THE SEARCH FOR A ZIONIST SETTLEMENT IN KENYA, 1902-1905

By

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This article seeks to shed additional light on the jugglery of land expropriation as practised by British imperialists in colonial Kenya, and to reveal the attitudes of European settlers towards the Jewish people. In order to make Kenya a "white man's colonial enclave" the original plan was to settle English or Anglo-Saxon settlers from England in the country. But the Englishmen were somewhat slow in going to Kenya immediately. Under these circumstances, the Foreign Office decided to reconsider its immigration policies in order to obtain the needed settlers elsewhere to occupy the expropriated land in Kenya. It was therefore suggested that non-English settlers be encouraged and assisted to go to Kenya immediately. The first groups to be thought of in this regard were Finns, Indians and distressed Jews who were fleeing from anti-Semitic persecution in Russia, Poland, and other countries in Eastern and Central Europe.

The idea of settling Finns in Kenya was dismissed by Charles Eliot, the then Governor or Commissioner of Kenya, who argued that having been acquainted with Finns and their maritime way of life, he doubted very much whether they could succeed as agriculturalists in a tropical climate such as that of Kenya. Whether Eliot's advice to the Foreign Office to discourage the suggested Finnish settlement in Kenya was taken seriously or not, the idea was altogether dropped. The settlement of the Indians (from India) and other Asiatics, in the Kenya highlands, was bitterly opposed by English settlers who were already in Kenya. For example, in January 1902, twenty-two of these settlers met in Nairobi to elect a committee to encourage white settlement and immigration, and to oppose Indian settlement and immigration, which they described as "detrimental to the European settler in particular and to the native inhabitants generally."

However, while Eliot was opposed to the idea of settling Indians in the highlands between Kiu and Fort Ternan, the area that had been reserved for Europeans only, he was willing to grant them land in the hot lowlands of Kenya. For example, in 1903 he openly adopted a policy of segregation which recommended that no Asians should be allowed to settle in or to own land between Kibwezi and Fort Ternan. Eliot did not think that it would be wise to let Indians acquire land to any extent
in the cooler parts of Kenya, which he considered suitable for Europeans. He argued, but did not prove his point, that the Indians did not appreciate the coolness of the highland climate and that agriculture was not the kind of labour to which the Indians were most accustomed. In any event, the Indians were never allowed to own land in the Kenya highlands during the entire colonial period.

The idea of settling Jews in Kenya was an unexpected one to the Kenya European settlers, who were now talking about their success in making the Kenya highlands secure against not only Indians and Finns, but also against the native people of Kenya themselves. But the prospect became historically and diplomatically a very controversial issue both in Kenya and in Europe. Not only did it attract considerable although mixed attention, but the phenomenon itself forced most European settlers to reveal their concealed anti-Semitic attitudes towards the European Jews in particular and all Jews in general. Secondly, the controversy split the Jews into two groups—those who wanted to establish a new base in East Africa and continue the struggle for the restoration of the Holy Land, and the Zionists who yearned mystically for the formation of a self-governing nation in Palestine.

The proposal to settle Jews in Kenya originated not with the Zionists themselves; it came from the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, who visited Kenya in December 1902, on his way to South Africa. He came to Kenya to see that country, which had become the property of the British Crown, to discuss with Charles Eliot about the settlement policies; and to see how the newly completed railroad that traversed Kenya was operating. Settlers welcomed him with pomp; and, indeed, his visit was regarded by them as the greatest event of the year, as well as the beginning of the white settlers' economic prosperity. Chamberlain was struck mute with the beauty of the country, its fertile soil, and the perfection and healthiness of the climate.

Surprisingly enough, what seemed important to him during this particular period was the suitability of the Kenya highlands as a new home for both Britons and the distressed Jews who had become the victims of pogroms in Europe, especially in Russia. As a result, when the Colonial Secretary returned to England, he revealed to his ministers and to other influential officials in his department his plan for settling Jews in Kenya.

After lengthy negotiations between the representatives of the Foreign Office, including Chamberlain himself, and the representatives of the Zionist Movement, notably Leopold Greenbe...
and Theodor Herzl, in 1903 the British government officially offered the newly formed Zionist Organization a large portion of land in the Kenya highlands, to be set aside as a new homeland for European Jews. The offer was a free grant of land, about 5,000 square miles or about 3,200,000 acres.

Politically, the settlement was to be an autonomous state with a local self-government under a Jewish governor, with complete religious and social freedom as reflected in Jewish customs, law and traditional beliefs. The Zionist leaders also demanded that once the settlement was established, its inhabitants must control immigration, internal administration, taxes, and appointments of local officials as well as judges. Theodor Herzl and other Zionist leaders in England accepted the offer as an "ante-chamber to the Holy Land," a stepping-stone or a preliminary step toward the ultimate Jewish restoration to Palestine. Although the Zionist leaders were considering other areas such as El Arish, the Sinai Peninsula, the Belgian Kongo, Mozambique and South Africa, for instance, Kenya was regarded during this particular time as the most promising area. However, Herzl and his associates had to yield, as we shall see shortly to the wave of protests from Russian Jewry, which saw in this scheme a betrayal of the Zionist ideal.

But as history would have it, the project never materialized, i.e., it never went beyond the planning stage, although the Zionists managed to send an expedition to Kenya to examine the land that had been offered to them by the British government.

There were several factors which significantly contributed to its failure. In the first place, the European community and its church leaders in Kenya were bitterly opposed to the whole idea of settling Jews in Kenya. For example, when the rumours of the Zionist scheme reached East Africa, the European settlers reacted indignantly. They met at Nairobi and formed a committee under the chairmanship of Lord Delamere, whose function was to wage an uphill battle against the suggested scheme.

Delamere, whose anti-Semitism was outright racial, and his associates pledged to fight to the hilt to see to it that no Jews were settled in Kenya. The settlers were both shocked and disappointed. They could not believe that the chief proponent of the scheme was the Colonial Secretary whom they had welcomed to Kenya in 1902 with pomp.

On August 28, 1903, Delamere, the then President of the Planters' and Farmers' Association, who also had applied for land in the same area (Uasin Gishu Plateau) that had been set aside as the future homeland for Jews, cabled to the London
Times strongly protest to the Foreign Office for making such decisions to settle "undesirable aliens" in the area originally reserved for the white race. The cable carried the following message:

Feeling here very strong against introduction of alien Jews. Railway frontage fit for British colonization 260 miles. Foreign Office proposes give 200 miles best to undesirable aliens. Is it for this that the expensive railway has been built and large sums spent on country? Flood of people of that class sure to lead to trouble with half-tamed natives jealous of their rights. Means extra staff to control them. Is British taxpayer, proprietor of East Africa, content that beautiful and valuable country be handed over to aliens? Have we no colonist of our own race? Country being settled slowly surely by desirable British colonial settlers. Englishmen here appeal public opinion, especially those who know this country, against this arbitrary proceeding and consequent swamping bright future of country. 13

In addition to the above cable, Lord Delamere wrote and published a pamphlet summarizing settlers' objections to the Zionist scheme as well as other problems that the British settlers had experienced in Kenya. He argued that the British settlers had been assured by Charles Eliot that all the highlands of Kenya were to be reserved for settlers of the British race. Eliot himself greatly doubted the expediency of putting in the midst of Anglo-Saxon settlers a body of alien Israelites. The European settlers argued that "Ghetto-bred Russian Jews, whatever their virtues, industry, and misfortunes, were unlike to command respect among, say, Masai warriors, or among the even less tractable Nandi, whom the King's African Rifles and Indian troops had failed to daunt and on whose country the Jewish settlement was apparently to impinge." 16

When Colonel Meinertzhagen heard in October 1903 that there was a plan afoot to offer the Jews a home on the Uasin Gishu Plateau, his first reaction was, "I hope they refuse it, for it is just asking for trouble." 17 In the first place, he wrote, "The Jews' home is in Palestine, not in Africa." 18 According to Meinertzhagen, the scheme could serve no useful purpose in Kenya, and it could only add to political confusion and, God knows; he predicted; "there will be enough trouble he in fifty years when Africans get educated." 19 He argued further that "the Jews are not good mixers--never have been; they have their own religion, customs and habits and would constitute a
most indigestible element in East Africa if they came in any numbers.20 Ironically, Col. Meinertzhagen had previously professed to be an ardent supporter of the Zionist cause.

While presiding over one of the settlers' protest meetings against the scheme, A. E. Atkinson described Jews as an undesirable, obnoxious people, who would serve as a stumbling-block to Kenya's progress if they were allowed to come.21 If the British government were in such a hurry to people Kenya, he argued, "then by all means let us have some of our own poor farm labourers from England."22

T.A. Wood, once a mayor of Nairobi, unequivocally accused the British government of betraying the settlers' cause and of giving away to the Jews one of the most enviable parts of the country, favourable for occupation by whites.23 According to Wood, the Zionist scheme was undoubtedly the worst grievance in a country which had equally suffered under many more grievances.24 Other settlers argued that priority should be given to the British soldiers who had fought and suffered during the Boer War and not to Macedonian alien Jews.25 McLelland Wilson, who claimed to have been more acquainted with Jews in both America and Europe, described the poor Jew as the worst man that the settlers could expect to find in Kenya.26

The settlers used The African Standard as the most effective forum to air their opposition to what they used to refer to as the "Jewish invasion." Between 1903 and 1905, the paper devoted much space to presenting vituperative and vicious attacks against the Jews. For example, the paper printed provocative articles and editorials entitled "The Country's Deathblow," "Goodbye East Africa," "Bloodshed" "Jewganda and Jewdrops," "The Land of the Noses," and "Pauper Jews." The African Standard revealed more than any other paper the settlers' anti-Semitic attitudes towards Jews. Inevitably, the assertion of Anglo-Saxon supremacy in Kenya contributed to the disturbing atmosphere surrounding relations between the Kenya settlers and the Foreign Office in London. The provocative editorials, letters to the editor, articles, and poems which the paper carried against Jews had serious repercussions for the future of race relations in Britain. For example, the paper touched upon the most sensitive and fundamental question of the race relations between the British people and the Jews in general and whether the British were anti-Semitic or not.

In September 1903, The African Standard carried an editorial describing the Zionist scheme as a bargain that had been "struck behind closed doors in Downing Street--or was it Lombard Street?--and when the whole bad business was carried to completion the British settler in Kenya was allowed to learn that his one valuable asset had been handed over to a band of Zionists."27
The British settlers regarded the Kenya highlands "as their rallying ground for a British settlement--for men of sinew, nerve, and knowledge," and not for the Macedonian paupers. The editorial continued to assert settlers' claims in regard to the Kenya highlands:

The climate is perfect. It is a white man's country. It is the one area in Kenya which offers an almost immediate return to the enterprise and capital of the white settler... Take this area from the map and Kenya is at once robbed of its first and finest inducement and attraction for the English and South African farmer. Lord Lansdowne has converted the whole of this valuable national asset into a playground for philanthropists.29

In their reaction to the scheme to settle Jews in Kenya, the Anglo-Saxon church leaders in Kenya argued that if the Jews were allowed to settle in Kenya there was a possibility they would attempt to exploit Africans economically for their own selfish advantage, hinder African proselytization, and thus effect the latter's moral attitudes towards the Christian religion. For example, W. G. Peel, the Bishop of Mombasa, gave one sermon in which he claimed that under no circumstances would the Jews concern themselves with the problem of lifting their heathen neighbours into the elements of Christian civilization.30 As a result, Peel further argued that for the sake of the Christian religion, white civilization, and proselytization of the African people, he would prefer Christian settlers in Kenya to accursed Jews.

It should be borne in mind at this juncture that all these deliberate anti-Semitic descriptions of the Jews by some Europeans as the most obnoxious people aimed at one goal—the monopoly and preservation of Kenya as a white Anglo-Saxon Protestants' country. Indeed, it is the gravest possible mistake for a European to suppose or claim that he is a better Christian than other races merely because he has been in the forefront in spreading Christianity. It is equally morally wrong for a European to use Christianity to justify land robbery and land monopoly under the guise of defending his culture and civilization among the victims of such monopoly and robbery of land. In fact, Africans are shocked when they hear some of the bitter and anti-Semitic prejudice that comes from Anglo-Saxon lips; a fact which is shockingly contradicted when the choice is between a white Jew and a black man. It is also amusing to note how the Anglo-Saxons in Africa continue to explain the difference between Jews and Africans—a phenomenon which has become an affront to the thinking and intelligence of present-day black Africans.
Other pertinent factors which contributed significantly to the failure of the Chamberlain Zionist project apparently came from the Zionists themselves. For example, from its inception, the Zionist groups in Europe continued to attack the project as divisive and a dangerous diversion from their main Palestinian objective—the idea of a Jewish restoration in Palestine. For example, when the Zionist Congress met at Basle in 1903 to discuss the offer, its members were so divided over the issue that after bitter and lengthy debate the only important accomplishment of that session was a decision by a vote of 295 to 177 to send a committee of investigators to Kenya, as indicated above, to investigate and report its findings to the Zionist Congress on the suitability and possibility of establishing a national home for European Jews there. The Russian Jews protested and rejected the offer because they viewed the whole scheme as a "betrayal of the Zionist idea." They argued that their ideal was to return and establish a true self-governing state on holy soil in Palestine. Some delegates at Basle, especially those from Bessarabia, were so bitterly opposed to the project that they went so far as to declare before the other delegates that they would rather endure more massacres and pogroms than "endanger the attainment of their ideal by permitting the movement to be shunted into a siding." As S.W. Baron has observed, from ancient time the Palestinian ideal alone reflected the age-old yearnings of the Jewish people.

While the Zionists were still divided between proponents and opponents of the project, the members of the Jewish expedition that had been sent to Kenya in 1903 to examine the offered land returned after spending three days on the Uasin Gishu Plateau and reported to the Zionist Congress sitting at Basle in August 1905, that "the district is, on the whole unsuitable for the settlement of fugitives from Russia." On August 8 the British government was officially notified by the Seventh Zionist Congress that, due to unfavourable reports from the members of the expedition, it was resolved to forego the whole idea.

The rejection of the offer by the Zionists themselves not only put an early end to the project, but the rejection itself was viewed as a relief to the Foreign Office, which had been directly involved in the whole idea. For example, Alfred Lyttelton, the Secretary of State for the colonies, considered the report "very fortunate" and added that "no opportunity should be spared of judiciously pouring cold water on this plan." The way was now clear, M.P.K. Sorrenson wrote, for British and South African colonization of the highlands of Kenya.
The European community at Nairobi was very delighted when it heard that the plan had been altogether dropped by the Zionists themselves. According to one observer, the settlers, who had strongly opposed the suggestion to settle the Jewish people in Kenya, were also relieved when the Zionist movement itself rejected the offer in the hope that their age-long desire to return to the Holy Land would eventually materialize.

Some authorities have expressed some doubts as to whether the two British settlers who were chosen to escort the members of the Jewish expedition led them to the Uasin Gishu Plateau proper. For example, except for these Jewish investigators, no other groups have ever described the area as totally unsuitable for settlement. The area is still regarded as one of the best parts of the Kenya highlands suited for mixed farming. The Boers, who trekked from Mombasa all the way to the Uasin Gishu Plateau, regarded it as a paradise whose climate resembled that of the South African high veld. Although the British had fought them for many years, being Europeans the Boers were still preferred by them to Jews and Indians as the new settlers of Kenya.

With respect to the foregoing, there is, however, another significant aspect of the argument which has not been seriously considered in the preceding pages and which definitely deserves serious attention at this juncture. The offer of African land to the Zionists by Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, was from its inception intrinsically imperialist, rather than humanitarian. Chamberlain himself was not a devout humanitarian: he was an imperialist and an ardent believer of the cult of the British Empire, which fed itself on the blood of the colonized and on the natural resources of their illegally annexed land. More poignant, Chamberlain was a political leader who regarded colonial wars as indispensable if the economic prosperity as well as national prestige of the British Empire was to be maintained. Joseph Chamberlain also believed that colonial activities were a historical responsibility, sacredly assigned to the British people by heavenly providence. For example, as one of the British exponents of the policy of overseas expansion, and in his capacity as Secretary of State for the colonies, Chamberlain eloquently maintained in 1897, five years before he visited Kenya in 1902, that:

In carrying out this work of civilization we are fulfilling what I believe to be our national mission, and we are finding scope for the exercise of those faculties and qualities which have made us a great governing race.... No doubt, in the first instance, when these conquests have been made, there has been loss of life among the native populations, loss of still more precious life among those who have been sent out to
bring these countries into some kind of disciplined order, but it must be remembered that this is the condition of the mission we have to fulfill.41

Unquestionably, by accepting the stolen African land from the robbers, the leaders of the Zionist movement in Britain had placed themselves in flat contradiction to the unanimous aims of progressive nationalist movements. For example, how could the Zionists, who were at the time accusing the imperialist Romans of expelling the Jews from their Holy Land, and later Palestinians of 'illegally' occupying the same land, accept a land that British imperialists had taken by force from its African owners, without contradicting their nationalist goals, ideology and philosophy? Moreover, the land they had accepted from the British government as "an antechamber to the Holy Land," had been fertilized and marked by the bones and precious blood of those Africans who had lost their lives in the struggle against British territorial aggrandizement between 1884 and 1902. Similarly, like Joseph Chamberlain, Theodor Herzl, one of the founders of the modern Zionist movement in Europe and one of those who had endorsed and accepted the offer of land in East Africa, was himself an expansionist and a great admirer of British expansion. For example, in embracing the Zionist alliance with the English, Herzl once declared:

England with her possessions in Asia should be most interested in Zionism, for the shortest road to India is by way of Palestine. England's great politicians were the first to recognize the need for colonial expansion. That is why Great Britain's ensign flies on all the oceans. And so I must believe that here in England, the idea of Zionism, which is a colonial idea, should be easily and quickly understood in its true and most modern form.42

Viewed from historical perspectives, one could go on indefinitely illustrating why the Zionist movement has been regarded by some groups and writers as the football or the ally of the imperialist powers, especially Britain and the United States. As Moshe Dayan later admitted, "without iron helmets and cannon (provided by imperialist powers), we would never have been able to plant a tree or build a house in Palestine."43 In other words, the Zionist movement was able to entrench and to sink its roots in Palestine because of the financial and military support which was generously extended to the Zionists, first by the Ottoman Empire, then by Britain, France, and the United States. Although Britain has been more associated with the Balfour Declaration, it should be remembered that France and the United States were also deeply involved in the process of creating the state of Israel. For instance, not only did the United States support the idea of
establishing a Jewish state in Palestine, but she was also a co-sponsor of the entire plan. It has been argued by some observers that when Britain unequivocally stated on November 2, 1917 that His Majesty's Government "viewed with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people," and that it would "use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object," its chief motive was to exploit the plight of the Jews in order to enhance its well-calculated imperialist interests in the Middle East. In other words the Balfour Declaration was regarded as a measure of modern imperialist warfare. Winston Churchill has been often quoted as having said in 1920:

If, as may well happen, there should be created in our lifetime by the banks of the Jordan a Jewish State under the protection of the British Crown, which might comprise 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 Jews, an event will have occurred in the history of the world, which would from every point of view be beneficial and would be especially in harmony with the truest interests of the British Empire.

Equally important, in his "History of the Peace Conference of Paris" H.W.V. Temperley described the Balfour Declaration as "a war measure adopted by the Powers of the Entente in their own interests... a bold, imaginative and statesman-like effort to prevent the influence of Jewry being exerted on the side of the Central Powers." Not only that, the Balfour Declaration has also been viewed by some Arab observers as another venture in the chains of colonial vicissitudes and imperialist conquest hitherto experienced by the Arabs in Palestine. In any case, the common element in all these diverse political and diplomatic arguments is that the Balfour Declaration, and later the Mandate for Palestine established by the League of Nations on July 24, 1922, provided the broad political framework with which large-scale settlement could be developed. That is to say, in some ways the history of Israel and the history of Arab nationalism have been decisively influenced at every stage by the conjunctures of world politics. According to E. V. Rostow, the Balfour Declaration was, among other things, an episode of World War I, during which period Arab nationalism was given great impetus by the British campaign against Turkey and by the Arab response to the implications of Balfour's famous statement.

It is both pertinent and worthwhile to remind the reader that Kenya was not the only country where the Zionists attempted to retrace the footprint of the Western imperialists and empire builders. Between 1905 and 1946, for example, the Zionists tried without success to negotiate with various governments which had acquired colonies overseas regarding Jewish settlement.
projects in North Africa, Mesopotamia, Brazil, 51 Mexico, Canada, Texas, British Guiana, Surinam, and Australia. The failure of these projects was attributed to the outbreak of the two World Wars and the Zionists' demand for a large Jewish colony within a colony, cultural and political autonomy, a large measure of autonomy in local government, as well as the power to control immigration.

Although some of the aspects of the whole episode remain to be explored and studied, in summary the writer maintains that there were two important factors which significantly contributed to the failure of the Zionist settlement scheme in Kenya and, consequently, to the rejection of the offer by the Zionist Congress. One was, as has been explained in the foregoing, the hatred and anti-Semitism demonstrated by some British settlers, such as Lord Delamere, A. E. Atkinson, Reverend Bennett, T.A. Wood, McClellan Wilson, Charles Eliot, Bishop Peel, and W. H. Tiller, the manager and editor of the African Standard in their racial bitterness against the Jewish people and in their consciousness of race and class. The second factor which helped to abort the project was the Zionists' insistence on the establishment for the Jewish people of a publicly, legally, and diplomatically assured place to live "peacefully" in Palestine—a dream which was fulfilled between 1917 and 1948.

In any case, the British government lacked not only legal rights to dispossess Africans in Kenya of their land, but it also lacked any rights to expropriate millions of acres of land from the same people and to offer them to Zionist groups in Europe.

NOTES

1 Some writers have erroneously referred to the idea of settling Zionists in Kenya as the "Uganda Project." It should therefore be made clear right from the outset that the project had nothing to do with Uganda for the simple reason that the area which had been earmarked for the said project has geographically and geopolitically always been part of Kenya.


NOTES


5 Ibid.


7 Ibid. (December 24, 1902), p. 4.

8 Ibid., p. 2.


10 See P.R.O. 2/785: Hurst, Memorandum (July 23, 1903). See also F.O.C.P. 8192, No. 19: Greenberg to Chamberlain (July 23, 1903).


12 Ibid.


18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.
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20 Ibid.


22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid. (August 29, 1903), p. 4.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 P.R.O., F.O. 2/785: Peel to Eliot, September 8, 1903. See also F.O. 2/716: Eliot to Lansdowne, September 10, 1903.

31 Baron, op. cit., p. 233. See also The Jewish World (August 31, 1903), p. 429.


33 Baron, op. cit., p. 228.

34 Huxley, op. cit., p. 125

35 Baron, op. cit., pp. 288-293. See also The Jewish World (August 31, 1903), p. 429.

36 Huxley, op. cit., p. 125.

37 P.R.O. 533/10: Greensberg to Lyttelton, August 8, 1905.

39 Ibid., p. 41.


41 See Joseph Chamberlain's speech at the Royal Colonial Institute dinner, March 31, 1897.

42 Cited in Prairie Fire: The Politics of Revolutionary Anti-Imperialism (San Francisco: Communications Co., 1974), p. 105. Zionism was a movement which originated in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 19th century with the aim of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. Its staunchest exponent and political expression was Theodor Herzl, a devout Zionist and a journalist in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Some of its fundamental impulse emanated from the violent anti-Semitism in many European countries as well as from the anti-Semitic sentiments generated by the Dreyfus case in France in the 1890s. According to some observers, it was Zionist visionaries, under the aegis of British imperialism, which motivated the Zionists to maintain in 1948 that Israel is "the potential homeland for all Jews," an idea (as far as the Zionists are concerned) that merited political support by the world community. Political Zionism asserted itself during World War I when Chaim Weizmann used extracted portions from A. J. Balfour's Declaration, which reads: "His Majesty's Government viewed with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object." For many years the Zionist movement did not have an encouraging membership; its membership increased during World War II when millions of Jews were exterminated by the Nazis. Before World War II thousands of Jews, especially those in the United States, had stubbornly refused to accept Zionism as a national movement. Some Jews had been arguing, and still do, that Zionism cannot solve the problem of the great majority of the Jewish people who live and will continue to live outside Israel. In fact, the Jewish community in the Americas is looked upon as holding within itself the most assured future of Jewish nationhood.

43 See Le Monde (July 4, 1969).
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44 See Robert F. Wagner, *Congressional Record* (February 1, 1944).

45 See Balfour Declaration (November 2, 1917).

46 Ibid.


50 Ibid., p. 84.