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Are These Truths Self-Evident?  
Language, Culture and Human Rights in the U.S. and China

by

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Spring 2003

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Language, Culture and Human Rights in the U.S. and China**

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**Jason Daniel Patent**

Abstract

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Doctor of Philosophy in Linguistics

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Eve E. Sweetser, Chair

American advocates of international human rights often assume that the notion of human rights is somehow “universal,” or understood in the same way across all linguistic and cultural communities. Critics of this view often resort to universalism’s logical opposite, radical relativism, which holds that no concepts are stable across cultures. Strong universalist and relativist claims tend to be *a priori*.

What is missing is empirical investigation. Cognitive linguistics offers useful tools for such an investigation. In this study, *human rights* is treated as a complex cultural category which can only be understood through underlying *cultural models* of what a human is: cultural expectations of how humans do and should behave, especially with respect to societal institutions such as the family and the state. The category *human*

*rights* is compared to its closest Chinese counterpart, *rénquán*, in a similar way: by unpacking the underlying Chinese cultural models.

What emerge are two complex systems of cultural models that serve as the basis for the differences and similarities between *human rights* and *rénquán*. Awareness of these differences points the way not only toward a deeper understanding of how these two cultural categories are related, but also to some deeply important aspects of American and Chinese culture. This can facilitate better cross-cultural communication about any number of issues.

## **Dedication**

I dedicate this dissertation to my two lovely ladies: to Colette, fellow traveler, playmate and partner in crime; and to Mariette, my muse in a cradle.

## Acknowledgments

I had no idea what I was doing applying to the Berkeley Linguistics department. I knew I was interested in language, and that I wanted to stay in the Bay Area. Things worked out, and only after I accepted the admissions offer did I start looking into what the department was all about. What a find! I have had the amazing fortune of learning some of the finest and sharpest minds in Linguistics and Cognitive Science.

Let's start with Eve Sweetser, whose eye for detail and nose for lazy argumentation nothing escapes, and who is always eager to learn about new things. George Lakoff first planted in my mind the idea of this dissertation topic, and is the king of the Big Picture: I owe him the inspiration to bring in a broader range of ideas than I otherwise would have, as well as so many of the original findings about language on which the research for this dissertation is based. Other Linguistics Department faculty inspired me in my earlier years, long before I set upon this research: Chuck Fillmore, Paul Kay, John Ohala, and Jim Matisoff are foremost in my mind as linguists whose research and accomplishments "osmosed" into me in the form of inspiration to ask challenging questions and do good work.

My fellow graduate students helped me in so many ways. Kevin Moore in particular was great to talk things over with, as his curiosity is matched only by the

sharpness of the questions he asks. Pamela Morgan, whom I must have bumped into more than a hundred times over the years, was always full of great ideas and enthusiasm, as well as support. Melinda Chen offered excellent suggestions in the early stages of my research. Chris Johnson, Joe Grady and Matt Juge were role models for me in their mastery of their material. Paula Rogers was a great co-T.A. and fun lunch companion, always with a unique perspective. And Madelaine Plauche and Suzanne Wertheim are two of the fun-lovingest linguists in existence: thanks for the good times and for your friendship.

All my students over the years deserve my thanks as well, for asking tough questions and helping me understand Cognitive Linguistics so much more thoroughly.

The SF posse — my peeps — have for years kept my belly and other parts of me full of wonderful things both literal and metaphorical. Thank you!

It's been a great run, more than I ever could have hoped for ten years ago when I flailed my way into the oh-so special place known as the U.C. Berkeley Linguistics Department. No dead-end streets here; I'm finally at the finish line!



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## Chapter 1: Introduction

Say it along with me: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” Over 200 years after its promulgation, the Declaration of Independence is still held up as one of the clearest enunciations of the putative American fascination with, and respect for, rights.

America’s determination to promote its view of rights — in particular, human rights — is visible in many aspects of its foreign policy, and often creates tension with governments who are viewed by the U.S. as insufficiently respectful of human rights. It therefore behooves us to try to understand as thoroughly as possible what is meant by *human rights*, if for no other reason than to ensure that speakers of different languages and members of different cultures are talking with, not past, one another.

There are innumerable angles from which to approach the study of human rights. In this dissertation are findings from the angle of language and culture: What similarities and differences can we find in the way people from two different cultures, speaking two different languages, talk and reason about human rights? The cultures investigated here are, to speak broadly and in overly general terms, American culture and Chinese culture. The methods are those of cognitive linguistics and cognitive anthropology. In this chapter, I introduce the theoretical basics; I put them to work on a specific set of

language data; I explore the question of the relationship between language and culture; and I describe in detail how the research for this study was carried out.

### Theoretical basics

Obvious as it may be, it is easy to forget: as we go about our lives, we humans are constantly engaged in a deeply complex, unconscious process of linguistic understanding and interpretation. Sound, raw form, hits our eardrums and we are somehow able to make meaning out of what we hear. We also regularly do the reverse, somehow converting our thoughts and feelings into raw form. This “somehow” has, broadly speaking, been the subject of linguistic research for almost half a century, and of cognitive linguistics for over two decades.

The question of how culture and language interact is a natural one for cognitive linguistics, and is a central question in this dissertation. Cognitive linguistics is founded upon the notion of linguistic structure as only one type of conceptual structure — or, from the perspective of the researcher, as one window into conceptual structure. Conceptual structures are built up over time through bodily and social interactions in the world, and these are mediated through culture. Culture, then, as a crucial component of the shaping of conceptual structure, is also crucial in the shaping of linguistic structure, and becomes a legitimate area of inquiry for the linguist.

Exactly how language and culture relate to each other has been the topic of extensive research since at least Whorf. In the world of cognitive linguistics, some early insights came from Charles Fillmore in his work on *frame semantics* (see, e.g., Fillmore 1975; 1976; 1982; 1985), and have been elaborated upon by many researchers since Fillmore (see, esp., Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Sweetser 1990). Cognitive linguists have also recognized the value of interacting with scholars whose expertise is culture — namely anthropologists — and this collaboration has produced interesting findings (see Holland and Quinn 1987).

Our own experiences provide a form of confirmation of the interrelatedness of language and culture, especially when we move beyond the comfortable confines of our own language and culture. As a native speaker of American English, for instance, I have had the experience of listening to a BBC news broadcast, and understanding more or less everything being said, only to be jolted by a transition into sports news and reports of cricket matches: suddenly nothing at all makes sense, because cricket is not a part of my culture, and so the linguistic forms that convey meanings related to cricket are not a part of my linguistic repertoire.

The subject of inquiry then is the relationship between form and meaning. Some form-meaning correspondences are more culturally complex than others. The relatively concrete, universal referent of, say, *hand*, involves much less conceptual complexity than

the referent designated by the focus of this dissertation: *human rights*.<sup>1</sup> As we will see, the English phonological string /hju<sup>1</sup>mən raɪts/ is linked to a massively complex set of cultural models, as is its closest Chinese counterpart, /ɿən<sup>1</sup> tɕ<sup>h</sup>yan<sup>1</sup>/ (*rénquán*). The central task of this dissertation is to unpack the similarities and differences between these “corresponding” linguistic forms.

Some big questions are being raised here: Just how are language and culture related? How can linguistic data also be cultural data? What exactly is culture? There is no centralized place in this dissertation where these questions are fully answered. Instead, in this chapter I introduce some of the tools for investigating these questions; in subsequent chapters I apply the tools to interview data; and what hopefully emerges from all this is a better sense of the answers to these big questions.

Rather than try to describe the basic tools of cognitive linguistics in the abstract, in this section I first give brief (and severely oversimplified) introductions to the tools and then apply them an actual body of discourse: the affirmative action debate in the US. We will thus see how linguistic data can in fact be cultural data.

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<sup>1</sup> Even relatively "simple" words such as *hand*, though, can also vary in meaning in culturally-specific ways. This is due to well-studied processes of semantic change, which broaden words' meanings over time. Thus, in American English, to take just a few examples, *hand* can designate: the body part; a verb denoting use of the body part to transfer an object (*hand the child the ball*); a verb denoting metaphorical transfer (*hand him an excuse*); applause; assistance (*give me a hand with this work*); and so on.

We owe the notion of *frame* and the field of *frame semantics* to Charles Fillmore (Fillmore 1975; 1976; 1982; 1985). The basic intuition is that words are understood against larger structures of human experience and knowledge, which Fillmore calls *frames*. For instance, no one would understand the meaning of *waiter* without knowledge of how restaurants work; no one would understand *shortstop* without knowledge of baseball; etc. Frames are ways in which we go about structuring our experiences as humans, and provide categories — reflected in language — for our experiences.

A simple example of a frame is what has become known as the Commercial Transaction frame. In the frame are entities, and these entities are related to one another in frame-specific ways. In the (prototypical) Commercial Transaction frame, there is a buyer, a seller, goods and money. The frame begins with a particular scenario, or arrangement of entities: the seller possesses the goods, and the buyer possesses the money. Then the buyer and seller exchange the money and the goods. In the resulting scenario, the seller has the money and the buyer has the goods. In English, the words *buyer, seller, goods, money* and many others make sense only with reference to the Commercial Transaction Frame.

A frame such as Commercial Transaction is obviously cultural, especially in its presuppositions. For instance, the frame makes no sense without a money economy, the notion of monetary value, and culturally agreed-upon standards of value. Furthermore,



the frame will be enacted in culturally-specific ways. In some cultures, cash transactions predominate; in others, such as the United States, credit- or debit-card transactions may be the most common.

Frames interact with one another in complex ways. As a relatively basic frame, Commercial Transaction is embedded in many other frames: the Standard Restaurant frame, in which goods are provided and consumed, after which money is provided; the Fast Food Restaurant frame, in which money and goods are exchanged in close temporal proximity; various Shopping frames, in which goods are gathered up by the buyer and then paid for; and so forth.

A good question to ask is: where does it end? Where does the system “bottom out”? The answer is that its frames are ultimately grounded in the human body and basic bodily experience. The Commercial Transaction frame requires the notion of possession. While possession takes many forms, most of which are metaphorical, there is a basic, literal notion of possession on which the others are based: physical, manual control over an object. Commercial Transaction also requires various other concepts — lack, need, desire, value, scarcity, etc., which are fundamental facts of human existence.

The frame is thus a useful unit of cultural analysis. Closely related to this is the concept of *cultural model*, developed by linguists and anthropologists, chiefly in Holland and Quinn (1987), Shore (1996), and Strauss and Quinn (1997). The basic notion is

related to frame, except the focus is somewhat different: while frames tend to be used to focus on relatively simple structures with readily identifiable entities, cultural models are used for analysis of more complex cultural structures. One way of looking at this is to say that cultural models are structured by frames. What a cultural model is will become clearer later in this chapter.

Frames and cultural models also structure and are structured by *metaphor*. In essence, metaphor, as discussed in Reddy (1979), Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff and Turner (1989), and Lakoff (1993) involves conceptualizing, as well as reasoning about, one thing in terms of another. For instance, when we speak of a love relationship in terms of “dead ends” and “spinning wheels,” we are construing love as a journey. Love is the *target domain*: the thing or notion or concept we are talking about. Journeys are the *source domain*, which provides the conceptual structure and language in terms of which we reason and talk about the target domain. When we reason via metaphor, we crucially map *inferences*, or *entailments*, from the source domain to the target domain. For instance, being at a dead end entails that we cannot move forward; therefore, being at a metaphorical “dead end” in a relationship means we can no longer make “progress” in the relationship.

In the terminology of metaphor analysis, we say that entities in the source and target domains *map onto* one another: the travelers map onto the relationship

participants; the vehicle maps onto the relationship; forward motion maps onto “progress” in the relationship; and so on.

To give another example: when we say that the price of a gallon of gasoline has “gone up,” we are using the More is Up metaphor, according to which a relatively high position on the vertical scale maps onto a relatively large quantity (in this case, a quantity of money). Or, when a person says she is “in pain,” the bounded region designated by *in* maps onto the state of pain being experienced.

#### A case study of cognitive linguistics in action: the affirmative action debate

A common experience when people first learn metaphor analysis is that suddenly they begin seeing metaphor everywhere. Before long it becomes apparent that there are few areas of our conceptual lives that are untouched by metaphor. The reasoning that we do about social and political life is no exception. One topic that has been discussed at length over the past few years in the U.S. is affirmative action, and once we turn our careful eye to affirmative action discourse we see metaphor working here as well.<sup>2</sup> Now we will take a look at how attention to metaphor can help us understand one body of discourse at a deeper level.

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<sup>2</sup> This section draws heavily on (Patent 2000).

The metaphor I am referring to construes public life in general (the target domain) as athletic competition (the source domain). The competition can take the form of a race, a football game, or some unspecified form of athletic contest.<sup>3</sup> This metaphor, PUBLIC LIFE IS ATHLETIC COMPETITION, is used explicitly in (1) - (3) below:

1. [Then-UC Berkeley Chancellor Chang Lin Tien, addressing a group of young people as part of the Berkeley Pledge outreach program, designed as a partial replacement of affirmative action in the UC system:] “You are all like Olympic athletes, with your ultimate task still ahead,” Tien said during yesterday’s meeting. “But you will not enter that competition unprepared. Let us turn disadvantage into our advantage, into our strength.” (Pilar Luchsinger, *The Daily Californian*, 7/26/96.)
2. [UC Regent and affirmative action opponent Ward Connerly, on why he predicted the passage of California’s Proposition 209, repealing affirmative action in all state hiring and contracting]: “There is a consistent element of fairness among the American people. We will kill an umpire if we think the call he makes is unfair. That’s the element that caused us to say in the 1960s that it wasn’t fair to say that blacks couldn’t eat in the same restaurants as whites...[Proposition 209] is saying that preferences are unfair, and people believe that.” (Quoted in Ryan Tate, *The Daily Californian*, 2/12/96.)
3. [From an article about House Speaker Newt Gingrich’s comments that the US is becoming obsessed with race]: ...the speaker suggested emulating the Chicago Bulls in their NBA championship playoffs with the Utah Jazz, noting that in the closing moments last week Michael Jordan didn’t limit himself to black teammates in looking for an open man.  
“This is the example for society to follow,” Gingrich said, “a group of individuals so focused on a common goal of winning that they don’t have time

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<sup>3</sup> Each of these will necessarily have its own entailments, but the important entailments for the findings presented here hold at a level superordinate to many different kinds of athletic competition.

to worry about what color the other guy is.” (*The San Diego Union-Tribune*, 6/19/97, A-15.)

Though at first glance there may seem to be nothing extraordinary about these statements, upon reflection something interesting seems to be going on here. How is it that remarks about Olympic athletes, unfair umpires, and Michael Jordan’s teamwork can be taken as remarks about society in general, and affirmative action in particular? The short answer is: via a complex metaphorical reasoning process, which we will now look at in some detail.

As mentioned before, in this analysis I subsume under ATHLETIC COMPETITION two distinct forms: TEAM SPORT and RACE. I focus on TEAM SPORT and RACE because it is these domains that appear most frequently in affirmative action discourse. Also, I do not distinguish, in the mappings given below, between TEAM SPORT and RACE, because the underlying “frame-schema” for competition (multiple entities struggling to attain a resource not all of them can have; see Morgan (1998: 147-152)) does not require that we do so in order to draw the inferences that we are interested in. More on this below, after the mappings.

### The mappings

Consider the table below:

Source Domain (Athletic Competition)	Target Domain (Public Life)
- the playing field - the arena of competition	- the “marketplace” - the public “arena”
- players/competitors	- citizens participating in public life, including workers, students, elected officials, entrepreneurs
- teams <sup>4</sup>	- companies, universities, and other collective organizations
- officials (referees/umpires)	- hiring/admissions committees - the courts
- victory	- being admitted to a university - getting a job - winning a contract
- rules of the game	- laws, social customs, etc.
- athletic skill/talent, measured in numbers: batting average, how long it takes to run a race, etc.	- “merit” and “qualifications”, often measured in numbers, especially test scores and grades.

This metaphor maps over many different sorts of athletic competitions, and it is at this relatively generic level that the key inferences are drawn; sport-specific knowledge is unnecessarily rich. For instance, there are many kinds of athletic skill, which are pertinent to different types of competition. But what is important in this metaphor is not what each of those particular skills contributes to one’s ability to succeed in any given sport; rather, what is crucial is that athletic skill *generally* will contribute to one’s success in athletic competition.

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<sup>4</sup> Teams raise a number of interesting questions worthy of further investigation, for to delimit a team is to demarcate a stark boundary between competition and cooperation: within the team, cooperation and subordination of individual desires to common goals is paramount; outside the team, competition reigns and the interests of the team in achieving victory over the other teams is paramount. For this reason companies — who want their employees focused on the interests of the company in gaining market share and out-earning other companies — often construe themselves as “teams” and want their employees to “catch the team spirit”. This is of course worthy of a much more detailed analysis than I can offer here.

Just what, then, are the key inferences that we get from this? To find out, let's take a look at the source domain — athletic competition — and what we know about it:

1. There is a set of rules.
2. Each competitor knows the rules equally well, or at least has a responsibility to know the rules well.
3. The rules apply equally to all competitors.
4. We can objectively measure skill by numbers: the fastest time, or the most points, wins.
5. Given (1) - (4), it would be nonsensical and absolutely unfair to change the rules, so that, for instance, a person or team could score fewer points and still be the winner.

Let's look at each of these a little more carefully, still focusing only on the source domain. (1) is clear enough: without the overarching structure of rules to play by, there would be no point in competing; chaos would reign. (2) manifests itself in penalties handed out for rule violation: disqualification for false starts in races, penalty yards in football, time spent in the penalty box in hockey, free throws awarded to the opponent in basketball, etc. And any claim by the violator that she "didn't know the rules" would get at best a cynical laugh. (3) is somewhat less explicit, but absolutely crucial. In this sense, athletic competition is the quintessential realm of "equality under the law". Who would advocate, for instance, allowing one batter four strikes in a baseball game without allowing everyone four strikes? Participants in the competition have, presumably, chosen to participate, and have done so with full knowledge of the rules. So asking for any sort of special consideration would be utterly contrary to the spirit of the competition, and

would surely be unwelcome. If, however, special consideration were granted to any of the participants, it would certainly be viewed as unfair by the other participants, since any advantage granted to one competitor is, in a competitive setting, a disadvantage for everyone else. Plus, the basic value of the competition would be diminished, since it would no longer serve the function of determining who's "best."<sup>5</sup>

In (4) we have the endless parade of statistics used to evaluate athletic performance: Flaherty is only batting .159, so we'll send him down to the minors; Jordan averages over 30 points a game, so we'll pay him \$30 million a year; Hank Aaron hit 755 home runs in his career, so he's the greatest slugger ever. We use numbers all the time to assess athletic performance, and assume that such numbers paint a more or less "objective" picture. Watching one minute of any television sports news program convinces one of the primacy of numbers in evaluating athletic performance.

Points (1) to (4), then, lead us to conclude that, since all competitors are knowingly participating in a structured activity with mutually agreed-upon rules applying equally to all, and since performance can be evaluated quantitatively, then "the most points" or "the fastest time" wins. To advocate any contrary means of evaluation would run counter to the entire system.

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<sup>5</sup> This is the problem with handicaps: as soon as a handicap is introduced, the competition is no longer determining who has the most "skill" or "merit".



Again, one of the principal claims of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) is that, in metaphor, source-domain forms of reasoning are used to reason about the target domain. In this case, the way we reason about athletic competition has repercussions for how we reason about public life and our positions within public life. What, then, of the target domain? Applying what we know about the source domain (athletic competition) to the target domain (public life), what sorts of inferences may we draw? If we substitute target-domain entities for source-domain entities, then we may reason as follows:

- 1'. There is a set of laws, or at least codified procedures, for a given hiring, round of admissions, etc.
- 2'. Each citizen/applicant knows the rules, which are spelled out on application forms, in accompanying booklets, or elsewhere.
- 3'. The rules apply equally to all applicants.
- 4'. We can objectively measure ability by such means as grades and test scores.
- 5'. Given (1') to (4'), changing the rules for one or more applicants, or groups of applicants, puts others at an unfair disadvantage: How could it make sense for someone with *lower* test scores to be selected over someone with *higher* scores?

So, to the extent that this metaphor is employed when reasoning about affirmative action, opposition to affirmative action falls naturally out of the reasoning process.

To bring the discussion back to frames and cultural models, we can turn to the research of Pamela Morgan (1998). In her analysis, there is in the United States a prevalent cultural model according to which many aspects of public life involve competition: for jobs, spaces in universities, government contracts, etc. There are, however, several frames according to which competition can be construed: as a sport, a

race, a game, war or predation. These are metaphorical construals. In the case of affirmative action, sports and races are the preferred construals, presumably because of the emphasis the source domains place upon rule-based behavior and on ability and merit. Thus, the PUBLIC LIFE IS ATHLETIC COMPETITION metaphor stems from both a particular, competition-based cultural model of public life and from two specific frames — races and games — that are used as source domains to structure that competition metaphorically. This is of course not the only cultural model of public life in the U.S., but is certainly a common one.

Discussion: metaphor as mask

Metaphor can be both a tool and a hindrance. It is useful to us in that, by allowing us to conceptualize the relatively abstract in terms of the relatively concrete, it introduces ways for us to reason about abstract concepts. But metaphor can also hinder our understanding by masking certain aspects of a target domain. Lakoff and Johnson realized this when they wrote:

The very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms of another (e.g., comprehending an aspect of arguing in terms of battle) will necessarily hide other aspects of the concept. In allowing us to focus on one aspect of a concept (e.g., the battling aspects of arguing), a metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on other aspects of the concept that are inconsistent with that metaphor. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 10)

This happens with PUBLIC LIFE IS ATHLETIC COMPETITION. Since this metaphor serves well the reasoning purposes of affirmative action opponents, then in order to see what is hidden by the metaphor it helps to imagine how a proponent of affirmative action might question the metaphor. To take one example: What of (2) and (2'): the presumption that all "competitors" understand the "rules" equally well? A proponent of affirmative action might ask: How do people learn the "rules" of how to succeed in public life? Are all "competitors" taught these rules equally well? Does everyone have the same understanding of the rules?

This mismatch arises from fundamental differences in the structures of the two domains. Specifically, the structure of the source domain is severely impoverished compared to the target domain: where in the frame structure of the source domain is there a slot for the learning of rules? For the possibility that some might learn the rules more thoroughly than others, or that some might have different understandings of the rules than others? This is just one example of the overall problem: the relatively impoverished structure of the source domain, when mapped to the target domain, robs the target domain of a great deal of its complexity. Once again this characteristic of metaphor can be seen either as inherently limiting, in that it restricts our ability to reason about relatively abstract and/or complex concepts, or as liberating, in that it allows us to reason at all

about complex concepts. Regardless, this two-sided coin of highlighting and hiding is a fundamental fact about metaphor.

There is much, much more to be said about metaphor, but for the purposes of this dissertation would take us too far afield. In fact, metaphor does not play a large role in this dissertation. The purpose of this brief foray into metaphor has been to show how metaphor is one form of cultural reasoning pattern, and to show that by looking carefully at language we can ascertain certain aspects of cultural reasoning.

Another purpose is to reveal the arbitrariness of cultural construals — there are many possible ways to construe public life — and to think of ways of reconstruing issues of importance to us. If one wishes to set policies that affect public life, one needs to find and promote reasoning patterns that support one's agenda. American liberals, George Lakoff argues (1996 and personal communication), have, over the past seven decades, ceded crucial conceptual and rhetorical ground to conservatives on many issues, affirmative action being a central example. For conservatives, whose philosophy emphasizes individual effort and merit independent of historical circumstances, the PUBLIC LIFE IS ATHLETIC COMPETITION metaphor is perfect. For liberals, who would rather bring attention to broader historical and societal forces that have limited the opportunities for certain populations, the metaphor is problematic, since it limits the

discussion to what happens “on the field,” saying nothing about how anyone “got to the field.”

Liberals would also prefer a view of college as a nurturing, non-competitive environment that prepares people for later competition in the job market; conservatives, on the other hand, prefer that college admissions, and the experience of college, themselves be based on competition. Here again, the reasoning patterns highlighted by the PUBLIC LIFE IS ATHLETIC COMPETITION metaphor serve well the conservative agenda.

The point is this: if one wants to affect the world in a positive way, one must first try to understand the world. In the realm of policymaking, if one has a political agenda, one has to promote certain reasoning patterns. But this can't be done until current, salient reasoning patterns are understood. This is true of any issue. In this dissertation I focus on the cultural models underlying reasoning about human rights in the U.S. in China. And while I stop short of any specific policy recommendations with regard to human rights, I do, in Chapter 6, suggest some ways in which Americans might wish to rethink their assumptions about human rights in light of what we learn in this dissertation.

#### A methodological issue: limitations of textual studies

We now briefly continue our discussion of metaphor as a means to addressing a methodological issue. It was mentioned above that the student of metaphor quickly learns that she never has to look far to find interesting data: a brief scan of the front page

of any newspaper, for instance, is bound to be filled with metaphors. However, if the researcher has certain specific questions she wants answered, or has hunches about conceptual structures she would like to uncover, then pre-produced texts have some inherent limitations. There may be times when a text hints at a given metaphorical structure, but stops short of actually employing the source-domain language that the researcher needs in order to be able to claim with confidence that a metaphor is present.

In the investigation of the PUBLIC LIFE IS ATHLETIC COMPETITION metaphor, this problem arises when we have people arguing against affirmative action based on (4') and (5') above: those who meet lower "objective" performance criteria (grades, test scores) should not be given "preference" over those who have performed "better":

4. When a student who has busted his chops to earn a 4.0 is turned away in favor of a 3.3 student, Connerly concluded, "This isn't benign. This isn't innocent... This is institutional discrimination." (Debra J. Saunders, *The San Francisco Chronicle*, 6/16/95, quoting Ward Connerly, an outspoken opponent of affirmative action)
5. [From a discussion of the history of affirmative action:] Marco DeFunis challenged the University of Washington Law School's 20 per cent quota for blacks. The school had rejected DeFunis though his GPA and test scores surpassed those of 36 of the 37 blacks... DeFunis's scores showed that he met a higher objective standard than those admitted in his place. (Roberts and Stratton, *National Review*, 3/20/95, 48 & 50)
6. Race- and gender-preferences aren't about equality. They are about inequality. When the regents voted to end preferences, they were voting to end a system that allows minorities — I should say some minorities, because it penalizes many Asians — admission into the UC system even if they have lower grades than white students. (Saunders, *The San Francisco Chronicle*, 1/22/96)

None of these examples explicitly employs source-domain language, so the researcher cannot convincingly claim that the PUBLIC LIFE IS ATHLETIC COMPETITION metaphor is at work here. This problem can be dealt with in a roundabout fashion with a claim such as: despite the absence of source-domain language, the key point to be made is that *if* one employs the metaphor, including the crucial source-domain notion of quantifiability, then one must find a target-domain counterpart of quantifiability. Thus, even if one can defend quantifiability without employing the metaphor, one cannot employ the metaphor without advocating target-domain quantifiability. Put another way: despite the absence of any explicit source-domain language, the strong presence of quantifiability in these target-domain examples reveals a reasoning process that is parallel to source-domain reasoning, and as such constitutes a form of evidence that the metaphor is at work here.

But this is a rather shaky form of inferential evidence. Even to call it “evidence” might be problematic. Certainly the speaker *may* be employing metaphorical reasoning, but we don’t know this with any degree of certainty without explicit usage of source-domain language. What the researcher needs is a way to “get inside” the reasoning of the speaker, and for this an interview is the ideal forum. In an interview, the questioner, when presented with language like that in (4) - (6), can find ways of nudging the interviewee to bring hidden conceptual structure to the surface, providing more concrete,

reliable evidence for whatever claims are being made. This is a chief reason why interviews constitute the primary methodology, and body of data, for this dissertation.

Later, when I present the data, I will discuss more specifics about the methodology I use, including its advantages and shortcomings.

### Human rights

I came to linguistics after spending the undergraduate and early graduate portions of my academic career in Chinese studies. When traveling in Chinese-studies circles, the topic of human rights comes up again and again, for many reasons. First and probably foremost, many of our early views of China were formed partially through exposure to American media representations of China. These representations of China often involve depictions of a country that “doesn’t value human rights.” Newspaper and magazine stories about human rights in China often follow a script that goes something like this: brave citizen expresses what would be considered in the U.S. to be justified opposition to the central government; central government threatens brave citizen; brave citizen persists; government cracks down on brave citizen and ruins his life, maybe even kills him or someone dear to him. But for as long as he is able, the citizen fights on.

Take for example the story of Wei Jingsheng. Wei was a leader of the 1978 “Democracy Wall” movement, and ended up serving over 15 years in prison for it. After being released in 1993, he was accused of plotting to overthrow the Chinese government.



The result of his 1995 trial was a second sentence, this one to 14 years in prison. He didn't serve out this second sentence, however; he was eventually released from prison and moved to the United States. The following, from China Rights Forum, describes Wei's second trial:

None of the actions cited in the charges against Wei appeared to violate Chinese law, so prosecutors quoted snippets of Wei's writings to prove he intended to "overthrow the government." Wei mounted a spirited defense, despite the fact that he was so ill the proceedings had to be halted several times so he could rest. In his statement, he told the court: "Actions to promote human rights and democracy and to expose and fight against the enemies of democracy and human rights do not constitute a crime." But the court ignored the strong legal and factual arguments of Wei and his brave lawyers, Zhang Sizhi and Li Huigeng, to reach the verdict its political masters had undoubtedly decided in advance.

"Lie low and recover your strength," Wei's friends told him after his release in 1993. Poor prison conditions had decimated his health: he could only walk short distances before getting out of breath and at 45, he has only 12 teeth left. But he refused to be silenced, continuing to voice his hope that China could develop a more democratic system with greater respect for human rights. As a symbol of principled resistance to arbitrary state power, Wei galvanized embattled human rights and democracy activists in China. His 14-year sentence is as much a sign to them and other dissenters as a punishment for Wei. (Sophia Woodman, "From the Editor," *China Rights Forum*, Spring 1996: 2)

This report contains several themes that appear frequently in such David-versus-Goliath stories: the protagonist is not only innocent, but praiseworthy; the odds are stacked against him by an authoritarian power structure; the power structure, despite its best efforts, is unable to silence the protagonist; the "principled" protagonist has the facts on his side; the protagonist's defeat is actually a victory of sorts, since it "galvanizes" his supporters.

I do not intend here to question the courage or the suffering of Wei Jingsheng. Nor do I mean to sanction the Chinese government's cruel behavior. As a linguist, however, it is my job to point out that, whatever the "facts of the case," this is one among many *construals* of the situation, and a common sort of construal in the American media. One result of so many stories of this sort being written and printed is that a common notion Americans have about China is that it is "not free," and that human rights are not valued. This is a prejudice, then, that aspiring American scholars of China carry with them from the moment they set foot, usually as undergraduates, in their first class on Chinese history, society, culture or language. The question of human rights thus becomes a central topic among China scholars as they move through their careers.

A second reason why human rights is a frequent topic in Chinese studies circles is that students and scholars of China from the U.S. tend to monitor U.S.-China relations rather closely, and human rights has been a key issue in U.S.-China relations for decades. Human rights thus becomes something those in Chinese studies tend to think about a lot, and are expected to be able to say something about.

Third, the subjective experience of many Americans "on the ground" in China is of a place that feels "less free" than the United States. Americans are often suspected of being spies, and treated with distrust; we must go through Byzantine bureaucratic

procedures to obtain student or teacher visas;<sup>6</sup> our favorite internet sites are often blocked; access to libraries and archives is strictly controlled; there is only one national newscast; the list goes on. Additionally, we may hear stories from our Chinese friends of — to put it in an American way — having their freedoms curtailed in various ways.

These factors conspire to bring human rights to the forefront among American students and scholars of China. Thankfully we have at our disposal some theoretical tools that can help shed light on human rights in a way that others have until now not been able to. Specifically, the objects of study in this dissertation are: (1) the structured set of cultural models that inform, broadly speaking, American and Chinese views of human rights, (2) the language used to talk about these models. I will now explain in more detail the research methodology used in this dissertation, along with its advantages and disadvantages.

### Research methods

I conducted a total of fifteen interviews: six in Chinese and nine in English. More properly, these were “recorded conversations” between two friends, or between a husband and a wife. All interviews took place in an office in Barrows Hall on the U.C.

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<sup>6</sup> I will stick here to the subjectivity of these notions: the American Immigration and Naturalization Service is, by all accounts, immeasurably more Byzantine than the equivalent Chinese bureaucracy, but that

Berkeley campus. Participants sat across a small table from each other, while I sat at a desk, with my back to them. Twelve printed questions were in a stack on the table.

Participants were instructed to take a question, read it aloud, discuss it for a few minutes, and then take the next question, until they were finished. After they were finished, I moved over to the table to ask follow-up questions based on what they had said.

Interviews, including follow-up questions, generally took 30 to 60 minutes.

I recruited participants in two ways. For the English speakers, I visited Linguistics 5 — U.C. Berkeley's introductory Linguistics class — early in the fall of 2001, and announced that I would offer ten dollars to native speakers of English, born and raised in the United States, to come talk with me about American culture. They were asked to bring a friend, who would also receive ten dollars. I wrote my email address on the blackboard. In ensuing email conversations, the participants' status as native speakers of English, born and raised in the U.S. was confirmed, and the interview time was established.

For the Chinese speakers, I joined the email list for the Berkeley Chinese Scholars and Students Association, or BCSSA. I sent out an email offering ten dollars to undergraduate native speakers of Chinese born and raised in Mainland China who would

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is not important for this discussion, since the question at hand is the subjective perceptions that lead China scholars towards questions of human rights.

be willing to talk to me about Chinese culture. The reason for requesting undergraduates was to have a better match with the English speakers, but unfortunately no undergraduates responded. I received responses only from graduate students, and given the time constraints of the project, had to proceed. Again, participants were asked to bring a friend. Ensuing emails confirmed participants as native speakers of Chinese from the Mainland.<sup>7</sup>

A number of methodological problems are immediately evident. First, the two populations' educational levels don't match up very well: in the case of the English speakers, first- and second-year undergraduates; in the case of the Chinese speakers, graduate students. Second, the Chinese speakers have spent varying amounts of time outside of China, so their cultural models have been correspondingly influenced and possibly changed, meaning that whatever picture of Chinese cultural models emerges from this study, it may be of only limited use in probing the models held by the overwhelming majority of Chinese people who have never even studied a foreign language, let alone lived abroad.

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<sup>7</sup> It is generally irresponsible for a linguist to refer to a "native speaker of Chinese," as there are so many varieties of Chinese. Material constraints — time and money — prevented me from limiting my search to native speakers of standard Northern Mandarin. For college-educated people from China, Mandarin serves as a *lingua franca*; one can always expect, at a Chinese university, that students can converse comfortably and fluently in Mandarin on any topic. Since all the Chinese participants in my study were highly educated, they were also comfortable speaking Mandarin with each other.

To address the first problem: whatever differences emerge between the English and Chinese speakers is likely to have little to do with such a small difference in educational level. As for the second problem: to the extent that we are interested in *differences* between the U.S. and China, this problem may actually be an advantage. That is to say, if we find, despite the “Americanization” of these participants’ cultural models, significant differences between the two populations, we might be even more confident in proclaiming the existence of cultural differences between the U.S. and China than we would if the Chinese population were less educated and had been less exposed to American culture. But contrariwise, if we are interested in *similarity* between the models of the two populations, we will not be able to factor out the difference in educational level.

A third methodological problem lies in my status as a non-native speaker of Chinese. As a native speaker of English born and raised in the U.S., I am able to have insights into the nuances of the language produced by the English-speaking participants that I am simply unable to have in the case of the Chinese speakers. In cases when I am not sure, on some fundamental level, what the basic meaning of a given utterance is, I have consulted with native speakers. But even this is of ultimately limited use. I simply am unable to have native-speaker/native-cultural-member intuitions about the Chinese data.

A fourth, related problem — and one of the central problems of cultural anthropology generally — is that all my findings about the Chinese data are filtered through my American cultural models. It is inevitable that the Chinese data will seem somehow strange to me. Along with this, it is easy to frame the Chinese data in terms of absence, or lack: notions such as “freedom to choose one’s occupation,” for example, are, for most Americans, important aspects of culture, and, when confronted with a culture that has a different view of the occupation-choosing process, an American is likely to frame the latter culture as “lacking” such-and-such a model. This has been a problem — which thankfully has been recognized and problematized over the past three decades — that has plagued all branches of Chinese studies in the West for quite literally centuries. For instance, Western historiography of China has often framed historical questions in terms of counterfactuals: Why didn’t China develop Western-style capitalism? Why didn’t China divide into distinct nation-states as Europe did? And so on. In the realm of human rights discourse, the problem has been similar: Why “isn’t there” a concept of human rights in China?

While there is no escaping the American cultural models through which I view the world, I do believe there are ways to minimize this problem. The key is to try to problematize “Americanness” as thoroughly as I problematize “Chineseness.” Again, since there is no “God’s eye view” — I am an American, and my Americanness will

influence my findings no matter how hard I may try to avoid this — an equal problematization of Americanness and Chineseness is only an ideal to aspire to. But the struggle is a useful one, one worth engaging in, and I hope that the results of my struggle will be evident in my findings. I believe that, having spent as much time as I have staring at the Chinese data and trying to understand it, as well as living, studying, teaching, and writing in China while producing this dissertation, that many of the cultural models have “seeped in” in a way, have made themselves enough a part of my identity that, when I train my eyes on the American data, it sometimes appears as if it is the American data that are strange, not the Chinese data. At these times, when I feel that the Chinese models “make more sense,” is when my analysis of American cultural models is likely to bear the most fruit, and when my problematization of Americanness is most nearly able to rival my problematization of Chineseness.

A fifth methodological problem is that language is the sole source of data for probing these cultural models: I am unable to observe actual behavior in the field, as an anthropologist might do. Thankfully, however, there is a now-well-established research tradition that employs similar methodologies — most articulately expressed in Naomi Quinn and Dorothy Holland’s (1987) introduction to the seminal volume on cultural models research, *Cultural Models in Language and Thought* (Holland and Quinn 1987), but also supported by a large portion of the enterprise of cognitive linguistics. Because



the methodology is so well justified in this essay, and because so much research has, both before and after Holland and Quinn's volume, validated the use of language as legitimate cultural data, I will not devote any more space to justifying the methodology in general terms — though I do address some more specific issues below.

The arguably artificial setting in which the interviews took place poses a sixth methodological problem. Ideally, a researcher would be able to supplement one's findings by gathering linguistic data, to borrow Edwin Hutchins' (1995) term, "in the wild." Unfortunately it is not always practical to do so, and the best we can hope for perhaps is a "feral" look at language and culture, which is what I hope to have produced here: given the artificial setting of the interview room, how can the data be made maximally "natural"? How can the participants be made most comfortable, so that any feeling that they are being watched is minimized? And how can an interview be structured so that no data are "wasted" during the initial part of the interview, when participants are least comfortable? To find answers, I consulted both with Alan Cienki, whose (To appear) paper on Russian words for *honesty* is based on interview data, and with Eve Sweetser. Both had two main suggestions. First, the format for the bulk of the interview should not be a question-and-answer back-and-forth between myself and one or more participants, because (a) this is a highly unnatural setting for people to converse in, and (b) for the Chinese speakers I had to be sure they would use language as they use it

when addressing other native speakers, rather than in the special “foreigner Chinese” that is normally spoken to me when interacting with native speakers of Chinese. So the suggested format was that of a recorded conversation between two native speakers.

Second, they suggested that the conversations be between friends, removing a potentially major source of discomfort and artificiality: strangers negotiating the complexities of getting acquainted with each other’s beliefs and conversational habits at the same time as they are trying to address complex cultural questions.

To these suggestions Cienki added some specifics about how to structure the interviews, in terms of both physical setting and content. For physical setting, he suggested the format that I ended up adopting, and that I described earlier in this chapter: for the bulk of the interview, participants sat across a table from each other while I sat some distance away with my back turned to them. The participants read and discussed printed questions, one by one. Once they were finished with the questions, I turned to face them, moved my chair over to their table, and asked follow-up questions. By the time my (still unfamiliar) face and voice entered the picture, the conversation had long since ceased feeling stilted or unnatural. In fact, usually by the second or third question, participants seemed — based on my subjective impressions of their rate of speech, intonation, and fluency — to feel more or less at ease.

As for interview structure, Cienki suggested asking a “warm-up” question, both to ease the participants into the interview process and to get them thinking, broadly, about the sorts of issues they would be addressing. (The English version of the warm-up question is: “Suppose you could create a new society. What would it be like?”)

My own, quite subjective, evaluation of these methods is that they worked: both sets of interview participants produced what sound like fairly natural conversations. Absent the possibility, not to mention the legality, of sharing the actual auditory records, I ask for the reader’s generosity in trusting that this assessment of mine is an honest and accurate one.

Finally, there is a seventh “problem” that is not really a problem, because it was intentional. I claim that this dissertation is about human rights. Yet nowhere in the interview questions does the term *human rights*, or even the term *rights* (or the Chinese “equivalents”), appear. How, then, could the interviews, and therefore the dissertation, be *about* human rights? Here we must draw on the experience of those who came before, and who learned, through trial and mostly error, that the best way to investigate a phenomenon about which a person has a great deal of knowledge, but for whom such knowledge is largely unconscious, is to do so in an indirect way. My own early experience with this research bore this out as well. I conducted a pilot interview with a Chinese speaker in which I asked him several direct questions about human rights. Or,

more precisely, I asked him some questions about *rénquán*, the Chinese “equivalent”<sup>8</sup> of *human rights*. The participant’s speech was littered, throughout the entire interview, with false starts and repetitions. He also peppered his answers with all sorts of hedges: *hǎoxiàng* (“it seems that...”), *wǒ juéde* (“I feel...”), *wǒ xiǎng* (“I think...”), *zhèige*, *nèige*, and *jiùshi (shūo)* (“this,” “that” and “then,” often used where an English speaker would use “um” or “uh.”). The overall impression was that he was not at all confident about his answers. What the source of his discomfort might have been is open to question, but I hypothesize that he lacked confidence that his own models of *rénquán* were expert enough to answer the questions to his own satisfaction, and therefore to my satisfaction. That is, one of his models of human rights was roughly the following meta-model: There are experts who know about human rights. I am not one of those experts. Therefore I will tell you what I can, but it isn’t worth much. At one point he says:<sup>9</sup>

7.  
 Guānyú            zhèige    rénquán            ne,        shíjì  
 As for            FILL     human rights      TOP     fact

shàng wǒ                      méiyǒu              hǎohāor              de  
 on    1-sg                      not-have              diligent              ADV

kàn    zhèige                      shū,                      jiùshishuō,

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<sup>8</sup> For the moment I cannot avoid such simplifications. Of course a central question of the dissertation is to what extent, and how, posing “equivalents” such as these is problematic.

<sup>9</sup> For descriptions of the pinyin romanization system and of my particular transcription conventions, please refer to Appendix A. For a key to the all-caps glosses of function words, please refer to Appendix B.

look	FILL	book	FILL		
jiùshi	<b>rénquán</b>	zài	xīfāng		
FILL	human rights	in	West		
<b>dàodǐ</b>	yǒu	shénme	zhèige	definition. <sup>10</sup>	
ultimately	have	what	FILL	definition.	

“As for human rights, to be honest I haven’t taken a close look at any, um, books, um, that is, that say what the Western definition of human rights **ultimately** is.”

Note in particular his use of the word *dàodǐ*, which invokes a model of experts who have the right of final arbitration in determining the “correct” definition of human rights. (One is reminded here of Paul Kay’s (1987) study of English *technically*.)

A bit further on in the interview, he brings this model explicitly into play. For around three minutes, he delves into “political” (*zhèngzhì*) matters, the domain to which he sees *rénquán* as belonging. He explains that, for important matters, the “top level” (he uses the English term) should be the first to know and deal with it. He the explains his reasoning:

8.

Rúguǒ	shuō	shì	zhèi	yàng	de
If	FILL	be	this	type	ATT
qíngkuàng	xià	ne,	zài	Zhōngguó	xiànzài
situation	under	TOP	in	China	now
de	qíngkuàng	xià,	jiùshishuō	shì	hěn

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<sup>10</sup> Here we can see a disadvantage of the one-on-one interview format with the Chinese speakers: a lot of English gets thrown in.

ATT	situation	under	FILL	be	very
duō many	rén person	jiùshuō FILL	shì be	m_iy™uÉ not-haveÉ	wǒ 1-sg
juéde feel	jiùshuō FILL	zhèngzhì government	jiùshuō FILL	shì be	xiànzài now
ne TOP	jiù FILL	yīnggāi should	shì be	jiāogěi give-over	zhèi this
zhǒng type	bǐjiào comparatively	zhuānyè specialized	de ATT	rénshì. person.	

“If we’re talking about this kind of situation, in China’s current situation, um, there aren’t, um, many people who...I feel that now, um, government, um, should be given to specialists to deal with.”

In other words: human rights belong to the realm of government, and government belongs in the hands of experts.

Given this, plus the aforementioned cues from this interviewee that he was not confident of his own models of human rights, I decided to change my methodology. I consulted with Eve Sweetser and George Lakoff, who offered advice on making my queries more indirect. The underlying hypothesis is that, even if speakers are not confident that they know anything about “human rights,” surely they have beliefs about the sorts of relationships that underlie questions of human rights, such as what a person is, and his/her relationship to social structures such as the family and the state. And while questions surrounding human rights as a whole cannot be entirely reduced to these

conceptual structures, an investigation into views about the individual and its relationship to the family and the state is useful for probing whatever the linguistic and cultural aspects of human rights might happen to be.

So I completely redesigned the interview questions and conducted eight interviews: four in English and four in Chinese. Unfortunately, not much interesting data was yielded, mostly because the questions were still not designed well enough. They covered too broad a range of issues, and as such did not form a particularly coherent set of questions. I tried to cover, in only eight questions: general issues of individual-family and individual-state relations; race; gender; religion; and human rights (I still couldn't bring myself to give up completely on explicitly asking about human rights.) While the data is not wholly uninteresting, my sense was that it failed to produce discourses that revealed much about cultural models in a systematic way.

So once again I completely reworked the interview questions. While this set of questions was still fairly broad, there was a theme running through almost the entire set: two thirds of the questions involve specific scenarios about individual-family or individual-state relations. Instead of relying on general questions, as I had mostly (though not entirely) done in the previous set of questions, I hoped that asking about specific, realistic scenarios might bring implicit cultural models to the surface. In approaching the question of how authentic a representation of in interviewee's cultural

models an ethnographer can gain access to, they ask: How conscious is a given interviewee of the models she is using in answering a given question? At one extreme lie Edwin Hutchins' (1987) interviewees, whose experiences are so painful that the relevant models have been repressed to a deep level of unconsciousness.<sup>11</sup> Quinn and Holland address the other extreme, along the way citing D'Andrade's (1987) piece in the same volume:

At another extreme, some linguistic outputs, but by no means most, have the "canned" quality of well-worked and well-rehearsed rationalizations or idealizations. Perhaps ethnographers are especially likely to be proffered such accounts. Much of people's cultural knowledge, however, is likely to be somewhere in between these two extremes of accessibility and inaccessibility — as D'Andrade...found for the American college students he interviewed about the way the mind works. These interviewees could not provide a comprehensive, well-organized view of the entire cultural model of the mind but could certainly describe how it operates when they were asked questions about specific examples. (8)

The next, rather obvious, question is: Why? Why should interview participants be more *confident* about their answers when specific scenarios are evoked? While this answer is highly speculative, I suspect it has to do with two factors.

First, cultural knowledge is *lived* through specific scenarios. This is what cultural knowledge, in some deep sense, is *for*. Bradd Shore (1996) makes this point when

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<sup>11</sup> Here I do not intend to conflate Lakoff's "cognitive unconscious" with Freud's unconscious. The distinction in this particular case is simply not important; what matters here is that the subjects are "not conscious" of the models they are invoking.



discussing the difficulty of locating “culture” in any given place, because culture is everywhere:

Aside from the obvious exotic Samoan artifacts, like fine mats or kava bowls that museums use to represent Samoan culture, it was not easy for me to point my finger at something in everyday village life and say “there’s culture.” But this was not because of the absence of culture, rather the opposite. Culture seemed to be everywhere and in everything. It was not easily pried free from the flow of life, so that one could isolate a moment of experience and say that there, at last, was a unit of culture for inspection. (43)

Given that culture is primarily *lived*, rather than reflected upon in an intellectual fashion, it makes sense that people would be more comfortable thinking about a specific scenario than about something much more general. From a frame-semantic perspective, we might say that we know how the various entities in a given frame relate to one another, and how these relationships should unfold over time, because we have experienced, either directly or indirectly, the relevant frame structures in our own lives.

Second, specific scenarios allow us to project ourselves imaginatively into specific frame-slots and reason through the temporal unfolding of a frame by drawing on our expectations about the behavior of the frame participants. If instead we are asked a very general question meant to cover a wide range of frames, we will be unable to ground ourselves in any particular frame structure, and will likely fall back into (possibly made-up) generalizations that will be of little or no use to the researcher.

Having dealt with methodological concerns, we may now turn our attention to some more theoretical issues. In particular, before going any further we should refine what we mean by “culture.”

### Cultural models: refining the notion

The term *cultural model* gained popularity and explanatory usefulness for linguists and anthropologists with the publication of Holland and Quinn’s *Cultural Models in Language and Thought* (1987). The conference on which this collection of essays was based was the first significant attempt at making explicit what had been, up until then, a more or less intuitive notion: that culture was systematically structured into “chunks” — which came to be known as *cultural models* — and that language could be used as a means of investigating these structures.

However, the notion of cultural model remained somewhat underproblematized until 1996, which saw the publication of Bradd Shore’s *Culture in Mind* (Shore 1996). Shore’s remarkable book addresses an enormous range of issues crucial to this dissertation, and thus figures prominently throughout. First, Shore argues forcefully for the integration of the study of mind and the study of culture. Unfortunately, given the history of anthropology as a field, such an obvious-seeming approach to mind and culture has not traditionally been so obvious to anthropologists. Since the empirical findings of cognitive linguistics are being taken as a theoretical given for this dissertation, we do not

need to spend time justifying Shore's "ethnographic theory of mind and...cognitive theory of culture." (13) But a look at some of Shore's taxonomies of cultural models will provide some useful insights into the view of language and culture adopted in this dissertation, and by extension a justification of the research methodology employed here.

Shore offers several ways of taxonomizing cultural models. One of these is *mental models* versus *instituted models*. Neither notion can be defined without reference to the other: they are the personal and public sides of the same coin. Take for example a (typical) wedding. I have a *mental model* of what a typical wedding is like: who is involved, what they wear, how the events proceed, etc. This mental model is based on an *instituted model*: actual weddings that take place outside of my cognitive world, and that I either witness personally, or which are mediated through some third-party representation, such as mass media (a newspaper article, a television program), stories told to me by my parents, photographs shown to me by friends. Mental models and instituted models stand in a complex dialectical relationship: my mental model of the typical wedding is shaped by the instituted model; because of this, my own wedding may re-enact, and thus help to perpetuate, the instituted model.

This dual existence, or "double life," of cultural models, also stands at the heart of Claudia Strauss and Naomi Quinn's (1997) treatise on cognition and culture. Using the terms *intrapersonal* and *extrapersonal* to refer, respectively, to the private (mental-

model) and public (instituted-model) dimensions of culture, they take as their task the detailed investigation of the dialectic between mental models and instituted models. I invoke their work for two reasons. First, the terms *intrapersonal* and *extrapersonal* add some useful terminology to the mix. And second, they, along with Bradd Shore, by problematizing the intrapersonal/extrapersonal distinction, help validate my project by showing how data about individual mental constructs is simultaneously data about culture. So we can think of the theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation as: cognitive linguistics shows us that language is a window into an individual's cognitive structures, and cognitive anthropology — in particular Shore's and Strauss and Quinn's breed of cognitive anthropology — shows how data about an individual's cognitive structures provides a window into culture. Quinn and Holland (1987: 18) put it eloquently: "The theoretical question is: How is cultural knowledge organized? The methodological strategy is to reconstruct the organization of this shared knowledge from what people say about their experience."

To be a bit more precise: if a particular interviewee uses a particular linguistic structure — or, from a semiotic perspective, a particular linguistic form, or signifier, or Langacker's (1987) "phonological pole" — in a particular context, we are on methodologically solid ground, first in discussing the meanings (or signifieds, or "semantic poles," or cognitive structures) with which the linguistic form is paired, and,

second, in inferring that these cognitive structures came about through the extrapersonal-to-intrapersonal end of the intrapersonal-extrapersonal dialectic. We may therefore make claims (with necessary caveats) about what the relevant extrapersonal structures are.

Using the term *schema* where we would use *model*, Strauss and Quinn put it this way:

Our definition [of culture] ... makes meanings psychological (they are cognitive-emotional responses), but highlights the fact that meanings are the product of current events in the public world interacting with mental structures, which are in turn the product of previous such interactions with the public world. (Strauss and Quinn 1997: 6)

One more thing remains to be said about the “double life” of culture and meaning.

While this is obvious from the standpoint of cognitive linguistics and cognitive anthropology, it still needs to be said whenever one uses terminology — such as *extrapersonal* — that implies the existence of structures outside of human cognition: extrapersonal structures are not claimed to exist objectively in the world. In some significant sense, there really is no “double life” to culture; culture exists *only* in the minds of individuals. That a person participates in a certain series of events that he categorizes as a “wedding” is a phenomenon of cognition. That a person views a certain series of events and categorizes it as a “wedding” is also a phenomenon of cognition. The intrapersonal/extrapersonal distinction, therefore, is not between subjective internal cognitive states and objective external events and categories. Rather, it is between internal cognitive states that result from observing and interacting with entities external to oneself and categorized in a particular way, and actions based on these internal cognitive

states and categories, which actions may form the basis for one's own and other people's future internal cognitive states and categories.

Returning to Shore's distinction between mental and instituted models, we now see that *model*, as used in these two senses, means two quite different things. In the case of mental models, a model is a cognitive construct. In the case of instituted models, a model is a set of phenomena observed and categorized in a particular way. I point this out not to be critical of Shore, but rather to get this pedantic theoretical issue out of the way so that, from now on, I may use shorthands like these without apologizing for them every time I use them.

Another of Shore's useful distinctions is between *model* and *schema*. What we are calling *models* have gone by various names in various fields: *frames* in cognitive linguistics; *scripts* in computer science (with a nod, of course, to Schank and Abelson (1977)), and *schemas* in psychology. All these terms are meant to refer to *roughly* the same phenomenon. However, Shore intends there to be an important distinction, in his terminology, between *model* and *schema*. In Shore's terms, the relationship of model to schema is that of specific to general: a schema — or, to use Shore's longhand, a *foundational schema* — consists of highly schematic (pardon the quasi-tautology) knowledge generalizable over many specific models. An example of a schema in the United States might be what Deborah Tannen (1998) found to be America's fascination

with argumentation as a means of resolving disputes. On the level of Shore's *model* we have: lawyer-versus-lawyer courtroom argumentation, television programs such as CNN's *Crossfire*, presidential debates, and so on. The *schema* is what captures the structure that is shared among all these models: the existence of verbal conflict, along with the view that such conflict is a *good way* to resolve disputes, or at least to inform people about issues.

Shore argues that schemas are a crucial factor not only in understanding the systematicity underlying what might superficially appear to be disparate phenomena, but also in the ongoing and creative construction of cultural systems. This process, which he calls *analogical schematization*, involves building new cultural models based on structure that they share with other models.<sup>12</sup>

For this dissertation, the distinction between *model* and *schema* matters mostly for the first of these two reasons: one of the projects at hand is to find whatever

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<sup>12</sup> Shore points out (69-70, fn. 12) a difficult epistemological issue confronting researchers making claims about the psychological reality of foundational schemas: how do we know the researcher isn't simply imagining the existence of a schema? The short, nihilistic answer is: there's no way to know anything at all. Shore's longer answer is: there exists a great deal of evidence that schema induction is something people often do in fact engage in when reasoning analogically. Plus there is a strong subjective sense, not only among ethnographers but among anyone involved in understanding cultures other than one's own, that what we experience as "cultural difference" must result from more than a haphazard collection of specific models, but result instead from what is shared among those models. To this we might also add Langacker's (1987) claim that much of our knowledge of the world is stored at a relatively schematic level, and one thing humans do simply by dint of being human is extract schemas from specific-level information.

systematicity can be found in the relevant cultural models, and an important part of this process is to look for structure that is shared among various models. If such systematicity can be revealed, then we have a useful way of problematizing some aspects of what is “essential” about Chinese and American culture, and will have a precise way of talking about differences and similarities between Chinese and American culture.

This last point brings me to a final, obviously necessary, caveat before concluding this section: this dissertation only gives a small glimpse into certain aspects of the massively complex structures that constitute “Chinese culture” and “American culture.” No single dissertation can do justice to such complexities. The extremely limited quantity and socioeconomic/educational variability of my interview participants will lead necessarily to equally limited conclusions about Chinese and American culture. I beg the reader’s indulgence to allow me to use “Chinese” and “American” as convenient shorthand throughout this dissertation.

We now turn our attention to a more detailed discussion of the interviews. Who was interviewed, and what exactly were they interviewed about?

#### The interview pools

I conducted nine interviews in English and six interviews in Chinese. I arranged for most of the English interviews to take place before any of the Chinese interviews. Because English is my native language, I could thus get a firm sense of whether the



interviews were producing good data, and modify the questions if necessary, before proceeding with the Chinese interviews. As it turned out, after the first two English interviews I added one question, but other than that the interviews remained the same. I ended up conducting six of the English interviews before any of the Chinese interviews. Then I did the six Chinese interviews in fairly rapid succession, before concluding with the final three English interviews.

These last three English interviews involved a different population of students. Because most of the views expressed in the first six English interviews were, perhaps predictably, toward the left of the American political spectrum, I decided to seek out more conservative students, figuring that whatever generalizations I would eventually want to make about American culture would be more valid if my interviewees represented a broader range of ideas. So I contacted Berkeley College Republicans via email, and a message was sent out to the list. A number of individuals contacted me, and I was able to arrange three interviews (at which point my funding ran out), following similar stipulations: ten dollars was offered to discuss American culture for 30 to 60 minutes, and it was requested that a conservative friend be brought along.

Again, there are methodological weaknesses to this approach. And again, the temporal and material constraints of my project did not allow me to sidestep them.

Perhaps the most obvious drawback of this approach is that these interviewees, as self-

identified members of a political group, and having been approached for selection based on their membership in this group, might, during the interview, produce exactly the sort of self-conscious discourse that, as discussed earlier, is of little use to the researcher.

Thankfully — and, of course, subjectively — it seems that the design of the interview, with the specificity of the scenarios, allowed for relaxed and natural conversations to take place. There was no sense on my part that these interviewees were “performing” any more than any of the other interviewees.

The English speakers form a fairly tight demographic group. They range in age from 18 to 21. Nine are 18, five are 19, three are 20, and one is 21. Their ages map almost perfectly onto their years in school: ten first-year students, four second-years, three third-years, and one fourth-year. There are ten women and eight men. All except one was born and raised in the U.S. (The exception was the result of a miscommunication. This interviewee was born in Germany, but moved to the U.S. at the age of three, and considers herself — and by all appearances is — completely linguistically and culturally native to the U.S.) All are native speakers of English. Thirteen were raised in California, two in the Southwest, and three east of the Mississippi. In terms of broad ethnic categories, one is half Latina, half Caucasian; one is half Korean-American, half Caucasian; one is Korean-American; five are Chinese-

American, and ten are Caucasian. As a whole this group is younger and less-educated than the Chinese-speaking group.

The twelve Chinese interviewees form a much broader demographic group. They range in age from 23 to 45, with a median age of 28. There are eight women and four men. All were born and raised in the P.R.C. Eight are from North China and four are from the South. Of those from the South, where Standard Mandarin is not spoken locally, all, due to their educational level, felt perfectly comfortable conversing in Mandarin. All are members of the dominant Han ethnic group.<sup>13</sup> Nine of the twelve were in their first year of a UC Berkeley graduate program; two were in their second year, and one was in her third year. For five of the interviewees, this was their first trip abroad. Another four had taken brief business or pleasure trips before, but had never lived abroad. The remaining three have been based in Japan for some time: two for 13 years, and one for 16 years, though for all three of them this was their first time in the U.S. The overall make-up, then, is a group of graduate students who have not spent much time abroad; those who have lived abroad the longest have spent the bulk of their time abroad in Japan, not the U.S.

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<sup>13</sup> There will be more to say about ethnicity in Chapter 4. Ethnicity has received much attention in Western scholarship of China over the past ten to twenty years. The quick summary is that, not surprisingly, ethnicity is primarily a cultural construct having little to do with genetic makeup.

## The English questions

I present the English-language questions first, for two reasons. First, so that the reader may familiarize herself with the material without slogging through glosses and translations, and second, because I designed and produced these questions first and then used them as a basis for the Chinese questions.

With the exception of the first two interviews, the same questions were asked to all sets of English-speaking participants. The first two interviews were different from the rest of the interviews in that there was one fewer question. The first and second interviews were different from each other in that five of the questions were worded slightly differently. I will explain this in more detail below.

There were twelve questions in all. The first question was:

1. Suppose you could create a new society. What would it be like?

The question was intended as a “warm-up”: to get the participants used to the interview setting, and to get them thinking about how societies are and should be formed.

2. How would you explain to a five-year-old what a government is and its relationship to the people?

This is the question that I added after the first two interviews. As shown by George Lakoff in *Moral Politics* (Lakoff 1996), while the Nation-as-Family metaphor seems to structure a great deal of reasoning about American society, explicit usages of family terminology are hard to come by. After the first two interviews I hit upon an idea for

tricking my participants into explicitly invoking the Nation-as-Family metaphor. I hoped it would work like this: We know that metaphor often involves conceptualizing a relatively complexly-structured target domain in terms of a relatively simply-structured source domain; we know that this is the case for the Nation-as-Family metaphor; I therefore wanted to get my interviewees to think to themselves: “How can I boil government down to its simplest conceptualization?” I chose five as an age because five is pre-school: I didn’t want my interviewees to be able to draw on a school-based metaphor.

The third question:

3. Suppose a citizen is walking down the street one day when the police arrest him. They don’t tell him<sup>14</sup> why; they simply arrest him and keep him locked up for three days before letting him go. He has done nothing illegal. What will this person think? What will this person do?

Now we get into our first scenario. I arranged the interview so that the questions about society came before the questions about the family: since I was hoping for evidence of the Nation-as-Family metaphor, I didn’t want to prime the interviewees by first asking family-based questions and then asking society-based questions. Specifically, Question

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<sup>14</sup> Except in cases in which gender specification was necessary for a question to be comprehensible, for all generic individuals in the interview questions I used males, for two reasons. First, I used males instead of females because I wanted the scenario to be as “unmarked” as possible. That is, given the markedness of gender, interviewees, in noting (consciously or unconsciously) the presence of a female “character,” might then “gender” the question and seek gender-based explanations, which would have distracted from the individual-versus-state type of discussion I was seeking.

Second, I used *exclusively* males because I didn’t want to introduce another parameter of variation.

#3 was aimed at getting interviewees to think and talk about what sorts of behaviors can legitimately be expected on the part of societal authorities such as the police, and what sorts of responses an individual might have if the behavior of the authorities was deemed illegitimate and possibly harmful to a person. The invitation to consider what the citizen would *think* was intended to get the interviewees to empathize as fully as possible with the citizen: to place themselves imaginatively into the citizen's slot in the frame structure so as to maximize their own motivation to draw on as many cultural resources as possible to reason through the scenario.<sup>15</sup>

4. With regard to the person in Question #3:
  - Will this person's response differ by educational level?<sup>16</sup>
  - What should this person do?
  - Should this person do the same thing regardless of his profession and social status?

I wanted to be sure that the interviewees both considered a broad range of hypothetical people and addressed the question of *should*: what (metaphorical) forces — emotional, moral, social — are at play in determining what a person does in a situation such as that described in Question #3?

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<sup>15</sup> In terms of George Lakoff and Jerome Feldman's Neural Theory of Language, we might say that I was getting the interviewees to perform a *simulation*. While NTL deals with more sensorimotor domains than politics and society, I believe the principle is the same: our *understanding of* an action is often based on an internal *simulation of* an action, be it sensorimotor or more abstractly psychological.

<sup>16</sup> The wording of the first bullet in the first interview was: "What will this person think and do if he is a worker? A farmer? A professor?" This was in keeping with the strategy of being as specific as possible.

5. The government passes a law doubling the income tax without consulting the citizens.<sup>17</sup> Is the government right to do this? What would citizens say? What would they do? What should they do?

Here we have potential conflict between citizenry and government, but this time the questionable activity by the government is carried out against the entire citizenry, allowing for the question of collective action to be addressed. The question about what citizens would *say* was included in the same spirit as the question about what the arrested citizen would *think*, except that this was intended to get interviewees to try and produce actual language that they expected the hypothetical people in the question might use. I also wanted to see if there was any frame-based connection between what people would hypothetically *say about* the situation and what they would *do about* the situation. For example, would people hypothetically say “this is wrong” and then take actions based on the view that it was wrong? Or might they say “this is wrong” but then not take any action?

6. The government decides to go to war. Chris is drafted into the army to fight, but he feels strongly that war is wrong. What will Chris say and do? What should he do?

The main purpose of this question, aside from continuing the general theme of citizen-state tension, was to probe how far people were willing to extend the legitimacy of

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However, I found that the interviewees got *too* detailed, in fact bogged down, in considering such specifics. So I switched to more general wording.

<sup>17</sup>“...without consulting the citizens” is missing from the first interview. I added it because, without it, the possibility is open that the government *did* consult the citizenry, making its actions more legitimate.

individual beliefs and desires over state interests (as defined by the state). The military seemed the perfect venue for discussing this, as war is often seen as perhaps the ultimate venue for the subordination of individual beliefs and desires to the interests of the state.

7. A tree has fallen and is blocking a public road in a remote location, hours from the nearest city.<sup>18</sup> Several large trucks are present, and could move the tree off of the road. Will they? Should they?

This question was inspired by something a Chinese interviewee had said during one of the eventually-discarded interviews. He and his partner had tangentially begun to discuss what they felt were some differences between Asian (his term: *Yàzhōu*, “Asia”) culture and American culture, when he related an experience of his: As an expert in administration, he often asked his students what they would do if they saw a dead mouse on a road. He found that his Asian students said they would call the relevant government authorities to deal with it. His point was that in “Asian cultures” people rely on the government to take care of things. So I decided to come up with a similar question, in specific-scenario form, to probe this.

8. If a person is rich, what should he/she do with his/her money?

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<sup>18</sup>“in a remote location, hours from the nearest city,” is missing from the first interview. I decided I wanted to make the scenario more extreme; I didn’t want the interviewees to be able to say, simply, that the hypothetical truck drivers could call the Highway Patrol and be done with it.



The idea here was to give the interviewees a bit of a break from specific scenarios before getting into the family-based questions. Of course I also hoped to get interesting data about general notions of economic responsibilities of individuals to society.

9. Tom is about to graduate from high school. He decides he doesn't want to go to college, despite his parents' wishes. Instead, he wants to join a rock band. What will the family members all say to one another? What will happen in the end? Who is right?

This is the first of two questions involving family disputes. Here we pit a young man against both his parents, who are presumably allied against him. Tom has some desires that are in conflict with his parents' desires. The goal of this question was to probe what interviewees thought about the various hypothetical family members' positions within the family: Who holds the power? When conflicts arise, how do they get resolved? The last sub-question, "Who is right?" was inspired by the research of psychologists Kaiping Peng and Richard Nisbett (Peng and Nisbett 1999), who found that, when faced with scenarios about family conflict and asked "Who is right?" Americans were more likely than Chinese to provide a simple yes/no answer to the question. I wanted to test this for myself.

10. The Smiths are a three-person family living in the United States: Mom, Dad, and their 17-year-old son Bill. Mom and Dad both work full-time jobs for similar salaries. Mom wants to buy a new car and give the old one to Bill; Dad thinks their current car will last several more years, and doesn't think they should waste money on a new car. What will they all say to one another? What will happen in the end? Who is right?

Here we have a conflict between two parents, with the son a likely ally of the mother.<sup>19</sup> I made Bill 17 years old so that he would be old enough to drive a car, but too young to be granted the autonomy from one's parents that comes, in the U.S., with turning 18.

11. There are stereotypes about certain ethnic groups in the United States.<sup>20</sup> Some claim, for instance, that because few African Americans play volleyball, that this says something about abilities possessed by certain ethnic groups. Is there any truth to such stereotypes?
12. Is there one dominant ethnic group in the United States? Is this the way it should be?

These questions, the last two of the interview, involve a shift to quite a different topic. My initial reason for coming up with questions about ethnicity was to probe, in interview format, some of the topics I had investigated in my earlier work on affirmative action (Patent 2000), and to broaden the inquiry into a cross-cultural study.

Unfortunately, what probing I managed to do in my first set of (ultimately discarded) interviews didn't yield much promising data. But I was still interested in questions of race and ethnicity, so I looked at some Chinese sources on the topic of *mínzú*, the closest Chinese equivalent of "ethnicity." What I found was shocking to me as an educated American: in textbooks intended for use in Chinese high schools, it was stated outright

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<sup>19</sup> In the first interview, the roles of the mother and father were reversed. I changed this after the first interview because I realized that, if I expected I might hear to patriarchally-inspired views of family structure, these views would gain more force if it was claimed that a father's wishes could overcome not just the opposition of the mother, but the dual opposition of the mother and the son.

that, although China was fortunate to have 56 different ethnic groups (*mínzú*), it was to China's advantage that one group, the "great" (*wěidà*) Han nationality, was in a leadership role. This willingness to openly justify the sort of power relationship that exists in China between the Han and the other 55 officially-designated ethnic groups got me curious about what interviewees might have to say about the matter. So these last two questions were different from the rest in that I first decided what I wanted to ask in Chinese, and then based the English versions on the Chinese.

Question #11 raises a stereotype that may seem strange. After all, how many of us puzzle over how few African Americans play volleyball? This was deliberate on my part: I wanted to prime the interviewees to think about stereotypes, but not give them an obvious example of a common stereotype to then work from. Instead, I wanted to see if they would produce stereotypes of their own.

Question #12 is meant to address the power question I had come across in my reading: If one ethnic group is in a socially dominant position, is this a good thing?

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<sup>20</sup> "...in the United States" is missing from the first interview. I decided to add it because I knew I wanted the equivalent Chinese question to be explicitly confined to China, so it made sense to explicitly confine this question to the United States.

## The Chinese questions

Given that my project revolves around the issue of what a cross-cultural “equivalent” might be, it is problematic to work putative cross-cultural equivalents into the very fiber of the research methodology. Problematic it may be, but it is also unavoidable. To employ what I believe to be some appropriate image-schematic reasoning: we need to decide on some sort of starting point, or the investigation cannot proceed. Fortunately, by the time I generated the Chinese questions for this round of interviews, I already had the experience of the earlier, discarded interviews, to guide me. One key, it seemed, in developing “equivalent” Chinese questions, was to have questions that contained a minimum of difficult-to-translate terms: terms that directly evoke cultural models that may not map well across cultures. In the early interviews, the presence of the terms *human rights* and *rénquán* immediately created problems for cross-cultural equivalence, both because they presupposed certain implicit cultural models, and because of all the geopolitical baggage that is automatically brought along when these terms are used. On the whole, this set of interviews seems to have managed to minimize this problem. Below, in discussing each Chinese question, I will note where this problem does arise.

I generated the Chinese questions myself, working from the English. Much to my chagrin — though not, I suppose, to my surprise — when I consulted with a native

Chinese-speaking friend, I found that my translations were grossly inadequate, and much revision was done. By the time I consulted with my friend, I had completed the English interviews, so there was no opportunity to go back and readjust the English questions to fit the Chinese more closely. I had to trust my friend's judgment that what she produced were indeed the best translations she could possibly produce. My confidence in the final results was increased by our lengthy discussions over each odd-seeming difference, however subtle: I always made sure she understood what I was trying to get at with the English version, and she then did her best to render Chinese translations that would set the stage in as similar a way as possible to the English versions. She was able to do this well, I believe, because she has lived in the U.S. (as a graduate student in History) for six years, and has, through her own experience of adapting to U.S. society, had to negotiate subtle linguistic and cultural differences.

I am including full interlinear glosses of the questions below. While aesthetically this may offend, it is important at this stage to be as precise as possible about cross-linguistic mappings, as every interview takes the questions the questions as a starting point.

Question #1:

Jiǎdìng	nǐ	nénggòu	chuànglì	yī	ge
Suppose	2-sg	can	create	one	CLAS
xīn	shèhui.	Zhèi	ge	shèhui	huì

new	society.	This	CLAS	society	will
shì	shénme	yàngzi	de?		
be	what	type	NOM?		

For reference, the corresponding English question was:

1. Suppose you could create a new society. What would it be like?

No big problems presented themselves for this first translation.

Question #2:

Jiǎrú	yī	ge	wǔ	suì	de
Suppose	one	CLAS	five	year-old	ATT
xiǎoháizi	wèn	nín	“zhèngfu”	shì	shénme
child	ask	2-sg formal	“government”	be	what
yìsi?	“Zhèngfu”	hé	“rénmín”	yǒu	shénme
meaning?	“Government”	and	“people”	have	what
yàng	de	guānxi?	Nín	huì	zěnme
type	ATT	relationship?	2sg-formal	will	how
huídá	ne?				
answer	MOOD?				

The corresponding English question was:

2. How would you explain to a five-year-old what a government is and its relationship to the people?

This translation, too, presented no major problems.

Question #3:

Jiǎrú	yǒu	yī	gè	gōngmín,	shénme
Suppose	exist	one	CLAS	citizen,	whatever
zuì	dōu	méiyǒu	fàn,	zài	guàng
crime	all	not-have	commit,	LOC	stroll

jiē street	de ATT	shíhou time	bèi PASS	jǐngchá police	dàibǔ. arrest.
Jǐngchá Police	bù not	gàosu tell	tā 3-sg	wèishénme why	bèi PASS
dàibǔ, arrest,	jiù then	bǎ take	tā 3-sg	suǒ lock	zài LOC
jiānyù prison	lǐ, inside,	yīzhí straight	dào until	sān three	tiān day
yǐhòu after	cái not-until	fàng set	tā 3-sg	zǒu. go.	Nǐ 2-sg
juéde feel	zhèi this	ge CLAS	rén person	huì will	zěnmē how
xiǎng? think?	Tā 3-sg	huì will	rúhé how	fǎnyìng? react?	Cǎiqǔ Take
shénme what	xíngdòng? measures?				

The corresponding English question:

3. Suppose a citizen is walking down the street one day when the police arrest him. They don't tell him why; they simply arrest him and keep him locked up for three days before letting him go. He has done nothing illegal. What will this person think? What will this person do?

The Chinese question involves three sub-questions, while the English version involves only two. This is because my native-speaker consultant felt that using the Chinese equivalent of the question “What will this person do?” was too general. She felt there should be two, more specific, questions in its place, asking first about a general “reaction” (*fǎnyìng*), which could include feelings or actions, and then about the active “measures” (*xíngdòng*) the arrested person would take.

Question #4:

Jiù Take	qiánshù aforementioned	de ATT	lizi example	láishuō: speaking:	zhèi this
ge CLAS	rén person	yīnggāi should	rúhé how	huíyìng respond	zhèi this
yàng type	de ATT	zhuàngkuàng? situation?	Zhèi This	ge CLAS	rén person
de POS	jiàoyù education	shuǐpíng level	huì will	bù not	huì will
yǐngxiǎng influence	tā 3-sg	de POS	fǎnyìng? response?	Rúguǒ If	yǐngxiǎng influence
dehuà, COND	nǐ 2-sg	juéde feel	zhèi this	yàng type	yǒu have
méiyǒu not-have	dàoli? reasonableness?	Yīnggāi Should	bù not	yīnggāi? should?	

The corresponding English question:

4. With regard to the person in Question #3:
  - Will this person's response differ by educational level?
  - What *should* this person do?
  - Should this person do the same thing regardless of his profession and social status?

There are several noticeable differences between the English and Chinese questions.

First, due to two oversights on my part, the order of the sub-questions is different. In the first two Chinese interviews, the sub-question about what the person should do was missing. Then, when I added it in, I put it in the wrong place, and failed to notice until after all the interviews had been completed.



A second difference is between the English wording of the first sub-question, “differ by educational level,” and the corresponding Chinese sub-question, which back-translates as “Will this person’s educational level influence his response?” My consultant felt that this was simply the best way to render the question in Chinese in a way that was easily comprehensible to the interviewees.

In the third sub-question there are two more differences. First, the English mentions “profession and social status,” while the Chinese sticks with “educational level.” My consultant felt it would be confusing to introduce profession and social status at this stage, that it would disrupt the flow of the question. I was willing to go along with this because what I was trying to address in the question — the extent to which there exists a model of the abstract, context-free individual — is addressed equally well by both the English and the Chinese questions; which exact parameter undergoes variation — education, profession, social status — is of secondary importance.

The final difference also relates to this. As in Question #3, the last English sub-question is split into two Chinese questions. My consultant and I went back and forth on this for quite some time. The Chinese questions back-translate into English as something like: “If [educational level] influences [his reaction], is this reasonable? Should it be [this way]?” This translation problem is a knotty one, since, I hypothesize, part of the reason the question is so easy to phrase in English is because of the presence in the U.S.

of the cultural model whose existence the question is probing; contrariwise, the question is difficult to phrase in Chinese because of the (relative) absence of the relevant model. I will address this in much more detail later. In the meantime, consider this a bit of a preview of things to come.

Question #5:

Rúguǒ If	zhèngfǔ government	méiyǒu not-have	dédào receive	rénmín people	de POS
tóngyì, agreement,	jiù then	zìxíng spontaneous	juédìng decide	bǎ take	suǒdé income
shuì tax	zēngjiā increase	yī one	bèi, multiple	nǐ 2-sg	juéde feel
zhèi this	yàng type	duì right	bù not	duì? right	Rénmín People
huì will	yǒu have	shénme what	fǎnyìng? response	Cǎiqǔ Take	shénme what
yàng type	de ATT	xíngdòng? measures	Nǐ 2-sg	juéde feel	rénmín people
yīnggāi should	rúhé how	huíyìng respond	zhèi this	yàng type	de ATT
zhuàngkuàng? situation?					

The English question:

5. The government passes a law doubling the income tax without consulting the citizens. Is the government right to do this? What would citizens say? What would they do? What should they do?

Two differences are apparent here, both fairly subtle. First, the Chinese version of “consulting the citizens” would back-translate roughly as “receive the agreement of the citizens.” This is what my consultant insisted on, for stylistic reasons. Second, we see a repeat of the issues confronted in Question #3: English “say” and “do” were found to be too abstract, and so were translated into something relatively more concrete.

Question #6:

Zhèngfǔ Government	juéding decide	yào will	dǎzhàng. fight-war.	Zhāngsān Zhangsan (name)	suīrán although
bèi PASS	yìngzhēng draft	rùwǔ, enter-army,	dànshi but	tā 1-sg	xīn heart
lǐ inside	qiángliè strong	rènwéi believe	zhànzhēng war	shì is	bù not
duì right	de. NOM.	Nǐ 2-sg	juéde, feel,	zài LOC	zhèi this
zhǒng type	qíngkuàng situation	xià, under,	Zhāngsān Zhangsan	huì will	zěnmébàn? do-what?
Tā 3-sg	yīnggāi should	zěnmébàn? do-what?			

The English question:

6. The government decides to go to war. Chris is drafted into the army to fight, but he feels strongly that war is wrong. What will Chris say and do? What should he do?

My consultant felt it would be strange to ask what Chris would say in such a situation.

She felt it would be best to translate “say and do” into Chinese *zěnmébàn*, which means

roughly “do what,” but in the sense of “do what in response to a bad situation.”

Question #7:

Zài LOC	yī one	ge CLAS	hěn very	piānpì remote	de ATT
xiāngxià countryside	dìfang, place,	yǒu exist	yī one	kē CLAS	dà big
shù tree	héng horizontal	dǎo fall	zài LOC	gōnglù public-road	shàng, on,
dǎngzhù block	le PERF	guòwǎng pass	chēliàng. vehicle.	Zài LOC	zhèi this
ge CLAS	shíhou time	zhènghǎo just-then	yǒu exist	jǐ a-few	liàng CLAS
kǎchē truck	jīngguò. pass.	Nǐ 2-sg	juéde feel	tāmen 3-pl	huì will
bù not	huì will	zhǔdòng take-initiative	bǎ take	zhèi this	kē CLAS
dà big	shù tree	cóng from	gōnglù public-road	shàng on	lā pull
kāi? off?	Nǐ 2-sg	juéde feel	tāmen 3-sg	yīnggāi should	bù not
yīnggāi should	zhèi this	yàng type	zuò? do?		

The English question:

7. A tree has fallen and is blocking a public road in a remote location, hours from the nearest city. Several large trucks are present, and could move the tree off of the road. Will they? Should they?

My consultant felt that more specifics were necessary for the question to make sense.

Her version would back-translate as:

- 7'. In a remote location in the countryside, there is a large tree that has fallen across a public road and is blocking vehicles from passing. Right at this time

a few trucks pass by. Do you think they will take the initiative to pull this tree off the road? Do you feel they should do this?

I am not entirely certain why my consultant insisted on such specific wording, but I decided, as in so many cases, to follow her suggestion, both because she was definitively expert in this realm, and because the difference in wording did not seem to me as if it would affect the way in which the relevant cultural models were being probed. That is, the English and Chinese versions of the question, I decided, set the stage in a similar-enough way.

Question #8:

Rúguǒ If	yī one	ge CLAS	rén person	hěn very	yǒu have
qián, money,	tā 3-sg	yīnggāi should	zěnmē how	yòng use	tā 3-sg
de POS	qián? money?				

The English question:

8. If a person is rich, what should he/she do with his/her money?

This translation posed no significant problems.

Question #9:

Wáng'èr Wang'er (name)	kuàiyào soon-will	gāozhōng high-school	bìyè graduate	le. INC.	Suīrán Although
tā 3-sg	de POS	fùmǔ parents	xīwàng hope	tā 3-sg	shàng attend
dàxué, university,	dànshì grad school	tā she	bù not	xiǎng want	shàng attend

university,	but	3-sg	not	want	attend
dàxué, university,	xiǎng want	zǔ organize	yī one	ge CLAS	yáogǔn rock-and-roll
yuètuán. band.	Nǐ 2-sg	juéde feel	Wáng'èr Wang'er	huì will	zěnmeyàng how
hé with	tā 3-sg	de POS	fùmǔ parents	shuō? speak?	Tā 3-sg
de POS	fùmǔ parents	yòu also	huì will	zěnyàng how	fǎnyìng? respond?
Zuìhòu Finally	tāmen 3-pl	huì will	juédìng decide	zěnmē how	zuò? do?
Nǐ 2-sg	huì will	zhīchí support	nǎ which	yī one	biān? side?

The English question:

9. Tom is about to graduate from high school. He decides he doesn't want to go to college, despite his parents' wishes. Instead, he wants to join a rock band. What will the family members all say to one another? What will happen in the end? Who is right?

I had doubts about how to translate this question into Chinese, as it had been designed to fit a stereotypical version of an American cultural model that we might call the “rebellious son” model, according to which the son in a family not only rebels generally against his parents, but rebels in a particular way: by either joining or forming a rock-and-roll band. I was skeptical about how well this model would translate into the cultural worlds of the Chinese interviewees. My consultant, however, insisted that the Chinese speakers would not find it strange. Once again, I assented to my consultant's judgment.

This problem raises again the thorny methodological question of how to go about designing this sort of inquiry: do we want “objectively” similar questions, to make the data “purer” in some sense, or do we “bias” the questions by tailoring them to fit what we expect are differing cultural models? While these scare-quotes indicate my hesitancy to lump my study and others like it in with the hard sciences, it does make some sense to try to make the questions as literally similar as possible and let the responses do the answering about the cultural models. At the same time, introducing unfamiliar cultural models could create a sort of cognitive dissonance, or confusion, which, if experienced by one interview pool and not the other, could fundamentally change the nature of the interview process by leading to inherently different strategies for answering a given question. My own strategy, again, was to discuss this all at length with my consultant, and ultimately go with her judgment.

Question #10:

Lǐ Li (name)	jiā family	yǒu have	sān three	ge CLAS	rén: person:
bàba, dad,	māma, mom,	hé and	shíqī seventeen	suì year-old	de ATT
nán male	háizi child	Lǐsì. Lisi (name).	Bàba Dad	māma mom	liǎng two
ge CLAS	rén person	měi every	gè CLAS	xīngqī week	dōu all
gè each	gōngzuò work	sìshí forty	ge CLAS	xiǎoshí, hour,	líng earn

yīyàng same	de ATT	gōngzī. salary.	Xiànzài Now	māma mom	xiǎng want
mǎi buy	yī one	liàng CLAS	xīn new	qìchē, car,	bǎ take
jiù old	qìchē car	gěi give	Lǐsì Lisi	kāi. drive.	Dànshi But
bàba dad	rènwéi believe	xiànzài now	de ATT	chē car	hái still
kěyǐ can	zài again	kāi drive	jǐ several	nián, year,	mǎi buy
xīn new	chē car	děngyú equal	shì be	làngfèi waste	qián. money.
Nǐ 2-sg	juéde feel	bàba, dad,	māma, mom,	hé and	Lǐsì Lisi
huì will	shuō say	shénme? what?	Zuìhòu Finally	tāmen 3-pl	huì will
juéding decide	zěnme how	zuò? do?	Nǐ 2-sg	huì will	zhīchí support
nǎ which	yī one	biān? side?			

The English question:

10. The Smiths are a three-person family living in the United States: Mom, Dad, and their 17-year-old son Bill. Mom and Dad both work full-time jobs for similar salaries. Mom wants to buy a new car and give the old one to Bill; Dad thinks their current car will last several more years, and doesn't think they should waste money on a new car. What will they all say to one another? What will happen in the end? Who is right?

Another difficult question presented itself here: Given the differences in

standards of living between the U.S. and China, a car is a much more significant purchase



for a Chinese family than for an American family. Would raising the stakes of the dispute alter how the dispute would be resolved, and ideas about who is right? I again gambled that the benefit of having as close to a literal translation as possible outweighed this potential drawback.

Question #11:

Zhōngguó China	shì be	yī one	gè CLAS	duō many	mínzú ethnicity
guójiā, country,	xiàng such-as	Hàn, Han,	Měng, Mongolian,	Huí, Hui,	Zàng, Tibetan,
yǐjī and	gè every	ge CLAS	shǎoshù minority	mínzú. ethnicity.	Nǐ 2-sg
juéde feel	měi every	ge CLAS	mínzú ethnicity	de POS	nénglì ability
hé and	tiānxìng nature	dōu all	yīyàng same	ma? QU?	

The English question:

11. There are stereotypes about certain ethnic groups in the United States. Some claim, for instance, that because few African Americans play volleyball, that this says something about abilities possessed by certain ethnic groups. Is there any truth to such stereotypes?

Backtranslatable as:

- 11'. China is a multi-ethnic country, consisting of Han, Mongolian, Hui, Tibetan, and many other ethnic minorities. Do you believe that the abilities and natures of all ethnic groups are the same?

There are immediate and obvious differences here. Recall that questions #11 and

#12 differed from the rest in that, for these, my starting point was the Chinese question.

That is, when I designed the English questions, I had in mind a particular way I wanted to ask the question in Chinese, and then had to adapt these questions for the American students. Broadly speaking, it is safe to say that Chinese speakers from the Mainland have no problems making general statements about the attributes of certain ethnic groups. As discussed earlier, I have also found that even in academic textbooks it is acceptable to make generalizations about ethnic groups. For this reason, I wanted to approach the question directly in Chinese, asking bluntly if different ethnic groups have different “abilities” (*nénglì*) and “natures” (*tiānxìng*).

For the Americans, though, I wanted to tread lightly, as race and ethnicity, and the extent to which it is culturally acceptable, at least among relatively educated people, to make generalizations about racial and ethnic groups, is in question. Hence the suggestive, indirect, generalized wording.

We are confronted once again with the now-familiar methodological problem of how best to trans-culturate these questions. Obviously for this question I chose a different route from earlier questions. The only other choice would have been to ask potentially quite offensive questions, and end up alienating and angering my interviewees, which I did not wish to do.

Finally, Question #12:

Zhōngguó	yǒu	méiyǒu	yī	ge	mínzú
China	have	not-have	one	CLAS	ethnicity

shì be	tèbié especially	zhàn occupy	yōushì advantage	de? NOM?	Nǐ 2-sg
juéde feel	zhèi this	yàng type	yīnggāi should	ma? QU?	

The English question:

12. Is there one dominant ethnic group in the United States? Is this the way it should be?

This question was much easier than #11 to deal with. The only questionable aspect is the extent to which *dominant* and *zhàn yōushì* are equivalents. The English term can refer to many domains, and doesn't necessarily have to do with power. It could refer, for instance, simply to population (though this may be metonymically connected to power). I was reassured by my consultant that *zhàn yōushì* also has these varied interpretations.

As the interviews progressed, I was tempted to change the questions in various ways. With the few exceptions discussed above, I resisted. I decided that I could continue transforming and retransforming the questions in a quest for The Perfect Interview, but that no such ideal would ever manifest. Instead, I would be left with more piecemeal and less robust data. So the questions, flawed as they are, remained, and form the basis of this dissertation.

### What comes next

While the reader is doubtless anxious to get into more data, it is first necessary that Chapter 2 intervene: we must take a look at the intellectual milieu surrounding discussions of human rights in China. Once this is done, I present the two data chapters: Chapter 3 dives quickly and deeply into cultural models of the family; Chapter 4 does the same for models of society. Then comes Chapter 5, which situates the specific data from Chapters 3 and 4 within more general Chinese and American cultural systems. Finally comes Chapter 6, which reexamines the question of human rights in light of the discoveries in Chapters 3-5.

## **Chapter 2: Human Rights in China: the Intellectual Milieu**

In addressing the topics touched upon in this dissertation, I am tossing my hat into an already-crowded ring. Or, rather, into several already-crowded rings. Aside from debates internal to linguistics, there is, outside of linguistics, a vast set of issues about which there exist enormous bodies of literature, including at least the following: general philosophical questions about human rights, including universalism versus relativism; more specific questions about human rights in China, including whether or not, and how, change should be attempted; general questions of family structure and its relationship to state structure, including materialist (Marxist) theories versus idealist conceptions; more specific questions about Chinese family and kinship structure; and the culture and politics of ethnicity, both generally and in China. It is obviously impossible for me to familiarize myself even with one of these bodies of literature, let alone with all of them, let alone offer critiques of them and situate my own research within them in a thorough fashion. Since this dissertation is about human rights, however, in this chapter I attempt to position my research within the intellectual milieu surrounding questions of “human rights in China.” The literature is gigantic; instead of reviewing it in its entirety, I first break the literature into several categories, and then examine some representative works and how my research relates to them.

The “human rights in China” literature breaks down roughly into the following categories, placed approximately in order according to how much they have in common with my research, beginning with the least:

- Universalist arguments that human rights should apply equally to all societies, and therefore to China. These take two forms:
  - The proactive, policy-oriented discourse of rights advocacy groups, aimed at pointing out human rights abuses in China and proposing solutions.
  - More academic approaches, usually relying on some type of philosophical argumentation.
- Relativist claims that human rights may not be legitimately applicable to all cultures.
- Ethnographic approaches intent not on prescribing human rights concepts but on understanding how Chinese culture relates to human rights. These include:
  - Philosophical ethnography: attempting to fit human rights into a Confucian framework.
  - Ethnography of recent intellectual history: investigating how recent Chinese intellectuals have addressed human rights.
  - Political ethnography: trying to understand Chinese culture — as it relates to human rights — through political documents.
  - Universalist ethnography: searching for cultural universals that might underlie similar thinking about human rights.
- Empirical investigation into Chinese people’s beliefs about human rights.

I will introduce each of these in turn.

### Universalism

A universalist slant on human rights is a theoretical prerequisite for human rights advocacy groups. Universalist assumptions, by dint of being assumptions, usually go unstated, but are readily apparent from the manifesto-like nature of the discourse. The

following, from *China Rights Forum*, the publication of the rights advocacy group

Human Rights in China, is typical of the more extreme rights advocacy groups' rhetoric:

Beijing should no longer be permitted to hide behind platitudes about "legal reform," "social stability" and "the right to subsistence." At its upcoming session in March, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights should put the Chinese government on notice that if China wants the world's respect, it must first begin respecting the basic human rights of all Chinese citizens, regardless of sex, age or political persuasion. (Woodman 1996: 2)

No attempt is made to define "basic human rights" or to frame them from any sort of cultural perspective. But of course, that's not the job of rights advocacy groups, be they relatively extreme groups like Human Rights in China or more moderate groups such as Amnesty International. At the same time, though, such rhetoric can be counterproductive to the extent that universalist assumptions are accompanied by unrealistic policy prescriptions, such as the following, again from *China Rights Forum*, about the lives of girls in China:

HRIC believes that to remedy these and other problems of discrimination, China should amend the various laws it has enacted to create independent mechanisms which may impose sanctions on institutions and agencies with discriminatory policies. China should take further proactive measures to redress discrimination against females in education. All population policy measures which have a discriminatory effect should be eliminated. Finally, the Chinese government should carry out an investigation into the reasons for the serious imbalances in sex ratios at birth, if it has not already done so and, in the light of the results, develop more effective strategies for combatting such phenomena. (1996: 16)

When universalism takes such an extreme form, it becomes so divorced from empirical study as to be irresponsible. For instance, China's family planning policy is well-known

to “have a discriminatory effect” on females. This is why 95% of the children in orphanages are girls. Is Human Rights in China arguing that the family planning policy be abolished? If so, have they thought through how this would affect the quality of people’s lives in China?

Quality-of-life questions aside, even for much milder human rights advocacy, there are serious intellectual questions that need to be addressed. One way of thinking about human rights advocacy is as follows: What advocacy groups want is for certain cultural models to be codified in law and enforced. They want to create a political (in the sense of state power) basis for human rights. Political institutions are many things, but in part they are a reflection of cultural models. Seeing human rights this way reveals the importance of looking at, and trying to understand, the cultural models that underlie political institutions. To the extent that political institutions and practices reflect cultural models that are prevalent in the populations affected by these institutions and practices, it is likely to be counterproductive to try to fashion political institutions based on one particular set of cultural models, and then try to impose them on a political system that reflects a different set of cultural models. In other words, any attempt to change institutions in a way that will result in respect for “human rights” must include an empirical investigation into the cultural models that underlie conceptions of human rights.



Another type of universalism comes from academics who explicitly acknowledge the presence of relativist positions and then argue against them. I take here as representative examples of such work three essays from a volume entitled *Human Rights and Chinese Values*, edited by Michael C. Davis (Davis 1995). This collection of essays was published in response to the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, a document produced as a result of a conference among Asian nations in response to perceived Western criticism about human rights in Asian countries. The Bangkok Declaration attempts to explain human rights difficulties in the context of economic development, and takes the stance that human rights will develop in time along with the economy. Depending on whom you ask, The Bangkok Declaration is anything from an honest effort to commit to human rights improvement to an utterly irresponsible apologist document for human rights abuses. By and large, the contributing authors to *Human Rights and Chinese Values* are closer to this latter interpretation. The discourse is generally more subtle than that of advocacy groups, but the stand is still clear: arguments based on cultural relativism are a red herring, exploited by unscrupulous leaders for raw political ends. “The people” are seen as basically in agreement with Western governments about human rights, and attempts by leaders to downplay the universality of human rights are viewed as directed more towards quelling domestic dissent than to silencing criticism by Western

governments. For instance, we have the following from the first essay in the volume, by editor Michael C. Davis:

It is important to note that in the Bangkok Declaration Asian governments were formulating a response not only to a Western challenge but primarily to the challenge of their own people. This seems to be the primary reason for their response. As the recent US capitulation over the MFN debate reveals, Western power, whether it be military or economic, represents a much less serious challenge to Asian governments who would abuse human rights than the people of Asia themselves. (Davis 1995: 22)

This sort of approach is quite common in this genre of human rights discourse. Painting oneself as a David allied with “the people” against repressive governmental Goliaths is meant to arouse the reader’s sympathy, as well as to perpetuate one’s own sense of righteousness in the cause of human rights. What is missed here is that the degree of sympathy that the people of any given society have for universalist ideas of human rights is a matter for empirical investigation, not an a priori given.

In her contribution to the volume, Eliza Lee makes a point somewhat similar to Davis’s. Her focus is not on brute-force political repression, but on one of its concomitants: the stifling of a culture’s self-definition. While she explicitly disavows radical universalism, her argument is still fundamentally universalist. She frames her point in terms of what she sees as an inherently self-undermining aspect of the Bangkok Declaration’s endorsement of cultural relativism:

In these senses, the cultural relativist argument implicit in the Bangkok Declaration bears its own negation. Accepting the idea of cultural rights necessarily raises the concern that cultural communities are actually heterogeneous, historical, and dialogical communities. As such, one needs

to ask whether the Bangkok Declaration is truly premised on defending cultural interests. As Avtar Brah notes, “Asia” or the “East” was historically constructed as the Other as “Europe” constructed its Self in the process of colonization. It is most ironic that the same cultural resources are now utilized by Asian political leaders to colonize their own people, in the sense of denying them the very cultural right to reflect on their own cultural practices and actively to construct/reconstruct their own identities. (Lee 1995: 88)

Her point is well taken. However, in making this point she assumes that this sort of active cultural self-definition is something that people universally are interested in engaging in. Of course it may turn out to be the case that this assumption is true, but instead of simply assuming it is true, we should treat it as a matter for empirical investigation.

Davis’s and Lee’s discursive approaches are somewhat subtle compared to the more overtly universalist argumentation in Margaret Ng’s contribution. Ng’s essay exemplifies perhaps the most extreme sort of academic universalism. She argues that human rights are “properly” conceived of as the largely “negative” rights of the Western tradition, such as political and civil rights, as opposed to the “positive” rights that tend to be espoused by socialist governments, such as the right to subsistence. Ng concludes her essay as follows:

Once it is accepted that political and civil rights are the only rights proper, as distinct from welfare rights which are aspirations, the fallacy of rights being culture-bound cannot be maintained. The negative nature of rights, and their universal validity, removes the excuse against their immediate and complete implementation. The true question is not whether each state may justifiably postpone the implementation of rights until certain economic conditions have been achieved. It is, rather, whether the State may legitimately violate the rights of the individual in order to attain such

collective goals as economic development, or simply to safeguard the continued power of a particular government. There can be no doubt what the answer is. (Ng 1995: 70)

Space limitations preclude a detailed frame-semantic analysis of Ng's rhetoric, but at a minimum it is clear from this passage that she takes universalism as a given, rather than as an open question worthy of empirical inquiry.

The other essays in this volume also, to a greater or lesser extent, take the universality of human rights as a given. My intention here is not to criticize the authors for assuming universality since, as with the advocacy groups, it is arguably not their job to address the relevant empirical questions. Rather, I wish merely to point out the desirability of empirical investigation as an input to such research, as the quality of work by scholars genuinely interested in improving the lives of China's people can improve if it is based on empirical findings rather than on speculation or assumption.

### Relativism

As we have seen, contributors to the Davis volume make universalist arguments as a response to cultural relativism. The roots of relativism go back as far as (see esp. Boas 1938). Relativism takes many forms, but the common thread is that, because cultures around the world differ, and because human rights is dependent to some extent on cultural values, we might expect some degree of variation in ideas about human rights around the world. A particularly lucid enunciation of the relativist position was offered

in a 1947 statement about human rights from the American Anthropological Association, written by Boas's student Melville Herskovits:

Standards and values are relative to the culture from which they derive so that any attempt to formulate postulates that grow out of the beliefs or moral codes of one culture must to that extent detract from the applicability of any Declaration of Human Rights to mankind as a whole....The rights of Man in the Twentieth Century cannot be circumscribed by the standards of any single culture, or be dictated by the aspirations of any single people. Such a document will lead to frustration, not realization of the personalities of vast numbers of human beings. (American Anthropological Association 1947)

Relativist arguments can range from strong prescriptive statements that no society has the right to pressure any other society to adopt its cultural norms, to quite mild, descriptive statements about cultural difference that make no prescriptions or proscriptions one way or another. As with the universalists, the relativists often lack an empirical bent, instead relying on unsupported assertions about cultural difference. For instance, George Kennan once argued that "there are no internationally accepted standards of morality to which the U.S. government could appeal if it wished to act in the name of moral principles." (Kennan 1985: 207) Again, this may be true, but needs to be investigated. There may indeed be culturally universal moral standards of behavior and treatment of human beings. They may be limited, but they may exist on some level. Given all the methods available as a product of decades of linguistic and ethnographic research, we should investigate this question empirically instead of relying on unsupported assertions.

Talal Asad, in his moderately relativist essay on torture in the context of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Asad 1997), is interested in such investigations. His article does not address China specifically, but is still germane for his interesting relativist argument. Asad begins (285) by quoting Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” He then goes on, throughout the essay, to discuss ways in which this wording might be differently construed, both in the public realm of statecraft and in the private realm of sexual practice. The moderate nature of his relativist position is concisely summarized in the following passage:

I do not argue that there can be no such thing as cruelty. I am merely skeptical about *the universalist discourses* that have been generated around it. But my skepticism is intellectual, not moral.

This paper is not concerned with attacking the reforms inspired by the United Nations condemnation of torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Rather, it focuses primarily on the way Western discourses about cruelty are constructed and the ways that the idea of torture can overlap with and substitute for ideas of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. In my view, such inquiries are necessary if we seek to clarify our transcultural judgments. (286. Emphasis in original.)

In not proscribing universalist efforts to influence human-rights-related institutions, Asad’s relativism is moderate. Towards the end of his essay, he also offers the following:

We need ethnographies of pain and cruelty that can provide a better understanding of how relevant practices are actually conducted in different traditions. Such ethnographies will certainly show us that cruelty can be experienced and addressed in ways other than as a violations of rights — for example, as a failure of specific virtues or as an expression of particular vices. (304)

I absolutely agree with Asad that ethnography is an intellectually responsible prerequisite to determining how universalist or relativist a position one wishes to adopt towards questions of human rights. I differ with him, however, in focus: whatever differences exist cross-culturally in conceptions of human rights, these differences are likely to be most detectable not in a domain as basic as human cruelty.<sup>21</sup> In fact, we will see strong evidence in this dissertation for similar expectations in China and the U.S. of how humans should be treated by one another. Regardless of this difference in focus, however, I agree with Asad in his call for an ethnographic (i.e., empirical) approach to the investigation of cultural difference. While Asad himself is somewhat of a relativist, adherence to an empirical approach is independent of universalism or relativism. Indeed, if one's universalism or relativism is to be a responsible one, it should be grounded in an empirical approach.

### Ethnography

Another major approach to the study of human rights in China is what could be broadly termed “ethnography” — in the sense of focusing on culture — though the methodologies are quite different from mine. The first of these we might call

“philosophical ethnography”: looking at Chinese culture through philosophical texts.

Again we take as our focus a representative volume: a 1998 compilation entitled

*Confucianism and Human Rights*, edited by William Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming

(de Bary and Tu 1998). In his introduction, de Bary lays forth the volume’s project:

It is obvious enough that Confucianism itself did not generate human rights concepts and practices equivalent to those now embodied in the Universal Declaration; it is not obvious that Confucianism was headed in an altogether different authoritarian or “communitarian” direction, incompatible with the rights affirmed in the Declaration. Our aim has not been to find twentieth-century human rights in Confucianism, but to recognize therein certain central human values — historically embedded in, but at the same time restive with, repressive institutions in China — that in the emerging modern world could be supportive of those rights. In this our concern is not so much to render judgment on the past record as to clarify the bases on which past judgments have been made — those which could inform our understanding of human rights as still in the process of formation. (de Bary 1998: 5-6)

There is thus a certain empiricism in the approach of this book: neither universalist nor relativist assumptions form the background of the essays. Instead, the authors endeavor to take as objective a look as they can at one of China’s most influential philosophical systems and match it up with human rights as laid out in the Universal Declaration.

Each of the authors takes a slightly different approach to the matter, and finds slightly different areas of overlap and mismatch between Confucianism and human rights, but methodologically the essays are essentially the same: look at some aspect or

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<sup>21</sup> In fact, the frame semantics of cruelty presuppose the unwillingness and victimhood of the person experiencing the pain. If pain is caused in a context in which the experiencer of the pain is a willing participant, the behavior on the part of the person causing the pain ceases to be “cruelty.”



aspects of the Confucian canon, and look for resonance with modern notions of human rights. While this somewhat empirical approach is a definite improvement over the a priori universalist and relativist approaches we have seen, this methodology involves an assumption which may or may not be valid: that Confucianism, however construed, is somehow equivalent to present-day Chinese culture. Once again, it may be the case that this assumption is true — that we can look at what Confucius, Mencius and other Confucian philosophers said and find, through ethnographic research, that their ideas map nicely onto modern-day Chinese cultural models — but again, until this is demonstrated empirically, it remains an assumption, and worthy of our skepticism. As philosophical exercises, the essays in this volume are superbly interesting; as serious attempts to investigate the relationship between human rights and Chinese culture, they somewhat miss the mark.

A second, somewhat similar, type of ethnography is the ethnography of intellectual history carried out by Marina Svensson in her extremely thorough, excellently written and reasoned dissertation, *The Chinese Conception of Human Rights* (Svensson 1996). Her project is to look at human rights as addressed by major Chinese intellectuals from 1898 to 1949, which covers one of the most intellectually rich periods in Chinese history: from the late-Qing reformers, through the early Republican anarchists and communists, the May Fourth Movement, all the way through the

communist revolution. Like the essays in the de Bary volume, Svensson's research relies on documents produced by intellectuals. However, Svensson's work is arguably more relevant to the question of how human rights relate to Chinese culture because of the focus, breadth and recentness of her source material: absent an ethnography of current Chinese views of human rights, documents produced about human rights by a wide range of intellectuals within, roughly, the past century, can give us a more accurate picture of how Chinese people are likely to be thinking about human rights than millennia-old texts by a handful of authors. However, what is still crucially missing is the same thing that is missing from the philosophical ethnographies of the de Bary volume: an empirical study of present-day Chinese views of human rights.<sup>22</sup>

The third type of ethnography, and the one bearing the closest affinity to my research, is what we might term "political ethnography." This approach has been pioneered by political scientist and constitutional scholar Andrew Nathan of Columbia University. He, like the philosophical and intellectual ethnographers, takes a broadly empirical approach, but his focus is on political institutions rather than on philosophical or intellectual writings. In particular, Nathan uses Chinese constitutions as a window into

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<sup>22</sup> In fairness, Svensson is aware of this limitation. She argues (p. 23) that many of these intellectuals, as populist-style activists, held views more in line with the "common people" than did philosophers. To the extent that this is true it lessens, but does not eliminate, the methodological shortcomings of Svensson's

Chinese views of human rights. He justifies this approach by arguing that constitutions reflect a society's aspirations, and therefore its values, and adds:

Constitutions are a good starting place for the study of rights because they represent the negotiated consensus of at least some dominant groups in a society on basic political questions. They are written with self-conscious care and use legal and philosophical terms with some precision...Moreover, if a society has had a series of constitutions, especially under changing regimes, then much can be learned from the changes and continuities among them. The ideas that survive from constitution to constitution, that are shared by competing groups, and that are appealed to even by politicians who otherwise behave unconstitutionally form a constitutional tradition of basic, widely held values and so offer insight into an important part of a nation's political culture. (Nathan 1986a: 78-79)

Nathan's methodology is quite novel and interesting, and obtains some useful results, some of which will be discussed in the Conclusion. And in looking at relatively recent documents — as opposed to centuries-to-millennia-old Confucian texts — whatever is revealed is quite germane to present-day China. I view Nathan's research and mine as mutually complementary and supplementary: his research is political ethnography; mine is linguistic ethnography. Both provide interesting and useful information about present-day cultural models.

The fourth and final type of ethnography is what I have called "universalist ethnography." This approach is taken by Alison Dundes Renteln in her book *International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism* (Renteln 1990). Her

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work. Of course, these "shortcomings" are only such with respect to the questions addressed in my

approach is ethnographic, in that she is investigating culture, and it is universalist in that she is searching for universals that could potentially underlie cross-cultural similarities in human rights thinking. Her ultimate conclusion is that there is indeed at least one such cultural universal: the idea that retribution for wrongdoing should be proportional to the wrongdoing. And since human rights is at least in part both about what should be considered wrongdoing and about how to redress wrongdoing, it can be therefore argued that there is at least one important universal way of thinking about at least one aspect of human rights. Renteln's approach is similar to mine in that she investigates human rights obliquely, that is through the lens of related cultural models rather than explicitly how people view "human rights." Her research is different from mine, however, in that her domain of inquiry is much broader: all the cultures in the world, as opposed to just the U.S. and China.

#### Empirical investigation

Empirical research into present-day views of human rights is difficult to find. To date I have found only one article citing such investigations: Ming Wan's superb essay, "Human Rights and Democracy" (Wan 1999), which appeared in the fascinating 1999 compilation *In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World* (Deng and Wang 1999).

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research, not hers. She is an intellectual historian, not an ethnographer.

Wan is critical of Western universalist assumptions and of claims by Western universalists, some of which were sampled above, that they speak for and stand with “the Chinese people” against the Chinese government. Wan recognizes the need for an empirical look at how Chinese people view human rights:

What has been missing in the public debate in the United States is the Chinese voice. The American public hears propaganda by the Chinese government and effective sound bites by Chinese dissidents. But not many people know or even care what “the silent Chinese majority” thinks. The silent Chinese majority is actually quite vocal in its own circles and is strongly opinionated about China and the U.S. policy toward China. To understand the feasibility and desirability of human rights pressure on China, one needs to know Chinese perspectives, not only those of the government and dissidents but also those of the society at large. (Wan 1999: 98)

He then moves on to explaining the Chinese government’s evolving view of human rights and, more importantly for our purposes, the views of the “silent Chinese majority.” Citing recent surveys of Chinese opinion — and in the process alleviating concerns about the accuracy of such surveys — Wan argues that most Chinese citizens are not overly concerned with human rights in the abstract. Rather, to the extent that human rights can improve stability and economic development, Chinese people tend to favor them; to the extent that they are seen as destabilizing the country and impeding economic development, Chinese people tend to view them with skepticism.

We will revisit Wan’s results in the Conclusion. For now, I merely wish to point out that his research is right in line with mine: it is an empirically-based investigation into what present-day Chinese people think about human rights. As with Nathan’s work,

Wan's research and mine are complementary: while his work involves large populations being asked simple, direct questions explicitly about human rights, enabling the gathering of statistics, my work involves small populations being asked complex, indirect questions about cultural models related to human rights, inviting non-statistical, qualitative analysis. Together, our approaches reveal a great deal about how human rights are viewed in China today.

### Situating this dissertation

I need to point out that, despite the critical nature of the above survey, my intention is not to criticize. Intellectual division of labor exists for a reason. Questions about what human rights are and how they relate to China need to be approached from as many angles as possible. Thus, my intention in this chapter is to show where there is at least one big gap in this field: the realm of linguistic ethnography. In this final section I step back from the specifics of the research discussed above in order to bring the need for my research into clearer relief.

One general problem in discussions about human rights and how they relate to China is that it is all too easy for discussions to degenerate into abstract and virtually meaningless generalizations about "the individual" in "the West" versus "the collective" in China. Even if we were to grant that such a difference exists, *what does this mean* for Westerners and for Chinese people? How would such a difference affect how people

approach their lives, and situations they might encounter in their lives? What sorts of differences might exist in the types of decisions people make in their lives? What sorts of things are considered most important? One could say that, in this connection, my research is a cross-cultural version of the old American political line, “How does it play in Peoria?” Sure, maybe “the West” privileges “the individual” and “China” privileges “the collective,” but such a statement is meaningless unless put into, and understood via, specific contexts in which specific reasoning is carried out.

A second problem in the literature about human rights is its focus exclusively on the relationship between the individual and the state. From a legal and institutional standpoint, such an approach seems reasonable. Yet we have seen, most convincingly in George Lakoff’s research (Lakoff 1996), that we can learn a great deal about the state by studying the family. Lakoff’s research is about the United States, but the relevant conceptual structures, in particular the Nation-as-Family metaphor, may prove to be present in other societies as well. The question of how the family and the nation relate to each other conceptually, both in China and in the U.S., is an important aspect of any inquiry into human rights, and forms a large part of Chapter 5.

A third problem running through much discourse about human rights is defining the subject matter. Human rights is obviously a contested category,<sup>23</sup> and so it is of course impossible for any one author to give a definition of human rights that will fit all purposes. And indeed many authors do acknowledge the limitations inherent in whatever definitions they may offer. Still, it is possible, within these limitations, to proceed with definitions of human rights that are responsible and useful within the given domain of inquiry. Unfortunately, however, there are still frequent problems with proposed definitions of human rights. The first type of problem is intellectual tautology: authors choosing definitions that are most convenient for their particular ideological agendas.

Consider, for instance, the following “definition” of human rights, from Jack Donnelly:

The term **human rights** indicates both their nature and their source: they are the rights that one has simply because one is human. They are held by all human beings, irrespective of any rights or duties individuals may (or may not) have as citizens, members of families, workers, or parts of any public or private organization or association. They are universal rights. (Donnelly 1998: 18. Emphasis in original.)

This definition is strongly universalist. While Donnelly himself claims to be a “weak relativist,” the thrust of his book is universalist, and this definition of human rights serves his rhetorical purposes quite nicely.

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<sup>23</sup> For research on contested categories — which earlier went by the name *contested concepts* — see (Gallie 1956), (Lakoff 1987), (Schwartz 1992), (Morgan 1998) and (Patent 2001).



A second type of problem with definitions of human rights is that, in the attempt to be as encompassing as possible, a definition may become so abstract as to lose almost all its meaning. Take the following, from Michael Freedon, who defines a “human right” as:

...a conceptual device, expressed in linguistic form, that assigns priority to certain human or social attributes regarded as essential to the adequate functioning of a human being; that is intended to serve as a protective capsule for those attributes; and that appeals for deliberate action to ensure such protection.” (Freedon 1991)

This definition applies as much to a heart transplant operation — along with the laws governing medical procedures — as it does to, say, the right of assembly.

A third kind of problem arises when the definition offered simply pushes the analysis back one analytical level. The essays in the de Bary and Tu volume, discussed above (de Bary and Tu 1998), suffer from this flaw. The working definition of human rights for the entire volume is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. De Bary justifies this definition by saying that the authors do not intend to adopt the UDHR as the ultimate definition of human rights for all purposes and for all times, but:

...to accept it as the going [definition] — universal to the extent that it was ratified formally by representatives of many world regions and cultures, and not thereafter repudiated by any official body but only confirmed and added to in subsequent protocols. Thus it represents a growing consensus on an expanding body of human rights concepts. (de Bary 1998: 5)

For the purposes of this volume’s contributing authors, this is probably the best definition that can be offered, and all that is really necessary. But defining “human rights” in terms

of a document does nothing to get at the *meaning of the words* in the document. For instance, Article 6 of the UDHR states: “Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.” If we are to determine, as the authors are attempting to determine, if and how such a right fits within the philosophical world of Confucianism, how can this task be accomplished without a separate problematization of what a “person” is considered to be, what constitutes “recognition,” and so forth. The conclusions we reach about the applicability of Article 6 to Confucianism depend crucially on our culture-dependent interpretation of the words and categories of Article 6. The document-based definitional approach thus begs the very question it aims to provide answers to.

It is no accident that I offer no definition of human rights in this dissertation. This is not a convenient sidestepping; rather it is part of a methodological commitment to avoid locking myself into overly narrow or broad categories, as would be inevitable were I to present an Aristotelian-style dictionary definition of human rights. The problems with the above definitions of human rights are inherent in the very notion and practice of definition itself. Definition is tied to widely-held folk theories of language according to which it is expected, via Aristotelian categorization, that it is possible and desirable to offer dictionary-style definitions of categories such that the definition will include all and only the desired members of the category. As we know from the entirety of Cognitive

Linguistics, this approach is doomed to failure. The approach of this dissertation is, instead, to make the broadly acceptable claim that, whatever *human rights* or *rénquán* means, this meaning depends on certain cultural models of what a human is. A human, in turn, can be understood via cultural expectations of how humans interact within various social structures, including the family and the state. And these expectations can be understood via an interview methodology that poses specific questions about specific scenarios, and asks interviewees to reason through them. What emerges is not a catch-all notion of *human rights* or *rénquán*, but instead some of the more important pieces of a necessarily incomplete and changing puzzle.

Another way of looking at this is to say that these definitional problems stem from a failure to sufficiently “unpack” human rights. To the extent that human rights are thought about as dependent on culture, they are written about as if they were atomic, rock-bottom units. One could say that the authors who write this way about human rights lack a sufficiently precise theory of culture. This is why it is important to bring methodological rigor to the treatment of culture as it relates to human rights. And since the data consist entirely of language, we also need precise ways of relating language and culture. Hence the methodology and theoretical framework described in Chapter 1.

Finally, a note about the importance of cross-cultural study generally. From the perspective of an early-21<sup>st</sup>-century cognitive linguist, the idea that cultural difference

influences human priorities is self-evident. Yet, there still exist schools of thought that owe their existences to acultural, abstract notions of individuals. Take rational choice theory for example: the entire basis of this theory is that humans the world over act “rationally,” or “in their self-interest,” when making decisions. Culture never comes into play; “rationality” is assumed to be as inalienable a part of human existence as is having two arms and two legs. As decades of anthropological and linguistic research have shown, however, such an acultural view of humanity is at best naïve, at worst pernicious. I consider this dissertation to be another nail in the coffin of such acultural theories.

It is time now to look at the data.

### **Chapter 3: Person and Family**

This chapter explores and exemplifies cultural models that arise in discussions of family disputes. What surfaces are models both of the family as a structure and of the individual people who make up the family: expectations, hopes, fears about what a person is and should be. In conjunction with Chapter 4, which investigates the person and society, we will see that, while many of the same models are available both for Chinese and Americans, these models are prioritized differently, and these different prioritizations shed light on possible differences in thinking about human rights.

The numbering system for the interviews, by which I will refer to them throughout the dissertation, is as follows: a capital letter, E or C, designates the language, and a number following the letter indicates the temporal order of the interview. For co-participants in an interview, my initial contact — the person who emailed me — is assigned the lower number. Thus, E-9 refers to the participant in the fifth English interview with whom I arranged the interview; E-10 refers to E-9's friend and interview partner.

There is an oddity in the numbering system that has resulted from all the discarded interviews discussed in the last chapter. The discarded Chinese interviews consisted of a single-participant interview with a Chinese speaker, followed by four two-person interviews, for a total of nine participants. Thus, the first Chinese interview in the

data set for this dissertation is C-10/11, and the last is C-20/21. For the English participants, there were also four discarded two-person interviews, but no one-person pilot interview, so the English data begin with E-9/10 and end with E-25/26. For reference, the table below gives the interviewees' sex and age data, as well as their relationships to each other.

Number	Sex	Age	Relationship between participants
C-10	M	28	married
C-11	F	23	
C-12	F	29	friends
C-13	F	40	
C-14	M	30	married
C-15	F	26	
C-16	F	27	friends
C-17	F	27	
C-18	M	23	married
C-19	F	23	
C-20	M	45	married
C-21	F	45	
E-9	M	19	friends
E-10	M	18	
E-11	F	18	friends
E-12	F	18	
E-13	F	18	friends
E-14	F	18	
E-15	F	18	friends
E-16	M	19	
E-17	M	18	friends
E-18	F	18	
E-19	F	19	friends
E-20	F	19	
E-21	M	20	friends
E-22	M	20	

E-23	F	18	friends
E-24	M	21	
E-25	M	19	friends
E-26	F	20	

Ellipses in quotations from interviews indicate either an abnormally long pause or an abrupt change in conversational or rhetorical direction. Italics indicate abnormally strongly stressed words or phrases. Boldface marks words or phrases to be discussed further, either immediately after the quote or later in the chapter. In some cases two or more nearby Chinese terms and their English equivalents are boldfaced. Because Chinese, like English, is SVO, assume unless otherwise specified that the order of the terms and/or phrases is the same for both the Chinese and the English. Finally, the third-person singular pronoun in Chinese — *tā* — is unmarked for gender. Because the relevant players in many of the questions are male, I have consistently translated *tā* as *he/him*.

#### Family disagreements: What we can learn

Questions #9 and #10 present scenarios in which members of a family disagree with one another over a course of action to take. For review, the English versions are:

9. Tom is about to graduate from high school. He decides he doesn't want to go to college, despite his parents' wishes. Instead, he wants to join a rock band. What will the family members all say to one another? What will happen in the end? Who is right?
10. The Smiths are a three-person family living in the United States: Mom, Dad, and their 17-year-old son Bill. Mom and Dad both work full-time jobs for similar salaries. Mom wants to buy a new car and give the old one to Bill;

Dad thinks their current car will last several more years, and doesn't think they should waste money on a new car. What will they all say to one another? What will happen in the end? Who is right?

#9 was designed to pit a child against his parents; #10 was designed to pit parents against each other, with the child as an ally of one of them. In thinking through and discussing these scenarios, interviewees reveal some of their ideas about power relations in the family, and about the mutual expectations family members hold for one another. This, in turn, helps us understand the interviewees' perspectives on what an individual is: how do gender, age, educational level, etc., determine the amount of power a person has, what is expected of her, and what she may expect of and for herself? And it is these questions that fundamentally underlie conceptions of human rights: What is an individual? What sorts of behavior can an individual expect of himself and of those around him? In what situations does a person have power, and how much? When and how is power used, rightly and wrongly, in relations among individuals and between individuals and social groups and institutions? The responses to Questions #9 and #10 provide some insight into these questions.

The question of power is addressed more thoroughly in responses to Question #10 than to Question #9, while responses to Question #9 yield much more than Question #10 about family members' expectations of one another and of themselves. I believe there are two reasons for this. First, in Question #10 the relative equality of a parent-versus-



parent dispute, as opposed to a parents-versus-child dispute, highlights that there is a power issue to be resolved. Second, in Question #9 the stakes are higher than in Question #10: whether or not a family buys a car is important, yes, but primarily on an economic level, while deciding whether to go to college could impact the rest of the child's life.

Below, we will first look at power, and so our first focus will be Question #10.

#### Dispute resolution: The Final Say model

Early in the interview process, I learned a new Chinese turn of phrase:

Shéi	shuō	le	suàn?
Who	say	PERF	drop? <sup>24</sup>

This highly idiomatic phrase translates as “Who has the final say?” It comes up in four of the six interviews, in response to Question #10. In a fifth interview, though the phrase itself is not used, the model exemplified by the phrase is invoked as a means of resolving family disputes. The following exchange, between C-10 and C-11, is typical.<sup>25</sup>

1.
  - C-11 Māma xiǎng mǎi, bàba bù tóngyì, māma zěnme gēn tā zhēngbiàn ne?
  - C-10 Lǐyóu hěn jiǎndān, wǒ jiù kāi xīn chē de qìpái a, gǎnjué hǎo a. [laughter]  
Wǒmen jiā kěndìng...zhèige shìqing kěndìng shì bàba **shuōle suàn**.
  - C-11 Wǒ xiāngxìn. Wǒmen jiā kěndìng shì māma **shuōle suàn**. Ā, wǒmen jiā xiànzài yǒu zhème yī zhǒng qíngkuàng. Wǒmen jiā diànshìjī yǐjīng tǐng pò de. Ránhòu xiànzài túxiàng yě bù hǎo, shēngyīn yě bù hǎo. Wǒ jiù

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<sup>24</sup> Here *drop* is meant in the idiomatic sense of “to cease discussion,” as in “Drop it. We’re done discussing it.”

<sup>25</sup> Interlinear-gloss versions of all passages are given in Appendix C; Chinese-character versions are in Appendix D.

qiángliè yāoqiú mǎi ge xīn de, wǒ bà yě qiángliè yāoqiú mǎi ge xīn de, wǒ mā bù tóngyì, yě shuō tài huā qián le, shuō zhèige hái yào zài kàn jǐ nián, nà wǒ mā zuìhòu shuō le jiù suàn le. Wǒ mā shuō wǒmen bù mǎi jiù bù mǎi. Nà nǐmen jiā kěndìng jiùshì nǐ bà shuō mǎi jiù mǎi. Zhèige wǒ juéde hǎoxiàng hé fùmǔ de jīngjì qíngkuàng...zìjǐ gèrén de shōurù qíngkuàng méiyǒu shénme hěn dà de guānxi.

- C-11 Mom wants to buy it, but Dad doesn't agree. How will Mom debate this with Dad?
- C-10 It's very simple: I'll get a new license plate, and it'll feel great! [laughter] In my family, definitely...for this, my dad would **have the final say**.
- C-11 I believe it. In my family Mom definitely **has the final say**. Hey, right now my family is dealing with something like this. My family's TV set is old. The picture and sound are bad. I demanded we buy a new one, and so did my dad, but my mom didn't agree. She said it was too expensive, and that we should keep watching this TV set for a few more years. So my mom had the final say. If my mom says we aren't buying one, we aren't buying one. Now in your family if your dad says you're buying one, you're buying one. I don't think this has anything to do with the financial condition...the individual incomes of the parents.

C-18 and C-19 go into some amount of detail about this model, and agree with C-11 that

salary has nothing to do with who makes these sorts of family decisions:

2.

- C-18 Zuìhòu juéding zěnmē zuò? Zhèige...zhèige lizi lí ha, gěi chūlái le bàba māma liǎngge rén gōngzuò sishí ge xiǎoshí, líng yíyàng de gōngzī, wǒ juéde zhèige líng...zài Zhōngguó zhèige jiāting lǐtòu, líng duōshǎo qián huòzhě shuō líng gōngzī de gāo-dī, jiù shuō zài zhèige jiāting zhōng zhèige juécè de qǔxiàng shì bùchéng zhèngbǐ de. Wǒde yìsi jiù shuō yǒude jiā lǐtòu jiùshì nǚ fāng zuò, jiù shuō yìxiē...zài yìxiē zhòngdà juéding dāngzhōng lái shuō, zhǔyào yóu nǚ fāng lái juéding. Zài yìxiē jiāting zhōng zhǔyào yóu nán fāng lái juéding. Zhèige shì gēn tā zhèige jiāting lǐ shéi zhèng qián duōshǎo shì méiyǒu rènhe guānxi de. Yīnwèi zài Zhōngguó jiāting wǒ juéde zhèi shì fēicháng pǔbiàn de yī jiàn shìqing. Shéi shuō, zhè shì qǔjuéyú píngshí zhèige jiāting dāngzhōng, shéi...
- C-19 **Shuō le suàn.**
- C-18 Shéi **shuō le suàn**, huòzhě shuō yòng bǐjiào zhèngshì de yǔyán shuō jiù shuō shéi de...shéi zài zhèixiē zhòngdà juécè shàng zhǔyào zuò zhǔyào juéding. Rúguǒ tā bàba jīngcháng zuò yìxiē dà de juéding, jiǎrú shuō zhèige jiā de yìxiē dà de kāixiāo a, dà de yìxiē nèige juéding de zhèige juécè dōu yóu tā bàba lái zuò chū de huà, wǒ juéde tāmen jiā kěndìng bù huì mǎi zhèi liàng chē. Dàn rúguǒ xiāngfǎn shì tā māma zuò zhǔyào juécè de huà, tāmen jiù huì mǎi yī liàng xīn chē.

- C-18 What will they decide to do in the end? This...this example says Mom and Dad both work forty hours and earn the same salary. I think that this...in Chinese families this bit about how much money they earn or the amount of their salaries doesn't form a ratio in a family's orientation as far as who makes final decisions. What I mean by that is that in some families the woman...for especially big decisions the woman decides. In some families the man decides. Who earns how much money has absolutely no bearing on this. I think this is extremely common in Chinese families. Who decides, this depends on who in the family usually...
- C-19 **Has the final say.**
- C-18 Who **has the final say**. Or, to use more formal language, who decides in cases where important final decisions are made. If his dad often makes important decisions — for instance if final decisions about this family's big expenditures are usually made by his dad — then I think there's no way this family would buy this car. But on the contrary if important decisions are made by his mom, then they'll buy a new car.

In follow-up, I asked how it is determined who has the final say, and they elaborated:

- 3.
- C-18 Jiùshi shuō, zhèige jiùshi Zhōng-Měi zhījiān de yī zhǒng chāyì, wǒ juéde kěnéng. Zài Měiguó kěnéng jiù shuō dàjiā zhèi ge jiāting lǐ...ní yào shuō **mínzhǔ** yě hǎo, zhèi ge juécè ba, kěnéng jiù jiànli zài yī zhǒng jiù shuō duōshù...shǎoshù fúcéng duōshù zhèi zhǒng jīchǔ shàng. Wǒ kěnéng duì Měiguó shèhui bù tài liǎojiě. Dàn zài Zhōngguó shèhui, jiù shuō, yī ge nánrén hé yī ge nǚrén jíehūn yǐhòu, jiù zài zhèige...
- C-19 Jiù zìrán'érrán de xíngchéng de.
- C-18 Zài jiāting yī zhǒng zìrán'érrán xíngchéng le zhèi zhǒng...jiù shuō zhèi zhǒng...
- C-19 Móshì.
- C-18 Móshì, duì. Dàodǐ shì zhèige nánrén zài zhèige jiāting lǐ zuòzhǔ, háishi nǚrén zài zhèige jiāting lǐ zuòzhǔ.
- Me Ò. Xiànzài Zhōngguó shèhui ne, dàduōshù...
- C-18 Wǒ juéde bǎifēnzhī liùshí de jiāting kěnéng hái shì zhèi yàng de.
- C-19 Duì. Huì yǒu yī ge rén zuòzhǔ.
- C-18 Huì yǒu yī ge rén zuòzhǔ.
- C-18 This I think is maybe a difference between China and the U.S. In the U.S. maybe you could say that in the family everyone...you can call it **democratic**<sup>26</sup> or whatever, but final decisionmaking is built on a

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<sup>26</sup> There will be more on this term later, both in this chapter and in Chapter 5.

foundation of the minority following the majority. Maybe I don't understand American society too well, but in Chinese society, after a man and a woman get married, then...

C-19 It forms naturally.

C-18 It's a sort of thing that forms naturally in a family...

C-19 A pattern.

C-18 Right, a pattern. Ultimately is it the man or the woman who's in charge of this family?

Me Oh. In Chinese society now, most...

C-18 I think maybe sixty percent of families are still like this.

C-19 Yes. Where one person is in charge.

C-18 Where one person is in charge.

The existence of the model, its appearance in five of six interviews, and the claim that this is still the main model for Chinese families, indicates it is a relatively healthy model within the Chinese cultural system.

Is there such a model in the U.S., in which one person is responsible for making family decisions? Yes. In four of the nine interviews such a model appears, first in E-13/14:

4.

E-13 And...um...in my family my mom has more authority over Dad. So my mom would win if this was my family.

E-14 Yeah. Mine too.

E-13 Right.

E-14 My dad's too easygoing. We would get a car.

E-13 Yeah, same with my dad. He'd be like, whatever. Sure, go ahead.

Note, however, that this case doesn't really involve dispute resolution, for there is no dispute. Dad just doesn't care. In essence, E-13 and E-14 have repudiated the premise of the question, at least vis-à-vis their own families: such a dispute simply would not occur in their families. So this seems to be an instance of something other than Final Say, or at

least a significantly weaker version of Final Say. This version does in fact appear in one of the five Chinese interviews as well. C-20 and C-21, respectively husband and wife, had agreed with each other that the mother in Question #10 would get her way. In follow-up, I asked why:

5.  
C-21 Zài Zhōngguó, zhèi māma hěn **lihai**.  
Me Shì ma?  
C-21 Mǎi dōngxi...  
Me Shì māma bǐ bàba lihai ma?  
C-21 Wǒ juéde.  
C-20 Shì. Mm. Zài Zhōngguó...  
C-21 Wǒ jiā, wǒ lihai o.  
Me Shì ma? [laughter]  
C-20 Zài Zhōngguó, qūxiàng yú mǔqīn zuò...  
C-21 Zuò juédìng.  
C-20 Jiùshi shuō, bìng búshì shuō zìjǐ bù duì, fēi yě bìxū tīngcóng nǚ fāng de, ér shì shuō nán de wúsuǒ...jiùshi shuō...  
C-21 Jiùshi ràng tā.  
C-20 ...wúsuǒwèi jiù hěn...  
C-21 Ràng tā.  
C-20 ...ràng zhe, ràng zhe nǚ...  
C-21 Nǚde jiù fēi yào jiānchí yìjian, nán de yìbān bù jiānchí, zài jiā lǐ.  
C-20 Zài jiā lǐ de, nǐ shuō zěnmeyàng jiù kěyǐ, kěyǐ. Nán de wúsuǒwèi.
- C-21 In China, the mother is more *lihai*.<sup>27</sup>  
Me Really?  
C-21 Buying things...  
Me The mom is more *lihai* than the dad?  
C-21 I think so.  
C-20 Yes. In China...  
C-21 In my family, I'm more *lihai*.  
Me Really? [laughter]  
C-20 In China the tendency is for the mother to make...  
C-21 Make decisions.

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<sup>27</sup> The term *lihai* is notoriously difficult to translate into English. So difficult, in fact, that I have elected not to translate it here. *Lihai* can apply to a person with a temper who intimidates other people; to a dominant athlete; to a superbly talented musician; and so on. Close English equivalents are “bad-ass” and “a force to be reckoned with.”

- C-20 That is to say, for a lot of things...it's not at all that the man has to...has to...
- C-21 Yield?
- C-20 What I'm saying is, it's not at all that he's saying he's not right and must at all costs obey the woman. It's just that the man doesn't...
- C-21 He just yields a bit.
- C-20 He doesn't care, and then...
- C-21 Yields.
- C-20 Yields, yields to the woman...
- C-21 Women always insist on their opinions. Men generally don't.
- C-20 In a family, whatever you say is okay. The man doesn't care.

C-20 and C-21 seem to be saying something about their family, and about Chinese families in general, that is similar to what E-13 and E-14 said about their families: that the man yields to the woman because he doesn't care, not because he is in any absolute sense powerless to stop her. So a weaker version of Final Say exists in China as well as in the U.S.

What of the other three American examples of Final Say? E-20, near the beginning of her answer to Question #10, says:

- 6.
- E-20 Well, chances are that Dad's gonna give in to the mom. It always happens. No matter what. Because the dad is whipped by the mom. Okay? That's definitely like what I think. So, whatever Mom wants, Dad will do. And so Bill has no say. It's all about the mom.

And then, at the end of her answer:

- 7.
- E-19 So you think Dad...or, Mom...Mom will win?
- E-20 Mom always wins. At least in my family. [laughter]

This seems like a fairly clear example of Final Say: Mom gets what she wants. The other two examples both come from the interviews with political conservatives, and state that the father will get his way simply by dint of his being the father.<sup>28</sup>:

8.

E-21 and the Dad...um...would maybe be...uh is the head of this household, um...would probably have the final say, and say that, no they don't...this car is...is good.

9.

E-24 I think eventually the dad will win, because...just 'cause he's the father. I don't know, that's just the way I think.<sup>29</sup>

These examples indicate that there is a Final Say model available to both Americans and Chinese in reasoning about the family decisionmaking process.

However, there is still the question of how strong this model is in China and the U.S., and what the competing models are. In both sets of interviews, two competing models emerge: Democracy and Money is Power.

### The Democracy Model

*Democracy* is a notoriously problematic term to translate cross-culturally. The most thorough work to date on this has been Frederic C. Schaffer's (1998) book, *Democracy in Translation*, in which he examines cultural differences between Western and Senegalese conceptions of democracy. His analysis, as well as David Collier and

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<sup>28</sup> Given George Lakoff's (1996) findings about Strict Father Morality, is it not surprising that such a view would come from a political conservative.

Steven Levitsky's (1997) study of various types of "democracies" in world politics, reveal that *democracy* is an immensely complex radial category that is also highly contested. Because it is contested, my own choice of what to call Democracy here may be contested as well. For this reason I will use Schaffer's criteria as my basis, as his analysis is unparalleled in its meticulous enumeration of the aspects that make up *democracy*. Here, in the family context, *democracy* is strictly metaphorical: regardless of the immense complexity of *democracy* as a category, it has historically been, and in the overwhelming majority of cases still is, a public, usually political, society-wide phenomenon. I will analyze this metaphor in more detail in Chapter 5, but for now just wish to point out *that* this is a metaphor.

In his first chapter, Schaffer separates out several aspects — or, in the terminology of radial- and contested-category analysis, *submodels* — of democracy. One is a traditional political-science definition of *democracy* involving elections (Schaffer 1998: 2). Another involves "inclusive participation in a cooperative or collective activity" (11). In the data to be presented below, I have found a third, revolving around *process*: differences being resolved through discussion, rather than through brute force (voting being included here as a type of "brute force"). Thus, there are three submodels to Democracy, placing emphasis on (a) majority-rules voting, (b) participation by a broad

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<sup>29</sup> This usage of the term *just* in choosing models will be examined in Chapter 4.



number of different populations, and (c) the process of allowing participants to give voice to their opinions. We will call these, respectively, Majority Rules, Everyone's Opinion Matters and Discussion.

Majority Rules simply states, for the present case, that the family will buy a new car because two people want to and only one person doesn't. This is explained nicely by C-14, in opposition to Final Say:

10.

C-14 Nà wǒ juéde dàjiā yīnggāi huì zuòxiàlai yíkuàir tāolùn zhèige shì. Dànshi zhèi jiàn shì kànqǐlái jiù shuō yào mǎi xīn chē de rén shíshàng zhàn le shàngfēng, yīnwèi māma hé Lǐ Sì kěndìng dōu shì yuànyì mǎi xīn chē de. Nà wǒ juéde rúguǒ shì yìbān jiāting dōu shì shǎoshù fú cóng duōshù ba. Kěnéng yǒu yìxiē tèbié chuántǒng de jiāting, tā shì fùqin de nèige juédìng shì zuì zhòngyào de. Zhèi yàngzi jiù huì fùqin shuō le suàn, nǎpà shì māma hé Lǐ Sì dōu shuō yào mǎi yào mǎi, dànshi wǒ juéde xiànzài yuèlái yuèduō de jiāting dàn shì shǎoshù fú cóng duōshù, jiù shuō sān ge rén, èr bǐ yī liǎng ge rén dōu shuō yào mǎi, yī ge rén nǐ bàba shuō bù mǎi, nà bù xíng, wǒmen liǎng ge rén dōu shuō mǎi, nà jiù mǎi le.

C-14 I think they should<sup>30</sup> all sit down and discuss this matter. But for this matter it looks like the people who want to buy a new car are at an advantage, because Mom and Li Si<sup>31</sup> definitely both want to buy a new car. So I think that if they're a typical family, in all those the minority follows the majority. Maybe there are some especially traditional families where the father's decision is most important. In this case the father has the final say even if Mom and Li Si both really want to buy it. But I think now in more and more families the minority follows the majority. That is to say, of the three people, it's two to one: two want to buy it. One, the father, doesn't want to buy it, but that doesn't work. The two of us say buy it, we buy it.

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<sup>30</sup> This *should* may be epistemic. The Chinese is *yīnggāi huì*. The first word (*yīnggāi*) means "should" and the latter (*huì*) expresses likelihood. So another possible translation is: "It should be likely that..." If this is the case, then C-14 isn't actively endorsing Majority Rules, but is instead merely claiming that it is prevalent in China today.

<sup>31</sup> Li Si is Bill's Chinese counterpart.

We also have the following from C-18 and C-19, immediately after their explication of the Final Say model quoted in (2) above:

11.  
C-19 Yǒude jiāting hái huì tóupiào a...juédìng.  
C-18 Duì. Zhèi shì bǐjiào **mínzhǔ** de jiāting.  
C-19 Mm.  
C-18 Dànshi zhèi zhǒng jiāting wǒ juéde shǎo yìxiē.  
C-19 Xiànzài yě tǐng duō de.
- C-19 Some families would vote...to decide.  
C-18 Yes. This would be a relatively **democratic** family.  
C-19 Mm hm.  
C-18 But I think there aren't that many of these families.  
C-19 Nowadays there are a lot.

Note that C-18 is not only using a model that I have labeled Democracy; he himself uses the term *mínzhǔ*. In a similar vein, C-17 invokes the Every Opinion Matters and

Discussion submodels of Democracy in her initial response to Question #10:

12.  
C-17 Zǔ...zǔ nèige, zhàokāi jiāting huìyì le. Xiànzài...xiànzài wǒ juéde, qǐmǎ wǒ bǐjiào shóuxī de nèi zhǒng jiāting gòuchéng yìbān dōu hěn shǎo yǒu fùmǔ liǎng ge rén jiù...jiù zuòchū juédìng ránhòu jiù tōngzhī zhèi ge háizi suàn le. Yìbān wǒ juéde hái tǐng zūnzhòng háizi juédìng ne, huì jiùshi yǒu shénme dà shì ránhòu huì dàjiā huì yīkuàir tāolùn a, shénmede.  
C-16 Duì. Wǒ juéde yě shì.
- C-17 They would organize...call a family meeting. Nowadays...nowadays I think...in fact in the sort of family structure that I'm more familiar with generally very rarely do the parents just...just make a decision and afterwards notify the child and that's it. Generally I think they will respect the child's decisions, and when something big comes up everyone will discuss it together and such.  
C-16 Yes, I think so too.

C-12 also invokes these submodels:

13.

C-12 Tāde bàba māma hé Lǐ Sì huì shuō shénme...wǒ juéde rúguǒ zhèige qíngkuàng yào fēn hěn duō...rúguǒ yàoshi shuō tāde fùmǔ, quèshí shòu de jiàoyu bǐjiào gāo nèi céngcì de huà...yīnwèi tā nénggòu mǎi liǎng liàng qìchē zhèi yàng, gōngzuò yě huì bǐjiào hǎo, nènme tā kěnéng jiāting jiù huì hěn **mínzhǔ**, tā jiù huì hé...jiù huì dàjiā gēn háizi hěn píngděng de zhèi yàng lái jiāng, wǒmen xiànzài chūyú shénme yàng de qíngkuàng, wǒmen dǎsuàn zěnmeyàng lái zuò, gèzì yǒu shénme yàng de lǐyóu, nǐ shì huì shénme yàng de yìjian, zhè shì yī zhǒng. Hái yǒu yī zhǒng, jiùshì shuō chúncuì shì xiàng suǒwèi **bàofāhù** nèi yàng de chūlái dehuà, nènme kěnéng jiù gēnběn bù huì...yěxǔ huì gēn háizi jiāng, yěxǔ bù huì, jiùshì fùmǔ zhèi yàng lái dīng, zěnmeyàng lái zuò.

C-12 What will Dad, Mom, and Li Si say to one another? I think that in this sort of situation you have to divide it into many...if his parents in fact are highly educated — because they have the ability to buy two cars they have good jobs — in that case maybe the family will be quite **democratic**, then they'll...they'll all discuss it equally with their child: this is the situation we're in, this is what we plan to do, this is how each of us thinks about this, how would you feel about this? This is one type. There's another type, which purely speaking comes from **get-rich-quick families**. In these cases maybe the parents wouldn't at all...perhaps they would discuss it with their child, perhaps they wouldn't. The parents just decide what to do.<sup>32</sup>

What I mean by the Discussion submodel is not simply that just any sort of conversation takes place. Presumably in all cases *some* form of conversation will be had, even if it consists only of one parent saying “I’m going to buy a new car,” and the other parent saying, “Okay.” Rather, I mean Discussion to refer specifically to the types of

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<sup>32</sup>The reasoning here needs to be explained in light of three cultural models that appear at various points in the Chinese interviews, in reply to various questions. The first is the expectation that higher education correlates with higher income. The second is that people with less education tend to have more traditional values. The third, which will be discussed more below, is that there is a positive correlation between “modernity” and household “democracy.” The Chinese term for get-rich-quick household is *bàofāhù*, literally “explode-make (money)-household.” It implies that someone has made money extremely quickly. In light of these three cultural models, it makes sense that the head of a *bàofāhù* would be someone of lower education, and therefore relatively impoverished and traditional, and whose household would be run in a relatively traditional, i.e. “undemocratic” way.

discussions in the above examples (including what C-14 says at the beginning of (10)), in which effort is explicitly taken to make sure the opinion of every discussion participant is heard. Everyone's Opinion Matters is obviously closely related. In fact, it could perhaps be argued that there are not two separate submodels here, since, for both C-12 and C-17, discussion and listening to everyone's opinions are seen as important. However, these two submodels are in theory separable: it is easy to imagine a household in which the parents discuss things with each other but leave their children out of family decisions, even important ones.

A qualification is necessary for Everyone's Opinion Matters: the child's age partially determines how much weight his opinion carries. Right after C-14's invocation of Majority Rules, I raise this issue:

14.

Me Suīrán jiùshi duōshù dāngzhōng yī ge jiùshi xiǎoháizi?

C-14 Dànshi tā, xiǎoháizi tā yě bù shì liǎng sān suì, yīnwèi shíqī suì wǒ juéde nánháizi zài jiā hěn yǒu dìwei le.

Me [The minority follows the majority...] Even though one of the majority is a child?

C-14 But he...the child isn't two or three years old, because I think at seventeen years a boy has a significant position in the family.<sup>33</sup>

The last example of these two submodels comes again from C-12:

15.

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<sup>33</sup> C-15, husband of C-14, then objects to her saying that boy children have a high position in the family, to which C-14 replies that her intention was not to emphasize his maleness; she simply couldn't help mentioning his maleness, given that the question stipulated a male child.

- C-12 ...zài wǒmen jiā suīrán wǒ zhèng qián hěn duō, dànshi wǒ cónglái dōu shì yào shāngliang zhe lái.
- C-13 Nà nǐ māma nèi dài ne? Nǐ bàba hé nǐ māma? Shéi **shuō le suàn**?
- C-12 Méiyǒu shéi **shuō le suàn**. Yě shì jiùshì yīnwèi wǒ juéde hǎoxiàng tāmen jiù tǐng **mínzhǔ** de. Bāokuò jiù duì háizi, tāmen zhījiān shénme shìqing dōu shì yíding shāngliang zhe lái. Ránhòu rúguǒ zhēnde dà shìqing de huà dōu yào háizi lái yìqǐ lái shuō, lái pīnpīnmìngmìng de tí yìjian huò zěnmeyang.
- C-13 Ò, nà nǐmen jiā hěn **mínzhǔ**.
- C-12 Duì a.
- C-12 ...In my family, even though I earn a lot of money I still always discuss things.
- C-13 What about your mom's generation? You dad and your mom? Who **has the final say**?
- C-12 No one **has the final say**. This is because, I think, it seems, they're very **democratic**. This includes how they are with their children. All of their matters are discussed. And on top of this, for really big things all the children come and discuss things together with the family, and offer their opinions and such with all their heart.
- C-13 Oh, your family is really **democratic**.
- C-12 Yes.

In C-12's family, Democracy — which in her case emphasizes the Discussion submodel — outweighs two competing models: Final Say and Money is Power. (Money is Power will be discussed more below.) All in all, then, five of the twelve Chinese speakers invoke some form of the Democracy model, but only three (C-12, C-14 and C-17) seem to have it as their primary model. (Recall that C-18 and C-19 have Final Say as their main model.)

The same three submodels of Democracy appear in the American interviews.

Let's look at Majority Rules first, which comes up in three interviews:

- 16.
- E-13 Well for sure Bill will want the car.
- E-14 Yeah.

- E-13 And so Bill will be on Mom's side.  
 E-14 So they got two on their side. Dad will probably lose.  
 [...]  
 E-13 "What will happen in the end?" I think they will end up buying the new car.  
 E-14 Just 'cause it's Bill and Mom to Dad.<sup>34</sup>  
 E-13 Yeah I think Bill and Mom will probably convince Dad.
17.  
 E-20 Um...well, Bill's gonna root for Mom.  
 E-19 Yeah.  
 E-20 'Cause it's two against one.
18.  
 E-21 In this case I think the seventeen-year-old son Bill has more leverage, in that one of the parents, the mom, is...is on his side. So it's like a two against one case here...

These are the only examples of Majority Rules in the American interviews. And they are fairly weak examples. First, E-13's is only marginally a case of Majority Rules: she says that Bill and Mom will convince Dad; in a pure case of Majority Rules, no convincing is necessary, as only the vote tally matters. Second, as we saw above, E-13 and E-20 ultimately opt — in different ways — for “Mom wins by dint of being Mom.” And third, also mentioned above, E-21 has a competing Final Say model. In fact, (8) — E-21's statement of Final Say — immediately follows (18), and, at least for the moment, supersedes it. (Later we will see that E-21 also has a strongly competing Money is Power model, which ultimately wins out.) So for none of these speakers is Majority Rules the dominant model.

The Discussion submodel plays an interestingly different role in the American interviews than in the Chinese interviews. In asking what the family members will all say, the question presupposes that a discussion will take place. Yet the six Chinese interviews break down as follows: (a) In two interviews, hypothetical discussions are offered by the participants; (b) in one interview the discussion aspect of the question is ignored; (c) in three interviews, it is explicitly stated that a discussion would and/or should take place. Of these categories, only (a) seems to indicate a high degree of comfort with the Discussion model, in that the participants were willing to go along with the presupposition given in the question. Category (b) means that the Discussion model formed no part of the answer, and (c) means that it wasn't enough that a discussion was presupposed: the participants felt they needed to mention explicitly that a discussion would take place.

This breaks down much differently for the American interviews: (a) In six of the nine interviews, specifics of the presupposed discussion are proposed; (b) in one interview, one of the participants says that the family will reach a compromise, which presupposes a discussion; (c) in one interview, the participants deliberately skip the discussion part of the question, claiming to have already addressed the relevant issues ---

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<sup>34</sup>The syntax here indicates a sports or game metaphor. I will analyze this in more detail later in this chapter.

via the Family Unit submodel; (d) in one interview, it is stated explicitly that the family will sit down and discuss the matter. Of these categories, only (d) possibly indicates discomfort with the Discussion submodel. The overall impression left is that Discussion is significantly more marked, and therefore unusual, in the Chinese family context than it is in the American family context.

The same seems to be true of Everyone's Opinion Matters: in only one of the hypothetical discussions is Bill excluded (E-19/20), and only because of the assumption that Bill has no money and so, via Money is Power, is rightfully excluded from the decisionmaking process (see (24) below).<sup>35</sup>

#### The Money Is Power model

According to Money is Power, one's income correlates with one's say in family affairs, or at least family affairs with a significant economic component. As we have seen, Money is Power is explicitly disavowed in the Chinese interviews by C-11 in (1) and by C-18 in (2). C-12, in (15), clearly has the model, but it is outweighed by Discussion. Below is another instance of Money is Power, in C-18/19, which occurs soon after their initial explication (in (2)) of the Final Say model:

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<sup>35</sup> Bill's age also figures into the elision of his decisionmaking power: right after saying Bill has no say because he has no money, E-20 and E-19 continue:

20      And he's seventeen. He's not even legal.



19.

C-18 Nǐ juéde tā bà gēn mā zěnme xiǎng? Zěnme jiǎng?

C-19 Tā bà huì jílì fǎnduì. Huì...huì báichū gèzhǒnggèyàng de lǐyóu huì shuō wǒ gōngzuò zhème xīnkǔ, zhèng zhème diǎnr qián, ránhòu yòu yào yǎng yī liàng xīn chē, yòu yào yǎng yī liàng jiù chē wǒ hái yào yǎng nǐmen niángǒu liǎ.

C-18 Búguò tā māma yě zìjǐ yǒu...

C-19 Nà zhǐ shì yī bàn a.

C-18 What do you think his dad and mom will think [about this]? What will they say?

C-19 His dad will object strongly. He'll...he'll lay out all sorts of reasons and say, I work so hard, and earn so little money, and now you want me to be responsible for both a new car and an old car, and on top of that I'm responsible for you two...

C-18 No, his mom still has her own...

C-19 But that's only half.

C-19's hypothetical rhetorical strategy for the father is interesting. In claiming to earn little money, he argues against the purchase; but in mentioning *that* he earns money, he invokes Money is Power. C-18's response indicates that he, too, sees the rhetorical usefulness of Money is Power. Thus it is clear that they have the model and see its relevance, even though for them it is ultimately outweighed by Final Say. The final instance of Money is Power appears in C-20/21. The discussion turns to the size of the expenditure involved:

20.

C-21 Dànshi zhèige...qìchē kěnéng bǐjiào dà, duì Zhōngguó rén lái jiǎng a. Bǐrúshuō huàn yī ge diànshìjī, diànshì kěnéng jiù...nèige nǚde shuō jiù xíng, dànshi rúguǒ tāmen jiā de gōngzuò...tā liǎng zhèng de yíyàng gōngzī, dōu yíyàng duō, érqǐě ne, jiùshì shuō mǎi yī ge chē duì tā jiā jīngjì fùdān fēicháng dà de huà, kěnéng děi jiè qián, rúguǒ shuō nǐ yào zài wèntí shèdìng, rúguǒ xūyào jiè qián de huà, kěnéng jiù liǎng ge rén jiù zài

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19      Yeah, doesn't count.

shāngliang, a, yào bù yào zhèi qián a shénme. Rúguǒ tāmen liǎ yǒu qián kěnéng jiù nǚde jiù huì zuò juéding.

- C-21 But a...a car is a relatively big expenditure to Chinese people. If instead it was a TV set, a TV set, maybe...what the woman says goes. But if the family works...both of them earn the same salary, the same amount, plus buying a car is a really big economic burden, maybe they will have to borrow money. If you wanted to stipulate in the question that they had to borrow money, then maybe the two of them would discuss it, whether or not to borrow money. If they are both rich, then maybe the woman makes the decision.

In none of these examples does Money is Power emerge as the dominant model.

In the American interviews, however, Money is Power appears in a more favorable light.

Consider the following:

21.  
E-12 And the dad is probably trying to conserve money, they both don't have really high-paying jobs and they're both working with the same amount of money, so he's gonna want to just keep their one car, but like because it's half her money and half his money, they both have a say I guess.

For E-12, no competing models emerge. Next we have:

22.  
E-21 Yeah, um, well if Mom and Dad have similar salaries and there's no real breadwinner and they're each contributing equally to the family, and I would think what the mom said is then...uh would be just as important as what the dad says.<sup>36</sup> Um...and for the dad to just say, no we aren't buying a car, but you can get a job...and then the mom will feel somewhat not satisfied in getting a car, and the dad could say something like, well, if it's reliability that's an issue, then, um, we'll just get you a really reliable car, and think about a way in which this...Bill can be re...more responsible and earn some amount of money to pay off the car we're going to give you. Um, who is right?  
E-22 Well it comes down to the issue I think of the family context, I mean like you said both of them are both similar in salaries, they both have...they're

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<sup>36</sup> Note the markedness of the mother's power here. E-21, as we have seen, does have a (father) Final Say model, albeit a weak one. It is difficult to imagine him saying that the dad makes as much as the mom, and therefore has as much say as she does.

both right in some sense, in that Mom might actually need a new car, Dad might think that you know, uh...they may not...may not necessarily have to buy the newest model, they could buy, you know a used car that's a year or two old, at a cheaper value. Um...

E-21 Yeah, the mom could say, well you know what, I'm contributing just as much to this family's income as you are, Dad...

No competing models emerge for E-22. As we have seen, E-21 has weakly competing

Final Say and Majority Rules models, but in this passage seems to come down ultimately

in favor of Money is Power.

E-13 and E-14 also raise Money is Power:

23.

E-14 I think the mom would feel that she has an equal say,<sup>37</sup> and so...

E-13 'Cause she makes the same amount of money.

E-14 She makes the same amount of money.

E-13 And it's kinda like, yeah, I agree.

We have seen that both E-13 and E-14 have weakly competing Final Say models, and

that both have competing Majority Rules models, though E-13's is weaker than E-14's.

E-19 brings Bill into the question of economic power:

24.

E-20 It's all about the mom.

E-19 No, it's all about the parents, because Bill has no money.

E-20 Bill has no money. He has no say in this conversation at all.

E-19 Yeah.

E-19 at no point addresses the issue of whether Money is Power matters as far as the

dispute *between the parents* is concerned, but she also at no point indicates that she has

any other competing models. As for E-20, we know that she has a weakly competing

Majority Rules model and a strongly competing Final Say model. However, near the beginning of her answer to Question #10 she leads on that maybe the strength of her Final Say model is influenced by her Money is Power model. Just after having read the question, she says:

25.

E-20 Sounds like my family. Except my mom makes a lot more money than my dad, so she gets to decide.

So even though she later says the dad is “whipped” by the mom — which has a strong sexual connotation — perhaps her mom’s final say in her family is related to her economic power as well.

Finally, E-23 exhibits Money is Power, though in a weak way:

26.

E-24 And I just think two cars'd be better. Like, in the long run, the wasting money on a car, it's not gonna...it's gonna be a...a better impact if they have two cars, like...

E-23 Right. But they...if they're making similar salaries they're probably gonna like share the...like, burden of the cost.

E-23’s version of Money is Power does not explicitly involve decisionmaking or dispute resolution: it is presupposed here that the new car is being bought. Still, the parents’ salaries are at least in some way connected to their roles as providers, so economic power is not completely irrelevant.

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<sup>37</sup> Once again the mother’s putative equality is marked.

All these examples seem to indicate that Money is Power is a stronger model in the U.S. than in China: no one explicitly disavows it; it often receives only weak competition from the other models; and in some cases it is the only model given.

In this connection I should mention that much ink has already been spilled about the predominance, or lack thereof, of Money Is Power in Chinese culture. Historian Delia Davin, for instance (Davin 1976), argues that the Communist revolution, by increasing the role of women in economic production, also increased their status, in particular their decision-making clout, within the household. Implicit in her argument is a strong Money is Power model. Kay Ann Johnson, however, argues (Johnson 1983) that deeply-rooted cultural norms impact, and will continue to impact, the position of women despite their increased economic contributions, thereby implying a relatively weak Money Is Power model.<sup>38</sup> My research can be viewed as providing some suggestive evidence in favor of the weakness of Money Is Power in Chinese culture.

Research by anthropologist Hill Gates raises a related issue: change over time. In her book *Chinese Working-Class Lives* (1987), she argues that in Taiwan, women who have entered the work force and begun earning money have enjoyed increasing say within the household. This, it seems, would only be possible with a strong Money Is Power model. While historical research would be necessary to validate this speculation, I

would argue that it is quite likely that Money Is Power strengthens along with the presence of robust labor markets valuing the skills of individuals. Such markets are relatively new to the mainland, but not to Taiwan. It is quite possible that the Money Is Power model is more robust on Taiwan for this reason. This would suggest also that Money Is Power is gaining, and will continue to gain, strength on the mainland. But to find out we can only wait and see. In the meantime, the evidence presented here suggests that Money Is Power is still a relatively weak model on the mainland.

#### Family dispute-resolution models: a synthesis

From the evidence examined, we may draw the following general conclusions:

- Final Say is stronger in China than in the U.S.
- Democracy-Majority Rules is relatively weak in both China and the U.S.
- Democracy-Discussion and Democracy-Everyone's Opinion Matters are stronger in the U.S. than in China.
- Money is Power is stronger in the U.S. than in China.

A few more observations here will further clarify the picture.

If we take a closer look at how Final Say is discussed by some of the Chinese interviewees, we can find more evidence for the relative strength of this model in Chinese culture. Repeated below are the parts of (1), (2) and (15) in which C-10/11, C-18/19 and C-12/13 introduce Final Say:

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<sup>38</sup> For an excellent and balanced summary of this debate, see (1997).

- C-10 In my family, definitely...for this, my dad would have the final say [*shuō le suàn*].
- C-11 I believe it. In my family Mom definitely has the final say [*shuō le suàn*].
- C-18 Who decides, this depends on who in the family usually...
- C-19 Has the final say [*shuō le suàn*].
- C-18 Who has the final say [*shuō le suàn*].
- C-13 What about your mom's generation? You dad and your mom? Who has the final say [*shuō le suàn*]?
- C-12 No one has the final say [*shuō le suàn*].

In all three cases, the existence and predominance of Final Say is *presupposed*. No one says that anything depends on *if* someone has the final say; it is simply stated that things depend on *who has* the final say. In the case of C-12/13, C-12 is forced to negate the presupposition. So in three of the six Chinese interviews, the Final Say model's predominance is presupposed. There is only one similar grammatical cue in all nine English interviews, which we saw above in (8), in which E-21 says the father is "the head of this household": the use of the definite article here indicates a presupposition that there *is* a head of the household.

It is, however, still possible for Final Say to be the dominant model for an American. Specifically, Strict Father Morality (Lakoff, 1996) licenses the father to have the final say in family matters. E-24 provides an excellent example of such reasoning, as we saw in (9) above. He offers no competing models. Furthermore, he states that the father's opinion will hold sway even though he himself thinks it would be best to buy a new car. This runs counter to a strong tendency in the interviews, both American and

Chinese: in general, the person with whom an interviewee's sympathies lie tends also to be the person the interviewee thinks will get his or her way. So Final Say is a strong option for Americans, at least for American conservatives.

Still, even for E-24 it is not the case that that the father necessarily makes a decision with which the other members of the family disagree. While summarizing his opinion, he states:

27.

E-24 I think ultimately what will happen in the end is that the dad will persuade like, the whole family, like, it's not necessary until later.

So the father is able to make his decision not simply by decreeing from on high; rather, he still must persuade the family that it is in their best interests to wait until later to buy the car.

Furthermore, Final Say is weak even among the other conservatives interviewed (E-21 through E-26). E-21, as we saw, mentions (father's) Final Say, but eventually resorts to Money is Power. None of the other four conservatives — E-22, E-23, E-25 or E-26 — even mentions Final Say. This may be due to the relative youth of this pool, or perhaps other factors.

Within both American and Chinese culture, there is at least one contextual factor that determines in part the relative strength of Final Say versus Democracy: the significance of the decision to the family under discussion, which in this case means the



size of the economic expenditure involved relative to the economic resources of the household. Both Chinese and American interviewees mention this. (And, of course, given the differences in standards of living between the U.S. and China, the purchase of a car is of more financial significance to a typical Chinese family than to a typical American family.) We already saw two examples of this above: in (15), C-12 emphasizes that especially for really important matters, the younger generation will be consulted; in (20), C-21 says that borrowing money would necessitate the husband and wife having a discussion before deciding whether to buy the car. C-12 offers a further example, as part of her defense of the Discussion submodel of Democracy. In follow-up, before the discussion in which C-12 denies C-13's presupposition of Final Say, the following exchange takes place:

28.

C-13 Nǚde **shuō le suàn** ba?

C-12 Wǒ juéde zhème dà de shìqing de huà yìbān bù huì shuō yī ge rén lái zuòzhǔ zhèige juédìng.

C-13 Shì ma?

C-12 Duì, yīnwèi zhè shì hěn dà liàng de zhīchū, nǐ búshì mǎi xiǎo dōngxi ma, nǐ mǎi qìchē ma, nà yídìng huì shì liǎng ge rén lái shāngliang de.

C-13 The woman **has the final say**, right?

C-12 I think that for such a big matter, in general there won't be one person in charge of making this decision.

C-13 Really?

C-12 Yes, because this is a very big expenditure, they're not buying some small thing, they're buying a car. Definitely the two of them would discuss it.

For C-21 and C-12, a particularly big expenditure means that Discussion will surpass

Final Say in importance. C-18, as part of his explanation of Final Say during follow-up

questioning, expresses a similar idea — that a big expenditure increases the importance of Discussion relative to Final Say — but in the end Final Say still gets the nod:

29.

C-18 Jiù xiàng jiā lǐ yìbān mǎi ge diànshì a, huò mǎi ge shénme zhèi yàng bǐjiào guì de yìxiē dōngxì, zài Zhōngguó háishi bǐjiào guì de dōngxì, dōu shì liǎng ge rén shāngliang. Xiān shì shāngliang. Dàn zuì hòu, jiù shuō juédìng, jué...qǐ juécè zuòyòng de wǎngwǎng jiùshi yī ge rén.

C-19 Duì.

C-18 Jiù shuō shāngliang de shíhou kěndìng yào liǎngge rén tóngshí lái shāngliang, bù kěnéng yī ge rén shuō mǎi le jiù kěndìng...mǎshàng jiù gěi mǎi huílái. Jiùshi zài shāngliang de guòchéng zhōng liǎng ge rén, jiù shuō hùxiāng jiéhūn yìdiǎn tā zuìhòu zhēnzhèng juécè le hái yào yǒu yī ge rén.

C-18 Say a family is buying a TV, or buying a relatively expensive thing, something that is relatively expensive in China. In all of these cases the two of them will discuss it. They'll discuss it first. But in the end, the decision...the role of making the final decision is always filled by one person.

C-19 Right.

C-18 That is to say, while discussing it, definitely the two of them would discuss it together, it's not possible that one person would say let's buy it and then...right away bring it home. It's just that through the process of discussion the two of them, after being married for awhile, there will be one person to make the actual final decision.

Only one such example is present in the American interviews, in E-13/14:

30.

E-13 But it's like, as a family you should make a family decision. I don't think like...you know when you're a family, you're kinda like one unit, you shouldn't go, okay, I'll just do this, and you guys do whatever. That's...at least I don't, I don't think that way. Like I think when you, **especially** like when you buy a house, you don't want like your dad to go like, I want this house, and your mom to go, no no no I don't like it, and your dad just goes and buys it with his own money.

E-14 Yeah.

E-13 If he had that much money. I think even a car, you know, is like a family decision. But you would have to weigh like pros and cons.

The key here is E-13's use of *especially*. What she seems to be saying is special about a house is that it is an enormous expenditure. So regardless of whether Final Say

ultimately wins out, it is weaker vis-à-vis Discussion when an economic expenditure is particularly large.<sup>39</sup>

However, this one example from the American interviews is slightly different from the Chinese examples, in that what the hypothetical house-buying father ultimately does is spend *his own* money on the house, not the family's money. So it is arguably not a case of Discussion winning out over Final Say, since the final say here is not about the family doing something as a unit — in this case an economic unit — but instead is about the father doing something completely on his own, as an independent economic unit.

What is involved here seems to be another model, which we will call the Family Unit model. The overall idea is that individuals in a family, when the stakes are high enough, do not act independently. Instead, the family, through some decisionmaking process, acts as a unit. Individual interests are flexed out of respect for the family as a unit. Two more examples:

31.

E-21 Yeah, the mom could say, well you know what, I'm contributing just as much to this family's income as you are, Dad...So...if you don't want to waste the car...money on the car, then I'll waste the money on the car and buy it. In which case there could be extreme division. But I think that would be just clearly wrong in all cases, in that the division would be, um,

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<sup>39</sup> One likely reason for the greater visibility of this particularly Discussion V. Final Say tension in the Chinese interviews is that a car is still a much larger expenditure relative to the average Chinese household than to the average American household, and so the Chinese interviewees had to be considering the “big expenditure” question to a larger degree than the Americans. The relative smallness of the expenditure for American families is highlighted in (30) by E-13's *even* in “even a car.”

far worse than what she's getting a new car [sic]. So I don't think she'd do that.

32.

E-26 Well, if their salaries are high enough, Mom could just buy a car and like discard Dad's idea, like with her own money, and then it wouldn't...

E-25 Yeah, that would not lead to marital bliss, though.

E-26 Well, no.

According to Family Unit, then, family members can't just run amok if they have the desire and financial means to do something that other family members don't want them to do.

I present Family Unit separately from the other models because it is not in competition with them. Rather, it is implicit in the other models: whether disputes are resolved via Final Say, Democracy, or Money is Power, in no cases, Chinese or English, is it ever advocated that an individual family member carry out the independent economic act of buying the car herself or himself. We have just seen that this possibility, in the rare cases in which it is explored, is immediately disregarded.<sup>40</sup> Thus it seems that in both China and the U.S., the relevant economic pool to be drawn from belongs, in some important sense, to the nuclear family as a whole. That is, the nuclear family has shared economic resources on which to draw, at least for major expenditures.

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<sup>40</sup> In her (1987) piece on American models of marriage, Naomi Quinn doesn't point out such a model directly, but does claim that many of the models converge to make marriage something that is "jointly lived" (189).

Dispute-resolution models: miscellaneous notes

One other model that surfaces in the data did not make it into the main discussion because it appeared only once. We'll call it Marriage Means Equality, and E-26 invokes it near the beginning of their discussion of Question #10:

33.

E-26 Well, it...the, um...they're married, so they should have equal say.

It was actually surprising to me that this model did not appear more frequently. Perhaps this has to do with the “similar salaries” stipulation, which invites Money is Power into the discussion. Without this stipulation, it is possible that Marriage Means Equality would have surfaced more often.

It is also worth noting a meta-model in the Chinese data with regard to Final Say versus Majority Rules: at times it is suggested that Final Say is more “traditional,” and along with this that Democracy is gaining ground. We already saw this in (10) above, when C-14 says that in certain traditional households the father would have the final say, but that in more and more households the minority follows the majority. We also saw this in (11), in which C-19 states that nowadays there are a lot of families who follow Majority Rules, implying that there were fewer of these families before now. And finally, this meta-model is implicit in C-12's claim, made in (13), that a “get-rich-quick” family would prioritize Final Say. (Much of the content of Footnote #9 is repeated here.) Her reasoning only makes sense in light of this meta-model. The Chinese term that I

have translated as “get-rich-quick household” is *bàofāhù*, literally “explode-make (money)-household.” It differs from “get-rich-quick” in that the money was probably made by someone with little education. There is a cultural model in China according to which those with a lower educational level have more traditional ideas. And so it is that the head of a *bàofāhù* would prioritize Final Say: as an uneducated person, s/he (more likely “he”) is relatively traditional, and the meta-model tells us that Final Say is a more traditional way of resolving family conflict.

#### Winning and losing: an American phenomenon

One particularly striking difference between the American and Chinese responses to Question #10 is that the Americans frequently speak of the mother or father “winning” or “losing,” while the equivalent Chinese terms, *yíng* and *shū*, never appear, even once.

We have already seen this in (4), (7) and (9), and (16). There is one more example:

34.

E-16 I identify with Bill. ... Um, that depends who Mom and Dad are. If they're my...if they're mine, eventually my mom will sort of win, but then the car will die and...

E-15 Why would mom win?

E-16 Bill's car will... Mom wins? Mom wins when Dad's car dies. And then you *need* a new car.

This terminology, then, appears in four of the nine English interviews. It seems to

indicate that some sort of contest is involved. Further evidence is offered below by E-20:

35.

E-20 Um...well, Bill's gonna root for Mom.

Bill wouldn't be "rooting for" anyone unless the interaction between the father and mother were being conceived of in terms of winning and losing. And in this latter case, the example is of a particular kind of contest, namely a sport.<sup>41</sup>

If we extend our search to language indicating not specifically game or sports competition, but more generalized conflict, we can include E-21's statement in (18) that Bill's mom is "on his side." At another point, E-21 states that there will be "some huge conflict" in this situation. E-9 says that Bill will "get really angry" if they don't buy a car, and the hypothetical discussion explored by E-17 and E-18 is a highly conflictual one. While the sports/game metaphor construals and the conflictual construals are not identical, what they share is that the interests of the various parties necessarily stand in opposition, and minimize the possibility of compromise (which will be discussed further below).<sup>42</sup>

This latter form of data, pertaining to conflictual construals of the scenario, is more subjective to evaluate than the sports/game terminology, but my strong impression is that conflictual construals of the scenario are almost completely absent from the Chinese interviews. In fact, the only example of a conflictual construal comes in (1),

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<sup>41</sup> See Morgan (1998) for a detailed discussion of how different contest metaphors relate to one another.

<sup>42</sup> This particular aspect of American culture has already received a thorough treatment in Tannen (1998). The public side of sports metaphors has been examined by Morgan (1998) and Patent (2000).

when C-11 uses the verb *zhēngbiàn*, which translates as “debate” or “argue,” in asking C-10 how the mom will “debate” this with the dad.<sup>43</sup>

One of the reasons for the relative strength of Final Say in China may be its role in minimizing conflict. This is discussed in two interviews. First, during follow-up questioning in C-18/19, they explain the compromise aspect of Final Say:

36.

C-19 Jíshǐ, jiǎrúshuō zhèi ge jiāting shì zhèi ge bàba zuòzhǔ de huà, jíshǐ tā māma hái shì xiǎng mǎi xīn chē, dànshi tā yě huì hěn...jiù shuō, búshì shuō hěn qíngyuàn, dànshi yě búshì shuō shì jíwéi fǎngǎn de qù zūncóng zhèi ge bàba de yìjian. Huì zhèi yàng. Jíshǐ zhèige...jiǎrúshuō zhèi ge jiāting lǐ shì zhèi ge māma zuòzhǔ de huà, tāmen zhèi ge bàba yě huì jiùshì shuō...búshì hěn qíngyuàn, dànshi yě bù huì jílì fǎnduì de nèi yàng de, huì nào de jiā lǐ tiānfāndìfù, ránhòu chǎo qǐ jià, yě bù huì zhèi yàng.

C-18 Duì, duì.

C-19 Jiùshì...jiùshì huì zūncóng qízhōng yī ge rén de yìjian.

C-19 Even if, for example in this family the dad is in charge, even if his mom still wants to buy a new car, she'll be very...that is, it's not that she would be completely happy about it, but she also wouldn't follow the dad's wishes in an extremely opposed way. This is how it would be. Even if the...say in this family the mom is in charge, their father also would say...he wouldn't be completely happy about it, but he also wouldn't fiercely oppose, he wouldn't be like that, have an earth-shaking fit, and then start to argue, he wouldn't act this way...

C-18 Right, right.

C-19 They'd...they'd follow the opinion of one of them.

The other example of this we have already seen, in (5), where C-20 and C-21 are discussing their version of Final Say, according to which husbands agree to obey their

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<sup>43</sup> It could also be argued that any instance of Majority Rules also implies both conflict and some metaphor, either a sports metaphor or a Family-as-Nation democracy metaphor. So if we count the Chinese examples of Majority Rules here, it could be argued that a conflictual construal of this scenario is more common than I have just argued it is.



wives mostly because they don't have strong opinions on matters. In such cases, Final Say helps avoid conflict, even though there might not have been much conflict to begin with.

Another way: Compromise

The American data, however, are not completely bereft of references to the possibility of compromise. Compromise is an option available to both Chinese and Americans. What I mean here by Compromise is that a final decision is reached in which nobody gets exactly what they want, but all parties get part of what they want. As with Family Unit, I did not discuss Compromise along with Final Say, Democracy and Money is Power because compromise can be arrived at through any or all of these models. We have just seen how Final Say can aid the compromise process. Majority Rules and Discussion can also be means to compromise: Majority Rules through using voting power as a bargaining chip, and Discussion through the voicing of opinions and alternatives. And, while there are no explicit examples in the data of how Money is Power is used for compromise, it is easy to imagine someone using their economic power as a bargaining chip in the process of compromising.

Explicit compromise solutions are offered in one Chinese interview and in two American interviews. C-18 and C-19 jointly suggest that the parents sell the old car to help in buying the new one. E-16 recommends that the family buy a cheap car, possibly

used, instead of a (relatively expensive) new car. And E-22 suggests that Bill get a part-time job and earn his own money to buy a car.<sup>44</sup>

Compromise solutions appear more frequently, for both the Chinese and American interviewees, in response to Question #9. Compromise appears as an option in five of the six Chinese interviews, and in five of the nine American interviews. My guess is that this is because the risks involved in an either-or decision are higher than they are for Question #10. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Question #10 is ultimately mostly about economics, while Question #9 is about the entire future of a young person. Respondee, in suggesting compromise more frequently, are hedging their bets in a sense, reducing the potential risks to Tom. This is most apparent in the following, from C-11:

37.

C-11 Fùmǔ fǎnduì wǒ zěnmébàn? Wǒ kěndìng bù huì shuō fùmǔ qiángliè fǎnduì de shìqing wǒ yīdìng yào qù zuò. Wǒ de fùmǔ zhēnde fǎnduì wǒ kěndìng jiù huì gēn wǒ fùmǔ tuǒxié. Zhè shì wǒ zìjǐ gèxìng de wèntí.

[...]

Búguò wǒ rúguǒ shì Wáng Èr de fùmǔ de huà wǒ kěndìng huì gēn tā shuō wǒ xīwàng tā kǎoshàng dàxué yǐhòu zài xuéxiào lǐ háishi kěyǐ qù wǎn tā de yīnyuè. Zhèi liǎng ge shìqing bìng búshì nènme máodùn.

C-10 Dànshi shàng dàxué duì tā de zhèi ge yáogǔn yuètuán bāngzhù dà ma? Jiù shuō nǐ wèishenme hái xūyào tā shàng dàxué? Rúguǒ tā xiǎng chéngwéi yī ge yáogǔn...

C-11 Yīnwèi wǒ duì tā de qiántú bù míngliǎo. Wǒ juéde dú dàxué de hua qǐmǎ tā jiù hái kěyǐ zhǎo fèn xiāngduì lái shuō hǎo diǎnr gōngzuò yǎnghù zìjǐ ba. Nǐ yàoshi zǔ yī ge yáogǔn yuètuán nǐ xiànzài yě bù dúshū le, nǐ wèilái jiù huì zěnmeyang?

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<sup>44</sup> This last suggestion has a very American ring to it. The cultural models behind it will be discussed later in this chapter.

- C-11 What would I do if my parents disagreed? I definitely wouldn't say that I'm going to press forth with something if my parents are strongly opposed. If my parents really are opposed I would definitely compromise with them. But that's just my personality.  
[...]  
Still, if I were Wang Er's<sup>45</sup> parents I would definitely tell him I hope that after he gets into college he'll continue playing his music at school. These two things don't really stand in opposition at all.
- C-10 But is going to school useful for his rock band? That is, why does he still need to go to college? If he wants to become a rock...
- C-11 Because I'm not clear about his prospects. I feel that if he goes to college at least he'll be able to find a relatively good job to take care of himself. If you want to start a rock band and you don't study now, what will your future be like?

C-11 seems to be saying precisely that because the stakes are so high, a compromise should be sought. She believes it is important for Wang Er to play his music, but also important to go to college so that he can find good work and establish himself economically.

C-12 and C-13 agree with each other that Wang Er can do both at the same time, and that in fact an education might help his music along:

- 38.
- C-12 Wǒ hái shì jué de tā yīng gāi shàng dà xué.  
C-13 Shàng dà xué.  
C-12 Duì. Yīn wèi...  
C-13 Gāo zhōng shì bù gòu de.  
C-12 Ér qiě shàng dà xué gēn tā zǔ yáo gǔn yuè tuán...  
C-13 Bù máo dùn, duì.  
C-12 Xiàn zài shì bù máo dùn de. Tā wán quán kě yǐ zài dà xué lí miàn yě lái zǔ tā de yáo gǔn yuè tuán, ér qiě dāng tā shàng wán dà xué néng gòu xué dào gèng duō de... tā kě néng huì duì yīn yuè gèng shēn de lǐ jiě.  
C-13 Duì.

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<sup>45</sup> Wang Er is Tom's Chinese counterpart.

- C-12 Kěnéng zuòchūlái de yīnyuè huì yào gèng shòu huānyíng, gèng yǒu shēndù.
- C-12 I still think he should go to college.
- C-13 Go to college.
- C-12 Yes, because...
- C-13 Middle school isn't enough.
- C-12 Also going to college and starting a rock band...
- C-13 Don't contradict each other, right.
- C-12 Nowadays there's no contradiction. It's no problem for him to start his rock band in college. Plus once he's finished with college he can learn about more...perhaps he'll have a deeper understanding of music.
- C-13 Yes.
- C-12 Maybe the music he makes will be more welcomed, and have more depth.

C-14 has a similar opinion, but C-15 disagrees about the specifics. Still, both agree that some form of compromise is called for:

- 39.
- C-14 Zuìhòu wǒ xiǎng tā de fùmǔ kěndìng huì qiǎngpò tā qù shàng dàxué. Dànshi wǒ yàoshi zuòwéi Wáng Èr de fùmǔ wǒ kěndìng huì shuō de bǐjiào cōngming yī diǎn, jiùshi shuō, nǐ xūyào qù shàng dàxué, dànshi nǐ de yáogǔn yuètuán zhèige **mèngxiǎng** yě bù yīdìng jiù huì pòmìe ne. Nǐ zài dàxué lǐbiānr nǐ yě kěyǐ jìxù jiàn yáogǔn yuètuán, érqǐě nǐ bù shàng dàxué de huà nǐ zhèige yáogǔn yuètuán jiù bù kěnéng jiàn de hěn hǎo. Jiù bù kěnéng yǒu fāzhǎn yǒu qiántú. Ránhòu, zuìhòu tāmen juédìng...wǒ huì zhīchí nǎ yī biān, wǒ shì zhīchí tā yìbiān shàng dàxué ránhòu yìbiān jiàn yáogǔn yuètuán. Yīnwèi zhèi liǎng ge shì...
- C-15 Nǐ de sīxiǎng bǐjiào lǎohuà.
- C-14 Nà nǐ shuō nǐ jiù ràng tā qù jiàn yáogǔn yuètuán, wǒ juéde shì niánqīng rén, tā bù shàng dàxué, bù shòu jiàoyu, zhè yě bù xíng.
- C-15 Tā kěyǐ jiàn le yáogǔn yuètuán jiù shàng dàxué. Xiànzài shàng dàxué niánlíng yǒu tǐng dà de.
- C-14 Nǐ shuō jiàn yī ge yáogǔn yuètuán, ránhòu zài shàng dàxué.
- C-15 Duì a.
- C-14 Dànshi tā zhèige qiántí shì kuài yào gāozhōng bìyè le, tā niánlíng tǐng xiǎo de, tā búshi shuō tā shì xiàng yánjiūshēng háishi...
- C-15 Tā jiù wán le, tā zhèi ge tiāncái jiù huǐ le.
- C-14 Zhèi ge tiāncái yào huǐ le, nǐ juéde...wǒ bù zhīdào, wǒ juéde Zhōngguó de dàxué...Zhōngguó dàxué gōngkè yālì búshi hěn dà, nǐ kěyǐ yìbiān shàng dàxué yìbiān zuò yáogǔn yuètuán. Měiguó hǎo duō dàxuéshēng, tāmen yě shì yìbiān shàngxué yìbiān yě **shíxiàn** le zìjǐ...jiùshi xuéyè zhī wài de hěn duō **mèngxiǎng**, wǒ juéde zhèi liǎng ge búshi tèbié chōngtū de.
- C-15 Duì, kěyǐ. Wǒ yě tóngyì nǐ de guāndiǎn.

- C-14 In the end I think his parents will definitely force him to go to college. But if I were Wang Er's parents I'd be smarter about it. I'd say, you need to go to college, but your **dream** of starting a rock band needn't be shattered. While in college you can continue to start a rock band. Plus, if you don't go to college then there's no way for your rock band to be built well. There's no way it can develop or have prospects. Then, in the end they will decide...who would I support, I support that he goes to college and forms a rock band at the same time. Because these two things...
- C-15 Your thinking is relatively old.
- C-14 Well, are you saying you would just let him start a rock band, I think he's a young person, and if he doesn't go to college and get a good education, that doesn't work.
- C-15 He can start a rock band and then go to college. Nowadays there are many people who go to college when they're older.
- C-14 You're saying he could start a rock band, and then go to college?
- C-15 Yes.
- C-14 But the premise of the question is that he's about to graduate from high school. He's very young. It's not like he's going to be a graduate student or...
- C-15 Then he's finished, his talent will be destroyed.
- C-14 His talent will be destroyed, you think...I don't know, I think Chinese universities...at Chinese universities the homework pressure isn't very great, you can go to college and do a rock band at the same time. Many college students in America, they also go to college and at the same time **realize**...a lot of **dreams** outside of their studies. I think these two are not especially in contradiction.
- C-15 Yes, okay. I agree with your point.

C-21 offers the possibility of compromise almost as an afterthought:

40.

C-21 Kěnéng, yěxǔ Wáng Èr jiù shuō, hǎo le, nà wǒ jiù yìbiān shàng dàxué,  
yìbiān qù bàn yáogǔn yuè ba.

C-21 Maybe, perhaps Wang Er will say okay, I'll go to college and do rock and roll at the same time.

C-18 thinks Wang Er's parents might take extreme measures to keep him from forming a rock band, such as severing his ties with his musician friends. In response, C-19 gets creative:

41.

C-19 Jiǎrú Wáng Èr zhēnde shì yào zǔzhī yī ge yáogǔn yuètuán de huà, wǒ juéde wǒ yàoshi Wáng Èr de fùmǔ wǒ jiù huì shuō, nǐ kěyǐ qù shòu zhuānyè de jiàoyu, bǐrúshuō shàng yī ge yīnyuè fāngmiàn de zhuānyè yuànxiào. Shàngwán zhèi yàng de dàxué zhī hòu nǐ jīngshòu le...jīngguò...shòu le yī xīliè de xìtǒng jiàoyu yǐhòu...zhuānyè jiàoyu yǐhòu, nǐ zǔzhī de yáogǔn yuètuán hé nǐ xiànzài zǔzhī de yáogǔn yuètuán de céngcì jiù bù huì yíyàng. Zhèi yàng de huà nǐ jiù huì yǒu zhuānyè shàng de zàojiù, huòzhě shuō nǐ zài zhuānyè shàng, zài nǐ de yīnyuè shàng huì yǒu gèng dà de fāzhǎn. Érqǐě wǒ juéde tā de fùmǔ kěyǐ bù yíding fēiděi yào yǐ fēicháng qiángyìng de shǒuduàn lái jiùshi bǎ tā guān zài jiā lǐ huòzhě shì shénme, shénme.

C-19 If Wang Er really wants to start a rock band, I think if I were Wang Er's parents I would say, you can get a specialized education, for example attend a special school just for music. When you're finished at this kind of school, having undergone...received an organized, systematic education...a specialized education, the rock band you form then and the rock band you would form now will be on different levels. This way, you will make achievements in your specialty, or, you will have more development in your speciality, in music. Plus, I think his parents don't necessarily need to use extremely coercive means such as keeping him in the house, or whatever.

There is much worth analyzing in these passages besides what is relevant for

Compromise, but for now I simply want to point out that Compromise is at least a

possibility for Question #9 in five of the six Chinese interviews, and that in four of those

interviews various compromise scenarios are talked through in some depth. For the

Americans, however, only one of the five examples involves much detailed thought. It

comes from E-21:

42.

E-21 I would think that there would be some level of compromise, that the parents would say okay, if you're not gonna go to college, then we're going to start charging you rent, and because of that you're gonna have to get a job, and so you can do your rock band as much as you want, but we're gonna charge you some amount of money per month, and that means you're gonna have to go to work. Or, they might say, alright, you don't

have to go straight into college, but you can take maybe one class, or two classes a semester and also do part-time with your band.

Two of the American examples are more or less afterthoughts. After considering some ways in which the conflict might play out, E-13 says:

43.

E-13 It's like you can do both, you can go to college and form a rock band.

No further elaboration is given. The same is true of E-15, who at the very end of E-15 and E-16's discussion, says:

44.

E-15 He could still go to college and study music.

E-20 suggests something similar, but backpedals when challenged by E-19:

45.

E-20 Like, maybe he can go to a J.C. or something, part time, and then you know...

E-19 Still continue his rock band. That could work. "What will the family members say?" It depends on the family. Like if the...well, the parents already want him to go to college. But he could go to college...yeah he could go to college and still do rock band...well it depends on like how serious he is though.

E-20 Yeah, if he...

E-19 It takes time, you have to tour and like, do promotions, and practice.

E-20 I know. I think it depends on the family, like...

E-19 Yeah.

Finally, E-17 and E-18 suggest that Tom go to college, but not strictly for the sake of compromise:

46.

E-17 I came to college *because* I wanted to be in a rock band. It's like there's no one here that could be in a rock band, I want to go to college and find someone.

[...then, in follow-up...]

- E-18 Well we said if he was smart though, he would want to go to college *and* join a rock band.
- Me But he doesn't.
- E-18 Yeah. Okay, but he doesn't. Um...well then he's stupid, he should go to college and join a...like, go to c...I think we said like it's smarter to make connections and...
- E-17 I mean like I know kids that are here now that just want to be in a rock band and who are just like wasting their parents' money and they don't really go to class, and they just sit in their rooms and play guitar all day, so in that sense I don't think it's...I mean if the kid does not want to learn, then I don't think he should go.
- E-18 Yeah.
- E-17 But I would hope that they could get to a place where he could see the merits, even if they're you know a means to his own end, that he should be there.

This is different from the Chinese suggestions that it is in Wang Er's best interest to go to college, which involved either persuasion from the parents' perspective — (39) and (41) — or, in C-12's statement in (38), a viewpointless claim that going to college might help foster Wang Er's understanding of music. Here in (46), what we have is an argument that if Tom sees things the way he should, he himself will see going to college as strategically beneficial to his rock-band ends. So the spirit here is not necessarily one of compromise, but of turning a perceived drawback into a benefit.

Given these examples, we may tentatively conclude that Compromise is available to both Chinese and Americans, but that the Chinese perhaps take it a bit more seriously than the Americans do.



## What sort of life?

Now we shift gears from family dispute resolution to views about what roles people play and are expected to play, both inside and outside the family, in each others' and in their own lives. Dispute resolution is primarily about who holds the power; this section is about broader questions of what a person is, and what makes a good human life. In this chapter we still confine ourselves to Question #9, but we will see in later chapters that some of the models that surface here appear in responses to other questions as well, questions that redound beyond the family and to society at large.

In addition to views about compromise, the last few passages above offer tastes of some rather significant differences in prioritization of cultural models between the Chinese and American interviewees that appeared in responses to Question #9. The first of these is in the clash between what we will call Success and Follow Your Dreams. Success refers to the notion that one should take steps to establish one's position in society. By "position" I mean a job that is well-paying, well-respected, or both. In explaining why most Chinese parents would not support Wang Er in his rock band quest, C-18 gives the follows explication of Success:

47.

C-18 Wǒ juéde zài xiànjīn Zhōngguó shèhuì, bǎifēnzhī jiǔshíwǔ de fùmǔ shì bù huì tóngyì tā zhèi yàng zuò ne. Yīnwèi dà...jiùshì...zài Zhōngguó de fùmǔ de pǔbiànxìng lǐ jiùshì xīwàng zìjǐ de hái zi kǎoshàng yī ge míngpái dàxué, ránhòu jiānglái yǒu yī ge fēicháng tǐmiàn de gōngzuò.

C-18 I think that these days in Chinese society, ninety-five percent of parents would not want Wang Er to do this. Because...that is...it is common for Chinese parents to hope for their children to get into a famous university, and then in the future get a creditable job.

Another aspect of Success is economic: it is a good idea to establish an economic foundation for oneself. We saw this above in (37), in C-11's argument that college is important for Wang Er's economic future. Success thus has both an economic and a status-based side.

Ideas of success in China and the U.S. are obviously not identical. For instance, in China an important aspect of one's success is the honor it brings to family members. While this is true to some extent in the U.S., it is less true than in China. "Reputable" occupations also differ: teachers, for example, are accorded higher status in China than in the U.S. So it is risky to claim there is one Success model shared by the U.S. and China. However, on the highly schematic level just sketched out, there is enough similarity to warrant positing a single, shared model: there is a highly general model in both cultures that privileges money, reputability and security.

Follow Your Dreams means that a person should do what they most love in life. These two models are not inevitably in tension — many athletes, businesspeople, musicians and such have become wealthy and respected doing what they love doing — but in the overwhelming majority of cases, some tension will surface between these two

models. This is resolved differently by Chinese and American interviewees: Chinese tend to prefer Success, while Americans opt more for Follow Your Dreams.

We have already seen an example of the Chinese preference for Success, in (37) above, where C-11 is adamant that Wang Er needs to attend college in order to get himself a good job and be able to take care of himself. C-20 and C-21 have a similar preference, which they express after C-21 has toyed with the idea of supporting Wang Er and then backed off:

- 48.
- C-20 Yīnwèi yáogǔnyuè zài Zhōngguó hái...
- C-21 Méiyǒu pǔjí ma.
- C-20 Búshì nènme tèbié de...tèbié de pǔjí, nènme...jiù...lìngwài gěi rén de yìxiang jiùshì yǒu diǎnr...
- C-21 Bù tài **zhèngjīng**.
- C-20 ...yǒu diǎnr bù zhèng...bù rù **zhèngyè** de yìxiē rén zài gāo zhèixiē, huòzhě shì bù zuòwéi yī ge **zhèngshì** de yī ge zhíyè. Zuòwéi fùmǔ...zuòwéi fùmǔ lái jiǎng tā huì háishi yāoqiú...zǐnǚ ne, nénggòu shàng dàxué, érqǐ nénggòu...
- C-21 Shòudào **zhèngguī** jiàoyu, duì.
- C-20 Mm. Shòudào gèng hǎo de jiàoyu, zhǎo yī ge...gèng jiā...wèntuǒ de gōngzuò.  
[...]  
Jiù zhèi ge wèntí lái shuō wǒ juéde kěnéngxìng háishi jiāzhǎng dūcù Wáng Èr hǎohāorde xuéxí, jìxù shàng dàxué shēnzào. Zhèi ge...
- C-21 Zhèi ge kěnéngxìng dà.
- C-20 Zhèi ge kěnéngxìng gèng dà yìxiē. Zhèi ge...
- C-21 Wǒmen huì zhīchí nǎ yī biān?
- C-20 Cóng wǒ běnrén lái jiǎng yīnggāi shì shuō, jiùshì...háishi ràng tā jìxù shēnzào, jìxù shàng dàxué.
- C-21 Duì, wǒ yě shì. Wǒ xiǎng...yáogǔn yuètuán méi...méi tài dà qiántú. Nǐ bìxū děi...
- C-20 Yě yǒu kěnéng nénggòu zhèng dà tiān, yě yǒu kěnéng, dànshì jiùshì shuō cóng yìxiang lái jiǎng, háishi...
- C-21 Wǒ bù xīwàng...duì. Wǒ huì zhīchí tā fùmǔ.
- C-20 ...yīnggāi gāo yī ge gèng āndìng, gèng...
- C-21 Duì, wǒ bù xīwàng tā qù bàn yáogǔn yuè.
- C-20 ...gèng shénme de gōngzuò.

- C-20 Because in China rock music still...
- C-21 Isn't popular?
- C-20 ...isn't all that...all that popular, and so...so...in addition the impression it gives people is a little...
- C-21 Not too **proper**.
- C-20 ...a little...it's done by the sort of people who don't do **proper sorts of jobs**, or it isn't a **proper** profession. As parents...as parents they will demand...that their children can go to college, plus that they can...
- C-21 Receive a **proper** education, right.
- C-20 Mm hm. Get a better education, find a...better...more stable job  
[...]  
Considering this question, I think the possibility of the parents urging Wang Er to study hard, to continue to pursue advanced studies in college, this...
- C-21 This possibility is large.
- C-20 This possibility is larger. This...
- C-21 Which side would we support?
- C-20 From my perspective, I would say that...it's best to have him continue advanced studies, that is to go to college.
- C-21 Yes, me too. I think...a rock band doesn't have...doesn't have good prospects. You absolutely must...
- C-20 There's also a chance that he'll make a lot of money, it's possible, but as far as one's impression goes...
- C-21 I hope he doesn't...right. I would support his parents.
- C-20 ...he should do a more stable, more...
- C-21 Right. I hope he doesn't go do a rock...
- C-20 ...more whatever job.

This passage gets a bit hard to follow at the end, because C-20 and C-21 are engaged in separate monologues. But the point is clear: playing in a rock band is not an honorable or respectable profession — C-20 and C-21 find several words that translate best as

“proper”<sup>46</sup> — and will not provide stable work, and so Wang Er should go to college.

The Success model is privileged.<sup>47</sup>

C-18 and C-19 also think Wang Er should go to college. C-18, after briefly considering Wang Er’s viewpoint, comes down in favor of the parents:

49.

C-18 Wǒ juéde wǒ hái huì zhīchí tā de fùmǔ. Yīnwèi...qíshí tā dú le dàxué yǐhòu yě tóngyàng huì yǒu gè yàng de **xìngqū** hé **àihào** kěyǐ dédào gè zhǒng gè yàng de fāzhǎn. Dàn wǒ juéde zhèi ge zhīshi shuǐpíng shì juédìng tā zhèi ge rénlèi yī ge **sùzhi** de yī ge zhòngyào de yī ge fāngmiàn. Suǒyǐ tā wánquán...tā zǔ zhèi ge yáogǔn yuètuán wánquán kěyǐ zài tā dú le dàxué yǐhòu, tā yǒu zìjǐ yídìng de fēnxī wèntí, jiějué wèntí yídìng nénglǐ yǐhòu, ránhòu zài...zài chóngrǎn kǎolǜ tā zhèi zhǒng xiǎngfǎ.

C-18 I think I would support his parents. Because...in fact after he has finished college he can still have all sorts of **interests** and **hobbies** to be developed in all sorts of ways. But I think knowledge level is an important aspect in determining humanity’s **quality**. So it is no problem for him...it is no problem for him to form this rock band after finishing college, after he has the definite ability to analyze problems and solve problems. Then he can...once again consider this plan of his.

C-18 here isn’t directly advocating the Success model, but rather two implicit components of it: that in order to be successful, one needs to have certain abilities to distinguish good decisions from bad decisions,<sup>48</sup> and that in order to do this one must

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<sup>46</sup> All these words begin with the morpheme *zhèng*, which alone means both literally and metaphorically “upright.”

<sup>47</sup> The overwhelming preference for Success here probably has something to do with these interviewees’ ages. These two are by far the oldest of the sample, both in their forties. They come off in this passage as stereotypical elder-generation Chinese. Though of course America is not without its “fuddy-duddies.”

<sup>48</sup> This is part of what one has when one has a high degree of *sùzhi*. It is quite possible that an entire dissertation could be written on *sùzhi*. The topic of *sùzhi jiàoyù*, or “*sùzhi* education,” is a hot one in China these days. One often hears taxi drivers complain that the *sùzhi* of Chinese people is low. This is why, for

have a certain level of formal education. Indirectly and implicitly, C-18 is arguing for the Success model.

C-19 is a bit more explicit. We have already seen, in (41), how C-19 offers a rhetorical strategy for Wang Er's parents to employ in persuading him to go to college.

Immediately before this, C-19 offers the following:

50.

C-19 Zài Zhōngguó rúguǒ rén xiǎng chénggōng de huà, tā suīrán yǒu hěn duō de tújìng, dànshì tā shàng dàxué, zǒu shàng chénggōng zhī lù shì yī tiáo xiāngduì lái shuō gèng shì yī zhǒng jiéjìng. Xiāngduì qítā lù lái jiǎng yěxǔ huì... tā de qǐdiǎn jiù huì gēn bié rén bù yíyàng.

C-19 In China if a person wants to be successful, even though he has many paths, to take to road to success, going to college is, relatively speaking, is even more of a shortcut. Relatively speaking, other paths might...his starting point will be different from other peoples'.

Her point: Wang Er should do whatever makes him successful fastest.

(38), (39) and (41) also offer support for Success, but more subtly. In these passages, the speakers aren't coming right out and saying "I support Wang Er's parents." However, everything they discuss is from the parents' perspective. In frame-semantic terms, they are projecting themselves into the parents' frame roles, asking themselves what they would do if they were the parents, and thinking carefully through how to persuade Wang Er to attend college. It might even be argued that the speakers here are not after all advocating the Compromise model; instead, they might hypothetically invoke

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instance, a taxi driver might say, automobile drivers cut each other off and run red lights; people don't

Compromise for rhetorical purposes, were they in the position of Wang Er's parents, but in actuality they support the parents' position in prioritizing Success. Speakers do occasionally project themselves into Wang Er's role — as the question invites them to do — but the efforts are fleeting compared to the thought expended on considering the parents' position and possible actions. C-12 hardly makes an effort. Immediately after posing her argument that Wang Er's music would have more depth if he went to college, she says:

51.

C-12 "Wáng Èr huì zěnmeyàng hé tā de fùmǔ shuō?" Tā kěnéng huì hěn zhíjiē lái shuō a, tā xiǎngyào zuò shénme yàng de shìqing.

C-13 Tā de fùmǔ kěnéng jiù gēn nǐ yíyàng de fǎnyìng. [laughter]

C-12 Duì, wǒ juéde hái néng huì shì zhèi yàng! [laughter]

C-12 "What would Wang Er say to his parents?" Maybe he would say directly what he wants to do.

C-13 His parents' reaction would maybe be the same as yours. [laughter]

C-12 Yes, I think it might be this way. [laughter]

C-13, we can see, makes no effort to address Wang Er's viewpoint, shifting right back to the parents' perspective, and C-12 follows right along. C-14, before suggesting the parents' rhetorical strategy discussed above, says the following about Wang Er's strategy:

52.

C-14 "Wáng Èr huì zěnmeyàng hé tā de fùmǔ shuō?" Nà Wáng Èr tā zuò yī ge **xiǎo qīngnián** tā kěndìng shuō tā xiǎng shíxiàn tā de líxiǎng jiù xiǎng jiàn yī ge yáogǔn yuètuán, zhèi ge shàng dàxué tā juéde bù zhòngyào, zhèi bù shì tā de rénshēng mènghǎng a, tā huì shìtú tóngyì...tā de fùmǔ tóngyì tā bù shàng dàxué, ránhòu qù jiàn yáogǔn yuètuán.

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stand in line; don't say "excuse me" when they bump into you; etc.

C-14 “What would Wang Er say to his parents?” Well, Wang Er, as a **young person**, he’ll definitely say he wants to realize his ideal, that is he wants to form a rock band, he thinks that going to college is not important, this isn’t his life’s dream, so he’ll try to agree...get his parents to agree that he not go to college, and after that form a rock band.

C-14 then goes into the detailed consideration of the parents’ viewpoint presented in (39).

Her reference to Wang Er as a “young person” (*xiǎo qīngnián*) is another subtle hint at

her viewpoint, and is related to what she says immediately before (52), just as she begins

her answer to the question:

53.

C-14 Wǒ juéde zhèi ge jiùshì shuō lǐxiǎng hé xiànré yǒushíhòu shì huì yǒu chāyì de.

C-14 I think this says that sometimes there will be a difference between ideals and reality.

In other words: Wang Er is a youthful idealist. What he really should do is go to college.

We are then left with overwhelming support for Success in the Chinese data: C-11, C-12 through 15, and C-18 through 21 all support Wang Er going to college. That leaves C-10, C-16 and C-17. C-16 at no point expresses a preference. But C-10 and C-17 do, and in doing so invoke models we will see much more of in the American data.

C-10 is the only Chinese speaker to advocate what we will call Live and Learn: making mistakes is not tragic, but rather can be a valuable part of the learning process.

We already got a hint of this in (38). After this, C-10 continues to disagree with C-11:

C-10 claims that there is in fact an inherent contradiction between college and a rock



band, since all the time Wang Er spends on his studies could be spent on his music. C-11

grows impatient and asks C-10: If this was your son, what would you do? And then:

54.

C-11 Juéduì bù xiàng nǐ shuō huà shuō de nènme qīngsōng.

C-10 Nà kěyǐ ràng tā qǔ ge jiàoxùn ma. **Chī yī qiàn, zhǎng yī zhì** ma.

C-11 There's no way you'd be as cavalier as you're saying now.

C-10 Let it be a lesson for him. **Learn from his mistakes.**

That Live and Learn is available as a model for Chinese speakers is evident in how easy

it is for C-10 to express this: he uses the following set phrase, or *chéngyǔ*:

55.

Chī	yī	qiàn,	zhǎng	yī	zhì.
Eat	one	pit,	grow	one	wisdom.

“Fall into a pit and your wisdom grows.”

Still, as mentioned, C-10 was the only one of the Chinese speakers to invoke this model.

Plus, listening to the conversation, including the pauses and when laughter occurs, one

really gets the sense that C-10 is playing devil's advocate with C-11. Regardless,

however, Live and Learn is available as an option.

The model that surfaces with C-17 is Follow Your Dreams. She and C-16 don't spend much time on Question #9. Both agree that their own parents probably would not want them to form a rock band instead of going to college, but only C-17 expresses an opinion about whom she would support in this situation. C-16 asks C-17 whom she would support. C-17's response is worth glossing in full:

56.						
Wǒ	juéde	měi	ge	rén	háishi	
1-sg	think	every	CLAS	person	after all	
yào	follow	zìjǐ	de	heart.		
should	follow	one's own	ATT	heart.		

“I think every person, after all, should follow one’s own heart.”

Of obvious note here is her use of English. Right after saying this, she chides herself for using English, and then offers the following “translation” of what she had just said:

57.						
Háishi	yīnggāi	jiānchí	zìjǐ	de	xiǎngfǎ	ba.
After all	should	maintain	one's own	ATT	opinion	SUG.

“After all, [a person] should maintain one’s own opinion.”

C-17 felt that English was a more suitable vehicle than Chinese for expressing what she wanted to express, namely that Wang Er should “follow his heart.” This is not at all to say that a similar idea cannot be expressed in Chinese: it is possible to *shíxiàn* (“realize”) one’s *mèngxiǎng* (“dreams”), as we saw in (39).<sup>49</sup> Follow Your Dreams is available as a model in Chinese, and is nicely expressible in Chinese, but even so C-17 felt the need to use English, possibly indicating some level of discomfort with the Chinese version.

Perhaps it seems unnatural in Chinese, or perhaps there is some other reason. Regardless,

it is interesting that the one person to advocate Follow Your Dreams used English in doing so.

Throughout the Chinese data, then, Success is strongly preferred to Live and Learn and Follow Your Dreams. In the English data, the case is reversed. Most interviewees are concerned with Tom's being successful, and are sympathetic to his parents, but feel it is most important for Tom to do what he wants and learn from his mistakes. At times, the Success model is openly questioned and subordinated.

Part of the background for this is another model, closely related to Follow Your Dreams, that appears only in the English data: the Life Path<sup>50</sup> model. It is a prerequisite to Follow Your Dreams. According to this model, each person has some special talent or skill, along with a desire to develop it. And time is tight: we only get one life in which to develop this talent or skill. It is hard to find examples from the interviews which articulate only this model; they are always bound up at least with Follow Your Dreams,

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<sup>49</sup> Also (52) above, C-14 uses the term *rénshēng mèngxiǎng*, which I translated as "life's dream"; but recall that she is speaking more from the parents' perspective, and as such is not particularly sympathetic to this aspect of Wang Er's viewpoint.

<sup>50</sup> In using a metaphor in the name of this model I do not mean to imply that all users of the model always employ the Life is a Journey metaphor when invoking this model, nor that the Life is a Journey metaphor is a necessary component of this model. Instead, I choose this name because, given how common the Life is a Journey metaphor is, and how closely related it is to the model I am explicating here, this name gets the essence of this model across to my American readers in the clearest, most concise way possible.

and sometimes also with Live and Learn and Success. The following brings in all these models:

58.

E-9 I have a friend, his name is J\_\_\_\_, he did exactly this, and like his parents wanted him to go to college, and the family members at first were like, don't do it, don't do it, and they were all angry about it, and then they sort of uh, and they definitely to one another speak badly of the idea, they think it's bad, but I mean eventually, eventually in the end, if, if, what do I mean in the end, but at the moment, they've sort of resolved it with saying, well this is what he wants to do, and like you know he'll learn or he won't, or whatever, but this is his path, and I...

E-10 I think that's right too, like conventionally, you know what I'm saying it's not a safe thing to do if you want to be financially secure all your life or something, but if that's not your big important thing...

E-9 ...which it shouldn't be...

E-10 Yeah, I definitely agree with you on that, but then I think you should just, I don't know, I think you should pursue, what you're interested in..

In other words: Tom has a life path, which is rock music. And he has a dream to be a rock musician, which he should follow. Not only is pursuing his dream good in and of itself, but it could also be a learning experience. And this is more important than being financially successful.

E-13 and E-14 point out that not trying one's life path could lead to regret. In supporting Tom's decision to join a rock band, they say:

59.

E-14 Yeah, I think...if he had to go out and do it then he should have done it and got it over with. Otherwise he's always gonna feel like, oh, I could have been a rock star.

E-13 Yeah, yeah.

E-20 gets at a certain urgency in the Life Path model:

60.

- E-20 I guess if the guy's got a lot of talent, and he really really wants to do it...  
E-19 I think he should do it.  
E-20 I think he should do it. 'Cause I mean, you're only one life, right? Do what you want.

The Life Path model seems to be saying, then, that one actually has a *duty* to follow one's dreams, because life is too short not to. E-15 makes this quite explicit, and in the process criticizes the Success model:

61.  
E-15 I don't know. I think that...you have to do what you want to do. And it isn't necessarily have to be [sic] the way that you're expected to do things, right, you know you graduate from high school, you go to college, you get married...

E-15's modal choice says it all. Which points out an interesting irony in this intersection of the Life Path and Follow Your Dreams models. In American culture, it is fair to say that choice is generally considered to be a good thing (more on this below). It is also a good thing to have a dream to follow. Having choices and having dreams are both liberating in a sense: they keep people from living their lives according to the dictates of others. But here, because of the urgency of the Life Path model, there is a claim that one's decision of whether to follow one's dreams is not a completely free one: one *has to* follow one's dreams, or one's life is wasted.

This urgency and sense of duty probably stem from a spiritual, if not religious (in the sense of institutionalized religion) aspect of American views of human life. This speculation is obviously in need of empirical evidence, but one does often hear of "God-

given talent,” even from the mouths of people who profess to be irreligious. God-given talent is, if it is not utilized in the process of following the appropriate life path, wasted.

The word *waste* appears frequently in responses to Question #9, and gets at this subtle aspect of Life Path. The sort of thing one wastes is a resource. Something is in limited supply, and one’s responsibility is to expend the resource as efficiently as possible. American interviewees often claim that it would be a “waste” for Tom to go to college, because he wouldn’t be following his Life Path. E-11 and E-12 sum up this idea nicely:

62.

E-11 And who is right? I think Tom is right, because...an education is a good thing in my opinion, but it's Tom's life, and if he wants to join a rock band then I think that's his choice. We need to have some rock band people.

E-12 I think he's right too, I mean because if his parents force him to go to high school...I mean to go to college, and like...and so he ended up going to college instead of joining the rock band, he wouldn't try hard, he wouldn't study, he wouldn't do any of that, because that's not where he wants to be, so it'd be a **waste** of like...of his time and of like the parents' money and of just...it'd be a **waste** of everything 'cause like he won't be trying hard because he doesn't want to be there, so it'd be better for him to do what he wants to do, because then he'll...put in a lot of effort to what he wants to do. And like if he wants to be a rock star, then he's gonna try really hard, and he's gonna be happy doing what he's doing, instead of like listening to his parents and being miserable.

Tom’s time, and the effort he is willing to put into his endeavors, is limited. It is wrong for Tom to be forced into a situation in which he is not using this resource in an efficient way.

The model here is further clarified by E-12, during follow-up questioning not about Question #9, but about Question #10. In her answer to Question #10, E-11 had stated that no one was right about the car. In follow-up, I asked her to elaborate. After restating her claim without elaboration, E-12 jumps in to offer some possible takes on who is right:

63.

E-12 And like if they're trying to conserve money, which it sounds like they're probably trying to do, because if they both have jobs and they both work a lot of hours and everything, then...I guess...they wouldn't want to get the car, but then again what are you working all those hours for, like I mean, you know, you have to go and buy yourself things, too, you can't just like work work work and then save up money, 'cause it's not...it's just a **waste**, like...I mean...yeah you're working hard but are you having a good life, are you enjoying your life? No.

What makes this use of *waste* particularly interesting is that in the overwhelming majority of cases this word is used as an argument in *Dad's* favor: buying a new car is a waste of money. But here, the precious resource is not the family's money, but the family's time and effort. If so much time is expended working so hard, then some of the money, metonymically connected to the time via salary, should be expended toward making these people happy. The urgency of this is vividly expressed once again via *have to*.

This, in turn, brings up a model that is superordinate to Follow Your Dreams, which we will call Pursuit of Happiness. Both models say that we should do what makes

us happy. Follow Your Dreams is just more specific in that , through its interaction with Life Path, there is a specific activity to be engaged in which makes someone happy. Pursuit of Happiness is clearly expressed by E-20 at the end of (60), and is further expressed many other times. Sometimes Pursuit of Happiness is not easy to distinguish from Follow Your Dreams. In the example below, one or both of these stands in opposition to Success:

64.

E-9 My brother dropped out of school and my parents were angry about it at first, but he makes like an enormous amount of money doing exactly what he wanted to do, and in their eyes making money would probably be a good thing and like you know he's doing what he wants to do and so I don't think the money thing is as important so...I don't know.

E-13 and E-14 are a bit more guarded in the endorsement of Follow Your Dreams, advising Tom to adopt a cautious attitude and to understand that his chances of failure are great, but still come down in favor of Follow Your Dreams:

65.

E-14 Well if he *really* wants to join a rock band he's gonna do it.

E-13 I think Tom will end up working at McDonald's. And he won't be able to...I mean...

E-14 You don't have any faith in Tom.

E-13 No it's like...there's so many bands out there, and a lot of them...yeah, a lot of them hit it big, but then they're usually one-hit wonders...

E-14 Yeah.

E-13 ...and then they're just like, plop, you know?

E-14 Chances are he's not gonna make it. He's just gonna end up...

E-13 It's just the statistics, you know, I don't wanna have like a negative outlook, but I think in the end he'll just run back to his parents and go, okay I'll go back to college, can you guys pay for it, you know?

E-14 Yeah.

E-13 Something like that.

E-14 Yeah. Chances are that would happen. But I mean if that's really what he wants to do, shouldn't he do it?



E-13 Yeah, I think you should totally go after your dreams and do what you want, but you also have to keep in mind that there are consequences for what you choose, and you have to weigh those.

E-13 and E-14 are not ready to give Tom free license to follow his dreams. Yes, he *should* follow his dreams, but this is a weaker modal than *have to*. What Tom “has to” do is understand that he is taking a risk and that the chances of the risk paying off in the way Tom hopes they will pay off are slim.

A new model surfaces here as well. E-14 begins by stating that Tom will do what he wants, regardless of his parents’ wishes. We will call this the You Can’t Change Me model. This is another model found with great frequency in the English interviews but is virtually absent from the Chinese interviews. In essence, the model states that people are going to do what they want to do, and that attempts to get people to do things they don’t want to do are doomed to failure, or are at least counterproductive. E-17 and E-18, near the end of a follow-up discussion about Question #9, decide that Tom is right, invoking You Can’t Change Me:

66.

E-17 I think he's...I think he's right though, if I had to pick. I think at seventeen...I mean if one year, you know, eighteen you're autonomous, I think...I think you have a pretty...I mean if...if your parents haven't instilled in you their belief system by then...by then, it doesn't really do them a lot of good to impose it on you at that point and say, well, you know this is what you should do.

E-18 Well they can't force him, anyway. It's his choice.

E-17 Right.

E-18 So.

E-17 Right.

E-18 Well if...if...basically like he should do what's gonna make him most happy.

First, note that E-18 comes down in favor of Pursuit of Happiness. Second, note E-17's switch from *instill* to *impose*: the framing of the latter implies that Tom, at seventeen, has a well-enough-formed value system of his own that his parents should not forcibly attempt to change it, because doing so would be counterproductive. And if this value system includes playing rock music, there's nothing the parents can do to change it. E-18 sums this up with her statement that the parents "can't force him." Granted, the *can't* here might be a colloquial equivalent of *shouldn't*, rather than a metaphorical force-dynamic claim that the parents are actually powerless to stop Tom. But the next example is clearer on this. E-21 plays Tom in a hypothetical argument with his parents, and says:

67.

E-21 Nope, no no Dad, I don't wanna go to college, I just don't like education, it really drags me down, I'm not feeling motivated to just go out, I'm gonna do poorly, it's gonna be a waste of your money. Instead I want to pursue what I'm really passionate about and join a rock band. I have a good deal of friends, and I don't wanna give that up. What are you gonna say, dad? I'm gonna do it, whether or not you like it or not, so...

We don't know whether E-21 agrees with Tom or not, but clearly he sees Tom as able to marshal *You Can't Change Me* in his favor.

E-11 expresses similar sentiment, that Tom will do what he wants, regardless of his parents' wishes:

68.

E-11 Um, what will happen in the end? I think Tom will end up doing whatever he wants to do in the end because it is his life and he'll...and by the time he's graduating high school he's old enough to make his own decisions and I don't think he would listen to his parents if he really wanted to join the

rock band. And who is right? I think Tom is right, because...an education is a good thing in my opinion, but it's Tom's life, and if he wants to join a rock band then I think that's his choice. We need to have some rock band people.

Tom is perceived by these speakers as an autonomous agent, with a will of his own, capable of acting on his wishes and inclined to do so. A person, by this model, naturally tends to mold the world to his desires, to transform his circumstances so that he may fulfill his desires.

It makes sense, then, that choice would come up frequently in these responses, as it did in (64) and in (66): "It's/that's his choice." A person intent upon changing the world to suit his desires will naturally, in the course of doing so, have to make choices. And so having the ability to choose is generally viewed as a good thing. We'll call this model Choice is Good:

69.

E-16 I've known a lot of people who've fantasized like that, but I don't think I know very many...

E-15 A lot of people I knew...I mean it's just choosing a different life.

The stakes aren't really that high according to E-15. Granted, there may be other models according to which Tom should live his life, but we shouldn't let ourselves get too hamstrung by them because, after all, it's "just" a choice.

E-25 and E-26 have an exchange which nicely summarizes You Can't Change Me and Choice is Good. The premise here is that Tom's rock-band bid has failed:

70.

- E-26 And he'd end up living off his parents for awhile. And then would probably either, um, go to some little tech college, or get a job, and...but...yeah, it's his choice. Family members would not be proud of him, but... "Who is right?" Um...well if you're talking about a secure future, it would be better to go to college, but I don't think that should be forced upon someone. Like if he...if he wants to do the rock band thing, then...I don't think there's a right or wrong answer.
- E-25 I mean I don't think the parents...his parents aren't wrong for wanting him to go to college, and he's not, and he's not really wrong for wanting to not go to college.
- E-26 Mm.
- E-25 So I mean I guess...uh...I mean if they really tried to force him to go to college, that...against his wishes, that might be wrong to some degree, but...
- E-26 Mm.
- E-25 Mm...
- E-26 Well I don't think they could really force him.

To get a bit more precise about Choice is Good: Having the ability to make choices is not merely a “good thing,” but, because it can facilitate learning to make the *right* choices, is seen as an important part of the developmental process:

- 71.
- E-10 The only thing I think that would be wrong is I think at that point in time it's probably time to let your kid decide on his or her own, and I don't know be confident in your job of parenting, you know, and don't expect them to follow your exact path if you teach them to be independent. Even if, I don't know...
- E-9 Yeah, it's like if you're so, I don't know this is probably very difficult to carry out, but if you're so insecure with your parenting job that you like have to force them to do exactly this so that you can feel good about it, you know if the kid, if you pressure the kid and he doesn't go to a rock band and he goes to college, is that gonna make you feel like you did a good parenting job? It's gonna make you feel like you forced the kid to go to college, you know?

So choice is good because it fosters independence. This is a key part of this American model of personhood. To be an independent person means many things — from basics such as knowing how to eat and defecate, to more advanced skills such as making enough

money to support yourself and your loved ones — but an important prerequisite to independence is having the ability to make good decisions.

The Live and Learn model highlights a corollary to this: part of learning to make good decisions is making bad decisions, and then not repeating them. By this model, it's okay if joining a rock band is ultimately not the “right” decision for Tom, because he will have learned valuable lessons in the course of his “bad” decision. E-22 says:

72.

E-22 So I guess we can conclude by saying that both of them have some right. I mean Tom has a right to kind of explore and find out for himself what he's all about, while the family has some level of right to say, ok, well if you're not gonna go to college, you know, fine, we'll make a compromise, but they also do...you know, they...they also might be right in the sense that he *should* go to college but he has to find that out for himself.

We can see here how Live and Learn and You Can't Change Me interact: Tom has a belief system. This belief system is in an ongoing process of evolution, as Tom becomes more and more independent. Tom can only become independent if his belief system evolves in the way it should evolve: without interference or imposition from others, in this case his parents.

The following, from E-19 and E-20, provides an excellent summary of a number of the models discussed in this section: Follow Your Dreams, Life Path, You Can't Change Me, and Live and Learn. (The first part of this passage was already given above in (60).)

73.

- E-19 I think he should do it.
- E-20 I think he should do it. 'Cause I mean, you're only one life, right? Do what you want.
- E-19 And also, like, if he...if he really wants to join the rock band, but he doesn't um...he doesn't...and he doesn't wanna go to college, then if he's being forced to go to college, he's not gonna like do well, and he's not gonna take it seriously. It's gonna be a waste.
- E-20 Oh I agree on that too, yeah.
- E-19 You could let him go with his rock band thing, and if it takes off great, and if it doesn't, then he'll realize that he needs to do other things.
- E-20 The hard way?
- E-19 The hard way, yeah.
- E-20 But at least he'll learn, right?
- E-19 Yeah.
- E-20 And he'll know.

I should note that the Success model is not absent from American responses. In fact, it gets mentioned frequently. But it is almost invariably subordinated to these other models.

Having described how Chinese and American interviewees prioritize different cultural models in responding to Question #9, a final note is in order on the question of whether or not the level of analysis presented here is desirable or adequate. Within a given cultural community there are surely forces at work which influence common notions of how one should go about choosing employment. Additionally, these notions may change over time. Sociologists have pointed out that class — in particular, the relative economic stability of a given family in a given generation — is a key deciding factor in this regard. Sociologist Jerome Hodos (personal communication), for instance, points out that for many American families, the whole notion of “career choice” is a

relatively new one, since earlier generations of a lower economic class, in struggling for upward social mobility, have had little control over their employment — Hodos frames it as having “jobs” instead of “careers” — while later generations (until recently, when downward social mobility became a more common trend) have had more freedom to exercise choice in employment.

Mary Pattillo-McCoy, in her (1999) study of Black middle-class families in the Chicago Area, addresses intergenerational conflict over educational and employment priorities from the perspective of class. She notes that economic stability, or its lack, often plays a large role in intergenerational disagreements over education and employment: younger-generation beneficiaries of older-generation upward mobility often do not prioritize continued economic stability to the satisfaction of the older generation.

Thus it could be argued that the cultural explanation I am offering here for differences in views about employment and economic stability is not an explanation at all; instead it is in turn based on deeper economic causes. My response is that on one level I agree: in some sense this is not “explanation”; it is description. But in another sense it is explanation as well: responses to Question #10 differ consistently by cultural affiliation, which is another way of saying that Person X says such-and-such *because he is Chinese* or *because he is American*. This is a form of explanation: responses group in

a certain way because of differential prioritization of certain cultural models within different cultural communities.

Another way to put this is to say that explaining the *origins* of the described cultural models is not my job. It could be the case that the Success model is prioritized more consistently by Chinese interviewees because the typical family in China has never enjoyed the same sort of prosperity and economic stability as that enjoyed for the past several decades by the middle class in the U.S. But that is a separate set of questions from the one at hand in this study. For whatever reasons, there is a particular set of cultural models prioritized by the American interviewees, and a different set of cultural models prioritized by the Chinese interviewees. This is an ethnographic fact, no less so because of whatever material constraints may have brought these differential prioritizations into being, or whatever future material constraints may change these prioritizations.

Summarizing: Differing views of personhood

Responses to Questions #9 and #10 indicate differing ideas of personhood in China and the U.S. A “typical” Chinese person would privilege the following models:

- In resolving family disputes: Final Say
- In deciding what Wang Er should do with his life: Success



According to the Final Say model, power resides in one member of the elder generation. Opinions of others may be solicited, but the ultimate decisionmaking power rests with one person. In some limited way, then, it doesn't matter what the various individuals in the family want. What is more important is minimizing conflict. This is gradually changing, say the interviewees, but it still seems that Final Say is the preferred model overall.

Preference for the Success model as well seems to elide individual, in this case youthful, desire in favor of practical wisdom. Wang Er has desires, but these desires are unwise, and the consequences of his acting on these desires are grave: he may end up not getting a decent-paying or creditable job. So it is of the utmost importance that Wang Er attend college and not join a rock band.

The desires of individuals are thus subordinated in both cases: in the family case, to relatively simple, conflict-minimizing decisionmaking; in the rock-band case, to the wisdom of the elder generation. This non-consideration of individual desire is also apparent in another model, which we have not yet looked at, that surfaces in answer to Question #10. I claimed earlier that the Life Path model doesn't appear anywhere in the Chinese interviews. However, there is a rough equivalent, Suitable Path, which C-18 explains in some detail:

74.

C-18 **Chéngcái** de tújìng yǒu hěn duō zhǒng. Bìng bù yíding shuō shàng dàxué ránhòu shàng yánjiūshēng dú shuòshì dú bóshì. Zhè yàng dāngrán shì yī zhǒng bǐjiào shuō, jiùshì dàjiā dōu pǔbiàn zǒu le yī zhǒng **chéngcái** zhī lù. Dànshi wǒ juéde yīnggāi yīn rén ér yì. Rúguǒ yī ge rén díquè shìhé zuò xuéwèn, huòzhě shuō díquè zài zhèi ge xuéshù shàng nénggòu yǒu suǒ jiànshù de huà, huòzhě shuō zhēnzhèng yǐhòu zài...mm...zìjǐ...zuò yánjiū a, zuò yìxiē, zhèixiē ér shíjì de gōngzuò, zuò gōngchéng...gōngchéng shàng de gōngzuò, nénggòu dédào bǐjiào dà de fāzhǎn de huà, wǒ juéde tā yīnggāi qù shàng dàxué. Dànshi rúguǒ duì yī ge rén lái shuō tā bù tài shìhé xuéxí dàn tā běnshēn zìjǐ yǒu hěn...zìjǐ yǒu qítā de yìxiē...àihào he...xìngqu, érqǐe zài zhèi fāngmiàn nénggòu fāzhǎn de hěn hǎo de huà, wǒ juéde tā méiyǒu biyào...jiùshì...zǒu...fēiděi zǒu gāokǎo nèige dùmùqiáo. Qíshí měi ge rén jiù shuō zhè yī shēng de fāzhǎn yǒu hěn duō...hěn duō zhǒng xuǎnzé. Tā kěyǐ wánquán shì...xuǎndào shìhé zìjǐ fāzhǎn de dàolù. Jiù shuō tā **rénshēng jiàzhí** / **tǐxiàn** bìng búshì tǐxiàn zài tā yǒu duō gāo de xuéshí, yǒu duō gāo de dìwèi, yǒu duō duō de cáifù. Wǒ juéde xiàng zhèi zhǒng fāzhǎn qíngkuàng tā yě kěyǐ shíxiàn tā de...jiù shuō...nénggòu zhēnzhèng **tǐxiàn** chū zìjǐ de **jiàzhí** lái.

C-18 There are many paths to **becoming a useful person**. It's not at all necessarily that you go to college, and then get a master's degree and then a Ph.D. This is a common route for people to **become a useful person**. But I think one should consider each person separately. If a person is truly suited to scholarship, or if a person can truly make contributions to academia, or if afterwards he can really...oneself...do research, or do some kind of practical work, do engineering...engineering work, and can attain a lot of development at this, I think he should go to college. But if for a person, he isn't all that suited to studying but he himself has...has some other...hobbies and...interests, plus he can develop these aspects well, I think it's not necessary for him...to go...that he must take the difficult path of taking college entrance examinations. In fact every person, in their life's development, has many...has many choices. He can completely...choose a path that is suitable to his development. That is, the expression of his **life's value** isn't at all **manifested** in his level of erudition, or how high his position is, or how much wealth he has. I think in this sort of development situation he can realize...that is...he can really **manifest his value**.

The similarity here with Life Path stems from the idea that there is more than one way to go through life, that different people are suited to different activities and professions, and that there is value in a person to be developed and realized. The big difference, though,

in Suitable Path lies in the absence, or near-absence, of *desire*. According to Suitable Path, a person has potential and value, and should find the path that best develops this potential and value. The term *value* tips us off to there being a commodity. Who benefits from this commodity? Given the bit about “making contributions,” it seems that the beneficiaries are people in society at large. This is also indicated by the term *chéngcái* — translated above as “become a useful person” — which literally translates as “become raw-material,” presumably raw material for society’s use. In other words, this is not about desire; it is about developing one’s potential in order to contribute to society.

Granted there is reference here to *hobbies* and *interests* as aspects of oneself to be developed, but the Chinese equivalents, *àihào* and *xìngqù*, have condescending undertones. Hobbies and interests are ancillary to one’s main activities in life. C-19, as part of an optimistic evaluation of her plan to send Wang Er to music school, gives us a taste of this, along the way further elaborating Suitable Path:

75.

C-19 Wǒ juéde rúguǒ shì yī ge hǎo háizi de huà, shì yī ge hěn dòng dào li, hěn dòng...jiù shì...hěn yǒu zìjǐ de xiǎngfǎ de yī ge háizi de huà, tā huì tīng tā fùmǔ de yìjian. Jiù shì nénggòu...yě shì wèile zìjǐ yǐhòu zài yīnyuè shàng nénggòu gèng yǒu...yǒu gèng dà de fāzhǎn, ér bù jǐnjǐn júxiàn yú shì zhǐ shì...shì yī zhǒng yúlè, shì yī zhǒng àihào, ér shì xiǎng yǒu gōngdà de fāzhǎn de huà tā huì tīngcóng tā fùmǔ de yìjian, ér qù xuǎnzé shàng yī ge yīnyuè fāngmiàn de zhuānyè de yuànxiào, yī ge zhuānyè dàxué.

C-19 I think that if he is a good kid, a kid who understands reason, who has his own way of thinking,<sup>51</sup> he will follow his parents' wishes. He'll be able to...to have greater development of his music in the future, and won't be merely constrained by only...a kind of recreation, a kind of hobby. Instead if he wants to attain great development he will follow his parents' wishes and will choose to go to a specialized music school, a specialized college.

According C-18, and C-19, music is just a hobby or interest to Wang Er, a side activity; to many American interviewees, it is the most important part of Tom's life.

Seeing how Suitable Path and Life Path differ drives home what seems to be a major difference in Chinese and American conceptualizations of what a person is and should be, and thus how life should be led: an individual's desires, and voicing and exploration of these desires, is an important part of life to an American. To a Chinese person, it can be a harmful distraction; in the end it is better to listen to one's parents and trust their wisdom.

Next, let's summarize the American responses. The "typical" American would privilege:

- In resolving family disputes
  - Democracy-Discussion
  - Money is Power
- In deciding what Tom should do with his life:
  - Life Path
  - Follow Your Dreams

---

<sup>51</sup> Speaking about a child "who has his own way of thinking" here seems to be euphemistic for "obedient child."

- Choice is Good
- Live and Learn
- You Can't Change Me

We have just discussed the role of desire here. But an American life is about more than desire. According to these models, taken together: each person has desires and a viewpoint. These desires and viewpoints should be valued in the family, and expressed in one's life (Democracy-Discussion). Money is a common means to fulfilling desires (as well as needs), and so if both parents are contributing equally to the family economy, they are equally entitled to have their opinions about desire- and/or need-fulfilling acquisitions respected (Money is Power). A person also may have a skill that they're specially suited to developing (Life Path), and they should have the choice (Choice is Good) to develop it for its own sake: because they desire to, and because doing so generates in the person a sense of satisfaction, of fulfillment (Follow Your Dreams). These talents should be explored even if they come into conflict with a high-paying and/or reputable job (Success). And attempts from the outside to stand in the way of developing one's talents should be rebuffed, because they are counterproductive in that people are going to do what they want regardless (You Can't Change Me), and because they interfere with the developmental process of learning to make good decisions (Live and Learn).

Some of the stark differences between the American and Chinese interviewees may be due to age difference: the Chinese speakers are on the whole older, and thus might tend to identify with and support the elder generation. But it is doubtful that this could account for much of the differences, given the relative smallness of the age gap when viewed against the profundity of the differences in the cultural models.

We may now begin to see how this ties back in with human rights. Traditional Western conceptions of human rights have been based on the autonomy of the individual, and on the protection of the interests of the individual against broader societal institutions. Here in Chapter 3, we have seen how this notion of the autonomous individual plays out in a family setting, and how there appears to be a different set of priorities for Chinese families. Next, in Chapter 4, we take a close look at something closer to the “home turf” of human rights thinking: society and its institutions.

## Chapter 4: Person and Society

In the last chapter we examined models that surface in cases of conflict among individuals in a family setting. In this chapter the focus broadens to society at large. The main focus is on hypothetical conflicts between citizens and social institutions: the bulk of human rights discourse is on this type of conflict. Such conflicts are presented in Questions #3, #4, #5 and #6. To supplement the data from these questions, we will also look at responses to Questions #7, #8, #11 and #12.

The English versions of Questions #3-#6 are repeated below:

3. Suppose a citizen is walking down the street one day when the police arrest him. They don't tell him why; they simply arrest him and keep him locked up for three days before letting him go. He has done nothing illegal. What will this person think? What will this person do?
4. With regard to the person in Question #3:
  - Will this person's response differ by educational level?
  - What should this person do?
  - Should this person do the same thing regardless of his profession and social status?
5. The government passes a law doubling the income tax without consulting the citizens. Is the government right to do this? What would citizens say? What would they do? What should they do?
6. The government decides to go to war. Chris is drafted into the army to fight, but he feels strongly that war is wrong. What will Chris say and do? What should he do?

#3 and #4 deal with a conflict between an individual citizen and, depending on how the question is viewed, individual police officers or the institutional police apparatus.

Question #5 is about a large institution making a decision that might adversely affect citizens as a collective group. And #6 is about either a tension between an individual and his country, a psychological tension within a person, or both. We begin with #3.

### Surprise arrest

Responses to this question are strikingly similar across all interviewees, Chinese and English. Since #3, of all the questions, involves arguably the most prototypical case of a “human rights violation,” and if this dissertation is claiming that there are significant cultural differences in conceptions of human rights, then #3 presents a bit of a puzzle to be explained. Solving this mystery is a central task of this chapter. First we will look at emotional responses, then at concrete actions taken.

Virtually every interviewee expresses some degree of surprise, if not outrage, on behalf of this hypothetical person. C-11 is the most extreme example. Even though she never comes out and says “He would be angry,” or “I would be angry,” she identifies so strongly with the person that her anger is audibly palpable throughout. Other interviewees often feel anger on the citizen’s behalf, either in the third person — considering how this hypothetical citizen would feel — or in the counterfactual first person, imagining themselves in his shoes. C-12 says he would *nùhuǒchōngtiān*, or “fly into a rage.” C-20 and C-21 add:

- 1.



- C-21 Nà dāngrán fēicháng qìfèn le.  
[...]
- C-20 Wǒ juéde zhèige, yàoshi wǒ yùdào zhèige shìqing, wǒ yě shì fēicháng...huì fēicháng qìfèn de, yīnwèi zìjǐ...méiyǒu...
- C-21 Méiyǒu rènhé cuòwu...
- C-20 Zìjǐ juéde méiyǒu rènhé cuòwu, fànzuì de zhèige kěnéngxìng, nènme tūrán bèi guānqilái, nà kěndìng zìjǐ...fēicháng qìfèn.
- C-21 Of course he would be extremely angry.  
[...]
- C-20 I think this, if I encountered this sort of thing, I also would be extremely...would be extremely angry, because myself, I...didn't...
- C-21 Didn't make any mistake.
- C-20 Myself, I'd think there isn't any possibility that I committed a crime but suddenly I'm arrested, then definitely I...would be extremely angry.

Confusion is another common response among the Chinese interviewees, and is

closely related to the citizen not being told what he did wrong:

2.

- C-17 Jǐngchá méiyǒu gàosu tā gàn shá, jiù báibái dàibǔ tā sān tiān ránhòu gěi fàng le? Zhèige shìqing bù kěnéng fāshēng ba? Fǎnzhèng huì juéde hěn mòmíngqímiào, zěnme gǎo de? Wǒ kěndìng yào gǎo qīngchu nǐ wèishenme nèi yàng zhuā wǒ.
- C-17 The police didn't tell him what he did, just locked him up for no reason for three days and then let him go? This sort of thing couldn't happen, could it? Regardless he would feel extremely confused, how could this happen? I would definitely want to clarify why you arrested me like that.

3.

- C-18 Wǒ juéde rúguǒ wǒ shì zhèi yàng de rén dehuà, wǒ huì juéde fēicháng bùkěsīyì, wǒ jīrán méi fàn rènhé de cuòwu, wèishenme yào bǎ wǒ guān qilái? Wèishenme bǎ wǒ suǒ zài jiānyù lǐ?
- C-19 Èrqiè méiyǒu rènhé jiěshì.
- C-18 Duì.
- C-18 I think that if I were this sort of person, I would feel it was inconceivable. Since I didn't make any mistake, why lock me up? Why lock me in jail?
- C-19 Plus there's no explanation at all.

C-18 Right.

Anger and confusion are common responses among the Americans as well:

4.

E-10 Well, not knowing what you're being arrested for, I'd be a little angry about, um...if this person was me, anyway.

5.

E-14 Well obviously he'll be confused, angry...

E-13 Very angry, I think.

E-14 Yes. Um...eventually probably develop a hatred for these people. Who wrongly judge him.

E-13 Yeah. I agree with you.

6.

E-15 Well, if I were that person I'd be very upset and angry. And confused.

7.

E-18 If it was me I'd be pissed off, I would be wanna...like, I'd be like what the hell was that?

8.

E-19 If that was me, I'd be angry. Because, they didn't even tell me what I did. And if I hadn't done anything wrong then there's no reason to arrest me. You should at least know, like, the reason.

9.

E-20 Well I'd be pissed off. Like really pissed off.

10.

E-23 Obviously, I would...he would be really angry, and...I think would start to become very bitter about the government. What kind of system is this, that he didn't do anything, they don't tell him his rights, or why he's...he's being arrested and he's, um, illegally detained.

E-24 Yeah. I'd be really pissed off.

So Chinese and American interviewees agree that something abnormal is going on here, something about which the citizen can be expected to feel angry and confused. The basis given for the anger and confusion is twofold: being locked up for apparently no good reason, and not being told why. This indicates three models, in both China and the U.S.: Free Movement, Good Reason and Disclosure. Free Movement means that it is generally expected that people can go where they want, and that it is abnormal for them to be forcibly confined.<sup>52</sup> Free Movement, we will see later this chapter, is a special case of a more general Well-Being model, according to which people expect to be treated well, and for others not to infringe upon their well-being.<sup>53</sup> Good Reason refers to the expectation that humans, and by extension human institutions, have good reasons for the actions they take. In the present case, Good Reason and Well-Being are closely related: we generally expect the police to protect the well-being of the citizenry. If an action (by whomever) runs contrary to someone's interests or well-being — in this case forcibly confining someone's free movement — there should be a good reason for it. What might be considered a "good reason" will vary, but at the very least someone else's well-being should be enhanced as a trade-off. And Disclosure, hand in hand with Good Reason,

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<sup>52</sup> More than mere movement is involved. More generally, the assumed freedom is to "go about one's life." This would include activities with minimal movement, such as sitting at home and paying bills.

<sup>53</sup> In some cases we may actually expect others to *improve* our well-being. More on this later, when we discuss Questions #7 and #8.

means that this good reason should be communicated to the person whose well-being has been infringed.

A question arises: Can Well-Being and Good Reason rightly be separated? Does a “good reason” necessarily always involve someone’s well-being? It may, but the separation of models is still useful here for analytical purposes: at the level on which speakers reason about the scenario, Good Reason suffices as an explanation, even though it could arguably be “unpacked” into Well-Being. There will be more on this in Chapter 5.

Well-Being, Good Reason and Disclosure are some of the most common models that human rights groups try to get codified in law, and enforced. As we have just seen, in the present study there seems to be strong cross-cultural agreement on these models.

Then there is the question of how the citizen would respond. Once again there is strong agreement. All Chinese interviewees consider, and usually advocate, relatively aggressive recourse. In the following passage, C-11 angrily explains what she would do, in the process further elucidating the models just discussed:

11.

C-11 Yī fāngmiàn wǒ zìjǐ kěndìng, wǒ kěndìng huì wèn wèishenme bǎ wǒ zhuā qilái le? Lìng yī ge...

C-10 Bù huí lái?

C-11 Tā bù huí lái wǒ yě hái shì huì wèn tā. Lìng yī fāngmiàn shì jiù shuō wǒmen jiā lǐmiàn yě huì cáiqǔ gè zhǒng gè yàng de qúdào lái tànqīng wǒ de xiāoxi, lái zhīdào wèishenme wǒ huì bèi dài qilai. Nènme rúguǒ sān tiān yǐhòu wǒ shénme shì dōu méiyǒu, tā bǎ wǒ gěi wǒ fāngzǒu le dehuà, nà wǒ kěndìng, wǒ bù huì jiùshì bàxiū de, wǒ kěndìng huì yào nòng

qīngchu tā wèishenme yào zhèi yàng zuò. Rúguǒ tā méiyǒu rènhe **dàoli** dehuà, tā yīnggāi cǎiqǔ...tā yīnggāi duì wǒ cǎiqǔ yìxiē shénme yàngzi de bǔcháng, dàoqiàn.

- C-11 One thing [I would do] is definitely, I would definitely ask why they arrested me. Another thing...
- C-10 What if [the officer] doesn't come back?
- C-11 If he doesn't come back then I will still go ask him. One other thing is that my family would take all sorts of measures to find out news about me, to find out why I was arrested. Then, if after three days I didn't do anything, and they let me go, then I would definitely, I wouldn't let the matter go. I would definitely want to get it clear why he did this. If he didn't have any **good reason** for what he did, he should take...he should take measures to compensate me, and apologize.<sup>54</sup>

The Chinese term that evokes Good Reason here is *dàoli*. As an adjective it can translate as “reasonable”; here as a noun it’s more like “reasonableness.” People, in China as in the U.S., are expected to behave in a “reasonable” fashion, that is to have good reasons for their actions. This is especially true of people who have the power to negatively affect our well-being, such as the police. But people cannot always be trusted to evaluate the reasonableness of their own actions, and so Disclosure is important: in cases where one’s well-being (here, Free Movement) is violated, the person undergoing the violation can help assess the degree of reasonableness. If the arresting officer doesn’t have good reasons for his actions, then what he did was wrong. Or, if he has good reasons but

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<sup>54</sup> Unfortunately there is no room here to discuss in detail the notion of *apology*, which was brought to the fore recently in the infamous “spy plane,” or EP-3 incident. I refer interested readers to Peter Hays Gries and Kaipeng Peng’s excellent (2002) article on the matter.

doesn't disclose them, then what he did was wrong. E-9 and E-10 get at this in the following passage:

12.

E-10 Definitely, I mean it is, it is underst-...I think, my personal opinion is it's understandable that if, if, like say there's some crazy person going around and like shooting everybody, and you like match up with his stuff or something and they see you and they arrest you, I mean, I mean granted I think they should...check the possibility, of you being that person, if you like match them up identically, but they should tell you that.

E-9 Yeah, and also, you know I mean as far as like the legal rights of people in the country, you can't just arrest someone 'cause they sort of resemble the person, you gotta have, you actually have to have a, not a warrant or whatever, I don't know but you have to, there has to be some reason why you're arresting him and not like...you know that gets back to like racial profiling and all, you know like people get arrested 'cause they look like somebody else but it's just 'cause they're the same race or something like that...all kinds of problems with that.

In other words: it's wrong to confine someone's movement, but possibly acceptable if there is a good reason for the confinement — here the protection of others' well-being from a maniacal killer — *and* this good reason is disclosed to the confinee.

Another common response to the arrest suggested by interviewees is to sue. In fact, in all six of the Chinese interviews it is suggested that the citizen sue. When this suggestion is made, it is never challenged; the Chinese interviewees are quite unanimous in their recommendation of this strong course of action. And while the Americans aren't unanimous on this, suing is also a popular course of action in American responses. What the Americans *are* unanimous on is that some form of legal action would and/or should

be taken, be it a lawsuit, some unspecified “legal action,” or simply making sure the officers are punished. Superficially at least, the Chinese and American interviewees seem to be viewing this situation in virtually identical ways. However, when we examine differences in responses to some other questions, and then come back and take a closer look at some responses to Question #3, some subtle but important differences begin to emerge. Bear with me, as our route is a circuitous one.

### Tax hike

Question #5 presents a scenario in which the government doubles the income tax without consulting the citizens. In designing the interviews, I intended this question to be similar to Question #3 in that a governmental institution does something that negatively affects the well-being of the citizenry. The main differences I intended were that (a) more people are negatively affected in Question #5 than in Question #3, and (b) the offending party in Question #5 is somewhat amorphous compared to the police officer(s) in Question #3. I wanted to see if responses to these two questions would be similar. For the Americans they are strikingly similar, but for the Chinese they are only somewhat similar.

The chief similarities for the Americans lie in that citizen reactions of anger and dissatisfaction are expected, along with a strong response, sometimes legal, sometimes

extra-legal (refusing to pay), sometimes violent. E-19 and E-20 agree that citizens would be angry:

13.

E-19 What would the citizens say?

E-20 They'd be *very* pissed off. Like, *really* pissed.

E-19 But then like, governments do stuff all the time that don't represent like what all your citizens want.

E-20 But how many people really want their income tax raised?

E-19 Actually yeah, most people would respond to that.

E-20 Negatively.

E-19 People...yeah, 'cause that would be like a...a united opinion, like everybody would be, like, no.

After voicing their expectation that Americans would be angry about the tax increase, E-

13 and E-14 say:

14.

E-13 "What would they do?" They would probably rebel...

E-14 Yeah, violently maybe.

E-13 Yeah, mobs. I can totally imagine that. And...yeah.

E-14 "What should they do?"

E-13 What *should* they do?

E-14 Fight it legally.

E-15 and E-16 advocate legal and extra-legal redress:

15.

E-16 What would they say? They would complain a lot.

E-15 Yeah.

E-16 What would they do? Um...

E-15 Refuse to pay maybe?

[...]

E-15 What *should* they do?

E-16 Not pay.

E-15 Not pay, yeah.



- E-16 Vote in new government officials.  
E-15 Yeah you could vote in new government officials and sometimes writing letters works.  
E-16 Well, yeah...writing letters and getting other people to write letters, because the more the better.

E-22 also suggests refusal to pay:

16.  
E-21 The citizens' um...response to this would be to, um, somehow combat the government, um and...  
E-22 Anarchy.  
E-21 Anarchy. [laughter] Um, maybe not anarchy, but...maybe not *pay* the income tax would be one way.

Public protest is another option:

17.  
E-24 So I think they would definitely speak out. They would like form rallies and protest...  
E-23 Yeah, I agree that would happen.  
E-24 People would have leadership skills and do it...  
E-23 Speak out.  
E-24 Yeah.

E-25 and E-26 suspect some stronger reactions may be in store:

18.  
E-26 There'd be rioting.  
E-25 Major backlash, yeah.  
E-26 Yeah, I mean if they did something that huge...  
E-25 You would get...you would get failure to comply, distrust of government, people would be voted out, or forced out by...by the media, or by just the general public...  
E-26 I mean if enough people are losing so much money that they can't, um...they no longer have, um enough to eat, or, um, a place to live, then there might be revolt.

E-19 and E-20 are also not confident that legal redress will work:

19.

E-19 Would they...would...should they work like within the laws already set down by the government, or should they like do their own thing?

E-20 Well, I don't know, if the government doubled their income tax without consulting the citizens *first*, I think there's something *wrong* with the government. Anarchy, anarchy! That's exactly what's gonna happen. I think people would...I don't know. 'Cause this is fairly unreasonable.

E-19 That's true.

The Well-Being model is clearly prominent here: citizens are angry at the government for acting in a way that adversely affects their well-being. However, the outrage in response to Question #5 is a more qualified one than in responses to Question #3: in most answers to Question #5 the Americans are willing to allow the government some leeway because the government consists of elected representatives. This difference is most pronounced in E-11/12, who not only are willing to give the government some leeway, but don't think the citizenry should do anything in response. E-11 puts it most clearly:

20.

E-11 Okay, I think they would respond. They would initially get angry and say the government has no right to do that, that's my money, I worked for it, so they can't take it away. And what should they do, I don't think they should do anything. I think the government knows what they're doing. They're elected into their position and they're doing what's best for the country. So I don't think the citizens have any right to say anything.

E-11 and E-12 are quite alone among the Americans in the extremity of their willingness to trust the government's decisions, but a similar, more understated view is present in several other American responses. Take the following, from E-14:

21.

E-14 Um...is the government right to do this? I think that when people elect a government or form a government, they're giving that government the right to lead them. And that government *is* right to do that, but it's their duty to, you know, say something about it.

We can cut the government some slack because we, the citizens, had some agency in putting them in power. But it does affect our well-being negatively, and so Disclosure is warranted. Presumably, Good Reason is relevant here as well: if the taxes are raised for no good reason, no amount of disclosure would justify the government's actions. Part of the reason we trust the government to lead us is that we trust that they have good reasons for the decisions they make, especially those that affect our well-being.

Specific good reasons are proposed by several interviewees. The most common one is some type of economic emergency, particularly war:

22.

E-13 Um, people would probably be angry. Unless these taxes were going like to a war or some good cause. Right?

23.

E-17 Like if they did that now, because they needed the money to bomb the hell out of the Taliban, they might have the right to do it.

24.

E-22 To double the income tax, in certain situations, you know maybe, I mean I...I think it'd also have to be in the context of like a situation, is...is it a temporary income tax, or is it permanent...on a permanent basis? Um...is it just in a time of war, that they need more funds?

25.

E-23 Where is the money going?

E-24 ...maybe there's a...maybe there's a r...emergency or something like a war or like some...

E-23 Economic crisis.

E-24 Yeah.

26.

E-26 But, I mean just in case there is a reason for the citizens should demand an explanation [sic]. I mean, perhaps it's wartime, and the g...you know, country's about to be taken over, then maybe a temporary change would be...warranted.

Along with the Good Reason model — again here related to some competing well-being, as presumably war is being conceived of as protecting the well-being of the nation as a whole — there are also several examples of Disclosure. We already saw one example, in (21), where E-14 says the government has a duty to “say something about it.” E-21 adds:

27.

E-21 Well, regardless I think the government has to inform its citizens somehow or at least consult them. Um, otherwise we don't have a wise government and it's acting foolishly.

E-26 follows up her invocation of Good Reason with Disclosure:

28.

E-26 I could see there being some sort of extenuating circumstances where it might be necessary, but...the government *would* owe the citizens an explanation if not like a vote.

The use of *owe* here gets at the moral aspect of disclosure. This is an instance of what Lakoff (1996) calls Moral Accounting: without explaining to the citizenry why it raised taxes, the government is in moral debt. It can clean the slate by providing an explanation.

All in all, there is a good deal of ambivalence in American responses to Question #5. There is anger and displeasure, and the possibility of a strong response, because Well-Being has been violated. But there is also the possibility that, if Good Reason — in this case, some competing well-being — and Disclosure are attended to, anger might be alleviated and responses less drastic. The following two passages express this ambivalence nicely:

29.

E-10 Alright, I, well, personally, what would citizens say? I don't know, they'd probably be pretty outraged. I mean like, I don't know, I'm sure they'd do whatever they could to fight it, and whatnot and, but I don't, I don't, it's like, personally if the income tax was doubled and it went to the government you'd hope that that'd be put into good things to make life better for all.

E-9 Yeah the government, the government definitely has the right to do it, the government, I mean this is ideal, but the government is supposed to be the people, so if the government does it, it should be the will, but that's not really true 'cause if they actually passed it I think there'd be such outrage, but I don't know.

30.

E-16 Um, as far as is the government right to do this? No. That's the opposite of what I would have a...well I mean...I guess I can't say that unconditionally because I suppose I can imagine a situation where it became necessary to get it through.

E-15 But it's not that hard to consult the citizens.

E-16 No. But it can take time. Look at right now...

E-15 It can take time to double the income tax.

E-16 Things like wars happen.

E-15 Yeah, but you could still let the people know before you double the income tax.

E-16 The government would be unrestrictedly wrong unless it could give a very good reason. That's what I would say.

- E-15 I still don't think you're right.  
E-16 Okay, well you don't have to think I'm right.  
E-15 I mean they could at least...  
E-16 Say something...  
E-15 Yeah.  
E-16 ...and you could put it to a referendum vote or something, but that would take a long time.  
E-15 I'm just saying you could inform the citizens.

In sum: while the Americans are willing to give the well-being-infringing authority a little more slack in Question #5 than in Question #3, the overall pattern is quite similar: infringement of well-being is something people get legitimately angry about and respond strongly to, and in order for it to be acceptable there must be both a good reason and an explanation of the reason.

Chinese responses to Question #5, however, exhibit significant differences from their responses to Question #3. True, many think that the government is *bù duì*, or “not right,” to do this, and that people would be dissatisfied, but the overall sense one gets is that the reaction, both in terms of the people’s emotions and their active responses, is much less severe than what we saw with Question #3. First, the emotional response is much milder. There is no talk of “anger” or of this being “inconceivable.” The strongest word offered to describe the emotional response is *bùmǎn*, which translates as “dissatisfied” or “unhappy,” and it comes from C-14, who explains below why she would be *bùmǎn*:

31.

C-14 Nà wǒ juéde rúguǒ zhèngfu méiyǒu dédào rénmin de tóngyì jiù zìxíng bǎ suǒdéshuì lǜ tígāo zhèi yàng kěndìng shì bù duì de, yīnwèi zhèngfu de suǒyǒu de xíngdòng yīnggāi dōu shì dàibiǎo rénmin de yìyuàn, fǎnyìng rénmin de shēnyì de, suǒyǐ rúguǒ tā shì zhèngfu bǎ zìjǐ, jiùshì rènwéi tā shì dúlì huòzhě gāo yú rénmin zhī shàng nèi ge tèshū de qúntǐ, tā juéde tā kěyǐ zìjǐ jiù zuò chū júecè zhèi yàng kěndìng shì bù duì de. Dànshi rénmin yǒu shénme fǎnyìng...rénmin dāngrán jiù huì...jiù huì bǐjiào **bùmǎn** le, jiù huì kàn...kěnéng zài Měiguó dehuà dàjiā rénmin de fǎnyìng yě huì bǐjiào jīliè yìxiē, kěnéng huì shàng jiē yóuxíng a, huòzhě xiě chū yìxiē...

C-14 Well, I think that if the government raised the tax rate without getting the consent of the people, this is definitely wrong, because all actions the government takes should represent the will of the people, and reflect the people's proposals, so if the government itself, if it believes it is independent or it is a collective organization that is above the people, it thinks it can just make this sort of final decision, then this is definitely wrong. But what sort of reaction would they have...the people of course would be...would be rather **dissatisfied**. They would look...maybe in America all the people's reactions would be more intense, maybe they would march on the street, or write some...

(C-14 gets cut off here by C-15, who gives his own opinion about what would happen in the U.S.) C-21 explicitly points out that Chinese people would not be angry about this:

32.

C-21 Jǐnjǐn shì yīnwèi suǒdé shuì zēngjiā yī bèi dehuà bù huì yǐnqǐ hěn dà de qīfèn. Dànshi jiùshì shuō yìbān de zhèi ge zhèng gè shèhuì dàjiā dōu huì fǎnduì zhèi jiàn shìqing, nà kěnéng shì, tā yǒu hěn duō hěn duō wèntí, dàjiā fēicháng **bù mǎnyì**, ránhòu kěnéng huì jǐjǐ qǐlái fǎnduì. Rúguǒ...dàn biéde dōu hěn hǎo, zhǐ shì jiù tí chū zēngjiā yī bèi bù huì yǒu hěn dà de nèi ge fǎnyìng.

C-21 Just doubling the income tax wouldn't cause much anger. But, but the whole society, in general, would oppose this if, if possibly, [society] many, many problems, everyone is extremely **dissatisfied**,<sup>55</sup> and then may actively stand up and oppose it. If...but if everything else is good, and

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<sup>55</sup> Here the Chinese is *bù mǎnyì*, effectively synonymous with *bùmǎn*.

only the matter of doubling the tax is raised, there won't be a very big **reaction**.<sup>56</sup>

So the reaction will be strong only if there are a great many problems. (Note the reduplication of “many” (*hěn duō*)). That is not to say, however, that there will be no reaction. The Chinese interviewees are virtually unanimous that the people would be displeased, but also that there isn't much the people could do, other than complain. There is also an effort to situate this question explicitly within a Chinese context. (We just saw an example of this in (31).) Interviewees are quick to point out that whatever the reaction would be, it might be different elsewhere, where political conditions are different. We begin with the following:

33.

C-10 Wǒ juéde guónèi de **fǎnyìng**...rúguǒ shì zhèi yàng dehuà, dāngrán yìjian kěndìng shì yǒu, dànshi yě kěnéng jiù bùliǎoliǎozhī. Dàn yào fā fā láosāo le.

C-11 Duì, wǒ juéde shì zhèi yàng. Bù huì yǒu tài dà de **fǎnyìng**, duì zhèige wèntí, yīnwèi wǒ juéde mùqián yī fāngmiàn lái jiǎng, gèrén suǒdé shuì běnshēn tā de qíngkuàng jiù bù shì hěn míngliǎo. Hěn duō dānwèi duì zhèi ge dōngxī de...dōu shì cǎiqǔ gè zhǒng fāngfǎ lái táobì de, wǒ juéde. Suǒyǐ...dànshi **fǎnyìng** kěndìng hái shì huì yǒu. **Xíngdòng**, wǒ gūji méi shénme **xíngdòng** kěyǐ cǎiqǔ de. Nǐ juéde rénmín yīnggāi rúhé huíyìng zhèi zhǒng zhuàngkuàng?

C-10 Méiyǒu bànfa. Zhèi ge...rúguǒ shì xīnwén zìyóu yìxiē le kěnéng hái kěyǐ fāxiè yī shēng.

C-11 Zài wǎng shàng nǐ huì kàn dào de, kěndìng huì kàn dào. Kěndìng huì kàn dào...yǒu láosāo zài wǎng shàng kěyǐ kàndào. Dànshi zhèngshì shūmiàn de dōngxī kěndìng méiyǒu.

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<sup>56</sup> See below for *reaction* versus *actions*.



- C-10 I think the domestic [Chinese] **reaction**...if it's like this, of course people will have opinions, but also might leave the matter unresolved. But they will complain.
- C-11 Yes, I think this is how it is. There won't be too big a **reaction**, to this problem, because I think now, one aspect is that the condition of individual income tax isn't very clear. Many places of work, with regard to this thing...they all take all sorts of measures to sidestep it, I think. So...but there still would be a **reaction**. As for a **actions**,<sup>57</sup> I imagine there aren't any **actions** to take. How to you think the people should respond to this situation?
- C-10 There's nothing to be done. This...if the press were a little more free then perhaps people could vent a bit.
- C-11 On the web you would definitely see this, definitely see this. You would definitely see...you could see complaining on the web. But there would definitely not be any formal written things.

C-11 mentions the extra-legal possibility of avoiding paying the taxes. C-12 also

suggests this, and agrees that the responses would be different in different countries:

34.

C-12 Wǒ juéde zhè zhēn shì jiùshi shuō huì bù tóng guójiā bù yíyàng. Nǐ xiàng zài Zhōngguó dehuà, tā hěn jiù huì bù zhēngdé nǐ de tóngyì jiù huì gěi nǐ zēngjiā...

C-13 Nà rénmin zěnme bàn ne?

C-12 Huì cǎiqǔ gè zhǒng gè yàng de fāngfǎ lái táo shuì.

C-12 I think this really would be different in different countries. For instance if it was in China, it's very likely [the government] wouldn't try hard to get your consent and would just raise your...

C-13 Well then what can the people do?

C-12 They'll take all sorts of measures to avoid paying the taxes.

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<sup>57</sup>The terms I have translated here as *reaction* and *actions* are, in Chinese, *fǎnyìng* and *xíngdòng*. The former refers to psychological or emotional reaction; the latter refers to actions taken in response to something.

C-18 agrees with C-12 that there may be some limited public venting, but nothing too

extreme:

35.

C-18 Mm, zhèi yàng kěndìng shì bù duì le. Yīnwèi méiyǒu rènhé lǐyóu jiù bù néng bǎ suǒdé shuì zēngjiā yī bèi. Mm... "Rénmín huì yǒu shénme yàng de fǎnyìng?" Wǒ juéde zài Zhōngguó bù huì yǒu rén qǐlái...jiù shuō shì...kàngyì nèi yàng...

C-19 Rénmín huì bàoyuàn.

C-18 Huì bàoyuàn, zhǐ shì huì shíxià de bàoyuàn, dàn bù huì yǒu rén zǒu shàng jiētóu huò kàngyì a, huòzhě shuō yóuxíng shìwēi a.

[...]

Jiù shuō zhǐ yào nénggòu zài yī ge xiāngduì bǐjiào shūshì wěndìng de huánjìng néng huó xiàqu dehuà, méiyǒu rén yuànyì zǒu shàng jiētóu jǔ ge páizi shìwēi yóuxíng shénme yàng de. "Cǎiqǔ shénme yàng de xíngdong?" Wǒ juéde huì yǒu rén jiù shuō zài méitǐ shàng huòzhě shuō zài yìxiē gōngkāi chǎnghé kěnéng huì jiù shuō fābiǎo gè zhǒng gè yàng de yánlùn, juéde zhèi yàng de zuòfǎ, bǎ suǒdé shuì zēngjiā yī bèi zhèi yàng de zuòfǎ fēicháng bù duì. Jùtǐ cǎiqǔ shénme...wǒ juéde bù huì yǒu rén cǎiqǔ tèbié jíduān de xíngdong. Zhìshǎo bǎifēnzhī bāshí rén bù huì cǎiqǔ jíduān de xíngdong.

C-18 Hm, this is definitely wrong. Because they doubled the income tax without any reason. Hm... "What sort of reaction would the people have?" I think in China people wouldn't rise up...that is...to resist, like that...

C-19 The people would complain.

C-18 They would complain, but only complain in the moment, but there wouldn't be people hitting the streets to resist, or marching and demonstrating.

[...]

That is, if [people] can keep living in a comparatively comfortable and stable environment, no one will be willing to hit the streets, hold up a sign, demonstrate, march, and so on. "What sort of actions would they take?" I think there would be people publicizing their opinions in the media or in public places, saying they think this method, this method of doubling the income tax is extremely wrong. What specific actions...I think there wouldn't be anyone doing anything too extreme. At least eighty percent of the people wouldn't take extreme measures.

As we have seen, there is dissatisfaction all around about the tax increase, but no one is advocating strong public action to change the situation. C-16 and C-17 flirt with the idea of taking a directly political route but then abandon it:

36.

- C-16 Dāngrán rúguǒ shì zài yī ge...jiùshi shuō, rénmín yǒu quánlì juédìng zhèngfu xíngwéi de dìfang lǐ, dāngrán qù cǎiyòng de zhèige tóupiào de quánlì. Rúguǒ shì yī ge jiùshi shuō nǐ méiyǒu yī ge xíngshǐ zhèi yàng quánlì de dìfang...
- C-17 Nǐ jiù shuō yě méi shénme yòng, duì ba? Nǐ xiǎng, nǐ xiǎng bǎ zhèi ge juédìng...gēnggǎi zhèi ge juédìng yě méiyǒu tújìng, méiyǒu lùtú, méiyǒu dào.
- C-16 Kěshì bǐfāngshuō zài Zhōngguó wǒmen yǒu, nèige...Rénmín...Rénmín Dàibiǎo Dà Huì hé Zhèngzhì Xiéshāng Huì...
- C-17 Nǐ huì zhǎo Rén Dà Dàibiǎo qù tán ma?
- C-16 Jiùshi shuō zhèli suǒwèi cǎiqǔ jiù shuō, cóng yī ge fǎlù jiǎodù lái shuō, mùqián Zhōngguó jiùshi nǐ xiāngduì lái shuō shì wéiyī kěyǐ tōngguò fǎzhì xíngshì de yī ge dào, yīnwèi nǐ...shǒuxiān zhèngfu bù shì mǐn xuǎn ne, suǒyǐ dāngrán bù kěnéng jiùshi shuō, yǒu xiàng Měiguó zhèi yàng de yī ge jiùshi xuǎnmín zhìdù. Dànshi lǐlùn shàng Zhōngguó zhèngfu de yìsi jiùshi shuō rénmín kěyǐ tōngguò tíjiāo nèixiē yì'àn lái...lǐfǎ ya, huòzhě gǎibiàn yìxiē zhèngcè.
- C-17 Nǐ kěyǐ xiàng nǐmen qū de Rén Dà Dàibiǎo fǎnyìng, dànshi wǒ bù juéde wǒ...wǒ bù huì zhèi yàng xíngdòng. Wǒ juéde méi shénme yòng.
- C-16 Jiùshi shuō wúxiào de yī zhǒng...yī zhǒng **mínzhǔ** zhìdù, duì bù duì?
- C-16 Of course if this is in a...in a place where people have the right to decide the behavior of the government, then of course they would use their right to vote. If it's in a place where this sort of right isn't exercised...
- C-17 You're saying it's no use, right? You think, you think this decision...to change this decision there's no route, no path, no road.
- C-16 But for example in China we have...People's...the People's Congress and the People's Political Consultative Conference...
- C-17 You'd go talk this over with the People's Congress?
- C-16 I'm saying here, so-called taking action, that is, from a legal standpoint, at present in China this is relatively speaking the only legal route you can take, because you...first, the government isn't chosen by the people, so of course it's not possible to, to have a voting system like there is in the U.S.

But in theory the Chinese government, that is, the people could submit some proposals...make laws, or change some policies.

C-17 You could go to your neighborhood People's Congress to respond, but I don't think, I...I wouldn't act in this way. I think it's useless.

C-16 It's an ineffective type of...type of **democratic** system, isn't it?

C-12 expresses something similar. After she proposes in (34) that the taxes can be avoided, C-13 questions this approach:

37.

C-13 Nà nǐ shuō de zhèi ge jiùshi yìng gè zhǒng xíngshì táo shuì zhèi yàng...tā bù shì yī ge...tā zhǐ shì gèrén de yī zhǒng xíngdòng a, tā bù shì yī ge...bǐrúshuō tōngguò yī ge shénme zǔzhī, tōngguò yī ge shénme, wǒ bù zhīdào shì, xiàng Rìběn guóhuì huòzhě shì shénme dìfāng zhèngfu huòzhě shì...

C-12 Nà nǐ zhèi huà shuō lái jiùshi yào shuō kàn nǐ de guóhuì, nà nǐ shuō Zhōngguó tā yě shì, tā huì shì, nèi ge, Rénmín Dàibiǎo Dà Huì, yíding shì tā lái tōngguò. Nà nǐ shuō tā nénggòu yǒu duōshǎo dàibiǎo rénmin de chéngdù? Duì ba?

C-13 Well what you said about applying all sorts of methods to avoid paying the tax, this isn't a...it's an individual action, it isn't a...for example going through some kind of organization, going through a, I don't know, like in Japan, the congress or some local government or...

C-12 Well you're saying this, you need to look at your congress. Do you think in China, it's also, the, the People's Congress, you'd definitely go through them. How representative of the people can they be? Right?

The picture beginning to emerge here is one of mild to moderate frustration at the action, but not much willingness to act in large-scale, public fashion to remedy the situation. All the people can really do is complain, but not much apart from that. And given China's political realities, it's not worth risking any public action to change things. C-20 and C-21 get at this latter point nicely:

38.

C-21 Kěnéng dàjiā yěxǔ huì qù yóuxíng. Dànshi xiànzài Zhōngguó Tiān'ānmén shìjiàn yǐhòu kěnéng bù huì nènme...nènme jiǎndān jiù huì qù yóuxíng le.

C-20 Cānjiā de rénrshù kěnéng...

C-21 Bù huì hěn duō le.

C-20 ...bù shì tèbié de...duōshù rén kěnéng jiùshi guānwàng, jiù kàn zhèi ge...yóu...gèbié de, bǐjiào shǎoshù de rén kěnéng bǐjiào jījīn de rén chū qù...kěnéng yóuxíng, yǒu kěnéng.

C-21 Maybe everyone would go march. But now in China, after the Tiananmen incident, maybe they wouldn't be so...it's not so simple to go march anymore.

C-20 The number of people participating...

C-21 Wouldn't be so high.

C-20 ...it wouldn't be so...the majority of people maybe would wait and see, just watch...a few, a comparative minority of people, maybe radical people would go out...and maybe march, maybe.

C-14 brings it all together concisely:

39.

C-14 Wǒ jiùshi...lǐxiǎng zhuàngtai hé xiànshí zhuàngtai, wǒ juéde fǎnyìng shì yíyàng de, jiùshi xīnwén méitǐ hé zhèngfǔ jīguān duì nǐ de fǎnyìng, tā de fǎnyìng shì shénme? Kěnéng zài xiànshí hé lǐxiǎng dāngzhōng yòu bù yíyàng.

C-14 I'm just...the ideal situation and the practical situation, I think the reaction is the same, it's just that the news media and government organs' reaction to you, what is their reaction? Maybe there's a difference between the practical and the ideal.

This is a nice encapsulation of the Chinese responses: the people would be unhappy about this decision, but the actions they will take can go no further than speech, whether complaining privately to friends, on the web to others, or to the news media. To go any further than this would be not only useless, but possibly dangerous.

What, then, of the cultural models? Clearly Well-Being is involved here: there is dissatisfaction at being treated in a way that is contrary to one's well-being. But there is hardly a trace of Good Reason and Disclosure here. I could find no examples of Disclosure, and only one of Good Reason. In this example, C-17 is expressing her displeasure at the government's action, saying the consent of the majority of the people should be obtained:

40.

C-17 Nǐ děi dédào rén...jué dà duōshù rén tóngyì. Yěxǔ wǒ bù tóngyì, dànshi rúguǒ...bǐrúshuō wǒ bù tóngyì dàn bǎifēnzhī bāshí rén tóngyì, wǒ yě méiyǒu yìjian. Wǒ jiù huì fúcóng dà duōshù rén de yìjian. Dànshi xiànzài shéi zhīdào nǐ zhèi ge zhēng shuì nǐ yuánlái mùdì shì gàn shénme.

C-17 You must obtain the people's...the consent of the vast majority of the people. Perhaps I don't agree, but if...for example I don't agree but eighty percent of the people agree, then I have nothing to say. I'll just follow the opinion of the majority of the people. But now who knows what the original goal of your collecting these taxes is?

Unfortunately there is no further elaboration. But at least C-17 thinks it somehow matters *why* the government is raising taxes.

The fact that so many of the Chinese interviewees are quick to contextualize their responses to Question #5 with respect to country in which it takes place, and the emphasis on the ineffectiveness of China's political institutions to redress people's grievances, indicates that the lack of attention to Good Reason and Disclosure may have less to do with cultural difference than with hard-nosed political reality. C-14's

separation of the “ideal” from the “practical” is further evidence of this: there *is* an ideal sort of arrangement, and possibly institutional structure, that would allow people to take more decisive action, but this institutional structure doesn’t exist in China.

My separation here of the “cultural” from the “political” is of course problematic. There is not space here to go into this issue in tremendous detail, but a few words are warranted. Using “culture” as intended in this dissertation, there can be no strict separation between the cultural and the political. Cultural models, among other things, are part of our inventory of knowledge about how to behave under certain circumstances: X happens, and my response options are A, B and C. Cultural models are stable<sup>58</sup>, yes, but changeable: China’s political institutions have been around for over fifty years, and there have consistently been negative consequences to strong expressions of public dissent, most recently and famously in 1989. This has resulted in a cultural model that we might call Nothing To Be Done, for which we have just seen plenty of evidence. But because of culture’s stability, we are accustomed, when we talk about cultural difference, to meaning long-lasting cultural difference, difference that has existed for so long it becomes essentialized as part of “what it means” to be a member of a given culture. (Another way to put this is to say that there is a widespread folk theory of *culture*,

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<sup>58</sup> See Strauss and Quinn (1997) for a thorough analysis of what they call the “centrifugal” and “centripetal” forces influencing cultural models.

according to which culture by definition consists of those aspects of human behavior, expectations of behavior (etc.) that endure over long periods of time, independently of changes in political institutions.) But political institutions can also force cultural change over relatively short periods of time. How enduring these cultural changes are — if they are changes at all in the present case — must await an historical perspective that we are of course unable to have yet. So for the present case — the Nothing To Be Done model — I am remaining agnostic as to how thoroughly “cultural” a phenomenon it is, in the sense of “it’s been around a long time,” and how “political” it is, in the sense that “people are inclined to behave one way, but behave differently because of current political realities.” As I said above, I do believe there is evidence for a more “political” interpretation, but there is also evidence — to be discussed below — for a more “cultural” interpretation.

There is a big question underlying this issue, a question which, unfortunately, the present methodology simply will not allow us to answer with any certainty. If we believe that political reality can shape cultural models, it is still an open question to what extent such shaping operates merely on *actions*, and to what extent it operates more deeply on *emotions*. That is, do people undergoing (what an American might term) political repression still experience the same emotional responses they might have experienced otherwise, but merely act differently because of fear of repercussions? Or, over time,



might political repression begin to shape not only people's actions but their emotional responses as well? It seems likely that the longer a politically repressive system has been in force, the more likely this latter result is: people simply do not have the emotional energy to worry about what *might be* when this energy does not and cannot have any influence on what *is*. According to this view, long-term political reality can have lasting cultural consequences. It is unfortunate that in the present case we are unable to reach any definitive conclusions about how deeply the culture has been affected by political institutions.

However, there is still some evidence for a more culture-based explanation of the responses to Questions #3 and #5 — that is, for an explanation based less on (relatively short-term) political reality and more on (relatively long-term) cultural patterns. I see two main problems with the argument that differences in political realities can account for all the differences between Chinese and American responses to Questions #3 and #5. First, while the Americans are equally angry about Question #5 and Question #3, the Chinese are not. As just discussed, reducing one's negative emotional response could be a useful coping mechanism in an authoritarian society, but it seems this couldn't account for the *degree* of difference here: as we have seen, Chinese interviewees are *much angrier* about Question #3 than about Question #5. Both questions involve some form of "bad treatment" of "average citizens" at the hands of governing authorities; if Chinese

people were simply accustomed to such treatment, we would expect minimal anger in response to *both* questions. But this is not what we see. Plus, the interviewees clearly felt safe expressing their anger about Question #3: if they had felt similar anger about Question #5, there is no reason to expect that they would have held back their expression of that anger. In other words, the emotional responses of the interviewees are genuine enough to be relied upon. So why is the emotional response so much weaker for Question #5 than for Question #3?

Second, the strong redress to Question #3 suggested by Chinese interviewees, particularly the lawsuit, deeply enmeshes the protagonist in China's political institutions, and risks inviting the wrath of some very powerful people. Whatever cultural models make it worth the risk of inviting this wrath must be strong indeed. How are these models different from the models evoked by Question #5?<sup>59</sup>

It seems then that differing political realities alone do not sufficiently account for the divergent responses to Question #5. I believe there are two significant differences

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<sup>59</sup> One could counter that it is indeed the political realities of China that account for the strong response: in China, because of the repressive political system, a person might not have anything left to lose after their well-being had been violated so grossly. I see two problems with this argument. First — and admittedly quite subjectively — I believe it exaggerates the severity of societal repression in China. Most any Chinese citizen would still have much to lose by pursuing a lawsuit. (Recall that in the scenario the person ends up being released.) Second, while it could possibly account for hypothetically different actions which people are willing to take in response to Questions #3 and #5, it doesn't account for the differences in *emotional reaction*. It can't account for why Chinese interviewees are so much more angry in response to Question #3 than to Question #5.

between Chinese and American cultural models that can account for this divergence. The first is differential assessment of the individual vis-à-vis the nation. The second is a fundamentally different way of thinking about the individual and morality. I will address the former first.

### The individual and the nation

We have already seen that Americans, in Question #5, are willing to sacrifice individual economic interest for the well-being of the country as a whole: via the Good Reason model — which in this case is simply application of Well-Being to a wider group of people — if the money is going to a “good cause,” a doubling of the income tax might in fact be tolerated, or at least less strongly opposed. However, when the stakes of the conflict are raised to life and death, American responses begin to look different.

Question #6, about Chris the pacifist, raises the stakes to this level.

I was puzzled at what I saw as an inconsistency in E-11 and E-12’s answers to Questions #5 and #6. They were perfectly willing to let the government raise taxes, but upset about Chris’s being drafted against his wishes. In follow-up, I asked them to explain:

41.

Me Now what if I play devil's advocate with you again, and I say, well, um, public officials declare war. And maybe war's not the best thing for me, just sort of applying the same argument that you applied in the whole taxes...maybe war isn't the best thing for me, but it's the best thing for the

country, I really don't really have any right to disagree with that, just like I don't have any right to disagree with the taxes.

E-11 I think that is different though, because that's your life, that isn't your money. I mean that's...*you*. And I don't think you should have to die for your country. That's me, I mean there are plenty of people out there that would die, but I don't think you should have to.

E-12 Right. Taxes and war are like completely different. 'Cause...taxes, okay, that...I guess that could affect your life, like you could lose or I don't know something like that, but it's like you're still alive, like you won't be like dead off...like dead somewhere in a different country where like who knows if they'll find you, you know, like it's just completely different.

This is the most extreme case of support for Chris in the American interviews, but even for interviewees mostly sympathetic to the government, there is also empathy for Chris. Chris's views are never completely elided, even by the conservatives, whom we might expect to be least sympathetic to an erstwhile "draft-dodger."

The main models here are Life Is Precious, Personal Principles, and Duty To Country. We just saw Life Is Precious above: people's desire to protect their own lives deserves our attention and respect. It is usually implicit, as background to the discussion: people take it as a given that people don't want to die, and that it is problematic to put someone in a position in which he is risking death. Personal Principles refers to the notion that the beliefs one holds most dear should be respected, and given some weight when they come into conflict with other desiderata. Duty To Country states that people might need to sacrifice their personal well-being for the nation as a whole. These models

will appear in various guises throughout the examples below. Other models will appear as well.

For every American interviewee, there is a strong tension among models here. No one finds this an easy decision to make. The following passage is quite long, but worth citing because it so nicely illustrates the various models in contention. It begins right after E-13 has read the question:

42.

E-14 Very moral questions.

E-13 Um...I think if he's drafted he should go, because it's kind of **his duty as a citizen**.

E-14 Yeah.

E-13 And, he's **fighting for his country**.

E-14 Mm hm. I agree. I think if he has **agreed to live here** under these laws and protected...you know, **get the benefits of this government**, that he has a duty to, you know, fight in the war. But I don't think...he won't feel that way. I think. "What will he say and do?" I think he'll...fight it. Try to get out of it.

E-13 Yeah he'll try to get out of it. But...

E-14 He won't...**put himself into it...you know, one hundred percent**.

E-13 Mm. I mean have you ever like done something that you don't really...you don't really believe in, but then you do it anyway?

E-14 'Cause someone tells you to?

E-13 Yeah, I'm trying to think of an example. Um...or it's not...it's something that you don't really want to do, but then you *should* do.

E-14 Something you don't believe in?

E-13 No, but that it's like you *should* do because, in this case you're a citizen and it's kind of like **your patriotic duty**. ... So like, what would Chris say and do? Okay I agree with you, like he'll probably try to get out of it, he'll probably say like, oh, I...I have to go finish my college degree, or have to do this...I...you know...but I think if like...I think if the government is insistent that he go to war, that he would...he would do it. But then **he wouldn't go a hundred percent**.

[...]

Okay then yeah, what *should* he do, he should go. He should go to the war and fight, and try to **be like a nurse or something**. [laughter] Not get killed.

E-14 We know that he doesn't want to get killed, he just **feels that the war is wrong**.

E-13 And he probably doesn't want to get killed either.

E-14 **No one wants to get killed**.

E-13 Exactly, who wants to get killed? I don't know.

E-14 Okay. Yeah I agree, I think he should go.

E-13 Yeah I think even...in those cases like even if something you don't want to do, but then it's kinda like **the right thing to do**, people tend to just do the right thing. Or do...what they're told to do.

E-14 I don't think it's necessarily right.

E-13 Okay okay it's not right. But he's *told* to do it.

E-14 He's...I think he should do it, because he's agreed to. **By living here he's agreed** to...you know...um...go along with the government.

E-13 Okay yeah.

E-14 Well not go al...but you know.

E-13 Go along with their laws and obey them? Kinda like what you were saying. 'Cause he's being...**he's getting all the benefits**. So that...so he's **obligated** to?

E-14 Kiiiiind of...

E-13 Kiiind of...

[...]

E-14 So it's just kinda like will he put his **morals** before...before his government?

E-13 Before his duty?

E-14 His patriotism.

E-13 I think he will.

[...]

E-14 I don't know anymore. What *should* he do? Uh...

E-13 Okay let's answer that, then what should he do?

E-14 Well initially I felt that he should go just because...he already felt that...well I mean since he has an obligation to his country. But that's also going against **what he believes is right**.

E-13 Okay. I think what he should do is he should go. Because I think he does have that duty. For his government.

- E-14 **Whether it's right or wrong.**
- E-13 Whether it's right or wrong. I mean...yeah, I mean that's really hard. I think I'm biased because I'm usually for war [laughter], and so I would think like...yeah, he should go because...the government wants him to. This is hard.
- E-14 Yeah it...I don't know.  
[E-13 then argues that Chris probably would go along and fight.]
- E-14 So that's what he *would* do, but that's not necessarily what he *should* do.
- E-13 Okay. That's true. So your standpoint is what he should do is he should still try to get out of it?
- E-14 Yeah...I'm not sure.
- E-13 You're not sure?
- E-14 I don't know.
- E-13 Okay. Well I'm just gonna say for myself like what he should do, I think he should still go...and get drafted. But...
- E-14 But see that...it's either he **loses his life** because he's not going along with everybody...
- E-13 Uh huh.
- E-14 ...or **he loses his you know his own morals**. 'Cause he goes along with everything. He's got...
- E-13 And there's no compromise.
- E-14 Yeah.
- E-13 Yeah that's a hard one. We'll just have to talk about it some other day.

The difficulty E-13 and E-14 are having resolving the tension among models is palpable throughout. Every time they think they've reached resolution, a competing model rears its head and they're right back where they started.

Life is Precious, as well as serving as background here, is also brought to the fore explicitly when E-14 says, "No one wants to get killed." Personal Principles here specifically involves Chris's own moral sense, as we see with the recurrent use of *moral*, *right* and *wrong*. And Duty To Country is strong here as well.

One particularly interesting aspect of Duty to Country that appears occasionally in the American interviews is that there are specific reasons *why* citizens have a duty to their country. Duty To Country isn't an atomic unit, but is derived from other principles. Specifically: the American government has granted rights to its citizens. Citizens have a choice: live in the U.S., or live elsewhere. We might call this the Love It Or Leave It model. By choosing to live in the U.S., Americans tacitly agree to take on a moral debt to society in return for rights and other benefits granted. The moral debt can be paid, in cases of war, by sacrificing one's individual well-being for the well-being of the nation as a whole.

Another model we see in this passage is one we saw last chapter: You Can't Change Me. Both E-13 and E-14 talk of Chris "not going a hundred percent." The idea here is that Chris won't be a great soldier if he doesn't *want* to fight. This implicitly argues against forcing Chris to fight, as it is not in the interests of the army to employ soldiers who won't fight as hard as they can. There will be more examples of this below.

We also see E-13 and E-14 try to find some compromise course of action for Chris, suggesting he be a nurse instead of a soldier. This sort of approach we will also see fleshed out more below, as we look at more examples of the models exemplified above.



Life Is Precious, in the guise of Pursuit of Happiness (see Chapter 3), is

articulated most clearly by E-17, as he painfully reasons his way through this dilemma:

43.

E-17 And so I think about that in terms of what it means to be patriotic, like how far will I take that, am I just all talk, or would I get out on the field and support that? And I'd like to think that I would. But...if...I mean there's so much I want to do in my life. And...war just seems like such a bad table to go to at...at...in Las Vegas, you know, it's just like it's a bad deal, it's like the odds are not good, the benefits are not worth...you know...I...I...we're talking about principles, and when compar...when it's a question of life or death, and compared with having the rest of my life with, you know, following through on what I say, principle, rhetorically, I don't think I'd do it.

Interestingly, for E-17 Personal Principles and Duty To Country are in alignment. Yet even so, he thinks he wouldn't go fight. This shows how strong Life Is Precious is for E-17: while the main tension for most is between Personal Principles and Duty To Country, and the resolution of this tension would make the decision to go and fight quite easy, for E-17 even having Personal Principles and Duty To Country aligned is not enough.

Personal Principles is given its strongest articulation by E-26, perhaps surprisingly a conservative<sup>60</sup>:

44.

E-26 Well, I don't think anyone should have to fight for something they don't believe in.

E-25 I mean...yeah, I guess...

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<sup>60</sup> Or perhaps not surprisingly if E-26 is in fact more libertarian than conservative.

E-26 Why would...why would you have to fight for a cause that's not your own?

For E-26, Chris's own beliefs come first. E-19 is willing to consider the possibility that for Chris himself, Personal Principles outweighs Life Is Precious:

45.

E-19 What if...it's not about him being killed, it's about like...maybe he doesn't care if he dies, you know, but maybe he...he just...he can't kill people. You know?

[...]

Well...I mean like the issue for him would be like of course nobody wants to die, but it's less about like him being afraid to go and...More about him like really truly believing that he shouldn't be killing other people.

E-19 doesn't come down for or against Chris here, but the possibility of a strong Personal Principles model is a necessary prerequisite for her to consider the situation this way.

Next, I present more discussions of the reasoning behind Duty To Country, introduced briefly above. E-22 examines the situation from the standpoint of the government:

46.

E-22 But I mean at the same time there's a tension about whether, you know he has the uh...you know, he enjoys the rights of being a citizen, I guess if the government's a democracy, or something like that. Should the govern...government be able to ask for reciprocation for these basic...basic rights that they defend?

E-10 takes the perspective that he imagines would be his own, were he in Chris's position:

47.

E-10 Because I don't know, I don't know, I think just being here and, I don't know, first off, I am using the government's money to go to school, and I chose to do that, and I do think that I owe, I have some kind of responsibility to that, or I should be responsible about that and shouldn't be just like take all the benefits of what I see is good and just be like screw you guys for anything that's bad because I definitely, I know that I've done that many times before.

[...]

Um, that's exactly what I would try my hardest to do, like is, is go to help 'cause, I don't know, all these people, all these people what they are out there fighting for, like maybe not the people who made the decisions, about, about going to war, but the people who are out there fighting, I think that they are there for, I don't know, for like this country, you know?

E-10 here invokes a corollary of Duty To Country, which we will call Duty to Fellow

Citizens: no one wants to go to war; others are agreeing to sacrifice their well-being to

fight so I should be willing to do the same. E-20 articulates this more explicitly:

48.

E-20 But...I mean...if my brother was out there...on the...on the field, fighting for his country, you know, for us, for everybody, and this loser over here is like, oh, I think war is wrong...I mean, I'd be pretty mad, because my brother would be fighting for this guy.

E-20 uses this in the service of arguing that Chris should fight. According to the Duty To

Fellow Citizens model, Chris's moral debt is incurred through others' willingness to

sacrifice their well-being, and to do so in part for Chris's benefit. So Chris should repay

this moral debt by being willing to make sacrifices, in turn, for those who are willing to

make sacrifices for him. E-20 also offers the following:

49.

E-20 I really don't know, it's kind of a...difficult question. It's...[sigh] should he be? Like from my point of view, being the sacreligious type person I am, uh...uh...no. 'Cause that's not fair to everybody else. I mean, nobody wants to go to war, and nobody wants to get killed in the line of fire.

E-20 is the only person actually to use the word *fair*, though what is being talked about here is clearly some form of fairness. The type of fairness involved here is what we might call “equality of sacrifice”: everyone must be willing to make equal sacrifices, in this case of their well-being.

This brings up another closely-related corollary model: the Categorical Imperative. This is meant to conjure up Kant’s idea that one possible basis for determining the moral validity of an action is to imagine what would happen if not just you, in a particular situation, did something a certain way, but everyone in every conceivable situation did things this way. In the present case, some speakers argue that Chris should fight because, if he didn’t, no one would. E-21 is clearest about this:

50.

E-21 Uh...I think Chris um...can still um...follow what the government does, and yet be individually opposed to the government, in that he can...not...go to war. Or, go into the army. Um I think he has that right, although...the government, if every person did this, wouldn't be able to wage war.

No specifics are given here as to *why* no one would fight, but presumably it is related to a flipside of Duty To Fellow Citizens: if it is true that one should respect others’

willingness to sacrifice by sacrificing themselves, then it is also possibly true that if others are not willing to make sacrifices, then I won't make sacrifices either.

In many cases, Americans are willing to consider alternatives to Chris's fighting in the war as acceptable ways for him to pay his moral debt. It doesn't have to be the direct sacrifice of well-being inherent in being a soldier; other sacrifices are possible. E-9, E-10, E-13 and E-19 suggest Chris help out with the medical care of soldiers; E-22 says Chris could be a cook for the army; and E-15 and E-16 say Chris could help out the war effort in ways other than fighting, but don't specify how. The passage below expresses how this would absolve Chris's moral debt:

51.

E-19 Maybe I could like work in the medical tent or something.

E-20 Yeah exactly, right? Or do something else.

E-19 Yeah.

E-20 But at least go. 'Cause...other people are fighting for you. It's only fair to do your share, right? So yeah, he should go be a doctor or something.

Finally, the You Can't Change Me model rounds out this picture of the individual and its relationship to the nation. You Can't Change Me appears in six of the nine interviews. We already saw one example, in (42) above, in which E-13 and E-14 claim that Chris won't give 100% to the fighting effort. In the following passages, it is argued that it is in fact not in the army's best interests to have soldiers who don't want to be there fighting the war:

52.

E-16 I don't know that someone who feels strongly that the war in question is wrong should necessarily fight. I don't...

E-15 Yeah I don't know if you really want them on the field.

E-16 That could be a problem too.

53.

E-21 Chris can still say something like, well, I...I can be governed by the government, I'm certainly not going to um...go against this war. But personally I'm against this war, um and I feel war is...is...is wrong. And in that case I wouldn't be a good addition to the army anyway.

54.

E-22 There's a tension there because you know...the government, A, isn't interested in having you know uh doves, in the army, you know uh...you know... 'cause it'd almost be like you know, having people that are in...well you know having people that are interested in fighting, you know in your army to kill somebody and they're not gonna all out [sic] a hundred perc...a hundred and ten percent.

55.

E-23 I think that he will really speak out and try to find a way to get out of it, because he doesn't...they don't want people to...to fight the war if they're completely against it. Like, what good is it to have people on your side that are fighting for you that first of all don't even want to be there, they don't believe in your cause...they have no...desire to... [interrupted by E-24]

56.

E-26 I mean if...if they're going to fight the war they should use people who *want* to fight the war that...I mean I think if it was that important to people, they would get volunteers to the extent that people agree with it.

E-25 Well see I think to a certain extent you can't really make people fight if they don't want to.

It may be the case that there is some sort of obligation on the part of individuals to support the nation, but if those individuals don't themselves believe they have this

obligation, or believe they have it but assign it a lower priority than something else, then it is useless to try to force them into action. It would be bad for the individuals *and* for the country.

All of these examples, and the models they invoke, taken together, give us a complex picture of an American view of citizenship. American citizens, by their very status as American citizens, have rights that are guaranteed and protected by the U.S. government. It isn't made clear from exactly what source the rights *derive*, but it *is* clear that the government is seen as *protecting* these rights, and that citizens benefit from this protection. Citizens enjoy a higher level of well-being as a result of these rights than citizens in many other countries do. We are free as citizens to choose whether or not to accept these rights. If we choose not to accept these rights, then we can live elsewhere; to choose to live in the U.S. is to agree to accept the rights and benefits of citizenship, and thus to incur a moral debt to the government. All citizens are equally bound in this way. This means that citizens have duties to each other: if one citizen is called on to make a sacrifice, then all citizens are called on to make a sacrifice. Therefore, in a time of war, when some people are asked to make difficult sacrifices — not only for the government but for other citizens — *all* people must make sacrifices.

However, these duties sometimes come into conflict with personal beliefs. In this case, the conflict is with *moral* beliefs. The American interviewees, even with their

strong and well-articulated Duty To Country models, to a one are deeply conflicted about how the tension between Duty To Country and Personal Principles should be resolved. The country is important, but so is the individual. Not only that, but the beliefs about the nation that inhere in Duty To Country are strongly informed by a particular model of the individual: the autonomous, choice-making individual — who decides to stay in the U.S. — underlies the entire moral structure of the Duty To Country model. Additionally, forcing collective action when the individuals that constitute the collective do not support the collective action will result in ineffectual collective action, as we saw in the examples of *You Can't Change Me*.

The relationship between the individual and the nation looks quite different in the Chinese interviews. Sympathy for Zhang San (Chris's counterpart) runs low. So low, in fact, that a disproportionate amount of the data comes from follow-up questioning, as no one was even willing to consider this as much of a dilemma without prompting from me. It's mostly an open-and-shut case: Zhang San is drafted, so he must fight. The following is typical:

57.

C-13 Tā zhǐ néng qù. Yīnwèi zuòwéi jūnrén tā zhǐ néng...bùguǎn tā gèrén yìzhì rúhé, tā yě yào qù, duì bù duì?

C-12 Duì.

C-13 He can only go. Because being a soldier one can only...it doesn't matter what his individual will is, he must go, right?

C-12 Right.



C-21 is equally explicit about this:

58.

C-21 Fú cóng mìng lìng shì tiānzhí ma. Yīnwèi tā yǐjīng bèi rùwǔ. Bǐrúshuō wǒmen lǎobǎixìng bù shì jūnrén, wǒmen kěyǐ nèige...fǎnduì...shuō, fǎnduì zhànzhēng shénmede, dànshi jūnrén ne, tā jiù kěnéng...tā xīn lǐ rènwéi bù duì tā yě méiyǒu bànfa.

C-21 Following orders is a bound duty. Because, after all, he's been drafted. Now we common people aren't soldiers, we can...oppose...say, oppose war and such, but a soldier, maybe he...in his heart he thinks it's wrong but there's nothing he can do.

There is a Personal Principles model articulated here — “in his heart he thinks it's wrong” — but Duty To Country clearly outweighs it.

There are other comments similar to this throughout the interviews, which got me thinking that perhaps the question had been worded in such a way as to preclude the possibility of Zhang San having other options. In China, as in the U.S., membership in the category *soldier* means that your individual will must be secondary to the orders of your commanding officers. The English question says that “Chris is drafted into the army to fight.” There is a time lag between the draft notice and actually becoming a soldier, and American interviewees naturally set the time frame of their answers to this interim period before Chris crosses the line from *civilian* to *soldier*. However, the Chinese version indicates that Zhang San is already a soldier. The Chinese equivalent of *draft* is *yìngzhēng-rùwǔ*. *Yìngzhēng* is close to English *levy*, and contributes the

semantics of recruitment; *rùwǔ*, however, literally means “enter army.” The entire lexical item *yìngzhēng-rùwǔ* thus means “to be drafted and enter the army.” Zhang San has crossed a clear category division between “ordinary citizen” and “soldier,” and so there is nothing to be done.

This meant that in all interviews I had to follow up with questions that (a) supposed Zhang San had not yet been drafted but was about to be drafted, and (b) pressed interviewees on whether there *should* be governmental policies to address the beliefs of individuals who oppose war. I made the case in terms of religious belief, because, given how reluctant people had been before follow-up to suggest on their own reasons for supporting Zhang San, it seemed necessary to posit strongly principled belief, and religious belief fit the bill.

What I found is that responses were still, if somewhat less clear-cut, strongly in favor of Zhang San’s participation in the war. In some cases, even with all my prodding, the interviewees still had a hard time considering Zhang San’s point of view at all. Examples of this will come below, but first I will give the few examples of support for Zhang San.

C-12 and C-13, who as we just saw were adamant about Zhang San’s participation before follow-up, change their perspective during follow-up questioning:

59.

- Me Nǐmen rènwéi ne, jiùshi yī ge rén yīnwèi zōngjiào yuányīn yīnggāi bù yīnggāi yǒu quánlì jiùshi bù dāng bīng?
- C-12 Yīnggāi. Yīnggāi.
- Me Yīnggāi?
- C-12 Yīnggāi.
- C-13 Yīnwèi zōngjiào yuányīn?
- Me Duì. Huòzhě shì **xìnyǎng** yuányīn. **Xìnyǎng** yuányīn.
- C-13 Zhè cóng tā gèrén jiǎng yīnggāi bù yīnggāi háishi shuō shàngmian zhèi ge...
- Me Cóng tā gèrén de nèi ge kànfǎ.
- C-13 Tā yīnggāi yǒu quánlì juédìng tā rùwǔ háishi bù rùwǔ, wǒ juéde. Yīnwèi rùwǔ bìjìng yào yǒu shēngmìng. Yào yǒu síwáng zuò dàijià.
- Me Do you both think the a person should have the right not to be a soldier because of religious reasons?
- C-12 He should. He should.
- Me He should?
- C-12 He should.
- C-13 Because of religious reasons?
- Me Yes. Or because of **beliefs**.<sup>61</sup> Because of **beliefs**.
- C-13 You mean from his own perspective of whether or not he should or what we talked about before...
- Me From his individual perspective.
- C-13 He should have the right to decide whether to join the army, I think. Because in the end being in the army you have to have life. The price you pay is death.

C-13 invokes Life Is Precious — not, like so many of the Americans, Personal Principles — in Zhang San’s defense. She is the only Chinese interviewee to do so. This is not to say, a la General William Westmoreland, that Chinese somehow view life as less precious than Americans do. Instead, as we will see below, arguments are often framed in terms of “interests,” and not putting one’s individual interests above the interests of

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<sup>61</sup> The Chinese term here, *xìnyǎng*, has religious connotations.

others. One strong interest that every person has in preserving his life, but perhaps one must risk sacrificing his own life for the lives of others. The question, then, is not of life not being precious, but about one individual deciding for himself that his life is more precious than the lives of others.

As for C-12, she doesn't elaborate on why she feels Zhang San should have the right not to join the army. However, a bit later she does reveal herself as a pacifist

60.

C-12 Zǒng'éryánzhī wǒ fēicháng zēnghèn zhànzhēng. Wǒ juéde hěn duō zhànzhēng chúncuì jiùshì zhèngkè zhījiān...wèile tāmen de lìyì lái fāqǐ, ránhòu dǎ zhe yī ge hěn hǎo de yī ge huǎngzi huì zěnme zěnmeyàng.

C-12 All in all I really hate war. I think many wars in essence are among politicians...are started for their interests, and then they use all sorts of nice pretenses and such.

We are left to wonder why C-12 supports Zhang San: because of reasons similar to Americans — Life is Precious, Personal Principles, etc. — or because of her ideological opposition to war.

Another statement in favor of Zhang San comes from C-16. She and C-17 have just been discussing whether it matters if a war is just or not. They have been going back and forth about individual interests versus the country's interests, and C-17 has just come down against Zhang San, saying he should fight. C-16 continues:

61.

C-16 Wǒ juéde tā yīnggāi...yīnggāi...fú cóng tā de xìn yǎng.  
[...]

Wèishenme? Yīnwèi...jiù xiàng wǒ shuō de qíshí...guójiā yào huòzhě zhànzhēng yào qíshí méiyǒu yī ge...qíshí zhèngyì hǎo duō dōngxi jiùshì shuō méiyǒu duì-cuò zhī fēn huòzhě méiyǒu hǎo-huài. Qíshí wǒ duì měi ge rén...suǒyǐ zuì hòu měi ge rén jiànli de jīchū shì nǐ zìjǐ de...nǐ zìjǐ de xìnyǎng. Nà...wǒ zhǐ shì cóng gèrén jiǎodù lái shuō le. Duì.

C-16 I think he should...should...follow his beliefs.

[...]

Why? Because...like I said...the country, or war, in fact there isn't...in fact for many aspects of justice there isn't a clear division between right and wrong or good and bad. In fact, I think that for every person...in the end the foundation that every person builds is your own...your own beliefs. So...I'm just talking from the perspective of the individual.

Apart from being a bit hesitating and rambling, this hardly qualifies as a ringing endorsement of Zhang San's following his beliefs. She seems to be making a weakly relativist point — in the spirit of Personal Principles — that people have their own moral foundations and have to make their own decisions about things, but she qualifies this by saying that she's only talking from the individual's perspective, indicating that there are other perspectives which she is not addressing.

These are the only comments in favor of Personal Principles. You Can't Change

Me makes a brief appearance in C-14/15, but is instantly rebutted by C-15:

62.

C-14 Jiùshì shuō kěndìng bù huì shì yī ge hǎo zhànshì.

C-15 Bù bù bù.

C-14 Tā huì yī biān qù shā rén, yī biān juéde zhèi yàng de shā rén shì bù duì de.

C-15 Zhèi ge wèntí duì nǐ lái kùn nán le. Suǒyǐ...wǒ yě bù yíding jiǎng de hǎo, yīnwèi...zhèi ge bù zhīdào zěnme huídá.

C-14 Zhèi ge hěn nán, zhèi...tā yīnggāi zěnme bàn?

C-15 Zhèi shì kàn nǐ bǎ shénme fàng zài zuì qiánmiàn de, tā qiánmiàn tā yǒu shùnxù de. Zhōngguó chuántǒng de shì guójiā shì fàng zài zìjǐ de qiánmiàn de, dàn wǒ xiāngxìn Měiguó yě shì zhèi yàng de, suǒyǐ fēicháng

jiǎndān. Tā jiù huì qù dǎ zhàng, ránhòu tā huì zuò yī ge hěn hǎo de zhànshì qù dǎ zhàng.

- C-14 That is to say he definitely won't be a good soldier.  
C-15 No, no, no.  
C-14 At the same time he's killing people he'll be thinking that war is wrong.  
C-15 This question is too difficult for you. So...I also won't necessarily be able to address this well, because...I don't know how to answer this.  
C-14 This is hard, this...what should he do?  
C-15 That depends on what you put first. There's an order to what is before him. Traditionally in China the country comes first, but I believe it's also this way in America, so it's really simple. He will go fight, and he will be a very good soldier in the war.

This is the only time You Can't Change Me appears in the Chinese interviews.

Compromise methods are also sought, but only in one interview. C-21 mentions the possibility that Zhang San could ask not to have to fire on the enemy, but C-20 says this is impossible. They do both suggest, however, that he could perhaps be put in the rearguard.

One final possible out for Zhang San relies on an expert model of China's legal system. Both C-11 and C-20 are willing to give Zhang San some leeway on the basis of China's law protecting religion:

63.  
Me Jiǎrú tā yǒu zōngjiào yuányīn, jiùshì bù kěyǐ dǎ zhàng. Tā de zōngjiào bù ràng tā dǎ zhàng. Dànshì zhèngfu yào tā dǎ zhàng. Nà tā zěnmē bàn ne?  
C-11 Nà wǒ juéde zhèi yàng de qíngkuàng zhèngfu bù ràng tā qù dǎ zhàng ne, Zhōngguó duì zhèi zhǒng shǎoshù mínzú tā méiyǒu, huòzhě jiù shuō zōngjiào xìnyǎng yě xūyào, qǐmǎ shì wǒmen yǒu guīdìng shuō shì yīnggāi zūnzhòng tāmen de zōngjiào xìnyǎng. Rúguǒ shuō nǐ shì zhèi ge zōngjiào běnshēn bu tóngyì dehuà...dànshì qǐmǎ qiántí shì zhèi ge zōngjiào shì yào bèi zhèngfu suǒ chéngrèn de zōngjiào.

Me Suppose he has religious reasons, and so can't fight. His religion won't let him fight. But the government wants him to fight. Then what should he do?

C-11 Then I think in this sort of situation the government won't make him go fight. China, for this type of ethnic minority,<sup>62</sup> or for religious beliefs, there needs...at least we have rules that say their religious beliefs should be respected. If because of this religion you fundamentally don't agree...but at least it has to be one of the religions that's recognized by the government.

64.

C-20 Búguò cóng Zhōngguó xiànfǎ lái jiǎng shì zūnjìng...jiù shuō zūnzhòng zhèi ge gèrén de...

C-21 Xìnyǎng ha.

C-20 Xìnyǎng zìyóu. Cóng zhèi ge jiǎodù lái shuō, nà, nǐ yào shì zūnzhòng rénjiā de xìnyǎng zìyóu, nà bù shā shēng...nà, kěyǐ bù shā shēng.

C-21 Nà jiù kěnéng jiù bù qù le.

C-20 A.

C-21 Kěnéng...yěxǔ jiù bù qù le.

C-20 Still, based on the Chinese constitution...that is, respect individual...

C-21 Beliefs.

C-20 ...freedom of belief. From this perspective, then, if you respect people's freedom of belief, then not killing...then, it's okay not to kill.

C-21 In that case maybe he won't go.

C-20 Mm hm.

C-21 Maybe...perhaps he won't go.

The “experts” in this case are those in the Chinese government who have determined which religions count as “official,” and therefore as legal. In appealing to this expert model, C-11, C-20 and C-21 are in some sense taking the easy way out by letting other

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<sup>62</sup> This points out a model of religion and ethnicity that is extremely common in China: things religious are almost invariably associated with ethnic minorities. Religious belief is in fact viewed as one of the defining characteristics of certain ethnic minorities, a characteristic that differentiates them clearly from Han Chinese.

— in their eyes more qualified — people resolve the issue for them. In doing so they also avoid committing to one side or the other of the conflict between Duty To Country and Personal Principles, such as it exists. In the end, we don't know if these interviewees agree with the expert model and we don't know if they feel Zhang San *should* be allowed not to fight.

It seems, then, that support for Zhang San is weak among Chinese interviewees. Life Is Precious, Personal Principles, You Can't Change Me, possible compromise approaches, and the above expert model all make cameo appearance, but the overwhelming tendency in the Chinese interviews is in favor of Duty To Country. (Some of the passages below do not come from follow-up questioning, but I only include quotes that do not rely for their reasoning on Zhang San already being a soldier. There is one exception to this, but it is dealt with on its own.)

We begin with a quote from C-17 that shows just how easy it is to dismiss

Personal Principles in the face of Duty To Country:

65.

C-17 Tā xīn lǐ shì, jiùshì shuō duì zhànzhēng shì yànwu de. Bù yuàn...tā rènwéi zhànzhēng shì bù duì de, dàn tā méiyǒu shuō tā bù yuànyì...bù yuànyì qù wèi guójiā xiàolì qù cānjiā zhànzhēng, shì bu shì? Tā yuán wén shì zěnmē jiǎng de? Tā hǎoxiàng rènwéi zhànzhēng shì bù duì de, dàn tā méiyǒu zhèi yàng shuō wǒ bù xiǎng bǎowèi zǔguó huòzhě shénme de.

C-17 In his heart, that is, he detests war. He doesn't want...he thinks war is wrong, but it didn't say he isn't willing...isn't willing to go protect the country and serve in the war, right? What does the original text say? It



seems he thinks war is wrong, but he doesn't say, I don't want to protect the country or whatever.

For C-17, Duty To Country is so strong that there is almost not a conflict here between this model and Personal Principles. Most Americans, as we have seen, are willing to consider holding to one's personal principles, even in a time of severe national need. And if one believes something is wrong, then one generally doesn't have a desire to act contrary to those beliefs. But for C-17, it is quite possible that Zhang San simultaneously opposes war and *wants* to fight in a war. We will see below that most Chinese support of Duty To Country is strong, but not this strong: Zhang San may have to fight in the war, but it is at least understood that his desire is not to fight:

66.

C-14 "Zài zhèi zhǒng qíngkuàng xià Zhāng Sān huì zěnmē bàn?" Nà wǒ juéde tā suīrán juéde bù duì, dànshi zhèngfǔ jiào tā qù rùwǔ tā bù yuànyì yě bù xíng. Suǒyǐ tā hái **děi** qù dǎ zhàng. "Tā yīnggāi zěnmē bàn?" Wǒ juéde zhèi ge rén shì bǐjiào tòngkǔ de, tā yīnggāi zěnmē bàn, yīnwèi zài zhànzhēng zhèi zhǒng qíngkuàng xià gèrén de yìjian, gèrén de shēngyīn hǎoxiàng xiǎn de tèbié wēiruò.

C-15 Duì.

C-14 Tā kěndìng hái **děi** qù dǎ zhàng, dànshi tā yīnggāi zěnmē bàn?

C-15 Bù zhīdào.

C-14 Wǒ juéde tā zhǐ néng zìjǐ háishi **děi** qù dǎ zhàng, dànshi tā huì bǎ tā de xīn lǐ de kànfǎ gěi tā de qīn yǒu huòzhě gěi xīnwén méitǐ shuō yī xià, dànshi zhèi yàng de zhèi ge rén kěnéng huì dāng pàntú, suǒyǐ yě bù xíng.

C-15 Tā yě bù huì dāng pàntú.

C-14 "In this sort of situation what would Zhang San do?" Well I think even though he thinks it's wrong, if the government tells him to join the army it's not okay for him not to. So he still **must** go fight. "What should he do?" I think this person is in a tough position as to what he should do, because under conditions of war it seems that individual ideas, individuals' voices manifest very weakly.

- C-15 Right.
- C-14 He definitely still **must** go fight, but what should he do?
- C-15 I don't know.
- C-14 I think his only option is that he still **must** go fight, but he would tell his opinions to his close friends or with the news media. But this sort of person might become a traitor so that's not okay either.
- C-15 He won't<sup>63</sup> become a traitor.

C-14 is aware of the possibility of Zhang San's individual beliefs being at odds with the government, but even the relatively insignificant action of talking to friends or the news media is overruled by both C-14 and C-15 as traitorous. C-16 and C-17 also don't see much choice for Zhang San:

67.

- C-16 Wǒ juéde...rúguǒ zhèi shì yī zhǒng qiángzhì de xíngwéi tā jiùshì...tā jiù rènwéi zhànzhēng bù duì tā yě **bìxū** fú cóng. Wǒ xiǎng zhèi ge kěnéng xuǎnzé de yúdi bù shì hěn duō.
- C-17 Jiùshì shuō, zhèngfu ràng nǐ qù, zhēng nǐ...ràng nǐ fú bīngyì le, nǐ yě méi shénme kě fǎnkàng de jīhuì.
- C-16 I think...if this is forced on him then...even though he believes war is wrong he still **must** obey. I think there isn't much room for him to make choices here.
- C-17 That is, the government makes you go, drafts you...makes you do military service, there's no opportunity for you to resist.

We have already seen in follow-up (see (61)) that C-16 is also sympathetic to Zhang San,

but C-17 is not:

68.

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<sup>63</sup> The Chinese translated here as *won't* is *bù huì*. *Bù* is a negator, and *huì* is a prediction. In other words, this *won't* is a prediction about Zhang San's actions, not any modal statement about external constraints on Zhang San's behavior.

C-17 Yǒu kěnéng tā shì xìn mǒu zhǒng zōngjiào tā bù xiǎng cānjiā zhèi chǎng zhànzhēng. Dàn tā guójiā ràng tā cānjiā wǒ juéde tā shì **yīnggāi** cānjiā. Wǒ juéde shì zhèi yàng.

C-17 It's possible that because he believes in some religion that he doesn't want to participate in this war. But if his country wants him to participate I think he **should** participate. I think this is how it is.

Her modal choice is a bit less strong, but her stance is still clear: Zhang San's duty to his country outweighs his personal beliefs. C-18 and C-19 are also clear on this:

69.

C-18 Suīrán tā zìjǐ juéde zhèi jiàn shìqing kěnéng huì bù duì, dànshi wǒ juéde tā bù huì biǎoxiàn chū lái. Tā yě huì suízhe dàjiā yìqǐ qù dǎ zhàng.

C-19 Zhāng Sān suīrán juéde zhèi ge dǎ zhàng bù duì, dànshi tā yíyàng huì...huì jìn zìjǐ de nǚlì qù rènzhēn de wánchéng zhèi xiàng rènwu.

C-18 Duì. "Tā yīnggāi zěnmē bàn?" Wǒ juéde...rúguǒ yào huàn shì wǒ de huà, wǒ bèi yìngzhēngrùwǔ le, wǒ juéde méiyǒu qítā de bànfa.

C-19 Zhǐ yǒu qù zuò...

C-18 Zhǐ yǒu qù zuò...

C-19 Zìjǐ **yīnggāi** zuò de shìqing.

C-18 Zìjǐ **yīnggāi** zuò de shìqing.

C-18 Even though he himself thinks this matter might be wrong, I think he won't let it show. He'll go along with everyone and go fight.

C-19 Even though Zhang San thinks this war is wrong, like everyone he'll...he'll conscientiously fulfill his duty with the utmost diligence.

C-18 Yes. "What should he do?" I think...if it were me, and I were drafted, I don't think there would be any other way.

C-19 The only way would be to do...

C-18 The only way would be do do...

C-19 ...what he **should** do.

C-18 ...what he **should** do.

The *should* here might be from Zhang San's viewpoint — Zhang San thinking "I should do this" — or it could be from the interviewees' perspective — "I think Zhang San should do this." Either way, Personal Principles is taking a clear backseat once again to

Duty To Country. From the very beginning of their discussion, C-20 and C-21 have no doubt about Zhang San's course of action:

70.

C-21 Tā jiù **děi** qù.

C-20 Tā **bìxū** **děi** qù.

C-21 Mm.

C-20 Tā jǐbiàn shì fǎnduì, nènme tā yīnwèi shì jūnrén...

C-21 Jiù **děi** fú cóng...

C-20 ...zài bùduì lǐ háishi **bìxū** **děi** fú cóng mìnglìng. Suǒyǐ tā zài zhèi zhǒng qíngkuàng hái **děi**, **bìxū** **děi** qù dǎ zhàng.

C-21 Duì. Ērqiě zài Zhōngguó wǒ juéde yǒu zhème yī ge qíngkuàng. Bǐrú zhànzhēng, bùguǎn zěnmeyàng, tā **yào** qù, jiù shuō nǐ pǎo le...zhèi ge táobīng shì tèbié kěchǐ.

C-21 He **must** go.

C-20 He **really must** go.

C-21 Mm hm.

C-20 Even though he opposes it, still because he's a soldier...

C-21 He must obey...

C-20 ...in the army he still **really must** obey orders. So in this situation he still **must, really must** go fight.

C-21 Yes. Also in China I think it's like this: in times of war, it doesn't matter what the situation, he **must** go. If you flee...deserting is really shameful.

What I have translated as *really must* is, in Chinese, *bìxū děi*. Each of these two words — *bìxū* and *děi* — can stand alone as *must*, but they can also be strung together for extra emphasis. The last word translated as *must* — *yào* — in many circumstances expresses desire, but here indicates compulsion.<sup>64</sup> Again, some of the strength of this response

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<sup>64</sup>This compulsion could be moral, or it could be based on the brute force of the institutions concerned. As we will see later in this chapter, there is a strong tendency in the Chinese interviews away from moral compulsion, which would argue here for an interpretation based more on institutional compulsion.

might have something to do with the wording of the question, as Zhang San is presumed already to be a soldier. But in follow-up, not much changes, even when the question of religious belief is posed. In the case of C-20 and C-21, in fact, the conflict is difficult to comprehend. They are convinced he would still have to go fight, but the very premise of the question is odd. It is hard to conceive of there being a religious draftee:

71.

C-21 Wǒ cónglái méiyǒu...wǒ juéde hěn yǒuyìsi, jiù cónglái méiyǒu xiǎng guo...kěnéng, wǒ juéde zhèi zhǒng qíngkuàng bǐjiào shǎo.

C-20 Zōngjiào...bùduì hé zhèi ge zōngjiào zhèi ge guānxi méi zěnme zhùyì guo.

C-21 Cónglái méiyǒu rén shuō guo.

C-21 I've never...I think this is interesting, I've never thought about...maybe, I think this type of situation is quite rare.

C-20 Religion...the army and religion, the relationship between them, I've never paid attention to it.

C-21 No one has ever mentioned it.

C-18, too, in follow-up, has a hard time comprehending the question:

72.

Me Jiǎrú Zhāng Sān zhīsuǒyǐ rènwéi dǎ zhàng shì bù duì de shì yīnwèi tā...shì yīnwèi zōngjiào de yuányīn. Nà tā yīnggāi zěnme bàn ne?

C-18 Jiùshi shuō, tā zhèi ge zōngjiào juéding tā bù yīnggāi qù cānjiā zhèi chǎng zhànzhēng?

Me Duì.

C-18 Jiǎrúshuō, jiù shuō, rúguǒ Zhōngguó hé Yīslánjiào de mǒu yī ge guójiā fāshēng jiāozhàn le, tā běnshēn xìn Yīslánjiào?

Me Tā zìjǐ rènwéi, yīnwèi zōngjiào yuányīn rènwéi shā rén shì bù duì de.

C-19 Bírúshuō tā xìn fó, dànshi tā yào qù dǎ zhàng, tā rènwéi...

C-18 Dàn wǒ juéde tā méiyǒu rènhé de qítā de xuǎnzé.

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Unfortunately this must, via the compulsion imposed by a lack of conclusive evidence, remain speculative. (Of course it could also be the case that *both* sorts of compulsion are intended here.)

- Me Suppose the reason Zhang San thinks war is wrong is that he...is for religious reasons. Then what should he do?
- C-18 That is, his religion decides that he shouldn't go participate in this war?
- Me Right.
- C-18 For instance, that is, if China and some Islamic country go to war, and Zhang San believes in Islam?
- Me He himself believes, for religious reasons, that it's wrong to kill people.
- C-19 For example he's Buddhist, but he has to go to war, he believes...
- C-18 But I think he doesn't have any other choice.

It takes a bit for C-18 to understand the possibility of someone not wanting to fight

because war *in itself* is wrong. And once he does understand, he still decides in favor of

Duty To Country.

C-19 gives a long defense of Duty To Country, quoted below in its entirety:

73.

C-19 Wǒ juéde kàn zhèi chǎng zhànzhēng shì shénme, jiù bǐrúshuō quèshí zhèi ge rén xìn fó, bǐrúshuō xìn fó, tā juéde tā bù yīnggāi qù móuhài shēngmìng, jiùshì qù jìnxíng zhèi zhǒng cánrěn de huódòng, dànshi bǐrúshuō zhèi ge qítā...qítā de guójiā yào rùqīn de, yǐjīng dá dào jiā ménkǒu le, nà wǒ wèile jiùshì bǎohù wǒ de zhèi ge jiā, wǒ yě bù kěnéng shuō wǒ xiùshǒu pángguān, bù qù guǎn. Wèile wǒ de zōngjiào, wèile wǒ bù nénggòu qù shā rén, wèile wǒ bù nénggòu qù...wǒ juéde zhèi yào kàn jiùshì jùtǐ de lǐyóu, jiùshì shuō zhèi ge zhànzhēng duìyú tā běnshēn zhèi ge yìyì dàodǐ yǒu duō zhòng? Jiùshì shuō tā rúguǒ juéde zhèi ge zhànzhēng suīrán shì bù yīnggāi qù dǎ, dànshi duìyú wǒ de yìyì yòu hěn zhòngyào dehuà, dàn wǒ juéde tā jiù huì qù cānjiā, érqǐè zhèngfu jiùshì yě yīnggāi jiùshì...jiùshì qiǎngpò...yě bù néng shuō shì qiǎngpò ba, jiùshì zhíxíng tā zìjǐ de zhèi zhǒng quánlì, ràng zhèi ge rén yìngzhēngrùwǔ qù cānjiā dǎ zhàng. Dànshi rúguǒ shuō tā duì zhèi ge zhànzhēng de yìyì...jiù zhèi ge zhànzhēng de yìyì duì zhèi ge Zhāng Sān zhèi ge rén lái jiǎng yìyì bù shì hěn zhòngdà, jiùshì shuō dǎ hé bù dǎ gēn wǒ lái shuō méiyǒu shénme guānxi, shì guójiā zhìdìng de yī zhǒng cèluè, jiùshì duì wǒ běnrén lái shuō bìng méiyǒu shénme dà'àn, bìng méiyǒu shénme hěn zhòngyào de yìyì dehuà, wǒ fǎn'ěr shì yī zhǒng fēicháng bèidòng de qiǎngpò de bù qíngyuán de qù dehuà, nènme wǒ dào juéde jiùshì...huì yǒu yìxiē bù hélí de dìfang cúnzài. Dànshi duìyú rènhe yī ge shèhui lái jiǎng, jiùshì tā bù kěnéng shì àn...jiùshì tā suǒ cǎiqǔ de shìqing, bù kěnéng shì àn suǒyǒu rén de yìyuàn

qù bàn. Tā bù kěnéng mǎnzú suǒyǒu rén de yìyuàn, yīnwèi měi ge rén de gèrén de yìyuàn dōu shì bù tóng de. Gè yǒu gèzì de xiǎngfǎ. Dànshi tā bìxū yào yǒu yī ge héxīn de lìyì zài lǐmiàn. Jiùshì shuō wǒ shì wèile dà duōshù rén de lìyì, wǒ wèile yī ge zhǔyào de lìyì qù cǎiqǔ de zhèi ge zhèngcè, zhèige cuòshī. Dàn wǒ bù kěnéng yīnwèi nǐ yī ge rén de bù yuànyì ér qù gǎibiàn zhèi ge wèile dà duōshù de rén de lìyì de zhèi ge cuòshī lái zhèi yàng de nèi ge xíngdòng. Wǒ juéde shì zhèi yàng de.

C-19 I think you have to look at what this war is, for instance if this person really is Buddhist, he's Buddhist, he thinks he shouldn't harm living things, or undertake this type of ruthless activity. But for example if another...another country wants to invade, and is already at the door,<sup>65</sup> then in order to protect my home, it's not possible for me to stand by and watch and not do something about it. For my religion, in order for me not to kill people, in order for me not to go...I think you have to look at the specific reason. That is, fundamentally how great is this war's meaning for him? That is, if he thinks even though I shouldn't go fight in this war, it still holds great meaning for me, then I think he would go participate, plus I think the government should...force...well I can't say force, but exercise his rights,<sup>66</sup> and make this person be drafted and participate in the war. But if the war's meaning for him...this war's meaning for Zhang San, the meaning isn't so great, that is, fighting or not fighting doesn't matter to me, it's just a government tactic, then for myself this war isn't a big deal, this war doesn't carry any important meaning, I'm just being passively forced to fight unwillingly, then in that case I think...there's some unreasonableness to this. But for any society, it's impossible...whatever measures it takes, it's impossible to do things according to the wishes of everyone. It's impossible to satisfy everyone's wishes, because everyone's individual wishes are different. Each person has his own way of thinking. But at the heart of it must be someone's interests. That is, for the interests of a great majority, for a more important interest I'll adopt this policy, this measure. But it's impossible for me to change this policy, that's in the interests of a great majority, or take this sort of action just because you don't agree. I think this is the way it is.

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<sup>65</sup> This metaphor will be examined more closely in Chapter 5.

<sup>66</sup> "Exercise his right" appears to be euphemistic for what C-19 almost said: force him to fight.

C-19 is willing to pay lip service to Zhang San's principles, but nothing more. Like C-17, C-19 sees the possibility of Zhang San actually *wanting* to fight, despite his religious beliefs. And while she briefly considers allowing him some leeway for his beliefs, she is quick to point out its "unreasonableness," and to frame Zhang San's actions as selfish.

Duty To Country really does seem to carry the day for the Chinese interviewees. As we have seen, respondees are sometimes unclear about their own beliefs as to whether Zhang San should have to fight, but all are clear that he *would* have to fight. This latter form of evidence of the strength of Duty To Country is not as convincing as the former, but it is still persuasive: Question #6 invites competing models into the discussion by posing this as a contradiction between Zhang San's beliefs and national policy. Even if the speakers themselves are not sympathetic to Zhang San, presumably, in order to answer the question thoroughly — as all interviewees seem eager to do — they would at least consider whatever competing models are at their disposal. But as we have seen, it is difficult to find any competing models at all.

One possible partial explanation for this has to do with differing historical realities of war in the U.S. and China. China's territorial sovereignty has been significantly violated twice in the past two centuries: after the Opium Wars of the mid-19<sup>th</sup> Century, and during World War II. China's experience of war has been a relatively desperate one: fight now or lose the homeland. In the U.S., however, national borders



have never been immediately threatened by an outside invading party, with the exception of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and even that was thousands of miles from the mainland. War is more of an abstract, preventive measure than a desperate, necessary measure to save the country's very existence. Thus, when a war scenario is posited, it is easier for an American to be sympathetic to an unwilling draftee, since the stakes are so much lower than they are in China.

However, I don't think this can account for the entirety of the difference in the strength of Duty To Country. First, wars are consistently justified in the U.S. as defending "vital national interests." The attacks that precipitated U.S. involvement in World War II were conceived of as immediately threatening territorial integrity. The "domino theory" metaphor, as analyzed by George Lakoff (1999), allowed the Kennedy administration to argue that control of Vietnam by the Vietcong effectively meant control of the Eastern hemisphere, the Western hemisphere, and ultimately the United States, by hostile communist forces. So even if in reality the United States' territorial integrity has never been seriously threatened, wars have been consistently conceptualized in this way. Second, there is an interesting exchange between E-25 and E-26 that is very hard to imagine Chinese people having. It includes pieces of (44) and (56):

74.

E-25 In order...in order to get that kind of widespread opposition to where people are...to where enough people are actively dodging the draft, it'd have to be a pretty illegitimate war, and by the time they're drafting

people, it's obvious that...that the war has gotten too out of control for the professional soldiers.

E-26 Mm hm.

E-25 Or it's come too close to home and they really need people to fight, in which case hopefully people would not be dodging the draft, but...hey, who knows? Um...

E-26 Well, I don't think anyone should have to fight for something they don't believe in.

E-25 I mean...yeah, I guess...

E-26 Why would...why would you have to fight for a cause that's not your own? I mean, maybe to Chris here like he believes the people are more important than the country. **The country's made of the people, not the land.** In which case it would be better for the people to maybe give up the war, or flee the country and like, you know, **let, um, the enemy government take over** to some extent to save lives.

E-25 Yeah, but...but like saving lives with...I mean what if the enemy government taking over is...is an oppressive dictatorship? I mean, I would...the people eventually are going to get tired of it and more blood's going to be shed throwing them out and reinstating a freer government.

E-26 Mm, well, yeah, but then the people who overthrow the government are...I mean if it's guerilla warfare, that [sic] they're going to be volunteers, people who do it because they *want* to, because they believe in it. I mean if...if they're going to fight the war they should use people who *want* to fight the war that...I mean I think if it was that important to people, they would get volunteers to the extent that people agree with it.

E-25 Well see I think to a certain extent you can't really make people fight if they don't want to.

I don't know how representative this view is of the American responses, as E-25 and E-26 are the only interviewees who explicitly address the possibility of the U.S. being taken over by an outside power. What I find interesting about this exchange, however, is the concern, throughout, with what individual citizens want and need as opposed to what the nation wants and needs: even if the very existence of the nation is threatened, individual

citizens' lives, wants and needs come first. E-26's metonymy is a nice encapsulation of this: "The country's made of the people, not the land." Without the people's support, the nation doesn't exist, indeed shouldn't exist. The overall point here is that, even in this case, in which war is explicitly conceptualized as threatening the existence of the nation, it is possible for Americans to prioritize the desires and moral concerns of people over Duty To Country. It is difficult to imagine such an argument being made by the Chinese speakers.

Unfortunately, the task of figuring out the reasoning *behind* Duty To Country is more difficult for the Chinese data than for the American data. The Chinese interviewees simply don't offer up as much detailed information behind this model. Even in C-19's long passage above, little reasoning is given for supporting the war, other than the supposition that the enemy is ready to take over the country, and therefore the situation is dire. However there are hints here and there, which I'll now present.

The Categorical Imperative plays some role here. Both C-15 and C-18 argue that if one person is allowed not to fight, then no one would fight. The reasoning, though not made explicit, probably goes something like this: wars are necessary; to fight a war, you need an army; life is precious, no one wants to die; people should be treated equally; therefore, Zhang San's resistance, taken to its logical conclusion, means there would be no army; therefore, Zhang San's resistance must not be taken seriously. All citizens have

a duty to fight when called on to do so. This is much like the American case, except there is no explicit evidence here for Duty To Fellow Citizens, which seems to be the basis for the American Categorical Imperative. Duty To Fellow Citizens certainly does exist in China — every year on television one sees, for instance, moving tales of self-sacrificing citizens rescuing other citizens from summer floods — but there is no explicit evidence of it here.

Both C-15 and C-18 offer partial explanations of Duty To Country. During follow-up, C-15's first response is to challenge the premise of the question. He says the only religious people in China are Tibetans and Uighurs (see also footnote #10), and since very few soldiers would be drafted from Tibet or Xinjiang (home of the Uighurs), this situation wouldn't occur very often, if at all. I then push him a bit, asking him to imagine that this *did* happen. He answers:

75.

C-15 Zhè shì dì yī ge qíngkuàng. Dì èr ge qíngkuàng shì jiǎrú hái yǒu de huà, yīnwèi zhè shì yǒu liǎng zhǒng qíngkuàng, nǐ zǒng jiùshì tāmen...jiùshì wǒmen jiǎng shì **Zhōnghuá mínzú** de yī zhǒng sīxiǎng, Zhōnghuá mínzú de yī zhǒng sīxiǎng tā shì guójiā shì zhìshàng de, jiùshì...suǒyǐ dehuà, suǒyǐ...jiùshì Zhōngguó yǒu yī jù gǔ huà jiào jìnzhōng bàoguó le. Suǒyǐ guó nèi ge dōngxī bùguǎn tā xìnயǎng zěnmeyàng tā dōu huì fàng zài dì èr wèi de.

C-14 Nǐ shuō bùguǎn shì duì Hàn zú lái shuō hái shì duì Měnggǔ, Xīnjiāng...

C-15 Duì, tāmen shǎoshù mínzú tā dōu huì yǒu zhèi yàng de. Suǒyǐ jiù shuō guójiā ràng tā qù dǎ zhàng, tā yǒu xìnயǎng de yuányīn tā jiù huì qù dǎ de. Tā bù huì qù xiǎng hěn duō dōngxī. Jiùshì tā huì gēn tā guójiā tā jiù huì qù dǎ zhàng. Zhèi ge zài lìshǐ shàng huòzhě zài...yìzhí dōu shì zènme fāshēng.

C-14 Duì.

- C-15 That was the first type of situation. The second type of situation is suppose there is someone [in Zhang San's position]. There are two types of situations, and speaking generally...what we're talking about is a type of thinking of the **Chinese nation**.<sup>67</sup> One type of thinking of the Chinese nation is to put the country first. That is...therefore, therefore...there's an ancient Chinese saying, "be utterly loyal to the country." Therefore the country, it doesn't matter what his beliefs are, he'll put them in a secondary position.
- C-14 You're saying it doesn't matter if it's for a Han person or for a Mongolian or someone from Xinjiang...
- C-15 Right, those ethnic minorities, they would all be this way. So if the country wants you to go to war, if he has religious reasons he'll still go fight. He won't think about it very much. He'll just go along with his country and fight. This, throughout history...things have always happened this way.
- C-14 Right.

So it's clear *that* the country comes first. Unfortunately, however, it still isn't clear *why*.

The only justification given is historical, which for C-15 is enough. C-18 offers another explanation:

76.

C-18 Zhèi ge duìyú Zhōngguó rén lái shuō...tā nèi zhǒng...zěnme shuō ne, jiù shuō tā fǎnduì zhèi zhǒng zhèngfǔ...kěnéng gēn wǒmen xiǎo shíhou jiēshòu de jiàoyu yǒu guān. Wǒ juéde xiǎo shíhou jiēshòu de jiàoyu dà bùfēn dōu shì juéde...zhèngfǔ, huòzhě shuō dǎng, juéding yìxiē shénme shìqing tā jiùshì yǒu dào li de. Érqǐè nèi ge méitǐ de dǎoxiàng dōu shì qīngxiàng yú shuō zhèi ge dǎng zhìdìng de zhèngcè shì zhèngquè de, shì hé lǐ de.

C-18 This, for Chinese people...this sort of thing...how to say it, opposing the government...maybe has to do with the education we received when we were young. I think the education we received when we were young, most

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<sup>67</sup> *Chinese nation* here is *zhōnghuá mínzú*. This term is meant to refer not just to China as a nation-state, but to all Chinese people both in China and around the world. There will be more on this below.

of it says...the government, or the party, if they decide on some matters it's reasonable. Also the orientation of the media tends to say that policies that the party decides on are correct, are reasonable.

This still isn't much of an explanation, however. It doesn't get at any cultural models that may underlie Duty To Country. Also, it sounds a tad suspicious: if C-18 has achieved this level of meta-awareness about his education, and has spent time abroad, then it seems he has begun to question the validity of what he was taught, and thus himself has the tools to be critical about the Chinese government — though it is also possible that he is speaking for people who still live in China and have not had exposure to other ideas.

For more clues about the reasons behind Duty To Country, we have two other sources. First are responses to Question #2:

2. How would you explain to a five-year-old what a government is and its relationship to the people?

As discussed in Chapter 1, the original purpose of asking this question was to elicit metaphors for the nation. Metaphorical aspects of answers to Question #2 will be addressed more generally in Chapter 5; here, we look briefly at some ideas, metaphorical and non-metaphorical, in the Chinese responses about what a government is and should be.

In Chinese responses to Question #2, several notions recur frequently. One is that government should represent the interests of the people. A second is that government

should serve the people. And a third is an expectation that a government should maintain social order, doling out punishments to criminals and ensuring that people are treated fairly. Unfortunately “representing the interests of the people” and “serving the people” often go undefined, but occasionally these first two aspects of government are described in terms of the third. C-14 offers the following definition of “serve the people,” in terms of a metaphor in which kindergarten students are playing a game and a dispute arises:

77.

C-14 Duì, tā jiù huì wèn shénme jiào "wèi rénmin fúwù?" Nà wǒ jiù shuō nǐmen yī qún xiǎo háizi zuò yóuxì le, kěnéng zhèi ge Zhāng Sān, tā míng míng shì tā shuō le, tā fēi yào shuō tā yíng le, nà zhèi yàng de tā zhèi ge jiùshi yī ge huài xiǎoháir, nà zhèi ge huài xiǎoháir ne, jiù xūyào yǒu yī ge tuántǐ lái ràng tā bù yào zhèi yàng zuò huài de xíngwéi, ràng tā zuò hǎo shì. Huòzhě rúguǒ tā jiānchí zuò huài shì, wǒmen jiù xiǎng bànfa bǎ tā gěi huòzhě guān qǐlai huòzhě chéngfá tā huòzhě bù ràng tā cānjiā yóuxì le, jiù shuō zhèi yàng nǐmen zuò yóuxì de yóutuán, yī ge dà de tuántǐ dāngzhōng xūyào yī ge xiǎo de tuántǐ lái bǎ dàjiā de yìjian gěi jízōng qǐlai.

C-14 Right, he would ask, what does “serve the people” mean? Well, I would say, a group of you kids, maybe Zhang San here, he says clearly, he insists on saying he won. Being like this he’s a bad kid, so this bad kid, this requires a group to make him not do this sort of bad behavior, make him do good things. Or maybe he keeps doing bad things, and we think of a way to lock him up, or to punish him, or to not let him play games. That is, this way your game-playing group, from a big group you need a little group to concentrate everyone’s opinions.

Here, serving the people is defined as regulating behavior to maintain order. Concern with order runs throughout the Chinese responses (and, for that matter, the American responses, though I won’t address that here). In two interviews, for instance, the *raison d’être* of government is given as protecting from the “terrifying” prospect of anarchy:

78.

C-17 Wèishénme yào yǒu zhèngfu? Jiùshi yīnwèi wúzhèngfu zhuàngkuàng shì hěn kǒngbù de. Suǒyǐ wǒmen yào yǒu zhèngfu, wúzhèngfu de zhuàngkuàng dàjiā dōu xiǎng gǎn shénme jiù gǎn shénme, wǒ xiǎng shā rén jiù shā rén.

[...]

Suǒyǐ wǒmen yào yǒu zhèngfu...lái kòng...lái shǐ yìxiē...nèi xiē rén de...pò zhèixiē hěn xié'è de yùwàng nèi zhǒng...shānghài bié rén de yùwang dédào kòngzhi.

C-17 Why do we need government? Because anarchy is terrifying. So we need government. Under anarchy, everyone does just what they want. If I want to kill someone I just kill someone.

[...]

So we need government...to control...to make some...those people's...destroy these people's evil desires, like that...their desire to harm other people will be controlled.

79.

C-21 Bù yào luàn. Xiàng yī ge fāngxiàng.

C-20 Duì. Jiùshi Zhōngguóhuà suǒ shuō de, wúzhèngfu zhuàngtài jiùshi...

C-21 Bù hǎo.

C-21 We don't want chaos. Go in one direction.

C-20 Right. As we say in Chinese, anarchy is...

C-21 Bad.

Other interviewees also point out the chaos-regulating, stability-maintaining function of government.

Returning to the question of Duty To Country: it is possible that citizens feel a moral debt to the government for maintaining order and providing a stable environment in which to live. This is of course speculative, but the evidence presented here is certainly compatible with such a conclusion, even if the evidence is somewhat indirect.



Another source of evidence to which we may turn is data from the original “discarded” interviews. Even with all the methodological problems present in those interviews, interesting and useful tidbits occasionally surface, and since we are somewhat desperate to find evidence here, and since two interviews provide such evidence, it is worth citing.

C-5, a 28-year-old female graduate student in Education, offers an ethnicity-based nationalistic perspective on Duty To Country. The question to which she is responding is “What duties does a country have toward its citizens.” She mentions providing for people’s basic material needs and providing a sense of safety. The she adds:

80.

C-5 Èrqiě wǒ juéde yào yǒu yī zhǒng...gěi zhèi ge guójiā de gōngmín yǒu yī zhǒng hěn zìháo de nèi zhǒng **mínzú gǎn**. Yīnwèi wǒ yǐ wǒ shì zhèi ge guójiā de gōngmín wéi róng. Wǒ juéde zhèi yàng kěnéng zhèi shì yī ge guójiā yīnggāi gěi de yìwu.

C-5 Also I think there should be...give the citizens of this country a proud feeling of **nationalism**. Because I take being a citizen of this country as honorable. I think this is maybe a duty that a country has toward its citizens.

One term here requires more careful definition. The word translated as nationalism is *mínzú gǎn*. *Mínzú* means “nation” in the ethnic, rather than the political, sense, and *gǎn* means “feeling.” The idea here is that a government, as a political entity, has the duty to instill in its citizens a sense of belonging to an ethnic community. Presumably this runs deeper than mere political loyalty.

The relationship between *nation* in the political sense and *nation* in the ethnic sense is addressed in more detail by C-3, a 33-year-old male graduate student in History.

The question he is responding to is “What duties does a person have to his family and country?” C-3 explains that duty to family and duty to country are highly prized in

China:

81.

C-3 Wèile guójiā nǐ kěyǐ fù chū yíqiè, wèile jiāting nǐ yě kěyǐ fù chū yíqiè. Dāng nèi liǎng ge gàinian chōngtū de shíhou, nǐ xuǎnzé duì guójiā de yìwu, nǐ yě shì zhèngquè de, nǐ xuǎnzé duì jiāting de yìwu, nǐ yě shì zhèngquè de. Dāngrán yìbān lái shuō, duì guójiā de yìwu hǎoxiàng gèng bèi rén kànzòng yī diǎn. Ránhòu ne, xiàndài lái shuō, **guójiā gēn mínzú** zuòwéi liǎng ge gàinian yǐjīng bèi fēnkāi lái le, dànshi zài Zhōngguó rén de nǎozǐ lǐmian, jiùshi zài dà bùfen pǔtōng Zhōngguó rén nǎozǐ lǐmian — jiùshi shuō nǐ rúguǒ bù shì xué fǎlǜ de, bù shì xué zhèngzhì de, bǎ liǎng ge gàinian gǎo de fēicháng qīngchu, fēn de hěn kāi — pǔtōng Zhōngguó rén guójiā hé mínzú wǎngwǎng shì hùnxíáo zài yìqǐ de. Guójiā jiùshi mínzú, mínzú jiùshi guójiā.

C-3 For the country you can give your all, and for your family you can also give your all. When these two come into conflict, if you choose your duty to the country, you’re correct, and if you choose your duty to your family, you’re also correct. Of course, in general, the duty to the country is seen by people as somewhat more important. On top of all that, nowadays “**country**” and “**ethnicity**” are two concepts that have already been separated. But in the minds of Chinese people, that is in the minds of most common Chinese people — that is, if you don’t study law and don’t study government and have these two concepts clearly differentiated — for common Chinese people “country” and “ethnicity” are always mixed together. Country is ethnicity, and ethnicity is country.

C-3 and C-5 give us a picture of Duty To Country stemming in large part from a basic sense of ethnic nationalism, of belonging to an ethnic group. This is further supported by

C-15's invocation, in (74) above, of the term *Zhōnghuá mínzú*, which means the “Chinese nation” in the ethnic, rather than the political, sense: it refers not just to people living in the P.R.C., but to all people of Chinese ethnicity around the world. As such it includes all of China's ethnic minorities, plus overseas Chinese communities. More so than residency in the P.R.C., membership in the *zhōnghuá mínzú* is what defines one as “Chinese.”<sup>68</sup>

If this is the case, then Duty To Country may be a “rock-bottom” cultural model for the Chinese that requires no further explanation. This must remain speculative, given the lack of overwhelming evidence, but, taken together, the various hints in the data point toward this conclusion. In fact, the difficulty in finding explicit articulations of the reasoning underlying Duty To Country is itself evidence that Duty To Country is taken as more of a given by the Chinese than the Americans: one's duty to one's country is self-evident. It requires no explicit justification.

Overall, then, the individual and the nation appear to stand in relationship to each other in quite different ways in China and the U.S. Returning to the original question, one reason why Chinese interviewees respond so much more negatively to Question #3

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<sup>68</sup> Chen Shuibian, the president of Taiwan, once got into trouble with the PRC government for a speech he gave in which he said he was proud to be a *huá rén*, or “Chinese person,” in the sense of *zhōnghuá mínzú*. His speech was translated into German as being proud to be *Chinesisch*, or “Chinese,” and then back-translated into Chinese as *zhōngguóren*, or “Chinese person” in the sense of the Chinese nation-state.

than to Question #5 may have to do with views of the individual vis-à-vis the nation.

While this is never explicitly articulated by any of the Chinese speakers, it may be the case that, since #5 involves a matter of national scope, speakers are willing to give the government more leeway, via Duty To Country, and to sacrifice some individual benefit.

#3, by contrast, involves no obvious benefit to the nation, or to anyone, whatsoever.

True, the scenario in #3 also has much more immediate and negative consequences for the protagonist than #5, but then we have a new mystery: why are the responses by Americans to these two questions so similar? Positing two different models of the relationship between the individual and the nation offers the advantage of explaining both mysteries: Question #3 highlights unjustified harm to an individual's well-being with no tangible benefit to anyone, and so both the Chinese and the American interviewees respond strongly. Question #5 highlights the relationship between the individual and the nation, and so the Chinese, because of the strength of Duty To Country, may be willing to give the government more leeway, while the Americans, with their strong support for the individual — whose economic well-being is harmed by the tax increase — feel less charitably toward the government. One could make the counterargument that Americans, as we have seen, are more willing to go along with the tax increase if there is a tangible

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The PRC government, reading this back-translated version, interpreted Chen's remarks as threatening the "one-China principle."

benefit to the nation as a whole, so this alone doesn't differentiate Chinese views from American views. However, recall that the entire moral underpinning of Duty To Nation is based for Americans on the individual, and Americans' flexibility with regard to the tax increase is predicated upon some benefit ultimately redounding to individuals. My argument here is that it *may* be the case that Chinese are still willing to go along with a decision by the government even if they themselves won't ultimately see any benefit from it.

This is obviously a shaky argument, and by itself cannot explain all the differences. There is more to this picture. Next I will argue that another reason for the difference in responses to Questions #3 and #5 stems from divergent views of what it means to be human and what it means to be moral.

#### Humans in and out of context

I am treading on treacherous ground here. In speaking in grand generalities about "essential" differences between Chinese and American views of humanity and morality, I risk being misunderstood as passing judgment on different ways of living. My intention here is expressly *not* to say one way or the other is a "better" way of being. I wish merely to present some suggestive evidence for some intriguing cultural differences.

The overall thrust of the argument is that, in general, Americans tend to view both the individual and morality from an abstract, decontextualized, "God's-eye view," while

Chinese view humans more from within their specific problem-solving contexts. For evidence, we turn to Questions #11, #12, #7 and #8, in that order.

Questions #11 and #12 provide data about how people are or are not contextualized according to their membership in a social group, in this case an ethnic group:

11. There are stereotypes about certain ethnic groups in the United States. Some claim, for instance, that because few African Americans play volleyball, that this says something about abilities possessed by certain ethnic groups. Is there any truth to such stereotypes?
12. Is there one dominant ethnic group in the United States? Is this the way it should be?

Recall from Chapter 1 that #11 was asked more bluntly in Chinese, back-translatable roughly as:

- 11'. China is a multi-ethnic country, consisting of Han, Mongolian, Hui, Tibetan, and many other ethnic minorities. Do you believe that the abilities and natures of all ethnic groups are the same?

And for Question #12, China is mentioned instead of the United States.

There are massive differences across the board in terms of how Americans and Chinese respond to this question. Here we will limit ourselves to what is relevant to this chapter, namely what sorts of things are said about individuals. Again the differences are stark. Americans are cautious about making generalizations. When they do make generalizations they offer them apologetically and insist on caveats. Physiological

differences among ethnic groups are sometimes posited, but are never linked to differences in mental abilities, though they are sometimes linked to differences in athletic abilities.<sup>69</sup> Overall, Americans are uncomfortable talking about people as members of ethnic groups, and instead prefer to focus on individuals.

The following is typical of the way in which physiological differences are discussed, and of the discomfort experienced by the Americans:

82.

E-16 Well, I can tell you that...between the genders there are real physical differences; between the ethnic groups there are real measurable physical differences, not gigantic ones, all one species, it's variation within the species. I can also say I personally admit that I'm not comfortable talking about this sort of thing, purely because acknowledging the variation between gender and race and that sort of thing opens the terrible can of worms of late Victorian anthropology and that sort of thing and people who think that you can measure people's cranium size and this sort of thing, and...and make all sorts of judgments about their ability to do this and that and the other.

In fact, it's quite possible that many Americans do in fact believe in sizeable "innate" differences among ethnic groups, but that, given both (a) the history, elaborated upon by E-16, of late Victorian anthropology, and (b) how averse American society has become to the very act of publicly classifying people by ethnicity, they don't want to explore the possibility of significant innate ethnic differences for fear of being misunderstood and

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<sup>69</sup> Certainly one would find competing models among less-educated people that give more credence to the relationship between physiology and mental abilities.

unfairly judged. Regardless of the reasons, however, there is a great deal of discomfort on the part of the Americans in answering Questions #11 and #12, appearing not only in passages like (82), but also palpable in a proliferation of pauses and false starts in response to these questions.

Reason (b) above — the aversion of Americans to publicly classifying people by ethnic group — is an immensely complex phenomenon, about which much could be said, but for which there is little room here to elaborate. Instead, I examine here one of the many reasons for this tendency: American privileging of the individual. Many times in the American responses, the individual is emphasized over group classification. In answer to #11, E-16 says:

83.

E-16 Well, but, what the really really important thing is, is to be able to differentiate between a stereotype and an individual. And if you want to have stereotypes, um, I think it's dumb, because I think it's going to make it more different...or more difficult for you to differentiate and for you to set that aside. If you...if you have any stereotype that you want to hold to...violently, I think that that's very very foolish. And other than that I don't care if you stereotype me for whatever you'd like to stereotype me for, as long as you're willing to get to know me and find out, well, I was wrong about this and this and this, and he's big but he's not good at any sports, ha ha ha ha, um...that sort of thing.

In response to #12, E-21 and E-22 begin to debate “diversity.” E-22 argues in favor of diversity; E-21 seems to be arguing against it. E-22 says it’s good for different ethnic



groups to interact and learn from each other, but E-21 stubbornly resists. Then he articulates his argument:

84.

E-21 Hm. Well you see, that's where I differ, I don't think that there's, um a diversity as...as related to an ethnic group. The...it's more like an individual diversity that, without...

E-22 Yeah you could think about it that way, as more of an individualistic...uh, tone of that nature, not...

E-21 That each person has talents that they can contribute to a body.

E-22 Right. Right, more of an individualist...instead of having a broad label of being a part of a certain ethnic group, it's more of each person...brings a certain set of uh skills, or...uh, interests to the table, basically, and, kinda pools it together.

E-21 Yeah, and...and that **each one is unique**, not that we have to include everyone in...

E-22 Right, I understand what you mean. In terms of...

E-21 ...in...in every particular aspect of life, because that's not where each individual person fits, in say some...case.

E-22 Well the idea I think...I think...well I think in the sense that going beyond each ethnic group is the way to look at each individual in each ethnic group as **having some special value**, or special interest that they have, which makes them diverse from another person in their own ethnic group, and the...you know...you...you'd have...a mixing there, uh...you'd...you'd have...that each person based...you'd...the way to look at it would be, you know, to basically, to **break away this whole concept of the ethnic group** you'd have to look at people as having their own separate sense of values, or each individual as having a sense of special value, or interests. Everyone's different in that sense, yeah.

E-21 Yeah, practically, if you're speaking that way, then if you're saying that there's some visual distinction between people of an ethnic group...

E-22 No no no, I'm not saying visual, but...

E-21 ...so then yeah I would say...I would say that we're also a society in which that's heavily weighed upon the conscious [sic] of each individual. But I...I'm saying that the diversity isn't so much within that ethnic...um, physical attribute, but it's more within the talents...

E-22 Right, yeah. On an indivi...individualistic level.

E-21 ...of **being a teacher or say a leader** or, whatever.

E-22 Okay. Yeah.

This is a fairly extreme notion of the individual vis-à-vis ethnicity. Note also the appearance of Life Path towards the end: what defines an individual is what she does with her life, such as “being a teacher or a leader.” Another model is present here as well: Unique Individual, according to which each person is unique and has special talents that differentiate her from every other individual. In fact it seems this Unique Individual model is a prerequisite to Life Path (more on this in Chapter 5). Granted, E-21 and E-22 are conservatives, and are therefore more likely to favor this sort of individualist explanation, but an argument can be made — even though there is no explicit evidence of it in my data — that *ideally*, across liberals and conservatives, people would be perceived, judged and appreciated more for their individuality than for their membership in an ethnic group. Certainly we have already seen a great deal of evidence that the individual is privileged by all the American interviewees, who range across the political spectrum. Unique Individual is an American model through and through, even though this more extreme version might tend to be articulated more by conservatives.

We conclude with a comment from another conservative. E-25 and E-26 are discussing, in response to #12, whether it should or shouldn't be the case that there is one dominant ethnic group. E-25 says it's not a problem, as long as people aren't being abused. E-26 answers:

85.

E-26 Well, I don't think you should force the change. Um, one thing that might be nice though is instead of doing that, instead of calling people, say, "minorities," just say people are people, you know.

Three items are worth noting. First, attention to the individual and downplaying of group membership. Second, her invocation of *You Can't Change Me*. And third, her use of *nice* to mark the ideal case in opposition to "reality." (Here, *might be*, by referring to an unreal, or non-factual, situation, strengthens the sense of non-reality.)

Chinese interviewees respond to #11 and #12 quite differently. While they often disagree with each other about the specifics of whether the abilities and basic natures of various ethnic groups are different, they are not at all hesitant, in responding to Question #11, to start listing off broad characteristics of these ethnicities. For question #12, as might be expected, there is sometimes hesitation in addressing the "should" question.

But what I want to focus on here is this question of the individual versus the group. Only twice in the Chinese responses is individual identity contrasted to group identity. The first instance:

86.

C-10 Nénglì hé tiānxìng dōu yíyàng? Nénglì dāngrán shì gèrén bù tóng a. Lìshǐ a, bāokuò tā de dìlǐ huánjìng a, yǔ jīngjì zhèixiē qíngkuàng a.

C-10 "Are their abilities and basic natures all the same?" Ability, of course every individual is different. History, including geographical environment, and economic conditions.

It's not entirely clear just what C-10 means here. He may be saying something like “the term ‘ability’ rightly applies to individuals, not groups, so we can’t talk about it here,” which is potentially a fairly strong statement that group identity should be subordinated to a more individual-based view of ability. However, the factors which he lists afterwards — history, geography and economic conditions — are factors which apply generally to groups. They are certainly different from the “individual talents and interests” noted by Americans. Since C-10 doesn’t elaborate on this any further, it’s hard to know exactly what he means, but my sense, based on the factors listed, is that this is at best a weak defense of an individual-based view. The other example comes from C-14. In explaining that she doesn’t mean to generalize that people from remote locations have a lower educational level, she says:

87.

C-14 Wǒ zhǐ shì shuō měi ge mínzú nénglì hé tiānxìng, jiùshì tā zhèige wèntí...qǔjuéyú tā zhèi ge nénglì hé tiānxìng shì zěnmeyàng dìngxìng de. Jiùshì rúguǒ shì tā nénglì hé tiānxìng bāokuò shénme tǐnéng a, xìnggé a shénme, wǒ juéde zhèi ge bù yào shuō měi ge mínzú nà tā shì...tóng ge mínzú měi ge rén lái shuō tā yě huì yǒu yìxiē chāyì. Dànshì zhèi ge chāyì wǒ juéde bù yǐngxiǎng jiù shuō dàjiā...gòngtóng hépíng shēnghuó...zài yī ge guójiā hépíng xiāngchǔ.

C-14 I’m just saying the abilities and basic natures of each ethnicity, that is this question...depends on how this ability and basic nature are defined. If ability and basic nature include such things as ability and character and such, I think for this one doesn’t want to say that every ethnicity, it’s...within the same ethnicity each person will **also** have some differences. But this difference, I think, doesn’t affect everyone...living peacefully together, in one country living peacefully with one another.

For C-14, the note on individual difference within an ethnicity is little more than a side note in her overall rhetorical thrust, which is to say that, whatever differences there are among China's ethnic groups, they're not so big as to destabilize the country. There is also linguistic evidence for the "add-on" nature of this observation: her use of *yě*, or "also." This indicates that the putative individual differences, to the extent that they exist, are present in addition to group differences.

Nowhere in Chinese responses to Questions #11 and #12 is it argued that ethnic groupings should be disregarded in favor of individual uniqueness. In addition, stereotypical characteristics of various ethnic groups are offered up with little or no hesitation, and without apology. The following, from C-18, is by far the most extreme example. He begins his answer to #11 by saying he needs to be careful not to reveal the existence of any ethnic or racial discrimination. C-19 then offers an answer based on differing historical and educational conditions, to which C-18 takes exception:

88.

- C-18 Wǒ bù tóngyì nǐ de kànfǎ. Wǒ yǒu hǎo duō, jiù shuō zhèixiē tóngxué ma, yīnwèi zài dàxué lǐ yǒu nèi zhǒng shǎoshù mínzú de yùkē bānr. Zhèige cóng nèi zhǒng bānjí shàng lái de xuésheng tā **díquè** zhèi zhǒng nénglì hé shuǐpíng jiù hé Hàn zú zhèixiē pǔtōng xuésheng lái bǐ, tā jiù chà yī ge dàngcì. Wǒ juéde zhèi gēn tā de...jiù shuō...hòutiān de jiàoyu yīnggāi shuō guānxi bù shì hěn dà. Zài wǒ lái shuō wǒ chéngrèn nèi zhǒng zhìshāng zhījiān nèi zhǒng chābié. Jiù shuō nǐ nèi zhǒng zhìshāng yǒu hěn dà de chéngfèn shì yóu nǐ zhèi ge xiāntiān yíchuán ér lái de.
- C-19 Shì a. Wǒ shuō de jiùshì yī dài yī dài yán...jiùshì yánxù xià lái de jiù zàoichéng tā de...
- C-18 Dànshì jiù shuō...hǎo duō zhèi zhǒng rén, tā yě shì jiēshòu le jiù shuō Hàn zú de jiàoyu, jiù shuō, yīnwèi xiànzài kāifàng...shǎoshù mínzú yě bìng bù yídìng jiù shuō...jiù shuō bìsè chéngdù fēicháng dà. Tā yě jiēshòu le, jiù

shuō, cóng xiǎo kāishǐ gēn Hàn zú xuésheng yíyàng jiēshòu tóng děng de jiàoyu. Zhèi yàng tóng děng de jiàoyu shàng lái yǐhòu...dào le dàxué yǐhòu tā nèi zhǒng gètǐ zhījiān de chāyì háishi bǐjiào míngxiǎn de. Dànshi wǒ chéngrèn jiùshi shuō...Hàn zú yě yǒu fēicháng cōngming de rén, yě yǒu jiù shuō zhènggè shuǐpíng zhèi zhǒng chāyì bǐjiào dà yìxiē. Dànshi dānchún cóng zhèi ge gètǐ lái kàn, wǒ juéde zhèi ge Huí, Zàng, hé zhèi ge Měng zhìshǎo zài zhèi ge gètǐ shuǐpíng lái shuō hé tóng děng céngcì de Hàn zú de rén lái bǐ, tā zhèi ge zhìshāng shuǐpíng xiāngduì lái shuō zhèngtǐ yào dī yī ge dāngcì. Dànshi nǐ yào shuō shēntǐ sùzhì kěnéng zhèi ge Měng zú hé Zàng zú rén yào bǐ Hàn zú rén yào shǎowēi hǎo yìxiē. Tā zhèi ge shēntǐ sùzhì zhījiān nèi ge chāyì háishi bǐjiào dà yìxiē de. Zhèi yàng bǐjiào míngxiǎn, jiùshi zài yùndòng huì shàng. Zài wǒmen xuéxiào de yùndòng huì shàng yě shì. Yìbān shǎoshù mínzú lái de xuésheng, tā shēntǐ sùzhì bǐjiào hǎo. Ránhòu jīngcháng nénggòu ná yìxiē guànjūn shénme de. Dànshi rúguǒ zhēnzhèng zài jìngsài dāngzhōng huòzhě shuō zhēnzhèng shuō, zài kēyán dāngzhōng, zhēnzhèng zuò de bǐjiào yōuxiù de wǒ juéde háishi Hàn zú de xuésheng..

- C-18 I don't agree with your opinion. I have a lot, that is, a lot of these classmates, because in college there are preparatory classes for ethnic minorities. The students that come from those classes, their abilities and levels are **truly** a level lower than the average Han student. I think this...that is...the relationship to their acquired educations isn't very big. As far as I'm concerned, I acknowledge that sort of IQ difference. That is, a big part of IQ is inborn and passed on.
- C-19 Right. That's what I'm saying, generation by generation it's passed...passed down, which creates...
- C-18 But I'm saying...many of this type of person, they have also received a Han education, that is, because of the open-door policy...ethnic minorities are not necessarily so [geographically] isolated. They have also received, that is, from a young age they start to get the same level of education as Han students. This way, when they move up after receiving the same level of education...after they get to college their **individual** differences are fairly obvious. But I acknowledge...among the Han there are also extremely intelligent people, also their entire level, this sort of difference is fairly large. But looking purely at the **individual**, comparing them to Han people at the same level, their IQ level is relatively speaking a level lower than the entire group. But if you want to talk about physical

**quality**,<sup>70</sup> maybe Mongolians and Tibetans will be a little better than the Hans. Differences in physical **quality** will be comparatively big. This is fairly obvious at track meets. Track meets at our school were this way. In general, minority students, their physical **quality** is comparatively good. And so they're often able to be the champions and such. But if we're **truly** talking about competition or **truly** talking about scientific research, making a **true** comparison, the ones who do outstandingly, I think, are still the Han students.

C-18's use of the *individual* here is clearly euphemistic. He is obviously talking about individuals only to the extent that they belong to certain ethnic groups. His use of *zhēnzhèng* ("true"; "real"; "actual") is interesting as well: he is dismissing the minorities' putative physical superiority as irrelevant, at least in light of the "true" superiority of Han students.

As an educated American, used to thinking and talking about race and ethnicity in a careful and guarded manner, I was taken aback when C-18 offered up this, for lack of a better term, diatribe. It would be completely inaccurate to take his remarks as representative of all the Chinese speakers, as nothing anyone else says remotely approaches the intensity of these remarks. At the same time, however, I don't think it is coincidental that it was a Chinese interviewee, and not an American,<sup>71</sup> who responded this way, given the other evidence presented of willingness among the Chinese to talk of

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<sup>70</sup> Here again we have *sùzhi*, this time referring to physical abilities.

<sup>71</sup> Again, an American with less education, given the right interview design, might very well offer this sort of opinion.

people in terms of ethnic group membership. And we can't chalk up C-18's response to ignorance of the sensitivity of these matters, as he prefaces what he says by acknowledging that he needed to "be careful."

My point here is expressly *not* to claim that Chinese are racist and Americans aren't. My personal belief is that people the world over are deeply racist in largely unconscious ways. Instead, what I am arguing here is merely that, with respect to Questions #11 and #12, a key difference between American and Chinese responses is that Americans are more inclined to redirect the group-based focus of the questions to an individual-based focus, whereas the Chinese are not.<sup>72</sup> Responses to Questions #11 and #12, as such, provide evidence of American models of an abstract, de-contextualized individual, against more contextualized notions of personhood in China.

Related to this abstract notion of the individual is an American view of morality as context-independent. We draw our evidence first from Question #7:

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<sup>72</sup> This is in line with a vast amount of my own personal experiences in China and the U.S. One repeated experience in China has driven this home for me time and again: use of the second person plural pronoun in conjunction with the word "foreigner," as in "you foreigners." For instance, I once took laundry to the cleaners, and was told that it would take a day longer than normal. Why? I was told: "Because a big group of you foreigners arrived the other day and are all having their laundry done here." My instinctive American reaction was to be offended at this elision of my individuality: what in the world did all of those other not-me people have to do with me? (For extended personal reflections on this pronominal usage, see Hessler (2001).)

This is not at all to say that similar things don't happen in the U.S. every day. But in the U.S. there are strong cultural models that serve as counterweights to such group-based generalizations: there is an ongoing, unresolved public debate in the U.S. about the extent to which group membership does, and



7. A tree has fallen and is blocking a public road in a remote location, hours from the nearest city. Several large trucks are present, and could move the tree off of the road. Will they? Should they?

In many ways the Chinese and American responses to this question are similar with respect to the question of what the truckers *would* do. Many speakers from both pools point out that it could well be in the truckers' own best interests to move the tree, and so they would. (We might call this model Expediency.) Another frequent response is to wonder whether the truckers would call the authorities instead of moving the tree themselves (the Call The Authorities model). But big differences appear with the question of *should*: the Chinese interviewees view Question #7 in terms of problem-solving, and thus focus on the *would*, barely addressing the *should*. The Americans, on the other hand, are virtually obsessed with the question of *should*: in such a situation, what is the "right thing" to do? (We'll call this model Do The Right Thing.) The differences here are truly striking. In all nine interviews, the Americans talk at some length about the question of whether moving the tree is the right thing to do. Not only that, but they are virtually unanimous that moving the tree is indeed the right thing to do, even if not an obligation. But they also feel that a lot of people wouldn't in fact move the

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should, shape individual identity. This is what the "culture wars" are all about. This debate simply doesn't exist in China.

tree, and this troubles them. We begin with the clearest case of framing this in moral terms:

89.

E-22 Well, again kind of a what-if situation in the sense that, um...you know if there's an ambulance that needs to get through that public road, and it's sitting there and a tree happens to fall down in front of it, I mean I would think that there'd be a sense of a moral obligation to help out by moving it.

E-22 doesn't have trouble with this being an obligation, but E-23 is a bit more hesitant, so feels the need to clarify what she thinks is meant by *should*:

90.

E-23 Yeah, it's...*should* is like, is it they're responsibility, they *must*...I mean, well...it'd be right for them to move it.

E-9 and E-10 are also thinking of this question in moral terms:

91.

E-10 If I had the power to help somebody out, and...I don't know, I...I would help them out even if like there was some like sensitive legal issue or something like that like, I don't know.

E-9 This goes back to the should of like should they morally or should they lawfully?

E-18 puts this in moral terms as well, in arguing that the truckers *would* move the tree:

92.

E-18 Yeah but do you understand like how many like of these like trucking men like have these morals invested in them of like, do the right thing?

This raises a related issue that comes up frequently: Americans believe that a person's decision to move the tree, or not to move it, says something important about this person's

nature. That is, how one behaves in this type of situation tells us *what kind of person s/he* is. E-13 says:

93.

E-13 It really depends on what kind of people, you know?

E-21 sees this question as a personal one:

94.

E-21 Now will the...that's more of a personal, um...I would say, um...question for...the selves of the truck-drivers, and...I would say if they had to get through the road, then, that they would probably be more inclined to move this tree. Should they, yes, they probably should do it, **just** for out of consideration of it being a public road and other people would have to get through there at some point in time.

So this question is not merely about what a person would do in such a situation, but about *who a person is*, about some very basic moral aspects of a person's identity.

E-21's usage of *just* is worth some comment. We saw earlier how *just* can be used to mark one's choice of models. Here, two models are doing battle as far as the question of *should* goes: Expediency and Do The Right Thing. Do The Right Thing wins, and E-21 marks his choice with *just*. However, *just* marks model choice in a particular, asymmetric way. In order to be marked with *just*, a competing model must meet two criteria. First, it must be a model favored strongly enough by the speaker to overwhelm all other competing models by itself. Second, it must somehow be more "basic" for that speaker, to require less "unpacking." In the present case, for E-21 Expediency involves plotting and calculating, thinking "What works best for me right now?" Reasons can be given for following Expediency. Do The Right Thing, on the

other hand, involves no calculating or scheming. It has to do with a very basic idea of how a person is expected to live and the moral choices one is expected to make, in this case to help other people. It requires no explanation: one “just” does the right thing, and doing the right thing — by itself — is important enough to take precedence over all competing models. Later in their discussion, E-21 and E-22 say:

95.

E-22 'Cause no one would move a large tree out of the way for free.  
Unless...unless they had a vested interest in also moving it out.

E-21 Or, maybe they were **just** really good-hearted.

Once again, Expediency and Do The Right Thing are in conflict, and once again Do The Right Thing is marked with *just*. The following expresses something similar:

96.

E-13 Well I don't see why they wouldn't, if there's a bunch of trucks there, and they're **just** there, they should **just** move it.

[...]

Should they? Of course, because...kinda like a...**just** a public duty...it's like if you see trash on the ground you *should* pick it up.

E-14 Right.

[...]

E-13 And so I think out of like **just**...courtesy, hopefully the trucks would move the tree, right?

The first *just* here is particularly interesting. It's different from the other *justs* in that it isn't marking model choice. Instead, it frames the situation in a particular way: the truckers didn't choose to be there. It just so happens that they are the ones there when this happens. Alone, this *just* could be used — based on American models we have

already seen about choice and consequences — to argue *against* the truckers taking action, since after all it's just bad luck for them. They didn't create the situation. But here, this *just* is used in concert with the model-choosing *just* to argue in favor of action: it could have been anybody who ended up in this situation, but it happens to be people with the ability to move the tree, and therefore they should use their unique abilities to do the right thing by moving the tree.

E-16 also uses the model-choosing *just*:

97.

E-16 Well it's not really their job or anything, the...I mean, I would think that the **unfortunate** reality of the situation would be whether or not they needed to get through. If...if there's large trucks present they...they're either going through or they're already past and...I would suspect if they need to get through they would, and otherwise they wouldn't. And they should, unless they've got...yeah they probably **just** should.

E-16 seems troubled that people might not act in a way that is moral, and so he refers to the situation as *unfortunate*. As a final example of this usage of *just*, we have the following:

98.

E-19 But I think that if the...like if the tree was affecting them, like on their side of the road, then they would move it, but if it was on the other side, they would just<sup>73</sup> drive by.

E-20 Unless they're **nice** people.

E-19 Unless they're **nice**, which would be good.

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<sup>73</sup> This *just* is different. The simplicity here is simplicity of action: driving by is a simpler action than stopping to help out.

E-20 Which'd be really **nice**. But I don't know. Should...like they *should* do it, **just** because you know it makes sense, right?

The word *nice* here also warrants note. It is used in two different senses here: “nice person” and “it would be nice.” The former gives further evidence that, for many Americans, how a person responds to this situation says something important about that person’s nature. The latter, in some American responses, is used to mark the “ideal” world in cases where ideals and the “real world” come into conflict. We have already seen how E-13 thinks the truckers should move the tree. Later on she starts to have doubts, and E-14 offers an opinion:

99.

E-13 Okay, how about *should* they move the tree though, let's say they had...they *could* go around the tree. Should they move it?

E-14 Well it would be *nice* of them.

We wind up this look at American responses to Question #7 with the following, from E-25 and E-26, which exhibits many of the themes just discussed:

100.

E-25 As a *personal* decision, yeah, I think they should, I would rather do something myself than wait a long time for someone else to do it.

E-26 Well I think the question is more like, should they do it as a public service instead of just<sup>74</sup> turning around?

E-25 Mm. Then in that case...well...

E-26 I don't think they should be required to, but like...it would...it would help people out. Like if...

E-25 So out...out of a goodness of your heart thing.

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<sup>74</sup> Again, this *just* marks simplicity of action rather than basicness of the model being chosen.

E-26 What they should, um...what they *should* do is if...is, if they choose not...they should be given the choice whether they want to move it, but if they don't want to, they *should*, but not be required to, like, I think, call somebody to move it.

E-25 Mm hm.

E-26 Like call a public service whose job it is to move it.

E-25 I think it would be *nice* if they moved it.

E-26 It would be nice if they moved it. I don't think you should force them to, I mean that's kind of verging on Communism.

We see here not only the conflict between Expediency and Do The Right Thing, the moral framing of the question, and the ideal-marking usage of *nice*, but also the now-familiar Choice Is Good.

Our overall picture, then, of the American responses is that this is simultaneously a practical, problem-solving question and a moral question, which is how it was asked: “Will they? Should they?” The Chinese responses are quite different. While they do not completely ignore the *should* question — and when it is addressed, no one says that the truckers *shouldn't* move the tree, and some say they should — no explanation is ever offered. Instead, they focus much more on the *would* aspects of the question, occasionally offering anecdotes of specific situations they've encountered. But the question of whether moving the tree is “the right thing to do” is simply absent from the discussion. There is some indication of a connection between what a person would do in this situation and the type of person this is, but this is limited to two responses: C-13, who has lived in Japan for 16 years, claims that Japanese people ignore other people's

problems, and offers an anecdote for support; C-15 claims the truckers would help because they're from a remote area, and rural people are more *chúnpǔ*, or "simple and pure," than urban people. But both of the comments relate to entire groups of people, not to an individual's own moral tendencies, as it is framed by the Americans.

There is one argument obliquely in favor of helping out. C-12 goes off on a tangent about what she perceives as a difference between China and the U.S.: she finds Chinese to be proactive in solving this type of problem, while Americans are more reliant on the authorities. She tells a story of seeing a burning car by the side of the road in the U.S., and being appalled that no one was stopping to help out, instead waiting for the police or whomever to come put out the fire. She then explains why it would be good to step in and help instead of waiting for the authorities:

101.

C-12 Yǒu kěnéng tā yī kāishǐ shì zháo hěn xiǎo de huǒ, nǐ yíxiàzi gěi tā mièdiào le, dànshi bù xǔ jiǔ, jiù zài nà dēngzhe dēngzhě lái, yīnwèi dēngzhe tā lái yídìng yǒu yī duàn de shíjiān ba, kěnéng jiù huì biàn chéng yī ge bǐjiào dà de.

C-12 It's possible that right at the beginning it's just a small fire, and you can put it out right away, but after a short while, if you're just waiting and waiting there for them to come, because you're waiting for them to come, there's a stretch of time, and maybe it will turn into a bigger fire.

The reasoning here is entirely practical, not moral: step in, because solving the problem now might save trouble down the line. The following, from C-18, sums up nicely the Chinese approach to this question:



102.

C-18 Wǒ juéde yīnggāi shì tāmen shì huì bǎ zhèi ge shù lái nuó zǒu le. Yīnwèi bìjìng zàochéng tāmen xíng chē de kùnnán. Wǒ juéde tāmen yīng...tāmen huì zhèi yàng zuò de. "Tāmen yīnggāi bu yīnggāi zhèi yàng zuò?" Wǒ juéde zhè jiùshì yī ge **guānniàn de wèntí**.

C-18 I think it should<sup>75</sup> be the case that they would move this tree. Because, after all, it is causing them trouble in their driving. I think they should...they would do this. "Should they do this?" I think this is a **conceptual question**.

This last bit needs to be glossed. C-18 says that this question is:

guānniàn	de	wèntí
conception	ATT	question

The construction here is N1 *de* N2, and has many uses, but one is to indicate the overall realm of inquiry for an issue. The English translation, *a conceptual question*, could be interpreted as referring to the individual conceptions of the drivers involved in the scenario. But this is not what C-18 is doing. He is not saying "It depends on the driver." He is saying that the question of "should" belongs to an entirely different realm of inquiry, the realm of *guānniàn*, or "conceptions." It is simply not relevant to this obviously highly practical question. To address this matter of "conceptions" distracts us from the important question: *How do you solve this problem?*

Similar differences emerge in response to Question #8:

8. If a person is rich, what should he/she do with his/her money?

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<sup>75</sup>This *should* is clearly epistemic.

Again there are similarities: both Americans and Chinese generally agree that a rich person should first meet the immediate material needs of herself and her family, and then give money to charitable causes. But again here the Americans are additionally concerned with what is “right.” (For this section I will present less of the evidence, as to present everything here risks getting repetitive.) E-16 explicitly uses the term *moral*:

103.

E-16 But, like I said before, what they *should* do is a matter of what I think they *ought* to do to benefit the most people, not necessarily what they...I don't know...I don't think that there's a **moral imperative**...well...hah...that is hard. Um...no maybe there is. I think there is. Actually. I think if...if they're rich in terms of having everything they need and they have money beyond their needs and the needs of their family and friends or whatever, then I think in that case yeah.

The following, from E-13 and E-14, sums up the relevant themes nicely:

104.

E-13 Okay, this is "should" and not "would," so...um...I think the person *should* give a large chunk of...okay what is it, *his* money...to some kind of charity...not...not just one charity, but different charities, 'cause I think, like, there's a lot of people who are living in poverty, not just in the U.S. There's a lot of people in third-world countries who don't get anything, you know. And, I think, **just** out of philan...philanthropy, you know?

E-14 Yeah. I don't necessarily agree with this, but a lot of rich...or, people believe that once they've made their money it's theirs and they have no obligation to give it to anybody.

E-13 But this is *should*...

E-14 *Should*.

E-13 ...not *would*, like...

E-14 Yes.

E-13 If we were talking *would*, people would not do that.

- E-14 But do you think that? Do you think that if they've earned their money, they shouldn't...
- E-13 No no, I'm not saying they should give all their money away. I think what you earn is, yeah you earned it, right? But then you should give **back** to the society. And you should give to people who don't have much because they can't...they're not as fortunate as you. They don't have those...they don't have those capabilities. They don't have...you know, they're not in the same situation as you. So...I think people should give...give **back** to the society. Give...you know.
- E-14 I agree.
- E-13 Like do something, like make a foundation, you know, I mean, you know like a charity.
- E-14 **Just** put it where it's needed.
- E-13 Yeah. Not like, I mean...yeah, a lot of people **do** say yeah I earned the money, so I should keep it, but really what are you gonna do with all that money? You're just gonna spend it on yourself, that's like so **selfish**. But then again if I were in that position I don't know what I'd do.
- E-14 Yeah.
- E-13 It'd be...it's easy to *say*...
- E-14 Yeah, see, everybody says, everybody says, this person *should* give it to charity, they *should* donate it, but that's not what people do.

There is much worth noting here. First, along with the model-choosing usage of *just*, we see another type of linguistic marking of model choice: DO-support, which marks a dispreferred model. This is related to DO-support's well-known emphasizing function: the speaker wants to make it clear that she isn't completely discounting her dispreferred model, and she calls attention to this with DO-support.

Another familiar theme is present here: E-13 and E-14 are clearly reasoning according to Do The Right Thing, but they are also aware, and seem a bit troubled, that most people wouldn't give as much as they should to charity. Note also the term *back* in

“give back to society.” People who are rich have been given something by society.

Exactly what that something is not made explicit (though E-21, a conservative, puts it in religious terms, saying rich people have been “given grace.”). This is reminiscent of what we saw last chapter with respect to Duty To Country in the U.S. In that case, an obligation sprang from having been granted rights, or at least having rights protected, by the government. In this case, an obligation results from having been granted wealth, by some unspecified grantor.

Intentions are important here as well: E-13 criticizes the money-hoarding rich person as “selfish.” This is not merely about achieving practical results, but, as with Question #7, about the *kind of person* involved.

E-13 and E-14 are also concerned about hypocrisy: Would I do the same thing in that situation? There’s an implicit self-criticism here: maybe it isn’t right for me to have expectations of others that I wouldn’t be able to live up to myself. This idea, that consistency is something to strive for, goes hand in hand with abstract morality: what are morals if not universal principles to be applied consistently across all situations? So there is a conflict here between two types of moral universal: the universal moral imperative to help others, and the moral ideal of one’s actions being consistent with one’s words, or “practicing what you preach.” The Americans generally tend to favor the former, claiming that rich people should give away a lot of money. The only exceptions are E-25

and E-26, who are classic conservatives in response to Question #8: the money I earned is mine, end of story. I have no obligation whatsoever, moral or otherwise, to give any of it away.

Questions of intention and hypocrisy are also addressed by E-9 and E-10, and reveal another aspect of Do The Right Thing: doing the right thing should stem from a the right sort of motivation, otherwise it risks not being “right”:

105.

E-9 A common answer to this question would be like you should give to charity, you know, um, but there’s the problem of like if someone goes to help somebody while if they help them, you know if someone goes to a soup kitchen or something like that to help out and serves them food, no matter what their motives are in doing so, the person gets to eat, right?

E-10 Right.

E-9 But you know then there is the idea that if you go there with the idea that you’re helping them only so that you can feel good, that’s not necessarily the best idea, versus um you know if you go there with the intent of helping someone.

E-10 Sincerely help.

E-9 Right. So I have like a rich godfather who is highly rich and gives a lot of his money to charity, but he always tells me, he’s like absolute capitalist and he thinks I’m not exactly, I don’t know I’m not really a socialist, but we always have this discussion and he tells me that, I’m not bad, and, capitalists aren’t bad, see I give my money away. And so like, I don’t know. I believe they *should* give it away, but the motives behind it...

E-10 Yeah, yeah. I don’t know, it’s like they justify all their bad things by giving away part of something and not, I don’t know, there’s no sincerity in it.

E-9 I mean that’s not good, however...

E-10 It does help someone.

E-9 It helps someone yeah.

E-10 I don’t know. Well like this question though, it’s not the motive for doing whatever, it’s what you should do with your money.

- E-9 Yeah, but I mean, what I'm saying is like, what you should do with your money is, in theory you should give it to charity...
- E-10 But do it for a good reason.
- E-9 But do it for a good reason, and if you don't do it for a good reason, like I was just saying, should you do it or not, so like, if the person's motives are good, then they should definitely give them to charity. If their motives are not good then I think maybe I don't know, maybe you should give it to charity, maybe you should be selfish with it I mean you're being selfish, I don't know. I mean you're being selfish anyways, I don't know exactly what a person with bad intent should do with their lots of money.

Good intentions are so important that it may actually be *wrong* to give with selfish intentions. E-9 and E-10 aren't 100% sure that this is the case, but the fact that this is as strong as a consideration as it is tells us something about the importance of sincerity in Do The Right Thing, and about what type of person is an ideally moral person. According to the view here, a moral person is not simply someone who brings about benefit to other people, but who does so out of compassion, or empathy, or some *sincere desire* to alleviate the suffering of others.

Nothing remotely like this appears in the Chinese responses. There are, however, as with Question #7, some basic similarities: take care of yourself and your family first, and the rest you should give to society. Though on this practical side, there is also one difference: Chinese interviewees more often stress the importance of investment, since, as C-19 says, *qián shēng qián*, or "money begets money." This difference may seem insignificant, but I believe it points to a major difference in orientation: towards the practical applications of money and away from the moralistic questions of the "right" or

“wrong” way to use one’s money. To be sure, there *are* ways that are better than others to use one’s money, but these too seem to have a practical orientation. C-13 says that a lot of people who got rich quickly — a phenomenon discussed briefly last chapter — simply waste their money. C-12 agrees, saying it’s a problem of a person’s *sùzhi*, or “quality” (also discussed last chapter, in footnote #48). No specific activity is mentioned as being a “better” way to use one’s money, but C-21 says people of low “cultural level” (*wénhuà céngcì*) might waste their money on such activities as gambling. C-20 mentions general “dishonest activities” (*xiéménr-wāidào*). Both C-20 and C-21, like C-12 and C-13, see these activities as bad because they are wasteful: there are better uses to which the money could be put, whether it be investment or charitable causes. The tone in these exchanges is decidedly not moralistic; it’s simply a shame that so much money goes to waste. No one discusses the putative rich person’s good or bad intentions, or possible selfishness. No one mentions a moral imperative. The overriding concern really seems to be making sure the money is used in the best way possible. C-18, after advocating the “invest first, donate later” strategy, summarizes his approach:

106.

C-18 Zhèi yàng dehuà wǒ juéde, jiù shuō, yī fāngmiàn tā zìjǐ gèrén de jiàzhí shíxiàn le, líng yī fāngmiàn tóngshí yòu duì zhèi ge shèhuì yòu zhàofú le, jiù shuō tā liǎng fāngmiàn dōu nénggòu dédào yìxiē rènkě. Wǒ juéde zhèi yàng dehuà tā zhèi ge qián, jiù shuō zhēnzhèng de tíxiàn dào zhèi ge qián de jiàzhí le.

C-18 If it’s like this, that is, one aspect is his own individual value has been realized, and another aspect is at the same time he has looked after society.

Which is to say, both aspects of his are able to get some approval. I think this way, this money of his, this has truly manifested the value of this money.

While C-18 is the only one to mention societal approval, the other themes here are well-represented in the Chinese responses: the money has value, and this value should be realized in the best way possible. Note also C-18's terminology of "realizing value" (*tǐxiàn jiàzhí*): this is the same terminology applied to Tom, the would-be rock musician, in C-18's explication of the Suitable Path model. The goal is value-maximization: something is in short supply, and so should be used in whatever way yields the best results, the most "bang for the buck." The emphasis on investment indicates that one "good way" to use money is to make more money. And from the standpoint of practicality, the logic is self-evident: if money is good, then more money is better. The emphasis here is on bringing about practical results, not on good intentions or generosity (or its opposite, selfishness).

As for the American notion of giving *back* to society, something similar is present in the Chinese interviews: E-13 says that money beyond one's needs should *huányuán* to society. The first morpheme here, *huán*, means "return," and *yuán* means "give, support." E-15 says extra money should *huíkui* to society. *Huí*, like *huán*, means "return," and *kuì* means "give as a gift." Unfortunately, however, there is no elaboration or explanation given. Who is the original "giver," and what is it that is given? If we



knew, we might perhaps also be able to say more about Duty To Country, but for now we can only say *that* there is some sense of having been given something if someone is rich.

Another difference between American and Chinese responses that parallels differences in reactions to Question #7 is that, as we have seen, the Americans generally have little problem with the question of *should*, but the Chinese seem uncomfortable with it. In all nine of the American interviews, the question is considered in the third person, with only the occasional, later consideration of what one might do oneself in that situation, and in those cases the impetus for switching to the first person is to introspect about intentions and possible hypocrisy, as discussed above. But four of the six Chinese interviews are immediately reframed as “what would you do” questions, eliding *should* in favor of *would*. C-16 and C-17 are explicitly annoyed at the moralistic implications of the “should” wording:

107.

C-17 Shuō yī ge rén hěn yǒu qián, tā yīnggāi zěnme yòng tā de qián, nà shì ràng nǐ qù...jiùshì wánquán nèi zhǒng **generalized** nèi zhǒng gǎnjué. Jiùshì hǎoxiàng gēn nǐ...

C-16 Tā yīnggāi yǒu hěn duō fāngshì qù yòng tā de qián, érqǐě tā yīnggāi xuǎnzé yī zhǒng tā de...tā xǐhuan de fāngshì qù yòng. Rúguǒ nèi ge qián shì tōngguò yī zhǒng zhèngdàng de héshì shǒuduàn.

C-17 Hǎoxiàng zhèi yàng nǐ shuō yìxiē dàodé shuōjiào shì...nǐ yīnggāi zěnmeyàng yòng nǐde qián, nǎ shì bǐjiào hǎo de, bǐjiào hǎo de fāngshì.

C-16 Duì.

C-17 Dànshi wǒ zhǐ néng huídá wǒ xiǎng zěnmeyàng yòng wǒde qián.

C-16 Qiántí shì wǒmen huì yǒu qián. [laughter] Wǒ de qián bù gòu fù fángzū de.

C-17 Érqǐě wǒ duì tā jiùshì shuō, "yīnggāi zěnmeyàng yòng tā de qián," "yīnggāi" zhèi liǎng ge zì wǒ kěnéng yǒu yī diǎn...bù shūfu.

C-16 Bièniu, shì ba?

- C-17 Duì. "Yīnggāi" hái yǒu yī diǎn dàodé, shuōjiào de gǎnjué.
- C-16 Wǒmen yīnggāi ràng měi ge rén zìjǐ xuǎnzé...yīnggāi qù zěnme yòng...bù shì yīnggāi...ràng měi ge rén zìjǐ xuǎnzé qù yòng tā de qián. Wǒmen zhǐ néng shuō rúguǒ wǒ yǒu qián de huà wǒ huì zěnme bàn.
- C-17 Duì.
- C-17 Saying a person has money, how should he use his money, that makes you...that sort of completely **generalized** sort of feeling. It seems that as for you...
- C-16 He should have a lot of ways to use his money, and should choose a way for him...a way of using his money that he likes. If the money was made through normal, suitable means.
- C-17 If you answer this way it's like speaking about morals or preaching...which ways of using your money are better, better ways.
- C-16 Right.
- C-17 But I can only answer how I want to use my money.
- C-16 The premise is that we're rich. [laughter] I don't have enough money to pay rent.
- C-17 Also, for this..."How should he use his money," "should", this word, maybe I'm a little bit...uncomfortable.
- C-16 Awkward, right?
- C-17 Right. "Should" has a bit of a feeling of morals, or preaching.
- C-16 We should let everyone choose for themselves...how they should use...not should, let everyone choose how to use his money. We can only say if I were rich what would I do with it?
- C-17 Right.

These two are simply not comfortable discussing the acknowledgedly moral question of what one "should" do with his or her money. In the process, they exemplify a Chinese version of Choice Is Good. Perhaps Choice Is Good, for which there has up to now been little evidence in the Chinese interviews,<sup>76</sup> is likely to surface in just this sort of context,

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<sup>76</sup> Despite its rareness in the interviews, Choice Is Good is definitely available as a model in China. It has, for instance, recently been exploited in advertising by China Telecom. Two common billboards one

in which it contrasts with this strongly dispreferred way of thinking about things:  
 moralistic “preaching” about what others should or shouldn’t do. Note also the English  
 “generalized” thrown in: this could perhaps indicate a notion of C-17’s that  
 “generalization” of this sort is best expressed directly in English because it is an  
 American phenomenon. This is purely speculative, of course.

C-18 and C-19 voice an objection similar to that of C-16 and C-17:

108.

C-18 Zhèi ge wǒ juéde...zhèi ge wèntí jiùshi yīn rén ér yì de. Jiùshi nǐ zhèi ge qián de shěng huā ha, qǔjué yú nǐ zhèi ge rén de yī zhǒng shìjièguān a, jiàzhí yìshi de zhǐxiàng.

C-19 Wǒ juéde zhèi ge wèntí yīnggāi wèn, "Rúguǒ nǐ hěn yǒu qián, nǐ yīnggāi zěnmeyàng yòng nǐ de qián?"

C-18 Duì. Shíjì shàng nǐ jiùshi biǎodá nǐ zìjǐ de kànfǎ ma, yīnggāi zěnmeyàng qù shǐyòng zhèi bǐ qián.

C-19 Zhèi yàng wèn.

C-18 This, I think...this question is different for each person. Your saving or spending money depends on your own world view, on the direction of your ideas about value.

C-19 I think this question should ask, “If you were rich, how should you spend your money?”

C-18 Yes. In reality you’re just expressing your own view, right, about how to use this sum of money.

C-19 It should be asked this way.

In her reformulation, C-19 says “should” instead of “would,” but the implication is the same: one’s own judgments about how to use one’s own money are rightly made by the

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sees are “Your web, your choice” (*nín de wǎng, nín de xuǎnzé*), and “It’s so nice to have a choice” (*yǒu le xuǎnzé zhēn hǎo*). Interestingly, at least the second of these — especially via the particle *le*, which conveys

person himself, not by someone else speaking overly generally. Again, what this demonstrates is the Chinese tendency to put people into specific decisionmaking contexts instead of generalizing about humanity as a whole.

One last difference in the responses: in no Chinese interview is charity mentioned without the qualification that one should take care of oneself and one's family first. But in six of the nine American interviews, the idea of philanthropy is offered up before the suggestion that one meet one's own material needs first. And in a seventh interview (E-25/26), even though philanthropy is ultimately rejected, it is at least addressed by them, while taking care of one's own financial needs isn't even raised. This last difference is further evidence that the Americans are concerned more overtly with the moral aspects of wealth, whereas the Chinese focus more on practical applications.

The overall picture emerging from answers to Questions #7 and #8, then, is of the Americans thinking in very general, moralistic terms about what an abstract human *should* do in these hypothetical scenarios, and of the Chinese thinking in more specific, practical terms about what people, often themselves, *would* do in these hypothetical situations. And recall too that responses to Questions #11 and #12 provide evidence for a

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the novelty of a situation — seems to presuppose, and to play on, a historical lack of choice and the concomitant “pleasant surprise” of the availability of a choice.

relatively abstract conception of personhood on the part of Americans, versus the more context-dependent conception of personhood offered by the Chinese.

To round out this picture, we turn to Question #4, the follow-up to Question #3:

4. With regard to the person in Question #3:
  - Will this person's response differ by educational level?
  - What should this person do?
  - Should this person do the same thing regardless of his profession and social status?

Every single interviewee, Chinese and American, agrees that the person's response would in fact differ by educational level. There are the usual differences with respect to the second sub-question, about what the person "should" do, but the focus here will be on differences in responses to the last sub-question. Overwhelmingly, Americans answer either with an unqualified "yes" or by qualifying "yes" with "ideally." There are two apparent exceptions. The first is E-21/22. They don't answer this question directly in the body of their response, but do offer the following:

109.

E-21 Um, the outside response, what he can actually do to this, um...and what this person is capable of doing, um...should...I mean I think that...that could probably be the same, I mean the person with the higher degree is going to do as much as he can.

E-22 Yeah.

E-21 Um, and the person with no education level maybe...would probably do as much as he can *too*. But...

E-22 Right, they both...they both strive for some sort of level of recourse.

E-21 Um, how that person is actually treated is probably not gonna be the same.

This seems to be a weak argument that on some level the responses would be similar. E-21 seems unwilling to commit to the *should* wording, however, so I press a bit in follow-up:

110.

Me But I guess my question is more like should...should that be the case? Is that the way things should be? That people's responses will differ by educational level.

E-21 That they will, or should the person's response be different?

Me Should it be the case that people's responses differ by educational level?

E-21 Um...

E-22 Yeah I think that there *should* be a difference, in the sense that like I said, the higher education, the more you're exposed to new ideas.

Me Alright.

E-21 I mean if the...if it's just um a *response*, then no I don't think there should be a difference. But if...if it...if it's the *level* of response, then yes I think that there *should* be a difference, in that, um...a person with more education is probably going to be, um, more intellectual, or...or better off or something, and that he can, um, give a different response than the person who isn't well educated.

Both E-21 and E-22 seem to be interpreting *should* here as epistemic. I mean *epistemic* here in the sense of Frank Palmer (1979) and Eve Sweetser (1990). *Epistemic* modality is distinguished from *deontic* (Palmer), or *root* (Sweetser), modality in the following way: root modality is about the metaphorical force dynamics (Talmy 1988) of actual or potential situations. Root *should*, for instance, prototypically denotes a noticeable-but-not-compelling metaphorical force acting on someone to bring about, or to facilitate bringing about, a new situation, as in: "You should quit smoking, since we'll miss you if you die of cancer." *Should* can be contrasted with, say, *must*, in that for the latter the

force is strong enough to be considered compulsion (the force cannot be resisted), but for the former it is not. *May* provides a separate contrast: the path to action is open — not blocked — but there is no force acting on the potential agent to carry out the act.

Epistemic modality is not about actual or potential situations, but about reasoning patterns. Epistemic *must*, for instance — as in “Tom’s coat is on the rack; he must be home” — indicates that the facts of the case are such that *I am forced to conclude that* Tom is home. Epistemic *should* also indicates a force pushing the reasoner to conclude something, but the force is weaker than for *must*. In the present case, what I am arguing is that E-21 and E-22 seem to be saying something like: “Given what I know about how education affects people’s decisions, I feel pushed to conclude that educational level will affect people’s responses to the scenario posed in Question #3.” This explains why both E-21 and E-22 use as evidence for their claim their belief that people’s educational levels will influence how they respond. This sort of appeal to evidence would be an odd way to explain a root usage of *should*, which tends to focus more on idealized, unrealistic situations. So while E-21 and E-22 both answer affirmatively to this *should* question, this answer shouldn’t be interpreted as contradicting the other Americans’ rejections of (root) *should* in response to Question #4.

The second exception comes from E-25 and E-26. They simply don't address the question, and I wasn't paying close enough attention to notice and ask in follow-up.

Even so, no contrary evidence is given; it's just that no additional support is offered.

Below are some examples of how this idea is expressed:

111.

E-9 Yeah, the word "should"'s kinda weird 'cause it's, it's like should this person do morally, like in theory, like in an ideal world of course they should you know, everybody should do the same thing because everybody has the same rights and therefore they should be able to do that.

112.

E-11 And should this person do the same thing regardless of his profession and social status? Yeah. Do the same thing. Um, I don't think he *would* do the same thing, but I think he should.

113.

E-13 "Should this person do the same thing regardless of his profession and social status?"

E-14 They should.

E-13 They should. Okay...okay. Okay let's say that the person was...or someone really important. And this happened to them. They should do the same thing as if they were...or as opposed to someone who was...like a homeless guy? On the streets of Berkeley?

E-14 Yeah. They should still stand up for themselves.

E-13 Okay. I think I agree with you. Like, regardless...I think like no matter where your status is, like everyone has the same rights, you know, natural rights I guess. And regardless of status, profession, whatever, you should...you should get the same rights, get the same response. Right?

E-14 Mm hm.

E-13 Do you agree with that?

E-14 Basic human rights, yeah.

E-13 Yeah.

114.



E-16 As far as the third question, whether they should do the same thing regardless of profession or social status, I mean ideally...yeah, they should. Really, it...everybody should.

115.

E-18 It shouldn't like differ or whatever, but like it really will.

116.

E-20 I mean, I think I would still, well you know, call my lawyers and try to do stuff. Try to like be repaid for whatever I guess was done to me, quote-unquote. So, I don't know, I guess it depends on the person. But I guess everybody should do it.

E-19 Ideally.

E-20 Ideally. Everything's ideal.

E-19 'Cause everyone should have the same rights.

E-20 Yeah. Everybody should.

The Americans have no problem decontextualizing this particular individual and saying that even though his educational and social context probably *would* make a difference, it *shouldn't*. We will call the model employed here Created Equal, borrowed from the Declaration of Independence: regardless of any human being's particular context, all humans are deserving of equal protection of their well-being. People might make decisions and take actions — such as committing crimes — that result in a legitimate loss of protection, but at the start — when we're "created" — we're all equal.

The Chinese responses to the third sub-question could hardly be more different.

As discussed in Chapter 1, even finding a way to translate this question into idiomatic Chinese was difficult for my consultant. The interview responses break down as follows: in one interview, the question goes unaddressed, and I didn't realize it and didn't follow

up; in two interviews, it is simply not understood what is being asked, even in follow-up; in one interviewee the *yīnggāi* (“should”) is taken as epistemic; and in the two remaining interviews one of the participants indeed understands the question as it was intended, but must go to some lengths to explain it to their interview partners.

The epistemic interpretation comes from C-21:

117.

C-21 Yīnggāi bù yīnggāi? Háishi...yīnggāi bù yīnggāi? Háishi jiùshi jiàoyu...yīnggāi ba. Dāngrán, yǒu zhīshi de, yǒu wénhuà de zhèi xiē rén, tā, dāngrán tā yào zuò chū xiāngyìng de fǎnyìng, dànshi yìbān de lǎobǎixìng, kěnéng tā jiù zuò yìxiē jùtǐ de, jiù bǐrúshuō...xíngdòng. Yīnggāi ba.

C-21 Should it [be this way]? After all...should it? After all, education...it should. Of course, these people with knowledge, with culture, they, of course they'll have a corresponding reaction, but the common people, maybe they'll just do some specific, for example...responses. It should [be this way].

As with E-21 and E-22, C-21 is not reasoning here about an ideal world. She is constructing likely future scenarios based on present fact, indicating that this *should* is epistemic.

C-15 and C-18 understand what I intended to be understood by the question, but both need to explain it to their conversational partners:

118.

C-14 "Rúguǒ yǐngxiǎng dehuà, nǐ juéde yǒu méiyǒu dàoli? Yīnggāi bù yīnggāi?" Wǒ duì zhèi ge wèntí...

C-15 Wǒ juéde, rúguǒ zhèi ge yǐngxiǎng dehuà zhèi yàng shì méiyǒu dàoli de. Yīnwèi tā shì zài yī ge fǎzhì shèhuì dehuà, bùguǎn tā de jiàoyu chéngdù de gāo dī dehuà, tā bù huì...zhè shì yī ge rén de jīběn quánlì, tā bùguǎn tā shòu méi shòu guo jiàoyu, tā yǒu yī diǎn xiàng shì tiān xià láí tā jiù zhīdào

fǎnzhèng jiù méiyǒu rén yīnggāi duì tā de...tā suǒ yōngyǒu de quánlì jìnxíng qīnhài de. Zhè yīnggāi gēn jiàoyu chéngdù méiyǒu guānxi de. Suǒyǐ, rúguǒ shuō zhèi yàng shì...zhèi yàng yǒu yǐngxiǎng dehuà wǒ juéde shì bù yīnggāi de.

- C-14 “If [educational level] influences [the response], is this reasonable? Should [it be this way]?” For this question, I...
- C-15 I think, if there is this influence, it's not reasonable. Because he's in a society with the rule of law, it doesn't matter what his educational level is, he won't...this is a person's basic right, it doesn't matter if he's received an education, it's a little bit as if he knows naturally that, regardless, there shouldn't be anyone who...who carries out an infringement of the rights he possesses. This should bear no relation to educational level. So, if it's this way...if there's this influence, I think it shouldn't be that way.

It's not clear if C-14 understands the question this way originally, because C-15 cuts her off. Regardless, after this explanation by C-15, C-14 understands and agrees. Note, however, that the desired equal treatment is still situated within a particular kind of society, namely one where the rule of law is highly developed. It is not as abstract a conception as the American conception. The following exchange is similar in this regard:

119.

- C-19 "Rúguǒ yǒu yǐngxiǎng dehuà nǐ juéde yǒu méiyǒu dàoли?" Wǒ juéde rúguǒ ér shì...yīnggāi shì...rúguǒ tā shì zuò le wéifǎ de shìqing nà jiùshì méiyǒu dàoли de. Wǒ duì zhèi ge wèntí bù shì...bù shì hěn...
- C-18 Wǒ juéde zhèi ge wèntí yīnggāi zènme lǐjiě. Rúguǒ yǐngxiǎng dehuà, jiùshì shuo zhèi ge jiàoyu shuǐpíng duì tā zhèi ge fǎnyìng zhèi ge yǐngxiǎng hé bù hé **dàoли**, zhèi jiàn shìqing. Wǒ juéde zài Zhōngguó zhèi jiùshì héli héfǎ de, zhèi jiùshì...
- C-19 Héhu dàoли.
- C-18 Héhu dàoли de shìqing. Yīnwèi zài Zhōngguó fǎzhì guānniàn zài měi ge rén xīnmù dāngzhōng bìng bù dōu shì yíyàng de. Jiùshì nǐ jiēshòu de jiàoyu shuǐpíng yuè gāo, huòzhě shuō nǐ jiēshòu le mǒu yī ge céngcì de jiàoyu shuǐpíng yǐhòu, nǐ cái jiànli yìxiē yíding de fǎzhì guānniàn, yīnwèi zài Zhōngguó hǎoxiàng yǒu hěn duō rén zhèi ge fǎzhì guānniàn bǐjiào dànbó. Jiùshì gāi shíxiàn yìxiē ta zhèngcháng de dàoли huò lǐyóu, tōngguò yìxiē zhèngcháng de tújìng lái shíxiàn zhèixiē quánlì dehuà. Tā bìng

méiyǒu...tā bìng méiyǒu...zhèi zhǒng gàinian, bìng méiyǒu zhèi zhǒng yìshi, tā yīnggāi qù zhǎo lùshī qù shíxíng yī zhǒng héfǎ de quánlì. Tā...jiù shuō, shòu jiàoyu céngcì bǐjiào dī de rén, tā méiyǒu zhèi zhǒng...méiyǒu zhèi zhǒng...jiù méiyǒu zhèi zhǒng yìshi. Suǒyǐ wǒ juéde tā de jiàoyu shuǐpíng yǐngxiǎng tā de fǎnyìng zhuàngkuàng. Zhèi ge shì bǐjiào yǒu dào li de.

C-19 Dànshi bù yīnggai...

C-18 Yīng bù yīnggāi wǒ juéde shì bù yīnggāi de. Zài yī ge bǐjiào fādá de shèhui lítōu wǒ juéde měi ge rén de fǎzhì guānniàn bù yīnggāi yīn tā zhèi ge jiàoyu zhuàngkuàng ér yì. Jiù shuō zhèi ge fǎzhì yàoshi yī ge xiāngdāng jiànquán de shèhui, tā zhèi ge pǔfǎ de yī ge, zhèi ge shǒuduàn yīnggāi bǐjiào de jiànquán. Jiù shuō měi ge rén de xīnmù dāngzhōng dōu yǒu yī ge zhèi ge...fǎlù de gàinian. Huíyìng yī zhǒng...jiùshi yìngjí zhuàngkuàng xià, tā zhèi ge fǎnyìng yīnggāi shì tōngguò hélí héfǎ de shǒuduàn lái shíxíng tā zhèngdàng de quánlì. Wǒ juéde zhèi ge měi ge rén dōu yīnggāi yíyàng de. Nǐ juéde ne?

C-19 Jiǎndān de shuō jiùshi zài zhèige, yī ge fādá de shèhui límiàn, wúlùn yù dào shénme shìqing huòzhě shì chǔlǐ shénme shìqing, dōu yīnggāi zūnxún yídìng de guīzé. Shéi wéifàn le zhèi ge guīzé jiù xiāngdāng yú shì fàn le fǎ yíyàng, suǒyǐ zhè ge shì bù yīnggāi de.

C-19 "If [educational level] influences [the response], is this reasonable?" I think if...should be...if he did something illegal then that's not reasonable. For this question I'm not...not too...

C-18 I think this question should be understood like this. If there is this influence, that is this influence of his educational level on his reaction, is this in accord with **reasonableness**?<sup>77</sup> I think in China this is reasonable and legal, this is...

C-19 In accord with reasonableness.

C-18 In accord with reasonableness. Because in China, conceptions of the rule of law are not at all the same in the eyes of every person. The higher your educational level, or after you have attained a certain level of education, only then do you form some definite concepts about the rule of law, because it seems that in China many people have a relatively hazy concept of the rule of law. What should happen is to realize, to realize these rights through some normal reasonableness, or reasons, through some normal routes. They don't at all have...they don't at all have...this sort of concept, don't at all have this sort of consciousness, that they should go

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<sup>77</sup> See (11) for a brief discussion of Chinese *dào li*.

find a lawyer to implement some sort of legal rights. They...that is, people with a comparatively low educational level, they don't have this...don't have this...just don't have this sort of consciousness. So I think his educational level will influence the circumstances of his reaction. This is fairly reasonable.

C-19 But it shouldn't...

C-18 Should it, I think it shouldn't. In a comparatively developed society I think every person's concept of the rule of law shouldn't differ according to his educational situation. That is, if the rule of law is relatively sound in this society, then the means for popularizing the law should be relatively sound. That is, in everyone's eyes there is a...a concept of law. Responding to a kind of...emergency situation, this reaction of his should use reasonable and legal means to implement his normal rights. I think this should be the same for every person. What do you think?

C-19 To put it simply, in this, in a developed society, no matter what the situation one encounters or deals with, they should all follow definite rules. Whoever goes against these rules, it's the same as breaking the law, so it shouldn't be this way.

Much effort goes into C-18 reaching the intended understanding of the question. He eventually reaches this understanding, but again couches his ideal in terms of a particular kind of legally-governed society. Plus, even after his long explanation, C-19 still has a slightly different interpretation. For her, it isn't about human beings being universally treated a certain way; instead, it's about laws being applied consistently. These two are certainly compatible, but the fact that she would word her response this way even after C-18's explanation indicates that she probably still isn't thinking about this in the same terms as the Americans.

C-15 and C-18 demonstrate that this model of the abstract individual is indeed available to Chinese interviewees; it's not as if the model is completely absent or

unavailable. But the degree of its relative infrequency compared to the American responses is telling. Created Equal seems to be a much stronger model in the U.S. than in China.

### Mystery solved

We are now in a position to answer our original question: Why are American responses to Questions #3 and #5 so similar, while Chinese responses are so different? Above I addressed the reasons related to Duty To Country. But clearly there is more to the picture.

A typical Chinese interviewee sees the scenario presented in Question #3 as a gigantic personal problem that requires solving. A tremendous amount of inconvenience is created for the citizen, resulting in anger. Still, it is a relatively small-scale, tractable problem: specific, identifiable individuals are responsible. It is possible to deal with these specific individuals both by reporting their misdeeds to their superiors and by suing them in court. Concrete action on the part of the individual citizen is enough to redress the problem.

From this problem-solving perspective, Question #5 is completely different. It may be annoying to pay more taxes, and it's not right of the government to raise taxes without consulting the citizens, but the ultimate effect on me is relatively minor.

Furthermore, the problem is society-wide, and to redress it would simply be impractical,

even potentially dangerous. For both Question #3 and Question #5, the Chinese perspective is one of problem-solving.

The Americans, however, view both questions in moral terms. They are angry about the surprise arrest not only because of the inconvenience caused, but because it is wrong; they are angry about the tax increase not only because it costs them more money, but because it is wrong. The people carrying out these actions are quite simply not acting as people *should* act. They are being irresponsible members of the moral community of humanity. Here I present a bit more evidence to flesh this out.

Chinese interviewees simply seem less concerned, for both Question #3 and Question #5, with questions of right and wrong. We have already seen that they do believe that the “bad guys” in these questions are in fact acting wrongly, but once this is said the question of right and wrong is dropped. This is true even for Question #5, which explicitly asks if the government is “right” to raise taxes: there is agreement that no, the government isn’t right, but no more is said on the matter.

But the Americans are once again overtly concerned with morality, for both Question #3 and #5. E-19 says the citizen should hire lawyers, because “it’s not right.” E-23 says “I don’t think you can just let something like this happen,” which is a set phrase generally used in redressing wrongs simply because they’re wrong. E-9, in response to Question #4, offers the following, slightly different take on the matter:

120.

E-9 I think the person should be completely obedient, and go along exactly with what they say, in action, but tell them at every moment that, you know if the person understands that this is wrong, they should say, “What you’re doing is wrong,” and repeatedly tell them that.

E-9 never argues that this would in any way solve the problem. He seems to be suggesting this form of moral instruction for its own sake.

The Americans’ moral outrage also takes a more subtle form. Throughout their answers, Americans frequently speak as if the Well-Being model and American laws are in alignment: there is an expectation that American rights-protecting laws should, and generally do, act to protect citizens’ well-being. So sometimes the moral outrage takes the form of dismay at the failure of the system to function properly:

121.

E-16 The entire problem came from a complete breakdown in our system, so if it's somebody living in the U.S. it's obviously wrong.

E-25 sums it up as follows:

122.

E-25 You can't just randomly and arbitrarily like take away someone's rights like that.

This moral outrage is a common theme in responses to Question #5 as well. The government is seen as acting in a morally reprehensible manner. A relatively oblique reference comes from E-21, who says in (27) that the tax increase would mean the U.S. doesn’t have “wise government,” and that the government is “acting foolishly.” The



now-familiar emphasis here is on the *kind of people* who would make this sort of

“unwise” decision. More explicit references are quoted below:

123.

E-18 No, but it says...it doesn't say "have the right," it says "Is the government *right* to do this?"

E-17 Right.

E-18 So, I don't think they're *right* do it.

124.

E-14 Yeah they should...here they should not do that. It's not right for them to do that.

E-13 Okay I agree. And I think like anywhere, not just in the U.S., but you know anywhere in the...anywhere in the world the government should not be allowed to impose laws on their citizens without their consent, right? I mean that's my view. Because I think that's...that's totally...that's...

E-13 is then cut off, so we never get to hear what she was about to say, but the overall

tenor here, that the government's action is wrong, is clear, along with the universalizing

tendency we have seen so frequently in American discussions. Below are two more

examples:

125.

E-22 But do they have a moral right to do something without... without... without the uh people that they govern, uh, opinion, or operating with uh, without the approval of the government...uh...uh the people, I mean?

126.

E-9 But I mean it depends on what you uphold as more important, like your own morals, or what like is the basis of our society and of our country, sort of the basis of our country is democracy, and so in that sense they definitely should not be raising taxes and that's wrong because it's not what people want.

This chapter has taken us through a number of questions on quite diverse topics, but all point to the same conclusion: there are two strongly contrasting models of personhood in China and the U.S. In fact, given the diversity of evidence presented here, I believe it is safe to accord these differing models the status of Shore's *foundational schema*: they pervade meaning-making at a great many different levels and in a great many different types of situations. All that is left is to name them. We will call the American schema the Moral Individual schema, and the Chinese schema the Problem Management schema.

As we have seen, part of the Moral Individual schema is a highly abstract notion of what an individual is. But there is a religious notion as well. The Declaration of Independence provides evidence for the religious aspects, with reference to humans being "created equal" and being "endowed by their creator." Sociologist Robert Bellah (1967; 1975) has a term for this: *civil religion*. The basic idea is that, even for self-identified agnostic, or even atheist, Americans, there is a strongly religious aspect to American beliefs about the individual and morality.

As for abstraction versus practicality generally, I am not the first to suspect this particular aspect of cultural difference between the U.S. and China. Alfred Bloom's (1981) book *The Linguistic Shaping of Thought*, has been the topic of much controversy both in the world of Chinese linguistics and in more general debates about Whorfian

principles. In one of Bloom's experiments, he asked Chinese and American subjects to answer the following question:

Everyone has his or her own method for teaching children to respect morality. Some punish the child for immoral behavior, thereby leading him to fear the consequences of such behavior. Others reward the child for moral behavior, thereby leading him to want to behave morally. Even though both of these methods lead the child to respect morality, the first method can lead to some negative psychological consequences — it may lower the child's self-esteem.

According to the above paragraph, what do the two methods have in common? Please select only one answer.

- A. Both methods are useless.
- B. They have nothing in common, because the first leads to negative psychological consequences.
- C Both can reach the goal of leading the child to respect morality.
- D. It is better to used the second.
- E. None of the above answers makes sense. (If you choose this answer, please explain.) (Bloom 1981: 53-54)

97% of the Americans chose C, while only 55% of the Taiwanese and 65% of the Hong Kong subjects chose C. There is much debate about the methodology of Bloom's experiments and about his results, but I will not address the debate here.<sup>78</sup> Instead, I wish to argue that Bloom is on to something when he offers a partially cultural explanation for the difference American and Chinese responses:

Most of the remaining Chinese-speaking subjects chose D or E and then went on to explain, based on their own experience and often at great

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<sup>78</sup> I refer interested readers to David Moser's excellent (1988) essay on Bloom's research.

length and evidently after much reflection, why, for instance, the second method might be better, or why neither method works, or why both methods have to be used in conjunction with each other, or perhaps, why some other specified means is preferable. For the majority of these subjects, as was evident from later interviewing, it was not that they did not see the paragraph as stating that both methods lead the child to respect morality, but they felt that choosing that alternative and leaving it at that would be misleading since in their experience that response was untrue. As they saw it, what was expected, desired, must be at a minimum an answer reflecting their personal considered opinion, if not a more elaborated explanation of their own experiences relevant to the matter at hand. Why else would anyone ask the question? American subjects, by contrast, readily accepted the question as a purely “theoretical” exercise to be responded to according to the assumptions of the world it creates rather than in terms of their own experiences with the actual world. (Bloom 1981: 54)

Whatever problems may exist with Bloom’s research, my own research supports this culturally-based claim. A similar claim is made by Pat Cheng in her (1985) analysis of Bloom’s work. She refers to another of the questions Bloom posed: “If all circles were large, and this small triangle [picture of triangle] were a circle, would it be large?” 83% of the American subjects answered “yes,” while only 25% of the Taiwanese subjects answered “yes.” (Bloom, 1981: 31) Cheng offers the following explanation:

...Chinese culture tends to be more practical than Western culture, as Bloom himself points out. This practical orientation may at least in part account for Chinese subjects’ unwillingness to answer such questions as “If all circles were large and this small triangle were a circle, would it be large?” (Cheng, 1985)

Cheng’s statement is too totalizing and essentializing, but it gets at something for which my research has presented specific empirical evidence. We now have a more clearly

problematized notion of Cheng's intuitive sense that Chinese culture is "more practical" than Western, or in our case at least American, culture: there is a foundational schema, Problem Management, which orients Chinese people's thinking towards finding ways to solve specific problems within specific contexts, and away from context-free, theoretical questions.

Returning to the question of human rights, what conclusions may we draw? It depends on the specific question being asked. If the question is: Is it generally expected in China that people should be treated well, and that if they are not treated well there should be a good reason and people should be told this good reason? Framing the question this way makes it look like a "basic human rights" question: should people's well-being and right to information be protected? And the answer is a resounding "Yes": we have seen ample evidence of the robustness of the Well-Being, Good Reason, and Disclosure models in China.

However, if the question is "Are human rights universal?" then the answer may look a little bit different. It should be clear by now that to employ the English term *human rights* is to evoke cultural models about what a human is and should be, and that these models don't always map perfectly onto Chinese models. Therefore, a "native" Chinese understanding of *rénquán* as an entire, interlocking complex of models is going to differ from a "native" American understanding of "the same" word.

We conclude with another quote from C-3, responding to “Do you think the concept of human rights is equally appropriate for all countries in the world?” He says:

127.

C-3 Dāngrán měi ge guójiā dōu yīnggāi jiǎng **rénquán**, dàn **rénquán**, tā yǒu hěn jùtǐ de nèiróng, jiùshì dàodǐ bāokuò nǐ xiē quánlì suàn shì **rénquán**, yīnwèi shéi dōu zhīdào **rénquán** zhèi ge gàinian tā bù shì yī ge chōuxiàng de gàinian, tā shì ge lìshǐ de gàinian.

C-3 Of course every country should respect **human rights**, but **human rights**, it has specific content, that is, ultimately, **human rights** should ultimately be considered to include what rights? Because everyone knows that this concept of **human rights** is not an abstract concept, it is a historical concept.

The historian frames it in terms of history; this culturally-inclined linguist frames it in terms of language and culture.

## Chapter 5: Model Systems

Chapters 3 and 4 revealed a complex set of cultural models used by interviewees to reason about various scenarios involving family and society. As it is, the list of models looks a bit haphazard and arbitrary. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how the models fit together in a system. We will see that, while each of the models discussed has a “life of its own” in that it can appear independently of the other models, many models can be and often are interdependent and together form ways of thinking about and acting in the world. Of course we are dealing here with only a tiny subset of the models that make up Chinese and American culture, but it is these systems taken as a whole that give the feeling of “Chinese” and “American” ways of conceptualizing the world.

This chapter has two main sections. First is a general discussion of how the models relate to one another. Much of what is said here has been addressed briefly in Chapters 3 and 4, but here is it fleshed out and systematized more fully. The second specifically addresses metaphor and the question of what it means for a metaphor to be “in a language” or “in a culture.”

Before discussing the differences between the American and Chinese systems, it needs to be pointed out that the foundational schemas, mentioned briefly at the end of Chapter 4, that differentiate the Chinese and American systems, are subordinate to a shared, higher-level super-schema: Well-Being. For purposes of exposition it made

more sense last chapter to treat Well-Being as a model along with all the others, but in this chapter I pose it as a super-schema because in some sense every model, including the Moral Individual and Problem Management foundational schemas, is about looking after people's well-being. George Lakoff argues convincingly in *Moral Politics* (1996) that it is well-being that underlies different conceptions of humanity and morality, and I adopt this view here. What we end up with in Chinese and American culture, then, are sometimes similar, sometimes different ways of reasoning about well-being.

#### The American system

The system begins with a foundational schema, Moral Individual, and the rest follows from this. That is, the entire system depends on the basic assumptions behind Moral Individual: that human beings are born (or, in some circles such as Fundamentalist Christianity, conceived) into a community of individuated beings who have a purpose. The purpose is to behave in a moral fashion, or to do what is right. Naturally, in the course of one's life, morality will come into conflict with other desiderata, but our primary purpose in this life is to be "good people." What exactly is considered moral behavior varies a great deal within American culture, as most thoroughly analyzed in Lakoff 1996's study of American liberals and conservatives. But as we saw throughout Chapters 3 and 4, across the political spectrum Americans share the belief *that* morality is a top concern, however morality may be defined.



A key aspect of Moral Individual is emphasized by the Unique Individual model: the belief that no two people are identical, and that this is a good thing. Each person brings something special to the world. Unique Individual, in turn, is a prerequisite for Life Path: part of our uniqueness resides in our talents and skills, and our uniqueness is wasted if we don't develop our talents and skills as thoroughly as we can. An important aspect of developing our uniqueness is that this development should be undertaken *for its own sake*. There are no ulterior motives; it is its own reward.

Frequently, however, development of one's talents also makes one happy. This is where Pursuit Of Happiness comes in. Pursuit of Happiness has a strong identity of its own, in that there are many human pursuits other than self-development that are deemed worth undertaking solely because they make us happy. Also, there are possible scenarios — such as a person talented in medicine deciding to become a doctor because she feels she can do the most good rather than because she enjoys it — in which developing one's talents doesn't make a person happy. But there is also a strong possibility of overlap between Pursuit of Happiness and Life Path. This overlap is given expression in the Follow Your Dreams model: when we have unique talents *and* developing these talents makes us happy, we should make developing these talents our top priority. Also of crucial importance here is *desire*: humans have desires, which deserve our attention

because fulfilling our desires can make us happy. This is part of what underlies Life Is Precious as well: an end to a person's life means an end to a person's happiness.

Another important aspect of Moral Individual is that each person is a decision-making agent: perhaps the most important aspect of being a moral individual is *deciding* how to behave morally. This brings in the Choice Is Good model: people should be given opportunities to make decisions for themselves, for this is ultimately what determines how moral a person is. Having decisions made for a person thus robs that person of the single most important act of self-definition. And people know and feel the importance of self-definition and will resist attempts to have decisions made for them; thus the You Can't Change Me model. The impulse to self-definition is so strong that it resists outside attempts to interfere with it.

Live And Learn reveals another, related aspect of self-definition: that the best way to learn to make good decisions is to allow a person to decide things for herself. The risk is that she might make a bad decision, but she will learn this lesson well because it was she who made the bad decision. This gives her a deeper understanding of good decisionmaking because she has tried an alternative path and discovered that it wasn't what she had hoped it would be. This idea of the "road not taken" is key: if instead someone else had made the "right" decision for her, she herself wouldn't *know* that the decision was "right" not only because she would resist (You Can't Change Me), but

because she never would have had the opportunity to observe the “wrongness” of the other path. She would have less data on which to base future decisions.

In the course of one’s unique development, a person develops a set of Personal Principles: models which a person prioritizes over all others. Because uniqueness is so prized, and because one’s personal principles are unique aspects of each individual, these principles are to be respected.

Another decision-making aspect of Moral Individual is highlighted by Do The Right Thing: it is important not only that we make decisions that facilitate our own unique personal development, but that we do things that benefit others, even at the expense of our own convenience or material benefit. That is, we must look after the well-being of others. The Well-Being super-schema is obviously a strong presence here. Do The Right Thing tells us we should make decisions that positively benefit others’ well-being. At the same time, we expect others to look after our well-being. Others may not actively *enhance* our well-being, but we generally expect people not to *harm* our well-being. We are offended when others act in ways directly contrary to our well-being. If people do harm our well-being, there should be a Good Reason for it, usually if not always a reason that trades off my well-being for someone else’s. That is, harming someone’s well-being incurs a moral debt that can be repaid in part with someone else’s well-being. But this is not enough: Disclosure tells us that the harmed person must be

informed of this tradeoff. In a way, this makes the harmed person a willing participant in the tradeoff of well-being: harming a person, if doing so is not to be immoral, requires the person's consent, and the only way to secure someone's consent is first to inform them of the tradeoff.

Tradeoffs of well-being also stand at the center of a difficult type of model conflict. Sometimes personal principles come into conflict with other desiderata. Whatever our personal principles may be, they are dependent on our uniqueness, and our ability to develop our uniqueness is contingent upon certain material and institutional circumstances. These circumstances are created and maintained in large part by the state. Since the state — in this case the United States government — has contributed to our well-being in this way, citizens of the U.S. owe the government a moral debt. Hence Duty To Country. Because we are autonomous, agentive, decision-making beings, we can decide *not* to accept this moral debt by leaving the U.S.: the Love It Or Leave It model. By choosing to live in the U.S., however, we choose to take on a moral debt that we might be called upon to repay, and whose repayment might conflict not only with our personal principles but with our most basic well-being, namely our lives. And because all individuals in the community of humanity are Created Equal, if one person is called upon to make a sacrifice, all people are called upon to make a sacrifice: the Duty To Fellow Citizens model. This combines with Life Is Precious — there is likely to be some

degree of compulsion involved in getting people to risk their lives, no matter how noble the cause — to yield the conclusion that one person being granted an exception could lead, via the Categorical Imperative, to everyone being granted an exception, and the country's needs not being fulfilled.

The model system just sketched is based on an idealized view of humanity. This is recognized by the American interviewees. More “reality”-based models may influence how people *actually* behave, as opposed to how people *ideally* behave: Success may supersede Follow Your Dreams; Expediency may outweigh Do The Right Thing; and presumably, though this doesn't come up in the interviews, Unique Individual may come into conflict with pressures to conform.

### The Chinese System

I enter somewhat more speculative and risky territory here. Speculative, because I am not Chinese. As an American, I am able fill in some of the missing details in the American model system. I don't have this option in describing the Chinese model system. Risky, because as a Westerner writing in sweeping generalities about Chinese culture I am in some sense guilty of essentializing and totalizing an “other,” and in doing so am opening myself to criticism from entire schools of Sinology that have built themselves on the premise that such essentializing perspectives are misleading and dangerous. All I can do here is appeal to this work in its entirety, including caveats

offered throughout earlier chapters, and ask the reader to understand that these caveats are intended as background here as well.

The Problem Management foundational schema underlies the Chinese model system. To be a person means to be engaged in a struggle to minimize the trouble one has to deal with in life. Particulars of given situations are given priority over generalizations meant to cover all possible situations. One problem every person has to solve is how to go about establishing an economic foundation for oneself and one's family. Privileging the Success model provides one with the tools to solve this problem: do what you need to do in order to make sure your economic needs are met. Yes, we may have desires to do certain things with our lives (Follow Your Dreams), but if these desires are leading us down a path that will result in not having a solid economic foundation, then pursuing one's dreams is not worth the risk of not having enough money to pay the bills or eat. It is also possible to make a mistake and learn from it (Live And Learn), but why bother if it's obvious, from generations of experience and accumulated wisdom, which path will most quickly lead to success and allow us to solve perhaps the most important problem of our entire lives?

This is not to say that the path to success is the same for everyone. Individuals do indeed have unique talents to contribute to society, and should pursue whatever path is most suited to their skills. This isn't so much about what people *want* to do with their

lives, but about how their own societal value can be maximized. While it is not exactly clear what sorts of “value” of this kind are most highly privileged, the main exposition of the Suitable Path model, from C-18, frames it in terms of “becoming a useful person,” and specifically mentions “practical work” and engineering. The focus is on applied (i.e. problem-solving) undertakings.

As in the U.S., part of the value that all people are expected to contribute to society is looking after one another’s well-being. Also as in the U.S., there must be a Good Reason for infringing upon someone’s well-being, and this reason, via Disclosure, should be communicated to the person whose well-being has been violated. If a problematic situation is created for someone due to an unreasonable — that is, good-reason-lacking and/or disclosure-lacking — violation of her well-being, this is wrong. However, how violated the person feels, and the strength of active response to the situation, will vary according to how tractable the problem is. If the immediate negative impact on the person is significant, and if perpetrator is clearly identifiable, and the means of redress are relatively direct (as in responses to Question #3), then deep anger will be felt and the problem will definitely be dealt with vigorously. But if there is minimal immediate negative impact on the person, and if the perpetrators are distant and amorphous, and the means of redress are relatively indirect (as in Question #5), then the emotional reaction will be minimal and the problem may not be responded to with much

vigor at all. In other words: if the personal impact is big and the problem is solvable, resolute attempts will be made to solve it; if the personal impact is small and problem is difficult to solve, there may be no attempt at all to solve the problem. It doesn't really matter how abstractly "wrong" an act is; the key questions again are "How big is the impact?" and "Can I solve the problem?"

Likewise, if a situation presents itself, as in Question #7, whereby the convenience of many is adversely affected and an act by one person could alleviate this inconvenience, this one person will tend to think of the situation not in terms of abstract right and wrong, but in terms of Expediency: if we can all still get where we want to go by taking another route, then we'll take another route; if we can't, then I might as well help myself while I help others, and move the tree. Money is viewed in similar terms: as a tool to solve problems. Therefore, investment is the wisest way to use one's money, because the more money the better, and the more problems can be solved.

Problems are encountered on a country-wide level as well. War is an extreme example. When the country faces a problem like this, Duty To Country dictates that individual well-being must be sacrificed for the well-being of the country as a whole. Every citizen has the same duty and so, via the Categorical Imperative, if one person is allowed not to fight, then all people are allowed not to fight, and the very existence of the country is threatened. It doesn't matter what our Personal Principles might be; the



country has a problem here, and everyone needs to do what they can to help solve it.<sup>79</sup>

There is Nothing To Be Done if a person's principles are at odds with the needs of the country: the only choice is to fight.

A personal note on the Nothing To Be Done model: the terminology here stems from my translation of the Chinese phrase *méi bànfa*. *Méi* means "not have," and *bànfa* means "method," but a particular kind of method: a method for solving a problem.

When I first lived in China, I was surprised, indeed annoyed, at how often I heard this turn of phrase in response to my impatient inquiries about such diverse matters as why the water wasn't running, why the buses stopped running at 7:00 p.m., why my room was so cold in the winter, etc. Even now, eleven years after my first trip to China, I occasionally feel outrage at what my American mind feels are unjustified inconveniences of living in China. The term *unjustified* is not accidental: the outrage feels like *moral* outrage. It's *just plain wrong*, the obtuse part of my American mind tells me, that any person should suffer such indignity. My Chinese hosts, however, shrug off such inconveniences as minor, and not worth making a big fuss over.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> I don't mean here to reduce Duty To Country to the Problem Management schema. There are almost certainly other cultural models, such as loyalty, involved. But since there is little direct evidence in the data about the reasoning underlying Duty To Country, for now I must stick to whatever aspects of Duty To Country for which there *is* data, and it does indeed seem that problem-solving is an important, if not the only, aspect of Duty To Country.

<sup>80</sup> A fair counter to my culture-based argument would be: anyone who is used to an inconvenience tends to shrug it off; Chinese people have simply grown accustomed to a lot of different sorts of

Thus, according to the Problem Management schema, there are only certain types of problems that warrant our problem-solving energies: problems that (a) directly and significantly harm our well-being and/or (b) can realistically be solved. The most important thing to understand about Problem Management is that it doesn't mean every problem must be solved. Instead, there is a deep-seated practicality and economizing of energy inherent in the schema: solve the problems that are worthy of one's energy to try and solve.

Again, there is much missing from this account, but the data that we do have provide a sketch of a system of cultural models that is quite different from the corresponding American system. (By "corresponding" I mean the set of models invoked to address corresponding scenarios.) Much ink could be spilled over the origins of these differences. Here I offer a glimpse of a common Chinese explanation, framed in terms of why the U.S. is so much more developed than China. C-16 and C-17, in response to Question #12, discuss the role of material conditions in forming the identities of different ethnicities and nationalities:

1.

C-17 Yǒu hěn dà de zuòyong. Nǐ xiàng Zhōngguó shì yī ge zhèi yàng yī ge...dì guǎng, dànshi wǒ bìng bù juéde tā zīyuán hěn fēngfù. Érqiě Zhōngguó rén yòu nènme duō. Zàochéng zhèi yàng yī ge huánjìng nǐ jiù shénme

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inconveniences, as a result of political and economic constraints; culture has nothing to do with it. For my reply, please refer to my discussion below about how culture relates to economic and political circumstances.

shìqing, zánmen shénme shìqing dōu huì zhēng. Yǐngxiǎng dehuà cóng xiǎo dào dà. Bírúshuō xiǎoxué dào chūzhōng, chūzhōng dào gāozhōng, gāozhōng shàng dàxué, shénme shìqing nǐ yào zhēng. Nǐ cái néng guò shàng bǐjiào hǎo de shēnghuó. Dànshi nǐ kàn Xīfāng de guójiā...nǐ kàn Jiānádà huòzhě xiàng Měiguó tā yào dì dà wù bó, wǒ zǒng juéde tā zīyuán hěn fēngfù. Nǐ kàn Zhōngguó xīběi nèi ge dìfang tā hǎo duō shì huāngmò. Tā zhèi biān jiù shénme, nǐ zhǐ yào...bù shuō tā bù fù chū nǚlì, rén zhǔyào jiùshi...kěyǐ shuō bǐ Zhōngguó rén fù chū shǎo hěn duō dàijià nǐ jiù néng guò shàng bǐjiào shūshì de shēnghuó. Dànshi Zhōngguó bù yíyàng, Zhōngguó nènme duō rén, huánjìng bù yíyàng, guóqíng bù yíyàng, nǐ jiù děi zhēng, nǐ cái néng guò shàng bǐjiào hǎo de shēnghuó. Suǒyǐ jiù zàochéng le Zhōngguó rén yǒu zhèi yàng yìxiē xīnlǐ jiégòu. Měiguó rén zhèi yàng yě zuò chéng yī ge xīnlǐ jiégòu, suǒyǐ wǎngwǎng shì yóuyú yī ge tā de...shì hěn kèguān de dōngxī, zhè hěn wùzhi de dōngxī zàochéng de.

- C-17 [Material environment] plays a big role. Look at China, it's this type of...the land is vast, but I don't at all think it is rich in resources. Also, there are so many Chinese people. This has created this sort of environment where everything you do, everything we do you have to struggle. This influences us from a young age. For example from elementary school to middle school, middle school to high school, high school to college, in everything we have to struggle. Only after this can you live a relatively good life. But if you look at Western countries...look at Canada or America, they have vast territory and abundant resources, and so overall I think they are rich in resources. Look at China's northwest, a great deal of it is desert. Over here [in America] it's more, you only...I can't say they're not diligent, but mostly people...you could say that they pay a much smaller price than Chinese people in order to live a comparatively comfortable life. But China is different, there are so many people in China, the environment is different, the national conditions are different, you have to struggle if you want to live a comparatively good life. So this has created a certain psychological structure in Chinese people. And this has also created a psychological structure for Americans, so it's always a result of their...of very objective factors, this is created by material factors.

I include this not as any sort of final word on what has created these cultural differences between the U.S. and China, but rather as an interesting side note of a meta-model which, in my own experience, I have observed many Chinese to hold of why the U.S. is more developed than China, and why the U.S. shouldn't try to preach to China about how it

should change. In conjunction with a metaphor involving a linear conception of history, according to which the U.S. is further along the development path than China is, the conclusion is drawn that time, and time alone, will bring China up to America's level of development, and along with this will bring more human rights to China's people.

Referring back to C-3 — from whom we heard briefly at the end of Chapter 4 — right after his proposal of the historicity of the concept of human rights, he adds:

2.

C-3 Jiùshi, wǒmen fāzhǎn dào zhè yī bù, ránhòu wǒmen yīnggāi yǒu nèixiē quánlì. Wǒmen yīnggāi zhèi yàng kàn, jiù shuō běn rén jiù méiyǒu yī ge chōuxiàng de, lǐxiǎng de rénquán, bǐrú Měiguó zài liǎng bǎi nián qián tā de rénquán gàinian wánquán bù yíyàng, gēn xiànzài. Tā yě bù kěnéng zuò dào xiànzài zhèi yàng rénquán de gàinian.

C-3 That is, once we have developed to this stage, we should have these rights. We should look at it this way. That is, people don't have abstract, ideal human rights. For example two hundred years ago America's human rights concept was completely different from now. It would have been impossible to have a present-day sort of human rights concept.

Regardless of the causes of the cultural differences that underlie differences in human rights thinking, it is important not only that human rights advocates understand these differences, but that they understand this Chinese meta-model and, when discussing human rights with Chinese citizens, understand that they are likely viewing human rights through the lens of this meta-model and might be skeptical of what they see as inappropriate and intrusive Western prescriptions.

As different as the Chinese and American model systems are, however, we mustn't lose sight of the significant ways in which they are similar. Most importantly,

from the perspective of human rights, the Well-Being super-schema is strongly in force for both cultures. Granted, what is considered “well-being” can vary greatly from culture to culture, but the sort of well-being involved here is arguably universal: allowing people basic control over their own movement, and looking after their economic needs. As we saw in Chapter 4, it is expected both in China and in the U.S. that people should be treated well, both by fellow citizens and by the government. Violations of well-being are marked cases. Even in the relatively unenthusiastic Chinese responses to Question #5, recall that (a) Chinese interviewees still say explicitly that the tax increase is wrong, and (b) complaining is given as a likely reaction, meaning that people would be dissatisfied with such an action by the government. To the extent that human rights involve the safeguard of humanity’s well-being and happiness, concepts of human rights *as an ideal* are equally applicable not only the China and to the U.S., but to all societies worldwide. In that sense, the data in this dissertation support a limited universalist claim for human rights.

At the same time, however, *as an ideal* is an important, culturally-laden hedge.

One other key cultural difference revealed by the data is that Americans tend to think and reason in terms of ideals, while Chinese tend to de-emphasize ideals in favor of actual, or at least likely-to-encounter, circumstances. And so any universalist angle on human rights must be tempered with an understanding that the very act of thinking in terms of

abstract ideals is a culturally-conditioned way of thinking that is liable to meet resistance not only with government officials who have a vested interest in impeding political reform, but with the “common people,” who themselves are accustomed to thinking not in terms of lofty ideals, but in terms of how to navigate the very real material constraints they encounter in their lives.

Let me emphasize again that I am not claiming that Americans are in any way “more moral” than Chinese, or anything remotely along these lines. The above paragraph, in fact, is meant to emphasize the highly idealized nature of American moralistic thinking. What an American person or a Chinese person would actually do when confronted with any of the scenarios asked about is anybody’s guess. This question could be investigated empirically, but is obviously far beyond the scope of this dissertation. Do recall, however, that the Americans are quite aware of the lack of fit between the ideal and the actual, and do not claim that they themselves necessarily *would* act in a moral fashion, only that they *should*. There is simply no evidence whatsoever about whether actual behavior on the part of Chinese or Americans is “more moral,” whatever that would even mean. This dissertation is about *ways of conceptualizing hypothetical scenarios*, not about actual behavior.

In a related vein, it must be pointed out that the two model systems discussed above may in some important ways *not* be equivalent. We all have many different sorts

of models at our disposal. For our purposes here, we at least have models of the way the world is and of the way people are, along with models of how the world should be and of how people should be. In other words, we have models of the actual and of the ideal. Some might argue that the ideal and the actual are closer in the U.S. than they are in China, and that therefore the American interviewees are freer to emphasize the ideal more than are the Chinese interviewees: Chinese interviewees are too busy thinking about how to flex their models of the ideal to fit a non-ideal situation; they have no psychological room to think or talk much about how things *should* be. This argument could then continue: it may be the case the the “cultural principles” behind Chinese and American culture are quite similar or quite different, but the methodology used in this research is unable to get at them. In the meantime, we have merely compared apples and oranges, missing the more “essential” underlying similarities and differences between American and Chinese culture.

Here is my reply: the validity of this criticism depends crucially on the purposes to which one is putting, and the claims one is making about, one’s research. If the purpose is to find abstract truths about “essential” differences and/or similarities between cultures, then my research has little to offer. If, however, the purpose is to find similarities and differences in how members of different cultural and linguistic communities reason their ways through the world, then my research is of value. I am

concerned primarily with similarities and differences in how Chinese and American people reason about human rights. Human rights exist within specific political and economic contexts. At present, China is a more politically repressed society, and a less prosperous society, than is the United States. These realities cannot help but inform people's thinking in a deep way, and it would be foolish to wish these differences away in order to focus on discovering something "essential" about Chinese and American cultural difference. These differences may indeed exist, and may indeed be discoverable, but that is a different project for a different time. For my research purposes, the fact that Chinese interviewees tend to invoke their models of the actual, while Americans tend to invoke their models of the ideal, is itself an important discovery.

This relates to the still-larger question, addressed early in Chapter 4, of where we draw the line between what we call "culture" and what we consider to be temporary adaptations to a particular political and economic context. There is a common folk model according to which "culture" is considered to involve something essential and long-lasting about a given society and its people: culture is that which endures the vicissitudes of history, that which remains static through changing political and economic circumstances. If we adopt this view of culture, then it could be fairly argued that my dissertation is not about Chinese and American culture. However, what I have tried, hopefully with some success, to argue for, is a more complexified and nuanced notion of



culture that allows us to take into account specific economic and political circumstances, fleeting as they might ultimately turn out to be.

We now shift gears and turn our attention to metaphor and how it fits into the model systems under discussion.

Metaphor: relating family and society

One of George Lakoff's (1996) most important discoveries in *Moral Politics* was the Nation-as-Family metaphor. Lakoff argues convincingly that, in the U.S., people's understanding of certain aspects of family life — in particular child-rearing practices — structure their reasoning about politics. One of my goals in this research was to probe for evidence of this metaphor both in the U.S. and in China. To this end, I posed Question #2:

2. How would you explain to a five-year-old what a government is and its relationship to the people?

I hoped that interviewees, when forced to reduce government to its simplest terms, would use a family metaphor in their descriptions. In broad strokes, I got what I wanted from the Americans, but not from the Chinese. A possible conclusion to draw would be that the Americans “have a Nation-as-Family metaphor” and the Chinese don't. But such a conclusion would be simplistic. To the point, we need to be precise about what we mean

by a metaphor “being in a language” or culture. This, in the context of the data, is the topic of the following discussion.

In none of the six Chinese interviews was a family metaphor offered at any point in response to Question #2. I had hoped people would propose explaining government as “parents,” but no such luck. Since at the time I envisioned metaphor as a central topic of the dissertation, I made persistent efforts during follow-up questioning to elicit the metaphor. It usually went something like this: “Your explanation of government was quite abstract. What if the five-year-old hears your explanation and says, ‘I don’t understand.’ Can you give a simpler explanation?” Even then, in only one interview is a family metaphor offered, and is then explicitly rejected as inaccurate.<sup>81</sup> C-13 proposes viewing the government as parents. C-12 says that, yes, maybe our parents were educated that the government is our parents, but things are different now:

3.

C-12 Dànshi xiànzài shuō nǐ de zhèngfu shì nǐ de jiāzhǎng kěndìng dàjiā bù huì tóngyì. Nǐ píng shénme shuō ta shì jiāzhǎng? Duì bù duì? Érqǐě wǒ juéde kěnéng jiùshì shuō yàoshi gěi tā júxiàn dào Zhōngguó lái jiǎng dehuà, rúguǒ nǐ yào wèn zài niánqīng yī diǎn de rén dehuà, tā kěnéng huì jiùshì, yīnwèi yǒu...dōu kāishǐ jiāo shuì ne.

[...]

Dànshi wǒ jiāo le shuì, nǐ píng shénme shuō shì jiāzhǎng shì wǒ zài yǎnghù nǐ a? Nǐ yīnggāi lái wèi wǒ zuò shìqing, duì bù duì? Suǒyǐ xiànzài huì yǒu hěn duō lǎobǎixìng nèi yàng, tā yào huì mà zhèngfu,

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<sup>81</sup> In both the body of the interviews and in follow-up, there is a frequent metaphor offered: government is construed in terms of kindergarten, either as the teacher or as the head of the class. A detailed look at this metaphor, however, while surely interesting in its own right, is beyond our present purposes.

quèshí shì zhèi yàng ne, nǐ méiyǒu wèi wǒ lái zuò hǎo shìqing, méiyǒu fúwù ha.

- C-12 But now if you say the government is your parents, definitely no one will agree with you. What's your basis for saying it's your parents? Right? Also I think maybe if you limit this to China, if you ask a somewhat younger person, maybe he will, because...they've all started paying taxes. [...]  
But I have paid taxes, what is your basis for saying it's the parents, and that I'm taking care of you? You should be doing things for me, right? So nowadays there are many common people like that, they'll curse the government, it's truly this way. You haven't done good things for me, haven't served me.

C-13 ends up convinced that the parent metaphor is not apt, and that ends the discussion.

The Americans, on the other hand, are quite willing to offer up a parent metaphor.

Recall here that this question was asked to only seven of the American interview pairs.

In four of the seven interviews, a parent metaphor is offered in the body of the interview.

In a fifth, it is given as part of follow-up, and once it is discovered, the interviewees are

happy with it. In the five cases of this metaphor, several different aspects of parenthood

are offered: caretaking, looking out for the child's interests and safety, dispute

resolution, rule enforcement, and generalized "authority." I include the following

because it offers the most varied ideas about the "parental" roles of government:

4.

E-23 Well, you have to be really general, but the government is the...a system, a group of people that are kind of in charge of a larger group of people.

E-24 Kinda like parents.

E-23 Mm hm. That's good. And they make rules, and they have a way to enforce those rules, if you break the rules, then...

E-24 You get in trouble.

E-23 Right, you get in trouble. They take care of you.

E-24 Mm hm.

E-23 The government provides for you, and, um, protects you.

Given how freely the Americans offer up this metaphor, and how it doesn't even seem to occur to the Chinese, we might be tempted to conclude that the Nation-as-Family metaphor exists in the U.S., but not in China. But this conclusion would be premature, as we have already seen an example of Nation-as-Family in response to Question #6. Recall C-19's long-winded criticism of Zhang San for avoiding the draft, in which she says:

5.

C-19 Dànshi bǐrúshuō zhèi ge qítā...qítā de guójiā yào rùqīn de, yǐjīng dádào jiā ménkǒu le, nà wǒ wèile jiùshi bǎohù wǒ de zhèi ge jiā, wǒ yě bù kěnéng shuō wǒ xiùshǒu pángguān, bù qù guǎn.

C-19 But for example if another...another country wants to invade, and is already at the door, then in order to protect my home, it's not possible for me to stand by and watch and not do something about it.

This is a fairly obvious example of Nation-as-Family. No family members are mentioned, but in the frame semantics of the family, the home is the most sacred location.

This is the only occurrence of the metaphor, but that doesn't matter. Clearly this reasoning pattern is readily available.

In this chapter there are ultimately three points I wish to make about metaphor.

The first, somewhat obvious, point is that we need to be precise about exactly what is mapping to what. The parent metaphor, of which there is only the one, ultimately rejected example in the Chinese data, but of which there are several examples in the American data, maps a subset of family relations onto a subset of government-citizen relations. This is the Nation-as-Family metaphor about which George Lakoff writes at

such length in *Moral Politics*. The key entailments involve family-internal matters such as child-rearing, dispute resolution, degree of independence of the children, moral education, etc. In particular, Lakoff argues, this metaphor focuses on the parents in that it is ultimately about determining the appropriate roles of the government as metaphorical parents.

The metaphor in (5), however, is different. Unfortunately there is very little data given, so it is difficult to know just how elaborate the structures of the source and target domains<sup>82</sup> can conventionally be, but at least this much seems clear: the metaphor is mostly about family-external threats, rather than family-internal relations. The chief entailment here is based on the fear inherent in imagining my home, my ultimate place of safety, being forcibly entered and me being harmed. C-19's rhetorical purpose is to criticize Zhang San's decision not to fight in the war, so she uses this metaphor in order to conjure up fear and urgency. Now, it is quite possible that the structure of the metaphor could be elaborated with family-internal relations, according to which the government is the parents defending the citizen-children, but there is no data for this. And even if there were, the entire metaphor is still dependent on the family-*external* threat.

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<sup>82</sup> Recall that in metaphor analysis the *source domain* provides the conceptual structure and language for reasoning and talking about the *target domain*.

Thus there are two quite different metaphors here, both of which could be fairly called Nation-as-Family. There exist at least two others as well, neither of which occurs in the data, but both of which I have come across in conversations and casual reading. One is used in referring to ethnic minorities: the “great family of the Chinese nation,” or *zhōnghuá mínzú dà jiātíng*. *Zhōnghuá mínzú*, we have already looked at; *dà* means “big, great”; and *jiātíng* means “family.” This metaphorical expression appears in rhetorical contexts in which the unity of the Chinese ethnicities is being emphasized, such as high-school textbooks on ethnicity. I once heard a similar expression used in a movie I happened to stumble across on television, about the “history” of Tibet, in which British forces arrive in Lhasa trying to persuade Tibet to break away from China. The Tibetan leader — presumably the Dalai Lama — rebuffs them, saying something along the lines of, “Tibetans, Mongolians, Uighurs, and Han, we’re all one big family.” In other words, we are unified, leave us alone, go back to India. Additionally, non-Han ethnicities are sometimes referred to as “brother ethnicities” (*xiōng-dì mínzú*). The aspect of family structure emphasized by this metaphor is unity, or indivisibility.

Another family, or at least home,<sup>83</sup> metaphor appears on billboards in some Chinese cities. The relevant expression is:

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<sup>83</sup> One problem in distinguishing these in Chinese is that *jiā* can translate both as “home” and as “family.”

6.

zhěngzhì huánjìng, měi huà jiā yuán  
repair environment, beautiful -ize home garden

“Fix the environment, beautify your home garden.”

The key aspect of home life here is caretaking: we should care about our country’s environment in the same way we naturally and deeply care about our homes. No family members are mapped here, but again it is quite possible to imagine family members being included in the mapping, with the government once again as parents, heading up the cleanup, and the citizens as children, helping out. But even so, this metaphor should be seen as a different metaphor from the others, because it is in some sense fundamentally *about* something different.

Ultimately, the point here is that what may look like a single Nation-as-Family metaphor is better viewed as a number of separate metaphors. These metaphors each emphasize different aspects of source-domain family structure, and are thus intended to cause listeners to do different sorts of reasoning about the target domain. So one answer to the question “Does the Nation-as-Family metaphor exist in China?” is that there are in fact several Nation-as-Family metaphors.

Another possible answer to this question raises the second point I wish to make about metaphors being “in a language” or culture: we need to bear in mind degree of

conventionality. This is where the distinction between on-the-fly analogy<sup>84</sup> and deeply-conventional metaphor becomes useful. There is of course no absolute distinction in kind between these two phenomena, as they exist at opposite ends of a cline, but if two examples are far enough apart on this cline they can look like examples of different phenomena. For example, when C-12 and C-13 are discussing the possibility of viewing the government as parents, they are trying out, and ultimately rejecting, an analogy. There is no unconscious, highly conventionalized language, and no correspondingly conventionalized reasoning pattern, according to which the government is the parents and the citizens are the children; instead, C-12 and C-13 are engaged in the highly conscious process of trying to match up the source and target domain structures — specifically the caretaking role of parents — and finding enough mismatch to reject the analogy. On the other hand, C-19's example seems more metaphorical: there is no conscious reasoning-out here; she doesn't miss a beat in referring to the country as a home, and obviously expects her listeners to understand. This indicates the much higher degree of conventionality of what we have come to call "metaphor" instead of "analogy."

The American cases seem to lie somewhat more towards the middle of the analogy-metaphor cline. As we saw, five of the seven interview pairs suggest viewing

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<sup>84</sup>The sense of analogy intended here is precisely its "on-the-fly" nature, rather than what Gentner and Gentner (1983) define as the central aspect of analogy, namely its mapping of the interrelations among



the government as parents, indicating that they see a good fit between source and target domain. However, the fact that conscious construction of this view of government is necessary indicates a lack of the unconscious conventionality that is the hallmark of metaphor. In other words, on this last point I am confessing to a flaw in my methodology: in posing Question #2, ultimately the most I could hope would be revealed are conceptual structures that look more like analogy than metaphor. Given its unconscious status, metaphor really just needs to “pop up” on its own; an ideal methodology would create scenarios that maximize the likelihood of metaphors being used. Unfortunately my methodology didn’t facilitate this process, and so there just isn’t much metaphorical data to analyze.

Regardless of this methodological snafu, however, we do have some useful metrics for trying to determine whether a given metaphor is “in” a language or culture. We need to investigate two matters: Is there highly conventionalized language and reasoning indicating a metaphor? And if not, do the reasoning patterns relevant to the would-be metaphor make sense to speakers of the language (i.e., members of the culture)? A sound methodology and analytical strategy that pays attention to both aspects should yield useful answers to this question.

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entities instead of the entities themselves.

Another aspect of the “presence” of metaphors in a conceptual system is worthy of our attention, and that is the rhetorical uses to which a metaphor might be put. Some metaphors, especially primary metaphors, pervade language and conceptualization at so many levels that they are “in” a conceptual system in the deepest way. However, Nation-as-Family does not appear to be this sort of metaphor, either for the Chinese or the American interviewees. Instead, we should view metaphors such as this as (if you’ll pardon the metaphor) tools to be used at various times for various rhetorical purposes. Do you want to persuade someone to fight in a war? Call the nation “home” and say the enemy is “at the door.” Do you want to convince someone that China is not about to disintegrate into inter-ethnic warfare? Call the ethnic groups “brothers.” For these latter metaphors, the aspects of source domain structure that get mapped to the target domain are somewhat arbitrary and sparse and depend, as I’ve said, on specific rhetorical purposes in specific contexts. We don’t need to say who the parents or children are when the enemy is at the door; we just need to fight.

The final point to discuss about metaphor is the longest and most complex. It has to do both with what metaphor *is*, in some deep sense, and with the current question of the sorts of evidence we can turn to for the presence of a metaphor in a given conceptual system. We begin this discussion with a brief look at what we might call the Family-as-

Nation metaphor, of which we saw examples in Chapter 3. The most thorough of these examples is repeated here:

- 7.
- C-12 ...zài wǒmen jiā suīrán wǒ zhèng qián hěn duō, dànshi wǒ cónglái dōu shì yào shāngliang zhe lái.
- C-13 Nà nǐ māma nèi dài ne? Nǐ bàba hé nǐ māma? Shéi shuō le suàn?
- C-12 Méiyǒu shéi shuō le suàn. Yě shì jiùshì yīnwèi wǒ juéde hǎoxiàng tāmen jiù tǐng **mínzhǔ** de. Bāokuò jiù duì hái zi, tāmen zhǐjiān shénme shìqing dōu shì yíding shāngliang zhe lái. Ránhòu rúguǒ zhēnde dà shìqing de huà dōu yào hái zi lái yìqǐ lái shuō, lái pīnpīnmìngmìng de tí yìjian huò zěnmeyang.
- C-13 Ò, nà nǐmen jiā hěn **mínzhǔ**.
- C-12 Duì a.
- C-12 ...In my family, even though I earn a lot of money I still always discuss things.
- C-13 What about your mom's generation? You dad and your mom? Who has the final say?
- C-12 No one has the final say. This is because, I think, it seems, they're very **democratic**. This includes how they are with their children. All of their matters are discussed. And on top of this, for really big things all the children come and discuss things together with the family, and offer their opinions and such with all their heart.
- C-13 Oh, your family is really **democratic**.
- C-12 Yes.

We also saw other examples of use of the term *mínzhǔ* in referring either to the Majority Rules or to the Discussion submodels of the Democracy model. We also had the following, referring to how the family considering buying a car in Question #10 might resolve the dispute:

- 8.
- C-17 Zǔ...zǔ nèige, zhàokāi jiāting huìyì le.
- C-17 They would organize...call a family meeting.

C-17's language here is clearly metaphorical: the verb-object structure *zhàokāi huìyì*, “call a meeting,” is from the domain of public institutions.

What these examples show is that the family can be conceived of in terms of the public, just as the public can be conceived of in terms of the family. As with the examples of Nation-as-Family, these Family-as-Nation examples offer little in the way of structure. They also seem, in ways similar to the Nation-as-Family examples, actually to be different metaphors. C-12 emphasizes the participatory aspect of democracy in order to highlight the voice of young people in her family; C-17 merely wishes to call attention to the fact that a meeting would be called to make a decision, without specific reference to the amount of power carried by the various family members.

Again, giving proper attention to the details of what maps to what is an important part of metaphor analysis. At the same time, however, enough micro-level attention to detail could yield a macro-level phenomenon worth our attention. In the current case, given the presence, limited as it is, of both a set of Nation-as-Family metaphors and of Family-as-Nation metaphors, it is beginning to appear as if there may be two domains, broadly construed, the structure of one of which may occasionally be used to reason about the other. Which aspects of these structures get mapped will vary from context to

context, but it may be the case that the cultural models of the family and societal domains indeed share enough structure that one can be occasionally viewed in terms of the other.<sup>85</sup>

In a moment, we will discuss in more detail how to investigate this similarity, but it is necessary first to delve into a thorny theoretical issue in metaphor studies: what role, if any, similarity plays in metaphor. In George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's landmark (1980) work, *Metaphors We Live By*, they rightly criticize the Aristotelian view, carried down to the present day by various philosophers and linguists, that metaphor primarily expresses similarity between two phenomena. Most importantly, metaphor maps inferences asymmetrically from source domain to target domain. Similarity is a symmetric relationship, so clearly metaphor is not based on similarity. Eventually, the basis for a great deal of this asymmetry was discovered by Joseph Grady (1997b) in his dissertation on primary metaphor. Grady's account goes roughly like this: primary metaphor is based on experiential correlations that take place in early childhood and that get "wired" into our brain's neural circuitry. For instance, the primary metaphor ACHIEVING A PURPOSE IS REACHING A DESTINATION arises out of an experiential correlation between, on the one hand, the sensorimotor (source-concept) experience of arriving at a destination and, on the other hand, the subjective (target-

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<sup>85</sup> For a thorough analysis of a number of domains — all related to competition — that can be either source or target domains for each other, see Pamela Morgan (1998).

concept) feeling of accomplishment that the child experiences upon reaching the destination. There is no similarity between achieving a purpose and reaching a destination; they are merely correlated in experience. Plus, one is a sensorimotor experience while the other is some subjective operation over this sensorimotor experience; again there is no similarity.

However, this does not mean an end to the role of similarity in discussions of metaphor. First, what of non-primary metaphor? It has been speculated that all metaphors may ultimately derive from primary metaphors, but this is as yet a completely unsupported claim. Arguments have been made by Grady for the presence of complex metaphors, such as THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS (see Grady (1997a)), which are formed by combining primary metaphors, but complex and primary metaphors hardly account for all the metaphors in existence. Quite simply, the claim that all metaphors derive from primary metaphors requires much further evidence before it can be taken seriously. And until it is, we must leave open the possibility that there is a large body of metaphors that do not derive from primary metaphors.

Second, even for primary metaphors, similarity may play an important role. While it is obviously true that there is no similarity between, say, achieving a purpose and reaching a destination, this doesn't matter. Framing things in these terms is misleading in that it obfuscates the crucial distinction between the (metonymic)

experiential correlation that gives rise to the metaphor and the post-“differentiation” (Johnson (1999)) metaphor. The underlying question here is: How does the child get from (frame-internal) correlation to (cross-frame) metaphor? Presumably, this can be answered with reference to Grady’s research: over time, as a given experiential correlation gets more and more firmly established in a child’s neural architecture, the child, when achieving purposes other than reaching destinations, will experience a sense of accomplishment that is *subjectively similar to* her sense of accomplishment in reaching a destination. The child will notice the similarity. (Note also the shared aspectual structure between, on the one hand, traveling toward, and ultimately reaching, a destination and, on the other hand, exerting effort — in this case especially non-physical effort — over a prolonged period of time and ultimately achieving one’s purpose.) The fact that this similar sense of accomplishment is experienced in a frame other than that of physical travel towards and arrival at a destination is what turns the original frame-internal correlation into a cross-frame metaphor. Thus even primary metaphors, while based in experiential correlations that involve no similarity, still require similarity in their evolution from frame-internal metonymic correlations to cross-frame metaphorical mappings.

Therefore, while there are good reasons to discard similarity as a be-all-end-all explanation of metaphor, the role of similarity cannot be completely elided. For our

present purposes, this is good news, for it allows us another avenue of investigation in searching for metaphors in a conceptual system: cross-domain similarity of reasoning patterns. This type of evidence is more indirect than overt linguistic evidence, but, given the above justification, is still of some use to us.

So we may ask, now that we have seen in great detail how Chinese and American people reason about certain aspects of the family and society, how similar these reasoning patterns are. Recall that, for the Chinese interviewees, the dominant model for family economic decisionmaking is Final Say, and for deciding what career to pursue is Success. For reasoning about various society-based conflicts and dilemmas, Chinese speakers consistently prefer to think in terms of the Problem Management foundational schema. While the reasoning behind Final Say is not completely clear, it does facilitate the swift resolution of conflicts, and therefore the solving of problems. The Success model, which often conflicts with Follow Your Dreams, privileges practicality — the management of basic economic problems — over individual desires that may threaten economic stability and social prestige. So Problem Management indeed seems to run through Chinese reasoning about both the family and society.

Americans, in responses to questions about society, consistently reason according to the Moral Individual foundational schema. In family matters, they privilege Democracy — specifically, Discussion — and Follow Your Dreams. Both models draw



on aspects of Unique Individual, which is a crucial part of Moral Individual: Discussion (along with its close relative, Everyone's Opinion Matters) values every individual's unique opinion, and Follow Your Dreams is all about a unique individual pursuing what he loves doing. The role of the American privileging of Money Is Power is a bit less clear, but is certainly compatible with models that privilege individual desires — via the connection between money and desire-satisfaction, as argued briefly in Chapter 3 — as well as with (primarily conservative but still generally American) models that connect work with moral character. That is, Money Is Power could be privileged in America in part because of the understanding that people who earn more money (a) have more of a right to satisfy their desires, and (b) should be listened to because of the moral authority inherent in their earning more money.

Conflict is another theme running through the family and societal reasoning of the Americans. Recall the Americans' emphasis on "winning" and "losing" in family conflict, and on direct, conflict-intensive redress of the scenarios presented by both Questions #3 and #5.

Overall, while Americans don't seem to view the family questions in the same explicitly moral terms as the societal questions, still, as far as privileging individual viewpoints and desires, there is strong commonality in how Americans reason about the family and about society.

It is important, however, to point out that there are points of mismatch as well. For instance, the strength of Money Is Power as a family model doesn't necessarily carry over in all ways to social institutions. Even conservatives, who might indeed argue that those who earn more money deserve to have more say in societal affairs, would presumably not argue that wealthy people should get more than one vote in elections. And contrariwise, while Majority Rules forms the political basis of American democracy, we have seen that it is a relatively weak model among Americans in the family context. The key, though, is that the family and societal reasoning patterns are *broadly* similar, if not identical.

At this point, whether we call this similarity in reasoning patterns “metaphorical” or “analogical” is essentially moot. We know there are Nation-as-Family metaphors in both China and the U.S., and Family-as-Nation metaphors at least in China, and almost certainly in the U.S. as well. It is thus possible to reason about either in terms of the other. One's ideas about society are informed by one's ideas about family, and vice versa. It is possible to imagine a person expecting better treatment from the government if her parents have treated her well; it is also possible to imagine someone demanding better treatment from her parents once they become aware of democratic institutions such as the vote.

Still, given the basicness of family versus public experience, we should take seriously Lakoff's (1996) claim that Nation-as-Family enjoys a certain primary status as a metaphorical reasoning pattern, and that family structure crucially underlies public, political belief structures. In this case, we might wish to view Family-as-Nation as a secondary, derivative metaphorical reasoning pattern. Delaney and Emanatian (1997) investigated one possibly-similar metaphorical phenomenon, in which laws in the U.S. in the 1930s and 1940s restricting the movements of Blacks into predominantly white neighborhoods were based on an ecology metaphor, according to which Black migration was construed as "invasion," and restrictive laws preventing migration as "barriers." The urban ecology domain, in turn, using terms such as "invasion," was originally conceived of in terms of military concepts. In the process, there is a "filter effect," according to which the structure of the target domain becomes less and less rich: the ecology domain only exploits some of the structure of the military domain, and the legal domain only exploits some of the structure of the ecology domain.

Something similar may have happened with Nation-as-Family and Family-as-Nation. I have already argued that the various Nation-as-Family metaphors only employ certain aspects of family structure. And Family-as-Nation only employs an extremely small subset of the structure of public institutions: family members are reduced to decisionmaking agents based solely on their voting power (Majority Rules) or, slightly

more complexly, their political voice (Discussion and Everyone's Opinion Matters).

There is no separation of powers, no Constitution, etc.

This is of course highly speculative, absent (a) a detailed diachronic look at the development of these metaphors, and (b) a careful analysis of exactly how public institutions and political beliefs have or haven't been formed based on family structure.

This brief section should be considered more a thought experiment than a serious presentation of data.

Ultimately, for the purposes of this dissertation, it doesn't matter. The most important point is that, to understand people's reasoning patterns about the family, we have to understand their reasoning patterns about society, and vice versa. These two domains are related via a complex system of cultural models, and for this dissertation what is most important is identifying the system, regardless of exactly how these two domains are and have been mutually constitutive.

## Chapter 6: Conclusion

In Chapter 1 a theory of culture was sketched, and a methodology was presented for exploring culture through language. In Chapter 2 I established the need for an empirical investigation into the cultural models underlying beliefs about human rights. Chapters 3-5 presented the empirical findings. In this concluding chapter I tie these findings back into the human rights discourse and show what has been learned in the process.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the findings of the human rights researchers that are closest to mine come from those whose methodologies most closely approximate mine. First is Ming Wan, who, as discussed in Chapter 2, used surveys to paint a picture of Chinese people's beliefs about human rights. His findings support the presence of the Problem Management foundational schema and the concomitant absence, or at least weakness, of the Moral Individual schema. His findings indicate that only one to three percent of Chinese people believe that people are born with the rights to "personal safety, election and dismissal of cadres, and not being abused in confinement." (Wan 1999: 108) Instead, 35-50 percent believe these rights are bestowed by the government. In other words, these rights are not abstract, or, in the terms of Western rights thinkers, "natural." Instead, they only exist to the extent that they are granted by a governing body.

Wan's findings also stress the practical nature of rights:

...the focus for most Chinese is not the inherent value of democracy and human rights but what these concepts can do for their living standards and for the country. People are not convinced that human rights and democracy will necessarily improve daily life, given China's unique conditions. Such views are reinforced by general satisfaction among Chinese with their rising living standards, the country's rising power, and their wish to see a powerful and prosperous China....Such prevailing views among ordinary Chinese explain why human rights and democracy continue to be perceived as foreign concepts removed from daily life.  
(108)

Wan then cites a quote from a *Washington Post* article by a barber from Beijing. The barber, in expressing his opposition to U.S. pressure on China to improve human rights, says: "I live better, I eat better. The rest doesn't matter." (Mufson 1997)

This notion — that human rights are to be supported only to the extent that they can improve people's practical living conditions — is exactly in line with the Problem Management schema and its associated models.

Wan ascribes these views mostly to China's current economic and political environment and how this environment has led to opposition to U.S. pressure. My research indicates that there are also deeper, possibly more stable cultural reasons behind these views, as the questions posed in my research do not directly involve human rights or U.S. pressure on China, and thus are less likely than the surveys cited by Wan to arouse possibly knee-jerk, nationalistic responses. Another way of putting this is to say that lukewarm ideas about human rights are perhaps more likely to be expressed in response to questions specifically about human rights, as the term *rénquán* conjures up negative associations of Western imperialism (whether cultural, economic or political).

Given his methodology, then, Wan is right to focus on economic and political causes for the views expressed; my research provides culture as an added explanation.

The other scholar whose results resonate with mine is Andrew Nathan. Recall from Chapter 2 that Nathan's research uses Chinese constitutions as an ethnographic window into Chinese conceptions of human rights. At least one of his findings closely mirrors those of Wan:

Despite their differences, the series of constitutions established a powerful tradition of continuity with respect to the basic nature of rights. First, in none of the constitutions were rights considered to be derived from human personhood; they were derived from citizenship in the state or, in the case of political rights in the Communist period, from membership in the progressive classes known collectively as "the people." Second, the very variability of rights from constitution to constitution was an important point of continuity. Chinese constitution writers felt able to add and withdraw rights fairly freely because they held that rights are granted by the state and can be changed by the state. (Nathan 1986a: 121)

Once again, human rights are not considered a birthright. And once again, rights are viewed not as abstract and eternal but as concrete and contingent. How else would it be possible for each constitution to offer its own unique list of rights? As we saw above with Wan's research, there are clearly political factors involved: from the standpoint of the state, there is obvious political advantage to considering rights to be defined and granted by the state. However, my research suggests that there are cultural reasons as well for this tendency in Chinese constitutions.

In another essay, Nathan expresses support for a partially culture-based view. This essay, which immediately follows his essay on Chinese constitutions, aims at

finding philosophical roots for the ideas institutionalized in the constitutions. In his conclusion, Nathan summarizes:

The common demands of critics and reformers throughout the century centered on two points: an end to arbitrary repression of individuals by the police and political cadres, and an expanded scope of free speech so that the people could contribute more creatively to the common goal of modernization. One is hard-pressed to find in the voluminous writings of modern dissenters any argument for self-centered individualism, for natural rights as ends in themselves, or for the right of the people to rule without the guidance of an elite party that supposedly knows their interests better than they do. The gap between American and Chinese democratic values thus is wide, not only at the level of official orthodoxies, but at the deeper level of the philosophical assumptions and cultural values that are shared within each country even by contending ideological factions. In short, although both countries value the ideas of democracy and rights, they do so in ways that lead to very different results. (Nathan 1986b: 162)

These findings resonate with mine in several ways. First, the focus on police abuse is reminiscent of the main narrative line of Chapter 4: Chinese interviewees were just as outraged as Americans about abusive police behavior. Second, free speech has been advocated as a means to modernization, not as an end in itself. And third, rights generally are seen not as abstract birthrights, but as concrete, context-specific, problem-solving tools.

What my research adds to Nathan's is twofold. First, we now have a wealth of data from Chinese people who, if "unordinary" in that they are highly educated, are certainly not philosophers or dissidents, and thus provide support from a wider range of the population for Nathan's conclusions. Second, we are now able to problematize more precisely just what the cultural values are that make up these views about human rights.



While Wan's and Nathan's findings are nicely compatible with mine, the work of many others is not. What I will do next is to use my findings as a lens through which to view the discourse produced by some other people who have written about human rights. In particular, we will look at this discourse in terms of universalism, and how Chapters 3-5 have shown certain aspects of universalism to be problematic. Before looking at these texts, however, there is one last finding from the data that needs presenting, for it rounds out the picture to be presented below: the often *prescriptive* nature of Americans' universalist beliefs.

Question #1 asked:

1. Suppose you could create a new society. What would it be like?

11 of the 18 American interviewees say this hypothetical society should be like the United States. Of the seven who do not explicitly pose the U.S. as a model, two say the society should be democratic and capitalist, and two others emphasize the importance of freedom and rights. That means that 15 of the 18 interviewees recommend either the U.S. in its entirety or some (still quite general) important perceived aspect of U.S. society as a model for other societies.<sup>86</sup> Thus, not only do Americans tend to believe in certain

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<sup>86</sup> Interestingly, four of the Chinese interviewees also mention the U.S. as a model. But they raise it differently from the Americans. No one suggests that the American model be applied in toto. Rather, they mention one or two quite specific aspects of the American system — separation of powers, direct elections — and suggest that an ideal society might incorporate these elements. These characteristics of American society are much more specific than “capitalism” or “respect for rights.”

universal aspects of humanity and morality, they also tend to view American society and institutions as universally desirable. We will see this prescriptive aspect of American universalism in some of the writings below.

Paralleling the order of Chapter 2, we first examine the words of a human rights advocate, and then follow it up with texts produced by academics.

We hear first from James D. Seymour, who, in his introduction to a compilation entitled *Tibet through Dissident Chinese Eyes* (Cao and Seymour 1998), contemplates the possibility of China being ruled by more “democratic” powers:

Things would be different then, for China would have a free press and the public would not be kept in captive ignorance. The costs of empire, both financial and moral, would become increasingly obvious and unacceptable. This situation would be like France in the mid-1950s during the final effort to retain Algeria as “an integral part of metropolitan France.” Whatever the context it will not be pleasant, but there is a chance that the end result will be just. And, as Cao notes, justice is essential if genuine democracy is to come to China. This means, first and foremost, a just resolution of China’s various ethnic problems. (Seymour 1998: xxv-xxvi)

I surely do not wish to argue here in favor of China’s policy towards Tibet, but rather to point out some problems with this sort of discourse. This passage involves two now-familiar tendencies. First, the invocation of a universalist notion of right and wrong, as indicated by his use of the words *moral* and *just*. And second, Seymour sees himself as allied with “the public” against a regime that keeps them in “captive ignorance.” I am not certain whether Seymour is American, but at least the moral aspects of the Moral Individual schema are clearly present here. Seymour is presupposing a universalist

notion of *what is right*. His concern here is exclusively with right and wrong. Not only that, but Seymour is *prescribing* a particular vision of right and wrong.

Once again for emphasis: I am not arguing in favor of China's policies towards Tibet. In fact, from a personal standpoint I find the policies repugnant. Which, in a sense, is why I find Seymour's rhetorical approach so counterproductive. Surely part of the project of improving the conditions of humans in the world must involve persuading those with whom we disagree. However, discourse of the sort just cited is not likely to find a sympathetic audience outside of those who already agree. "Ordinary" Chinese people tend, not surprisingly, to view Chinese policies towards Tibet in terms of Problem Management.<sup>87</sup> And since the Chinese government's policies have resulted in improved infrastructure and a higher standard of living in Tibet, it is also not surprising that most Chinese citizens are supportive of the policies. The tightly controlled Chinese press of course plays a large role here — most Chinese citizens are not aware of the government's excesses in Tibet, and so their judgments are often based on one-sided reporting and outright deception — but the cultural side of the question still needs to be addressed.

What I mean by this is that attempts to persuade others of the problematic nature of China's policies in Tibet might enjoy more success if they focused less on universalizing moralistic generalizations and more on concrete problems faced by

Tibetans as a result of Chinese policies. For instance, while it may be the case that living standards are higher now in Tibet than they were in 1950, and that transportation is more convenient, many ordinary Tibetans have suffered tremendously since the P.R.C. decisively took control of Tibet. We have already seen how strongly Chinese interviewees react to the “surprise arrest” scenario in Question #3: we know that Well-Being, Good Reason and Disclosure are all strong models for the Chinese. So, instead of speaking in terms of what is “moral” and “just,” perhaps it would be more effective to describe specific scenarios of abuse of the Tibetan citizenry at the hands of the police. This would not solve the larger problem of information control by the P.R.C. government — that is, not many ordinary Chinese citizens would have access to such texts — but this is true of texts like Seymour’s as well. What such reframings *would* accomplish is improving the odds that Chinese people, whoever and wherever they are, will be persuaded of the problematic nature of Chinese policies in Tibet.

Revisiting the words of some of the academics from whom we heard in Chapter 2, we can now be more precise about how universalism is problematic for them as well.

Recall the following from Margaret Ng’s piece about culture and human rights:

Once it is accepted that political and civil rights are the only rights **proper**, as distinct from welfare rights which are aspirations, the fallacy of rights being culture-bound cannot be maintained. The negative **nature of**

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<sup>87</sup> For a fascinating exposition of these issues, see Hessler (Hessler 1999).

rights, and their **universal validity**, removes the excuse against their immediate and complete implementation. The **true** question is not whether each state may **justifiably** postpone the implementation of rights until certain economic conditions have been achieved. It is, rather, whether the State may **legitimately** violate the rights of the individual in order to attain such collective goals as economic development, or simply to safeguard the continued power of a particular government. **There can be no doubt** what the answer is. (Ng 1995: 70. Emphasis added.)

Ng's passage is full of words and phrases — which I have boldfaced — that presuppose a “God's-eye” view of morality and rights. Ng herself has no objection to using the term *universal*. Plus her discourse is explicitly prescriptivist. Once again, this sort of persuasion is likely to fall on deaf ears.

While Ng lies to the extreme end of the universalist cline, more subtle universalism can be found even in the language of the most careful, balanced scholars. Svensson, for instance, is concerned that the *reductio ad absurdum* of cultural relativism might undermine efforts to study human rights, including her own:

In my view it is impossible to be an advocate of human rights while at the same time adhering to cultural relativism in its more extreme form, because this is the same as value nihilism. Since human rights are rights which we have simply as human beings, they should apply to all people regardless of cultural or national identity. (Svensson 1996: 28)

This is the standard universalist definition of human rights as “natural rights” that humans have simply by dint of being human. Svensson is also aware of the prescriptivist nature of such a conception of rights:

One could also say that the idea of human rights is more prescriptive than descriptive in character. The fact that human rights have their origin in the West does not undermine their universal applicability, and nor [sic] do the

obvious violations of human rights worldwide, including the West, render impossible their future realization. (Svensson 1996: 29)

So while Svensson is aware of the prescriptive nature of the Western conception of human rights, she is not critical of this. She is a rights prescriptivist. Unfortunately for her and others who share her views, however, she seems unaware that this prescriptivism, if not appropriately reframed, might itself impede the production of more effectively persuasive discourse, and therefore the ultimate improvement of people's lives the world over.

There are other ways, too, in which Western human rights scholars are bound by their own cultural presuppositions. Staying for the moment with Svensson, in her Introduction she sets up a dichotomy between "cultural relativism" and "cultural imperialism," and argues that the latter is "the lesser of two evils." (14) Why? Because: "It is important to stand up for the values you believe in." (14) Svensson is Swedish, not American, but in this clear prioritizing of the Personal Principles model she sounds exactly like the American interviewees. Andrew Nathan, another consummately articulate and balanced human rights scholar, expresses something similar in arguing against extreme cultural relativism. After laying out four arguments against an extreme relativist position, he asks rhetorically: "And even if the above points were lacking, do we not finally have the obligation to give voice to the values we believe in, as other have to express theirs?" (Nathan 1986b: 163) His statement is even slightly stronger than

Svensson's: not only *should* we give voice to our Personal Principles, but there is in fact a *moral imperative* that we do so.

Interestingly, both Svensson (27) and Nathan (163) use a relativist argument to undermine relativism, claiming that relativism itself is a product of Western values. What they are unaware of, however, is the culturally-specific nature not of relativism, but of their own universalism. In this connection it is important to make explicit something that until now in this chapter, aside from a hint from Svensson, has remained implicit: the very universalism inherent in the American Moral Individual schema *requires* prescriptivism. If we are morally bound to do the right thing for others by moving trees for them or donating to worthy causes, then surely we are equally bound to work for the ultimate, birth-endowed guarantors of their well-being: human rights. The cultural models that make up the Moral Individual schema require us to see to it that not only we ourselves, but humans the world over are able to have their rights protected. As Svensson says: "To claim for yourself rights which you deny others smacks of hypocrisy and double standards." (14) "Hypocrisy and double standards" must be avoided, as they run counter to the moral consistency, or absolutism, of the Moral Individual schema. So we see the self-perpetuating nature of the universalism of the Moral Individual Schema.

Similarly, the emphasis that the Problem Management schema places on specific contexts and conditions leads to an aversion to universalizing statements and

prescriptions about human rights. Just as a would-be tree-mover's specific situation needs to be taken into consideration before discussing whether he "should" move the tree, every society's specific situation needs to be taken into consideration before discussing what that society "should" do about human rights.

The fact that even the most balanced scholars at times come across like my interviewees tells us that perhaps we are on to something significant: the scholarship of human rights is itself rife with certain cultural presuppositions. And these presuppositions, in going unrecognized, instead of clarifying an already muddy picture, actually run the risk of contributing further to cross-cultural misunderstanding. To make this point just a bit more forcefully, I will quote one last human rights scholar, Jack Donnelly, also cited in Chapter 2 for his strongly universalist definition of human rights.

Near the beginning of his book, *International Human Rights* (Donnelly 1998), Donnelly addresses the question of where human rights come from and how they might be justified:

The human nature that is the source of human rights rests on a moral account of human possibility. It indicates what human beings might become, not what they have been historically or "are" in some scientifically determinable sense. Human rights rest on an account of a life of dignity to which human beings are "by nature" suited. If the rights specified by the underlying theory of human nature are implemented and enforced, they should help to bring into being the envisioned type of person, one who is worthy of such a life. The effective implementation of human rights thus resembles a self-fulfilling moral prophecy.

Unfortunately, no philosophical theory of human nature has widespread acceptance. Although consensus is no measure of truth, without consensus any particular theory — and any action based on it —



is vulnerable to attack. The problem is even more severe when we recognize that many moral theories, and their underlying theories of human nature deny human rights. (Donnelly 1998: 21)

While Donnelly hedges his philosophical statement at times — putting quotation marks around “are” and “by nature” — it is clear that he *believes* this account. He refers at the beginning to “the human nature that *is* the source of human rights”; he begins his second paragraph with *unfortunately*, indicating his preference for a clear philosophical justification of his universalist perspective; and the lack of such a clear justification is a *problem made more severe* by moral theories that contradict the universality of human rights. Donnelly may feel some ambivalence about making a moral statement about human rights and their universality, but in the final analysis he is a universalist.

With his meta-awareness of the moral nature of the view of humanity that he is advocating, Donnelly would not be mistaken for one of the American interviewees. However, the vision he articulates is precisely the vision articulated — if less explicitly — by one after another of the American interviewees. The problem, as with Svensson and Nathan, is a lack of ethnographic introspection on the part of human rights scholars, and the potential damage that this lack of introspection can do both to the goals of cross-cultural understanding and to the very cause so many human rights advocates and scholars hold so dearly: improving the well-being of the people of the world. My intention here, as in Chapter 2, is not to criticize. Rather, my hope is that this

dissertation, in offering a new window through which to view American and Chinese culture, might also provide new ways for scholars and advocates to think about and frame questions of human rights so as to be more effective in bringing about change. Because, after all, I too am an American. I believe in human rights and I want to see them protected and enforced. And I believe that being as self-aware as possible about how one's own cultural assumptions influence one's thinking, speaking and writing can only help in this cause.

Specifically, how might this self-awareness help us in changing actual policies and practices? One difficulty in addressing any issues related to human rights is that, as we have seen, the term *human rights*, along with its Chinese counterpart *rénquán*, is an insufficiently problematized notion: it needs to be unpacked into its component cultural models in order to be understood in the most meaningful ways. What this means is that whenever the term and its "equivalents" are invoked, members of different cultural/linguistic communities are immediately talking past one another, and end up disagreeing about issues where there may actually be more agreement than is immediately apparent. Thus framing issues in terms of "human rights" or "*rénquán*" can obscure common goals, instead emphasizing differences, and lead to ever greater animosity and misunderstanding.

But it doesn't have to be this way. We have seen that some quite basic cultural agreement exists between Chinese and American interviewees, for example, on the level of the Good Reason and Disclosure models. But we were only able to see this after carefully problematizing *human rights/rénquán*. It is a well-known truism of policymaking that things get done when parties can find common ground and shared goals. To the extent, then, that framing issues not in terms of *human rights/rénquán*, but in terms of the underlying cultural models, can unearth shared goals, efforts should be made to find specific policies and to make specific policy recommendations based on the cultural models, not on the disagreement-inducing, insufficiently problematized terminology. In this way I hope that this study has begun to point the way toward more fruitful cross-cultural communication, and ultimately toward policies that result in the better treatment of human beings worldwide.

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## Appendix A: Pinyin transcription guide<sup>88</sup>

The *Hànyǔ Pīnyīn* romanization system, abbreviated simply as ‘pinyin,’ is the official system used in the P.R.C. for romanization of Mandarin Chinese. It is also the system most commonly used outside of China for the study of Chinese.

Each Mandarin syllable consists of three phonological units: an initial (either a consonant or “zero”), a final (the rest of the syllable) and a tone. The guide below is intended to help those with a background in linguistics to approximate Mandarin pronunciations. Nearest IPA equivalents are given for reference.

### Initials

<u>Pinyin</u>	<u>IPA</u>	<u>Description/notes</u>
b-	/p/	voiceless unaspirated bilabial stop
p-	/p <sup>h</sup> /	voiceless aspirated bilabial stop
m-	/m/	voiced bilabial nasal
f-	/f/	voiceless labio-dental fricative
d-	/t/	voiceless unaspirated alveolar stop
t-	/t <sup>h</sup> /	voiceless aspirated alveolar stop
n-	/n/	voiced alveolar nasal
l-	/l/	voiced alveolar lateral
z-	/ts/	voiceless unaspirated dental affricate
c-	/ts <sup>h</sup> /	voiceless aspirated dental affricate
s-	/s/	voiceless dental fricative
j-	/tʃ/	voiceless unaspirated alveolo-palatal affricate
q-	/tʃ <sup>h</sup> /	voiceless aspirated alveolo-palatal affricate
x-	/ç/	voiceless alveolo-palatal fricative
zh-	/ʈʂ/	voiceless unaspirated retroflex affricate
ch-	/ʈʂ <sup>h</sup> /	voiceless aspirated retroflex affricate

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<sup>88</sup> A nod to Zev Handel (personal communication) for his indispensable assistance with this Appendix.

sh-	/ʃ̺/	voiceless retroflex fricative
r-	/ʐ/	voiced retroflex approximant (sometimes fricative); retroflexion is more pronounced than in English /r/
g-	/k/	voiceless unaspirated velar stop
k-	/k <sup>h</sup> /	voiceless aspirated velar stop
h-	/x/	voiceless velar fricative (usually with an uvular articulation)

To this list some add a “zero initial,” which affects transcription of finals. See the table below for details.

### Finals

<u>Pinyin</u>	<u>IPA</u>	<u>Notes</u>
-i	/i/	This vowel’s allophones vary greatly depending on which initial the vowel follows. After dentals (z-, c-, s-) is pronounced [ʒ], but with little frication; after retroflexes (zh-, ch-, sh-, r-), it is pronounced [ʒ̺], also with little frication. Elsewhere it is pronounced [i]. With zero initial, this final is written ‘yi.’
-u	/u/	With zero initial, this final is written ‘wu.’ After j-, q-, and x-, ‘u’ is used to represent /y/ instead of /u/ (see below).
-ü/-u/yu	/y/	The /u/ and /y/ phonemes only contrast after /n/ and /l/, so the umlaut is conventionally left off if the initial is not n- or l-, i.e. if it is j-, q- or x-. With zero initial, this final is written ‘yu.’
-a	/a/	Nothing special to note for this final.
-ia/ya	/ja/	With zero initial, this final is written ‘ya.’
-ua/wa	/wa/	With zero initial, this final is written ‘wa.’
-uo/-o/wo	/wo/	After b-, p-, m- and f- — i.e., initials with a labial component — it is written ‘o.’ With zero initial, this final is written ‘wo.’
-e	/ɛ/	Nothing special to note for this final.
-ie/ye	/je/	With zero initial, this final is written ‘ye.’
-üe/ue/yue	/ɥɛ/	As with -ü, the umlaut is omitted unless the initial is ‘n’ or ‘l.’ With zero initial, this final is written ‘yue.’
-ai	/aj/	Nothing special to note for this final.
-uai/wai	/waj/	With zero initial, this final is written ‘wai.’
-ei	/ej/	Nothing special to note for this final.
-u(e)i/wei	/wej/	With zero initial, this final is written ‘wei.’ Some analyses of

		pinyin list this final as -uei, to show that it is the equivalent of /w/ + /ej/, but it is never written this way in actual transcriptions.
-ao	/aw/	Nothing special to note for this final.
-iao/yao	/jaw/	With zero initial, this final is written 'yao.'
-ou	/ow/	Nothing special to note for this final.
-i(o)u/you	/jow/	With zero initial, this final is written 'you.' Some analyses of pinyin list this final as -iou, to show that it is the equivalent of /j/ + /ow/, but it is never written this way in actual transcriptions.
-an	/an/	Nothing special to note for this final.
-ian/yan	/jan/	With zero initial, this final is written 'yan.' The /a/ is raised to close to [ɛ].
-uan/wan	/wan/	With zero initial, this final is written 'wan.' After j-, q- and x-, 'uan' is used to represent /ɥan / instead of /wan/ (see below).
-üan/uan/yuan	/ɥan/	With zero initial, this final is written 'yuan.' Except for zero initial, this final only appears after j-, q- and x-. It never appears after 'n' or 'l,' so the umlaut is never actually transcribed. The /a/ is raised to close to [ɛ].
-en	/ən/	Nothing special to note for this final.
-in/yin	/in/	With zero initial, this final is written 'yin.'
-u(e)n/wen	/wən/	With zero initial, this final is written 'wen.' With other initials, it is written 'un,' and the phonetic realization is close to [un]. After j-, q- and x-, 'un' is used to represent /yn/ instead of /wen/ (see below).
-ün/-un/yun	/yn/	Except for zero initial, this final only appears after j-, q- and x-. It never appears after 'n' or 'l,' so the umlaut is never actually transcribed. With zero initial it is written 'yun.'
-ang	/aŋ/	The /a/ is backed to near [ɑ].
-iang/yang	/jaŋ/	With zero initial, this final is written 'yang.' The /a/ is slightly backed.
-uang/wang	/waŋ/	With zero initial, this final is written 'wang.' The /a/ is backed to near [ɑ].
-eng	/əŋ/	Nothing special to note for this final.
-ing/ying	/iŋ/	With zero initial, this final is written 'ying.'
-ueng/weng	/wəŋ/	This final only appears with zero initial, and is thus always written as 'weng.'
-ong	/oŋ/	Nothing special to note for this final.
-iong/yong	/joŋ/	With zero initial, this final is written 'yong.'

-er                    / > /        Despite the VC pinyin transcription, phonologically this is a single (vowel) segment, similar to / > / in American English, but with a more open articulation. Sounds close to American English “are,” but with more severe retroflexion. This final always appears with zero initial.

Sometimes a pinyin syllable will be encountered with ‘-r’ added to an otherwise complete syllable. This is used to represent what is called *érhuànyīn*, or rhotacization, an interesting phonological phenomenon in certain (mostly northern) Mandarin dialects. Rhotacized syllables result from the fusion of ordinary syllables with the sub-syllabic suffix -r (which is derived from *er*). The resulting forms are realized with rhotacization of the vowel, accompanied by various other vowel deformations. The original endings of the syllables (i.e. off-glides and nasal endings) are generally elided, but the velar nasal ending leaves its trace in nasalization of the vowel. Rhotacization serves certain derivational-morphophonemic functions, such as diminution and colloquiality.

### Tones

There are four tones in Mandarin, plus a fifth “neutral tone,” which involves shortening and reduction of the vowel, along with contextual determination of the voice pitch. The pinyin symbols for the four tones are intended to be iconic for voice pitch. (Neutral tone has no diacritic.) The table below explains in more detail.

<u>Tone</u>	<u>Example</u>	<u>Notes</u>
1	ā	High-steady, equivalent to 55 on the Y.R. Chao scale.

2	á	Rising, equivalent to 35.
3	ǎ	In most contexts, low, equivalent to 11. However, before a pause it is pronounced roughly 213, and before another third tone it is pronounced like a second tone, i.e. 35.
4	à	Falling, equivalent to 51.

Mandarin, unlike many other Chinese languages (or “dialects”) has relatively few sandhi rules. There are some lexically-specified sandhi rules for certain syllables, most notably the negator *bù* and the number ‘one,’ *yī*. Before a fourth-tone syllable, *bù* and *yī* both change to second tone. Before a syllable of any other tone, *yī* changes to fourth tone. *Yī* is pronounced in the first tone only when counting or when representing the digit ‘1’.

#### Transcription conventions in this dissertation

I have given generally broad transcriptions. I mean this in two ways. First, in cases of tone sandhi, I have transcribed the lexically-specified tone rather than the sandhi tone. Thus, for example, for ‘not right,’ I have transcribed *bù duì*, even though the phonetic realization is *bú duì*.

Second, some of the interviewees are from South China, where the retroflex series of initials has merged into the dental series. There is no distinction, for instance, between ‘long,’ *cháng*, and ‘to store,’ *cáng*. Both are pronounced /ts<sup>h</sup>aŋ/. In my transcriptions, however, I have maintained the standard-Mandarin transcriptions, in the interests of consistency and clarity.





## Appendix B: Interlinear gloss abbreviations

ADV	adverbializer
ATT	attributivizer
CHG	change of situation
CLAS	classifier
COMP	comparative
COND	conditional marker
CONT	continuous aspect
CRS	currently relevant state particle (akin to English present perfect)
DEG	degree marker
EMPH	emphasis
EXP	experiential marker
FILL	conversational space-filler
INC	inceptive
LOC	locative
MOOD	mood particle
NOM	nominalizer
NOM	nominalizer
ORD	ordinal marker
PART	partitive
PASS	passivizer
PERF	perfect (completive) particle
PROG	progressive aspect marker
POS	possessive
QU	question particle
REL	relativizer
SUG	Suggestion particle
TOP	topicalizer

## Appendix C: Interlinear glosses of Chinese data

### Chapter 3

#### 3-1:

C-11	Māma Mom	xiǎng want	mǎi, buy,	bàba Dad	bù not	tóngyì, agree,
	māma Mom	zěnmē how	gēn with	tā 3-sg	zhēngbiàn argue	ne? MOOD
C-10	Lǐyóu Reason	hěn very	jiǎndān, simple,	wǒ 1-sg	jiù then	
	kāi open	xīn new	chē vehicle	de ATT	qìpái license plate	a, MOOD,
	gǎnjué feeling	hǎo good	a. MOOD.	[laughter]	Wǒmen 1-pl	jiā family
	kěndìng... definitely...	zhèige this	shìqing matter	kěndìng definitely	shì be	bàba Dad
	shuō say	le PERF	suàn. drop.			
C-11	Wǒ 1-sg	xiāngxìn. believe.	Wǒmen 1-pl	jiā family	kěndìng definitely	
	shì be	māma Mom	shuō say	le PERF	suàn. drop.	Ā, Hey,
	wǒmen 1-pl	jiā family	xiànzài now	yǒu have	zhème this	yī one
	zhǒng type	qíngkuàng. situation.	Wǒmen 1-pl	jiā family	diànshìjī TV set	yǐjīng already
	tǐng very	pò broken	de. NOM.	Ránhòu Afterward	xiànzài now	túxiàng picture
	yě also	bù not	hǎo, good,	shēngyīn sound	yě also	bù not

hǎo. good.	Wǒ 1-sg	jiù then	qiángliè strongly	yāoqiú demand	mǎi buy
ge CLAS	xīn new	de, NOM,	wǒ 1-sg	bà dad	yě also
qiángliè strongly	yāoqiú demand	mǎi buy	ge CLAS	xīn new	de, NOM,
wǒ 1-sg	mā mom	bù not	tóngyì, agree,	yě also	shuō say
tài too	huā spend	qián money	le, MOOD,	shuō say	zhèi this
ge CLAS	hái still	yào will	zài still	kàn watch	jǐ several
nián year,	nà so	wǒ 1-sg	mā mom	zuìhòu in the end	shuō say
le PERF	jiù then	suàn drop	le. PERF.	Wǒ 1-sg	mā mom
shuō say	wǒmen 1-pl	bù not	mǎi buy	jiù then	bù not
mǎi. buy.	Nà, Well,	nǐmen 2-pl	jiā family	kěndìng definitely	jiùshi just
nǐ 2-sg	bà dad	shuō say	mǎi buy	jiù then	mǎi. buy.
Zhèi This	ge CLAS	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	hǎoxiàng seemingly	hé with
fùmǔ parents	de POSS	jīngjì economic	qíngkuàng ... situation...	zìjǐ self	gèrén individual
de POSS	shōurù income	qíngkuàng situation	méiyǒu not have	shénme any	hěn very
dà	de	guānxi.			

big ATT relationship.

3-2:

C-18

Zuìhòu In the end	juédìng decide	zěnmē how	zuò? do?	Zhèi This	ge... CLAS...
zhèi this	ge CLAS	lizi example	lǐ inside	ha, MOOD,	gěi give
chūlái come out	le PERF	bàba Dad	māma Mom	liǎng two	ge CLAS
rén person	gōngzuò work	sìshí forty	ge CLAS	xiǎoshí, hour,	lǐng earn
yíyàng same	de ATT	gōngzī, salary,	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	zhèi this
ge CLAS	lǐng... earn...	zài LOC	Zhōngguó China	zhèi this	ge CLAS
jiāting family	lǐtou, inside,	lǐng earn	duōshǎo how much	qián money	huòzhě or
shuō say	lǐng earn	gōngzī salary	de ATT	gāo-dī, amount,	jiù then
shuō say	zài LOC	zhèi this	ge CLAS	jiāting family	zhōng middle
zhèi this	ge CLAS	juécè final decision	de ATT	qǔxiàng tendency	shì be
bù not	chéng form	zhèngbǐ ratio	de. NOM.	Wǒ 1-sg	de POSS
yìsi meaning	jiù then	shuō say	yǒude some	jiā family	lǐtou inside
jiùshi just	nǚ women	fāng party	zuò, be,	jiù then	shuō say
yìxiē...	zài	yìxiē	zhòngdà	juédìng	dāngzhōng

	some...	LOC	some	important	decision	among
	lái come	shuō, say,	zhǔyào mostly	yóu by	nǚ woman	fāng party
	lái come	juédìng. decide.	Zài LOC	yìxiē some	jiāting family	zhōng middle
	zhǔyào mostly	yóu by	nán male	fāng party	lái come	juédìng. decide.
	Zhèi This	ge CLAS	shì be	gēn with	tā 3-sg	zhèi this
	ge CLAS	jiāting family	lǐ inaide	shéi who	zhèng earn	qián money
	duōshǎo how much	shì be	méiyǒu not have	rènhe any	guānxi relationship	de. NOM.
	Yīnwèi Because	zài LOC	Zhōngguó China	jiāting family	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think
	zhèi this	shì be	fēicháng extremely	pǔbiàn common	de ATT	yī one
	jiàn CLAS	shìqing. matter.	Shéi Who	shuō, say,	zhè this	shì be
	qǔjuéyú depend	píngshí normally	zhèi this	ge CLAS	jiāting family	dāngzhōng, among,
	shéi... who...					
C-19	Shuō Say	le PERF	suàn. drop.			
C-18	Shéi Who	shuō say	le PERF	suàn, drop,	huòzhě or	shuō say
	yòng use	bǐjiào comparatively	zhèngshì formal	de ATT	yǔyán language	shuō say
	jiù	shuō	shéi	de...	shéi	zài

then	say	who	POSS...	who	LOC
zhèixiē these	zhòngdà important	juécè final decision	shàng on	zhǔyào mostly	zuò make
zhǔyào important	juédìng. decision.	Rúguǒ If	tā 3-sg	bàba dad	jīngcháng often
zuò make	yìxiē some	dà big	de ATT	juédìng, decision,	jiǎrú for example
shuō say	zhèi this	ge CLAS	jiā family	de POSS	yìxiē some
dà big	de ATT	kāixiāo expenditure	a, MOOD,	dà big	de ATT
yìxiē some	nèige FILL	juédìng decision	de ATT	zhèige FILL	juécè final decision
dōu all	yóu by	tā 3-sg	bàba dad	lái come	zuò make
chū out	dehuà, if,	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	tāmen 3-pl	jiā family
kěndìng definitely	bù not	huì will	mǎi buy	zhèi this	liàng CLAS
chē. car.	Dàn But	rúguǒ if	xiāngfǎn opposite	shì be	tā 3-sg
māma mom	zuò make	zhǔyào important	juécè final decision	dehuà if	tāmen 3-pl
jiù then	huì will	mǎi buy	yī one	liàng CLAS	xīn new
chē. car.					

## 3-3:

C-18	Jiùshi That is	shuō, say,	zhèige FILL	jiùshi FILL	Zhōng-Měi China-U.S.	zhījiān between
	de ATT	yī one	zhǒng type	chāyì, difference,	wǒ I	juéde think
	kěnéng. maybe.	Zài LOC	Měiguó U.S.	kěnéng maybe	jiù FILL	shuō FILL
	dàjiā everyone	zhèi this	ge CLAS	jiāting family	lǐ... inside...	nǐ 2-sg
	yào want	shuō say	mínzhǔ democracy	yě also	hǎo, good,	zhèi this
	ge CLAS	juécè final decision	ba, SUG,	kěnéng maybe	jiù just	jiànli build
	zài LOC	yī one	zhǒng type	jiù FILL	shuō FILL	duōshù... majority...
	shǎoshù minority	fúcong follow	duōshù majority	zhèi this	zhǒng type	jīchǔ foundation
	shàng. on.	Wǒ 1-sg	kěnéng maybe	duì toward	Měiguó U.S.	shèhui society
	bù not	tài too	liǎojiě. understand.	Dàn But	zài LOC	Zhōngguó China
	shèhui, society,	jiù FILL	shuō, FILL,	yī one	ge CLAS	nánrén man
	hé and	yī one	ge CLAS	nǚrén woman	jiéhūn marry	yǐhòu, after,
	jiù then	zài LOC	zhèi this	ge... CLAS...		
C-19	Jiù Just	zìrán'érrán natural	de ADV	xíngchéng form	de. NOM.	
C-18	Zài	jiāting	yī	zhǒng	zìrán'érrán	xíngchéng

	LOC	family	one	type	natural	form
	le PERF	zhèi this	zhǒng... type...	jiù FILL	shuō FILL	zhèi this
		zhǒng... type...				
C-19	Móshì. Pattern.					
C-18	Móshì, Pattern,	duì. right.	Dàodǐ Ultimately	shì be	zhèi this	ge CLAS
	nánrén man	zài LOC	zhèi this	ge CLAS	jiāting family	lǐ inside
	zuòzhǔ, rule,	háishi or	nǚrén woman	zài LOC	zhèi this	ge CLAS
	jiāting family	lǐ inside	zuòzhǔ. rule.			
Me	Ò. Oh.	Xiànzài Now	Zhōngguó China	shèhuì society	ne, MOOD,	dàduōshù... majority...
C-18	Wǒ I	juéde think	bǎifēnzhī percent	liùshí sixty	de ATT	jiāting family
	kěnéng maybe	hái still	shì be	zhèi this	yàng type	de. NOM.
C-19	Duì. Right	Huì Will	yǒu have	yī one	ge CLAS	rén person
	zuòzhǔ. rule.					
C-18	Huì Will	yǒu have	yī one	ge CLAS	rén person	zuòzhǔ. rule.
<b>3-5:</b>						
C-21	Zài LOC	Zhōngguó, China,	zhèi this	māma mom	hěn very	lihai. lihai.



Me	Shì Be	ma? QU?				
C-21	Mǎi Buy	dōngxi... thing...				
Me	Shì Be	māma mom	bǐ than	bàba dad	lihai lihai	ma? QU?
C-21	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde. think.				
C-20	Shì. Right.	Mm. Hm.	Zài LOC	Zhōngguó... China...		
C-21	Wǒ 1-sg	jiā, family,	wǒ 1-sg	lihai lihai	o. MOOD	
Me	Shì Be	ma? QU?	[laughter]			
C-20	Zài LOC	Zhōngguó, China,	qūxiàng tend	yú toward	mǔqīn mother	zuò... make...
C-21	Zuò Make	juédìng. decision.				
C-20	Jiùshi Then	shuō, say,	bìng at all	búshì not	shuō say	zìjǐ oneself
	bù not	duì, right,	fēi must	yě also	bìxū must	tīngcóng follow
	nǚ woman	fāng party	de, ATT,	ér but	shì be	shuō say
	nán male	de NOM	wúsuǒ... not care...	jiùshi FILL	shuō... FILL...	
C-21	Jiùshi Just	ràng yield	tā. 3-sg.			
C-20	...wúsuǒwèi ...not care	jiù then	hěn... very...			

C-21	Ràng Yield	tā. 3-sg.				
C-20	...ràng ...yield	zhe, CONT,	ràng yield	zhe CONT	nǚ... woman...	
C-21	Nǚde Woman	jiù just	fēi must	yào must	jiānchí maintain	yìjian, opinion,
	nánde man	yìbān generally	bù not	jiānchí, maintain,	zài LOC	jiā family
	lǐ. inside.					
C-20	Zài LOC	jiā home	lǐ inside	de, ATT,	nǚ 2-sg	shuō say
	zěnmeyàng how	jiù then	kěyǐ, okay,	kěyǐ. okay.	Nánde Man	wúsuǒwèi. not care.
<b>3-10:</b>						
C-14	Nà Well	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	dàjiā everyone	yīnggāi should	huì will
	zuòxiàlai sit down	yíkuàir together	tǎolùn discuss	zhèi this	ge CLAS	shì. matter.
	Dànshi But	zhèi this	jiàn CLAS	shì matter	kànqǐlái appear	jiù FILL
	shuō FILL	yào want	mǎi buy	xīn new	chē car	de ATT
	rén person	shíshàng in fact	zhàn stand	le PERF	shàngfēng, upper hand,	yīnwèi because
	māma Mom	hé and	Lǐ Sì Li Si	kěndìng definitely	dōu all	shì be
	yuànyì want	mǎi buy	xīn new	chē car	de. NOM.	Nà Then

wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	rúguǒ if	shì be	yìbān common	jiāting family
dōu all	shì be	shǎoshù minority	fúcong follow	duōshù majority	ba. SUG.
Kěnéng Maybe	yǒu have	yìxiē some	tèbié especially	chuántǒng traditional	de ATT
jiāting, family,	tā 3-sg	shì be	fùqin father	de POSS	nèige FILL
juédìng decision	shì be	zuì most	zhòngyào important	de. NOM.	Zhèi This
yàngzi way	jiù then	huì will	fùqin father	shuō say	le PERF
suàn, drop,	nǎpà even if	shì be	māma Mom	hé and	Lǐ Sì Li Si
dōu all	shuō say	yào want	mǎi buy	yào want	mǎi, buy,
dànshi but	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	xiànzài now	yuèláiyuèduō more and more	de ATT
jiāting family	dàn but	shì be	shǎoshù minority	fúcong follow	duōshù, majority,
jiù then	shuō say	sān three	ge CLAS	rén, person,	èr two
bǐ compare	yī on	liǎng two	ge CLAS	rén person	dōu all
shuō say	yào want	mǎi, buy,	yī one	ge CLAS	rén person
nǐ 2-sg	bàba dad	shuō say	bù not	mǎi, buy,	nà then
bù not	xíng, work,	wǒmen 1-pl	liǎng two	ge CLAS	rén person

dōu	shuō	mǎi,	nà	jiù	mǎi
all	say	buy,	well	then	buy

le.  
PERF.

**3-11:**

C-19	Yǒude Some	jiāting family	hái still	huì will	tóupiào vote	a... MOOD...
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juédìng.  
decide.

C-18	Duì. Right.	Zhèi This	shì be	bǐjiào comparatively	mínzhǔ democratic	de ATT
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jiāting.  
family

C-19	Mm. Mm hm.
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C-18	Dànshi But	zhèi this	zhǒng type	jiāting family	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think
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yìxiē.  
somewhat.

C-19	Xiànzài Now	yě also	tǐng very	duō many	de. NOM.
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**3-12:**

C-17	Zǔ... Organize...	zǔ organize	nèige, FILL,	zhàokāi call	jiāting family	huìyì meeting
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	le. PERF.	Xiànzài... Now...	xiànzài now	wǒ 1-sg	juéde, think,	qǐmǎ at least
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	wǒ 1-sg	bǐjiào comparatively	shóuxī familiar	de ATT	nèi that	zhǒng type
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	jiāting family	gòuchéng process	yìbān generally	dōu all	hěn very	shǎo few
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	yǒu have	fùmǔ parents	liǎng two	ge CLAS	rén person	jiù... just...
	jiù just	zuòchū make	juédìng decision	ránhòu afterwards	jiù just	tōngzhī notify
	zhèi this	ge CLAS	háizi child	suàn drop	le. PERF.	Yìbān Generally
	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	hái still	tǐng very	zūnzhòng respect	háizi child
	juédìng decision	ne, MOOD,	huì will	jiùshi FILL	yǒu have	shénme some
	dà big	shì matter	ránhòu afterwards	huì will	dàjiā everyone	huì will
	yíkuàir together	tǎolùn discuss	a, MOOD,	shénmede. and such.		
C-16	Duì. Right.	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	yě also	shì. be.	
<b>3-13:</b>						
C-12	Tā 3-sg	de POS	bàba dad	māma mom	hé and	Lǐ Sì Li Si
	huì will	shuō say	shénme... what...	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	rúguǒ if
	zhèige this	qíngkuàng situation	yào want	fēn divide	hěn very	duō... many...
	rúguǒ if	yàoshi if	shuō say	tā 3-sg	de POS	fùmǔ, parents,
	quèshí really	shòu receive	de ATT	jiàoyu education	bǐjiào comparatively	gāo high
	nèi that	céngcì level	dehuà... if...	yīnwèi because	tā 3-sg	nénggòu can

mǎi buy	liǎng two	liàng CLAS	qìchē car	zhèi this	yàng, type,
gōngzuò work	yě huì also will		bǐjiào comparatively	hǎo, good,	nènme then
tā 3-sg	kěnéng definitely	jiāting family	jiù then	huì will	hěn very
mínzhǔ, democratic,	tā 3-sg	jiù then	huì will	hé... with...	jiù then
huì will	dàjiā all	gēn with	háizi child	hěn very	píngděng equal
de ADV	zhèi this	yàng type	lái come	jiǎng, talk,	wǒmen 1-pl
xiànzài now	chǔyú be at	shénme what	yàng type	de ATT	qíngkuàng, situation,
wǒmen 1-pl	dǎsuàn plan	zěnmeyàng how	lái come	zuò, do,	gèzì each
yǒu have	shénme what	yàng type	de ATT	lǐyóu, reason,	nǐ 2-sg
shì be	huì will	shénme what	yàng type	de ATT	yìjian, opinion,
zhè this	shì be	yī one	zhǒng. type.	Hái Still	yǒu have
yī one	zhǒng, type,	jiùshi FILL	shuō FILL	chúncuì pure	shì be
xiàng resemble	suǒwèi so-called	bàofāhù get-rich- quick	nèi that	yàng type	de ATT
chū out	lái come	dehuà, if,	nènme then	kěnéng maybe	jiù just
gēnběn at all	bù not	huì... would...	yěxǔ perhaps	huì would	gēn with

	háizi child	jiǎng, talk,	yěxǔ perhaps	bù not	huì, would,	jiùshi just
	fùmǔ parents	zhèi this	yàng type	lái come	dìng, settle,	zěnmeyàng how
	lái come	zuò. do.				
<b>3-14:</b>						
Me	Suīrán Although	jiùshi FILL	duōshù majority	dāngzhōng among	yī one	ge CLAS
	jiùshi be	xiǎoháizi? child?				
C-14	Dànshi But	tā, 3-sg,	xiǎoháizi child	tā 3-sg	yě also	bù not
	shì be	liǎng two	sān three	suì, years old,	yīnwèi because	shíqī seventeen
	suì years old	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	nánháizi boy	zài LOC	jiā home
	hěn very	yǒu have	dìwei position	le. MOOD.		
<b>3-15:</b>						
C-12	...zài ...LOC	wǒmen 1-pl	jiā family	suīrán although	wǒ 1-sg	zhèng earn
	qián money	hěn very	duō, much,	dànshi but	wǒ 1-sg	cónglái never
	dōu all	shì be	yào want	shāngliang discuss	zhe CONT	lái. come.
C-13	Nà Then	nǐ 2-sg	māma mom	nèi that	dài generation	ne? as for?
	Nǐ	bàba	hé	nǐ	māma?	Shéi

	2-sg	dad	and	2-sg	mom?	Who
	shuō say	le PERF	suàn? drop?			
C-12	Méiyǒu Not have	shéi anyone	shuō say	le PERF	suàn. drop.	Yě Also
	shì be	jiùshi FILL	yīnwèi because	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	hǎoxiàng apparently
	tāmen 2-pl	jiù just	tǐng very	mínzhǔ democratic	de. NOM.	Bāokuò Include
	jiù FILL	duì for	háizi, child,	tāmen 3-pl	zhījiān among	shénme whatever
	shìqing matter	dōu all	shì be	yídìng definitely	shāngliang discuss	zhe CONT
	lái. come.	Ránhòu Afterward	rúguǒ if	zhēnde really	dà big	shìqing matter
	dehuà, if,	dōu all	yào want	háizi child	lái come	yìqǐ together
	lái come	shuō, talk,	lái come	pīnpīnmìngmìng fervent	de ADV	tí raise
	yìjian suggestion	huò or	zěnmeyang. how.			
C-13	Ò, Oh,	nà so	nǐmen 2-pl	jiā family	hěn very	mínzhǔ. democratic
C-12	Duì Right	a. MOOD.				
<b>3-19:</b>						
C-18	Nǐ 2-sg	juéde think	tā 3-sg	bà dad	gēn and	mā mom
	zěnme how	xiǎng? think?	Zěnme How	jiǎng? say?		



C-19	Tā 3-sg	bà dad	huì will	jíli fervent	fǎnduì. oppose.	Huì... Will...
	huì will	bǎichū lay out	gè every	zhǒng type	gè every	yàng type
	de ATT	lǐyóu reason	huì will	shuō say	wǒ 1-sg	gōngzuò work
	zhème this	xīnkǔ, laborious,	zhèng earn	zhème this	diǎnr little	qián, money,
	ránhòu afterward	yòu also	yào must	yǎng care for	yī one	liàng CLAS
	xīn new	chē, car,	yòu also	yào must	yǎng care for	yī one
	liàng CLAS	jiù old	chē car	wǒ 1-sg	hái also	yào must
	yǎng care for	nǐmen 2-pl	niáng wife	liǎ. two.		
C-18	Búguò Still	tā 3-sg	māma mom	yě also	zìjǐ self	yǒu... have...
C-19	Nà That	zhǐ only	shì be	yī one	bànr half	a. MOOD.
<b>3-20:</b>						
C-21	Dànshi But	zhèi this	ge... CLAS...	qìchē car	kěnéng maybe	bǐjiào comparatively
	dà, big,	duì for	Zhōngguó China	rén person	lái come	jiǎng say
	a. MOOD.	Bǐrúshuō For example	huàn exchange	yī one	ge CLAS	diànshìjī, TV set,
	diànshì TV	kěnéng maybe	jiù... just...	nèi that	ge CLAS	nǚde woman

shuō say	jiù just	xíng, okay,	dànshi but	rúguǒ if	tāmen 3-pl
jiā family	de POS	gōngzuò... work...	tā 3-sg	liǎng two	zhèng earn
de NOM	yíyàng same	gōngzī, salary,	dōu all	yíyàng same	duō, much,
érqiě also	ne, MOOD,	jiùshi FILL	shuō FILL	mǎi buy	yī one
ge CLAS	chē car	duì for	tā 3-sg	jiā family	jīngjì economic
fùdān burden	fēicháng extremely	dà big	dehuà, if,	kěnéng maybe	děi must
jiè borrow	qián, money,	rúguǒ if	shuō say	nǐ 2-sg	yào must
zài LOC	wèntí problem	shèdìng, suppose,	rúguǒ if	xūyào must	jiè borrow
qián money	dehuà, if,	kěnéng maybe	jiù just	liǎng two	ge CLAS
rén person	jiù then	zài LOC	shāngliang, discuss,	a, MOOD,	yào want
bù not	yào want	zhèi this	qián money	a MOOD	shénme. FILL.
Rúguǒ If	tāmen 3-pl	liǎ two	yǒu have	qián money	kěnéng maybe
jiù then	nǚde woman	jiù just	huì will	zuò make	juédìng. decision.

**3-28:**

C-13 Nǚde  
Woman

shuō  
say

le  
PERF

suàn  
drop

ba?  
SUG?

C-12 Wǒ

juéde

zhème

dà

de

shìqing

	1-sg	think	so	big	ATT	matter
	dehuà if,	yìbān general	bù not	huì would	shuō say	yī one
	ge CLAS	rén person	lái come	zuòzhǔ rule	zhèi this	ge CLAS
	juéding. decision.					
C-13	Shì Be	ma? QU?				
C-12	Duì, Yes,	yīnwèi because	zhè this	shì matter	hěn very	dà big
	liàng amount	de ATT	zhīchū, expenditure,	nǐ 2-sg	búshì not	mǎi buy
	xiǎo small	dōngxì thing	ma, MOOD,	nǐ 2-sg	mǎi buy	qìchē car
	ma, MOOD,	nà so	yídìng definitely	huì would	shì be	liǎng two
	ge CLAS	rén person	lái come	shāngliang discuss	de. NOM.	
<b>3-29:</b>						
C-18	Jiù Just	xiàng resemble	jiā family	lǐ inside	yìbān general	mǎi buy
	ge CLAS	diànshì TV	a, MOOD,	huò or	mǎi buy	ge CLAS
	shénme whatever	zhèi this	yàng type	bǐjiào comparatively	guì expensive	de ATT
	yìxiē some	dōngxì, thing,	zài LOC	Zhōngguó China	háishi still	bǐjiào comparatively
	guì expensive	de ATT	dōngxì, thing,	dōu all	shì be	liǎng two

	ge CLAS	rén person	shāngliang. discuss.	Xiān First	shì be	shāngliang. discuss.
	Dàn But	zuìhòu, in the end,	jiù just	shuō say	juéding, decision,	jué... decide...
	qǐ serve	juécè final decision	zuòyòng function	de NOM	wǎngwǎng always	jiùshi be
	yī one	ge CLAS	rén. person			
C-19	Duì. Right.					
C-18	Jiù FILL	shuō FILL	shāngliang discuss	de ATT	shíhou time	kěndìng definitely
	yào will	liǎng two	ge CLAS	rén person	tóngshí same time	lái come
	shāngliang, discuss,	bù not	kěnéng possible	yī one	ge CLAS	rén person
	shuō say	mǎi buy	le PERF	jiù then	kěndìng... definitely...	mǎshàng immediately
	jiù then	gěi for	mǎi buy	huí lái. return.	Jiùshi FILL	zài LOC
	shāngliang discuss	de POS	guòchéng process	zhōng during	liǎng two	ge CLAS
	rén, person,	jiù FILL	shuō FILL	hùxiāng mutual	jiéhūn marry	yìdiǎn awhile
	tā 3-sg	zuìhòu in the end	zhēnzhèng real	juécè decide	le PERF	hái still
	yào will	yǒu have	yī one	ge CLAS	rén. person.	

3-36:

C-19	Jíshǐ, Even if,	jiǎrúshuō suppose	zhèi this	ge CLAS	jiāting family	shì be
	zhèi this	ge CLAS	bàba dad	zuòzhǔ rule	dehuà, if,	jíshǐ even if
	tā 3-sg	māma mom	háishi still	xiǎng want	mǎi buy	xīn new
	chē, car,	dànshi but	tā 3-sg	yě also	huì woul	hěn... very...
	jiùshuō, that is,	búshì not	shuō say	hěn very	qíngyuàn, willing,	dànshi but
	yě also	búshì not	shuō say	shì be	jíwéi extremely	fǎngǎn opposed
	de NOM	qù go	zūncóng follw	zhèi this	ge CLAS	bàba dad
	de POS	yìjian. opinion.	Huì Woul	zhèi this	yàng. way.	Jíshǐ Even if
	zhèi this	ge... CLAS...	jiǎrúshuō suppose	zhèi this	ge CLAS	jiāting family
	lǐ inside	shì be	zhèi this	ge CLAS	māma mom	zuòzhǔ rule
	dehuà, if,	tāmen 3-pl	zhèi this	ge CLAS	bàba dad	yě also
	huì woul	jiùshi FILL	shuō... FILL...	búshì not	hěn very	qíngyuàn, willing,
	dànshi but	yě also	bù not	huì would	jǐlì fervent	fǎnduì oppose
	de EMPH	nèi that	yàng type	de, NOM,	huì would	nào yell
	de so much that	jiā family	lǐ inside	tiānfāndìfù, earthshaking,	ránhòu afterward	chǎo argue

	qǐ begin	jià, argument,	yě also	bù not	huì would	zhèi this
	yàng. type.					
C-18	Duì, Right,	duì. right.				
C-19	Jiùshi... Just...	jiùshi just	huì would	zūncóng follow	qízhōng among them	yī one
	ge CLAS	rén person	de POS	yìjian. opinion.		
<b>3-37:</b>						
C-11	Fùmǔ Parents	fǎnduì oppose	wǒ 1-sg	zěnmébàn? do what?	Wǒ 1-sg	kěndìng definitely
	bù not	huì would	shuō say	fùmǔ parents	qiángliè ferverently	fǎnduì disagree
	de ATT	shìqing matter	wǒ 1-sg	yīdìng definitely	yào must	qù go
	zuò. do.	Wǒ 1-sg	de POS	fùmǔ parents	zhēnde really	fǎnduì oppose
	wǒ 1-sg	kěndìng definitely	jiù just	huì would	gēn with	wǒ 1-sg
	fùmǔ parents	tuǒxié. compromise	Zhè This	shì be	wǒ 1-sg	zìjǐ self
		.				
	gèxìng character	de ATT	wèntí. question.			
[...]						
	Búguò Still	wǒ 1-sg	rúguǒ if	shì be	Wáng Èr Wang Er	de POS

	fùmǔ parents	dehuà, if,	wǒ 1-sg	kěndìng definitely	huì would	gēn with
	tā 3-sg	shuō say	wǒ 1-sg	xīwàng hope	tā 3-sg	kǎoshàng test into
	dàxué university	yǐhòu after	zài LOC	xuéxiào school	lǐ inside	háishi still
	kěyǐ can	qù go	wánr play	tā 3-sg	de POS	yīnyuè. music.
	Zhèi This	liǎng two	ge CLAS	shìqing matter	bìng at all	búshì not
	nènme so	máodùn. contradictory.				
C-10	Dànshi But	shàng attend	dàxué university	duì for	tā 3-sg	de POS
	zhèi this	ge CLAS	yáogǔn rock	yuètuán band	bāngzhù help	dà big
	ma? QU?	Jiùshuō That is	nǐ 2-sg	wèishenme why	hái still	xūyào need
	tā 3-sg	shàng attend	dàxué? university?	Rúguǒ If	tā 3-sg	xiǎng want
	chéngwéi become	yī one	ge CLAS	yáogǔn... rock...		
C-11	Yīnwèi Because	wǒ 1-sg	duì toward	tā 3-sg	de POS	qiántú prospect
	bù not	míngliǎo. clear.	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	dú study	dàxué university
	dehuà if	qǐmǎ at least	tā 3-sg	jiù then	hái still	kěyǐ can
	zhǎo find	fèn CLAS	xiāngduì relatively	lái come	shuō say	hǎo good

	diǎnr COMP	gōngzuò work	yǎnghù care for	zìjǐ self	ba. SUG.	Nǐ 2-sg
	yàoshi if	zǔ form	yī one	ge CLAS	yáogǔn rock	yuètuán band
	nǐ 2-sg	xiànzài now	yě also	bù not	dúshū study	le, CHG,
	nǐ 2-sg	wèilái future	jiù then	huì will	zěnmeyang? how?	
<b>3-38:</b>						
C-12	Wǒ 1-sg	háishi still	juéde think	tā 3-sg	yīnggāi should	shàng attend
		dàxué. university.				
C-13	Shàng Attend	dàxué. university.				
C-12	Duì. Right	Yīnwèi... Because...				
C-13	Gāozhōng High school	shì be	bù not	gòu enough	de. NOM	
C-12	Érqiě Also	shàng attend	dàxué university	gēn with	tā 3-sg	zǔ form
	yáogǔn rock	yuètuán... band...				
C-13	Bù Not	máodùn, contradictory,	duì. right.			
C-12	Xiànzài Now	shì be	bù not	máodùn contradictory	de. NOM.	Tā 3-sg
	wánquán completely	kěyǐ can	zài LOC	dàxué university	lǐmiàn inside	yě also
	lái	zǔ	tā	de	yáogǔn	yuètuán,



	come	form	3-sg	POS	rock	band,
	érqiě also	dāng when	tā 3-sg	shàngwán finish	dàxué university	nénggòu can
	xuédao learn	gèng more	duō much	de... ATT...	tā 3-sg	kěnéng maybe
	huì would	duì toward	yīnyuè music	gèng more	shēn deep	de ADV
	lǐjiě. understand.					
C-13	Duì. Right.					
C-12	Kěnéng Maybe	zuò make	chū out	lái come	de ATT	yīnyuè music
	huì would	yào would	gèng more	shòu receive	huānyíng, welcome,	gèng more
	yǒu have	shēndù. depth.				
<b>3-39:</b>						
C-14	Zuìhòu In the end	wǒ 1-sg	xiǎng think	tā 3-sg	de POS	fùmǔ parents
	kěndìng definitely	huì would	qiǎngpò force	tā 3-sg	qù go	shàng attend
	dàxué. university.	Dànshi But	wǒ 1-sg	yàoshi if	zuòwéi be	Wáng Èr Wang Er
	de POS	fùmǔ parents	wǒ 1-sg	kěndìng definitely	huì would	shuō say
	de DEG	bǐjiào comparatively	cōngmíng intelligent	yī one	diǎn, bit,	jiùshì shuō, that is,
	nǐ 2-sg	xūyào need	qù go	shàng attend	dàxué, university,	dànshi but

	nǐ 2-sg	de POS	yáogǔn rock	yuètuán band	zhèi this	ge CLAS
	mèngxiǎng dream	yě also	bù not	yīdìng definitely	jiù just	huì will
	pòmiè destroy	ne. MOOD.	Nǐ 2-sg	zài LOC	dàxué university	lǐbiānr inside
	nǐ 2-sg	yě also	kěyǐ can	jìxù continue	jiàn form	yáogǔn rock
	yuètuán, band,	érqiě also	nǐ 2-sg	bù not	shàng attend	dàxué university
	dehuà, if,	nǐ 2-sg	zhèi this	ge CLAS	yáogǔn rock	yuètuán band
	jiù then	bù not	kěnéng possible	jiàn build	de DEG	hěn very
	hǎo. well.	Jiù Just	bù not	kěnéng possible	yǒu have	fāzhǎn development
	yǒu have	qiántú. prospect.	Ránhòu, Afterward,	zuìhòu in the end	tāmen 3-sg	juéding... decide...
	wǒ 1-sg	huì would	zhīchí support	nǎ which	yī one	biān, side,
	wǒ 1-sg	shì be	zhīchí support	tā 3-sg	yìbiān one side	shàng attend
	dàxué university	ránhòu afterward	yìbiān one side	jiàn build	yáogǔn rock	yuètuán. band.
	Yīnwèi Because	zhèi this	liǎng two	ge CLAS	shì... be...	
C-15	Nǐ 2-sg	de POS	sīxiǎng thinking	bǐjiào comparatively	lǎohuà. old.	
C-14	Nà Well	nǐ 2-sg	shuō say	nǐ 2-sg	jiù just	ràng allow

	tā 3-sg	qù go	jiàn build	yáogǔn rock	yuètuán, band,	wǒ 1-sg
	juéde think	shì be	niánqīng young	rén, person,	tā 3-sg	bù not
	shàng attend	dàxué, university,	bù not	shòu receive	jiàoyù, education,	zhè this
	yě also	bù not	xíng. work.			
C-15	Tā 3-sg	kěyǐ can	jiàn build	le PERF	yáogǔn rock	yuètuán band
	jiù then	shàng attend	dàxué. university.	Xiànzài Now	shàng attend	dàxué university
	niánlíng age	yǒu have	tǐng very	dà old	de. NOM.	
C-14	Nǐ 2-sg	shuō say	jiàn build	yī one	ge CLAS	yáogǔn rock
	yuètuán, band,	ránhòu afterward	zài then	shàng attend	dàxué. university.	
C-15	Duì Right	a. MOOD.				
C-14	Dànshi But	tā 3-sg	zhèi this	ge CLAS	qiántí premise	shì be
	kuài soon	yào will	gāozhōng high school	bìyè graduate	le, INC,	tā 3-sg
	niánlíng age	tǐng very	xiǎo young	de, NOM,	tā 3-sg	búshi not
	shuō say	tā 3-sg	shì be	xiàng toward	yánjiūshēng graduate student	háishi... or...
C-15	Tā	jiù	wán	le,	tā	zhèi

	3-sg	just	complete	PERF,	3-sg	this
	ge CLAS	tiāncái talent	jiù then	huǐ destroy	le. PERF.	
C-14	Zhèi This	ge CLAS	tiāncái talent	yào will	huǐ destroy	le, PERF,
	nǐ 2-sg	juéde... think...	wǒ 1-sg	bù not	zhīdào, know,	wǒ 1-sg
	juéde think	Zhōngguó China	de POS	dàxué... university...	Zhōngguó China	dàxué university
	gōngkè homework	yālì pressure	búshi not	hěn very	dà, big,	nǐ 2-sg
	kěyǐ can	yìbiān one side	shàng attend	dàxué university	yìbiān one side	zuò make
	yáogǔn rock	yuètuán. band.	Měiguó America	hǎo very	duō many	dàxuéshēng, college student,
	tāmen 3-pl	yě also	shì be	yìbiān one side	shàngxué study	yìbiān one side
	yě also	shíxiàn realize	le PERF	zìjǐ... self...	jiùshi just	xuéyè studies
	zhī POS	wài outside	de ATT	hěn very	duō many	mèngxiǎng, dream,
	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	zhèi this	liǎng two	ge CLAS	búshi not
	tèbié especially	chōngtū conflict	de. NOM.			
C-15	Duì, Right,	kěyǐ. okay.	Wǒ 1-sg	yě also	tóngyì agree	nǐ 2-sg
	de POS	guāndiǎn. opinion.				

**3-40:**

C-21	Kěnéng, Maybe	yěxǔ perhaps	Wáng Èr Wang Er	jiù just	shuō, say,	hǎo good
	le, MOOD,	nà then	wǒ 1-sg	jiù just	yìbiān one side	shàng attend
	dàxué, university,	yìbiān one side	qù go	bàn do	yáogǔn rock	yuè music
	ba. SUG.					

**3-41:**

C-19	Jiǎrú Suppose	Wáng Èr Wang Er	zhēnde really	shì be	yào want	zǔzhī organize
	yī one	ge CLAS	yáogǔn rock	yuètuán band	dehuà, if,	wǒ 1-sg
	juéde think	wǒ 1-sg	yàoshi if-be	Wáng Èr Wang Er	de POS	fùmǔ parents
	wǒ 1-sg	jiù then	huì would	shuō, say,	nǐ 2-sg	kěyǐ can
	qù go	shòu receive	zhuānyè specialized	de ATT	jiàoyu, education,	bǐrúshuō for example
	shàng attend	yī one	ge CLAS	yīnyuè music	fāngmiàn aspect	de ATT
	zhuānyè specialized	yuànxìào. school.	Shàng Attend	wán finish	zhèi this	yàng type
	de ATT	dàxué university	zhǐhòu after	nǐ 2-sg	jīngshòu receive	le... PERF...
	jīngguò... pass...	shòu receive	le PERF	yī one	xìliè series	de ATT
	xìtǒng system	jiàoyu education	yǐhòu... after...	zhuānyè specialized	jiàoyu education	yǐhòu, after,

nǐ 2-sg	zǔzhī organize	de REL	yáogǔn rock	yuètuán band	hé and
nǐ 2-sg	xiànzài now	zǔzhī organize	de REL	yáogǔn rock	yuètuán band
de POS	céngcì level	jiù then	bù not	huì will	yíyàng. same.
Zhèi This	yàng type	dehuà if	nǐ 2-sg	jiù then	huì will
yǒu have	zhuānyè specialized	shàng on	de ATT	zàojiù, achievement,	huòzhě or
shuō say	nǐ 2-sg	zài LOC	zhuānyè specialty	shàng, on,	zài LOC
nǐ 2-sg	de POS	yīnyuè music	shàng on	huì will	yǒu have
gèng more	dà big	de ATT	fāzhǎn. development.	Érqiě Also	wǒ 1-sg
juéde think	tā 3-sg	de POS	fùmǔ parents	kěyǐ can	bù not
yídìng definitely	fēiděi must	yào want	yǐ use	fēicháng extremely	qiángyìng forceful
de ATT	shǒuduàn means	lái come	jiùshi FILL	bǎ take	tā 3-sg
guān close	zài LOC	jiā home	lǐ inside	huòzhě or	shì be
shénme, whatever,	shénme. whatever.				

**3-47:**

C-18	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	zài LOC	xiànjīn nowadays	Zhōngguó China	shèhuì, society,
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	bǎifēnzhī percent	jiǔshíwǔ 95	de ATT	fùmǔ parents	shì be	bù not
	huì would	tóngyì agree	tā 3-sg	zhèi this	yàng type	zuò do
	ne. MOOD.	Yīnwèi Because	dà... big	jiùshi... FILL	zài LOC	Zhōngguó China
	de POS	fùmǔ parents	de POS	pǔbiànxìng universality	lǐ inside	jiùshi be
	xīwàng hope	zìjǐ own	de POS	háizi child	kǎoshàng get into	yī one
	ge CLAS	míngpái famous	dàxué, university,	ránhòu afterward	jiānglái future	yǒu have
	yī one	ge CLAS	fēicháng extremely	tǐmiàn honorable	de ATT	gōngzuò. work.
<b>3-48:</b>						
C-20	Yīnwèi Because	yáogǔn rock	yuè music	zài LOC	Zhōngguó China	hái... still...
C-21	Méiyǒu Has not	pǔjí popular	ma. SUG.			
C-20	Búshi Not	nènme so	tèbié especially	de... ADV...	tèbié especially	de ADV
	pǔjí, popular,	nènme... so...	jiù... FILL...	lìngwài additionally	gěi give	rén person
	de REL	yìnxiàng impression	jiùshi be	yǒudiǎnr... a bit...		
C-21	Bù Not	tài too	zhèngjīng. proper			
C-20	...yǒudiǎnr ...a bit	bù not	zhèng... -...	bù not	rù enter	zhèngyè proper job
	de	yìxiē	rén	zài	gǎo	zhèixiē,

ATT	some	person	LOC	do	these,
huòzhě or	shì be	bù not	zuòwéi be	yī one	ge CLAS
zhèngshì formal	de ATT	yī one	ge CLAS	zhíyè. profession.	Zuòwéi Be
fùmǔ... parents...	zuòwéi be	fùmǔ parents	lái come	jiǎng say	tā 3-sg
huì would	háishi still	yāoqiú... demand...	zǐnǚ children	ne, MOOD,	nénggòu can
shàng attend	dàxué, university,	érqiě also	nénggòu... can...		

[...]

C-20	Jiù Take	zhèi this	ge CLAS	wèntí question	lái come	shuō say
	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	kěnéngxìng possibility	háishi still	jiāzhǎng parents	dūcù urge
	Wáng Èr Wang Er	hǎohāor diligent	de ADV	xuéxí, study,	jìxù continue	shàng attend
	dàxué university	shēnzào. excel.	Zhèi This	ge... CLAS...		
C-21	Zhèi This	ge CLAS	kěnéngxìng possibility	dà. big.		
C-20	Zhèi This	ge CLAS	kěnéngxìng possibility	gèng more	dà big	yìxiē. somewhat.
	Zhèi This	ge... CLAS...				
C-21	Wǒmen 1-pl	huì would	zhīchí support	nǎ which	yī one	biān? side?
C-20	Cóng	wǒ	běnrén	lái	jiǎng	yīnggāi



	From	1-sg	self	come	say	should
	shì be	shuō, say,	jiùshi... FILL...	háishi after all	ràng make	tā 3-sg
	jìxù continue	shēnzào, excel,	jìxù continue	shàng attend	dàxué. university	
C-21	Duì, Yes,	wǒ 1-sg	yě also	shì. be.	Wǒ 1-sg	xiǎng... think...
	yáogǔn rock	yuètuán band,	méi... not have...	méi not have	tài too	dà big
	qiántú. prospect.	Nǐ 2-sg	bìxū must	děi... must...		
C-20	Yě Also	yǒu have	kěnéng possibility	nénggòu can	zhèng earn	dà big
	tiān, heaven,	yě also	yǒu have	kěnéng, possibility,	dànshi but	jiùshi FILL
	shuō FILL	cóng from	yìnxiang impression	lái come	jiǎng, say,	háishi... still...
C-21	Wǒ 1-sg	bù not	xīwàng... hope...	duì. yes.	Wǒ 1-sg	huì would
	zhīchí support	tā 3-sg	fùmǔ. parents.			
C-20	...yīnggāi ...should	gǎo do	yī one	ge CLAS	gèng more	āndìng, stable,
	gèng... more...					
C-21	Duì, Yes,	wǒ 1-sg	bù not	xīwàng hope	tā 3-sg	qù go
	bàn do	yáogǔn rock	yuè. music			
C-20	...gèng	shénme	de	gōngzuò.		

...more      whatever      ATT      work.

**3-49:**

C-18	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	wǒ 1-sg	hái still	huì would	zhīchí support
	tā 3-sg	de POS	fùmǔ. parents.	Yīnwèi... Because...	qíshí in fact	tā 3-sg
	dú study	le PERF	dàxué university	yǐhòu after	yě also	tóngyàng same
	huì will	yǒu have	gè ever	yàng type	de ATT	xìngqu interest
	hé and	àihao hobby	kěyǐ can	dédào receive	gè every	zhǒng type
	gè every	yàng type	de ATT	fāzhǎn. development.	Dàn But	wǒ 1-sg
	juéde think	zhèi this	ge CLAS	zhīshi knowledge	shuǐpíng level	shì be
	juéding decide	tā 3-sg	zhèi this	ge CLAS	rénlèi humanity	yī one
	ge CLAS	sùzhi quality	de REL	yī one	ge CLAS	zhòngyào important
	de ATT	yī one	ge CLAS	fāngmiàn. aspect.	Suǒyǐ Therefore	tā 3-sg
	wánquán... completely ...	tā 3-sg	zǔ form	zhèi this	ge CLAS	yáogǔn rock
	yuètuán band	wánquán completely	kěyǐ can	zài LOC	tā 3-sg	dú study
	le PERF	dàxué university	yǐhòu, after,	tā 3-sg	yǒu have	zìjǐ own
	yíding	de	fēnxī	wèntí, wèntí,	jiějué	wèntí

	definite	ATT	analyze	problems,	solve	problem
	yídìng definite	nénglì ability	yǐhòu, after,	ránhòu afterward	zài... then...	zài then
	chóngxīn anew	kǎolǜ consider	tā 3-sg	zhèi this	zhǒng type	xiǎngfǎ. idea.
<b>3-50:</b>						
C-19	Zài LOC	Zhōngguó China	rúguǒ if	rén person	xiǎng want	chénggōng succeed
	dehuà, if	tā 3-sg	suīrán although	yǒu have	hěn very	duō many
	de ATT	tújīng, path,	dànshi but	tā 3-sg	shàng attend	dàxué, university,
	zǒu go	shàng up	chénggōng success	zhī POS	lù road	shì be
	yī one	tiáo CLAS	xiāngduì relative	lái come	shuō say	gèng more
	shì be	yī one	zhǒng type	jiéjìng. shortcut.	Xiāngduì Relative	qítā other
	lù road	lái come	jiǎng say	yěxǔ perhaps	huì... will...	tā 3-sg
	de POS	qǐdiǎn starting point	jiù then	huì will	gēn with	bié other
	rén person	bù not	yíyàng. same.			
<b>3-51:</b>						
C-12	“Wáng Èr “Wang Er	huì will	zěnmeyàng how	hé with	tā 3-sg	de POS
	fùmǔ parents	shuō?” say?”	Tā 3-sg	kěnéng maybe	huì will	hěn very

	zhíjiē direct	lái comee	shuō say	a, MOOD,	tā 3-sg	xiǎngyào want
	zuò do	shénme what	yàng type	de ATT	shìqing. matter.	
C-13	Tā 3-sg	de POS	fùmǔ parents	kěnéng maybe	jiù just	gēn with
	nǐ 2-sg	yíyàng same	de ATT	fǎnyìng. reaction.	[laughter]	
C-12	Duì, Yes,	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	hái still	néng can	huì will
	shì be	zhèi this	yàng! type!	[laughter]		
<b>3-52:</b>						
C-14	“Wáng Èr “Wang Er	huì will	zěnmeyàng how	hé with	tā 3-sg	de POS
	fùmǔ parents	shuō?” say?”	Nà Well	Wáng Èr Wang Er	tā 3-sg	zuò be
	yī one	ge CLAS	xiǎo young	qīngnián youth	tā 3-sg	kěndìng definitely
	shuō say	tā 3-sg	xiǎng want	shíxiàn realized	tā 3-sg	de POS
	lǐxiǎng ideal	jiù then	xiǎng wang	jiàn build	yī one	ge CLAS
	yáogǔn rock	yuètuán, band,	zhèi this	ge CLAS	shàng attend	dàxué university
	tā 3-sg	juéde think	bù not	zhòngyào, important,	zhèi this	bù not
	shì be	tā 3-sg	de POS	rénshēng life	mèngxiǎng dream	a, MOOD,

tā	huì	shìtú	tóngyì...	tā	de
3-sg	would	try	agree...	3-sg	POS
fùmǔ	tóngyì	tā	bù	shàng	dàxué,
parents	agree	3-sg	not	attend	university,
ránhòu	qù	jiàn	yáogǔn	yuètuán.	
afterward	go	build	rock	band.	

**3-53:**

C-14	Wǒ	juéde	zhèi	ge	jiùshi	shuō
	1-sg	think	this	CLAS	FILL	FILL
	lǐxiǎng	hé	xiànshí	yǒushíhou	shì	huì
	ideal	and	reality	sometimes	be	will
	yǒu	chāyì	de.			
	have	difference	NOM			

**3-54:**

C-11	Juéduì	bù	xiàng	nǐ	shuō	huà
	Absolutely	not	resemble	2-sg	say	word
	shuō	de	nènme	qīngsōng.		
	say	DEG	so	relaxed.		
C-12	Nà	kěyǐ	ràng	tā	qǔ	ge
	Then	can	allow	3-sg	pick up	CLAS
	jiàoxùn	ma.	Chī	yī	qiàn,	zhǎng
	lesson	SUG.	Eat	one	pít,	grow
	yī	zhì	ma.			
	one	wisdom	SUG.			

**3-74:**

C-18	Chéngcái	de	tújìng	yǒu	hěn	duō
	Become	ATT	path	have	very	many
	useful					
	zhǒng.	Bìng	bù	yídìng	shuō	shàng
	type.	At all	not	definite	say	attend

dàxué university	ránhòu afterward	shàng attend	yánjiùshēng graduate student	dú study	shuòshì M.A.
dú study	bóshì. Ph.D.	Zhè This	yàng type	dāngrán of course	shì be
yī one	zhǒng kind	bǐjiào comparatively	shuō, say,	jiùshì that is	dàjiā everyone
dōu all	pǔbiàn universal	zǒu go	le PERF	yī one	zhǒng type
chéngcái become useful	zhī ATT	lù. road.	Dànshi But	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think
yīnggāi should	yīn according to	rén person	ér and	yì. different.	Rúguǒ If
yī one	ge CLAS	rén person	díquè really	shìhé suited	zuò do
xuéwèn, academia,	huòzhě or	shuō say	díquè really	zài LOC	zhèi this
ge CLAS	xuéshù academia	shàng on	nénggòu can	yǒu have	suǒ REL
jiànshù contribution	dehuà, if,	huòzhě or	shuō say	zhēnzhèng really	yǐhòu afterward
zài... LOC...	mm... hm...	zìjǐ... oneself...	zuò do	yánjiū research	a, MOOD,
zuò do	yìxiē, some	zhèixiē these	ér also	shíjì practical	de ATT
gōngzuò, work,	zuò do	gōngchéng ... engineering ...	gōngchéng engineering	shàng on	de ATT
gōngzuò, work,	nénggòu	dédào	bǐjiào	dà	de

work,	can	receive	comparatively	big	ATT
fāzhǎn development	dehuà, if,	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	tā 3-sg	yīnggāi should
qù go	shàng attend	dàxué. university.	Dànshi But	rúguǒ if	duì for
yī one	ge CLAS	rén person	lái come	shuō say	tā 3-sg
bù not	tài too	shìhé suited	xuéxí study	dàn but	tā 3-sg
běnrēn at root	zìjǐ self	yǒu have	hěn... very...	zìjǐ self	yǒu have
qítā other	de ATT	yìxiē... some...	àihào hobby	he... and...	xìngqù, interest,
érqiě also	zài LOC	zhèi this	fāngmiàn aspect	nénggòu can	fāzhǎn develop
de DEG	hěn very	hǎo good	dehuà, if,	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think
tā 3-sg	méiyǒu not have	bìyào... need...	jiùshi... FILL...	zǒu... go...	fēiděi must
zǒu go	gāokǎo high tests	nèi that	ge CLAS	dú sole	mù wood
qiáo. bridge.	Qíshí In fact	měi every	ge CLAS	rén person	jiù FILL
shuō FILL	zhè this	yī one	shēng life	de ATT	fāzhǎn development
yǒu have	hěn very	duō... many...	hěn very	duō many	zhǒng type
xuǎnzé. choice.	Tā 3-sg	kěyǐ can	wánquán completely	shì... be...	xuǎndào choose
shìhé	zìjǐ	fāzhǎn	de	dàolù.	Jiùshuō

suited	self	develop	REL	road.	That is
tā 3-sg	rénshēng life	jiàzhí value	tǐxiàn manifest	bìng at all	búshi not
tǐxiàn manifest	zài LOC	tā 3-sg	yǒu have	duō how	gāo high
de ATT	xuéshí, erudition,	yǒu have	duō how	gāo high	de ATT
dìwèi, position,	yǒu have	duō how	duō much	de ATT	cáifù. wealth.
Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	xiàng resemble	zhèi this	zhǒng type	fāzhǎn development
qíngkuàng situation	tā 3-sg	yě also	kěyǐ can	shíxiàn realize	tā 3-sg
de... POS...	jiùshuō... FILL	nénggòu can	zhēnzhèng really	tǐxiàn manifest	chū out
zìjǐ own	de POS	jiàzhí value	lái. come.		

**3-75:**

C-19

Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	rúguǒ if	shì be	yī one	ge CLAS
hǎo good	háizi child	dehuà, if,	shì be	yī one	ge CLAS
hěn very	dǒng understand	dàoli, reason,	hěn very	dǒng... understand ...	jiùshi... FILL...
hěn very	yǒu have	zìjǐ own	de POS	xiǎngfǎ opinion	de REL
yī one	ge CLAS	háizi child	dehuà, if,	tā 3-sg	huì would
tīng	tā	fùmǔ	de	yìjian.	Jiùshi



listen	3-sg	parents	POS	opinion.	That is
nénggòu... can...	yě also	shì be	wèile for	zìjǐ own	yǐhòu afterward
zài LOC	yīnyuè music	shàng on	nénggòu can	gèng more	yǒu... have...
yǒu have	gèng more	dà big	de ATT	fāzhǎn, development,	ér and
bù not	jǐnjǐn only	júxiàn limited	yú to	shì be	zhǐ only
shì... be...	shì be	yī one	zhǒng type	yúlè, entertainment,	shì be
yī one	zhǒng type	àihào, hobby,	ér and	shì be	xiǎng want
yǒu have	gōngdà grand	de ATT	fāzhǎn development	dehuà, if,	tā 3-sg
huì would	tīngcóng follow	tā 3-sg	fùmǔ parents	de POS	yìjian, opinion,
ér and	qù go	xuǎnzé choose	shàng attend	yī one	ge CLAS
yīnyuè music	fāngmiàn aspect	de ATT	zhuānyè specialized	de ATT	yuànxiào, school,
yī one	ge CLAS	zhuānyè specialized	dàxué. university.		

#### Chapter 4:

#### **4-1:**

C-21	Nà Then	dāngrán of course	fēicháng extremely	qìfèn angry	le. CHG.
	[...]				

C-20	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	zhèi this	ge, CLAS,	yàoshi if	wǒ 1-sg
	yùdào meet	zhèi this	ge CLAS	shìqing, matter,	wǒ 1-sg	yě also
	shì be	fēicháng... extremely...	huì would	fēicháng extremely	qìfèn angry	de, EMPH,
	yīnwèi because	zìjǐ... oneself...	méiyǒu... not have...			
C-21	Méiyǒu Not have	rènhe any	cuòwu... mistake...			
C-20	Zìjǐ Oneself	juéde think	méiyǒu not have	rènhe any	cuòwu, mistake,	fànzuì crime
	de REL	zhèi this	ge CLAS	kěnéngxìng, possibility,	nènme so	tūrán suddenly
	bèi PASS	guānqilái, lock up,	nà then	kěndìng definitely	zìjǐ... oneself...	fēicháng extremely
	qìfèn. angry.					
<b>4-2:</b>						
C-17	Jǐngchá Police	méiyǒu not have	gàosu tell	tā 3-sg	gàn do	shá, what,
	jiù then	báibái in vain	dàibǔ arrest	tā 3-sg	sān three	tiān day
	ránhòu afterward	gěi let	fàng release	le? PERF?	Zhèi This	ge CLAS
	shìqing matter	bù not	kěnéng possible	fāshēng happen	ba. SUG.	Fǎnzhèng Regardless
	huì would	juéde feel	hěn very	mòmíngqímào, confused,	zěnme how	gāo do

	de. NOM.	Wǒ 1-sg	kěndìng definitely	yào would	gǎo get	qīngchu clear
	nǐ 2-sg	wèishenme why	nèi that	yàng way	zhuā arrest	wǒ. 1-sg.
<b>4-3:</b>						
C-18	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	rúguǒ if	wǒ 1-sg	shì be	zhèi this
	yàng type	de ATT	rén person	dehuà, if,	wǒ 1-sg	huì would
	juéde think	fēicháng extremely	bùkěsīyì, inconceivable,	wǒ 1-sg	jìrán since	méi not have
	fàn commit	rènhe any	de ATT	cuòwu, mistake,	wèishenme why	yào want
	bǎ take	wǒ 1-sg	guān close	qilái? up?	Wèishenme Why	bǎ take
	wǒ 1-sg	suǒ lock	zài LOC	jiānyù jail	lǐ? inside?	
C-19	Érqiè Also	méiyǒu not have	rènhe any	jiěshì. explanation.		
C-18	Duì. Right.					
<b>4-11:</b>						
C-11	Yī One	fāngmiàn aspect	wǒ 1-sg	zìjǐ oneself	kěndìng, definitely,	wǒ 1-sg
	kěndìng definitely	huì would	wèn ask	wèishenme why	bǎ take	wǒ 1-sg
	zhuā arrest	qilái INC	le? PERF?	Lìng Additional	yī one	ge... CLAS
C-10	Bù Not	huí return	lái? come?			

C-11	Tā 3-sg	bù not	huí return	lái come	wǒ 1-sg	yě also
	háishi still	huì would	qù go	wèn ask	tā. 3-sg.	Lìng Additional
	yī one	fāngmiàn aspect	shì be	jiù FILL	shuō FILL	wǒmen 1-pl
	jiā family	lǐmiàn inside	yě also	huì would	cǎiqǔ adopt	gè every
	zhǒng type	gè every	yàng type	de ATT	qúdào pathway	lái come
	tàntīng ask about	wǒ 1-sg	de POS	xiāoxi, news,	lái come	zhīdào know
	wèishenme why	wǒ 1-sg	huì would	bèi PASS	dài arrest	qilai. INC.
	Nènme So	rúguǒ if	sān three	tiān day	yǐhòu after	wǒ 1-sg
	shénme any	shì matter	dōu all	méiyǒu, not have,	tā 3-sg	bǎ take
	wǒ 1-sg	gěi for	wǒ 1-sg	fàngzǒu release	le PERF	dehuà, if,
	nà then	wǒ 1-sg	kěndìng, definitely	wǒ 1-sg	bù not	huì would
	jiùshi FILL	bàxiū let go	de, EMPH,	wǒ 1-sg	kěndìng definitely	huì would
	yào want	nòng get	qīngchu clear	tā 3-sg	wèishenme why	yào want
	zhèi this	yàng type	zuò. do.	Rúguǒ If	tā 3-sg	méiyǒu not have
	rènhe any	dàoli reason	dehuà, if,	tā 3-sg	yīnggāi should	cǎiqǔ... adopt...

tā	yīnggāi	duì	wǒ	cǎiqǔ	yìxiē
3-sg	should	to	1-sg	adopt	some

shénme	yàngzi	de	bǔcháng,	dàoqiàn.
some	type	ATT	compensation,	apology.

**4-31:**

C-14	Nà	wǒ	juéde	rúguǒ	zhèngfu	méiyǒu
	Then	1-sg	think	if	government	not have
	dédào	rénmín	de	tóngyì	jiù	zìxíng
	obtain	people	POS	consent	then	on their own
	bǎ	suǒdeshuì	lǜ	tígāo	zhèi	yàng
	take	income tax	rate	raise	this	way
	kěndìng	shì	bù	duì	de,	yīnwèi
	definitely	be	not	right	NOM,	because
	zhèngfu	de	suǒyǒu	de	xíngdòng	yīnggāi
	government	POS	all	ATT	actions	should
	dōu	shì	dàibiǎo	rénmín	de	yìyuàn,
	all	be	represent	people	POS	will,
	fǎnyìng	rénmín	de	shēnyì	de,	suǒyǐ
	reflect	people	POS	proposal	NOM,	therefore
	rúguǒ	tā	shì	zhèngfu	bǎ	zìjǐ,
	if	3-sg	be	government	take	self,
	jiùshi	rènwéi	tā	shì	dúlì	huòzhě
	that is	think	3-sg	be	independent	or
	gāo	yú	rénmín	zhī	shàng	nèi
	high	then	people	POS	above	that
	ge	tèshū	de	qúntǐ,	tā	juéde
	CLAS	special	ATT	collective,	3-sg	think
	tā	kěyǐ	zìjǐ	jiù	zuò	chū
	3-sg	can	self	just	make	out

júecè final decision	zhèi this	yàng way	kěndìng definitely	shì be	bù not
duì right	de. NOM.	Dànshi But	rénmín people	yǒu have	shénme what
fǎnyìng... reaction...	rénmín people	dāngrán of course	jiù just	huì... would...	jiù just
huì would	bǐjiào comparatively	bùmǎn dissatisfied	le, PERF,	jiù just	huì would
kàn... look...	kěnéng definitely	zài LOC	Měiguó America	dehuà if	dàjiā everyone
rénmín person	de POS	fǎnyìng reaction	yě also	huì would	bǐjiào comparatively
jīliè intense	yìxiē, somewhat,	kěnéng definitely	huì would	shàng go to	jiē street
yóuxíng march	a, MOOD,	huòzhě or	xiě write	chū out	yìxiē... some...

**4-32:**

C-21	Jīnjīn Only	shì be	yīnwèi because	suǒdé income	shuì tax	zēngjiā increase
	yī one	bèi multiple	dehuà if	bù not	huì would	yīnqǐ cause
	hěn very	dà big	de ATT	qìfèn. anger.	Dànshi But	jiùshi FILL
	shuō FILL	yìbān general	de ATT	zhèi this	ge CLAS	zhěng entire
	gè CLAS	shèhuì society	dàjiā everyone	dōu all	huì would	fǎnduì oppose
	zhèi this	jiàn CLAS	shìqing, matter,	nà then	kěnéng definitely	shì, be,

	tā 3-sg	yǒu have	hěny very	duō many	hěny very	duō many
	wèntí, problem,	dàjiā everyone	fēicháng extremely	bù not	mǎnyì, satisfied,	ránhòu afterward
	kěnéng definitely	huì would	jījí intense	qǐlái rise up	fǎnduì. oppose.	Rúguǒ... If...
	dàn but	biéde other	dōu all	hěny very	hǎo, good,	zhǐ only
	shì be	jiù just	tí raise	chū out	zēngjiā increase	yī one
	bèi multiple	bù not	huì would	yǒu have	hěny very	dà big
	de ATT	nèi that	ge CLAS	fǎnyìng. reaction.		
<b>4-33:</b>						
C-10	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	guónèi domestic	de ATT	fǎnyìng... reaction...	rúguǒ if
	shì be	zhèi this	yàng way	dehuà, if,	dāngrán of course	yìjian opinion
	kěndìng definitely	shì be	yǒu, have,	dànshi but	yě also	kěnéng maybe
	jiù just	bùliǎoliǎozhī. drop it.	Dàn But	yào want	fāfā láosāo complain	le. PERF.
C-11	Duì, Yes,	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	shì be	zhèi this	yàng. way.
	Bù Not	huì would	yǒu have	tài too	dà big	de ATT
	fǎnyìng, reaction,	duì toward	zhèi this	ge CLAS	wèntí, problem,	yīnwèi because
	wǒ	juéde	mùqián	yī	fāngmiàn	lái

	1-sg	think	now	one	aspect	come
	jiǎng, say,	gèrén individual	suǒdé income	shuì tax	běnrēn at root	tā 3-sg
	de POS	qíngkuàng situation	jiù just	bù not	shì be	hěn very
	míngliǎo. clear.	Hěn Very	duō many	dānwèi work unit	duì toward	zhèi this
	ge CLAS	dōngxi thing	de... POS...	dōu all	shì be	cǎiqǔ adopt
	gè every	zhǒng type	fāngfǎ method	lái come	táobì avoid	de, NOM,
	wǒ 1-sg	juéde. think.	Suǒyǐ... Therefore...	dànshi But	fǎnyìng reaction	kěndìng definitely
	háishi still	huì would	yǒu. have.	Xíngdòng, Response,	wǒ 1-sg	gūjì estimate
	méi not have	shénme any	xíngdòng response	kěyǐ can	cǎiqǔ adopt	de. EMPH.
	Nǐ 2-sg	juéde think	rénmín peopl	yīnggāi should	rúhé how	huíyìng respond
	zhèi this	zhǒng type	zhuàngkuàng? situation?			
C-10	Méiyǒu Not have	bànfǎ. method.	Zhèi This	ge... CLAS...	rúguǒ if	shì be
	xīnwén news	zìyóu free	yìxiē somewhat	le PERF	kěnéng maybe	háiyǒu still
	kěyǐ can	fāxiè vent	yī one	shēng. sound.		
C-11	Zài LOC	wǎng internet	shàng on	nǐ 2-sg	huì would	kàndào see
	de,	kěndìng	huì	kàndào.	Kěndìng	huì



	EMPH,	definitely	would	see.	Definitely	would
	kàndào... see...	yǒu have	láo sāo complaint	zài LOC	wǎng internet	shàng on
	kěyǐ can	kàndào. see.	Dànshi But	zhèngshì formal	shūmiàn written	de ATT
	dōngxi thing	kěndìng definitely	méiyǒu. not have.			
<b>4-34:</b>						
C-12	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	zhè this	zhēn really	shì be	jiùshi FILL
	shuō FILL	huì would	bù not	tóng same	guójiā country	bù not
	yíyàng. same.	Nǐ 2-sg	xiàng resemble	zài LOC	Zhōngguó China	dehuà, if,
	tā 3-sg	hěn very	jiù just	huì would	bù not	zhēngdé obtain
	nǐ 2-sg	de POS	tóngyì consent	jiù then	huì would	gěi for
	nǐ 2-sg	zēngjiā... increase...				
C-13	Nà Then	rénmín people	zěnmē how	bàn do	ne? MOOD?	
C-12	Huì Would	cǎiqǔ adopt	gè every	zhǒng type	gè every	yàng type
	de ATT	fāngfǎ method	lái come	táo avoid	shuì. tax.	
<b>4-35:</b>						
C-18	Mm, Hm,	zhèi this	yàng way	kěndìng definitely	shì be	bù not

	duì right	le. MOOD.	Yīnwèi Because	méiyǒu not have	rènhé any	lǐyóu reason
	jiù just	bù not	néng can	bǎ take	suǒdé income	shuì tax
	zēngjiā increase	yī one	bèi. multiple.	Mm... Hm...	"Rénmín People	huì would
	yǒu have	shénme what	yàng type	de ATT	fǎnyìng?" reaction?"	Wǒ 1-sg
	juéde think	zài LOC	Zhōngguó China	bù not	huì would	yǒu have
	rén person	qǐlái... rise up...	jiù FILL	shuō FILL	shì... be...	kàngyì resist
	nèi that	yàng... way...				
C-19	Rénmín People	huì would	bàoyuàn. complain.			
C-18	Huì Would	bàoyuàn, complain,	zhǐ only	shì be	huì would	shíxià momentary
	de ATT	bàoyuàn, complain,	dàn but	bù not	huì would	yǒu have
	rén person	zǒu go	shàng on	jiētóu street	huò or	kàngyì resist
	a, MOOD,	huòzhě or	shuō say	yóuxíng march	shìwēi demonstrate	a. MOOD.
	[...]					
	Jiùshuō That is	zhǐ only	yào want	nénggòu can	zài LOC	yī one
	ge CLAS	xiāngduì relatively	bǐjiào comparatively	shūshì comfortable	wěndìng stable	de ATT

huánjìng environment	néng can	huó live	xiàqu continue	dehuà, if,	méiyóu not have
rén person	yuànyì want	zǒu go	shàng on	jiētóu street	jǔ raise
ge CLAS	páizi sign	shìwēi demonstrate	yóuxíng march	shénme whatever	yàng way
de. NOM.	"Cǎiqǔ "Adopt	shénme what	yàng type	de ATT	xíngdong?" response?"
Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	huì would	yǒu have	rén person	jiù FILL
shuō FILL	zài LOC	méitǐ media	shàng on	huòzhě or	shuō say
zài LOC	yìxiē some	gōngkāi public	chǎnghé setting	kěnéng maybe	huì would
jiù FILL	shuō FILL	fābiào publish	gè every	zhǒng type	gè every
yàng type	de ATT	yánlùn, opinion,	juéde think	zhèi this	yàng type
de ATT	zuòfǎ, method,	bǎ take	suǒdé income	shuì tax	zēngjiā increase
yī one	bèi multiple	zhèi this	yàng type	de ATT	zuòfǎ method
fēicháng extremely	bù not	duì. right.	Jùtǐ Specific	cǎiqǔ adopt	shénme... what...
wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	bù not	huì would	yǒu have	rén person
cǎiqǔ adopt	tèbié especially	jíduān extreme	de ATT	xíngdòng. response.	Zhìshǎo At least
bǎifēnzhī percent	bāshí 80	rén person	bù not	huì would	cǎiqǔ adopt

	jíduān extreme	de ATT	xíngdòng. response.			
<b>4-36:</b>						
C-16	Dāngrán Of course	rúguǒ if	shì be	zài LOC	yī one	ge, CLAS,
	jiùshi FILL	shuō, FILL,	rénmín people	yǒu have	quánlì right	juédìng decide
	zhèngfu government	xíngwéi behavior	de ATT	dìfang place	lǐ, inside,	dāngrán of course
	qù go	cǎiyòng use	de REL	zhèi this	ge CLAS	tóupiào vote
	de ATT	quánlì. right.	Rúguǒ If	shì be	yī one	ge CLAS
	jiùshi FILL	shuō FILL	nǐ 2-sg	méiyǒu not have	yī one	ge CLAS
	xíngshì format	zhèi this	yàng type	quánlì right	de ATT	dìfang... place...
C-17	Nǐ 2-sg	jiù just	shuō say	yě also	méi not have	shénme any
	yòng, use,	duì right	ba? SUG?	Nǐ 2-sg	xiǎng, think,	nǐ 2-sg
	xiǎng think	bǎ take	zhèi this	ge CLAS	juédìng... decision...	gēnggǎi change
	zhèi this	ge CLAS	juédìng decision	yě also	méiyǒu not have	tújìng, path,
	méiyǒu not have	lùtú, route,	méiyǒu not have	dàolu. road.		
C-16	Kěshì But	bǐfāngshuō for example	zài LOC	Zhōngguó China	wǒmen 1-pl	yǒu, have,
	nèi	ge...	Rénmín...	Rénmín	Dàibiǎo	Dà

	that	CLAS...	People...	People	Represent	Big
	Huì Meeting	hé and	Zhèngzhì Government	Xiéshāng Consult	Huì... Meeting...	
C-17	Nǐ 2-sg	huì would	zhǎo find	Rén Person	Dà Big	Dàibiǎo Represent
	qù go	tán discuss	ma? QU?			
C-16	Jiùshi shuō That is	zhèli here	suǒwèi so-called	cǎiqǔ adop	jiù FILL	shuō, FILL,
	cóng from	yī one	ge CLAS	fǎlǔ legal	jiǎodù angle	lái come
	shuō, say,	mùqián now	Zhōngguó China	jiùshi be	nǐ 2-sg	xiāngduì relatively
	lái come	shuō say	shì be	wéiyī only	kěyǐ can	tōngguò pass
	fǎzhì legal	xíngshì format	de ATT	yī one	ge CLAS	dàolu, road,
	yīnwèi because	nǐ... 2-sg...	shǒuxiān first	zhèngfǔ government	bù not	shì be
	mín people	xuǎn choose	ne, MOOD,	suǒyǐ therefore	dāngrán of course	bù not
	kěnéng possible	jiùshi FILL	shuō, FILL,	yǒu have	xiàng resemble	Měiguó America
	zhèi this	yàng type	de ATT	yī one	ge CLAS	jiùshi FILL
	xuǎnmín electoral	zhìdù. system.	Dànshi But	lǐlùn theory	shàng on	Zhōngguó China
	zhèngfǔ government	de POS	yìsi meaning	jiùshi FILL	shuō FILL	rénmín people
	kěyǐ	tōngguò	tíjiāo	nèixiē	yì'àn	lái...

	can	pass	submit	those	proposal	come...
	lǐfǎ legislation	ya, MOOD,	huòzhě or	gǎibiàn change	yìxiē some	zhèngcè. policy.
C-17	Nǐ 2-sg	kěyǐ can	xiàng to	nǐmen 2-pl	qū district	de POS
	Rén Person	Dà Big	Dàibiǎo Represent	fǎnyìng, react,	dànshi but	wǒ 1-sg
	bù not	juéde think	wǒ... 1-sg...	wǒ 1-sg	bù not	huì would
	zhèi this	yàng way	xíngdòng. respond.	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	méi not have
	shénme any	yòng. use.				
C-16	Jiùshi shuō That is	wúxiào ineffective	de ATT	yī one	zhǒng... type...	yī one
	zhǒng type	mínzhǔ democratic	zhìdù, system	duì right	bù not	duì? right?
<b>4-37:</b>						
C-13	Nà Then	nǐ 2-sg	shuō say	de REL	zhèi this	ge CLAS
	jiùshi be	yìng apply	gè every	zhǒng type	xíngshì format	táo avoid
	shuì tax	zhèi this	yàng... way...	tā 3-sg	bù not	shì be
	yī one	ge... CLAS...	tā 3-sg	zhǐ only	shì be	gèrén individual
	de POS	yī one	zhǒng type	xíngdòng response	a, MOOD,	tā 3-sg
	bù not	shì be	yī one	ge... CLAS...	bǐrúshuō for example	tōngguò pass

	yī one	ge CLAS	shénme whatever	zǔzhī, organization	tōngguò pass	yī one
	ge CLAS	shénme, whatever,	wǒ 1-sg	bù not	zhīdào know	shì, be,
	xiàng resemble	Rìběn Japan	guóhuì congress	huòzhě or	shì be	shénme what
	dìfāng place	zhèngfu government	huòzhě or	shì... be...		
C-12	Nà Then	nǐ 2-sg	zhèi this	huà word	shuō say	lái come
	jiùshi be	yào want	shuō say	kàn look	nǐ 2-sg	de PASS
	guóhuì, congress,	nà then	nǐ 2-sg	shuō say	Zhōngguó China	tā 3-sg
	yě also	shì, be,	tā 3-sg	huì will	shì, be,	nèi that
	ge, CLAS,	Rénmín People	Dàibiǎo Represent	Dà Big	Huì, Meeting,	yídìng definitely
	shì be	tā 3-sg	lái come	tōngguò. pass.	Nà Then	nǐ 2-sg
	shuō say	tā 3-sg	nénggòu can	yǒu have	duōshǎo how much	dàibiǎo represent
	rénmín people	de ATT	chéngdù? degree?	Duì Right	ba? SUG?	
<b>4-38:</b>						
C-21	Kěnéng Maybe	dàjiā everyone	yěxǔ perhaps	huì would	qù go	yóuxíng. march.
	Dànshi But	xiànzài now	Zhōngguó China	Tiān'ānmén Tiananmen	shìjiàn affair	yǐhòu after

	kěnéng maybe	bù not	huì would	nènme... so...	nènme so	jiǎndān simple
	jiù just	huì would	qù go	yóuxíng march	le. MOOD.	
C-20	Cānjiā Participate	de REL	rénshù number	kěnéng... maybe...		
C-21	Bù Not	huì would	hěn very	duō many	le. MOOD.	
C-20	...bù not	shì be	tèbié especially	de... ADV...	duōshù majority	rén person
	kěnéng maybe	jiùshi just	guānwàng, watch,	jiù just	kàn watch	zhèi this
	ge... CLAS...	yóu... by...	gèbié a few	de, ATT,	bǐjiào comparatively	shǎoshù minority
	de ATT	rén person	kěnéng maybe	bǐjiào comparatively	jījìn radical	de ATT
	rén person	chū out	qù... go...	kěnéng maybe	yóuxíng, march,	yǒu have
	kěnéng. possibility.					
<b>4-39:</b>						
C-14	Wǒ 1-sg	jiùshi... just...	lǐxiǎng ideal	zhuàngtai situation	hé and	xiànshí practical
	zhuàngtai, situation,	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	fǎnyìng reaction	shì be	yíyàng same
	de, NOM,	jiùshi just	xīnwén news	méitǐ media	hé and	zhèngfu government
	jīguān organ	duì toward	nǐ 2-sg	de REL	fǎnyìng, reaction,	tā 3-sg



de POS	fǎnyìng reaction	shì be	shénme? what?	Kěnéng Maybe	zài LOC
xiànshí practical	hé and	lǐxiǎng ideal	dāngzhōng among	yòu also	bù not
yíyàng.					

**4-40:**

C-17	Nǐ 2-sg	děi must	dédào obtain	rén... person...	jué absolute	dà big
	duōshù majority	rén person	tóngyì. consent.	Yěxǔ Perhaps	wǒ 1-sg	bù not
	tóngyì, agree,	dànshi but	rúguǒ... if...	bǐrúshuō for example	wǒ 1-sg	bù not
	tóngyì agree	dàn but	bǎifēnzhī percent	bāshí 80	rén person	tóngyì, agree,
	wǒ 1-sg	yě also	méiyǒu not have	yìjian. opinion.	Wǒ 1-sg	jiù just
	huì would	fúcéng follow	dà big	duōshù majority	rén person	de POS
	yìjian. opinion.	Dànshi But	xiànzài now	shéi who	zhīdào know	nǐ 2-sg
	zhèi this	ge CLAS	zhēng levy	shuì tax	nǐ 2-sg	yuánlái original
	mùdì goal	shì be	gàn do	shénme. what.		

**4-57:**

C-13	Tā 3-sg	zhǐ only	néng can	qù. go.	Yīnwèi Because	zuòwéi be
	jūnrén soldier	tā 3-sg	zhǐ only	néng... can...	bùguǎn regardless	tā 3-sg

	gèrén individual	yìzhi will	rúhé, how,	tā 3-sg	yě also	yào must
	qù, go,	duì right	bù not	duì? right?		
C-12	Duì. Right.					
<b>4-58:</b>						
C-21	Fú cóng Obey	mìng lìng order	shì be	tiānzhí bound duty	ma. SUG.	Yīnwèi Because
	tā 3-sg	yǐjīng already	bèi PASS	rùwǔ. enter ranks.	Bǐrúshuō For example	wǒmen 1-pl
	lǎobǎixìng common people	bù not	shì be	jūnrén, soldier,	wǒmen 1-pl	kěyǐ can
	nèi that	ge... CLAS...	fǎnduì... oppose...	shuō, say,	fǎnduì oppose	zhànzhēng war
	shénmede, whatever,	dànshi but	jūnrén soldier	ne, as for,	tā 3-sg	jiù just
	kěnéng... maybe...	tā 3-sg	xīn heart	lǐ inside	rènwéi believe	bù not
	duì right	tā 3-sg	yě also	méiyǒu not have	bànfǎ. method.	
<b>4-59:</b>						
Me	Nǐmen 2-pl	rènwéi believe	ne, MOOD,	jiùshi FILL	yī one	ge CLAS
	rén person	yīnwèi because	zōngjiào religious	yuányīn reason	yīnggāi should	bù not
	yīnggāi should	yǒu have	quánlì right	jiùshi FILL	bù not	dāng serve as
	bīng?					

		soldier?				
C-12	Yīnggāi. Should.	Yīnggāi. Should.				
Me	Yīnggāi? Should?					
C-12	Yīnggāi. Should.					
C-13	Yīnwèi Because	zōngjiào religious	yuányīn? reason?			
Me	Duì. Right.	Huòzhě Or	shì be	xìnyǎng belief	yuányīn. reason.	Xìnyǎng Belief
					yuányīn. reason.	
C-13	Zhè This	cóng from	tā 3-sg	gèrén individual	jiǎng say	yīnggāi should
	bù not	yīnggāi should	háishi or	shuō say	shàngmian above	zhèi this
	ge... CLAS...					
Me	Cóng From	tā 3-sg	gèrén individual	de POS	nèi that	ge CLAS
	kànfǎ. view.					
C-13	Tā 3-sg	yīnggāi should	yǒu have	quánlì right	juédìng decide	tā 3-sg
	rùwǔ enter ranks	háishi or	bù not	rùwǔ, enter ranks,	wǒ 1-sg	juéde. think.
	Yīnwèi Because	rùwǔ enter ranks	bìjìng after all	yào must	yǒu have	shēngmìng. life.
	Yào	yǒu	sǐwáng	zuò	dàijià.	

Must have death be price.

**4-60:**

C-12	Zǒng'éryánzhī All in all	wǒ 1-sg	fēicháng extremely	zēnghèn hat	zhànzhēng. war.	Wǒ 1-sg
	juéde think	hěn very	duō many	zhànzhēng war	chúncuì purely	jiùshi be
	zhèngkè politician	zhījiān... among...	wèile for	tāmen 3-pl	de POS	liyì interest
	lái come	fāqǐ, start,	ránhòu afterward	dǎ put forth	zhe this	yī one
	ge CLAS	hěn very	hǎo good	de ATT	yī one	ge CLAS
	huǎngzi pretense	huì will	zěnmē however	zěnmeyàng. however.		

**4-61:**

C-16	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	tā 3-sg	yīnggāi... should...	yīnggāi... should...	fúcéng follow
	tā 3-sg	de POS	xìnyǎng. belief.			
	[...]					
	Wèishenme? Why?	Yīnwèi... Because...	jiù just	xiàng resemble	wǒ 1-sg	shuō say
	de REL	qíshí... in fact...	guójiā country	yào want	huòzhě or	zhànzhēng war
	yào want	qíshí in fact	méiyǒu not have	yī one	ge... CLAS	qíshí in fact
	zhèngyì justice	hǎo very	duō many	dōngxī thing	jiùshi FILL	shuō FILL

méiyóu not have	duì-cuò right-wrong	zhī POS	fēn division	huòzhě or	méiyóu not have
hǎo-huài. good-bad.	Qíshí In fact	wǒ 1-sg	duì toward	měi every	ge CLAS
rén... person...	suǒyǐ therefore	zuìhòu in the end	měi every	ge CLAS	rén person
jiànli build	de REL	jīchū foundation	shì be	nǐ 2-sg	zìjǐ own
de... POS...	nǐ 2-sg	zìjǐ own	de POS	xìnyǎng. belief.	Nà... So...
wǒ 1-sg	zhǐ only	shì be	cóng from	gèrén individual	jiǎodù angle
lái come	shuō say	le. PERF.	Duì. Right.		

**4-62:**

C-14	Jiùshì shuō That is	kěndìng definitely	bù not	huì would	shì be	yī one
	ge CLAS	hǎo good	zhànshì. soldier.			
C-15	Bù No	bù No	bù. No.			
C-14	Tā 3-sg	huì would	yī one	biān side	qù go	shā kill
	rén, person,	yī one	biān side	juéde think	zhèi this	yàng type
	de ATT	shā kill	rén person	shì be	bù not	duì right
	de. NOM.					
C-15	Zhèi	ge	wèntí	duì	nǐ	lái

	This	CLAS	question	for	2-sg	come
	tài too	kùnnán difficult	le. MOOD.	Suǒyǐ... Therefore...	wǒ 1-sg	yě also
	bù not	yídìng definitely	jiǎng say	de DEG	hǎo, well,	yīnwèi... because...
	zhèi this	ge CLAS	bù not	zhīdào know	zěnme how	huídá. answer.
C-14	Zhèi This	ge CLAS	hěn very	nán, difficult,	zhèi... this...	tā 3-sg
	yīnggāi should	zěnme how	bàn? do?			
C-15	Zhèi This	shì be	kàn look	nǐ 2-sg	bǎ take	shénme what
	fàng put	zài LOC	zuì most	qiánmiàn forward	de, NOM,	tā 3-sg
	qiánmiàn forward	tā 3-sg	yǒu have	shùnxù order	de. EMPH.	Zhōngguó China
	chuántǒng traditional	de ATT	shì be	guójiā country	shì be	fàng put
	zài LOC	zìjǐ oneself	de POS	qiánmiàn forward	de, NOM,	dàn but
	wǒ 1-sg	xiāngxìn believe	Měiguó America	yě also	shì be	zhèi this
	yàng way	de, NOM,	suǒyǐ therefore	fēicháng extremely	jiǎndān. simple.	Tā 3-sg
	jiù just	huì would	qù go	dǎ fight	zhàng, war,	ránhòu afterward
	tā 3-sg	huì would	zuò be	yī one	ge CLAS	hěn very
	hǎo	de	zhànshì	qù	dǎ	zhàng.

	good	ATT	solider	go	fight	war.
<b>4-63:</b>						
Me	Jiǎrú Suppose	tā 3-sg	yǒu have	zōngjiào religious	yuányīn, reason,	jiùshi that is
	bù not	kěyǐ can	dǎ fight	zhàng. war.	Tā 3-sg	de POS
	zōngjiào religion	bù not	ràng allow	tā 3-sg	dǎ fight	zhàng. war.
	Dànshi But	zhèngfu government	yào want	tā 3-sg	dǎ fight	zhàng. war.
	Nà Then	tā 3-sg	zěnmē how	bàn do	ne? MOOD?	
C-11	Nà Then	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	zhèi this	yàng type	de ATT
	qíngkuàng situation	zhèngfu government	bù not	ràng make	tā 3-sg	qù go
	dǎ fight	zhàng war	ne, MOOD,	Zhōngguó China	duì toward	zhèi this
	zhǒng type	shǎoshù minority	mínzú ethnicity	tā 3-sg	méiyǒu, not have,	huòzhě hor
	jiùshuō that is	zōngjiào religious	xìnyǎng belief	yě also	xūyào, need,	qǐmǎ at least
	shì be	wǒmen 1-pl	yǒu have	guīdìng rule	shuō say	shì be
	yīnggāi should	zūnzhòng respect	tāmen 3-pl	de POS	zōngjiào religious	xìnyǎng. belief.
	Rúguǒ If	shuō say	nǐ 2-sg	shì be	zhèi this	ge CLAS
	zōngjiào religion	běنشēn at root	bu not	tóngyì agree	dehuà... if...	dànshi but

	qǐmǎ at least	qiántí premise	shì be	zhèi this	ge CLAS	zōngjiào religion
	shì be	yào must	bèi PASS	zhèngfu government	suǒ NOM	chéngrèn recognize
	de REL	zōngjiào. religion.				
<b>4-64:</b>						
C-20	Búguò Still	cóng from	Zhōngguó China	xiànfǎ constitution	lái come	jiǎng say
	shì be	zūnjìng... respect...	jiùshuō that is	zūnzhòng respect	zhèi this	ge CLAS
	gèrén individual	de... POS...				
C-21	Xìnyǎng Belief	ha. MOOD.				
C-20	Xìnyǎng Belief	zìyóu. freedom.	Cóng From	zhèi this	ge CLAS	jiǎodù angle
	lái come	shuō, say,	nà, well,	nǐ 2-sg	yàoshi if	zūnzhòng respect
	rénjiā person	de POS	xìnyǎng belief	zìyóu, freedom,	nà then	bù not
	shā kill	shēng... life...	nà, then,	kěyǐ can	bù not	shā kill
	shēng. life.					
C-21	Nà Then	jiù just	kěnéng maybe	jiù just	bù not	qù go
	le. CHG.					



C-20	A.					
	Mm hm.					
C-21	Kěnéng... Maybe...	yěxǔ perhaps	jiù just	bù not	qù go	le. CHG.
<b>4-65:</b>						
C-17	Tā 3-sg	xīn heart	lǐ inside	shì, be,	jiùshi shuō that is	duì toward
	zhànzhēng war	shì be	yànwu detest	de. NOM.	Bù Not	yuàn... -
	tā 3-sg	rènwéi believe	zhànzhēng war	shì be	bù not	duì right
	de, NOM,	dàn but	tā 3-sg	méiyóu not have	shuō say	ta 3-sg
	bù not	yuànyì... willing...	bù not	yuànyì willing	qù go	wèi for
	guójiā country	xiàoli serve	qù go	cānjiā participate	zhànzhēng, war,	shì be
	bu not	shì? be?	Tā 3-sg	yuán original	wén text	shì be
	zěnmē how	jiǎng say	de? NOM?	Tā 3-sg	hǎoxiàng apparently	rènwéi believe
	zhànzhēng war	shì be	bù not	duì right	de, NOM,	dàn but
	tā 3-sg	méiyóu not have	zhèi this	yàng way	shuō say	wǒ I-sg
	bù not	xiǎng want	bǎowèi protect	zǔguó motherland	huòzhě or	shénmede. whatever.
<b>4-66:</b>						
C-14	"Zài "LOC	zhèi this	zhǒng type	qíngkuàng situation	xià under	Zhāng Sān Zhang San

	huì would	zěnmē how	bàn?" do?"	Nà Well	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think
	tā 3-sg	suīrán although	juéde think	bù not	duì, right,	dànshi but
	zhèngfu government	jiào make	tā 3-sg	qù go	rùwǔ enter ranks	tā 3-sg
	bù not	yuànyì willing	yě also	bù not	xíng. okay.	Suǒyǐ Therefore
	tā 3-sg	hái still	děi must	qù go	dǎ fight	zhàng. war.
	"Tā "3-sg	yīnggāi should	zěnmē how	bàn? do?"	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think
	zhèi this	ge CLAS	rén person	shì be	bǐjiào comparatively	tòngkǔ in pain
	de, NOM,	tā 3-sg	yīnggāi should	zěnmē how	bàn, do,	yīnwèi because
	zài LOC	zhànzhēng war	zhèi this	zhǒng type	qíngkuàng situation	xià under
	gèrén individual	de POS	yìjian, opinion,	gèrén individual	de POS	shēngyīn voice
	hǎoxiàng apparently	xiǎn manifest	de ADV	tèbié especially	wēiruò. weak.	
C-15	Duì. Yes.					
C-14	Tā 3-sg	kěndìng definitely	hái still	děi must	qù go	dǎ fight
	zhàng, war,	dànshi but	tā 3-sg	yīnggāi should	zěnmē how	bàn? do?
C-15	Bù Not	zhīdào. know.				

C-14	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	tā 3-sg	zhǐ only	néng can	zìjǐ oneself
	háishi still	děi must	qù go	dǎ fight	zhàng, war,	dànshi but
	tā 3-sg	huì would	bǎ take	tā 3-sg	de POS	xīn hear
	lǐ inside	de REL	kànfǎ view	gěi give	tā 3-sg	de POS
	qīn relative	yǒu friend	huòzhě or	gěi give	xīnwén news	méitǐ media
	shuō say	yī one	xià, bit,	dànshi but	zhèi this	yàng type
	de ATT	zhèi this	ge CLAS	rén person	kěnéng maybe	huì would
	dāng be	pàntú, traitor,	suǒyǐ therefore	yě also	bù not	xíng. okay.
C-15	Tā 3-sg	yě also	bù not	huì would	dāng be	pàntú. traitor.
<b>4-67:</b>						
C-16	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde... think...	rúguǒ if	zhèi this	shì be	yī one
	zhǒng type	qiángzhì force	de ATT	xíngwéi behavior	tā 3-sg	jiùshi... be...
	tā 3-sg	jiù just	rènwéi believe	zhànzhēng war	bù not	duì right
	tā 3-sg	yě also	bìxū must	fúcóng. obey.	Wǒ 1-sg	xiǎng think
	zhèi this	ge CLAS	kěnéng maybe	xuǎnzé choose	de ATT	yúdi room

	bù not	shì be	hěn very	duō. much.		
C-17	Jiùshi shuō, That is,	zhèngfǔ government	ràng make	nǐ 2-sg	qù, go,	zhēng levy
	nǐ... 2-sg...	ràng make	nǐ 2-sg	fú serve	bīngyì military duty	le, PERF, duty
	nǐ 2-sg	yě also	méi not have	shénme any	kě can	fǎnkàng resist
	de REL	jīhuì. opportunity.				
<b>4-68:</b>						
C-17	Yǒu Have	kěnéng possibility	tā 3-sg	shì be	xìn believe	mǒu some
	zhǒng type	zōngjiào religion	tā 3-sg	bù not	xiǎng want	cānjiā participate
	zhèi this	chǎng CLAS	zhànzhēng. war.	Dàn But	tā 3-sg	guójiā country
	ràng make	tā 3-sg	cānjiā participate	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	tā 3-sg
	shì be	yīnggāi should	cānjiā. participate.	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	shì be
	zhèi this	yàng. way.				
<b>4-69:</b>						
C-18	Suīrán Although	tā 3-sg	zìjǐ oneself	juéde think	zhèi this	jiàn CLAS
	shìqing matter	kěnéng maybe	huì will	bù not	duì, right,	dànshi but
	wǒ	juéde	tā	bù	huì	biǎoxiàn

	1-sg	think	3-sg	not	would	display
	chū out	lái. come.	Tā 3-sg	yě also	huì would	suízhe follow
	dàjiā everyone	yìqǐ together	qù go	dǎ fight	zhàng. war.	
C-19	Zhāng Sān Zhang San	suīrán although	juéde think	zhèi this	ge CLAS	dǎ fight
	zhàng war	bù not	duì, right,	dànshi but	tā 3-sg	yíyàng same
	huì... would...	huì would	jìn maximize	zìjǐ own	de POS	nǚlì diligence
	qù go	rènzhēn conscientious	de ADV	wánchéng complete	zhèi this	xiàng CLAS
	rènwu. task.					
C-18	Duì. Yes.	"Tā "3-sg	yīnggāi should	zěnmē how	bàn?" do?"	Wǒ 1-sg
	juéde... think...	rúguǒ if	yào want	huàn exchange	shì be	wǒ 1-sg
	dehuà, if,	wǒ 1-sg	bèi PASS	yìngzhēngrù le, wǔ draft	PERF,	wǒ 1-sg
	juéde think	méiyǒu not have	qítā other	de ATT	bànfǎ. method.	
C-19	Zhǐ Only	yǒu have	qù go	zuò... do...		
C-18	Zhǐ Only	yǒu have	qù go	zuò... do...		
C-19	Zìjǐ Oneself	yīnggāi should	zuò do	de REL	shìqǐng. matter.	

C-18	Zìjǐ Oneself	yīnggāi should	zuò do	de REL	shìqǐng. matter.	
<b>4-70:</b>						
C-21	Tā 3-sg	jiù just	děi must	qù. go.		
C-20	Tā 3-sg	bìxū must	děi must	qù. go.		
C-21	Mm. Mm hm.					
C-20	Tā 3-sg	jíbiàn even if	shì be	fǎnduì, oppose,	nènme then	tā 3-sg
	yīnwèi because	shì be	jūnrén... soldier...			
C-21	Jiù Just	děi must	fúcéng... obey...			
C-20	...zài ...LOC	bùduì troops	lǐ inside	háishi still	bìxū must	děi must
	fúcéng obey	mìnglìng. order.	Suǒyǐ Therefore	tā 3-sg	zài LOC	zhèi this
	zhǒng type	qíngkuàng situation	hái still	děi, must,	bìxū must	děi must
	qù go	dǎ fight	zhàng. war.			
C-21	Duì. Yes.	Érqiě Also	zài LOC	Zhōngguó China	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think
	yǒu have	zhème this	yī one	ge CLAS	qíngkuàng. situation.	Bǐrú For example
	zhànzhēng, war,	bùguǎn regardless	zěnmeyàng, how,	tā 3-sg	yào must	qù, go,
	jiùshuō	nǐ	pǎo	le...	zhèi	ge

	that is	2-sg	escape	PERF...	this	CLAS
	táobīng desert	shì be	tèbié especially	kěchǐ. shameful.		
<b>4-71:</b>						
C-21	Wǒ 1-sg	cónglái ever	méiyǒu... not have...	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	hěn very
	yǒuyìsi, interesting,	jiù just	cónglái ever	méiyǒu not have	xiǎng think	guo... EXP...
	kěnéng, maybe,	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	zhèi this	zhǒng type	qíngkuàng situation
	bǐjiào comparatively	shǎo. few.				
C-20	Zōngjiào... Religion...	bùduì army	hé and	zhèi this	ge CLAS	zōngjiào religion
	zhèi this	ge CLAS	guānxi relationship	méi not have	zěnmē how	zhùyì pay attention
	guo. EXP.					
C-21	Cónglái Ever	méiyǒu not have	rén person	shuō say	guo. EXP.	
<b>4-72:</b>						
Me	Jiǎrú Suppose	Zhāng Sān Zhang San	zhīsuǒyǐ why	rènwei believe	dǎ fight	zhàng war
	shì be	bù not	duì right	de NOM	shì be	yīnwèi because
	tā... 3-sg...	shì be	yīnwèi because	zōngjiào religious	de ATT	yuányīn. reason.
	Nà Then	tā 3-sg	yīnggāi should	zěnmē how	bàn do	ne? MOOD?

C-18	Jiùshi FILL	shuō, FILL,	tā 3-sg	zhèi this	ge CLAS	zōngjiào religion
	juéding decide	tā 3-sg	bù not	yīnggāi should	qù go	cānjiā participate
	zhèi this	chǎng CLAS	zhànzhēng? war?			
Me	Duì. Yes.					
C-18	Jiǎrúshuō, Suppose,	jiù FILL	shuō, FILL,	rúguǒ if	Zhōngguó China	hé and
	Yīslánjiào Islam	de ATT	mǒu some	yī one	ge CLAS	guójiā country
	fāshēng happen	jiāozhàn war	le, PERF,	tā 3-sg	běnnshēn at root	xìn believe
	Yīslánjiào? Islam?					
Me	Tā 3-sg	zìjǐ oneself	rènwéi, believe,	yīnwèi because	zōngjiào religious	yuányīn reason
	rènwéi believe	shā kill	rén person	shì be	bù not	duì right
	de. NOM.					
C-19	Bǐrúshuō For example	tā 3-sg	xìn believe	fó, Buddhism,	dànshi but	tā 3-sg
	yào must	qù go	dǎ fight	zhàng, war,	tā 3-sg	rènwéi... believe...
C-18	Dàn But	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	tā 3-sg	méiyǒu not have	rènhé any
	de ATT	qítā other	de ATT	xuǎnzé. choice.		



## 4-73:

C-19	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	kàn look	zhèi this	chǎng CLAS	zhànzhēng war
	shì be	shénme, what,	jiù just	bǐrúshuō for example	quèshí truly	zhèi this
	ge CLAS	rén person	xìn believe	fó, Buddhism,	bǐrúshuō for example	xìn believe
	fó, Buddhism,	tā 3-sg	juéde think	tā 3-sg	bù not	yīnggāi should
	qù go	móuhài harm	shēngmìng, life,	jiùshi that is	qù go	jìnxíng carry out
	zhèi this	zhǒng type	cánrěn ruthless	de ATT	huódòng, activity,	dànshi but
	bǐrúshuō for example	zhèi this	ge CLAS	qítā... other...	qítā other	de ATT
	guójiā country	yào about to	rùqīn invade	de, EMPH,	yǐjīng already	dá dào arrive
	jiā home	ménkǒu door	le, PERF,	nà then	wǒ 1-sg	wèile for
	jiùshi FILL	bǎohù protect	wǒ 1-sg	de POS	zhèi this	ge CLAS
	jiā, home,	wǒ 1-sg	yě also	bù not	kěnéng possible	shuō say
	wǒ 1-sg	xiùshǒu fold hands	pángguān, watch,	bù not	qù go	guǎn. address.
	Wèile For	wǒ 1-sg	de POS	zōngjiào, religion,	wèile for	wǒ 1-sg
	bù not	nénggòu can	qù go	shā kill	rén, person,	wèile for

wǒ 1-sg	bù not	nénggòu can	qù... go...	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think
zhèi this	yào must	kàn look	jiùshi FILL	jùtǐ specific	de ATT
lǐyóu, reason,	jiùshi shuō that is	zhèi this	ge CLAS	zhànzhēng war	duìyú for
tā 3-sg	běnsēn at root	zhèi this	ge CLAS	yìyi meaning	dàodǐ ultimately
yǒu have	duō how	zhòng? important?	Jiùshi shuō That is	tā 3-sg	rúguǒ if
juéde think	zhèi this	ge CLAS	zhànzhēng war	suīrán although	shì be
bù not	yīnggāi should	qù go	dǎ, fight,	dànshi but	duìyú for
wǒ 1-sg	de POS	yìyi meaning	yòu have	hěn very	zhòngyào important
dehuà, if,	dàn but	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	tā 3-sg	jiù just
huì will	qù go	cānjiā, participate,	érqiě also	zhèngfǔ government	jiùshi FILL
yě also	yīnggāi should	jiùshi... FILL...	jiùshi FILL	qiǎngpò... force...	yě also
bù not	néng can	shuō say	shì be	qiǎngpò force	ba, SUG,
jiùshi just	zhíxíng carry out	tā 3-sg	zìjǐ own	de ATT	zhèi this
zhǒng type	quánlì, right,	ràng make	zhèi this	ge CLAS	rén person
yìngzhēng rùwǔ draft	qù go	cānjiā participate	dǎ fight	zhàng. war.	Dànshi But

rúgǔo if	shuō say	tā 3-sg	duì toward	zhèi this	ge CLAS
zhànzhēng war	de POS	yìyi... meaning...	jiù just	zhèi this	ge CLAS
zhànzhēng war	de POS	yìyi meaning	duì for	zhèi this	ge CLAS
Zhāng Sān Zhang San	zhèi this	ge CLAS	rén person	lái come	jiǎng say
yìyi meaning	bù not	shì be	hěn very	zhòngdà, important,	jiùshi shuō that is
dǎ fight	hé and	bù not	dǎ fight	gēn with	wǒ 1-sg
lái come	shuō say	méiyǒu not have	shénme any	guānxi, connection,	shì be
guójiā country	zhìdìng formulate	de REL	yī one	zhǒng type	cèluè, tactic,
jiùshi FILL	duì for	wǒ 1-sg	běnrén oneself	lái come	shuō say
bìng at all	méiyǒu not	shénme have	dà'àn, big deal,	bìng at all	méiyǒu not have
shénme any	hěn very	zhòngyào important	de ATT	yìyi meaning	dehuà, if,
wǒ 1-sg	fǎn'ěr on the contrary	shì be	yī one	zhǒng type	fēicháng extremely
bèidòng passive	de ATT	qiǎngpò force	de ATT	bù not	qíngyuàn willing
de ATT	qù go	dehuà, if,	nènme then	wǒ 1-sg	dào on the contrary

juéde think	jiùshi... FILL...	huì would	yǒu have	yìxiē some	bù not
héǐ reasonable	de ATT	dìfang place	cúnzài. exist.	Dànshi But	duìyú for
rènhe any	yī one	ge CLAS	shèhui society	lái come	jiǎng, say,
jiùshi FILL	tā 3-sg	bù not	kěnéng possible	shì be	àn... according to...
jiùshi that is	tā 3-sg	suǒ NOM	cǎiqǔ adopt	de REL	shìqing, matter,
bù not	kěnéng possible	shì be	àn according to	suǒyǒu all	rén person
de POS	yìyuàn wish	qù go	bàn. do.	Tā 3-sg	bù not
kěnéng possible	mǎnzú satisfy	suǒyǒu all	rén person	de POS	yìyuàn, wish,
yīnwèi because	měi every	ge CLAS	rén person	de POS	gèrén individual
de POS	yìyuàn wish	dōu all	shì be	bù not	tóng same
de. NOM.	Gè Every	yǒu have	gèzì every	de POS	xiǎngfǎ. opinion.
Dànshi But	tā 3-sg	bìxū must	yào must	yǒu have	yī one
ge CLAS	héxīn core	de ATT	lìyì interest	zài LOC	lǐmiàn. inside.
Jiùshi shuō That is	wǒ 1-sg	shì be	wèile for	dà big	duōshù majority
rén person	de POS	lìyì, interest,	wǒ 1-sg	wèile for	yī one

ge CLAS	zhǔyào more important	de ATT	lìyì interest	qù go	cǎiqǔ adopt	
de REL	zhèi this	ge CLAS	zhèngcè, policy,	zhèi this	ge CLAS	
cuòshī. measure.	Dàn But	wǒ 1-sg	bù not	kěnéng possible	yīnwèi because	
nǐ 2-sg	yī one	ge CLAS	rén person	de POS	bù not	
yuànyì willing	ér then	qù go	gǎibiàn change	zhèi this	ge CLAS	
wèile for	dà big	duōshù majority	de ATT	rén person	de POS	
lìyì interest	de REL	zhèi this	ge CLAS	cuòshī measure	lái come	
zhèi this	yàng way	de ADV	nèi that	ge CLAS	xíngdòng. act.	
Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	shì be	zhèi this	yàng way	de. EMPH.	
<b>4-75:</b> C-15	Zhè This	shì be	dì ORD	yī one	ge CLAS	qíngkuàng. situation.
	Dì ORD	èr two	ge CLAS	qíngkuàng situation	shì be	jiǎrú suppose
	hái still	yǒu have	dehuà, if,	yīnwèi because	zhè this	shì be
	yǒu have	liǎng two	zhǒng type	qíngkuàng, situation,	nǐ 2-sg	zǒng always
	jiùshi	tāmen...	jiùshi	wǒmen	jiǎng	shì

	FILL	3-pl...	FILL	1-pl	say	be
	Zhōnghuá Chinese	mínzú ethnicity	de POS	yī one	zhǒng type	sīxiǎng, thought,
	Zhōnghuá Chinese	mínzú ethnicity	de POS	yī one	zhǒng type	sīxiǎng thought
	tā 3-sg	shì be	guójiā country	shì be	zhìshàng topmost	de, NOM,
	jiùshi... that is...	suǒyǐ therefore	dehuà, if,	suǒyǐ... therefore...	jiùshi that is	Zhōngguó China
	yǒu have	yī one	jù CLAS	gǔ ancient	huà word	jiào called
	jìn maximize	zhōng loyalty	bào report	guó country	le. MOOD.	Suǒyǐ Therefore
	guó country	nèi that	ge CLAS	dōngxi thing	bùguǎn regardless	tā 3-sg
	xìnyǎng belief	zěnmeyàng how	tā 3-sg	dōu all	huì would	fàng put
	zài LOC	dì ORD	èr two	wèi position	de. EMPH.	
C-14	Nǐ 2-sg	shuō say	bùguǎn regardless	shì be	duì for	Hàn Han
	zú ethnicity	lái come	shuō say	háishi or	duì for	Měnggǔ, Mongolian,
	Xīnjiāng... Xinjiang...					
C-15	Duì, Yes,	tāmen 3-pl	shǎoshù minority	mínzú ethnicity	tā 3-sg	dōu all
	huì would	yǒu have	zhèi this	yàng type	de. EMPH.	Suǒyǐ Therefore
	jiù	shuō	guójiā	ràng	tā	qù

FILL	FILL	country	make	3-sg	go
dǎ fight	zhàng, war,	tā 3-sg	yǒu have	xìnyǎng belief	de ATT
yuányīn reason	tā 3-sg	jiù just	huì would	qù go	dǎ fight
de. EMPH.	Tā 3-sg	bù not	huì would	qù go	xiǎng think
hěn very	duō many	dōngxi. thing.	Jiùshi Just	tā 3-sg	huì would
gēn follow	tā 3-sg	guójiā country	tā 3-sg	jiù just	huì would
qù go	dǎ fight	zhàng. war.	Zhèi This	ge CLAS	zài LOC
lishǐ history	shàng on	huòzhě or	zài... LOC...	yìzhí always	dōu all
shì be	zènme this way	fāshēng. happen.			

C-14 Duì.  
Yes.

**4-76:**

C-18	Zhèi This	ge CLAS	duìyú FOR	Zhōngguó China	rén person	lái come
	shuō... say...	tā 3-sg	nèi that	zhǒng... type...	zěnme how	shuō say
	ne, MOOD,	jiù FILL	shuō FILL	tā 3-sg	fǎnduì oppose	zhèi this
	zhǒng type	zhèngfu... government ...	kěnéng maybe	gēn with	wǒmen 1-pl	xiǎo young
	shíhou	jiēshòu	de	jiàoyu	yǒu	guān.

time	receive	REL	education	have	connection.
Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	xiǎo young	shíhou time	jiēshòu receive	de REL
jiàoyu education	dà big	bùfen part	dōu all	shì be	juéde... think...
zhèngfu, government, or	huòzhě or	shuō say	dǎng, party,	juédìng decide	yìxiē some
shénme whatever	shìqing matter	tā 3-sg	jiùshi be	yǒu have	dàoli reasonableness
de. NOM.	Érqiě Also	nèi that	ge CLAS	méitǐ media	de POS
dǎoxiàng orientation	dōu all	shì be	qīngxiàng tend	yú toward	shuō say
zhèi this	ge CLAS	dǎng party	zhìdìng formulate	de REL	zhèngcè policy
shi be	zhèngquè correct	de, NOM,	shì be	héilǐ reasonable	de. NOM.

**4-77:**

C-14	Duì, Yes,	tā 3-sg	jiù just	huì would	wèn ask	shénme what
	jiào be called	"wèi "for	rénmín people	fúwù?" serve?"	Nà Then	wǒ 1-sg
	jiù just	shuō say	nǐmen 2-pl	yī one	qún group	xiǎo small
	háizi child	zuò do	yóuxì game	le, PERF,	kěnéng maybe	zhèi this
	ge CLAS	Zhāng Sān, Zhang San,	tā 3-sg	míng clear	míng clear	shì be
	tā 3-sg	shuō say	le, PERF,	tā 3-sg	fēi must	yào must



shuō say	tā 3-sg	yíng win	le, PERF,	nà then	zhèi this
yàng type	de ATT	tā 3-sg	zhèi this	ge CLAS	jiùshi be
yī one	ge CLAS	huài bad	xiǎoháir, child,	nà then	zhèi this
ge CLAS	huài bad	xiǎoháir child	ne, MOOD,	jiù just	xūyào need
yǒu have	yī one	ge CLAS	tuántǐ group	lái come	ràng make
tā 3-sg	bù not	yào will	zhèi this	yàng type	zuò do
huài bad	de ATT	xíngwéi, behavior,	ràng make	tā 3-sg	zuò do
hǎo good	shì. matter.	Huòzhě Or	rúguǒ if	tā 3-sg	jiānchí continue
zuò do	huài bad	shì, matter,	wǒmen 1-pl	jiù just	xiǎng think
bànfǎ method	bǎ take	tā 3-sg	gěi make	huòzhě or	guān close
qīlai INC	huòzhě or	chéngfá punish	tā 3-sg	huòzhě or	bù not
ràng let	tā 3-sg	cānjiā participate	yóuxì game	le, CHG,	jiù FILL
shuō FILL	zhèi this	yàng type	nǐmen 2-pl	zuò do	yóuxì game
de ATT	yóutuán, group,	yī one	ge CLAS	dà large	de ATT
tuántǐ group	dāngzhōng among	xūyào need	yī one	ge CLAS	xiǎo small

de ATT	tuántǐ group	lái come	bǎ take	dàjiā all	de POS
yìjian opinion	gěi make	jízhōng concentrate	qǐlai. INC.		

**4-78:**

C-17	Wèishénme Why	yào must	yǒu have	zhèngfu? government ?	Jiùshi Be	yīnwèi because
	wúzhèngfu anarchy	zhuàngkuàng situation	shì be	hěn very	kǒngbù terrifying	de. NOM.
	Suǒyǐ Therefore	wǒmen 1-pl	yào must	yǒu have	zhèngfu, government,	wúzhèngfu anarchy
	de ATT	zhuàngkuàng situation	dàjiā everyone	dōu all	xiǎng want	gàn do
	shénme whatever	jiù then	gàn do	shénme, whatever,	wǒ 1-sg	xiǎng want
	shā kill	rén person	jiù just	shā kill	rén. person.	
	[...]	]				
	Suǒyǐ Therefore	wǒmen 1-pl	yào must	yǒu have	zhèngfu... government ...	lái come
	kòng... control...	lái come	shǐ cause	yìxiē... some...	nèixiē those	rén person
	de... POS...	pò destroy	zhèixiē these	hěn very	xié'è evil	de ATT
	yùwàng desire	nèi that	zhǒng... type...	shānghài harm	bié other	rén person
	de REL	yùwang desire	dédào receive	kòngzhi. control.		

**4-79:**

C-21 Bù yào luàn. Xiàng yī ge  
 Not want chaos. Toward one CLAS  
 fāngxiàng.  
 direction.

C-20 Duì. Jiùshi Zhōngguó suǒ shuō de,  
 Yes. Be Chinese NOM say NOM,  
 language  
 wúzhèngfu zhuàngtài jiùshi...  
 anarchy situation be...

C-21 Bù hǎo.  
 Not good.

**4-80:**

C-5 Érqǐě wǒ juéde yào yǒu yī  
 Also I-1sg think must have one  
 zhǒng... gěi zhèi ge guójiā de  
 type... give this CLAS country POS  
 gōngmín yǒu yī zhǒng hěn zìháo  
 citizen have one type very proud  
 de nèi zhǒng mínzú gǎn. Yīnwèi  
 ATT that type ethnic feeling. Because  
 wǒ yǐ wǒ shì zhèi ge  
 I-1sg take I-1sg be this CLAS  
 guójiā de gōngmín wéi róng. Wǒ  
 country POS citizen be glorious. I-1sg  
 juéde zhèi yàng kěnéng zhèi shì  
 think this way maybe this be  
 yī ge guójiā yīnggāi gěi de  
 one CLAS country should give REL

yìwu.  
duty.

**4-81:**

C-3	Wèile For	guójiā country	nǐ 2-sg	kěyǐ can	fù pay	chū out
	yíqiè, everything,	wèile for	jiāting family	nǐ 2-sg	yě also	kěyǐ can
	fù pay	chū out	yíqiè. everything.	Dāng At	nèi those	liǎng two
	ge CLAS	gàinian concept	chōngtū conflict	de REL	shíhou, time,	nǐ 2-sg
	xuǎnzé choose	duì to	guójiā country	de REL	yìwu, duty,	nǐ 2-sg
	yě also	shì be	zhèngquè correct	de, NOM,	nǐ 2-sg	xuǎnzé choose
	duì to	jiāting family	de REL	yìwu, duty,	nǐ 2-sg	yě also
	shì be	zhèngquè correct	de. NOM.	Dāngrán Of course	yìbān general	lái come
	shuō, say,	duì to	guójiā country	de REL	yìwu duty	hǎoxiàng it seems
	gèng more	bèi PASS	rén person	kànzhòng prioritize	yī one	diǎn. bit.
	Ránhòu Afterward	ne, MOOD,	xiàndài modern	lái come	shuō, say,	guójiā country
	gēn with	mínzú ethnicity	zuòwéi be	liǎng two	ge CLAS	gàinian concept
	yǐjīng already	bèi PASS	fēnkāi separate	lái come	le, PERF,	dànshi but

zài LOC	Zhōngguó China	rén person	de POS	nǎozi mind	lǐmian, in,
jiùshi be	zài LOC	dà big	bùfen part	pǔtōng common	Zhōngguó China
rén person	nǎozi mind	lǐmian in	- -	jiùshi FILL	shuō FILL
nǐ 2-sg	rúguǒ if	bù not	shì be	xué study	fǎlǜ law
de, NOM,	bù not	shì be	xué study	zhèngzhì politics	de, NOM,
bǎ take	liǎng two	ge CLAS	gàinián concept	gǎo make	de DEG
fēicháng extremely	qīngchu, clear,	fēn separate	de DEG	hěn very	kāi distinct
- -	pǔtōng common	Zhōngguó China	rén person	guójiā country	hé and
mínzú ethnicity	wǎngwǎng always	shì be	hùnxíáo mix	zài LOC	yìqǐ together
de. NOM.	Guójiā Country	jiùshi be	mínzú, ethnicity,	mínzú ethnicity	jiùshi be
guójiā. country.					

**4-86:**

C-10	Nénglì Ability	hé and	tiānxìng basic nature	dōu all	yíyàng? same?	Nénglì Ability
	dāngrán of course	shì be	gèrén individual	bù not	tóng same	a. MOOD.
	Lìshǐ History	a, MOOD,	bāokuò include	tā 3-sg	de POS	dìlǐ geographic
	huánjìng	a,	yǔ	jīngjì	zhèixiē	qíngkuàng

environment MOOD, and economic these situation

a.  
MOOD.

**4-87:**

C-14	Wǒ 1-sg	zhǐ only	shì be	shuō say	měi every	ge CLAS
	mínzú ethnicity	nénglì ability	hé and	tiānxìng, basic nature,	jiùshi FILL	tā 3-sg
	zhèi this	ge CLAS	wèntí... question...	qǔjuéyú depend on	tā 3-sg	zhèi this
	ge CLAS	nénglì ability	hé and	tiānxìng basic nature	shì be	zěnmeyàng how
	dìngxìng define	de. NOM.	Jiùshi That is	rúguǒ if	shì be	tā 3-sg
	nénglì ability	hé and	tiānxìng basic nature	bāokuò include	shénme whatever	tǐnéng physical ability
	a, MOOD,	xìnggé character	a MOOD	shénme, whatever,	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think
	zhèi this	ge CLAS	bù not	yào want	shuō say	měi every
	ge CLAS	mínzú ethnicity	nà then	tā 3-sg	shì... be...	tóng same
	ge CLAS	mínzú ethnicity	měi every	ge CLAS	rén person	lái come
	shuō say	tā 3-sg	yě also	huì will	yǒu have	yìxiē some
	chāyì. difference.	Dànshi But	zhèi this	ge CLAS	chāyì difference	wǒ 1-sg
	juéde	bù	yǐngxiǎng	jiù	shuō	dàjiā...

think	not	influence	FILL	FILL	everyone...
gòngtóng together	héping peaceful	shēnghuó... live...	zài LOC	yī one	ge CLAS
guójiā country	héping peaceful	xiāngchǔ. live together.			

**4-88:**

C-18	Wǒ 1-sg	bù not	tóngyì agree	nǐ 2-sg	de POS	kànfǎ. opinion.
	Wǒ 1-sg	yǒu have	hǎo very	duō, many,	jiù FILL	shuō FILL
	zhèxiē these	tóngxué classmates	ma, SUG,	yīnwèi because	zài LOC	dàxué university
	lǐ inside	yǒu have	nèi that	zhǒng type	shǎoshù minority	mínzú ethnicity
	de POS	yùkē preparatory	bānr. class.	Zhèi This	ge CLAS	cóng from
	nèi that	zhǒng type	bānjí class	shàng up	lái come	de REL
	xuésheng student	tā 3-sg	díquè truly	zhèi this	zhǒng type	nénglì ability
	hé and	shuǐpíng level	jiù just	hé with	Hàn Han	zú ethnicity
	zhèxiē these	pǔtōng common	xuésheng student	lái come	bǐ, compare,	tā 3-sg
	jiù just	chà lack	yī one	ge CLAS	dàngcì. level.	Wǒ 1-sg
	juéde think	zhèi this	gēn with	tā 3-sg	de... POS...	jiù FILL
	shuō... say...	hòutiān tomorrow	de possessive particle	jiàoyu teacher	yīnggāi should	shuō say

	FILL...	acquired	ATT	education	should	say
	guānxi relationship	bù not	shì be	hěn very	dà. big.	Zài LOC
	wǒ 1-sg	lái come	shuō say	wǒ 1-sg	chéngrèn acknowledg e	nèi that
	zhǒng type	zhìshāng I.Q.	zhījiān among	nèi that	zhǒng type	chābié. difference.
	Jiùshuō That is	nǐ 2-sg	nèi that	zhǒng type	zhìshāng I.Q.	yǒu have
	hěn very	dà big	de ATT	chéngfèn part	shì be	yóu from
	nǐ 2-sg	zhèi this	ge CLAS	xiāntiān innate	yíchuán pass down	ér thus
	lái come	de. NOM.				
C-19	Shì Yes	a. MOOD.	Wǒ 1-sg	shuō say	de REL	jiùshi just
	yī one	dài generation	yī one	dài generation	yán... -	jiùshi be
	yánxù continue	xia down	lái come	jiù then	zàochéng create	tā 3-sg
	de... POS					
C-18	Dànshi But	jiù FILL	shuō... FILL...	hǎo very	duō many	zhèi this
	zhǒng type	rén, person,	tā 3-sg	yě also	shì be	jiēshòu receive
	le PERF	jiù FILL	shuō FILL	Hàn Han	zú ethnicity	de POS



jiàoyu, education,	jiù FILL	shuō, FILL,	yīnwèi because	xiànzài now	kāifàng... open...
shǎoshù minority	mínzú ethnicity	yě also	bìng at all	bù not	yídìng definitely
jiù FILL	shuō... FILL...	jiù FILL	shuō FILL	bìsè close off	chéngdù degree
fēicháng extremely	dà. big.	Tā 3-sg	yě also	jiēshòu receive	le, PERF,
jiù FILL	shuō, FILL,	cóng from	xiǎo young	kāishǐ begin	gēn with
Hàn Han	zú ethnicity	xuésheng student	yíyàng same	jiēshòu receive	tóng same
děng level	de ATT	jiàoyu. education.	Zhèi This	yàng type	tóng same
děng level	de ATT	jiàoyu education	shàng up	lái come	yǐhòu... after...
dào arrive	le PERF	dàxué university	yǐhòu after	tā 3-sg	nèi that
zhǒng type	gètǐ individual	zhījiān among	de REL	chāyì difference	háishi still
bǐjiào comparatively	míngxiǎn obvious	de. NOM.	Dànshi But	wǒ 1-sg	chéngrèn acknowledg e
jiùshi FILL	shuō... FILL...	Hàn Han	zú ethnicity	yě also	yǒu have
fēicháng extremely	cōngmíng intelligent	de ATT	rén, person,	yě also	yǒu have
jiù FILL	shuō FILL	zhěnggèr entire	shuǐpíng level	zhèi this	zhǒng type
chāyì difference	bǐjiào comparatively	dà big	yìxiē. somewhat.	Dànshi But	dānchún purely

cóng from	zhèi this	ge CLAS	gètǐ individual	lái come	kàn, look,
wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	zhèi this	ge CLAS	Huí, Hui,	Zàng, Tibetan,
hé and	zhèi this	ge CLAS	Měng Mongolian	zhìshǎo at least	zài LOC
zhèi this	ge CLAS	gètǐ individual	shuǐpíng level	lái come	shuō say
hé with	tóng same	děng level	céngcì level	de REL	Hàn Han
zú ethnicity	de ATT	rén person	lái come	bǐ, compare,	tā 3-sg
zhèi this	ge CLAS	zhìshāng I.Q.	shuǐpíng level	xiāngduì relative	lái come
shuō say	zhěngtǐ entirety	yào will	dī low	yī on	ge CLAS
dàngcì. level.	Dànshi But	nǐ 2-sg	yào want	shuō say	shēntǐ body
sùzhi quality	kěnéng maybe	zhèi this	ge CLAS	Měng Mongolian	zú ethnicity
hé and	Zàng Tibetan	zú ethnicity	rén person	yào will	bǐ than
Hàn Han	zú ethnicity	rén person	yào will	shāowēi a bit	hǎo good
yìxiē. somewhat.	Tā 3-sg	zhèi this	ge CLAS	shēntǐ body	sùzhi quality
zhījiān among	nèi that	ge CLAS	chāyì difference	háishi still	bǐjiào comparatively
dà big	yìxiē somewhat	de. NOM.	Zhèi This	yàng type	bǐjiào comparatively

míngxiǎn, obvious,	jiùshi that is	zài LOC	yùndòng sports	huì meet	shàng. on.
Zài LOC	wǒmen 1-pl	xuéxiào school	de REL	yùndòng sports	huì meet
shàng on	yě also	shì. be.	Yìbān General	shǎoshù minority	mínzú ethnicity
lái come	de REL	xuésheng, student,	tā 3-sg	shēntǐ body	sùzhi quality
bǐjiào comparatively	hǎo. good.	Ránhòu Afterward	jīngcháng often	nénggòu can	ná take
yìxiē some	guànjūn champion	shénmede. whatever.	Dànshi But	rúguǒ if	zhēnzhèng truly
zài LOC	jìngsài competition	dāngzhōng among	huòzhě or	shuō say	zhēnzhèng truly
shuō, say,	zài LOC	kēyán scientific research	dāngzhōng, among,	zhēnzhèng truly	zuò do
de DEG	bǐjiào comparatively	yōuxiù outstanding	de NOM	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think
háishi still be	Hàn Han	zú ethnicity	de ATT	xuésheng. student.	

**4-101:**

C-12	Yǒu Have	kěnéng possibility	tā 3-sg	yī as soon as	kāishǐ start	shì be
	zháo catch	hěn very	xiǎo small	de ATT	huǒ, fire,	nǐ 2-sg
	yíxiàzi immediately	gěi for	tā 3-sg	mièdiào put out	le, PERF,	dànshi but
	bù not	xǔ very	jiǔ, long,	jiù then	zài LOC	nàr there

děngzhe wait	děngzhě wait	lái, come,	yīnwèi because	děngzhe wait	tā 3-sg
lái come	yídìng definitely	yǒu have	yī one	duàn stretch	de ATT
shíjiān time	ba, SUG,	kěnéng maybe	jiù just	huì would	biàn change
chéng become	yī one	ge CLAS	bǐjiào comparatively	dà big	de. ATT.

**4-102:**

C-18	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	yīnggāi should	shì be	tāmen 3-pl	shì be
	huì would	bǎ take	zhèi this	ge CLAS	shù tree	lái come
	nuó move	zǒu go	le. PERF.	Yīnwèi Because	bìjìng ultimately	zàochéng create
	tāmen 3-pl	xíng move	chē car	de REL	kùnnán. difficulty.	Wǒ 1-sg
	juéde think	tāmen 3-pl	yīng... -	tāmen 3-pl	huì would	zhèi this
	yàng way	zuò do	de. EMPH.	"Tāmen "3-pl	yīnggāi should	bu not
	yīnggāi should	zhèi this	yàng way	zuò?" do?"	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think
	zhè this	jiùshi just be	yī one	ge CLAS	guānniàn concept	de ATT
	wèntí. question.					

**4-106:**

C-18	Zhèi	yàng	dehuà	wǒ	juéde,	jiù
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This	way	if	1-sg	think,	FILL
shuō, FILL,	yī one	fāngmiàn aspect	tā 3-sg	zìjǐ oneself	gèrén individual
de POS	jiàzhí value	shíxiàn manifest	le, PERF,	lìng additional	yī one
fāngmiàn aspect	tóngshí same time	yòu also	duì for	zhèi this	ge CLAS
shèhuì society	yòu also	zhàofú look after	le, PERF,	jiù shuō that is	tā 3-sg
liǎng two	fāngmiàn aspect	dōu all	nénggòu can	dédào obtain	yìxiē some
rènkě. approval.	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	zhèi this	yàng way	dehuà if
tā 3-sg	zhèi this	ge CLAS	qián, money,	jiù FILL	shuō FILL
zhēnzhèng true	de ADV	tǐxiàn dào manifest	zhèi this	ge CLAS	qián money
de POS	jiàzhí value	le. PERF.			

**4-107:**

C-17	Shuō Say	yī one	ge class	rén person	hěn very	yǒu have
	qián, money,	tā 3-sg	yīnggāi should	zěnmē how	yòng use	tā 3-sg
	de POS	qián, money,	nà that	shì be	ràng make	nǐ 2-sg
	qù... go...	jiùshi FILL	wánquán completely	nèi that	zhǒng type	generalized generalized
	nèi that	zhǒng type	gǎnjué. feeling.	Jiùshi FILL	hǎoxiàng seem	gēn with

	nǐ... 2-sg...					
C-16	Tā 3-sg	yīnggāi should	yǒu have	hěn very	duō many	fāngshì method
	qù go	yòng use	tā 3-sg	de POS	qián, money,	érqiě also
	tā 3-sg	yīnggāi should	xuǎnzé choose	yī one	zhǒng type	tā 3-sg
	de... POS...	tā 3-sg	xǐhuan like	de REL	fāngshì method	qù go
	yòng. use.	Rúguǒ If	nèi that	ge CLAS	qián money	shì be
	tōngguò pass-through	yī one	zhǒng type	zhèngdàng proper	de ATT	héshì suitable
	shǒuduàn. means.					
C-17	Hǎoxiàng Seem	zhèi this	yàng type	nǐ 2-sg	shuō say	yìxiē some
	dàodé moral	shuōjiào preach	shì... be...	nǐ 2-sg	yīnggāi should	zěnmeyàng how
	yòng use	nǐ 2-sg	de POS	qián, money,	nǎ that	shì be
	bǐjiào comparatively	hǎo good	de, ATT,	bǐjiào comparatively	hǎo good	de ATT
	fāngshì. method					
C-16	Duì. Yes.					
C-17	Dànshi But	wǒ 1-sg	zhǐ only	néng can	huídá answer	wǒ 1-sg

	xiǎng	zěnmeyàn	yòng	wǒ	de	qián.
	want	g how	use	1-sg	POS	money
C-16	Qiántí Premise	shì	wǒmen	huì	yǒu	qián. money.
	[laughter] [laughter]	Wǒ	de	qián	bù	gòu enough
	fù pay	fángzū rent	de. EMPH.			
C-17	Érqiě Also	wǒ	duì	tā	jiùshi FILL	shuō, FILL,
	"yīnggāi" should	zěnmeyàn	yòng	tā	de	qián,"
	"yīnggāi" "should"	zhèi	liǎng	ge	zì	wǒ characte 1-sg r
	kěnéng perhaps	yǒu	yī	diǎn... bit...	bù	shūfu. comfortable.
C-16	Bièniu, Awkward,	shì	ba?			SUG?
C-17	Duì. Yes.	"Yīnggāi" "Should"	hái still	yǒu have	yī one	diǎn bit
	dàodé, moral,	shuōjiào preach	de ATT	gǎnjué. feeling.		
C-16	Wǒmen 1-pl	yīnggāi should	ràng let	měi every	ge CLAS	rén person
	zìjǐ oneself	xuǎnzé... choose...	yīnggāi should	qù go	zěnmē how	yòng... use...
	bù not	shì be	yīnggāi... should...	ràng let	měi every	ge CLAS

rén person	zìjǐ oneself	xuǎnzé choose	qù go	yòng use	tā 3-sg
de POS	qián. money.	Wǒmen 1-pl	zhǐ only	néng can	shuō say
rúguǒ if	wǒ 1-sg	yǒu have	qián money	dehuà if	wǒ 1-sg
huì would	zěnmē how	bàn. do.			

C-17 Duì.  
Yes.

**4-108:**

C-18	Zhèi This	ge CLAS	wǒ 1-sg	juéde... think...	zhèi this	ge CLAS
	wèntí question	jiùshi be	yīn because	rén person	ér then	yì different
	de. NOM.	Jiùshi FILL	nǐ 2-sg	zhèi this	ge CLAS	qián money
	de POS	shěng save	huā buy	ha, MOOD,	qǔjué depend	yú on
	nǐ 2-sg	zhèi this	ge CLAS	rén person	de POS	yī one
	zhǒng type	shìjièguān worldview	a, MOOD,	jiàzhí value	yìshi mentality	de POS
	zhǐxiàng. orientation.					
C-19	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	zhèi this	ge CLAS	wèntí question	yīnggāi should
	wèn, ask,	"Rúguǒ "If	nǐ 2-sg	hěn very	yǒu have	qián, money,



	nǐ 2-sg	yīnggāi should	zěnmeyàng how	yòng use	nǐ 2-sg	de POS
		qián?" money?"				
C-18	Duì. Yes.	Shíjì Fact	shàng on	nǐ 2-sg	jiùshi FILL	biǎodá express
	nǐ 2-sg	zìjǐ self	de POS	kànfǎ view	ma, MOOD,	yīnggāi should
	zěnmeyàng how	qù go	shǐyòng use	zhèi this	bǐ sum	qián. money.
C-19	Zhèi This	yàng way	wèn. ask.			
<b>4-117:</b>						
C-21	Yīnggāi Should	bù not	yīnggāi? should?	Háishi... After all...	yīnggāi should	bù not
	yīnggāi? should?	Háishi After all	jiùshi be	jiàoyu... education...	yīnggāi should	ba. SUG.
	Dāngrán, Of course,	yǒu have	zhīshi knowledge	de, REL,	yǒu have	wénhuà culture
	de REL	zhèi this	xiē PART	rén, person,	tā, 3-sg,	dāngrán of course
	tā 3-sg	yào want	zuò do	chū out	xiāngyìng relevant	de ATT
	fǎnyìng, reaction,	dànshi but	yìbān general	de ATT	lǎobǎixìng, commonfolk,	kěnéng maybe
	tā 3-sg	jiù just	zuò do	yìxiē some	jùtǐ concrete	de, ATT,
	jiù FILL	bǐrúshuō... for example...	xíngdòng. actions.	Yīnggāi Should	ba. SUG.	

4-118:

C-14	"Rúguǒ If	yǐngxiǎng influence	dehuà, if,	nǐ 2-sg	juéde think	yǒu have
	méiyǒu not have	dàoli? reasonableness ?	Yīnggāi Should	bù not	yīnggāi?" should?"	Wǒ 1-sg
	duì to	zhèi this	ge CLAS	wèntí... question...		
C-15	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde, think,	rúguǒ if	zhèi this	ge CLAS	yǐngxiǎng influence
	dehuà if	zhèi this	yàng type	shì be	méiyǒu not have	dàoli reasonableness
	de. NOM.	Yīnwèi Because	tā 3-sg	shì be	zài at	yī one
	ge CLAS	fǎzhì law	shèhui society	dehuà, if,	bùguǎn no matter	tā 3-sg
	de POS	jiàoyu educational	chéngdù degree	de POS	gāo high	dī low
	dehuà, if,	tā 3-sg	bù not	huì... would...	zhè this	shì be
	yī one	ge CLAS	rén person	de POS	jīběn basic	quánlì, right,
	tā 3-sg	bùguǎn no matter	tā 3-sg	shòu receive	méi not	shòu receive
	guo EXP	jiàoyu, education,	tā 3-sg	yǒu have	yī one	diǎn bit
	xiàng resemble	shì be	tiān heaven	xià down	lái come	tā 3-sg
	jiù just	zhīdào know	fǎnzhèng regardless	jiù just	méiyǒu not have	rén person
	yīnggāi	duì	tā	de...	tā	suǒ

should	to	3-sg	POS...	3-sg	NOM
yōngyǒu possess	de REL	quánlì right	jìnxíng carry out	qīnhài harm	de. EMPH.
Zhè This	yīnggāi should	gēn with	jiàoyu education	chéngdù degree	méiyǒu not have
guānxi connection	de. NOM.	Suǒyǐ, Therefore,	rúguǒ if	shuō say	zhèi this
yàng type	shì... be...	zhèi this	yàng type	yǒu have	yǐngxiǎng influence
dehuà if	wǒ 3-sg	juéde think	shì be	bù not	yīnggāi should
	de. NOM.				

**4-119:**

C-19	"Rúguǒ If	yǒu have	yǐngxiǎng influence	dehuà if,	nǐ 2-sg	juéde think
	yǒu have	méiyǒu not have	dàoli?" reasonableness?"	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	rúguǒ if
	ér and	shì... be...	yīnggāi should	shì... be...	rúguǒ if	tā 3-sg
	shì be	zuò do	le PERF	wéifǎ illegal	de ATT	shìqing matter
	nà then	jiùshi be	méiyǒu not have	dàoli reasonableness	de. NOM.	Wǒ 1-sg
	duì to	zhèi this	ge CLAS	wèntí question	bù not	shì... be...
	bù not	shì be	hěn... very...			
C-18	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	zhèi this	ge CLAS	wèntí question	yīnggāi should

	zènme this way	lǐjiě. understand.	Rúguǒ If	yǐngxiǎng influence	dehuà, if,	jiùshi FILL
	shuo FILL	zhèi this	ge CLAS	jiàoyu educational	shuǐpíng level	duì to
	tā 3-sg	zhèi this	ge CLAS	fǎnyìng reaction	zhèi this	ge CLAS
	yǐngxiǎng influence	hé accord	bù not	hé accord	dàoli, reasonableness,	zhèi this
	jiàn CLAS	shìqing. matter.	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	zài LOC	Zhōngguó China
	zhèi this	jiùshi be	héli reasonable	héfǎ legal	de, NOM,	zhèi this
	jiùshi... be...					
C-19	Héhū Accord	dàoli. reason.				
C-18	Héhū Accord	dàoli reason	de REL	shìqing. matter.	Yīnwèi Because	zài LOC
	Zhōngguó China	fǎzhì legal	guānniàn concept	zài LOC	měi every	ge CLAS
	rén person	xīnmù idea	dāngzhōng among	bìng at all	bù not	dōu all
	shì be	yíyàng same	de. NOM.	Jiùshi Be	nǐ 2-sg	jiēshòu receive
	de REL	jiàoyu education	shuǐpíng level	yuè the more	gāo, high,	huòzhě or
	shuō say	nǐ 2-sg	jiēshòu receive	le PERF	mǒu some	yī one
	ge CLAS	céngcì level	de ATT	jiàoyu educational	shuǐpíng level	yǐhòu, after,

nǐ 2-sg	cái only then	jiànli build	yìxiē some	yídìng definite	de ATT
fǎzhì legal	guānniàn, concept,	yīnwèi because	zài LOC	Zhōngguó China	hǎoxiàng it seems
yǒu have	hěn very	duō many	rén person	zhèi this	ge CLAS
fǎzhì legal	guānniàn concept	bǐjiào comparatively	dànbó. dim.	Jiùshi FILL	gāi should
shíxiàn realize	yìxiē some	tā 3-sg	zhèngcháng normal	de ATT	dàoli reasonableness
huò or	lǐyóu, reason,	tōngguò go through	yìxiē some	zhèngcháng normal	de ATT
tújìng path	lái come	shíxiàn realize	zhèixiē these	quánlì right	dehuà. if.
Tā 3-sg	bìng at all	méiyǒu... not have...	tā 3-sg	bìng at all	méiyǒu... not have...
zhèi this	zhǒng type	gàiniàn, concept,	bìng at all	méiyǒu not	zhèi this
zhǒng type	yìshi, mentality,	tā 3-sg	yīnggāi should	qù go	zhǎo seek
lǜshī lawyer	qù go	shíxíng exercise	yī one	zhǒng type	héfǎ legal
de ATT	quánlì. right.	Tā... 3-sg...	jiù FILL	shuō, FILL,	shòu receive
jiàoyù educational	céngcì level	bǐjiào comparatively	dī low	de REL	rén, person,
tā 3-sg	méiyǒu not have	zhèi this	zhǒng... type...	méiyǒu not have	zhèi this
zhǒng... type...	jiù that is	méiyǒu not have	zhèi this	zhǒng type	yìshi. mentality.

	Suǒyǐ Therefore	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	tā 3-sg	de POS	jiàoyu educational
	shuǐpíng level	yǐngxiǎng influence	tā 3-sg	de POS	fǎnyìng reaction	zhuàngkuàng. situation.
	Zhèi This	ge CLAS	shì be	bǐjiào comparatively	yǒu have	dàoli reasonableness
	de. NOM.					
C-19	Dànshi But	bù not	yīnggai... should...			
C-18	Yīng Should	bù not	yīnggāi should	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	shì be
	bù not	yīnggāi should	de. NOM.	Zài LOC	yī one	ge CLAS
	bǐjiào comparatively	fādá developed	de ATT	shèhui society	lǐtou in	wǒ 1-sg
	juéde think	měi every	ge CLAS	rén person	de POS	fǎzhì legal
	guānniàn concept	bù not	yīnggāi should	yīn because of	tā 3-sg	zhèi this
	ge CLAS	jiàoyu educational	zhuàngkuàng situation	ér and	yì. different.	Jiù shuō That is
	zhèi this	ge CLAS	fǎzhì legal	yàoshi if	yī one	ge CLAS
	xiāngdāng very	jiànquán comprehensive	de REL	shèhui, society,	tā 3-sgq	zhèi this
	ge CLAS	pǔfǎ popularize	de ATT	yī one	ge, CLAS,	zhèi this
	ge CLAS	shǒuduàn means	yīnggāi should	bǐjiào comparatively	de ADV	jiànquán. comprehensive

	Jiù shuō That is	měi every	ge CLAS	rén person	de POS	xīnmù idea
	dāngzhōng among	dōu all	yǒu have	yī one	ge CLAS	zhèi this
	ge... CLAS...	fǎlù law	de ATT	gàinián. concept.	Huíyìng Respond	yī one
	zhǒng... type...	jiùshi FILL	yìngjí deal with	zhuàngkuàng situation	xià, under,	tā 3-sg
	zhèi this	ge CLAS	fǎnyìng reacton	yīnggāi should	shì be	tōngguò go through
	héilǐ reasonable	héfǎ legal	de ATT	shǒuduàn means	lái come	shíxíng exercise
	tā 3-sg	zhèngdàng proper	de ATT	quánlì. right.	Wǒ 1-sg	juéde think
	zhèi this	ge CLAS	měi every	ge CLAS	rén person	dōu all
	yīnggāi should	yíyàng same	de. NOM.	Nǐ 2-sg	juéde think	ne? MOOD?
C-19	Jiǎndān Simple	de ADV	shuō say	jiùshi be	zài LOC	zhèi this
	ge, CLAS,	yī one	ge CLAS	fādá developed	de ATT	shèhuì society
	lǐmiàn, in,	wúlùn no matter	yù meet	dào arrive	shénme what	shìqing matter
	huòzhě or	shì be	chǔlǐ deal with	shénme what	shìqing, matter,	dōu all
	yīnggāi should	zūnxún follow	yídìng definite	de ATT	guīzé. rule.	Shéi Who
	wéifàn violate	le PERF	zhèi this	ge CLAS	guīzé rule	jiù just

xiāngdāng equal	yú to	shì be	fàn violate	le PERF	fǎ law
yíyàng, same,	suǒyǐ therefore	zhè this	ge CLAS	shì be	bù not
yīnggāi should	de. NOM.				

**4-127:**

C-3	Dāngrán Of course	měi every	ge CLAS	guójiā country	dōu all	yīnggāi should
	jiǎng heed	rénquán, human rights,	dàn but	rénquán, human rights,	tā 3-sg	yǒu have
	hěn very	jùtǐ specific	de ATT	nèiróng, content,	jiùshi be	dàodǐ ultimately
	bāokuò include	něi which	xiē PART	quánlì rights	suàn count as	shì be
	rénquán, human rights,	yīnwèi because	shéi whoever	dōu all	zhīdào know	rénquán human rights
	zhèi this	ge CLAS	gàinian concept	tā 3-sg	bù not	shì be
	yī one	ge CLAS	chōuxiàng abstract	de ATT	gàinian, concept,	tā 3-sg
	shì be	ge CLAS	lìshǐ history	de ATT	gàinian. concept.	

Chapter 5:

**5-1:**

C-17	Yǒu Have	hěn very	dà big	de ATT	zuòyong. function.	Nǐ 2-sg
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xiàng resemble	Zhōngguó China	shì be	yī one	ge CLAS	zhèi this
yàng type	yī one	ge... CLAS...	dì land	guǎng, broad,	dànshi but
wǒ 1-sg	bìng at all	bù not	juéde think	tā 3-sg	zīyuán resource
hěn very	fēngfù. rich.	Érqiě Also	Zhōngguó China	rén person	yòu also
nènme so	duō. many.	Zàochéng Create	zhèi this	yàng type	yī one
ge CLAS	huánjìng environment	nǐ 2-sg	jiù just	shénme whatever	shìqing, matter,
zánmen 1-pl	shénme whatever	shìqing matter	dōu all	huì will	zhēng. struggle.
Yǐngxiǎng Influence	dehuà if	cóng from	xiǎo young	dào until	dà. old.
Bǐrúshuō For example	xiǎoxué elementary school	dào to	chūzhōng, middle school,	chūzhōng middle school	dào to
gāozhōng, high school,	gāozhōng high school	shàng attend	dàxué, university,	shénme whatever	shìqing matter
nǐ 2-sg	yào must	zhēng. struggle.	Nǐ 2-sg	cái finally	néng can
guò live	shàng up	bǐjiào comparatively	hǎo good	de ATT	shēnghuó. life.
Dànshi But	nǐ 2-sg	kàn look at	Xīfāng Western	de ATT	guójiā... country...
nǐ 2-sg	kàn look at	Jiānádà Canada	huòzhě or	xiàng resemble	Měiguó U.S.
tā	yào	dì	dà	wù	bó,

3-sg	be	land	big	thing	broad,
wǒ 1-sg	zǒng always	juéde think	tā 3-sg	zīyuán resource	hěn very
fēngfù. rich.	Nǐ 2-sg	kàn look at	Zhōngguó China	xīběi northwest	nèi that
ge CLAS	difang plas	tā 3-sg	hǎo very	duō many	shì be
huāngmò. wasteland.	Tā 3-sg	zhèi this	biān side	jiù just	shénme, whatever,
nǐ 2-sg	zhǐ only	yào... want...	bù not	shuō say	tā 3-sg
bù not	fù pay	chū out	nǚlì, diligent,	rén person	zhǔyào mostly
jiùshi... just...	kěyǐ can	shuō say	bǐ COMP	Zhōngguó China	rén person
fù pay	chū out	shǎo less	hěn very	duō much	dàijià price
nǐ 2-sg	jiù just	néng can	guò live	shàng up	bǐjiào comparatively
shūshì comfortable	de ATT	shēnghuó. life.	Dànshi But	Zhōngguó China	bù not
yíyàng, same,	Zhōngguó China	nènme so	duō many	rén, people,	huánjìng environment
bù not	yíyàng, same,	guóqíng conditions	bù not	yíyàng, same,	nǐ 2-sg
jiù just	děi must	zhēng, struggle,	nǐ 2-sg	cái finally	néng can
guò live	shàng up	bǐjiào comparatively	hǎo good	de ATT	shēnghuó. life.
Suǒyǐ	jiù	zàochéng	le	Zhōngguó	rén

Therefore	just	create	PERF	China	person
yǒu have	zhèi this	yàng type	yìxiē some	xīnlǐ psychological	jiégòu. structure.
Měiguó U.S.	rén person	zhèi this	yàng type	yě also	zuò do
chéng create	yī one	ge CLAS	xīnlǐ psychological	jiégòu, structure,	suǒyǐ therefore
wǎngwǎng always	shì be	yóuyú because of	yī one	ge CLAS	tā 3-sg
de... POS...	shì be	hěn very	kèguān objective	de ATT	dōngxì, thing,
zhè this	hěn very	wùzhì material	de ATT	dōngxì thing	zàochéng create
de. REL.					

**5-2:**

C-3	Jiùshi, Just,	wǒmen 1-pl	fāzhǎn develop	dào to	zhè this	yī one
	bù, step,	ránhòu afterward	wǒmen 1-pl	yīnggāi should	yǒu have	nèixiē those
	quánlì. rights.	Wǒmen 1-pl	yīnggāi should	zhèi this	yàng way	kàn, look,
	jiùshūo FILL	běn root	rén person	jiù just	méiyǒu not have	yī one
	ge CLAS	chōuxiàng abstract	de, ATT,	lǐxiǎng ideal	de ATT	rénquán, human rights,
	bǐrú for instance	Měiguó U.S.	zài at	liǎng two	bǎi hundred	nián year
	qián	tā	de	rénquán	gàinián	wánquán

before	3-sg	POS	human rights	concept	completely
bù not	yíyàng, same,	gēn with	xiànzài. now.	Tā 3-sg	yě also
bù not	kěnéng possible	zuò do	dào arrive	xiànzài now	zhèi this
yàng type	rénquán human rights	de ATT	gàinian. concept.		

**5-3:**

C-12	Dànshi But	xiànzài now	shuō say	nǐ 2-sg	de POS	zhèngfu government
	shì be	nǐ 2-sg	de POS	jiāzhǎng parents	kěndìng definitely	dàjiā everyone
	bù not	huì would	tóngyì. agree.	Nǐ 2-sg	píng based on	shénme what
	shuō say	tā 3-sg	shì be	jiāzhǎng? parents?	Duì Right	bù not
	duì? right?	Érqiě Also	wǒ 1-sg	juéde think	kěnéng maybe	jiùshi FILL
	shuō FILL	yàoshi if	gěi for	tā 3-sg	júxiàn limit	dào arrive
	Zhōngguó China	lái come	jiǎng say	dehuà, if,	rúguǒ if	nǐ 2-sg
	yào want	wèn ask	zài at	niánqīng young	yīdiǎn COMP	de ATT
	rén person	dehuà, if,	tā 3-sg	kěnéng maybe	huì would	jiùshi, just,
	yīnwèi because	yǒu... have...	dōu all	kāishǐ begin	jiāo pay	shuì tax

ne.  
MOOD.

[...]

Dànshi But	wǒ 1-sg	jiāo pay	le PERF	shuì, tax,	nǐ 2-sg
píng based on	shénme what	shuō say	shì be	jiāzhǎng parents	shì be
wǒ 1-sg	zài PROG	yǎnghù nurture	nǐ 2-sg	a? MOOD?	Nǐ 2-sg
yīnggāi should	lái come	wèi for	wǒ 1-sg	zuò do	shìqing, matter,
duì right	bù not	duì? right?	Suǒyǐ Therefore	xiànzài now	huì would
yǒu have	hěn very	duō many	lǎobǎixìng common people	nèi that	yàng, way,
tā 3-sg	yào want	huì would	mà curse	zhèngfu, government,	quèshí actually
shì be	zhèi this	yàng way	ne, MOOD,	nǐ 2-sg	méiyǒu not have
wèi for	wǒ 1-sg	lái come	zuò do	hǎo good	shìqing, matter,
méiyǒu not have	fúwù serve	ha. MOOD.			

## Appendix D: Chinese data in characters

### Interview Questions:

1. 假定你能够创立一个新社会。这个社会会是什么样子的?
2. 假如一个五岁的小孩子问您:「政府」是什么意思?「政府」和「人民」有什么样的关系? 您会怎么回答呢?
3. 假如有一个公民,什么罪都没有犯,在逛街的时候被警察逮捕。警察不告诉他为什么被逮捕,就把他锁在监狱里,一直到三天以后才放他走。你觉得这个人会怎么想?他会如何反应?采取什么行动?
4. 就前述的例子来说:
  - 这个人应该如何回应这样的状况?
  - 这个人的教育水平会不会影响他的反应?
  - 如果影响的话,你觉得这样有没有道理?应该不应该?
5. 如果政府没有得到人民的同意,就自行决定把所得税增加一倍,你觉得这样对不对?人民会有什么反应?采取什么样的行动?你觉得人民应该如何回应这样的状况?
6. 政府决定要打仗。张三虽然被应征入伍,但是他心里强烈认为战争是不对的。你觉得,在这种情况下,张三会怎么办?他应该怎么办?
7. 在一个很偏僻的乡下地方,有一棵大树横倒在公路上,挡住了过往车辆。在这个时候正好有几辆卡车经过。你觉得他们会不会主动把这棵大树从公路上拉开?你觉得他们应该不应该这样做?
8. 如果一个人很有钱,他应该怎么用他的钱?
9. 王二快要高中毕业了。虽然他的父母希望他上大学,但是他不想上大学,想组一个摇滚乐团。你觉得王二会怎么样和他的父母说?他的父母又会怎样反应?最后他们会决定怎么做?你会支持哪一边?
10. 李家有三个人:爸爸,妈妈,和十七岁的男孩子李四。爸爸妈妈两个人每个星期都各工作四十个小时,领一样的工资。现在妈妈想买一辆新汽车,把旧汽车给李四开。但是爸爸认为现在的车还可以再开几年,买新车等于是浪费钱。你

觉得爸爸,妈妈,和李四会说什么?最后他们会决定怎么做?你会支持哪一边?

11. 中国是一个多民族国家,象汉,蒙,回,藏,以及各个少数民族。你觉得每个民族的能力和天性都一样吗?
12. 中国有没有一个民族是特别占优势的?你觉得这样应该吗?

### Chapter 3:

#### 3-1:

- C-11 妈妈想买,爸爸不同意,妈妈怎么跟他争辩呢?
- C-10 理由很简单,我就开新车的气牌啊,感觉好啊。 [laughter] 我们家肯定...这个事情肯定是爸爸说了算?
- C-11 我相信。我们家肯定是妈妈说了算。啊,我们家现在有这么一种情况。我们家电视机以经挺破的。然后现在图像也不好,声音也不好。我就强烈要求买个新的,我爸也强烈要求买个新的,我妈不同意,也说太花前了,说这个还要再看几年,那我妈最后说了就算了。我妈说我们不买就不买。那你们家肯定就是你爸说买就买。这个我觉得好像和父母的经济情况...自己个人的收入情况没有什么很大的关系?

#### 3-2:

- C-18 最后决定怎么做? 这个...这个例子里哈,给出来了爸爸妈妈两个人工作四十个小时,领一样的工资,我觉得这个领...在中国这个家庭里头,领多少前或者说领工资的高低,就说在这个家庭中这个决策的取向是不成正比的。我的意思就说有的家里头就是女方做,就说一些...在一些重大决定?敝欣此悻 主要由女方来决定。 在一些家庭中主要由男方来决定。 这个是跟他这个家庭里谁挣钱多少是没有任何关系的。 因为在中国家庭我觉得这是非常普遍的一件事情。 谁说,这是取决于平时这个家庭当中,谁...
- C-19 说了算。
- C-18 谁说了算,或者说用比较正式的语言说就说谁的...谁在这些重大决策上主要做主要决定。如果他爸爸经常做一些大的决定,假如说这个家的一些大的开销啊,大的一些那个决定的这个决策都由他爸爸来做出的话,我觉得他们家肯定不会买这辆车。但如果相反是他妈妈做主要决策的话,他们就会买一辆新车。

#### 3-3:

- C-18 就是说,这个就是中-美之间的一种差异,我觉得可能。 在美国可能就说大家这个家庭里...你要说民主也好,这个决策吧,可能就建立在一种就说多数...

少数服从多数这种基础上。 我可能对美国社会不太了解。 但在中国社会，就说，一个男人和一个女人结婚以后，就在这个...

C-19 就自然而然地形成的。

C-18 在家庭一种自然而然形成了这种...就说这种...

C-19 模式。

C-18 模式，对。 到底是这个男人在这个家庭里做主，还是女人在这个家庭里做主。

Me 哦。 现在中国社会呢，大多数...

C-18 我觉得百分之六十的家庭可能还是这样的。

C-19 对。 会有一个人做主。

C-18 会有一个人做主。

3-5:

C-21 在中国，这妈妈很厉害。

Me 是吗？

C-21 买东西...

Me 是妈妈比爸爸厉害吗？

C-21 我觉得。

C-20 是。 呀。 在中国...

C-21 我家，我厉害哦。

Me 是吗？ [laughter]

C-20 在中国，趋向于母亲做...

C-21 做决定。

C-20 就是说，并不是说自己不对，非也必须听从女方的，而是说难男的无所...就是说...

C-21 就是让他。

C-20 ...无所谓就很...

C-21 让她。

C-20 ...让着，让着女...

C-21 女的就非要坚持意见，男的一般不坚持，在家里。

C-20 在家里的，你说怎么样就可以，可以。 男的无所谓。

3-10:

C-14 那我觉得大家应该会坐下来一块儿讨论这个事。 但是这件事看起来就说要买新车的人实上站了上风，因为妈妈和李四肯定都是愿意买新车的。 那我觉得如果是一般家庭都是少数服从多数吧。 可能有一些特别传统的家庭，他是父亲的那个决定是最重要的。 这样子就会父亲说了算，哪怕是妈妈和



李四都说要买买，但是我觉得现在越来越多的家庭但是少数服从多数，就说三个人，二比一两个人都说要买，一个人你爸爸说不买，那不行，我们两个人都说买，那就买了。

3-11:

C-19 有的家庭还会投票啊...决定?

C-18 对。 这是比较民主的家庭。

C-19 呀。

C-18 但是这种家庭我觉得少一些。

C-19 现在也挺多的。

3-12:

C-17 组...组那个，召开家庭会议了。 现在...现在我觉得，起码我比较熟悉的那种家庭构成一般都很少有父母两个人就...就做出决定然后就通知这个孩?铀懔怒? 一般我觉得还挺尊重孩子决定呢，会就是有什么大事然后会大家会一块讨论啊，什么的。

C-16 对。 我觉得也是。

3-13:

C-12 他的爸爸妈妈和李四会说什么...我觉得如果这个情况要分很多...如果要是说他的父母，确实受的教育比较高那层次的话...因为他能够买两辆汽车这?，工作也会比较好，那么他可能家庭就会很民主，他就会和...就会大家跟孩子很平等地这样来讲，我们现在处于什么样的情况，我们打算怎么样来做，各自有什么样的理由，你是会什么样的意见，这是一种。 还有一种，就是说纯粹是象所谓暴发户那样的出来的话，那么可能就根本不会...?残砣屿?孩子讲，也许不会，就是父母这样来定，怎么样来做。

3-14:

Me 虽然就是多数当中一个就是小孩子?

C-14 但是他，小孩子他也不是两三岁，因为十七岁我觉得男孩子在家很有地位了。

3-15:

C-12 ...在我们家虽然我挣钱很多，但是我从来都是要商量着来。

C-13 那你妈妈那一代呢? 你爸爸和你妈妈? 谁说了算?

C-12 没有谁说了算。 也是就是因为我觉得好像他们就挺民主的。 包括就对孩子，他们之间什么事情都是一定商量着来。 然后如果真的大事情的话都要

孩子来一起来说，来拼拼命地提意见或怎么样。

C-13 哦，那你们家很民主。

C-12 对啊。

3-19:

C-18 你觉得他爸跟妈怎么想？怎么讲？

C-19 他爸会极力反对。会...会摆出各种各样的理由会说我工作这么辛苦，挣这么点儿钱，然后又要养一辆新车，又要养一辆旧车我还要养你们娘儿俩。

C-18 不过他妈妈也自己有...

C-19 那只是一半儿啊。

3-20:

C-21 但是这个...汽车可能比较大，对中国人来讲啊。比如说换一个电视机，电视可能就...那个女的说就行，但是如果他们家的工作...他两挣的一样工？尸都一样多，而且呢，就是说买一个车对他家经济负担非常大的话，可能得借钱，如果说你要在问题设定，如果需要借钱的话，可能就两个人就在商量，啊，要不要这钱啊什么。如果他们俩有钱可能就女的就会做决定。

3-28:

C-13 女的说了算吧？

C-12 我觉得这么大的事情的话一般不会说一个人来做主这个决定。

C-13 是吗？

C-12 对，因为这是大量的支出，你不是买小东西嘛，你买汽车嘛，那一定会是两个人来商量的。

3-29:

C-18 就象家里一般买个电视啊，或买个什么这样比较贵的一些东西，在中国还是比较贵的东西，都是两个人商量。先是商量。但最后，就说决定，决...起决策作用的往往就是一个人？

C-19 对。

C-18 就说商量的时候肯定要两个人同时来商量，不可能一个人说买了就肯定...马上就给买回来。就是在商量的过程中两个人，就说互相结婚一点他最后真正决策了还要有一个人。

3-36:

C-19 即使，假如说这个家庭是这个爸爸做主的话，即使他妈妈还是想买新车，但是她也会很...就说，不是说很情愿，但是也不是说是极为反感地去遵从这个

爸爸的意见。会这样。即使这个...假如说这个家庭里是这个妈妈做主的话，他们这个爸爸也会就是说...不是很情愿，但是也不会极力反对的那样的，会闹得家里天翻地覆，然后吵起架，也不会这样。

C-18 对，对。

C-19 就是...就是会遵从其中一个人的意见？

### 3-37:

C-11 父母反对我怎么办？我肯定不会说父母强烈反对的事情我一定要去做。我的父母真的反对我肯定就会跟我父母妥协。这是我自己个性的问题。

...不过我如果是王二的父母的话我肯定会跟他说我希望他考上大学以后在学校里还是可以去玩儿他的音乐。这两个事情并不是那么矛盾。

C-10 但是上大学对他的这个摇滚乐团帮助大吗？就说你为什么还需要他上大学？如果他想成为一个摇滚...

C-11 因为我对他的前途不明了。我觉得读大学的话起码他就还可以找份儿相对来说好点儿工作养护自己吧。你要是组一个摇滚乐团你现在也不读书了，你未来就会怎么样？

### 3-38:

C-12 我还是觉得他应该上大学。

C-13 上大学。

C-12 对。因为...

C-13 高中是不够的。

C-12 而且上大学跟他组摇滚乐团...

C-13 不矛盾，对。

C-12 现在是不矛盾的。他完全可以在大学里面也来组他的摇滚乐团，而且当他上完大学能够学到更多的...他可能会对音乐更深地理解？

C-13 对。

C-12 可能做出来的音乐会要更受欢迎，更有深度。

### 3-39:

C-14 最后我想他的父母肯定会强迫他去上大学。但是我要是作为王二的父母我肯定会说得比较聪明一点，就是说，你需要去上大学，但是你的摇滚乐团这个梦想也不一定就会破灭呢。你在大学里边儿你也可以继续建摇滚乐团，而且你不上大学的话你这个摇滚乐团就不可能建得很好。就不可能有发展有前途。然后，最后他们决定...我会支持哪一边，我是支持他一边上大学然后一边建摇滚乐团。因为这两个是...

- C-15 你的思想比较老话。
- C-14 那你说你就让他去建摇滚乐团，我觉得是年轻人，他不上大学，不受教育，这也不行。
- C-15 他可以建了摇滚乐团就上大学。现在上大学年龄有挺大的。
- C-14 你说建一个摇滚乐团，然后再上大学。
- C-15 对啊。
- C-14 但是他这个前提是快要高中毕业了，他年龄挺小的，他不是说他象研究生还是...
- C-15 他就完了，他这个天才就毁了。
- C-14 这个天才要毁了，你觉得...我不知道，我觉得中国的大学...中国大学功课压力不是很大，你可以一边上大学一边做摇滚乐团。美国好多大学生，他们也是一边上大学一边也实现了自己...就是学业之外的很多梦想，我觉得这两个不是特别冲突的。
- C-15 对，可以。我也同意你的观点。

3-40:

- C-21 可能，也许王二就说，好了，那我就一边上大学，一边去办摇滚乐吧。

3-41:

- C-19 假如王二真的是要组织一个摇滚乐团的话，我觉得我要是王二的父母我就会说，你可以去受专业的教育，比如说上一个音乐方面的专业院校。上完这样的大学之后你经受了...经过...受了一系列的系统教育以后...专业教育以后，你组织的摇滚乐团和你现在组织的摇滚乐团的层次就不会一样。这样的话你就会有专业上的造就，或者说你在专业上，在你的音乐上会有更大的发展。而且我觉得他的父母可以不一定非得要以非常强硬的手段来就是把他关在家里或者是什么，什么。

3-47:

- C-18 我觉得在现今中国社会，百分之九十五的父母是不会同意他这样做呢。因为大...就是...在中国的父母的普遍性里就是希望自己的孩子考上一个名牌大学，然后将有一个非常体面的工作。

3-48:

- C-20 因为摇滚乐在中国还...
- C-21 没有普及嘛。
- C-20 不是那么特别的...特别的普及，那么...就...另外给人的印象就是有点儿...
- C-21 不太正经。

- C-20 ...有点儿不正...不入正业的一些人在搞这些, 或者是不作为一个正式的一个职业。 作为父母...作为父母来讲他会还是要求...子女呢, 能够上大学, 而且能够...
- C-21 受到正规教育, 对。
- C-20 呀。 受到更好的教育, 找一个...更嘉...稳妥的工作。  
[...]
- C-20 就这个问题来说我觉得可能性还是家长督促王二好好儿地学习, 继续上大学深造。 这个...
- C-21 这个可能性大。
- C-20 这个可能性更大一些。 这个...
- C-21 我们会支持哪一边?
- C-20 从我本人来讲应该是说, 就是...还是让他继续深造, 继续上大学。
- C-21 对, 我也是。 我想...摇滚乐团没...没太大前途。 你必须得...
- C-20 也有可能能够挣大天, 也有可能, 但是就是说从印象来讲, 还是...
- C-21 我不希望...对。 我会支持他父母。
- C-20 ...应该搞一个更安定, 更...
- C-21 对, 我不希望他去办摇滚乐。
- C-20 ...更什么的工作?

3-49:

- C-18 我觉得我还会支持他的父母。 因为...其实他读了大学以后也同样会有各样的兴趣和爱好可以得到各种各样的发展。 但我觉得这个知识水平是决定他这个人一个素质的一个重要的一方面。 所以他完全...他组这个摇滚乐团完全可以在他读了大学以后, 他有自己一定的分析问题, 解决问题一定能力以后, 然后再...再重新考虑他这种想法?

3-50:

- C-19 在中国如果人想成功的话, 他虽然有很多的途径, 但是他上大学, 走上成功之路是一条相对来说更是一种捷径。 相对其他路来讲也许会...他的? 鹬鹬突突? 别人不一样?

3-51:

- C-12 "王二会怎么样和他的父母说?" 他可能会很直接来说啊, 他想要做什么样的事情。
- C-13 他的父母可能就跟你一样的反应。 [laughter]
- C-12 对, 我觉得还能会是这样! [laughter]

C-14 "王二会怎么样和他的父母说?" 那王二他做一个小青年他肯定说他想实现他的理想就想建一个摇滚乐团, 这个上大学他觉得不重要, 这不是他的人生梦想啊, 他会试图同意...他的父母同意他不上大学, 然后去建摇滚乐团。

3-53:

C-14 我觉得这个就是说理想和现实有时候是会有差异的。

3-54:

C-11 绝对不向你说话说得那么轻松。

C-12 那可以让他取个教训嘛。 吃一堑, 长一智嘛。

3-74:

C-18 成材的途径有很多种。 并不一定说上大学然后上研究生读硕士读博士。 这样当然是一种比较说, 就是大家都普遍走了一种成材之路。 但是我觉得应该因人而异。 如果一个人的确适合做学问, 或者说的确在这个学术上能够有所建树的话, 或者说真正以后再...呀...自己...做研究啊, 做一些, 这些而实际的工作, 做工程...工程上的工作, 能够得到比较大的发展的话, 我觉得他应该去上大学。 但是如果对一个人来说他不太适合学习但他本身自己有很...自己有其他的一些...爱好和...兴趣, 而且在这方面能够发展得很好的话, 我觉得他没有必要...就是...走...非得走高考那个独木桥。 其实每个人就说这一生的发展有很多...很多种选择。 他可以完全是...选到适合自己发展的道路。 就说他人生价值体现并不是体现在他有多高的学识, 有多高的地位, 有多多的财富。 我觉得象这种发展情况他也可以实现他的...就说...能够真正体现出自己的价值来。

3-75:

C-19 我觉得如果是一个好孩子的话, 是一个很懂道理, 很懂...就是...很有自己的想法的一个孩子的话, 他会听他父母的意见。 就是能够...也是为了自? 阆院箬 谖衾稚夏芄桓? 有...有更大的发展, 而不仅仅局限于是只是...是一种娱乐, 是一种爱好, 而是想有公大的发展的话他会听从他父母的意见, 而去选择上一个音乐方面的专业的院校, 一个专业大学。

Chapter 4:

4-1:

C-21 那当然非常气愤了。

[...]

C-20 我觉得这个, 要是我遇到这个事情, 我也是非常...会非常气愤的, 因为自己...

没有...

C-21 没有任何错误...

C-20 自己觉得没有任何错误, 犯罪的这个可能性, 那么突然被关起来, 那肯定自己...非常气愤?

4-2:

C-17 警察没有告诉他干啥, 就白白逮捕他三天然后给放了? 这个事情不可能发生吧。 反证会觉得很莫名其妙, 怎么搞的。 我肯定要搞清楚你为什么那样抓我。

4-3:

C-18 我觉得如果我是这样的人的话, 我会觉得非常不可思议, 我既然没犯任何的错误, 为什么要把我关起来? 为什么把我锁在监狱里?

C-19 而且没有任何解释。

C-18 对。

4-11:

C-11 一方面我自己肯定, 我肯定会问为什么把我抓起来了? 另一个...

C-10 不回来?

C-11 他不回来我也还是会去问他。 另一方面是就说我们家里面也会采取个种个样的渠道来探听我的消息, 来知道为什么我会被逮起来。 那么如果三天以后我什么事都没有, 他把我给我放走了的话, 那我肯定, 我不会就是罢休的, 我肯定会要弄清楚他为什么要这样做。 如果他没有任何道理的话, 他应该采取...他应该对我采取一些什么样子的补偿, 道歉。

4-31:

C-14 那我觉得如果政府没有得到人民的同意就自行把所得税率提高这样肯定是不对的, 因为政府的所有的行动应该都是代表人民的意愿, 反映人民的审议的, 所以如果它是政府把自己, 就是认为它是独立或者高于人民之上那个特殊的群体, 它觉得它可以自己就做出决策这样肯定是不对的。 但是人民有什么反应...人民当然就会...就会比较不满, 就会看...可能在的话大家人民的反应也会比较激烈一些, 可能会上街游行啊, 或者写出一些

4-32:...

C-21 仅仅是因为所得税增加一倍的话不会引起很大的气愤。 但是就是说一般的这个整个社会大家都会反对这件事情, 那可能是, 它有很多很多问题, 大家非常不满意, 然后可能会积极起来反对。 如果...但别的都很好, 只是就提

出增加一倍不会有很大的那个反应。

4-33:

C-10 我觉得国内的反映...如果是这样的话,当然意见肯定是有,但是也可能就不了了之。但要发发牢骚了。

C-11 对,我觉得是这样。不会有太大的反应,对这个问题,因为我觉得目前一方面来讲,个人所得税本身它的情况就不是很明了。很多单位对这个东西的...都是采取个种方法来逃避的,我觉得。所以...但是反应肯定还是会有。行动,我估计没什么行动可以采取的。你觉得人民应该如何回应这种状况?

C-10 没有办法。这个...如果是新闻自由一些了可能还可以发泄一声?

C-11 在网上你会看到的,肯定会看到。肯定会看到...有牢骚在往上可以看到。但是正式书面的东西肯定没有。

4-34:

C-12 我觉得这真是就是说会不同国家不一样。你象在中国的话,他很就会不征得你的同意就会给你增加...

C-13 那人民怎么办呢?

C-12 会采取个种个样的方法来逃税。

4-35:

C-18 唔,这样肯定是不对了。因为没有任何理由就不能把所得税增加一倍1。唔..."人民会有什么样的反应?"我觉得在中国不会有人起来...就说是...抗议那样...

C-19 人民会抱怨。

C-18 会抱怨,只是会时下地抱怨,但不会有人走上街头或抗议啊,或者说游行示威啊。

[...]

就说只要能够在在一个相对比较舒适稳定的环境能活下去的话,没有人愿意走上街头举个牌子示威游行什么样的。"采取什么样的行动?"我觉得会有人就说在媒体上或者说在一些公开场合可能会就说发表各种各样的言论,觉得这样的做法,把所得税增加一被这样的做法非常不对。具体采取什么...我觉得不会有人采取特别极端的行动。至少百分之八十人不会采取极端的行动。

4-36:

C-16 当然如果是在一个,就是说,人民有权利决定政府行为的地方里,当然去采



用的这个投票的权利。 如果是一个就是说你没有一个人行使这样权利的地方  
...

C-17 你就说也没什么用, 对吧? 你想, 你想把这个决定...更改这个决定也没有途径, 没有路途, 没有道路。

C-16 可是比方说在中国我们有, 那个...人民...人民代表大会和政治协商会...

C-17 你会找人大代表去谈吗?

C-16 就是说这里所谓采取就说, 从一个法律角度来说, 目前中国就是你相对来说是惟一可以通过法制形式的一个道路, 因为你...首先政府不是民选呢, 所以当然不可能就是说, 有象美国这样的一个就是选民制度。 但是理论上中国政府的意思就是说人民可以通过提交那些议案来...立法呀, 或者改变一些政策。

C-17 你可以向你们区的人大代表反应, 但是我不觉得我...我不会这样行动。 我觉得没什么用。

C-16 就是说无效的一种...一种民主制度, 对不对?

4-37:

C-13 那你说的这个就是应各种形式逃税这样...它不是一个...它只是个人的一种行动啊, 它不是一个...比如说通过一个什么组织, 通过一个什么, 我不知道是, 象日本国会或者是什么地方政府或者是...

C-12 那你这话说来就是要说看你的国会, 那你说中国它也是, 它会是, 那个, 人民代表大会, 一定是它来通过。 那你说它能够有多少代表人民的程度? 对吧?

4-38:

C-21 可能大家也许会去游行。 但是现在中国天安门事件以后可能不会那么...那么简单就会去游行了?

C-20 参加的人数可能...

C-21 不会很多了。

C-20 ...不是特别的...多数人可能就是观望, 就看这个...由...个别的, 比较少数的人可能比较激进的人出去...可能游行, 有可能。

4-39:

C-14 我就是...理想状态和现实状态, 我觉得反应是一样的, 就是新闻媒体和政府机关对你的反应, 它的反应是什么? 可能在现实和理想当中又不一样。

4-40:

C-17 你得得到人...绝大多数人同意。 也许我不同意, 但是如果...比如说我不同

意但百分之八十人同意,我也没有意见。我就会服从大多数人的意见。但是现在谁知道你这个征税你原来目的是干什么。

4-57:

C-13 他只能去。因为作为作为军人他只能...不管他个人意志如何,他也要去,对不对?

C-12 对。

4-58:

C-21 服从命令是天职嘛。因为他已经被入伍。比如说我们老百姓不是军人,我们可以那个...反对...说,反对战争什么的,但是军人呢,他就可能...??心里认为不对他也没有办法?

4-59:

Me 你们认为呢,就是一个人因为宗教原因应该不应该有权利就是不当兵?

C-12 应该。应该。

Me 应该?

C-12 应该。

C-13 因为宗教原因?

Me 对。或者是信仰原因。信仰原因。

C-13 这从他个人讲应该不应该还是说上面这个...

Me 从他个人的那个看法。

C-13 他应该有权利决定他入伍还是不入伍,我觉得。因为入伍毕竟要有生命。要有死亡做代价。

4-60:

C-12 总而言之我非常憎恨战争。我觉得很多战争纯粹就是政客之间...为了他们的利益来发起,然后打着一个很好的一个幌子会怎么怎么样。

4-61:

C-16 我觉得他应该...应该...服从他的信仰。

[...]

为什么?因为...就象我说的其实...国家要或者战争要其实没有一个...其实正义好多东西就是说没有对错之分或者没有好坏。其实我对每个人...所?宰豎笠扛豎私?立的基础是你自己的...你自己的信仰。那...我只是从个人角度来说了。对。

4-62:

C-14 就是说肯定不会是一个好战士。

C-15 不不不。

C-14 他会一边去杀人，一边觉得这样地杀人是不对的。

C-15 这个问题对你来太困难了。 所以...我也不一定讲得好，因为...这个不知道  
怎么回答？

C-14 这个很难，这...他应该怎么办？

C-15 这是看你把什么放在最前面的，他前面他有顺序的。 中国传统的是国家是  
放在自己的前面的，但我相信美国也是这样的，所以非常简单。 他就会去  
打仗，然后他会做一个很好的战士去打仗。

4-63:

Me 假如他有宗教原因，就是不可以打仗。 他的宗教不让他打仗。 但是政府  
要他打仗。 那他怎么办呢？

C-11 那我觉得这样的情况政府不让他去打仗呢，中国对这种少数民族它没有，或  
者就说宗教信仰也需要，起码是我们有规定说是应该尊重他们的宗教信仰。  
如果说你是这个宗教本身不同意的话...但是起码前提是这个宗教是要被政府  
所承认的宗教？

4-64:

C-20 不过从中国宪法来讲是尊敬...就说尊重这个个人的...

C-21 信仰哈。

C-20 信仰自由。 从这个角度来说，那，你要是尊重人家的信仰自有，那不杀生...  
那，可以不杀生。

C-21 那就可能就不去了。

C-20 啊。

C-21 可能...也许就不去了？

4-65:

C-17 他心里是，就是说对战争是厌恶的。 不愿...他认为战争是不对的，但他没  
有说他不愿意...不愿意去为国家效力去参加战争，是不是？ 他原文是怎么讲  
的？ 他好像认为战争是不对的，但他没有这样说我不想保卫祖国或者什么  
的。

4-66:

C-14 "在这种情况下张三会怎么办?" 那我觉得他虽然觉得不对，但是政府叫他  
去入伍他不愿意也不行。 所以他还得去打仗。 "他应该怎么办?" 我觉

得这个人是比较痛苦的,他应该怎么办,因为在战争这种情况下个人的意见,个人的声音好像显得特别微弱。

C-15 对。

C-14 他肯定还得去打仗,但是他应该怎么办?

C-15 不知道。

C-14 我觉得他只能自己还是得去打仗,但是他会把他的心里的看法给他的亲友或者给新闻媒体说一下,但是这样的这个人可能会当叛徒,所以也不行。

C-15 他也不会当叛徒。

4-67:

C-16 我觉得...如果这是一种强制的行为他就是...他就认为战争不对他也必须服从。我想这个可能选择的余地不是很多。

C-17 就是说,政府让你去,征你...让你 伏兵役了,你也没什么可反抗的机会。

4-68:

C-17 有可能他是信某种宗教他不想参加这场战争。但他国家让他参加我觉得他是应该参加。我觉得是这样。

4-69:

C-18 虽然他自己觉得这件事情可能会不对,但是我觉得他不会表现出来。他也会随着大家一起去打仗。

C-19 张三虽然觉得这个打仗不对,但是他一样会...会尽自己的努力去认真地完成这项任务?

C-18 对。"他应该怎么办?" 我觉得...如果要换是我的话,我被应征入伍了,我觉得没有其他的办法。

C-19 只有去做...

C-18 只有去做...

C-19 自己应该做的事情。

C-18 自己应该做的事情。

4-70:

C-21 他就得去。

C-20 他必须得去。

C-21 呀。

C-20 他即便是反对,那么他因为是军人...

C-21 就得服从...

C-20 ...在部队里还是必须得服从命令。所以他在这种情况下还得,必须得去打

仗。

C-21 对。而且在中国我觉得有这么一个情况。比如战争，不管怎么样，他要去，就说你跑了...这个逃兵是特别可耻？

#### 4-71

C-21 我从来没有...我觉得很有意思，就从来没有想过...可能，我觉得这种情况比较少。

C-20 宗教...部队和这个宗教这个关系没怎么注意过？

C-21 从来没有人说过。

#### 4-72:

Me 假如张三之所以认为打仗是不对的是因为他...是因为宗教的原因。那他应该怎么办呢？

C-18 就是说，他这个宗教决定他不应该去参加这场战争？

Me 对。

C-18 假如说，就说，如果中国和伊斯兰教的某一个国家发生交战了，他本身信伊斯兰教？

Me 他自己认为，因为宗教原因认为杀人是不对的。

C-19 比如说他信佛，但是他要去打仗，他认为...

C-18 但我觉得他没有任何的其他的选项。

#### 4-73:

C-19 我觉得看这厂战争是什么，比如说确实这个人信佛，比如说信佛，他觉得他不应该去谋害生命，就是去进行这种残忍的活动，但是比如说这个其他...其他的国家要入侵的，已经达到家门口了，那我为了就是保护我的这个家，我也不可能说我袖手旁观，不去管。为了我的宗教，为了我不能够去杀人，为了我不能够去...我觉得这要看就是具体的理由，就是说这个战争对于他本身这个意义到底有多重？就是说如果他觉得这个战争虽然是不应该去打，但是对于我的意义又很重要的话，但我觉得他就会去参加，而且政府就是也应该就是...就是强迫...也不能说是强迫吧，就是执行他自己的这种权利，让这个人应征入伍去参加打仗。但是如果说他对这个战争的意义...就这个战争的意义对这个张三这个人来讲意义不是很重？就是说打和不打跟我来说没有什么关系，是国家制定的一种策略，就是对我本人来说并没有什么大案，并没有什么很重要的意义的话，我反而是一种非常被动的强迫的不情愿地去的话，那么我倒觉得就是...会有一些不合理的存在。但是对于任何一个社会来讲，就是他不可能按...? 褻? 所采取的事情，不可能是按所有人的意愿去半。他不可能满足所有人的意愿，因为每个人的个人的意愿都是

不同的。 各有各自的想法。 但是他必须要有一个核心的利益在里面。 就是说我是为了大多数人的利益，我为了一个主要的利益去采取的这个政策，这个措施。 但不可能因为你一个人的不愿意而去改变这个为了大多数的人的利益的这个措施来这样地那个行动。 我觉得是这样的。

4-75:

C-15 这是第一个情况。 第二个情况是假如还有的话，因为这是有两种情况，你总就是他们...就是我们讲是中华民族的一种思想，中华民族的一种思想他是国家是至上的，就是...所以的话，所以...就是中国有一句古话叫尽忠报国了。 所以国内个东西不管他信仰怎么样他都会放在第二位的。

C-14 你说不管是对汉足来说还是对蒙古，新疆...

C-15 对，他们少数民族他都会有这样的。 所以说国家让他去打仗，他有信仰的原因他就会去打的。 他不会去想很多东西。 就是他跟他的国家他就会去打帐。 这个在历史上或者在...一直都是这么发生？

C-14 对。

4-76:

C-18 这个对于中国人来说...他那种...怎么说呢，就说他反对这种政府...可能跟我们小时候接受的教育有关。 我觉得小时候接受的教育大部分都是觉得...?TM府，或者说党，决定一些什么事情他就是有道理的。 而且那个媒体的导向都是倾向于说这个党制定的政策是正确的，是合理的。

4-77:

C-14 对，他就会问什么叫 "为人民服务?" 那我就说你们一群小孩子做游戏了，可能这个张三，他明明是他说了，他非要说他赢了，那这样的他这个就是一个坏小孩儿，那这个坏小孩儿呢，就需要有一个团体来让他不要这样做坏的行为，让他做好事。 或者如果他坚持做坏事，我们就想办法把他给或者关起来或者惩罚他或者不让他参加游戏了，就说这样你们做游戏的游团，一个大的团体当中需要一个小的团体来把大家的意见给集中起来。

4-78:

C-17 为什么要有政府？ 就是因为无政府状况是很恐怖的。 所以我们要政府，无政府的状况大家都想干什么就干什么，我想杀人就杀人。

[...]

所以我们要政府...来控...来使一些...那些人的...破这些很邪恶的欲望那种...伤害别人的欲望得到控制？

4-79:

C-21 不要乱。 向一个方向。

C-20 对。 就是中国话所说的，无政府状态就是...

C-21 不好。

4-80:

C-5 而且我觉得要有一种...给这个国家的公民有一种很自豪的那种民族感。 因为我以我是这个国家的公民为荣。 我觉得这样可能这是一个国家应该给的义务。

4-81:

C-3 为了国家你可以付出一切，为了家庭你也可以付出一切。 当那两个概念冲突的时候，你选择对国家的义务，你也是正确的，你选择对家庭的义务，你也是正确的。 当然一般来说，对国家的义务好像更被人看中一点。 然后呢，现代来说，国家跟民族作为两个概念已经被分开来了，但是在中国人的脑子里面，就是在大部分普通中国人脑子里面 — 就是说你如果不是学法律的，不是学政治的，把两个概念搞得非常清楚，分得很开 — 普通中国人国家和民族往往是混淆在一起的。 国家就是民族，民族就是国家。

4-86:

C-10 能力和天性都一样？ 能力当然是各人个人不同啊。 历史啊，包括他的地理环境啊，与经济这些情况啊。

4-87:

C-14 我只是说每个民族能力和天性，就是他这个问题...取决于他这个能力和天性是怎样定性的。 就是如果是他能力和天性包括什么体能啊，性格啊什么，我觉得这个不要说每个民族那他是...同个民族每个人来说他也会有一些差异。 但是这个差异我决得不影响就说大家...共同和平生活...在一个国家和平相处。

4-88:

C-18 我不同意你的看法。 我有好多，就说这些同学嘛，因为在大学里有那种少数民族的预科班儿。 这个从那种班级上来的学生他的确这种能力和水平就和汉族这些普通学生来比，他就差一个档次。 我觉得这跟他的...就说...后天的教育应该说关系不是很大。 在我来说我承认那种智商之间那种差别。 就说你那种智商有很大的成分是由你这个先天遗传而来的。

C-19 是啊。 我说的就是一代一代延...就是延续下来就造成他的...

C-18 但是就说...好多这种人,他也是接受了就说汉族的教育,就说,因为现在开放...少数民族也并不一定就说...就说闭塞程度非常大。他也接受了,就说,从小开始跟汉族学生一样接受同等的教育。这样同等的教育上来以后...到了大学以后他那种个体之间的差异还是比较明显的。但是我承认就是说...汉族也有非常聪明的人,也有就说整个儿水平这种差异比较大一些。但是单纯从这个个体来看,我觉得这个回,藏,和这个蒙至少在这个个体水平来说和同等层次的汉族的人来比,他这个智商水平相对来说整体要低一个档次。但是你要说身体素质可能这个蒙族和藏族人要比汉族人要稍微好一些。他这个身体素质之间那个差异还是比较大一些的。这样比较明显,就是在运动会上。在我们学校的运动会上也是。一般少数民族来的学生,他身体素质比较好。然后经常能够拿一些冠军什么的。但是如果真正在竞赛当中或者说真正说,在科研当中,真正做得比较优秀的我觉得还是汉族的学生。

4-101:

C-12 有可能他一开始是着很小的火,你一下子给他灭掉了,但是不许久,就在那儿等着等着来,因为等着他来一定有一段的时间吧,可能就会变成一个比较大的。

4-102:

C-18 我觉得应该是他们是会把这个树来挪走了。因为毕竟造成他们行车的困难。我觉得他们应...他们会这样做的。"他们应该不应该这样做?"我觉得这就是一个观念的问题。

4-106:

C-18 这样的话我觉得,就说,一方面他自己个人的价值实现了,另一方面同时又对这个社会又照拂了,就说他两方面都能够得到一些认可。我觉得这样的话他这个钱,就说真正地体现到这个钱的价值了。

4-107:

C-17 说一个人很有钱,他应该怎么用他的钱,那是让你去...就是完全那种 generalized 那种感觉。就是好像跟你...

C-16 他应该有很多方式去用他的钱,而且他应该选择一种他的...他喜欢的方式去用。如果那个钱是通过一种正当的合适手段。

C-17 好像这样你说一些道德说教是...你应该怎么样用你的钱,哪是比较好的,比较好的方式。

C-16 对。



C-17 但是我只能回答我想怎么样用我的钱。

C-16 前提是我们会有钱。 [laughter] 我的钱不够付房租的。

C-17 而且我对他就是说, "应该怎么样用他的钱," "应该" 这两个字我可能有一点...不舒服?

C-16 别扭, 是吧?

C-17 对。 "应该" 还有一点道德, 说教的感觉。

C-16 我们应该让每个人自己选择...应该去怎么用...不是应该...让每个人自己选择去用他的钱。 我们只能说如果我有钱的话我会怎么办。

C-17 对。

4-108:

C-18 这个我觉得...这个问题就是因人而异的。 就是你这个钱的省花哈, 取决于你这个人的一种世界观啊, 价值意识的指向。

C-19 我觉得这个问题应该问, "如果你很有钱, 你应该怎么样用你的钱?"

C-18 对。 实际上你就是表达你自己的看法嘛, 应该怎么样去使用这笔钱。

C-19 这样问。

4-117:

C-21 应该不应该? 还是...应该不应该? 还是就是教育...应该吧。 当然, 有知识的, 有文化的这些人, 他, 当然他要做出相应的反应, 但是一般的老百姓, 可能他就做一些具体的, 比如说...行动。 应该吧。

4-118:

C-14 "如果影响的话, 你觉得有没有道理? 应该不应该?" 我对这个问题...

C-15 我觉得, 如果这个影响的话这样是没有道理的。 因为他是在一个法制社会的话, 不管他的教育程度的高低的话, 他不会...这是一个人的基本权??, 他不管他受没受过教育, 他有一点相象是天下来他就知道反证就没有人应该对他的...他所拥有的权利进行侵害的。 这应该跟教育程度没有关系的。 所以, 如果说这样是...这样有影响的话我觉得是不应该的?

4-119:

C-19 "如果有影响的话你觉得有没有道理?" 我觉得如果而是...应该是...如果他是做了违法的事情那就是没有道理的。 我对这个问题不是...不是很...

C-18 我觉得这个问题应该这么理解。 如果影响的话, 就是说这个教育水平对他这个反应这个影响合不合道理, 这件事情。 我觉得在中国这就是合理合法的, 这就是...

C-19 合乎道理。

- C-18 合乎道理的事情。 因为在中国法制观念在每个人心目当中并不都是一样的。 就是你接受的教育水平越高,或者说你接受了某一个层次的教育水平以后,你才建立一些一定的法制观念,因为在中国好像有很多人这个法制观念比较淡薄。 就是该实现一些他正常的道理或理由,通过一些正常的途径来实现这些权利的话。 他并没有...他并没有...这种概念,并没有这种意识,他应该去找律师去实行一种合法的权利。 他...就说,受教育层次比较低的人,他没有这种...没有这种...就没有这种意识。 所以我觉得他的教育水平影响他的反应状况。 这个是比较有道理的。
- C-19 但是不应该...
- C-18 应不应该我觉得是不应该的。 在一个比较发达的社会里头我觉得每个人的法制观念不应该因他这个教育状况而异。 就说这个法制要是个相当健全的社会,它这个普法的一个,这个手段应该比较的健全。 就说每个人的心目当中都有一个这个...法律的概念。 回应一种...就是应急状况?卢 他这个反应应该是通过合理合法的手段来实行他正当的权利。 我觉得这个每个人都应该一样的。 你觉得呢?
- C-19 简单地说就是在这个,一个发达的社会里面,无论遇到什么事情或者是处理什么事情,都应该遵循一定的规则。 谁违犯了这个规则就相当于犯了法一样,所以这个是不应该的。

#### 4-127:

- C-3 当然每个国家都应该讲人权,但人权,他有很具体的内容,就是到底包括哪些权利算是人权,因为谁都知道人权这个概念它不是一个抽象的概念,他是个历史的概念。

#### Chapter 5:

##### 5-1:

- C-17 有很大的作用。 你象中国是一个这样一个...地广,但是我并不觉得它资源很丰富。 而且中国人又那么多。 造成这样一个环境你就什么事情,咱们什么事情都会争。 影响的话从小到大。 比如说小学到初中,初中到高中,高中上大学,什么事情你要争。 你才能过上比较好的生活。 但是你看西方的国家...你看加拿大或者象美国它要地大物博,我总觉得它资源很丰富。 你看中国西北那个地方它好多是荒漠。 它这边就什么,你只要...不说他不付出努力,人主要就是...可以说比中国人付出少很多代价你就能过上比较舒适的生活。 但是中国不一样,中国那么多人,环境不一样,国情不一样,你就得争,你才能过上比较好的生活。 所以就造成了中国人有这样一些心理结构。 美国人这样也做成一个心理结构,所以往往是由于一个他的...是很客观的东西,这很物质的东西造成的。

5-2:

C-3 就是，我们发展到这一步，然后我们应该有那些权利。 我们应该这样看，就说本人就没有一个抽象的，理想的人权，比如美国在两百年前它的人权概念完全不一样，跟现在。 它也不可能做到现在这样人权的概念。

5-3:

C-12 但是现在说你的政府是你的家长肯定大家不会同意。 你凭什么说它是家长？ 对不对？ 而且我觉得可能就是说要是给它局限到中国来讲的话，如果你要问再年轻一点的人的话，他可能会就是，因为有...都开始交税呢？

[...]

但是我交了税，你凭什么说是家长是我在养护你啊？ 你应该来为我做事情，对不对？ 所以现在会有很多老百姓那样，他要会骂政府，确实是这样呢，你没有为我来做好事情，没有服务哈。