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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

Message Received:
How Politicians and the Media Influence Attitudes on Immigration

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Lydia Louise Lundgren

Committee in charge:

Professor Kaare Strom, Chair
Professor Marisa Abrajano
Professor William Chandler
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2014

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Chair

University of California, San Diego

2014

DEDICATION

To my family, my friends and my mentors

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All errors and omissions are my own.

VITA

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Message Received:
How Politicians and the Media Influence Attitudes on Immigration

by

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Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

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Professor Kaare Strom, Chair

Public opinion on the importance of the immigration issue varies over decades, years and even months, while feelings on the issue vary between individuals even in the same political party. I argue that in order to understand these opinions on immigration, we must examine the messages sent from politicians and the media, in the form of agenda-setting and framing. Using three original datasets derived from computerized and manual content analysis, I study British newspapers and politicians, identifying how

messaging varies between sources and with what outcomes. Through time series analysis, I find that the British media and politicians consistently influence the perceived importance of immigration over long periods of time, though other major events, such as the 2008 economic crisis, can interrupt this influence. Therefore, it is not only a question of *whether* agenda-setting works, but also *when*. Following this analysis, I examine whether different newspapers maintain different kinds of framing and agenda-setting in Britain, finding that variation exists between newspapers. Moreover, I establish the need to consider the powerful effect of positive frames on feelings about immigration, as well as the importance of considering other frames that link immigration to critical issues, such as the economy or crime. I find that this latter type of frame increases negative feelings about immigration whereas negative frames have no effect on negative feelings. Finally, I examine whether politicians also vary in their use of frames on immigration—not only between parties, but also within them. I find that such variation does exist among British politicians, and that the use of frames is not only influenced by demographic considerations of a politician's district, but also the party politics at play—whether the political seat is competitive or safe. The dissertation reaffirms the importance of messages in influencing opinions on immigration, and it provides a thorough investigation of the different forms these messages take, and how they are used effectively by the media and politicians.

Chapter 1

Introduction: How Messages Matter

How do messages from the media and politicians influence people's opinions on immigration? Do all messages impact the public in the same way, no matter their source? How do these messages vary across media sources, politicians and political parties, and why? Research shows that messages influence opinions, but we are still learning about how they work, and how they vary in form and influence not only across the media and partisan groups, but also within them. Refocusing our analysis on the language used in messaging across different sources will produce answers to these questions as well as a more nuanced understanding of how and why messages matter.

This dissertation provides evidence that messages from the media and politicians vary across and within sources and that these varying messages influence opinions on immigration—specifically the importance of the immigration issue and feelings about immigration. The perceived importance of the immigration issue may influence demand for policies on the issue and feelings about immigration can inform the nature of those policies or how they are received. Thus, explaining how messaging influences these two kinds of opinion contributes to the literature on the power of rhetoric and public opinion, but also to the evolution of immigration policy and intergroup relations.

Determining what influences opinions on immigration is an important task. One may think attitudes on immigration are relatively static across groups of people and across time, as people may either hold firm opinions on the issue, or not think much of this issue at all. Yet, in many countries, we observe opinions on immigration and

immigrants varying across different groups at different times, over stretches of years, or a few months. Understanding why the public shifts in their opinions on immigration is important as nations across the world are trying to negotiate the very difficult process of deciding whether and when to afford rights to newcomers in their societies—requiring the public to determine where they stand on this issue.

In my dissertation, I argue the trajectories of these debates depend on how immigration is addressed by actors in society, specifically politicians and the media. Moreover, I argue that the source of the message influences both the form of the message and its influence. Studying messaging and immigration attitudes in Britain, I conduct manual and computerized content analysis to build three original datasets on messaging. I analyze and explain how and why messages from the media and politicians matter, and reveal how language has influenced the trajectory of immigration attitudes.

I find that in order to understand why certain messages are used and how these messages influence opinions, we must examine their source. Messages are not uniform in their construction and their influence—rather, messages vary according to the person or the medium delivering them. Further, messages depend on *when* they are delivered, they may be more effective at one point in time than another. Finally, in order to fully comprehend the power of messaging, we need to devise analytical devices that will identify how these messages are influencing opinions—that is what are the frames used in messaging that are most effective? Often, framing effects are studied in the laboratory—for this provides a clear causal link between the framing mechanism and the changes in opinion. I also pursue such research, described in the conclusion, but I contend that we must examine the real lived experience more closely before stepping into

the laboratory. For example, examining the effects of positive or negative frames provides a useful foundation on which to build such analyses, but we must consider other frames, rooted in the literature and drawn from real world examples. Once these frames are identified, we can return to the lab, more confident that we are testing for an effect that occurs in the real world. I describe my argument and methods in more detail below.

The Road Map

In the following chapters, I propose new methods for analyzing the influence of agenda-setting across sources (i.e. the media and politicians), new categorical coding schemes for identifying and measuring frames on immigration, and a new understanding on why certain frames are used by certain actors. These analyses confirm that variation in messages matter. I find that messages vary in their content across different sources, and that variance matters insofar as it impacts the messages' influence.

Figure 1.1. depicts the basic model of messaging in the literature. First, the messages analyzed are often derived from media sources, and their effects are analyzed using two mechanisms: agenda-setting or framing (we might also include other mechanisms here such as priming), on opinions including perceived importance of immigration and feelings on the issue. The mechanisms will be defined and elaborated below, but in short agenda-setting is emphasizing a particular issue whereas framing highlights certain dimensions of that issue.




Figure 1.1. Basic Model in the Literature

I build upon Figure 1.1 in my dissertation, arguing that we need to extend and expand the model in order to fully comprehend how messages influence public opinion. First, I suggest we acknowledge that messages may be derived from numerous sources. These sources may include different types of media, politicians, or other actors whom I do not analyze in the dissertation including religious leaders or activists, for example. Second, I contend we need to know more about the mechanisms by which these messages influence opinions—are these mechanisms sensitive to their timing and/or their content? In particular, I also suggest we need to reconsider the frames we analyze. As I am analyzing frames regarding immigration, I develop two new framing categories based on the group threat and representation literatures, both of which are discussed in depth in the following chapters. Finally, we hear a great deal about negative feelings about immigration, but I am also interested in exploring what messages influence positive feeling about immigration. Therefore, Figure 1.2 depicts my approach.




Figure 1.2. Theoretical Model Advanced in the Dissertation

The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 examines previously confidential documents in order to provide support to my argument that messages matter, but also shed light on how and why from the perspective of politicians in Britain between 1950 and 1970. Chapter 3 considers other explanatory factors regarding perceived importance of immigration and people's feelings about the issue. I find that there are ambiguous findings for the effects of structural, contextual and individual level characteristics (such as age or gender) on opinion, strengthening the need to examine messaging effects. Regarding this literature on messaging, I find these studies often focus on a single media source of messaging—whether it is actually one media source (such as one national newspaper) or an aggregate measure of all media sources (such as television stations and magazines). Therefore, I consider the benefit of examining multiple messaging sources

and comparing their relative influence. I also observe another under-researched political actor in the literature on public opinion on immigration: politicians.

In Chapter 4, I present my theory and approach with a schematic model. I argue that individual level and contextual level factors help to explain attitudes toward immigration and immigrants, but they cannot explain why opinions vary between similar groups of people in similar places, or why they fluctuate drastically over long periods of time. I argue that political actors, in particular the media and politicians, influence opinions on immigration and immigrants through two forms of messaging: agenda-setting and framing. Yet, I also address *why* these forms of messaging matter, explaining the importance of the source of the message as well as its content. Finally, I explain how each subsequent empirical chapter tackles particular causal relationships in the overarching theory of the influence of messaging.

In Chapter 5, I examine why publics may perceive immigration to be an important national issue at one point in time, but not at others. I argue that the media and politicians influence the public's perceptions on the importance of immigration through agenda-setting. This chapter uses an original dataset on monthly records of public opinion in Britain from 1998 - 2012 as well as original content analysis on media and politicians' rhetoric on immigration to test this hypothesis. Through time series analysis of the data, I find that the media and politicians do influence opinions on immigration's issue importance over time. I also find that aside from considering *how* agenda-setting works (i.e. what terms specifically are used and to what effect) and how it may vary in its influence dependent on its *source* (i.e. whether the agenda-setting is produced by the

media or politicians) it is also important to consider *when* agenda-setting will work (i.e. it may be effective in some periods of time but not in others).

Chapter 6 examines the media messaging more closely. Often, scholars conflate media sources into one aggregate source or disaggregate the media according to partisan leanings. I examine the ways in which nine national newspapers in Britain use agenda-setting and framing on immigration, finding that newspapers vary in their use of agenda-setting and framing not along partisan lines, but according to their publication type, i.e. whether they are intellectual or popular newspapers, for example. Therefore, media messaging and its influence vary depending on the media source in question. Moreover, I find that positive frames have a positive effect on feelings about immigration. Surprisingly, though, I find that when I control for frames highlighting potential areas of “threat” from immigrants (i.e. the economy, culture, crime, etc.) not only do these frames increase negative feelings about immigration, but negative frames also have no effect on negative feelings. The fact that positive frames have an effect where negative frames do not is an important finding for it speaks to the complexity of frames and their effects. These findings suggest that frames do not operate along a linear scale, where more positive messages increase positive feelings and negative messages increase negative frames. Rather, simply linking the issue of immigration to these other issues of concern can stimulate negative feelings.

Extant literature has often focused on media frames, and in Chapter 7, I shift that focus toward another critical political actor: the politician. As evidenced in Chapter 6, media messaging varies across different newspaper sources, and I contend politicians’ messaging will also vary within and between parties. Further, the archival research

above demonstrated the relevance of political considerations to politicians' strategies regarding any messages delivered about immigration. In this chapter, I not only identify variation in political messaging from politicians—even within the same party—I also consider the role of party politics in explaining this variation. Through original content analysis of 930 articles from 155 English newspapers during the 2005 immigration policy debate, I observe an expected amount of variation in position frames *between* parties, but unexpected variation *within* parties. Merging the data described above with electoral and demographic census data, I use regression analysis and find that Members of Parliament and their opponents select a particular frame on immigration based on district-level characteristics of his or her constituency, e.g. demographic and economic factors, *in addition to* party politics at play, e.g. whether the district is a safe or competitive one. The analysis clarifies and explains messaging of politicians on immigration.

The dissertation establishes and explains how messages matter, contributing to the literature on agenda setting and framing, and drawing attention to the under-studied politician. Moreover, the analysis identifies the importance of language, even down to particular word choice or associations of particular issues (e.g. the economy, crime, culture) with immigration in influencing the public's feelings about immigration. In Britain, the media and politicians have shaped the immigration debate and the opinions of the British public with their messages on this issue over time. The importance the public affords to the immigration issue has important implications for the public's demands for, or concern about policies on immigration, and the public's feelings about this issue will influence the evolution of those policies and intergroup relations. This dissertation makes strides in explaining how messages influence the ways in which those opinions develop.

Chapter 2

The Politician's Perspective: Messaging in Archival Documents

In this Chapter, I provide an historical narrative of Britain's history of immigration, derived from previously confidential sources. These documents help to explain not only how messages matter, but also why it is useful to consider the source and the content of the messages. As reflected in the statements below, politicians recognized the power of messages on immigration, carefully selecting the wording and the timing of certain messages, as well as determining who ought to deliver the message and how.

Britain provides a useful case to study these questions for several reasons, which I discuss in the following section. The National British Archives holds previously confidential governmental documents from the 1950s to the 1970s that have now passed the 30-year threshold and are available to the public. The narrative that grows out of the analysis of these documents is a useful place to begin to understand how important words are to politicians and the media when talking about the immigration issue. As evidenced below, politicians spend time analyzing the use of even one specific word choice in discussing the issue of immigration—they were aware of the importance of words in the mid-twentieth century and I would argue are just as aware of their importance today. The stories below help to shed light on why politicians select certain messages to speak about immigration, and their awareness that messages, in their various forms and from different sources, can influence the public in dramatic ways.

Immigration and Messaging in Britain

Britain has a rich immigration history, and has a very strong record of refugee intake dating back to the sixteenth century when Britain took in almost 100,000 French Huguenot refugees. In more recent history, the country has struggled to negotiate this record of welcoming refugees and asylum-seekers and its fluctuating need for labor with reactions against the (sometimes perceived) consequences of such immigration—including changing demographics and strain on public services. More recently, the issue of immigration has been quite salient in electoral cycles in Britain, and there has also been growing “anxiety over Muslim integration.” (Ford et al. 2012).” Finally, immigration has varied quite drastically in its perceived importance in this country since 1960, but also in the short-term over several months, as shown with recent panel surveys (See Graphs in Chapter 3). This is the kind of variation my dissertation seeks to explain. There has also been great debate over the issues of immigration, asylum-seekers, refugees, and more recently Muslim immigrants and migrants from the European Union. Therefore, immigration is a topic that is frequently reported on in the media, discussed and debated by politicians, and on the minds of the citizens, providing the opportunity to test whether the messaging from media and politicians is influencing the opinions of the public.

Further, the variation in the media and politicians is also useful in measuring different kinds of rhetoric and its impact. The political system in Britain is parliamentary, and the party system includes two large mainstream parties, a strong third party and multiple smaller parties. The two main parties, the Conservative (center right) and Labour (center left) parties, have at times converged on immigration policy platforms and

even attempted to keep it off the national agenda (Dancygier 2009). In recent years, these two parties as well as the strong third party, the Liberal Democrats, have taken differing strategies toward this issue, with the Conservatives taking a slightly more restrictionist stand on the issue at times (Norris 2006). There are also two smaller parties, the British National Party (BNP) and Britain Independence Party (UKIP), which have promoted anti-immigration platforms. On the other hand, parties like the socialist Respect party maintain a strong pro-immigration platform. The parties at the extreme ends of the ideological spectrum, the Respect on the left and UKIP and BNP on the right, are predictable in their immigration policy strategies. However, as I will show in Chapter 7, there is significant variation in strategies within and between party politicians of the mainstream parties.

The media culture in Britain also provides a useful means of analyzing variation in sources of media messaging on immigration and its influence. There are multiple sources of media reporting, especially with the advent of the Internet, social media sources, etc. Although I do not utilize these sources in this dissertation, it will be important to examine these sources as systematic analysis becomes more and more possible with the availability of more information online. I utilize the availability of online newspaper archives for my dissertation. The history of the newspaper in Britain is an important one. Keeble (2005) writes: “By the end of the [nineteenth] century the place of journalism within the political process was so well established that it could claim for itself: ‘a place of power at least equal to half-a-dozen seats in parliament’” (Greenwood 1897: 704, quoted in Keeble (2005), 10). Since then, a range of national and regional newspapers flourished in the British press. Many of these entered the market in the early

twentieth century, but some, like the *Independent*, came to fruition in the 1980s (For histories see McNair (1994), Keeble (2005) and Temple (2008)). These newspapers range from intellectual broadsides to more popular-driven tabloids. Therefore, how do a person's opinions about immigration change depending on their readership of such newspapers? This dissertation answers this question.

The diversity of newspapers in Britain provides an opportunity to examine more closely the variation of messaging on immigration in the media as well as the impact of that variation on public opinion. Further, the political landscape makes it possible to explore the impact of politicians on public opinion, as well as variation in rhetoric among politicians.

Media & Politicians in the History of Britain

An example from Britain in 1968 sheds light on the interplay between messaging and public opinion. In the 1960s, Kenyan Asians began to seek refuge in Britain to escape discrimination in Kenya. The 1962 Immigration Act allowed people with a British passport, living in independent Commonwealth countries, to move freely to Britain. At the end of 1967 and in early 1968, a wave of Kenyan immigrants arrived in Britain. Although net migration to Britain had actually decreased during the 1960s, the 1967-8 influx of Kenyan Asians did represent an observable demographic change—a change reported on in media coverage. Over this time, newspaper reporting on immigration increased. It is difficult to get systematic data on many papers for this time period, but the Guardian provides records of reporting for these years. In December, 1967, there were 29 stories, in January 42 stories and by February there were 99 stories on immigration issues that month. However, even with the changing environmental

context and increasing media coverage, the perceived issue importance of immigration remained at 6 percent in February, 1968.

In late February, 1968, a debate began to ensue between the Tories and the Labour Party. Enoch Powell, a Conservative Member of Parliament (MP), began to speak against Asian Kenyans' right to hold a British passport, and by February 22nd the Labour Party responded to such strengthening opposition with a plan to revoke this right with the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill instituted on the 1st of March (Hansen 1999). During this period, Guardian news reporting on immigration remained high, with 100 stories on immigration in March. In April, 1968, Enoch Powell gave his "Birmingham speech" which is more often referred to as the "Rivers of Blood" speech, invoking fears of immigrants outnumbering natives and increasing racial diversity. The issue importance of immigration rose from 6 percent in February 1968, to 27 percent by June of 1968. Similarly, during this year, positions on the issue of immigration—specifically immigration control—shifted. In March of that year, survey data revealed that 37 percent agreed with a "total ban on all immigration: white or coloured", while 58 percent disagreed.¹ By December 1968, another survey revealed a marked shift: 66 percent agreeing and 26 percent disagreeing with such a ban.²

With such limited data on public opinion, it would be difficult to establish a clear causal link between the influence of politicians and the media and these changes in opinion. However, importantly, we see here an example of short-term variation in opinion that is not attributable only to contextual changes and individual level

¹ Data drawn from the March 1968 National Opinion Polls Political survey, available in

² Data drawn from the December 1968 National Opinion Polls Political survey, available in the UK data archive.

characteristics—which would have been unlikely to change much between February and June or December of 1968. The numbers of refugees had been high in the early 1960s, decreasing throughout the decade with a resurgence in late 1967-68. However, as noted above, still in February 1968, public concern about immigration had not risen along with increased demographic changes occurring shortly before. I suggest that the consistently increasing media reporting as well as political speeches like Powell's began to provide the public with political stories with which to understand these changes to society. As Jacobs and Shapiro argue (2000), I contend that the media was/is capable of influencing public attitudes on immigration, and politicians were/are aware of this influence. As a result, politicians will strategically decide how and when to talk about the issue of immigration, taking the media messaging into consideration, as well as constituent preferences. In turn, politicians, too, may influence opinion on the issue—not only respond to opinions. As well, it is not only messages, in general, but specific messages in particular, that influence opinion. That is, messages are crafted in relation to other past messages or messages from other sources, and each word, or lack thereof, matters. In fact, it may have been the parties' agreement to keep immigration, and its racial undertones, off the agenda as much as possible in 1968 that created such sensation when Enoch Powell spoke so openly and passionately about these issues. Therefore, I argue that messages influence opinion, but that we must examine messages in concert with one another—different types of messages from different sources—in order to understand how and why they are constructed and influential.

This theory is supported in archival research of government documents in Britain. These documents reveal politicians' awareness of the media and the media's ability to

use certain story-telling techniques (such as agenda-setting and framing, for example) that will influence opinions. I will examine several examples throughout British history that support the theory that messages, and their construction, mattered quite a bit to the trajectory of opinion. As well, I focus mainly on politicians and the ways in which these actors worked to address the issues regarding immigration as there already exists a great deal of work on the media, but not nearly as much on politicians. That said, I also include references to the importance of the media and its involvement in messaging on the immigration issue.

Examining archival governmental documents lends understanding about how messages change public opinion. In Britain, for example, politicians, advisors, members and leaders of organizations would all gather for meetings on the subject of immigration—tackling important decisions on how to discuss immigration in speeches or press releases, for example. These debates shed light on the factors these politicians’ considered when crafting messages on immigration, and therefore anecdotally inform us about how messages were believed to influence opinions at that time. What is striking is the similarity between the past and the present in terms of the factors that were considered to be important in crafting these messages with public opinion in mind. The following review of these documents proceeds by outlining the factors and the strategies devised by politicians about how to discuss the immigration issue in the public domain.

Politicians and Political Messaging on Immigration: In Their Own Words

Immigration in Britain is directly tied to the breakup of the British Empire after World War II. The 1950s and 1960s brought migration from the newly independent colonial territories to Britain. Many migrants traveled to Britain as they maintained

British Citizenship under the law at that time. The Conservatives developed a strategy for their politicians in 1955 to counter potential questions from the native British public regarding these influxes of immigrants, mainly from the West Indies at that point. The Conservative and Unionist Central office supplied politicians with suggested answers to questions that may arise, including: “What is the candidate’s attitude to the growing influx of immigrants from the Colonies, particularly the British West Indies?” or “Are not many of these immigrants an undesirable type?”.³ To the second question, the suggested response seemed to maintain a reasoned approach: “The great majority are law-abiding citizens, but if some are not this is true of all communities.” To the first question, politicians were advised to first relate to the public and also express the “complexity” of the issue: “I know and share the concern which the large numbers of immigrants is causing. We must remember that all these people are British subjects. The problem is therefore one of great complexity.” As well, the politicians were also encouraged to stress that this was *not* a partisan issue: “This is not a matter which should be allowed to become an issue of Party controversy. My own view is that the best course might be to hold a full inquiry to bring out all the facts.” It was a general consensus among the parties in these years to attempt to keep immigration off the table (Dancygier 2011). In fact, aside from anti-immigrant parties and certain mainstream politicians, most politicians would still prefer to keep this issue off the agenda (Joppke 1999; confirmed in Interview with Member of Parliament Margaret Hodge).

³ COO 4/6/151 No. 31 With the Compliments of the Conservative and Unionist Central Office, General Election 1955, Questions of Policy, Coloured Immigrants, dated May 9, 1955, “Candidates may be asked the following questions”

Not only were politicians and their parties concerned with maintaining a clear message regarding immigration's "complexity" and non-partisan nature, they also expressed a desire to prevent the proposal of any legislation regarding the influx of immigrants in the late 1950s. In 1955, Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, wrote in a Memorandum to the Prime Minister, Conservative Sir Anthony Eden:

Some ministers, notably the Lord President, favour early legislative action to guard against the long-term threat to the racial character of the English people. Others feel that Colonial immigration is not yet a matter of general public concern, save in a few districts where the rapid influx of West Indians has been concentrated, and that it would be inexpedient to embark on such controversial legislation now.⁴

The tension between those anticipating conflict and those assuaging such concerns had not dissipated by 1957. However, it was not only domestic consequences considered, but also the impact of any legislation to curb immigration on international relations.

Conservative MP Lennox-Boyd wrote: "...any attempt to impose reciprocal restrictions on the entry into the United Kingdom of Commonwealth citizens from other Commonwealth countries would present us with great difficulties: for example, it is almost certain that India and Pakistan, who at present, impose little or no control on the entry of United Kingdom citizens into those countries, would retaliate."⁵ This concern for the consequences on international relationships is often not addressed in the literature as it is difficult to gather evidence for it, as it is often only acknowledged in confidential documents, such as this. However, it is an important dimension to consider, if only to

⁴ PREM 11/2920 Norman Brook 10th November 1955 "Prime Minister: Colonial Immigrants"

⁵ CCO 4/7/166 Dated 24th May 1957 "Personal" "Commonwealth Relations Office, Downing Street, to Oliver Poole from Alan Lennox-Boyd, MP"

keep in mind, and may help to explain political strategies that are often non-transparent. Politicians not only walk a tightrope between immigrant and native populations, as will be described below, but also domestic and international interests.

In 1957, there was a growing acknowledgement that public opinion may not allow these international considerations to take precedence in the coming decade. Politicians in the Conservative Party expected the numbers of immigrants to rise in the coming years, and although they observed the immigrant population's transition to be occurring mainly with success, the major area of worry were neighborhood effects, felt or perceived by the native white population:

Apart from acute difficulties arising out of their need for living accommodation, and short of an economic recession in the future, which might hit them hard, the immigrants have adapted themselves amazingly well to their new environment and climate. What we ignore at our peril is the bitter resentment often felt by the local white English citizens. This arises as a direct consequence of tremendous difficulties created by this concentrated and persistent influx from overseas. In addition to the problem of finding living accommodation for them there was the other problem implicit in their presence, namely the consequent effect of their presence upon the social and political life of the neighborhoods involved. “⁶

It is interesting that even in 1957, the theories of Dancygier (2011) and Hopkins (2010) regarding the importance of demographic changes and limited resources to intergroup relations was discussed by politicians, aware of these important factors. We also observe politicians deliberating between being responsive to public opinion and developing

⁶ CCO 4/7/166 “Confidential: West Indian, Asian and Southern-Irish Immigrants” Dated 7th June 1957, pg. 1

policies they preferred, corresponding to the theory put forth by Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) that politicians are both responsive to, and seek to influence public opinion.

There is also substantial support for the theory presented in this dissertation—that messages from politicians and the media matter—both in their construction as well as their relation to other messages. Moreover, there is a good deal of evidence that speaks to the “complexity” of the issue and the care with which politicians debated how messages should be sent to the media and the public in light of ongoing events including inter-party relations, demographic changes, resource debates, and riots.

In 1957, the Conservative Party still desired to keep the issue off the agenda: “It was essential that it should not become a contentious inter-party issue,” and the Conservatives felt this would not be a problem taking into consideration Labour’s point of view: “Owing to lack of interest on the part of the immigrants, the Labour Party had dropped the idea of trying to mobilise them politically.”⁷ The Labour Party may have abandoned, for the moment, the idea to mobilize immigrant populations, sometimes because these populations often moved districts or the gain of their votes would mean the loss of others⁸, but there is evidence that the problems facing Conservatives regarding the native population were no less of a concern for the Labour Party. In a letter dated 14th February, 1957, a Paddington Councilor wrote: “As you are no doubt aware, Paddington is one of the areas into which there has been a large influx of West Indians. This has aroused considerable resentment among the more backward sections of the population,

⁷ CCO 4/7/166 “Confidential: West Indian, Asian and Southern-Irish Immigrants” Dated 7th June 1957, pg. 3

⁸ Labour Party Files—Meeting Minutes/Papers Letter from JW Raisin, London District Organizer of the Labour Party, to Morgan Phillips, Secretary, Labour Party, 11 September 1958, with enclosed report: “Racial Disturbances in London, Report

including unfortunately some members of our own Party....there is a great deal of anti-colour feeling as a consequence of the housing situation.”⁹ The housing shortage and declining condition of council homes (public homes) seemed to be a primary concern for these districts experiencing larger influxes of immigrants—forcing politicians in these districts to become aware, at least, of the problems, even if they chose not to discuss them in public.

Yet, events in September of 1958 would make silence on the issue more difficult. That year, riots broke out in Nottingham and London. The media quickly grabbed hold of the story, and the resulting attention both domestically and internationally became a matter of grave concern for politicians. Following the media coverage, British Liberal Cabinet member, Sir Charles Hobhouse, wrote to the Prime Minister:

The press has got a good story and although leading articles are mostly sane, reporting is mainly sensational. What concerns me most is the effect overseas of the sensational and exaggerated reporting. With overseas, as well as domestic opinion in mind, I have put some suggestions to the Home Secretary today. They include a swift enquiry by someone of standing appointed by the Home Secretary into the causes of the incidents: an accompanying statement emphasizing the local character of the incidences, the public detestation of the colour-bar, and the fact that all British subjects, white or coloured, enjoy absolute equality before the law: certain steps with newspaper proprietors: some television activity following and related to such a statement. Two week-end speeches by the Home Secretary, one on Friday and one on Saturday, will help to hold the position this week-end. But I am afraid we shall lose the initiative at home and suffer more harm abroad if last night's statement is not followed up briskly.¹⁰

⁹ Labour Research Department Box/ Folder: Institute of Race Relations Press Cuttings Summaries c. 1955 – 1958/ Letter 14th Feb 1957 from Cllr Mrs. M Haston PEO S Paddington DLP to Mr. Eric Whittle, Assistant Commonwealth Officer, LP, South Paddington Labour Party

¹⁰ PREM 11/2920 “From the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, to Prime Minister, “the ‘Race-Riot’ Story” 4th September 1958

This statement conveys a clear concern for the trajectory of public opinion, the nature of media reporting, and the specific messages that should be conveyed by political representatives following the riots.

In particular, there developed a complex discussion on the cause of the riots and whether they were resource or race-based. The Home Secretary convened a meeting to discuss the reasons for the violence, and also take under consideration these kinds of recommendations. The Commissioner of Police believed there had been:

“widespread resentment in certain arenas of London against the effects of the influx of coloured people. Local white residents felt that the coloured immigrants reduced the amenities of the neighborhood, and, in particular, that they lived in conditions which the local and public authorities would not tolerate for white people. The houses in which coloured people lived were notoriously over-crowded and there was resentment at the way in which coloured landlords attempted to get rid of white tenants.”¹¹

Mr. Norman Manley, Chief Minister of Jamaica, went further to suggest that he did believe the riots were racially motivated: “In [Manley’s] view, the main factor underlying the recent disturbances was not competition for housing, jobs or women, as had been suggested, but basic racial hostility.”¹² The Home Secretary, Conservative R.A. Butler, quickly repudiated this belief in the meeting, stating: “the recent disturbances had not

¹¹ PREM 11/2920 3rd September Home Secretary’s Meeting Minutes “to discuss the recent racial disturbances in Nottingham and London and the general problem of coloured immigration”

¹² PREM 11/2920, “Racial Disturbances: Note of a Meeting held in the Home Secretary’s Room on Monday, 8th September, 1958. Present: Home Secretary, Colonial Secretary, Mr. Norman Manley Chief Minister of Jamaica, Dr. Cummins Prime Minister of Barbados, Dr. Lacorbiniere Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of the West Indies, Mr. Garnet Gordon Commissioner for the Federation of the West Indies, Mr. de Susa Welfare Liaison Officer British Caribbean Welfare Service, Sir Austin Strutt, Mr. KB Paice, Mr. TA Critchley”

been symptomatic of feeling in this country as a whole. Notting Hill, in particular, had unfortunately a long reputation for public disorder. There were...no grounds for thinking that there was any widespread racial antagonism in this country. The Government would play its part in helping to educate public opinion and he would ensure that the question of appointing local welfare officers was examined forthwith.”¹³ As evidenced, politicians paid mind to a variety of factors: contextual events, causal factors, public opinion—specifically “helping to educate public opinion”—and the media’s reporting on immigration issues. The fact that these leaders were concerned at all with “helping to educate public opinion” spoke to their belief that public opinion could be influenced in this way—an “education”, which may be crafted in such a way to produce a certain outcome. These considerations informed political action—actions that ranged from responsiveness to influence.

The Labour Party also focused on these factors. In October of 1958, an internal Labour Party report noted: “Although race relations are no longer ‘hot news’ judging by the total number of press cuttings received this month as compared with last, the high proportion of general articles and letters seems to indicate continued awareness and concern for the long term problems connected with the permanent settlement of coloured

¹³ PREM 11/2920, “Racial Disturbances: Note of a Meeting held in the Home Secretary’s Room on Monday, 8th September, 1958. Present: Home Secretary, Colonial Secretary, Mr. Norman Manley Chief Minister of Jamaica, Dr. Cummins Prime Minister of Barbados, Dr. Lacorbiniere Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of the West Indies, Mr. Garnet Gordon Commissioner for the Federation of the West Indies, Mr. de Susa Welfare Liaison Officer British Caribbean Welfare Service, Sir Austin Strutt, Mr. KB Paice, Mr. TA Critchley”

Commonwealth citizens in this country.”¹⁴ This excerpt is particularly informative, as it suggests that even in 1958, politicians maintained, if not systematic, at least comprehensive manual content analysis of newspaper reporting on issues such as race relations or immigration in order to maintain an understanding of what was currently “hot news”.

The Labour Party, recognizing the long-term implications of the race relations debate went a step further than the Conservative Party in their rhetoric on racism. During this period, fascist parties began to spread racist propaganda, which the Labour Party, in particular, publicly abhorred. In 1962, for example, the Labour Party’s Annual Report stated: “The Labour Party deplores the recent growth of fascist and other racist propaganda which, it believes, is deeply repugnant to the overwhelming of the British people.”¹⁵ It was also around this time that a piece of legislation, outlawing racist behavior, began to develop in the minds of certain politicians: “We therefore urge Her Majesty’s Government to introduce legislation which, while carefully preserving the normal rights of freedoms of speech, will clearly prohibit public incitement to racial hatred.”¹⁶ Therefore, the Labour Party, though in agreement with the Conservative Party about the benefits of keeping immigration off the agenda, chose to be more vocal about race relations.

¹⁴ Labour Party Archives/Labour Research Department/Folder: Institute of Race Relations Press Cuttings Summaries c. 1955 – 1958/ UK/44 October 1958

¹⁵ The Labour Party Annual Report 1962 (252)
Appendix II “Statement on racial hatred, National Executive Committee 1962

¹⁶ The Labour Party Annual Report 1962 (252)
Appendix II “Statement on racial hatred, National Executive Committee 1962

Further, the Labour Party also acknowledged at this time that although there were some opinions that had solidified against immigrants, there were many still forming, and apt for persuasion: “Surveys and investigations have shown that apart from a fanatical colour-prejudiced minority, there are a large number of people who are slightly prejudiced or suspicious of newcomers. This large group could be swayed either way.”¹⁷ This is a useful example of politicians establishing the extent of their influence over public opinion. This statement speaks to the idea that politicians are at once taking into consideration public opinion, but also keeping tabs on the extent to which that opinion can be influenced.

Certain politicians used this knowledge to benefit themselves in district elections—using anti-immigrant rhetoric to sway voters. The Committee on Racial Discrimination described such an attempt in 1964: “The recent action of the Conservative Party in Smethwick [during the election] in asking the Council to buy up all the houses in a certain street in order to prevent coloured immigrants from buying houses is deplorable. It is an outrageous act of racial discrimination and you will appreciate that such action will not stop in one street but will snowball until the immigrants are barred from every street in Smethwick.”¹⁸ In this case, the Conservative Party used anti-immigrant sentiment to secure support in the district.

Anti-immigrant sentiment was not only used to advance the electoral success of the Conservatives, but it was also used against them. For example, following the General

¹⁷ Labour Party Papers: Confidential, Labour Party, RD.209/February, 1962, Home Policy Committee, Note on Integration of Immigrants

¹⁸ CCO 3/6/63 Letter from J Joshi, of Coordinating Committee against Racial Discrimination on Dec 11, 1964, to Lord Blakenham

Election in 1964, a by-election was held in Leyton in 1965. The seat became vacant when the current MP was made a life peer in the House of Lords. This resulting campaign took on a racially-focused, immigration-related undertone. Ronald Buxton, the Conservative Candidate in Leyton, stated in a letter:

There is clearly an attempt by Labour to brand me as a racist...I do assure you that this is far from being the case, and I appear to have been deliberately misrepresented by the "Observer". The Immigration issue has been thrust at us because of the adoption of the issue by Mr. Gordon Walker from Smethwick, and the press seem determined to create the picture that we intend to fight the Election on this issue. Because of this, last week we issued the enclosed [] notes to express our view and to avoid further misrepresentation.¹⁹

Therefore, whereas anti-immigrant sentiment with racial undertones was used openly and successfully in Smethwick, the same would not work for Buxton in Leyton. Therefore, when he tried to discuss immigration issues, the Observer newspaper declared that such discussion was "racist". In the same letter, Buxton attempted to defend his focus on the immigration issue by attaching a report on recent canvassing in the area, explaining that the immigration issue was alive in the minds of the residents, and therefore should be addressed by the politicians. One such memo read: "Many local residents seem increasingly concerned over the numbers of immigrants coming into the Borough and this concern appeared to arise not from racial prejudice but because of the continuing housing shortage and the fact that accommodation considered to be the right of local people was being occupied by immigrants."²⁰ Buxton was trying to argue that he was *responding* to

¹⁹ CCO 1/14/65/2 Letter 23rd November, 1964 from Ronald Buxton (Conservative Candidate in Leyton) to Sir Alec Blakenham

²⁰ CCO 1/14/65/2 Letter 23rd November, 1964 from Ronald Buxton (Conservative Candidate in Leyton) to Sir Alec Blakenham, attached Memo

the public's concern over the issue of immigration in Leyton, though the Labour Party and certain media sources claimed he was doing so to manipulate certain outcomes, i.e. his electoral success.

The tensions identified by Buxton—irrespective of his authenticity in his admonitions of his innocence—highlight not only the complexity of the issue of immigration, but any discussion of it. The politicians in Smethwick seemed to have little concern over how their discussion of the immigration issues would be interpreted, whereas Buxton was certainly preoccupied by these concerns. Nonetheless, it seemed that once the immigration issue was open for discussion, politicians found themselves in a rhetorical labyrinth. Yet both Buxton and Peter Griffiths in Smethwick navigated the labyrinth successfully, taking different approaches, but both winning their respective seats.

Crafting messages about immigration required focusing not only on the larger ideas conveyed but even on each individual word. For example, a memo reveals that the Prime Minister suggested “the word ‘regulate’ might be substituted for ‘control’ in line 3 of the proposed terms of reference.”²¹ In a meeting in 1965, when a recommendation was made on how to discuss the issue of immigration, it, too, suggested that word choice be considered carefully: “Sir Edward said he felt that all MPs should avoid any slap-happy remarks about integration, oppose the idea that no steps could be taken to improve the situations, and not identify themselves with a “we” and “they” point of view.”²²

²¹ PREM 13/382 Letter from DJ Mitchell to CJ Otton, Esq, Home Office, February 23, 1965.

²² Minutes of the Immigration Policy group held on Friday April 30th 1965 at 10:00 am, PG 9/65/10

These documents also indicate that politicians did act strategically regarding immigration, and reveal that what they say and when about this issue is often deliberate and coordinated. For example, both the Conservative and Labour Party intended to “create the right kind of public opinion”²³. In a January 1965 letter to the Prime Minister Harold Wilson, Home Secretary Frank Soskice wrote: “It is I think essential to frame any such provision [regarding the Race Relations Act] as to win general public approval, and to avoid any appearance of unduly inhibiting anything [referring to resentment felt by natives] which could reasonably be regarded as legitimate even if biased and bitter criticism on discussion of a public issue.”²⁴ This kind of attention to moving public opinion in certain directions persisted into the 1970s, expressing the need to “work to change the climate of opinion”²⁵ on immigration issues.

These documents shed light on the private strategies of politicians to acknowledge public opinion, identify the media’s relationship with the public, and then devise means of addressing issues that succeed both in promoting the desired policy as well as preventing a loss of public support, i.e. deciding between being responsive and influential. The above is also evidence of the ways in which the context of the late 1950s to the 1970s played a role in the crafting of messaging. At times, the climate of opinion was such that policies were discussed in private. For example, the initial decision to reduce immigration in 1965 by “reducing the number of employment vouchers”, was

²³ Edward “Teddy” Taylor, Conservative Party MP, April 2, 1965

²⁴ PREM 13/382 January 4th 1965, Letter to Prime Minister from Frank Soskice, Home Secretary

²⁵ Andrew Faulds, Labour Party MP, May 21, 1976

made “without publicity” for both domestic and international reasons.²⁶ A letter written months later to the Prime Minister from the Cabinet Economic Advisor to the Labour Party, Thomas Balogh, sheds light on the difficult context amidst which politicians were trying to navigate immigration policy. Balogh wrote:

It may be felt desirable to set a limit to immigration for social or political reasons. However, the following economic considerations should be borne in mind when decisions are made on this subject...[Immigration] is essential to prevent the substantial wage drift that is likely to arise as a result of rigidities in the labour force at full employment. Without immigration, there would be serious shortages of workers willing to do unskilled, dangerous and dirty jobs, since training for semi-skilled work with semi-automated machines is simple and easily available.²⁷

Therefore, politicians were bombarded on the one side by certain populations calling for a stop to immigration, and the knowledge on the other side that their country depended on it. This is an example of when politicians may desire to respond to opinion, but also influence it for political reasons, in order to reconcile two such competing demands.

In all of these discussions of politicians, the media, the context and the public, it is important to acknowledge the immigrants, as well. As these debates regarding immigration persisted, immigrants were reacting to them. A 1965 document read: “Immigrants now felt that the Government had decided to discriminate against them and they were becoming less and less inclined to cooperate in multi-racial activities and were establishing instead their own racial groups favouring direct action to protect their

²⁶ PREM 13/383 Confidential Memo from Mr. McIndie, Cabinet Office, April 9th, 1965

²⁷ PREM 13/383 Letter dated 5th July 1965 from T Balogh to the Prime Minister.

interests.”²⁸ Politicians were not only walking a tightrope between responding and influencing the public, or between domestic and international concerns, but also, as Dancygier (2011) described them, “walking a tight-rope” between native and immigrant interests. Years later that tight-rope would become one of the most important to the Labour Party. In a 1976 Labour Party briefing on campaigning, members observed: “Government must reassure immigrants on the Labour Party anti-racist stand—leading ministers should do this. There is need for more immigrants to come into the Party. The Party is walking a tight-rope—care has to be exercised about what is said—or it could rebound in the future.”²⁹ This is again an example of how messages exist in concert with one another, and that one message may work to include one group while threatening to exclude another.

Conclusion

These examples show that the history of rhetoric on immigration in Britain has been a complicated one, involving public opinion, changing contextual factors, media behavior and political strategy. There is good reason to believe that the public is influenced by their surrounding contexts, but that the media and politicians hold sway over how the public will ultimately make sense of those surroundings. Regarding immigration, there are many issues to consider—e.g. demographic changes at local and national levels, types of immigration, services and rights provided to immigrants, policies on immigration, or the political representation of immigrant groups. Therefore, I argue

²⁸ PREM 13/384 words recorded from Archbishop of Canterbury in the Record of a Meeting in the Prime Minister’s Room at the House of Commons at 11:45 A.M. Wednesday, December 1, 1965

²⁹ “Private and Confidential, NEC 24 November 1976 NAD/112/11/76, Campaign against racism, reports on selected Constituencies”

that the ways in which messages on immigration are constructed—how often they are used and what dimensions they focus on when they are—is important to examine in order to establish variation in messaging between sources and their influence on public opinion.

The following chapter steps back from examining the effect of messages on public opinion, reflecting on the other explanatory factors in the literature. In short, the perceptions of conflict between native and immigrants outlined above and the importance of the relationship between constituents and their representatives provides the foundation for understanding the explanatory power and limitations of these other factors.

Chapter 3

Variation in Public Opinion on Immigration: Explaining Perceived Importance & Feelings

In this chapter, I question how well certain explanatory factors fare in answering why the public holds certain feelings about immigration and its importance, and I propose a way forward in explaining these outcomes. In particular, I offer an explanation for some of the ambiguous results regarding group threat theory and public opinion on immigration, and I also suggest ways to leverage the explanatory value of messaging by disaggregating messages by their source and type. Finally, I explain why messaging will shed light on the public's perceived importance of and feelings about immigration.

It should be noted that public opinion about immigration could be a bundle of many different attitudes. In this dissertation, I explain why opinions on the perceived importance of immigration and feelings about the issue vary between individuals and over time. As discussed in the introduction, these two sets of opinion can inform the evolution of policy and intergroup relations. Importantly, in explaining feelings about immigration, I am not solely concerned with anti-immigrant sentiment, which is often the subject of study in the immigration literature (Citrin and Sides, 2008; Zick et al. 2008). The widespread reality of anti-immigrant sentiment certainly warrants explanation, but it is also important and useful to explain other types of feelings, including positive attitudes toward immigration.

The Dependent Variables

As discussed in the previous chapter, opinions about immigration vary more than we may think. The graphs below show variation in public opinion on perceived

importance of immigration at the aggregate level in Britain. Figure 2.1 below shows monthly aggregate opinion between 1968 and 2010. This graph makes clear that the aggregate perceived importance of immigration has risen and fallen quite drastically over these decades in Britain. What explains this variation?




Figure 2.1. Variation in the Salience of Immigration in Britain 1968 – 2010

Source: Gallup International, Britain, (1968 – 1971) and IPSOS MORI polls (1974 – 2010)

Similar long-term data on feelings about immigration is not available, and therefore it is difficult to show how feelings about immigration vary over time. Yet, we do have survey evidence (e.g. The British Election Study; Lundgren and YouGov 2014 survey experiment) that shows variation in feeling about immigration across groups of individuals. Further, although we often focus on negative feelings about immigration,

there is reason to consider more closely the variation in positive feelings about immigration. For example, in a 2010 British Election Study Survey, 11.3 percent of respondents expressed having positive feelings about immigration (whether happy, proud, confident or hopeful). This is not a high percentage, but it is thus all the more important to determine what factors influence these kinds of feelings versus the more prevalent negative feelings (e.g. angry, disgusted, uneasy or afraid). Feelings about the issue of immigration can be correlated with or contribute to feelings about the groups who are immigrating or the policies that develop regarding this issue, and therefore, it is essential to understand better how these opinions are influenced.

What Explains Perceived Importance and Feelings about Immigration?

There is no shortage of literature trying to explain variation in opinions on immigration. However, scholars point to different explanatory factors depending on the opinion in question. I will discuss explanations for perceived importance of immigration below, and will focus on feelings about immigration to start. In order to explain these opinions, the literature often builds on the influence of individual and contextual influences, as well as the studies of prejudice and group threat, which also have a long and rich history in academia. The theories on what stimulates a rejection of newcomers or out-groups provide a useful foundation for understanding feelings toward immigration as it involves the presence of newcomers in society. I will review this literature, as well as suggest a simple theoretical contribution that should enable us to resolve one of the current debates in the literature regarding whether economic or cultural threats are more powerful in explaining feelings about immigration.

Group Threat

In order to explain resistance to or rejection of immigration, scholars often examine individual level factors (e.g. education-level, gender, partisanship) that may influence attitudes as well as external factors (e.g. demographic changes, state of or change in the economy). Whether the independent variables are internal or external to the individual, their explanatory rationale often stems from the theories of group threat. In general, perceptions of group threat often develop from the perceived distinction between insiders and outsiders, and a reaction against the out-group in order to protect the in-group (Tajfel 1981). Yet, although the literature is heavily rooted in the group threat theory, Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) observe in their review of the literature that there exist great inconsistencies in operationalizing “threat” (e.g. using sizes of groups or opinions about groups as proxies for group threat) and an overreliance on this explanatory theory. I offer a theoretical suggestion that will help to clarify the inconsistencies in past research and operationalizations of threat. After clarifying the meaning of “threat”, I suggest that by shifting attention to the mechanisms by which threat is conveyed or described, i.e. media and politicians, we can gain greater traction on why and how group threat matters for opinions about immigration.

In 1995, in order to explain prejudice, Quillian operationalized “threat” as “The size of the subordinate group relative to the dominant group...indexed by the percentage of the population resident in the country that is not a citizen of a country in the EEC.” (594) It may also be the case that group threat is felt by the minority group—however in the traditional literature, group threat was used to understand why members of large groups reacted against members of smaller groups. Quillian’s operationalization of group

threat reflected the mere presence of a sizable out-group represents threat. Other scholars have taken this measure and reconsidered its statistical relationship with opinions on out-groups. For example, Schneider (2008) suggests that the relationship between the sizes of out-groups, such as immigrants, and native opinions about immigration will not be linear. Higher levels of immigrants in a community may eventually stop increasing anti-immigrant attitudes, due to the community's "familiarization" with this out-group—a theory never tested, but hypothesized by Blalock (1967) (Schneider 2008, 55).

Therefore, this theory suggests and finds support for the idea that higher levels of immigrants in one's community actually ceases to produce anti-immigrant sentiment as it does in communities with fewer immigrants (See also Savelkoul et al. 2010; Hjerm 2009). In other words, anti-immigrant sentiment and immigrant group size are not linearly related. Moreover, Hopkins (2010) finds that it is not the size per se of the immigrant community, but the rate of change in that number over time that can lead to anti-immigrant sentiment. The sizes of out-groups are sometimes referred to as the *contextual* influences on opinion—that is, the context surrounding an individual would include the demographic conditions, or the sizes of immigrant groups, which would therefore impact attitudes toward immigration in the ways described above (See also Money 1999, Eger 2009). Therefore, the literature began by suggesting that the size of the out-group served as a proxy for threat—yet over time, this theory evolved.

Context, and the size of the out-group is certainly important to identifying potential threats to the in-group, but other scholars have delved beyond the size of a group and looked into the various kinds of threat perceived by individuals from out-groups—no matter the size of the group. These types of threat are often categorized as

economic or cultural; realistic or symbolic (Stephan et al. 2002; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Horowitz 1985, Fetzner 2000; Eger 2010, Roemer et al. 2007, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Each of these threats depends on the perception that out-groups will threaten the status quo of in-groups. At times, scholars will bundle these threats together into one overall group threat. For example, survey questions such as: “Foreigners enrich our country”, “Foreigners are a burden to society”, “Foreign children damage quality of education”, or “Immigrants take our jobs” serve to create an overall index of threat (Scheepers et al. 2002, Coenders 2001, and Schneider 2008).

On the other hand, some scholars look at each kind of threat individually. An example is Stephan et al. (2002) who analyze realistic threats separately from symbolic threats in explaining prejudice between white and black Americans. Realistic threats, they argued, referred to the perception of power held by different groups in society (it may also effect concern for criminal behavior, as well, described below), whereas symbolic threats reflected the perception of difference in values in beliefs between groups in society. Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007), on the other hand, address the difference between economic threats (over jobs, for example) and cultural threats (over religious or value differences). Often realistic threats are equated to economic threats and symbolic threats to cultural threats. I will return to these types of threats below, but first, two important distinctions must be addressed.

Scholars also consider the difference between perceived and actual threat. Scheepers, Gusbert and Coenders (2007) acknowledge there is a difference between threats that can be observed as occurring, such as sources of socioeconomic conflict, and difficult to observe, or perhaps only perceived, such as cultural or historical sources of

conflict. Moreover, returning to Quillian's operationalization of threat as the size of the out-group, Strabac 2011 finds: "The *perceived* size of an immigrant population has an impact on anti-immigrant prejudices, but the *real* size does not" (emphasis my own). Thus, it is possible that the ambiguous results found regarding sizes of immigrant populations in surrounding communities is derived from this difference between the perceived and actual size (See also Blinder forthcoming). In general, it is clear that the research on threat has attempted to categorize its kinds and determine which of these is most likely to predict prejudice toward, anxiety about, or resistance to different out-groups, as well as feelings about immigration.

Aside from the *kinds* of threat, scholars also separate perceived threat operating at the individual level, threat to one's own condition—or at the group level, threats to one's group (McLaren 2003). At the individual level, threat depends upon a potential insecurity of the individual. For example, to measure personal economic threat, McLaren (2003) measures perceptions of the risk of losing a job and the level of income. Therefore, a person is more likely to feel threatened economically by newcomers if she is scared of losing her job or is not financially secure. For this reason, scholars find that individuals with higher levels of education (and thus theoretically those with more secure job opportunities), those who have secure employment, and those with higher income levels are thought to be "insulated" from economic concerns (See also McLaren 2013, also Hainmueller & Hiscox 2007; Schneider 2008; Coenders et al. 2008).

Yet, McLaren and Johnson (2007) as well as several other scholars of the European context (see Quillian 1995; Snides and Citrin 2007; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004) find little or no evidence for these kinds of economically self-interested

concerns. McLaren and Johnson (2007) find in Britain that income level, job type, and unemployment status have no relationship with opinions on immigration, including opinions that immigrants are bad for the economy, perceptions of job competition with immigrants and general hostility to immigrants (see also Semyonov et al. 2006; Wilkes et al. 2007). Therefore, the theories regarding individual economic threat do not always perform statistically.

It may not only be individual level concerns at play but also group level, described by Group Conflict Theory (See Blumer 1958). This theory suggests that although an individual may not be threatened by immigrants personally, she may perceive conflict between immigrants and a group to which she belongs—thus informing feelings about immigration. For example, Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) find that in the U.S. context, personal economic concerns are not indicative of feelings about immigration but that national economic concerns are. However, in the European context, there is not as strong support for these kinds of economic group threat theories. In analyzing both *actual* economic indicators—unemployment levels, GDP per capita—and *perceived* economic group threats scholars find ambiguous results. At times, there is support for these realistic or economic threats, but not at others (McLaren 2003; McLaren and Johnson 2007; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004).

In short, most scholars find more support for the cultural or symbolic threats (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; McLaren 2013). Cultural and symbolic threats may relate to religion, values, nationality, or norms, for example. Reviewing the literature on threat, McLaren (2013) asserts, with caution, that concerns about the impact of immigration on culture and crime in the country have a stronger relationship with anti-

immigrant sentiment than do economic concerns. Notably, McLaren includes discussion on crime, which is not necessarily an economic threat, and can be argued to be a cultural one insofar as it addresses norm and rule breakers, which can be understood as threatening to the cultural or symbolic status quo. Moreover, scholars focus on “ethnic” threat, which is a kind of symbolic identity threat, whereby immigrants with identities differing from the native culture are deemed to be most threatening (see Schneider 2008; Scheepers et al. 2002; McLaren 2003; Quillian 1995).

Of course, both economic and cultural threats may depend upon the identity of the migrants. Brader et al. (2008) find that US respondents have more favorable responses to European and high-skilled migrants than to non-European and low-skilled migrants. Similarly, in the European context, Ford (2011) finds evidence in Britain for more acceptance of immigrants from white and culturally more proximate regions. However, he also finds that this kind of preference ordering is not present among younger Britains.

It is likely then, that perceptions of threat may be time dependent—relying on a set of conditions at a particular point in time that identify a certain out-group as being particularly threatening to a particular in-group. The issue of immigration taps into multiple segments of society such as racial groups, religious groups, or socioeconomic classes. Immigrants may overlap with these groups, but they also may be perceived as threatening to them in certain cases. Characteristics such as age, race, religion, nationality or socioeconomic status of native individuals play a significant role in how people view newcomers. For example, a 1986 New York Times article quoted Dr. Fuchs of Brandeis University on what he termed a “historical reversal” whereby “traditionally, the black leadership and communities strongly opposed immigration as a direct threat in jobs and

services, [but by 1986] blacks and Mexican-Americans have forged an alliance on immigration questions”. These kinds of perceived threats and newfound alliances change and develop over the years, but are rooted in identities that may inform opinions about immigration, and are informed by messages provided by society’s leaders.

One way in which these perceptions of threat—whatever the threat may be—change over time is through contact with immigrants. Allport (1979) argued that contact, or interaction, with members of out-groups exposes member of in-groups to a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of their identity, reducing the perceived threats. Scholars have advanced this theory of contact, exploring the idea that contact with out-groups may lead to both negative and positive opinions depending on the kind of contact. Intuitively, negative interactions will lead to negative opinions and positive interactions to positive opinions (Stephan et al. 2002; McLaren 2003). Further, it is not only the type of contact with an out-group that scholars identify as critical to the outcome, but the degree of an individual’s identification with the in-group, as well. That is, individuals who identify strongly with the in-group also have stronger reactions, often negative, to members of the out-group (Stephan et al. 2002).

The extent to which a person identifies with the in-group begins to tap into another area of research that is becoming increasingly more important—the psychological influences on opinion. In particular, implicit prejudice—the subconscious reactions to the out-group—are being studied with experimental designs, and scholars are finding very strong support for the effect of implicit attitudes on a multitude of opinions toward immigrants, such as feelings about immigrants or the perceived threats of immigrants (Ivarsflaten et al. 2010; Knoll 2013). Quillian (2006) argues from a

sociological viewpoint that the psychological studies examining implicit prejudice are the most sophisticated and ought to be pursued more in the discipline. That said, such studies are often expensive, requiring an experimental survey technique, and may lack external validity (See Sniderman and Theriault 2004). Moreover, it is still to be determined where these implicit attitudes stem from, and how they evolve.

Advancing the Literature on Group Threat

Reviewing the literature on anti-immigrant sentiment, Ceobanul and Escandell (2010) admonish scholars in sociology and political science for their fixation on “competitive threat” and encourage a strengthening of the “conceptual apparatus and expanding the theoretical range and analytical focus” (310). In particular, the authors question the “institutional and sociopolitical macro-level factors”, such as economic conditions or political institutions, which affect attitudes toward immigration and immigrants. I provide a clarification of some of the ambiguities of “threat” as well as a suggestion for integrating an institutional and political perspective on threat.

There is a way in which a very simple differentiation in the literature has been glossed over, and with it, an important theoretical contribution to the threat literature. This difference addresses threats involving conflict or involving competition. Fisher (2005) asserts, building on the work of Kriesberg (1973) that “Competition may or may not involve awareness; conflict does. In the case of competition, parties are seeking the same ends whereas conflicting parties may or may not be in agreement about the desirability of particular goals” (100). This is an important distinction in the literature on immigration. Competition, then, would be immigrants and natives vying for the same outcome—which could be a particular job or flat. These groups would not even

necessarily be aware of the other, but would be in competition for the job or the flat. Even if they are aware—they are all in pursuit of the same end: the job or the flat. Conflict, however, would involve awareness and potentially a disagreement about the ultimate goal. For example, conflict may involve immigrants' and natives' awareness of one another and disagreement about the way things should be, what national norms should look like, or laws, rights, etc. Conflict may be immigrants disagreeing with natives about how jobs and flats ought to be distributed or how employment should be structured in society. The extent of the threat may vary depending on whether it is understood as competition or presented as conflict.

Therefore, the stronger support for cultural threats and the ambiguous results for economic threats in the literature may actually depend on whether the threat is interpreted as competition or conflict. For example, another set of authors move away from the economic or cultural categories of threat and focus on life or death conflict. Lahav and Courtemanche (2012) assert that there will be a convergence of opinion against out-groups “when basic needs are threatened (e.g. law and order, public safety, crime, survival) (484). Therefore, the authors contend “When migration is associated with physical threat such as crime, terrorism, law-and-order concerns, we may expect broad protectionist impulses” (484). It may be that all of these studies that find such strong support for certain causal indicators are actually all measuring perceptions of conflict, rather than competition, where perceptions of the threat of conflict is a much stronger influence than of competition. Moreover, it is important to consider that conflict may be most apparent when cultural differences are identified—as normative differences inherently bring to light differing opinions on what goals ought to be and an awareness of

the “other”. But conflict may exist on a number of different issues, including economics or rule of law, for example, regardless of culture. Our distinction between economic and cultural threats is perhaps not the most useful for it overemphasizes the importance of culture without attributing that importance to a more likely cause—perceived conflict. In other words, if a debate about the economy was painted in clearly conflicted terms, with a distinct difference clarified between natives and newcomers on the ultimate goals of economic development, I believe this kind of economic threat would be as strong in its effects on opinions on immigration as a cultural threat. Therefore, in the subsequent chapters, when I refer to economic or cultural threats—I assume both to be conflict-suggestive, but along these differing dimensions.

A non-culturally laden example from Scotland, the Isle of Canna, may help to drive this point home. In 1981, the island was gifted by its owner to the National Trust for Scotland. At that point, the Trust was given representative control over the island. As part of its attempt to generate funds for the island’s upkeep, the Trust selected families to immigrate to the island. These newcomers did not get on well with the locals, with whom there were “damaging public rows.”³⁰ However, eventually over a twenty-year period, management of the island changed its tactics, placing some control back in the hands of the natives by incorporating them into a kind of representative decision-making process. As one local stated: “It’s vital that local people are empowered to have a strong say on their future. Until now Canna has been managed from Inverness [a mainland

³⁰ Perman, Ray, “Lesson in Trust: How nation’s island heritage can be left to thrive,” September 6, 2010 *Times online* (<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/scotland/article2715008.ece>)

city].”³¹ What some may call cultural difference stemmed not from ethnic or religious differences (largely the same in this case) but from the distinction between islanders and non-islanders, which informed conflict—arguing over how life should operate on the island and awareness that the newcomers were different, they were the “other”.

This anecdote also refocuses our attention on a different kind of culture. We may think of the more obvious cultural differences when we talk about immigrants and natives—such as nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion—but we must not forget political culture that is derived from the political histories of society. Democratic citizens like to think that they have some control over the politics of their societies—just as the islanders on the Isle of Canna felt. If that political control or representation is not managed or protected in some way, then what may have only been competition between groups could devolve into conflict where the groups are made aware of one another and their differing ideas about ultimate goals and outcomes.

McLaren and Johnson (2007) present evidence that is very much in line with this thinking. They find that self-interest—their index of measures of what they call *competition* with immigrants—has very little influence on anti-immigrant feelings. Rather, they find the most influential to be: “threats to in-group resources posed by immigration, threats to the shared customs and traditions of British society (particularly those posed by Muslims) and – to a lesser extent – the potential for increased crime that may result from immigration.” These factors, resources, shared customs, and crime, all concern potential areas of conflict, rather than competition, over the “desirability of goals” and an awareness of the alleged group responsible for this potential conflict.

³¹ (<http://www.pressandjournal.co.uk/Article.aspx/1885433>)

Threats to in-group resources suggest disagreement over how these resources are to be accumulated and distributed, which involves more than competition, and identifies the group responsible. Threat to shared customs is essentially the definition of conflict, insofar as customs will determine the desirability of certain goals. Moreover, crime represents a rejection of the customs of the land. Therefore, linking immigrants to acts of crime will likely associate immigrants with an opposition to the accepted “desirability of goals” or rules within that society, and therefore contribute to more resistance to and more negative feeling about immigration, in general. Of course, I would not argue the same effects would occur if the immigrants in question were the victims of such crimes, in which case, a more sympathetic response would be more likely.

There is a mechanism, often ignored, that can help to mediate these kinds of threats or conflicts, and as the Canna case demonstrates. It is related to the norms of society—the natives have a culture in existence, designed to handle conflict, and that design is derived from an agreed “desirability of certain goals”. This mechanism, of course, is democratic politics and representation. The quote above, that the locals’ access to having a “strong say on their future,” highlights the crux of this matter, and also other intergroup conflicts. This access is what democratic theory holds up as the critical component to a functioning democracy—representation of interests. Group threat then, is useful in explaining this situation in Canna—there certainly was an in-group and out-group distinction. The distinction was further defined and exacerbated by a loss of political efficacy by the islanders and concern over the changing status quo on the island—a disagreement about the desirability of goals, i.e. conflict. Dancygier (2011) makes strides in identifying the importance of this political mechanism in mediating

threat. She identifies the growing political strength of immigrants to help explain native violence against them, as well as immigrant political alienation to help explain immigrants' violent acts toward the state. Although Dancygier was focused on violent conflict, she also touches on a critical concept in non-violent conflict between immigrants and natives—political power and representation. Therefore, it is important to consider contextual factors in explaining opinions on immigration, but it is equally important to account for the political factors, as well, and I do so in the dissertation analysis.

Media, Politicians and Opinions on Immigration

Messages conveyed by the media on issue importance and group-threat or conflict influence the public's perceptions of immigration's importance and their feelings on the issue. After years of study, the academic community agrees that the media is quite powerful (e.g. Iyengar and Simon 1993, McCombs 2004; Hopkins 2010). As Iyengar 2011 summarizes: "the evidence indicates that media presentations achieve considerable influence over public opinion" (261). McCombs (2013) explains one way in which the media can shift opinions on issue importance, for example: "[Media does] considerably more than signal the existence of major events and issues. Through their day-by-day selection and display of the news, editors and news directors focus our attention and influence our perceptions of what are the most important issues of the day" (1).

Media messages matter, but I also argue that messages from politicians influence public opinion on immigration. As discussed above, refocusing on the political dimension is useful when studying these opinions. I focus on messages provided from political parties and politicians to determine whether messages from these sources vary in content and effect from other sources of messaging, such as the media. The importance of

what politicians say and how they say it, and the impact of both on public opinion is well documented in the literature. (See Norris 1999, Norris 2005, Chong and Druckman 2007, Kinder and Sanders 1990, Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Abrajano 2010; Newton 2008, Vavreck 2009; Matsubayashi 2012). For example, Newton (2008) analyzes how politicians framed immigration reform by focusing on the various identities of immigrants—illegal, alien or immigrant—in the U.S. context. Her study provides a useful starting point from which to develop a broader categorization of political rhetoric on immigration. Moreover, Money (1997, 1999) analyzes the decision-making strategy regarding the number of immigrants in a constituency and making immigration-control a campaign issue to sway an election outcome. This piece is foundational and provides a useful platform from which to analyze the specific kinds of rhetoric politicians use to speak about immigration when they do, and the ways in which this varied rhetoric may influence opinion.

As the discussion on conflict and group threat demonstrated above, there must be an articulation of difference—an awareness of the other—for group threat, or perceived conflict, to realize itself, and ordinary citizens must be able to observe that articulation and find it relevant. That articulation, and its meaning, often comes from the more dominant actors within society (Blumer 1958). As Citrin and Sides suggest, it may be that “people’s perceptions of immigration and immigrants rely more on elite messages and less on the objective circumstances around them” (2006, 352). These dominant actors, or elites, may be many different people including religious leaders or social movement leaders, but I focus on politicians and the media. I apply this literature to public opinion

on immigration, specifically through analysis of two mechanisms used in messages about immigration: agenda-setting and framing.

As discussed above, agenda-setting is a measurement of the emphasis on and attention to an issue. Framing³² adds another layer of potential influence. Framing can be understood as certain words that are used together in order to encourage a “particular conceptualization of an issue” (Chong and Druckman 2007, Brader et al. 2008).

Immigration is certainly an issue susceptible to framing (e.g. Knoll et al. 2010, Newton 2008, Brader et al. 2008) as it can be defined along multiple dimensions; therefore, the dimension chosen is important (Popkin 1991, 93). As Popkin argues: “Framing effects occur whenever altering the formulation of a problem, or shifting the point of view of an observer, *changes the information and ideas the observer will use when making decisions*” (emphasis my own, Popkin, 1991, 82). Frames have also been defined with political elites in mind: “[frames are] devices embedded in political discourse, invented and employed by political elites, often with an eye on advancing their own interests or ideologies, and intended to make favorable interpretations prevail” (Kinder and Sanders 1990, 74). Therefore, frames can act independently or regardless of intent, but they can also help elites shift public opinion toward outcomes they prefer.

Framing addresses various nuances in the language used or associations made to convey information about issues, which could be analyzed along a positive or negative

³² There is much discussion in the literature on the differences between framing and priming. Here, I follow Druckman (2010) and refer to framing as distinct from, not synonymous with priming. Priming is also a valued concept in the literature (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987, Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007), but it refers to the way in which language regarding an issue and/or a politician changes the criteria by which an individual will evaluate that politician, for example, rather than opinions, in general.

dimension, for example. That is, frames may encourage people to think positively or negatively about a policy based on an assessment of its negative or positive features. However, framing can highlight other dimensions, as well. Druckman (2010) describes President Bush's framing of the country's situation in the early 2000s in terms of terrorism and homeland security, whereas it may have been framed in terms of the national economy or status of healthcare (of course, context plays an important role here, and without the events of 9-11, President Bush may not have been able to frame the country's situation in these ways).

Therefore, it is important to consider what dimensions of immigration elites choose to focus on, not simply whether the issue is framed in a positive or negative light. As observed in the historical narrative in the previous chapter, politicians thought carefully and strategically about what dimensions of the immigration issue ought to be highlighted or downplayed in their rhetoric—not simply focusing on a positive or negative spin. Further, in laboratory and survey experiments, Brader et al. (2008) and Knoll and Redlawsk (2010) begin to push the framing literature beyond a positive and negative dimension by analyzing the impact of identity cues—varying both ethnic and/or skill level characteristics of immigrants in their framing experiments. They find that these identity cues can also stimulate group-threat responses regarding immigration in negative ways. This study provides evidence that certain associations may provoke negative feelings about immigration even if negative words or frames are not used, supporting the need to examine frames beyond a positive-negative dimension. Further, Merolla et al. (2013) also examine the effects of frames regarding immigrants and frames regarding immigration policy on public opinion on immigration and policy, finding

evidence for the latter. All of these authors have pushed beyond positive and negative dimensions, analyzing language in a more nuanced manner in order to understand its effects on attitudes on immigration.

The importance of words and discourses on immigration is well researched in other disciplines, as well. Strauss (2012), an anthropologist, examines discourses on immigration in the United States identifying patterns in statements made by citizens that reflect the discourses engaged by others on the issue of immigration. She argues that the transmission of such discourses to citizens is not based on ideologies or broad values, but rather contain “bite-sized” messages that are “easier to mentally grasp and repeat”(337). She calls the exposure to such pieces of information “opinion communities”, which aptly describes a contextual environment that differs from those more often studied in political science. These opinion communities include friend groups, neighbors, relatives, coworkers, but as Strauss explains can also include “dispersed opinion communities formed by identity groups or the audiences for different media” (337). I would add politicians are also capable of contributing to these opinion communities through their rhetoric.

Acknowledging the importance of opinion communities helps to establish the importance of the sources of information and messaging that inform opinions. Agenda-setting and framing may not only vary between individual messages on immigration, but between the sources of those messages. In my own work, I am interested in the variation in messages *between* and *within* media sources and political parties.

Addressing the Outstanding Questions in the Literature

In constructing a theory of how media and politicians influence opinions on immigration through messaging, it is useful to acknowledge where extant literature has identified gaps in understanding how these messages operate, and whether there are constraints on their influence. For example, numerous scholars have provided evidence for the ability of the media to influence opinions. Yet, Iyengar (2011) also point to various questions that remain. For example, do media effects persist over time? Most studies on the subject examine such influence in short periods of time in experimental settings. Other scholars suggest, therefore, that influence should be studied outside of the laboratory (Sniderman and Theriault 2004). Further, the impact of messages may be, as Iyengar puts it, “limited by the audience’s partisan predispositions” (261), but is partisanship the only mediating factor at play? Finally, the media is not the only actor capable of influencing opinions, which begs the question of the influence of other actors in society.

Therefore, to reiterate, I recommend analyzing messages outside the laboratory, establishing a more nuanced record of what real life messaging on immigration actually looks like before turning toward studying its effect on opinion in the lab. Moreover, I propose analyzing *how* messages influence opinion, such as the perceived importance of immigration and positive or negative feelings about immigration. In other words, does agenda-setting work differently when it is the media or the politicians using it? Do certain frames increase negative opinions on immigration more than positive feelings, and if so, what do those frames look like? I also suggest exploring how messages may be mediated by factors other than partisanship, turning attention to other “opinion

communities” described in Chapter 3, such as different media outlets. For example, in a laboratory setting, the researcher determines what messages subjects are exposed to. Yet, in real life, these messages vary across different media sources, politicians, etc.

Therefore, if there was a way to know what newspaper(s) people were reading, for example, we could analyze the frames and agenda-setting used in that newspaper in order to test their effects on their attitudes. Finally, it is important to identify how messages from the under-researched group—politicians—influence opinions on immigration but also how this influence compares to the media.

Real World Messaging: Newspapers & Quoted Politicians

In order to get a sense of what messages are being conveyed regarding immigration in Britain, I suggest we examine British newspapers. The media is indeed a well-researched influence on opinions on immigration and other issues (in general). Yet, we have only begun to scratch the surface on the various ways in which *different kinds of* print media influence opinions. In particular, I build on the work by Dunaway et al. (2010) who suggest: “news coverage is a potentially important and currently neglected explanatory variable in determining Americans' attitudes toward immigration” (363). This is equally true in Europe. Newspapers provide a rich assortment of messaging on the issue of immigration on a daily basis. Moreover, there is widespread variation in newspapers, including partisan leanings or publication type (i.e. broadsheets or tabloids). Therefore, I argue for the need to explore variation in these sources and their content in order to arrive at a more comprehensive, real-world understanding of the variation in messaging on immigration.

The press, as discussed in Chapter 2, had been very influential politically throughout British history. As described by Marsh (2006): “the [British] press is a powerful and legitimate force in democracy [but it is not] representative [of its readers]...[the press] can speak for them, articulate their views or what they perceive them to be... [and] hunt out the facts to confirm their readers’ views of the world [and then]...press the case hard.” (Quoted in Temple 2008). Further, print journalism, such as newspapers, still maintain wide readership in Britain (Wring and Deacon, 2010, 437). Daily newspaper circulation was a little over 10 million copies per day in 2010. Importantly, newspapers vary in several ways, making it possible to examine the importance of variation in the kind of newspaper and influence on public opinion. For example, the British national papers vary according to partisan endorsements, type of reporting—“quality”, “mid-market” or “populars”— for example (Wring and Deacon, 2010), each of which may convey different types of messaging on immigration.

Further, newspapers provide a source for politician messaging when reporters quote politicians about certain issues. Records of current political speeches, television-appearances, or campaign materials are difficult to come by, and thus constrain our ability to track politicians’ messaging on issues like immigration. With the advent of the Internet, this may be more possible, as politicians take to various websites like twitter and so forth. In the meantime, it is useful to refer to newspapers for such messages, or to records of political debate, such as those in the British Parliament. In this dissertation, I make use of newspapers and parliamentary transcripts—both available online—to identify messages conveyed by British politicians.

Connecting the Dots and Moving Forward

The discussion of extant literature above informs the arguments developed and tested in this dissertation. First, although agenda-setting has been used to explain the perceived importance of immigration in previous literature, there has yet to be a comparison of effectiveness in agenda-setting across sources, such as the media and politicians, or even within different media outlets. Therefore, in Chapter 4, I develop an argument regarding the importance of identifying the source of agenda-setting in order to fully establish its effects.

Secondly, in explaining negative feelings about immigration, positive feelings are largely ignored and perceived conflict is perhaps conflated with competition. Moreover, there are multiple dimensions to immigration—beyond the positive and the negative—such as economic, cultural, criminal, etc. and these dimensions ought to be considered when establishing the influence of framing effects on feelings about immigration. Therefore, in testing the effects of frames, I examine positive and negative frames as well as frames that highlight other dimensions of immigration, and I examine their effects on negative *and* positive feelings.

Finally, politics—in terms of political representation or political messaging—are often ignored in understanding feelings about immigration. Thus, I test for the importance of political representation in understanding feelings about immigration. I also examine and explain how party politics influences the ways in which politicians use various types of frames about immigration.

In the next chapter, I outline a model regarding the influence of messages from the media and politicians on public opinion on immigration, building on the existing research.

Chapter 4

A Theory of How Messages Matter

The previous chapters have identified two important questions about public attitudes on immigration: 1) why the saliency of immigration varies from time to time, and 2) why people may have positive or negative feelings about immigration. These are my two primary dependent variables of interest. In this chapter, I offer a model that provides the basis of my theory explaining where these messages come from and how they work. In particular, I develop a comprehensive theory of messaging that accounts for its source, the mechanism of its influence and its effects.

The Elements of How Messages Matter

As stated in the Introduction, I argue that in order to understand how messages matter, we must acknowledge the source of the message. There are many actors in society who may influence opinions on immigration. I focus only on media and politicians in this dissertation, but it is worth noting that messages may also come from other sources, such as interest groups, religious leaders or political activists. Therefore, my theory of messaging contends messages vary in their construction and their effects depending on their source. Therefore, we must identify where messages come from before we attempt to establish why they matter.

Further, my theory also acknowledges that context plays an important role in shaping opinions, and also informs messages. Messages often draw on the events and occurrences in the world, and thus reality influences messages—providing constraints on what messages are possible but also opportunity for some messages to thrive. For example, the statement, “immigrants are flooding into our country” would be difficult to

convey if there had been no immigration in a country for years on end. There may be ways in which these messages can manipulate reality but it is much more difficult to create messages that ignore reality all together. Therefore, I argue it is necessary to examine frames in the real world in order to establish what dimensions of immigration they are highlighting and to what effect.

Once the message is sent, it may come in various forms with varying outcomes. For example, agenda-setting, framing, priming, tone all describe modes of messaging. I focus the former two. Moreover, these messages may not only impact opinions in the short-term, as evidenced in survey research, but in the long-term, as well. It is useful to consider both outcomes—short and long term influence—to understand better how messages matter.

Further, messages may influence multiple types of opinion on immigration. Scholars have studied opinions on how immigrants effect the economy, which immigrants should be prioritized for entry into a country, or whether immigrations levels ought to be changed. In this study, I focus on feelings about immigration and its perceived importance. As explained in the Introduction, these two types of opinions help to understand how policies on immigration are addressed and proposed and how intergroup relations evolve.

Finally, it is worth considering why the relevant actors choose to use certain messages, or none at all. For example, why do politicians choose certain types of frames to speak about immigration? What influences the selection of each of these types of messages? Answering these questions will help us to understand how messages matter in terms of their creation, not only their impact.


Model of How Messages Matter

Taking all of these elements of how messages matter into consideration, there are multiple combinations of factors we could examine. In my theory, I focused on particular actors (i.e. media and politicians) and agenda-setting and framing, which help to establish how messages influence feelings about immigration and its perceived importance—the two main dependent variables. I study messages used by various media sources and politicians to test for differences in the effects on the dependent variables depending on the source and content of the message. Further, I consider whether these messages and their effects vary in the short and the long term, and I analyze how context matters in the influence of messages. Finally, I identify variation across media sources and politicians, and I explain why politicians use the messages they do on immigration.³³

The model depicted in Figure 3.1 identifies these key actors and situates them in the causal story of how messaging matters. The colored lines outlining portions of the models correspond to the chapters that test these portion of the causal story. Together, these chapters help to explain the various elements of messaging.

The model I develop acknowledges the importance of context, e.g. demographic realities, economic conditions, or party politics. Thus, I do not argue that context does not matter. Rather, it matters a great deal, as it provides the material from which politicians and the media draw to develop their stories and messages regarding immigration. Further, I do not argue that the media and politicians have equal sway over the public. On the other hand, I contend that the extent of influence differs for these two

³³ Although it would be interesting to analyze why the media chooses certain messages, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation, and a fruitful area of further research.



Note: In Bold are Factors Examined and Explained in the Dissertation
 In Grey are Factors Beyond the Scope of the Dissertation

Figure 3.1. Model of External Influences on Public Opinion

elites. As discussed in the literature review, the media operates as part of opinion communities, where individuals expose themselves to certain kinds of information. As long as individuals want to pursue information, the media is able to achieve a higher level of information dissemination than politicians among the public—on a daily, and now

even on a by-the-minute basis. The current (2014) and future Internet opportunities may be changing this asymmetry. That said, although politicians may not have had the same kind of access to the public at the time periods examined in this dissertation (1950 – 2010) their positions as political representatives provide them with an authority on political issues not afforded to the media. Moreover, even in more cynical times, the public may look to their political leaders for guidance on certain important issues. The model, therefore, distinguishes between messaging effects between the media and politicians.

First, I test the long-term influence of contextual factors and media and politician agenda-setting on the perceived importance of immigration in Britain. Chapter 5 includes an analysis of the influence of context, media and politician agenda-setting on perceived importance of immigration in the long-term, from 1998 - 2012. As explaining the influence of messaging in the long-term is often not the subject of study, this chapter provides a valuable contribution to our understanding on this subject.

Chapter 6 examines media messaging in closer detail, identifying agenda-setting and framing in nine national British newspapers and testing their varying effects on perceived importance of immigration and feelings about immigration, respectively. These effects are examined in the short-term—in the months preceding the 2005 and 2010 general elections in Britain. It would also be useful to explore the influence of politician messaging in the short-term, and I plan to pursue this research in future work.

Finally, Chapter 7 examines frames used by British politicians, and explains how party politics, not only contextual factors such as demographic change, inform the variation on frames used not only between parties but also within them. It would be

equally useful to explain the strategies of media messaging, but as mentioned above, this is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

On the Direction of Causality

Some may argue that the model above does not consider the ways in which the public influences the media and politicians. For example, newspapers rely on readership, and therefore, one could argue that newspapers will merely respond to, or even represent, public opinion on issues (Temple, 2008). Moreover, politicians depend on the electoral connection (Mayhew 1974), and therefore should desire to make the public happy by responding to their preferences. These are valid perspectives, and I do not argue that they are not true. However, I contend that these conditions operate as constraints, not as the sole guiding principles for the media and politicians.

Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) develop a theory that outlines the relationships between the media and politicians to public opinion that is consistent with my theory of messaging. In short, their argument is that legislators “attempt to change public opinion in order to mitigate the electoral costs of pursuing their policy goals” (45). In other words, there are many costs associated with responsiveness to public opinion—politicians may be unsure what opinion will be in the next election cycle, it can require compromise between a politician’s policy goal and that of the public, and it can be time-consuming to identify where constituents stand on issues (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000, 45-6). Therefore, politicians act strategically, identifying opportunities to change opinion in order to achieve their policy goals with the minimal cost.

In fact, the authors suggest that the reason politicians rely so much on opinion polls is not to follow these trends and patterns in opinion, but to understand better how to

change them. One of the ways in which politicians move public opinion is “*through* the media’s coverage of [policy choices and political strategy]” (65). They also argue that when scholars have studied the influence of the media, they tend to “underplay the driving influence on news reporting: the actual behavior and strategy of government officials and their allies...In short, the behavior and strategies of politicians affect not only policy debates but also the media coverage of them” (56, 61). Therefore, this perspective helps to shift the perspective on politicians from being at once simply responsive to public opinion and vulnerable to the behavior of the press, and toward a more complicated perspective accounting for influential and responsive behavior of politicians. It also clarifies the media’s influential role—at once benefitting from the opportunity to inform the public as they see fit, while also being constrained by the stories politicians and events in the world provide to them. The media and politicians are thus constrained by public opinion insofar as they need the public to continue to turn to them to provide stories about the world around them, but they have opportunity to influence opinions through those stories in ways that benefit their own interests. In Chapter 7, I begin to explain how and why politicians may strategize the use of certain messages. As discussed, examining media strategies is an area of study ripe for further research.

Concluding Remarks

I test the various components of the model in Figure 3.1, taking causal direction into consideration in each of the analyses, and ultimately explaining how messages matter. Ultimately, the story that develops in each chapter is one of complexity—messages do influence the public’s perceptions of the importance of immigration as well

as positive and negative feelings on the issue. Yet, the source (e.g. newspapers or politicians), the content (e.g. types of frames, agenda-setting), and the timing (e.g. critical events) of the messages mediate the influence of messages on these two dependent variables, as the following chapters will show.

Chapter 5

Messaging Over Time: Examining the Influence of Media and Politicians on the Perceived Importance of Immigration

This chapter tests how messages from politicians and the media matter in the long term, asking: Why do publics perceive immigration to be an important national issue at one point in time but not at others? Thus, the chapter tackles one of the two dependent variables studied in this dissertation: the perceived importance of immigration. First, I will show that perceived importance varies quite dramatically over long stretches of time, and second, I will explain why.

Structural explanations of public opinion, such as demographic changes or unemployment levels, sometimes referred to as “indicators”, certainly provide important contexts that will inform opinions on immigration (Birkland 2001). If immigration levels rise, for example, publics may process that information and pay more attention to the immigration issue, affording it more importance. Scholars have also explored whether unemployment levels influence attitudes on immigration, hypothesizing that a shortage of jobs could stimulate perceived competition between natives and immigrants (McLaren 2003, 2007). As unemployment levels increase, however, why would publics be more likely to consider immigration as the most important issue—why not the economy? As Birkland states: “These numbers [or indicators] by themselves do not have an influence over which issues gain greater attention and which fall by the wayside” (2005, 117). Rather, Birkland (2001) and Citrin and Sides (2006) contend, elite messages may influence how the public understands and assesses these changes. Politicians and the

media, for example, are able to provide a means of understanding and organizing one's situational context through political stories (Popkin 1991, Vavreck 2009, Iyengar 2011). Political actors in society can take certain pieces of information about an issue and couch them in ways that emphasize certain features—e.g. the issue's importance. Thus, it is important that we integrate these political actors into our explanations of public's opinion on the nation's most important issues, such as immigration.

This chapter demonstrates that when the media and politicians mention the word “immigration” or related terms, they are also influencing the trajectory of opinion on the issue. In short, the emphasis on the issue, which is known in the scholarly literature as agenda-setting (See Baumgartner and Jones, 1995, Birkland 2001, Iyengar 2011), is related to the evolution of opinion on immigration and the extent to which the public perceives immigration to be an important issue. As discussed in earlier chapters, I do not argue that structural factors are insignificant—rather they are quite important. I argue that as these events occur, political actors in society begin to talk about them in public domains such as media outlets or government bodies. The media may grab onto a story on immigration and cover it intensely for weeks or months. Similarly, government representatives may begin to speak more often about immigration-related policy in response to structural and contextual developments. This coverage and attention influence public opinion on immigration. I test my theory of messaging at the aggregate level in this chapter.

In the analysis below, I find that structural and contextual factors matter, but that agenda-setting by the media and politicians also influence aggregate opinions on the salience of immigration, thereby leading the public to consider immigration to be an

important issue. I find that certain structural and contextual events occur, political actors emphasize the issue of immigration (i.e. agenda-setting), and ultimately these variables influence public opinion on the importance of immigration. I also find that in determining how to measure agenda-setting, i.e. selecting the terms to operationalize agenda-setting, we must be aware that certain terms may hold different meaning to the public.

Immigration may involve discussion on the process of immigration, immigrants, asylum or refugees, for example. Therefore, in measuring agenda-setting, it may seem reasonable to combine these terms into one aggregate measure of agenda-setting.

However, I find that this may be problematic, as the following analysis provides evidence that the public seems to react differently to agenda-setting on the word “immigration” than they do to agenda-setting on the word “refugees”, for example. Finally I also find that aside from considering *how* agenda-setting works (i.e. what terms specifically are used and to what effect) and how it may vary in its influence dependent on its *source* (i.e. whether the agenda-setting is produced by the media or politicians) it is also important to consider *when* agenda-setting will work (i.e. it may be effective in some periods of time but not in others). In the analysis, I find that the 2008 financial crisis ruptures the trend in the public’s opinions on the salience of immigration, and thereby changes the impact of the independent variables. I discuss these findings in detail below.

Aggregate Public Opinion in Britain

Before turning to the explanations of changing public opinion on the importance of immigration, it is necessary to understand better what these changes in opinions look like over time. Figure 4.1 shows the monthly aggregate perceived importance of immigration in Britain between January 1998 and December 2011. I collected this data

from Ipsos-MORI, an organization in Britain that conducts monthly polls. Much like the Gallup polls, Ipsos-MORI conducts monthly polls on a range of issues. In particular, they ask a representative national sample in Britain to identify the most important national issue, and then ask if there are any other important issues they would like to mention. The respondents can name as many issues as they like. Ipsos-MORI maintains a list of 47 categories, one of which is immigration, and the respondents' answers are placed into these existing categories; they publish the percentage of people reporting each of those issues monthly.³⁴

However, the poll conflates immigration with race relations, and therefore, it is impossible to tease the two apart. That is, respondents who mention race relations as the most important issue are recorded in the immigration category. Nonetheless, the poll reflects the rise of this issue from a peripheral national concern to one of the few issues that are mentioned most often in Britain during this time period, a pattern that is similarly apparent in other reputable polls.³⁵ Unfortunately, systematic monthly data for the time period in question is not available from these other sources, and therefore Ipsos-MORI is the best available data. According to the Migration Observatory, a data management and oversight organization at the University of Oxford, the Ipsos-MORI results are reliable (also see Jennings and Wlezien 2009).

Figure 4.1 raises the question of why perceived importance rises, and falls, as it does over this time period. As the trend shows, the salience of immigration varies

³⁴ The full list and data on each issue is available at Ipsos-Mori: <http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/2905/Issues-Index-2012-onwards.aspx?view=wide>

³⁵ Ibid.

dramatically over this time period, changing over short periods as well as long periods. Structural and political actor influences may help us to refine our understanding of these changes in opinion on the importance of the immigration issue. One way to potentially establish which factors are influencing public perceptions is to address whether critical events over this time period can explain shifts in public opinion on immigration, and its perceived importance.




Figure 4.1. Percentage of Individuals Reporting Immigration to be the Most Important Problem in Britain, 1998 - 2011

Figures 4.2 – 4.3 place key events alongside the aggregate opinion, separating structural social and economic events (Figure 4.2) from political events (Figure 4.3).

Certainly, these events are not exhaustive of potentially related factors or events influencing perceived importance of immigration, but they do provide a glimpse of how

these events may factor into the trajectory of perceived salience of immigration.³⁶ It is also possible to outline certain expectations for how these events may influence perceived importance of immigration. For example, in Figure 4.2, we might expect economic shifts (e.g. unemployment levels), demographic changes (i.e. levels of immigration), or critical events that may be directly or indirectly related to the issue of immigration (e.g. Immigrant trafficking deaths) to influence the public's perceived salience of immigration.




Figure 4.2. Major Social and Economic Events in Britain by Month 1998 – 2011

Economic and demographic events occur throughout the time period, beginning in 1998 with the highest level of asylum applications in Britain's history. Such an increase in

³⁶ An even more detailed graph is available in Appendix A.

applications may lead to the public's reporting immigration as significant issue. Yet, we do not see marked rise in the perceived importance of immigration until 2000. Later, in 2009, net (legal) migration falls by one-third, but in December of that year, a spike up in perceived importance emerges. Thus, in this case, we observe a reverse of the expected outcome— demographic changes reflecting decreases in immigration is met with an increase in perceived importance of immigration from the British public.

In terms of employment rates, we may expect increases in unemployment to raise perceptions of importance about immigration, insofar as the native public may associate unemployment with incoming labor migrants taking their jobs. Again, the reason for the public making that link between unemployment and immigration would need to be explored—and I would argue it would be the result of political actor influence. For example, it is difficult to establish clear and consistent links between certain structural changes and changes in perceived importance of immigration. For example, in March of 2005, a record drop in unemployment occurs, which is in fact followed by a drop in perceived importance of immigration. In 2010, however, when unemployment levels fall again, there is little change in the salience of immigration amongst the public. Therefore, it is difficult to establish clear links between these kinds of critical structural events and public opinion.

Finally, economic factors regarding the national economy may influence the opinions on the importance of immigration.³⁷ In 2008, the economic crisis appears to have a drastic effect on the public's perception of the importance of immigration. In fact,

³⁷ I would argue we would need to examine how the public makes such a link between economic events and immigration. I conduct initial tests on this issue in Chapter 5. This area of research is ripe for further study.

this economic crisis results in a significant decline in immigration's importance from forty-four percent in March to twenty-two percent by December. Analyzing the Ipsos-MORI data further reveals a shift in the public's perceptions of the importance of two other issues: the economy and unemployment. These two issues rose in importance during this same period from 23 percent to 66 percent for the economy and 6 percent to 15 percent for unemployment. Clearly, the public shifted considerably in their perceptions of most important issues during this time. The 2008 crisis acted as a "focusing event"³⁸, suddenly drawing the nation's attention toward a very serious problem, though it was a problem that simultaneously distracted the media, politicians and the public away from the issue of immigration. Although this one critical event seems to have had an effect on opinions, which will be examined in detail below, these other events are not sufficient to explain variation in opinion preceding 2008.

Social events related to violence between immigrants and natives could also highlight the importance of the immigration issue for some individuals. For example, in June of 2000, there were a number of deaths of immigrants in Dover, England. Fifty-eight undocumented immigrants died as they were smuggled into the country in a truck. Such an event, with so many lives lost, may signal to the public that immigration is an important national issue. However, the graph shows a decline in perceptions of importance during this time. On the other hand, as race riots ensued in July of 2001, the terrorist attack of 9-11 occurred in the United States, and after a white English male named Ross Parker was murdered in Britain by several young people of Pakistani background in an unprovoked racially-motivated attack in September of that year making

³⁸ See Birkland (2005) p. 118 for more detail on focusing events.

newspaper headlines, the importance of immigration rose. However, these events involve race relations, and therefore, the increase in perceived importance may be capturing the importance of race relations more than that of immigration. Similarly, major violent events such as the London bombings in 2005 and the protests of budget cuts in 2011 were not directly related to immigration and therefore it may not be a surprise that these events are not associated with an increase in the perceived importance of the immigration issue. Again, acknowledging whether the media is discussing immigration as all of these events are occurring is important in understanding how the public prioritizes the issue of immigration.

There are also events reflecting political dynamics as well as immigration-related events that may influence opinion on immigration. It may be that as politicians propose policies or introduce anti-immigrant platforms, the public shifts toward perceiving immigration as an important political, national issue. The expectation would be that as politicians focus their political party platforms and policies on immigration issues, the public's perception of the importance of immigration would increase.

As Figure 4.3 highlights, a series of laws pertaining to immigration were introduced during this period; several political party movements against immigration also took place.³⁹ While some of these laws are associated with upticks in perceived importance, others are linked to a decreased saliency towards public views on immigration. The passing of legislation and government publications, such as White

³⁹ See Appendix A for more comprehensive graph including more events, including legislation.

Papers⁴⁰, are associated with both lower points of perceived importance (the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act in 2002, for example) as well as higher peaks (the British Overseas Territories Act 2002, for example). Moreover, political party activity on the extreme ends of the ideological spectrum is associated with varied outcomes in aggregate opinion. For example, when a new political party, Veritas, adopted an anti-immigrant platform, the perceived importance was at a high of 40 percent. Yet, when the anti-immigration British National Party (BNP) wins its first Parliament seat in May of 2008, perceived importance began to steadily decline from 42 percent in April to 37 percent in May and then 22 percent in December—yet, as acknowledged above, this is also concurrent with the financial crisis. While these events are telling, it still remains an open questions as to how these kinds of political leaders and parties, as well as other politicians' and parties' reactions to them, are influencing opinion, and if they are in fact doing so at all. The following section aims to do so.

⁴⁰ White Papers provide a report with information on an issue as well as any proposals on that issue.




Figure 4.3. Major Political Events in Britain 1998 – 2011

Although these distinct events are informative they cannot fully explain the changing perceptions of the public regarding the importance of immigration in Britain. Perhaps it is not the passing of the law that increases the perceived salience of immigration, for example, but the degree to which immigration is discussed by politicians or the media, in general. I therefore test whether this argument of agenda-setting by the media and politicians will influence the perceived importance of the immigration issue.

Agenda-Setting

My theory of messaging focuses on both agenda-setting and framing, two mechanisms by which political actors influence public opinion. In this chapter, I focus only on agenda-setting, as it is the mechanism used to explain the perceived importance

of issues (Baumgartner and Jones, 1995; Norris, 2006; Dunaway et al. 2010). Agenda-setting refers to the emphasis placed on certain issues, which results in the public's opinion that these issues are important (Baumgartner and Jones, 1995; Birkland 2001; Norris, 2006; Dunaway et al. 2010). As McCombs (2013) states: "For all the news media, the repetition of a topic day after day is the most powerful message of all about its importance" (2). In other words, when the public reads about "immigration" once in a newspaper, they may not think twice about it. However, if they are exposed to articles featuring "immigration" three times in one morning, then ten times the next morning, and twenty by the end of the week, they will likely afford more importance to the issue.

Agenda-setting is unlike framing in that it does not "alter voters' attitudinal predispositions *per se*" (Norris 2006, 202, emphasis original). Rather agenda-setting prioritizes certain issues over others in rhetoric and thus makes a similar change in the minds of constituents As Iyengar (2011) summarizes, scholars have identified two psychological mechanisms by which agenda-setting works. The first speaks to the political issues that come to mind when a person is asked about them. If the news is paying particular attention to the issue of crime, for example, then this issue will come to mind more easily for people when they are prompted to report what they think are the most important national issues. On the other hand, some people likely view the news, or politicians, as reliable sources for judging the importance of issues, and therefore people will take their cues from these political actors in determining what they think are the most important issues (See Iyengar 2011, pgs. 246-7 for review). Politicians may wish to use agenda-setting in order to shift the political debates toward issues they feel stronger on than their opponents (Norris 2006). The media, McCombs (2013) argues, also "sets the

public agenda” (2).⁴¹ That said, my theory does not speak to the intentions of the political actors in using rhetorical devices such as agenda-setting⁴², but rather focuses on the influence of the agenda-setting, regardless of its intention. As well, extant literature has not studied the agenda-setting power of politicians in influencing the importance of immigration, and therefore this study makes an important contribution to the studies of agenda-setting and public opinion on immigration.

Hypothesis

Specifically, H1 tests the role of agenda-setting by the media and politicians:

H: The emphasis on immigration issues by the media and politicians will increase the perceived importance of immigration.

Of course, it is important to consider other control variables. In particular, the number of foreign-born in the country may influence the perceptions of the importance of immigration (Hopkins 2011, Money 1999, Eger 2009) The increase of foreign-born populations may increase the number of voters exposed to these changes, and also increase perceptions of group threat and therefore stimulate concern about the issue of immigration and signal its importance. Further, insofar as immigrants are associated with taking native jobs, increasing unemployment levels may also in turn heighten perceptions of the issue of immigration (McLaren 2003; McLaren and Johnson 2007). Finally, I argue it is important to account for the relationship between the public and the state.

⁴¹ See previous chapters for discussion on debates in the literature regarding the media’s role in agenda-setting.

⁴² This is an important subject and one I explore in other work, in particular in explaining the implementation of immigration policy. For a review of these kinds of theories, see Birkland (2005, 108- 134) on elites and power, and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) and Sabatier (2007) for a review of advocacy coalition framework.

Dancygier (2011) identifies the growing political strength of immigrants as an explanatory factor of native violence against immigrants, and she finds that immigrant political alienation explains immigrants' violent acts toward the state. Although Dancygier is concerned with violent behavior and not the perceived importance of immigration, the attention to the relationship between constituents and their political leaders is critically important in understanding these intergroup relations—both socially and politically. A public that is satisfied with its government may trust that government to handle the immigration issue and its consequences, thereby reducing concern over the issue as well as its perceived importance. On the other hand, when there is low public satisfaction with the government, I expect more individuals to report immigration as an important issue. If the public is not satisfied in their government, then they are also likely to lack the necessary trust in the government's ability to handle the consequences of immigration. Therefore, I also control for the public's satisfaction with their government.

Data

I test H1 using time series analysis and an original dataset that is described below. As noted above, the dependent variable is measured with a survey question that conflates the perceived importance of immigration with race relations. I only test for the influence of agenda-setting on *immigration* by the media and politicians. I do not measure agenda-setting on race relations, nor do I conflate agenda-setting on this issue in the media or by politicians with agenda-setting on immigration. Therefore, I am biasing *against* the influence of my key independent variables on agenda-setting on immigration as the dependent variable captures both immigration and race relations. In other words,

the inclusion of race in the dependent variable biases against my own argument, since the salience of immigration is combined with the salience of race relations. Therefore, since I am not testing for agenda-setting on race, if my findings support my hypothesis, then I can be even more confident that my key variables are influencing perceived importance of immigration—in spite of the inclusion of perceived importance of race in these data.

In order to measure political actor messaging and influence, I collected monthly measures reflecting political actor discussion on immigration, including politicians' references to immigration, as well as any mentions by newspapers on this subject matter. These measures reflect agenda-setting by politicians and the media, which should increase the perceived importance of immigration. With respect to the media, the more mentions of immigration-related terms in a newspaper should heighten the saliency of immigration, thereby diverting the public's attention to this issue and its importance. For politicians, their discussion of potential or existing immigration-related laws on immigration in parliament can vary considerably. In one month, for example, they may collectively mention immigration one hundred and ten times (i.e. April 1998) in their political discourse, while the next month they may refer to it thirty-nine times (May 1998). Thus while it could be the same bill up for discussion, the extent to which it is discussed can fluctuate. The question then is whether that variation, and whether the attention paid to immigration in governmental discussions such as those in parliament, influences the public's opinions on immigration.

In order to gather data on politicians' rhetoric on immigration, I refer to parliamentary transcripts. Such transcripts are available online for the time period

analyzed.⁴³ I collect monthly data on references to “immigration”, “immigrants”, “asylum seekers” and “refugees”. These measures reflect that the emphasis Ministers of Parliament (MPs) place on immigration issues during this time period in parliamentary discourse, and effectively measure agenda-setting on the issue.

I develop a similar measure for the degree to which the media pays attention to the immigration. I draw from the online newspaper database, NewsBank, to create monthly measures of media references to immigration issues in British newspapers. The sample of newspapers includes eighteen national and regional papers. These represent some of the most widely read newspapers in Britain, ranging from tabloid papers to intellectual newspapers, with a range of partisan perspectives. Although data on regional newspapers is limited, I include them in the sample as they reflect non-national reporting on immigration. I build on the work of Dunaway et al. (2010) who use state newspapers in the United States, which is an important contribution to the literature on agenda-setting, as it has mainly focused only on national reporting. It may be that some people are more likely to read their regional paper than a national paper. Therefore, including the regional papers helps to account for agenda-setting for these individuals.⁴⁴

⁴³ For the period preceding 2005, see: <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/> and following 2005: <http://www.parliament.uk/search/advanced/>

⁴⁴ In order to be certain that simple counts for the newspapers is sufficient and appropriate, I also collect a disaggregated sample of media coverage, and use the Hopkins (2010) method of weighting each newspaper by their average number of references over the time period in question, and totaling the sum of all weighted monthly measures. I perform this data collection and analysis on a smaller sample of monthly periods, between January 1998 and December 2000. Repeating the analysis below on this smaller sample reveals that weighting the articles in this way produce consistent results with those presented in this paper. As a robustness check, I run all the analysis below with only national newspapers (and only English papers) and all results are consistent with the combination of national and regional reporting. Therefore, it seems

Ultimately, there are over 40,000 newspaper articles throughout the entire period, from fifteen national papers: *The Sunday Times*, *the Times*, *Daily Mirror*, *Sunday Mirror*, *The People*, *The Independent*, *the Independent on Sunday*, *the Sun*, *News of the World*, *the Express*, *the Express on Sunday*, *the Guardian*, *the Observer*, *Financial Times*, *Evening Standard*; five Scottish newspapers: *Daily Record*, *Herald*, *Sunday Herald*, *The Scotsman*, *Scotland on Sunday*, and three regional papers from two English regions (North West and West Midlands): *Lancashire County Publications*, *Cheshire*, *Greater Manchester* and *Merseyside Counties Publications*, as well as *Birmingham Mail*.

I gathered the remaining data from multiple sources. Monthly unemployment level data come from the Office of National Statistics.⁴⁵ Monthly data on the public's satisfaction with the government are taken from the same public opinion data source as the perceived importance of immigration variable, Ipsos-Mori.⁴⁶ These measures are merged with the agenda-setting measures into one dataset.

I use time series analysis examining monthly data on my two agenda-setting variables for the media and politicians, and aggregate changes in perceived importance of immigration. By doing so, I am able to establish the impact of political actors on changing opinions.

that although the reporting does vary somewhat between regional and national papers—regional papers focus more on their designated constituencies, for example—the content regarding agenda-setting on immigration is not so dissimilar to national reporting to lead to different outcomes regarding aggregate national opinion.

⁴⁵ Available at: <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/hub/index.html> For any data questions or access to data, please do not hesitate to contact the author.

⁴⁶ Unfortunately, data on foreign born is only available annually from the Office of National Statistics; there is no monthly data available to my knowledge.

Determinants of Perceived Importance of Immigration

In order to analyze factors influencing the perceived importance of immigration through time series analysis, it is first important to understand trends in the salience of immigration during this time period. Figure 4.4 presents this trend. As the figure shows, there is an increasing trend in the data, reflected by the red line showing the fitted values. Since 1998, the percentage of the British population reporting the importance of immigration as a national issue has increased. However, although a trend exists in the data, there also appears to be a shift in the pattern in 2008. One method to explore this change is to determine whether “structural breaks” or unexpected shift occurs in the data. Theoretically, this would mean that there was some sort of interruption in the patterned movement of the data over time. The data in Figure 4.4., for example, indicates a clear drop in 2008 that does not reestablish the preceding pattern of data. Operationally, this means that we must test for such a break in the data because if one exists, it will affect any subsequent analysis. Time series analysis assumes there is a pattern in the data that we can explain—however, if there is a significant and unique break in this pattern, then any analysis of the entire dataset will be problematic for it does not take into consideration this structural break in the data and a break in the overall pattern.

The analysis reveals a structural break in 2008, where there is a steep decline in the behavior of the time series that does not follow the preceding increasing trend (see Appendix A for all statistical analysis). This is the year the BNP won their first parliamentary seat, but, more importantly, it is also the year of the 2008 economic crisis that impacted countries across the globe. In April 2008, perceived importance of immigration was forty-four percent, and declining every month until hitting a low of

twenty-two percent in November and December. The shift in the data on perceived importance of immigration occurs as the crisis unfolded across the globe, and therefore, it is important to address not only the role of political actors in changing public opinion on immigration, but also major national or international events such as this economic crisis.




Figure 4.4. Testing for Trend in Perceived Importance in Britain 1998 - 2011

Aside from analysis of trends and structural breaks, it is also necessary to test for seasonality, to determine whether there are repeating patterns in the data. As the data is monthly, I test for monthly seasonality, finding that there is seasonality in May. The seasonality in May seems reasonable given the election cycles in Britain, which often holds elections in May of election years. It may be that election campaigning generates agenda-setting on immigration that then declines after the election. I will need to control for this seasonality in subsequent analysis.

Understanding these features of the dependent variable will assist in analyzing its relationship to the independent variables: media agenda-setting, politician agenda-setting, unemployment levels, levels of foreign-born, and public's satisfaction with government. Figure 4.5 below plots each of the independent variables (in red) with the dependent variable (in blue) (The operationalizations for these variables were discussed above on page 71-72). This figure reflects how each of the key independent variables changes over the designated period, and in relation to the dependent variable. From the figures below, it is possible to identify potential relationships between the variables. For example, satisfaction with government and unemployment rise and fall against the perceived importance of immigrations whereas levels of foreign-born rise and fall with this variable over time. The former relationship is intuitive. If people are satisfied with the government, they may be more likely to trust how they would handle immigration issues, and thus not perceive the issue to be important. On the other hand, when unemployment is declining, the public's perception of the importance of immigration is increasing. As stated above, subjects were asked to report the most important issue as well as any others that came to mind. Therefore, it makes sense that if unemployment is high, they may be more likely to report the economy or employment as important issues, but it is curious that they would not also mention immigration—since the literature suggests that unemployment should increase the group threat response. I would argue that unemployment operates in this way for two reasons: 1) unemployment reflects competition and not conflict, and therefore may not provoke any added concern over the immigration issue, 2) at the time that unemployment is high, media and politicians are likely discussing economic issues more than immigration-related topics—therefore

agenda-setting on economics not immigration. As we see from the Figure 4.5, the relationships between politicians and the media with perceived importance reflect a more complicated pattern, though the years preceding 2003 seem to show an extremely close relationship between newspaper reporting on immigration and perceived importance. Thus, the foundations for an argument for the influence of agenda-setting is reflected in the Figure.

One other issue to consider is whether references to a particular type of immigrant are driving perceived importance of immigration. In other words, does it matter if politicians mention immigrants, illegal immigrants versus asylum seekers or refugees? As an article in the British paper, the Guardian, tells us: “‘Refugee’ reminds us that they’re seeking refuge from persecution; today’s ‘asylum seeker’ focuses on the place to which they want to come.”⁴⁷ Figure 4.6 shows the variation in the relationship between these various immigrant categories made by politicians in Parliament and perceived importance for the time periods pre and post 2008, when the structural break occurs along with the economic crisis.

⁴⁷ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2002/jun/08/immigration.immigrationandpublicservices>




Figure 4.5. Perceived Importance of Immigration, by Independent Variables




Figure 4.6. Correlations Between Perceived Importance of Immigration & Types of References Made By Politicians Preceding (Left) and Following (Right) Break in 2008

As Figure 4.6 indicates, the correlations between agenda-setting terms and public opinion vary across terms and across the pre and post-2008 periods. There does seem to be a much weaker relationship between references to refugees and perceived importance of immigration, reflected in the R-squared values. Therefore, when these reference types are combined into one measure, it is possible that the influence of references to immigration or immigrants, specifically, is diluted by the references to refugees. The ratio of references to immigration versus refugees by politicians is approximately 5:2. The fewer number of references to refugees may also be influencing the results, but it is

still important to address these different relationships with opinion. Therefore, this must be taken into account in the analysis below by disaggregating these types of references.

These relationships also appear to change direction in the period following the structural break. Again, it raises the question about *when* agenda-setting may work and *how* it does so. The data further reveals a lack of a relationship between politicians' references, regardless of immigrant category, and perceived importance of immigration after 2008 until 2010, when a positive relationship returns. That said, there are so few data points in the time series in 2010 and 2011 (i.e. 24) it is difficult to draw any sort of systematic conclusions.⁴⁸

Turning to the media agenda-setting, I also examine whether references to different categories of immigrants in newspapers shift the correlations with opinions. Therefore, I employ a similar analysis for the media and present these figures are provided in the Appendix. The predicted positive relationship between newspaper references and perceived importance of immigration holds true for references to immigration, immigrants and asylum-seekers in the time period preceding the break. However, there seems to be a negative relationship when the focus is on refugees. This negative relationship, however, stems from an isolated period of three months (April, May and June 1999). Removing these three months reflects a strong positive relationship between articles mentioning refugees and perceived importance. This anomaly in the time series is most likely due to the sympathetic nature of reporting on the massive numbers of Eastern Europe's refugees during these months. Once this period is accounted for,

⁴⁸ As well, data on foreign-born populations is already limited and there is not currently data available for 2012.

newspaper references to all types of immigrants have a strong positive relationship with perceived importance—which vary considerably with the findings from political rhetoric on immigration. Nonetheless, I leave these outliers in the dataset so as not to bias my results.

Time Series Analysis

Carefully reflecting on the aggregate data over time begins to tell us about the relationships between these variables, but in order to determine if the independent variables are influencing perceived importance of immigration, it is necessary to take the analysis further using time series analysis. Understanding the trend, structural break and seasonality in the dependent variable is important, but to conduct time series analysis, it is also necessary to determine whether the data is stationary (the effect of the errors decays over time), non-stationary (errors have a large effect later on), or a random walk (errors have an equal effect over time). I test for stationarity using the DF-GLS test (Durbin’s alternative test for feasible generalized least squares); the results indicate the data is non-stationary, which means the data is unpredictable and thus cannot be modeled.⁴⁹ Analysis of non-stationary data may suggest relationships between variables that do not actually exist—the results are not consistent or reliable.

When I take the structural break into consideration, I find that the data preceding 2008 is stationary, but the data following the break in 2008 is non-stationary. Again, it is likely that the 2008 economic crisis played a role in this structural break—which I will discuss below. Although it is possible to take other measures to change non-stationary data to stationary data (see Bisgaard and Kulahci 2011), the data following the 2008

⁴⁹ All analysis is included in Appendix A

break is severely limited in size. There are insufficient data points (i.e. 36) to conduct reliable time series analysis. Therefore, I only conduct time series analysis on the time period preceding the break (pre-2008).

Although the data is determined to be stationary, it is still necessary to account for autocorrelation, where the time series is correlated to its past and future values. Simple OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) analysis will report biased estimates of standard errors if there is autocorrelation.⁵⁰ The graphs depicting autocorrelation functions⁵¹ find that the data follow an autoregressive process (AR). The AR process means that there should be enough memory in the process so that perceived importance of immigration today is statistically significantly correlated with perceived importance of immigration in the months prior. This is important as it speaks to the nature of aggregate public opinion, and its correlation with previous periods in time. The public's aggregate opinion in time t is in part responsible for the aggregate opinion in time $t+1$ and so forth. Thus, it is necessary to control for the influence of opinions on subsequent opinions in order to correctly determine whether other independent variables also have any effect

I use the Prais-Winsten (1954) method of FGLS (feasible generalized least squares) method to account for autocorrelation in the time-series data. This test uses “generalized differencing” by running a naïve regression model, taking the estimated residuals from that model, and regressing them on their lags.⁵² In other words, this process provides a correlation coefficient, and the Prais-Winsten test essentially uses lagged values of the dependent variable to predict its current values. This process is

⁵⁰ The statistical tests for autocorrelations are described in Appendix A

⁵¹ Available in Appendix A

⁵² With no intercept because the mean error should be zero.

necessary because of the autocorrelation above—we must address the influence of past public opinion on present public opinion. Again, due to data limitations, I only perform this analysis on the period preceding the break.⁵³ I estimate a model that lags the independent variables in order to show the impact of these variables on the perceived importance in the following month. I disaggregate the Parliamentary references because I find that unlike the media, the Parliamentary references to different words related to immigration (i.e. immigration, asylum seekers, refugees) have different relationships with the dependent variable, as demonstrated in the Figure above.⁵⁴

Table 4.1 provides the results from the analysis. In model 1, the independent variables are all lagged by one month. As predicted, the estimates from model 1 indicate that the prior levels of the foreign-born population increase the present perceptions of the importance of immigration, while prior values for satisfaction with the government

⁵³ There are several missing data points in the dataset. For example, there are only twelve missing observations for perceived importance of immigration, as well as thirteen observations missing for Hansard for months of August (Parliament's summer break). The perceived importance missing data points are random. First, I interpolate the data using multiple imputation to generate missing values, which is possible using Stata. This process uses existing data to generate values, but the imputation is done more than once, including a random component in the data in each iteration, preventing the underestimation of standard errors of regression coefficients. I find that the analysis for multiple imputation is the same as using the average of the generated values for missing values. Thus, I interpolate missing values from the average of the values derived from the multiple interpolation. For the Parliamentary values, I interpolate the data points by averaging the two closest observations because these missing data points are non-random. Some may argue that the absence of rhetoric in Parliament in August is important and by interpolating data for this period in time, I am biasing the outcome. I disagree, and contend that the lack of rhetoric in August is not the same as a lack of rhetoric at any other period. Therefore, creating a measure that averages the two nearest points reflects a record that at once captures the memory of the rhetoric in July with the gaining momentum of the rhetoric in September. Further, a review of newspaper articles in August reveals that politicians maintain a vocal presence even while not in Parliament.

⁵⁴ I also ran tests with the media disaggregated and found no differences in results.

decrease the perceptions of importance. The media's agenda-setting in the previous month, as well, has a positively significant relationship with the perceived importance of immigration in the present month. Politicians' references to immigration in the previous month reflect no statistically significant relationship to perceived importance in this model.

The theory advanced in this chapter suggests that political actors are aware of and acknowledge structural and contextual events. Therefore, I run additional models of analysis that reflect this temporal process. The theory suggests that changes within society occur, e.g. demographic changes, economic changes, etc., and then political actors are able to act in response to contextual and structural changes, addressing or ignoring these changes through their rhetoric. Subsequently, these decisions regarding their rhetoric will change the trajectory of public opinion on that issue. After considering the theory depicted in the Figure 3.1 in Chapter 4, I chose a model that would reflect the order of influence between contextual factors, media and politician agenda-setting and perceived importance of immigration. Therefore, I model this temporal relationship in Models 2 and 3. Rather than taking all independent variable at time $t-1$ (i.e. one month prior to the opinions), the control variables lag by two months at $t-2$, and the key agenda-setting variables at $t-1$. Again, the logic behind this alternative estimation procedure is that structural events occur, such as changing unemployment levels or foreign-born populations ($t-2$). It may be then, that the media and politicians observe these changes and the public's perception of the government, and then make decisions on how and when to refer to issues of immigration ($t-1$). Therefore, if surrounding context and satisfaction with the government changes in January, politicians and the media will have

their opportunity to react through rhetoric by February and by March these influences should have taken hold, effecting the perceived importance of immigration. I ran robustness checks ensure that number of months by which the variables were lagged in Models 2 and 3 were appropriate—these checks are described below. Further, model 3 includes a control for seasonality, accounting for whether the month of May—the election month—is influencing perceptions of the importance of immigration.

In models 2 and 3, the agenda-setting variables reveal an interesting picture. The coefficient capturing newspaper references is positively signed and reaches statistical significance at conventional levels; this strengthens the argument for the media’s role in agenda-setting. References to immigration or immigrants by politicians have a positively significant relationship with aggregate opinion whereas references to refugees have a negatively significant relationship.

Importantly, these findings suggest that politician agenda-setting may depend on the specific immigrant group mentioned by politicians. As discussed earlier, references to refugees may encourage sympathetic responses to the issue of immigration, downplaying their negative impact on the country and refocusing attention toward the need to assist those in need.

This type of agenda-setting then may work against the traditional theory that increases in references to an issue produce a rise in perceptions of its importance—unless, of course, we consider immigration and refugees to be two separate issues, which is most certainly plausible. On the other hand, perhaps the term “refugees” operates more as a frame rather than as an agenda-setting mechanism. Although not traditionally used to explain perceived importance of issues, it is possible that frames may indeed influence

such opinions as well as agenda-setting. As shown in the model above, greater attention to the issue of refugees reduces perceived importance of the issue of immigration but only when such statements come from politicians. This theory does not hold when considering the media—increases in all types of references result in perceptions of importance. Therefore, just as it is important to consider *when* agenda-setting might work, it may be equally important to consider how its effects may vary according to its source, and whether frames—not only agenda-setting—influence perceptions of issue importance.

The findings further suggest that politicians have a much more complicated relationship with the public. On the one hand, the times series estimates suggest that the media has a consistent, statistically significant influence on perceived importance of immigration. Despite the differences in the effect of the source of agenda-setting, these models show evidence for non-structural influences on aggregate public opinion on immigration. There is strong evidence to suggest that the media and politicians indeed influence the perceived importance on immigration over time through discussion on the issue in the public domain.

In the estimates from models 2 and 3, a positive and statistically significant relationship once again exists between foreign-born populations and immigration opinion, while the relationship between satisfaction with government and opinion is statistically significant and signed in a negative direction. Thus, the results confirm the notion that if the public is satisfied with their government, they are less likely to consider immigration to be an important issue, but increasing levels of immigration are likely to inspire concern and therefore perceived importance of the immigration issue.

Unemployment levels continue to exert no influence on aggregate opinions towards immigration, though this is consistent with the explanation provided above.

Table 4.1. Estimates on Influences on Perceived Importance of Immigration

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Perceived Importance of Immigration		
<i>Lagged (T-1)</i>			
MP References to Immigration	0.011	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
MP References to Asylum Seekers	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
MP References to Refugees	-0.02	-0.02*	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.011)
News References to Immigration, Refugee or Asylum	0.01**	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployment	-3.25		
	(1.64)		
Satisfaction with Gov't	-0.23*		
	(0.10)		
Foreign Born	6.93***		
	(0.84)		
<i>Lagged (T-2)</i>			
Unemployment		-2.54	-2.54
		(1.54)	(1.54)
Satisfaction with Gov't		-0.26**	-0.26**
		(0.09)	(0.09)
Foreign Born		6.73***	6.70***
		(0.82)	(0.82)
<i>Seasonality</i>			
May of each year			1.01
			(1.66)
Constant	-16.76	-18.54	-18.16
	(13.36)	(12.85)	(12.87)
Observations	108	107	107
R-squared	0.78309	0.80640	0.80867
Adj. R-squared	0.76790	0.79271	0.79305

Prais-Winsten (1954) method of FGLS; Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Robustness checks

For models 2 and 3, I ran robustness checks to test whether the agenda-setting and control variables produced similar results depending on the number of months lagged. Interestingly, when the agenda-setting variables are lagged by more than one month, they lose any effect on the dependent variable. These checks reinforce the idea that politicians and the media can consistently influence the public, but their influence may be short-lived compared to other factors. I also ran tests altering the number of months the control variables were lagged, finding that satisfaction with the government is robust up to five months, whereas values of the foreign-born population are robust up to 36 months. The latter findings regarding the foreign-born may also be a product of the lack of monthly data on the foreign-born population, and therefore when such data is available, it would be prudent to revisit the influence of this variable.⁵⁵

Further, as stated above, I disaggregated news coverage in robustness checks in order to ensure that the differences in references to certain terms (i.e. immigration, refugee, asylum-seeker) did not produce different effects on the dependent variable as

⁵⁵ Some studies also suggest including the independent variables at time t with all relevant lags. I also ran a model including all independent variables and their lags up to three months back. This model reveals a slightly different story, but one that is consistent with the findings here. In this model, both the media and politicians are influential in their agenda-setting, but only in the time period, t , and once again politician references to asylum have no effect while the other two kinds of references remain consistent in their influence. Therefore, their influence is immediate and then weakens in subsequent months. Interestingly, only satisfaction has any immediate effect on perceived importance of immigration, reducing its likelihood, and foreign-born population numbers in the month prior, $t-1$, influences these opinions, but in no other period. This model reflects the sensitivity of the time series model. Importantly, however, although the story reflected in this model changes in terms of when the politicians and the media are most influential by one month, it is consistent with the argument that they *are* influential and that influence is short-lived.

they do for politicians. I found that this media effect does not vary in its influence depending on the reference to immigration/immigrants, asylum or refugees. Therefore, it is interesting to note that the varying messages provided by the media do not have the same effects as those provided by politicians. These results are discussed below.

Another important consideration in this analysis centers on the possibility of reverse causality in the analysis (Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) provide a useful perspective on this possibility. They argue that politicians do pay attention to public opinion, but mainly in order to understand how they may best influence it toward their desired goal. This perspective is not purely a cynical one, but also one based in the tenets of democracy, where the public selects representatives whose ability to make decisions is superior to the public at large. Thus, politicians are at once responsive to public opinion as well as interested in influencing it. The media, as well, is likely influencing public opinion. The media selects events and issues to cover in their reporting, and it is through this coverage that the public learns about the most salient issues in society (McCombs 2013, 135). Theoretically, then, it does not stand to reason that politicians and the media would simply speak about or report on immigration when the public deems it an important issue.

To account for this possibility, I estimate models that tested the reverse influence of public opinion on media references and politician references. In other words, I tested public opinion as the independent variable in a series of models in which the media and politician messaging were the dependent variables. These robustness checks reveal no statistically significant influence on politician or media references to immigration issues. Further, I found that the control variables did not have any effect on politician or media

references. However, when politician references are considered in their disaggregated states—that is references to immigration/immigrants, to asylum, and to refugees—the size of the foreign-born population, unemployment rates and newspaper references to immigration are all positively and significantly related to politicians' references to refugees. Therefore, politicians may be strategizing the use of references to refugees, taking their cues from the media and the national context. In other words, politicians may be paying attention to contextual events and the media reporting on immigration (as we know from the archival research they did so in the past) and using references to refugees to moderate the concern over the immigration issue. I include this table in Appendix A. The implications of these relationships are described below.

Discussion

These findings demonstrate the power of political actors to influence opinion on immigration through agenda-setting, and thus provide empirical support for my theory. Contextual and structural explanatory factors are not irrelevant. In fact, these factors are certainly influential in the evolution of public opinion on immigration, as well as other important events. However, political actors influence the trajectory of that evolution—when they speak about a certain issue, the public hears them. This is not to suggest that political actors are the puppet-masters of public opinion, rather they are much more appropriately likened to circus ringleaders—directing the public's attention from one spectacle to another. In fact, political actors do pay a great deal of attention to public opinion, and are constrained by it, as discussed in the preceding chapter. Yet, to be constrained by public opinion is not equivalent to being fully responsive to it. Politicians and the media are able to assess structural and contextual events, acknowledging the state

of public opinion on a given issue, and proceed in their rhetoric in such a way that serves their interests through such mechanisms as agenda-setting. As discussed above, politicians may be strategic not only in setting the agenda, but also *un*-setting it, by speaking about refugee-related topics.

These findings also provide reason to consider more critically *how* agenda-setting works (i.e. what terms specifically are used and to what effect) and how may it vary in its influence dependent its *source* (i.e. whether the agenda-setting is produced by the media or politicians) as well as *when* agenda-setting will work (i.e. it may be effective some periods of time but not in others). The results highlight the importance of carefully specifying measurements of agenda-setting. For example, the analysis indicates that the term, “refugee(s)”, produces an equivalent outcome to the use of “immigrant or immigration” when used by the media, but not when used by politicians. The findings regarding the term “refugee” also highlight the possibility of what may be considered “agenda-thwarting”, in other words, using messaging to decrease rather than increase perceptions of an issue’s importance. After all, politicians will want to direct attention to certain issues they feel most confident about in order to secure office or promote legislation, but they may equally wish to deflect attention to other issues they feel less secure about—hence the need to *un*-set the agenda. Certain key words, such as “refugees”, may assist politicians in their overall goal to control the agenda—whether that means putting issues onto it, or taking them off of it.

It is also possible that this term operates more as a frame as opposed to a mechanism of agenda-setting. The term “refugee” may highlight a certain dimension of immigration about which the public is more sympathetic. If “refugees” is operating as a

frame in this context, then it requires discussion on how frames may influence perceived importance. It is not customary to use frames to explain the perceived importance of an issue—agenda-setting is the customary explanatory mechanism for these opinions—and such an effect is ripe for further research. I will address these kinds of questions in the subsequent chapters. In addition, the timing of agenda-setting appears to matter. The economic crisis appears to have created a schism between political actor rhetoric and public opinion, although more data is necessary to establish the extent of this shift.

Finally, when analyzing the relationship between political actors and public opinion, it is critical to establish and identify variation in the influence of political actors. For example, political strategy regarding rhetoric on immigration may be more complicated than we think, and certainly more complicated than the media's relationship with public opinion. While politicians do discuss immigration issues at certain points in time, when a related policy is under debate for example, they may also choose to focus on specific aspects of that issue in their agenda-setting, e.g. immigration to increase perceived importance or refugees, to mollify the impact of agenda-setting. The media, on the other hand, maintains a very consistent and more simplistic relationship with public opinion towards immigration, where agenda-setting on immigration—no matter who they refer to—results in increased perceived importance on the issue.

The following chapter delves deeper into this relationship between the media and public opinion on immigration by examining differences across newspapers in influencing a variety of opinions on immigration, analyzing both agenda-setting and framing. The analysis confirms the media's influence on these opinions, and explains

how varying types of media coverage will influence opinion in different ways at the individual level.

Chapter 6

Variation in Media Messaging & Public Opinion on Immigration

Introduction

The previous chapter established a media effect, specifically newspaper reporting, on the perceived importance of immigration, whereby media agenda-setting on the issue of immigration increased its perceived importance. I extend this analysis by examining the impact of variation *within* media messaging regarding immigration, asking whether exposure to particular *kinds* of media reporting influences public opinion in different ways. The analysis disaggregates the “media” and questions whether exposure to certain media sources, such as different newspapers with varying types of rhetoric, impacts the extent of media effects on public opinion on immigration. I analyze media agenda-setting and framing and test whether there is variation in the use of these mechanisms across newspapers in Britain and whether this variation influences opinion in different ways.

The following chapter examines this question by analyzing newspaper reporting and readership in Britain. Each section explores the effect of exposure to newspaper sources and one of two dependent variables: perceived importance of immigration and feelings about immigration. Further, I examine the appropriate measure to examine any relationship between these variables. In particular, I create three measures of agenda-setting: 1) the emphasis on immigration-related articles relative to *all* other articles in that paper; 2) the emphasis on immigration-related articles in a newspaper relative to articles in that paper mentioning other critical issues; 3) the emphasis on immigration in each article mentioning immigration within a paper. I also develop a new measure for

framing effects, delving beyond a positive and negative dimension and considering other types of frames that may influence feelings on immigration.

In conclusion, I discuss the importance of examining rhetoric in the real world and its influence on public opinion, before returning to experimental laboratory settings. Testing the influence of positive and negative frames, for example, is useful, but there may be other important frames used in existing media sources that would be equally useful to test in these controlled settings. Therefore, this chapter provides such an analysis of these other kinds of frames, their influence on opinion, and their potential as treatment effects in an experiment that is discussed in a subsequent chapter. Moreover, although the research is conducted in Britain alone, future research will examine the variation in media effects in a comparative context, testing whether the findings in this chapter are generalizable to other contexts.

The Media & Public Opinion

The media is indeed a well-researched influence on opinions on immigration and other issues in general. Yet, we have only begun to scratch the surface on the various ways in which different kinds of media influence opinions (Iyengar 2011). Newspapers, for example, provide a rich assortment of messaging on the issue of immigration on a daily basis. Further, there is widespread variation in newspapers, including partisan leanings or publication type (i.e. broadsheets or tabloids). Therefore, I argue for the need to explore variation in the content of these sources in order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the variation in messaging on immigration.

Norris (2006) provides a foundation on which to pursue such a study. In her study of media influence on changes in public opinion and behavior within Britain during the

2005 General Election, she examines the impact of what she terms: media channels (both newspapers and political election broadcasts), and new technology channels (such as the internet). She finds evidence for the importance of such media outlets, though she finds that they vary in their importance depending on the outcome of interest. In particular, she finds that reading of newspapers was *not* influential on opinions regarding the parties' handling of asylum, looking at whether respondents read papers endorsing either Conservative or Labour parties. Partisan endorsements are certainly a useful way to establish variation within newspapers. However, this categorization does not tell us much about the rhetorical mechanisms used in the papers (e.g. agenda-setting and framing). Further, there may be other, more useful, categorizations for these newspapers that can help to explain influence on a variety of opinions.

Case Selection and Data

As discussed in Chapter 1, the history of the newspaper in Britain is an important one. The importance and diversity of newspapers in Britain provides an opportunity to examine more closely the variation of messaging on immigration in the media as well as the impact of that variation on public opinion. Print journalism, such as newspapers, still maintain wide readership in that country, despite declining sales and the introduction of alternative media sources (Wring and Deacon, 2010, 437). Moreover, these papers vary in several ways, making it possible to examine the importance of variation in the kind of newspaper and influence on public opinion. The British national papers vary according to partisan endorsements, type of reporting—"quality", "mid-market" or "populars"—for example. Table 5.1 below provides two different ways to categorize nine of the most read national newspapers in Britain.

These two categorizations—partisan endorsements and newspaper type—are important for they highlight different dimensions of the paper. In previous research, scholars have focused on the partisan endorsements of newspapers to try and determine whether the partisanship of the paper informs how and why readership of that paper would inform public opinion (See Norris 2006). However, it may not be that partisan endorsement is the, or the only, factor that would help us understand how readership of newspapers informs opinions. Rather, as I am interested in the kinds of messages in these papers, and thus, the actual words and writing within them—I am also interested in their newspaper *type*, i.e. whether they are considered quality, mid-market or popular papers. The first column in Table 5.1 includes the name of the paper, while the subsequent columns include the partisan endorsement by the paper, strength of that endorsement and the type of publication, all designations provided by Wring and Deacon (2010). As we see from these columns, there is not only variation across newspapers on different dimensions, but there is also variation within newspapers over time. The first step is to determine whether there is also variation in the rhetoric used in each paper, whether this rhetoric varies according to any of these categories above, and finally whether the variation between and within these sources of newspaper reporting on immigration influences public opinion on the issue. I will discuss these measures in greater detail in the following sections.

Table 5.1. Partisanship Endorsement, Strength of Endorsement & Ideology

	2005			2010		
	Partisan	Strength	Type	Partisan	Strength	Type
Daily Telegraph	Cons	Strong	Quality	Cons	Mod	Quality
Daily Mail	Cons	Strong	Mid-market	Cons	Strong	Mid-market
Express	Cons	Strong	Mid-market	Cons	Very Strong	Mid-market
Sun	Labour	Weak	Popular	Cons	Strong	Popular
Times	Labour	Weak	Quality	Cons	Weak	Quality
Daily Mirror	Labour	Strong	Popular	Labour	Strong	Popular
Guardian	Labour	Weak	Quality	LibDem	Mod	Quality
FT	Labour	Very Weak	Quality	Cons	Very Weak	Quality
Independent	Lib Dem	Mod	Quality	Lib Dem	Mod	Quality

Source: Wring DJ, Deacon DN, (2010) “Patterns of Press Partisanship in the 2010 General Election” *British Politics* 5((4)):436-454

Perceived Importance

The previous chapter provided strong evidence for the influential effect of media agenda-setting on perceived importance of immigration when the opinions were considered in the aggregate. This chapter questions whether the same relationship remains strong at the individual level. If an individual reads a certain newspaper that reports frequently on immigration, will that individual be more likely to perceive immigration to be important than someone reading a paper that seldom covers immigration? The argument presented in this chapter suggests that this is in fact the case, and therefore, the news—and the agenda-setting—to which individuals are exposed will influence their opinions on the importance of immigration as a nationally important issue. This section tests the following hypothesis:

H1: Readers of newspapers that have higher levels of agenda-setting, i.e. emphasis on immigration, will be more likely to report immigration as an important issue compared to readers of newspapers with lower levels or no agenda-setting.

The remaining question, then, is to determine how best to measure agenda-setting to test this hypothesis. In order to operationalize agenda-setting, we must be able to measure the emphasis placed on a certain issue. The question then becomes: how do we measure emphasis? Some measures of emphasis (i.e. agenda-setting) weight different sources according to the number of articles they each report on immigration, thus creating a single index for emphasis on immigration from multiple sources, as done in the previous chapter. This method is useful if we want to examine a single all-encompassing measure of agenda-setting derived from a number of sources (see Hopkins 2010 for another example). Additionally, taking an average number of articles across a sample of newspapers at various periods of time is also useful if one wants to identify a single signal (See Dunaway et al. 2010). However, for the purposes of this analysis, it is crucial to identify the strength of different newspaper sources separately, allowing for comparisons across all newspapers at a single point in time. This chapter examines variations on three measures of agenda-setting below, comparing *across* newspapers to determine the most appropriate method.

Measuring & Testing Agenda-setting

In order to test H1, we need to know which paper an individual is reading, and we need to know what agenda-setting on immigration looks like in that paper compared to other papers. To test the influence of media effects on public opinion, I use the British Election Study (BES) Internet Panel Survey from 2005 – 2010. The surveys ask

respondents whether they read a specific paper daily or often, and therefore provide a useful and unique opportunity to link potential messages from a newspaper to an individual rather than assuming such a link. There are nine national newspapers for which this data exists, and they are the same as in Table 5.1 above. This survey also allows me to test public opinion at different points in time, as well as changes over time between campaign survey periods in 2005 and 2010.⁵⁶ Several scholars have attested to the representativeness of these surveys and argue that they are “statistically indistinguishable” from in-person surveys (Sanders et al. 2010)⁵⁷ and the results derived from these surveys are reliable.

The next step is to create measures for agenda-setting for each paper. If we imagine an individual in the sample, we know that she is reading either none or at least one of nine newspapers. What we want to know is whether the newspaper she chooses to read emphasizes the issue of immigration to such an extent that she would thus perceive this issue to be the most important. In this way, newspapers act like filters—each one providing a different kind of signal regarding immigration issues. Thus, we need to calculate the proportion of coverage (i.e. emphasis) on immigration within that paper to measure the strength of the agenda-setting on immigration. There are several different

⁵⁶ I also ran the models on the 2010 face to face panel survey. This survey does not allow for change over time between 2005 and 2010, but does include an ideology variable, which the 2005 – 2010 panel Internet study does not, and allows for change between the pre campaign period and the post campaign period. The survey is of a representative sample of the electorate in Britain. The pre- and post-campaign data were gathered by in-person interviews. In particular, I was curious about whether the ideology variable was significant as a control, and found that it was not. Therefore, I feel confident that the use of the 2005 – 2010 Internet survey is the best case scenario, even though it lacks the ideology variable.

⁵⁷ The data are weighted based on respondent’s age, gender, social class, region and past vote in the 2001 General Election.

ways to do this, depending on how we understand emphasis (or agenda-setting), and how we determine its “strength”. In measuring emphasis, what qualifies as stronger emphasis—stronger relative to what? There may be more emphasis on immigration relative to all other coverage in the newspaper, relative to other potentially important issues reported on in the paper, or relative to other issues discussed within the articles that refer to immigration. I provide a measure of each of these possibilities and explain these differences below in detail.

The first measure I create is the proportion of articles on immigration for one period relative to all articles published during that time (See Iyengar et al. 1993 for a similar method). To create this measure, I establish the total number of articles published during the 60-day periods preceding the BES campaign survey in 2005 and 2010. Using Lexis Nexis, I searched the nine national newspapers read by individuals in the BES for any articles reporting on immigration issues. In order to retrieve these articles, I used search terms. I began with search terms used in other work, such as the word “immigration” (see Hopkins 2010). However, this one term does not return all relevant newspaper articles. Therefore, I broaden the scope of retrieval words, using other words that speak to the immigration issue in Britain: immigrant, refugee, and asylum. Britain’s strong history of accepting refugees and asylum-seekers is an integral component of the immigration debate in the country, and the previous chapter showed a strong relationship between media use of these terms and increased perceptions of importance of immigration. Diversifying the retrieval terms in these ways will not draw the entire universe of articles on immigration, but they certainly make such a sample more representative of the actual discussions that pertain to this issue.

I performed this search for the time periods preceding the survey periods in 2005 and 2010. These dates for the newspaper sampling precede the dates of the survey in order to measure the kind of agenda-setting at work *before* the survey was taken. Table 5.2 shows the ordering of the samples.

Table 5.2. Dates of Data Analysis

Measuring Rhetorical Mechanisms	BES Campaign Survey
60 days Prior to Survey	
February 1 – April 5, 2005	April 6, 2005 – May 6, 2005
February 1, 2010 – April 6, 2010	April 7, 2010 – May 5, 2010

This selection of articles referring to immigration issues covers a two-month period (February through March) preceding the campaign surveys that began in April of 2005 and 2010. All together this amounted to 1,934 articles for all newspapers across both time periods.

Using the number of articles referring to immigration during those same time periods, I then calculate the proportions of these over each newspaper's total number of publications for that period. This measure indicates the extent of emphasis on immigration articles relative to all other articles in the newspaper. Table 5.3 shows these proportions. Based on the agenda-setting literature, we would hypothesize that newspapers with higher values, and therefore more agenda-setting on immigration as measured in this way, would influence their readers to perceive immigration to be an important national issue. There is variation in agenda-setting in these papers between 2005 and 2010. The tests below will show whether such variation in agenda-setting matters in influencing their readers of the importance of immigration.

Table 5.3. Proportion of articles on Immigration relative to all other articles

Newspaper	Prior to Campaign Survey 2005		Prior to Campaign Survey 2010
Independent	0.014	Independent	0.007
Guardian	0.013	Daily Mail	0.007
Express	0.010	Guardian	0.006
Times	0.009	Times	0.006
Daily Mail	0.009	Express	0.004
Financial Times	0.009	Telegraph	0.004
Telegraph	0.007	Financial Times	0.004
Sun	0.004	Sun	0.003
Mirror	0.003	Mirror	0.002

The table above shows emphasis on immigration related to *all* other reporting in each paper. In other words, these numbers show the proportion of articles dedicated to immigration issues within the entire set of newspaper articles during this time period. In this measure, agenda-setting means the emphasis on immigration relative to all other reporting in each newspaper.

Using this measure of agenda-setting, we find that in 2010, there is less agenda-setting on immigration than in 2005. Further, the two popular papers, the Sun and the Mirror, consistently reflect less agenda-setting on immigration than the other papers. It will be interesting to see whether these patterns are consistent using the other measures of agenda-setting. The second measure, which I describe below, is a more refined measure of agenda-setting.

Agenda-setting means that attention to a certain issue will suggest its importance to individuals. Importance of one issue, then, is perceived to be important relative to

other issues. Thus, I also conduct a second series of measures on agenda-setting, comparing proportional emphasis to immigration relative to other “important issues” reported on in these newspapers. I refer to the BES to identify other most important issues reported by respondents during the campaigns in 2005 and 2010. In 2005, these include: relations with the EU (2.27%), law and order-crime (13.71%), education (3.81%), environment (2.27%), NHS (13.31%), taxation (4.05%), economy (8.6%), Iraq war (1.98%), terrorism (2.95%), and pensions (3.92%). In 2010, these include: NHS (1.21%), education (.71%), spending/social services (.71%), unemployment (2.53%), the economy (41.33%), crime (3.2%), the euro/Europe (1.53%), the environment (1.65%) and terrorism (.73%). In 2005, 21.74% of the respondents reported immigration or asylum to be the most important issue in 2005 and 18.96% in 2010. Therefore, I calculate the number of articles referring to each of these “important issues”.⁵⁸ By creating a universe of articles addressing issues identified by the public as important, we can calculate the proportion of this universe in each newspaper that refers to immigration issues—creating a measure we can compare across the various newspapers. Table 5.4 below shows the proportional values.

⁵⁸ For all search terms used to retrieve these articles, see Appendix.

Table 5.4. Proportion of Articles on Immigration Relative to Articles on “Important Issues”

Newspaper	Prior to Campaign Survey 2005		Prior to Campaign Survey 2010
Express	0.145	Express	0.085
Sun	0.123	Sun	0.066
Daily Mail	0.112	Daily Mail	0.066
Independent	0.098	Independent	0.048
Guardian	0.080	Guardian	0.043
Mirror	0.077	Mirror	0.043
Times	0.076	Telegraph	0.043
Telegraph	0.071	Times	0.041
Financial Times	0.052	Financial Times	0.019

Table 5.4 reflects different results for agenda-setting for each of these newspapers than the previous measure. For example, the two popular papers, the Sun and the Mirror show much higher levels of agenda-setting in Table 5.4. On the other hand, there is consistency between Tables 5.3 and 5.4 insofar as there is a decline in agenda-setting on immigration in newspapers between 2005 and 2010.

Measuring emphasis within the articles themselves may also help us to learn more about their potential agenda-setting influence. It may be that analyzing references to immigration relative to all coverage or a subset of coverage is not sufficient for identifying an extent of emphasis and operationalizing agenda-setting. Rather, it may be necessary to measure the extent of emphasis on immigration *within* articles referring to the issue, not only within the newspaper at large. For example, in the measures above, articles that mention immigration issues once are given the same weight as articles that mention it more than once.

A third measure of agenda-setting can be achieved by establishing the extent of coverage on immigration when immigration is mentioned. In order to test this kind of agenda-setting, I use a software program called Yoshikoder, specifically design for computerized content analysis (CCA) (Lowe 2011), to calculate the proportions of references to the terms on immigration issues mentioned above. Once the newspaper articles were downloaded, I inputted them into Yoshikoder. The program applies a dictionary of terms to the selected documents, allowing for various types of analysis. In this case, it is possible to determine the extent, or the proportion, of reporting on immigration when immigration is mentioned at all. Articles may refer to immigration in passing but not spend time reporting on the issue, and therefore, these calculations help to measure the extent of emphasis (i.e. agenda-setting) on the issue within this subset of articles. Table 5.5 shows the proportions in years 2005 and 2010. These proportions may seem low, but as Lowe (2006) reminds us: “about 50% of all tokens in English text are contentless grammatical function words.”⁵⁹

Table 5.5. Proportion of References to Immigration *Within* Articles Mentioning Immigration

Newspaper	Prior to Campaign Survey 2005		Prior to Campaign Survey 2010
Express	0.015	Express	0.013
Sun	0.015	Sun	0.011
Mirror	0.013	Daily Mail	0.009
Daily Mail	0.010	Mirror	0.009
Times	0.009	Independent	0.007
FT	0.009	Telegraph	0.007
Independent	0.008	Guardian	0.006
Guardian	0.007	FT	0.005
Telegraph	0.007	Times	0.005

⁵⁹ <http://www.yoshikoder.org/courses/apsa2006/apsa-yk.pdf>

Interestingly, the measures in Table 5.5 are consistent with those in Tables 5.3 and 5.4: agenda-setting appears to have declined in all newspapers between 2005 and 2010. This, is an important finding, for it shows how agenda-setting varies over time and between sources. Further, Table 5.5 is more consistent with Table 5.4 regarding the popular papers—these papers appear to use more agenda-setting on immigration using the two latter measures. These three measures provide unique ways of operationalizing agenda-setting, and it will be important to test their influence on the dependent variables measuring perceived importance to determine whether identifying the influence of agenda-setting may be sensitive to how we measure it.

Analysis

I analyze the effects of agenda-setting on the perceived importance of the immigration issue in 2005 and 2010 using logistic regression analysis. The key independent variables reflect exposure to certain types of agenda-setting. These variables are achieved by matching the agenda-setting values above with readership of the nine newspapers in Britain mentioned earlier, thereby using a respondents' choice of newspaper to link agenda-setting to the individual. The dependent variable is a dummy variable measuring whether the individual identified immigration as an important national issue.

I also control for individual level variables (age, marital status, education, income, religion, ethnicity, race, gender, party identification), perceptions of the state (whether the government treats the respondent fairly and whether they think national economy has gotten worse), and contextual variables including the percentage of minority and migrant

populations in one's community. As Citrin and Sides (2006) find, individual level characteristics are useful in explaining attitudes on immigration. Higher education levels, for example, are often correlated with more inclusive perspectives on the immigration issue. Perceptions of the state, however, requires further explanation. The theories of group threat and prejudice, described in previous chapters at length, stem from an assumption of an in-group out-group distinction and threats to an in-group of some kind. Quillian (1995), for example, finds that perceptions of economic threat can lead to more prejudice toward out-groups. Therefore, I contend that a respondent's feelings about the state of the economy will influence their opinions on immigration issues and immigrants. Moreover, Dancygier (2011) extends the threat theories to include a political threat, where an in-group is threatened by the growing political strength of an out-group. Thus, whether a respondent believes the government treats him/her fairly should also influence attitudes toward immigration—mediating the extent of any perceived political threat. Finally, scholars have found ambiguous results regarding the importance of contextual factors, such as the size, or change in size, of immigrant populations, and therefore I include these measures as controls (Money 1999, Hopkins 2010, McLaren 2003, 2007). These specifications are all explained in detail in Appendix B.

The tables below only show the results from the models. I exclude control variables that are not significant in order to conserve space, but the full tables are in Appendix B. Models 1 and 2 show the results for the first measure of agenda-setting (“Measure 1”)—the proportion of immigration articles relative to *all* other articles in 2005 and 2010, respectively. Models 3 and 4 apply the second measure (“Measure 2”)—the proportion of immigration articles relative to articles on “important issues” and

models 5 and 6 rely on the final measure (“Measure 3”)—the proportion of immigration-related references relative to all other references in immigration-specific articles.

In the Table, the key independent variables measuring agenda-setting vary in their influence on opinion. The Measure 2 and Measure 3 are significantly related to the dependent variables in both years whereas the Measure 1 is not in either year. It seems that we have established there are at least two useful measures of agenda-setting at the individual level. Measure 1, which was useful in explaining aggregate public opinion in the previous chapter, was not as useful in explaining opinion at the individual level. Further, all of these measures are lagged, measured sixty days prior to the survey date when the respondents were asked about the issue they consider most important. Thus, we can be more confident that these measures are in fact influencing opinion and not simply responding to it.

The results from the table reveal several effects of the demographic variables on the dependent variable, perceived importance of immigration. In 2005, older people are all less likely to report immigration to be the most important problem, those with higher incomes and Asians are less likely in 2010, and the more educated are always less likely to consider immigration to be important. Married people are more likely to report immigration as the most important problem in all models aside from 4 and 6.

Table 5.6. Agenda-setting and Perceived Importance

Perceived Importance of Immigration						
	(1) 2005	(2) 2010	(3) 2005	(4) 2010	(5) 2005	(6) 2010
<i>Agenda-setting</i>	Measure 1		Measure 2		Measure 3	
	1.67 (1.66)	2.62 (2.77)	0.85*** (0.17)	0.98** (0.31)	6.88*** (1.38)	6.61*** (1.94)
<i>Controls</i>						
Married	0.06*** (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)
Education	-0.09*** (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.01)
Income	-0.01 (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.003)	-0.01 (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.003)	-0.01 (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.003)
Asian	0.06 (0.07)	-0.09* (0.03)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.09* (0.04)	0.06 (0.07)	-0.08* (0.04)
Government is Unfair	0.08*** (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)
Economy is Worse	0.05* (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.05* (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.05** (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)
<i>Partisanship</i>						
Labour	-0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Conserv.	-0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.027)	0.03 (0.02)
Liberal Democrat	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)
UKIP	-0.05 (0.06)	0.11* (0.053)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.09 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.09 (0.05)
Green	-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.13*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.009 (0.04)
BNP	0.48*** (0.12)	0.47*** (0.07)	0.51*** (0.12)	0.46*** (0.07)	0.51*** (0.12)	0.46*** (0.07)
<i>Context</i>						
Percent Migrant	-0.07* (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Constant	0.29*** (0.04)	0.15 (0.11)	0.24*** (0.04)	0.15 (0.11)	0.23*** (0.04)	0.15 (0.11)
Observations	2,728	2,607	2,728	2,607	2,728	2,607
R-Squared	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Adj. R-Squared	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

The variables reflecting one's relationship with the government are also quite telling. In 2005, those who feel that the government treats them unfairly are more likely to report immigration as the most important issue. This finding could reflect the sense of political threat perceived by these individuals, and their lack of faith in the government to handle well the issue of immigration and its consequences. Further, in 2005, those who feel the national economy is getting worse are also more likely to report immigration as the most important issue, which may reflect a perceived economic threat, exhibiting itself as associating immigration with importance on the national agenda.

Party identification is less predictive for the mainstream respondents. Only in model 5 are Labour members less likely to report immigration as the most important problem. Membership in the Conservative Party is not influential in perceiving immigration to be the most important issue. That said, Liberal Democrats are always less likely in 2005. At the extremes, however, party identification is more revealing: members of the BNP are always more likely to report immigration the most important problem whereas Green party members are always less likely in 2005.

In terms of contextual variables, the percent of migrants in the area is negatively related to the dependent variable in 2005. This means that people who live in areas where more migrants reside are less likely to report immigration to be important. This is consistent with the contact theory (Allport 1979) that states that more contact with the

“other” reduces concern derived from “otherness”. The lack of results for contextual variables in 2010 may reflect the lack of more recent data.⁶⁰

However, as the dependent variable is binary, it is also necessary to establish the strength of the influence of agenda-setting. I use the Tomz, Wittenburg and King’s (2001) Clarify program for Stata to calculate first differences, setting all other variables at their mean⁶¹. This enables us to establish the relative effects of the independent variables on the perceived importance of immigration. Table 5.7 below reflects the strength of the influence of agenda-setting on the dependent variable, perceived importance of immigration. For example, two standard deviation shifts in agenda-setting results in almost a ten percent change in the probability that a respondent will report immigration to be the most important issue in 2005. In 2010, the influence of agenda-setting seems to have weakened; two standard deviation shifts in agenda-setting results in about a five percent change in the probability that a person will perceive immigration to be the most important issue. Interestingly, the strength of agenda-setting seems to vary over time, suggesting that the finding in the previous chapter is worth further exploration: it may not only be a question of *whether* agenda-setting works, but *when* it works. As suggested in the previous chapter, it may be that the 2008 global financial crisis impacted the influence of agenda-setting on immigration, or perceptions of important issues, in general. In either case, the timing matters, and agenda-setting may work at one point in time but not another.

⁶⁰ More recent 2011 census data is becoming available during the writing of this chapter. Integrating this data may prove useful, though the census data (2011) will cover a period one year passed the survey data collection (2010).

⁶¹ A Stata software program created by Tomz et al. (2001)

Table 5.7. First Differences for Agenda-setting on Perceived Importance

	Agenda-Setting	
	1 Standard Deviation Shift	2 St. Dev Shift
Probability of Perceived Importance 2005	.044 (.01)	.096 (.02)
Probability of Perceived Importance 2010	.025 (.01)	.053 (.02)

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Now that variation in agenda-setting between the papers has been established and tested on public opinion, it is also possible to identify any patterns to this variation based on the *type* of newspaper. Table 5.7 below shows two different tables. On the left hand side are the values for Measure 2 of agenda-setting (proportion of immigration articles relative to articles on other important issues) and on the right for Measure 3 (proportions of references to immigration relative to all other references in immigration-specific articles). The blocks are color-coded according to the type of publication. The purple represents Popular papers, the green are Mid-Market papers, and the blue are the Quality paper. The values are sorted in descending order so as to convey the relative use of agenda-setting across these various newspapers.

Table 5.8. Examining Patterns of Agenda-setting in Newspaper Type

Measure 2

Newspaper	60 days Prior to Campaign Survey 2005		60 days Prior to Campaign Survey 2010
Express	0.15	Express	0.09
Sun	0.12	Sun	0.07
Daily Mail	0.11	Daily Mail	0.07
Independent	0.10	Independent	0.05
Guardian	0.08	Guardian	0.04
Mirror	0.07	Mirror	0.04
Times	0.07	Telegraph	0.04
Telegraph	0.07	Times	0.04
Financial Times	0.05	Financial Times	0.02
	= Popular		
	= Mid-Market		
	= Quality		

Measure 3

	2005		2010
Express	0.016	Express	0.013
Sun	0.015	Sun	0.011
Mirror	0.014	Daily Mail	0.009
Daily Mail	0.011	Mirror	0.009
Times	0.009	Independent	0.008
FT	0.009	Telegraph	0.007
Independent	0.008	Guardian	0.007
Guardian	0.007	FT	0.006
Telegraph	0.007	Times	0.006

From this table, we see the popular and mid-market papers gather at the top, with the highest proportions—aside from the Mirror for measure 2. The quality papers, on the other hand all gather at the bottom, with the lowest proportions. Here, we begin to see relationships between the type of publication and agenda-setting. The popular and mid-market papers have higher agenda-setting measures on immigration than do the quality papers. In other words, the content analysis reveals higher levels of agenda-setting in these papers. Therefore, in future analysis, it would be possible to use the type of publication as a proxy for types of agenda-setting, based on these results.

Feelings About Immigration

This section questions whether the media influences positive and negative feelings about immigration, and tests what kinds of elite-driven signals may influence these kinds of feelings. I argue that we need to explore frames beyond a positive and negative dimension in order to better understand how framing immigration influence feelings on the issue. Framing may focus on many different dimensions of an issue. I follow those authors who examine the influence of positive and negative frames, but I also add a third framing category. In order to do so, I refer to the group threat literature.

To review, perceptions of group threat often develop from the perceived distinction between insiders and outsiders, and a reaction against the out-group in order to protect the in-group (Tajfel 1981). Threats are often categorized in two ways: cultural (See Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007, Fetzer 2000) and economic (Eger 2010, Roemer et al. 2007, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Following Dancygier (2010) I also include political threats, which are defined as threats to political representation as newcomers enter represented constituencies and become new voters. Moreover, McLaren (2013)

finds that the issue of crime can also stimulate perceived threats regarding immigrants when crime is associated with various immigrant groups or the process of immigration. Each of these threats depends on the perception that out-groups will weaken, hurt, or simply make uncertain, the cultural, economic, political, or social well-being of in-groups. It may be argued that these categories would fall under a “negative” tone category. However, all these issues—cultural, economic, political, and even crime—may be discussed in positive or neutral tones, but still stimulate concern for individuals who associate these factors with the problems of immigration. Therefore, although I take into consideration negative and positive references in my analysis, I also account for these seemingly innocuous factors that could prompt individuals to react against immigration or immigrants. I term these frames “threat frames” in order to highlight their association with threatening dimensions of immigration. I expect these frames to have a stronger effect than negative frames.

The hypotheses then, are:

H1: Readers of newspapers that use negative or threat frames (i.e. Economic, Cultural, Political, Crime) will be more likely to have negative feelings about immigration.

H1a: Not only will Threat frames increase negative feeling about immigration, but they will have a stronger effect on negative feelings than will negative frames.

H2: Readers of newspapers that frame immigration with positive factors will be more likely to have positive feelings about immigration.

To test these hypotheses, I return to the BES survey. I created a new set of framing variables to capture the positive, negative, and what I will call “threat category” framing effects. It is necessary to establish how immigration is framed in these ways each newspaper. Yoshikoder, the CCA software program mentioned above, allows for the making of original dictionaries in order to perform these analyses. Therefore, I

created such a dictionary, combining my own content-analysis categories, with the well-known Inquirer categories available online.⁶² The dictionary I have created is composed of four categories: Key Words, Positive, Negative, and Threat. Key Words include those words associated with immigration, such as “immigration”, “immigrant”, “migrant”, “asylum-seeker”, and “refugee”. This category is original to the dictionary that I have created, and provides a measure of agenda-setting.

The Threat category includes sets of words that I compiled as well as sets from the Inquirer. These sets all draw on the threat literature, identifying cleavages along which natives may be threatened by newcomers, or issues that may inspire competition or conflict, as described above. These issue areas include: culture, economics, politics, and crime. I borrow the economic and culture word sets from Inquirer, but I also add to the cultural set with additional words referring to cultural factors including religious orientations and language. These are all described in detail in Appendix B. I refer to the Inquirer database in creating the Positive and Negative categories, named “Positiv” and “Negativ”.

Once the dictionary was created, I had two options. I could have run the word set categories on the entire body of articles, or I could run “concordances” and apply the dictionary categories to these subsets of the articles. Making a concordance in Yoshikoder means first identifying key words—such the “Key Word” category above referring to all immigration-related terms. Next, the software program identifies the words preceding and following these key words as they are found in the text. For

⁶² Both sets of dictionaries can be found here:
<http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~inquirer/homecat.htm>

example, a concordance from the 2010 sample from the Sun reads: “last night accused of fiddling **immigration** figures to mislead voters in”. Here we have the key word, immigration, as well as the words (usually 5 words) preceding and following the term—these sets of words are called concordances. Yoshikoder finds *all* concordances for the key terms and calculates the proportion of that total sample of words dedicated to “Positive”, “Negative” and “Threat” categories. That is, it determines whether those words preceding and following the key word fit into any of these categories. I ran these concordances on newspaper articles from each newspaper that includes all articles, retrieved by the same keyword search described above, for the (almost) two months, February 1 – March 27, preceding the pre-test survey. The survey questions regarding feelings about immigration were only asked in that pre-test. This sample includes 764 articles for all nine newspapers.

After collecting the proportional statistics for each of the framing categories described above, I created variables linking the proportion of frames used by a newspaper to readers of that newspaper. This variable captures an individual reader’s exposure to such frames, by associating the proportional value of each frame in a newspaper to the readers of those papers. These variables are called: Reference to Threat Categories, Negative References and Positive References. The dependent measures are described below:

Negative Feelings about Immigration This is a dummy variable created from the question “Which, if any, of the following words describe your feelings about immigration?” It is coded as a 1 if the respondent reported any of the following feelings: Angry, Disgusted, Uneasy, or Afraid, and a 0 otherwise.

Positive Feelings about Immigration This is a dummy variable created from the question “Which, if any, of the following words describe your feelings about immigration?” It is

coded as a 1 if the respondent reported any of the following feelings: Happy, Hopeful, Confident or Proud, and a 0 otherwise.

I then estimate the influence of the framing categories on feelings about immigration.

Below are the regression results. Only significant variables are included. The full table can be found in Appendix B.

The key independent variables of interest help to explain positive and negative feelings on immigration. Very surprisingly, the results show that negative frames on immigration do not increase negative or positive feelings about immigration. This is quite remarkable, especially when we see that the threat categories are positively and significantly associated with negative opinions. This suggests that the first hypothesis above is only half correct. Further, positive frames are positively and significantly influencing positive feelings about immigration, whereas positive frames have a negatively significant relationship with negative feelings. Therefore, although negative frames do not influence more negative feelings about immigration in individuals, exposure to positive frames does influence positive feelings.

Regarding the control variables, we see several statistically significant relationships—some of which are surprising. This analysis reveals older people are more likely to have positive feelings about immigration, as are those who are married. More education is related to less negative feelings and more positive feelings. Being a member of a union is positively and significantly related to having both positive and negative feelings, which is an interesting finding. To reiterate, feelings on immigration as measured in the analysis is not a linear scale. Rather, one can report both positive and negative feelings about the issue, explaining how divergent outcomes, such as this one,

are possible. This finding also indicates a more complex relationship between membership in unions and feelings about immigration, where these members are more likely to hold conflicting feelings about immigration. Perhaps surprisingly, Christians and Catholics are both less likely to have positive feelings about immigration.

In terms of individual's relationship to the government, those who find the government unfair and those who think the national economy has gotten worse are more likely to have negative feelings and less likely to have positive feelings. These findings are consistent with the idea that a weakening relationship to the state and concerns about that state's welfare could make one more wary of immigration—possibly due to the concern that newcomers would continue to make things worse for the nation and that individual's relationship to it.

We also see partisan effects appear in the data. Supporters of the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties are both less likely to have negative feelings and more likely to have positive. Supporters of the Conservative party are more likely to have negative feelings and less likely to have positive feelings about the issue. Not surprisingly, members of UKIP, the party that made anti-immigration a platform issue in 2010, are more likely to have negative feelings about immigration. Interestingly, there are no significant findings for members of the far-right British National Party (BNP). The BNP experienced internal problems starting in 2009, with some members upset about the inability of the leadership to win seats in more districts and their willingness to admit non-white members. Therefore, the findings here may reflect the weakening of the party, in general at the time of the survey in 2010.

Table 5.9. Framing Effects and Feelings About Immigration

	(2) Negative Feelings About Immigration	(3) Positive Feelings About Immigration
<i>Frames</i>		
References to Threat Categories	2.91*** (0.68)	-2.13*** (0.54)
Negative References	0.27 (0.59)	-0.08 (0.51)
Positive References	-4.75*** (1.43)	3.43** (1.18)
<i>Controls</i>		
Age	0.00 (0.00)	0.002** (0.001)
Male	-0.00 (0.01)	0.016 (0.011)
Married	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Education	-0.13*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.02)
Union	0.41** (0.15)	0.08* (0.04)
Rent	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)
Income	-0.00 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Christian	0.02 (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Catholic	0.03 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.01)
Unfair Gov	0.10*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Economy has Worsened	0.07*** (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
Labour	-0.07** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.01)
Conservative	0.05** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)
Liberal Democrats	-0.07* (0.03)	0.08*** (0.02)
UKIP	0.06* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
Green	0.045 (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)
BNP	0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)
Percent Migrant	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)

Table 5.9. Framing Effects and Feelings About Immigration (continued)

	(2) Negative Feelings About Immigration	(3) Positive Feelings About Immigration
Percent Migrant squared	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Percent Minority	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Percent Minority squared	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Constant	0.38* (0.15)	-0.10* (0.04)
Observations	2,607	2,607
R-squared	0.16	0.10
Adj. R-squared	0.15	0.09

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Finally, although the results are not shown here (but available in Appendix B), there is no evidence to suggest that agenda-setting influences feelings on immigration, and no evidence for any of the contextual variables. Aside from the demographic variables mentioned above, there is strong evidence for the importance of exposure to framing effects in explaining feelings about immigration. Further, there is less support for a simple positive-negative framing dimension to explain feelings about immigration. Rather, it is important to complicate our understanding of what types of frames influence these feelings, in order to establish an accurate reflection of framing effects.

Again, it is important to examine the strength of these framing effects. Table 5.9 shows that the strength of the threat frames are indeed stronger than the negative frames in influencing feelings about immigration. Further, the positive frames also show greater strength than the negative frames. For example, one standard deviation shift in the proportion of threat frames changes the probability of a respondent having negative feelings about immigration by twenty-two percent. The same first standard deviation shift

in positive frames reduces that probability by four percent, whereas negative frames have no apparent impact on the probability of a person having negative feelings about immigration. Two standard deviations in negative frames reflect a one percent shift in the probability of negative feelings, but the same shift in threat frames and positive frames result in stronger changes in the dependent variable—albeit in opposite directions.

There are similar results for positive feelings about immigration. Negative frames have no impact. However, threat frames reflect a consistent reduced probability that a person would report positive feelings about immigration. Positive frames, though, increase the probability of positive feelings in both cases. It will be important to examine the strength of these framing effects in a controlled setting, informed by these findings.

Table 5.10. Strength of the Framing Effects on Feelings on Immigration

	Negative Feelings	
	1 St. Dev Shift	2 St. Dev Shift
Threat Frames	.22 (.05)	.25 (.05)
Negative Frames	.00 (.01)	.01 (.02)
Positive Frames	-.04 (.01)	-.11 (.02)
	Positive Feelings	
	1 St. Dev Shift	2 St. Dev Shift
Threat Frames	-.12 (.04)	-.13 (.04)
Negative Frames	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)
Positive Frames	.02 (.00)	.05 (.01)

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Conclusion

The findings and analysis presented here shed new light on the role of the media in the development of immigration opinions, and the importance of conceptualizing and analyzing media framing effects beyond a positive and negative dimension. As observed above, individuals may be more influenced by media reporting when there is a direct link drawn between immigration and other issues such as the economy, culture, politics or crime that could stimulate a group threat response. The findings above suggest these types of frames are more likely to influence the development of negative feelings (i.e. Angry, Disgusted, Uneasy, or Afraid), than negative frames. On the other hand, the powerful influence of positive frames must not be overlooked. Individuals reading newspapers using more positive frames on immigration were more likely to have more positive feelings (i.e. Happy, Hopeful, Confident or Proud) about immigration. Further, the findings remind us that variations in the type of media outlet, e.g. publication type or partisan affiliation may be useful in explaining media effects, but we must first examine and understand the rhetoric used within these papers before using them as proxies for such rhetoric.

This chapter provides a systematic analysis on the influence of agenda-setting and framing in newspaper reporting on public opinion on immigration. Through analysis of survey data and content analysis, this chapter finds that exposure to certain kinds of rhetoric on immigration influences opinion on the issue—but that exposure is complex. Although it is critical to simplify the real world in order to study it systematically, it is just as critical to refrain from reducing it to such simple dimensions that the explanatory nuances of the lived experience are lost.

These findings provide a new perspective with which to examine framing effects on immigration, for example. In other work, I examine these frames—positive, negative, and threat frames—in a survey experiment in order to test their influence while ensuring internal validity. Moreover, it is important to examine whether these findings are specific to Britain. Therefore, I also examine these variations in media rhetoric exist in other countries and whether these differences have similar effects on public opinion.

Chapter 7

Framing Immigration Messages: Explaining Political Rhetoric on Immigration

Introduction

The previous chapter focused on media frames, and in this chapter, I shift that focus toward another critical political actor: the politician. As evidenced in the previous chapter, media messaging varies across different newspaper sources, and I contend that politicians' messaging will also vary between and within parties. Further, the archival research in Chapter 1 demonstrated the relevance of political considerations to politicians' strategies regarding any messages delivered about immigration. In this chapter, I not only identify variation in political messaging from politicians—even within the same party—I also consider the role of party politics in explaining this variation.

Through original content analysis of 930 articles from 155 English newspapers during a 2005 immigration policy debate, I observe variation in position frames on immigration *between* politicians in different political parties, but a surprising range of variation *within* parties. Merging the data described above with electoral and demographic census data, I use regression analysis and find that Members of Parliament and their opponents select a particular frame on immigration based on district-level characteristics of their respective constituencies, e.g. demographic and economic factors, *in addition to* party politics at play, e.g. whether the district is a safe or competitive one. The analysis clarifies and explains messaging of politicians on immigration, and further, continues to push the analysis of frames beyond positive and negative dimensions

Politicians can frame issues strategically (Kinder and Sanders 1990; Riker 1996). As discussed in earlier chapters, framing emphasizes a particular dimension of an issue. Therefore, the next questions to ask are how and why politicians frame immigration in the ways that they do. In order to answer these questions, we must first attempt to identify what we know about how politicians frame immigration. However, we quickly learn that our knowledge of how politicians frame immigration is rather limited. We know that political parties strategically decide whether or not to engage anti-immigrant parties on the subject of immigration, and how to do so (Meguid, 2010), but this does not tell us much about the actual language used by individual politicians. In fact, it is rare that politicians' language on the immigration issue is analyzed at all since much of the focus of elite messaging is on the media (See Newton 2008 for examples of analysis of politician rhetoric). As the literature on politician rhetoric on immigration is scarce, I argue that in order to explain politicians' influence on public opinion, we must first acknowledge the complexity inherent to their messaging on immigration. After all, the previous chapters have established that in order to understand why messages matter, we must know more about how the messages are constructed and conveyed by whom.

Decoding the Message

In this chapter, I provide a novel method to analyze rhetoric concerning groups in society, and I present a theory regarding politician's strategic use of such rhetoric on immigration. In order to develop the original coding scheme used in this paper, I drew upon literatures regarding political representation and group threat. As migration continues to increase throughout the world, democratic societies must address the question of which people or groups are to be represented by elected leaders—and this

includes citizenship, voting rights, and international human rights. Democratic representation may range from being very inclusive of all newcomers to forms of representation that are quite exclusive. Benhabib (2004) provides a useful theoretical concept of “political membership” that can help us better understand this range of political representation. Political membership is the “principles and practices” country leaders use to incorporate newcomers in existing societies (Benhabib 2004). Therefore, the important distinction is the one between newcomers and existing members, which evolves over time as leaders and the public negotiate how to incorporate newcomers—how to determine how belongs in the in-group and who belongs in the out-group.

As these negotiations and iterations occur, questions arise as to the ways in which societies define in-groups and out-groups and how each will be represented in the polity. Of course, the representation of these groups may depend heavily on the attitudes and opinions of the native populations with whom they reside within the democracy. As Citrin and Sides suggest, it may be that “people’s perceptions of immigration and immigrants rely more on elite messages and less on the objective circumstances around them.” (2006, 352) Elites are capable of identifying the aspects of issues about which opinions form and thereby potentially influencing those opinions further in some direction (Zaller 1992, Popkin 1991).

Focusing on elite references to immigration is critical in explaining these perceptions of immigration, and thus we should focus our efforts on the framing of such references in order to understand their explanatory power. Chong and Druckman (2007) define frames as certain words that are used in order to encourage a “particular conceptualization of an issue”, which are often analyzed along a positive or negative

dimension. That is, frames can encourage people to either positively embrace a policy option or negatively reject it. They can also shift consideration from one aspect of an issue, e.g. refugees fleeing persecution, to another, e.g. crimes committed by immigrants. I believe that we are in need of a new method of framing analysis that delves beyond the positive and negative dimension, rooting analyses in the theories of representation and group threat, which I explain below. As Zaller argues: “elite discourse [often]...highlights only a portion of what is going on” (Zaller, 1992, 13). This paper serves to systematically analyze these discourses on immigration in order to establish what “portion” is reaching and potentially influencing the public, how it is framed and why. This is a critical step in understanding how elite rhetoric influences attitudes on immigration, but also the perception of group distinctions, in general. Therefore, the framing scheme I develop is applicable to immigrants, but also useful in analyzing the extent of inclusion and exclusion of any groups in society—e.g. ethnic, racial or religious.

Existing Literature on Framing Immigration

Extant literature on the subject of framing regarding immigration often focuses on the media. The media is indeed a powerful influence on public opinion, but Hopkins (2011) also questions whether there may be a distinction between the effect of media and politicians’ references to immigration. After all, ideas and exposure to new information may also come from and be influenced by political affiliation, insofar as partisanship serves as a perceptual screen and politicians can provide important information cues. (Campbell et al. 1960, Green et al. 2004, Popkin 1991) The media may therefore provide a means of understanding and organizing one’s situational context through political

stories, as Popkin (1991) and Vavreck (2009) suggest politicians do. However, the media has a different set of objectives than politicians, the latter of which is concerned with reelection, for example. Perhaps more importantly, it is the politicians who will or do represent the newcomers politically, and therefore analyzing what representatives say about immigration is interesting for it should shed light on the frames politicians believe *should* be useful politically in securing or maintaining public support.

It is not only *whether* to study this rhetoric that is at issue, but also *how* to analyze it. In this paper, I focus first on *frames* used in this rhetoric. Several studies provide a strong foundation for the analysis of frames regarding immigration. One such study examined framing of immigration in a laboratory setting, and varied the effect of framing messages in terms of positive or negative consequence (Brader et al. 2008). For these authors, positive consequences might include “strengthening the economy, increasing tax revenues, enriching American culture” whereas negative consequences would be “driving down wages, consuming public resources, undermining American values” (Brader et al. 2008, 964). However, although Brader et al. (2008) do rely on positive and negative frames for their analysis, these authors, as well as other such as Knoll et al. (2010) and Newton (2008), help to move the literature on framing forward by acknowledging that *negative* frames regarding immigration may highlight immigrants’ “out-group” status, using terms such as “Mexican” or “illegal” in the American context, for example. These “out-group” cues are considered to be anxiety-provoking (Newton 2008), or capable of stimulating a “group threat” response (Tajfel 1981). Identification of certain frames associated with groups in society are critical to understanding their role in that society—that is, part of the in-group or the out-group. Yet, not all frames employing ethnic cues or

group labels are negative—as Brader et al. 2008 show with their use of the “European” cue, which is considered to be less threatening than “Mexican”. Further, I contend that the in-group and out-group distinctions are not ideal-types at all times and it would be more beneficial to consider these two points at opposite ends of a continuum, or even subject to multiple dimensions. We would thus benefit from one overarching method of framing analysis that accounts for all these various factors and could be applied to all groups, not only immigrants. In addition, before we examine, and try to understand, the effect of frames regarding certain groups in the lab, we must better understand these frames in the real world. Below, I propose a new method of framing analysis, useful to immigration studies but also group studies at large, as well as provide empirical examples of and explanations for politicians’ rhetoric.

Reframing Immigration Between Representation and Group Threat

When we examine the framing of immigration, what is it that we are trying to determine? First, it is important to define further what framing is, as they process be defined in several ways. Chong and Druckman (2007) explain that, in general, “Framing refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue”. However, as I am mainly interested in the frames utilized by political elites, in this paper, I incorporate the following definition: “[frames are] devices embedded in political discourse, employed by political elites, often with an eye on advancing their own interests or ideologies” (Kinder and Sanders 1990, 74). As discussed above, as well as in Chapter 5, analyzing frames regarding immigration, as well as other issues, often considers the positive – negative dimensions of frames (See

Hopkins 2010, for example). That is, does a certain frame express the negative consequences of immigration, or the positive consequences? However, what are these types of frames really articulating? Can a frame still be negative if it does not mention the negative consequences of “illegal immigration”, for example? Certainly the answer is yes, but what do such frames look like? And what do positive frames look like? Finally, are there frames that fall somewhere in between? Most importantly, is the positive and negative dimension the appropriate scale to analyze these frames?

I argue that although the distinction between positive frames and negative frames, emphasizing the positive or negative dimensions of immigration respectively, is a useful place to start, we should extend the analysis of frames of immigration further by returning to the group threat literature mentioned above. In Chapter 6, I examine the association between immigration issues and other issues of public concern. In this Chapter, I continue to examine these kinds of associations, but I also add a perspective on representation. That is, since we are examining politicians—the potential or actual representatives in a country—I believe it is important to examine how the frames they use regarding immigration identify who is included or excluded in society. That is, the issue of immigration not only addresses *how* the interests of democratic constituents will be represented—but it also concerns debate over *who* is part of the democratic constituency to be represented.

Political theory sheds light on this issue. For example, Walzer (1983) wrote on the “distinctiveness of cultures and groups”, and explained that for those who value such distinctiveness, then “closure must be permitted somewhere”(39). That is, in essence, the definition of the in-group, closing itself off from any out-groups. For this reason then,

Walzer continued: “At some level of political organization, something like the sovereign state must take shape and claim the authority to make its own admissions policy, to control, and sometimes restrain the flow of immigrants.” (Walzer 1983, 39) In this way, then, the definition of the in-group not only operates to *exclude* immigrants according to the in-group preferences, but it also *includes* all those within the in-group. This may seem obvious, but this is a critical point, for when members of the in-group do not feel *included* in the decisions regarding the out-group, then the closure that was so important to the survival of the group’s distinctiveness is threatened. Certainly individuals may feel more or less concerned about such distinctiveness, the extent to which it is threatened and the ways in which their elected representatives protect it (See Blinder and Lundgren, forthcoming, for explanatory factors of variation in perceived threat). It is, after all, the democratic representatives who influence, with varying degrees, the evolution of admissions policies that control and regulate the inflow of immigrants into their country. It is also democratic representatives who assist in the evolution of Benhabib’s notion of “political membership” through their development of admissions and integration policies, for example. And so, Benhabib (2004) taps into an important feature of democratic representation within sovereign states, when she notes: “we can render the distinctions between ‘citizens’ and ‘aliens,’ ‘us’ and ‘them,’ fluid and negotiable through democratic iterations.” (21) That is, the in-group and out-groups still depend on a sense of *closure* at some cleavage line. However, that line is negotiable—its placement will depend in great part on the preferences of the constituents of democratic sovereign states and the decisions and actions of their elected representatives.

The categories of framing that I outline below draw on this idea of negotiable distinctions between the in-group and the out-group, and analyze frames on immigration in terms of their references to representation, inclusion and exclusion. I integrate this idea with the theories of group threat, interacting the potential cleavage area distinguishing insiders from outsiders with the distribution of the constituencies that form on either side of it. I describe this process in detail below. Examining frames in this way helps to tackle the important questions regarding the extent to which democratic representation extends to newcomers and outsiders, and therefore helps us to move beyond the positive and negative dimension and move toward an analysis of democratic inclusion and exclusion.

The Coding Scheme

As discussed in Chapter 3, group threats are often categorized in two ways: cultural (See Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007, Horowitz 1985, Fetzer 2000) and economic (Eger 2010, Roemer et al. 2007, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Following Dancygier (2010) I also include political threats, which are defined as threats to political representation as newcomers enter represented constituencies and become new voters. Each of these threats depends on the perception that out-groups will weaken the cultural, economic, or political well-being of in-groups. This is similar to the “negative” frames discussed above—that is, the negative consequences. However, culture and economics may be discussed in non-negative ways as well. Further, it is not only the emphasis on the *quality* of the frame (e.g. positive and negative) but also the *content* of the frame (e.g. the aspect of immigration being addressed) that is important to examine. Abrajano (forthcoming) also identifies the importance of identifying more specific issue areas that

are discussed regarding immigration. By building on the existing scholarship, I identify the potential cleavage identified in a frame—the issue about which barrier may be defined between newcomers and natives, such as the national culture—before I articulate the *constituencies* on either side of that cleavage. Distinctions regarding who falls outside the in-group still remain negotiable. In this step, I am simply identifying a frame that emphasizes a dimension that *could* separate natives and immigrants in some way. As discussed in Chapter 5, these frames reference areas where natives may feel potential or actual competition or conflict with immigrants—such as economy, culture, crime, or politics, for example.

The table below provides examples of various potential lines of cleavage within the three group threat categories.⁶³

Table 6.1. Examples of Potential Cleavage Areas

Cultural	Economic	Political
• <i>Language</i> • <i>Religion</i> • <i>Race</i> • <i>Criminal Behavior</i>	• <i>Housing Services</i> • <i>Education Services</i> • <i>Health Services</i> • <i>Jobs</i>	• <i>Representation</i> • <i>Policy</i> • <i>Border Control</i> • <i>Entry</i>

Once the potential cleavage is identified, I determine the *distribution* of groups that fall around it within the frame. This is a two-step process.

First, it requires identifying whether the relevant groups fall on the same side of the cleavage, whether they fall on the same side *equally*, and/or whether they fall on different sides of the cleavage, identifying clear in and out-groups on either side of the cleavage. This, in short, attempts to identify the location of the “immigrant” within the

⁶³ Upon request, the author can provide a thorough outline of all issue areas around which cleavages may form based on the coding scheme used for this project.

democratic constituency concerning the particular issue (potential cleavage) at stake. I categorize these locations (which may be considered *negotiable distinctions*) as divisive, aligning and conditional. Divisive frames exclude immigrants from the group of democratic constituents, the “natives”. Divisive frames thereby divide the constituency—pitting native interests against immigrant interests—along one of the cleavage categories mentioned above. Referring back to Chapter 3, divisive frames highlight conflict between groups—where there is a disagreement over ultimate goals or outcomes.

On the other hand, aligning frames include both the immigrant and native groups on the same side of a potential cleavage, where the alignment may concern a public good or a norm, for example. Aligning frames acknowledge similarities and sympathies between immigrant and native groups. Therefore, although the frame identifies a certain immigrant group, aligning frames are attempting to negotiate the weakening of this group distinction, if not the eradication of it.

The final category of frames is less definitively inclusive or exclusive, though it may be the frame most concerned with negotiating the specifics of such distinctions. I term this category, conditional frames. Conditional frames acknowledge the potential alignment of immigrant and native interests *conditional* on the acknowledgement of native’s interests or concerns. In other words, conditional frames would acknowledge the importance of immigrant interests, including this group within the native constituency, but not equally. In a conditional frame, representation is shared, but also hierarchical, prioritizing native interests before immigrant interests. It can also be understood as the identification of competition between newcomers and natives. While inclusion exists in

this frame, it is not equally distributed. The table below provides examples of each type of frame.

Table 6.2. Examples of Frames Distributing Groups Along the Cleavage

Divisive	Aligning	Conditional
• <i>Exclusive of Immigrant Interests</i> • <i>Anti-immigrant</i> • <i>Racism</i> • <i>Zero-sum Outcomes (Natives or Newcomers get all or nothing)</i>	• <i>Inclusive of Immigrant Interests</i> • <i>Anti-racism</i> • <i>Multicultural</i> • <i>Sympathetic</i>	• <i>Prioritizing Native Interests Before Immigrant</i> • <i>Hierarchical Political Representation of Groups</i> • <i>Conditionally sympathetic</i>

Finally, it is also important to identify who the groups are. The “native” population is often an ambiguous category that may, at times, not even be mentioned explicitly in the frame. However, if we are discussing “immigrants” in any context, then we are also implicitly discussing non-immigrants, whoever they may be. Thus, where there is a divisive or conditional frame, it is left to determine whether the “immigrants”, “asylum-seekers,” refugees”, “illegal immigrants” are to be included with the in-group or the out-group in the frame. There may of course be more than one in-group and out-group in reality, but these frames are slices of the real world, and thus it is only a matter of identifying whether there are in-groups or out-groups identified in the individual frame. Moreover, frames often go beyond the broader identities mentioned above and identify a broader range of racial, ethnic, religious, or country of origin identity categories. Therefore, frames often identify sub-sets of immigrating groups. As noted above, in laboratory and survey experiments, Brader et al. (2008) and Knoll and Redlawsk (2010) begin to push the framing literature beyond a positive and negative

dimension by analyzing the impact of such identity cues—varying both ethnic and/or skill level characteristics of immigrants in their framing experiments. However, it is also important to examine how all immigrant identities mentioned by elites are positioned in society, not only those placed in the out-group, but also those that are included or associated in some way (perhaps conditionally) with the in-group. As such, I account for the type of immigrant mentioned as well as any other identifying characteristics regarding ethnicity, race, religion or country of origin.

This new coding scheme is useful because it is rooted both in the theories of group threat, (understood as competition or conflict, not only physical vulnerability) and in the theories of representation—both of which are at the heart of the immigration literature as well as the processes of democratic society. By identifying frames according to these measures, we can begin to examine how categories of political membership are discussed within countries—what potential cleavages are important to a society at particular times, how immigrant and non-immigrant groups are distributed around those cleavages, and what immigrant groups, in particular, are of greater or less concern. It is also possible to observe how and when these distinctions *change* over time. These are all questions that can be addressed by the use of these framing categories. Ultimately, identifying these kinds of frames will shed light on how immigration is framed by politicians along the dimension of representation—a critical step in understanding how politicians determine who belongs politically in society, and most likely how the public determines where they stand on this issue of representation and belonging.

The next section explains the method of content analysis I employ in order to identify these frames used by British politicians. I then provide specific examples of how the coding scheme operates by examining particular politicians who have used such frames in their rhetoric, providing anecdotal evidence that these frames vary between politicians, and are informed by political strategies. A broader analysis of 930 British newspaper articles including British politicians' rhetoric follows, in order to analyze more comprehensively the type of rhetoric and framing on immigration in Britain.

Method: Content Analysis

In order to employ the framing scheme above, I use content analysis on newspaper articles to identify the frames used by politicians. Vavreck (2009) employs a useful coding scheme for political campaign rhetoric, drawing on Geer (1999), which codes each appeal or sentence used by a politician. This technique allows for a nuanced coding scheme that takes into consideration the various ways in which politicians may speak about immigration, potentially using multiple frame at a given time.⁶⁴ Table 6.3 provides examples of how certain portions of rhetoric are coded. The codebook is lengthy, accounting for 31 issue/cleavage categories (i.e. economy, housing, culture, etc.), the three representation frames (aligning, divisive or conditional) and 26 identity categories (e.g. British, Pakistani, African, etc.). For each article, I coded every frame in the article—accounting for all frames on immigration used by the media or by politicians quoted in the text. These categories are derived from literature on group threat related to

⁶⁴ In this chapter, I follow Vavreck and do not count repetitive frames, therefore I am identifying the types of frames used and by whom. In other work, I do account for the relative use of the types of frames.

immigration issues, as well as from a review of a random sampling of immigration-related political speeches and newspaper articles.

Table 6.3. Examples of Messages and Coding Scheme

Message	Issue Cleavage	Frame	Identity
The overwhelming strain placed on our medical services by the chronic health problems suffered by asylum seekers and illegal immigrants	Economic: Services	Divisive	Asylum seekers and immigrants
has a superb reputation for generously welcoming new immigrants and people willing to work hard and make a new life for themselves and their families, be they Irish, Italian, or, since the early Seventies, Kashmiri Muslims	Political: Residence	Aligning	Immigrants, Irish, Italian, Kashmiri Muslims
Covering your face is intimidating and offensive. It's not an acceptable form of dress. We're not a Muslim country	Cultural: National identity	Divisive	Muslim
We should also look at drawing up different rules based on, for instance, length of residence, citizenship or national insurance contributions which carry more weight in a transparent points system used to decide who is entitled to access social housing...most new migrant families are economic migrants who choose to come to live and work here. If you choose to come to Britain, should you presume the right to access social housing?	Economic: Services (Housing)	Conditional	Refugees, migrant families

As I am interested in the statements that are most likely reaching the general public, I analyze the content of newspapers, as opposed to Parliament speeches.⁶⁵ It also

⁶⁵ I would have liked to include political speeches, as well in the analysis. Unfortunately, as of yet, I have not been able to find a systematic record of political speeches. Further, I am not only interested, in this paper, with Members of Parliament and the rhetoric they employ, but also their political opponents. In order to account for the rhetoric of these challengers, I cannot use the Hansard Parliamentary speeches to supplement the analysis.

became apparent that limiting the newspapers analyzed to national or London-based papers would mean that I might not be retrieving articles from newspapers more likely to report on constituency-related issues and therefore also quotations of constituency representative Members of Parliament or their opponents. Therefore, I increase the newspaper database to one-hundred and eighty-five nationally representative newspapers throughout England.

In order to retrieve these articles, I used search terms. I began with search terms used in other work, such as the word “immigration” (see Hopkins 2010). However, this one term does not return all relevant newspaper articles. Therefore, I broaden the scope of retrieval words, using other words that speak to the immigration issue in Britain, such as: immigrant, refugee, asylum, racial⁶⁶, and Muslim. Britain’s strong history of accepting refugees and asylum-seekers is an integral component of the immigration debate in the country. Further, since the 1960s, policies on racial tolerance have been intimately related to immigration policies, and therefore, it is important to consider both subjects when analyzing immigration issues. Further, political parties such as the BNP and UKIP have increasingly used anti-Muslim appeals in their propaganda (Ford et al. 2010), and often in conjunction with anti-immigrant appeals, especially regarding cultural differences. Diversifying the retrieval terms in these ways will not draw the entire

Again, in other work, I also look into the correlation of rhetoric used in Parliament and quoted by the media for current Representatives.

⁶⁶ Using the word, race, returns sports-related articles whereas racial returns articles addressing issues of race and ethnicity.

universe of articles on immigration, but they certainly make such a sample more representative of the actual discussions that pertain to this issue.⁶⁷

This sampling method is useful as it is more comprehensive and representative; but it also means returning on average five-hundred and fifty articles per month. Further, the coding scheme I employ, accounting for the various framing categories outlined above, and their sources, requires the coding of one-hundred and two possible categories. Therefore, my analysis is limited to a 45-day period in 2005. In future work, it would be fruitful to examine other periods of time, such as the 2010 period discussed in the previous chapter. I explain the specific 2005 date selection below.

Diverging Dialogues: Examples from the Britain

In order to examine more closely the frames employed on immigration issues, I chose to use the General Election of 2005 for an initial implementation of the coding scheme. In this year, the number of the far-right anti-immigrant British National Party (BNP) Parliamentary candidates increased from thirty-three in 2001 to one hundred and seventeen in 2005. Additionally, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), advocating for Euro-skepticism and leaving the European Union, fielded 495 candidates in the 2005 General Election. It was during the 2005 election that UKIP widened its platform to include anti-immigrant sentiment, a move that continued into the 2010 election (Ford et al. 2012). Finally, it was in January 2005 that Michael Howard, the Conservative Leader, attempted to institute “dog whistle politics” regarding immigration

⁶⁷ Although the framing categories should be generalizable to any country, these search terms are not necessarily. Therefore, some knowledge of the immigration debates within each country must be considered in order to develop the appropriate search terms and thus retrieve a better sample of rhetoric.

issues, drawing on an Australian example. Dog Whistle Politics are useful for politicians who wish to draw in one group of constituents without alienating others—using a type of coded language that is “inaudible” to some constituents while understood by others (Goodwin and Saward 2005). For example, a billboard campaign run by the Tories in 2005 read: "Are you thinking what we're thinking? It's not racist to impose limits on immigration."⁶⁸ Slogans such as these attempted to draw back in the Conservative voters who had moved toward the BNP or UKIP, while not alienating core supporters who did not wish to be associated with the rhetoric of these far-right parties, racism or xenophobia.

Although the Conservative Party may have highlighted the immigration issue in an attempt to win the general election in 2005, they were unsuccessful. However, they did succeed in taking over several Labour strongholds that year. In fact, two Conservative politicians, Stewart Jackson and Phillip Hollobone, challenged Labour incumbents and won in somewhat surprising victories, while two Labour politicians, Margaret Hodge and Fiona MacTaggart, held their Labor strongholds in 2005. Even though it may not have won the General Election, Howard’s rhetoric on the immigration issue sparked debate on the subject. The examples of these four representatives shed some light on the use of rhetoric in political battles.

⁶⁸ See Martin Kettle, “Are you thinking what I'm thinking about the election? Thanks to tactical voting and electoral apathy the Tories could win it,” *The Guardian* March 7, 2005, available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/mar/08/election2005.politicalcolumnist>

With the presence of far-right anti-immigrant parties, divisive categories of frames are easy to identify among these politicians. However, mainstream party politicians also employ divisive frames. For example, Stewart Jackson, Conservative⁶⁹ politician, challenged Labour⁷⁰ MP Helen Brinton in her constituency of Peterborough in both 2001 and 2005. He finally won in 2005 and held the seat in the 2010 General Election. The newspaper searches did not find any quotations regarding immigration issues from Mr. Jackson prior to August 31, 2004. On that date, Mr. Jackson wrote a letter to the London paper, *The Express*, entitled, “Asylum Policy is Bringing My Great City to its Knees.” This letter provides useful examples of framing of immigration according to the scheme above.

In the letter, Jackson writes: “The overwhelming strain placed on our medical services by the chronic health problems suffered by **asylum** seekers and illegal **immigrants**, the pressure on the council to house growing numbers, the disruption in classrooms...surprises no one but the Government and its compliant local MP.” Using the categories above, first, the potential cleavage is identified. Here, the cleavage is public services including medical, housing and education. The frame employed regarding that cleavage is divisive—it is highlighting negative consequences and competing interests. He also identifies a particular subset of newcomers, “asylum seekers and illegal immigrants.” Jackson continues and also identifies the in-group, however, with descriptive characteristics: “People in Peterborough, of all races and faiths, now realize that, without their agreement or that of their local council, their city has become a

⁶⁹ A mainstream, center-right Party

⁷⁰ A mainstream, center-Left Party

dumping ground for 80 per cent of the **asylum** seekers for the Eastern Region.” Again, we can identify the out-group as “asylum seekers” and we know more about the in-group: “all races and faiths”. This is a very interesting distinction. Jackson is not suggesting that the in-group is a sub-set of white British Protestants, for example, but rather broadening the in-group category to include other races and religions, and legal immigrants, while keeping asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants in the out-group category.

Interestingly, and consistent with his identification of in-group characteristics, Jackson uses an aligning frame regarding a specific subset of the population. He contends: “[Peterborough] also has a superb reputation for generously welcoming new **immigrants** and people willing to work hard and make a new life for themselves and their families, be they Irish, Italian, or, since the early Seventies, Kashmiri **Muslims**.” Here, the potential cleavage is residence for newcomers, and the groups included in the in-group are not only the “natives” of Peterborough but also “immigrants” understood as “people willing to work hard and make a new life for themselves and their families” including Irish, Italians or Kashmiri Muslims. This is a particularly important distinction, for Jackson could have described these included groups in various ways, and therefore, his mentioning of Kashmiri Muslims, in particular is notable. After all, not all politicians are willing to include this subset in the in-group.

Understanding Mr. Jackson’s constituency can offer more insight into this choice. Peterborough is in the East of England outside Greater London. The 2001 census reports the demographic composition as 14.18 percent non-white (compared to 12.5 percent in England overall), with 1.77 percent born in other EU countries and 8.85 percent born in

non-EU countries (compared to 1.41 percent and 6.91 percent respectively in England overall). In 2001, it also reported 8.2 percent as Muslim, 64.3 percent Christian, and 24.71 percent of no religion or no stated religion (compared to 3 percent as Muslim, 72 percent Christian, and 22 percent of no religion or no stated religion in England overall). The expectation then could be that Jackson, attempting to challenge the Labour incumbent MP in 2005, wished not only to avoid alienating minority members of this constituency, such as the Muslim population, in Peterborough, but in fact, he may even have been attempting to win them over as voters, though they are not alone a large voting bloc. Therefore, it is not only the demographics at play, I would argue, but also the party politics and the attempt to strengthen that electoral connection for both incumbents and challengers.

Not every politician has the same demographic make-up within constituencies, however. For example, Conservative politician, Phillip Hollobone, MP for Kettering since 2005 had remained relatively silent on the issues of immigration until 2010. In fact, in 2007, Hollobone was considered “not well known to the public,” and kept a low media profile.”⁷¹ Perhaps this silence on immigration issues is not terribly surprising as his constituency is quite different from Mr. Jackson’s. The 2001 census reports the demographic composition as 2.99 percent non-white, with 1.33 percent born in other EU countries and 3.03 percent born in non-EU countries. In 2001, it also reported 0.43 percent as Muslim, 73.05 percent Christian, and 24.89 percent of no religion or no stated

⁷¹ Leo McKinsty, “How can our grasping MPs justify such huge claims for expenses?” *The Express* October 29, 2007.

religion. Therefore, Kettering, in 2001 at least, maintained a very low share of foreign-born population and Muslim population.

Yet, in early 2010, Hollobone criticized the use of the burka. In the *Daily Mirror* on March 12, he was quoted as saying about the burka: “Covering your face is intimidating and offensive. It’s not an acceptable form of dress. We’re not a **Muslim** country. It goes against our way of life.”⁷² Here, the cleavage is cultural, and in particular religious. It is also divisive, highlighting a cultural threat, identifying Muslims wearing the burka as the out-group. It is interesting that a politician representing a constituency with such a small percentage of Muslim population would focus on this out-group so intently. Again, however, party politics may have played a role in this strategy. UKIP a far-right anti-immigrant party had pursued a hardline against the wearing of the burka and had planned to challenge incumbents in many constituencies. After Hollobone’s movement against the burka, however, UKIP stated that it would not run in Kettering, although the far-right BNP (British National Party) would still pursue a seat in that district.⁷³ In fact, by the end of April of that year, UKIP would campaign *for* Phillip Hollobone in Kettering, assisting him against the BNP movement in his district.⁷⁴ More research is necessary to confirm the role of party politics in influencing Hollobone’s attacks on the burka, but it certainly seems to be a plausible explanation.

Changing demographics and party politics can also influence politicians on the left side of the ideological dimension. An interesting change, from the use of aligning

⁷² “Tory: Burka is offensive – RELIGION” *Daily Mirror*, March 12, 2010.

⁷³ “General Election 2010: UKIP encourages voters to ‘sod the lot,” *The Telegraph*, April 13, 2010.

⁷⁴ “UKIP Leader backing Phillip Hollobone,” *Northants Evening Press*, April 28th, 2010.

frames to conditional frames, is found in a closer examination of Margaret Hodge, Labour MP for Barking. Hodge is herself the daughter of Egyptian immigrants, and in 2002, she suggested acknowledging the positive aspects of the British asylum program rather than scapegoating asylum seekers: “We’re so obsessed with the fear that it will create a rightwing backlash that we fail to argue the contribution that **asylum** seekers can make.”⁷⁵ Here, she identifies a cleavage as entrance and residence. Although not explicitly stated, the comment addresses the “contribution” of asylum seekers, and to make any such contribution they would need to be allowed into the country and to reside within it. The frame is aligning as it directly addresses the “contributions” of this group, asylum seekers, and thus the positive outcomes of including this group within the in-group. She acknowledges, as well, a potential rift within the in-group, between the “rightwing” and everyone else.

However, it may have been Hodge’s implicit exclusion of “rightwing” views from the in-group that caused her to employ different frames later in her career. In 2005 and 2010, Margaret Hodge was forced to address the growing support in her constituency for the BNP. Census data on Barking, in 2001, reported 19.9 percent non-white, 1.11 percent born in the EU and 12.78 percent born outside the EU. According to census reports, the number of foreign-born increased consistently after 2001.⁷⁶ By 2005, Hodge began to change her rhetoric on immigration, culminating in a letter written to the *Observer* years later in May of 2007. This letter received a great deal of attention as it expressly advised changing public housing policy to prioritize “native” interests.

⁷⁵ Jackie Ashley, “Jackie Ashley meets Margaret Hodge, higher education minister,” *The Guardian*, June 24, 2002.

⁷⁶ Waiting on the release of the 2011 census to confirm.

We should also look at drawing up different rules based on, for instance, length of residence, citizenship or national insurance contributions which carry more weight in a transparent points system used to decide who is entitled to access social housing. There are a small number of confirmed **refugees** who, of course, would receive the same entitlements as British citizens. However, most new **migrant** families are economic migrants who choose to come to live and work here. If you choose to come to Britain, should you presume the right to access social housing?⁷⁷

Here the cleavage is public services, particularly public housing. The frame is conditional. Hodge is including, for example, the group of “confirmed refugees” who should have the “same entitlements as British citizens” although she is also suggesting that this inclusion be moderated according to new rules that would account for “length of residence”, which refugees have less of than long-term residing citizens. She also does not exclude “migrant families” but she literally questions excluding them from social housing, thereby making their inclusion conditional on their partial exclusion from certain services. Party politics may also be at play in this example as the BNP attempted to challenge Hodge on the immigration issue and she struggled to formulate a political response that would not alienate her constituents and rather draw them back into the fold.

Hodge describes, in her own words, why such framing may be necessary: “Need is an important factor, but it's not the only factor. This is about a rebalancing; listening and responding to a strongly felt sense of unfairness in the allocation of public resources. In lancing that boil, we could do much to promote understanding which leads to better tolerance and integration in our society.” Again, there is a conditional tone to her language. Newcomers are welcome to be included in the in-group, but that inclusion must

⁷⁷ Margaret Hodge, “To My Fellow Immigrants” *Observer* May 20, 2007.

operate according to certain rules that may prioritize subsets of the in-group over others in order to prevent a “sense of unfairness” and to provide for “better tolerance and integration”. Her reference to “listening and responding” also inspires consideration for that electoral connection between voters and their representatives, and it may be that Hodge is attempting to strengthen a weakening connection in her district.

Such divisive or conditional frames were employed by MPs in constituencies with low to moderate levels of diversity and foreign-born. The question then is: are they ever employed in constituencies that have very high levels of diversity and/or a large foreign-born population? Certainly, we find aligning frames used by MPs representing these districts. For example, Fiona Mactaggart, Labour MP for Slough since 1997, represents constituents where 37.28 percent of the population identifies as non-white, 1.8 percent born in the EU and 20.99 percent born outside the EU. Further, religious populations were reported to be 14.21 percent Muslim, 52.84 percent Christian, and 18.65 percent reporting no religion or not religious. Other sizable groups included Hindus at 4.53 percent and Sikhs at 9.13 percent. Representing such a diverse constituency, Mactaggart stated in 2003: “In Britain we have a proud tradition of supporting free speech and allowing people to follow their own beliefs.”⁷⁸ She proceeded by stating:

British **Muslims** have consistently shown how it is possible to be British, **Muslim** and proud. Throughout the country, **Muslims** with their strong commitment to community development and with enterprise and dedication are playing a vital role in building a strong and vibrant society...For example a British woman can wear the hijab comfortably in public or in a school.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ “Britain will not follow French ban on scarves,” *Birmingham Post* December 19, 2003.

⁷⁹ “Britain will not follow French ban on scarves,” *Birmingham Post* December 19, 2003.

This statement stands in stark contrast to Hollobone's above—though they were notably stated seven years apart. Here, the cleavage is cultural, and religious, where the Muslim population is aligned with and included in the in-group. It also does not acknowledge that there may be dissident voices within the in-group, such as those stated by Hodge above.

It is not only the Muslim population to which Mactaggart applies an aligning frame. In 2004, then the Home Office Minister of Race Equality and Communities, she stated: "More than 50 years ago Britain agreed that oppressed peoples of the world should be given **refuge** here if they are living in genuine fear of their lives in their own country...It is important not to believe the lies that the British National Party and far right groups tell about **refugees** and **immigrants**, who have so much to contribute."⁸⁰ Here, Mactaggart identifies the cleavage: entrance, and uses an aligning frame, emphasizing not only positive outcomes but also acknowledging a right of inclusion provided to "refugees" by the in-group "fifty years ago". She also identifies a rift in the in-group, between "British National Party and far right groups" and everyone else. Therefore, she is acknowledging a possible group she would like to exclude from the in-group, as Hodge had done.

This is a critical consideration for all political issues. Certain interests are ultimately represented by policies and politicians, and others are not. However, immigration issues are different from other policy areas because they may ultimately represent interests that some constituents would not qualify as "constituent interests."

⁸⁰ "Minister says we must all work to drive out racism," *Bristol Evening Post* September 17, 2004.

Representation of newcomers, and including newcomers in the in-group, also raises the question of how this representation and inclusion will impact others from the in-group. This is why it is so important to acknowledge which groups are included, and how, in the in-group. Moreover, inclusion may depend on which issues of immigration is being discussed. Identifying how these inclusions vary according to the groups and the speakers, and across time, will provide a better understanding of how political membership is being and has been debated and negotiated in societies. The evolution of such debates and negotiations should also tell us something not only about the elites who speak on these issues, but the publics to whom they are speaking.

The next section attempts to answer other questions raised by the examples above. That is, how do politicians frame immigration according to the new coding scheme provided? Above we see only Conservative politicians using divisive frames, and we would expect such frames from the BNP and UKIP, but do politicians of other parties like Labour or the Liberal Democrats, use divisive frames? Do only Labour politicians use aligning frames? I will begin to answer some of these questions, and explain the reasons regarding variation in usage.

The 2005 General election: January and February

As I am limited by the number of articles and frames I can analyze due to the comprehensive coding scheme I employ, I chose the period of January 1 – February 15, 2005 for this analysis.⁸¹ This period includes 930 newspaper articles related to immigration issues. It was also on January 24th that the media began to report on

⁸¹ The terrorist attack of 2005 committed in July of that year. Therefore, there is no mention of this event in this time period.

Howard's new immigration policy proposals. Therefore, there are an equal number of days recorded in the dataset before and after this event. Of course, such a limited time frame means I am only able to analyze who spoke how and why, not *whether* someone spoke on the issue since there is no way of knowing that I capture all quotations within the time frame and politicians may have spoken on the subject outside the time frame. In total, I identified 89 politicians speaking on immigration issues within the 930 newspaper articles.

Variation in Political Rhetoric

The politicians quoted in the newspaper articles are members of six political parties. The Conservative and the Labour parties are the largest on the right and left of the ideological center, respectively. The Liberal Democrats are a smaller center-left party, but managed to form a coalition with the Conservative Party later in the 2010 election. The RESPECT Party is a smaller left-wing party and the BNP and Veritas (a fringe party but one I included for comprehensiveness) are smaller right-wing parties, the BNP being on the far-right. There was a Labour majority government under Blair at the time of the content analysis in January and February, 2005. Figure 6.1 presents the average use of frames associated with each party.




Figure 6.1. Politician Average Use of Frames By Party




Figure 6.2. Politician Average Use of Frames on Economic Issues




Figure 6.3. Politician Average Use of Frames on Cultural Issues

The parties are located on the Graph from left to right as they would be placed on an ideological spectrum. Without disaggregating by issue, we observe more divisive frames used by center-right and right-wing parties, and more aligning frames used by center-left and left-wing parties. This seems somewhat consistent with the literature that suggests more exclusive stances persist on the right than on the left. (See Kitschelt and McGann 1997). Conditional frames are also not employed by the two more extreme right and left parties, BNP and RESPECT, which is consistent with their ideological positions on the spectrum. With the exception of Veritas, it is the more mainstream party politicians that employ conditional frames. These findings are consistent with the idea that the divisive, conditional and aligning frames fall along the political ideological dimensions from right to left, and from exclusive to inclusive, with some negotiation of inclusion and exclusion within the center.

However, a more complicated story emerges when we examine the issue frames. On economic and cultural issues, in Figures 6.2 and 6.3, for example, Conservative and Labour parties are somewhat consistent in terms of use of divisive frames, but they do diverge on the political dimension with Conservative Party politicians employing divisive frames more frequently than the Labour party. This makes sense given the Conservative Party's shift to take a hard line on immigration policy during this time. Similarly, the two largest parties' use conditional frames and aligning frames more than divisive frames. This is particularly interesting as it reflects rhetoric by mainstream politicians that focuses mainly on inclusion (even if conditionally) of immigrants economically and culturally.

The data on identity references is somewhat limited. Although I find in my research, and examine in other work, that the media often uses identity references in its reporting on immigration, this is not the case for politicians. Figures 6.4 and 6.5 present the variation in identity references by politicians. These findings are consistent with the immigration patterns of Britain. The groups mentioned by politicians have been important actors in the process of and the dialogue on immigration since colonialism and post-colonialism in the 1960s. For example, the Kenyan and Ugandan Asians took refuge in Britain when they were expelled from their respective African countries in the 1960s. Eastern Europeans and Middle Easterners also have a history of migration to Britain as refugees in the 1990s, 2000s and as immigrant workers in more recent years. Finally, the Muslim population has, in more recent years, become associated with the issues of immigration, and these data are consistent with this association.




Figure 6.4. Sum of Identity References, by Issue




Figure 6.5. Sum of Identity References, by Frame

References to identity vary significantly across parties, however. The Labour Party politicians refer to a range of specific identities whereas Conservative politicians, at

least within this time frame analyzed, focus on the two religions: Muslim and Jewish. Further, both parties refer to the Muslim population with aligning and divisive frames at an almost equal rate. With the exception of Muslims and Eastern Europeans, all groups are referred to with aligning frames. This is an important finding since it directs our attention toward Muslims and Eastern Europeans who seem to hold a position in rhetoric that differs from other groups that are mentioned, and deserve further exploration and explanation. Further, aside from these two groups, it seems that when politicians mention specific identities, aside from immigration status (i.e. immigrant, refugee, etc.), it is with an aligning frame.

The story of the political rhetoric can also be analyzed in a more fine-grained way by looking at variation *within* the parties. For example, we know Howard decided to focus on immigration policy (the political issue frame), but how did other Conservatives speak about immigration issues over this time period? And how did the other parties vary internally? Interestingly, there is great variation within the Conservative Party regarding the use of frames for each issue. Figures 6.6 and 6.7 show within party variation for the Conservative and Labour Parties on the Cultural Issues.⁸² Although I include the politicians' names on the x-axis, their names are not the critical feature of the figures. Rather, the figures show how use of frames varies across individual politicians, even in the same political party.

⁸² The graphs do not show averages of frames, however, but do show the counts. Doing so allows for a more accurate depiction of the data due to the small sample sizes.




Figure 6.6. Conservative Party References (Simple Count) to Cultural Issues




Figure 6.7. Labour Party References (Simple Count) to Cultural Issues

There are several important observations to make regarding these results. First, although it is the right-wing Parties that are more often associated with making cultural references regarding immigration—often highlighting potential cultural threats derived from immigration to the nation—it is the Labour Party politicians that are more often reported in the news during this time period on this issue area. Further, the use of divisive frames on cultural issues regarding immigration is observed within both Parties but is not dominant. Similar findings exist when the economic and political issue areas are analyzed. Importantly, then, we need to examine further the reasons for this intra-party variation.

Taking the analysis one level deeper, we find that certain politicians also vary in their use of frames. Although the number of representatives, as well as the data, is more limited for more extreme parties, such as the BNP, Veritas and the RESPECT party, it is interesting to note that these extreme parties are more cohesive in their use of frames at the politician and the party level than the two major parties. This is consistent with the idea that mainstream parties may need to appeal to a wider audience with more varied political preferences than those at the extreme ends of the ideological spectrum.

The above analysis presents an empirical puzzle: why does there exist variation in the use of frames between politicians, even within the same party. Below, I propose hypotheses to explain these variations. The findings begin to tell a story about how political membership is negotiated by political leaders through their rhetoric. In the UK, for example, we see that immigration issues are not only discussed in divisive ways, and that the most negotiation, or variation in the use of frames, occurs at the middle of the

political spectrum. We also find that different kinds of issues (or potential cleavages) are more often associated with certain types of frames by certain parties. Finally, we may have expected more consistency in the use of frames within parties, but these data show that within parties in the middle of the spectrum, there is great variation in the use of frames. This begs the questions as to why such inter- and intra-party variation occurs.

Explaining The Use of Frames

Now that I have provided an overview of the variation in rhetoric of politicians between and within parties, we also have a better understanding of the political rhetoric variable to be explained in this paper. But it still remains to be seen why such variations exist within the parties. The theory put forth in this paper suggests that situational factors (i.e. context) at the sub-national level (specifically the parliamentary constituency level⁸³) influences politicians' usage of certain rhetoric on immigration issues, but that we should not neglect the role of party politics. I argue that party politics, explained below, also influence the use of rhetoric.

Using the theoretical concept of “political membership” not only helps in analyzing the framing of immigration, but also in understanding why politicians would employ certain frames over others. Politicians' rhetoric may be constrained by their need to maintain the electoral connection with their constituents. Therefore, the make-up of those constituencies would influence how that electoral connection is strengthened. The number of foreign-born and asylum-seekers, and the overall diversity in the constituency will matter to the politician—creating constraints on and opportunities for the rhetoric

⁸³ The sub-national level is the parliamentary constituency level because this is the level of politics MPs will be most influenced by since it outlines their electorate, just as it would do for other political issues.

employed regarding immigration issues. However, it may be that the politician is not so concerned with an electoral connection—perhaps her seat is a safe seat. On the other hand, the seat may be particularly threatened, by the advancement of an extreme right party or the competitiveness of another mainstream party in the district, for example. Therefore, I argue that a politician's endeavor to garner votes and support in a constituency, which is in part reflected in their framing of immigration issues, is mediated by the politician's constituency profile as well as the political party politics currently at play in the district. In other words, politicians will make several decisions regarding the issue of immigration. First, they will decide whether to talk about it at all. Thus, if a politician avoids the issue altogether, this is not without careful consideration and forethought. Second, if a politician chooses to speak on the issue of immigration, their words will matter. Each word selected by a representative or candidate will create a certain message, or frame in this context, that is distinguishable from other messages or frames. These choices regarding these words, messages and frames are deliberate, and part of a carefully crafted political strategy. Of course, mistakes happen—words are used by accident or microphones are left on when they should not be, and messages are sent without intent. These kinds of gaffes are not included in this analysis simply due to the lack of any record of them during the time frame I examine, though they too would be interesting to examine. Rather, this analysis maintains that political strategies start with carefully selected words that form frames and send messages deliberately.

This paper explores four hypotheses regarding the use of particular frames. First, there are intuitive hypotheses regarding the use of frame by parties:

*H1: On immigration, politicians of Right-wing parties will use **divisive** frames more than left-wing parties*

*H2: On immigration, politicians of Left-wing parties will use **aligning** frames more than right-wing parties*

These hypotheses do not delve into the questions as to why these frames are not being used uniformly *within* parties, however. In order to examine this question, I integrate contextual and party politics factors to try and explain variation in the use of frames.

I hypothesize that divisive frames will be more likely to be used in competitive districts. These political debates may utilize the issue of immigration to generate political support by putting forth a political message that seems to indicate responsiveness and attention to their electorate, by placing native interests first and foremost. Further, the immigration issue can act as a valence issue, or an issue that crosses party lines, and therefore can help politicians to attract their core or swing voters if they espouse a native-centered, divisive frame in a district where anti-immigration sentiment is high.

H3: On immigration, divisive frames will be used by politicians (incumbents and challengers) in competitive districts, and where there is higher unemployment and lower percentages of foreign-born, non-white and Muslim populations.

Of course, this strategy may not work if there is also a population in the district that is pro-immigrant or immigrant themselves. For example, where there are larger populations of foreign-born, non-white and Muslim people, there may also exist larger voting blocs composed of these individuals. As these constituencies grow in size, they may also increase their political influence. As a result, it may go against the politician's

interests to employ divisive frames where such stances may alienate voters who share characteristics or sympathies with the groups placed in the category of the excluded “other” by divisive frames. High unemployment levels, on the other hand, draws on the group threat literature that suggests that immigration may stimulate the threat response, especially among those who may be at higher risk if placed in competition with newcomers. The unemployed may be such a group—believing that newcomers will mean more competition for jobs. Politicians may respond to this fear, employing divisive frames where unemployment is high in order to attract voters who wish to know that their livelihoods will not be threatened by newcomers by adopting more exclusive political stances toward them.

I argue the use of aligning frames stems from a different set of conditions.

H4: Aligning frames are employed by incumbent politicians in non-competitive districts, and with low unemployment and high percentages of foreign-born, non-white and Muslim populations.

Politicians in safe districts may prefer aligning frames over others as they would be more protected from backlash (relative to those in competitive seats) to such an inclusive political stance toward the “other”. This also assumes, however, that core political supporters would not retaliate against such a stance and the politician would be making this same assumption. Regarding the demographic conditions, the same logic persists here as in H3. Where there are higher percentages of foreign-born, non-white and Muslim populations, there may also be larger voting blocs composed of these groups who

would likely be more responsive to aligning frames. Low unemployment, on the other hand, may reflect less susceptibility to the group threat response within the constituency, and thus more willingness to adopt an aligning stance toward newcomers.

Data & Methods

The data on political rhetoric has been described in detail above, and I merge this data with British Election and British Election Survey data based on the parliamentary constituency of the Member of Parliament.⁸⁴ This data includes election data at the parliamentary constituency level for 2001 and 2005 as well as constituency level demographic data. The survey data will be analyzed in the next section. I use OLS models to test the hypotheses above. Below, I describe the operationalizations for each variable.

Divisive & Aligning In order to operationalize these dependent variables, I use the

original dataset that includes the coding for all political rhetoric captured during the time frame: January 1, 2005 – February 15, 2005. These are dummy variables.

Parties I include a dummy variable identifying the politician's party membership (i.e. Labour, Conservative, etc.).

Competitive Seats for Challengers and Incumbents The designation of unsafe seats is taken from the Norris Election dataset, where districts are coded as being very marginal or very safe along a 5 point scale. I create a dummy variable that is

⁸⁴ *The British Parliamentary Constituency Database, 1992-2005*, Release 1.3 compiled by Pippa Norris.

coded as 1 if the district is “ultra-marginal” or “fairly marginal” and 0 if the district is considered to be “fairly safe”, “very safe” or “ultra safe”.

Safe Seats Again, using the Norris Election Dataset, I create a dummy variable that is coded as 1 if the district is “very safe” or “ultra safe” and 0 otherwise.

Note: There is a third category of seats termed “fairly safe” and these are the omitted category.

Demographics Percentages of migrant, non-white and Muslim populations within the district. This information is from the Norris Election dataset. I also include the squared percentages of these groups in order to account for non-linear relationships.⁸⁵

Controls

Aside from the key independent and dependent variables above, I also control for other important variables.

Constituency Salient in the News It is possible that the ways in which politicians from those districts speak about immigration is correlated in some way with frequent media coverage.

Using the media coverage data that I compiled, I create a dummy variable to account for whether the district has been discussed in the media in reference to immigration issues more than other districts. Therefore, any district that has more than four frames associated with it is considered to be a salient constituency in the news,

⁸⁵ Some scholars suggest that contextual influences, such as demographics, do not operate linearly—that is the effect of larger numbers of immigrants in an area will not have a linear effect on dependent variables, but rather may follow a non-linear or curvilinear pattern.

which is approximately 15% of the constituencies mentioned. These values are not derived from the politician's reference to immigration, but rather newspaper reporting on the issue

Competitive Frames It may be that specific frames are more likely to be used when there is a political debate at play within the district. I create a dummy variable, where "1" accounts for more than one politician referencing the issue of immigration for a given district. That is, in certain districts, the incumbent as well as the challenger is recorded as employing a certain frame.

Ethnic Minority Politicians This variable is coded as 1 if the politician is of an ethnic minority group, 0 otherwise. This data is drawn from the Norris Election dataset. It will be important to note whether this identity characteristic of the politician plays any role in their use of frames. I expect these politicians to use aligning frames more than divisive or even conditional.

Findings and Analysis

In order to establish the factors that influence politicians' use of certain frames regarding immigration, I use OLS to estimate the relationship between the use of certain frames and the variables influencing their use. Table 6.4 presents the two Models I run; Model 1 shows divisive frames as the dependent variable and Model 2 shows the aligning frames as the dependent variable. I will discuss Model 1 first.

In both Models 1 and 2, the Conservative Party is the baseline category. Therefore, politicians who are from the BNP and Veritas use more divisive frames than Conservative politicians, but Labour, Liberal Democrats and RESPECT politicians do

not. This is consistent with H1 and H2 above. Right-wing politicians have more of a tendency to use divisive frames than left-wing politicians. Model 1 also shows no support for demographic explanatory variables, nor does it show support for the other controls.

Nonetheless, we do observe that incumbents and challengers in unsafe districts present a strong positive and significant relationship with the use of the divisive frame. These findings support H3. Surprisingly, we also find that challengers in safe seats use divisive frames. These results tell us politicians in the baseline category—constituencies that are considered “fairly safe”—as well as incumbents in safe seats, are not likely to use divisive frames. This suggests that divisive frames are used in more unstable constituencies, i.e. competitive or unsafe, or by politicians who wish to destabilize an incumbent. This is an important finding for it implies that divisive frames are used strategically for political purposes.

Table 6.4. Determinants of Politician's Use of Frames

VARIABLES	(1) Divisive	(2) Aligning
<i>Party Affiliations & Party Politics</i>		
Labour	0.0783 (0.080)	0.2580** (0.081)
Liberal Democrats	0.1531 (0.106)	0.2478* (0.108)
RESPECT	-0.5336 (0.324)	0.4697 (0.329)
Veritas	0.6971*** (0.139)	-0.0367 (0.141)
BNP	0.6707** (0.240)	-0.2277 (0.244)
Incumbent in Unsafe Seat (determined in 2001)	0.3197*** (0.089)	0.0804 (0.090)
Challenger for Unsafe Seat (determined in 2001)	0.6249** (0.223)	-0.0727 (0.226)
Incumbent in Safe Seat (determined in 2001)	0.0945 (0.069)	0.1914** (0.071)
Challenger for Safe Seat (determined in 2001)	0.2798* (0.139)	0.1404 (0.141)
<i>Context in District & Other Controls</i>		
% Muslim	-0.0254 (0.018)	-0.0069 (0.019)
% Muslim^2	0.0006 (0.000)	0.0002 (0.000)
% Foreign-Born	0.0048 (0.022)	-0.0263 (0.022)
% Foreign-Born^2	-0.0003 (0.000)	0.0011* (0.000)
% Non-White	0.0005 (0.018)	0.0221 (0.018)
% Non-White^2	0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0005* (0.000)
% Unemployed	-0.0422 (0.032)	-0.0147 (0.032)

Table 6.4. Determinants of Politician's Use of Frames (continued)

VARIABLES	(1) Divisive	(2) Aligning
Constit. Salient in News	-0.1407 (0.093)	0.0844 (0.094)
Competitive Frames	-0.0497 (0.094)	0.2047* (0.095)
Politician is Ethnic Minority	-0.1478 (0.129)	0.3113* (0.131)
Constant	0.3237* (0.144)	0.1011 (0.146)
Observations	219	219
R-squared	0.3529	0.3514
Adj. R-squared	0.2912	0.2895

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Aligning frames reveal a slightly different story. Model 2 shows that Labour and Liberal Democrats have a significant positive relationship with the use of aligning frames. Again, this is consistent with the H2 above that left-wing party politicians will use aligning frames more than right-wing party politicians. Again, we see the importance of party politics in the use of aligning frames, which is exactly the opposite of the divisive frames. Incumbents in safe districts are more likely to use aligning frames, supporting H4, although there is no such finding for challengers. It appears that there may be more incentive for incumbents to espouse aligning frames than for challengers to do so. This finding requires further inquiry in subsequent studies, which delves beyond the scope of this dissertation. Perhaps incumbents in safe districts benefit from the use of aligning frames because of the preferences of their core constituency—who would not be won over by a challenger using such frames. Or, perhaps safe incumbents use their stability to promote alliances between immigrants and natives in their district. As discovered in earlier chapters, positive frames did contribute to more positive feelings

about immigration, and therefore aligning frames may have similar effects. These are important questions for further research.

Regarding the demographic variables, the percent of foreign-born squared as well as the percent of the non-white population squared are both significant. Therefore, contextual factors do influence the use of aligning frames as H4 predicts. Interestingly, however, these variables operate in opposite ways. Where the percent of foreign born is high, politicians are more likely to use aligning frames regarding immigration, but they are less likely to use aligning frames in areas where the percent of non-white population is high. The fact that these different types of populations may influence politicians' choices on the use of aligning frames differently is an important finding. It suggests that diverse populations may vary in their political make-up and their political preferences insofar as that diversity varies. In other words, a large foreign-born population may be termed "diverse", and a large non-white population may also be termed "diverse". Yet, these *diverse* populations do not necessarily have the same interests regarding immigration, and the absence of a white majority does not guarantee a population who would respond positively to an aligning frame. Therefore, perhaps foreign-born populations, not surprisingly, would be supportive of hearing aligning frames regarding immigration, whereas non-white minority populations, or those who have resided in Britain for a longer period, may not be as supportive and therefore would influence politicians against the use of aligning frames. The data analyzed here does not allow for identifying the voting population within the foreign-born—and therefore establishing a direct link between their preferences and politicians wishing to gain their votes. These

findings encourage continued attention to explaining the role of demographic context in the immigration process.

Finally, politicians who are ethnic minorities are more likely to use to aligning frames, which may be influenced by a kind of descriptive representation in that district. Further, when multiple politicians are speaking about immigration issues in a district (i.e. competitive frames), it is aligning frames, not divisive, as Model 2 shows, that are more likely to be present. Again, it is important to acknowledge the data limitations regarding this finding as the time frame and method of extraction of quotations may not have caught all competitive frames. Thus, this result may require further analysis in future work.

These two models reveal some important findings regarding the use of framing and the theories of political membership. First, it may be the case that contextual conditions do play a role in the use of frames, but it is a more complicated role than previously conceptualized—at least in Britain for the time period examined. Further, the role of party politics, namely the competitiveness of districts can influence the ways in which politicians frame immigration issues and place newcomers within and outside of the in-group.

Conclusion

The framing scheme used in this paper accounts for complexity not captured in a positive-negative dimensional measure of political rhetoric. This paper finds that the negotiation of political membership of immigrants by politicians may be influenced not only by context and demographics, but even more so by politics at play in various districts. Therefore, in order to understand the reasons for and influence of political

messaging on immigration, the power of politics across a country seems to outweigh, or at least compete with the power of contextual factors. Negotiating political membership of immigrants, then, falls into the broader negotiation of political membership for all constituents, and thus depends on factors that may be far removed from the issue of immigration.

This chapter establishes that politicians vary in their use of messages regarding immigration, even within parties, and provides a theory for the reasons why politicians convey these differing messages about immigration. Although scholars have established that concern for the personal vote is often lowest in an electoral system like Britain's (Carey and Shugart 1995), we observe a break with true party discipline on the issue of immigration within parties. However, perhaps the concern for a personal vote on this issue, and others like it that cross party lines, is in fact a strategy of party discipline—seeking to maintain the seat for the Party by stretching beyond the Party line? This is an interesting question that falls beyond the scope of this dissertation, but would be worth further exploration in the future. In either case, the findings have important implications for analyzing political strategies and political messaging on immigration, and shows that the two are related. Although it may be reasonable to associate certain political parties with certain kinds of immigration messaging, the findings in this chapter suggest that such associations may gloss over a more interesting story of intra-party variation and district-specific strategizing on how to address important issues.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

This dissertation set out to examine and explain how messages from the media and politicians influence people's opinions on immigration—specifically the importance of the immigration issue and feelings about immigration. I questioned whether all messages impact the public in the same way, or if the source of the message mattered in terms of its influence. Importantly, I found that messages do vary according to source, both in their form and influence. Refocusing the analysis on the language used in messaging across different sources, I used manual and computerized content analysis to establish what frames and agenda-setting look like in the real world.

The previous chapters have shown that messages from the media and politicians move public opinion in different ways, providing evidence that both the source and the content of the message matter in determining how messages influence feelings about immigration and its importance within the British public. Further, I have demonstrated that by “source” I do not only mean the media versus politicians, but also different types of media and different politicians. These various sources of messages influence opinions on immigration through at least two mechanisms—agenda-setting and framing—and the dissertation provides novel ways to identify and measure these mechanisms.

The Argument & Findings

Chapter 2 reviewed numerous cases in British history in which politicians deemed the nature of words and messages regarding immigration to be of the utmost importance—warranting careful consideration and planning. In reading these documents,

it also became clear that in addition to the media, we should look to other actors in society whose messages may influence the public, such as politicians. Especially in terms of immigration, we may hear about messages from the extreme groups on various aspects of immigration, but it is important to examine politicians' messages across the ideological spectrum and within political parties. Similarly, it is just as important to examine variation within media sources.

I have argued that messages do matter for they influence the development of opinions on immigration, but that they matter in different ways, depending on their source and their content. In particular, I suggested an approach that examined the ways in which framing and agenda-setting influence the perceived importance of immigration and feelings about this issue, focusing on how we operationalize both of these mechanisms, and identifying the variation in messages and their influence between and within the media and political parties.

In Chapter 5, I found that the media and politicians do influence the perceived importance of immigration through agenda-setting on this issue. I also found that their influence was immediate in nature, influencing opinion in the month prior to a public opinion survey on the importance of immigration, and weakened over time. However, this is only a *direct* effect. The chapter also informed us that public opinion on the perceived importance of immigration at time t influences public opinion at $t+1$. If agenda-setting by the media and politicians affects public opinion at time t , then this messaging actually has long-lasting *indirect* effects on opinion. Thus, messaging may very well be able to change the trajectory of public opinion on the perceived importance of immigration.

Further, this chapter also helped to establish that although both the media and politicians influenced the public in determining what Britain's most important issue should be, the media was stronger and more consistent in its influence. No variation in the type of agenda-setting used (i.e. emphasizing immigration, asylum-seekers or refugees) resulted in any difference in effect on opinions. On the other hand, the variation in agenda-setting of politicians resulted in opposing outcomes, in which references to immigration or immigrants increased the perceived importance of immigration, while references to refugees decreased these perceptions. Therefore, there may ways in which politicians or other actors use agenda-setting to de-emphasize certain issues, attempting to prevent certain issues from getting onto the agenda. This question is ripe for further research.

In Chapter 6, I focused solely on the media, and the ways in which newspaper frames and agenda-setting on immigration influenced the perceived importance of immigration *and* feelings about immigration. Unlike Chapter 5, this chapter examined agenda-setting and framing across different kinds of media sources, including nine national newspapers. I found that media agenda-setting can be operationalized and measured in different ways, and that measurement affects whether we determine agenda-setting to be influential. I also found that agenda-setting influence weakened between 2005 and 2010. As discussed in Chapter 5, the 2008 economic crisis weakened the agenda-setting influence of the media and politicians in Britain. This is consistent with the findings in Chapter 6. From these two analyses, we begin to ask not only whether and how agenda-setting works, but also when.

Importantly, Chapter 6 finds that the power of positive frames has been understudied and under-appreciated. Scholars often focus on negative frames and their effects, but my analysis suggests that we ought to consider more carefully the influence of positive frames as they do have an effect on feelings on immigration. Chapter 6 also produces original framing categories that delve beyond a positive-negative dimension. In fact, including my new threat frame category, the association between immigration topics and other important issues of concern to the public, results in washing out any effects of negative frames on negative feelings about immigration. Some may wonder how a threat frame, which in another context may be innocuous, can increase negative feelings on immigration. I argue that the association of immigration with these other areas of concern to the public (e.g. culture, economy, crime, etc.) highlight their *potential* conflict with newcomers, and thereby increase negative feelings toward immigration. My results confirm these findings, and warrant further research on these frames.

Finally, Chapter 7 explores the reasons why politicians use the frames they do, and establishes that these frames vary between political parties and within them. I find that politicians are influenced in their use of frames by the demographics of their district but also the party politics at play—specifically whether their seat is in a safe or competitive district. Incumbents in safe seats were more likely to use frames that I defined as “aligning”(i.e. highlight similarities and shared goals between immigrants and natives) than politicians in competitive seats or in seats that were considered neither safe nor competitive. On the other hand, incumbents and challengers in competitive seats and challengers in safe seats were all more likely to use divisive frames (i.e. those highlighting conflict between immigrants and natives) than incumbents in safe seats or

challengers and incumbents in seats that were considered neither safe nor competitive. These findings are important, for they highlight the relevance of politics in politician messaging. In future work, it will also be important to examine how these politicians influence opinions on immigration through their messages, and whether the use of frames and their influence on public opinion is also informed by the rank and position of politicians in the party.

The findings in this chapter are useful to scholars of integration and public opinion literatures as well as of media and rhetoric. The framing scheme provides a method for analyzing membership in society as conveyed by the speaker. This method of framing analysis then may be useful to scholars studying and attempting to assess the integration of certain migrant or minority groups in society. (Hochschild and Mollenkopf, 2008) Further, now that we have empirical evidence for the observed variation in political rhetoric, we can move our analyses of the effects of elite rhetoric on public opinion forward, both in real world examinations and laboratory experiments. In other work, I apply the findings regarding the “threat” frames to designing a survey experiment through YouGov, in which I test the effects of the source and frames on opinions on immigration. The findings confirm the results found in Chapter 6 of this dissertation.

Finally, this paper is a contribution to our understanding of the inclusion and exclusion of immigrants as well as the strategies of politicians regarding their political rhetoric on this inclusion and exclusion of the newcomer. In conclusion, the analysis confirms the need to delve beyond distinctions of partisanship or positive versus negative, and to consider the appropriate philosophies with which to examine, classify, and understand the language used in messages.

Implications

The analysis in this dissertation focuses on British cases, but the findings are relevant and applicable to countries around the world. In Europe, certainly, very similar debates are ongoing in the media and among politicians, and at certain times we even hear these messages repeated across countries. For example, in October, 2010, German Chancellor, Angela Merkel declared multiculturalism had failed, and in February of the next year, Prime Minister of Britain, David Cameron, and French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, agreed. These three leaders faced challenges within their country regarding immigration, diversity and the policies regarding both. Based on the findings in this dissertation, these messages and the media reporting on them would have an effect on public attitudes on the importance of the immigration issue and feelings about it.

Essentially, now that we know that messages matter, it is necessary to understand more clearly how they work, and whether they work the ways I suggest they do in contexts outside of Britain. That requires identifying the different sources of messages and accurately measuring their agenda-setting or framing of immigration in order to understand how they differ across source and in effects on opinion.

These overarching arguments put forth in this paper are transferable to other contexts, and some authors confirm this in their own work. For example, in the United States, the media has focused on issues of immigration, and politicians providing certain messages on the issue at certain points in time. As stated in Chapter 3, Dunaway et al. 2010 point to the variation in influence of US newspapers in influencing opinions on immigration, and Merolla et al. (2013) examine the ways in which print media and cable news frame immigrants and immigration policy in different ways. Although these studies

do not focus on politicians, they have findings that are similar to those in this dissertation, namely that media sources vary in their agenda-setting and their framing of the immigration issue. Therefore, this kind of variation in messaging does not appear to be Britain-specific.

Moving Forward

My dissertation advances the study of political science by explaining how and when messages matter, influencing opinions on immigration, and how they vary across sources. To my knowledge, systematic analysis of the messaging of politicians on immigration is rare, and therefore this dissertation helps to expand our knowledge on this topic. Further, I establish the limits of partisan or negative frame effects, turning our attention to other powerful frames. The dissertation reaffirms the importance of messages in influencing opinions on immigration, but it also provides a thorough investigation of the different forms these messages take, and how they are used differently by media sources and politicians. The findings also contribute to other important areas of study, aside from the power of messaging. My work analyzes and explains the role of political actors in developing messages and swaying public opinion on immigration, specifically, which is critical to understanding the development of immigration policy and the evolution of intergroup relations.

In explaining public opinion on immigration, or other issues, scholars often utilize the benefits of experimental surveys and experiments to test the influence of certain kinds of messages on public opinion. These are very valuable tests that provided a foundation for my own research. Yet, it is also important to assess variation in messaging that exists in the real world, and to test these ideas outside the laboratory. My dissertation

contributes to the foundations of literature on the power of messaging, and now we can return to the lab with new frames and sources to test that are drawn from the lived experience.

Finally, we now have a better understanding of *how* these messages really work—recognizing that the source that delivers the message can be as important as its content. Certainly the content is also critical—it may influence opinions in surprising ways. Moreover, there may be times when messaging works and times when it does not. With these foundations, we can move forward in our understanding of how messages matter, knowing more about how public opinion will develop and change depending on the messages received.

APPENDIX A




Figure A.4.1 All events alongside Perceived Importance




Figure A.4.2 Correlations between the Independent Variables and Perceived Importance of Immigration





Figure A.4.3. Correlations Preceding (Left) and Following (Right) 2008 Structural Break

Time Series Analysis

Structural Break

Analysis of unknown structural breaks finds breaks in 2008, from March – May using the Quandt likelihood ratio.

I test for autocorrelation, to ensure that values in one period are not dependent only on the preceding values. We can understand these as the errors following a first-order autoregressive process (AR1) or first-order moving average process (MA1).



The graph above reveals an AR1 process but not an MA1 process. Although the data is stationary, the AR1 process means that there should be enough memory in the process so that the correlation of Issue Importance today with months prior is statistically significant. The MA1 process would mean correlation would only last one period.

A correlogram confirms that variables are correlated with values preceding them. In fact, the previous value of perceived importance has a correlation with the present value of value: .9038. There is a declining correlation in subsequent lags of the variable. Partial correlations coefficients reveal a steep decline after the first lag.

Table A.4.1 Robustness Checks

	Politician References		Media References
VARIABLES	All	References to Refugees	
<i>Lagged 1 month</i>			
Parliamentary References to Immigration			0.13
			(0.20)
Parliamentary References to Asylum Seekers			-0.19
			(0.20)
Parliamentary References to Refugees			0.72*
			(0.34)
Media	0.32	0.18***	
	(0.18)	(0.04)	
Perceived Importance	5.59	-0.96	3.48
	(5.87)	(1.13)	(3.34)
Unemployment	106.92	59.00***	-142.20*
	(84.90)	(15.48)	(65.57)
Satisfaction	0.36	0.32	-1.32
	(5.45)	(1.04)	(4.07)
Foreign Born	23.50	21.18*	-36.30
	(55.62)	(10.32)	(38.10)
Constant	-588.35	-472.46***	1,369.03**
	(659.37)	(121.09)	(510.07)
Observations	121	108	108
R-squared	0.10317	0.26577	0.13757
Adj. R-squared	0.06418	0.22978	0.07720

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Appendix B

Search terms in Lexis Nexus for 2005:

HLEAD(EU) AND HLEAD(constitution) OR HLEAD(EU) AND HLEAD(referendum)
HLEAD(Crime) OR HLEAD(Criminal)
HLEAD(Education)
HLEAD(climate change) OR HLEAD(global warming) OR HLEAD(pollution)
HLEAD(NHS)
HLEAD(Taxation) OR HLEAD(Tax cut) OR HLEAD(Tax bill)
HLEAD(Economy) OR HLEAD(Economic)
HLEAD(Iraq War) OR HLEAD(Iraq)
HLEAD(Terrorism) OR HLEAD(Terrorist)
HLEAD(Pension)
HLEAD(Immigration) OR HLEAD(Immigrant)
HLEAD(asylum) OR HLEAD(refugee)

Search terms in Lexis Nexus for 2010:

HLEAD(Crime) OR HLEAD(Criminal)
HLEAD(Education)
HLEAD(climate change) OR HLEAD(global warming) OR HLEAD(pollution)
HLEAD(NHS)
HLEAD(Economy) OR HLEAD(Economic)
HLEAD(Terrorism) OR HLEAD(Terrorist)
HLEAD(Spending) OR (Social services)
HLEAD(unemployment)
HLEAD(euro) OR HLEAD(EU)
HLEAD(consumer debt)
HLEAD(Immigration) OR HLEAD(Immigrant)
HLEAD(asylum) OR HLEAD(refugee)

Variable Specifications

Demographics

Age This is a continuous variable for a person's age at the time of the survey.

Male A dummy variable for male respondents.

Married A dummy variable for being married

Further Education A dummy for continuing education beyond the age of 19.

Union A dummy variable for belonging to a union.

Rent A dummy variable for renting, not owning a household.

Income A continuous variable, increasing in income level.

Church of England A dummy variable for membership in the Church of England.

Catholic A dummy variable for membership in the Catholic Church.

Relationship to Government These variables captures a respondent's perceived relationship with the government and/or representatives.

Unfair This is a dummy variable in response to the question of whether the respondent thinks the Government treats people like them unfairly. It is a 1 if they answer yes and a 0 otherwise.

Worse This is a dummy variable capturing whether the respondent thinks the national economy has gotten worse, coded as a 1 if they think it is worse or much worse, and 0 otherwise.

Partisanship These variables are coded 1 for belonging to the Party of interest, and a 0 otherwise: *Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, UKIP, Green, BNP*

Changed Readership These dummy variables reflect whether respondent changed to reading a different daily newspaper in 2010. It is coded 1 if they changed to reading the newspaper and 0 otherwise: *New to Telegraph, New to The Express, New to The Daily Mail, New to The Times, New to Financial, New to Times, New to Sun, New to Mirror, New to Guardian, New to Independent*

Contextual Variables

Percent Migrant This variable is a continuous variable for the percent of migrants living in one's district, derived from 2001 census data and merged by the British Election Study with the survey data at the parliamentary constituency level.

Percent Migrant squared This is the same variable as above but squared in order to account for a non-linear relationship.

Percent Minority This variable is a continuous variable for the percent of non-white residents living in one's district, derived from 2001 census data and merged by the British Election Study with the survey data at the parliamentary constituency level.

Percent Minority squared This is the same variable as above but squared in order to account for a non-linear relationship.

Note: The variable for ideology is not included in the Internet 2005 – 2010 dataset.

Table A.5.1 Explaining Perceived Importance of Immigration

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Issue Importance During Campaign 2005	Issue Importance During Campaign 2010	Issue Importance During Campaign 2005	Issue Importance During Campaign 2010	Issue Importance During Campaign 2005	Issue Importance During Campaign 2010
Age	-0.00200** (0.001)	-0.00002 (0.001)	-0.00198** (0.001)	-0.00011 (0.001)	-0.00183** (0.001)	-0.00009 (0.001)
Male	-0.01542 (0.017)	-0.03013 (0.017)	-0.01872 (0.017)	-0.02894 (0.017)	-0.01953 (0.017)	-0.02937 (0.017)
Married	0.06664*** (0.018)	0.03560* (0.018)	0.06185*** (0.018)	0.03407 (0.018)	0.06058*** (0.018)	0.03374 (0.018)
Education	-0.09996*** (0.018)	-0.09762*** (0.017)	-0.08818*** (0.017)	-0.09525*** (0.017)	-0.08512*** (0.017)	-0.09478*** (0.017)
Union	-0.01842 (0.018)	0.04619 (0.106)	-0.01813 (0.018)	0.03308 (0.101)	-0.01861 (0.018)	0.03200 (0.100)
Rent	0.01428 (0.023)	0.01510 (0.022)	0.00879 (0.023)	0.01352 (0.022)	0.00809 (0.023)	0.01301 (0.022)
Income	-0.00558 (0.003)	-0.01083*** (0.003)	-0.00564 (0.003)	-0.01075*** (0.003)	-0.00504 (0.003)	-0.01071*** (0.003)
Church of England	0.03581 (0.019)	0.00143 (0.019)	0.02685 (0.019)	-0.00352 (0.019)	0.02768 (0.019)	-0.00423 (0.019)
Catholic	-0.02622 (0.031)	0.02471 (0.037)	-0.02980 (0.031)	0.02394 (0.036)	-0.03080 (0.031)	0.02368 (0.037)
Asian	0.06412 (0.072)	-0.09172* (0.039)	0.05854 (0.070)	-0.08972* (0.040)	0.06011 (0.070)	-0.08910* (0.040)
Black	-0.01220 (0.082)	0.05638 (0.090)	-0.02647 (0.080)	0.05990 (0.091)	-0.02129 (0.080)	0.06055 (0.090)
Unfair	0.08559*** (0.019)	0.03244 (0.018)	0.08283*** (0.019)	0.03109 (0.018)	0.08382*** (0.019)	0.03122 (0.018)
Worse	0.05187* (0.020)	0.02559 (0.017)	0.05027* (0.020)	0.02315 (0.017)	0.05330** (0.020)	0.02340 (0.017)
Labour	-0.03997 (0.021)	0.01588 (0.023)	-0.03724 (0.021)	0.01287 (0.023)	-0.04101* (0.021)	0.01085 (0.023)
Conserv.	-0.01146 (0.028)	0.04302 (0.024)	-0.01866 (0.027)	0.03756 (0.024)	-0.01453 (0.027)	0.03761 (0.024)
Liberal Democrat	-0.07280* (0.030)	-0.03132 (0.027)	-0.06389* (0.030)	-0.03083 (0.027)	-0.06549* (0.030)	-0.03182 (0.027)
UKIP	-0.05058 (0.064)	0.10847* (0.053)	-0.05969 (0.062)	0.09981 (0.052)	-0.05976 (0.062)	0.09905 (0.052)
Green	-0.15517*** (0.028)	-0.01388 (0.049)	-0.13999*** (0.029)	-0.01021 (0.049)	-0.13678*** (0.030)	-0.00926 (0.049)
BNP	0.48457*** (0.125)	0.47351*** (0.071)	0.50646*** (0.125)	0.46246*** (0.071)	0.50817*** (0.125)	0.46155*** (0.071)
Percent Migrant	-0.07531* (0.00653)	0.00653 (0.00653)	-0.07054* (0.00653)	0.00633 (0.00633)	-0.06809* (0.00653)	0.00655 (0.00655)

	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Percent Migrant Squared	0.01272	-0.00619	0.01203	-0.00613	0.01155	-0.00620
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Percent Minority	0.00120	0.00270	0.00089	0.00272	0.00072	0.00274
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Percent Minority Squared	-0.00001	-0.00003	-0.00000	-0.00003	0.00000	-0.00003
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Proportion of Immigration Articles Relative to Whole Newspaper	1.67834	2.62052				
	(1.662)	(2.773)				
Proportion of Immigration Articles Relative to Other Imp Issue Articles			0.84919***	0.97965**		
			(0.165)	(0.305)		
Proportion of Immigration References Relative to all references in Immigration Articles					6.87532***	6.61450***
					(1.378)	(1.941)
Constant	0.29222***	0.15979	0.24850***	0.15927	0.23800***	0.15760
	(0.044)	(0.115)	(0.045)	(0.110)	(0.045)	(0.109)
Observations	2,728	2,607	2,728	2,607	2,728	2,607
R-Squared	0.07242	0.08005	0.08322	0.08449	0.08243	0.08514
Adj. R-Squared	0.06418	0.07150	0.07508	0.07598	0.07428	0.07664

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table A.5.2 Explaining Changes Perceived Importance of Immigration

	(1) Changing to Reporting Immigration as Most Important Problem from Pre-Campaign to Campaign Survey 2005	(2) Changing to Reporting Immigration as Most Important Problem from Pre-Campaign to Campaign Survey 2010	(3) Changing to Reporting Immigration as Most Important Problem from 2005 to 2010
Age	0.00048 (0.000)	0.00100* (0.000)	0.00055 (0.000)
Male	-0.02262* (0.009)	-0.00606 (0.011)	-0.03861*** (0.011)
Married	0.00063 (0.010)	0.01494 (0.012)	0.00777 (0.012)
Education	-0.01780 (0.011)	-0.02962* (0.012)	-0.03378** (0.013)
Union	0.00939 (0.011)	-0.09189 (0.108)	0.01804 (0.013)
Rent	-0.00029 (0.012)	0.02775* (0.014)	0.00257 (0.015)
Income	-0.00215 (0.002)	-0.00188 (0.002)	-0.00243 (0.002)
Christian	0.01315 (0.011)	-0.00078 (0.012)	-0.01434 (0.013)
Catholic	0.00195 (0.019)	-0.01818 (0.022)	0.00510 (0.023)
Asian	0.07036 (0.048)	-0.02134 (0.052)	-0.05702 (0.057)
Black	0.05798 (0.057)	0.04386 (0.067)	0.00111 (0.068)
Unfair Gov	0.02092* (0.010)	0.00961 (0.011)	-0.00302 (0.012)
Economy has Worsened	0.00736 (0.011)	0.00384 (0.011)	0.02094 (0.013)
Labour	-0.02444 (0.013)	-0.02496 (0.015)	0.00097 (0.015)
Conservative	0.00386 (0.015)	-0.00067 (0.015)	-0.02097 (0.017)
Liberal Democrats	-0.00275 (0.020)	-0.02683 (0.019)	0.04370 (0.024)
UKIP	-0.03735 (0.034)	-0.00915 (0.028)	0.03834 (0.040)
Green	-0.05338 (0.043)	0.01935 (0.037)	-0.01417 (0.051)
BNP	0.01385 (0.067)	0.04383 (0.039)	-0.02009 (0.079)
Popular Papers	0.02201 (0.013)	0.05051*** (0.015)	

Mid-Market Paper	0.00191	0.03056*	
	(0.014)	(0.016)	
Quality Papers	-0.02349	-0.02422	
	(0.013)	(0.014)	
New to Popular Papers in 2010			0.08793**
			(0.028)
New to Mid-Market Paper in 2010			0.02637
			(0.024)
New to Quality Papers in 2010			0.01201
			(0.022)
Percent Migrant	-0.02019	0.01580	-0.02392
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Percent Migrant squared	0.00562	-0.00612	0.00173
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Percent Minority	0.00014	0.00239	0.00318
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Percent Minority squared	0.00000	-0.00002	-0.00005
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.06053*	0.10341	0.09129**
	(0.027)	(0.111)	(0.031)
Observations	2,728	2,607	2,728
R-squared	0.02264	0.03348	0.02291
Adj. R-squared	0.01323	0.02374	0.01350

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Yoshikoder Coding

As stated above, the Inquirer online has detailed descriptions of their coding measures for the positive and negative categories, found at:

<http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~inquirer/homecat.htm>

Yoshikoder allows for an * to be placed at the end of words to account for variation in words ending in various ways but meaning similar things. For example: fraud and fraudster would both be captured with fraud*

The terms included in the threat category are as follows:

Words for Economy and Culture are taken from the Inquirer's "Econ" and "Relig" categories.

Original contributions include:

<i>Culture</i>	<i>Crime</i>	<i>Political</i>
British*	Abuse*	EU
English*	Accuse*	BNP
Integrat*	Arrest*	Conservatives
Raci*	Court*	Labour
Antiimmigration	Crime*	Democrats
Assim*	Criminal*	Green
Claim*	Danger*	UKIP
Cohesion	Fraud*	Amnest*
Culture*	Illegal*	Citizenship
Foreign	Illicit*	Deport*
Genuine	Jail*	Elect*
Headscar*	Police*	Level*
Language	Prison*	Mobiliz*
Legitimate*	Security*	Party
National*	Smuggl*	Policy
Protest*	Terror*	Politic*
Religi*	Trafficking	Quota
Tradition*	Victim*	Represent*
Value*		Rights
		Vote
		Voting

Example of Concordances

Positive	" great opportunity to address the immigration question and to put a"
Negative	" alarmed by the scale of immigration battered by the global economic"
Threat	"alarmed by the scale of immigration battered by the global economic "
None	"to remain before the existing asylum system was

	introduced in August”
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Table A.5.3. Partisan Papers and Opinions on Parties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Poor Opinion of Labour Handling of Asylum 2005	Poor Opinion of Conservative Handling of Asylum 2005	Poor Opinion of Labour Handling of Immigration 2010	Poor Opinion of Conservative Handling of Immigration 2010
Age	-0.00085 (0.001)	0.00227** (0.001)	0.00204* (0.001)	0.00276*** (0.001)
Male	-0.01464 (0.019)	-0.02597 (0.017)	0.04644* (0.018)	-0.01283 (0.017)
Married	0.03984 (0.021)	0.02244 (0.019)	0.00861 (0.020)	0.01211 (0.019)
Education	-0.07399*** (0.021)	0.06944*** (0.019)	-0.04821* (0.020)	0.01814 (0.020)
Union	0.00191 (0.022)	0.09011*** (0.021)	0.21785 (0.160)	-0.21601 (0.188)
Rent	0.03467 (0.024)	0.03280 (0.024)	-0.02370 (0.025)	0.04925* (0.024)
Income	-0.00798* (0.003)	-0.00090 (0.003)	-0.00231 (0.003)	0.00271 (0.003)
Christian	-0.01461 (0.021)	-0.08939*** (0.018)	-0.02716 (0.020)	-0.07045*** (0.019)
Catholic	-0.04650 (0.039)	-0.01933 (0.037)	0.00119 (0.036)	-0.03310 (0.035)
Asian	-0.22676** (0.084)	-0.04345 (0.100)	-0.24389* (0.109)	-0.05654 (0.080)
Black	-0.03114 (0.136)	0.09789 (0.136)	-0.19861 (0.127)	0.01023 (0.133)
Unfair Gov	0.24751*** (0.021)	-0.07181*** (0.019)	0.16078*** (0.020)	-0.00198 (0.018)
Economy has Worsened	0.11944*** (0.022)	-0.07852*** (0.019)	0.10356*** (0.021)	-0.04862* (0.019)
Labour	-0.20513*** (0.024)	0.10397*** (0.027)	-0.20173*** (0.028)	0.11085*** (0.028)
Conservative	0.04139 (0.029)	-0.12734*** (0.017)	0.12827*** (0.026)	-0.23496*** (0.022)
Liberal Democrats	-0.11196** (0.040)	0.13363** (0.044)	-0.05453 (0.035)	0.11841** (0.036)
UKIP	0.06180 (0.075)	0.02800 (0.067)	0.10606* (0.044)	0.01549 (0.053)
Green	0.12201 (0.085)	0.11990 (0.097)	-0.00425 (0.082)	0.08564 (0.077)
BNP	0.19367	-0.03264	0.08944	0.30708***

	(0.108)	(0.145)	(0.055)	(0.077)
Conservative Paper	0.12635***	-0.15538***	0.07209***	-0.07954***
	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Labor Paper	0.05689**	-0.02607	-0.04756	0.00520
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.039)	(0.040)
Liberal Democrat Paper	-0.04083	0.12881*	-0.12102***	0.17753***
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Percent Migrant	-0.01009	0.01740	-0.00587	0.06211
	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Percent Migrant squared	-0.00035	-0.00431	-0.00636	-0.01539
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Percent Minority	0.00136	0.00661*	-0.00108	0.00207
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Percent Minority squared	0.00002	-0.00010	0.00006	-0.00002
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.45645***	0.20759***	0.18332	0.37690
	(0.053)	(0.047)	(0.167)	(0.193)
Observations	2,728	2,728	2,607	2,607
R-squared	0.20339	0.14478	0.23102	0.18885
Adj. R-squared	0.19572	0.13655	0.22327	0.18068

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table A.5.4. Framing Effects and Feelings About Immigration

	(1) Negative Feelings About Immigration	(2) Positive Feelings About Immigration
Age	0.00048 (0.001)	0.00134* (0.001)
Male	-0.00196 (0.015)	0.01520 (0.011)
Married	0.00755 (0.017)	0.02723* (0.013)
Education	-0.12641*** (0.019)	0.06094*** (0.015)
Union	0.41152** (0.157)	0.08230* (0.034)
Rent	-0.01035 (0.020)	0.00401 (0.015)
Income	-0.00382 (0.003)	0.00013 (0.002)
Christian	0.02440 (0.016)	-0.03063* (0.012)
Catholic	0.03486 (0.028)	-0.03980* (0.018)
Unfair Gov	0.10208*** (0.016)	-0.05966*** (0.012)
Economy has Worsened	0.07241*** (0.017)	-0.03355* (0.014)
Labour	-0.07678** (0.023)	0.08850*** (0.017)
Conservative	0.05790** (0.020)	-0.01171 (0.012)
Liberal Democrats	-0.07306* (0.030)	0.09124*** (0.024)
UKIP	0.05956* (0.027)	-0.01391 (0.018)
Green	0.04824 (0.063)	0.03300 (0.051)
BNP	0.04777 (0.038)	-0.01740 (0.013)
References to Threat Categories	6.09986*** (1.669)	
Negative References	-4.76695*** (1.215)	
Positive References		4.67064** (1.448)
Agenda-setting 2	1.37496 (1.603)	0.38462 (1.421)
Agenda-setting 3	-3.59001	-22.76182

	(12.106)	(12.565)
Percent Migrant	-0.01062	0.00713
	(0.029)	(0.024)
Percent Migrant squared	-0.01035	0.00629
	(0.008)	(0.007)
Percent Minority	-0.00235	0.00055
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Percent Minority squared	0.00005	0.00000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.35491*	-0.08309
	(0.163)	(0.047)
Observations	2,607	2,607
R-squared	0.16853	0.10767
Adj. R-squared	0.16048	0.09938

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

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