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

CHAPTER ONE

Intergroup Emotions Theory: Production, Regulation, and Modification of Group-Based Emotions

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Abstract

Emotions are a ubiquitous aspect of interaction between groups. As described in Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993), intergroup emotions are emotions people feel on account of their membership in a group to which they belong and with which they identify. In this chapter, we first describe the foundational assumption of IET: that the experience of intergroup emotions depends upon group membership and the pervasive normative processes that group membership entails. We then review the voluminous literature that documents the intragroup and intergroup cognitive and behavioral outcomes driven by such emotions. We next review the theoretically and practically crucial notion of how such emotions are regulated, a topic that has been an increasing research focus in the last 5 years. The chapter ends with a description and discussion of intergroup emotion-relevant interventions that have been or could be designed to improve intergroup relations.



1. INTRODUCTION

Emotions are an obvious and ubiquitous aspect of interaction between groups. The anger that fuels aggression, the guilt that lingers long after a transgression, the fear of subordination and retaliation, as well as the pride of superiority and the satisfaction of victory are obvious in every encounter of groups in conflict or cooperation. Yet for most of the 20th century, psychological attempts to understand intergroup relations focused largely on the cognitive underpinnings of such interactions (see Allport, 1954/1979, Chapter 22, for an exception). From the activation of negative mental representations about the out-group (for reviews, see Judd & Park, 2005; Nelson, 2009), through the cost/benefit analysis of various strategies in disputes (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961), to the development and consequences of evaluations of one group by another (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010; Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman, 2005, for reviews), the major social psychological approaches brought to bear on intergroup relations throughout the 20th century were eerily devoid of affect and emotion (Mackie & Smith, 2017).

It was against this theoretical backdrop that we developed Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET), an attempt to reclaim human emotions as holding central sway in the affairs between one group and another (Mackie et al., 2000; Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 2009; Mackie & Smith, 2002, 2015; Smith, 1993; Smith & Mackie, 2006, 2008; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). The emotions that we thought crucial for understanding intergroup relations were

not, however, those experienced by unique individuals, as usually described by emotion theories. Instead we focused on emotions arising from and determined by intragroup and intergroup processes intimately bound up with group membership. We termed such emotions intergroup or group-based emotions, terms we use interchangeably through this chapter. These are emotions people feel on account of their membership in a group to which they belong and with which they identify (Niedenthal & Brauer, 2012; Smith et al., 2007).

Group-based emotions are theoretically and empirically distinguishable from individual emotions (Smith et al., 2007). For example, a group member may feel pride because of the in-group's accomplishments, while as an individual feeling disappointed at his or her own accomplishments. Group-based emotions (emotions as a group member) are also different from emotions group members might feel about belonging to the group (emotions toward or about being a group member). For example, a group member may feel pride about being a member of a group, perhaps because membership requires evidence of strong commitment or some similar test. But the same member might feel guilt as a function of belonging to the group that is seen as having unjustly harmed another group. The first is an individual emotion about the fact that *I belong to this group*, the second is a group-based emotion about the fact that *my group behaved wrongly* (Mackie et al., 2017; see Kuppens & Yzerbyt, 2014).

In all other regards, however, evidence suggests that intergroup emotions share the same physiological, embodied, and motivational properties of individually experienced emotions. For example, experiencing group-based anger, anxiety, or sadness changes arousal, vocal tone, risk perception, and information seeking in the same way experiencing individual anger and sadness does (Rydell et al., 2008; Seger, Smith, & Mackie, 2009; Weisbuch & Ambady, 2008; Wohl, Porat, & Halperin, 2016). For us, "emotions" include occurrent states, or feelings experienced in the moment, such as anger at an out-group or pride regarding one's nation. They also include more enduring affective dispositions or "emotional attitudes" (Oatley, 2000). Just as in everyday language we might say someone is "afraid of dogs" without implying the person is experiencing fear at the moment, we can describe a group as contemptuous of immigrants, meaning that when thinking about immigrants, they tend to appraise them in ways that lead to feelings of contempt. For the last 20 years, we and our collaborators, as well as others working along conceptually similar lines, have systematically explored the antecedents and consequences of group-based emotions for both positive and negative intergroup relations.

1.1 Organization of the Chapter

Our goal in this chapter is not just to review the major conclusions that can be drawn from this work but also to speculate freely about several new issues. In this way, the chapter reflects the excitement that thinking about and researching intergroup emotions always generates in us. In this chapter, we first describe the foundational assumption of IET: that the experience of intergroup emotions depends upon group membership and the pervasive normative processes that group membership entails. We then review the voluminous literature about the behavioral outcomes (intragroup and intergroup) that are driven by intergroup emotions. We next deal with the theoretically and practically crucial notion of how such emotions are regulated, a topic that has been an increasing research focus in the last 5 years. We finally turn to the question that largely motivated our original interest: if emotions do hold central sway in the affairs of groups, how might interventions be designed to improve intergroup relations? Considering this two-decades long research enterprise from this perspective, we are optimistic that the study of intergroup emotions will continue to reap theoretical and practical benefits.



2. PRODUCTION OF INTERGROUP EMOTIONS

2.1 Group Membership and Social Identity

Psychological membership in a group is a necessary condition for the experience of group-based emotion. One cannot feel group-based emotions without feeling oneself to be a member of a group. In turn, seeing oneself as a member of a group imbues the group with psychological significance. More formally, as described by Tajfel and Turner (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), group membership arises from social categorization (the process of categorizing individuals as members of a social group) and self-categorization (the process of seeing oneself as a member of a social group). In its most thoroughgoing form, psychological group membership consists of perceiving the self as an interchangeable member of the group, an outcome that results from activation of information about the typical properties of a group and transference of those properties to the self. So when you are thinking about yourself as a social or personality psychologist, for example, you see yourself as being analytic in a way you might not think of yourself as an individual. When every member of the group thinks about themselves as typical of the group, this process reinforces the perception of similarity with other interchangeable group members.

What makes individuals define themselves in terms of group membership? For some individuals, particular group memberships may be chronically activated—the newly converted religious zealot, for example. Some group memberships are imbued by society with significance and pervasively affect how others treat group members—and so these group memberships also tend to be chronically salient. But more typically, salience of a group membership is contextually induced both directly and subtly (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). At the SPSP conference, we're all social and personality psychologists. Mention politics and we're all conservatives or liberals; mention harassment and our identities resolve as females and males or gay or straight or transgender. Intergroup conflict, competition, or power differences are particularly potent activators of group membership. In many of our laboratory studies, we invoke group membership merely by asking people to self-identify as a member of a national, political, religious, ethnic, or gender group, just as they would while answering demographic items on a form (Mackie et al., 2017). Sometimes our activation of group membership is subtler, when we arrange to expose people to out-group members or symbols, signs, or songs signifying group membership, or we encourage them to complete jumbled sentences that activate a particular group membership (Seger et al., 2009). Less subtly, we can ask them to think about themselves in terms of a particular group membership (think about yourself as an American; Smith et al., 2007). All of these techniques appear to be effective (Seger et al., 2009).

Many factors can increase or decrease the salience of group membership and thus its psychological consequences. First, identification with a group reflects the centrality and importance of a particular group membership to the self (Iyer & Leach, 2008; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 2008) and varies from individual to individual within a group. Because it triggers motivated processing, identification moderates many consequences of social categorization (for a review, see Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002), for example, increasing the power of processes that make members' thoughts, feelings, and behaviors group-consistent (Oyserman, 2007; Oyserman, Fryberg, & Yoder, 2007). Second, a range of intragroup processes can increase the power of self-stereotyping and conformity. Being surrounded by signs and symbols of group membership, being in the presence or under the scrutiny of other in-group members, having one's group membership or prototypically questioned, needing to act in concert, all push the group to be more central and important to the individual and the individual to become more similar to the group. Finally, increased activation of the intergroup context, such as presence of the out-group, intergroup comparison, and

particularly intergroup competition, also increases the salience of group membership and consequent conformity to the group. To the extent that any of these conditions increase the salience of group membership, they will affect group-based emotions.

2.2 Group Membership and Identification Determine Group-Based Emotion

The fact that group membership dictates emotional experience is most compellingly demonstrated by studies that activate one or another social identity within the same individuals. For example, in a series of studies, we directed participants to think about themselves first as a member of one particular group ("Think about yourself as an American") and then to think about themselves in terms of a different group membership ("Think about yourself as a woman"), and so forth (Seger et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2007). As each distinct group membership was activated, we assessed the extent to which participants reported experiencing 12 emotions (in general, not targeted at any specific object or event). Regardless of the group membership activated, or the order in which they were activated, people reported different emotional profiles depending on the social identity currently salient. These profiles were distinct both quantitatively (an individual reported feeling more pride when thinking about herself as a UCSB student than when thinking about herself as a Democrat) and qualitatively (an individual feeling no fear or anger as a UCSB student but considerable fear and anger as a Democrat). Thus, the same individual reported different emotional experiences when self-categorizing as a member of one group rather than another.

Group-based emotions directed toward objects and events are also dependent on group membership. For example, in one study from our laboratory (Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith, 2008), emotions directed toward two out-groups, the police and Muslims, were different depending on participants' group membership. We led half of our American college student participants to think about themselves as Americans (telling them we were comparing American and non-American responses) and half to think about themselves as students (telling them we were comparing students' and non-students' responses). We then asked them to report the extent of two key emotions, anger and respect, they felt toward two different social groups, Muslims and police. As Table 1 shows, compared to when they were categorized as students, participants categorized as Americans felt more anger and less respect toward Muslims. In contrast, compared to when they were

Table 1 When Self-Categorized Differently, American Students Report Distinctly Different Levels of Emotion Toward Muslims and Police

Self-Categorization	Emotion Toward Target			
	Anger/Muslims	Respect/Muslims	Anger/Police	Respect/Police
American	1.20	1.64	1.81	3.57
Student	0.84	1.95	2.11	3.21

Compared to when they were thinking about themselves as students, participants thinking about themselves as Americans reported more anger and less respect toward Muslims, and less anger and more respect toward police.
Data from Ray, D. G., Mackie, D. M., Rydell, R. J., & Smith, E. R. (2008). Changing categorization of self can change emotions about out-groups. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *44*(4), 1210–1213. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2008.03.014.

categorized as Americans, participants categorized as students felt more anger and less respect toward the police (see also Yzerbyt & Kuppens, 2009).

Similarly, emotional reactions to events are changed when group membership changes (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003; Gordijn, Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, 2001; see Yzerbyt, Dumont, Gordijn, & Wigboldus, 2002, for a review). In one classic study, participants read about a proposal to raise tuition (and thus state revenues) for non-Coloradan students attending Colorado universities. When participants were thinking about themselves as residents of the state, they reacted with less anger to the proposal than when they were thinking about themselves as students (Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Dumont, 2006).

As noted earlier, the intensity of identification with a particular group (including the subjective importance of the group membership) can also influence group-based emotions. In the study described earlier (Smith et al., 2007) in which we categorized participants first into one social category ("Think about yourself as an American") and then into another ("Think about yourself as a woman"), and then asked them about the positive and negative emotions they were experiencing, we also assessed identification with each relevant in-group. As can be seen in the right-hand column of Table 2, identification typically correlates positively with the intensity of positive group-based emotions such as pride or satisfaction (e.g., Smith et al., 2007).

The story with negative emotions is more complex; see left-hand column of Table 2. Identification may correlate only weakly with these emotions (such as anger at the in-group or frustration) because high group identifiers find ways to think about or reappraise their group to avoid experiencing

Table 2 For Three Different Groups (US, Democrat, and Republican), Positive Group-Based Emotions Generally Correlate Strongly and Positively With Group Identification, Whereas the Corresponding Correlation for Negative Group-Based Emotions Is Negative and Weak

Type of Emotion	Average Correlation of Negative Emotions With Group Identification	Average Correlation of Positive Emotions With Group Identification
US individual	−0.11	0.23
US group-based	*−0.14*	*0.55*
Democrats individual	0.02	0.12
Democrats group-based	*−0.04*	*0.54*
Republicans individual	0.03	0.05
Republicans group-based	*−0.06*	*0.48*

Correlations of group identification with individual-level emotions of the same participants are also shown for comparison; they are generally much weaker. Because these are averages of several correlations, direct significance tests are not available, but a single correlation with absolute value of 0.22 or higher has $P < 0.05$.

Data from Smith, E. R., Seger, C. R., & Mackie, D. M. (2007). Can emotions be truly group level? Evidence for four conceptual criteria. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93*(3), 431–446.* http://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/0022-3514.93.3.431, Study 2.

such emotions (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2006; Smith et al., 2007).

Finally, high and low identifiers sometimes differ not just in the intensity of a particular emotion, but experience qualitatively different emotions about the same event. For example, high identifiers with a sports team may experience anger following a team loss, whereas low identifiers feel sadness instead (Crisp, Heuston, Farr, & Turner, 2007).

How do group membership and group identification produce these significant changes in group-based emotions?

2.3 Group Membership to Group-Based Emotion: The Effects of Norms

The psychological experience of group membership has immediate and pervasive consequences for the experience of group emotions. When group membership is activated, group-based emotions, just like other group characteristics, are activated and adopted. Imagine someone who frequently thinks of her nation as a symbol of freedom and justice. Because she frequently feels group-based pride associated with her national group membership,

group-based pride soon comes to be activated and experienced whenever membership in that group is salient. Both recent and decades-old emotional experiences may come to be associated with group membership, just as traits and typical behaviors are, providing a self-stereotyping route that generates long-term or chronic group-based emotions.

People clearly have knowledge about the emotional tenor of their in-group, the patterns of emotional experience that are typical of the group (Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2005). We Democrats are (currently) appalled. We mourners are sad. We members of honor cultures are quick to anger when provoked. The activation of such associations can lead to group members experiencing the emotions typically associated with group membership. Leonard, Moons, Mackie, and Smith (2011) asked women to estimate in an online survey how angry (among other emotions) they thought women (among other groups) were. In this way, the women told us what they believed about one emotional quality of their in-group. Two to four weeks later, the women came into the lab and, after reporting their gender (increasing the salience of this membership), reported how much anger they felt when thinking about themselves as women. The angrier the women thought their in-group was when asked earlier, the angrier they reported feeling while now thinking of themselves as members of that group, regardless of their levels of anger as an individual (see also Gao, Chen, & Li, 2016). Thus, they self-stereotyped or adopted the emotional quality they thought their group possessed.

What have been described in the literature as self-stereotyping effects are examples of the pervasive normative or referent informational influence effects that help determine group-based emotional experience. The motivation for such influence is acceptance of group membership and willing adoption of group characteristics. Changes that result from such normative influence are privately internalized and seen as true, accurate, and correct, rather than reflecting public compliance designed to avoid rejection or loss of resources (Hogg & Turner, 1987a, 1987b). Consistent with such influence, group members' emotions converge toward the group norm or prototype, even when group members do not interact (Parkinson et al., 2005). Some of our studies (Moons, Leonard, Mackie, & Smith, 2009) informed US college student participants about what specific emotions various groups had reported feeling, reminded them of their membership in one of these groups, and then, among other questionnaires, assessed their emotions. Categorization into a particular group caused participants to report experiencing the emotion or emotions that we had led them to believe were typical of that

Table 3 Manipulation of the Perceived Emotion Norm Produces Emotional Convergence

Condition	Anger Reported as Individual or Group Member		
	Individual	**Gender**	**American**
"Americans feel little anger"	2.66	2.49	2.29
"Americans feel lots of anger"	2.55	2.55	2.70

Manipulation of the perceived emotion norm for the American group ("Americans feel little anger" or "Americans feel lots of anger") led participants to report experiencing that same level of anger when thinking about themselves as Americans, but not when thinking about themselves as individuals or when thinking about themselves as a member of their gender group.

Data from Moons, W. G., Leonard, D. J., Mackie, D. M., & Smith, E. R. (2009). I feel our pain: Antecedents and consequences of emotional self-stereotyping. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45*(4), 760–769.* https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.04.016, Experiment 2.

group. Group members converged toward the group emotion norm regardless of whether the emotion was positive (happiness) or negative (anger and fear), and regardless of the nature of the group they were categorized into (national, gender, or laboratory-created minimal groups). Group members showed normative influence effects only on the emotion said to be typical of the in-group, and only for the group of which they were a member (as Table 3 shows for the emotion of anger).

Importantly, those highly identified with the group showed all these effects more strongly. Even more indicative of the role of normative processes, such convergence increased when we strengthened participants' motivation to ally themselves with the group, by making them think they were somewhat different from the rest of their in-group, as can be seen in Table 4 (see also Reysen & Branscombe, 2008). Such effects are all classic indicators of the role of normative processes.

Other studies also show that individuals' emotions move toward the emotion norm of the group once they are categorized as group members. In multiple studies, we have assessed participants' individual-level emotions, categorized them into one of multiple groups, and then assessed their emotions as group members. We calculated the mean level of each emotion expressed by group members as an estimate of the descriptive emotion norm in the group. Across studies, the emotions that people express as group members are closer to the group norm than are the emotions they expressed as individuals. This happens across emotions, across group types, and regardless of whether individuals are explicitly or subtly categorized into the group (Banerji et al., 2011; Seger et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2007). Such convergence

Table 4 Norm Convergence Occurs for Both Positive and Negative Emotions, Especially When Group Membership is Questioned

	Measured Group-Based Emotion	
Condition	**Happiness**	**Anger**
Control (no norm)	5.03	2.63
High group anger and happiness norm	5.31	2.87
High group anger and happiness norm plus distinctiveness feedback	5.52	3.21

Participants were assigned to a fictitious group. Those in the control condition received no information about that in-group's emotion norm, whereas all other participants learned that the in-group tended to have high levels of both anger and happiness. Participants in the third condition also received feedback that made them seem distinct from the group, increasing motivation to converge toward the group norm. *Data from Moons, W. G., Leonard, D. J., Mackie, D. M., & Smith, E. R. (2009). I feel our pain: Antecedents and consequences of emotional self-stereotyping.* Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45*(4), 760–769.* https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.04.016, Experiment 3.

is specific to the in-group—being exposed to other groups' emotion norms has little effect. It is thinking about oneself as a member of this particular group, with its particular emotion norm, that seems to drive the change in emotions that group members report experiencing (Moons et al., 2009; Seger et al., 2009), and those highly identified with the group show the effects more strongly.

Cultural effects on emotional experience also provide evidence for the influence of normative processes on emotion (for reviews, see Jack, 2016; Tamir et al., 2016). This assertion is bolstered by recent conceptualizations of cultural differences as due primarily to normative influences (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010; Gelfand & Jackson, 2016; Shteynberg, Gelfand, & Kim, 2009) Members of collectivist/interdependent cultures value and experience positive, other-engaging, low-arousal emotions more than do members of individualist/independent cultures (e.g., Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000; Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa, 2006; Scollon, Diener, Oishi, & Biswas-Diener, 2004; Tsai, 2007). Although most of this research is on individual emotion, it has implications for group-based emotion as well. For example, Chinese participants (from a culture that values dialecticism, or acceptance of inherent contradictions) show greater complexity of group-based positive emotions in reaction to an event than do members of other groups (Americans), meaning that they report the simultaneous experience of multiple, often conflicting emotions (Lu, Hamamura, Doosje, Suzuki, & Takemura, 2017). Also consistent with the group-based emotion literature, cultural research on emotion shows that members of cultures

particularly tightly bound by normative influence (Gelfand et al., 2011) are more likely to block their individual reaction to a situation in favor of assessing the normatively appropriate emotional reaction (Matsumoto, Yoo, & Nakagawa, 2008). Thus, people who feel the press of group norms more strongly are most likely to experience and display the group-based emotions typical of their group. Consistent with this idea, members of interdependent cultures (compared to members of independent cultures) are more oriented toward in-group than out-group members and more attuned to identities developed in small face-to-face groups than abstract social categories (Kitayama et al., 2000).

Of course, norms are often in conflict. Different members of a group often report different profiles of both general and specific group-based emotions, as revealed by cluster analyses (Fernando, Kashima, & Laham, 2014). In data from a representative national sample on group-based emotions (Seger, Banerji, Park, Smith, & Mackie, 2016), this technique shows, for example, three subgroups of Asian Americans with distinct patterns of emotions toward their own group. Thus, individual group members can be exposed to multiple conflicting descriptive norms. In addition, descriptive norms (the way things are) are often imperfectly aligned with injunctive norms (the way things should be; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Goldenberg, Saguy, & Halperin, 2014; Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993). General group norms can conflict with specific norms that group members develop to handle concrete situations (Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005).

How do group members deal with conflicting emotion norms? The most likely possibilities are that such conflict is avoided by projection (assuming other in-group members share one's own group-based emotions), rather than sampling information about others' emotions; by biased sampling (such as exposure only to close others whose probability of emotional similarity is high); or by biased perception. Whether unconscious or conscious, such strategies can produce outcomes including false consensus and pluralistic ignorance at the group level. Another strategy may be to ignore or reject conflicting emotion norms by decategorizing some members of the in-group ("America, love it or leave it!"). Issues of how groups and group members deal with conflict among emotion norms to avoid schism (Sani, 2008) seem ripe for investigation.

In sum, one way in which group emotions arise is through the activation and experience of emotions associated with group membership, which come to function as a group norm.

2.4 Group Membership to Group-Based Emotion: Group-Based Appraisals

The second route by which group membership triggers group-based emotions is through an appraisal, construal, or interpretation process. Because social categorization imbues the group with affective significance, group members see the world—event and objects—in terms of what they mean for the group. Thus, the appraisal, construal, or interpretation processes typically seen as determining emotions are qualitatively changed by group membership. Different emotion theories hold that appraisals of objects and events in the world trigger particular emotions (Scherer, Shorr, & Johnstone, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), or alternatively, that patterns of arousal and affect triggered by objects and events are appraised, construed, or interpreted in a way that leads to the conscious awareness that a particular emotion is being experienced (Russell & Barrett, 1999).

In the context of an activated group membership, appraisal, construal, and interpretation occur not from the individual's point of view but from the group's point of view. Group membership causes people to see the world through group-colored glasses, so events, objects, and situations are appraised, construed, and interpreted in terms of their implications for the group rather than for the individual self. Classic examples illustrate the difference. An individual thinking about herself as a woman sees the promotion of a female colleague as beneficial for the group and feels pride, even though on an individual level, promotion of another woman over the self is negative, arousing envy (Brewer & Weber, 1994). Group members who have personally done nothing wrong experience guilt at the misdeeds—even perpetrated generations earlier—of other group members (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004; Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2007; Swim & Miller, 1999). Similarly Danish Muslims who have never personally experienced the oppression of living under the rule of foreign occupiers nevertheless feel considerable anger on behalf of their subordinated in-group about these situations—more anger, in fact, than do Danish Muslims who have actually personally experienced life in such conflict zones (Obaidi, Bergh, Sidanius, & Thomsen, 2017). We feel terrible when our national team loses, even though personally we neither contribute to the outcome nor suffer the consequences (Crisp et al., 2007). In all these cases, then, group-based appraisal, construal, and interpretative processes produce acute (event- or object-triggered) group-based emotions that

are quite different from the emotions that arise when perceivers appraise the same events as individuals.

Appraisals can also become routinized over time, such that the emotions that spring from them are automatically activated upon activation of appropriate group membership. For example, the emotions that the Stereotype Content Model identifies as directed toward different out-groups (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) are assumed to have originally arisen from appraisals of the group's competency and warmth. Similarly, according to Image Theory, appraisals of status and power initially evoke out-group-directed emotions such as trust and admiration, emotions that eventually become directly associated with the groups themselves (Brewer & Alexander, 2002).

The evidence that different patterns of group-based appraisal trigger different and distinct group-based emotions is now voluminous (Mackie & Smith, 2015; Yzerbyt & Kuppens, 2013). Group-based anger, classically regarded as rooted in appraisal of an external threat or obstacle with which the in-group has resources to cope (Mackie et al., 2000), is also importantly affected by appraisals of injustice and illegitimacy (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). Out-group directed hatred arises from appraisal of the source of extreme threat as stably, enduringly, and inherently evil (Halperin, 2008). Out-group-directed disgust is based on the appraisal of harm by contamination from dangerous foods, germs, bodily products, and by extension, ideas, attitudes, or behaviors that are regarded as moral violations (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Opotow, 2005; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008; Staub, 1989). Appraisals of in-group threat, weakness, uncertainty, and lack of control produce group-based fear (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Group-based guilt arises from the appraisal that the in-group has acted unworthily, and caused or enjoys the benefits of an unfair advantage over another group (Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008). Both envy and resentment can underlie intergroup schadenfreude, the malicious pleasure a group feels when misfortune befalls a high status and competitive out-group (Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003; Ouwerkerk, van Dijk, Vonkeman, & Spears, 2016).

On the positive emotion spectrum, appraisals of events or outcomes as consistent with in-group goals spark satisfaction and joy. Those emotions transform into group-based pride when the positive event or outcome is also attributable legitimately to in-group actions, control, or valued qualities such as competence and warmth (Fiske et al., 2002; Harth et al., 2008; Roseman, 2001; Schori-Eyal, Tagar, Saguy, & Halperin, 2015; Sullivan & Hollway, 2014). Group-based admiration or respect depends on appraisals of the target group or event as competent, warm, and morally consistent

(Janoff-Bulman & Werther, 2008; Onu, Kessler, Andonovska-Trajkovska, Fritsche, & Midson, 2016). Research has also assessed the emotion of intergroup hope, which derives from the appraisal that an important, positive outcome for the in-group is uncertain, largely uncontrollable, but possible (Cohen-Chen, Crisp, & Halperin, 2017).

If group membership determines appraisals, appraisals change as group membership does, and thus so do emotions. Experimental evidence for this point, both as regards appraisals for acute emotions about events and appraisals for more chronic emotions about objects, now abounds. As students, participants see affirmative action proposals as fair and beneficial and are satisfied; as Whites, however, those same participants view affirmative action as detrimental to the in-group and are angry (Garcia-Prieto, Mackie, Tran, & Smith, 2007). As students, people see a tuition increase as unjust and are angry: as state residents, the same people appraise a tuition hike much more favorably, and are happy (Gordijn et al., 2006; Kuppens, Yzerbyt, Dandache, Fischer, & van der Schalk, 2013). As females, young women feel more threatened by and therefore experience more anger, fear, and disgust toward Muslims than they do when their identity as young people, students, or unique individuals has been made salient (Kuppens & Yzerbyt, 2012).

Group-based appraisals are also subject to normative influence, which makes them more likely to be shared among group members (Parkinson et al., 2005). To our knowledge, norm effects on group-based appraisals have not yet been directly demonstrated (e.g., by providing information about how other group members appraise group-relevant events). However, in an instructive study, Imada and Ellsworth (2011) showed that cultural preferences for particular appraisals for success and failure dictated individuals' experience of particular emotions following these outcomes. For example, in success situations, Americans reported more positive appraisals of personal resources and felt more pride than did Japanese, who were more likely to appraise the outcome as uncertain or dependent on external resources and to feel lucky. Members of dialectically oriented cultures appraise intergroup situations in more complex and nuanced ways (Lu et al., 2017). Similarly, the experience of different individual emotions in honor, face, and dignity cultures (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Pedersen, Forster, & McCullough, 2014; Smith et al., 2016) is posited to be the result of group-based differences in how threat is appraised.

Because group emotions depend crucially on shared appraisals based on a group's goals (Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2003), groups can encourage

or enforce particular appraisals of what are inherently ambiguous events. Game-theoretic studies of intergroup conflict show that group appraisals of the specific details of their situations are precisely tuned to be functional (Bornstein, 2003). For example, the particular characteristics of a competitive situation might lead groups to appraise the situation in terms of in-group superiority (e.g., "we are more loyal and committed than they are") and thus to advocate for risk-taking. In the same way, if the group wants to mobilize against an out-group, it can encourage appraising the hiring of an out-group member as a threat; if the group wants to advance its moral standing, the hiring of an out-group member can be appraised instead as a positive sign of the in-group's commitment to inclusive values. Normative enforcement of negative attributions about and consequent negative emotional reactions like contempt or scorn regarding certain kinds of accomplishments or achievements can, in fact, prevent members of some groups from advancing in academic or economic domains dominated by other groups (Ogbu, 2004).

2.5 Role of an Out-Group's Emotions

Out-group emotions also affect the emotions that an in-group experiences. But the process of perceiving out-group emotions is contaminated by biases and stereotypes. Even at the perceptual level, out-group emotional expressions are judged as more indicative of negative emotions than are in-group expressions (Lazerus, Ingbretsen, Stolier, Freeman, & Cikara, 2016). We asked members of one group to report their emotions and also estimate what emotions they thought members of an out-group might be experiencing (Seger et al., 2009). In these studies, for example, men reported how they felt as men and estimated how women felt as women. Similar questions were asked with respect to Democrats and Republicans. We were thus able to compare estimates of what groups reported they were actually feeling with what out-group members thought they were feeling. Estimates of out-group emotions were quite accurate, but were also influenced by two predictable biases. First, projection meant that the in-group imagined to some extent that the out-group felt the same way they did. Second, an in-group positivity bias meant that people thought that out-group members experienced more negative emotion, and less positive emotion, than did their in-group.

Emotion stereotypes also affect estimates of out-group emotion in specific situations. Moons, Chen, and Mackie (2017; see also Lau, Morewedge, & Cikara, 2016) asked White participants to predict how a White or Black American male would react emotionally to a range of negative vs positive events (getting negative vs positive performance feedback, being insulted

vs praised, losing vs finding money). Group-based emotion stereotypes influenced predictions: White Americans thought that a Black American male would react more angrily than a White male to negative events, but predicted no differences in the two group's emotions about positive events. In a second study, participants expected men to be angrier than women upon receiving negative feedback. These results are consistent with other evidence of bias that in-groups show regarding out-group emotions. For example, whereas in-groups are assumed to experience a range of subtle, complex, "uniquely human" emotions, such as regret, compassion, and anguish, out-groups are more likely to be attributed only nonuniquely human or primary emotions, such as fear and anger (Leyens et al., 2000).

Whether their perception involves bias or not, out-group emotions influence the in-group's own emotions. Which in-group emotions are triggered by out-group emotions no doubt depends on the intergroup context (Hess & Fischer, 2014). In the context of intergroup cooperation, encountering a happy out-group member may lead to the same shared emotions of joy and satisfaction. In the context of intergroup rivalry or competition, however, observing a happy out-group member may cause complementary emotions of anxiety or anger in the in-group, whereas an anxious out-group member may lead to perceptions that the in-group has the upper hand, triggering positive emotions. Weisbuch and Ambady (2008) demonstrated just such an effect among Yankees and Red Sox baseball supporters. Supporters of a team expressed similar emotions when they learned their in-group felt happy or afraid. But they expressed the opposite emotions when they learned the out-group was happy or afraid. Another study found that perceived out-group disappointment (as opposed to fear) triggered complementary in-group guilt (Solak, Reifen Tagar, Cohen-Chen, Saguy, & Halperin, 2017). Of course, these processes are subject to the same biases and stereotypes already discussed, and thus seem likely to lead to systematic inaccuracies in prediction of both out-group emotion and behavior.

2.6 Production of Intergroup Emotions: Summary

Thus, either via the activation of associated emotion norms or via the triggering of group-biased appraisal, construal, and interpretation processes, group membership can result in the experience of a wide range of specific and distinct emotions. Depending on the particular configuration of group-based emotions associated with membership or of group-based appraisals, feelings of anger, fear, disgust, pride, guilt, envy, and so forth can be directed at either the in-group, the out-group, or events relevant to them.



3. CONSEQUENCES OF INTERGROUP EMOTIONS

Intergroup emotions play a crucial role in group life because they are functional. Individual emotions operate to optimize the functioning of the individual in the environment, and group-based emotions play a similar role. To do so, they shape the relationship between members and the group, and they affect behavior—both intragroup and intergroup behavior.

3.1 Intergroup Emotions Shape Intragroup Processes

First, shared group emotions create and reinforce affiliation processes, essential for the viability of groups (Barsade & Knight, 2015; Mengus & Kilduff, 2015). Face to face or media-based contact among group members makes possible social appraisal, emotion contagion, and vicarious emotion sharing, processes that rely on influence from perceiving others' emotions (Manstead & Fischer, 2001; Parkinson, 2011). For example, adults look at others' emotional reactions to decide how much of a risk to take (Parkinson & Simons, 2012). Even such fundamental processes are dependent on shared group membership. For example, emotional mimicry and vicarious emotion learning occur much more readily among in-group members (see Hess & Fischer, 2014) and among group members who identify strongly with the group (Ilies, Wagner, & Morgeson, 2007).

Even the attribution of emotion to in-group members without face-to-face contact can induce experience of the same or similar emotions in other group members, through normative processes. The knowledge of shared emotion then contributes to decreases in the sense of individual self and increases in the sense of shared or common identity, with concomitant feelings of similarity, unity, and integration (Barsade & Gibson, 2012; Knight & Eisenkraft, 2015; Rimé, 2013). Thus, the extent to which members of minimal and natural groups see their own emotional reactions as fitting with those of the in-group affects self-categorization. In fact, individuals who fail to experience or express such shared emotions may feel that they do not belong to the group (Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, Bruder, & Shepherd, 2011). Sharing emotions within the in-group may be especially important if those emotions also distinguish the in-group from the out-group (Wohl, Hornsey, & Bennett, 2012).

In a mutually reinforcing process, shared group-based emotions also determine the extent to which group members engage in affiliative behaviors directed toward the group (Smith et al., 2007). In these studies, the more

strongly in-group members felt pride, satisfaction, and happiness as group members, the more likely they were to display symbols of group belonging such as flags and pins, perform group-defining behaviors such as voting, and affiliate with other members of the group. These binding functions of group-based emotions can take a number of forms. We have been exploring the relations among the typically positive group-based emotions felt toward the in-group as a whole, toward other in-group members, and about belonging to the group. It may well be that these different types of positive group-based emotional ties differentially predict willingness to perform affiliative behaviors, depending on the specific group (Mackie et al., 2017).

It is not only positive emotions that bind groups together. In a classic study, Kessler and Hollbach (2005) showed that both happiness toward the in-group and group-based anger toward the out-group predicted higher identification with the in-group, whereas anger toward the in-group and happiness toward the out-group were associated with lower levels of identification. The more members are motivated to belong, the more motivated they are to experience even negative group-based emotions, such as group-based sadness, as long they believe that experiencing the emotion would be socially binding (Porat, Halperin, Mannheim, & Tamir, 2016). Other negative in-group emotions also motivate group members to perform in-group defining and affiliative behaviors. Group-based nostalgia, a yearning for the way the group "used to be," correlates with tendencies to protect in-group identity (Smeekes, 2015). Collective angst is aroused by contemplation of an extinction threat to the group, and increases members' desire to engage in behaviors such as ensuring that the group's culture and history is passed on, donating to in-group organizations, preference for in-group rather than out-group marriage, and opposition to immigration (Jetten, Mols, Healy, & Spears, 2017; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015; Wohl, Branscombe, & Reysen, 2010).

Two recent sets of studies provide particularly compelling evidence that group-based emotions play a causal role in identity creation and maintenance. First, intergroup emotions appear to determine whether discrimination increases or decreases identification for members of a stigmatized group. Arab Muslims living in Quebec were reminded of discrimination against their group. If they reacted with group-based dissatisfaction, they felt a higher sense of identification with the in-group than before, regardless of whether they perceived discrimination to be high or low. If perceived discrimination did not engender group-based dissatisfaction, however, identification with the in-group declined (Perozzo, de la Sablonnière, Auger, & Caron-Diotte, 2016). Second, Livingstone, Shepherd, Spears, and Manstead

(2016) told angry group members that some group members also felt angry and others felt sad. When asked about all of these other group members, the participants saw themselves as much more similar and close to the other angry group members, and identified themselves as sharing a common categorization with those who shared their emotion, much more than with those who did not. These findings support the idea that emotions can causally determine group membership, even when they are negative, and even when other possible bases for group belonging are present.

Thus, the experience of intergroup emotions, and especially the knowledge that such emotions are shared, functions to create, maintain, and strengthen identities, particularly when they are under threat.

As a logical consequence of their ability to strengthen group identification, intergroup emotions can also motivate group action (Barsade & Knight, 2015; Collins, Lawrence, Troth, & Jordan, 2013; van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012). The motivating effect of group emotions on intragroup behavior has been studied extensively in the context of work and organizational groups. A meta-analysis of 39 studies of more than 2000 work groups showed that positive group emotions have positive effects on task performance, regardless of whether the group is long term or fleeting (Knight & Eisenkraft, 2015). Positive emotions typically enhance productivity (Menges, Walter, Vogel, & Bruch, 2011), although these effects can depend on task type and intragroup trust (Williams, 2007). Negative emotions can also increase task performance early on in groups, especially if the source of the affect is external to the group, but tend to undermine performance later in group development, especially if people and events internal to the group generate the negative feelings (Knight & Eisenkraft, 2015). A common theme in these studies is that shared emotions facilitate cooperation, coordination, and a sense of efficacy that makes group action possible, and thereby improve performances that depend on these qualities.

3.2 Intergroup Emotions Shape Intergroup Processes

3.2.1 Encouraging Collective Action

In an intergroup context, the same action-motivating function of group-based emotions is also highly relevant. Maitner, Mackie, and Smith (2006) have shown how intergroup emotions act as general motivators of behavior as they wax and wane in the presence or absence of group behavior. In two experiments, group members believed that the in-group had been attacked, which produced anger at the out-group in some members and fear of the out-group in others. They were then led to believe that the in-group either failed

to act, or countered with out-group-directed aggression. Among those who were angry, anger (an emotion that typically motivates approach) toward the out-group was equal in all three conditions. Failure to act on the in-group's part increased anger directed toward the out-group. It also increased in-group-directed anger, presumably as a motivator of appropriate action. When the in-group took aggressive action, however, intergroup anger toward the out-group dissipated (as the appropriate behavior had occurred) and was replaced with group-based satisfaction (see Table 5). In contrast, among in-group members who felt fear, attacking the out-group further increased fear, presumably to further motivate avoidance rather than aggression. In a third study, group-based guilt following aggression declined when the in-group made reparations but increased if the in-group aggressed again. Thus, the group-based emotions generated by an event functioned to initiate a certain action, increased until that behavior occurred, and then dissipated or resolved into a reinforcing emotion such as satisfaction and pride.

The specific combination of intergroup anger and perceptions of group efficacy is a potent motivator of group action. van Zomeren and colleagues' dual-path model of collective action (van Zomeren, 2015; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; van Zomeren et al., 2004) proposes that appraisals such as harm and injustice feed into group-based anger, whereas appraisals of group resources or efficacy separately promote collective action. As an example of these motivating effects, Shi, Hao, Saeri, and Cui (2015) manipulated fairness (in one study) and group-based anger and group efficacy (in a separate study) and found that fairness appraisals determined group-based

Table 5 Group-Based Anger at an Out-Group After an Insult and After the In-Group Response

	Group-Based Anger Toward the Out-Group	
Condition	**Immediately After Insult**	**After In-Group Response**
No response	4.4	3.9
Successful response	4.0	3.0
Unsuccessful response	4.2	5.0

Group-based anger directed at the out-group was equal in all three conditions immediately after the insult. If the in-group responded successfully, anger decreased, but an unsuccessful response resulted in increased anger.

Data from Maitner, A. T., Mackie, D. M., & Smith, E. R. (2006). Evidence for the regulatory function of intergroup emotion: Implementing and impeding intergroup behavioral intentions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42*, 720–726.* https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2005.08.001, Study 2.

anger, and that group-based anger and perceived group efficacy then independently predicted collective intentions to protest against increased school fees and unhygienic cafeteria conditions for Chinese university students. Group-based anger motivated both low-cost and high-cost forms of protest, but anger and efficacy together predicted willingness to engage in high-cost collective action (see also Ayanian & Tausch, 2016).

3.2.2 Directing Specific Out-Group-Targeted Behaviors

More than just the general motivation to act, the experience of both general and event-specific intergroup emotions specify what action is likely to be taken (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). All things being equal, the experience of both general and event-specific intergroup anger (compared to other emotions) makes approach, confrontation, and aggression more likely; intergroup fear (compared to other emotions) makes avoidance and withdrawal more likely; intergroup pride (compared to other emotions) makes affiliation with the in-group more likely, and so forth (for summaries, see Iyer & Leach, 2008; Mackie et al., 2009; Mackie & Smith, 2015; Parkinson et al., 2005). Thus, one of the strong points of the study of intergroup emotions is their highly specific predictive value. Knowing that one group dislikes or has a negative attitude toward another tells us little about how such prejudice will play out in specific forms of discrimination. In contrast, the group-based emotion approach suggests that a group that fears another is more likely to avoid it, a group that is angry at another is more likely to aggress against it, a group that hates another is more likely to try to annihilate it, and so forth. Moreover, the readiness to act that was the initial focus of most laboratory studies of intergroup emotions has now been extended to actual intergroup behavior in the context of intergroup conflicts (van Zomeren, Postmes, et al., 2008; van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008).

We recently reviewed the extensive evidence that specific intergroup emotions increase the likelihood of specific intergroup behaviors (Mackie & Smith, 2015). That review revealed that both in laboratory studies and in the field, out-group-directed anger, hatred, fear, guilt, and anxiety all had distinct and reliable effects on the kinds of behavior that groups desired to, intended to, and did actually engage in toward other groups. Although not as often studied as negative emotions, positive emotions directed toward the out-group, particularly admiration and respect, also increased the likelihood that out-groups would be approached, helped, and forgiven their transgressions.

Understandably, research continues to center on the emotional precursors of aggression. With the application of intergroup emotions to situations of intergroup conflict, particularly on-going violent and intractable conflict, there have also been attempts to answer more completely the questions of which group-based emotions, under what conditions, result in what kind of aggression toward an out-group.

Although the role of out-group-directed anger as a particularly potent predictor of antagonistic and aggressive behavior remains undisputed, researchers have also looked at emergent effects of specific combinations of emotions. In several cases, research suggests that distinct emotions or combinations of emotions predict "normative" confrontation, protest, political action, or aggression designed to change the out-group's behavior, vs "nonnormative" forms of intergroup behavior outside conventionally accepted boundaries, such as extreme violence, warfare, and ethnic cleansing, which aim to remove the out-group or radically alter a situation (Bal & van der Bos, 2017). For example, in analyses of student protests in Germany, Tausch et al. (2011) showed that anger predicted support for "normative" forms of confrontation, whereas disgust appeared to justify more extreme and aggressive intergroup behavior (see also Schütte & Kessler, 2007; Spears et al., 2011).

Out-group-directed hatred has also been proposed to motivate extreme aggression. In contrast to anger appraisals that reflect harm and the possibility of redress (typically because of in-group resources; Fischer & Roseman, 2007), hatred reflects appraisal of the out-group as stably and inherently evil and as posing an intractable threat to the in-group (Halperin, 2008; Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009). Hatred therefore does not encourage confrontation or aggression aimed at changing a situation, but rather actions designed to irreparably weaken or destroy the out-group (Halperin, 2008; Halperin et al., 2009).

As mentioned earlier, one group-based emotion implicated in severe intergroup aggression is disgust, particularly in combination with anger. Anger and disgust toward an out-group share appraisals of harm to the in-group and predict desire to attack the transgressing group (Mackie et al., 2000). We suggested that moral outrage might be thought of as a particularly virulent combination of anger and disgust driven by perceived moral transgressions (Haslam, 2006; Martín-Peña & Opotow, 2011; Opotow, 2005; Staub, 1989) to which the only suitable reaction is eradication (Mackie & Smith, 2015). Disgust or contempt at the group level can play a role in the dehumanization that has been implicated in more extreme forms of intergroup aggression, such as ethnic cleansing and genocide

(Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Harris & Fiske, 2006). Adding further complication, Matsumoto, Frank, and Hwang (2015) have recently argued that hatred is itself a combination of anger, contempt, and disgust. All this evidence suggests the potential value of systematic attempts to map clusters of emotions onto more vs less extreme situations of intergroup violence or conflict.

Another intergroup emotion that has only recently received research attention is intergroup humiliation. Intergroup humiliation is the shared emotional experience of being devalued, rejected, and wronged as a group, and knowing that you have not retaliated or redressed these wrongs (Matsumoto, Hwang, & Frank, 2016; Veldhuis, Gordijn, Veenstra, & Lindenberg, 2014). Such a situation is appraised as high in both threat and powerlessness, and results in the acceptance of a devalued, scorned, or rejected identity even as the situation is considered unjust (Fernández, Saguy, & Halperin, 2015). This mix of appraisals gives intergroup humiliation elements of both anger and shame (Jonas, Otten, & Doosje, 2014; Leidner, Sheikh, & Ginges, 2012), and because of this is associated with conflicting tendencies for approach and avoidance (Allpress, Brown, Giner-Sorolla, Deonna, & Teroni, 2014). When such conflicts are amplified, intergroup humiliation may even be relevant to predicting engagement in terrorist activities (Matsumoto et al., 2016).

The importance of appraisals of intractability, or enduring inability or refusal to change, for extreme violence seems clear. In the context of protests in Israel, Shuman, Cohen-Chen, Hirsch-Hoefler, and Halperin (2016) found that people's theories about whether groups and individuals can change (incremental theories) or do not change (entity theories) predicted whether they engaged in normative or nonnormative action. For group members who both identified with the in-group and held incremental beliefs, variations in their strength of belief that groups could change predicted anger toward the out-group, which in turn predicted normative collective action (consistent with the idea that anger motivates behavior designed to change the situation). For highly identified group members who adhered to entity theories, however, the strength of their conviction that groups do not change predicted not anger but hatred (underpinned by entity theory-consistent appraisals of enduring unchangeable evil), which in turn predicted nonnormative collective action, designed to eliminate the offending out-group.

Research on the intergroup emotions that might promote not just the reduction of bias, ethnocentrism, and conflict, but also an increase in intergroup trust and cooperation continues to flourish. Respect, trust, and

forgiveness as important triggers of intergroup reconciliation have received particular attention (Alon & Bar-Tal, 2016; Hughes, Ambady, & Zaki, 2017; Kenworthy et al., 2016; Noor, Branscombe, & Hewstone, 2015; Simon & Schaefer, 2018). A different positive emotion, collective hope, is based on the appraisal of possibility and desirability: that the out-group and the intergroup situation can be changed to the benefit of the in-group (as we just described, this appraisal may depend on more general beliefs about stability vs change). Hope promotes deescalation and reconciliation in two ways. First, hope increases engagement in collective action designed to bring about positive change (Shuman et al., 2016; Wlodarczyk, Basabe, Páez, & Zumeta, 2017), whereas collective hopelessness lowers intentions to engage in behavior to redress a group's wrongs (Aubin, Amiot, & Fontaine-Boyte, 2016). Second, hope presages forgiveness. For example, in one study, an apology from an offending out-group predicted willingness to reconcile, mediated by collective hope (Wenzel, Anvari, de Vel-Palumbo, & Bury, 2017). Third, in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, collective hope was associated with conciliatory attitudes during deescalation (Rosler, Cohen-Chen, & Halperin, 2015). Finally, using a preemptive strike game, Halevy (2017) showed that hope significantly decreased attack rates relative to fear, happiness, and a control condition. Although Halevy considered this paradigm to be interpersonal in nature, the relevance of his work to intergroup situations is obvious.

3.2.3 Consequences of Perceptions of Out-Group's Emotions

A final route through which intergroup emotions can have consequences for intergroup behavior is via the in-group's perceptions and interpretations of an out-group's group-based emotions. Earlier, we described the role of perceived out-group emotions in the production of the in-group's own emotions. In our studies in a Black–White interracial context (Moons et al., 2017), these perceptions were consequential. The angrier an out-group member was predicted to feel, the more in-group participants expected to feel afraid while interacting with the out-group target, and the less willing they were to actually interact with the out-group target. In the interracial interaction, the racial stereotype of Black males feeling angry and the resulting anticipation of feeling fear appeared to indirectly contribute to greater avoidance of Black men.

Other research finds similar effects of an out-group's perceived emotions. In three studies across two cultural contexts, Pauketat, Mackie, and Tausch (2017) looked at an in-group's response to threat from an out-group. Consistent with IET, threat triggered out-group-directed anger and disgust,

which in turn increased participants' desire to retaliate against those threatening them. But how the out-group felt about the in-group also played an important role. The extent to which participants thought that the out-group felt contempt for the in-group significantly increased out-group-directed anger, which then motivated action. These findings mesh nicely with a growing body of research on emotional meta-perceptions at the group level. For example, the more American Muslims perceive other Americans to fear them, the more intense their anger (Rodriguez Mosquera, Khan, & Selya, 2017; see also Levin, Roccas, Sidanius, & Pratto, 2015).

On the other hand, an in-group's understanding of an out-group's emotions might underpin intergroup empathy and, as a consequence, prejudice reduction and reconciliation. Perceived respect from the out-group facilitates recategorization (Simon, Mommert, & Renger, 2015) and reconciliation (Simon & Schaefer, 2018). Perceived similarity is a powerful force for positivity in intergroup relations, and realizing that the out-group feels the same emotion under the same circumstances, or that both in-group and out-group experience the same emotion toward a relevant event or object, can be a compelling force toward unity. McDonald et al. (2017) exposed Jewish Israeli participants to an anger-eliciting news story and then told them that either an individual member of the out-group (a Palestinian citizen of Israel) or the out-group as a whole (Palestinians of the West Bank) had reacted in the same way. Emotional similarity, whether between a participant and a single member of the out-group or between a participant and the out-group as whole, led to increased support for conciliatory political policies toward the out-group. The consequences of sharing emotion across group boundaries, perhaps especially if the shared emotion violates expectations and stereotypes, have yet to be systematically investigated.

3.3 Are In-Group- or Out-Group-Targeted Emotions More Consequential?

It is clear that group-based emotions, whether directed at the out-group or at the in-group, have important consequences for intergroup interactions. Emotions such as in-group pride or collective angst can facilitate group-serving behaviors that disadvantage and discriminate against out-groups. Out-group-directed emotions, such as anger, fear, or disgust, can also fuel intergroup biases and conflict. Which side of this emotional coin is more important? Are intergroup relations influenced more by emotions about the in-group or by emotions about the out-group?

Reprising a conceptual argument made earlier by Brewer (1999) and Gaertner et al. (1997), Greenwald and Pettigrew (2014) recently argued that how people treat out-groups is more related to what they feel about their in-groups than to what they feel about those out-groups. People offer benefits (from job offers to emergency aid) to in-group members much more readily than to out-group members, but there is little evidence that this is done with the intention of causing active harm to out-groups (e.g., Mummendey et al., 1992). Public opinion surveys consistently show that although White Americans oppose affirmative action programs aimed at helping minorities, they also oppose outright discrimination against minorities. Thus, White Americans' lack of support for programs thought to put the in-group at a disadvantage appears to be rooted in the desire to benefit the in-group, rather than in wanting to specifically harm out-groups. Experimental studies (Weisel & Bohm, 2015) show that even in real-world zero-sum conflicts or rivalries (between political parties or sports teams, for example), people choose monetary allocations that benefit the in-group over allocations that actively harm the out-group (see also Brewer, 1999). All these types of evidence support the conclusion that bias and discrimination are driven mostly by in-group love, the desire to promote the in-group, rather than by out-group hate, the desire to actively harm the out-group. Existing evidence is not completely consistent, however; Lehr, Ferreira, and Banaji (2017) found that fans of rival baseball teams valued out-group losses over in-group gains, suggesting that out-group negativity is stronger in this instance.

From the preponderance of evidence, we suggest that positive emotions toward the in-group are more likely to drive intergroup bias and discrimination, compared to negative emotions toward the out-group. Importantly, the absence of positive emotions is clearly distinguishable (conceptually and empirically) from the presence of negative emotions, meaning that in-group positivity and out-group negativity can be independently measured. Thus, research on emotions toward the in-group and out-group in conflict situations offers the potential to test the hypothesis that in-group positivity drives conflict processes to a greater extent than out-group negativity. One study (to our knowledge) has taken this approach. In the context of disputed multiculturalism policies in New Zealand, Perry, Priest, Paradies, Barlow, and Sibley (2017) measured European New Zealanders' feelings of warmth and anger toward the in-group and the Maori out-group. Both in-group favoritism and out-group hostility contributed independently to predicting attitudes on conflict-relevant policies.

3.4 Multidirectionality of Processes

We conceptualize social categorization as initiating activation of either associated emotions or group-based appraisals, producing group-based emotions, which in turn produce intragroup or intergroup behavior. This has proven to be an enormously generative framework. It is important to realize, however, that this sequence of events is not always as unidirectional as this statement of theory may suggest, in particular because emotion (both incidental and integral) has widespread forward and backward effects on cognition (Smith & Mackie, 2006).

First, emotions influence appraisals, just as appraisals determine emotions. Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001) showed that people feeling fearful made pessimistic appraisals, compared to people feeling angry, who made more positive and optimistic appraisals of events. Han, Duhachek, and Agrawal (2014) showed that guilt activated concrete specific appraisals of an object, whereas shame activated abstract function-based appraisals. Kettle and Salerno (2017) showed that anger increases conservatism by increasing appraisals of competition for resources. Although almost all experimental evidence for these effects occurs at the interpersonal level, similar processes seem likely to operate at the group level (for reviews, see Keltner & Horberg, 2015; So et al., 2015).

Second, the activation and experience of group-based emotion, and emotion sharing in general, influence group membership and identification. We reviewed some of these consequences of emotions earlier. Shared emotion leads to tighter bonds (Manstead & Fischer, 2001; Peters & Kashima, 2007). Feeling positively valenced emotions about the in-group and shared anger toward an out-group increase group identification (Kessler & Hollbach, 2005; Smith et al., 2007).

In one particularly compelling example, based on van Zomeren and his colleagues' model of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2004), Thomas and McGarty (2009) experimentally primed group members with a group emotion norm of outrage and found that its effects increased both the sense of group belonging and appraisals of the in-group as efficacious, processes typically posited as precursors of emotion. The primed emotion also had more typically expected downstream influences, such that sharing group-based outrage made it more likely for the group to act (see also Parkinson et al., 2005).

Finally, intragroup or intergroup behavior feeds back in multiple ways on group membership and emotion. Yzerbyt, Kuppens, and Mathieu (2016) showed that Belgian high schoolers' discussion of whether university

entry exams in Dutch should be implemented intensified their estimates of the group emotion norm, extremitized group-based emotion, and heightened the sense of group belonging. Group behavior may change the group's situation, or at the very least its appraisal of its situation, changing group-based emotions, which starts the process again (Maitner et al., 2007; Shepherd, Spears, & Manstead, 2013; van Zomeren, Postmes, et al., 2008; van Zomeren, Spears, et al., 2008). As will become clear in the interventions section, multidirectionality allows for potentially effective interventions to target any stage of the processes, from group identification to appraisals, emotion, or behavioral effects.

3.5 Consequences of Intergroup Emotions: Summary

In summary, the evidence that group-based emotions shape the relationship between members and the group and affect both intragroup and intergroup behavior is now compelling and continues to grow. Intergroup emotions have particular import for escalating and deescalating intergroup conflict. It is impressive that this conclusion is supported by results not only of well-controlled laboratory studies but also of ingeniously designed field studies, including many that have taken place in the midst of ongoing, long-lasting, and bitter conflicts.



4. THE REGULATION OF INTERGROUP EMOTIONS

Despite a popular conception of emotions as triggered uncontrollably by environmental events, a growing body of work testifies to the conditions under which, and the processes by which, people can change, or regulate, their emotions to attain desired goals (Gross, Sheppes, & Urry, 2011). Because of the focus of this chapter, we narrow our discussion of regulation to the ways in which group members, in both intragroup and intergroup contexts, can regulate emotions that arise from group belonging (Goldenberg, Halperin, van Zomeren, & Gross, 2016).

4.1 Motives for Emotion Regulation

Seminal work on emotion regulation (Gross, 1998) identified two primary classes of motives: hedonic goals (to increase positive feelings or decrease negative feelings) and instrumental goals (often longer-term goals to motivate or energize particular behaviors). This typology was extended by Tamir (2016) to include more specific ways that emotions could be

regulated to pursue virtually any goal or “broad classes of [desired] outcomes” (p. 201).

Whereas Gross and Tamir focused on individual-level emotion regulation, Goldenberg et al. (2016) addressed the regulation of group-based emotions. Both hedonic and instrumental motives have clear relevance. Emotions that promote a positive view of the in-group are naturally hedonically pleasing, for they affirm one’s current social identity. Such emotions also generally facilitate instrumental goals at the group level, increasing unity and loyalty, as well as the group’s potential for collective action. Thus, positive group emotions such as pride, respect, and hope can serve both hedonic and instrumental motives. Notably, sharing the *same* emotions as other group members can serve these functions as well, independent of the specific emotions involved. Shared negative emotions such as intense anger or fear may not be hedonically positive, but could be instrumental, for example, in encouraging group members to support war or other intense conflicts in service of the group’s longer range instrumental goals.

To make this discussion more concrete, here are examples of motives that are likely to be especially relevant for group-based emotions.

- The hedonic desire to adopt or sustain positive emotions about the in-group, likely to be especially important for high identifiers, for example, when confronted with evidence of the in-group’s negative acts.
- The desire to match other in-group members’ emotions. This motive could be hedonic (sharing emotions feels good) or instrumental/social, promoting group unity and loyalty.
- The desire to experience specific emotions that facilitate collective action, an instrumental/performance motive (Tamir, 2016). Anger often facilitates collective action in conflict (van Zomeren et al., 2012). Feelings of fear and weakness might also be functional in justifying a group’s destructive actions in conflict through portraying the in-group as a victim (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009). If a group’s cohesion is in question, group members might want to increase their feelings of group pride. Desired or ideal levels of specific emotions, like these examples, have been found to predict group members’ later reports of their actually experienced emotions in intense conflict situations (Porat, Halperin, & Tamir, 2016).
- The instrumental desire to refrain from experiencing emotions that promote collective action, when such action would be difficult or costly (e.g., would subject the in-group to heavy repression by powerful outgroups). In this situation, group members may be motivated not to experience anger or other action-promoting emotions.

- The desire to experience emotions viewed as correct and desirable, perhaps triggered by learning that other in-group members' emotions are inconsistent with an injunctive norm. This is an instrumental/social motive. For example, Goldenberg et al. (2014) found that people who learned of an in-group's immoral action reported higher levels of guilt if they believed other in-group members reported little guilt.
- The desire to respond appropriately to an out-group's emotions (an instrumental/performance motive). Depending on the situation, an in-group may seek to mirror an out-group's emotion (e.g., anger) or to adopt complementary emotions (e.g., respond to out-group anger with fearful submission).

4.2 Strategies for Emotion Regulation

Gross and Thompson (2007) identified a set of strategies for emotion regulation, which vary in the stage in the emotion-generation process that they affect. Goldenberg et al. (2016) further elaborated these strategies in the context of regulating group-based emotions.

Situation selection involves choosing whether or not to even enter or expose oneself to emotion-eliciting situations (e.g., declining to view horror movies if one finds them upsetting). For group-based emotions, one might choose to attend or avoid situations (such as communal memorial ceremonies) that elicit strong group-based emotions. *Situation modification* can operate by changing the group's actual situation (which may be possible only for relatively small groups) or by changing specific aspects of the way one interacts with the situation. Wearing a gay pride flag to a pride parade, for example, modifies the situation in a way that likely increases one's experience of group-relevant emotions (Goldenberg et al., 2016). Note that it may also influence the emotions of other group members. Finally, situation modification can involve changing the way information about a situation is communicated, whether by censoring or emphasizing particular aspects in ways that contribute to desired emotional responses.

Attention deployment strategies in group contexts include the classic strategy of "social creativity," such as focusing one's attention on nonobvious dimensions on which the in-group excels, while ignoring more prominent dimensions on which it falls behind. Attention can also be shifted to specific events (e.g., those that make the group look good, or those that support the group's self-image as a victim) as a way of regulating group-based emotions—this is a strategy group leaders routinely employ.

Cognitive change strategies fall into two categories. First, people can reinterpret or reappraise the meaning of group-relevant events to alter their

Table 6 A Misattribution Cue Lowered Reported Intergroup Anger Following an Insult from an Out-Group

Condition	**Misattribution Cue**	**No Cue**
Intergroup insult	4.97	5.94
No insult	2.06	1.58

A misattribution cue decreased the intergroup anger felt following an insult from an out-group. Anger was low and the cue had no effect when there was no intergroup insult.
Data from Rydell, R. J., Mackie, D. M., Maitner, A. T., Claypool, H. M., Ryan, M. J., & Smith, E. R. (2008). Arousal, processing, and risk taking: Consequences of intergroup anger. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34*(8), 1141–1152.* https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167208319694, Experiment 1.

emotional responses. For example, Doosje and colleagues found that high group identifiers reinterpreted their in-group's past negative behaviors in ways that made them seem less negative, reducing group-based guilt. Misattribution (thinking of emotion-induced arousal as arising from a different source) can reduce the intensity of emotions such as group-based anger (Rydell et al., 2008). As Table 6 shows, participants' group-based anger following an intergroup insult was lower if they were given a plausible alternative explanation (the physical environment) for their feelings of tension and irritation; anger was low and the misattribution cue had no significant effect when there was no insult. Misattribution effects have usually been studied by providing an external cue, but presumably people could seek to misattribute arousal on their own, by drinking alcohol, for example (Steele, Southwick, & Critchlow, 1981).

Second, people can also shift their self-categorization to perceive themselves either as independent individuals, as members of a different, cross-cutting group (e.g., as a woman rather than a Republican), or as members of a higher-level, more inclusive group (e.g., an American rather than a Republican). Because group-based emotions are generated in the first place by appraisals of relevance to a specific group, such shifts in self-categorization can alter the emotion-generation process.

Finally, *response modification* processes seek to directly affect behavioral or physiological processes involved in emotion. The ways this can be done (e.g., intentionally suppressing emotional reactions) presumably are quite similar for individual or group-based emotions. However, the consequences may differ, because emotion expression and communication are so important for group-based emotions in signaling to other members and often in encouraging similar emotions (Goldenberg et al., 2016).

Another type of response modification regulation strategy is *behavior change*. Although focused on individual rather than group-based emotions,

Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, and Zhang (2007) take the view that much and perhaps most behavior is performed to regulate anticipated future emotions. For example, someone might give to charity not because she feels a particular emotion such as compassion at the moment, but because she believes that if she does not give, she will likely feel guilty in the future. Although conventional thinking about emotion regulation speaks to the benefit of regulating specific emotions (e.g., sadness, anger, guilt, joy), Baumeister et al. (2007) appear to emphasize the positive or negative valence of the anticipated emotion most. To the extent that people can anticipate how their group-relevant actions might cause future group-based emotions, Baumeister et al.'s feedback theory is also relevant to such behaviors. The decision to order a preemptive strike against an enemy, for example, may be motivated as much or more by the anticipation of relief than by the current emotion of fear. Given the evidence reviewed above that group-based emotions regulate group-based behavior, this perspective warrants further exploration at the intergroup emotion level.

As several of our examples suggest, emotion regulation strategies may be employed by individuals themselves or by others (usually fellow in-group members). Goldenberg et al. (2016) term these intrinsic and extrinsic emotion regulation, respectively. Extrinsic regulation is especially important for group-based emotions, because these are typically caused by group-relevant events that affect many or all group members, and because group members tend to experience similar emotions. Leaders can have a strong influence on group emotions (Barsade & Knight, 2015), and thus may be especially likely to attempt to change group members' emotions (e.g., stoking anger to prepare a group for collective action). Even individuals' efforts at intrinsic emotion regulation (i.e., aimed at their own emotions) will often have effects on others in the group by changing emotional expressions that are communicated to others.

4.3 Identity Regulation as a Means of Emotion Regulation

In the organizational psychology literature, the term "identity regulation" has been used, in a qualitative/interpretive framework, to label the process by which "employees are enjoined to develop self-images and work orientations that are deemed congruent with managerially defined objectives" (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002). We define identity regulation much more broadly, paralleling emotion regulation, as any goal-driven process that seeks to change either the specific identity (personal or social) that is salient for a person at a given time or the importance of or commitment to a specific

identity. Although goal directed by definition, the process may or may not be conscious and strategic, just as emotion regulation can take place in certain circumstances spontaneously and without specific intention (Mauss, Bunge, & Gross, 2007). Identity regulation is typically engaged in by an individual, but other people or groups may at times seek to regulate a person's identity.

Our focus in this chapter is on identity regulation in the service of emotion regulation: shifting identification to or increasing identification with groups that yield hedonically positive or instrumentally useful group-based emotions, and/or decreasing attachments to groups that generate negative or dysfunctional group-based emotions. Shifting identification may change emotion intensity because group membership is a prerequisite for experiencing group-based emotion. Increasing or decreasing identification may change the motives for and thus the nature of group appraisals, and thus group emotions. For example, deidentifying might shift emotions about a negative event from anger to sadness (Crisp et al., 2007), whereas increasing identification can motivate reappraisals that avoid guilt about group actions (Doosje et al., 2006).

How can people modify their identity to regulate group-based emotion? There has been little direct consideration of identity regulation in the literature, but we can speculatively distinguish two general types of strategies.

4.3.1 Changing Self-Categorization

First, someone can change self-categorization to a different group (whether cross-cutting or superordinate) or to the individual self. We mentioned these possibilities earlier, as a means of regulating group-based emotions. This process has been studied under terms such as "cultural frame switching" in bicultural individuals (e.g., Hong, Chiu, & Kung, 1997; Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000), and it can be facilitated by priming (e.g., exposing oneself to cultural products such as art, music, or language).

4.3.2 Changing Self-Investment

Second, within a given self-categorization, one can increase or decrease group identification. As we conceptualize it, group identification has two main components (see Leach et al., 2008). One is *self-investment*: feelings of commitment to the group, bonds with other group members, and the importance of the group to the self. This is measured by such items as "I feel solidarity with (group)" and "I often think about the fact that I am (group)" (Leach et al., 2008). The second dimension is *self-definition*: feelings of similarity to other group members, measured by items like "(Group) people

have a lot in common with each other." Changing group identification might involve changing either or both of these dimensions, which might involve different strategies.

Regarding self-investment change, several strategies can help a person come to feel more committed to the group or perceive it as a more important aspect of the self. *Situation selection* could involve exposing oneself to explicit symbols of the identity (e.g., culturally relevant art, music, or language in the case of a cultural identity), or attending identity-relevant events (ceremonies, conferences), as well as affiliating with other group members. Just as studies of cultural priming show that exposure to identity-relevant symbols can shift self-categorization (e.g., Hong et al., 2000), such exposure should also induce people to think more frequently about the identity and treat it as more important. *Situation modification* might involve wearing identity-relevant clothing or other symbols (e.g., a t-shirt with a political slogan, a clergyperson's garb), both to influence one's own thoughts, feelings, and actions, and also to influence the way others treat one. *Attention direction* could involve focusing attention on specific identity-relevant aspects of a complex situation, such as aspects that are especially relevant for one's feelings and behavior *as a woman* or *as a social activist*.

Cognitive change includes several potential identity regulation strategies. A person could frame many or most aspects of everyday life as group-relevant acts. For example, a religious person might think of his or her occupation or daily acts of helping others as aspects of religious duty. A scientist might approach everyday decisions by reflecting on what is supported by empirical evidence.

Behavior change as a type of *response modification* can help shape identities. Individuals can act in ways that both reflect and, in turn, reinforce commitment to a group identity. Such behaviors include sacrifices for the group: contributions of time or money, or a willing risk of personal safety, for example, by joining the military. Displays of group symbols (e.g., clothing, aspects of language, or lifestyle) might also mark and reinforce group membership. Investments in group membership also seem likely to elevate commitment and importance, for example, undergoing years of training for a profession or difficult group initiation rites.

4.3.3 Changing Self-Definition

The second aspect of group identification (Leach et al., 2008), similarity to the group, can also be modified by *behavior change*. Conforming to the group's norms by thinking, feeling, and acting in ways that are similar to other group

members should generally heighten self-definition. Conversely, if lower levels of self-definition are desired, then one could seek to differentiate oneself from other members by avoiding conformity. A second potential strategy involves *cognitive change*: one could reconceptualize the meaning of "similarity," for example, by thinking of group members as highly similar in the ways that "really matter" despite their superficial differences.

4.4 Regulation in Intragroup Contexts

Both emotion regulation and identity regulation can be extrinsic (performed by others, usually fellow group members) or intrinsic (performed by the individual him or herself). Given the functionality of positive and shared group-based emotions, it is no surprise that groups—especially intentionally formed groups (like clubs, religious affiliations, and professional associations) as well as natural groups (such as gender, ethnicities, and age cohorts)—engage in specific practices and behaviors that enhance positivity and sharing of emotion, as an additional social "glue" that increases identification and readiness for collective action (Beyer, von Scheve, & Ismer, 2014; de Rivera, 2014; Lawler, 2003). As noted earlier, emotions are under strong normative control, and the transmission of injunctive norms (what people ideally should or ought to do; what is approved, expected, and correct) is essential for group cohesiveness and commitment (Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009). Groups also routinely seek to increase their members' self-investment (feelings of commitment and importance about the group) through the types of identity-shaping strategies previously discussed (e.g., select group-relevant situations, cognitive change to reinforce group importance, behavior change to increase commitment).

An intragroup context is by definition one in which group members interact and influence each other. Thus, as individual group members regulate their own emotions and feelings of group identification, those efforts may affect others. If one person engages in situation selection, attention direction, or cognitive reappraisal to experience (say) group pride instead of guilt, this should make it more likely that other members will do the same. Leaders or prototypical group members, of course, are likely to be especially influential over other members (Hogg, 2001). Shared emotions and high levels of group identification may also occur without direct member-to-member social influence, to the extent that most group members perceive group norms in similar ways, or focus on similar group-relevant events (such as obstacles that the group has overcome) and appraise them in similar ways (e.g., as a source of pride; Smith et al., 2007).

4.5 Regulation in Intergroup Contexts

Based on the considerations outlined earlier, emotion regulation would be expected to be common in intergroup conflict situations. Depending on the group's goals, regulation could be aimed either at preparing the group for conflict (e.g., increased levels of anger) or at deescalating conflict (e.g., decreased anger, increased fear, perhaps increased empathy for the out-group). Some empirical evidence is consistent with this expectation. Porat, Halperin, and Tamir (2016) studied the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, finding that reports of desired levels of anger or empathy toward the out-group predicted the same individuals' later reported experienced levels of those emotions, as well as their preferences for policies regarding the conflict. Given this pattern of experienced emotion shifting toward desired levels, these results strongly suggest that successful emotion regulation was occurring, a conclusion that is strengthened by field experiments in which emotion regulation training produced predicted effects (Halperin, 2013; Halperin, Cohen-Chen, & Goldenberg, 2014). In a study during the 2016 election campaign, we measured American students' currently experienced and ideal levels of positive and negative emotions toward their own and the opposite political party (Democrat or Republican; Haupert, Smith, & Mackie, 2016). Students reported feeling high levels of negativity and low levels of positivity toward the opposite party. However, they also stated that they would ideally like to feel more positive than negative about the opposite party, suggesting that they found the high levels of conflict during the campaign uncomfortable and would seek to regulate their emotions in a more positive direction.

4.5.1 Role of the Out-Group

In an intergroup context, the salient out-group is a crucial consideration for regulation of emotions and identity. The out-group is often a competitor or rival, as well as a target for social comparisons, and it can affect regulatory processes in several ways.

As we described earlier, emotions perceived in or attributed to the out-group can affect the in-group's emotions. For example, perceptions of whether out-group members feel anger or fear toward the in-group feed directly into appraisals of how threatening the out-group is. These perceptions therefore determine how much effort the in-group must put into collective action. A more threatening out-group (e.g., angry and highly committed, as well as strong in material resources) puts a greater burden on the in-group to mobilize members through shared emotion, shared

identity, and commitment processes (van Zomeren, Postmes, et al., 2008; van Zomeren, Spears, et al., 2008).

Group members may also seek to regulate out-group members' emotions. Of course, many standard strategies in intergroup conflict involve trying to shape out-group emotions. For example, a threat or bluff strategy is aimed at making the out-group fear the in-group so they will back down; at other times, groups seek to portray themselves as victims in order to elicit sympathy and support among out-group members. Expressions of emotion on behalf of the in-group may be part of such strategies (e.g., expressing in-group anger as a way of increasing out-group fear).

4.6 Regulatory Processes: Conclusions

Our field is just beginning to consider emotion regulation in the context of group-based emotions (Goldenberg et al., 2016). Such emotion regulation rests on the same motives, and draws on most of the same strategies, as individual-level emotion regulation. But the dependence of group-based emotions on self-categorization and the importance of group identification means that a new set of strategies, involving shifts in categorization or identification (what we term identity regulation), also come into play. In general, thinking about emotions at the group rather than the individual level brings in a whole new layer of complexity. Not only an individual's motives, but also group goals become important drivers of regulatory efforts. Group-level strategies (such as those aimed at inducing shared emotions in group members) also become relevant. And in intergroup situations, a third layer is added, for the emotions of the out-group become not only a key part of the situation to which the in-group must respond but also potentially a target for regulation. Clearly, there is scope for much additional research and theoretical development on these topics.



5. IMPLICATIONS OF INTERGROUP EMOTIONS FOR INTERVENTIONS

Much research interest in prejudice and intergroup relations has been motivated by the hope that understanding the underlying social and psychological processes can point toward effective interventions that can reduce intergroup conflict and ultimately improve people's lives. Traditional approaches to intervention have focused largely on two aspects of the underlying processes: categorization and stereotypes. Categorization-based approaches such as recategorization and decategorization seek to shift people

from an "us vs them" perspective to regard others as part of a more inclusive in-group, or to make group boundaries less salient (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Crisp & Hewstone, 2007; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Hogg, Abrams, & Brewer, 2017). Stereotype-based approaches seek to change the characteristics that people associate with out-groups, making them less negative and more positive, whether through intergroup contact or through more controlled exposure to stereotype-disconfirming information about the out-group (Dovidio, Love, Schellhaas, & Hewstone, 2017; McIntyre, Paolini, & Hewstone, 2016).

Our intergroup emotions framework offers a somewhat different perspective on potential interventions. Categorization, including self-categorization, remains important as the fundamental process that enables the experience of group-based emotions. But this perspective gives less centrality to stereotypes (beliefs about groups) than to affect (emotions about groups). Research finds, for example, that changes in affect rather than in beliefs more typically mediate the positive effects of intergroup contact, as we will describe later. Finally, our perspective quite generally assumes multidirectional causation among processes of categorization, appraisal, emotion, and behavior. Thus, interventions are not restricted to targeting the early stages of the process (such as categorization and stereotypic beliefs about groups), but can apply at any point. For example, an intervention might focus on changing emotional expression to shift emotional experience (Niedenthal, Winkielman, Mondillon, & Vermeulen, 2009).

In this final major section of the chapter, we describe interventions under three headings. Classic interventions—well tested in the literature—will be reviewed, with a focus on evidence about the extent to which their effects are mediated by changes in emotion. We then describe interventions specifically targeted at emotions; these tend to be newer and some have only preliminary empirical support. Finally, we mention potential interventions that are theoretically plausible, but that demand further focused validation research.

5.1 Classic Interventions

5.1.1 Intergroup Contact

Personal contact with members of an out-group reliably reduces prejudice, as a meta-analysis of a half-century of research has shown (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Although contact that creates the conditions for actual friendship is probably the most effective (Pettigrew, 1998), other, less intense varieties of contact, also reduce prejudice. Extended contact (knowing that a

friend has an out-group friend), vicarious contact (observing intergroup interaction without personally participating), and imagined contact have been studied (see Dovidio et al., 2017, for a recent review). Even informal neighborhood contact—i.e., living in a multiethnic neighborhood—can have positive effects (Christ et al., 2014).

Contact reduces prejudice in major part through affective mediators. Changes in affect rather than in beliefs mediate the positive effects of intergroup contact, as found in studies by Miller, Smith, and Mackie (2004) and a meta-analysis by Pettigrew and Tropp (2006). In fact, intergroup contact can successfully reduce prejudice even if stereotypes change little or not at all (Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Bachelor, 2003). Relevant emotions include not only negative threat-based emotions, such as fear, disgust, and anger but also positive emotions, such as respect, which is reliably increased by intergroup contact (Lopez-Rodriguez, Cuadrado, & Navas, 2016; Seger et al., 2016). There are other mediators of contact effects as well, especially change in norms (Dovidio et al., 2017). However, the intuitive assumption that contact operates chiefly by providing accurate knowledge about the out-group and therefore breaking down inaccurate stereotypes seems to be incorrect. Instead, effects of contact may be best understood by studying both the (often negative) intergroup emotions that contribute to or constitute prejudice in the first place, and also the ways that intergroup contact alters and reshapes those emotions to reduce prejudice.

As a cautionary note, although positive intergroup contact reliably reduces prejudice, it can also have ironic effects, especially for members of disadvantaged groups. A variety of studies now show that, for such members, intergroup contact can reduce the desire for collective action to remedy the group's disadvantage by increasing positive emotions and reducing anger toward the dominant group, as well as increasing trust (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009). For example, negative contact between Black or Latino Americans and White Americans led to increases in self-reported engagement in collective action, partially as a result of increased group-based anger, whereas positive contact reduced anger and, consequently, collective action (Hayward, Tropp, Hornsey, & Barlow, 2017). These findings remind us that not prejudice reduction but rather the restoration of positive intergroup relations should be the ultimate goal of interventions, and that such restoration sometimes occurs only through collective action and social conflict.

5.1.2 Social Categorization

As noted earlier, categorization-based interventions such as decategorization and recategorization have been widely studied. Little work has specifically

examined emotions as mediators of such interventions' effects. An exception is Ray, Mackie, Smith, and Terman (2012), who examined cross-categorization (Crisp & Hewstone, 1999). Cross-categorization seeks to reduce prejudice against one out-group by introducing a second, cross-cutting category boundary (e.g., by inducing people to consider that Republicans and Democrats are also either men or women). With both real and laboratory-created groups, Ray et al. found that discrete emotions including anger, disgust, and admiration accounted for the effect of cross-categorization on evaluative measures of prejudice. In one study, the intensity of positive and negative discrete emotions (e.g., admiration, disgust, anger) directed at the cross-classified groups better predicted evaluations of those groups, compared to the simple assumption that people will more positively evaluate shared group memberships compared to unshared memberships. Thus, cross-categorization as a prejudice-reduction intervention may, at least in part, operate through emotional mediators.

A related strategy is the activation of intersectional identities as a means of altering categorization, emotions, and behavior. Levy, Saguy, van Zomeren, and Halperin (2017) advanced the concept of "gateway identities"—groups that bridge or share the identities of two groups locked in negative group relations. For example, the dual-identity or cross-categorized group Israeli Arabs constitutes a gateway group between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians. In laboratory and field studies, the mere presence of such a group was found to increase allocations toward the previously disliked out-group and decrease support for aggressive political policies that targeted them. Along with reduced in-group identification and reduced negative stereotyping of the dual identity group, a reduction in anger toward the out-group mediated these effects.

Finally, in research reviewed earlier, we and others have demonstrated that simply shifting people from one self-categorization to another (e.g., from student to American) can change their emotions toward a target out-group (e.g., Muslims; Ray et al., 2008; see also Dumont et al., 2003). Such shifts in categorization could be induced in many ways, from subtle presentation of group symbols (Seger et al., 2009) to the mention of a specific comparison group (e.g., "In this study, we are comparing opinions of students vs nonstudents").

5.1.3 Intergroup Apologies

In the processes of forgiveness and reconciliation following intergroup conflict, intergroup apologies frequently play a role. Group-based emotions are central mediators of the effects of apologies. In one study in our laboratory, participants were first reminded of their UCSB student identity, learned

about a transgression against their group by an out-group (the faculty), and then completed group-based emotion measures about that out-group. Participants subsequently learned whether the out-group had apologized or not, after which they completed the emotion measures again (Leonard, Mackie, & Smith, 2011). Findings revealed that for the group receiving an apology, anger as well as respect toward the out-group mediated effects of the apology on forgiveness and the desire to seek retribution. Fig. 1 shows the mediation relations: In the apology condition, the reduction in anger from pre- to postapology is partially responsible for the decreased desire for retribution, whereas an increase in respect mediates an increased likelihood of forgiveness for the offending out-group.

The emotions expressed by the apologizing group appear to be important as well. In one study, only when apologies were accompanied by expressions of "secondary" or uniquely human emotions (such as anguish and remorse) did they lead to forgiveness; apologies accompanied only by primary emotions such as fear did not have this effect (Wohl, Hornsey, & Bennett, 2012). More broadly, a meta-analysis (Van Tongeren, Burnette, O'Boyle, Worthington, & Forsyth, 2014) suggests that across diverse types of intergroup conflicts, guilt and trust are the strongest predictors of intergroup forgiveness. In contrast, negative intergroup emotions and strong



Fig. 1 Mediation of effect of apology on desire for retribution through intergroup anger and effect of apology on forgiveness through intergroup respect. *Data from Leonard, D., Mackie, D. M., & Smith, E. (2011). Emotional responses to intergroup apology mediate intergroup forgiveness and retribution.* Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47*(6), 1198–1206. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.05.002*.

in-group identification represent the most important barriers to forgiveness. Intergroup apology and forgiveness have been much less studied than contact- and categorization-based approaches, but existing evidence suggests both that apology and reconciliation can be effective interventions and that their effects are at least partly mediated by intergroup emotions. It is even possible to conceptualize apology and reconciliation as emotion regulation processes—aimed specifically at regulating the out-group's emotions (Čehajić-Clancy, Goldenberg, Gross, & Halperin, 2016).

5.1.4 Perspective Taking

Perspective taking involves providing a perceiver information about an out-group member, for example, in a written narrative or a video, or asking the perceiver to self-generate such information, for example, by presenting a photo and asking for an imaginative description of a "day in the life" of the target person. Such manipulations generally result in reduced prejudice, although there are theoretically important exceptions (Sassenrath, Hodges, & Pfattheicher, 2016; Todd & Galinsky, 2014). Like intergroup contact, perspective taking probably operates through multiple mediators; this similarity is not surprising since intergroup interaction (like any interaction) ordinarily includes efforts to understand the perspective of the other. Todd and Galinsky (2014) conclude that both affective processes (empathy) and cognitive processes (changes in attribution and self-out-group merging) are part of the picture. They suggest that empathy may be more important with manipulations that provide information about the target (e.g., his or her negative experiences) rather than more minimal manipulations such as the "day in the life" task.

Other emotional reactions besides empathy can also occur in perspective-taking. For example, when a member of a dominant group takes the perspective of a historically subordinated group, group-based guilt or moral outrage could result (Barth & Stürmer, 2016). One recent paper examined this context and found differences between taking the perspective of a specific out-group individual vs the out-group as a whole (e.g., "imagine how [the group] must have experienced the events…, how they must have felt, …"). Group-level perspective taking increased collective guilt, whereas individual-level perspective taking did not, but instead caused feelings of empathy. However, both types of perspective taking increased willingness to compensate the out-group for its past mistreatment (Barth & Stürmer, 2016). The researchers suggest that group-level perspective taking (compared to individual-level) makes group membership more salient, amplifying group-based emotional and behavioral reactions.

5.2 Emotion-Targeted Interventions

Traditional approaches to intervention in intergroup conflict generally target categorization or negative stereotypes about out-groups. With the emerging understanding that emotions play a key role in prejudice and intergroup behavior, as postulated by IET and other perspectives, interventions that directly target emotions are ripe for study. Halperin and his colleagues have done considerable work in this area, often in the context of an intractable intergroup conflict (the Israeli–Palestinian conflict; Halperin, 2013; Halperin et al., 2014; Halperin & Pliskin, 2015). They describe two strategies for harnessing emotion regulation.

5.2.1 Direct Emotion Regulation Strategies

A direct strategy applies general emotion regulation processes such as reappraisal to shift intergroup emotions and hence political attitudes (see Goldenberg et al., 2016). Several studies have examined reappraisal training involving exposure to anger-inducing images under instructions to respond to them objectively, analytically, and in a detached manner rather than emotionally. In studies with Jewish Israeli participants in the context of an ongoing, long-lasting, and bitter conflict, such training has positive effects on emotions toward the Palestinian out-group (especially a reduction in anger) and results in more positive policy attitudes (Halperin, Porat, Tamir, & Gross, 2013). Similarly, a recent study of students in the U.S. state in which the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing occurred found that training in reflection (an emotion regulation technique), compared to rumination and control conditions, led to decreased anger and bias against Muslims (Steele, Rovenpor, Lickel, & Denson, 2017).

5.2.2 Indirect Emotion Regulation Strategies

However, the applicability of direct emotion regulation strategies in intractable conflict may be limited, because even if people are trained to use a regulation strategy, they will not do so unless they are motivated to change their negative emotions about the out-group—a condition that may often be absent in strong real-world conflicts (Halperin et al., 2014). In this case, an alternative, indirect strategy may be useful. This strategy involves focused interventions aimed at specific appraisals, predicted to change corresponding emotions. In one example of this approach, the emotion of hatred, and its associated appraisal that the out-group has unchangeable negative

characteristics, was targeted by messages suggesting that groups in general are malleable and can change (Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998). Halperin, Russell, Trzesniewski, Gross, and Dweck (2011) showed experimentally that such messages did indeed change appraisals and increase support for political compromises as a road to peace. Other studies have successfully used similar approaches to increase group-based guilt, which can play an important role in reconciliation (Čehajić-Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011).

5.2.3 Emotion Norm Interventions

As we described earlier in the section on norms, group-based emotions are strongly influenced by perceived in-group emotion norms. A key distinction (Cialdini et al., 1990) is between descriptive norms (what people do, or the perception of what people do) and injunctive norms (what people ideally should or ought to do, or the perception of what is approved, expected, and correct). Both independently predict attitudes, behavioral intentions, and behaviors (Jacobson, Mortensen, & Cialdini, 2011). Both descriptive and injunctive norms are frequently misestimated or misperceived (Berkowitz, 1997; Blanton, Köblitz, & McCaul, 2008; Larimer, Irvine, Kilmer, & Marlatt, 1997; Perkins & Wechsler, 1996) and can be shifted by feedback (whether accurate or false: Prince & Carey, 2010; Reid & Aiken, 2013). Our research on emotion sharing and convergence (e.g., Moons et al., 2009) illustrates how feedback about descriptive norms can influence emotional experience within a group, as well as downstream attitudes and behavioral intentions. However, there is little work explicitly assessing the relation between injunctive norms and group-based emotions. Because correction of norm misperceptions has proven a powerful interventional strategy for attitude and behavioral change (Tankard & Paluck, 2016), there is good reason to think that all these outcomes would apply equally for norms regarding group-based emotion. Just as social norms campaigns can create or correct perceptions of descriptive and injunctive norms, they could alter perceptions of group-based emotion norms, with concomitant changes in emotion and behavior.

However, under certain circumstances, norms-based interventions might backfire. For example, Goldenberg et al. (2014) gave participants information about a negative action performed by their in-group against an outgroup, and also told them what percentage of in-group members in a survey had reported feeling guilty about this action. Lower levels of guilt among other in-group members led participants to personally report higher levels

of guilt. The authors suggested that this reflected a compensation process, wherein participants felt more guilt themselves to compensate for what they saw as inadequate levels of guilt among other in-group members. Rather than conforming to the apparent group descriptive norm, they attempted to compensate for others' perceived failure to express the emotion appropriate under the injunctive norm. The extent to which such processes might limit the applicability of emotion norm interventions in conflict is currently unclear.

5.3 Novel, Theoretically Predicted Interventions

Finally, we describe interventions for which there is at least a tentative theoretical basis to expect positive effects, but that have as yet been studied little or not at all.

5.3.1 Identification-Based Interventions

Whereas manipulations targeting self-categorization have been widely tested (as described earlier), those seeking to shift people's levels of identification with their groups have received less study. Lower levels of group identification, for example, are associated with less intense group-based emotions, especially positive emotions (e.g., Smith et al., 2007). Existing work shows that inducing people to think about their negative emotions toward the in-group, or their positive emotions toward the out-group, both lower levels of group identification (Kessler & Hollbach, 2005). Barnett, Moore, and Harp (2017) found that increasing the salience of discrepancies between the individual group member's values and what other members are actually like can induce negative emotions about the group. For example, learning that other group members are not very similar to what one thinks group members should be like causes feelings of guilt. Other manipulations that might prove effective in reducing people's group identification include providing information that the individual is quite different from other group members, and providing cues that increase the salience or importance of alternative, competing group memberships.

5.3.2 Ideal Emotion Norm Interventions

We have argued that alongside their currently experienced group-based emotions, people have emotion goals: ideal or desired levels of particular emotions (Haupert et al., 2016). These can be regarded as injunctive norms. As Porat, Halperin, Mannheim, et al. (2016) and Porat et al. (2016) have shown, ideal levels of emotions in a conflict situation can predict actual

self-reported levels of emotion at a later time, as well as consequential political attitudes. Thus, it might be possible to target ideal emotions with interventions. Perhaps a group norm intervention similar to those we have described (Leonard, Moons, et al., 2011; Moons et al., 2009) could be used, informing people that other group members say that group members should ideally like to feel high levels of empathy, low levels of anger (etc.), rather than simply telling them that other group members currently feel such emotions. Though theoretically promising, no research has yet tested the effectiveness of such interventions.

5.3.3 In-Group Emotion Focus

As described earlier, theoretical arguments (Brewer, 1999; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014) and preliminary evidence (Perry et al., 2017) support the idea that emotions toward the in-group as well as emotions toward the out-group may be important in driving attitudes and behavior in conflict. Cikara, Van Bavel, Ingbretsen, and Lau (2017) present evidence on neural representations, which they interpret as consistent with the idea that in-group preference is more central than out-group hostility in group perception and cognition. Based on this idea, interventions targeting the nature of people's affective ties to their in-groups might be effective. We already know that the nature of attachment to in-groups can vary qualitatively, for example, involving different in-group-targeted emotions (Mackie et al., 2017) or distinct dimensions of group identification (Leach et al., 2008; Roccas et al., 2008). Interventions aimed at shifting the ways people think about their in-groups have been relatively understudied (compared to interventions aimed at reducing out-group hostility), yet may even outperform the latter type of interventions, if the evidence summarized by Greenwald and Pettigrew (2014) is correct.

5.3.4 Time Perspective and Emotions

There have been suggestions that different emotions become accessible as drivers of intergroup behavior when people focus on the past vs the future. Spanovic, Lickel, Denson, and Petrovic (2010) found, in one intergroup situation, that when people adopted a future focus, fear of the out-group led to aggression. In contrast, a focus on past events meant that anger about the out-group's perceived past transgressions was more important for predicting aggression. Although, in this particular study, both past and future focus led to increased desires to aggress, in other intergroup situations, shifts of time perspective could lead to more positive emotional outcomes. For example, it

might be possible to encourage group members to downplay past events (and associated feelings of anger) in favor of thinking about hope for the future, thereby encouraging reconciliation. Existing evidence supports the importance of hope in intractable conflict situations (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Porat, & Bar-Tal, 2014), but we propose investigation of interventions or manipulations that focus people on the future, as one means of increasing feelings of hope.

A different type of intervention might draw on the finding that when people feel that their time in life is limited, they increasingly prefer calm and related low-arousal emotions (Jiang, Fung, Sims, Tsai, & Zhang, 2016). (Terror management theory might say that the same manipulation could induce death thoughts and nonconscious anxiety, but this is not inconsistent with wanting calm emotion states.) Thus, manipulations causing people to view their future time perspective as limited could induce calm feelings, which seem likely to reduce preferences for anger and conflict.

5.3.5 Group vs Group Member Focus

Connection to an in-group can take two distinct forms. Traditional conceptions of group connection involve feelings about the group as a whole. But people can also be bonded to a group through relationships with other group members. This has been conceptualized as the distinction between common identity and common bond groups (Prentice, Miller, & Lightdale, 1994), or between social attraction (attraction to a depersonalized prototypical concept of the group) and interpersonal attraction (liking for other individual members of the group; Hogg & Hardie, 1992), or between collective and relational identity (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Measures reflecting these two types of connection to the group have been developed (Prentice et al., 1994), and research using them makes clear that people are connected to different groups in different ways. Furthermore, both types of connection to groups can influence in-group-related behavior (Hogg & Hardie, 1992; Zhang, Chen, Chen, Liu, & Johnson, 2014).

We expect that emotions toward groups vs members may often differ, for both out-groups and in-groups. For out-groups, the group as a whole generally stands as a symbol of the group's disliked goals and values, whereas individual out-group members may elicit more positive emotions, including respect or sympathy. The entire literature on intergroup contact and prejudice, in fact, indicates that positive feelings about individual out-group members can generalize to make feelings about the out-group as a whole more positive. The same prediction would follow from Sears' (1983) "person

positivity bias," the observation that individual people tend to elicit more positive responses than other types of social objects, such as groups. For in-groups, however, the story may be different: the in-group often represents an ideal that will elicit highly positive emotions. In contrast, other in-group members may often be seen as falling short of the ideal and may elicit negative feelings, such as disappointment or even anger. These predictions are somewhat tentative because, although existing research has established that people can be connected either to a group as a whole or to other group members, no previous research has examined the emotions that people experience with these two foci.

We propose that interventions that seek to shift people's focus between groups as entities vs group members as individuals might be able to change emotional responses, either to in-groups or out-groups, in ways that might ameliorate conflict. Scattered evidence supports this idea. Cooley and Payne (2016) found that using an implicit measure of attitudes with images of collections of several out-group members (compared to the usual version where each target is a single out-group member) resulted in more reliable measurement of prejudiced attitudes. Although this study did not examine emotions toward out-groups vs individual members, it makes it plausible that such emotions might differ. More directly, Barth and Stürmer (2016) found that asking people to take the perspective of out-group individuals vs the out-group as a whole led to distinct emotional reactions. Thus, it appears to be worth investigating potential manipulations that shift people between thinking of groups vs members.

5.3.6 Interventions Targeted at Perceptions of Out-Group Emotions

An in-group's emotions are often influenced by the emotions the out-group is perceived as experiencing (e.g., in-group anger or fear might arise in response to out-group anger). Thus, interventions could target these perceptions. Exposure to individual out-group members who express calm or positive emotions (rather than anger) might have effects, as might information that out-group members are not uniform in the emotions they feel. Interventions could suggest that out-group members' emotions are different from what in-group members believe, or are similar to those of in-group members, promoting recategorization (McDonald et al., 2017). Finally, people might be provided information suggesting that the out-group can easily change (even if it is currently experiencing anger)—a type of manipulation successfully used by Levy et al. (1998) in a somewhat different context.

5.3.7 Linguistic Interventions

Relatively subtle linguistic manipulations might be able to shape emotions and hence behavior in intergroup situations. One study (Nook, Schleider, & Summerville, 2017) displayed negative images to participants with instructions to write about each using either close or distant language. Distance could be spatial (instructions were to write about the image as if it were physically close vs far away), temporal (write using or avoiding the present tense), or social (write using vs avoiding the word "I"). Self-ratings of negative affect following the images showed that the distancing language reduced negative affect, with physical distance being the most effective. The researchers concluded that "language may constitute a primary target for both measuring and manipulating psychological distance and cognitive emotion regulation" (2017, p. 343). Building on this idea, we suggest that manipulating the language used in descriptions of group-relevant events, or the language people are encouraged to use in writing their own descriptions, may influence their emotions (e.g., reducing anger at the out-group) and hence their intergroup attitudes and behavior. Other related work (Libby & Eibach, 2011) suggests that when past events are recalled or reexperienced in a first-person perspective, they lead to more emotion, compared to events reexperienced from a third-person or observer perspective.

Language can also be used to manipulate the distinction, described earlier, between a focus on a group as a whole vs group members. Cooley et al. (2017) had participants consider either "people in a group" or "a group of people." The former phrasing, focusing on the individual members, led to greater perceptions of mind as well as greater sympathy. The authors suggest (p. 697) "such framing may be a key facet predicting support for policy decisions involving groups of people. For example, in the context of intergroup conflict, people may perceive the morality of launching a drone to be quite different if the potential victims are framed as the people of Afghanistan vs Afghan people. Likewise, if a group wants to elicit sympathy for their victimization, this research provides a simple way for doing so." These examples suggest that linguistic interventions could be used to shape emotion regulation or emotional responses more generally, potentially with positive effects in intergroup conflict.

5.3.8 Embodied Interventions

Finally, recent work on embodiment effects suggests novel manipulations that might influence emotions or feelings about other people. Of course, embodiment ideas at the individual level are a component of well-studied

emotion regulation processes. For example, suppressing behavioral expressions of emotion is found to reduce emotional experience (Niedenthal et al., 2009). But embodiment effects are also found at the interpersonal or group level. As Fiske (2004) argued, communal sharing relationships (those involving self-other overlap) found between close kin, friends, and in-groups are marked and reinforced by a variety of embodied cues. These include sharing food, having similar appearance, moving in synchrony, and interpersonal proximity and touch. Just as facial expressions both signal and potentially reinforce emotional feelings, such cues both reflect and can cause the corresponding feelings, such as closeness, empathy, and positive affect.

Seger, Smith, Percy, and Conrey (2014) tested the effects of a brief, casual interpersonal touch by an experimenter (African-American or Asian-American in different replications) on the implicit attitudes held by White student participants toward the experimenter's group. Compared to a no-touch control condition, participants who were touched had reliably more positive implicit attitudes, and this was true even for those who in postexperimental questioning did not even recall being touched. Thus, the effects of interpersonal touch, like the effects of positive contact with an individual out-group member in general (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), seem to generalize and create positive attitudes toward the entire group.

Other embodied manipulations operate at the group rather than dyadic level in the first place. Wiltermuth and colleagues (Wiltermuth, 2012; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009) found that a group of participants who (under instructions) moved and made sounds in synchrony cooperated with each other more on a later task, as well as complying more with another group member's requests. This occurred even when the request was to perform an antisocial act, suggesting that the effect was not just driven by increased positive feelings. Similarly, Good and Russo (2016) had diverse groups of schoolchildren sing together or, in control conditions, work on art together or play competitive games. Singing together—another manipulation of synchronous movement—led to more cooperative behavior. These studies measured dependent variables involving cooperation, conformity, or social influence, rather than emotional responses or prejudice. Still, it is not a huge leap to suggest that all these variables tap the same underlying processes of self-other overlap (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991) and, thus, that embodied manipulations such as touch or synchronous movement represent a promising approach for targeting emotions toward out-groups, and ultimately prejudice reduction and intergroup conflict resolution.



6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Much research on intergroup processes, including on intergroup emotions, has been motivated by the possibility of designing theoretically based interventions that could ameliorate destructive intergroup conflicts. As this chapter demonstrates, the research now offers a wide range of theoretical principles and empirical findings regarding the ways group-based emotions are produced, as well as their consequences for both intragroup and intergroup processes. Within this overall body of work, newer threads address such topics as the role of an out-group's perceived emotions in the production of in-group emotions, the role of normative processes in shaping such emotions, and the motives and strategies that impact regulation of these emotions.

The focused review of existing and potential interventions with which we end the chapter suggests a rich array of possibilities for practical payoffs from our increasing understanding of the role of group-based emotions in intergroup behavior. First, several classic, well-studied interventions, including intergroup contact, appear to have much of their effect specifically by changing intergroup emotions. Second, a range of intervention approaches targeted specifically at emotions, such as direct and indirect emotion regulation, appear effective in preliminary studies. Third, we described novel, mostly untested potential interventions that are theoretically expected to alter one or another stage of the processes involved in emotion production or their consequences, including approaches aimed at emotions toward the in-group (rather than the out-group), at shifting time perspective, or using linguistic or embodied manipulations. All in all, continuing to address the role of emotions in intergroup perception and behavior seems likely to be as generative an enterprise in the next 20 years as it has been in the last two decades, and promises to continue paying concrete dividends in the form of theoretically backed, practically usable interventions.

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