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Colonial Legacies in State Building: Bureaucratic Embeddedness, Public Goods  
provision, and Public Opinion in Nigeria

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree  
Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Ada Johnson-Kanu

Committee in Charge:

Professor Jessica Trounstone, Chair  
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2021

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The Dissertation of Ada Nina Johnson-Kanu is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

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2021

## **Dedication**

To

My mother, Onyeka Johnson-Kanu who pushes me to be more than I think I am capable  
of.

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# Colonial Legacies in State Building: Bureaucratic Embeddedness, Public Goods provision, and Public Opinion in Nigeria

## Abstract

This dissertation traces the changes in the ethnic composition of staff of the Nigerian Federal Civil Service. I use historical data to show that colonial hiring practices created inequalities in the level of representation various ethnic groups in Nigeria have in the civil service. I also show that this inequality has consequences for how public goods are provided to the public, and for how the public views the civil service. The dissertation is made up of three substantive chapters (which are standalone papers).

In the first chapter, I argue that while colonial investment plays a huge role in contemporary development and inequality, the indigenous groups' capitalization of early colonial investment creates inequality and concentrates some economic opportunities in certain groups. The colonized were not just bystanders, they actively participated in the building of their new country, and their actions were consequential. Using data on the Nigerian civil service spanning a century, I argue and find that those who had early access to colonial, and missionary education were able to capture the early Nigerian civil service leveraging their educational qualifications while hiring almost exclusively from within their ethnic group to fill vacancies that emerged in the civil service when they gained the power to do so. Consequently, those groups that got into the civil service first still enjoy larger than proportional representation within the service today despite colonial, and post-colonial policies implemented to combat this phenomenon.

The second chapter explores the consequences of representation in the bureaucracy on public goods provision. I argue that geographic and demographic patterns in historical bureaucracies' impact modern bureaucracies today. These legacies reflect on modern variations in "bureaucratic embeddedness" – how well particular ethnic groups (and sometimes regional groups) are represented in government agencies – which has consequences for the provision of public goods. I show that colonial leaders that built the bureaucratic state did not incorporate certain indigenous Nigerian groups into the civil service. Those groups that were first brought into the service by the British remain more likely to occupy service positions in the pre-independence, post-independence, and modern democratic periods. Strikingly, this historical legacy appears to only weakly influence allocation of public goods projects but has clear negative consequences for the completion of said projects. Groups that were historically (and thus presently) highly represented in the civil service see lower completion rates of projects allocated to them than those that were not included in the periods of state building. I attribute this to weak social sanctioning of bureaucrats from the groups and the agencies they belong to, lack of information on allocated projects by their group, and politicians' unwillingness to hold bureaucrats accountable.

In the third chapter I ask: how do citizens who are highly represented in the bureaucracy view government performance? I suggest that those who are represented in the bureaucracy are less likely to be satisfied with government performance on major issues, they are also less likely to contact government officials or view them as corrupt. I theorize that this is because these individuals separate the implementation of government policy from the responsibility of bureaucrats when their group is highly represented. Individuals lack information on what the bureaucracy does and assign any blame in the workings of the state to elected officials rather than the bureaucrats who actually carry out politicians directives.

**Part I****Colonial Legacies and Bureaucratic  
Embeddedness**

# 1 Introduction

This dissertation explores how the Building of the Colonial civil service in Nigeria had consequences on the post colonial representation of various groups in the country. The consequence manifests in pervasive inequality in the level of representation in the civil service where those who got employed into the service first are still more represented within it than those that entered after.

The Theory chapter defines concepts and describes how the Nigerian civil service came about and what factors influenced early entry into the civil service. I argue that precolonial institutions and local elites facilitate the pathways through which local groups pushed to be included in the colonial service. However, those groups that enjoyed precolonial forms of education, were reluctant to embrace the western version of education and were thus initially excluded from employment in the early civil service. Groups that were represented in the legislature had advocates within the government that pushed for investment in education and incorporation of Nigerians in the civil service thus increasing the group representation in the post colonial civil service.

I also argue that groups who got into the civil service early and thus highly represented after the colonial era are more likely to see poor completion rates of public projects allocated to them. I suggest that bureaucrats do not have much power over the allocation of public projects but do have a say in the implementation of allocated projects. Highly embedded groups in government agencies are unlikely to be held accountable by their agency since they can capture it due to their size. This emboldens bureaucrats who then engage in rent seeking behavior and expropriate resources meant for the completion of projects allocated to their groups. Their groups on the other hand may also be unlikely to hold them accountable as well. Thus the inequality in the level of embeddedness of bureaucrats within government agencies has negative consequences for public goods provision.

I also explore the consequences for public opinion on government performance. I argue that groups who are highly embedded in the civil service are less likely to be satisfied with the performance of the government. These groups experience corruption from co-ethnics who are part of government agencies. Their interaction with co-ethnic civil servants taints their perception of civil servants and the work they do on behalf of the civil service.

I find support for many of my arguments which are studied across three empirical chapters the first of which tackles how colonial legacies influence the composition of the Nigerian Federal Civil Service. The second empirical chapter studies how variation in the level of embeddedness in the civil service across states affects the completion rates of local public projects allocated to that state. The third empirical chapter studies the impact of unequal representation in the civil service on the public opinion of government performance.

## Part II

# Theoretical Foundations

## 1 Bureaucratic Embeddedness

Bureaucratic embeddedness refers to the aggregate ties and connections individual bureaucrats have with groups in the public (Evans 2012, Pepinsky, Pierskalla and Sacks 2017). That is, the individual bureaucrat has a relationship to a defined group. In many places like Nigeria, groups are also defined geographically. Thus, if a bureaucrat is from Kano state, then I say they have ties and connections to Kano state and Kano state is embedded in the bureaucracy through that bureaucrat.

Bureaucratic embeddedness is therefore the aggregation of the number of bureaucrats with ties and connections to a group within a bureaucracy. Simply put, this is the proportion of the bureaucracy that is made up of people with ties to a specific group. Because groups are highly segregated in Nigeria, group membership and state of origin are heavily overlapping. This means that if there are ten bureaucrats in the ministry of health and three of them are from Kano, then that Kano state has an embeddedness level of 0.3 in the Ministry of Health. Bureaucratic embeddedness is therefore a continuous measure ranging from zero to one. Embeddedness varies by group and by government agency.

The degree of embeddedness a group has in an agency depends on how many people in that group are qualified for positions in the bureaucracy. It is also affected by how large the group is. The more people in the group, the more likely they are to place someone in the bureaucracy. The educational attainment of that group affects how many people they can place in the bureaucracy. The number of people they already have in an agency is important because those who already have a foot in the door can help others get in as well. This is related to the path dependence process I discuss below.

## 2 The Emergence of Bureaucratic Embeddedness

I have argue that bureaucrats matter for public goods provision, and that the level of a groups embeddedness in government agencies vary by group. But how does this variation emerge? We might predict that politicians play an important role in the composition of the bureaucracy through appointments and patronage (Lewis 2010, Toral 2021). However, many of these appointments do not affect all levels of the bureaucracy (Brierley 2021, Krause and O'Connell 2016).

Alternative to the political reasons for the variation in representation of groups in the civil service, I argue (and show in this dissertation) that historical legacies influence the contemporary level of embeddedness for groups today. Colonial governments prioritized the employment of educated indigenous people at the expense of those who did not receive colonial education (Ricart-Huguet 2020). There are also arguments that those who were first employed into the colonial bureaucracy after receiving education, used their new positions to bring members of their group into

the bureaucracy through recommendations. Thus those who were employed early capitalized on their position to bring members of their group into open positions. This means that those who got into the bureaucracy first have a higher chance of persistence within the government agencies. Today, we see that the groups that are highly embedded in the bureaucracy are the same groups that held that position in the past.

**Precolonial education and Western educational attainment** To understand how indigenous groups first attained positions in the colonial Bureaucracy, we need to understand the requirements for employment in the service and the political terrain the colonized found themselves in during colonial rule. For employment in the colonial Bureaucracy, individuals needed to have at least a secondary level education. This is because the duties they would carry out was done in the language of the colonial power and official documents usually contained advanced concepts and vocabulary that the indigenes could only grasp after attaining a certain level of education. In Nigeria, the colonial officials were reluctant to employ local Nigerians and only made exceptions for educated Nigerians.

Prior to the colonization on Nigeria, there existed various ethnic groups with varying degrees on organization. For instance, in what was to become as Northern Nigeria now, there existed the Sokoto Caliphate, the Kanem-Borno empire which were highly organized and centralized. There were also other centralized groups with their own systems of governance and bureaucracy that provided public goods to the public. These precolonial institutions predicted the sort of colonial investments and the type of governance introduced by the Europeans.

Groups that had precolonial structures and organizations especially centralized bureaucracies should be able to use these existing structures to disseminate colonial directives. For instance, Müller-Crepon (2020) argues that existing precolonial structures determined whether indirect or direct rule was instituted by European powers. In Northern Nigeria, the British instituted indirect rule as local chiefs and traditional rulers were incorporated into the administration of the area. In southern Nigeria, the British were much more involved in the administration of the protectorate. The already existing precolonial structures were useful for facilitating the spread of colonial policy.

I therefore argue that groups who had precolonial institutions that could facilitate the spread of policy are better able to provide colonial education to their citizens using this structure. These groups are able to attain higher levels of education and since education is the main requirement for getting employed in the colonial Bureaucracy, they will therefore see higher levels of representation within the Bureaucracy.

While precolonial structures are useful for disseminating colonial policy, should these structures already be in use for other policies, it would be difficult for them to be used for a new purpose. For instance, if precolonial structures are used to disseminate local forms of education, it would be difficult to use such to propagate colonial education. Thus I also expect that groups that had precolonial education are less likely to be represented in the colonial Bureaucracy. This is because they have already entrenched educational systems that are difficult to change and they may be unwilling to switch to the western style of education.

**Local elites will fight for educational investment, and inclusion of their people in government service** As precolonial structures help groups get their foot into the doors of power during colonial rule, local elites are just as instrumental at getting their members of their group through the door. In colonial Nigeria, local elites who were incorporated into the colonial government had some power to convince the colonial government to invest in infrastructure that was beneficial to local Nigerians. For instance, member of the Lagos Trade Council, S. C. Obianwu was able to convince the colonial government to invest in building railway lines to connect residents across Port Harcourt. Obianwu was himself a non-elected member of the council, having been first appointed in 1923. Three Nigerians were elected to this council in 1923, while there were at least 5 others who were appointed due to the positions they held in society(Nwogbaga N.d.).<sup>1</sup>

Local elites who sat with Europeans in legislative bodies are better able to articulate issues that face their people which the Europeans may not be aware of and thus get policy advantages for their group. I therefore expect that should a group have local elites representing them in the colonial legislature, they should be able to attract educational investments for their people which would create qualified people to be placed in government agencies. These elites are also better suited to advocate for greater representation of their group members in government agencies. Thus, the higher the level of representation within the legislative body of colonial governments, the higher the level of embeddedness a group would have in government agencies.

**First entrants will not wish to relinquish power** As groups enter the Bureaucracy, they will employ from their groups as they get the power to make employment decisions. Since bureaucrats are given autonomy and allowed to make and execute policy, indigenous bureaucrats would create employment opportunities for members of their groups. Government jobs in colonial and post colonial periods were stable, paid well and were respected occupations in society. Therefore, those who attained such positions would be reluctant to let go of such positions. Ricart-Huguet (2020) argues that bureaucrats were most likely to become politicians and cabinet ministers in the post colonial period. Therefore colonial bureaucrats may have recognized the strategic positions they occupied and worked towards capturing future political positions for their group.

I therefore expect that those groups that got into the colonial bureaucracy first would maintain their numbers within the bureaucracy and attempt to increase their population. These groups would capture government agencies through employing from within their group to fill vacant positions as they arise and as they gain the power to do so.

**Government policies may not influence change in civil service as intended** While it is a logical conclusion that groups would capture agencies they can to the detri-

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<sup>1</sup>The 1923 elections was the first election where the franchise had been extended to include more people especially Nigerians. Nigerians and other residents who had earned at least 100 pounds in the previous year were eligible to vote. However, this election was not very representative as only Nigerians in Lagos and Calabar were elected into the council. Northern Nigeria was completely excluded from both elected and appointed positions.

ment of other groups that had not been incorporated into the bureaucracy early enough, other groups are bound to fight the unequal representation within the bureaucracy by pushing for policies that can reverse the effect of the persistence of the first entrant into the bureaucracy advantage. Reforms, changes in who controls government policy may influence the persistence of inequality in representation in the bureaucracy because of early entry and hiring from the early group. These policies and events influence the level of embeddedness of each group within the bureaucracy.

However, these policies may not be as powerful as one may expect to change colonial legacies. I therefore expect that government policies will influence the level of embeddedness of groups within the bureaucracy. However, I remain agnostic to the direction of this influence. Of course this has consequences for the way bureaucrats provide public goods to the public and how they public view government agencies and their agents.

### 3 The Bureaucrat's Incentives

Bureaucrats have their own goals and incentives and these may or may not be in alignment with the priorities and preferences of politicians and voters. Politicians and bureaucrats may have different preferences, and on the same issue space, they can have different ideal points (Meier 1987). The politician chooses to delegate to bureaucrats who have policy discretion and private information, with uncertainty of the outcome (Huber and Shipan 2006). They do so because they have numerous responsibilities and no experience with policy implementation.

**The bureaucrat's agency** Civil service in African states have undergone transformation through periods of colonization and post colonizations. These agencies evolve and develop strong rules that guide their daily operations. For instance, in the Nigerian civil service, it is difficult to outright fire a civil servant that has gone through the confirmation process in a ministry. The civil servant is entitled to an investigation by an internal committee and this investigation can take a long time to complete thus delaying accountability. Not all civil servants are caught when they engage in corruption. High profile cases where huge sums of money have been embezzled are usually broadcast and sensationalized.

Civil servants do not mismanage funds all by themselves. To escape censure, a civil servant may share the dividends of their corrupt practices with their colleagues. Generally, whistle blowing within government agencies is rare (Lavena 2016). Thus, civil servants can escape accountability for misappropriating funds from their agency. For instance, when Clement Illoh, misappropriated funds from the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P), part of the funds were recovered from his colleagues. During the his trial, the court ordered forfeiture of the funds from both him and his accomplices. When the Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund Management decided to award 192 fraudulent consultancy contracts and pocket the money, the proceeds from these contract were distributed among at least four other people (SaharaReporters 2020).

In many developing countries, government jobs are highly sought out because

of the opportunities for rent seeking. As the seniority of the civil servant increases within the service, the opportunities to make decisions involving public projects and funding increases along with the opportunity to misappropriate funds. From the example in the introduction, Maina, who was still under investigation for corruption still sought out another civil service job, perhaps because of the potential to expropriate more funds.

Civil servants do not declare their assets before taking a job with the civil service. It is difficult to audit them to distinguish what is part of their wealth outside of their pay from the service. Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Commission (ICPC) has advised that the government begin auditing civil servants and requiring them to declare their assets to curb corruption within the Federal Civil Service ([Uwugiaren 2021](#)).

**The bureaucrat's Group** Citizens may also fail to hold bureaucrat members of their group accountable for three reasons- they have no knowledge of the public policy to be implemented for their benefit, they know the bureaucrat is a member of their group and do not sanction them for that reason, and they prefer private goods over public goods.

Many African countries fall in the low income and lower-middle income category according to the World bank definitions ([Serajuddin and Hamadeh 2020](#)). A good portion of the citizens live below the poverty line. Civil servants know this and may give monetarily to their co-ethnics from the resources they expropriate. It is possible that co-ethnics do not hold civil servants accountable because they are indifferent between private goods and the provision of public projects. That is, they may prefer to receive monetary resources that are instantaneous, to public projects that take time to complete and be beneficial. In many developing democracies politicians engage in the provision of private goods at election time to secure votes ([Cantú 2019](#), [Jensen and Justesen 2014](#)). For example, during Ramadan celebration in 2021, Rep Lado of Niger state shared a whopping 50 million Naira to his constituents ([PeoplesGazette 2021](#)). He has been criticized on social media for dishing out cash instead of constructing projects for his constituency.

Group solidarity forces individuals to accept wrongdoing from a co-ethnic rather than report them to a non-co-ethnic for punishment. Co-ethnics of the bureaucrat may accept their under-performance since having a co-ethnic employed in a government agency uplifts the image of the group. Outing a member of the group may threaten the position of the group and the prospects of other group members obtaining positions within the service since the groups reputation suffers. Government jobs in Nigeria are prestigious positions and co-ethnics may value having a co-ethnic in the bureaucracy as much as they do receiving public goods.

Additionally, citizens may not hold bureaucrats accountable because they just don't know who provides what public goods - politicians or bureaucrats ([Martin and Raffler 2021](#)). Even when they have this information, their channel to accountability may be through politicians and they may not have enough information on how much power the politician has over the bureaucrat. It is also possible that citizens blame the wrong politicians for the project and the completion rates ([Harding 2015](#)). Citizens may value the allocation of the project alone and not just the completion of said project ([Dasgupta 2015](#)). This means that they will not hold politicians or

bureaucrats accountable where they fail to complete allocated projects.

**Political Oversight** Politicians may not hold bureaucrat accountable for corrupt practices because these practices, though not sanctioned by them, benefit their re-election plans, since bureaucrats share the spoils from their corrupt practices with politicians who in turn use it to fund their reelection campaigns (Brierley 2020). Thus, bureaucrats have incentives to shirk their responsibilities and expropriate resources meant for project completion when they know they will not be held accountable by either voters or politicians.

Sometimes, politicians who are to hold civil servants accountable may be allied with civil servants, and do not hold them accountable. For instance, Herman Hembe allegedly received moneys from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during his tenure as the chairman of the House committee on capital market in 2011. He chaired the investigations into the crash of the Nigerian capital market when these allegations came to light. During the committee hearings, Hembe exchanged accusations with the director general of the SEC. The appeals court later dismissed the corruption charges against him. He was later sacked from the house due to election irregularities in 2017 (Tukur 2017).

**Public Projects Provision** Local public goods projects are geographically exclusionary. That is, one gets better access to the good the closer they are to its location. For instance public schools can be accessed by students who live within the district in which the school is located. A bore-hole provides water to those who are close to where it has been drilled into the ground. Those farther away from the location of the good can incur costs in the form of transportation and time if they wish to access these goods, and in some situations, non-local individuals may be barred from accessing the good at all.

Groups want to receive public goods from the government (Dixit and Londregan 1996). I assume that groups will not turn away local public goods provision when it is given to them. They prefer that these goods be provided by the government instead of being privately provided. For individual members of groups, it is more expensive to provide these goods themselves than it is for the government to do so on their behalf. Additionally, private provision would require that they solve several collective action problems to decide what goods will be provided and how to provide them (Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Ostrom 1990). Thus, groups want politicians representing them to provide them with local public goods. Where a politician fails to do so, I assume that groups will hold them accountable by not reelecting them. Thus, I predict that politicians has strong incentives to manage the distribution of public goods projects and direct them toward their supporter.

I assume all politicians want to implement policy that benefits groups they represent (Cox and McCubbins 1986, Franck and Rainer 2012). However, politicians have other duties and responsibilities, and they lack the necessary expertise for implementation, and so they delegate the provision of these goods to the bureaucracy (Gailmard and Patty 2012, Shipan 2004).

After delegating provision of the good, politicians expect bureaucrats to implement the policy. However, politicians face a principal agent problem with bureaucrats (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991, Turner 2017). The bureaucracy has some level

of autonomy, and some information that may not be available to politicians (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast 1989, Huber and Shipan 2006). Politicians therefore must manage these two issues when delegating to get the outcome they want for groups they represent. They also have to monitor bureaucrats while they implement policy to make sure they do their jobs to the politician's satisfaction (Raffler 2016).

## 4 Representative Bureaucracy and Satisfaction with Government

If bureaucrats from groups that are highly embedded in the bureaucracy are corrupt and mismanage the provision of local public goods, how does this behavior affect the perception their co-ethnics have of government and their satisfaction with it? Highly embedded groups can capture the bureaucracy because their population is higher than that of other groups within the agency. These groups may also be over represented in the agency relative to their population in society. For such groups, it is more than likely that members of that group know or have come in contact with co-ethnic bureaucrats. The opinion of bureaucrats by those that might have come in contact with them may be influenced by this contact.

**Contact with Government Agencies** Those individuals who have had contact with co-ethnic bureaucrats would have opinions of the bureaucracy that is based on their interaction with this bureaucrat. For instance, if an individual should interact with a co-ethnic who works in the civil service, that individual would leave the interaction with a perception of that civil servant which they may transfer to all civil servants. When they meet another civil servant, they would base their interaction with this new acquaintance based on the interaction they had with a previous acquaintance.

However, It is not apparent that highly embedded bureaucrats would display their corrupt nature to co-ethnics. I have argued that government jobs are highly sought after, well paying, and well respected jobs. I have also argued that because of this, co-ethnics do not punish bureaucrats who shirk their duties and mismanage the provision of public goods. I argue now instead that individuals from highly embedded groups would view bureaucrats as less corrupt. This is because bureaucrats will not be corrupt in their dealings with their co-ethnics. I make this assertion because, if bureaucrats displayed corrupt behavior to their co-ethnics, co-ethnics are more likely to try to hold them accountable. I have also argued that co-ethnics do not hold their bureaucrats accountable because they value their co-ethnic bond and government jobs are hard to come by so they do not want to jeopardize the jobs of those that have them. Thus, individuals from groups that are highly represented in the bureaucracy are more likely to have favorable opinions of the performance of bureaucrats.

Furthermore, co-ethnics can differentiate the corrupt provision of public goods from bureaucrats and only attribute them to the politicians that approve these public goods from provision. Harding (2015) shows that citizens can correctly attribute the provision to the politicians in charge of their provision. However, even in the case of road provision in Ghana, the national executive does not actually implement the

provision of the road themselves but citizens still attribute the provision of the good to them. Such is the case here too, individuals would attribute the mismanaged provision of public goods to politicians that approve such good provision rather than the bureaucrats that oversee its implementation. Therefore, I expect that despite contact with civil servants, individuals from groups that are highly represented in the bureaucracy are less likely to be satisfied with the way the government handle issues such as public good provision.

## Part III

# Ethnicity, Education, and Representation in the Civil Service

## 1 Introduction

The dominant narrative in scholarship on colonialism treats the colonized as passive bystanders in policymaking that determines the future of their country. In Africa especially, the legacies of colonialism are attributed to the policies, and investments of European colonizers (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2000, Easterly and Levine 2016). But I argue in this chapter that this is not the case entirely. Africans under colonial rule were able to carve out spaces for themselves, and worked towards investments, and policies that produced long lasting consequences. They also pushed European colonial governments towards investments in economic activities that were not beneficial to the European's extractive agenda. However, not all groups participated in this building effort, and those that got to the table first steered policy to benefit themselves.

There is plenty of evidence that colonial investment in agriculture especially cash crops was crucial to economic development (increase in wealth, attaining higher quality of life) of certain groups, thus producing inequality. For instance, Shokpeka and Nwaokocha (2009) found that the British encouraged cash crop cultivation at the expense of food crops which families were reliant on in Nigeria. In the Benin region in particular, British leaders destroyed food crop farms and encouraged the cultivation of only cash crops. Native officials were used to enforce the colonial governments preferences. In the same vain, Roessler et al. (2020) show that cash crop production disadvantaged the production of food crops and produced long term inequality between geographic regions produced economic growth. However, colonial investment in infrastructure that facilitated agricultural production. Cash crop production in colonial times have implications for who is in the post colonial ruling coalition (Pengl and Roessler 2020).

The expropriation of land resources by settled Europeans in Africa led to liberation wars and differing paths after independence (Paine 2019). In their bid to obtain as much resources from the places they colonized, Europeans established extractive colonial institutions that prevent the long run growth of many previously colonized countries today (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2000). It has been argued that the disease environment of possible colonies determined whether they got extractive institutions or not. Additionally, The legal institutions set up in colonized countries also influence long run economic development of these countries today (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes and Shleifer 2008). Thus colonial institutions and policies influence colonized nations even after colonialism might have ended.

Colonial investments matter for post colonial outcomes (Huillery 2009). Particularly, colonial investment in education predicts educational attainment in the post colonial period. The colonial, especially missionary investment in education persists in the long term resulting in disparities in educational attainment between those

who received early missionary education and those who did not (Okoye and Pongou 2014). Education, and trade were two ways through which colonial legacies transferred to modern development (Agbor 2015). Colonial investment in education, and human capital predicts long run economic growth in Africa (Agbor 2015). Colonial investment in education also led to an incumbency advantage for those from regions who received more investment than others. The consequences of these are evident in the unequal representation of ethnic groups in post colonial African cabinets (Ricart-Huguet 2020).

In this chapter, I show that investments made in education by both colonial and indigenous Nigerians allowed some groups to capture parts of the Nigerian civil service and install members of their groups in the service. Employment in the Nigerian colonial civil service was based on merit through educational qualifications, groups with higher educational attainment were able to secure positions in the service. This phenomena deep rooted in the colonial state making process, has persisted in Nigerian where those groups that got into the colonial civil service early on are still deeply embedded in the civil service compared to groups that got into the service later. Colonial and post colonial government policy intended to include the vast number of Nigerian groups into the service have failed to decrease the inequality in representation among groups in the civil service.

Using data on the composition of the Nigerian civil service spanning a century, I show that getting employment in the civil service early during the colonial period predicts the level of embeddedness of a group in the civil service in the post colonial period. This effect persists even when government policy intended to reform the civil service, regime changes, and political events are accounted for. I suggest that deliberate policy to encourage education and diversity in the employment of civil servants may be necessary to curtail this long run effect of early civil service representation since it has negative consequences on the provision of local public goods.

This chapter contributes to the literature on the long run consequences of colonialism. Particularly, this chapter adds to the literature on the influence of colonial investments (particularly in education) on economic outcomes in contemporary times. The chapter adds to our understanding of the role indigenous groups played in the colonization, and state building processes. Specifically, it shows how colonized people can take advantage of the state building process of colonialism, and how this produces lasting benefits for them that are not easily eroded over time and in the presence of government policy, or unexpected political shocks.

## 2 Access to Colonial Education in Nigeria

Northern Nigeria was insulated from the western European education given by Christian missionaries in the south (Fafunwa 2018). This was because the British promised to not interfere with the Northern way of life which was based on Islamic religious doctrine. The British to this effect maintained indirect rule over the Northern protectorate of Nigeria before amalgamation with the South in 1914.<sup>2</sup> The British thus prevented the missionaries from spreading their religion and education in the North

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<sup>2</sup>Southern Nigeria consists of the Western and Eastern Regions.

early in the colonization process. The North already had Islamic education and a number of schools dedicated to the dissemination of such <sup>3</sup>.

This does not mean that western education did not exist in the North during the colonial times. The colonial government set up the Department of Education in Northern Nigeria before 1910. By 1913, there were no less than 200 pupils in primary schools in Northern Nigeria (Fafunwa 2018).<sup>4</sup> One of the first tertiary institutions was situated in Zaria in Northern Nigeria in 1930 the other two were in the Eastern and Western regions. The Northern elites limited their people's attendance at these schools. Indeed emirs in the North sent their own offspring to obtain western education as they feared they may lose their political positions if they did not, but barred the children of wealthy elites, and merchants from obtaining the same (Tibenderana 1983).

Southern Nigerians took advantage of western education provided by missionaries who implemented their own agenda separate from those of the colonial governments under whose jurisdiction they operated (McIntyre 1982). Many of these missionary schools were funded by European Christians who were enthusiastic about converting Africans and "educating the natives" (Omolewa 2006). Missionary schools run especially by the Roman Catholic Mission and the Church Missionary Society were rarely funded by the colonial government when they first started (Ayandele 1968). Each school operated under its own curriculum and taught the students whatever the head teacher decided to teach (Fafunwa 2018). However, during world war 2, many of these missionary schools had to turn to the government for funding instead of relying on donations from congregations in their home countries. Funding from the colonial government meant that these schools now fell under the jurisdiction of the colonial government and had to follow the teaching curricula set by the government.

Not all Southern Nigerians were sponsored by the missionaries or the colonial government to receive education. Nigerians persuaded the British to invest in education (Nnoli 1977). The role of parents and ethnic unions in propagating educational attainment cannot be overstated (Usman and Falola 2019). Ethnic unions in the colonial period pooled money together to send promising members of their community to receive western education from colonial government schools and schools in Britain. Fafunwa (2018) argues that Yoruba missionaries, doctors, lawyers and surveyors like Herbert Macaulay, Sapara Williams, and Nathaniel King, were instrumental in the push for education among the Yoruba. For instance, the Eko Boy's High School - the first private secondary school in Nigeria - was built in 1913 through funds contributed by the locals in Lagos with the Reverend Euba spearheading its development (Fafunwa 2018). Thus with the help of prominent co-ethnics and ethnic unions, Yorubas were able to invest in the educational growth of their group.

Among the Igbo, Ozumba Mbadiwe and others organized scholarships for their co-ethnics to obtain higher education in the Americas in the 1940s and 50s. How-


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<sup>3</sup>Fafunwa (2018) asserts that there were about 50,000 Quranic schools in Northern Nigeria at the turn of the 20th century.

<sup>4</sup>In fact, Fafunwa (2018) records that there were 1100 primary schools pupils in Northern Nigeria alone as opposed to 37000 in southern Nigeria. At this time Northern Nigeria did not have investment in education from missionaries, but the colonial government was in charge of providing education in that region.

ever, many of these schemes failed though, nevertheless I record them as ethnic mobilization events to secure higher educational attainment for the group (Fafunwa 2018). The 1930s - 1950s were a time of fierce competition between southern Nigerian groups on which group could attain the highest levels of education. Notable players were the Ibibio, the Igbo, and the Yoruba. Having an educated co-ethnic was very influential to the entire group increasing the number of educated citizens.

Figure 1: Primary School Enrollment by Region




*Notes: The number of pupils enrolled in primary schools 1947 - 1966 for the three regions.*

Progress of enrollment of students in schools across the country varied by region with the southern regions seeing higher enrollment pre and post independence while the Northern areas lagged behind. Southern elites made investments in education as they saw it as a way out of poverty since those with education had higher chances of obtaining government jobs. Figure 1 and 2 show the distribution of primary and secondary school enrollment by region over time.<sup>5</sup> We can see that while the Eastern and Western Regions saw rapid increases in enrollment in the 1950s, in the Northern region, educational enrollment was slower to take off.

Even with low educational attainment, in 1963, leaders in the Northern region chose to cap the building of new schools in the region where the area had attained 28 percent primary education (Dudley 1966). The North spent less in the decade after independence on primary and secondary education compared to the west and

<sup>5</sup>Data from Fafunwa (2018)

Figure 2: Secondary School Enrollment by Region



*Notes: The number of students enrolled in secondary schools 1952 - 1966 for the three regions.*

east. I contend that differences in educational attainment during the colonial and post colonial periods were driven by ethnic elites endorsement, and investment in education. I therefore expect that groups who had access to colonial education first are more likely to have the highest population of educated individuals as they encourage and recommend from their networks for education access and investment.

It may be the case that there is a selection problem on what group gets access to education outside of the investment in education made by colonial governments. There may be precolonial factors that influence who decides to accept western education and who does not (Aguolu 1979). Variation in precolonial institutions have been widely studied and scholars have shown that centralized vs decentralized precolonial institutions are consequential to post colonial development (Dasgupta and Johnson-Kanu 2020, Englebert 2000, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013, Wilfahrt 2018). In the case of Nigeria, both the Western, and the Northern parts were home to some centralized precolonial states - The Oyo and Benin Empires in the West, and the Sokoto Caliphate and the Kanem-Borno Empire in the North. The Eastern part on the other hand lacked centralization. However, both the Eastern, and the Western parts of the country embraced western education while the North did not partly because it was too entrenched in its institutions to adapt to the Western institutions introduced by the British (Aguolu 1979). In this chapter, I also test this assertion that precolonial institutions may be instrumental to attaining representation within the civil service. I expect that those with precolonial institutions would have structures that facilitate the dissemination of colonial innovations including education.

The main identifiable difference between early adopters of western education and others appears to be religion (Abdurrahman 2012). Platas (2018) shows that there is divergence in educational attainment for Muslims and Christians across Africa. Christians were exposed to missionary education while Muslims were not. Today, Christians are more likely to be educated than Muslims. This corresponds to the North - South dynamic in Nigeria where Northerners are predominantly Muslims, while Christians are mostly in the South.

One explanation for the adoption of Christianity in Southern Nigeria is the "keeping up with the Joneses" attitude of southern Nigerians. For instance, Igbo villages were subject to raids by the British troops, and those villages that professed to Christianity were often spared the ugly side of the passing troops (Ekechi 1971). Other villages took notice and converted to Christianity. The social status of villages that were Christians was something to admire and other villages sought to become like them. Northerners on the other hand already had Islam and Islamic education and were thus reluctant to leave it for the western religion and its associated education.<sup>6</sup>

The Sokoto Caliphate which ruled a large proportion of Northern Nigeria, had developed a system of education based on Islamic teachings that taught students mathematics, science, and foreign languages (Abdurrahman 2012). They also recruited teachers from as far as Egypt, and the Ottoman Empire. It is understandable that with a rigorous educational system already in place, Northern leaders may not have wanted to embrace a new system of learning. Therefore, precolonial systems of education may better explain why some groups embraced western style education more

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<sup>6</sup>There are also Yoruba Muslims. They however attained western education with the rest of their group.

readily than others better than precolonial centralization. In this particular case, pre-colonial education was tied to religion just like colonial education was. Thus, I expect that groups with precolonial education, will be less likely to embrace Western education and thus have less representation within the colonial bureaucracy.

### 3 Education, Ethnicity, and Employment in the Nigerian Civil Service

Before 1945, it was difficult for Nigerians to obtain senior positions in the Nigerian Colonial Civil Service (Nwankwo 1980). In fact, the British deliberately excluded them from these positions despite their qualifications. They did so to prevent the Nigerians from mobilizing within the civil service as they perceived they may then work against the aims of the colonial government. At this time, the colonial government agenda was not in line with Nigerians agenda for economic development and liberation.

The colonial civil service was not interested in developmental projects and the government feared that should Africans gain senior positions, they would push the bureaucracy towards that. The colonial government disadvantaged Nigerians by extracting and exporting goods, paying them lower than market rate and restricting trade to other European countries thereby decreasing the level of foreign exchange in the hands of Nigerians (Charle 1967). The British colonial development projects consisted of building railways and roads to facilitate the production of and export of cash crops and new centers of colonial administration (Dauda 1993). Lagos was a major port and improving exports meant investing in sea transport and road networks that would connect the cash crop areas to the port for easy transportation out and receipts of foreign exchange.

After the second world war, many British civil servants in Nigeria had to be deployed back to Britain (Olusanya 1975). As a result there was need to change strategies on colonial administration as they were short staffed. Nigerians were thus allowed into the civil service at higher rates albeit in junior positions. Nigerian politicians and elites pushed for the *Nigerianization* of the civil service to bring an end to colonial rule in the country (Olusanya 1975). The 1954 constitution encouraged regionalization and saw more Nigerians obtain jobs with the civil service working for regional governments who sought to increase the level of Nigerians holding administrative power (Dudley 1966).

Those from the East and Western regions were able to hire their co-ethnics into regional civil service. Ethnic unions connected individuals with potential to those co-ethnics who had the power to assist them with employment (Smock 1969). Civil servants from the regional services could transfer into the Federal civil service as the regional administrations were not thought to be below that of the federal.<sup>7</sup> Thus with regionalization came another opportunity for already existing civil servants to continue to capture the service by recommending for employment and employing their co-ethnics. The mass exodus of foreign civil servants pre and post independence (Nwankwo 1980) allowed already existing groups in the civil service to increase their

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<sup>7</sup>In fact there are records of such transfer within the data collected for this paper.

numbers while also making way for the inclusion of other groups that previously under or unrepresented in the service. Northerners on the other hand dominated political positions post independence as a result of their population which led the NPC to win the most seats in the 1959 elections. However, Northern executives were forced to work with a civil service that was almost exclusively staffed with southern bureaucrats since the North had very few qualified people to take up positions in the service (Gberevbie 2010).

Individuals seeking employment need only go to the Federal Civil Service Commission to pick up an application and leave their application packet with the commission. Should an opening materialized, potential employees would be contacted for interviews. Sometimes the job descriptions of open positions may aid the attraction of qualified applicants (Briggs 2007). Thus those who have the inside information would also know exactly where their qualifications match with the needs of the service and therefore apply for such positions. Some jobs are only advertised in house. When new agencies are created, the positions are first offered to civil servants first before the public.


Interestingly, policies have been enacted in the post colonial era to address the arguments I make, and to increase diversity of ethnic and state-groups in the civil service. Northern Nigerians would prefer civil service employment based on the federal character principle and merit since they are grossly underrepresented despite having the highest population in the country. As shown in Figure 3, Northern Nigeria is shaded with lighter orange colors depicting that states in this region each make up less than 3 percent of the entire civil service. The Northern state with the largest population in the civil service is Kaduna which makes up just less than 5 percent of the civil service population. Combined, the 19 states of northern Nigeria, with more than 50 percent of the entire country, makes up less than 30 percent of the entire civil service in 1999. On the other hand, Southern Nigerians are happy for employment in the civil service to be merit based since they can boast of higher levels of education than the northern part of the country.

Civil service reforms in Nigeria have not worked to improve the efficient functioning of these organizations. Rent seeking behavior runs amok among civil servants with the windfalls of oil production which has led to a boom in the hidden economy (Salisu 2001, Sekwat 2002). It is not clear if this would also influence the employment and retention aspects of the service since research shows that increasing diversity in the civil service could lead to more efficient provision of public services and goods (Rasul and Rogger 2015). Political influence in the service may also help stifle the agenda of civil servants as their appointment of some civil servants could change the composition of the civil service. I expect that civil service reforms as well as other changes in government and its policies should influence the level of representation groups have in the civil service.

## 4 Changes in the Composition of the Civil Service

I assert that changes in the composition of bureaucrats in the Nigerian civil service is driven by the recruitment into the service of co-ethnics of already existing civil servants. At independence in 1960 however, there were enough vacancies due to

Figure 3: Map of Nigeria showing the level of Embeddedness of each State in the Civil Service in 1999



*Notes: The level of representation of states in the entire civil service in 1999. the darker the color, the higher the level of representation. Darkest read shows the state has a representation of over 5% in the civil service. light yellow represents a representation of less than 1% in the service.*

the exit of most of the British civil servants (Nwankwo 1980). In this section, I use time series data on the ethnic composition of civil servants to show the changes that occurred as some groups captured and secured their place in the civil service while other struggled to get their foot in the door.

Data on civil servants is collected from the Nigeria National Archives in Kaduna and the Federal Civil Service Commission. The Federal Character Commission data is available for 1996 - 1999. I use data from 1997 and 1999 since they contain information for all Ministries in the civil service while the other two years only collect a subset of this data for agencies under the ministries. The Archives keep staff lists of all Federal Civil Servants including their names, date of first employment, the ministry, department or agency they work for as well as the date of their present appointment among other information. These data are available for the period 1928 - 1966 with gaps.

Figure 4: Sample page of the Nigerian Colonial Staff list 1928

| ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE—continued.                                                                                                                                              |                                                            |                        |                      |                      | ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE—continued. |                                                            |                        |                    |                      |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| CLASS I. GRADE II.                                                                                                                                                             |                                                            |                        |                      |                      | CLASS II—continued.               |                                                            |                        |                    |                      |
| ANTHROPOLOGICAL OFFICERS (2), £1,050 AND £210 DUTY PAY.                                                                                                                        |                                                            |                        |                      |                      |                                   |                                                            |                        |                    |                      |
| Holder.                                                                                                                                                                        | N.P. or S.P.                                               | First Appointment.     | Present Appointment. |                      | Holder.                           | Secretariat or Provincial Administration = S. M. Land = L. | Nigerian, N.P. or S.P. | First Appointment. | Present Appointment. |
| †C. K. Meek ... ..                                                                                                                                                             | N.P.                                                       | 24-7-12                | 1-4-24               |                      | †H. G. Aveling ... ..             | P.                                                         | S.P.                   | 22-3-11            | 30-7-19              |
| †H. F. Mathews ... ..                                                                                                                                                          | S.P.                                                       | 30-11-10               | 1-4-26               |                      | †G. S. Hughes ... ..              | "                                                          | "                      | 5-4-11             | 22-8-19              |
| CLASSES II AND III.†                                                                                                                                                           |                                                            |                        |                      |                      | 15†J. G. Lawton ... ..            | "                                                          | "                      | 5-4-11             | 10-10-19             |
| PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION (353), SECRETARIATS (31), LANDS (5)=389. £500, 570-30-720-40-960* or (revised scale) £450, 510-30-720-40-960* and £300, 315, 330, 350-25-600-30-720. |                                                            |                        |                      |                      | †O. W. Firth ... ..               | "                                                          | "                      | 15-5-11            | 20-10-19             |
| CLASS II.                                                                                                                                                                      |                                                            |                        |                      |                      | †G. H. Findlay ... ..             | "                                                          | "                      | 26-7-11            | 28-11-19             |
| Holder.                                                                                                                                                                        | Secretariat or Provincial Administration = S. M. Land = L. | Nigerian, N.P. or S.P. | First Appointment.   | Present Appointment. | †V. F. Biscoe ... ..              | "                                                          | N.P.                   | 2-8-11             | 5-12-19              |
| †H. S. Sison ... ..                                                                                                                                                            | P.                                                         | N.P.                   | 1-6-07               | 15-2-14              | (A)                               |                                                            |                        |                    |                      |
| †M. J. de la P. Beresford ...                                                                                                                                                  | S.                                                         | "                      | 7-11-08              | 1-1-14               | †H. A. Prankerd ... ..            | "                                                          | "                      | 12-10-10           | 1-10-11              |
| P. J. Gardner ... ..                                                                                                                                                           | P.                                                         | S.P.                   | 19-12-08             | 4-12-15              | 20†A. R. Whitman ... ..           | "                                                          | S.P.                   | "                  | 22-11-11             |
| †Capt. E. B. Wanton ... ..                                                                                                                                                     | "                                                          | "                      | 31-7-09              | 8-2-17               | †P. R. Diggle ... ..              | "                                                          | N.P.                   | "                  | 22-11-14             |
| 5†H. M. Brice Smith ... ..                                                                                                                                                     | "                                                          | N.P.                   | 16-1-09              | 17-10-17             | J. W. C. Rutherford ...           | "                                                          | S.P.                   | "                  | 22-11-11             |
| †J. D. Thomson ... ..                                                                                                                                                          | "                                                          | S.P.                   | 27-4-10              | 22-10-18             | †E. S. Penhaleton ... ..          | "                                                          | N.P.                   | "                  | 22-11-11             |
| †J. B. L. Macleay ... ..                                                                                                                                                       | "                                                          | "                      | 27-7-10              | 22-10-18             | †J. S. Ross ... ..                | "                                                          | S.P.                   | "                  | 20-3-12              |
| †H. W. Cowper ... ..                                                                                                                                                           | "                                                          | N.P.                   | 30-11-10             | 15-12-18             | 25†M. Macgregor ... ..            | "                                                          | "                      | "                  | 20-3-12              |
| †A. L. Wain ... ..                                                                                                                                                             | "                                                          | S.P.                   | 30-11-10             | 1-1-19               | †A. E. F. Murray ... ..           | "                                                          | "                      | "                  | 22-5-12              |
| 10†E. L. C. Behar ... ..                                                                                                                                                       | S.                                                         | N.P.                   | 8-3-11               | 1-1-19               | †J. H. M. Molyneux ...            | "                                                          | N.P.                   | "                  | 22-3-11              |
| †J. N. Smith ... ..                                                                                                                                                            | "                                                          | "                      | 30-11-10             | 22-3-19              | †C. N. Monsell ... ..             | "                                                          | "                      | "                  | 24-7-12              |
| †R. W. M. Daniels ... ..                                                                                                                                                       | "                                                          | S.P.                   | 22-3-11              | 8-7-19               | †Capt. H. Webber ... ..           | "                                                          | S.P.                   | "                  | 24-7-12              |
| * Plus £72 Seniority Pay from £720 subject to approval of Efficiency Bar Certificate.                                                                                          |                                                            |                        |                      |                      | 30†H. T. B. Dew ... ..            | "                                                          | "                      | "                  | 21-8-12              |
| † Officers on old leave regulations.                                                                                                                                           |                                                            |                        |                      |                      | †G. E. Murphy ... ..              | "                                                          | "                      | "                  | 22-10-12             |
| The relative Seniority of officers on the long grade is in some cases subject to revision.                                                                                     |                                                            |                        |                      |                      | †A. D. Hamlyn ... ..              | "                                                          | N.P.                   | 19-10-10           | 27-11-12             |
|                                                                                                                                                                                |                                                            |                        |                      |                      | †H. L. Ward Price ... ..          | "                                                          | N.                     | "                  | 27-11-12             |
|                                                                                                                                                                                |                                                            |                        |                      |                      | †Pay Lt. C. J. Chaytor, R.N.      | "                                                          | N.P.                   | "                  | 27-11-12             |
|                                                                                                                                                                                |                                                            |                        |                      |                      | 35†P. E. M. Richards ... ..       | "                                                          | S.P.                   | "                  | 13-8-13              |
|                                                                                                                                                                                |                                                            |                        |                      |                      | †K. V. R. Rae ... ..              | "                                                          | S.                     | "                  | 13-8-13              |
|                                                                                                                                                                                |                                                            |                        |                      |                      | 35†E. E. Knapp ... ..             | L.                                                         | S.P.                   | 18-7-12            | 1-1-14               |

Notes: Page from the 1928 colonial civil service staff list showing the name, department, start date, first appointment, protectorate of assignment, salary scale and other information of the civil servant.

Additionally, I collect civil service staff lists from the Southern Nigeria Protectorate for the years 1906, 1907, and 1909 gotten through the University of California library in microfiche form. These data are used to infer the number of Nigerian civil servants in the civil service before and just after amalgamation in 1914. Reading through the staff lists, I find that there are no recorded Nigerian civil servants between 1906 and 1909. This is in line with historical research that shows and argues

that Nigerians were restricted from government positions during this time and that there were few Nigerians qualified based on educational attainment to hold these positions.

Figure 5: Sample page of the Southern Nigeria Protectorate Staff list 1906

| 70                                                |                                                             | 71                                |                                        |
|---------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| CIVIL ESTABLISHMENTS—continued.                   |                                                             | CIVIL ESTABLISHMENTS—continued.   |                                        |
| <b>MARINE DEPARTMENT.</b>                         |                                                             | <b>PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT.</b>   |                                        |
| Marine Superintendent                             | ... .. Herbert Alexander Child, Lieut. R.N.                 | Director of Public Works          | ... .. Andrew McAlister.               |
| Assistant do.                                     | ... .. Hugh Graham Moore, Commander R.N.R.                  | Deputy Director of Public Works   | ... .. George Leonard Harvey.          |
| Senior Marine Officer                             | ... .. Virgoe Backland, Lieut. R.N.R.                       | Senior Assistant Public Works     | ... .. James Paton Auld.               |
| Marine Officer                                    | ... .. Cecil Henry Edward Crosswell, Lieut. R.N.R.          | Department                        | ... .. Frederic Douglas Fowler.        |
| Do.                                               | ... .. Thomas Ewan Day, Lieut. R.N.R.                       | Assistant Public Works Department | ... .. Charles Ernest Hackett.         |
| Do.                                               | ... .. Herbert Charles Valentine Barnard                    | Do.                               | ... .. Vincent Charles Bourne.         |
| Do.                                               | ... .. Chetman, Lieut. R.N.R.                               | Do.                               | ... .. Sidney Golden.                  |
| Do.                                               | ... .. Arthur Bernard Crowe, Lieut. R.N.R.                  | <b>CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT.</b>        |                                        |
| Do.                                               | ... .. Hugh Delven Church.                                  | Collector of Customs              | ... .. Herbert Leslie Searle.          |
| Do.                                               | ... .. Reginald Mitchell Reynolds, Lieut. R.N.R.            | Assistant Collector of Customs    | ... .. Sydney Claude Overton Pontifex. |
| Do.                                               | ... .. Robert Herbert Wilfred Hughes, Lieut. R.N.R.         | 1st Class Supervisor of Customs   | ... .. Thomas Fraser Burrows.          |
| Do.                                               | ... .. Percy Cox.                                           | Do.                               | ... .. Hartley Eganhouse.              |
| Do.                                               | ... .. Arthur Charles Baker, Lieut. R.N.R.                  | Do.                               | ... .. James Frederick Marshall.       |
| Do.                                               | ... .. George Robinson Hudson, Sub-Lieut. R.N.R.            | 2nd Class Supervisor of Customs   | ... .. John Douglas Milne Stewart.     |
| Do.                                               | ... .. John Dorman Wilson, Lieut. R.N.R.                    | Do.                               | ... .. Frederick Arthur Clinch.        |
| Do.                                               | ... .. Mark Pearson, Lieut. R.N.R.                          | <b>TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT.</b>      |                                        |
| Do.                                               | ... .. Arthur Greenstock.                                   | Transport Officer                 | ... .. Vacant.                         |
| Assistant Boatswain                               | ... .. Wilfred Storey.                                      | <b>* CALABAR DIVISION.</b>        |                                        |
| <b>MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.</b>                        |                                                             | Divisional Commissioner           | ... .. Secretary.                      |
| Principal Medical Officer                         | ... .. Robert Allman, L.R.C.S., C.M.S.                      | District Commissioner             | ... .. Franklin Godschall Johnson.     |
| Deputy Principal Medical Officer                  | ... .. Allan Hastings Hanley, F.R.C.S., C.M.S.              | Assistant District Commissioner   | ... .. William Henry Kernan.           |
| Senior Medical Officers*                          | ... .. Joseph Patrick Fagan, L.R.C.S., etc.                 | <b>WEST DISTRICT.</b>             |                                        |
|                                                   | ... .. Thomas Edmund Rice.                                  | Assistant District Commissioner   | ... .. Hugh Lemarchand.                |
|                                                   | ... .. Charles Renfrie Chichester, L.R.C.P., L.R.C.S., etc. | <b>* EASTERN DIVISION.</b>        |                                        |
|                                                   | ... .. John Donald Small, L.R.S., etc.                      | Senior Divisional Commissioner    | ... .. Francis Robert Winn Sampson.    |
| Nurse                                             | ... .. Margaret Manson Graham.                              | (Acting)                          | ... .. Vacant.                         |
| Do.                                               | ... .. Lotty Sleigh White.                                  | Travelling Commissioner           | ... .. Vacant.                         |
| Do.                                               | ... .. Lizzie Kendall Bailey.                               | <b>DERAMA DISTRICT.</b>           |                                        |
| Do.                                               | ... .. Mary Lillian Mustard.                                | District Commissioner (Acting)    | ... .. Harold Frank Frederick Pryce.   |
| Do.                                               | ... .. Katherine Gertrude Appleton.                         | Assistant District Commissioner   | ... .. Vacant.                         |
| <b>PRISON DEPARTMENT.</b>                         |                                                             | <b>BONNY DISTRICT.</b>            |                                        |
| Inspector of Prisons and Governor of Calabar Gaol | ... .. George Smith Booth Gray.                             | Assistant District Commissioner   | ... .. Reginald Hargrove.              |
| <b>CIVIL POLICE DEPARTMENT.</b>                   |                                                             | * At date of completion.          |                                        |
| Inspector                                         | ... .. James Lewis Rowan Parry, Captain.                    |                                   |                                        |
| Assistant Inspector                               | ... .. Edward Daguid, Lieut.                                |                                   |                                        |
| Do.                                               | ... .. Thomas Frederick Rowan Parry, Lieut.                 |                                   |                                        |

*Notes: Page from the 1906 Southern Nigeria Protectorate civil service staff list showing the name, level, and department of the civil servant. There are other pages within the staff list with more detailed information of civil servants including their date of birth, educational qualifications, history of postings within the service, dates of leaves and locations of leaves taken, salary scale and amount as well as their marital status.*

Staff lists for the Nigerian colonial civil service and the southern Nigerian colonial civil service contain information on the names, position, department, date of first appointment, date of current appointment among other information. Occasionally there is information on personal details like the educational qualification of the staff, the times they took leave from the service, their marital status, age and locations they have been posted to. For the staff list 1928 to 1966, I assemble the list of all civil servants in that period. This list contains about 55,000 entries. Of this number, 12,000 are Nigerians.

With the help of four research assistants, I code the ethnic groups each of these civil servants belong to. For each name, the research assistant codes the group they believe - based on their experience as Nigerians - the civil servant belongs to. In Nigeria, ethnic names are easy to identify. For instance, grown up Nigerians who have consumed media and interacted with others know that Adebayo is a Yoruba name, Chukwuemeka is an Igbo name, Dankwambo is a Hausa name, Ameh is an

Igala name, Osasuyi is a Bini name, and so on. The RAs coded all 55,000 names after which I met with them together to reconcile the differences in the coding. Many of the names were coded similarly across RAs. The only disparity between RA coding were where there were English names mixed with Nigerian ones. We made the decision based on majority opinion where to classify these names.

The classification of names is grouped for some minority groups because of their frequency in the dataset. For instance, a Birom person is grouped with Ngas, and Eggon people who share geographical space with them. Since during the colonial and early post colonial era, minority groups in Nigeria were not well represented in politics or the civil service. I group minority groups thus for sample size reasons only. Majority groups like the Hausa-Fulani are usually grouped together in Nigerian politics as such I use the conventional typology to classify members of that group. The Kanuri, Shua Arabs and minority groups in Northern Nigeria are also classified under Hausa-Fulani as it is difficult to distinguish between a Kanuri name and a Hausa name where they both bare Arabic last names. Islam has been around in Northern Nigeria since at least the 14th century, the proliferation of Islamic names is endemic to Northern Muslims that it is difficult to distinguish a Fulani person from Shua Arab by name alone without other identifying information such as the geographic location of their origin.

For the period for which data is classified based on the names available, it is not problematic to classify all these groups (Hausa, Fulani, Shua Arab, Kanuri, Gwari, and so on) together since they do not make up a significant portion of the population even when combined. For instance, in Fig 6 we observe that the Hausa/Fulani make up about five percent of the entire civil service in 1966. This group includes most of the Northern Muslim names recorded in the staff list for that year.

Fig 6 shows the level of embeddedness in the civil service for all civil servants between 1928 and 1999, and Fig 7 shows the level of embeddedness for only Nigerian civil servants only. In 1928, the British made up the largest population of civil servants in the country. In fact, the vast majority of colonial civil servants were British up until the 1940s when world events necessitated the deliberate incorporation of Nigerians into the service. Post independence in 1963, we can see that the population of British civil servants had reduced by more than half. At independence in 1960, many of the British living and working in Nigeria in various capacities chose to return to their country. This created vacancies that were quickly filled by qualified Nigerians.


#### **4.1 Elites, Institutions, and the Composition of the Civil Service**

I have asserted that precolonial centralized bureaucracy would provide channels through which to disseminate colonial policies. Precolonial education is on the other hand predicted to decreased the adoption of western style education and thus groups having this are expected to be less embedded in the civil service. I hand code whether a group had precolonial centralized institutions, I also code if they had precolonial educational systems and the number of representatives they had elected, and nominated into the Lagos Town council in 1923.<sup>8</sup> I take an average of the level of embed-

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
<sup>8</sup>I code precolonial institutions based on data from Dasgupta and Johnson-Kanu (2020). Data on the 1923 election is gotten from Nwogbaga (N.d.).

Figure 6: Temporal distribution of Civil Servants



*Notes: Distribution of civil servants for all available data years 1928 to 1999. 1999 data coded from state to corresponding ethnic group. Ethnic groups are color coded and the corresponding group names are labeled on the right. This panel shows that for the entire civil service including Non-Nigerians.*

Figure 7: Temporal distribution of Civil Servants (Nigerians Only)



*Notes: Distribution of civil servants for all available data years 1928 to 1999. 1999 data coded from state to corresponding ethnic group. Ethnic groups are color coded and the corresponding group names are labeled on the right. This panel shows that for only the Nigerian civil servants.*

dedness of all groups in the 1930s, the decade preceding the first election of Nigerians into colonial legislature in 1923.

Table 1 shows that indeed precolonial institutions are associated with an increase in the level of embeddedness of a group in the civil service. The presence of precolonial education decreases the level of representation within the service by at least 7 percent. An increase in the number of representatives in the Lagos Town Council increases the level of embeddedness in the 1930s by 5 percent.

Table 1: Effect of Institutions and Elites on Bureaucratic Embeddedness

|                            | Embeddedness Level in the 30s |                         |                         |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
|                            | Mean                          |                         |                         |
|                            | (1)                           | (2)                     | (3)                     |
| Precolonial Centralization | 0.055**<br>(0.024)            |                         | 0.040**<br>(0.018)      |
| Precolonial Education      | -0.079**<br>(0.034)           |                         | -0.047**<br>(0.022)     |
| Legislative Representation |                               | 0.052**<br>(0.023)      | 0.018**<br>(0.007)      |
| Observations               | 297                           | 297                     | 297                     |
| R <sup>2</sup>             | 0.142                         | 0.130                   | 0.145                   |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>    | 0.136                         | 0.124                   | 0.133                   |
| Residual Std. Error        | 0.236 (df = 294)              | 0.238 (df = 294)        | 0.237 (df = 292)        |
| F Statistic                | 24.382*** (df = 2; 294)       | 21.993*** (df = 2; 294) | 12.382*** (df = 4; 292) |

*Notes: Ethnicity clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Precolonial institutions, education and returned slaves are dummy variables, 1 for if they were present for that group and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is the embeddedness level for each ethnic group for each MDA averaged for the decade 1930s. Unit of observation is the Ethnicity-MDA. \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .*

## 4.2 Civil Service composition in t-1 predicts the composition in t

I expect that previous levels of bureaucratic embeddedness within the civil service should influence future levels of the same. Thus I calculate the level of embeddedness of each ethnic group in the sample from 1928 to 1966 for each ministry, department, or agency (MDA) in the Nigerian civil service. Although significant amount of data is missing due to unavailability, I am able to estimate using historical records, that there were no other Nigerians in the colonial civil service before 1920 except a handful of Yorubas.<sup>9</sup> Educational records show that there were not many educated Nigerians before 1920, thus it follows that the number of Nigerian civil servants is negligible for the period before WWII.

Armed with this information, I create a panel of embeddedness measures for each ethnic group in each MDA and for the years 1925 to 1966. Pre 1940, I know the proportion of some Nigerian ethnic groups like the Igala/Igberira or the Nupe is

<sup>9</sup>More information in the appendix.

negligible and almost 0. Even the Igbo who attained position in the service after the Yoruba in the 1940s were barely visible before 1940. I can thus record the proportion of the civil service that belongs to minority groups such as the Igala/Igbirra as 0 before 1930. Fig 6 shows that the only Nigerian group to record a presence in the civil service before 1940 is the Yoruba, so recording 0 for other groups for this period is not far fetched and helps to balance the observations for years with data.

The final dataset is a panel showing the levels of representation of each Nigerian ethnic group within various MDAs for the periods 1925 to 1966 with some gaps in the series. I leave out the British civil servants from my sample since this paper is only interested in understanding how Nigerians made the civil service their own and how the population of various Nigerian ethnic groups in the civil service changed over time. There are about 6,000 observations used for analysis in this section. Since I expect previous embeddedness levels to influence future levels, I create 1, 3, and 5 year lags of the embeddedness measure which is my independent variable on interest. the dependent variable is the embeddedness measure at time  $t$ . The estimated equation is as follows:

$$Embed_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta Embed_{ijlagged} + \epsilon$$

Where  $Embed_{ijt}$  is the level of embeddedness an ethnic group  $i$  has in an MDA  $j$  in time  $t$ .  $Embed_{ijlagged}$  is the (1, 3, or 5 years) lagged level of embeddedness group  $i$  has in MDA  $j$ . Finally,  $\epsilon$  captures the error term. Since the data is a panel, I include, time, MDA, and ethnicity fixed effects in my estimations.<sup>10</sup> Results are displayed in Table 2.

The results in table 4 show that previous levels of embeddedness do influence current levels and this is the case for levels even 5 years in the past.

### 4.3 Alternative Explanations: Do Government Policies Change the Composition of the Civil Service?

I argue that the level of embeddedness of various groups in the civil service is determined by the historical connections they have already in the civil service. A counter argument is that other factors influence the level of embeddedness groups have in the service. These factors include civil service reforms, changes in the regime the service serves, unexpected political events and wishes of the executive branch who the civil servants answer to. In this section, I test my expectation that civil service is insulated from the influence of policy makers in the form of civil service reforms, regime changes, and undue influence of politicians agenda.

Research on civil service reforms conclude that in Nigeria, reforms do not increase the efficient working of the service (Anazodo, Okoye and Chukwuemeka 2012, Magbadelo 2016, Sekwat 2002). These reforms have also failed to curb corruption and rent seeking within the service (Salisu 2001). Civil service reforms may not produce their intended consequence, but they may help change the level of embedded-

<sup>10</sup>I account for other factors that may influence the entry of groups into the civil service, primarily the investment in education and precolonial levels of centralization and schooling. However, since these are time invariant, the time fixed effects takes care of this, and I do not include them in my model since they get dropped otherwise.

Table 2: Previous levels of Embeddedness Predict Embeddedness in time T

|                         | Embeddedness Level in T |                     |                     |                     |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|                         | prop                    |                     |                     |                     |
|                         | (1)                     | (2)                 | (3)                 | (4)                 |
| Embeddedness t-1        | 0.408***<br>(0.052)     | 0.353***<br>(0.051) | 0.344***<br>(0.050) | 0.345***<br>(0.050) |
| Embeddedness t-3        | 0.208***<br>(0.044)     | 0.170***<br>(0.041) | 0.162***<br>(0.041) | 0.163***<br>(0.041) |
| Embeddedness t-5        | 0.206***<br>(0.044)     | 0.181***<br>(0.042) | 0.173***<br>(0.041) | 0.173***<br>(0.041) |
| Time FE                 | N                       | Y                   | Y                   | Y                   |
| Ethnicity FE            | N                       | N                   | Y                   | Y                   |
| MDA FE                  | N                       | N                   | N                   | Y                   |
| Observations            | 22,220                  | 22,220              | 22,220              | 22,220              |
| R <sup>2</sup>          | 0.476                   | 0.500               | 0.504               | 0.507               |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.476                   | 0.498               | 0.502               | 0.505               |

Notes: MDA and Ethnicity clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Embeddedness level is between 0 and 1 and the dependent variable is embeddedness is time t. The main dependent variables are 1, 3, and 5 year lags of the embeddedness measure. Data is an unbalanced panel between 1925 and 1966. Unit of observation is the Ethnicity-MDA-Year. \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

ness in the service of some groups after they are enacted. Thus, this could be an alternate explanation for the changes in embeddedness levels of groups in the civil service.

Political events are another alternative explanation for changes in the composition of the civil service. For instance, we know from historical records that world war II was an important event that changed representation in the civil service by the enactment of post war policies that encouraged the recruitment of Nigerians into the service. On average, political events and shocks may produce a change in the composition of the civil service.

I code the events data for civil service reforms, political events, regime changes and changes in the head of government that may influence the employment and retention of civil servants. Table in the appendix shows the list of these events from 1925 up until 1999. These variables take a value of one if the event occurred in that year and 0 otherwise. I also create lagged variables for reform, political events and regime changes since it may take a while for the change to translate to changes in the composition of the civil service.

I code the ethnicity of the head of government and create a variable that takes the value of 1 if the head of government shared the same ethnicity as the groups in our dataset. I expect that heads of governments would encourage the recruitment of their co-ethnics into the civil service during their tenure. I fit the following model:

$$Embed_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta_1 Embed_{ijlagged} + \beta_2 PolEvent_t + \beta_3 Reform_t + \beta_4 Regime_t + \beta_5 HOG_t + \epsilon$$

Where  $Embed_{ijt}$  is the level of embeddedness an ethnic group  $i$  has in an MDA  $j$  in time  $t$ .  $Embed_{ijlagged}$  is the (1, 3, or 5 years) lagged level of embeddedness group  $i$  has in MDA  $j$ .  $PolEvent_t$  captures the occurrence of a political event like elections, international or civil wars that affect Nigeria,  $Reform_t$  records if there was civil service reform in year  $t$ ,  $Regime_t$  indicates a regime change from authoritarianism to democracy in year  $t$  and  $HOG_t$  indicates the characteristics of the head of government such as their ethnic alignment with groups and the change in the head of government in time  $t$ . Finally,  $\epsilon$  captures the error term. Since the data is a panel, I include, time, MDA, and ethnicity fixed effects in my estimations. Table 3 shows the results.

The results in table 3 show that even when alternative explanations are accounted for, previous levels of embeddedness still influence the future levels. Of the alternate explanations, Independence, and ethnic alignment with the head of government appear to be the most important predictors of embeddedness levels. Civil service reforms, regime change and change in the head of government do not appear to significantly influence the embeddedness level of ethnic groups in the civil service.<sup>11</sup>

#### 4.4 Are these Short term results?

So far, there is evidence that embeddedness from 5 periods into the past influences future levels, but how far do these effects extend? I create a composite measure of the share of the civil service that ethnic groups occupy for the entire historical period

<sup>11</sup>In other model specifications, I include 1, 3, and 5 year lags for civil service reform, political events, and regime change. The estimates do not attain any significance even when lagged.

Table 3: Previous levels of Embeddedness Predict Embeddedness in time T

|                            | Embeddedness Level in T       |                             |                             |                              |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
|                            | prop                          |                             |                             |                              |
|                            | (1)                           | (2)                         | (3)                         | (4)                          |
| Embeddedness t-1           | 0.398***<br>(0.051)           | 0.350***<br>(0.050)         | 0.343***<br>(0.050)         | 0.343***<br>(0.050)          |
| Embeddedness t-3           | 0.201***<br>(0.043)           | 0.167***<br>(0.041)         | 0.161***<br>(0.041)         | 0.162***<br>(0.041)          |
| Embeddedness t-5           | 0.201***<br>(0.043)           | 0.178***<br>(0.042)         | 0.173***<br>(0.041)         | 0.173***<br>(0.041)          |
| Civil Service Reform       | 0.199***<br>(0.037)           | -2.656***<br>(0.464)        | -2.780***<br>(0.466)        | -2.772***<br>(0.463)         |
| Political Event            | 0.265***<br>(0.044)           | 6.281***<br>(0.747)         | 6.533***<br>(0.755)         | 6.518***<br>(0.751)          |
| Regime change              | 0.128<br>(0.084)              | -3.554***<br>(0.612)        | -3.692***<br>(0.614)        | -3.707***<br>(0.613)         |
| HOG Change                 | 0.084<br>(0.069)              | 0.517<br>(0.395)            | 0.542<br>(0.394)            | 0.564<br>(0.394)             |
| Ethnic Align w/ HOG        | 0.319**<br>(0.137)            | 0.436***<br>(0.137)         | 0.371**<br>(0.155)          | 0.370**<br>(0.154)           |
| Independence               | -0.002<br>(0.023)             | 2.617***<br>(0.462)         | 2.746***<br>(0.465)         | 2.762***<br>(0.462)          |
| log of population pre 1990 | 4.774***<br>(1.058)           | 6.977***<br>(1.100)         | 1.568*<br>(0.851)           | 1.563*<br>(0.858)            |
| Time FE                    | N                             | Y                           | Y                           | Y                            |
| Ethnicity FE               | N                             | N                           | Y                           | Y                            |
| MDA FE                     | N                             | N                           | N                           | Y                            |
| Observations               | 22,220                        | 22,220                      | 22,220                      | 22,220                       |
| R <sup>2</sup>             | 0.480                         | 0.502                       | 0.504                       | 0.508                        |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>    | 0.480                         | 0.500                       | 0.502                       | 0.505                        |
| Residual Std. Error        | 2.147 (df = 22209)            | 2.105 (df = 22140)          | 2.100 (df = 22131)          | 2.094 (df = 22105)           |
| F Statistic                | 2,052.429*** (df = 10; 22209) | 282.217*** (df = 79; 22140) | 256.017*** (df = 88; 22131) | 200.127*** (df = 114; 22105) |

Note:

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

*Notes: MDA and Ethnicity clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Embeddedness level is between 0 and 1 and the dependent variable is embeddedness is time t. The main dependent variables are 1, 3, and 5 year lags of the embeddedness measure. Data is an unbalanced panel between 1925 and 1966. Unit of observation is the Ethnicity-MDA-Year. \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01.*

1925 to 1966, I investigate whether this measure has any effect on the embeddedness of ethnic groups in various MDAs in the 1990s, about 30 years later than the last recorded year in the staff lists. I estimate the following model:

$$Embed_{ij} = \alpha + \beta \overline{HistEmbed}_i + \epsilon$$

Where  $Embed_{ij}$  is the embeddedness level of ethnic group  $i$  in MDA  $j$  and is measured in 1997 and 1999 pooled.  $\overline{HistEmbed}_i$  is the average level of embeddedness for ethnic group  $i$  in MDA  $j$  in the period 1925 to 1966. Finally,  $\epsilon$  captures the error term.

Table 4: Previous levels of Embeddedness Predict Embeddedness in time T

|                                 | Embeddedness Level in the 90s |                          |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|
|                                 | prop                          |                          |
|                                 | (1)                           | (2)                      |
| Average Historical Embeddedness | 4.538***<br>(0.567)           | 4.148***<br>(0.442)      |
| Civil Service Reform            |                               | 8.720***<br>(0.471)      |
| Ethnic Align w/ HOG             |                               | -7.463***<br>(0.487)     |
| Align_Ethn_HOG                  |                               | 6.941***<br>(1.241)      |
| Observations                    | 891                           | 891                      |
| R <sup>2</sup>                  | 0.240                         | 0.485                    |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>         | 0.239                         | 0.483                    |
| Residual Std. Error             | 7.613 (df = 889)              | 6.276 (df = 886)         |
| F Statistic                     | 280.892*** (df = 1; 889)      | 208.835*** (df = 4; 886) |

*Notes: MDA and ethnic group clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Embeddedness level is between 0 and 1 and the dependent variable is embeddedness in time  $t$ . The main independent variable is the historical average of the embeddedness measure. Data is pooled 1997 and 1999 embeddedness measures for state groups that map onto ethnic groups based on geographical space. Unit of observation is the Ethnic group-MDA. Other covariates like change in Head of government, Regime change, political event are dropped from the model during estimation. \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .*

The results show that even 30 years later, historical embeddedness is still associated with the levels of embeddedness of ethnic groups in MDAs in the late 1990s. Even when we account for alternate explanations, historical levels of embeddedness influences the future levels. It is incredible that this historical legacies are persistent even decades into the future.

## 5 Ethnic Networks, and Employment in the Civil Service

Across ethnic groups in Nigeria, progressive or ethnic unions played a significant role in the furthering education and economic opportunities for their members. Many villages across Nigeria had improvement associations, progressive unions, or economic unions that fostered economic development by providing opportunities to those who belonged to the group (Ottenberg 1955). This is especially the case among the Igbo and Yoruba of southern Nigeria who competed fiercely to obtain both under colonialism (Bates 1974). The Yoruba led the rest of the country in educational attainment during the colonial period, by the 1930s when the Igbo realized the value of education, Yorubas already occupied most of the public positions allowed Nigerians. The Igbo, though lacking much colonial investment in education made it a priority to catch up to the Yorubas.<sup>12</sup> The Yoruba had powerful ethnic unions that spurred on their educational development and produced political and bureaucratic leaders during the colonial era. Many famed Nigerian politicians of Yoruba extract at the time like Obafemi Awolowo, were heavily involved in the Yoruba unions.

It was in the process of furthering their economic ambitions that the Igbo identity solidified. Before colonialism, most Nigerians identified themselves with respect to their villages (Smock 1969). Migration to Lagos for economic opportunities necessitated the formation of the larger group identity to take advantage of networks already set in place by co-ethnics from other geographic areas or villages. This changed the way migrants and people back in the village identified themselves (Van Den Berselaar 2005). Thus the larger ethnic groups were born where individuals no longer thought of themselves as being Afigbo, or Mbaise, but just being Igbo. This new identity allowed individuals to take advantage of shared identity with a larger group of people and the economic advantages that came with it in the process of state formation in Nigeria.

### 5.1 The Yoruba in the Ministry of Health

In 1928, there were a few Nigerians in the colonial civil service. The staff list of 1928 published the names of seven Nigerians. Of these seven, three worked in the medical office, two in surveys, and the other two served on the Lagos town council. The Lagos town council was comprised of local elites who served as advisors to the colonial government (Decker 2010). They gave recommendations to the colonial government on development projects to undertake. This section is interested in the Nigerian civil servants who served in the medical office.

All the Nigerians recorded in the staff list this year were of Yoruba extract. This is because at the time the Yoruba were the most educated group in the country producing all except 1 of the first 10 qualified doctors in the country. Many of these doctors did not work in the civil service or even in Nigeria. Some were employed in

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<sup>12</sup>The first government secondary school in Igboland was built in 1929, 20 years after Kings college was built in Lagos (Yorubaland). Before this, Hope Waddell Training Institute was founded in 1895 which served the entire eastern region but was located in Calabar, an Efik/Ibibio area. By amalgamation in 1914, the Yorubas already had 14 secondary schools and the Igbos none. This early lack of investment did seem to deter the Igbos as their elites, and ethnic unions pursued colonial investment in the area and pooled resources to make such investments were they did not exist.

Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast (now Ghana). Not all Nigerian doctors who labored in Nigeria worked with the government. Some had private practices that catered to the medical needs of both Nigerians and foreigners in the Lagos area.

Three Nigerian doctors in the civil service were O. O. Sapara (brother to Sapara Williams), K. Faderin, and S. L. A. Manuwa. I could not find any information on Faderin besides the entry in the staff list in 1928. However, I found an article published by him in 1927 on dysentery outbreak in a Nigerian prison due to a change in diet from yam to white rice (Faderin 1927). There is a host of information on the other two doctors luckily, and their case may help us understand how one person can open up the doors for others who belong to their ethnic group.

Sapara was born in Sierra Leone of returned slave parents who were originally from the present day Ogun state in Nigeria. He returned to Nigeria with his family and obtained missionary education in Lagos (Adeloye 1974). After his sister died in child birth, he decided to be a medical officer. He eventually gained honors in midwifery from St Thomas Hospitals Medical school in London, and in 1895, he was awarded the L.R.C.P. and L.R.C.S. in Edinburgh, the L.F.P.S. in Glasgow, and was elected a Fellow of the Royal Institute of Health in Scotland. When he returned to Nigeria the following year, he was appointed assistant colonial surgeon in the Lagos colony.

As a Nigerian in the colonial service, Sapara was instrumental to the building of the first public dispensary in the country at Saki, Lagos in 1901. He contributed to the study and therapy of tropical diseases in West Africa, led the fight against the bubonic plague in Lagos in 1924, and pushed the government to do more in the fight against infant mortality. He is best known for his work on smallpox which he successfully eradicated as a pandemic in Epe, Western Nigeria, for which he was awarded the Imperial Service Order by King George V. He was also instrumental in getting the government to turn his Massey street dispensary in Lagos into the Massey street hospital in 1926. His contributions to the field of medicine in Nigeria was so revered that a street was named after him.

Manuwa was a junior medical officer in the Nigerian civil service by the time Sapara retired in 1928. He was born in present day Ogun state, Nigeria in 1903. Like Sapara, he obtained missionary education in Lagos before heading to Britain where he received medical degrees in Edinburgh and Liverpool (Manuwa 1976). After he returned to Nigeria in 1927, he joined the colonial civil service as a medical officer. He is best known as the first highly skilled Nigerian surgeon with his exploits which include inventing a surgical knife for excisions of tropical ulcer (Manuwa 1946). He worked in administrative positions later, and advocated for more educational facilities to educate future Nigerian doctors which led to the opening of the first medical school in the country - University College Hospital in Ibadan.

By 1999, civil servants from Ogun state where Sapara originated from, made up the largest proportion of individuals in the Ministry of Health with 13 percent of the entire population. The Ministry of Health overall continues to be dominated by the Yoruba (excluding Kwara state) who hold 41 percent of all the positions in this MDA as at 1999. Both Sapara and Manuwa pushed for more opportunities for Nigerians in general when they had the ears of the British colonial government. Their works serve to expel the notion that colonial governments invested based on their own interests and not on that of local elite. Though these great men may have advocated on behalf

of Nigeria, those from their own ethnic group benefited the most from the progress that was brought about through their handwork which. Thus local elite can influence investment in opportunities that are then captured by them and those associated with them.

## **6 Discussion**

I have argued that colonial legacies have long run effects on the composition of the civil service. I attribute this to two reasons. Firstly, ethnic groups who realized the importance of education early persuaded colonial administrators to invest in education for their people. Where colonial administrators and missionaries did not provide education, ethnic elites and ethnic unions stepped in and made investments in education and other economic infrastructure. Secondly, ethnic groups who got into the civil service first employed from their ethnic group when they gained power to do so.

For government policies to change the composition of the civil service, the Head of government and other politicians have to craft policies deliberately to improve educational attainment for various ethnic groups in the country. It may be that the Federal character principle may be important for creating an equitable employment process in the civil service.

## Part IV

# Bureaucratic Embeddedness and Local Public Projects

## 1 Introduction

Inequality in access to basic government goods and services is prevalent in every nation. Political economists have argued that this inequality is the result of electoral incentives faced by politicians and their constituents. Given that resources are finite, governments must make decisions about which public goods to provide, and where (and to whom) to provide them. Much of the literature focuses on electoral benefits as drivers of these decisions, while failing to consider the role that the bureaucracy plays in this process (Cox and McCubbins 1986, Dixit and Londregan 1996). I contend that though constituents and politicians play important roles, the role of the bureaucracy is equally important and crucial to explaining differentials in public goods provision.

For instance, we have powerful experimental evidence that cooperation within groups determines the provision of public goods to their community (Habyarimana et al. 2007). This research helps us to understand *which* groups are most likely to succeed in agreeing to engage in collective actions. However, once cooperation is achieved the job of generating public goods is delegated to a government. We also know that politicians' preferences play a role in public goods provision (De Kadt and Lieberman 2017, Harding 2015). For these scholars, inequality, is due to the differences in preferences between and within groups and politicians (Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Williams 2017). And yet, the politicians themselves do not actually build wells and roads, libraries, and dams, and so their priorities also fail to fully explain variation.

In many developed and developing countries, provision of public goods is left to bureaucratic agencies that are set up and tasked with specific goals. Bureaucrats have interests in policy and outcomes that may diverge from the interests of politicians who delegate to them (Rivera 2020, Wilson 1989). Agencies develop organizational cultures, persistent patterned ways of thinking, that may lead agents' preferences to conflict with their principals'. Agencies can emphasize meritocratic hiring and promotion making political dismissals of agents being nearly impossible (Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 2012). In short, the bureaucracy is not a "hapless pawn" for politicians to control (Wilson 1989). Bureaucrats, however, know that they answer to the executive and the legislature (Hammond and Knott 1996)). Therefore, they act strategically to secure much needed resources given constraints.

Politicians use fire alarms (accountability mechanism after the bureaucrats have already performed their tasks through a less centralized implementation of policies that help agencies monitor agents for violations of rules and regulations) rather than police patrols (monitoring bureaucrats while they carry out their tasks in a more centralized manner through surveillance of agency actions) to monitor bureaucrats and make sure they implement policy that aligns with what politicians want (McCubbins

and Schwartz 1984). Intuitively it makes sense for bureaucrats to be held accountable by politicians this way. However, in Nigeria, Federal Civil Service jobs are highly prized. The government pays relatively well and on time compared to other private sector jobs or state government jobs. Both politicians and citizens do not want to jeopardize the jobs of their co-ethnics who are Federal civil servants and do not hold them accountable when they fail to complete public projects. The process of using fire alarms to hold civil servants accountable in Nigeria is usually long and drawn out often producing undesirable results.

In 2013, Abdulrasheed Maina, the then Chairman of the Pension Reforms Task Team (PRTT) was dismissed from the civil service for being involved in a 42 billion Naira scam, evading arrest and absconding from his duties (Sesan 2017, Umoru 2017). Before joining PRTT, he was a director at the Ministry of Interior. He fled the country. By 2017, news filtered throughout the country that Maina had not only returned to Nigeria, but had been reinstated at the Ministry of Interior and promoted! The news and the investigations behind this incident are popularly refereed to as "Maina-Gate". This civil servant under investigation for corrupt practices by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission was allowed to evade accountability and even promoted while at it. This high profile scandal resulted in the dismissal of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation who is in charge of all appointments and promotions (Akeregha and Akpan 2019). Charges were brought against others who were involved in this scandal. Senate hearings on this case produced no punishment for the main actors in it (Busari 2017). In Dec 2020, Maina was remanded into custody for the remainder of his trial (Ataro 2020). Investigations into this trial began in 2013, the main scandal due to his reinstatement was in 2017 and as of writing this, the case is still ongoing. Of the 42 billion Naira, about 10 billion, and a few assets have been recovered. Holding bureaucrats accountable is a long and difficult process that takes years and even then, accountability may not even be attained.

It is alleged that Maina, a co-ethnic of the then Attorney General of the Federation, and Minister of the Interior, was allowed to crawl his way back into the civil service because of this connection. Thus, his co-ethnics who were appointed by a co-ethnic president shielded him from accountability. In the provision of a service - managing civil servants pension funds - Maina engaged in corrupt practices and did not provide the service adequately in the process. Corruption cases such as these hinder the provision of public goods and services.

Scholars have shown that public goods projects implementation is influenced by a groups representation in the bureaucracy (Bhavnani and Lee 2018, 2019). I contend, perhaps counterintuitively, that groups that are highly embedded in a government agency have lower completion rates of projects allocated to them. This is because bureaucrats from that group can capture resources meant for their group without being held accountable in their agency (because they have power in the agency due to their size), or by their group (due to social trust within the group and attribution of project delivery to politicians). These bureaucrats have an incentive to be corrupt. Xu, Bertrand and Burgess (2018) argue that bureaucrats are perceived to be more corrupt in their home region Thus, highly embedded groups in the bureaucracy see lower completion rates of projects allocated to them even if politicians would like these projects completed. This contrasts with existing evidence that higher representation may produce better or equal provision of goods to groups in a country (Gulzar,

Haas and Pasquale 2020).

Groups vary in their level of embeddedness in any agency, which I claim emerges from historical legacies - colonial hiring process and the capture of the civil service by groups that got there first. These historical legacies lead to some groups being over represented since they got there first, while others are under represented given their population in society. Unequal representation of groups is problematic as representation influences the provision of public goods. Many public goods are location specific. They are accessed and used by a local community. When groups are also geographically defined or segregated, variation in bureaucratic embeddedness can produce inequalities in public goods provision.

The literature suggest that representative bureaucracies (where group proportions mirror that of the population) should produce better outcomes for more groups in society (Meier, Wrinkle and Polinard 1999, Rasul and Rogger 2015). Scholars have also argued that civil servants who are embedded in an area are more susceptible to corruption (Bhavnani and Lee 2018). This paper reconciles these contrasting explanations on representation of groups within the bureaucracy by showing that while representation is important for public goods provision, more representation can have negative consequences for goods provision.

This chapter contributes to our understanding of spatial variation in the quality of public goods (operationalized as the completion rate of public projects). I argue that the unequal provision of goods in a state is affected by unequal levels of bureaucratic embeddedness across groups in that state. Simply put, my arguments suggest that where a group is highly embedded in a bureaucracy, that group is less likely to receive higher quality public goods from the government compared to places with lower levels of embeddedness.

I find that historical legacies influence levels of later bureaucratic embeddedness. I also find that while bureaucratic embeddedness is not important in the decision to allocate projects to states, both historical and contemporary embeddedness are important for the completion of projects after they have been allocated. My results suggest that politicians control the allocation of projects, but bureaucrats determine how and when the projects will be completed.

The structure of the chapter is as follows: I then explore the influence of historical embeddedness on contemporary embeddedness in the next section. Then I statistically analyze the relationship between embeddedness and public project allocation and completion rates. I conclude by discussing solutions to the over representation of some groups within the civil service relative to others.

## 2 The Nigerian Federal Civil Service

The Nigerian Federal civil service is in charge of implementing the division of most government projects (Nwosu 1978).<sup>13</sup> I consider the ministries, departments, and agencies (MDA) in the Nigerian Federal Civil Service. Though there are state and local government agencies, I focus on the federal civil service exclusively. I do so because it is the highest bureaucracy in the country and carries out most impactful

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<sup>13</sup>They may contract out the direct provision to private parties who work on their behalf while civil servants oversee the implementation of such.

policy implementation. Focusing on the national level also allows for more comparison between agencies and groups. The financial structure of the country implies that revenue is collected from taxes, crude oil sales and borrowing at the federal level and then disbursed to states and local governments. The Federal Government therefore has most of the power in policy implementation while states and local governments must rely on the federal government for allocations with which to develop their areas.

MDAs cover a specific policy issue. For instance the Ministry of Health deals with issues that are health related. While the term MDA is all encompassing, there are agencies and departments which fall under ministries- hence ministries supersede most agencies and departments. For instance, Federal Medical Centers, and the Center for Disease Control both fall under the ministry of Health. Some agencies under a ministry can be regional or national. They are regional if they deal with issues facing only one region, and national if their functions cover the entire country. There are some stand alone agencies that are part of the civil service but not under the civil service hierarchy. These are the bureau of public procurement, the code of conduct bureau, the Civil Service Commission and the Federal Character Commission among others.

Typically in the Civil Service, newly vacant positions are first offered to civil servants that have served in that MDA for sometime (Briggs 2007). They are given the information and opportunity to apply for positions before the jobs are advertised more widely. Civil servants are also asked if they can recommend people for the open position from their networks. Thus, civil servants have an incentive to fill open positions with people they know since it saves them the cost of going through an extensive hiring process. A public hiring process entails publishing the job posting. This is done in the national daily newspapers, and government bulletins and gazettes.

The composition of the Civil Service - the embeddedness of groups within the service - is highly dependent on the previous composition of groups. As I show below, historical legacies influence the proportion of the civil service that is occupied by various groups in the country. This means that those who have historically occupied positions within the civil service are more likely to continue to do so. Highly salient groups are ethnic groups and religious groups. In this paper, though I focus on ethnic groups, this is reflected in my data through its overlap with geographical groups - states. As such groups considered moving forward will be states.

Nigeria operates using an informal rule - *Federal Character*. This rule requires that all government offices be composed of citizens from all the states within the country. In practice one cannot tell that this rule is adhered to or that people attempt to use this rule during employment of new government officials.

MDAs are required to produce a budget for each fiscal year. Within the MDA, civil servants bargain on what projects should be included in the budget. After bargaining, the MDA presents their budget to the head of civil service to compile for all ministries. The head of civil service is a member of the Federal executive council (FEC) and he lets the presidency know what the MDAs want. Civil servants have special interests that they want fulfilled and can include this in their budgets to the FEC. Some of their interests may go towards projects that directly benefit the state they come from. Hence, having an individual from a state in the civil service is important for obtaining benefits for that state.

## 2.1 Civil Service Data

To better understand the civil service, the inequality in representation of states within it and how instrumental civil servants are to public goods provision, I collected data on the composition of the service. My data was collected through fieldwork trips to Nigeria in 2019. Data was collected from two sources, the Federal Character Commission and the National Archives of Nigeria.

The Federal Character Commission was created through an executive military government act in 1995 is charged with researching and documenting the implementation of the federal character rule in Nigeria. The agency monitors the levels of representation of various states and other groups within the country. They also aim to encourage the reduction of inequality in representation.

From 1996 to 1999, the Federal character commission compiled staff statistics for all Ministries, Departments, and Agencies in the Federal civil service. This data shows the proportion of each MDA a state holds - how embedded the state is in the MDA. The 1997 and 1999 statistics contain data for all Main Ministries and the departments and agencies under them. While 1996 and 1998 data are for sub agencies under the ministries exclusively. In this paper, I rely on mostly data from 1999, and pooled 1997/1999 data for historical analysis. The Manpower statistics record the percentage of each MDA that is made up of civil servants from various states across the country. This is my primary measure of the level of embeddedness of the state in the MDA.

The Nigerian National Archives under the Ministry of Information Culture and Tourism keeps records of all Government related publications that are at least 15 years old. Sometimes they keep more recent documents. The archives have materials dating back to precolonial times. The earliest recorded material being an Arabic text from the 15th century. Pertinent to this paper are colonial and precolonial documents that record the government employees, their roles and other personal details. The Federal Civil Service staff lists show the list of names of all federal civil servants employed by the Nigerian government within the year the lists were published.

Data used in this paper are from the years 1928 to 1966 with significant gaps in the series. I scanned the data from the National Archives repository in Kaduna, Nigeria, and then digitized and formatted the data for analysis. The resultant dataset is a spreadsheet containing names, current positions, tenure, and sometimes the qualifications of each civil servant recorded. Figure 8 shows a sample page of the staff list from 1966. There is relatively rich information - compared to the manpower statistics - to understand more about each civil servant.

Since the data consisted of names of civil servants, I used the names to estimate the ethnicities of bureaucrats with the help of a team of research assistants based in Nigeria.<sup>14</sup> Four research assistants belonging to 3 different ethnic groups who have lived in different parts of the country for long periods of time were recruited to code the ethnicities associated with the names in the staff list. In Nigeria, it is relatively

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<sup>14</sup>I do not use the Harris (2015) method of name classification as I do not have a priori information on the expected proportions of ethnic groups both within the service and in the general population. Nigeria does not keep ethnicity specific census data but rather most documents contain identification data based on the states of origin of individuals which may or may not tell one about the ethnicity of that person since many states are multi-ethnic and some ethnic groups cut across states.

Figure 8: Sample Staff list page

| MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES     |               |                |                   |                     |                                       |
|---------------------------------------------------|---------------|----------------|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Appointment and Name                              | Establishment | Date of birth  | First Appointment | Present Appointment | Salary Scale and Remarks              |
| <b>Technical Officers (Agriculture)</b>           | 16            |                |                   |                     | <b>Scale C(T) 2, 3, 4</b>             |
| N. N. Okparanta (m)                               | ..            | 1-9-19 ..      | 1-5-38 ..         | 4-7-59              | Junior Post, 38-59                    |
| S. A. Soreni (m)                                  | ..            | 1-1-20 ..      | 1-12-46 ..        | 4-7-59              | Junior Post, 46-59                    |
| J. A. Obi (m)                                     | ..            | 20-2-32 ..     | 8-1-51 ..         | 27-10-60            | Kew Cert. in Horticulture             |
| A. A. Ononokpono (m)                              | ..            | 28-1-32 ..     | 3-9-51 ..         | 15-6-62             | Junior Post, 51-52                    |
| E. U. Edem (m)                                    | ..            | 11-9-35 ..     | 30-7-54 ..        | 15-6-62             | Junior Post, 54-62                    |
| T. O. Agulana (m)                                 | ..            | 4-12-25 ..     | 22-1-45 ..        | 25-4-63             | Junior Post, 35-63                    |
| G. N. Nwofiah (m)                                 | ..            | April, 1931 .. | 4-6-52 ..         | 24-4-63             | Junior Post, 52-63                    |
| M. C. Ezediokpu (m)                               | ..            | 15-9-30 ..     | 29-5-52 ..        | 23-1-64             | Junior Post, 52-64                    |
| R. O. Fatimehin (m)                               | ..            | 13-3-23 ..     | 26-4-45 ..        | 15-1-65             | Junior Post, 45-65                    |
| H. O. Achike (m)                                  | ..            | 1925 ..        | 26-4-45 ..        | 15-1-65             | Junior Post, 46-65                    |
| K. U. Nduke, B.Sc. (m)                            | ..            | 20-12-39 ..    | 2-2-59 ..         | 21-4-65             | Junior Post, 59-65                    |
| A. O. Nkwocha (m)                                 | ..            | 25-3-28 ..     | 19-8-50 ..        | 1-4-62              | Junior Post, 50-65                    |
| C. E. Ansa (m)                                    | ..            | 25-12-30 ..    | 5-7-52 ..         | 15-6-62             | Junior Post, 52-65                    |
| C. A. St. Matthew-Daniel, B.Sc. (m)               | ..            | 9-2-34 ..      | 26-3-66 ..        | 26-3-66             |                                       |
| 2 Vacancies                                       |               |                |                   |                     |                                       |
| <b>Assistant Technical Officers (Agriculture)</b> | 19            |                |                   |                     | <b>Scale C(T) Training 1, 2</b>       |
| S. L. Adesoji (m)                                 | ..            | 25-2-22 ..     | 1-4-47 ..         | 1-4-62              |                                       |
| T. A. Udom (m)                                    | ..            | 1-7-26 ..      | 1-7-44 ..         | 23-2-63             |                                       |
| S. Sijuade (m)                                    | ..            | 8-8-38 ..      | 2-1-59 ..         | 26-11-62            | Study leave                           |
| U. S. A. Ukpong (m)                               | ..            | 10-10-41 ..    | 18-5-60 ..        | 18-5-60             | Study leave                           |
| A. O. Oladiran (m)                                | ..            | 19-8-36 ..     | 5-1-56 ..         | 7-12-64             | Study Leave                           |
| S. A. Omowon (m)                                  | ..            | 1-4-39 ..      | 1-2-66 ..         | 1-2-66              |                                       |
| 13 Vacancies                                      |               |                |                   |                     |                                       |
| <b>Mechanical Demonstrators</b>                   | 2             |                |                   |                     | <b>Scale C(T) 2, 3, 4</b>             |
| M. A. Bankole, G.A.I.E., D.A.E. (m)               | ..            | 25-2-27 ..     | 25-10-62 ..       | 25-10-62            |                                       |
| 1 Vacancy                                         |               |                |                   |                     |                                       |
| <b>Librarian</b>                                  | 1             |                |                   |                     | <b>Scale A</b>                        |
| Vacant                                            |               |                |                   |                     |                                       |
| <b>Library Officer</b>                            | 1             |                |                   |                     | <b>Scale C(E) 2, 3, 4</b>             |
| Mrs O. F. Ojo ..                                  | ..            | ..             | 21-9-64 ..        | 21-9-64             |                                       |
| <b>FEDERAL FISHERIES SERVICE</b>                  |               |                |                   |                     |                                       |
| <b>Director</b>                                   | 1             |                |                   |                     | <b>Group 6</b>                        |
| D. R. Niven, B.Sc. (m)                            | ..            | 3-4-27 ..      | 23-6-50 ..        | 29-3-64             | Fed. of Malaya and Singapore, 1950-58 |
| <b>Principal Fisheries Research Officers</b>      | 2             |                |                   |                     | <b>Group 7</b>                        |
| A. J. Hopson, M.Sc. (m)                           | ..            | 6-9-32 ..      | 6-6-62 ..         | 6-6-62              | Ghana, 59-62                          |
| E. O. Bayagbona, B.Sc., Hons. (Zoology) (m)       | ..            | 29-8-36 ..     | 9-7-60 ..         | 1-12-63             |                                       |
| <b>Senior Fisheries Research Officers</b>         | 2             |                |                   |                     | <b>Scale A1</b>                       |
| 2 Vacancies                                       |               |                |                   |                     |                                       |
| <b>Fisheries Research Officers</b>                | 8             |                |                   |                     | <b>Scale A</b>                        |
| E. N. C. Eziuzo, B.Sc., Hons. (Zoology) (m)       | ..            | 14-3-35 ..     | 3-10-61 ..        | 3-10-61             |                                       |
| V. O. Sagua, B.Sc., Hons. (Zoology) (m)           | ..            | 26-8-38 ..     | 22-6-63 ..        | 22-6-63             |                                       |
| J. G. Tobor, B.Sc., Hons. (Zoology) (m)           | ..            | 6-38 ..        | 1-7-63 ..         | 1-7-63              |                                       |
| J. de Vries, B.Sc., Hons. (Zoology) (m)           | ..            | 2-4-18 ..      | 22-4-64 ..        | 22-4-64             |                                       |
| A. D. Onyia, B.Sc., Hons. (Zoology) (m)           | ..            | 5-7-37 ..      | 3-4-56 ..         | 13-7-64             |                                       |
| G. A. Igonifagha, B.Sc., Hons. (Zoology) (m)      | ..            | 18-7-37 ..     | 2-7-56 ..         | 7-1-66              |                                       |
| 2 Vacancies                                       |               |                |                   |                     |                                       |
| <b>Master Fisherman Grade 1</b>                   | 1             |                |                   |                     | <b>Scale C(T) 2, 3, 4, 5</b>          |
| G. S. Kinnaird (m)                                | ..            | 1-4-25 ..      | 12-8-63 ..        | 12-8-63             |                                       |
| <b>Master Fisherman Grade II</b>                  | 1             |                |                   |                     |                                       |
| Vacant                                            |               |                |                   |                     |                                       |
| <b>Engineering Officer</b>                        | 2             |                |                   |                     | <b>Scale C(T) 2, 3, 4, 5</b>          |
| E. W. Mudd (m)                                    | ..            | 4-2-05 ..      | 28-9-62 ..        | 28-9-62             |                                       |
| 1 Vacancy                                         |               |                |                   |                     |                                       |
| <b>Technical Officers</b>                         | 2             |                |                   |                     | <b>Scale C(T) 2, 3, 4, 5</b>          |
| S. A. Wokoma (m)                                  | ..            | 25-1-25 ..     | 23-4-45 ..        | 3-8-59              |                                       |
| T. E. Aggo (m)                                    | ..            | 27-9-29 ..     | 13-3-50 ..        | 1-4-60              |                                       |
| <b>Assistant Technical Officer</b>                | 1             |                |                   |                     | <b>Scale C(T) Training 1, 2</b>       |
| 1 Vacancy                                         |               |                |                   |                     |                                       |

Notes: Page from the 1966 civil service staff list showing the civil servant's name, department, date of birth, start date, first appointment, salary scale and other information.

easy to determine the ethnicity of an individual given their name. For instance, Efiiong is unambiguously an Ibibio name, Oladipo is a Yoruba name, Babagana is a Hausa/Fulani name, Okonkwo is an Igbo name. For Nigerians, the overlap between ethnic names is relatively low. That is, there are very few names that are difficult to classify because they are often used by multiple ethnic groups. Most common names are easily ascribed to a group by the majority of people, and most Nigerians can easily make this ascription.

The research assistants coded the names of 55,000 civil servants which is the total number of names in the staff lists from 1928 to 1966. Of these names, about 12,000 are indigenous Nigerians based on the names recorded. The RAs assigned ethnicity to all of these names. After ethnicities are assigned, I met with the RAs together and we reconciled any differences in the classification of names. Many of these differences had to do with the classification of Nigerians with mixed English names.


I then group the civil servants into their respective state-groups. I do this because single large groups occupy multiple states and it is difficult to assign states to individuals. For instance the Yoruba people can be found in Ekiti, Kwara, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, and Oyo states. They are also a minority in Kogi and Edo states. For smaller groups, their presence may be confined to one state, hence assignment to a state is easier. For instance, the Nupe and Urhobo are found almost exclusively in Niger, and Delta states respectively. Since ethnicity in Nigeria overlaps nearly perfectly with geography, it is relatively easy group ethnic groups into states so we can match it to public projects data which are location based.

Figure 9 shows the states the civil servants were classified into. The state groups are directly derived from the geographic location of ethnic groups in Nigeria since it overlaps with geography in Nigeria. Figure 10 shows the geographical location of various ethnic groups across the country. For instance, while the state group map groups most of Northern Nigeria together under the header Hausa/Fulani, this group also includes the Kanuri, Shua Arabs, Gwari, and other minority ethnic groups in Northern Nigeria. The header Efik/Ibibio includes all Ekoi, Elagham and others, Ijaw includes the Kalabari, and Ikwere, and so on.

Incidentally, these state-groups classification roughly maps unto Nigerian regions at independence. From 1963 - 1967, the states shaded in grey (excluding Kwara, the northernmost grey shaded state adjacent to the state shaded in red) made up the western region which is predominantly Yoruba, along with the purple shaded areas where the Bini, Urhobo, Itshekiri have historically have resided. The states shaded in green are predominantly Ijaw and Ikwere, the pink shaded states are Igbo, and yellow shaded states which are made up of Ibibio, Efik, and some minority groups made up the Eastern region. Finally, the states shaded in orange are predominantly Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri with a host of minority ethnic groups, states shaded in blue are Biron, Ngas, Eggon and other minority groups including the Hausa and Fulanis, teal states are predominantly Jukun, Tiv, Idoma and other minority ethnic groups, and red shaded state, home to the Igala and Igbirra, made up the Northern region.

I produce a measure of how much of the civil service as a whole state-groups occupy. These measures are comparable to the measures developed by the Federal Character Commission described above. This measure shows the embeddedness level of each group in the entire service. Because the names of agencies have changed frequently from 1966 to 1999, it is difficult to match MDAs across time. The

Figure 9: Map of Nigeria showing State Groups



*Notes: Map of Nigeria showing the state-groups the ethnic names are assigned to. State groupings are necessary in this paper since the outcome variables are measured at the state level and the two sets of data need to be reconciled.*

*Notes: Map of Nigeria showing the location of ethnic groups. The state-group assignment maps onto this map to reconcile the independent and dependent concepts of interest. Source: Library of Congress*

changes from 1999 through 2017 are reconcilable and thus it is easy to track civil servants and their respective agencies during this period. Thus, I match state-groups across time only and not also across MDAs between the archival and Federal character commission datasets.

### 3 Historical Embeddedness Predicts Contemporary Embeddedness

Having merged the archival data with the Federal character commission data, I then explore the relationship between the historical level of embeddedness of state-groups within the civil service to their contemporary level of embeddedness. This paper explores how education, ethnic networks, and colonial employment policies led to the over representation in the service today of groups that were first incorporated into the civil service.

My dependent variable is the average of the embeddedness measures by state-group for all the years 1928 - 1960 as well as pre and post 1960/independence periods. My independent variable is the level of embeddedness in 1997 and 1999 pooled. The N for this estimation is small because the data use here is based on the state-groups and not states since the historical data cannot be transformed into state level data. I fit this simple OLS equation below and table 5 shows the results.

$$Embed_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \overline{HistEmbed_i} + \epsilon$$

Where  $Embed_i$  is the level of embeddedness of state-group  $i$  in the entire civil service in time  $t$ . Time is either 1999 or 1997 and they are pooled.  $\overline{HistEmbed_i}$  is the average level of embeddedness state  $i$  has in the civil service in the periods 1928 to 1966, pre 1960, and post 1960 periods. Finally,  $\epsilon$  captures the error term.

Panel A of Table 5 suggests that state-groups that are highly embedded in the civil service for the pre independence period and the whole historical period are **less** likely to be represented in the civil in the 90s. However, column 3 suggests that state-groups more embedded in the post-independence period are **more** likely to be well represented in the 90s. These conflicting results suggest that there is another piece of the embeddedness puzzle for the pre-independence period.

Panel A shows results for the entire civil service, which includes many non-Nigerians who are not present in large numbers after independence. That is, prior to independence, the Nigerian bureaucracy employed large numbers of British colonists. After independence, British residents left Nigeria in large numbers. So, what Columns 1 and 2 tell us is that British civil servants were less likely to be represented in the civil service in later years. I subset the data to include only indigenous Nigerians and re-run the regression. These results suggest that state-groups that are more embedded in all historical periods are more likely to be well represented in the 90s. This means that those Nigerian state-groups that got into the civil service in early have an advantage on representation over those that entered later.

These data offer powerful evidence that bureaucratic embeddedness is related to previous levels of embeddedness. This suggests that bureaucrats may have some autonomy in deciding who else gets to be a bureaucrat. In other work, I show that

Table 5: Historical Bureaucratic Embeddedness predicts Contemporary Embeddedness

| <b>Panel A: All Civil Servants</b>           |                       |                       |                     |
|----------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| Embeddedness in 90s                          | All                   | Pre-Independence      | Post-Independence   |
| Average Embeddedness                         | −0.001***<br>(0.0002) | −0.001***<br>(0.0002) | 0.004**<br>(0.001)  |
| Observations                                 | 20                    | 20                    | 20                  |
| R <sup>2</sup>                               | 0.131                 | 0.155                 | 0.276               |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>                      | 0.083                 | 0.108                 | 0.236               |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 18)                | 0.078                 | 0.077                 | 0.072               |
| F Statistic (df = 1; 18)                     | 2.709                 | 3.303*                | 6.855**             |
| <b>Panel B: Only Nigerian Civil Servants</b> |                       |                       |                     |
| Embeddedness in 90s                          | All                   | Pre-Independence      | Post-Independence   |
| Average Embeddedness                         | 0.029***<br>(0.006)   | 0.062***<br>(0.013)   | 0.005***<br>(0.001) |
| Observations                                 | 18                    | 18                    | 18                  |
| R <sup>2</sup>                               | 0.603                 | 0.598                 | 0.585               |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>                      | 0.579                 | 0.573                 | 0.559               |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 16)                | 0.051                 | 0.051                 | 0.052               |
| F Statistic (df = 1; 16)                     | 24.353***             | 23.799***             | 22.550***           |

*Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Average levels of embeddedness for both the dependent and independent variables range from 0 to 1. In column 1, the independent variable covers the whole historical period, in column 2 focuses on pre 1960 period, while the last column shows results for post colonial period from 1960 to 1966. \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .*

bureaucrats staff the civil service from within their networks to maintain their proportions within the service.

## 4 Bureaucratic Embeddedness, Politicians, and Constituency Projects

Bureaucratic embeddedness is determined by historical legacies which are the direct result of Colonial hiring policies.<sup>15</sup> Embeddedness itself has consequences for contemporary outcomes like local public goods provisions. Next, I explore how embeddedness influences the quality of public goods accessible to citizens.

In Nigeria, politicians in the National legislature - senators, and members of the house of representatives - have the ability to bring public goods projects to their constituencies. This is done through constituency projects. Typically, a legislator identifies a project that they think will benefit their constituency, they then nominate that project for the national yearly budget to be implemented by an MDA. Politicians may choose to monitor the implementation of said project through the MDA. [Awofeso and Irabor \(2020\)](#) argue that legislators do not generally monitor the implementation of such projects and leave this to the purview of civil servants.

Like other countries such as Kenya ([Harris and Posner 2019](#)), Nigeria sets aside funds each year as part of its budget for the provision of public goods by legislators. Constituency projects in Nigeria are implemented by the civil service and are subject to national budget constraints. Technically, politicians do not provide more to the implementation of constituency projects besides nominating them, but they can claim credit for the project and be rewarded by their constituents through reelection. I assume bureaucrats' role in the allocation of projects to constituencies is greatly diminished by the fact that politicians themselves nominate the projects and as such are firmly in charge of the allocation decision of these projects.

For data on constituency projects, I turn to Tracka, a platform from Budgit - an organization in Nigeria interested in accountability in government public goods provisions. Since 2015, Budgit has tracked constituency projects and published reports on their activities on their website. I use data from the 2017 report as it tracks more states compared to the previous years. In this year, it tracked projects in 20 of the 36 states in Nigeria. The states tracked are shown in Figure 11.

Keep in mind that I only use a cross section of data in this study due to availability. It is not possible for me to observe the eventual completion of any of the projects that are uncompleted given the data I have. Thus it is possible that these projects get completed in the future but are not observed here. Tracka reports for each year only show the projects allocated that year the reports were released to it is not easy to monitor one project across time through this data.<sup>16</sup>


Tracka data is collected in the following ways. Firstly, the Tracka team monitors

<sup>15</sup>See wp on state building for more info on how colonial policies create the historical legacies.

<sup>16</sup>In reading through the reports and converting them to a manipulatable dataset, I did come across a few projects that were allocated in a previous year but not implemented. These projects were moved over from the previous budget to the budget of the year the report was made. That is, were projects are not completed or started in one year, politicians can nominate them for implementation in the next years budget thus making them approved projects for two separate years.

the government budget for all projects allocated to states. They also monitor the announcement of constituency projects included in the yearly budgets and record them in their on-line platform. On this on line platform, individuals who are members of communities where projects have been allocated can report on the implementation status of the project. Tracka also has teams of experts who track the constituency projects to the location they are to be delivered and report the implementation status of the project. These evaluations are published in their annual reports and are also included in the online database of constituency projects the team keeps.

Figure 11: Map of Nigeria showing States where Constituency Projects have been Tracked



*Notes: Map showing the states in Nigeria for which constituency project data was tracked and collected in 2017. This graphic is taken from the 2017 constituency project report released by Budgit.*

The data lists the projects nominated in each state that year. There is a detailed description of what is to be implemented by the project, the cost of the project, its location (town, state, and constituency) and how much of the project has been completed. The completion rate information is not coded as a continuous variable. Tracka records whether the project was started, abandoned, not started, ongoing or in progress, could not be tracked due to location issues or other issues that prevent the evaluators from tracking the data.

I code the categorical completion rate into binary dependent variables thus: project started, project started and completed, project started and ongoing and project started and abandoned. I regress these dependent variables on the embeddedness measures

from 1999. I remove from my analysis all projects with tracking issues as it is difficult to say if they were started or not and this may cause bias to the results if they are coded improperly.<sup>17</sup> Thus, I am left with about 900 out of the 1200 projects tracked that year.

I expect that the higher the level of embeddedness a state has in an MDA, the less likely their projects are to be started, completed, or ongoing. I also expect that higher levels of embeddedness would increase the likelihoods of the project being abandoned after it has been started. I fit the following linear probability model:

$$Complete_{ij} = \alpha + \beta Embed_{99ij} + \gamma \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon$$

Where  $Completion_{ij}$  is the binary indicator of if the project has been completed, abandoned, started or is in progress for a project allocated to state  $i$  by MDA  $j$ .  $Embed_{99ij}$  is the level of embeddedness state  $i$  has in MDA  $j$  in 1999.  $\mathbf{X}$  is a vector of covariates that influence group  $i$ 's project completion rate and their level of embeddedness across all MDAs. These include, the logged population of the state in 2016, indicators for whether the president is from that state, the party alignment between the president and the governor in that state, and the number of legislative representatives they state has.  $\epsilon$  captures the error term clustered at the MDA and State level. Results are displayed in Table 6.

Table 6: Bureaucratic Embeddedness and Constituency Projects

|                                | Project Completion Status |                     |                   |                  |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|------------------|
|                                | Pr(start)                 | Pr(complete)        | Pr(ongoing)       | Pr(abandon)      |
|                                | (1)                       | (2)                 | (3)               | (4)              |
| Embeddedness                   | -1.796***<br>(0.630)      | -1.453**<br>(0.612) | -0.343<br>(0.588) | 0.165<br>(0.145) |
| Covariates                     | Y                         | Y                   | Y                 | Y                |
| Observations                   | 994                       | 994                 | 994               | 994              |
| R <sup>2</sup>                 | 0.012                     | 0.011               | 0.015             | 0.002            |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>        | 0.008                     | 0.007               | 0.011             | -0.002           |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 989) | 0.484                     | 0.497               | 0.366             | 0.109            |
| F Statistic (df = 4; 989)      | 3.112**                   | 2.861**             | 3.766***          | 0.487            |

Notes: MDA and State clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Completion status are binary 0 or 1, and recorded in 2017. Embeddedness is from 1999 and is measured as a fraction ranging from 0 to 1. \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

It appears that as the level of embeddedness of a state in an MDA increases, the probability of constituency projects allocated to them starting or getting completed decreases. A one percent increase in the level of bureaucratic embeddedness of a

<sup>17</sup>All projects for which evaluators stated could not be tracked due to unspecified location in the project information they received are removed from my sample. So are any projects labeled "untracked" or "not yet tracked". Only data that have definite information on whether they have been started, abandoned, in progress or completed are included in my dataset.

group in an MDA on average decreases the probability that a project is started by 1.79 percent and the probability it is completed by 1.45 percent. I find no results for the probability the project would be ongoing or abandoned although the signs of the estimates are as expected. These results mirror those where historical embeddedness (average from all historical periods from the previous section) is substituted as the independent variable of interest as shown in the appendix.

Interestingly, the data does not capture the specific location of bureaucrats. This means that an embedded civil servant need only belong to a specific ethnic group and be associated with one of the 36 states in Nigeria or the Federal capital territory. So a civil servant from Kano may work from the capital- Abuja (the headquarters), or Ondo state. The negative results may be as a result of this civil servant working in their home state, the capital or any other state in the country. My analysis does not discriminate between any of the 3.

## 5 Bureaucratic Embeddedness and NEEDS Projects

Rasul and Rogger (2017) study how management practices influence the effective delivery of public projects in Nigeria. They do this using OPEN data on development projects approved under the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) plan in 2006 and 2007 (10 years prior to the constituency project data collection period). Their data consists of almost 5000 hand coded engineering assessments of the completion rates of each of the projects. Of the projects, I am only interested in those allocated to states and not national level programs that benefit the whole country. This means that, all projects for which their locations are recorded as "National" instead the name of one of the 36 states are removed from my sample. After removing national projects, I am left with just under 3000.<sup>18</sup>

The data contains information on the projects pertinent to this study such as the type of project (procurement or development project), the completion rate of the project and the location of the project. The completion rate of the projects is a continuous variable unlike with the constituency projects data.

**Allocation of Projects** To understand the relationship between the number of projects allocated to each state and the embeddedness of the state in the civil service, I collapse the data by state and MDA to capture the number of projects allocated to each state by an MDA. For some state-MDA pairings there are no projects. These observations are recorded as zeroes. I adjust the number of projects by the population of state since the range of values is very wide and can affect the interpretation of results. The dependent variable is therefore the number of projects per capita for each state-MDA observation. I expect that higher levels of bureaucratic embeddedness should lead to higher levels of projects per capita.

I expect bureaucrats to allocate as many projects as they can (if given the power) to states they belong to. My intuition here is simple, the more projects they allocate

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<sup>18</sup>I also code the parent ministry for all MDAs in the dataset to correspond with data from 1999. This means that all Federal Medical Centers will be coded as belonging to the Ministry of Health since they fall under its purview and the embeddedness variable is calculated at the overarching MDA level.

to their state, the more they can then expropriate from the resources allocated for the provision of such goods. I fit the following OLS model to test my expectations:

$$Number_{ij} = \alpha + \beta Embed_{99ij} + \gamma X_i + \epsilon$$

Where  $Number_{ij}$  is the number of projects per capita allocated to state  $i$  by MDA  $j$ . Like with the previous regression,  $Embed_{99ij}$  is the level of embeddedness state  $i$  has in MDA  $j$  in 1999.  $X$  is a vector of covariates that influence the number of projects allocated to group  $i$  and their level of embeddedness across all MDAs. Covariates for all models in this section include the project type i.e. procurement or development project, the level of representation in the federal legislature, the political party alignment between the state and the national executive, a binary variable capturing if the executive comes from that state and the log population of the state in 2006. Finally,  $\epsilon$  captures the error term clustered at the MDA and State level. All results are shown in Table 7.

Table 7: Bureaucratic Embeddedness and the Number of Public Projects Allocated

|                         | Number of Projects per Capita |                         |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
|                         | (1)                           | (2)                     |
| Embeddedness            | -2.093<br>(6.701)             | 9.346<br>(8.587)        |
| Covariates              | N                             | Y                       |
| Observations            | 314                           | 314                     |
| R <sup>2</sup>          | 0.001                         | 0.269                   |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | -0.002                        | 0.257                   |
| Residual Std. Error     | 2.082 (df = 312)              | 1.792 (df = 308)        |
| F Statistic             | 0.226 (df = 1; 312)           | 22.698*** (df = 5; 308) |

*Notes: MDA and State clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. The number of projects is adjusted by the population of the state to deal with the skewness of the measure. It is recorded in 2006/2007. Embeddedness is captured in 1999 and ranges from 0 to 1. \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .*

I do not find that bureaucrats play a significant role in the allocation of public projects to states. It may be the case that, politicians are in charge of who gets what. These projects were also approved by the Federal executive council which is made up of the president and his appointees.

**Completion Rate of Projects** I now turn to the completion rates of projects allocated to states by politicians. I expect that higher levels of embeddedness would produce lower completion rates of projects. To test this, I estimate the following equation using OLS:

$$Completion_{ij} = \alpha + \beta Embed_{99ij} + \gamma X_i + \epsilon$$

Where  $Completion_{ij}$  is the completion rate of projects allocated to state  $i$  by MDA  $j$ . Again,  $Embed_{9ij}$  is the level of embeddedness state  $i$  has in MDA  $j$  in 1999.  $\mathbf{X}$  is a vector of covariates that influence group  $i$ 's project completion rate and their level of embeddedness in any MDA.  $\epsilon$  captures the error term clustered at the MDA and State level.

Table 8: Bureaucratic Embeddedness and Public Projects Completion Rates

|                         | Project Completion Rate |                         |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
|                         | (1)                     | (2)                     |
| Embeddedness            | -0.297<br>(0.302)       | -0.745**<br>(0.353)     |
| Covariates              | N                       | Y                       |
| Observations            | 2,864                   | 2,864                   |
| R <sup>2</sup>          | 0.0004                  | 0.017                   |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.00001                 | 0.015                   |
| Residual Std. Error     | 0.430 (df = 2862)       | 0.427 (df = 2857)       |
| F Statistic             | 1.024 (df = 1; 2862)    | 8.222*** (df = 6; 2857) |

Notes: MDA and State clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Completion rate is a fraction between 0 and 1 and recorded in 2006/2007. Embeddedness is captured in 1999 and ranges from 0 to 1. \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table 8 shows that higher levels of bureaucratic embeddedness is indeed strongly related to lower project completion rates. States with higher levels of representation within the civil service are going to see lower completion rates of projects allocated to them compared to those with less representation. The size of this effect is large and worrisome. Column 2 suggests that a percentage increase in the level of embeddedness of a group in the civil service, decreases the completion rate of projects allocated to them by nearly 75 percent!

**Civil Servants Levels and Completion Rates** All civil servants are not created equal. Some may be more important for project completion than others. I thus divide bureaucrats into groups based on their grade levels as outlined in the civil service handbook. The Nigerian civil service has 17 grade levels and permanent secretaries above these levels. Grade levels 1 through 6 are junior level staff, grade levels 7 through 14 are senior level or executive level staff who can take some decisions and are supervised by director level staff who start at grade level 15 upwards. I thus divide civil servants across MDAs into these 3 groupings in the 1999 data and estimate the previous equation again with the embeddedness variable broken down thus.

$$Completion_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 Junior_{99ij} + \beta_2 Senior_{99ij} + \beta_3 Director_{99ij} + \gamma \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon$$

Where  $Completion_{ij}$  is the completion rate of projects allocated to state  $i$  by MDA  $j$ .  $Junior_{99ij}$ ,  $Senior_{99ij}$ , and  $Director_{99ij}$  represent the level of embeddedness at junior, senior, and director levels that state  $i$  has in MDA  $j$  in 1999.  $\mathbf{X}$  is a vector of covariates that influence group  $i$ 's project completion rate and their level of embeddedness across all MDAs.  $\epsilon$  captures the error term clustered at the MDA and State level.

Table 9: Bureaucrat's Level and Completion rate of Public Projects

|                         | Completion Rates of Projects |                         |
|-------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|
|                         | (1)                          | (2)                     |
| Junior                  | 0.850***<br>(0.302)          | 0.823**<br>(0.324)      |
| Senior                  | -0.651**<br>(0.267)          | -0.612**<br>(0.282)     |
| Director                | -0.074<br>(0.114)            | -0.137<br>(0.112)       |
| Covariates              | N                            | Y                       |
| Observations            | 2,864                        | 2,864                   |
| R <sup>2</sup>          | 0.004                        | 0.019                   |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.003                        | 0.016                   |
| Residual Std. Error     | 0.430 (df = 2860)            | 0.427 (df = 2855)       |
| F Statistic             | 4.113*** (df = 3; 2860)      | 6.916*** (df = 8; 2855) |

Notes: MDA and State clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Completion status are binary 0 or 1 and recorded in 2006/2007. Embeddedness is measured as a fraction ranging from 0 to 1. \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

The results indicate that senior civil servants are bad for the completion rates of public goods projects. States with high level of embeddedness in the civil service at the senior level are going to see lower completion rates of projects allocated them. One percent increase in the number of senior civil servants in an MDA from a group on average decreases the completion rates of projects by more than 60 percent! This effect is huge and consistent with the previous findings in this paper. Senior civil servants can make decisions and have the opportunity to misappropriate funds from their MDAs.

The opposite is true for junior civil servants however, as they seem to increase the level of project completion for projects allocated to their states. An increase in the embeddedness level on junior civil servants from a group in an MDA is associated with an increase in completion rates of projects by over 80 percent! Junior civil servants do not have much opportunity to misappropriate funds. They are not given the decision making powers and as such have to do their jobs right. With good job performance, they can be promoted to senior positions where the opportunity for

corruption is greater. They therefore have the incentive to do the right thing because of future opportunities.

Alternatively, it has been argued that politicians give low skilled positions to their supporters (Brierley 2021) who may have incentives to complete the projects allocated to their states and given that their junior status may allow little opportunity of corruption. In this sense, patronage may be good for efficient public goods provision (Torral 2021), unfortunately junior civil servants do not have the power to drive these projects to completion.

## 6 Discussion

The finding that bureaucrats decrease access to quality public goods to certain groups is in line with Slough (2020). The mechanisms however differ greatly. Taken together, the results display a bleak picture for groups that are over represented within the Nigerian bureaucracy. Conventional wisdom dictates that members of the same group should want to cooperate with each other to obtain public goods. It should follow that having a member of the group in a place that gives them power to provide such goods should be a good thing for the entire group. However, this paper suggests that the opposite is in fact true. Over representation of co-ethnics is bad for the provision of public goods in Nigeria. Nigerians it appears are more likely, to expropriate resources meant for their co-ethnics than they would those meant for non co-ethnics.

I have argued that co-ethnicity breeds trust and thus a sense of familiarity that does not encourage accountability whereas distrust of non co-ethnics encourages scrutiny of the work they do. Groups and politicians alike may be more willing to sanction bureaucrats who are not members of their group than they would members of their group even when such members are more corrupt than the out group bureaucrat. This may make sense on some level, but why do groups or politicians not care enough to do sanction bureaucrats when they expropriate resources since it leads to worse outcomes for the group? This is puzzling and should be studied in future work.

One reason bureaucrats may not be forced to complete public projects and desist from corrupt practices with regards to their jobs may be that citizens in Nigeria do not have enough information about government projects and how they are implemented. For instance, reading through the Tracka reports, I find that the frequency of citizens owning up to not knowing that a project was allocated to them was very high. Even when some of these projects were completed and in use, some citizens in the area were still not aware the project existed. Some projects were also unable to be tracked because of this same reason. It could be that politicians do not advertise some of the projects they nominate for their constituents during non election years. Politicians may be more likely to broadcast the projects they give their constituents during election years instead. Since 2017 was not an election year, this may be probable. Further investigation into why constituents may not have any idea of projects allocated to them is necessary to understand this.

While the results show that levels of representation in the civil service matters for public projects completion, it is interesting that levels of embeddedness in 1999 are

important for projects allocated in 2007 and even 2017! what is even more striking is that historical average of embeddedness is also important for predicting public project completion in recent times! Understanding why this historical legacy still influences outcomes today is crucial to the country's development since many policies have been enacted and implemented to ensure equitable distribution of resources across groups and geographical locations in the country. It may be worth a try codifying and taking the Federal character principle in hiring civil servants seriously may be beneficial to the quality of public goods citizens receive in Nigeria.

The pessimistic conclusions from this chapter mirror that in [Kasara \(2007\)](#), where the author finds that as politicians get better at monitoring local intermediaries in their core constituency, they get more emboldened to tax agricultural productivity from that place. Here, where bureaucrats represent a group in the bureaucracy, they know the group may not get access to the agency except through them, and so take advantage of the situation by expropriating resources meant for the completion of projects allocated to their group. It may also be the case that the group is just satisfied by having their own in the civil service that they do not hold them accountable when they fail to perform.

## Part V

# Representative Bureaucracy and Citizen Perception of Government Performance

## 1 Introduction

If the level of representation of a group within the bureaucracy influences the completion rate of the public goods projects these groups are represented, then it is interesting to know what represented groups think of government agencies. In this chapter I tackle this using survey data from the Afrobarometer.

I argued that the higher the levels of representation a group has within the civil service, the more favorable the perception members of that group will have for the civil service. I also argued that on the flipside, members of such a highly embedded group are more likely to have unfavorable opinions of the government itself and be dissatisfied with how they handle various issues in the country.

I find that respondents from highly represented groups have less contact with government agencies and agents. They are more likely to view government agents as not corrupt but more likely to be disappointed with the way the government handles corruption in the country. Those whose groups are highly embedded in the civil service are also less likely to be satisfied with how the government handles other issues such as the economy, inflation, crime, inequality and job creation. I present these data and results in the next section and discuss them in the section after that.

## 2 Data and Results

As with the previous two chapters, I rely on historical data on the composition of the civil service obtained from the National archives in Kaduna and discussed previously. The measure of historical bureaucratic embeddedness is the mean of the measure of bureaucratic embeddedness used in the Chapter III. This captures the historical average level of representation of each ethnic group within the Nigerian civil service. This is the independent variable of interest in this chapter as with the the previous two chapters.

Survey data from Afrobarometer is used to study how ordinary people in Nigeria, interact with, and perceive government agencies and how they carry out their duties. The Afrobarometer conducts surveys across a number of African countries. In each round, they ask individuals their opinions on democracy, the ruling and opposition parties and the performance of their government among other questions. Here, I am interested in questions on individuals interaction with government agencies and agents and their satisfaction with how the government handles key issues in the country.

I use data for only Nigerian respondents for rounds 3 , 4, 5, and 6 which were

conducted in the years 2005, 2008, 2013, and 2015. I recode all ethnicities and states to corresponding Nigerian groups and states for all respondents as they are numerically coded. Respondents who do not belong to Nigerian ethnic groups are removed from the sample. The data contains over 6000 respondents. Analysis may be done on less respondents in cases where respondents refuse to answer questions asked.

**Contact with government** I have argued that individuals from groups that are highly represented in the civil service base their perception of the civil service based in part by their interaction with co-ethnic civil servants. It is important to understand how much interaction they have with civil servants. Survey questions on how much contact individuals have had with civil servants exist although not in the exact context ideal for answering this question. The Afrobarometer asks the respondents the following:

("During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views: An official of a government agency?")

Respondents can respond with Never, Only once, A few times, or Often. Those that say they do not know and those who refuse to answer are dropped from the analysis. Figure 12 shows the distribution of responses. We can see that not a huge portion of the respondents have had any contact with civil servants.

While this question is useful for understanding contact with civil servants, it places the contact in the context of obtaining help from the government agents rather than in a more social capacity where individuals interact with each other as co-ethnics. However, this may still be useful to understanding interactions between respondents and civil servants.

Table 10 column 1 shows the results for the following linear probability model:

$$Contact_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \overline{HistEmbed_i} + \epsilon$$


Where  $\overline{HistEmbed_i}$  is the average level of embeddedness of group  $i$  in agency  $j$  in the period 1928 to 1966.  $Contact_i$  is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the respondent has contacted government agencies even once.  $\epsilon$  is the error term. The results show that those respondents from groups that are highly embedded in the bureaucracy are less likely to have had contact with government agents. In fact, as the level of embeddedness increases, the less the likelihood of contact with government agencies.

**How corrupt are government officials** I expect that respondents from groups that are highly represented in the civil service are going to view civil servants favorably. This means that they are less likely to see civil servants as corrupt. I test this expectation here. In the Afrobarometer survey, respondents are asked:

*How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Government Officials?.*

Responses are None, Some of them, Most of them, All of them,. Figure 12 shows the distribution of the responses. We can see that most of the respondents view at least some government agents as corrupt.

Figure 12: Contact with, and Perception of Corruption of Government Agents



*Notes: Distribution of survey responses ranging from 0 to 3. Data from Afrobarometer Rounds 3 to 6.*

I fit the following linear probability model:

$$Corrupt_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \overline{HistEmbed}_i + \epsilon$$

Where  $\overline{HistEmbed}_i$  is the average level of embeddedness of group  $i$  in agency  $j$  in the period 1928 to 1966.  $Corrupt_i$  is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the respondent thinks that at least some of the government agents are corrupt.  $\epsilon$  is the error term. Table 10 column 2 shows the results. The results suggest that higher levels of embeddedness is associated with decreased perception of corruption of civil servants.

Table 10: Representative Bureaucracy and Contact with and Corruption Government

|                         | <i>Contact with and perception of Government Agents</i> |                        |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|
|                         | Contact Government                                      | Government Corruption  |
|                         | (1)                                                     | (2)                    |
| Embeddedness            | −0.001***<br>(0.0002)                                   | −0.0003***<br>(0.0001) |
| Observations            | 6,179                                                   | 6,011                  |
| R <sup>2</sup>          | 0.045                                                   | 0.005                  |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.043                                                   | 0.003                  |

Note: \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

Notes: Ethnicity and Round clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Afrobarometer rounds 3 to 6 are pooled together for a sample size of about 6000 respondents. Embeddedness is an aggregate measure of all historical embeddedness for each group from 1928 to 1966, and ranges from 0 to 1.. \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01.

**Paid bribe to government agents** Additionally, I test to see how representation in the bureaucracy affects the difficulty respondents face in obtaining government services. Afrobarometer respondents are asked:

*In the past year, how often, if ever, have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor to government officials in order to:*


Individuals respond with never, once or twice, a few times, or often. Again, those who do not respond or have no knowledge about the question are dropped from the analysis. Figure 13 shows the responses to questions on bribe payment to obtain certain government services. I recode the categorical variables into dummy variables 1 for if they have ever paid bribes, and 0 for where they have never paid bribes.

I fit the following linear probability model:

$$Bribe_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \overline{HistEmbed}_i + \epsilon$$

Where  $\overline{HistEmbed}_i$  is the average level of embeddedness of group  $i$  in agency  $j$  in the period 1928 to 1966.  $Bribe_i$  is a dummy variable taking the value of one if

Figure 13: Paid bribe to Government Agents



*Notes: Distribution of survey responses ranging from 0 to 3, 7 means they do not know enough to answer the question. Data from Afrobarometer Rounds 3 to 6.*

the respondent has paid a bribe to obtain a service at least once.  $\epsilon$  is the error term. Table 10 column 2 shows the results. I obtain null results for most of the estimates on bribe payment to obtain government services save for paying bribes to the police. Those respondents belonging to groups that are highly embedded in the civil service are less likely to report paying bribes to the police. This is fascinating as it suggests that representation in the civil service allows respondents to escape the burden of bribing the Nigerian police which is quite notorious for exploiting the ordinary man. This could mean that highly embedded civil servants shield their co-ethnics from the exploitative nature of the police.

Table 11: Representative Bureaucracy and Paying Bribes for Government Services

|                         | <i>Ever paid Bribe</i> |                     |                    |                      |                       |
|-------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
|                         | School                 | Hospital            | Ids                | HH Services          | Police                |
|                         | (1)                    | (2)                 | (3)                | (4)                  | (5)                   |
| Embeddedness            | 0.0002<br>(0.0003)     | 0.00001<br>(0.0003) | 0.0002<br>(0.0002) | -0.00003<br>(0.0002) | -0.001***<br>(0.0002) |
| Observations            | 4,062                  | 4,115               | 6,158              | 6,156                | 6,152                 |
| R <sup>2</sup>          | 0.007                  | 0.014               | 0.024              | 0.014                | 0.031                 |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.005                  | 0.012               | 0.022              | 0.013                | 0.030                 |

*Note:*

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

*Notes: Ethnicity and Round clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Afrobarometer rounds 3 to 6 are pooled together for a sample size of about 6000 respondents. Embeddedness is an aggregate measure of all historical embeddedness for each group from 1928 to 1966, and ranges from 0 to 1. \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .*


**Satisfaction with Government Performance** Finally, to understand how representation within the civil service influences individuals satisfaction with government performance, we turn to survey questions that ask respondents if they approve or disapprove of how the government handles certain issues in the country. There are no questions in the Afrobarometer that outright asks respondents if they are satisfied with the government in general, but these battery of questions are useful for understanding how individuals view the government over a spectrum of their responsibilities. The question asks:

*How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: .*

The respondents respond with Very badly, Fairly badly, Fairly well, and Very well. Some refuse to answer or say they do not know. They are removed from the sample. Individuals respond to a range of such questions on the economy, jobs, inequality, inflation, crime and corruption service provision in health care, public schools, water and sanitation. Figure 14 shows the range of responses for various questions on satisfaction with government performance. The responses are converted from or-

dered categorical to binary variables. Very badly and fairly badly are coded as 0s and fairly well and very well are coded as 1s.

Figure 14: Satisfaction with Government Performance



Notes: Distribution of survey responses ranging from 0 to 3, 7 means they do not know enough to answer the question. Data from Afrobarometer Rounds 3 to 6.

I fit the following linear probability model to estimate the association between embeddedness and satisfaction with government performance:

$$Satisfaction_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \overline{HistEmbed}_i + \epsilon$$

Where  $\overline{HistEmbed}_i$  is the average level of embeddedness of group  $i$  in agency  $j$  in the period 1928 to 1966.  $Satisfaction_i$  is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the respondent thinks the government performed fairly well, or very well.  $\epsilon$  is the error term. Table 10 column 2 shows the results. The results suggest that higher

Table 12: Representative Bureaucracy and Satisfaction with Government Performance

| Satisfaction with Government Performance |                       |                       |                       |                       |                    |                     |                     |                       |                      |
|------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
|                                          | Economy               | Job                   | Inflation             | Inequality            | Crime              | Health              | Education           | Water                 | Corruption           |
|                                          | (1)                   | (2)                   | (3)                   | (4)                   | (5)                | (6)                 | (7)                 | (8)                   | (9)                  |
| Embeddedness                             | -0.001***<br>(0.0002) | -0.001***<br>(0.0002) | -0.001***<br>(0.0002) | -0.001***<br>(0.0002) | 0.0004<br>(0.0003) | -0.0004<br>(0.0003) | -0.001*<br>(0.0003) | -0.001***<br>(0.0002) | 0.001***<br>(0.0003) |
| Observations                             | 6,155                 | 6,148                 | 6,158                 | 6,121                 | 6,138              | 6,157               | 6,151               | 6,155                 | 6,122                |
| R <sup>2</sup>                           | 0.012                 | 0.008                 | 0.013                 | 0.010                 | 0.005              | 0.006               | 0.006               | 0.010                 | 0.009                |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>                  | 0.010                 | 0.006                 | 0.011                 | 0.008                 | 0.003              | 0.005               | 0.005               | 0.008                 | 0.008                |

*Note:*

\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

*Notes: Ethnicity and Round clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Afrobarometer rounds 3 to 6 are pooled together for a sample size of about 6000 respondents. Embeddedness is an aggregate measure of all historical embeddedness for each group from 1928 to 1966, and ranges from 0 to 1. \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01.*

levels of embeddedness is associated with decreased perception of corruption of civil servants.

Table 12 shows the results from a linear probability model for the association between historical representation in the civil service and satisfaction with how the government deals with various issues. The results largely show that higher levels of representation in the civil service is associated with decreased approval of how the government handle most issues. For those with historically higher levels of representation in the civil service are less likely to be satisfied with the way the government handles the Economy, Job creation, Inflation, Inequality, Education, Water/sanitation and corruption in the country.

### **3 Discussion**

It is interesting that individuals from groups that are highly represented in government view government agents as less corrupt but are also dissatisfied with how the government handles corruption. This means that individuals differentiate between government agents and the government itself. It could be that they associate government agents with their own co-ethnics and see them as incorruptible while they view the government as elected officials who are doing nothing to tackle corruption.

I find no results for paying bribes for government services. This could be because some of these services are not provided directly by the government. For instance, there is a plethora of private schools and hospitals such that individuals who encounter issues with the public providers can take their business to the private providers of such services. Thus they do not need to pay bribes to access the public services when they can get it hassle free in the private market.

## Part VI

# Discussion and Conclusion

## 1 Contribution

This dissertation contributes to literature in many ways. I show that colonial hiring patterns produce inequality in representation within the post colonial civil service. I argue that this is the result of precolonial institutions and education as well as colonial policies that attached the attainment of western style education as a prerequisite to obtaining colonial civil service employment. These inequalities are not easily changed even after policies are introduced to address the ills of such hiring patterns. The consequences of the persistence of these patterns are twofold.

Firstly, inequality in representation in the service influences the workings of the civil service. Those that are highly represented are more likely to have civil servants that are corrupt because they cannot be held accountable. These corrupt civil servants are responsible for the implementation of local public projects which they do not provide adequately. This work has found that states with higher levels of representation in the Nigerian Federal Civil Service are less likely to see public projects allocated to them completed. The completion rates of all Federal projects including constituency projects is less for highly embedded groups than other groups.

Secondly, groups that are highly embedded in the civil service are less likely to think positively about the performance of the government on a host of economic, social, and political issues. It appears that since these groups are highly embedded, they are more likely to know someone who is a corrupt civil servant and they transfer their experience with this group member to the rest of the government agency. Thus, their opinion of government is colored by their experience with it and the poor public goods delivery they experienced.

This dissertation contributes to the literature on the persistence of the implications of colonial policy. It also contributes to our understanding of the bureaucracy, how it is staffed and how the composition of its staff changes. This work also adds to the literature on representation, inequality and its consequence on public goods provision.

## 2 Future Research

Future research can investigate the mechanism behind individuals negative perception of government performance when they are highly represented within government agencies. In the previous chapter, I argued that individuals perceived government negatively due to their experience with group members who are members of the civil service. While the results show that highly represented respondents were more likely to be less satisfied with the performance of the government, the chapter has not analyzed exactly through what mechanism this comes about. I have alluded that this could be based on two reasons. It could also be that they have experience with incomplete projects and so their approval of the governments performance is

tired to this. They attribute this incompetence with project implementation to the Federal government and thus their approval of government performance decreases.

However, this work has not tested this mechanism adequately. While I have shown that there higher representation in the bureaucracy is associated with decreased satisfaction with government performance on select issues, I have not shown how this association is produced. I think this is an interesting relationship to explore in the future, how attribution of public goods provision influences satisfaction with goods provision in the presence of possible interaction with bureaucrats who actually provide these services inadequately.

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### **3 Appendix**