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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
IRVINE

When Favoritism Seems Right:
The Cultural and Moral Drivers of Situational Favoritism

THESIS

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in Social Ecology

by

Hohjin Im

Thesis Committee:
Chancellor's Professor Chuansheng Chen, Chair
Professor Jutta Heckhausen
Associate Professor Christopher Bauman

2019

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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

When Favoritism Seems Right: The Cultural and Moral Drivers of Situational Favoritism

By

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Master of Arts in Social Ecology

University of California, Irvine, 2019

Professor Chuansheng Chen, Chair

Favoritism has traditionally been examined from the lens of a target-specific typology. However, recent studies of favoritism suggest that situations largely influence whether people engage in favoritism or not. To examine whether situational cues also form a typology of favoritism, 10 scenarios were used to empirically test the target-specific typology and derive a new situational typology of favoritism. Results reveal four distinct classes of response patterns: 1) Total Utilitarianism, 2) Do No Harm, 3) Consequential Favoritism, and 4) High Favoritism. To explain the four classes of response patterns, three dimensions were introduced to reflect the 1) seriousness of harm, 2) directness of harm, and 3) number of individuals involved. Do No Harm varied along the directness dimension, Consequential Favoritism varied along the seriousness dimension, and Total Utilitarianism varied along both the seriousness and multitude dimensions. High Favoritism showed high tendency for favoritism regardless of the dimensions. The pattern of responses among the classes did not differ based on the target of the beneficiary (e.g., nepotism and cronyism). Multinomial logistic regression results show various cultural and individual values predict class membership. Discussion of predictors and implications for pattern of responses to situational favoritism are given.

INTRODUCTION

Ingroup bias, the tendency to more positively regard the ingroup over the outgroup, is posited by scholars to derive from the social identity theory, which suggests that individuals will define their identities by group memberships and seek to maintain that identity via association with positive qualities of their own group as compared to the outgroup (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). While ingroup bias has, in the psychology literature, been examined as intergroup dynamics and processes, the manifestation of the psychological phenomenon outside the scholarly domain has been met with less than favorable responses. In the business world, ingroup bias is more commonly regarded as favoritism, the act of giving preferential treatment to others for their relationships over merits. Favoritism is a common and global phenomenon in the business world (Jones, 2012) and more extreme cases may enter domains of corruption. Indeed, favoritism and nepotism are commonly regarded as two types of corruption (Transparency International, n.d.). Instances of favoritism are frequently covered in the news, encompassing both the political (e.g., President Trump's appointing his daughter and son-in-law to government positions, (Abramson, 2018) and business sphere (e.g., KEB Hana Bank's nepotistic hiring practices, Yonhap News, 2018).

A plethora of prior research studies illustrate the negative consequences of favoritism, including negative job stress (Arasli & Tumer, 2008), job dissatisfaction (Nadeem, Ahmad, Ahmad, Batool, & Shafique, 2015), negative impact on wages (Ponzo & Scoppa, 2010), and formation of negative views toward the beneficiary (Padgett & Morris, 2005). However, some scholars have argued that under some conditions and relationships, favoritism may be beneficial. Specifically, Jones and Stout (2015) argue that favoritism may allow for greater maintenance of social cohesion within the workplace and enable quicker human capital transfer. Indeed, several

prior studies have documented that individuals tend to cooperate more with those of the same group membership (Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014; Kramer & Brewer, 1984) or facilitate the trust of expecting reciprocal cooperation (Yamagishi, Jin, & Miller, 1998; Yamagishi, Mifune, Liu, & Pauling, 2008). This project's objective, however, is not to argue for the benefits or consequences of favoritism. Rather, this project seeks to examine under what situations does favoritism appear to be the rational alternative and to what type of people does this occur. To investigate this research topic, a situation-driven typology is first introduced and empirically identified. Then, various cultural and individual values are examined for their predictive value of said typology.

CHAPTER 1: A TYPOLOGY OF FAVORITISM

In the current body of literature, the subtypes of favoritism are commonly determined by the relationship between the acting agent and the beneficiary. Accordingly, nepotism is for family kinship, cronyism for close friendship or acquaintanceship, clientelism for patron-clientship, and so forth. Scholars wishing to examine target specific forms of favoritism often employ this typology to operationalize favoritism behaviors (e.g., Arasli & Tumer, 2008; Aydogan, 2009). The target specific typology of favoritism has proven effective in advancing research efforts, sparking separate lines of research examining the effects and causes of cronyism (e.g., Begley, Khatri, & Tsang, 2010; Khatri & Tsang, 2003; Khatri, Tsang, & Begley, 2003, 2006) and nepotism (e.g., Jones, 2012; Padgett & Morris, 2005; Wated & Sanchez, 2012, 2015) or both (e.g., Arasli & Tumer, 2008; Aydogan, 2009; Jones & Stout, 2015; Nadeem et al., 2015).

Just as diverse as the typology of target-driven favoritism, an examination of prior literature highlights the prevalence of favoritism across a wide spectrum of situations. Studies examining favoritism in academic settings give evidence of favoritism for advancement opportunities (Barnett & McCormick, 2004), decision making (Blase, 1988), selection of beneficial activities (Aydogan, 2009), and publication opportunities (Medoff, 2003), to name a few. Likewise, in the corporate workplace setting, studies have examined favoritism in cases of hiring practices (Jeanquart-Barone & Peluchette, 1999), interaction with firms (Im & Chen, 2019), performance evaluations (Prendergast & Topel, 1996), giving bonuses (Shaw, Choshen-Hillel, & Caruso, 2018), and promotion decisions (Mujtaba & Sims, 2011). Despite the wide range of situations in which favoritism occurs, however, it remains unclear whether the degree of prevalence of favoritism across these diverse range of situations is varied. Conceptually, one may expect favoritism to vary in accordance to the situational cues made salient to the acting

agent. For instance, Shaw et al. (2018) found that when one's decisions are made public, participants tend to express bias *towards*, rather than *for*, their friends, suggesting that situations in which one's decisions are subject to the observation of others may serve to alter the target of the favoritism behavior. Indeed, a brief review of literature of favoritism research reveals the influence of specific situational cues on how favoritism may manifest differently.

A series of studies from Yamagishi and colleagues (1993, 1996, 1997) found that when only the participants were aware of the target's ingroup membership (i.e., in the event of asymmetric information), the tendency for ingroup bias was lessened. Results from these studies suggest that ingroup bias is driven by the expectation that ingroup members will reciprocate the favoritism behavior in the form of future benefit, rather than altruism on count of similar ingroup membership status (Yamagishi et al., 1998; c.f., Cadsby, Du, & Song, 2016). For situations in which the beneficiary is not aware of their recipiency, the acting agent may be less likely to express favoritism.

Favoritism and ingroup bias may also be influenced with the context surrounding the group membership. Studies have found that favoritism increase with greater saliency of the ingroup (Chen, Brockner, & Chen, 2002; Schofield, Deckman, Garris, DeWall, & Denson, 2015), national identity (Feather, 1994), and characteristics of the group (e.g., size, status; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992). While group salience may increase favoritism, results from a few studies also illustrate the influence of group norms on favoritism. When group norms are ambiguous, ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation have been shown to increase, while when group norms endorsing equal treatment are made clear, the outgroup were treated well, if not better (Aberson & Ettlin, 2004). Another study found that there may be a reversal of ingroup bias where the ingroup is perceived more negatively, or at least given more negative treatment,

than the outgroup when the ingroup member fails to adhere to expected group norms, such as reciprocating loyalty (Dunne, 2018). Thus, in situations where the one's group membership is made more salient or when individuals have dispositional high identification with their own ingroup, the tendency for ingroup bias may be higher.

Several studies illustrate the influence of situation-specific cues on how favoritism manifests among people. Beyond the target-specific typology, no study, to the best of our knowledge, has attempted to classify favoritism by categories of situations. Robinson and Bennett (1995) previously utilized a multi-dimensional scaling approach to develop a typology for workplace deviance behaviors; some of which, are also loosely symptomatic of favoritism, such as a boss refusing to give employees their earned benefits. Because workplace deviance is defined as violations of organization norms, whether determined formal policies or informal procedures, engagement in favoritism may also tread along the lines of workplace deviance. Robinson and Bennett (1995) introduced two dimensions with which workplace deviance was characterized by: 1) seriousness of the deviant act and 2) the extent to which the deviance is harmful to individuals opposed to the organization. However, because favoritism is a specific type of deviance, compared to the broad construct examined by Robinson and Bennett (1995), the dimensions by which favoritism may be categorized by may correspond to 1) the seriousness of the consequence to the non-beneficiary and 2) the extent to which the said consequence can be directly attributed to the acting individual. Hence, following the current body of literature on the target-specificity of the beneficiary, situational influence on favoritism, and current typology of workplace deviance, a set of hypotheses (H1A-B) are given with an alternative hypothesis (H1C):

H1A: Target specific typology of favoritism, characterized by nepotism and cronyism, will emerge.

H1B: A typology characterized by the dimensions of seriousness of the situation and directness of harm will emerge.

H1C: A typology characterized by the dimensions of seriousness of the situation, directness of harm, and other unidentified factors will emerge.

Collectivism Values as Predictors of Favoritism

Culture has long been speculated as a key predictor of the intention to engage in favoritism. In particular, collectivism has been conceptually related to ingroup bias and favoritism. Collectivistic cultures are characterized as emphasizing group goals (Triandis, 2001) and place more concern on the maintenance of relationships (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010; Ohbuchi, Fukushima, & Tedeschi, 1999). It has been postulated that the strong emphasis and high valuation of the ingroup may then manifest into cognitive values of ingroup bias and behaviors of favoritism. For instance, recent studies have found that collectivism was related to increased tendency for ingroup bias (Giannakakis & Fritsche, 2011; Gómez, Kirkman, & Shapiro, 2000), greater tolerance and normalization of nepotism (Wated & Sanchez, 2012, 2015), and perception of favoritism (Im & Chen, 2019). For individuals who endorse greater collectivism ideals, the ingroup may be more salient, thereby increasing tendency to give preferential treatment to those ingroup members (Chen et al., 2002; Schofield et al., 2015). Accordingly, where collectivism is culturally normative (e.g., China, Mexico), favoritism may not catch the ire of prying eyes as they would in Western cultures, where individualism is more endorsed (e.g., Canada, United States). For instance, in China, ingroup bias and favoritism are closely rooted in the idea of *guanxi*, the establishment of a social connection between

individuals, characterized by reciprocal social obligations that maintain the interpersonal cohesion (Yang, 1994). Similar constructs exist beyond East Asian culture, with evidence of *blat* in Russia (Ledeneva, 1998, 2009), *wasta* in Arab cultures (Sidani & Thornberry, 2013), and similar, but not termed, normative values in Mexico (Boutilier, 2009).

Within collectivism is a narrower focused concept of *familism*, the extent to which one's identity is closely tied to family and values strong attachment, loyalty, and solidarity with their family (Sabogal, Marín, Otero-Sabogal, Marín, & Perez-Stable, 1987; Triandis, Marin, Betancourt, Lisansky, & Chang, 1982). East Asian and Latino cultures typically report higher endorsement of familism compared to their Western counterparts (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). Like with collectivism, the valuation of family led some researchers to speculate the relation between familism and favoritism toward family members (Im & Chen, 2019; Van de Vliert, 2011; Wated & Sanchez, 2015). In a culture where familism is heavily endorsed, social networks may be established with preferences given to those of kinship. For instance, in South Korea, familism has been considered as a key driver in the establishment of strong social networks among the economically and politically elite (Kim, 2007; Park, 2004). However, it is worth noting that doctrines of collectivism and familism may manifest differently across East Asian and Latino cultures (Campos & Kim, 2017). Lawrence and Yeh (1994) made the point to suggest that while the Mexican culture emphasize collectivity with the family, individuality may hold precedence for those outside the family circle, such as friends or coworkers. In Japanese culture, however, one's close and loyal ingroup may be formed from a framework of non-birthright attributes. In this regard, nepotism may be more prevalent and cronyism less so in Latin contexts, and the opposite for East Asian contexts.

Culture, Individual, and Moral Values as Predictors of Unethical Conduct

As discussed in prior sections, to the extent to which more severe acts of favoritism are deemed unethical, several factors that predict unethical behavior may also serve fruitful in predicting favoritism. In addition to collectivism or familism values discussed in the prior section, an additional cultural component that may be related to unethical conduct may be tightness-looseness. Cultures that are “tight” typically exhibit having strong and rigid norms accompanied by low tolerance for behaviors that deviate from said norms, whereas cultures that are “loose” typically exhibit having weak and flexible norms with a high tolerance for deviant behavior (Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006; Gelfand et al., 2011). One study examining the relation of tightness-looseness with respect to unethical behavior found that individuals from tight cultures showed less tolerance for and were less likely to engage in unethical behavior (Zourrig, Park, El Hedhli, & Zhang, 2018). Thus, in tight cultures, unethical behavior, which may be deemed deviant behavior, may be less tolerated.

Personal values have also been illustrative of individuals’ tendencies for unethical conduct. In prior studies, power has been linked to the promotion unethical conduct (Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2015; Kennedy & Anderson, 2017; Vriend, Jordan, & Janssen, 2016), stemming from the rationale that such status may undermine morality by inducing self-focus (Lammers, Galinsky, Dubois, & Rucker, 2015; Piff, Stancato, Côté, Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012). Further, a series of studies conducted by Kouchaki and Desai (2015) found that individuals were more likely to engage in unethical behavior if they were anxious or felt threatened, suggesting that disruptions to one’s current state of being may induce one to act unethically in an effort to reclaim that sense of security. Additionally, observation or proximity of ingroup members engaging in unethical conduct has been shown to facilitate and encourage unethical conduct in the agents themselves (Fosgaard, Hansen, & Piovesan, 2013; Gino, Ayal, &

Ariely, 2009; Gino & Galinsky, 2012; O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2012). In such cases, the observation of close others engaging in unethical behavior undermined one's own moral compass, leading the individual to act unethically themselves (Gino & Galinsky, 2012). Indeed so, dissociation from predisposed ideals of moral objectivity may prompt inclinations for unethical conduct (Rai & Holyoak, 2013). Studies on moral relativism highlighted the positive association between increased relativism and increased tendency to engage in unethical conduct (Lu et al., 2017; Rai & Holyoak, 2013). Thus, the findings and implications from a series of studies and conceptual papers lead us to propose the following hypotheses:

H2A: Ethnic group differences and cultural values of collectivism and familism will predict target-specific typology differences.

H2B: Values of moral relativism and conformity will predict the typology favoritism based on the dimension of directness of harm while values of power, achievement, and security will predict the typology based on the dimension of seriousness of the situation.

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

Subjects

Participants were recruited from a large Pacific-Western university in the United States via an online subject pool for course credit ($N = 804$). To capture the different dimensions of individualism-collectivism, participants from three ethnic backgrounds known to endorse the cultural dimension, White European-American (individualism), Latino/Hispanic-American (familism), and East Asian (collectivism), were sampled. Those of East Asian ethnic background were oversampled to collect enough participants that were international academic status. Because the individualism-collectivism dimension is understudied and less clear for other ethnicities (e.g., Arabic, Filipino, etc.), the study limited sampling to the three aforementioned ethnic groups. Twenty-eight participants were removed due to not meeting ethnicity criteria and 25 were removed for incomplete or missing data. Four international participants (3 Europeans and 1 Latino/Hispanic) were removed from subsequent analyses due to the small sample of non-East Asian international participants. In total, three ethnic groups comprising four cultures, White European-Americans ($n = 162$, 82% female, $M_{\text{age}} = 22.30$, $SD_{\text{age}} = 5.01$), Latino/Hispanic ($n = 277$, 86% female, $M_{\text{age}} = 21.00$, $SD_{\text{age}} = 3.44$), East Asian-Americans ($n = 198$, 77% female, $M_{\text{age}} = 20.30$, $SD_{\text{age}} = 1.96$), and International East Asians ($n = 110$, 74% female, $M_{\text{age}} = 19.90$, $SD_{\text{age}} = 1.48$), were sampled for this study ($N = 747$, 81% female, $M_{\text{age}} = 20.90$, $SD_{\text{age}} = 3.43$). Placement into one of the three ethnic groups was determined by participants' self-reported ethnicity.

Procedures

The study was administered entirely online via Qualtrics. All participants consented to participating in the study for course credit and had freedom to terminate their participation at any

time. Participants provided relevant demographic information, completed scales assessing their cultural orientation, and responded to six moral vignettes. Each situational vignette required the participants to choose one of two possible choices, a favoritism choice or a justice choice. Upon making this choice, they were given three additional questions assessing the moral relativism of their choice. This study was given an Exempt Review Determination from the university's Institutional Review Board.

Measures

Demographics. Participants reported their age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, parental education attainment, length of stay in the United States, and academic residency status (i.e., domestic or international).

Individualism & Collectivism. Participants completed the Kin (8 items), Neighbor (10 items), and Friend (10 items) portion of the Individualism-Collectivism Scale (INDCOL Scale, for reliability and validity test, see Hui, 1988; Triandis, Leung, Villareal, & Clack, 1985), $\omega = 0.732$. Because the sample was comprised of undergraduate students, participants did not complete the other three relationships (i.e., Parent, Spouse, and Co-worker) for surface validity purposes. All items were measured on a 6-point Likert scale with anchors from 1 (Strongly disagree/false) to 6 (strongly agree/true). Sample items include "I can count on my relatives for help if I find myself in any kind of trouble" (Kin), "I am often influenced by the moods of my neighbors" (Neighbor), and "My good friends and I agree on the best places to shop" (Friend).

Tightness & Looseness. Participants completed an adjusted version of the 6-item Tightness-Looseness Scale (Gelfand et al., 2011) to measure the degree to which they perceived the tightness of their culture, $\alpha = 0.747$. Tightness is operationalized as having strong, rigid norms and low tolerance for deviating from said norms, whereas looseness is operationalized as

weak, flexible norms and high tolerance for deviating from said norms. All items were measured on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 6 (Strongly Agree). Sample items include “There are many social norms that people are supposed to abide by in my culture” and “People in my culture almost always comply with social norms”.

Theory of Basic Values. Participants completed the shortened 10-item version (Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005) of the Schwartz Values Survey (Schwartz, 1992). The shortened version presents one item per value: 1) Power, 2) Achievement, 3) Hedonism, 4) Stimulation, 5) Self-direction, 6) Universalism, 7) Benevolence, 8) Tradition, 9) Conformity, and 10) Security (for brief review, see Schwartz, 2012). The values are presented with their respective defining goals, and each value is rated on a 9-point Likert scale with anchors ranging from 0 (Opposed to my principles) to 8 (Of supreme importance). Examples of values include “social power, authority, wealth” (for Power) and “obedience, honoring parents and elders, self-discipline, politeness” (for Conformity).

Familism. Participants completed the 14-item Familism Scale (Sabogal et al., 1987), $\omega = 0.821$. This scale measures three dimensions of familism: 1) Familial Obligations (6 items measuring one’s perceived obligation to provide support to their family), 2) Perceived Support from the Family (3 items measuring one’s perception that their family is a source of support), and 3) Family as Key Referents (5 items measuring the extent to which one conceives their family as their referral point). All items were measured on a 5-point Likert scale with anchors from 1 (very much in disagreement) to 5 (very much in agreement). Sample items include “Aging parents should live with their relatives” (familial obligation), “When someone has problems s/he can count on help from his/her relatives” (support from the family), and “The

family should consult close relatives (uncles, aunts) concerning its important decisions” (family as referents). All three dimensions were averaged together to compute the overall familism score.

Situational Vignettes

[Table 1.]

Participants were originally presented with 6 unique situational vignettes, each with two versions—Family and Friend—that depicted an agent in a morally ambiguous dilemma. Upon subsequent examination of the vignettes by the authors, one vignette was dropped from further analysis due to the lack of clear comparison between the ingroup and outgroup. Thus, the current study examines 5 unique vignettes, each with two versions (the Family version to assess nepotism and the Friend version to assess cronyism), for a total of 10 vignettes. The following is an example of one of the vignettes used in the study (Family version):

Bill was recently hired by a university to be a part of the undergraduate admissions committee where he screens applicants for their qualifications. He has two applications left to review and only one admission spot remaining. He decides to look at both applications at the same time. He notices that one application is from his [cousin/friend], whose qualifications are below the university acceptance cutoff line. The other applicant's qualifications, however, meet the cutoff line.

The topics of the vignettes are given in Table 1 and full vignettes are given in Appendix A. Following the 2-dimensions previously identified in Robinson and Bennett (1995), scenarios were designed to vary in degree of direct-indirect harm to the target as well as severity of the situation. Thus, two vignettes (i.e., hospital and school shooting) reflect severe situations and three vignettes (i.e., university admissions, gift giving, and DMV) reflect minor to moderate situations along the minor-serious dimension. Two vignettes (i.e., university admissions and gift

giving) reflect direct harm situations and three vignettes (i.e., DMV, hospital, and school shooting) reflect indirect harm situations on the indirect-direct harm dimension.

The family condition's beneficiary was chosen to be a cousin rather than an immediate family member to avoid immediate family role-based influences and obligations that may otherwise introduce confounding factors (Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990). All participants completed both conditions of the same vignette before proceeding onto the next vignette. Participants were randomly assigned to either receive the Family versions of the vignettes first or the Friend versions of the vignettes first to counterbalance any order effects from having one version systematically precede the other. The order of the presentation of the vignettes was randomized for all participants. The names of the agents in the vignettes were changed to match the self-reported gender of the participants.

Following a similar methodology used in Miller and Bersoff (1992), participants were asked to place themselves in the shoes of the agent and choose one of two possible choices, one representing a favoritism choice and the other a justice choice, following each vignette. Favoritism choices were those that would benefit the ingroup member whereas justice alternative choices were characterized as the choice that is desirable from a fair or merit-based point of view. An example of a favoritism choice from the prior example is given:

ACCEPT HIS [COUSIN/FRIEND] AND REJECT THE OTHER APPLICANT – despite his [cousin/friend] not having the qualifications.

The following, then, is an example of a justice choice:

REJECT HIS [COUSIN/FRIEND] AND ACCEPT THE OTHER APPLICANT – even though it will make his [cousin/friend] sad.

Each vignette presented a caveat that made the justice choice more salient. For instance, in the vignette presented prior, the caveat is that the interpersonal beneficiary does not meet the qualifications to be admitted whereas the stranger does. Brief descriptions of each vignette's favoritism choice along with the percentage of the total sample that opted for the favoritism choice for the family or friend versions are outlined in Table 1.

Moral Relativism. Upon selecting either a favoritism choice or a justice choice, participants were asked three follow-up questions assessing the degree to which they viewed their choice as being morally objective. They were asked to indicate (“Yes” or “No”) whether they believed their choice were 1) still right in the face of hypothetical rules against it, 2) governed by obligations beyond those prescribed by rules or laws, and 3) a choice that others should make despite reluctance to do so. The questions were adopted from Miller and Bersoff (1992). The sum score of the number of questions the participants select “Yes” for each vignette (ranging from 0 to 3) were then averaged across the 10 vignettes to create a composite variable, $\omega = 0.780$. The score was then reverse scored to get a Moral Relativism variable.

Analytical Plan

To examine the distinct patterns by which participants selected to engage in favoritism, a latent class analysis (LCA) was conducted with the 10 vignettes to examine the best class model using R package *poLCA* (Linzer & Lewis, 2011). No covariates were added at the LCA stage. LCA was first conducted for a 2-class model, and the number of classes in the model was increased by increments of 1 until the model failed to reach maximum likelihood. Each model's fit metrics (e.g., AIC, BIC, Log Likelihood) were then compared to examine which model achieved best goodness-of-fit. Because the *poLCA* package does not provide statistical comparison of models, such analyses were not conducted. The *poLCA* package also does not

provide a method of obtaining relative entropy. Thus, a separate string of R syntax was used to measure relative entropy.

After the latent classes were identified, a multinomial logistic regression was used to examine which variables predicted class membership. For ease of interpretation, the model was split into three steps. The first step contained demographic variables (age, gender, marriage status, parental education, ethnicity [dummy-coded], and academic residency status). The second step contained cultural and moral variables of interest (tightness-looseness, collectivism, familism, and moral relativism). The third step contained conceptually relevant individual values variables (power, achievement, conformity, and security). Lastly, interactions between ethnicity and the relevant cultural and moral variables were examined.

CHAPTER 3: RESULTS

[Table 2.]

A comparison of the number of class models ranging from 2 to 4 classes is shown in Table 2. A 5-class model was run but did not converge, failing to reach maximum likelihood. The 4-class model, compared to 2 or 3-class models, achieved the lowest AIC and BIC with an entropy of 0.853. The 4-class model was then examined for distinct conceptual patterns by which each class may be labeled.

[Figure 1.]

The first class is given in Figure 1. This class was characterized as having generally low probability of showing favoritism, relative to Classes 2-4, and avoiding showing favoritism entirely for the School Shooting scenario. Individuals in this class opted to avoid favoritism in the School Shooting scenario where one ingroup life is compared to five outgroup lives, and a utilitarian choice of choosing five lives over one is taken. However, in the case of the DMV scenario, where one ingroup is pitted against multiple outgroup members, individuals in this class opted to show relatively high probability of showing favoritism. One explanation may be that the utility gained to the ingroup member may have been weighed more heavily than the dispersed inconvenience gained by many outgroup members. This suggests that individuals in this class may not abide by strictly maximizing utility of all beneficiaries but take a total utilitarian approach. Thus, a conceptual interpretation suggests that this class emphasizes total utilitarianism, in which the utility of all individuals involved in the situation is taken into consideration. Hence, this class is referred to as the *Total Utilitarian* (TU).

[Figure 2.]

The behavioral pattern of Class 2 is depicted in Figure 2. This class was characterized as avoiding scenarios in which the favoritism behavior mandates a direct causal harm to the outgroup member, such as in the University Admissions and Gift-Giving scenarios. In the prior scenario, the acting agent's decision to show favoritism to the ingroup member directly denies the rightful admission of the outgroup member. In the latter scenario, the acting agent's decision to show favoritism to the ingroup member directly denies a fair allocation of money to the outgroup member. In all other scenarios, however, the harm done to the outgroup members are less causal and more indirect. Thus, Class 2 is referred to as *Do No Harm (DNH)*.

[Figure 3.]

The behavioral pattern of Class 3, named Consequential Favoritism, is depicted in Figure 3. This class was characterized as showing favoritism only in scenarios where the cost associated with not showing favoritism was high (i.e., life-and-death situations). Accordingly, individuals in this class showed favoritism in the Hospital and School Shooting scenarios where the option of not showing favoritism carried the potential of the ingroup member dying but not in the other scenarios where the possible consequences to the ingroup member are minor to moderate in scale. Thus, Class 3 is referred to as *Consequential Favoritism (CF)*.

[Figure 4.]

The behavioral pattern of Class 4, named High Favoritism, is depicted in Figure 4. This class was characterized as generally showing high favoritism across all situations, relative to one or more of the other classes. This is particularly salient for the University Admissions and Gift-Giving scenarios where individuals in this class showed greater probability of showing favoritism than all the other classes. Thus, this class is referred to as *High Favoritism (HF)*.

[Table 3.]

For all classes, the distinct patterns by which participants engaged in favoritism did not change based on whether the target of the beneficiary was a family member (nepotism) or friend (cronyism). Thus, H1A was not supported. However, DNH and CF show support for the two dimensions of seriousness of consequences and directness of harm, partially supporting H1B. The classification and conceptualization of TU, however, does not align with either of the two dimensions. Accordingly, a separate, third dimension for the number of possible individuals impacted was conceptualized (see Table 3 for each vignette's categorization under each dimension) to support H1C.

[Table 4.]

A multinomial logistic regression was conducted to examine which variables predicted class membership. As shown in Table 3, the odds of being culturally tight was significantly lower in HF than DNH ($p = 0.010$) and CF ($p = 0.016$) but no differences were found in other comparisons between TU, DNH, and CF (p ranges from 0.109 – 0.945). Relative to TU, the odds of being collectivistic were significantly higher in DNH, CF, and HF (p ranges from <0.001 – 0.005). However, there were no differences in collectivism odds between DNH, CF, and HF (p ranges from 0.359 – 0.946). Relative to TU, the odds of being familistic was not significantly different for CF ($p = 0.752$) but were significantly higher in DNH ($p = 0.017$) and HF ($p < 0.001$). Accordingly, the odds of being familistic was significantly higher in DNH and HF than CF (p range from <0.001 to 0.018), with no difference between DNH and HF ($p = 0.118$). Relative to DNH, the odds of being morally relativistic was lower for TU ($p = 0.011$) and CF ($p < 0.001$) but there is no difference from HF ($p = 0.090$), partially supporting H2B. Accordingly, the odds of being morally relativistic was higher in HF than CF ($p = 0.026$). Relative to HF, the odds of endorsing the value of power was significantly less in DNH and CF (both $p < 0.001$) but showed

no difference with TU ($p = 0.077$). There were no significant class differences regarding the valuation of achievement (p ranges from 0.459 – 0.973) or conformity (p ranges from 0.076 – 0.653). The odds of valuing security were higher in CF than HF ($p = 0.027$) but otherwise no differences were found between the classes (p ranges from 0.124 – 0.718). The lack of significant findings partially do not support H2B.

[Table 5.]

[Figure 5.]

[Figure 6.]

[Figure 7.]

[Figure 8.]

Interaction analyses examining ethnicity (Latino/Hispanic and East Asian) with relevant cultural and moral variables (Tightness, Collectivism, Familism, and Moral Relativism) were conducted. Relative to TU, in DNH, there were significant interactions between Latino/Hispanic ethnicity and collectivism ($p = 0.005$) and familism ($p = 0.019$). Likewise, significant interactions between East Asian ethnicity and collectivism ($p = 0.008$) and familism ($p = 0.011$) were found. These interactions are also depicted in Figures 6 and 7. For low collectivism, both Latino/Hispanic and East Asian ethnic groups showed greater probability of class placement in TU than DNH. However, as collectivism increased, both ethnic groups showed greater probability of class placement in DNH while probability of class placement in TU decreased. For White European-Americans, the probably of DNH placement was consistently higher than TU placement (see Figure 6). However, for Familism, the opposite was true. For White European-Americans, low familism revealed greater probability of TU placement over DNH placement, with the pattern alternating as familism increased. However, for Latino/Hispanic and East Asian

ethnic groups, the probability of TU and DNH placement were either similar or probability of DNH placement was consistently higher than TU (see Figure 7). Relative to DNH, there was a significant interaction between the Latino/Hispanic ethnicity and collectivism ($p = 0.020$). Estimated marginal means for tightness (Figure 5) and moral relativism (Figure 8) are also given but showed no significant interactions with ethnicity.

CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

While the current body of literature has primarily examined favoritism from the lens of a target-specific typology, the results of this study illustrate how information beyond just the relationship of the beneficiary comes into consideration for engaging in favoritism. The results suggest that favoritism may vary along the dimensions of seriousness, directness of harm, and perceived total harm, loosely supporting Robinson and Bennett's (1995) two dimensions of workplace deviance but also introducing a new dimension of total harm involved. Overall, this study showed that the target specificity did not result in differentiated patterns among the classes, suggesting that for the specific situations examined in this study, the target of the beneficiary may not be important. Further, ethnicity was not a significant predictor for any class membership. However, the significant interactions for ethnicity and cultural values of collectivism and familism suggest some importance of ethnic differences. For Latino/Hispanics and East Asians, high valuation of collectivism is related to greater probability of class membership in DNH and lower probability of membership in TU. Low valuation of collectivism, however, presents the opposite trend. This interaction with collectivism is not observed in White European-Americans but is surprisingly present in familism, compared to Latino/Hispanics and East Asians where it is not, suggesting that ethnicity, while not directly predicting class membership, may still influence the way in which cultural values relate to class membership. For White European-Americans, increasing valuation of collectivistic ideals and familism may be more reflective of individual values than cultural norms.

Further, students who self-reported international academic status were more likely to be in HF. Because this study only examined international students from East Asia, due to the disproportionate demographic composition of East Asian foreign students within the subject

pool, this finding is not absolute but provides some basis with which one may hypothesize that differences in behavioral intentions for favoritism may stem from cross-national differences rather than ethnic differences within the U.S.. Indeed, because a large part of this demographic group is believed to be from China, where societal and cultural norms of *guanxi* may be emphasized, the tendency for this demographic group to disproportionately be situated in HF may be reflection of such norms. Future studies may benefit from collecting samples from other nations to examine possible predicted differences. Nonetheless, results from this study do not seem to support the notion that favoritism varies largely depending on the identity of the beneficiary.

Firstly, the favoritism scenarios were designed to vary along the two dimensions of seriousness and directness of harm, loosely aligning with Robinson and Bennett's (1995) dimensions of workplace deviance. While the scenarios corresponded accordingly, subsequent analyses of people's responses suggested that the classes identified from the LCA could not be neatly explained by a two-dimensional typology. This was more so evident from the identification of TU where favoritism probability of the hospital and school shooting were strikingly different despite carrying the same characteristics regarding seriousness and indirectness of harm (Table 3). Hence, we introduced a new dimension that captures the number of people involved in the scenario and provide the discussions of the dimensions:

Dimension 1. In line with prior literature on the typology of workplace deviance (Robinson & Bennett, 1995), the seriousness of the behavior allowed for a conceptual understanding of the magnitude of possible consequences involved for both the ingroup and outgroup member. Hence, the first dimension is labeled the *minor-serious dimension*. The consequences associated with the gift (receiving a cheaper gift) and DMV scenarios (waiting a

bit longer in line) were regarded as minor along the spectrum of this dimension because the costs present inconveniences at most. The university admissions scenario was regarded as moderate, as the consequences involved a relatively significant life event. The hospital and school shooting scenarios were regarded as serious, as the consequences involved life and death situations for both the ingroup and outgroup members. Accordingly, among the four classes identified in this study, CF varied along the seriousness dimension where members of this class exhibited high probability of engaging in favoritism for the two serious scenarios but otherwise showed low probability for all others.

Dimension 2. The second dimension was loosely based on prior literature (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Because favoritism is an interpersonal phenomenon, this dimension was adjusted to incorporate whether the behavior was a direct or indirect cause of their subsequent consequences. Thus, this dimension was labeled the *indirect-direct dimension*. Both the university admissions and gift scenarios were direct scenarios in that the acting agent was the sole arbiter of the consequence involved (i.e., denying someone's rightful admission or giving a cheaper gift). In contrary, the remaining three scenarios were indirect in that the acting agent's decisions may lead to the subsequent consequence, but other factors may be deemed the arbiter of harm (e.g., it was not the opening of the door that gets the classmates killed, but rather the school shooter). Among the four classes identified in this study, DNH varied along the directness dimension, as depicted in the tendency for individuals in this class to exhibit high probability of favoritism for scenarios where the cause of harm is indirect, but otherwise avoids scenarios where they may be held responsible for any direct harm.

Dimension 3. While the two dimensions of seriousness and directness of harm explain DNH and CF, the identification of TU suggests that a two-dimension typology is not sufficient

enough to adequately explain the patterns of favoritism. Post-hoc analyses identify that two of the five scenarios involve a comparison of one ingroup member with more than one outgroup member. Thus, we introduce a new *single-multiple dimension* to capture how many individuals may be potentially impacted in the scenario. However, the sheer number of individuals harmed cannot sufficiently explain the patterns of TU. Both the DMV and school shooting scenarios involve multiple outgroup members but show striking differences in the probability of engaging in favoritism. Thus, we reasoned that for TU, the seriousness of harm is taken into consideration in conjunction to the third dimension. In the case of the DMV scenario, the potential cost to outgroup members is minor and distributed (e.g., small inconvenience of waiting longer in line) in contrast to the school shooting dilemma where the potential cost to outgroup members is high and distributed (e.g., dying). Individuals in this class, however, show high probability of favoritism in the hospital scenario, suggesting that when the potential harm is focused on one outgroup member, the rational alternative may be to choose the ingroup member. Thus, individuals in this class may be characterized as attempting to maximize the total utility of all those involved, avoiding direct and serious harm to multiple outgroup members.

Subjective Responses to Dimensions

Several factors come into play when determining the type of people who respond differently to the same composition of characteristics in a scenario. We dub this psychological tendency as *subjective situational responses* to denote the notion that cultural and individual values induce different tendencies for favoritism among individuals. While target-specificity may not have provided the large variations in favoritism responses as prior literature would have suggested, results do provide an interesting insight into how different people reason when favoritism and ingroup bias is the rational alternative.

DNH was more likely to endorse familism and moral relativism than both TU and CF and more collectivism than TU, partially supporting H2B. The tendency for individuals in this class to depict higher probability of favoritism with moral relativism is in line with prior literature suggesting that moral relativism is related to tendencies to engage in unethical conduct (Lu et al., 2017; Rai & Holyoak, 2013). In situations where the direct arbiter of harm is not the acting agent, the indirect disassociation may allow one to morally disengage and select favoritism as the intended behavior. In contrast, CF was less likely to endorse values of familism or moral relativism than both DNH and HF. CF was also less likely to endorse the personal value of power but more likely to endorse the personal value of security than HF. These low tendencies in variables related to unethical conduct confirms CF's characterization as varying along the dimension of seriousness, avoiding favoritism across situations where the consequences are not severe. In comparison to the rest of the classes, TU was less likely to endorse familism than DNH and HF and less likely to endorse moral relativism than DNH. TU was also less likely to endorse collectivism than all classes. Indeed, examining the estimated marginal means reveal that TU generally showed low probability of class membership at high values across all relevant variables. These results suggest that the decisions and tendencies for those in TU were driven by variables outside culture and moral values. An examination of prior literature suggests that individuals with antisocial personality traits (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011), possessed anger traits (Choe & Min, 2011), and exhibited lower levels of empathy (Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013) were more likely to engage in utilitarian judgment, none of which were directly measured in this study. Nonetheless, it stands to reason that cultural values in collectivism, tightness, and familism, in addition to moral relativism, were not highly related to the likelihood of membership to TU. Lastly, an examination of HF suggests that those that are relatively high

along most or all of the cultural and individual values discussed in this paper may exhibit high favoritism regardless of the situational cues salient in the scenarios. For these individuals, engaging in favoritism may be deemed normative or expected.

The multinomial logistic regression results illustrate to us that several cultural and individual variables may explain the pattern by which they respond to scenarios that vary along the three dimensions. All classes reported relatively high probability of engaging in favoritism for the hospital scenario, suggesting that cultural or individual values may not be strong drivers of situations in which the situations are serious, harm to outgroup is indirect, and there is a single outgroup member involved. However, further research can clarify the patterns by which individuals respond to these scenarios by examining every possible combination along the three dimensions. Further, it will help to present multiple scenarios that share the same composition of the characteristics to investigate the robustness of the findings.

Limitations

There are several limitations with this study that should be considered in tandem with the interpretation of the results. Firstly, the sample was drawn from a university student body population rather than a body of business managers. Because using vignettes that the majority of participants would not have prior real-world exposure to would have impeded external validity, this study capitalized on using vignettes that university students would be able to better relate to. Thus, none of the situational vignettes reflected real-world managerial events (e.g., hiring) that illustrate opportunities for engaging in nepotism or cronyism. To maximize external validity of the results, future studies may opt to replicate or conduct similar tests that examine managers.

Secondly, the extent to which findings from hypothetical situations and moral dilemmas reflect real behaviors should also be assumed with caution. While the use of dilemmas has been a

staple part of moral and ethics research, dilemmas may often lack experimental and psychological realism (Bauman, McGraw, Bartels, & Warren, 2014), resulting in observable discrepancies between hypothetical and real-life decisions (Bostyn, Sevenhant, & Roets, 2018). While this study attempted to minimize such issues by developing vignettes that the sample population could relate to, caution should nonetheless be taken when generalizing results.

Lastly, this study utilized ten vignettes (five for each target) to examine the dimensions of situational favoritism. While the vignettes were all different in their own composition of the three dimensions, the use of only five vignettes per target limits the extent to which this study's results can be considered an exhaustive investigation into the favoritism typology. Future studies will benefit from examining more scenarios to both replicate the dimensions and classifications of individuals, as well as, further diversifying the typology of favoritism.

Implications

The results presented here have theoretical implications for further developing our understanding of favoritism as well as practical implications for addressing favoritism when the situational cues surrounding those favoritism behaviors are salient. While favoritism often carries a negative connotation, certain situational conditions may make favoritism a rational alternative for individuals. As shown in this study, the situational conditions are not interpreted in the same manner, with some individuals expressing favoritism across all situations and some responding to only certain compositions of situations along the three dimensions of favoritism. This typology of favoritism, while not exhaustive, may provide a foundation with which future studies may seek to examine when ingroup bias is deemed rational.

The results of this study also present practical implications for favoritism in the business sector. While a majority of the participants showed low tendency to engage in favoritism for the

direct harm scenarios, many more were likely to indicate their intention to engage in favoritism when the harm was indirect. Thus, this signals to us that individuals may be more prone to engage in favoritism where it may be less conspicuous (i.e., when it's less clear that they are the direct arbiter of harm). This suggests that firms may need to be more conscious of areas in which favoritism may manifest indirectly (e.g., interacting with select firms and partners) than directly (e.g., hiring family members).

Conclusion

Like with Robinson and Bennett (1995), it is our intention for this study to allow researchers to examine favoritism with a classification framework in mind. While our study did not provide typological differences between nepotism and cronyism, it remains important to still consider how the identity of the beneficiary may induce different types of responses, whether behavioral or judgmental, from both the acting agents and observers. Psychological and management research studies have heavily examined favoritism from the lens of target-based typology, but recent studies give evidence of researchers' understanding of how situations may play a significant role in both the promotion and mitigation of favoritism. Further research can help to garner a more concrete and nuanced understanding of the multiple dimensions associated with favoritism and its related psychological phenomena.

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APPENDIX A: VIGNETTES

Scenario 1. Bill was recently hired by a university to be a part of the undergraduate admissions committee where he screens applicants for their qualifications. He has two applications left to review and only one admission spot remaining. He decides to look at both applications at the same time. He notices that one application is from his [cousin/friend], whose qualifications are below the university acceptance cutoff line. The other applicant's qualifications, however, meet the cutoff line.

Scenario 2. It's close to New Year's, and Timothy's dormitory is having a gift-giving event. Everyone in the dormitory is assigned two people to give gifts to. People have traditionally bought gifts around \$10 for this event. Tim is assigned his two people, and notices that one is his [cousin/friend]. He does not know the other person. Tim has a budget of \$20 he can use to buy the gifts.

Scenario 3. Sam went to the Department of Motor Vehicles office to renew his license. Despite going early in the morning, there is a long line in front of him. The line is moving very slowly. While waiting for the line to decrease, someone asks him if they can cut in front of him. This person is Sam's [cousin/friend] who explains that he is in a big hurry. However, there is a long line behind Sam.

Scenario 4. Ethan is out on a drive. At a stoplight, he sees two pedestrians crossing the street. When they are halfway across the street, an oncoming car hits them both and speeds off. Ethan jumps out of his car and runs to the two injured pedestrians. He is shocked to see that one of the pedestrians is his [cousin/friend]. They are both seriously injured, but the stranger appears to be in worse shape. Ethan calls 911, and an ambulance is on the way. However, the ambulance will take 20 minutes to arrive and Ethan is not sure if the two will survive for that long.

Unfortunately, there is no one else around. He is 10 minutes from the hospital, but his car can only fit one more person.

Scenario 5. John was walking to his next class when he hears gunshots in the distance. He turns around to see a flurry of students running his way in a panic. John looks around for an escape route and sees an open classroom door. He hurries inside and sees five other students already in the class. John quickly closes and locks the door behind him. Soon, someone bangs on the door and screams for the door to be opened. John recognizes this voice to be his [cousin/friend]. The gunshots are louder than ever, and fragments of the bullets can be heard hitting the wall.

Table 1.

Situational Vignettes and Favoritism Choices of Each

Situational Vignette	Favoritism Choice	Family	Friend
1. University Admissions Dilemma	Admit a family/friend to the university despite him/her lacking qualifications.	21	16
2. Cost of Gift Dilemma	With a limited budget, spend more on a gift for family/friend and less on stranger.	22	22
3. DMV Line Dilemma	Let family/friend cut in line at the DMV and have the (undisclosed number of) strangers behind you wait longer.	69	61
4. Hospital Dilemma	Take a less critically injured family/friend to the hospital and leave the more critically injured stranger.	76	69
5. School Shooting Dilemma	Open the door to the classroom, allowing the family/friend into safety, but risk the shooter from entering the classroom where 5 other strangers are with you.	81	75

Note: Percentage of sample that opted for favoritism choice is given for Family and Friend targets.

Table 2.

Comparison of Latent Class Models

<i>Class n</i>	<i>Log Likelihood</i>	<i>AIC</i>	<i>BIC</i>	<i>G²</i>	<i>χ²</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>df Residual</i>	<i>Entropy</i>
2	-3910	7861	7958	1524	4928	21	726	0.827
3	-3782	7628	7775	1268	4398	32	715	0.913
4	-3660	7405	7604	1024	2736	43	704	0.853

Table 3.

Dimensions

Situational Vignette	Dimensions		
	Minor-Serious	Indirect-Direct	Single-Multiple
1. University Admissions Dilemma	Moderate	Direct	Single
2. Cost of Gift Dilemma	Minor	Direct	Single
3. DMV Line Dilemma	Moderate	Indirect	Multiple
4. Hospital Dilemma	Serious	Indirect	Single
5. School Shooting Dilemma	Serious	Indirect	Multiple

Table 4.

Multinomial Logistic Regression Examining Odds of Class Membership by Predictors

	Class 2 (DNH)			Class 3 (CF)			Class 4 (HF)		
	OR	95% CI	OR	95% CI	OR	95% CI	OR	95% CI	
Class 1 (TU) Reference									
Tightness	1.098	0.777 - 1.552	1.109	0.770 - 1.598	0.725	0.489 - 1.074	0.725	0.489 - 1.074	
Collectivism	2.876***	1.654 - 5.000	2.317*	1.289 - 4.162	2.926***	1.557 - 5.498	2.926***	1.557 - 5.498	
Familism	1.860*	1.117 - 3.099	1.091	0.636 - 1.872	2.705***	1.514 - 4.835	2.705***	1.514 - 4.835	
Moral Relativism	6.343*	1.522 - 26.436	0.437	0.099 - 1.928	2.100	0.428 - 10.317	2.100	0.428 - 10.317	
Power	0.891	0.760 - 1.044	0.891	0.753 - 1.056	1.182	0.982 - 1.423	1.182	0.982 - 1.423	
Achievement	1.069	0.896 - 1.274	1.012	0.840 - 1.219	1.015	0.829 - 1.243	1.015	0.829 - 1.243	
Conformity	0.904	0.783 - 1.044	0.871	0.748 - 1.015	0.932	0.790 - 1.101	0.932	0.790 - 1.101	
Security	1.032	0.870 - 1.224	1.109	0.925 - 1.329	0.912	0.751 - 1.108	0.912	0.751 - 1.108	
Class 2 (DNH) Reference									
Tightness			1.010	0.757 - 1.348	0.660*	0.482 - 0.905	0.660*	0.482 - 0.905	
Collectivism			0.806	0.507 - 1.279	1.017	0.616 - 1.680	1.017	0.616 - 1.680	
Familism			0.587*	0.377 - 0.913	1.455	0.909 - 2.328	1.455	0.909 - 2.328	
Moral Relativism			0.069***	0.021 - 0.229	0.331	0.092 - 1.188	0.331	0.092 - 1.188	
Power			1.000	0.877 - 1.141	1.327***	1.141 - 1.542	1.327***	1.141 - 1.542	
Achievement			0.947	0.818 - 1.096	0.950	0.807 - 1.117	0.950	0.807 - 1.117	
Conformity			0.964	0.855 - 1.087	1.031	0.902 - 1.179	1.031	0.902 - 1.179	
Security			1.074	0.930 - 1.241	0.884	0.755 - 1.034	0.884	0.755 - 1.034	
Class 3 (CF) Reference									
Tightness					0.654	0.462 - 0.925	0.654	0.462 - 0.925	
Collectivism					1.263	0.726 - 2.198	1.263	0.726 - 2.198	
Familism					2.480***	1.473 - 4.176	2.480***	1.473 - 4.176	
Moral Relativism					4.811*	1.205 - 19.216	4.811*	1.205 - 19.216	
Power					1.326***	1.125 - 1.563	1.326***	1.125 - 1.563	
Achievement					1.003	0.840 - 1.198	1.003	0.840 - 1.198	
Conformity					1.070	0.924 - 1.238	1.070	0.924 - 1.238	
Security					0.823*	0.692 - 0.978	0.823*	0.692 - 0.978	

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Adjusted for Age, Gender, Marriage Status, Socioeconomic Status, Ethnicity, and Academic Residency Status.

Table 5.

Multinomial Ethnicity and Cultural/Moral Variables Interaction

	Class 2 (DNH)			Class 3 (CF)			Class 4 (HF)		
	OR	95% CI	OR	95% CI	OR	95% CI	OR	95% CI	
Class 1 (TU) Reference									
Latino × Collectivism	9.369**	1.976 -	44.413	2.202	0.455 -	10.666	2.516	0.436 -	14.524
Latino × Familism	0.163*	0.036 -	0.744	0.315	0.068 -	1.456	0.343	0.064 -	1.836
Latino × Moral Relativism	4.283	0.065 -	282.861	30.076	0.469 -	1927.875	26.510	0.278 -	2528.319
Latino × Tightness	0.591	0.242 -	1.445	1.153	0.458 -	2.902	1.298	0.471 -	3.579
Asian × Collectivism	9.314**	1.804 -	48.078	4.563	0.845 -	24.624	3.173	0.512 -	19.657
Asian × Familism	0.140*	0.031 -	0.641	0.240	0.051 -	1.125	0.295	0.055 -	1.590
Asian × Moral Relativism	4.118	0.054 -	311.545	74.004	0.946 -	5786.808	20.907	0.202 -	2167.743
Asian × Tightness	0.454	0.182 -	1.135	0.867	0.336 -	2.241	0.692	0.244 -	1.963
Class 2 (DNH) Reference									
Latino × Collectivism				0.235*	0.069 -	0.799	0.268	0.066 -	1.096
Latino × Familism				1.933	0.580 -	6.439	2.100	0.563 -	7.826
Latino × Moral Relativism				7.037	0.258 -	191.600	6.175	0.157 -	242.256
Latino × Tightness				1.950	0.920 -	4.132	2.195	0.948 -	5.079
Asian × Collectivism				0.490	0.141 -	1.705	0.340	0.083 -	1.395
Asian × Familism				1.711	0.531 -	5.518	2.109	0.580 -	7.673
Asian × Moral Relativism				18.013	0.658 -	492.873	5.068	0.142 -	181.159
Asian × Tightness				1.911	0.917 -	3.982	1.525	0.661 -	3.515
Class 3 (CF) Reference									
Latino × Collectivism							1.142	0.265 -	4.926
Latino × Familism							1.087	0.272 -	4.346
Latino × Moral Relativism							0.879	0.022 -	35.594
Latino × Tightness							1.126	0.462 -	2.743
Asian × Collectivism							0.695	0.158 -	3.052
Asian × Familism							1.233	0.316 -	4.814
Asian × Moral Relativism							0.282	0.007 -	10.705
Asian × Tightness							0.798	0.329 -	1.933

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Adjusted for Age, Gender, Marriage Status, Socioeconomic Status, Ethnicity, Academic Residency Status, Tightness, Collectivism, Familism, Moral Relativism, Power, Achievement, Conformity, and Security.

Figure 1.

Class 1 Total Utilitarianism Response Patterns




Figure 2.

Class 2 Do No Harm Response Patterns




Figure 3.

Class 3 Consequential Favoritism Response Patterns




Figure 4.

Class 4 High Favoritism Response Patterns




Figure 5.
Tightness by Ethnicity




Figure 6.
Collectivism by Ethnicity




Figure 7.
 Familism Estimated Marginal Means by Ethnicity




Figure 8.

Moral Relativism Estimated Marginal Means by Ethnicity

