



Decolonizing Settler Colonialism: Kill the Settler in Him and Save the Man

Lorenzo Veracini

In recent years settler colonial studies consolidated into an autonomous comparative scholarly subfield. Both the scholarly journal *Settler Colonial Studies* and the emerging literatures that its associated blog has monitored since 2010 are a testament to this strengthening.¹ In 1998, when *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology* appeared, Patrick Wolfe offered one of this field's founding statements: "settler invasion is a structure, not an event."² An Australian-produced response to the consolidation and global spread of postcolonial studies as discourse and method,³ Wolfe's book and its defining formulation invited scholars to look for settler colonialism in the ongoing subjection of indigenous peoples in the settler societies. The contemporary settler politics, he noted in an oft-quoted passage, had been "impervious to regime change."⁴ Aboriginal poet and militant Bobby Sikes reflected on the lack of substantive change with irony: "What? Postcolonialism? Have they left?"⁵

However, possibly an indication of its relative success, settler colonial studies as interpretative framework has more recently been the object of sustained critique. As I outline below, this criticism was not coordinated and emerged from quite different scholarly settings. The first section of this article presents a provisional rejoinder to this criticism ("provisional" because I wish I had more space to do justice to these critiques and engage in more extended debate). This section's main purpose is to give a sense of a rapidly developing debate and to offer an entry point to the scholarly literature; it therefore privileges inclusion rather than exhaustiveness, with different critiques grouped and responded to thematically. Overall, the section argues that

LORENZO VERACINI is associate professor of history and politics at the Swinburne University of Technology in Melbourne, Australia. His research focuses on the comparative history of colonial systems and settler colonialism. He has authored *Israel and Settler Society* (2006), *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (2010), and *The Settler Colonial Present* (2015). Lorenzo is coeditor of *The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism* (2016) and editor-in-chief of *Settler Colonial Studies*.

settler colonial studies has been often critiqued as if it were premised on what Latin Americanist Hernan Vidal called “technocratic literary criticism,” or the “presumption that when a new analytic and interpretative approach is being introduced, the accumulation of similar efforts in the past is left superseded and nullified.”⁶ Vidal was talking about the ways in which postcolonial studies had failed to engage with Latin America and with scholarship emanating from there.

Similarly, as I elaborate below, settler colonial studies has been criticized for potentially neglecting indigenous studies and the colonized position of slaves and their descendants. But there is no technocratic impulse in the case of settler colonial studies; as a scholarly endeavor it was never meant to nullify previous efforts. On the contrary, this paper argues that settler colonial studies always saw itself as building on the previous accomplishments of both indigenous critique—the global emergence of transnational indigenous studies—and the critiques of racial capitalism offered by the black radical tradition.⁷ It is in the context of this genealogy that this article was submitted to the *American Indian Culture and Research Journal*.

More importantly, however, the second section reflects on the possible uses of settler colonial studies to further decolonizing agendas. I am a settler, but indigenous resurgence is in my interest. It will make me a better human being and a worse settler. The title of this article is a play on Richard H. Pratt’s ominous late-nineteenth-century motto, “kill the Indian in him and save the man.”⁸ It condenses my key proposal. I recommend a Fanonian (and metaphorical) “cull” of the settler; the aim is to save the “man,” or the woman.⁹ My humanity is to come; it will follow genuine decolonization. Fanon got it right. I am thinking about a type of liberation that in the end works for all, even if this involves a deferred reconciliation—indeed precisely *because* it involves a deferred reconciliation.¹⁰

The critiques explored in this paper’s first section are very different from each other, as will be outlined further. On the one hand, a few settler scholars, while genuinely concerned with indigenous welfare, foreclose the possibility of a decolonizing passage. They are confident that political processes undertaken *within* the political structures of the settler polities will result in genuine progress. They thus reject one of settler colonial studies’ main contributions, which was to alert us to what Alissa Macoun and Elizabeth Strakosch have called the settler polities’ “central structural continuity.”¹¹ They reject the proposition that a decolonizing passage is needed. On the other hand, indigenous and nonindigenous radical scholars argue that indigenous resurgencies will result in sovereignties that will remain extraneous to the settler polities, and that there is no need to imagine an indigenous-nonindigenous relationship that is ongoing. In other words, the former critique argues that indigenous sovereignties will be contained by settler ones; the other argues that indigenous sovereignties will be essentially unrelated to settler ones. But why containment *or* excess? Can we think of a dispensation where indigenous sovereignty is articulated without being subsumed or superseded?

Settler colonial studies aims to constitute a space between these two options. The other main contribution of settler colonial studies is that there is a need to focus on settlers and what they do in order to undo settler colonialism. They are the problem; they should not be normalized. A rejection of the official settler “politics of recognition”

(fair enough) should be paralleled by the active constitution of decolonizing nonindigenous constituencies. Settlers could be part of decolonization, possibly even an asset for it, and developing a cultural pedagogy that turns them into agents for decolonization is worth the effort. Additionally, as this paper argues, settlers have much to gain from the genuine decolonization of settler colonialism. The “settler contract” was never fair but is now especially meaningless.¹² Settlers may try something better.

SETTLER COLONIAL STUDIES AND ITS DISCONTENTS

A number of scholars have critiqued settler colonial studies for its methodology. In a 2014 article that warranted a special section in *Australian Historical Studies*, social scientist and historian Tim Rowse authoritatively decried the “structuralist” approach of settler colonial studies.¹³ This is an important argument and it was raised several times afterwards. Even if settler colonial studies actually consists of a variety of very different approaches, it is true that settler colonial studies focused on the ways in which settler invasion *structures* a particular set of unequal relationships between indigenous and exogenous collectives. But ultimately, as I have argued in my response to Rowse’s article, to label scholars contributing to settler colonial studies “structuralist” is unwarranted.¹⁴ Just as looking at history does not make you a historicist, observing a particular social structure does not make you a structuralist.

Similarly, law historian Lisa Ford, who collaborated with Rowse in an important international project appraising the heterogeneity of contemporary indigenous-settler relations in multiple contexts, criticized settler colonial studies for its tendency to propose abstract analyses detached from specific situations: an alleged failure to contextualize.¹⁵ Again, this is a most relevant observation. But all theory is a result of abstraction. Hence, Ford critiques settler colonial studies for doing precisely what it set out to do: to abstract for the purpose of theory. Criticism like this can only be sustained if we somehow imagine that the scholarly debate that underpins the emergence of settler colonial studies is entirely disconnected from surrounding disciplinary fields and scholarly traditions. Moreover, conceptual-analytic and empirical-descriptive moments are necessarily linked: one would not exist without the other. The critique here is that settler colonial studies forsakes empirical observation, while actually it is predicated on it. Settler colonial studies would not be possible without work that emanates from related disciplinary traditions and national historiographies. Possibly the most significant characteristic of settler colonial studies as a developing subfield has been its transdisciplinary and comparative character. Indeed, in this instance abstraction should be seen as the dialectical outcome of empiric achievement, not its denial.

Other scholars have contested settler colonial studies by focusing on its findings. Uncomfortable with the notion of a “logic of elimination” and its proliferation in a multiplicity of interpretative contexts, New Zealand historian of imperial formations Tony Ballantyne authoritatively criticized a definition of elimination “so capacious as to be analytically unhelpful.”¹⁶ But the definitional apparatus of settler colonial studies and its emphasis on elimination is dialectically linked to its opposite: let’s call it the colonial logic of reinscription, the ongoing reproduction of colonial difference, the

sustained implementation of what Partha Chatterjee has called colonialism's "rule of difference."¹⁷ A drive towards elimination and a focus on the reproduction of colonial difference remain dialectically linked. In any case, settler colonial studies always aimed to complement, not replace, colonial or imperial studies.

The notion that settler colonial studies allegedly proclaims the elimination of indigenous resistance is much repeated, yet an exploration of settler colonialism's "logic" of elimination cannot be construed as an appraisal of an accomplished elimination. How this "zombie" claim has proliferated is epitomized by Miranda Johnson's recent dismissal of Wolfe's work as "insufficient": relying on the critiques of others, her argument misreads Wolfe, who never suggested that settler colonialism successfully "eliminates" indigenous peoples.¹⁸ The fundamental distinction here is between the "logic of elimination" and "elimination." They are identified by different terms and are not the same, yet this distinction is lost in these critiques. Generally, they take two shapes: some emphasize that indigenous peoples retained agency and the ability of shaping relationships *in the past* and for a long time, and that this ability counters the notion that indigenous autonomy was "eliminated" by settler invasion. As a result, a focus on the "middle ground" and its longevity diverts attention from the successive settler onslaught on indigenous communities. Others note that indigenous struggles for sovereignty and self-affirmation will renegotiate the terms of settler domination in the future, and that present struggles, through their very existence, counter the notion that indigenous autonomy was ever "eliminated." Both approaches fail to consider that the logic of elimination and indigenous agency and resurgence are also dialectically related. Whether in the past or in the present, settler colonialism's logic of elimination remains the dialectical counterpart of indigenous sovereignty. Neither should be appraised in isolation.

Rowse, Ford, Johnson, and Ballantyne—a group that includes a settler scholar whose expertise is primarily in indigenous policy, two law historians, and an historian of British imperial formations—have expressed an antipodean reluctance to acknowledge settler colonial studies.¹⁹ This is, however, a global debate. Scholars contributing to borderlands historiographies have similarly expressed dissatisfaction with settler colonial studies. They are especially alarmed by some of its keywords, such as "take-over," "elimination," "structure," and "binaries." This should not surprise, given that borderlands historiographies are characterized by very different terms: "situational," "circumstantial," "ambiguous," "contingent," and "unpredictable."²⁰ Borderlands historiographies concentrate on an "end of empire" in locales where the power of imperial centers finally wanes, exhausted by distance. These two literatures have developed different terminologies because they examine different circumstances. But settler colonial studies, too, refers to an "the end of empire" of sorts: an empire that runs its course without exhausting itself—an empire that completes its "transit," to use Jodi Byrd's apt concept.²¹ Supersession is neither a colonial reinscription of difference nor a borderlands dissolution of power.

I would like to suggest that an articulation of analytical labor may be emerging here: one historiography addresses locales where "anything can happen," and where power is "contested by many and controlled by none"; the other deals with settings

where “something has happened,” that is, settler conquest, which prompts the recurrence of unfounded allegations that settler colonial studies sees settler colonialism as ultimately “inevitable.”²² And yet, even an analysis that is guided by a determination to recover the historical ascendancies of indigenous polities and their ability to exercise their “imperial moments” against indigenous and nonindigenous collectives alike has to consider the successive emergence and consolidation of settler-colonial orders.²³ The two approaches may complement each other rather than being mutually exclusive. Different focuses may result in a non-debate, like a tennis match between accomplished players who face off at opposite ends of separate courts. But I would suggest that this tension should not be seen as necessarily sterile; borderlands historiographies and settler colonial studies remain dialectically linked.

Moreover, settler colonial studies was never meant to operate in an intellectual vacuum. Rather, as a paradigm identifying a specific mode of domination, it was designed to explore the dialectical tension between exploitation and elimination. Of course, this tension is not new—it constitutes, for example, Hegel’s master-slave dialectic (one may disagree that it represents what actually happened, but it cannot be denied that it remains a seminal contribution to the ways we understand exploitation).²⁴ Elimination and exploitation not only coexist in tension; they also codefine each other.²⁵ One does not exist without the other, and in their dialectical opposition one brings the other into existence. Emphasizing a constitutive dialectic, settler colonial studies was always meant to integrate, not displace, the already available ways in which colonial phenomena are analyzed. Nor was it an attempt to flatten complexity or predetermining outcomes; on the contrary, as part of a dialectical reflection, settler colonial studies was meant to enable a focus on the constitutive binaries that produce hybridity, and not only as a result of an encounter between different subjectivities following displacement and the colonial encounter, but also as a result of interaction between different modalities of domination that appear in the spectrum of possibilities characterized by exploitation and extermination. Rather than contest borderlands methodologies, settler colonial studies was an invitation to explore the borderlands where different modalities of oppression, not simply different empires and their agencies, meet.

An articulation of analytical labor may apply with regard to other disciplinary approaches as well. Introducing an edited collection on the topic of “Native Diasporas,” Gregory Smithers and Brooke Newman recently argued against “rigid paradigms” and for “fresh, meaningful, and methodologically innovative ways.”²⁶ According to these authors, who note that Wolfe sees indigenous history as made up of only victimization and violence, Wolfe’s paradigm is restrictive and limits Native agency—hence their commitment to a postcolonial perspective. Postcolonial studies’ reiteration of an irreducible hybridity, however, results from a disinclination to inquire into its constitutive components.²⁷ This inquiry would complement, not betray, specific observation, and analyze, not reduce, “heterogeneity.”²⁸ What is, after all, hybridity constituted by? It is like saying, for example, that gravity “just is,” instead of thinking about force and mass.

Other scholars have complained about settler colonial studies’ consolidation relative to other fields. In a brief article published in the magazine of the American Historical Association, Nancy Shoemaker reminds historians that settler colonialism

is only one among many (i.e., twelve) types of colonialism and noted that in “the past several years, settler colonial theory has taken over my field.”²⁹ Similarly, Kēhaulani Kauanui recently noted that “Settler Colonial Studies does not, should not, and cannot replace Indigenous Studies,” and that “to exclusively focus on the settler colonial without any meaningful engagement with the indigenous—as has been the case in how Wolfe’s work has been cited—can (re)produce another form of ‘elimination of the native.’”³⁰ Echoing similar concerns, Canada-based scholars Corey Snelgrove, Rita Kaur Dhamoon, and Jeff Corntassel have argued recently that a renewed focus on settlers and their hegemony may contribute to obscuring indigenous peoples.³¹

The focus shift is undeniable. But there is a specific genealogy at work here that should not be ignored. Settler colonial studies is necessarily predicated on the previous achievements of indigenous scholars. It does not displace indigenous-based scholarship and its epistemologies; indeed, it acknowledges them through its very existence as well as through scholarly referencing. But reinscribing the settlers as the only agents of history and, historiographically speaking, returning full circle to a pre-1960s exclusive focus on heroic, manly pioneers is now impossible. On the contrary, emphasis on this presumed risk itself neglects the relevance of the indigenous-led paradigm shift. There is no way back: the achievements of indigenous studies and other historiographies in centering the experience and epistemologies of indigenous peoples are now irreversible and we are all better off for it. Also, a determination not to ventriloquize, or to speak on behalf of indigenous voices, should not be misconstrued as neglect, nor does deference to indigenous voices mean there is a lack of interest.³²

In their survey of what they define as ways of “colonial unknowing,” Manu Vimalassery, Juliana Hu Pegues, and Alyosha Goldstein similarly referred to settler colonial studies.³³ They were considering “the ways in which the generative work of Patrick Wolfe has been taken up reductively to occlude settler colonialism as constitutively entangled with broader imperial formations,” how analyses of settler colonialism “as isolated from imperialism and differential modes of racialization are consequences of the institutionalization of this work as a distinct subfield,” and how this approach can “foreclose or bracket out interconnections and relational possibilities.”³⁴ They do not mention specific instances of this actually happening—and there is a good reason why you need a body to set up a murder trial. My suggestion, however, is that disciplinary currents actually ran the other way around: it was the analysis of settler colonialism that followed those of colonialism and imperialism; it was settler colonial studies that made observing the interconnections possible.

Other critiques have noted a tendency to see settler colonialism as “inevitable and transhistorical.”³⁵ The possibility of preemption is a serious charge; preemption is, after all, what settlers do as they enter “empty” lands (or what their sovereigns do, depending on who retains the initiative),³⁶ and preemption is incontestably a move critical analysis should avoid, not replicate. It is true that the scholars who have contributed to settler colonial studies as a developing field have collectively focused on settler colonialism as a mode of domination, but they certainly do not think that it is “unavoidable.” It is like the television series *Mayday* (known in Australia and elsewhere as *Air Crash Investigations*), which focuses on the planes that crash, but nonetheless does

not assume that all planes must invariably fall from the sky. Likewise, in exploring a specific mode of domination settler colonial studies observes ongoing subjection, but to do so neither predetermines it nor sees it where there is none.

Ultimately, the best way to respond to these criticisms is to patiently reconstruct genealogies. Settler colonial studies cannot replace indigenous studies because it is predicated on it. Settler colonial studies cannot obstruct an analysis of the relationship between differently colonized constituencies because it follows the consolidation of colonial and postcolonial studies. If anything, it enables a relational analysis that had been previously impossible. The same holds true for the notion that settler colonialism was only one mode of domination among many and often not even the most important one: the analysis of settler colonial phenomena was added to the analysis of other colonial formations; it was predicated on this work. It is not a return, but a dialectical departure. Likewise, settler colonial studies cannot be accused of proclaiming indigenous elimination, or of seeing it as inevitable, because it was born in a contestation of the alleged “postcoloniality” of settler societies. Settler colonial studies emerged *against* claims that assumed a postcolonial condition: “What? Have they left?”

UNDOING THE GLOBAL “SETTLER REVOLUTION”

Some critiques, however, cannot be met with genealogy. Settler colonial studies has been criticized (1) for not offering practical suggestions and (2) because it may even hinder projects of indigenous emancipation.³⁷ Though they arise from very different standpoints, both these critiques identify a political deficit. The list that follows is an attempt to cover that deficit that, moving away from scholarly contestations, collects possible suggestions for developing a decolonizing agenda. Audra Simpson defines settler colonialism as “an ongoing structure of domination that targets Indigenous peoples for elimination.”³⁸ It is a good starting point. “Decolonizing settler colonialism,” as invoked by this article’s title, envisages a circumstance in which the settler demand for indigenous land and vanishing is finally discontinued in all its forms. Decolonizing is here understood as a process that will lead to the eventual undoing of settler colonialism as a mode of domination and its legacies. I wish to again emphasize that although settler colonial studies has proven good as heuristics—and making reality intelligible is what heuristic devices should be asked to do—settler colonial studies should not and cannot develop *by itself* a theory of settler decolonization. As it necessarily depends on the leadership of others, this list is even more provisional than the previous one. Decolonization will be a collective, indigenous-led endeavor.³⁹

(1) A refusal to compartmentalize will contribute to undoing settler colonialism. If settler colonialism is a mode of domination premised on a particular relationship, its undoing will be a relationship. This is not a metaphor. This is what happens after land is returned and substantive sovereignty is acknowledged. Eve Tuck and Wayne Yang make a compelling case and their call to think carefully when talking about decolonization should be taken seriously: “Until stolen land is relinquished,” they note, “critical consciousness does not translate into action that disrupts settler colonialism.”⁴⁰

The decolonized relationship I am talking about would *follow* that disruption, not substitute for it.

In the settler polities two very different compartmentalizing movements currently affect indigenous and settlers. For the sake of clarity, I would call these compartmentalizing options the “conservative” and the “radical.” Kirsty Gover systematically explored the conservative in *Tribal Constitutionalism*, a comprehensive exploration of recent developments in indigenous governance and self-governance in all the Anglophone settler societies.⁴¹ Gover concludes her survey by arguing that “tribal constitutionalism introduces a new legal pluralism to the constitutions of the Western settler societies that is necessary for the continuation of tribal self-governance.”⁴² In recent decades, and in very different ways and contexts, the “tribes” explored in her work have indeed become able to autonomously determine membership and to regulate their internal governance and their collective relationships with the settler polities that contain them. But significantly, they do so as other associations do and are burdened by similar limitations. There is no inherent sovereign charge in this type of indigenous associationism. You and I can set up corporate bodies to manage assets we own and operate them along very similar lines. This is the conservative compartmentalizing option. The radical compartmentalizing option, on the other hand, demands a sovereign charge. Glen Coulthard’s influential critique of the liberal “politics of recognition,” for example, is premised on “resurgence” as a reclamation of inherently sovereign capabilities.⁴³

Resistance against the false promises of “recognition” is indeed key, but resistance is inevitably contextual and relational. There are instances when recognition is *denied* as a means of repression (in contemporary Australia or Israel, for example), but also other instances when recognition is *enforced* as a tool of repression. In cases of denial of recognition, demanding that the settler polity formally recognize indigenous priority can be a powerful decolonizing stance. Indigenous resistance is necessarily heterodirected, a struggle shaped by contextual constraints. Opposing settler colonialism as a mode of domination requires flexibly resisting (in alphabetical order): absorption, amalgamation, assimilation, concentration, dispersal, exclusion, extermination, incarceration, integration, invasion, termination, transfer—and indeed, resisting state-sponsored recognition and its “cunning” as well.⁴⁴ Even the prospect of settler evacuation should be resisted. When it is offered, it is usually intended to evade treaty responsibility and responsibility in general, and evacuate marginal land that is incapable of sustaining meaningful indigenous sovereignty. I have referred elsewhere to this prospect as settler “self-transfer.”⁴⁵

Coulthard argues that indigenous “resurgences” are necessarily premised on the unilateral self-affirmation of indigenous subjectivities, and that this self-affirmation must be independent of settler recognition. The last point is incontrovertible, but Fanonian self-affirmation should be a means to an end, with the ultimate horizon remaining a genuinely decolonial form of recognition—ultimately, a type of revolutionary humanism. Fanonian self-affirmation is the necessary preliminary work to establish the very possibility of dialectical movement: I am a settler and I am on indigenous land even when I am home and I should know my place in that place, yet I think there is still a “we” in a future in which decolonization is underway, let alone

one in which decolonization is fully realized.⁴⁶ Decolonizing futures should be futures where the indigenous-settler relationship remains meaningful and ongoing as it is decolonized.⁴⁷ Under settler colonialism, the settler typically aims to discontinue the indigenous-settler relationship and demands that the indigenous “problem,” if not the indigenous person, must disappear. Coulthard’s neglect of settlers, beyond tactically welcoming them as potential “allies,” reproduces that discontinuation in some ways. For Fanon (but not for Coulthard) nationalism needs to be only a transitory phase, an antithesis leading to the moment of future synthesis: not a prematurely declared totality, but a truly decolonized world that one day may reconstitute humanity in its unity.⁴⁸ Settler colonial studies is equally needed, even though it is predicated on critical indigenous studies and can only follow it.

Decolonization will also be furthered if the compartmentalizing of the international state system, which enforces bounds on different settler colonial projects, is rejected. Steven Salaita’s recent formulation of “inter/nationalism” encapsulates this stance.⁴⁹ His book of the same title is about a new internationalism: not a cosmopolitan or a socialist internationalism, but a global indigenous one, where the nation is not that of the settler nation state but the nation that is to arise through the decolonization that is to come. Settler colonial projects are imbricated in each other, those involving Israel and the United States even more than others. They will be undone by inter/nationalist struggles.

(2) Defending place-based indigeneity will contribute to undoing settler colonialism. Place-based indigenous life is already advocated by indigenous scholars and I have little to add beyond a minor suggestion.⁵⁰ Defending place-based indigeneity could be promoted at the conceptual level by using “indigenous” and related terms in their noncapitalized form. Capitalization looks flattering, but it may not be worth it. As indigenous claims are premised on specific relationships to place, there is more decolonizing strength in the adjective than in the noun—nouns, after all, are eminently transferable and indigenous collectives should resent all transfers. “Indigenous” in its adjectival form is stubbornly place-specific. The capitalized form subtly detaches indigenous peoples from their most significant claim: their ontologic relationship with “Country,” as Aboriginal Australians refer to their estates.

This grammatical point is important in that grammar is sovereignty. Grammar organizes knowledge. Carl Schmitt, who knew a thing or two about sovereignty, famously noted that “Caesar is also the master of grammar.”⁵¹ Rather than capitalizing, using lower case for key terms would sustain a crucial argument about political geometry and settler colonialism: indigenous people retain a better claim than that of settlers because they are indigenous and retain their connection to country/land, not because they are a people; and they are a people because they are sovereign, not because they are indigenous. One could conceive of sociopolitical collectives that may be “Indigenous” but not “indigenous” (for example, one is “indigenous” irrespective of where exactly one is located, just like an “English” person remains “English” whether she is in England or not).

Moreover, as Fanon noted in the context of an inherently relational dialectic, “it is the settler that brings the native into existence” (as “native”), and it is the settler society that brings “indigenous” peoples into existence.⁵² An emphasis on a settler-derived ethnogenesis would hinder efforts to self-affirm indigenous subjectivities and recover or sustain indigenous place-based existence. Geographer Sarah Radcliffe also reflected on the politics of capitalization and noted that indigeneity “refers to a socio-spatial field, not a particular group.”⁵³ I agree: the decolonization of settler-colonial relationships is a sociospatial field, a process that necessarily involves collectives that have displaced and those who have not. Noncapitalization reminds us of that fundamental fact.

(3) Analytical clarity will contribute to undoing settler colonialism. Settler colonialism is not white supremacy, not capitalism, not patriarchy. It articulates with other structures of domination but it remains a distinct part of a system of oppression. Discussing the specificity of settler colonialism as a mode of domination is not meant to detract from the importance of other oppressive or dispossessive systems, but rather to integrate them. Modes of domination overlap and interact; they remain related. Settler colonial studies offers a set of analytical tools, and there is no limit to how many tools one may want to own.

Likewise, settler colonial studies is not critical indigenous studies. Even though it is predicated on it, the two should be kept separate. Byrd’s recent intervention on this topic and her call to constantly question whether new scholarship is actually furthering decolonizing passages is needed and welcome.⁵⁴ Kauanui’s already-mentioned paper also warned about the risk of collapsing the two.⁵⁵ But the two fields may be seen as complementary, and there is hope that indigenous resurgencies may be paralleled by settler ones. Complementarity carries its own risks and Byrd and Kauanui were highlighting precisely those risks, rightly reminding scholars that indigenous concerns and their priority should be always foregrounded, but a settler resurgence would be necessarily premised on their prior reconstitution as decolonizing subjects. As this article’s title also suggests, the metaphorical resurgence of the settler must follow his metaphorical death.

In other words, if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterized, to use Wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that “come to stay” and by an unrelenting “logic of elimination,” the way out may be to turn the former against the latter.⁵⁶ Pratt’s perverse proposal about “killing Indians” and “saving men” suggested using indigenous individuals for the purpose of indigenous elimination. This proposal would operate in two simultaneous directions, sapping the demographic and cultural strength of indigenous polities while accruing human material for the settler project. My proposal to similarly (and metaphorically) “kill settlers” to “save their humanity” aims to turn the descendants of invaders, including their political descendants, into resources for decolonization. The idea is to finally depart as settlers: “What? They may be leaving?”⁵⁷

For this to occur, one needs to talk about settlers and one needs to talk to them. We need to make decolonization appealing to them, too. The positive vision of a more meaningful and sustainable relationship with the places we inhabit and all its communities should continue to be brought forward, but we should also point out

that decolonization is also worth it because settler colonialism now has very little to offer. Once premised on the promise of independent life on the land, it has ended up consisting almost exclusively of dispossession for all and subordination to distant and unaccountable concerns. It was a false promise then; it is an exploded promise now. We need a specific cultural pedagogy that will allow a step-by-step building-up of an alternative hegemony. To “educate” literally means to “lead out.” This etymology and the analogy that it evokes reveals how focusing on pedagogy may be apt. We should aim to lead the settler out. For this “war of position” what is needed is indigenous leadership (i.e., a relation).⁵⁸

(4) Entangling worlds and a type of indigenous-led settler indigenization will contribute to undoing settler colonialism. “Entangling” should be distinguished from “reconciliation.” The latter can be defined in many ways, and definition is always a very political act (that “reconciliation” means many different things to many different peoples probably contributes to its current proliferation in public discourse in many settler societies). Reconciliation is indeed a powerful image and it is routinely mobilized in a variety of settings. Its advocates (even if they may be advocating the term for very different reasons and on the basis of very different understandings) adopt it because it promises closure (this is also why apologies have become frequent). “Closure” is a significant asset when the aim is to foreclose future relationships.

Those who oppose reconciliation processes often demand that settlers must remain “accountable.” I am not saying that calls for reconciliation and accountability should be seen as politically equivalent, but I want to note that both are equally premised on metaphors that emanate from the language of financial accounting. Accounting is one of the “metaphors we live by.”⁵⁹ Reconciliation and accountability are indeed not the same politically: in seeking a settler-determined closure, officially sanctioned “reconciliation” brings the calculus forward, while accountability pushes the calculus back in order to defer a settler-determined closure.⁶⁰ But a calculus remains a calculus: financial accounting requires that we think about an end, about the time when the books will be closed. There is no more finality than this. Moreover, in a way all “settlements” (especially financial transactions) are final, and settler colonialism as a mode of domination aims towards finality. Unlike reconciliation, then, entanglement programmatically rejects closure and finality.

Structuring metaphors are crucial; they construct and therefore preempt meaning (preemption again). I propose we move away from the logic of give-and-take and associated spreadsheets; we must rely on better metaphors. Honoring treaties and shaping treaty traditions enables us to think about respectful relationships that are ongoing, to think about each other’s respectful presence in our lives. This is not that new. Indigenous peoples have traditionally understood treaties as ongoing and negotiable.⁶¹ I agree that treaties can be seen as final settlements—transactions between indigenous peoples and settlers have been routinely seen as conveying property rights in perpetuity—but they can also be seen as ongoing reciprocal arrangements. As Eva Mackey has argued, “treaty” should be seen as a verb rather than a noun.⁶² Treaties can be about finalizing a full and final purchase, but they can also be seen as rental

agreements, compacts where property is not conveyed in perpetuity (that is, the opposite of a final settlement). Settlers should accept that the best they can do is to see themselves as respectful and respected guests and to commit to “rent” indigenous property. If settler colonialism is about imagining “free” land somewhere else, and land can only be free if indigenous peoples are violently dispossessed, then rent is a way out of settler colonialism. Better metaphors should not have to rely on brand-new ideas; after all, the idea that settlers should pay rent, that is, the prospect of a fiscal compact that recognizes indigenous sovereignty, is not new in Australia.⁶³

The price may be discussed, but hidden in plain sight within these “rental” agreements will be the fundamental prior recognition of the sovereign rights of the lessor. Treaties historically produced terrible consequences for indigenous communities, and this historical legacy must be kept in mind, but the treaty traditions that may sustain a decolonial future should be different. Lessees must undertake to respect the property of the lessors. They do not build poisonous pipelines on land they do not own; if they do, they are, to use a technical term, delinquent tenants. Rental transactions are not final settlements (this is one way of relinquishing the finality that is inherent in the “logic of elimination”). Most importantly, with rental agreements indigenous rights could be represented as normal, not “special” rights.⁶⁴ Special rights is a notion that settler constituencies have found especially unpalatable.

Likewise, if we recognize the etymological relationship among “entreat,” “entertain,” and “treaty” as meaningful, treaties could be seen as “treats” rather than bitter pills. The added value of this approach is that treaty relations could be understood as not occasional treats, but as a type of superfood that nourishes individuals and communities. Provided that indigenous protocol is respected and that it is clear that we meet on indigenous ground and that this recognition carries important consequences for the way we relate to each other, treaty traditions could be entertaining—important moments when we entertain each other; Ivan Illich defined these moments as “conviviality.”⁶⁵ Treaties could thus become the “tools” for conviviality we so desperately need! Even “reconciliation” could be recovered as a metaphor if we were clear about rejecting closure. It has *consilium* in it. With treaty traditions, reconciliation could be seen as a description of a “society in council.”

In this context, an indigenous-led type of settler indigenization and associated “uncertainties” will help decolonization.⁶⁶ This is about turning settler yearnings for indigenization on their head. Indigenous people are: they *are* indigenous, while settlers become: they *indigenize*. As “being indigenous” by definition excludes ever *having become* indigenous, settlers can never “be indigenous.” It is a paradox of the settler condition that can never be satisfactorily avoided—there is a reason why logics is shaped by universal laws, and even the sovereign in this case cannot decide on the exception. Settlers should embrace their becoming.⁶⁷ In an article entitled “Becoming Pakeha,” John Newton refers to the need to learn to “speak and act from the political space which our relationship with Maori open up to us.”⁶⁸ I think all settlers should seek relationships with indigenous peoples and cherish the political space that they open up. Settlers, after all, have always sought space; they might make good use of this metaphorical space as they return land.

New Zealand sociologist Avril Bell recently offered an analysis of a new public building, Te Ahu, part of a community complex that services a small rural community in the Far North of New Zealand. In the main entrance stands a series of seven *pou* (carved wooden posts) representing the community's seven peoples. Five are representing Maori, one is for Pakeha, and one for "Dalmatians" (settler New Zealand's exclusivist, British-only immigration policy allowed for some exceptions). This array not only concerns representation; indeed, the *pou* signify the ancestors' actual presence. This is an indigenous way of doing things that has meaning. The *pou* "entangle Maori and Pakeha ontologies," Bell notes, and thus the *pou* figure an *ongoing* relationship framed by indigenous tradition.⁶⁹ In this sense, they are a break from settler-colonial practice, and an "act of resistance to the settler colonial project of erasure."⁷⁰ Bell adds that they are "a powerful affirmation *from* Māori of my identity and claim to this place as my home."⁷¹ They enable an act of "indigenization of public space" and a type of indigenous-led settler indigenization. It is a smart move: the *pou* signify settler belonging and authority, but do so as they refer to the ongoing presence of specific ancestors.⁷² These ancestors, for Pakeha and "Dalmatians" alike, are, and forever will be, from somewhere else.

Settler colonialism as a mode of domination typically seeks finality. Interrupting its drive is genuine decolonizing work. We need interruptions. Audra Simpson evoked the Mohawk "*interruptus*."⁷³ We need the settler *interruptus* too.

NOTES

1. See *Settler Colonial Studies*, <http://www.tandfonline.com>. See also "Settler Colonial Studies blog," <http://settlercolonialstudies.org/>.

2. Patrick Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event* (London: Cassell, 1999), 163.

3. Quite interestingly, postcolonial studies was also originally an Australian intellectual export. See Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Subaltern Studies and Postcolonial Historiography," *Nepantla: Views from South* 1, no. 1 (2000): 9–32.

4. Patrick Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (2006): 387–409, at 402.

5. Cited in Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples* (London: Zed Books, 1999), 24.

6. Hernan Vidal, "The Concept of Colonial and Postcolonial Discourse: A Perspective from Literary Criticism," *Latin American Research Review* 28, no. 3 (1993): 113–19, at 117.

7. See, for example, Patrick Wolfe, *Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race* (London: Verso Books, 2016), especially 4–5, 36–37, and 174. Considering the ways in which *Traces of History* recapitulates thirty years of scholarly endeavor leading to the establishment of settler colonial studies, its references offer an important entry point to this scholarly subfield's indebtedness to previous achievements. In particular, Wolfe cites as foundational the work of Philip Deloria and Eric Williams.

8. See Richard H. Pratt, "The Advantages of Mingling Indians with Whites" (1892), in Francis P. Prucha, ed., *Americanizing the American Indians: Writings by the "Friends of the Indian," 1880–1900* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 260–71, at 261. Pratt was the inventor of non-reservation boarding schools for indigenous children, one of the most destructive weapons ever devised against indigenous cultures and sovereignty. This summation, however, is not mine, but Jared Sexton's;

see Jared Sexton, "The Vel of Slavery: Tracking the Figure of the Unsovereign," *Critical Sociology* 4–5 (2016): 583–97, at 587, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920514552535>.

9. I realize that speaking of "humanity" and of "man" is fraught and that we should question the normalizing trend that allows individuals to speak on behalf of "humanity" in a gendered way rather than from their specific subject position.

10. On Fanon's "antidialectical" dialectics, see George Ciccariello-Maher, *Decolonizing Dialectics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017). While Fanon eventually focused on Algeria, a unique settler colony, he did theorize settler colonialism. Indeed, Udo Krautwurst concludes his analysis of Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth* by emphasizing how for Fanon, every colonist is potentially a "permanent resident or settler." Udo Krautwurst, "What is Settler Colonialism? An Anthropological Meditation of Frantz Fanon's 'Concerning Violence,'" *History and Anthropology* 14, no. 1 (2003): 55–72, at 58, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10275720032000069601>; But what if the distance between *Black Skins, White Masks* (which had resulted from Fanon's discovery of colonialism after his displacement to the metropolis) and *The Wretched of the Earth* was due to his discovery of settler colonialism after his displacement to Algeria? See Ciccariello-Maher, 72. Ciccariello-Maher registers this distance but does not see two distinct forms of colonialism. Fanon did, and this passage from the *Wretched of the Earth* aptly encapsulates settler colonialism's logic of elimination: "In Algeria there is not simply domination but the decision, literally, to occupy nothing else but territory"; Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967), 98. Fanon knew about the superfluity of the indigent person under settler colonialism.

11. Alissa Macoun and Elizabeth Strakosch, "The Ethical Demands of Settler Colonial Theory," *Settler Colonial Studies* 3, nos. 3–4 (2013): 426–43, at 428, <https://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2013.810695>.

12. Carole Pateman, "The Settler Contract," in Carole Pateman and Charles W. Mills, *Contract and Domination* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007), 35–78.

13. Tim Rowse, "Indigenous Heterogeneity," *Australian Historical Studies* 45, no. 3 (2014): 297–310, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1031461X.2014.946523>.

14. Lorenzo Veracini, "Defending Settler Colonial Studies," *Australian Historical Studies* 45, no. 3 (2014): 311–16, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1031461X.2014.946526>.

15. See Lisa Ford, "Locating Indigenous Self-Determination in the Margins of Settler Sovereignty: An Introduction," in Lisa Ford and Tim Rowse, eds., *Between Indigenous and Settler Governance* (London: Routledge, 2013), 1–11.

16. Tony Ballantyne, "Contesting the Empire of Paper: Cultures of Print and Anti-Colonialism in the Modern British Empire," in Jane Carey and Jane Lydon, eds., *Indigenous Networks: Mobility, Connections and Exchange* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 236, and 240, n72. On the "logic of elimination," see Patrick Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (2006): 387–409, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14623520601056240>.

17. Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments* (Princeton University Press, 1993), 19.

18. Miranda Johnson, *The Land is Our History: Indigeneity, Law, and the Settler State* (Oxford University Press, 2016), 169, n12. See also Julian Brave NoiseCat, "When the Indians Defeat the Cowboys: How Indigenous People and the Left Can Continue to Win in the Wake of Standing Rock," *Jacobin*, January 15, 2017, <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/01/standing-rock-indigenous-american-progress/>.

19. Rowse, "Indigenous Heterogeneity;" Ford, "Locating Indigenous Self-Determination;" Johnson, *The Land is Our History*; Ballantyne, "Contesting the Empire of Paper."

20. Pekka Hämäläinen and Samuel Truett, "On Borderlands," *Journal of American History* 98, no. 2 (2011): 338–61.

21. See Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).

22. Pekka Hämäläinen, "The Shapes of Power: Indians, Europeans, and North American Worlds from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Centuries," in Juliana Barr and Edward Countryman, eds., *Contested Spaces of Early America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 31–68, at 33.

23. *Ibid.*, 46, 65–68.

24. Louis Althusser famously wrote in 1962 that "one phantom is more especially crucial than any other today: the shade of Hegel." He aimed to overcome this phantom's presence but did not disavow it. Louis Althusser, *For Marx* (London: Verso Books, 2005), 116.

25. Catherine Kellogg's recent reading of Judith Butler and Catherine Malabou's exchange regarding Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* compellingly suggests that dispossession is necessarily and dialectically structured into two valences. See Catherine Kellogg, "'You Be My Body for Me': Dispossession in Two Valences," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 43, no. 1 (2017): 83–95, <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0191453716651667>.

26. Gregory D. Smithers and Brooke N. Newman, "Introduction," in Gregory D. Smithers and Brooke N. Newman, eds., *Native Diasporas: Indigenous Identities and Settler Colonialism in the Americas* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2014), 9.

27. It should be noted that not all the interventions emanating from postcolonial studies have rejected settler colonial studies. See, for example, Diana Brydon, "Postcolonial and Settler Colonial Studies Offer Human Rights a Revised Agenda," in *Reworking Postcolonialism: Globalization, Labour and Rights*, eds. Pavan Kumar Malreddy, Birte Heidemann, Ole Birk Laursen, and Janet Wilson (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2015), 183–98.

28. See Alyosha Goldstein, "Introduction: Toward a Genealogy of the U.S. Colonial Present," in Alyosha Goldstein, ed., *Formations of United States Colonialism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 1–30. Goldstein argues that in its recuperation of binarism settler colonial studies obscures "the forms of heterogeneity and incommensurability that trouble simple binary oppositions"; *ibid.*, 9.

29. Nancy Shoemaker, "A Typology of Colonialism," *Perspectives on History*, October 2015, <https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/october-2015/a-typology-of-colonialism>.

30. J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, "A Structure, Not an Event": Settler Colonialism and Enduring Indigeneity," *Lateral: Journal of the Cultural Studies Association* 5, no. 1 (2016), <http://csalateral.org/wp/issue/5-1/forum-alt-humanities-settler-colonialism-enduring-indigeneity-kauanui/>.

31. Corey Snelgrove, Rita Kaur Dhamoon, and Jeff Cornthassel, "Unsettling Settler Colonialism: The Discourse and Politics of Settlers, and Solidarity with Indigenous Nations," *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 3, no. 2 (2014): 1–32, <http://decolonization.org/index.php/des/article/view/21166>; see also Rowse, "Indigenous Heterogeneity." Similar points were made by others, notably Joanne Barker in her Tequila Sovereign blog in a series of posts in March and April, 2011 ("Why 'Settler Colonialism' Isn't Exactly Right," March 13, 2011; "More Musings on Why 'Settler Colonialism' Doesn't Work (For Me)," March 15, 2011; "Reflections on the UCLA School of Law: Critical Race Studies Program; Race & Sovereignty Symposium," April 3, 2011; "Settler 'What?'," April 9, 2011). See my response to her critique, <https://settlercolonialstudies.org/2011/04/20/lorenzo-veracinis-response-to-the-scepticism-of-tequila-sovereign/>; and Elizabeth Strakosch and Alissa Macoun, "The Vanishing Endpoint of Settler Colonialism," *Arena Journal* 37/38 (2012): 40–62, <http://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=639920374125373;res=IELLCC>.

32. Snelgrove, et al. have even suggested that settler colonial studies enjoyed an easier path towards academic recognition and institutionalization than native studies. They cite the recent acquisition of *Settler Colonial Studies* by international scholarly publisher Taylor & Francis Group as proof. This is a most unfair comment: moving away from an open access format after two years is proof

of lack of funding and institutional support, not the reverse. The paywall separating potential users and the articles the journal publishes is defeating, most certainly not an indication of success. See Snelgrove, et al., "Unsettling Settler Colonialism," 9.

33. Manu Vimalassery, Juliana Hu Pegues, and Alyosha Goldstein, "Introduction: On Colonial Unknowing," *Theory & Event* 19, no. 4 (2016). The papers collected in the special issue these authors introduce are equally critical of settler colonial studies.

34. Ibid.

35. Snelgrove, et al., "Unsettling Settler Colonialism," 26. See also Ford, "An Introduction."

36. Robert Nichols, "Theft Is Property! The Recursive Logic of Dispossession," *Political Theory* 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591717701709>.

37. See Rowse, "Indigenous Heterogeneity"; and Jodi A. Byrd, "Still Waiting for the 'Post' to Arrive: Elizabeth Cook-Lynn and the Imponderables of American Indian Postcoloniality," *Wicazo Sa Review* 31, no. 1, (2016): 75–89, especially 79.

38. Audra Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 74.

39. On the importance of heuristics in undoing the hegemony of the "settler revolution" and as decolonizing practice, see Lorenzo Veracini, *The Settler Colonial Present* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), especially 95–109.

40. Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, "Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor," *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 1, no. 1 (2012): 1–40, at 19, <http://decolonization.org/index.php/des/article/view/18630/15554>. Yet again, "decolonization is not a metaphor" may be more precisely rendered as "decolonization is not a synecdoche" (i.e., *not* the part for the whole; not "critical consciousness" instead of a land base that would sustain autonomous indigenous communities).

41. Kirsty Gover, *Tribal Constitutionalism: States, Tribes, and the Governance of Membership* (Oxford University Press, 2010); also see Johnson, *The Land is Our History*.

42. Gover, 209.

43. Glen Sean Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014).

44. See Elizabeth A. Povinelli, *The Cunning of Recognition: Indigenous Alterities and the Making of Australian Multiculturalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).

45. Lorenzo Veracini, "Afterword: Orania as Settler Self-Transfer," *Settler Colonial Studies* 1, no. 2 (2011): 190–96, <https://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2011.10648821>.

46. See Ciccariello-Maher, 47–74. This was Jean Paul Sartre's reading as well. Sartre, not Fanon, eventually changed his mind about the primacy of class over race. See Jean Paul Sartre, "The Wretched of the Earth," in Jean Paul Sartre, *Colonialism and Neocolonialism* (London: Routledge, 2005 [1964]), 75–86.

47. For a compelling analysis of the ways in which settlers might become allies of indigenous struggles, see Clare Land, *Decolonizing Solidarity: Dilemmas and Directions for Supporters of Indigenous Struggles* (London: Zed Books, 2015).

48. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*.

49. See Steven Salaita, *Inter/Nationalism: Decolonizing Native America and Palestine* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), especially xiv–xvi.

50. See Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel, "Being Indigenous: Resurgences against Contemporary Colonialism," *Government and Opposition* 40, no. 4 (2005): 597–614, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2005.00166.x>.

51. "Caesar dominus et supra grammaticam," cited in Jan-Werner Müller, "On Conceptual History," in Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn, eds., *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History* (Oxford University Press, 2014), 74–93, at 82.

52. Fanon, 36.
53. Sarah A. Radcliffe, "Geography and Indigeneity I: Indigeneity, Coloniality and Knowledge," *Progress in Human Geography* 41, no. 2 (2017 [2015]): 220–29, n4, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132515612952>.
54. Byrd, "Still Waiting."
55. Kēhaulani Kauanui, "A Structure, Not an Event."
56. This turn of phrase is Marcelo Svirsky's. See Marcelo Svirsky, "The Collaborative Struggle and the Permeability of Settler Colonialism," *Settler Colonial Studies* 4, no. 4 (2014): 327–33, at 329, <https://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2014.911649>.
57. In her recent *Dying from Improvement*, Sherene Razack perceptively refers to Leslie Thielen-Wilson's argument that "settlers must be able to imagine when they are leaving." Sherene Razack, *Dying from Improvement: Inquests and Inquiries into Indigenous Deaths in Custody* (University of Toronto Press, 2015), 27. It is an invitation to either physically remove from occupied land or renegotiate the settler subject position and reconfigure it, to depart as settlers and to remain as guests. My proposition about metaphorically killing settlers and saving their humanity shares the same approach.
58. On social struggle as "war of position" see Antonio Gramsci, *Quaderni dal carcere*, ed. Valentino Gerratana (Torino: Einaudi, 1975).
59. See George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003 [1980]).
60. I mention here Mark Rifkin's recent suggestion to develop an indigenous "temporal sovereignty," the ability to establish relationships to land that are not defined by settler time, which includes the ability to defer "juridical time." See Mark Rifkin, *Beyond Settler Time: Temporal Sovereignty and Indigenous Self-Determination* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017), especially 180.
61. On treaties as open-ended and negotiable, the beginning of an ongoing relation rather than its end, see Paul McHugh, "Crown-Tribe Relations: Contractualism and Coexistence in an Intercultural Context," in Glyn Davis, Barbara Sullivan, and Anna Yeatman, eds., *The New Contractualism?* (South Melbourne: Macmillan Education Australia, 1997).
62. Eva Mackey, *Unsettled Expectations: Uncertainty, Land and Settler Decolonization* (Halifax, NS: Fernwood, 2016), 141.
63. See Treaty Republic webpage, "Pay the Rent Rationale," <http://treatyrepublic.net/content/pay-rent-rationale>. Treaty Republic is directed by Aboriginal activist Robbie Thorpe (Krautungalung) and is "committed to issues relating to Australian history, Indigenous sovereignty, lack of treaty, land-rights justice, genocide, national denial and 'Pay the Rent.'"
64. Besides, paying rent would allow settlers to begin understanding that they are, as Fiona Nicoll has argued, "*in* Indigenous sovereignty." See Fiona Nicoll, "Reconciliation In and Out of Perspective: White Knowing, Seeing, Curating, and Being at Home In and Against Indigenous Sovereignty," in Aileen Moreton-Robinson (ed.), *Whitening Race: Essays in Social and Cultural Criticism* (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2004), 19–29, at 19 (emphasis mine).
65. Ivan Illich, *Tools for Conviviality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973).
66. "Certainty" and related "settled expectations," as Eva Mackey points out, are fundamental drivers of settler fantasies. See Mackey, *Unsettled Expectations*, especially 27–40.
67. Stuart Hall famously argued that cultural identity is more about "becoming" than "being." Perhaps there is a reason why indigeneity has routinely defied the definitional constraints of cultural studies. Stuart Hall, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora," in Jonathan Rutherford (ed.), *Identity, Community, Culture, Difference* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990), 222–37, at 225.
68. John Newton, "Becoming Pakeha," *Landfall*, no. 218 (2009): 38–48, at 40.
69. Avril Bell, "Entangled Worlds: Ontology and Relationality in a Settler Society," Space and Place Inter-Disciplinary.net conference, Mansfield College, Oxford University, September, 2015,

3–5, at 4, <http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/critical-issues/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/ABell-sp6-dpaper.pdf>.

70. Bell, “Entangled Worlds,” 5. (I am okay with macrons in this case for the very same reason why I advise against capitalizing “indigenous.”)

71. *Ibid.*, 3.

72. *Ibid.*, 5.

73. Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus*.