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Freedom and Impermanence - Recovering the Liberal Ideal from the Metaphysics of Modernity

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Freedom and Impermanence - Recovering the Liberal Ideal from the
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A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
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by

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December 2014
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For Kay, with whom the most essential ideas contained herein were developed .... and for Tony, who taught me everything I know about philosophy .... I love our Amerasian Blues....

.....and thank you to my parents, my friends, and my families. It would have been impossible for me to complete this project without the love and solidarity of David, Ed, Bobby, Cedric, Paige, Chris, Marla, Liam, Stefanie, Jocelyn, Jason, Francois, Darren, Julian, E.G., Lennon, Pamela, Maria, Prem, and, of course, Professor Laurie.....

..... and an extra special thanks to Flora, who answered for me the question of being with infinite love, and the wisest of knowledge: that we are all “animal(s) looking for a home, [to] share the same space for a minute or two.” (David Byrne)

“Keep on Rockin' in the Free World....” (Neil Young)

“How!” (Vital sound of a Bison – an American Buffalo)

San Francisco, California. December 17th, 2014
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Abstract

Freedom and Impermanence – Recovering the Liberal Ideal from the Metaphysics of Modernity

by Jovian Radheshwar

Liberalism, the political philosophy created in the name of freedom, has, because of its complicity with structures of power organized for the production of permanence, in the history of the modern west, been transformed into an ideological template for the rationalization of moralized power politics, thus abrogating prior fundamental commitments to the freedom of humanity. From ancient to contemporary, with a special focus on the middle-modern milieu, this project traces through western concepts of liberty and their connection to structures of power and authority, both within the west and beyond it, as well, for example through the use of liberty as the handmaiden of power politics in the sphere of international relations and the politics of economic development.

Following this historical and philosophical study of the phenomenology of freedom, encompassing in division one a study of the structure of the idea of freedom in liberal thought and in division two a consideration of its effects in recent histories of international relations, division two thereafter concludes with an alternative conceptualization of freedom inspired by a thorough-going ethical embrace of impermanence
as a linchpin in a fundamental and ontological notion of being-in-the-world.

A newly-enriched and imaginative liberalism offers a possibility for an ethical ground for politics organized for the greatest freedom of each person in a complex age. The onslaught of technological rationality has resulted in an enframed world of power underscored by the ubiquitous manipulation of technique and gesture, leaving the human-animal at the mercy of thoughtlessness in the service of technologically-manufactured permanences now merged with being. This complexity has become an illusory end-in-itself, obscuring our collective and individual experiences of being, and the contingency, and impermanence, of being. As such, we must, as beings whose existences are at issue, determine, through critical rethinking, how political thought should proceed in freeing beings for the possibility of evolution, survival, and the ongoing practice, of being free.
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INTRODUCTION

In organizing our thoughts about existence, we repeatedly succumb to a temptation to make things permanent. For the simple reason that nothing about the physical world is permanent, other than change, our immediate refuge in the world of thoughts for seeking to make things permanent is our only chance for doing so. Essentially, the way we exist in space and time brings the experience of impermanence to the fore of our consciousnesses; after all, we are going to die, everyone we know is going to die, everything we ever worked for will be annihilated by cosmic forces of the universe when the sun runs out of fuel and consumes the solar system that is the home to our planet earth, and every artifice we construct as a testament to our being-in-the-world will become no more long before the final moments, as the undulations of human, animal, and the non-sentient world cosmically-conspire to reveal the fragility of our projects. In the face of this fact about existence - these limitations inherent in the structure of existence - we have a choice. We can either own up to them and build our lives in an empirical and scientific manner, guided by reason, in order to make the best we can of our fragile lives, or we can attempt to defy these limitations and seek to overcome them altogether; it is a matter of accepting our contingency as persons, as beings, or of struggling to
overcome contingency, and make ourselves masters of space and time.

Because everything physical is limited by the fact of decay, and for human beings, by the fearsome specter of death, this finitude of physical forms leaves us, the *homo sapien*, at a loss if we seek immortality. But this has been an age-old quest, and one unlikely to be completely exorcized from our consciousnesses any time soon. For Talib Kweli, another view is possible.

“You only scared to die when you ain’t livin’ right man…”

Against the tradition of many human societies, and certainly the West, Kweli is indicating that there is a biological basis for the experience of fear, and this is found in not “living right.” Kweli is also suggesting that people, by virtue of being able to experience this fear, implicitly are aware of right and wrong, and that, like Nietzsche suggested, that these moral terms are essentially rooted in physical and biological phenomena. In his genealogies on the origins of the terms ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ and ‘evil’ Nietzsche has located the origin of those conceptual phenomena in a need of human beings to stabilize the flows of their existences for the sake of ensuring that they could reliably access said designations (good, bad, and evil), as a guide to action,
construction and recognition,⁴ and as a means to creating a notion of proper order for persons who would be deemed as more and less worthy of merit and access to the goods of life - physical and conceptual - appropriate to their stations in life.⁵ In ways such as these, people have tried to make their selves, ranks, and material wealth more or less permanent.

In so doing, it is fairly obvious that we have to organize our individual lives, as well as our social togetherness, through the construction, use, and continuing faith in the organizational capability of the wills of individuals and collectives. But presently, and for the foreseeable future, too, it doesn’t appear as though we will be able to overcome the limitation placed on our lives by the fact of death, nor will we be able to overcome many other less final limitations that result from our insignificance in relation to the universe about whose size we have only managed to place forth competing theories that make distinct spatial claims.⁶ The will runs out of fuel, and there is nothing we can do about it. We can only manage our decay, and make it as graceful as possible, and make the necessary psychological adjustments, aided by our linguistic expressions, to make sense of this process of coming into presence and then again passing into absence. Kweli’s declaration, then, is based on a deep existential attunement to these cosmic realities
- realities about which many persons care not to think of in the current world. But despite the significant cultural hegemony of human social and political arrangements in the current world geared toward the production of the illusion of permanence, this older, contingency-accepting, authentically-spiritual wisdom about human life remains alive in the arts, in various religious traditions around the world, and can be found in the philosophies that inform the central thesis of this project.

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Our efforts here are undertaken for a very specific reason. In the current world the human value of freedom is essentially under siege. By ‘essentially,’ here we mean that there is no way to understand our current world without placing at the center of this understanding the way in which freedom is being threatened with socio-political obsolescence. This may seem needlessly contrarian at first, since, after all, our politics apparently are more and more organized in the name of freedom: the freedom to think independently, the freedom to vote for various leaders who voters expect to be accountable on the basis of their ability to deliver freedom, the freedom to speak and publish ideas outside of the mainstream, the freedom to buy and sell one’s property
and tradable goods and products to anyone whom one wishes to transact with, the freedom to pursue happiness, the freedom to supposedly love whomever one wishes to love, etc. The legalization of gay marriage; the liberalization of barriers to trade within and across nations; the sweeping, rebellious impulse in the name of liberal freedoms associated with freedom for the individual and the need to limit the power of constituted authorities in order to guarantee that freedom found across the Arab and Muslim world now - and which have begun consolidating their success in the Latin American world following the rise of social democratic governments there in the last decade or so; the encouragement via global electronic connectivity of the rise of many new expressions of individuality and community long lacking the means to speak their names and causes; the rise of women in the professions and the feminist revolutions in sexuality and sociality…..these have all been typical of the age we inhabit, and all are revolutionary forces changing human existence. The world as we know it today is rapidly being transformed by multitude impulses to freedom.

Accordingly, a counter-attack has been waged by those whose ways of life, long ossified by metaphysical entombment, are potentially threatened by these forces. In some cases the threat is quite real, such
as in the ardent desire of many Egyptians to try their former ruler
Hosni Mubarak and his various hangers on manipulating the political
scene there subsequent to the initial Egyptian revolution of 2011, and
to at the very least incarcerate them for their crimes against the people,
or in some cases execute them for some of those crimes which
certainly include the murder of innocent persons. In other cases, the
threats those waging the counter-attack against freedom imagine is
precisely that - an iota of their imaginations - but, because of the way
in which their imaginations inform their cognitive apprehension of the
material world, their feelings of being threatened by the changes under
discussion here are at least partially-related to real material changes
that altered conceptions of being-in-the-world will require.

In both cases, of apparently direct threats to status and even the lives
of those who have benefitted from the restriction of the freedom of
others, and in the case of those indirect threats resulting from imagined
and real threats, and the combination of these threats, those engaged in
the counter-attack against the rise of long-repressed freedoms have
relied on various technologies of distancing to stave off the
challenges that have emerged to the security of their positions. Some
of these technologies are as old as human societies, and in some cases
even older, such as the basic tools of violence used to inflict physical
pain and impress upon challengers in their bodies the consequences of contravening the order of the day in their actions and, even, in their thoughts - for example through the use of torture. Orders of authority have also for a broad swathe of human history used symbolic significations to codify the appropriate social positions of persons living in those orders to ensure as best as possible the stability of their rule. Titles of nobility, normalized codes of behavior appropriate to social class, the designation of formal rank in institutions created by human beings, and other such mechanisms have been employed to create what Nietzsche has called “the pathos of distance”10 such that the space between persons, communities, social classes, and nations, could be ideologically-reinforced.

This raises the obvious question of why this must be done: why have people felt the need to completely segment their existence, and thence organize their cognitive capacities in line with the division of social reality? After all, social existence is indivisible, and therefore the only way persons can assure themselves, and even then only for a limited time, of the apparent benefits of distance is through the deployment of technologies of distancing. Failing such a concerted exertion of the will, we shall posit, human cognitive capacities, apprehensions of our surroundings, and empathic feelings for the Other will always
eventually overtake the distance between oneself and other persons, between human groups and social classes, and between nations, and, as a result, will reveal the inherent contingency of artifices that have been constructed to give unique permanence to our conception of being.

Artifice can be thought in a freer manner, however this alternative notion remains veiled in the society of seekers of permanence.

This returns us to Kweli’s concept of “living right,” which, rather than being associated with the internalization of essentially true and good concepts, morality, a certain vulgar concept of ‘truth,’ and the presumed permanent presence of these figments as unchanging, instead seeks to have us consider why we fear death when we are not living right. Death, according to Martin Heidegger, is associated in our existential situation as human beings with the finitude of our existence,\(^\text{11}\) and this is something which we are all radically aware of: death is the always present but often unnamed Other whose ramifications for our existence we can only accept, not alter. Plato long ago wrote in *The Republic* that in the afterlife - that is, after we die - we would be rewarded with the goods of the heavens and a fortuitous reincarnation if we lived our lives in accordance with the requirements
of justice - and failing this that we would be at a loss, sent to Hades, and be deprived of those fortunes reserved for the just.\textsuperscript{12} Similar notions of reincarnation and posthumous rewards for adherence to doctrinal coda can be found in all the major world religions, and, apparent paganisms aside, in indigenous traditions from various parts of the globe. But all this compels us to ask the question of why human beings and societies have felt the need to construct such a notion of posthumous rewards, of the atheist version of these - glory and legacy - and why indeed the focus of the world’s spiritual traditions are frequently pointed at death, as opposed to life. I am suggesting here that Kweli is a philosophical thinker whose primary concern is not death, but is a redoubled effort to extricate ourselves from morbidity and ask ourselves the question of what living right entails.

Since we are all going to die, the question of human space and time, the space and time of our lives, is more appropriately a question of how we shall live, and how we will harness what is unique, so far as we can know, for human beings, to make our lives worth living. An inescapable question of togetherness arises therefore, since human existence is an essentially political one - that is, one that is lived in a \textit{polis}, a gathering of beings together in the world.\textsuperscript{13} How shall we live together? What will be the basis of our togetherness? Will our
togetherness be ruled by the imperatives that originally drove people to develop technologies of distancing, and thereafter the imperatives that developed as a result of living and being conditioned for life by the kind of life created by those technologies? Or is something else possible?

These technologies, that produce distance between people, societies, nations, social classes, men and women, older and younger, between religious orders, and which form their own epistemological trainings for persons reared in their midst, we will argue in this project, have been a response to an ontological preconception of being - a notion of human nature, that is - that seeks to essentialize the nature of people for the sake of escaping from the confines of our contingent space-time existentiality. Therefore this entire way of existing associated with what the current world considers order is fundamentally about escaping from the presence of otherness and difference comprehended as danger - whose maximum expression comes in the guise of death, but whose innumerable manifestations terrorize people on the way to death, rendering them unfree and unfulfilled, breeding into them ressentiment, turning them into dealers of anguish and pain to their contemporaries and their progeny. All will thus live a life of missed opportunities, of bodily expression (including intellectual and artistic
since the body is the house of the mind) prevented; and those who refuse to conform to these disciplines will be surveilled with suspicion, tolerated when possible/appropriate, and scapegoated in moments of extreme social anxiety. The excluded must be controlled, domesticated, normalized, and, if need be, exterminated lest society become lackadaisical to the maintenance of order.15

But what of living right? Surely we will continue to construct artifice. But what will be our relationship to our creations? There is no natural order for human life. We cannot know for certain if there is a natural order to the material and sensible universe, although we can gain a utilitarian glimpse here and there, and some of these glimpses can be truly awe-inspiring and revelatory, such as in the discovery of the Higgs-Boson particle that constitutes the physical precursor of mass. Nonetheless, our glimpses are fleeting, contingent, and dependent on our creatively constructed languages. Science, as much as poetry, is poetry. Unlike the formalized understanding of prose, that seeks to communicate a rational, universalizable, and ‘objective’ argument - objective because it turns the truth into something that is understood as objectively present, whose presence we can confirm, ironically through connecting its being to suprasensory conceptual laws of physical reality - poetry is always spontaneous, it writes human life
but pointing in the direction of new forms of expression that never 
exists before. Thus its capacity to arouse the literary sensibilities of 
people even in the absence of adherence to conventions of grammar 
and narration that generally provide the pathmarks of being in a given 
text. In poetry lies the present-becoming-the-future even in the 
apparent focus on temporally-past instances of reflection. And because 
no two people have ever been exactly the same, either physically or in 
regard to their consciousness, communication, authentic 
communication, between persons must on some level always be 
poetic. Heidegger, invoking his favorite poet, Hölderin, proclaims with 
much clarity that “poetically, man dwells.16” Poetically we point in the 
direction of the unexplored and essentially always unfinished nature of 
existence, and together, with each other, with the Other holding the 
hand of the self, we go into the future to come. There are no 
guarantees and the only source of stability is that most fragile of all 
human forces, love.

Quite radically, those who wish to transform themselves into 
objectively present beings, who seek to guarantee their future with 
anything more than the agency of love must eventually rely on 
technologies of distancing, and always reinforce through their agency 
the distance between Self and Other. This move therefore cuts them off
from the possibility of a primordial togetherness with the Other; in essence love is exchanged for power. Consequently, people who require this distance can easily develop an addictive relationship to those technologies, which require a person to turn themselves into something objectively present, the Other into an opposed objectively present principle-being, and enforce these designations in consciousness, in physical reality, and the recordings of history, with a high degree of reliability. From this constellation of efforts the resulting expectations for order and distance that take on a prescriptive significance for the building of families, communities, nations, and other clusterings of togetherness (a vulgar togetherness based on exclusion) over generations will alienate people and communities from one another. Their poetry, the source of language, affect, and therefore intellectual and physical expression, will lose the vital interplay between beings needed for the creation of new ideas, and will come to be characterized by an effortful reinforcement of those manufactured, seemingly objectively present tokens and significations that form the basis of political economy.

Because losing sight of the origins of the contingency of the construction of political economy is essential to ensuring belief in its naturalness, a threat to any part of this framework will become a threat
to the whole, and life beyond can thus seem unimaginable. This returns us to Kweli’s statement at the outset - indeed, people living in the midst of division are not living right, because their abjuration of death, difference, and the Other, too, brings fear to the fore whenever the constructed normality they’ve become habituated to is interrupted. Gripped by this fear, which becomes their primary object in life, both to escape from and to believe in because its absence brings their entire life and efforts into question, people begin to lose sense of the possibilities that their surroundings are always teeming with. This, quite literally, prevents people from becoming what they could have become, and by this I don’t mean to say that people will fail to live up to some metaphysical or ideal version of themselves, because such a conception of becoming is fundamentally restricted, but rather, that the poetry of experience that people are potentially available to experience is dashed, and people are always more or less relatively aware of this. To retain this capacity for dimmed faculties, of a restricted imagination, and of a repressed body, then, fear comes to be a justificatory ward, precluding the possibility of living right in the Kwelian sense. By reducing our interaction with our surroundings, and with the Other who is always already found there, the portion of our bodies and our souls seeking the new, new influences, new experiences, needful of these for growth, empowerment, inspiration,
and love becomes uninitiated in living, uneducated in how to take care in myriad new and unfolding situations - which existence seems to guarantee we will face - and afraid, ultimately, of the Other that is both found without, and as well within, the self.

“The common bond between Us may be the Other. The Other may not even be as localized as a definable Them that one can point to. In the social cohesion of scandal, gossip, unavowed racial discrimination, the Other is everywhere and nowhere. The Other that governs everyone is everyone in his position, not of self, but as Other. Every self, however, disavows being himself that Other that he is for the Other. The Other is everyone’s experience. Each person can do nothing because of the Other. The Other is everywhere elsewhere.”

Each of us experiences the experience of the Other because we are the Other for every other Self that shares existence with us. This means we may be as strange as we may imagine the Other to be, we are more or less equally strange for the Other, so the judgment of other people on the basis of standards which we feel are associated with normality requires the capacity to claim that we, ourselves, are the holders of insight into the nature of reality, according to an overarching logic that purportedly explains the laws of cause and effect relatively reliably. But in claiming such exceptional perceptual prowess, we preclude a more spontaneous, primordial relationship with our surroundings, in
which the Other resides with us, and to which the Other is actively contributing to the truth of its unfolding. The metaphysical notion of truth that stands in our path to our surroundings, traditionally associated with Plato in the Western cannon, who claimed only the truly wise could access the forms - or truths that are truly true because of their universality and timelessness, their existence outside of time - is based on a division of reality, resulting in the oxymoronic idea of a ‘real reality’ determined by the wise with access to the laws of nature, and a ‘deficient reality’ full of the hustle and bustle of regular folk, women, slaves, children, and everyone else, wherein what happened, what happens, and what is happening, are all considered ephemeral phenomena unworthy of being admitted to the record of the truth.19

But this is where the politics of our cognition, and how experience itself is politicized, becomes a question for political theory. And politics is fundamentally a question of how we shall live together in the polis, which as we have alluded to above, is a question of how beings are gathered near one another in the name of being being itself. Inescapably, humans are political animals, meaning that we are a type of living being that at least for a significant while in all our lives, must be around other human beings in order to learn the information, tactics, maneuvers, and actions with which we need become familiar
in order to survive. The kind of gathering is in question here, and the mechanisms associated with the gathering is where we find the origins of technology, whose potential political significance to which we have alluded above. *Techne*, the ancient Greek word for art, craft, and technique, the root word of technology - which is the systematic study and ‘improvement’ or more accurately refinement, of technique - has at its root a close relationship to the production of artifice, which simply means those things that have been created out of the handiwork of human beings that would not have existed on their own otherwise in nature. This more expansive definition of technology is restricted for awareness, however, in the current world, where the term has instead come to colloquially signify electronic, machine, informational, and other ‘advanced’ technologies associated with circuitry, semiconductors, radio and electromagnetic waves, and other creations related to the increasingly efficient manipulation of the natural world for the sake of producing a system of presences associated with our modern culture of comfort, entertainment, military security, casual energy consumption, and ubiquitous record-keeping. The kind of political togetherness (or as we have suggested above, vulgar togetherness based on the exclusion of those to be feared) promoted by the current world constellation of technologies, thus, takes on a life of its own. Under these terms the organizers of *polis* seeks to reproduce
themselves. As such the contingency of our political options has been forgotten, rendering our choices somewhere in the range between invisible to consciousness and unnamable in speech and thought due to the ward of fear concerning the potential revelation of the Other.

Social order is technology, and the way in which beings are brought near, or kept at a distance, physically, intellectually, spiritually, and in terms of ethics and morals, is the primordial function of technology. Different modulations of these relationships produce different kinds of togethernesses. This includes the extent to which lives, ideas, feelings, histories, historicizations of their histories, creativity, and anything else that inheres in existence is admitted to the bar of that which counts as real, significant, and politically-relevant in determining the parameters of the polis. Thus understanding the polis as a gathering, a more primordial definition than the generally-invoked one of ‘city,’ is intimately connected to the idea of technology, which itself is merely a means for bringing certain people, according to certain criteria determined in various manners, nearer to oneself, or keeping people at bay; in some cases, technology can, and has, been used to remove beings altogether from our surroundings. And here I mean killing them, and histories of nations and communities are replete with examples of this.
But why kill the Other? In Antonio Negri’s and Michael Hardt’s *Multitude*, an interesting alternative conception of the uses and misuses of violence is put forward: aggressive war against people who have not done anything to attack another people waging said aggressions must always be sanctified, justified, in the name of order, and, quite obviously, war waged in the name of defense against said aggressions never bother with justifications for both the obvious reason that those under attack don’t have time to consider justifications, and they very idea of justifying the defense of one’s own life seems illogical and unnecessary to people under threat of invasion and perhaps decimation, if not annihilation as a free, or at least unique, people.20 Usually, aggressors cast the enemy to be attacked as a mortal threat to the security of the order of the day - spreading the fear of death amongst their countrymen and women. From the Spanish conquistadors who would read Christian declarations of right before entering into battle against the indigenous nations of the Americas to the American Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, the former invoking the threat of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism to justify the invasion of Iraq and continuing occupation and aggression against Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and other places whose listing would go on, and the latter whose chief counter-
terrorism advisor John Brennan engages with the President in ‘just war’ deliberations over killing innocent persons through clandestine and illegal aerial drone warfare, citing St. Augustine and Michael Walzer’s *Just and Unjust Wars* as influences on their decision-making, aggressors have sought to justify their aggression. In so doing, the Other, theoretically, can be killed with impunity since ‘we’ are ‘right’ in our actions, and their position as the Other invalidates all their protestations to the contrary, and reduces their opposition to our aggression to something unnatural, and that cannot, therefore, be considered a legitimate political grievance.

In order to remain free of the Other, something which is impossible, then, in the case of aggressive war - a limit example of a technological orchestration of togetherness - a mixture of physical and idealogical technologies of distancing that aim to keep the Other at bay spatially and in consciousness, is required. But none of this addresses either the omnipresent fear of the Other that undergirds this entire manning of being, or how to live with the Other whose existence can truly never be extinguished, both because this is impossible short of genocide and even then unlikely, because as Laing saw it, we are all the Other for someone else, always already. Those engaged in this practice are thus unfree even from the fear and insecurity their practice purports to
produce security as a protective cover for.

But this is all very complicated, since, on the one hand, the United States of America is a nation whose ostensible liberalism has been invoked in the name of precisely its attempt to project power across the globe for the sake of overthrowing regimes whose apparent intolerance of the Other within their borders has been cast as a reason for that intervention. Tolerance, it appears, has itself as an idea been yoked to the self-conception of America, and if we examine the thoughts of various European thinkers who supported colonial ventures, this maneuver of bringing tolerance into the Western fold as something essentially an ideological property of the West is caught up with our current conception of what it means to be a liberal, and free being.23 There is some value, some ideological appeal, in thinking of oneself as being a liberal. Aristotle claimed that liberalism has been marked by magnanimity, largesse, generality, and because all these require an extension of the self in space and time, the strength to be so; just as much the wealth, too.24 But in today’s world, moral inconsistency - not the least the unwillingness and/or the inability to accept contradictions or the prevalence of paradoxicality in the midst
of order - and intellectual laziness are orders of the day, wherein conservatives in America on the one hand trumpet the need for traditional values domestically, but all the while argue that our Western civilization has progressed beyond anything that can be hoped for by the non-Western world indicating the need to forcibly liberalize those societies for their own sake.

Liberalism, like all values when these are rendered manipulable for the sake of reinforcing the identity of the group against the non-identity and otherness of the Other, is transformed into something that simply needs to be reinforced through technologies of distancing - in this case preventing criticisms of foreign policy as not in line with stated intentions (the common charge of American hypocrisy on the matter of freedom from much of the rest of the world) from being heard or considered as a sincere criticism (the common deflection of this achieved through the reversal of the discussion to refocus on the deviant otherness of the Other: “those Muslims are so bad to women we have to do something25”), and refusing to sincerely address the purported liberalness of American society in its manifestation presently and its moorings historically by ignoring and/or minimizing the brutality of the twin holocausts fundamental to the nation’s founding, the decimation of the nations of indigenous America and the
sickening and twisted manipulation and attempted herd-animalization and consequent slow-motion genocide against persons from numerous African nations.26

Clearly, persons with a historical awareness and with enough integrity to own up to what they can learn about history will have to sort this out in some manner. The options appear to be either acknowledgment, and all the reckonings that entails, or willful ignorance, and all the requirements for distancing from the Other, who always carries this historical knowledge. The production of the nation as a spectacle has been a chief means by which to ensure this forgetting, since, if we consider the mind and the body to be one, the memory of these crimes are imprinted on the bodies of all involved, both perpetrator and victim. And none can help but feel it. The capacity to experience the spontaneous generation of feelings associated with this set of historical awarenesses is at the center of our project and the desire to revalue the possibility of authentic liberalism.

By way of this introduction, fundamentally concerned about living right, and its opposite, fear, ultimately of death as the maximal Other,
but, too, of everything else other than the self as commonplace daily
phenomena in human experience, we hope to illustrate the stakes
involved in how we answer the question: how shall we exist in
freedom? Shall we make our consciousnesses in the image of the
permanence of our artifice, be these states, social orders, economic
arrangements, cultural practices, stations of privilege, and other
creations, or will we base our existence on this earth on the fact of
impermanence and declare ourselves worthy of freedom in spite of
that impermanence? Is freedom the freedom from contingency? Or is
freedom the ability, maturity, knowledge, and creativity to face up to
contingency, accept it, and with the potential to experience joy and
love, to nonetheless struggle and labor to make the best of our finitude
in the face of the impermanence that characterizes the human
condition?

In the Platonic manner of conceptualizing knowledge that renders that
which is truly knowledge as permanent and thematically metaphysical,
what is revealed is an attempt on the part of humankind to escape the
body, its decay, its impermanence. All elements of the world -
including the female of the human species because of their required
intensity of bodily awareness due to the fact of biological
reproduction, and the laboring masses of the world whose awareness
of the contingency of all social reproduction on their labors - that are more closely connected to the body, then, are associated with uncleanness, death, decay, impermanence, and therefore placed on a lower order of being than those, generally men, whose rational perfection and bodily contingency permit them to imagine with more - but still illusory and misguided - realism the possibility of permanence. Enforcing this division, between permanent and impermanent, between the bodily experience and that of the supposedly distinct rational mind, requires technologies designed for this effort, and theorists as old as Plato have admitted that for the sake of disposing people to their natures, supposedly, the erection of artificial structures in society is necessary. This is an obvious contradiction only resolved by the keepers of order in *The Republic* reserving for themselves the power to decide, through their superior capacity for intellection, what the natures of those under their rule are, and disposing them appropriately to various employments deigned necessary for the upkeep of the social whole - the gathering of beings organized by the technology of the *polis*.28

From Plato, through his disciple Aristotle, through their revivalists in modern European political thought - such as Hegel for whom the state is a central element in the development of human consciousness - and
even to their apparent detractors like Hobbes and Machiavelli, the state understood as the human creation, the artifice, at the heart of the terms of order, has been the dominant technological device for how to gather beings in a *polis.* Serving this technology, as is the duty of the citizen, however, has produced much confusion about what it means to be a human being, what the reality of the state truly is, and what, ultimately, it means to be a free person. Giving the state a reality that is not its own, dishonest conservative theorists - which ironically has come to include the majority of self-anointed liberals - have begun to take the state’s presence for granted, and have naturalized those ideological - that is artificial and constructed - understandings of human beings such that gave rise to the state. Indeed, both Plato and Hobbes, opposite views about the existence of a highest good and the role of the state in shepherding it as opposed to creating it by virtue of *fiat* authority, believe that in the absence of order human beings will resort to an animalistic existence which in the first disparages animals as devoid of love, and secondly ignores empirical reality about the presence of love in human life in areas in which the state almost never reaches. And while their statist and authoritarian visions are not impossible certainly, their approaches to dealing with the consequences of that vision is rather disabling in relation to the possibilities for life, expression, and freedom, that inhere in the human
To escape this, Plato constructs Philosopher-Kings and the Guardian caste from which the Philosophers as wise rulers are selected from, and Hobbes posits the state as a guarantor of order in both the material and ideational realm, ultimately backed up by force acting in pursuit of an architectonic balance that political science as a study of order reveals. In both cases those who contravene the good, and the normalized order, irregardless these two thinkers’ differences on questions of equality among human beings in nature, are threats to the state and can be punished through the sovereign power enacting a ban, or declaring in effect war against the recalcitrant in question.

Western political thinkers have in general been champions of the state and the necessary order it purportedly provides to human affairs. Naturalizing the state, therefore, has been a most significant ideological maneuver commenced to effect a naturalization of human behavior as ‘human nature.’ The dialectical framing of being as ‘human nature’ thereafter dramatizes the state as an ongoing performance in which people in accordance with their natures that have been generally and specifically (wherever possible in relation to the availability of technologies of biopolitical management) - and
directly and indirectly - defined for them in accordance with an overall political conception of order determined by authority play their assigned roles. Within this greatly restricted framework, the space of freedom, of free action, limited to the sphere of a depoliticized life ensconced safely within a hovel, permits that only those who agree to this segmentation of space and time ought to be free, and those who threaten it are variously irrational, dangerous, uncivilized, barbarian, vainglorious, and, in today’s terminology, are cast as ‘terrorists,’ whose being is in fact concomitant with being enveloped within and thus only capable of dealing to others, terror, and, more insidiously, this same designation, too, denies those same persons the human status afforded those whose suffering we recognize as human suffering. Having failed to grant human status to ‘terrorists,’ we delude ourselves into the foolish belief that they are incapable of suffering, and, therefore, that their actions can be explained and understood on this basis.

Now as we indicated above, humanity is far from accepting this without a fight, and numerous rebellions abound globally at this point in the name of a more thoroughgoing freedom demanding more than the right to play with trinkets and be distracted by grandiose spectacles
in one’s so-called ‘free’ time. Many people apparently don’t want to live in fear of death, of the Other, and in despair of life. But deactivating this potential in all people is something that makes possible the ability of social classes and groups in power around the world to harness people’s productive power for their own designs. So a counter-attack has been commenced; and for allies global elites have enlisted the assistance of variously privileged sectors around the globe whose identification with global elites through shared (supra) nationalist historiographies that come to encompass religious fundamentalism at one extreme and the idea of a ‘modernized’ nation of self-interested and self-reliant rational actors at the other, since in both cases, unwavering belief in religion in a fundamentalist, ritualistic manner, and belief in the self as a disciplined island unto itself secured through the prudence associated with forgoing the joys of spontaneity and concentrating on hard discipline, can only be given longevity beyond the immediate through the guarantee of economic and resource security seemingly grantable by elites in control of largesse.

But this is nothing new in a sense, since any casual, but at least honest, appraisal of the rise of nation-states in the modern Europe-dominated world system cannot but take note of the fact that nationalism was always dependent on internationalism, for both ideological as well as
material reasons. Without the enslavement of Africans no Europe or America would exist as these entities now do, and without the analogous reduction of the world’s indigenous to what Martin Heidegger called “the standing reserve”\textsuperscript{40} that could be disposed with in any manner deemed expedient in many of the world’s nations, including quite significantly in postcolonial societies seeking political consolidation\textsuperscript{41}, would lack the required apparatuses of control to even begin to assert their claims of ‘effective control’ which underscore the possibility of a state being recognized as such by other states in the context of international law. This contradiction, presently, is being straddled by an accepted legal aporia that gives maximum leeway to state authorities and a minimum of respect and freedom to individuals that always already make up the being of such states. The systematization of political science as a field of scholarship dominated by consciousness of the state form as the essential element of politicality tragically reduces our awareness of these contingencies that influence the dialectical development of being-in-the-world. As we shall see this has implications for political \textit{praxis} as well as for the commission of scholarship under the aegis of progress as progress comes to be equated with the rationalization of the state, which, taken as permanent, is essentially irrational.\textsuperscript{42}
So our intervention is most timely. There is a war being fought around the world - William Robinson has termed this a “world war,” with casualties climbing into the hundreds of millions. In many ways there are many wars being fought in accordance with the struggle to liberate societies from the kind of ontological restriction that has become commonplace among nations competing in an international political system typified by competition over the resources that are conceived to be the source of all of modern life. As former colonial societies have come to be represented by nation-state institutions around the globe, people in these societies have begun clamoring for the goods of life long held by the people of the West as their daily privilege, and have begun to pressure their authorities in direct and indirect ways to provide those goods. And the extent to which new states can provide these goods, or alternatively use repressive means to control those segments of their populations that they cannot create a strong identification with through the panegyrics of nationalist pomp, they can survive for another day. But because the European states from where these technologies of order emerged and were refined through the mercantile and imperialist world order could only do so through the massive exploitation of the colonial world, replete with genocidal policies, the new states seeking to do much the same must either turn their domestic space into internal labor colonies - as China has done.
with what is called great success - or turn their energies outward toward instability-creating military adventurism.\textsuperscript{44} Indeed, the incompleteness of these states reveals the irrelevancy of the inside-outside dichotomy undergirding the idea of the nation-state bounded by a territorial frontier; as many examples can be found of states waging ‘internal wars’ to complete their territorial claims as can be found of states attacking others beyond their borders for similar reasons.\textsuperscript{45}

The production the the subject, the citizen, the national individual belonging to the haloed community of destiny associated with the nation-state requires defining those to be excluded and requires the internalized self-discipline of the citizen, as well, whose spontaneous capacities, as discussed initially above, have to be attenuated in favor of apprehending reality in line with this ideal. Michel Foucault has described this understanding of self-discipline as “governmentality,\textsuperscript{46}” which, when arranged at higher orders of the state for the purpose of the attempted rationalization of political economy is best understood by his definition of the term as “the conduct of conduct.\textsuperscript{47}” Freedom in the context of competing nation-states in an international political system characterized by the despair-driven mongering of the resources of life by collections of persons (\textit{polis}) over and against other
gatherings of persons, in a world lacking the ontological imagination driven by an openness to the question of being - why are there beings rather than nothing? - will come to require the discipline of conduct Foucault had in mind since in the absence of normalized (and normalizing), state-directed discipline, individuals and nations will be unable to trust that all are signed onto the same project of making-present those goods of life associated with the identity, ideally, with greater and greater levels of reliability.48

But people are always already living in a shared world, whose daily ‘worlding,’ the set of activities and interactions that make up the character of the world itself as denoted by an all-encompassing signifier for the verb that characterizes those activities, presumes a unified whole as a stabilizing projection of reality. So when freedom is transformed into governmentality, so that the reliable production of permanent artifices comes to be expected, and when the technologies used to harness the resources for these artifices and to provide security for their existence through distancing come to require the exploitation of the global environment at the expense of other nations, people begin to realize that they are depriving the rest of the world of the means of life. Fearing their own bad consciences, and desperately needing to convince themselves of their exceptionalism in order to justify their
behavior to themselves, for many persons discipline in the material and ideational realms of existence becomes necessary to avoid confrontation with Kweli’s claim about the fear of death: these people ‘ain’t livin’ right,’ and they know it. They could have been much more, they could have created intimate relationships with the Other, shared cultural technologies, refined these processes in a global and civilizational dialogue aimed at the creation of a loving, shared, global community. Falsified as permanence, freedom must come at the expense of the Other, and, eventually, of the Self, since by denying the experience of otherness at the center of the experience of selfhood, one which is always accessible to the undisciplined, empathic consciousness, bodily possibilities contained within the mind-body nexus, within the physiology of human existence, are dashed.

Societies based on this kind of jealous and private notion of experience, one which cringes at the possibility of experiences anew in order to retain an hypnotized everydayness to ward against the experience of the Other, must, we shall see, come to conceive of inter-societal, international, and global relations between groups as an amalgamation - be this democratic, representational, monarchic, etc. - of authoritarian impulses deemed necessary to render sovereign decision to divide the ontological totality to preclude the Other from
appearing on the Other’s own terms. Various political technologies can be deployed to this effect, ranging from military force to prejudicial tolerance so long as the Other’s appearance remains relatively unthreatening to oneself.

Alexander Wendt, has offered a moderate corrective to the development of the study of world politics by claiming, importantly, that ‘anarchy is what states make of it,’ as opposed to a natural situation in which nation-states taken as natural human orderings in relation to territory and population act in ways that correspond to a universal rationality.\textsuperscript{49} This latter position has been commonplace in political science, and has a historical tradition associated with it reaching back into a European historical imaginary that emphasizes the capacity of persons to pursue an idealized notion of individual moral security connected to security for the community,\textsuperscript{50} and connects these in turn to the ideal ordering of the state, in order to ameliorate the ambiguity of the human experience resulting from the rapacity in human nature and the absence of moral conventions of serious meaning or that are owed any consideration in determining individual action without the power of fear being concentrated in a regularized authoritarian capacity ensconced in the state institution.\textsuperscript{51} Reactions to ambiguity defined by fear are not the only reaction
possible, although once fear begins spreading, once fear is held up as the human experience itself in the absence of order, a path dependent logic begins to operate which greatly pressurizes subsequent reactions to be carried on in a similar manner.\textsuperscript{52}

In the early ‘Cold War’ period, scientists and mathematicians at the RAND corporation, a US military think tank in Santa Monica, California, formalized much of this logic concerning fear of the Other being an inescapable reality in the mathematical models that have come to together make up what is now called “Game Theory.\textsuperscript{53}” The most significant game - “the Prisoner’s Dilemma” - is where two players find themselves in a situation of mutual distrust in relation to the potential benefits of cooperating with authorities who have imprisoned them, or with each other. According to the assumptions of the game, both players’ least worst option is to always snitch on one another, reneging on any agreement they may have to remain silent in the face of authorities who require one or the other to relate to them the needed information to convict either of them of the crime in question for which they are in prison and awaiting trial. This is because being physically separated, neither has the ability to reliably reinforce any possible agreement upon mutual silence, making cooperation with prison authorities most likely to be their best route.
But this leaves both sides confessing to a crime, producing the worst possible outcome and giving authorities information to convict both prisoners of the crime. This is likened to not only the situation all individuals face, such as in Hobbes’ theory where individuals surrender their political self-determination to authority since self-determination for both interlocutors in a discreet interaction is considered to be politically potentially destabilizing. Classically, that has been the view considered ‘realism’ by the prevailing orthodoxies of political science and statecraft. But, atop that, in neorealist theory, where a dehistoricized and depoliticized Hobbesianism is applied onto nation-states who are presumed to be “unitary” and “rational.” This produces the outcome that all states will, and indeed, should, arm themselves in preparation for armed conflict with one another since cooperation in the end is generally impossible unless inequality between nations permits powerful states to offer protection to smaller ones under certain circumstances.

Escaping the “war of all against all” - what international relations theorists term “the security dilemma” - within the state thus required internal discipline of populations whose plurality thence necessitated instrumental reduction. Outside of the state’s borders, thus, the best that could be hoped for would be a cold peace. Indeed, between the US
and the former Soviet Union such a state of affairs persisted, with both conducting witch hunts for communists (in the US) and counterrevolutionaries (in the Soviet Union), and adopting an aggressive, nuclear-armed posture relative to one another, to ensure a peace based on the threat of destruction. The same logic still applies. The RAND corporation’s development of game theory eventually came to underly assumptions that formed the basis of the development of economics, econometrics-evaluations of social policy, and eventually a lot of the disciplines in the social sciences. What was first a cautious, if paranoid, assumption in Hobbes’ work to err on the side of security, and what was similarly deployed as a reason in Hans Morgenthau’s theory of world politics to pay heed to the disastrous and tragic effects of the human ego when its unbridled expression of lust of power is given vent thereby abolishing trust and common morality in human affairs, has now been systematized by neorealists and game theorists alike as a scientific theory that describes human behavior as being always driven by zealous guarding of the self (and the state - the collective ego projection of selves seeking self-ness with a degree of surety exceptional when considered in relation to selves generally) understood as essentially-defined by nature as unitary, which thus came to underpin the US’ claim to better safeguard human nature during the ‘Cold War’ against the essentially (that is,
essentialized) socialist and collectivist Soviets whose attempts to create an alternative basis for cooperation would always end up in totalitarian control and the abolition of freedom for the individual.\textsuperscript{59}

Quite curiously, then, freedom for the individual seems to require (1) conformity to the parameters and behaviors of the national identity, in order to enable the appropriate signaling of presence through standardized language to their fellow citizen such that they could be trusted as an extension of the self (necessitating thus the domestication and/or the obliteration of the Other within the self for individuals and for societies), creating very, very narrow, if any, space for individual freedom,\textsuperscript{60} and, (2) a posture of permanent hostility in relation to all persons outside the social boundary. This second point is essential because in the absence of this hostility the first point, concerning the conformity of signification, is undermined, leaving the individual potentially designable as the domestic enemy\textsuperscript{61} - a determination made by sovereign power that must use dissent as a negative example of the consequences of non-conformity to teach a lesson to those under the sway of state regarding what lies in wait for them - since the lack of clear demarcations articulated to the territory of the state, which in powerful states corresponds to the rationalization of many of their major interests in a regime of property (or propriety), will result in the
entirely contingently-defined transformation of the population within
into the *prima causa*, the locus, from which *evil* becomes.\textsuperscript{62} This
analysis suggests that in addition to being opposed to non-conformity,
this sovereign arrangement must also disempower the people with
relatively more or less intensity depending on the circumstances of
threat it imagines it faces, casting democratic government, even its
possibility, by the wayside.

In its aftermath, the logic of the ‘Cold War’ - which saw the
undemocratic institutionalization of the national security, ‘deep state,’
has since mutated through the continuation of the vested military-
industrial interests that are at the core of the American state’s
sovereign exceptionalism into the so-called ‘War on Terror\textsuperscript{63}.’ This
fearsome project, in an era of globalization, is rapidly reorganizing the
territorial basis of politics, and, as such has brought the ‘logic’ of
‘mutually assured destruction,’’ refined in the ‘Cold War,’ to
individuals, whose declaration of dissent and freedom, whose casting
the Other as ‘terrorists,’ and, whose fight for the remaining spoils of
the pre-globalized, nation-state system of identity politics, invites mass
destruction to be unleashed at local, regional/middle-level (i.e. - the
war in the Congo), and global stages of conflict, spelling catastrophe
for human civilization and beyond.
Herfried Münkler, a German political theorist, has argued that violence in the name of civilization, despite the inherent dangers of the process, is an unimpeachable necessity, because in the absence of imperial order, the costs associated with what he calls the “barbarism” at the edge of empire will endanger all of civilization, and so he makes the case that American power ought to augmented by a new European defense capacity under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a revamped and robust European Union military capacity under the leadership of so-called responsible powers like Germany, the United Kingdom and France. The costs of this, which we can only fathom he ignores because he thinks non-European (non-white, that is) lives are simply of less importance than those of Europeans, since his work more or less omits any consideration of the effects of imperial hyper violence on those who are its victims, he deems necessary and even salutary for human civilization.

This conservative resignation, from which freedom fails to find its expression because of its particular intensity and the behaviorally/culturally-conditioned lack of imagination in place from the imperatives of power politics, reveals the limits of understanding identity as something that can be made objectively present, and
presents us with a lacuna in Heidegger’s thought concerning that ever-controversial claim of his philosophies concerning the question of the *authenticity* of being-in-the-world.66

It is our position that only a plural identity, always already changing, influenced by the pregnant possibilities of *physis*, can ever be authentic, since, as Heidegger himself says, the “being of *dasein* is essentially care.”67

This inquiry will proceed in two divisions. In division one we will examine the major political philosophies of freedom in the modern West and see how these have come to be understood not as spontaneity and the ability to be available for the situation of existence, and thus to be truly free in the mind, body, and soul, but have instead come to be understood as a specie of what Foucault termed “governmentality.”68 From the discipline of colonial subjects in the colonies to the discipline of the working-class majorities in the imperial societies, governmentality has offered some among the global majority the chance to be powerful, and to rise to the level of elite status, but the ability to project power as domination, the goal of elites, is not the
same as freedom and requires the orchestration of human life in line with complex, and most often repressive technologies that have the effect of gathering people together in collectives based on resentment and despair in order to better dispose their pre-ontological being to being available harnessing by power politics. And while there are revolutionary impulses to overcome this and reclaim freedom understood authentically around the world today, it is important to pierce the armor of the ideological apparatus of the American-dominated, so-called ‘free world’ to reveal that another, more robust, more enjoyable, more loving freedom, is sought after, and is in fact more than possible. As Arundhati Roy has put it

“Another world is not only possible, she is on her way. On a quiet day, I can hear her breathing.”

In division two our inquiry will proceed to consider the way in which the prevailing, impoverished notion of freedom has come to dominate our thinking about foreign affairs and international relations in an era of globalization. Here we will examine how American exceptionalism - premised ideologically on an officially-stated public liberalism but factually-premised on actual realpolitik flowing from the same ontological root - has produced an ideological discourse of order
masquerading as scientific, and how this has led to states in the international system taking on pressures associated with the security dilemma as understood in the context of American imperatives for dominance, but which have had, as well, a significant prescriptive effect on the behavior of states, ‘sub-state’ groups, and, increasingly in a globalized era, individuals, who, in relation to the arguments in chapter one, have begun to willingly trade freedom for the chimera of security in the context of the ‘War on Terror.’

*This idea, of a ‘War on Terror,’ it will be argued, is in fact a war against freedom,* both for individuals who will feel the pressure to conform in order to not be labelled ‘terrorists’ and thus jeopardize their own security, and states, which if they are reconfigured for providing a framework for the existential idea of freedom, run the risk of running afoul of the global imperial concept. This global imperial concept, born in the modern West, now has come to rely on local proxies, whose identification with local sources of identity notwithstanding, are essentially Western insofar as they agree to the terms of making present their identity on the technological assumptions about the *polis* present long ago in Western history but for which alternative conceptions abound in other ontological traditions found globally; these being essentially hierarchical notions of natural right whose
rightful place in the garbage dump of stupid ideas that, but which are given life anew through the permanence-seeking distortion of being resultant from the naturalization of (political) artifice whose aim is nothing more than the re-legitimization of class rule in an essentially democratic era. As Zizek has put it in a critique of American politics after 9.11, which we can apply writ large to the global scene fundamentally-conditioned by American cultural power, the new political intervention that sees the globalization of networked power of states to prosecute counter-terror and counter-insurgency strategies and tactics is primarily aimed at “disciplining emancipatory excesses” that inhere in the contemporary global occasion after many decades of socio-cultural liberalization that typify the post-1968 global shift.

The purpose of all this effort is to take a stand in favor of freedom, and to propose a political theory of how to relearn, and defend this freedom from the adherents of permanence, whose reign of terror can only end in the destruction of the human race.
“Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another, the attaining of the former being still but the way to the latter. The cause whereof is that the object of man’s desire is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time, but to assure forever the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions and inclinations of all men tend, not only to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life, and differ only in the way; which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions in divers men, and partly from the difference of the knowledge or opinion each has of the causes which produce the effect desired.” (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, I, XI)

“I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual a restless desire for power after power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for more intensive delight than he has already attained to, or that he cannot be content with moderate power, but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.” (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, I, XI)

“The fascist answer to the recognition of reality is the rejection of the postulate of freedom.” (Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, Page 268)

“The Discovery of society is thus either the end or the rebirth of freedom. While the fascist resigns himself to relinquishing freedom and glorifies power which is the reality of society, the socialist resigns himself to that reality and upholds the claim to freedom, in spite of it. Man becomes mature and able to exist as a human being in a complex society.” (Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, Page 268)

“Resignation was ever the fount of man’s strength and new hope. Man accepted the
reality of death and built the meaning of his bodily life upon it. He resigned himself to the truth that he had a soul to lose and that there was worse than death, and founded his freedom upon it. He resigns himself, in our time, to the reality of society which means the end of that freedom. But, again, life springs from ultimate resignation. Uncomplaining acceptance of the reality of society gives man indomitable courage and strength to remove all removable injustice and unfreedom. As long as he is true to his task of creating a more abundant freedom for all, he need not fear that either power or planning will turn against him and destroy the freedom he is building by their instrumentality. This is the meaning of freedom in a complex society; it gives us all the certainty we need.” (Polanyi, The Great Transformation, Page 268, emphasis added)

“Should we shout? Should we scream? What happened To the Post-war Dream?”

(Roger Waters, ‘Requiem for the Post-war Dream,’ from Pink Floyd’s The Final Cut)

I. The National Security State as a response to the Postwar Dream: Paranoia, otherness, and The Construction of Threats

In the closing years of the second world war, when Karl Polanyi penned the above words, there was much hope that a new kind of world order would replace the one that came prior. A world of democracies, economic development, and liberal freedoms for individuals was envisioned by thinkers, leaders, and people around the
world from east to west, north to south. Those who still held to the contradictions to this vision from the among residuals depths of reactionary forces of racist colonial empire felt their days numbered as decolonization movements swept, on the fuel of the postwar dream, through the former colonial states, giving birth to more than a hundred new nation-states formed nominally in the name of the freedom of their people, now able to live in self-determined nations. Facing up to the resulting complexity arising from the multitude of relationships now to be carried forth on a free and equal basis through institutions like state sovereignty - institutionalized in international organizations like the United Nations Organization - required a new maturity of human beings and societies they comprised, was this new found arrangement to be a success. The Non-Aligned Movement, 3rd World Internationalism, and new political theories from the emerging societies nonetheless resolutely proffered the “postulate of freedom” as Polanyi put it. Emerging from racism, exploitation, and subjugation through generalized violence, the new nations expressed the desire to face up to the new world, and to begin the arduous process of reason-led, trial-and-error-learning-based, reconstruction of a civilization laid to ashes by modern technology deployed to much destructive effect in the final days of empires clinging to their domains and in their battles
against one another in the world war. Manu Bhagavan, quoting India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, points towards the mass sentiments that Nehru himself was an elite crystallization of: the desire to escape from poverty and despotism that animated the moral force of what Bhagavan has termed evocatively, “the Nehruvian International”:

“The interdependence of world problems means the interdependence of various parts of the world on each other .... And so we advance necessarily to the realization of a world order and a world government .... India will help in this process to the best of her ability. Our nationalism has always been based on this conception of world order and international cooperation.

This statement followed from interest amongst World Federalists in Nehru, in part stemming from a speech he delivered on 3 April 1948:

We talk of world government and one world and millions yearn for this ....I have no doubt in my mind that world government must and will come, for there is no other remedy for the world’s sickness. The machinery for it is not difficult to devise. It can be an extension of the federal principle, a growth of the idea underlying the United Nations, giving each national unit freedom to fashion its destiny according to its genius, but subject always to the basic covenant of world government.”

From Central and South America - two places largely untouched by actual fighting in relative terms by the war but long treated as colonies
by the United States - to the rest of the emerging world in Africa and Asia, to the marginalized worlds of minorities and historically-oppressed groups in the Western world, the desire to seize the moment after the war was decisive for the spirit of the age. The desire for a “new man” was best put by Frantz Fanon, an international man of the 3rd world, of Black Liberation, and anti-colonial struggle. Writing in his masterful tome, *The Wretched of the Earth*, he offered a searing indictment of the modern history of European power politics, racism, imperialism, and nationalist tyrannies over European workers, coupled with a desire to look forward and construct a new world:

“[What matters now]…. Is the very basic question of not dragging man in directions which mutilate him, of not imposing on his brain tempos that rapidly obliterate and unhinge it. The notion of catching up must not be used as a pretext to brutalize man, to tear him from himself and his inner consciousness, to break him, to kill him. No, we do not want to catch up with anyone. But what we want is to walk in the company of man, every man, night and day, for all times. It is not a question of stringing the caravan out where groups are spaced so far apart they cannot see the one in front, and men who no longer recognize each other, meet less and less and talk to each other less and less. The Third World must start over a new history of man which takes account of not only the occasional prodigious theses maintained by Europe but also its crimes, the heinous of which have been committed at the very heart of man, the pathological dismembering of his functions and the erosion of his unity, and in the context of the community, the fracture, the stratification and the bloody tensions fed by class, and finally, on the immense scale of humanity, the
racial hatred, slavery, exploitation and, above all, the bloodless genocide whereby one and a half billion men have been written off. So comrades, let us not pay tribute to Europe by creating states, institutions, and societies that draw their inspiration from it. Humanity expects other things from us than this grotesque and generally obscene emulation. If we want to transform Africa into a new Europe, America into a new Europe, then let us entrust the destinies of our countries to the Europeans. They will do a better job than the best of us. But if we want humanity to take one step forward, if we want to take it to another level than the one where Europe has placed it, then we must innovate, we must be pioneers. If we want to respond to the expectations of our peoples, we must look elsewhere besides Europe. Moreover, if we want to respond to the expectations of the Europeans we must not send them back a reflection, however ideal, of their society and their thought that periodically sickens even them.

For Europe, for ourselves and for humanity, comrades, we must make a new start, develop a new way of thinking, and endeavor to create a new man.74

This new freedom was not exclusively for those who had been on the receiving end of colonial and imperial violence and humiliation, but more radically than even that - which was certainly radical in terms of the world structure that prevailed at that time, after all it sought to completely alter the status quo in the colonized world75 - Fanon’s theories were also aimed squarely at residual and former colonial masters within the colony’s local European quarter, and back in their safe European homes.76 Fanon argued that European societies had been made sick by the disease of automatic privilege associated with race or
class membership, and indeed pointed out that in the European states the working classes had long been detested, relegated to a position of a lower order of humanity akin to a subhuman race, and exploited with little to no concern for their welfare.77 Elites presented as a salve for these bleeding wounds the possibility of identification with the nation, even granting the masses a role in the production of the nation, the right to access the wealth of the elite and the freedom imagined enjoyable once individual success was attained because of the rational personal conduct that supposedly brought this about, and social stability only presumed possible through the coercive bonds of the nation-state with a monopoly on the legal use of violence deemed the necessary repertoire of modern and modernizing ordered freedom.78 Surrendering their own individual capacity to formulate political thoughts in a spontaneous and idiosyncratic manner informed by a healthy self-expression driven by a close relationship between mind and body, and with immanent, non-alienated relations in the community populated by thinking, free, solicitous, and capacious beings, Fanon argues, the people of the Western nations who consent to the governing order’s terms of domestic peace internalize a specie of the same violence that nations in the colonies had waged life-or-death struggles to resist. Once again, in The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon writes:
“...the European spirit is built on strange foundations. The whole of European thought developed in places that were increasingly arid and increasingly inaccessible. Consequently, it was natural that the chances of encountering man became less and less frequent. A permanent dialogue with itself, an increasingly obnoxious narcissism inevitably paved the way for a virtual delirium where intellectual thought turns into agony since the reality of man as a living, working, self-made being is replaced by words, an assemblage of words and the tensions generated by their meanings. There were Europeans, however, who urged workers to smash this narcissism and break with this denial of reality. Generally speaking, European workers did not respond to the call. The fact was that the workers believed they too were part of the prodigious adventure of the European spirit. All the elements for a solution to the major problems of humanity existed at one time or another in European thought. But the Europeans did not act on the mission that was designated them and which consisted of virulently pondering these elements, modifying their configuration, their being, of changing them and finally taking the problem of man to an infinitely higher plane. Today we are witnessing the stasis of Europe. Comrades, let us flee this stagnation where dialectics has gradually turned into a logic of the status quo. Let us reexamine the question of man. Let us reexamine the question of cerebral reality, the brain mass of humanity in its entirety whose affinities must be increased, whose connections must be diversified and whose communications must be humanized again.79

Having become less and less aware of their surroundings, because commanded as such by elitist political thought for many centuries, enough European persons - call them the nascent middle classes - let their rulers do the real thinking for them, and thus restricted through
various means their own thinking to that which could be made present through the internalization of what rulers have deemed to be at various times the key signifiers of the realness of reality. With very few exceptions, the history of mainstream European philosophies and political thought have forever been cursed as a result, and alienation - even if potentially overcome from time to time in philosophical heroism - came to be the relation of most European nations and their citizens to their surroundings; surroundings which, of course, never ceased to be the wellspring of life itself.

David Campbell has argued that in the midst of the uncertainty created by the rise of post-Christian ideas about political order associated with Thomas Hobbes, on the one hand, and Rene Descartes, on the other, the state’s managers - an increasingly institutionalized and organized technique of gathering people and populations together and near one another in order to control the processes of social reproduction - had to deploy the idea of a negative foundation for their state’s existence and to guarantee loyalty of the people as the source of its existential security, and did so by circulating “discourses of danger” about the world beyond the local community and the unseen in each person beyond that which was seen and apparently evident in everyday social intercourse. Certainly states existed in other places beyond the
boundaries of Europe, but in China, India, Africa, and pre-European-settlement Americas, these states were usually typified by various positive ideals of togetherness that bound people together ranging from worship of the ruler and/or king/queen, worship and veneration rituals of ancestors accorded a high level of consistency through various institutions that oversaw those rituals, and even in some cases, forms of what we call political liberalism today, with an emphasis on the human capacity for freedom and creativity, and the moral charge to tolerate differences along with the practical and positive benefits such tolerance had for social order and collective life. In this project, however, our position is that these systems, while important to retrieve in ways this project endorses since our aim is to retrieve freedom as the most essential human value, are nonetheless temporarily eclipsed in their world-historical significance for now as a result of contingent developments in the last several hundreds of years that have displaced their purchase on the organization of life in the polis by ideas that were fundamentally developed in the course of what is casually referred to as ‘western modernity.’ This is why Fanon’s words on the matter are so impassioned - and important - but that at the same time his is a tone of hopeful desperation since alternatives that the past he imagines must have held for him have been alienated from him and everyone else by processes of deracination and the objectification of beings by the logic
of a scientific *praxis* seeking to explain everything, and then reduce the everything to be ready-at-hand. He and many others, then and now, remain desperate for new ideas about how people will live together in this world we are fated to share.

To begin addressing the question that will dominate this division - What is Freedom? - we will have to situate ourselves in relation to the dominance of ideas that have become globalized through the multivariate historical agency of European imperialism, first, and thence were intensified in their long-term significance by means of the residual relations first created in that era, and thence normalized as the real through systematic simplifications of human existence made possible through concealment of dialectical reality in favor of metaphysical essentialism. The taking for freedom as the ability to produce a permanent state of being free of impediments, or free of any potential negative moral or ethical judgment by others, has given rise to a foreign policy in the United States of America, buttressed by the scholarly inquiry into the political science of international relations, that seeks to produce the permanent arrangement of the world’s resources, and persons, as much as possible, in a manner that comports with the socially-constructed expectations of the American people. This is not to say that the political class in America is directly
accountable to their governed, but rather, taking into account the governed’s expectations, the perception of these are being met such that the terms of political rule are not challenged is an inherently fuzzy notion that involves the complex manipulation of symbols associated with American statecraft; the empirical record that shows that the elites’ need to sell a version of freedom to the American people as the outcome of American foreign policy has been, and remains, essential to the political class’ being able to operate in the manner they so choose to serve their own interests in the absence of critical inquiry and movement. We would also add that despite the socially-constructed and contingent nature of these expectations there are specific factors that conceal this contingency and add a great deal of epistemic inertia precluding changes in cognitive ability: (1) a political project with roots deep in western history and whose American incarnation have been long invested in understanding the world metaphysically, (2) a global political environment in which producing goods for consumption associated with metaphysically-defined freedom has a strong role in creating the impression of the presence of legitimate authority, (3) contingent structures of identity for individuals and groups understood as timeless and essential, and (4) the connection of all of these epistemic bastions of the status quo for selves, social groups, and nations to the unavoidability of suffering,
and the absence of a means to integrate and overcome pain in prevailing metaphysical vocabularies.\textsuperscript{87}

Our initial focus will be the historical origins of the ideas associated with freedom that gave rise to what will be seen as a two-fold foreign policy paradigm that sets as a goals, first, that the domestic sphere is secured by demarcating the spatiality of the Other, and second, the concealment of the enablement of organized violence against foreigners through various methodologies capable of neutralizing spontaneous thinking about the facticity of such actions. This argument is inextricably linked to the way in which the Self, understood as the individual and the essential idea of national community they purport to belong to, relates to the Other, in the various ways the Self conceives of the Other, ranging from the internally-differentiated minority and non-conformist in this negatively-grounded democratic age secured by majoritarian sanction, to those external others belonging to other nations and ostensibly therefore deemed potentially, or actually, a threat to the Self. In \textit{Writing Security} Campbell shows that in the course of the development of the very idea of statecraft as we have come to see it practiced and understood in the current era, the institutionalization within the sovereign authority the ability to decide on what constituted the domestic and the foreign was essential in the
process of defining the kind of person who would be understood to be a citizen of the state, and that the very idea of foreign policy, usually thought of as a bridge between one essential and pre-constituted realm and another such realm was more primordially tied up with the process of drawing the boundaries of acceptable behavior within a domestic polity than it was a rational calculation of policy, externally-oriented. The consequence of this was the marking off of identities as examples of the looming presence of the Other who was the origin of threats to acceptable domestic identification practices on the part of individuals governed by the state. Over time the normalization of these practices achieved through hegemony of material and ideological configurations which reinforced the status quo has concealed this essential contingency of both identity and the practice and legitimacy of what is called foreign policy. Campbell writes successful performances of foreign policy require the functionality of a “double exclusion” “in which internal threats made possible external dangers and external dangers controlled internal threats,” which therefore reinforce one another as the sources of security and insecurity, through which the state comes to be seen as legitimate.

To these points we can add Noam Chomsky’s observation by way of Walter Lippman that the media engines of the American state have
achieved to a significant degree the “manufacturing of consent” through the (1) manipulations of the symbology of danger and threat construction through the use of language playing on historic tropes of danger and enemies lurking beyond, and (2) the subsequent surrender of common peoples’ decision-making and reasoning, and ultimately even their desire to reason, regrading the crafting of foreign policies, to elites who are systematically presented as experts to whom deference ought to be paid:

“government, to be successful in its foreign and domestic policies alike, must comply with three basic requirements. It must recognize that the conflict between the requirements of good foreign policy and the preferences of public opinion is in the nature of things and, hence, unavoidable, […] the government must realize that it is the leader and not the slave of public opinion… a dynamic, ever changing entity to be continuously created and recreated by informed and responsible leadership, […] it must distinguish between what is desirable in its foreign policy and what is essential, and while it may be willing to compromise with public opinion on nonessentials, it must fight, even at the risk of its own fortunes, for what it regards to be the irreducible minimum of good foreign policy."

But the happy dream of being safeguarded and protected within the domestic space of the nation, and of each nation’s being globally-protected within its own space relative to other nations by the guarantee of the global hegemon - the United States of America in the
post world war two period - has to come to an end for the American people and for many of America’s allies who, out of ideological alignment or convenience, aligned themselves with American power now some sixty and more years ago.\textsuperscript{94} Campbell points out that in addition to the political and economic ramifications of imperial decline and the eclipsing of the Westphalian system of nation-states, that in the new globalization system - whose results are ongoing - we are witnessing an “irruption of contingencies”\textsuperscript{95} wherein what was previously thought essential is now becoming contingent on a planetary scale. This brings into question the old order of political being-in-the-world unconcealing “discourses about prior, primary, and stable identities”\textsuperscript{96} that are its constituents, which can thence be observed in their contingent reproductivity. States and nations are \textit{contingent} products that aim to produce something like \textit{essence} and \textit{permanence}.

Researchers and analysts have also pointed out in various ways the “internationalization of the state,”\textsuperscript{97} the rise of the “transnational state apparatus” and the “transnational capitalist class,”\textsuperscript{98} and the new migrations of nations and peoples around the world en masse in search of stable and relatively more desirable livelihoods as productive processes are altered by those in control of them in the service of
Globalized expectations for order have been challenged at borders, within stratified global cities, and in that linchpin of global order in the post world war two era, the nation-state itself. So-called ‘failed-states,’ often those cobbled together on the basis of arbitrary imperial impositions of order and political economy based on existing extractive economies, and with little regard for bioregional and ecological exigencies reflective of the contingency of the prevailing terms of order - nothing more than the imposition of metaphysical ideas of order onto an essentially changing and usually chaotic human social reality - because of the economic, ecological, and political crises they now face, have been forced to resort to the use of force to maintain the power relations which make them up in recent years. And where they have been unable to do so, their rulers have been able to either compel powerful states in the system through varied subterfuge to provide them assistance in their pursuit of goals the powerful states’ rulers associate with overall systemic stability, and that the leaders of middle and lower-level powers make certain to present as such. When these states are unable to reproduce the terms of global political and economic order in accordance with the wishes of the more powerful states, and especially those of the United States in recent times, a powerful incentive to intervene is felt by the global powers in whichever way necessary, ranging from military
intervention in the traditional sense - with technological adaptations employed as needed and as they become available from military research complexes the world over - to various diplomatic and political-economic strategies including sanctions, embargoes, coercive negotiations, etc.\textsuperscript{104}

In recent times, an emblematic, and relatively low-cost tool of intervention has been the unmanned aerial vehicle, or drone, by means of which the US military has developed a global strike capacity that allows them to adjust their desired levels of carnage with some precision\textsuperscript{105}, and to avoid casualties that have been the hallmark sacrifice of great wars conducted by great powers historically.\textsuperscript{106} Until very recently, Americans, however, have remained happily ignorant of the reality of this new and terrible form of warfare, misdirected by the obfuscations of national security. This loaded phrase - national security - far from being an objective signifier of the security of one’s domestic community and space, in fact, in its acceptance in the nomenclature of normal news talk, indicates in its increasing circulation - along with the christening of “homeland security”\textsuperscript{107} following the attacks of 9.11.2001 - rather than safety and security, the exposure of Americans to the intense insecurity of the globalization system; insecurities in a previous era visited upon others, which most Americans - like
Europeans before them in regard to the depravity of imperialism - had remained happily ignorant of the reality of.

Recent political developments in the heart of the empire, however, have forced Americans from the margins to the mainstream to begin questioning not only the doctrine of national security, in place since the start of the ‘Cold War’ and now ubiquitous in the punditocracy of cable television news following the onset of the terror wars, but also the police powers in American cities that have been massively expanded as a result of the ‘scientific’ study of security procedures enabled by the panoptic epistemology-generated data set on domestic behavior and activities intensified with new fears after the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11th, 2001. From the killing of family dogs, to the institutionalized groping of the genitals of air travelers, the absurd, sycophantic, stupidity required of Americans is causing many to recoil in shock. But if public opinion polls are to be believed, still a majority of Americans feel as though these practices are necessary in the name of their security, which, as we have just mentioned above, is now joined at the hip the the abstract idea of national security. This all despite the fact that the history of American wars overseas has already evidenced the integration of
surveillance and population management strategies abroad back in America following war efforts.\textsuperscript{112}

Alfred McCoy has documented just such a transpiring in the context of the war against the Philippines that culminated in American control of that nation as a direct colony for a half a century at the outset of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{113} Surveillance techniques involving the use of informants and the spreading of disinformation, torture tactics used to produce additional information about resistance fighters eluding capture in order to neutralize them, techniques of imprisonment to achieve the same were all brought to back to America from that war (as was President Taft, too, who prior to being President presided over an American colonial occupation)\textsuperscript{114}; then it was water-boarding and the use of a real-life prisoner’s dilemma to crack loyalties, now it’s the introduction of surveillance drones, massive “strategic interception”\textsuperscript{115} of all digital communications to be data-mined to establish patterns of behavior and interconnection for analysis,\textsuperscript{116} and the introduction of extra-legal, situational lawlessness as needed by reference to national security exigencies when deemed necessary by the federal government, local governments, and their exceptional combinatory collaborations, making a mockery of, and even subverting for the
purposes of the state the very idea of liberal government built with checks and balances to prevent the accumulation of tyrannical power. Indeed, as Corey Robin points out, multi-layered government now seems more likely to greatly magnify the scope of political repression, rather than secure us in the knowledge that checks and balances could work as some think they were intended to.

The development of the security state as a conceptual idealization of the functioning of the state has roots in other western nations besides America. Fanon, in *A Dying Colonialism*, writing on the culture of the colonial city of Algiers in French-ruled Algeria in the twilight of empire, reported that as the need to provide security to the European quarter of the city become more pronounced as the independence struggle and urban guerrilla combat intensified, eventually many French themselves, ranging from collaborators with the Algerians to sympathizers on the one hand, to those more driven by personal concerns such as smuggling into the colony their cache of illegal drugs or bootlegged alcohol, to even the innocent non-collaborating and law-abiding Frenchman, came under the scrutiny of security systems run by the occupying regime’s security forces and police. The paranoia unleashed by the use of disguise, the subversion of traditional gender roles in the Algerian community by women revolutionaries, the
increasing humanitarian sentiment among French Algerians - prominently including Jewish colonists who made cultural contacts with Jewish Algerians - local Arabs - during the Vichy period which immediately preceded the decisive phase of the Algerian struggle in the aftermath of the second world war, the increasing effectiveness of Algerian revolutionaries in planting bombs undetected by security forces, the use of the French language - long the language of the occupation in which the common use of words themselves came to be understood as a statement of French superiority and Algerian and Muslim inferiority - by the partisans of freedom as the new Voice of Algeria radio, and the overall porousness of the complex security apparatus with its multiplying points of contact and enforcement requirements across the colony, combined to radically-undermine the French forces’ own belief in the tenability of their colonial project.\textsuperscript{120}

For a while, though, due to their possession of great technological powers of destruction - air raids, commando operations, and the systematic use of torture to punish Algerians, spread mistrust and fear among their ranks, and gather information on how to locate and kill or capture their cadre in hiding and on the run - the French were able to temporarily overcome the impending futility, and the psychological effects of that futility on their will to remain in Algeria.\textsuperscript{121}
But in so choosing this path to reinforce their belief in the goodness of France, and the civilizing mission they purported to be carrying out, the French who supported the odious tactics clearly contradicted their own supposed moral values regarding their civilized and liberal self-conception, revealing in their stead the practical and behavioral effects resultant from a series of pragmatic compromises that began in France during the destruction of the old regime and its replacement with the order of equality based on utopian visions of the revolutionary era.  

Unable to achieve the kind of “general will” that those political and epistemological philosophies presumed to be possible because of the ontology of humanity at their core, increasingly France’s imperial project, throughout their broadly-dispersed domains of influence, would come to rely on the indiscriminate use of terrorist violence to prove the rationality of France’s self-proclaimed universal values.  

From Haiti to Algeria to Indochina, French philosophers, politicians, political activists, businessmen, and scientists sought to prove the universality of French values - their permanence, that is - by both the sword and by the written word of their language. But when these projects failed, as they all inevitably did, the resort to violence to force the recalcitrants of order to ‘be free,’ to confirm the universality of Enlightenment concepts of progress, knowledge, order, and most importantly, what constituted a free being, was commenced.
This fundamentalist and absolutist adventurism can assist us in understanding the fanaticism and extreme violence of the American neo-imperial project in Iraq, and, if we follow Fanon’s analysis of the capitulation of the French left in the face of nationalist exhortation to remain loyal to the empire (who much as the American left now, reacted with fear and trembling towards being tarred as disloyal)\textsuperscript{125}, and, now, increasingly also explains analogous circumstances within America’s “homeland,\textsuperscript{126}” now unfolding in America, with the tactics of the terror wars being imported back into America to discover those individuals and groups deemed enemies of the state.\textsuperscript{127} In reality, however, the only major domestic threat America faces comes not from those deemed enemies or their potential sympathizers in the ‘war on terror,’ but, according the US government’s own information, from white supremacist groups, Christian fundamentalists who have transformed the religion of Jesus Christ into an armed doctrine of cleansing and purity,\textsuperscript{128} and various nativist and neonazi organizations whose ranks are increasingly recruited from soldiers returning from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.\textsuperscript{129} This is no small concern in a nation that still to this day consists of a fairly large proportion of people who blame liberals and peace activists for the “loss of Vietnam.\textsuperscript{130}” But following rancorous objections from several politicians belonging to
the Republican party the sheepish Democratically-controlled
Department of ‘Homeland’ Security withdrew the report containing
this invaluable information and have certainly not engaged in any sort
of public relations and information/education campaigns to raise
consciousness among Americans in general about this potential
threat.\footnote{The consequences have already been disastrous.} 

But this disaster goes beyond the murder and horrific violence and
discrimination visited upon Arab, South Asian, Muslim, African
Muslim, African, Latino, and various Americans of non-European
ancestry. The fear that has gripped America following the onset of the
new terror wars - which have no end in sight and seem to possess a
capacity for multiplication of conflict - has caused Americans,
including the majority of Americans from non-European backgrounds,
to acquiesce in the proliferation of a new security architecture as well
the sacralization of national security that has effectively transformed
the United States’ own domestic territory into a “battle-space\footnote{The enhanced
powers of authorities ranging from local law enforcement to
federal and military authorities have become increasingly accepted as
standard operating procedure. Indeed, as former Vice President Dick
Cheney chillingly put it, this is “the new normal.”} the

\footnote{And much like the belief in the mission of civilization associated with the French}
colonial project that led ordinary Frenchmen - and especially French elites and intellectuals - to identify with an essential French identity, the American idea of national security leads ordinary Americans to identify with an essentialized identity of America with an order-producing, freedom-expanding, positive conception of exceptionalism, which carries with it an concomitant negative conception: excluding all threats to the positive conception through the use of an unbridled will to power accentuated by technological violence deployed to negate difference and otherness understood as danger.135

II. Ways of Being, Permanence in the Liberal Tradition, and the Roots of Liberal Identity Politics

The illusion of permanence and access to a steady stream of both material and ideological advantages that strengthen the sway of illusion have together come to be understood as freedom. Nonetheless, the consequences of the deployment of political technologies are naturalized, and thus remain unrecognized by many of the apparent beneficiaries of those technologies. As such, a philosopher of freedom is confronted with a fundamental conundrum: how can we make
evident the process of *naturalization* of artificial political constructs that preclude an awareness of freedom inhering in existence, available to all persons in an entirely unique manner in accord with their *physis*, but awareness of which will be unattainable so long as their freedom remains yolked to the naturalized-artifice that compresses the spatiality of existential freedom with metaphysical identity politics?

division

For people generally, a more fundamental existential question emerges: What is Being? This question, *pregnant* with infinite answers, is essentially unanswerable in a final form, and this is proven empirically by any casual observation of human history. Even where answers have been given in ways that have been dominant over periods of time, those answers - expressed as the synthesis of differences into a form of life seen as *natural* to a group - have come and gone. From great empires to small tribal communities, forms of life come and go, and if they are more and more systematized - as in the case with the power politics of historical empires and great powers - all the while, they cannot admit to the internal differentiation, contingency, and the omnipresent chaos within.\textsuperscript{136}

In the introduction we considered the question of permanence and impermanence, and our analysis in this division is concerned with the
equation of freedom with permanence, and the way in which this notion - permanence - distorts empirical reality and obscures awareness at the level of ontology.137 This question, the wonderment that an awareness of it imposes on our consciousnesses, and the corresponding impossibility of providing a final answer - any answer in the final will be a negation of the real138 - is the key to our freedom as human beings. The provision of the goods of life - the object of the political philosophies of liberalism as that word has been bandied about in the Western canon - and securing these goods as individual property to give life to the individual in a manner considered secure has been the dominant theme in the tradition that has come to inform the now globally-hegemonic idea of freedom.139 The securing of property through the agency of rights would enable the individual to exercise self-ownership, free labor power ‘liberated’ from feudal constraint and responsive to what theorists again naturalized as the laws of supply and demand which would deliver market prices in the absence of artifice,140 thus facilitated their participation in the world of supply and demand from a ground on which for some time could be constructed systems of increasing efficiency, encompassing greater swathes of human societies, and, eventually, to produce a mobile, material and ideological capacity, for rationalization, and intensification of social and economic activity never possible in the
context of pre-market society.\textsuperscript{141}

On these registers - land ownership, the fairness of exchange values in the market for the produce of the land and labor, the freedom of the ability to sell one’s labor, and in addition, and the freedom of being free from obstacles to social and economic activity - freedom is understood to be the ability of an individual to live in a manner that is free of artificial impediments and only obstacles considered natural, such as the laws of supply and demand as these are defined by the field of economics, and the free of constraints emergent from the presence of other people and the territorial and temporal constraints of space and time. But the three most basic elements in economic production, land, labor, and capital, are essentially limited in their availability, and to treat them as purely tradable commodities is delusional.\textsuperscript{142}

In classical economics, there is no direct consideration of the renewability of soil for the production of goods from the earth, and there is similarly no concern for political implications of gathering people together to prime them for selling their labor power in a fashion that abstracts their bodily limits and capacity for laboring in the pursuit of achieving economies of scale,\textsuperscript{143} the most essential goal in large-scale profit-making endeavors.\textsuperscript{144} Consideration of these political
questions could scandalize prevailing arrangements. The kind of human clusterings that occur in a market-driven society, and the way in which these were brought about, for good reason, have had to be consigned to a forgotten past - and when the past that constituted the present is considered, various kinds of narrative are employed to see to it that the past is imagined as a necessary and rational forerunner of the present. Obviated in this kind of partial remembering, is, of course, the matter of choice, and therefore, the question of being that sits at the core of individual choices in all instances: why be one way rather than another?
Thereafter that question reduces, logically following, to why are there beings at all rather than nothing? This question, when considered, is a pathway to infinity, literally. This is the gateway to freedom. The radical contingency and utter meaninglessness of existence in the traditional metaphysical sense made manifest in pondering this question simply and empirically levels - as in reduces to basic ground (lessness) - all conceptions of order, of exceptionalism, of perfection, to being species of the same thing: the drive for certainty. But, in the final analysis, being cannot ever be certain of itself understood in a fixed, metaphysical, and essential sense. Seeking this can only deepen self-doubt to unmanageable proportions.146

Economics as a separate disciple characterized by the discovery of certain objective laws of human nature in consideration of physical limitations cannot be distinguished from politics. Doing so results in the depoliticization of human life and therefore obscures the role of choice in the configuration of human affairs.147

The ideas underpinning freedom seemingly have come to require the prosecution of foreign adventures in the name of spreading this same freedom to other places westerners consider to be less fortunate than the West. This takes place on the terrain of a shared world, since it is
obvious that the ability to enjoy pleasure upon pleasure is something which will require material largesse, generally tending to outstrip the endowment of resources found in any one place; but less obviously, and more insidiously from the standpoint of the question of being, must also take place in the context of an ideological competition over representations of what counts as being in the languages found in different places in the world (or through the displacement of indigenous languages by the language of an expansionist power) in order to create a justified rationale for the exploitation of resources and to produce the calmness of mind needed for those seeking to ensure their enjoyment of pleasure after pleasure.\textsuperscript{148}

Must freedom exist for one person in a social vacuum such that their freedom can only be understood in a zero-sum manner, as Hobbes’ political theory of the need for order seems to strongly imply?\textsuperscript{149} Is this state of affairs an inevitable path-dependent trajectory because of the existence of the repertoire of technologies available for the sacralization of identity politics through ideological epistemology articulated to the reproduction of ontological enclosure that restricts the being of being?\textsuperscript{150} And we must extrapolate this question upward, and ask if freedom can be understood to be the property of one nation over and against its possible enjoyment by other nations.\textsuperscript{151} This will
be the central question in the second division: can nations enjoy freedom together or will they feel the need to jealously guard scarce quantities of freedom against one another in the rough and tumble of international relations? For now, the question will remain focused on the individual whose ability to bring to themselves the goods of life has been equated with freedom; this concept having been made explicit in the words of Hobbes that we began this division with.

What most theorists whose work owes a debt to Thomas Hobbes fail to consider in a systematic fashion is the way in which his theory is not simply an anti-religious, secular, and scientific statement on human political affairs, social order, and the inherent equality of all individuals before death.\textsuperscript{152} Even though two well-regarded critics of Hobbes - John Locke, who disagreed with Hobbes’ institutionalization of political power in the absolute sovereign deemed necessary for order since individuals couldn’t be trusted as their own judges and thus the individual or core group of individuals assuming sovereignty must be controlled by the agency of a representative institution wherein legislation based on the laws of nature revealed through reason would produce a better stability than a single man could,\textsuperscript{153} and John Stuart Mill, whose criticisms of Jeremy Bentham’s theory of Utilitarianism in his most famous work \textit{On Liberty} contained a significant critique of
the Hobbesian idea of the commensurability of persons and their fundamental constitutions concerning the predictability of their behavior in relation to appetites and aversions which underlay Hobbes’ theory of radical existential equality of persons - apparently seize upon his ontological reductionism, both accepted the basic Hobbesian idea that individual freedom required absolute protections against exposure of the individual to fear that they would surely be gripped by if there were no formal political order.\textsuperscript{154} The state of nature for Locke, and the state of undeveloped and uncivilized society for Mill, are epistemological-conceptual bogies through which rationalizing arguments are structured that greatly encourage individuals to agree with the parameters of the political order, and whatever exceptional powers are deemed required to maintain that order.\textsuperscript{155}

For Locke, the question of being is answered in much the same manner as Hobbes: that human beings are rational actors whose reason will guide them towards their appetites and away from those things they find averse.\textsuperscript{156} And for Mill, the question is similarly answered, save for the importation into his philosophy of certain notions of increasing possibilities for enlightenment through scientific skepticism operationalized into a rational inquiry into the truth of what is perceivable through the senses.\textsuperscript{157} But clearly these are two sides of the
same coin. If we are to take Locke at his word his views are such that a parliamentary institution is the best way to institutionalize a prudent, conservative, and tolerant socialization for society seeking to enact the law of nature, and for Mill a similar institution is needed and properly civilized and trained persons needed to populate it, and space for eccentric and odd influences on the gradual perfectibility of progress must be protected lest the gains of civilization be drowned out by what he imagined to be the uncouth and unlettered opinions of the masses who lacked the necessary education. But in both cases, with Hobbes, their understanding of freedom was as freedom from obstacles, the only differentiation in their thought is that these successors of Hobbes simply think this is best achieved not through an absolute sovereign but through a sovereign whose action and capacity is checked by formal liberal institutions. Both Locke and Mill, like Hobbes, however, reserve absolute power to the state, especially in the context of a state of emergency, or otherwise defined exceptional situation whereby the normal functioning of the law is to be suspended in the name of commencing some higher, extraordinary goal associated with preserving the unexceptional circumstances of civil society that ought to prevail the rest of the time.

“But since a rational creature cannot be supposed, when free, to put himself into
subjection to another; (though, where he finds a good and wise ruler, he may not perhaps think it necessary or useful to set precise bounds to his power in all things) 
*prerogative* can be nothing but the people’s permitting their rulers to do several things, of their own free choice, where the law was silent, and sometimes too against the direct letter of the law, for the public good; and their acquiescing in it when so done: for as a good prince, who is mindful of the trust put into his hands, and careful of the good of his people, cannot have too much *prerogative*, that is, power to do good…”

And although Locke followed up this apparently contradictory claim of executive power, at least in relation to the main thrust of his theoretical distinction from Hobbes, with claims that the “*prerogative*” power only can be used for “preservation” of both man, and the “nation,” in accordance with the “law of nature”

163 understood as the inability of any man to do himself harm, our criticism is buttressed all the more by his original claim of exceptional powers since the point we are making here is that the liberal notion of the Self, from Hobbes, and now to Locke, is seen as a permanent, unchanging entity, who for the sake of being his highest self must live in accordance with the laws of nature; these revealed by the use of “*reason*”

164 in both Hobbes’ and Locke’s theories. And despite the incongruity of political theories based on the servicing of the appetites in relation to the Platonic concept of the eternal *idea*,

165 - which in ancient philosophies of Greece could only be accessed through the willful repression of the passions in
the name of reason\textsuperscript{166} - both Hobbes and Locke presume that there are eternal truths about human nature, and that reason can guide, if the passions are sufficiently trained either through fear,\textsuperscript{167} or through paternal education in the laws of nature and tradition,\textsuperscript{168} compelling individuals to realize and act in comportment with that nature.

Out of these claims on the nature of human beings and their societies, both Hobbes and Locke conserve the idea of permanence, if a stripped down, disenchanted version relative to the “pure intellection”\textsuperscript{169} that was supposed to reveal the eternal idea in the ancient Greek universe. In seeking to preserve the existence of some sort of permanence-seeking individual, the passions, while partially unleashed,\textsuperscript{170} must remain repressed, are judged a source of threat to good order, and explicitly in Hobbes’ work demands the censorship of thought by individuals for their own sake, through the unrestrained agency of the state to create institutions to produce fear\textsuperscript{171} backed up with the threat of violence - and short of violence, the violence of banishment.\textsuperscript{172} The aim of this intervention is to produce a prudential temperament in individuals such that they police themselves without need of constant supervision by the state.\textsuperscript{173} In Locke’s work much of the Hobbesian apparatus of fear in civil society remains in tact, with the one governmental shift from absolute sovereignty concentrated in a unitary
government to the same the kind of sovereignty employed by a parliamentary institution serving to both divide power and restrain it, on the one hand, and to magnify and legitimize its operationalization in practice, on other hand (see above).174

Liberals, testifying to their faith in progress and capacity for self-correction from their Hobbesian origins, cite John Stuart Mill, whose defense of individual freedom of conscience first and foremost as the crux of individuality - eccentricity,175 that is - or, more contemporaneously, the theorists John Rawls and Richard Rorty, whose purportedly non-metaphysical176 theories of politics seemingly grant the individual the widest possible range of freedom from social conformity and the dictate of obeying sovereign authority based on potentially arbitrary and exclusionary concepts of social order. However, in all these cases the notion of the individual as a permanent being whose permanence and desire to subsist as such lie at the center of each’s thought. In Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, reasoning is thematized in a hypothetical “veil of ignorance” and “original position” through which reason is said to purely operate in a thought experiment which privileges a constructed self without constitutive attachments to her surroundings, and therefore capable of engaging in a meaningful abstraction of the inessential elements of
their existence in order to serve that which is essential.¹⁷⁷

What Hobbes would have us regulate ourselves in relation to our fear, and Locke through our being disciplined by paternal authority, Rawls thus simply abstracts away as a postulation and basis for the subsequent construction of his systematic liberal theory.¹⁷⁸

Through these thought experiments Rawls purports to find essential reasons for why his understanding of political liberalism is persuasive to people in general, irregardless of their cultural contingency.¹⁷⁹ Constitutive cultural attachments, we should remember, are precisely those attachments which in Plato’s philosophy, and then later through Christian adaptation and the gospel of original sin, made common persons irrational and intellectually inferior to those who were truly rational and whose rationality was denoted by their ability to control their passions.¹⁸⁰ But this is in fact impossible, and when apparently possible is only possible in a negative mode, for even when the individual is abstracted from their attachments to the world - or believe themselves to be - they remain essentially attached to the world, and instead internalize social rank and corresponding values associated with an abstracted notion of mastery over the world that gives rise to clear chains of causality, and most crucially, notions of good and
evil. What is emphasized to enable this kind of attunement are values deemed universal elements of human nature, and cast aside are emotions which remain a part of an individual’s consciousness. But having lost this connection to their own consciousnesses, such abstractions in lieu of otherness of the Other are at the mercy of the powerful in whose image these abstractions are fabricated.

Focusing on the negative basis, as in Hobbes and Locke, or a minimal basis for agreement among persons, as in the case of Rawls, those who remain marginal to these agreements persist as a problem for the realization of political order, and according to Michel Foucault, this leaves them at the mercy of state intervention in their lives so that their behavior can be normalized if possible, if they are so lucky. But in actual practice the violence used to normalize individuals never produces uniform results, and suffer from diminishing returns even if temporarily successful. Thus, as Giorgio Agamben argues in *Homo Sacer*, recalcitrants of order in the metaphysical, national community; a community - whose self-identity is understood to be an essential, unique national identity, but which conceal their essential constitution’s being made up by the negation of outsiders through the circulation of “discourses of danger” - which will be on the receiving end of violence aimed ostensibly at their reform, but, in
actual practice is mostly concerned with the prosecution of violence to make an example of the Other for the inhabitants of the state regarding what behavior and personal conduct is acceptable and what is not. To be clear, the determination of acceptable and unacceptable behavior cannot claim to operate for the discovery of an essentialized category that remains always the same for any given order. Rather, this idea of normality has to be produced and reproduced, and is not the matter of the pure conspiracy of evil beings - although there is some of that to be sure - but is rather better understood as an undulating and shifting consensus that emerges between the fears of common people, which are stoked amongst that group and by elites for psychological, economic, political, power-lusting, narcissistic, and other reasons, which, from time to time, brings into focus the idea that some behaviors are diametrically opposed to the good order of the nation. As William Connolly puts it, “The state today is a ministry for collective salvation through a politics of generalized resentment.” If we take resentment in the generalized sense invoked here, we can comprehend those who spontaneously conform to the being of the state, and who, in search of enemies, would rather have an “evil” enemy and despair at existence itself in order to produce certainty in the mind than entertain the possibility of a more thoroughgoing freedom that can only be
found in responsibility for oneself at the level of consciousness - which would at the least require self-reliance in the matter of phenomenological cognition of the world in relation to political lines of division. But in today’s world this is dashed, as is evident in the ‘nature’ of the enemy as presented to the people of the state: a being who always exists but whose virulency and threat to established order emanates from a shifting array of others whose being muddled together is indicative of the failure of Cartesian epistemology that turns thinking into the internalization of social norms that have become systematic in their manifestation in political economy.191 The state, not only today, but in its very origins in ancient times as well as modern, in the traditions of western political thought, has been a tool for “collective salvation through a politics of generalized resentment,192” wherein its goal and that of those who act and reenact its presence - either consciously and self-interestedly or as per the disciplinary effects of hegemony - is to produce both the objects of resentment out of this more generalized sense of despair, as well as the belief in artificial solutions to those objects’ existence understood as a problem; these solutions become the policies that only the state can deliver. As such the state, in its normalizing logic of order, produces the enemy as well as the solution to the existence of the enemy - force and the suspension of the law which the enemy takes advantage of - to
secure its own ground.\textsuperscript{193}

In \textit{Fear - The History of a Political Idea}, Corey Robin has suggested that in the historical development of liberalism, seen as a political philosophy of individual freedom mainly from arbitrary governmental power, on the one hand, and from the coercion of other individuals, on the other, a premium is placed not on the development of freedom as an idea for maximum expression of the individual’s unique creativity and capacity for action in the world, but, rather, on freedom from all manner of fear, which is seen as the chief experience of individuals in relation to both one another and the world in general.\textsuperscript{194} This is an understandable position for individuals to take, evidenced, Robin argues, by the historical record wherein European polities - that is arrangements of people in groups - have been characterized by the omnipresence of fear, both of oneself through the doctrines of church teachings, and of the Other understood as everything outside of the Self.\textsuperscript{195} By naturalizing fear as the main reaction and impulse of individuals towards their world, and depoliticizing its occurrence - namely by treating it as a force of nature divorced from politics - early liberal theorists became absolutists of escapism altogether, neither facing fear resolutely and with maturity, nor admitting to its inherent role in the construction of civil society as a repose from the chaos of
non-political life in a state of nature.\textsuperscript{196} Even the name reveals the naturalization of fear - the “state of nature” where life is “nasty, brutish, and short.”\textsuperscript{197}

But the effect of this thinking regarding the state of nature, and even the reverse mythology constructed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau wherein the state of nature was idolized as a space of total freedom before the inevitable and unavoidable degradation of freedom in the formation of the social contract\textsuperscript{198} is to obscure that this pre-social state never meaningfully existed in an empirical sense and any memory we have of it is simply a created memory - positively or negatively charged - whose function as a ward has been to safeguard the prevailing terms of order, lest fearsome effects be experienced by those who aren’t sufficiently disciplined by its \textit{status as truth}.\textsuperscript{199}

However, since this memory is constructed and contingent, it always can be potentially revealed to be as such. Therefore liberals who defend individual freedom and the primacy of individual freedom as the goal of political organization of liberal society, time and again, have utilized this potential negative experience of fear, and more elementally, \textit{pain},\textsuperscript{200} to provide a ground for the need for politics; this has the epistemological effect of incentivizing at the biopolitical level
belief in the terms of order, despite their underlying mythical status. Robin writes the following on Richard Rorty, whose philosophical embrace of contingency maintains in it a veiled attack on all political activists who seek to change the status quo by admonishing any action that could possibly produce the experience of pain:

“Richard Rorty likewise agreed that negative experiences like cruelty made it possible to affirm liberal principles without resorting to an architectonic philosophy. Solidarity with victims of cruelty, he wrote, was “to be achieved not by inquiry” - the traditional route of liberals like Rawls or Dworkin - “but by imagination, the ability to see strange people as fellow sufferers.” The liberal need no longer worry about the grounds of her ideals once she realized that she was “more afraid of being cruel than anything else.” All she needed to recognize was that “traditional differences (of tribe, religion, race, customs, and the life)” were “unimportant when compared with similarities with respect to pain and humiliation.” She could forego the unanswerable philosophical question “Do you believe and desire what we believe and desire?” and ask instead, “Are you suffering?”

But despite the humanist appeals seemingly embedded in these words from Rorty, surprisingly not noted in Robin’s otherwise fine treatment of what he terms “the liberalism of terror,” which he traces back to Montesquieu and the framers of the American constitution with regard to the need to check government power, on the one hand, and to the rhetorical power of Hannah Arendt’s theoretical analysis of “total
terror,\textsuperscript{203} on the other - is Rorty’s controversial claim in defense of “ethnocentrism,” justified, for Rorty, for the West because of the fact of the development of hegemonic liberalism that ultimately depends on the avoidance of pain that lies at the core of Rorty’s political thought\textsuperscript{204} - which, as Giorgio Baruchello puts it in a 2000 journal article “could easily turn into a replica of nationalism, or of tribalism, or into a form of imperialism\textsuperscript{205}” which limit empathy for suffering.

In the current political climate, of the division of the global consciousness of humanity on the basis of the nation, reinvigorated by the enactment of the tropes of statecraft in the post-9/11 terror wars,\textsuperscript{206} evident in the use of drones to carry out what are claimed to be precision strikes, which in fact have killed thousands of non-combatants,\textsuperscript{207} and the concomitant distancing achieved by ignorance, willful and otherwise, and rationalization, it is clear that to invoke suffering, and then to argue that this is the basis for a liberal community’s capacity to recognize itself in the Other, easily mutates into a kind of liberal triumphalism which obscures “moral equivalence” between “us and the terrorists;\textsuperscript{208} this rhetoric is made use of by democrats and republicans alike to justify air strikes and drone strikes that kill civilians.\textsuperscript{209} After all, those civilians are from a terrorist nation, are devoid of human characteristics, and their absolute
otherness to our liberal community with its apparent capacity for ironical subversion of the Self,\textsuperscript{210} displayed by their willingness not only to suffer on purpose but to kill themselves in the name of higher ideals which must be evidence of their non-individuality since these must be impositions on them from outside of themselves.\textsuperscript{211} To clarify here: an impermanent and contingent self is not the same as a liberal ironist, whose capacity for irony and contingency is seen as a capacity possessed permanently. How can we recognize suffering when we demand that the claim of suffering be put forth in a language we understand, especially when we demand from the Other that they speak in our terms to explain this suffering and that they cause no offense to our values by pointing out that these values are the place from with their suffering emanates?

Western liberal theory enables the avoidance of not only the obvious historical complicity of our community and its way of living in the world, requiring the arrangement of beings worldwide as the “standing reserve”\textsuperscript{212} made possible by the technologies of globalization, but, too, liberalism’s continuing emphasis on the formalization of choice situations obscures the regimentation and surrendering of the ability to make choices about the world and our political way of being together which come to be governed by the ideological naturalization of
While we lack the fast drama of suicide bombers, ours is a slow suicide with bloated defense budgets, spiritual suicide evidenced by historic levels of drug and alcohol addiction, slow and humiliating suicide through addiction to fast so-called ‘foods’ chasing after narcotic-like bodily sensations despite consequences on our health, cognition, and relationships to other persons and the earth. The ironist relativist thus transforms into the cultural imperialist, suggesting their ‘relativism’ to be predicated on a pre-given stickiness of identities within any particular historical community.

Baruchello continues:

“Cultural identities, in fact, are only partially a matter of agreement or peaceful conversation. Quite often, in order to determine and nurture a sense of “ethnicity,” “poetry” is accompanied by “force,” whether legal or illegal, and this applies to liberal democracy as well as to any other recognizable “community.” Perhaps, “poetry” itself is just an expression of “force,” insofar as a dominant section of the population selects from the “literary canon,” and the school programs. And we should not forget that cultures are fluid, living entities, incorporating other potential or actual “ethnoses” and cultures, thus involving profound tensions. Naturally, unless the dominant group succeeds in homogenizing all differences - and we shall all live in Rorty’s “liberal utopia”…“

Concealing its cultural origins, either through the move to universalism, as the case has been until the very recent past, or through
a half-hearted embrace of contingency - half-hearted because relativist in the sense of taking group identity as essential but group designation/membership as contingent and inessential to individuals who are free to choose membership in the best group if rational enough to do so, - resigned to ‘ethnocentrism,’ and retaining faith in group superiority, what has come to be understood as liberalism is hardly liberal if we take that word to signify open-mindedness, tolerance, openness and even acceptance and invitation to change, hospitality, and a full-embrace of the contingency of the Self. This template, of progress of order, of “civilization,” of worthiness for freedom - and an adjoining mission to free others not yet free, or to at least bring them some measure of freedom appropriate to their backwards state - has an old history in the West. Positing a universal template for civilization, and viewing nations as discreet groups capable of moving together only with the application of great compulsion, John Stuart Mill, writing on “harm” - analogous to the suffering that Rorty seeks to ground liberalism as a politics with reference to - has both claimed and warned the wayward that

“the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”
but quickly adds that

“The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”\textsuperscript{219}

In the first instance, the vagueness of the idea of harm is precisely as vague as “suffering,” which Baruchello challenged in Rorty’s work, and since harm and suffering are tied up together, and neither Mill nor Rorty can offer a means by which to recognize either save for the subjective feeling of either, both are quite open to being abused, and indeed have been, to create the basis for various political projects. From interventions advocated by the now infamous Kony 2012 group in central Africa\textsuperscript{220} to the mission to bring freedom to Iraq - whose purported non-freedom was deemed an imminent threat to global order in 2002 and 2003,\textsuperscript{221} liberals are all too happy to prove how ‘free’ they are through this move to save others from themselves. Liberals, especially in America, as William Spanos has noted, take as their ideological hero Captain Ahab chasing the White Whale (of pure freedom and the \textit{sunnun bonum} - binding their ship of state together in a recognition of a \textit{sunnun malum}, thus providing for a permanent replication of the friend-enemy distinction even when circumstances
change), and are employing rational and methodical approaches in the
hunt for an impossible, insane, dream.  

Taking this mad quest to reenter the state of nature and tame the wild,
to bring about global order to enable the possibility of their faith in
progress, liberals have often looked to, and still need look no further
than, the words of Mill to both provide succor to their own sense of
supremacy and legitimize their castigation of the alien Other to a lower
rung of social order:

“It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine [of freedom] is meant to
apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of
children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of
manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of
by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as external injury. For
the same reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society
in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage. The early difficulties in
the way of spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of
means for overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is
warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain and end, perhaps otherwise
unattainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with
barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by
actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of
things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by
free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience
to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. But as soon as
mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion (a period long since reached in all the nations with whom we need here concern ourselves), compulsion, either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good, and justifiable only for the security of others.223"

 Manifest in this position that, when reading Mill, leaps from his pages, is that freedom is a very dangerous property and while desirable, can only be trusted to certain kinds of individuals who would exercise it in accordance with the terms of social order. That social order itself, though, was to be separated entirely from the zone of freedom insofar as it, and its enforcers, would have to be excused from its ethical-legal-moral framework in order to periodically preserve order. As such, not much freedom actually could persist, save for in the antechambers of the brilliant, the eccentric, the well-connected, and such others - and freedom would simply be for all those not found in the rarified climes of the elite nothing more than an ideology of conformity to the prevailing norms of the day, whatsoever their origins might be.224

 Robin, in his philosophical biography of Alexis De Tocqueville, who had considerable influence on Mill,225 discovered that in his private letters, Tocqueville, writing to his brother, decried the state of political apathy in France following the revolution (compare this to the point we have been making about freedom and identity being understood as
‘felicity’ in Hobbes’ formulation: “[Tocqueville] confessed to his brother that he often shared their father’s “devouring impatience,” his “need for lively and recurring sensations.” “Gnashing his teeth behind the bars of reason” (which, he admitted, had “always been like a cage”), he longed for “the sight of combat”; it “always excites me,” he wrote.226). As an self-proclaimed aristocratic person with a complex relationship to the politics of the French revolution,227 however, we can easily see that his attitude towards the masses of French persons now liberated and infused with a new revolutionary spirit and confidence to change their life circumstances was one of decided condescension. “Tocqueville lamented,” Robin writes, “the end of the Reign of Terror,” because by contrast the increasingly regularized patterns of politics that had settled into place could never produce another “Napoleon” whom he admired as “the most extraordinary being who has appeared in the world for many centuries.”228
Just for fun let us compare Tocqueville’s words on Napoleon - and the desire for a dictatorship, something which Tocqueville would support in response to the uprising of 1848 - with Carl Schmitt, the German fascist, and Nazi legal theorist, on the same matter. Considering the question of morals and democratic authority to be one of the “program of ‘people’s education,’” Schmitt says:

“The consequence of this educational theory is a dictatorship that suspends democracy in the name of a true democracy that is still being created. Theoretically, this does not destroy democracy, but it is important to pay attention to it because it shows that dictatorship is not antithetical to democracy. Even during the transitional period dominated by the dictator, a democratic identity can still exist and the will of the people can still be the exclusive criterion. It is then particularly noticeable that the single practical question affected is the question of identification, and specifically the question of who has control over the means with which the will of the people is to be constructed: military and political force, propaganda, control of public opinion through the press, party organizations, assemblies, popular education, and schools. In particular, political power, which should come from the people’s will, can form the people’s will in the first place.”

Friedrich Nietzsche also agreed with the preceding assessment of Napoleon, and both Tocqueville and he shared a romantic longing, to break out of what both assumed to be a banal and increasingly mass society being made “unmanly” by the leveling effects of the prevailing understanding of liberalism. From liberalism and individual
freedom - which on some level Tocqueville, Mill, and Nietzsche each endorsed - we have come to the worship of power pure and simple, and a strong aversion to the freedom of individuals who might pursue their own lives without spontaneous consent to the parameters determined by the socioeconomic organization of power in the state and the hegemonic extension of the state in civil society. From the French masses whose supposed simpleness, to the non-European world - the castigation of which Tocqueville borrowed from Mill who decried “China” as a “warning example” of civilizational decline brought about by becoming “stationary,” whose possibility of being “farther improved,” “must” come at the hands of “foreigners” - the recommendation of Tocqueville, echoing Mill’s imperialism in style but going beyond it in romanticized tone, to overcome both European anomie and the prostration of excellence before the meek he thought endemic to democracy and the freedom of the small people whom he so despised and whom he imagined sated by their bourgeois creature comforts, was to be found in the crusade for progress; or, less deceptively, conquests and imperialism. “In the domination of foreign lands,” Robin writes

“Tocqueville envisioned the regeneration of the European race, a continental awakening from the flaccid sleep that followed the defeat
of Napoleon. Witnessing Europe’s armies march across the globe, Tocqueville thought less as a Frenchmen or a republican than as a European. He cared less about which nation was doing the conquering than that conquering was being done. As the British prepared to fight the Opium War, he wrote, “I can only rejoice in the thought of the invasion of the Celestial Empire by a European army. So at last the mobility of Europe has come to grips with Chinese immobility!” It was a “great event,” “pushing the European race out of its home,” and “submitting all other races to its empire or its influence.” Against those - like himself - who normally would “slander our century” because of its piddling politics, Tocqueville insisted that “something more vast, more extraordinary than the establishment of the Roman Empire is growing out of our times, without anyone noticing it; it is the enslavement of four parts of the world by the fifth.”

What each of these selections show about western liberalism, partially born out of a reactionary spirit against the masses of Europeans breaking free from the bonds of feudalism - fears that individualism would be subsumed by this mass’ depravity - which sought to selectively harness that newfound political energy to pursue projects liberals associated with greatness on a massive, even continental, and eventually, even global, scale, is that liberalism has been an
ideology useful as a tool for the self-conception of the individual as being identified with a transcendental notion of ‘the good’ as much as it has been concerned with individual freedom. In all these cases, from Rorty in recent times, back to Hobbes and Locke, who variously contested the question of the proper limits of individual freedom in order to create a space for state-sanctioned individual greatness in accord with the terms of order, what we witness is a liberal politics of identity, and not a liberal politics of embracing change, pondering the question of being, or experimenting with lifestyles and life-actions in the name of freedom itself.\(^{236}\) For Rorty, liberalism is about proving how caring ‘we’ are and how uncaring ‘they’ are, never mind that his endorsement of ethnocentrism licenses precisely the uncaring behavior towards the suffering of others by denying their essential role in the constitution of the Self (and selves) in a globalized world defined by the encounter with difference and the response to this.\(^{237}\)

For Tocqueville and Mill, the overt appeals to laws of nature, or to a liberal metaphysics, is put aside in favor of an appeal to the metaphysicalization of what both imagine to be the freedom of an individual over and against a threatening world whose mediocrity would overwhelm the individual in the absence of certain political privileges, either for the eccentric, in the case of Mill, or for the
aristocratic for Tocqueville. Both became identified with civilization, freedom, progress, and, if we read Nietzsche right, the idea of the ‘good’ itself. But, as Nietzsche also makes clear, a desire to define oneself in relation to the Other in such a way that sees the Other as the source of evil, as the source of problems to be overcome, is indicative not of the crusading spirit that Tocqueville and Mill seem to assent to and give the space of sovereignty to, but is indicative of “slave morality”\(^\text{238}\) of persons whose inability to tolerate difficulty and difference cause them to seek to reduce the world to manipulable objects devoid of agency in order to keep anything from surprising them.\(^\text{239}\)

In Mill’s work, the goal posited, ‘progress,\(^\text{240}\)’ remains vague, on the one hand, and on the other, when given concreteness, seems only a reinforcement of the values associated with the British Empire.\(^\text{241}\) By becoming civilized, and therefore progressing towards the goal of civilization - the selfsame ‘progress’ - a circularity, precisely the kind that Rorty admits to,\(^\text{242}\) is in evidence, and a metaphysical ideal of the kind of being to be made present, and whose presence is taken as evidence for the realization of civilization, is fabricated as a grundnorm\(^\text{243}\) for the operations of everyday politics. Such circularity on the ‘true’ nature of ‘the good’ goes back to Plato’s old trick positing
the realm of the ideas where the truth lives eternally, and belief in these ideas, which despite Mill’s seemingly open-minded deconstruction, appear in a radicalized form in On Liberty. Mill’s view is just such a radicalization of Platonic truth precisely because stripped of positive content - the aim of the discussions in The Republic about stories of Hades, the need to promulgate two teachings on the matter of death to different social classes to dispose them in different manners, discussions about the role of women, children and slaves in the ideal society, and the like are positive in the sense that they say something about the way society should be - it leaves the intellectual elite free to make case by case determinations in line with liberty and their understanding of the laws of nature as needed, on the basis of Mill’s modified utilitarianism. For persons such as Mill, who also measured civilization by the distance from which normal persons in a country were at a remove from bearing witness of pain, the apparatus of the state would be employed to create freedom for the eccentric - leaving aside the class prejudices and mistreatments this intellectual man survived in daily life out of consideration, scandalizing this man; indeed any thinker must be scandalized in such confines so long as they think - and the subsequent arrangement of persons, things, and orchestration of action in society must all be commenced in order to produce this notion of freedom. Mill, at least,
was honest about what this would entail; in his essay entitled ‘Civilization,’ Mill writes:

“It is not difficult to see why this incapacity of organized cooperation characterizes savages, and disappears with the growth of civilization. Co-operation, like other difficult things, can be learnt only by practice; and to be capable of great things, a people must be trained to it in small. Now, the whole course of advancing civilization is a series of such training. The labourer in a rude state of society works singly, or if several are brought together by the will of a master, they work side by side, but not in concert; one man digs this piece of ground, another digs a similar piece of ground close to him. In the situation of an ignorant labourer, tilling even his own field with his own hands, and associating with no one except his wife and his children, what is there that can teach him to co-operate? The division of employments - the accomplishment by the combined labour of several, the tasks which could not be achieved by any number of persons singly - is the great school of co-operation…. … By these operations, mankind learn the value of combination; they see how much and with what ease it accomplishes, which could never be accomplished without it; they learn a practical lesson of submitting themselves to guidance, and subduing themselves to act as interdependent parts of a complex whole. A people thus progressively trained to combination by the business of their lives, became capable of carrying the same habits into new things. For it holds universally, that the one only mode of learning to do anything, is actually doing something of the same kind, under easier circumstances. Habits of discipline once acquired, qualify human beings to accomplish all other things for which the discipline is needed. No longer either spurning control, nor incapable of seeing its advantages; whenever any object presents itself which can be attained by co-operation, and which they see or believe to be beneficial, they are ripe for attaining it….

…The characters, then, of a high state of civilization being the diffusion of property
and intelligence, and the powers of co-operation.”

At this point in our inquiry three theorists loom large over our imagination in light of Mill’s words, first, on the matter of who is qualified for freedom, and, second, as regards his recommendation for the use of expedients in transforming them into such should they not already be such, and, third, relative to his views regarding the pathway to this progress, as described in his much less well-known essay just quoted. Plato, whose most famous work cynically recommended the regimentation of the entire society for the purpose of bringing freedom to the intellectually-superior to pursue pure intellection\textsuperscript{248}; Nietzsche, whose rejection of all training of individuals commenced in the name of civilizing humanity as the infection of humanity by a disease that will bring about their eventual downfall in an orgy of warfare and destruction as those sickened wage greater and greater destructive wars in the name of their proving themselves ‘the good’ - no, the GOOD-est\textsuperscript{249}; and, brimming with a possibly optimistic vision, Fanon, who we included an extended selection from at the outset of this division, wherein he seems to be replying to precisely the coordinates explicated by Mill in the just concluded selection with the claim that the purpose of training is not to break people but to show men and women the pathway to an authentic, contingent, defensible, robust, and life-
affirming freedom.\textsuperscript{250}

But in the constructions of Mill, Rorty, Hobbes, and Locke, escaping entirely the state of nature and the manifold fears, intrusions on individuality, and property, and the extensive suffering we are likely to feel there without a sovereign agency, it seems that in order to be free, to be ourselves in the world, we must either surrender a bit of our individuality to either produce the orchestration of sovereignty to defend our property, to discipline us into coordinated action in the name of ‘progress’ while still taking the idea of national essence as a touchstone for organizing our actions, or, as Rorty has put it, we must sacrifice our strong, publicly-significant poetry and political fantasies\textsuperscript{251} in order to simply get along with each other. In the last instance especially, we are presumed to be more capable of enjoying life in a postmodern liberal utopia where we can fashion ourselves in accord with our wishes, despite the obvious limitation Rorty imposes. Oddly though, despite this seemingly post-metaphysical claim, Rorty still promotes an identity politics associated with avoiding suffering altogether, and also, oddly, links his version of the liberal project with Nietzsche, whose claim was that liberalism, especially the kind that shrinks from pain and suffering, either for oneself or in regard to inauthentically medicating the suffering of others in order to alleviate
it pure and simple - and not to address its root causes as would befit a heroic politics - would introduce disorder and disease into individuals who would be doomed to suffer in the same way, again and again, without overcoming the Self that they were that gave rise to the suffering in the first place.\(^{252}\) Thus, Rorty, despite claiming to be post-metaphysical, continues to advance a metaphysics of the Self associated with identifying the Self with ‘the Good.’ The liberal desire to ensure identity with ‘the Good’ necessitates (1) foreign policy adventurism,\(^ {253}\) (2) the contravention of the values of the supposedly ‘Good’ in order to reproduce the bases for power relations that gave rise to the possibility of identifying with being liberal in the first place,\(^ {254}\) and, finally (3) by the simple fact of the high cost of the regimentation of society that Mill has in mind, and the way in which this would also place similar demands on \textit{physis} in Rorty’s version of Mill’s liberal polity (to ensure that devices to alleviate ‘suffering’ were aplenty)\(^ {255}\), liberalism also results in the displacement of persons, natural resources, and living beings in general from their worlds would more or less invite dialectical reply by the displaced in assertion of their existence.

Is this to be the fate of liberalism, then? The fate of being liberal? The fate of freedom? Will freedom necessarily produce the kind of single-
minded pursuit of self such that, (1) the eventual employment of technologies of physical separation (distancing) will be utilized to play (and thus reinforce the ‘reality’ of) zero-sum game of individuals against other individuals? And then between groups of individuals (nations) against other such competitive constellations of *pols*? And when this is successful (2), must those who produce that distance then generate an ideology that reinforces and normalizes that distance, crusading on behalf of socially-constructed ideology deemed ‘nature’ to reinforce this distance as an *idea*? After all, modern European metaphysics presumes the equality of all humanity, but must nonetheless differentiates those who are to be denied human status; and as in the late, ‘postmodern’ era, through a resort to identity politics without universal and rationalist justifications of the Self’s being equivalent to ‘the Good,’ because of the unimpeachably noble intentions of the denizens of the West, seen as the locus of liberalism, and freedom.

*Our contention is that there is a ground-floor betrayal of the idea of being liberal as a living, changing, and always emergent life practice.* And this is no surprise, given that our entire premise is that the turn away from the emergent and towards the essential that underlies the attitude toward existence found in wealthy and powerful climes has
precisely this effect on values: it makes them relative.

But by relative we don’t mean that understanding of relativism that we find in neoconservative thought. There is nothing wrong with changing one’s views according to new information. What is a problem, though, is being disingenuous about the continuing validity of one’s position when sustaining such a view requires willful ignorance, which, as we shall see, is typical of the neoconservative position, which holds that there are absolute values and that belief in these values is a non-relativist position. This means that both the continuing belief in values out of alignment with one’s *physis*, as well as the incentive to reorder one’s as-yet-unfolding discernment of reality accordingly, strongly prejudice persons against that reality. This formula - which creates a gap between existential and metaphysical being - is an old one in human societies, and among its various psychological and political functionalities, we are most concerned with its enabling the valuing of the Self as superior the any others whose being is ‘contaminated.’ R.D. Laing has shown that this has led to an operationalization - and therefore relativization - of familial love, in order to use the apparent existence of it as the true metaphysical ideal around which the family must be oriented in order to obtain favors within the family unit. Love, thus, when enchained to the
reproduction of a particular kind of human behavioral pattern which is
at its core political and the product of choice, but naturalized and
spiritualized at the same moment, thus concealing the agency of
individuals to shape the love relationship in accordance with their own
feelings.

As such, love, like any other ideal, such as freedom, can be turned into
a tool for political discipline imposed by artifice, but at the same time,
because of its comportment with our seemingly universal human
desires, this artifice is concealed under naturalizations of social order.
In addition to serving the ends of established powers in society, such
an understanding of these important human ideals turns the very notion
of idealism, of searching for the possibility of directing one’s life in
accordance with one’s own self-given ideals, into a fugitive possibility;
an abnormality to be controlled in the name of security. This is the
ultimate cost of instrumentalization that seeks to store up all of being
as power, as ‘the standing reserve.’

Once the reduction of beings, and being generally, to the status of
‘standing reserve’ is achieved, for both Richard Rorty, the self-
declared liberal, and for the neoconservative Francis Fukuyama, we
have arrived as a human civilization, at the ‘End of History.’ Despite
the obvious silliness of the idea of history ending, or of philosophy and the competition between political ideologies in general being things of the past,\textsuperscript{261} not only does postmodern liberty produce the kinds of displacement discussed above, not only does it generate reaction across the world as the theft of land and social disintegration resultant for communities across the world takes hold, NOT only does it also produce revolutionary theories, organizations, and new forms of transnational solidarity in the name of socialism where nations and communities continue to value freedom despite immensely complex circumstances found in both the global north and south; it also, must, in the end also sow the seeds of the restarting of history in the West, as well since the drive to globalization on which it is dependent has shown itself to be unaccommodating to difference.

And while many in the West claim Mill, or Fukuyama, or before either of them Hegel, and other theorists representing the varieties of liberalism,\textsuperscript{262} made allowances for change in their political philosophies, the subscription of each of these thinkers to the teleological understanding of history sees progress as a process of perfectibility that allows the eventual escape from history. This belief forms the theological core of the political ideology of modernity. But the partisans of modernity cannot validate their belief in progress
through scientific empiricism; their desire to answer the question of being in a final manner - the thinnest version being Mill’s answer about progress and then determining that progress to be in evidence in Europe; the same Europe which would later consume itself and non-European lands in a destructive fury in the 19th and 20th centuries - and the thickest version being found in the dialectical idealism of Hegel with Fukuyama, wherein the ‘End of History’ is deemed a rational state that can be ruled over by civil servants and a rationalized, politically-integrated civil society, provides a managerial framework for the production of Mill’s ‘progress’ and ‘ordered liberty,’ - requires their turning away from empirical reality. This is not freedom. Nor is it an acceptable substitute, because, in the end, the malcontents of this concept of order will cause states constituted thus to embark on military campaigns that, while perhaps in the short run may provide the states an opportunity to construct an ahistorical mythology of victory that gives states’ populations a sense of the state’s enduring quality, will in the longer term unleash centrifugal forces that will undo their legitimacy and authority, producing counter-identities that unbind state-run social orders and threaten more generally human coexistence altogether.
III. From Permanence to Obedience: Necessity, Security, and Consciousness. To Be (authentic) or Not to Be? Permanence in Material Relations, Permanence in Cognition, and Freedom as Identity Politics

Ultimate resignation - a matter on which we invoked the words of Karl Polanyi at the outset - reveals much about who we are and what our political commitments are. In *The Power Elite*, C. Wright Mills has radically observed the core of conservative resignation - a rung on the descending ladder into the depths of fascism and destructiveness\(^{263}\) - wherein a “conservative mood”\(^{264}\) settles in over individuals who feel disempowered by the overawing power of powerful institutions in society, like the state (and especially the military/police), global corporations, and the entire complex of social institutions engaged *and* not engaged in business, warfare and politics, and whose ubiquity and omnipresence seem to not only place individuals at a disadvantage in pursuing whatever life plans they may imagine they have that might have been entirely original and their own (as Rawls would base his free society on in theory)\(^{265}\), but causes the quieting, out of strategic reasons, of their spontaneous being of their authentic selves.\(^{266}\) In exchange for their individuality, individuals are given the right to be
free of insecurity (Hobbes), to be free to reign sovereign over their property (Locke), to theoretically be unrestrained in their subjectivity so long as their actions do not ‘harm’ another (Mill), and to be free of the imposition of “strong poets”\textsuperscript{267} whose political fantasies must be privatized for the sake of the liberal community (Rorty).

In each of these instances, constituted powers in the midst of social order can indeed provide the individual a measure of security. But failing to recognize the contingency of this state of affairs, and instead to see security in accordance with the order of nature, societies governed by the technological apparatus of the state (and the extended state) collectively conceal political artifice in order to loan to order a sense of naturalness and inevitability. Democratic and purportedly representative polities have often based legitimate authority on the provision of goods associated with the security of a normalized life, on the one hand, and the acquiring of the resources needed to provide these goods, accomplished by the projection of power beyond the nation-state, on the other.\textsuperscript{268} Imperialism has its own institutionalizing dynamic, and once accepted as reality, takes on inertia that characterizes the sense of permanence typical of institutions that comprise the social constellation. Mills, writing on the way in which the military-industrial complex institutionalized its worldview through
politics, communication, educational institutions, and the world of business and finance through complex, largely informal, linkages.\textsuperscript{269} argued that the epistemology underlying the “military metaphysic”\textsuperscript{270} would lead to the widespread incorporation of the military-defined codification of threat perceptions into common language.\textsuperscript{271} In the contemporary context of the ‘war on terror,’ the acceptance of the military-defined worldview has resulted in the general surrender of most Americans, \textit{including the anti-war political left}, of both the moral significance of their views on war and peace, and also their capacity to even legitimately participate in a discussion of international relations.\textsuperscript{272} Freedom, therefore, seems to require obedience to experts, and a certain willingness to remain ignorant, as well, so as to not challenge expert views which assign epistemological tasks and ontological purpose concealed as nature.\textsuperscript{273}

In a situation where individuals are left alone with an inability to trust their own perceptions, the basis of social solidarity is threatened in a radical manner. The ontology found in modern liberal thought is based on the idea that individuals are competing with one another in a social context defined by natural laws of human interaction, in either a straightforward manner, or, more insidiously, in a zero-sum game wherein trust and social bonds are so frayed that individuals begin to
perceive their neighbors’ gain as their own personal loss, thus no longer content to gain for themselves but to measure these gains in relation to those of their neighbors. Embedded in the ideas of Rene Descartes and Thomas Hobbes, both theorists of absolute subjectivity, is the idea that individuals are in search not only of the confirmation of their own existence as rational beings who know the truth in terms of the laws of nature discerned by the application of the systematic methodology validated by experts, but that the presence of another being whose similarly-confirmed rationality one can be certain of is a prerequisite to security for individuals. Hobbes, in casting aspersions on the “vainglorious” takes precisely this stand since individuals who refuse to submit to order are insufficiently prudent and it is the state’s duty to socialize them or neutralize them in order to maintain ordered social intercourse. Analogously, Descartes suggests that the internalization of rationality as science and as a guide for behavior is a mark of enlightenment in relation to the dark ages wherein such learnings were supposedly lacking. Fear of disorder and chaos that predominated in feudal Europe, due, according to him, to the reign of unreason, could thus be overcome, and people could gain the tools needed to discover the knowledge that would once again provide a baseline to their existence - a ground for being.
But both of these theorists have a peculiar attitude towards the question of being and therefore in regard to human existence. For Hobbes, it was to be feared because trust was foolish in the absence of reserve threat, and for Descartes, the idea that parts of the world were unknowable by reason, or that reason could fail in comprehending the object of thought - in this case a version of humanity’s Other - was intolerable. So for Hobbes greater and greater levels of security were needed to stave off threats to existence, and for Descartes, and later Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and the theorists and scientists who fabricated the modern sciences of nature, and eventually social science, too, greater rationality was needed to ensure the freedom of individuals from the all-consuming doubt that drove Descartes to ground being on the escape from doubt over existence.

From these philosophies today we have the national security state, and the emergence of panopticism as the basis for knowledge about the elements of social order.

Freedom comes to be associated with control. And not merely control. This variety of control cannot be situationally-surrendered when such a course would be advisable: state security is defended with the power over life and death, and individual existential angst is guarded against.
through the production of language, laws of nature, the circulation of economic objects in markets based on the myth of the rational and individual actor that serves to rationalize the normalization of capital and currency as a mass instrument on an unprecedented scale, and through the tokenization of personhood as objectively present through the orchestration of these ensembles of being(s) for that purpose.

Against this orchestration of being we can, Martin Heidegger writes, “answer the call of conscience”\textsuperscript{280} which makes us aware of our surroundings and, importantly, the way in which our surroundings - \textit{physis} - are rearranged by metaphysics. If we respond to the call we can be said to be \textit{authentically free}.\textsuperscript{281} On the other hand, if we take note of this orchestration, find ourselves dissatisfied with its implications in our consciousness, and it causes existential \textit{angst} and nausea in our bodies, upsets our bowels, and we find it otherwise undigestible, and we seek to treat the symptoms of these concerns rather than address the root causes, and in the process lose our conscious awareness of the possibility of asking questions that get at the root causes, we can be said to be both \textit{inauthentic} and unfree.\textsuperscript{282}

\textit{Inauthenticity} offers another approach in addition to the self-numbing just mentioned: fully identifying with the power that commences the
orchestration of beings in accord with the making present of the identity of ‘the good.’ Polanyi, as quoted above, has termed this the core of fascism,283 as has Erich Fromm,284 who has described recourse to this as evidence of a desire to connect with a leader to alleviate suffering - a role that ambitious, power-seeking persons are all too willing to fulfill.285 Susan Sontag has defined fascism as the “organization of violence,” pure and simple, and violence done in the name of ‘the good’ is equally organized; this should call our colloquial use of the term ‘fascism,’ radically into quesrtion. Good or evil, assent to the terms of order thus constituted mean an individual is complicit with coercive powers of social orchestration, and more so, are willing to alter their own ideas about the world - at least publicly - so as to not give the appearance of disloyalty to established powers in society. Some call this security, others, hegemony geared towards the oppression of their being.

IV. Beneath the Ensemble, the Screams

In a recent report on the treatment of detainees at the United States’ naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on the daily news program
Democracy Now, it came to light that the extensive use of medical technology in all areas of such technology, physical, pain relief, cardiac, nutritional science, and even psychology, have been deployed to alleviate the suffering of the men held there, who are generally innocent of any crimes, remain uncharged, and have even been declared eligible for release from the prison camp.286 In a chilling interview, a physician and activist has indicated that the symptomatic suffering of individuals at the camp is being treated in accord with certain elements of the ethical code of medical science, but that the political exclusion and oblivion to which their humanity is subjected, the division of their consciousness from the overall human world287 has left them abject and with no other choice but to fast until the death. Their suffering, however, is not recognized by most Americans, who remain distracted with the problems in their individualized milieux. Atop this scandalous moral disengagement among most Americas, the use of medicalized language of care to alleviate their tormentors of the reality of the inhumanity of their continued abuse obscures the matter behind a veil of hypocrisy rationalized through immediately-deployed technology to bring about distanciation between Self and Other.
And somewhere in the distance, ‘California Über Alles’ by the Dead Kennedys can be heard:

“I am governor Jerry Brown
My aura smiles
And never frowns
Soon I will be president!

Carter power will soon go away
I will be führer one day
I will command all of you
Your kids will meditate in school

California über alles
über alles California

Zen fascists will control you
100% natural
You will jog for the master race
And always wear the happy face
Close your eyes, can't happen here
Big bro' on white horse is near
The hippies won't come back you say
Mellow out or you will pay
California über alles
über alles California
Now it is 1984
Knock knock at your front door
It's the suede/denim secret police
They have come for your uncool niece
Come quietly to the camp
You'd look nice as a drawstring lamp
Don't you worry, it's only a shower
For your clothes here's a pretty flower!
Die on organic poison gas
Serpent's egg's already hatched
You will croak, you little clown
When you mess with President Brown
California über alles
über alles California…..”288

V. The Ugliness of Beauty

“When the people of the world all know beauty as beauty, there arises the recognition of ugliness. When they all know the good as good, there arises the recognition of evil.”289

VI. Freedom as a Technology of Governmentality, Isaiah Berlin’s Mystification of the ‘Cold War,’ and Resignation as an Element in Social Order

Martin Heidegger writes of the essence of technology as the gradual study, mastery, and utilitarian refinement of technique - or techne - which allows beings to be brought nearer or kept farther for various reasons.290 In the introduction we have discussed already how technologies of distancing have been used in human society in various ways, and more radically (in an analytic sense), that all technology is
essentially about bringing beings nearer and further from individuals and groups. It can be said that the essence of technology is to be found in machines, but in the end, aren’t machines devices used to bring beings - in this case resource inputs for productive processes - nearer, and therefore to make them ready-at-hand? Similarly, and in the opposite case, technology pushes beings - persons or things - further away through the use of military means, police techniques, incarceration, and other mechanisms of violent, less-than-violent, and ideological division. Ideas, because of their prescriptive effects on human interaction, are the bases upon which we develop our technologies. If we organize society on the basis of the worship of a particular dynastic family and their members, then indeed we would transform through art - technique, that is - the relatively uninteresting minutia of their lives into totems of worship, signifiers of existential lessons and meanings, and engage in other such activities that aggrandize their existences and make their continued communal aggrandizement the basis for rituals that give rise to social order.

But we have come to understand technology in a very different manner; in a manner that has itself replaced the idea of human possibility, creativity, and imagination with the worship of the Self understood as an essentially-truly-existing being. This is not the idea
of the authentic self. Instead, we have come to believe that the Self has a
truth-status to it independent of the Other, and indeed, independent of
technology and the orchestration of beings more generally. As such, the
sustenance of the selfhood of the Self comes to dominate all social
relations, and the effects of this expectation can hardly be considered
to be politically-insignificant. Medicalizing Guantanamo prisoners’
torture, the misuse of yoga and meditation - as well as other
approaches to health and fitness - for the purpose of psychological
numbing not too distinct from drug addiction, widespread alcohol
abuse, the transformation of mainstream psychology, marketing,
religion, and entertainment into vehicles for providing the “cultural
enjoyment of identity”292 (as opposed to the contingency-accepting
identity’s enjoyment of radical cultural difference), and the
instantaneous delivery of all these technologies - and more, the list is
more immense than one book - in real-time to one’s smartphone-cum-
pocket computer (including live updating yoga class schedules
complete with zip code search for the jet-set) are all used to provide
not only support to our ‘true’ selves, but to also allow us to easily tell
ourselves a nice story about what good people we are. In postmodern
America at the outset of the new terror wars, this is what freedom is all
about: a market-driven fantasy of escapism.
Gone for the most part are the old freedoms associated with overt racial privilege of one group over another. These privileges are now expressed through the standard operating procedures of police departments with black and latino officers who still ruthlessly hunt young black men and boys but who hide behind the veneer of rationality and security which supposedly necessitate such terrorism; the “blue wall of silence” makes police departments often impenetrable. And in polite company, too, women have increasingly seized the new technologies of the Self with a vengeance often out-doing their male counterparts in education, career, and social recognition. This is not to say that patterns of racial and gender-based violence and criminality are surpassed. Hardly. But it is to say that the public discourse of Jim Crow and formal sexism in many significant laws have been replaced with a color/gender-blind law that masks continued oppression along more or less the same lines of exclusion, and that one who speaks up against this is widely seen as needless cranky, or needlessly political; to engage in verbalized critiques of structures of domination is to complain about the nature of things. The technologies that produce privilege are still in operation, but increasingly, formerly-officially-subjugated groups are asked to stake their claims for dignity on the basis of assimilating those technological apparatuses - especially of selfhood - without criticism of a radical
nature. After all, we are now all free to be ourselves, right?
But the cost of all this is the continued division of the world into those who benefit from the prevailing social arrangements, and those who continue to be on the receiving end of the violence used against them in order to effect the orchestration of the world’s resources to produce freedom for the wealthy nations and the wealthy in the impoverished nations. Eric Williams has made this argument about the dependency of freedom on the institution of slavery in his research, and the American founders’ immensely contradictory natures, revealed in their writings on liberty and on race confirm this. The machine I use to type these very words I write contains rare-earth minerals harvested in war zones by armed gangs partially constituted of children soldiers who sell their wares to unscrupulous middle-men, who then bring those precious resources to factories in China where workers have been put through misery, a police state, and the repression of culture seen as a threat by that very state, and are compelled to churn out MacBook Pro laptops at a blistering pace, leading to suicides of workers, revolts against factory owners, and much handwringing at Apple Computer about how to maintain that corporation's image as a progressive company appealing to liberal, self-obsessed, but nonetheless, supposedly good persons such as myself.

The alleviation of suffering in this context, and the expectation that
suffering is abjured from normal life, produces a negative understanding of liberty which sanctions only those expressions of existence which lie safely within the parameters of politics prevailing at the moment and the orchestration of being brought about in the midst of such a politics. The normalization of this idea of existence, and the ‘right’ for all to enjoy it amounts to the normalization of structural and practical violence on a day to day basis that requires people to conform to the machine to secure its uninterrupted functioning. And the entire apparatus of the state, its educational institutions, disciplinary and punitive facilities and organizations, employment institutions ranging from the blue-collar to the white-collar, from the military to the scientist, are all aimed at ensuring that people accept these terms of order.296

At the same time, within our institutions of political order, nominally aimed at the manufacturing of this sort of freedom, a narrow band of acceptable identity is policed through the vehicle of toleration, which, much like freedom itself, is an element of the overall transformation of spontaneous human existence into governmentality - the “conduct of conduct”297 - wherein spontaneous relations of persons to persons is governed by the codes of conduct in line with producing the requisite togetherness and apartness of beings needed for the reproduction of
social order. For liberals, because of their moral investment in being ‘good’ in their own self-conception, the practice of political and public tolerance becomes a technology of government that carries a utilitarian function, but loses its ethical character insofar as ethical orientations are not merely utilitarian in the present instance but can also have a prescriptive effect. Written into Mill’s ‘harm principle,’ and into Rorty’s call to avoid suffering - is the implicit charge to never harm anyone which of course comes to include not challenging persons’ beliefs about themselves, the goodness of their nation. Tolerance of others could be readily withdrawn whenever the Other was seen to be irrational (Locke), or hot-tempered to the point of losing their prudence (Hobbes). Wendy Brown has theorized that tolerance is like a switch that may be turned on and off, and that, if we extend this logic, it bears a great deal of similarity to the inversion of the famous war theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s claim by Foucault whereby it is claimed that “politics is war by other means.” The extension of tolerance doesn’t grant freedom to the Other, instead it functions much like a temporary truce aimed at achieving proper distance, and it also confers onto the party doing the tolerating a sense of superiority in relation to the party being tolerated. As such, liberalism is hardly, in practice, a political philosophy with a consistent set of values, but, rather, can be seen as an evolving set of
compromises based on the lowest-common denominator in society that can serve as a basis for social order.\textsuperscript{302} In all these examples evident is the ideological function of technology in bringing beings near and holding them at bay; in keeping beings in a certain spatial and temporal relation to one another; at arm’s length now; thereafter, in a tight embrace; as needed.

Now we will turn to a consideration of the two main forms of freedom that have been developed in the West in relation to the oft-forgotten ontological fields of space and time that serve as the bases for human existences.\textsuperscript{303} Isaiah Berlin, and before him Benjamin Constant, have labelled these concepts ‘positive’ or ‘ancient’ liberty, and ‘negative’ or ‘modern’ liberty.\textsuperscript{304} Despite his reactive, despair-driven sympathies, which led him to support a cynical “rollback”\textsuperscript{305} strategy in the ‘Cold War,’ Isaiah Berlin cautions against linking this sort of defensive cynicism in favor of western freedom into an absolute idea that would come to link that policy with an absolute justification any and all acts commenced in its name;\textsuperscript{306} in the instance of such a transpiration, instead of defending negative liberty at home in the West, the Western powers would get caught up in unsustainable military expansion in the name of what westerners would call freedom, but what the rest of the world would see as a drive for economic hegemony, at best, or as
outright neocolonialism, at worst. Despite his prescience in asking our caution in this regard - to be cautious about saying that things are permanent in this world and attempting to make them so\textsuperscript{307} - and his withering critique of the conservative and traditionalist fear of freedom and liberalism (understood here as an authentic liberal culture, politics, and way of being made possible through political commitment as opposed to resort to the naturalization of fear of the Other, the unknown, and of the inescapable suffering inherent to life itself)\textsuperscript{308}, Berlin nonetheless evinces in his thought a continuing fear of political change and call for a retreat from the world of freedom and revolutionary change, preferring instead, as he puts it, the kind of freedom he imagines only possible in a “decaying,” “late modern,” “capitalist culture.\textsuperscript{309}”

Berlin’s conception of liberalism leaves a gaping political void which thankfully we can turn elsewhere to fill with more optimistic theories that give succor to the claim of freedom in a complex age.\textsuperscript{310} However, for his contemporaries Berlin’s words became the source of their zealous counterrevolutions fought in the name of individual freedom, but which trapped both the West, and the newly-free world around the globe, in a competition over resources to posit the absolute and sublime selfhood of the Self over and against one another as nations on
the global stage, and, eventually, in an age of globalization that sees the relocation of the fault lines of conflict within nations, we are witness to precariously cobbled-together nations unraveling along numerous lines of division, threatening to tear apart the social fabric in those societies first, and perhaps subsequently, in the West someday, as well.311

VII. Liberal Resignation Explored: Negative Liberty, Shrunken Beings, and the Rationalization of Counterrevolution

Isaiah Berlin, whose political philosophy is decidedly not one with great sympathies towards those on the receiving end of European barbarism, is nonetheless a mature and honest western liberal philosopher on one extremely important count: in his philosophy he indicates, by way of a submerged warning, that the “measure of pluralism”312 that has been generated in the West is fundamentally threatened by the historical drive, found in the West and elsewhere, to become entirely free of uncertainties associated with human existence.313 Quite sweepingly dismissing the security-obsessions of Hobbes and Locke in regard to property, paternal privilege, posterity,
and prudence run amok, and also looking beyond the ideas of John Stuart Mill in regard to possibility of constructing an advancing civilization whose continual progress is marked by enlightenment and social orchestration that minimizes harm through disciplinary education, Berlin, in an existentialist ode to contingency, and with a general sense of resignation, writes:

“It may be that the ideal of freedom to choose ends without claiming eternal validity for them, and the pluralism of values connected with this, is only the late fruit of our declining capitalist civilisation: an ideal which remote ages and primitive societies have not recognised, and one which posterity will regard with curiosity, even sympathy, but little comprehension. This may be so; but no sceptical conclusions seem to me to follow. Principles are not less sacred because their duration cannot be guaranteed. Indeed, the very desire for guarantees that our values are eternal and secure in some objective heaven is perhaps only a craving for the certainties of childhood or the absolute values of our primitive past. “To realise the relative validity of one’s convictions,” said an admirable writer of our time, “and yet to stand for them unflinchingly is what distinguishes civilised man from a barbarian.” To demand more than this is perhaps a deep and incurable metaphysical need; but to allow it to determine one’s practice is a symptom of an equally deep, and more dangerous, moral and political immaturity.314”

So here we get a strong dose of resignation. Berlin is claiming that there is little that the West can do to spread its notion of pluralism, which he explicitly associated with negative liberty315 - the spatial and
temporal freedom from constraint guaranteed by either recognition or enforcement\textsuperscript{316} - to the rest of the world, on which he piles intellectual calumnies that are the fashion of political theory (“remote ages,” “primitive societies,” etc.) which mark as real the constructed boundaries between self and other on which western self-conception lie. The best those of us fortunate enough, like Berlin and myself, whose parents fled from the non-West to the haloed West, giving us the privilege of being reared in material largesse, can hope for is to engage in a slow defense of the hemorrhaging (“declining”) civilization we happen to find ourselves to be contingently a part of for no other reason than dumb luck. Insofar as this requires doublethink in order to permit us to either have such a novel and ideal self-conception as being inherently worthy of such a structural position, and/or the extent to which we must also identify with - contingently or however - with the political economy of power prevailing in society at the moment, once again ideological and material technologies of distancing are required to be ready-at-hand for our use. Our acculturation to these means may be incomplete and less fervent than what less capaciously thoughtful persons reveal by their daily thoughtlessness,\textsuperscript{317} but the effect is the same in spite of the maturity of the resigned perspective in admitting to the configuration of political economy. Indeed, Berlin wishes that we admit to the “decline” of our social order, rather than
seeking to reverse the decline through whatever creative means we may have at our disposal in our surroundings, if only we took the moment to look there.

Indeed, what are our surroundings? At the time of Berlin’s writing, despite his protestations to the contrary against metaphysics in the above quote, Berlin himself, and the West in general, were engaged in a defense of a kind of worldview typically metaphysical in nature. Charles Taylor, following Berlin’s characterization of the victims of imperialism and racism the world over seeking not liberty but “simply recognition,” has theorized the expanding significance of “the politics of recognition.” Berlin, in ‘Two Concepts of Liberty,’ in claiming that this is not a specie of the freedom that he associates with pure, unadulterated, and rational individual consciousness, but that it is instead a mere “search for status” driven by the desire for group privileges, casts a blind eye to his own Anglo, European, white, and class-based privileges, the product of recent global history, which apparently has inured him from concern that his privilege is indeed contingent.

But, this is again not because of his ignorance pure and simple, nor is it entirely ascribable to him as an elitist ‘Cold War’ liberal, British
foreign service officer and lecturer at Oxford.\textsuperscript{322} To understand this aspect of his thought, and to see how it serves as both an opening, a bridge really, to a world of worlds, but how it also explains his recoiling from that world of pluralism, settling instead for a cosmetic multiculturalism and pluralism in a world dominated by the Western alliance in the wake of the second world war, we have to turn to an analysis of the formalization of the rules of negative and positive liberty, then being constructed as rational science by theorists of mathematics, statistics, economics, and the social sciences, many of whom prominently worked for the RAND corporation in California, a United States Department of Defense-associated think tank.\textsuperscript{323} There, during the ‘Cold War,’ researchers initially developed ‘game theory,’ including the infamous “prisoner’s dilemma,\textsuperscript{324}” in which individual persons were presumed to be (1) entirely alone, (2) confronted by essentially hostile dispositions from all others confronted in the world as a characteristic of rational human behavior, and thus (3) that placing trust in any other person was irrational.\textsuperscript{325} As a result, the only real way out of the game was to have another player, with different interests - a state in this case as a guarantor of order trusted by both of the initial players - whose own interest was to seek recognition as an objectively real institution which could provide a framework for cooperation by bearing certain costs associated with insecurity.\textsuperscript{326} So
in this context liberalism, pluralism, and the level of civilization, openness, and indeed freedom for the individual it was hoped would be provided, are all based on the same domestication Mill insisted upon in ‘Civilisation,’ and that the following words from Hobbes confirm as deeply-rooted in the Western imagination, combining an analysis of individual human nature with an extrapolation about interstate behavior:

“As amongst masterless men, there is perpetual war of every man against his neighbour, no inheritance to transmit to the son nor to expect from the father, no propriety of goods or lands, no security, but a full and absolute liberty in every particular man, so in states and commonwealths not dependent on one another every commonwealth (not every man) has an absolute liberty to do what it shall judge (that is to say, what that man or assembly representeth it shall judge) most conducing to their benefit.”

To escape from the security dilemma human beings confront in a “masterless” condition, where the “difference of manners” found in the “state of nature” meant the impossibility of trusting anyone and the absurdity of all significations that lack the force of law for regularization and clarification, Hobbes offers the following paradigmatic, in our current terminology, essentially fascist, solution:

“To come now to the particulars of the true liberty of a subject (that is to say, what
are the things which, though commanded by the sovereign, he may without injustice refuse to do), we are to consider what rights we pass away, when we make a commonwealth, or (which is all one) what liberty we deny ourselves by owning all the actions (without exception) of the man or assembly we make our sovereign. For in the act of our submission consisteth both our obligation and our liberty, which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from thence, there being no obligation on any man which ariseth not from some act of his own; for all men equally are free. And because such arguments must either be drawn from the express words I authorize all his actions, or from the intention of him that submitth himself to his power (which intention is to be understood by the end for which he so submitth), the obligation and liberty of the subject is to be derived, either from those words (or others equivalent) or else from the end of the institution of sovereignty, namely, the peace of the subjects within themselves, and their defence against a common enemy.329"

Organizing the community thus, with internal order for the purpose of external security in mind, Hobbes also states that

“The liberty of subjects lieth, therefore, only in those things which, in regulating their actions, the sovereign hath praetermitted (such as liberty to buy, sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own abode, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; and the like).330"

Those who operate outside the bounds of the social contract - the “covenant” - are deemed “vainglorious331,” their very inability to
submit to the terms of social order causes them to be considered by those thus prostrating to be dangerous outlaws. Unable to authorize the institution of sovereignty, the vainglorious remain, from our perspective, spontaneously free, but for the purposes of order they count neither as individuals with rational capacities, nor as members of the community with the same privileges and immunities of membership derived by other automatically conforming persons.

When studying recent western social orders, and many in other parts of the world where we locate the drive for security of life understood as permanence - needed to give succor to the functioning of the “ontologically insecure”\textsuperscript{332} mind - the prevalence of outlaws in relation to the social order can be readily observed. Indeed, rather than resembling a rational construction of social order, the Hobbesian-inspired system under consideration here, which secures the negative liberty of individuals even at the cost of rendering individuals submissive in their very being, appears to license government officials to render those found in society and transform them into threats to order, to be made an example of. Hobbes is explicit about this maneuver, so we can at least appreciate his honesty - an honesty no other nominally liberal theorist following him would grant us in their discourse on matters political.\textsuperscript{333} In the context of a civil war,
individuals, according to Hobbes, have experienced the danger of violence, surely, but more significantly for the question of building a reliable social order on the ashes of a situation such as the kind of conflict Hobbes was warning posterity to be on guard for, was the matter of freeing individuals from what Hobbes termed “absurdity,” which would arise when definitions, moral values, and all other socially-useful signifiers would be robbed of their meaning; to re-inject meaning into words themselves the definitional authority of the sovereign was necessary. Through this mechanism people could once again come to trust one another in the midst of a manufactured cold peace guaranteed by the threat of overwhelming force.

But because of the inherent division of the world into spheres of existence on display in Hobbes’ thought - a division echoed variously in others’ subsequent thinking - the individuals who are the beneficiaries of the kind of violence against internal recalcitrants and external threats, who cannot bear to accept their own violence which is thus abstracted from their daily awareness, come to rely on a variety of charms, tokens, and, in essence, ego-ideals as projections of themselves to reinforce their worthiness to benefit from the divisions they have sown in the world through their variously collective agencies in order to procure the necessary resources to make manifest
their ability to be good persons. Although Isaiah Berlin appears to
tune a certain maturity in his acceptance of contingency in his
tought, he nonetheless fails to say anything about those who are on
the receiving end of the violence that polices the boundaries of
political economy in space, time, and in the soul of individuals whose
spontaneity is most precluded by the status quo.\textsuperscript{335} In Berlin’s world,
where positive liberty - a positive project aimed at producing a
freedom to live life in accordance with one’s visions of justice\textsuperscript{336} -
must always conclude in a totalitarian project, indeed, all we can hope
for is a world of trinkets, in which we can become “men without
chests,” who pass the time “bowling alone,” at history’s end.\textsuperscript{337} To
accept that history has ended, a view that Berlin anticipated in his
thought when he declares “our civilisation” to be in terminal decline, is
to accept a way of life associated with negative liberty, but in its
reactive, resigned, and defensive mode, activates the intervention of
the state, social institutions, and other mechanisms of panoptic
normalizing-individualizing training to bring about that way of being,
which transforms negative liberty into a positive liberty doctrine.\textsuperscript{338}

Essentially, the positive liberty doctrine of negative liberty - the right
to be free to live the form of life free from insecurity, fear, impermanence, and other obstacles - by domesticating all positive
values and terming them expressions of individual choice from a rational actor’s *tabula rasa* mind, by calling the repressive expressions of identity formulated under such circumstances ‘culture’, and deigning their collective expression to be pluralism, by requiring the submission of all individuals to the terms of order as laid down by the political institution of a sovereignty that is seen as the guarantor of a cold peace between individuals who would otherwise be at each other’s throats, reduces the range of what can be called freedom, what evidence of rational behavior on the part of individuals can be regarded as indicative of the free actions of rational individuals, creates widespread social mistrust replete with all the human emotions associated with antipathy between persons (jealously and envy, fear, lack of respect, objectification and manipulability, etc.), and leaves persons in an “un-worlded,” disoriented, state of shock. Of course all of these realities contradict the stated purpose of freedom and a social order designed to guarantee freedom for individuals.

From Berlin’s resignation, which gives rise during the ‘Cold War’ to the foreign policy doctrine of “rollback” that saw wars of national liberation as threats for the West, to Hobbes’ dismissal of the “vainglorious” in favor of the prudential, to Locke’s castigation of the “quarrelsome and contentious” as being unworthy as inefficient land
stewards in relation to the goals of marketization and productivity that are found at the center of the capitalist existential ethos, to Rorty’s ethnocentric - albeit ironic - pride in liberalism as the progeny of the West that has necessarily given birth to its now global mission to save the world from suffering, and to Fukuyama’s claim of the same combined with an activist declaration in favor of spreading democracy through the beneficent agency of elites who had understood the necessity of domesticating humanity’s thymos for the sake of giving people what they really wanted - despite their protestations to the contrary - what we witness is a promulgation of freedom with limits affixed that reflect the panoply fears of social groups and individuals whose attitudes are structurally-situated for dissemination by various media.\textsuperscript{340}

Berlin’s warning to the Western world to guard against the reification of liberty as a thing in itself went unheeded, but that the same proclivity which he was critiquing in fact characterized his idea of the individual: an abstraction of being from the community and the mind’s powers of rationality and reason from the physical body on which it depends for sustenance, developing an idea of a purer reason and more rational rationality individuals can be capable of that can then be taken as evidence of their being civilized and properly educated, and can
therefore rationally confirm for others their being(s). In other words, Berlin’s own notion of freedom is caught up with the search for and the guarantee of status, which, as it were, cannot be surrendered for the sake of adapting to a changed world condition that would cause one’s civilization to go into decline. When new forms of liberty are pressed for, when groups whose historical cultures have been denied by the depravity of colonialism and imperial domination by alien powers, are these newly-assertive political formations, nations and ideological movements both, seeking their freedom or “merely” their “status” as full human beings? Berlin indeed admits that “the craving for status is, in certain respects, very close to the desire to be an independent agent,” but subsequently concludes his discussion on the “search for status” stating that

“such revolutionaries have usually felt it necessary to argue that, despite this, they represented the part of liberty, or “true” liberty, by claiming universality for their ideal, which the “real selves” of even those who resisted them were also alleged to be seeking, although they were held to have lost the way to the goal, or to have mistaken the goal itself owing to some moral or spiritual blindness. All this has little to do with Mill’s notion of liberty as limited only by the danger of doing harm to others. It is the non-recognition of this psychological and political fact (which lurks behind the apparent ambiguity of the term “liberty”) that has, perhaps, blinded some contemporary liberals to the world in which they live. Their plea is clear, their cause is just. But they do not allow for the variety of basic human needs. Nor yet for the ingenuity with which men can prove to their own satisfaction that the road to one
ideal also leads to its contrary."  

Berlin fails to recognize his invocation of true freedom as a concept in his essay at this point, and, that in his favored doctrine of negative liberty which at its core presumes the provision of security for individuals to be able to be, entirely without impediment, commits precisely the same sin in relation to liberty generally that he has ascribed here to those who seek merely an equalized status as opposed to the true cosmonauts - such as Berlin himself and as well members from his social and intellectual circles - in search of the truer liberty. Sustaining these privileges in the face of the drive for status, logically, therefore, requires at the same time the distancing of the witnessing of violence inherent in the system from those who will enjoy negative liberty if this doctrine is supported by legitimization as the freedom of free human beings - since those not enjoying it must have their deprivation rationalized in some manner. However, even in the case of the fortunate ones with the ability to enjoy negative liberty - in Berlin’s time persons such as himself, in ours a good example being the middles classes and labor aristocracies of the capitalist states - its production, and its continuing security, still require the harnessing of the technologies associated with some positive conception of life - even if that positive conception is paradoxically negating and nihilistic.
in its practical effect on society by means of quantifying nature in the name of culture transformed into permanent institution to be preserved against all possible decay through the articulation of all values - of the human world and the natural world - towards the operationalization of \textit{physis} permanently subordinated to the metaphysics of order.

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**IX. Rationalism and Nihilism at the End of History, or, Nietzsche’s Prophecy: “The War of Spirits”**

Thus it is not controversial even in the most spirited homes of science to realize, despite our technologies, \textit{physis} has become obscure to us as a result the way in which the systematization of knowledge has truncated the confidence of the individual in their own perceptions, and therefore in their unmediated experience of our surroundings. But \textit{physis}, in its very way of being, always remains \textit{there}, and, as such, teems and overflows the containers of conceptualization that characterize the hegemonic understanding of being, and so therefore must be tamed from its teeming if one is to retain faith in a metaphysical system. Such a feat must be impossible unless individuals organize through class, identity, nationalism, religious
nationalism, or even the normalization of individuality for the sake of making it functional for group-based maneuvers on which the system’s reproduction, material and ideological, is premised. In such a circumstance, freedom, conceived of as governmentality, has come to rely on economic activity organized with the assistance of the state and its associated institutional milieu - private and public - backed up by the decidedly illiberal machinery of sovereignty armed with the ability to decide on death, life, and, more to the point in crafting an ordered liberty, the *form of life* itself. So global elites have to fix “the economy, stupid” so that resources can be made available for ensuring selective benefits for those who accede to the terms of order and so that these can be credibly withheld as a sanction against those who fail to do so. Economic and technocratic political management is not merely a matter of applying a slide-rule to laws of nature and determining outcomes and policies to be utilized and sought after. Rather, a depoliticized politics of freedom emerges, judging some to be free, others not, some to be worthy of freedom, others not, some to be trainable for freedom, others beyond the pale, and so forth; this produces novel forms of exclusion based on an artificial division between the free and the unfree, on the basis of shifting, essentialized, but still inessential, criteria.
Aiming to discipline the conduct of society, and to do so in the name of freedom, requires the creation of an accountable subject whose actions can be measured against a proper standard for evaluation, and for Nietzsche, the emergence of free will, which would become the basis of this modern accountability, is a story thus etched in the dripping blood of slaves, subjugated persons, and out of the pains inflicted on oneself in the name of discipline.\textsuperscript{347} Most importantly, though, he has stated that the “civil servant,” who in a democratic age nominally-free of feudal titles of nobility, is, theoretically, every citizen in society who must presumably take responsibility for the sustenance of social order, and, who, in adhering to the terms of order as regards proper administration of rational behavior aimed at social progress\textsuperscript{348}, confirms having achieved becoming a “thing-in-itself,” “raised up” over and above the actual individual (“the civil servant as phenomena”) such that judgment about right and wrong, about good and evil conduct, can be rendered.\textsuperscript{349} Thus can a person be said to not only be free, and here Nietzsche is critiquing Kant, but to be trustworthy enough to be left alone in their freedom since their identity with rationality means they wont disturb social order. If they were to disturb the order of the day, they could be deemed to be unfree and lacking in the requisite character for freedom.\textsuperscript{350} Nietzsche’s original words on the matter follow:
“What is the task of all higher education?” To turn men into machines. “What are the means?” Man must learn to be bored. “How is that accomplished?” By means of the concept of duty. “Who serves as the model?” The philologist: he teaches grinding. “Who is the perfect man?” The civil servant. “Which philosophy offers the highest formula for the civil servant?” Kant’s: the civil servant as a thing-in-itself raised up to be judge over the civil servant as phenomenon.351

Cedric Robinson has pointed out the development and adoption of Kant’s political and moral philosophies in the predecessor states and cities of what would become Germany - as a philosophical ground for their nascent liberal legal orders - where a need arose to normalize bourgeois rationality came at the expense having a historically present, contingent, and authentic way of being and instead sought the securitization of social order352. Kant’s extreme doubtfulness of objective reality combined with his neoplatonist distinction between the higher faculties of the mind and the lowliness of the body - which had to be controlled for the sake of having any chance of accessing the real through objective laws of observation - made his philosophy appealing to those with sedentary, small-pleasures-filled lifestyles in the cities.353 These are the same people Nietzsche would later decry for the offense of yearning for the kind of freedom of “Christians, Cows, Shopkeepers,” etc. This class’ anxieties as the middle-classes between
the feudal lords and the very wealthy on the one hand and the impoverished, laboring, and bonded classes, on the other hand, which made them especially insecure about downward mobility and resentful of those above them, also encouraged the discovery of “a new social order”\textsuperscript{354} in which their creative energies could be unleashed and where those below them would also be clearly demarcated from them through new, reworked codes of social privilege and recognition that would serve as the basis for such.\textsuperscript{355} But as Charles Mill has written, this amounted to, when contextualized with Kant’s writings on race and empire,\textsuperscript{356} a theory of racialism that both distinguished the bourgeois from other classes, and, at least in Kant’s work, also sought to determine the basis for that distinction; and thus began a sad tradition of racism in German thought which would be found in the writings of Max Weber, Hegel, Marx and Engels, Nietzsche, and of course, Heidegger, as well. What Kant sought was not freedom per se, but what subsequent scholars have termed \textit{herrenvolk} democracy - master race democracy - which would do away with titles of hereditary nobility restricted to family and would expand the circle of recognition to those within a nation whose identity with rational, moral, and universal law indicates their elevation and legitimate capacity to shape common affairs.\textsuperscript{357} But in addition to the overt racism of Kant’s philosophy, which advocated a European union of states that would
conquer and civilize the world in accord with European values in the name of taming wildness and uncivilized peoples, the strong emphasis in his work on following the moral law as revealed by reason which if applied properly would produce the same outcome in all similar instances tended to alleviate the individual of the actual need to think authentically about a given situation, and transforms freedom into a tool used by the judges of social order and comity to ensure compliance with normal functioning over and against the spontaneous freedom of the individual. Nietzsche writes:

“Becoming has been deprived of its innocence when any being-such-and-such is traced back to will, to purposes, to acts of responsibility: the doctrine of the will has been invented essentially for the purpose of punishment, that is, because one wants to impute guilt. The entire old psychology, the psychology of will, was conditioned by the fact that its originators, the priest at the head of ancient communities, wanted to create for themselves the right to punish - or wanted to create this right for God. Men were considered “free” so that they might be judged and punished - so that they might become guilty: consequently, every act had to be considered as lying within the consciousness.”

Seeking to make reference to a higher order as the source of all value, rather than seeing the idea of a higher order as a man-made idea fabricated under specific circumstances, placing the idea of freedom in the realm of this higher order - essentializing it - is not only not
empirical insofar as freedom cannot be described in this manner with any degree of stability lest actual expressions of freedom come to contradict it and judged therefore as species of unfreedom, but it also obscures the question of being by removing responsibility for one’s self.

On this question of value many seek to describe Nietzsche as either an extreme individualist or as an apologist for the genocides of the twentieth century which came after him by saying that those types of historic crimes were only possible because of the moral relativism his philosophy introduced with so much deadly poetry. However this is an unfair characterization leveled on him by people who have failed to comprehend the dialectical concept of repression-response, or sublimation-desublimation, centered on the bodily reality of human life, that is at the core of his philosophy. Seeking to escape the body - more to the point, death and decay - and not being content with the poetry of theologies that speaks of a return to the sacred realm or fusing with the universe, god, or whatever other holy concept, indeed seeking to prove the reality of this goodness for the law-abiding, for the conformist, such individuals are characterized by their total lack of belief since their reduction of belief and faith to rational categories of empirical science, in the end, must also reveal the illusion of their god.
to themselves, as well. Tropes of the nation, of nationalist exception, of racial glory, of rational perfectibility of the rational self-interested actor whose superior knowledge makes them the representative of the consummated essence of all humanity (or at least of the nation), and negatively, tropes of the fear of otherness as threats to positive conceptions of the Self; these are all the circulating discourses of a culture and a society whose aim is to convince itself of its own existence, and atop, its goodness and worthiness for goodness.

Anticipating the desires of persons like Fukuyama to formalize control over human existence and the history-making quality that we find in each person, Nietzsche issued the following declaration in the name of the highest freedom, which, when we combine with Heidegger’s argument that the essence of being is “care,\textsuperscript{361}” produces a radical insight about the activity of caretaking, the dialectical relationship between Self and Other as always already informing the becoming of beings, and, most importantly, that this process will never truly come to a close and we will never be alleviated of its’ needing to be practiced.

“What alone can be our doctrine? That no one gives man his qualities - neither God, not society, nor his parents and ancestors, nor he himself. (The nonsense of the last idea was taught as “intelligible freedom” by Kant - perhaps by Plato already.) No one
is responsible for man’s being there at all, for his being such-and-such, or for his being in these circumstances or in this environment. The fatality of his essence is not to be disentangled from the fatality of all that has been and will be. Man is not the effect of some special purpose, of a will, an end; nor is he the object of an attempt to attain an “ideal of humanity” or an “ideal happiness” or an “ideal of morality.” It is absurd to wish to devolve one’s essence on some end or other. We have invented the concept of “end”: in reality there is no end.

There is no escape from life other than death. Anything short of that is an illusion whose effects on the body and mind make life less than what it could have otherwise been, and, because our consciousness is spontaneous and our intelligence is coeval with physis and not with the realm of the pure forms and ideas whose various manifestations in ancient and modern philosophies have kept this old prejudice alive and well into the day and age of the sciences, our lives, if lived in a manner that takes those forms as the signposts of all meaning and existence, will be consumed by resentment against what is, what could have been, and could be. We will call those free, dialectically engaged persons interacting with their surroundings “terrorists” for reminding us of this immediateness of our existences, and in defense of our spiritualized notion of the Self, be it group-centered or individual-centered; we will wage war against the Other. Policing the boundaries of the Self with the concept of morality, the accumulated resentments
of humanity coalesced around nation-states - “the ministry for collective salvation through a politics of generalized resentment”\textsuperscript{363} - which will then wage wars in ways never imagined possible in previous times lacking the extravagant, and therefore fragile and highly vulnerable, techno-political orchestrations of our age of the “world picture.”

“I contradict as has never been contradicted before and am nevertheless the opposite of a No-saying spirit. I am a bringer of glad tidings like no one before me; I know tasks of such elevation that any notion of them has been lacking so far; only beginning with me are there hopes again. For all that, I am necessarily also the man of calamity. For when truth enters into a fight with the lies of millennia, we shall have upheavals, a convulsion of earthquakes, a moving of mountains and valleys, the like of which has never been dreamed of. The concept of politics will have merged entirely with a war of spirits; all power structures of the old society will have been exploded - all of them are based on lies; there will be wars the like of which have never yet been seen on earth. It is only beginning with me that the earth knows great politics.\textsuperscript{364}.”

In the previous section we discussed Isaiah Berlin’s criticism of positive liberty on the lines of his general rejection of all absolute ideals of “armed prophets” who would force belief in a “final solution” to the problems inherent in the human condition on recalcitrant and aberrant individuals whose ways of living rejected totalized visions.\textsuperscript{365}
Here we have a prophecy from Nietzsche about the rise of precisely those armed prophets whose notion of truth - systematic lies concerning the unfolding of existence in order to retain the illusion of permanence - as a spiritualized and essentialized collection of iotas eventually requires them to engage in precisely the sort of militancy Berlin associates with positive liberty doctrines including revolutionary doctrines of national liberation in the 3rd world. Fanon anticipated this development when he discussed how nationalist movements would be tempted by the tokenization of identity as a sufficient, even exemplary, triumph over the degradation of their societies by colonialism and the racist insults they had to endure under those systems of rule. Like Nietzsche, Fanon understood that the mind resides within the body and that attempts to discipline the mind’s apprehension of the unfolding of reality without taking heed of the basic human drives, including in the context of overcoming colonialism and racism the drive to overcome humiliation, are doomed to be inadequate. Berlin, on the other hand, yields to resignation about the inescapability of the situation of the late capitalist west, which, in seeking to preserve its’ pluralism and zone of negative liberty, would be met with multifarious challenges from the emerging world whose very ability to be human had been stripped from them in
order to bring negative liberty to the West, and as a result, is resigned to the state of affairs that predominated the early ‘Cold War’ wherein American power, as the leading power in the West, would come to be used against wars of national liberation because these wars, as “wars of spirit,” were contests over not only the decolonization of the physical world where colonialism once ruled with an iron fist, but also were threats to the very idea of freedom being based on the ability of the individual to proceed through life unimpeded that propelled the imperial vision in the first place.368

Berlin himself was a partisan of this idea of freedom, but failed to recognize that a metaphysical notion of the Self - contradicting the rejection of absolute ideals stressed elsewhere in his thought and ultimately the source of his liberal counterrevolutionary resignation in the face of a rising tide of positive liberty - called much of his philosophy of freedom radically into question for a burgeoning global physis:

“The desire to not be impinged upon, to be left to oneself, has been a mark of high civilisation on the part of both individuals and communities. The sense of privacy itself, of the area of personal relationships as something sacred in its own right, derives from a conception of freedom which, for all its religious roots, is scarcely older, in its developed state, than the Renaissance or the Reformation. Yet its decline
would mark the death of a civilisation, of an entire moral outlook.\textsuperscript{369}.

Evident in Berlin’s words here, as well as the quote from him above where he indicated that pluralism and negative liberty were better and more humane than the alternatives, and that these ideals are the progeny of the West alone - an advanced West whose giving way to the non-West in regard to the mantle of global leadership would do all humanity a disservice - is that he somehow thinks that personal relationships and privacy were not human concerns before the rise of the Christian concept of the Self, and, at that, the Protestant version, since it is in that movement where many theorists have located the individualization of the Self, including even Polanyi and Fromm, whose work is otherwise more open-minded and reluctant to draw conclusions about the presence or lack thereof of these ideas in other parts of the world prior to or concurrently with European modernity.\textsuperscript{370} Because of this view, Berlin, historicizing history in accordance with the narrative of progress associated with the Enlightenment, of course comes to think that the rise of new nations beyond the West will become a threat to the West.

Berlin’s feelings were hardly restricted to him. We have already considered some of those whose thoughts prior to those of Berlin’s
arrival prefigured this idea of the defense of the individual understood as a set of interests and possessions - both material and ideological - that led them to sound the alarms for the need to defend order at home, and to also export order abroad, in the name of what they imagined to be freedom. In fact, as Robin says about Tocqueville, this was not really much more than anxiety over the loss of privileges and status associated with changing political fortunes leading to a need to reassert oneself in foreign lands - a process he traces from Tocqueville to the modern day when observing the resignation of American liberals post-9.11 to the reactionary politics of the right-wing of the Republican party within the US resulting in the reassertion of their ostensibly liberal understanding of themselves by projecting their powers onto a world to be civilized abroad.371 The consensus that has emerged regarding neoconservative/neoliberal politics and economic theory, with privatization of public wealth and institutions, the attenuation of welfare policies, the rise of police state practices for those within the territory of the West - a mirror-image with allowances for sensitivities of sentiment relative to those practices elsewhere - and other elements of the political economy of forced austerity and the propaganda of discipline reflects anxiety over the loss of status. This is proven by the simple fact that liberals who might otherwise challenge these policies find themselves either being apologists for them or
increasingly in favor of some of them.\textsuperscript{372} Liberals can thus make common cause to be made with despotism in the name of liberty, both at home and abroad, as Mill endorsed at the height of Britain’s liberal imperialism projects aimed at the production of the political economy of empire geared toward the freeing of individuals (such as himself) deemed worthy of all the resources needed to enact eccentric liberty.\textsuperscript{373}

Chris Hedges has recently indicated that this understanding of freedom, whose ultimate conceit is nothing more than selfishness, and an egoistic failure to engage in self-examination and self-criticism because oneself is deemed to be worthy of everything, eventually boomerangs. Americans prosecuting the ‘war on terror’ - a quest for global hegemony over resources masked in the language of ‘just war’ theory - with the importation of the tactics of the ‘war on terror’ into America itself indicates the veracity of this epistemological slippage since perceptions about the appropriateness of policy emerging from resignation about the chances of changing the world for the better, within America and abroad, and over the moral-ethical framework in which state policies should be conceptualized.\textsuperscript{374} Failure to change the world in America has led liberals to campaign beyond America to save nations from humanitarian catastrophes, but when those campaigns fail, which they seemingly always do recently if we consider the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan, at least from a liberal perspective in line with the reasons prominent self-appointed liberals gave for favoring invasion in 2001 and 2003, those same liberals have sought to blame domestic American constituencies such as lazy American workers and students, whistle-blowers who have revealed immense corruption and criminality on the part of the government, and other marginal domestic groups. In this these instances liberals have replayed the same accusatory tone that conservatives spoke after the US withdrawal from Vietnam, wherein anti-war demonstrators, blacks, women, and other people on the move in the 1960’s and 70’s were seen as fifth-columnists whose seeming disloyalty somehow influenced American soldiers abroad and led to a decline in their morale in that ignominious war.

In such a context budget cuts at home and belief in military force abroad, for the ruling classes this belief becomes an ideology held in unison across the partisan divide. For to retreat into creature comforts, and to reorder society, at home and abroad, to protect these indulgences, regardless of whether one enjoys multiculturalism or football, burgers, and beer, is the same thing: the fascism of the Self. Combined and coordinated selves, conservatives and liberals alike have resigned themselves to a compromise on social issues - in the
form of a depoliticized agreement to disagree - in order to cooperate on economic and military/strategic ones. They thus preside over the “death of the liberal class.” “Support for the war” Hedges writes “has allied liberals with venal warlords in Afghanistan who are as opposed to the rights of women and basic democratic freedoms, and as heavily involved in opium trafficking, as the Taliban. The supposed moral lines between the liberal class and our adversaries are fictional. The uplifting narratives used to justify the war in Afghanistan are pathetic attempts by the liberal class to redeem acts of senseless brutality. War cannot be waged to instill any virtue, including democracy or the liberation of women. War always empowers those who have a penchant for violence and access to weapons. War turns the moral order upside down and abolishes all discussions of human rights. War banishes the just and the decent to the margins of society. The power of modern weapons means inevitable civilian deaths or “collateral damage.” An aerial drone is our version of an improvised explosive device. An iron fragmentation bomb is our answer to a suicide bomb. A burst from a belt-fed light machine gun causes the same terror and bloodshed among civilians no matter who pulls the trigger.”

Liberals, according to Hedges, used to critique capitalism but now have “embraced the market,” and have chased radicals out of their ranks. The result?

“Mechanisms of control...have produced the “patriotic” citizen, plagued by job losses, bankrupted by medical bills, foreclosed on his or her house, and worried about possible terrorist attack. In this historical vacuum, the “patriotic” citizen clings
to the privilege of being a patriot - or, perhaps, the double privilege of bring white and a patriot. The retreat into tribal identity is a desperate attempt to maintain self-worth and self-importance at a time of deep personal and ideological confusion. The “patriotic” citizen, although abused by the actual policies of the state, unfailingly supports widespread surveillance and permanent war. The “patriotic” citizen does not question the $1 trillion in defense-related spending. The “patriotic” citizen accepts that the eighteen military and civilian intelligence agencies, most of whose work is now outsourced to private corporations, are held above the government. The “patriotic” citizen accepts the state’s assertion that it needs more police, prisons, inmates, spies, mercenaries, weapons, and troops than any other industrialized nation. The “patriotic” citizen objects when anyone suggests that military budgets can be cut, that troops need to come home, that domestic policies need more attention than the pursuit of permanent war. The military-industrial lobbies have ensured that military budgets are untouchable. The “patriotic” citizen admires the military and somehow pretends that the military is not part of the government. In the name of patriotism, the most powerful instruments of state power and control are effectively removed from public discussion. We endure more state control than at any time in U.S. History. And the liberal class, whose task was once to monitor and protest the excesses of the power elite, has assisted in the rout…
... The failure by the liberal class to articulate an alternative in a time of financial and environmental collapse clears the way for military values of hypermasculinity, blind obedience, and violence. A confused culture disdains the empathy and compassion espoused by traditional liberalism. The cruelty runs like an electric current through reality television and trash-talk programs, where contestants endure pain and humiliation while they betray and manipulate those around them in a ruthless world of competition. These are the values championed by an increasingly militarized society and the manipulation and dishonesty on Wall Street. Friendship, trust, solidarity, honesty, and compassion are banished for the unadulterated world of competition.378

Recent polls taken of Americans concerning the use of drones to kill people in supposedly hostile nations and regions, including a question that explicitly stated that it would be “acceptable to target civilians” produced astonishing results showing support by a portion comfortably higher than a simple majority.379 As Robin has also pointed out, the fear of being labeled unpatriotic has led to self-censorship among liberal media networks, has produced a total silencing of political activism in the workplace for fear of losing one’s job, has silenced Arab-American and Muslim-American communities with fear and concern over becoming targets for vigilante violence, and, Robin also indicates, all of this has become not only acceptable for influential liberals whose writings and speech set the tone for the culture of liberalism in America, but that beyond that, that they have actively
chided detractors for being unpatriotic in precisely the way Hedges indicates in the preceding selection.  

Berlin’s words foreshadow the kinds of compromises Hedges indicates in his essays, and that Hannah Arendt also understood to be at play in the racism that undergirded the halcyon days of European imperialism. Negative liberty in this sense is a universe of false pluralisms whereby what counts as plural is not the spontaneity of distinct consciousnesses - the chief reason for pluralism’s appeal - but instead the apparent, surface-level preservation of identities as essentialized iotas of culture which become impenetrable fortresses to the power of spontaneous reason flowing from the apprehension of *physis* and to the dialectical interplay between persons and nations inherent to freedom. Berlin, illustrating just this compromise of identification with the power that can provide protection, unwittingly reveals the fascist core of what has come to be understood as liberalism:

“[Another] characteristic of this notion of liberty is of greater importance. It is that liberty in this sense is not incompatible with some kinds of autocracy, or at any rate with the absence of self-government. Liberty in this sense is principally concerned with the area of control, not with its source……..The despot who leaves his subjects a wide area of liberty may be unjust, or encourage the wildest inequalities, care little
for order, or virtue, or knowledge, but provided he does not curb their liberty, or at least curbs it less than many other regimes, he meets with Mill’s specification…….
The desire to be governed by myself, or at any rate to participate in the process by which my life is to be controlled, may be as deep a wish as that for a free area for action, and perhaps historically older. But it is not a desire for the same thing. So different it is, indeed, as to have led in the end to the great clash of ideologies that dominate our world. For it is this, the ‘positive’ conception of liberty, not freedom from, but freedom to - lead one prescribed form of life - which the adherents of the ‘negative’ notion represent as being, at times, no better than a specious disguise for brutal tyranny.\textsuperscript{382}.

All attempts, according to Berlin to change the prevailing framework of negative liberty to make space for new ways of being not presently accepted because of the long-term normalization of ways of being an individual and the social and political arrangements of resources as the “standing reserve” to bring about that state of individuality, must terminate in the curtailment of freedom in accordance with the presumption that all such attempts to change the world can only be aimed at the elimination of contingency.\textsuperscript{383} Berlin’s other point, that negative liberty is a special blessing of the West for the rest of the world reinforces this belief - ahistorically we are quick to add - and that therefore it is absolutely imperative to produce the social arrangement that will give succor to people of Berlin’s class’ self-conception as free persons without obstacles in their way so that they
can strategically offer the rest of humanity bits of freedom as well, when they are so generous as to part with their precious time and resources.

Making the sublime body of the individual understood as a representation of the Self of more importance than the individual as an actual phenomena in the world as the world unfolds moment by moment has had the effect of alienating people from their own sense of self-interest, gearing them towards the defense of their idealized conception of what they imagine themselves to be: completely free, among the haloed and blessed, and not having to engage in explanation of their addictive patterns of behavior, either to others, or more importantly here, to themselves. Beholden to their drug-dealer who sells them their selves, individuals learn to not question authority.

This notion of the Self leaves individuals entirely at the mercy of (1) securing the signification of identity in the being of the Other understood as absolutely other, and (2) since this in the end will be deemed unreliable for the permanence-seeking being, this concept of the Self leaves the individual with no other option but to accept the intervention of a 3rd party to provide stability to the terms of order
undergirding the production of permanence in the midst of an uncertain existence. The RAND corporation undertook a series of experiments which produced an ideology that dismissed collective action as “irrational,” and that individuals behaving rationally would not act in “the common interest,” and that not only were forms of authoritarian statism with the outward appearance of communism and socialism to be feared as the deleterious outcomes of social organization, but that because “[unions must] require compulsory policies to achieve results,” the labor movement, too had the same “authoritarian overtones.”

While much has been made of these theories of human behavior, their claim to empirical validity can be brought into question by the prevalence of movements to change the world that overcome the collective action problem purportedly insurmountable in the absence of a 3rd party to give confidence to the individuals, or groups of individuals, attempting to cooperate with each other. Other examples of socially-significant action on the part of individuals and groups abound such that these theories cannot be seen as much more than a systematized prejudice built on the assumptions of Hobbes’ political thought whereby what was understood by Hobbes to be the
characteristic of a limit situation of political conflict and an extremely prudent pathway suggested to be followed in such a conflict so as to maximize security and survivability, is transformed into a general theory of human behavior in places and times even when the question of political order is not as pressing as it was in Hobbes’ day. As a result a spectacularly disabling fear is promulgated throughout society, tearing asunder social formations, public worlds, communities, labor unions, and any forms of combination that could cause individuals to resent extra work. Indeed, the most influential game in the rational choice theory pantheon was named “fuck you buddy” wherein it was presumed that the Other would always have an incentive because of not being able to guarantee one’s own cooperation with them, to cheat and betray their fellow person, suggesting that betrayal was to be the norm in what would come to be understood as rational human behavior. What emerges, from the capitalist apologetics of Mancur Olsen to the liberal social democracy of John Rawls, and even to Amartya Sen’s oft-deemed liberalization of the project of rationalism apparently evident in his inclusion of social goods and preference rankings (only to then use rational choice modeling to create a basis for society on not withholding these in accordance with a measure of a social equilibrium that cannot accommodate too much difference), is a negatively secured social order that inverts the Kantian moral ethic -
itself problematic because of its universalism expressed through the categorical imperative - from searching for the universally-recognized good in any situation to the avoidance of danger through a universally-recognizable bad that a rational person would always agree to avoid.\footnote{387}

How, in practice, this can be anything other than the straight-jacketing of personality, independent judgment, and the fastening of the development of consciousness onto the normalized terms of order, appears to be impossible.

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X. The End of History and its Discontents: Fukuyama’s Fascist Versus Fanon’s “Inessential” self

Taking aim squarely at the idea of freedom understood as a permanent zone of exclusion for the individual, Fanon makes short work of the tenability of such a claim, and also indicates that to all such claims there is a dialectical response:

“In its narcissistic phase the colonialist bourgeoisie, by way of its academics, had implanted in the minds of the colonized that the essential values - meaning western values - remain eternal despite all errors attributable to man. The colonized intellectual accepted the cogency of these ideas and there in the back of his mind
stood a sentinel on duty guarding the Greco-Roman pedestal. But during the struggle for liberation, when the colonized intellectual touches base again with his people, this artificial sentinel is smashed to smithereens. All Mediterranean values, the triumph of the individual, of enlightenment and Beauty turn into pale, lifeless trinkets. All those discourses appear a jumble of dead words. Those values which seemed to enoble the soul prove worthless because they have nothing in common with the real-life struggle in which the people are engaged……

……And the first among them is individualism. The colonized intellectual learned from his masters that the individual must assert himself. The colonialist bourgeoisie hammered into the colonized mind the notion of a society of individuals where each is locked in his subjectivity, where wealth lies in thought. But the colonized intellectual who is lucky enough to bunker down with the people during the liberation struggle, will soon discover the falsity of this theory. Involvement in the organization of the struggle will already introduce him to a different vocabulary. “Brother,” “sister,” “comrade” are words outlawed by the colonialist bourgeoisie because in their thinking my brother is my wallet and my comrade, my scheming. In a kind of auto-da-fe, the colonized intellectual witnesses the destruction of all his idols: egoism, arrogant recrimination, and the idiotic, childish need to have the last word. This colonized intellectual, pulverized by colonialist culture, will also discover the strength of village assemblies, the power of the people’s commissions and the extraordinary productiveness of neighborhood and section committee meetings. Personal interests are now collective interest because in reality everyone will be discovered by French legionnaires and consequently massacred or else everyone will be saved. In such a context, the “every man for himself” concept, the atheist’s form of salvation, is prohibited.”

And anticipating the temptation of positive liberty when the identity of the individual, in this case as an individual whose individuality is
premised, like Berlin’s, on their being an intellectual, Fanon preempts with concrete experience and an eye for the nuances of human existence by pointing out that a freedom and interplay of beings with beings is precluded because

“In order to assimilate the culture of the oppressor and venture into his fold, the colonized subject has had to pawn some of his own intellectual possessions. For instance, one of the things he has had to assimilate is the way the colonialist bourgeoisie thinks. This is apparent in the colonized intellectual’s inaptitude to engage in dialogue. *For he is unable to make himself inessential when confronted with a purpose or idea.* On other hand, when he operates among the people he is constantly awestruck. He is literally disarmed by their good faith and integrity. He is then constantly at risk of becoming a demagogue. He turns into a kind of mimic man who nods his assent to every word by the people, transformed by him into an arbiter of truth. But the fellah, the unemployed and the starving do not lay claim to the truth. They do not say they represent the truth because they are the truth in their very being.”389

But in response to the basic point Fanon is making, on behalf of those not positioned to make this point to a global audience of thinkers, liberals from the West have decried either Fanon specifically, as in the case of Arendt who referred to him as a fetishist of violence,390 and not as someone speaking a basic and radical truth about the world in which we live, or they have attacked the idea at the core of his philosophy: that human drives for freedom exist in all people and can only be
whittled through distortion and abjectness trained into them as addiction to sensation, disease both mental and physical, and through the compromises in their existence that become characteristic of those who accept their own debasement. Losing their drive, their desire to live a full life and to determine their own fate, they become “men without chests,” and fear, prudence, racial similitude, and resignation - what C. Wright Mills termed “the conservative mood” - become their existential realities. This infects the thinking of Isaiah Berlin, John Stuart Mill, Richard Rorty, and Francis Fukuyama from the direction of their either positing a teleological goal in history - metaphysical or otherwise - as well as the earlier liberals Hobbes and Locke, who are evidently essentially consumed by fears of imprudence expressing itself as non-conformity or inefficiency upsetting a prevailing social order already arrived at because of the eternal nature of natural laws they claim govern humankind. The fear of the Other, driven by a deep awareness of one’s own not living right, and suspicion that the Other is looming and seeking revenge, creates an incentive to depoliticize society, the world, indeed politics altogether, and leads to omissions of reality - such as the “specter” of the Vietnam genocide - from the American imagination of exceptionalist triumphalism.
The violence on display, through the institutionalization of fear in American society, for those with the right kind of eyes, is not fathomed by Fukuyama, who uses his elite students as examples to describe the nature of American life,\textsuperscript{395} hardly a representative group for the desperation and loathing now found throughout the land. In so missing the point, he manages to essentialize those who wish to “restart history” as mere malcontents in the minority, not to be taken seriously.\textsuperscript{396} Dismissing those who are discontent with what he calls liberal democracy, Fukuyama, avoiding all responsibility for the criminality commenced in the name of American freedom and capitalism, assigns these errors to a secularized eschatology of capitalism and the rationalization of all life according to one image of human destiny, writes:

“Looking backward, we who lived in the old age of mankind might come to the following conclusion. No regime - no ‘socioeconomic system’ - is able to satisfy all men in all places. This includes liberal democracy. This is not a matter of the incompleteness of the democratic revolution, that is, because the blessings of liberty and equality have not been extended to all people. Rather, the dissatisfaction arises precisely where democracy has triumphed most completely: it is a dissatisfaction with liberty and equality. Those who remain dissatisfied will always have the potential to restart history.”\textsuperscript{397}

Those who would restart history, then, abandon the holy project of the
enlightenment to know all truths, to determine all values, and to live in accordance with those rational prescriptions, which have obviously provided a framework for “liberty and equality,” which malcontents of course do not want. Or so Fukuyama would have us think. Even Hegel, who Fukuyama based his theory on, would disagree.

“Before the universal can perform a deed it must concentrate itself into the One of individuality and put at the head an individual self-consciousness; for the universal will is only an actual will in a self, which is a One. But thereby all other individuals are excluded from the entirety of this deed and have only a limited share in it, so that the deed would not be a deed of the actual universal self-consciousness. Universal freedom, therefore, can produce neither a positive work nor a deed; there is left for it only negative action; it is merely the fury of destruction.398”

In order to escape this two-bit ahistorical appropriation of Hegel’s dialectic - a statist approach we are not defending herein - Fukuyama spends a great deal of time dwelling on the Platonic conception of thymos - the spirited part of the soul assigned to the guardian class in his philosophy of the state - and argues that the rationalization of thymos in accordance with the modern sciences, whose goal he sees as the rationalization of desire per se, is threatened by historical forces that Nietzsche and Fanon explicitly took notice of. And while Hegel is honest enough to indicate the extent to which the state and civil society
merge in his theory of political order, Fukuyama offers a clouded vision that remains obscured to the reader so as to not appear as relatively fascistic as it actually is. His preferred solution to the dilemma of the will was to domesticate desire in the name of reason, and that liberal democratic capitalism would achieve this by giving free reign to domesticated desires to be fulfilled and depoliticized. Sheldon Wolin has called this “Inverted Totalitarianism,” where creature comforts are met, private domiciles are nominally inviolable - save for in exceptional scenarios - and individuals are divided from one another through market segmentation, the manipulation of identity, and the use of police state repression to discourage political mobilization and concern.

None of this squares with Hegel’s criticism of bourgeois culture, and instead reveals congruity with Hobbes’ ideas expressed in the previous section of this division concerning what sorts of activities would be permitted and what would be prohibited, and the kind of corporatization of society as the state would be necessary for the preservation of order, secured by the individual’s authorization, because defined as rational, the institution of sovereignty is the collective corporeal body of society. Hobbes, honest enough to expand his analysis into the realm of foreign affairs between states, at
least had the decency to admit that the order between states in order to preserve a domestic realm arranged for the sake of market freedom and shallow, possessive, and therefore secure, individualism and freedom, would require each sovereign to confront each other as enemies and lords of incommensurate domains.\footnote{Fukuyama, in the name of ending such conflicts, endorsed, for the sake of that old philosopher’s canard of truth and consistency, the “homogenization of mankind,”\footnote{Inherent to this process would be the last man’s usurpation of the noble Nietzschean and Fanon-inspired emerging world’s goal of making a new man and the transvaluation of all values in the name of a new internationalism where nations would be free and equal and part of a global consciousness aimed at increasing the freedom for all. This was the vision of liberal internationalism created in the revolutionary minds of persons like Fanon and Jawaharlal Nehru, whose sister Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, as well as Paul and Eslanda Robeson, among many others, were involved in major international theorizing about the new world order based on development, modernity, socialism, and 3rd world non-alignment in relation to the major power blocs of the then emerging ‘Cold War.’}} Fukuyama, in the name of ending such conflicts, endorsed, for the sake of that old philosopher’s canard of truth and consistency, the “homogenization of mankind,”\footnote{Inherent to this process would be the last man’s usurpation of the noble Nietzschean and Fanon-inspired emerging world’s goal of making a new man and the transvaluation of all values in the name of a new internationalism where nations would be free and equal and part of a global consciousness aimed at increasing the freedom for all. This was the vision of liberal internationalism created in the revolutionary minds of persons like Fanon and Jawaharlal Nehru, whose sister Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, as well as Paul and Eslanda Robeson, among many others, were involved in major international theorizing about the new world order based on development, modernity, socialism, and 3rd world non-alignment in relation to the major power blocs of the then emerging ‘Cold War.’} for the sake of human freedom at ‘the end of history.’ Inherent to this process would be the last man’s usurpation of the noble Nietzschean and Fanon-inspired emerging world’s goal of making a new man and the transvaluation of all values in the name of a new internationalism where nations would be free and equal and part of a global consciousness aimed at increasing the freedom for all. This was the vision of liberal internationalism created in the revolutionary minds of persons like Fanon and Jawaharlal Nehru, whose sister Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit,\footnote{As well as Paul and Eslanda Robeson, among many others, were involved in major international theorizing about the new world order based on development, modernity, socialism, and 3rd world non-alignment in relation to the major power blocs of the then emerging ‘Cold War.’} as well as Paul and Eslanda Robeson, among many others, were involved in major international theorizing about the new world order based on development, modernity, socialism, and 3rd world non-alignment in relation to the major power blocs of the then emerging ‘Cold War.’\footnote{As well as Paul and Eslanda Robeson, among many others, were involved in major international theorizing about the new world order based on development, modernity, socialism, and 3rd world non-alignment in relation to the major power blocs of the then emerging ‘Cold War.’}
In his distortion of liberalism, bespeaking a greater betrayal of liberality and freedom - an ethos purportedly universal in nature because of its inherent accommodation of difference through creative decentralization, a maximum of individual liberty, and an ethical determination on the part of individuals to tolerate and accept one another - in favor of western identity politics crudely absorbing Hegelian teleologies of history to depoliticize American triumphalism licenses his intellectual and moral omission of the Indochina genocide, activates casual castigation of recalcitrants to his views as “Indians” attacking “wagons” on the path to destiny,* Fukuyama shows his cards:

“For while modern societies have evolved toward democracy, modern thought has arrived at an impasse, unable to come to a consensus on what constitutes man and his specific destiny, and consequently unable to define the rights of man. This opens the way to a hyperintensified demand for recognition of equal rights, on the one hand, and for the re-liberation of megalothymia on the other. This confusion in thought can occur despite the fact that history is being driven in a coherent direction by rational desire and rational recognition, and despite the fact that liberal democracy in reality constitutes the best possible solution to the human problem.409,4

We have already shown that what Fukuyama and the pantheon of liberal thinkers prior to him consider democracy is actually an exclusionary politics decided upon by those who display the proper
showmanship of statecraft needed to imbue confidence into the mass of people through a manipulation of the iconography of the nation, and that what is considered liberalism fails to even include within it a robust notion of being liberal. Instead, a conservative, resigned, resentful individualism is what these thinkers have in mind, one which breeds exclusion, and the *megalothymia* that Fukuyama decried. As Nietzsche clearly understood, there is no end to history unless one wishes to surrender the capacity to make history, which is itself an oxymoron since the “there-disclosing” character of human existence is the source of history as an idea. Fukuyama places all rational values in the West, and denies them to the Other, whose clamoring for freedom is dismissed callously as the resort to a threatening relativism of values because (1) the West is the only rational source of the disclosure of historical instances in his work, and (2) pretensions to expand beyond the West and include the instances of existence of the Other *in the truth of the truth* would essentially threaten his triumphalistic narrative. Fukuyama continues:

“It is possible that if events continue to unfold as they have done over the past few decades, that the idea of a universal and directional history leading up to liberal democracy may become more plausible to people, and that the relativist impasse of modern thought will in a sense solve itself. That is, cultural relativism (a European invention) has seemed plausible to our century because for the first time Europe
found itself forced to confront non-European cultures in a serious way through the experience of colonialism and de-colonization. Many of the developments of the past century - the decline of the moral self-confidence of European civilization, the rise of the Third World, and the emergence of new ideologies - tended to reinforce the belief in relativism. But if, over time, more and more societies with diverse cultures and histories exhibit a similar long-term patterns of development; if there is a continuing convergence of types of institutions governing most advanced societies; and if the homogenization of mankind continues as a result of economic development, then the idea of relativism may seem much stranger than it does now. For the apparent differences between peoples’ “languages of good and evil” will appear to be an artifact of their particular stage of historical development.\textsuperscript{411}

So here we see that instead of reading Nietzsche how we have read him - that repression of human agency results in resentment that creates violence, psychoses, and other forms of disorder in the individual leaving them weak and at the mercy of authority - and how Fanon politicizes our understanding of existentialist philosophy - Fukuyama reads Nietzsche as a straightforward exponent of undomesticated and dangerous forces that are ascribed to being the preserve of essentialized, non-western, not properly domesticated others whom we must be on the guard for for their wildness threatens the freedom of the “last man” that Fukuyama associated with why the West triumphed in the ‘Cold War.\textsuperscript{412} This goes for people who reside in the West and have been rebellious and who have been renegades,
engaging in critiques of their own societies. The disparagement of Noam Chomsky, Michael Moore, Chelsea Manning, Daniel Ellsberg, Julian Assange, Martin Luther King, Sandra Fluke, Jane Fonda, and any and all cultural critics and political activists as some specie of crazy, evidencing madness in their affairs, being anarchist and otherwise psychologically unfit, or bringing them before the McCarthy Committee, or subjecting them to surveillance, shows that being American, or western, is not about where you’re at, but who you are - your identity being understood as presented iotas of signification that cause others to ‘trust’ you as a ‘rational’ person with a prudent disposition.

But the story of history doesn’t end here. Rather than living up to the liberal values associated with the project of democracy, the preservation of the systematics of democratic machinery is preserved at the expense of those liberal values, offering a curious inversion of Fareed Zakaria’s claim that democracies in 3rd world nations were showing signs of becoming “illiberal democracies.413” Perhaps this can be explained by projection, or, perhaps, by the kind of competitive envy that is there for all to see in Thomas Friedman’s opinion columns where we can find him frequently praising the Chinese and the Indians
for working hard and learning useful things like science and math, decrying Americans as lazy, too interested in cultural theory, and otherwise unfit to compete with undemocratic (China) and deeply-conservative and collectivist/family-honor-based (India) societies. Indeed, to look for a specific destiny for humanity and to seek to discover this in a consensus agreed upon by all can only come through the homogenization that is part of globalization of economic relations that make people so desperate that in many cases those whose spirit is broken in the name of the ‘Spirit of History’ seek no more than the tawdry trinkets afforded them as iotas of meaning, be these material objects circulated in the economy of capitalism, or be they the essentialized iotas of identity understood as essence which serve only as a cultural nomenclature of language and clothing for an homogenized, resentful, resigned, power-identifying being beneath.

XI. The Essential Self and Fascist Liberalism: Betraying Freedom
Via the Rationalization of Alienation, the Nation-State, and Beyond

In the absence of cultural meanings, those having been swept aside as
relativist by the transformation of humanity by technology in the name of serving rational desires and the desire for rational recognition, the person finds themselves in a peculiar position of alienation, isolation, loneliness, and powerlessness over their fate beyond a very narrow sphere. Fanon described that a result this was European’s way of seeing their “wallet as their brother” and their “scheming as their comrade.” Indeed, under the veneer of civil society, the anxieties of the war of all against all have returned to the fore, and the result is a widespread lack of faith in institutions and a similar lack of trust for one’s fellow human beings. As Fanon also indicated above, the inability of a person thus essentialized to make themselves inessential leads them into a communicative quagmire wherein not only is signification pared down to the bare minimum at the expense of loquacious and poetic ruminations that could point beyond the essence of what is, to a new world, but also even basic rudimentary significations are called into question. This is precisely the resignation that infected Berlin, and that ironically Fukuyama, despite his elitism, celebrated as a cultural achievement.

But the solution pointed to in Fukuyama’s words from just above, to this so-called “crisis of the West,” is that nations should reinvest their energies in the myth of the nation for the sake of giving people
the needed outlets for their drives and desires, to sate them, and also to
diffuse them. This curious blend of liberalism - concern for the lives of
individuals however grudgingly and narrowly conceived - and statism
incorporates an understanding of an individual’s complete personality
that is essentially incomplete and inauthentic as we shall see, but that
is supposed to cure them of their mistrust for one another through the
mechanism of recognition understood initially anthropologically, then
extrapolated and consecrated as the culture of the nation. Carl Schmitt,
a close friend of and theoretical collaborator of Leo Strauss, and
fervent Nazi political activist at the highest level of the party at a time,
discerning the same crisis of liberalism in Europe, ascribed the
inability of the liberal state to send people to their deaths and demand
from them the ultimate sacrifice as the source of this crisis.418 As
David Campbell has put it, for the state, “stasis means death,”419 so we
can understand Schmitt’s point that what he called “constituent
power,420” is something that states have to always harness in the name
of identity. Identity is the expression of human life for Schmitt, and the
state is seen as its ideal representative, in the national form, since, for
Schmitt the political sphere of human existence is distinct from other
spheres - economic, social, cultural, etc. - and this is essential to
preserving the defense of a specific people - the nation - because for
him politics is about the “distinction between friend and enemy.421”
With this in mind we can understand that the calls for the preservation of an authentic, essential, and unique west, are none too different than the calls for and Israel with a Jewish identity, a Hindu Rashtra in India, a Pakistan or Egypt with a Muslim character, a Nigeria or Philippines with a Christian identity, since, as we recall from the immediately preceding discussion of Berlin and Fukuyama, of Rorty, Hobbes, and Locke, that what connected all these thinkers was a desire to preserve an interiorized domestic space whereby certain behaviors, liberals like to call this freedom, can be unfettered in their practice, and other behaviors can be restricted and excluded altogether.

But because there are no guarantees for the permanence of these identities, and because the nomadic history of humankind immediately disproves the validity of nation-states as an essential and universal form, the deployment of technological resources to produce the kind of gathering of people near one another to form a nation-state is a necessity of such arrangements. So here we have a question of binding individuals together against their spontaneity and inclinations to explore their surroundings on their own terms. As we discussed above, from Hobbes through to the present, liberalism has been grounded on the fear of the state of nature, of other individuals, of other nations… and because of this what has been called liberalism bears intense
similarity to Schmitt’s nation-state conception wherein the nation becomes a holy community capable of extracting from individuals the highest sacrifice: that of their lives. “In the case of need,” defending the idea of the state against individual freedom being the basis for politics, Schmitt writes

“the political entity must demand the sacrifice of life. Such a demand is in no way justifiable by the individualism of liberal thought. No consistent individualism can entrust to someone other than to the individual himself the right to dispose of the physical life of the individual. An individualism in which anyone other than the free individual himself were able to decide upon the substance and dimension of freedom would be only an empty phrase.”

But not just their lives. They are called upon to sacrifice something more valuable by liberal states. Two points. First, despite the apparent architectonic incongruity between Schmitt’s words here, and Hobbes, cited above, where he indicated that there was never a justified authority unless individuals authorized authority, Hobbes engaged in considerable backsliding on this point by concluding that living within a state is implicit authorization of the sovereign institution, and that rational fear of the end of social life and of individual life at the hands of the state of nature - war with other nations or through ravages of the planet - would propel the rational individual to thus authorize the state.
Schmitt’s portrayal of nationalist states as being comically devoid of individualism, and attendant caricature of liberal states being devoid of fellow-feeling fails to distinguish his view from Hobbes’ view. Second, Schmitt’s, and Hobbes’ emphases on life, its protection, its possibly being surrendered, its strategic employment by the state for various ends, foreshadows a most important distinction we will be addressing below, between zoe - or “bare life” - and bios - life with political and social identity conferred through formalized rules of recognition. In both cases, recognition, not individual freedom, is the aim of the state, because as Robin pointed out in relation to Hobbes, only a very narrow band of behavior is accepted within the state, with death as the ward, and fear its existential offspring, manipulated by the state to obscure reality in order to ensure stabilized recognition. Here we see the similarity in Hobbes’, Schmitt’s, and Fukuyama’s notions of order, not to mention other liberal theorists we have been examining. The individual is free to absorb the form of life on offer in their society, but not beyond the limits of the “law of nature,” “prudence,” “harm” arbitrarily defined (as it must always be when elevated to a principle for governance through which individuals will regulate other individuals in the name of absolute freedom as their core social expectation), “suffering,” and, ultimately, fear. Liberal states, defying their apparent charge, request individuals to sacrifice their integrity,
something that individuals have been known to be willing to die for.

Against both Schmitt and Hobbes, at times individuals, both individualists and those more group-minded, may see themselves as relatively inessential and on their own, may opt to sacrifice their comfort, themselves, their adherence to constructed national traditions, etc., for reasons ranging from the magnanimous to the utterly pragmatic. From the struggles for civil rights and freedom in the heyday of the black struggle to overcome American racism, to the volunteers in the Spanish civil war assisting the forces fighting against fascism in that country in the 1920’s and 1930’s, and in many other moments in the recent past, evidence abounds whereby liberals sacrificed their lives and well-being for causes they deemed just. What they wouldn’t sacrifice their lives for was the state understood in a repressive and violent manner, often times being willing to give their lives for the causes in opposition to such a state of affairs. What Schmitt is decrying is not the inability of liberals to sacrifice themselves due to their inherent hedonistic depredations, but his inability to imagine that the state could not command that sacrifice any longer in the name of the social order of which he was the beneficiary, affording him status, privilege, recognition and a relatively easy life relative to the swathes of humanity relegated to the receiving end of
the state’s violence. The same goes for Fukuyama, whose focus on his own students as being somehow representative of American life and society in general is a dead giveaway of his being out of touch with reality.

Schmitt is correct, though, on one point: that the liberal state whose mission was to satisfy individual wants and needs would not hold quite as much ability to command those individuals in its’ midst to die in the name of the state, since, as we have been discussing in this division, those individuals reared in such a context with the expectations for life inherent therein, would not be able to make a calculation for the common good, however defined, leaving liberal states even more dependent on the use of fear to ensure this critical agency. So liberalism, versus Schmitt’s conservatism, merely produces individuals free to be conservative and left alone, as opposed to simply conservative because that way of being has been imputed a naturalness associated with the traditions of the nation.

Two developments ensue. First, a new way of understanding individualism was developed that abstracted individualism from social contexts that precede contextual drives for creating loyalty to a state formation. To achieve this rational human behavior was modeled on
the basis of (1) individuals not being able to trust one another and besides that not wanting to for the sake of their own advantage, and (2) this model of human behavior was recirculated through disciplines of social sciences ranging from political science and international affairs, where these ideas were used to justify US foreign policy *realpolitik* in the ‘Cold War’ to convince policy-makers and the people alike that hard-nosed alliances with dictators holding back the tide of wars of liberation were necessary to the preservation of their own freedoms back home, to the rapidly developing sciences of modern economics where similar ideas of a mutual standoff between individuals were naturalized. This had the effect of undermining alternative economic arrangements and production calculi whose immediate goal was not short-term profit, such as development projects, social investments in community life, and other invaluable but difficult to monetize and quantify aims of social organization geared towards production.

So this first set of developments, generally understood under the rubric of rational choice theory, sought to delay the reckoning of a social order lacking the poetic imagination of individual and community history-making by giving a naturalness to selfishness, which on a micro-scale mimicked precisely the behavior of American policy-makers abroad operating in the context of “the military metaphysic”424
that Mills said was the result of anxiety over status among military-industrial-complex operators whose very sense of self was so insecure that they sought the recreation of “primary bonds”\textsuperscript{425} by recreating certainty on the basis of a status hierarchy scaleable by those with the darkest imagination of threat and the consequent confidence-producing abilities to sell security from those imagined threats, thus reinforcing the institution’s position in society through enlarged, because thus justified, budgets, and also invigorating and sustaining belief within the organization in the organization’s reason for existence.\textsuperscript{426} Identification with the military through cinema, television, and news-cum-propaganda reinforces the worldview underlying the confidence strategies of the military-industrial-complex’s operatives, but, as we can rightly anticipate, is always already threatened by the consciousness of veterans of wars whose rapidly expanded awareness from being in war zones, and from the massive economic disturbance in society caused by war spending whose ripple effects are felt throughout society. As a result pressure always exists in this context to find new ways of reinforcing belief in the state, so performance of statecraft, the deputization of much of the population as “civil servants,” the creation of reward and punishment hierarchies associated with employment and recognition (turning back Fukuyama’s point about recognition being naturally desired on its
head),\textsuperscript{427} and the looming threat of exclusion at the conceptual and at the practical level for failing to adjust one’s cognition in line with the prevailing epistemology. But there is simply too much world, too much empirical fact, too much lived life, for this to hold indefinitely and in all places, so eventually, servants of permanence must move beyond the confines of the state to reproduce their terms of order.

This leads to the second point, that the transnationalization of the state apparatus becomes necessary since persons will eventually realize that their own interests don’t match with those seeking to make things, especially themselves and their rule, permanent. In \textit{Promoting Polyarchy} William Robinson conducts research into the foundations of the drive towards the global dispersal of production, consumption, cultural circulation, and security patterns and shows that a number of intellectuals closely associated with the foreign policy elite in America and their allies and contemporaries in other countries - very prominently Samuel Huntington, whose significance we will address below - conspired to deliberately cannibalize the accumulated wealth, monetary and social, of the working and middle-classes of their respective countries, long based on industrial production and middle-level trading functions, by utilizing new technologies of transportation and communication to take advantage of governments around the
world whose internal order and legitimacy was weak, was based on coercive domination of civil society through mechanisms of physical violence, and who could become dependent on the three poles represented by the US, Japan, and the powerful European states’ provision of largesse for their internal power politics exigencies. In return for their largesse, the countries and corporations represented in transnational fora such as the Trilateral Commission would have access to ready-made outlets for excess production of consumer goods which would increasingly become less affordable to the immiserated middle-classes in their own countries, and to a massive supply of impoverished and repressed laborers who would be presented with the demonic fait accompli we are now familiar with in the form of the global material, textile, manufactured goods, and electronics sweatshop/maquila system whereby production costs are kept low through political repression, and we in the West come to enjoy our freedoms once again, with new low, low prices.428

At the core of all this is the ontology of being that we base our notion of “world,” upon. We began this division by quoting it directly from Hobbes, who declared that “felicity” is ceaseless consumption that ends only in death. In the absence of a nationalist dogma that Schmitt thought necessary for the cohesion of the state, which was always thin
and based upon an elite’s prejudice against the masses borne out of their essential disconnection from reality, we have come to replace that not with a profoundly egalitarian and loving society, but one whereby humanity’s negative self-image is medicated through endless consumption, all the more made effective as a marketing slogan because we are the ‘good’ ones who deserve to be happy.

But the prevalence of nationalist dogma, or the lack thereof, is irrelevant, since, in the end both Hobbes and Schmitt favor the use of material power to reinforce the status quo, with the former asking permission from the authorization of individuals rationalized through fear, and the latter commanding the same because of the fear and trembling instilled by traditions that divided the world metaphysically into friend and enemy. Corey Robin has also indicated in an article about Edmund Burke that this erstwhile traditionalist and conservative, portrayed as an isolationist multiculturalist at times, actually favored in uncompromising terms a Europe-wide counterrevolutionary rollback of forces that threatened the status quo, all in the name of preserving the idea of a traditional society with elites who would rule because they knew better than the masses - a vision essentially the same as Huntington’s and of other elites who have sought alliances with elites of other nations than their own in the face of the breakdown of social,
political, and economic consensus.\footnote{429}

On closer examination this is precisely what Schmitt had in mind when he spoke of national identity, since in his imagination, as Giorgio Agamben points out in \textit{State of Exception}, he is attempting to fill what he perceives to be the terrifying ‘void’\footnote{430} of human existence without meaning, and as Schmitt himself indicates in his writing, this meaning can only be given to people through their community, whose organization politically as a nation, is the consummation of their destiny as a people; and to this they can only be led by elites. Elites therefore should collude across borders to preserve the idea of borders. In a world without states, Schmitt writes, all distinction becomes impossible, and the ability of states to use war as a tool to gain obedience of their citizens is lost.\footnote{431} So statecraft, like modern capitalist marketing of the “ideology of consumerism,”\footnote{432} is aimed at overcoming the same inherent problem associated with the despairing attitude toward life and community on the part of isolated individuals: their resignation to an alienated fate that has centrifugal effects on social organization, especially since that organization of society in the first place is based on dividing humanity (the bundle of emotions and feelings whose locus in classical theory is the body - such as love, friendship, honor, joy, etc.) against itself and its now abstracted
consciousness (the mind, the rational controller of the body, etc.). The capacity for obedience in both situations relies upon an intervention by another actor in the social system outside of the dialectical relation between two individuals, providing them a framework of signification for making “common sense” possible and therefore reciprocal recognition, as well.

In a sense, then, the prisoner’s dilemma situation is overcome in both the consumerist and the nationalist formulas because in both the individual contra another individual is given a template for signaling amongst themselves for the sake of trustworthiness. The conundrum of recognition is solved, as is the arbitrariness of the harm principle in Mill’s theory. By this provision the state reduces its own burdens of reinforcing its political discipline in civil society, and it also, by transferring this burden onto individuals, gives seekers of permanence a means to police the boundaries and limits of their own day to day existence in accordance with their own needs. The result is an identity politics, in positing an identity as the case is with nationalism, and in negating all identities, as the case is in accelerating global capitalism, that articulates what normal, regular, and even free behavior is considered to be in society to the exigencies required for authority. As Hobbes puts it, freedom is what the sovereign decides is permitted,
and as Schmitt puts it, the sovereign is the agent in political society who can decide upon (1) the suspension of normal functioning of the laws and the spontaneous existence of society to conduct interventions outside of the normal functioning of law and order, often in contravention of that order, but for the sake of securing the illusion of order in society, and (2) which forms of life are to be excluded from society as examples to the rest that certain transgressions of the sovereign’s will will not be tolerated - something achieved through the use of violence against bodies, recriminations against ways of living, and other means of distancing to produce the social distance required to ensure the lesson is learned.

In an essay on Schmitt’s *The Concept of the Political*, Leo Strauss has suggested that none of this goes far enough, and that something more akin to universal moral leadership on the part of the West is required for the preservation of world order because in the absence of the universal principles of a moralizing force - especially in the context of the ‘Cold War’ - the prisoner’s dilemma always threatens to reemerge. Strauss makes this point clear when he chastises Schmitt for citing Hobbes’ understanding of sovereignty in theorizing about the nature of decision-making authority. If people realized the implication of Hobbesian sovereign relativism, Strauss argues, then they could
always determine that there is no natural law and therefore that all law being conventional needn’t be respected, threatening nationalist projects even of the kind that Schmitt argued would be conservative enough to secure the compliance of the masses with the diktat of tradition in one country. Keeping this in mind, Fukuyama’s desire for using the power of modern science to determine ‘what people really want’ and combining those insights to be gained with a need to project an image of stable order in which those desires could be ministered to would seem to require on a global level the kind of imperial order the neoconservatives have long cherished.

In this way neoliberal economics, with its despairing view of human nature, makes common cause with neoconservative politics offering shallow identity structures based on the ritualization of culture and religion for the sake of producing a sense of belonging in order to bind nations together such that they can be a part of the global order of production and consumption.
DIVISION TWO

XII. Shock and Awe: The March of Freedom, The State of Exception, and Disciplinary Effects of Exemplary Violence on a Global Scale

Our efforts have motivated by a remarkable documentary film, *The Trap: What Happened to Our Dreams of Freedom*, by the filmmaker Adam Curtis. In the opening montage of each of the film’s three hour-long installments, a brief clip is played where we witness an American soldier in Iraq, apparently without irony, yelling at a crowd of Iraqis to “get the fuck back; we’re here for your fucking freedom.” For Americans, on the one hand, that freedom is understood as the ability to do whatever one wants without obstacles, complemented by the notion that such a desire is entirely natural and entirely salutary for human beings. But, as we have seen, on the other hand, this freedom also requires submission and conformity, and most essentially, an agreement on the objects of fear in the world. This agreement extends to codifications of personal conduct to avoid improper signification that might threaten either the positive conception of national order in a nationalist/fascist doctrine of identity (secretly pined after by some of today’s liberals) or the negative conception of liberty formed around the exclusion of certain behavior as threats to the security of individual freedoms to be privately enjoyed.
What emerges in this vision of public order is an enforceable guarantee on ways of life, ideally decentralized when possible to achieve efficiency through everyday enforcement by citizens amongst each other, but of course at times requiring the use of coercive violence to indicate both the unacceptability of a way of life, and to give vent to resentments among citizens who have repressed their spontaneity in order “fit in,” who can prove for themselves their supremacy and identification with power through the ‘real’ victory they can thus feel over the Other.

In , *The Shock Doctrine*, Naomi Klein argues that the purpose of American foreign policy interventions - through the agency of “shock and awe” - is to “de-pattern” existing behavioral practices in societies around the world and to re-articulate activities for connection to the ostensibly free-market of global capitalism. Without these critical interventions, Klein argues in her critique of Milton Friedman’s economic theories’ claim to naturalness and universality, individuals as they are conceived by neoliberal economic theory wouldn’t be ‘free’ in terms of their choices in the market, their ability to own property, and, thus, ultimately, in their ability to securely exercise free-choice over their fates in life absent dreaded social coercion emanating from what are usually decried as primitive, unfree, subversive, backwards, and otherwise traditional mechanisms of social control, and in the end anything that led them to
insist on solidarity. Writing about the war against socialist subversives and anyone, ultimately, deemed insufficiently loyal to the government of Chile under Augusto Pinochet - and that government’s ability to use sovereign violence and invoke a state of exception to license the legality of that violence - Klein writes that

“Many torturers adopted the position of a doctor or surgeon. Like the Chicago economists with their painful but necessary shock treatments, these interrogators imagined that their electroshocks and other torments were therapeutic - that they were administering a kind of medicine to their prisoners, who were often referred to inside the camps as *apestosos*, the dirty or diseased ones. The would heal them of the sickness that was socialism, of the impulse toward collective action. Their “treatments” were agonizing, certainly; they might even be lethal - but it was for the patient’s own good. “If you have gangrene in an arm, you have to cut it off, right?” Pinochet demanded, in impatient response to criticisms of his human rights record.441”

David Campbell has written that “discourses of danger” underly the efficient operation of the state, since its operationalization as a real object requires the conducing of behavior, and often relies on similar languages of disease and diseased bodies, invasions, foreignness, impurities and contamination, all in addition to the more generally understood manipulations of morality and social normativity.442 This both naturalizes the idea of the threat itself, concealing the role of political choice in its fomentation, and also appeals to the idea of nature to gain adherents to
order who have been themselves systematically blinded by state-centric epistemologies, and so cannot see that theirs is a perspective among others and nothing more.\textsuperscript{443} The only source of interconnection between people could be their allegiance to the same political order, and not their recognition of humanity in the Other, whose body was marked with taboos, ancient and modern, that society had to be protected from.\textsuperscript{444} For example, The Argentine junta and the Chilean dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, Klein writes, employed economic and political shocks in a fashion they represented to themselves as “medical.\textsuperscript{445}” “[Milton] Friedman likened his role in Chile to that of a physician who offered “technical medical advice to the Chilean government to help end a medical plague” - the “plague of inflation.\textsuperscript{446}” And Klein adds

“Arnold Harnberger, head of the Latin America program at the University of Chicago, went even further. In a lecture delivered to young economists in Argentina, long after the dictatorship had ended, he said that good economists are themselves the treatment - they “serve as antibodies to combat anti-economic ideas and policies.” The [junta’s] foreign minister, Cesar Augusto Guzzetti, said that “when the social body of the country has been contaminated by disease that corrodes its entrails, it forms antibodies. These antibodies cannot be considered in the same way as the microbes. As the government controls and destroys the guerrilla, the action of the antibody will disappear, as is already happening. It is only a natural reaction to a sick body.\textsuperscript{447}”

The use of violence is thus justified. Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt
have written, echoing Nietzsche’s thoughts on the matter,⁴⁴⁸ that the very notion of “just war theory” is necessarily an aggressive doctrine seeking to license imperialist war when no such agreement on adventurism could exist because of its obvious immorality in a given situation.⁴⁴⁹ Hardt and Negri write that “Democratic violence can only defend society, not create it,”⁴⁵⁰ and that “just war theory” is linked to the “premodern” tradition in Europe of “religious wars” that have nothing to do with a “democratic position on violence.”⁴⁵¹ In one case violence is accepted as a sad necessity, tragedy really, in the defense of a community with no options, whereas “just war theory” is, if it is framed as being defensive, only defensive of “values” and not of communities, and therefore is caught up with the desire to make the world anew. This might seem odd for a moment, but consider that in the world at any given moment there are many values to be found, and to declare that one value is truer than another will require convincing many to surrender their values, either symbolically, or in actuality. “This Language is, of course,” Klein continues

“the same intellectual construct that allowed the Nazis to argue that by killing “diseased” members of society they were healing the “national body.” As the Nazi doctor Fritz Klein claimed, “I want to preserve life. And out of respect for human life, I would remove a gangrenous appendix from a diseased body. The Jew is the gangrenous appendix in the body of mankind.” The Khmer Rouge used the same language to justify their slaughter in
Cambodia: “What is infected must be cut out.”

And what would be cut out? According to Klein’s research into the torture program the southern cone countries introduced by the United States’ clandestine security services, coupled with the academic and scholarly intervention of the group of Economists who came to be labeled “the Chicago Boys” after the University of Chicago economics department where many of their more influential number held positions, had as its goal exorcising people of “the only transcendental theology: solidarity.”

Solidarity is, after all, the basis for human social life, the source of social support, of family, of friendships, of culture, of healthy forms of recognition and authentic togetherness between persons, and therefore is a source of alternative loyalty not defined by states or corporations. During the ‘Dirty Wars,’ the depths of selfish indulgence of entitlement and privilege by the ruling class included theft of children from leftist families whose parents were being tortured and murdered to have them brought up by families the regime approved; in Israel the expanding purview of the state and civil society in banning Jewish-Arab/Muslim romantic relations; in Nazi Germany, and in today’s Russia, the exhortation to women to be the mothers of the nation and to make a new generation of nationalist children; and in the United States, the use of overt forms of sexual control and racial segregation, as well as less obvious forms of
class, intelligence/educational, regional, and cultural/behavioral inducements and sanctions. Giorgio Agamben has suggested that nothing really distinguishes democracy from totalitarianism in an era of biological-political control, since the fear of disease - in this context virally-spreading uncontrolled solidarities emerging spontaneously always already as *being* - is the primary threat to order. Indeed, in the word ‘disease’ are the two words ‘dis-ease,’ and solidarity makes both states and those who identify with them rather uneasy.

“The torturers understood the importance of solidarity well, and they set out to shock that impulse of social interconnectedness out of their prisoners. Of course all interrogation is purportedly about getting valuable information and therefore forcing betrayal, but many prisoners report that their torturers were far less interested in the information, which they usually already possessed, than in achieving the act of betrayal itself. The point of the exercise was getting prisoners to do irreparable damage to that part of themselves that believed in helping others above all else, that part of themselves that made them activists, replacing it with shame and humiliation.”

Klein writes that Muslim prisoners at Guantanamo, Cuba, are similarly abused by their captors with a torture program specifically designed to humiliate that which they love and that which is the source of their sense of solidarity and togetherness: Islam. Sexual torture began immediately, as did desecrations of the *Koran*, to which is now added today forms of force-feeding and physically-invasive searches for “contraband” (from
where said contraband would be procured at a US military base remains an unasked question in the minds of the enforcers), all designed to destroy the camp inmate’s humanity, and potential for healthy, loving, social life, and that most essential element of trust.\textsuperscript{460} Klein points out that these types of beliefs about ways of life that don’t immediately appear to be coeval with one’s own belief are characteristic of “fundamentalists.”\textsuperscript{461} So it is without apparent irony, but replete with actual irony, that liberals who practice liberalism as an identity politics as opposed to an existential \textit{praxis} label non-Western cultures with precisely that designation as fundamentalists.\textsuperscript{462} But this lack of irony, brought about because of an inability to (1) make the self “inessential” as Fanon has put it, and (2) because of the need to create distance between us and them, as we discussed in the introduction in relation to R.D. Laing’s hypothesis about the desire to make experience permanent to escape the contingency of human existence, should not surprise us at this moment. From Nazism to Capitalism, to Stalinism, the ontological basis of modern human life is based on an existentially-divided global \textit{physis} seen as \textit{lebensraum} for some, and necessitating relegation of others to dark places from where their screams can be quieted.

What this boils down to in essence is the imbalance introduced into the world-concept itself by the idea of freedom understood strictly as
permanence - as permanent access to experience and the ability to deny this to others through distancing mechanisms - and the transformation of other individuals, nations, cultures, communities around the world in all forms, into what Heidegger has called “the standing reserve. As Karl Polanyi has put it, this is also comprehensible as “disembedding” of social life from the surroundings that sustain social life, leaving individuals and the communities they formed without their bases of support, self-respect, and meaning, and thus leaving them at the mercy of the state and its allies in the production and maintenance of private privileges over and against any conception of the public.

The orchestration of beings and things in order to secure negative liberty - meaning for groups the absence of obstacles to group identity and the same for individuals plus a small zone for tolerated idiosyncrasies - in any implemented version, will be characterized by one underlying commonality. Without removing unordered elements in the overall conceptualization of order in play, there remains a possible alternative to the prevailing worldview. The prevailing view, whose premise remains the mobilization of resentment against spontaneity, infinity, nothingness, and change, cannot tolerate alternatives because these offer something other than the alienation of the body from consciousness, of individuals from each other, and of individuals from their own sense agency and potential
for authenticity. Thus the following attitude towards violence becomes necessary to secure identity as norm:

“…the state of exception is the opening of a space in which application and norm reveal their separation and a pure force-of-law realizes (that is, applies by ceasing to apply), a norm whose application has been suspended. In this way, the impossible task of wielding norm and reality together, and thereby constituting the normal sphere, is carried out in the form of the exception, that is to say, by presupposing their nexus. This means that in order to apply a norm it is ultimately necessary to suspend its application, to produce an exception. In every case, the state of exception marks a threshold at which logic and praxis blur with each other and a pure violence without logos claims to realize an enunciation without any real reference.”

As the agent of the sovereign exception, seeking to realize the creation of a norm - in this case a normalized way of being free gone planetary - the American soldier in the scene described above relies on a kind of violence that at its root is absurd because it purports to impose a normative order but in so doing violates that idea of order by invoking an exceptional circumstance to rationalize its own commission. As Agamben points out in discussing the work of Walter Benjamin, - whose work he frames as a reply to Schmitt’s normative concept of “sovereign violence” - “pure violence” which does not seek to create a social order by its commission, “severs the nexus between law and violence,” long deemed necessary from liberals like Hobbes and fascists like Schmitt, to ensure that the
state’s use of violence would not be questioned. Pure violence, because of its being an immanent development - this being the source of Hardt and Negri’s “democratic violence”\textsuperscript{467} which we pointed about above was the opposite of “just war theory” - is “bloodless” but also “lethal” and fundamentally undermines the legitimacy of the state and reveals the presence of a society that exists regardless of the state form.\textsuperscript{468} For sovereign violence to function, as Klein has shown, people have to be abstracted from their connections in the world, made into a \textit{tabula rasa}, and then through what Schmitt calls “constituent power,\textsuperscript{469}” have to be rebuilt in the image of reward and punishment, identity and difference, good and evil, such that their new identity cannot be eclipsed by recollections of their old one, that their new identity is seen as the only possibility. Klein also indicates that this precise anti-rational \textit{logos}, masqueraded as rationality, as reason itself, serves the purpose of undoing people’s constituent connections to the world around them, their society, their community, their friends, their language, their cultures. For too long, humanity has been guided by such an ideology that has both made us “homeless”\textsuperscript{470} and diverted our senses away from a radical apprehension of \textit{physis}; what Klein’s work adds is a systematic understanding of this violence has been the primary mechanism of making the world safe for negative liberty and the neoliberal/neoconservative consensus that has emerged to cater to the material and psychic needs of tortured individuals
whose only way back home is through identification with a corporate hierarchy or ideological advertisement of a political party that grants them material and psychic protection in an uncertain world defined by terrorist violence by states, and through the power politics practiced by these governments which have pressurized the international political order, forcing neutral states and revolutionary states to rely on just such an understanding of the human being in order to recalibrate and then harness individuals for the production of national security.\textsuperscript{471} 

The ideology of national security took root in powerful countries, and then was, and continues to be, mimicked across the world.\textsuperscript{472} Of course realpolitik precedes the ‘Cold War,’ but there are a few things that set apart that era from previous ones. In the time preceding the ‘Cold War,’ there were no weapons of the same destructive potential that the US, and USSR following the US’ lead, came to possess. Hydrogen bombs could annihilate entire nations, capital cities, and indeed the world population over and again. This made the imperative of orchestrating individuals within states in line with the perceived needs of national security all the more pressing for controllers of states; and made citizens all the more likely to press for it, too. But there is a corollary for states without nuclear weapons: either as allies of nuclear weapons states, or as the users and victims of destructive weapons not as powerful as nuclear weapons but
nonetheless stronger weapons than had been previously available in history, second-tier powers had stronger incentives to discipline their citizenry for analogous ends. Clearly other processes, related but with their own internal logics, such as the globalization of economic processes, the new-fangled migrations and dislocations of nations across the globe made homeless by the consolidation of states for single nations, and the mechanization of transport - including military transport - exacerbated these anxieties.

Applying this analysis to the social terrain in the ‘Cold War,’ what we find is not a battle between capitalism and communism, but rather a confrontation between two power blocs, each held together by technologies of violence, torture, distancing, making objects present, and reproducing the identity of the state and/or nation as a locus of security guaranteed by the ideology of permanence, brought about through either through the discipline of politically-crafted depoliticized markets or in planned economies exhibiting various overt forms of ideological voluntarism.

Individuals who are not properly disciplined into fear as a productive emotion will not be able to prudentially conduct themselves in the midst of an ordered political economy, and, as a result, fear must be generated
for the sake of keeping order together. At the heart of all these technologies then, is fear, and if one does not fear, one must be made to fear.\textsuperscript{473} This must happen irrespective of the nature of human beings and if they indeed are naturally fearful or not. Such questions are not particularly important since it is unlikely that we can really ever know the answer, and deployments of tropes regarding human nature are always political in nature.

Combining Agamben’s insight about \textit{homo sacer} - the excluded being in western political ontology from antiquity through to current times\textsuperscript{474} - as the exemplary negation that functions as a cognitive boundary and warning concerning the kinds of behaviors that would be anathema to the \textit{polis},\textsuperscript{475} with Klein’s critique of the creation of the \textit{tabula rasa} individual with market-articulated interests in what we might term hyper-capitalism after its obviation of a concrete ground for strictly manufactured groundings,\textsuperscript{476} we can see that via state-sanctioned violence and the nominal democratization of these functions in the popular imaginary expressed through the decentralization of political control and the generation and sating of popular tastes for supremacism through the circulation of images as a reinforcer of identity,\textsuperscript{477} Western liberalism has re-imagined freedom of identity understood as unchanging essence, and must negate the real world for the sake securing the realm for the
essentialized individual and community to even be imaginable in the face of the always already plural world of beings.478

But there is an uneven reception for freedom and liberalism across the world, indicating political and ontological difference, and alerting us to the matter of people’s attitudes towards existence, their disposition towards the Other, and how this orientation informs their choices in life. People have often accepted the segmentation of social reality for the sense of permanence they can derive therewith, and this has been done in various ways all over the world; such is why the Western empire of Europe and America has found frequently collaborators in disparate locations supposedly hostile to the West. At best, though, such persons ignore the richness in their surroundings - and at worst they are choosing a restricted understanding of their existential possibilities; restrictions which have been created through the agency of imperial powers, disciplinary institutions normalized as part of life that simply must be accepted whose purpose is the further normalization of that life, and the violence these institutions, domestic and foreign, rely upon to divide the self against itself in order to hold the possibility of a true self as a dangling reward for conformity.479 But as our analysis should make clear, this can be understood easily in the colonial context because of the readily-grasped difference between the colonizer and the colonized, but is not therefore
somehow not in evidence within non-colonized nations, where indeed, such divisions within selves, across social class, between men and women, and such, are politicized and utilized to debase everyone as potentially excludable from order, and to therefore strongly pressure individuals to conform to the terms of order or stake out a lonely existence in dissent.  


Writing on the middle-classes in the emergent “shining” India, Arundhati Roy has discovered a most fascinating element in that class’ sense of identity as Indian, modern, liberal, secular, and, increasingly, as wealthy. Writing on the issue of the abrogated sovereignty and military occupation of Kashmir and the subjugation of the Kashmiri people by the Indian military since 1947, and secessionist movements around India, Roy indicates that with all the brouhaha that accompanies Indian middle-class banter about preserving the nation’s unity and proving to the world that Indian secularism can accommodate the various nationalities, religious groups, and various diverse people of India, this selfsame middle-class, perhaps seeking to emulate their more wealthy upper-class cousins in both
India and elsewhere, has forgotten that their own apartment complexes, shopping malls replete with submachine gun-toting guards, paramilitary operations aimed at taming tribal rebellions so that mining and other resource-gathering operations can commence, also indicate an ironical desire to secede from India, too. “A vertical secession,” that would take them to “another planet.”

For India, like any place, is a present and a *physis*, and not merely a degraded physical world whose true essence is found in a select group of representative people or institutions, public and private. The state, or any social class using the state and other mechanisms to create a sense of essential truth, indicates of a drive for permanence in the world, but in the end these drives must rely on sectioning off that deemed essential from the rest deemed inessential.

Negative liberty, and its supposed opposite, positive liberty, are linked together by the underlying assumption in both that liberty can be made permanent and securely enjoyed in perpetuity. This has been the goal of influential Western theorists of freedom, who must, in addition to speaking of freedom, also theorize a justification for secure status - that exact notion of freedom that Isaiah Berlin either decried as not true freedom at worst, or at best a hybrid of freedom with other less grandiose visions mired in primitive collectivisms that defined the non-Western world for him. The effect of this rhetorical maneuver is to normalize the possession of status.
for Westerners, and to diminish movements on the part of other groups to seek such status as a specie of positive liberty that Berlin, through his vast influence, would direct people to be suspicious of, giving rise to a need to contain these movements, and, in previous times, as evidence of behavior threatening the progress of ordered liberty of the civilized. But this idea of progress and order is not a specific property of the West, as Roy’s work will show us, because the desire to both have privilege over and against one’s own countrymen and women, as well as to be recognized as rightfully possessing that freedom, both by one’s neighbors and to feel it for oneself, is much in evidence in modern India.

However this is ideologically-premised, we can witness the sublimation of the human existence as logos, on the register of both culture more broadly, and in the specialized case of the culture of economic organization, wherein the socially-dependent and contingent logics of making being present in the world are increasingly “disembedded” from their constitutive surroundings. Karl Polanyi wrote that this move to disembed a way of life, a rationalized system for making a way of life present, would require the willful ignorance of the contingency of such systems, always already impermanent because of their reliance on “fictitious commodities.” Land, labor, and capital, the fictitious commodities, behave quite unlike the inputs in the formulas of classical economics,
which assumed the externalities of production - which include resource depletion, environmental effects, unstable value-measures, and the exhaustion of labor - associated with impermanence to be insignificant for inclusion in the models of marketplace behavior. Simply, commodities are assumed to be available, and their depletion is not modeled into the theories of market economics; but obviously land, labor, and capital are all limited by nature. Ignoring this was made possible by the ideology of seeing money as a thing-in-itself that existed as a natural element of existence, myths of support for which vary from the treatment of gold as a “shiny metal” that people agreed upon as a store of value that was never subject to “spoilage,” to the current fashion, where floating exchange rates are not formally pegged to the value of precious metal but where currency values are determined by the reliability of a currency as a unit of account based on “market fundamentals” that conform to expectations for profit, “sound” management of resources, and as an accurate reflection of the value of value.\textsuperscript{486} Beneath these vague terminologies lies the industrialist’s, and the financier’s, capacity to reliably mobilize land, labor, and capital, which is nothing other than an orchestration of beings and things for the aim of producing permanence, in this special case. The drive to amass power in this way is disembedding economic practices from society’s overall economic patterns, and is driving the sublimation of the identity of powerful social groups through nationalist, capitalist/
progressivist, religious fundamentalist, and similar political ideologies that have as their aim the essentialization of their group’s privileges and social standing.\textsuperscript{487}

Polanyi, writing about the advent of market society in Europe, anticipated this sort of development in other parts of the world. In \textit{The Great Transformation}, regarding the naturalness of the free-market economy, and therefore the “rational actor” - the individual at the core of the market system - Polanyi observes:

“The road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled intervention. To make Adam Smith’s “simple and natural liberty” compatible with the needs of a human society was a most complicated affair. Witness the complexity of the provisions in the innumerable enclosure laws; the amount of bureaucratic control involved in the administration of the New Poor Laws……; or the increase in governmental administration entailed in the meritorious task of municipal reform. And yet all these strongholds of governmental interference were erected with a view to the organizing of some simple freedom - such as that of land, labor, or municipal administration. Just as, contrary to expectation, the invention of labor-saving machinery had not diminished but actually increased the uses of of human labor, the introduction of free markets, far from doing away with the need for control, regulation, and intervention, enormously increased their range. Administrators had to be constantly on the watch to ensure the free working of the system. Thus even those who wished most ardently to free the state from all unnecessary duties, and whose whole philosophy demanded the restriction of state activities, could not but entrust the self-same state with the new powers, organs, and instruments required for the establishment of
Laissez-faire. 488,

Liberals have sought to orchestrate society for the sake of producing freedom of the individual in a manner that is entirely unbounded from responsibility to apprehend the reality of the physis we all share. This requires, just as it would in the life of an individual who would live out of sorts with their surroundings, the institutionalization of the ability to make a sovereign decision to alter the course of existence in favor of avoiding the kinds of shifts that accrue as a matter of course in the life of a person, community, and world. Polanyi’s example, vastly expanded upon by Michel Foucault in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, where we see the use of administrative technologies of organizing and mobilizing human beings in accordance with the need to make present certain products - in the case of Polanyi’s analysis of the rise of market society whose legitimacy is premised on the widespread availability of these products for mass consumption - and to make present beings themselves on the order of their conformity with the terms of good and evil found in a society - in the case of Foucault’s theory of the use of “panopticism” 489 - clearly illustrates Agamben’s analysis of the state of exception - the suspension of the normal functioning of the law - that is in fact required for the possibility of setting up something like an idea of the normal functioning of the law and the understanding of social relations
under the law as being *normal* in the first place. This requires both exemplary violence, as well as the generalized conducing of conduct in line with the vision of social order through state intervention in civil society and social life.\textsuperscript{490}

This is because, just as Fanon discovered in the midst of struggle, as Nietzsche discovered in his own tortured thoughts in the stultifying air of decaying and fearful Christendom, and as Polanyi discovered in his study of the rise of market society and market man, “hope springs from ultimate resignation,” even though resignation can also drive a person to identity with “power,” instead of “a more abundant freedom.”\textsuperscript{491} We can call this development, which really existed in many places and at many times in history, ‘the dialectic of freedom.’ In the context of the “countermovement”\textsuperscript{492} against the disembedding of the essentialized autonomous subject as a thing-in-itself, much like Nietzsche’s ‘civil servant’\textsuperscript{493} we discussed above, Polanyi writes that “while laissez-faire” was not possible in the absence of “State action,” the response to the fabrication of the order of industrial society came about in a “spontaneous,” and therefore, relatively more natural way (keeping in mind our distinction between nature understood as what *is*, and artifice simply denoting the willful efforts aimed at construction human beings undertake, *and* that we are making a claim about *relative naturalness* here,
since, by definition nothing human beings make is natural per se, although always already part of the natural world). Our claim is simply that free-market theories require the orchestration of human life and, as Heidegger’s radical insight about technology clarifies, the reduction of people and things to “standing reserve” in order to prepare the ground for reorganization of social order requires a great deal of human intervention than action in the opposite direction aimed at restoring the sense of simple everydayness that accompanied pre-capitalist life; our imagination of this era remains a powerful memory of freedom in our consciousness as human species.

“Laissez-faire was planned; planning was not… […] … if ever there was a conscious use of the executive in the service of a deliberate government-controlled policy, it was on the part of the Benthamites in the heroic period of laissez-faire. The other half was first mooted by that eminent liberal, Dicey, who made it his task to inquire into the origins of the “anti-laissez-faire” or, as he called it, the “collectivist” trend in English public opinion, the existence of which was manifest since the late 1860s. He was surprised to find that no evidence of the existence of such a trend could be traced save the acts of legislation themselves. More exactly, no evidence of a “collectivist trend” in public opinion prior to the laws which appeared to represent such a trend could be found. As to later “collectivist” opinion, Dicey inferred that the “collectivist” legislation itself might have been its prime source. The upshot of his penetrating inquiry was that there had been a complete absence of any deliberate intention to extend the functions of the state, or to restrict the freedom of the individual, on the part of those who were directly responsible for the restrictive enactments of the 1870s and 1880s. The legislative spearhead of the
countermovement against a self-regulating market as it developed in the half century following 1860 turned out to be spontaneous, undirected by opinion, and actuated by a purely pragmatic spirit.\textsuperscript{495}

So recalcitrant elements, generally first among the most despised classes, are always already rebelling against efforts to consecrate one way of being as the cardinal virtue of social order; unless they can be depoliticized in their understanding of their rebellion through institutional and educational mechanisms that cause them to believe in their lower status and caught in a spirit of epistemological dependency and robbed of agency. But enforcing this understanding of the possibilities for being-in-the-world is costly, must be outsourced beyond the state and its agents be they police or military, or institutional in nature, to civil society and even to families, where ideologies of disempowerment are transmitted across generations in the form of resentment, child abuse, normalized sexual violence against women to enforce the gender hierarchy found in many societies and certainly still prevalent in the West and in America, and through internalized racism and other forms of essentialized self-hate that police the boundaries of identity in order to ensure that children don’t stray too far from ‘one of their own’ in friendships, romantic relations, eventually in the generation of new families, and in seeking out the Other experientially in whatever way possible, in their lives.
But this multitude of points of enforcement suggests the impossibility of forever policing these boundaries reliably in the absence of the use of violence, and the threat of violence to instill fear in individuals. In particular young people whose physical stamina and stature is deemed a threat to the physical humiliation-premised terms of order followed by the self-identified majority in democratic states are treated with suspicion. This (1) instills in them some variant of second-class existence, and (2) punctures for those who hold onto their physical spirit and refuse in however small (or large) a fashion the terms of order prevailing in society the essentialness of precisely those terms, enabling and galvanizing their vision and ability to resist.\textsuperscript{496} W.E.B. DuBois referred to this phenomena as “second sight,\textsuperscript{497}” which he said would give African-Americans a special kind of epistemological vision unavailable to whites, who, as Fanon indicated above in his critique of colonized intellectuals whose adherence to the \textit{mission civilaстрice} of the European nations, like the colonized intellectual who had doubled-down on identification with the ruling power for the sake of whatever advantages gained, similarly were unable to “make themselves inessential”\textsuperscript{498} enough to see the world anew.

Individuals going through the great transformation of humanity that marked the beginning of the capitalist era found themselves in a trap,
whereby to be free they had to make themselves permanently present, both for the sake of being trusted with that freedom by others with more power and in a position to deny it to them if deemed untrustworthy because of not signifying thought properly, as reflected in emerging consensuses on human nature, and for the sake of their own self-conception having already internalized division and judgment of their spontaneity. On this register liberalism as it has been understood, and as it has been spread through imperialism throughout the world, produces a stratified and internally-differentiated hierarchy of people and groups that comes to encompass all elements of human life and affords only to a very small number at the commanding-heights of society a true measure of negative liberty that Isaiah Berlin thought so worthwhile. For most of the rest it is a governmentality that leaves us in a trap of having to demonstrate worthiness for freedom, and having to equally subject our ‘free’ choices to the scrutiny of measuring its’ conformity with the terms of order.

XIV. The State Colonizes the Polis: From Speenhamland to the Camp

Combining our perspectives on economic liberalism, as deconstructed by Polanyi, and on liberalism as an identity politics for the good people, we find the curious reality that indeed both of these ventures to term the self
as being a liberal self whose openness, generosity, and capacity for unaccountable and unrestrained action requires the use of sovereign violence to discipline contingent and spontaneously becoming beings becoming their being in defiance of metaphysical templates. We thus discern a doubled process of disembedding of identity understood as the essence of being from the world itself; a world deemed to be fallen, sinful, polluting, poisonous, and thus comprised of dangers to be defended against; and the only defense against such a world is the use of violence in the name of transforming the body, or existence, of the recalcitrant element(s) within the Self or the Other, into an object lesson for the people what fate awaits them should they insist on being.\textsuperscript{499} To ward off the freedom of becoming, sovereign violence, as Agamben’s reading of Schmitt suggests, harnesses “constituent power” which is flowing through the social fabric always already and, if not garnered for the reproduction of identity, can be realized as a revolutionary force associated with freedom of biological life - \textit{zoe}.\textsuperscript{500} Instead of embracing animal existence, \textit{zoe}, traditional Western political theory has sought to discipline existence in the name of reproducing \textit{bios} - or political life;\textsuperscript{501} based, we wish to add, on a very narrow definition of the political as that associated with the state, as opposed to our more capacious invitation offered to beings in the desire for all of our freedom.
This duality, which dates back to Aristotle and has found various forms of expression in subsequent thought (state of nature versus civilized humanity, human life existing between “beast” and “god,” etc.\textsuperscript{502}) was most pronounced in terms of significance for our political moment in the work of Hannah Arendt, who argued that “statelessness”\textsuperscript{503} as a widespread phenomena in then Europe, and clearly a phenomena whose significance continues to increase since Arendt’s day, threw into question the ability of nation-states to consistently bequeath rights and protections - what is deemed required for the security of human status - to the people living within its borders.\textsuperscript{504} In her work on totalitarianism Arendt indicated that the purpose of the concentration camps was to completely denude people of their politically-significant public characteristics of identity, which was the aim of torture and regimenting of daily life according to both the abstract directives of order and the arbitrary and whimsical minutiae and sadistic idiosyncrasies of camp administrators indulged in the name of order.\textsuperscript{505} These administrators of course were in a position of absolute power over those in the camps, and so even if a hefty dose of bureaucratic normalization coupled with the kind of moral disengagement that masks barbarity in hierarchical organizations permitted the general sense of not being involved in the worst sorts of crimes made the evil in the camps “banal” rather than “radical,” the effect of administering life in the camps was the systematic torture of those who were held there.\textsuperscript{506} This
is identical to Klein’s point about the use of “shock therapy” by localized use of electroconvulsive therapy for one individual, destroying them through dissociative pain, or in the globally-significant sense of shocking populations of enemy nations with tools ranging from the apparently subtle macroeconomic tinkering through global, national, public, and private financial institutions issuing various veiled and not-so-veiled threats to meet demands or risk capital flight to the readily apparent desire to “shock and awe” nations into compliance through aerial bombardment and other displays of force.

Speenhamland was a predecessor to the camp. Polanyi describes this economic support system for the poor who were swept up by the policy of government-sanctioned land theft (enclosure) which had “ghastly” effects on the “self-respect of the common man.” The predecessor of what came to be known later as “the Poor Laws,” the policies that Polanyi places under the signifier “Speenhamland” guaranteed the “right to live” but not access to education, or the corollary right to organize and collaborate with fellow poor, and, too, restricted and even annulled the ability of England’s poor to remain on their ancestral lands where they resided as serfs and laborers for centuries. In addition to this, residents in the various estates for the poor set up under these laws were not permitted to move about the country as they wished, which had the effect
of increasing dependency on the state through the arresting of what dynamism may have been possible, and locking adults into an economically-depressed provincialism. The laws themselves produced the contradictory outcome of apparently caring for the poor, but severely degrading them at the same time - not due to the capitalist reading of the situation as a straightforward result of social welfare’s softening effects; Polanyi indicates that welfare coupled with modern labor innovations like trade unions would have produced a new concept of individual and community security and self-reliance in the midst of rapid economic changes513 - for the reason that once the process of industrial and land consolidation had secured the economic and social hegemony of the newly powerful middle-classes in England whose livelihoods depended on ever-increasing trade in the now global market of the British empire, the protections under the Speenhamland laws, which had increasingly become the law of the land in most of rural England,514 were rescinded in order to increase labor productivity through negative incentives that now characterize not only Britain’s but much of the world’s labor markets (i.e. – ‘Don’t work don’t eat).515 The collapse of the “self-respect of the common man” whose previous pre-capitalist livelihood had been robbed from him by enclosure was now thrown into a frightening, dangerous, perilous new world. This fundamentally degraded not only his ability to survive, but his entire way of life, being tossed this way and that, was
annihilated.

“Speenhamland was designed to prevent the proletarianization of the common people, or at least to slow it down. The outcome was merely the pauperization of the masses, who almost lost their human shape in the process…

…The Poor Law Reform of 1834 did away with this obstruction of the labor market: the ‘right to live’ was abolished. The scientific cruelty of that Act was so shocking to public sentiment… Never perhaps in all modern history has a more ruthless act of social reform been perpetrated; it crushed multitudes of lives while merely pretending to provide a criterion of destitution in the workhouse test. Psychological torture was coolly advocated and smoothly put into practice by mild philanthropists as a means of oiling the wheels of the labor mill…

…The bureaucratic atrocities committed against the poor during the decade following 1834 by the new centralized Poor Law authorities were merely sporadic and as nothing compared to that most potent of all modern institutions, the labor market… If Speenhamland meant the snug misery of degradation, now the laboring man was homeless in society. If Speenhamland had overworked the values of neighborhood, family, and rural surroundings, now man was detached from home and kin, torn from his roots and all meaningful environment. In short, if Speenhamland meant the rot of immobility, now the peril was that of death through exposure. 516”

While we can safely admit that Speenhamland was not organized for the purpose of “production of corpses” 517 as Arendt would write about the Nazi camps following the end of the second world war, there is a congruity between the two in the maintenance of unreality and closing off individuals from their world that eventually robs them of their humanity
by obscuring them from the world - the “world” in the Heideggerian sense as the totality of references that form our home as human beings. Writing about the “incredibility” of the “horrors of the camps,” and their unworldly, even non-worldly “uselessness” Arendt correctly states that “in the midst of war,” despite shortages that came to undermine the German war effort, the Nazis “set up enormous, costly extermination factories and transported millions” to them. Such miscalculations on their part as the war was being lost “gave the whole enterprise an air of mad unreality.” It is precisely this madness, this unreality, that, as analysts of current political trends, that we do not ascribe to similar situations precisely because of the, perhaps, theatrical insanity of the Nazi camps, and of course the extensive documentation of that insanity by the Nazis themselves in the organized manner of their bureaucratic legacy. But other holocausts are well-documented too, so it behooves us to revisit this matter.

Extending our analogy from Speenhamland as a template for the production of homeless populations unable to fend for themselves and leaving them at the mercy of powerful factions whose interests they would then serve after being rearranged, into our analysis of the insanity - and ultimately, eventually, the ubiquity, too - of the camp - a move inspired by the trajectory of our criticism which will become apparent below - Arendt
faces this particular theoretical abyss of dehumanization.

“This atmosphere of madness and unreality, created by an apparent lack of purpose, was the real iron curtain which hides all forms of concentration camps from the eyes of the world. Seen from outside, they and the things that happen in them can be described only in images drawn from a life after death, that is, a life removed from earthly purposes. Concentration camps can very aptly be divided into three types corresponding to three basic Western conceptions of life after death: Hades, Purgatory, and Hell. To Hades correspond those relatively mild forms, once popular even in non-totalitarian countries, for getting undesirable elements of all sorts - refugees, stateless persons, the asocial and the unemployed - out of the way; as DP (displaced persons) camps, which are nothing other than camps for persons who have become superfluous and bothersome, they have survived the war. Purgatory is represented by the Soviet Union’s labor camps, where neglect is combined with chaotic forced labor. Hell in the most literal sense was embodied by those types of camp perfected by the Nazis, in which the whole of life was thoroughly and systematically organized with a view to the greatest possible torment…

… All three types have one thing in common: the human masses sealed off in them are treated as if they no longer existed, as if what happened to them were no longer of any interest to anybody, as if they were already dead and some evil spirit were amusing himself by stopping them for a while between life and death before admitting them to eternal peace."

And in a comment that foreshadows her later shift in analytical focus from the “radical evil” of the camp to the “banal evil” of the perpetrators of the carnage therein, but that also prefigures Robin’s analysis about the retention on the part of the victims, bystanders, and even the collaborators
of their humanity, Arendt indicates that an attunement towards one’s own uselessness, one’s own inability to think, and a belief in the inevitability of power - and one’s powerlessness in the face of power - potentially dooms postwar humanity to the same fate suffered by millions in the second world war. Indeed, the connection between Speenhamland and the camps was that in both cases, apparatures of distinguishing humans from humans, of creating two species out of one, were presided over by humans, not monsters, and our humanity contains both strands. We can be terrified or liberated

“…we may say that radical evil emerged in connection with a system in which all men have become equally superfluous. The manipulators of this system believe in their own superfluousness as much as in that of all others, and the totalitarian murderers are all the more dangerous because they do not care if they themselves are alive or dead, if they ever lived or never were born. The danger of the corpse factories and holes of oblivion is that today, with populations and homelessness everywhere on the increase, masses of people are continuously rendered superfluous if we continue to think of our world in utilitarian terms. Political, social, and economic events everywhere are in a silent conspiracy with totalitarian instruments devised for making men superfluous. The implied temptation is well understood by the utilitarian common sense of the masses, who in most countries are too desperate to retain much fear of death. The Nazis and the Bolsheviks can be sure that their factories of annihilation which demonstrate the swiftest solution to the problem of overpopulation, of economically superfluous and socially rootless human masses, are as much of an attraction as a warning. Totalitarian solutions may well survive the fall of totalitarian regimes in the form of strong temptations which will come up whenever it seems impossible to alleviate political, social, or economic misery in a manner worthy of
This warning has not been heeded, however, and the lesson of taking our concept of political life, which Arendt saw as essential to providing the new stateless masses of pre-second world war Europe the physical security needed for human life, inessentially, rather than essentially with a notion of necessity, is lost on her as well. Her emphasis always remained on what Cedric Robinson has called “the order of politicality,” wherein the being of the state is overdetermined by thought, literature, culture, forms of organization, and ritual practice of social form, producing an actually-existing authority with a monopoly on the political sphere of life understood as essentially-determined by the agency of the state as a transcendental, theological, being. But in recent times this has also been historically confirmed as requiring the consummation of a singular order within a state, usually through the vehicle of mutual recognition found in nationalism. Arendt discusses this at length in *Origins*, but does so in a manner that ascribes to it an epistemological inevitability she associated with the Tocquevillian trope of the inexorability of mass society and the overwhelming power of anomie. Robin has suggested this lent Arendt’s work a distinctly elitist tinge, which saw the masses as hopeless in the absence of certain structured myths that would guide them through a swamp of immorality and confusion they were otherwise destined for.
The best she could offer was patriotism and an understanding of freedom in her essay “What is Freedom?” that was hopelessly caught up with a worship of French Resistance fighters in the second world war, many of whom not only were complacent prior to the formation of the Nazi threat to French sovereignty, but who, also, subsequent to the liberation of their country, would go on to participate in France’s various attempts to recapture colonial outposts lost at the end of the war for a brief time.529

While indeed it is true that a strongly identified people with a strong sense of themselves can draw on that identity as a reserve to withstand the imposition of tyranny, as Arendt points out in her discussion of the heroism of the Danes in resisting the Nazi occupation of their land and in highlighting their protection of the nation’s Jewish population through ingenious and inventive forms of collective action,530 what is obscured in her account, which focused on Danish identity, is that many individuals acted from deeply present, aware, conscious, and authentic places in their experience, and that it would be unfair to give credit to the nation when in fact in each case remarkable individuals working together overcame the kinds of collective action problems that had come to characterize Western life.531 Zygmunt Bauman has pointed out that defensiveness in relation to changing social constitution is what gave rise to the machinery of order which eventually reached its pinnacle in the Holocaust, itself a product of
modernity. What the Danes refused was not that they would lose their national pride, but that they would lose their 
*humanity* if they allowed the world of references, their world, that is, that they made their home within, to be destroyed. This home would be degraded by the technological, alienating, destructive power represented by the Nazi occupiers if they failed to resist on all fronts. Indeed, they conspired to save their Jewish neighbors not merely to save Denmark - it was uncertain at the time if Denmark would survive the war as an independent nation at that point - but because the Jews were a part of Denmark, and Denmark happened to be the setting for the enactment of their humanity.

Economic beings, as described in Polanyi’s discussion of the transformation of human society from traditional to market-based society and culture, and political beings, as described in Agamben’s, Arendt’s, and Schmitt’s work, and endorsed in the thought of the liberal theorists whose work we surveyed above wherein a distinction between the individual as phenomena and the individual as a properly constituted, identified being, as either a citizen, a fellow national, or as a haloed member of the sacred circle of the free, are a specie of the differentiation and distancing that was sought to be protected through the sequestration of the Other in the camps. This gave rise to the kind of policy manipulations that are now fully-integrated into our world through the idealized notion of macroeconomic

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discipline that arguably transforms the entire world into a camp for being tinkered with by independent central banking authorities in the private, public, and increasingly globalized finance; in effect, forms of life have become behavioral experiments to be carried out by economic policy-makers at the commanding heights of the global financial architecture.\textsuperscript{533} And although Arendt states that she wishes that a kind of politics could be used to preserve human plurality, much like Berlin claims, too, basing that plurality on a plurality of essences - nations or entirely self-contained individuals primed with the expectation of guaranteed impermeability and individual identity as a charm, a ward, against being engulfed - is precisely what resulted in the carnage of the second world war, where more nations than Germany fought for the crown of being the leader of the human race. America was one such nation, but Arendt often shrank from the broader implications of her insight about the “banality of evil” when this could be applied to the society in which she would come to find refuge from the camps herself. But where she failed to go, we certainly can, and must.\textsuperscript{534}

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XV. Western Modernity and the Holocaust: American Destruction of Vietnam as a Product of Freedom and Liberal Democracy
The creation of modern identity, rooted in the systematized presencing of the self understood as a true self depends on the orchestration of beings, things, the environment, social patterns, forms of governance, and beliefs - ideology - all for the sake of disembedding individuals from their surroundings. The sublimation of identity as an idea is a process fraught with actual violence in the extreme, and this only threatens to become worse as the technology of warfare becomes more destructive; and as this technology subsumes domains of existence thought distinct from military affairs, such as information technology, or neuroscience, for example, vastly expanding the scope of violence in human affairs. This violence, to be clear, while of course sadistic, is encompassed in the broader concern of states to retain purchase over the manifestation of the polis - the gathering - and to ensure that its spontaneous development is constrained and disciplined in line with the reproduction of the state. Technology is not an inexorable development, nor is its precise manifestation a required, unavoidable expression of either pure knowledge or human nature.

“The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such…

…The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order appears differently than it did
when to set in order still meant to take care of and to maintain. The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In the sowing of the grain it places the seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be released either for destruction or for peaceful use. 536
In each of these examples, of agribusinesses, atomic energy, and the expansion of resource extraction to a planetary scale, Heidegger makes clear that technology, _techne_, one of the most ancient and singularly definitive elements of humanity’s being-in-the-world, in the current age, developed out of necessity to sustain the prevailing understanding of being as a terminal response to the question of being, has come to “enframe”\(^537\) all of existence. If anything, he wasn’t radical enough given recent developments in the global biotech agricultural industry, and the events that have scandalized the nuclear power industry with the catastrophe at Fukushima. Atop these calamities, we can add the globalization of the camp as a technology of making people superfluous for the sake of harnessing negative destructive energies to keep the process of planetary domination ongoing by disposing camp inmates to desperation, and those outside the camp loyal to the terms of order through the understandable and ardent desire to never be in a camp.

For Heidegger a terrible irony abounds in these statements. And this irony is the route to the extremely significant, and radical message, of his political philosophy. After the second world war, he remained silent on the matter of public contrition for his involvement with the Nazi party, and that same party, which his scholarly stature lent a great deal of legitimacy to, also carried out that most modern of massacres - the Holocaust.
Bearing in mind his response to his former student Herbert Marcuse on the matter - that “after 1945 a confession was impossible for me,\(^{538}\) - for Heidegger an inauthentic confessions in the style of other Nazis who sought to appease political currents was simply not responsible; it used traditions of signification and symbolic speech to excuse oneself through a masquerade of good and evil. Hinting at Heidegger’s own silence being a willfulness to hold his own complicity forever next to his own soul because of his immense guilt, rather than a mark of a lack of contrition as many have suggested - we can expand on this point by way of Leslie Thiele’s commentary on the matter, which both usefully excavates Heidegger’s own candor on the matter - which got him in considerable trouble - and also indicates on the part of Thiele, a scholar otherwise quite sympathetic to Heidegger’s philosophy, the same metaphysical maneuver inherent in seeking the permanence of values of good and evil, values, which, as it were, were completely obscured in the experience in the camps where operatives, collaborators, relative bystanders, and victims formed a painful cooperative embrace of humanity’s death drive in the name of making Germany modern.\(^{539}\) In Germany’s quest for modernity, she was merely following in the footsteps of her European neighbors. As a result, all of the West, and its idea of freedom as the mastery of life and the world, are utterly scandalized.
“[In a lecture in 1949] Heidegger twice announced the essential equivalence of the extermination camps and other phenomena - first the motorized food industry, the blockades of East Germany, and the manufacture of hydrogen bombs, and then the perishing of millions from hunger in China. The effect of these comparisons, and probably their intent, was to diminish the significance of the Nazi atrocities. The Reich’s premeditated annihilation of millions in an attempted genocide is equated with sundry modern technological developments, along with the wantonly destructive effects of ideologically based politics…. Place against the all-encompassing problem of the global will to technological mastery, fascism, Heidegger declared, was essentially indistinguishable from modern democracy. Therefore his “mistakes” as a proponent of Nazism may be judged “so insignificant that they may not even be called tiny…”

…The important difference comes down to one of intentions. And this difference - between the hateful, cruel, and genocidal intentions of the Nazis and the generally irresponsible and covetous ones of agribusiness, for example - remains a far from insignificant concern.\textsuperscript{540}

Thiele fails to understand that Heidegger’s thought is not concerned with the categories of good and evil, which, following Nietzsche’s analysis of this question - an analysis that arguably was among the most significant influences on Heidegger’s philosophy\textsuperscript{541} - are categories created by the harnessing of the world’s resources, made possible through the breeding of the human animal with these ideas of who they truly are into them through the use of instruments of discipline. To be sure we are not pointing at a pure free being to be discovered beneath acculturation. Rather, in seeking what people \textit{are} we are looking for an infinity of potential, a way of
countering the idea of human nature - what Heidegger called the “restriction of being”\textsuperscript{542} itself. The categories of good and evil, and their essential influence on ideology associated with current political practices and human identity, do indeed spring from the same root: the inability to make oneself inessential. Richard Polt offers the window to another interpretation of Heidegger’s controversial equation of nuclear weaponry, factory farming, mass starvation during the ‘Great Leap Forward’ in Mao’s China, and the camps.

“In one of his rare references to the Holocaust, Heidegger proposes that [the totalitarian horrors of the twentieth century are the consequences of the technological worldview]. But he says so in a way that is most disturbing: “Agriculture is now a mechanized food industry, essentially the same as the manufacture of corpses in gas chambers and extermination camps, the same as the blockade and starvation of countries, the same as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs.” Most interpreters find this passage shocking and understandably so. For although Heidegger does not condone mass murder, the implication of his claim seems to be that modern farming is just as bad. In addition, the references to blockades and hydrogen bombs allude to the Soviet Union and the United States, and imply that there is no significant difference between these countries and Nazi Germany. Do all these phenomena really spring from the same root, and does that mean they are all ‘essentially the same’\textsuperscript{543}?”

The very drive for permanency, revealed in deep narrative structures of American exceptionalism in texts from the founding of America through the modern day, leads to the destruction of ways of life seen to be
conducted on a different material and existential basis than our own. Indeed, to the above quote we can add the depredations of the biotech corporation Monsanto, the ongoing violence against the nations of Iran and Cuba by American blockade, and the blockade against Iraq which killed upwards of half-a-million children - which then Secretary of State Madeline Albright deemed to be a worthwhile cost in pursuing US geopolitical goals - which terrorized that nation in between the two wars America has waged upon it, just to pick a few glaring examples, of American behavior entirely in concord with Heidegger’s insight.

In the aftermath of Vietnam war, to consecrate ourselves ‘the good’ and the Vietnamese our objects for saving and as our enemies, and to excuse our own actions there, we have lost Heidegger’s insight and the lesson of his own life’s fragility, his own ethical scandalousness, which would inform us of our own complicity in great crimes that rise to the level of the Holocaust itself.

“the American command… […] …violently uprooted a traditional - stable, agricultural, and family-oriented - people (those who survived), transforming them into a population of spiritually as well as physically mutilated refugees…

…For the Vietnamese peasants, we recall, the cultivation of rice was not simply a matter of the production of another food commodity. It was a traditional way of life, bearing little resemblance to Lyndon Johnson’s representation of Vietnamese society as one of “hunger, disease, and despair.” As the English combat photographer Phillip Jones Griffith
says in his great photographic history of the American destruction of the culture of Vietnam:

“The Vietnamese are a rice-growing people. For two thousand years their adeptness at pursuing this perennial task has been sustained by their belief born of Buddhism, structured by Confucianism, and mystified by Taoism, sees every man, every thought, every action as significant and interrelated within a universal order. It transcends Western religious dogmas: it is a collective acceptance of the values recognized by all of their self-evident virtue…

…The secret of their strength lies in the nature of their society…Harmony as the supreme virtue - and being a part of that harmony - was the motivating force, enabling villagers to accept toil in the fields. Rites and rituals gave meaning to the work far beyond simply providing food to eat. In the fields were buried one’s ancestors whose spirit passed through the soil into the rice, so that eating it became the ritual by which one inherited one’s ancestors’ souls…”
…the callously indiscriminate bombing of the the countryside, the use of herbicides, the designation of free fire zones, and the forced relocation of the peasants in “New Life Hamlets” - the technological relay we can call, on the authority of the American Command’s own rhetoric, the “pacification” of the radical difference that was Vietnam - all contributed to the destruction of this “alien” rice culture. What did the United States - the agricultural knowledge industry and the technical agencies whose responsibility it was to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the Vietnamese - offer the peasants in compensation for the destruction of their rice fields and the burning of their nuclear villages? It was not simply American rice, which, according to Griffiths, “the people hate”… It was also - and here, at last, we rejoin Heidegger’s “unpardonable pronouncement” - the introduction of IR 8, the higher-yielding and faster-growing - ‘miracle’ - rice strain developed in ‘international’ experimental stations controlled and ideologically manipulated by American capital…

…Understood in the light of the above retrieval of the historical specificity of the American involvement in Vietnam, we recognize the essential continuity between the two practices. We see that the massive introduction of the technologically produced ‘miracle’ rice strains was in essence the same as the massive introduction of the technological war machine, that indifference to human suffering betrayed by the ‘liberal’ discursive practices of American agricultural aid agencies was complicitous with the indifference to the human suffering of the Other betrayed by the discursive practices of the political and military commands.544.

The concept of freedom we have been discussing, the concept that traditional liberals, and even the capacious-minded Berlin whose resignation about the possibility of forcing Western ideals onto the world was a signpost of appreciation of a larger humanity, have clung to, have sought after, and have praised as the greatest human goal is clearly in
league with uncivilized barbarism. In this case, apparently the Americans couldn’t tolerate, or even permit to exist on the other side of the planet, a way of life radically-different from their own. This hardly seems to be liberal. Furthermore, the evidence suggests we cannot be considered free since we cannot brook the world’s unfolding without holding a gun to the head of humanity, literally in Vietnam, and figuratively in the formalization of Hobbesian resentment in the science of rational choice.

We shall force them to be free:

“refugees who fled the increasingly inhospitable countryside and flooded into South Vietnam’s urban areas were among those for whom the war made everyday life a misery….refugee ghettos housed huge numbers of Vietnamese in hovels made of garbage.

…At a senate subcommittee hearing dealing with the plight of Vietnamese refugees, Dr. Herbert Needleman, the head of a charity devoted to child war victims, painted a striking picture:

“Saigon itself is becoming a garbage heap rising out of a cloud of smog. We lived in a Vietnamese home on a small, urban street. In the morning on the way to breakfast, we would encounter the bodies of rats run over by motorcycles at night. One sees garbage piles 8 feet tall by 20 feet square with children picking through them. Homeless children, sometimes completely nude, walk the streets and sleep in doorways.”

In a 1968 Foreign Affairs article, the Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington suggested that the United States “may well have stumbled upon the answer to ‘wars of liberation’” through what he called “forced draft urbanization and modernization… […]
Huntington, in his own words, coldly adduces that the urbanization of Vietnamese society, a precursor to the rearrangement of the political economy of postwar Vietnam on the basis of capitalist development with strong bureaucratic centralization, was the beneficial outcome of the “intensification of the war effort.” This undermined the fashionable counterinsurgency theory of Robert Thompson - of British-Malaya war fame - whose ideas are generally credited with giving voice to the notion of “winning hearts and minds” through the use of small troop corps and developing working relationships with “the natives.” Contra Thompson, Huntington argues that “if the direct application of mechanical and conventional power,” “takes place on such a massive scale as to produce massive migration from the countryside to city, the basic assumptions underlying Maoist doctrine of revolutionary war no longer operate. The Maoist-inspired rural revolution is undercut by the American-sponsored urban revolution.”

Seeking the destruction of the world of old Vietnam, Huntington offers the
general theory of the “strategic hamlet”\textsuperscript{549} - or concentration camps - to which people were rounded up and forced to live - much like Speenhamland denied free mobility and made to rely on largesse - without access to their traditional sources of livelihood.\textsuperscript{550} Huntington chillingly writes with mechanical precision about human lives, in a manner not too dissimilar from those who planned the “final solution”\textsuperscript{551} at the Wannsee conference a quarter century prior, where calmly matters concerning “forced evacuation,” the selection of strong Jews for “operating the extermination machinery,” the need to draw up the “necessary legislation for making the victims” technically “stateless,” and the provision of “the necessary railroad cars” and that “trains did not conflict with other timetables.\textsuperscript{552}” “In an absent-minded way the United States in Viet Nam” Huntington wrote

“stumbled upon the answer to ‘wars of national liberation.’ The effective response lies neither in the quest for conventional military victory nor in the esoteric doctrines and gimmicks of counter-insurgency warfare. It is instead forced-draft urbanization and modernization which rapidly bring the country in question out of the phase in which a rural revolutionary movement can hope to generate sufficient strength to come to power.\textsuperscript{553}”

This betrays a few conceits about American freedom. First, there is a powerful element of messianism involved in negative liberty, and that
Berlin’s warning about flipping it into positive liberty was not only never heeded, but comes to sound more like a prophecy born out of resignation. Even the mild-mannered Hobbes, who fancied himself a messenger of moderation against “vainglorious” revolutionaries willing to die for a cause, realized that for his vision of negative liberty to be successful that state intervention in society was necessary which must either involve the state in the use of violence, or must require the agents of the state to be willing to die for the state, necessitating some form of proselytizing sentiment on the part of enforcers. Huntington indeed speaks of a better way of life for the Vietnamese as something that the Americans could literally bring to the Vietnamese by bombing the country mercilessly, and to achieve this the entire US state institution, as well as civil society, had to be brought in line to quell dissent, supply troops in large numbers, and engage in war production. There is one word that best describes this: regimentation.

Second, the very idea that somehow liberal democracy is different in its intent in relation to the Other in comparison to formal fascist governments is revealed to be at best a question of degree of hostility/toleration - something which fascist governments take note of as well despite the all-powerful caricature that has come to occupy the Western imaginary regarding such - and at worst is revealed to be more or less the same.
Gassing people in a discrete individual incinerator, or a group in a shower of Zyklon B appears here to be the same as ‘death from above’: the annihilation of wood-thatch dwellings and forests with incendiary ordinance. Intentions seem meaningless.

And third, both the Holocaust itself and the prosecution of the war in Vietnam with extreme violence and cruelty seem to be examples of wars against the Other insistent on existing of their own terms outside of the ontological cartography of the nation - and in both cases the connection of these actions towards the Other in a war, one for national purity and lebensraum, and the other for global dominance in the geopolitical competition in the ‘Cold War’ and another variant of lebensraum - reveals the fallacy of Schmitt’s distinction of the enemy from the enemy within. States cannot be understood as essential and sole representatives of single nations. In reality they must be unfinished bodies, and the demonstration of closure through the raising up of the figure of homo sacer to be the receiver of exemplary violence is a performance of identity, and the only way that states can speak for the nation - be this a regionally/culturally/racially confined notion (Germany), or be it a global project of producing deracinated individuals and communities embroiled in the circuits of global capitalism and the reproduction of freedom (America).
Destroy their world. Destroy the village to save it.

“The soul is, of course, not a purely metaphysical concept, for it signifies a personal history in life as well as in death. For the Vietnamese to leave the land was to leave a part of the personality. When in 1962 the Diem regime forced the peasants to move behind the barbed wire of the strategic hamlets, the peasants found that they no longer trusted each other. And for an excellent reason. Once landowners and tenants, they became overnight improvidents and drifters who depended for their survival on what they could beg or take from others…

…The American war only completed the process the Diem regime had begun, moving peasants out of the villages and into the refugee camps and the cities, the real strategic hamlets of the war. For these farmers, as for their distant ancestors, to leave the hamlet was to step off the brink of the known world.554

And the fate of those in the countryside? As per Huntington’s recommendation?

“With artillery, helicopters, and tactical bombers at its disposal, the Allied command declared whole areas outside the strategic hamlet belt “free fire zones,” where anything moving might be shot. Inside the belt it permitted the artillery to fire out almost at random every night on suspected Viet Cong concentrations, trails, and staging areas - a tactic known as “harassment and interdiction.” All this unguided firing naturally dissuaded many peasants from following what would have been their normal course of slipping away from the crowded, squalid enclosures. At least one American admitted that the NLF were not far wrong in calling these settlements concentration camps.555"
Fitzgerald also offers the following reply to Huntington:

“But there was nothing absentminded about the manner in which the U.S. armed forces went about their program of “forced-draft urbanization.” Nor was it a simple oversight that they neglected the corollary of “modernization.” Since 1954 - indeed since 1950 with the American sponsorship of the French war in Indochina - the United States has had only one concern and that was the war to destroy the revolutionary movement. It has not won that war and it has not destroyed the revolution, but it has changed Vietnam to the point where it is unrecognizable to the Vietnamese.556

This nihilistic fury against the Other is America’s legacy in Vietnam, and was commenced in the name of freedom. This much was believed in by individuals like Huntington, however cynically, and by American rank-and-file soldiers who either suppressed their memories of that war and found various mechanisms of escape from the truth, or became in many cases radical anti-war activists.557 Some of these soldiers would sustain their truth-telling for the rest of their lives - those lucky enough to survive the madness of war on physical and psychological fronts. Others, however, would eventually come to inauthentically cast aside their memories, leaving its lessons behind for opportunism of the kind that led Martin Heidegger into the nihilism of national socialism for a time.558

The camps perversely inverted people’s sense of selfhood and their
interests; their capacity for love and trust withered into despair and
cynicism. Combining our analysis of ‘the Shock Doctrine,’ Speenhamland,
the Nazi camps, the strategic hamlets of the American war in Vietnam, and
the production of what Thiele calls “homelessness” in the supposed
search for a metaphysical order to the world, it is clear that the
reformulation of individuals along the lines of such orderings is a
chimerical, insane process. Baumann agrees, indicating that in opposition
to prevailing assumptions of the barbarity of the Holocaust - signifying its
supposedly being a break on the march of progress - a retrogression - in
fact the Holocaust could only be a product of modernity. In seeking to
quantify the world, bring it to objective presence for the sake of making it
manipulable, human beings have become homeless in the world because
this afflicts all of us potentially, and unleashes a competition amongst all
of us to ensure it doesn’t happen to us. What is lost? The ability to be at
home in the world: Heidegger calls it “dwelling,” which he explicitly
connects to what he believes ought to be called “thinking,” and Polanyi
calls it “habitation,” which, like Heidegger’s concept of dwelling,
invokes a quality of being present with what is rather than seeking to
reorder the world for the sake of improvement, the origins of which are to
be found in the salesmanship of the market and the expectations it spreads
across the globe, magnifying desires to keep up with one’s neighbors in
accumulations for the sake of self-worth.
But the production of homelessness is now so total that the victims and the perpetrators of this idea have long since lost the notion of being at home in the world that Heidegger writes about when he invokes the idea of the “heimisch”\textsuperscript{564} quality of existence. Dwelling, which is activated by a mindful-staying-with, by being’s authentic “getting-ahead-of-itself,” and most of all by care, by stewardship of one’s “thrownness,” or contingency, brings about this heimisch quality, and this cannot be accessed or comprehended if one is fixated entirely on bringing to presence a certain understanding of being-in-the-world definable by only that notion of presence.\textsuperscript{565} To “think” Heidegger says, is “to dwell”\textsuperscript{566} on a matter before consciousness, to mindfully-remain-present-with, and in so doing, one creates a home - a dwelling. But those who would forget Vietnam, who refuse to dwell on the war, and its significance for America, excuse barbarity, which, just like the Nazi Holocaust was commenced in the name of civilizational order. This indicates a desire to anoint oneself within the fold of morality, leaving reality behind, since it is of less import than identification with this theological notion of modernization as the inexorable destiny of humankind, both enabling future atrocities, and erasing the complicity we have with those committed.

“The war in Vietnam, it should not be forgotten, was inaugurated and escalated to its most
intense and destructive violence by both liberal Democratic and conservative Republican presidential administrations [...][...] and was debated globally, not in terms of the fate of democracy in America, but of the very idea of liberal capitalist democracy. This spectacle of the self-destruction of the “benign” logic of liberal democracy - this inadvertent rendering visible of the genocidal violence latent in its otherwise invisible because banalized imperial “center elsewhere” - was the essential witness of the Vietnam war at large. It was, if the grotesquely comic banality (to which the highly serious American speaker is utterly blind) is understood as a carnivalesque trope of the inexpressible horror of the event he, like the Pentagon planners of the war, routinizes, perfectly imagined in synecdochical form by the major who, in the aftermath of a large-scale search and destroy operation, told a reporter, “in a successful attempt at attaining history, ‘We had to destroy Ben Tre in order to save it.’” Ben Tre...was not simply geographical/political space occupied by the “enemy”; it is an earth...inhabited by a people whose culture sacralized this earth’s very (spatial and temporal) being…

...We must, that is, not be seduced by the emergent “larger pattern” of History into forgetting that America’s intervention in Southeast Asia was undertaken in the name of “winning hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese people to the fundamental and historically realized ontological principles of the “free world” and that it eventually took the visibly contradictory form of an all-out - undiscriminating - linguistic, ecological, cultural, economic, and military violence. We must also not forget that this polyvalent violence was read by a significant portion of the people of the United States, of Europe, and of the Third World, including responsible representative Western intellectuals such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Bertram Russell, Noam Chomsky, and Martin Luther King, as genocidal in its intent and in its proportions. Nor must we forget that, however symptomatically enacted, the protestation of the war in the United States - its “refusal of spontaneous consent” to the truth discourse of liberal capitalist democracy, to invoke Antonio Gramsci - brought the American government to a crisis that only the disruption of the Civil War has surpassed in critical intensity. The examples (among many others) of President Lyndon Johnson’s decision not to run for reelection and the ensuing violence unleashed by Mayor
Richard Daley at the Democratic national convention in Chicago and a little later by Governor James Rhodes at Kent State University attest to this crisis of hegemony…

…What, […] happened in that time, […] was, […] something akin to an epistemic break. The unspeakable violence perpetrated in the name of the principles of freedom by the United States during the Vietnam War symptomatically disclosed at multiple sites on the continuum of being the contradictions inhering in the truth discourse of liberal capitalist democracy. To put it concretely and positively, America’s inordinately violent conduct of the war made visible the polyvalent global imperial will to power that, under normal conditions, strategically remains invisible in the (onto)logic of the “free world.”

The American people, whose status as citizens of a nation considered the beacon of freedom for the world has been a source of much self-satisfaction and self-worth over the last several decades, and whose lifestyle is the main beneficiary of the instrumentalization of being, are also an unfinished people, which Spanos’ point about the anti-war protests, the challenges to the democratic party old guard and the violent repression unleashed, and many, many other moments in the public record, imagination, and memory confirm. But there is a peculiar division of labor in the maintenance of this concept of American identity and order, wherein many of the soldiers who fight wars have to live the rest of their lives in some form of denial - ranging from an inability to talk to an inauthentic braggadocio - about their deeds, and elites and elite intellectuals concoct the narrative opiates that enable all those who refuse the task to thinking to bask in the unremitting glow of triumphalism. Rounding out our analysis
of the Vietnam war’s singular importance in offering a grounded and well-reasoned critique of negative liberty and the way in which this manner of freedom is made possible by a tenuous, conceit-ridden discourse about the nature of human beings and the destiny of peoples, as expressed by Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis, Spanos combines our several themes concerning freedom, liberalism, violence, and the use of official narratives in the search of permanence, all in the employ of, and commenced by, the extinguishing of thought:

“As [Fukuyama’s] representation of the likely future “setbacks and disappointments in the process of democratization” as mere distractions “from the larger pattern that is emerging in world history” inexorably ordains, Fukyama’s “Hegelian” metaphysical problematic compels the trivialization of the history of the Vietnam war, if not the complete obliteration of its epochal significance. In his only more or less direct reference to that globally disruptive occasion, he violently reduces the resonant double differences that was/is the Vietnam War to the reified status of one in a series of vaguely affiliated historical “accidents” (a “fluke”) that reflects our attention from the planetary eventness of this war. From his Hegelian perspective - and reminiscent of the nineteenth-century American discourse of Manifest Destiny - Fukuyama transforms the Vietnam War into a minor, passing, and mere (i.e., fundamentally irrelevant) digression in the grand, inexorable, and necessary progress of the dialectical (meta)narrative of History toward its self-devouring end. In short, just as his mentor effaces the historical presence of Africa from his dialectical history of the world - “At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of the World; it has no movement of development to exhibit” - so Fukuyama pacifies the disruptive force of the (non)event of Vietnam:
“It is possible, after all, that the present trend toward democracy is a cyclical phenomenon. What reason, then, do we have to expect that the situation of the 1970s will not recur…?

…Can it not be argued, moreover, that the current crisis of authoritarianism is a fluke, a rare convergence of political planets that will not recur for the next hundred years?…

…But it is precisely if we look not just at the past fifteen years, but at the whole scope of history, that liberal democracy begins to occupy a special kind of place. While there have been cycles in the worldwide fortune of democracy, there has also been a pronounced secular trend in a democratic direction… Indeed, the growth of liberal democracy, together with its companion, economic liberalism, has been the most remarkable macropolitical phenomenon of the last four hundred years.…

…Fukuyama’s ocularcentric obliteration of [the Vietnam War’s] disclosive singularity in his euphoric representation of the end of the Cold War assumes a glaring visibility of epochal historical proportions. The totalizing and encompassing - panoptic - “look” he so casually advocates against the “merely” immediate event comes to be seen, not as the means of a disinterested reading of the itinerary of modern (Cold War) history as he claims, but as a powerful enabling agency of a polyvalent imperial interpretive project. It takes on the lineaments of a lethal act of reduction and pacification that repeats at the site of thinking the indiscriminate violent practice that destroyed Vietnam in order to “save it.” It is for this reason that this fissure in his totalized text - this visibility of his representational obliteration of the thisness of the war - needs to be carefully thought not only for its ideological implications but also for its implications for thinking as such.568"

The reason Fukuyama, and Huntington, who will be remembered for his cartoonish depiction of civilizations in conflict as the new global geopolitics after the ‘Cold War, will be always adjoined in their theories is
precisely the manner in which both theorists seek to extinguish thought, by crafting a phony home for the West, either as triumphant, or as triumphant but needing to police the boundaries of civilizational order lest the retrograde ‘cultures’ of the rest of the world’s civilizations (they can hardly be even deemed such, Huntington seems to repeatedly suggest) drag the West back into history. Naturalizing history as inexorable and identity as essence for essentialized (read: racialized, tribalized, nationalized, etc.), individuals are reduced to automatons fulfilling a role determined for them by those who claim to know their true being. It is difficult to imagine a less free way of being, or a less thoughtless way of conceptualizing existence. Fighting a ‘war on terror’ at the ‘end of history,’ it appears as though a wild pack of genocide-deniers are hell-bent on destroying freedom and its always already present twin: thinking. By failing to acknowledge the indeterminacy of good and evil, by gearing up for the production of identity as goodness, we (1) fail to recall Heidegger’s insight into the nature of what we call modernity: that it is ontologically about using technology to reduce all beings to “standing reserve,” and (2) we are forced to inauthentically portray complex human events and persons as scapegoats to ensure our own sense of affirmation. It doesn’t matter what we do the Other, because we’re good enough, we’re smart enough, and gosh darn it, people like us.
XVI. The Ideology of Progress in India - Thoughtlessness, Fascist Democracy, and Civilized Savagery

“Thinking,” Martin Heidegger has written, is “thanking.” Thinking returns us through a gratitude for existence to the things themselves, to the unconcealment, the disclosure, of phenomena. Thoughtful awareness must be eliminated if negative liberty is to be accepted across the globe. Because of the fear of each other, and of the Other more broadly conceived as a foreign element, that undergirds Western political ontology, negative conceptions of togetherness have been forged over time with an eye to necessity of combination undertaken in the name of removing uncertainty and doubt brought about by the human experience that can always be revealed by thought. These approaches have been increasingly globalized, either by the West itself, or through admirers of the West found in societies traditionally understood as being non-Western. But, as Robin points out in his discussion of Hobbes, political fear has to be constructed if it is to be regularized. Without a predictable, and normalized individual, the orchestration of negative liberty becomes impossible, since some will accept some things, and will reject others, while the opposite will be the case for other persons. Thinking, more than anything else, is
the way out of this morass for individuals. By revealing the entirety of a situation, thinking overwhelms and overawes individuals into a moment in time, where they are then capable of gradually revealing the myriad references that constitute a moment; this opens the doorway to authentic being-together-with and at the very least, tolerance, of the Other.

Thinking, thankfully, is a spontaneous human capacity that can be awakened in various ways.

But thoughtlessness was become dominant in the modern world. It is quite useful to cite the words of the former Indian finance minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram, who in an interview in 2008 with news magazine Tehelka, had the following to say about the modernization and urbanization of India; his words match Huntington’s.

“Urbanisation cannot be stopped. It is an inexorable process. All you can do is mitigate the harmful effects of mindless urbanisation by building new cities, by limiting the size of cities, by creating more green and open spaces in cities. I don’t think it’s within the power of any country or people to stop this natural progression. We must try to manage it rather than interfere with it. My vision of a poverty-free India will be an India where a vast majority, something like 85 percent, will eventually live in cities. Not megalopolises but cities. In an urban environment it is easier and more efficient to provide water, electricity, education, roads, entertainment and security rather than in 6,00,000 villages. I also believe a significant number of Indians would want to live in the countryside and
continue farming. That should be welcome and we should encourage it, but it would be a much smaller number than people who have moved to cities. My vision again is that we must continue to emphasise the imperative need of growth over a long period of time. We get weary easily. We have three to four years of high growth and we sit back as though it is a given. Growth is not a given. You have to work hard for it. We have to ensure that the growth process continues for the next 20-30 years. When we have eliminated poverty, illiteracy, some of the most debilitating diseases, when we have immunised every child, when we have eliminated very basic deficiencies like lack of drinking water, electricity, rural road connectivity — at that point of time, the process will become automatic and people will themselves ensure that growth continues at a fairly sustained pace. But for that moment to arrive, to get rid of poverty in our lifetime, we need to work very hard to sustain a growth rate of nine percent moving up to 10 percent. If you want to get rid of poverty over the next hundred years, you can have a different model or system. But if you want to get rid of it in the next 20 years, we have to work very hard for it.

The inexorability of progress, which Chidambaram and Huntington clearly both take faith in, leaves them free of any obligation to tolerate difference, especially when these differences vehemently cling to a vision whose ontological completeness in identification with their surroundings gets in the way of reducing of the world to “standing reserve.” Evident is the failure of thinking, of the imagination, and of the capacity to understand, welcome, become friends with, or even minimally tolerate the presence of the Other. The search for permanence has rendered the mere otherness of the Other - their continuing existence and ontological difference - to be a threat. Echoing the Vietnamese reverence of Xa, the Dongria Kondh
people have worshipped hills now marked for bauxite extraction (to the
tune of four trillion dollars in value)\textsuperscript{572} by Vedanta, a transnational mining
corporation.\textsuperscript{573} The hills are their god, and, for the inhabitants of this part
of India that is today in a state called Orissa, “it’s as though god has” now
“been sold.\textsuperscript{574}” But “Vedanta is only one of many multinational
corporations closing in on Orissa.\textsuperscript{575}” This land is under siege by an Indian
state operating not only in the name of development - which led even the
much-admired Jawaharlal Nehru to build dams atop tribal villages\textsuperscript{576} - but
in the name of capitalist development closely tied with global financial
centers far away from India. It is no wonder that the Dongria Kondh, and
many peoples like them in India’s heartland have taken up arms against
the state, since they, as well as many family-farmers across India, now, are
victim to the expropriation of their land under the 1894 “Land Acquisition
Act,” which, as the date should imply, was a law brought into force while
India was a colony of England.\textsuperscript{577} Who indeed, rules India (and Pakistan)?
“If the…hills are destroyed,” Arundhati Roy writes

“the forests that clothe them will be destroyed too. So will the rivers and the streams that
flow out of them and irrigate the plains below. So will the Dongria Kondh. So will the
hundreds of thousands of tribal people who live in the forested heart of India, whose
homeland is similarly under threat…

… In our smoky, crowded cities, some people say, ‘So what? Someone has to pay the
price of progress.’ Some even say, ‘Let’s face it, these are people whose time has come.
Look at any developed country, Europe, the United States, Australia - they all have a
'past’. Indeed they do. So why shouldn’t we?578,

And this attitude has led to the development of India’s own strategic hamlets program, free-fire zones, the imprisonment of human rights activists who cite India’s own constitution that declares that the rights of tribal people must not be violated and their land not taken from them, and the institutionalization of a war-footing in relation to vast tracts of India’s internal territory.579 For the poor in India, be they rural people like the tribals who are either caught up in, sympathize with, receive token protection from, or participate in the Naxalite army - also known as ‘the People’s War Group,’ - ‘progress’ means civil war.580

For Chidambaram and his allies, it means profits. The finance minister himself was previously a lawyer for Enron corporation,581 which had bribed the center-right Bhartiya Janata Party government in the 1990’s in order to gain a foothold in the tempting Indian energy market of rising middle-classes seeking access to a modern lifestyle. To bring about the orchestration of beings to produce accumulations and concentrations of power as measured in terms of capital, Indian elites are turning India into a vast labor camp.582 Employing the disciplinary logic of freedom demanding conformity of the rising middle-classes with a program of genocide, creating illusory permanence for a relatively new social order
through appeals to nationalism and religiosity, and granting the poor in India’s cities the right to work for a pittance, to be abused by their social betters as a due course of “nature,” having already lost their land and dignity in the “forced-draft urbanization” that Huntington and Chidambaram have both thought to be the gateway to prosperity, India’s new ruling and privileged classes of administrators - the petty bourgeoisie - have sought security over freedom, and persecute individuals with conscience and awareness with as much zeal if not more than their officially-Western counterparts.

Ashis Nandy has written that the transformation of India by colonialism had, among other effects, the highly significant consequence of priming the new Indian nation for its entry into global power politics, but that this would require the disciplining of India’s “subcultural differences” and “asymmetry” in a manner that would, like Robin shows in Edmund Burke’s reactionary thought, require a more activist project than something that could simply be called “conservatism.” India’s traditional pluralism and anarchy are thus to be replaced with a unified and centralized state, and into the void generated by the lack of this presence in India in relation to her competitors on the global stage, the Indian fascist projects “middle-class Western values.” And thus keeping up with the Juneses now become maintaining honor among the Kumars,
Rajputs, Singhs, Ashrafs, and Advanis.

For their cousins in the jungles of Dantewada, Operation Green Hunt, an elite commando military campaign, and strategic hamlets, is rapidly destroying ancient cultures that predate the *Vedas*, and for their brothers and sisters involved in farming, the increasing sell out of their livelihoods and land to global agribusinesses (yes the same that Thiele described as ‘irresponsible’\(^586\) rather than genocidal) through monetary debt vehicles that have driven 180,000 or more to the despair of suicide.\(^587\)

The purpose of the preceding discussion, other than marshaling valuable empirical support for our theory, is to show that the contingent acceleration of these processes in India is not a necessary development and it requires the active complicity and decision-making of powerful social agents. Masking their decisions in the air of inevitability, the elite reveal their own unfreedom, since they are ascribing their actions to forces other than themselves, and they create a social framework of denial which must always be defended against spontaneous awareness. India has millions of displaced people and was itself born out of the forcible transfer of millions, too.\(^588\) As the refugees in urban slums, in resettlement camps, and in other desperate places cut off from their livelihoods, their homes, and their communities, entire societies have been relegated to desperation.
and are hanging at the edges of survival. Their lives and deaths become irrelevant to the new rising middle-classes and the democracy that purports to be that shining class’ authentic representative.

“It’s not very surprising that [the necessity of progress] it into the version of the New India currently on the market. That’s because what is on sale is another form of denial… In this universe, systemic horrors are converted into momentary lapses, attributable to flawed individuals, and a more “balanced,” happier world is presented in place of the real one. The balance is spurious: often Union and Progress (the BJP and Congress) are set off against each other, a liberal secular critique of the Union project used to legitimize the depredations of the Progress project. Those at the top of the food chain, those who have no reason to want to alter the status quo…[have the] job…to patrol the border, diffuse rage, delegitimize anger, and to negotiate a ceasefire.589"

This identarian fascism feasts on the poor, both as its foot-soldiers, and its victims, and is historically-linked to economic failure, social inequality, and the opportunities these present for politicians who will become the “harvesters of sorrow.590"

“Right now in India we have to negotiate the dangerous cross-currents of neoliberal capitalism and communal neo-fascism. While the word capitalism hasn’t completely lost its sheen yet, using the word fascism often causes offense. So we must ask ourselves, are we using the word loosely? Are we exaggerating our situation, does what we are experiencing on a daily basis qualify as fascism…?

… When a government more or less openly supports a pogrom against members of a
minority community in which more than one thousand people are brutally killed, is it fascism? When women of that community are publicly raped and burned alive, is it fascism? When authorities collude to see to it that nobody is punished for these crimes, is it fascism? When one hundred and fifty thousand people are driven from their homes, ghettoized, and economically and socially boycotted, is it fascism? When the cultural guild that runs hate camps across the country commands the respect and admiration of the prime minister, the home minister, the law minister, the disinvestment minister, is it fascism? When painters, writers, scholars, and filmmakers who protest are abused, threatened, and have their work burned, banned, and destroyed, is it fascism? When a government issues an edict requiring the arbitrary alteration of school history textbooks, is it fascism? When mobs attack and burn archives of ancient historical documents, when every minor politician masquerades as a professional medieval historian and archaeologist, when painstaking scholarship is rubbished using baseless populist assertion, is it fascism? When murder, rape, arson, and mob justice are condoned by the party in power and its stable of stock intellectuals as an appropriate response to a real or perceived historical wrong - committed centuries ago - is it fascism? When the middle class and the well heeled pause a moment, tut-tut, and then go on with their lives, is it fascism? When the prime minister who presides over all this is hailed as a statesman and visionary, are we not laying the foundation for full-blown fascism.

The Indian state now defends itself with Orwellian-sounding laws named “the Prevention of Terrorism Act,” which was repealed in 2004, only to be reintroduced in 2008 as a new amendment to the already in place “Unlawful Activities Prevention Act,” which, among other things, institutionalized the state’s ability to prevent peaceful assemblies, impose gags on free speech, and to take other preventive measures as the
government sees fit in the name of national security. Under these laws, and the regime of lawlessness legalized under their rubric, millions, including Muslims, indigenous *Aadivasi* tribal peoples, communists, land reform activists, social justice campaigners, advocates of Kashmiri autonomy and/or independence, organizers seeking greater freedom from Delhi in India’s untamed northeast, and many others, have had their rights abridged. This has also transformed whole classes of law-abiding citizens into unfree persons, who, by virtue of their thoughts - the spontaneity of the awareness - are criminalized.

The paranoia of this state of affairs is reflected clearly in India’s activities in Kashmir, a land to which they hold a conflicting, irresolvable claim to, along with Pakistan; irresolvable because of the very idea of the need to produce permanence as the basis of national order. In Kashmir, Roy writes

“even junior commissioned and noncommissioned officers of the army [are allowed] to use force (and even kill) any person on suspicion of disturbing public order or carrying a weapon. On suspicion of! Nobody who lives in India can harbor any illusions about what that means. The documentation of instances of torture, disappearances, custodial deaths, rape, and gang rape (by security forces) is enough to make your blood run cold. The fact that despite all this, India retains its reputation as a legitimate democracy - in the international community and among its own middle class - is a triumph.”
Laws like these are designed to promote a sense of normalcy within a country for those who are ostensibly the beneficiaries - however actually temporarily - of this state of affairs. War is the reality for much of India, “But in urban India,” Roy tells us

“wherever you go... you have TV monitors in which election promises have already come true. India’s Shining, Feeling Good. You only have to close your ears to the sickening crunch of the policeman’s boot on someone’s ribs, you only have to raise your eyes from the squalor, the slums, the ragged broken people on the streets and seek a friendly TV monitor and you will be in that other beautiful world. The singing-dancing world of Bollywood’s permanent pelvic thrusts, of permanently privileged, permanently happy Indians waving their tricolor flag and Feeling Good. It’s becoming harder and harder to tell which one’s the real world and which one’s virtual. Laws like POTA are like buttons on a TV. You can use it to switch off the poor, the troublesome, the unwanted.”

XVII. *Bios, Zoe, and the Creation of Superfluous Beings - Identification with Arbitrary Power*

The two preceding sections have been included for the purpose of giving direct evidence to the claim that not only is freedom itself transformed into a narrow vision of conformity when conceived as permanent possession, but that the very notion of being free - being open for the
disclosure of being - is betrayed through the institutionalization of the capacity for decision-making to determine insiders and outsiders. This capacity must eventually blur foreign and domestic spatial distinctions. Because of the inherent uncertainty of these designations, to secure the self, the group seeking permanence embarks on adventures beyond the domestic space to give succor to its resource base on the one hand, and, on the other hand, as Tocqueville’s praise of France’s and Europe’s racially-based adventures abroad makes clear, these journeys to new lands are also undertaken to prove to the self the self’s superiority to other beings whose being is thus brought into question. This relational and negative understanding of the self can only be meaningful in the context of the relationship between Self and Other. Domination, the destruction of the Other, and the vaunting of the Self, the garnering of the means of selfhood through physical violence or through a combination of physical violence and supremacist ideology, can, in the end, only result in the degradation of the idea of freedom. Quite simply, freedom is about choice, and the justificatory reference to necessity as the reason behind colonial ventures, behind the stockpiling of power understood as the holding in reserve of beings and things, and behind the inability to remain still and await the disclosure of existence, all obscure both choice and the awareness of choices. Even simpler, can we characterize the impatient, anxious, and utterly fearful as free? As per the Hobbesian formula, as assented to by
Locke, Mill, Tocqueville, and those in favor of the liberal variant of disciplinary governance, authentic choice is surrendered to the sovereign. In some cases, the sovereign agency recreates relatively inconsequential choices for persons in society, i.e. - elections and choice of political party membership in officially-sanctioned groups. But even the rudiments of choice, for both the commoner and for the elite, are self-mystified with appeals to inexorable processes and human nature; indeed Chidambaram’s words about the necessity of harsh discipline for 20-30 years before progress would became automatic seem to echo Mill’s infamous assent to the idea of despotism being necessary for barbarians to be governed properly until they could make spontaneous progress manifestly on their own without tutelage. 598

Western modernity is a contingent spatiality and temporality. But failing to recognize it as such, we conceive of ideas of progressiveness, historical destiny, and the naturalization of violent processes in which choice plays a fundamental role because they are the product of artifice, as being simply there, as objectively present, and thus revelatory sources of duties to be fulfilled. 599 If viewed in this manner, the very unfree eventuality of needing to prove that one is indeed a ‘free one’ worthy of freedom will come to consume not only domestic political and social interactions - and indeed because of the near-total absence of regulation in the private realm.
of the American workplace, in economic interactions but also activates a foreign-policy footing aimed at producing and reproducing the basis of this distinction between the free and the unfree abroad. In our discussion of the Vietnam war this much should be obvious. So too should be the fascist nature of the American intervention there and the cultural fascism associated with denying the significance of the Vietnam war. In our discussion of the production of the same kinds of privileges in Indian politics and economy - which Roy satirizes by referring to it as the secession of the rich and the middle-classes from India - an upwards secession freeing the elite from planet Earth itself - we can also witness the abrogation of not only the liberal legal framework, but the cultural effect of this on the people who are trained towards progress at any cost, in opposition to countermovements in society that refuse to go along.

“modern totalitarianism can be defined as the establishment, by means of the state of exception, of a legal civil war that allows for the physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the political system. Since then, the voluntary creation of a permanent state of emergency (though perhaps not declared in a technical sense) has become one of the essential practices of contemporary states, including so-called democratic ones…

…This transformation of a provisional and exceptional measure into a technique of government threatens to radically alter - in fact, has already palpably altered - the structure and meaning of the traditional distinction between constitutional forms. Indeed, from this perspective, the state of exception appears as a threshold of indeterminacy
between democracy and absolutism.\textsuperscript{602}

The long-standing erasure of difference in Western political philosophy through the metaphysical mechanism of disciplining the unfolding of existence - the becoming of being - in order to fit it into a template associated with making being permanent, which Heidegger was also charged as being complicit with because of the manipulability of his concept of authenticity in the wrong hands,\textsuperscript{603} is given new intensity in the current globalized moment since the spread of systems of power and production globally have undermined nations’ self-conceptions and notions of destiny.\textsuperscript{604} We also witness the assertion of power over the bare life of individuals, \textit{zoe}, in the name of an order of power no longer capable of using sovereign violence associated with re-inscribing political order for this same reason, since it cannot clothe persons in the armor of \textit{bios} in a rational manner that allows individuals to make their lives stable unless they precede their sense of identity and the authentic possibilities for being found in their connection, through their identity, to their surroundings, with simply the idea that the sensation of permanence itself is what their identity is coeval with.\textsuperscript{605} Following our recovery of Heidegger’s heresy about the ontology of modernity understood as the production of the standing reserve to be rendered manipulable for the making present of beings in accordance with the orchestrations of power, in which he
equated the Nazi genocide with the advent of mechanized agriculture, the point here is that there is an inner logic to this drive - not because metaphysical truths about it are true, but simply because of its own self-conception as worthy of, and through the will capable of, mastery of the world amounting to permanent security. But because this sovereign violence always shifts its targets, always finds faults in the construction of order, even the most seemingly secure identities can be on the receiving end of violence, and somehow this fact must be ignored by those who identify entirely with that order.

Disembedding a political being from the plurality of beings, and holding it up as it were, as an example for all to follow - and holding up a constitutive opposition in the body of *homo sacer* as a counterexample of failed discipline - political institutions and other institutions that remain political, since the question of being circulates as a specter in their daily operation, quiet the infinities of freedom that can emerge from spontaneous expression and spontaneous thought and redirect people’s energies toward the material and ideological reproduction of the sublime body understood to be the common identity of people within the organized framework in question. This was the case in Plato, remained the case in Hobbes’ sovereign, continued to be the case in each of the liberalized forms of rule associated with the liberal critique of absolute power that in
the end only democratized the capacity for sovereign decision but didn’t question the corporatized body itself.\textsuperscript{607} and even remains the case in the theories liberals like Richard Rorty and John Rawls, who, in seemingly calling for a maximum of pluralism, nonetheless fail to accommodate difference in their concepts of ordered liberty.\textsuperscript{608}

In the context of economics, in a “zone of indistinction” at the precipice of modernity that we have suggested was a predecessor of the camp, the exposure of people to the decisions of individuals and groups who operate several removes from the reality that they will come to influence by virtue of the organization of social interaction in places like Speenhamland, the subsequent Poor Laws regime in England, and in the sudden privatizations accompanied by an increase in unaccountable state power whose mission is to ensure compliance of the people at all costs, creates a sparser, more rarified sublime body than that of the nation ostensibly clothed in the coverings of culture. This is the idealized notion of the individual as a rational actor, divorced from cultural meanings, in theory, since rationality now comports with its ‘realistic’ measure through the market mechanism whose expression of value in terms of money - monetary numbers to be specific - is taken as a reliable indicator of their trustworthiness with freedom.\textsuperscript{609} But just like the scenario of the sublime body of the nation - and in modern times because of the residue of the idea
of race, the purportedly biological and ideal body of the race as the nation - an ultimately unsustainable idea of existence is held up as an example to the rest of the people in society as a basis for their disciplinary behavioral goals.610

In both cases, the economic and the political, insofar as we can even conceive of these domains as separate from one another, the process of idealization has been characterized by a negative ideal of purity, rationality, and other codes of belonging through the exclusion of chaotic elements. Most importantly, the raising of the specter in question is a fundamentally violent process, though this violence is frequently concealed. As Klein indicated in *The Shock Doctrine*, the violence can be broad and social in scope, such as through the widespread use of sovereign violence to mortify the body of *hominès sacri* with slow death from economic blockade or fast death through the familiar instrumentality of militaries, or can be pinpoint precise through the use of psychological and physical technologies of torture that separate an individual from their own experience and their own perceptions of reality.611

In the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, often taken as the “father of modern moral philosophy,612” this precise division of the self from their own faculties is taken as being empirically true for all beings, and in this regard
Kant follows Descartes, whose philosophy as we discussed above has been recast in a dozen lights since his time in all subsequent philosophies that on some level divide the actual person, seen as deficient, as a bundle of emotions and passions that cloud their vision - their senses - from the idealized person, whose dispassion, whose ability to resolutely control their emotions, their ability to ‘see the big picture.’ The picture is decided in its constitution in advance. But if we have read our Plato correctly, there is nothing new about this view of the human being, and Fukuyama’s negative invocation of *thymos*, or spirit, as a thing to be held in check by rationality brings this trope right into the current moment.

At their core, economic determinism associated with market economics and theories of human nature that emphasize disconnection and alienation between persons, and that point the route to community through the internalization of rational fears which produce discipline, and, too, supremacist and fascist theories of political identity and order associated with the nation-state as a destiny of a peoples, both share the commonality of requiring an orchestration of material and thought for the purpose of reproduction of order. This orchestration is brought about through the use of sovereign violence, which, unlike violence used for the purpose of defense, has no restrictions on its operation - it is simply meant to introduce artificial suffering into the world atop the suffering human
beings will already likely experience as a element of existence. For this very reason it must be justified through doctrines such as just war theory, which are usually understood as mere justifications by those on the receiving end of action, and should therefore be understood as a salve on the minds of the perpetrators since they themselves lose their humanity in the process of commission; through bringing death to the Other, torment to the Other, and doing so in a manner based on the use of arbitrary, but sanctified, power, but that retains the character of being arbitrary always already since there is no recognition of the sacrificing of *homo sacer*, for the terms of order to be preserved. Therefore, on some level, the production of the division between the factual, instantiated, empirical human being, and the disciplined, idealized, essential human being as subject whose objective presence allows them to remain dispassionate and perceive objective being truly and universally necessitates the transformation of both the victim and the victimizer of organized violence into something less than fully human.

“The inhabitants of a totalitarian country are thrown into and caught in the process of nature or history for the sake of accelerating its movement; as such, they can only be executioners or victims of its inherent law. The process may decide that those who today eliminate race and individuals or the members of dying classes and decadent peoples are tomorrow those who must be sacrificed. What totalitarian rule needs to guide behavior of its subjects is a preparation to fit each of them equally well for the role of executioner and the role of victim. This two-sided preparation, the substitute for a principle of action, is
XVIII. The World is a Camp: Negation, Power-Seeking and Power-Worshipping as Freedom

In the camps, be they actual camps or nations made into camps by the totalitarian logic of technology in service of permanence, where the double-disembedding of the rational actor and the sublime national body is made real, where the defense of the reproducibility of the permanent and essential understanding of the national people and the self is actuated, where it eventually is revealed to the self and the nation that the last line of defense for permanence is the application of force, we witness the decay and supersession of the nation-state as a concept of order; but in its demise lashes out, seeks final adherents, internationalizes its patterns of loyalty and security, and becomes deterritorialized.\textsuperscript{614} Especially in the case of the powerful nations with the most complex issues internally, since these states have had to overcommit their resource base and their reserves of legitimation devices for the sake of (re)producing their internal empires of freedom and wealth.\textsuperscript{615} This is the prophecy of Nietzsche’s war of spirits, and the second world war was a precursor to this. Most
importantly, this war was itself at least partially a product of German desires to prove their being equal of the other European imperial powers, and thus to play power politics, and to show that they too were a force to be reckoned with. Not only were they technologically strong and organized in carrying out the conquests befitting a machine civilization, but they would seek to prove they were purer as well. But this is nothing that hadn’t already been commenced by the other European nations in the name of their empires in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and to forget this point is fashionable, but it is incorrect.

But, nonetheless, the German example is instructive since the conflicts between these new countries in the 3rd world have taken on characteristics of the kind of racism once exported there through imperialism. Fanon anticipated this development as a mechanism of the colonized bourgeoisie in these countries who would seek to make themselves the new permanent masters of the newly free countries. Scholars who have relied on the categories of political realism associated with the rise of the Westphalian system in European history therefore fail to understand the incentives and the forces at play in the attempt to construct states in the former colonized world, where the energies of negation, racism, and hyper-competitiveness, all layered onto societies with very different ontological underpinnings
that the West, are now witness to violent processes that are tearing identities asunder not on the basis of aristocratic competitions that were the stuff of feudal Europe, but on the basis of the naturalized artificiality of biological-political divisions articulated to a mass understanding of human nature. And for this we can thank the Germans, who in defeat, managed to set the stakes for nationalist movements throughout the world, which became replete with many elite admirers of Hitler unafraid to manipulate the iconography of the nation, harness the popular will, and kill many more persons in the name of their fiefdoms than was ever done in feudal Europe.

And so the war of spirits has come to engulf India and Pakistan, Shia and Sunni, Mestizo and Indigenous, Congo and its many nationalities which in the fog of war seem to be less meaningful than people’s immediate circles for cooperation to enhance survival prospects in war zones, Arab and African, Khmer and Vietnamese, Muslim and Christian Filipino, Tamil and Sinhalese, Chinese and Tibetan, and, in the former Yugoslavia as well, all the nationalities of that former-cosmopolitan nation-state, carved into protectorates, at loggerheads with each other, with peace amounting to a stalemate policed by NATO soldiers and arms. Preceding the cold peace that emerged in Southern Europe between religions and ethnicities, during the war, the resort to the widespread reliance on rape as a weapon of war
marked, for Agamben, a new biopolitical phase in international conflict, whose main purpose was the creation of a nationalist political force. Agamben writes:

"the camps have, in a certain sense, reappeared in an even more extreme form in the territories of the former Yugoslavia. What is happening there is by no means, as interested observers are quick to declare, a redefinition of the old political system according to new ethnic and territorial arrangements, which is to say, a simple repetition of the processes that led to the constitution of European nation-states. At issue in the former Yugoslavia is, rather, an incurable rupture of the old nomos and a dislocation of populations and human lives along entirely new lines of flight. Hence the decisive importance of ethnic rape camps. If the Nazis never thought of effecting the Final Solution by making Jewish women pregnant, it is because the principle of birth that assured the inscription of life in the order of the nation-state was still - if in a profoundly transformed sense - in operation. This principle has now entered into a process of decay and dislocation. It is becoming increasingly impossible for it to function, and we must expect not only new camps but always new and more lunatic regulative definitions of the inscription of life in the city. The camp, which is now securely lodged within the city’s interior, is the new biopolitical nomos of the planet.619"

The use of feeding tubes to break hunger strikes; the indefinite detention of persons without formal charges or even an inkling of evidence proving their guilt of any crime, let alone terrorism against America in that nation’s ‘war on terror;’ the herding of immigrants globally into detention camps and the proliferation of these camps where multitudes make their home;
the transformation of wide swathes of land into free-fire zones of the kind we are now acquainted with; the sacrifice zones where environmental decay, economic abandonment, security vacuums, and social decay are left to do their work on people whose mobility and capacity to seek refuge elsewhere is legally or informally limited; the introduction of police state technologies and strategies into urban environments; the planetary scale of slum-dwelling; the emphasis on middle-class family honor expressed through social self-segregation ranging from gentrification to the formal and informal arrangement of marriages to reproduce social class…..Agamben’s analysis appears to bear out. In these desperate places, people still want freedom. But freedom is a bodily urge, a unity of the consciousness with one’s actions that require support at some point even for the strongest and most strident individual. And so desperation becomes a technology of rule: the creation of isolation through ideologies of selfishness, racism and other forms of group-essentialization whose apparent resolution can only be warfare, and through other concordant means, and the absence of these artificial bindings leaves the individual alone in their abjectness.\textsuperscript{620} Dissolvent forces spread and rip apart communities, nations, and individuals, and in desperation, the state is sought as a provider of relief - so much so that being transformed into a cog in the machinery of the state is seen positively as a source of security, and, also, as coeval with the modest modicum of freedom imaginable.
XIX. Technological Fanaticism: Death From Above, The Logic of Genocide, and the Production of Homelessness

Arendt was quoted above saying that “totalitarian rule needs to guide behavior [...] to fit each [citizen] equally well for the role of executioner and the role of victim.”621 the self-victimization of Americans who accept their powerlessness over politics, and whose empowerment and potential is refracted through the lens of party politics that has lost all meaning,622 who zealously defend their party identifications through mass media,623 and through the castigation of dissidents and members of third parties as being hopeless idealists, reveal in their machinations to identify with authority a certain resignation to having their fate determined by authority, consequences be dammed. Writing about the “fanatical” quest to improve, during the second world war, aerial warfare techniques to exact maximum carnage at the lowest possible cost - carnage which consumed the lives of millions of Japanese civilians in a drawn out, coldly statistically-refined campaign before the use of nuclear weapons at the end of the conflict624 - Michael Sherry indicates that (1) “almost 4 percent of the [air force sortie] were killed or missing in action on each mission, and the mean number of
missions completed was 14.72, barely past the halfway point,\(^{625}\) and that thousands of pilots died in training accidents, and were likely to suffer from major psychological disorders,\(^{626}\) that (2) tactical considerations such as those made to carry out the infamous fire raids on Tokyo required exposing the airmen to even more dangers than normal by stripping aircraft of defensive gunnery and flying at very low altitudes in the sight of enemy anti-aircraft fire,\(^{627}\) and, (3) that the insanity of all of this could be rationalized through the cult of “aggressive potency” associated with male status in a world defined by patriarchal power and assertion of pride, in this case expressed through a drive to destructiveness that would prove its presence through numerical data.\(^{628}\) This is a precise example of Hannah Arendt’s point about the interchangeability of individuals in functional roles, as well as in their roles as victims or victimizers, in fascist, totalitarian social formations. American airmen were only less expendable to American military planners than the Japanese were because they needed the American airmen, whereas the Japanese civilians below were completely expendable, as evidenced by the huge numbers killed, and the utter indifference to their suffering revealed in Army Air Force documents.\(^{629}\) But the various decisions made to expose American pilots to increased dangers, which in many cases were made in the context of militarily questionable fire-raids that followed 2-3 fire raids on towns and cities that had already been reduced to ashes, whose inhabitants had fled
the cities to the countryside, simply to conduct experimental calculations on the effectiveness of flight formations for dropping incendiary ordinance, from certain altitudes, in certain concentration mixtures within the ordinance packaging, at various angles of deployment, etc., should give the most nationalist Americans pause in contemplating the nature of their state.  

Liberal democracy, when organized for the preservation of individuals who see themselves as essentially-identified with their nation, with their community - itself seen as emanating from an essentially-true identity - and with the family understood in a neo-tribalist way, apparently can be a more flexible technology of fascism than even what are called formal fascisms, since, by appealing to the individual’s own sense of self as articulated to a community that by definition gives him freedom, liberal democracy can retain the trappings of being common-sensical - as Kant would have it - but also flexible enough to shift the nomenclatural terrain of rule when expedient. As a result individuality is limited to narrow terrain, and authority is seen as its guarantor. But when this transpires, individuals suppress themselves. Sherry argues that the compensation evident in air force programs, and in militarism more generally is “technological fanaticism,” which allows for identification with the machines of power, that, through their operation by man, give men the
sense of power they’ve lost by being implicated in hierarchies that rob them of their spontaneity.\textsuperscript{632}

Focusing on the minutiae of complex technological systems which were themselves as deadly as combat at times, Sherry argues, the airmen were able to forge a solidarity with each other unavailable to them in civilian life, and which, in a moment of animosity towards the Other - whose threateningness was exaggerated and caricatured to make them appear the repository of all that was evil and unmanly - they could forge a sense of national purpose and identify with it, as well as see themselves as individually-talented and intelligent elements within a larger ‘natural’ whole - the nation at war - which would treat them as heroes on their return from combat someday.\textsuperscript{633} But these tokens of hyper-masculinity served to pacify the consciousness of the airmen in the victorious American Army Air Force in the second world war, leaving them often emotionally void, and morally disengaged from the consequences of their actions.\textsuperscript{634} This moral escapism went straight up to the top of the bomber command, with Curtis LeMay, the commander in the Pacific, who relied on econometric data to make decisions about Japanese and American losses alike in the air war, relying on a transforming criteria not guided even by strategy but merely by a short-term notion of efficiency gains, to calculate acceptable losses on the American side versus a proportionally acceptably victorious
rate of losses on the ground for the enemy below in Japan. This turned the islands of Japan into a vast concentration camp, the Japanese reduced to Pavlovian dogs in the eyes of the American war planners, to be made to jump this way and that through the application of disciplinary sovereign violence, where experimental forms of warfare were made more deadly through iterations informed by application of the latest advances in statistics, computing, and applications of the scientific method aimed at the refinement of techniques. Robert McNamara, who would later implement the same strategy in Vietnam as Defense Secretary, one of LeMay’s top aides, would later claim, “we were acting as war criminals.” Japan was a laboratory for these experiments, to an extent far more than Germany; although, the destruction of German cities, as we shall see, was also no trifling matter.

But the congruity to Agamben’s Arendtian invocation of the camps here is because of the prevalence in both the Nazi camps and the nothingness to which the American Army Air Forces reduced Japan: a zone of marginalization from all of human existence, removed from the world. The experimentation conducted from the vantage point of a disciplinary all-powerful, panoptic eye, whose self-transparency was impossible, was, in both the Nazi camps and the American transformation of Japan into a free-fire zone, irregardless our admission, commenced in the name of
progress. The “Fifth Air Force’s intelligence officer declared on July 21\textsuperscript{st} [1945] that “the entire population of Japan is a proper Military Target….,
THERE ARE NO CIVILIANS IN JAPAN.\textsuperscript{637}” So fighter pilots took to the
“strafing of passenger trains,\textsuperscript{638}” and also after all the cities were
destroyed, combat effectiveness would be gauged by moving operations to
“all urban areas with a population greater than 30,000 peoples,\textsuperscript{639}” and yet
“another possibility lay in new methods of starvation to supplement the
interdiction of food transport: the rice paddies might be sprayed with oil,
defoliants, or biological agents….\textsuperscript{640}” Indeed, the momentum of
destruction spun the war against the Japanese out of control, beyond the
limits of the laws of war - and came to encompass raids on Chinese,
Taiwanese, and Filipino cities, where the indifference to the lives of
civilians nominally considered to be friendly to the United States
government and military was evident in the fire-bombing of infrastructure
they too depended upon.\textsuperscript{641}

In one night in 1945 estimates place well over 100,000 killed in Tokyo,
and this process was repeated several times over in every major Japanese
city during the war. In the aftermath of each raid, statistics were gathered,
flight formations and ordinance strategies were scrutinized, and loss rates
among flight crews were compared.\textsuperscript{642} 52,173 American air force
personnel were lost as were 70,252 British Royal Air Force pilots - mainly in similar campaigns over Germany which saw the horrific fire bombing of the city of Dresden, where 40,000 were also killed in one night.\textsuperscript{643} Reports even suggested that American commanders were aware of the existence of American POW camps nearby Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but ruled out considerations for the lives of their fellow comrades-at-arms in making the final decision to use the bomb, whose use would usher in a new era of American world sovereignty.\textsuperscript{644}

How exactly is the brutality of the Nazis any different from this? The Western philosophical tradition, which has had a decisive effect on the formation of political societies in the West, infects liberalism and fascism alike with the need to make present the objectiveness of being. In seeking to make being present, the being of being \textit{itself} - the existence of humanity - is threatened with extinction.

William Spanos, whose courageous intellectual inquiry has inspired our efforts, was a young American soldier in 1945, taken prisoner of war during the Battle of the Bulge by the German army. Shortly thereafter, he ended up in a POW camp near Dresden, Germany, where, following raids on that city, he was taken by his captors to dig out and sort dead bodies for mass burial and disposal otherwise. In his memoir of his experiences in
the second world war, where his not quite fully white American status as a son of Greek immigrants to America gave him DuBoisian second-sight of his own sort, which opened up the factual nature of the world itself as opposed to the metaphysical criteria of world as ‘History,’ Spanos quotes a student of his asking him the question: “Did you ever return to Dresden Professor Spanos?” To which he replied “I never left there.”

“This singular event of World War II perpetrated by the Allied high command in London was systematically muted by the media of the ‘free world’ and most of the histories of the war written by the victors in its aftermath in order to celebrate Western democracy - its humanity - over Western and later Eastern (Soviet) totalitarianism. Subsumed under then larger ‘global’ story of victory against an evil that was infecting Western civilization, this terrific event was “localized,” and the enormity of its calculated brutality - its terrorist goal - was, like Hiroshima and Nagasaki, virtually obliterated from the West’s cultural memory. The Allies justified their attack on this undefended city at the time by representing it as a strategic center for the German war effort against the Soviet Union on the Eastern front. The firebombing of Dresden, it was claimed, was intended to aid the Soviet army’s defense… Despite the fact that the Soviet army was at that time on the offensive, that rationalization, it seems, took hold and over the years since then became a historical truth. In thus viewing this singular temporal event from above - an event intensely lived by massive numbers of human beings below - the official histories enabled the forgetting of the firebombing of this defenseless city. In so doing, they tacitly put its horror out of play in the debates over later military actions undertaken by the United States in the period of the Cold War, the excessive violence of which might have been illuminated by the inhumanity of the bombing of Dresden - the mass slaughter perpetrated by Britain and the United States. I am referring, above all, to its scorched-earth policy (the use of napalm, herbicides, and other chemicals, the B-52 bombings) that
killed and maimed over a million Vietnamese civilians, destroyed their land, and transformed an ancient rice culture into a population of refugees during the decade of the Vietnam war, all in the name of “saving Vietnam for the free world.”

The world is a camp.

From the destruction of Falluja, in the present, and for generations to come through the saturation of that Iraqi city with depleted uranium munitions; to the support for torture policies on a mass scale conducted by US and Western-allied states in Latin America’s dirty wars of the 1970’s and 80’s; to the continuing explosions of bomblets leftover from the US war throughout Indochina that to this day claims hundreds of lives, mostly of children, every year in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam; to the cutting of social and economic programs to needy people the world over, often being undertaken through policies clothed in the theories of economic liberalism seeking to create an accountable rational actor - a being-in-itself to be the standard of judgment for beings as phenomena; to the countless daily aggressions by authority figures - official and un-uniformed - against social outcastes in the name of order and purity; to the pavlovian command to “mellow out” or else in the world’s richer climes, where consciousness of the division sown into the being of being is rejected as “negative thinking” rather than being taken as a warning, seen
as a symptom of uppityness and maladjustment rather than as a prescient warning of things to come;\textsuperscript{651} in all these instances and many more the use of terror by the authorities scattered around the world, where successful, has been internalized as the naturalization of hegemony, as human nature, yielding a ready-made pathway for being, traversable by some - the privileged - and pined after by many others: those without privilege and who have had their own self-regard beaten out of them. The ontology of the modern world has made conformists and “herd-animals” among us into hunting packs traversing the globe for meat;\textsuperscript{652} most of the rest of us are homeless.

This radically threatens the very possibility of freedom, which, as a social phenomena, is a beautiful idea more flexible and beautiful than all other concepts because, by inhering to our physical instincts for love, joy, nourishment, intellectual and artistic stimulation, communication, interconnection, and new and meaningful experiences, all to bring about a life worth living, free of the fear that Kweli warns us about, freedom, as an idea is unlike all the other forms imagined by Plato. These fossils exist in an invisible heaven, a temple of Sarastaro,\textsuperscript{653} to which we can only gain admission if we prove our worthiness through conformity with another person’s will. This conformity requires us to forgo our consciousness and our perceptions, which, in a system that defines terror as the absence of
order, reduces all free peoples to terrorists.

But the erasure of consciousness is, in the end, impossible. There is always the sneaking suspicion that those named terrorists are not really such, and that those charged with prosecuting holy wars of what has been called freedom, are not the benevolent henchmen they seem. On the march to the eventual use of the nuclear bomb against Japan, collective guilt of American war planners increased more and more, leading to measures to censor the presses, and to establish the collective guilt of the Japanese in deserving their fate. Much like the later Western liberal inquisition against Martin Heidegger for speaking the truth of being, LeMay insisted that in Japan “there are no innocent civilians,” and that the government’s decisions about treatment of prisoners of war justified his own not being bothered so much “to be killing the so-called innocent bystanders.” Relying on claims to moral superiority in the end, officers like LeMay either disowned the attacks in terms of their intent, claiming that their purpose was not the indiscriminate bombing of civilians, but was “to destroy the industrial and strategic targets concentrated in urban areas.” Sherry adds

“In reasoning similar to that employed in defense of the bombing of Dresden, it seemed that because “these operations were not conceived as terror raids against the civilian population,” they were in fact not such. LeMay’s raids were undertaken “without
abandoning the concept of precision destruction.” Because the shift to area incendiary raids had been so long in the making, because precision attacks did continue, because economic effects (however diffuse) remained an objective, and because precision methods remained so central to the defense of American strategic air power, even airmen did not always realize they were crossing the threshold…

…But the denial of intent to destroy entire cities and create terror became increasingly hard to maintain. The weeks following the [first Tokyo raid] saw self-deception gradually transformed into deception of others. The air force was alter to any signs that the criticism it feared after the Dresden raids might reappear regarding Tokyo. [An officer on Guam] was informed that “commentators were having a field day searching implications… which imply this is area bombing and speculating whether this means departure from policy of precision bombing.” [The officer] was quickly instructed to counteract “editorial comment…about blanket incendiary attacks upon cities….Guard against anyone stating this is area bombing….”

…[Air force public relations officers] faced…a dilemma: wanting on the one hand to exploit LeMay’s blitz for all the prestige and publicity it was worth, on the other hand to head off the growth of a barbaric image for the air force. One solution was to resort to a rhetoric of cost-benefit analysis, contrasting the B-29s’ strikingly low loss rates with stunning statistics: “1,200,000 factory workers…made homeless” and “at least 100,000 man-months” of labor lost to Japan and “369,000,000 sq. ft. of highly industrialized land… leveled to ashes” in the Tokyo raid alone. Of course the human carnage was implicit in such statistics, but they kept the emphasis on the economic objectives of precision bombing. Of course there was no denial that incendiaries were the weapon and great conflagration the result, but incendiary attack was simply “the economical method of destroying the small industries in these areas… of bringing about their liquidation…”660
XX. The Containment of Democracy and the Existential Significance of Terror for Freedom as a Mechanism for Depoliticization

At some point, people will rebel against the reduction of their existence. The actuarial mapping of individual behavior for the sake of social control, which plays on individuals’ fears of death, uncertainty, and the willfulness of other individuals and the randomness of nature that can produce death and uncertainty, has transformed freedom into an insurance strategy for security, and has greatly narrowed the terrain of acceptable forms of life as a result. But the problem with these strategies is that beyond their being repellant for partisans of freedom, they fail on their own terms, as well. At first glance, the rebounding effect on unintended targets - “blowback” - produces the very uncertainty sought to be secured against in the first place. In fact, “blowback” bears striking resemblance to the need for the state to make enemies to justify its continued existence in prevailing form: namely, as a centralized concentration of authority and power over the economic, political, and military domains of life. Centralization is seen as a means for individuals to cooperate with each other in the absence of authentic social trust, and is producing political formations, that are tightly controlled by coteries of decision-makers in formal public and informal private roles throughout the world.
William Robinson has argued, citing our old friend Samuel Huntington, that the United States and its allies, with economic and political interests throughout the world, favored the deliberate restriction of democracy wherever possible, and, if possible, when democracy become more and more seemingly inevitable as a result of mass movements that seemed to always bloom to confront authoritarianism, the use of political intervention tools throughout the US’ military, intelligence, and civilian government capacities (read: DOD, CIA, and State) to steer the outcomes of democratic revolutionary surges towards the manageable outcome called “polyarchy.\textsuperscript{663}” By balancing the use of coercive power with the political production of consensus for elite domination through the use of identity politics playing on people’s fears, sorrows, hopes, and desires, and other emotions, through the use of electoral politics designed to give vent to popular angers and frustrations, Huntington and other leading “organic intellectuals”\textsuperscript{664} of the ruling class hoped to preserve the basic coordinates of anti-democratic mechanisms of exploitation, but in a new context where the voices of people for the possibility of an authentic life simply was no longer avoidable. But the cost of this was a shockingly cynical attitude towards expressions for freedom, now in a democratic age, wherein the symbology of rule was undertaken in the name of humanity itself. As such, freedom has been restricted to the prerogatives of authority.
Freedom had been transformed into a technology of government. Such a strategy runs up against limitations. The lack of on the ground knowledge in the institutions of the new political intervention, and difficulty in many countries of finding an elite that could play a tutelary role in relation to the mass of the people that would also secure the ongoing trust of the people limited this strategy to only a few countries.

The terms of order in all these societies are fragile, and, to whatever extent they remain functioning societies, for the people, that is, not for the expediencies of the state, we can witness a response to the process of disembedding. The response to the sublimation of objective presence as identity, what we are calling disembedding following in Polanyi’s thoughts on the matter and combining them with Agamben’s paradigmatic insight into the idealization of the sublime body of the nation through the internal negation of the Other as homo sacer - the representative of wild nature to be tamed as opposed to civilized, purportedly permanent artifice as man - requires the commitment to pay attention to one’s surroundings, as the integrity, as Cedric Robinson has put it, “to know what one knows.”665 Because this radical knowledge of the physis that one finds themselves in always already is immediately evidence for the contingency of artifice, all quests for permanence are revealed as contingent and revealed as artifice therein, it brings to the fore of consciousness,
especially for those who wish to abjure such comprehension, (1) the requirement to work to produce the naturalization so long taken for granted, and (2) usually, for those at the apex of the production of permanence, their reliance on others who are considered to be their social inferiors - a self conception that has come to have epistemological significance for the elite and the possibility of their self conception being defensible - which essentially threatens their sense of self-worth, deservingness, and similar rationalizations on which the stabilization of their positions depends. Thus, Robinson points out, they seek camaraderie in similarly-afflicted elites in other countries, since the naturalized basis for their authority and its benefits within their own society is coming apart. This reveals polyarchy for what it truly is: a stop-gap on the way to authoritarianism:

“A situation of anomie is becoming endemic in life around the world…: pandemics of crime and drugs, crises of “governability,” the disintegration of family and community bonds, widespread personal alienation and despondence, and so on. The type of hegemonic order we are witnessing…[…]…is…[…]… what some… might refer to as “hegemony based on fraud,” in which a rapacious global elite is thrusting humanity into deeper levels of material degradation and cultural decadence. Under such conditions, there are no no guarantees for the personal security of any members of society, even… […]… the privileged stratum… The United States seems to be the model, not the exception. While the United States “promotes democracy” around the world, Amnesty International released annual reports in the early 1990s documenting a growing pattern of systematic human rights violations inside the United States. The US prison population
doubled between 1960 and 1980, and then tripled between 1980 and 1990. Robert Reich…describes a situation of “fortress cities” and “social class apartheid” which is nearly identical to patterns found in most Third World countries. In Latin America… between 1980 and 1990… 90,000 people were “disappeared” by government and security forces. A frightening new phenomenon appeared in the capitals of nearly every Latin American country: “social cleansing,” or systematic killing, sometimes by official security forces but most by shadowy private paramilitary groups and security guards tied to the wealthy, of indigent people pushed by economic forces beyond their control to the margins of society.666

And for those who are lucky enough to not face the distancing technologies of “containment,” what is available is “repressive incorporation” which functions as intended for some, but for the vast majority serves as a temporary check on the formation of political awareness. How long this lasts is a function of the availability of, and skillful orchestration of, resources needed to fuel the engines of consumption. “Escalating global inequalities” Robinson continues

“mean that only a shrinking minority of humanity can actually consume. But the “culture-ideology of consumerism,” disseminated through omnipresent symbols and images made possible by advanced communications technologies, is a powerful message that imbibes mass consciousness at the global level. Its manifest function is to market goods and make profits, but its latent political function is to channel mass aspirations into individualist consumer desires and to psychologically disaggregate intersubjectivities.* Induced wants, even though they will never be met for the vast majority, serve the purpose of social control by depoliticizing social behavior and preempting collective action aimed at social
change, though fixation on the search for individual consumption. Personal survival, and whatever is required to achieve it, is legitimized over collective well-being. Social bonds of pre-alienation (pre-capitalist bonds) dissolve but new bonds are not forged among marginalized supernumeraries.

And as it goes for individuals whose desperation drives them to cling to power presenting itself as authority through the guise of permanence of the will, so too it goes for nationalist collectivities based on the exclusion of Otherness, which come to emphasize their own survival over and against the survival of civilization, the planet, and of life on earth. The congruity of these points, from “man” to “state” is revealing. Our metaphorical analogy is that the consumption of material objects dovetails with the ‘consumption’ of identity, in this case understood as something like nationalism in the purer sense or in the sense of nationalism clothed in the language of religion or ideology, because it requires the orchestration of inputs to bring about the enactment of the material-ideological nexus underpinning the production of identity. At the same time the opposite holds: the ability to consume material goods as a matter of course, as an element of privilege or right, requires the orchestration of ideational inputs to activate acquisitiveness as a way of life. As William Robinson points out that this depoliticizes social behavior, transforming complicity in circuits of exploitation expressed materially as ownership of class-status symbols into ‘mere fun,’ and the ritualistic and repetitive performance of
identity is to be left alone as simply what one does because they are members of such and such group, irregardless that group’s ethical dispositions and if these do or do not accord with individuals’ consciousnesses.

Cedric Robinson has argued persuasively that those with the “decency” to own up to their awareness, that same honesty which Ali Shariati, the Iranian existentialist who mixed Shia Islam, Third World Internationalism, and Marxist revolutionary philosophy, called “martyrdom,” the courage to “bear witness” to the indeterminacy of existence, were thus accountable for the revelation of contingency when events in the world overtook conceptions of order. Of course this is a very simple point, but its simplicity - its incredible easiness - is lost on those who are caught up in their identification with the terms of order; for them, revelations such as these amount to terror, chaos, and the complete absence of any notion of order; this presumes both the perfection of order on the basis of the metaphysics of making things present, as well as, in the absence of presence, the prevalence of chaotic terror. Now indeed, terror and chaos are no fun, even if interesting for a short while, but the problem here is the (1) exaggeration of order and the expectations produced thus, which disable authentic action in one’s physis since the experience of terror will be unbearable and will lead persons to seek order again at all costs, and (2)
that this exaggeration has epistemological consequences for the ability of people to properly understand their surroundings. Indeed, must the absence of order be understood as terror? Is there something absoluteness necessary in this view of things?

“Terror must be understood as the absence of order and bearing no other relationship to order. Terror is neither the presence of too much order, regardless of administration, nor order's midwife. If, as Camus suggested, decency is the resolve to know what one knows, then the decency of order – what one knows – is always potentially terror. The intuition here that there is no true existential order is constantly available to the human being. ........And this is an intuition which is terrible in the extreme. If we remember this, R.D. Laing's characterization of the schizophrenic individual 'suffering' from 'ontological insecurity' becomes a remark on the psychosocial process by which human society reproduces the human condition in microcosm: the absence of order.669"

But, as it were, adherents of the terms of order have a paradigmatic option: covering up this existential absence of their haloed order through the deployment of a conceptual political structure which consigns the individual to an hierarchical location, obviating the need for the individual to confront existential terror and freedom, and to only have the responsibility of playing a role defined by identity to provide support for order. This conditioning is reflexive, and can function more or less efficiently, and has the ability to distort the individual's apprehension of the world – transforming existence into a metaphysics of presence –
leaving the world impoverished for the imagination and unfathomable in one’s awareness.

“It is in the the same fashion that terror and order may be said to articulate. Order results from the observation of terror at the level of gross phenomena. And it is this insight which propels the follower and the phenomenon of followership, as a device to avoid the experience of terror, into preeminence. There are, of course, important differences to be perceived between different order from the various vantage of observation. But their true richness – true as an authenticity to their participants – is the capacity for integrating the elements, the facts, of experience. All else that is historical, that is superfluous.670"

And so individuals retain a choice: they can join in the production of order, and remain - or become - oblivious to the technological orchestration of beings that underlies their notion of security, freedom, and even life itself; or they can try to remain deeply present in their surroundings. For those who opt for oblivion, actions that pierce this oblivion - and words and analysis that do the same, either as harangue or as warning - are graded on an proto-actuarial scale of terror within their consciousnesses, ascribing to some the label “terrorist,” or the increasingly common “terror-sympathizer”671 reactively and without delay. And indeed, nobody is safe from these designations. Such designations not only serve to prolong actual hot conflicts around the world, but also serve as a check on domestic populations ranging from minorities - for whom the threat of
being labeled as an “internal enemy” serves to nullify the freedoms which so many migrated to Western countries in search of during the ‘Cold War’ - to majorities, whose potential for identifying with humanity writ-large, enemy nations’ civilians, and minorities in their own society whose origins could be in some cases traced back to those nations or who the majority are ignorant of due to the cognitive effects of supremacist communal irrationality that prides itself on casually-confused in fits of casual racism.

In either case, either the retail therapy of consumerism, or the groupthink of nationalism, for so-called liberals and conservatives, combined with the appeal of leaders to channel political feelings into the proper avenues for expression (voting and party membership), leaves individuals entirely at the mercy of a political order that bases its own justification on its ability to deliver the means of consumption to its citizens, but all the while bases its security on its citizens’ loss of imagination and the capacity to think. In countries where this becomes less and less possible to sustain, William Robinson has written that the failure of nation-states, organized around a singular identity, to contain the economic processes necessary for the functioning of polyarchic regimes in the peripheral regions of the system of Western and American-led globalization has unleashed forces which now threaten to tear states apart in a conflict which may at times remain
localized to those peripheries, but constellations of global conflict now truly globalized through various technologies of communication and transport.673 And so the West will hardly be spared. In peripheral countries, the elite understand what is taking place, and attempt to ruthlessly crush threats to their rule, and promulgate localized formulas for inuring their populations to the violence conducted in their name.674

In the West, however, it appears as though populations have been stupefied by consumerism such that the normalized veneer of civil society and social life, in which the imperative to be happy and consume - indeed, to happiness through consumption - both functions as a behavioral expectation as well as a mechanism by which the political acts of persons from either the physical or ideological peripheries of existence come to interpreted as “terrorism.” Note that this discussion largely conforms to Nietzsche’s prophecy of a war of spirits, whereby the spiritualized - essentialized - understanding of the self, standing either alone or with others like itself, defines the self and its quest for dignity, which it simply must impose on any who threaten its dignity, and wherein the resort to depoliticized terminology like “terrorism” to describe those attempts simply reinforce the need for additional such violence to break this veneer. Once the veneer is broken, of course, then those formerly in a position of privilege in the relation of Self and Other see themselves as victimized,
and under threat because of their own essentialized view of themselves, and are quite willing to forgo even the shallow democratic niceties of polyarchy in favor of greater and greater executive action conducted in the name of the unified nation placing its quest for political order to be reinstated entirely above politics in a depoliticized conceptual terrain; as if they were fighting sub-humans, necessitating no explanation thence, for their actions, either to the Other, or to themselves.

Ward Churchill expressed with radical clarity the consequences of accepting this view of the Other for the sake of getting along with the business of being American. Churchill points out in the absence of a process of “national introspection,” regarding the message sent by the attackers on 9.11.2001, which might allow Americans to begin thinking about the need to “fundamentally rework [their] relationship with those upon whom [they have] heretofore proven so cavalier in visiting the worst sorts of oppression,” there is little chance of there being peace on lasting terms - which strongly suggests that the ‘war on terror’ will continue for the indefinite future, and, that prosecuting such a war is in many ways the destiny of countries whose ontological basis is the concept of being and the freedom of that being we have been discussing thus far.

When the consequences of American violence are brought up, Churchill
points out that conservatives rely on a discourse that casts the violence an aberration, and that this does nothing to disprove “the rule” and that when pressed, “conservatives invariably retreat in to a level of diversionary polemic excusable at best on elementary school playgrounds, arguing that anything ‘we’ have done is somehow excused by allegations that ‘they’ have done things just as bad.” But worse still, for those of us for whom it is insufficient to criticize conservatives - not a difficult endeavor - but whose concern is to speak up in the name of freedom, is what Churchill describe as progressives’ “far more refined, hook-free analysis.” Having given up a searches for perpetrators as “crudities” of “conspiracy theory,” liberals “have become quite monolithic in attributing all things negative to handy abstractions like ‘capitalism,’ ‘the state,’ ‘structural oppression,’ and, yes, ‘the hierarchy.’” Churchill says this enables them to conjure up what he calls “‘the miracle of immaculate genocide,’ a form of genocide… in which…there are no actual perpetrators and no one who might ‘really’ be deemed culpable by reason of complicity. The parallels between this ‘cutting edge’ conception and the defense mounted by postwar Germans… are as eerie as they are obvious.” Thus Churchill offered a critique of those who sought to use 9.11.2001 as a mechanism to further secure the globally-disembedded rational actor, who was born again in the twilight of Jimmy Carter’s America, emerging into the full light of day in the go-go 1980’s that ‘restored America’ during Reagan’s rule, that debated eating
take-out and renting movies or going out for dinner at the end of history with Jerry and Elaine, and who has become the ideal of success not only for young Americans, but, increasingly for people the world over. Quietly contemplating their next business deal, their after-work yoga class, what they’ll purchase from Whole Foods Market for dinner later that night, how they’ll spend their next holiday in a more fabulous place dripping in authenticity and culture, the conservative diversionist merges in their being with the liberal illusionist. Churchill writes:

“The implications of [the failure of consciousness] were set forth in stark relief during the aftermath of 9-1-1, when it was first suggested that a decided majority of those killed in the WTC attack might be more accurately viewed as “little Eichmanns” - that is, as a cadre of faceless bureaucrats and technical experts who had willingly (and profitably) harnessed themselves to the task making America’s genocidal world order hum with maximal efficiency - than as ‘innocents.’ The storm of outraged exception taken by self-proclaimed progressives to this simple observation has been instructive… The objections have been mostly transparent in their diversionary intent, seeking as they have to focus attention exclusively on janitors, firemen and food service workers rather than the much larger number of corporate managers, stock brokers, bond traders, finance and systems analysts, etc., among those killed…

…Left unstated…is the more accurate term we should employ in characterizing a representative 30-year-old foreign exchange trader who, in full knowledge that every cent of his lavish commissions derived from the starving flesh of defenseless Others, literally wallowing in self-indulgent excess, playing the big shot, priding himself on being a “sharp dresser” and the fact that “money spilled from his pockets…flowed like crazy… [spent] on the black BMW and those clothes - forgetting to pack ski clothes for a Lake
Tahoe trip, dropping $1,000 on ‘new stuff’ and so on.” As a “cool guy” with a “warm heart”? A “good family man?” Just an “ordinary,” “average,” or “normal” fellow who “happened to strike it rich?” How then are we to describe Eichmann himself?…

…Clearly, either the devastating insights concerning ‘the banality of evil’ offered by Hannah Arendt in her 1963 study *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, have yet to penetrate the consciousness of many American progressives, or American progressives are in the main every bit as mired in the depths of denial as the most hidebound of their conservative counterparts. *Irrespective of whether there is an appreciable segment of the US population prepared to look the matter in the face, however, the same condition of willful blindness cannot be said to prevail throughout much of the rest of the world.*

When these costs sustaining the illusion of democracy and equality in the midst of such obvious inequality at the very level of existence itself become overwhelming, authoritarianism, legitimated through the invocation of the “state of exception,” lays in wait for its chance in the sun.

XXI. Freedom as Governmental Technology: Permanence, and the Transformation of Liberalism into Fascism

To train individuals to accept (1) their own lack of knowledge, which leaves them unprepared for life’s eventualities, and (2) the annihilation of the other’s being, an “epistemology of ignorance” has developed to
reinforce the type of knowledge needed to sustain “racial polities” and to systematically ignore information that could threaten political consensuses derived on the basis of ‘race’ and other such essentializations of being. This, Charles Mills argues, prepares persons to agree spontaneously through their cognition and understanding of the world - and the choices and commitments they make therein - to engage in conquest collectively and systematically. Freedom is thus transformed into something other than a universal political idea applicable to humanity; it becomes a thing ‘we’ shall possess, and that must be denied for the sake of our possession, to ‘them.’ With regard to liberalism, ostensibly a theory of government designed to protect individual liberty, this division of ‘worlding’ facilitates the inconsistent way that freedom permits certain social intervention as being necessary for freedom - which can change situationally in accordance with perceptions of threat. “The securitization of identity,” Nik Rose has written, is

“a strategy for securing the obligatory access points for active citizenship… [producing] a ceaseless manipulation, the obligation to continuously and repeatedly evidence one’s citizenship credentials as one recurrently links oneself to the circuits of civility. In a society of control, a politics of conduct is designed into the fabric of existence itself, into the organization of space, time, visibility, circuits of communication. And these enwrap each individual life decision and action - … - in a web of incitements, rewards, current sanctions and forebodings of future sanctions which serve to enjoin citizen to maintain particular types of control over their conduct. These assemblages which entail the
securitization of identity are not unified, but dispersed, not hierarchical, but rhizomatic, not totalized but connected in a web or relays of relations. But in policing the obligatory access points to the practices of inclusion, they inescapably generate novel forms of exclusion.686

What C. Wright Mills has described as the corporate personality of the power elite,687 through the “securitization of identity,” is democratized and dangled, as freedom, in front of broader and broader populations - in theory - and the only thing they have to do is to learn how to properly fear, enjoy, desire, move, and, eventually if they are ambitious enough, how to think as well. Rose, agreeing with our assessment of the confusion of Isaiah Berlin, suggests that Berlin failed to understand the “link between liberty and discipline,” and that “responsibilization” was required if people were to be trusted on their own in a society designed around the imperative of control;689 whose control? Everyone’s sense of being in control;690, to participate in the sustenance of the administrative combine that supports the ‘free-market’ that forms the basis of materially-determined freedom. C. Wright Mills, however, echoing Polanyi’s analysis on this point, argues that the corporate person is indeed defined by their conformity, which constrain so very much of their existence that an honest analyst taking appraisal of the human condition must wonder if the material objects they receive, along with the adulation and praise whose basis is their production of the tell-tale signs of prestige, and which forms
their self-worth, are all truly worth the costs.\textsuperscript{691}

The cost of ‘freedom’ in the first place is the loss of a rooted understanding of existence that makes space for community, for human interaction, for language itself and the ability to have a personal history that is \textit{of consequence} for an individual. Because people cling to these things, the community and their memory, Polanyi argues those who sought the disembedding of the rational agent wholly individualized in their being from the social terrain altogether were, despite their purported drive for what was called freedom, always met with a “countermovement” and that thus it would be wiser to characterize the “market pattern” as a “double-movement” that corresponded to the deployment of, and reaction to, power.\textsuperscript{692} As Milan Kundera has written, “The Struggle of Man against Power is the Struggle of Memory and Against Forgetting.\textsuperscript{693}” Polanyi, echoing this sentiment, indicating that the peoples’ refusal was/is “governed by a double movement: the market expanded continuously but this movement was met by a countermovement\textsuperscript{694} check the expansion in definite directions. Vital though such a countermovement was for the protection of society, in the last analysis it was incompatible with the self-regulation of the market, and thus with the market system itself.\textsuperscript{695}” Because “man and nature,” must be made “subject to the laws of supply and demand,” and thus into “commodities” “produced for sale,” they
would be recast as such, effectively abstracting individuals from their social and natural base, and transforming nature through what Polt, interpreting Heidegger’s analysis of Descartes, calls the impoverished vision of the world in the latter’s philosophy of that tied that which can be thought to that which was reliably verifiable to the senses as being objectively present.696 Thus, being is measured in terms of money, capital, and economic input/output productivity (much like the free individual in Rose’s account of the actuarial concept of freedom now yearned for globally as a marked of advancement).697 Harnessing these materials, free individuals can, it is said, achieve nearly anything.

This point will have implications in our closing discussion in this chapter on the matter of freedom and authenticity. For now the point to take away from it is that through this sleight of hand beings who place their faith in willfulness as the source of all agency (1) must be always disappointed in the failures of the will, since this is literally unavoidable, even with excesses of violence and effortful striving, and (2) that the drive to secure the idea of individual will, and therefore of individuals’ perfect security produces the ironical situation wherein individuals seek to bind people in society together in a manner that produces reliable and predictable behavioral outcomes.
So while Polanyi locates the rise of pauperism in the transformation of world trade that saw the elevation of a new standard of profitability, rendering the lives of the poor in the English countryside superfluous, the half-hearted attempt at preventing the mobility of laboring classes created by enclosure policies - the substance of the Speenhamland scheme - led to misguided attempts to protect the new poor in the name of maintaining social order. But this came at the expense of their dignity and the interconnectedness-wholeness of society; costs which were intensified by the cruel state interventions symbolized by the Poor Laws. These laws played on the frustrations of the new wealthy in relation to their inability to get the poor to do just as they wished, which they imagined would benefit the new social order, and eventually had the effect of dividing society altogether and overturning the older morality. What emerged from the ashes of at least moral if not practical and effective solidarity was, Polanyi indicates, the scientific production of happiness for the greatest number.

“…if the workers were physically dehumanized, the owning classes were morally degraded. The traditional unity of a Christian society was giving place to a denial of responsibility on the part of the well-to-do for the condition of their fellows. The Two Nations were taking shape. To the bewilderment of thinking minds, unheard-of-wealth turned out to be inseparable from unheard-of-poverty. Scholars proclaimed in unison that a science had been discovered which put the laws governing man’s world beyond any doubt. It was at the behest of these laws that compassion was removed from the hearts,
and a stoic determination to renounce human solidarity in the name of the greatest happiness of the greatest number gained the dignity of a secular religion…

…The mechanism of the market was asserting itself and clamoring for its completion: human labor had to be made a commodity…Out of the horrors of Speenhamland men rushed blindly for the shelter of the utopian market economy. 700"

In these divisions, Polanyi argues, lay the foundations of an intensified double-movement of disembedding-reembedding, the consequences of which were a “perilous deadlock” that eventually became the groundwork for a reinvigorated identity politics of the ruling classes seeking to keep themselves separate from the poor and the partisans of a socialist freedom in society. The identification with power, versus the desire for freedom that questioned this power and social arrangement would produce “the twentieth century fascist crisis. 701” In seeking to turn labor, land, and money into the needed unlimited resources required for the production of the market-concept of individual freedom, the expectation of wealth and the right to do whatever one wishes to do would drive these partisans in the direction of the utopianism of market-ruled society, obviated of moral dilemmas and the authentic choices beyond the simple transaction of good and capital. 702 Contrarily, those whose labor would be taxed unto their debility or even death, whose lands would be alienated from them through the consolidation of ownership effected by financial conglomerations, 703 and whose money, earnings, real estate equity, and savings would be
manipulated in accord with the whimsical whims of central bankers responsive to industry and not the needs of society in general, would see themselves as objects circulating in the marketplace, too, and would, when they could, reject these terms. But often they wouldn’t be in a position to do so because in the absence of labor organizations, their ability to survive depended on their receiving a wage, no matter the psychological, physical, and emotional costs inflicted in a demeaning work environment. But the desire to attend to their consciousness - intellectual and physical - would mean that in opportune moments workers would act on such instincts to cooperate and create mechanisms of social protection against the demands of the market.

In *The Great Transformation*, Polanyi locates the rise of fascism in the failures of market society because of the expectations that it unleashes when its social formation comes to be seen as natural, and its adherents begin to treat those variously unadapted to it: the poor, temperamental malcontents, artistic persons unbound by social conventions regulating space and time, etc.; as the enemies of nature. From Argentina to the recent attacks on the homeless and “Occupy” protestors, from both private individuals and from the state, this pattern is confirmed. This treatment becomes the fate of non-conformists - by choice and by happenstance - despite the fact that in most cases it is safe to say that such persons simply
seek to remedy the insecurity which they are made to experience by those who command the political economy, whose decisions in complex, large, modern societies, necessarily expose many to artificial - i.e. - man-made - uncertainty. Failing to recognize this, before the second world war and after the first, during the interim, democratic societies gave way to increasingly totalitarian ones who would go to war to defend the idea of the historical spirit of the nation in a desperate struggle to preserve their identities - understood as the unchanging, and besieged essence of who they were as individuals and as communities. In some cases the war was brought to nations by Germany and Italy, the leading fascist states in Europe, and in other cases, the fascism of racist imperialism had long over-extended the traditional European powers of the time, leaving them unprepared for the Nazi blitzkrieg which was lying in wait for a moment of weakness. Such is the reason much of the second world war was fought in North Africa.

In all these cases, young men were regimented into a neotraditional social order to achieve again the disembedding of the nation and its idea of the rational actor, borne out of the dismal science of market economics that reduced men and women to things to be infinitely exploited, and out of the quest for national essence that put their lives in the hands of the state understood as the authentic representative of the pure nation. Against the
drive to re-embed the abstracted rational actor and the sublimated essence of the nation into the essentially plural social, economic, and communal situation in each regional spatialization of *physis* - this being the countermovement generated by the impulse for freedom - the fascist, as Polanyi wrote, “rejects the postulate of freedom,” and “glorifies power,” that is considered to be the “reality of society,”

706 by those with impaired social and political vision. “The fascist solution,” Polanyi writes

“of the impasse of the market economy is achieved at the price of the extirpation of all democratic institutions, both in the industrial and in the political realm. The economic system which was in peril of disruption would thus be revitalized, while the people themselves were subjected to a reeducation designed to denaturalize the individual and make him unable to function as the responsible unit of the body politic. This reeducation, comprising the tenets of a political religion that denied the idea of the brotherhood of man in all its forms, was achieved through an act of mass conversion enforced against recalcitrants by the scientific methods of torture.707"

In order to make the ‘trains run on time,’ as the saying goes, fascism emerged as a solution to the inability to ensure the operations of the market economy in a liberal polity. “Submission to the impersonal forces of the market,” Friedrich von Hayek argues, “made possible the growth of civilization.708” But in his philosophy, like in all the purported liberal philosophies we have been attending to, the question to sovereignty remains looming large: who will decide which are the natural and
impersonal forces? The permanence sought after would necessitate the cessation of questioning and thus the annulment of democracy. Hayek suggests, much like Hobbes, that anyone who seeks to force their opinion on another is a dangerous person - but he forgets that he himself does precisely this through his appeals to nature.\footnote{709} Polanyi points out that the simultaneous collapse of market systems, because of their inherent artificiality, in much of the world led to fascist, socialist-authoritarian, and New Deal-style Keynesian responses - but that in every instance the free-market itself was cast aside as a source of instability, the source of anti-democratic and anti-social instincts for individuals and groups of individuals which would tear society apart as these were organized into cartels, on the one hand, and into fascist political movements, on the other.

To make these new social organizations seem necessary, indeed to make these artificial constructions seem natural and thereby “denaturalize” persons, Bauman shows that historically rulers and powerful social groups in modern European societies relied on “boundary-drawing practices” which, much like the basic ontological politics of exclusion at the center of Agamben’s theory, served to reinforce an essentialized notion of belonging, and which, ironically, could be reworked and suspended at any time to create a new sense of order and belonging, ejecting formerly included persons as threats to the in-group.\footnote{710} When Polanyi uses the term
“nature” in the above quote, he is referring to whatever is, and not what has been naturalized, that being the result of artificial processes aimed at producing nature as artifice to give it the appearance of permanence.

This is what fascism is all about, as Erich Fromm argued in Escape from Freedom, wherein he argues that negative liberty relies on (1) “automaton conformity” so as to ensure the productive engines of negative liberty are undisturbed by spontaneousness and difference, (2) and intensifies from there into the urge for domination and eventually in desperation, into destructiveness, even before the formal institutionalization of fascism as a governmental mode; the seeds of this type of human behavior are sown in the expectations, fears about not meeting those expectations, the objects of those fears being circulated through the economy of language and symbolic meanings in a society. In subsequent iterations these values can be reinforced as natural, resulting in the multiplication of fear-based self-alienation with its reinforcement in language itself.

The poor and the Jew, the immigrant and the terrorist, the slave and the thug and the welfare queen - the moral sufferer and the immoralist whose audacity, which could be as minimal as their audacity in persisting to exist on their own terms, breaks open the cycle of fear to an alternate view - these persons are a threat to the seekers of permanence and so when things
go awry in relation to the ontology of being prevailing in a
metaphysically-ordered *physis*, they become the scapegoats, the
receptacles of all blame, and, therefore, the targets of furies of violence
sanctified in the name of order. The disembedding of economic rationality
from society, and the sublimation of communal rationality expressed in the
form of the nation-state understood as the destiny of a civilized and
rational peoples, and transforming it into a permanent identity, are
processes which must be reenacted over and over again through the rituals
of organizations that make up the state. This transforms freedom into
governmentality and authentic individuality into terrorism.713

Such fear and conformity is more simply managed and reinforced in an
atmosphere of fascism - where the *fasci* are bundled together with a tight
rope - than in a free society.714 Ironically, however, the use of freedom as a
propaganda device, succored by the use of rewards both material and
ideological, both indicates the extent to which freedom in practice has
become its opposite, but also that the desire for freedom remains all the
while, because it was never, and indeed can never be, extinguished. What
does this tell us about freedom?

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XXII. Disembedding as a Political Structure: Freedom Found in Hell, And the Farce of Ordered Liberty and Nation-States

The process of disembedding is never complete. First, individuals never quite surrender their being, and, even though it may appear that they do, there is no possibility of them being able to maintain complete purity of thought and action in the name of their metaphysical ideal. This could change; indeed it appears as though there is a major drive in the existence-fearing nations of the world today to reinforce structures of authority, but even then there will arise incompleteness when this is mapped onto reality because the creation of authority as an idea cannot match the billions of history-making agents in the world whose experiences, no matter how repressed their spontaneousness, will at some point overflow prevailing conceptions of being. This is not hard to understand, since, as it were, we have imperfect systems in place at the moment, these systems repeatedly create unanticipated beings, and if we begin to fathom a transhistorical system encompassing all cultures and future generations the idea of there being a complete narrative that encompasses being and existence seems rather absurd. Examples of this abound, from blowback in foreign policy, to side effects in medication, and to the more mundane everyday failures of the disembedded worldview - like planning one’s commute to work only to be thwarted by a car accident - which must omit elements of
unfolding reality in order to maintain itself as an idea.

Second, the sheer level of resources required for the maintenance of the sublimated individual or group, because this is based on the use of authority to convince us that the three fictitious commodities - land, labor, and capital - are indeed unlimited, either through the direct agency of coercion in the name of the race or nation expressing its superiority and historical destiny, or in the indirect harnessing of individuals’ labor power by producing confidence in productive activities that make investors, governments, and regular workers and people want to invest in an entrepreneurial undertaking, thereby producing faith in the delimitation of financial activity, in the end cannot be sustained. There are limits to growth, which, once reached, must be administered by individuals and groups who agree with the terms of order. But eventually, as even partisans of imperial rule admit, from time to time the economics of empire require purges of upper-level functionaries for the simple reason that there (1) isn’t enough wealth to go around, and (2) the dearth of unlimited wealth creates a centrifugal effect that tempts corruption in favor of the actual, embodied self, over and against the consecrated and idealized self whose selfhood is derived from their connection to the terms of order.\textsuperscript{715} The greater the application of resources understood as a manifestation of power to control outcomes, the more evident, therefore,
the weakness of the agent seeking to control those outcomes since at such a moment, their rule can no longer be termed hegemonic; this is a mark of desperation. From the naval battles that saw the destruction of the Spanish Armada by the rising English sea power in the sixteenth century, to the accelerated importation of African slaves prior to the Civil War in the United States in the nineteenth century, to the deployment of extra troops by the United States in the so-called ‘surge’ strategy in Iraq and then later in Afghanistan at the outset of the twenty-first, the empirical record of history confirms this.

Third, the process of disembedding, because of the magnitude of resources required, the level of orchestration and control required, complicated by the inability of even the most technologically-buttressed projects to guarantee outcomes and the concomitant need to produce faith in the process in the face of inevitable failures and shortcomings, must eventually enlist the aid of some of those who will be harmed by the process. This is a great weakness of these systems, and the fact of resistance illustrates that choice was itself never lost. Human social relationships and their actual history doesn’t involve clear moral choices that deign one group to be the embodiment of good and another that of bad or evil. Significantly, this means that freedom cannot be a specie of identity politics, and, that in freedom there are no guarantees of moral
action, so clothing freedom as such transforms it into a metaphysical ideal that gives justification to political action after the fact, but occludes the choices made at the time of decision and unburdens members of a group from reflecting on the ethical, moral, emotional, and empirical consequences of their choices in favor of a narrower understanding of their group’s identity, enabling a performative and ritualized faith in nationalist exceptionalism.

But this constellation of choices necessarily casts out individuals from the community, even entire communities from the larger community, that a residue of bad conscience is inescapable. From this treatment of the Other arises the fear of the Other, and ultimately, the fear of death itself as that which is absolutely Other. From Machiavelli, who advocated a mature acceptance of the founding violence that gave rise to cities,\textsuperscript{718} to the ancient philosophy of Christianity and Judaism that focused on the betrayal of Adam by Eve in eating from the tree of knowledge that made mortal life a reality, to the expressions of sacrifice and salvation in other cultures, too, a significant trope adjoining the rise of national, imperial, and ideas of religious polities, has been the notion of original sin,\textsuperscript{719} which casts violence and immorality as both necessary and unavoidable, and therefore in need of being redeemed. Quite simply, this is nothing other than the drive to disembed the existence of being from the world, which is

\textsuperscript{718} From Machiavelli, who advocated a mature acceptance of the founding violence that gave rise to cities.

\textsuperscript{719} The notion of original sin has been central to religious and philosophical thinking, emphasizing the innate corruptibility of human nature and the necessity of redemption through divine grace.
seen as dangerous to being, even though it is the place of being. Erich Fromm, in an essay called *On Disobedience*, revalues Eve’s so-called betrayal by saying it was an act of courage that made both responsibility as well as freedom human potentialities.\(^\text{720}\)

Forgetting original sin has been a human activity ever since, so much so, that its implication has been transposed onto ‘the son of God’ in the Judeo-Christian tradition, and other narratively-recast charismatic saviors throughout the world, a world which is now increasingly influenced by the spread of economic globalization and the secularization of Judeo-Christian ideas about existence contained in that conjuncture of notions.\(^\text{721}\) This isn’t to say that ‘original sin’ in the Christian sense - that we must be doubtful of ourselves because of our being inherently contaminated by sin - is appropriate to resurrect as a ward against human rapacity. Rather, we simply ought not turn away from the real, either as born-again types freeing ourselves of sin and responsibility by ritualistically worshipping Jesus Christ and fetishizing his crucifixion,\(^\text{722}\) or as neo-Catholics who would reinvigorate our internalization of sinfulness in the name of a conservative orthodoxy.\(^\text{723}\) Instead, we should embrace contingency, with its good and evil, and authentically take responsibility for what we have been and seen, in order to better guide what we may yet become, seeing the past as both prelude and warning - rather than a self-fulfilling
prophecy of unfreedom and renewed drives for the sublimation of the self in the name of permanence - that can be the source of an empirical lesson that may inform our ethics.

But, as Ashis Nandy has pointed out in relation to the effects of colonialism in forming a hegemonic conception of spatiality and temporality that has survived into modern India, the internalization of the desire to see oneself as an essence developing, progressing, ‘in time,’ and therefore capable of organizing space in regard to rationalized social organization that seeks the maximization of utility has only intensified.\textsuperscript{724} This, we recall from our preceding discussion of Polanyi’s theory of the rise of market society, has now come to acquire the status of a political “religion”\textsuperscript{725} that has dealt a body blow to the notion of solidarity. Hindu nationalism, which was a response to Hindu ‘original sin,’ understood in the literature as the plague on Hindu self-conception because of the “Hindu defeat,” was used by its proponents to aggressively push for the transformation of both the Hindu religion and the Indian nation, a heretofore non-existent historical entity, into a religion of “hard gods” and a nation with a unified identity cooperating to achieve progress.\textsuperscript{726} Rather than “accept Hindus as they were,” as Nandy suggests Gandhi’s politics was defined by, Hindu nationalists, were more interested in not only preparing India to become a modern country, but also to even perhaps
someday prove India’s more essential essentialness than the Western nations that were a source of India’s colonial humiliation. Nandy writes that

“The newly created sense of linear history in Hinduism - an internalized counterpart of the Western theory of progress - was a perfect instrument for this purpose. It allowed one to project into history the sense of inferiority vis-a-vis an imperial faith and to see the golden age of Hinduism as an ancient version of the modern West.”

And the effect of this recasting of Hindu ‘original sin,’ the source of Indian exceptionalism and the inability of Indian nationalists - those who seek to disembed the idea of India from the richly plural physis found in the South Asian subcontinent - to acknowledge their own histories since this would open up the contingency of Indianness and Hindu identity in a manner that wouldn’t fit with progressiveness and improvement tropes, is to transform history into a series of registers of good and bad actions, whose judgment and surveillance in the name of the disembedded, ideal identity, is totally necessary. The implications for freedom of individuals and for liberalism as a political practice aimed at producing broader and broader freedom for each should be fairly obvious. In the name of the consummated history of essentially-existing nations and peoples, whose objectively-verifiable presence is proof of so much, “myth” comes to define anything outside of the official history, including, ironically, the
real, non-mythical lived realities of everydayness for people. Contrasting this idea of myth as everything outside of the register of official history reorganized spatially and temporally by colonialism and its internalization, to the actual mythical concept of space and time at the core of Western ontology productive of the political structures of the Raj and now modern South Asian states, Nandy states that

“The core of such a concept of time - produced in the West for the first time after the demise of medievalism - consists in the emphasis on causes rather than on structures (on “why” rather than “what”), on progress and evolution as opposed to self-realization-in-being, and on the rationality of adjustment to historical reality (pragmatics) and of change through constant dramatic action (rather than on the rationality of a fundamentally critical attitude towards earlier interpretations and change through only critical interventions and new interpretations). For the modern West, and for those influenced by its concept of time, history itself is a chronology of good and bad actions and their causes, and every revolution is a disjunction which must be either protected against counter-revolutions or reduced to the stature of a false ‘coming’ on the way to a real revolution.”

But all the while actual history and actual truth, understood as simply that which has happened, threatens to be remembered and made significant for people’s awareness, choices, and actions. Writing on the decidedly-difficult to accept, but extensively well-documented historical fact of Jewish collaboration with Nazis in the second world war, Corey Robin revisits Jewish councils’ attempts to variously save some Jews, protect
some Jews with high social standing (many of whom were on the
councils), use various tactics to delay mass murders which of course
eventually took place, and also preserve elements of dignity and choice in
eventually opting to die in lieu of the continuation of torture practices
visited upon them, was indicative, not of Jewish depravity or evilness as
certain Jewish political groups today are fearful this is a revelation of, but
that humanity was actually never quashed entirely in the camps, and even
that forms of resistance continued. So much so, that Robin indicates that
this blurs the line between collaborator and resister sufficiently so that
what becomes of the essence for analysis of these sorts of terrible, fear-
magnifying circumstances is to focus on the structure of social and
political institutions that give rise to the framework in which fear is so
significant, rather than relying on an individualized analysis of moral
potency found in any given person, or, as in this case, the moral status of
groups. The question is one of ontology of the individual and of society -
an essentially structural question about the existence of beings - since our
aim is to think about a politics of freedom, and not to judge willful people
as worthy of freedom and apparently will-lacking people as unworthy,
since, as Nandy has pointed out in relation to colonialism, and as Robin
shows in his discussion of the camps through Arendt’s important
theorizing on the matter, individuals seem to retain some vestiges of
agency and freedom even in these most dire circumstances, and that for
individuals to stop making choices altogether beyond the external application of violence as torture, people must also internalize their own lack of agency.

This point suggests that the psychological internalization of the structure of being that essentialized oneself or one’s group as being ‘the good,’ or those who see themselves as noble victims has the effect of removing agency from individuals and groups, as for example in the case of the Israelis - the self-appointed nation-state representative of the world’s Jewish peoples - which was made evident in a recent controversy over a series of scholarly inquiries into precisely this issue of the Jewish role in the Holocaust, as well as the fabricated nature of the connection of European Jews to the land in the Middle East that has come to be the location of the Israeli state.\(^{731}\) Having to see their suffering as entirely unique, their enemies as essentially evil in nature, and their new neighbors as undeserving of trust, the core group of Zionist political activists who would agitate across more than one-hundred years to the present day have internalized the same spatial and temporal conception of order that led to the Nazi’s invocation of \textit{lebensraum}.\(^{732}\) That such a foreign policy requires the commission of crimes goes without saying, but in the case of Israel, the United States, and India, each of these nation’s elite classes and subordinate classes from poor to well-off that identify with the state as an
organic extension of the nation, a powerful element of denial, again
premised on the division of existence into good and evil, of history into
discreet adjudicable moments, and of space into civil society and that
which lay beyond as the realm of barbarians, enabled by harnessing
needed material for ideological production, is readily observed in practice.
Media systems, including advanced forms of commercial propaganda that
coincide with the consumerist ideology - viewing identity as both token to
be possessed and activating element enabling both material consumption
and political conquest as its ongoing physical basis, which circulate the
significations of identity, institutional order, and politics throughout civil
society, produce a being - a conception of existence - held above the
*physis* as a metaphysical ideal, discipline social order in accordance with
these ideas of good and evil - and far from passively consuming these
images, people acculturated thus tend to demand these images as a
mechanism of fantasy and escape from an underlying reality that has left
them alienated from the world, others, and themselves.

The use of structural adjustment, aerial warfare, the proliferation of the
technological police state through public and private space to the point
that surveillance is increasingly the norm and not the exception, and the
demand for technologies of distancing that operate on the registers of
space and time combine to produce a docile subject, and as Foucault
pointed out, this external structural situation is internalized through a negative dialectical relationship that winnows individual self-conceptions in line with the essentialized identity of their social, ethnic, political, etc., group. For example, because the Jews were so thoroughly scapegoated in German society - “they lacked allies in the wider population” - because “like all peoples the Jews were divided between elites and followers, and [...] the leaders [...] counseled their followers to take the path of cooperation and non-resistance” when facing deportation to concentration and death camps, because they were well-organized under the rubric of the Jewish councils, which had the trust of the Jewish communities under Nazi rule, and “because they subscribed to a belief in eternal Jewish victimhood,” their overall structural position in German society, and in Nazi-occupied Europe more broadly, was one that, because of its precariousness demanded an attitude of “realism” valued conformity and obedience over rebellion, identity and essentialism over the discovery of new solidarities, and ultimately, left them lacking the types of political resources that could have helped in combating the Holocaust’s evil. Nonetheless, Robin adds that despite all this, Arendt’s account reveals that there were a number of choices about what course to take that involved the Jewish leadership at the time - including armed resistance and flight to the forests, both of which produced survival rates higher than rates for those who complied with Nazi commands - and this
proved that despite the terror of their situation, the residents of the camps, despite being reduced to an abjectness most horrible to contemplate, “no longer” were, Robin writes “the victims terror” in Arendt’s *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, in comparison to her earlier work on totalitarianism “simple, unthinking automatons. Instead, they were rational agents, making calculations similar to those described by Hobbes. They assumed that if they cooperated in the here and now, they might buy enough time to survive until the Allies arrived. It was not a crazy calculus, but its claims to rationality supported a logic of fear and induced obedience.738"

So choice, thrust upon human beings by circumstances, and decided upon by human beings who retained the existential traits that characterized their humanity - chiefly the finitude of space and time - remained all the while despite the systematic torture they met. What is important, though, is the way in which ontology pre-conditioned those choices in a manner that tied collectivities together in such a way that their members couldn’t defy the leadership of those above them, and that leadership was itself carried out by those in such roles with the panache of legitimate authority.739 But those Hobbesian calculations, which require the internalization of fear on the basis of presuming that there is a rational agent who essentially exists in one way for all time and that fear is a useful ward for that agent to navigate their way through life, cuts off the dialectical understanding of
individual existence in relation to others, to the community in general, and to the natural world.

This leaves individuals entirely at the mercy of power, whether this power is organized on the basis of positive liberty that presents the fulfillment of identity as the destiny of a people, or on that of negative liberty, since without the ability to bear witness to their own lives on their own terms, being told what to fear, and therefore how to think, persons come to rely on the edicts of the sovereign to make decisions for them; to think for them. Heidegger anticipated that the transformation of thinking itself into the internalization of the dictums of rationality established by the sciences on the basis of establishing objective presence would dispose persons to imagine themselves to be thoughtful, even to be free agents, because their successful internalization of iotas would convince them that indeed they existed on the terms of existence established by metaphysical politicality. Taking structure for granted, both of the human being as individual and of the supposed reality of the world, the “automaton conformist” imagines themselves free:

“The decisive point is not what is thought but how it is thought. The thought that is the result of active thinking is always new and original; original, not necessarily in the sense that others have not thought it before, but always in the sense that the person who thinks, has used thinking as a tool to discover something new in the world outside or inside
himself. Rationalizations are essentially lacking this quality of discovering and uncovering; they only confirm the emotional prejudice existing in oneself. Rationalizing is not a tool for penetration of reality but a post-factum attempt to harmonize one’s own wishes with existing reality.  

We can add that it is quite clear that these were choices made in response to the structure of order and the ontological assumptions of that order’s effects the nature of creating ‘true’ human beings. But in fact these are individuals who have replaced their selves, understood as the actual existing and decaying selves, with something less. Fromm called this a “pseudo-self,” which because it was down the road of losing itself more and more, and more and more engaged as a result in the rearguard defense of its inauthenticity, it would become more desperately attached to the terms of order governing the \textit{physis} in accordance with metaphysics. But when threatened, this individual, with pride in their apparent individuality, would insist on their apparent freedom, and would not take kindly to the interruption found in radical critique. Recent controversies over the necessity of fearing Muslims that have erupted in Western countries have found, for example, prominent self-proclaimed liberal commentators insisting on the superiority of Western values of tolerance in related to the intolerant Muslim world, but who at the same moment they make such statements also excuse the extreme forms of violence prosecuted by Western nations against a number of countries across the Muslim world.
under the banner of the ‘war on terror.’ What is made clear by our discussion is that for groups of people whose identity is caught up with essentially-belonging, to a notion of nation, or to a notion of good, have their cognitive capacities distorted as a result, and are unable to face the sheer chaotic contingency of human existence, preferring to utilize identity as a key to inauthentic, but apparently actual, belonging to banish such thoughts.

The response by Jews who were the victims of the Holocaust, and by many who survived, suggests that the disembedding of identity is never complete, and the process itself begets in the end either a form of fatalistic collective suicide commenced in the name of identities that utilize the idea of essentialness to retain authority until the very end, or, if the relative powerfulness of the groups involved is different, with the weaker group being capable of survival, then rather than collective suicide what will ensue is collectivist politics based on exclusions of the Other to ensure group security once and for all. The first scenario describes the choices of Jews who became variously resigned to their fate in assisting in the machinery of death concocted by the Nazi’s evil, and the second one refers to the politics of the state of Israel, which, built by Zionist survivors of the Holocaust who arrived in large numbers in the area that would become Israel before and immediately after the war in Europe, has since its
founding forever been premised on the politics of exclusion not merely aimed at Arabs and Muslims whom they have ethnically-cleaned from their country, but increasingly towards anyone who fails to spontaneously consent to the myth of Israeli exceptionalism - such as African migrants, Jew and non-Jew alike - who, because of their life experiences and memories cannot but refrain from such mindless adulation. But in either case, the reenactment of the decision taken in the name of the artificial, but naturalized identity must be commenced over and over again, which implies that the role of structural position of groups in the formation of consciousness looms large, and the the ontological division of the world into good and evil on the basis of ‘progress’ or ‘order’ - all fundamentally categories of essentialized identities - influences individual will more than most of us would like to admit; especially those of us who imagine ourselves to be free.

Both of these responses are blurred, though, since the self-perception of power is uncertain, and within the camp, the reservation, the casbah, the ghetto, and the favela, as zones of indistinction, where absolute power operates absolutely, reversals of power and powerlessness, of life and death, of presence and absence, occur frequently, quickly, and in unpredictable ways. The recent - and ongoing - hunger strike at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where the US military controls a major prison
camp for suspects detained in the ‘war on terror,’ is evidence of this reality. First, it is obvious that indefinite detention amounts to dehumanization, none too different than the Nazi camps or the strategic hamlets from the Vietnam-American war era: prisoners are simply removed from the world. Second, this level of dehumanization is compounded by the reversal of sovereign power that informs Agamben’s theorizing about the state of exception wherein now the need to protect life - understood as the biological expression of essential human nature - becomes the anchor of “biopolitical”\textsuperscript{745} legitimacy. Thus prisoners are subjected to force-feedings, involuntary psychological and psychiatric evaluation, being perversely goaded into docility with access to high-tech entertainment products, and other elements of middle-class American life that conservatives eagerly to point out, making indefinite detention apparently equivalent to a “Club Med” vacation. But, third, these elements of control - the carrot and the stick, if you will - have failed to prevent the men held there from commencing a massive hunger strike - whose massiveness and threatening nature is attested to by the media blockade imposed by the military - which, if it results in deaths, will ironically show these men to be free until their last breath and reveal the powerlessness of the powerful in producing a dehumanized identity for the powerless to resign themselves to. American freedom’s dark underbelly of torture and sadism will thus be revealed.
The scandalous understanding of being as objective presence, with the material resources, the intellection capacity measured as the internalization of rationalizations, and the ability to back up words with a resort to violence, traditionally, and technologies of distancing more generally since now violence has come to encompass the ability to conduce a form of living in a particular way through torture, through forced-feedings, through the use of legislative subsidies for the farming of unhealthful ‘food products’ linked to a myriad of conditions that kills and depreciate the quality of life, is all fully on display. All these manifestations are connected. At their root, returning to Heidegger, is humanity’s temptation to reduce being to manipulable inputs in the orchestration of existence with a teleological aim in mind. Because this teleology is always an illusion of the future to come, its main significance is its prescriptive effects in the present. Simply put, some beings are something, other beings are nothing, and the evolution of ‘freedom’ in the name of permanence is greatly aided by the way in which freedom is falsified as the ability to do what one wants no matter what. Whomever can effectively punish the enemy of ‘freedom’ then becomes the one to who the essentialized individual, incapable of “making themselves inessential,” will surrender their actual freedom.
XXIII. Metaphysics and the Willful Denial of the Worldliness of the World: From Freedom to Judgment; From Love to (In)Tolerance - Freedom as a Thing-In-Itself as Judge of Freedom as Phenomena

We now turn to a discussion of another vision of freedom, which, we will argue is (1) older and universal, (2) cannot be extinguished even with the most awful violence - examples of which we have discussed - in the absence of acquiescence by persons to artifice which they become convinced is nature, and (3) whose recovery will offer humanity a way out of the terrible prophecy of our age being a “great war of spirits”: cataclysmic clashes between zealous individuals and groups whose attachment to their artifices that emanate the illusions of permanence is so strong that any insult, perceived or actual, no matter how irrelevant to their everydayness in the absence of the artifice’s bask, becomes the source of building resentment. Nietzsche said that the redirection of this resentment - ressentiment, in his terms, resentment against life itself - to alleviate suffering, to numb, temporarily, feelings of resentment through the distraction of identity and the games of metaphysics - which make people “interesting” by turning themselves into “an adventure” - would become the new programmatic of authority in a fallen, post-religious age.
Manipulating spiritualized selves and feeding delusions of grandeur, the self-hatred of one’s own inferiority, and coaxing people into acceptance of the status quo, where individuality is a threat to the the stability of manufactured presences, leaders - Nietzsche calls them “ascetic priests” who orient human activity in the service of an ascetic, life-denying, ideal - impair cognitive function directly and indirectly, hoping to produce a society of individuals who stroke their egos and idealized selves as precious gifts, whose ontological insecurity causes them to cling to these visions all the more.

So with this insight the question shifts to a concern with how ontology comes to inform the development of consciousness. If the idea of being that prevails is one that sees being as a transcendental idea, rather than simply being itself, replete with all of its’ characteristics and ripeness for observation and consideration, eventually, and even immediately, a narrowed consciousness of possibility will guide the process of becoming: the essence of being at the core of the facticity of existence. Theorizing on the nature of being as “care” for that which is, and casting aside the kind of regimentation of existence found in hierarchic and bureaucratic organization - the division of being and the obscuring of the totality of references that make up the “worldhood” of the “world” - Heidegger writes that the capacity to see ahead of the moment, for beings to be able
to “be ahead of themselves” is made possible by attunement to “facticity” that is the authentic basis of existence because

“being-ahead-of-itself means being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world. As soon as this essentially unitary structure is seen phenomenally, what we worked out earlier in the analysis of worldliness becomes clearer. There we found that the referential totality of significance (which is constitutive for worldliness) is “anchored” in the for-the-sake-of-which. The fact that this referential totality, of the manifold relations of the in-order-to, is bound up with that which dasein is concerned about, does not signify that an objectively present “world” of objects is welded together with a subject. Rather, it is the phenomenal expression of the fact that the constitution of dasein, whose wholeness is now delineated explicitly as being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in…is primordially a whole. Expressed differently: existing is always factical. Existentiality is essentially determined by facticity.”

Heidegger continues immediately thereafter making clear the relationship between “facticity,” “care,” “authenticity,” being “free,” and finally “politics” understood existentially in a manner inherent to the unique position in the “world” of each person. Choices, no matter how odious, and human values, no matter how despicably debased, continue to exist in the worst situations, and didn’t require the buttress of state authority to create situations of consumer choice in marketplaces and electoral politics to remain real - calling into question the narrow vision of freedom-plus-security bandied about as the real deal today. Consciousness is not
equally-distributed, and so we bear witness to the contest of wills, even in one individual, between authenticity and inauthenticity, and just how difficult it becomes to resolutely choose one or the other simply on the basis of the will. Individuals, to be free, require support. *This requires a doctrine of public, social, political, and relational freedom.*

“Since being-in-the-world is essentially care, being-together-with things at hand could be taken in our previous analyses as *taking care* of them, being with the *Mitdasein* of others encountered within the world as *concern*. Being-together-with is taking care of things, because as a mode of being-in it is determined by its fundamental structure, care. Care not only characterizes existentiality, abstracted from facticity and falling prey, but also encompasses the unity of these determinations of being. Nor does care mean primarily and exclusively an isolated attitude of the ego toward itself. The expression “care for oneself,” following the analogy of taking care and concern, would be a tautology. Care cannot mean a special attitude toward the self, because the self is already characterized ontologically as being-ahead-of-itself; but in this determination the other two structural moments of care, already-being-in…..and being-together-with, are *also posited*.…..
...In being-ahead-of-oneself as the being toward one’s ownmost being free for authentic existentiell possibilities. It is the potentiality-for-being for the sake of which dasein always is as it factically is. But since this being toward the potentiality-for-being is itself determined by freedom, dasein can also be related to its possibilities unwillingly, it can be inauthentic, and it is so factically initially and for the most part. The authentic for-the-sake-of-which remains ungrasped, the project of one’s potentiality-for-being is left to the disposal of the they. Thus in being-ahead-of-itself, the “self” actually means the self in the sense of the they-self. Even in inauthenticity, dasein remains essentially ahead-of-itself, just as the entangled fleeing of dasein from itself still shows the constitution of being of a being that is concerned about its being.\textsuperscript{755}

The conscious choice to be what one can be, then, is not a matter of choosing from displayed options as in a marketplace, or in terms of of such a choice understood metaphorically in the midst of human existence beyond the actual confines of the situation of transaction, but rather, comes to encompass a conscious awareness and action upon one’s contingency - what Heidegger called “already-being-in”\textsuperscript{756} - and one’s community through which a person becomes the kind of self that they are, and indeed, could be - this denoted by the term “mitdasein,” German for “being-together-with.\textsuperscript{757}” Access to this awareness, something which is always available, and is extremely simple to grasp - despite being “ungrasped”\textsuperscript{758} - is found through the action and attunement called “care,” which, as care, literally brings before consciousness the question of being: why are there beings rather than nothing? Answering this question is
impossible, but rumination upon it, mindfully being-present with it, is the mechanism by which all philosophy and knowledge are born. It is the purpose of political authority to orchestrate beings by removing the urgency of this question from consciousness, producing a de-humanized being whose ability to respond to their consciousness is gone because they lose awareness of the ontological priority of care that implicates them in being always already.

“……As a primordial structural totality, care lies “before” every factual “attitude” and “position” of dasein, that is, it is always already in them as an existential a priori. Thus this phenomenon by no means expresses a priority of “practical” over theoretical behavior. When we determine something objectively present by merely looking at it, this has the character of care just as much as “political action,” or resting and having a good time. “Theory” and “praxis” are possibilities of being for a being whose being must be defined as care.

However, liberalism is essentially about conceiving freedom as ‘freedom from’ - negative liberty - which is structured to facilitate unawareness of the question of ontology and the phenomena of care that it points up to. Because of this internalization of ignorance, for the sake of survival in a world thus arranged, this must come at the expense of the Other; who shall
recompense in kind. But since we cannot ultimately shake our character of existence, irregardless our effort - we can only create greater and greater illusions through the use of technologies of distancing - negative liberty breeds a sense of paranoia about the Other; and therefore about existence in general, since the being of the Other is also everyone’s own experience as the Other of another person’s notion of selfhood. Translation: take negative liberty far enough in its material and ideological grandeur, support its practice with consumption patterns that inure individuals to pain and gear them towards pleasure, real or mediatized, and give them the full-reign to indulge themselves however they wish so long as it doesn’t conflict with the expedients of state.

To avoid reckoning with one’s consciousness, the will is used as a sword to attempt the division of reality in the name of freedom for the individual. But to what end? As previously discussed, the connection of the appearance of the free will – a trait of the free and willing being, meaning one with a certain capacity for accountability - with the contemporaneous appearance of the idea of duty understood as obligation and the solemnization of obligations to the community understood essentially transformed freedom into conformity; into an identity politics of an identity that couldn’t make itself inessential. The will is thus revealed to be, as such, the essence of metaphysics: to will to be such and such being,
the will to an identity, the will to truth, ultimately, the “will to power”762 where power simply means ability understood as force, and where willing is the means by which this power is disciplined in accordance with what is considered to be being. In this light Descartes’ famous dictum - “I think therefore I am” - is understood in a more explicitly Platonist fashion: I am because I have used my will to indicate through my disciplined speech and iotas of consciousness that I truly think. Failing to make this resolutely present as one’s way of existing in the world, individuals are not to be trusted with freedom, and those who claim to possess freedom are released, on the terms of negative liberty reproduced by the terms of order, from the impulse and proto-ontological call of conscience to care for such individuals.

Several connecting remarks are in order. The move to create negative liberty for individuals requires the possibility of individuals disembedding themselves from their surroundings and the contingent but dependent social interactions that constitute them. This doesn’t mean that individuals are to be elements of a collective pure and simple, but, rather, that their very individuality exists in a dialectical relationship with the community, with the language of the community, and the culture of that community that can either promotes or restrain their individuality. The development of a personality, its potential for autonomy, and its’ depth, is something that
cannot be accounted for by the utopian vision of negative liberty as Berlin himself understands. The problem is that most liberals are scarcely as honest as Berlin on this register, and fail to consider any authentic consideration of the social framework - positive liberty doctrines - that give rise to negative liberty. Hobbes and Locke both invoke fear, paternal discipline, and conservative culture as a defender of liberty - but vainglorious persons can easily ask what sort of liberty is this…

“My conception of freedom. The value of a thing sometimes does not lies in that which one attains by it, but in what one pays for it - what it costs us….there are no more thorough injurers of freedom than liberal institutions. Their effects are known well enough: they undermine the will to power; they level mountain and valley, and call that morality; they make men small, cowardly, and hedonistic - every time it is the herd animal that triumphs with them. Liberalism: in other words, herd-animalization………..

…..These same institutions produce quite different effects while they are still being fought for; then they really promote freedom in a powerful way. On closer inspection, it is war that produces these effects, the war for liberal institutions, which, as a war, permits illiberal instincts to continue. And war educates for freedom. For what is freedom? That one has the will to assume responsibility for oneself. That one maintains the distance which separates us. That one become more indifferent to difficulties, hardships, privation, even to life itself. That one is prepared to sacrifice human beings for one’s cause, not excluding oneself. Freedom means that the manly instincts which delight in war and victory dominate over other instincts, for example, over those of “pleasure.” The human being who has become free - and how much more the spirit who has become free - spits on the contemptible type of well-being dreamed of by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, females, Englishmen, and other democrats. The free man is a warrior.”
What Nietzsche is saying here is that modern liberal society has domesticated people, and has labeled that domestication to be one and the same with freedom, with *being free*. There are two general approaches to producing this kind of security on an ongoing basis, and usually both are found together at all times: by either producing an ideology which confers the name of freedom onto a select people, or by using the world’s resources and orchestrating them appropriately for the sake of creating the physical political economic base for the mass production of the telltale effect of freedom and distributing these sufficiently to create a sense of a normal state of affairs, making it possible for people to lose awareness of their fragile origins and obscure their always unknown fates. Released from responsibility for either thinking about, or from actually participating in, the provision of the resources needed for life being possible, individuals think themselves free. But as Robin pointed out with respect to Hobbes, and as we have expanded that view of being educated for fear found in Hobbes’ thought where it is suggested as generalized wisdom of fear of existence and the change central to it (Berlin), and the fear of pain (Rorty), and even fear of the historical history-making capacity of conscious action (Fukuyama), that encompasses a great deal of what has been called liberal thought, this creates a truncated understanding of the self whose very possibilities for existence are limited to their spatial-
temporal parameters assigned to them by power, controlling thus their very unfolding as living beings.\textsuperscript{764} Such socialization, Nietzsche suggests, will cause those who value their freedom to lash out against all structures.

We propose to read Nietzsche ironically here. Rather than seeing his above statement as straightforward endorsement of warlike mentalities, the section at the end of the quote concerning the comparative element of freedom wherein Nietzsche points out how his loathing the freedom of those whom he deems “the last man” - and whose way of life Fukuyama sees as the pinnacle of human achievement\textsuperscript{765} - suggests another reading other than a sweeping aside of all those deemed weaklings. Instead of seeing the warrior as a template of freedom per se, the context of the whole quote suggests a timeliness (or perhaps untimeliness) to the claim that the “free man is a warrior.” When Nietzsche says this, he is saying that those who wish to be free in the world bequeathed by liberalism - the so-called modern world - defined by the “leveling of mountain and valley” must indeed resort to a warrior-footing - a siege mentality - in their attunement to existence.

Liberal institutions are the products of war, but are now institutionalized. Liberal institutions naturalize the violence of the state - essentially artificial - and, as Mill said in his essay ‘Civilization,’ outsource the
legalized commission of official violence to designated purveyors of it, leaving the overwhelming majority of the populace free to be ‘civilized’ in accordance with his definition of the term as being capable of great acts through “combination” between individuals. But, as we shall see, Mill’s criteria for great acts of combined forces of individuals is simply greatness itself, understood as utility in his specialized reformulation of that term decided upon by the intellectual class who becomes the self-referential point-of-departure for evaluation as such. The result of this has been to domesticate violence in the name of collective defense of the community defined by intellectuals acting in their masked interest, with the semi-ironic outcome of encouraging hostility towards the Other, whose very Otherness is seen as a threat to the products of the combined efforts of ‘our’ civilization; the internalization of the identity of which serves as the main structural support for continued elite rule. This effectively shifts the instinct for free action to a class of deciders. Having given up the instinct of conquest, be it physical and military, or be it social, artistic, sexual, or intellectual, having internalized domesticated manners, common people have become inured to the ongoing violence conducted in their name by elites: or, those whose own resentment is so strong that they have commandeered the heights of the state and other powerful institutions, so they can achieve the permanence associated with accumulations of power - still an illusion that cannot escape death - and achieve concentration and
centralization by transforming stridency into ‘defense.’ “No government,” Nietzsche writes

“admits any more that it keeps an army to satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest. Rather the army is supposed to serve for defense, and one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But this implies one's own morality and the neighbor's immorality; for the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense. Moreover, the reasons we give for requiring an army imply that our neighbor, who denies the desire for conquest just as much does our own state, and who, for his part, also keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite and a cunning criminal who would like nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward victim without any fight. Thus all states are now ranged against each other: they presuppose their neighbor's bad disposition and their own good disposition. This presupposition, however, is inhumane, as bad as war and worse. At bottom, indeed, it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars, because as I have said, it attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile disposition and act. We must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense just as completely as the desire for conquests.\footnote{766}

To become free of this morass of fanaticized and aggressive domesticity, \textit{be} as a free person, “the free man” must be a “warrior” and nothing less, since, in the absence of the capacity for war, negative liberty domesticates individuals into narrower and narrower bounds of acceptable conduct within the prevailing laws; these laws being the product of a negative dialectic of social regulation and control indulgent of the whimsical
desires of domesticated peoples to enact moral prohibitions against that which they imagine threatens them but in actuality they are simply intolerant of. Free expression is channelled into narrower and narrower modes of intellecction as acceptable forms of expression, and even this intellecction itself will come to rest on the edifice of the ongoing search for knowledge understood as the amalgamation of the laws of nature understood as a relay of objective presences to be accumulated, stored, arranged, and eventually, orchestrated, to further effect the process of knowledge as mastery over the world. But the simply maddening element in all this is that the idea of ‘world’ that underlies this drive for mastery is itself an impoverished concept of world set up in advance already as something that mastery can be gained over. The only reply to this state of affairs imaginable to Nietzsche, despite his iconoclasm, was to reassert the self purely through the will, because, as he most thoroughly revealed in his philosophy, the entirety of the Western philosophical cannon was nothing more than various truncated and domesticated expressions of “the will to power.”

“...like Nietzsche’s identification of freedom with radical individualism, the identification of freedom with mastery is pathological. By pathological I mean something born of and nourished by existential resentment. When postmodern libertarians, like their positive and negative counterparts, completely equate freedom with mastery, they are effectively striking out against an ambiguous and overpowering world. The mastery that
is sought relieves the individual from fully acknowledging and hence authentically experiencing its own thrownness in the world.768

Political freedom must admit to the shared nature of existence and the rationally unfathomable plurality of beings therein, and cannot accept the restiveness of resentfulness aimed at mastery over oneself as a counter-sovereignty that liberal theories utilize as their negative ground for social order. The liberal individualist, to exist authentically freely, must “mitigate” their “pursuit of sovereignty,” so they can “eschew resentment.769” The use of the ideal of collective defense of the community, and concepts of race, nation, religious identity, class, and other designations denoting in and out groups must at some point be relied upon, necessitating the institution of governmental authorities capable of rendering legitimated decisions to protect the community against a dangerous world and internal dissension that are perceived by those possessed by resentment as essential threats to their existence.

Western concepts of being, be they liberal or conservative, or even postmodern, are predicated thus on some notion of willing, and this sort of distinction of the self from the society has given rise to the self as an idea whose premise is violent rupture and division from others. Negative liberty masks this rupture through normalization, and positive liberty
justifies it on the basis of some positive truth discourse of, say, the nation as an idealized community peopled by exemplary and disciplined individuals. As we have discussed previously, this distinction between negative and positive liberty is a canard, but one that been put to social use by liberal theorists - Isaiah Berlin comes to mind again - to indicate the superiority of negative liberty over positive as an aim of, perhaps a special trait of, higher orders of civilization.

Chief among its virtues, cited all the way back in Aristotle’s times, where magnanimity was associated with liberality that was the province of those freed from daily labors through a socio-economic system whose basis was mass enslavement along racial lines, through the work of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, and up to the present day in the writings of a great many partisans of liberal internationalism/imperialism, supposedly, is tolerance. Wendy Brown writes that tolerance, praised as evidence of elevated morality made possible through the rational domestication of warring instincts that historically are manifest in religious battles, nationalist conflicts, rather than indicating loving indulgence of the Other, in fact, to the contrary engages an aspect of the overall governmentality of liberalism that demarcates the space between the civilized and the barbarians. Instead of tolerance being a value among other values, to be practiced, to be cast aside in moments of passion, liberal thought understands it as a
property of persons entitled to tolerate others and thus also as a propriety
to maintain in order to maintain the claims of status. Writing an analysis of
Susan Okin’s - a prominent liberal feminist - call for Western and liberal
societies to speak out against illiberal social practices beyond the West, Brown argues that

“Tolerance, is not … repudiated [by Okin] as a value but rather becomes a practice of
demarcation, drawing the line at the “barbaric” or the coerced [by illiberal social
practice]……all instances of the barbaric and the coerced are found on the non-Western
side of the line - that is, where culture or religion are taken to reign and hence where
individual autonomy is unsecured. No legal Western practice is marked as barbaric,
including feasting on a variety of animals except those fetishized as pets; polluting the
planet and plundering its resources; living and dying alone; devoting life to the pursuit of
money; making available human eggs, sperm, and infants for purchase by anonymous
strangers; performing abortions; stockpiling nuclear weapons; tolerating sex clubs,
indigency, and homelessness; enjoying flagrant luxury in the presence of the poor;
consuming junk food; or undertaking imperialist wars.771”

Our above discussion of American atrocities in Japan and Vietnam, and the
spread of these ways of thinking - accepting the violence of modernity as a
natural progression of the species - to India evident in that its’
government’s was against its own people and the importation of large-
scale mechanized agricultural production causing hundreds of thousands
to lose their land through financial scheming driving them to suicide,
should make clear that Brown’s analysis has much empirical support. Tariq Ali has written of the current global moment being a “clash of fundamentalisms”\textsuperscript{772} where arrayed on one side are the tribal rebellions that variously make up the irredentist and obscurantist religious movements and ultra-violent ‘terrorist’ organizations challenging states around the world; on the other side we have “capitalist fundamentalists,\textsuperscript{773}” whose devotion of neoliberal economic order whose basis is austerity when necessary to keep confidence in the engines of overproduction and to give succor to the “culture-ideology of consumerism”\textsuperscript{774} has led them to lay waste to democratic governments and movements the world over through various political and military interventions going back at least a century and perhaps more. Capitalism and the politics of “technological fanaticism” is as fundamentalist as its enemies - if not more so - save it has developed, through the long trajectory of moralization that Nietzsche amply critiques in his philosophical corpus, a mechanism of escaping responsibility for actions flowing from its underlying system of thought through the naturalization of their artifice, the universalization of their morality as morality as such.* Tolerance, a straightforward and useful concept for survival and avoidance of needless tensions of mind, when universalized, like when freedom is universalized has, as Isaiah Berlin anticipated
“The effect [of labeling] the non-West [as] intolerable for harboring certain practices that are not only named barbaric, that is, uncivilized in contrast to our practices, but coerced, that is, unfree compared to our practices. The limits of tolerance are thus equated with the limits of civilization or with threats to civilization. Indeed, insofar as both invoke a civilizational discourse to broker the tolerable, those who worry about tolerating what portends the unraveling or decline of Western civilization (Samuel Huntington, the neoconservatives, right-wing Christians) converge ideologically with those who worry about tolerating non-Western practices that are outside civilization’s pale (Susan Okin, liberals, human rights activists). Conservatives and liberals alike deploy this colonially inflected discourse to establish a civilizational norm by which the tolerable is measured, a norm that tolerance itself also secures.775”

By transforming our values into eternal values, and seeking to make the world in our image, making exceptions for those liminal others we can tolerate (because they are not a threat to us), and ensuring that threats to our orchestration of the “standing reserve” are neutralized in the name of our freedom, we retire the question of being and doom ourselves to a narrow vision of life. This vision of life may be enough for some for some time, even for many, but alarming rates of drug use, divorce, spousal battery, eating disorders, obesity, resentment against minorities, and other forms of ressentiment - resentment towards life itself from which people seek respite in the enactment, illusion, or both, of mastery - have produced a resigned attitude that gives the lie to the pretension of liberalism. When Brown points out that Okin ignores the major problem of young women in
America and the West more broadly starving themselves to become thinner - not merely to satisfy men’s desires, but more so to avoid the kind of negative peer-shaming associated with being perceived as fat - or when we can add to this important point the similar one about homophobia among young men whose possibly being associated with homosexuality in any way causes them to reinforce masculinist and machismo virtues that emphasize their willfulness and strength at the expense of their inner life, their friends, their family, and their emotions - these points may strike some as being strange examples of a critique of Western freedom. But they are obvious. By restricting being, by focusing all our energies on the reinforcement of a metaphysical ideal of the self, we have to turn our vision away from our surroundings, which, is where opportunities for friendship and love, the basis for human life and society, and is where our freedom ultimately lies.

The restriction of being transforms not only choices but cognition, and leaves the actions of the Other unexplainable. This not only transforms foreigners into potential terrorists, but it also masks actions that could be understood quite easily as terrorism on the part of Westerners by the naturalization of what is essentially artifice, thus concealing its deleterious implications for freedom, everywhere. “In sum,” Brown writes
“why is Okin more horrified by the legal control of women by men than by the controlling cultural norms and market productions of gender and sexuality, including norms and productions of beauty, sexual desire and behavior, weight and physique, soul and psyche, that course through modern Western societies?…

…When individual rights are posited as the solution to coercion, and liberalism as the antidote to culture, women’s social oppression and subordination (as opposed to their contingent or domestic violation or maltreatment) appears only where law openly avows its religious or cultural character - that is, where it has not taken the vow of Western secularism. But as the examples above suggest, by formulating freedom as choice and reducing the political to policy and law, liberalism sets loose, in a depoliticized underworld, a sea of social powers nearly as coercive as law, and certainly as effective in producing subjectivated subjects. Indeed, as a combination of Marcusian and Foucaultian perspectives reminds us, choice can become a critical instrument of domination in liberal capitalist societies; insofar as the fiction of the sovereign subject blinds us to powers producing that subject, choice both cloaks and potentially eroticizes the powers it engages. Moreover, Okin’s inability to grasp liberalism’s own cultural norms - in which, for example, autonomy is valued over connection or the responsibility for dependent others (with which women are typically associated), liberty is conceived as freedom to do what one wants (for which women are so often faulted), and equality is premised on sameness (while women are always conceived as different) - blinds her to the deep and abiding male superordination within liberalism: not just in “liberal cultures” or in the sphere of the family but in liberal legalism and political principles.776”

To be absolutely clear, our position is that there is always choice, that choices can be made at any time, but that the existence of these choices is not the same thing as freedom and that to present choices being presented to individuals as the provision of freedom by the social order is to, as
Brown has put it, both “cloak” and eroticize social order that produces the circumscribed choices associated with the prevailing liberal concept of freedom. Rather, freedom precedes the notion of choice altogether, and to fetishize the existence of choice as evidence of freedom transforms choices into part of the technological machinery of power that seeks to perpetuate itself and organize constituent human activity in its name. Rather freedom understood as being confronts individuals with choices in regard to how they will exist, rather than the narrower idea of choosing which product or political party they identify with, and therefore choice must be understood in an altogether more original manner. Concealing the big questions and redirecting people towards the smaller ones, liberalism limits peoples choices in the name of giving them choices, and so masks the power relations in society. Liberals and supposed partisans of freedom fail to recognize, as Brown points out in regard to Okin, the continued existence of many coercive, choice-free, situations that undergird the apparent production of choice.

Corey Robin points out that the notion of private property, that institution that undergirds our freedom in liberal political philosophy, either of material things or in relation to our bodies as the source of labor and independent thought, and our capacity for independent thought and judgment supported by our apparent material independence evident
because of our possessions and capacity to produce more possessions for ourselves or to trade with others, conceals beneath its depoliticized facade significant unfreedoms kept in place by the use of fear as a legitimate tool of governance of hierarchical organizations that typify the American workplace and we can add, that are typical of workplaces reorganized by capitalist reforms in other countries, as well. Focusing our fears on the apparent difference of the Other interpreted as danger to be saved from, instead of focusing on injustices in our own countries we can rectify, we engage instead in the chimerical pursuit of freeing Others from social structures that are widely recognized as antiquated in their own societies anyway for which a struggle for change is generally in the offing, and which, in many cases, our own political alliances with the most retrograde elements in other countries have been essential in sustaining, from Afghanistan to Argentina. All the while, we accept our own increasingly narrow social, political, spatial, behavioral, and everyday, truncation of liberty in the name of empire abroad, economic expedience domestically, and the preservation of the privileges of those strata whom we identify with our own life goals in lieu of creating a social democratic economic systems in which we could pursue our dreams since such changes are understood as threatening to the prevailing order of things; with change we could lose our sense of dominion.
All these things were necessary to preserve the fetish of choice in a world where choices for most people were no longer evidence of freedom and therefore a rational and willful agent, but were options between worse and less worse - as in the camps - because the preservation of the self understood as coeval objectively-present goodness ruled out new solidarities lying about the *physis* waiting to be taken up. So there are terrible choices, and these are where our freedom is truly to be found. Instead we remain focused on choices associated with our right to indulge ourselves with some or other pleasure. Concluding her critique of liberal feminism and addressing this point, Brown writes that

“the putative legal autonomy of the subject combines with the putative autonomy of the law from gendered norms and from culture more generally to position women in the West as free, choosing beings who stand in stark contrast to their sisters subjected to legally sanctioned cultural barbarism. From this perspective, liberal imperialism is not only legitimate but morally mandated. “Culture” must be brought to heel by liberalism so that women are free to choose their antiwrinkle creams…

…There is a final irony in Okin’s formulation of “culture” as the enemy of women. This focus sustains an elision of the conditions imposed on Third World women by global capitalism, conditions to which Western critics could be responsive without engaging in cultural imperialism or endorsing political and military imperialism. These hardships range from the hyperexploitation of labor in export platforms and free trade zones to global capitalism’s often violent disruptions of dislocations of family and community. If the aim is to secure possibilities for modest self-determination for Third World women, what could be more important that addressing and redressing these circumstances?
Instead, in her obsession with culture over capitalism, indeed in her apparent indifference to the mechanics of poverty, exploitation, and deracination, Okin repeats a disturbing colonial gesture in which the alleged barbarism of the native culture, rather than imperial conquest, colonial political and economic deformation, and contemporary economic exploitation, is made the target of progressive reform.\(^780\) Such thinking has led to feminism lending a hand to American war-making in Afghanistan, and the humiliation of Pakistan and Afghanistan’s Pashtun people, in the name of freeing ‘their women’ from the clutches of the Taliban. In recent years, with the intensification of that conflict with the use of aerial drone warfare that has killed thousands of persons, likely the overwhelming majority of them being civilians,\(^781\) it is increasingly likely that desperate persons whose very way of life is deemed illegitimate and excluded from political dialogue, in a desperate desire to make their point of view present for global communication, will resort to irregular military assaults, as evidenced by the recent bombing in Boston.\(^782\) It is also increasingly likely that government officials, knowing this dynamic intimately, will stoke it, will invent it, and will fabricate it to instill fear in the public, and increase their authority and budgetary powers through these mechanisms; in fact this has already occurred on a widespread basis.\(^783\)

This fear, of the world, of death, of the Other, because “we ain’t livin”
right’ is the driving force of the political ontology of exclusion, whose ultimate consequence is to transform freedom into an identity politics regulated by a governmentality - operationalized self-regulation - and threatens to do the same with all other human values too.

But the infection of freedom with the idea of essentialized human nature is more pernicious, since freedom is being. Only those who have forgotten the question of being could possibly negate the being of the Other in a manner similar to George W. Bush’s infamous declaration: “they hate us for our freedoms.” From the liberal feminists in Brown’s critique, to the colonized intellectuals unable to “make themselves inessential,” to the broader population whose desperation in the face of political and economic exploitation and whose expectations for the good life and identification with that which is good as such cause them to cling to the terms of order and guarantors of these terms, and to all those who have abjured the unfinished nature of existence, the dialectical unfolding of reality itself becomes an experience in terror.

Securing of social space (lebensraum), securing of the rationality of the individual mind and the community space of recognition on the basis of the recognition of rationality and desires as the core of humanity and human similitude, and the postmodern move to extend strategic tolerance
to those deemed unthreatening, all lead us into the trap of security. We have traded our freedom for an essentialized vision of ourselves, the security of which is understood as freedom. This is why Berlin couldn’t see that the movements of the Third World rising from colonial rule to rebuild social order were seeking freedom, since he associated their rise with threats to his lofty perch he inhabited comfortably with his social class of armchair deliberators and adjudicators of the fates of others.

Freedom is denied in the name of freedom. Even in the postmetaphysical and postmodern conceptualization, the insistence on equal recognition from authorities, in giving the final say on conferral to those in the state who control the law attached to freedom a bunch of conditionalities which restrict and spatialize being physically and temporally in accordance with the terms of order. So even the freedom of the warrior is an illusion that is packaged, marketed, and sold to those whose temperament would otherwise be irreconcilable with the needs of order.

XXIV. Nationalists of Enframement Versus Spaces of Dwelling: The Limits of Western Political Ontology and Heidegger’s Human, All-too-Human, Dilemma
“...helplessness and doubt paralyze life, and in order to live man tries to escape from freedom, negative freedom. He is driven into new bondage. This bondage is different from the primary bonds, from which, though dominated by authorities or the social group, he was not entirely separated. The escape does not restore his lost security, but only helps him to forget his self as a separate entity. He finds new and fragile security at the expense of sacrificing the integrity of his individual self. He chooses to lose his self since he cannot bear to be alone. Thus freedom - as freedom from - leads to new bondage.”

At the end of *Escape From Freedom*, Fromm asks if there is “an inevitable circle that leads from freedom to new dependence?” Freedom has come to be understood as “felicity” in which a person would progress from “one pleasure to the next”; a process only terminated in one’s demise. Rendering permanent the artifice - technologically enhanced organized social power relations - that must be created and naturalized, as Hobbes honestly admitted, no matter the cost in terms of obedience and conformity, is worth it, because from this we can get things for our security. The political philosophy of liberalism has sought to make social and political space for this understanding of the individual; but at the cost of banning behavior considered a threat to social order no matter the erroneousness of such a designation: the vainglorious, the irrational, and, in a recent modulations of this understanding, those shaped by essentialized cultures and ethnicities which have not been deracinated in the name of modern life. Such persons cannot spontaneously and
reflexively consent to the inherent goodness of social order because they retain their constituent connection to the worlding of the world.

Nandy has documented the manifestation of newfound anomie in India that was to be elemental in Indian culture at the end of British imperial rule and which has continued into the independence phase, showing that this sort of alienation led people to give up their negative liberty - which was sought to be instituted in India by the agency of the British governance system that was aimed at producing the greatest good for the greatest number - because the anxiety individuals from privileged strata felt in their lives as a result of exposure to social and economic insecurity was intolerable in regard to their high self-conception.\textsuperscript{787} Positions in the Indian Civil Service were opened up to Indians, who competed intensely over these new opportunities among each other; competitiveness manifest along the lines of communal identities now beginning to be expressed as identities for the first time in a political form in accordance with the central goal of metaphysics: to ensure the recognition of presence. Inherent racism of the colonial situation, and the manner in which indigenous knowledge and learning was castigated by British imperialists as evidence of continuing backwardness, alongside official censuses, laws aimed at reforming Indian society, and economic and social flux made anxieties all the more intense.\textsuperscript{788} In a rush to prove themselves to
themselves, and to the British, as well, Indians from all social backgrounds with privilege - perceived, expected, desired or otherwise - competed against one another to secure the avenues to their continuing privilege, which offered little challenge to British imperial agents, who, sitting astride the political economy of imperialism, were content to manipulate factions against one another to their own benefit.789

From the Hindu fundamentalists to their Islamic counterparts, to the arch-nihilists who terrorize American schools and ethnic and religious minorities, the reactionary malcontents of the prevailing order are all seeking some form of the confirmation of the ability to exist on the terms of identity made manifest through the agency of the disciplined will. Those who fall through the cracks of modern societies whose terms of acceptance are based on identity, because political order is predicated on exclusion to create a sense of inclusivity and security, will either have to invent a new society for themselves to exist in, or will seek either revenge or suicide as their remaining options. The first option generally leaves individuals increasingly alone - and therefore exposed to arbitrary power - as a result of the atomizing effects of negative liberty; the remaining two choices are terrifying to contemplate, and are the source of what we call ‘terrorism’: violence against the terms of order born of desperation and with no apparent aim in mind other than to feel the intensity of one’s
extreme empowerment through the guise of violence before death;\textsuperscript{790} to go out with a bang, as they say. This view is important because some have argued that suicide terrorism, for example, is evidence of “collective rationality”\textsuperscript{791} found in cultures that are “pre-modern” or that don’t value individualism or human rights. Such orientalist canards only serve to exaggerate the inhumanity of the Other, and avert our gazes from the massacres of innocent people committed by Western governments, concealed by militarist-sanitized language of “collateral damage,” and from the attitude that prominent Western statesmen have towards human life even in the West: “Military men are just dumb, stupid animals to be used as pawns in foreign policy.\textsuperscript{792}”

For the alienation spread thus when people become aware of powerlessness, to be survivable on the determinations of order, individuals must be “tranquilized”\textsuperscript{793} in relation to the question of being, because intense discontent is always possible in a society based on alienation of oneself from oneself. When Heidegger writes about “inauthenticity,\textsuperscript{794}” alienation and one’s accession to it is what he has in mind, and not, as has been suggested by his liberal critics, failure to live up to a transcendental idea of a true self that metaphysical philosophies - or those premised on a pure reactionary inversion of metaphysics, such as Rorty’s postmodern liberalism or Berlin’s cynical resignation to the inability to change the
world without such movements eventually turning totalitarian - have presumed whenever words like ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ are confidently uttered. Heidegger writes of “entanglement”795 as always already present for all beings, and is inescapable save for a chance moment here and there: solitude, meditation, flight from community that nonetheless is simply a response to community as entangling (indicating the power of entanglement, ironically), and, he also says, in moments of “anticipatory resoluteness”796 where a person is open to the unfolding of their existence in a manner of gratitude (“thinking is thanking”), “solicitude,” and “releasement.797” Once the question of being is retired from consciousness, “the way in which things have been publicly interpreted holds fast to dasein in its falling prey,798” which makes it very difficult for people to step back from the bustle of everydayness and reflect on who they are in relation to the totality of references; which is to say that “falling prey,” which is made possible because because of total “faith in a worldview,” which “hovers”799 over everydayness and its entanglements, leads one to literally fall prey to alienating ideals since these pronounce a judgment of how a person should be, and that their “thrownness” is an essentialized, “finished fact.800” To accept, and then to remain self-alienated, requires individuals’ being entangled with the relay of restricted signifiers associated with the “they-self,
“idle talk and ambiguity, having-seen-everything and having-understood-everything, develop the supposition that the disclosedness of *dasein* thus available and prevalent could guarantee to *dasein* the certainty, genuineness, and fullness of all the possibilities of its being. In the self-certainty and decisiveness of the they, it gets spread abroad increasingly that there is no need of authentic, attuned understanding. The supposition of the they that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine “life” brings a *tranquilization* to *dasein*, for which everything is in “the best order” and for whom all doors are open. Entangled being-in-the-world, tempting itself, is at the same time *tranquilizing*…

… This tranquilization in inauthentic being, however, does not seduce one into stagnation and inactivity, but drives one to uninhibited “busyness.”… Tempting tranquilization aggravates entanglement… Entangled being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquilizing, it is at the same time alienating.⁸⁰¹

“This alienation,” Heidegger continues, “which *closes off* to *dasein* its authenticity and possibility,” and therefore “forces it into its inauthenticity,” which fluctuates between poles of total disempowerment since persons as such will be unable to accept their their contingency understood positively as possibility because of their resignation which propels them to accept the signs of hegemony, on the one hand, and the illusion of mastery over being and things as an avenue of escape from the admission of contingency, and, most importantly, finitude, on the Other. Agamben’s political theory regarding the role of *homo sacer* in activating, legitimizing, and defining the boundaries of the community, the role of the state in creating and maintaining those boundaries, and in producing the
fear of otherness explains precisely this situation: where all of us are potentially homo sacer, all are tasked with the dictate of mastering of ourselves and of our surroundings in the name of social inclusion and high-functioning conformity - often called ‘success’ - and where we must bend reality, understood as what is, to our life plans, life stories, self-conceptions, notions of the good and of moral order, for the sake of ensuring our belonging. The phenomenology of being are a person’s drives, emotions, and propensity for spontaneous behavior; but in this model of mastery people are forever at war against otherness in themselves, and that they see in, and frequently enough project onto, others. The result is self-alienation that is especially intense in the modern, Cartesian-inspired reduction of the world to objective presence confirmed as present through the activity of thinking understood as the cognitive processes of the rational mind having successfully internalized the prevailing criteria for what counts as being. “A Cartesian orientation that objectifies the world fuses our who and our how,” Thiele writes

“our identity and our behavior, in a specific way. The world becomes the raw material for representation, acquisition, control, and domination by the subject. The dangerous self-confidence expressed in humanity’s unsustainable exploitation of the earth is the fruit of this equation of freedom and sovereign power. The result is that humanity is now threatened by the ecological limits of a world it has unceasingly sought to possess and master.”
The profound irony of human existence is that the increasing drive to control the world in the name of certainty ultimately must fail for all persons because of the inherent limits to the existential human condition. These limits are physical, spatial, and temporal, and take on the character of “finitude.” But there is freedom in recognition of limits because on the one hand, death, the paradigmatic marker of finitude in all the senses encompassing physical, spatial, and temporal limits, discloses to people the “nothingness” to which each will return at some point, and the potential meaninglessness that can come to define life itself in the absence of some sort of authenticity, which comes about when one takes a stand on their being; a possibility obviously only when a person remains resolutely open to asking the question of being, and also patient in awaiting the disclosure of being.

Authenticity is essential to our thesis on freedom understood as a singular human value. Freedom is something which precedes all other values in a manner that configures us towards other values. Freedom can be a decision to be risk-averse as much as it can be flamboyant rambunctiousness. It can be solitude as much as it can be passionate engagement with the world. But what divides freedom from unfreedom, and what divides authenticity from inauthenticity are the same: namely,
that freedom and authenticity require acknowledgement of the self’s thownness in the world, and cannot be equal to the quieting - either actual or through an unlived repression that remains voluble - of the conscious memories, promiscuous thoughts, and futural projections and desires of the person flowing therewith. On this register Isaiah Berlin and Heidegger both agree, with the former decrying the “retreat into the inner citadel”\textsuperscript{804} - the desire to attenuate one’s attachments to the world in order to retain mastery within a smaller and smaller space of possibility - and the latter, quoted above, pointing out the dangers of “falling prey” to the “they-self,” leading beings to a “fall into publicness,\textsuperscript{805}” which foregoes the spontaneity of the self so that the individual can safely identify with society and its’ prevailing formalization of freedom. In both cases, Berlin’s a critique of privatist retreat, and Heidegger’s critique of a public one, individuals surrender their possibility of being authentic in order to gain the trappings of a secure existence, where self-care is greatly restricted to become manageable (Berlin’s negative liberty), or is augmented with publicness so that individuals can become secure in their thinking by the rote repetition of rationality understood in the Cartesian sense to secure consciousness against the absence of order.

But elites everywhere see themselves as a privileged social class, so thus individuality, of persons either within or beyond their own nation, if
spontaneous, is seen as a threat to the frequently unearned status that marks the elite as elite. Elites are typically “conservatives without ideology,” whose primary interest is the garnering of the resources of privilege while risking as little as possible. But this often cannot continue in perpetuity, so the organized irrationality of such a mode of class politics must be in defiance of the limits on growth imposed on human artifice by the reality of limits on labor, land, and capital. The fear of death—remembering Kweli’s epistemological claim about the emergence of that sentiment—is strong in elite circles since defiance of these limitations to secure privilege in perpetuity must on some level leave elites with an easiness about how they live.

But when we are opened up again to the experience of insecurity and and the finiteness of existence, we have the chance of becoming free. By becoming aware of our surroundings understood primordially as physis and not as metaphysics, in a way that is entirely our own, our awareness of the precariousness of life, obviates the structures of mastery, and makes us free. The state cannot save us, nor can our money, and having been a “good” person is also just as irrelevant. “Death,” Heidegger writes

“is the ownmost possibility of dasein. Being toward it discloses to dasein its ownmost potentiality-of-being in which it is concerned about the being of dasein absolutely. Here the fact can become evident to dasein that in the eminent possibility of itself it is torn

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away from the they, that is, anticipation can always already have torn itself away from the they. The understanding of this “ability,” however, first reveals its factual lostness in the everydayness of the they-self…

…The ownmost possibility is nonrelational. Anticipation lets dasein understand that it has to take over solely from itself the potentiality-of-being in which it is concerned absolutely about its ownmost being. Death does not just “belong” in an undifferentiated way to one’s own dasein, but it lays claim on it as something individual. The nonrelational character of death understood as anticipation individualized dasein down to itself. This individualizing is a way in which the “there” is disclosed for existence.

But technology used to increase and refine the mastery of the world through the use of technique precludes people’s awareness of their own radically-individualized existences, rendering them elements in a larger “world-picture.” The manifestation the world as a picture, a copy of the real based on the search for the idealized forms of truth understood as essence - which Plato somewhat ironically, from our perspective, understood as more real than present physical objects - has transformed all of reality into the “standing reserve” enframed by technology rendering everything from nature, to humanity and human communities, to experiences and even possibilities themselves, as reduced and manipulable resources, with the purpose of being stored up as potential to be judiciously expended for reproducing the terms of order conceived of as a material and ideological ensemble of interventions aimed at essentializing beings, and naturalizing their place in the operation of machines.
This radical insight calls into question the entire Western tradition of political thought, since, as that tradition developed over the years, until Nietzsche’s radical rebellion, and Heidegger’s radicalization and systematization of Nietzsche’s criticism, it was always insistent that the truth about the world, about good and evil, about causality, and about what beings were in actuality, was to be found “behind” the world and not “in it.”

Perhaps the world is too frightening for philosophers in this tradition, and perhaps it is for people in general reared in its epistemic wake, but the effect has been to produce the perception that the world, because of its impermanence, couldn’t be true, and that only that which always remained present, was, in fact, true. It is difficult to think of a less empirical attitude towards reality, and despite the apparent correction that emerges from the rise of the sciences, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, have pointed out that these prejudices against the truth of impermanence have passed from Christendom into the world of science. Among the sciences, the sciences of society emerged through the circulation of normalizing ideations of human nature, measured, refined, re-postulated, and so forth. But these methodologies were deceptive in the stated objectivity. Foucault has shown that underneath apparently accurate measurements of designated behavioral categories lay political exigencies associated with the naming and relegation of individuals and communities.
for the sake of depoliticizing political conflict and projecting an image of normalcy. Failing to question this, then, would prevent individuals from understanding their contingent constitution by power relations, and would leave them an essentialized being, members of such and such ethnicity understood, as a permanent identity as opposed to one forged in struggle (such as that of “Black” Afro-diasporic peoples, and “secular” Jewry of that diaspora), or as belonging to one side any number of opposed dualist conceptions roughly marking good and evil. But good people still die, just like evil. And there is no amount of science that has yet altered this fact.

In response to the fear of death, then, states are formed but they are also always the expression of the ability to expose some to death and relatively shelter others from it for perhaps some time longer. The current international system is defined by the “world picture” in which good and evil states are arrayed against each other, and the citizens of these states are presumed to be authentically represented by states which are taken as the authentic and organic representative of the nation and the community. In a remarkable passage Heidegger connects his insights about modernity that have been the source of so much controversy and diversionary maneuver by so-called liberals who have come to view freedom as their fundamental property, lacking in others:
“The fundamental event of the modern age is the conquest of the world as picture. The word “picture” now means the structured image that is the creature of man’s producing which represents and sets before. In such producing, man contends for the position in which he can be that particular being who gives the measure and draws up the guidelines for everything that is. Because this position secures, organizes, and articulates itself as a world view, the modern relationship to that which is, is one that becomes, in its decisive unfolding, a confrontation of world views; and indeed not of random world views, but only of those that have already taken up the fundamental position of man that is most extreme, and have done with the utmost resoluteness. For the sake of this struggle of world views and in keeping with its meaning, man brings into play his unlimited power for the calculating, planning, and molding of all things. Science as research is an absolutely necessary form of this establishing of self in the world; it is one of the pathways upon which the modern age rages toward the fulfillment of its essence, with a velocity unknown to the participants. With this struggle of world views the modern age first enters in the part of its history that is the most decisive and probably the most capable of enduring…

…A sign of this event is that everywhere and in the most varied forms and disguises the gigantic is making its appearance. In so doing, it evidences itself simultaneously in the tendency towards the increasingly small. We have only to think of numbers in modern physics. The gigantic presses itself forward in a form that actually seems to make it disappear - in the annihilation of great distances by airplane, in the setting before us of foreign and remote worlds in their everydayness, which is produced at random through radio by the flick of the hand. Yet we think too superficially if we suppose that the gigantic is only the endlessly extended emptiness of the purely quantitative. We think too little if we find that the gigantic, in the form of continual not-ever-having-been-here-yet, originates only in a blind mania for exaggerating and excelling. We do notthink at all if we believe we have explained this phenomenon of the gigantic with the catchword “Americanism.”
The clash of world views, themselves essentially a part of the apparatus of the worlding of the world understood as a world picture is a clash that in a race to secure being for perpetuity, a certain velocity overtakes the production and reproduction of social order, with new technological inventions aimed at mastery over the world being fabricated all the while, with these inventions eventually coming to increase the extent to which the world is enframed by technology in the name of making beings and things present for the purpose of harnessing. Quite obviously all thinking is lost in such a reduction - assuming we accept its effects on us - since in producing more and more material needed to succeed in this clash, thinking understood as mindfully staying with the object of thought, as rumination, in a manner reminiscent of Heidegger’s use of the term ‘dwelling’ to describe the nature of existence along with the fundamental role of consciousness in existence, is lost in favor of an instrumentalized understanding of thought itself; articulating thought to the exigencies of the state understood as an institution designed to preserve the status quo social relations. When Heidegger concludes this thought by suggesting that we have to expand beyond merely equating this acceleration and exaggeration with “Americanism,” - to which we can even add ‘Westernness’ - he is in agreement with our general thesis in this project: namely that the so-called modern world is defined by a generalized project
of instrumentalization and this is drive found in all of the world’s societies thanks to the spread of technology understood as a naturalized artifice that awakens certain insecurities in human beings at the level of ontology. These insecurities, however, do not rise to the level of consciousness and authenticity quite often because of the allure of technological oblivion in relation to the question of being. The result of this is an increasingly accelerated drive towards “gigantism,” along with its twin phenomena of the making of things “increasingly small,” the perfect expression of which is the development of atomic weapons which make impossibly large-scale explosions and city-busting devastation possible in one fell swoop, but rely on technologies that harness sub-atomic particles arranged in extremely precise processes. Nuclear technology, along with industrialized biotechnologies that splice genes to sow massive fields owned by monopolistic firms, the industrial prisons which micro-manage the lives of individuals prisoners held in abjectness and terror in a massive housing institution that one can frequently observe thousands held in a single overcrowded facility, and other modern technologies, such as computerization, and telecommunications, and unmanned drone aircraft guided by radars across the globe but small enough to be launched with the flick of a wrist in some cases, all bear more than a mere resemblance to Heidegger’s concerning “gigantism,” and in fact point to a generalized temptation for mastery over the world now sought in country after country, of which
America was merely the first major global exemplar.

This point has a few important implications for the idea of authenticity. First, this idea is readily transferable across cultural boundaries, although still associated strongly with the West and “Americanism.” International relations in an insecure world has a reflective effect wherein states observe each other’s developments and copy, and even try to surpass, one another. This is precisely the temptation which seduced Heidegger to Nazism and support the Nazi movement in the name of the German nation.815 Internationally, this creates a climate of world wars and epic conflicts between neighboring states. Domestically, this rips apart essentially plural countries made up of many nations and peoples, many of which are not readily classifiable along the lines of race, ethnicity, and other traditional designators of community identity, and forces people to define themselves in essentialized ways, to join these communities they don’t necessarily identify with, and indeed to see themselves as members of these communities in many cases for the rest of their lives.

To be like America, nation-states have tried to define themselves in line with the benefits of the provision of negative liberty and economic freedom through the rule of law. At the twilight’s inception for the American post-world war two consensus when counter-hegemonic
warfare against the US’ empire of global capitalism struck a blow in the United States, the President’s reaction was “you are either with us, or with the terrorists.” And so Pakistani liberals are termed agents of Israel, Indian liberals as agents of Pakistan or of Western ideas, African-American freedom activists as agents of Communism, etc., and all are marked for destruction or marginalization by states seeking to prove their ability to assert “effective control” over territory and a monopoly on “legitimate” violence. Dualism is an assault on pluralism, the latter which requires an infinite dialectical engagement, as opposed to the former, necessitating the far less intellectually-demanding deployment of a negative dialectics of pre-given essentialized identities proving themselves to be in existence through the will to power.

Second, this acceleration of identity-practices associated with a normalized notion of being secured by the apparatuses of technology produces a confrontation of world views, which, as we recalled from the above discussion of Nietzsche contra Fukuyama, takes on the character of a “war of spirits,” wherein the ironic battle of highly technological and materially-destructive powers are commenced in the name of the spiritualization of identity understood as a sublime essence giving meaning to a fallen material world. We had to destroy the village to save it. Heidegger’s contribution on this point is not insignificant: “as soon as
the gigantic in planning and calculating and adjusting and making secure shifts over out of the quantitative and becomes a special quality, then what is gigantic, and what can seemingly always be calculated completely, becomes, precisely through this, incalculable. From debates concerning true nature of reality in recent breakthroughs in subatomic physics to debates about the true nature of a Muslim religionist in seeking to provide a firm footing for the identity of the nation-state of Pakistan, and of course those same debates about Germanness and authenticity that consumed Heidegger and other German conservatives in the 1920’s and 1930’s, the desire to know, to organize and assemble, and to produce out of beings a standing reserve of objects summonable to enact identity - or essentialized truth in the case of particle physics - is on some level always a mad project of social planning and social control, and such arrangements at the least raise a question about the naturalness of the truth being sought, and usually and worse still, reveal such projects to be the product of deep existential needs to produce totems of certainty to arrange the world just so; and a corresponding inability to let beings be.

Third, holding a gun to the other’s head, now to be quantified and transformed into a represented object for consciousness, states and their managers project all of their own negating instincts about existence onto the Other, and so a cycle of violence is born. Part of this cycle, which
denies the being of the Other as an epistemological precondition, is to ensure as best as possible this way of organizing reality over and against the Other being capable of revealing itself to be different, but yet similar, to the self. As Nietzsche pointed out, we live in an era of defensive standing armies among nations prepared to destroy their enemy at a moment’s notice, but who effectively suppress, by method of their panoptic, bureaucratic, form of organization, the instincts for conquest which could easily have been vented in gentler and more productive ways than in organized modern barbaric warfare. So the world of different but similar others is understood not as one world shared among such beings, but as a limited terrain inhabited by radically different others whose insistence on otherness cannot be tolerated.

But as Kweli warned us, our fear of death, as the absolute Other of human consciousness, transposed onto other people, other states of being, onto change itself having come to be associated with decay, is most pronounced when we “ain’t livin’ right.” The truth, our surroundings, what is, is overwhelming, both because of the task of quantifying it - gigantic and infinitesimal - and because these quantifications represent qualitative notions that un-thinking beings who are alienated from the promiscuity of the intellect find no meaning in. Science, like metaphysics and religious theology before it, is one worldview among others, and not a source of
practical knowledge that becomes an essential element of being-in-the-world as Heidegger describes the hammer in the workshop of the workman in the first part of the existential analytic in *Being and Time* as being a tool, information or a knowledge that is “ready-at-hand”\(^819\) for practical application. This charge of thoughtlessness is not a moral judgment - rather it is a generalized claim about the current moment, because ultimately, even the scientists who pursue the mysteries of the cosmos must, of necessity, become less aware of the machinery - either willfully or otherwise - that they employ, its origins, its social opportunity cost, to pursue their experiments. That thinking remains present in the world at all seems incomprehensible. For those who safeguard thinking as a possibility, whose willingness to admit this fortuitous presence is evident in lieu of relying on its presence as a mechanism of judgment over and against the possibility of being, the only attitude that can be adopted is one of safeguarding and caretaking that which gives rise to thinking as a possibility. Such an attitude always makes contingent that which is essentialized. “Criticism is the art of making facile gestures difficult.”\(^820\)

Authenticity can therefore be salvaged because the incalculable becomes the shadow, the specter of order and discipline, “that is” Heidegger writes, “cast around all things everywhere when man has been transformed into *subjectum* and the world into picture.”\(^821\) In this residue lies the space for
thought, for the unthought, for the wandering mind, and for the questioning, wandering consciousness seeking to live its own life - which, as a thrown singularity towards death, must always already be completely unique because the contingent nature of language and the factual historicity of each person is always creating more and more history. Even as ‘anti-history’ or ‘post-history.’ After all, at some point enough time will have elapsed, and someone will see the need to write the history of the time subsequent to the ‘end of history’ and will find human actions, in concert, in solitude, and in the struggle with, collaboration with, and love of, nature, to have played some role in the formation of our collective existences. The transformation of tradition into shallow repetitive acts; the transformation of knowledge and rationality into the same through the Cartesian reduction of being to thinking and of thinking to the internalization of rationalizations that confirm the objective presence of being; the subversion of subversiveness by the designs of postmodern marketing and advertising that creates niche population subgroups for the sake of selling Che Guevara t-shirts; the opposite but related and overall controlling phenomena of producing at an accelerating pace the kinds of technological machinery that further subdivides being simply for the sake of harnessing it as “standing reserve,” to lend the illusion of mastery greater omnipresence; in each the worlding of the world, the possibility of authenticity, and of being-together-with, which is in dialectical relation to
being-in-the-world - the source of our only worthwhile conception of freedom - is something people have taken flight from.

But acknowledging the unknown, and safeguarding the unknowability of the unknown as a limit idea that puts the sciences in their place, and therefore brings technology - understood as the orchestration of beings for aims that can only be classified as artificial - can lead us in a different direction. “By means of this shadow the modern world extends itself out into a space withdrawn from representation,” Heidegger writes

“and so lends to the incalculable the determinateness peculiar to it, as well as a historical uniqueness. This shadow, however, points to something else, which it is denied so long as he dawdles about in the mere negating of the age. The flight into tradition, out of a combination of humility and presumption, can bring about nothing in itself other than self-deception and blindness in relation to the historical moment…

… Man will know, i.e., carefully safeguard into its truth, that which is incalculable, only in creative questioning and shaping out of the power of genuine reflection. Reflection transports the man of the future into that “between” in which he belongs to Being and yet remains a stranger amid that which is.²²²”

Poetry, as Heidegger understands it, is the use of language in as-yet-unmapped modes that explore the “shadow,” the unknown, in a manner that revels in its unknowability. The most astounding advances in particle physics and in microbiology cannot exhaust that which is knowable, and
the use of these technologies lies not in a complete mapping of the world, but in their ability to illuminate newer questions about human potentiality, and on a greater scale than that, about the potentiality for being, and of beings, generally. As such the best science and technology is itself poetry. *This puts technology in its place*, because failing that, technology defines human life in accordance with the image of the powerful factions that control political orders. This is precisely the problem with the falsification of reality in the name of permanence that figures heavily in our thinking. Rather than seeking stability, or order, language - a spontaneous faculty of the mind - is anticipatory in mouthing guttural sounds that only after later are stabilized as meanings. And even then these words we play with are merely signposts on the way to unconcealing that which remains concealed about existence, and will become concealed again when people stop talking about it. What is undeniable, though, is that these sounds have a proto-linguistic meaning indicative of some notion “world” connected to an idea of “home” understood as that space in which people “dwell.” “Poetically, man dwells.”

Authenticity is simply the ongoing commitment to bear witness to the unfolding of one’s existence and to always question the structures of perception and becoming that have been presented for oneself, and to remain aware always of the indivisibility in the final analysis of self and
other that the unfolding of existence is dependent on. This doesn’t mean that the self is immersed in a sea of others to whom the self must always conform in behavior, thought, and speech. Hardly. Rather, it means that the self cannot be the unique, interesting, and worthwhile experience - called life - in the absence of others. Heidegger makes this interplay of self and other clearer in his discussion of death in *Being and Time*. Despite death being one’s “ownmost possibility” as we quoted Heidegger as saying previously, in understanding and accepting that facticity of death, this possibility is immediately recognized in others, too, since these others are all participating with all selves in caretaking beings through the experience of life. Part of this caretaking is the co-creation of poetry and language, as opposed to receiving the so-called truth from authorities and then blandly recycling these as what one thinks and as what one does.

But inauthenticity can also linger if individuals take care as merely “leaping-in” to do things and provide things for other beings. Heidegger understands this as a “deficient mode” of the existential phenomena of “care.” In doing things for a person or providing them things, as per the apparentness of needs determined by the political economy underlying people’s terrain of action in the name of physical survival, the failure to accompany beings in the present produces an understanding of care that essentializes the Other as needy, the self as the
provisioner, and reinforces the structure of reality as it has been defined
metaphysically. Beings require each other understood as beings unfolding
in an non-preconceived manner in order to authentically be. Accepting
existential limitations, pushing against these when possible and assisting
others in the same, building a community and a freedom on the “fact of
death,” as Polanyi has put it, allows people to develop freedom as a social
practice that provides individuals made homeless by the ravages of
modern technology with a possibility of creating a home in this life.

“The ownmost nonrelational possibility is not to be bypassed. Being toward this
possibility lets dasein understand that the most extreme possibility of existence is
imminent, that of giving itself up. But anticipation does not evade the impossibility of
bypassing death, as does inauthentic being-towards-death, but frees itself for it.
Becoming for one’s own death in anticipation frees one from one’s lostness in chance
possibilities urging themselves upon us, so that the factical possibilities lying before the
possibility not-to-be-bypassed can first be authentically understood and chosen.
Anticipation discloses to existence that its extreme inmost possibility lies in giving itself
up and thus shatters all one’s clinging to whatever existence one has reached. In
anticipation, dasein guards against falling back behind itself, or behind the potentiality-
for-being that it has understood. It guards against “becoming too old for its victories.”
Free for its ownmost possibilities, that are determined by the end, and so understood as
finite, dasein prevents the danger that it may, by its own finite understanding of existence,
fail to recognize that it is getting overtaken by the existence-possibilities of others, or that
it may misinterpret these possibilities, thus divesting itself of its ownmost factical
experience. As the nonrelational possibility, death individualizes, but only, as the
possibility not-to-be-bypassed, in order to make dasein as being-with understand the
potentialities-of-being of the others. Because anticipation of the possibility not-to-be-bypassed also disclosed all the possibilities lying before it, this anticipation includes the possibility of taking the whole of dasein in advance in an existentiell way, that is, the possibility of existing as a whole potentiality-for-being.825"

Because death is certain, and because awareness of this fact about existence requires a certain “attunement” that opens one up to the feeling of “angst”,826” - “anxiety about nothingness” - nothingness remains a possibility for all beings and behooves all beings who are aware of it to bear witness to the some-thing of their being - the phenomenal reality - that is their own, that is each’s own. “Dying is care”827 at the level of ontology, so being aware of this process of decay, and taking care of our own as well as others’ experience of this process is necessary insofar as we may care to keep the possibility of being free for one’s own factual existence as a real one. Keeping in mind that care for oneself is related to care for the world, and for the beings and things in the world authentically - as opposed to the deficient mode just discussed that reinforces the essentialized and therefore inauthentic conceptualization of beings and things - the possibility for freedom and authenticity is thus summed up:

“What is characteristic about authentic, existentially projected being-toward-death can be summarized as follows: Anticipation reveals to dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of itself, primarily unsupported by concern taking care of things, but to be itself in passionate anxious freedom toward death which
is free of the illusions of the they, factual, and certain of itself.\textsuperscript{828,}“

XXV. The People against people: Agamben, Heidegger, and Immanent Freedom Without Metaphysics

Liberation cannot be achieved in one country at a time since this will necessarily relegate that country, if liberated, to confront a sea of colonialism which it will be forced to contend with all the resources of the colonial powers arrayed against it. Power in this case, essentially military and economic might in conjunction with propaganda aimed at recycling tropes of ‘barbarism’ and ‘savagery’ that are the old line of the conservative and metaphysical world order speaking fallaciously in the name of liberalism and freedom, will severely challenge the freed nation and peoples to the limit. Globalization as it is presently conceived has been a process led by the powerful nation-states in the system along with the corporations that are more or less entirely connected to the formal state apparatus. As a result, the circulation of essentialized understandings of people as representative of various classes of labor, or as entirely devoid of humanity because of their belonging to certain severely loathed groups, has predominated over the dreamy vision of mobility for all. Indeed, most
persons are now subject to major insecurities and dislocations brought about through various means which cannot but be described as terrorism.

“The camp is the new biopolitical nomos” - the normative order - “of the planet.” Let us clarify. First, the circulation of norms of being, the ranks, organizing, and judging people in accordance with these norms, and then deploying technologies of distancing to control and transform individuals - shock therapy, economic shock, cultural imperialism, imperial conquest, genocide, etc. - combines the paradigm of the camp from Arendt’s work, where the camp dwellers were subjected to much the same and as a result were stripped of their humanity in the eyes of even many of their own number - although not entirely - and most of the citizens of Germany and the other contending powers in the second world war who would eventually liberate the inmates in the camps, with Foucault’s work, which depicts the transformation of imprisonment in the modern age into a scientific technique for the transformation of individuals - both inside and outside the walls of the prison - through the institutionalization of the panopticon, - which, in surveilling all inmates, and in producing eventually an epistemological overflow of data driven by the necessity of knowledge creation, encompasses persons outside the prison walls as well in an expanding network of social control, in the name of control and order. Gone are the myths of privacy, pure
individuality, communities, and identities, violence-free lives and consciousnesses, and the possibility of perfect security - these all being implicated in an overall system of control, cross-cut with the operations of power and knowledge. In the place of these fantasies are interconnection, postmodern “beasts of no nation,” a clash among those who are fighting to control the “age of the world picture” at the “end of history” inhabited by a power elite comfortable with seeing itself as unbounded to location, family, culture and tradition understood existentially, ruling over an era of “das man,” “internationalized states” whose power projection capacities are being developed, in concert with private military contractors, to corral the warrens of humanity into organizable and utilitarian territorial conceptions (such as maquiladoras and export-processing zones), global climate change as a result of the negative externalities of the production chain gone global long understood as socialized costs to not be considered in the profit-maximizing production equations of neoclassical economics, and the proliferation of resistance forces promising either freedom and liberation or some variant of nostalgic longings for imagined pasts projected onto an uncertain futures with a markedly fascist flavor.

Pepe Escobar has written in a recent article, ‘Post-History Strip Tease,’ that there is now a concentration camp for Muslims - Guantanamo, - there
is a simulacrum concentration camp in Palestine and especially in Gaza, and that with the response by the American state’s northeastern regional security forces from multiple agencies, and the accompaniment of their actions by cheering drunken crowds in the streets of Boston, to the recent bombing there, we also have an instantiated state of exception evident in American domestic law enforcement procedures. Escobar writes that with failed states, panopticon-surveilled global cities like London - and more ominously places with massive wealth gaps like Rio De Janeiro and Bombay - with police forces comparable to standing armies and layers of private security atop, successful states resorting to regimes of brutality and austerity to control their citizenry, and a political class ruling over these wastelands of the social with a “negative art” of imagining the “least worst society possible,” human social life and civilization are taking a turn to the dystopian.

The increasingly escapist politics of disembedding that has come to define the “human,” or as Aime Cesaire points out, has come to define that “European invention,” “man,” has, at the same time as its being highly destructive because of its indifference to what is in the name of servicing the illusion of a permanent artifice that the caveman bows before (read: the obelisk in 2001 Space Odyssey, or the same concept featured in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*), the dialectical propensity to allow us
to shift our gaze towards that which truly is. This is because there is no inherent reason that the caveman cannot look away from the obelisk, from the artifice, and see what truly is in his or her surroundings. Every political philosophy we surveyed has been some variant of a constructed edifice which has been presented as the ‘true’ answer to the human condition, including Mill’s, whose theory of rational progress and the institutionalization of skepticism and the search for the truth has been lauded by liberals as a free-minded alternative to metaphysics. But by measuring humanity in the image of its cooperative projects, and not by simply valuing human beings as they are, Mill created a standard of evaluation that mimics the split between public and private realms that mapped onto other divisions in existence that prioritize one over the other. Against this valuation of what Aristotle called bios over zoe Agamben has called for us to think about identity, existence, and human freedom in an entirely different way such that the split between self and other that has been constitutive of the polis, which today has led to the production of the camp to sequester elements to be removed from the polity in a zone of indistinction, need no longer be central. Indeed, the polis, the gathering, the city, and the space of human civilization - if we simply take that term to mean peaceful interaction and coexistence - be it a traditional city or state formation, or be it a camp organized on the peripheries of power and centralized authority, could, in either case, be a place of either the
judgement and relegation of facticity and the historicizing element of being to clandestinity, or could be a place where “bare life,” zoe, could be supported with love, friendship, and cooperative work. Agamben, defending the reading of Heidegger we have put forth in this chapter, where we suggest that his philosophy is one of freedom and authenticity, and not one which is an existential support for Nazism and authoritarian sovereignty - something more accurately put to Schmitt and his defense of the state as the protector of human essence - to which it has been attributed by liberals in the West seeking to desperately divert attention from their own complicity with savagery, is worth quoting at length here. In this selection is contained the seeds of the new humanity that Fanon has spoken of, and that Sartre, inspired by Fanon, wrote about in his introduction to *The Wretched of the Earth* in order to free the European peoples of their illusions of supremacy.841 If we follow the dialectics of artifice, which Hegel, the liberals in the European canon of political thought, the modern American and neoliberal partisans of globalization, and even now the American left with its embrace of identity politics as a means of repressive desublimation through allowing the consumption of the self’s reinforcement as identity and cultural belonging, what we see is that factual human beings are disparaged in favor of adherence to the codes of what counts as “man,” and that, in the end, to properly police the boundaries of inclusion the “bare life” of each bios must be administered
on the biological-political level, since there is no logical reason to not do this once the state of exception is invoked. Like Arendt and Polanyi, who both saw the origins of fascism in the great expectations of liberalism to produce “improvement” of society at the cost of “habitation,842” Agamben sees the origins of Nazism in the desire to produce negative liberty for the group within a polis, thus radically questioning political science and the practice of politics, as well as our very understanding of the human, in the West. “For both Heidegger and National Socialism,” Agamben analyzes “life has no need to assume “values” external to it in order to become politics: life is immediately political in its very facticity. Man is not a living being who must abolish or transcend himself in order to become human - man is not a duality of spirit and body, nature and politics, life and logos, but is instead resolutely situated at the point of their indistinction. Man is no longer the “anthropomorphous” animal who must transcend himself to give way to that, if grasped, constitutes him as Dasein and, therefore, as a political being. This means, however, that the experience of facticity is equivalent to a radicalization without precedent of the state of exception (with its indistinction of nature and politics, outside and inside, exclusion and inclusion) in a dimension in which the state of exception tends to become the rule. It is as if the bare life of homo sacer, whose exclusion founded sovereign power, now became - in assuming itself as a task - explicitly and immediately political. And yet this is precisely what characterizes the biopolitical turn of modernity, that is, the condition in which we find ourselves. And this is the point at which Nazism and Heidegger’s thought radically diverge. Nazism determines the bare life of homo sacer in a biological and eugenic key, making it into the site of an incessant decision on value and nonvalue in which biopolitics continually turns into thanatopolitics and in which the camp, consequently, becomes the absolute political space. In Heidegger.
on the other hand, homo sacer - whose very own life is always at issue in its every act - instead becomes Dasein, the inseparable unity of Being and ways of Being, of subject and qualities, life and world, “whose own Being is at issue in its very Being.” If life, in modern biopolitics, is immediately politics, here this unity, which itself has the form of an irrevocable decision, withdraws from every external decision and appears as an indissoluble cohesion in which it is impossible to isolate something like a bare life. In the state of exception become the rule, the life of homo sacer, which was the correlate of sovereign power, turns into an existence over which power no longer seems to have any hold.843

Heidegger’s choice to become a Nazi represents not what his liberal detractors have suggested - his philosophy’s complicity with the Holocaust and the aggressive warfare of the Nazi government in the second world war - but rather can be seen as a cowardly - but human, all-too-human - capitulation to his own fears and trepidation owing both to the inescapability of these states of mind in the human condition and the failure of his imagination, and his ignorance, at the time, about the “Being of Being.” By emphasizing what has been labeled the “decisionist” element of his thought, and by not carefully reading his own rejection of Nazism before even the outbreak of the second world war, he becomes a convenient scapegoat and foil for aberrations in the otherwise progressive march toward modernity and civilization that has been the narrative superstructure of self-identification for the West.844 But what is more specifically revealed in Heidegger’s choice on our reading is that his
desire to defend Germany and Germanness from what he perceived to be the existential threat of the Soviet Union, Communism, and what many Germans for centuries had considered their Slavic inferiors, is that the Western idea of the nation-state, whereby one people’s existence is seen as contiguous with a piece of territory, and with the state as an organic appendage fastened to both as an agent of rationalization of ownership and control - a.k.a. sovereignty - has built into it precisely this limitation, this weakness, this propensity to warp perceptions of its residents by producing a sense of naturalness about its existence.⁸⁴⁵ This, as we have been saying all along, transforms that which is essentially artifice into a illusorily naturalized totem of devotion - a being constructed by beings seeking to escape from finitude - which, since requiring the harnessing of resources and beings as resources for its survival and support both incentivizes authorities to condition the people to become one people in thoughts, behavior, and existence, to the detriment of variety and diversity, and encourages the people to go along with this, lest they risk exclusion, persecution, social ostracism, and death at the hands of the enforcers of order. In democratic nations - what some have termed herrenvolk democracies⁸⁴⁶ - this enforcement capacity is flexibly distributed throughout the body politic to all citizens - and perhaps even aspiring citizens - to perform in order to receive recognition as one who is included in the political order.⁸⁴⁷ From such fear-induced coordinates of belonging
is born the politics of divide and conquer, where authorities can distribute recognition to some groups at the expense of others, and where these groups are disposed to compete with one another for this recognition; all in the name of the People.

Agamben writes that this distinction between “People” and “people,” between *bios* and *zoe*, is more elementary than Schmitt’s “friend-enemy” distinction and even that between classes in Marx’s concept of “class struggle.” This is because in the absence of guaranteed recognition nobody is willing to trust one another, and the various mechanisms in history for bringing about this trust - rationality, nationalism, co-religiousness, imperial decree, and even the idea of the fraternity of humanity (language which excludes women) - have all been dependent on both the conferral of recognition according to evaluable criteria whose origins are in the essentialization of the self and of identity achieved through material performance of physical tasks, and the ideological fervor deemed necessary in the reproduction of the state as society. Trust can also emerge from, as Agamben said in the previous quotation, the recognition of the unity of Being that is always already factual - in Heideggerian terms - by accepting the limitations in existence, chiefly death, and building our freedom on the basis of this facticity. This is precisely how Polanyi concluded his discussion of socialism and freedom in a complex society,
specifically that this would require the identification of the socialist with society and the freedom of each individual, and would necessitate a clash with fascists who would base their idea of freedom on the desire to turn away from social complexity in the name of identification with power which facilitated their desire to sublimate their being over and above the unity of which Agamben speaks through the philosophy of Martin Heidegger.

And this mentality has come to infect all major ideologies. From liberal apologetics over drone attacks on civilians in American war zones - and the adjoining phenomena of the drastic diminishment of the vigor of the anti-war movement during the Presidency of Barack Obama, to the subversion of feminism and queer radicalism through liberal feminist exultations for women to compete with men in careers such as finance and military jobs (rather than engaging in a feminist, or eco-feminist critique of these fields) and the enormous emphasis on repealing “don’t ask don’t tell” and securing marriage rights for gay people, to the creeping anti-immigrant sentiment - both newfound and suppressed in the name of politeness for so long - in both Europe and America, and to the general transformation of identity politics into a “politics of self-respect,\textsuperscript{849}” in non-white countries building new, precarious nations in the wake of the ravages of colonialism, what we see is Nietzsche’s prophecy of the “war
of spirits” come true. The sublimated, spiritualized, essentialized version of the self - what some may call an “ego-ideal” - which forces those who are not accepted and included to posit the freedom of warriors to compete and survive with their dignity, gives way to a war of the People versus the people.

“...if the people necessarily contains the fundamental biopolitical fracture within itself, then it will be possible to read certain decisive pages of the history of our century in a new way. For if the struggle between the two “peoples” was certainly always under way, in our time it has experienced a final, paroxysmal acceleration....when it becomes the sole depositary of sovereignty, the people is transformed into an embarrassing presence, and misery and exclusion appear for the first time as an altogether intolerable scandal. In the modern era, misery and exclusion are not only economic or social concepts but eminently political categories (all economism and “socialism” that seem to dominate modern politics actually have a political - and even a biopolitical - significance)... …our age is nothing but the implacable and methodical attempt to overthrow the division dividing people, to eliminate radically the people that is excluded. This attempt brings together, according to different modalities and horizons, Right and Left, capitalist countries and socialist countries, which are united in the project - which is in the last analysis futile but which has been partially realized in all industrialized countries - of producing a single and undivided people. The obsession with development is as effective as it is in our time because it coincides with the biopolitical project to produce an undivided people.850.

The significance of this point is difficult to overstate. First, rather than politics being a conflict of ideologies about different ways of life, the
question, quite radically, of being, of what way of life should prevail, is apparently settled to a degree that Fukuyama would surely relish. Except in this case the negative side of the ‘end of history’ is revealed: namely, that global civilization fabricated in the pursuit of certainty, freedom, and what has been casually referred to as democracy - but is really just the democratization and decentralization of sovereign violence to the “People’s” representatives - has produced a commonality of recognition across nations and ideological systems on the basis of existential fear of the Other, understood simply as recalcitrants to order. The simple truth about this insight is that Heidegger’s great error, for which he has been endlessly excoriated and his philosophies marked with a taboo to ward off exploration by those seeking to learn from this great thinker’s ideas and failings, is an entirely human error that is committed repeatedly the world over in the name of what J.S. Mill called civilization: the coordinated activity of disciplined individuals under the direction of their social and intellectual betters aimed at producing that which is good for the continued progress of “the People.” Disagreement with these projects, refusal to go along with them, or half-hearted participation are deemed to be cause for suspicion on the part of those who police the boundaries of identity and its reproduction.

In the United States today, the language used to described Muslims, the
lower-middle classes and below, those receiving various forms of social welfare or social security - including the old, who are seen as drains on society, - women who insist on reproductive choice access or on sexual freedom, homosexuals who refuse to toe the line of the newfangled heteronormativity for gays being dangled before their eyes as enticements to conformity (reinforced by opportunity for membership in the military), black Americans who refuse to give up black pride and cultural uniqueness, various latino populations who are perceived as ‘illegals’ - a disgusting way of describing people whose own nations have been economically ravaged by American foreign economic policies, prompting their desperate migrations - constitute an amalgam of exclusionary gestures whose poisoned fruits may become ripened in the near future.851 Bauman has said as much when he compares the use of boundary-drawing practices in Nazi Germany with those used to address anxieties over status and social change in the Western democracies.852 Glenn Greenwald has documented similar practices with regard to an ongoing battle in the gay community over the veneration or revulsion of Chelsea Manning, a soldier currently imprisoned for passing information about global power politics to Wikileaks, an independent journalism and anti-corruption resource whose publication of Manning’s information has also placed its staff in legal and perhaps physical jeopardy at the hands of the United States’ government.853 The battle over who counts as “the People” is precisely
what rages in these instances - and in the modern world, because the technologies of distancing available, from weaponry to organizational systems, from ideological apparatuses like the mass media to the subtle influences of self-alienation within each individual, this battle, as Agamben says, can take any form. “The extermination” Agamben writes

“of the Jews in Nazi Germany acquires a radically new significance in this light. As the people that refuses to be integrated into the national political body (it is assumed that every assimilation is actually only simulated), the Jews are the representatives par excellence and almost the living symbol of the people and of bare life that modernity necessarily creates within itself, but whose presence it can no longer tolerate in any way. And we must see the extreme phase of the internal struggle that divides People and people in the lucid fury which with the German Volks - representative par excellence of the People as a whole political body - sought to eliminate the Jews forever...

… The fracture that was believed to have been been overcome by eliminating the people (the Jews who are its symbol) thus reproduces itself anew, transforming the entire German people into a sacred life consecrated to death, and a biological body that must be infinitely purified (through elimination of the mentally ill and the bearers of hereditary diseases). And in a different yet analogous way, today’s democratico-capitalist project of eliminating poor classes through development not only reproduces within itself the people that is excluded but also transforms the entire population of the Third World into bare life. Only a politics that will have learned to take the fundamental biopolitical fracture of the West into account will be able to stop the oscillation and to put an end to the civil war that divides the peoples and the cities of the earth.854"

Second, Heidegger’s failure was born of his desire to retain purity, and this
desire cannot simply be ascribed to merely Nazis or certainly to a relatively marginal political figure such as Heidegger. The tokenization of identity, its transformation into an essentialized understanding of the self, as something permanent, is a fully-globalized problem today. Liberals and conservatives alike, now only differentiating themselves on the basis of party/group (i.e. - ‘race,’ nation, even gender or sexual orientation) membership and not on temperament or disposition - most ‘liberals’ are in fact conservatives when faced with danger - both plot and scheme away at garnering for their group the resources needed to carry out projects that secure the group and/or aggrandize the self-conception of its members. This was the purpose of our discussion of Arundhati Roy’s political thought concerning the middle classes of present-day India, where the “Union” and “Progress” projects are two sides of the same coin, both relying on a negative sanction against otherness, and both complicit in genocidal violence against the Other.

Heidegger’s failure politically, to either realize the success of his project, or to live up to the profound statements he makes on behalf of freedom, caretaking of being, authenticity, and, in the end, individuality engaged in an immanently dialectical relationship with the question of being doesn’t impugn his philosophy any more than supporters of Barack Obama being believers in free speech and unquestioning of the Obama administration’s
foreign policy program of targeted assassination impugns the value of free speech as an ideal.

The problem is not that Heidegger was a temporarily active Nazi, it is that the notion of being that he felt he was defined by at the time and place that he exhorted Germans to “follow the fuhrer” and when he participated in purifying purges on behalf of the party in his academic place of employment - his most odious act being the purging of his mentor, the great philosopher Edmund Husserl, a German-Jew to whom he dedicated *Being and Time* - he was following a concept of order and being that preceded the arrival of his philosophy and that has survived quite in tact following his death. Indeed, this is the danger about being - if it is not sufficiently examined, questioned, wondered about, ruminated upon, and experimented with authentically (as opposed to for the mere sake of experimenting itself), being can be ignorantly reduced downward to idealized notions of existence and the self, as well as the community, in precisely the kind of resignation that characterized Isaiah Berlin’s statement about freedom being a specific property of the West, Richard Rorty’s claim that ethnocentrism was all we could expect of people, including intellectuals, and all the other liberals’ view, in some form or another, that the irrational and undomesticated had to be made to submit to the terms of order before they could be trusted with freedom and the rights
for which liberalism purports to the safeguard of. For Heidegger, Germanness meant anti-communism, the preservation of an idealized notion of a volk that defined the nation, and that all beings and resources necessary, gathered in a manner that needless to say involved brutal coercion from the family structure and throughout society at large, had to be harnessed for this outcome.

Liberals have claimed that they could avoid this outcome with the traditional liberal approaches to social order that emphasize rights, individuality understood as the liberation of one’s true self and concomitant identity, checks and balances in the governmental apparatus to strangle and frustrate the growth of despotism, and the creation and security, especially importantly in Arendt’s philosophy, of a private sphere or otherwise named realm in which one could retreat from the demands of society and simply live. If we broaden our conception of politics to include the polis understood simply as “the gathering,” and we disabuse ourselves of conceiving of the political as merely the state - which of course we want refuge from - but rather as the entire terrain of existence of which the state is merely one part, if we make our being an issue for our being, then the rationalizations, justifications, differentiations, and distancings that we produce through the drive towards mastery over the planet, then we can immediately understand why Arendt was wrong about
her claim of racial integration being a private matter,\textsuperscript{855} and that that issue, and all such issues addressing the question of how we shall live together are not only political - since they bear on our relations with one another in the \textit{polis} - but are related, in how we choose to deal with them, fundamentally to our freedom, our own ability to be free in the context of our thrownness - our factual, contingent circumstances beyond our control - and our ability to consciously consider the idea of freedom for safeguarding. Against this liberal conceit that divides the world into spheres of being and non-being - deficient, unfree, educable being to be disciplined for the sake of cooperative action - Agamben, following Foucault’s deconstruction of the sciences and of knowledge, closes \textit{Homo Sacer} by arguing for collapsing the distinction between \textit{bios} and \textit{zoe} so that the confusions that have perplexed seekers of freedom, because failing this, the cycle of violence between peoples in the name of being recognized as “the People” has no end in sight. The “biopolitical body”

“that is bare life must itself instead be transformed into the site for the constitution and installation of a form of life that is wholly exhausted in bare life and a \textit{bios} that is only its own \textit{zoe}. Here attention will also have to be given to the analogies between politics and the epochal situation of metaphysics. Today \textit{bios} lies in \textit{zoe} exactly as essence, in the Heideggerian definition of Dasein, lies in existence. Yet how can \textit{bios} be only its own \textit{zoe}, how can a form of life seize hold of the very \textit{haplos} that constitutes both the task and the enigma of Western metaphysics? If we give the name form-of-life to this being that is only its own bare existence and to this life that, being its own form, remains inseparable
from it, we will witness the emergence of a field of research beyond the terrain defined by the intersection of politics and philosophy, medico-biological sciences and jurisprudence. First, however, it will be necessary to examine how it was possible for something like bare life to be conceived within these disciplines, and how the historical development of these very disciplines has brought them to a limit beyond which they cannot venture without risking an unprecedented biopolitical catastrophe.856.

Taking these last two points together, what follows is that the idea of negative liberty is unsustainable, and in order to sustain it a division between who enjoys it and who doesn’t have the right to enjoy it must be introduced into the polis. This has the effect of transforming, at first, at least part of the place of the gathering of beings into a space governed by a different nomos than that which governs the ‘free’ section. Vividly capturing this in his film The Battle of Algiers, the filmmaker Gillo Pontecorvo depicts in that masterful work the ‘European city’ as entirely distinct from the ‘the Casbah,’ - or Arab quarter, with one governed by the ability to access leisure and the other forced into a brutal competition for survival that becomes a breeding ground for self-hatred, criminality, internecine conflict, and, with the right sort of elements present, the incipient feelings that can be manipulated by fundamentalist parties if there is no revolutionary movement present. But the connection to this violence, to these feelings, and to not feel ashamed of them, is the avenue to an authentic retrieval of possibilities latent in the physis. This is what
Agamben means by the founding of a new form-of-life that is at once *bios* and *zoe*, and that *bios* would be based on *zoe*, and *zoe*, or bare life, alone. In order to have it the other way, whereby recognition could be secured through the use of metaphysical categories that are defined as the *logos*, or political rationality in this case, of the *polis*, human societies have taken an immensely unproductive detour on the way to being, indeed, they have lost the ability to be, since existence, disciplined by the category of essence, always already requires forms of mastery, over the self, over others, and over the world. Anywhere we witness this drive to mastery at work, we are witness to profound unfreedom, on the part of the masters as well as the slaves, leaving us only with the freedom of the warrior, cutting through metaphysical totems in the name of the freedom of the chained self; but this same warrior is unable to free his and her fellows, and in the end, in isolation, cannot free his or herself in a manner that comports with specifically human freedom: that kind of openness, experience, love, joy, artistry, knowledge, poetry, and, yes, even technological forms of enjoyment, that are only possible in society and when humanity has a home in language and literature.

The drive to mastery has created an era that Heidegger calls “the Age of the World Picture,” which is the result of the “enframing” of beings and things in the matrix of technology, and most importantly, the reduction, as
we have discussed previously, of beings and things to the position of “the standing reserve,” - that compilation of elements and resources needed to make the trains run on time. In every respect this philosophical insight anticipates what today we call ‘globalization,’ which during the so-called ‘Cold War’ was in its initial stages and is now secured by the panoptic net that has come to encapsulate much of the globe in the name of freedom and democracy - and liberalism and the drive to progress and civilization, too - under the name ‘the war on terrorism.’ Freedom is a governmentality - a mode of government - that produces its own systems of order, and that the freedom of the individual understood as an objectively present bearer of rights and accountable for its responsibilities on the basis of its will requires the securitization of freedom through techniques of government.

Samuel Huntington, writing for the Trilateral Commission in the 1970’s referred to this conundrum as the effect of having too much democracy because the desire of formerly excluded sectors to be involved in the governing of society - this being the promise of what the overwhelming majority of people around the world understand to be democracy - and so he recommended that a new vision of democracy be launched in order to sate the masses’ desires for liberation from authority, but at the same time to secure that authority’s legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Bill Robinson has indicated that Huntington’s chief contribution in this time
was to revise his previous thesis of capitalist modernization being sufficient on its own to produce world order. It was not effective enough on its own because the centralization of power it produced no longer gave the lie to capitalism’s authoritarian ideology. Rather, through the use of interventions in the emerging field of political culture theories in the political sciences, institutions in civil society, a new, autonomous and independent bourgeoisie could be created to effectively indigenize the interests of the richer nations in the Third World.\textsuperscript{858}

This model of development, indeed, of humanity, human desires, human actions aimed at satisfying those desires, effectively tried to provide an answer to the question of being, and therefore preclude local variations and contingent, authentic, knowledge available to partisans of freedom in various sectors of the globe. It also had the effect of providing a similar model for freedom, or at least reinforcing the existing model, in the richer nations, so that as the neoliberal economic agenda began having its effect on those societies, the middle, upper-middle, and otherwise aspirant social classes therein would clamor after recognition by their social and economic superiors - whose absolute, nearly feudal power, in the workplace goes unchallenged to this day (unionization rates are falling precipitously!)\textsuperscript{859} - which, as with any metaphysicalization of being, creates a hierarchy of interpreters who, generally, are not qualified, per se,
but who learn the codes of signification, and audaciously grab their position in a competitive, self-aggrandizing move that cannot brook not being a winner in all instances. So all ideals become relative, all choices become driven by despair and resentment, and thus strategic, with the illusory goal in mind of one day reaching Valhalla. The residents of that gentle clime, from their perch, tinker, manipulate, and transform the system of signification with foresight that they acquire out of necessity (which of course leaves them open to being manipulated by a new class of the ambitious, too, but the mechanics of ego-individualism and the absence of positive ideals remains all the while irregardless of who rules). And in the world’s institutions of higher learning and knowledge, in conjunction with private research institutes, the elite create a framework to colonize knowledge itself, and retain authority on this basis.

Fanon has called for a new man, as has Agamben, as has Polanyi, and, in a tacit reversal of his previous position concerning the “destiny of the volk,” which Heidegger has been rightly criticized for - if not for intent at least for the kind of aesthetic politics it opens up and the inherent uncontrollability of the outcomes of such political programs (criticism similar to that leveled on Nietzsche, Freud, and also Charles Darwin) - by Jurgen Habermas, near the end of the essay ‘the Age of the World Picture,’ he makes the case that nations, race, and empires are the
outgrowth of the idea of objectified humanity as “subjectum,⁸⁶¹” effectively clarifying what he meant by volk in the first place. I say this knowing full well the controversy it arouses, but with this in mind, consider the following: the volk, or “the people,” in Agamben’s construction, simply means the community understood as a “singularity” which is the object not of fear or discipline, or even order, but of love.⁸⁶² And there is no inherent reason for this object of love, the ‘volk,’ the identity, the community, or even the lover, to be understood as an essence that always is something such and such, but, rather, as Agamben says, as “whatever.⁸⁶³” Poetry, in its ongoing commitment to witness the unfolding of existence, is the existential mode of being that enables this sort of awareness of possibility, of freedom, and is in this sense, the enemy of technology in service of the artifice. “Whatever singularity,” Agamben writes, “which wants to appropriate belonging itself, its own being-in-language, and thus rejects all identity and every condition of belonging, is the principal enemy of the State. Wherever these singularities peacefully demonstrate their being in common there will be a Tiananmen, and, sooner or later, the tanks will appear.”⁸⁶⁴ And appear they will, because, as Heidegger writes “Man founds and confirms himself”

“as the authoritative measure for all standards of measure with which whatever can be accounted as certain - i.e., as true, i.e., as in being - is measured off and measured out (reckoned up). Freedom is new as the freedom of the subjectum. In the Meditationes de
prima philosophia the freeing of man to the new freedom is brought onto its foundation, the subjectum. The freeing of modern man does not first being with the ego cogito ergo sum, nor is the metaphysics of Descartes merely a metaphysics subsequently supplied and therefore externally built onto this freedom, in the sense of an ideology. In the co-agitatio, representing gathers all that is objective into the “all together” of representedness. The ego of the cogitare now finds in the self-securing of “together” of representedness, in con-scientia, its essence. Conscientia is the representing together of whatever has the character of object, along with representing man, within the sphere of representedness safeguarded by man. Everything that presences receives from out of this representedness the meaning and manner of its presence… The con-scientia of the ego as subjectum of the coagitatio determines, as the subjectivity of the subjectum that is distinctive in this way, the Being of whatever is…

…Man has become subjectum. Therefore he can determine and realize the essence of subjectivity, always in keeping with the way in which he himself conceives and wills himself. Man as a rational being of the age of the Enlightenment is no less subject than is man who grasps himself as a nation, wills himself as a people, fosters himself as a race, and, finally, empowers himself as lord of the earth… In the planetary imperialism of technologically organized man, the subjectivism of man attains its acme, from which point it will descend to the level of organized uniformity and there firmly establish itself. This uniformity becomes the surest instrument of total, i.e., technological, rule over the earth. The modern freedom of subjectivity vanishes totally in the objectivity commensurate with it. Man cannot, of himself, abandon this destining of his modern essence or abolish it by fiat. But man can, as he think ahead, ponder this: Being subject as humanity has not always been the sole possibility belonging to the essence of historical man, which is always beginning in a primal way, nor will it always be.865

Thiele writes that alternative ways of being and relating between self and other are everywhere to be found around us, and that “wonder and
astonishment” is what mindful thinking about the plurality of beings can be for those who are interested in freedom. Precluding these types of thoughts from emerging, indeed, preventing thought itself from functioning in a spontaneous and uncoerced manner is the aim of sovereignty, be it found in states or in individuals, since they see themselves as defending a proper way of being to which they must aspire lest they truly and totally resign themselves to being nothing. Agamben notes that the significant conflicts over forms of life in the coming years, especially in an age of globalization, will be between “the State and the non-State,” because the state is “not founded on a social bond…but rather on the dissolution, the unbinding it prohibits” meaning that identities articulated based on the negation of the Other who is not a member of that identity can be integrated into the state on its terms, but that singularities that refuse identities - a metaphysical nature - are impossible to discipline.

In response to the “planetary petty bourgeoisie,” - residents of the camp who have become its administrators - Agamben writes that

“instead of continuing to search for a proper identity in the already improper and senseless form of individuality,* humans were to succeed in belonging to this impropriety as such, in making of the proper being-thus not an identity and an individual property but a singularity without identity, a common and absolutely exposed singularity - if humans could, that is, not be-thus in this or that particular biography, but be only the thus, their
singular exteriority and their face, then they would for the first time enter into a
community without presuppositions and without subjects, into a communication without
the incommunicable.868*

This requires a new understanding of facticity, of the origins of the private
sphere of life, and of the possibilities of positive liberty whose fruition can
only come about in a relatively more “socialist” and “anarchist”
understanding of human existence, where the only function of authority is
to teach its expertise and then disappear altogether, and where the idea of
sovereignty understood as the absolute capacity to render decisions on the
distinction between friends and enemies is transformed into merely the
capacity, not the right or duty, to engage in defensive uses of force when
deemed necessary, and not in accordance with just war doctrines that can
in the end only be mechanisms for the justification of aggression. Hobbes
would agree, ironically, with that claim, since, in the end, the individual
even in his theory - the singularity burdened with identity, rationality, and
the conformities of bios - has every right according to nature to defend
themselves from the aggressions of anyone up to and including the
state.869

The state, in history both prior to and reaching its pinnacle in the political
philosophy of liberalism and in that of its detractors who are merely
reactive to it in the philosophies of fascism but who still take it as a touchstone, has been a mechanism of those who benefit, simply, from freezing the status quo, and in arresting, more accurately attempting, to arrest change, can only prevail for an interval. Over time, the contradictions quashed temporarily by the agency of sovereign authorities are pushed and pulled by material and ideological currents beyond the boundaries of the state and into the global realm. Bill Robinson has extensively documented the rise of the “transnational capitalist class” and its increasingly congealing “transnational state apparatus,” created in a contingent moment by privileged classes in many nations whose attachment to a way of life has become globalized. The Nazis were defeated in the second world war, but today Germany rules the European continent through its hegemonic position in the European supra-state, the European Union, and the elites around Europe collaborate with the Germans in the name of preserving their privileges against their own people. Identities have become containers that people can be boxed into and controlled. And in controlling people, these identities, ranging from various specific national and ethnic identities, to religion-based identities, and to the identity simply as ‘the free,’ or even as ‘the happy,’ people who succumb to this circumstance are denuded of the possibility of responding authentically to their surroundings, their fellow travelers, and all those beings and things that make up their world.
Against this identity politics of essentialized subjects, we have posited an immanent concept of being-in-the-world, invoking the philosophy of the controversial philosopher Martin Heidegger. Thiele sums up this ideological maneuver as follows:

“The political sensibility we may derive from Heidegger’s philosophy, then, might be formulated as follows: Let not a resentment at our thrown Being-in-the-world-with-others become the impetus for the pursuit of possessive mastery. Strive for a home in difference and bear witness to its freedom.”

XXVII. Being-Here, Being-There: Authentic Liberalism

We will close our inquiry by discussing the merits of the Heideggerian idea of authenticity and its relevance to the reframing of liberalism that has driven this effort. This requires our interrogation of certain terminology that has been used to carelessly refer to liberalism in recent years, which, as we have been suggesting, is erroneous. First, as previously emphasized, liberalism has been understood as identity politics and not as a practiced way of life. For this reason it has been employed by both conservatives and liberals - self-proclaimed - to indicate certain things, but not *liberalness*, or liberality. Conservatives have used
liberalism as a tool to indicate their tolerance of difference - a tolerance which as we have seen in Brown’s work, can be switched on and off as need be - and their magnanimity with resources and wealth they may have a periodic excess of through the mechanism of charity, of which there are many new formulations being experimented with. Some of these notions of charity even utilize the concept of indebtedness innovatively to retain control over the recipient of the loan given - portrayed as generosity pure and simple, although with caveats - thus allowing the donating party to conserve as best as they can their excess but gain the benefits of labeling themselves as liberals. This point should give us pause, because its implication is that many who call themselves liberals in today’s world are in fact conservative as a matter of their temperament, because their generosity, ability to tolerate, and overall sense of security are based on the conservation of their position and the political dynamics of the status quo on which these rest.

Second, conservatives and liberals alike use liberalism’s identity-politics to shield themselves from dialectical engagement with other people who share the world with them, retreating into an ironically postmodern (in the case of conservatives) or selfishly disengaged (in the case of liberals) standpoint in relation to the unfolding of reality. While conservatives whose belief in traditional values are challenged by changing elements of
existence which reveal those beliefs to be contingent and rooted in the conjunctures of contingencies of a bygone time, and therefore use the liberal individualist framework to claim that everyone is entitled to one’s own point of view - ‘this is a free country,’ they can be overheard saying in resignation - a liberal, when challenged on the socioeconomic basis of their ability to express their individuality, namely, that it lies upon a basic exploitation of the world’s resources and other people around the world whose ‘right’ to free and enjoyable lives - on the terms of liberalism’s universal theory - must be repressed for the liberal’s individuality to be possible, must also resort to some form of justification or rationalization. Most of the excuses, if simple ignorance isn’t pled, take the form of distancing, which of course is the cause of ignorance in the first instance, but through complex ideological maneuvers, can also come to encompass updated tropes of ‘ancientness’ of differences between cultures and therefore the justification of the lot of those who toil in globalization’s factories of gloom. Matt Yglesias, writing for the website Slate.com, has recently, in the wake of an horrific building collapse that has claimed the lives of over 500 workers whose toils bring brand-name clothing to the West, written that the people of Bangladesh, where this collapse occurred, have a different cultural valuation of human life than Americans do, and therefore the collapse of this factory, which workers were forced to enter against their wishes by hired goons in league with politicians and the
shady sub-contractors used by the global textile industry, was not sufficient evidence to make the case for uniform global labor standards, which would threaten the progress of business and economic growth. Liberalism, in both the case of the conservative retreating into fundamentalism based on tradition, and in that of the self-professed liberal vouching absolutely for a fundamentalist understanding of individualism and economic ‘laws’ that operate purely in the absence of political - i.e. - existential - choice by individuals involved in such a system, is used as a means for producing expediency in favor of the continuation of the depredations found in the status quo. The consequences be damned.

So liberalism has been used as identity politics, and, also, as a mechanism to achieve a retreat from reality. Little effort is made to differentiate between politics done in the name of one worldview or another, or between authentic individuals who truly engage in a care-taking politics in their physis, and those who are rightly distrusted. Arundhati Roy has argued that this mentality has led to a kind of resignation to making money and becoming caught up in everyday social lives for bourgeois middle-class Indians, who, while surrendering their political agency to politicians whom they collectively loathe, and to lower-classes who sometimes are the source of social movements for change but are just as often if not more frequently subverted by identity politics (the politics of
self-respect) and vote-bank politics in which they exercise little autonomy over their final vote choices. Heidegger called this self-absorption in the “they-self,” characterized by “idle talk” and a kind of trivial “curiosity,” which would preclude a recognition of one’s thrownness in the world, and even the phenomena of worldhood itself understood as an ontological totality.873

The importance of Heidegger’s emphasis on facticity, and that this means that existence precedes essence should be clear now. The world is always decaying, changing, reemerging, and the word ‘being’ simply is humankind’s appropriation of this phenomena; it is our way of marking its taking place, its temporal unfolding. This means that underneath the word is in fact an unstoppable ‘becoming’ including a being (becoming)-towards-death that marks all existences, including that of the ‘universe’ itself. Human beings who remain engaged in the world - not overcome and falling prey to it - who care for their contingency and their thrown relations and connections with beings and things, posit some notion of ‘world’ as a unity of references, beings, temporality, and space, in order to orient themselves to the unfolding of the everydayness of existence. Failing to do this, or to come to terms with others having already done this, and the significant extent to which others have constituted the individual’s self through the interplay of these references that make up the
world, individuals may reject the worldhood of the world, and create what the psychiatrist and philosopher R.D. Laing has called a “false-self system,” which can enable the individual’s retreat from the world as it is into a world of fantasy.\footnote{874}

So our third point here is that liberalism, even more than enabling an expedient escapism, because of its transformation from a moral and political practice into an mechanism of identity politics, also has the effect, if understood this way, of producing what Laing has termed “ontological insecurity.”\footnote{875} This outcome is most significant since it (1) leaves the individual stuck in a search for security by trying to “recreate primary bonds”\footnote{876} that are no longer available to individuals subsequent to their childhood experiences with familial and parental guarantees, theoretically (theoretically since this leaves aside the fact that many children also experience the phenomena of these guarantees being conditional, being mixed with confusing messages relating to arbitrary and corporal punishment, and in some cases only seeing these guaranteed in the lives of others and thus internalizing the expectation indirectly); (2) liberalism therefore produces a retreat from one’s own perceptions of the world, forcing reliance on authorities who, today, speaking in the name of science, objectify, and rearrange beings as “the standing reserve.” This only heightens alienation and therefore one’s reliance on authority for the
sake of designating activity in the service of larger projects than oneself.

If their capacity to reject their position remains lively enough, they become a potential enemy simply for their thoughts. Banning rebels from social order, authorities are able to turn back to the rest of the people, and indicate that their only deliverance from such rebels is to accept the hegemonic intervention of the state, because, in the absence of authority, individuals will find themselves in an irreconcilable ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ which will drive them to despairing their fellow human beings as sources of violence, chaos, and instability, who must be made accountable to authority to protect society both from itself, and from outsiders whose potential admissibility to the pact cannot be considered for various expedient reasons for those in command, rationalized to those ruled over by reference to essential difference. But individuals realize on some level that there is something amiss in this state of affairs, which requires both their denuding of spontaneity, and the discipline of their feelings, emotions, and potential for love, all found in their bodily, material, everyday realities, through the agency of the mind as a bulwark of stabilized representation.

But this is not a reason to abandon liberalism, because, even though communitarian philosophers suggest that liberals cannot form social
solidarity, against this view we can propose to rethink the individual along the lines of a Heideggerian critique of the liberal subject, thereby texturing that subject with attachments, connections, relationships, and encumbrances, that, rather than becoming a scandalous intrusion into the autonomy of individuals, can instead be seen as the source of their ability to be authentically in the world, to make their own meaningful choices, and to rise to their destinies. Opposed to this is the idea that individuals either make free decisions on the basis of free-will, or that freedom itself is entirely an illusion in the sense we have been driving at here, and that collective life understood in a way that negates the self in the name of the collective, is the only road forward. Against this resignation, where individual freedom at the expense of the non-conformist, or achieved through collective aggrandizement, perhaps in the form of nationalism, are the only authentic options available for people, Jonathan Salem-Wisemann writes, invoking the conception of individual freedom we have been employing here, that

“in Heidegger’s early thought it is the individual who enjoys an ontological, and, by extension, normative priority over community, yet this priority does not come at the expense of deracinating individuals from their cultural contexts.”

Liberalism, requires leaving the question of being unanswered. Answering
this question has been the route to political and social order in most
traditional liberal and European political philosophy, from the
anthropologies of Hobbes which labeled freedom as a property of the
rational being but whose inclination is always towards self-preservation
against all others, to the universalization of this idea, which Foucault
called the “empirico-transcendental doublet,” formally at least as early
as the works of Kant which sought to posit a universal moral order
(transcendental) that through dispassion and discipline human beings
could gain access to and therefore be recognized by their fellow beings as
free, rational, and worthy of that freedom (empirical proof of conformity).
In seeking an answer to the question of being freedom has been made into
something metaphysical, into a property, to be gained, to be secured, to be
lost. As Wendy Brown argued, the transformation of tolerance into a
mechanism for identity politics of the ruling class, to distinguish
themselves from those whom they proclaim the authority, duty, and even
right, to tolerate (and not tolerate), like we are saying about freedom itself
as an idea transformed into governmentality, restricts the manner in which
people can meet each other, conditions their awareness of the world, and,
in so doing, strongly influences the directionality of interaction and the
products of interaction. The precondition for interaction, and the
postcondition of the interpretation of the outcomes of interactions is lain in
advance, so individual facticity, which is based on thrown circumstances
rather than pure will understood as expressible in rational decision making, cannot be admitted to influence the interaction. Individuals must be deracinated (as the Vietnamese culture had to be as well, in the name of progress); or factual existence as transformed into an exaggerated fear of collectivism that fails to see collectivism in negative liberty-based societies whose social order is enforced through culture, as well, but whose culture is recognized non-contingently as rational human behavior simply by the *fiat* of sovereign definition.

This deployment of rationality, indeed of thinking, transforms the critical capacity into calculative reasoning, which, if taking as its reference point the prevailing mode(s) of being and the orchestration of beings as such, reduces beings to essentialized existences not changing and not becoming always already “whatever,” makes it impossible to *be authentically*. In the absence of authenticity as a possibility, there is no for freedom, and eventually people too come to understand what is prevalent as destiny simply, conditioning their interactions in a way that connects them to the producers of social order - the state and corporations managing legions of persons through bureaucratic hierarchies that sub-divide tasks - greatly limiting their awareness of choices and their potential for being-together-with others. This is the purpose of technology deployed for the sake of gaining greater and greater levels of mastery over beings and things - over
the world: it makes all art, sensation, enjoyment, leisure, culture, and human activity part of its technologizing ambit. The more manifest the technological enframement of being-in-the-world, the less likely that a free meeting between beings, in all their radical difference, can take place.

This last possibility is where we find the significance of the idea of authenticity, which the individual can come to understand by responding to the “call of conscience,” that which becomes manifest in the “call of care.” Salem-Wisemann argues that the existential instinct to care, which emerges from an individual’s awareness of their surroundings and not through a metaphysical renunciation of enjoyment or privilege in the name of justice and being a selfless or good person, is specific to individuals in their space and time, and that this limits freedom to merely those choices available in a person’s unique life situations. This is not an argument for abandoning social justice, but merely to engage in these pursuits authentically, and to obviate the need for judgment on the question of the moral standing of a person through their memberships and apparent concern for global charity. Communitarians, according to Salem-Wisemann, have leveled a similar critique against individualism and liberal politics because they say that this call of conscience that vaunts “decisionism,” over collective decision-making endows “isolated individuals with the abstract freedom to pursue arbitrary ends.” But for
Heidegger, the point about authenticity is not that it appear consistent in relation to some overall moral framework, but that his idea of being - “fundamental ontology”882 - simply reveals to us the fact that thrownness determines what choices there are, and in abandoning metaphysics of either liberalism understood as the preservation of the self, or seen as the defense of historically true values inherent to political bodies like city-states and nation-states, we can begin to see how we are residing in a factual world of our own making, allowing us the possibility of being responsible for it, to care for it, and therefore, to care for ourselves in the most robust sense.

Without such a conception of the uniqueness of the self, as a non-teleological self, there would appear to be no particular meaning to freedom, since all persons would simply be receptacles for the same education and who would be presumed to then, as a Kantian may have it, make rational choices that are universalizable. Unlike a Kantian individualist, or a Hobbesian anthropologically-defined security-maximizer fearing an imminent - exaggerated deliberately - fear of death, which both prescribe a metaphysics of being,

“Heidegger does not endorse any particular tradition; he merely recognizes Dasein’s inevitable immersion and self-understanding within a particular horizon of intelligibility; a particular social and historical context. Dasein’s primordial “historicizing” thus “lies in
authentic resoluteness…in which Dasein *hands itself down* to itself, free for death, a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen.” Clearly, it is false to think of Dasein as utterly deracinated from all forms of social life, for Dasein’s selfhood is a project that can only be realized in the shared, historical unfolding of its community.883

In the Hobbesian world in which individuals are strongly discouraged from using their private languages to create with the peers a public language of desire, fear, freedom, expression, love, emotion and everything else beyond the merely practical considerations of exchange, obedience to the law, and stable signification in the name of security, and in the Kantian world, where positive liberty is theoretically sought after but is restricted to a ‘true form’ whose trueness is adjudicated upon by the intellectual elite and those who successfully take the position of judge, the community, and historicization that happens in a dialectical manner between individual and community is cast aside in favor of a rigorous institutionalization of judgment that permits for the recognition of rationality through the use of practical reason, and the human being is cut off from other human beings who are viewed as either potentially dangerous (Hobbes), or as a source of possible irrationality (Kant), and, as a result, an intervening authority comes to be of the essence in assisting the metaphysical education of the individual *contra* their surroundings.
Hobbes, making this quite clear, has written:

“He whose error proceeds from the authority of a teacher or an interpreter of the law publicly authorized is not so faulty as he whose error proceedeth from a peremptory pursuit of his own principles and reasoning; for what is taught by one that teacheth by public authority, the commonwealth teacheth, and in all crimes that contain not in them a denial of the sovereign power, nor are against an evident law of authorized doctrine, excuseth totally; whereas he that groundeth his actions on his private judgment ought, according to the rectitude of the error thereof, to stand or fall.”

And while Hobbes tries to maintain the distinction between publicly acceptable reasons and decisions and the ability of people to still hold private opinions as a matter of the natural limits of the state’s ability to coerce thoughts, he nonetheless adds that in “such a diversity of as there is of private consciences, which are but private opinions, the commonwealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the sovereign power farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes. So thus in diversity is weakness and distraction to social order, and that permitting such a possibility, the rulers of the state, whose power is required as an article of faith for the provision of freedom from, tempt chaos and disorder that will destroy a free society of individuals free to pursue their own ends in the framework of the law. This is recipe for the proliferation of interests and expectations that Fromm warns us will produce the desire for a
dictatorship.

But acknowledgement of limits produces an ironic kind of freedom. The idea of perfect liberty in Hobbes’ thought is simply an inducement, and not an authentic possibility. Authentic reflection and judgment of one’s thrownness does not preclude freedom, but rather informs us of “the strong sense in which Dasein’s choices are culturally and historically bound” and that this is “not inconsistent with Dasein’s freedom to stand back from, neglect, renounce - in other words revise - these thoroughly circumscribed possibilities in a way that [communitarian philosophers] have difficulty attempting to explain.” “Revisability,” Salem-Wisemann argues, is an essential freedom, one that is in practice undeniable in the absence of the harshest coercion, and that this trumps both tolerance as a mechanism for accommodating difference, as well as universalization as a mechanism for incorporating difference, since this would prevent individuals from making their own decisions on what their own goals in life would be, and would also result in an institutionalization of the majority’s desire to never be challenged on their views, which would produce an illiberal outcome. And the mere tolerance of difference, Salem-Wisemann adds shortly thereafter, is inadequate because “Dasein is only conditionally attached to its ends and is always open to revise its ends as the situation changes,” because in a system based on mere tolerance
individuals are not free to radically-individualize their consciousnesses and thinking in concern of their own being because there would be a strong incentive to remain a member of a recognized, and tolerated, group in society, and there would be a major incentive for group administrators to police the boundaries of group identity through custom, law, and coercive political and economic relationships through hierarchical administrative procedures that secure the reproduction of relationships fomented under its sign.889 “Consequently,” Salem-Wisemann concludes

“by showing how revisability is consistent with a “thick theory” of the self, Heidegger’s existential analytic provides ontological support for the most robust argument for individual freedoms. His view of the self helps us, at a deeper level of analysis, to settle an ongoing argument within liberal theory.890

But despite our emphasis on individual freedom, there is nothing particularly anti-community in Heidegger’s thought. This oversimplification usually involves an exaggeration of both Heidegger’s stature in the Nazi movement, and also a jump to conclusions regarding what is a fairly nuanced, but at least from our perspective, extremely obvious argument that attends to the facticity of the human experience. Salem-Wisemann indicates at the end of the article that even though “Heidegger privately harbors an illiberal view of politics,” and that he is likely “guilty of philosophical inconsistency” and “tragic theoretical
blindness” - indeed we cannot say much more about Heidegger from a standpoint of moral judgment as citizens of Western nations given our genocide-denying attitude towards the Vietnam war, to say nothing of similar atrocities conducted in many countries in the world by our political institutions - but that “this is no reason for contemporary readers who rightly reject Heidegger’s personal politics to likewise stop thinking about the possibilities Heidegger’s philosophy […] offers to a liberal politics in our pluralistic age.”891

XXVIII. A Point of Departure

The creation of game theory in the ‘Cold War’ to rationalize capitalist democracy and stake the claim that it was the only route to a free and liberal society, then, comes to appear not so much a claim about the individualist nature of the self in the Western polis - this being the core of the theory - but rather a projection of self-conceptions of conformity onto the Other about whom collectivist generalizations are proffered, because the inability to square a doctrinal individualism with an actual conformity because of the absence of liberal culture. To bind the collective together, at once incapable of authentic individuality and therefore of authentic
connections between individuals, the idea of the prisoner’s dilemma, “the trap,” to borrow the title of Adam Curtis’ documentary, comes to define reality for nations organized in the midst of the metaphysics of modernity. This precludes the formation of connections in the absence of coercion, because any such loyalty would be termed irrational - which means that nation-states have to be based on a negative identity that excludes certain groups as the key to signification of togetherness for the rest. Accepting this coercion as the rational basis for society, on a purely cost-benefit scale, destroys spontaneous being-together-with. “If inauthenticity is characterized by coercion,” Salem-Wisemann concludes

“even in subtle forms like unspoken peer pressure, then authenticity is characterized by a freedom from such coercion. If this is so, if authenticity demands freedom […] then surely authenticity and authentic social relations would most likely flourish in a world that permits, rather than prevents, freedom of association, freedom of speech, conscience, work, movement, and so forth, since rights to such freedoms are designed to prevent at least some of the sorts of paternalistic relationships characterized by inauthenticity…the analyses of Dasein and Mitsein in [Being and Time] move within recognizably liberal horizons and thus provide a detailed road map for liberals attempting to defend their normative commitments without reverting back to atomistic or unduly abstract conceptions of the self.”

As Karl Polanyi was noted as saying above, the idea of a self-interested rational actor had to be disembedded from a social context in which
people found themselves in order to seem real. But at the beginning of the ‘Cold War,’ the imperative to defend wealth already secured by America and by the other Western powers through imperial conquest led to persons whose lives had been supported and instrumentalized by industrialization to become frightened of (world) society itself, with prominent organic intellectuals representing global powers from George Kennan to Samuel Huntington recognizing pointing out that the imperative of US foreign policy was to retain its preponderance of wealth and power (Kennan) and to transform other societies in our image so that their development would be managed by our vision of social order and would benefit our corporations (Huntington). What we got was torture and dirty wars, on the one hand, and giveaways of surplus agricultural products deemed unlikely to be consumed by Americans, on the other. Through these twin agencies of violence and social transformation, which in the institutions of slavery, jem crow, the genocide and concentration of American Indian nations in reservations, the immigration labor regimes that strategically manipulate labor supplies, etc., which were also applied to America and actual Americans, too (a point often forgotten if we tell history from a strictly state-centric perspective and utilize a metaphysical - meaning legal - definition for Americans, as opposed to an immanent and existential one that counts all people living in America as Americans), the removal of all the relations and social contexts needed for an authentic and free
individual was achieved to enough of a degree that a culture of conservative individualism and consumerism has arisen. This disconnects people from each other in the name of freedom, and we can see its effects around the world. By doing so, individuals are articulated not to communities or families or neighborhoods, but to large, impersonal, bureaucratic institutions of the state and the corporate economy, against which they simply cannot stand alone, and because of the prescriptive effects of game theory, will have difficulty finding allies to stand with. So we have a scared collective of atomized individuals, rather than a robust community of strongly shaped persons who can authentically relate to their being-in-the-world in multiple ways who create the kind of social resilience needed to defend freedom, practice open-mindedness, and avoid becoming a mindless drone who could be swindled by economic and political confidence men.

From the ‘end of history’ to the liberal identity politics of Richard Rorty, to the systematic attempt by John Rawls to create a science of liberal morality; back in history to the frankly fascist admission by Hobbes his need to fasten all concepts and notions of good and evil to produce a disciplined subject, to Tocqueville’s desire to prove liberalism to be a muscular ideology more worthy of imperial victories than other doctrines, and J.S. Mill’s desire for more or less the same thing, our so-called liberal
tradition has not been particularly interested in open-mindedness, and has, in each case, sought to arrest somehow the unfolding, *the becoming, that is*, of being. Each of these philosophers, including Mill - whose idea of individual freedom seems at first glance more open-ended than the others because of his defense of eccentricity, is in the final analysis much more akin to these co-travelers of his in relation to a second point, namely, what is the significance of one’s identity - hold dear a concept of being that prioritizes a proof for the existence of being. It is fair to say that they have inherited this need to prove themselves and justify their existence through the sweeping influence of Descartes; each of these thinkers variously *thinks…. and therefore they are*. For Mill, this is even more pronounced, since his superior and always improving thinking in the name of utility and individual freedom understood as an expedient for the benefit of civilization, smuggles back in an ontology which he seems to momentarily dismiss.

Each of these philosophies, therefore, can be compared accurately to rational choice theory’s core assumptions about human nature: human beings are driven by self-interest loosely defined, they are rational agents who can reflect on their surroundings and choose wisely, and they can stabilize cooperation with each other on public matters. On the first point, this is patently false empirically; regarding the second one, as we have
already said the alienated individual cannot reflect authentically on their surroundings, and each of these theories is responsible for producing social alienation; and regarding the third point, in recent years only fear - a negative ideal for group identity - has motivated individuals in the absence of state coercion on a truly significant level, and individuals remain locked in their own milieux, unable to authentically bond with the Other, to share the world with the Other, in the absence of guarantees.

“In mapping out the social landscape in contour lines of rational self-interest, rational choice theorists have at times been hegemonic in insisting that the rational choice approach is not only a valuable methodological tool for social science, but that it is the only cogent method for making progress. Its many contributions to social theory, especially in situations where questions of self-interest dominate (such as in negotiation and coalition formation) should not make us deaf to the way the language of rational choice theory can sound like INGSOC* in Oceania: the state-condoned language of Big Brother that continually strikes words, and hence concepts, meanings, and practices, out of existence. To insist that human behavior be understood, even predicted, in terms of a well-ordered set of transitive preferences combined with strategic calculations of how to maximize expected utility is to nullify modes of existence not structured around payoffs; love, sympathy, respect, duty, and valor fall by the wayside. Transitivity, completeness, and the axioms of expected utility theory become the defining characteristics of rationality whereas the dictum of treating individuals as ends in themselves has no basis in reason.894"

Individuals, thus reduced to being elements in an orchestrated reality, are
reduced to seeking as their dignity the permanence of their position in the overall ensemble of existence, which they are encouraged to identify with as their lot. Rational choice theory, which assumes that reality is rationally-constructed and as inevitable for all persons, becomes a powerful vehicle to rationalize the status quo and also to naturalize it. Dividing nations from one another, and individuals within and across nations from each other, too, and then conditioning people to accept this reality, diverting individuals’ attentions through a shallow understanding of freedom as a final hegemonic mobilization for consent to rule, leaders in nation-states that stabilize this system also produce the expectation in people that all will conform. When this theory fails to explain reality, as it always has because while it presents itself as a non-normative theory, it in fact makes negative normative claims on how human society should be arranged as an atomized mass or rational individuals acting on their strategic interests and instrumentalizing life and other people, too, it specifically fails to prepare people in the world for the emergence of difference that is always already manifest in the uniqueness of each passing moment. Be these agents of disorders individuals or enemy nations, those primed to the terms of order will feel the psychological experience of terror - the absence of order - which Fromm has indicated will drive them to redouble their reliance on leadership to extricate them from their situation, either by assigning them a role in the social system (if
they are so lucky in an age of downsizing and expendable populations rendered superfluous), or by giving them a relatively stable existence in comparison with the fear-driven tropes of the state of nature.

But on the contrary, what we have strived to show in this chapter is that individuals are always in a position to make a choice, even if these choices are not particularly good, and that social structures have an effect not only on the choices available, but also the manner of choosing available. What is called ‘rational choice’ comes to be understood not as individuals authentically pursuing their existence in relation to their *physis* - something which is fortunately irreducible to normalization - but as a projection of what certain persons might choose writ large as an explanation for all human behavior, which either lives up to the standard of rationality projected - be this disposed towards the maximal use of resources for a nihilist pursuit of pleasure at the expense of others and the world in a fashion which eventually threatens even the sustainability of the self; or be it the rationalization through discipline of an identity associated with a communal ritual and the unsustainable orchestration of resources in the name of reproducing that identity *against* the unfolding of being - or if they fail to do so, can be judged as being less-than-human, with the attendant consequences to be commenced by the use of force.
XXIX. Self and Other: A Model Interaction

“Back the fuck up, we are here for your fucking freedom.” - U.S. Soldier in Iraq, Second American-Iraqi War

“Fuck you buddy.” - name of iterative game created by the RAND corporation to show that rational human behavior was to not cooperate with other people, save for in the presence of a guarantor providing order.
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3 Ibid. 39.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid. 146.

6 Astrophysicists generally proffer three spatializations of space. The universe is either (1) expanding outward as a plane resembling a pancake on a skillet, (2) expanding outward in a spherical, globular fashion, or (3) is expanding outward in two conic formations where the tips of both cones intersect indicating the placement of the big bang, and the cones themselves appear as a hyperbola when viewed from a lateral perspective. There is no final agreement on what the universe actually ‘is.’

7 The question of threat is inherently irresolvable. Our position is that perception and existence become one in the phenomena of action, and the commencement of a counter-attack, a counterrevolution, is evidence of the feeling of necessity emergent from the experience of threat. The dialectical position takes the view that human beings interact with their environment and the ideas of the age, and in light of the contingent consciousness they develop certain choices will become more likely than others. In this case, the expectation of permanence
produces anxiety in the face of uncontrollable change and difference. This anxiety, in turn, and the way in which one takes this anxiety, determines how one will act in its enveloping midst.

8 With the military in Egypt back in power as of 2013 and popular socialist as well as islamist protest organizers imprisoned and harassed, and thousands massacred at various junctures in the counterrevolution, recent history has borne witness to the reality of anxiety as a political force whose intensity cannot be discounted when considering the capacity of human beings to engage in brutality.

9 Refined mechanisms improved through regularization, study, and experimentation, that in some way or another serve the purpose of keeping being(s) at a distance from another being or group of beings. These can be physical in nature, such as a separation wall or a howitzer gun, ideological, much as a hierarchical social system would function to keep some beings in certain places and others in other places, or epistemological, insofar as techniques of thinking and perceiving the world also function to keep beings at bay or bring them near.

To this list we would also add that information and telecommunications technology function similarly in that their operation brings representations of being(s) nearby in a manner that is entirely artificial.


21 Ibid.

22 Miller, David and T. Mills. 2009. “The terror experts and the mainstream media: the expert nexus and its dominance in the news media.” *Critical Studies on Terrorism*. 2.3. 414-437. See also Miller, David and T. Mills. 2010. “Counterinsurgency and terror expertise - the integration of social scientists into the war effort.” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. 23.2. 203-221. Among other helpful arguments and empirical research, Miller and Mills advance the position that the rise of counter-terrorism as an academic specialization in political science departments in the 1960’s and 1970’s, and their expanding power in the 1980’s onward to the current day is indicative of an overall drive to legitimize the behavior of the West waging generalized counterrevolution against democratic and popular aspirations around the world. The nexus of terror-talk, anti-communism, civilizational defense, and even liberal defenses of progressive politics are all present in the literatures they survey to provide a scope of the field in order to adequately map their hegemony in mainstream media discourses of the politics of political rebellions globally.


24 Ibid. 29. See also Aristotle (1996). 40-41.


28 Ibid. 94.


the notion of the rule of law is a tautology whose justification, unlike the theory of dictatorship found in Schmitt, whose honesty is both alarming as well as politically useful to the opponents of the ancien regime, which means that liberalism also has its basis in the grounding assumption - the grundnorm - that takes the legal order as a hypothetical given. All this accomplishes is the concealment of the operations of power, whereas Schmitt and other theorists of sovereign authority are more interested in the political-existential reality which underlies the possibility that a grundnorm can even be invoked.

31 See Plato (1991). See also Hobbes, T. and E. M. Curley. 1994. *Leviathan: with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668*. Indianapolis. Hackett Pub. Co. Plato, whose understanding of love is entirely anthropocentric, sees the chief difference between animals and humans in the capacity of human beings to use both their spirited capacities and their intellection to control their animal urges, presumably suggesting that animals lack these abilities. Hobbes would seem to accord with the position that love is a convention that has been bound up with bloodlines for so very long that it would be quite unlikely that the stability of newfound love relationships could be of any lasting character save for the occasional chance - which would of course disqualify it from becoming a politically relevant concept.

32 Morgenthau, H. (1962). Here another view of the possibility of love, politics, and human social and political transformation is offered, whereby the oscillation between love and power that characterizes the striving aspect of human existence to overcome its “insufficiency” in the face of death and nothingness contains within it the possibility of language and community that could be inherently liberal and negotiated, presuming that the communication between constituent elements in society is enabled in institutional design and ontological conception.

33 Schmitt would be in agreement with Hobbes on this point with the caveat characteristic of his criticism of liberalism in general: that the revelation of an overall systemic legal order remains entirely dependent on the possibility of forgetting the basis of order in the sovereign act of decision that grounded that order over and against other alternative possibilities that could have emerged from the becoming of beings in the absence of that particular notion that informed state intervention in that context. This point is extremely important since Schmitt lays bare what Hobbes conceals, and the implications for liberalism as it has been practiced are decisive. In the absence of normless, ungrounded decision, the continuing existence of the state according to Schmitt - and conceptually we agree with this view irregardless our overall revulsion at Schmitt’s fascist political philosophy - comes into question as a result of the divestment of value from the ongoing operations of
the legal system which comes to be a meaningless abstraction to be gamed, manipulated, and generally used for
the fulfillment of private imperatives as opposed to sovereign ones. See Schmitt (1985).

34 This point also parallels Schmitt’s concerning the need to identify and discipline the “domestic enemy.” See
32-33, 51.


New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux. See also Fukuyama, F. 2006. The end of history and the last man. New
York, Free Press

37 Here we begin to proffer a notion of ‘life’ that invokes the unfinished and the indefinable that is to be found at
the essential core of the existentialist and anti-metaphysical conception of being. Our use of the word, when
deemed to indicate this unfinished quality, will be highlighted.

38 Schmitt (1985). Schmitt’s conception of ‘constituent power’ is used in theories of sovereignty to produce
precisely this effect, despite the fact that Schmitt’s assertion of the inherent politicality of the state and the
people can only be sustained with an accompanying depoliticization of the state achieved through the
 technological institution of sovereignty as a mechanism established to remain constant and therefore somewhat
 ‘above’ politics. In light of our primordial definition of politics as the gathering of beings within the polis - the
 city being one such thematization - the assertion that this gathering can only be sustained through a particular
form of politicality that sees the need for authority to be held as sacrosanct, and then placing such a notion
beyond challenge through an ontological reductionism that emphasizes the metaphysical identity conferred by
the state onto citizens as the essence of their being (bios) amounts to either a fear of intellectual
 spontaneoususness or its deliberate occlusion by fiat. If the political, on Schmitt’s own terms, encompasses the
totality of existence, then such a restriction on the unfolding of that totality in the dialectical perceptions and
conceptions of beings within said totality can only amount to depoliticization. See also Schmitt (2007). ‘The
Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations.’

39 Prior to its formal declaration the ‘war on terror’ has already taken numerous forms that has seen the
introduction of a contradiction between liberal legal traditions on the one hand and the expeditious operations of
the machineries of order, on the other. Among these in the United States is the ‘war on drugs’ and the abrogation
of liberal freedoms in urban America for the sake of controlling the purportedly irrational other whose racial and rational status is thus essentially polluted and distorted by the apparently inhuman use of drugs (of course this is a completely absurd belief in the absence of sovereign authorities dictating which drugs are to be considered ‘drugs’ which are to be the subject of state war-making), the ‘war on crime,’ and the overall ‘war on poverty’ framework for the fabrication of American identity that undergirds both the liberal and the conservative instinct towards the integration of the other into the overall state project of sovereign territorial uniformity. However, the drive towards territorial control, which is essential in the history of international law in the West for the sake of designating the presence of an actual state, is only for ideological effect and to achieve and sustain recognition form other states who seek reciprocity for their territorial claims. Beneath these claims, in the globalizing world, David Campbell has pointed out, there is an “irruption of contingencies” that has fundamentally called this arrangement into question. This in turn points at what William Robinson has called the “neoliberal state” which corresponds to the emergence of, in a globalized world political economy, regimes of “flexible labor markets,” “just-in-time production and shipping,” and differentiated regimes of sovereign authority that transnationalize ‘upwards’ to new international institutions and ‘downwards’ to corporations and sub-state entities and political/social movements.

States in general, from the most powerful to those that are more obviously unfinished, and are derogated as such in political science literature on international relations an foreign policy, are all encapsulated in this relatively new networked framework of sovereignty, which affords them additional pools of resources to rationalize their domestic territorial claims - but only by means of material redistributions of wealth to selected essential sectors or the enhanced capacity for physical coercion of any and all elements who fail to submit spontaneously to the control of inherent spontaneity of being.

The ‘war on terror’ as such is a fundamentally global project that seeks the harmonization of interests globally in accordance with the metaphysical modernity of global capitalism and its culture of consumerism at the root of the modern reply to nothingness. The production of certain presences, taken as coeval with order, the good, and with the possibility of freedom, has resulted in the fabrication of a state machinery to preserve these presences. The possibility of their absence, experienced as ‘terror,’ has resulted in the isomorphic mimicry of the desire to control the appearance of ‘terror,’ evidenced in the multitude of states that either opportunistically

40 Heidegger (1977). 17

41 Raza (2012)

42 This is a point that Schmitt admits to, for better or worse, but Hobbes, the Western ancients in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle (the latter’s conception of the organic pre-state social constitution of the polis has been incredibly influential on the development of what Cedric Robinson has called “the order of politicality” that has come to operate as a background, ontological assumption about the nature of human societies and even individual human beings who are thus cast as being organically-linked to a physis essentialized in accordance with the dictate of permanent order - which, quite paradoxically, Aristotle seems to admit quite readily isn’t actually permanent in nature) and their modern antecedents like Georg Hegel and neoconservative Francis Fukuyama cannot admit to because of their failure to wrestle adequately with the problem of meaninglessness, and, in Hobbes’ case, since he admits to this, his inability to grasp the contingency of human responses to meaninglessness predicated on his ontological reduction of human to happiness addict, also produces a similarly unsatisfying intellectual consideration of the multivalency of being and nothingness. See Schmitt (1985). See also Robinson, C. J. 1980. *The terms of order: political science and the myth of leadership.* Albany, State University of New York Press. See also Hobbes (1994). See also Aristotle (1996).

43 Robinson, W. I. 1996. *Promoting polyarchy: globalization, US intervention, and hegemony.* Cambridge England; New York, Cambridge University Press. Note the date of this particular writing - 1996. It is likely that now the casualties, if we are in agreement with any bit of this material analysis, are significantly higher. In addition to measurable casualties in terms of deaths and injuries, etc., there are many, many, many other kinds of harms that are not directly accounted for in such numbers, such as the destruction of cultures and environments, the transformation of cities into slums abounding with artificially-inflated, and therefore controllable levels of risk, and other such harms, abound.

Islam. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press. See also Robinson (2004). To this we can adduce the recent military and intelligence operations of the Turkish government, the Pakistanis, the Israelis, and many others, who, right up till this day, tempt destabilizing their neighborhood in order to take advantage of the crisis. Robinson, building on crisis theory, argues that an emerging order-seeking bloc, the transnational capitalist class, which has operationalized the state and nationalism in their own aegis, has benefitted from military and security crisis by offering the possibility of pooling resources and resolving security problems through supranational coordination.

45 Ibid.


47 Ibid.

48 This interpretation borrows from Heidegger’s concept of technology as the technical means of arranging beings, which Foucault has broadly thematized in a number of different social-institutional phenomena’s inner-workings in a number of influential studies of modern institutions as elements of a panoptic/disciplinary/security systematization of overall social relations. Success in this state of affairs, for individuals, groups, and states, has come to be measured in terms of the capacity to arrange social life in order to make present through combined efforts that which societies, for various reasons have come to label ‘the good.’ See Rose, N. 1999. The Powers of Freedom - Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge University Press.


51 Hobbes (1994)


55 Ibid. “Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power.” 107

56 Hobbes (1994). 76

58 Amadae (2003). 71-72

59 Ibid. See also Berlin (1998). This is a central theme of the project. If individuals can only be understood in isolation from the Other, and if the contamination of this zone of isolation, either ethically, physically, or in the abstract when considering the individual, is manifest, then this cannot properly be considered an individual on this account. If this logic is extrapolated to the state or the nation, the consequences are, clearly, fascist. This is not to fetishize collectivism or dismiss individualism! This is simply to shine a light on a dialectical tension, inescapable in the human condition, between self-ness, and group-ness, which, if taken this way, would cause any person to be highly suspicious of ideologies that promise its abolition in favor of one or the other pole. This insight, in turn, reveals to us that Isaiah Berlin’s contradiction, which will be delved into below, that sees him describing anti-colonial movements for self-determination as a quest for negative liberty for the group and therefore not properly individual freedom - which he places on a pedestal as a metaphysical chimera only thinkable with the omission of empirical knowledge of European history - on the one hand, and then fails to recognize the precisely exact role played by European states in the name of national political projects in bringing about the possibility of individual freedom at all in Europe, on the other, is an example of this sort of metaphysical and ideological thinking that dashes the possibility of a useful ideology that could enable the development of individual human beings rationally educated to be capable of weathering the oscillation between individual and group experiences in existence. As such, freedom becomes the fascism of the individual, where the individual, understood in their multifarious composition of beings expressed as a composite and distinct being resultant, must systematize the technology of presencing the individual as such irregardless the needs of other such individuals - each being understood as a collection of beings. The urge to systematize individuals, subtly and indirectly in Berlin’s essay, and to do the same, directly and opaquely, in Waltz’s neorealist doctrine in relation to individualized states as distinct ‘real’ entities, reveals much about the lack of coherence in social theories of modern western life, and also, thus, the reductionist and instrumentalist impulse that arises as the creative work of the resignation towards life at the ‘End of History.’ See discussion in Chapter 1 for elucidation.

60 Rose (1999)

61 Schmitt (2007). 51
This interpretation of Schmitt’s idea of the domestic enemy relies on a double-appropriation. First, Nietzsche’s understanding of *prima causa* - the first cause, a position assigned to god in a theological universe - if applied to the understanding of *evil*, which Nietzsche understood as nothing other than the affixing of irredeemable guilt for the ills of existence onto one group or individual, as a social force also evinced by Nietzsche, reveals the essential reliance of metaphysical systems on constructed truths that the sciences more reliably provide than theology or metaphysics comes to distort reality itself if a person is infected with the life-hating *ressentiment*. The world worlds literally through hate, and evil, which is projected onto some exemplary figure. See Nietzsche (1967). See also Agamben (1998). Second, this move to explain violence against identifiable and categorized groups of persons, vastly enabled by the totalitarian spying infrastructure now spread across the modern world and encroaching quickly there beyond, at the level of ontology, has been engaged by Schmitt and Agamben in their various writings. In that interpretation, Schmitt offers that sovereign exceptionalism must be accepted in order for society to be preserved against centrifugal forces of the world that will tear it apart. Thus the sovereign operates in an extra-legal fashion that permits for the shifting of ideological terrain in relation to designable enemies, theoretically, at will and/or whim. Agamben, in localizing the understanding of this phenomena in the personal act of killing the domestic enemy - *homo sacer* - whose status is determined precisely because of his unstable signification of the norms of the *polis*, and, as such, to preserve the sense of public morality and order, the killing of *homo sacer* is permissible so long as no ceremonials accompany the non-sacrifice, but still practically sacrificial, murder. In this analysis, Agamben reveals to us what is required in individual consciousness and psychology to enable such a decision: a threshold of tolerance of difference premised on fear of otherness which, when exceeded, casts tolerance aside for more primeval action. THUS, combining these two points, we can see that at the individual level, and at the gross-level of the state as we find in Schmitt’s opaque and rhetorically-concealing (of the violence) account of sovereignty, the development of fascism can be entirely organic and multidirectional in regard to the trajectories of social influence, where we see individuals as well as states cohered by those individuals acting on the desire to preemptively eliminate the Other. See Agamben, G. and K. Attell. 2005. *State of exception*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press


Care is understood as ‘taking care’ literally. This is a simple concept, but sometimes the simplicity of an idea is lost sight of in what is rightly described as a difficult and disorienting text. It is our view that a process of disorientation from metaphysics, certainty, and what has been falsely reduced as ‘truth’ from that which is being, is necessary to sharpen one’s awareness of reality as well as concept. Think about it: if the question of being is “why are there beings instead of nothing?” and this question derives from the broadly thematic “what is being?” , then one possible answer is that being is care, for in the absence of ‘taking care’ there wouldn’t be any beings at all. The abdication of the command of being that one should care for being - both one’s own being as well as being more generally - for Heidegger, as well as for us here, is the beginning of the process of losing that which is specifically human about dasein - literally ‘being-there’ or ‘being-here’ disclosed by what Heidegger calls dasein’s “spacish” existential dimension - which Nietzsche radically critiques in his indictment of the cowardice, immorality, tiriteness, and sheepishness, of the “last man.” As we shall see, ‘taking care,’ is an extremely rich concept, and is quite literally inexhaustible. What is relevant here is the manner in which neoconservative thinkers - Fukuyama stands out for obvious reasons here - lionize the modern world’s technologically-enhanced delivery of physical and ideational pleasures to individuals in accordance with their essentialized needs, to which the masses’ adhesion has come to be defined as a simple matter of ‘rational choice.’

The effect of this state of affairs is to foreclose the possibility for individuals to ask themselves the question of being, which entails their surrender of their inherent power to care for and shape being, resulting in a profoundly undemocratic, anti-individualist, and ultimately, deeply inhumane social normativity that Fukuyama stupidly called “the End of History.” See Heidegger (1996). See also Nietzsche, F. W. and W. Kaufmann (1976). “The Twilight of Idols.” The portable Nietzsche. New York, Penguin Books. See also Fukuyama (2006).


Ibid. Zizek is speaking specifically about the retrenchment of conservatism bordering on nationalist-fascism
in America post-9.11 as a reply to what Noam Chomsky, for example, has referred to as the “civilizing” effects of the revolutionary civil rights, Black freedom, anti-war, feminist, sexual freedom, and other democratic collaborations that fundamentally changed American identity.


73 Ibid. 437. Italics indicate Bhagavan’s citation of Nehru. First quote from Nehru, transcript of recording played before the United World Federalists’ Herald Tribune Conference, 26 Oct. 1949, Second quote from Nehru’s speech, quoted in a letter from Bennet Skewes-Cox to Dr Hyman Lischner, 18 Oct.

1949


75 Ibid. Fanon points out that the transformation of colonialism is indeed something that amounts to a systemic transformation nothing less than absolutely total and it comes to encompass the physical and ideational world of the colony, wherein decolonization necessitates a fundamental challenge to all the structures of order. Thus, what is required is not merely the capture of the edifice of political order by the forces representing (or claiming to represent) native groups, but the radical transformation of individuals, too, whose languages, behavioral priorities, and ultimately, beliefs about good and evil, must be, more or less, destroyed, and then made anew. These, of course, were all carried out previously in the name of colonialism, and thus the intensity of these activities for the achievement of decolonization should not be surprising.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 Rose (1999). 94

79 Fanon (2004). 237-238


See also Heidegger, M. 2000. Introduction to metaphysics. New Haven, Yale University Press.

82 Campbell (1998). 48


89 Ibid.

90 Ibid. 63-64


92 Campbell (1998)


Ali, T. 2008. *The duel: Pakistan on the flight path of American power.* New York, Scribner. In the history of Pakistan, Ali points out, whether or not the rulers be military or civilian, and the enemies communists or islamists, the leaders of this state have invariably mastered the art of presencing narratives and behaviors desired by their American colleagues and masters in the latter’s quest for global imperium. From Ayub to Zia, from Bhutto to Sharif, Pakistan’s leaders have recognized their precarious position and have sought to support their national independence through subservience and the surrender of sovereignty. Raza (2012) has also pointed out that the failure of nascent political orders to harness what Schmitt has called “constituent power” in the creation of new constitutional orders will leave them lurching from armed forces’ rule to submission to external authority to back up that rule.

Scheuer, M. 2004. *Imperial hubris: why the West is losing the war on terror.* Washington, D.C., Brassey's.


_Critical Inquiry_. 31.4. 880.


111 This historical trajectory of this development can be traced back in a directly institutional sense to the outset of the ‘Cold War.’ At that time the American ruling establishment began to view global affairs through the lens of national security, but the nature of the American state - specifically its unfinished frontier - required defining America’s ‘national’ security in terms of American power projection across the globe as an unacknowledged, and thus hegemonic and dominating, empire of truly world-historical expansiveness. As such, over a period of years, in the name of various justifications, the military high command has come to divvy up the planet into regional commands that have responsibility for the achievement of American (and now increasingly explicitly global capitalist) goals within each sector. Starting with the adoption of National Security Planning Directive 51, penned by arch-hawk Paul Nitze after his prevailing in the debate with George Kennan and the more cautious realists that saw the initial ascendancy of what has today effectively combined the neorealist worldview that systematizes human nature and state behavior by removing all non-objective elements in state constitution, with the crusading spirit of a messianic liberalism that imagined in the Soviet Union the absolute negation of itself thus necessitating a strategic-level confrontation that had to be won by any means necessary, through the present day administration that employs a similar mixture of cold-blooded systematic realpolitik with the rhetorical, and sometimes misconceived and adventurous implementation of a policy of democracy promotion deemed the best route to security in the battle against today’s other. In both of these moments that
bookend the start of and current present-moment point of arrival for American empire, what is evident is the utter disregard for territorially-based notions of security, let alone economic development and modernization, of America itself. Over time, as a result, significant swaths of the American people began developing a political identity, vastly assisted by the manufacture of their consent through mass media, (not so) subtle working relations between media elites and the government, and other cultural factors from which these political technologies originated, which adjoined their personal sense of security, something which all human beings perhaps have some level of instinctual awareness, to the grandiosity of the edifice of the national security state’s triumphalist and socially-dispersed, celebration of itself as the guarantor of order. In this sense the national security state is America’s new god, perhaps replacing the dollar, which remains the god of the wealthy, who cannot be bothered to worship in a consistent manner - which itself emplaces a class prejudice into the possibility of apprehending reality itself - and national security as a doctrinal concept fulfills the role that religion, which experiences a secular decline, previously played. Campbell (1998). Spanos (2008)


114 Ibid.


116 This greatly simplifies and revolutionizes surveillance as a mechanism of security as well as preventive social control, as the massive interception of all data produced creates a pool of information which can be analyzed in many, many, possibly infinite, ways, through the application of algorithmic and regression analyses, to observe patterns of interaction, the patterns of content within interactions, the relative salience of interactions, throughout the world, in theory, given the availability of processor speed and data storage capacity. Nik Rose points out that this creates an “actuarial model” of the individual and of freedom more generally, by affixing to individuals behavioral profiles that they can they be ranked in accordance with institutional perceptions of threat and loyalty. It is our opinion that this is not freedom at all, and only can be such if one deliberately shrinks their consciousness in accordance with the need to control spontaneous apprehension of physis as determined by metaphysical dikat. Rose (1999)

117 Robin (2004). 14-15
118 Ibid. 14-15, 205-208

119 Fanon (1965). 61

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.

122 Robin (2004). 88-92. See also discussion below on Tocqueville’s political and ideological acrobatics, undertaken, in his case, to preserve what he imagined to be liberty, but, which, on our analysis, will be shown to be something else altogether; namely, privilege secured through material relations as well as in cognition for oneself.


124 It suffices to point out here that the US and France both share an enormous failure of their publicly stated civilizing mission in Vietnam, although we should add that Chomsky adds a very subtle reinterpretation of this supposed ‘failure’ of US power specifically, since, in the aftermath of American withdrawal from Vietnam, the name of Vietnam’s communist government as such didn’t have any consequence at all. Like the Chinese Communists, the Vietnamese ruling party is communist in name only, opting for a form of authoritarian state capitalism that benefits the ruling hierarchy over and against the average Vietnamese person. But, that being said, the terms of order, in order to properly function in the context of the American-led liberal democratic framework and confer ideological rents on America’s vaunted global position, hegemony must be both cultural as well as material in the strict sense as concerns the exploitation of natural resources. In the absence of that, Chomsky may be correct, that the utter destruction of Vietnam has permitted the US to achieve a de facto victory there despite suffering, in the context of the international law of war, a de jure defeat. The investment in the de jure victory as this was caught up with the American identity, and that of France prior to that, was, nonetheless, the metric by which most analysts measure the outcome of the Indochina holocaust. As such, the immediate ideological effect of the US withdrawal from Vietnam was a massive loss of prestige, and therefore hegemonic ‘soft power,’ for the US. Churchill (2003). See also Fitzgerald, F. 2002. Fire in the lake : the Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam. Boston, Little, Brown. See also Turse, N. 2013. Kill Anything that Moves - The Real American War in Vietnam. New York, Metropolitan Books. See also Chomsky, N. and Shannon, P. 1982. “The Legacy of the Vietnam War.” Indochina Newsletter. Issue 18. Accessed from http://
Bauman (1989). Bauman makes the simple point that the development of technology is not a value-neutral process by which the scientific community simply expresses its drive for knowledge, but rather, is driven by deep existential needs, on the one hand, and concentrations of power that enable certain groups in society to present their technological needs as objective. As such, chillingly, the fact that certain technologies of control, or manufactured, industrial-scale slaughter, have been fabricated, implies with a very strong degree of certainty that these tools will be utilized to do their dirty work at some point. Michael Sherry makes the same point in regard to the development of air power by the US state, as well as by other competing powers in the context of the first and second world wars, and the intervening period between. In Sherry (1987), the author argues that air power was presented to the modern nations as a means by which to abate the possibility of a future war through the communication of threats to safety so immense that there would be no chance that a rational policy maker would commence war under such circumstances. Of course this argument failed to predict the eventuality of the most destructive era of violence in human history in the 20th century, which saw industrial scale slaughter perpetrated by the Western allied powers, too, as much as humanity bore witness to the murderous criminality of the fascist powers. The theory of strategic nuclear deterrence, fanciful notions of mutually-assured deterrence by aerial drone warfare, as well as the ever-present naysaying of those who retain irrational faith in the terms of order who constantly minimize the potential harmfulness of the fearsome apparatuses of social control that have been erected in recent times that enable mass surveillance, etc., all are more evidence of the absolute blindness that western powers, many of their more comfortable citizens, and their globally-dispersed adjuncts, have in regards to the boomeranging effect of these technologies of control. As Cesaire indicates, the redeployment of these technologies in the capitals of empire is inevitable as the failed colonial expeditions begin to search the domestic terrain for the source of instability that MUST have been the reason for the inability to sustain imperial energies. In turn, this provides validity to Campbell’s thesis, that foreign policy is not primarily about the rational relationship between two pre-constituted and actually distinct domains of political order, but, is rather a vehicle for the maintenance of this separation. Searching for this division abroad, in fact those who benefit from this state of affairs are more than willing to accept it in a domestic formulae, since this affords their enjoyment of exceptional right over and above others in the midst of physis. See Cesaire (1972).
Law School) and Global Justice Clinic (NYU School of Law). 2012. “Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and
Drone War in Pakistan, 2004-2010 - The History of an Assassination Campaign.” Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism. 33.


129 United States Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis. 2009 “Rightwing
Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment.”

130 Spanos (2008). 146

131 US DHS 2009.

murder-authority-and-the-heart-of-whiteness-reflections-on-the-massacre-in-oak-creek-wisconsin-at-the-sikh-
gurudwara/


and film before World War II. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press. Robinson’s central premise here
is that the rise of film technology itself was spurred forth by the need to perform being to drown out the being of
otherness in the midst of being. In this case, the being in question was ‘whiteness.’

137 Heidegger (2000)

138 Thus unleashing a competition for what Fukuyama, whose appropriation of Hegel’s dialectic to pronounce
its realization in the form of the liberal-democratic state at the ‘end of history,’ which relies on the mechanistic reading of human nature and the march of history being driven by the drive for metaphysical - namely, permanent - recognition, found in Kojeve’s interpretation of the political significance of Hegel’s thought, is the basis of a process that found its completion in the ‘cold war’ being ‘won’ by the United States government. The resulting fusion, as Nik Rose points out, would be named as freedom. It appeared to be as such because of these political economic concomitants, but took on the haloed status of a political theology because of the material capacity of the state in its formal and augmented/expanded capacity to circulate the discourse of the nation-state which would function, irregardless the intentions of secular rulers, much like organized religion; only with greatly expanded capacities. This manner of social organization coincided with the expansion of liberal freedoms, and strongly underwrote which social groups would be trusted with their possession. Jealous competitions over the material necessities of statecraft in the nation-state/globalization hybrid political order unleashed by the democratization of sovereignty, the magnification of power as the capacity to harness the efforts of large populations towards various ends that couldn’t be fathomed in previous political eras that flows from the democratization of formal politics in the absence of similar efforts to achieve cultural, everyday, social democratization, and greater desperation sown into the world’s populations as a result of major drives to rationalize territory in accordance with metaphysicalized exigencies, are all indicative of Nietzsche’s prophetic pronouncement on the modern age being the “war of spirits.” The conflicts that the world would come to experience would be more and more intense, destructive, and harmful to the survival of humanity, at the least, and even possibly all life on the planet. The point of Nietzsche’s pronouncement, here, is not to suggest that this is an inexorable end, but rather than part of the trajectory of modernity - the will to power - was both his hallmark idea as well as his intellectual style, allowing him to offer his own self-criticism while demonstrating the pitfalls of faith in the will to power. It is even all the more appropriate that he did all of this quite unwillingly, being driven mad in the process. In pursuit of mad ends, the use of rational means will undoubtedly drive one to madness. In this case, the idea that one provides a final answer to the question of being, and then, in seeking to enforce this answer, opt to orchestrate beings in a particular territory in accordance with the biopolitical physicality of their abstraction of being, tempt the possibility of permanent control and stability of expectation, will demand the gradual divorce between the languages of description for physical reality and for being understood as a metaphysical abstraction. Nations, as a mechanism developed precisely to reinforce this division in existence, thus, are negations, and as negations, the beings negated, thus, in seeking to play the terms


140 This of course was never the case, it was merely that certain groups in society, namely the ruling classes, would on some level simply assert the claim that their position was somehow natural. Charles Mills refers to this as the “naturalization of merits” essentially for some in society, and through which the overall functioning of the economy could be termed ‘free’ in that the outcomes were evidently in accordance with the order of nature. See Mills, C. 1997. The racial contract. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

141 Harvey, D. 2005. The new imperialism. Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press. 115-121. See especially Harvey’s concept of “spatio-temporal fix” which offers a nice territorial illustration of the expansive properties of global capitalism, but all the while, by emphasizing the transient and shifting nature of centers for capitalization, at both the core and the periphery of various nested contingent capitalist geographies, and the functionality of bubble economics in creating value through speculation fundamentally underwritten by confidence arrangements premised on a pre-ontological Cartesianism that reduces as the that which must be made present to being the objects of thinking (“cogito ergo sum”), and the need for territorial space for this functionality to be brought into practice. This contingent and territorially-bound yet unbound form of accumulation allows for maximum flexibility for globally-mobile economic activities, especially finance capital, but also other kinds of economic activity that benefits from the radical upscaling and downscaling of the scope of control sought over beings by increasingly refined technical means. Heidegger thematically construed this newfound intensification of the drive for control over beings as the drive for the gigantic and the infinitesimal to be reduced to the calculable for human consciousness. To this understanding Harvey adds on, cynically, and rightly so, that if you can make a few bucks in this process, why not? See Heidegger (1977). See also Macpherson (1962)

142 Karl Polanyi has called these three commodities “fictitious commodities” for this reason. See Polanyi (2001). 75, 204.
143 Ibid. See also Klein (2007).
144 Hayek (2007)
145 Heidegger (1996) See especially Heidegger’s discussion of “vulgar” time, deemed as such because of the manner in which the everydayness of temporality articulated to the production of presence in a spatio-temporal manner, segments and organizes the temporality of human existence in a manner of concealment in relation to “primordial temporality” which is simply being-towards-death and a conscious awareness of time in an elemental sense that defies human comprehension in some objective sense, save for the idea of being-towards-death. Accepting this element of reality is the core of Heidegger’s teaching in *Being and Time*, and is the basis of our conception of freedom in this work. In his discussion of “vulgar” time, Heidegger is essentially claiming that the entire modern temporality of progress and the steering of history itself is a massive ideological apparatus aimed at the denial of the fact of death. 390.
146 Polanyi (2001). 268
147 See Schmitt (1985). The conception of decision at the core of Schmitt’s astute analysis of the state and its behavior nonetheless undermines his own conception’s potential universal validity, since, as he makes clear, in his theory is retained an ontological preference for a certain metaphysical order to determine being-in-the-world in a particular piece of territory, and the full acceptance, honest in his case, therein of the necessity for the preservation of the right to authoritative decision in the sovereign institution that transcends daily politics. As such the political, whose differentiation from other realms of human existence Schmitt has been generally recognized as the theoretical exponent, is in fact misunderstood by Schmitt, since elementally, the *polis* simply means the gathering of beings, enabled by initially primitive but over time increasingly sophisticated technologies of distancing. Schmitt’s move in fact depoliticizes politics within the state in the same manner that Hegelian nationalist trajectories might, and where the Schmittian construction of national identity becomes, as Nietzsche puts it, a “thing in itself, raised up to judge phenomena,” the same point can be made of economic-based political identity which seeks the metaphysicalization of certain behavioral practices in order to achieve permanence, too. Later, the similarity between these two phenomena will be thematized, appropriating Polanyi’s concept of ‘disembedding,’ which he employs to describe the removal of production relations from an essential material connection to environmental surroundings in which such processes occur. Polanyi’s description more or less matches Nietzsche’s existential generalization on this count, in this case of economic relations being the base from which reification takes place. The separation of foreign policy decision-making from democratic
politics as advocated by Hans Morgenthau, and the analogous desire to see central banking distinguished from all other domestic policy-making are species of this process of metaphysicalization, in both of these instances, to have the state become the guarantor of certainty and security. See Nietzsche (1967). See also Nietzsche (1976) “Twilight”. See also Morgenthau (1993) See also Agamben (1998). See also Agamben (2005)

This is accomplished through exclusion of individuals and groups that fail to conform to local taboos that serve as markers of community identity and bound this identity over and against the presence of other identities. See Hobbes (1994). See also Campbell (1998). See also Jackson (2005). See also Connolly (2002). See also Robin (2004).

Hobbes (1994)

Heidegger (2000)

Morgenthau (1993)


Locke (1980)


This doesn’t dilute the power of the sovereign institution, but, rather, greatly magnifies it. See Schmitt (1985)

Ibid.

Locke (1980). 164

Ibid.

Ibid. See also Hobbes (1994)

Ibid. See also Strauss, L. 1953. *Natural right and history*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.


Locke (1980)

Plato (1991)

Nietzsche (1967).


Mill (1998)


Rawls (1999, 2005)

Raza (2012)


Heidegger (1996)

as indeed ‘true rationality’ is a chimera and an impossibility by design, whose furtherance can only be a species of what in an entirely different, yet analogous context, was called “mission creep.” See Fitzgerald (2002). See also Spanos (2008). See also Spanos, W. 1990. "Heidegger, Nazism, and the Repressive Hypothesis: The American Appropriation of the Question." *Boundary 2*. 17.2. See also Turse (2013)


Foucault (1995)

Ibid.

and which therefore cannot admit to its own dependence on the being of others for the possibility of its own self-conception - see Heidegger, M. 1969. *Identity and difference*. New York., Harper & Row.
Campbell (1998)

Agamben (1998, 2005)


Nietzsche (1967)

Jackson (2005)

Campbell (1998)


Robin (2004)

Ibid. See also Campbell (1998)

Agamben (1998)

Hobbes (1994)


Robin (2004)


Robin (2004). 146

Ibid.


Ibid.

Jackson (2005)

Spence (2005). Stanford-NYU Drones Report (2012). Williams (2010). Surveying this assortment of data on the drone war, it is quite obvious that the overwhelming majority of those killed in these strikes have been non-combatants - so-called ‘collateral damage.’ The targeting criteria of the US administration authorizes the commission of “signature strikes” which are at the discretion of a drone pilot remotely-piloting the craft from vast distances of separation from the combat zone. These criteria permit the targeting of individuals and groups based on patterns of behavior which can denote, according to the rules, an enemy presence, in the absence of positive identification of high-value targets - these persons being the stated targets of the drone program. Any analysis that fails to take into account the irrationalities of mission creep, where panoptic surveillance technology and the data produced therewith epistemologically expands to encompass more and more abnormal behavior within its scope of consideration, cannot accurately capture this truly barbaric - but seemingly antiseptic - aspect of the drone program, and will therefore rely on the government’s official line on the matter, starting with obsequious acceptance of CIA director Brennan’s assertions of zero civilian casualties, but now that that has been proven a lie, shifting to whatever backpedalling effort to minimize the gruesomeness of drone warfare through the use of strategic public relations.

208 Baruchello (2000)

209 Scahill (2013)

210 This being Rorty’s standard for freedom. Ironically, when this is transformed into an absolute value by Rorty’s ethnocentrism, it loses all the power of ironicalness as the West’s own bloody history is falsified and as well treated without irony by westerners and western thinkers responsible for continuing the inquiry into the real. Baruchello (2000). Rorty (1989).

211 See Brown (2006)

212 Heidegger (1977)

213 Robinson (1996) Polyarchy

214 Read below for a unique interpretation of relativism. Neoconservative theorists’ favorite rejoinder to socialists and liberals is the fear that relaxing traditional values will usher in moral relativism that can only
produce social chaos and barbarity. Leo Strauss discusses in his work, for example, the Nazi scientists’ experiments on the Jews as evidence of the kinds of things that would happen in a science-governed world in the absence of moral safeguards derived from the Christian faith. The problem, though, for Strauss, and others, is that in fact it was their totemic belief in God and their desire to have society accord with this, followed into the scientific era wherein we see that scientific atheism is a species of belief in God, only in this case the *prima causa* becomes the will to power enabled in its range of action by the mastery over beings afforded by sciences. In the name of permanence, both religion and science, when one has ‘faith’ in them as essentially true, behave in incredibly similar ways by conducing distortions of the real to fit a pre-given theory.

This is what we mean here by pointing out that Rorty’s relativism, in line with the neoconservative designation of this term’s socio-political significance in marking the need for a stable order of metaphysical value, isn’t really ‘relativism.’ And furthermore, that true relativism, what Heidegger calls true nihilism, would go further and will call into question the Self, the state, culture, and all other permanence-positing effronteries. Only in this final action, it is our position, can we hope to be open to the revelation of being in its truth. In turn, our position is that metaphysics is nihilism understood as the absence of values, whereas relativism that Rorty claims to champion, but fails to do so thoroughly, sunders artifice - especially those which have been naturalized - and thus is protective of the real and the mystery of the real in its overwhelming unknowability.


217 Mill (1998)

218 Ibid. 14

219 Ibid.


http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/03/201231284336601364.html


When we reconsider the state as a performance, rather than holding to the traditional view of its reality, we yield two insights. First, as Campbell puts it, the inside and the outside of the state are essentially the same, especially because even the Westphalian order at its various zeniths of intensity and acceptance as hegemonic and definitive of international reality required at its core reciprocal recognition of states and this could only be brought about through the formation of identities that over time negotiated and renegotiated their existence and boundaries with each other. This means that the formula that Mill expressly applies to foreigners in the preceding quotation applies equally to those within the state, too, who fail to conform at the required level of satisfactoriness to fulfill their role(s) in the ‘domestic’ political economy. The implication for authentic democracy is obvious: the imperative to present a certain face in international affairs produces the incentive at the structural level for fascist domestic politics and the reduction of democratic practice, institutions, and culture, to a cosmetic purpose concealing the essential dictatorship of metaphysical identity and defense beneath.

Second, the blurring of the inside and the outside of the state just discussed, must, in the end be decided upon by a sovereign power in order to remain in conformity with the identity of the state that legitimizes the operations of political economy. From an existential perspective, then, we can understand that in a nominally-democratic social order in which some expectation of democracy and equality operates - however ineffectively but present nonetheless - the assertion of authority must in the first instance be a hubristic positing of oneself above others by right as opposed to talent, and thence, for precisely this reason, must gain sanction from some justificatory paradigm that transforms what is in essence usurpation into legally-recognized right. See Schmitt (1985)

The question here is simple. Are you, or is anyone else content with the idea of surrendering your individual capacity to process reality insofar as friends and enemies are concerned? Is there an inherent danger to individual freedom when this authority is unquestioningly handed over to others whose personal motivation to be sovereign drives their desire to present themselves as one’s ally in addressing a dangerous world? If your answers to these questions reveal trust in authority then you have no business proclaiming a belief in freedom and democracy, for such an attitude reveals deference to and fear of usurpers, whose entire panegyrics are aimed at the manufacture and management of power structures that constrain beings against their freedom.

See Robin (2004). 92 Tocqueville’s revulsion at the loss of the old world in the midst of the French
revolution, as well as his resignation to the reality of mass society and what would be an inevitably always more and more democratic world, came to influence Mill’s thinking in the 19th century. Mill, whose commitment to freedom was inspired by his own vision of human excellence profoundly influenced by the ancient Greeks, the German romantics, and the industrial revolution and modernity, saw something he considered to be potentially great in the expression of coordinated human power to master the world and use this mastery to provide a more humane existence for all. However, his biases against those with whom he disagreed were pronounced and distinctly illiberal. As such he began to fear the onslaught of the hordes of mass society against the eccentric. De Tocqueville had the same fears of the masses in France, fears which, from a certain perspective not taking account of the distorting effects of the metaphysics of presence on the practice of politics, seemed to come to pass quite horribly. The need to intervene in society to preclude such an occurrence, now in the name of humanity and progress, linked together the thoughts of these two men. Corey Robin, for example, describes Tocqueville as a “counterrevolutionary liberal.” Mill’s preferential voting scheme, which can be traced to liberal thinkers who preceded him who sought to broaden franchise to a voting public that nonetheless would exclude the masses of non-property holders, can be understood as a push for institutionalizing such an attitude that in Tocqueville’s feelings found more emotive expression. See also Mill (1836, 1998). See also de Tocqueville (2001).

Robin (2004). 88-89

Ibid. Robin points out that at different moments Tocqueville could be found on different sides of the revolution, from being a partisan to being a true reactionary seeking the installation of a dictatorship in response to the 1848 Paris uprising. 88-92

Ibid. 89


Nietzsche (1976) ‘Twilight of Idols.’ 547

Ibid. See also Tocqueville (2001)


Robin (2004). 91-92

This is the professed faith of Mill, who nonetheless betrays this impulse of his by insisting on disciplining the temporality of existence by imposing the modernist template of progress - and atop that faith in its goodness and in the civilization that produces it - which in effect naturalizes what Europeans had achieved as evidence of that selfsame progress. Whilst this is perchance appropriate in the context of the critique of what was then a very real “Oriental Despotism,” Mill’s failure to locate his critique at the level of ontology - by asking the question of being - which is in evidence in his concern for the improvement of being - an epistemological concern that leaves the question of political aesthetics unexplored - Mill contradicts the freedom he supposedly seeks for the institutionalization of experimentation with lifestyles and trajectories of existence. See Mill (1836, 1998)

Baruchello (2000)

Thus herein lies the problem with democratic social orders in the absence of a democratization of individuality which could perhaps make possible for individuals the ability to examine the sources of their selves and refashion themselves accordingly in line with the moral and ethical values. As such, people’s insistence on the preservation of their identities at all costs, where these identities are understood as timeless essentialities, as a result of the inherent limitations of nature understood as that which is, encompassing both the eternal, the incomprehensible, and the artificial, will necessitate the discovery of ‘evil’ as a *prima causa* which can thereafter be subjected to technologies of distancing and control aimed at the domestication of the spontaneity of being. These technologies, then, are a replacement for the less reliable godhead concept, because at the very least modern technologies offer the illusion of control. Absolute concomitance with these technologies - which as an ensemble of practices can thematically be understood as ‘the state’ - is the modern version of this primordial enslavement of which Nietzsche writes in the *genealogy*, terming it therein ‘slave morality,’ which says ‘no’ to life in the absence of certain guarantees.

Ibid. See also Heidegger (1977, 2000)


Ibid.

Rorty (1989). 47-48

Nietzsche (1967). See specifically ‘Ecce Homo.’ 327. This is the prophecy of the ‘great war of spirits’ that Nietzsche, we take the position, is presciently conceptualizing the terms of modern political order through. The battle over (1) the right to have a spirit - and we use the word ‘right’ with all due deliberateness here - and (2) to then triumph in the competition with other spiritualized selves - individual or collective - evidenced in nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and the highly individualized competition between beings unable to ask the question of being and engage in an ontological critique of existence, now manifest in a globalized ‘war on terror’ that serves as the ontological paradigm of the security state, sees the at times gradual and sometimes rapid erosion of all values, morals, and limits on the prosecution of officially-sanctioned violence in the name of order. In this manner, modern metaphysics of the Self, that seeks the discovery of the true self that is supposed to be the highest good as regards the life possibilities of individuals in a nominally-free but not-quite-yet thoroughgoing liberal existential consensus, unleashes a nihilistic fury of increasingly organized violence as more and more persons search for their true selves, but in failing to discover this chimerical notion, utilize the negating technologies of official violence to prove their existence to themselves by the negation of the Other.

All this emerges as hegemony because of the inability to accept the contingency of good and evil, and the unavoidable presence of evil within oneself. In search of purity, individuals and states, as Machiavelli put it, are willing to prosecute “pious cruelties” that greatly upset any possibility of global peace based on mutual recognition of limits, freedom, and, ultimately, reliance of selves on others, without whom the very notion of individual identity, is, literally, utterly meaningless. See also Machiavelli, N. and D. Donno. The Prince. 2003. New York. Bantam Classic. 83-84

And in this argument Rorty aligns his post-modern liberalism with the neoconservative Fukuyama, as both seek an end to politics and the reign of necessity based on common recognition of humanity made possible by ‘civilization.’ See Rorty (1989). See also Fukuyama (2006)
Nietzsche (1967). 129-134

See Robin (2004) on “the liberalism of terror.” 144-146, 148-149

This point is made, rightfully, by Schmitt. See Schmitt (1988). 28-29

This basic question of economic limits to growth seems to be more or less ignored in Rorty’s political theory, and from our research, the closest he gets to addressing this significant omission is in Rorty (1999). As such, we can safely assert that the prevailing normative hegemony of neoliberal economics and its environmental destructiveness is abjured in Rorty’s larger conceptualization of a postmodern liberal utopia wherein the availability of resources for individuals to live the technologically-complex lifestyle at its root seems to be more or less taken for granted. See also Rorty (1989)

Mills (1997). See also Robinson (2001). The invention of the phrase ‘untermenschen’ - German for ‘subhuman’ - is usually credited to the Nazis, and many of those who trace this lineage go on to locate it as an oppositional concept to Nietzsche’s ‘ubermensch,’ or superman/overman, ascribing the term for subhuman persons to Nietzsche’s theorization. However, as Mills points out, the term can be traced to Kant, the theorist of liberal metaphysics, oft-cited by theorists in the international relations tradition who invoke Kant’s name in connection with ‘democratic peace theory’ which sees the transformation of part of the world into a liberal political ‘zone of peace,’ held together by normative commitments. These normative commitment, Mills points out, are essentially linked to a ‘racial contract,’ assent to which most basically requires agreement on the inferior position of non-European nationalities.

As Rorty would have it in his ‘ethnocentric’ view. See Baruchello (2000)

See especially Strauss (1953). Herein Strauss argues that the depredations of the fascist regimes in the second world war were essentially linked to the relaxation of belief in transcendental human values. Against this view, it is our position that in seeking to confirm their own transcendental, beyond-human status, the Nazis, the Japanese, the Americans, the Soviets, the British, and after the war, in their colonies all these powers and the French, too, engaged in large scale atrocities precisely in the name of pursuing such essentialized ideals in order to their mastery over the world and thus their ability to honor these metaphysical totems that Strauss imagines life to be impossible in the absence of.

Laing (1967). This affords the experts of manipulation some immediate gains, but in the long run makes everyone cynical about love as a concept. 87-89
260 Fukuyama (2006)

261 See Rorty’s discussion here of the need to domesticate what he calls ‘strong poets’ whose private fantasies of idealistic strivings he claims will harm social stability if left free to be fully vented irregardless the normative legal standard in most western societies that fully protects freedom of expression. Rorty’s words on this point betray a significant contradiction between liberalism in theory and the cultural inability to translate theory into practice. Despite strong support in western countries’ legal systems and, as has been reinforced in official historical narratives that equate liberalism, the West, and freedom all with one another, nonetheless, this supposed existential western liberal calls for a rationalized view of the need to potentially curtail expression - even expression by those very similar to himself (he names philosophers of the past whose romantic and passionate views of freedom he deems to be destabilizing because of their idealism - Fichte, Schelling, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, to be specific), to say nothing of the likely implications of his ‘ethnocentric’ attitude in relation to the question of giving any quarter to the strong poetry of cultures more difficult for the Rortarian to comprehend that those of there merely European exotic. See Rorty (1989) 120-121. Because of this view, Rorty comes to conclude that philosophy has run its course and that private ideologies informed by people being open with their feelings will come to replace philosophy in a way that can be radically decentralized and perhaps much more useful for the daily lives of people, who, in being their own poets, can develop their own contingent vocabularies. This is all well and good, save for the issue of social coordination, on the one hand, and the generalized drive towards eliminating welfare states around the world, that neoliberalism has come to understand as an inefficient allocation of resources, in order to best free up resources to be utilized by the ‘free.’ In this instance, the ‘free’ come to resemble a sort of neo-calvinist elect, seeking to confirm their predestinated excellence and superiority, rather than to in fact be free. See Rose (1999). 195-196

262 Our inclusion of Fukuyama here is important. Neoconservatism is an outgrowth of the despairing and resigned liberalism that predominates today, and that takes as its initial assumption the precise assumption that we find in conservative, metaphysical, and theological doctrines: that the individual is not to be trusted, that people become fearful in the face of difference in all cases as a natural instinct, and that people prefer metaphysical lies to existential truths. The irony, here, is that on this last point, Rorty is entirely in agreement. When he posits the replacement of political ideologies that form public discourse with the elevation of subjective suffering above all structural considerations, he, too, is relegating strong poetry, the kind that can become truly political, to the private sphere. Much like Fukuyama. Fukuyama (2006). Rorty (1989)
This last one seems an especially pernicious illiberal attack on the cornerstone of the Millian liberal tradition - the defense of eccentricity. Now, Rorty, on the simple fact of the potential political - and therefore uncontrollable - effect of poetry on society, seeks the privatization of the discourse on the most important poetry. As such, he achieves little more than the formalization of the trite illiberal rule of socializing that proscribes the discussion of politics and religion in polite company. See Rorty (1989). 28

Arendt makes this point in her analysis of totalitarian political systems and their being rooted in the imperialism that bourgeois economic order comes to require as the franchise of bourgeois existence becomes broader over time. To feed expectations for democracy and fairness - in the bourgeois order and in regard to the conception of economic man at the core of that order - states must engage in non-democratic practices that constitute a contradiction in the overall inter-nationalized inter-state world system. As the boundaries that sought to secure the realm of a nation defined by a way of life become more permeable over time in the current era - Campbell called this the ‘irruption of contingencies’ - the idea that imperialism is carried out only abroad becomes laughable, since, after all, in the beginning this was merely a project undertaken to preserve the social order on which certain privileges had been enjoyed for some time. Many scholars have noted the boomerang effect of imperial, necessarily totalitarian technologies, as these return in search for the terms of order back home to the nation. What results in effect is the denigration of the individual as phenomena - as an inferior being - in comparison to a new national ideal, practiced against one’s own country as a form of internal colonialism. See Arendt (1973). Campbell (1998). Cesaire (1972). Churchill (2003). Graham (2006). Jackson (2005). Klein (2007). Robinson (2004). McCoy (2009)
the intention in leveling this argument is to openly challenge the idea that the prevailing american state culture and self-proclaimed majorities do not value freedom, and, to this end, demand the conformity of non-conformists who do. fearing exclusion from socialization, anti-war liberals, people with humanitarian spirit, and other potential politically-active persons, have largely failed to challenge the intensification of imperial activity following 9.11. in some cases, too, certain prominent liberals have lent their active support to the imperial providing, if shoddy, nonetheless public arguments in favor of the current wars. in the official media where appearances are evidently quite clearly stage-managed to provide the establishment with the greatest amount of coverage for policies and events that favor their prevailing attitudes. See Miller and Mills (2009, 2010). See also Bialasiewicz, et. al. (2007). See also Cameron (2007)


Ibid

So Descartes' theory has a democratic implication when compared to Hobbes - however, the kind of democratization favored by Descartes, based on the mutual evidence of the presence of a thinking being where thought’s presence in a being would be confirmed by the outward - conformist - behavior of that being in relation to the prevailing norms of society, to which were imputed *ipso facto* a veneer of rationality, when democratized, would be applied by normal people for the first time in a manner that became the official discourse, too. See Foucault (2003). See also Heidegger (1977)


Rose (1999) provides a thematic understanding of the role of surveillance in the creation of freedom as a mode of governmentality that instrumentalizes freedom as a method of political rule over society. In his work, and that of Foucault, Heidegger, Bauman, Hedges, Cedric Robinson, and William Robinson, we can gain additional insights that, when contextualized with reference to the larger theory in Rose’s book - that freedom is a technology of government - vastly enhances our comprehension of the US’ National Security Agency’s strategic surveillance program, made public by leaks in 2013. The remaining support that the security complex still retains - despite this hemorrhaging in wake of the Snowden revelations - shows us the extent to which something called ‘freedom’ had been made to be compatible with the technologies of domination. For example, now, as Glenn Greenwald has revealed in his reporting on the issue, the NSA has developed as a goal the

280 Heidegger (1996). 268

281 Ibid. 287

282 Ibid. 275-276

283 Polanyi (2001). 268

284 (1941)


289 Lao Tzu and D. Lau. 1964. Tao Te Ching. London. Addison Wesley. 6

290 Heidegger (1977)

291 Robinson (2004) predicts the arrival of a warfare state that has come to replace the welfare state in the globalization era. Technologies of separation aimed at creating spaces for inhabitation by different social orders have come to the fore as a central development of social order in the current world, irregardless the nature of the political system. 159-160


293 Bobo, L., and V. Thompson. 2006. “Unfair by Design: The War on Drugs, Race, and the Criminal Justice System.” Social Research. 73.2. 462-463


See Katzenstein, P. and R. Keohane. 2007. Anti-Americanisms in world politics. Ithaca, Cornell University Press. In this text the authors attempt to systematize a body of literature around ‘anti-Americanism,’ which they propose to study as a real phenomena articulated specifically opposition to the Americanness of Americans, as opposed to the view held in much of the world that Americans are no better or worse than other nations and peoples, but are perhaps currently led by terrible groups of people engaged in organized violence against the freedom of average people around the world.


Brown (2006)

302 Drury (1997) argues that this lack of a coherent and unifying purpose leaves liberal theory and liberals generally at a loss when asked to forward positive values. Brown (2006) makes the same point in her Regulating Aversion, where it is put forth that tolerance elevates to a value in itself, made metaphysical and stripped from its socio-political context for development as a social practice, has a kind of probationary effect on the lives of people under its sway and the sway of liberal legalism more generally. As such, when the time comes to become intolerant of political ideologies and realignments that could upend the practice of liberalism as a real cultural practice, the capacity and resignation to self-defense this implies has already been spent mistakenly in another theater of operations. Hedges (2006, 2010), as he is renown for, makes this manifest in his criticism of the American right wing, whom he argues liberals must become defensively intolerant of, as well as his later critique of the liberal class itself, which, in pursuing the twinned aggrandizement of their material lives and psychological self-esteem, have opted to settle for an ideology that enforces happinesses as a requirement for class membership, even if this happiness is to be enjoyed over and against the absolute negation of the being of the Other as ‘standing reserve’ to be exploited and should they rebel, to be annihilated for the sake of controlling the cognitive frame required to reproduce the terms of order in society.

As indeed, there are various conceptions of space and time that are relevant, and that conflict with one
another.

304 Berlin (1998)

305 The reference is to Truman and then Eisenhower’s decision to support authoritarian regimes throughout the world, and symbolically to support the principle of eventually liberating Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union’s control, however cynical or slow and deliberate this latter policy may have been notwithstanding (the evidence is mixed on this point, since covert operations prevailed throughout the ‘Cold War’ but at the same time major military maneuvers never commenced). Eventually, late in the Eisenhower years and in the early Kennedy administration, before the onset of matters of considerable controversy regarding Kennedy’s views on Vietnam, these aforementioned policies melded into a doctrine of ‘rollback’ aimed at stemming the tide of ‘wars of national liberation’ since it was presumed that these would be harmful for a US-centric ‘stability’ due the reality of impoverishment - and therefore the appeal of land reform and legal equality which were always on offer from communist rivals - which would drive nascent nationalist movements for basic change into the socialist camp. This was compounded by the US’ legacy of racial slavery and apartheid, which any minutely aware decolonial person would find odious and a mark of an enemy nation. See in our discussion below Berlin’s attitude towards the freedom fighters of the conquered world of the global south, wherein his dismissal of their lifelong struggles for not being on par with the purer freedom he imagines is only the property of his social class. In this move, he mimics Mill, but, also like Mill, we cannot forget, Berlin conceals the subjectivity of his position with an objective veneer that reduces those with opposed or otherwise different notions of freedom to non-being. His argument repeats the Millian view of training for the colonials through despotism to induce progress from stagnancy. Later, this precise attitude is found in the American military and political advisers to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations who put forward that a theory modernization could serve as an capitalist manifesto of sorts, and that progress through the stages of modernization would, if properly supervised, bring nations into modernity. Indeed, the communists developed, based on Marxian terminologies, their own variety of the same thing, which served their imperial arrangements similarly. See Berlin (1998). See also Mill (1998). See also Fitzgerald (2002). See also Spanos (1990, 2008).


307 Ibid

308 Indeed, the mainstream liberal thinkers of the canon all indicate that on some level the nature of threat is so overwhelming, that in opting to erect an all-powerful state to ameliorate these fears, liberals set up the state to
meet impossible expectations that come about from an anthropocentric faith in technology and a corresponding inability to surrender that which shall always remain beyond human control. Thus, suffering, which is simply a matter of existentiality, comes to be a rectifiable condition due to its origins in the actions of those deemed ‘evil’ in relation to the constituted social order. See Nietzsche (1967). 68


310 The point here is not to make a fetish out of optimism as a cure to pessimism and mistrust, but simply to point out that the idea of a free society requires optimism and creativity to bring about in conjunction with ontological critique.

311 In Pakistan, for example, the war over the identity of the state has recently reached civil-war proportions, with thousands being killed. It is well-established that the Pakistani state and the elite have pursued policies at the behest of the United States, economic and military, which have been broadly unpopular with the vast majority of Pakistanis and have thus required resort to martial law. This has led to the ironic situation where the state is allied with the US but the image of the US in society has become very negative for both understandable and also out of control, theoretical reasons that see the US’ hand behind each and every activity of the state and every bad incident in society. In the midst of the fog of war that has in this context descended over Pakistan in the last two or so decades, which dates back to the era of the Pakistani-US alliance in the Soviet-Afghan war, the environment in that country has become more and more conducive to the activities of militant groups, to the extent that a “kalashnikov culture” prevails; armed gangs, religious outfits, military-connected quasi-governmental/quasi-charitable organizations, cutthroat private businessmen with ties to armed groups for self-protection and to dabble in black markets and lucrative profits to be had therein have come to dominate society to such an extent that major politicians must sing their tune in their strongholds. Having carved out this space for their continued existence, the militant groups, even the most loyal to the state - often their either current or former patron - have come to inhabit a space of symbiotic dependency with the state, since in most instances the groups can rely on the expectations for visibility of faith in the context of the metaphysics of presence, and thus can contest the state’s legitimacy on matters of faith. Out of this scenario emerge two potential enemies to the western world so long as that western world sees its being metaphysically: first, the groups themselves, with the assistance of the peculiarities and vulnerabilities of modern technology in its incredible ubiquity, can strike at the West; and second, in association with governments who in the future may be increasingly compromised by their being influenced by militant groups may come to understand their overall geopolitical interests differently


313 Ibid.

314 Ibid. Berlin cites Joseph Schumpeter

315 Ibid. 198-199

316 Fukuyama (2006) argues that the search for recognition and knowledge aimed at practical technical control of natural forces has been the underlying impetus behind the dialectical progression of ideological development towards the endpoint of liberal democratic capitalism. This significance of this point here is that Fukuyama, like other liberals, in making the point that liberalism is somehow the ideal form of government, naturalizes a whole series of political and economic relations associated with enforcement of the zone of negative liberty. This oversight is also found in Berlin’s work in the sections of his writing we analyze below. 201-206

317 Read this carefully. I am paying a compliment, not registering an insult.

318 This critique includes Rorty as well, whose concealed metaphysics - that considers the alleviation of suffering to be coeval with a notion of the good - and not so concealed metaphysics - where we are witness to his elevation of western culture as the least complicit with the aggravation of suffering and that is at the same time the source of values that demand the reduction of suffering. This metaphysics is concealed in Rorty’s work because of his general avoidance of imperialism, racism, and their ongoing, real-world, actual, physical legacies. See Baruchello (2000)


320 Taylor, C. 1992. "Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition”: *Multiculturalism - An Essay by Charles Taylor*." Princeton University Press. Taylor points out that the desire for recognition has produced a world political milieu in which the identity of individuals cannot be secured in the absence of recognition as a means of escape from anomie and uncertainty. Taylor has argued that the sources of the Western self can be found in a Christian culture that became increasingly secularized in the last few centuries, and that the unique
form of individualism that has developed is reflective of this. Taylor, unlike Berlin and other liberals, is of the view that these elements of the Self result in the formation of a dense self with many, many contingent elements, without which the Selfhood of that particular self would be impossible. This means something quite simple: Berlin, Mill, Hobbes, Locke, Fukuyama, and even Rorty despite his focus on the feelings of individuals which he in fact reduces in an non-nuanced manner to suffering and its absence, all are of the view that the Self has been freed of these constraints in the West, and thus the West has something of a bit of knowledge to offer the world. And although Berlin’s language describing an existential freedom is poetic and capacious, his narrow-mindedness regarding what freedom could be suggests his own metaphysicalizing move, which aside from being in contrast to our own philosophical preferences as regarding matters of freedom, violates Berlin’s own worldview as regards giving up metaphysics as a sign of maturity. At issue here is his clinging to a “self” as constituted and unchangeable, which can thus relativize everything other than its own self as as means by which to express its own identity. See also Berlin (1998). See also Fukuyama (2006). See also Rorty (1989). See also Robin (2004)

321 Berlin (1998)
322 Berlin (1998). This interpretation of Berlin’s thought and its existential congruity to real world events borrows liberally from the highly compelling biographical part three of the documentary film, The Trap - What Happened to Our Dreams of Freedom, which treats centrally Berlin’s ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ as a theoretical statement from a theorist who lived through turbulent times and who was, unlike many theorists, quite influential in the formal establishment politics of his day. Adam Curtis, the documentarian, sees the essay as a central ideological statement of ‘Cold War Liberalism,’ which essentially involved an ideological effort to challenge the near-hegemony of the instinctual drive towards socialism then found among the world’s poor. Berlin’s characterization of positive liberty as a road to tyranny because of its emphasis on the combined discipline required for development and social improvement would serve as the basis for much of the thought of the RAND corporation’s subsequent development of Modernization theory, which, proffered as an alternative to Marxian stages of development, sought to convince nations, and most importantly their critical postcolonial elite decision-makers, that the endpoint of RAND’s program would mark the development of a modern society that would enshrine the individual as sacrosanct and the role of the state as a neutral arbiter between individuals pursuing their inherent interests in the absence of governmental coercion that would arise from the formal emplacement of explicitly positive doctrines. This worldview was to be systematized after Berlin’s essay at the
RAND corporation, where the mathematician John Nash, and the political scientist Walt Rostow, among other figures, began to develop, respectively, rational choice theory and the application of that theory to the development of political institutions that would balance individual interests and incentivize their activity to reward the adoption of certain technologies as part of an overall complex of technologies that would reorganize society’s relationship with the material world in order to gear up for what Heidegger has termed ‘enframedment,’ the globally-sweeping reduction of beings to ‘the standing reserve’ and the reconceptualization of the world as a picture. See Curtis, Adam. 2007. *The Trap - What Happened to Our Dreams of Freedom*. Original Documentary aired by the British Broadcasting Corporation. See also Amadae (2003). Spanos (1990, 2008). Heidegger (1977)

323 See above footnote.


325 Ibid.

326 Ibid. See also Hobbes (1994)

327 Mill (1836)

328 Hobbes (1994). 140

329 Ibid. 141. Note here the origins of the Self whose being persists in the liberal imaginary of politics as a being whose capacity to clearly authorize authority is taken as evidence of its existence and rationality. This at the very least involves recognition, the absence of which is the basis for the movement for group rights that Berlin casts aspersions onto as not quite true freedom, which he reserves for individuals as he understands them. For Berlin, it would appear, the individual is only free in the absence of social relations, which, in failing to offer a positive theory to give liberalism a broad cultural support, Berlin naturalizes as the true individual worthy of a Millian zone in which to nurture their eccentricities. As such Berlin cannot admit to the socially-constructed nature of the idea of the individual as he understood it.

330 Ibid.

331 Ibid.


333 Indeed, for Hobbes all such rationalizations, while perhaps the obligation for individuals to adhere to in terms of its effects on social order, couldn’t but be authorized by sovereign power. For liberals subsequent to Hobbes some form of rationalization would emerge to govern the logic of enemy creation, which would then be


336 Ibid. 206

337 Fukuyama (2006)


341 Berlin (1998)

342 Ibid. 232-233

343 Ibid. 233


345 And beyond this to exclude entirely others whose status as expendable bodies to the system of global capitalism - “supernumeraries” - as their social and economic integration into the regimes of capital in various global locales is deemed less cost-effective than their continuing exclusion, and, with increasing velocity, their vanquishment. Robinson (2004). See also Agamben (1998). Ahmed (2013). Harvey (2005)

346 Rose (1999) 235-236

347 Nietzsche (1967). 69

348 “Progress” here should be understood not simply as an idea that connotes forward movement, but as a contestable notion due to the varieties of conceptions that abound about what it is. As such, an interesting approach to “progress” can be to simply observe what people in fact do in the name of achieving some measure of it.

349 Nietzsche (1976). 532

350 Mills (1997) 70-71

351 Nietzsche (1976) 532.
Robotson (2001). See chapter two on the rise of the German bourgeoisie and their relationship with the philosophy of liberalism from Kant, and the theory of materialism found in Marx.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Mills (1997). 71-72

Ibid.

Spanos (2008).

Nietzsche (1976). 499-500

Fukuyama (2006)

Heidegger (1996). 180

Nietzsche (1976). 500

Connolly (2002). 207

Nietzsche (1967). 327


Fanon (2004). See discussion of racism in Africa between Africans in new nation-states. 105-106

Ibid. 175-176

Amadae (2003). See also Turse (2013)


Ibid. See also Jackson (2005). Hedges (2010)

Mill (1998)


Spanos (2008)
377 Hedges (2010). 44

378 Ibid. 154-155


380 Robin (2004)

381 Arendt (1973)

382 Berlin (1998). 201-203

383 Ibid

384 Amadae (2003). 180

385 Connolly (2002). 208-210

386 Amadae (2003).

387 Ibid.

388 Fanon (2004). 12

389 Fanon (2004). 13


391 Fanon (2004)

392 Fukuyama (2006). 311-312

393 Mills (1999). 328-330

394 Spanos (2008)

395 Fukuyama (2006)

396 Ibid.

397 Ibid. 334

398 Hegel (1977). 359

399 Ibid.

400 Fukuyama (2006)


Princeton University Press.
Ibid.


Ibid


Bhagavan (2009)


bering_the_overlooked_life_eslanda_robeson

Fukuyama (2006). 337-338

Heidegger (1996). 170

Fukuyama (2006). 338

Ibid.


Fromm (1941)

Fanon (2004). See above.

Fukuyama (2006). 336-338

Schmitt (1985, 2007)

Campbell (1998). 12


Schmitt (2007)

Ibid. 71


Mills (1999). 199-200, 202, 204-205
Fromm (1941)


Robin (2004)

Robinson (1996). *Nine Theses*…


Agamben (2005). 60

Schmitt (2007)

Robinson (1996). *Nine Theses*…..

Rose (1999)

See Strauss, L. “Notes on Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political.” In Schmitt (2007)

Curtis (2007)

Robin (2004). 144-145

Rose (1999).

Mills (1999). 141

Fromm (1941)

Klein (2007)

Ibid. 112

Campbell (1998)

Robinson (2004). 90-91

Such as various notions of uncleanliness associated with mythical and religious belief, and the fusion with and sometimes supersession of such beliefs by ideas associated with the current age, such as biological inferiority and scientific ways of marking bodies.

Klein (2007). 32, 45, 79

Ibid. 113

Ibid.
See Nietzsche (1967). 47-48


Ibid.

Ibid.

Klein (2007). 114

Ibid. 112

Ibid.


Agamben (1998, 2005)

Klein (2007). 112

Ibid

Ibid

Consider for example the public debates in the United States in the fall of 2014 between die-hard atheists on the one hand and those wishing to extend tolerance to religious communities, on the other. The same crusading instincts and penchant for collective punishment of the essentialized illiberal other that more suit the existential disposition of reactionaries are only display publicly by so-called liberals Sam Harris and Bill Maher, whose oblivion to the moral implications of their negation of the humanity of the other come remarkably close to the official rhetoric one might find in the fascist position. See Hussain, Murtaza. 2013. “Scientific Racism, militarism, and the new Athiests.” Al-Jazeera English. August 8. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/04/20134210413618256.html

Heidegger (1977)

Polanyi (2001)
Agamben (2005). 40

Ibid


Ibid


Thiele (1994)


See Robin (2004)


Ibid

Klein (2007)

Hedges (2009)

Heidegger (1969)


See Fanon (1965, 2004). See also Fromm (1941)


Ibid. 56


Ibid. See also Amadae (2003)

Polanyi (2001)


This is a very important implication of Polanyi’s analysis of the ideology of liberalism, since, in the end, the individual and the individual expressing their being through the collective supra-individual - the nation - come
to rely on reactionary politics. Below we will explore this concurrent reification of being alongside the reification of the economic order. See subsequent discussion on “the double-disembedding.”

488 Polanyi (2001). 146-147

489 Foucault (1995). 204


491 Polanyi (2001). 268

492 Ibid. 146-147

493 Nietzsche (1976). 532

494 Polanyi (2001)

495 Ibid. 147. We should note here that “public opinion” doesn’t mean mass opinion as we understand it in our poll-driven culture, but rather, the opinion of the lettered classes who by and large are not the source of the revolutionary convulsions that are found among the poor, driven to desperation by the uprooting of their lives from their livelihoods as a matter of course as the masters of the universe pursue grand designs of social engineering aimed at producing “nature.” Explaining such a scenario, one must be thankful for the word ‘oxymoron.’

496 See Fanon (1965). Especially chapter entitled “This is the Voice of Algeria.”


498 Fanon (2004). 13

499 Agamben (1998)


503 Arendt (1973)


505 Arendt (1973)

polis.

Polanyi (2001). 84. Speenhamland was the location of a meeting between English Justices in 1795 wherein they decreed together that welfare payments to alleviate the crisis of the countryside and the new urbanizations brought about by the enclosure movement would be tied to the cost of basic commodities associated with survival, such as bread grains, for example. But, as Polanyi points out, the initial generosity of this system was quickly rendered perverse through the encampment of poor and vagrant persons in settlements, ostensibly for their improvement and access to markets and state services, and thus their being rendered entirely at the mercy of the whims of state authorities. The Speenhamland-style system proliferated throughout the country until the 1800’s when the introduction of various poor law reforms - essentially the restriction of social services and welfare through their being made conditional on certain programmatic compliances - compounded onto the initial helplessness of the poor in the Speenhamland system and their basic misallocation in the economy in terms of talent a further sense of abjection and otherness on the part of the poor and the pauper. Polanyi argues that this policy intervention, as we will see in the following discussions, essentialized the poor as the source of ill within social order, as a pesky thing to be managed, and which ultimately, through robbing the poor of their lands - the common now enclosed - would become a total burden on society. Polanyi points out that this utter dependency on the state, created by law, rendered the poor totally unprepared for when many of their number would be flung out of Speenhamlands into workhouses and other coerced and abusive labor situations, and, as such, set up the poor for an accelerated dehumanization on the basis of the modern notion of possessive individualism which was the inverse of the unfreedom of the poor. See also Macphearson (1962)

Polanyi (2001). 85-86

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. See also Macphearson (1962)
Increasingly, the widespread use of the phrase “internally-displaced person,” would appear to confirm this particular analysis from Arendt as political prophecy.
Heidegger (1977) “The Word of Nietzsche.” This essay broadly explores the significance of Nietzsche’s most famous parable of the Madman in the Marketplace from *The Gay Science*. In this essay, Heidegger locates the central role of producing being and its relationship to will as the motor of Nietzsche’s thought, which shows Nietzsche’s conception of being, thus, to be caught up in the modern Cartesian milieu, despite such much visceral critique he had subjected the latter to. As such, the notion that freedom could result from “releasement” rather than willing was alien to Nietzsche, despite it being apparently within the horizon of his thought’s grasp. Without this understanding of Nietzsche’s thought, his ideas, and atheism generally, have been reduced to another modernist ontotheology, doomed to remain in the cycle of enframing - security. What shall we do so soothe ourselves? We murderer of murderers? We shall use technology to become gods. But in such a quest, as is central to Heidegger’s thought, we have lost sight of the necessity to ask the question of being, and, as such, have now become increasingly the mindless servants of the technologies themselves in the name of greater control.

Heidegger (2000)


Spanos (1990). 231-236

Turse (2013). 145-146


Ibid. 650

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Arendt (1994)

Ibid.

Huntington (1968). 652

Fitzgerald (2002). 430

Ibid. 124-125
556 Ibid. 431-432

557 The curious case of Secretary Kerry being one such very prominent example. The vast influence and organization of veterans against wars the United States fights strongly supports the existentialist thesis regarding reality. Sadly, as in the case of Kerry, in civilian times, the trend appears to be reversible, as regards consciousness.

558 This is widely confirmed by the casual and systematic forgetting that the memory of the Vietnam war is lost to. See Spanos’ collected works on this matter. Also consider the speeches from President Barack Obama that has seen the American president refer to the Vietnam war in terms of nobility. See Garamone, Jim. 2012 “Obama Praises Vietnam Vets at War’s Anniversary.” Armed Forces Press Service.. May 28. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116518

559 Thiele (1994)

560 Bauman (1989)


562 Polanyi (2001)

563 Macpherson (1962)


565 Heidegger (1996)

566 Heidegger (1968)


569 Heidegger (1968)

570 Robin (2004)

571 P. Chidambaram, ‘My Vision is to Get 85 Percent of India into Cities,’ Interview with Ray, Shantanu and Chaudhury, Shoma, in Tehelka, December 31, 2008


573 Ibid.

574 Ibid
Enron corporation, once based in Houston, Texas, was involved in a massive corruption scandal that brought down the corporation and its executives. Beyond that, dealings in the California energy market, influence over deregulation policies, and corruption of financial trades overseen by the Securities and Exchanges Commission all together indicated the presence of massive unaccountable power, created precisely through the drive to disembed from the functioning of the real economy a specialized regulatory/financial economy to exercise discipline. Enron’s financial deregulation position, impeccably dressed-up in the language of macroeconomic stability and the globalization of foreign direct investments, is illustrative of the dangers of the reduction of truth to complete manipulability, too. See Roy (2009)

As much is clear from the official economic policy of the new government as of April 2014, which seeks to compete with China to earn profits for industrialists dependent on cheap labor and allied with the formal state.

the naturalized artifice that is the Indian social system.

Robin (2004). See also Nandy (1998) on the question of Indian fascism versus Indian conservatism. 104

Nandy (1998). 105

see above discussion


Roy (2009). 163

See Nietzsche’s (1967) discussion of the ‘Ascetic Priest’ in the third essay. See (or listen) also to the song of the same title, “Harvesters of Sorrow,” from Metallica. 1988 ...and Justice for All. Los Angeles. Elektra Records.
This is a reference to the pogrom committed by the factions of the right-wing Hindu movement in India allied to the then-BJP government of Gujarat state, in 2002.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. 54

Ibid. 56

see above discussion in division one.

Mill (1998)

This further expands on the theoretical implication of J.S. Mill’s theory of eccentric liberty for intellectuals in society combined with maximum negative liberty allowable for all to their benefit. Since Mill removes the role of guardianship of ontology from a formally-recognized hereditary elite of sorts, and places it with the properly scientifically-acculturated. See Mill (1998)

Robin (2004). Compared to other western countries, the United States is lacking in workplace protections, meaning that the space in which most persons spend most of their time is, in the US, governed in an authoritarian manner. 232

Roy (2009). 56-57

Agamben (2005). 2-3

it is widely assumed that Heidegger was reverting to a metaphysical understanding of being and of the will to power in various moments in his work, not the least in his references to authenticity. Our position is that the problem with ideas like authenticity lie in their being understood metaphysically, rather than in a looser fashion always already connected to the physis understood as undisciplinable unfolding.

Robinson (2004)

This is the implication of Agamben’s critique of Schmitt’s conceptualization of the necessity of law itself as an always-emergent phenomena bridging the aporia between exception and norm. If one is not part of the apparatus of sovereignty, it means that that individual cannot retain any self-determination over their own fate and more importantly its meaningfulness, since acceptance of a decision from above is required for inclusion within the community. Our contention, joining Agamben, is that globalization has massively undermined the
purchase that bios can have on human existence. See Agamben (1993, 1998, 2005)

606 Heidegger (1977)

607 This seems an obvious point one can take away from Hobbes and apply to the generalized understanding of beings of individuals and social beings in the midst of liberalism as it has been understood in an incomplete manner by so-called ‘mainstream’ liberal theorists. See Fromm (1941) on “automaton conformity.”


610 Polanyi (2001)

611 Klein (2007). See also Agamben (1998)

612 Mills (1997)

613 Arendt (1973). 468


615 Johnson (2004)

616 In this manner we can grasp the co-constitutive quality of bourgeois culture and German imperialism, as also explained by Hannah Arendt in her study. Arendt (1973)

617 Concern with pollution of the self by the other remained a central concern throughout the fascist period in German history, and the reemergence of discourses of disease and medicalization, as well as sequestration, concerning both physiological illness as well as political dissent biologized, bodes ill for the current moment. The plethora of center-periphery conflicts in states and regions around the world also indicates that the analysis of Agamben, which will be explored below, wherein he concludes that we are witness to the onset of a global civil war, has considerable empirical and ontological weight. See Agamben (1998). Bauman (1989). Campbell (1998, 2005)

618 Fanon (2004). 108-109. See discussion on African racism against other Africans. Fanon points out that not only is the idea of racism against Africans by Africans themselves absurd, but as a result, absurd, too, is the very concept of race itself, since it is obviously a non-empirical concept instantiated into reality by artifice, and not by nature. In addition to this, the very notion of Africans, who have been the locus of global capitalist racist marginalization for centuries since the birth of the modern world system, adopting racism either amongst one another or towards the metropole, is impossible for Fanon to comprehend in the absence of the utter debasement
of African histories and self-determination seeking a chimera of self-assertion as an ideological iota of escapism.

619 Agamben (1998). 176
621 Arendt (1973). 468
622 Hedges (2010)
624 Sherry (1987)
625 Ibid. 205
626 Ibid. 205-206
627 Ibid. 271-272
628 Ibid. 215
629 Ibid. 284-285
630 Ibid. 271-272
631 Ibid. 251-255
632 Ibid. 273
633 Ibid. 217
634 Ibid. 252
636 Ibid
637 Sherry (1987). 311
638 Ibid.
639 Ibid. 312. Meaning of course that all ‘viable targets’ in cities of larger magnitude and population had already been annihilated, and that therefore the pursuit of ‘knowledge’ about air power in the great military experiment would continue elsewhere…. in smaller cities. Sherry indicates that this produced a massive opposite urban-to-rural migration at the time, with entire remaining urban pockets becoming uninhabited overnight in many cases.
640 Ibid
Of course the current wars in the Middle East, with the recent illegal expansion of hostilities into Syria by the Obama government, has produced, within its opening weeks, the deaths of persons who perhaps were in fact theoretically friendly to the possibility of American intervention in the region. To ask these persons to remain ‘pro-American,’ and to understand their own liberal-minded, freedom-seeking opposition to Bashar al-Assad’s Damascus government as equivalent to a pro-American political orientation is to ask these persons to bury their wrongly-murdered loved ones without the possibility of justice.

As evidenced by the recent conviction for murder of a number of mercenaries employed by American mercenary firms for murder in American courts, including in the case of the Nisour Square massacre in Baghdad during the height of the formal occupation of Iraq where among the dead was the son of a pro-American and patriotic Iraqi man, even Americans, left to their own devices, understand what justice is. On a human to human level, this much is undeniable.

The creation of distance through the technological sequestration of beings produces inhumanity. The technological fanaticism of modernity is a fundamentalist ideology. Like any fundamentalism, it requires the ability to edit perceptions and understandings that individuals may arrive at spontaneously, replacing their native intelligence - physis - with the metaphysics of presence associated with that system. In the case of Japan, and in the case of Syria-Iraq today, the production of the presence of death and management appear to be conjoined.

Similarly, American state officials are noted saying that part of the justification for not negotiating the release of American hostages - in this case civilians - from their captors is that the lack of payout will make Americans less tempting targets. Of course this ignores that the ‘currency’ of internet videos with beheadings in them are in...
increasing demand in some parts of the world, and this currency is not readily convertible into USD.


646 Ibid. 91


648 Klein (2007)


650 Robinson (2004)

651 Hedges (2010)


654 Sherry (1987)

655 Ibid. 250, 284-285, 288-291

656 and adding volumes to this truth in his silences

657 Sherry (1987). 287

658 Ibid

659 Ibid. 288
660 Ibid. 288-289
662 Robinson (2004)
663 Robinson (1996) Polyarchy
664 Ibid. 68-70
665 Robinson (1980). 108
666 Robinson (1996) Polyarchy. 377
667 Ibid. 378
669 Robinson (1980). 107
670 Ibid. 108
672 Schmitt (2007)
673 Here we are referring to both transnational irregular factions - ‘terrorists’ - and also to insurgent groups regionally or nationally focused. See Robinson (2004). See also Hardt, et. al (2000, 2004)
674 Ahmed (2013)
676 Jackson (2005)
678 Ibid. 19
679 Ibid
680 Ibid
681 Ibid
682 Ibid. 19-20. Emphasis added.
Also known as lending farmers money and then taking their farms when they are unable to pay. I feel it is a very likely safe to make the argument without empirical support that there is some merit to considering that following outright conquest, in history, perhaps, we can assert that this method of acquiring land has been the major mechanism of concentration of ownership in land.

See Macpherson (1962)
Books.

706 Polanyi (2001). 268

707 Ibid. 245

708 Hayek (2007). 211-213

709 Ibid

710 Bauman (1989)

711 Fromm (1941). 185-206

712 Ibid. 179-185


714 Here the actuality of governmental form is irrelevant, as, indeed, our point is that cultural fascism dominates the landscape of existence in the midst of so-called ‘liberal democracies.’

715 See Hegel (1977)

716 Münkler (2005)

717 Ibid.


721 Taylor (1992)

722 Hedges (2006)


726 Nandy (1998)

727 Ibid. 26
Ibid. See also Foucault (2003)

Nandy (1998). 60

Robin (2004). 124-125


Foucault (1995)

Robin (2004). 125

Ibid

Ibid

Ibid

Ibid. 125

Ibid

Fromm (1941). 195

Ibid

Ibid

Robin (2004). 158-159


Nietzsche (1967). 36-39

Ibid. 84-85

What Morgenthau has, for example, called ‘insufficiency.’ See Morgenthau (1962)

Nietzsche (1967). 116-118

Ibid

Heidegger (1996)

Ibid

529
Ibid. 179

Ibid

Ibid. 180

Ibid. 116-118

Ibid

Ibid. 180-181

Heidegger (1968)

Ibid

See Laing (1967)


Nietzsche (1976). 541-542

Robin (2004)

Fukuyama (2006)

Nietzsche (1976). 284

Mills (1999). 216-224

Thiele (1995). 71

Ibid

See Brown (2006). 186-199

Ibid. 190-191


Ibid

Robinson (1996) *Nine Theses*


Robin (2004). 236

Robinson (2004)

See Seahill (2013). See also Klein (2007)

International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic, et. al. (2012)


Fromm (1941). 257

Ibid. 256

Brown (2006)

Nandy (1998)

Ibid

Ibid

See Fanon (2004) 93-94

See Hussain (2013)


Heidegger (1996) 177-178

Ibid. 180

Ibid

Ibid. 166

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid

Ibid. 167

Ibid. 166

Ibid. 166

Spence (2005) offers an up-to-date conceptualization of risk in the midst of a globalizing world.
Foucault (1995)

Ibid


Heidegger (1996). 107


Robinson (2004)


Ibid

Ibid

Ibid

Cesaire (1972)

See Aristotle (1996)

Fanon (2004). See “Preface”

Polanyi (2001)


Spanos (1990)

Robinson (2004)

Mills (1997)

See Taylor (1998)

Agamben (1998). 176-180


Robin (2004). See also Hedges, et. al. (2012)

Bauman (1989)

see above

Agamben (1998) 179-180

Agamben (1998). 180

Heidegger (1977)

Robinson (1996) *Polyarchy*

Robin (2004)

Thiele (1995). 149

Heidegger (1977). 152-153

Agamben (1993)

Ibid

Ibid. 87

Heidegger (1977). 152-153

Thiele (1995)

Agamben (1993). 85-86

Ibid. 65

Hobbes (1994)

Robinson (2004)


Heidegger (1996)

Laing (1960). 94-99

Ibid. 39-43

Fromm (1941)


Books. 318-319


880 Ibid. 541

881 Ibid.

882 Ibid. 540-541

883 Ibid. 543

884 Hobbes (1994) 199-200

885 Ibid. 212

886 Salem-Wiseman (2003). 544

887 Ibid. 544-547

888 Ibid. 546

889 Ibid.

890 Ibid. 546

891 Ibid. 533

892 Amadæ (2003)


894 Amadæ (2003). 296