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Native Land and Foreign Desire: *William Penn's Treaty with the Indians*¹

BETH FOWKES TOBIN

It seems natural to Whites, to look on lands in the possession of Indians with an aching heart, and never to rest 'till they have planned them out of them.

—Joseph Brant²

Benjamin West's *William Penn's Treaty with the Indians* portrays Penn and his associates dispensing gifts to Indians (figure 1). Dominated by a benevolent gesture, this painting disguises political and economic power as the workings of a highly developed moral sensibility and conquest as an act of magnanimity. West's painting has assumed legendary status in American popular culture, making its way into high school history textbooks as an example of the nobility of Penn and his power to effect peaceful relations between Europeans and Indians. West's presentation of Penn's "justice and benevolence" toward the Indians is a masterpiece, not only aesthetically as an engaging painting but politically as a powerful piece of propaganda that continues to work its magic on viewers today.³

West's masterpiece functions on two narrative levels. The first level is the one of the story depicted—William Penn's mythical treaty with the Indians; the second narrative, not represented explicitly but lying buried beneath the surface, is the story of Thomas Penn, William Penn's son, and his effort to negotiate

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several other and equally ambitious land deals with Indians. Commissioned by Thomas Penn and painted in 1771 and 1772, *William Penn's Treaty with the Indians* celebrates simultaneously both Penns' successful acquisition of enormous tracts of Indian land. This essay will examine West's painting in the context of the land speculations of William and Thomas Penn. More attention will be given to Thomas Penn's efforts, since his speculation in Indian land can help to explain why he commissioned the painting and why he felt the need to have his family's relations with the Indians depicted in such an amicable light.

PEACEFUL EXCHANGE

Before turning to the context in which the painting was produced, we need to take a look at the painting and the dramatic scene it portrays. At the center of West's *William Penn's Treaty with the Indians* is a bolt of cloth painted an eye-catching white in this rather dark composition. Quakers and Indians stand around this source of light as if it were a campfire. West has, in fact, substituted the cloth for the council fire around which such treaties usually took place. For Algonquian and Iroquoian peoples, particularly the Six Nations Confederacy and its allies, the fire symbolized peace and was always to be kept burning as long as peaceful relations existed between the treating parties. The bolt of cloth, like the fire it displaces, is a part of the peaceful negotiations that are under way in this scene. The cloth's placement in the composition and its coloration stress its power to effect this peaceful exchange of Indian land for European manufactured goods.

West uses light and color to move our eyes around the semicircle of treating men. The white cloth grabs our attention, and then our eyes move back and forth between the cloth and the Indians, who are adorned in reds, whites, and greens. The shape, color, and texture of the arm of the muscular man sitting in a cluster of Delaware Indians and the sheen on his shaved head capture our attention and direct our eyes around the semicircle of exotic men with red-feathered headdresses, beaded head- and armbands, and elaborate earrings hung in ears that have been slit to accommodate them. The brightly clothed, feathered, and decorated men absorb our attention; we linger over the detail in their dress, hair, and ornamentation. Light shines on the Indians' faces, illuminating their excited features, which express mingled sur-



FIGURE 1. Benjamin West (1738–1820), Penn's Treaty with the Indians. Courtesy of the Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts, Philadelphia. Gift of Mrs. Sarah Harrison (The Joseph Harrison, Jr. Collection).

prise, awe, and envy. In contrast to these gaily decorated Indians, William Penn is hardly visible on first glance. He stands half-obscured by shadows, dressed in brown, and would escape our notice if it were not for his white neck cloth. The Quakers' faces are obscured by shadows—they are distant, unemotional, calm. Their sober and discreet clothing reflects their subdued emotional state.

The details of dress and the use of color work to obscure the true nature of the exchange that is taking place. Penn and his fellow Quakers are capitalists, traders, dealers who profit from their investments and exchanges in commodities. They are motivated by the desire for gain. In this painting, the Europeans' acquisitiveness is displaced onto Indians; for it is on the Indians' faces that greed flickers. West has arranged the figures so that the posture of the Indians—their necks outstretched and their bodies leaning forward—indicates their excitement and eagerness over the prospect of possessing this lustrous cloth. It is as if these Indians can barely restrain their emotions and their desire to consume these commodities. West has made the Indians into the desiring/consuming subjects, while the Quakers are represented as the bestowers of gifts. To effect this reversal, which makes the Indians into the greedy ones and erases the Quakers' desire for native land, West has not only employed light and color but gender as well to shape the moral stature of the treating parties.⁴

Portraying the Delaware dressed in brightly colored clothing and elaborate jewelry and the Quakers in anachronistically drab garb, West has used gender to differentiate the desires of these treating men. West's choice of a bolt of cloth to represent trade goods marks the Indians' desires as distinctly feminine. Instead of a bolt of cloth, he could have chosen to paint a hatchet, a rifle, or a barrel of rum to represent trade goods, but these items were too heavily associated with frontier violence and would not have served his purpose of showing a treaty that would ensure peaceful relations between Indians and colonists. West could have painted cast-iron pots, hoes, blankets, mirrors, or glass beads to represent trade items, but instead of these things, which he may have deemed too mundane to depict, he chose to portray the Delaware coveting a bolt of cloth, not unlike the cloth that women in London would gather around to purchase in a linen draper's shop. West has cleverly reduced the Indians' desire for trade goods to a desire for cloth, which was (and still is) a heavily gendered item.

West's Indians are depicted as emotional, gaudily dressed, and feminine in their desire for cloth and trinkets. In the minds of Europeans, this love of finery was associated with women. Eighteenth-century British moralists were forever chastising women for their fondness for "frippery." Addressing a female audience in his *A Father's Legacy to His Daughters* (1774), Dr. John Gregory wrote that "the love of dress is natural to you, and therefore it is proper and reasonable," and Jonathan Swift comments on "how naturally do women apply their hands to each others lappets and ruffles and mantua's, as if the whole business of your lives, and the publick concern of the world, depended on the cut or colour of your dresses."⁵ It was also an eighteenth-century commonplace that women and "savages" shared a love of finery and bodily decoration as well as a consequent mental and moral weakness: "A strong inclination for external ornaments ever appears in barbarous states. . . . An immoderate fondness for dress, for pleasure, and for sway, are the passions of savages; the passions that occupy those uncivilized beings who have not yet extended the dominion of the mind, or even learned to think with the energy necessary to concatenate that abstract train of thought which produces principles. And that women from their education . . . , are in the same condition, cannot, I think, be controverted."⁶ For this moralist, European women and New World savages were less rational and self-disciplined than European men; in short, they were less civilized and occupied a lower rung on the ladder of cultural evolution. Even though the decorated bodies of women and of "savages" were admired by European men, these bodies were also believed to be morally suspect because they were thought to exude a debased sensuality associated with an intellectual inferiority.

West purposely highlights the Indian figures' bright clothing, feathers, and jewelry to feminize and debase them, while he uses the browns and blacks of the Quaker garb to underscore the Europeans' moral superiority and their lack of frivolous desires. Reinforcing the feminine qualities of these Indians is the foregrounded madonna-like figure of the nursing Indian mother and child. The Quakers, all men, are plainly dressed, their masculinity and rational powers stressed by their attire. West chose to paint them wearing not what these men would have worn in the late seventeenth century—satin waistcoats, silk stockings, brocaded jackets, laced cuffs, and elaborate wigs—but what Friends wore in the mid-eighteenth century, the now famous "plain"

Quaker costume. If West had painted Penn wearing what he had really worn, Penn would have been far more decorated and finely dressed than any of the Indians.⁷ Genteel and fashionable attire on William Penn would have blurred the binary opposition that West has put into play between the feminized, desiring, and morally inferior Indians and the rational, self-disciplined, and beneficent Quakers. If West had painted Penn in historically accurate attire, he would have blurred the ideological subtext of this painting, which goes something like this: Unable to restrain their emotions and their desires to consume these commodities, the Indians, like women, are easily seduced into exchanging their only valuable commodity for gaudy trinkets, and they deserve what they get—the loss of their land (and honor) and the erasure of their presence in this place. West stresses the inevitability of this erasure of Indian ways and the inexorable “progress” of civilization by eclipsing the Indian town in darkness. The Indian houses stand in the shadows as if already disappearing, while the houses of the Europeans rise up in full light and the sun dances on the river and the distant ships holding cargo. West uses light and color as well as the details of dress to reinforce binary oppositions between the feminized, savage, and immoral Indians and the masculine, civilized, and liberal Quakers.

West’s portrayal of William Penn’s peaceful exchange of goods for land simultaneously represents and masks the true nature of the encounter between the real William Penn (and his heirs) and the Leni Lenape (and their heirs). What looks like some kind of gift-giving or exchange of commodities for land is, in reality, an act of conquest. William Penn had been granted Pennsylvania by the Crown, in whose name the land had been claimed by right of “first discovery.” As Native American activist Menno Boldt argues, the Crown’s claim to land in North America violates seventeenth- and eighteenth-century international law. “‘First discovery’ entitled a state to declare sovereignty over and to claim title to only *unoccupied* territory. The British Crown knew North America was not unoccupied. Thus, the Crown knowingly violated two of the prevailing European principles of international justice: it declared sovereignty over Indians and claimed title to their lands.”⁸ As historian Urs Bitterli observes, Penn labored to legitimate the Crown’s dubious grant by having his agents visit each band of Delaware living along the rivers that fed into Chesapeake Bay and by purchasing quitclaims from them. His purchase of quitclaims indicates, as Bitterli contends, that Penn

felt the illegality of the Crown's claim of sovereignty and did not rely on the idea that this land was empty, unencumbered, and there for the taking. Penn, in fact, recognized the Indians as the original owners of the land, and, before he would sell any part of his huge grant from the Crown, he insisted on having the legal title to the land. Very much aware of the Indian "encumbrance," he negotiated for the sale of the land with the various bands of Delaware that owned and occupied the lands along the Susquehanna and Delaware rivers. In exchange for their land, the Delaware accepted his offer of peace, gifts, and reserves, land on which they were to live unmolested.⁹

The contradiction that stems from Penn's having to "buy" Indian land he supposedly already owned lies submerged in West's painting, surfacing in the striking ideological reversals that drive the narrative depicted in the painting. Penn's desire for Native American land fueled his actions, particularly his seeking of quitclaims, and yet Penn and the Quakers surrounding him are not represented as people driven by desire. Dressed in subdued Quaker garb, they are the calm, rational, and deliberate "Friends," whose actions are inspired by radical Christian beliefs and governed by the tenets of political economy. West displaces desire onto the Indians and effectively erases Penn's acquisitive behavior. Penn and his investors in this new colony stand aloof from the trading and the exchange of merchandise, thereby negating their link with the profit motive. A member of the group holds a map/deed that establishes Penn's proprietary status and legal control of the land. The play of light and shade, as well as the contrast of lively reds and greens against somber browns and grays, assists in the creation of the impression that William Penn is someone who acts not out of self-interest but out of enlightened and dispassionate altruism.

The other contradiction that haunts this painting concerns the representation of Penn as a man of peace and as someone whose fair and sound business practice ensures peaceful relations with Indians. Although Penn was careful to conduct himself honorably and peaceably with Indians, he was able to finesse his deals with them because the threat of violence was implicit in the European colonization of America.¹⁰ Violent confrontation had occurred between Europeans and Native Americans in the mid-Atlantic region in the fifty years previous to Penn's arrival. Penn's insistence on peaceful relations with the Indians distinguished him from his predecessors—the Dutch, for example, in the Hudson

River valley and the New England Puritans, who had nearly exterminated the Pequot and were in the midst of conducting total war against the Wampanoag and the Narragansett. Penn's construction of himself as a man of peace implicitly contained its opposite, the violent, greedy, genocidal European. Penn's successful exchange of "land for peace" benefited enormously from the very real threat of European warfare.¹¹ The Delaware knew that this was the best deal they were going to get, and they took it.¹²

By portraying Penn and his fellow Quakers as thoughtful, serious, and somber men, West was stressing the Quakers' peaceful tactics in getting what they wanted. He wrote in his commentary on this painting, "The great object I had in forming that composition was to express savages brought into harmony and peace by justice and benevolence, by not withholding from them what was their right [sic], and giving to them what they were in want of, as well as a wish to give by that art a conquest made over native people without sword or Dagder [sic]."¹³ What West means by "not withholding" is that Penn, unlike many of his colonizing entrepreneurial contemporaries, paid something for lands he took, and, by "giving to them what they were in want of," Penn gave Indians manufactured goods they did not possess. West sees commerce as pacifying and civilizing the "savages"—as giving them what they lacked and bringing them into peaceful relations with whites.¹⁴ This painting celebrates the moment when the Delaware Indians were brought into the rational, enlightened, and mechanistic workings of global mercantile capitalism. The bolt of cloth, simultaneously a payment, a gift, a commodity, and a promise of peace, masks an act of conquest under the guise of trade.¹⁵

COLONIAL POLITICS

By commissioning West to paint *William Penn's Treaty with the Indians*, Thomas Penn asserted the legality of his father's royal grant and stressed the peacefulness of his father's dealings with the Indians of the Delaware and Susquehanna river region. However, his reasons for portraying his father's negotiations with Indians arguably had less to do with recreating the historical past and more to do with putting his own dealings with Indians in a good light. As Ann Uhry Abrams points out in her article "Benjamin West's Documentation of Colonial History: *William Penn's*

Treaty with the Indians," the iconography of this painting has much more to do with contemporary politics than with representing an actual historical moment. Abrams argues quite convincingly that Thomas Penn commissioned West "to celebrate the return of peace to Pennsylvania" after years of conflict between Quakers and Penn's agents as well as between Indians and backwoods settlers.¹⁶

As Abrams notes, West's painting draws upon Pennsylvania legend to comment on contemporary politics and promote Thomas Penn's position as proprietor of the colony of Pennsylvania. His role as proprietor had been attacked in the 1750s by the Assembly of Pennsylvania, led by Ben Franklin, who sought to do away with the proprietary form of government and to substitute in its place a charter from the king, which was the form of government of several other colonies. West's painting underscores the Penns' hereditary interest in Pennsylvania, reminding viewers that Thomas Penn's father was a peaceful man whose interests were paternal and benevolent, who encouraged merchants in their commerce, provided them with trade and land on which to build a thriving community, and protected the colonists from the hostility of Indians. This painting seeks to smooth out difficulties between Penn and the colonists by representing William Penn, and Thomas Penn by association, as the benevolent protector of colonists, their commerce, their communities, and their well-being. The outstretched hand of the figure of William Penn underscores the generosity implicit in Penn's governance of the colony. The open hand signifies both William Penn's gift to the Indians of goods in exchange for land and his creation of the colony by this act of negotiation. Not only is Penn giving gifts to Indians, but he is also creating economic opportunity for generations of colonists. This double act of benevolence highlights the Penn family role as guardians of trade and keepers of peace, issues that were of utmost importance in the 1750s and 1760s in colonial Pennsylvania.

Although Abrams has explored in detail the painting's colonial context and the battle between Thomas Penn as absentee proprietor and the Quaker-dominated Pennsylvania Assembly, more needs to be said about the politics implicit in this painting, in particular those politics surrounding the acquisition of Indian land. The image of William Penn treating with the Indians was a powerful icon for colonists and those concerned with colonial life. West tapped into an already existing tradition—the iconographic

representation of a European and a Native American treating peacefully together. As Abrams has demonstrated, this image appeared in peace medals given by colonists to Indians as tokens of their peaceful relations. What is celebrated in the peace medals and in the West painting is the nonviolent transfer of Indian lands to white colonists. Vivien Green Fryd has called this transaction "land for peace," implying that the Europeans will, one way or another, get the land they desire, either through the Indians' relinquishing it peacefully or through the Europeans' waging war.¹⁷ West's use of the peace medal configuration reinforces the image of the Penns as peacemakers, and this image needed bolstering, especially after the turbulence arising out of the Walking Purchase of 1737 and his treaty with the Six Nations in 1754.

West's painting successfully belies the political and economic turmoil involved with the Penn family's dealings with the Eastern and Western Delaware. This painting depicts the Penns as clever negotiators with the natives, as promoters of commerce, and as the beneficent founders of a thriving colony. Thomas Penn was especially interested in promoting this image of himself and his family, because he had been accused of fraud in his dealings with the Indians and was held responsible for the violence that occurred on the frontier during the 1750s and 1760s. One of the ideological goals of this painting was to present the Penns as capable leaders, peacekeepers, and knowledgeable negotiators with Indians to counter the mounting critiques of the proprietary system in general and the Penns' speculation in Indian land in particular—speculation that some thought benefited only the Penns at the expense of the safety of those living in the western reaches of the colony.

PURCHASING INDIAN LAND

In its use of Pennsylvania legend to rewrite the recent past, West's image of William Penn's dealing with the Delaware functions much like a palimpsest. Scratch its ideological surface, and beneath this image lie layers of other treaties, all involving Thomas Penn and all productive of dissension, not the peace that is commemorated in West's painting. From the late 1720s until the late 1760s and the ratification of the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, Thomas Penn eagerly and aggressively pursued the acquisition of Indian land on which to expand his empire in the New World.

Penn's acquisition of land was often criticized by natives who insisted that they had never agreed to sell the land, that they were never fully compensated for the land, and/or that the negotiators of treaties and surveyors of deeds always took more land than the Indians intended to give away. Penn and his representatives met frequently with the headmen of various bands of Delaware and Iroquois during these decades, simultaneously purchasing lands and dealing with complaints about those purchases. For example, at a conference in 1728, the Tulpehocken Delaware complained they had never been recompensed for land settled on by German immigrants; in 1732, on one of his trips to America, Penn personally met with Delaware people who had also complained about being displaced by his father's acquisitions; in 1737, Penn's representatives conducted the infamous Walking Purchase for lands along the northern reaches of the Delaware River and in the Lehigh Valley; in 1742 and 1744, Penn's representatives treated with the bands of Delaware who had refused to vacate this land; in 1754, at the Albany Congress, John Penn, Thomas's nephew, persuaded the Six Nations to sign away their authority not only over lands along the northern branch but also the western branch of the Susquehanna River, thereby extending Penn's holdings to the Ohio River in what is now western Pennsylvania; and in 1756, Penn's people had to defend the Walking Purchase against the accusation of fraud by the Delaware chief Teedyuscung. Penn's aggressive land acquisition policy aroused the hostility of the displaced Indians, especially those bands of Delaware who had lived along the Delaware, Lehigh, and Susquehanna rivers, as well as members of the Six Nations who regarded the Wyoming Valley as their hunting lands and the Susquehanna as their western road into the Ohio region and their southern route to the Shenandoah Valley.

The two land deals that caused a considerable amount of friction were the Walking Purchase of 1737 and the "sale" of lands along two branches of the Susquehanna River at the Albany Congress of 1754. The Walking Purchase has received a great amount of attention from historians as an example of the kind of deception that speculators like Thomas Penn engaged in to acquire Indian land. What makes this land swindle particularly outrageous is the hypocrisy of Penn and his agents and the pretense to legality that Penn's lawyers promulgated. What outraged the Delaware then and what irritates contemporary historians now are Penn's blatant lies and his claims to have been

pursuing a legal course of action as well as fulfilling his father's wishes. Penn pretended to have a draft of a deed from his father that stipulated that the Penns owned a tract of land stretching from the banks of the Delaware as far a man could walk in a day-and-a-half. Francis Jennings points out that, in a British court of law, a draft of a deed or a copy of a deed would not have given anyone legal possession but that, in Pennsylvania, Penn could get away with this kind of legal charade. Not only did the Penns use a dubious deed; they employed runners to "walk" the distance. The runners covered more than sixty miles and thereby extended the bounds of the purchase to include far more than the original, disputed lands.¹⁸

The Walking Purchase was an attempt on Thomas Penn's part to get lands beyond the boundary of what his father had obtained so that he might sell the land to get out of debt. Thomas Penn was so desperate to generate money from Indian land that he sold the lands belonging to the Delaware above the Tohickon Creek before he had "legally" secured the Walking Purchase. Even before the Walking Purchase, Nutimus, a Delaware sachem, repeatedly protested Penn's maneuvers to get his people's land, saying of Penn, "He keep begging and plagueing us to Give him some Land and never gives us leave to treat upon any thing till he Wearies us Out of Our Lives." After the Walking Purchase, the land that Penn had sold secretly to speculators could then be sold legally to settlers who thought they were buying with clear titles. However, Nutimus continued to protest the Walking Purchase, despite threats from colonial settlers who believed they were in the right. Nutimus wrote to the Bucks County chief justice, "We dare not Speak for our Rights but there is an Uproar and [we are] in danger of being Cut to pieces. . . . [I]f this practice must hold why then we are no more Brothers and Friends but much more like Open Enemies." Jennings states that, with the total sales of Pennsylvania lands amounting to more than £200,000, the Penn family "rose from the shabby gentility of perpetual debt to a status of substantial riches and power."¹⁹

Complaints by Delaware Indians continued into the 1740s and were dealt with at two conferences, one in Philadelphia in 1742 and another at Lancaster in 1744. The Iroquois—sachems from the western and southern nations, mostly Seneca and Onondaga, not the Mohawk—were invited to attend to help settle the disputes between the Penns and the Delaware, who were sometimes referred to as the Iroquois' "cousins" or "nephews." Essentially

what transpired at these meetings was that the Iroquois told the Delaware to stop complaining and to vacate the land. In Philadelphia on 12 July 1742, Canasatego, an Onondaga sachem, delivered a dramatic speech in which he chastised the Delaware for their unruliness, accusing them of being "in the wrong in their Dealings" with Penn's agents, and promised to "remove them, and oblige them to go over the River Delaware, and quit all Claim to any Lands on this side. . . ." Canasatego directed the following comments to those Delaware present, including Nutimus and Sassoonan:

Let this Belt of Wampum serve to chastise you. You ought to be taken by the Hair of the Head and shaken severely, till you recover your Senses and become sober. You don't know what Ground you stand on, nor what you are doing. . . . But how came you to take upon you to sell Land at all? We conquered you; we made Women of you; you know you are Women, and can no more sell Land than Women; nor is it fit you should have the Power of selling Lands, since you would abuse it. This Land that you claim is gone thro' your Guts; you have been furnished with Cloaths, Meat, and Drink, by the Goods paid you for it, and now you want it again, like Children as you are. . . . You act a dishonest Part, not only in this, but in other Matters: Your Ears are ever open to slanderous Reports about our Brethren; you receive them with as much Greediness as lewd Women receive the Embraces of bad Men. And for all these Reasons we charge you to remove instantly; we don't give you the Liberty to think about it.²⁰

This speech and the part played by the Iroquois in the enforcement of the Walking Purchase have proven troubling to those historians who admire the Six Nations for the way in which they held onto their land and their identity despite the proximity of colonial governments. Historians have accused the Iroquois of failing to protect their dependencies from colonial greed and encroachment, of gaining from the loss of Delaware lands, and of acting as if they were agents of the Penn proprietary government.²¹ While the cultural and historical gap may be perhaps too great to understand fully and therefore judge the Iroquois for their actions concerning Delaware land, we can with greater success analyze the way in which British and Euro-American contemporaries and historians alike have interpreted the Iroquois sachem's gendered language.

The language that Canasatego used to describe the relations between the Delaware and the Six Nations is interesting for many reasons. *Cousin*, *nephew*, and *grandson* are all commonplace terms used as metaphors to express varying kinds of relations between the Six Nations and their Algonquian neighbors to the south and west. What strikes historians as puzzling is his use of the word *women* to describe the eastern Delaware. Many historians assume that this is a derogatory term meant to chastise and humiliate the Delaware and to remind them of their dependent status vis-à-vis the Six Nations.²² Other historians have pointed out that the Iroquois did not think of women as inferior or dependent but rather as vital to the survival of the community and complementary to men in their social, economic, and political functions. David Richter has suggested that women had their sphere of activity involving food production and internal government, while men had their sphere of activity involving hunting and war. Women's work was crucial to the band's well-being, and their opinions were respected. For example, the women's council would choose the leaders, and men would not go to war without the consent of the women's council. In general, women were concerned with intratribal affairs, and men were occupied with extratribal affairs.²³ That Canasatego called the Delaware women was not necessarily an attack on their integrity as a people; rather, it can be interpreted as reminding the Delaware that the Iroquois were to act as their mediators in any dealings with the colonists. Perhaps Canasatego was reminding them that the various Delaware bands, acting as single entities, had failed in the past to protect themselves from the depredations of colonial governments and the Euro-American greed for land and that they should have relied on their more astute uncles, the Iroquois, to negotiate with foreigners. Whether or not the Iroquois could have protected or even wanted to protect the Delaware and Susquehanna Indians from the Penn family's desire for native land is another question, too complex to be dealt with adequately here.

Canasatego's use of gendered language is reflected in West's painting, which, as I have argued, is heavily gendered in its representation of the Delaware and the Quakers. Perhaps West knew of this famous speech; he had spent his youth in Philadelphia, where this council convened, and his early adulthood in Lancaster, the site of the 1744 Treaty, and the Iroquois delegation's treatment of the Delaware may have been partly local legend. West employs gender to discredit and to trivialize the treating

Indians in his painting, and this attitude parallels the way in which most British and Euro-American observers have interpreted Canasatego's speech.

THE PENN PURCHASE AND THE ALBANY CONGRESS

Iroquois diplomacy is again associated with the loss of Delaware lands at the Albany Congress in 1754. Some historians have suggested that the Penns were adroit in using the Iroquois to effect purchases of land in Pennsylvania and that it was their work at Lancaster that, according to Francis Jennings, "opened a gate to the trans-Appalachian west for British colonization, and it guaranteed a violent French response."²⁴ At Albany, the Penns were able to wring even greater land cessions from the Iroquois than at Lancaster. At the Albany Congress, John Penn, Thomas's nephew, treated with the sachems representing the Six Nations (Mohawk, Seneca, Onondaga, Oneida, Cayuga, Tuscarora) with the goal of purchasing land that extended westward beyond the Allegheny Mountains, in what is now western Pennsylvania. The purchase of this enormous tract of land soon caused severe difficulties for the Penn family, since it occasioned the resentment of the Indians living in that area, primarily the Western Delaware and Shawnee. This resentment grew as forts were built along the Ohio River and as settlers, encouraged by the security that these forts provided, moved into what had been Indian territory. This movement of colonists into western Pennsylvania and the northern Ohio River valley was in violation of the treaty of 1726 between Great Britain and the Six Nations Confederacy. The confederacy ceded all their lands, including the lands of the Delaware, to the king for him to hold in trust and for the government to guard from French incursions and to protect for Indian use only. In what was known as the Deed of 1726, the Iroquois ceded lands to the Crown with the understanding that these lands were being surrendered "for Protection, and not Settlement," "to be protected and defended for their Use as hunting Lands." This territory was regarded by the Six Nations Confederacy and its allies as hunting grounds vital to the maintenance of their way of life and, more importantly perhaps in the minds of the English, as vital to the continuance of the fur trade. The board of trade described this Deed of 1726 as a "measure . . . most wise and prudent with regard to their own interests, and the most advantageous with regard to Ours."²⁵

By 1756, the resentment felt by Indians living in western Pennsylvania, as well as by some of the members of the Six Nations Confederacy, over colonial invasion into western lands had grown so great that British authorities feared that the Iroquois and their allies, which included the Delaware and the Shawnee, would not support the British in the impending war with France. Sir William Johnson, superintendent of Indian affairs in the Northern District of North America, worried that the colonists' invasion of Indian lands might alienate the affections of the confederacy and drive them into the arms of the French. He was concerned by the colonists' having "claimed large Tracts of Country & attempted settlements thereon. . . . Our indiscriminate avidity alarms them with Jealousy, and raises Prejudice against us wch are improved by the French." The French, in contrast to the English and colonists, had told the Indians that they did not want to possess their lands but only wanted to trade with them. After conquering Oswego, the French told the Onondaga that they had driven the "English from their Lands & would not like them [the English], keep possession, but leave 'em free to them and their Posterity forever."²⁶

In a series of letters to the lords of trade and plantations, Sir William Johnson suggested that the Penn purchase was alienating their Indian allies: "The Great Patents of Lands wch had been purchased & taken up in those parts & our extended scattered Settlements beginning to crowd upon the Indians, had been a long Eye sore to them, infected them with Jealousy & disgust towards the English." He repeats his accusation a few months later:

I think I have before now hinted to your Lordships my opinion, that the Hostilities wch Pensilvania in particular had suffered from some of the Indians living on the Susquahanna did, in some measure, arise from the large Purchase made by that Govt. two years ago at Albany. I have more reason every day, from talking with the Indians, to be confirmed in this suspicion. I am inclined to believe, tho' this purchase was publicly consented to at Albany, some of the 6 Nations are disgusted at it & others repent their consenting to it, and that part of them do underhand connive at the Disturbances between the Susquahanna Indians and the Province of Pensilvania, whose raising Forces and building Forts on the Susquahanna River, tho' it hath very plausible Pretences, is at the Bottom bad policy & really intended to secure Lands wch it would more for the true Interest of the community to give up, at least for the present.

He implies not only that the Penn claim to the western lands was causing bloodshed on the frontier but that the disaffection aroused by this claim could threaten the ability of the British to protect their North American colonies from French expansion in the New World. Johnson urged the board of trade to use its power to make Thomas Penn relinquish the deed of sale for the lands along the Susquehanna and beyond the Alleghenies, even if the Penns were legally the owners of these vast tracts of land:

I conceive the most effectual method of producing Tranquility to that Province would be, a voluntary & open Surrender of that Deed of Sale, fix with the Indians, in the best manner they can, the Bounds for their Settlements & make them Guaranties to it. I know that this Land was fairly & publickly paid for & that the Indians are unjust & unreasonable to recant & keep the money; but if the Times & good Policy require it, to yield will be more advantageous than to contest, tho' on the side of Justice. Besides 'tis private property & the general Welfare suffers by persisting in the Title to it.²⁷

Complaints by the Iroquois, the Delaware, and the Shawnee about white settlers moving into their lands were taken seriously by the board of trade. Acting as the board's agent, Johnson was especially aware of the dangers of alienating the Iroquois. At the Albany Conference of 1754, Sir William and the commissioners from the six northern colonies met with the sachems of the Six Nations to discuss the French threat, to persuade the confederacy to align itself with the English, and to listen to Indian complaints about fraudulent land claims as a way to appease their resentment. The commissioners recognized that "purchases of Land from the Indians by private persons for small Trifling Considerations have been the cause of great uneasiness and discontents. And if the Indians are not in Fact imposed upon and injured, Yet they are apt to think that they have been." The colonial commissioners urged that "the Complaints of the Indians relative to any Grants or possessions of their Lands fraudulently obtained be enquired into, and all injuries addressed." The commissioners also set up guidelines for purchasing Indian lands, stressing that "all future Purchases of Lands from the Indians be void unless made by the Government where such Lands lye, and from the Indians in a Body in their Public Councils."²⁸

During this Albany conference, while such resolutions were being passed, John Penn made the deal with the sachems of the Six

Nations to purchase land west of the existing boundaries of Pennsylvania. The purchase conformed to the guidelines, in that Penn was authorized by his government and the exchange took place in a public council. Problems arose, however, when the Delaware complained that they had not authorized the sale of their lands; the Six Nations had acted for them, and the Delaware and some members of the Six Nations Confederacy felt that this was not right. The Penns' agents had taken advantage of the Iroquois myth of Delaware dependency to effect the purchase. The notion that the Delaware were dependent on the authority of the Six Nations and could not act for themselves in council stems from Iroquois claims that they had defeated the Delaware in the seventeenth century and had extended over them their political and military power, making the Delaware dependent on the Six Nations for military protection and acting for the Delaware in council, making treaties and, in this case, selling their land. The Delaware protested their status as Iroquois dependents, but the British continued to support the idea that the Six Nations could dominate the western Indians living beyond the pale of Iroquoia.²⁹

The Penn purchase also was questioned by the Six Nations when, a year later, after the Albany Conference, several members of the Six Nations complained to George Croghan, an Indian agent for the government of Pennsylvania, that the deed was never a deed of purchase but rather "a Deed of Trust." Croghan also reported that the Pennsylvania delegates revealed to him that the lands west of the Alleghenies "was neither Purchased nor Paid for."³⁰ The distinction between a deed of trust and a deed of sale was enormous in the minds of the Indians, but, in the colonial courts, their differences were all too often elided. Land held in trust was not supposed to be for sale; the Crown or, in the case of Pennsylvania (not a Crown colony), colonial officials were supposed to exert exclusive control over the land and protect it from alienation. This protective mechanism rarely functioned, because the pressure from land speculators was too great and the rewards of selling Indian land were too tempting.³¹

Conflicts between Indians and colonists over land had many causes, some having to do with basic cultural, economic, and philosophical differences. The Iroquoian and Algonquian peoples of northeastern America did not think of land as a commodity to be possessed exclusively by one individual. Because they held land communally and because their form of government was not hierarchical but consensual, no one person could claim owner-

ship and the right to alienate the land from the people who used it.³² Europeans and Euro-Americans, obsessed with the idea of private property and insistent on exclusive access to land, sought the "owners" of Indian lands so that they could purchase them. Land speculators, Indian traders, and colonists would approach an Indian in private and persuade him with gifts of rum, cloth, and metalwork to put his mark on a deed and "sell" his land, thereby circumventing the consent of the larger group and the uncertainties of a public council. For example, Conochquiesie, an Oneida sachem, complained to Johnson about the methods that Connecticut's agent, John Henry Lydius, used to obtain Indian land: "Brother. You promised us that you would keep this fire place clean from all filth and that no snake should come into this Council Room. That Man sitting there (pointing to Coll: Lyddius) is a Devil and has stole our Lands. He takes Indians slyly by the Blanket one at a time, and when they are drunk, puts some money in their Bosoms, and perswades them to sign deeds for our lands upon the Susquehanna which we will not ratify nor suffer to be settled by any means."³³ Confusion between Indians and Europeans over land tenure also arose when Indians would "sell" land, thinking they were giving whites permission to use the land temporarily, for a lifetime or less, not realizing that selling was a permanent form of alienation. One of the most common complaints by Indians was that, when they had agreed on a sale of a certain tract of land, surveyors acting for the new owners would enlarge upon the tract of land, doubling, trebling, even increasing its size a hundredfold.³⁴

THE PENN PURCHASE AND FRONTIER VIOLENCE

In their quest for more land on which to expand westward, the Penns had angered the Delaware and had irritated the Iroquois. A delegate from the Six Nations explained the Indians' grievances at a public meeting with Sir William Johnson: "The Governor of Pennsylvania bought a whole Track and only Paid for half, and desire you will let him know, that we will not Part with the other half, but keep it. These things makes us Constantly uneasie in our Minds, and we desire you will take care that we may keep, our lands for our selves."³⁵ The Delaware and Iroquois grievances over the Penn purchase aroused anxiety on the frontier and concern on the board of trade. Recognizing the danger that the

Penn purchase had occasioned on the frontier, the board of trade worried that the Penns' appropriation of western lands would threaten Britain's alliance with the Iroquois and the Ohio Indians against the French. The board of trade argued,

The extensive Purchases of Land made not only by the Proprietaries of Pennsylvania, but in other Governments bordering on the Indian Country, have long since occasioned Disgusts and Suspicions of Injury in the minds of the Indians; And that these Jealousies have been one principal Cause of their Defection from the British Interest, and of the Hostilities which they have committed on the Frontiers of His Majesty's Provinces.³⁶

The Penns were outraged by the suggestion that the Delaware were upset about the purchase of lands in Wyoming Valley and lands west of the Susquehanna River; they even demanded proof that the Delaware felt betrayed by the treaty of Albany. As the proprietors of Pennsylvania, they challenged Sir William Johnson and "all the World to shew any one Instance of their Conduct, that has given Dissatisfaction to the Six Nations." Thomas Penn was most upset that his reputation as an honorable man had been besmudged by Johnson's insinuations. His reputation as a fair dealer with the Indians was very important to him, but, even more importantly, he certainly did not want to be held responsible for Indian attacks on frontier settlements. In a letter to their agent, the proprietaries Thomas and Richard Penn explained that they were "extremely desirous that the Rectitude of all our Proceedings with the Indians shoud appear in the most publick Light, and that no Suspicion of contrary Measures on our Part shoud ever exist."³⁷

It was during this crisis over the Penn purchase of 1754 and frontier violence that the Pennsylvania Assembly, under the leadership of Benjamin Franklin, sought to undermine the Penns and their agents and the governor of the province by treating with the Indians themselves.³⁸ Concerned about the "Desolation and Terror" of a "cruel War" that the Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo had been waging "against Your Majesty's Subjects in . . . Provinces of Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey," Benjamin Franklin and representatives from the assembly usurped William Penn's legacy and cast themselves in the role of peacemakers.³⁹ The Quakers believed that the Indians who were participants in the frontier warfare were acting in response to the unfair dealing of the Penns and the proprietary government. They met twice

with the Delaware in 1756 and 1757 and heard their complaints against Penn not only for the recent purchase of Susquehanna lands but old grievances stemming from the Walking Purchase of 1737. Those Delaware who had been cheated of their lands in the Lehigh Valley region and had been evicted with the help of the Iroquois had moved west to the Susquehanna and beyond, where they joined the western Delaware and Shawnee in attacking Pennsylvania frontier settlements. The Quakers were right that the frontier violence grew out of recent and old grievances, for, when asked by the new governor, William Denney, if the people or the government of Pennsylvania had done injury to the Delaware, Teedyuscung, a Delaware chief treating at Easton in 1756 with the colonial government, responded, "[T]his very ground that is under me (striking it with his Foot) was my Land and Inheritance, and is taken from me by fraud." Detailing the various forms of fraud, Teedyuscung explained how the sons of William Penn "forge[d] a Deed like the true one," how they bought land from one sachem "what belongs to the other," and how they "took in double the Quantity intended to be sold."⁴⁰

When Franklin and his Quaker associates heard Teedyuscung's complaints "that the Indians had been unjustly dispossessed and defrauded of large Quantities of Land by Your Majesty's Subjects," they promised to lay the deeds and treaties before the king. In promising to go directly to the king with their complaints, Franklin and his associates were trying to circumvent Penn. Not only was Penn angered by these proceedings, but Sir William Johnson was disgusted by Franklin's attempt to shut him out of the negotiations; as the sole agent for the Crown in Indian affairs, Johnson felt that, in treating with the Indians privately, Franklin had muddled negotiations and had rendered the Indians "more difficult to treat with." Johnson resented "the extraordinary Conduct of the Assembly in appointing Members of their own House to interfere, as Provincial Commissioners, in Indian Treaties" and blamed Franklin for the failure of these meetings. Relying on Sir William's judgment, the board of trade advised the king and his privy council to reject Franklin's petition to lay the documents of the Penn purchase before the king and to refer the Indians' complaints and the negotiation for settlement back to Johnson. In rejecting Franklin's petition, the board and the privy council reaffirmed Johnson's position as "Sole Agent of Indian Affairs, who might manage and direct our concerns with them upon one uniform Plan, and thereby put a stop to the mischiefs so long

complained of, arising from the irregular and unwarrantable interferences of particular provinces, and in many instances of particular persons." Unfortunately, Teedyuscung would not meet with Johnson because of Johnson's association with "the Indian Nations . . . who had been instrumental to the misunderstanding in selling the Lands in Question."⁴¹

After much discussion with the board of trade, on 11 December 1756 the proprietors relinquished the lands west of the Alleghenies but insisted that, if the Iroquois decided to sell these disputed lands, they must sell to the Penn family. This decision to relinquish a legal claim on Indian land is rather remarkable, since it does not conform to the usual chain of events involving European and colonial desires for Indian land. The Penns' returning the land to the Iroquois and the western Delaware and Shawnee can be interpreted as a gracious and benevolent act, but it can also be seen as prudent. The Penns were clearly acting in their own interests, for, if the Iroquois and their "dependents" had refused to align themselves with the British, then France could have won the French and Indian War, and the Penns would have lost a lot more than the lands contiguous to the Susquehanna, Monongahela, and Allegheny rivers.⁴²

BOUNDARIES

Benjamin West's painting conveys a sense of the inevitable movement of Europeans onto Indian lands and the resulting retreat of the natives to lands beyond the frontier. Toward the right margin of the painting, the figure of a Delaware man is walking out of the picture, headed into the dark, primeval forest, carrying a rolled blanket over his shoulder. He looks as if he has received his goods in exchange for his land and is moving on to lands beyond the Delaware River. His movement out of the picture is in a left-to-right line. This left-to-right movement is reiterated by a figure in the background on the left margin of the painting. The figure appears to be a man with a dark complexion, possibly an African servant or seaman, who looks as if he is unloading a boat, for he is carrying bundles from the shore in the direction of the buildings. Ships lie in wait in the harbor, ready to unload their cargoes and passengers, and this anticipated movement, also left to right, is echoed by the way in which the Europeans have already transformed the landscape, clearing the forest and building houses.

The European landscape has pushed back the Indian village to the far right of the painting so that it occupies only a fraction of the picture's space.

Despite representations such as West's, this movement of colonists onto Indian land was not necessarily inevitable, nor was it seen as inevitable in 1770. After winning the war with France, the British Crown reasserted its desire to protect the western lands from white settlers and land speculators. The British government tried to create a viable border between its colonies and Indian territory with the Proclamation Line of 1763, which, reiterating the treaty of 1726, declared the Allegheny Mountains the border between Euro-American settlements and native lands.⁴³ This kept Penn from reasserting his claims, but it did not stem the flow of whites into the lands beyond the Alleghenies. The Crown had very little control over the movement of whites into Indian lands. As Georgiana Nammack points out, "despite the continued efforts of the Crown to regulate and control the granting of lands in the colonies, it seemed that the home government had genuine difficulty in enforcing its authority, and the problem of curbing speculation in huge grants persisted."⁴⁴ Distressed by the influx of white settlers and dissatisfied with the implementation of British policy, the western tribes, primarily the Western Delaware and Shawnee of Ohio and the Seneca of the Great Lakes region, as well as some Chippewa, Huron, and Miami—inspired by the example of Pontiac, an Ottawa war chief—conducted raids on the forts and settlements in the Ohio River valley. After two years of frontier warfare, Johnson finally persuaded the Seneca to bury the hatchet and to quit harassing frontier settlements; in 1766, Pontiac made peace with the British.⁴⁵

In 1768, Johnson negotiated the Treaty of Fort Stanwix. By this time, he and Thomas Penn were on the same side, Penn having appointed Johnson to act as leader of the Pennsylvania delegation. Johnson succeeded in fixing the boundary between Indian lands and colonial provinces not along the Allegheny Mountains but along the Ohio River. This line was not popular with the Ohio Indians—Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo—who occupied this area, and it was not what the board of trade had wanted; Johnson was criticized by both London and the Ohio Indians for giving away too much land to the colonists. But, as some historians have suggested, Johnson was realistic in his estimations of the seriousness of the white incursion into Indian territory and felt it was impossible for the Indians to hold onto land that they had already

lost to backwoods settlers, traders, and speculators. Johnson may have reasoned that it was pointless to attempt to create a frontier line along the Allegheny Mountains when it had already broken down as a real border.

In general, Johnson's policy on Indian land was to encourage Indians to sell their lands that had been squatted on by colonists, so that they could at least get something for land that they were in the process of losing control over. His motives for ignoring the board of trade's directives and redrawing the boundary have been criticized by historians who point out that he benefited materially from this redrawn boundary, since he received large tracts of land along the Ohio River. The Iroquois benefited from the treaty also, since the boundary line left most of their lands on the Indian side of the line. "In effect," Michael McConnell writes, "the Six Nations maintained their own territorial integrity by selling land occupied by people on the fringes of the Iroquois world." Richard White characterizes the Treaty of Fort Stanwix as "a cynical compact born of the mutual weakness of its two major parties: the Iroquois and the British empire." The British "effectively abdicated their role" as protectors of Indian lands and mediators between tribes, and "the Iroquois betrayed those people who were nominally under their protection."⁴⁶

Not only did Johnson negotiate away the lands of the Ohio Indians; he also gave away lands belonging to the Cherokee. Johnson extended the border westward, far beyond the board of trade's suggested boundary, where the Ohio and Kanawha rivers met. Johnson moved the line to the Tennessee River, only thirty miles from the Mississippi, although the board of trade had wanted the southern boundary to be the Allegheny Mountains so that colonial settlements would be restricted to within three hundred miles of the Atlantic, an area fairly accessible to His Majesty's troops. Johnson ignored the board of trade's advice and the orders of the Earl of Hillsborough, secretary of state, and drew the line to the Tennessee River, thereby alienating lands—what was to become Tennessee, Kentucky, and part of Alabama—on which the Cherokee lived and hunted. He negotiated this boundary not with the Cherokee or other southern nations but with the Six Nations Confederacy, which claimed to be the Cherokee's overlords by ancient right of conquest. Johnson's decision to ignore Cherokee rights was expedient as well as convenient. He could pretend that the Iroquois' suzerainty extended over their neighbors in Ohio and their enemies in Kentucky; in this way, he

could gain legal control over vast interior tracts of land. Johnson's actions can be explained as "enlightened" British policy. By alienating and insulting the Cherokee, he kept jealousies alive between the Indians of the North and the South and helped to prevent the formation of what could have been a very powerful pan-American Indian alliance, one that could have threatened British control of not only the western frontier but provinces such as New York, Pennsylvania, and Georgia.⁴⁷

Sir William Johnson also disobeyed orders from the board of trade when he drew the boundary to exclude from Indian territory a large tract of land along the Susquehanna River known as the Wyoming Valley. He arranged for this land to be sold to Thomas Penn, who gave the Iroquois ten thousand Spanish dollars. Johnson's reasoning was that this Wyoming Valley had been under dispute for several years; fighting over it were Delaware, Iroquois, white settlers from Connecticut who claimed it as a part of their province, and the Pennsylvania colonial government, which thought Connecticut's claims absurd. Johnson may have thought a clear title under the Penns would prevent further hostilities in this area.⁴⁸ Penn was probably delighted with this purchase, since the valley was part of what he had thought he was buying in Albany in 1754, when his agents treated with the Iroquois for western lands. After fourteen years, Penn finally got what he wanted: land on which to expand westward.

Painted a year after the ratification of the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, West's painting is a celebration of Thomas Penn's "peaceful" acquisition of Indian land, marking Penn's successful resolution of violent conflict over westward expansion. It is also a vindication of his character, an assertion of his own standing as a gentleman and a plaindealer. Through the figure of his father, Thomas Penn rewrote the history of his own troubled relations with the Delaware and asserted his peaceful intentions and goodwill toward colonists. As Ann Uhry Abrams has noted, Thomas Penn had suffered greatly under Franklin's attacks in the late 1750s, and, after the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, he was also plagued by accusations that he had obtained large tracts of land for speculation and personal gain. Abrams suggests that West's painting, in reiterating "the images of peace in Pennsylvania," was "a visual resolution of the many conflicts that had divided the Colony for over two decades."⁴⁹ West achieved this visual resolution not only by employing the iconography of the peace medal but also by using color, light, movement, and gender to reinforce

the ideological projections and displacements that lie at the heart of this painting.

The Penns' troubles over acquiring Indian land were never really resolved, only postponed until the American Revolution transformed their relationship to North America. The troubles caused by land speculation and Indian resistance to back country settlement shifted from the Penns' shoulders to the new American federal government, which feebly struggled to contain individual, corporate, and state desire for Indian land, insisting that it had assumed from the British Crown sovereignty over Indian land and, with sovereignty, stewardship over Indians and their lands.⁵⁰ But that is another story, one that involves issues of land, identity, and sovereignty, a story that continues to be written today.

NOTES

1. I am grateful to this journal's anonymous readers for their astute comments and gracious suggestions that were most helpful in revising this essay. I have stolen (an act in keeping with my forbears) this chapter title from Lilikalā Kame'eleihiwa's powerful book about the dispossession of the Hawaiians at the hands of American missionaries and sugar planters, *Native Land and Foreign Desires: Pehea Lā E Pono Ai?* (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1992).

2. These words, according to his biographer, Isabel Kelsay, were uttered on Brant's deathbed. See Isabel Thompson Kelsay, *Joseph Brant, 1743–1807: Man of Two Worlds* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1984), 652.

3. "Justice and Benevolence" are West's words. See Helmut von Erffa and Allen Staley, *The Paintings of Benjamin West* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 207. Ann Urhy Abrams suggests, "This painting has been reproduced and reinterpreted perhaps more than any other American work, appearing often in textbooks as an actual portrayal of the historic event" (pp. 59–60). I am much indebted to Abrams's work, especially her insistence that "one must look beyond the William Penn legend," to understand the work's significance, for "it spoke on many levels" (p. 75). See her article, "Benjamin West's Documentation of Colonial History: *William Penn's Treaty with the Indians*," *Art Bulletin* 64 (1982): 59–75.

While it is customary to claim William Penn as belonging to American history and Benjamin West as an American painter, I think of both of these men as belonging to the British Empire. (Besides, to call Penn an American is anachronistic; he would not have labeled himself so.) West used his Pennsylvania birth and colonial upbringing to exoticize and market himself, but he was loyal to Britain and active in the loyalist and expatriate American community in London. In his portrait of John Eardley-Wilmot (1812), West included images

of himself and his wife among representations of various loyalists, all of whom are shown seeking shelter under the spreading cloak of a benevolent Britannia.

4. For a history of the various ways that Euro-Americans have projected their needs and anxieties onto Native Americans in their construction of the figure of the Indian, see Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., *The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present*, part 3 (New York: Random House, 1979).

5. John Gregory, *A Father's Legacy to His Daughters* (1774), facsimile edition, ed. Gina Lurie (New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1974), 55; Jonathan Swift, "A Letter to a Young Lady on Her Marriage," (1727) in *Satires and Personal Writings by Jonathan Swift*, ed. William A. Eddy (London: Oxford University Press, 1932), 67.

6. Mary Wollstonecraft, *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792; New York: Norton, 1975, 1988), 186–87. An advocate of education for women, Wollstonecraft argues here that European women, because they lack formal education, are emotionally, intellectually, and morally inferior to European men.

7. Regarding the authenticity of the Indian attire, von Erffa's and Staley's commentary on this painting suggests the Indian costumes are authentic but not necessarily Lenape in origin. West seems to have combined dress from Iroquois, Lenape, and other Algonquian peoples to create an artistic effect. See von Erffa's and Staley's commentary in *The Paintings of Benjamin West*, 207.

8. Menno Boldt, *Surviving as Indians: The Challenge of Self-Government* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 3.

9. See Urs Bitterli, *Cultures in Conflict: Encounters Between Europeans and Non-European Cultures, 1492–1800*, trans. Ritchie Robertson (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1989), ch. 5, especially 122–32. See also Francis Jennings, "Brother Miquon: Good Lord!" in *The World of William Penn*, ed. Richard S. Dunn and Mary Maples Dunn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 196–97. Acquiring Indian quitclaims also bolstered his claims against Maryland's for land along the Susquehanna River. See Francis Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744* (New York: Norton, 1984), 225.

10. For Penn's construction of himself as a man of peace in his dealings with the Delaware, see his letter "To the Kings of Indians," 18 October 1681: "I am very sensible of the unkindness and injustice that has been too much exercised towards you by the people of these parts of the world, who have sought themselves, and to make great advantages by you, rather than be examples of justice and goodness unto you; which I hear has been matter of trouble to you and caused great grudgings and animosities, sometimes to the shedding of blood, which has made the great God angry. But I am not such a man, as is well known in my own country. I have great love and friendship toward you, and I desire to win and gain your love and friendship by a kind, just, and peaceable life. . . ." See Jean R. Soderlund, ed., *William Penn and the Founding of Pennsylvania, 1680–1684, A Documentary History* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 88.

11. Vivien Green Fryd's term. See her *Art and Empire: The Politics of Ethnicity in the United States Capitol, 1815-1860* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 28.

12. See Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1975), ch. 8, "The Deed Game" and ch. 17, "Outrage Bloody and Barbarous." For the deed of Penn's first purchase from the Lenni Lenape, see Soderlund, *William Penn and the Founding of Pennsylvania*, 156-62.

13. Von Erffa and Staley, *The Paintings of Benjamin West*, 207.

14. A popular theme in eighteenth-century British mercantile thought was the civilizing influence of trade on the primitive peoples of the world. These sentiments are expressed succinctly in George Lillo's *The London Merchant* by the great merchant, Thorowgood, who says of "the method of merchandise" that "it promotes humanity, . . . arts, industry, peace and plenty; by mutual benefits diffusing mutual love from pole to pole. . . . I have observed those countries where trade is promoted and encouraged do not make discoveries to destroy, but to improve mankind by love and friendship to tame the fierce and polish the most savage; to teach them the advantages of honest traffic by taking from them, with their own consent, their useless superfluities, and giving them in return what, from their ignorance in manual arts, their situation, or some other accident, they stand in need of" (III, i, 2-22). See George Lillo, *The London Merchant; or the History of George Barnwell in British Dramatists from Dryden to Sheridan*, ed. George H. Nettleton et al. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 595-623.

15. The language describing the "gifts" is ambiguous and multivalent. In the first deed from the Lenni Lenape, the gifts are described as "goods, merchandise, and utensils," as "presents," and as indicating that the sachems "have granted, bargained, sold, and delivered, . . . unto William Penn, his heirs and assigns, forever, all that or those tract or tracts of land . . ." ("Deed from the Delaware Indians," in Soderlund, *William Penn*, 156-57). Penn refers to these exchanges as purchases. For another version of the meaning of these kinds of exchanges of commodities, see Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) and his discussion of the French-Algonquian alliance, which was cemented by such gift-giving ceremonies.

16. Abrams, "Benjamin West's Documentation of Colonial History," 75.

17. Fryd, *Art and Empire*, 28.

18. See Francis Jennings's account of the Walking Purchase in *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its beginning to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744* (New York: Norton, 1984), chapters 16 and 17, particularly 330-42 and appendix B.

19. Nutimus to Jeremiah Langhorne, 21 November 1740, Penn Mss., Indian Affairs 4:30, Historical Society of Pennsylvania; qtd. in Jennings, *Ambiguous Empire*, 320-21, 341; *ibid.*, 346.

20. Council Minutes, 12 July 1742, Philadelphia; reprinted in *The History of the Five Indian Nations of Canada*, ed. Cadwallader Colden, 2 vols. (1727-47; New York: Allerton Book Co., 1922), 2: 104-11.

21. Michael N. McConnell sees the Penn-Six Nations alliance as "an instrument of coercion and dispossession" (pp. 59–60). For a discussion of the Six Nations' impact on the westward movement of the Delaware, see chapter 3 of McConnell, *A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724–1774* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992). David K. Richter agrees that "Iroquois behavior in selling lands out from under the Delaware and Shawnee 'Props of the Longhouse' was certainly one of the less admirable moments in the Six Nations' history" (p. 275). But he suggests that this Pennsylvania-Iroquois connection was "the work of a particular faction of headmen" who claimed "to speak for the Confederacy Council" (p. 274). See chapter 11 of Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992).

22. See Jennings, *Ambiguous Empire*, 341–46.

23. Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse*, 22–23 and 42–43.

24. Jennings, *Ambiguous Empire*, 362. Jennings puts it even more dramatically: "The fateful alliance between Pennsylvania and the Iroquois changed history on the large scale. When James Logan [Penn's agent] seduced the Iroquois into serving his purposes against their tributaries instead of protecting the tributaries against him, he opened the gate to colonial settlement beyond the Appalachians, insured that the French would respond in arms, and guaranteed the deaths of hundreds of Pennsylvania's back settlers at the hands of Delaware seeking righteous, though misdirected, vengeance" (*Ambiguous Empire*, 345).

25. The board of trade to the king's privy council, 1 June 1759, in *The Documentary History of the State of New-York* (hereinafter referred to as *DHNY*), 4 vols., ed. E.B. O'Callaghan (Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons, 1849), 2: 780; board of trade to the king, 11 December 1755, *DHNY*, 2: 704; board of trade to the king's privy council, 1 June 1759, *DHNY*, 2: 778.

26. Johnson to the board of trade, 10 September 1756, *DHNY* 2: 736. I have not regularized the spelling and shorthand of Sir William Johnson, George Croghan, or Benjamin Franklin, all of whom have their own spellings of Pennsylvania.

27. Johnson to the board of trade, 28 May 1756, *DHNY* 2: 719; Johnson to the board of trade, 10 September 1756, *DHNY* 2: 736–37; Johnson to the board of trade, 10 September 1756, *DHNY* 2: 737.

28. Proceedings of Commissioners from 6 Provinces met at Albany Anno 1754 on Indian Affairs, 9 July 1754, *DHNY* 2: 610–11.

In his history of the British Empire, Lawrence Henry Gipson stresses the inability of London and the Crown to control the colonial scene in North America: "It is exceedingly important to grasp the fact—something that many students of British colonial history have not fully appreciated and that the failure of the British ministry to comprehend before 1775 cost the British people dearly—that none of the mechanisms evolved by the British government to keep the Empire in due subordination were really adequate to the task with the growing maturity of the American colonies" (5: viii). See Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*, 12 vols, *Volume V: Zones of International Friction* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942, 1961).

Georgiana C. Nammack argues that colonial governors were not able (and frequently did not want) to enforce the board of trade's policies that regulated the sale of Indian land. "In America, colonial officials were not only reluctant to satisfy Indian complaints [about fraudulent land purchases], but also were apparently unwilling to enforce Crown regulations pertaining to land grants." Such regulations stipulated that "lands were to be properly surveyed in the presence of the Indians, and surveys and deeds were to be recorded within a specified period of time" (p. 91). Colonial governors and officials, most visibly in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, participated in land speculation deals that ignored the Crown's policies. Nammack describes the various ways in which colonists perpetrated fraud, one of which was to use the phrase *more or less* in describing the portion of land, so that the possessor of a deed could claim as much as one hundred times as much land as the Indians had intended to sell (pp. 99–100). See Georgiana C. Nammack, *Fraud, Politics, and the Dispossession of the Indians: The Iroquois Land Frontier in the Colonial Period* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969).

29. Francis Jennings argues that the idea that the Iroquois had ascendancy over the Delaware was a "myth, originated with English colonial officials" and insists that the Iroquois did not have a "position of importance" among Pennsylvania's many bands of Delaware (p. 75). See his "'Pennsylvania Indians' and the Iroquois," in *Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600–1800*, ed. Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrell (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1987), 75–91. Michael N. McConnell explores the relationship of the Six Nations Confederacy with the Ohio Indians, among them the Delaware, the Shawnee, and the Mingo. He argues that the Ohio region was not simply a part of the Iroquois empire. "Instead of a land subdued and controlled by the Six Nations, there was an Ohio Indian world created by a variety of people—Shawnees, Delawares, and Iroquois. Into this world the councils of the Six Nations rarely intruded; and when they did, it was with little influence and less authority" (p. 93). The Penn sale and the Fort Stanwix Treaty of 1768 are instances of what McConnell sees as the Iroquois abandoning "reciprocal obligations to their own people in the west and to others whom the Iroquois periodically found it useful to call 'dependent'" (p. 112). See McConnell, "Peoples 'In Between': The Iroquois and the Ohio Indians, 1720–1768," in Richter and Merrell, *Beyond the Covenant Chain*, 93–112. Richard White argues that both the Iroquois and the British exploited this myth for their own advantages, both knowing that it was not as true as they wished. See Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), ch. 8.

30. Croghan is quoted in a letter from the proprietors of Pennsylvania to the board of trade, September 1757, *DHNY* 2: 754.

31. See Nammack, *Fraud, Politics, and the Dispossession of the Indians*, for the ways in which colonial officials benefited from the sale of Indian lands, especially the appendix on fees officials charged every time land changed hands, 107–108. John Tabor Kempe, attorney general for New York, explained to Sir William Johnson why he wanted to speculate in Indian lands: "It is the

only way I can have of making my office of any advantage to me, . . . because I . . . am but illy supported in my office" (Kempe to Johnson, 23 May 1766, cited in Nammack, *Fraud, Politics, and the Dispossession of the Indians*, 101). Menno Boldt summarizes the effect of the Royal Proclamation in 1763: "[T]he Crown was establishing itself as the exclusive real-estate agent for vast tracks of Indian land that were destined to be surrendered under treaties. Then, on the basis of purchase and grants, the Crown transferred proprietary title to land surrendered by Indians, from itself to the provinces, to settlers, and to corporations (e.g., the Hudson's Bay Company) [in Johnson's case, the Indiana Company]. But it consistently denied Indians proprietary title to any of their ancestral lands, even to their reserves" (pp. 4–5). See Boldt, *Surviving as Indians*.

32. For Delaware land tenure, see Jennings, *Ambiguous Empire*, 325–28.

33. Treaty minutes, 3 July 1755, in *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, ed. Edmund B. O'Callaghan and Berthold Fernow, 15 vols. (Albany: Weed, Parsons, and Co., 1856–87) 6: 984; qtd. in Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 107.

34. Nammack details colonial land fraud practices, focusing on provincial New York and Iroquois lands. She cites an Onondaga speaker who complains about the use of deeds and patents to defraud Indians of their lands: "'[W]e were always ready to give, but the English don't deal fairly with us, they are more cunning than we are; they get our names upon paper very fast, we often don't know what it is for'" (*Fraud, Politics, and the Dispossession of the Indians*, 104).

35. Proprietors of Pennsylvania to the board of trade, 10 September 1757, *DHNY* 2: 751.

36. Board of trade to privy council, 1 June 1759, *DHNY* 2: 773.

37. Proprietors of Pennsylvania to the board of trade, 11 December 1756, *DHNY* 2: 738; Thomas and Richard Penn to Richard Peters (their agent), 12 March 1757, *DHNY* 2: 743.

38. For Franklin's position on Indian affairs, see Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 87–95, 280–81.

39. Franklin's petition to the board of trade, *DHNY* 2: 771–72.

40. Treaty minutes, 13 November 1756, in *Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania*, ed. Samuel Hazard, 16 vols. (Harrisburg, PA: Theo. Fenn, and Co., 1851), 7: 324–26.

41. Franklin's petition stated "that all the Purchase Deeds and Writings by which . . . Thomas and Richard Penn . . . now hold any Lands within the back Parts of the Province of Pennsylvania, should be examined and Copies laid before Your Majesty for Your Royal Decision, of the Bounds and Limits between the Lands heretofore bought of the Indians, and those yet unpurchased." For Franklin's petition, see *DHNY* 2: 771–72. For Johnson's reaction to the petition, see Johnson to the board of trade, 5 June 1760, *DHNY* 2: 792. For the board of trade's analysis of the affair, see Report on the Preceding Petition, 1 June 1759, *DHNY* 2: 774–75.

42. When the Delaware complained about the Penn purchase, Thomas Penn wrote to the board of trade insisting that the land had been sold without

fraud and legally belonged to the proprietors of Pennsylvania, Thomas and Richard Penn. But to prevent further violence and possible defection from the British alliance, the Penns decided to return the land west of the Allegheny Mountains. In their letter to the board of trade, the proprietors let the board know that this reparation was not done lightly. They end their letter reminding the British government of its duty to protect private property: "[T]hey hope [that] private Property will ever be as much regarded, and as unwillingly given up by the Crown as Land in Provinces under His Majesty's immediate Government, and where the Lands are granted by virtue of his Commission" (*DHNY* 2: 741). The implication here is that the Penns felt they were forced to return land to the Indians, something that any other province would never have allowed to happen.

43. For an interesting discussion of the repercussions of the Royal Proclamation, see Menno Boldt, *Surviving as Indians*. Boldt argues that, under the proclamation of 1763, "the British Crown unilaterally asserted its sovereignty over self-governing indigenous nations in North America, and claimed proprietary title to lands on which Indians had lived and survived from time immemorial. . . . The Royal Proclamation was uniquely framed to dispossess Indians of their sovereignty and lands" (p. 3). In claiming sovereignty over Indian land, the Crown was simultaneously protecting Indian land from unauthorized white encroachment and depriving Indians of property rights over their land.

44. Nammack, *Fraud, Politics, and the Dispossession of the Indians*, 95.

45. For a discussion of Indian discontent leading up to "Pontiac's Rebellion," see White, *The Middle Ground*, ch. 7, and McConnell, *A Country Between*, ch. 8.

46. McConnell, "Peoples 'In Between,'" in *Beyond the Covenant Chain*, 111; White, *The Middle Ground*, 351. For a defense of Johnson's redrawing of the boundary, see James Thomas Flexner, *Mohawk Baronet: Sir William Johnson of New York* (New York: Harper, 1959), ch. 23. Richard White sees Johnson as consulting "his own private interests as much as he did imperial interests" (p. 353). For a discussion of Johnson's motives and conduct during the negotiations of the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, see Jack M. Sosin, *Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 175-78. For a discussion of the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, including Johnson's and the Iroquois' motives, see McConnell, *A Country Between*, 244-58.

47. See Johnson to Hillsborough, 18 November 1768, *DHNY* 2: 917-19. Johnson's rationale for ignoring the Cherokee's sovereignty is stated thusly: "Your Lordship will find that the Six Nations, insisting on their right to the Lands as far South as the Cherokee River have Ceded the Same to his Majesty, and . . . I found . . . that I could not deny them the Liberty of asserting their pretensions to the Southward without highly disobliging them, and preventing the Settlement of the rest. . . . From many former enquiries & disputes on these subjects I never could find that the Cherokees claimed to the Westward of the Great Mountains or North of the River of their Name but that the Six Nations

always did Claim thereto. . . . Should the Cherokees now or hereafter under Colour of a Claim farther North be treated with and Surrender it up, It would occasion much Expence and Trouble to obtain the Consent of the Northern Indians, who are a much more formidable people . . ." (pp. 917–18).

48. Flexner, *Mohawk Baronet*, 326.

49. Abrams, "Benjamin West's Documentation of Colonial History," 69.

50. In 1780, after running out of funds to pay its soldiers, the state of New York had promised men who joined the militia that they would be paid in Indian land. After the war, the federal government tried to stop New York from distributing land to militiamen, arguing that the state had no right to cede Indian land. That right rested with the federal government. The federal government had this fight with other states in the decades after the Revolutionary War. For a discussion of the way in which Iroquois land was distributed after the war, see Richard H. Schein, "Framing the Frontier: The New Military Tract Survey in Central New York," *New York History* 74 (1993): 5–28.