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COMMENTARY

Governance and Aboriginal Claims in Northern Canada

DON COZZETTO

INTRODUCTION

Northern Canada is a complex and fragile homeland blessed with physical and natural resources which are now subject to modern land claims agreements. An important public policy issue that receives little attention in the academic literature relates to the various models of governance that will be established once aboriginal claims are settled in Canada's north.¹ For northerners, however, claims settlements represent the single largest item on the public policy agenda. Most of the research on native claims focuses upon the normative foundations for the claims, the unique cultural and environmental dimensions, and the quantification of actual entitlements in the form of cash and land transfers. This paper transcends the debate over entitlements and seeks to refocus the dialogue around those issues relating to post-claims governance.

Admittedly, this paper is a polemic. My objective is to generate discussion and, hopefully, further research concerning what might be termed the implementation phase of the claims process. This is particularly important for the Dene/métis of the Mackenzie region of the Northwest Territories, the Inuit of the eastern Arctic, and the Council for Yukon Indians in the Yukon.²

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The terms *discussion* and *research* are important, because I purposely avoid detailing a litany of prescriptive problem-solving models. This has been done often enough in the past, with less than favorable consequences. Examples to illustrate this point include the provisions of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, the Inuvialuit Final Agreement, and the James Bay and Northern Quebec Final Agreements. These are discussed below. Therefore, my contention is that, although additional research is much needed, prescription is best left to the aboriginal people themselves.

ABORIGINAL CLAIMS

Native people in Canada's north posit that they are slowly being assimilated into the white southern economic, social, and political system.³ The question at hand is to what extent the settlement of aboriginal claims can create a system of governance that will preserve the native culture, allow for the efficient administration of programs, and provide for active and continued native participation within the Canadian political system.

The government of Canada is now negotiating claims settlements with several northern native groups—the Council for Yukon Indians, the Dene/métis of the Northwest Territories, and the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (TFN). The first two groups have now signed agreements in principle with the government.⁴ The TFN negotiations on behalf of the Inuit are ongoing.⁵ In addition to control of the land, the natives are seeking financial compensation aimed at redressing previous wrongdoing, revenue-sharing agreements with respect to resource development, a tax-free status on future earnings, control over wildlife, and jurisdiction over the environment.⁶

Native groups want to develop their own political systems and thereby provide the resultant cultural, educational, and social-welfare programs. Secondly, they want to control economic development on their lands. In other words, native administrative organizations intend to regulate non-renewable resource development with no direct input from the federal government. Finally, a separate judicial system may be required to deal with the unique aspects of native life.⁷

All native claims proposals envision a form of self-government

that operates within the existing Canadian federation. However, the complexity lies in the fact that potential models of governance may take a variety of forms. For example, *The Dene/Métis Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement in Principle*⁸ and *The Inuvialuit Final Agreement*⁹ call for a number of non-profit corporate structures; the Nunavut proposal envisions a territorial or "public" government in the eastern Arctic and Keewatin regions;¹⁰ the *Kativik Act* in Quebec established a regional government;¹¹ and the *Yukon Agreement in Principle* provides the framework for what is called the "one" government model.¹²

PRESENT ORGANIZATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Government in the north has always operated on the premise of colonialism. In the northern Canadian context, this term refers to the British colonial model of political and economic exploitation. In *Canada's Colonies: A History of the Yukon and Northwest Territories*, historian Kenneth Coates provides the following definition of the term "colonial" and its applicability to the north:

The term "colonies" is used deliberately. So long a colony itself, Canada is most reluctant to acknowledge its own colonial tradition. . . . The extensive powers of the national bureaucracy, the continued reliance on federal subsidies, and frequent federal intervention in regional affairs all make plain the north's colonial status.¹³

Political scientist Frances Abele and sociologist Daiva Stasiulis define Canada in general and the north in particular as a "white settler colony."¹⁴ Sociologist John Frideres develops a "macro-model" of colonialism depicting native groups as internal colonies exploited by the dominant white Canadian society.¹⁵

Actual power was never transferred by the federal government to northern institutions. As a result, the southern-based government organizational infrastructure has dominated the economic, social, and political environment of northern native peoples.¹⁶ The agency charged with executing these paternalistic northern policies is the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.¹⁷

Economic activity in the north is a dichotomous relationship

between the wage-based economy and the traditional economy. This organizational dualism is the cornerstone of the colonial framework that exists today. The traditional economy is premised upon an inherent value system tying the individual to a sense of community. Almost exclusively native, it centers around the activities of hunting, fishing, and trapping. The primary impetus for native claims settlements is to entrench the traditional values that reaffirm the link that native people have to the land.¹⁸ This essential spiritual association is the most misunderstood aspect of the dual economy. Those who argue that the traditional economy generates only an insignificant \$80 million annually have missed the point. Their advocacy of what I call the "one more mine" scenario totally neglects the cultural importance of the traditional economy.

The wage-based economy, on the other hand, relies on exporting staples to the southern metropolis. Large multinational corporations exert tremendous pressures on government institutions to allow development to take place in a variety of resource sectors. Natives have little control over the decisions made by these agencies. The rationale for such development often is that it is "in the national interest." The indigenous peoples are dominated by these powerful private and public sector organizations. The development ethos that gripped Alaska during the 1970s is a case in point.¹⁹

Historically, little benefit has accrued to northerners as a result of these large-scale developments. Examples include the mine at Rankin Inlet, the Nanisivik mine, and the Polaris mine.²⁰ Resource revenues become the catalyst for government's policy initiatives "north of sixty," with environmental and socioeconomic impact upon native people relegated to a secondary position. The problems are exacerbated by federal government departments unwilling to modify policy initiatives to address the concerns of the native people.

Ottawa's policies toward "managing" the north reflect a public administration philosophy related directly to the welfare state. Government simply categorizes the Dene, Inuit, and métis as "poor" and extends the welfare net to "solve" their problems. Organizations are established to provide education, health care, and housing, and townsites are constructed to contain and assimilate these people.

These policies subordinate tradition, family, the indigenous economy, and the sense of community to material possessions.

Land simply becomes a commodity bought and sold on the open market. The social cost of this cultural genocide becomes evident in statistics related to unemployment, suicide, and crime rates in the northern native population.²¹ For native people, on the other hand, the land epitomizes, in a spiritual sense, their cultural identity. Although many other factors are important in claims negotiations, the land is the pivotal bargaining instrument—hence the term “land claims.”

It is obvious that native groups and government view the claims process from different perspectives. This often seriously constrains efforts at consensus-building. Whites are basically indifferent to the entire process. They emphasize program-specific criteria such as the provision of housing and education, and seem always to point to the fact that government funding of the native efforts to settle claims legitimates the benevolent white patriarch.²²

Natives perceive the situation quite differently. Native people in general, and their political leaders in particular, view white government organizations as assimilationist, coercive, and exploitative. They feel that the plethora of government agencies²³ involved in the negotiation of claims are attempting to manipulate them by extinguishing their aboriginal entitlements, establishing a native version of existing organizations, and then legally carrying on with the status quo. Natives do not assume the inevitability of the loss of their culture, but view the process as enhanced by government manipulation. The premise for the political component of the claims, therefore, is the avoidance of this incremental model of assimilation, and its replacement with a new form of organization. This has obvious implications not only for the current system of colonial government, but also for the native groups intent on developing new models of governance.

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

Viewing aboriginal claims through a series of comparative lenses helps to define a number of initiatives undertaken by aboriginal groups in Canada as well as in other countries. Specifically, a variety of factors and problems are defined that lend assistance to the development of alternative models of governance in northern Canada. It is impossible in one article to do justice to all aboriginal groups who have struggled for self-determination. Therefore, I

discuss those aspects of the global movement toward entrenching aboriginal rights that I consider most salient in the northern context. These include the native rights movement in Alaska, the western Arctic region of the Northwest Territories, the Yukon, the provinces, and northern Quebec. The term *comparative* in the heading of this section is used in the broadest possible sense. Although international comparisons undoubtedly can be useful, intranational examples also provide food for thought.²⁴

In attempting to assess new and distinctive forms of governance, one must address the need to structure post-claims political, administrative, economic, and social institutions differently. The question becomes, What's wrong with the types of political and administrative institutions that for so long have been synonymous with the successful evolution of both the private and public sectors?

The answer is derived, in part, from an examination of a recently imposed organizational infrastructure that has clearly not achieved the desired results for native people; the case in point is the imposition of the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). In *Incompatible Goals*, Gary and Kathleen Anders capture the essence of the problem in stressing the need to develop "a framework for understanding differences between cultural and organizational values . . . one that explains incompatibility between the design and organizational structure of corporations, and their incongruence with the cultural values and expectations of shareholders. . . ." ²⁵

Alaska

When ANCSA was first passed by Congress, it was touted as the most comprehensive and sophisticated aboriginal settlement ever made. In addition, it was the most lucrative compensation package ever negotiated by natives and government. In a recent study, Thomas Berger points out, however, that "Congress wanted to bring the Alaska Natives into the mainstream of American life."²⁶ It would be unfair to state that Congress was insensitive to the subsistence economy of native people. In fact, strong recognition was given to the need to establish a land base upon which this traditional lifestyle could be sustained. However, the ethos that pervaded the entire claims settlement related directly to enhancement and growth of the market economy at the local

level. In other words, increased aggregate wealth could improve the social and economic plight of native people.

The Alaska agreement, unique in United States history, transferred an enormous amount of land and money to Alaska Natives. In total, 44 million acres of land and \$962.2 million were transferred to native control.²⁷ As lawyer Thomas Berger states, however, the important thing to remember is that "Congress extinguished by legislation the aboriginal title Alaska Natives held to their lands throughout Alaska, and it extinguished also their aboriginal right to hunt and fish on these lands."²⁸ The cash settlement was compensation for the 90 percent of the Alaska land mass taken by the federal and state governments (over 300 million acres).

In order to manage the assets now owned by the native people, ANCSA provided for the establishment of twelve regional corporations and more than two hundred village corporations.²⁹ Natives owned shares in each of these entities (usually one hundred shares in each).

Congress's imposition of a profit-driven framework had implications that were obviously not considered. First, the possibility of a stagnant northern economy was never envisioned. Second, little consideration was given to how native traditional values could be integrated into this corporate organizational framework. Third, native people empowered with this new authority were never adequately trained to cope with the accompanying responsibility. In *Lost Frontier*, Hanrahan and Gruenstein sum up the dilemma caused by forcing conventional political and economic models upon northern native people:

Given the limitations and potential pitfalls involved in the modern corporate structure it is somewhat surprising that, during the years of debate preceding the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, the focus was almost solely on the corporation as the vehicle for a settlement. Remarkably, the presettlement debate gave no serious consideration to developing a more democratic entity that would more nearly meet the economic and cultural needs of the Native peoples.³⁰

Congress was obviously motivated by the political perception that large-scale development could freely take place in Alaska if this thorny issue of native claims could be resolved. As Gary and

Kathleen Anders correctly state, "ANCSA is the equivalent of a treaty through which the Federal Government was able to provide for the construction of the TransAlaska Oil Pipeline."³¹ Federal and state governments, therefore, were inspired by future resource royalties, and relegated constituent concerns to a secondary position.

Government's insistence on utilizing southern models based upon traditional organization theory almost resulted in Alaska Natives' losing their land by 1991. This was to be the year that ANCSA allowed for removal of the tax moratorium on undeveloped lands and the sale of corporate shares to non-native interests.

The objective is not to point the finger of blame at any one group. Rather, this brief comparative analysis is intended to serve as an educational tool in our examination of alternative models of governance. I do not pretend that the situation in the eastern Arctic is the same as that in Alaska. Nor do I advocate the importation or rejection of the Alaska model. I merely contend that comparative analysis is useful if we are to take a more responsible approach to the claims settlements, and to promote the development of associated organizational infrastructures that will help prevent the mistakes witnessed in Alaska.

The James Bay Agreements

The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (1975) and the Northeastern Quebec Agreement (1978) were the first modern aboriginal claims settlements in Canada. The former was negotiated with the Inuit and Cree of northern Quebec, while the latter was with the Naskapi band of northeastern Quebec. Other signatories were the governments of Canada and Quebec, the James Bay Energy Corporation, the James Bay Development Corporation, and Hydro-Quebec.

Although the Cree have made important strides in the area of self-government (for example, the Cree School Board, various wildlife management boards, and a judicial system that incorporates aboriginal custom),³² native people affected by these agreements are currently experiencing a number of difficulties with respect to the implementation phase. In particular, the lack of any predefined implementation strategy or an effective dispute resolution framework has resulted in ill feelings and costly liti-

gation. For example, a \$2.5 million out-of-court settlement with the Port Burwell Inuit was reached in 1988. In the fall of 1988, the federal government finally reached a settlement with Grand Council of Crees concerning the construction of a village for the Ouje-Bougoumou Cree.³³ Important for our purposes is the fact that the agreements extinguished aboriginal rights in return for compensation. Second, several key issues remain unresolved almost fifteen years after the original settlement.

The impetus behind this claim related directly to the provincial government's intention in the early 1970s to develop massive hydroelectric projects in the James Bay/Ungava Bay regions. Large areas used for subsistence purposes would be flooded, and drainage of various bodies of water would be drastically altered. The Cree and the Inuit entered into a four-year litigation battle to have the associated legislation (Bill 50) declared unconstitutional.³⁴ Their argument was premised upon a contention that aboriginal title over the lands in question had never been surrendered. Although the Superior Court of Quebec issued an injunction prohibiting the development without consideration of aboriginal rights, both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada deemed the project to be in the public interest.³⁵ The native people, therefore, were forced to suspend litigation in favor of negotiation.³⁶

The \$225 million cash settlement was allocated on a per capita basis—\$90 million for the Inuit and the remainder for the Cree. The act stipulates that all money is to be paid into development corporations. The Makavik Corporation and the Cree Regional Authority are examples.

In addition to the corporate structures, the *Kativik Act*³⁷ established the Kativik Regional Government (KRG).³⁸ Under Part I of the act, the Inuit settlements became separate municipal corporations. All members of the municipality, native and non-native, participate. Part II of the act created the KRG. Although in theory the KRG represents all residents of northern Quebec, in fact the overwhelming proportion of native people living in the area make it an Inuit regional government. The KRG exercises authority over all territory not occupied by the municipalities.³⁹ Although this concept of regional government was designed to provide both community input to the policy process and accountability to the electorate, recent experiences indicate that the model is seriously flawed. Neither the KRG nor the municipal

corporations have the tax base to generate sufficient revenues. Second, Makavik does not have the venture capital needed to foster economic development and employment opportunities for native people. Federal bureaucrat Walter Rudnicki estimates that \$60,000 in capital is required to create just one job in the northern Quebec region.⁴⁰ Finally, the governments of Quebec and Canada have maintained a dominant position in the region. Native regional government is almost totally dependent upon federal and provincial funds. In 1988, federal expenditures alone amounted to more than \$99 million.⁴¹

The COPE Agreement

In 1984, the governments of Canada and the Northwest Territories and the Committee for Original People's Entitlements (COPE) signed the Western Arctic (Inuvialuit) Claims Agreement. This was the first comprehensive claims agreement involving native people of the Northwest Territories. Then Minister of Indian Affairs (DIAND) John Munro described the objectives surrounding the negotiations:

Three main objectives were recognized throughout the negotiating process as essential ingredients of such a settlement: preservation of Inuvialuit culture and values within a changing northern society; preparation of the Inuvialuit to be equal and effective participants in the northern and national economies, and in society in general; and promotion and preservation of the Arctic's wildlife, biological productivity and natural environment.⁴²

The agreement primarily affects the 4,000 native residents who live in what is known as the Inuvik district of the Northwest Territories (the communities of Inuvik, Aklavik, Sachs Harbour, Holman Island, Paulatuk, and Tuktoyaktuk).⁴³ Its provisions include the transfer of title to 35,000 square miles of land, of which 5,000 square miles is in fee simple absolute, including both surface and subsurface rights.⁴⁴ The agreement calls for a cash settlement of \$152 million to be paid in a series of annual installments between 1984 and 1997.⁴⁵ The initial payments are exempt from taxes. In addition, an Economic Enhancement Fund totaling \$10 million and a Social Development Fund totaling \$7.5 million were established.⁴⁶

The agreement also provides for ownership and management of water resources, an environmental impact screening and review process, the establishment of a national park in the western portion of the Yukon North Slope, a territorial park on Herschel Island, and a series of participation agreements respecting wildlife harvesting and management.⁴⁷

Since its inception, the Inuvialuit Final Agreement has been fraught with difficulties. In fact, major problems with implementation prompted DIAND to issue its *Comprehensive Land Claims Policy*⁴⁸ which required that all final agreements be accompanied by an implementation plan. Two years later, the evaluation directorate of DIAND issued *Guidelines for Land Claim Agreement Implementation Plans*.⁴⁹ The directorate concluded that "there was no common understanding as to the precise nature of a final agreement implementation plan."⁵⁰ Ten core problem areas were defined, ranging from the role of negotiators, to interpretation of the final agreement, to communication between levels of government. In effect, the number of federal, territorial, and native agencies involved in the process complicated the situation so much that no one could any longer define precise areas of responsibility. Payment of monies, transfer of land, establishment of corporations, and the creation of management boards all had a fiery baptism.

The problems experienced by the Inuvialuit are highlighted in the document, *Creating a Better Tomorrow: Aboriginal Claims in the Northwest Territories*.⁵¹ It concludes that no single group has yet to effectively tackle the problems associated with governance and the tangential issues related to implementation.

CONCLUSION

The examples presented above—Alaska, northern Quebec, and the western Arctic—serve to reinforce my premise that the cornerstone to native success in a post-claims north is directly linked to the development of suitable models of governance. This is particularly important for the Dene/métis, given the fact that their *Agreement in Principle* allows for the establishment of the corporate model along the lines discussed above.⁵² The question becomes, How do they avoid the pitfalls experienced in the western Arctic, northern Quebec, and Alaska?

For the Inuit of the eastern Arctic, the selection of a compatible

model of governance is equally important. If the division of the Northwest Territories occurs,⁵³ where does one draw the boundary? What impact will the Meech Lake⁵⁴ accord have on the claims process? What role will the existing government of the Northwest Territories play? Will the Yukon "one" government model eventually result in assimilation? Should the Inuit territory of Nunavut be established by legislation, or should Nunavut be constitutionally entrenched? How is the continued delivery of public programs to be financed—through block appropriations or by formula financing? What about the importance of training native people in the skills required to administer the various programs that will come under their jurisdiction? In effect, we have already lost a generation in terms of the training cycle.⁵⁵ Given that few qualified native people exist, this lack of training directly resulted in the failures discussed above.

These are important issues, not only for northern native people, but for their aboriginal counterparts in southern Canada. In British Columbia alone, fourteen claims are pending. The Lubicon Lake Indians of northern Alberta and the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN) are demanding more autonomy. National leader of the Assembly of First Nations (AFN) George Erasmus recently commented that "long before King Arthur was organizing the tribes in his little kingdom, we were governing ourselves."⁵⁶ Erasmus is certainly correct. However, the complexities associated with governance in a modern society require a much more sophisticated approach to self-government than was the case during the era of King Arthur. The message is clear. Unless more attention is devoted to establishing models of governance that are compatible with the culture and lifestyle of the indigenous population, unless adequate provisions are made for ongoing funding, and unless training is provided on a massive scale, aboriginal peoples all across Canada will face insurmountable problems in their efforts at attaining self-determination under native government.

NOTES

1. In the context of this paper, the term *governance* means the "determination of the appropriate authority, responsibilities and the process of governing in the northern territories and among native peoples." This definition is from Frances Abele and Katherine A. Graham, "Plus Que Ça Change . . . Northern and Native Policy" in *How Ottawa Spends: The Conservatives Heading into the*

Stretch, ed. Katherine A. Graham (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1988), 115.

2. In these instances, models of governance have yet to be finalized. However, all agreements-in-principle do state that local autonomy is forthcoming upon agreement of the settlement.

3. See J. Rick Ponting, ed., *Arduous Journey: Canadian Indians and De-colonization* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986).

4. Refer to *Dene/Métis Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement in Principle* (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1988); *Yukon Land Claim Framework Agreement* (Whitehorse, Yukon: Government of Yukon Land Claims Secretariat, 1989).

5. *Nunavut: A Report on Land Claims from the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut* (Ottawa: TFN, September 1989).

6. An interesting discussion on aboriginal people's concern for the environment is found in Douglas R. Franklin and James L. Jacobs, "Indian Water Rights," *Journal of Soil and Water Conservation* (May-June 1988).

7. The Maori Land Court system in New Zealand is often mentioned as a model. Refer to *The Maori Land Courts* (Wellington, New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, 1980). Also see Veryan Haysom and Jeff Richstone, "Customizing Law in the Territories: Proposal for a Task Force on Customary Law in Nunavut," *Études Inuit Studies* 11:1 (1987).

8. See note 4.

9. Refer to *The Western Arctic Claim: The Inuvialuit Final Agreement* (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs, 1984).

10. Refer to Inuit Committee on National Issues, *Completing Canada: Inuit Approaches to Self-Government* (Kingston, Ontario: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1987).

11. *Kativik Act*, sections 173-202.

12. For a discussion of the Yukon claim, refer to James S. Frideres, "Native Claims and Settlement in Yukon," in Ponting, *Arduous Journey*. The "one" government model refers to a proposal whereby natives and non-natives would govern together. Native people would occupy a proportion of elected and administrative positions. This model resembles the Sami parliament in Scandinavia.

13. Kenneth Coates, *Canada's Colonies: A History of the Yukon and Northwest Territories* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1985), 9-10.

14. Frances Abele and Davia Stasiulis, "Canada as a White Settler Colony: What About Natives and Immigrants?" in *The New Canadian Political Economy*, ed. Wallace Clement and Glen Williams (Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queens University Press, 1989).

15. John Frideres, *Native People in Canada: Contemporary Conflicts*, 2nd ed. (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc., 1983), 295.

16. Gurston Dacks, *A Choice of Futures: Politics in the Canadian North* (Toronto: Methuen, 1981).

17. Frances Abele, "Conservative Northern Development Policy: A New Broom in an Old Bottleneck?" in *How Ottawa Spends: Tracking the Tories*, ed. Michael J. Prince (Toronto: Methuen, 1986).

18. Dacks, *A Choice of Futures*.

19. Refer to Gary Anders, "Implications of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act," *Journal of American Indian Education* (May 1986).

20. Realistic native employment levels were never reached at any of these sites. At Nanisivik, Mineral Resources International never achieved the quotas for native employment and training established under contractual agreements with the federal government. See Charles W. Hobart, "Inuit Employment at the Nanisivik Mine on Baffin Island," *Études Inuit Studies*, 6:1(1982).

21. Refer to Gary C. Anders and Kathleen K. Anders, "Incompatible Goals in Unconventional Organization: The Politics of Alaska Native Corporations," *Organizational Studies*, 7:3(1986); Michael Jackson, *Locking Up Natives in Canada—A Report of the Committee of the Canadian Bar Association on Imprisonment and Release* (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 1988).

22. Dacks, *A Choice of Futures*.

23. For example, the Inuit and Cree of the James Bay region of northern Quebec negotiate annual budgets with no fewer than seven government departments.

24. Charles T. Goodsell, "The New Comparative Administration: A Proposal," *International Journal of Public Administration* 3:2(1981).

25. Anders, "Incompatible Goals."

26. Thomas R. Berger, *Village Journey: The Report of the Alaska Native Review Commission* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), 20.

27. *Ibid.*

28. *Ibid.*, 24.

29. *Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act*, 1971.

30. John Hanrahan and Peter Gruenstein, *Lost Frontier* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), 118.

31. Anders, "Incompatible Goals," 214.

32. Refer to Richard Salisbury, *A Homeland for the Cree* (Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queens, 1986).

33. The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, The Northeastern Quebec Agreement, *Annual Report 1988* (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1988).

34. Donald Purich, *Our Land: Native Rights in Canada* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, Publishers, 1986).

35. Inuit Committee, *Completing Canada*.

36. Refer to Delia Opekokew, *The Political and Legal Inequities Among Aboriginal People in Canada*, background paper no. 14 (Kingston, Ontario: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1987). An excellent discussion of the KRG is found in Jean-Pierre Rostaing, "Native Regional Autonomy: The Initial Experience of the Kativik Government," *Études Inuit Studies* 8:2(1984).

37. *Kativik Act*, Parts I and II.

38. Rostaing, "Native Regional Autonomy."

39. Refer to section 244 of the Act.

40. Walter Rudnicki, *Canada Funded Development Systems* (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs, unpublished report, 1979).

41. *Annual Report*, 1988.

42. *The Western Arctic Claim: A Guide to the Inuvialuit Final Agreement* (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1984), 1.

43. An excellent book on the Inuvialuit Final Agreement is Janet M. Keeping, *The Inuvialuit Final Agreement* (Calgary: The Canadian Institute of Resource Law, 1989).

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44. Refer to Western Arctic (Inuvialuit) Claim Implementation, *Annual Report 1987-88* (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1988); *The Western Arctic Claim*, 6.
 45. Annual Report.
 46. *The Western Arctic Claim: A Guide*, 1984.
 47. Inuvialuit Final Agreement, 15-31.
 48. *Comprehensive Land Claims Policy* (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1986).
 49. *Guidelines for Land Claim Agreement Implementation Plans* (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, May 1988).
 50. *Ibid.*, i.
 51. *Creating a Better Tomorrow: Aboriginal Claims in the Northwest Territories* (Yellowknife, Northwest Territories: Aboriginal Rights and Constitutional Development Secretariat, undated), 20-26.
 52. Although a detailed discussion of the Dene/métis claim is beyond the scope of this paper, refer to Michael Asch, *Home and Native Land: Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian Constitution* (Toronto: Methuen, 1984), chapter 7.
 53. A plebiscite concerning division of the Northwest Territories gave approval to dividing the territories into Denedeh and Nunavut. The former corresponds to the traditional area occupied by the Dene/métis, while the latter corresponds to the eastern lands traditionally occupied by the Inuit. Actual division has yet to be sanctioned by the federal government but is a focal point in the claims negotiation process.
 54. Meech Lake refers to a series of negotiations between the federal government and the provinces concerning the role Quebec will play vis-à-vis the Constitution. This is important to the claims process, because constitutional amendments affecting aboriginal rights require the consent of the provinces. Native people have requested that their aboriginal claims be negotiated with the same commitment and special status that the federal government has demonstrated toward Quebec. In addition, Meech Lake would require that any decision to grant the northern territories provincial status would require the unanimous consent of the provinces.
 55. For an excellent example of the complexities and importance surrounding training and employment of native people, see Frances Abele, *Gathering Strength*, Komatik no. 1 (Calgary, Alberta: The Arctic Institute of North America, 1989).
 56. Saskatoon *Star Phoenix*, 11 August 1989, section A.