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The Will to Develop Isn’t Enough: The International Labor Organization, Indonesia, and India in Decades of Cold War and Development

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By

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Committee in Charge:
Associate Professor Daniel Sargent, Chair
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Abstract

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In 1969 as International Labor Organization (ILO) Director-General David Morse surveyed the organization's almost two decades of development endeavors, Morse was frank. The organization failed to meet its primary objective of reducing intractable inequality between the industrialized North and the developing South. None of the ILO's marque initiatives moved the needle. Although the ILO could boast of an enviable record of development projects—particularly in building state capacity and bureaucratic knowledge production—the ILO's operationalizing of an ambitious development spirit and agenda was insufficient. The will to develop was not enough.

This dissertation examines the ILO's heady Cold War history under Morse's director-general leadership from 1948 until 1970 when the organization matured into a development leviathan. Promising postcolonial states such as India and Indonesia partnered with the ILO in a broad effort to embed the organization's suite of capitalist practices in local economies. The ILO's programs attended to the needs of Indian and Indonesian governments' desire to fuel rapid economic growth in the absence of domestic and foreign capital investment. Training, research, and advising by the ILO advertised simple solutions that organically trained managers who possessed expert knowledge in the productivity that propelled Western economies. Morse and much of the ILO staff espoused the merits of post-war American and European capitalism. Morse quietly advanced the United States' Cold War interests, and under his management the organization functioned as an instrument of American power to spread capitalism. Nearly-insurmountable barriers prevented the realization of the ILO's mission—as was clear by the late 1960s—and the pressure of developing states, embodied by the Group of 77, to remedy systemic inequities precipitated friction within the ILO and the United Nations.

By 1969 the ILO reached its zenith, celebrating its fiftieth anniversary from its founding at Versailles in the creation of the League of Nations. The ILO received the 1969 Nobel Peace Prize and was poised to launch its sweeping World Employment Programme to remedy the shortcomings of its first twenty years of development campaigns. Morse resigned in early 1970 after twenty-two years as director-general, and his successor's appointment of a Soviet national triggered a diplomatic crisis with the United States. American policy makers looked to reforming the ILO as a route to stifle protest within the United Nations against American interests. The United States' withdrawal from the ILO in 1977 was culmination of five years' threats by policy

makers and labor leaders such as George Meany. The end of American membership starved the ILO and was the catalyst for change within the organization. When the United States rejoined in 1980, it weakened the organization at a time when the international economy's commanding heights transformed into a new vision of global market economics that had little space for the ILO.

This dissertation is dedicated to my mother and Jeffrey Hadler.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

Some of the best years of my life have been as a graduate student at Berkeley, and I have many to thank. I could not have asked for a better intellectual home than the University of California, Berkeley. History department faculty, graduate students, and staff were outstanding support for this intellectual project, and the university as a whole crackles with life. This dissertation was concluded in the weeks before a pandemic shuttered Berkeley and life in the United States. I learned much about letting go during the pandemic weeks, and realizing that events have a way of signaling when it is time to move on from a project even if aspirations collided acutely with reality. The original intent for this dissertation's broader foundation were dashed. In the end, completion was paramount, and I accepted this reality as I was in the process of leaving the academy.

I was honored to have Daniel Sargent as my adviser and mentor at Berkeley. My first interaction with Daniel came on a phone call welcoming me to Berkeley as I was living on a Cairene houseboat, and his enthusiasm was undimmed from the first call until the dissertation's final stages. He always found time to advise me, and he struck the right balance between guiding the project and allowing me to set my own course. He was optimistic while encouraging me to see that my skills and talents were not confined to the academy. He kept me motivated to find success through my project, rather than seeing my production as an academic cul-de-sac where the dissertation met one end. Even when he encouraged me to ask questions through the analytic of global history, his lessons on the nature of power and where it resides will influence all of my future work. I am grateful for the hours of conversation we had during my graduate career where he, ever practically, discussed my thoughts and went out of his way to nurture my career.

James Vernon was a mentor from the beginning until the end of my career. He was one of my first teachers at Berkeley, and was an advocate for my global research agenda. Although he is committed to the craft of sophisticated historical work, his priority was preserving humanity in all interactions with a commitment to being a good human over the trappings of a professor whose work was his life. Throughout my time as a graduate student, he never tipped the scales too heavily and urged personal discovery as the best means to intellectual development. He is the portrait of a mentor who is invested in the life of the university. In a celebratory drink days before California closed, in a moment when I was willing to cut ties with this dissertation's future prospects, he encouraged me to not lose sight of my accomplishment and its value for historians. I have come to realize that my drink with James was my goodbye to Berkeley, and I could not have asked for a fitting send off.

Mark Brilliant, like James, was one of my first teachers at Berkeley. Mark and I bonded over Teach For America, music, frank conversation, political economy, and a love American history. Unlike most faculty members, however, he valued my origin that differed from the socioeconomic background of my colleagues. He took my opinions seriously on matters political and scholarly. He consistently sought out my perspective, noting that the academy suffered without the views of people who typically are outside its walls. I benefited from his disregard for the aloof scholarly trappings that are the academy's stock-in-trade. Commitment to the craft of history, he would rightly teach me, was imperative for aspiring historians. A person's politics, I especially learned from him, should never impede sophisticated historical analysis or one's honesty with themselves.

Marion Fourcade gracefully joined my committee when I faced a moment of duress when Jeff Hadler tragically died. Marion was an exemplar of how a scholar should act within an intellectual community. Brilliant, kind, and helpful, she welcomed me when she had no reason to add to her already extensive workload. I regret that I was not fortunate enough to learn from her in a classroom setting. Nevertheless, her vision of mentorship showed her commitment to students' intellectual growth. I, like many, had the genuine luck of existing in her orbit.

Upon returning to the United States after fieldwork in Indonesia, I transitioned away from pursuing an academic job and to career options outside the professoriate. One January day, Daniel forwarded me an email from a cybersecurity expert named Jonathan Reiber, who was searching for a research assistant. Jonathan hired me, and more than a boss, he became a mentor who was dedicated to helping my career. He went above and beyond the call to facilitate my career, and took the time to see my value as a person, intellectual, and colleague. My research associate position with him concluded as I started as a Summer Associate at the RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C. Mike Mazarr introduced me to RAND, encouraging me to apply my historical skills to national security challenges. Bonny Lin also welcomed me into her project that connected my regional expertise to security challenges. The experience at RAND was invaluable to pivoting away from the academy after years of research and writing.

Numerous foundations and institutions provided material support for research and writing. The Department of Education's Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad and the Foreign Area and Language Studies grants nurtured my Indonesian language skills while providing the foundation that became a core of this dissertation's research on the Hays. My research and writing were supported by the Harry S. Truman Foundation, Lyndon B. Johnson Foundation, Gerald Ford Presidential Foundation, Labor and Working Class History Association, Hoover Institute, Clements Center for National Security, Hagley Museum and Library, Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Berkeley Center for Southeast Asian Studies, and Berkeley's Institute for the Study of Societal Issues. The Center for Southeast Asian Studies generously facilitated my graduate education conference grants and multiple Foreign Language and Area Studies grants that continued my *Bahasa Indonesia* training at Berkeley and in Indonesia.

My time at Berkeley has been improved by the richness of the graduate students surrounding me. Special thanks to Derek O'Leary, Agnieszka Smelkowska, Joseph Ledford, Claire Wrigley, Maria Barreiros Almeida Reis, Grace Goudiss, Lee Hekking, James Lin, Anthony Gregory, Brendan Mackie, and Cindy Nguyen. At the Institute for the Study of Societal Issues, Ogi Radic, Andrej Milivojevic, and Allen Ratliff were constant voices of friendship in the final two years of my time at Berkeley and the best office mates I could have asked for as I wrapped up my graduate program. Derek and Agnes were fast friends, and I could not have asked for closer friends to experience the entire life cycle of my time at Berkeley. Coffees with Agnes and chats with Derek kept me alive and focused during challenging moments. Joseph and I struck common chords on national security, and our friendship and professional interests coalesced quickly.

Administratively, numerous history department and other staff members provided crucial assistance during my seven years at Berkeley. Within the history department, Mabel Lee, Todd Kuebler, and Erin Leigh Inama were always present to explain and smooth out any departmental or institutional barriers that arose. My path often wound through Sproul Hall where Berkeley's fellowship administration staff were mainstays of my first five years of education. Solomon Lefler managed the Fulbright-Hays expertly, and Solomon recognized that dissertation research is best conducted without micromanaging a Ph.D. candidate's life in Jakarta. Meeting Gina Farales Blanco was my first glimpse of the high quality staff I could rely on at Berkeley, and her support during my first three years receiving FLAS grants helped me navigate funding during my coursework years as my Indonesian language and research accelerated.

A nucleus of graduate students welcomed me in the South and Southeast Asian Department. Katie Bruhn, Thiti Jamkajornkeiat, and Kat Gutierrez were steadfast colleagues. Katie and Thiti were, form the beginning, trusted friends from Berkeley to Jakarta. My bonds with Thiti over political economy started in classes, winding through the archives and over drinks in Jakarta and Berkeley. Katie was a cornerstone of my experiences in Indonesia: celebrating my birthday, commiserating in Jakarta and Yogyakarta about the struggles of the field, coffee writing sessions, and her generosity in assisting the housing search. Personally and professionally, Katie was ready to discuss pastries, dissertations, and our shared love of the cultures that defined our Middle Western upbringings.

I struggle to imagine my experience at Berkeley without Jeffrey Hadler's guiding presence. From my first email when I was living in Yogyakarta until our last communication, Jeff welcomed me into the cozy group of Indonesianists and consistently advocated for me. He made certain that I was not treated as an interloper or a dilettante, and his candid counsel was a source of comfort throughout my time in his world. He passed shortly after I arrived in New Delhi for research, and I still feel his absence when closing my final chapter at Berkeley. One of my greatest regrets in my academic career is that I was not able to present a paper in Jeff's memory at the Association of Asian Studies panel to celebrate Jeff. COVID-19 deprived me and several others of the opportunity to demonstrate Jeff's enduring intellectual legacy at the panel. I am genuinely fortunate to have had his influence in my intellectual and personal life. I have dedicate this dissertation in part to him, and I will treasure his memory for the rest of my life.

This has not been a smooth road to completion, and I belong to a network of friends who have been in my corner for decades. The love and backing of my friends Mike Witte, Zac Cooper, Katie Lee, Matt Foelsch, Doug Snyder, Rob Morrison, Kathy Craven, Jason Berg, Alicia Tooley, Christine Ferenchik, Seth Nissen, Lindsay Der, Charmaine Leonidas, Steve Seamandel, and Katy Alejos meant the world to me. From Chicago to Radio City Music Hall to Alamo Square and all points in between, I could count on them.

I belong to a broad, generous web of family. It is one of the blessings of my life to have supportive family. The Diel, Gabel, Jones, Dunn, Glanzer, and Ray families have been staunch backers since my childhood, and I appreciate their love through the years. Keeping their voices in mind has always kept me grounded, never losing touch with the perspective of those who scholars should strive to engage. My aunt, Marilyn Gabel, sadly passed shortly before the dissertation and my years in academia concluded, and I will always cherish her indefatigable backing at a crucial moment in my life.

My brother, Ben, and his family of wife Becky and children Wyatt, Elias, and Zoey transformed my life. I could not have anticipated the joy being an uncle would bring to me, and Ben and Becky labored to be sure I was present in their lives. That was not easy when an uncle appeared for petite chunks of time when gallivanting around the globe. The same could be said for being a somewhat absent brother, and Ben has been a stalwart in my life.

My father and step-mother, Jimmy Lee and Janice Williams, have cheered on my career as I galloped around the world. I owe much to both of them, and being the son of truck drivers has taught me some of the most valuable lessons when I glimpsed the world through their eyes and years behind the wheel. Drivers like my parents keep this country moving, even when much of the country overlooked their hard work. The lens I see the world through is constantly filtered through my years of good fortune being their son. I celebrate this dissertation's conclusion

knowing that they have been always willing to support my love of history and this dream of finishing my dissertation.

One of the blessings of my life was to be raised by Linda and Don Fehrenbacher. Don taught me to imagine a big world out there that was waiting to be explored. The lesson of his father, Joseph Fehrenbacher, helped me see the route to climbing in the academy even if one does not possess an esteemed pedigree. Don always believed in me, pushing me to reach higher while being light-hearted about life. It is nearly impossible for me to summarize how central my mother is to me. Her life story is one of tirelessly striving to provide her sons with the best life opportunities that did not exist for her. She was born with vision and hunger. She taught me to never surrender—certain that life would reward hard work, pluck, and persistence. She was right, and I dedicate this dissertation to her for all she has instilled in me.

Colleen Kredell was a rock in my dissertation's final two years. Our first date at Mission Pie set off a journey that I never could have anticipated. Through trips across the country and in California, we built a life that I cannot dream of living without. A pandemic forced us to postpone our wedding, forego my graduation, and mute what was intended to be a joyous celebration of our lives. We gracefully rolled with the punches, adapting and rescheduling, and emerged stronger as a result of the challenges we faced during the quarantine months. I am lucky to have her love in my life, and I am thrilled to close this chapter and begin our lives together.

BK Williams
San Francisco, CA

Introduction

"How can this be possible in the middle of the twentieth century?" Visiting India in 1950, International Labor Organization (ILO) Director-General David Morse was aghast at the depths of poverty unfolding before his eyes. "It was the first time I had ever seen mass poverty," Morse wrote in his diary. At every stop, the urgent need for development "became more and more incredible." His weekslong visit throughout India left an indelible mark that inspired his and the ILO future's work. The trip to India was a formative moment for the director-general, convincing him to instrumentalize the ILO for a campaign to stamp out poverty and underdevelopment lest they be a contagion for war. He and the ILO launched a global movement to use the organization's expertise and resources to boost postcolonial countries' economic development. From his first election in 1948 until his surprise retirement in 1970, he oversaw the ILO's transformation from a body focused on labor standard-setting for the industrialized West to a development institution with one of the most impressive global footprints among the United Nations (UN) specialized agencies.[1]

The ILO responded to the call of postcolonial states to advise on local manpower, productivity, and management to facilitate economic growth without relying on foreign capital or management. At the high tide of decolonization and the Cold War, the ILO transparently favored capitalism and leaned on the history of Europe's and the United States' industrial revolutions to comprehend how postcolonial states should modernize to raise living standards. In fact, industrial concepts from the United States' experience during the Second World War and Western Europe's postwar recovery stocked the ILO's development programs. From its beginning in 1950 and ending with its peak in 1969, the ILO offered postcolonial states such as Indonesia and India a suite of economic ideas that were popular primarily owing to their ties to the United States' and Western Europe's record of productivity.

Neither Morse nor the ILO were immune to the Cold War's geopolitical struggle or the tidal pull of postcolonial politics. Both forces tugged at the ILO before Morse's 1970 resignation, and they spun out of control when his replacement, Wilfred Jenks, promptly selected a Soviet national for an opening on the ILO's directorate. Labor titan George Meany, allies in Congress, and the United States' business community seethed at the turn of events following Morse's departure. The United States' withdrawal from the ILO—announced in 1975 and formalized in 1977—removed 25 percent of the organization's budget, gutting the ILO until a new director-general met the United States' insistence on reform in 1980. For American policy makers, disciplining the ILO served notice to the UN that the United States would not tolerate an anti-American political forum. The outcome of the United States' withdrawal resulted in renewed American control over the organization and a gradual series of budget cuts. In the era of the Washington Consensus, the ILO was a relic of a bygone political economy.

What is one to make of the ILO's dizzying success from 1948 until 1969, culminating in winning the 1969 Noble Peace Prize? At the zenith of the organization's power, Morse admitted failure in reaching one of the organization's foremost goals. The ILO could lay claim to an impressive list of accomplishments in building state capacity and spreading knowledge. Nevertheless, as he acknowledged, "in one major respect our record of achievement has been disappointing: I refer to our inability so far to close the widening gap between the rich and the

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[1] David Morse diary entry, May 1, 1956, Reflections 1956-1966, Box 89, Folder 3, David A. Morse Papers (hereafter DAMP), Seeley G. Mudd Rare Manuscript Library, Princeton University.

poor." The ILO was unlikely to ever fulfill such a lofty ambition of narrowing systemic economic inequity among nation-states. In his final year as director-general, the ILO formulated and initiated the World Employment Programme (WEP) to remedy the organization's shortcomings and meet the looming population explosion in the Global South. WEP's chances were dim without the organization's largest backer. The United States' 1970s disciplining of the ILO along with global economic turbulence stymied WEP, and the ILO limped out of the 70s.

This dissertation argues that the Morse-led ILO responded to the needs of postcolonial states in an effort to embed a capitalist political economy in the postcolonial world assistance to lessen inequality and preserve peace following World War II. Development aid for industrialization was the means to achieve the ILO's end. To sustain this argument, this dissertation uses case studies from Indonesia and India. Both were two of the most prominent postcolonial states whose history symbolizes the initial arc of decolonization and many of the dilemmas plaguing postcolonial states. Indonesia and India embraced the ILO's suite of development programs—fully aware of the ILO's capitalist pedigree—exemplifying how these states employed a hybrid planning model that blended ideas from capitalism and communism to fuel economic growth. The ILO's productivity and management training offered nations such as Indonesia and India a low-cost, sustainable solution that promised to speedily build local knowledge, state-capacity, and expertise. Yet, in the end, Morse was correct on the ILO's inability to narrow inequality among nations. Winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1969 was more than an inflection point for the ILO. It marked the end of a global development dream that stirred peoples and governments to marshal the will to develop. Certainly, states continued to industrialize and the ILO's technical assistance persevered. The reigning development model from 1950 until approximately 1970, however, faded when its failures became readily apparent, as evidenced by Morse's statement. Indonesia's, and soon after China's, welcoming of foreign capital in the late 1960s and early 1970s hinted at a new dawn for industrialized development that began in earnest in the 1980s.

Scholarly Intervention

The dissertation agrees with David Engerman's insistence that foreign relations and international historians should foreground economics and political economy in comprehending the Cold War's development competition. Engerman argues that historians must move beyond the intellectual history of development into "development-as-practiced." That is, examining how development agencies conducted work on the ground in the Global South rather than looking outward from the West.[2]

This dissertation intervenes in the historical literatures covering the ILO, development, the United States and the world, and international history. Although small and recent, the extant writings on the ILO dive into the institution's history along with its relationship with Europe and the United States. Historians Eileen Boris, Jill Jensen, and Sandrine Kott have written some of

[2] David Engerman, *The Price of Aid: The Economic Cold War in India* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2018); David Engerman, "Development Politics and the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 41, no. 1 (January 2017), 13. Engerman makes the point that fine-grained analyses of development primarily are from ethnographic accounts, and scholars of American foreign relations have much to provide in understanding how development historically functioned on the ground. Oscar Sanchez-Sibony's revisionist *Red Globalization: The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) strikes new ground in this direction. Sanchez-Sibony is correct to point out the comparative underdevelopment during the Cold War and how that weighed on the Cold War. Regardless, this dissertation disagrees with his periodization, stance on Soviet foreign policy, and the conduct of the Cold War.

the best works on the organization's history.[3] These fine institutional histories ask important questions about standard and convention setting, gender, and the ILO's global role. Their scholarship views the ILO through the lens of Western Europe's and the United States' involvement in Geneva. In terms of the ILO's global activities, the books shed little light on the ILO's mid-century transformation. Daniel Maul's 2012 *Human Rights, Development, and Decolonization: The International Labour Organization, 1940-70* and 2019 *The International Labour Organization: 100 Years of Global Social Policy* frame the ILO's history through its relationship with the developing world and the United States. Maul asks global questions, answered in an institutional history told through the ILO Archive.[4]

This dissertation builds on the ILO scholarship and diverges from it by fusing evidence from Indonesia and India to understand the ILO's history. Development, pushed from within and without, was the organization's post-1950 *raison d'être*. Telling the ILO's history solely through the perspective of its or Western archives fails to grapple with the organization's international development labors. Global research sheds light on how the ILO endeavored to build productive economies by cooperating with governments. As this dissertation contends, the ILO's history explains a larger global story during the twentieth century. Accordingly, this dissertation combines institutional and global archives to intervene in the ILO literature to provide a thorough evaluation of the ILO as an agent of global development.

In Mark Mazower's terminology, development was "world-making," and the ILO affords on the ground insight to examine how worlds were made or destroyed in a postcolonial frame. Historians of development, the United States' foreign relations, and international historians recently grew beyond the intellectual history and origins of modernization theory to consider how development unfolded in the Global South.[5] Bearing the influence of Arne Westad's *The Global Cold War*, and much like this dissertation, these historians conducted multi-sited archival inquiries to grapple with the extent of world-making.[6]

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[3] Eileen Boris, "Equality's Cold War: The ILO and the UN Commission on the Status of Women" in *Women's ILO: Transnational Networks, Global Labour Standards and Gender Equity, 1919 to Present,* eds. Eileen Boris, Dorothea Hoehtker, Susan Zimmermann (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 97-120; Jill Jensen, "International Labor Standards and the Building of Two Postwar World Orders: The United States and the International Labor Organization, 1919-1954" (Ph.D. diss., University of California Santa Barbara, 2011); Sandrine Kott, "Fighting the War or Preparing for Peace? The ILO during the Second World War," *Journal of Modern European History* 12, no. 3 (August 2014), 359-376.

[4] Daniel Maul, *Human Rights, Development, and Decolonization: The International Labour Organization, 1940-70* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Maul, *The International Labour Organization: 100 Years of Global Social Policy* (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019), also Maul, "'Help Them Move the ILO Way': The International Labor Organization and the Modernization Discourse in the Era of Decolonization and the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 3 (June 2009), 387-404. The Cold War and decolonization is mostly absent from chapters in *The ILO from Geneva to the Pacific Rim: West Meets East,* eds. Jill Jensen and Nelson Lichtenstein (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

[5] Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present* (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), Chapter 10; exemplary intellectual history works includes Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); David Engerman, *Modernization From the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003); Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

[6] Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); this includes but is certainly not limited to Matthew Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 2008); Nick

This dissertation continues and broadens this discussion by infusing political economy and elements of the history of capitalism into the development, American foreign relations, Cold War, and international history scholarship. The ILO sought to globalize what Charles Maier calls the "politics of productivity" of labor peace, high productivity, and shared material prosperity to postcolonial nations. Even in failure, the organization's postwar trajectory articulates why globalizing the politics of productivity laid the foundation for capitalism's expansion in Asia. This dissertation concludes that scholars can comprehend the market economy's global expansion in the twentieth century by reflecting on the ILO's collaborative mission to build productive postcolonial economies.[7]

Taking cues from Timothy Mitchell's *Rule of Experts*, the dissertation approaches this topic by tracing how the ILO cooperated with governments in Indonesia and India to embed the idea of the economy in postcolonial states. Bureaucrats in Indonesia and India found the potential of productivity and American management enticing in the quest to accelerate economic growth. Few historians of either country have studied these topics. South and Southeast Asian historians typically avoid the subjects of political economy and development in the postcolonial period, and the ILO's development activities in both countries creates the space to consider how the concept of the economy was institutionalized in ministries and factories. The ILO's experts instructed bureaucrats, businessmen, and occasionally workers to harness the power of economic knowledge. Research from the case studies illustrates that ideas on productivity and management training emerging from the United States' World War II productivity revolution were alluring to postcolonial policymakers. Instead of charting a simple story of continuity from colonial to postcolonial thinking on productivity, this dissertation maintains that the ILO's progress points to an historical rupture that was engendered in part by the United States' wartime experience.[8]

What is the ILO?

The ILO is a tripartite UN specialized agency that focuses on human rights, social justice, and crafting standards and conventions to preserve workers' rights. It is also the only surviving institution from the League of Nations borne of the Versailles attempt of constructing a new international order. The organization's tripartite structure guarantees a voice for a member-states' employer, worker, and government delegate. The ILO is governed by three components: the International Labor Office; the Governing Body; the International Labor Conference (ILC). The International Labor Office is the organization's permanent secretariat and includes the

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Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010); Daniel Immerwahr, *Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2015); Amy Offner, *Sorting Out the Mixed Economy: The Rise and Fall of Welfare and Developmental States in the Americas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019).

[7] Charles Maier, "The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II," *International Organization* 31, no. 4 (Autumn, 1977), 607-633. Maier's book *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006) extends this further and dubs the United States "an empire of production."

[8] Timothy Mitchell, *The Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), Part III. Francine Frankel's *India's Political Economy, 1947-2004* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) remains one of the singularly best works on India's postcolonial political economy, and few other works rival its historical work. Tania Li's *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007) merges history and ethnography to understand the pitfalls of Indonesian development campaigns across and remains one of the few books by an Indonesianist to chart change over time in Indonesia's development.

organization's director-general and subordinates who administer the ILO. I use the term "directorate" throughout this dissertation to refer to the International Labour Office in order to avoid acronym confusion.

The Governing Body operates as the ILO's executive council by setting the organization's policy and budget. Members include rotating non-elective seats and ten permanent, industrially advanced countries: the United States, Japan, Brazil, Germany, the Russian Federation, India, Italy, China, the United Kingdom, and France. Non-elective seats rotate every three years. The Governing Body votes on and submits the budget for the ILC to consider.

The ILC meets annually every June when all member-states convene in Geneva to vote on the ILO's budget and labor conventions and recommendations. Member-states send a tripartite delegation of two government, one employer, and one worker representative. The largest of the ILO's conferences, the ILC features wide-ranging debates on international labor conditions that was initiated after the ILO's 1919 founding.

Representatives of European unions and the United States' American Federation of Labor (AFL) met in 1919 at Versailles during the post-World War I burst of international organization creation. President of the AFL, Samuel L. Gompers, spearheaded the writing of the ILO constitution along with Albert Thomas, the first ILO director-general. Fifty-four nations joined the ILO in its first five years, hailing predominantly from Europe and Latin America. The ILO was a part of the League of Nations and was based in Geneva, Switzerland, except for a short interregnum during World War II.

The United States Senate's rejection of the League of Nations Treaty in 1919 kept the United States out of the ILO until 1934. President Franklin Roosevelt piloted a course to enter the United States into the organization without declaring membership in the League of Nations. The Soviet Union also joined in 1934, with Germany withdrawing in 1935, and the two leading industrial powers, the United States and Soviet Union, kept the ILO alive when the League of Nations crumbled. The ILO temporarily relocated to Montreal during World War II until the League's successor institution was born and the ILO plotted a new course for a postwar world.

To anticipate a new international system with the United States representing liberal democracy, delegates from forty-one nations convened at the 1944 ILC held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The ILC closed by enshrining the ILO with a new set of principles, named the Declaration of Philadelphia. The Declaration of Philadelphia consisted of five principles to guide the ILO after the war. Delegates at the ILC shared a common belief that the ILO's overriding future purpose was to prevent global economic cataclysm and war. The Declaration of Philadelphia was suffused with the notion that material prosperity acted as a bulwark against the severity of economic decline that precipitated World War II. Four of the principles echoed ideas expressed in New Deal labor legislation, the Atlantic Charter, and trans-Atlantic social democratic values: the right to collective bargaining, freedom from want, social security, freedom of expression, a minimum wage, and the right to earn a living. The document's signatories also agreed that "poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere," and this statement aptly describes the ILO's vision for its post-1945 mission in the Global South.[9]

Principle Five looked to a postcolonial future governed by the pursuit of development. Although not issuing an appeal for decolonization, the Declaration of Philadelphia concluded by

[9] ILO Declaration of Philadelphia, https://www.ilo.org/legacy/english/inwork/cb-policy-guide/declarationofPhiladelphia1944.pdf.

emphasizing the universality of the ILO's principles. The "progressive application to peoples who are still dependent, as well as to those who have already achieved self-government" of the Declaration's principles was "a matter of concern to the whole civilized world." This statement departed from the ILO's pre-1944 restraint for applying its principles to colonized areas, which the organization dubbed *non-metropolitan territories*. ILO delegates in Philadelphia adopted a global vision with the intent of forestalling war by spreading material progress to the coming tide of postcolonial peoples.[10]

Days after the ILC approved the Declaration of Philadelphia, President Franklin Roosevelt signed the document along with Director-General Edward Phelan and other delegates. Roosevelt's signing was more than a symbolic act. He presided over the United States' expansion into an industrial leviathan that emerged from the war physically unscathed. Phelan and others signified their recognition that the Americans would direct the organization's postwar future. The ILO joined the UN's budding family of specialized agencies in 1945, the only body inherited from the League of Nations. As will be discussed in Chapter 1, Morse's 1948 election to the ILO director-generalship set in motion the longest tenure of a director-general in the UN and the organization's conversion to an operational development institution.

President Franklin Roosevelt at the Declaration of Philadelphia Signing, with Secretary of Cordell Hull and Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins standing behind Roosevelt, and Director-General Edward Phelan Signing the Declaration, May 17, 1944

Sources, Methodology, and Case Studies

Evidence for this dissertation spans multiple archives and countries. I conducted research at the ILO headquarters in Geneva, various archives in the United States, the National Archives of Indonesia (*Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia* [ANRI]), and the National Archives of India (NAI). The bulk of the dissertation's sources originate in the ILO Archives and the National Archives of the United States. Materials from ANRI and NAI are woven into the chapters to add depth to the ILO's interaction with the case studies, to investigate Indonesia's and India's

10 Ibid.

political economy development aspirations, and explore how two of the most prominent Global South states viewed the ILO as a means to development *and* foreign policy ends.

Methodologically, the dissertation blends foreign relations history and international history. Research in the United States, Indonesia, and India revealed that each state viewed the ILO as an arena to realize their respective national security aims. The bulk of documents pertaining to the ILO at ANRI and NAI, when available, were housed in the records of diplomatic ministries. The same is true of the materials found in the United States' archives. Analyzing the ILO required that I shed an initial assumption that foreign policy was a second order concern for member-states and the ILO directorate. In the end, a concern for erosion of America's foreign policy influence in the ILO and UN at large triggered the United States' withdrawal.

Even though this dissertation analyzes the ILO's past, it is not a strict institutional history. I purposefully steered away from a detailed study of ILO parliamentary procedure, standards and conventions, or the organization's internal dynamics. Maul, Jensen, Boris, and others examine the ILO's inner workings acutely, yet they all rely primarily on the ILO's or the United States' archives. My goal is to investigate how the ILO functioned outside the corridors of its Geneva headquarters, while also recognizing that politics within the ILO mattered significantly. Indonesian and Indian case studies allow me to comprehend why the ILO thrived or failed in each country, and what the ILO's history uncovers about development, capitalism, postcolonialism, and the international system in the twentieth-century.

Chapter Structure and Outline

This dissertation is structured chronologically across four chapters. Chapters 1 through 3 focus on the ILO's relationship with the United States and detailed case studies of the ILO in Indonesia and India. Much like the ILO, Chapters 1 through 3 are tripartite in organization: a section on the United States' relationship with the ILO, on Indonesia, and on India. Chapter 4 steps back from the work of development to take a decade-long look at the United States' turbulent encounters with the ILO during the 1970s. It recounts how the United States disciplined the ILO following Morse's 1970 retirement after twenty-two years as director-general.

Chapter 1, "The Will to Develop," traces the beginning of the ILO's embrace of development with Morse's election to the director-generalship and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's insistence in 1947 that the ILO adopt the mantle of modernization assistance. The chapter opens with a secret Indonesian report comparing the United States' and the Soviet Union's economic capacity, illustrating the high regard for the suite of productivity ideas that ILO experts espoused in the field. Indonesian and Indian documents demonstrate the desire to build state-capacity to establish a sovereign postcolonial economy with the ILO's help. The chapter ends in 1952 as the ILO formally initiated a collaborative development relationship with Indonesia and India.

Geopolitics and the work of development dominated the ILO during the mid-1950s. Chapter 2, "The Cold War Comes in and Development in Practice," documents the ILO's growth into an operational development organization and a Cold War battleground from 1952 until 1957. The Soviet Union rejoined the ILO in 1954, and the United States and its Western allies encountered new political dynamics within the organization. The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and the Chamber of Commerce represented the United States' employer interests at the ILO, and both organizations lobbied the United States government to prioritize

Cold War strategy at the ILO to resist the Soviet Union. By 1957, a Senate report disputed claims of weakening American influence and quieted NAM and the Chamber. Meanwhile, the ILO's management training and productivity programs flashed quick signs of progress in India that sat unevenly next to halting efforts in Indonesia. Political disorder in Indonesia hindered the ILO's projects, and presaged signs of decay that metastasized in the 1960s.

Chapter 3, "At the Mountaintop," begins when the ILO was reconsidering its operational capacity in 1958 and concludes in 1969 when the ILO won the Nobel Peace Prize. The eleven-year span constituted the ILO's apex. Its development activities in India grew alongside a vast extension of its global membership base and footprint during the rapid creation of postcolonial Africa. The latter group of nations protested apartheid South Africa's ILO membership, forcing the United States to stumble in backing South Africa while Indian delegates rallied behind the anti-apartheid cause. India pursued a two-track approach at the ILO to guarantee development assistance and use the ILO to raise India's diplomatic profile among postcolonial nations. Where India's prominence rose, Indonesia staggered in the face of overwhelming economic and political crises that ended in horrific mass-murder in 1965 and 1966. The new regime, led by General Suharto, rejoined the ILO, cemented an authoritarian government, and welcomed foreign capital in the aftermath of the events of anti-communist purges.

The ILO's fall from grace nearly destroyed the organization. Chapter 4, "Surviving the '70s," attends to the ILO's crisis of existence in the 1970s and American policy toward the ILO. ILO development activities in Indonesia and India continued during the decade and the ILO lumbered toward a conclusion in WEP. In spite of this, the United States' first disruption of funding in 1970 until 1972, followed by formal withdrawal ILO in 1977, nearly destroyed the organization when 25 percent of its funding evaporated. Resumption of American membership in 1980 left the ILO facing a new reality with a circumscribed agenda and budget at a time of tectonic shifts in the international economy.

Chapter 1 – "The Will to Develop": Embracing the Productivity Miracle at the Dawn of Postcolonial Sovereignty, 1947 – 1952

In 1951, with fear of another great power war looming in Asia or Europe, Indonesian President Sukarno and Prime Minister Sukiman Wirjosandjojo commissioned a secret report comparing the Soviet Union's and the United States' strategic and economic resources. The report's author, Darsono, was clear: the United States towered over the Soviet Union in every metric. In terms of military manpower and technology, even with a Soviet atomic bomb, he argued that the United States' military capabilities would overwhelm the Soviets. Domestically, his research revealed, the American consumer economy exhibited no signs of cooling. Contrary to "the hopes of the leaders in Moscow," American defense spending did not crowd out a high standard of living. Americans were "not forced to consider what should be prioritized more guns or butter, because both can be supplied abundantly," he wrote. World War II spurred the widespread diffusion of cutting edge factories throughout America that met military and civilian needs. According to the report, little evidence existed that the Korean War dampened America's high levels of consumption and consumer confidence. Consumer spending, he stated, even grew in response of the Korean War as relentlessly high industrial productivity eliminated the choice between butter and guns.[1]

In terms of productivity, Darsono found that the Soviets lagged far behind the Americans with significant consequences for Russia's military preparedness and its civilians' standard of living. The Soviet Union's military production flagged and quality of life had risen little due to the fact that "productivity from workers in the USSR currently is only 1/4 or 1/5 compared to the USA." Comparatively speaking, American industrial efficiency preserved a baseline of defense industries while simultaneously fueling constant improvements in standard of living. In comparing Eastern and Western European productivity, the contrast was also readily apparent if another war erupted in Europe. Western European productivity in the areas under American influence dwarfed Soviet dominated Eastern Europe. Side-by-side, the report determined, the United States was the world's economic and military leader, and industrial productivity sustained its growth.[2]

Darsono's report opens this chapter to explain the source of the International Labor Organization's (ILO) singular authority and why postcolonial leaders such as Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru persuaded the ILO to formulate a development agenda. This chapter argues that postcolonial policy makers and the ILO's Director-General, David Morse, steered the ILO to a development program that, at its core, sought to globalize an American definition of productivity. Evidence from Indian and Indonesian archives demonstrates how and why these states urgently requested ILO development assistance to raise productivity, in spite of the ILO's and Morse's capitalist pedigree. Early meetings of the ILO avoided discussions of the bubbling Cold War, owed in part to the absence of the Soviet Union. Newly independent Asian member-states skirted the Cold War out of the ILO. For the latter, the United States' experiences in World War II European reconstruction became a platform for molding postcolonial political economy.

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1 Darsono to Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, with report Comparison of the United States' and Soviet Union's Power, December 12, 1951 (*Perbandingan Kekuatan Amerika-Sarekat dan Rusia-Sowjet*), No. 2038, Cabinet of the Indonesian Prime Minister Collection (*Koleski Kabinet Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia 1950-1968*), National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia (*Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia*, hereafter ANRI). As is a common convention among Indonesians, the author used only one name.

2 Ibid. Emphasis in Original.

Historiographically, this chapter leans on Charles Maier's concept of the "politics of productivity" that was exported to Western Europe during the European Recovery Program, commonly known as the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan created productivity councils with the European Production Agency, elevated non-communist unions to positions of power, and attempted, however unevenly, to remap Western European political economy. Maier widened this concept by dubbing the postwar American order "an empire of production" in his 2007 book *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors*. Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin reached similar findings in *The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire* by arguing that postwar Western European workers happily agreed with a new political economy that generated abundance by marrying labor peace to productivity. Buying into the economic new common sense delivered "economic growth—making the pie bigger, as it was often put," that tabled questions of distribution of income or wealth. America rescued Western European capitalism and settled on a model that created an economic floor for the United States' liberal economic order. I argue in this chapter that the ILO broadcasted and postcolonial leaders in Asia admired for its potential to grow economies and establish an American-inspired political economy of high productivity and growth with labor peace.[3]

Scholarly disagreement exists on the scope of Western Europe's transformation and the extent to which its political economy realigned alongside an expanding welfare state. Historian Alan Milward disputes the conclusion that the Marshall Plan was the monolithic savior of Western Europe, and he doubts that the politics of productivity revolutionized European class relations or redistributive priorities. Victoria de Grazia recounts, on the other hand, that reconstruction and postwar Europe was the site of a vast remapping of industrial productivity that preceded an expansion of the consumer market. Although an American standard of living was an aspiration that was met in the 1950s, the Marshall Plan achieved its goal of wedding Western Europe to the United States' economic order and consumer-focused Fordism. Postwar Europe, de Grazia illustrates, was marked by industrialists sharing the gains of productivity, thus facilitating the spreading of an American Market Empire in postwar Western Europe.[4]

Historians agree that joint American and European actions effectively stymied communist unions in Western Europe as the Cold War became entrenched in labor politics. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Department of State covertly subsidized non-communist unions and centralist political parties in Italy and France at a precarious moment. The CIA funneled cash through the American Federation of Labor's anti-communist operative in Western Europe, Jay Lovestone, to deliver cash to fund non-communist unions and shape elections that prevented communists from taking advantage of the postwar destruction and power vacuum.[5]

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[3] Maier *Among Empires*, Chapter 5; Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin. *The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire* (London: Verso, 2012) 96-100; 101. Maier's argument casts a long shadow and many cite him to understand political transformation that the politics of productivity encapsulates in postwar Europe.

[4] Alan Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–51* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) argues that the Marshall Plan's effect is overstated considering the timing of delivery aid and quantity of resources; Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance Through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2005), 346-348. Also see Barry J. Eichengreen, ed., Europe's Postwar Recovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Michael Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe 1947-1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Matthias Kipping and Ove Bjarnar, eds., *The Americanisation of European Business: The Marshall Plan and the Transfer of U.S. Management Models* (London: Routledge, 1998).

[5] Hugh Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008), 53-56. Wilford's chapter "AFL-CIA: Labor" is one of the better and more succinct explanations of the uneasy partnership between the AFL-CIO and the CIA during the Cold War. Also see Federico Romero, *The United*

For Morse, the covert actions and the Marshall Plan saved Europe, and represented "the single greatest political event of the postwar period."[6] Though many actors participated in this moment, Morse was an instrumental figure who embodies Maier's politics of productivity in planning for post-1945 Europe and then implementing a grand agenda in the global South. Morse was indefatigable with a singular purpose—void of sympathies for communism—that he drove toward during his twenty-two-year tenure as ILO Director-General.

This chapter shares a chronological starting point with historians of the ILO, yet its methodological intervention in the historiography of America and the World differentiates it from other works. Daniel Maul's book *Human Rights, Development, and Decolonization: The International Labour Organization, 1940-70* covers a similar time range and ILO archival sources in this chapter. My research, on the other hand, differs from Maul's and other historians by stepping beyond the ILO archives in Geneva. At all times since 1948, the ILO operated globally and this chapter represents the first work that combines sources from the ILO and national archives to uncover the roots of why the ILO embark on a global development campaign that drew on the expertise of the United States.[7]

Research for this and subsequent chapters suggests that the United States' economic model was more influential than may have been previously considered. The Soviet model of a planned economy appealed to postcolonial policy makers who were inspired by rapid industrialization and the simultaneous promise of social uplift. Yet as Darsono's report indicates, the United States' industrial prowess was unrivalled in the early 1950s. American productivity accelerated at historically unseen rates during World War II and after, transforming into an industrial leviathan thanks to a production miracle in the war years after the Great Depression.[8] Subsequent chapters will demonstrate that the United States' modes of management, training, and organization were widely pursued in two of the leading postcolonial states. India and Indonesia adopted the Soviet-inspired Five Year Plan framework to coordinate macroeconomic planning at a national scale. Nevertheless, archival evidence from India and Indonesia on the ILO's role in development supports the assertion that postcolonial development should be portrayed as a hybrid endeavor that welcomed capitalist innovations without being beholden to socialism. Capitalism helped make development tick. Chapters Two and Three will heed David

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States and the European Trade Union Movement, 1944–1951 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Kaeten Mistry, *The United States, Italy and the Origins of the Cold War: Waging Political Warfare, 1945-1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); and Jon V. Kofas, "U.S. Foreign Policy and the World Federation of Trade Unions, 1944-1948" *Diplomatic History* 26, no. 1 (January 2002). Subsequent chapters will describe Morse's stance on communism in the 1950s and 1960s as the Cold War shifted from the Europe to the Third World.

6 David A. Morse oral history conducted by James Fuchs July 30, 1977, Harry Truman Presidential Library (hereafter HTPL), https://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/morse2.htm last accessed November 16, 2017.

7 Maul, *Human Rights, Development, and Decolonization: The International Labour Organization, 1940-70* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), Chapters 1 and 2. Also see; Sandrine Kott, *Globalizing Social Rights: The International Labour Organization and Beyond* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Jill M. Jensen, and Nelson Lichtenstein, eds. *The ILO from Geneva to the Pacific Rim: West Meets East*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Theresa Wobbe and Leá Renard, "The Category of 'Family Workers' in International Labour Organization Statistics (1930s–1980s): A Contribution to the Study of Globalized Gendered Boundaries between Household and Market," *Journal of Global History* 12, no. 3 (2017).

8 Mark Wilson, *Destructive Creation: American Business and the Winning of World War II* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016) 78-80. Robert J. Gordon, *The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016) catalogs a long history of inventions that drastically improved quality of life and productivity, as well as explains why the productivity miracle peaked and, pessimistically, will not return.

Engerman's call to investigate the untidy realities of "development as practice" and local reception of American techniques.[9] Chapter One articulates the common cause found by Nehru, Sukarno, and Morse to globalize a characterization of productivity that surfaced most clearly amid World War II and migrated south at the dawn of postcolonial sovereignty.

This chapter also addresses the legacy of the New Deal in the historiography of America and the World. While acknowledging the New Deal's inspiration in terms of collective bargaining and principles that inspired the human rights revolution, Chapter One sees the wartime period of 1940-1945 as a moment of rupture. Historians such as Elizabeth Borgwardt, Kirin Patel, and David Ekbladh use the New Deal to describe the United States' changing relationship with the world after 1945. This chapter's intellectual starting point is the warfare state that arose out of World War II. Revolutions in American industrial policy established a foundation that was more consequential for political economy than the New Deal for delivering impressive levels of productivity in an environment that bought labor peace and quieted demands for wage increases. Also, this chapter intervenes in the America and the World scholarship by conducting research in Indian and Indonesian archives to study the impetus for why postcolonial policymakers and bureaucrats sought out ILO development aid. Chapters two and three will intervene further by examining reception and outcome of the modernization programs. The ILO's development blueprint and the requests of leaders in decolonizing India and Indonesia looked to American manpower strategies, industrial relations education, and management that emerged as an outcome of the Second World War.[10]

The historical literature on postcolonial India and Indonesia is thinner than the writings on the colonial periods. Although a few dissertations specializing in postcolonial Indian history have been published recently, room for exploration clearly exists. A new generation of historians of South Asian history will soon publish books on the postcolonial period. Methodologically, this chapter and subsequent ones seek to participate in broadening the discussion by employing documents from Western archives in conjunction with local sources. As one recent dissertation writer, Nikhil Menon, notes, the lack of sources for postcolonial India poses numerous barriers for historians. The history of postcolonial Asia can, I believe, be narrated by weaving a rich evidentiary tapestry in the midst of a tumultuous period in regional and global history.[11]

Morse acknowledged in 1948 after his election that disorder in Asia posed a risk to the world, and he forced the ILO to pivot to Asia and welcome a postcolonial future with a steadfast commitment to development. Odd Arne Westad's *Global Cold War* argues persuasively that the Third World was the primary site of contest between the United States and Soviet Union. The

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9 David C. Engerman, "Development Politics and the Cold War," 10. As Engerman writes about the realities of Indian development and its relationship to a perceived Soviet patron and influence, "The differences were evident in the day-to-day negotiations where historians have too often feared to tread" (12). Chapters 2 and 3 will examine the realities of development as local actors incorporated technologies from the United States and the local reception to efforts to replicate a model of productivity imported primarily from the United States.

10 Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2005); Kiran Klaus Patel, *The New Deal: A Global History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016); David Ekbladh "Mr. TVA": Grass-Roots Development, David Lilienthal, and the Rise and Fall of the Tennessee Valley Authority as a Symbol for U.S. Overseas Development, 1933–1973," *Diplomatic History* 26, no. 3 (July 2002).

11 Rohit De, "The Republic of Writs: Litigious Citizens, Constitutional Law, and Everyday Life in India (1947-1964)," Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 2013; Nikhil Menon, "Planned Democracy: Citizenship, Development, and the Practices of Planning in Independent India, 1947-1966," Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 2017; Mircea Raianu, "The Incorporation of India: The Tata Business Firm Between Empire and Nation, ca. 1860-1970," Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 2017.

ILO's transition to Asia signifies when an American proxy's gaze drifted away from the West, especially when the voices from newly independent Asia clamored for the ILO to assume a new role.[12]

Setting the Agenda

The ILO's 1944 Philadelphia Doctrine enshrined the concept that "poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere" into the organization's postwar.[13] Morse and many in the ILO shared the belief that economic conditions triggered World War II, and the same threat menaced a world wracked by poverty. He asserted that removing the barriers for high productivity would form the material foundation for economic growth that would, in Keynesian fashion, allow for the benefits of prosperity to be shared. The ILO under Morse's guidance approached the predicament of poverty with a suite of measures to create from the top down a stable environment where workers would not derail growth with strikes or other disputes. Postcolonial leaders and bureaucrats prized ILO technical assistance with its American influence that promised a simple, non-radical avenue for the growth that would buoy postcolonial sovereignty.

For all of the Philadelphia Declaration's high-flying rhetoric, the ILO's postwar purpose crystallized around two key events in 1947 and 1948. The Philadelphia Doctrine's liberal ethos mirrored the Atlantic Charter by prioritizing the elimination poverty and the fear of want in order to prevent another global war. Nevertheless, simultaneous pushes from India and the United States infused the ILO with a spirit of development. Indian Prime Minister Nehru opened the ILO's Preparatory Asian Regional Conference in October 1947, delivering a speech that cataloged the challenges of endemic poverty and underdevelopment in Asia. Nehru's prominence in the international and postcolonial sphere left him uniquely qualified to issue a measured appeal for immediate organizational reform and economic assistance from the ILO. And the ILO responded. Eight months after Nehru's speech, David A. Morse was unanimously elected to the position of director-general. Morse infused the ILO with a restless character and commitment to launching a bold development program. ILO experts were fluent in the currents of development sweeping the Western world, yet the organization was fundamentally shaped by Nehru and Morse in 1947 and 1948.

The first pivotal moment arrived when delegates from nearly every Asian colonial territory and independent state attended the first Preparatory Asian Regional Conference in New Delhi in October and November 1947. 235 representatives from independent states of Afghanistan, Burma, Thailand, Ceylon, nationalist China, Pakistan, and Nepal were seated alongside members of British, French, Portuguese, and Dutch colonial territories in Southeast Asia, as well as observers hailing from the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the UN. The conference was the largest held in postwar Asia up until that point.[14]

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12 Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*. Conceptually, I am also borrowing from Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952," *Journal of Peace Research* 23, no. 3 (September 1986).

13 Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labor Organization, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-islamabad/documents/policy/wcms_142941.pdf accessed November 4, 2017.

14 *Preparatory Asian Regional Conference of the International Labour Organisation, New Delhi, October—November 1947, Record of Proceedings* (International Labour Office: Geneva, 1948). This information is located in a nonpaginated section of the report.

India asserted a dominant role among the ILO's Asian member-states in the wake of the Second World War. India's colonial government first joined the ILO in 1919 at its founding and was selected to join the Governing Body in 1922. Discussions for the conference between the ILO, British, and Indian counterparts began in 1945, with Government of India officials emphasizing their desire to host the conference first instead of holding a second Asian regional conference in India at a later date. Shamal Lall of the Indian Government's Department of Labor enthusiastically lobbied for India over China. Lall cited three reasons: India's seat on the Governing Body since the ILO's founding; its formal ILO recognition as a state of industrial importance; civil war in China. His third reason highlighted China's civil disorder and postwar disarray in comparison to India's calm and ability to guarantee the conference would be held.[15]

Once the matter was settled and the Governing Body selected New Delhi, India's ambition to lead Asia collided with colonial realities in Dutch Indonesia. Nehru spoke frequently in favor of Indonesia's freedom and backed its war for independence. Accordingly, Indonesian diplomats requested India's assistance in sending a delegation to the meeting, only to find their appeals rebuffed.[16] The ILO's constitution required the presence of a delegation chosen by colonial administrators, without any contribution from national governments unless authorized by colonial administrators. India was placed in a compromising position due to Nehru's stature as a proponent of anticolonial struggle when India could not intervene to guarantee the participation of an Indonesian delegation. Exchanges between the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Labor illustrate how they attempted to preserve good will with the Indonesian Republic and its nationalist leaders, Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta. Attempts to elude poor public relations could not be sidestepped, they concluded. India's consul-general in Indonesia was instructed to apologize and stress their inability to override the ILO's constitution.[17] India's calculus as a rising regional and global power afforded little breathing room for navigating the political concerns and standing for Asia at the ILO's conference.

Nehru opened the ILO's Preparatory Asian Regional Conference in New Delhi on October 27, 1947, by insisting the ILO wake up to the pressing dilemmas facing Asia, and to adopt a new raison d'être. Nehru's speech represented an urgent call that the ILO was, in his mind, obligated to heed. Only two months after India's independence, Nehru prominently spoke for much of Asia and its postwar and postcolonial status. The creation of the UN from the League of Nations' ashes formed a novel political and rhetorical space that he occupied with haste.[18] In New Delhi, Nehru was one of the foremost advocates for a new ILO that had yet to emerge from an embryonic state. His speech combined with Morse's election to director-general a year later to indelibly propel the ILO into a development titan that typified an age.

After praising the ILO's history and the Philadelphia Doctrine's potential, Nehru shed diplomatic niceties in favor of a stark accounting of how India's and Asia's poverty threatened global peace and recovery. Decades of war and colonialism had hindered the economic growth that raised standards of living, and the ILO's geographic fixation with Europe and the United States would have to be abandoned to remedy the danger lurking in Asian poverty. He likened poverty to a contagion that would spur unrest and counter prosperity for all, thus leaving it in the

[15] S. Lall Department of Labour Government of India to Prior in the High Commissioner of India's Office, October, 12, 1945, MEA, NAI.

[16] Indian Consul General in Batavia to Foreign Ministry New Delhi, October 20, 1947, MEA, NAI.

[17] Ministry of Labour for V.K.R. Menon, October 23, 1947, MEA, NAI.

[18] Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 167-171.

best interest of the industrialized West to offer its assistance to underdeveloped states. Even further, his address offered a glimpse of a development scheme for India and future postcolonial states.[19]

Nehru's diagnosis of India's development predicaments was straightforward: India was facing "grave problems" that were "economic in the main." His solutions, while daunting in implementation, were linear and moved along a path that connected to the Soviet experiment and later the trajectory Walt Rostow formulated in *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. For Nehru, "The development of industry" of every stripe would deliver the high production necessary to raise living standards and defeat the specter of poverty. Industry alone, however, was insufficient. Development required a change of mindsets that was guided by planning and an acceptance of prioritizing national progress over individual gain. Regarding the latter, he highlighted India's continuing struggles with strikes that hindered productivity and growth. "Arbitration, consultation, and adjudication" of strikes presented the ideal path for social advancement. He closed his historic remarks with a plea that "this Conference will bring about industrial peace" not "to stop progress," only to resolve strikes in an orderly fashion that insured productivity.[20] Although he described India's postcolonial reality, he linked Asia and India throughout the speech. He blurred the lines between nation-state and region, urging a set of common responses to Asia's dire need for assistance in industrial, manpower, and economic expertise from the ILO.

[19] *Preparatory Asian Regional Conference*, 1-3.

[20] Ibid., 3-6. Nehru would repeat this message throughout his time as Prime Minister. A little under a year later, Nehru informed workers at a cordite factory "You must cooperate in the great task of raising the people's economic lot and avoid strikes which will retard you in achieving this. Now that the war is over, we have to devote our attention to other fields of production. We have to build up our country, we have to increase production and bring about the industrialisation of the country….Strikes hold up production" from "A Fair Deal for Workers" in Jawaharlal Nehru, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Second Series, Volume Six,* S. Gopal, ed. (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1986), 305.



Nehru Addresses the Preparatory Asian Regional Conference, 1947

The conference's formal proceedings included a resolute appeal for research on the nature of labor and life on plantations, many of which remained under foreign control. India's worker delegate, R.C. Khedgikar of the communist All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), led the charge to force the Governing Body to approve a study on the condition of work on plantations in Asia. P.P. Narayanan, a Malaysian worker's representative, concurred with Khedgikar's proposal and the attendees agreed to the resolution's language. Specifically, it asked for an investigation into forced and voluntary labor occurring on plantations. Members of a subcommittee on health and work on plantations echoed Khedgikar's proposal, with a government of India suggestion for the creation of an industrial committee to investigate industrial hygiene and other practices on plantations. The attendees adopted the resolutions and forwarded them on to the Governing Body.[21] The Governing Body concurred and the issue became a regular component of meetings on Asia, evidence of the ILO's acceding to pressures from formerly and still colonized territories to push the ILO in a new direction.

ILO Assistant Director-General Jef Rens closed the conference, summarizing the event's historical precedence and defining the ILO's future while "a strong wind of liberation is blowing through" Asia.[22] Rens disputed Nehru's characterization of the ILO's historical and geographic focus, and he offered only a lukewarm agreement to Nehru's and other Asian delegates' request to retool the ILO. On the question of a vastly transformed ILO, he said, "the establishment of new machinery" with country offices and international conferences "is not necessarily the best way to go about it." Financially, as well, the ILO could not afford to break from the past.[23] Rens was out of step with his time, in this matter. He failed to grasp a consensus that was forming

21 *Preparatory Asian Regional Conference*, 44-46, with subsequent discussions on 138, 230-231, 218, 266. The proposed resolutions are spread across the proceedings.
22 Ibid., 101.
23 Ibid., 105.

around the new responsibilities for international institutions and UN specialized agencies in a decolonizing era. The Philadelphia Declaration anticipated a rising tide of decolonization and development, due in part to delegations from colonial territories that spoke at the Philadelphia conference. For all of the preparation, as Rens's closing speech indicates, few within the ILO's ranks exuded the drive, organizational vision, experience, and charisma to harness the development spirit that was budding along a global North and South axis. Imagining a novel future for the ILO required new blood.

David Morse's election to the position of ILO director-general reoriented the organization in precisely the ways Rens doubted, firmly planting it on a development course. Morse's biography speaks to his bureaucratic approach to and international qualifications in labor and political economy matters that emerged out of the cauldron of the New Deal and the Second World War's warfare state. After graduating Harvard Law School, Morse worked at the Department of Interior as the General Counsel for the Petroleum Labor Policy Board, partially on the recommendation of Felix Frankfurter. He was promoted and his New Deal career leaped by serving as Regional Attorney for the National Labor Review Board (NLRB) for New York City until the Wagner Act was declared unconstitutional in 1937. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor persuaded him to join the United States Army and leave his private practice. He became the Chief of the Manpower Division of the Military Government for the invasion of Sicily "and was given the responsibility for preparing the decrees for General [Dwight D.] Eisenhower which would abolish" Italian corporatism. Eisenhower recruited Morse to function as his counsel on labor matters, and Morse was assigned to lead the Manpower Division of the Allied Military Government for postwar labor planning in Germany. Morse concluded his military service with the rank of lieutenant colonel and was awarded the Legion of Merit. Following the war's conclusion, he accepted a position in President Harry Truman's Department of Labor as Assistant Secretary of Labor, where he spearheaded the opening of an international labor desk with labor attachés posted in embassies around the world.[24]

Morse's involvement in planning the reconstruction of Europe after World War II left an indelible mark. "Europe was in a shambles," he said, referring to the war devastated continent. Reconstruction administrators such as himself leveraged Marshall Plan aid to force recipients into creating productivity councils that included fellowships to study American wartime production regimes. Americans "were people who reckoned that we knew about all there was to know at that time in the free world about productivity and productivity techniques." Morse praised the trips for Europeans to observe productivity measures, technology, and industrial relations in the United States where "they, particularly" could learn "from us." In no uncertain terms, Morse's position of power at this formative moment—along with Truman's Point Four development agenda—was instrumental and became a cornerstone of the ILO's global efforts.[25]

Morse's twenty-two-year tenure as director-general aligned with the United States' attention to development assistance. Truman's inaugural address in 1949 outlined an ambitious series of goals to launch modernization assistance, operating under the name Point Four. A State Department official, Willard Thorp, was dispatched to Geneva to solicit Morse's feedback on

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24 David A. Morse oral history conducted by James Fuchs July 25, 1977, HTPL, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/morse1.htm last accessed November 16, 2017. Few authoritative biographies of Morse exist, and this summary stems from the Truman Library's oral history. The ILO's biography of Morse summarizes his biography and many accomplishments at ILO http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/ilo-director-general/former-directors-general/WCMS_192712/lang--en/index.htm.

25 Morse oral history, July 25, 1977.

Point Four. Morse informed Thorp "that I thought it was a tremendous thing and as far as I was concerned he could be sure that I was going to remold the entire program of the ILO" around Point Four.[26] In a personal letter to Truman, Morse lauded Truman's development agenda in language that mirrored his remarks to Thorp.[27] One could construe Morse's letter and discussion with Thorp as evidence of a sycophant. Nevertheless, the ILO's post-1948 history exemplifies how Point Four was an inspiration that guided Morse and the larger organization.

Morse's election to director-general in 1948 initiated a sea change in the ILO from setting labor standards to supplying technical assistance globally. Truman advocated for Morse to fill the vacant director-general position when Edward Phelan completed his tenure. Truman saw Morse as a seasoned expert in American industrial political economy and building labor organizations to combat communism in the midst of upheaval.[28] The Governing Body voted unanimously for Morse during its annual 1948 meeting in San Francisco, that continued for another twenty-two-years.[29] As historian Daniel Maul writes, Morse was preoccupied by the course of events in Asia and the fear that the victory of Mao Tse Tung's communist forces over the nationalist Kuomintang in China would doom Asia. China and the ILO's 1947 conference in New Delhi compelled Morse to act. His first actions were to place the ILO on an operational path to address the modernization imperatives arising in the global South, led by Nehru.[30]

Preconditions for Take Off

With Morse in charge at the ILO, the organization was ready to cooperate with the requests emanating from the global South and to broadcast an American system of political economy. This section describes the initial phase that precedes 1951 when the ILO crossed over into a fully operational institution. A change of mindset was required at both the ILO and in postcolonial India. A war for independence raged in Indonesia between nationalist forces and the Dutch, thus preventing Indonesia from entering the ILO's orbit or engaging with international development bodies. Nehru's India, on the other hand, commenced discussions of steering the

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[26] David A. Morse oral history conducted by James Fuchs August 3, 1977, HTPL, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/morse3.htm last accessed November 16, 2017.

[27] Morse to Truman, March 16, 1951, HTPL https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/pointfourprogram/documents/index.php?documentid=1-8&pagenumber=2, last accessed November 16, 2017. Morse was responding to the International Development Advisory Board's March 1951 report to President Truman that articulated the national security rationale behind immediate economic development assistance. The report noted that without industrial production and self-sustaining markets, postcolonial economies could collapse and would precipitate the conditions where communist subversion would thrive. American defense needs insisted upon reliable supply chains of natural resources from the underdeveloped areas of the world. Hence, organizations such as the ILO were an integral component in national security policy. Chapter three "A Gospel of Liberalism: Point Four and Modernization as National Policy, 1943-1952" in David Eklbadh's *Great American Mission* offers a thorough exploration of Point Four's genesis. Although Ekbladh's and Elizabeth Borgwardt's scholarship have much to commend, my project articulates the influence of what historian James Sparrow refers to as the warfare state in development projects that was a rupture from the New Deal.

[28] Jill Jensen, "International Labor Standards and the Building of Two Postwar Orders: The United States and the International Labor Organization, 1919-1954," PhD dissertation, 279.

[29] *International Labour Office Minutes of the 105th Session of the Governing Body, San Francisco—12, 14, 19 and 29 June 1948*, 15.

[30] Daniel Maul, "The ILO, Asia and the Beginnings of Technical Assistance, 1945–60" in *The ILO from Geneva to the Pacific Rim: West Meets East*, eds. Jill M. Jensen and Nelson Lichtenstein (New York: Palgrave Macmillan)118, 119.

public to embrace macroeconomic planning and subordinating personal gain for national sovereignty.

The first debate on how the ILO could best assist a future India appeared in 1946, hinting at what India's Planning Commission later dubbed "'A Will to Develop.'"[31] In a letter from late December 1946, the ILO requested India's national government stance on a proposed convention governing inspections for industrial and commercial settings. Deputy Secretary of the Government of India, V. Narayanan, rejected the proposal by noting the lack of a consciousness for industrialization that would necessitate inspections. Indian public opinion, he argued, was ill prepared for the intrusion of a new form of labor regulation in an industrialized space—a space that was not yet widespread in India. He reasoned that the process of industrialization had not yet taken root in India, and thus requesting support for a convention would founder in India and non-colonized Asia at large. The first step should be a campaign "towards popularising these ideas and creating the conditions necessary for their effective implementation," he suggested. Once a majority of Indians grew accustomed to factories and industrial regimes of production, then an inspection convention would be tenable. India's growing concern, however, rested in devising an efficient manpower policy and coordinating employment on a national scale.[32]

A second ILO questionnaire on a proposed convention for the creation of an employment service to coordinate labor opportunities and information arrived a year later, and it received a more positive response. The official reply again disputed the applicability of a convention for India and similar underdeveloped states. India's independence was several months away and centralized authority over national employment was yet to be realized. Nevertheless, the response insisted, an ILO convention that encouraged the notion of an employment service was welcome, for it "would be the surest method of promoting full employment, higher productivity and output and raising the standard of living for the people of the world." India was in the midst of designing a body to manage industrial manpower, yet they saw great value in an employment service that resulted from an ILO convention.[33] Going forward, the questionnaires stopped; development work began. The 1947 questionnaire marks a end of the ILO's priority for setting labor standards, with future efforts by the ILO and India to meet the urgency of utilizing manpower for productivity.

India's government turned to Ford Foundation experts to assist in the formulation of India's manpower strategy in 1947. A retrospective history of India's manpower policy written by the Ford Foundation illuminates the struggles India faced and steps they took to marshal industrial labor in the pursuit of development after independence. Indian officials identified the necessity of a manpower strategy that was governed by the state to turn the motors of development. In spite of India's nascent industrial workforce, India's development plans relied on a meteoric growth of industrial laborers. The postcolonial government formed the Scientific Manpower Committee in 1947 to evaluate India's productive potential with present and future labor resources. This body represented India's initial bureaucratic institution to organize

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31 Planning Commission, "The Process of Planning in India," undated, UI/251-18/64, Ministry of External Affairs (hereafter MEA), National Archives of India (hereafter NAI). The document is an appendix in India's response to the report of 37th Session of the Economic and Social Council, Geneva, from 13th July to 15 August, 1964.

32 V. Narayanan Dep Sec Government of India to ILO Director-General in Montreal, Subject "Questionnaire on the Organisation of Labour Inspection in Industrial and Commercial Undertakings," 12/28/1946, PN 8(15) UN1, 1947, MEA, NAI.

33 Answers to ILO Questionnaire on Employment Service Organisation – Fifth Item on the Agenda of the Thirtieth Session (Geneva) 1947, undated, 8(12)-UNO.I/47, MEA, NAI. A cover letter in the Folder indicates that the response was sent to the Ministry of External Affairs by the Department of Labour on March 28, 1947.

manpower to boost productivity during India's modernization campaign. In this, Nehru's government pushed the ILO and found an enthusiastic collaborator in Morse.[34]

Morse announced the ILO's official pivot to development work in his June, 1949 report to the ILO's thirty-third annual conference. The ILO's previous directors-general deserved praise, he insisted, for assembling an organization that met its member states' needs. Decolonization altered the geopolitical calculus, he asserted. Initial stages of decolonization ushered states onto the world stage, and these states demanded immediate assistance to boost productivity in preparation for industrialization and training of bureaucrats in recently decolonized governments. Echoing Nehru's opening New Delhi remarks in 1947, Morse proposed to the Governing Body three key institutional changes: decentralize the ILO's functions to permit greater autonomy for regional preferences; boost and strengthen industrial committees; partner with other development organizations to maximize effect. His report was inflected by a late 1940s zeitgeist: urgency. "A seething, restless world" demanded that the ILO "meet the challenge of its time," ensuring that it "always move forward, and when necessary expand, or it will move backward and wither away." The Governing Body approved Morse's proposals, and the ILO's mission began anew and on a wholly different path than at its founding at Versailles.[35]

Tangible evidence of Morse's new vision for the ILO appeared during his month-long visit to India in December 1949 and January 1950. He would preside over an ILO Governing Body meeting held in Mysore, India, and meet with Nehru and numerous other officials before opening the ILO's Asian Regional Conference in Sri Lanka where the ILO and its regional members would discuss Asia's top three concerns: "increased production, industrialization, full and effective use of manpower." Morse's comments at a press conference in Mumbai pointedly stated his intentions for visiting India. "From the outset," he said of his ambitions as director-general, "as a matter of avowed policy, pursued the aim of intensifying the Asian activities of the organization." It certainly could not have escaped Morse's attention that Mao's victory in China left India alone among prominent Asian countries as the last democratic bulwark against communism.[36]

Morse eagerly became the public face of the ILO in his visit, availing himself of every opportunity to inform the Indian public via radio, lectures, and newspaper articles about the ILO. Numerous distinguished Indians celebrated Morse and the ILO, while also calling on the organization to acknowledge India's and Asia's unique difficulties. Abid Ali Jaferbhai, who led India's largest union the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), honored the ILO for its illustrious history in India. Jaferbhai stated in public remarks that he dreamed of a day when workers' productivity would one day drive down the cost of living and raise the quality of life for workers, similar to the United States. Contrary to Jaferbhai, Ramanlal Lallubhai, President of

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[34] George Tobias and Robert Queener, July 22, 1967, "India's Manpower Strategy Revisited 1947-1967," Folder 001680, Box 66, Catalog Reports, Ford Foundation Records (hereafter FFR), Rockefeller Archive Center (hereafter RAC). The literature on planning and the economy in postcolonial India is thin. Nikhil Menon's dissertation "Planned Democracy: Citizenship, Development, and the Practices of Planning in Independent India, 1947-1966 (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 2017) is one of the only examples of scholarship that address the Nehruvian state's ambitious Five Year Plans and attempt to revolutionize India's economic and civil life.

[35] *Report of the Director-General to the International Labour Conference, Thirty-Second Session, Geneva, 1949* (International Labour Office: Geneva, 1949), 5. The general description is drawn from the first five pages of the report.

[36] Press Conference at the Secretariat, Government of Bombay, Statement of David A. Morse, Director-General, International Labour Office, Geneva, December 11, 1949, Box 23, Folder 3, David A. Morse Papers (hereafter DAMP), Seeley G. Mudd Rare Manuscript Library (hereafter SMRML), Princeton University.

the Ahmedabad Millowners' Association, struck a different tone. Lallubhai starkly laid out the difficulty ahead for India on the issue of wages and productivity. His portrait of India's industrial relations future was bleakand he requested that the ILO remain cognizant of Indian and Asian realities that eluded easy answers. Both Jaferbhai and Lallubhai represented differing poles in the debate over productivity in Indian political economy as Morse sought to boost the ILO's public profile and skirt tough conversations. The *Times of India* covered Morse's visit with stories relating the ILO's commitment to ramping up technical assistance to India and Asia, and he also reached out to Indians with radio addresses.[37] In addition to explaining the ILO's basic functions and history, he promoted the ILO's universality and the organization's expert advice for governments in constructing labor policies and resolving problems that plagued postcolonial Asia.[38] Although his visit likely accomplished little in the way of altering the course of the ILO's relationship with India, Morse raised awareness of the ILO and demonstrated to Nehru and the government of India that the ILO was prepared to meet Nehru's calls from 1947.

Morse meeting Nehru at a New Delhi reception in Morse's honor on December 19, 1949

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37 Speech by Sjt. Abid Ali, President, BPNTUC, Welcoming Mr. and Mrs. David Morse, Director-General of the ILO, December 11, 1949; Welcome address by Ramanlal Lallubhai, President of the Ahmedabad Millowners' Association, December 15, 1949; both preceding documents are located in Box 23, Folder 3, DAMP. Stories in the *Times of India* included "Social Reform by Asian Nations: Plea for Priority by ILO Chief," December 8, 1949; "Meets Labour Minister: Study Tour of India Planned," December 11, 1949; "Intensification of ILO's Activities in Asia," on December 12, 1949. Abid Ali later went on to serve as Deputy Minister for Labor in the Union Government from 1952 until 1962.

38 Morse speech "India and the ILO" delivered over the All India Radio on Monday, 19 December, 1949, Box 23, Folder 3, DAMP.

Even though Morse acted readily as the ILO's pitchman, India's staggering poverty left an indelible mark. As his private journal indicates, his observation of poverty in India shook him. Scenes of visible starvation with "indifference to life" and death haunted his trip. "Could this be possible in the middle [of the] 20th century?," he questioned himself years later when recalling the trip before a return visit to India. His public performance in front of audiences and in radio speeches belied a profound level of dismay. Perhaps this trip more than any other served as a foundational moment for the recently elected director-general when he was forced to confront Asian poverty that could not be separated from colonialism's legacy. Moving forward, his personal commitment to battling poverty merged with his disdain for communism. The journal entries are somewhat unclear which often took priority in that dichotomy. Nevertheless, Morse's journal entry reveals a genuine desire to lift the world out of destitution, and Asia was the first place to begin.[39]

Morse's presence at the Mysore meeting of the Governing Body and the Asian Regional Conference signaled the ILO's growing involvement in Asian development and a pledge to broaden the ILO's operational footprint. For the first time in Asia, the Governing Body met after requests for greater visibility in Asia that were initially proposed at the 1947 First Preparatory Conference.[40] His initial remarks to the Governing Body applauded his Indian hosts and India's potential, while also laying out the future for the ILO's development work. Technical assistance nourished economic development, he said, and it would "play a major role in realizing the world of peace and ever expanding productivity that we set as our goal."[41] Much of the Governing Body's over the course of January 3 through 7 centered on the issue of launching a labor training fellowship program for Asian member-states, technical assistance measures, and reports from various committees.

Arguably the Governing Body's marquee achievement occurred on the first day by welcoming Indonesia into the ILO. Indonesia's sovereignty was transferred officially on December 27, 1949, after several years of a war for independence. In a vote of twenty-seven to one, with Poland dissenting, the Governing Body instructed the Director-General to invite an Indonesian delegation to attend the Asian Regional Conference with the hope of future Indonesian membership. Indonesia accepted, kicking off a relationship that became central to Indonesia's future development and fostering an inclusive, universal space for Asian states' sovereignty to grow.[42]

This theme lingered during the Asian Regional Conference as the ILO formally welcomed newly-independent Indonesia into the ILO's member-states. Prior to the Governing Body, the ILO had limited contacts with Indonesians that were mediated by the Dutch. A welcome address written by Nehru and read by India's government delegate, V.V. Giri, applauded Indonesia's participation and spoke of the critical nature of economic assistance. "South and South-East Asia demand development," Nehru wrote, in their desperate struggles to

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39 David Morse diary entry, May 1, 1956, Reflections 1956-1966, Box 89, Folder 3, DAMP.
40 Press Conference at "Cochin House," New Delhi Statement of David A. Morse, Director-General, International Labour Office, Geneva, December 11, 1949, Box 23, Folder 3, DAMP.
41 Statement by the Director-General at Opening of Governing Body, 110th Session, Mysore India, December 29, 1949, Box 23, Folder 3, DAMP.
42 *Minutes of the 110th Session of the Governing Body, Mysore 3 – 7 January, 1950* (International Labour Office: Geneva, 1950), 18-21. Poland voted no out of fear that the Netherlands failed to agree to full Indonesian sovereignty. Arguably, the Polish were the Soviet Union's most prominent proxy before the Soviet Union joined the ILO in 1954. Morse's comments in his oral history for the Truman Library make clear that he saw the Polish as a Soviet voice of opposition within the ILO.

overcome the burdens of colonialism. The conference ended with the creation of a new committee to analyze plantation labor and, although inconclusive, discussions for the Asian Advisory Council (AAC) to boost local influence over the direction of technical assistance from Geneva.[43] As Daniel Maul maintains, the climate at the Regional Asian Conference was less confrontational than the 1947 meeting. By 1949, Asian participants accepted the ILO's genuine efforts that carried the promise of delivering technical assistance. None of the delegates challenged the Cold War influence on the ILO's development aid. In fact, the conference cheered the ILO's commitment to modernizing labor with a message of universality.[44]

India's delegates to the 1950 International Labor Conference held in Geneva commended the organization's decisive turn to Asia that they attributed, in part, to India. In an account written by India's government representatives, they celebrated an optimistic conclusion to the meeting with an obvious shift in tone at Geneva. Belgian delegate Leon-Eli Troclet delivered introductory remarks that vowed "the organization was abandoning a more or less academic role and entering on a path of practical activity." Morse echoed Troclet's statement, and the report's authors took stock of India's future in an operational ILO. They saw India playing a vital part in ILO's governance that would likely increase with India's ascendance on the world stage, without challenges to India's government. The Indian report noted a promising decision that favored India in a membership dispute at Geneva. An ILO committee on representation of worker's delegates sided with India's government in a decision that overruled the trade union Hind Mazdoor Sabha's (HMS) insistence that Nehru's bureaucrats prevented HMS representatives from joining India's worker's delegation. The committee affirmed India's autonomy in selecting delegates, and rejected any claims that the government was not sovereign in this area.[45]

In the grander scheme, India's stature in the ILO's blossomed in response to a change of institutional culture at the ILO. "We could not also fail to notice that, partly as a result of sustained pressure from Asian countries," principally India, "the ILO and the Director-General in particular, are taking a growing and active interest in problems of Asian countries."[46] As the ILO's prerogatives shifted, India bore the responsibility as the most vocal, democratic proponent for an Asian turn. India stood to reap political gain when the ILO initiated an operational presence, and the ILO under Morse wasted little time in acting on its newfound priorities.

Operational in Asia

The Asian Regional Conference signified a turning point for the ILO and its Asian member-states, especially India and Indonesia. Under the banner of development and universality, Morse steered the ILO decisively in favor of technical assistance to Asia while building the ILO's infrastructure to anticipate the future of postcolonial Africa and the Middle East. Morse's ideological convictions were far from universal. He strived to prevent communism from gaining traction in the tenuous first years of decolonization that mirrored his preparation for post-war Europe. India and Indonesia were the largest postcolonial Asian states, yet both were committed to a neutral foreign policy. Regardless, the ILO's position in the United Nations preserved political breathing room for all parties to launch an ambitious development program

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43 Record of Proceedings, Asian Regional Conference, Nuwara Eliya (Ceylon), January, 1950, 12-13, 113-114.
44 Maul, *Human Rights, Development and Decolonization*, 130-131
45 Report of the Indian government Delegation to the Thirty-Third Session of the International Labour Conference, Geneva, June-July, 1950, Ministry of Labour & Employment Library (*Shram Shakti Bhavan*, hereafter SSB).
46 Ibid.

that became a model for future postcolonial modernization campaigns. Events in 1950 heralded the rise of a new ILO alongside its postcolonial partners.

Indonesia's place in the ILO immediately assumed a new prominence with the announcement that the first meeting of the ILO's Plantation Committee would be held in Bandung, drawing the Republic of Indonesia into the ILO's orbit. Prior to formal independence, Indonesia's relationship with the ILO was tenuous and based on permission from the Dutch government. By November 1950, the Governing Body approved Indonesia's membership and Indonesia signed into a technical assistance agreement with the ILO on November 2, 1950.[47] The period after the transition of power was tumultuous, peaking with a widespread strike by the Plantation Workers Union of the Republic of Indonesia (*Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia* [SARBPURI]) in fall 1950. Indonesia's sovereignty was a work in progress, and the sudden interruption of Indonesia's primary exports forced the newly installed government to search for assistance.

The first postcolonial government confronted a pressing issue in the wake of the SARBUPRI strike. How could they erase the colonial labor code and replace it with one that guaranteed high levels of productivity to fuel the economy? A first step entailed turning to the ILO to collect and analyze foreign labor laws. At the behest of the prime minister, Indonesia's Ministry of Justice collected and circulated a summary of labor laws from the United States, Netherlands, India, and Russia that were provided in part by the ILO. In the case of the United States, the Indonesian researcher synthesized the contours of American industrial labor policy via the 1944 *American Economic Problems* published by the War Department and the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. The excerpt on American labor law declared that it was based on the principle of collective bargaining and cooperation between workers and employers to serve the greater good. Industrial warfare endangered future of the United States' democratic project "if the interests of special groups run counter to the welfare" of the broader body politic. The other cases emphasized a greater role for tripartite cooperation, except the Soviets where "labor discipline is one of the most important tasks of the government." The ministry official who prepared the materials, Wongsonegoro, expressed his wish that Indonesia could draw upon the experiences of the assembled countries to reduce frictions between workers and employers that plagued independent Indonesia's first encounter with a crippling strike.[48]

After from the 1951 Asian Advisory Meeting in Sri Lanka, the ILO and Indonesia that the first conference for the Committee on Plantation Work held in Bandung on December 4 through 16, followed by a meeting of the ILO's AAC. For Indonesians, the Bandung meetings were an early moment to shine after wresting sovereignty from the Dutch. Vice President Muhammad Hatta's remarks at the inaugural session emphasized the rights of governments to intervene to remedy difficulties in production and pay for workers. Hatta also spoke of the need to recognize that workers must feel respected for production to thrive and generate employment opportunities. The Committee on Plantation Work consisted of several reports from various

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[47] Agreement No. 25 Between the International Labor Organisation and the Government of Indonesia, No. 711, Mohammad Bondan Collection, ANRI.

[48] "Schematic Overview of Documents from Foreign Legislation" in Wongsonegoro Ministry of Justice to the Minister of Labor ("*Schematisch Overzicht van Stukken Uit de Buitelandse Wetgeving*" in *Wongsonegoro Kementrian Kehakiman ke Menteri Perburuhan*), November 21, 1950, No. 653, Collection Cabinet of the Indonesian Prime Minister 1950-1959 (*Koleksi Sekretariat Kabinet Perdana Menteri, 1950-1959*), ANRI.

countries cataloging poor conditions, and calling for concerted action to remedy the situation through increases in wages.[49]

The ILO's AAC met in Bandung on December 18 until 20 subsequent to the main conference to formulate an agenda for future meetings of the Governing Body and AAC. The Asian Regional Conference in Sri Lanka had advised all members to form an employment service in line with the ILO's Convention Number 88 Concerning the Organization of the Employment Service, so that Asian member states could study respective labor markets, collect data, and build a state apparatus to identify trends that would place workers in vital sectors for future growth. An employment service facilitated development projects and, most importantly, "such programs are the basis of effective placement operations and for the transfer of manpower from one branch of economic activity to another (e.g., from agriculture to industry)." In essence, the Sri Lanka conference determined that adopting the ILO's method of employment service was the preferred avenue for how countries would make the leap to industrialization that would generate jobs for many growing populations. As Charles Maier argues, an emphasis on an employment service and full employment was etched into the Marshall Plan and the politics of productivity that the United States exported to Europe and the world.[50]

Members of the AAC discussed prevailing low wages in Asia amidst unions' insistence to boost earnings even with the lack of productivity jumps. Governments were stuck. "The new popular governments of Asia would need the cooperation of labor in pursuing their avowed policy of bringing about an increase in production," yet the demands from unions in a postcolonial frame were to drastically raise wages after decades of low pay during the colonial era. The fear of disruptive strike waves hung uneasily over countries where labor previously was a source of organized resistance to colonial powers that nationalist political parties utilized. Work stoppages disrupted the bids to erect the economic scaffolding of postcolonial sovereignty. Leaders such as Nehru and Sukarno walked a narrow line.[51]

The initial conference's primary function was to raise awareness of plantation workers' plight and low wages. In Indonesia, as the Ministry of Labor's delegate reported, foreigners owned the majority of plantations where wages for Indonesians were lowest in Asia. Only the Indonesian government sent a delegation to the conference after SARBUPRI boycotted the conference, likely in response to the Indonesian government's speedy resolution of the SARBUPRI strike that temporarily strangled Indonesia's primary exports. The Indonesian government, as Ann Stoler argues, was quick to resolve the strike on terms that were mutually beneficial, if not favoring the foreign interests.[52]

The SARBUPRI strike forced Indonesia to introduce arbitration measures and devise a new solution to discover methods to prevent labor unrest. To immediately resolve the matter,

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49 The Situation of Workers Domestically and Internationally (*Situasi Perburuhan Dalam dan Luar Negeri, Desember 1950*), No. 445, Collection of the Cabinet of the President of the Republic of Indonesia (*Koleksi Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia 1950-1959*), ANRI.

50 Memorandum on Employment Information Programmes in Asian Countries, Asian Advisory Committee, December 18-20, 1950, GI 10/14-10/34, Box 82, League of Nations Archive (hereafter LNA), United Nations; Maier, *Among Empires*, 227-228.

51 Problems of Wage Policy in Asian Countries Asian Advisory Committee, December 18-20, 1950, GI 10/14-10/34, Box 82, LNA; Antoinette Burton, *The Trouble with Empire: Challenges to Modern British Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 107-118.

52 Situation of Domestic and Foreign Labor, December 1950 (*Situasi Perburuhan Dalam dan Luar Negeri, Desember 1950*), No. 445, Cabinet President Republic of Indonesia, I 1950-1959, ANRI; Ann Stoler, *Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra's Rubber Plantation Belt, 1870-1979* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), 125-130.

Indonesia passed Law No. 1 in 1951 to provide protections for workers in terms of working hours, conditions, and allotted leave. Law No. 1 also empowered the government with the position supreme body to mediate labor disputes. To instantiate this, the government created the Committee for Resolving Labor Disputes (*Panitia Penyelesaian Perselisihan Perburuhan Pusat* [P4P]) to force mediation in disputes to avert the outbreak of strikes that could cripple industries. P4P interceded in labor disputes by issuing binding and sweeping regulations that warded off strikes, even if the decisions occasionally blunted collective bargaining to attain labor peace.[53]

P4P notched speedy victories in achieving its goal by spring 1952. Indonesia's information service asserted that government centers located in ten provinces informed workers of their rights and the proper methods to seek redress without resorting to work stoppages or strikes. A chairman of the central Javanese center, however, indicated that they were overburdened and struggled to meet the sheer number of requests pouring into the office.[54] The Minister of Information, Mononutu, claimed in May that Prime Minister Wilopo's cabinet and President Sukarno credited P4P for stanching industrial disputes, and the government was not anticipating future strikes thanks to P4P. Throughout the 1950s, as a result of its early accomplishments, P4P was the central institution for remedying labor unrest as the Indonesian government searched for solutions to the pressures of governing a postcolonial workforce to utilize manpower in a direct manner.[55]

Like Indonesia, India faced post-independence strike waves that threatened to suffocate the economy. The government responded to the crisis by authoring the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) that entered into law in 1948. Legally justified by the exigencies of national defense, striking workers were required to enter into arbitration. The IDA envisioned a harmonious tripartite space to resolve whatever disagreement catalyzed a strike. Industrial disputes, nevertheless, showed no signs of abating after the IDA went into effect. According to the Ministry of Labor totals, 6.6 million days were lost to strikes in 1949, and the number peaked at 12.8 million the following year.[56] The communist AITUC protested the IDA's ability to strip workers of the right to strike and the preservation of wartime labor codes to achieve labor peace. Data from 1951 indicates that perhaps the IDA's arbitration succeeded when days lost to disputes plummeted to roughly 3.3 million. Going forward for India, the ILO's technical assistance served the urgent demand to prevent strikes by boosting industrialization that could build the foundation for wages to improve and instill labor peace with a framework of security for workers.[57]

India officially signed a technical assistance agreement with the ILO in April 1951, commencing a long-running development relationship. The first ILO experts to arrive focused on productivity, vocational education for plantation workers, and assistance with building a social security system.[58] Within a year, the ILO's footprint grew with the opening of an Asian Field Office in Bangalore. Indian labor officials dispatched ILO questionnaires, such as one regarding

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53 E.J. Hawkins "Labor in Developing Countries: Indonesia" in *The Economy of Indonesia: Selected Readings*, Bruce Glassburner, ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971), 236-241. P4P and Law No. 1 were the reigning policies until the Labor Disputes Act No. 22 of 1957, signed by Sukarno on April 8, 1957, that went into effect in June 1958.

54 ILO Monthly Report, Indonesia, March 1952, C 74-2-4a, ILO Archive.

55 ILO Monthly Report, Indonesia, May 1952, C 74-2-6a, ILO Archive.

56 Descriptive Memoir, Ministry of Labour as on 1st April 1954, SSB.

57 AITUC Report on the Twenty-Second Session, Kolkatta, 1947, 5, V.V. Giri National Labour Institute; Descriptive Memoir Ministry of Labour as on 1st April 1954, SSB.

58 Ministry of Labour Report 1952-1953, SSB.

handicrafts and small-scale industries, perhaps as a means to expand centralized power.[59] In August 1949, the Ministry of Labor also began sending free ILO publications to every state to "centralize the distribution" and therefore situate the Ministry of Labor as the principal source. The Nehruvian state availed itself of ILO assistance, arguably, to facilitate an extension of the state's power in the gambit of building a political economy attuned to productivity.[60]

Calls for Indonesia to adopt ILO structures first occurred in 1951 due to questions of how to best promote full employment and prevent future strikes. One prominent solution originated in the city of Yogyakarta's labor office that dispatched a copy of its proposal for an employment service to the prime minister and his cabinet. The report utilized ILO Convention Number 88 and its widespread adoption by ILO member states to argue for a nation-wide strategy and department for an employment service. Speaking in grand terms, the Yogyakarta office's commentary insisted that the Ministry of Labor "has a broader and deeper task than the 'labor market'…or 'job placement.'" The Ministry of Labor's primary responsibility was to organize and manage the national labor market along the lines stated by the ILO convention. Forming a national program could overrule local practices that inhibited full employment and dampened growth. The proposal stressed that local policies held sway, and "it is clear that regulating the market is not a matter of <u>provincial or local interest</u>, but a <u>national interest</u>." The document went on to insist that the central government could authoritatively organize and manage a national labor market that would redound to the advantage of businesses and workers. An operational ILO in Asia fostered the conditions where proposals such as the employment service triggered the drive to build a novel political economy.[61]

The United States also began to see the ILO's operational face in Asia as a moment of opportunity in the binary struggle with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union rejected membership in the ILO, and an article in 1948 in the newspaper of the Central Council of Trade Unions of the USSR, *Trud*, referred to the ILO "as the instrument of American monopoly." V. Rastorgouieff, the author, related how the United States and Britain carved up the Governing Body and leadership positions to serve their interests. Rastorgouieff dubbed Morse "a puppet of Wall Street," and the piece concluded calling for the ILO's democratization.[62] Morse's campaign to decentralize the ILO and strengthen regional bodies gained the attention of American propaganda efforts. Shortly after the Asian Regional Conference on January 24, 1950, Voice of America broadcasted a summary of the meeting. It shared with listeners the ILO's new progress in Asia and its universality, and new directions in Asian representation within the organization, especially from India where the United States showed great interest.[63]

In New Delhi, Indian officials met with the American labor attaché, Henri Sokolove, to clarify the stakes for India following the Asian Regional Conference regarding the composition

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59 ST Merani Director Labour Conferences Ministry of Labour to All State Governments, August 19, 1952, 19(72)-K/52, MEA, NAI.

60 Dr ST Merani IAS Director Labour Conferences to All State Governments, June 14, 1949, Progs., Nos. P.102-105, 1949, Regional Commissioner, NAI.

61 Transcript from the Decree of the Yogyakarta Special Government (*Turunan Dari Turunan Surat Keputusan Dewan Pemerintah Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta*), September 21, 1951, No. 800, Prime Minister's Cabinet Secretariat, 1950-1959 (*Sekretariat Kabinet Perdana Menteri, 1950-1959*), ANRI (emphasis in original); Maier, *Among Empires*, 227-228. Indonesia did not ratify Convention Number 88 until 2002.

62 V. Rastorgouieff, "The International Labour Office as the Instrument of American Monopoly," September 22, 1948, Box 1, Folder 26, DAMP.

63 Argus Tresidder to Department of State, February 3, 1950, Box 1500, 398.06 ILO/2-150-5/3150, Records of the Department of State Record Group 59 (hereafter RG 59), National Archives and Records Administration II (hereafter NARA).

of the AAC and to clarify India's role in the ILO's future in Asia. Most likely, the Indian officials sought to influence Morse and American policy in the ILO. Prior to a meeting with Secretary of the Ministry of Labour VKR Menon, the Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Labour, Sadashiva Patel, secretly chatted with Sokolove. Patel stated that Nehru's prestige was wrapped up in a body that consisted mostly of Asians and not colonial powers. Later the same day, Menon and Patel met with Sokolove to voice their concern that the composition of the ILO's new AAC included European colonizers. Menon also requested that the United States increase its funding from 18.35 per cent to at least 25 per cent. The embassy employee who forwarded notes from the meetings, First Secretary J. Graham Parsons, advised that the United States should "support the justified demands of the Asian countries" to prevent European encroachment in a body that was intended solely for Asians.[64]

The American government's delegate to the International Labor Conference, Arnold Zempel, received instructions from the Department of State along the lines of Parsons's advice. Durward Sandifer informed Zempel that the Department of State saw the ILO as a tool for improving the United States' international relations. On the question of representation in the ILO and AAC, Zempel's orders were straightforward. Zempel was to back an expansion of the number of Asians in the ILO's management—in order to assure the ILO's overall effectiveness and—as his instructions explained, to support the United States' Cold War aims. Additionally, the United States fully supported the Governing Body's call for Asian member states to take advantage of manpower modernization aid that fashioned America's vibrant working-class and political economy of high productivity.[65]

Domestically, American workers continued their high levels of productivity that drove union membership rates and led to measures of abundance previously unseen in the United States and in world history. Wendy Wall's *Inventing the American Way* charts how this process originated in an unspoken accord between the business community and liberals to sidestep discussions of inequality in exchange for a high productivity economy that fostered affluence for all. Systemic inequalities in capitalism were rendered mute in a time of booming affluence for all. Anticommunism bolstered the argument and prioritizing growth and dismissing economic inequality became the central rationale of American political economy.[66]

The 1950 Treaty of Detroit agreement between General Motors and the United Auto Workers (UAW) symbolized this new direction in political economy. The Treaty Detroit secured benefits, wage raises with cost of living adjustments, and bargaining in exchange for guaranteeing routinely high productivity without strikes. The UAW under the leadership of Walter Reuther won a landmark victory for workers that became the standard for industrial relations. Business interests at the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and auto and steel industries willingly assented to collective bargaining and contracts that mirrored the Treaty of Detroit. Businesses traded recognition via collective bargaining for a labor movement that was denuded of radicalism, pegged their wage gains to productivity metrics, and was more comfortable at the table than on the picket line. No voices in organized labor cried out to protest economic inequality or went on strike to force a fundamental revision of political economy.

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64 J. Graham Parsons to Department of State, March 29, 1950, Box 1500, 398.06 ILO/2-150-5/3150, RG 59, NARA.
65 Durward Sandifer to Arnold Zempel, November, 21, 1950, Box 1502, RG 59, NARA.
66 Wendy L. Wall, *Inventing the "American Way": The Politics of Consensus from the New Deal to the Civil Rights Movement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 167, 195. See also Nelson Lichtenstein, *The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit* (New York: Basic Books, 1995). Lichtenstein relates Walter Reuther's biography and the Treaty of Detroit that is layered on top of the consequential events transpiring in American history that Reuther typified.

Wages rose and the Keynesian pie expanded; the American worker and their standard of living became a global paragon.[67]

The Cold War and American experience proved inescapable for Morse and the ILO. Morse transparently preferred the United States' political economy and judged it the best approach to eradicating poverty and preventing war. Nonetheless, Morse concealed his true intentions that are only discovered in communications with American diplomats that are housed in various archives or in his private diary. Crucially, the ILO's Asian member-states kept the Cold War out of the ILO. Development was of paramount importance, and the ILO represented the richest and most industrially advanced country. American political economy and the politics of productivity generated unparalleled levels of abundance that distinguished the United States from its geopolitical competitor.

Conclusion

This chapter articulated the ILO's early postwar history to trace the factors that propelled it into adopting a new, global agenda. The argument of this chapter stresses that it was the ambitions of two key figures—Nehru and Morse—who reoriented the ILO away from a history of quietly backing colonialism and standard setting to development. The politics of productivity suffused their actions to instill institutional change in an organization that proved averse in yielding to the times, as evidenced by Rens's closing remarks at New Delhi in 1947.

Nehru's significance cannot be minimized in how he convinced the ILO to bend to the urgent needs of decolonizing Asia. His remarks in New Delhi altered the calculus for the ILO at a time when Nehru spoke most prominently for postcolonial peoples in international organizations. India's long-standing membership in the ILO added substantial weight to Nehru's calls, and subsequent chapters will demonstrate Nehru's government's embrace of the ILO and Morse's efforts. Perhaps most significantly, Nehru imbued the ILO with the spirit of development that was inseparable from postcolonialism's DNA. His speech shaped the organization's trajectory and pulled it from a torpor caused by the Second World War. He may have recognized that embarking on a course to modernize labor was essential for the ILO's survival, and it was equally essential for postcolonial India to have the ILO's resources to commence the initial stages of frenzied development in India.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Morse's visit to India in December 1949 and January 1950 left him stunned. He asked himself, "could this be possible in the middle [of the] 20th century?"[68] The answer, of course, was yes, and he could not shake the experience years later as he reminisced before his visit to India in 1957. His exposure to the visceral realities of poverty, life, and death in postcolonial Asia steeled him in his pursuit to change the world. Even if Nehru and others Asian leaders warned Morse of the dilemmas they faced, it may not have registered to the same degree until he visually confronted the source of Nehru's urgency. The trip was a fundamental moment to demonstrate a new ILO commitment to postcolonial development. Morse's next actions were to expand on the ground operations once the ILO's budget increased to support technical assistance. Piloting a new course required a profound investment of time and money, not only espousing universalism. The ILO started the 1950s prepared to implement and partner with states that were entered into the postcolonial moment.

Indonesia played a limited role in this chapter due to the formal guarantee of autonomy in late December 1949. Indonesia's de facto control over Java and many islands in the Indonesian

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67 Panitch and Gindin, *Making of Global Capitalism*, 83-85.

68 David Morse diary entry, May 1, 1956, Reflections 1956-1966, Box 89, Folder 3, DAMP.

archipelago did not earn it the international recognition to engage with the ILO or other members of the United Nations family. Indonesians achieved sovereignty after years of a destructive war for independence, only to be dropped into the postcolonial predicament of establishing economic sovereignty. Archival evidence from the Indonesian National Archives points to the conclusion that the immediate postcolonial governments saw great utility in importing the ILO's methods to manage its labor force and prepare it for the development work ahead. Additionally, participating in the ILO's conferences engendered a sense of international recognition. Internationalism would soon sweep the postcolonial world in the 1950s, as both Nehru and Sukarno ascended to new political heights to shape geopolitics and the Cold War.

The early Cold War battle lines were drawn in the ILO, even as Morse submerged his anticommunism beneath a rhetorical line of universalism. Representation in the ILO was limited to governments from the West and Latin America that had not yet been experienced revolutionary politics that fractured into civil wars. The lack of representation for the Soviets or communist China preserved the ILO as a space free from the tugs of war that would later appear. Morse and the ILO touted the ILO's universalism once the Soviet Union formally joined in 1954 after Joseph Stalin's death that included a global reorientation of Soviet foreign policy. The Soviets introduced a destabilizing element in the ILO. American domestic critics in business and in labor launched blistering attacks on the Soviets, all the while mumbling about Morse's intentions. Early ILO technical assistance escaped debate in the Governing Body and ILO conferences of its capitalist lineage. The die was cast. Morse effectively managed the ILO to prevent development programs from sinking into the Cold War's political sands.

As Darsono's comparative analysis of the American and the Soviet strengths indicates, Morse and the ILO represented the United States' astounding progress in boosting productivity that precipitated levels of abundance with a magnitude that had yet to be seen in human history. Morse was uniquely qualified to be the messenger for this success story. Chapter two will begin with the difficult, uneasy process of exporting the ILO's suite of productivity measures. Frequently, the lack of resources in both countries plagued the advancement of the ILO's agenda. Compulsory arbitration by Indonesia's P4P and India's Industrial Disputes Act blocked some strikes by channeling them through a bureaucratic process. Chapter three will demonstrate how the ILO was essential in training bureaucrats who manned the front of life of labor peace. It was in the realm of training managers and bureaucrats that the ILO rushed into during the 1950s. Morse and others acknowledged that cultivating managers was the necessary starting point for productivity to rise and for managing manpower. It may seem counterintuitive that the ILO specialized in management expertise and globalizing management technologies. Morse and his local partners saw the struggle for growth through the prism of a top down strategy of building a structure that could coordinate untapped reservoirs of labor for an industrial future. Chapter two will investigate this process via documents from Indian and Indonesian archives to gauge reception and the legacy of these campaigns in forming a supervisory presence in factories, small-scale industries, and in the halls of ministries. Although agriculture was an early concern for postcolonial India and Indonesia, industry was the solution and there was no better exemplar than the world's leading industrial power and its corps of managers.

Chapter 2 – The Cold War Comes In & Development in Practice: Soviet Entry to the ILO and an Operational ILO in India and Indonesia, 1952 – 1957

The 1950s witnessed the ILO's evolution into an operational development institution and, simultaneously, a Cold War battleground. This chapter analyzes both changes that transpired in the 1950s that set the tone for the ILO's future. Much of the troubles the ILO encountered in the 1970s can be traced to the organization's history the Soviet Union's reentrance to the ILO in 1954. Employer delegates from the United States nearly revolted following the 1954 announcement. In 1957, after business groups demanded a Congressional investigation, the committee studying American presence in the ILO identified the ILO as a key player in advancing the United States' global Cold War foreign policy. 1957 also marked nearly a decade of Morse's tenure as director-general, and the ILO took stock of its first few years in Indonesia and India to determine what programs succeeded or failed in the midst of rapid decolonization.

Morse remained the crucial actor to shepherd the ILO into a new era where the world's second largest industrial power, the Soviet Union, participated fully as a member. Morse's Cold War bona fides remained unchanged. He appreciated, nevertheless, that the Soviet Union's absence weakened the ILO's credibility. When the Soviet Union notified the director-general in 1954 of its intent to rejoin the ILO with terms that violated the ILO Constitution, the director-general refused to grant conditional membership. The Soviet Union retracted its demands and joined the ILO's ranks. American reaction from the government and its business community was heated. Both parties anticipated Soviet participation, yet the communist presence in the Governing Body elevated the threat to the United States' control over the ILO.

Representatives from the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and Chamber of Commerce rejected the notion that the Soviet Union could join a tripartite organization. The participation of Soviet employer delegates angered NAM, and NAM pushed its allies in Congress to investigate the merits of American participation in the ILO. NAM's critiques reappeared twenty years later, and this chapter seeks to understand the roots of the objection to Soviet membership that nearly destroyed the ILO in the 1970s. Extending beyond the historical cause and effect relationship, this chapter seeks to understand how the business community saw itself as a player in the global Cold War.

This chapter also zooms in on development practice in Indonesia and India from 1952 until 1957. Both countries solicited assistance from the ILO to import knowledge and practices in Western productivity, management, and industrial relations. Progress was mixed. Perhaps owing to India's greater modernization under British colonialism and low political volatility, ILO programs found considerably more success in India. Indonesia's almost annual turnover in prime ministers along with economic turbulence presented numerous difficulties for achieving sustainable development gains in the 1950s. Sukarno's and Indonesia's postcolonial prestige peaked in the mid-1950s after the Bandung Conference. In spite of this notoriety, the experience of on-the-ground development workers sheds light on realities of postcolonial development that much of the decolonizing world faced to establish economic sovereignty.

Attaining economic sovereignty required a hybridized approach for postcolonial planners and bureaucrats. Although the Soviet Union often receives credit for inspiring the five year plan model, this chapter illustrates how Indonesian and Indian ministries wittingly embraced capitalist practices to ramp up productivity. An American management practice created during World War II named Training Within Industry (TWI) was especially popular. TWI promised to speedily build a corps of local managers who also held knowledge of Western productivity methods. The

ILO and the United States' 1950s aid arm, the International Cooperation Agency (ICA), collaborated with businesses and ministries to embed TWI. ILO and ICA development projects proceeded in conjunction with local partners in the Global South in the mid-1950s, and the Cold War's realignment in 1954 from European theaters to the developing world added a new imperative to the ILO's labors.

The ILO as a Cold War Battleground

The Soviet Union withdrew from the ILO in 1937, never expressing serious interest in rejoining even when the UN absorbed the ILO until 1953. Prior to 1953, the Soviet Union utilized the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) to influence labor politics and political economy in the Global South. The WFTU was born during a meeting of international unionists in 1945 in a pre-Cold War moment where unity trumped ideological dispute. Bitter Cold War rivalries in the WFTU led to the departure of American and Western European unions that resulted in the formation of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in 1949.[69] During this Cold War WFTU-ICFTU split, the ILO transformed from an anemic organization into a global development force without the Soviet Union.

Post-war Soviet press organs criticized the ILO for its connections to the West, capital, and tripartism. The newspaper of the Central Council of Trade Unions of the U.S.S.R., *TRUD*, leveled a searing attack on the ILO in an article titled "The International Labour Office as the Instrument of American Monopoly." The piece dubbed Morse "a puppet of Wall Street" who headed an institution that "defends the interests of the great monopoly capitalists and not the interests of the workers and of their organizations."[70] In a similar vein, a 1949 article in the official Soviet magazine *The New Times* continued the rhetorical attacks. The piece related the many ways in which the ILO undercut workers around the world, and, differing from the *TRUD* article, tied the ILO to an American imperialist project that was intent on destabilizing the Soviet Union and the WFTU. "The activities of the ILO show that this organization is at present in the hands of the American imperialists who are using it first and foremost as a weapon to fight the camp of democracy" and its worker representatives, the WFTU. In explaining why the Soviet Union rejected the ILO, the author, V. Rastorguyev, stated that the tripartite nature of the ILO prevented it from legitimately protecting workers or allowing unions "to exert any influence" on the ILO's endeavors.[71]

Stalin's death in March 1953 precipitated a sea change in Soviet policy toward the Global South and the UN. Recognizing that the Soviet Union had surrendered the ILO and other UN specialized agencies to the United States' influence or control, Nikita Khrushchev and the Soviet Union's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vyachselav Molotov, reversed Stalin's hostility toward the ILO. Khrushchev and Molotov determined that the WFTU's limited global legitimacy jeopardized the Soviet Union's ability to compete with the United States in the globally influential ILO.[72]

The Soviet Union's first announcement of intention to rejoin the ILO arrived in a letter to Morse on November 4, 1953. Puzzlingly, instead of declaring immediate membership, the letter

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[69] Anthony Carew, *International Confederation of Free Trade Unions* (Berne, Switzerland: Peter Lang, 2000), 8-10.
[70] V. Rastorgouieff, "The International Labour Office as the Instrument of American Monopoly," September 22, 1948, Box 1, Folder 26 Criticism of International Labour Organization, MC #097, DAMP.
[71] V. Rastorguyev, "The True Purpose of the International Labour Organization," March 23, 1949, Box 1, Folder 26 Criticism of International Labour Organization, MC #097, DAMP.
[72] Alvin Rubenstein, *The Soviets in International Organizations: Changing Policy Toward Developing Countries, 1953-1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), 10.

inserted qualifications to Soviet reentry. First, the document insisted on altering the ILO's structure to increase worker delegates from a third to a half of members—effectively terminating the ILO's tripartite character. Second, the Soviet Union refused to abide by Article 37 of the ILO's Constitution that utilized the International Criminal Court (ICC) to resolve disputes or convention violations. The Soviet Union, the letter indicated, rejected the ICC's jurisdiction over matters in the ILO.[73]

Morse unilaterally rejected the Soviet Union's bid for a conditional membership. Prior to the November 4 letter, Morse conducted secret discussions with Molotov on Soviet readmission to the ILO. Morse assured Molotov that he welcomed the Soviet Union as long as it accepted the constitution and was an active, due-paying member. The demands surprised Morse. Without consulting representatives from member-states or the Governing Body, Morse dismissed the Soviet membership letter.[74] He wrote to Molotov, "the Constitution makes no provision for membership on the basis of incomplete acceptance of its obligations," encouraging the Soviet Union "to consider the desirability of giving the matter further consideration and of communicating further with the Director-General on the subject."[75] Morse was unapologetic in his dismissal of special treatment for the Soviet Union. "I was the trustee of the constitution," he asserted later in an oral history interview. He told members of the ILO "'it's clear that you cannot have this kind of acceptance.'" He reasoned that a conditional entry for the Soviet Union created an unsustainable precedent, and he rebuffed internal criticism of his decision.[76]

Rumors swirled as to why the Soviets insisted on special membership criteria. A *New York Times* editorial attributed the Soviet letter to an upcoming report on forced labor that would implicate the Soviet Union for slave labor, with the possibility of a referral to the ICC. Editors warned that "meekly" accepting the Soviet demands would put a stamp of approval for future qualified membership and, worse in their eyes, transform the ILO "into another bear garden."[77] A speech delivered by Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell to the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) convention shared the editorial's concerns, and linked Soviet actions to fear of an ILO report on forced labor in Russia. Mitchell cautioned that Soviet membership as written in the November 4 letter "would erect a roadblock on an avenue which freedom-loving people everywhere have used to travel forward to get a better life."[78]

American diplomatic posts abroad pointed to geopolitics to explain the Soviet Union's desire to rejoin the ILO. The United States' Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Charles Bohlen, brushed away concerns about the ICC and forced labor. In Bohlen's estimation, Soviet policy makers accepted that their preferred venue for shaping international labor politics, the WFTU, showed little hope of rivaling the ILO's international reach. The Soviet Union's foreign policy turn to the decolonizing South under Khrushchev and the ILO's development efforts in the postcolonial world necessitated a Soviet pivot to membership in an organization with legitimacy. Unlike the WFTU, Bohlen wrote, participation in the ILO afforded the Soviet Union a position "to influence legitimate labor" movements in the Global South. He noted that the Soviet Union acted similarly in joining UNESCO, and Soviet actions were solely geopolitical in orientation.[79]

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[73] Legation of the U.S.S.R. to David Morse, November 4, 1953, *International Labour Office Official Bulletin* 37, 7 (December 31, 1954), 229.

[74] Morse oral history.

[75] Robert Winfree to Department of State, November 17, 1953, Box 1509, RG 59, NARA.

[76] Morse oral history.

[77] Editorial, "The Soviet and the I.L.O.," *New York Times*, November 10, 1953.

[78] "Text of the Address by Secretary of Labor Mitchell at C.I.O. Convention," *New York Times*, November 19, 1953.

[79] Charles Bohlen to Department of State, November 27, 1953, RG 59 398.06 Box 1509, RG 59, NARA.

A source from the ILO refuted the forced labor report justification and looked instead to the ILO's postcolonial presence when discussing the matter with the United States' Public Affairs Officer in Geneva. According to the ILO source, the Soviet Union previously cooperated in initiating the committee to investigate forced labor, and thus was not intimidated by the report or a possible ICC case. The source claimed that the Soviet Union rejoined the ILO only after a post-Stalin foreign policy shift to compete with the United States globally. Membership in the ILO opened the door for the Soviet Union to field its agents via the ILO, and the ILO's more than 120 technical assistance posts in Asia, Latin America, and Africa were almost unrivaled in number among the UN specialized agencies. "Many of the" ILO technical assistance missions were "key spots for infiltrating labor policies and for collecting and disseminating information," the source alleged. Moscow would rejoin the ILO, the Public Affairs Officer reported, because waging the binary struggle between United States and the Soviet Union required ILO membership.[80]

Debate over Soviet membership continued within the ILO during the winter and spring of 1954, and Morse refused to relent. Some dissenting voices in the ILO maintained that the organization's claims to universality were undermined by the director-general's decision. He countered by stressing that his responsibility as the director-general was to preserve the ILO's constitution, and the Soviet Union was welcome to join without qualification.[81] Ultimately, Morse's resolve convinced Molotov to abandon his previous requests. In one sentence on April 24, 1954, the Soviet Union rejoined the ILO. By proclaiming its willingness to abide "the obligations of the Constitution of International Labour Organisation," the Soviet Union returned to the ILO and a Cold War battle began in the ILO.[82]

The Soviet Union reentered the ILO months before the 1954 ILC, and the United States government issued strategies to employer delegates for managing potential Soviet propaganda. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, David McKendree Key, provided instructions for the employer delegates. Key dubbed Soviet entry as a new era for the ILO. Communist propaganda never reached far in an ILO predominantly run by the United States and its allies. Soviet delegates and experts, he cautioned, would amplify their assault on capitalism and the West. The State Department's objectives for the employer delegates included drawing attention to the Soviet Union's hypocrisy on working conditions in communist states as well as the USSR's inability to meet the ILO's standards. Instead of replying in kind to "Soviet bombast," the United States government advised employers to curb their excitement. "A Soviet pose of 'sweet reasonableness' was best refuted by contrasting Soviet words with Soviet deeds," and employers should exercise restraint in responding to Soviet insults.[83]

The seating of Soviet employer delegates presented the United States government with a dilemma, based on the nature of state ownership of factories. Instructions for the United States government's delegation indicated that the Soviet's presence in ILO employer delegations should be resisted. Government delegates were ordered to dispassionately lobby against Soviet employers. American representatives were not, however, to take a principled stand alone. The State Department directed delegates to avoid conflict unless other members of the Governing Body united against Soviet employers. Few allies backed the United States' campaign to

80 Henry F. Nichol to Department of State, November 30, 1953, Box 1509, RG 59, NARA.
81 Morse oral history.
82 Vyachselav Molotov to David Morse, April 24, 1954, Box 1510, RG 59, NARA.
83 David McKendree Key to Arthur Langlie, May 28, 1954, Box 1510, RG 59, NARA.

stonewall the Soviet Union's employers. Ultimately, the Soviet employer delegates were seated in an effort to avoid conflict at the 1954 ILC.[84]

The 1954 ILC consisted of a small number of Soviet barbs targeting the United States and the ILO's universality. A Soviet government delegate, Amazasp Avakimovich, opened his address to the ILC's selection committee by critiquing the ILO's failure to include the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the organization. Universality, Avakimovich declared, was in doubt with the United States' "unjust and immoral" use of its power to prevent the PRC from membership in the ILO. An American worker delegate, George Delaney, immediately objected to Avakimovich's comments. Delaney noted that a PRC membership discussion was out of order by pertaining to credentials and not relate to the selection committee. The ILC President, Paul Ramadier, agreed and instructed Avakimovich to end the discussion. Overall, as an Indonesian government delegate to the ILC summarized in an official report, the ILO's university increased with the inclusion of the Soviet Union and eight Eastern European states. The delegate reported that limited disagreements occurred as members of the "anti-communist representatives [responded] with serious attacks," as Western delegates ramped up their opposition to the Soviet Union.[85] Principal among these were the United States' employer delegates from the National Association of Manufacturing (NAM).

During the early 1950s, NAM officials warily supported the ILO prior to 1954. NAM's employer delegate to the ILC, William L. McGrath, typified the business community's stance. McGrath, writing in a 1953 article titled "What Should We do About the ILO?," deemed the organization "a paradise for world planners who are playing at being god." He advocated for a steady American presence in the organization as long as the United States' sovereignty was never violated by ILO standards or conventions. In spite of its links to state planning, he wrote, the ILO was a forum "to explain the free competitive system to the people of the rest of the world." Soviet membership forced him and others at NAM and the Chamber to reconsider their stance on the ILO.[86]

The presence of Soviet delegates on the employer's ILO division triggered an acute ideological reaction by NAM and the Chamber. Both argued that employers were nonexistent in communism and the Soviet Union lacked a political economy that could send tripartite delegates. The state, not the people, they contended, owned the means of production, and Soviet employer delegates would be agents of the Soviet state. Business representatives adopted an aggressive Cold War rationale for American membership to prepare for the possibility of Soviet employers. Congressional testimony by Richard P. Doherty, who worked as a NAM employer adviser to the ILO and president of the Television-Radio Management Corporation, symbolized the rhetorical turn. Doherty testified on October 4, 1954, to the fact that "the ILO must now be regarded as an instrument in the Cold War." Employers' responsibilities included, he asserted, resisting Soviet propaganda that aimed to influence the decolonizing Global South's economies. He tied the business community to the Cold War geopolitical contest by insisting that employer delegations to the ILO shouldered a duty to protect capitalism by opposing communism. His testimony urged Congress and business leaders to launch a concerted effort in the ILO with the understanding that

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[84] Position Paper: USSR Employer Issue, May 31, 1954, Box 1510, RG 59, NARA.

[85] Report of the Indonesian Delegation to the 37th ILO Conference June 1954 in Geneva [*Laporan Delegasi Indonesia ke konferensi I.L.O. ke 37 Djuni Th. 1954 di Djenewa*], No. 1728, Prime Minister's Cabinet Secretariat, 1950-1959, ANRI.

[86] William L. McGrath, "What Should We do About the ILO?," NAM Series I Records, 1917-1970 Acc 1411, subject code cf. 100-L, Box 267, Folder: McGrath: "What Should We Do About the ILO" - reprint ILO 1000.a, Hagley Museum & Library (hereafter HML).

"our economic system can survive only as we fight courageously and successfully." Although Cold War rhetoric was hardly new to the American business community, the ILO previously escaped the binary struggle between capitalism and communism. Doherty and others understood the gravity of the Soviet entry into the ILO and the consequences for capitalism's global influence.[87]

A year after Molotov's 1954 ILO letter declaring unconditional membership, NAM spelled out its ILO policy in an internal memo that also informed objectives for future employer delegates. With the United States' membership in the UN and secretariats such as the ILO, NAM backed aggressive participation in the ILO. Ushering the Cold War into the ILO demanded that employer delegates not "abandon the influence American business can wield on this international front on behalf of free competitive enterprise." An alliance of worker and employer delegates at the ILO was coalescing to defeat communist efforts to undermine the ILO, the memo explained. With both worker and employer delegates united, "there exists for the first time a real opportunity for free employers and free labor to win the battle of the Cold War" and to unmask communism as the "the political system of slave labor and dictatorship." American businesses, the memo charged, should lead the assault to prevent Soviet control of the ILO and avert a loss of American influence in a venue that shaped perceptions of political economy. Retreating from the ILO deprived employer delegates of the opportunity to make the case for "free competitive enterprise," and, at that moment, a strident Cold War rationale infused the justification for the United States' continued ILO membership. NAM prized the ILO's development role and appreciated the ILO's value for influence and propaganda—be it for capitalism or communism—at the ILO. Retreat was not an option.[88]

NAM and the Chamber convinced the House of Representatives in 1956 to undertake a thorough investigation of the United States' policy toward the ILO to guarantee the strategic harmony of anti-communist objectives. A 1957 joint report by the Departments of State, Labor, and Commerce titled "The Report of Advisory Committee on United States Participation in the International Labor Organization" examined the United States' relationship with the ILO. Representatives from each department responded to a list of eight concerns from the employer delegates, mostly prompted by the Soviet Union's reentry to the ILO. In terms of the ILO's domestic impact, the committee found few ILO benefits for workers in the United States. ILO standards and conventions were commonplace in the United States. The primary finding, however, was unambiguous: "policy toward and participation in the International Labor Organization must be considered primarily in terms of the goals of United States foreign policy." ILO development campaigns advanced the cause of global democracy promotion by accelerating industrialization, and this served the United States' strategic ambition of nurturing budding capitalist states. The ILO functioned as an "instrument in the ideological contest" between the United States and the Soviet Union. Accordingly, committee members maintained that active

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87 Richard P. Doherty testimony "US Employers Should Continue Participation in the International Labor Organization," October 4, 1954, Box 265, NAM Series I Records, 1917-1970 Acc 1411, subject code cf. 100-L, Folder: Participation in ILO Popular Reaction (Public, members, etc.), HML.

88 NAM Memo "International Labor Organization (ILO)," April 9, 1955, Box 263, NAM Series I Records, 1917-1970 Acc 1411, subject code cf. 100-L, Folder: ILO Formulation & Background Objectives & Operation, HML. Emphasis in original.

American membership was imperative. Surrendering the ILO to the Soviet Union risked damaging the United States' credibility in the midst of a heated ideological contest.[89]

In a series of recommendations, the report provided the foundation of the United States' policy toward the ILO until withdrawing in 1977. Crucially, the Department of State assumed primary responsibility for the ILO with the Cold War's globalization. The ILO graduated from a forum for discussion on conventions to "a battleground in the Cold War between the democratic and totalitarian regimes." An interagency committee with representatives from State, Labor, and Commerce shared policy control on technical issues. The Department of State, nevertheless, governed ILO policy in broadcasting American values to the decolonizing and then-colonized world. Committee members also exhorted American delegates to support a broadening of operational development work in the ILO. The recommendation praised the ILO's headway, yet stressed that delegates should not relax in urging quicker progress on the technical assistance front. Training for workers and managers flowed through the ILO from North to South, and American strategic interests were best met via technical assistance. Lastly, the committee called for a robust public education program to inform American citizens on the ILO's merits. An informed citizenry would continue to back the United States' presence in the UN, and thus guarantee that the United States would remain invested in international organizations at the moment when the ILO commenced operational activities.[90]

Development in Practice: India

The ILO's operational front first launched postcolonial Asia with sweeping productivity, management, manpower, and vocational state capacity building via development assistance. ILO technical assistance activities in India concentrated primarily on two fronts: management training and productivity instruction. In both cases, the ILO responded to Indian requests for assistance to launch the ambitious First Five Year Plan. The ILO's progress in the early- and mid-1950s was uneven due to myriad factors. By 1958 when the ILO and India updated a new technical assistance agreement, however, the ILO achieved some of its goals to inculcate Western management and productivity practices. The labors of ILO experts, Indian government counterparts, and Indian business owners culminated in disseminating specific notions of the relationship between labor and management to boost productivity throughout India.

Management training—specifically Training Within Industry (TWI)—represented the first successful venture of ILO and Indian cooperation. Request for TWI assistance originated not from government, rather from the Ahmedabad Textile Industry's Research Association (ATIRA) in 1951. ATIRA sought answers to "high labor turnover, high absenteeism, and damages to material and equipment" in mills. ATIRA's solution to those chronic issues was improved managers and training for supervisors. ATIRA reached out to the ILO Asian Field Office for recommendations, and a TWI trainer was dispatched to diagnose problems along with provide solutions. By the time of the Planning Commission published its final draft of the Five Year Plan in December 1952, the Planning Commission wholly embraced TWI and made it a government responsibility to collaborate with the ILO's TWI experts.[91]

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[89] *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements on the Committee of Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Part III Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive, July 8, August 2, and October 3, 1963*, 370-378.

[90] Ibid., 378, 379, 383-385, 389.

[91] Evaluation of the ILO Technical Assistance Programme in India (1950-55), T.A. Expanded Programme, Folder: India (IND-1) Manpower Organisation B.T.W.I., TAP0-33-1 (B), ILOA.

TWI emerged in the United States' humming World War II factories. It emerged as a solution to chronic wartime manpower shortages and unfamiliarity with industrial labor. TWI was portrayed as one of the primary engines of record productivity and maintaining labor peace. After the war, Marshall Plan aid stressed raising productivity rapidly to rebuild economies. TWI was a tested solution that was embedded in the Marshall Plan advice to jump start Western European and Japan's economies. The Americans' management training provided an ephemeral solution, even though it was tested in Western Europe. TWI's proponents in the United States and Europe boasted of its abilities to generate the twin feats of high productivity and peaceful labor relations. A chain of transmission occurred from American wartime factories to recovering Western Europe before spreading to the developing world where it fed into economic planners' dreams.

ILO experts conducted a study of a textile mill in Ahmedabad in 1951, and the results flashed the promise of an easily imported management scheme. Improvements from the initial study showed a rise of spinning output from 7 to 18 percent and upticks in weaving from 11 to 30 percent.[92] ATIRA's head of psychology, Vikram A. Sarabhai, reported that with minor adjustments to the training of workers and supervisors, the ILO's expert, F.A.J. Taylor, delivered conclusive results. Implementing TWI convinced ATIRA to request greater assistance from the ILO to cement the management training in Ahmedabad. Sarabhai told the Government of India's Minister of Labor, V.V. Giri, "continuous reinforcement and extension training" by ILO experts could build a system of management training for developing India. Although historians may question the accuracy of Taylor's and ATIRA's quantitative results, and if the gains were short-lived, Sarabhai sold Giri on TWI's value.[93]

The ILO's first TWI expert in India, Clifford Fee, arrived in August 1953 to launch a rapid campaign of disseminating TWI. Fee was the first of three ILO experts who traveled throughout India to lead TWI classes, offer hands on training, and boost the ILO's profile in India. Fee spent his first several months in Ahmedabad, Vadodara, and New Delhi. He participated in long-term planning of a future TWI institute and seminars for industries beyond textiles, for instance in a Mumbai cement company. Records of his meetings primarily included Indian government officials such as Giri in addition to employers. Typically, union representatives did not appear on Fee's list of officials visited or locations of classes taught.[94] The Government of India's appraisal of Fee and TWI's record of accomplishments in Ahmedabad remained positive, and the Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Labour wrote to Morse in March 1954 to request an extension of Fee's services in India until 1955.[95]

ATIRA founded the TWI Association-Ahmedabad in 1953, and its newsletter published at the close of 1954 extolled Fee's headway in only a year's time. Starting with only twenty-two textile mills in October 1953, he commenced a successful record of training a total of 4,452 men: 2,030 in Jobs Methods, 1,846 in Job Relations, and 576 in Jobs Training. 122 supervisors were prepared to teach follow-up refresher courses, thereby sustaining the first year's achievements. Employers, industrialists, and business owners in other Indian cities took note, and TWI

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92 Ibid.

93 Vikram A. Sarabhai to V.V. Giri, December 24, 1953, Collection: T.A. Expanded Programme, Folder: India (IND-1) Manpower Organisation B.T.W.I., TAP0-33-1 (B), ILOA.

94 I.L.O. Technical Assistance Programme for the Government of India, Progress Report No. 7, May 31, 1954, T.A. Expanded Programme, Folder: India (IND-1) Manpower Organisation T.W.I. Reports from Mr. Clifford Fee and Mr. Pearson, TAP0-33-1 (B)1, ILOA.

95 E.U. Damodaran to Morse, March 26, 1954, T.A. Expanded Programme, Folder: India (IND-1) Manpower Organisation B.T.W.I., TAP0-33-1 (B), ILOA.

associations appeared in Mumbai, Kolkata, and New Delhi. Fee and another ILO, Stephen Pearson, fanned out beyond the initial site of Ahmedabad to spread TWI.[96]

Pearson, like Fee, found widespread fascination for TWI during hurried travels throughout India. In December 1954 after his first handful of months in India, Pearson taught TWI classes and met with employers at numerous industries throughout India: ATIRA in Ahmedabad; Associated Cement Companies Mumbai; Mukhand Iron & Steel Company Kerala; Millowners Association Madhya Pradesh; Hindustan Aircraft Association Bangalore; Bangalore Woolen, Cotton & Silks Mills Co. Ltd; Indian Telephone Industries Limited Bangalore; Stan-Vac Mumbai; Burmah Shell Mumbai. Employers marveled at TWI's promise, he insisted, pressuring him to commence instruction. He warned that "the demand for TWI is so great that there is a danger of being swept off ones feet and doing TWI for the sake of doing it. Associations and managements so far encountered by this expert have been insistent in their demand for the training of officers immediately." The problem, he stated, emerged from a burst of enthusiasm with weak extension of supervisory training. "A jaundiced view of TWI" could result from this error, and it threatened the longevity of successful TWI implementation. Instead of running institutes and instruction, he envisioned a decentralized program led by Indian state governments that tied the states to the Five Year Plan. He recognized the boundaries of his proposal, and continued his efforts at convincing Indian employers to slowly embrace the management scheme. He likewise found the best adoption when instructors used "Indian English" and taught the concepts simply without overburdening the students with detailed instruction.[97]

Fee and Pearson evangelized TWI widely in India, and they found a ready flock. Meetings, classes, seminars, and institutes occurred continuously throughout 1955. Their reports in spring 1955 depicted considerable interest in TWI. The initial success in Ahmedabad and press reporting precipitated an "awakening" for the Indian government and business community. "Training has already commenced in the following branches of industry: cement, textiles, electricity, mining engineering, oil distribution, rubber, steel production and railways" as well as in Ministry of Public Works in New Delhi, the two experts communicated to Geneva, noting their limited ability to meet the torrent of requests.[98]

Six months later by October 1955, an official government TWI Centre opened in Mumbai that showcased the government's commitment to the management training. Fee and Pearson praised the Ministry of Labour's dedication to training Indian counterparts with a national vision for strengthening the work of the ILO experts and Indian TWI associations. Institutionalizing TWI created, for the ILO experts, a clear marker that the ILO mission glimpsed a successful end of the technical assistance program in 1956.[99]

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96 T.W.I. Newsletter Annual 1954, T.W.I. Association Ahmedabad, T.A. Expanded Programme, Folder: India (IND-1) Manpower Organisation T.W.I. Reports from Mr. Clifford Fee and Mr. Pearson, TAP0-33-1 (B)1, ILOA.

97 I.L.O. Technical Assistance Programme for the Government of India, First Report, December 24, 1954, T.A. Expanded Programme, Folder: India (IND-1) Manpower Organisation T.W.I. Reports from Mr. Clifford Fee and Mr. Pearson, TAP0-33-1 (B)1, ILOA.

98 I.L.O. Technical Assistance Programme for the Government of India, Joint Progress Report No: 1, April 6, 1955, T.A. Expanded Programme, Folder: India (IND-1) Manpower Organisation T.W.I. Reports from Mr. Clifford Fee and Mr. Pearson, TAP0-33-1 (B)1, ILOA.

99 I.L.O. Technical Assistance Programme for the Government of India, Joint Progress Report No: 6, October 15, 1955, Folder: India (IND-1) Manpower Organisation T.W.I. Reports from Mr. Clifford Fee and Mr. Pearson, TAP0-33-1 (B)1, ILOA.

The head of the ILO mission in India, V.K.R. Menon, expressed his favorable opinion of TWI's adoption in India in a letter to the ILO Asian Office. "The TWI form of supervisory training might be the most practicable in India for some time to come," Menon remarked. On the other hand, a current of doubt existed in some Indian officials' minds. One questioned if TWI endured as a primary mode of management training in the United Kingdom, the United States, or Europe. Nevertheless, Menon struck a positive note in assessing the effect of the TWI technical assistance program in India as it drew near its close.[100]

The ILO's TWI mission concluded in 1956 in self-congratulatory fashion. Approximately 10,000 supervisors were trained in TWI during the experts' three year mission from 1953 until 1956. Independently, India's government constructed the infrastructure for expanding TWI in concert with the ILO and Indian employers. An ILO report touted the accomplishments of their technical assistance. Notably, they credited the training for identifying dilemmas that restrained development while also changing mindsets. "The introduction of TWI has brought to the surface for correction dormant problems of industrial organization and administration." Rationalizing management and training of supervisors, according to ILO authors, cast a light on colonial management mindsets that sustained negative industrial practices. Consistent, deliberate training in TWI ensured the effective workplace relationships that fueled higher productivity levels. ILO experts required six months' time for "conditioning attitudes" among Indians before training could commence. Once sufficiently prepared to understand the logic of supervisory training for workspaces—especially industrial sites—TWI training realized its goal of building better supervisors. And with a national network of centers, training seminars, and qualified personnel in place, TWI became a fixture of how the Indian government conceived of management training.[101]

After the ILO mission ended, the Indian government continued to prioritize TWI in 1957 and beyond. The 1957 Indian Labour Conference's recommended an immediate rise of TWI efforts at the national, state, and industry level. Conference leaders also suggested research to devise a list of the targeted growth industries for the Second Five Year Plan, and preparing TWI sessions for the future of work in India.[102]

The Union Minister for Labour, Employment, and Planning, Gulzari Lal Nanda, praised TWI's virtues to assist India's future at the Indian Labour Conference. TWI accomplished in little time a massive expansion of mid-level supervisors who, trained in industrially efficiency, would drive India's industrialization. Industrial progress engendered material progress for workers, Nanda emphasized, thus smoothing labor disputes that threatened to derail India's development. In his words, Fee and Pearson's three year mission "trained 4 institute leaders who assisted in training 126 trainers who in turn have trained 7,000 supervisors who direct the work of 100,000 production workers." Sustained TWI training expanded the benefits and the small investment reaped considerable long-term gain. "Employers' organizations, technical and professional associations, management and trade union executives have gone on record" to laud TWI's boon for India's labor relations, quality of finished materials and production totals. The future Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission and Prime Minister acknowledged that

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100 V.K.R. Menon to Rene Livchen, June 18, 1956, T.A. Expanded Programme, Folder: India (IND-1) Manpower Organisation T.W.I. Reports from Mr. Clifford Fee and Mr. Pearson, TAP0-33-1 (B)1, ILOA.

101 Evaluation of the ILO Technical Assistance Programme in India (1950-55), T.A. Expanded Programme, Folder: India (IND-1) Manpower Organisation B.T.W.I., TAP0-33-1 (B), ILOA.

102 N.S. Mankiker memo, August 20, 1957, T.A. Expanded Programme, Folder: India (IND-1) Manpower Organisation T.W.I., TAP0-33-1 (B), ILOA.

TWI was far from a panacea. Regardless, India benefited considerably from the ILO's three year mission that left an indelible mark on India's political economy and aspirations of rising industrial productivity.[103]

In 1952, Director-General Morse's *World Labor Report* to the ILC fixated on productivity and the technical assistance that was the centerpiece of the ILO's Indian development campaigns. Morse informed delegates that the "the problem of productivity" inspired a majority of the ILO's efforts. He gave a succinct definition of productivity: "the ratio between output of wealth produced and the input of resources used up in the production process." He stressed that the totality of a country's inputs and outputs had to weighed in any true measure of productivity. In essence, he invited a wide-ranging inclusion of social, political, and economic metrics to any formula that defined productivity. His and the ILO's motivating concern was raising global standards of living, and productivity was the means to this end at dawn of the postcolonial moment.[104]

A productivity ethos lived within the ILO and its early productivity endeavors. In 1952, ILO productivity experts conducted studies in India, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, Sri Lanka, Greece, Yugoslavia, Hong Kong, Brazil, and Bolivia. The first four—India, Pakistan, Israel, and Egypt—were the "principal missions" for the ILO in the early 1950s. An ILO report on these missions likened social and economic conditions in each of those four countries to England in the early years of the Industrial Revolution. Pressures on land and increased agricultural productivity fed urbanization, the story went, and dispossessed agricultural workers fled to cities. Industrial development was accepted as a necessary and certain outcome for developing countries in ILO publications. Newly minted industrial laborers struggled under repressive management that equated their manpower to productivity. ILO training sought to upend this tradition and replace it with modern productivity and management practices. Productivity offered, in one sense, professional management training to adopt a benevolent, humane approach to managing workers. Respected workers were productive workers. Accordingly, ILO experts tethered productivity to smooth relationships between employers and workers. In countries such as India with a smaller pool of capital and a gulf of human labor, ILO experts sought to impart analytical, social scientific knowledge of how to create a harmonious workplace that sped industrial development and social progress.[105]

India was one of the ILO's primary sites of productivity missions in the 1950s, and it was divided into two periods. The first, 1952 until 1954, consisted of introducing specific notions of industrial productivity to textile mills and industrial engineering. The second, 1955 until 1958, as with TWI, saw an intensification of productivity instruction, practice, and expertise spreading throughout India. The productivity technical assistance mission consumed the majority of the ILO's Indian activities in the 1950s. Its most lasting, visible achievements are arguably found during this period.

Morse's 1952 *World Labour Report* cited the need for productivity training to facilitate India's First Five Year Plan's goal of 40 percent uptick in industrial production and commerce.[106] A team of four ILO productivity experts arrived in India in 1952 during the First

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[103] *Summary of the Proceeding of the Indian Labour conference (15th Session, New Delhi—11th-12th July, 1957)*, SSB.

[104] *Report of the Director-General of the International Labour Office: World Labour Report 1953* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1953), 3, 64, 65.

[105] "ILO Productivity Missions to Underdeveloped Countries: I," *International Labour Review* 76, 1 (August 1957), 3-7.

[106] Ibid., 20.

Five Year Plan's opening years. The experts specialized in management and industrial engineering, and the mission was extended from its original timeline of six months to two years with the hopes of devising solutions for India's then-contemporary and future productivity.[107]

Productivity was a central concern for India's Planning Commission in the 1952 report that was published at the launch of the First Five Year Plan. Although the report noted the higher efficiency of industrial over agricultural productivity, the document showed a decline of industrial productivity ranging from 20 to 30 percent in the years after 1939. A boon of postwar productivity studies in Europe, Japan, and elsewhere convinced the Planning Commission of the merit for similar research in India. One cause, the report affirmed, was a breakdown of relations between workers and management. Two narratives developed, common to workplace disputes: employers alleged workers' efforts declined; workers responding that poor wages and conditions triggered a decrease in productivity. The report called for "scientific investigations regarding these claims" resolved by "trained personnel, reliable industrial and labor statistics, and a scientific attitude on the part of organizations of employers and workers." Such an investigation was impossible, the authors concluded. "None of these conditions exists in the country today" and the absence of scientific data, trained professionals, and employers' and workers' mindsets impeded productivity. India's industrial development, the report indicated, necessitated high levels of industrial productivity to overcome the shortage of capital to raise living standards and pilot India's modernization.[108]

India's vision mirrored the ILO's productivity ethos, and the Planning Commission and Ministry of Labor invited ILO experts to assist in resolving India's dilemma. Experts were tasked with analyzing textile and engineering firms' work structure, job types, material usage, and time management. The Planning Commission tapped Indian counterparts among the government, employers, and unions to cooperate with the ILO. Joint ILO and Indian efforts held the promise of devising sustainable solutions that injected scientific reasoning into the pursuit of driving up productivity. ILO experts would train Indians who could then apply their knowledge to the task of preventing productivity declines, the Planning Commission wrote.[109]

Indian postcolonial productivity faced a number of dilemmas, according to the ILO experts' reports. In terms of capital, Indian domestic capital for investment was low, foreign exchange was scant, and the horizon for foreign direct investment was dim. India's large population guaranteed a labor surplus, yet many employers, unions, and workers hesitated to approve measures that would precipitate unemployment or labor unrest. Many Indians viewed ILO productivity experts warily, fearing that their instruction was a source of disruption. Few Indian workers knew Western productivity ideas and, as an ILO report purported, their lack of education or experience spurred apprehension to improve a worksite's output lest jobs be eliminated. An initial survey of textile mills in Mumbai, Ahmedabad, and Kolkata also revealed a number of poor quality machines in states of disrepair. Finished material lacked uniformity and quality could not be guaranteed. In essence, the ILO experts discovered myriad human, capital, and technological dilemmas that hindered productivity.[110]

Disarming suspicion over the ILO experts' mission proved challenging. J.B. Shearer and Thomas Matthew, attempted to demonstrate the value of productivity training in a Kolkata mill

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107 "ILO Productivity Missions to Underdeveloped Countries: I," 22.

108 *India's First Five Year Plan*, http://www.planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/welcome.html

109 *India's First Five Year Plan*, http://www.planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/welcome.html

110 *Report to the Government of India on a Productivity Mission (December 1952 – May 1954)* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1955), 6-8.

that benefited employer and employee alike. Shearer and Matthew ran time, motion, and materials studies to routinize the flow of work and streamline the work space. They first introduced paper forms to methodically account for hours, materials, machines used, and labor hours expended. Second, the experts attended to the physical space of labor. They exhibited that seating a worker at a table to clean parts rather than sitting on the floor saw jumps in productivity of 60 percent. Tables also instilled a spatial arrangement that functioned best with delineated work areas featuring required cleaner, brighter, well ventilated spaces. Workers' well-being would improve, they argued, and productivity grew with their satisfaction to labor in a safer environment. A third study determined a path to improve quality control by evaluating every step from raw material to a finished product. Wood boxes, in this case study, were not uniform, resulting in almost 100 variations in size. The solution was to standardize every step from sawing to assembling, to storing the finished product the fabrication process to drop the number of 100 to four. Millworkers typically completed a total of four to seven boxes daily. The number of boxes jumped to eleven per day by systematizing the fabrication process, and the amount of materials wasted also declined. A final experiment consisted of instructing workers to create a flow chart for every step of grinding materials to illustrate where to locate efficiency gains. Workers were instructed to prevent materials from being stored on the floor and instead always resting on a table or in an inspection area. The proposed steps reduced the number of steps in grinding from thirteen to nine. Benefits included saving labor time that could be allocated to other tasks, clearing floors for smoother operations, and more thorough inspection of finished materials.[111]

Results from the first productivity team's two-year mission were uneven. Shearer, Matthew, and others delivered 104 lectures in Mumbai from February 1, 1953, until April 24, 1954, when the mission concluded. Lecture topics ranged from "the why and how of productivity"; incentives; time and motion studies; material handling; an introduction to the ILO. Fourteen mills were visited in Mumbai and another twelve in Ahmedabad during the project's life span. Geographically, the mission's scope was limited. Although Indian officials supported the experts, local support primarily emerged from employers and factory owners who sought to increase higher quality textiles.[112] Ultimately, the mission achieved little beyond a minor splash, with no discernible effects that catalyzed a nation-wide response due to two primary reasons. First, focusing on only textile and engineering industries prevented the mission from influencing Indian production methods. Second, there was little attempt by the Indian government to institutionalize productivity training across industries or to centralize productivity goals in a center or institution.[113]

Recommendations at the close of the first mission advised the government to embed productivity thinking on a national scale. Shearer and Matthew expressed their concern that few Indians understood the meaning of productivity and its difference from increased work load for laborers and a better life for all. A flimsy grasp of productivity's promise, the ILO staffers claimed, obstructed a change in workplace culture or in the minds of industrialists, employers, and workers. Apprehension and doubt could be dispelled by a movement to explain productivity's considerable benefits in order to catalyze a new way of conceptualizing work. Indians could not realize the full potential of labor without altering how the workplace was

111 Ibid., 45-49.
112 Ibid., 73, 74, 105-111.
113 "ILO Productivity Missions to Underdeveloped Countries: I," *International Labour Review* vol. 76, no. 1 (August 1957), 25.

structured, managed, and labored within on a daily basis, the report insisted. Investigations into avenues to improve industrial efficiency were hobbled without a local transformation. The experts suggested an urgent need for a National Productivity Center (NPC) to meet the needs of a diverse India at a formative time in its postcolonial development. An NPC will reinforce their training, they claimed, and mature into a national clearing house for the ideas and training that would launch a productivity thinking in India.[114]

The second stage of the ILO's productivity mission beginning in 1955 and lasting until 1958 attempted to resolve the first mission's shortcomings in cooperation with the Indian government to build a national movement. India's Chief Adviser of Factories in the Ministry of Labor and Employment, N.S. Mankiker, guided the outline of the ILO's second productivity mission. Mankiker informed an ILO representative that India sought a holistic model of productivity for "industrialists and workers" alike, irrespective of the industrial sector. Even though productivity experts would provide analytical services, India's Ministry of Labor and Employment prioritized an educational campaign that wedded scientific investigation, a national mission, and labor peace to deliver high levels of productivity.[115]

Findings in the report of the Second Five Year Plan hailed progress on establishing labor peace to accelerate productivity. The 1956 document stated that the social and economic benefits of increased productivity without the introduction of new machinery or significant capital investment. "Steps like better lay-out of plants, improvement in working conditions, and training of workers," all of which the ILO suggested, contributed to "industrial peace" and higher productivity. Institution-building was also on the mind of India's Planning Commission. The Central Labor Institute was created and intended to facilitate an expansion of productivity's benefits on a nation- and state-wide scale—all of which was imperative for India's modernization.[116]

By fall 1955, the ILO experts diversified their message to meet the desires of the Indian government's broad productivity aspirations and to build a Mumbai-based NPC. Experts delivered instruction and analysis at varied workplaces, including the Mumbai State Transit Board, Hindustan Aircraft Limited, Hindustan Machine Tools Factory, and Bharat Electronics. State-owned enterprises such as the Indian Telephone Industries and others requested assistance in designing a program that could be replicated in nationalized industries, then disseminated to the private sector.[117]

ILO experts' ten- to twelve-week standardized instruction resembled concentric circles across industries that began with plant managers in the first weeks before broadening to workers in later weeks. Instruction was held in the industrial cities of Mumbai, Kolkata, Bangalore, Vadodara, Madras, and Coimbatore to cover south, west, and east India. One of the primary concerns in the second productivity mission was to "arouse interest in the general subject of productivity" among upper echelon managers that could filter down to any and all worksites. Following higher-level instruction on productivity, courses on wages, incentives, factory layout, machine and tool maintenance, work assessment, raw and finished product evaluation, and human relations were tailored to middle- and lower-management. Productivity teaching shifted

114 *Report to the Government of India on a Productivity Mission (December 1952 – May 1954)* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1955), 33-36.
115 Walker Report on New Delhi May 9 – 13, 1955, T.A. Expanded Programme, Folder: India (IND-1) Manpower Organisation B.T.W.I., TAP0-33-1 (B), ILOA.
116 *India's Second Five Year Plan*, http://www.planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/welcome.html
117 P.S. Narasimhan to ILO Headquarters Geneva, September 2, 1955, India (IND.2) National Productivity Centre July 1955-December 1957 (Series: TA Expanded Programme), TAP 0-33-2, Jacket 2, ILOA.

to union leaders and employees in the final weeks to more practical issues: bargaining, wages, time efficiency studies. Instructors labored to place all members of the Indian workforce in the story of productivity's achievement "to remove fears and unjustified suspicion." Participants took a two-week break to study their respective work sites' efficiency, waste, or areas for improvement. Then all students assembled to present their findings and discuss their future plan for improving their respective workplaces to drive up productivity.[118]

ILO experts also appeared in a variety of workplaces to demonstrate how to achieve efficiency from productivity investigations. Lawrence Brooks was instrumental in demonstrating efficiency gains for repairing public transit vehicles for the Mumbai and New Delhi transportation boards. Brooks organized instruction as mentioned in the preceding paragraph to scrutinize cost-savings from waste, poor spatial layout, and material usage. In Mumbai, productivity students improved the floor plan to cut time transferring parts and other materials thereby shrinking the overall workspace from 33,600 square feet to 23,600. Reduction of work space saved the transportation board from constructing a new maintenance facility and led to a jump in the weekly repair of water pumps from forty-five to seventy-two. He replicated the course and hands-on practice in New Delhi that doubled the number of repaired busses to 24 a week.[119] He collaborated with the New Delhi Transportation Board foreman, I.A. Malik, and the shop's trade union secretary, Ishar Singh, to hasten maintenance times. Malik, Singh, and other teams' materials studies contributed to the quicker return of busses to streets and riders experienced more efficient service, much to the ILO's satisfaction when assessing the project.[120]

In assessing the ILO's second productivity mission, results were mixed. Other examples mirrored Brooks' Mumbai and New Delhi transportation board accomplishments. Turnover from trained productivity workers, especially, weakened the longevity of the mission's success. The effect of Brooks' and others' instruction could not overcome India's vast geographic area. Regardless, interest in productivity spiked in India, and the ILO took credit for the transformation. Additionally, the Indian government followed the 1954 recommendation to build the NPC much to the ILO's pleasure.[121]

On January 6, 1955, the Indian government convened a meeting of employers, officials, and the ILO's productivity expert from the United State, Hy Fish, to discuss the formation of the NPC.[122] A representative from the All India Organization of Industrial Employers (AIOIE), Walchand Hirachand, voiced his concern that labor productivity was abysmally low. He symbolized Indian employers' desire for ILO technical assistance for productivity training.[123]

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118 "Report on a Mission to Lebanon, India, Burma and Pakistan November – December 1957," Box 24, Folder 4: Mission to India, Burma, Thailand, Pakistan, and Lebanon 1957, David A. Morse Papers 1895-1994 MC #097, DAMP.

119 "ILO Productivity Missions to Underdeveloped Countries: I," *International Labour Review* vol. 76, no. 1 (August 1957), 27, 28.

120 Report on a Mission to Lebanon, India, Burma and Pakistan November – December 1957," Box 24, Folder 4: Mission to India, Burma, Thailand, Pakistan, and Lebanon 1957, David A. Morse Papers 1895-1994 MC #097, DAMP.

121 ILO Productivity Missions to Underdeveloped Countries: I," *International Labour Review* vol. 76, no. 1 (August 1957), 153.

122 All India Organization of Industrial Employers Circular "The National Productivity Centre of India," January 18, 1955, Folder: All India Organisation of Industrial Employers from 3-1-1955 to 9-12-1955, File number 261 part 1, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (hereafter NMML).

123 Report by Walchand Hirachand, Representative of the All-India Organisation of Industrial Employers as Employers' Delegates, on the Fifth Session of the Inland Transport Committee of the International Labour

Indian industrialists, in particular, championed the NPC's birth at home and in Geneva, and pushed to study other countries' productivity methods. An exploratory ten-member committee of Ministry of Labor and employers from textile industry visited Japan to observe production methods in October and November 1956. The committee's six volume report advised the NPC's immediate formation.[124] The following year, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry announced the NPC's official creation.[125] NPC members drafted a constitution in February 1958, and embarked on building the organization. The constitution emphasized the group's national and international aspirations from its New Delhi headquarters. With the overriding goal of spreading its productivity message to "all spheres of economic activity of the country," NPC officials established a national infrastructure and planned domestic conferences. Additionally, in September 1958, a delegation from NPC embarked on a six-week tour of West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States to study productivity methods. In less than four years, the ILO's recommendation bore fruit and accomplished its goal of local investment in productivity, albeit primarily from employers.[126]

Spreading a productivity ethos widely in India was of greater consequence to the ILO than proven accomplishments in minor case studies. The ILO championed the effect of changing mindsets and initiating a new pattern of thought. They viewed productivity through the lens of a epistemological revolution for modernizing postcolonial states. Absorbing this ethos into daily life meant that the transmission of lessons from the "most progressive and successful industries in highly developed countries" that could shape daily life. Morse was an ardent believer in the notion that productivity was a key ingredient for postcolonial modernization. ILO productivity experts' less visible influence could, the ILO hoped, prove more durable for a country's transformation with a model that could be exported readily within the ever-expanding postcolonial map.[127]

Development Setbacks: The ILO in Indonesia

The ILO's progress of influencing productivity and political economy in Indonesia proved less successful than India's smoother adoption, by comparison. ILO staffers faced an early difficulty of assembling data on the archipelago's workforces or unions, and resistance from the communist union SOBSI. Into the early 1950s, ILO experts visiting the nation struggled to turn the workers into legible units. One ILO report claimed that neither the ILO nor any local entity possessed a firm grasp of Indonesia's workers or union types. Any data provided to them was "meagre and at the same time highly confusing."[128] The union with the widest Indonesian membership, SOBSI, retained the best collection of union and worker data. SOBSI touted a membership base in the millions throughout Indonesia, yet one ILO staffer questioned if dues-

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Organisation held at Geneva, 15th-27th February 1954, Folder: 5th Session of the Inland transport Committee of the ILO Geneva , File number 239, Collection: Walchand Hirachand, NMML.

124 A.N. Saxena and L.K. Bala Ratnam, *Planning & Promotion of Productivity: The Indian Experience, Volume 1* (New Delhi: National Productivity Centre, 1985) 32, 34.

125 Report on a Mission to Lebanon, India, Burma and Pakistan November – December 1957," DAMP.

126 *NPC Annual Report 1958-59* (New Delhi: National Productivity Centre, 1959), 33, 79.

127 Report on a Mission to Lebanon, India, Burma and Pakistan November – December 1957," DAMP.

128 Chief of the Workers' Relations Service, Geneva to Tahi Tobing, May 2 1952, ILO Correspondent: Indonesian - Workers' Organizations, 05/1952-05/1956, file series c 74-8, ILOA.

paying members totaled to more than a fraction of its reported members.[129] Regardless, as discussed in Chapter 1, SOBSI wielded a great degree of political power throughout the archipelago. ILO experts found a less than welcoming reception from SOBSI leaders. A SOBSI official resolution dubbed the ILO fake (*palsu*) and a "traitor to the workers' struggle" and an "agent of imperialism." Politically, SOBSI viewed the ILO through the lens of the Cold War's bipolar struggle, and ILO experts were acutely aware of SOBSI's authority within Indonesia. ILO reports on Indonesian productivity, management training, and compensation frequently conflicted with the communist union's ideological goals to collaborate with the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* [PKI]) to transform Indonesia into a communist state. The resistance the ILO faced from SOBSI compounded the structural dilemmas wracking postcolonial Indonesia.[130]

Bureaucratic squabbling, endemic material shortages, and political instability stymied Indonesia's development in the early- to mid-1950s. One expert, Richard Lyman, notified the ILO headquarters that the Indonesian Ministry of Labor refused to permit Lyman or other experts from cooperating with other ministries. They felt a "proprietary interest in the full amount of ILO assistance available," he remarked, and his suggestion of a government-wide program of technical assistance collided with the Ministry of Labor's insistence on controlling the ILO's programs in the sluggishly-developing country.[131] By 1955, most ILO studies on vocational training, wages, employment centers, workforce data, and manpower slowed due to frequent turnover of Indonesian prime ministers and general political volatility. Indonesia's period of Liberal Democracy stretching from 1950 until 1957 consisted of seven different prime ministers and cabinets, most of which lasted no more than a year. RJ Walker, an ILO expert on manpower, reported that the political unpredictability prevented the implementation of sound budgeting practices across governments. Shortages in foreign exchange precipitated material shortages that hampered experts' work, and engendered a current of uncertainty even as Indonesia's and Sukarno's prominence on the world stage climbed.[132] ILO experts' housing and transportation difficulties—with many turning to unreliable government-owned automobiles to travel outside of Jakarta—limited their ability to survey labor conditions beyond major cities.[133]

In the wake of Indonesia's first wave of postcolonial strikes, ILO experts tackled one of the fledgling nation's most pressing concerns: wages and industrial peace. Labor politics intruded. On wages, SOBSI representatives and Ministry of Labor employees resisted ILO expert WJ Hull's recommendation to establish a committee to write a national plan for controlling wage growth. One senior official disagreed Hull's recommendation, doubting the efficacy for any such body and hinting at political impasses. Hull refuted the claim, but he was told that a SOBSI vote

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129 Oh Sien Hong to Jan Schuil ILO, January 3, 1949, Relations: Indonesia — Central Body of Workers' Organizations - BPSS (*Pusat Serikat Buruh Indonesia, PSBI*) (Series: Relations) (11/1948 - 12/1955), ILOA.

130 1 May 1950 Resolution, SOBSI Representative Whisnu Samain and M. Jasin Representative GASBRI to various offices of state and SOBSI, archive, press (*Resolusi 1 Mei 1950 Whisnu Samain Wakil SOBSI [dan] M. Jasin Wakil GASBRI kepada various offices of state and SOBSI, archive, press*), No. 1715, Collection State Secretariat of the Prime Ministers' Cabinet 1950-1959 (*Koleksi Sekretariat Negara Kabinet Perdana Menteri Tahun 1950-1959*), ANRI.

131 Report on Mission to Jakarta, 9 to 16 July 1954, Richard Lyman, July 26, 1954, Indonesia General (Series T.A. Expanded Programme) TAP 0-74 (Jacket 1) Box 420 1954-1957, ILOA.

132 RJ Walker, Report on Mission to Indonesia 4 to 11 June 1955, June 28, TAP 0-74 (Jacket 1) Box 420 1954-1957, ILOA.

133 Replies to Questionnaire on Evaluation of 1956 Programme, March 4, 1957, TAP 0-74 (Jacket 1) Box 420 1954-1957, ILOA.

of approval was required before the minister of labor could agree to founding a committee to regulate wages.[134] In a subsequent meeting with the P4P—the council created after the strike emergency in 1951 to mediate industrial disputes—Hull found himself on the defensive. When the P4P Secretary General commented that Hull was a proponent of "a liberal policy based on collective bargaining" that was seemingly at odds with Indonesian political economy, Hull concurred, somewhat. He urged P4P to adopt a practice of blending "compulsion" with "liberalism" to inject steadiness in workers' pay. In his mind, P4P's authority within the country afforded it the power to check runaway wage increases that rose higher than productivity. He summarized this encounter in a progress report that ultimately cast doubt on the members of P4P or the Ministry of Labor agreeing to his proposal. "It is needless to point out that there will be no spectacular adoption of a wages policy," he speculated.[135]

The closing report of the ILO mission on wages and industrial relations warned that fluctuations of wages and lack of uniformity in workers' pay hindered development. The report pointed to a number of dilemmas plaguing Indonesia's industrial relations: incomplete data for policy makers, jockeying for power among unions, the lack of collective bargaining machinery, inflation, and the absence of a government-led wage strategy in a period of declining productivity. Without a reliable national strategy to control wages that was pegged to productivity, "economic development and plans for industrialization will be endangered and sufficient capital may not be attracted [for] investment."[136] Much of the lengthy report written by Hull painted a dismal portrait of Indonesia's political economy. Repeatedly, Hull conveyed that Indonesia's listing economy stifled productivity gains that would simultaneously entice foreign capital to invest and initiate a surge in employment. Wages, the report concluded, represented one of many predicaments that necessitated an immediate state intervention to calm Indonesia's economy. Hull's advice was less oriented to wages and industrial relations and more to politics, and influencing Indonesian politics was a domain beyond his control.[137]

Ultimately, Hull's efforts resulted in little progress by the close of his mission in 1957. The Ministry of Labor's head of industrial relations, Soetarto, dismissed Hull entirely, not to mention Hull's calls for wage restraint. Hull "did not fully grasp the political background in Indonesia and there therefore his major recommendations in the labor-management relations field are not realistic," the minister of labor declared. Soetarto effectively canceled any future technical assistance on wages, stating that neither the Ministry of Labor nor the Government of Indonesia saw merit in preserving ILO training on the subject.[138]

Hull was not alone among ILO experts in prescribing heavy-handed state action to arrest Indonesia's economic slide. A letter to the ILO's treasurer and Morse confidant, Edward Riches, from a wages expert who visited Jakarta insisted that "persuasion and explanation are useful and

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134 WJ Hull Progress report no 7, August 20, 1956, Indonesia (INS-5) Labour conditions and administration A) Wages Policy Reports from WJ Hull 1955-1957 (Series: TA Expanded Programme) TAP 0-74-5(A)-1 Jacket 1 Box 431, ILOA.

135 WJ Hull Progress report no 8, October 1, 1956, Indonesia (INS-5) Labour conditions and administration A) Wages Policy Reports from WJ Hull 1955-1957 (Series: TA Expanded Programme) TAP 0-74-5(A)-1 Jacket 1 Box 431, ILOA.

136 *Report to the Government of Indonesia on Wage Policy and Industrial Relations* (International Labour Office: Geneva, 1958), 4.

137 Ibid., 50-51.

138 P.S. Narasimhan Report on Mission to Djakarta 7 to 15 May 1957, Folder: Indonesia (INS-1) Manpower Organisation A) Instructor Training (Series: TA Expanded Programme) TAP 0-74-1 (A) jacket 1, Box 422 1953-1957, ILOA.

necessary" for framing a public discussion on wages, "but not enough" in the Indonesian case.[139] Instead of depicting Hull as a lone voice who failed to comprehend Indonesia, it appears more accurate that the ILO's philosophy of development conflicted with Indonesian politics in the 1950s. One could argue that Indonesia's colonial history in the twentieth century convinced many Indonesians that foreign capital and influence represented a threat to sovereignty, and the ILO's assumptions of how to stimulate growth caused friction in the ILO-Indonesian relationship. Well-intended advice from the ILO likely ran against the grain of decisions that were, at the root, local governance prerogatives at Indonesia's peak of postcolonial prominence.

When revisiting the ILO programs in Indonesia from 1950 until 1957, an internal ILO report found little to celebrate. Though not all of the ILO's programs in Indonesia were "to be written off as a dead loss," most made fleeting headway against battering winds of political volatility, economic difficulties, and malaise among the civil service. A total of twenty-one ILO experts led seminars, advised the government, and contributed to the creation of a vocational training center in Bandung. The vocational training center purportedly showed the greatest signs of promise, even though the report acknowledged that training equipment languished while waiting to clear customs at Jakarta docks. The Bandung center was hampered by limited government financial support, and, as a result, it "was rarely training at full capacity" and civil servants struggled with meager government funding. ILO experts required an engaged government, and, as the report lamented, official Indonesian capacity declined markedly across the seven years. Almost annual turnover in the office of the prime minister destabilized civil servants and ushered in new ministers whose priorities clashed with previous or subsequent ministers.[140]

Amidst the instability, as Hull's experience with Soetarto demonstrates, the ILO applied its knowledge of development, production, manpower, and management to supply the Indonesian government with prescriptive political steps it should take to resolve its problems. ILO experts' advising veered into the realm of politics in spite of lacking a deep political understanding of postcolonial Indonesia. Both systemic factors prevented the ILO from providing solutions that could have accelerated productivity. In spite of this impasse, Indonesia's postcolonial government warmed to an idea that the ILO spread in India: Training Within Industry (TWI).

As with India, Indonesia's Planning Bureau welcomed TWI in the 1950s to facilitate productivity during its First Five Year Plan. The principal architect of Indonesia's TWI program was not from the ILO. An American manpower expert named Edgar McVoy from the United States International Cooperation Administration (ICA) advised the Indonesian Planning Bureau during the drafting of its First Five Year PlanMcVoy began working for the Planning Bureau in 1954, visiting cities such as Palembang in Sumatra as part of his research. Palembang police reported that he met with leaders from SOBSI and other unions to explain American labor and collect data on oil company workers. Police informants observed that his primary focus rested on the health of local oil companies, not on workers.[141]

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139 H. Zeoetweij note on report to Edward Riches, November 13, 1957, Folder: Indonesia (INS-5) Labour conditions and administration A) Wages Policy Reports from WJ Hull 1955-1957 (Series: TA Expanded Programme) TAP 0-74-5(A)-1 Jacket 1, Box 431, ILOA.

140 I.L.O. Technical Assistance Report to Indonesia, Undated, Indonesia General (Series T.A. Expanded Programme) TAP 0-74, Jacket 1, Box 420 1954-1957, ILOA.

141 Letter from the Head of National Police to the Prime Minister regarding a copy of a letter from the head of South Sumatra's Police about the visit of the visit of McVoy, a labor expert (*Surat dari Kepala Kepolisian Negara kepada Perdana Menteri mengenai salinan surat Kepala Kepolisian Sumatera Selatan mengenai kunjungan Mc. Voy, ahli perburuhan*) June 16, 1954, No. 3096, Collection State Secretariat of the Prime Ministers' Cabinet 1950-1959

McVoy's services to the Planning Bureau began in 1954, and expanded in 1955 during the writing of Indonesia's First Five Year Plan. McVoy's research in Palembang and other cities culminated in May 1955 with two formal proposals to the National Planning Bureau on the necessity of TWI. He diagnosed Indonesia's primary impasse facing development gains not as political or economic shortcomings. Instead, he targeted the lack of trained supervisors across public and private industries whose knowledge boosted productivity. The departure of foreign supervisors, he asserted, coincided with the creation of new industries in Indonesia that generated a scarcity of managers. His proposal referenced the success of TWI in Japan and India, and outlined a two-year plan for implementing TWI training, including for Indonesians to receive training in Japan, England, or the United States. Promoting TWI's universality, the pitch nearly guaranteed results for Indonesia by hiring TWI experts from abroad for in-country training to transform Indonesia's managerial class. The experts' training of Indonesians in job methods, instruction, and human relations would multiply the number of managers by disseminating the TWI method at workplaces throughout the archipelago. Most importantly, similar to India, TWI promised the creation of an Indonesian manager pool that was not reliant on foreign supervisors.[142] TWI was, in his words, a "'package' program" tailored to meet a country's needs with proven results that advanced productivity across a spectrum of industries, including the public sector.[143]

In February 1956, McVoy met the National Planning Bureau and representatives from the ministries of labor, economy, public works, and others to determine if Indonesia should incorporate TWI into the First Five Year Plan. Participants heard of the ICA grant of 145,000 dollars to launch a TWI program in 1958 that would establish a supervisory training program. Most in the meeting approved of the opportunity. When asked about a potential language barrier with translating training materials from English to Indonesian, McVoy assured the assembled men that TWI pilot programs in Malaysia and Singapore utilized Malaysian-language manuals that were easily translatable to Indonesian. Delegates from the ministries roundly expressed interest in TWI and accepted the ICA proposal, with the belief that once entrenched in the government it would then be implemented by Indonesia's business community.[144]

Once approved by the National Planning Bureau, TWI was added to the draft First Five Year Plan. The Minister of National Planning, Djuanda Kartawidjaja, assembled a final draft in May 1956 for consideration by the prime minister's cabinet.[145] The lack of professional supervisors impeded Indonesia's productivity, the draft emphasized, and TWI's record of high performance in Japan and India justified launching a program in Indonesia.[146] At only 200 pages, the First Five Year Plan suffered from a considerable lack of detail for coordinating a nation-wide development program.[147] Inflation, rising rice imports, volatility in global commodity

(*Koleksi Sekretariat Negara Kabinet Perdana Menteri Tahun 1950-1959)*, ANRI. The ICA was the precursor to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

142 Proposal for Supervisory Training Programme in Indonesia, May 26, 1955, No. 736, Mohamad Bondan Collection, ANRI.

143 A Suggested Programme of Technical and Supervisory Training in Indonesia, May 3, 1955, No. 736, Mohamad Bondan Collection, ANRI.

144 Minutes of the Meeting of the National Planning Bureau, February 25, 1956 (*Risalah Rapat T.W.I. Biro Perancang Negara*), No. 736, Mohamad Bondan Collection, ANRI.

145 Benjamin Higgins, "Indonesia's Five Year Plan," *Far Eastern Survey* 25, no. 8 (Aug., 1956), 122.

146 Ministry of National Planning, Five Year Plan (*Rencana Lima Tahun*), No. 736, Mohamad Bondan Collection, ANRI.

147 Don D. Humphrey, "Indonesia's National Plan for Economic Development," *Asian Survey* 2, no. 10 (December 1962), 12.

prices, rebellion in 1958, domestic political disputes that resulted in Sukarno's authoritarian Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*), and difficulties surrounding the nationalization of Dutch commercial and industrial holdings proved too turbulent for the realization of the First Five Year Plan.[148]

Development projects administered by the ILO, the ICA, and others adapted and, as will be discussed in the following chapter, demonstrated an ability to achieve goals. Under worsening conditions the ILO completed a productivity survey that persuaded the Ministry of Planning to inaugurate a planning commission, and the ICA's TWI program accomplished its goals. In other words, some headway was made. Nevertheless, Indonesia staggered along in the mid- to late-1950s without a clear roadmap to weather a series of upheavals that metastasized into the cataclysm of horrific violence in 1965 and 1966.

Conclusion

By the end of 1957, the ILO was prepared to launch into a new era. The pace of decolonization quickened, any concerns on American involvement were quieted, and the ILO's programs in India gathered steam. Cold War tensions unmistakably rose within the ILO, yet Morse's leadership prevented them from spilling over to damage the organization's credibility. Representatives from NAM continued to question the Soviet Union's membership in the ILO, but neither Morse nor the United States government pursued a course of action that could weaken the ILO by blocking Soviet participation. The organization's progress in influencing India's political economy documents why the ILO pushed ahead.

Spreading productivity and TWI illustrated the ILO's and the United States' possibility for helping postcolonial Indonesia and India. The United States' track record in productivity and management was most widely appreciated among planners in both countries. Instead of viewing the postcolonial experiences of both states as beholden to socialist modalities of economic thought, the embrace of TWI in particular exhibits a penchant for blending strategies to achieve growth. It is unclear why the ILO did not pursue TWI training in Indonesia when the National Planning Bureau agreed to an ICA proposal. Nevertheless, through an examination of documents and development practice, the inclusion of TWI in both countries' Five-Year Plans clarifies that the postcolonial development model was not ideologically rigid. American capitalist methods of production were uniquely valued by both countries' planners.

Indonesia's postcolonial experience departed from India's accomplishments in multiple ways. The path forward for both countries diverged sharply by 1957, and Indonesia's recurring economic tribulations foreshadowed a dismal future. Without a stable government and growth, Indonesia's economy exhibited few signs of life that could propel the country's economy in ways that aligned with the First Five-Year Plan. Nonetheless, the ILO's and ICA's development programs would proceed at the end of the 1950s and into the 1960s.

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[148] United States Economic Survey Team, *Indonesia: Perspective and Proposals for United States Economic Aid*, 83.

Chapter 3 – At the Mountaintop: The ILO's Zenith and A Decade of Development in India and Indonesia, 1958 – 1969

On June 10, 1969, David Morse opened the fifty-year anniversary celebration at the ILC with a bold vision for the ILO's future by applauding the organization's transformation into a global development institution. Praise poured in from around the world to credit the ILO for its achievements, many member-states created stamps to commemorate the ILO, and months later the ILO won the 1969 Nobel Peace Prize. Pope Paul VI attended the ILO's jubilee, lauding the ILO for its global pursuit of striving for social justice, material prosperity, and, most of all, peace. The Pope linked the ILO's mission to the Catholic Church's embrace of development "which 'is the new name for peace,'" and urged the ILO to persevere its ambitious goals to eliminate the sources of poverty, privation, and want.[149]

David Morse Introduces Pope Paul VI to the 1969 ILC

The ILO was unquestionably at the zenith of its power. Almost twenty-years into his tenure as director-general, the ILO grew into an organization that evolved in concert with decolonization. It adapted to the tenor of decolonization, seeking to course correct when its programs' efficacy declined. In accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, Morse was humble yet proud of his and the organization's record of progress since 1949.

Chapter 3 begins in 1958 and concludes in 1969 to trace the ILO's rise until wining the Nobel Peace Praize, and also to document the seeds of conflict that nearly destroyed the organization in the 1970s. Morse prudently steered the organization to change with its times while keeping development in the forefront of its strategy. UN Secretary-General U Thant heralded the ILO's accomplishments in development even as "dark clouds seem to hang over"

[149] Address of His Holiness Paul VI to the Assembly of the International Labour Organization, June 10, 1967, http://www.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/speeches/1969/june/documents/hf_p-vi_spe_19690610_cinquantesimo-oil.html.

the world that obstructed modernization campaigns.[150] Experts on the ground in countries such as India and Indonesia worked to spread the ILO's model of American-influenced political economy. The director-general, a canny politician, skillfully prevented the organization from lapsing into decay that could undermine its relationship with member-states or its primary sponsor, the United States.

Morse's record of progress pleased American policy makers, even if others such as George Meany doubted the director-general's hold over the ILO. Morse earned his Cold War stripes by diligently preventing the Soviet Union from receiving any spots in the ILO directorate, its staff of experts, or even in routine hiring. He boasted or joked in a 1967 meeting with American diplomats that he "deserved a decoration from the United States government" for sidelining the Soviet Union.[151] George Meany disagreed. He warned of creeping communist influence that eroded the United States' control over the ILO, and, progressively, he drove a wedge between the United States and the ILO. The consequences of his actions may not have been obvious in the 1960s, even when sympathetic Democratic administrations listened to him. Richard Nixon's administration, discussed in Chapter 4, took a different tack when trying to reshape the United States' relationship with the UN and world.

This chapter juxtaposes the histories of Indonesia and India to show divergent tracks of the ILO's success in cooperating with local governments. Indonesia from 1958 until 1965 presents a case study of failed governance under Sukarno, culminating in a ghastly massacre that fundamentally reoriented Indonesia's political economy. The International Cooperation Agency's (ICA) Training within Industry (TWI) program showed progress and the ILO could point to ephemeral success. The ILO plodded along as Indonesia's economy spiraled out of control, the bureaucracy's morale dipped, and Indonesia slid into chaos. Sukarno withdrew from the ILO in January 1965 in what now could be described as a marker of where the country was headed in that disastrous year.

The ILO thrived in India's high tide of development. The ILO collaborated in building lasting institutions and continuously embarking on new projects. Experts cheered the spread of productivity by the National Productivity Center (NPC), and expanded the scope and scale of the ILO's influence in India. India's rising postcolonial stature engendered a rise in the country's standing within the ILO. At the start of the 1960s, Indian delegates pursued a dual track policy in the ILO: participate fully to ensure steady development assistance, and employ its influence to position it as one of the more prominent postcolonial power brokers. This policy proved mostly successful. India emerged as one of the ILO's exemplars, and Morse referenced it when forging a new path as the organization reached a crossroads in 1958.

The Road to the Jubilee and the Nobel

Closing out the 1950s, Morse's report to the ILC in 1958 foreshadowed a new direction for the ILO's amid the accelerating pace of decolonization. The document, titled *The I.L.O. in a Changing World*, traced the ILO's growth into an operational organization. He voiced his concern that the ILO risked falling behind unless it continuously revised its approach to development activities. At its root, he reminded the ILC, the ILO was animated by the response to requests from the decolonizing world to create the institutions that facilitated a process of

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150 *50 Years of the ILO: Commemorative Session at the United Nations, 29 October 1969* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1969), 1.

151 Memorandum of conversation with Morse, Tubby, Weaver, et al, November 14, 1967, David A. Morse Papers 1895-1994 MC #097 Soviet Union 1954, 1958, 1961, 1967, 1970 Box 11 Folder 8, DAMP.

industrialization to generate economic growth. "The underdeveloped countries have been faced with a desperate need to set in motion an industrial revolution so as to increase the production of wealth." The ILO responded to this by launching an expansion of regional activities, industrial committees, social security consulting, productivity missions, and management training. Yet the director-general's report indicated that the past years of achievements were not a predictor of future accomplishments.[152]

Although some of the ILO's development assistance from the 1950s was slated to continue—Morse highlighted the ILO's training of over 20,000 managers with the Training Within Industry (TWI) program—ILO operations required, he said, a change in perspective to shift power away from ILO headquarters in Geneva into the regions. Regionally focused, adaptive technical assistance emerged as the organization's paramount vocation and future direction in *The I.L.O. in a Changing World*. The "conditions of life" in the Global South afflicting the majority of the world's population prevented the economic benefits of industrialization from spreading to all peoples, the director-general asserted.[153] Less of a clear plan of action and more of a gesture at a new direction, he explained that the ILO was retooling. He was, like many global policy makers, reacting to the increasing number of newly independent states and the emergence of the Third World as a geographic and political concept. The report concluded that the ILO's leaders anticipated the birth of many postcolonial African states in the 1960s. Operationally, he stated, the ILO needed to learn from its technical assistance program's successes and failures to devise a new operational direction. The new African nations' postcolonial experience would not mirror the ILO's first testing ground, Asia, and thus the director-general and others in the directorate rethought the organization's aspirations in 1958.[154]

India's representatives attending ILO conferences read of *The I.L.O. in a Changing World* in their briefing documents even as late as 1969. Morse accurately surmised the effects stemming from the 1950s' and 1960s' "anti-colonial revolution," the document explained. His call for remodeling the ILO's operations "had considerable impact on the program and methods of the organization" that determined the ILO's development projects in what became the UN's First Development Decade.[155]

The ILO's vision for the 1960s came into precision in a report for deliberation by the Committee on Technical Cooperation in preparation for the 1961 ILC, occurring simultaneously with the launch of the UN's First Development Decade. The committee's ninety members originated from the developed and developing world, and its members shaped much of the ILO's agenda.[156] The committee's final report, *The Role of the ILO in the Promotion of Economic Expansion and Social Progress in Developing Countries*, outlined what it called the organization's "operational program" for the 1960s. The authors identified a severe dilemma facing the ever-expanding number of postcolonial states. Leaders of these new states struggled without local sources of capital. "Domestic capital formation is an essential requirement for growth," the report found, and the "will to develop" would never reach fruition without an infusion of capital. Echoing dominant modernization thinking of the time, the report's authors

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152 *The I.L.O. in A Changing World, Report of the Director-General to the 42nd Session of the International Labour Conference, 1958* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1959), 3.
153 Ibid., 38.
154 Ibid., 90.
155 International Labour Conference - Briefs to the Delegation, Department of Cabinet Affairs, 52/7/CF-60-63 Vol II, NAI.
156 Department of Labor, "Monthly Labor Review, September 1961," 84 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), 948.

advised for a marriage of economic aid from the developed world with local capital. The committee instructed the ILO to encourage economic aid from industrialized donor nations alongside an increase in the organization's technical assistance programs. Industrial development—not the Declaration of Philadelphia's emphasis on social justice—reigned supreme for the ILO, and the committee argued for the ILO to augment its robust technical assistance even if capital and aid failed to rise.[157]

Cheap solutions, the committee found, were readily at hand in the ILO's arsenal of technical assistance that could resolve the deficiency of local capital to invest. Productivity and management training held the key for low-cost remedies to boost industrial productivity of existing industries without a significant investment of capital. Once "management becomes productivity minded," productivity spiked.[158] The report's authors referenced multiple examples from India to illustrate the advantages of embracing a productivity mindset to expand industrial growth. The benefits of productivity flowed by "increasing wealth so that there may be additional income to distribute."[159] Simplified, productivity was a panacea, and it offered a global solution to a dilemma. In line with Morse's comments on adaptability in *The I.L.O. in A Changing World*, the committee wrote that optimal productivity was achieved when the ILO collaborated with local actors to mold a program around the needs of specific country. The report touted India's National Productivity Center and Indian business initiatives as an example of ILO experts' effective on-the-ground planning. Technology and knowledge from the West provided no gains if the programs adopted a one size fits all approach, and the committee insisted that a future-oriented posture for the ILO necessitated thorough cooperation with local governments, businesses, and unions to advance economic development and transform local productivity and management habits.[160]

With a clearer operational vision in 1961, the ILO under Morse's direction evolved alongside postcolonial and Cold War politics that crept into the ILO's governance. Morse's second unanimous reelection in 1961 to a third five-year term—after initially indicating he would not run again for director-general—cemented his control over the ILO.[161] The director-general's vacillating on running for another term angered American labor titan George Meany, who increasingly doubted the ILO's and Morse's motives.[162] Meany loudly questioned to the press, government officials, and President John Kennedy if the Soviet Union's influence dominated the ILO. Meany claimed in 1961 that "ILO is 'rapidly being captured by Iron Curtain countries,'" and cautioned that "the time will soon arrive when you can kiss the ILO good-bye.'" Even though Morse largely steered the ILO in concert with the United States' foreign policy, Meany's criticism carried political weight that amplified when it appeared that Morse buckled to anti-apartheid forces in the ILO.[163]

Safely reelected, Morse aligned himself with insurgent anti-apartheid delegates in the ILO at the 1961 ILC who lobbied to terminate South African membership. The 1961 Sharpeville

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157 *Role of the ILO in the Promotion of Economic Expansion and Social Progress in Developing Countries* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1961), 3.
158 Ibid., 30.
159 Ibid., 18.
160 Ibid., 32.
161 *United States Department of Labor Annual Report, 1962* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), 126.
162 "Meany Heals Rift with Head of I.L.O.," *New York Times*, June 24, 1964.
163 Memorandum of Conversation with Harlan Cleveland and George Meany, August 14, 1962, Box 775, RG 59, NARA.

Massacre in South Africa and the prohibition of protesting political parties, such as the African National Congress, pushed African anti-apartheid discussions into the ILO. Delegates to the 1961 ILC adopted a resolution that suggested South Africa withdraw from the ILO. The ILO Constitution lacked a process for terminating membership, and the South African government regime refused to leave.[164] 163 delegates voted in support of the resolution, but eighty-nine votes against the resolution revealed a current of discomfort among many Western delegates at the prospect of excluding South Africa. Regardless of the votes in favor, the South African regime refused to acknowledge a toothless resolution with the United States' backing. The intersection of anti-apartheid politics with postcolonial overtones colliding with the ILO's constitution presaged a larger fight that drew the limits of American power and influence over the ILO.[165]

The issue simmered until two years later in 1963 when Arab and African delegates' pressure campaign convinced Morse to act on South Africa. South Africa's constitutional right to participate in the conference went unresolved, and Morse cooperated with dissenting delegates to formulate a solution to the crisis in a Governing Body meeting.[166] African, Asian, and Middle Eastern delegates, along with Meany, walked out of the conference to protest apartheid and South Africa's presence in the ILO. The Governing Body issued three resolutions in response to significant opposition to South African membership: first, permanently banning South Africa from all conferences except the ILC; second, instructing Morse to meet with the UN Secretary General, U Thant, to discuss South African apartheid; third, empowering a Committee on Questions Concerning South Africa to finalize a report on amending the ILO Constitution to terminate South Africa's membership until it abandoned apartheid.[167]

The United States walked a fine line on protecting the principle of constitutional rights and not alienating rising Third World actors. American Cold War foreign policy required that the United States not abandon its South African ally.[168] Secretary of State Dean Rusk issued a formal policy statement for the United States' diplomats in Geneva in January 1964 to avoid an erosion of the ILO's constitution. American representatives were instructed to support terminating South Africa's membership in the ILO only if the UN formally cut ties. The Department of State intended for this policy to protect all members' constitutional rights and prevent the ILO from lapsing into a political forum. Rusk's instructions delineated what the United States interpreted as the limits of political activism within the ILO.[169]

Fortunately for the United States, South Africa's Minister of Labor, A.E. Trollip, announced the country's official intent to withdraw from the ILO on March 11, 1964. In the month preceding the decision, the ILO Governing Body took further steps to finalize South Africa's exclusion from the ILO. South Africa's government likely sought to forestall political embarrassment should the organization formally ban the nation due to apartheid. Trollip's

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164 Report of Rudolph Faupl, United States Workers' Delegate to the 47th Annual Session of the International Labor Conference, Geneva, Switzerland - June 5-26, 1963, RG18-003 International Affairs Dept. Jay Lovestone Files 1939-1974 Box 43, Folder 43/27 International Labor Organization, 1962-1963, the George Meany Memorial Archives (hereafter GMMA).

165 Renee Grawitzky, "The Role of the ILO During and Ending Apartheid," 3, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_214906.pdf.

166 "World Labor Chief Drafts a Plan to Ostracize South Africa," *New York Times*, June 25, 1963.

167 Report of Rudolph Faupl, GMMA.

168 The literature on this topic is rich, with Thomas Borstelman's *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) being one of the best works on the subject.

169 Dean Rusk to United States Embassy in Geneva, "US Policy Paper on South African Question in the ILO," January 7, 1964, Box 1272, RG 59, NARA.

statement blasted the ILO for deviating from labor issues to politics, and anti-apartheid forces cheered South African's withdrawal.[170]

Indian delegates allied with the anti-apartheid cause, and the nation use its prominence within the non-aligned movement and Third World nations to shape ILO policy. Instructions for India's government delegates to the 1964 ILC instructed delegates to back an amendment to the ILO Constitution to permanently exclude South Africa. "The important thing is to ensure that there are no South African representatives at the forthcoming session of the Conference and to eliminate the possibility of a similar recurrence." South Africa's presence at the ILC angered independent African states and created disorder by distracting the ILO from its development activities, the briefing document rationalized, and thus a constitutional provision to exclude South Africa was justified. India's standing within the organization would also rise.[171]

A 1965 report on South Africa and the ILO prepared for the cabinet of Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, summarized the events of 1964 until 1965 and the progress toward South Africa's expulsion. India's membership on the ILO's Committee on Questions Concerning South Africa helped resolve African member-states' "pressing demand" to remove South Africa. Politically, India's star burned brighter as a result of its vocal anti-apartheid stance that culminated in a transformation of the ILO's politics.[172]

Handling the United States' support for South African membership was not the Americans' only diplomatic complication in 1964. In a likely bid to control the ILO leadership, Morse heeded the advice of international consulting firm McKinsey and Company to alter the structure of nominating associate and deputy directors-general to the ILO's directorate. Jef Rens, a deputy director-general and Belgian national, rejected the structural change, and actively undermined its implementation.[173] After Morse requested Rens' resignation, the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak protested Morse's decision. In a friendly correspondence between Morse and Rusk—each referring to the other by their first names of Dave and Dean—Rusk asked Morse to rescind the request for resignation.[174] The director-general agreed, and Rusk could turn to the issue of American influence in the ILO in the mid-1960s.[175]

In 1964 and 1965, Rusk confronted the question of waning American authority in the ILO. A January 1964 Department of State assessment celebrated the Soviet Union's narrow gains, surmising that the Soviets failed "to exert influence decisively on important issues" within the organization. The Soviet Union's "major preoccupation was full exploitation of the South African issue," and the Soviets accomplished their goal of capitalizing on the United States' policy of backing the apartheid regime.[176] And as the Secretary of State was told in a June 1964 memo on South Africa in the ILO, "the political liabilities" of "once again appearing to defend South Africa against most of the non-Western world" dragged the United States' prestige.

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170 Embassy in Johannesburg to Department of State, "South African Withdraws from the ILO," March 19, 1964, Box 1271, RG 59, NARA.

171 Undated brief for ILC June 1964, Jacket title: 48th Session of ILO in Geneva, 1964 - Amendment for ILO Constitution for Suspending or Expulsion of its Members - Item 10, 11 & 12 of Agenda, UI/215-13/64, MEA, NAI.

172 "Summary for the Cabinet," February 1, 1965, Jacket Title: Instrument of Ratification - Amendments (Nos. 1, 2 & 3) relating to the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation adopted at the International Labour Conference held at Geneva, MEA NAI.

173 Aide-Memoir: Top Management Structure of the ILO, March 11, 1964, Box 1271, RG 59, NARA.

174 Dean Rusk to David Morse, February 27, 1964, Box 1271, RG 59, NARA.

175 David Morse to Dean Rusk, April 14, 1964, Box 1271, RG 59, NARA.

176 Department of State circular telegram "48th Session of the International Labor Conference," January 24, 1964, Box 1272, RG 59, NARA.

Perhaps even worse on a domestic public relations front, Meany railed against perceived American government delegates' passivity in Geneva.[177]

The irascible labor chief's suspicion of the ILO and fundamental opposition to the Soviet Union worsened by 1965. An April 12, 1965, letter from Rudolph Faupl, who served as the AFL-CIO's worker delegate, to Meany cast serious doubt on Assistant Secretary of Labor George Weaver's ability to discern communist perfidy at the ILO. Weaver routinely represented the United States in the capacity of government delegate in Geneva. His voting at one point, according to Faupl, was an example of "capitulation to communist blackmail" by supporting Soviet delegates' participation in an industrial committee.[178] Faupl's letters likely contributed to Meany's mounting jaundiced view of the ILO. Rusk personally called Meany in April to encourage him to not air his concerns or walk out of the ILO in protest.[179] In a follow-up meeting between the two, Meany demanded "a reaffirmation" by the United States government to actively "oppose Soviet attempts to take over control of the ILO." Rusk agreed to work with the AFL-CIO and Meany to the best of his abilities. Nevertheless, Rusk likely knew that Meany's anti-communist fervor was misplaced when seen through the lens of the ILO's directorate.[180]

Morse's accomplishment of keeping the Soviet Union and its satellites from filling key, or even many, roles in the ILO reveals Meany's misperception. The Soviet Union occasionally scored tactical victories in the ILO's procedural affairs. The fight over South Africa was a middling propaganda victory for the Soviet Union by forcing the United States to throw its weight behind a flimsy constitutional justification. Strategically, the director-general obstructed the Soviet Union from attaining a legitimate base of power in the ILO. He accomplished this while charming the ILO's member-states into universal backing for his continued tenure as director-general.

Once again Morse hinted at retirement in 1966, triggering a wave of concern at the State Department that the United States would lose its domination of the ILO. Weaver explained to President Lyndon Johnson's shadow chief of staff, M. Warvin Watson, that he was prepared to replace Morse if rumors of the director-general's retirement proved true. "The ILO serves our national interest," Weaver wrote to Watson, by advocating for freedom, resisting communist propaganda, and shaping the Global South's economic development. If Morse retired—and one of his primary lieutenants C. Wilfred Jenks did not replace him as director-general—Weaver lobbied for President Johnson to nominate him in order to preserve the United States' authority over the ILO.[181]

Weaver's campaign failed when Morse opted to run again for director-general in 1967 before the meeting of the Governing Body in February. In fact, as a memo to National Security Advisor Walt Rostow attested to, neither Secretary Rusk or Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz believed that Weaver would receive a sufficient number of votes to win the director-generalship. Rusk and Weaver agreed that the ideal candidate was a non-Western, American-oriented national if Morse retired.[182] Among member-states, Morse's popularity went undiminished, and many

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177 Memorandum for Dean Rusk, "ILO—The Wilson Amendment for Suspension of South Africa from the Participation in the ILO Conference," June 27, 1964, Box 1272, RG 59, NARA.

178 Rudolph Faupl to George Meany, April 12, 1965, RG1-038 Office of the President. George Meany Files, 1940-1980 Box 62, Folder International Labor Organization (ILO), 1957, 1961-1964, GMMA.

179 Harlan Cleveland Memorandum to Rusk, April 3, 1965, Box 1270, RG 59, NARA.

180 Joseph Sisco Briefing Memorandum for Dean Rusk, "Your Meeting on International Labor Organization Affairs," April 23, 1965, Box 1270, RG 59, NARA.

181 George Weaver Memorandum for W. Marvin Watson, August 25, 1966, Box 1268, RG 59, NARA.

182 Benjamin Read to Walt Rostow, August 31, 1966, Box 1268, RG 59, NARA.

counseled him to remain as director-general instead of someone such as Jenks. Morse, ever the politician, almost certainly recognized that his candidacy was a near-lock.[183] Governing Body members voted unanimously to reelect him in 1967 for another five-year term, guaranteeing his authority over an organization that reached a total of 118 member-states.[184]

Once safely reelected, Morse persevered in blocking the Soviet Union from increasing its power at the ILO. The United States' presence within the organization dwarfed the meager number of Russian nationals, and he reminded the diplomats "there was not a single USSR expert in the field on the ILO's payroll" thanks to his efforts. He warned the Americans that he could not resist the pressure forever. Had the organization been under the control of any other nationality, he remarked, the hypothetical director-general would have nominated a Soviet national to a deputy director-general position years prior.[185] The director-general closed the meeting by guaranteeing that the Soviet Union would eventually receive a notable ILO administrative position, "and that the only question was one of time."[186] He reiterated this the following year in a meeting with American diplomats in Genevea. He "had stalled for years" and pressure to hire a Soviet national for a deputy director-general was becoming politically impossible for him to shake.[187]

The United States had little to worry about at the ILO. In spite of Meany's heated critique, Soviet gains were minimal at best. At no point did Soviet delegates attack Morse or field a rival candidate for the job of director-general. Morse piloted the organization on a safe course that sidelined communist member-states from wielding influence over substantive matters or the organization's future. No other UN specialized agency featured such an extensive tenure by an American. The ILO's fifty-year anniversary approached in 1969, and the organization globalized the United States' political economy and the European one influenced by the Marshall Plan. Decolonizing Africa emerged as the ILO's central geographic focus even though the organization sustained its programs in Asia.

Indonesia's Spiral into Chaos and Authoritarian Rebuild

As Morse asked the ILO to reconsider the ILO's purpose in changing world, its progress in Indonesia wheezed under the pressure of the country's political and economic struggles. Sukarno's Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*) instituted Indonesia's first authoritarian government in 1957, as Sukarno consolidated power in an ultimately doomed bid to stabilize Indonesia's fractious politics. An ILO expert, B.G. Williams, painted a dour picture in April 1958. "The overall situation in Indonesia does not sound too cheerful these days and there appears to be an air of expectancy everywhere." ILO and UN representatives proceeded with delivering technical assistance to the government on a range of development areas. Evidence of

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183 Geneva to Department of State, November 25, 1966, Box 1267, RG 59, NARA.

184 "Morse Re-election, Budget Approval Highlight 168th Governing Body Session," *International Labor* VIII, 2 (March-April 1967), 14.

185 Memorandum of conversation with Morse, Tubby, Weaver, et al, November 14, 1967, David A. Morse Papers 1895-1994 MC #097 Soviet Union 1954, 1958, 1961, 1967, 1970 Box 11 Folder 8, DAMP.

186 Memorandum of conversation with Morse, Tubby, Weaver, et al, November 25, 1967, Box 1249, RG 59, NARA. Although carrying different dates, this conversation appears to be the same as the one from the memorandum of conversation in the DAMP collection.

187 Embassy in Geneva to Department of State, memorandum of conversation with Morse, May 20, 1968, Box 1249, RG 59, NARA.

their labors often evaporated when the Indonesian government ricocheted from crisis to crisis, especially in managing the economy.[188]

Indonesia's Ministry of Manpower turned to technical assistance from the ILO and the for productivity advice. A three month ILO productivity mission starting in November 1958 and ending in January 1959 surveyed a small collection of factories, primarily in Java. Like many ILO documents, the productivity mission's final report was dripping in the discourse of modernization theory. The report was out of touch with prevailing conditions in Sukarno's Indonesia with an economy that staggered in the absence of capital and under duress from inflation. Productivity and management training presented a solution to Indonesia's lack of capital for investing in development, the report's authors promised. "Raising the level of productivity in all branches of industry through the application of modern management techniques" fueled industrialization, and this growth could both rescue the economy and catalyze a rise in standards of living for all Indonesians.[189]

The mission's goal was to meet the standards set by the Five Year Plan to change Indonesia from an export economy—subject to the whims of commodity price fluctuations—with imported consumer goods to a self-sustaining national economy. Experts taught how Indonesians could drive their own productivity without expensive foreign assistance and capital. Although brief, the mission divided into four parts: two days of training on management for representatives of Indonesia's government, unions, and employers; a three week training course for public and private sector managers; a four week, hands-on testing of classroom lessons; concluding with a two day wrap up of the classroom and practical lessons. Lessons included proper factory floor layout, materials handling, quality control, and finished product assessment. As with the Indian productivity mission, experimental testing showed showing considerable improvement when methods were applied correctly. Attendees visited a range of factories, including textiles, building materials, radio and electronic equipment, and publishing. "Students have now become productivity-conscious," the report pronounced, and they appreciated the fruits of industrial efficiency for fueling Indonesia's economy. Hints of concern for Indonesia's potential appear in the final report, with members of the mission commenting on the poor quality of management across workplaces visited. The experts credibly pointed to success in building an institution within Indonesia after suggesting the institutionalization of a government productivity center. Samjono, the Minister of Manpower, announced on February 15, 1959, the creation of Indonesia's Institute of Productivity to coordinate national productivity plans throughout the archipelago.[190]

Over the course of the next year, ILO experts reported steady decline in Indonesia's bureaucracy, economy, and security. The 1957 CIA-sponsored *Permesta* insurgency in Sumatra tugged at Indonesia's stability until the Indonesian military snuffed out the insurgency in 1958. Political volatility spurred anxiety among state employees, with one ILO expert observing that "a change in political control can cause a change in the personnel structure within departments."[191]

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188 B.G. Williams Report, April 18, 1958, Indonesia (INS.1) Manpower Organisation Including Vocational Training G) Vocational Rehabilitation Reports from BG Williams (Series: T. A. Expanded Programme), TAP 0-74-1(G)-1, Box 427, ILOA.

189 *Report to the Government of India on a Productivity Demonstration Mission (November 1958 – January 1959*) (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1959), 2.

190 Ibid., 6, 16-17.

191 Simonds progress report no 4 May-June 1959, undated, Indonesia (INS.1) Manpower Organisation Including Vocational Training E) Employment Service Reports from Mr. T.J. Simonds (Series: Technical Assistance Programme Expanded Programme), TAP 0-74-1(E)-1, Box 427, ILOA.

A year after Samjono signed the paperwork to open the Institute of Productivity, an ILO expert witnessed no visible activity at the Institute with no prospects for future work.[192] Additionally, representatives of the private sector admitted to the experts that a lack of capital stymied growth and dampened their ability to initiate new projects.[193]

The TWI collaboration between the United States' International Cooperation Agency (ICA) and the Indonesian Ministry of Manpower, however, demonstrated progress. Unlike ILO projects that primarily advised or consulted without a long-term, institution-building agreement, the TWI project was grounded in clear-cut goals and with a sizable financial grant. It also benefited from lofty official support that even included Prime Minister Djuanda. Djuanda's remarks on May 13, 1958, at the opening of the TWI Institute connected the management program to Indonesia's First Five Year Plan. The public and private sectors, he said, stood ready to gain as each implemented a proven approach to management that was tested in developed and developing countries. "The people's standards of living" would grow accordingly with TWI's adoption in Indonesia, and he cheered the opening of an institute to broadcast TWI throughout Indonesia.[194]

ICA recruited TWI Incorporated—a small consulting firm based in Cleveland, Ohio—to formulate a plan for Indonesia to achieve its goals in a little under two years. Stated ambitions at the onset of the program shared similar language with the ILO's TWI program in India. Improved management led to drops in waste, improved quality of finished products, fewer workplace accidents, and "all of this means higher production cost" that the Americans' supervisory program pledged to eliminate. TWI Incorporated employees' instruction would start with a nucleus of Indonesians who would become experts bearing the title "TWI Program Specialists," and they would fan out to teach other Indonesians. Implementing the program across Indonesia's public and private worksites offered the hope of labor peace by smoothing relations between workers and supervisors. Accordingly, as the document emphasized, "this installation could well be the most important contribution to business and the industrial productivity of Indonesia."[195]

Publicity for the ICA's program encouraged participation for Indonesians, with the intention of paving the way for its continuity within Indonesia by building a cadre of TWI trainers. A Sumatran based entrepreneurial group notified its members of the project's beginning in a May/June 1959 newsletter. Training would begin in Jakarta and, like concentric circles, spread out from the capitol. Participants in the instruction "are able to propagate the trained knowledge within their own business circles," the piece read, and news of TWI's benefits spread among Indonesian businesses who sought to increase their productivity.[196]

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192 John Fox Report on Mission to Djakarta 26-28 April 1960, undated, Indonesia - General 1958-1963 (Series: Expanded Program of Technical Assistance) TAP 0-74, Jacket 2, Box 420, ILOA.

193 Report of B.F. Osorio-Tafall 1 July to 31 December 1960, April 28, 1961, Indonesia Reports from the Resident Representative (Series: T.A. Expanded Programme), Tap 0-74-0, Jacket 2, Box 421, ILOA.

194 Content of the Indonesian Prime Minister's Speech at the Inauguration of the T.W.I. Committee on May 13, 1958 (*Bahan Pidato Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia Pada Pelantikan Panitia T.W.I. Tanggal 13 Mei 1958*), No. 736, Mohammad Bondan Collection, ANRI.

195 Objectives of Training Within Industry in Indonesia (*Tujuan dari Latihan dalam Perusahaan di Indonesia*), undated, No. 736, Mohammad Bondan Collection, ANRI.

196 Bulletin No. 14 Months May/June 1959 Foundation for Social Affairs Entrepreneurs in Indonesia to Participants from the Foundation for Social Affairs Entrepreneurs in Indonesia, 27 Files on the ILO Asean Regional Conference, in English 1958-1960 (*Bulletin No. 14 Bulan Mei/Djuni 1959 Jajasan Badan Permusjawaratan Urusan Sosial Pengusaha di Indonesia kepada Para peserta dari (Jajasan) Badan Permusjawaratan Urusan Sosial Pengusaha di*

The final ICA TWI report written by consultant John Greenland and a separate one written by a Ministry of Manpower official, Mohammad Bondan, traced the program's sole year of instruction. Greenland praised the Indonesian civil servants he worked with on administering the program. He confidently left Indonesia with six TWI Program Specialists who were scheduled to begin instruction for an additional sixty-two students to disseminate TWI knowledge throughout the archipelago.[197] Bondan's final report tallied 2,912 Indonesians who participated in classroom instruction, most of whom worked in middle management from a diverse set of industries and work spaces primarily in Java and Sumatra: a paper factory, cement works, a weapons plant, an electricity company, rubber and palm plantations, oil extraction and refining, shipyards, a glass factory, a cigarette and cigar factory, and textiles. Bondan extolled the program's accomplishments. A head of a rubber plantation reported to Bondan that the methods he learned led to an increase from three kilograms to four kilograms of rubber drawn per tree. In the project's short life span, Bondan wrote, the training illustrated Indonesians' ability to enhance productivity without an umbilical cord of foreign managers and foreign capital to guide Indonesia's economy.[198]

Conversely, the ILO's capacity for executing programs sputtered. One of the ILO's longer-running tasks in Indonesia—the National Employment Service mentioned in Chapter 1—cratered in 1961 at the end of the ILO's mission. The final report was caustic. Facilities at the Bandung office were "old and dilapidated" in a manner that symbolized a lack of state investment. Staff were overworked, under trained, and buried under clerical tasks that prevented them from managing the employment service. The main office in Jakarta shared data slowly on hiring possibilities, thus delivering outdated information "too late to be of practical value" for Indonesians in search of work. T.J. Simonds, the ILO expert, recommended local autonomy and clear, quick lines of communication for the transmission of data from the central Jakarta office to Bandung and other cities. Otherwise, the National Employment Service, like its offices, depicted only signs of decay.[199]

The ILO's cooperation with Indonesia's government on social security in the early 1960s repeatedly exhibited evidence of state decline within the public sector. From 1962 until 1964, ILO progress reports recounted recurring problems in the formation and implementation of social security legislation. One update from the field in 1962 communicated that the Indonesian draft legislation revealed that "stress has been laid to bring together regulations which are impressive and desirable, however, that little attentions has been paid to the possibility whether an efficient administration can easily be set up…or financed in the future."[200] By late 1964, S. Boye, an ILO expert, looked back at spiraling inflation and rejected the feasibility of social security in Indonesia. "Galloping inflation," he stressed, eroded public financing and pushed Indonesia's economy to the brink of implosion. "The cost-of-living index with basis 100 in 1958, was 1,785 in 1963, 3,088 in January 1964, and reached 4,328 in September 1964." The cause for

Indonesia), No. 27, RA.1 Archive of the General Association of Rubber Planters on the East Coast of Sumatra (*Arsip Algemeene Vereniging van Rubberplanters ter Oostkust van Sumatra*), 1892-1985, ANRI.

197 Final Report of Training Within Industry, Inc. Training Program, undated, No. 736, Bondan Collection, ANRI. Although undated, details within the report indicate it was written after the program ended in 1960.

198 Information about the T.W.I. Program Pilot Project in Indonesia (*Informasi tentang Pilot Project T.W.I. di Indonesia*), May 31, 1960, No. 736, Mohammad Bondan Collection, ANRI.

199 *Report to the Government of Indonesia on the Organisation of the National Employment Service 1961* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1961), 10, 16, 31.

200 Reichel to Valentin Zelenka, November 5, 1962, Indonesia Social Security (Series: Technical Assistance) 1953-1963 Tap 0-74-4, Jacket 1, Box 430, ILOA. Reichel's first name is unknown at this time.

runaway inflation and economic decline can be attributed in part to Sukarno's authoritarian government, Guided Democracy.[201]

Economically, Sukarno's quixotic war against Malaysia, prestige projects, nationalization of foreign-owned industries, and subordination of economics to Guided Democracy's political agenda shackled Indonesia's economy. Twin forces of rampant inflation and untenable deficit spending fueled an economic catastrophe, at a time when Sukarno withdrew from the international community with scant foreign exchange or gold reserves on hand to service 2.2 billion dollars of foreign debt. Politically, underlying the economic failure, Indonesia teetered on the precipice of disaster when Sukarno cut ties with the UN.[202]

On January 20, 1965, Indonesia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Subandrio, formally declared Indonesia's immediate withdrawal from the UN. Sukarno resented Malaysia's independent entry as a member in the UN, and ordered Subandrio to proclaim Indonesia's termination of all UN affiliations. For the ILO, confusion reigned for two more months until Subandrio confirmed Indonesia's departure from the ILO in a letter to Morse. Indonesia began a year that culminated in a botched coup on the night of September 29, 1965 that precipitated the ghastly slaughter of members of Indonesia's Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* [PKI]).[203]

Indonesia prior to October 1965 sat on the brink of collapse. Sukarno's authoritarian Guided Democracy limped along as he pursued a futile war against Malaysia while the economy neared-collapse, with inflation tipping over 500 percent in 1965. The events leading up to the failed putsch of September 1965 remain murky, and questions of culpability go unanswered today. Several officers with the backing of a small cadre of PKI leaders kidnapped then murdered seven generals. Historian John Roosa's book *Pretext for Mass Murder* charts how the coup was poorly planned and executed, and the Indonesian army led by General Suharto violently reacted to squash the coup. Jess Melvin's 2018 book *The Army and the Indonesian Genocide: Mechanics of Mass Murder* deftly chronicles the military's orchestrated campaign to murder Indonesian communists. Melvin traces the planning well in advance of October 1, 1965, and then outlines how the killing was enacted. Without a doubt, the consequences for hundreds of thousands of innocent Indonesians, primarily communists, were horrifying. Politically, Suharto outmaneuvered Sukarno and seized power in summer 1966 to enact an almost thirty-year authoritarian government known as the New Order (*Orde Baru*).[204]

The first hints of Indonesia's likely re-entry to the ILO, and the UN at large, occurred on May 24, 1966, during a meeting between Morse and Harlan Bekti, the Vice Chairman of the Federation of Employers' Associations of Indonesia. Indonesia's new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adam Malik, tasked Bekti with approaching the ILO, UN, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the United States for reopening ties. Bekti inquired about the steps to formally reenter the ILO. Morse informed him that due to the ILO's constitution's provision requiring a two-year notice to withdraw membership, Indonesia was still a member and a perfunctory step

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201 Boye Report on Mission to Indonesia (15 November - 17 December 1964), undated, Indonesia (INS-4) Social Security (Series: Technical Assistance) 1.1.64-31.12.60 Tap 0-74-4, Jacket 2, Box 430, ILOA.

202 Hal Hill, *The Indonesian Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2, 3. The majority of the debt was held by the Soviet Union and its satellites.

203 Subandrio to Morse, March 8, 1965, Morse Cabinet Files - Withdrawal of Indonesia from the ILO, 1965-1966, ILOA.

204 John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup D'Etat in Indonesia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); Jess Melvin, *The Army and the Indonesian Genocide: Mechanics of Mass Murder* (London: Routledge, 2018).

such as sending a letter to ignore the withdrawal notice or sending a delegation to the next ILC would suffice. Bekti thanked Morse and set in motion Indonesia's resumption of ILO membership.[205] Following up on these instructions, Malik wrote Morse on August 8, 1966, canceling Subandrio's withdrawal announcement and quietly returning Indonesia to the ILO.[206]

Indonesia's course of stabilization after flirting with economic collapse took several years, and economic stability precipitated the dual tracks of economic recovery and the strengthening of Suharto's New Order. In addition to seeking bilateral assistance and delaying debt payments, Indonesia's government rescinded Sukarno's nationalization of Indonesia's industries and actively embraced global capital. Recognizing the limits of development without capital—discussed in the ILO and elsewhere—the New Order promoted its improved, safe investment climate.

To initiate this outreach, the Indonesian government published books that advertised the new embrace of capital. One, titled *Investment: New Policies & Procedures on Indonesia's Foreign Capital Investment* and written by the Department of Information in 1967, narrated Indonesia's stabilized economy, friendly investment laws, and published images that depicted Indonesia diverse spaces for investment. *Investment's* preface explained Indonesia's recent history of volatility, pledging that failed economic policies of the past were trumped by the New Order's economic prudence. To best demonstrate their commitment, as well as rupture from Sukarno's Guided Democracy, the regime's first priority was to restore expropriated property and holdings to foreign companies. "This is a shift from previous policy, and, unmistakably, it aims at creating a healthier climate for foreign investment." [207]

One of the final alterations to the law governing foreign enterprises was signed by Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX—the State Minister for Economic Affairs and the Sultan of Yogyakarta—on December 14, 1967. Returning control of enterprises to private, foreign businesses was one of the more lasting repudiations of Sukarno's government. Perhaps more importantly, it signaled to foreign capital that the New Order and its ministers were acting with fidelity to build a climate of trust for investment and development aid from all corners, including the ILO.[208]

Several months after rejoining the ILO, Indonesia's Minister of Manpower and the Minister for the Development of Human Welfare and Culture requested Suharto's approval to send a delegation to the 1967 ILC. Indonesia's limited public finances required that ministers justify dispatching Indonesians for expensive foreign travel. The Minister of Manpower, Awaludin Djamin, sent a memo to Suharto making the case that participation at the ILC would help Indonesia secure more funding in 1968 to fuel Indonesia's economic and development plans. He insisted that previous ILO studies and advising testified to the ILO's capacity to provide meaningful assistance in manpower, management training, and productivity. He further sought to convince Suharto to tie the ILC to other ambitions. The ILO was a venue to increase cooperation with Southeast Asian nations and the ILO would thus "be very useful in the future," he told Suharto, thus benefiting the New Order's foreign policy aspiration to strengthen regional

[205] Meeting between the Director-General and Mr. Harlan Bekti, May 24, 1966, Morse Cabinet Files - Withdrawal of Indonesia from the ILO, 1965-1966, ILOA.
[206] Jakarta to Department of State, August 9, 1966, Box 1268, RG 59, NARA.
[207] *Investment: New Policies & Procedures on Indonesia's Foreign Capital Investment*, Department of Information, Howard Palfrey Jones Papers, Box 62, Folder: Subject File: Indonesia Foreign Capital Investment, Hoover Institution Archives.
[208] Republic of Indonesia Government Statement Concerning the Return of Foreign Enterprises, December 14, 1967, No. 174, Cabinet Secretariat 1966-1971 (*Secretariat Kabinet 1966-1971*), ANRI.

cooperation.[209] Awaludin had participated in the December 1966 ILO Asian Advisory Committee held in Singapore, and the ILC would mark Indonesia's first public return at a large-scale ILO conference.[210] Indonesia's Minister for the Development of Human Welfare and Culture concurred with Awaludin, and listed the upsides accruing from participation in ILO conferences and meeting with other ministers: receiving fellowships, technical expertise, vocational training, assistance on learning about underemployment, manpower and educational planning, and cooperation. Suharto agreed, and Indonesia sent a delegation to the 1967 ILC.[211]

Awaludin's speech at the ILC laid bare the manpower worries facing Indonesia and hindering its recovery.[212] In spring and summer 1967, Suharto solidified his control over the country. Indonesia's economy struggled as unemployment remained high—accurate data on precise totals remains sparse to today—and wages were low.[213] The Ford Foundation sent Edgar McVoy, the Department of Labor expert who advised the writing of Indonesia's First Five Year Plan, to review conditions in Indonesia and report to the Ministry of Manpower on his findings. McVoy told Awaludin, "in a long-run perspective, the two facts which are most important in raising employment levels and reducing unemployment are a high rate of economic growth, with wide distribution of income, and a reduction in the birth rate." McVoy saw promise in Indonesia's recovery, albeit growth would be slow until the economy stabilized.[214]

ILO experts in 1968 and 1969 witnessed the halting steps toward stabilizing the economy that resulted in slow improvement in Indonesia. Attempts to gather reliable labor and employment statistics faltered, according to ILO experts. "Two crude realities will have to be faced before going into more detailed planning," they wrote. Limited expenditures in the New Order's budgets cast doubt on the possibility of government financing of archipelago-wide surveys, data was not returning even when surveys were sent, and owing to low salaries the surveys were often sold as scrap paper to supplement bureaucrats' paltry income.[215] A year later in September 1969 the same expert applauded Indonesia's macroeconomic stability to "slow down the galloping inflation and balance the budget for the first time in their history." Manpower planning, statistical surveys, productivity and management, he wrote, lagged well behind its potential. The New Order simply could not redirect "meager government funds" for those areas in its hasty efforts to stabilize the economy.[216]

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209 Awaludin to Suharto, May 3, 1967, No. 2242, Collection of National Ministry for Economy, Finance and Industry 1967 – 1973 (hereafter EKUIN [*Menteri Negara Bidang Ekonomi, Keuangan dan Industri Tahun 1967 – 1973*]), ANRI.
210 *International Labour Conference, Fifty-First Session Geneva, 1967, Record of Proceedings* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1968), 28.
211 K.H. Idham Chalid to Suharto, May 9, 1967, No. 2242, EKUIN, ANRI.
212 *International Labour Conference, Fifty-First Session Geneva, 1967, Record of Proceedings*, 28.
213 Jakarta to Department of State, August 11, 1967, Box 1255, RG 59, NARA.
214 Notes for Brig Gen. Dr. Awaludin, Minister of Manpower, Indonesia From: Edgar C McVoy, Consultant, Ford Foundation, September 6, 1967, Collection: Ford Foundation Records, International Division, Asia and Pacific, Program Area One Files, Series 1: Asia Box, Ford Cataloged Reports, Box 129, Folder 002948, Rockefeller Archives and Center (hereafter RAC).
215 Gonzalez-Ruiz to Lacroix, January 13, 1968, Indonesia - Overall Economic and Social Development - Prices, wages and related statistics (Series: United Nations Development Programme (Technical Assistance), 11/1966-12/1969, ILOA.
216 Gonzalez-Ruiz to Lacroix, September 25, 1969, Indonesia - Overall Economic and Social Development - Prices, wages and related statistics (Series: United Nations Development Programme (Technical Assistance), 11/1966-12/1969, ILOA.

Also in 1969, Indonesia launched its Five Year Development Plan (*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun* [REPELITA]) to jump start Indonesia's modernization. REPELITA hinged a upon mass infusion of bilateral aid, technical assistance from the UN, and private capital into Indonesia. Soon enough, ILO experts launched numerous projects in conjunction with the government, and aid poured into Indonesia. Indonesia's model of development marked a turning point on the national, regional, and global scale. Indonesia's approach to development became the future, and organizations such as the ILO played an important role in empowering the New Order's developmental state. The ILO, however, found itself out of pace with the times and barely survived the decade. The organization's accomplishments in Indonesia widened in the 1970s and 1980s, picking up steam and showing the extent of the possible with a strong, technocratic state, much like postcolonial India's relationship with the ILO.

India's Diplomacy and Development at the ILO

In India, the ILO's projects' scope widened and older programs demonstrated success. New projects included advising for the government on safety in mines, industrial psychology, apprenticeship training, workers' education, vocational rehabilitation of the blind, an inter-firm comparison mission in conjunction with the All India Management Association, and more. The partnership between the ILO and the government of India proceeded without hiccups from the later 1950s until 1970. In fact—as witnessed during the debate over South Africa's expulsion—Indian delegates' political stature climbed. India's prominence within the postcolonial moment elevated it among the ILO for member-states and the directorate. Simultaneously, Indian government officials, labor leaders, and business representatives routinely solicited ILO assistance to facilitate India's economic development. Thus, the Indian government viewed the ILO as fulfilling two goals: advancing India's political standing among postcolonial states and helping India's economy attain industrial growth, especially in productivity and management.

The ILO's program in productivity and management evolved after 1958 to meet India's changing industrial landscape. The mission grew from assisting the creation of the National Productivity Centre (NPC) to teaching seminars for executives and state employees into the 1960s. TWI instruction and small seminars tailored to specific industries or at specific production facilities, the ILO found by 1958, struggled to initiate nation-wide change. ILO experts believed that "the key to economic progress lay in being able to convince the senior most managers in industry, commerce and administration of the need to apply modern management practices, and in developing the managerial skills of these men."[217] ILO experts applied this reasoning in consulting for a variety of industries and in the public sector, such as: Mumbai government offices, Simla's Labor Bureau, the Sugar Wages Board, various coal mines, Mysore Public Works, Hindustan Aircraft at Bangalore, tool and dye works, state transportation boards, and a footwear production facility in Perambur.[218]

In collaboration with the NPC, the ILO organized its first Bangalore-based four week Advanced Management Program for Directors and General Managers in November 1961, followed by a Conference of Indian Industrial Leaders in New Delhi in December 1960 that was opened by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The thirty-four participants spanned numerous industries, including petroleum, chemicals, transportation, steel, and textiles. All of the senior executives who attended were targeted for their ability to meet goals set by boards of directors or

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[217] *Report to the Government of India on the Work of the I.L.O. Management Development and Productivity Mission 1954-1964* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1964), 25.
[218] Ibid., 21.

chief executive officers.[219] Four weeks of intense training were meant to inculcate Indian managers with a bedrock understanding of how to ideally manage their respective companies. Without evidence, the ILO reported that the members of the Bangalore and New Delhi conferences proceeded to implement the lessons and "stimulated a remarkably high volume of managerial change in the companies from which the participants came."[220] Subsequent seminars were held in Bangalore, Mumbai, Coimbatore, and Kolkata before the productivity and management mission concluded in 1964. From textiles to tires to tobacco companies, the ILO's final report touted its wide-reach in the two phases of its program. Senior managers from 100 companies attended ILO conferences from 1960 until 1964, and, along with the NPC, the ILO declared victory in contributing to a sea change in thinking on productivity and management in India.[221]

The ILO's sense of accomplishment in India extended beyond the private sector into the public sector. Within Asia by the early 1960s, ILO experts reported that Japan and India ranked as the leaders of management training. India in particular stood out as the "leader" for public sector management.[222] Leslie Mitchell, an ILO expert for the second phase of the mission, commended the Indian bureaucracy on its willingness to change by adopting techniques from ILO and the NPC.[223] Mitchell noted that in conjunction with the NPC, the experts succeeded in their mission to "to arouse interest, carry out demonstrations, stimulate productivity consciousness" in India. Perhaps Mitchell was correct. NPC officials broadcasted a notion of productivity throughout India that was indebted to the ILO's influence, and continue operations to today.[224]

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219 Saxena and Ratnam, *Planning and Promotion of Productivity*, 135.

220 *Report to the Government of India on the Work of the I.L.O. Management Development and Productivity Mission*, 26.

221 Ibid., 2, 55-57.

222 Some Notes on the Area of Work for the ILO Management Development & Productivity Mission in India over the Period 1962-1966, October 5, 1961, India (IND-2) National Productivity Centre Reports from Experts Jan 1960-April 1962 (Series: TA Expanded Programme), TAP 0-33-2-4, Jacket 5, Box 196, ILOA.

223 Mitchell to Menon, September 2, 1963, India National Productivity Centre February 1963-31 XII 1963 (Series: TA Expanded Programme), TAP 0-33-2, Jacket 5, Box 189, ILOA.

224 Leslie Mitchell Progress Report No 25 June & July 1961, Jacket 5, Box 189, ILOA.



NPC's Map of its Network in India by the End of the 1960s

Gains made during India’s Second Five Year Plan in 1961 and at the beginning of the Third Five Year Plan in 1961 slowed in the early 1960s due to war, and the Planning Commission grappled with the dilemma of achieving full public buy-in for development. Broadening the development’s ambitions were essential, especially in finding employment to keep pace with India’s burgeoning population. R.L. Mehta, a secretary to India’s Ministry of Labor and Employment, wrote Prime Minister Nehru’s cabinet in 1964 with the news that wage growth was stalled by the growth of workers. Mehta projected that India’s labor force would shift away from agriculture—then hovering at 70 percent, a static figure since 1900—owing to “the experience of the first two plans that a larger proportion of employment opportunities generated during the period” were based industrial and commercial occupations. More solutions were required.[225]

Democratizing development and planning was essential for “creating a ‘*will to develop*’ among different sections of the people,” in the words of Planning Commission official Muhammad Shaghil. Shaghil equated India’s Planning “somewhere in between broad economic policy making by the Treasury in the UK and detailed economic planning by the Gosplan in the USSR,” with France as the closest parallel to India’s planning in Europe. Accordingly, routes existed to assimilate all Indians into the nexus of India’s planning as long as the Indian government could “mobilize the willing cooperation of the people for a balanced program of rapid economic development.”[226] Nevertheless, war with China in 1962 and economic turbulence posed challenges for India’s modernization. Like many other developing states, India’s ambition collided with a two-sided problem: a lack of capital and a shortage of local knowledge that could spur industrialization. An Indian representative at the UN hoped in 1964 that budding discussions between Global South nations on trade and capital could arrive at a solution. He acknowledged, however, that “capital goods and technical know-how from abroad” were essential for achieving a will to develop, and the ILO was ready to meet both goals to help India develop.[227]

In 1960, the ILO collaborated with the Indian government to build a central training institution for management and productivity that opened in 1964, targeting a rising professional middle class. The National Institute for the Training of Industrial Engineers (NITIE) was conceived in August 1960 with a joint agreement by ILO staffers in India, the NPC, and the Ministry of Labor and Employment. Dubbing it “urgent,” ILO management expert Rhys Wynne-Roberts completed initial work to launch NITIE as a residential campus for instructing budding industrial engineers on Western thinking of productivity and management.[228] The official government report justifying NITIE pointed to myriad reasons why its creation was essential. India’s five year plan model required a high number of industrial engineers, and demand was projected to outstrip available industrial engineers. Engineers’ knowledge of productivity methods was essential for fulfilling the plan, the official report insisted. A second reason

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225 R.L. Mehta to the Prime Minister’s Cabinet, May 21, 1964, Jacket title: 48th Session of the International Labour Conference Geneva-June-July, 1964 composition of the Indian delegation and instructions for the delegation, UI/326/4/77/1 MEA, NAI.

226 Muhammad Shaghil to G.D. Chaudhry, June 26, 1964, Jacket title: 37th Session ECOSOC Item No. 9 Economic Planning and Projects, UI/251-18/64, MEA, NAI. Emphasis mine.

227 R.C. Arora Dep Sec MEA UN Division to Shri MR Shroff Dept Economic Adviser Min Finance Dept of Economic Affairs, July 8, 1964, Jacket title: 37th Session - ECOSOC - Item No. 5 World Economic Trends UI/251-16/64, MEA, NAI.

228 Rhys Wynne-Roberts to the Asian Field Office, August 2, 1960, India - National Institute for the training of industrial engineers (Series: Special Fund), 02/1959-12/1962 SF 0-33-2-A, Jacket 1, Box 63, ILOA.

addressed the costs of development. India could not afford foreign training, and knowledge learned abroad risked imparting a foreign concept of an industrial engineers' training that could be out of step with local industrialization. Lastly, positioning India as a regional hub, the report looked to a future where Asian nations would travel to India for instruction. NITIE was intended to be the first example of its kind in Asia "comparable in status to the major industrial engineering institutions in Europe and the USA."[229] The ILO embraced the plan, cooperating with the NPC and the Indian Ministry of Labor and Employment to organize an institute that remains in operation today.[230]

With tripartite funding from the United Nations Development Programme, the Indian government, and the ILO, NITIE opened in summer 1963. Initial reports from NITIE by year's end showed slow progress. Limited road construction, residential and classroom facilities, hiring of Indian staff, and leadership stunted NITIE's first few months of operation.[231] Students arrived to NITIE classrooms on March 9, 1964. From opening in 1964 until September 1966, a total of 966 students received training. ILO experts led curriculum creation, consulted on the institute's management, taught occasional courses, and participated in hands-on testing in Mumbai factories. Predominantly, the instruction and leadership were guided by Indians, and an Indian-centric instruction was one of NITIE's singular appeals.[232]

An advertisement for NITIE in the NPC's journal, *Productivity*, from 1966 promoted the institute's modern, Indian-taught classes that could transform Indian production. NITIE's courses were lecture- and discussion-based, and taught in classrooms for students to learn how "the development of highly sophisticated products" was "within the reach of you or any Indian enterprise." Even more important, the advertisement insisted, students tested their knowledge in Mumbai factories. Those sites were NITIE's "laboratory" for students to implement their instruction to constantly improve Mumbai's factories and prepare students to import their experiences to their home workplaces. Courses included TWI, production methods, logistics, accounting, human resources, marketing, and sales. Each semester's four months provided students with a complete understanding of how to manage a business and its workers as well as derive peak productivity from workers and machines.[233]

NITIE's courses advanced steadily throughout the 1960s. A recession in 1967 and 1968 weakened funding, and student enrollment dipped.[234] Recurring power outages also plagued NITIE's classrooms and laboratories. Student interest was sustained in spite of these flaws. From its opening in March 1964 until March 1969, India invested three million rupees and 2,475 students attended 246 courses at NITIE. The ILO celebrated NITIE's and their own accomplishment in spite of headwinds, much of which were outside the ILO's control.[235]

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229 Government of India Ministry of Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs Scheme for the Establishment of National Institute for training in Industrial Engineering (NITIE) January, 1961, India - National Institute for the training of industrial engineers (Series: Special Fund), 02/1959-12/1962 SF 0-33-2-A, Jacket, 1 Box 63, ILOA.
230 Blickenstaff to John Fox, May 8, 1961, Jacket 1, Box 63, ILOA.
231 End of Year Report on NITIE for period 1 July - 31 December 1963, Jacket 2, Box 63, ILOA.
232 Fifth UN Special Fund Semi-Annual Report for National Institute for Training in Industrial Engineering 1 April 1966 to 30 September 1966, Jacket 1, Box 63, ILOA.
233 NITIE Advertisement, *Productivity* 7, 3 (1966), 471.
234 Semi-Annual Progress Report NITIE 1 April to 30 September 1968, India - Human Resources Development - National Institute for training in industrial engineering, Bombay (Series: United nations Development Programme (Special Fund)) 01/1968-12/1968, UNDP/SF 33-2-B-2-1, Jacket 2, ILOA.
235 NITIE semi-annual report 1 October 1968 to 31 March 1969, Jacket 4, ILOA.

Simultaneously, India established an assertive presence within the ILO during the 1960s. India's role in advancing anti-apartheid politics in 1961 through 1964 marked the onset of India projecting its political influence within the ILO. Delegates increasingly used India's postcolonial clout to carve out a space for shaping discourse within the ILO as well as the organization's structure. Certainly India was not alone among postcolonial member-states that wielded considerable influence. Still, few states had been the vanguard for postcolonial causes, received comparable developing funding, or neared India's scale. Indian representatives at the ILO appeared cognizant of this position, and they employed it for the cause of anti-colonial resistance and postcolonial economic sovereignty.

In 1965, an Indian government delegate to the ILC, S.V. Purushottam, called for a greater allocation of technical assistance to the decolonizing world, and away from the industrialized North. Workers' delegates and an American government representative, Assistant Secretary of Labor Weaver, argued that the ILO's universality demanded that workers in industrialized countries not be ignored. Purushottam recounted that Weaver and unnamed members of the workers' delegation cautioned that the West's workers could grow indifferent to the ILO if the organization's programs neglected their citizens. "Balance or equality was certainly desirable," Purushottam responded, "but the areas of poverty were infinitely wider than the areas of prosperity and it would be completely unrealistic and very conservative to speak in terms of equality between these two areas." Saying that "it was therefore the need of the hour," he exhorted all representatives to rally behind the cause that the ILO had no choice but to prioritize the developing worlds' concerns over those of the workers in the industrialized states. More than a casual debate on the nature and purpose of the ILO, he voiced a prevailing concern that the banner of universalism concealed an ulterior motive of not facilitating the Global South's development in terms of aid, trade, and representation.[236]

Decolonization in Africa ushered in a number of new member-states for the ILO, and many clamored for power within the ILO. Newly independent African countries and allies in the Soviet Union and socialist countries sought to institute constitutional changes to break the West's grip on the ILO. Although the United States and Europe's control over the ILO softened as states like India's prominence ascended, the Western powers maintained preponderance in setting the organization's agenda. One proposal to counteract that reality recommended an increase of seats in the Governing Body from forty to forty-eight and eliminating permanent seats. Widening the number of seats on the Governing Body, proponents asserted, would democratize the ILO and equitably distribute power away from the Western industrialized member-states. Official Indian ILO policy backed the suggested changes to the Governing Body and, on the whole, "maintained that countries of different regions should be allowed to exercise their rightful influence over the policy of the ILO." Additionally, the voices calling for change coupled constitutional and proportional improvements with an appeal to widen the ILO's recruitment pool. ILO experts, staff, and directorate hailed primarily from Europe and the United States. Structural reform of hiring, the proposals insisted, would remain consistent with the ILO's insistence on universality.[237]

Recognizing that Morse and others resisted their initiatives to alter the Governing Body, the voices for change shifted their energies to strip the Governing Body of its primary decision-making power and elevating the ILC to the ILO's "supreme body." India's representative to the

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236 S.V. Purushottam to R.M. Doiphode, June 12, 1965, Jacket title: 49th Session of the International Labour Conference - Report of the Director General, UI-227(17) 65-VI, MEA, NAI.
237 K.D. Gandhi to G.D. Chaudhry, June 30, 1965, UI-227(17) 65-VI, MEA, NAI.

discussions on the Committee for the Program and Structure of the ILO, K.D. Gandhi, surmised that "the socialist and African countries would be able to exert greater influence in ILO matters." Morse rejected such proposals, citing the ILC's inability to set policy efficiently for a large institution. Gandhi was not convinced. He agreed with the criticism of the West's control over the Governing Body. "Not only the Communist countries but even the Indian Government representatives have on occasion felt the need for referring certain issues to the Conference so as to be able to circumvent the manipulation and efforts of the Western countries." India should, he advised, put its weight behind reforming the ILO.

India played a leading role in protecting Asia's share of technical assistance in the ILO's expanding geographic horizons for development at the close of the 1960s. The ILO's Sixth Asian Regional Conference held in Tokyo in 1968 became an important springboard for fashioning an Asian Manpower Plan that informed the ILO's World Employment Program (WEP). While at the conference, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) instructed delegates to skirt condemning the Soviet Union's brutal suppression of an uprising in Czechoslovakia. Censure of the Soviet Union over the Prague Spring revolt distracted from the conference, and, the MEA memo reasoned, heaping blame on the Soviet Union was counterproductive to the reestablishment of Czechoslovakia sovereignty when the regional conference was the priority.[238] At the conference, India's primary delegate, Jaisukhlal Hathi, lobbied for a bold vision of remodeling global development, trade, and aid. Asia's population boom eroded the ILO's success in improving the quality of life for Asians, Hathi emphasized, and this would continue into the 1970s "unless the trade and aid policies of the affluent countries were suitably modified." He stated that a well-structured manpower plan for Asia could work in concert with the developing world's push to reorder the flow of trade and aid.

On the regional level, Hathi situated India as a leader in manpower planning, and he proposed that his government was amply suited to contribute to a comprehensive Asian manpower plan. His address to the conference vocally supported constitutional changes to the ILO's structure to flip the balance of power within the organization. One outcome of the ILO restructuring, he said, was a reordering of technical assistance funding. "Even though Asia accounted for nearly half of the world's population" he emphasized, "its share of ILO's expenditure on technical cooperation activities consisted only 20 percent." The Asian Regional Conference concluded beneficially for India's interests, according to the Indian delegation's final report. An Asian Manpower Plan was integral to devising the WEP's goals, and the report concluded that India's active participation at the conference raised India's profile within Asia and the ILO.[239]

India's delegation for the November 1968 Governing Body meeting readied for a strong showing for resolutions pertaining to colonialism. In advance of the meeting, guidelines for Indian government delegates reminded the officials that ILO gatherings served two basic purposes: securing development assistance and foreign policy. India's consistent lobbying for Global South causes and compatriots at the ILO paid political dividends, and official

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238 Undated Ministry of External Affairs memo on Czechoslovakia & Lack of GOI Condemnation, Fourth Asian Regional Conference of the ILO - Tokyo - September 2-14, 1968 UI/326/31/68, MEA, NAI.

239 Report of the Indian Government Delegation to the 6th Session of the ILO Asian Regional Conference to P.C. Mathew (1968), Jacket title: 173rd Session of the Governing Body of ILO Geneva November 4-15, 1968, UI/326/34/68, MEA, NAI.

representatives were ordered to factor the international ramifications into their statements, voting, and informal conversations.[240]

The usually staid Governing Body conference turned into a near embarrassment for the India in 1968. After promoting a resolution with the title Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Natarajan Krishnan and the Indian government delegation stumbled when they hinted that no Indians would attend a proposed seminar on racial discrimination. The Indian representatives heartily endorsed the seminar in 1967, and Krishnan and others reassured African and Asian member-states of their continuing interest. Commenting that the "volte face" had "caused considerable embarrassment," he counselled that "non-participation would give rise to needless speculation that we have a guilty conscience and have something to hide." Protecting India's interests and saving face required official attendance, he wrote, and their presence could garner "positive results rather than sterile polemical decisions." Rather than risk political fallout due to their inconsistency, the delegation stuck reverted course to uphold India's standing when the ILO and the UN amplified their development goals for the 1970s.[241]

As the ILO solidified the WEP and the UN formulated targets for its Second Development Decade to begin in 1971, Indian officials advocated for steps to prevent failure of both ambitious programs. Noting that the "First [Development] Decade has not been much of a success," an Indian UN representative in Geneva, Syed Shahabuddin, pilloried the UN's initial attempt at organizing an international development program. "There was no global strategy of development," Shahabuddin wrote, and UN General Assemblies development objectives contained only "universal aspirations for development but without any clear-cut strategy or targets in terms of international economic cooperation." India's duty was at the UN and in the ILO's WEP developing planning, he emphasizing, establishing an assertive Indian footprint in the formulation of future global development metrics for India's modernization and political ends.[242]

Morse officially announced WEP at the 1969 ILC as part of the fiftieth anniversary festivities. The director-general acknowledged the ILO's tremendous progress in its first fifty years of building a safer, more peaceful world. Stepping back from feting his own organization, he said "in one major respect our record of achievement has been disappointing: I refer to our inability so far to close the widening gap between the rich and the poor." The fruits of material prosperity, also, were consumed by elites, and standards of living throughout the world failed to show marked movement upward. A "growing disenchantment among the industrialized countries with the value of development aid," although not shared by him, argued for a novel approach to solving the intractable dilemmas of development that twenty-years of work had not resolved due to poor planning and will. The will to develop, strong as it may have been, was never powerful enough to leap the hurdles it encountered. WEP was an attempt to overcome the past's mistakes. WEP centered on cooperating with governments to drive up employment to counter the decade's population pressures and to achieve gains that could ameliorate the gap between rich and poor.[243]

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240 Mahidnera Kishore to S.K. Das, September 25, 1968, Jacket title: 173rd Session of the Governing Body of ILO Geneva November 4-15, 1968, UI/326/34/68, MEA, NAI.

241 Natarajan Krishnan to P.C. Mathew, November 29, 1968, UI/326/34/68, MEA, NAI.

242 Syed Shahabuddin Memorandum, undated, UN Development Decade II UI/251-12/68-vol II, MEA, NAI.

243 *The World Employment Programme: Report of the Director-General* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1969) 3, 4, 6. A June 10, 1969, *New York Times* editorial on the fiftieth anniversary concurred with Morse, "The vast—and in many cases, growing–disparities between standards in the developed and the underdeveloped countries indicate how remote the I.L.O. is from full attainment of its goals."

Morse detailed WEP in a series of lectures at Cornell University in 1969. The ILO was widening its aperture, and the organization would look holistically at the world of employment, from rural to urban. WEP was the ILO's gamble to move beyond what he labeled the UN's "sterile and unproductive" debates and turf wars. The ILO formulated an agenda with a scope and scale unlike any of its past undertakings.[244]

WEP was a massive global undertaking. It entailed an unprecedented collection of data on the nature of employment and poverty for heavy industry, agricultural, and medium- and small-scale industries. WEP's data analysis included the first IBM-based regression analyses at ILO, heralding a rise in the future direction for labor analyses.[245] Women workers were perhaps for the first occasion globally, investigated with fidelity. Numerous economists and social scientists from around the world, such Amartya Sen, were brought into the ILO to assist WEP. The consequences for countries such as India, if WEP could attain its lofty ambitions, would be sizable.

WEP dominated all ILO conferences in 1968 and 1969, and Indian government delegates dove into the planning. Delegates sparred with the ILO's staff, critiquing the wooden, fixed goals that were floated in initial debates. In preparation for the 1969 ILC, government delegates were ordered to maintain message discipline: "a global plan of action and assistance to developing countries" was required to respond to the challenges of the day. Indian delegates at the 1968 ILC consistently promoted Asia's priority in WEP. "The need of the hour for the ILO, therefore, is to assist the developing countries of Asia" in building a viable workforce that could then be replicated by other Global South states. Similar to the official stance at the Tokyo Asian Regional Conference—as it also would in a 1969 Conference of Asian Labor Ministers held in New Delhi—India's development and foreign policy needs were met with a greater ILO investment in Asia.[246] Instructions for the delegates at the next ILC emphasized the necessity of India's and Asia's prominence in setting WEP's targets that also could be molded to meet local labor conditions. Boldly, India's official line at the 1969 ILC was to stress the elasticity of ILO standards, based on geography. Conceding that the workers' delegates from the industrialized West refused to budge on shrinking the ILO's role in standards setting in favor of ramping up technical assistance, Indian representatives argued for flexibility in standards. Standards for workers in Asia, they expressed, were different than those in Europe or the United States. The aim was to thwart concerted efforts by the West to push standards that collided with realities in Asia. Morse and others at the ILO conceived of WEP "to help build a world free from fear and want" by vastly growing the number of jobs globally. WEP's intended addition to the Second Development Decade necessitated that Indian delegates seek to influence WEP in order to protect India's and Asia's working environment, the Ministry of Labor told delegates.[247]

India's delegates, like Morse, tiptoed around the lack of Soviet or socialist control over the ILO in the late 1960s. N. Krishnan, India's Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva,

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[244] David Morse, *The Origin and Evolution of the ILO and its Role in the World Community* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1969), 90.

[245] James G. Scoville oral history, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Labor Series, interview conducted August 15, 1995, https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Scoville,%20James%20G.%20Foot%20Soldier.toc.pdf.

[246] K. Bhusan memo, January 17, 1969, Jacket title: 52nd Session of the International Labour Conference under article 26 of the Constitution of the ILO, UI/326/2/70 (52), MEA, NAI. Emphasis in original.

[247] Ministry of Labour Summary for the Cabinet "Instructions to the Indian Government Delegation to the 53rd Session of the International Labour Conference (Geneva, June 1969), May 17, 1969, 52/7/CF-60-63 Vol II, Cabinet Papers, NAI.

wrote the Ministry of External Affairs' Joint Chairman that pressure on India by the Soviet Union was increasing. Soviet delegates at the UN requested India's backing in 1969 for a candidate for the chairmanship of the 1970 Governing Body meeting or the 1970 ILC. Krishnan diplomatically declined the request. A potential Indonesian candidate for the ILC was circulated informally in the ILO's diplomatic circles, and India could not risk "alienating African or Asian states" by siding with the Soviets. Years of grievances "nursed" by the Soviet Union and its satellites for lack of inclusion in the ILO's ranks of leadership or heads of conferences, legitimate as they were, did not sway Krishnan. As a political forum, India's priorities centered on nurturing an African and Asian coalition to wield power as the organization neared its fifty-year anniversary.[248]

In advance of the ILO's jubilee in 1969—the name assigned to the anniversary—a campaign to nominate the ILO for the Nobel Peace Prize materialized in Geneva. The Swiss government formally requested Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi propose the ILO receive the award, with the letter nodding to India's global significance as means to improving the ILO's chances for persuading the Nobel Committee.[249] The letter was part of a campaign originating among the UN community in Geneva, it was rumored. An ILO candidacy for the Nobel Prize was considered years before, but shelved to wait for the fifty-year anniversary that could improve the ILO's odds. According to India's delegation in Geneva in October 1968, "ILO officials themselves privately claim to have no inside knowledge…although we feel that such a proposal would have been presented only after appropriate high-level consultations among all the ILO personalities." Entrenched personalities employed by the ILO retained significant power within the organization and Geneva, and their intercession was likely. An Indian diplomat, K.K.S. Rana, questioned the utility of institutions winning awards on anniversaries, yet he acknowledged that momentum for its nomination would only grow and could snowball into a near-certain win.[250] Two months later in December, Rana updated his previous memo that the diplomatic community in Geneva rallied to advocate for the ILO. He confirmed that planning quietly began two years prior. The "award was virtually certain" even with a heavy-handed ILO role in nominating the organization. India's representatives in Geneva and elsewhere stated their support, and the mission prepared for news to arrive of the ILO's victory.[251]

Conclusion: The Nobel and ILO at the Mountaintop

The official announcement of the ILO's win arrived on December 10, 1969, almost a year after Rana's prediction. Aase Lionaes the Norwegian Chairwoman of the Nobel Committee lauded the ILO during her award presentation speech. After laying out an early history of the ILO, Lionaes praised the ILO's global accomplishments of transforming into a worldwide organization. She credited the tripartite structure that incorporated perspectives from diverse actors among employers, governments, and workers to set over 250 conventions and standards that were universally applied. The ILO's post-war's operational turn to "building a bridge between the poor and the rich nations" with development assistance earned the ILO particular praise from the Nobel Committee. Her address commended the ILO for its forward-thinking WEP as evidence of the organization's commitment to constructing an equitable world with economic growth that erected a foundation of social justice for ensuring global peace. WEP, she

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248 N Krishnan to Narendra Singh, November 28, 1969, UI/326/1/70 (52), MEA, NAI.
249 Max Petitpierre et al to Indira Gandhi, UI/326/1/70 (52), MEA, NAI.
250 K.K.S. Rana to S.K. Das, October 16, 1968, UI/326/1/70 (52), MEA, NAI.
251 K.K.S. Rana to S.K. Das, December 6, 1968, UI/326/1/70 (52), MEA, NAI.

predicted, arrived at a crucial moment to counteract the coming population bomb, as warned in the 1968 book written by Paul and Anne Ehrlich. WEP itself could not create jobs around the world for the millions expected to enter labor markets in the coming decade. Its brilliance, she said, lay in a global plan with plans to share expertise and implement consulting with governments by sharing best practices from the developing world. She applauded the nearly herculean task for beginning at a moment when it was most needed for global stability and for sharing the opportunities for affluence that all deserved.[252]

David Morse Accepts the 1969 Nobel Peace Prize from Aase Lionaes

Morse accepted the accolade on behalf of the ILO, delivering an address that summarized the organization's accomplishments without taking credit for its transformation under his tenure as director-general. The ILO's founding in 1919 was born of particular circumstances in a burst of endeavors to prevent the return of global war, and the Second World War and decolonization forced the ILO to adapt to predicaments "which are in many ways even more baffling and intractable than those" encountered after the organization's birth, he said. Evolving priorities since meant that the organization worked to ensure that the "fruits of development" were equally consumed rather than for elites or those at the top of the postcolonial hierarchy. He remarked that the ILO's mission was destined to founder unless it tackled a looming population explosion that threatened to offset gains in the global standard of living made since the late 1940s. Returning to themes present in the Declaration of Philadelphia, he echoed the concern that "the elimination of poverty, hardship, and privation" set the stage for world peace. WEP was a bid to prevent the return to conditions of the Great Depression that could upset the global order and reintroduce instability. Inequitable benefits from economic growth and lack of well-paid employment, in his eyes, endangered the progress that had painstakingly been made since Nehru warned of poverty's viral risk at the ILO in 1947. An overriding goal to "keep the peace" inspired the ILO to

252 Aase Lionaes, Award Ceremony Speech, December 10, 1969, https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1969/press.html.

undertake WEP, and it compelled the organization to urge states and leaders to shift their priorities from the implements of war and to ensuring that standards of living and social justice undergirded sustainable, shared economic growth.[253]

At the end of Lionaes's remarks she mentioned briefly at a "certain internal political tension" that existed among the ILO's member-states. The swelling of its ranks beyond the traditional industrialized countries after the boom of postcolonial states increased jockeying for power in the ILO. In hoping that the ILO could resolve its dynamics, her words pointed to a coming fight that came to distract the ILO in the 1970s. Regardless, neither she, Morse, nor anyone could predict the ILO's fall from the mountaintop.[254] The ILO occupied a complicated position in 1969. It was at the apex of its global prestige, winning arguably the most renowned award in the world. Institutionally, its experts, training centers, regional activities, and headquarter hummed with remarkable productivity. At the same time, as Morse said at the 1969 ILC Fifty-Year Jubilee, the organization failed in its primary mission. WEP was intended to remedy this shortcoming and create the foundation for global social justice, peace, and prosperity. The ILO began 1970 brimming with possibility, unaware of the storm lapping at its shores.

253 David Morse, International Labour Organization – Acceptance Speech, December 10, 1969, https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1969/labour-acceptance.html.
254 Aase Lionaes, Award Ceremony Speech.

Chapter 4 – Surviving the '70s: The ILO's Near Demise and the United States Campaign to Tame the ILO and UN, 1970 – 1980

Typically, the story of the United States withdrawing from the ILO in 1977 is ignored except by historians of the ILO. Although it received ample media attention in the 1970s, it does not register in most, if any, retellings of the 1970s or American relations with the UN. This chapter argues that the ILO assumed an unrealized prominence for America's role in the UN and the international system. Documents from Richard Nixon's, Gerald Ford's, and Jimmy Carter's presidential libraries reveal a debate over how disciplining the ILO could be used to tame the UN, increase American influence, and sideline actors who used the UN as a forum to attack the United States. Rather than a blip on an historical radar, the Nixon and Ford administrations debated withdrawing from the ILO as a testing ground for how the United States could arrest what they perceived to be a slide in American influence and power. Increasingly, American withdrawal evolved into questions of traditional allies' support for the United States. Carter's administration withdrew and used American financial leverage over the ILO to deliver a broadside to the UN, the specialized agencies, and the world. After the ILO acceded to American demands and the United States rejoined in 1980, Ronald Reagan and Congress continued to reform the UN as American foreign policy goals shifted in the 1980s.

One of the United States' primary goals in reforming the ILO, and by extension the UN, was to depoliticize the organization. Anti-American and -Israeli rhetoric reached a fever pitch in the UN during the early 1970s. Although a political shift transpired in the ILO, American policy makers sought to tame the ILO. As this chapter argues, the ILO and the UN were always political forums. The ILO was a political organization that was largely controlled by David Morse to the benefit of the United States, and Morse effectively curtailed Soviet or developing world ambitions to alter the ILO. Morse's abrupt retirement in 1970 removed the United States' ally from the ILO, and his departure ushered in new concerns about a politicized ILO when Director-General Wilfred Jenks abruptly appointed a Soviet citizen to the ILO directorate. By announcing an intent to withdraw from the ILO in the 1975, the United States attempted to preserve the ILO as a political space for the United States' geopolitical agenda by disciplining the organization.

Domestic politics shaped the contours of the debate over the United States' ILO membership. AFL-CIO president George Meany flexed his power in the 1970s, at times binding presidents' hands. Meany's role in this process cannot be neglected. He was an irritant for administrations that sought to court the labor titan and guide American diplomacy. The AFL-CIO's and Meany's domestic power base elevated his stature, and no president could act on the ILO without his backing. Carter relied on Meany to endorse his administration's domestic and foreign policy initiatives. In deliberating if the United States should leave the ILO, Carter would not decide without support from Meany. "We will continue to get and need the support of organized labor on issues important to us," Carter wrote in 1977 when deliberating on withdrawal, insisting that his administration align policy with the AFL-CIO before setting a course of action.[255]

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[255] Ray Marshall Memorandum for the President, Reasons for Withdrawing from the ILO, October 17, 1977, Box 34b, Office of the Chief of Staff Files, Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files, International Labor Organization, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (hereafter JCPL).

This chapter also incorporates archival evidence from India to assess American policy through a foreign lens. India was the most prominent—in terms of political stature and national scale—Global South member-state in the ILO. India's significance in postcolonial politics also shaped the outcome of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), also known as the Group of 77 (G77), in the UN. Indian perspectives on the United States in the ILO offer a valuable lens to evaluate American policy when the United States sought to tame the ILO—as a proxy for the UN—while maintaining strong relations with the developing world. Indeed, India and other states were the primary beneficiaries of ILO support that was intended to blossom during the 1970s.

Chapter 4 begins with Morse's surprise resignation in 1970 and concludes with Carter's decision to reinstate American membership in the ILO. This chapter primarily focuses on the United States' relationship with the ILO. Although WEP and ILO programs in Indonesia and India endured, the ILO fought for its survival in the 1970s when the United States first cut off funding in 1970, announced its intent to withdraw in 1975, and then left in 1977. Morse's successor, Jenks, did not share Morse's political acumen. His mistake precipitated the most serious shock to the ILO since the death of the League of Nations. While the ILO emerged from the League's demise stronger, the same cannot be said of the ILO since 1980.

Morse's Resignation & the Road to Withdrawal

News of Morse's departure arrived abruptly and without much prior notice on February 9, 1970. Rumors swirled that Morse's resignation was timed to prepare for a bid to replace the soon-to-retire head of the UN Development Programme, Paul Hoffman.[256] Telling a *New York Times* reporter he was "'resigning, not retiring'," Morse announced that he would return to private life on May 31, 1970, when his tenure as director-general concluded. He vacated the position after earning unanimous support by voters in the Governing Body in 1957, 1962, and 1967.[257] His twenty-two years at the ILO marked the longest period of an executive leader in a UN organization.

Morse cited three reasons for relinquishing control of the ILO: timing; new organizational priorities; and a desire to return to the United States. The coincidence of the fifty-year jubilee, the launching of WEP, and the Nobel Peace Prize was a fitting moment, he stated, to step aside. As the ILO prepared to greet the 1970s with a bright horizon of new goals with WEP—at the flood tide of the ILO's institutional life—he insisted that an executive with "new and fresh approaches" was best poised to navigate the coming decade. Lastly, he and his wife, Mildred Morse, wished to resume residency in the United States after residing in Geneva since 1948 and leading a globe-trotting life when the ILO exploded in size. He oversaw the expansion of the ILO's membership from fifty-one member states prior to 121 in 1970, and a fostered new respect for the ILO as a development institution when it heeded calls from Nehru and others to adopt a role in development.[258]

In India, the official reaction to Morse's retirement was muted. Notes from India's representative in Geneva commented on Morse's impeccable timing. "The ILO is currently at the peak of its glory and will now enter a plateau, so to speak. By staying on for the remainder of his tenure, Morse would not have been able to enhance his prestige any further." As the author

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256 "Morse Quitting the ILO After 22 Years," *Washington Post*, February 10, 1970.
257 Henry Tanner, "I.L.O. Chief 'Resigning, Not Retiring," *New York Times*, February 10, 1970.
258 "Morse Resigns," *International Labor*, vol 11, no. 1 (January – February 1970), 14.

indicated, Morse accomplished his goals and stood ready to leave after making an indelible mark on the ILO, especially his track record of limiting the Soviet Union's involvement in the ILO.[259]

Evidence of Morse's anti-Soviet stance endured even after he announced his resignation in a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, Zoya Mironova. Mironova pressed Morse to appoint Pavel Astapenko, a Soviet citizen, as an assistant director-general prior to Morse's departure in May. Morse demurred. The director-general had previously accepted the certainty of increased Soviet participation in the ILO's ranks. Claims of the ILO's universality rang hollow when Western nations controlled the organization's policy and leadership. Even though Morse backed the slow-moving negotiations for Astapenko's nomination, Morse rejected Mironova's request to fast-track the appointment process. Morse attributed this decision to respecting his successors' right to determine new entrants to his leadership team, the lack of a vacancy until July 1970, and a likely disinterest by the Governing Body to rush an appointment made by an outgoing director-general.[260]

In a lengthy exchange that revealed much about the Soviet Union's role in the ILO, Mironova attempted to persuade an unyielding Morse. She "did not see the logic" in Morse's decision, and insisted "that it should be a 'point of honor'" for him to finalize a process he initiated. She questioned if his opinion on Astapenko had changed, and urged Morse to reconsider lest the ILO and the Soviet Union erase any progress made toward treating the Soviet Union equitably in the ILO. Morse refused to budge. He reiterated his points and praised Astapenko's qualifications. Nevertheless, he found it disrespectful to intrude on the next director-general's management prerogatives. All of the other UN secretariats and international organizations included at least one Soviet citizen in its upper echelon leadership, and she noted that the ILO was the outlier in the UN without any Soviet leaders. And as she reminded the director-general, she had first raised the issue with him four and a half years prior. An ingrained "'prejudice'," she asserted, against the Soviet Union prevented the communist nation from contributing to ILO policy. The Soviet Union, she remarked, "had been too patient, and perhaps this had been a mistake." He was not swayed. "It was not procedurally possible" for him to meet the Soviet Union's demand, and he expressed his regrets that there was insufficient time to appoint Astapenko.[261]

Perhaps Morse told Mironova the truth: administrative hurdles and respect for his successor prevented him from realizing a long-negotiated appointment. A likelier conclusion merges his stated justification with a deep-seated disinterest in cooperating with the Soviet Union over twenty-two years. Mironova was correct that the ILO lacked Soviet citizens occupying leadership roles or many Soviet citizens in the ranks of labor experts. Had Morse wished to cooperate genuinely with the Soviet Union, he could have handily realized that goal prior to 1970 and demonstrated the ILO's true universality. Morse's political ideology was firmly rooted in Cold War politics, and he seldom acted on opportunities that increased the Soviet Union's stature. It fell to the next director-general, C. Wilfred Jenks, to manage the Soviet Union's ILO presence.

Jenks replaced Morse at a time of undimmed possibility for the organization, and the British citizen ostensibly kept the ILO squarely in the Western fold. The Governing Body elected Jenks on May 20, and he began on June 1. Jenks was an almost forty-year ILO veteran. He

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259 N. Krishnan to illegible, February 12, 1970, UI/326/31/70, MEA, NAI.
260 Meeting in the Director-General's Office, Memorandum of Conversation, April 17, 1970, Box 11, Folder 8: Soviet Union 1954, 1958, 1961, 1967, 1970, DAMP.
261 Ibid.

started in the ILO's legal office in 1931, before working his way up through the ranks to principal deputy director-general in 1967. He assisted Morse in building the ILO's development apparatus in the decolonizing Global South. Within the ILO, his area of expertise centered on labor standards and human rights, and he was a mainstay figure in coordinating the ILC's agenda.[262] A *New York Times* profile praised his ability to wage and win bureaucratic battles in the ILO, and his decades of experience, bureaucratic acumen, and knowledge of international labor standards positioned him to earn the support of the Governing Body. He narrowly edged out Frenchman Francis Blanchard to win the position, and, according to some reporting, Jenks convinced members of the Governing Body to approve his candidacy with the understanding that he would not seek another term after his five-year position ended in 1975.[263]

It is impossible to ignore the signal event for the ILO's season of trouble in the 1970s: Jenks' appointment of Astapenko to the position of assistant director-general. The United States Congress, with the help of AFL-CIO president George Meany, struck back immediately by cutting off funding, with the ILO losing 25 percent of its budget. Jenks asserted that his hands were tied and that here merely fulfilled Morse's wish. Based on the documentary evidence, it appears likely that Jenks misunderstood Morse or was lying once the consequences became clear. Morse's tenure at the ILO could be best understood as finding avenues to limit Soviet participation and influence in the ILO. Jenks bungled the transition and announcement, potentially hamstringing the ILO in the 1970s. The ILO was not foreordained to become a casualty of the 1970s and a shifting international political economy. In fact, the United States supported Jenks's candidacy for director-general precisely because they believed he was least likely to appoint a Soviet nation.[264]

Jenks understood the stakes, yet failed to appropriately prepare the United States or make accommodations to stanch the United States' ire. It was an unforced tactical error that held sweepingly negative consequences. Much of this could have been avoided had Jenks discussed the appointment with the United States in earnest to plot out the formal announcement of an American national in the directorate rather than informing them that Astapenko would be the next assistant director-general without a reciprocal appointment. American diplomatic cables reveal that the United States was caught flat footed by Jenks's announcement or lack of any attempt to provide a face-saving, administrative off set. For the first time in twenty-two years the United States occupied no offices in or guided the ILO's directorate when G77 nations suggested amendments to the ILO Constitution to formally alter the organization's structure.

The Indonesian delegation's report from the 1970 ILC commented on the African and Latin American nations' lobbying for increased voice on the Governing Body. Far from a global South assault on the North, Indonesian delegates backed no changes to the ILO's constitution. "The status quo must be maintained," the government representative wrote, owing to the difficulties in amending the constitution while maintaining the ILO's founding principles. The report noted the workers' delegations concerns that the economic development programs would suffer in the face of departures from the ILO's constitution. A working party meeting to deliberate constitutional modifications failed to achieve a consensus when facing a resolute front

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262 *International Labor* 11, 1 (January – February 1970), 19.
263 "Cautious Chief of I.L.O.," *New York Times*, August 29, 1970.
264 Paul E. Masters, "The International Labor Organization: America's Reentry and Withdrawal" *International Social Science Review* vol. 71, no. 3/4 (1996), 15. A letter sent to David Morse by ILO employee John L. Crawford on July 20, 1970 echoes this claim. In this case, Crawford was warning Morse of Jenks's flippant informing of an American representative in Geneva and the likely difficulties soon too appear.

of industrialized Western opposition. African member-states and the Soviet Union could not convince a sufficient number of Latin American states to join their campaign. Even though the constitutional reform efforts foundered—thus preserving the West's control over the Governing Body—Meany's and Congress' anger festered.[265]

Jenks's decision and the campaign to amend the ILO Constitution infuriated Meany, and his testimony to the House Appropriations Committee was instrumental to convincing congressmen to immediately cease paying the United States' annual contribution. The *New York Times'* editorial board noted that Meany was "the hardiest of cold warriors" who "stampeded" the Senate into cutting off paying American membership dues.[266] In response to Congress' decision, Jenks launched a vigorous public relations defense. ILO official protests of the actions claimed that the end of due payments would "seriously embarrass the United States" and damage the prospects of global peace.[267] Meanwhile, inside the ILO, belt tightening began as the staff union backed a 5 percent board pay cut, and it became apparent that the principal victim would be development assistance.[268]

Funding the ILO became a domestic political football that played out in Congressional theater. More than the geostrategic implications, the Nixon administration responded to Meany's haranguing testimony with electoral politics in mind. The *New York Times'* editorial page questioned the administration's motives. In lambasting the government's failure to pay its ILO dues, the editorial board implored the Secretary of State William Rogers to intervene. Or, it asked "has Mr. Meany taken over that post in the Administration's current eagerness to court blue collar voters?"[269] On matters domestic and foreign, the administration nurtured the political bonds between Nixon and Meany that could sway working-class Americans to vote for Nixon in 1972 or for Congress to accede to the administration's policy endeavors. For instance, Meany was identified as a voice to assuage Congressional resistance to foreign aid in an outline of "Project Overkill" to lobby Congress for Nixon's foreign aid bill.[270] The ILO was an ideal opportunity for the administration to avoid open conflict with Meany. Ideology, in 1970, was not catalyst for the president's decision to act on the ILO. And as Marshall Wright suggested to Kissinger, "I do not think the season is right for stirring up George Meany."[271] Wright met with the AFL-CIO's Jay Lovestone in December and found, much to his surprise, that Lovestone encouraged the administration to meet its financial obligations, remain a full member of the ILO, and to compel change from within the organization.[272]

Traditional American allies in Europe were perplexed by Congress' action. A memo from the Italian government, for instance, expressed concern that the lack of dues could prove "highly embarrassing" for the United States' allies. The Italian government agreed that the ILO was devolving into a forum that attacked the West with the ambition of altering the ILO's

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265 Report from the Indonesian Government Delegation, International Labor Organization Governing Body, 178th Session, Geneva March 3-6, 1970 (*Laporan Delegasi Republik Indonesia, Governing Body International Labour Organisation Sidang ke-178 Djenewa, 3 – 6 Maret, 1970*), No. 4949, EKUIN, ANRI.
266 "Starving the ILO," *New York Times*, August, 26, 1970.
267 Memorandum Kyril Tidmarsh to Winspeare Gucciardi, August 20, 1970, Folder International Labor Organisation Various Correspondence, G.I. 10/7 (1942), United Nations Archives, Geneva.
268 "ILO Staff Asked to Take 5% Wage Cut," *New York Herald Tribune*, October, 8, 1970.
269 Editorial, "Undermining the ILO," *New York Times*, September 28, 1970.
270 Marshall Wright to Kissinger, November 1, 1971, Box 323, Richard Nixon Presidential Library (hereafter RNPL).
271 Marshall Wright to Kissinger, September 23, 1970, Box 330, RNPL.
272 FRUS, Document 29, December 17, 1970, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume V, United Nations*.

constitution to weaken the traditional power of industrialized countries. Regardless, in a sentiment shared by European allies, the Italian government argued that best tool to prevent further erosion of the ILO's structure was to work from within the organization.[273]

An Indian diplomat in the United States, Dalip Mehta, criticized Congress in a memorandum to the Ministry of External Affaairs for acting impetuously in ways that were counter-productive to American policy. Mehta cautioned, however, that failure to keep the Americans in the ILO could precipitate a legacy of failure at the ILO. He asserted that it was in every member-state's "own interest," especially India's, to leverage whatever power it could muster to preserve American membership. Even though the loss of America's 25 percent contribution potentially crippled the organization, he commented that the United States remained "the world's greatest industrial nation" and it kept the ILO alive.[274]

A February 1971 report by the Departments of State, Labor, and Commerce analyzed the challenges and promise of participation in the ILO, as well as the ILO's value to shaping the UN. Nixon had ordered the report, garnering signatures from Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans, and Secretary of Labor James Hodgson. Each department contributed to the report, and it rehearsed many of the traditional complaints against the ILO: Soviet machinations and antagonistic Third World countries used it as a forum to undermine America; it served little purpose to a domestic labor movement; and the ILO under Jenks drifted from Morse's pro-West attitude. The report credited the United States' "shock-effect" that elicited changes ranging from Jenks' statements to the tenor of the ILO's meetings. The interdepartmental report concluded that United States' options were simple: "get out or stay in." Although the document argued for remaining in the ILO, it concluded that American grievances with the UN created an opportunity to use the ILO to initiate broader changes. Leaving the ILO would trigger "short-run shock-value" for the UN and would be "an unmistakable signal for serving notice upon each of the other UN organizations that the United States will no longer pay any price just to be a member." Punishing the ILO risked further American departures from specialized agencies, the report asserted, and it carried the potential of catalyzing the UN's demise.[275]

The report concluded that in spite of what the United States considered legitimate grievance, staying in the ILO safeguarded American global influence that could shape geopolitics during the Cold War. In terms of waging the Cold War, there was little value in withdrawing. "The U.S. interest in ILO is basically political" by serving "as a means to promote U.S. foreign policy" and globalizing an ideology that insisted upon a free labor movement. A principled stand against the ILO would surrender the ILO to the Soviet Union and diminish any of the ILO's gains. Returning to the question of the ILO as a site for contest, the author argued that the ILO should be seen as an open forum for competition between capitalism and communism. Withdrawal, the document reasoned, damaged American foreign policy. "If the object of foreign policy is to maintain or even increase a nation's influence abroad in directions that it desires," the report asked "what rationality exists in an action that clearly would decrease

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273 Memorandum, undated, Folder International Labor Organisation Various Correspondence, G.I. 10/7 (1942), United Nations Archives, Geneva.
274 Dalip Mehta memo, August 9, 1970, UI/326/31/70, MEA, NAI.
275 The United States and the ILO: The Problem and A Plan of Action An Interagency Report on the Participation of the United States in the International Labor Organization, February 16, 1971, Box 333, Folder: National Security Council Files Subject Files: International Labor Organization (ILO) [May 69 - Jun 72] [2 of 3], RNPL.

their influence?” Ultimately, the interdepartmental authors concluded, reforming the ILO from within offered the ideal route for protecting American global influence and reshaping the UN.[276]

In May 1971, after Meany’s testimony, the Nixon administration puzzled over a clear policy direction. In fact, the president had not authoritatively determined how to resolve the impasse.[277] The administration settled on a course of taming the ILO rather than withdrawing. Kissinger recommended the Nixon adopt a conciliatory rather than a combative direction. Meany’s testimony to the House of Representatives, Kissinger insisted, rocketed the issue to the forefront of Congress’ attention. The labor titan’s testimony was not backed by efforts to convince Congress to withdraw from the ILO, leaving Kissinger with the conclusion that Meany “probably does not want the U.S. to quit the ILO.” Dubbing 1971 “a trial period” until May 1972, Kissinger advocated for the United States to push for institutional changes within the ILO and to cooperate with Meany and Congress to release ILO funds.[278]

Nixon, without much notice, rejected Kissinger’s advice. He notified Kissinger of his decision on May 15, 1972, to end all funding for the ILO. Nixon also wrote that he would not entertain appeals to restore funding.[279] Although Kissinger notified Rogers of the president’s decision that effectively called for withdrawal, Kissinger pursued a different tack than he would three years later.[280] He swung into action to preserve American membership in the ILO, recruiting Caspar Weinberger to formulate a strategy to convince Nixon to reverse course. Kissinger assured Nixon that the value for the United States in remaining active in the ILO outweighed the negative consequences of withdrawing. From geopolitics to economics, the United States stood to lose. “We will be accused of turning the organization over to the Soviets,” Kissinger warned of the geopolitical legacy for withdrawing. Economically, the United States’ balance of payments benefited from the ILO’s global campaigns to apply labor standards that strived for higher wages. Kissinger’s penultimate point invoked Meany’s name to emphasize that the administration was without allies. Meany, whose anger cooled since his testimony, blandly stated that the United States should pay its dues. Nixon was convinced and acquiesced to paying the United States’ dues.[281]

Following India’s war with Pakistan in 1971, official Indian documents a disinterest on the part of the Indian government to accede to American demands at the ILO. A crisis bubbled in December 1971 when a Soviet bid for chairmanship of the ILC or a Governing Body meeting arose. Indian officials lined up squarely behind the Soviet Union, even if tacitly. Upon receiving notification of a Soviet request for their candidates’ support, the Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), P.R. Sood, wrote India’s acting representative at the UN Geneva to say “in view of the support given to us by the Soviet Union in the present war with Pakistan,” India should promote the Soviet Union’s government delegate, Ivan Goroshkin, for a candidate of either meeting.[282]

Sood was well aware of the potential consequences that Indian backing of a Soviet candidate could trigger. He documented the risks in an MEA memo by disclosing that the United States’ ILO representatives signaled that a Soviet chairmanship of the Governing Body or ILC

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276 Ibid.
277 Mel Levine to Alexander Haig, May 14, 1971, Box 333, RNPL.
278 Kissinger to Nixon, undated, Box 133, RNPL. Emphasis in original.
279 Nixon to Kissinger, May 15, 1972 Box 333, RNPL.
280 Kissinger to Rogers, undated, Box 333, RNPL.
281 Kissinger to Nixon, June 17, 1972 memo, Box 333, RNPL.
282 P.R. Sood to P.M.S. Malik, December 7, 1971, UI/326/67/71, MEA, NAI.

would precipitate an American departure, “putting the whole organization into a deep crisis.”[283] By late December, again citing Soviet support during the recent Indo-Pakistani War, he instructed Indian representatives in Geneva that the time arrived for “quiet but firm backing” for Goroshkin. Sood continued this reasoning in further orders to diplomatic personnel in Geneva, New York, and Moscow. Goroshkin’s candidacy was doomed by an almost certain voting bloc of employers and government delegates who would wholesale vote against a Soviet national. Sood labeled American claims “intransigence” and petty for erecting roadblocks to Soviet or Eastern European candidates. Still, in January 1972, however, he warned that the risk of American of withdrawal should be regarded as more than a threat. “It needs to be carefully assessed whether there is any substance behind this threat,” he advised. Goroshkin’s candidacy failed, and a Canadian government delegate, John Mainwaring, chaired the Governing Body and Dutch government delegate Gerard Veldkamp served as the ILC’s president.[284]

“A Club to Pressure the ILO”

Although the United States was preoccupied with the ignominious departure from Vietnam and Watergate hearings that culminated in Nixon’s August 4, 1974 resignation, the ILO question simmered as perceived erosion of the UN system increased. The Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) admission to the UN with observer status and condemnation of Israel infuriated Meany. He decried the politicization of the ILO and the selective attacks on the West. The ILO was weighing granting the PLO observer status, and he was not shy in airing his objections.[285] He vented his frustrations in a September 1974 letter to Kissinger, prompting a State Department reply that ILO Director-General Blanchard was apprised of the United States’ firm rejection of granting the PLO observer status.[286]

Internally, the Ford administration debated on how to manage the UN alongside the G77’s calls for revision of the international economic orders. As Kissinger advocated for a world of interdependence, a CIA intelligence memorandum stated that less developed countries (LDCs) in the UN aimed for “fundamental revisions of international practices and institutions” that could “erode the remaining potential of the UN.” The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report marked a turning point: the less developed countries were transitioning from requesting technical assistance and development aid to demanding greater control over international relations. Gloomily, the intelligence memo warned of a UN that was denuded of its relevance and deteriorating power of the United States in the Security Council.[287]

The admission of the PLO to observer status in the ILO on June 12, 1975, triggered a walkout by the United States’ delegates and was the catalyst for Kissinger’s subsequent letter of intent to withdraw. The labor delegate and one of the AFL-CIO’s stalwart cold warriors, Irving Brown, wasted little time in walking out, and Meany promptly applied pressure to Congress to

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283 P.R. Sood Memo, December 21, 1971, UI/326/67/71, MEA, NAI.
284 P.R. Sood to P.M.S. Malin, January 10, 1972, UI/326/67/71, MEA, NAI.
285 Bruce Rockwook, “Human Rights and Wrongs: The United States and the I.L.O.—A Modern Morality Play,” *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 10, no. 2 (1978), 371-372.
286 FRUS, Document 67, Letter from Acting Secretary of State Ingersoll to the President of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (Meany), October 12, 1974, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume V, United Nations*.
287 FRUS, Document 20, Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, February 11, 1975, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume V, United Nations*.

end payment of the United States' membership dues.[288] Perhaps seizing on the opportunity, the Ford administration put in motion plans that the 1971 ILO interdepartmental study entertained.

A decision to withdraw cohered during the summer and fall of 1975. With the support of the Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO's Executive Council, the political machinery of the executive branch moved decisively to leave the ILO. The PLO's observer status "was the tip of the iceberg" for a politicized ILO that diminished its efficacy. Ford's administration settled on issuing a letter of intent to leave the ILO that would be paired with an interdepartmental group to study the ILO's response.[289] Departing the ILO offered the promise of systemic shock. "The letter of intent will act as a club to pressure the ILO, as well as the other UN secretariats, into accepting the subsequent reforms the U.S. suggests."[290]

Seeing a broader horizon for change, news leaked that withdrawal was impending in the midst of American plans to remodel development and the UN. A speech written by Kissinger and delivered by Daniel Patrick Moynihan at the UN General Assembly on September 1, 1975, titled "Global Consensus and Economic Development," heralded a bold transition in the model of development, global economics, equal participation in the world order, and reforming the UN. Noting that the "methods of development assistance of the 1950's and 60's are no longer adequate"—and calling for a vast expansion of capital available for development aspirations—the speech suggested for a wholesale reform for development and the UN.[291]

Even though the key stakeholders who guided ILO policy were in harmony on withdrawing, apprehension existed in September 1975. Seven Congressmen, including Jacob Javits, implored Kissinger to cease drafting the letter of intent. The Congressmen insisted that there was not widespread backing in Congress for leaving the ILO, and 1976 funding for the ILO went virtually uncontested in Congressional appropriations discussions. They insisted, rather than a den of anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism, the ILO was firmly in the Western camp. "Our nation would deserve the international ridicule" accrued from leaving the organization, they claimed, should the administration and its partners at the Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO steer a course to withdraw.[292]

In a conversation with Kissinger, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, and Moynihan on September 22, 1975, two uncontested facts emerged: first, the consequences of withdrawing were sending ripples through the UN; second, Meany was one of the primary, if not the central, power brokers in the United States' ILO policy, and one that colored the United States' relationship with the UN.[293] Waldheim relayed Blanchard's "desperate" plea to request

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288 Paul E. Masters, "The International Labor Organization: America's Withdrawal and Reentry," *International Social Science Review* vol. 71, no. 3/4 (1996), 16.

289 Draft Memorandum for the President, U.S. Response to Problems with the International Labor Organization (ILO), August 26, 1975, Box 72, Folder: International Labor Organization, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library (hereafter GFPL).

290 ILO Issues Paper, September 15, 1975, Box 72, Folder: International Labor Organization, GFPL.

291 Henry Kissinger, "Global Consensus and Economic Development," *The Department of State Bulletin* 73, 1891, 427.

292 Congressman Gale McGee, et al. to Henry Kissinger, September 17, 1975, White House Central Files (hereafter WHCF) Subject Files IT 21 International Boundary and Water Commission, US-Mexico to IT 34 International Labor Organization Box 3, Folder IT 34 International Labor Org., GFPL.

293 Meeting in the Secretary General's Office, September 22, 1975, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, Series: Peacekeeping – Cyprus, Folder Notes for the Files, S-0903-0001-05-00001, United Nations Archives, https://search.archives.un.org/uploads/r/united-nations-archives/d/7/3/d73f4b63dad016e5ef21029a77e952e7205d67229dea5bec191d7967a482a6ef/S-0903-0001-05-00001.pdf.

Kissinger's help in preventing American departure, adding that the "whole UN system" was threatened by the American actions. In spite of apparent sympathies, Kissinger portrayed resisting Meany and the American labor community as a futile pursuit. "We simply cannot get money from Congress for a labor group when our own labor people oppose it." In what may have been a stab at levity after Moynihan noted that Secretary of Labor John Dunlop "has Meany's confidence," Kissinger replied, "yeah, I wish I had" Meany's confidence.[294]

Former Ambassador Laurence Silberman, who became the special envoy for explaining America's ILO policy, also attributed responsibility for American withdrawal to the AFL-CIO. Despite Kissinger's reputation as a strategist, Meany and others in the AFL-CIO objected to what they characterized as a strategy that was "supine and less aggressive" than was warranted. In Silberman's retelling, the AFL-CIO determined American policy.[295]

Meany's fury was not lost on the *New York Times* editorial board, who dubbed him "Secretary of State Meany" for his efforts to drive a wedge between the United States and the ILO. The editors criticized the Ford administration for "meekly" capitulating to Meany who used his power to direct American foreign policy. The editorial acknowledged the ILO's slide into a body that paled in comparison to its former stature, yet, like the letter from the Congressmen, questioned what material gain resulted from "another round of shock therapy that merely contributes to isolating the United States in an interdependent world."[296]

Opposing viewpoints failed to sway Ford or Kissinger. The president authorized a letter of intent to withdraw in October 1975 after reading a memorandum produced by Secretary Dunlop. Dunlop, sharing a conclusion with the *New York Times* editorial board, wrote that the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce had lost faith in the ILO, with the former using its influence in Congress to hamstring the ability of the United States to pay its ILO dues. Dunlop explained that a letter of intent complied with an ILO constitutional requirement that exiting states notify the ILO two years in advance of terminating membership. Such a letter could convince the ILO and the UN to "more amenable to the reforms suggested by the U.S." Meantime, the Ford administration convened an interdepartmental Cabinet Level Committee on the ILO comprised of Silberman, Meany, and administration officials to gauge progress while also advising Ford on the likelihood of a future withdrawal.[297]

The formal declaration of intent to withdraw arrived on November 5, 1975, in a letter from Kissinger to Blanchard. "The United States does not desire to leave the ILO. The United States does not expect to do so," Kissinger wrote. Regardless, should the ILO's climate fail to improve, the United States' ability to participate could not be guaranteed and the United States would permanently withdraw. Kissinger's letter, likely authored by Dunlop, cited four conditions prompting the US to announce withdrawal: the erosion of tripartite representation; selective concern for human rights; disregard of due process; the increasing politicization of the organization.[298]

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[294] FRUS, Document 81, Memorandum of Conversation September 22, 1975, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume V, United Nations*.
[295] Laurence Silberman oral history conducted September 23, 1998, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project.
[296] "Secretary of State Meany," *New York Times*, October, 18, 1975.
[297] L. William Seidman to the President, October 11, 1975, Presidential Handwriting File Human Rights - Equality: Women, Box 25, Folder Int. Orgs - Int. Labor Org., GFPL.
[298] Kissinger to ILO Director-General, November 5, 1975, Box 20, Folder International Labor Organization, David H. Lissy Associate Director for Education, Labor and Veterans and Special Assistant for Domestic Affairs Files: 1975-77, GFPL.

For the United States, Jenks's decision was the point of origin that was followed by a series of errors that indicated a drift in how the ILO served as a forum for developing nations to criticize American foreign policy and capitalism. Even further, it was symptomatic of the United States' declining prominence in the UN. Daniel Patrick Moynihan's March 1975 article in *Commentary* "The United States in Opposition" condemned much of the sentiment that the nations in the Global South articulated in the United Nations. Moynihan claimed that prominent postcolonial states celebrated the Soviet Union's influence while rebuking the United States; and they attacked the developed countries for their failures. He contended that the United States should "go into opposition" to save international liberalism by speaking truth to Third World power and "to say this directly, loudly, and forcefully."[299] Ford's administration took notice and appointed Moynihan its ambassador to the United Nations. The administration further heeded the call by using its power to discipline the ILO and the UN system.

Officials in the Indian government discussed the American efforts to change the UN and its specialized agencies, due to pressures from the South. Senior diplomats in India's delegation to the UN in New York and Geneva ILO warned of "the far-reaching process" to reform the UN initiated by the United States. Brajesh Mishra spelled out his opinion on American protest to the state of affairs in the United Nations. He wrote, "what the US really wants is that the developing countries should not press for decisions in international organizations against very serious American objections."[300] This letter and others like it stressed that the ILO was a proxy in the United States' assault on the UN. Evidence from the MEA highlights India's political commitments to other postcolonial states comprising the G77.

Publicly and privately the United States refused to budge, even as it sought to advance reforms. In conversation at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) meeting in Brussels shortly after sending the letter, Kissinger insisted that the United States sought to force changes and remain in the ILO. He also said that sending the letter "was the price we had to pay to George Meany to avoid cutting off all UN funds."[301] Diplomatically, in 1976, Silberman was recruited to explain American objections and building a coalition among American allies to compel the ILO to change.[302] Silberman simultaneously served as American ambassador to Yugoslavia while shuttling between European capitals to convince traditional allies to band with the United States. At every stop, he impressed upon concerned allies, such as British Prime Minister James Callaghan, that there was little hope for an American reversal. Silberman presented a simple argument: rally behind the United States and endorse ILO reform, and the Americans would return. He also emphasized that the 1976 presidential election would not contribute to a change in policy. The allies' assistance in reforming the ILO was the only hope, Silberman explained, to preserve the United States' presence in the ILO and perhaps the UN.[303]

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299 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "The United States in Opposition," March 1, 1975, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/the-united-states-in-opposition/. This trend continued when Moynihan excoriated the UN General Assembly's vote on Zionism as racism on November 10, 1975.

300 Brajesh C. Mishra GOI Perm Rep to UN GVA to Shri MA Vellodi Sec East MEA, July 16, 1976, UI/326/19/75, MEA, NAI.

301 Memorandum of conversation, East-West Relations (European Communist Parties); Angola; Spain; Yugoslavia; Cyprus; Italy, December 12, 1975, *FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 2, Documents On Western Europe, 1973–1976*.

302 Gerald Ford to Laurence Silberman, January 21, 1976, WHCF Subject Files IT 21 International Boundary and Water Commission, US-Mexico to IT 34 International Labor Organization, Box 3, Folder IT 34 International Labor Org., GFPL.

303 Silberman oral history.

Ford's Cabinet Level Committee on the ILO provided Silberman and others in the administration with a clear set of reform objectives. Principal among these goals was preventing an Eastern European delegate to lead the ILC, WEP conferences, or smaller meetings, for instance the ILO Maritime Conference. All communications with allies and ILO leaders messaged that the United States would not retreat from the letter of intent, and Director-General Blanchard was to be informed that the United States earnestly desired to remain a member of the ILO.[304] In essence, the United States wished for the ILO to eschew politics in favor of the business of development, standards, and data collection. Silberman communicated the policy objectives to leaders in West Germany, Japan, Britain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, and Canada in February and March 1976. Reception was chilly among the capitols he visited. "It is generally not a welcome message," he reported.[305]

Carter Withdraws

The 1976 presidential election overshadowed the ILO drama, and Carter's administration assumed responsibility for determining the right course of action. Silberman cautioned European allies from presuming that a Democratic administration would deviate from Ford's letter of intent to withdraw. If the allies wished for the United States to remain, he stressed, they should "support us on these messy ideological issues which they would prefer to sweep under the rug."[306] Far from changing course, Carter's administration maintained Ford's strategy. The new secretaries of State, Labor, and Commerce publicly declared no change in American standing on the letter of intent and the administration formed a new Cabinet Level Committee on the ILO.[307] A transition document for the incoming presidency noted positive improvements in the UN thanks to the United States' "new elements of substantive leadership." Regardless, a solution for the ILO question remained unclear, and the administration's decision would hinge upon the outcome of the June 1977 ILC. The two-year letter of intent would expire in November 1977, and the deadline generated a raft of meetings and memos.[308]

The Carter administration dove into contending ILO plans. One National Security Council (NSC) staffer, Mindy Kotler, wrote the Deputy National Security Advisor, David Aaron, a forceful memo on August 26, 1977. Kotler argued for decisive action: "too long the U.S. has acted like the spoiled rich kid on the block, pouting whenever it does not get its way….The U.S. must learn to use its instruments of power more effectively." A variety of memos and letters surfaced in 1977, and Kotler's stands out due to its middle ground of arguing to remain in the ILO by utilizing other coercive measures to convince the allies to line up behind American policy. Through parliamentary tactics and hypothetical allied letters of intent to withdraw, she contended that allies were instruments of American power. She recognized that the United States' allies lobbied for the United States to remain in the ILO, and that afforded the United States leverage. "The U.S. and her allies have the power of the purse," she wrote, and the risk of lost development funding would force countries to retreat from an activist posture in the ILO. Aaron forwarded the letter to National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, noting that

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304 Hal Horan to Brent Scowcroft, January 12, 1976, Box 3, Folder IT 34 International Labor Org., GFPL.
305 Hal Horan to Brent Scowcroft, February 25, 1976, Box 3, Folder IT 34 International Labor Org., GFPL.
306 Silberman oral history.
307 Ray Marshall to Jimmy Carter, May 23, 1977, Collection: Office of Staff Secretary Files, Series: Presidential Files, Box 22, Folder 5/24/77 [2], JCPL.
308 FRUS, Document 50, Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State, undated, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-14, Part I, Documents on the United Nations, 1973-1976.*

Brzezinski should consider Kotler's suggestions "if we want a harder line" that fell between remaining or withdrawing.[309]

Kotler, like others, recommended a one-year extension of the letter of intent to further compel change within the ILO. Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance argued for postponing the decision to further collaborate with partners in the ILO. Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall allied with the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce to advocate for withdrawal after a June 1977 ILC failed to demonstrate hope for ILO reform. Marshall attended the June ILC and dismissed the likelihood of American membership in the ILO. During the ILC, the Soviet Union and other states prevented a discussion of ILO standards' violations in the Soviet Union, and the same voting bloc scuttled an American-backed campaign to end investigations into Israeli labor practices in the occupied territories. An appearance of gradual improvements in 1976 and 1977 vanished. For ILO antagonists, the meeting was evidence of the futile pursuit to transform the ILO. Happening five months before the deadline to withdraw, the new administration grappled with a solution.[310] Others such as American Ambassador to the UN Andrew Young argued that modernizing the ILO was best achieved from within rather than outside.[311] Senator Jacob Javits, who once championed ILO membership in a letter to Ford, questioned the efficacy of ILO membership that would damage American credibility.[312] Soon, the ILO question became captive to bureaucratic politics as various sides sought to influence Carter.

Two camps emerged in formal government discussions on the ILO, falling into clear-cut divisions. Representatives from the AFL-CIO, Chamber of Commerce, Departments of Labor lobbied for withdrawal. The Department of State and NSC argued for remaining within the organization by postponing membership termination at a moment when the Carter administration was rebuilding ties to the developing world. The fault lines between the two camps were laid bare during a contentious meeting of the Cabinet Level Committee on the ILO on October 12, 1977. Questions of the ILO's utility, American credibility, and the sincerity of friends and allies cropped up. Lane Kirkland and Irving Brown from the AFL-CIO presented an unyielding case for withdrawal. Neither of the two men believed that the ILO benefited workers around the world when the organization was captive to politics, and the Chamber of Commerce's representatives echoed their complaints. Brzezinski and Vance were lone voices for preserving membership, and the case for remaining was drowned out by a determined argument for leaving.[313]

Pressure on India to lobby Carter increased as the decision to withdraw loomed. On several occasions, Indian diplomats were informed by ILO Director-General Francis Blanchard and even the American diplomatic corps that Carter could be influenced by Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai. India's head diplomat in New York noted, the domestic influence of the AFL-CIO and he commented that Carter's "hand would be strengthened" from Desai in the

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309 Mindy Kotler to David Aaron, August 26, 1977, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material Subject File, Box 31, Folder International Labor Organization (ILO), 3/77-5/80, JCPL.

310 Christopher Joyner, "The United States' Withdrawal from the ILO: International Politics in the Labor Arena," *The International Lawyer*, vol. 12, no. 4 (Fall 1978), 733.

311 A.H. Raskin, "Consideration of Tripartism If U.S. Should Leave I.L.O.," *New York Times*, July 13, 1977.

312 Senator Jacob Javits, "Eurocommunism, Détente, and Human Rights," *Congressional Record*, 123:19, July 21, 1977, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1977), 24350, 24351.

313 Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Cabinet-level Committee on the ILO Meeting, October 12, 1977, National Security Affairs Staff Material - North/South Funk - Subject File, Box 111, Folder: International Labor Organization, 3/77-6/78, JCPL.

White House's internal debate.[314] The United States' permanent representative to the UN in Geneva, William vanden Heuvel, nearly pleaded with an Indian counterpart for a letter from Desai. Vanden Heuvel suggested three points, all of which sympathized with the United States' objections and conveyed India's concerns for the lasting effects of withdrawal "not only from the ILO but for all other international organizations." The notes from the meeting between vanden Heuvel and the Indian diplomat, Gharekan, indicate that India agreed with the American complaints regarding due process. Indian policy, on the other hand, would not endorse the sweeping constitutional changes merely to appease the United States and potentially undermine other global South states.[315]

For the United States' diplomatic and national security cabinet officials, the case to remain in the ILO was clear. The ILO was as an instrument of American power and disciplining the ILO could wound the UN system. Vanden Heuvel wrote Carter's committee, imploring them to delay withdrawal for one year. Carter's commitment to the UN and desire to construct a positive relationship with the Global South, vanden Heuvel assured the committee, would suffer should the United States withdraw. Surrendering after the 1977 ILC permitted "anger, frustration, and disappointment" to determine the course of policy when the State Department was certain that reforming the ILO was attainable. The ambassador's pleading collided with louder voices in the domestic political arena, who commanded a larger audience in the president's eyes.[316]

Meany's loud, public antipathy for the ILO was equally shared by the Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber's President, Richard Lesher, saw no justification for delaying the end of membership. In fact, Lesher concluded that only positive outcomes would flow from withdrawal. He advised Carter to weigh the domestic and geopolitical consequences for weakness. "The credibility of the United States would be seriously questioned" if Carter extended ILO membership, Lesher remarked, in a post-Vietnam moment where the United States appeared to retreat from its global standing. Without any domestic bases of support for remaining in the ILO—and the AFL-CIO and Chamber opposing—the administration courted a political disaster that would dent the new president early on in his administration. He closed by claiming that another key factor weighed: there was no documentation that the ILO accomplished much of consequence for workers foreign or domestic. One could disagree with Lesher's stance on ILO accomplishments. Alongside Meany, however, Lesher's strident anti-ILO activism presented Carter with two voices who represented vast political blocs in the United States. Seldom were the AFL-CIO and Chamber allied on an issue, a fact likely not lost on the president who consumed to a number of opinions, including leading conservatives.[317]

Conservative commentator George Will labeled the ILO a "ship of fools" and joined the chorus of those backing withdrawing from the ILO. "The ILO of 1919, like the world of 1919, is long gone," Will wrote. He dismissed the arguments for remaining. In spite of pledges that ILO members would reign in their policies and advocate for a depoliticized ILO, the June 1977 ILC demonstrated little evidence of headway in resolving America's complaints. The letter of intent failed to influence the ILO's agenda or its control by parties hostile to the United States.

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314 Permanent Representative Government of India in NYC UN to Secretary (East), 8/20/1977, UI/326/19/75, MEA, NAI.

315 Gharekhan to Foreign Sec New Delhi, August 28, 1978, UI/326/19/75, MEA, NAI.

316 William vanden Heuvel to Secretary Marshall, et al, October 12, 1977, Presidential Papers of Jimmy Carter Chief of Staff Butler, Box 102, Folder: Subject File ILO, 9/19/77-12/6/77 [CF, O/A 8], JCPL.

317 Richard Lesher to Jimmy Carter, October 3, 1977, Box 102, Folder: Subject File ILO, 9/19/77-12/6/77 [CF, O/A 8], JCPL.

Terminating membership, he asserted, "will be a warning shot across the bow for the United Nations," and would signal American fortitude and that states should not feel "that it is safe to call this nation's bluff."[318]

Requests for continued American membership appeared from a variety of corners, most prominently from Europe. Pope Paul VI directly urged Carter and Meany to remain in the ILO, and he was among many European leaders who lobbied for the United States to retain membership in the ILO.[319] Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans dispatched a letter from the European Commission in an attempt to sway the president. Tindemans' letter struck a sympathetic note, agreeing with the United States' objections and considered the June ILC "damaging to the organisation." He and the other nine leaders in the European Commission worried that American termination of membership would imperil the UN and the ILO at a time of its renewed successes with the WEP. They pledged to work in concert with the United States and partners in the developing world to prevent further erosion of tripartism and due process. He pressed Carter to extend the intent to withdraw, thus effectively carving out a year or more to enact lasting reform for the ILO "whose historical commitment to social justice is so consonant with the purposes of your government." Tindemans' appeal to Carter's passion for social justice and human rights, ultimately, may have overlooked the primary force driving Carter's calculus: domestic politics.[320]

The domestic political risks of ILO withdrawal were low for Ford and Carter, with potentially fewer repercussions among voters. Gallup polling data from the 1970s illustrates a decline in popular support for the UN. In 1975 when Ford made the decision to announce withdrawal, 51 percent of Americans believed that the UN was doing a poor job with 32 percent registering their approval. In previous years the positive/negative splits among the data were: 35 to 43 in 1971; 50 to 35 in 1967. The numbers improved again in 1978 before trending downward again in the early 1980s.[321] Considering the tenor of the United States' relationship with the world, American citizens likely gave both presidents the necessary clearance to punish the ILO.

The formal end of membership in the ILO occurred unceremoniously on November 1, 1977. Vance sought to no avail to convince Carter in the final days of October that an eighty-nation promise of support to strip away political matters from the ILO justified preserving American membership.[322] His efforts failed to sway the president. Carter's three sentence announcement came with little ceremony, and was read by Secretary of Labor Marshall. The statement plainly articulated that the United States was ceasing membership after the failure of "corrective measures" to "restore that organization's commitment to its original purposes." Future American participation in the ILO was not doomed. The United States could return "whenever the ILO is again true to its proper principles and procedures."[323]

Carter looked to domestic politics, and not geopolitics, to shape his decision on the ILO. Disenchantment with Détente afflicted many in the administration and the United States, but Carter's rejection of Vance's and Brzezinski's counsel demonstrates that a domestic political

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318 George Will, "Time to Leave this 'Ship of Fools'," *Washington Post*, October 20, 1977.
319 Helen Dewar, "Carter Expected to Announce U.S. is Quitting ILO," *Washington Post*, November 1, 1977.
320 Robert Hunter to Jessica Tuchman, September 12, 1977, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material Subject File, Box 31, Folder: International Labor Organization (ILO), 3/77-5/80, JCPL.
321 Data available at http://news.gallup.com/poll/116347/united-nations.aspx Gallup's data points emerge from an uneven interval between years, likely corresponding to events rather than a consistent daily tracking poll.
322 Special to the *New York Times*, *New York Times*, October 31, 1977.
323 Jimmy Carter, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Jimmy Carter 1977 Book II—June 25 to December 31, 1977* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978) 1951, 1952.

calculus drove the president's policy choice on the ILO. Carter's correspondences and notes on the ILO reveal little appetite for reforming the UN or international relations. Winning the support of the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce benefited Carter early on in his presidency. Meany's spate of grudges against the ILO culminated in his long-sought aspiration, and Carter actively sought Meany's backing. As the Carter quote from the introduction spelled out, he anticipated needing the irascible labor leader in his corner for political battles to come. Acquiescing to the AFL-CIO's campaign to terminate membership was a small cost that could reap tremendous gain in the domestic political arena. Years of serving as an instrument of American power convinced the administration to jettison when its purpose had been fulfilled.

Reactions to the American withdrawal varied from concern on the part of the industrialized states to surprise that the United States acted on the threat to terminate membership. Israel was the sole country that approved of the United States' action. One Soviet representative opined that the "U.S. departure was a tactical mistake of major magnitude."[324] Ambassador vanden Heuvel reported that the reaction in Geneva "was predictable." Allies and partner states regretted the decision, the Soviet delegates were caught off guard but would capitalize on the vacuum, and developing world countries' opinions differed based on their political proximity to the United States. Others, such as the Chinese, "were bewildered," he wrote, and "many ILO officials were unprepared psychologically for the announcement." The ILO fired 230 employees and the Governing Body voted to slash the ILO's budget by 21.7 percent. Members of the Cabinet Level Committee expressed their concern that tripartism, due process, and a depoliticized forum would reemerge in the ILO once the shock set in, thus enabling reentry.[325]

Updates from Geneva filtered in over the course of the spring, and the members of the committee debated progress at the ILO. Vanden Heuvel often communicated improvement, however incremental, only to face staunch disagreement from the AFL-CIO's Kirkland and Brown who frequently lambasted attacks on Israel at the ILO. As in the March 3, 1978, meeting, however, all parties agreed to remain in contact with their respective counterparts at the ILO to forge a path for American reentry.[326] Regardless, Brzezinski's deputy on the committee aired his concern to the national security advisor that the committee existed primarily to "block reentry under any conditions to the ILO."[327] The withdrawal proponents steered all deliberations on resuming membership. Equally, in the minutes of the committee's meetings, representatives from the Department of State and the NSC flashed few signs of fight. Concerns for waning American influence failed to persuade the committee to adopt a more enthusiastic strategy to rejoin the ILO, with vanden Heuvel warning the Soviets "are bound to gain greater influence the longer we stay out."[328]

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324 Howard D. Samuel to Members of the Cabinet-Level Committee on ILO, November 23, 1977, National Security Affairs Staff Material - North/South Funk - Subject File, Box 111, Folder: International Labor Organization, 3/77-6/78, JCPL.

325 Minutes of the Cabinet Level Committee on the ILO, November 28, 1977, Box 111, Folder: International Labor Organization, 3/77-6/78, JCPL.

326 Minutes of the Cabinet Level Committee on the ILO, March 6, 1978, Box 111, Folder: International Labor Organization, 3/77-6/78, JCPL.

327 Henry Richardson to Zbigniew Brzezinski, February 17, 1978, Box 111, Folder: International Labor Organization, 3/77-6/78, JCPL.

328 William J. vanden Heuvel to Zbigniew Brzezinski, August 4, 1978, Box 111, Folder: International Labor Organization, 7/78-4/79, JCPL.

As part of the United States' global public relations campaign, officials fanned out to countries such as India to explain the justification for withdrawing. India's Labor Secretary, K.S. Raghupathi, met with representatives from the Department of Labor and State, including Deputy Under Secretary of Labor Howard Samuel. Samuel detailed the reasons for the United States' departure from the ILO as well as resistance to proposals to increase the Governing Body to what he considered an unwieldy fifty members. As he closed his remarks, he asked Raghupathi to assist in "'stabilizing the situation'" at the next ILC when Blanchard aimed to please all parties. Raghupathi welcomed the suggestion and encouraged the United States to rejoin the ILO, commenting "one could sense that almost everyone was eager to see the United States return." He relayed that Iran and Brazil competed for the United States' seat on the Governing Body, yet neither "were anxious to hasten a decision" or offend the absent United States. The head Iranian government delegate made a "specific reference of keeping the seat warm" rather than presume a guaranteed future Governing Body place for Iran.[329]

Before they parted, Raghupathi asked for clarity on the primary barrier for American reentry into the ILO. Henry Pollack, a State Department labor official, replied that the failure of due process at the ILO represented a significant hurdle. The Soviet Union utilized parliamentary measures to stymie critique of its violation of ILO labor standards, Pollack said. The United States could not accept an ILO that critiqued certain nations such as Israel while allowing other states to escape criticism while committing egregious violations. Little prospect for a speedy American return to the ILO appeared during the meeting, and this mirrored the Carter administration's policy.[330]

The June 1978 ILC resulted in political developments that could satisfy President Carter or Meany, yet neither earnestly sought rapprochement. Even though positive signs emerged from the 1978 ILC—Director-General Blanchard even earned Kirkland's praise by advocating for American reentry—the trends of politicization and attacks on Israel persisted in muted form.[331] The United States performed kabuki theater when it came to the ILO. In public the United States lobbied for reform by assuring allies and partners that membership was the primary goal if the organization met American demands. Privately, Carter ordered that the United States should cease serious efforts to rejoin the ILO. Brzezinski rejected an NSC staffer's August 1978 request to issue a strong public statement backing resumption of membership, noting the president's certain disapproval of any such statement.[332]

Conclusion: A Tamed ILO and American Reentry

Progress on rejoining, however, moved speedily a year later in summer and fall of 1979. The *New York Times'* editorial page counseled that the time was optimal was for resuming membership. A September 3 editorial, "Time to Return to the I.L.O.," applauded the ILO's headway in meeting the United States' demands to depoliticize the organization. Meany's and the administration's strategy succeeded, the editorial claimed, owed in part to member states' recognition of a cash-starved ILO that curtailed its development assistance. "Member nations in need of development assistance may be eager to win Arab or Soviet goodwill, but not to the

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[329] Gist of Discussions which the U.S. Government Representatives Had When They Called on Labour Secretary on 14th March 1978, UI/326/18/78, MEA, NAI.
[330] Ibid.
[331] Minutes of the Cabinet Level Committee on the ILO, August 10, 1978, Box 111, Folder: International Labor Organization, 7/78-4/79, JCPL.
[332] Henry Richards to Zbigniew Brzezinski, August 8, 1978, Box 111, Folder: International Labor Organization, 7/78-4/79, JCPL.

point of financially hobbling the I.L.O." Sufficiently tamed, the editorial counseled the United States' Cabinet Level Committee should restore American membership in the ILO.[333]

Deeming Blanchard's and the ILO's steps satisfactory, Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall informed the president that, in his opinion, the United States should rejoin the organization. Meetings of the cabinet level committee on the fall agreed that American requirements were met. On December 6, Marshall asked Carter for authorization to argue for American reentry in an upcoming cabinet level committee on the ILO. Brzezinski and acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher concurred with Marshall. With Marshall writing his support for return, the last bulwark of ILO opposition in Carter's administration embraced membership. A White House tally of cabinet members also indicated that "strong bi-partisan support" existed in the House of Representatives for returning the ILO.[334]

What accounts for Marshall's evolution from staunch antagonist to proponent who could, ultimately, lobby the president to change American policy? In the administration, he was the loudest proponent for withdrawal and often stated his reluctance to seek readmission to the ILO. One likely answer is that Marshall coordinated agreement with the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce. His letter to Carter indicated that the Chamber and AFL-CIO backed American reentry. Both parties' agreement gave Carter the political coverage he required to push American membership to the ILO. Primarily, Blanchard and the United States' allies reformed the organization to meet American demands to save the ILO once the magnitude of American departure were inescapable.

The director-general's report on the ILO's activities 1978 noted the extreme stress facing the organization that "should not be minimized." Blanchard laid bare the stark realities facing the ILO: staff cuts, canceled meetings at the regional- and occupational-scale, curtailed research projects, and a considerable reduction in technical assistance programs. The ILO's future was bleak without American membership. "The vitality and dynamism of the organization" was imperiled by the absence of the budgetary contribution as well as divisions within the G77. Blanchard remarked that discussions on a transformative, global agenda by the G77 and leaders of the NIEO fractured, producing "a climate of frustration and distrust." Dreams of marrying WEP's basic needs strategy with the social and economic justice prerogatives of the NIEO fizzled, and Blanchard vented his frustration at the ILC. To save the ILO, Blanchard acted.[335]

To win the support of the Carter administration, AFL-CIO, and the Chamber of Commerce, Blanchard turned to traditional allies and pushed through a raft of measures. Allies were invested in the United States' return, because, as Ambassador Silberman asserted, "they cared desperately" about ushering the Americans back into the ILO due to its corrosive effects on the UN community and the ILO. For the Europeans and Japanese, American absence guaranteed that the UN as a whole suffered. Thus they were active partners in assisting Blanchard's campaign to mollify the Carter administration's lingering concerns.[336]

Blanchard and supporters in the ILO resolved the United States' four problematic issues: the erosion of tripartism, selective human rights concerns, due process, and politicization. Politicization declined after fissures in the NIEO and G77 precipitated considerable fractures

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[333] Editorial, "Time to Return to the I.L.O.," *New York Times*, September 3, 1979.
[334] Subject: Marshall Memo Re Renewal of U.S. Membership in the International Labor Organization, December 11, 1979, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Series: Presidential Files, Box 142, Folder: 12/11/1979, JCPL.
[335] Francis Blanchard, *Activities of the ILO, 1978: Report of the Director-General* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1979), v, vi, ix.
[336] Silberman oral history.

among a voting bloc of developing world countries, and Egypt's rapprochement with Israel split the Arab states. The 1979 ILC was not marked by the same tenor of political discussions that had dominated the forum throughout much of the late 1960s and 1970s. Similarly, attacks on Israel declined and the director-general quietly campaigned to hamstring a resolution that denounced Israeli labor practices in the Occupied Territories. The remaining two issues were resolved through parliamentary tactics and a condemnation of human rights violations in Czechoslovakia. Previously, the United States criticized the lack of independent delegations when governments sent compliant worker and employer delegates who toed the government line. To prevent worker and employer delegates from voting against their respective government delegations, Blanchard piloted a measure through the Governing Body that created a secret ballot for worker and employer delegates to guarantee the freedom to vote without the fear of angering a government delegate. To remedy the final American critique, the Governing Body condemned Czechoslovakia's government for dismissing political opponents of the communist party from their workplaces. Additionally, the Governing Body authorized investigations into violations of workers' rights in the Soviet Union and Poland. With these four measures completed, Blanchard and supporters in the Governing Body satisfied the United States' primary objectives. The Soviet Union's delegates failed to exploit the vacuum created by the American departure, and the time was ideal for reestablishing American predominance in the ILO.[337]

A briefing document for President Carter emphasized that the time was perfect for a return for three key reasons. First, no longer could the United States accomplish its goals from outside the ILO; only from within could they wrench further change from the organization. Second, backers of reform would feel "betrayed" if the United States persevered in its insistence to demand the ILO's additional restructuring, and American leadership would guarantee that all parties remained content with the organization under quiet American control. Even further, Blanchard committed to increase hiring of Americans in senior staff positions. The benefits for American diplomacy were clear. "A presence which would permit us to more closely align ILO programs with U.S. foreign policy interests," was at hand. With these factors in mind, members of Carter's cabinet counseled that the United States should rejoin the ILO.[338]

Carter publicly announced the intent to rejoin the ILO on February 13, 1980. The statement opened with a recapitulation of the ILO's faults in the 1970s. Carter noted that his 1977 decision was influenced by the notion "that other countries would come to realize that the ILO and other U.N. agencies can only be effective if they are not used for political propaganda purposes." Once depoliticized, thanks to the efforts of allies in the ILO, the organization course corrected sufficiently to please the president. Carter referenced the AFL-CIO's and the Chamber of Commerce's backing to renew membership and reinvigorate the ILO for the 1980s. An ILO agenda that privileged "human rights and dignity" for the world's workers, Carter asserted, was the principal goal for an ILO heading into the 1980s.[339]

Carter was correct, the United States accomplished its objectives of taming the ILO thanks to allies, partner states, and Blanchard. To claim the ILO was depoliticized was, in fact, an error. Director-General Morse guaranteed that the ILO was a political instrument in the Cold

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337 Renewal of U.S. Membership in the International Labor Organization (ILO), undated, memo in Marshall's letter to Carter, Office of Staff Secretary; Series: Presidential Files, Box 142, Folder: 12/11/79-Not Submitted-DF, JCPL.
338 Ibid.
339 Jimmy Carter, "Statement on the U.S. Decision to Rejoin the Organization," February 13, 1980, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Jimmy Carter 1980-81 Book I* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), 306, 305.

War. Although imperfect during Morse's tenure, the United States could rely on the ILO to remain in the ambit of the United States' Cold War political camp. American victory in 1979 and 1980 arrested a political drift within the organization that opposed the United States' geopolitical agenda. Politics remained an essential feature of the ILO. After 1980, the tenor of political rhetoric stayed safe for the United States and its foreign policy.

Director-General Francis Blanchard oversaw the reunification of the ILO and the United States. The spiral that was initiated by Jenks' appointment of Astapenko reached its conclusion. Blanchard met the basic demands to strengthen the ILO's attention to tripartitism, to abandon anti-Israel measures, and to renew attention on breeches of conventions by the Soviet Union and its satellites. Most importantly, Americans regained de facto control over the ILO's programs and budget. The United States achieved a long-running ambition of shrinking the ILO's budget by the mid-1980s. A report issued by the Comptroller General in 1982 stated that the goal in 1977 to contain the budget would succeed in the mid-1980s. "United States policy has also been to oppose any real growth in the budgets of the international organizations." Slow timing on the United States' part prevented more immediate action that they forecasted would take effect after the 1986-1987 biennia budget.[340]

In fact, ILO budget data reveals precisely this picture in a recurring evolution of program and expenditure levels that declined steadily. The gravity of this cannot be overstated. As the ILO's budgetary data from 2008 displays, the ILO survived the 1970s even if barely, only to limp into the 1980s. The history of the United States' relationship with the ILO in the 1970s portrays the super power's evolving goals for the international system and the UN. Specialized agencies such as the ILO were relics of an older era, and the organization faced budget shortages that hampered its ability to push for meaningful change when capital and globalization dominated the international economy.

Evolution of programme and expenditure levels

Real programme evolution (1978–2009) (zero base is 1978–79 approved programme and budget)



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[340] *Sustaining Improved U.S. Participation in The International Labor Organization Requires New Approaches*, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate, by the Comptroller General of the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1980), 25.

Conclusion

As fears of the Great Depression vanished in the midst of an economic crisis where Keynesian tools foundered and a new geopolitical order of Détente materialized, the ILO was an anachronism. The ILO's genesis can be traced to the urge to rebuild the post-war world and guarantee peace by sharing the fruits of material prosperity that high growth, productive economies delivered to the West. Morse and the ILO anticipated decolonization and heeded Nehru's entreaty to commence development projects lest war and revolution spread further in postcolonial Asia. The ILO's mission sought to reduce global inequity among developed and developing nations by embedding a suite of productivity, management, and manpower ideas in Global South economies to accelerate growth. The United States' industrial advancement in World War II inspired most of these economic solutions, and the organization was clearly advancing a political and ideological suite of ideas during the Cold War. More than any other member of the UN or competing international institutions, the ILO symbolized a model of political economy development practice that mirrored economic thinking in the corridors of Western power that were also shared in many postcolonial dreams of industrialization as the panacea for the dilemmas of slow postcolonial economic growth.

Case studies in Indonesia and India reveal the difficulty and promise the ILO faced against the headwinds of postcolonial nation-building. Even when successful in working primarily with the state and business interests, as was the case in India, systemic factors obstructed progress. Lack of capital, international trade imbalances, violence, and other intervening factors hemmed in economic development projects. By 1969, as Morse acknowledged, the ILO could not lay claim to achieving one of its paramount aspirations. Wilfred Jenks' poor political management instigated a crisis that Francis Blanchard deftly navigated to preserve the ILO. Self-inflicted diplomatic wounds paired with changing international economic and political tides left the ILO scrambling to remain relevant after 1980.

Following an uncertain history in Indonesia, the ILO made headway in collaborating with the government throughout the 1970s. Scaling the organization's programs cemented closer ties between experts and bureaucrats in Jakarta. A January 1980 evaluation of ILO programs in 1978 and 1979 for Deputy Director-General Bertil Bolin applauded the close ties that experts and representatives from headquarters cemented through regular meetings. Improvement, however, seldom went beyond the water's edge of bureaucracy. "Tripartism, which is one of the main pillars on which the ILO stands, remains at best perfunctory in Indonesian because both the employers and workers organizations do not have funds to finance a minimum level of professional staffing." Nevertheless, the ILO elevated its profile within the authoritarian New Order, and there was hope for the future if Indonesia's industrialization plans spread economic benefits to Indonesians.[341]

In India, official questioning of the organization's significance appeared in the late 1970s and snowballed into the early 1980s. A Gujurati labor minister, N.M. Barot, did not mince words during a 1977 meeting with the ILO's India office director. Barot opened the meeting by stating, "seen from the standpoint of the condition of life and work of the poor in India and elsewhere, the relevance of the ILO to such people was not very apparent."[342] Fissures appeared in a 1982

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[341] Briefing book for Bertil Bolin January 26-30, 1980, Indonesia - General (Series: Technical Assistance) 1979-1980 TAP 0-74 Jacket 6 Box 429-A, ILOA.

[342] Minute D.S. Raj re: Jain meeting with N.M. Barot Labor Minister of Gujarat, June 15, 1977, India - General (Series: Technical Assistance) 1977-1981, TAP 0-33, Jacket 6, Box 172B, ILOA.

meeting between Director-General Blanchard and India's Labor Secretary in 1982. The Ministry of Labor informed Blanchard that "the ILO's 1960s cycle of technical assistance" required immediate modernizing. Principal among these was a updated focus on "sophisticated training" that was beyond the traditional assistance offered by the ILO.[343]

The ILO's history after 1980 remains a positive one, yet one that is dimmer when compared to its heady mid-century days. Budget cuts trimmed the organization's sails amid globalization and neoliberalism turn that forced the ILO to respond to momentous changes in the global economy rather than to help steer them. Conventions in the 1990s and early 2000s on banning child labor, guaranteeing decent work, fundamental principles and rights at work, and ensuring social justice in a globalized era demonstrate the ILO's diligence in upholding the values in its constitution and the Declaration of Philadelphia. Although unfair to call the ILO a shell of its former self, its relevance waned after 1980. The ILO marked the organization's centenary in 2019, and the celebrations trumpeted the organization's victories and contributions to a better world for workers. 2019 paled in comparison to 1969's jubilance followed by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize when the ILO was poised to remedy the failings of a development model it espoused,.

A Ford Foundation analysis of manpower training and state-capacity building in India echoed Morse's 1969 comments. Ford's primary adviser on manpower to the Indian government, Charles Kidd, observed that India and much of the Global South had reached a manpower, productivity, and management turning point. Kidd called for a thorough reappraisal of industrial relations, manpower, and development assistance in a December 1970 internal report. The report recommended that all parties from the Ford Foundation to government and academics reassess if evidence for progress existed for manpower and productivity development. He cautioned that the old way of business was counterproductive. Manpower development merely cemented "the privileges of limited occupational groups, rather than a machine for securing more equitable distribution of income."[344]

In spite of Kidd's pessimism, the World Bank doubled down on growth centric development that mirrored the ILO's strategy in the 1950s and 1960s. World Bank President Robert McNamara recruited esteemed Canadian diplomat and Nobel Peace Prize Winner Lester Pearson to write a sweeping assessment of development, foreign aid, and the future of modernization efforts. McNamara intended to convince world leaders, especially those in donor nations, to abandon doubts about the merits of foreign aid and development funding.[345] Pearson mostly obliged in a 1969 report that avoided harsh realities of limited accomplishments in favor of proselytizing development's universal good. He implored donor states to resist the trend to cut aid budgets. The Pearson Report asked for Western countries to devote 1 percent of their gross national product for foreign aid, instead of committing to other priorities such as a "march into the space age" when the Global South required a steady current of assistance. On one account, the Pearson Report presciently argued for a future step to stimulate growth: foreign direct investment (FDI). And he was not alone in calling for an expansion of FDI.[346]

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343 Remarks of the DG concerning the Aide Memoire Prepared by the Labour Secretary GOI, for Discussion with the DG, ILO, January 25, 1982, Jacket 6, Box 172B, ILOA.
344 Charles V. Kidd for the Ford Foundation "Manpower and Employment as Ford Foundation Programs in India End of Tour Report by Charles V. Kidd," December 1, 1970, Box 72, RAC.
345 Patrick Sharma, *Robert McNamara's Other War: The World Bank and International Development* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 59-60.
346 Lester Pearson, "A New Strategy for Global Development," *UNESCO Courier* (February 1970), 8, 15.

India's Minister of West Bengal, S.S. Ray, raised similar concerns in a pair of 1974 letters to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Ray was a powerful Congress Party official whose correspondence seem ahead of his time in India, yet entirely of the global capitalist zeitgeist. Ray advocated strenuously for adopting market solutions matched with an opening for FDI to arrest India's declining economic growth. He cited Paul Samuelson's canonical textbook on economics to bolster his case that liberalizing the economy and opening up to FDI would generate jobs ahead of India's population crisis. "Let the ideal capital and foreign investments flow and the change we shall then observe will be very marked indeed," Ray implored Indira to consider.[347] Citing international examples, Ray stated "the traditionally rigid Communist systems have changed their policies and are encouraging foreign investments, there is a scramble even in the United States and Europe for the 're-cycling' of the 'petrol-dollars'…. China is getting millions of dollars from the multinational corporations in the West to increase its productive output and services."[348] Ray, who went on to serve as India's Ambassador to the United States from 1992-1996, articulated a nascent conviction that capital would be the engine of growth. Indira refused to break from India's broad vision of socialism, even as East and Southeast Asian states reaped the benefits of Western and Japanese FDI.

Many historians note the demise of the West's development consensus in the late 1960s. In its ashes a new consensus was born in capitals throughout Asia and the West, dawning in the 1980s and flowering in the 1990s and up to today. Historians of neoliberalism often chart its transmission from Global North to South via the Americas, primarily in Pinochet's Chile. One could question if this model is accurate. An alternate explanation perhaps can look to torrents of FDI pouring into Asia in the 1980s to fuel development that also generated globalization. The new development consensus—and one that holds sway in the present moment—privileges capital as the engine of development. Institutions like the ILO were unable to compete against this new development consensus when hyper-capitalism demolished a mid-century model of managed capitalism. Even though the ILO survived the 1970s and global capital's apotheosis in recent decades, it is difficult to depict a future where the ILO returns to its former global prominence.

347 S.S. Ray to Indira Gandhi, April 23, 1974, 17(635)/74-PMS, Prime Minister's Office, NAI.

348 S.S. Ray to Indira Gandhi, December 9, 1974, 17(635)/74-PMS, Prime Minister's Office, NAI. Chapter 3 "Upgrading Socialism: Technology, Debt, and East European Reform" in Besnik Pula's *Globalization Under and After Socialism: The Evolution of Transnational Capital in Central and Eastern Europe* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2018) is one of the better works charting the process of integration for Europe and the movement of capital into Eastern Europe. One could ask if Pula's account and this dissertation asks if an outcome of a global 1968 should incorporate capital and technology to understand the world after 1968. One could examine the building of Soviet gas pipeline's to Europe as continuation of this shift.

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