

“A Remedy for Barbarism”: Indian Schools, the Civilizing Program, and the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation, 1871–1915

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If there is an idol that the American people have, it is the school. If you don't believe it, go out to Pine Ridge, where there are seven thousand Sioux on eight million acres of land . . . and find planted . . . thirty-two school houses, standing there as a testimony to our belief in education . . . It is a remedy for barbarism, we think, and so we give the dose . . . The school is the slow match . . . [I]t will blow up the old life, and of its shattered pieces [we] will make good citizens.

—Testimony of Miss Annie Beecher Scoville
Annual Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners in the
Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1901

During the late nineteenth century, no solution to the so-called Indian problem was mentioned more often than education. Determined to remold Indians into models of white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant society, government officials seized upon schools as the best way to make such changes a reality. Confident that the classroom could transform Indian children more effectively than

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any other institution, policy makers sought to create a comprehensive school system that would provide a systematic, uniform standard of progress for those who entered it. Of the government's various programs, only education promised a complete metamorphosis for Indian children. Schools could be built anywhere and everywhere; they could accommodate students of all ages and both sexes; and they could act as the most powerful engine possible of the cultural reorientation that policy makers envisioned. Most important, schools targeted young children, those most vulnerable to change and least able to resist it. The Indian school system, Robert Utley has observed, "represented the most dangerous of all attacks on basic Indian values, the one most likely to succeed in the end because it aimed at the children who had known little if any of the old reservation life."¹

Policy makers hoped for a school system that would simultaneously solve the immediate Indian problem and provide the foundation for future generations of assimilated children. At a bare minimum, the goal was to produce students schooled in the rudiments of Anglo-American agriculture and habits of work, who were proficient in the use of the English language, and who knew and appreciated the truths of the Christian religion, preferably the Protestant variety. Sure of their ability to win such a victory, officials enthusiastically promoted the schools as the most important component of the government's Indian policy. Hailing the classroom as the laboratory of permanent change, commissioner of Indian affairs Thomas J. Morgan spoke for reformers, educators, and policy makers alike when he said that "education is essential to civilization" and that there were "no insuperable obstacles in the way of blending Indian children with white children."²

To achieve this transformation, policy makers created a comprehensive Indian school system during the latter decades of the nineteenth century. Building on an already well-established tradition that reached back to Thomas Jefferson's day, government officials joined the idea of a comprehensive Indian school system to the reservation program that dominated post-Civil War policy. The primary architect of this system was Thomas J. Morgan, commissioner of Indian affairs from 1889 to 1893. Thoroughly devoted to the goal of a transformed, civilized Indian population, Morgan energetically supported the Indian schools as the engines that would "turn the American Indian into the Indian Ameri-

can."³ Speaking to the 1889 Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of the Indian, Morgan outlined his philosophy:

When we speak of the education of the Indian, we mean that comprehensive system of training and instruction which will convert them into American citizens Education is the medium through which the rising generation of Indians are to be brought into fraternal and harmonious relationships with their white fellow-citizens, and with them enjoy the sweets of refined homes, the delight of social intercourse, the emoluments of commerce and trade, the advantages of travel, together with the pleasures that come from literature, science, and philosophy, and the solace and stimulus afforded by a true religion.⁴

It was a huge task, but Morgan and others regarded it as nothing less than the choice between the Indians' survival as civilized members of American society and the sure extinction that the whites believed would be the inevitable lot of all backward peoples. "This civilization may not be the best possible," noted Morgan, but "they cannot escape it . . . and must either conform to it or be crushed by it."⁵

At the heart of Morgan's plan lay an elaborate tier of schools. A combination of day schools, reservation boarding schools, off-reservation boarding schools, mission schools, and public schools made up the components. Of these, he considered the reservation schools, and especially the boarding schools, the most critical. Here, students could be carefully controlled, literally molded anew, to paraphrase Frederick Hoxie, into models of white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant America.⁶ The boarding schools, notes Bruce David Forbes, lifted "young people out of native contexts and immersed them in white American culture. The intention was to raise godly, civilized, educated children, with all the implication those words carried [T]he separation of the boarding school made children more educable in new patterns."⁷

The idea of such a system gained widespread support as the necessity for providing such opportunity to the tens of thousands of Indian children in the West became more and more obvious. Determined to act as a beneficent victor, the United States government undertook its obligations in the spirit of benevolent assimilation. Far better to lift them up, said policy makers, than to leave them mired in the uncivilized life of the camp. It was a solution that measured cultural worth very narrowly, but, insisted the

government, it was surely better than leaving the Indians to fend for themselves against the army or the settlers who were already claiming most of the West.

The three decades following 1865 were notable for the energy that went into reform and, speaking in relative terms, into a progressive Indian policy. Arguably the most significant of these programs was the Indian school system. Advocates trumpeted its utility, and the Indian Office inevitably opened its annual reports with a section on education that reported, in glowing terms, the progress made in the past year. With the enthusiastic support of various reform groups and policy makers, a national Indian school system began to take shape by the late 1870s. Between 1877 and the turn of the century, the program enjoyed significant support. Annual expenditures, for example, increased from a mere \$20,000 in 1877 to nearly \$4 million by 1911. The number of schools showed similar increases, up from forty-eight reservation boarding schools to 173 by the first decade of the twentieth century. Enrollments shot up during the same period from 8,020 to more than 21,000.⁸ Casual observers could not help but think that such numbers revealed stunning advances.

Statistical tables, however, do not reveal the whole story. Despite the apparent success indicated by these numbers, the question of how well the schools actually assimilated Indian students is a matter for debate. Viewed through the lens of official reports, the Indian school system appeared to work well; policy makers could point to statistics as the proof. In fact, however, when the system is scrutinized from the perspective of specific reservations and schools, it becomes clear that the schools suffered nearly universally from serious deficiencies in disturbingly regular patterns. Although there were exceptions, on balance reservation schools were miserably run, poorly administered, and only marginally successful. The task of educating tens of thousands of Indian children in the difficult circumstances typical of most reservations meant that the lofty rhetoric of policy makers often crumbled before the withering realities of reservation life. Even more important, the government's campaign to destroy native culture and replace it with a permanent set of mainstream, Anglo values foundered. In the end, Morgan was incorrect. The Kiowa and Comanche could escape the campaign, and they could avoid being crushed by it.

Despite its crucial role in the government's civilizing program, education has received relatively little attention, especially at the

reservation level. Although standard reservation histories usually include sections on the Indian schools, there are few studies that focus primarily on schools.⁹ This is unfortunate, for it was at the reservation level that most Indian children experienced the schools, and it was at that level that the greatest expectations were created. Of course, it was also at that level that the problems and limitations of Indian schools were most apparent. But what we know about the reservation schools is often wrapped around discussions of larger issues and not around discussions of what students actually experienced.¹⁰ In his important work on late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Indian policy, for example, Frederick Hoxie provides a brilliant analysis of how educational goals shifted between 1880 and 1920. He offers us a useful overview of education policy from the perspective of Washington but ultimately tells us little about how that policy was worked out on reservations.¹¹

The same is true of accounts that discuss specifically the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation. On the one hand, Mildred Mayhall's work on the Kiowa, to take one source, is dated, relies heavily on secondary sources, and is historically and ethnographically simplistic. Indeed, it makes no important contribution to our understanding of the Kiowa and their reservation experience, and it provides virtually no discussion of the schools.¹² On the other hand, William T. Hagan's monograph on the Comanche is a model of scholarship that remains the standard reference for the reservation. Hagan tells us much of interest about the reservation's schools that is not told elsewhere, but, because it is bound up in a broader discussion of the reservation, Hagan's treatment of the schools is limited. He does, however, give us important material on the poor condition and treatment of the schools and ably outlines the central issues and problems. Much of what will follow confirms his overview and rests in part on his conclusions.¹³

By looking more closely at reservation schools, we can gain an important perspective on the implementation of policy, on the difficulties of reservation life, and on the limitations that all too often crippled the government's civilizing agenda. This essay examines schooling on the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation in the southwest corner of Oklahoma. Like the work of Hagan and others, it places the discussion in the broad context of the general reservation experience, but then extends into less well-known areas by focusing more closely on schools and the prob-

lems they faced. The Rainy Mountain Boarding School, for example, a typical reservation school that opened in the fall of 1893, clearly illustrates the dilemma of educating Indian children in the late nineteenth century. Despite its relatively long history, however, and its relationship to a critical era of policymaking, Rainy Mountain has never been the subject of any in-depth, scholarly treatment; nor, for that matter, have any of the reservation's other schools. This creates a notable gap in our understanding of what reservation schools were doing.

The reservation schools and the civilizing agenda also offer a way to examine the rhetoric and reality of policy. Thus schools become a sort of barometer for assessing the intentions of government officials. Schools and the civilizing campaign also tell us a great deal about the ability of Indian people to forge an accommodation based on a middle ground. Unwilling to surrender completely but well aware of the consequences of rejecting the schools, the Kiowa and Comanche sought a solution that combined two worlds and two sets of lifeways. In doing so, they often, if ironically, accepted schools and the civilizing program as necessary components in their survival as native people.

The negotiations that created the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation occurred in the fall of 1867, when the United States government made the latest in a series of attempts to secure a settlement with the Kiowa and their neighbors.¹⁴ Anxious to open the southern Plains to settlement and increasingly impatient about the lengthy process that had plagued the opening, United States officials convinced the Kiowa, Comanche, and other southern Plains tribes to negotiate a permanent solution. Three days of discussions at Medicine Lodge Creek in Kansas produced a treaty. Government representatives made the usual pronouncements about perpetual peace and friendship. Boundaries for a reservation were outlined, and annuities were guaranteed for the next two decades. The treaty promised an agency and staff to attend to the needs of the tribes for the life of the agreement. Important plans for allotment (and inducements to encourage it) were included, as were the usual comments on education and civilization. These were all standard fare, reflecting the dominant assumptions of the era and serving as a blueprint for the transformation of the tribes. In its emphasis on accelerating the assimilation of the tribes, the agreement reflected what Paul Prucha has noted was the central goal of reformers and policy makers alike: a Protestant, civilized Indian.¹⁵

In fact, the purpose of the treaty was to clear Indians out of the way, not to worry at length about what should be done with them. Neither the treaty nor the government that sponsored it ever created the conditions necessary for the transformation of the Kiowa and Comanche. Indeed, even if those conditions amounted to nothing more than the destruction of anything construed as "Indian," it cannot be said that the government ever successfully managed to obliterate the salient features of such culture. In reality, the treaty did not promote peace at all; according to Hagan, it was used to "give the stamp of legitimacy to United States efforts to concentrate the Indians and open the region to white exploitation." This critical flaw crippled the Medicine Lodge agreement from its inception. The government made promises that it would not keep, promises that, according to Hagan, it never intended to honor. It was a specious document, and the civilizing program it outlined would prove it.¹⁶

At the heart of that program lay the schools and teachers promised by the treaty—one each for every thirty pupils on the reservation. "The necessity of education is admitted," noted Article 7, especially on so-called "agricultural reservations."¹⁷ Coming as it did in the era of the Peace Policy, amid public concern about the government's uneven performance to date, reformers hoped that policy makers would sincerely embrace the cause. After all, hadn't the Indian Office committed itself to a comprehensive system of schools designed to elevate Indian children to civilization? By telling the nation that education and civilization were synonymous and that the true object of policy was educating children, hadn't the government sent a clear message about its reservation policy? For missionaries like Quaker Thomas Battey, Indian schools "seemed like a holy experiment" that would fit comfortably into the civilizing program created by Medicine Lodge.¹⁸ A few administrators and missionaries agreed with him; during the next decade, a small handful of schools began to dot the reservation. This fledgling system, however, gave false encouragement, a situation best revealed through a brief examination of the reservation in its formative years.

Control of the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation passed to the Quakers in 1869, when responsibility for the Central Superintendency came to them under the provisions of the Peace Policy. The first agent was Lawrie Tatum, a forty-seven-year-old Iowa farmer appointed in May 1869, a fact he reportedly discovered while reading a newspaper story.¹⁹ A thorough-going Quaker

whose temperament meshed perfectly with the humanitarian goals of the Peace Policy, Tatum faced an enormous task. Before him were more than six thousand Indians from ten tribes, speaking nine languages and occupying an area the size of Connecticut. He did not yet know it, but Tatum ultimately discovered that his Quaker devotion was badly out of step with the overwhelming realities of the reservation.²⁰

An omen of the future came shortly after Tatum took office, when an inspection of the agency convinced him that its needs were so great that significant increases in budget and supplies were necessary. On 21 August 1869, Tatum wrote to the Indian Office with his revised estimates for the agency's needs. First, he pointed out that he required no fewer than twenty-seven farmers and fourteen cooks for the current year to fulfill his obligations to the tribes. Moreover, he continued, those numbers would have to be increased to eighty and thirty, respectively, for the coming year. Tatum also requested twenty-five wagons, 160 mules, and 120 plows, all of it necessary to provide the "fostering and protecting care of the government" to which the tribes were entitled.²¹

Tatum's requests exceeded \$200,000—a figure that went far beyond anything authorized in the Medicine Lodge Treaty and well beyond what the Indian Office could provide. The commissioner's response was coldly emphatic: The Medicine Lodge Treaty guaranteed one farmer, not twenty-seven. Tatum would have to make do with what he had. When he continued to push for larger budgets and greater support, Commissioner Francis A. Walker tersely reminded him in 1872 that "the United States have [sic] given them a noble reservation, and have [sic] provided amply for all their wants."²² It was not an encouraging beginning.

Forced to make do with what little they had, Tatum and his successors forged ahead with programs intended to support the civilizing agenda of the Peace Policy. This meant transforming tribesmen into farmers and stockmen. By using the influence of schools, churches, and other Anglo-American institutions, agents hoped to lead the tribes as quickly as possible to new lives. In the meantime, rations and annuities not only provided them with basic necessities but also served as a discouragement to the raiding in which too many tribesmen still engaged. It was a daunting task, however, and agents rarely gained control of the reservation. Although in theory they possessed what commissioner of Indian affairs Thomas J. Morgan described as "semi-despotic powers," few agents ever managed to master the com-

plexities of the reservation environment. In a revealing passage in his study of the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation, Hagan has argued that "the typical agent learned to avoid trouble by not pushing the civilization program too hard and thus setting his Indians against him." An 1870 report from Tatum suggests that Hagan is correct. Tatum commented to the commissioner that annuity payments ironically represented an incentive to ignore agency policies, because if the Indians behaved themselves, their payments might be reduced. "They repeatedly told me that . . . the only way to get a large amount was to go on the war path awhile, kill a few white people, steal a good many horses and mules, and then make a treaty and they would get a large amount of presents and a liberal supply of goods for that fall."²³ Similar stories and accounts of failing programs were staples in subsequent reports from the reservation's agents.

The unfortunate fact that most agents were of poor caliber only made the situation worse. Tatum was an exception to the rule, and even he found the situation beyond his control. Some of his successors showed much less fortitude and initiative, and several were openly not interested in the hard work of running the agency. Many of the agents at the Kiowa-Comanche agency turned out to be nothing more than political hacks with no real qualifications for the job. One was a former lumberyard manager, for example, and another was a grocer. A third, despite the fact that he was, as Hagan notes, "innocent of any prior experience with Indians or the West," came with a reference that reported him "entirely free of bad habits (never drank liquor in his life)." Others were not always as morally upstanding. Methodist missionary John Jasper Methvin once described agent J. Lee Hall as "a great man in ruins on account of drink." Matters improved somewhat when army officers replaced civilian agents on the reservation after 1893; until then, however, a procession of malcontents, incompetents, and ill-suited appointees plagued the agency. In the process, they created conditions that were generally so miserable that the agency earned a well-deserved reputation as one of the nation's worst.²⁴

Part of the problem lay in the government's expectations. It is safe to say that agents were expected to be all things to all people and that excuses or explanations to the contrary were usually not well received. In 1891, the acting secretary of the interior informed newly appointed agent George D. Day that the Indian Office considered the position of agent

one of far more than ordinary importance, both for the interests of the government and of the Indians who will be brought under your charge and direction; that sobriety and integrity must mark the conduct of yourself and every one . . . under your charge; that an improved condition in the affairs of the Agency will be expected within a reasonable amount of time . . . ; that the education and proper training of the Indian children and the agricultural and other industrial pursuits of the adult Indians must receive your constant and careful attention, to the end that they may be advanced in the ways of civilization, and to the condition of self-support; and that your commission will be held with the express understanding that you will use your utmost endeavors to further these objects and purposes.²⁵

Under the circumstances, this was a tall order for even the most devoted agent; finding men who would take seriously the injunction to render "constant and careful attention" was difficult indeed.²⁶

This was truly unfortunate, for the Kiowa-Comanche agency was an important test of the civilizing agenda that sat at the core of policy goals. The lack of control meant that Kiowa and Comanche alike continued to raid with near impunity and to regard both the reservation and the Medicine Lodge agreement with disdain. Commenting on the disruptions that continued to plague the southern Plains in the wake of Medicine Lodge, central superintendent Enoch Hoag reported in 1870 that the principal troubles in his region came from the Kiowa, the Comanche, and the Kiowa-Apache tribes. Two years later, the commissioner of Indian affairs characterized those tribes as "wild and intractable." He noted, "Even the best of them have given small signs of improvement." Exasperated, the commissioner declared that, in light of continued raids and troublemaking by those tribes, "the point has been reached where forbearance ceases to be a virtue." Most urgently needed was "a wholesome example which shall inspire fear and command obedience." Tatum confirmed Hoag's dreary evaluation in 1872 by admitting that "the Kiowas and a few hands of the Comanches are uncontrollable by me."²⁷ Here, on a reservation widely considered an important test for the government's civilizing programs, progress was nearly nonexistent; half a dozen years after the Medicine Lodge agreement had set the terms for the Kiowa and Comanche, little had changed.

A summary of conditions during the mid to late 1870s reveals astonishingly little success. Civilizing programs were failing miserably. There was no school system to speak of. Attempts to get the Kiowa and Comanche to farm or raise stock fizzled. So little was being achieved that most of the agency's Indians found it relatively easy to resist assimilation or, at the very least, to accept it on terms that did not mean forfeiting their sense of cultural identity.²⁸ In 1875, nearly eight years after Medicine Lodge, Hoag reported that the number of Indians on the agency wearing so-called citizen clothing stood at eight. The number of houses occupied by Indians was also only eight. And only sixty of more than six hundred school-age children were receiving instruction at the agency's only school.²⁹ In 1871, less than two years after the signing of the treaty, Hoag told his superiors that, although the Peace Policy was working, "its beneficial results, in some instances, have been seriously crippled by want of promptness on the part of the Government."³⁰ It was a masterful understatement.

Like many of the rest of the reservation's civilizing programs, schooling met with indifference, poor support, and inadequate funding. Few examples more clearly illustrate the limitations of reform; few examples more clearly reveal the distance between rhetoric and reality. Required by the Medicine Lodge Treaty to provide a school and a teacher for every thirty school-age children on the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation, the government struggled from the beginning to make good on its obligation. In reality, it never came close to providing anywhere near enough schools; between 1870 and 1920, for example, rarely more than a half-dozen schools operated at one time on the reservation. Of that number, about one-half were not even government schools, but mission schools supported by private charities. The promises of Medicine Lodge were still waiting to be fulfilled when Tatum reported in 1870 that his agency had no schools and he did not expect to get any in the foreseeable future, because, he noted, "There have been no funds either to build houses or sustain teachers."³¹

For nearly three years, Tatum waited in vain for the bureau to meet its obligations. Ironically, when the first school finally opened in 1871, it was not a government school but a private one supported in part by the Society of Friends. In February 1871, Josiah and Elizabeth Butler, Ohio Quakers, opened a small boarding school near the agency at Fort Sill. Initially, the school attracted mostly Caddo and Wichita students; Kiowa children did not

attend it regularly or in significant numbers until three or four years later. During its first term, the school was home to a total of twenty-four children, who attended school five days a week for four-and-one-half-hours a day, and concentrated on spelling, reading, and writing. Butler's diary entry after the first day of class reported an encouraging beginning for the seven students with whom he opened the school:

I read a psalm, explaining what it was. I then explained the use of the small bell. I got all in a class before Wilson's Chart No. 1, spelling cap, cat, dog, ox, hen, &c., the pictures of the same being before them. They articulated better than I had expected . . . I gave them slates and they made fairly good figures. I kept them at it one hour and then dismissed them until after dinner. I gave them an hour for noon, then an hour on slates and charts, an hour for recess and then another hour as before.³²

To complement the academic instruction they received, Butler arranged work for the older boys at the agency sawmill on Saturdays for fifty cents each per day. Elizabeth taught sewing and domestic skills to the girls. The school also provided food, lodging, and clothing for its students.

Invited to see for himself how the children were doing, Tatum visited at the end of the first term and reported that the pupils "all showed marked progress for the length of time they have been studying."³³ As for Butler, it was a modest beginning, but he believed there was great promise in the experiment, and he knew in his heart, he said, that his labor was not in vain. It may not have been in vain, but it was surely a lonely crusade; for the next eight years, his was virtually the only school on the reservation.

Others made similar attempts, but none of them proved very successful; in fact, most of them failed within several years of opening. An instructive example came from the experience of Thomas C. Battey, an Iowa Quaker who got along well with the Kiowa. After helping to open the Riverside School at the nearby Wichita agency in Anadarko, Battey announced in March 1872 that he had received a sign from the Lord telling him to open a school among the Kiowa. (It is worth noting that the Kiowa chief Kicking Bird personally invited Battey to begin a school in his camp.) Arriving at Kicking Bird's camp in December 1872, Battey held classes in a long tent divided into living quarters for himself and a classroom for his pupils. By his own recollection, the Indians

regarded the school with some hesitation. In any event, Battey found his hands full just managing simple conversation with Kiowa children (as well as their parents) who did not speak English. In her study of schooling on the reservation, Ida Moore commented that "as to the school, as [the term] is generally understood, it did not seem to amount to much."³⁴ Years later, a former Riverside teacher took a more critical stance and blamed the Kiowa for ruining the school:

Battey traveled with the Kiowas for more than a year, but the school he tried to hold in his tent was never very successful. Just about the time he would get some scholars interested, either some old Kiowas or some young Kiowas would enter the tent, laugh, or forcibly evict the students so that it was impossible to hold regular classes.³⁵

Agent James Haworth did not assign blame in his annual report for 1873, but he also did not offer a very hopeful prognosis: "Thomas C. Battey has not been very successful in keeping up a school . . . among the Kiowas," but Haworth was "much encouraged he will convince them to allow a regular school this fall and winter."³⁶ He was wrong.

In the meantime, the agency struggled along, relying exclusively on Butler's school at Fort Sill. Within two years of its opening, the school served more than thirty students, most of whom, if one is to believe official reports, were making satisfactory progress. In 1875, Kiowa and Comanche parents enrolled their children for the first time, a heartening development. Twenty Kiowa children entered that year, bringing the school's enrollment to nearly sixty students. Ironically, the interest shown by the Kiowa in getting their children into the school quickly pushed it beyond its limits and contributed to the overcrowding that became chronic. Agent Haworth complained to Washington that he could have had many more children in school if he had more room, more schools, and more teachers. As it was, he could accommodate only about sixty of more than six hundred school-age youngsters.³⁷

Limited facilities forced agents to turn children away every term. Even when Indian parents tried to pay for the privilege, they discovered that there simply was not space; one chief reportedly offered a pony to get his child into the school but was refused because the school was full.³⁸ Haworth reported in 1877 that "several of the Indians who have children in school have told me

that they are very anxious for their children to get an education sufficient to become teachers among their own people." Others asked repeatedly when their children could expect to be enrolled. One year later, P.B. Hunt wrote that, with seventy-five students crowded into the school at Fort Sill, the facility was strained beyond capacity; many more students would gladly have attended but could not because of the lack of space and teachers.³⁹

The willingness of the Kiowa and Comanche to enroll their children is an important and often misunderstood part of the story. Conventional wisdom holds that tribes jealously resisted the schools and tried by any means available to keep their children out of the hands of government teachers. Although it is true that such resistance occurred on the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation and that some Indians never willingly surrendered their children, it is equally true that a great many Indian parents there showed an extraordinary interest in getting their children into school. The seriousness with which the tribes addressed the agents about the distressing lack of schools sheds light on an interesting set of issues: Forced onto the reservation, unwilling to commit to the wholesale cultural change demanded by the government, Kiowa and Comanche people nevertheless showed a genuine interest in gaining the best possible advantage when it came to schools. In 1880, for example, agent P.B. Hunt reported

a sincere desire upon the part of the parents to have their children educated in the schools. A few years ago many children were entered . . . [with] the parent wishing and expecting to obtain favor with the agent; but now I am satisfied that higher motives actuate the larger portion of them. They are heard to say that they are too old, that it is too late for them to change their ways, but that they wish their children to learn and follow the white man's ways.⁴⁰

Two decades later, an official Kiowa delegation took time during discussions on allotment to remind the Indian Office of the tribe's continued support for education:

We have placed our children in schools provided by the government and christian [sic] societies; . . . these schools, having a capacity of 700 pupils, are kept filled with our children, and . . . we point to these facts as evidence that we are striving in the right way to fit our people for the day we realize must come.⁴¹

In April 1909, a visiting inspector reported that, as far as Rainy Mountain School was concerned, "there is no difficulty in keeping up the present attendance from the surrounding scholastic population."⁴² Even if agents' reports sometimes stretched the truth, it is nonetheless true that parents were willing—if not eager—for their children to get an education.

Oral histories also reveal levels of support for the schools that challenge traditional assumptions about resistance from reservation communities. Parker McKenzie said that, by the time he entered Rainy Mountain School in 1904, "most of the Kiowas already were impressed of the benefits of education and took advantage of schooling." Moreover, "no one had to inform them about schools, they were on hand and saw them." McKenzie's parents, he said, were anxious to have their children enrolled in order to "get us used to boarding school life."⁴³ Other former students remembered enrolling because their parents wanted to make sure the children received food, clothing, and shelter. Some also went to join relatives or friends, and some because they had no choice. Eugenia Mausape's parents enrolled her in the Methvin Methodist Institute because, she said, "they think it's good way." Cecil Hunting Horse ended up at Methvin (and later at Rainy Mountain) for largely the same reasons. Methvin, Hunting Horse said, had taught his father "the right way of living."⁴⁴ And at the Rainy Mountain School, Lewis Toyebo's father was granted permission in 1902 to camp on the school grounds so that he might attend classes with his son.⁴⁵

The failure of the schools simply cannot be satisfactorily explained by Indian resistance. On the contrary, at the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation, the boarding schools were filled to overflowing every year, and the tribes regularly implored their agents to build more and better facilities. Moreover, as Bruce David Forbes has observed, the willingness to accept the schools did not necessarily reflect "capitulations to foreign culture but might be more positively described as attempts to find a new organizing center for lives which had suffered disruption."⁴⁶ Kiowa and Comanche parents knew very well what the schools were about, and they understood what their children could learn in them. But because Kiowa and Comanche adults were proving adept at combining accommodation with cultural resilience, the schools were not necessarily the pulverizing machine some feared them to be. This is not to dismiss the coercion that lay at the core of schooling, nor to underestimate the truly momentous changes

that all students underwent. But Howard Jarrod reminds us that, even if schools emphasized cultural reordering, they also provided "a needed center of social order and identity for Indians undergoing rapid social change."⁴⁷ And it was, as often as not, rapid social change that was responsible for producing children who kept their sense of Indianness intact.

To encourage the tribes to support the schools, agent Haworth made a bold move in 1874, creating a school board composed of two chiefs from each of the agency's tribes. The board's membership was changed frequently to insure contact with as many influential leaders as possible. According to one observer, "the first fruits of this policy was the agreement to furnish students in 1874."⁴⁸ Indeed, the fruits of the policy seem to have been genuine. Once Rainy Mountain opened, it never once failed to reach its full capacity, and school administrators only rarely resorted to coercive measures to get children enrolled. The same was generally true for the reservation's other school.

Obviously, there were exceptions, for not every parent willingly surrendered a child. In September 1901, for example, Cora Dunn reported that allotment negotiations had left the Kiowa "in an ugly frame of mind." They intended to be as "annoying as possible," she reported, which included holding their children out of school for leverage in the negotiations that followed. "If the children do not come in by the first of the coming week," she continued, "some coercive measures will have to be used." The situation was remedied when a group of parents voluntarily collected enough children to open the school.⁴⁹ To be sure, there were incidents that required coercion and a variety of punishments, including withholding rations or grazing money, and even confinement in the Fort Sill stockade. Yet, overall, at least where Rainy Mountain was concerned, the problem was not Indian recalcitrance as much as limited facilities and lack of schools.

By 1879, matters began to improve. The consolidation of the Wichita and Kiowa-Comanche agencies in 1878 meant more school-age children to worry about, but it also provided an additional school, the Wichita School in Anadarko, later known as Riverside School. Agent Hunt announced plans to improve both the Wichita School and the Fort Sill plant to provide space for about three hundred pupils, nearly double the number then in attendance. Still, as he ruefully admitted, at least five hundred others—a majority of the reservation's school-age children—would lack classrooms. Without significant increases in budgets, it was the best he could

do. Fortunately, the Indian Office approved several desperately needed additions. In late 1879, a new building went up at Riverside; similar improvements to the Fort Sill School followed about a year later. In 1887, a new school at Fort Sill was approved. The deteriorating condition of Battey's original school, combined with a reluctance by the tribes to send their children to school with other Indians, prompted the Comanche to insist on a separate facility. Agent J. Lee Hall enthusiastically supported the idea; the school would be a strong bargaining chip with the Comanche, who, he said, were "by far the best material out of which to make good citizens." Construction began in 1890 on a site about four miles south of the fort. The school opened its doors in October 1892 when thirty-three Comanche girls entered; by 1893, it was filled to its capacity of one hundred students. This was an indication that circumstances were slowly improving, for by then the Kiowa had gotten approval for a school of their own at Rainy Mountain.⁵⁰

It took more than two decades for these modest gains, and in the end they did little to alleviate the problems. Despite additional construction, improved facilities, and surprising levels of support from the tribes, the reservation's schools remained desperately overcrowded and poorly run. In 1882, for example, the Riverside School suffered a fire, the effects of which were still being felt two full years later when, because of limited repair funds, the school building was near collapse. The agent conceded that, in the coldest weather, "there was actual suffering" among the students. In 1885, the agent's official report made the embarrassing admission that, on balance, the schools had accomplished very little.⁵¹ Matters remained miserably unresolved three years later when agent Eugene White lamented that, although the Kiowa-Comanche agency was "very large and important . . . it would be hard to imagine one with fewer or less adequate facilities." He called the schools "greatly inadequate," and reported that the Fort Sill School was so badly in need of repair that it was scarcely habitable. One year later, in 1889, W.D. Meyers continued the litany of complaints by declaring the Fort Sill School "a disgrace to the government that owns it." As evidence, he pointed to the sordid state of affairs at the school, whose superintendent had been dismissed for drunkenness and then inexplicably reappointed, a fact that Meyers said had "wrecked it for the year."⁵²

As if the scarcity and quality of schools did not pose serious enough problems, the quality of school employees often proved to be mediocre at best. Attracting reliable employees was difficult

under the best of circumstances, due in no small measure to the poor pay and miserable conditions that prevailed. It was hard work with few comforts, and there were few financial rewards for those who entered the service. Commissioner of Indian affairs Thomas J. Morgan reminded Kiowa agency officials in 1891 to be mindful of budget appropriations, filling only those positions most desperately needed and at the lowest salaries possible. "In fixing the compensation of the various employees," wrote Morgan, "you will bear in mind that . . . salaries should be as low as is compatible with efficient service." Moreover, positions involving manual and unskilled labor were to be reserved for Indians, who could be paid less than whites to do the same work. Morgan instructed agent Charles Adams to recruit local Indian men as assistant millers, assistant herders, assistant carpenters, wood choppers, butchers, and police. In the schools, disciplinarians, laborers, cooks, and so on were to be drawn from the local camps and paid less than their white counterparts.⁵³

Turnovers were frequent at every school. At the Kiowa School near Anadarko, for example, four men served as superintendent between 1885 and 1889. The first, although judged by an investigator for the Indian Rights Association to be "a nice well-meaning man; industrious, honest, and all that, and would make a good farmer, . . . [he] has no faculty for managing a school." His successor was fired for drunkenness. The third stayed only a few months and, in the words of the Indian Office, left after using "objectionable and profane language to such an extent as to shock the female employees." The fourth, a twenty-five-year-old Kansan, was removed in 1891 after one of his employees whipped two boys so savagely that the two and a companion fled the agency, were caught in a winter storm, and froze to death.⁵⁴

Conditions at the agency's other schools proved no better, especially on the matter of teachers. One inspector described two of the three teachers at the Kiowa School in 1887 as openly incompetent. In his opinion, only the third teacher, along with the matron and seamstress, were worthy of employment. They alone, he reported, were the "grains of salt which save this school from absolute stench." C.C. Painter of the Indian Rights Association inspected the agency's Kiowa School in 1887 and left utterly appalled by what he had seen:

I was first introduced into the main room of the school where an Honorable Judge from Texas, who had deserted the bar

and bench in behalf of these people, teaches the young Indians He is a little mite of a man—sallow, spiritless. He sat with one hand in his pockets; and about once a minute he would pronounce the word the pupil had been hung on since he pronounced the last He looked as if he had gotten out of his grave to find “a chew of terbaccer.” I have never seen such a perfect picture of the old field schoolmaster. In another room presided the wife of the superintendent Both he and she worked diligently, but so far had failed in this as in everything else they had attempted in the way of teaching.⁵⁵

Nepotism was rampant, caused partly by the isolation of the agency and the difficulty in obtaining reliable help, and partly by agents who knew they could appoint relatives with impunity. On the staff of the Kiowa School in 1889, the superintendent and one of the teachers were married. One teacher was a cousin to the wife of the superintendent. The assistant matron and industrial teacher were married, and the cook was the matron’s sister. It was no wonder that, after evaluating the agency’s school staff in 1885, one inspector described the schools as “asylum[s] for relatives and friends who cannot earn a support elsewhere.”⁵⁶

At the Rainy Mountain Boarding School near Gotebo, matters were particularly bad. Opened in 1893 to serve the reservation’s Kiowa communities, the school suffered a chronic lack of qualified staff members. Between 1895 and 1902, it employed no fewer than fifteen different teachers. Only one stayed as long as two years; the rest drifted in and out at an average of one every six months. Indeed, the Indian Office dismissed the school’s first superintendent and industrial teacher before classes even began. Described by an inspector as “total failures; indolent and shiftless,” the two men were summarily dismissed from government service.⁵⁷ When the school opened in the fall of 1893, it had no certified teacher, a fact that did not prevent the Indian Office from ordering it to receive students anyway. Until a qualified teacher could be located, said the commissioner, the superintendent’s wife would have to be pressed into service on a temporary basis. During the ensuing six months, the school went through no fewer than two farmers, two industrial teachers, and two teachers.⁵⁸

Cora Dunn, who ran the school from 1894 until 1910, repeatedly complained about the lack of qualified teachers and reliable help. In 1901, she noted dryly that an applicant for a full-time position as a laborer was “a trained machinist, a competent musician, and,

as he did not during the night develop aspirations to the position of superintendent, I think he will do." Several years later, she worried about hiring a teacher who was "laboring under illusions that ought to be dispelled at once before she comes nearly two-thousand miles I have one employee now who wants the earth," she continued, "and I doubt my ability to divide it satisfactorily between the two."⁵⁹

Matters remained unsettled at Rainy Mountain over the years. In 1899, with enrollment at 110 students, the school had only one full-time teacher. By 1912, the school held 146 students but employed only two full-time academic teachers. Of those students, 110 were classified as first, second, or third graders and had only one teacher, who met all three classes simultaneously. In 1917, the school's superintendent admitted that since 1915 there had been no less than twelve changes in the teaching corps.⁶⁰ It was largely the same for other positions. Between 1895 and 1902, the school employed at least six matrons, three seamstresses, four cooks, and five laundresses. Rainy Mountain's statistics reflected a trend that was typical of many reservation schools, particularly those in remote regions. By 1927, in fact, personnel turnover in the Indian school system nationwide reached 48 percent annually.⁶¹

There were other concerns as well. Shortly after opening in 1893, Rainy Mountain filled beyond its planned capacity of 125 to 150 students and just as quickly outgrew and overwhelmed its limited resources. By 1894, a host of problems began to affect the school. Some were minor (the need for steps on porches, for example); others, however, were evidence of serious and dangerous conditions. The school's water supply was one such issue. Rainy Mountain's original plumbing was so decrepit and faulty that within a year it posed a dangerous health threat. Unmoved by superintendent Cora Dunn's repeated requests for funds to repair or replace the system, the Indian Office took no significant action for more than a decade. This procrastination permitted conditions that proved ruinous to the welfare of students. Drop-pit latrines, unsanitary living quarters, and limited water supplies combined to create health hazards of the worst kind. Requests for funds to build a modern sewer and water system (estimated cost was about \$1,800) met with stony refusals. Indeed, only when Dunn threatened to close the school early because of shortages and unhealthy conditions did she get a reply from the commissioner's office. In the end, her plea for \$40 to purchase a wagon-mounted water barrel (to supply the needs of more than 170 staff and

students) brought a curt response authorizing "no more than \$30.00 for one wagon water tank."⁶²

A decade later, Dunn's successor, James McGregor, was fighting the same battle. Despite some improvements, the situation remained desperate. In April 1912, a physician assigned temporarily to the school reported that seventy-nine of 147 students suffered from trachoma, an affliction leading to blindness caused by unsanitary conditions and poor water supplies. As evidence of the declining conditions, McGregor informed the agency that, among other things, "three small boys must be bathed in the same water and then only every other week." One year later, he angrily reported "a deplorable condition and suffering children" and implored the agent for some help, asking plaintively, "[I]s it not time that relief be furnished Rainy Mountain School?"⁶³

A part-time physician was finally assigned, and the agent instructed McGregor to conduct hygiene classes in the battle to improve conditions. McGregor complied, and in December 1913, Rainy Mountain held "Tuberculosis Day," complete with a program featuring presentations with titles such as "Our Efforts, Handicap, and Results along Hygienic and Sanitary Lines at Rainy Mountain School," "Danger of Dust and How to Avoid It," and a rousing finale, "The Dangerous Fly."⁶⁴ Whether this proved effective is difficult to say, but in December 1913—the same month of the tuberculosis program—the school reported a trachoma infection rate of 98 percent. Three years later, an astonishing 163 of 167 students were infected; in 1917, 154 were ill. To ease the discomfort of the most advanced cases, the Indian Office authorized the purchase of thirty pairs of dark glasses. In the absence of a physician and without modern water and sewer systems, it was the best the school could do.⁶⁵

The Riverside and Fort Sill boarding schools faced similar episodes of illness and held similar programs. At Riverside, such programs resembled religious convocations, supplemented with lessons on the prevention of tuberculosis and other diseases. One typical program from around 1915 opened with the doxology and the Lord's Prayer, continued with readings from scripture, and climaxed with a lecture on "Causes of Tuberculosis and How to Avoid the Disease." A Reverend Wilkin followed with a talk he called "The Bible on Health," and the student body closed the program by singing "The Fight Is On."⁶⁶

The trachoma and tuberculosis crises were part of a continuing series of calamities at all of the agency's government schools.

Some months it was rations or shoes; at other times, it was concern over supplies or facilities. On one occasion, Cora Dunn queried agent John Blackmon on the chances of getting an additional school building because overcrowding was getting out of control; yet she hastened to add that "the only time the pupils really lacked for sufficient air is when all are assembled [in unison] in the schoolroom used as a chapel."⁶⁷ At the time of her letter, the school's attendance was 129. Here was disturbing evidence of the distance between the rhetoric of the Indian Office and the glaring reality of school life on the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation. How could the government ever create a safe, structured environment in which the work of education could be carried out if there were not enough schools? More than that, how could it ever prepare students for life outside of the school and the reservation?

A comparison with schools at other agencies across the nation reveals similar situations and complaints. The superintendent of the Fort Lapwai School in Idaho reported in 1892 that his school had been without a principal teacher for nearly three months and that the position had been filled by a series of advanced Indian pupils for two months.⁶⁸ Even at the somewhat better-positioned Haskell School in Lawrence, Kansas, conditions were uncomfortably crowded. There, more than five hundred students and staff were crowded onto a campus built to hold only three hundred.⁶⁹ In 1893, the Pine Ridge agent reported "four complete changes in the corps of teachers and employees in two years" at the Oglala Boarding School.⁷⁰ And at Wisconsin's La Pointe agency, where an average of only 280 of 1,283 eligible students were in school, the agent revealed a particularly bad situation. His schools could not provide even minimum needs: "Physical comforts are not provided for the children and they suffer from want of proper food [D]uring the season of sugar-making, berry-picking, and rice-harvest, the children are taken [by their parents], otherwise they would starve."⁷¹

In 1894, a collection of similar reports reached Washington. From South Dakota's Crow Creek agency, Fred Treon wrote that "the boarding school has been rather demoralized. Too many changes in employees have undoubtedly taken place One grade . . . had as many as four different teachers during the year just closed, and it is safe to say that the children . . . know but little more than when they started in." The superintendent at the Oneida School in Wisconsin was in even worse shape. "Since

September 1893," he wrote, "we have had eleven different persons in the classroom, six of them regular appointments and the others temporary."⁷² Out on the Rosebud agency, George Wright submitted an annual report that resembled what had been coming out of the Kiowa-Comanche agency for years:

This agency (though one of the most important in the service) is still unprovided with a Government boarding school The question naturally presents itself to them [the Lakota]: "If so desirable, why not have one for our children on our own reserve." This subject has had attention of the Department for the past *fourteen years* [emphasis added].⁷³

Although it is possible to find positive reports that give high marks to some schools, on balance the agents' annual reports suggest that reservation schools suffered widely from overcrowding, high turnover rates, poor facilities, and limited budgets.

Private schools fared little better. The handful that opened on the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation enrolled a relatively small number of pupils (agency records suggest combined enrollments of about one hundred pupils), and they often had brief life spans. An array of religious groups, including the Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Quakers, and Catholics, established schools on the reservation beginning in the 1880s. In 1888, for example, the secretary of the interior notified the Indian Office of a request from the Board of Home Missions of the Presbyterian church for 160 acres near Fort Sill to carry on "an Indian training school." Two years later, Reverend S.V. Fait had a church set up and announced plans for a boarding school to be opened the following year. In February 1893, Fait informed commissioner of Indian affairs Thomas J. Morgan that the Mary Gregory Memorial Mission School was finally ready to receive its first students. In 1894, the school's annual report advertised a twenty-student capacity but reported that, for the eight-month term just completed, the average attendance had been only eight students. The school boasted more cattle and mules (ten) than students. By 1895, attendance rose to ten; in September 1897, the year of its closing, it finally reached twenty-one.⁷⁴

The Methodists, Baptists, and Catholics were close behind. Reverend John Jasper Methvin opened the Methvin Methodist Institute south of Anadarko in the fall of 1890, with the support of the Methodist Episcopal Church South. By spring 1891, he had sixteen Kiowa and five Comanche students in class. Until it closed

in 1908, the institute enjoyed a well-earned reputation (especially among the Kiowa) as a good school.⁷⁵ During the same period, Reverend W.W. Carithers of the Reformed Presbyterian church opened Cache Creek Mission among the Apache and Kiowa-Apache, tribes he believed were especially needy of education. "There are a lot of children growing up in that section that are training for the penitentiary unless they are diverted from their present course," he informed the agent.⁷⁶ It remained open until just after World War I. Joshua H. Given, a Kiowa educated by the Presbyterians and ordained as a minister, also announced his intention to build both a church and a school.⁷⁷ W.D. Lancaster, a Baptist missionary and one of Rainy Mountain's first employees, opened the Lone Wolf Mission in September 1890 on the north fork of the Red River with about a dozen pupils, most of them Kiowa. The Kiowa liked the school, reported one observer, "because it is located among them. The Government school . . . and all the mission schools except one are . . . in a bunch near the agency at Anadarko." Like most of the other small mission schools, however, Lone Wolf attracted few pupils and suffered from scanty support. Reports for 1891, for example, indicate an average attendance of between eleven and thirteen pupils. It closed in 1910.⁷⁸

In addition to these, the Catholics ran Saint Patrick's Catholic Mission in Anadarko between 1891 and 1911, after which the buildings were leased to the government and reopened as the Anadarko Boarding School. In 1880, the Chilocco Indian School opened north of Newkirk, Oklahoma. A large off-reservation school of the sort pioneered by Pratt at Carlisle, Chilocco served primarily to further the training of students who had already been through reservation boarding schools. It cannot, therefore, be said to have improved materially the terrible shortage of schools on the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation.⁷⁹

Indeed, the Indian Service so completely neglected its agreements during the era that fulfilling Article 7 alone of the Medicine Lodge Treaty would have required expenditures far beyond the government's capacity and willingness to commit resources. Hagan, for example, has reported that the commissioner's office admitted in 1878 that "if the United States simply lived up to its treaty obligations to the Comanches, Kiowas, and Kiowa-Apaches, it would consume all the educational funds allotted to the entire population of the Indian Territory exclusive of the Five Civilized Tribes." Four years later, Commissioner Hiram Price reported that, by his reckoning, the government had fallen behind a total of

nearly \$2 million in meeting educational commitments for the Kiowa-Comanche agency since the signing of the Medicine Lodge pact.⁸⁰ In his annual report for 1885, superintendent of Indian education John H. Oberly wrote that, with regard to education, "the government [has] failed to give effect, in accordance with their letter, to most of the . . . [treaty] provisions. It may also be stated that Congress annually fails to give effect . . . to most of the still vital provisions." The secretary of the interior's report for 1884, continued Oberly, revealed that \$4,033,700 was necessary to fulfill education obligations across the country. On the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation alone, the amount was \$245,206, a sum equal to 22 percent of the government's entire education budget of \$1.1 million for 1885.⁸¹

A report from the superintendent of Indian education in 1883 revealed the extent of the problem on the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation. According to the government's master plan, thirty-two schools erected at a cost of \$1,000 dollars each were to be built beginning in 1869. By 1884, the reservation had only three government schools with an estimated total enrollment of only 120 children, and, as noted earlier, the government had fallen more than a quarter of a million dollars in arrears. Figures for other agencies indicated similar plans and failures. At the nearby Cheyenne and Arapaho agency, the total owed was \$283,000; for the Crow agency, the sum was \$262,000; for the Navajo, it was \$883,000; for the Ute \$255,500; on the Sioux Reservation, it was an astonishing \$1.4 million.⁸² What had happened at the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation was occurring all over the country. The problem, of course, was that, for the year 1885, the total education budget of the Indian service was only \$1.1 million.

Yet, year after year, the Indian Office announced that, with the exception of annuities, no other component of the government's program received as much money or accomplished as much good work. There was truth in such statements, but it was not the whole truth. From a budget of only \$20,000 in 1877, the annual education appropriation had grown to \$2.9 million by 1900. The number of schools more than doubled, and the number of students went up sevenfold. But what these numbers actually represented was not very clear, for almost nowhere in the country was the government meeting its obligations. At Rainy Mountain School, where teachers struggled to teach classrooms of sixty and seventy children, there was little chance that the school could accomplish the task of transforming the children. Thus, the fact that it was filled to

capacity every year was not a reliable indication of the progress demanded by the Indian Office. Most agencies suffered similar shortages, and most had only a fraction of their children in school. In 1880, the commissioner's office stated that, at fifty-one of sixty-six agencies, fewer than 50 percent of the eligible students had classrooms and teachers. It revealed that, on at least seventeen agencies, there were no treaty school funds whatever.⁸³ By comparison, the Kiowa-Comanche agency enjoyed real advantages. At least it had schools.⁸⁴

But from the very beginning, the Kiowa-Comanche agency endured serious problems that crippled the government's plans for civilizing the tribes. Most important, federal policy makers failed to make meaningful commitments to either the Indian school system or its ancillary civilizing programs. Far from being a remedy for the so-called barbarism of Indian life, the school system on the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation was symptomatic of a policy that was ambivalent at best, dishonest and willfully neglectful at worst. By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the optimism of an earlier generation began to fade, schools were destined to lose even more ground. A telling comment came from anthropologist James Mooney, a man often accused of protecting Indian rights. Writing in 1903 to Albert K. Smiley, reform advocate and sponsor of the Lake Mohonk Conference, Mooney advised the government to "throw out the fancy eastern education . . . Shape the whole Indian policy to make it impossible for an Indian . . . to get a dollar except by earning it . . . I doubt if more than a small percentage can meet this test, but that is the percentage worth saving."⁸⁵

Mooney's letter illustrates the dilemma faced by policy makers and educators during the era. There were practical and philosophical barriers to the goal of civilizing Indians by immersing them in "fancy eastern education." Initially spurred on by the legions of reformers who dominated policymaking in the years right after the Civil War, Indian schools achieved a status that elevated them beyond anything else in the government's policy kit. Yet, as the Kiowa-Comanche experience suggests, the level of support given to schools never matched their supposed importance. The difference between what the government said it would do, what it really intended to do, and what it actually did is quite remarkable. Even if one puts the commissioner's annual reports in the best possible light, government support was generally poor for what was routinely called the most critical link in solving the

Indian question. By the turn of the century, moreover, a panoply of things—industrialization, erosion of popular support, the closing of the frontier, allotment—reversed the few gains of the late nineteenth century and helped to turn the schools into little more than vocational training schools expected to produce workers.

Fred Hoxie suggests that the dramatic changes that redirected Indian education after the 1890s were carefully and deliberately crafted to create a marginalized Indian population. Assimilation no longer meant absorption into the mainstream. (Given the actual state of the schools, had it ever?) Other observers agree. "Federal boarding schools did not train Indian youth to assimilate into the American melting pot," writes Tsianina Lomawaima. Instead, they "trained them to adopt the work discipline of the Protestant ethic and accept their proper place in society as a marginal class."⁸⁶ Out on the Kiowa-Comanche agency, the sorry state of the schools meant that they could rarely do anything more, despite the ruffles and flourishes of the Indian Office.

Paul Prucha disagrees, arguing that policy makers sincerely wanted to assimilate Indian children but failed for a variety of reasons. Lack of effort, however, was not one of the causes. "Some social scientists," he writes, "preached a hierarchy of superior and inferior races; but the men who formulated federal Indian policy and programs did not accept such dogmas."⁸⁷ Even though Prucha recognizes a shift in policymaking, he also believes that there were no dramatic reversals or changes after the turn of the century. Yet the fact remains that even if Prucha is correct, the civilizing agenda, as well as the role of the schools in it, never had the necessary support to achieve the government's goals. Moreover, dividing the discussion between the two dominant interpretations (Hoxie versus Prucha, broadly) ignores a continuity that seems to have dominated the Indian schools. If the Kiowa-Comanche agency is any kind of guide, then it is clear that policy makers were never able to provide Indian children with the education promised them.

The question, of course, is one of intent. The argument can be made that the government really meant to give Indians the education promised them and that other factors unfortunately got in the way. That argument, however, rings false. Either a government acts on its agreements or it does not; and regardless of how the situation at the Kiowa-Comanche agency is explained, the patterns of neglect and half-kept promises are compelling evi-

dence of a government that kept saying one thing and doing another. It is not that good intentions ran afoul of larger limitations, but rather that honest intentions likely never existed to begin with. Hagan, for one, calls the agreements made at Medicine Lodge "a mockery of true bargaining." The evidence offered by the schools fully supports this interpretation. Thus the dichotomy that some see between eras is perhaps less rigid than we suppose. What Hoxie describes as the state of affairs after the turn of the century was, in fact, only a worsening of already well-established trends. The civilizing program as established through the Kiowa-Comanche schools gives us ample evidence of how limited the vision was and how unwilling the government was to accept its obligations.

And what of the students? What did the civilizing program and the schools do to them and for them? A stroll with a former student across Rainy Mountain's now-ruined campus in the summer of 1990 provided me with some answers. At the age of ninety-two, Parker McKenzie went with me to visit the campus that was his home between 1904 and 1914. At one point, he suddenly came across the school's old flagpole base and stood immediately at attention, hand over his heart. A moment later, he resumed our conversation about his life in the Kiowa communities that surround Rainy Mountain. The contradictions were interesting; an hour earlier he had been giving me directions to the school in Kiowa and telling me about who lived where and what they had done as Kiowa people. Finding the flagpole base, however, took him back to a place and time that stood in stark relief to everything that he had been so busily telling me. Indeed, that earlier era had been intended to make conversations like the one we were having impossible.

Like many other students, McKenzie is an example of how the schools and the civilizing program simultaneously failed and succeeded. They failed inasmuch as they did not destroy native culture and identity. Cutting children's hair, dressing them in new clothing, and teaching them to farm, bake, or sew did not necessarily transform them. Given the circumstances at the agency's schools, it is unlikely that such a transformation could have been achieved anyway. Yet the schools also succeeded in important ways. Hundreds of Kiowa and Comanche children went through them and gained important experience and skills. Obviously, fluency in English was a critical factor; the students left the schools with varying levels of proficiency but with enough

knowledge to survive. The vocational education they received likewise made it possible for them to make their way in the world beyond the campus. McKenzie went on to a long career as an administrator in the Bureau of Indian Affairs; he also perfected a written Kiowa syllabary and has devoted his life to maintaining Kiowa culture.

It was not a perfect preparation, and it was not what the students deserved, but it did help to ease the transition they all faced. "If it hadn't been for Rainy Mountain School, I probably wouldn't be typing this account," McKenzie once wrote. "Despite the hardships we encountered there, they were well worth the time . . . It provided us the opportunity for an education, though rudimentary for most of us."⁸⁸ Other students carried similar memories away. "I really did, I really did like that school," said Sarah Long Horn. "I'm always thankful that I went to that school because that's lots [sic] of things I had . . . learned there." And, on his ninetieth birthday, Lewis Toyebo told his descendants that he had "fond memories [of school] . . . I now see that the Kiowa people have made rapid progress from the tipi to the halls of higher education . . . That was the wish and prayer of our ancestors who have gone on."⁸⁹

Importantly, the schools could not succeed in destroying students' identity as Indians. Although they sought transformation, the schools and the civilizing program could not force children to abandon their lives as Indian people. The irony is that, in the process of beginning their new lives, students combined two worlds. Thus there is the seeming contradiction of going to school yet staying Indian. Students actively practiced the rituals and ceremonies specifically forbidden by the civilizing programs and deliberately protected their knowledge of prereservation traditions. They also learned English, accepted Christianity, and made careers in the white world. Like a great many former students, McKenzie remembered this as a normative experience. "Many families encouraged their offspring to carry on Kiowa traditions as a matter of tribal identity," he wrote. "Such encouragement could not be thought of as hindrances to their education. They presumably saw it to be better as two persons instead of one." Another elderly Kiowa who attended Riverside and Fort Sill in the early twentieth century said that the schools did not destroy his identity "because I wouldn't let that happen." Scores of youngsters made similar decisions; the consequences of their actions are borne out in a rich tapestry of powwows, celebrations,

and cultural practices that dominate life in the Indian communities of southwestern Oklahoma today. Indeed, one anthropologist suggests that the Indian schools on Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation actually fostered the survival of native life. "The very segregationist and assimilationist beginnings of the Oklahoma boarding schools," writes Sally McBeth, "effectively, if inadvertently, seem to have fostered the formation of an Indian identity."⁹⁰

In the end, Annie Scoville's vision of a school system that made good citizens out of shattered pieces did not prevail. Stymied by politics, graft, stupidity, and stubborn Indians, the civilizing agenda limped along on cobbled parts. Given the reality of the situation and the priorities and limitations of the Indian Office, it was probably impossible for the program to do anything else. And what Scoville called the "shattered pieces" of Indian life turned out to be more resilient than she had ever imagined.

NOTES

1. Robert M. Utley, *The Last Days of the Great Sioux Nation* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963), 37.
2. *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs* (hereafter cited as *ARCIA*) (1892), 5.
3. *ARCIA* (1889), 3-4, 402. For a summary of Morgan's career, see Paul Prucha, *American Indian Policy in Crisis: Christian Reformers and the Indian, 1865-1900* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972), 293-304.
4. Lake Mohonk Conference Proceedings, *ARCIA* (1889), 16-17.
5. *ARCIA* (1889), 304; Thomas J. Morgan, *Studies in Pedagogy* (Boston: Silver, Burdette, and Company, 1889), 348-50. In 1891, Morgan issued a comprehensive, ten-point plan titled "A Settled Indian Policy" that outlined his plans for an Indian school system. It is a clear expression of the reform he intended to bring to the Indian Service; see *ARCIA* (1891), 3-8.
6. Frederick Hoxie, *A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 190.
7. Bruce David Forbes, "John Jasper Methvin: Methodist 'Missionary to the Western Tribes' (Oklahoma)," in *Churchmen and the Western Indians, 1820-1920*, ed. Clyde A. Milner and Floyd A. O'Neil (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1895), 56.
8. *ARCIA* (1911), 190. For summaries of the era, see Paul Prucha, *The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians*, 2 vols. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), vol. 2, and, specifically, chapters 24, 26, and 27. See also Prucha, *American Indian Policy in Crisis*, 265-327; Michael C. Coleman, *American Indian Children at School, 1850-1930* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1993); Robert W. Mardock, *The Reformers and the American Indian* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971); Loring B. Priest, *Uncle Sam's Stepchildren: The Reformation of United States Indian Policy, 1865-1887* (New

Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1942); Hoxie, *A Final Promise*, especially chapter 6.

9. There are exceptions. See, for example, Henrietta Man, "Cheyenne-Arapaho Education, 1871-1982" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Mexico, 1982); Clyde Ellis, "'To Change Them Forever': Schooling on the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation, 1869-1920" (Ph.D. dissertation, Oklahoma State University, 1993); Sally McBeth, *Ethnic Identity and the Boarding School Experience of West-Central Oklahoma Indians* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1983); Devon Mihesuah, *Cultivating the Rosebuds: The Education of Women at the Cherokee Female Seminary, 1851-1909* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1993); Coleman, *American Indian Children at School*. The most well-known treatments of the Indian schools, however, deal with large off-reservation schools such as Phoenix, Carlisle, or Chilocco. See Robert Trennert, *The Phoenix Indian School: Forced Assimilation in Arizona, 1891-1935* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988); Tsianina Lomawaima, *They Called It Prairie Light: The Story of Chilocco Indian School* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994).

10. Again, there are exceptions to this tendency, especially in the recent literature. As one reviewer of this essay pointed out, "the need in new scholarship is to go *inside* the school; few authors have done that." Coleman, *American Indian Children at School*, has successfully done this, as have McBeth, *Ethnic Identity and the Boarding School*, chapters 5 and 6, and Ellis, "To Change Them Forever," especially chapters 5 and 7. Lomawaima's recent history of Chilocco is almost exclusively devoted to a discussion of student life.

11. Hoxie, *A Final Promise*, chapter 6. In fairness, it is important to note that Hoxie deliberately limits his discussion to policymaking and that he also considers the Indian Territory something of a special case in considering policy decisions for the era.

12. Mildred Mayhall, *The Kiowas* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962).

13. William T. Hagan, *United States-Comanche Relations: The Reservation Years* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990). For a similar treatment of reservation schools, see Donald J. Berthrong, *The Cheyenne and Arapaho Ordeal: Reservation and Agency Life in the Indian Territory, 1875-1907* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), especially chapter 3.

14. The best description of the negotiations remains Douglas Jones, *The Treaty of Medicine Lodge* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966). An excellent summary of the issues may be found in Hagan, *United States-Comanche Relations*, 1-43, on which I have relied heavily. See also Mayhall, *The Kiowas*, but note that her account is quite poor. Provisions of the treaty are in Charles J. Kappler, *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties*, 7 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1903), 2:977-84.

15. See Prucha's comments in *The Great Father*, 1: 488-500.

16. Hagan, *United States-Comanche Relations*, 42-43.

17. Kappler, *Indian Treaties*, 2:979.

18. Ida Cleo Moore, "Schools and Education among the Kiowa and Comanche Indians, 1870-1940" (Master's thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1940), 15. In 1875, the Board of Indian Commissioners observed that Indian education was dictated by "simple justice and duty" and, moreover, by the fact that the government's proper policy "consists not so much in feeding or governing the adults as in educating the children." *Annual Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners* (1875), 8-9.

19. Tatum, *Our Red Brothers*, 24.

20. Tatum's account of his experience in the Indian Service is in *Our Red Brothers*. See also Hagan, *United States-Comanche Relations*, especially chapters 4–8, for a revealing examination of Tatum's experiences, which turned out to be omens of a failed reservation policy. On the Quaker administration of the agency, see Lee Cutler, "Lawrie Tatum and the Kiowa Agency, 1869–1873," *Arizona and the West* 13 (Autumn 1971): 221–44; Burritt M. Hiatt, "James M. Haworth, Quaker Indian Agent," *Bulletin of the Friends Historical Association* 74 (Autumn 1958): 80–93; Aubrey L. Steele, "The Beginning of Quaker Administration of Indian Affairs in Oklahoma," *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 19 (December 1939): 364–92; idem, "Quaker Control of the Kiowa-Comanche Agency" (Master's thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1938); idem, "Lawrie Tatum's Indian Policy," *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 24 (Spring 1944): 83–98. Population statistics come from the *Annual Report of the Kiowa Agency* (hereafter cited as ARKA) in the ARCIA (1870), 728. Tatum reported these numbers for the tribes under his jurisdiction: Kiowa, 1,896; Comanche, 2,742; Apache, 300; Wichita, 260; Caddo, 500; Delaware, 95; Keechee, 100; Tawaconi, 140; Waco, 140; Hie-en-eye, 100.

21. Tatum, *Our Red Brothers*, 10; Hagan, *United States-Comanche Relations*, 61–63.

22. ARCIA (1872), 396; Hagan, *United States-Comanche Relations*, 62.

23. *Ibid.*, 158; ARCIA (1870), 725.

24. See Hagan, *United States-Comanche Relations*, chapter 8, for an excellent discussion of agents. Methvin quoted from John Jasper Methvin, *In the Limelight* (Anadarko, OK: Plummer, 1928), 50. The situation did not improve over the next decade. Between 1893 and 1905, six more men served as agent. Although the quality seems to have gone up—because the agents after 1893 were almost entirely selected from U.S. Army officers—the average tenure remained relatively brief.

25. George Chandler to George D. Day, 18 November 1891, Kiowa Agents and Agency Files, 1890–92, Records of the Kiowa Agency, Record Group 75, National Archives, Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

26. Speaking at the Lake Mohonk Conference in 1893, Merrill Gates complained that "under the pretentious name of 'home rule' senators and representatives were allowed to dictate the nomination, as agents, of perfectly worthless men." Indian service appointments "should cease to be part plunder, awarded to partisan workers to build up party interest." *Lake Mohonk Conference Proceedings*, ARCIA (1893), 1017.

27. *Annual Report of the Central Superintendency* (hereafter cited as ARCS) (1870), 718; ARCIA (1872), 429, 632.

28. For a recent discussion of the legacy of this accommodative response, see Benjamin R. Kracht, "The Kiowa Ghost Dance, 1894–1916: An Unheralded Revitalization Movement," *Ethnohistory* 39:4 (Fall 1992): 452–77, and especially Kracht's conclusions on 470–72.

29. ARCS (1875), 768.

30. *Ibid.* (1871), 876. For discussions of the Kiowa agency and reservation experience, see Michael D. Mitchell, "Acculturation Problems among the Plains Tribes of the Government Agencies in Western Indian Territory," *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 44 (Summer 1966), 281–89; Forrest Monahan, "The Kiowa-Comanche Reservation in the 1890s," *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 45 (Winter 1968): 451–63; Martha Buntin, "History of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Wichita Agency," *Panhandle-Plains Historical Review* 4 (Spring 1931): 62–78; William D. Pennington, "Government Policies and Farming on the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation,

1869–1901” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1972); Hugh D. Corwin, “Protestant Mission Work among the Comanches and Kiowas,” *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 46 (Spring 1968): 41–57; Hagan, “Kiowas, Comanches, and Cattle-men,” *Pacific Historical Review* 40 (August 1971): 333–55. For a comparison of a neighboring agency and reservation, see Berthrong, *The Cheyenne and Arapaho Ordeal*.

31. ARCIA (1870), 729.

32. Josiah Butler, “Pioneer School Teaching at the Comanche-Kiowa Agency School, 1870–73,” *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 6 (December 1928): 499–500.

33. Thomas C. Battey, *The Life and Adventures of a Quaker among the Indians*, intro. Alice Marriott (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), 39.

34. Moore, “Schools and Education among the Kiowas and Comanches,” 15.

35. Ruby W. Shannon, “Friends for the Indian” (bound, typescript ms., c. 1970), in the open stacks of Linschied Library, East Central University, Ada, Oklahoma.

36. ARCIA (1873), 588.

37. *Ibid.* (1875), 567; *Annual Report of the Kiowa Agency* (hereafter cited as ARKA), in ARCIA (1875), 775.

38. ARCIA (1876), 398–99. In the same passage, Haworth stated that “our difficulty was not in getting enough children, but in . . . the capacity of the house. The parents and friends of the children manifested a great interest in the schools; seldom a day passed that some of them were not there . . . [They] seemed as proud of their progress as anybody could be.”

39. *Ibid.* (1878), 557.

40. ARKA (1880), 195.

41. Senate Document 76 (56–1), Serial 3850, 1900, 9–10.

42. Inspection Report of C.L. Ellis, 24 April 1909, Record Group 75, National Archives, Washington, DC. Kiowa Agency Classified Files, 1907–1939, Establishment or Abolition of Schools.

43. Parker McKenzie to the author, 1 August 1990.

44. Mausape and Horse quoted in Forbes, “John Jasper Methvin,” 64. McBeth, *Ethnic Identity and the Boarding School*, 108–111, identifies six reasons for enrolling children: (1) It would enable children to cope more effectively with a changing cultural environment. “Now,” said one Kiowa-Apache man, “we in White man’s world. Today, we got to go that way”; (2) schools provided clothes and other necessities. “I wanted to go home and be with momma, but she said ‘Well if you come home we’ll only be eating one meal a day, and so I think you should go to Riverside’”; (3) the death [or illness] of a parent often meant that a child was sent away to school; (4) they went because their friends were there; (5) difficulty in the public schools; (6) opportunity to associate with other Indian children.

Interviews of former students collected for the Doris Duke Oral History Collection in the 1960s and 1970s confirm all of McBeth’s categories. See especially Myrtle Paudlety Ware interview, 11 November 1971 (T-76); Guy Quoetone interview, 23 March 1971 (T-37); Sarah Long Horn interview, 27 June 1967 (T-62); James Haumpy interview, 11 July 1967 (T-81); Fred Bigman interview, 14 June 1967 (T-50); and James Silverhorn interview, 28 September 1967 (T-146), microfilm copies at the Western History Collection (hereafter cited as DDOH), University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma. See also Ellis, “To Change Them Forever,” 144–52, for a discussion of how and why children enrolled at Rainy Mountain School.

45. "Happy 90th Birthday Lewis Toyebo, February 28, 1982," a birthday memento shared with me by Mrs. Ruby Williams of Fort Cobb, Oklahoma; see also Cora Dunn to John Blackmon, 30 January 1906, Rainy Mountain School Records, Records of the Kiowa Agency, Record Group 75, National Archives, Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (hereafter cited as RMS, OHS).
46. Forbes, "John Jasper Methvin," 64-65.
47. Howard Harrod, *Mission among the Blackfeet* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971), 113.
48. A.J. Vail, *A Memorial of James M. Haworth* (Kansas City, MO: H.N. Farey and Company, 1886), 87. Hagan regards the creation of the school board with less optimism, calling it "a quixotic move that apparently achieved little," *United States-Comanche Relations*, 134.
49. Cora Dunn to James Randlett, 5 and 14 September 1900, RMS, OHS.
50. ARCIA (1879), 174; *ibid.* (1880), 197; *ibid.* (1881), 141-42; *ibid.* (1887), 164-65; *ibid.* (1892), 386, 640; Hagan, *United States-Comanche Relations*, 199-200. One source suggests that the primary reason for Comanche obstinacy was that they "objected to their children's attending school with the Kiowa," George Posey Wild, "History of Education of Plains Indians of Southwest Oklahoma Since the Civil War" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1941), 227. See also W.D. Meyer's annual report from 1889, when he noted that the Comanche were "still clamorous for a school of their own," an attitude that he attributed to "tribal prejudice," ARKA (1889), 189.
51. *Ibid.* (1882), 130; *ibid.* (1884), 125; *ibid.* (1885), 311.
52. *Ibid.* (1888), 95,97; *ibid.* (1889), 188-89.
53. Thomas J. Morgan to Charles Adams, 20 March and 26 June 1891, Kiowa Employees Files, Records of the Kiowa Agency, OHS.
54. Hagan, *United States-Comanche Relations*, 195-96.
55. *Ibid.*, 195; C.C. Painter, *Condition of Indian Affairs in Indian Territory and California* (Philadelphia: Indian Rights Association, 1888), 39.
56. Report of Inspector Armstrong, 7 September 1885, Records of the Kiowa Agency, Microfilm KA 14, OHS; Hagan, *United States-Comanche Relations*, 196-97, addresses these episodes as well, and my account rests largely on his narrative.
57. John Richardson to Morgan, 28 February 1893; George Day to Morgan, 24 February 1893; Morgan to Day, 10 March 1893, RMS, OHS. When the school's superintendent attempted to resign and avoid the stigma of being fired, the commissioner refused to allow it. See Morgan to Day, 17 April 1893, *ibid.*
58. D.W. Browning to Hugh Brown, 21 August, 20 October and 24 November 1893; W.H. Cox to Brown, 28 November 1893; Pay Vouchers for Rainy Mountain School, 30 June, 30 September and 31 December 1893, all RMS, OHS.
59. Cora Dunn to Randlett, 28 October 1901; Alice B. Moncue to John Blackmon, 24 November 1906; Dunn to Blackmon, 14 December 1906, RMS, OHS.
60. C.V. Stinchecum to Cato Sells, 5 January 1917, *ibid.*
61. Employee statistics for Rainy Mountain School derived from quarterly reports for Indian schools, *ibid.*; turnover figures from McBeth, *Ethnic Identity and the Boarding School Experience*, 94; Parker McKenzie to the author, 1 August 1990.
62. Dunn to D.W. Browning, 6 July 1895; Browning to Captain Frank Baldwin, 3 August 1895; Dunn to Browning, 26 August 1895; Browning to Baldwin, 13 September 1895, RMS, OHS.

63. James McGregor to Dr. Ferdinand Shoemaker, 18 April 1912; McGregor to Ernest Stecker, 29 April 1913; McGregor to Stecker, 16 December 1912; Stecker to Robert Valentine, 19 December 1912; McGregor to Stecker, 10 August 1912; Valentine to Charles Norton, 26 August 1912, *ibid.*

64. "Program of Tuberculosis Day, Rainy Mountain School," 7 December 1913, *ibid.*

65. Annual Report of the Rainy Mountain School, 13 December 1913, KAE, NA, 1907-1939; invoice for purchase of dark glasses, 17 October 1917 RMS, OHS. Similar conditions prevailed at the better-maintained Fort Sill School. In 1911, officials reported that 123 of 154 students were diagnosed as having trachoma, "old trachoma," conjunctivitis, or "suspicious" symptoms. That meant an infection rate of 80 percent. Figures derived from Fort Sill School Medical Report, 2 November 1911, Records of the Fort Sill School, OHS.

66. "Tuberculosis Day Program," c. 1915, undated files, Records of the Riverside School, OHS.

67. Dunn to John Blackmon, 6 January 1906, RMS, OHS.

68. Report of the Fort Lapwai School, *ARCIA* (1892), 662.

69. Report of the Haskell Indian School, *ibid.*, 664-65.

70. Annual Report of the Pine Ridge Agency, *ibid.* (1893), 288.

71. Annual Report of the La Pointe Agency, *ibid.*, 348.

72. Annual Report of the Crow Creek Agency, *ibid.* (1894), 277; Report of the Oneida School, *ibid.*, 229.

73. Annual Report of the Rosebud Agency, *ibid.*, 293-98.

74. *ARKA* (1889), 189; *ibid.* (1890), 188; William F. Vilas to John Oberly, 13 December 1888; Oberly to W.D. Myers, 22 December 1888; Thomas J. Morgan to George Day, 3 February 1893; 1894 Annual Report for the Mary Gregory Memorial Mission, Records of the Kiowa Agency, Kiowa Schools, Microfilm KA 96, OHS.

75. *ARKA* (1889), 189; *ibid.* (1890), 189; Hagan, *United States-Comanche Relations*, 199. Methvin was hailed by two historians of the Methodist church in Oklahoma as "the first apostle to the Indians of the Plains"; see S.H. Babcock and J.Y. Bryce, *The History of Methodism in Oklahoma: The Story of the Indian Mission Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South*, vol. 1 (n.p., 1935), 237.

76. W.W. Carithers to James Randlett, 26 March 1905, Records of the Kiowa Agency, Kiowa Schools, Microfilm KA 96, OHS.

77. *ARKA* (1889), 189; *ibid.* (1890), 188.

78. Thomas J. Morgan to Charles Adams, 11 September 1890, 15 November 1890, and 12 August 1891; Reverend J.S. Morrow to Morgan, 7 May 1891, Records of the Kiowa Agency, Kiowa Schools, Microfilm KA 96, OHS.

79. For correspondence and histories of these and other schools, see *ibid.*

80. Hagan, *United States-Comanche Relations*, 134; *ARCIA* (1882), 34.

81. *ARSIE* (1885), 83, 94; *ibid.* (1883), 475.

82. *Ibid.* (1883), 475-76; *ibid.* (1885), 83.

83. *ARCIA* (1918), 177; *ibid.* (1880), 85-86.

84. By the turn of the century, however, pressure on the agency's schools worsened. Reservation census statistics for 1903, for example, show a significant increase in the number of children between the ages of six and sixteen, precisely the group expected to attend schools. Among the agency's five major tribes, the school-age populations were Apache, 35; Kiowa, 277; Comanche, 351; Wichita, 114; Caddo, 118; see *ARKA* (1903), 260. The total number was 1,055,

a significant increase from the 1880s and 1890s, when the school-age population hovered between 600 and 800. At about this time, the Indian Office also began to retrench its reservation school system in favor of forcing Indian children into the public schools.

85. James Mooney to Albert K. Smiley, 11 September 1903, in L.G. Moses, *The Indian Man: A Biography of James Mooney* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 151. A reading of the ARCIA for the years after 1900 offers ample evidence of the changing attitudes inside the Indian Office. Representative samples may be found in 1900 (Commissioner William Jones); 1903 (Francis Leupp); 1912 (Robert Valentine); 1918 (Cato Sells); and 1921 (Charles Burke). The shifts in opinion and official policy goals were clearly articulated by this group of commissioners. Hoxie's comments on the Progressive Era in *A Final Promise* are particularly instructive.

86. Hoxie, *A Final Promise*; Tsianina Lomawaima, "Domesticity in the Federal Boarding Schools: The Power of Authority over Mind and Body," *American Ethnologist* 20 (May 1993): 227-40.

87. Paul Prucha, *The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians*, 2 vols. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 2:761.

88. Parker McKenzie to the author, 1 August 1990.

89. Sarah Long Horn interview, 27 June 1967, T-62: 14, DDOH; "Happy Birthday Lewis Toyebo, February 28, 1982."

90. McKenzie to the author, 1 August 1994; for examples of this process, see the James Silverhorn interview, 28 September 1967, T-146, DDOH; Fred Bigman interview, T-50, *ibid*; McBeth, "Indian Schools and Ethnic Identity: An Example from the Southern Plains Tribes of Oklahoma," *Plains Anthropologist* 28 (Spring 1983): 120. Ethnologists and ethnohistorians have highlighted some of the processes by which critical practices have been retained and revised to function in the contemporary world. See, for example, Alice Anne Callahan, *The Osage Ceremonial Dance: I'n-Lon-Schka* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990); Eric Lassiter, "'They Left Us These Songs . . . That's All We Got Left Now': The Significance of Music in the Kiowa Gourd Dance and Its Relation to Native American Continuity," in *Native American Values: Survival and Continuity*, ed. Thomas E. Shirer and Susan M. Branstner (Sault Saint Marie, ON: Lake Superior State University Press, 1993): 375-84; Clyde Ellis, "'Truly Dancing Their Own Way': Modern Revival and Diffusion of the Gourd Dance," *American Indian Quarterly* 14 (Winter 1990): 19-34.