by terrorists may be intended to cause people to exaggerate the strengths of the terrorist and the importance of the cause, to provoke governmental overreaction, to discourage dissent, or simply to intimidate and thereby enforce compliance with their demands.[23]

Most often definitions of terrorism include only violence against civilian targets. MIPT-TKB's definition does not. And while the definition does stipulate that most attacks are against civilians, this is not a limitation of the data collection, but merely a characterization of the data. In fact, only approximately 17 percent of attacks are directed against civilians in the dataset. Many other definitions of terrorism are limited to *only* incidents where civilian noncombatants are the primary target. For example, the U.S. State Department's definition of terrorism requires terrorist events be, "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."[24] Noncombatant targets include only civilians and military personnel who are either unarmed or not on duty at the time of the incident. By limiting coverage to civilian attacks, researchers capture only a fraction of some group's attacks. For research questions about the nature of civilian targeting, this limitation is not problematic. However, this project explains the variation between civilian and non-civilian targeting and, thus, MIPT-TKB's broader definition is most suitable.

Secondly, the MIPT-TKB dataset is one of the largest available. It includes over 35,000 incidents perpetrated by more than 800 groups in a large number of countries. The

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[23] MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. "Glossary". Website accessed February 9, 2006. http://www.tkb.org/Glossary.jsp#T

[24] Accessed at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2000/2419.htm on February 3, 2009.

MIPT-TKB dataset also covers incidents over a relatively long time span: 1968-2007. For these reasons, its scope offers the most information to interested researchers and the greatest potential for generalizable findings. To the best of my knowledge, the only other dataset that surpasses MIPT-TKB's scope is the Global Terrorist Database 1 (GTD1) at the University of Maryland (Global Terrorism Database START/CETIS 2008). GTD1 also covers a wide array of incidents (over 80,000-many of these are MIPT incidents as GTD subsumed MIPT in 2008) over a long period of time (1970-1997). However, as of this writing, I have been unable to attain a copy of the GTD1 data and have been unable to use it outside of its web-based platform.[25] If GTD were easily available, it is hampered by two problems: data collection inconsistencies and missing data for all of 1993.[26]

Finally, MIPT-TKB records domestic attacks. [27] Many prominent databases, such as the ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) dataset (Mickolus 2006), only cover international events. One notable exception, the TWEED dataset (Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data), covers exclusively domestic attacks, but is geographically limited to Western Europe. There are two good reasons to include domestic and international attacks. First, the vast majority of attacks are domestic, perpetrated by groups in their states. Of all attacks by the 40 groups designated as

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[25] There is also a GTD version 2. It has a shorter scope and covers fewer incidents. For information on the differences between GTD1 and GTD2, see http://www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd/gtd1_and_gtd2.asp. GTD2 is also unavailable outside of its web platform.

[26] For a complete discussion on these limitations, see the GTD FAQ page at: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/faq/

[27] Domestic attacks are those in which the attacker and target are from the same country in which the attack occurs. In international attacks, the target, attack location, and the perpetrator are from different countries. The distinction between domestic and international terrorism is not always clear. In the case of 9/11, al-Qaeda operatives from abroad carried out the attacks with very few personal connections within the United Sates. This was clearly an international attack. In the case of al-Qaeda attacks in Iraq, the group recruits operatives from within Iraq as well as bringing in operatives from abroad. When the cell is comprised of Iraqis, the attack should be counted as domestic, but because al-Qaeda is based abroad it is usually classified as international.

terrorist organizations by the US government, approximately 87 percent were domestic (i.e. the attack took place in the same state as the group is based). Analyzing only international attacks would result in a significantly lower number of attacks and may result in a very unreliable assessment if international attacks are substantively different than domestic attacks.

Secondly, related to the point above, there is reason to suspect that international terrorism is driven by a very different logic than domestic terrorism. Many of the world's most infamous attacks - 9/11, the Munich Olympic bombings, the recent spate of attacks in India, and the 2004 Madrid train bombings - are international. In each case, terrorists carried out fatal attacks using high profile delivery systems such as trains and planes in very public locations like hotels and downtown districts. In many ways these attacks appeared to be scripted to generate intense media coverage, capturing the attention of an international political audience who may be sympathetic to or compelled by the acts such that the group gains international support. If international attacks are orchestrated to capture the international media's attention (and, ultimately, convince an international audience of group's political aims) while domestic attacks are not aimed at garnering media attention, the subsequent targeting patterns could produce two very different trends. Insofar as my results indicate, domestic attacks are much more likely to involve civilian targets. This suggests several possible alternatives which I discuss in the results section below.

Dependent Variable

My dependent variable is target choice. For hypotheses 1 and 2 the relevant target is civilians and for hypotheses 3a-c it is the government (and the military according to hypothesis 3a). The data on targeting is from MIPT-TKB. MIPT-TKB identifies twenty-one types of targets: airports and airlines, businesses, diplomatic, educational institutions, government, journalists and media, maritime, military, NGOs, other, police, private citizens and property, religious figures and institutions, telecommunications, terrorist or former terrorists, tourists, transportation, unknown, and utilities. For my purposes, "civilians" include only those in the category of "private citizens and property". MIPT-TKB defines attacks on private citizen(s) as: attacks on the public in general where there is no clear target besides civilians. Attacks on public places such as markets, commercial streets, and busy intersections are included.[28]

For civilian targeting, I collapsed the targeting data to a dichotomous measure where one is equal to all the attacks against private citizens and all other types of attacks take the value of zero. Of approximately 35,000 attacks covered by MIPT-TKB worldwide, civilian attacks account for 17.45 percent of the dataset. In some attacks civilians are significantly affected but not explicitly targeted. While my theory is about groups that deliberately target civilians, it would be informative to develop a secondary measure of civilian impact that would account for attacks in which civilians were either targeted or significantly affected. In this measure attacks such as the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania which killed and injured hundreds of civilians would be included. Unfortunately, when the target is not listed as civilian, there is no systematic way to generate this sort of variable.

For hypotheses 3a-c, I also used a dichotomous measure of target choice. The variable is a one for all attacks on government targets and a zero for all other targeting

[28] Attack definition from author communication with RAND specialist.

options. In this case I aggregate MIPT's targeting categories such that a government target includes the following categories: government, military, and diplomatic targets. This is appropriate because each of these targets is one type of government target and hypotheses 3a-c do not distinguish between targets at this level of specificity. Attacks on the government account for nearly 26 percent of all attacks in the MIPT-TKB dataset.

Regime Variables

There are several regime types of interest in this analysis and I use several different ways to identify them. First, I use the polity scale to identify democratic regimes. The polity variable is a 21-point aggregate measure of regime type (Marshall and Jaggers 2006). Fully institutionalized (consolidated) democracies receive the highest polity scores (10). The lowest values signify regimes that are fully institutionalized autocracies (-10). Middling scores indicate regimes that are mixed or incoherent, otherwise known as anocracies. Similar to many other analyses, I classify democratic regimes as those with polity scores of 6 or higher. These include states like the U.S., U.K, Israel, Spain, Germany, the Philippines after the 1987 Constitution was instituted, Colombia, and India. If regimes transition into the democratic category, I only code them as such after one year as democracies. For instance, until 1987 the Philippines was considered an autocracy and had a polity score of -6 or lower. With the establishment of the 1987 Constitution its polity score changed to an 8. I consider it democratic starting in 1988, one year after the constitution was established (and since which it has remained).

For non-democracies, I draw on Geddes (1999) coding of different non-democratic regime types. Geddes' codes three primary types of non-democracies, personalist regimes, military regimes, and single-party regimes, and all amalgam types (e.g., personalist single-party regimes or military personalist regimes).[29] Geddes' coding covers countries that existed between 1946 and 1996 with a population of at least one million and in which the regime lasted at least three years.[30] In total, Geddes' coding covers 92 countries and nearly 2000 autocratic country-years.

However, because Geddes' coding of autocratic regime types ends in 1996, I use polity as an alternative measure to identify autocratic regime types. While polity does not distinguish different types of non-democracies, its time coverage (through 2007) allows for more contemporary comparisons between non-democracies and democracies. Polity scores identify two different types of non-democracies. Autocracies are regimes that are furthest from democracies, scoring a -6 or lower. These are the least-free of all regimes with few, if any, democratic attributes. Anocracies are regimes that score between 5 and -5. As with democracies, I only coded regimes as either autocratic or anocratic one year after a major transition. Because anocracies cover an 11 point span on the polity scale, I frequently encountered regimes that transitioned between anocratic types. For instance, Ecuador between 1963 and 1983 experienced several different regimes and transitions. Table 2.1 shows Ecuador's polity score and the corresponding regime coding.

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[29] According to Geddes, "military regimes were defined as those governed by an officer or retired officer, with the support of the military establishment and some routine mechanism for high level officers to influence policy choice and appointments. Single-party regimes were defined as regimes in which the party has some influence over policy, controls most access to political power and government jobs, and has functioning local-level organizations. Regimes were considered personalist if the leader, who usually came to power as an officer in a military coup or as the leader of a single-party government, had consolidated control over policy and recruitment in his own hands, in the process marginalizing other officers' influence and/or reducing the influence and functions of the party." (Geddes 1999, page 20)

[30] Geddes does not include Soviet successor states, citing bias and severely truncated regime life spans.

Table 2.1: Regime Types and Polity Scores: example Ecuador 1963-1983

Country	**Year**	**POLITY**	**Regime Type**
Ecuador	1963	-1	Anocracy
Ecuador	1964	-1	Anocracy
Ecuador	1965	-1	Anocracy
Ecuador	1966	-1	Anocracy
Ecuador	1967	-1	Ambiguous Transition
Ecuador	1968	5	Ambiguous Transition
Ecuador	1969	5	Ambiguous Transition
Ecuador	1970	0	Ambiguous Transition
Ecuador	1971	0	Ambiguous Transition
Ecuador	1972	-5	Ambiguous Transition
Ecuador	1973	-5	Anocracy
Ecuador	1974	-5	Anocracy
Ecuador	1975	-5	Anocracy
Ecuador	1976	-5	Anocracy
Ecuador	1977	-5	Anocracy
Ecuador	1978	-5	Dem. Transition
Ecuador	1979	9	Dem. Transition
Ecuador	1980	9	Democratic
Ecuador	1981	9	Democratic
Ecuador	1982	9	Democratic
Ecuador	1983	9	Democratic

I consider each year preceding and following a major shift (at least three points) transitioning. A regime is only considered consolidated (not transitioning) if it received the same polity score last year and does not transition the subsequent year.

The last type of regimes theorized about in this analysis are transitioning regimes. To the best of my knowledge, no dataset is available that categorizes transitioning regimes. Instead, I created transitioning types using the polity data. I coded three specific types: autocratic transitions, ambiguous transitions, and democratic transitions. In autocratic transitions the polity score moves at least three points downward and results in a stable polity score. Democratic transitions do the opposite. For instance, in table 2.1 the years 1978 and 1979 are coded as democratic transitions because the polity score increased positively by at least three units and the transition resulted in a more democratic regime. Although in Ecuador's case this transition resulted in a consolidated democracy, this is not necessary for a regime to experience a "democratic transition". Had Ecuador's polity score between 1980 and 1983 been "0" instead of "9", the transition would still be coded as democratic. Unlike this transition, Ecuador's earlier transition between 1967 and 1972 is coded as an ambiguous transition because the polity score increases then decreases. Although the regime after the transition is decidedly more autocratic, because the transition moved both ways it is ambiguous. Had the span of the transition been entirely downward, it would have been coded as an autocratic transition.

Table 2.2 shows the distribution of attacks on civilian and government targets by regime type. The first six types are generated using polity measures and the last three using Geddes' classification. As predicted by the theory, civilians in democracies face a disproportionate risk of attack compared to all other categories of non-democratic regime. In fact, with the exception of the transitioning regimes, the threat to civilians in democracies is between two and sixty times greater compared to all forms of non-democratic regimes. Civilians also face a disproportionate risk in democracies compared to all types of transitioning regimes, although the range varies from 1.6 to 2.1 times greater.

Table 2.2: Distribution of Attacks: Civilian and Government Targets by Regime Type

Regime Type: Polity (Years 1968-2006)	**% of Attacks on Civilian Targets**	**% of Attacks on Government Targets**	**Total Number of Attacks**
Democracy	23.07%*	32.47%	*16,125*
Anocracy	11.90%	33.78%	*1,806*
Autocracy	7.47%*	37.40%	*1,540*
Democratic Transition	14.21%	37.72%	*753*
Ambiguous Transition	12.74%	51.52%	*10,882*
Autocratic Transition	16.60%	40.63%	*982*
Regime Type: Geddes (Years 1968-1999)			
Single-Party	0.45%	35.52%	*442*
Military	3.13%	41.92%	*799*
Personalist	3.23%	39.67%	*557*
* significant in Chi2 test			

Similarly confirmatory, in comparison to all forms of non-democratic regimes, government targets in democracies are at a lower risk of being attacked. Particularly telling is the comparison between government targets in democracies and those in military regimes. In democracies government targets were attacked 32.47 percent of the time, while in military regimes they were attacked 41.92 percent of the time.

In addition, I generated Graph 2.1 (below) to compare attacks amongst consolidated (non-transitioning) regimes identified by polity measures. I anticipate that the least democratic regimes, those identified as autocratic, will be associated with proportionately more attacks on government targets and fewer on civilians. In democracies this trend should be reversed and anocracies should fall in-between. Graph 2.1 suggests that my expectations are appropriate; civilian attacks are highest in democracies and lowest in autocracies and government attacks are highest in autocracies and lowest in democracies.

Graph 2.1: Regime Types and Targeting Trends



Table 2.3 supplements the regime comparisons in Table 2.2. In Table 2.3 I list five countries in which there have been a large number of attacks and in which both a consolidated democracy (6 or higher) and consolidated autocracy (-6 or lower) existed between 1968 and 2006.

Table 2.3: Attacks on Civilians and Government Targets in Countries with both Autocratic and Democratic Regimes

	% Attacks on Civilians		**% Attacks on Government**	
Country	**During Democracy**	**During Autocracy**	**During Democracy**	**During Autocracy**
Philippines *Autocratic 1974-1984 (Under Marcos) Democratic 1988-2006*	21.53%	5.0%	24.36%	30.0%
Spain *Autocratic 1968-1973 (Under Franco) Democratic 1979-2006*	1.83%	0%	27.84%	54.55%
Greece *Autocratic 1968-1972 (Under Ioannidis) Democratic 1976-2006*	3.75%	0%	45.83%	72.41%
Chile *Autocratic 1976-1986 (Under Pinochet) Democratic 1990-2004*	0%	0%	21.74%	36.85%
Guatemala *Autocratic 1982-1983 (Under Montt) Democratic 1997-2006*	0%	0%	70.0%	43.75%

The countries include the Philippines, Spain, Greece, Chile, and Guatemala. The first two columns of Table 2.3 show the distribution of attacks on civilians under both regime types. In the Philippines, Spain, and Greece a greater proportion of attacks targeted civilians when the country was ruled by democratic leaders. In Chile and Guatemala attacks on civilians did not occur in the dataset. This suggests, as predicted by H1, that democratic political institutions are more risky for civilians. Columns three and four demonstrate the incidence of attacks on government targets. In all countries except Guatemala attacks on government targets are more likely under non-democratic institutions compared to democratic institutions. This finding is consistent with hypotheses 3a-c.

Control Variables

To account for alternative influences on the relationship between attacks on civilians and political institutions I include a number of controls. First, I control for nationalist groups, identified as those that pursue a set of goals defined in nationalist or separatist terms. Data on group type comes from MIPT-TKB, which designates groups as one or a mix of the following ideologies: anarchist, anti-globalization, communist/socialist, environmental, leftist, other, nationalist/separatist, racist, religious, right-wing conservative, and right-wing reactionary. For the control measure, all nationalist/separatist groups and amalgam nationalist/separatist types are designated as "nationalist." Frequently the amalgam types are nationalist/separatist and religious. These groups' goals are nationalist in scope but refined by religious tenets. Groups like Hamas, al-Qaeda in Iraq (also known as al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers), Hezbollah, Kach (a radical Jewish organization in Israel), and Lashkar-e-Taiba all advocate highly nationalist and separatist agendas, but their demands are couched in religious tenets. Unlike the other group-level controls discussed below, nationalism is coded for the entire universe of MIPT-TKB organizations. As a result of time and resource limitations, all other group-level controls are coded for organizations identified as terrorist groups by the US, UK, and Australian governments. For more information on that list of groups, see Chapter Four.

Groups with nationalist goals distinguish their constituent populations as distinct from the “other population”. This is important to control for because nationalist groups’ goals naturally distinguish a population of citizens as targets because of their affiliation as “the other” (Drake 1998). As a result, nationalist groups may be more likely to target the civilians in the “other” population. Furthermore, given a nationalist context, it may be easier for terrorist groups to identify and attack citizens without suffering losses in support. When potential supporters believe they can be easily isolated from terrorist activity, perhaps because easily accessible cues like race and ethnicity enable terrorists to discriminate their attacks, the risk to supporters is minimized. Thus, the better the group is at lessening the risk to its own supporters, the fewer supporters will withdraw their support in the face of civilian attacks. In separatist conflicts, these distinctions are more likely present than in conflicts aimed at changing the central governing authority.

As a second control, I estimate the size of the organization. This variable varies from one to three. I used rough estimates of small, medium, and large organizations as cutoff points. Groups with memberships between 1 and 100 receive a one, groups with memberships between 101 and 1000 receive a two, and groups with more than 1000 members receive a three. All group size measurements are approximations taken from the literature used to collect data for services and political affiliation. Several of the size estimates come from the START Center’s TOPS (Terrorist Organization Profiles) dataset, which provides approximations of group strength as indicated by group membership. To the best of my control, all size estimations represent the organization's size at its pinnacle. Accurate cross-temporal estimations were impossible to gather (in most cases, only one size estimation was available). As much as possible, I attempt to capture the size of a group's enlisted membership, not their civilian supporters. I expect that the larger the organization, the more likely it will attack civilians because the associated costs (government counter measures, loss in civilian support, etc…) may be more easily tolerated by a large organization with many resources.

Third, to account for Weinstein's (2007) argument about outside resources, I include a variable indicating whether the organization is state-sponsored. According to Weinsten, when groups have outside sponsorship they are more likely to indiscriminately kill civilians. Groups that rely on resources from local populations are less likely to indiscriminately kill civilians, and less likely to kill civilians overall. I expect that attacks from foreign-sponsored terrorist groups are more apt to target civilians compared to groups that generate resources from local resources. Data for sponsorship come from TOPS. When states are an organization's primary means of support, the organization received a one for outside sponsorship. Hezbollah is one clear example of an organization with outside sponsorship--it derives many of its resources from Iran and Syria.

Fourth, I control for the number of splinter or faction organizations. Competition between terrorist organizations plays an important role in determining the character of violence. Recent studies show that groups use suicide attacks strategically to demonstrate legitimacy in the face of competing extremist organizations (Bloom 2004 and Clauset, Heger, Young, and Gleditsch 2010). When an organization splits or fractures, the resulting multi-group competitive environment changes the original organization's incentives to attack civilians. Competition or outbidding can result in higher numbers of civilian targeted attacks as groups attempt to outdo each other by demonstrating superior capabilities and a willingness to take extreme measures (Hultman 2005).

Data on splinter and factions come from the TOPS dataset. For each organization a list of related groups is given and the relationship between the two organizations is described. The relationship categories include: ally, rival, ally and rival, suspected splinter group, splinter groups, suspected ally, suspected alias ally, other affiliation, faction, founding group, shared members, umbrella organization, supported cause, enemy, and successor. I generated the "competitors" variable by summing the number of rival, faction, and splinter organizations associated with each group.[31]

Fifth, I control for whether the attack was domestic or international. While MIPT-TKB supplies both international and domestic attacks, there is no associated code to distinguish the attack type. As a rough approximation, I first code each organization's home base. Al-Qaeda, an organization whose core has moved across multiple borders, was coded as based in Afghanistan.[32] Attacks were coded as domestic when the home base country matched the country where the attack took place. To be certain, this is a rough approximation for the attack type. Some targets, such as international business and foreign diplomats, are more international in nature than the geographic location implies. For most of the data, however, this approximation is accurate.

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[31] I did not count the suspected categories as these seemed inconclusive. Likewise, I did not include the enemy category because it was unclear whether enemy organizations would actually generate competition between organizations which may drive the outbidding. Instead of competing by increasing the attacks on private citizens, enemy organizations may spend a majority of their effort attacking each other such as the United Self-Defense Forces in Colombia (AUC) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

[32] There are two other al-Qaeda organizations in the dataset: Al-Qaeda in Palestine and al-Qaeda in the Land of Two rivers. Each of these organizations has central cores that are static, in Israel and Iraq respectively.

I also control for a several variables as robustness checks. Existing literature does not theorize about the relationship between these variables and civilian targeting. Nonetheless, many are routinely used in conflict studies and I include them here. These variables include: a dummy for attacks by Hamas, the percentage of a state's mountainous terrain, ethnic fractionalization in a state, whether the state relies heavily on oil exports, GDP per capita, state population, and year fixed effects. Data on mountainous terrain, ethnic fractionalization, and oil are from Fearon and Laitin (2003). Data on GDP and population come from Gleditsch (2002). I used Gleditsch for these data because they are updated through 2004, whereas Fearon and Laitin's data only includes measures through 1999. The measures I do use from Fearon and Laitin are time-invariant. The Hamas control is included because Hamas is an outlier in regards to civilian targeting. Hamas targeted civilians in 490 attacks, more than double the closest group.

Methods

To estimate the relationships described above and because my dependent variable, target choice, is a dichotomous measure, I use a logit model. I use a variety of specifications, including controlling for time fixed effects and using different sub-populations to verify the robustness of my findings. In most models I cluster on the terrorist group based on the assumption that observations may not be independent within groups.

Results

I divide the results into two sections. The first and primary section explains the results regarding the impact of democratic institutions (consolidated and transitioning) on civilian targeting (H1 and H2). The second section explains the results for attacks in non-democratic regimes (H3a-c).

Democracy and Civilian Targeting

Tables 2.4a and 2.4b show the results for various specifications and the relationship between consolidated democratic institutions and civilian targeting. Model one includes attacks by all groups in the MIPT-TKB universe and model two is limited to attacks that have been linked to specific groups. Nearly two-thirds of attacks in MIPT-TKB universe are perpetrated by "unknown groups". Model two breaks out the known groups to assess whether the democracy variable behaves differently within a subset of the universe. However, the results for both cases are similar; democracy is significant and positively associated with more attacks on civilians. In model three I add the nationalism control which is positive and significantly associated with attacks on civilians. Models 4a and 4b include the control for Hamas which, as expected, comes back positive and highly significant. As opposed to model 4a, model 4b is restricted to the sample of attacks generated by model 5a which is limited by data coverage for country-level controls (e.g., GDP and population). I test model four using both the restricted and unrestricted populations in order to verify the relationship between democracy and civilian attacks is not sensitive to changes in the universe of cases. In both instances the democracy variable remains positive and significantly related to attacks on civilian targets. In model 5a I add all the country-level controls, which does not alter the results on the key independent variable, democracy, or the Hamas or nationalism control.

Table 2.4a: Regression Results for Attacks on Civilian Targets, All Regime Types

Variable	**Model 1 (includes attacks by unknown groups)**	**Model 2[a]**	**Model 3**	**Model 4a**	**Model 4b (using obs. from 5)**	**Model 5a**
Democracy	0.75*** (0.18)	1.38*** (0.36)	1.69*** (0.45)	1.32*** (0.36)	0.77** (0.25)	1.15** (0.40)
Nationalism			1.64*** (0.36)	1.32*** (0.30)	1.33*** (0.26)	1.06*** (0.25)
Hamas				2.35*** (0.29)	2.14*** (0.27)	1.35*** (0.30)
Mountainous Terrain						-0.01** (0.009)
Ethnic Fractionalization						0.61 (0.55)
Oil Dependent						-0.87** (0.43)
GDP Per Capita						-0.27 (0.29)
Population						-0.37*** (0.10)
Year Fixed Effects			Included	Included	Included	Included
Constant	-1.95 (0.14)	-2.67 (0.14)	-5.4 (060)	-5.49 (0.62)	4.89 (0.55)	1.46 (3.19)
Number of Observations	32,088	11,602	8,627	8,627	5,982	5,982
R-Square	0.021	0.048	0.26	0.31	0.30	0.32
Number Clusters	865	864	75	725	621	621
***significant at 0.01 **significant at 0.05 *significant at 0.10 [a] Excludes attacks by unknown perpetrators						

The models in Table 2.4b show the results when more controls are added. Model 5b uses the same variables of 5a, but is run for the population generated by model 6a. Model 6a uses a smaller universe of attacks because the data for the remaining group-level characteristics is restricted to attacks by all groups listed as terrorist by the US, UK, and Australia (see discussion about country-level control above). Models 6a and 6b run the regression for only the group-level controls: state sponsorship, group size, competitors, and whether the attack was domestic. Given the limited coverage, the universe of cases drops dramatically. Model 6b is limited to only attacks that are covered by model 5a. Model seven includes all control variables.

Table 2.4b: Regression Results for Attacks on Civilian Targets, All Regime Types

Variable	**Model 5b (using obs. from 6a)**	**Model 6a**	**Model 6b (using obs. from 5a)**	**Model 7**
Democracy	2.01** (0.69)	1.46** (0.54)	1.15** (0.41)	1.98** (0.62)
Nationalism	0.79 (0.57)	1.44** (0.59)	1.02* (0.56)	0.51 (0.62)
Hamas	0.94** (0.41)	3.02*** (0.41)	2.23*** (0.47)	0.99 (0.62)
State Sponsorship		1.52** (0.46)	0.41 (0.43)	-0.15 (0.35)
Group Size		-0.61* (0.33)	-0.42 (0.46)	-0.06 (0.42)
Number of Competing Groups		0.03 (0.25)	0.22 (0.27)	0.31 (0.21)
Domestic Attack		-0.30 (0.50)	0.13 (0.45)	0.39 (0.48)
Mountainous Terrain	-0.04* (0.02)			-0.04* (0.02)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.45 (1.14)			-0.25 (1.30)
Oil Dependent	-0.18 (0.89)			0.15 (0.79)
GDP Per Capita	-0.52 (0.58)			-0.31 (0.50)
Population	-0.36 (.23)			-0.27 (0.23)
Year Fixed Effects	Included	Included	Included	Included
Constant	4.29 (5.76)	-4.00 (1.17)	-3.90 (1.36)	1.23 (5.26)
Number of Observations	2,538	3,744	2,538	2,545
R-Square	0.38	0.43	0.36	0.38
Number Clusters	49	52	49	51
***significant at 0.01 **significant at 0.05 *significant at 0.10				

Table 2.5 shows the results from models 8-14, which test the relationship between democratic transitions and civilian targeting. In these models the universe of cases includes attacks that take place in transitioning regimes.

Table 2.5: Regression Results for Attacks on Civilian Targets, Transitioning Regimes

Variable	Model 8	Model 9a	Model 9b [a]	Model 10	Model 11a	Model 11b [a]	Model 12
Democratic Transition	0.09 (0.19)	0.49* (0.25)	1.32*** (0.34)	0.61** (0.27)	0.44 (0.36)	0.97*** (0.24)	0.43 (0.47)
Nationalist Group		-0.51** (0.20)	0.10 (0.29)	-0.52* (0.27)	-0.54* (0.27)	0.19 (0.31)	0.42 (0.42)
Mountainous Terrain				-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.00 (-0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Ethnic Frac.				0.88* (0.49)	0.58 (0.60)	1.90** (0.77)	2.88** (1.15)
Oil Dependent				-0.39** (0.15)	0.50 (0.34)	0.58 (0.64)	-0.03 (0.83)
Iraq					-1.02** (0.40)	-1.21** (0.37)	-1.00 (0.78)
GDP per capita							1.00** (0.41)
Population							0.16 (0.20)
Year Fixed Effects		Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included
Constant	-1.89 (0.12)	-2.51 (1.19)	-4.20 (0.32)	-2.48 (1.44)	-2.44 (1.50)	-22.03	-29.86
Number of Observations	12,617	11,799	2,259	10,673	10,673	1,895	916
R-Square	0.0001	0.08	0.08	0.04	0.05	0.12	0.17
Number Clusters	246	203	245	183	183	172	124

***significant at 0.01 **significant at 0.05 *significant at 0.10
[a] Excludes attacks by unknown perpetrators

With the exception of the nationalist group indicator, all group-level attributes are largely unavailable for organizations operating in transitioning regimes. I include all state-level controls when available and an additional control for Iraq which, like Hamas above, accounts for a disproportionate share of attacks. Model 8 begins by testing the relationship between democratic transition and attacks on civilians. In models 9a-b I add the nationalist control. Model 9b is restricted to only attacks by known groups (similar to model two in table 2.3a). Model 10 adds controls for mountainous terrain, ethnic fractionalization, and oil dependency. Model 11 adds the control for Iraq. Model 11b is restricted to only attacks by known groups. In model 12 I add the GDP and population indicators, which have very limited coverage and dramatically reduce the universe of cases. The next sections describe the results for all variables, drawing on the findings in tables 2.4a, 2.4b, and 2.5.

i. Democracy

The finding for democracy is positive and robust throughout most of the analysis. In particular, consolidated democracies are significantly positively correlated with attacks on civilians (tables 2.4a-b). In models one through seven, democracy is significant at less than a 0.05 level. This finding is not sensitive to controls for the perpetrating organization or for other country-level indicators. Nor are they sensitive to controls for time-specific effects or changes in the universe of cases. These findings support hypothesis one and my theory that democratic institutions encourage attacks on civilian targets.

The results for democratic transitions are also positive, although they are not as robust. The findings are significant at the 0.10 level in model 9a, but not in model 11a. Interestingly the findings in models 9b and 11b are both significant, suggesting the theory is more suitable for attacks by known groups. This is curious and could be the result of a number of factors. For instance, attacks may be easily linked to known perpetrators when the groups are highly organized and politically active. These attacks are more likely to be driven by the political logic described in my theory. Unknown attacks may be perpetrated by lone attackers or the result of groups' mistakes, either of which are less likely to reflect a coherent political strategy as much as a personal vendetta or a operation gone astray.

The democratic transition variable is also relatively weak in the fully specified model 12. The universe of cases in model 12 drops significantly because GDP and population data are largely unavailable in transitioning regimes. To verify that the universe of cases is not unique, I re-ran model 8 with the universe of cases from model 12. The result for democratic transitions is positive and significant. Despite some fluctuations in the significance of the variable indicating democratic transitions, the results are consistently positive and highly significant in some cases. These findings support hypothesis 2. Together with the findings from tables 2.4a-b, the findings indicate that democratic political institutions are strongly correlated with attacks on civilians. This is true when those institutions are consolidated or when states transition toward regimes that include more democratic features.

ii. Nationalism

In tables 2.4a-b, nationalist groups are positively and significantly associated with attacks on civilian targets. This is consistent with the idea that nationalism may lower the costs of attacking civilians because groups can easily identify civilian targets from "other" groups. However, when the universe of cases is restricted to only transitioning regimes, this finding becomes less significant and, surprisingly, when it is significant it is negative. Why, in transitioning regimes, do nationalist groups behave differently? One line of reasoning suggests that if the transition occurs because of the nationalist group's demands, attacks on civilians may be counterproductive to the ability of the group to consolidate its power. Alternatively, nationalist groups in transitioning regimes may face extraordinary repression by the regime whose leaders grasp on power is tenuous in which case attacking any civilians is an extraordinarily costly strategy (see Chapter Three for further discussion on the costs associated with attacks on civilians).

iii. State-Sponsorship, Group Size, Competitors, and Attack Type

The results for these variables are generally insignificant. In model 6a state-sponsorship is positive and significant, a finding that supports Weinstein's theory about outside sponsorship and indiscriminate civilian targeting. However, this finding is not robust to changes in the universe of cases or the introduction of state-level controls. Group size, also significant (but negative) in model 6a, is also not robust to these changes either. There are a variety of reasons why these variables do not have significant empirical relationships to civilian targeting despite theoretically sound reasoning suggesting the opposite. The coding of these variables may not capture the appropriate variation. Group size, for instance, is a three tiered indicator which does not account for the wide variation in group size that exists. Alternatively, data for these variables only cover a subset of groups (around 50) and it is possible that more coverage would reveal more substantive relationships.[33]

iv. Mountainous Terrain, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Oil Dependency

The country-level controls (mountainous terrain, ethnic fractionalization, and oil dependency) return varied results. In all the tables mountainous terrain comes back negative and it is significant in several different specifications. These results suggest that in countries with rugged territory, groups are less likely to attack civilians. Rugged

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[33] In Chapter Four I use these controls in another set of regressions with somewhat different results. The discussion in Chapter Four explains these results.

territory advantages groups with local knowledge. For these groups, launching attacks on government targets is less costly (i.e. they can hide, launch attacks, and retreat more effectively because they know the terrain), and this may be leading some groups to substitute away from attacks on civilians. Mountainous terrain may also indicate a significant degree of separation between populations, making it difficult for a group from one location to attack civilians in other locations. To the extent that government agents exist in all population centers, it may be less costly for groups to focus their attention on government forces embedded locally.

Ethnic fractionalization is not significant in tables 2.4a-b, however in transitioning regimes, table 2.5, it is positively associated with significantly more attacks on civilian targets.[34] The fact that this relationship seems to hold up only in transitioning regimes reveals something about the nature of ethnicity and political instability that warrants further investigation.

In states with a significant reliance on oil revenue civilian targeting is less likely, however, this result is not robust. The sign on the coefficient changes frequently and it is only significant in two models.

v. GDP Per Capita and Population

The GDP and population variables are largely unimportant. In only one instance, model 12, is GDP significant. In that case it is positively related to attacks on civilians indicating, perhaps, that more developed democratically transitioning are, the more attractive civilian targets become. I find this result suspect largely because the GDP and

[34] This finding is somewhat contrary to those in Chapter Four where I find that characteristics that isolate groups tend to decrease an organization’s likelihood of civilian targeting. The fact that ethnic fractionalization is positive and significant here suggests that something about ethnic cleavages in transitioning states reverses this logic.

population data on transitioning regimes are sparse. The fact that it is significant for this small universe of cases but not in the larger universe of non-transitioning cases suggests that the coefficient in model 12 is capturing something unique and not generalizable. Similarly, in only one instance is population significant. In model 5a the population measure is significantly negatively associated with attacks on civilian targets. However, this variable is highly sensitive (see models 7 and 12).

Non-Democracies and Government Targeting

Hypotheses 3a-c state that government targets should be attacked disproportionately more frequently in non-democracies compared to democracies because the winning coalition and selectorate in these regimes consist of primarily government officials. In table 2.6 below, I use various measures of non-democracy (Geddes' and Polity indicators) to verify these hypotheses. I exclude transitioning regimes from this analysis because the hypotheses specify a comparison between non-democracies and democracies. However, results in the models below remain unchanged if I include transitioning regimes.

The results for non-democratic regime types are mixed. In models 13-15, I test the relationship between Geddes' non-democratic regime types and attacks on government targets. Model 13, for instance, analyses whether any form of military regime is significantly related to attacks on government targets.[35] In each of these models the attacks analyzed occur on or prior to 1999 because Geddes' coding ends in 1999. The fact that none of the regime types is significantly related to attacks on government targets may

[35] Here government targets include MIPT's government and military categories. Hypothesis 3A specified that the military would be attacked more often. If I limit the dependent variable to only attacks on military targets and test the relationship with Geddes' military regime types the results are insignificant.

be an artifact of the data coverage for this pre-1999 period during which MIPT only recorded international attacks.

In models 16-19 I use the polity scale to indicate non-democratic form. In these measures I test whether autocracies (-6 or below on the polity scale) have a significant relationship with attacks on government targets. The results tend to be positive, even when I control for Colombia which, like Iraq above, accounts for a disproportionately large share of attacks on government targets. However, they are sensitive to year fixed effects and the addition of state-level controls. Thus, while the sign on the autocracy coefficient is generally in the expected direction, this result is less robust than that above for democracy.

The results for several controls suggest a number of interesting, albeit tentative, conclusions. Mountainous terrain is positively associated with attacks on government forces. Recall that for attacks on civilians this variable was negative. The positive coefficient here suggests that terrorist groups have local knowledge of the rugged terrain, allowing them to more easily launch attacks on government targets.[36]

The oil dependency and population measures are significant and positively associated with attacks on government targets. For oil, this finding is not entirely surprising. In states with a significant reliance on oil, government personnel and infrastructure regulating and managing the supply of oil will be targeted in order to undermine leaders hold on power which is largely based on controlling the supply of oil revenue. Finally, GDP per capita is negatively correlated with attacks on government

[36]According to Scott (2009), rugged terrain is a proxy for diminished governance which may also impact a terrorist group's assessment of the costs associated with attacking government targets.

targets. One explanation for this finding revolves around state capacity. In states with high capacity, government targets may be well defended and more costly to attack. In states with low capacity, the opposite trend would make government targets more attractive targets.

Table 2.6: Regression Results: Non-democracies and Government Targets

Variable	**Model 13**	**Model 14**	**Model 15**	**Model 16**	**Model 17a**	**Model 17b (obs. from 20)**	**Model 18**	**Model 19**
Military Regime	0.28 (0.20)							
Single-Party Regime		0.01 (0.20)						
Personalist Regime			0.19 (0.30)					
Autocracy (Polity)				0.45*** (0.13)	0.51*** (0.14)	0.46** (0.20)	0.19 (0.14)	-0.14 (0.14)
Mountainous Terrain								0.007** (0.002)
Ethnic Fractionalization								-0.17 (0.27)
Oil Dependent								0.59** (0.19)
GDP per capita								-0.13** (0.05)
Population								0.09** (0.03)
Colombia					0.48** (0.20)	0.47** (0.20)	0.63** (0.20)	0.40 (0.30)
Year Fixed Effects							Included	Included
Constant	-0.61 (0.05)	-0.61 (0.05)	-0.61 (0.05)	-1.03 (0.06)	-1.09 (0.08)	-1.01 (0.10)	-1.73 (0.26)	-1.54 (0.76)
Number of Observations	7,237	6,878	6,975	17,665	17,665	14,360	17,665	14,360
R-Square	0.001	0.00	0.0005	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.04	0.05
Number Clusters	384	359	366	669	669	594	669	594
***significant at 0.01 **significant at 0.05 *significant at 0.10								

Conclusion

In this chapter I theorized about the affect political institutions have on the likelihood that terrorist groups attack civilian targets. Specifically, I argued that democratic institutions, because they empower civilians in unique ways, incentivize groups to attack private individuals in order to impose significant costs on politicians and maximize the group's chances of receiving policy concessions. The empirical analysis in this chapter demonstrated strong links between democratic political institutions and rates of civilian targeting. In democracies and in regimes transitioning towards democracy, terrorist attacks are significantly more likely to target civilians compared to non-democracies. This finding is robust to a large number of different specifications.

The theory's implication for non-democratic regime types is that government targets will bear the brunt of terrorists' attacks. However, the empirical analysis did not show this relationship as clearly as it did for that between civilian targeting and democratic institutions. There are several possible explanations. First, the theory is incorrectly specified in regards to non-democratic regimes. This is very possible because our knowledge about non-democratic regime types is in many ways incomplete. To remedy this, a nuanced comparative analysis that clearly identifies the composition of wining coalitions and selectorates across non-democratic regime types should be paired with an equally nuanced analysis of targeting within those states. A second alternative explanation for the insignificant findings for non-democratic regimes is that incident reporting in these regimes is biased towards non-findings. Insofar as autocratic leaders frequently control the media and flow of public information, attacks on government targets may be under reported in these states. Autocrats who have incentives to portray a powerful hold on office have incentives to hide information about attacks on government targets as these attacks may signal weakness to the larger population and international community. To the extent that this phenomenon exists, it would bias the findings in table 2.6 toward negative and insignificant relationships.

The results for democracies clearly suggest a vital link between political institutions and the way in which violent groups script their actions. Terrorist groups, driven by political motivations, account for political institutions and how those institutions distribute power. Their attacks are designed, at least in part, to apply pressure on government officials by imposing costs their support base.

Nonetheless, one significant question remains unanswered. Recall from table 2.2 that in democracies groups targeted civilians approximately 25 percent of the time. The other 75 percent of the time attacks are directed elsewhere, largely at government, police, military, and business targets. Given my argument about the political benefits inherent to attacking civilian targets and, from a practical perspective, the ease of actually attacking civilians, why are so many attacks not directed at civilian targets? Is it simply the case that one or two groups carry out all the attacks on civilians or is there wider variation present? Do groups attack civilians differently over time?

In the remainder of this dissertation I examine this issue from the perspective of the organization and within the context of democracies. Specifically, I explore how a terrorist organization's relationship with its civilian supporters influences the group's chances of targeting civilians. The theory presented in the subsequent chapter and tested in Chapters Four and Five again describes a group of civilian supporters, but focuses on the importance of civilian supporters for a violent organization instead democratically-elected leaders.

Chapter 3

The Ties that Bind: How Communities Constrain Targeting Decisions

Successful guerrilla operations involve the people. It is the quality of their resistance to the enemy and support for the guerrillas which in the end will be the decisive factor…In fact, a guerrilla force will be unable to operate in an area where the people are hostile to its aims. And it must be remembered always that it is the people who will bear the brunt of the enemy's retaliatory measures

Handbook for Volunteers of the Irish Republican Army

Guerrilla war is a kind of war waged by the few but dependent on the support of many.

B. H. Liddell Hart

Chapter One posed the following question: why do some violent groups attack civilians while others do not? The argument and findings from Chapter Two further complicated this question. Democratic political institutions provide strong incentives for groups to attack civilians and, yet, even in these regimes there is wide variation in just how frequently groups engage this strategy. In this chapter I develop a theory that explains these divergent targeting patterns in democratic settings. I argue that a terrorist group's incentives to attack civilians are tempered by its need to maintain community support from within a local population. I develop my argument in several sections. The first introduces the protagonists: a terrorist group, a government, and local community members. I describe the relationships between these three by focusing on the costs and benefits pertinent to each. Subsequently, I describe the general sequence of events occurring after terrorists attack and each actor's role in the events. The second section lays out my theory. My argument rests on two ideas: terrorist groups need support from local-level populations and civilian attacks impose high costs on local populations. I devote substantial portions of this section to describing each of these ideas. The third section of this chapter examines the theory's implications. In this section I discuss the three conditions described in Chapter One: punishment, goods provision, and the distinctiveness of a group's support base. For each, I derive testable hypotheses, which are the subjects of Chapters Five and Six. The fourth section briefly overviews how I test the hypotheses in the remaining chapters and offers several concluding remarks.

The Central Actors

Three actors are pertinent to a terrorist organization's decision to target civilians: the terrorist organization itself, a government, and a local community. For each actor, I explain costs and benefits germane to waging, fighting, or living with a terrorist campaign. I refer to these costs and benefits frequently in later sections, particularly when I lay out my argument about how target choice impacts community support.

The Terrorist Organization

In an attempt to attain its ideal point, a terrorist group has four major considerations: its political goals or "ideal point", its supporters, the cost of producing violence, and the group's resources. Of the four elements, three are straight forward. First, a group's ideal point represents its ideal policy outcome. For example, the ideal policy position espoused by the radical group Hamas is that Israel ceases to exist as a politically recognized state. A group's utility increases when the distance between its ideal policy and the current policy position shrinks. If the current policy reflects the group's ideal, then the distance is 0. As the distance grows, however, the group's utility decreases. For instance, the Saudi decision to allow US troops in the country during the first Gulf War moved Saudi policy further from al-Qaeda's ideal point.

Secondly, to achieve its ideal policy outcome, a terrorist group uses violence. This violence costs resources to produce. Groups are rational and prefer to maximize coercive influence in such a way that minimizes the cost of violence (Enders and Sandler 1993). Some components of this cost include buying weapons, gathering intelligence, securing locations, and hiring operatives. One way groups can minimize costs is by attacking targets that are undefended and easy to access (soft targets). Private civilians frequently fall into this category, particularly when they exist in democracies that ensure their freedom of movement and assembly. I briefly touched on this point earlier, but it is fundamental and worth revisiting here. Attacks on civilians cost very little which, in addition to the argument in Chapter Two about democratic political institutions, is a significant reason civilians are attractive targets. Hard targets that are well protected and very difficult to access necessitate a higher degree of planning, preparation, tactical weaponry, and skill. For example, in Belfast during The Troubles, fortress-like fortifications, including gates, security towers, setback infrastructure, cameras, and bullet-proof glass, increased the costs of attacking police stations. For the purposes of my theory, I assume the costs of attacking civilians are constant across groups.[37]

Thirdly, terrorist groups are concerned about their resource endowments. With one significant exception, monetary and non-monetary resources are included in this

[37] Although in reality these costs probably differ. In states like Israel with extensive check points, road blocks, and defense measures, attacks on even civilian targets are probably more costly for Palestinian groups compared to other groups around the world. To the extent that a regime's type is associated with high or low costs, this analysis considers only democratic regimes. To the extent that a country's specific policies determine costs, I control for these effects in analysis in Chapter Four.

consideration. Terrorists' community supporters, another type of resource, I separate from this category and describe below. Resources include things such as donations, captured natural resources like diamonds or drugs, and any resources obtained through criminal means. Many violent groups' largest pool of resources comes from state sponsorship. This has become a nontrivial issue in many states' international relations. For instance, the US, which began sanctioning state sponsors of terrorism in 1979, currently identifies five states as terrorist sponsors: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Typically this designation alleges that the sponsor state supplies a variety of resources, including protection from extradition, material support, and training.

The final consideration, a group's civilian support base, is more complex. This consideration includes the size of the group's local support base and includes group members and non-member community supporters.[38] Supporters increase as the group grows due to swells in their recruitment or as they become more popular with the local community. I do not assume that optimal levels of support are decreasing with bigger organizations. Group members who are frequently underground to avoid capture rely on community non-member supporters to hide them and deter authorities. More terrorist operatives on the ground means that more members must find cover from authorities. The bigger the group, the more reliant terrorists are on community resources.

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[38] An organization's utility has a nonlinear relationship with the number of supporters, such that its utility increases with the number of supporters to a certain point. After this point, its utility decreases as the number of supporters increase. This reflects the idea that all groups prefer supporting coalitions that are minimal in size in order to maximize the number of benefits that each supporter receives and minimize the group's cost of maintaining supporters (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003 and Rabushka and Shepsle 1974). Supporters are valuable until the size of the support group ensures the success of the group, and after that point they become unnecessarily costly. For simplicity, I assume that terrorist groups do not reach this apex.

There are a variety of reasons individuals choose to support terrorist organizations. Some may be drawn to organizations' ideologies. For instance, terrorist groups operating out of Arab countries may capitalize on the population's low confidence in America, sentiments calculated to be shared by the majority of Arabs in a recent survey.[39] Others may support the group as an alternative to what they view as an oppressive government. The rhetoric used by many nationalist movements indicates this type of appeal amongst its supporters. In 1995, for example, the Kurdish group the PKK issued a statement to the United Nations, charging the Turkish government with pursuing systematic polices to deny the existence of the Kurdish people and genocide.[40] Those who find appeal in these sentiments back the PKK as a means of opposing the repressive Turkish government. Alternatively, some individuals may lend their support simply because they have family members or friends involved in the organization.

Regardless of the reason, developing these *local level* connections to develop and maintain its base of civilian supporters is vital for violent groups. Material resources, including those from international sources, do not substitute for local support. Take, for instance, Hezbollah, which maintains one of the most successful nonviolent wings in Southern Lebanon and has a great deal of support as a political party outside of Lebanon.

> Syria and Iran openly support it, and much of the Arab world regards it as heroic, for its successful resistance against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon… and legitimate, because of its participation in Lebanese parliamentary politics. Even officials in France, Canada, and other Western nations have acknowledged the value of its social and political projects.[41]

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[39] See Lynch, Marc. "Paint By Numbers". 2009. http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090529/REVIEW/705289991/1008. Accessed 12/2009

[40] PKK Statement: http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51/009.html Accessed 12/2009

[41] Byman, 2003. http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20031101faessay82606/daniel-byman/should-hezbollah-be-next.html. Accessed April 4th , 2008

International support is important for a group like Hezbollah, but it cannot replace the functions of its Lebanese constituency. Local supporters provide logistical assistance, such as hiding operatives. Local support provides domestic legitimacy, something that is especially important for groups with political wings. It stands to reason that Hezbollah, for example, would be far less successful without the strong support (and votes) of citizens in southern Lebanon, despite all the aid it receives from Syria. Even a group like al-Qaeda that has successfully built an international following could not have done so without support from Taliban-dominated villages on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to keep its leadership successfully hidden. While al-Qaeda does not seek local legitimacy via voters in these communities, it stands to reason that without a significant amount of local support (even if it was tacit) al-Qaeda could not have developed its broad network of international connections.

The Government

What matters to a government is similar to what matters to a terrorist group. Each component is essentially the same, except the costs of violence are replaced by the cost of government counter measures. These costs include things like installing metal detectors in buildings, gathering intelligence, manning border crossings and check-points, enforcing curfews, and fighting terrorists in the streets. Additionally, these costs encompass both threat deterrence (such as the measures just mentioned) and emergency reaction measures. Emergency reaction measures include ensuring communication between emergency responders and simulating emergency conditions, something the US Department of Homeland Security has invested heavily in since the 9/11 attacks.

The government has some ideal policy position that represents the current status quo policy. Under this assumption, the current policy does not impose any costs on the government. This policy position is ultimately what violent groups attempt to alter.

The government's resources are drawn from many domestic and international sources. Within its borders, states obtain resources from taxation and extracting natural resources. Governments also receive support from both international institutions, like the International Monetary Fund, and other states through sources like development aid.

The relationship between a democratic government's community supporters and its utility is very similar to the terrorists'. Government authorities, particularly legislators and executives, are entirely dependent on the goodwill of a minimum winning coalition of voters drawn from the larger selectorate. Officials depend on the population for support in elections, but also for support in rooting out violent opposition groups. Up to this point I've stressed the importance of local-level backing for terrorist groups, but a community's good graces go two ways. Because a community possesses inside knowledge, community support significantly increases the effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts (Ucko 2007). Soldiers with local knowledge are vastly superior at rooting out terrorists and local populations provide that vital information.

Individuals in the Local Community

The final actor in this analysis is the local population. Each local population is comprised of individuals living in the same state as the terrorist group and the government. An individual supports either the government or the terrorist group.[42] And

[42] In reality this choice is more complex, especially when multiple violent groups with the same agenda are involved. In the empirical chapters I control for some of these effects.

derives negative utility the further his ideal point is from the current policy. When an individual evaluates whether to support the government or violent group, he evaluates two things: the distance between his ideal position and the group's ideal relative to the distance between his ideal and the government's ideal; and the cost/benefit ratio of supporting each alternative.

Individuals pay costs associated with the conflict and receive benefits from the government and/or the terrorist group. The cost individuals pay from terrorist violence is determined by the individual's likelihood of being affected by a terrorist's attack multiplied by the total cost of the attack. If, for instance, an individual travels to and from areas frequently targeted with lethal attacks, his costs from violence would be higher compared to other individuals who rarely visit these spots. In my argument below and in Chapter Five I describe why terrorist groups attempt to minimize these costs for their supporters.

Individuals in an area affected by violence also face potential costs from the government's counter measures. For instance, if the government imposes curfews and security check points, it becomes increasingly costly to go to and from work or shop for necessities. In extreme cases, counter- measures repress individuals. These measures decrease any individual's overall utility significantly. How much they decrease this utility is determined by multiplying the costs imposed by the counter measures and an individual's likelihood of being affected. Like above, in subsequent sections I describe why a government has incentives to minimize these costs, especially for its own supporters.

The remaining considerations for any individual are the benefits he or she receives from the violent group and government. For example, violent groups or government can build schools for children in their community or provide food, shelter, or welfare for needy individuals. These benefits endear the provider to the recipients, thus both the violent group and the government have positive incentives to distribute services.

An individual's decision to support the government or the violent organization is contingent on the costs imposed by and the benefits received from these actors and the relative distance between his or her ideal point and that of the group or government. Thus, a terrorist organization appeals to its supporters by representing their views, keeping the costs of violence down, and increasing the benefits provided for supporters. For their part, governments acquire support by doing essentially the same thing. When governments overreact to terrorists, the costs imposed on individuals can backfire. As these costs increase, community members see the government as overbearing and oppressive which can cement some terrorists' rhetoric.[43]

The Terrorist Attack, a Government's Response, and the Community Reaction

A terrorist attack involves three basic stages. First, the violent organization decides whether to attack civilian or non-civilian targets. Following the attack, government officials select a set of strategies to counter the terrorists. One way in which these strategies vary is on the costs they impose on local populations. For instance, a high cost strategy might be complete repression or genocide of a population that a government believes to be supportive of the rebels' cause. Low cost strategies, like criminalization or

[43] Interested readers should see Kydd and Walter (2006) for a description of provocative terrorism. For an interesting case, see Rappaport (1984) on the Sicarii.

discriminate attacks, impose few costs on local populations because they impose costs directly on the violent perpetrators while avoiding noncombatants.

In the final move, community members decide whether to support or not support the terrorist group. I do not assume that supporting the terrorist organization means not supporting the government; community members could also remain neutral and not lend support to either side. The local population's calculation accounts for costs imposed by the terrorist attack and the government's reaction as well as any actual or expected benefits offered by either the terrorist group or the government.[44] Members of the local population who receive benefits value the terrorist group (or government) with increasing regard as benefits grow.

Theory: The Elements of Strategic Targeting

In this section I explain how civilian supporters affect a terrorist group's targeting choices. The theory rests on two central ideas. First, terrorist groups rely on local populations. Is reliance consistent across all groups? Probably not. There are a multitude of factors that determine when groups need community support. Larger groups that carry out complex operations probably need more logistical support from a community. New groups or, as Weinsten (2007) points out, those with few resources may need an excess of local level assistance. Groups that run for political office need the support of voters and are more reliant on local populations in order to gain seats for their political representatives. Given the complexities surrounding when and how much support groups need, there is no reason to suspect that all groups rely equally on local populations. Reliance may be shaped by factors such as a group's size, its resource base, and the

[44] For simplicity, I assume community members receive all intended benefits.

specifics of its political agenda. For those less reliant groups, community bonds are less constraining. For the heavily reliant, community bonds are especially constraining. I attempt to control for “degree of reliance” in the quantitative analysis (see Chapter Four for a discussion). However, my goal here is to explain the effect of community bonds on target selection. To do that, I assume reliance exists at some minimal level for all groups. Anecdotal evidence from Chapter Five indicates that this assumption is accurate.

The second argument my theory draws on is that terrorist groups impose the highest costs on local populations when they attack civilians. Other targets, such as military personnel, diplomats, government officials, and infrastructure, are far less costly for the group’s civilian supporters. The risk to civilian supporters goes down when non-civilian targets are in the crosshairs and, I argue, a government’s reaction to non-civilian targets imposes fewer costs on a terrorist group’s civilian support base. The following sections describe these ideas in turn.

The Ties that Bind

Ultimately terrorist organizations desire policy concessions from government agents. However, this goal is sought after in context of another objective, namely to increase the group’s support from within the community.[45] Pursuing local level support is critical, so much so that when Petraeus and Mattis (2006) rewrote the Army’s field manual on counterinsurgency, they described the local population as “a critical center of gravity of an insurgency.”[46]

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[45] Readers interested in the strategies (violent or otherwise) insurgents use to gain supporters should read Weinstein (2007)

[46] Petraeus and Mattis. 2006. Page 1-18.

While community support is oft-touted as highly beneficial for violent non-state organizations, understanding the specific benefits is important. Terrorists (and other violent actors) cannot substitute material resources for community support; supporters fill roles that material goods cannot. I argue that community supporters are necessary for two reasons. First, community supporters provide valuable and local logistical assets that are essential for successful violent operations and group maintenance. For example, Levitt (2004) notes that Hamas' smuggling operations benefit from community member assistance.

> Hamas is known to use hospitals it supports to secure recruits, medical supplies, and chemicals. In one case, Hamas recruited Mustafa Amjad, a doctor at al-Ghazi Hospital in Jenin, to help infiltrate suicide bombers into Israel from the Jenin area. After his arrest in June 2002, Amjad confessed to helping Hamas terrorists enter Israel while delivering medicines in his professional capacity.[47]

In another example, a constable stationed in South Armagh fighting the IRA noted that "[Government forces] can work without the people, whereas [an IRA unit] can't...they have to have the people on their side for intelligence, safe houses, safe place for weapons, cover if they were caught so someone could say: 'Yes, he was with us all night'."[48]

Secondly, as the group's support base grows, so does pressure on the government to change its policies. This pressure is particularly acute in democracies where government agents are beholden to citizen preferences. As more become sympathetic to a terrorist's cause, votes favor the terrorist's ideal policy outcome and political aspirations. More importantly, perhaps, communities swayed by the ideals of a violent organization

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[47] Levitt 2004. http://www.meforum.org/article/582, accessed 8/11/2008
[48] Harnden. 1999. Page 82-83

can elect politicians, even terrorists themselves, as representatives. When terrorist organizations have political arms, this political benefit is very appealing.

Costly Targets

Since terrorist groups need supporters, their strategic decisions include calculations about how community members are affected by terrorists' violent activities. How are target choice and community support linked? I argue that when a group attacks civilians, it imposes high costs on community supporters, more so than when different targets are attacked. Additionally, when terrorists target civilians, they lose supporters who find the act morally reprehensible. Both high costs and normative concerns undermine the relationship between a terrorist group's civilian support and its targeting strategy.

i. Direct and Indirect Costs

When civilians are attacked, supporters pay costs in two ways. First, targeting civilians directly affects local populations because groups often attack civilians in ways that do not ensure their supporter's safety. In other words, if a terrorist group is not careful about accounting for the whereabouts of its supporters before an attack, its supporters may end up being in the wrong place at the wrong time. This is an example of the costs associated with terrorist violence. IRA attacks during the mid-1970's exemplify this trend. Between 1972 and 1976 the IRA perpetrated a large number of attacks. In order to assess the risk to IRA supporters when the group targeted civilians, I analyzed each attack between 1972 and 1976. Based on the Sutton Index of Deaths (CAIN 2009) which lists both attacks and descriptions of those killed in the attack, I began by counting attacks directed at civilian targets. The IRA perpetrated 200 such attacks, mostly in shopping centers or public hotels. Next, I counted the number of Catholic civilians killed in those attacks which, in this case, totaled 30. Thus, every time the IRA attacked civilian targets, 0.15 (15/200) Catholic civilians died. In contrast, during the same time period the IRA attacked non-civilian targets approximately 300 times and only 15 catholic civilians were killed (frequently as collateral damage of gun fights between IRA members and the British Army). Thus, the risk to Catholic civilians when the group engaged non-civilian targets is dramatically less, only 0.05 (15/300) deaths per non-civilian attack. The empirics bear out a central point; when a group attacks civilians the risk to its supporters is much higher than when it attacks non-civilian targets.

Secondly, violence eliciting a harsh response from government agents or opposing paramilitaries imposes large costs on local communities suspected of supporting violent opposition groups. I argue that this indirect effect is most likely after civilian attacks. This holds for two reasons.

First, by assuming a very basic but realistic logic to government reactions, the implications are bleak for communities. That assumption is as follows: governments will harden targets they believe groups will attack. This is based on the calculation that the hardening process deters attacks and forces terrorist groups to substitute towards other less-costly targets (Enders and Sandler 1993; 2006). For instance, when groups attack embassies, governments fortify embassies with metal detectors and guards, and groups direct their attacks elsewhere. The same logic holds for civilian targets. By hardening civilian targets, anticipatory governments make violence against civilians more costly for groups to undertake. What types of measures harden civilian targets? Metal detectors at airports, public buildings, and public gathering places like stadiums have become common in the United States after 9/11. In other places such as Israel and the UK, security checkpoints on roads, cameras in public places, and curfews aim to decrease a terrorist group's ability to successfully deliver a blow.

Although it may seem obvious, clearly understanding these defensive actions' implications is important. Arce and Sandler (2005) argue that defensive hardening measures impose high public costs.[49] Terrorists may be slowed by check points, bomb detection devices, and biometric identification, but so is the entire citizenry. The effect from the blockage of route 443 in the West Bank serves as a practical example. Highway 443 is a major thoroughfare that has been blocked for many years to Palestinians whose access points have been barricaded and residents forced to use unmaintained and unsafe back roads. A spokesperson for the Association of Civil Rights in Israel, Yoav Loeff, described the measures as a form of apartheid and noted that the blockade "makes the movement of goods more costly so [it] has an economic effect and it can endanger life for emergency cases who may take an hour to get to hospital instead of 15 minutes."[50]

If the government believes attacks will target government entities such as military patrols, police stations, and government buildings, responding by hardening these targets is far less costly for community members. Fortifying government targets imposes costs mainly on government agents. In the end, however, when governments expect attacks to target civilians, hardening to deter the threat translates into high costs for society.

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[49] They also note the irony in the fact that most governments pursue defensive actions that impose high costs on local populations, despite the collective benefits that might be achieved if states collaborated. Interestingly, they claim this only holds for international terrorism because governments can overcome collective actions problems associated with protective measures when facing domestic threats. However, assuming governments are unitary actors capable of achieving collective action is problematic. Collective action problems stemming from bureaucratic and inter-agency competition can stymie effectiveness which means cost-imposing reactions are likely even when government agents face a domestic threat.

[50] Macintyre (2007)

Secondly, a group's supporters suffer when the organization attacks civilians because these attacks can incite an in-kind response by government agents or by paramilitary forces that oppose the group (and, in many cases, are supported by the government). In-kind responses when groups attack government targets maintain the violence between these two actors. However, by attacking civilians, particularly individuals in a government's constituent base, officials may respond by repressing the group's base. Instead of criminalizing groups' behavior or selectively targeting violent operatives, governments repress communities supposedly cooperating with and supporting violent organizations.

In some instances, a Madisonian "tyranny of the majority" logic drives government officials to repress minorities despite their actual involvement in a violent organization. In *On Liberty* Mill wrote, "there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling, against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them"[51]. To the extent that a terrorist group, a self-proclaimed representative of the minority, targets civilians in the majority, the group's supporters suffer when the majority responds by using state institutions to repress them.

Some governments utilize less direct methods of repression, methods not necessarily sanctioned by the population but rather carried out through illegal paramilitary forces. Responding to a dramatic uptick in civilian deaths caused by ETA operatives (ETA's most lethal year was 1980—the group killed approximately 45 civilians), the Spanish government established Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacion

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[51] Mill 1909. See http://www.serendipity.li/jsmill/jsmill.htm for a full text copy. Accessed 6/20/2008

(GAL) to target ETA members and sympathizers (Sánchez-Cuenca 2009). GAL death squads operated "when killings by the Basque separatist group Eta were at their height and… more than a third of the people killed by the Gal death squads had no connection to ETA."[52] This response to ETA's intense campaign on civilian targets in the early 1980's proved extraordinarily costly for ETA's civilian supporters, including those with no formal connection to the organization.[53] Beginning in the mid-1980's, ETA's attacks on civilians dropped and its attacks on business and government targets increased. Yet the response to ETA in the latter period was more measured; no equivalent to GAL was ever again utilized.

In addition to the government's response, a terrorist's supporters pay costs when individual civilians organize (often into militias) to counter the terrorists by attacking the terrorists' supporters. Combs (2003) notes that violence against innocent persons creates "a cycle of violence with those against whom the terror-violence is first carried out becoming so angered that they resort to terrorism in response, directed against the people or institutions regarded as responsible for the initial terrorist acts."[54] In Chapter Five I describe how Loyalist militias throughout Northern Ireland wrecked havoc in Catholic neighborhoods following IRA attacks on civilians. This was one of the most significant threats to IRA backers. Its pattern was very clear—members of that community describe the retributional violence as cyclical whereby IRA attacks on Protestants provoked local militias from Protestant neighborhoods to counter by attacking random civilians in Catholic neighborhoods.

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[52] BBC 1998.

[53] It also drew sharp criticism from the Spanish population, largely because GAL's seemingly haphazard targeting.

[54] Combs, Cindy. 2003. Page 26.

While it is reasonable to assume that a group's supporters would blame the organization when it mistakenly killed members of its base, a direct cost of civilian targeting, it is less obvious that the same logic holds for the indirect costs described above. Attacks on civilians may impose high indirect costs on a group's supporters, but for these costs to matter to a terrorist group they must result in a loss of support for the organization. In other words, a group's supporters must find fault in the group for the response after the group's attack. If supporters lay all the blame on the government or civilian militia for indirect costs, counter measures would not necessarily lead to a decreased level of support for the terrorist group. Yet, evidence indicates that supporters do blame with terrorist groups. In a 2006 New York Times article, Hassan Fattah explained why some Lebanese reacted negatively to Hezbollah establishing itself in their village. Fattah noted that villagers rejected the group because they had to "pay the price" when Israeli attacks destroyed their town and killed civilians (Fattah 2006). The Council on Foreign Relations described the same dynamic in Palestine following a Hamas attack. "After a rocket explosion at a Hamas rally September 23, 2005, killed fifteen people, Hamas blamed Israel and launched rocket attacks against it. Israel retaliated with punitive air strikes, which Palestinians blamed Hamas for provoking," (Council on Foreign Relations 2009).

ii. Normative Costs

While both the indirect and direct costs of civilian targeting can cause dips in a group's support, also damaging is the loss of supporters resulting from normative judgments of civilian targeting. Notions of proper warfare implore actors at battle to avoid harming ordinary civilians. This moral imperative was apparent in a 2003 press conference with President Bush and then Prime Minister Tony Blair. Discussing a terrorist attack that killed 50 earlier that day in Turkey, Blair called the terrorists "callous, brutal murderers of the innocent" and Bush referred to their cruel "contempt for innocent life."[55] The idea of avoiding civilians during war is pervasive throughout modern, mostly western, democracies. It is the cornerstone of contemporary interpretations of the Geneva Conventions. When terrorists attack civilians they alienate those who believe that form of violence to be unjustified and reprehensible.[56] In a 2009 article, Mia Bloom described the civilian base for the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) rejecting the organization after it killed civilians in a lethal attack on the Colombo Central Bank. "After the deadly 1996 Colombo Central Bank and World Trade Center attack, which killed 91 civilians and injured more than 1,400, resulting in a backlash even among their staunchest supporters, they decided to choose their targets more wisely, focusing on the military, the police and the government." Avoiding backlash from supporters who find civilian targeting morally reprehensible is a significant reason for some groups like the Tigers to avoid civilian targets altogether.

To review, this section laid out several important reasons why civilian targeting is costly for terrorist groups. Although the costs paid are not monetary, attacking civilians is by and large inexpensive, violent groups risk losing supporters. Thus, a trade-off exists. Civilians are cheap and effective targets, but cost the group local support. The next section examines the implications of this argument.

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[55] Guardian, UK http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/nov/20/iraq.iraq Accessed 6/20/2008

[56] The implications of the normative argument and the cost imposing arguments are observationally equivalent. Community members find supporting groups that target civilians more difficult and, thus, these groups face a high risk of community alienation.

Implications and Hypotheses

This section develops three hypotheses as a way of thoroughly testing the validity of my theory discussed above. The hypotheses describe conditions favoring civilian targeting.

Punishment

Although all groups need community support, some are more inhibited by this requirement than others. That is to say, some communities can punish terrorist organizations while others cannot. When no mechanism for punishment exists or when terrorist groups successfully use coercive force to compel community support, terrorists are less likely to be concerned with the effects of their violence on the local population and more likely to act with impunity. When communities can punish terrorists, however, groups will avoid civilian targets in order not to provoke punishment.

What are some of the ways community members can punish terrorists? Individuals can choose not to cooperate with violent groups by closing their homes as safe havens. In other instances, individuals may inform police or government authorities about the terrorists' activities. Measuring a community's capability to punish is difficult. There are many ways to punish and very little information about community/group interactions. The trick, empirically and theoretically, is to identify a punishment mechanism not subject to coercive intervention on part of the terrorist organization. Because this analysis deals with organizations operating in democratic countries, one such mechanism exists: political participation. As described earlier, ample data exists documenting the electoral fortunes of politically active groups and it likely less subject to manipulation by a violent group with a political stake.

Violent organizations in democracies frequently participate in the electoral process. The IRA, ETA, Hamas, Hezbollah, and al-Fatah are several prominent examples, but smaller and lesser known groups also participate in elections. Because communities can vote against the group's candidate or party, they can effectively sanction terrorist groups. The more costs groups impose on communities, the less likely communities are to elect them to office. In more specific terms this means that civilian targeting is more costly for groups that compete for electoral office.

H1: Ceteris paribus, groups with political wings are less likely to attack civilians than groups with non-political wings.

Earlier I noted that groups that run for office are more reliant on communities. The more reliant a terrorist group is on community support, the more sensitive it is to how its violence affects local communities. This is problematic and presents a potential selection effect that confounds the logic behind my theory. Do groups that run for office chose to attack fewer civilians because of their increased reliance on communities or because communities can use elections to sanction the group's behavior? In reality, it could be both. A group's actions could be predicated on the existence of both the punishment mechanism and its degree of reliance. A third possibility is that running for political office and attacking non-civilian targets occurs when moderates dominate the organization. In this case, running for office and target selection are only related insofar as they occur because of the leadership's preferences and not because running for office imposes certain restrictions on the targets a group can choose. In order to specifically address these observationally equivalent outcomes, I analyze the causal mechanisms behind the IRA's targeting choices during its political life. In that case, both increased reliance and the punishment mechanism appear to influence the IRA's target choice.

Interestingly, some politically active groups are also known for their attacks on civilians. Hamas, for instance, chooses civilian targets the vast majority of the time and competes, successfully, for Palestinian public office. The next implication explains how a group like Hamas can get away with imposing such high costs on its constituency in the face of risky electoral competition.

Goods and Services

Benefits like education, welfare, infrastructure, housing, medical care, and food are primary components of a community member's decision to support the terrorist group or the government. If a community receives significant benefits from government agents, it may be more difficult for extremist organizations to rally support against government policies.

This notion, however, works both ways. Violent groups can and regularly do deliver goods and services to communities. Hezbollah and Hamas both provide welfare services, education, and medical services to their constituents; the FARC in Colombia supplies medical services; the Tamil Tigers maintain mail services (among other things); and the Communist Party of the Phillipines (New People's Army) even provides literacy programs and performs marriage ceremonies for their supporters.[57] Hezbollah is, perhaps, the most famous service provider.

> While *Al Moqawama al Islamia* (The Islamic Resistance) has attracted much of world attention, the various other community activities of

[57] Data on group-specific goods and services comes from my own collection efforts which are more fully described in chapter three.

> Hizbullah are of equal if not greater importance at home. It runs a range of philanthropic and commercial activities including hospitals, medical centers, schools, orphanages, rehabilitation centers for the handicapped, supermarkets, gas stations, construction companies, a radio station (*Nur*) and public service television station (*Al Manar*). Up until the middle 1990's Hizbullah was also responsible for public services and utilities in the southern suburbs of Beirut.[58]

These benefits positively impact an individual's utility and make the violent opposition an attractive alternative, particularly if governments are unable or unwilling to provide goods and services.

Varying levels of goods and services distribution change an individual's decision to cooperate with violent terrorist organizations. Recall that local populations evaluate both the costs and benefits of supporting a terrorist organization. Holding all else constant, as the benefits an individual receives increase, it becomes harder (more costly) for that individual to shift his or her allegiances. When he or she receives few benefits from the violent group, as the costs of violence mount, it becomes harder to support the group. This implies the following:

H2: Ceteris paribus, as the goods and services a group delivers to a population increases, the likelihood of civilian attacks also increases.

To be clear, there are a large number of reasons why an organization would chose to provide goods and services. Delivering a fatal blow to the civilian population of a target government without losing many of its own supporters is one possibility. Alternatively, providing services may be the organizing principle for some groups. For others, it may simply be a tool through which the group gains leverage and credibility from domestic and international audiences. Whatever the reason behind a group's

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[58]Hezbollah Website: http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/. Accessed 1/23/2008

decision to become a provider, I argue that the effect of service provision is that it makes civilian targeting less costly to the organization that does it. Thus, service provision, while not necessarily caused by a desire to target civilians, makes it cheaper to target civilians, which is why I argue the two activities go are correlated.

Government Repression

Earlier I argued that governments have incentives to react repressively (i.e. impose high costs on communities) when civilian targets are attacked. Implicit thus far is the assumption that this reaction is nonstrategic. That is to say, governments always repress when civilians are attacked and as a result communities always face high costs from this targeting decision. But consider the costs of this reaction for the government. An individual's utility is partially determined by the costs and benefits derived from government authorities. Governments, like terrorist groups, need to strike some balance with a minimum number of supporters such that the benefits of supporting the government outweigh the costs. When a government imposes harsh counter measures against an entire population, it risks losing its own supporters who view the harsh measures as indicative of a repressive regime.

Under what conditions are government authorities most likely advocates of a harsh response in the face of civilian attacks? Government officials prefer to discriminately target those cooperating with terrorist organizations in order to minimize the costs imposed on their own supporters and maximize those paid by community members cooperating with the violent group. Under conditions of low information, when populations are integrated and separating the governments' and opposition's supporters is difficult, harsh counter-measures are unlikely.

In segmented neighborhoods or countries with concentrated ethnic populations such as the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, the Palestinians in Israel, and the Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland, identifying would-be terrorist supporters is much easier. For violent organizations, imposing higher costs on (potentially) sympathetic community members is risky business. When government agents can easily identify and discriminately repress the group's community supporters, groups are less likely to use civilian targeting in order to lessen the risk of repression. Thus:

H3: Ceteris paribus, when populations are highly segmented, groups are less likely to engage in civilian targeting.

An implication of this argument is that a terrorist group's supporters ought to always integrate in order to offer the organization the most strategic leeway insofar as attacking civilians goes. Yet in many conflicts, the opposite occurs. Co-ethnics or like-minded individuals band together, limited by clearly defined geographic boundaries. This puts the violent organization at a clear disadvantage and makes it easier for a government to impose repressive measures on a group's supporters. What explains this behavior?

In the Northern Ireland case, one significant reason individuals came together in pocket communities (e.g., the Catholic neighborhoods in West Belfast) was for defense from unionist paramilitary groups. While neighborhood isolation made it easier for government forces to search, jail, and intimidate IRA supporters, it made it more difficult for opposing paramilitary groups to launch deadly attacks largely because armed guards controlled access into and out of these communities (something that government officials could easily overcome but paramilitary forces could not-see Chapter Five for further discussion). When a violent group faces opposition in the form of paramilitary or other non-governmental organizations, living closely together is a net defensive gain if it mitigates the threat of relatively unrestricted and hostile paramilitary groups despite enabling government agents to discriminately apply countermeasures (usually non-lethal).

In addition, pocket communities form to reduce the costs of interaction by providing local public goods unique to the neighborhood. By speaking the same language, adhering to the same cultural customs, or providing specific foods, inhabitants of pocket communities decrease the costs of interaction within neighborhoods. This benefit is present in both conflict and non-conflict zones.

Violent groups do not necessarily exert control over their supporter's actions. In conflict zones, individuals move very quickly, often immediately following threats from opposing organizations or their supporters when sectarian tensions are highest. In 2008, Reuters reported that "Minority Sunni Arabs were driven out of many neighborhoods by Shi'ite militants enraged by the bombing of the Samarra mosque in February 2006. The bombing, blamed on the Sunni militant group al Qaeda, sparked a wave of sectarian violence."[59] Following sectarian violence, mixed neighborhoods decline and homogenous neighborhoods develop. Terrorist groups with few resources are likely unable to utilize the number of resources necessary to control population movements and, thus, are forced to choose their targets from a less than ideal strategic position (i.e. with a support base that is easily distinguishable by government agents).

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[59] Fox 2008.

Each of the three hypotheses above depicts a relatively static understanding of terrorist groups, communities, and policy makers. As such, they are useful for cross-group comparisons, but not necessarily temporal changes. Yet there is no reason that the hypotheses should not apply over time. That is, changes in a community's ability to punish, the level of services provided by a terrorist group, or the constitution of a group's supporters should result in changes in the group's targeting strategy. For example, if a violent organization began investing in medical care for a local neighborhood, it could take advantage of leverage from providing those resources and attack civilians without losing as many supporters. Indeed, in the case study of the IRA, I show how that group's foray into politics initiated a change in its targeting strategy, one that eventually led to a decrease in attacks targeted at civilians.

Explaining Mixed Incentives

It is easy to understand why terrorist groups would engage in behavior that enables them to attack civilians with few negative consequences. The positive incentives to target civilians are clear; it is a low cost violent strategy and when confronting a government beholden to civilian preferences (i.e. a democratically elected government), terrorizing civilians can be politically profitable. That said, why don't all groups do things that would allow them to attack civilians all the time? My theory implies that service providers without political parties and very integrated supporters are most likely to attack civilians. While the location of a group's support base might be difficult to manipulate, organizations actively choose to run for political office and to distribute goods and services. Why don't all distribute goods and none run for office? My theory implies that this combination would make it easier to attack civilians. What value do groups get from doing things that make it difficult to attack civilians?

For its part, political participation is puzzling behavior not only because it makes it difficult for a violent group to attack civilians, but also because the group opens itself up to punishment. The costs associated with punishment certainly go beyond limiting the groups targeting strategy. Losing at the polls implies difficulty for a group in: a. convincing a government that it should give in to the group's demands b. fundraising, particularly from intra-community resources c. recruiting for a cause publically revealed to be unpopular and d. fighting off challenges from groups with complementary political agendas.

There are several plausible answers why violent groups subject themselves to these risks. Running for office is one way groups legitimize themselves in democratic systems. If legitimacy is gained through popular recognition and acceptance, by demonstrating mass support at elections, terrorist groups force governments to take their demands (and threats) seriously. Beyond legitimacy, political participation is another front on which to appeal to potential supporters, particularly more moderate supporters who are less willing to back a purely violent organization. Aside from attracting moderate supporters, political participation enlarges a group's reach, enabling it to engage in public debates, hold fund-raising events, and, perhaps, appeal to a broad international audience that its political arm can openly embrace. Thus, while running for office has potential pitfalls, there are a number of clear benefits.

Why don't all groups provide goods? Aside from the leverage it buys groups to target violence more freely, providing goods may go a long way in legitimizing an organization in the eyes of a community. Providing things like food, shelter, medical assistance, education, and spiritual guidance can bolster a group's legitimacy as a benevolent authority within a community. Why then don't all groups provide for their community constituents? To be certain, it is not clear that many do not. In Chapter Four's quantitative analysis I develop a measure of goods provision based on evidence from open-source documents. This measure indicates that some groups do not provide goods, but in reality many of these "non-providers" may actually be providing a low level of goods and/or services. As groups devote more resources to goods provision, these programs become larger and more observable. Aside from the issues of unobservable indicators, groups may not be able to provide services due to limitations in their provision. Providing goods requires groups to produce or procure necessary capital, both of which are difficult for small clandestine organizations without significant sources of funding. For some groups, providing services may be much more difficult when a state's institutions generally serve a population well. When hospitals, schools, welfare, and religious institutions are available from the state, an opening in the "resource" market will be hard to tap. This could result in either few opportunities for groups to become service providers or the development of "niche" services where groups offer unique services to communities. For instance, the IRA offered consulting services to those living in West Belfast on how to handle the state's housing laws.

While running for office and providing goods should change a group's likelihood of attacking civilians vis-à-vis the group's connection with a base of community supporters, groups may limit their violent options because of the benefits inherent to running for office and the costs associated with providing services. My theory addresses the affect these activities have on a group's incentives to target civilians, but does not address the conditions under which groups pursue these nonviolent behaviors. While my empirical work attempts to control for confounding factors (such as organizational size) that influence both a group's likelihood of running for office and attacking civilians, the conditions that make groups choose certain nonviolent behaviors are understudied. However, as this dissertation demonstrates, nonviolent choices shape violent ones. Understanding violence necessarily means theorizing about and accounting for nonviolence.

Additional Implications

There are several additional implications of my theory that reveal its limitations. One assumption I make is that civilians, for their part, willingly accept the goods and services offered by violent groups. This implies some degree of passivity on the part of communities. To a certain extent, this may be true. Collective action problems and limited outside options can make it hard for community members to decline goods and services doled out by even the most horrific violent group. But this assumption is problematic when groups use coercive force to ensure communities "accept" the goods and services offered. Public beatings by the Taliban, a group known for adjudicating disputes in very public, very harsh ways, likely coerce many otherwise unwilling Afghans to accept the Taliban's version of "rule of law". When this occurs, it is incorrect to characterize communities as being bought off by the nonviolent good things the Taliban provides. Instead, communities are forced into accepting a group's authority which, in all likelihood, makes community members even less willing to accept (despite their inability to detest) the group's attacks on civilian targets.

A second assumption I make is that community members can freely punish (or reward) a group via the ballot box. The implication there is that individuals will punish a group when it misbehaves and reward it when appropriate. Yet, again, another alternative exists in which violent groups stuff ballot boxes, coerce voters into casting ballots for their candidates, and intimidate opposition supporters. In this case, it is inappropriate to interpret election outcomes as the extension of a community's preferences.

Both of these assumptions and implications shed light on a significant limitation of my theory. Namely, the mechanisms identified by my theory as linking communities to violent groups are not valid when communities are totally coerced by violent groups. In the face of coercion, my theory does not predict targeting outcomes given group's nonviolent activities. I believe this limitation is less problematic within my universe of cases (i.e. violent groups operating within democracies). In democracies, a free media and government institutions go a long way in deterring groups from employing forceful coercion. In non-democracies, however, this limitation is more challenging. As is the case with the Taliban, groups in non-democracies may find it easier to act with impunity, forcing communities to "support the rebels" regardless of what the rebels do.

Another limitation of my theory is that it does not address terrorist attacks carried out by a single individual, by far an anomalous type of attack. The Unabomber and anthrax killer targeted civilians and did not seem constrained by a need for community support. My theory sheds no light on who or what these individuals choose to strike. This is a limitation, but because most attacks are carried out by groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, the PKK, and ETA, the theory remains very much relevant.

Conclusion

The beginning of this dissertation posed the following question: given the attractiveness and ease of targeting civilians, why do violent groups attack non-civilian targets in democracies? In response, this chapter developed a theory based on the group's dynamic relationship with local communities. What makes this theory unique is its concentration on an actor frequently omitted from other accounts: local communities. Because terrorist groups benefit from the support of local communities, the nature of terrorist violence is constrained. Terrorists must strike a balance between the logistical and political benefits associated with targeting civilians, and the costs that targeting civilians imposes on local populations. I argued that groups are less likely to target civilians when they can be punished for this behavior, but are more likely to attack civilians when they distribute goods. I also identified the vital role played by a government's response to terrorism. When governments cannot isolate their supporters from the terrorists' supporters, harsh countermeasures can backfire, causing the government to lose support. Thus, the more isolated a terrorist group's supporters are from the rest of the population, the more repressive a government can be and the less likely terrorist groups will attack civilians.

This argument advances commonplace conceptions about the nature of violent conflict between terrorist groups and government authorities. Violence intended to coerce policy concessions from policy makers is not simply a consequence of what terrorist organizations believe to be the most damaging target. Rather, targeting involves a nuanced calculation that reflects how terrorists interact with local populations.

The remaining chapters examine the hypotheses derived above in more detail. The next chapter introduces my quantitative dataset and discusses several new variables gathered for this analysis. Using this data, I run a logit model on target choice, using attacks from 1968-2007 to test all the hypotheses derived above. The subsequent chapter, a detailed case study of the IRA in Northern Ireland, is designed to validate the causal mechanisms in my theory by exploring how the Provisional's armalite and ballot box strategy changed the nature of that group's violence.

Chapter 4

Empirical Evidence of the Terrorist/Community Link

This chapter presents data and tests to analyze the hypotheses from Chapter Three. In order to do this, this chapter utilizes new and original data about terrorist organizations. These new data provide information about terrorist groups' participation in two types of nonviolent activities: goods and services provision and electoral participation. I gathered this data for over 40 terrorist groups operating throughout the world. Each measure provides new information that is both significant for testing the theory presented in Chapter Three and has potential applicability for a large number of studies about terrorist organizations, an issue I discuss in the conclusion. To test my hypotheses, I couple this new data with information on the target in over 3,000 terrorist attacks. I find support for my argument. To review, I argue that terrorist groups are most likely to attack civilians when they provide goods and services, do not participate in elections, and government agents cannot easily distinguish the terrorists' supporters from their own. I also find interesting results for some of the controls. For instance, the tests show that nationalist groups and those without foreign sponsors are more likely to attack civilians.

This chapter is organized into three primary sections. The first section describes the dataset. In this section I discuss my universe of cases, unit of observation, dependent variable, and independent variables. I describe my primary independent variables in detail, paying particular attention to the two new variables identified above. The second section explains the methods used to test my claims. This section also presents regression results for a series of different modeling specifications. The third and final section discusses my results in relation to my theory.

Data

To test my theoretical claims, I use data on terrorist attacks from MIPT-TKB. These are the same data used in Chapter Two to assess the impact of political institutions on target choice. For a complete discussion of MIPT-TKB, see Chapter Two.

Universe of Terrorist Groups

I test my claims on incidents perpetrated by groups listed as terrorist organizations by the U.S. State Department, the United Kingdom, and the Australian Government.[60] After combining these lists, there are 58 terrorist organizations (see table 4.1 below).

[60] For the lists see: US Department of State 2005 (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm) , UK Proscribed Terrorist Groups 2008 (http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/terrorism-act/proscribed-groups) , and Australian Listing of Terrorist Organizations 2008 (http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/AllDocs/95FB057CA3DECF30CA256FAB001F7FBD?OpenDocument).

Table 4.1: List of U.S., U.K., and Australian Designated Terrorist Organizations	
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)
Aden Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)	Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MeK)
Ansar al-Islam	National Liberation Army (Bolivia)
Ansar al-Sunnah Army	National Liberation Army (Colombia)
Armed Islamic Group	New People's Army (NPA)
Asbat al-Ansar	Orange Volunteers (OV)
Aum Shinrikyo / Aleph	Palestine Liberation Front
Babbar Khalsa International (BKI)	Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)	PFLP -- General Command (PFLP-GC)
DHKP/C	Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)
Egyptian Islamic Jihad	Red Hand Defenders (RHD)
Hamas	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM)	Revolutionary Nuclei
Hezb-e Azadi-ye Afghanistan	Revolutionary Organization 17 November (RO-N17)
Hezbollah	Shining Path
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)	Tanzim
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)	Ulster Defence Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters
Irish Republican Army (IRA)	Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
Islamic Jihad Group (Uzbekistan)	United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)	al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)	al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (GAI)
Jamatul Mujahedin Bangladesh	al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI)
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)	al-Qaeda
Kach	al-Qaeda Organization in Palestine
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)	al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)	al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

While using three lists reduces bias from any one country's conception of terrorist organizations, these three countries are often allies and likely share similar ideas about what constitutes a terrorist organization. In general each government considers acts that are intended to coerce or intimidate the public or government through physical violence, damage to property, or risks (including electronic) to public safety as terrorism. While the definitions are fairly broad, there are, unfortunately, very few other lists. Both the EU and Canada publish lists, but a large majority of these groups also fall on either the US, UK, or Australian lists. To the best of my knowledge, the only list which designates a significantly different set of terrorist groups is the Indian Government's list. However, incidents perpetrated by these groups are often not covered by MIPT-TKB. [61]

I limit the universe of attacks by these 58 groups to those targeted against democracies for theoretical reasons.[62] Limiting the universe in this way is consistent with my theory about the nature of violence in democratic settings. As I discussed in Chapter Three, analyzing violence targeted at one type of regime allows me to rule out confounding institutional factors that may influence terrorists' strategic decisions. By focusing on one regime type, in this case democracies, the influence of political institutions on a target's value is relatively equal across terrorist organizations. In addition, the findings from Chapter Two that motivate this analysis demonstrate that civilians in democracies are at a significantly increased risk of being attacked. Explaining the factors that make civilians safer, even in democratic settings, is one way to begin developing a more comprehensive theory of target choice.

As in Chapter Two, I use the polity scale to determine whether an attack occurs in a democratic country. Recall that I classify democratic regimes as those with polity scores of 6 or higher. Out of the universe of 58 terrorist organizations, not all target democratic regimes. A number of groups attack some mix of democracies, anocracies, and autocracies. For instance, the group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), has carried out attacks in both India (a democracy) and Pakistan (an anocracy). Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (GAI), the organization charged with the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1995, attacked in

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[61] See http://www.mha.gov.in/uniquepage.asp?Id_Pk=292 for a complete listing of Indian designated terrorist organizations.

[62] Table 3a.2 in the appendix shows regressions including attacks in both democracies and non-democracies. See results section for further discussion.

Pakistan (which was democratic at the time), Egypt (an autocracy), and Croatia (an anocracy). There are 13 organizations (on the list of 58) that have attacked solely non-democratic regimes. These groups and the governments they target are listed in the appendix in table 4a.1. None are included in the analysis.

The remaining 45 terrorist organizations constitute the universe of terrorist organizations in this analysis. Using the MIPT-TKB incident data, these 45 organizations attacked over 3,300 times between 1968 and 2007. Over 80 percent of the attacks are distributed between three regions: Latin American and the Caribbean, the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and Western Europe. Two organizations, Hamas and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, have each attacked over 500 times. On average, approximately 50 incidents are attributable to each of the remaining 43 groups.

Dependent Variable

My dependent variable is target choice, specifically whether an attack targeted civilians or not. The data on targeting comes from MIPT-TKB. Like Chapter Two, the central variable in this analysis is a dichotomous measure indicating whether the attack targeted a civilian or not. Civilians are attacked in 17.5 percent of all MIPT-TKB attacks, but in my restricted sample (only groups on the US, UK, Australian lists that attack democracies) civilians are attacked over 26 percent of the time. The difference is probably a consequence of how democracies like the US, UK, and Australia define terrorism as being an act of violence against civilian noncombatants..

Main Independent Variables

There are three primary independent variables in this study: political participation, goods and services distribution, and segmented support base. I collected data to generate the first two. I use several variables from the Minorities at Risk Project (Minorities at Risk 2009) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) to proxy for whether or not a group's support base is segmented/integrated.

Political participation is a dichotomous measure indicating whether the group directly participates or sponsors candidates in competitive democratic elections. Participation in elections includes groups or candidates that participate in either local or national-level races. In order to assess participation, I sought evidence from seven primary sources: the MIPT-Rand Terrorism Database, the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, the Minorities at Risk Project, the Library of Congress Country Studies, the Center for Defense Information (CDI) Terrorism Project, the Uppsala Conflict Database, and the Australian Listing of Terrorist Organizations.[63] When no conclusive evidence was found in these primary sources, I used a general internet search and verified any findings using multiple sources.

Of all the terrorist attacks, approximately two-thirds are perpetrated by organizations that participate in elections (25 organizations in total). Most of the politically active organizations, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, have political wings with very close ties to the violent organization. Usually the armed and political wings are run by the same set of individuals. These organizations are easily characterized as "politically active." Other organizations, such as the IRA and the Basque Fatherland and Freedom Movement (ETA), have violent wings that are more loosely connected to political parties (Sinn Fein and Herri Batasuna, respectively). In the cases of "loose affiliation," I

[63] All databases were accessed between June 2007 and September 2009. While the MIPT database was available online, I used data from http://www.tkb.org/. When MIPT was taken down, group profile data was transferred to create the TOPS dataset, available at http://www.start.umd.edu/data/tops/. All other databases are listed in the works cited.

classified the organization as politically active if there was significant evidence of shared elite membership between the armed group and the political group. Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, for instance, were both alleged IRA leaders and are successful MP's from Sinn Fein. Like Adams and McGuinness, the leadership of loosely affiliated political and violent organizations frequently overlaps.

As is to be expected, not all "politically active" terrorist groups are politically active throughout their tenure. One of the most famous, Hamas, began its violent activities in the late 1980's, but did not actively pursue elected office until 2005 when it ran for municipal office. Only in 2006 did it participate in legislative elections, culminating in Fatah's loss of power and the beginning of Hamas' forays into national-level politics. The data in this analysis do not capture this sort of variation--groups are either politically active or not (they get a 1 if politically active between 1968 and 2007 and a 0 otherwise). Data on both the segmented support base and a group's goods and services distribution are also panel-level and do not reflect variation across time. Due to time and resource constraints, this limitation is insurmountable for the large-N analysis.[64] However, the case study in the next chapter addresses cause and effect relationships over time.

The second primary independent variable identifies groups that provide goods and services. I used the same search method and seven primary sources listed above to find information for this variable. In total, approximately one-third of attacks are perpetrated by organizations that deliver goods and services (8 groups in total). This variable is also a

[64] A time-series dataset is currently under construction directed by Victor Asal at the University of Albany in conjunction with researchers at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of Maryland. This dataset will include both the political party and goods and services distribution variables and should be available for a limited number of groups by 2010.

dichotomous measure. A 1 indicates goods providers, and A 0 non-providers. Goods and services take many forms. In coding this variable, I searched for evidence that an organization was providing one or more goods or services that would fall under the following categories: medical, welfare, education, infrastructure, or defense. The most common goods and services mentioned throughout the sources found (of which most were primary) were hospital and ambulance services, building and staffing schools and religious institutions, and providing security forces within neighborhoods.[65]

Unlike political participation, which is easily very 1`fiable, I encountered a host of issues while coding for goods provision. To start with, sources were often vague, mentioning links between terrorist organizations and community goods and services without any concrete details regarding the resource's whereabouts, specific nature, or the personnel involved. For instance, take the following description of Lashkar-e-Toiba:

> The headquarters *[of Lashkar-e-Toiba]* houses a Madrassa (seminary), a hospital, a market, a large residential area for 'scholars' and faculty members, a fish farm and agricultural tracts. The LeT also reportedly operates 16 Islamic institutions, 135 secondary schools, an ambulance service, mobile clinics, blood banks and several seminaries across Pakistan.[66]

The account notes LeT's activities, but very little specific detail. While this description is sufficient to qualify LeT as a service provider, it demonstrates the lack of detail typical in this sources I searched. Nowhere is there mention of specifically where these institutions are found, who is in charge, when they began operations, or how they are managed. In large part I believe the ambiguity in these descriptions is the result of organizational

[65] Evidence indicated that large groups like Hamas and Hezbollah provide most of these goods. Smaller groups like the IRA provide one or two of these goods (in the IRA's case, security forces and patrols are commonly mentioned in the literature).
[66] Information from the South Asia Terrorism Portal 2008.

incentives to keep specific information from leaking out in order to protect the group from infiltration.

When information was difficult to find from the primary sources, sometimes general searches revealed more. However, in these general sources I was careful to rely on more than one source and only on sources that had legitimate credentials. For instance, one significant service provided by the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) was post-tsunami reconstruction aid, however those efforts were not documented in any primary material. Instead, I relied on sources from the Sri Lankan government (the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process), the South Asian Analysis Group, and the UN Refugee Agency (each of these sources confirmed the LTTE's aid activities after the tsunami). Government and academic sources such as these were common as secondary sources.

This only became a coding issue when there were no details on the services provided, in which case the group was not counted as a service provider. This occurred most often when groups claimed to defend certain populations or segments of society from the incursion of outside enemies, but had no other verifiable community services. For instance, spokesperson Karlos Manuel of the New People's Army in the Philippines, a communist/socialist organization, wrote in 2005 that, "the NPA will always actively defend itself and protect the people and the entire revolutionary movement." Like the NPA, many violent groups claim to protect "the people." However, also like the NPA, there is often very little evidence that these statements are anything more substantial than lip service. In order to qualify as a defense-oriented good or service, there had to be concrete evidence (meaning some mention of a specific type of service-e.g., police patrols, security details, or refuge provision) that organizations dedicated resources to securing communities outside of battlefield exchanges.

Another issue I suspect is relevant is that goods and service provision is under-reported because, unlike political participation, delivering goods and services is unregulated. I expect under-reporting primarily affects two sets of groups. First, groups operating in states with low capacity may also be characterized by tightly controlled press and media outlets. In these situations, organizations could develop extensive social networks into communities, offering a plethora of public goods, but information restrictions makes it less likely that any evidence would have turned up in my search. However, because the universe of terrorist groups in this analysis is restricted to those in consolidated democratic regimes in which a free media us usually supported, I do not anticipate this type of under-reporting to plague the results.

Secondly, and more problematic, is under-reporting related to the inability of some organizations to deliver goods and services on a large scale. Information is probably most widely available for large organizations distributing a sizeable number of goods and services. To the extent that an organization's size is a significant predictor of its targeting proclivities, goods and services distribution would appear related to targeting patterns when in fact it may not be. This is one reason why I control for organizational size, as is discussed in the section below.

The last primary independent variable is segmented support base. In the previous chapter, I hypothesized that the more isolated (or segmented) a group's supporters, the less likely that the group would attack civilians. When isolated, a government can apply counter measures discriminately against the terrorists' supporters. Unlike the previous two variables, I did not independently collect this measure. Data on the isolation of a particular segment of a state's population are difficult to find. Many indicators of population concentration such as population density or urban/rural divergence apply to a state's entire population. Yet state-wide measures are not entirely appropriate. My theory requires a measure that is specific to a group within a state.

To the best of my knowledge, no measures exist that directly measure a group's isolation as I theorized about in Chapter Three. For that reason, I use three proxy measures, each of which indirectly captures "group segmentation/isolation". I use three to account for the imperfection inherent with each measure. To the extent that these measures show similar results, the theory is more likely appropriate.

The first and most theoretically accurate measure comes from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). The MAR project collects group-level data on over 280 minority groups worldwide.[67], The precise indicator I use comes from a subsection of the dataset called "Group Concentration Indicators". Specifically, I use the variable for urban/rural distribution (labeled GC119 in the MAR documentation). This variable ranges from one to five, with low values indicating groups with mainly rural populations and high values indicating groups with mainly urban populations. A last value, -99, is used to indicate when coders had no basis to judge a group's concentration. I disregard observations when they take on this value, which happens in less than 0.4 percent of observations. This variable is available for two time periods, 1960 and 1990. Because most of the attacks in the MIPT-TKB take place after 1990, I use the 1990 concentration values. Although this is a rough approximation, I expect that when

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[67] Additional information about the MAR project can be found at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/.

organizations have populations that are mostly rural (1 on the scale), they are more isolated and easier for governments to target with aggressive counter measures. Conversely, urban populations (5 on the scale), even highly concentrated ones, may be more difficult to aggressively target.[68]

In order to match terrorist groups with MAR organizations, I coded the population the terrorist organization claimed to represent (such as the Basques for ETA). Then I matched the terrorist group's population with the Minority at Risk groups. For many terrorist groups, particularly those without nationalist or religious aims, identifying a specific population of representation was impossible. For example, the well-known Tokyo sarin nerve gas attacks were carried out by the group Aum Shinrikyo, a quasi-religious cult-like organization. Like many earlier anarchist groups, Aum Shinrikyo neither claimed to represent the Japanese people as a whole, nor any segment of them. Consequently, Aum Shinrikyo is not mapped to any MAR population.

Out of the universe of 45 organizations, only 22 are matched with MAR groups. Clearly, this significantly diminishes the universe of cases and presents two significant problems when I use this second proxy. First, the types of organizations positively matched to MAR groups tend to be different compared to the wider universe of organizations largely based on the distribution of nationalist groups. Notably, over 99 percent of attacks from the "MAR organizations" are associated with nationalist groups while only approximately 63 percent of attacks are associated with nationalist groups in the larger universe. In the regressions below I control for groups with nationalist political

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[68] Although this approximation does not account for highly concentrated urban populations, I expect that even when groups living in urban settings live in dense pockets next to other groups, a government must account for any spill-over effects from counterterrorism measures.

agendas as one way to counter the effects this difference may exert on the results. The second problem is not so easily overcome. Reducing the sample population reduces the precision and external validity of the results when I analyze the results using this second proxy indicator.

Apart from the technical problems associated with this indicator, it is important to also assess its validity as a proxy measure for the group integration/segmentation. Table 4a.2 in the appendix lists the groups with extreme urban and rural supporting populations. One the rural end, groups represent the Sri Lankan Tamils, the Moros, and the Kashmiris. Each of these largely rural groups live in areas dominated by their ethnic kin. According to the Sri Lankan census, for instance, the vast majority of Sri Lankan Tamils live in the a handful of districts in the north and east of the country. The more urban populations, the Palestinian, Irish, and Basques, tend to live in areas with mixed concentration, although this measure is imperfect. The Basques live in an isolated urban setting in the Basque area of Spain. Palestinians are highly urban; Gaza is the most densely populated area in the world. Although all Palestinians live in one general area, the divisions among Palestinians who support one group over another are less clearly defined.[69] In terms of my theory, this means that the Israeli government faces a difficult task in identifying, for instance, Hamas supports and targeting them for retribution after Hamas attacks Israel. For IRA supporters in Northern Ireland, the fact that the MAR data indicate this group as "integrated" is actually misleading. While a large share of this group's supporters come from Belfast, a wall separates the Catholic population from the Protestants. As a result,

[69] The war in 2006 resulted in a more segmented population, but this occurred after the data used in this analysis.

this urban population is not highly integrated. However, without cross-country data indicating features of urban-settings such as dividing walls, barricades, or check-points, these features make this indicator imperfect and make it more important that the relationship between support group isolation and target choice be verified with multiple indictors. Because of the technical and substantive problems with this variable (and those below), I consider the results for this measure modestly suggestive and in my discussion below I try not to overstate the findings.

The second indicator I use to measure the isolation of a terrorist group's supporters is a dummy measure indicating whether or not the state is noncontiguous. This data comes from Fearon and Laitin (2003). I expect that groups in noncontiguous states, states with territory separated by either vast swaths of land or large masses of water (for instance, Angola form Portugal), will be more likely to have supporters separated and isolated from the government. When this occurs, groups will be less likely to target civilians because it is easier for governments to discriminately repress the group's supporters in response.

This indicator is also problematic. It does not directly measure a characteristic of any segment of the population. It is a state-level indicator that is impossible to link directly to any sub-population. Despite this problem, I argue that it is more probable that in noncontiguous states a group draws support from a segment of the population that is isolated from the mainland (compared to its peers operating in contiguous states).

Finally, the third indicator of isolation I use is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the group is covered by MAR. To be considered for inclusion in MAR, the group must be ethnically based, non-state, and have political significance. To meet the requirements for political significance:

- The group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other groups in a society
- The group is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests

Groups that qualify as MAR groups are systematically discriminated against, organize to counter that threat, and collectively pursue their own interests. By being included in the MAR universe, these organizations are highly likely to be isolated by society as a result of discrimination. The fact that MAR groups draw on their ethnic differences to pursue their interests suggests that these groups will also be isolated for their collective defense. While my theory predicts a negative relationship between civilian targeting and MAR membership, like the other proxy measures some problems are inherent to this measure. Groups in covered by MAR are all ethnically based and tend to have nationalist agendas. Thus, it is difficult to tease out the effect of group isolation from that of nationalism or ethnicity on a group's targeting choices (when possible, I control for these measures). Related, this variable will not identify non-ethnic groups that are systematically discriminated against and, therefore, live in isolated communities.

Table 4.2 lists each primary independent variable, its possible values, and the associated percentage of civilian attacks. To assess the values in Table 4.2, compare the High and Low values of the same variable. For instance, the theory predicted more civilians would be targeted by groups without political parties; thus, the appropriate comparison is between the first two numbers listed in column three (28.74 and 38.50). Because the theory makes no comparative predictions about what traits make groups relatively similar, it does not make sense to compare the Low value of one variable the Low (or High) value of another variable.

Table 4.2: Variables, Expectations, and the Distribution of Civilian Attacks

Variable	Value	Expectation	% of Attacks Targeting Civilians
Does the Terrorist Group Have a Political Party?	Yes	Low	28.74
	No	High	38.50
Does the Terrorist Group Distribute Goods/Services?	Yes	High	51.55
	No	Low	22.50
Does the Terrorist Group Represent a Segmented Support Base?			
Urban/Rural	Yes*	Low	8.43
	No*	High	56.99
Noncontiguous State	Yes	Low	12.59
	No	High	37.37
MAR Group	Yes	Low	46.49
	No	High	19.95

* "Yes" values represent the most rural support base and "No" values represent the most urban base. Intermediate values of the urban/rural variable are not listed.

Table 4.2 shows that the relationship between civilian targeting and most variables tends toward my expectations. Civilians are targeted in 28.74 percent of the attacks by politically active organizations, which is nearly 10 percent less frequent than the similar statistic for organizations without political parties. This finding is in line with hypothesis 2, which posits political activism as negatively correlated with attacks against civilian targets. The results for the other variables also provide similar supporting evidence. Attacks against civilians are most likely to originate from groups that distribute goods and services compared to non-distributors. Attacks against civilians are much more likely to come from organizations in noncontiguous states and with urban-based supporters. The MAR indicator does not conform to expectations. Groups identified as MAR groups are more likely to attack civilians. I discuss reasons for this difference below in the regression analysis.

This series of comparisons is very basic. The determinants of target choice are, in all probability, influenced by a variety of outside factors including some related to the organization, attack mode, and the type of government terrorist groups confront. Many of these factors can confound the relationship between my central independent variables and civilian targeting. I describe how I control for these influences below.

Controls

As in Chapter Two, I include controls for variables associated with alternative arguments to the one I present. Specially, I control for nationalist groups, organization size, outside resources, the number of competitors, and whether the attack was domestic or international.[70] I also include a control as a structural indicator that is necessary because of changes in the way MIPT-TKB collected data. In 1998, MIPT-TKB added a vast amount of domestic data to its collection. Consequently, the bulk of attacks take place after 1998. To protect from any coding irregularities between the pre- and post-1998 collection efforts, I assign a value of one to all attacks after 12/31/1997 and a zero to all attacks before this date.[71]

In total, then, there are six control variables in addition to the three primary independent variables. Table 4.3 shows the descriptive statistics and expected signs for all independent variables, controls, and the dependent variable. The descriptive statistics in Table 4.3 are for the universe of groups in democracies which is why there are some differences from the means reported in Chapter Two.

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[70] See Chapter Two for a full description of these controls.
[71] In Chapter Two I used year-fixed effects instead of this indicator. Using either approach does not substantively change the results in this chapter or those in Chapter Two.

Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics							
Variable	No. Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Median	Min	Max	Exp. Sign
Attacks on Private Citizens (DV)	3332	0.315	0.464	0	0	1	NE**
Goods and Services Delivery	3332	0.309	0.462	0	0	1	+
Political Participation	3332	0.719	0.449	1	0	1	-
Segmented Support Base (Urban/Rural)	1897	4.516	1.045	5	1	5	+
Segmented Support Base (Noncontiguous State)	3287	0.559	0.496	1	0	1	-
Segmented Support Base (MAR Group)	3332	0.569	0.495	1	0	1	-
Nationalist	3332	0.633	0.481	1	0	1	+
Group Size	3247	2.678	0.602	3	1	3	+
Foreign Sponsorship	3332	0.416	0.493	0	0	1	+
Number of Competitors	3332	0.824	0.956	1	0	4	+
Domestic Attack	3332	0.886	0.316	1	0	1	NE**
MIPT Control	3332	0.709	0.454	1	0	1	NE**
** NE indicates no expectation							

Methods and Analysis

To estimate the relationships discussed above, because target choice is a dichotomous measure, I employ a logit model. For a more complete assessment, I break the analysis down into several models. The first three show the singular relationship between civilian attacks and the three independent variables identified in H1-H3. Model four runs the regression including all three independent variables.

Models five through nine include the remaining control variables. In these models, I also address concerns about any country-specific effects that may be influencing the results. There are a number of reasons to assume that observations within the same country are not independent. For instance, a government’s counter measures may influence the target choice in ways not discussed above, in which case attacks should reflect those dynamics. Alternatively, attacks may be influenced by a country's violent history and/or culture. For these reasons, observations within any given country may be similar, which I account for by clustering the results in models five through nine by country. [72]

Table 4.4 shows regression results for models one through four.

Table 4.4: Regression Results Models 1-4

Variable	Model 1 Coefficient (Std. err)	Model 2	Model 3a	Model 3b	Model 3c	Model 4
Associated Political Party	**-0.44*** (0.08)**					**-3.77*** (0.19)**
Goods/Services Distribution		**1.29*** (0.07)**				**3.36*** (0.15)**
Support Group Concentration (Urban/Rural)			**0.88*** (0.07)**			**0.96*** (0.07)**
Support Group Concentration (Noncontiguous)				**-2.39*** (0.09)**		
Support Group Concentration (MAR Group)					**1.88*** (0.09)**	
Constant	-0.46 (0.06)	-1.23 (0.04)	-4.26 (0.37)	0.32 (0.05)	-2.02 (0.08)	-2.92 (0.33)
Num Observations	*3325*	*3325*	*1890*	*3287*	*3332*	*1890*
R-Squar	*0.007*	*0.06*	*0.08*	*0.20*	*0.12*	*0.42*
***significant at 0.01						

Table 4.4 indicates plausibility for this project's theoretical claims. Model 1 begins by examining the correlation between political participation and civilian targeting. The negative sign and low standard error indicate a significant relationship whereby groups with political parties are less likely to attack civilians. Results from model two show that

[72] I also ran the models clustering for group type. The results, particularly the signs on the coefficients, do not change significantly.

when an organization provides goods and services, it is significantly more likely to attack civilians. Model 3a examines targeting and support group concentration using the urban/rural indicator. The positive and significant finding indicates that when supporters are integrated, the groups they support are more likely to attack civilians (recall that high values on the concentration measure indicate more integrated, urban populations). Model 3b shows similar results using the noncontiguous dummy variable for group concentration. Like table 4.3, model 3c reveals results for MAR indicator that are the opposite of those expected. Model 4 includes all independent variables and the results remain unchanged (including either the noncontiguous or MAR indicators reveals the same results as those revealed in models 3b and 3c). In model 4 each variable is highly significant and in the expected direction.[73] One important thing to note, however, is the significant decrease in the number of observations between the first two models and model 3a and 4. The first two models analyze nearly two times the number of attacks. The change in observations results from the limited data coverage of the "Support Group Concentration" variable described earlier. Models three and four are less general as a result, but the findings remain consistent.

Models five through nine introduce the control variables. The results for these models are displayed in table 4.5. As an additional check on the findings, table 4a.3 in the appendix lists models ten through twelve which mirror models 5, 6, and 8 but include attacks against non-democracies for all groups. They models also include the polity measure to control for regime type. By including these attacks, the number of observations increases by approximately 200 attacks, however the substantive results

[73] Using the alternative proxy measures for group segmentation do not change the results.

remain the same. In addition, in the appendix I also show table 4a.4 (models 13-17) which includes additional robustness checks on the key variables by adding a control for Hamas, GDP per capita, ethnic fractionalization, mountainous terrain, and population. The findings for the key independent variables are marginally sensitive to these controls. Political party loses significance; it barely misses the mark in models 13, 14, and 17, but remains consistently negative. Goods and services remain positive and significant in the smaller universe of cases (when the urban/rural variable is included), but loses significance in the larger universe of cases (models 16-17). This may be the result of correlation between groups that are able to provide services and those with certain geographic and democratic characteristics. Rugged terrain, low GDP per capita, or a high number of ethnic groups could all contribute to government official's inability to access or serve certain populations, thereby opening the door for violent organizations to provide communities with goods and services. If this is the case, some of the state-level variables are picking up the otherwise strong and positive effect services has on civilian targeting. Finally, the variable used to proxy support group concentration (urban/rural distribution) is mostly positive and significant as expected.[74]

[74] Results for the state-level indicators are largely similar to the findings in Chapter 2. Mountainous terrain remains largely negative, the Hamas control positive, and ethnic fractionalization, when significant, continues to be positively related to attacks on civilian targets in both analyses. The Oil indicator was not used here because it lacked variation.

Table 4.5: Regression Results Models 5-9					
Variable	**Model 5**	**Model 6**	**Model 7**	**Model 8**	**Model 9**
Associated Political Party	**-3.77*** (0.82)**	**-1.61** (0.64)**	**-1.42** (0.63)**	**-2.32** (1.01)**	**-1.82 (1.43)**
Goods/Services Distribution	**3.36*** (0.59)**	**1.55** (0.76)**	**1.24* (0.64)**	**4.03*** (0.42)**	**3.70*** (0.47)**
Support Group Concentration (Urban/Rural)	**0.96*** (0.09)**			**1.29*** (0.24)**	**1.40*** (0.29)**
Nationalist Group		**2.63*** (0.65)**	**2.21*** (0.47)**		
Size of Group		**-0.42 (0.59)**	**-0.59 (0.64)**	**0.15 (0.57)**	**0.09 (0.56)**
State or Foreign Sponsor		**-1.66*** (0.64)**	**-1.98*** (0.76)**	**1.99** (0.86)**	**2.04* (1.06)**
Number of Competing Groups		**0.59* (0.36)**	**0.72* (0.41)**	**0.18 (0.25)**	**0.26 (0.34)**
Domestic Attack		**2.61*** (0.53)**	**1.01* (0.61)**	**2.32*** (0.46)**	**0.54 (0.36)**
MIPT Structural Variable			**2.75*** (0.24)**		**2.73*** (0.20)**
Constant	-2.92 (0.53)	-3.47 (1.29)	-3.43 (1.57)	-9.49 (2.53)	-10.76 (2.71)
Num Observations	*1890*	*3240*	*3240*	*1805*	*1805*
R-Square	*0.42*	*0.32*	*0.39*	*0.47*	*0.53*
Num Clusters	*26*	*36*	*36*	*26*	*26*
*indicates significance at 0.10 **indicates significance at 0.05 ***indicate significance at 0.001					

In table 4.5 model five is specified similarly to model four, but the data are clustered by country resulting in 26 total clusters. In that model all three key independent variables remain highly significant, and the sign on each remains consistent. Models six through nine include the remaining control variables. Models six and seven do not include the support group concentration measure, which is included in models eight and nine. I opted to run these models separately as a result of the large decrease in observations associated with the concentration measure. Because eight and nine include concentration, I did not include the nationalist control because almost all attacks in this limited universe are from nationalist groups.[75]

Beginning with models six and seven, both the political party and the services variables are significant and in the expected direction. Political party is significant at the 0.05 level in both models. Service distribution is significant at the 0.05 level in model six, and barely misses that mark in model seven where it is significant at the 0.055 level. The results in both cases support H1 and H2 derived in the previous chapter. Groups that participate in politics are not likely to attack civilians, whereas those that deliver services are likely to attack civilians.

There are also a number of interesting and strong results from the control variables. The nationalist variable comes back highly significant and positively related to attacks against civilians. There are a number of possible explanations for this outcome. As described above, groups with nationalistic goals may find attacks against civilians belonging to the "other" as less costly on moral grounds, especially if the terrorist group's supporters share negative sentiment about the worthiness of the "other's" citizens. Additionally, nationalist groups may more easily distinguish members of the other, lessening the risk to their own supporters and making attacks against civilians particularly easy for this subset of organizations. Then again, this cuts both ways. If

[75] There are only two attacks in this universe conducted by a non-nationalist group with a support base identified by MAR. Those attacks are from the Palestinian Liberation Front, a group identified as "Leftist" and "Other" by the TOPS database.

civilian members of the "other" are more easily distinguishable to the terrorist group, civilian members of the terrorist group's supporters may also be easily distinguishable to the government. In turn, the government could repress those communities as a way to counter the threat. The positive findings here suggest that, despite civilian attacks, in cases where separation or annexation is at stake, authorities may be unwilling to impose high costs on those they believe could support the terrorist group. Territory is valuable so the stakes in nationalist conflicts are high. If they are sufficiently high and the government believes that the violent group has low levels of support, authorities have few incentives to clamp down on communities because by doing so they reinforce the terrorist's rhetoric depicting the government as repressive. In any case, this suggests an interesting research opportunity into how a government perceives (and then reacts to) the level of threat posed by the nature of a group's demands and the methods governments use to gauge support for opposition movements.

Surprisingly, no significant relationship exists between the size of an organization and target choice. Larger organizations are no more (or less) likely to attack civilians than smaller organizations. This may indicate one or several things. First, and most simply, the data are telling the truth; there is actually no relationship between cost and organizational size. Secondly, an organization's size has no bearing on the costs that supporters pay after a group attacks civilians. If this happened, the marginal supporter for a small group would be just as dissuaded to continue supporting the group after civilian attacks as the marginal supporter for a larger group. Finally, the proxy variable used for size is not capturing the variation adequately. Given the lack of data, rough estimates, and coarse intervals used for estimation, this seems like the most obvious problem. If better data were available on organizational size and resource base, this variable might return very different results.

The results on foreign or state sponsorship are also surprising. In the first place, the sign switches between models 6/7 and 8/9. In models 8/9, this variable is sensitive to limiting the universe to only MAR groups (ethnic groups). When this is the case, the variable is positive as predicted by Weinstein (2007). But when the universe is not limited in this way (models 6/7), the variable becomes negative and significant, a very surprising result. This difference may indicate something about the dissimilarity between insurgents in civil wars, the groups Weinstein described, and terrorists more generally. As concerns this point, two possibilities come to mind. First, terrorist groups are generally weaker than insurgents fighting organized civil wars. As a result, foreign sponsors may have more control over the tactical decisions of the group. For some sponsors, like states, adequate international and domestic pressure to withdraw support if the violent group attacks innocent civilians could force the violent group to attack fewer civilians in order to maintain its relationship with the sponsor. Secondly, states might sponsor a violent group as a way to enhance their existing military confrontation with other states, particularly if the state and the group have similar goals. For years, Kashmiri anti-Indian groups benefitted from a strong relationship with Pakistani authorities. Over 80 percent of attacks by the three primary terrorist groups with alleged connections to Pakistan, Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), have targeted non-civilian targets, especially government, military, and police. Sponsored groups may be more of a complement to the sponsor's existing military power.

The number of competing organizations has a positive influence on the odds that civilians will be attacked. Recall from previous discussions, this finding is not unexpected. Groups may target civilians as a way to demonstrate their resolve in the face of increased competitive pressure from other groups who compete for the same supporters. Although this finding is less significant from others (0.10 level), it provides evidence that competition positively impacts the odds of civilian-targeted attacks.

Domestic attacks are also positive and significantly related to attacks against civilians. The fact that groups are more likely to attack civilians when their attacks take place in the same country in which they are based is somewhat surprising. In cases of domestic terrorism, when civilians are attacked the presiding government should be able to react more swiftly to repress the threat than a foreign government. On the other hand, in cases of international terrorism like 9/11, the foreign government (the U.S in the case of 9/11) may be able to more easily repress the terrorists' supporters in another state with fewer direct consequences to their domestic constituency. The positive finding here may simply indicate that this dynamic is not the usual response.

In models eight and nine the universe of cases drops because of the addition of the urban/rural support group concentration variable. This variable remains consistent with earlier findings; groups that draw their support from supporters who are isolated are less likely to attack civilians. While most results are generally similar, there are a few notable differences. First, in model nine the significance on the political party variable decreases. This would be more alarming if the sign on the variable changed, but it does not. In this smaller universe of cases, the estimation is noisier but still indicates a negative relationship between political participation and civilian targeting. Secondly, the competitors variable loses its significance, although like the political participation variable, its sign remains unchanged. Finally, and most surprising, is that the variable indicating whether a group has a foreign sponsor is positive and significant. In the limited universe comprised of nationalist groups, having a foreign sponsor increases the odds that the group will attack civilians. This finding is consistent with existing literature. The fact that the findings are different with the larger universe of cases in models 6 and 7 may indicate something particular to nationalist groups. One possible explanation for this peculiarity is that the sponsors of nationalist groups are systematically different than non-nationalist sponsors. If nationalist groups tend to fill their coffers with donations from ex-patriots and non-nationalist groups develop ties with states, this difference might account for the positive finding. States may be better able to control their agents (and therefore reduce attacks on civilians) than unorganized groups of ex-patriots living in various locations.

Table 4.6 reports the results of regressions using the noncontiguous state measure and MAR indicator to proxy for group concentration.

Table 4.6: Regression Results Models 10-14					
Variable	**Model 10**	**Model 11**	**Model 12**	**Model 13**	**Model 14**
Associated Political Party	**-0.57 (0.48)**	**-1.35* (0.70)**	**-1.46** (0.59)**	**-1.45** (0.51)**	**-1.46** (0.60)**
Goods/Services Distribution	**0.79 (0.56)**	**1.31* (0.78)**	**0.36 (0.48)**	**1.12** (0.64)**	**1.22* (0.65)**
Support Group Concentration (Noncontiguous State)	**-2.23** (0.81)**		**-1.79*** (0.43)**		
Support Group Concentration (MAR Group)		**2.38** (1.02)**		**1.71** (0.71)**	**0.22 (0.86)**
Nationalist Group			**1.76*** (0.43)**		**2.04*** (0.43)**
Size of Group			**-0.26 (0.33)**	**-0.86 (0.56)**	**-0.60 (0.64)**
State or Foreign Sponsor			**-1.29** (0.63)**	**-2.14** (0.66)**	**-1.98** (0.74)**
Number of Competing Groups			**-0.16 (0.29)**	**0.73 (0.45)**	**0.69 (0.44)**
Domestic Attack			**0.93** (0.46)**	**1.19* (0.71)**	**1.00* (0.61)**
MIPT Structural Variable			**2.88*** (0.40)**	**2.80*** (0.39)**	**2.74*** (0.28)**
Constant	0.34 (0.83)	-1.96 (0.50)	-1.99 (1.11)	-2.27 (1.16)	-3.36 (1.59)
Num Observations	*3287*	*3332*	*3202*	*3247*	*3247*
R-Square	*0.23*	*0.20*	*0.43*	*0,37*	*0.39*
Num Clusters	*35*	*36*	*35*	*36*	*36*

Results from models 10 through 15 reveal similar trends amongst several key variables. Political party remains consistently negative and robust to a number of different specifications. With the exception of model 10, political participation has a significant relationship to target choice. Goods and service distribution also returns results similar to table 4.5. It is positive in each specification, although it is not significant in models 10 or 12 when the noncontiguous state variable is used. The results on both these variables, in particularly the consistency of their sign, further suggests that the theory has appropriately identified the relationship between political participation, service provision, and a group's decision to target civilians.

The first proxy measure for group concentration in table 4.6 is whether the state is noncontiguous. The negative sign indicates that attacks in noncontiguous states are less likely to target civilians. This is consistent with my theoretical expectations and a strongly significant finding in models 10 and 12. The results for the MAR proxy are curious. In models 10 and 13 the variable is positive and significant, the opposite of my theoretical expectations (recall, MAR groups are likely isolated leading me to theorize that civilian attacks from groups representing MAR groups would be unlikely). However, the MAR proxy is very sensitive to the inclusion of the nationalist variable (is significance goes away completely in model 14), indicating a degree of correlation between groups that are considered appropriate for the MAR and those with nationalist agendas (this was why "nationalist" was left out in models 5, 8, and 9). The two variables are highly correlated at 0.80. This suggests that in models 3c, 11, and 13 this variable is picking up much of the influence of the nationalist dummy which, from table 4.5, showed a clear positive relationship with civilian targeting. For this reason, I am less inclined to rely on the results from this variable while the other two measures, noncontiguous state and urban/rural distribution, were more robust and consistent with each other and my expectations.

Finally, the control measures in table 4.6 exhibit similar trends as in table 4.5. The nationalist indicator is positive and significant. The foreign sponsor indicator is negative, consistent with models 6 and 7 in which the larger universe of attacks is used. The domestic and MIPT variables remain positive and significant. The number of competing groups in table 4.6 is consistently insignificant. This dies differ from models 6 and 7, however the significance level in those models was low.

Substantive Results

To complement the results above, I used Clarify (Tomz, Winnenberg, and King 2003) to simulate the predicted probabilities and first differences associated with each variable. I began by simulating the logit regressions in models 5, 6, and 12.[76] I calculated first differences by initially setting the variables to their median levels (see table 3.3). One group that closely resembles an organization with median level characteristics is the Basque Fatherland and Freedom organization (ETA). ETA has a political party, is not a service provider, and most of its supporters live in an urban setting. It is a large nationalist organization, without a foreign sponsor and regularly conducts attacks against domestic (Spanish) targets.

[76] I present the first differences for models 5 and 6, although the first differences are calculated for models 7 through 9 and displayed in table 4a.5 in the appendix.

Table 4.7: Simulated First Differences Using Models 5, 6 and 12

When this characteristic	Shifts from … to …	Change in Probability that Civilians will be Attacked: **Model 5** (upper and lower bounds)	Change in Probability that Civilians will be Attacked: **Model 6** (upper and lower bounds)	Change in Probability that Civilians will be Attacked: **Model 12** (upper and lower bounds)
Associated Political Party	Group with Political Party to Non-Associated Group	**71.2% (41.1% to 85.3%)**	**34.7% (7.6% to 59.6%)**	**31.0% (4.9% to 55.2%)**
Goods/Services Distribution	Non-provider to Provider	**65.8% (43.7% to 75%)**	**34.1% (3.2% to 62.4%)**	**6.6% (-15% to 25%)**
Support Group Concentration (Urban/Rural)	Highly Urban to Mostly Rural	**-15.3% (-42.3% to -3%)**		
Support Group Concentration (Noncontiguous State)	Noncontiguous to Contiguous			**49.5% (29.3% to 66.4%)**
Nationalist Organization	Nationalist to Non-nationalist		**-31.7% (-56.3% to -9.8%)**	**-20.3% (-41.5% to -5.9%)**
Size of Group	Large Group to Small Group		**17.8% (-27.6% to 59.2%)**	**11.3% (-16.1% to 40.8%)**
State or Foreign Sponsor	Non-foreign Sponsor to Foreign Sponsor		**-25.8% (-51.1% to -4.1%)**	**-16% (-36.2% to -0.3%)**
Number of Competitors	One Competitor to 3 Competitors		**23.8% (-6.1% to 50.7%)**	**-3.8% (-19.7% to 17.6%)**
Domestic Attack	Domestic Attack to International Attack		**-32.3% (-57.7% to -9.5%)**	**-12.8% (-26.7% to -1.2%)**

Next, I calculate the first differences associated with models five and six. The resulting probabilities are displayed in table 4.7 (above). The first column, generated by simulating model 5, shows strong relationships between shifts in the three key independent variables and the probability that terrorist attacks will target civilians. In this model, the probability of attacks against civilians given median-level characteristics is 15 percent. If a median-level organization shifts from having a political party to not, the likelihood of its attacks targeting civilians increases by 71.2 percent. The upper and lower bounds indicate that the probability is 95 percent likely to lie between approximately 40 percent and 85 percent. This finding suggests my theory that political association reduces the likelihood that terrorist organizations will target their attacks against civilians is accurate.

Similarly confirmatory, the results for services and supporters' concentration suggest that changes in each of these variables alter the likelihood that an organization will attack civilians. By shifting from a non-provider to a provider, the probability of attacking civilians increases by 66 percent. When a terrorist group's supporters shift from a mainly urban to a mostly rural concentration, where they are easily targeted by government forces, the likelihood that the group will attack civilians decreases by 15 percent. The confidence bound for both goods and services provision and group concentration show that these findings are significantly different from zero.

This first difference for group concentration above is calculated by shifting the concentration variable from a five to a one. I generated graph 4.1 to view the effects along each level of the concentration variable.

Graph 4.1: Changes in the Probability that Civilians will be Attacked at Different Levels of Support base Concentration



The median value of the concentration variable is five, representing a mainly urban population. Holding both the political association and the services variable constant at their medians, the graph shows a dramatic leap from mostly urban to mainly urban supporting populations. The probability civilians will be attacked increases nearly 7 percent between these values. The difference between mostly urban and mixed populations is approximately 2.5 percent. The probability changes less than 1.5 percent over the first two categories of concentration (mainly rural and mostly rural). This trend suggests that organizations with primarily rural supporting populations are much more constrained when it comes to civilian attacks, whereas mostly urban and mainly urban-based organizations are significantly more likely to target civilians.

In the next column of table 4.7, I report the first differences for simulations using model 6. Since the group concentration variable is omitted in model six, the universe of attacks is much larger. In this model, the probability of attacks against civilians given median-level characteristics is 38 percent. Although both the services and political party variables no longer have such a substantial effect, both appear to remain sizeable predictors of targeting behavior. Shifts away from political association increase the chances that civilians will be targeted by 35 percent, and shifts toward service provision increase the likelihood that civilians will be targeted by 35 percent.

The substantive results for some of the control variables are very striking. By simulating a change in a group's ideology away from nationalism, the probability of civilians being attacked decreases by more than 30 percent. This analysis confirms that when groups embrace a nationalist or separatist ideology, they are considerably more likely to attack civilians. A secondary analysis of group type, one not preformed here, might examine different group types in this large-N setting, focusing on differences between more precise categories of organizations.

Large changes also occur when the type of attack shifts from being domestic to international. This effect lends credence to the idea that there is a significant difference between the logic of international and domestic attacks. The impact of shifting a group's funding source away from a foreign entity also has a substantial impact as indicated by the nearly 25% decline in the probability that the organization will attack civilians.

Finally, in the last column of table 4.7 I calculate first differences using model 12. The only new finding in this column is the sizable impact of noncontiguous states. Using this proxy measure instead of the urban/rural distinction, attacks on civilian targets increase by 49.5 percent when attacks take place in contiguous states. This sizable impact further suggests that the accessibility of a group's support base is an important factor in whether or not the organization targets civilians.

Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that studying violent outcomes in relation to nonviolent activities can yield insightful results. Target choice is simply one of a myriad of strategic decisions terrorists make, meaning that there is enormous potential for research projects to explore other aspects of violent decisions in context of terrorists' nonviolent behaviors. The reverse is true as well. We know very little about what makes groups become political or decide to offer communities assistance, and even less about how decisions to use violence may alter the course of these more benign activities.

In Chapter Three I presented a theory predicting three outcomes in democratic contexts: when terrorist groups are associated with political parties they are less likely to attack civilians; when terrorist groups provide services they are more likely to attack civilians; and when terrorists draw support from highly concentrated populations they are less likely to attack civilians. The analysis from this chapter supports these claims. In eight of the nine models the political party variable is significant and negative, and in the ninth model the variable is negative and just misses a standard significance level. In all models the services variable is significant and positive, as is the variable for group concentration.

These findings strongly suggest that terrorist organizations rely heavily on cultivating and maintaining support from civilian populations and this affects whether they target civilians with violence. These results demonstrate a link between how groups manage this support and the character of their violence. Perhaps inherent to organizations with political arms, the results above indicate that these groups in particular have more to lose when it comes to the decision about who or what to attack. The substantive results show that, overall, the most significant changes in targeting strategies occur when comparing politically active terrorist groups to non-active terrorist groups. It may be safe to assume, albeit it is untested in the current research, that politically active terrorist organizations seek more broad-based civilian support than their non-political counterparts. As a result, the median supporter of these organizations sits more in the middle of the political spectrum. He or she is likely more moderate and less tolerant of violence. Consequently, politically active groups are less willing to choose violent tactics that alienate median-level supporters.

This analysis shows that imposing costs is not the only link between terrorist groups and supporting populations. Violent choices have cost-imposing consequences, but some groups counter this dilemma by allocating efforts toward community service projects. These projects have a substantial effect on targeting decisions. The evidence here suggests that groups can and frequently do "buy loyalty" through this distributive mechanism, effectively enabling violent activities that would otherwise discourage supporters.

While the results in this chapter generally support my theory, panel data of this sort do not provide proof of causality and, consequently, cannot fully substantiate my theoretical mechanisms. The correlations here do not account for changes across time, a drawback to panel data. To tease out the causal mechanisms more clearly, in the next chapter I examine the development of the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland.

Chapter Four: Appendix

Table 4a.1: List of Groups that Never Attack in Democracies	
Group	**All attacks occur in….**
Aden Abyan Islamic Army	Yemen
Ansar al-Islam	Iraq
Ansar al-Sunnah Army	Iraq
Asbat al-Ansar*	Lebanon
Egyptian Islamic Jihad	Egypt, Yemen
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM)	Kashmir, Pakistan
Hezb-e Azadi-ye Afghanistan	Afghanistan
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)	Kashmir
Islamic Jihad Group (Uzbekistan)	Uzbekistan
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)	Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
al-Ittihaad al-Islami	Ethiopia, Somalia
al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb	Algeria, Ethiopia
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	Iraq, Saudi Arabia
*Although Lebanon's most recent polity score indicates a democracy, Asbat al-Ansar made this list because its attacks took place when Lebanon was considered a non-democratic regime.	

Table 4a.2: List of Rural and Urban Groups	
Rural Groups (MAR Group, Country)	**Urban Groups (MAR Group, Country)**
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Indian Tamils, Sri Lanka)	Basque Fatherland and Freedom (Basques, Spain)
Babbar Khalsa International (Sikhs, India)	Hamas (Palestinian, West Bank/Gaza Israel)
Abu Sayyaf Group (Moros, Philippines)	Palestine Liberation Front (Palestinians, West Bank/Gaza Israel)
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (Kashmiris, Kashmir)	Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Palestinians, West Bank/Gaza Israel)
Hizbul Mujahideen (Kashmiris, Kashmir)	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Palestinian, West Bank/Gaza Israel)
Jaish-e-Mohammad (Kashmiris, Kashmir)	PFLP -- General Command (Palestinians, West Bank/Gaza Israel)
Lashkar-e-Taiba (Kashmiris, Kashmir)	Tanzim (Palestinian, West Bank/Gaza Israel)
	al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (Palestinians, West Bank/Gaza Israel)
	al-Qaeda Organization in Palestine (Palestinians, West Bank/Gaza Israel)
	Asbat al-Ansar (Sunnis, Lebaanon)
	Continuity Irish Republican Army (Catholics in Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland UK)
	Hezbollah (Shi'is, Lebanon)
	Real Irish Republican Army (Catholics in Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland UK)
	Irish Republican Army (Catholics in Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland UK)
	Irish National Liberation Army (Catholics in Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland UK)

Table 4a.3: Regression Results Models 10-12			
Variable	**Model 10**	**Model 11**	**Model 12**
Associated Political Party	**-3.7*** (0.000)**	**-1.72** (0.007)**	**-2.19** (0.033)**
Goods/Services Distribution	**3.4*** (0.000)**	**1.43* (0.058)**	**4.23*** (0.000)**
Support Group Concentration	**0.62*** (0.000)**		**0.85* (0.083)**
Polity	**0.31** (0.011)**	**0.25 (0.248)**	**0.62 (0.329)**
Nationalist Group		**2.21*** (0.000)**	
Size of Group		**-0.20 (0.692)**	**0.47 (0.393)**
State or Foreign Sponsor		**-1.43** (0.034)**	**2.52** (0.038)**
Number of Competing Groups		**0.59* (0.086)**	**0.16 (0.414)**
Domestic Attack		**2.31*** (0.000)**	**2.20*** (0.000)**
Constant	-4.4 (0.000)	-5.7 (0.025)	-14.5 (0.015)
Num Observations	*2117*	*3696*	*2032*
R-Square	*0.44*	*0.33*	*0.49*
Num Clusters	*48*	*62*	*48*
*indicates significance at 0.10 ** significance at 0.05 ***significance at 0.001			

Table 4a.4: Regression Results Models 13-17					
Variable	**Model 13**	**Model 14**	**Model 15**	**Model 16**	**Model 17**
Associated Political Party	**-1.82 (1.18)**	**-1.05 (0.90)**	**-0.29 (0.69)**	**-1.10* (0.64)**	**-1.05 (0.66)**
Goods/Services Distribution	**2.64* (1.56)**	**3.06* (1.64)**	**0.63 (1.60)**	**-0.51 (0.53)**	**-0.47 (0.55)**
Support Group Concentration (Urban/Rural)	**1.08* (0.60)**	**1.04** (0.388)**	**0.10 (0.35)**		
Nationalist				**0.73 (0.52)**	**0.74 (0.53)**
Size of Group	**-0.26 (0.64)**	**0.34 (0.70)**	**-1.01 (0.84)**	**0.61 (0.41)**	**0.58 (0.42)**
State or Foreign Sponsor	**1.64 (1.28)**	**1.21 (1.27)**	**0.86 (1.18)**	**-0.98 (0.69)**	**-0.95 (0.72)**
Number of Competing Groups	**0.30 (0.30)**	**0.54** (0.27)**	**0.80** (0.31)**	**0.42** (0.16)**	**0.34* (0.20)**
Domestic Attack	**0.37 (0.41)**	**1.11** (0.45)**	**1.49** (0.58)**	**0.60 (0.41)**	**0.52 (0.45)**
MIPT Indicator	**2.72*** (0.20)**	**2.43*** (0.31)**	**2.62*** (0.38)**	**2.79*** (0.55)**	**2.92*** (0.52)**
Hamas Control	**1.25 (1.66)**	**0.08 (1.81)**	**1.52 (1.73)**	**1.45* (0.78)**	**1.14 (0.94)**
GDP Per Capita		**-0.36** (0.13)**	**-0.09 (0.35)**	**-0.74** (0.35)**	**-0.80** (0.37)**
Ethnic Fractionalization		**3.70** (1.70)**	**7.66*** (1.90)**	**-0.38 (0.86)**	**0.02 (0.93)**
Mountainous Terrain		**-0.50** (0.17)**	**-0.28 (0.23)**	**-1.04*** (0.21)**	**-0.99*** (0.27)**
Population			**-1.11*** (0.28)**		**0.26 (0.21)**
Constant	-8.06 (5.31)	-7.39 (4.09)	6.75 (5.29)	3.96 (2.90)	7.12 (3.41)
Num Observations	*1805*	*1218*	*1218*	*2448*	*2448*
R-Square	*0.53*	*0.47*	*0.49*	*0.41*	*0.41*
Num Clusters	*26*	*25*	*25*	*34*	*34*

Table 4a.5: Simulated First Differences Using Models 7-9

When this characteristic	Shifts from … to …	Change in Probability that Civilians will be Attacked: Model 7 (upper and lower bounds)	Change in Probability that Civilians will be Attacked: Model 8(upper and lower bounds)	Change in Probability that Civilians will be Attacked: Model 9 (upper and lower bounds)
Associated Political Party	Group with Political Party to Non-Associated Group	**28% (3.6% to 52%)**	**39.9% (2.6% to 78.3%)**	**-36.3% (-8.8% to 79.6%)**
Goods/Services Distribution	Non-provider to Provider	**26.4% (-1.0% to 3.7%)**	**74.9% (67% to 80.8%)**	**71.7% (58.3% to 81.4%)**
Support Group Concentration	Highly Urban to Mostly Rural		**-9% (-16.8% to -4%)**	**-15.8% (-28.8% to -6.9%)**
Nationalist Organization	Nationalist to non-nationalist	**-39.4% (-60.5 to -18.2%)**		
Size of Group	Large Group to Small Group	**21.6% (-25.6 to 58.3%)**	**1.2% (-9.9% to 33.4%)**	**2.6% (-17.6% to 41%)**
State or Foreign Sponsor	Non-foreign Sponsor to Foreign Sponsor	**-35.8% (-61.9% to -8.6%)**	**33% (4.5% to 68.3%)**	**40% (-4.2% to 75.2%)**
Number of Competitors	One Competitor to 3 Competitors	**24.7% (-5.6% to 47.2%)**	**4.9% (-3.4 to 21.9%)**	**11% (-6.4% to 44.6%)**
Domestic Attack	Domestic Attack to International Attack	**-21.5% (-45.7% to 3.2%)**	**-7.9% (-14.5% to -3.8%)**	**-5.2% (-12.8% to 1.8%)**
MIPT Structural Variable	Pre-1998 Attack to Post-1998 Attack	**-43.5% (-60.6% to -20.7%)**		**-14.7% (-26.8% to -6.5%)**

Chapter 5

Taming the Armalite with the Ballot Box: The IRA's Transformation in Northern Ireland

This chapter analyses the violent targeting patterns of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (hereafter, IRA). The IRA, established in 1969, was the primary organization opposing British influence in Northern Ireland. The conflict between British authorities and the IRA resulted in one of the longest bouts of low-intensity conflict in a contemporary democracy. The Troubles, as the conflict was later named, lasted until 2005 when the IRA officially laid down their arms.

In this chapter, I assess the impact of political participation on the IRA's willingness to attack civilians. This chapter's central goal is to assess propositions not sufficiently evaluated using the large-N analysis from Chapter Four. While that analysis demonstrated negative correlations between political participation and civilian targeting, it did not show conclusive proof that elections deter groups from attacking civilians because voters punish groups that do so. In this chapter I show how and why political participation leads to a decreased risk of civilian targeting by evaluating changes over time in targeting and political strategies. This focused approach allows me to rule out alternative possibilities suggesting that targeting and voting strategies are epiphenomenal to the context of the conflict itself and unrelated. In addition, over the course of my analysis, I discover several new things that add dimension and nuance to my theory. Specifically, the timing of elections and supporters' interpretation of a group's targeting choices influence targeting decisions, neither of which I previously described and both of which add clarity to my theory.

While a large number of groups operate in democracies and are considered terrorist organizations, I chose to study the IRA primarily because the group's political and violent history follows an interrupted time series framework. The group utilizes violence throughout the 30 years of the Troubles (with the limited exception of several ceasefires), but participates in politics only in the conflict's latter half. This allows me to compare relatively similar pre-treatment and post-treatment segments of time.

Another advantage to studying the IRA is that many of its activities are verifiable. Work on Northern Ireland has produced a monumental amount of data and discourse. Data on the attack patterns, target choices, collateral damage, and community projects of the IRA are easy to access and substantiate. This data boon should not be underestimated, particularly in conflict studies. Frequently conflict analyses are limited by unavailable quality data and, despite researchers' best intentions, statistical models (and some qualitative works) suffer as a consequence. Firsthand accounts of the Troubles are relatively easy to gather because the conflict has, for the most part, concluded. Lingering republican violence is usually retribution or related to criminal activity, both of which are a far cry from the frequency and intensity of violence prior to the Belfast agreement in 1998 and the group's decommissioning of arms in 2005. Given distance from the conflict period, accessing ex-IRA operatives, community members, and government officials was possible and interviewees were generally forthright with their answers.[77] Having this

[77] In addition to interviews, research on the IRA's violence and community activities comes from several sources. The first is documents and resources found at the Linen Hall library in Belfast. The second source

information is extremely advantageous because it allows me to address potentially confounding variables in order to determine the true effect politicalization has on target choice.

The chapter proceeds in the following sections. The next section outlines specific theoretical expectations about the IRA's targeting choices given its relationship with community supporters in Northern Ireland. The second section briefly lays out the history of the conflict and the Troubles. The third section provides the bulk of the analysis. In this section, I examine my central theoretical propositions. The subsequent section looks closely at alternative explanations. The last section concludes and reflects on how future studies might incorporate the lessons learned from this analysis.

Theoretical Expectations

To review, groups rely on community supporters for a variety of logistical and supportive functions. I argue that attacking civilians imposes significant costs on those same supporters, largely as a result of a government's reaction to terrorism. As supporters' costs increase, the odds that the marginal supporter will defect also increase. What exactly does it mean to defect or withdraw one's backing? I argue that one way is for supporters to punish violent organizations at the polls, by withdrawing their votes for the group's candidate or party. Results from Chapter Four indicate that, on average, groups running political parties are less likely to target civilians than groups that do not participate in politics. This finding suggests that the electoral mechanism is an effective

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is material from the CAIN archive online which is particularly helpful as a data source for attacks and electoral results.

way for supporters to check a group's violent tactics.[78] In other words, political organizations are less likely to target civilians because it is bad for political business--voters opt not to cast their ballots in a group's favor when it attacks civilians.

However, given the nature of available data, my previous analysis did not uncover the causal relationships between violence and politics. Terrorist organizations do not always start out with political wings; in fact, many contemporary large-scale movements began as purely violent groups that only backed political parties or candidates after some time (e.g., ETA, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the IRA). I begin this analysis by examining the following proposition relating political participation to target selection:

Proposition 1: Because attacks on civilians impose costs on supporters and supporters can punish groups that compete in elections, when a group previously outside the political arena begins to compete in elections, it will decrease attacks on civilian targets.

This proposition addresses how changes over time in a group's political strategy can impact its military strategy. As a group begins to participate in electoral politics, it subjects itself to punishment. Because it is less likely that individuals will back a group that attacks civilians, I anticipate that groups will decrease attacks on civilian targets once they participate in elections.

For the IRA, this temporal pattern is clear in the first two decades of the group's existence. In the 1970's, IRA attacks on civilian targets are at their height, as are the costs associated with repressive government and unionist paramilitary actions against Catholic

[78] However, it could also mean that groups with political stakes are less likely to target civilians because it reduces their legitimacy to voters and not necessarily because voters punish for such behavior (although the two outcomes probably do exist simultaneously). One goal of this chapter, therefore, will be to establish that voters do react to civilian targeting and that groups, in turn, change their behavior.

communities. The IRA's targeting strategy changed dramatically around 1980 when it began to prepare itself for political competition in local and national politics, beginning with the election for the Northern Irish Assembly. The group began crafting a strategy (including explicit appeals to the Northern Irish electorate and tempering its violent attacks on civilians) aimed at garnering support for Sinn Fein, the IRA's political party. Although its political activity increased steadily throughout the 1980's, I anticipate that the violent wing of the organization altered its military strategy at the beginning of the IRA's political transformation to reflect its newly established political constraints. In comparative terms, then, violence before 1980 should look substantively different than it did after 1980.

Evaluating the pre- and post-electoral patterns is important and shows how the incentives of an organization change with politicization. Equally important for my theory, however, is to demonstrate that the punishment mechanism does in fact work when applied. The odds a group's military strategy will change are dependent on its leadership's expectations that community members will opt to punish the organization at the polls. If IRA supporters within the Catholic community could endure or did not care about the costs associated with civilian targeting, they would be less likely to alienate IRA-backed political candidates. If voters do not punish a violent group for attacks on civilian targets the null hypothesis to mine is supported--competing in elections has no effect on civilian targeting. Theoretically, however, I expect the opposite. As attacks on civilian targets rise, an organization's supporters will punish the group at the polls, thereby demonstrating the punishment mechanism. Consequently proposition two states:

Proposition 2: A group's political party will suffer electoral losses as violent attacks on civilian targets increase.

Interestingly, the early 1990's provides a window through which to judge whether or not the IRA was ever really punished for attacking civilians. Between 1989 and 1994, IRA attacks on civilian targets spiked relative to the decades after and before that time period. The sudden increase in civilian attacks can be traced to the beginning of peace negotiations and several bouts of intense intercommunal violence--factors I explain below. By focusing on the changes in Sinn Fein's vote share before, during, and after that time period, I find evidence that the electorate in Northern Ireland did in fact sanction (and then subsequently reward) Sinn Fein in response to the IRA's violent choices. The evidence links individual's expectations about the costs of supporting the IRA directly to its targeting choices. Prior to delving into the analysis, I briefly describe the historical context from which the IRA emerged.

Historical Overview: The Rise of Militant Republicanism

The IRA's objectives originated from an organization called the Irish Volunteers, a group gathered at the behest of several outspoken Irish nationalists in November 1913. The volunteers were ideologically dedicated to the principle of Irish home rule, something that had been debated for nearly 75 years in Westminster. During World War One, the Volunteers planned one of Ireland's most famous violent episodes, the Easter Rising of 1916. The timing of the rising was intended to take advantage of English forces who were largely involved elsewhere. During the Rising, Irish rebels, including the Volunteers, captured prominent buildings in Dublin. Most famous was the rebels' hold out in the General Post Office in central Dublin. After a week, the rebellion was suppressed.

What followed from the defeat, however, was not the movement's devastation. To the contrary, what came after the rebellion marked the beginning of large-scale militant Irish nationalism and the popularized ideational basis for the contemporary IRA. After defeating the rebels, British authorities executed 15 of those involved. They did so over many days and in a manner so deplorable, including executing a rebel leader shackled to a chair because his ankle was shattered, that popular opinion about the British occupation of Ireland turned sour.

> The executions helped to achieve what the rebellion itself had not--an intensification of nationalist feeling well beyond the rebel ranks. Together with the post-Rising arrest and internment of many people, the executions produced sympathy for that rebel cause which they were supposed to undermine…the dead rebels became martyrs. Masses, postcards and badges all honoured them in the post-Rising period.[79]

The British reaction provided a springboard for growing dissent to codify into organized popularly-supported nationalist sentiment. This aggressive type of nationalism would become the central organizing principle for Irish nationalists for the next 100 years.

By 1919 violence broke out again, spearheaded by Irish nationalists in what was later termed the War of Independence. Despite a relatively unorganized IRA, popular opinion continued to solidify behind Irish nationalists, forming the IRA's historical base of support.

In 1920 Westminster passed the Government of Ireland Act. The 1920 act extended home rule privilege to Southern Ireland and provided a separate parliament for

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[79] English. 2003. Page 5

the remaining six counties in Northern Ireland. While unionists supported this split, republicans did not and the fighting continued until 1921 when the sides agreed to the Anglo-Irish Treaty. The treaty established Ireland as a dominion under England and provided a mechanism for Northern Ireland to opt out and be ruled directly from London (an option the North ended up taking). The treaty divided Irish nationalists. Although many republicans, including Michael Collins the epic Irish nationalist famed by Hollywood, agreed to the terms of the treaty, many others did not, arguing that Ireland should be fully independent and not an English dominion. Fighting broke out between the pro-treaty and anti-treaty sides, and resulted in one of the bloodiest chapters in Irish history. The Irish Civil War was short-lived, lasting only from 1922 to1923. Although accounts differ slightly, most claim that approximately 500 people died in and around Belfast just between 1920 and 1922.[80] In 1923 the anti-treaty republicans (the IRA) laid down their arms in defeat, although not before many could legitimately claim that Northern Ireland had been born into violence.

After the civil war, violence did not end, although it abated significantly. The IRA was fraught with mounting internal pressure that pitted those who saw the movement's future in politics against more traditional views of the group as a purely military endeavor. This divide stemmed from more than a spat over tactical approaches. At its core, the debate was about the group's guiding philosophies. Many within the IRA saw the government in the South as illegal and counter to the group's goals. Advocating participation in the Southern Government instead of continued abstentionism meant "transversing the quagmire of traditional republican philosophy which specifically

[80] For instance, see McKittrick and McVea 2000, page 4 or English 2003, page 39.

rejected any move that would give the recognition to what was regarded as the illegal Southern parliament."[81] Readers acquainted with the group's modern history will recognize the familiarity of this tension; in later years the IRA split numerous times over whether political participation was an appropriate course to take.

In the 1940's the IRA consolidated its military wing and launched attacks in Ireland and Britain. Scores of the attacks went wrong and near the end of the decade the movement was at its knees. After years of regrouping, in 1956 the IRA surfaced again in a series of significant battles named the "Border Campaign." The aim of this campaign was to use camps in the southern state as logistical bases and attack significant targets in Northern Ireland. The reaction by authorities on both sides of the border was swift and repressive. The police in the south made planning difficult, while interment was introduced in the North. In addition, public support for the campaign did not materialize largely because the conflict was contained to very specific locations outside of major cities (Moloney 2002). After 5 years, the campaign lost steam and the group fell back yet again.

In the late 1960's, internal debates about the group's future dominated the organization's agenda. Many involved believed recognizing and participating in the political institutions of the North and South was the appropriate next step. A smaller group did not and, by December 1969, those with staunch views about abstentionism broke from the IRA to form the Provisional IRA. The Provisionals (known as the IRA after 1969) proclaimed themselves to be the communal defenders of the Irish in Northern

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[81] Smith. 1995. Page 60.

Ireland and began a violent campaign against British rule in the northern six counties, thus starting the contemporary period known as the Troubles.

Analyzing the Propositions

In this section I analyze Propositions One and Two through the lens of the Troubles, a period lasting from 1970 to 2005. The analysis focuses on establishing the effect of political participation on a group's targeting as described in Chapter Three. Insofar as possible, the analysis follows the historical evolution of the organization.

Prior to the analysis, I provide a brief explanation of the major actors involved in the conflict. On the nationalist or republican side, the IRA was the dominant organization. Other smaller splinter groups emerged throughout the conflict, but none came close in size, influence, or capability to the IRA. A large number of security and government forces battled with the IRA, including British officials, the British army, and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Northern Ireland's police force. Aside from government and security forces, the IRA's major adversaries were loyalist (also known as unionist) paramilitary groups. The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) were the two major loyalist groups. While religious differences did divide the antagonists, religious institutions were not central to the conflict and are not included in this analysis.[82]

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[82] In none of my interviews with ex-IRA, UVF, or UDA members did individuals ever refer to or describe the conflict as religious in nature. In fact, some made a point of indicating that it was in fact not a conflict based on religious tenets. Therefore, my analysis excludes references to the Catholic or Protestant churches, although groups on both sides did interact with religious leaders. For the IRA, these relationships were highly important and facilitated negotiations, an issue not directly addressed here. Interested readers should refer to English (2003) or Ruane and Todd (1996).

Proposition One: Comparing Violence, Pre and Post-Electoral Competition

This section compares IRA targeting before and after competing in elections. The group began its foray into electoral politics around 1980. I find a considerable difference between pre- and post-electoral competition periods; during the former, the IRA appears much more willing to attack civilian targets compared to the latter period. Statements from the Republican leadership during the transition to politics indicate an awareness of the negative political consequences associated with civilian targeting. These findings confirm Proposition One and suggest that political participation changes the incentives of an organization to target civilians. In the subsequent section I provide evidence that establishes the existence of the punishment mechanism, which is the mechanism I argue that makes a political organization's incentives differ from an organization without a political wing.

i. Violence Pre-Electoral Competition

The first decade of the Troubles marked the most intense wave of violence either side would see throughout the conflict. Between 1970 and 1976, IRA attacks against civilian targets were at their height (Graph 5.1 below-see Eugene (2007) for data description). In absolute terms, the IRA was responsible for nearly 300 attacks on civilian targets during this time.

Graph 5.1: Number of IRA Attacks on Civilian Targets, 1971-1997.



This level of intensity is not surprising given two factors. First, IRA supporters had little recourse. The punishment mechanism did not exist at this stage in the conflict. Secondly, the wave of intense violence coincided with IRA efforts to provide community services within Catholic communities of Belfast. Recall from Chapter Three, I predict that by providing services organizations secure supporters and can afford to pursue violence against civilian targets. The IRA facilitated its community outreach efforts by establishing advice centers that forged links between Catholic communities and IRA members. In author interviews, one police officer who operated under cover in Belfast described the centers as, "facilities where members of the public were encouraged to come, which reinforced the IRA as part and parcel of the community."[83]

Through advice centers, the IRA provided two central services. First, community members received education and assistance on housing and welfare issues, as well as legal representation and advice.[84] This was particularly important in many neighborhoods

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[83] Author interview, March 2009.

[84] Over the decades, many of the advice centers targeted their services at specific segments of the population. For instance, Picture 5a.1 in the appendix shows a poster advertising the services of the Falls Neighborhood Women's Center, dated 1987.

where the civil rights movement had provoked many uninvolved in the nationalist conflict to protest the British and Unionist government's distribution of housing and welfare benefits. Secondly, the centers gave the IRA bases from which to consolidate control over the security of neighborhoods. The IRA's security activities were localized; most were contained within small pockets of nationalist communities in Belfast, mainly in Western Belfast where the poorest Catholics lived. Interviews with community members, police, and ex-IRA characterize the group's security forces into two types. First, a portion of group members were devoted to fighting the "outside enemy", including the state police forces, British armed services, and loyalist paramilitaries. The second segment of IRA security forces was a quasi-policing force. Individuals in these units were tasked with taking care of "anti-social" behaviors within the community. Anti-social behavior included a large range of things from theft to offensive neighbors. Members of the community reported suspected individuals (informers) or activities (such as neighborhood crime, drugs, or petty theft) to the IRA through the advice centers.[85]

Apart from these community services, what effect did the IRA and its violence have on nationalist communities during the conflict's early years? In Chapter Three I theorized that violence against civilian targets inflicts costs on a group's supporters. These costs are the reason why communities punish organizations. The IRA's history supports this logic; during the 1970's civilian supporters of the IRA paid dearly for the group's behavior. Two major sources of these costs were the British authorities and loyalist paramilitary groups.

[85] IRA units dealt heavy punishments to anti-social behavior; guilty individuals would be knee-capped (a process in which a person's knees were shot) or six-packed (when ankles, knees, and wrists were shot) depending on the severity of their crime and the resources the IRA expended to catch the individual. Author interview with police official (covert unit). Spring 2009.

For their part, British authorities reacted swiftly to a several hundred fold increase in the number of IRA attacks on civilian targets. In 1971 the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Brian Faulkner, ordered authorities to detain suspected terrorists indefinitely. Operation Demetrium, otherwise known as internment, lasted through 1975. Prime Minister Faulkner described his decision to implement internment as a method to target the IRA and diminish the threat to civilians.

> The main target of the present operation is the Irish Republican Army which has been responsible for recent acts of terrorism and whose victims have included protestant and catholic alike. They are the present threat…[They] have murdered in cold blood, created situations which have led to death or injury to people quite uninvolved in disorder, maimed numerous people including young children and put at risk the jobs and whole future of entire communities.[86]

The operation's implementation was haphazard. Civilians from communities with suspected IRA ties, not necessarily IRA members, were jailed and tortured. English (2003) notes that in the first twenty four hours of internment, fewer than 100 of the 342 people arrested were affiliated with the IRA.[87] Throughout internment, Catholic communities suffered at the hands of the British and Northern Irish authorities. Many of those picked up were relatives of the individuals named on the interment lists, while many others simply fit the physical description and were found in the correct area.[88] By the end of internment, thousands of individuals suspected of terrorism had been arrested, most were released, and some were subjected to experimental interrogation treatment including constant 'white noise', inconsistent sleep patterns, and being forced to stand for long periods of time. Although some internment activities targeted unionist

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[86] BBC 1971.
[87] English 2003, page 140.
[88] Coogan 1995, page 126.

paramilitaries, of the 1,981 people detained, over 94 percent (1,874) were of Catholic or republican background.[89] And most of those individuals were from communities the IRA purported to represent, although few had actual links to the violent group.

While internment was incredibly costly for those in Catholic communities, the costs did not lessen when internment ended. The mid-1970's ushered in a period of sectarian battles between IRA and loyalist paramilitary groups (many with alleged links to government authorities). Of the 516 civilian deaths caused by the IRA, nearly 45 percent fell between 1972 and 1976. For loyalist paramilitaries, the numbers are starker. Of the 845 civilian deaths caused by these organizations, 59 percent occurred during the same time period.[90]

During this period both the loyalists and the IRA engaged an "indiscriminate sectarian killing game," resulting in scores of tit-for-tat attacks against civilian targets.[91] For IRA leaders, targeting civilians at this point seemed necessary. One IRA leader noted that, "Republicans had to hit back at Loyalists. It was as simple as that. They were slaughtering the Nationalists. There was no other way around it."[92] Yet for the Loyalist paramilitaries, evidence indicates that this reaction was exactly what they wanted because the logic behind loyalist killings hinged on undermining the IRA's nationalist support base. Moloney (2002) described this logic aptly as, "terrifyingly simple: the more Catholics [Loyalists] killed and the more horrible the manner of their deaths, the stronger the pressure would be on the IRA to stop its activities."[93] In one author interview, one

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[89] CAIN Web Service. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/intern/sum.htm. Accessed 4/7/2009
[90] Sutton Index of Deaths, found at CAIN Web Service.
[91] Moloney2002.
[92] Moloney 2002. Page 146
[93] Moloney2002 . Page 145

community member who now works establishing links between Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods reiterated this dynamic. "Loyalists targeted catholic citizens. They wanted to turn the community against [the IRA] which brought the realization that nobody would win the conflict."[94] Why was the IRA so easily provoked if it meant a loss in support? For one reason, at this stage of the conflict no formal punishment mechanism existed for civilians to express their dissatisfaction. For individuals living in nationalist communities supporting the IRA and its tit-for-tat violence meant risking costly retribution. The accounts above support my theory that civilian targeting imposes high costs on a group's supporters and that in the absence of a clear mechanism to punish the group, attacks on civilians targets are likely.

During these early years, the IRA behaved predictably. It provided community services, perhaps securing some supporters, while those who were not won over lacked a method through which to punish the group for any cost-imposing violence (i.e. civilian targeting). Theoretically, this combination of factors predicts a conflict in which civilian targets are frequently in the crosshairs, something that did occur early in the Troubles. Yet in the late 1970's, a fundamental strategic change began to take root. The group's leadership began considering (and ultimately accepting) opening the organization up to political competition.

ii. The Decision to Integrate Politics into the Struggle

Why did the movement embrace politics? Theoretically, there are a large number of possibilities that a group like the IRA would do so. Becoming political is one way to compete with rival groups or increase an organization's funding. For the IRA, running for

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[94] Author interview, October 2008.

political office prolonged the movement's momentum.[95] One IRA supporter commented retrospectively that after the sectarian battles "republicans realized that they needed a political strategy."[96] This sentiment was echoed by Gerry Adams himself who, by the late 1970's, had been involved in IRA activities for the better part of a decade (English 2003, Bell 2000, and Rafter 2002). In his autobiography, Adams wrote that "it was becoming clearer that the main problem was that the struggle had been limited to armed struggle. Once this stopped, the struggle stopped."[97]

As the Republican movement began its metamorphism into a political *and* violent struggle, its leadership grappled with two issues: the need to sell the political idea to a segment of hard care extremists within the Republican ranks and, once there was sufficient buy-in, what the shift into politics would mean for the group's violent tactics. Convincing all Republicans that a political struggle was necessary proved difficult. The fact that not all IRA leaders bought into the idea made the transformation nearly impossible. At the heart of the issue was that the political strategy alienated members who found the contradictions in participating in British-imposed political institutions unacceptable. The decision to move into electoral politics had plagued the group before, causing splits within IRA ranks. Disagreement over this issue prompted the formation of two dissident groups, the Real IRA (RIRA) and the Continuity IRA (CIRA).[98] In dealing with its transformation into politics, IRA and Sinn Fein leadership began to consider and

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[95] This type of shift was not easily digested by purists in the IRA. The idea of participating in British imposed institutions made many uncomfortable and some downright militant. In later years when the group did finally embrace politics, a extreme faction would split and form a dissident group called the Continuity IRA

[96] Author interview, October 2008.

[97] Adams 1996. Page 247.

[98] Members of these groups exist today; in fact, the CIRA was most recently alleged responsible for the late February 2009 bombings in Northern Ireland that left two police men, two soldiers, and two civilians dead.

eventually advocate for a more professional violent strategy. Underpinning this strategy were two central themes.

First, the Republican leadership had to convince the movement's base that violence would remain an important, if not the most important tactic in the struggle. This was important because many hard-liners who fundamentally opposed the move to politics were primarily concerned that the IRA would take a back seat to Sinn Fein. In order to reassure those uncomfortable with the move into politics, Republican leaders regularly described and justified the political struggle as a complement to the violent struggle. In a now famous speech at a Sinn Fein convention in November 1981, party leader Danny Morrison asked delegates, "Who here really believes we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with the ballot paper in one hand and the Armalite in the other, we take power in Ireland?"[99] In 1982 at a Sinn Fein convention, a motion passed indicating that "all candidates in national and local elections, and all campaign material, be unambivalent in support of the armed struggle."[100] Even as late as 1984 Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams noted that "armed struggle is a necessary and morally correct form of resistance in the six counties [Northern Ireland] against a government whose presence is rejected by the vast majority of Irish people."[101] The move into politics was not intended to end or diminish the violent struggle. In fact, the move into politics forced Republican leaders to reassure the base that violence would continue.

The second theme resonating through the Republican ranks during the political transformation was the acknowledgment that political participation demanded reforming

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[99] Rafter, 2005. P. 114 After that date, the combined forces of Sinn Fein at the polls and the IRA in armed struggle were termed the 'Ballot Box and Armalite' strategy.
[100] Rafter 2005. Page 119.
[101] English, 2003. P. 244

(but not eliminating) the group's violent tactics. Danny Morrison, in an interview after coining the "Ballot Box and Armalite" strategy described above, expressed a tension between politics and violence. He admitted that, "I wanted to reassure people that it was possible to support the waging of an armed struggle and simultaneously take part in electoral politics—even though deep down I knew there were contradictions. I knew there was a ceiling to how far you could go."[102]

For the Republican leadership, the ceiling created by political participation imposed certain professional standards on the IRA units which had previously been unconcerned with the electoral ramifications of their actions. Specifically, civilian targeting became significant as the organization began campaigning for voters. This was evident as early as the late 1970's, when Gerry Adams was beginning to craft the strategy to join the IRA and Sinn Fein. In response to the 1978 La Mon House hotel bombing, in which dozens of civilians were killed and injured, Gerry Adams lamented that he could "feel two years of work go down the drain".[103] McKittrick and McVea (2000) noted that:

> Up until the La Mon bomb the IRA had been causing fewer civilian casualties, partly because the drop in loyalist violence had brought a sharp decrease in the tit-for-tat killings, and partly because it knew how counterproductive civilian deaths were. For the IRA the almost unimaginable horror of the La Mon attack was a disastrous setback, since although it regarded itself as an army, almost the entire world regarded the La Mon as sheer terrorism, indefensible on any basis.[104]

The need to protect civilians was felt not only in the context of the IRA's political conquests in the North, but also amongst nationalist supporters in the Republic of Ireland. The fact that the IRA drew heavily on resources from the south and that the group called

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[102] English 2003. Page 225
[103] McKittrick and McVea, 2000. P. 129
[104] McKittrick and McVea, 2000. P. 129

for unification of North and South meant that its constituents in the South were important. Neumann (2005) argued that because "the killing of civilians of whatever community [was] strongly rejected among the electorate in the Irish Republic," the IRA faced considerable constraints in its ability to generate mass-support north and south of the border while civilians continued to be square in IRA crosshairs.

The process of fully incorporating reforms and convincing all IRA units to conduct themselves in a "voter-friendly" way was hastened when a series of events cleared an unexpected political path for the organization. Bobby Sands, a republican hunger striker, died while on strike in prison. Sands death came days after his election to serve as a Westminster MP. His symbolism as an MP proved to many that republican interests could be successfully engaged at a political level. More than that, Sands' death demonstrated that Republicans could win. What had been a slow march toward accepting a political strategy within the IRA's ranks gathered speed. The irony of these events was that the hunger strikes were not intended to hasten this process.

> It would be wrong…to see 1981 as *beginning* a process of republican politicization: it would be more accurately understood as a unintended accelerator of a process already favoured by the leaders of the movement…Before 1981, the republican leadership had been trying to move in a political direction; indeed, one of the ironies of the hunger strike was that republican opposition outside the jail to the prisoners' intended strike was partly based on the objection that such a strike would divert time, energy and attention away from the process of politicization which republican leader wanted to pursue – and which the hunger strike in the end reinforced.[105]

The vehicle for the IRA's political strategy was Sinn Fein, a nationalist party begun in the south at the turn of the century. Sinn Fein shared its ideational foundations

[105] English. 2003. Page 206-207

with the IRA, and many Sinn Fein members shared allegiances between the two groups. Sinn Fein was a natural partner. Sinn Fein began its official foray into politics in 1982, by winning 10 percent of the vote in the election for the Northern Ireland Assembly. [106]

Through its formative years the political leadership continued to reaffirm that that there were consequences imposed by IRA attacks on civilian targets. In response to a 1988 IRA attack that killed two Catholics, Republican leader Martin McGuinness said that "while the freedom struggle goes on the IRA has a responsibility to ensure as much as humanly possible that civilians are not endangered."[107] A year later, the group's leadership reaffirmed McGuinness' statement and indicated an acute awareness that attacks on civilians were bad for political business. In reporting on a closed session of a 1989 Sinn Fein conference in which the IRA Army Council delivered a message, the Belfast Telegraph reported that "the IRA is to take greater care to avoid civilian casualties in its terror campaign in response to concern expressed by Sinn Fein over the effect of its operations on the party's political prospects." At that same conference, in his Presidental address Gerry Adams warned members about the "detrimental effect of the IRA killings on civilians". He went on to say that "the wider base of the republican movement had the right to question and did question those IRA operations in which civilians were killed or injured." Then vice-president McGuinness reiterated Adams'

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[106] Throughout the 1980's, Sinn Fein gathered steam, winning sizable victories in several elections. In 1983, Sinn Fein won 13.4 percent of the votes in a race for seats in Westminster. In 1984, it won 13.3 percent of the votes in European Elections. In 1985, it won nearly 12 percent of votes in elections for local representatives.

[107] English 2003. Page 259

sentiments by noting that the "killings of 'non-combatants' had a damaging effect on morale."[108]

Just as IRA leadership argued during the organization's political conception in the early 1980s, sustaining a political base throughout its formative years meant that its violent attacks had to keep civilians out of the crosshairs. But to what extent were the leadership's statements reflected on the battlefield? Did the IRA change its violent tactics when Sinn Fein began its venture into electoral politics? I analyze this issue below.

iii. Violence Post-Electoral Competition

According to Proposition One, the IRA should have profoundly altered its targeting strategy after 1982 when Sinn Fein stood for election. The data and historical record support this argument. During the 1980's, attacks on civilian targets were significantly lower. In fact, the total number of attacks intended for civilian targets between 1980 and 1989 was 14, which was lower than the total for any one year from the previous decade.

A close inspection of the data, however, reveals that the organization decreased its attacks on civilian targets well before it actually competed in elections. This suggests a slightly more nuanced version of events than that implied by Proposition One. Specifically, these events suggest a modification to the temporal implications of Chapter Three's theory. Groups do not simply change their violent strategy when they begin to participate in elections. The change can take place earlier as a result of a forward thinking leadership anticipating strategic modifications. Thus, the nuance lies in the timing; changes in a group's targeting patterns should precede electoral participation. This is

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[108] All quotes from Sinn Fein conference coverage by Devine (1989) of The Belfast Telegraph.

consistent with the overall theory that groups should be accounting for their supporter's reactions to violence.

One reason IRA attacks may have decreased is that the group's community outreach and services distribution had faltered, leaving the organization unable to secure support through this mechanism. Yet throughout the late 1970's and early 1980's, the advice centers continued to operate, offering a larger variety of services (including some cultural activities like Irish language classes) and were soon turned into Sinn Fein community centers. Additionally, during the hunger strikes in the early 1980's, the IRA ran transportation services for the families and friends of imprisoned individuals from Catholic communities.[109] Had services gone down, I would have expected a drop in the rate of civilian targeting. The evidence, however, indicates the level of IRA community services was steady, if not increasing, during this time period, ruling out a link between the group's service provision and its radical shift in targeting.

The development of a political wing is the single most significant change in the group's strategy and most obvious explanation for the decrease in civilian targeting. One potential point of contention is that political participation decreases violence overall, which means the level of attacks against civilians should also go down. Upon developing its political wing, the IRA did decrease the number of violent attacks which, subsequently, meant the level of attacks intended against civilians also dropped. Telling, however, is that despite the lower levels of violence after Sinn Fein entered politics, the violence that did occur was orchestrated very differently. The Proportion of attacks on civilians dropped precipitously. Between 1971 and 1980, 32 percent of IRA attacks were

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[109] Author interviews, March 2009.

directed at civilian targets. Between 1981 and 1990, that number dropped by 66 percent. Only 11 percent of attacks were aimed at civilians in the latter time period. Graph 5.2 shows the bi-yearly proportions and overall trend in the proportion of civilians attacks between 1971 and 1990. The results clearly show that the nature of IRA violence changed just prior to the group's first electoral competition; the proportion of attacks on civilians decreased. Furthermore, Graph 4.2 also shows that as competition continued throughout the 1980's, the IRA chose not to target civilians in the same proportion as it had during the 1970's when its leadership was neither contemplating nor participating in electoral competition. In the end, these proportions suggest that running for political office had a considerable negative impact on the group's inclination to attack civilians.

Graph 5.2: Proportion of Civilian Attacks: 2-Year Averages



An alternative interpretation to this course of events, at least in the IRA's case, is that the decrease in civilian-targeted attacks reflected Adams' personal preferences and had little to do with his forethought on the IRA's political participation. This argument seems quite plausible. After all, the decrease in both violence and attacks coincides with

Adams' start on the IRA's Army Council. However, Adams had been in charge of the Belfast section of the IRA during the group's most bloody years, 1971-1973, and had clearly demonstrated the capability and willingness to target civilians (English 2003). The fact that his tenure on the Army Council coincided with a reduction in violence appears mostly as a coincidence. Thus, the reduction in the number of attacks on civilians is more likely related to the group's politicalization. Historically, violence under Adams' direction did not indicate his unwillingness to target civilians.

Analysis of the IRA's behavior before and after it entered politics supports my theoretical claims: organizations that participate in politics should be less likely to target civilians. In addition, events reveal that a decrease in civilian targeting may coincide with the leadership's decision to begin pursuing politics rather than the group's formal participation in political processes. While consistent with my theoretical expectations, events during this time merely suggest that those within the IRA considered political outcomes when they orchestrated their violent campaign. They do not provide a real test of the punishment mechanism. Since attacks on civilian targets remained low, electoral outcomes cannot be causally linked to targeting changes. However, in the late 1980's and early 1990's patterns of violence change and attacks on civilians increase, presenting both a challenge to my theory and an opportunity to analyze whether or not supporters actually use elections as a method of punishment. I focus on these issues below.

Proposition Two: Punishment for Civilian Attacks

In this section, I evaluate whether or not supporters use elections to punish an organization for targeting civilians. In the late 1980's and early 1990's, IRA attacks on civilian targets increased dramatically. Focusing on electoral outcomes over this time period, I find that Sinn Fein did in fact loose supporters when IRA violence put civilians in the crosshairs. But this time period is a double-edged sword for my theory. While I successfully predict the decrease in electoral support following an increase in IRA attacks on civilian targets, my theory does not predict that the group should have increased its attacks on civilians in the first place. I begin this section by examining this contradiction. Why did the group's violence change in the face of what appeared to be incentives to keep civilian targeting at a minimum? Below I discuss two reasons for the change: mistakes or bad operations that contributed to a rise in sectarian violence and the negotiations process that led the IRA to enforce conformity within Catholic communities.

The increase in civilian attacks largely resulted from several catastrophic IRA operations in which civilians became the unintended targets. These "bad operations" began on November 8th, 1987, when an IRA bomb went off killing thirteen civilians in the town of Enniskillen. The attack left many aghast throughout nationalist communities. Those dead were among many gathered for a remembrance ceremony for servicemen killed during the First and Second World Wars. The IRA claimed the bomb had been intended for soldiers and police and that the timing mechanism had failed. This excuse had little sway as communities reacted to the horrifying events. One senior IRA figure noted that "after disasters like Enniskillen, houses were shut to the IRA."[110] In interviews with IRA members after the bombing, David McKittrick (1998) reported the following exchange:

> A few days after Enniskillen, in a small back room off the Falls Road, a senior IRA man told me: "Politically and internationally, [Enniskillen] is a major setback. Our support is in concentric rings. The centre is the

[110] Moloney 2002, page 324.

> republican movement, the next is the nationalist community in the north, followed by the south, then solidarity groups, left groups and finally international sympathy. Our central base can take a hell of a lot of jolting and crises, with limited demoralization. But the outer reaches are just totally devastated."[111]

The second major mistake for the IRA occurred in 1993. An IRA bomb in a fish shop along Protestant-dominated Shankhill road exploded at noon on a Saturday, killing nine and injuring sixty others. All of the victims were civilians, despite IRA claims that the bomb had been intended for members of unionist paramilitary groups. While the attacks at Shankhill and Enniskillen may or may not have been directed at civilians (bad operations had occurred throughout the conflict and usually were less catastrophic[112]), bad operations provoked intercommunal sectarian violence akin to that of the mid-1970's. Unionist paramilitary groups killed scores of Catholics seeking revenge for attacks like that in the fish shop on Shankhill Road. The IRA responded in kind, attacking civilians nearly 90 times between 1988 and 1994.

Attacks against civilians also increased as a result of political negotiations, which took place simultaneously. Negotiations occurred along two fronts. First, talks began between leaders of the two primary groups representing nationalist interest--Sinn Fein and the Social, Democratic, and Labour Party (SDLP).[113] The parties differed on exactly what constituted the core antagonism in Northern Irish politics; for the SDLP, the IRA's violence provoked intra-community rivalries that produced the central disagreements. For

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[111] McKittrick 1998.

[112] For instance, on October 4th, 1989, the IRA shot James Babington, a Catholic living in Belfast with no connections to paramilitary groups on either side of the conflict or security forces. In a public statement, the IRA expressed profound regret, and claimed its operatives had confused Babington with another man allegedly working for loyalist paramilitaries (McKittrick, Kelter, Feeney, Thornton, and McVea 2007, page 1181)

[113] The SDLP is a nonviolent alternative to Sinn Fein and the IRA. Its aims are relatively similar; however, members disagree with the use of violence to pursue an independent Northern Ireland.

the IRA and Sinn Fein, continued British occupation was the key divisive issue. While the talks did not end in agreement, they did establish a link between Sinn Fein and the SDLP. This link was maintained years later, when Gerry Adams and John Hume (SDLP leader) met on a semi-regular basis to discuss the nationalist agenda. Secondly, talks between British authorities and leading Sinn Fein/IRA members laid the groundwork for the Good Friday Agreement beginning in the late 1980's. By 1998 the parties emerged to present what became known as the Good Friday (or Belfast) Agreement.

A significant segment of IRA attacks at the time were directed at maintaining unity and order within republican communities during these negotiations. On the ground, this meant IRA operatives directed their efforts towards intracommunal affairs, attacking those deemed to be helping British forces (including barbers who cut soldier's hair) and individuals from dissident groups whose efforts might spoil the negotiations. Maintaining conformity increased the group's leverage at the negotiating table. This strategy was designed to deter spoiling attacks from other nationalist groups and ensure a strong hand in community policing matters. By doing this the IRA could cement its role as an authority capable of controlling the nationalist movement, thereby gaining leverage at the negotiating table.

Although the leadership had apologized for mistakes and taken significant steps in control violence within the republican community, at this point in time it also began to reiterate earlier calls for caution and professionalization of active IRA units. This theme had dominated the leadership's rhetoric a decade earlier when Sinn Fein began participating in elections. In 1989, Gerry Adams publically rebuked the IRA. At a Sinn Fein conference in Dublin he told the IRA that, "You have a massive responsibility. At times the fate of the struggle is in your hands. You have to be careful and careful again."[114] Reporters noted that Adams' statement to be careful after killing an "exceptional" number of civilians was a warning to the IRA, one that repeated an earlier admonition in which Adams told the IRA to "'get its house in order' after one of its bombs killed two of his Roman Catholic constituents in West Belfast."[115]

The reasons for Adams' concerns about IRA attacks on civilians became clear as Sinn Fein began losing the ground it had won during the previous decade. By comparing electoral returns in the early 1980's to those between 1988 and 1994, I find evidence indicating that Sinn Fein was being punished for IRA behavior. I analyze Sinn Fein's participation in three types of elections: European elections, local elections, and Westminster elections.[116] Graph 5.3 shows the percent of the vote Sinn Fein won in each of those elections (left axis). The line on the graph plots the number of IRA attacks targeted against civilians between 1980 and 2004 (also on the left axis).

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[114] Adams 2005. Page 102

[115] Reading Eagle 1989. Page A-18

[116] Sinn Fein has also participated in the elections for the Northern Irish Assembly. However, due to the conflict, those elections did not take place between 1983 and 1997. Thus, those results are excluded.

Graph 5.3: Sinn Fein Election Results and IRA Attacks on Civilian Targets



Beginning with the European elections, Sinn Fein lost ground in the early 1990's. In 1984, it captured 13.3 percent of the vote, but in 1989 and 1994 it won less than 10 percent of the vote. In elections since 1994, Sinn Fein has won significantly larger proportions: 17.4 percent in 1999 and 26.3 percent in 2004. This trend is predicted by my theory; in the period of intense IRA attacks against civilians, Sinn Fein's election results were significantly worse than in either the preceding or subsequent periods when IRA attacks did not target civilians.

Elections for Westminster demonstrate similar trends. Sinn Fein won 13.4 percent in 1983.[117] In 1992, at the height of the IRA's attacks against civilian targets, election results for Sinn Fein were at a low point, 10 percent. In 1997, after the violence had died down, Sinn Fein gained back more than its earlier share of support, winning 16 percent of the votes. By 2004, nearly 25 percent of the votes went toward Sinn Fein candidates.

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[117] In 1986 there was a special by-election for counties Newry and Armagh, in which Sinn Fein turned in predictably poor results. I removed this entry because of the unique nature of the by-election.

The yearly trends for local elections are not as clearly predicted by the theory. Prior to 1990, Sinn Fein won approximately 11.5 percent of the vote. In 1993, its share increased to 12.5. Although this increase was not very sizable, it came during what appears to be the height of IRA attacks on civilian targets. However, close inspection of the 1992-1993 period shows that the May 1993 elections took place after a significant downward trend in civilian-directed IRA attacks. During 1992, 24 attacks targeted civilians. Between January 1993 and May 1993, only two such attacks occurred. These numbers suggest that the IRA tempered its violence prior to elections in order to maximize Sinn Fein's returns, something consistent with Proposition Two. After 1994 when the IRA's violence refocused on non-civilian targets, local level election results for Sinn Fein increased nearly four percentage points with each subsequent election. By 2005, Sinn Fein had captured nearly 25 percent of local seats.

The organization's reorientation toward non-civilian targets after the mid-1990's suggests that the punishment voters inflicted was a significant deterrent to the IRA's violent strategy against civilian targets. Peace negotiations continued to take place until the late 1990's, so the pressure to enforce unity within republican communities remained present.[118] Threats to IRA dominance from dissident republican groups remained persistent; in fact, some of those groups exist today and continue to engage in violence. Similarly, Unionist militias remained threats to republican communities. The two primary groups, the UDA and the UVF, only started disarming in 2009. Furthermore, in author interviews, several civilians living in West Belfast and self-identified republicans said

[118] In 1995 a 'framework document' was drafted and laid the groundwork for negotiations thereafter. It was widely contested (particularly by loyalists) until the 1998 peace agreements.

that Enniskillen led to Gerry Adams' defeat in the 1992 Westminster elections, noting that was the ultimate price the IRA paid for killing innocent civilians.[119]

While the attack patterns and voting returns generally support my theory, the historical patterns do not entirely conform. After all, electoral returns from Graph 5.3 drop prior to the significant uptick in civilian targeting. What explains this trend? In terms of violence, the IRA's most notorious attack, Enniskillen, took place in 1987. However, insofar as the IRA's account of events is truthful, Enniskillen was not intended for civilian targets. It was a bad operation (meaning that civilians were unintentionally caught in the crosshairs). As mentioned above, bad operations were partially to blame for sectarian battle and large increase in civilian attacks in the late 1980's and early 1990's. But their occurrence also suggests something about the phenomenon of targeting itself, and a refinement to the theory from Chapter Thee. In Chapter Three I theorized that when a violent group attacks targets such as the police, army, government officials, or military infrastructure, its supporters pay fewer costs than when the group deliberately attacks civilian targets. However, when attacks intended for non-civilian targets wind up killing civilians, the group may suffer consequences *as though* it had intended the attack to target civilians. This can occur because a group's supporters may not believe that an attack was accidental.

Ultimately, targeting is a matter of perception for the group's community supporters and for the government. Because outsiders lack the necessary information to judge the group's intentions, the nature of the group's violence is judged after it has occurred. Lacking complete information, there is no way to tell whether an operation that

[119] Author interviews, March 2007-March 2009.

kills civilians is intentional or accidental. To outsiders, both types of attacks look the same. Because targeting civilians imposes costs on a group's support base, it is not surprising that the IRA released statements after certain attacks attempting to set the record straight. These statements inform supporters and government officials of the group's mistake, perhaps dissuading authorizes from pursuing repressive countermeasures and convincing community supporters to remain loyal.

Theoretically, how can bad operations impact a group's supporters? Consider somebody who marginally supports the IRA, an individual who backs the republican movement and strongly prefers that internecine violence be contained between members of paramilitaries and the security forces. After Enniskillen, she decides whether continuing to support the IRA is worthwhile. Even if she believes the IRA account of events and that the group is apologetic for the attack, she is now less certain that the IRA is capable of keeping civilians out of the crosshairs during attacks intended for non-civilian targets. Furthermore, she may be increasingly concerned about the reaction from government forces or loyalist paramilitary groups seeking retribution. Many of the costs associated with civilian targeting still apply.

Targeting civilians matters, but for a group's supporters, targeting is subjective. Attacks deliberately set for civilian targets are indistinguishable from the instances of bad operations described above. Because supporters can pay heavy costs in either case, deliberately or unintentionally targeting civilians can result in a significant loss of support for the responsible group. Therefore, I expect supporters will punish an organization at the polls for attacks against civilian targets *and* attacks in which civilians become the unintended targets.

Unfortunately, there is no way to verify an organization's intentions prior to an attack, which means that coding an attack's intended target is impossible. Remember, however, targeting is subjective. Attacks that harm civilians may be perceived as intentional, regardless of the group's intent. Therefore, I analyze whether Sinn Fein is punished after attacks that inflict civilian casualties. Graph 5.4 compares elections results (right axis) and the number of civilians killed in IRA operations between 1970 and 2004.

Graph 5.4: Sinn Fein Election Results and Civilian Casualties



Graphs 5.3 and 5.4 are similar in so far as both indicate an increase in the incidence of civilian-involved attacks in the early 1990's. However, Graph 5.4 indicates that civilian casualties increased prior to incidents of intentional civilian targeting (Graph 5.3). This increase corresponds to the Enniskillen attacks in 1987 and provides a better explanation for why Sinn Fein's results decreased in the late 1980's. During this time, bad operations are linked closely with Sinn Fein's electoral fate. When these attacks occur, Sinn Fein suffers.

Both the trends in civilian deaths and civilian targeting correlate with Sinn Fein's success at the polls. The trends suggest that the punishment mechanism operates within nationalist communities in Northern Ireland when groups deliberately or unintentionally target civilians; in both instances, communities withdraw their backing. Theoretically, these findings suggest the importance of perspective and information when analyzing the nature of a group's violence.

Additional Explanations

In this section I evaluate alternative explanations for changes in the IRA's violence. Most of the alternatives are drawn from the literature described in Chapter One. In some cases, the alternatives cannot be casually linked to changes in IRA strategy because they remain constant during the entire course of the Troubles. Ideology is one such alternative. Literature on ideology posits that organizations with different ideologies should target differently (Drake 1998). It stands to reason, then, that if an organization changes its ideology it should also alter its targeting strategy. But from its conception in 1969, the Provisional's ideology has remained consistently grounded in nationalist rhetoric and orientation. The group remained steadfastly tethered to the goals of driving British authority out of Northern Ireland.

Weinstein (2007) posits another possibility; changes in the IRA's level of civilian targeting resulted from changing relationships with foreign sponsors. According to this logic, groups that draw heavily from foreign sponsors and do not rely heavily on resources within communities are more likely to practice indiscriminate violence against civilians. A nontrivial portion of the IRA and Sinn Fein's resources have always come from abroad, specifically from Irish communities living in the United States. Those funds covered Sinn Fein's political activities and a variety of IRA activities including its military operations (guns, ammunition, phones, etc…) and side payments (wages) to Volunteers and supporters (Rafter 2005). The central problem in assessing the foreign sponsorship explanation, however, is that both the IRA and Sinn Fein's finances are shrouded in secrecy. Knowing either group's budget or even the proportion from foreign donors is impossible to pinpoint.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that IRA backers in the United States contributed most significantly in the 1970's after the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID) was established in the USA to channel funds to the republican movement during the Troubles. However in the 1980's and 1990's the organization suffered internal splits and became a less significant financial resource. "By 1996 traditional Irish-America was contributing negligible amounts to the IRA's coffers. In the past these contacts had enabled the IRA quite easily to raise up to $50,000-$100,000 in emergencies--for example, to fund a special operation--but not anymore."[120] In its place, the Friends of Sinn Fien (FoSF) emerged and established offices in Washington and New York. FoSF has had a great deal of success since the mid 1990's, some estimating FoSF's worth to Sinn Fein to be approximately five million Euros since 1997 (Rafter 2005). However, this money donated to the FoSF is accounted for through the Foreign Agents Registration Act with the U.S. Department of Justice. Accordingly, FoSF must provide regular accounts of its donors, activities, and disbursements, through which many steps have been taken to ensure that only Sinn Fein's legal political activities receive support and not the military activities of the IRA.

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[120] Moloney 2002, page 460-1

The correlation between IRA targeting and foreign sponsorship is only somewhat supportive of Weinstein's logic. During the 1970's, when the IRA was leveraged most heavily on foreign resources, the group did attack civilians most often. Furthermore, as NORAID suffered setbacks during the 1980's, the IRA simultaneously decreased its attacks on civilian targets. But the spike in civilian targeting in the late 1980's and early 1990's (see Graph 5.1) cannot be explained by any obvious changes in the group's external funding. More troubling for this explanation, however, are statements from IRA members noting that civilian casualties "devastated" international support (such as that described previously in reference to the Enniskillen bombings). These statements suggest a possible refinement to Weinstein's theory. Foreign donors enable a group independence from communities in its immediate proximity. However, the closer the ties between those immediate communities and the foreign donors, the less independence foreign reliance buys. Many of IRA's US backers are ex-patriots from Northern Ireland with close relatives and friends living in the North. For the IRA at least, international funding did not necessarily translate into a decreased reliance on local communities, which would temper civilian attacks. Instead, it may have actually heightened the restrictions on the group's behavior because of the close ties between international donors and nationalists in Northern Ireland. If the IRA was getting most of its resources from outside sources during the early 1970's, this refinement is not supported. If funding channels were not clearly established until the mid 1970's, this refinement might be supported. Unfortunately, without concrete budgetary estimates it is difficult to assess the causal impact of foreign sponsorship. At least, the mixed evidence above matches the inconsistent findings on the foreign sponsor variable in Chapter Four's quantitative analysis.

Another set of explanations briefly touched on in Chapters Two and Four posit that competitive environments are more likely to result in high numbers of attacks on civilians as groups attempt to differentiate themselves and reveal their capabilities to an audience. Aside from the IRA, there are four violent groups competing for republican sympathies. The Official IRA (OIRA) formed in 1969 from the split that created the Provisionals. This group declared a cease-fire in 1972, and its membership dissipated thereafter. The Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), which broke from the OIRA in 1974, presented a more significant military challenge to the IRA. Throughout its tenure it remained steadfastly committed to military activities; however INLA membership is estimated to be extremely small (fewer than 50 members) and localized relative to that of the IRA (TOPS 2009). The Continuity IRA (CIRA) broke from the Provisionals in 1986 over the group's movement into politics. The CIRA has remained fairly small, its membership falling somewhere between 20-50 individuals (TOPS 2009). Finally, the Real IRA (RIRA) split from the Provisionals in 1998 over the cease-fire talks and subsequent Good Friday Agreement. In 1998 the RIRA conducted the single most deadly attack during the Troubles, killing 29 and injuring hundreds with a car bomb.

When IRA attacks were heaviest against civilian targets between 1971 and 1974, few viable competitors existed. The OIRA ceasefire began in May 1972, and the INLA did not conduct its first violent attack until 1975. Subsequent INLA attacks were sporadic throughout the 1970's. Thus, at the height of IRA attacks on civilians, the group faced little in the way of competition for republican supporters. During the early 1990's spike in civilian attacks, the IRA did face competition from the CIRA. Yet the dissipation in civilian attacks in the mid 1990’s does not correlate with any changes in the relationship between the CIRA and the IRA. Further, CIRA membership estimates suggest that the CIRA never presented a real challenge to the IRA. For these reasons, the links between group competition and civilian targeting are unsupported.

In Chapter Three I posed one additional theoretical reason why the IRA could have altered its behavior. Changes in the distribution of a group’s supporters shift the costs supporters pay vis-a-vie a government’s reaction. Government repression is easiest when supporters are highly concentrated. However, during the Troubles, populations did not vary greatly. Maps depicting changes in the religious concentration of Catholics throughout Northern Ireland approximate changes in the population density of IRA supporters. Figure 5.1 shows the relative changes in the percent of Catholics in each electoral district across two time periods: 1971-1981 and 1981-1991. Overall, Northern Irish Catholics experienced moderate growth in both periods, a fact reflected by the overwhelmingly blue districts on both maps. Only a handful of districts experienced either excessively positive or negative growth (indicated by either pink or peach coloring). The district with the largest absolute population, Belfast, did not experience either excessive growth or decline in the percentage of its Catholic population.



Figure 5.1: Map of Change in Percentage of Catholics per Electoral Ward in Northern Ireland, 1971-1981 and 1981-1991

To affirm this information, I asked paramilitary members and Protestant and Catholic civilians living in Belfast whether or not there had been significant civilian movement between neighborhoods during the Troubles. UDA leaders and community members indicated that only in the early 1970's did populations shift as individuals from mixed communities self-segregated Belfast and other large towns into neighborhoods of Catholics and Protestants. When asked when the movement stopped, interviewees overwhelmingly confirmed that by 1974 the populations had settled.[121] Thus, any related

[121] Interviewees repeatedly mentioned 1974 as the year by which neighborhoods had become concentrated with either nationalist or loyalist supporters because it was the year of the Ulster Workers Strike, a pivotal event for both sides in the conflict. In 1974, the Ulster Workers Council called a strike that lasted for two weeks in response to the Sunningdale Agreement that established power sharing between sides in the conflict. The strike eventually undermined the agreement, but on the streets both loyalist and republican communities became segregated quickly as members of the various paramilitaries set up barricades. These barricades established groups' geographical territories.

changes in the IRA's violent strategy would have occurred in the first three to four years of the conflict. While this may be a reason for some initial adjustments, it cannot be causally linked to any changes during the subsequent thirty years of the conflict.

One factor not explored in the literature on terrorism or conflict, but that presents a possible alternative explanation, at least in the IRA's case, is the occurrence of ceasefires. IRA scholars often note the significant impact of ceasefires on a variety of factors. Harnden (1999) describes ceasefires as symbolic of the extreme nature of some IRA units; those in South Aramagh did not adhere to ceasefires and often blatantly disregarded them. Ruane and Todd (1996) describe ceasefires as significant in altering the opinion of Southern Catholics toward the North, effectively softening stereotypes and Southern views of Sinn Fein and the IRA.

The IRA declared ceasefires five times. The first was short-lived, lasting from June 26 to July 9 in 1972. The second spanned February 1975 to January 1976. More than a decade later, the group called a 1990 ceasefire over the Christmas holiday. In the wake of negotiations that would eventually lead to the Good Friday Agreement, the group called two additional ceasefires; the first from August 1994 to February 1996, then again in July 1997. The July 1997 ceasefire was eventually formalized as part of the Good Friday Agreement.

In context of the IRA support, some have described the ceasefires as providing a type of peace dividend, swelling Sinn Fein's supporters both at home and abroad in times when violence was low (Rafter 2005). This argument implies that support correlates with ceasefires and is problematic for my argument if it provides a clearer explanation for the variation in Sinn Fein's electoral results. To assess this alternative, I examine Sinn Fein's electoral returns during ceasefires. Prior to the 1990's, it is difficult to know the effect of ceasefires--Sinn Fein did not participate in elections during any declared ceasefire in the 1970's. In June 1994, two months prior to the 1994 ceasefire, Sinn Fein participated in European elections without much success. Since the ceasefire had not been declared, these results may not be surprising. Without the ceasefire, no peace dividend could be collected at the polls. What happened during the August 1994 and February 1996 ceasefire? Unfortunately, nothing measurable occurred because elections did not take place during this time period. Between February 1997 and July 1997, the ceasefire was suspended. In May 1997, Sinn Fein made remarkable strides, gaining more votes in both local level and Westminster elections than ever before or any time since. The fact that the group made such substantial electoral gains does not support the idea that peaceful relations necessarily translated into successful electoral campaigns.

Conclusion

This chapter presented evidence for the theory advanced in Chapter Three through a detailed analysis of the Irish Republican Army. I examined how an organization's participation in electoral politics shapes the character of its violence by enabling community supporters to effectively withdraw their support. In the case of the IRA, running for office led to a precipitous decline in the portion of attacks targeting civilians and, when IRA attacks did target civilians, nationalist communities withdrew their support for Sinn Fein. The case demonstrates evidence in favor of the punishment mechanism explained in Chapter Three and, in a larger sense, that a group's nonviolent activities and civilian supporters can affect its violent strategies.

The analysis focused on two core propositions about the temporal relationship between punishment and targeting decisions. First, I argued that a group's violence prior to competing for political office is more likely to be directed against civilians than afterwards. Indeed, the IRA of the 1970's was more likely to attack civilians. In the late 1970's the group shifted its tactics. This shift corresponds with significant changes in the group's willingness to consider nonviolent, specifically electoral, strategies. When the group actually entered the political arena in the early 1980's, it had established a pattern of violence much less threatening to civilian targets. Furthermore, after establishing a political wing, the IRA never again attacked civilian targets in the same proportions as it did previous to the partnership with Sinn Fein.

The second proposition dealt with the willingness of a group's supporters to punish the organization for cost-imposing behavior. Specifically, I argued that organizations would suffer electoral loses at the polls when their violence targeted civilians. This result is consequential of the high costs supporters pay for civilian attacks. Indeed, during the IRA's campaign in the 1970's, its supporters were interned and attacked by paramilitaries opposing the IRA. The IRA's targeting changes around 1980 suggest IRA leaders' anticipation of facing a critical electorate. But the real test came in the late 1980's, when the group's attacks on civilians increased. Sinn Fein suffered subsequent setbacks throughout the early 1990's. Anecdotal evidence from the time period points to the important role that civilian attacks *and* civilian casualties played in Sinn Fein's returns.

While the IRA's history supports conclusions that are internally valid, it is equally important to note that I believe the findings for this case transcend the confines of

Northern Ireland's unique parameters. I argue this case has external validity because the IRA is generally representative of many other contemporary large-scale violent movements. Like Hamas, ETA, and the PKK, IRA violence was contained within one geographical area. Geographic spread makes some groups like al-Qaeda very unique and may have a large impact on the group's decisions about how to script violence. For instance, al-Qaeda's attacks in one country may have little to no impact on its supporters in other countries. Like other groups, the IRA was financed through a variety of outside donors and internal profiteering, and had a leadership structure and tenure that was well established. To the extent that financing and management structure dictate a group's violence, the IRA is not entirely unique from many of its contemporaries.

This does not imply that nothing about the IRA or its strategy was distinctive. The percentage of attacks perpetrated by the IRA against civilian targets was less than ten percent--a remarkable number in comparison with Hamas which attacks civilians nearly 85 percent of the time (recall Figure 1.0 from Chapter One). But neither the group's relationship with communities in Northern Ireland nor its financing, recruitment, logistical, ideational, or political problems are spectacularly different from other large-scale violent organizations elsewhere in Europe, Latin America, or the Middle East. These traits make the IRA an attractive case insofar as the lessons learned can be applied elsewhere. Most specifically, the IRA's participation in politics demonstrates how an organization's incentives to attack civilians change once the group becomes accountable to its civilian constituency.

Chapter 5: Appendix



Figure 5a.1: Poster Advertising Falls Women's Centre, From Linen Hall Library, Troubled Images Collection. Belfast, Northern Ireland.

This poster, probably dating from 1987, advertises a series of classes for women organized by the Falls Women's Centre. The listed classes were: Irish for beginners, women's health, photography for beginners, assertiveness training, return to study and video for beginners.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

This dissertation began with a puzzle. Why are some groups more likely to attack civilians than others? While a few groups attack civilians very frequently, many others avoid them altogether. Furthermore, groups' behavior over time can demonstrate marked shifts in targeting trends. This dissertation approached this puzzle on two fronts. First, I examined the influence of political institutions in determining the likelihood that groups attack civilians. I found strong evidence that democratic institutions positively affect this outcome. This is a fundamental finding; it suggests that political institutions play an influential role in determining a target's attractiveness. In the second part of my argument, I narrowed the focus, concentrating on violent organizations operating in democratic settings. In this context I examined targeting decisions in relation to a violent organization's need to establish and nurture a base of civilian supporters. The bulk of the dissertation focused on this relationship. I found that when groups do things to shore up their support, like providing goods and services, they are more likely to attack civilians. However, when groups are subject to electoral punishment by their supporters, they are less likely to attack civilians. These findings support my theoretical claims; namely, that how a violent group manages its relationship with its civilian support base affects whether it can afford to attack civilians.

Most studies of terrorism do little to explore organizations' nonviolent behavior. In contrast, this project brings it to the fore. I connect a group's benign activities to its violent strategy with a theory positing civilian supporters as crucial to group survival. When a group targets civilians, it imposes high costs on its supporters. How the group engages a community nonviolently, whether through politics, public services, or both, has bearing on whether its supporters will absorb the costs associated with targeting civilians. By linking groups' violent and nonviolent actions, this project conceptualizes terrorist groups outside of the battlefield and as intrinsic parts of communities.

This project also departs from the conventional treatment of violence as incident counts and, instead, examines the character of violent attacks. Only recently has data been collected on factors like targeting, tactics, and geographic location of conflicts- variables that help us understand what strategies actors use during conflict. By examining targeting, one strategic element, this project adds dimension to our growing knowledge of irregular violence, political institutions, and noncombatant attitudes.

Most importantly this project demonstrates how two factors, political institutions and communities, play important roles in shaping the nature of violence. Political institutions shape the methods of coercion; they influence what behaviors are most likely to coerce a government into policy concessions. But the factors that influence a group's targeting choices extend beyond a government's political configuration. In fact, in the same way that governments' are sensitive to attacks on their supporters, violent groups must also account for the impact of their own actions on their supporters. Why is this the case? Violent groups need civilian support to carry out clandestine operations and win political concessions. Without that support, operations fail and politicians see little reason to concede to terrorist's demands. Echoing Mao's sentiments from 1937, the passage from the IRA's handbook that begins Chapter Three sums this sentiment up nicely.

Successful operations involve the people; they bear the brunt of the enemy's retaliation. Without that support, operations fail and movements collapse.

The remainder of this chapter reviews my quantitative and qualitative findings, the project's implications, and a handful of scholarly and practical questions that emerge from this project and its findings.

Findings

In this section I review the evidence discussed in this project. I describe how my findings added nuance to my theory as well as some of the surprising results.

Quantitative Findings

In Chapter Two I describe and test the argument about the relationship between political institutions and civilian targeting. I assert that democratic institutions encourage attacks on civilian targets. I discuss why this is the case in both consolidated democracies as well as states transitioning toward democracy. The important segments of any regime, those attractive to terrorist groups seeking political change, are the minimum winning coalition and the selectorate. These two groups are responsible for choosing a regime's leadership and for a regime's policies. In democracies, because civilians make up the core of both of these groups, they face an increased risk of being attacked compared to their non-democratic counterparts.

The quantitative findings from Chapter Two support this argument. Democratic political institutions and states involved in democratic transitions are significantly linked to a higher level of attacks on civilian targets. Preliminary evidence from attacks in nondemocratic regimes where I expect government targets will bear the majority of violence, modestly suggests my argument applies in these cases as well.

In addition to the significant findings about democracy, Chapter Two revealed other interesting findings, some of which were confirmed by Chapter Four and are discussed below. One finding unique to Chapter Two is that there exists a negative relationship between civilian targeting and mountainous territory but a positive relationship between mountainous territory and attacks on government. In Chapter Two I speculated about how terrain may be related to the costs of choosing certain targets and why mountains decrease the costs of attacking government targets.

The empirical results from Chapter Four describe why, even in the context of democracies where political institutions give groups strong incentives to attack civilians, some organizations choose not to do so. More generally, Chapter Four's quantitative analysis provides a series of tests designed to examine the links between target choice and the relationships groups foster with local communities, the crux of Chapter Three's argument. The findings support my general assertion that terrorist groups are bound by community constituencies and that their violent decisions are guided, at least partially, by the nature of their nonviolent interactions with supporters. There are three key results. First, I find strong evidence indicating organizations that devote a portion of their resources to providing goods and services are more likely to attack civilians. The link between resource provision and attacks on civilians is robust across a wide variety of modeling specifications. Second, I find equally strong evidence regarding the political participation variable. Running in democratically contested elections has a negative impact on a group's likelihood of attacking civilians. This corroborates my theoretical expectation: when groups can be punished by being voted out of office, they are much less likely to attack civilians. Third, groups are more likely to attack civilians when they draw support from highly integrated bases of support, where terrorist's supporters are mixed with (or in close proximity to) government supporters. While this conclusion is less strong because of data limitations it still supports my argument that integrated bases of support make it exceedingly more difficult for a government to discriminate its tactics and impose costly countermeasures on the group's supporters.

In addition to the central findings above, the quantitative analysis also revealed several other interesting relationships. Groups pursuing a nationalist agenda are more prone to attack civilians. This may not be surprising; the average nationalist group likely finds civilians other than their ethnic or religious peers easier to target. It is far more plausible to avoid attacking your own supporters when they stand out as co-ethnics. One surprising finding in Chapter Four is that groups with foreign sponsors are less likely to target civilians. This runs counter to Weinstein (2007) who argues that organizations with foreign support will ruthlessly and indiscriminately kill civilian populations. Interestingly, this variable was positive in Chapter Two when groups from all regime types were included. This suggests that outside sponsorship works differently in democracies than in autocracies and that perhaps Weinstein's conclusions are most appropriate in non-democracies. Finally, the analysis revealed that domestic attacks are more likely to target civilians than international attacks. The exceptions to this finding are quite notable, including the September 11 attacks in New York and the Madrid train bombings in 2004. By and large, however, groups perpetrating international attacks typically direct their violence at non-civilian targets such as military personnel and government officials. The number of attacks on U.S. military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan exemplify this trend, as do the plethora of terrorist attacks on embassies and diplomatic personnel around the world.

The quantitative findings from Chapter Four suggest a significant relationship exists between violent groups and non-member community supporters. That relationship, in turn, affects the violent choices groups make. These findings are supportive of the theoretical argument laid out in Chapter Three. However, as pointed out in Chapter Three, the quantitative tests show significant correlations between variables but do not indicate causal relationships. The qualitative findings from Chapter Five move one step closer to describing the causal relationships.

Qualitative Findings

The qualitative analysis focused on the IRA in Northern Ireland. In a broad sense, my goal with this case was to demonstrate the causal relationships between nonviolent activities and a group's targeting strategy. The case of the IRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein, emphasizes the role of politics by exploring how the IRA's transition to politics in the 1980's changed the nature of its violence.

The analysis of the IRA in Chapter Five highlights several unique things about the relationship between politics and violence. Most basically, running in contested political elections decreases the odds a group's violent wing will attack civilians. Evidence from Northern Ireland relates this phenomenon to the costs, both normative and tangible, Sinn Fein supporters faced when the IRA killed civilians. Normatively, republican voters did not want to cast ballots for a terrorist group, one responsible for killing even protestant civilians. But beyond a sense of civility, IRA supporters had learned IRA attacks on civilians were not good for the community. In early phases of the conflict, Catholic neighborhoods were devastated when unionist militias and government agents targeted those neighborhoods for revenge and repression after the IRA attacked civilians. When, in later years, Sinn Fein and the IRA joined forces, republicans punished Sinn Fein at the polls after IRA attacks again sparked tit-for-tat reprisals. These losses explain why politically engaged groups tend to attack civilians less often: they pay a political price because civilian attacks impose a high cost on political supporters.

The analysis also shows evidence supporting two minor modifications to my theory. First, when an organization transforms itself from being purely violent to being both violent and political, the group's violence may be transformed long before the first election. My theory initially predicted that changes would occur once communities could punish the violent organization. Instead, evidence indicates changes in the IRA's strategy coincided with Gerry Adams' decision to organize politically, which occurred several years before Sinn Fein ever ran for office. By concentrating on non-civilian targets well before the election, the IRA appeared to have preemptively decreased the costs for Sinn Fein's potential supporters in the run up to Sinn Fein's first political contest in order to win votes.

The second modification uncovered in the IRA analysis relates to perceptions of targeting and a group's ability to control its targets. Detailed analysis of IRA attacks reveal many accidents in which civilians were killed by mistake when attacks intended for other targets, such as security personnel, did not go as planned. Despite the IRA's apologies and claims of error, communities had no way of discerning attacks intended for civilians from attacks intended for non-civilians. In addition to anecdotal evidence, trends correlating Sinn Fein's support and the number of civilians killed by the IRA suggest that bad operations cost Sinn Fein support. One unexpected effect of becoming political, therefore, may have been to professionalize the IRA's ranks. As the consequences of violent mistakes increased through a lack of community support at the polls, the IRA had more incentives to clean up operations and insure civilian safety.

Implications

The implications of this project add to both our theoretical knowledge and practical understanding of unconventional violence and those groups responsible. Theoretically, this project examines and presents violent groups in a new and innovative light. The evidence suggests a fundamental shift in the way we conceptualize these non-state actors and the strategies behind their violence. On a practical level, this project points to some very strong links between certain nonviolent activities and the violent strategies groups pursue. For those designing countermeasures, these links are vital to predict and understand the strategic logic behind certain conflict outcomes.

Significant Theoretical Implications

While the first implication is discussed briefly in the introduction, it is vital and warrants repeating. The primary theoretical implication of this project is that civilians matter. To date, communities and private civilians have largely been left outside our theoretical models, their importance either discounted entirely or considered to be minimal. After all, they do not fight for either side and are usually only involved insofar as they are counted as collateral damage. Yet violent organizations routinely identify the important roles civilian supporters play in maintaining the organization. This project takes this relationship seriously. Conceived here, violent organizations cater to and are significantly impacted by communities of individuals without formal connections to the organization. Sustaining the relationship with a community is a group's first-order priority and, as demonstrated both empirically and through case research in this dissertation, managing this relationship influences the battlefield in nontrivial ways.

By complicating the behavior of groups engaged in conflict, this project also implies that we should be considering more than just what groups do when they are not being violent. Off the battlefield, many organizations are engaged in community outreach programs, political representation, and goods provision. While we have known for a long time that Hamas and Hezbollah are actively involved in the civic life of ordinary Palestinians and Lebanese, the connection between these organization's nonviolent activities and their violent attacks is novel. Modeling or theorizing about the behavior of non-state actors in conflict entails accounting for these activities.

Beyond the inner dynamics of violent organizations, this dissertation also speaks to the implications of institution building in transitioning states. Democracy, while frequently touted as the best form of government for states in transition, can be dangerous. By empowering civilians through representative government, democratic institutions make civilians attractive targets for terrorist groups. Consequently, this finding chips away at the primacy of democracy as the preeminent form of government or, at the very least, complicates its establishment in transitioning states.

In addition, the findings and argument from Chapter Two suggest some utility to identifying more precisely minimum winning coalitions and selectorates by regime (instead of regime type, the more coarse method used here). Doing so may go a long way in advancing researchers' predictive abilities when it comes to describing the nature of internal conflicts. In addition, this sort of identification might yield researchers the ability to predict the targets of international terrorism where groups attack a state's vital resources outside of its geographic boundaries.

Policy Implications

For those concerned with state building and policies directed at establishing political institutions, the findings in this project suggest more diligence related to creating democratic institutions. It is not enough to get civilians out to vote. Officials must also protect them from violence intended to sway political outcomes, an all-too-frequent occurrence in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The findings in this dissertation also add dimension to counterinsurgency methods. It is problematic for policymakers to limit those methods to things intended to meet or outmatch an adversary's violence. The theory and results here suggest that breaking the link between communities and violent groups may go a long way in dismantling an organization. A grassroots approach is advantageous because local populations have vital information about terrorists and insurgents. Consequently, by sharing information communities can prove vital the success of COIN operations or, alternatively, by withholding information communities severely disadvantage COIN operations. Without local knowledge, government forces are at a severe disadvantage. Without community acquiescence (passive or active) to the activities of a rebel group, the group is at severe disadvantage. In what effectively reversed US policy in Iraq, General Petraeus and Lieutenant General Mattis noted this imperative in the new field manual on counterinsurgency:

> Successful conduct of counter insurgency operations depends on thoroughly understanding the society and culture within which they are being conducted… In the vast majority of counterinsurgency operations since 1945, the insurgents have held a distinct advantage in their level of local knowledge. They speak the language, move easily within the society, and are more likely to understand the interests of the population. Thus, effective counterinsurgency requires a leap of imagination and a peculiar skill set not encountered in conventional warfare. The interconnected, politico-military nature of insurgency and COIN requires immersion in the people and their lives to achieve victory.[122]

Counter terrorism should not alienate people, nor should it neglect them as a vital resource. They are, perhaps, the single biggest advantage terrorist organizations have, but can also be the single most destructive force in their defeat. To that end, there are several options.

First, the cases suggest that when violent groups fill the roles normally reserved for governments, their violent options are enlarged. Buying off community support by providing goods and services means that a violent group can attack civilians without risking significant losses in community supporters. On this point, governments would benefit from taking a lesson from the terrorists' playbook. Providing welfare, medication, food, and education to a community can go a long way in securing its good blessings and, in turn, getting the information necessary to root out a terrorist threat This idea complements those in the Counterinsurgency Army Field Manual (2006) and is slowly being integrated into US strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. It was also one of the keys to defeating the Malaysian Communist rebels under the British implemented Briggs plan. Under this plan villagers who had provided vital resources to the rebels were resettled,

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[122] Petraeus and Mattis. 2006. Page 1-18.

received provisions, and a home. These same villagers provided valuable information to British authorities charged with tracking down the rebels.

Secondly, integrating violent groups into the political process can temper their violent actions. The case study of Northern Ireland and the empirical results both demonstrate that when groups stand for election, they are less likely to attack civilians. Not only is there a correlation between elections and targeting, but the case study demonstrates that communities actually use elections to punish groups using extreme forms of violence. Encouraging political participation in which organizations rely on democratic forms of representation may go a long way in decreasing the threat of terrorism. In the case of the IRA, political participation became a feasible alternative after years of conflict did not significantly change the position of the nationalist community. Waiting for that to occur, however, is costly and not optimal. To the extent that governments open lines of communication by empowering a group's political representatives (perhaps by sending messages through these individuals or holding negotiations with them), organizations may be more inclined to integrate a political wing.

However, governments face a host of issues that discourage strategies to politically incorporate violent groups. Foremost, it would likely be unpopular. American acceptance of al-Qaeda as a political party after 9/11 seems unrealistic. Indeed, there are a number of instances in which modern democracies have banned political parties based on their links with terrorist organizations. Spain outlawed the Basque party Harri Batasuna in 2003 after investigations linked its financial dealings to ETA. The Turkish government banned several Kurdish political parties, accusing them of ties with violent Kurdish separatists including the PKK. Why do governments do this, particularly if political participation lessens the threat to civilians? This benefit is likely overshadowed by the sitting government's concerns about legitimizing a violent extremist organization, one that regularly attacks the government's constituency.

While allowing violent groups to stand for election may not be a feasible option, other mechanisms exist that enable community members to effectively strip an extremist organization of its impunity. These mechanisms involve establishing a good relationship between community members and police officials. If citizen informers are protected and encouraged to share information with police, violent groups can be successfully checked. As the violent organization imposes higher costs on community supporters, the likelihood of citizens informing authorities about the group's actions should similarly increase. This arrangement works when two conditions hold. First, the police need to offer adequate protection for informants. Second, and perhaps most difficult, communities need to view police as legitimate and just authority figures. In the absence of either of these, potential informants have very few incentives to share information.

Establishing a police presence in neighborhoods and encouraging interaction between police and civilians has implications beyond enabling community members to punish violent organizations. Specifically, one of the fundamental services violent organizations offer communities is protection and dispute adjudication, services normally provided by a police force. When violent groups offer better protection from petty theft, drug-related crime, and other common crimes, it is more costly for community members to do anything that threatens the violent organization. When, however, police do these things, it undermines the authority of extremist organizations.

Future Research Questions and Applications

This final section presents several unanswered questions and potential research agendas related to this project. I describe these below, beginning with a set of practical questions regarding the relationships developed as a result of goods provision and political representation.

Interestingly, very little is known about exactly how and under what conditions groups pursue these nonviolent alternatives. It is very possible that a more nuanced understanding of these nonviolent alternatives would shed light on why conflict occurs and what might be done to deter it. For policy makers, understanding these issues is essential to design effective countermeasures.

Groups that deliver goods and services must have the resources, capacity, and will to do so. But what conditions make goods provision more or less likely? Knowing the answer to this question is the first step in understanding the practical side of organizational operations. To the best of my knowledge, there is no comparative research documenting why some groups provide goods, nor anything the types of goods provided. Why, for instance, does Hamas provide medical services but the IRA did not? Do government actions make some goods more or less attractive to supply? Do groups only provide the things neglected by government agents or do groups make markets for the services they are best suited to produce, such as the classic market for protection generated by the mafia? Specifically to whom do groups provide goods and what determines eligibility for recipients? Beyond distributional issues, how do groups organize themselves to produce these goods? These are basic practical questions and represent just how little we know about terrorist operations.

The academic literature on conflict suggests a number of interesting theoretical questions as well. For instance, some argue conflicts ensue when antagonists engage in series of ever-increasing threatening behavior, literally spiraling tensions into a full blown conflict. Could the same spiraling behavior explain goods provision in certain areas? For instance, do actors competing for the support of local communities use goods provision as a way to secure supporters, creating a "spiral to the top" whereby the number and/or quality of goods and services increases until one group has secured a winning coalition of loyal followers?

Explanations for political participation are also relatively scarce in the academic and policy literature. What makes a group more or less likely to run for office? Heger, Jung, and Wong (2008) suggest that nationalist groups have an incentive to run for office, largely because it demonstrates the group's ability to mimic a state. But not all groups with nationalist goals run for office. Do established institutions affect a group's political inclinations? Do electoral rules entice groups to throw their hats in the race? This dissertation shows that there is a price groups pay for political participation, namely their violent options are limited, so what makes politics attractive enough for some groups but not for others? Do groups gain legitimacy, supporters, and resources when they run for office? How does running for office affect the group's ability to achieve its goals?

In addition, apart from what is becoming a large literature on suicide tactics, relatively little is known about how groups script their attacks. Why do some groups use extremely lethal methods, while others try not to kill? What factors affect a group's proclivity to cause economic and infrastructure damage? How does the nature of a group's opponent shape the conflict? For instance, the IRA faced government forces and paramilitary units. The Tamil Tigers faced primarily government forces. Palestinian groups face Israeli government forces, Jewish extremist organizations, and competition from other Palestinian groups. How do these different types of opponents affect the way in which groups use violence?

Although many of the issues above could be expanded to larger projects, I conclude here by suggesting two specific areas for future research. First, relatively little is known about the success or failure of violent non-state actors. To that end, this project suggests two lines of potential inquiry. First, how does a group's targeting profile impact its ability to gain concessions from governments? Do the logistical benefits inherent in attacking civilians translate into real political gains? Alternatively, is it the case that only groups strong enough to engage military targets receive policy concessions? Secondly, how do the nonviolent activities of an otherwise violent group affect the group's success? Do either goods provisions or political participation act as springboards for success? One theme highlighted by this project is that violence is often only *one* arena of activity for some organizations. As we go forward in evaluating what makes some groups successful, fully understanding the impact of nonviolent activities will likely be crucial.

The second broad research agenda deals with multiple group environments, where more than one organization competes for the support of a local community. The literature on conflict commonly deems environments competitive when more than one *violent* group competes for support from the same group of individuals. Yet it is very likely that researchers are underestimating the amount of competition. Groups like the IRA faced competition from nonviolent groups, chiefly the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). The SDLP competed politically with the IRA, pursuing very similar nationalist agendas and never engaged in violent acts. How does competition in nonviolent activities affect violent groups and their ability to garner concessions? How does the nature of a group's violence differ when it faces competition for hearts and minds from other violent groups versus when the competition is exclusively nonviolent? Providing answers to these questions, aside from an interesting intellectual exercise, could go a long way in providing policy makers with information relevant to successful counterinsurgency operations.

As an increasing number of contemporary conflicts are unconventional, involving irregular violent methods and non-state organizations, it becomes increasingly important to understand the character of the actors involved. Although the violent groups frequently represent extreme views and most certainly use extreme tactics, countering them means practitioners must understand some of their more mainstream activities because it is these activities that create bonds and links of accountability between terrorist groups and communities. Researchers face similar incentives. To characterize conflict, academics must incorporate a more complete version of violent groups into their models. This dissertation moves in that direction by explaining how a group's violent targeting choices are affected by the relationship it fosters with local communities and the political institutions of the government it targets.

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