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Transnational Piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1821-1897

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

by

Leonidas Mylonakis

Committee in charge:

Professor Thomas W. Gallant, Chair

Professor Gary Fields

Professor Mark Hanna

Professor Hasan Kayali

Professor Michael Provence

2018

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Chair

University of California San Diego

2018

DEDICATION

To Anna

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BOA	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi. Ottoman Prime Ministry Archive
A.MKT	Sadâret Mektubî Kalemî Belgeleri
BEO	Bab-1 Ali Evrak Odası
HR.TO	Hariciye Nezareti Tercüme Odası
Y.A.HUS	Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Maruzat
Y.MTV	Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat
Y.PRK.ASK	Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Askeri Maruzat
Y.PRK.PT	Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Posta Telgraf Nezareti Maruzatı
GAK	Genika Archeia tou Kratou. Greek General State Archives
TNA	The National Archives of the United Kingdom at Kew, London
FO	Foreign Office
YE	Ypourgeio Exoterikon. Archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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VITA

- 2010 Bachelor of Arts, University of California San Diego
- 2010-2018 Teaching Assistant, University of California San Diego
- 2014 Master of Arts, University of California San Diego
- 2018 Doctor of Philosophy, University of California San Diego

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History

Modern Europe – Greece
Professor Thomas W. Gallant

Late Ottoman Empire
Professor Hasan Kayalı

Piracy from Early Modern Times to the Present
Professor Mark Hanna

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Transnational Piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1821-1897

by

Leonidas Mylonakis

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California San Diego, 2018

Professor Thomas W. Gallant, Chair

Studies of Mediterranean piracy are usually restricted to the early modern period. This is because western intervention in the orient was believed to have brought about an end to piracy in the region, especially after French expansion into North Africa and the installation of a Bavarian monarchy in Greece. This dissertation analyzes transnational piracy in Greece and the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century showing that violent maritime crime continued to the century's end. By looking at unpublished archival sources in Ottoman Turkish, Greek, French, English, and Italian housed in the Ottoman Prime Ministry archives, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives, and other regional collections, this work is the first study to document the continued persistence of piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean after the French colonization of Algiers in 1830 and the end of the Greek War of Independence in 1832. It charts the changing

rates and nature of piracy over the course of the nineteenth century and considers the factors that shaped it, with these ranging from political reforms to changes in the regional economy caused by the accelerated integration of the Mediterranean into the expanding global economy during the third quarter of the century. It also considers imperial power struggles, ecological phenomena, shifting maritime trade routes, revisions in international maritime law, and changes in the regional and world economy to explain the fluctuations in violence at sea. By extending the narrative of piracy in the region well into the modern era, my work revises the current literature by showing that there was much greater continuity between modern and earlier forms of maritime predation.

Chapter 1: Introduction

“You tell me Monte Cristo serves as a refuge for pirates, who are, it seems to me, a very different kind of game from goats.”

“Yes, your excellency, and it is true.”

“I knew there were smugglers, but I thought that since the capture of Algiers, and the destruction of the regency, pirates existed only in the romances of Cooper and Captain Marryat.”

“Your excellency is mistaken; there are pirates, like the bandits who were believed to have been exterminated by Pope Leo XII., and who yet, every day, rob travelers at the gates of Rome. Has not your excellency heard that the French charge d’affaires was robbed six months ago within five hundred paces of Velletri?”

“If it happened.”

“Well, if, like us, your Excellency lived in Livorno, he would hear from time to time a little boat loaded with goods, or a pretty English yacht, which was expected at Bastia, Porto Ferrejo, or Civita. Vecchia has not arrived, no one knows what has become of him, and no doubt he will have broken himself against some rock. Well, that rock he met was a low, narrow barge of six or eight men, who surprised or looted him on a dark and stormy night at the bend of some wild and uninhabited islet, like bandits stop and loot a post-chaise at the corner of a wood.”

“But,” said Franz, still stretched out in his boat, “how cannot those who have such an accident come to complain, how do they not call on these pirates the vengeance of the French, Sardinian, or Tuscan government?”

“Why?” Gaetano said with a smile.

“Yes why?”

“Because, first of all, everything that is good to take is carried from the ship or yacht on the boat; then bind the feet and hands to the crew, attach each man's neck a ball of twenty-four, make a hole the size of a barrel in the keel of the captured ship, we go back on the bridge, close the hatches and go on the boat. After ten minutes, the vessel begins to complain and moan, gradually it sinks. First, one side plunges, then the other; then it gets up again, then it plunges again, sinking ever further. Suddenly a noise like a cannon-shot sounds: it is the air that breaks the bridge. Then the ship agitates like a drowned man who struggles, getting heavier with each movement. Soon the water, too much pressed into the cavities,

rushes out of the openings, like the liquid columns which would be thrown by its vents some gigantic sperm whale. Finally, it utters a last rattle, makes a last turn on itself, and rushes into the deep by digging a vast funnel that swirls for a moment, fills up little by little and eventually completely fade away; so that at the end of five minutes it takes the eye of God himself to go to the bottom of this calm sea to retrieve the missing ship.”

“Do you understand now,” added the boss, smiling, “how does the vessel not enter the port, and why the crew does not complain?”¹

¹ Alexandre Dumas, *Le Comte de Monte-Cristo*, vol 2. (Paris: Michel Levy Freres, Libraires Editeurs, 1861), 132-3. See Chapter 31. Italy: Sinbad the Sailor. The French original is as follows:

« Mon cher Gaetano, dit-il au patron, vous venez de me dire, je crois, que l'île de Monte-Cristo servait de refuge à des pirates, ce qui me paraît un bien autre gibier que des chèvres.

- Oui, Excellence, et c'est la vérité.

- Je savais bien l'existence des contrebandiers, mais je pensais que, depuis la prise d'Alger et la destruction de la Régence, les pirates n'existaient plus que dans les romans de Cooper et du capitaine Marryat.

- Eh bien, Votre Excellence se trompait : il en est des pirates comme des bandits, qui sont censés exterminés par le pape Léon XII, et qui cependant arrêtent tous les jours les voyageurs jusqu'aux portes de Rome. N'avez-vous pas entendu dire qu'il y a six mois à peine le chargé d'affaires de France près le Saint-Siège avait été dévalisé à cinquante pas de Velletri?

- Si fait.

- Eh bien, si comme nous Votre Excellence habitait Livourne, elle entendrait dire de temps en temps qu'un petit bâtiment chargé de marchandises ou qu'un joli yacht anglais, qu'on attendait à Bastia, à Porto-Ferrejo ou à Civita-Vecchia, n'est point arrivé, qu'on ne sait ce qu'il est devenu, et que sans doute il se sera brisé contre quelque rocher. Eh bien, ce rocher qu'il a rencontré, c'est une barque basse et étroite, montée de six ou huit hommes, qui l'ont surpris ou pillé par une nuit sombre et orageuse au détour de quelque îlot sauvage et inhabité, comme des bandits arrêtent et pillent une chaise de poste au coin d'un bois.

- Mais enfin, reprit Franz toujours étendu dans sa barque, comment ceux à qui pareil accident arrive ne se plaignent-ils pas, comment n'appellent-ils pas sur ces pirates la vengeance du gouvernement français, sarde ou toscan?

- Pourquoi ? dit Gaetano avec un sourire.

- Oui, pourquoi ?

- Parce que d'abord on transporte du bâtiment ou du yacht sur la barque tout ce qui est bon à prendre ; puis on lie les pieds et les mains à l'équipage, on attache au cou de chaque homme un boulet de vingt-quatre, on fait un trou de la grandeur d'une barrique dans la quille du bâtiment capturé, on remonte sur le pont, on ferme les écoutilles et l'on passe sur la barque. Au bout de dix minutes, le bâtiment commence à se plaindre et à gémir, peu à peu il s'enfonce. D'abord un des côtés plonge, puis l'autre ; puis il se relève, puis il plonge encore, s'enfonçant toujours davantage. Tout à coup, un bruit pareil à un coup de canon retentit : c'est l'air qui brise le pont. Alors le bâtiment s'agite comme un noyé qui se débat, s'alourdissant à chaque mouvement. Bientôt l'eau, trop pressée dans les cavités, s'élance des ouvertures, pareille aux colonnes liquides que jeterait par ses événements quelque cachalot gigantesque. Enfin il pousse un dernier râle, fait un dernier tour sur lui-même, et s'engouffre en creusant dans l'abîme un vaste entonnoir qui tournoie un instant, se comble peu à peu et finit par s'effacer tout à fait ; si bien qu'au bout de cinq minutes il faut l'oeil de Dieu lui-même pour aller chercher au fond de cette mer calme le bâtiment disparu.

« Comprenez-nous maintenant, ajouta le patron en souriant, comment le bâtiment ne rentre pas dans le port, et pourquoi l'équipage ne porte pas plainte ? »

By the time Alexandre Dumas wrote his masterpiece *The Count of Monte Cristo* in 1844, the only pirate ships that were supposed to be in the Mediterranean were wrecks upon the sea floor or fictitious ones that were imagined memories of a romanticized past. For a book set largely in France and Italy, the connection to an orientalized Eastern Mediterranean was strong. The protagonist's mistress was none other than the fictional daughter of Ali Pasha Tepedelenli, the Lion of Ioannina whose roar commenced the Greek revolution and whose head later adorned a silver platter presented to Sultan Mahmud II. It was those uprisings in the Near East that advanced the plot while Edmond Dantes rotted his youth away in prison, creating the conditions for his rival to hone his military edge and his outlaw allies to thread the line of legality and make their way as smugglers. Dumas expected his reader to believe these to be romanticized characters of a past that no longer exists, making an exciting last hurrah in times when absolutism had returned to crush the dreams in which lower class figures could rise to prominence.

The orientalist gaze is more concerned with using an imagined Other to reflect on developments closer to home.² Whether or not pirates actually roved the eastern seas was of little concern to Dumas. It was widely accepted in France and the rest of western Europe that maritime marauders were no more, that they only belonged to the realm of fiction. As it turns out, they were wrong. Piracy did not end with the conquest of Algiers and the demise of the Barbary corsairs. In the Aegean, piracy persisted and would do so into the following century.

² The beginnings of this branch of discourse can be found in the works of Edward Said. See, Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1979), and Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, Inc, 1993).

Defining Piracy

What is piracy? Where does piracy happen? Put simply, piracy is violent theft at sea. Then why does it warrant its own study apart from banditry? There are some key differences that separate the two fields of study. First, piracy requires a ship, which is a fairly sizable startup expense compared to that needed to commit banditry on land. It also traditionally requires large numbers of people to crew said ship, especially if the goal is to overwhelm the intended target and to make resistance hopeless. Many pirate enterprises rely on smaller ships and crews, as only the most successful can essentially operate as their own private warship.

Another distinction is that piracy is a crime that takes place where borders are fluid and jurisdiction is murky. This has led to questions over who is responsible for the security of international waters, a problem that persists to this day when prosecuting Somali Red-Sea pirates.³ The boundary of international versus territorial waters also remains in flux. Over the centuries of its existence, the Ottoman Empire consistently expanded its maritime boundaries in an attempt to secure its island provinces from foreign interference.⁴ In the present day, we consider territorial water to be a certain distance from controlled land. Exactly how far that is has caused fierce debate and tension between Greece and Turkey, almost leading to war in the Aegean in several instances. The reach of territorial waters has been considered six, ten, or twelve nautical miles at various points over the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Currently, further reach from the shoreline favors Greece as it controls almost all the Aegean islands.

³ C. Paul Hallwood and Thomas J. Miceli, *Maritime Piracy and Its Control: An Economic Analysis* (Springer, 2014), 115-122.

⁴ See, Michael Talbot, “Ill-Treated by Friends’: Ottoman Responses to British Privateering in the Mid-18th Century” (Presentation, *Sylvia Ioannou Foundation Conference: Corsairs and Pirates in the Eastern Mediterranean, 15th-19th c.*, Athens, Greece October 18, 2014).

Disagreement over these exact details leads to the grey and black spaces where pirates and smugglers can operate most effectively.

Piracy has typically been divided into three or four sub-categories: pirate, privateer, corsair, and filibuster. The labeling of an action as piracy varies by context. At the most essential, popular level, pirates were outlaws on a boat. They robbed, stole, and answered to no one but themselves. Upon even a cursory examination, this romantic myth fades into the mist. What if a state hired pirates as mercenaries, or armed them, giving them license to attack enemies with the support of the state? The concept of pirates fighting for a higher power, be that for God or the king, introduces the categories of corsair and privateer. Thus, piracy existed simultaneously both as the broad category of all maritime violence committed by non-state forces and, within that broad definition, as a narrower category of violence committed by mariners with no sanction from any formal authority.

Even that is a myth, however. Pirates, like all other men of the sea, did not remain permanently adrift; they frequently touched land. And where they did, they formed connections: families, trading partners, suppliers, and the like. No one thought of themselves as a pirate as a form of permanent identity. Instead, it was a temporary occupation, a means of making a living. For example, Sir Henry Morgan made his fortune from raiding Spanish shipping, and with his prize money bought several plantations, became Lieutenant Governor of Jamaica, and actively sought to suppress piracy in the Caribbean. Piracy was a means to gain wealth, not an end in itself. As Mark Hanna warns, most historians either fall into the trap of romanticizing the freedoms that piracy offered or viewing all pirates as psychotic villains to be dealt with by the

good landed men of the Royal Navy.⁵ Pirates can be thought of as private military entrepreneurs. They primarily operated outside of the law, but they did not exit from society. Pirates maintained deep entanglements with landed society to be able to do things such as fence their goods, resupply, make social calls, and ultimately retire. Even when they took captives, pirates ensured that the captives' loved ones would be able to pay ransom to the appropriate people.⁶ After all, people are much more valuable to their families than to a slave-master.

“Pirate” was at a fundamental level a label states and their representatives gave to their enemies, particularly when they wanted to cast them as illegitimate and not worth negotiating with. This usage goes back to ancient times, where in one example, Romans cast Mithridates Eupator VI of Pontus and his Cilician allies, Rome’s rival in the Eastern Mediterranean, as being a “pirate king.”⁷ In the nineteenth century, British naval officers such as Sir Thomas Stamford Bingley Raffles labeled Malay nobles as “pirates” in order to justify taking naval action against them and by so doing to incorporate the Malay peninsula into the British empire.⁸ Pirates were the enemy of all, *hostis humani generis*, and any modification of that category was meant to bring legitimacy to a profession that was usually cast as being outside the bounds of the law.

Privateers were naval entrepreneurs who were given letters of marque to raid the shipping of enemy states. They did not need to observe the rules of warfare beyond simply not attacking

⁵ See, Mark G. Hanna, *Pirate Nests and the Rise of the British Empire, 1570-1740* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2015), 8.

⁶ Eyal Ginio, "Piracy and Redemption in the Aegean Sea during the first half of the Eighteenth century," *Turcica* 33 (2001): 135-147.

⁷ See, Daniel Heller-Roazen. *The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations* (New York: Zone Books, 2009), 51; and Manuel Tröster, "Roman Hegemony and Non-State Violence: A Fresh Look at Pompey's Campaign against the Pirates," *Greece & Rome* 56.1 (2009): 14-33.

⁸ See, Alfred P. Rubin, *The law of piracy*. Vol. 63. (1988), 220-257; and Sandy J.C. Liu "Violence and Piratical/Surreptitious Activities Associated with the Chinese Communities in the Melaka–Singapore Region (1780–1840)" in Tedd Y.H. Sim, *Piracy and Surreptitious Activities in the Malay Archipelago and Adjacent Seas, 1600- 1840* (Singapore: Springer, 2014).

ships of the same state as their sovereign or allies. They were funded by capturing prizes. Thus, they operated with little difference to pirates, with the exception that they accepted one sovereign, rather than none. States commissioned privateers to accomplish their general goals, as Britain hired privateers like Sir Francis Drake to raid Spanish bullion shipments, simultaneously weakening their imperial rival and bringing extra revenue into state coffers.

Corsairs are often described in the same way as privateers, except they are guided by the church rather than the state. This leads to discussion of corsairs to be reminiscent of the grand sectarian divisions laid out in Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations*.⁹ The narrative of piracy in this view takes on the undertones of crusade and jihad, two topics more often discussed with more passion than reason. Two groups dominate the history of corsairing. One was the order of the Knights of St. John, based in Malta, and the other was the Barbary corsairs of the Ottoman Empire's North-African vassal states: Algeria, Tunis, and Tripoli. There were also other, smaller groups, all based in the Mediterranean. As a rule, historians cast the conflict of corsairs in the Mediterranean as a struggle between a Christian northern shore against an Islamic southern one. The actual situation regarding these naval raiders becomes romanticized as religious struggle.

Louis Sicking offers a modest recategorization of maritime military entrepreneurs. He drew up a simple table with two axes: first, did they take orders from a state; and second, were they financed by a state. Navies and temporary war fleets both took orders and received funding from the state. Filibusters, such as those used for American expansion during the nineteenth century, were financed by but did not answer to the state; they were simply armed irregular

⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Penguin Books India, 1996).

soldiers who were set loose to make trouble for the enemy. Privateers answered to the state, but did not receive any funds, and instead were remunerated via captured booty. Lastly, pirates operated entirely outside of state control. As with all forms of military entrepreneurship, the lines separating these naval forces were muddled and violated at a moment's notice. Naval officers would not turn down plunder and prizes out of hand, and even the most anarchic of pirates had some alibi should they come face to face with the law.¹⁰

Categorization based on military entrepreneurs, including filibusters and regular armed forces, rather than only pirates avoids the trap of labeling pirates as both an overarching and sub-category. Notably missing from Sicking's categories are corsairs. This is because the two main "corsair" groups referred to in Mediterranean history could fit neatly into the other already existing categories. The state-based corsairs of North Africa could more easily be viewed as privateers, commissioned by either a local *dey* or by the Ottoman sultan. Islam may have been an aspect of how states legitimized maritime predation, but ultimately, we are still dealing with secular rather than religious motives.

On the other hand, the Maltese corsairs, the Knights of St. John, were essentially either a criminal organization or a micro-state unto themselves. They took no orders from any sovereign. Molly Greene has shown to great detail how their supposedly faith-based raids were unconcerned with targeting only Muslims. The knights did not hesitate to take prizes from Catholic Venetians or Orthodox Ottoman Greeks.¹¹ The Knights of St. John were pirates, not crusaders.

¹⁰ Louis. H. J. Sicking et al, "Islands, Pirates, Privateers and the Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern Mediterranean," in *Seapower, Technology and Trade: Studies in Turkish Maritime History*, eds. Dejanirah Couto, Feza Günergun, and Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, (Piri Reis University Publications, 2014), 241.

¹¹ Molly Greene, *Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants: A Maritime History of the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Princeton University Press, 2010).

Recent historians have shown that holy war was not their primary concern for North Africans, weakening the distinction between *corso* and privateering. Emrah Safa Gürkan argues that the term “corsair” was really most reflective of the Knights of St. John at Malta, and that historians have labeled North African ships as corsairs to try to explain all Mediterranean piracy in that way, despite North African ships taking orders from a state.¹² He has also questioned the degree to which North African ships were motivated to conflict by religion.¹³ The regencies of North Africa turned their cannons on their rival Muslim states as often as they turned them upon western ships and shores.

Amedeo Policante has shown how the discourse of the pirate-state went from different, equal, conflicting, northern versus southern Mediterranean to unequal colonial relations imposing European culture on "rogue-" or "pirate-" states, and why this was done over the last two centuries.¹⁴ He builds upon Lotfi ben Rejeb’s scholarship that shows that the entire discourse of North Africa as “Barbary,” and thus barbarian, was used as an imagined contrast against what Europeans thought of themselves.¹⁵

Corsairing and privateering are categorically the same thing. From an academic standpoint it is tempting to suggest eliminating the term “corsair.” Doing so would increase the linguistic drift between the common language and academic writing, weakening the impact

¹² Emrah Safa Gürkan, “A Holy Razzia? Ottoman Corsairs in Ottoman Historiography.” (presentation, *Sylvia Ioannou Foundation Conference: Corsairs and Pirates in the Eastern Mediterranean, 15th-19th c.*, Athens, Greece, October 18, 2014).

¹³ Emrah Safa Gürkan, "Batı Akdeniz’de Osmanlı korsanlığı ve gaza meselesi. [The issue of Ottoman piracy and gaza in the western Mediterranean.]" *Kebikeç: İnsan Bilimleri İçin Kaynak Araştırmaları Dergisi* 33 (2012): 173-204.

¹⁴ Amedeo Policante, “Barbary Legends on the Mediterranean Frontier: Corsairs, Pirates and the Shifting Bounds of the International Community,” in *Corsairs and Pirates in the Eastern Mediterranean, fifteenth-nineteenth centuries*, ed. Gelina Harlaftis (2016), 141-150.

¹⁵ Lotfi Ben Rejeb, ““The general belief of the world’: Barbary as genre and discourse in Mediterranean history.” *European Review of History—Revue européenne d’histoire*, 19 no. 1 (2012): 15–31.

which the suggestions of specialists might have. Corsair will continue as a term among in our common parlance, so instead of attempting to purge it, we should offer the subtle clarification that it is categorically the same as a privateer, and the term only arose separately in distinct geographies.

Piracy and Language

When discussing terms and categories, it should be remembered that these are the terms used by Anglophone academics. Both Greek and Turkish authorities from the nineteenth century used different categories for piracy based on their mother tongues.

In Ottoman Turkish, the term *korsan* encompasses all extrajudicial providers of maritime violence: Pirates, privateers, and corsairs. Thus, when reading Ottoman documents referring to a *korsan*, pirate is only a partially correct translation. In reality, when the Ottomans saw a *korsan*, they saw a maritime military entrepreneur. This *korsan* would act in his (as they were overwhelmingly male) own interest, and that interest would often be at odds with the state's interest in maintaining a monopoly on violence. When dealing with these men, the state could either send its forces against them or co-opt them with offers of security for offering their services in the interests of and in the name of the state. Lands that westerners saw as endemic of piracy and totally outside the rule of law, the sultan saw as useful allies and as a way to project state power into the periphery.

In the Greek language, there are two types of extra-state maritime military entrepreneurs. The term *peiratis* (πειρατής) acts exactly as the English term "pirate." In common parlance it

carries all the ambiguities of its sub-categories and in academic parlance it carries the specificity of referring to those self-interested aquatic bandits acting without ties to any state. *Koursaros* (κουρσάρος) combines both the notion of corsair and privateer.

The denizens of the Eastern Mediterranean did not always separate themselves out into neat ethnic categories nor did they speak only purified forms of their languages. Many of them were polyglot, and many spoke hybridized versions of several languages. For example, interrogations of suspected pirates in the Kapodistrian naval courts were conducted in *Katharevousa*, a purified version of Greek used by the state, but the responses were in a version of the common demotic Greek that borrowed heavily from Turkish.¹⁶ When the officials would ask for the suspects profession, a common answer was “είμαι γεμιτζής,” [“I am a sailor”] opting for the Turkish word for sailor, “*gemici*.”¹⁷ More uncommonly the suspects would respond in a pidgin, where the answers occasionally made use of Turkish grammar interwoven into the Greek: “*Ali Paşa'nın*” rather than “*tou Ali Pasa*” for the genitive case. Language was as fluid as the water upon which pirates sailed.

¹⁶ The use of *Katharevousa* by the state and its employees as early as the revolutionary period and beyond was a performance of a particular interpretation of what it meant to be Greek: that Greeks have not been ‘tainted’ by history since ancient or Byzantine times. The official use of *Katharevousa* continued until the collapse of the junta in 1974, and its counterpart remained the common spoken tongue of the masses. After almost two centuries of state preference for *Katharevousa*, the common tongue of Greeks would win out as the language of the state. With demotic, loan words from Turkish and other languages would remain in the Greek language, as they had for centuries.

¹⁷ See interrogations in GAK, K, 47, B, Φ II.

Geography

This dissertation is primarily concerned with two states: The Ottoman Empire, and its first fully independent successor state — Greece. By the dawn of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was only just shy of its maximum historical territorial reach, having lost territory in central Europe and the northern Balkans as a result of the rout resulting from the failed 1683 siege of Vienna. After that recession from Hungary and the other territories that fell to the Habsburgs, their European border remained relatively stable for over a century. The other major area of Ottoman territorial loss occurred on the northern shores of the Black Sea. After several wars with the Russians, the Ottomans were unable to defend the Crimean Tartars, their close ally. Additionally, their territories in present-day Romania, the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were granted autonomy and the requirement to be governed by a Christian *voyvoda*. These losses meant that the Black Sea, once in practice an Ottoman lake, became a contested sea. The conquest of Crimea granted Russia a warm-water port with which they could build a naval force potentially able to sail straight for the Dardanelles. The Black Sea would no longer only be trafficked by merchant ships. Once the domain of peace, the sea would now become a domain of war which would require the Sublime Porte to send its frigates northward — resources that would have been spent on their other vast coastal territories.

These seaside-territories were vast. There were two provinces that had islands in their name. The Ottoman name for the province of the Aegean and surrounding regions was the *Eyalet-i Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid*, or Province of the Islands of the White Sea, commonly referred

to as the Archipelago Province.¹⁸ Southwest of the Archipelago Province lay the other island-province of the Ottomans: *Eyalet-i Cezayir-i Garb*, or Province of the Islands of the West, known today as Algeria.¹⁹ Algeria was at the heart of piracy in the Mediterranean during the early modern era. Along with the other north African territories of Tunis and Tripoli, they retained a great deal of autonomy under the Ottoman Empire and made much of their income from taxing trade passing through their waters. Whereas the Archipelago Province was fully integrated into Ottoman legal norms and could be considered as the “Ottoman Mediterranean,” the North African corsair-states enjoyed a great deal of autonomy and by the 1620s even began conducting their own foreign policy.²⁰

In all its forms, the Aegean Sea has been composed primarily of two geographic features: islands and peninsulas. What little land states held was surrounded by sea. The waters could bring forth the bounties of trade, but they also simultaneously exposed the region’s inhabitants to the ravages of maritime marauders. Both powerful foreign navies and small-scale raiding enterprises were able to shape the archipelago’s modern history. How the Ottoman Empire and Greece interacted with both the Great Powers and backwater pillagers would shape their alliances and security strategy. Greece, a state without any territory outside of the archipelago, simply found itself crippled in any instance, such as during the Crimean War, where they turned against Britain. How the state dealt with its sea-robbers is much more nuanced.

¹⁸ Both in Ottoman and Modern Turkish, the Mediterranean is literally translated as white sea. Whereas the Ottoman borrows from Arabic (*bahr* - sea) and Persian (*sefid* - white, as well as the genitive construction used), the Modern Turkish word is *Akdeniz*.

¹⁹ Algeria was named as an island province either for having a few islands off the coast that have collapsed into the sea, or as part of the larger Arabic identity of the whole region as being isolated with desert to the south and sea to the north.

²⁰ For the most recent study regarding this, see, Joshua M. White, *Piracy and Law in the Ottoman Mediterranean* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017).

The Ottoman Empire was one of the largest states in history. Despite reaching the Red Sea, Black Sea, Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, Adriatic Sea, and much of the Mediterranean, most of the reports of piracy in both the Greek and Ottoman archives during the nineteenth century took place in the Aegean Sea. This is unsurprising when considering the island-topography and infinite amount of trade routes and opportunities for ambush in the far-southern tip of the Balkan Peninsula and the nearby islands. This is a land where mountains rise from the sea, intermingled as such that neither of these elements are ever more than twenty miles apart. Sailors could navigate the Aegean without ever losing sight of land.²¹ Those on the islands and coastline had two options for how to build their settlements: either they could live by the shore and thus connect themselves to the bounties and perils of trade and piracy on the sea lanes, or they could build up in the mountains, isolating and protecting themselves.

The mountains and sea created two opposing forces upon Mediterranean societies: centripetal and centrifugal forces. Mountains would isolate settlements from one another, even if they were relatively nearby. On the other hand, coastal settlements would be in close contact with all other coastal settlements throughout the Mediterranean and beyond. The sea offers a cheap way of shipping goods, people, and ideas across all ports upon its shores. Unlike shipping goods by lands, which would need to be trucked across a certain series of maintained land routes, the sea offers a multitude of routes, allowing options for bypassing certain choke points.

Traversing the Mediterranean by ship funnels travelers through certain areas. The two main entrances and exits to the Mediterranean are Gibraltar in the west, connecting to the

²¹ See the map in Figure 1.1. Readers interested in the effects of the environment and topography upon society can find several studies in the vein of the *Annales* school of thought. Fernand Braudel is one of the earliest scholars in that field, and his work specializes in the Mediterranean. For his discussion of the sea, see, Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (Univ of California Press, 1995), 103-167.

Atlantic, and the Bosphorus in the east, connecting to the Black Sea. The construction of the Suez Canal in 1869 added Port Said, Egypt to the last of gateways by adding access to the Red Sea. While the Archipelago Province of the Ottoman Empire did not include the great city on the Bosphorus, it was also a necessary through point for maritime trade. Much as mountainous territory provided cover from which bandits could launch their ambushes, so too could pirates seek cover hiding in the coves and caves of these partially-submerged mountain ranges of the Aegean.




Figure 1.1: Inset of, The Mediterranean and Black Seas - Physical. George Philip & Son, Ltd. The London Geographical Institute. (to accompany) Philips' Mercantile Marine Atlas. Second Edition ... 1905. (insets) Mediterranean and Black Seas, showing visibility of land. (with) Section of the Mediterranean Sea.

Historical Context

The seventeenth century has widely been argued to be a period of European-wide or even global crisis.²² Whether or not one agrees with this general thesis, certainly the Ottoman Empire had a crisis at sea following its 1571 loss at the Battle of Lepanto. Whereas in prior years the Ottoman fleet was a force not to be reckoned with, following the catastrophic loss of their fleet the Ottomans lost control of the waves. The matter was not so simple that western navies could sail in and entirely take the islands over. Instead, the Mediterranean became an anarchic stomping ground for pirates and corsairs. The most infamous of these corsairs were the Muslim pirates of the Barbary Coast and the Knights of St. John, Catholic corsairs based in Malta since 1530. These maritime marauders posed a great menace to coastal communities.

Some pirates were driven purely by opportunism, but most at least nominally justified their actions within the context of a broad holy war between Christians and Muslims. The primary source literature is filled with both sides using imagery of crusade or Jihad. Notable Ottoman traveler Evliya Çelebi,²³ for example, uses evocative Islamic imagery in describing the 1669 Siege of Candea²⁴ against Venetian forces: “Day and night I girded my loins and recited the Muhammadan call-to-prayer, or I tended to the Muslim *gazis*²⁵ who had entered the thick of battle with bloody hands and bloody sword, with burning heart and naked breast, and with the

²² For an account of the seventeenth century crisis in the Ottoman Empire, see Jack A Goldstone, "East and West in the Seventeenth Century: Political Crises in Stuart England, Ottoman Turkey, and Ming China," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 30, no. 1, (1988), 103-142.

²³ Çelebi is a title in Ottoman akin to gentleman bestowed to educated or noble men.

²⁴ Present-day Herakleion, Crete.

²⁵ Frequently spelled ghazis. Muslim holy warriors.

words of the holy Koran on their lips.”²⁶ The Eastern Mediterranean did not undergo large scale state-sponsored religious purges like the Spanish Inquisition in the west and instead remained a bastion of religious diversity. In the Ottoman Empire, Christians, Muslims, and Jews lived side by side and were forced to deal with adversities such as piracy communally. Though fiery religious rhetoric remained commonplace in the seventeenth century, the bonds of local community overcame religious divides in the Ottoman Empire.

The strategies for overcoming piratical hostage-taking varied in the different Mediterranean religious communities and will be examined in more depth in the following section. In almost all instances a captive could be freed by ransom. The incentive of ransom as well as the inherent profit in the slave-trade drove pirates to abduct their targets. Since the Catholic domains made no pretense of religious tolerance, they were able to organize ransom payments through ecclesiastical institutions without concern about religious minorities. This is a phenomenon peculiar to the Catholic world, as Orthodox Christians, Jews, and Muslims had no equivalent. In a religiously diverse society it would have made little sense to organize ransom payments and prevention via ecclesiastical channels. Instead the Ottomans system more closely resembled the mercantile communities in Tunis, who all contributed to a common cause. The Ottoman response to a hostage crisis was to act through personal intermediaries or state mechanisms to fund the release of hostages. In the years between Lepanto and the Cretan War, the Ottoman fleet was on the defensive and patrolled the waters to prevent pirates from harassing their territory and to hunt them down after the fact.²⁷

²⁶ Robert Dankoff and Sooyong Kim, *An Ottoman Traveler: Selections from the Book of Travels of Evliya Çelebi* (London: Eland Publishing Limited, 2010), 295.

²⁷ The Ottoman fleet might have had trouble in chasing down faster ships. According to Katip Çelebi, there is a “well known criticism of Spanish captains who taunt [the Turks] saying ‘your ships are not fast.’ On this side [of the argument], expert corsairs retort, ‘Our ships do not chase those who flee, and do not flee from those who chase.’”

To gain a cartographic anchor on Ottoman conceptions of the world at this time²⁸ I employ another seventeenth-century Çelebi – Katip Çelebi – and his sixteenth century predecessor Piri Reis.²⁹ Born in late fifteenth century Gelibolu,³⁰ Piri was raised in the shadow of his illustrious uncle Kemal Reis and came of age as a corsair.³¹ He eventually joined the Ottoman fleet and climbed the ranks to become the *Hind Beylerbeyi*.³² In 1521 he finished his great cartographic study, the *Kitab-ı Bahriye*. In it he maps out the known seas of the world, from the coast of South America to Southeast and East Asia. Additionally, for all areas of particular concern to the Ottomans he details out the location of harbors, cities, fortresses, and fresh water. While paying some attention to what state controls the area at the time, Piri Reis is not interested in the ethnographic makeup of the various lands. While primarily this is due to the priority to convey the more immediate geostrategic information, this may also be due to Ottoman apathy towards the subject. The Ottomans had little need to understand local ethnicities because they had no desire to change them. There was not a “Turkification” process or goal. So long as territories incorporated into the empire provided troops or taxes, the Sublime Porte was willing to leave its subject populations be.

Katip Çelebi was more of a scholar and spent his time mapping and recording history. His *Tuhfet ül-kibar fî esfâr il-bihâr*³³ goes all the way up to his death in the Cretan War. Also

Svatopluk Soucek, *The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2012), 150.

²⁸ As Robert Redfield tells us, “If we describe a community as an ecological system we describe it not as the members of that community themselves think of it. They are ignorant of a science of ecology. If what we want most to understand is their own view of things, we need concepts that will describe the inside view, as much of it as we can come to share.” Robert Redfield, *The Little Community* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), 32.

²⁹ Reis is an Ottoman title akin to captain or chief.

³⁰ Present-day Gallipoli, Turkey.

³¹ Piri Reis, *Kitab-ı Bahriye*. (İstanbul: The Historical Research Foundation İstanbul Research Center, 1988), 16.

³² Loosely translatable as Admiral of the Indian Fleet.

³³ Translated as “History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks.” See, Soucek, *Maritime Wars of the Turks*, 2012

interesting is some of the commentary and advice he gives in the book outside of merely narrating events. While not a corsair himself, he still respected corsairs and relayed their advice that if the admiral of the Ottoman fleet is not a corsair, he should follow the advice of one.³⁴ This reflects the reality in the early modern Mediterranean that both sides saw the effectiveness of corsair tactics. Corsairs knew how to pick an easy fight, how to make and not expend profit, and how to keep their crew content. These skills were invaluable in command decisions as they were more grounded in human psychology and practical circumstances, not in the high ideas of holy war or honorable combat. Sailors on the whole had a reputation for violence,³⁵ and it was impractical to treat the sultan's fleet separately from his corsair allies.

One of the most common destinations for captives on both sides was to serve out their days rowing as a galley slave. Hostages were not the only type of captives grueling away in the ships. "Most thieves were sentenced to forced labor in the galleys, a punishment that may indicate the navy's need for rowers at the time as well as a rising crime rate."³⁶ Theft made up about two thirds of Ottoman convictions around 1720. Half of these convictions were for armed robbery,³⁷ so the galley crew was rough, tough, and untrustworthy. Seeing the dangerous potential of enemy captives and convicted criminals serving as the primary source of labor for a ship, Katip Çelebi proposes that "the *bey*s³⁸ should remove from each of their many ships one hundred infidels and replace them with Turks; those who do not comply should be called to order—many a *bey* ship has been lost when galley slaves (*forsas*) seized it."³⁹ In the seventeenth

³⁴ Soucek, *Maritime Wars of the Turks*, 148.

³⁵ Fariba Zarinebaf, *Crime and Punishment in Istanbul 1700-1800*. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2010), 73.

³⁶ Zarinebaf, *Crime and Punishment*, 73.

³⁷ Zarinebaf, *Crime and Punishment*, 73.

³⁸ Ottoman term for Captain.

³⁹ Soucek, *Maritime Wars of the Turks*, 153.

century the Ottoman Empire and Venice began to move away from relying on galley slaves, as they were undependable when they thought they could be freed by an enemy ship. Instead both states slowly transitioned to regular paid labor.⁴⁰ It became apparent that it was not economically optimal to use a rebellious slave crew, as the slave uprisings and escapes were frequent. However, while the Mediterranean naval market for slaves was diminishing, the global slave market was expanding. While black slaves became preferable in the western hemisphere, Muslims had no qualms about utilizing slave labor from any source, as they had done for centuries. The demand for slaves of all colors in Islamic societies remained even while their use rowing in the galleys diminished. Any chance of intimate connection a slave or convict would have to their captor's society would be stunted once sentenced to the galley. Forced labor in an enclosed environment only allows horizontal bonds to form among the slave-rowers. Vertical bonds are top down displays of power. Thus, the rowers' only hope of forming reciprocal bonds is with each other in a display of resistance to their captors. The solution of switching over to paid labor was less about having workers of the same religion as the captor, and more about allowing vertical bonds to form. In this case, trust was formed by switching to paid labor by subjects.

⁴⁰ Zarinebaf, *Crime and Punishment*, 168.

Captivity and Ransom Practices in the Early Modern Mediterranean

The history of ransoming in the Mediterranean is usually analyzed from a Christian perspective. Many scholars are aware of this, so in their account they try to complicate the story told by non-specialists who see piracy as simply a Muslim versus Christian struggle. Even so, the scholarly literature also places an emphasis on describing Christian institutions in greater detail than Islamic ones. Fernand Braudel, for example, takes the position that “too much attention has been paid to the protests and arguments of the inhabitants of Christian shores and historians have sometimes been rather hasty in drawing conclusions.”⁴¹ At the same time, Braudel himself continues this cycle as the entirety of his work *The Mediterranean* adopts an overwhelmingly Christian perspective. His section on the Ottomans mostly focuses on how the Christian states dealt with them. Taking this Eurocentric shortcoming into account, I adopt a broader perspective that focuses on the experiences of Christians, Jews, and Muslims and shows that all of them shared similar fears regarding abduction. As Daniel Hershenzon concludes, Mediterranean captivity and slavery was a single interrelated and asymmetrical system, where the predominately Christian West had set up a series of redemptive institutions which did not have a direct equivalent in the Muslim-dominated East.⁴² These communities responded to the threat of enslavement largely through the establishment of sectarian funds for ransoming their captive comrades. Ransom payments were also occasionally secured from across sectarian lines.

⁴¹ Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, 886.

⁴² Daniel Hershenzon, "Towards a connected history of bondage in the Mediterranean: Recent trends in the field," *History Compass* 15.8 (2017).

For centuries in Mediterranean Christendom, wealthy men purchased their freedom with their own personal fortunes. Then starting in 1581 Pope Gregory XIII set up an institution for the ransoming of Catholic prisoners called the *Opera Pia Redenzione de' Schiavi*.⁴³ In Tunis, certain mercantile communities established a special tax to pay the ransom of captured community members. Catholic monks could enter redemptive holy orders formed with the goal of redeeming captives. The Trinitarians used one third of their alms to ransom Christians from Muslim captors. The Mercedarian order, sometimes referred to as the cult of Our Lady of Ransom, was theoretically willing to exchange one of its members to free a brother of the faith from Saracen slavery. Despite the renown that this cult enjoyed, the only French Mercedarian to actually indenture himself was Sebastien Bruyère, who was held hostage in Algiers from 1643 to 1652.⁴⁴ As a pious institution, its main goal was to gain converts in the ever expanding battle for souls.⁴⁵ Much to the chagrin of the church, increased contact with Islam often resulted in Christians turning renegade and converting to Islam.⁴⁶ States such as France theoretically tolerated individual conversions because of its treaties with the Ottomans, but in practice local consuls strongly discouraged the practice and interfered with apostasy.⁴⁷ French and Venetian consuls also took a proactive role in assuring not just the release, but oftentimes the escape of Catholic prisoners held in the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁸

⁴³ Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, 887.

⁴⁴ Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 12, 232.

⁴⁵ Braudel 1995, 888.

⁴⁶ For an example of a Catholic priest going renegade, see Ariel Salzman, "A Travelogue Manqué? The Accidental Itinerary of a Maltese Priest in the Seventeenth Century Mediterranean," in Adnan Ahmed Husain, and Katherine Elizabeth Fleming, eds., *A Faithful Sea: The Religious Cultures of the Mediterranean, 1200-1700* (Oneworld Publications Limited, 2007), 149-72.

⁴⁷ Peter Lamborn Wilson, *Pirate Utopias: Moorish Corsairs & European Renegades* (Autonomedia, 2003), 13.

⁴⁸ Mark Mazower, *Salonica, city of ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews 1430-1950*. (Vintage, 2007), 104.

Protestant northern-European merchants who traveled to the early modern Mediterranean also had to deal with the threat of capture. In Denmark, for example, friends and family of the victims usually paid their ransom, but not infrequently church congregations raised funds to ransom captured members of their flock.⁴⁹ Unfortunately for the captives, there was not an inside man effectively coordinating the exchanges of money and people, so in many instances the wrong captive found his way out of Algeria and into Denmark.⁵⁰ Beginning in the 1620s, the king funneled state funds towards the payment of ransoms. The initial intent was to redeem all Danish slaves, but the price proved to be too high. So, after twenty years of effort, only half of the seventy slaves targeted by the king's efforts had found their way back home.⁵¹ The sluggishness of this effort led to more proactive efforts by the sailors most threatened by enslavement.⁵² "Every shipmaster and mate paid a small part of their wages, so-called ransom money, to help free Danish sailors from slavery in the Barbary States."⁵³ This fundraising technique was initially adopted in response to the threat not only of Barbary corsairs but of European privateers as well. The Spanish and Portuguese were at the time powerful Catholic maritime powers whose privateers were willing to target both Christians and Muslims. In 1715

⁴⁹ Erik Gøbel, "The Danish 'Algerian Sea Passes', 1747-1838: An Example of Extraterritorial Production of 'Human Security' / Die 'Algerischen Seepässe' Dänemarks, 1747-1838: Ein Beispiel der extraterritorialen Produktion humaner Sicherheit," *Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung* (2010): 170.

⁵⁰ England too encountered problems with having contacts and negotiators with the appropriate linguistic skills to effectively conduct ransom. Protestantism meant northern Europe would not have access to the Catholic Mercedarian and Trinitarian redemptive orders. See, Linda Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire and the World 1600-1850* (Random House, 2003), 54.

⁵¹ Gøbel, "Algerian Sea Passes," 170.

⁵² The threat to captured sailors is best exemplified the British context which mirrors much of what is happening in Denmark. "If seized at sea and held in North Africa, it was extremely unlikely that a common seaman would be able to assemble his own ransom. Unlike prisoners taken in a conventional European war, he could rarely hope to be exchanged for men from the other side. And even if they got to learn of his predicament, his family back in Britain would find it hard to raise money on his behalf. So when the authorities in London were slow to intervene, Barbary captives could be stranded and enslaved in North Africa for many years, and sometimes for ever." Colley, *Captives*, 54.

⁵³ Gøbel, "Algerian Sea Passes," 171.

the Danish king consolidated these various fundraising mechanisms into a single slave fund, with church and state sources forming half of the funds while the shipmasters' association paid the rest.⁵⁴

These funds were critical to sailors because the standard marine insurance would not aid them in the event of their capture by Muslim privateers. Insurance companies, in order to avoid paying money, loaded their contracts with technicalities that did not consider corsairs to be pirates but as a legitimate navy authorized by a state with which Denmark was not at war. Eventually an insurance company moved in to fill this gap, but most Scandinavian shipmasters continued to sail without specialized insurance.⁵⁵ This was likely due to the relatively small number of Danish traders that piracy insurance affected. The few sailors who purchased this insurance on top of existing investments were likely the brave few who plied their trade in Muslim waters. In 1747, piracy insurance lost its relevance when Denmark signed a tribute-treaty with the North African pirate regencies and made Algerian sea passes compulsory among its Mediterranean sailors.⁵⁶ These documents were expensive to secure,⁵⁷ but proved more effective in securing freedom for Danes than merely flying an easily forged Barbary-allied flag. Flying any particular flag involved some risk in a Mediterranean teeming with competing corsairs from various religious and political alliances. Putting up the wrong colors in the face of corsairs could end in disaster, and this problem was exacerbated when corsairs would often fly flags of the opposing faction in order to lull their victims into a false sense of security.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Gøbel, "Algerian Sea Passes," 173.

⁵⁵ Gøbel, "Algerian Sea Passes," 173.

⁵⁶ A similar treaty was signed in 1682 requiring sea-passes from British ships after a war between England and Algiers. See, Colley, *Captives*, 52.

⁵⁷ Gøbel, "Algerian Sea Passes," 180.

⁵⁸ Roderic E. Cavaliero, "The Decline of the Maltese Corso in the XVIIIth Century, A Study in Maritime History." *Melita historica: Journal of the Malta Historical Society* 2.4 (1959): 226.

In the Ottoman-allied city-state of Ragusa,⁵⁹ the Jewish community regularly paid ransom for Ottoman subjects. “A study of documents from the Ragusan archives which discuss ransom and captivity among the Jews of Ragusa shows us that they made a significant contribution in this field both as individuals and as a community, particularly at a time when the winds of war were blowing in the area and the Jews served as mediators between the Muslim and Christian worlds.”⁶⁰ In return, the state gave Jews preferential treatment in many matters such as consular appointments and state backing against their Christian competitors.⁶¹ Like the rest of the sectarian groups represented in the Mediterranean, Jews also had organizations which would ransom Jewish captives.⁶²

Mediterranean Muslims had a long history of using religious institutions to redeem slaves. The Quran instructed Muslims to donate funds towards those in need, including the ransom of slaves.⁶³ Muslims considered this to apply to slaves of all types, whether captured in a slave-raid by pirates, or on the field of battle by soldiers. The difference is not hard to fathom, especially considering that the environment among corsairs on the high seas perpetuated images of crusade and jihad. Redemptive charity via *evkaf* in the Muslim Mediterranean changed very little between the medieval and early modern period. As seen paralleled in all the examples from

⁵⁹ Present-day Dubrovnik, Croatia.

⁶⁰ Moisés Orfali, "Ragusa and Ragusan Jews in the Effort to Ransom Captives," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 17.2 (2002): 27.

⁶¹ Orfali, *Ragusa*, 27.

⁶² Mazower, *Salonica*, 106; Yaacov Lev, *Charity, Endowments, and Charitable Institutions in Medieval Islam* (University Press of Florida, 2005), 139-140.

⁶³ “It is not righteousness that ye turn your faces towards east or west; but it is righteousness –to believe in God and the Last Day, and the Angels, and the Book, and the Messengers; to spend of your substance, out of love for Him, for your kin, for orphans, for the needy, for the wayfarer, for those who ask, and for the ransom of slaves; to be steadfast in prayer and practice regular charity; to fulfill the contracts which ye have made; and the firm and patient, in pain (or suffering) and adversity, and throughout all periods of panics. Such are the people of truth, the God-fearing.” (QS Al Baqarah (2): 177), cited in Ataina Hidayati, "Cash waqf institution and accounting issues," *International Seminar and workshop on Islamic accounting* (Yogyakarta, Indonesia: Universitas Islam Indonesia, 2011), 5.

the northern shores of the Mediterranean thus far, redemptive charity was also used as a tool of legitimation by the church and state from the medieval caliphates through Ottoman times. Non-secular states could reap the public-relations benefits of charity from the religion they championed. For the Ottomans and Abbasids this was especially important since the state did not act directly in funding ransom as happened in Europe; this was left to the local communities. When the state acted directly in redemption, it was either in negotiating treaties for avoiding enslavement of Muslims, negotiating prisoner exchanges, or managing redemptive *evkaf*. It is worth noting that *evkaf* were not restricted to Muslim control; Christians and Jews living under Islamic rule could also set up their own *vakıf*. Usually ransomed peoples were locals, but occasionally there was a show of pan-Islamic solidarity. There is a case where Muslims captured in Majorca were brought to port-towns in Syria and Palestine where local Muslims bought their freedom.⁶⁴ Ottoman handling of ransom was consistent with the *longue durée* tradition of redemptive practices.

The traditional narrative regarding Mediterranean *corso* showed the Other was perceived across religious lines – usually weighing Christianity against Islam. Several historians have now refuted the simplicity of that narrative. Molly Greene writes about the Greek Orthodox Ottomans who became victims of the Catholic corsairs seeking to prey upon Ottoman Muslims.⁶⁵ Erdem Kabadayı and Tobias Reichardt challenge the notion that Muslims never enslaved other Muslims. They highlight a 1760 case where an Iranian Muslim named Himmet wished to leave the service of his Turkish master in Anatolia. His master then threatened him with outright

⁶⁴ Lev, *Charity*, 1, 137-9, 142.

⁶⁵ See, Greene, *Catholic Pirates*.

enslavement, so Himmet petitioned the Ottoman government only to have the case passed down to a local *kadi*.⁶⁶

In both examples tenuous barriers are brought up between the Orthodox Greeks and the Catholic Maltese, the Shi'ite Persian and the Sunni Turks. Rather than view these as even more intricate religious divides, it is more fruitful to examine the political situation of the states that these contested groups are subject to. Even while the *seyhulislam*⁶⁷ regarded Iranians as so heretical that they were no longer Muslims, they remained officially protected from enslavement. This was because the policy of sectarian religious exclusionism was justification for war against Persia. The religious boundary between Shi'ite Persia and the Sunni Ottoman Empire was active primarily during time of war between the two states. Himmet likely chose to stay in the Ottoman domain during such a time due to marriage to a local woman.⁶⁸

Sectarian captive-taking raids were commonplace in medieval Spanish frontier towns.⁶⁹ "The fear of capture and the desire for redemption caused the king, the nobles, or the municipality itself to establish institutions, called either hospitals or houses of redemption, for

⁶⁶ Erdem Kabadayı and Tobias Reichardt. 2008. "Trying to Avoid Enslavement: The Adventures of an Iranian Subject in Eighteenth-century Anatolia," in Suraiya Faroqhi, ed., *Another Mirror for Princes* (Piscataway, New Jersey: Isis Press, 2008), 220.

⁶⁷ The head of Islam in the Ottoman Empire, second only to the Caliph/Sultan (Arabic: Sheikh al-Islam).

⁶⁸ Kabadayı and Reichardt, "Trying to Avoid Enslavement," 220-226.

⁶⁹ For example, "At some time in 1234 six Muslim captives had escaped from the prison of the house of redemption of Moya. Gonzalo de Alcotón, a knight of Moya, rode out after them and recaptured them. The Muslim town of Requena, located some fifty kilometers away, had a treaty with Moya, and it sent a troop of knights and foot soldiers to take the prisoners from Gonzalo. Since the Muslim prisoners had been booty from lands inimical to both Moya and Requena, the municipal council of Moya ordered a Christian, Gonzalo Díaz of Requena, to pledge for them, meaning that he offered ransom money on behalf of the Muslims in expectation of future compensation. Gonzalo Díaz of Requena pledged Muslims and beasts of Requena, worth 200 maravedís, to the council of Moya. Then, because of the treaty between Moya and Requena, the council of Moya directed the commander of Moyas house of redemption (who was also named Gonzalo Díaz) to accept the remaining 1,000 maravedís that settled the claim from Requena. The document was witnessed by local officials, jurors, by the military governors (alcaldes) of the towns of Teruel, Castiel, and Ademuz, and by the commander of the house of redemption in Castiel." See, Theresa M. Vann, "The Matter of the Muslim Captives and the Town of Moya." *Mediterranean Studies* 6 (1996): 40-41.

the purpose of ransoming captives. Run by the military religious orders and financed by the municipalities in which they were located, the houses acted as intermediaries for ransoming captives: they raised funds, negotiated with the holders of the captives, and handled the exchange of prisoner."⁷⁰

The Ottoman Muslim community, as exemplified in Rhodes during the late eighteenth century, had similar mechanisms to handle ransom: 1) institutions established by notables or the community to ransom captives, 2) that these were run by religious orders, in the case of Rhodes embodied by the *vakif*, and 3) that these were financed by local municipalities.⁷¹ There are other similarities as well between the Spanish and Ottoman example. For example, in both cases there were professional ransomers that would network with captors and ensure the redemption process went along smoothly.⁷²

Nowhere was nearly so well networked in this regard as the pirate regencies in North Africa. Each ransom negotiator sent to North Africa allowed for a dialogue between states that took each other's subjects captive. Hostage exchanges occurred, especially when a state was tight on funds.⁷³ The pirate regencies had an advantage though. They often sold off their captives in exchange for new weapons.⁷⁴ This made it more difficult for European powers to effectively

⁷⁰ Vann, "Muslim Captives," 39.

⁷¹ See the Foundation Charter (*vakif*) of Hafiz Ahmed Agha in Rhodes, Greece. 1796. Translated by John Robert Barnes. *Greek Ministry of Culture, Fourth Ephorate of Byzantine Antiquities*, 1998, and my unpublished article, Leonidas Mylonakis, "Ransom in Rhodes: The *Vakif* as a Communal Fundraising Mechanism for Redemption," (presentation, *The 4th Biennial Ancient Borderlands International Graduate Student Conference: Innovation in Borderland Regions*, University of California – Santa Barbara, April 2014).

⁷² Vann 1996, p. 48.

⁷³ Colley, *Captives*, 45.

⁷⁴ For example, in 1737 France ransomed 75 friars from Morocco for a large stash of gunpowder, a sizable sum of cash, and a trade agreement. See, Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 89.

mount slave-raids upon the Barbary Coast.⁷⁵ Spaniards still attempted to take slaves in land raids upon North Africa, while Maltese and Tuscan corsairs continued targeting Muslims merchant ships at sea and in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁷⁶ The local government in Algiers organized the *waqf al-haramayn* to pay ransom. A portion of the booty from Christian ships provided funding for the *vakif*.⁷⁷

Early nineteenth-century Morocco was one of the major pirate regencies of North Africa, though it did not pledge allegiance to the Ottomans. Because of this it lacked the intimate diplomatic contacts and went so far as to ban trade with the Spanish, who they viewed as the enemies of Islam.⁷⁸ Going beyond ideological divide, Spain and Morocco had a history of bad relations ever since the *Reconquista*. Though Morocco forbade trade with the Christian powers for ideological reasons, merchants reconciled their differences and continued trading on the black market as the global demand for slaves continued well past the formation of the abolition movement. Even in the 1890s, seven or eight thousand slaves passed through the Moroccan slave market annually.⁷⁹

On the island of Andros, the repeated actions of the monks of the Hagia Monastery show that in the Ottoman Empire sectarian boundaries were not unsurmountable walls. Time and again the monks took action to help redeem Ottoman Muslims from a servile fate. In June of 1650 a Venetian galley had lost control of ten of its Ottoman galley slaves. Tasting freedom, the

⁷⁵ Prior to the second siege of Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman Empire had the most formidable military in Europe. Even after Ottoman defeat, even colonial European powers had smaller military forces than that of the Ottoman Empire, or even Morocco. See, Colley, *Captives*, 35.

⁷⁶ Robert C. Davis, *Christian slaves, Muslim masters: white slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500-1800* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 8-9.

⁷⁷ Ginio, *Piracy and Redemption*, 142.

⁷⁸ C R Pennell, "The geography of piracy: northern Morocco in the mid-nineteenth century," in C R Pennell *Bandits at sea: A pirates reader*, by C R Pennell, ed., (New York: NYU Press, 2001): 57-58.

⁷⁹ Mohammed Ennaji, *Serving the master: Slavery and society in nineteenth-century Morocco* (St. Martin's Press, 1999), 109.

fugitives fled to nearby Andros. Reaching land was not to end their worries as Venetian ships set off in search of these fugitives. The monks of Hagia monastery hid the Muslims from the Venetian search and did what they could to foster them back to health.⁸⁰ When they thought it safe, they took to the sea and dropped off the Muslim escapees in the Ottoman mainland city of Karystos. The waters around the island came to be largely dominated by the Venetians who would have been none too pleased were they to catch their former slaves being transported to safety. The monks were taking a risk akin to that of smugglers transporting contraband or of pirates sailing through hostile waters. These monks repeatedly took these actions in aiding the escape of Muslim galley slaves and bringing them to safety.⁸¹ The cross-sectarian efforts to redeem captives on Andros serves as a reminder that the world was not viewed entirely through sectarian eyes. Similar to the Ragusan Jews, people often acted to preserve their local community regardless of their neighbors' religion.

The Traditional End of Piracy

As with most matters in history, Mediterranean is generally associated with a certain time and place. The popular tales all hark back to the sixteenth century and tales of Barbarossa's fleet wreaking havoc upon his Frankish foes. The regencies on the North African coast, known to the Europeans as Barbary, continued plaguing European trade in the Mediterranean up until the nineteenth century. The Barbary corsairs and their Catholic foes in Malta totally dominated

⁸⁰ Elias Kolovos, "Insularity and Island Society in the Ottoman Context." *Turcica* 39 (2007): 104.

⁸¹ See Kaireios Ottoman Library archive on Andros (<http://androsdocs.ims.forth.gr/>), doc 134/135.

western discussions of piracy in the Mediterranean. Rather than summarize the entire history of piracy in the region, this section will simply trace each thread of piracy's historical yarn to where they have been cut off.

The first pirate society to end in the nineteenth century was the knightly Order of St. John, based in Malta. While the knights were active raiding earlier in the 1790s trying to supplement their income after Napoleon seized their French estates, Napoleon finally expelled them from the island in 1798.⁸² Two years later, England captured Malta, and in 1807 banned slavery. Malta rapidly transformed from a corsair's castle to a British colonial naval base.⁸³

At the start of the nineteenth century, rather than paying tribute and acknowledging the sovereignty of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli over their own seas, western powers chose war. The first was the United States, a fledgling country that found its trade routes with the Mediterranean were no longer protected by British tribute payments. Tripolitan ships began harassing American merchant ships in the Mediterranean beginning in the 1780s. In 1800, the US flagship *George Washington* was pressed into Algeria's service to act as a cargo freighter to send Algeria's tribute to İstanbul.⁸⁴ America began tributary payments to Algeria, but Tunis and Tripoli began demanding comparable payments for safe passage. After Algeria raised ransom and tribute demands to unreasonable levels, over \$1 million in 1800 dollars, President Thomas Jefferson lobbied for the formation of a federal navy, a controversial proposition in a divided Congress. In

⁸² See the Foundation Charter (*vakıf*) of Hafiz Ahmed Agha in Rhodes, Greece. 1796. Translated by John Robert Barnes. *Greek Ministry of Culture, Fourth Ephorate of Byzantine Antiquities*, 1998.

⁸³ Ayşe Devrim Atauz, "Trade, Piracy, and Naval Warfare in the Central Mediterranean: The Maritime History and Archaeology of Malta," (PhD Thesis, Texas A & M University, 2004), 272.

⁸⁴ Frank Lambert, *The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World* (Macmillan, 2005), 100. This dissertation will use the current name for the great city on the Bosphorus. İstanbul only became the official city name in the early years of the Turkish Republic. During the Ottoman era, the city was known as Constantinople in English and Konstantiniyye in Ottoman Turkish, both from the Greek Κωνσταντινούπολις.

1801 America sent over a small fleet to Tripoli, who had recently raised their ransom demands to the level of the larger and more dangerous Algeria. For three years the Tripolitans laughed off the American blockade which consisted of a handful of deep water warships, unable to pursue the lighter Tripolitan gunboats into shallow water. In one episode of the war, a United States warship ran aground some rocks and was captured by Tripoli. Rather than risking the warship's use by enemy forces, Jefferson appointed Stephen Decatur to lead a raid to demolish the ship in Tripoli's harbor.⁸⁵ The high-risk stealth mission succeeded without incident, leading to Decatur becoming a national hero, and solidifying his position in America's continued conflicts with the North African Regencies.

In 1804, America returned with a larger fleet, containing proper gunboats, which was able to successfully block off Tripoli's port and capture Derna. The U.S. ambassador to Tripoli negotiated a reduced annual tribute to Tripoli along with the release of Americans captured during and prior to hostilities. Concerned with budgetary spending, Congress downsized the navy. With the American military threat removed, Tripoli once again raised their tribute demand.

In 1807, the North African Regencies of the Ottoman Empire began fighting amongst themselves. Tunis fought and defeated Algeria's army.⁸⁶ While North Africa was war weary, and Europe lay in ruins following the Napoleonic wars, the United States sought to end its tribute payments to the Barbary states once and for all. The American Navy had dramatically expanded to fight against the British in the War of 1812, which ended in 1814. One year after those hostilities ended, the fleet sailed to North Africa to subdue the weakened regencies. Seeing the

⁸⁵ Lambert, *The Barbary wars*, 123-56.

⁸⁶ See, Asma Moalla, *The Regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte, 1777-1814: Army and Government of a North-African Eyâlet at the End of the Eighteenth Century*. (Routledge, 2005).

threat that the United States Navy posed and weak from regional conflict, each regency quickly sued for peace and formally ended their tribute demands to the United States.⁸⁷

After the two wars the United States set a precedent showing that raiding off the North African coast could be prevented by military might, not simply through diplomacy. Following the American example, in 1816 British and Dutch fleets also bombarded Algiers to demand release from tribute payments and freedom for European captives. Most of the captives held were not English or French, but overwhelmingly hailed from the various states of the Italian peninsula. The days of North African raiding were not yet over. As they had done repeatedly in the past, within two years Algiers reconstructed its fleet and resumed roving the sea for captives.⁸⁸ As Gillian Weiss has described in *Captives and Corsairs*, the Greek struggle for independence would inspire motivation for France to turn against its Islamic Ottoman ally and send troops to both of the Island provinces of the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Algeria.⁸⁹ The republican opposition to the Bourbon royalists took up the cause of philhellenism and imbued it with rhetoric laced with race, faith, violence, and gender.

In 1830, France would pick up on the lesson that Barbary could be beaten, and the Greek War of Independence helped fuel the French will to liberate them from their “barbarian” nature. Like many western observers, the French saw the war in certain lights. There was the ever-popular religious view, of Christendom and Islam being engaged in Holy War. Another light was that of color, of “dark” North African pirates fighting and enslaving “white” Greek Christians. This viewpoint ignored the actual myriad skin tone present on both shores of the Mediterranean,

⁸⁷ Lambert, *The Barbary Wars*, 157-78.

⁸⁸ Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 151-2.

⁸⁹ Greece was *Eyalet-i Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid*, province of the Mediterranean Islands, and Algeria was *Eyalet-i Cezayir-i Garb*, province of the Western Islands.

and instead was simply a relabeling of the religious categories. Lastly, the Greeks striving for independence were cast as women seeking freedom from violent male oppression. Again, the root for all these categories lay in the religion of the people, but the employed rhetoric masked the religious categories as others that secular leaning French republicans would be keener to support.

Until 1827 the French monarch stood by his ally, Sultan Mahmud II. Unlike those with the sultan, French relations with the Algerian *Dey* Hussein leading up to then had been stretched since the 1790s. During its own revolution, France had borrowed exorbitant sums from two Jewish merchants in Algeria who were in the business of redeeming captives. France remained delinquent on this debt, creating tensions between the two states. When Hussein hit the French Consul Pierre Deval with a flyswatter in 1827, France [over]responded by sending a squadron to blockade Algeria's port until they received an official apology.⁹⁰ The blockade lasted until 1830, when King Charles X of France decided to invade.

The king's decision to forgo his alliance and side with the republican philhellenic opposition was part succumbing to unending republican rhetoric, part seeking a permanent solution to naval security, and part desire to set up a cash-crop industry to trade with in "liberated" Algeria. Whatever the justification for the invasion, within six days of the French fleet reaching the Algerian shore, the war was over. The *dey's* fortifications crumbled and his palace prisons were torn open, revealing neither thousands of beaten Frenchmen nor harems filled with alabaster-skinned Christian women. Instead they found only about two hundred Greeks, Spaniards, and Italians who while happy to be set free did not exactly sate the French

⁹⁰ Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 162.

orientalist fantasy. Charles X of France's invasion of North Africa was based on fiscal, political, and diplomatic factors, but his public rhetoric was of liberation and expanding civilization to the region.⁹¹ The French colonization of Algiers was the final form of western intervention initiated by England and America in the southern coasts of the Mediterranean. From the western viewpoint, Mediterranean piracy ends when gunboats arrived from the west flying sails of red, white, and blue; and blue, white, and red. The western powers deemed North-African sailors, once renowned for their marked autonomy, to be "free" only when they were fettered under the shackles of colonialism.

Maritime Raiding by the Numbers

Digitization of archives in Greece and Turkey has made this dissertation possible. The bulk of the primary sources used in this dissertation were attained by keyword searches relating to piracy in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ottoman Prime Ministry archives. These filters resulted in thousands of pages of relevant results, which were nestled among millions more pages of irrelevant documents. This section will describe some general data trends that are observable from metadata alone.

The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives begin in 1826 and end in 1913, after which access is more tightly restricted. There are seventy-six document folders dealing with piracy spread over those eighty-seven years, so the average rate is just under one folder of

⁹¹ Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 162-67, 257.

documents reporting piracy a year. This rate holds roughly steady, with small spikes or remissions forming exceptions. Only four cases concerning piracy were filed in these archives during the revolutionary 1820s. This lack of paper trail does more to highlight the nascence of the revolutionary government rather than correctly reflect the level of piracy in and around the Aegean. Archival sources from the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain show that piratical incidences occurred at elevated levels during Greece's revolutionary decade.

Viewing these documents year-by-year helps to reveal precise periods of elevated or decreased piratical activities that can be tied to particular political or international events. In the five-year span from 1835-39, ten cases were reported, doubling the general rate. There was also a small spike in 1843 and during the Crimean War in the 1850s. 1858 was the first year that there were no reports of piracy in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives, and from 1861-1913, a fifty-two-year span, there were only thirty-one cases reported, with a small spike observable in 1893.

Looking at the proliferation of page count dedicated to piracy for each year can also offer some valuable insights, with the caveat that as the bureaucracy grew over the century, so too did the length of reports. For example, by the 1880s and 90s, the page count for piracy spiked without an actual spike in the number of reports. Smoothing the data by taking three-year averages (Figure 1.3) allows for a quicker understanding of the general trends by reducing the seeming jaggedness of the graph.⁹²

⁹² To accomplish this, I created a program in Python that averages every year's page-count data with the preceding and following year. I have included the raw data in Figure 1.2.




Figure 1.2: Number of pages per year concerning piracy, YE.




Figure 1.3: Average number of pages per three-year period concerning piracy, YE.

The Ottoman archives stretch much further back than the Greek archives, as it is the state that both knocked out the Byzantine Empire and lasted into the days of fighter planes and chemical warfare, collapsing as did so many other European empires in the aftermath of the First World War. I begin tracking data in 1820, one year before the onset of the Greek War of Independence. The last document relevant to this study appears in 1911. Exempting the first decade of the twentieth century, the overwhelming majority of documents referencing piracy in the Ottoman archives for the time-period of this study concern the Mediterranean.⁹³

When these documents are grouped by decade, we can more easily see the decreasing trend of piracy over the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. The pivotal point between averaging three cases every two years and one case every two years occurs in the 1850s, apparently as a result of the Crimean War. The conflict resulted in the signing of the *Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law* which placed an international ban on state employment of privateers.

When looking at the number of events in both states combined, we see a small bump in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. This bump is much more minor than the page count relating to piracy in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggests. This methodology of counting events rather than pages proves more consistent given changing bureaucratic practices over the century and will provide the basis of discussions of the piracy data in this dissertation.

⁹³ The first decade of the twentieth century saw a staggering amount of piratical cases in the Red Sea, particularly Farasan Island (Modern day Saudi Arabia) and Massawa (Modern day Eritrea). These cases largely involved Italy's expanding interests in the region and Ottoman resistance at both the local and state level. One interesting case features Ottoman naval officers joining local pirates on conducting a raid on Italian shipping. BOA BEO 1753/131422. There are 35 documents dealing with this particular issue in the Ottoman archives. This imperial rivalry in the Red Sea and East Africa warrants its own study.




Figure 1.4: Number of documents concerning Mediterranean piracy, BOA and YE.

Chapter Breakdown

The introduction of my dissertation goes over legal definitions of piracy and geographic considerations, and briefly recaps early modern piracy, captivity, and the end of North African corsair societies. It then offers a statistical overview of nineteenth-century reports of piracy in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ottoman Prime Ministry archives. Lastly, it offers a summary of the chapters of the dissertation. The second chapter delves into theoretical aspects of the field of piracy. It looks at the relation between maritime raiding and economics, and then uses the concept of heterotopia to examine how pirate societies offer different understandings of race and gender from those on land.

The third chapter begins the chronological narrative that will carry through the rest of the dissertation. It looks at the 1820s and 30s together as a great period of Ottoman upheaval and civil war, beginning with the Greek War of Independence in 1821 and carrying forward with Mehmed Ali of Egypt's uprising against the Ottoman Empire which lasted until 1840. I use Crete as a case study, as it was an Ottoman island that became a major base for Greek revolutionaries that turned to piracy. They raided friend and foe alike to support themselves, becoming a major point of contention between rotating Greek revolutionary governments and European allies and eventually leading to the allied massacre of these pirate-revolutionaries. While Greece gained sovereignty by 1832, Crete instead became a territory of Egypt and its new struggle against the Ottoman Empire. Chapter four looks at the period of political reforms that followed this period of strife: the beginning of the *Tanzimat* reforms in the Ottoman Empire, the 1839 Edict of the Rose Garden, and the introduction of a constitution in Greece. This period of liberal reforms in the region correlated with an increased rate of piracy, matching that of the 1830s, which lasted until the end of the Crimean War in 1856.

Chapter five looks at a period of legislative and maritime-policing reform and economic stagnation beginning with the aftermath of the Crimean War. The war ended with the drafting of the Treaty of Paris and the Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law which legislated a ban on privateering among its signatories. This end on state-sanctioned maritime raiding led to a negligible reduction in cases of piracy in Greece and the Ottoman Empire. It was not until those economies took off in the 1870s that fewer individuals committed piracy and instead picked up the plow to participate in the cash-crop craze. The sixth chapter will discuss the phylloxera epidemic and resulting currant boom's growth of the Greek economy and its correlation with reports of piracy dropping by half.

Chapter seven concludes with how different states viewed piracy during the 1897 war. Classic cases of piracy had diminished by this period, and when viewed from both Greek and Ottoman sources, we see what the Ottomans were calling a pirate ship, the Greeks were viewing as a regular naval unit under orders to break a ceasefire to harass the Ottomans for a better position at the negotiating table. While the Ottomans had an unmitigated victory on land, their fleet had decayed over decades of neglect as funds had fled westward to pay the public debt. This was emblematic of the Ottoman ability to enforce order through a regular army coming to an end, as their Balkan foes returned to using the tactics of irregular warfare. I end the dissertation with a brief conclusion considering why an entire century of piratical activity in the Eastern Mediterranean fell from historical memory.

Chapter 2: Comparative Approaches to the Study of Piracy

As in every field, critical theoretical frameworks are useful in this case to explain the cause and impact of piracy and to indicate how the field contributes to the broader literature. This chapter offers a brief overview of major theoretical contributions to the field of piracy. As this body of work contains studies by scholars that cover every major world region, there will be no geographic limitation to my discussion.

I begin by discussing the scholarship on the economics of piracy. Several scholars have argued that piracy played an important role in connecting disparate communities to the broader global economy, just as several others have used macro-economic factors to explain what motivated individuals to commit violent crimes on the high seas. I then discuss how the concept of heterotopia is useful in explicating social dimensions of pirate life, including gender, sexuality, race, and class. The chapter ends with a discussion of how piracy has been used for the purpose of state legitimation, both by states interested in governing their own territories and by colonial powers attempting to extend their reach to faraway lands and seas.

Thus far, banditry has been the subject of more academic inquiry than piracy, yet both forms of outlawry are fundamentally similar. Throughout this chapter I draw upon studies of banditry, and particularly upon bandit-state relations, to utilize the wealth of knowledge that that field has provided in order to understand states' attempts to monopolize violence and by doing so to enhance their legitimacy.

The Economics of Piracy

In an honest service there is thin commons, low wages, and hard labour. In this, plenty and satiety, pleasure and ease, liberty and power; and who would not balance creditor on this side, when all the hazard that is run for it, at worst is only a sour look or two at choking? No, a merry life and a short one shall be my motto.¹

The above sentiment attributed to Bartholomew Roberts, the dreaded pirate Black Bart, evokes two lines of debate. On one hand, some argue that the life of liberty and ease was a large draw for seafarers to resort to piracy. This argument can be easily folded into the economic argument, where even these niceties are only obtainable from the hope of extraneous profits that piracy offers. Here, Roberts is running the calculations of cost and benefit, risk and reward. Rather than the lure of a libertarian lifestyle, economic considerations were the primary factor in generating piratical activity and maritime black-market trade. This section presents a general overview of the economics of piracy and smuggling. It then explores the application of these principles in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Mediterranean economy.

At a fundamental level, pirates are parasites. John Anderson looks at the cost of piracy and privateering to their victims, to trade, and to the wealth of the state. Whereas many scholars point out that piracy allows for access to alternative markets² or increased capitalist penetration into the periphery,³ Anderson contends that piracy is not economically neutral. Both pirates and

¹ Bartholomew Roberts, quoted in Charles Johnson, *A general history of the robberies and murders of the most notorious pirates* (London, 1724).

² David J. Starkey, "Pirates and markets," in C R Pennel, ed., *Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader*, (New York: NYU Press, 2001): 114.

³ Thomas W. Gallant, "Brigandage, Piracy, Capitalism, and State-Formation: Transnational Crime from a Historical World Systems Perspective," in Josiah McC Heyman, ed., *States and Illegal Practices*, (New York: Berg, 1999): 37.

their victims needed to invest in weaponry and protection. Additionally, piracy resulted in both an immediate reduction in tradable assets and long-term damage to production and trade networks. When maritime trade was conducted on a small scale, merchants would need to invest in arming themselves against pirates. However, as the scale of trade increased, seafarers could invest in military ships to protect a large merchant convoy, or ultimately deploy a navy to effectively patrol an entire area in order to ensure the safety of unarmed maritime traffic. The final stage, where an entire sea could be made safe from piracy, was nearly impossible to ensure. Since it was often difficult to distinguish pirates who blended into maritime communities from typical seafarers, naval patrols were ineffective in eliminating piracy. Anderson expresses the orthodox opinion that piracy likely existed wherever there were impoverished or economically vulnerable littoral communities that valued local autonomy over rule from some distant central authority, be they part of that state or not.⁴ He still sees some value in a naval solution to piracy, ending his article by proposing some solutions for piracy that combine international cooperation in developing technology for maritime surveillance and law enforcement with a call for economic development that improves the material conditions of maritime communities.

Economics is useful for understanding both the fiscal and the physical incentives that pushed people towards piracy. In *The Invisible Hook*, Peter T. Leeson proposes market forces to explain various aspects of piracy, from proto-democracy to its reputation for torture and brutality. In his chapter on the practice of pressing, Leeson argues that pirates using force to recruit crew-members was the exception rather than the norm.⁵ Mass claims of being press-

⁴ John L. Anderson, "Piracy and world history: An economic perspective on maritime predation," *Journal of World History* (1995): 175-199.

⁵ Peter T. Leeson, *The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009): 21.

ganged into a pirate crew were used primarily as a defense in court to avoid capital punishment.⁶ Volunteers for pirate crews could be relied upon, whereas a pressed member would require extra surveillance so that they would not desert or betray the crew to the authorities. The British Royal Navy, however, did not have such qualms about betrayal, and had an additional incentive to press crew-members: to disrupt pirate ecosystems.⁷ If a coastal community was suspected of aiding piracy, rather than investing in military action to attack an entire populace (which as Anderson pointed out, is ineffective at best), navies could steal away the seafaring population without concern for judging individuals for piracy.

Leeson's work varies from many of his colleagues by pointing out that pirates who chose to become seafarers were once themselves members of the merchant marine. He does not neglect to explain the factors that led them to go "on the account," i.e., to become pirates: abusive merchant marine captains, demobilization from war and prospects of lower wages in the legitimate workforce, and a chance to strike it lucky by looting a rich ship and retire. He looks back at the abuses of the merchant marine to, in part, explain brutal torture practices and egalitarian, democratic social structures on board pirate ships. He claims the former were in part committed against known abusive captains who avoided punishment from the state, while the latter was put in place to avoid replicating the conditions that gave rise to such abuses. The reputation that pirates built up for brutality was meant to mask that, in truth, pirates were cowards. They would much rather convince their victims that resistance is futile than risk expending resources fighting.

⁶ This compares to Dian Murray's similar claim that homosexuality was used similarly in courts to avoid capital punishment. Dian Murray, "The Practice of Homosexuality Among the Pirates of Late 18th and Early 19th Century China," in C R Pennel, ed., *Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader*, (New York: NYU Press, 2001): 244-252.

⁷ Leeson, *The Invisible Hook*, 155.

Piracy was not the only illicit trade that took place at sea. Alan Karras writes about the other black-market merchants – smugglers. Even more so than pirates, smugglers sought to avoid violence. Therefore, rather than acquire commodities through violent robbery, smugglers purchased their goods. Unlike lawful merchants, they were willing to transport and sell goods on their own terms to markets where those goods were banned or heavily taxed. Smuggling could not exist in a true free trade market where all goods are legal and there are no tariffs. The implementation of trade laws caused smuggling, as the demand that existed remains. Unlike piracy, the main victims of smuggling are abstract: hurt state revenues from avoided taxes and continued consumption of desired but dangerous contraband. Local populations would support smugglers, as they helped grow the economy and provide access to proscribed goods. Smugglers were more effective than pirates in helping the economy, because there was not the threat of government intervention and violent reprisal that the communities that supported piracy faced. States recognized the potential benefits of smuggling, and sometimes supported it. For example, Lord Farquhar of the East India Company proposed smuggling cheap labor from China to the British Caribbean, which was illegal because of a restriction on emigration from China that the Qing dynasty had enacted. Even when smuggling opposed state interests, such as tax collection, the penalty was usually a relatively small fine, as it was when Jeb Bush's wife was caught evading customs taxes. Karras ends with a discussion of free versus fair trade. He argues that smuggling is free trade without restriction. Proponents of "fair trade" often critique smuggling for violating laws and hurting revenues. Yet fair trade does not exist in reality, as most people ignore border regulations concerning goods and labor, and the government even expects this to

be the case.⁸ Market forces account for the sum of both legitimate and illegitimate trade. When the state passes a prohibition against a certain trade, that trade often continues, albeit illegally.

One key market force that drove people to piracy was oversupply of labor. David Starkey looks at the violent side of international trade disequilibria. He asks to what extent market forces created the conditions in which piracy flourished by looking at types of Early Modern Atlantic predation, the market forces that were associated with it, and by placing these in a wider context of market inefficiency during the age of sail. After examining various factors relating to the influence of supply and demand on the genesis of piracy, Starkey claims that the most important factor in causing piracy was excess seafaring labor, which lasted for ten to twenty years after demobilization following the end of a major war. This development led to unemployment and underemployment among the naval population, thus creating a pool of laborers who could be recruited to join pirate crews. After that time period, the excess seafaring population which had turned to piracy would find other employment opportunities on land, or otherwise die off from or quit piracy. Once this “pirate bubble” burst, the “short wave” of piracy ended and conditions returned to equilibrium. Similar explanations could also be used to account for the “long waves” of piracy among the Caribbean buccaneers and Mediterranean corsairs. In the Barbary case, for example, even though the land was fertile, the sea was the source of captured raw materials and slave labor.⁹ Starkey turns a blind eye to the ransom markets which seem to have been the main motivation for taking captives. Slave labor did not pose significant advantages over peasant

⁸ Alan L. Karras, *Smuggling: Contraband and Corruption in World History* (Plymouth, United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010), 32, 45, 51, 133-5.

⁹ Starkey, "Pirates and Markets," 108, 118-120.

labor. Slavery was something that was forced upon captives while awaiting payment, not the intended end in itself.

The collapse of longstanding powers often created an opportunity of new economic systems to emerge. Gonçal López Nadal looks at the Mediterranean *corso* as a violent form of seafaring mercantilism that arose in a crisis economy. At the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, the Ottoman Navy was destroyed in a pyrrhic victory for Christendom. This brought about the economic marginalization of North Africa that made it more appealing to conduct *corso* over legitimate trade. So, instead of viewing the seafaring bandit population as enemies of mankind, state authorities chose to coopt privateers and corsairs. They created rules about who could be attacked, what goods could be captured and distributed, what percentage of the loot should be taxed by the state, and who should be witnesses to the adherence of these rules. While such regulations defined the main distinction between pirates and corsairs, corsair captains would sometimes avoid taxation regulations by selling their booty at other ports.¹⁰

This behavior, selling goods in peripheral markets, increased the spread of capitalist penetration outside of the economic core. Thomas W. Gallant argues that military entrepreneurs were “both products of and contributors to the advancement and consolidation of capitalism and modern states.”¹¹ He proposes that all men of violence were able to cross the boundaries between legality and illegality, performing the same function with different labels: i.e. tax-collecting vs robbery. Many scholars have adopted this framework by looking at piracy as an occupation that men, and occasionally women, drifted in and out of, as opposed to being a lifelong career, or

¹⁰ Gonçal López Nadal, "Corsairing as a Commercial System: The Edges of Legitimate Trade," in C R Pennel, ed., *Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader*, (New York: NYU Press, 2001): 125, 128, 131-32.

¹¹ Gallant, "Brigandage, Piracy, Capitalism, and State-Formation," 50-51.

worse yet, a form of identity. The scholarship that still refers to pirates as a social group tends to be engaged with romanticized ideas of pirate utopias and proto-democracies.¹² These discourses were inspired by the debate surrounding the social banditry model developed by Eric Hobsbawm, first in a chapter in his book *Primitive Rebels* and then more fully in his seminal study, *Bandits*.¹³ Gallant argues that rather than employing Hobsbawm's discreet categories for social banditry, it would be more productive to use a world systems framework of core, periphery, and semi-periphery, and terms such as labor exploitation, surplus extraction, and capital accumulation. This allows scholars to not only examine pirates in their own right, or only focus on the harm that they inflicted on their victims, but also offers evidence that piracy and banditry could improve economic situations in the countryside by increasing monetization, encouraging marketization, and providing a venue for upward mobility. They also aided in the formation of centralized states by either offering their military services, or by providing a target for states which sought to exert their claim to a monopoly on legitimate violence.¹⁴ It was common for states to use military entrepreneurs in both ways. In the cases of the Spanish coast guard, the later incarnation of Ottoman janissaries (Turkish: *yeniçeri*), and the Greek *klefts*, non-state military entrepreneurs were hired to create order on the frontier. Once the state was able to mobilize a regular army, it turned its new forces on the old irregulars to "neutralize" its old, autocephalous, decentralized forces.

¹² See, Peter Lamborn Wilson, *Pirate Utopias: Moorish Corsairs & European Renegadoes*. (Autonomedia, 2003); and, Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker. *The many-headed hydra: Sailors, slaves, commoners, and the hidden history of the revolutionary Atlantic* (Beacon Press, 2000).

¹³ Eric Hobsbawm, *Primitive rebels: Studies in archaic forms of social movement in the 19th and 20th centuries* (Manchester University Press, 1971); Eric Hobsbawm, *Bandits* (Hachette UK, 2010).

¹⁴ Gallant, "Brigandage, Piracy, Capitalism, and State-Formation," 28, 50-51.

The island of Malta produced one of the most feared bands of corsairs of the early modern period – the Knights of St. John. Ayşe Devrim Atauz offers a *longue durée* study of Malta and its role throughout history in Mediterranean commerce, piracy, and warfare. The period when the island was controlled by the Knights of St. John stands out, as it was an extra-imperial corsair-state. While not subject to any other state, Malta was dependent on external sources of food, fuel, and other necessary commodities. Thus, the Knights of St. John offered their corsairing services to various European powers in exchange for much needed political, financial, and material support. In return, Malta served as a sort of naval school for Europeans to get experience roaming the high seas before joining their respective navies. Thus, the main difference between Maltese and North African corsairs, besides on whom they preyed and to whom they prayed, was that the Barbary corsairs provided their services to the Ottoman state, albeit inconsistently, while the knights provided their services to Christian states. Surprisingly, throughout their entire stay on Malta, the knights had only an average of five and a maximum of six galleys. This figure is surprisingly low for an island that wrecked so much havoc on Ottoman, Ragusan, and Venetian shipping. Atauz finds that Malta was actually of little historical importance in terms of the broader Mediterranean economy, as the presence of the Knights of St. John on the island was inconsequential to the broader regional economy and exaggerated the importance of the island.¹⁵ It was only during their tenure that the island's population increased, with fortification building projects and general support of the pirate industry providing employment for the remainder of the Maltese population, while raiding brought in both consumable and tradable goods.

¹⁵ Ayşe Devrim Atauz, "Trade, Piracy, and Naval Warfare in the Central Mediterranean: The Maritime History and Archaeology of Malta," (PhD Thesis, Texas A & M University, 2004), 261-9.

Malta is a perfect example of piracy creating an economic boom. Even though the tenure of the Knights of St. John on the island would constitute what Starkey would call a “long wave” of piracy, the Maltese economy was unsustainable without granted European and stolen Mediterranean resources. When the Knights of St. John’s properties in France were seized in 1798, the local population happily handed the knights over to Napoleon. Two years later, the British seized Malta, and the island became the empire’s major base of operations in the Mediterranean, a role that became even more important after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869.¹⁶ Malta then operated as a base mid-way between Britain and India, with its importance ebbing and flowing as other Mediterranean islands passed in and out of British imperial control.

Rather than seeing Malta as a locale where corsairs established trade networks that then stimulated integration into the world economy and capitalist growth, as Gallant would suggest, instead we see *corso* impairing meaningful growth. When the Maltese corsairs were no more, the ransom networks built up during the early modern period gave way to more profitable British imperial trade networks as the island became a notable transit hub. This is not to say that piracy did not bring Malta wealth. It most certainly did. But the entire industry of Malta was focused around corsairing. As *corso* became no longer profitable or sustainable, the island’s economy stagnated until it became deeply integrated into the capitalist world economy under Britain. This is akin to the phenomenon of Dutch disease, which at its core describes the influx of a resource proving temporarily profitable as labor shifts away from the more sustainable manufacturing or agricultural sectors.¹⁷ Perhaps Malta would have been more sustainable if it had managed to

¹⁶ Atauz, “Trade, Piracy, and Naval Warfare in the Central Mediterranean,” 269, 272.

¹⁷ See, Steven Oliver, Ryan Jablonski, Justin V. Hastings; “The Tortuga Disease: The Perverse Effects of Illicit Foreign Capital.” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 61, Issue 2, no. 1 (June 2017): 312–327.

integrate into non-violent regional trade routes, rather than be reliant on a volatile industry of violence and foreign imports.

Piracy occurred in the context of both the regional and global economic trade which they plundered. Daniel Panzac describes both international and domestic Ottoman trade routes during the eighteenth century, arguing that they were complementary. He shows that the Ottomans were integrated as deeply into South Asian maritime trade as they were into Western Mediterranean commerce. The domestic trade networks of the Ottoman Empire were largely restricted to the three seas the empire included—the Black, Red, and White (Mediterranean) seas. Panzac identifies four major characteristics of Ottoman maritime trade in the eighteenth century. First, Ottoman domestic trade was roughly double that of international commerce. Major regional industries, such as silk and textile production in Syria for example, were important primarily for satisfying internal, domestic demand. The second major characteristic Panzac reveals is the dominant position held by Muslim charterers in inter-Ottoman trade. Muslim merchants would rent or lease large numbers of European ships for trade throughout the Ottoman Mediterranean.¹⁸ Third, Panzac points to the growing importance of non-Muslims in Ottoman international trade during the eighteenth century. Armenians nearly monopolized the role of banker and money exchanger, and in 1750 controlled the mints in İstanbul. Greeks meanwhile were able to enter maritime trade markets at the expense of European merchants, as Gelina Harlaftis, who goes into greater detail than him, shows.¹⁹ Panzac attributes the ascendancy of non-Muslims in European

¹⁸ Daniel Panzac, "International and Domestic Maritime Trade in the Ottoman Empire during the 18th Century," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (1992): 189-190, 202-3.

¹⁹ Gelina Harlaftis, "The 'Eastern Invasion': Greeks in Mediterranean Trade and Shipping in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries," in Colin Heywood and Mohamed-Salah Omri Maria Fusaro, eds., *Trade and Cultural Exchange in the Early Modern Mediterranean: Braudel's Maritime Legacy* (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010), 223-252.

trade to their roles as brokers in the Levantine trade. The final characteristic Panzac points out is the increasing penetration of European mercantilism into the empire. Simply put, the Ottoman economy was becoming increasingly integrated into the world economy, which was driven by greater demand, and thus higher prices, for cotton for the booming European textile industry, and increasing New World competition for the traditional Levantine commodities like sugar and coffee. Economic instability led the Sublime Porte to allow the circulation of stable foreign currencies within the empire. The Ottoman long eighteenth century ended in the 1820s and 1830s with the political fragmentation caused by the Greek Revolution, Mehmed Ali's uprising in Egypt, and the colonization of Algiers, all of which led to the reformation of maritime trade relations and a weakening Ottoman role in the world economy.

As trade balances changed, so too did the practices of pirates and their prey. Gelina Harlaftis studied Greek trade in order to understand eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Mediterranean commercial networks. She attributes the rise of Greek shipping to declining French trade in the Levant as it became embroiled in various wars. Thus, we see that military conflicts may reduce piracy by offering employment to military entrepreneurs, but they also employ seafaring merchants and create hostile conditions for maritime trade. In the tumultuous decades surrounding the French Revolution, the only viable strategy for trade was to form large caravans escorted by naval vessels to ward off attackers.²⁰ Ottoman Greek merchant ships also traveled in heavily armed caravans and did so well into the nineteenth century.²¹ As the

²⁰ Harlaftis, "The Eastern Invasion," 239. See also: Katerina Galani, "The Napoleonic Wars and the Disruption of Mediterranean Shipping and Trade: British, Greek and American Merchants in Livorno," *The Historical Review/La Revue Historique*, 7 (2011): 179-198; Gelina Harlaftis and Sophia Laiou, "Ottoman State Policy in Mediterranean Trade and Shipping, c. 1780–C.1820: The Rise of the Greek Owned Ottoman Merchant Fleet," in Mark Mazower, ed., *Networks of Power in Modern Greece: Essays in Honor of John Campbell* (New York, 2008): 1-44.

²¹ Harlaftis, "The Eastern Invasion," 244.

Ottomans had conflicts with France and Russia during this time, they were subject to the predations of pirates and privateers given letters of marque by those two states.

Harlaftis identifies two dominant currents of international trade and four major zones of regional trade. The two main long-haul trades conveyed exports from the Levant, including grain, olive oil, cotton, wool, tobacco, rice, coffee, flax, silk, dried fruits, carpets, among others, and imports from the Atlantic world including grain, dyeing substances, hides, cotton, coffee, cocoa, sugar, vanilla, wine, and quinine. These are largely, but not entirely, raw materials destined for European markets. The major actors in Mediterranean long-haul trade were Spain, Ottoman Greeks, Venice, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The fleets Harlaftis found most important in the Levant trade were the Ottoman and the Ragusan. Livorno also was a major competitor for the Levant trade, not by deploying a fleet of its own, but by lowering tariffs to attract trade.²²

As the nineteenth century progressed, Habsburg Austria acquired an important role in Levantine trade. Alison Frank looks at the Austrian policy of morally opposing yet simultaneously supporting the African slave trade as it passed through the Levant. Whereas the Great Powers suggested that commercial interests and emergent ideologies of civilization and freedom were mutually reinforcing, the captains of the Trieste-based Austrian Lloyd shipping company found that they were impossible to align. Lloyd had established two trade routes from Alexandria to İstanbul by steamship that were so profitable that they accounted for 64% of the company's total income. Even though Austria was committed to abolition, slave-smugglers

²² See, Harlaftis, "The Eastern Invasion," 233-4, 247; and Despina Vlami, "Commerce and Identity in the Greek Communities: Livorno in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," *Diogenes* 45.177 (1997): 73-93. See also, Despina Vlami, *Trading with the Ottomans: The Levant Company in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015).

managed to hide their human cargo on these popular and efficient steamships, and so it was difficult for Austria to ban the trade. A large part of the problem came from the diversity of both the Ottoman subjects and their slave populations. As opposed to the Americas, where free men and slaves were distinguished primarily by skin color, the Ottomans had slaves and subjects of all colors. Additionally, Ottoman slaves could rise into positions of power, all the way up to the rank of grand vizier, shattering the western concept of enslavement guaranteeing a low, abused status. Frank's work shows that adopting a Mediterranean perspective reveals that a vibrant, if underground, slave trade was active into the 1870s and likely beyond, decades after the supposed abolition of the slave trade both internationally and domestically within Austria, revising the Atlantic-centric historiography on the topic.²³

The absence of slaves as commodities poses an interesting question in the other authors' works on the Mediterranean. While studies of corsairs and pirates are quick to point out the human trafficking aspect of their activities, those focusing on the supposedly legitimate trade in the Mediterranean are largely silent on the subject. It seems that there is still much to be done on bringing together studies of licit and illicit maritime trade networks. The traditional economic principles of supply and demand alongside the updated core-periphery model offered by world systems theory provide a framework to evaluate total trade, regardless of legality. Once we fully understand the mercantile ecosystem, then the effects of laws on seafarers and men of violence becomes clearer. Defining the line between legal and illegal trade, therefore, becomes an issue more about sovereignty, modernity, and hegemony than morality.

²³ Alison Frank, "The Children of the Desert and the Laws of the Sea: Austria, Great Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and the Mediterranean Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 117, No. 2, (April 2012): 412-16, 433.

Piracy and Heterotopia

By definition piracy is an illicit activity. Pirates' nests and ships thus constitute an alternative environment, removed from the various hegemonic forces emanating from the state and outside of normative social forces. As with other outlaws and sailors, pirates behave in ways that deviate from society's norms. Peter Lamborn Wilson describes society on board pirate ships as part of an anarchic "Temporary Autonomous Zone," akin to the academic label for a place of difference: heterotopia.²⁴ Dian Murray, Kenneth Kinkor, Catherine Wendy Bracewell, Judith Tucker, Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker all offer arguments that place pirates somewhere between landed society and seaborne anarchy. Murray adopts an analytical framework based on sexuality; Kinkor, race; Bracewell and Tucker, gender; and Rediker and Linebaugh, class struggle. The common element that connects all these different aspects of pirate is best captured by Foucault's concept of heterotopia. As pirates are defined by state-centered hegemonic forces as being outside the order of things, the society in which pirates live is inherently then a place of otherness, be that in regards to sexuality, race, gender, or class.

Pirate ships offered spaces for divergent sexualities. Dian Murray writes about gender and sex among the pirates of early nineteenth-century China. In her article, she argues that early nineteenth-century Chinese pirate homosexual sex could be triggered by a number of factors: 1) the needs of people who were homosexual or bisexual by nature, or heterosexual, desiring sex, and unable to attain hetero sex; 2) violent rape; 3) the need of pirate confederation leaders to create solidarity and patron-client relations through a sexually intimate hierarchy; 4) the desire of

²⁴ Wilson's 1991 book informs his understanding of North African society. See, Wilson, *Pirate Utopias*, 200; and Peter Lamborn Wilson, "TAZ: The Temporary Autonomous Zone," (*New York: Autonomedia*, 1991).

apprehended pirates to avoid capital punishment and be tried for the less severe crime of homosexuality.²⁵ Murray's research connects to Richard Burg's work on sodomy among seventeenth-century Caribbean pirates. Burg argues that Caribbean pirate homosexuality was largely caused by the culture of women not being brought on board ships, be they mercantile, naval, or piratical. Thus, much like prison inmates, the only option for non-solitary sex was homosexuality. Chinese maritime culture differed by allowing women on board ships as either family or captives. Cultural attitudes towards women dictated, theoretically, that women could only have intercourse with their husbands, and that any extramarital intercourse would be punished by the execution of both parties. Captives could be coerced into matrimony, but once married, the wife could expect no sexual advances from the rest of the crew. Some women were capable of becoming captain of a junk, and from 1807-1810 there was the pirate confederation headed by Cheng I Sao, widow of the confederation's founder Cheng I. With women spread throughout all ranks of the pirate fleet, the question of homosexual preference no longer becomes simply about limited access to women as in the Caribbean. Many pirates were young and in the prime of their life and they held out the hope of finding a suitable wife. Homosexuality offered a low-repercussion option to satisfy sexual needs while not entering a lifelong commitment. Homosexual relations between captain and crew also seemed to serve as a sort of initiation into the hierarchy on board, with the captain on top both figuratively and literally. It is unclear to what degree these relations were consensual or forced. Pirate captains may have tended towards pedophilia, yet at the same time they had multiple wives, suggesting a fluidity in sexual practices, enabled by their superior rank. For a pirate unfortunate enough to be apprehended by

²⁵ Murray, "Homosexuality Among the Pirates of Late 18th and Early 19th Century China," 248.

Qing authorities, a common legal defense to avoid capital punishment, instead receiving only up to fifty lashings, was to claim that they were abducted, raped, and pressed into service.²⁶ The success of this legal strategy suggests that the number of homosexual pirate incidents we have on record are inflated, yet at the same time based on a reality that a Qing court would have found convincing.

Pirate ships offered a space where racial relations differed from those on the American mainland. Kenneth J. Kinkor writes about race relations among Atlantic pirates. He uses a Hobsbawmian framework of social banditry to explain how pirates were a motley crew of disempowered groups united in revolt against a social oppressor. While problems exist with confirming the supposed virtuous causes of social bandits, Kinkor's explanation of unity in the face of a common social oppressor makes sense, so long as we understand that the oppressor is the state. Inherent to all the various Atlantic states in early modern times was the institutional persecution of criminals and people of color. Thus, black men who already found themselves out of favor with the state had an incentive to join a band of pirates. Fictional pirate tales tend to ignore blacks, or to cast them either as cannon fodder or savages. The 1984 discovery of the shipwrecked *Whydah Galley* off Cape Cod offers archaeological evidence suggesting that European pirates should not be viewed as individual criminals who happened to live together, but as a socially deviant subculture engaging in maritime revolt. Kinkor argues that in reality, the booty that pirate crews divvied up was based on ability, not skin color, religion, or nationalism. During the 1715-1726 golden age of Atlantic piracy, blacks made up roughly twenty-five to

²⁶ Murray, "Homosexuality Among the Pirates of Late 18th and Early 19th Century China," 244-8. Lauren Benton shows us that such alibis in case of capture were common among pirates who were navigating multiple imperial legal spaces. See chapter 3, Lauren A. Benton, "Sovereignty at Sea: Jurisdiction, Piracy, and the Origins of Ocean Regionalism," in *A search for sovereignty: law and geography in European empires, 1400-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 104-161.

thirty percent of pirate crews. There were also several notable black captains presiding over white crew members. Kinkor's attempt to paint an egalitarian and tolerant pirate society is overly idealistic. Despite slaves and pirates having a common enemy, there was not a consistent policy as to how to deal with captured slaves. Sometimes they were attacked, left behind, freed, or offered or forced to join the pirate crew. Kinkor suggests that religion was not a significant obstacle for pirate crews to overcome. In the Mediterranean, however, religion was the main dividing line that separated enemy from ally among both Barbary and Maltese corsairs. For British and French privateers, that line would be a national one aimed primarily against the Spanish. When captured and tried, some black pirates were "spared" capital punishment, instead being labeled as slaves, incapable of possessing any agency of their own, and were thus sold into servitude. Just as in China, where homosexuality was turned to as a legal defense for a lesser sentence, so too could race be used as a legal defense. Most captured black pirates, however, were tried on the same footing as whites, earning the same punishment: death.²⁷

Even if they were not aboard the ships, women played key roles in piratical societies. Catherine Wendy Bracewell argues that Uskok women were seen as symbols, as mediators between Uskoks and the outside world, and as members of the Uskok community. Uskoks were a group of Christian naval marauders that inhabited the city of Senj and plundered the coasts of Dalmatia during the sixteenth century. Venetian sources either cast the Uskok women as immoral criminals or as crusaders desperately defending Christendom from the Ottoman-Muslim threat. The former claimed Uskok marriage practices were immoral, as women from well-to-do

²⁷ Kenneth J. Kinkor, "Black men under the black flag." in C R Pennel, ed., *Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader*, (New York: NYU Press, 2001): 196-204.

families were abducted by Uskok raiders to coerce their family into a marriage alliance.²⁸ When their husbands died, women would immediately remarry, probably to ensure that they obtained economic support. Venetian naysayers also claimed that Uskok women bore arms, viewed themselves as part of a violent honor society, and even resorted to witchcraft to conjure up storms to aid their husbands on raids. Contrasting with these accounts, Giovanni of Fermo, a local merchant, casted the Uskoks as driven by “poverty, want, and the short-sighted self-interests of Venice.” He claimed that much like the Knights of St. John at Malta, Uskok raiders distinguished between illicit Christian goods and licit booty from Muslims and their business associates.²⁹ When speaking of Uskok women in particular, he held them up as a beacon of morality who should be looked up to by Italian women.

While many of the details about Uskok society were distorted by Venetian writers looking to extol or slander the Dalmatian raiders, they all agree that Uskok women played an important role in both Uskok and broader society. One Venetian source abandoned all hope of luring a man who had married into an Uskok family out of a life of crime, noting that the bonds of Uskok marriage were stronger than the freedom granted by a state pardon. Uskok women would invest heavily in their husbands’ raiding activities, even joining syndicates to provide supplies and share in the rewards. When their husbands were captured, they would either attempt to free them through bribes, or buy the rights to Ottoman prisoners in order to exchange them for their husbands. Because Uskok women were not guilty of any crime except by association, they

²⁸ Catherine Wendy Bracewell, "Women among the Uskoks of Senj: Literary Images and Realities," in C R Pennel, ed., *Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader* (New York: NYU Press, 2001): 323. While these coerced kinship ties led to local support, this is hardly a case of Hobsbawmian social banditry.

²⁹ Bracewell, "Women among the Uskoks," 324-5.

could circulate in Venetian and Ottoman society to act as intermediaries, to collect ransom, and to gather information.³⁰

The relation between women and piracy extended into the Mediterranean beyond Uskok society. Judith Tucker shows that, on one hand, the gendered masculine violence of pirates made the sea an existentially unsafe space for women. Violent competition between men would place victors on the masculine end of the patriarchal hierarchy and feminize the subordinated groups.³¹ On the other hand, women participated in piracy “not only as victims, but as resisters, mitigators, and collaborators.”³² She joins Gillian Weiss in showing how gendered images of piracy were used by European powers to depict a violent, backwards orient as an area which required European intervention.³³ This shows how understanding gendered aspects of piracy is important not simply for its own sake, but it helps to show how piracy fit with other developments such as nationalization, imperialism, and colonialism.

Many people were attracted to the ideas of living with the social freedoms and divergences that piratical societies offered. In *Pirate Utopias*, Peter Lamborn Wilson draws primarily upon secondary sources to write a microhistory of corsair-renegade society in Salé. Wilson argues that it was the greater freedoms offered by North African Islamic society, or at least the European understanding of it, rather than the promise of plunder that drew Europeans into the Islamic fold. The North African corsair-republics were more open societies than the ones presided over by European absolutist monarchies. Islamdom was also more sexually liberated

³⁰ Bracewell, “Women among the Uskoks,” 329-31.

³¹ See, Tucker, Judith E. Tucker, “She Would Rather Perish Piracy and Gendered Violence in the Mediterranean,” *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 10.3 (2014): 33-4.

³² Tucker, “She Would Rather Perish,” 8.

³³ See chapters 7 and 8 in Gillian Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs: France and slavery in the early modern Mediterranean* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

than Christendom; while sharia outlawed homosexuality, both it and pederasty were socially idealized.³⁴ On this point, Wilson attacks Burg, criticizing him for applying nineteenth- and twentieth-century moralities to sixteenth-century societies in his simultaneous defense of adult homosexuality as acceptable and admonishment of pedophilia as a disorder. To Wilson, these were some of the reasons that Europeans would “turn Turk” and undergo social resistance.

Wilson also employs Eric Hobsbawm’s model of social banditry with one significant alteration. Hobsbawm argues that pirates cannot be social bandits because they only seek self-aggrandizement and are not attached to society at large. Wilson contends that groups of pirates formed their own social order and even established their own local governments,³⁵ which were anarchistic in granting maximum personal freedoms and communistic in their relative economic egalitarianism.³⁶ This seems problematic, as hierarchy still existed on pirate or corsair ships. Perhaps it was not as stratified as in land-based society simply because it dealt with smaller numbers of people, most of whom were armed and critical to the functioning of the ship and its mission. Nevertheless, to picture it as an egalitarian utopia seems a fantasy. To contend with Hobsbawm, even outside of the context of ship culture, pirates interacted with land-based society frequently. Whereas bandits could live off of the land for a time, pirates needed to frequently put into a friendly port to get supplies.

For further support of the argument regarding pirate social resistance, Wilson turns to Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh’s portrayal of the seventeenth-century maritime world as a precursor to the Industrial Age. Ships were something akin to floating factories, maritime

³⁴ Wilson, *Pirate Utopias*, 17, 30, 184.

³⁵ Such as ship’s article, an onboard set of laws.

³⁶ Wilson, *Pirate Utopias*, 145-6.

workers labored in similar conditions to the proletariat: powerless, underpaid, poor health conditions, and exploited by wealthy merchants, ship owners, and governments. The last framework of social resistance that Wilson draws upon is linguistic; the creation of the *Lingua Franca*, a pidgin of the various Mediterranean languages spoken on-deck by the crews consisting of a hodge-podge of European renegades and Muslim-born corsairs. This distinct language suggests the existence of a separate, if crude, corsair culture.³⁷ To Wilson, corsair republics were temporary autonomous zones which constituted their own distinct egalitarian societies, free from the grasp of land-based authorities.

Pirate ships and societies were often the loci of class struggle. Rediker and Linebaugh write a history of the early modern trans-Atlantic working class through the metaphor of the Hydra of Lerna. Each of the heads was one of the divisions of labor constituting a menacing whole which Atlantic rulers seeking to prop up a new capitalist order attempted to slay. At times the proletariat appeared docile and slavish “hewers of wood and drawers of water” or as rebellious and self-active – the many-headed hydra.³⁸ Rediker and Linebaugh identify four phases of class struggle in the revolutionary Atlantic. The first took place in the commons from 1600-1640 when English capitalism spread and expropriated workers throughout the British Empire and its colonies. The second phase occurred on the plantations from 1640-1680, when failed uprisings against English capitalism occurred in both the metropole and the colonies, securing the plantation as a foundation of the new economic order. The next phase took place 1680-1760, surrounding the golden age of Atlantic piracy, on board sailing ships which had features of both the factory and the prison. During this period, market-oriented maritime states or

³⁷ Wilson, *Pirate Utopias*, 21-22. 49.

³⁸ Rediker and Linebaugh, *The many-headed hydra*, 328-9.

hydrarchies consolidated and stabilized Atlantic capitalism and the slave trade. Rediker and Linebaugh posit that pirate communities endangered the slave trade with their alternative way of life: multiracial, democratic, and autonomous; thus, they were exterminated. This period was followed by a wave of multiethnic worker and slave uprisings in the Americas. From 1760-1835 revolts continued until serious reforms were implemented in the United States, Haiti, France, Ireland, and England, eventually leading to the abolition of impressment and plantation slavery. In the American case, “the Founding Fathers used race, nation, and citizenship to discipline, divide, and exclude the very sailors and slaves who had initiated and propelled the revolutionary movement.”³⁹ The trans-Atlantic proletariat was not unified by class, nation, or race, and were ripe for economic and social exploitation.⁴⁰

Piracy and State Legitimation

Positioning piracy outside the law allowed states to set the boundaries regarding what was considered legitimate and illegitimate activity. Robbing merchant ships at sea was illegal. Unless, of course, said seizure was permitted by a letter of marque, part of a declared wartime blockade or a blockade during times of peace, or if the seized ship was suspected of transporting illicit goods.⁴¹ By defining what and when certain actions were deemed legitimate, states gained a powerful tool to harness the benefits of violence while decrying its use by others. They could

³⁹ Rediker and Linebaugh, *The many-headed hydra*, 328.

⁴⁰ Rediker and Linebaugh, *The many-headed hydra*, xii, 332.

⁴¹ For a discussion on the origins of legal blockades outside times of war, see Will Smiley, “War without War: The Battle of Navarino, the Ottoman Empire, and the Pacific Blockade,” *Journal of the History of International Law* 18 (2016): 42-69.

use the presence of violence in a region as reason to intervene, inserting themselves into new regions promising pacification. This section examines states' relations with outlaws on both land and sea as part of their effort to secure a monopoly on violence and enhance their legitimacy.

The monopolization of force constitutes one of the key pillars of modern state-building.⁴² Pirates and brigands had a close relationship to the states in which they thrived. Often, they are depicted as a threat by the state so that the people would accept the state's claim to be their protector. States often spread fear of brigands, whether the threat was real or not, in order to gain more power over the people by promising protection. Then as now, there was undoubtedly some cause for fear, but whether or not the threat was as great as the state claims is another story. In revolutionary Greece, both before the rebellion and for generations after, bandits were tools of the state. Fearful of powerful bandit gangs causing disruptions, the Ottoman Empire would co-opt bandit and pirate captains and make them state officials. Thus, the state could retain its monopoly on violence by merely endorsing other sources of it. The Greek War of Independence was largely carried out by these bandit gangs, and their presence continued in the new state, though they were wiped out over time as the state saw the need for more emphasis on a regular rather than an irregular military.

In the case of modern Egypt, Nathan Brown argues that both the local dynastic and British colonial rules of Egypt used bandits to solidify state rule, not by employing them as the Ottomans had done, but by using their existence to create a fear which legitimized their authority to utilize increased force. This tactic was initially used by the dynastic Egyptian rulers, but when

⁴² For an account on how state rulers went from encouraging non-state violence to eliminating it, see, Janice E. Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton University Press, 1996).

they proved unsuccessful in curbing banditry in a humane manner, the British used the same rationale to assert the reasons why they should govern Egypt. Local rulers had established violent commissions on banditry that would impose capital punishment with little evidence. The British, viewing themselves as clearly superior to those they colonized, believed that they could succeed with western law procedures; that they could efficiently root out bandits while maintaining a cumbersome legal process. The British failed in the same manner as the locals did, though they did not admit to their own failure, as it would have weakened their claim to legitimacy.

Eventually the British found that they suffered from the same difficulties as had the Egyptian leadership in the 1880s. The Egyptian leadership had invented banditry as part of the construction of an intrusive state that would be autonomous from British control. The British used banditry and the harsh Egyptian response to claim that their intervention was necessary to provide for tranquility and justice; yet it gradually appeared impossible for the British to impose their idea of order at the same time that they were enforcing their idea of justice.⁴³

Brown shows that in Egypt an essential aspect of control was the claim to a monopoly of violence, which meant eliminating the competition represented by the bandits who terrorized the countryside. Brown opposes Hobsbawm's social bandit model, arguing that the *fellahin* (peasants) were often the victims of bandit raids. The bandits cared not about whom they robbed. The rich had more to steal, but if such a target was not available, the bandits had no qualms about attacking peasants.

⁴³ Nathan Brown, "Brigands and State Building: The Invention of Banditry in Modern Egypt," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32 (April 1990): 279.

Scholars of the Ottoman Balkans have been on the forefront of researching the ways which states have dealt with banditry in their domains, either by confrontation or co-option. John Koliopoulos and Karen Barkey offer what has become the standard account of bandit-state relations in the Greek and Ottoman fields.⁴⁴ Gerassimos Karabelias has attempted to add piracy to Koliopoulos' narrative but did so only at a cursory level more by implication than by depth of evidence.⁴⁵ While Koliopoulos provides an excellent periodization of Greek banditry, ultimately his book argues that a culture of glorifying bandits as social heroes slowed the Greek march to modernity. Since the publication of *Brigands with a Cause*, post-modern scholars have argued for multiple modernities, breaking from a (western) Euro-centric grand historical narrative. Karabelias, Koliopoulos, and Batalas all write similarly about the relationship between bandits and the emerging modern Greek state in the nineteenth century. They trace the activities of military entrepreneurs from Ottoman rule prior to the Greek Revolution to the late nineteenth century, when the Greeks disbanded the irregular army and placed more emphasis on their regular army in preparation for war with the other emerging Balkan states.⁴⁶ In Ottoman times before the rebellion, bandit gangs would essentially become the leaders of their territory, able to extract levies from the population and instill fear in them so that they would remain subservient. When they did this without being the legitimate leader of the area, they were known as *klefts*,

⁴⁴ John S. Koliopoulos, *Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, 1821-1912*. (Clarendon Press, 1987); Karen Barkey. *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*. (Cornell University Press, 1994).

⁴⁵ Gerassimos Karabelias, 2008. "From national heroes to national villains: bandits, pirates and the formation of modern Greece," in Stephanie Cronin, ed., *Subalterns and social protest: history from below in the Middle East and North Africa*. Vol. 7 (Routledge, 2008).

⁴⁶ See, Achilles Batalas, "Send a thief to catch a thief: state building and the employment of irregular military formations in mid-nineteenth-century Greece," *Irregular Armed Forces and their Role in Politics and State Formation* (2003): 149-177; Karabelias, "Bandits, pirates and the formation of modern Greece"; John S. Koliopoulos, "Brigandage and irredentism in nineteenth-century Greece," *European History Quarterly* 19.2 (1989): 193-228.

and if the sultan viewed them as difficult enough to crush, he would merely give them his blessing and place them in charge of the area as protectors known as *armatoloi*. To the peasants, there was no difference between the two; it was merely a name change. It was not a difference of cops and robbers, but of robbers and state-approved robbers. A man could be an *armatolos* one day and a *kleft* the next. During the Greek Revolution, the *armatoloi* saw an opportunity to expand their power, and joined the struggle against their Ottoman overlords. They did not do it for freedom or liberty or to create a Greek state, but rather for their own personal gain. As they bore the brunt of the fighting during the revolution, the new Greek state had to make some arrangement with them in order to keep them in check, which they did by making them part of an irregular army. The Greek state arose in part due to direct bandit activities. For the Greeks, the bandits were the heroes of the revolution, and only afterward did they begin to view them as a scourge to the nation. Koliopoulos, Karabelias, and Batalas look at the myth of social banditry put forward by Hobsbawm, and again discredit it, saying that even in Greece where bandit captains such as Theodoros Kolokotronis helped fight for the liberation of a people, they did not do it for the peasantry, but for themselves.

The Greeks eventually decided that either the bandits would directly help them in their irredentist aims by terrorizing neighboring countries or they would be exterminated. Effectively, Greece had decided upon two militaries: an irregular one for state expansion, and a regular one for policing matters within the state. “Greek Foreign Minister Alexandros Rangavis expressed the view in 1856 that the Greek army had never been, nor was meant to be, anything but an internal peace-keeping force, as Greece’s national boundaries and independence were guaranteed

by the Protecting powers.”⁴⁷ In the middle of the century, they turned upon the bandit gangs which during the revolution had been the saviors of the nation. Any brigand who was not part of the regular or irregular army was hunted down, and within two years more than one thousand brigands were either killed or arrested.⁴⁸ Bandits play a key role in the legitimization of state control. Requiring a monopoly on violence, states crushed banditry in order to assert their legitimacy. Even in Greece, where the bandits helped to form the state, ultimately the state had to eliminate them. Outlaws had no place in a modern society.

The fledgling state of Greece owed its sovereignty in part to military irregulars. The centralizing state also tried creating a standardized army, but it relied primarily on co-opting bandits for its security. With a few notable exceptions, banditry remained an internal issue in Greece, and did not trouble Greece’s Protecting Powers.⁴⁹ Piracy, on the other hand, inherently posed a threat to international Levantine trade. Incorporating pirates into state security would have undoubtedly led to conflict with British, French, and Russian ships passing through the Aegean. For this reason, Greece was unable to openly support privateers or corsairs, and any support of piracy would need to be unofficial.

Reliance on irregulars to fulfill basic state functions often backfired. In Anatolia, the co-opting of bandit gangs frequently occurred when the Ottoman sultan was unable to successfully crush them with his regular forces. The *derebeys* were similar to figures such as Ali Pasha Tepedelenli who were bandit rulers who possessed enough power that the Ottoman state forces could not easily crush them and so were legitimized and made governors of the regions in which

⁴⁷ Koliopoulos, *Brigands with a Cause*, 296.

⁴⁸ Koliopoulos, *Brigands with a Cause*, 166.

⁴⁹ For an instance of Greek banditry troubling Britain, see, Rodanthi Tzanelli, "Haunted by the 'Enemy' Within: Brigandage, Vlachian/Albanian Greekness, Turkish 'Contamination,' and Narratives of Greek Nationhood in the Dilessi/Marathon Affair (1870)." *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 20.1 (2002): 47-74.

they resided. In theory they were loyal to the sultan, but in practice they thought little of him and would keep the revenues they earned from taxes and mining.⁵⁰ This type of weak central control continued until the twentieth century, when the 1908 Young Turk Revolution overhauled the state with the reestablishment of the short-lived 1876 Ottoman constitution and fifteen years later the Turkish Republic replaced what remained of the empire.

Hunting down outlaws was often ritualized to enhance state legitimacy beyond simply the act of monopolizing violence. Lauren Benton has showed how the corpses of captured outlaws were often displayed publicly. As traders and passengers were funneled past choke points in the natural geography, they would be confronted with the miserable fates of those deemed unacceptable to the state.⁵¹ Whether it be the crucified bodies of rebellious gladiators lining the Appian Way or the rotting corpses of ungovernable pirates left hanging in Caribbean harbors, the message remained the same. The state decided what was illegal and it alone was responsible for exacting vengeance or showing mercy.

Giuseppe Garibaldi took this message one step further when uniting Italy during the *Risorgimento*. John Dickie argues for a situation where banditry was viewed as a national scourge that the state had to eliminate in order to impose its authority over the nation. The *carabinieri* institutionalized and ritualized violence in such a way that if a captured outlaw obeyed, even during his execution, he was allowed to retain some of his honor. Execution was the common punishment for crime, but even before the lines of the firing squad there were ways in which one could show obedience to the state and thus retain honor.

⁵⁰ Andrew G. Gould, "Lords or Bandits? The Derebeys of Cilicia," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Oct., 1976): 494.

⁵¹ See chapter 2, "Treacherous Places: Atlantic Riverine Regions and the Law of Treason" in Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty*.

Like many standardized forms of punishment, it requires a minimum of 'cooperation' from the victim in order to function smoothly. In return he is allowed ritual expressions of bravery, contrition or consent: refusing or taking a blindfold, giving the order to fire himself etc. A Bourbon officer smuggled into Italy to lend expertise to the brigands chose to be shot in a kneeling position as he intoned his final prayers. Both the proclamation at a parade ground shooting and the small courtesies of the execution in the field involve a ritual accord between the offender and the law, a minimum demonstration of the victim's legally recognizable subjective coherence. It is almost as if the victim is normalized and moralized in the instant of annihilation.⁵²

The state used the bandits as a tool to gain legitimacy. They offered to trade the bandits' honor, which was held in high regard in Mediterranean societies, for their obedience to the state. Either way the bandit was dead once caught, so why not die with honor? Obedience to the state from those who it was persecuting helped legitimize the formation of the Italian nation.

Chronologically, I begin in an era when irregular military forces were being displaced by modern, standardized, regular armed forces. These forces were not modern for using more recent technologies, but for their more direct relation to the central state. There was a gradual transition from an imperial hub-and-spoke model of indirect control through administrative intermediaries and irregular forces to expanding state powers and a tighter control via more direct administration and regular state forces. As state power grew, governments became more interested in issuing directives than negotiating with individuals in spaces of difference. In the next chapter, we will see how the Ottoman Empire became embroiled in two decades of continuous conflict, in the midst of which it lost both of its "island provinces": Greece and

⁵² John Dickie, "A Word at War: the Italian Army and Brigandage 1860-1870," *History Workshop Journal* 33 (1992): 16.

Algeria. North Africa had long acted autonomously of the Sublime Porte, creating a thorn in the side of Ottoman diplomats attempting to create and maintain European alliances. When France invaded and took over Algiers, it met minimal resistance from Ottoman forces. This was largely because the Ottoman Empire was facing a more existential threat as Egyptian forces marched on İstanbul. To some degree, however, the Ottomans gave Algeria up. In their modernization project that led to the bloody demise of the janissaries in favor of a modern, regular army, there was as little desire to make room for autonomous corsairing societies as there was for autocephalous janissary gangs.

Chapter 3: Piracy during the Ottoman Civil Wars, 1821-1840

The story of the Greek War of Independence usually focusses on the battles and campaigns that took place on land, and typically ends in 1832 with the arrival of Otto of Bavaria as the first king of independent Greece. It is a narrative in which bandits led the charge against the sultan's forces sent to suppress the insurrection. Koliopoulos introduced the concept of "military enterprisers," explaining that the bandit lords who participated in the revolution were more interested in benefiting themselves than in creating a democratic, liberal nation-state.¹ He also explains how the state that accorded bandits like Kolokotronis near mythological status for their efforts during the revolution did an about-face when the war was over and the new government came to view these power-hungry military men as more of a menace than as national heroes.

The traditional narrative limits the broader importance of the uprising on regional geopolitics. The Greek uprising against the Sublime Porte not only established the independence of a new small kingdom, perhaps presaging the empire's eventual piecemeal partitioning, but in the following decade also provided inspiration to both internal and external actors looking to seize power from a weakened sultan. This chapter focuses on the naval campaigns in the Aegean and adopts a transnational approach in order to highlight the interconnected nature of the Eastern Mediterranean, where the histories of the Aegean archipelago, Egypt, North Africa, the Levant, and Anatolia were deeply entangled. It centers on Crete, an island that was part of both the Greek and Egyptian uprisings against the Sublime Porte, to complicate the narrative of religious

¹ See, John S. Koliopoulos, *Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, 1821-1912* (Clarendon Press, 1987).

conflict by showing westerners fighting Christian pirates on Crete, Algerian corsairs offering humanitarian aid to Crete, and Mehmed Ali of Egypt governing the island with ambiguous religious rhetoric.

In the area around Syntagma Square, the political center of Athens, countries from around the world compete for real estate for their embassies. While not the biggest, the closest embassy to the square belongs to Egypt. Most Greeks think little of this fact. After all, Greece is European, so why pay attention to the embassy of a seemingly insignificant African country. Historically though, Egypt and Greece both shared a desire for autonomy or independence from the Ottoman Empire. Political expediency, however, led them to be on opposite sides during the 1820s insurrection, but soon thereafter on the same side, waging open war against the Sublime Porte.

The uprising against the Ottoman Empire in the Archipelago Province during the 1820s has been viewed in a number of ways. Independent Greece cast the events as a glorious national revolution, liberating the Greek nation from the shackles of Ottoman oppression. Western powers saw the uprisings as a chance to free a Christian population from its Muslim overlords. The Sublime Porte saw the rebellion initially as a bandit war, where gangs led by *klefts* threatened imperial rule, and the Porte responded accordingly by deploying irregular forces and militia to crush it.

Another equally valid way to view this war is as a bandit conflict at sea — a pirate uprising, as it were. While Selim III's New Order reforms were aimed at modernizing the army and navy, the 1820s and 1830s were the first decades that saw the first effective steps to implement those reforms. The first move was the elimination of the old janissary corps and the establishment of the new, conscript-based force called the Trained Victorious Soldiers of

Muhammad, which initially was unable to deal with the rebellion. Naval reforms became necessary as a second step after the Porte's loss by its North African vassal states and their corsair forces. During the Greek War of Independence, the forces that the Ottomans fielded on both land and sea were mostly irregular.

Likewise, the Greek rebel naval forces described themselves in the same terms as the bandit gangs on land, as *kapetani* (captains) leading privateers instead of bandits. The revolutionary government had very little control over these forces, which were often more interested in booty and prizes than in the struggle for national liberation. So much so that they frequently clashed more with other Greek *kapetani* than with Ottoman forces.²

The 1820s were a period of modernization in the region. Egypt had standardized its *fellahin* army and the Ottomans purged their janissaries in favor of a modern western-style army. Greece created a standing army initially manned primarily by Bavarians, to the chagrin of the *kleft* lords. At every step there was resistance, and these standing armies only entered the war towards its end, if at all. Irregular forces battled during what they perceived to be possibly their final days. Once military standardization was completed, opportunities for vertical mobility as a military entrepreneur diminished. The leaders of irregular units had to either prove themselves as critical to the state's security or challenge the writ of the state itself.

This chapter looks at the 1820s and 1830s as decades of upheaval and civil war, beginning with the Greek War of Independence in 1821, then continuing with the war from the North African perspective, ending with Mehmed Ali uprising against the Ottoman Empire. I use

² For example, George Koundouriotis of Hydra and Botasses of Spetses were instrumental in fighting against the supporters of Kolokotronis in what amounted to a civil war in 1824. See, George Finlay. *History of the Greek Revolution*. Vol. 2 (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 331.

Crete as a case study, as it was an Ottoman island that became a major base for Greek revolutionaries who turned to piracy. They raided friend and foe alike to support themselves, becoming a major point of contention between various Greek revolutionary governments and their European allies and eventually leading to the allied assault on these pirate-revolutionaries. While Greece gained independence by 1832, Crete remained under Muslim suzerainty, first as a territory of Egypt and then as an Ottoman province once again.

Gramvousa: Rebels, Sailors, Pirates, Prey

On an island off the north-western tip of Crete a castle stands atop a cliff, resisting the beating of ocean waves and the wear of time. The shallow lagoon of Balos, filled with clams, connects this island to the parched peninsula jutting out from Crete. At low tide, men and animals can cross on foot and harvest clams for food. When the tide rises, small ships can pass over this strip where ships of deeper keel would run aground.

Gramvousa, as both the fortress and island are known, was constructed by the Venetians between 1569 and 1584. It was meant to guard ships passing through the Gulf of Kissamos headed to and from Venice. As the peninsula leading to Gramvousa was inhospitable, the only feasible way to supply the fortress was by sea. After Ottoman conquest of the island in 1669, other fortifications became of greater importance and so when the Ottomans finally conquered Gramvousa in 1691, they let the fortress go derelict.

As nothing but a skeleton crew patrolled the crumbling fortifications, Gramvousa was vulnerable to attack. When Greek insurrection broke out in 1821, the Ottoman military was

occupied with suppressing the rebellion. While Ottoman forces were distracted, Cretan and Greek rebels seized and occupied the fort. Ottoman troops were able to secure most of Crete, but the island-fortress remained outside of the Sublime Porte's grasp. In 1826, the arrival of the North African fleet cut off the rebels on the island from the revolutionaries in the Morea.

Deprived of supplies and information, the rebels at Gramvousa became focused on survival. They had their ships, they had protective walls, and they had a shallow littoral environment around them over which they could pass with ease, but larger ships-of-war could not. These maritime men-of-violence turned to piracy in order to survive and would gain the ire of Greece's western allies, ultimately bringing the two into open conflict.

By 1827, piracy was on the rise throughout the Greek world, including Gramvousa. Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Mehmed Ali, led the Egyptian expedition to aid the Ottoman efforts to quash the Greek rebellion. His successful march through the Peloponnese forced Greek military forces to scatter and the Greek revolutionary government retained control over only a very small part of the peninsula. Cut off from any logistical support, Greek rebels throughout the region simply sought survival and personal plunder. Dimitris Dimitropoulos identifies Syros, Mykonos, Samos, and Gramvousa as key areas which turned to piracy and where pirates could fence their goods.³ The Greek government, led at the time by Petrobey Mavromichalis, was accused by the Great Powers of allowing piracy to flourish.⁴ Dimitropoulos contends that internal Greek

³ Dimitris Dimitropoulos cites Despina Themeli-Katifori. *Η δίωξις της πειρατείας και το θαλάσσιον δικαστήριο: κατά την πρώτην Καποδιστριακήν περίοδον* [*The Persecution of Pirates and the Naval Courts during the first Kapodistrian Period*]: 1828 – 1829, 1/2, (Athens: National Kapodistrian University – School of Philosophy, 1973), 40-43; and Apostolos Delis, “A Hub of Piracy in the Aegean: Syros during the Greek War of Independence,” 41-54 in the same volume as his own chapter, Dimitris Dimitropoulos, “Pirates during a Revolution,” in *Corsairs and Pirates in the Eastern Mediterranean, fifteenth-nineteenth centuries*, ed. Gelina Harlaftis (2016), 33.

⁴ The United States of America also had a presence in the region during the Greek War of Independence. They were primarily interested in trade, so the Americans were concerned with piracy and sought to protect their own ships but did not actively hunt down pirates. This was largely out of interest in maintaining neutrality in the conflict while negotiating a commercial treaty with the Ottomans. Part was in the interest of maintaining good relations with

correspondence in late 1827 used terms like “shame,” “abominable,” “cursed,” “infamy,” and “unholy and inhuman” to describe piracy, showing his government’s general opposition to the chaos they created.⁵ Nevertheless, the Great Powers expressed concern over attacking the pirate-rebels at Gramvousa due to their nominal affiliation with the Greek state.⁶ Without direct approval from Mavromichalis, the Greek-revolutionary-pirate nests were untouchable.

The revolutionary government was unable to contain the outbreak of piracy in 1827, as they were hanging on by a thread until the Battle of Navarino in October of that year. The following year would bring a change of guard within the Greek government. No longer would it be led by rebels who had fought the Ottomans from the very start of the revolution.

In 1828, Ioannis Kapodistrias came to Greece as its new Governor. Kapodistrias was far more concerned with Greece fitting into a western system of diplomacy than trying to simply co-opt every agent of violence in his territory. Having been trained in Russia's court as the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, he expected his troops to be regular and regulated. As such, pirates and *klefts* had no place in his vision for Greece. Once in office, Kapodistrias gave Admiral Codrington and the western fleet the go-ahead they needed to crush the pirate-rebels at Gramvousa. There and elsewhere the Greek and allied fleets were able to pursue and prosecute pirates with extreme prejudice. Kapodistrias is typically credited with directing Andreas

the Greek revolutionary government, which at times considered these pirates to be revolutionaries, so America could potentially establish a naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean. America was interested in protecting its Mediterranean commercial shipping from piracy, be it Greek or North African, and it had recently lost its base in Minorca after slighting Spain by acknowledging the independence of the fledgling Latin American states. See Konstantinos Hatzopoulos, “The U.S. Navy in the Aegean during the Greek War of Independence, 1821-1829,” in Apostolos E. Vacalopoulos, Constantinos D. Svolopoulos, and Béla K. Király, eds., "Southeast European maritime commerce and naval policies from the mid-eighteenth century to 1914," *East European Monographs* (1988).

⁵ Dimitropoulos, “Pirates during a Revolution,” 30.

⁶ CG Pitcairn Jones, ed., *Piracy in the Levant, 1827-8* (Navy Records Society, 1934).

Miaoulis to eliminate piracy in the region, but Despina Themeli-Katifori warns us that the narrative does not end so neatly.

Most of those who wrote about Kapodistria's efforts to organize the Greek state also mention his attempted persecution of piracy. However, they all perceived the subject in a superficial way. They limited themselves to the narration of Andreas Miaoulis' expedition against the piracy centers of North Sporades, as well as the attack of Gramvousa by the French and the English. These undertakings, indeed spectacular and effective, managed up to an extent to discourage the pirates, who were convinced that the period of anomaly had ended. However, these actions did not complete, nor were they possible to end, the attempts to secure the Greek seas from the pirates that hurt the traffic and transit in the Eastern Mediterranean. These [pirates], even though they knew they clashed with the organized state, could not possibly transform overnight into law-abiding and peace-loving citizens.⁷

Themeli-Katifori's doctoral dissertation still stands as the major study of piracy during the Kapodistrian era. Her work delves deeply into the revolutionary Greek Navy's court records. Unfortunately, the study is in Katharevousa, a variant of Greek which is no longer taught. Additionally, her work does not appear in online databases. For this reason, and for its relevance to this chapter, I will provide a summary of her dissertation here.

⁷ "Οι περισσότεροι εξ εκείνων οι οποίοι συνέγραψαν περί του Καποδιστρίου των προσπαθειών διά τήν οργάνωσιν του Ελληνικού κράτους μνημονεύουν και την επιχειρηθείσαν υπ'αυτού δίωξιν της πειρατείας. Άπαντες όμως ακροθιγώς επελήφθησαν του θέματος. Περιορίσθησαν να εξιστορήσουν την υπό τον Ανδρέαν Μιαούλην επιχειρήσιν κατά των πειρατικών κέντρων των Βορείων Σποράδων και την αναληφθείσαν υπό των Γάλλων και Άγγλων επίθεσιν κατά της Γραμβούσης. Αι επιχειρήσεις αυταί, θεαματικάί πράγματι και αποτελεσματικάί εν τινι μέτρω, κατεπτόησαν τους πειρατάς οι οποίοι επείσθησαν ότι έληξεν η περίοδος της ανωμαλίας. Εν τούτοις διά των ενεργειών αυτών δέν επερατώθησαν, ουδ' ήτο δυνατόν να τερματισθούν αι προσπάθειαι διασφαλίσεως των ελληνικών θαλασσών από τους λυμαινομένους το διαμετακομιστικόν εμπόριον της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου πειρατάς. Ούτοι, όσον και αν ανετλήθησαν ότι ήρχοντο εις αντίθεσιν προς οργανωμένον κράτος, δέν ήτο δυνατόν από της μίας ημέρας εις την άλλην να μεταβληθούν εις νομοταγείς και φιλειρηνικούς πολίτας." See, Themeli-Katifori, *Η δίωξις της πειρατείας*, ια'.

In all, Kapodistrias' efforts had positive results. N. Sporades and Thassos were rid of the militaries, who were absorbed in the newly-formed military units. Gramvousa was evacuated and its inhabitants settled in Crete or in the liberated Greek territories.

The outlaws wanted for piracy and the wanted prison breakers (such as Savvas Voulgaris, Ioannis Spetsiotis, Theod. Portaritis, etc.) escaped to the ottoman-occupied territories. They continued their pirate activities but were concealed not only by the Turks but also by the Christian chiefs-of-arms or dignitaries of these territories who took advantage of the situation to tax the local citizens.

The field of activity for piracy moved to the coasts of Asia Minor, Macedonia and Thessaly which were not controlled by the Greek state. The government could therefore deny any responsibility.

However, in order to secure the Greek seas, the Greek state needed to be fiscally robust (i.e. have money), which would then enable the organisation of the commercial and agricultural relationships and ensure peaceful employment for the citizens. The fact that this couldn't happen determined the fate of shipping (navigation) and of the first governor and the Greek state in general.

Kapodistrias knew that it would take a long time for the war-ridden country to solve their production problems on their own and therefore placed his hopes on external support. This didn't happen because the Protective Powers didn't want to act as guarantors, therefore there was no interest from investors. As a result, by the end of 1829 the needs of the state were covered by monthly subsidies from France and Russia and with the money deposited in the newly-formed Finance Bank.

At the same time, Kapodistrias tried to revive commerce and allowed transactions with the ottoman-occupied areas of Evia and Thessaly, under specific terms. But since the nautical blockade that supported the businesses in Eastern Sterea Ellada gave the ability to smugglers to smuggle with the enemy, Kapodistrias forbade the ships to approach the coasts of Evia and Thessaly (some minor exceptions are in the footnote).

The consequences of the economic difficulty were multiple. Firstly, a big part of ship-owners remained out of service since the government could not cover neither the hiring and maintenance of the ships nor the crews' wages. Kapodistrias insisted that the government used more private ships than were needed for the state's defense.

The lack of proper employment led these seamen to seek employment abroad (eg. Egypt).

In addition, the wages that the government supplied were not sufficient (“satisfactory” in the text), given that the seamen could no longer rely on the extra income that came with partaking in looting, as before. So, they would abandon their ships and return to their islands where they remained unemployed.

Similarly, the navy militants would abandon their posts and return to their prior homes, especially in the case of N. Sporades, or go to Thessaly and Macedonia where they couldn’t be persecuted by the Greek authorities. Their numbers grew disconcertingly especially after the Battle of Petra (29 Sept 1829),

The government then, seeking to control the desertion, instituted the pay of wages after a 3-month service. The seamen did not want to return though given that they were used to being paid at the beginning of every month. So, the notables in Hydra, worrying about the high number of unemployed in their island, pleaded with the government for the re-institution of the monthly payment and offered to act as guarantors against any desertion. But their plan could not be applied since only about half of the fleet were from Hydra (974 out of 2086 men).

Reprising the commercial relationships would of course solve the problems in the islands. However, in order to compete with the European commercial navy and with the big commercial companies (developed in Syros which had a “neutral” standing), a lot of funds were needed. But all the funds were consumed by the war. So, the notables from Hydra and Spetses, exposing the suffering and poverty of the people, pleaded with Kapodistrias for opening up the ports of all islands to imports and exports.

Kapodistrias refused initially to comply expecting to secure the funds abroad, either by borrowing or by attracting capital in the Bank. Convinced eventually that he’s waiting in vain, he acquiesced (Jan 1830) to open up the ports of Hydra one year and Spetses the other (and so on). Since this hardly improved the economy of the two islands, the financiers (the people with the capital) turned towards investing their money by buying land and joined the anti-government front, influencing also the bourgeoisie of the commercial ship-owners and the lower class of simple sailors. It was a matter of months for piracy to arise as a means of undermining Kapodistrias’ regime. Since mid-1830, piracy was not only a way to stand in for the destroyed commercial relationships but also a means to exercise anti governmental pressure.

It is in this way that piracy re-appears in 1829 in Mani, too. The plans to create a farmers’ class through redistributing the land were not implemented, neither did the measures to remove the Maniates from the isolated mountains and the tiny gulfs of Messinia and Lakonia and put them in the military bases. So the inability to direct the people towards peaceful and legal employment left them exposed to be swayed by the [anti-governmental] rhetoric and led them again to piracy.

The feudal leaders of that area, such as Mavromichalis and Kapetanakis families, perceiving their power diminishing in front of the government, took advantage of the Maniates' dissatisfaction and swayed them towards opposing the government.

This is how, despite Kapodistrias' initial popular support and despite his effectiveness in battling piracy, the difficulties which followed the period of the Struggle (meaning the war) and which were cultivated by the European Powers - by denying monetary support and by portraying Kapodistrias regime as authoritarian - cut short the restructural work of the first Governor, who struggled to follow an exclusively national political line.⁸

The Last Call of the Corsairs: North African Intervention

The Greek rebellion posed an existential threat to the Ottoman Empire. By the nineteenth century, the elite military force of the Ottomans, the janissaries, had become uncontrollable. During the early centuries of Ottoman expansion, janissaries were conscripted from the empire's non-Muslim (*zimmi*) population. They were recruited through the *devşirme* as children, converted to Islam, and trained to be the elites in either the military or bureaucracy, depending on their skills. The system was predicated on the periodic acquisition of new recruits, but once the janissaries organized and demanded that their position become hereditary, corruption became rampant. By the nineteenth century, they were more like a mafia than a military organization. Sultan Selim III had planned on creating a modern, professional military (*nizam-i cedit*) to replace them in the late eighteenth century, but this move only increased their discontent, leading to the sultan's overthrow. Where he failed, Sultan Mahmud II succeeded. Viewing the old janissary forces as the largest threat to the empire, even with the Greek rebellion ongoing, the

⁸ See, Themeli-Katifori, *Η δίοχις της πειρατείας*.

sultan planned an operation that has come to be known as “the auspicious incident.” In a single day, June 15, 1826, the new *nizami* military was ordered to slaughter the old, down to the last man.

Weakened by the violent change of guard, and with it clear that the officials in the Archipelago Province were unable to suppress the rebels on their own, Sultan Mahmud II called upon his other provinces for military aid. The most powerful of the forces mobilized to suppress the rebellion were from Egypt and North Africa. Mehmed Ali of Egypt had his own *nizami* forces, and Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers brought with them their corsair fleets. These provinces were all closely communicating with one other, sharing intelligence, and generally taking their orders from Cairo rather than İstanbul.

The Greek rebellion was one of the last instances where corsairs were called to action on a large scale by a state. Ibrahim Pasha led Egyptian forces to the Morea to suppress the Greek rebellion, but his fleet was not only Egyptian. Closely aligned with him were the pirate-regencies of Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers. Each of these cities were autonomous territories of the Ottoman Empire. Since the early modern period, they were notorious for not just governing themselves, but also for acting independently from the Sublime Porte and conducting their own diplomatic relations from foreign powers. They paid tribute to the Ottoman Empire and answered its calls to arms, but they decided irrelevant of the sultan’s will with whom they would be at peace. Whereas Egypt had developed its military largely along Napoleon’s model, involving paid conscript soldiers that were not reliant on plunder, the other North African provinces were still

reliant on booty to pay their troops.⁹ Internal Algerian correspondences from the 1820s are useful to illuminate the last call of the corsairs – to suppress the Greek rebellion.

The insurrection created a wide scale disruption of daily life. Constant warfare made it unsafe to continue working, especially when that work could not be done within a safe haven surrounded by city walls. As workers declined to head out to the fields and the grain mills, agricultural production plummeted. Famine ensued.

On the island of Crete, the *kadi* of Chania petitioned the pasha of Algiers for relief from famine, as the Ottoman garrison on Crete was unwilling to share food with the local populace. This reinforces the notion that Algiers was viewed as an autonomous element within the empire that was worthy of petition when official channels were failing.

All the inhabitants of the well-guarded city of Chania; all are your slaves, all are miserable, helpless and unhappy. They have all gathered in the courtroom of noble and resplendent justice, and they resolved to send this missive to beg compassion. The request made by the inhabitants of this city tends to obtain prompt assistance in grains of all kinds, of which they are well acquainted with the name, but of which they are utterly deprived. For more than forty days, the mills have been closed and the inhabitants, your slaves, are in distress and calamity: they are in the face of death. We sent almost ten letters in various countries to solicit food, we spread the news of our distress in all places, but until today we did not get anything. It's also in vain that we asked rations to the governor of the citadel who commands for the Padishah.

So we turn to the borders of Algiers the victorious, and we ask for prompt help in wheat and barley. Our country does not have and yours is abundantly provided with this generosity. We address all the notables, all the custodians of authority and we give them notice of our position.¹⁰

⁹ Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's men: Mehmed Ali, his army and the making of modern Egypt* (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 182.

¹⁰ A. De Voulx, *Recherches sur la coopération de la Régence d'Alger à la guerre de l'indépendance grecque d'après des documents inédites* (Paris, 1856), #19 February 1, 1827.

Chania was a city with large numbers of both Muslims and Christians. The Muslim leader of the district was responsible for all residents, regardless of their faith. In his plea, he did not distinguish that the relief should target residents of only one religion, nor does he explicitly blame or call for aid from agents based on religion. In the chaos of rebellion, his eyes appeared unclouded by rhetoric of holy war. Instead, he seems simply interested in ending the suffering of his people.

As the rebellion in the Peloponnese gained traction and grew more violent, Muslims in the region began to flee for their lives. In 1821, the first year of the uprising, the capture of Tripolitsa resulted in the execution of all Muslim and Jewish residents, even though the revolutionary forces had promised them a safe evacuation. The message was clear. The Greek rebels were uninterested in allowing Muslims to continue living in the region under Christian rule. As the Greek rebels controlled the isthmus at Corinth, there was no land route for the Muslim refugees to escape on foot. This meant that they could only evacuate the region by sea. The Ottoman Navy was primarily manned by Egyptian and North African ships, so many of the refugees were ferried south across the Mediterranean. Algeria was actively updating the refugees on the progress of the war.

I will inform your lordship that various people from Morea, who have settled in our town, have received from their country letters which announce that Koptan Bey is at Navarino with thirty-two ships of our master the Sultan. The ships of Tunis are with him. They wait for Lord Ibrahim Pasha to arrive from Kolmata [Kalamata], and when he reaches Navarino they will leave for Mani. As for the honorable and illustrious, formidable and magnanimous leader, the lord Capitan-Pasha, he is at El Medelli [Mytilene] with the surplus of the victorious fleet.¹¹

¹¹ A. De Voulx, *Recherches*, #20. November 9 1826.

In the early years, as Ibrahim was reconquering the Peloponnese, there was reason for the Muslim refugees to be optimistic about returning home. The revolution seemed to be nearing an end as Egyptian forces pacified the region. As already seen in the case of Chania, local Ottoman officials were using rhetoric which suggested that they were interested in reestablishing peace and normal relations for both their Muslim and Christian subjects. The Peloponnesian Muslims ultimately found themselves permanently excluded from independent Greece. For a moment, however, there was a light at the end of the tunnel as Ottoman forces continued to score military victories, and local leadership began to plan for reconstructing in the postwar.¹²

Where the *kadi* of Chania wrote in secular language, the *dey* of Algiers openly used the rhetoric of *gazve*, or holy war. The language of religious conflict permeates every document produced by Algiers during the Greek War of Independence. At times, this rhetoric was backed up by concrete actions that directly contradicted the goal of reestablishing order at the war's end. "They announce that Ibrahim Pasha has arrived at Navarino, and has brought about five thousand Greek prisoners, men or women, large or small. Lord Ibrahim Pasha received from the Sublime Porte a sword and a caftan. He was appointed in person to be General-in-Chief at sea."¹³ The enslavement of these five thousand Greeks has become a major factor in Greek's complaints about Muslim atrocities. This egregious example of human trafficking is worthy of complaint,

¹² See, A. De Voulx, *Recherches sur la coopération de la Régence d'Alger à la guerre de l'indépendance grecque d'après des documents inédites* (Paris, 1856). #24. 18 January 1827:

There are about twenty ships in Navarino belonging to the fleet of our master the sultan (may God assist him). One of these vessels is a ship on which the Lord Ibrahim Pasha must embark; the others are frigates and corvettes. Our master the sultan (may God help him!) Has sent about fifteen thousand men from Mahomedan troops. They penetrated and took 'Atna (Athens), at least they seized the city and the Greeks were surrounded in the citadel. We think that today, if it pleases God, they are taken.

The Morea and half of the Mani Mountains are in the hands of the Greeks, but the other half have submitted to the Muslims. Anapol, Kerdas and Drounda remained in the hands of the Greeks. May God destroy them!

¹³ A. De Voulx, *Recherches*, #24. 18 January 1827.

but it is worth remembering that Egypt and the North African provinces maintained complex relations with all sides involved.

While cursing Christianity as its enemy, Algeria continued to trade with the west. “The English ship which had left Algiers for İzmir, chartered by merchants of Algiers, was stopped by the Greeks, who removed all that he carried in terms of money and goods, so that it arrived empty to İzmir.¹⁴ May the most-high God exterminate them!¹⁵” British and French merchants continued in their important role in domestic Ottoman shipping. Western philhellenism during the Greek rebellion was not reason enough for Algerians to disrupt their own trade. This particular example is interesting, because it reverses the traditional ethnic roles of the early modern period. Traditionally, there was a dispute about western corsairs using the rhetoric of holy war to target Ottoman shipping, even when the ships were manned by Greeks or Venetians.¹⁶ In this case, there were Greek rebels plundering Ottoman ships manned by westerners. The same balance between commercial contact and confessional conflict from the previous era was still present in the early nineteenth century.

The Battle of Navarino and the total destruction of the Ottoman and Egyptian fleets changed the course of the war. The Egyptian and North African fleet was reduced to flotsam. Ottoman forces lost all the benefits that naval dominance affords: surveillance, resupplying food, munitions, and manpower, and denying the enemy the same. From an Algerian perspective, this loss was doubly disastrous.¹⁷ The French, British, and Russians were cooperating and were

¹⁴ The contemporary Greek name for the city was Smyrna. İzmir is the modern Turkish rendition of the same name.

¹⁵ A. De Voulx, *Recherches*, #22. 28 September 1827.

¹⁶ See, Molly Greene. *Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants: A Maritime History of the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Princeton University Press, 2010).

¹⁷ For a description of the Battle of Navarino from an Algerian perspective, see, A. De Voulx, *recherches*, #23. 28 December 1827:

committed to creating an autonomous or independent Greece. But more so, the corsair fleet, the wooden wall that protected the Barbary Coast, had fallen. The imperial powers of Europe were now able to go after the North African regencies more aggressively. Three months before the Battle of Navarino, Algiers was already wary of war with France. “We received from Alexandria a letter from Captain Moustafa-Rais, dated 24th of Hidja. He came by way of Malta and encloses a letter to Lord Ibrahim-Aga. He announces in this letter that they were preparing to leave Alexandria, but that the news of the war with the French being reached in this city, the Lord Mehmed-Ali-Pasha opposed their departure and said, ‘I will not let you go until I receive a letter from Algiers.’”¹⁸ France had already attacked Algiers in 1815 in an attempt to end white slavery. The assault in and of itself led to no permanent changes, as Algiers resumed taking captives once it rebuilt its fleet. This led France to consider three options when dealing with North Africa: accept matters as they were, wait for a local “Barbary revolution” by North Africans to bring themselves into the fold of “civilization,” and lastly, to pursue “*la mission civilatrice*” – the

What I have to say to your lordship is that before this we sent your highness a letter dated the 27th of Rabi'ettani in which we informed you that an American schooner had arrived from Malta that day and had brought the news that the English, the French and the Russians (God exterminates them!) had attacked the ships of our Lord the Sultan (may God help him!) and the ships of Sid Mehmed-Ali Pasha, in the harbor Navarino; that they had given them a great battle, and that, according to their assertions, the Moslem fleet was entirely destroyed; that the English ships had entered Malta in the most dilapidated state, and that they had 755 wounded and 40 killed.

After that, we heard that the three nations mentioned had a considerable number of dead and wounded in countless quantities, and that they had raised quarantine in Malta in order to bring down the wounded.

It has also come down to us that about thirty of the ships of the Muslims are safe and sound. The Muslims had 22 warships, namely: 5 vessels, 15 large frigates, 30 corvettes; the overhang consisted of brigs and schooners; with them were 41 merchant ships, in all 107 vessels. The ships of the Christians who took part in the battle were 27 according to their statements, including 12 ships with three decks; the surplus consisted of small vessels and frigates.

It is said that at the time of the fight, Ibrahim Pasha was not in Navarino, that he was traveling on land and that he took a city named Meniteha and killed most of the inhabitants. When the Christians learned this, they wanted to avenge the Greeks and did what was just told; but (God knows!) they have received: a big blow, and they do not want to admit it. When Captain Loubi arrived here from Livorno, I wanted to charter him to send him to Navarino to obtain certain news, even at my expense. But he told us: "Before my departure from Livorno, the English, the French, and the Russians informed all the merchantmen that they were forbidden to go to Turkey, and that those who were to be sailed for that destination would be brought back to Malta. "- Loubi also told us: "- My sailors have imposed the condition to make no trip to Turkey, otherwise I would venture to leave, but it is impossible for me to find other sailors.

¹⁸ A. De Voulx, *Recherches*, #22. 28 September 1827.

imposition of western norms upon the area by way of conquest.¹⁹ With the loss at Navarino, Algerian intelligence reported that the French were preparing for an African invasion. “I will inform your lordship that French dogs are preparing to go to Algiers in the spring. They prepare twelve bombards, each with two bomb mortars, one at the bow and one at the stern. Four are ready, and they work for others. They say they want to divide their attack between Algiers, Bone and Oran [other cities in Algeria to the west and east of Algiers].”²⁰

There were several factors influencing France’s decision to send its fleet to blockade and eventually invade Algiers. Philhellenism was widespread among French Republicans, but the Bourbon monarchy was interested in maintaining its alliance with the Sublime Porte. There were debates about white slavery, previously alluded to. Ultimately, the French expectation that they would find thousands of European captives in North Africa was wildly overblown. When French forces arrived, there were only around two hundred captives, mostly Greek, Italian, and Spanish, in the hands of slave traders. All of them were men, which also confounded the French expectation they would find harems filled with fair European maidens. Lastly, the establishment of a colony in North Africa would allow for easier access to resources to satisfy the French demand for cash crops.²¹ These factors shaped the attitude for French public opinion.

The incident that compelled the French to finally intervene had more to do with courtly behavior and outrage. During the French Revolution, the government borrowed heavily from two Jewish merchants in Algeria who were in the business of redeeming captives. The restored French government refused to honor the debts racked up by the revolutionary governments,

¹⁹ Gillian Weiss. *Captives and Corsairs: France and Slavery in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 152-4.

²⁰ A. De Voulx, *Recherches*, #23. 28 December 1827.

²¹ Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 166-67.

creating tensions with its creditors, and when in 1827 the *Dey* Hussein struck the French Consul Pierre Deval with a flyswatter, Charles X responded by sending a squadron to blockade Algeria's port until he received an official apology.²² This blockade remained in place until France's decision to colonize Algiers in 1830. The invasion only took six days and, though it met resistance from all Algerians regardless of religion or ethnicity, the French forces were too strong. The decade of the Greek revolution, then, ended with the demise of the North African corsair-states. From this point on, France would rule Algeria until 1962.

The Death of Democracy and the Birth of Modern Greece

When Greece had won the war at sea and gained independence guaranteed by England, France, and Russia, the conflict against the Ottomans ended and the conflict between Greeks began. Petrobey Mavromichalis refused to follow Kapodistrias's leadership, particularly when the governor began to undermine the very constitution under which he had been elected. This led the new leader of Greece to charge the old one with treason.²³ Meanwhile, at sea, the two remaining admirals of the Greek revolutionary fleet clashed in a struggle for dominance.²⁴ Kapodistrias, once a seasoned foreign minister of the Russian Empire, was unable to govern the nascent Hellenic Republic.

²² Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 162.

²³ Thomas W. Gallant, *The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, 1768 to 1913: The Long Nineteenth Century* (Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 104.

²⁴ Laskarina Bouboulina was another great admiral of the revolution. She perished in 1825, not in combat with the Ottomans, but in a feud with other Greeks on the island of Spetses.

October 9, 1831, relatives of Petrobey Mavromichalis approached Kapodistrias while he was at church and assassinated him, stabbing him in the stomach and shooting him in the head.²⁵ With few exceptions, Greek historians of piracy argue that maritime predation came to an end with Kapodistrias's death. Kostis Konstantides goes one year further, arguing that piracy ended in 1832, with the arrival of King Otto and his Bavarian forces.²⁶ The consensus among historians, then, is that Aegean piracy ended with the creation of the independent Greek kingdom.

An exception to this orthodoxy is George Kolovos. In his blog post on Peri Alos, he suggests that piracy persisted deeper into the nineteenth century. Like all other historians discussing Mediterranean piracy thus far, he abandoned the level of detail used earlier when he shifted his discussion to piracy after the revolution, giving vague allusions and no concrete citation or example:

Kapodistrias, however, knew that in order to eliminate piracy, the root causes, ie the economic and social problems that caused and maintained it, had to be eliminated. For this reason, he tried to integrate into the armed forces or employ in the cultivation of the land unemployed seamen and irregular soldiers, and refugees. But the economic difficulties of the state prevented the exploitation of all these unemployed, which caused their dissatisfaction with the Governor. So slowly piracy began to reappear. So long as the re-establishment of the unemployed was delayed, so difficult was the complete elimination of piracy.

After Kapodistrias' murder, pirate cases multiplied. It was such an audacity that they did not hesitate to capture a naval ship. Still in the sources is mentioned the case of a warship that switched to piratical. It took several years and the concerted

²⁵ Christopher Montague Woodhouse, *Capodistria: The Founder of Greek Independence* (Oxford University Press, 1973), 501.

²⁶ Kostis Konstantinides, *Η ληστεία και η πειρατεία στη Σκύρο, Σκιάθο και Σκόπελο κατά τη διάρκεια της επανάστασης του 1821 μέχρι της αντιβασιλείας του Όθωνα, Ιστορική μελέτη βασισμένη αποκλειστικά επί εγγράφων, τόμος πρώτος [Brigandage and Piracy in Skyros, Skiathos, and Skopelo during the 1821 revolution until the reign of Otto]* (Athens: The Skyros Society, 1988).

actions of the next governments to fight the phenomenon. However, whenever the central administration weakened due to the government, constitutional and state changes that took place until the middle of the second half of the 19th century, pirates' activity increased.²⁷

Because of Kapodistrias's assassination and the subsequent civil unrest, the European powers viewed Greece as unready for democracy, and in keeping with the strong preference of the conservative leaders of restoration Europe for absolute monarchies, they abolished the Republic and, after a lengthy search, selected in 1832 Otto of Bavaria to be the first king of Greece. Weakened by infighting that was tantamount to a civil war and just over a decade of conflict, the Greek political leadership had no choice but to accept the imposition of an absolute monarch. The switch to autocracy, however, did not end the struggle at sea. The only year of Otto's reign for which the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not record any incidences of piracy in the Aegean was 1858. The Bavarian Monarch may have had absolute power—at least until 1844—, but he did not have absolute control.

The following example gives us an insight into the nature of piracy during Otto's reign. In 1835, the Hellenic Royal ship *Samos* was patrolling the northern border in the Sporades. It

²⁷ “Ωστόσο ο Καποδίστριας γνώριζε ότι για να εξαλειφθεί η πειρατεία έπρεπε να εκλείψουν τα γενεσιουργά αίτια της, δηλαδή τα οικονομικά και κοινωνικά προβλήματα που την προξενούσαν και τη συντηρούσαν. Για τον λόγο αυτό προσπάθησε να εντάξει στις ένοπλες δυνάμεις ή να απασχολήσει στην καλλιέργεια της γης τους άνεργους ναυτικούς και άτακτους στρατιωτικούς, και τους πρόσφυγες. Οι οικονομικές όμως δυσχέρειες του κράτους, απέτρεπαν την αξιοποίηση όλων αυτών των ανέργων, γεγονός που προκαλούσε τη δυσαρέσκειά τους εναντίον του Κυβερνήτη. Έτσι σιγά – σιγά η πειρατεία άρχισε να επανεμφανίζεται. Όσο λοιπόν καθυστερούσε η αποκατάσταση των ανέργων, τόσο δύσκολη ήταν η παντελής εξάλειψη της πειρατείας.

Μετά τη δολοφονία του Καποδίστρια τα πειρατικά κρούσματα πολλαπλασιάστηκαν. Ήταν δε τέτοιο το θράσος τους που δεν δίστασαν να αιχμαλωτίσουν πλοίο του πολεμικού ναυτικού. Ακόμα στις πηγές αναφέρεται και η περίπτωση ενός πολεμικού πλοίου που μεταπήδησε σε πειρατικό. Χρειάστηκε να περάσουν αρκετά χρόνια και οι συντονισμένες ενέργειες των επόμενων κυβερνήσεων για την καταπολέμηση του φαινομένου. Ωστόσο όποτε εξασθενούσε η κεντρική διοίκηση με αφορμή τις κυβερνητικές, συνταγματικές και πολιτειακές μεταβολές που έλαβαν χώρα μέχρι τα μέσα του δεύτερου μισού του 19ου αιώνας, η δράση των πειρατών αυξανόταν.” George Kolovos, “Η ΠΕΙΡΑΤΕΙΑ ΣΤΑ ΧΡΟΝΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΣ ΕΠΑΝΑΣΤΑΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ Η ΑΝΤΙΜΕΤΩΠΙΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΑΠΟ ΤΟΝ ΚΑΠΟΔΙΣΤΡΙΑ [Piracy in the years of the Greek Revolution and the Confrontation of Kapodistrias]” last modified May 9, 2011. https://perialos.blogspot.com/2011/05/blog-post_09.html

pulled into an island harbor to take refuge, but four freshly commandeered pirate ships crewed by seventy men were also docked there. The crew of the *Samos*, upon realizing this, demanded that the pirates surrender; instead, when they confronted the marauders, it was they who were easily overpowered. Thus, the *Samos* was captured and became the fifth ship in this pirate armada, which soon took to sea and commandeered a sixth ship. They then targeted an Ottoman warship as their seventh victim, but were unsuccessful, as the military crew repelled them. While fleeing the battle, the *Samos* became stuck between two rocks, and so the pirates took off all of its supplies and scuttled the ship. Days later, Greek warships came to repair and reclaim the *Samos*.²⁸

From this incident, we learn a few things. The crew size of pirate ships was still numerous. This matches pirate activities from early modern times when pirates sought to have enemies give in by overwhelming their victim with a swarm of marauders, thus hoping to actually avoid combat and incurring losses. Later in the century, this tactic would change. This episode also suggests that pirates were still operating in small fleets. It was not just one vessel conducting the raid but several, and the large number of pirates in the crew allowed them to capture more ships and to add them to their fleet. Lastly, these pirates were both particularly bold and interested in adding warships to their fleet, despite the increased risk compared to capturing merchant ships. Typically, pirates would use any type of ship they could get, even if it did not have weaponry on board, such as permanent artillery. They could easily fire swing guns over the sidewalls of a merchant ship. Also noteworthy about this episode is that the pirates attacked both Greek and Ottoman warships. The former seems to have been taken more by surprise than direct

²⁸ Dimitris G. Fokas, *Χρονικά του Ελληνικού Β. Ναυτικού, 1833 – 1873*. [*Chronicles of the Hellenic Royal Navy 1833-1873*]. (Documents of the General Headquarter of the Royal Navy, 1923), 23-4.

assault, while the latter was attacked, albeit unsuccessfully, after an open pursuit at sea.

Attacking warships was always risky and pirates usually avoided attacking them to minimize risk to themselves. Indeed, the failed attempt to take the Ottoman warship in this case led to the pirates' losing the Greek warship they had captured. For whatever reason, these pirates thought the rewards of capturing a warship outweighed the risks of attacking it.

Though Greece gained independence, it was not quite the maritime nation we think of today. During all of Otto's reign, the Kingdom of Greece controlled only Attica, the Morea, and a few nearby islands. The remainder of the Archipelago Province remained in Ottoman hands. Crete, the largest island, was granted by the sultan to Egypt as a reward for Ibrahim Pasha's efforts in suppressing the Greek rebellion. Little did the sultan know that Mehmed Ali was planning a rebellion of his own.

Egypt's Rise from Cretan Eyes

Mehmed Ali of Egypt had not answered the sultan's call to crush the Greek rebellion out of good will. He expected to be rewarded for his efforts. His main goal was to add Syria and the Levant to his administration, and the resources that those would bring him. Instead, Mahmud II offered him Crete and the Hijaz.²⁹ To Mehmed Ali, this was not the lofty honor he was hoping for. He already controlled Crete from his efforts against the Greeks, and it was a much smaller, resource-poor territory. Worse still, the territory was still prone to rebellion.

²⁹ The Hijaz is the west coast of the Arabian Peninsula. It includes Jeddah and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

To help in controlling the island, Mehmed Ali set up a bilingual state newspaper for the island, *Vaka-yı Giridiyye*, or “Events of Crete.”³⁰ This newspaper ran weekly throughout the 1830s and published on both domestic Cretan affairs as well as international events. From its pages we can follow the course of the Egyptian uprising against the Ottoman Empire from a unique perspective. For example, in issue 71 on September 6, 1832 we see the rhetoric used to build a common identity between Egyptians and Cretans. “Four enemy warships are coming, but the divine powers believe that the sea belongs to Egypt... To get God on our side and celebrate the Regent [Mehmed Ali] with joy, there will be three days of cannon fire from the fortresses of Chania, Souda, Gramvousa, and Kasteli Kissamou.”³¹ Egyptian leadership chose to utilize vague religious rhetoric that did not openly preference either Islam or Christianity in their administration of the island. The sea which surrounded was cast as belonging to Egypt with divine approval. At the same time, the second sentence serves to remind Cretans of the Egyptian military presence on the island, domesticate it by retaining place names, and celebrate it by use of celebratory cannon-fire. The fortress at Gramvousa returned to state-use under Egyptian rule. It became an island-fortress where people were sent to exile.³² In some ways, the island remained a place for outlaws. Only instead of the walls protecting pirates by keeping the state out, they protected the island by keeping brigands in.

Ultimately, Egypt’s uprising against the Sublime Porte ended in 1840 in defeat. The Great Powers rallied behind preserving Ottoman territorial integrity to preserve the balance of

³⁰ This newspaper was published in both a Katharevousa form of Cretan-dialect Greek and Ottoman Turkish. Some Greek references to the newspaper mistakenly identify the latter language as Arabic, which shares a common script. The copies kept in Crete and Alexandria have been lost, so all that remains are scans of the version archived in İstanbul.

³¹ *Vaka-yı Giridiyye*, Issue 71. September 6, 1832.

³² *Vaka-yı Giridiyye*, Issue 67. August 4, 1832.

power in Europe. While Mehmed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha could outmaneuver the Ottoman army, they were unable to defeat a united European front at the same time. Mehmed Ali ceded his territorial control over Crete and the Hijaz to the sultan and renounced his ambitions over Syria in exchange for peace and officially-recognized hereditary rule over Egypt and Sudan.

From Crete, a conflict typically cast as Greek Christians loosening the yoke of Ottoman-Muslim oppression appears quite different. During the rebellion, Greek pirates at Gramvousa fought against the Ottomans, but also raided western-Ottoman trade ships and were finally exterminated by western warships. In Chania, relief from famine for both the Christian and Muslim residents came from Algiers, whose *dey* sent aid even while emphasizing sectarian differences and sending corsairs to quash the rebellion in the Morea. Egyptian governance of the island again tried to soothe the sectarian divide by employing sufficiently ambiguous rhetoric where both the Christian and Muslim residents of Crete could rally under the banner of Mehmed Ali. Though this conflict was the closing chapter of corsairing in the Mediterranean, a practice traditionally told through the lens of a primordial religious struggle, the sharp religious divide seemed already dulled in the early nineteenth century. As piracy continued in the region without the state-supported corsairing or privateering structures, the notion of religious divide driving piracy would only grow more tenuous.

Chapter 4: A New Age of Piracy, 1840-1856

When viewing the 1840s and 1850s in terms of criminal activities, this period is best understood in terms of continuity rather than by the political reforms that were prevalent in the Eastern Mediterranean, and Europe at large. In Greece during the 1830s, the state was still adjusting to the new realities that it faced. During the same span in the Ottoman Empire, the Porte struggled in the civil war with Egypt that broke out after the Greek rebellion. Once the dust from the conflict settled, all involved looked to bring about peace and stability. The Eastern Mediterranean witnessed a nearly two-decade respite after the two preceding decades of wars and uprisings.

Both Greece and the Ottoman Empire entered new eras around 1840. The Ottoman Empire finally entered an age of peace accompanied by reforms extending fundamental civil rights to its religious minority populations.¹ Greece began to shake off some of its growing pains as the introduction of a constitution in 1844 placed limits on the king's power. The reforms did little, however, to change the rates of pirate attacks from those in the preceding decade: in Greek waters the number dropped from fifteen to five, while in the empire the rate remained the same in both decades at five. Both decades saw much less piracy than had occurred during the war years of the 1820s.²

¹ This set of reforms was known as the *Tanzimat*. See, Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton University Press, 1963).

² Again, the main source for piracy in Greece during the revolution is not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had not been yet fully setup during the revolution, but rather sources such as the Kapodistrian Naval Courts and foreign naval records like those of Admiral Codrington as recorded in *Piracy in the Levant*. See, Themeli-Katifori's dissertation, Despina Themeli-Katifori, *Οι αποφασεις του θαλασσιου δικαστηριου [The decisions of the naval court]*, 1828-1829 (Athens, 1976); and, CG Pitcairn Jones, ed. *Piracy in the Levant, 1827-8* (Navy Records Society, 1934).

This chapter addresses some of the fundamental questions about the nature of piracy in this new era. Piracy continued in the Eastern Mediterranean region, but was its fundamental character the same? What was the new Greek state's stance on piracy? Were the pirates of this period still primitive rebels? What was the makeup of a typical pirate crew? Was ransom still a major source of profits? This chapter concludes with a discussion of a case in which the states differed dramatically in their views of an individual who was suspected of being a pirate. Was he an outlaw attempting to deceive them by invoking the classic legal defense that he was an innocent man who had been captured by pirates and forced into service or was he really just an unfortunate soul who was being truthful in his claim. Like so many other aspects of the mid-century, piracy displayed continuities with the past but also some that marked this as transitional moment. Most importantly, as this chapter shows, piracy persisted, contrary to the historiographical consensus.

Breaking with the Past

Greece had gained independence from the Ottoman Empire, but as with most fledgling states, independence also brought vulnerability. Just as American independence meant that the United States had to redefine its relations with foreign states, including the North African Regencies, as it was no longer protected by British treaties, so too did Greece have to find its way in the realm of international diplomacy.

Among the first to seek to exploit Greece's novice politicians was merchant-marine Captain Gestin of the French brig *Marie Joë* in 1840. In the midst of the Greek revolution in

1827, Gestin's vessel was attacked and pillaged by Greek pirates off the coast of Cyprus. Gestin's representative, M. Lagrue, wrote that despite repeated requests, the Greek government had taken no steps toward advancing the investigation. With choice words for what he thought of Greek state efforts concerning piracy, he formally requested that reparations be paid to his client.³

The case that the Greek government should bear responsibility for this incident stood on shaky ground. Cyprus was well outside of Greek territory. The incident occurred under the presidency of Kapodistrias, under whose leadership Greece strove to suppress piracy, even when pirates were attacking in support of the revolution. As such, Greece could not be faulted for enabling the pirates to conduct the raid in question. Greek diplomats responded by turning down the request for reparations, but they saw the bigger game at play.⁴ Were reparations to be granted on such shaky grounds, or even at all, Greek leadership feared there would be no limit to the number of cases that would be brought against the state born in bloody revolution.

Over a decade later, in 1854 at the onset of the Crimean War, Greece still had to convince European allies of its vigilance in hunting pirates.⁵ The outbreak of the Crimean conflict created a disruption in maritime security. The Ottoman Empire had to focus its resources on fighting against the Russians. Both irredentists and pirates saw an opportunity to profit from the chaos. Seeing weakened Ottoman defenses, Greece unofficially sided with Russia and sent forth irregular troops north into Thessaly and Epiros. Incidences of piracy rose in the region, not altogether challenged by the Greek state which welcomed the further disruption of the Ottoman

³ YE 1840/55/1 #4227, pp. 35-6.

⁴ YE 1840/55/1 #4227, pp. 37-8.

⁵ See the letter from Mavrokordatos to Baron Forth-Rouen promising "more precise and severe orders relating to the hunt for pirates." YE 1854/55/1B, #6874, pp 176-7.

security apparatus. Once Britain and France joined the fray on the side of the Ottomans, any chance Greek for territorial expansion from the war diminished. Greece, an insular and peninsular state, had no hope of defeating the British Royal Navy. In May of 1854, British and French occupied the Acropolis in Athens.⁶ No longer trusting Greece to manage its own affairs, for the remainder of the war they set up a government that was in close cooperation with the two western powers.

In order to get out of hot water with Britain and France, Greek ambassadors attempted to soothe concerns that Greece would continue to be a destabilizing force in the region by showing that they were stepping up efforts to expel pirates from Greek territorial waters, citing and translating into French internal correspondence from the Ministry of Justice:

The information of that purchaser which reaches the Minister concerning acts of piracy committed in your area, denotes enough that the ordinary vigilance of the judicial authorities is inadequate to repress the scourge which begins to infest the waters of Greece.

Consequently, both the Prosecutors and the Investigating judges must be doubled in vigilance and attention to each case in their respective jurisdiction... At the slightest suspicion they delay the investigation. The alienation of the objects from the piracy which in all probability are clandestinely sold in the same parts of the Kingdom, under their part also the object of the most active surveillance.

For this purpose, in the first instance of an act of piracy, the prosecutors must accurately verify the horrible nature of the objects; they will inventory the incidences for circulation to the investigating judges of the jurisdiction respecting the waters of their coast to be used for attracting the police authorities to their residence.⁷

⁶ Thomas W. Gallant, *Modern Greece: From the War of Independence to the Present, second edition* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 71.

⁷ YE 1854/55/1 B. #3434 (Translation of #4551 into French), pp. 26-7. P. Kalligas, Minister of Justice, to the General Procurers of the Royal Court.

This letter ends with a commitment to restore normal relations with the Ottoman Empire, an ally of Britain and France. The two western powers expected that Greece would then cooperate in the enforcement of security along international maritime trade routes. Greek officials laid out a position which at first went unnoticed by its protectors and occupiers, but later grew to be a thorn in their relations: that Greece would purge pirates from its own waters. The problem became that Greece did not explicitly aim to remove piracy from the region overall, but simply drove them into other waters. The Greek plan was summed up by Konstantinos Kanaris, Minister of the Navy, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

I have the honor to bring to your knowledge the measures which have just been taken by this Ministry against the piracy which has just been manifested on the coasts of the Negrepoint and the Northern Sporades, and for the extinction of these flames, which is beginning to infest our territories.

The Royal Golette *Matilda* has received the order to reside in the waters of the Negrepoint and patrol constantly, accompanied by the sloop *Delphinie*, along the coasts of this island. She is standing by the Oreos station.

In the Northern Sporades the Royal Cutter *Glaucus* cruises the same, accompanied by the sloop *Panthine*, for surveilling those areas. It is stationed out of Skiathos.

These ships are primarily destined for the extinction of piracy; they shall also lend their appeals to the authorities of those localities and militaries of these localities for the maintenance of public order: Finally, they perform all the duties inherent in the service of the ships of the state, such as the inspection of the papers of the Greek merchant ships encountered *en route*, and so on.⁸

At the time, the allies accepted Greece's plan to increase the security of its maritime border. The resulting cooperation in patrolling and policing the Aegean led to an abundance of

⁸ YE 1854/55/1 B. #2297, pp. 28-9. Athens, May 31 1854.

documentation concerning regional piracy. Documents from this period of semi-occupation tend to be longer, as officials from different states vied to justify their different understandings of piracy against those of other states. Often, they went into greater depth to determine whether or not the suspects were indeed pirates or not. In one instance, a set of documents reveals a fierce debate where the western powers accuse Greece of implicitly supporting piracy so long as it occurs in Ottoman territorial waters.

Pirates or Patriots? The 1854 Epiros Revolt

While the Ottoman Empire was focusing all its attention and resources on fighting the Russians, life became more difficult for its subjects whose prosperity was needed to help ease the Porte's financial burdens. In 1854, peasants in the Epiros region took up arms against the state which was leaving them hungry.

While this revolt was taking place, reports of pirate raids in the northern Aegean began to flow in. British and French captains and diplomats sent a flurry of correspondences questioning whether these raids had anything to do with the rebellion in the neighboring Ottoman province. The captain of the galleon *Solon* assumed it was pirates, while the captain of the Greek schooner *Mathilde* assumed it was revolutionaries who should be supported or at least not interfered with. Ultimately, the suspects turned out to simply be pirates.

I have already had the honor of telling you about the bands of pirates that left in September and October last summer from Euboea, Skiathos and Skopelo. You thought, you told me, that they were not pirates, but the *reyas* that followed the insurrection had fled the Turkish reaction by taking refuge in Greece and eating

bread in this country that were trying to return in Macedonia. I am unfortunately able to undeceive you today. Several individuals of one of the bands which I have mentioned to you have been arrested at Samothrace and Thasos, and I have on board one of those brigands whose confessions, of which I agree so much with the information taken by me on various points I recognize a certain value.⁹

The first reports involved an armed ship entering Greek territorial waters and plundering the mainland and the islands north of Euboea. The British royal steamer *Triton* captained by Lieutenant Lloyd encountered this ship and determined them to be pirates. After apprehending them, Lt. Lloyd turned the suspects over to the local Greek authorities. Once in Greek custody, the local officials declared that the suspects were patriots from Macedonia and not pirates. Rather than transfer them to Volos to meet justice, the pirates were released.

I beg to call your attention in writing, as I have already done verbally, to a communication received from Euboea respecting the liberation as alleged, by the Authorities of Kerochori, of certain prisoners lately seized and delivered into the hands of the gens d'armerie by Lieutenant Lloyd of H.M.S. *Triton*.

Lieutenant Lloyd met a suspicious looking boat filled with armed men, in the direction of Pontico. On hailing them they gave no answer, and on sending a boat to bring them to the steamer, they received it by pointing their guns and pistols from the bushes where they had taken shelter, nor was it until Lieutenant Lloyd had sent another boat well armed, and had obtained aid from the peasantry on H. Wild's estate, that after much resistance on the part of the pirates and a sharp firing on both sides, he was enabled to seize a portion of the pirates.

Lieutenant Lloyd, who, under the circumstances might have detained them himself, delivered his prisoners into the hands of the Greek Gens d'armes. The Gens d'armes transmitted them to the Authorities of Kerochori for confinement and trial, as Robbers and Pirates, but it is since ***stated that the Authorities have pronounced them to belong to the Patriots who have reentered from Thessaly and have allowed them to go freely wherever they chose*** [emphasis mine].

⁹ YE 1854/55/1B, #337, pp 189-91. The Captain of the Frigate *Solon* writing to the commander of the goletta *Mathilde*. Skiathos, 27 December, 1854.

I am persuaded from the zeal which the present Ministers have already shown in repressing crime, that immediate inquiry will be made into this statement, and if found to be borne out by facts, that measures will be taken to punish as it deserves so serious a dereliction of public... [Document suddenly ends, following page missing]¹⁰

Thus began a period when British and French officials increasingly scrutinized Greece's commitment to uprooting piracy. While the episode was being discussed, Greece's minister of foreign affairs, M. Argyropoulos, was replaced by Alexandros Mavrokordatos.

Mavrokordatos immediately tried to assuage the concerns of the protecting powers by reaffirming Greece's commitment to securing its waters. He claimed that Greek reports concerning the suppression of piracy were deemed to be "most satisfactory," and he declared that "this happy result is due to the measures taken by the Commanders of the Royal Governments' French and English War ships. The Government appreciates the true value of the services of the Royal naval forces. We give our gratitude and thanks to commanders Rouen of the steamer *Narval* and Wyse of the Frigate *Leander* who contributed to reestablishing public security in our lands."¹¹ The new foreign minister's wording and confidence did not put allied officials at ease, as it seemed to suggest that Greece sought only to relocate pirates from Greek waters to neighboring seas. The implications of this policy of relocation rather than persecution will be further explored in the next section. International trade, particularly that of the Britain, France, and their Ottoman ally, remained threatened. Mavrokordatos was unable to convince the British and French ambassadors to have the same confidence in the Greek legal system that he

¹⁰ YE 1854/55/1 A, pp 96-99. #148423. Letter in English from Thomas Wyse to M. Argyropoulos, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Athens, July 25 1854.

¹¹ YE 1854/55/1 B, p. 99. Letter in French from the Hellenic Ministry of the Royal House to Thomas Wyse and Baron Rouen (English and French Ambassadors). Athens, 30 July 1854.

possessed. Thomas Wyse, the British ambassador, offered a detailed critique of the failures of Greece's provincial governments to prosecute suspected pirates, even when there was strong evidence against them. The full text is provided in the appendix of the chapter, but a brief selection shows Wyse's disappointment with the Greek justice system: "They were, after a short and inefficient examination by the Commissary of Police, recognized as 'Patriots' and not as 'Pirates...' It is to be observed that the assessors of Agriovotani and Corbatzi neither read nor write."¹²

The framework in which the provincial Greek administration understood these events was similar to Eric Hobsbawm's picture of bandits as "primitive rebels."¹³ These were men of violence, acting out in a social context which the administration more than the pirates themselves viewed as unjust. Greek officials viewed these men as the *klefts* and revolutionaries of the previous generation: every act of violence, every move to break down society was one step closer to emancipation from Ottoman rule. They ignored, of course, that these pirates were also raiding Greek territory and allied ships. To the officials of Kerochori, Agriovotani, and Corbatzi, the question was not so much if these men were pirates *or* patriots, but if they were pirates *and* patriots. Within a framework of primitive rebellion, an act of piracy was an act of patriotism.

¹² YE 1854/55/1 A, pp 116-130. #4964. Athens, 30th August, 1854. Letter in English from Thomas Wyse, the British Ambassador, to Mr. A. Mavrokordatos, Minister of Foreign Affairs. This is the first document where the Minister of Foreign Affairs changes from Argyropoulos to Mavrokordatos.

¹³ See, Eric Hobsbawm, *Primitive rebels: Studies in archaic forms of social movement in the 19th and 20th centuries* (Manchester University Press, 1971). Hobsbawm's understanding of banditry has sparked much debate on the topic. While at this point, academics generally refute his understanding of banditry as not reflecting reality, it does reflect folk understanding of banditry and social resistance. Thus, it is worth using his frameworks when discussing how different societies understood banditry as part of their social fabric.

Greece Exporting Piracy?

The above documents involving suspected rebels from Epiros who turned out to be merely pirates show the commitment Greece had to securing its own waters, and western skepticism at Greece effectively doing so. The Greek minister of foreign affairs, Mavrokordatos, wrote that piracy did not exist in the region when British and French warships held clear evidence to the contrary. The foreign ambassadors then suspected Greece of tribalism – favoring ethnic brothers over the law.

Diplomats from the Great Powers were interested in purging pirates, the enemies of all, from all the waters in which they traded. Piracy impacted shipping, both directly, by literally robbing proceeds, and indirectly, by creating a practical necessity in which merchant ships would need to pay higher insurance premiums to traverse pirate-infested waters.¹⁴

By late 1854, Greece had repeatedly stated its position on how to deal with piracy. In December of that year, western patience snapped as the Greek strategy proved ineffective at deterring piratical raids upon allied shipping. When Mavrokordatos informed the French delegation of a pirate raid upon a French warship, he did little to address what measures might be taken to prevent such raids. “A galley, mounted by forty men, marched at intervals from time to time, signaling its passage by the acts of piracy, and even of brigandage committed by its crew and the naval vessel, *Espeax Marte*, by six men armed, traverses in the same guilty vestiges the waters of which they left. The Royal Goletta *Mathilde* was ordered to depart and cruise to

¹⁴ Erik Gøbel, "The Danish 'Algerian Sea Passes', 1747-1838: An Example of Extraterritorial Production of 'Human Security' / Die 'Algerischen Seepässe' Dänemarks, 1747-1838: Ein Beispiel der extraterritorialen Produktion humaner Sicherheit." *Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung* (2010): 164-189.

prevent pirates from attempting to raid the waters and isles of Greece.”¹⁵ Greece was already scrutinized by the British on the issue of piracy. It had done little to convince its western allies that it took their concerns about maritime security seriously. The French ambassador, Baron Forth-Rouen, was furious at the Greek government for being disinterested in actually quashing piracy. He started by blaming Greek authorities for refusing to share intelligence with French forces who were hunting pirates and ends with a direct accusation. “It is painfully astonishing that in the Pro Memoria note, the commander of the *Mathilde* was ordered not to purge the pirates, but simply to prevent them from entering into the waters of Greece.”¹⁶

To the French ambassador, Greece seemed interested in reducing piracy only in its own waters while keeping it active in neighboring Ottoman domains. The Greek fleet was told to turn away pirate ships, not capture or destroy them. Seeing the directness of the accusation and fearing repercussions, Mavrokordatos both justified Greek actions and promised vague procedural reforms. “The memoria which I have had the honor of addressing you on this subject had no other purpose than to inform us of their presence on dimensions which it is not permissible for our warships to explore past a certain distance. As to the orders given to the Commander of the *Mathilde*, ... [They have been ordered] to commit to document more precise and severe orders relating to the hunt for pirates.”¹⁷ Mavrokordatos listed why Greek warships could not legally pursue pirates outside of Greek territorial waters, but he dodged the question of why they would not prosecute those pirates caught within those borders. The commitment to

¹⁵ YE 1854/55/1B. p. 166. #6813. Athens 9/21 December 1854. Document in French from Mavrokordatos addressed to Baron Rouen.

¹⁶ YE 1854/55/1B. pp 174-5. #6879. Athens 22 December 1854. Letter in French from Baron Forth-Rouen to Mavrokordatos.

¹⁷ 1854/55/1B. pp 176-7. #6899. Athens 14/26 December 1854. Letter in French from Mavrokordatos to Baron Forth-Rouen.

levy more severe punishments upon pirates remained loose and would not necessarily ease French concerns over Greek security. The promise for more precise orders addressed the concerns that the British had earlier in the year, when Greek provincial government did not find the captured pirates to be pirates at all. Legal reform could force provincial government to have a more precise definition of piracy that could not be skirted away from so easily. Of course, these promises were those of a politician aiming at placating a particular audience and were not guaranteed to be bound by a legislative authority.

On several occasions afterwards during the nineteenth century, Greece would implicitly support piracy just outside its borders. This raises the question: why did Greece want to explicitly avoid purging pirates? Some of the answer lies in the feasibility of getting the job done. Committing to a total war on piracy would place a huge burden on resources. With what resources Greece on hand, it was impractical, if not impossible, to have warships patrolling all the coasts of Greece. “As the maritime force which the Government has at its disposal is insupportable, and cannot, therefore, extend its surveillance over the whole extent of our country, we impatiently await our ships retained in the port of Gravisa... We shall take it upon ourselves to put the newly arrived vessels into operation; and we hope, by their assistance, to completely purge the waters of Greece of all traces of piracy.”¹⁸

If the pirates could be driven elsewhere in a more cost-effective manner, they would become someone else’s problem. For Greece’s geographic situation, this almost always meant that pirates would be driven to the Ottoman Empire, though sometimes they would head west to the British-held Ionian Islands. Would Greece risk the security of its own waters to ensure that

¹⁸ YE 1854/55/1 B. #2297, pp. 28-9. Athens, May 31 1854.

Ottoman waters were less secure? This question will be raised multiple times in this dissertation, and in most cases, the answer is affirmative: Greece did hope that piracy would weaken their Ottoman neighbor.

Pirate Kinship Networks

One common question about piracy is who were the pirates? Much like banditry, pirate bands were largely formed from kinship networks. Several primary sources show us pirate crews consisting of nuclear families, extended kinship networks, members of a single ethnic group, and members of diverse ethnic groups. There was a plurality of pirate-crew makeups extant during the nineteenth century. Pirates often affiliated with locals both to gain intelligence, access to markets, and places to hide away. This section will provide examples of each of these social networks at play among pirate crews.

When attempting to identify pirates, historians often only have a name to go by. When several individuals have the same surname that probably indicates a close kinship connection. Ethnicity cannot be determined with the same level of confidence. The same person could be recorded as Nikolaos, Niccolo, or Nicholas, depending on the preference of the administrator creating the record. Each of these names suggest a different ethnicity, in this case Greek, Italian, and English or French. Also, individuals could have surnames that do not match the way that they identify themselves. Thus, any ethnic designation from name alone is at best guesswork. Additionally, determining a pirate to be Greek does not answer which state they were subjects of. Greeks were likely to be from Greece, the Ottoman Empire, the Ionian Islands, as well as the

smaller possibility of them being subjects of other states. All of these concerns can be seen in the following text: “All these Pirates are Greeks, and from them we know of one named Pietro Leucaditi from Santa Maura [Leucadia/Lefkada]. They exposed with their oath that they have communicated with pirates who cannot be known if they come from Greece or from Turkey.”¹⁹ Both the personal and surname of Pietro Leucaditi could be Greek or Italian, depending on if the name was modified by the penman. The “Greek” pirates he communicated with could likewise be either from the Greek Kingdom or *Rum* from the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, the Ionian lawman seems to discount the potential of the suspects being Ionian citizens, yet another possible subjecthood common to ethnic Greeks.

One of the most common relations visible among pirates was familial. Oftentimes, two or more crew members had the same surname, suggesting either a filial or a fraternal relation. While anthropological work on Mediterranean families emphasizes the important of extended kin networks (Turkish: *soy*; Greek: *σώι*), nuclear families remained a critical part of that framework. The following example shows the proceeds from piracy being split among a nuclear family.

To follow up on my letter of October 29th, you will receive an excerpt from a report by the *Heron's* Commanding Officer, I am writing to inform you that the Royal Prosecutor of Syra having interrogated the three individuals whom Captain Lebegue has taken to Henousa, to guide himself in the search for the two pirates who took refuge in this island, one of the interrogated individuals declared who the famous Nicotzara, I find at this moment in Euboea, with five of his companions. This pirate leader has his father, his mother and several brothers in Chalcis, who are all designated as recalling the proceeds of his robberies.

¹⁹ “Tutti queste Pirati sono Greci, e da essi conossero uno di nome Pietro Leucaditi da Sta Maura. Tanto esposero col loro giuramento, ed io siccome ho rilevato che hanno comunicato con pirati i quali non si puo conoscere da quale parte erano partiti; o dalla Grecia ovvero dalla Turchia.” YE 1846/55/1, pp. 9-11, #14359. Eussamia, 14 September 1846. Letter in Italian from Fermiato Antonio F. Pana, Incaricato di Pamita to the Local Director of Cefalonia.

I presume that the Royal Prosecutor of Syra will transmit this information to the Hellenic Government, and in any case I beg Your Excellency to agree with the colleagues that he be procured without delay for the arrest of the pirate Nicotzara.²⁰

The kinship networks seen among pirates correlate to those found on land amongst bandits. Outlaws may have operated outside of the law, but they did not operate outside of society. Thomas Gallant's conclusion about bandit kinship applies equally to the case of pirates: "if one part of Hobsbawm's argument is that 'scratch a bandit and you will find a peasant,' then the corollary should be 'scratch the bandit next to him and you will find his brother.' The social universe of the bandit was replete with constellations of kinship connections. Greek bandits were not lone wolves but collections of kinsmen, and banditry was a family affair."²¹

There are several examples of crews that seem to be predominately from one ethnic group. When piracy occurs around the Aegean, it tends to be Greek names. When piracy occurs off the coasts of Italy, it tends to be Italian. When the Ionian islands report piracy, it is often names that appear as a hybrid of Greek and Italian. When the Ottomans discuss piracy in foreign correspondence in French, the names tend to be Frankified versions of names that are predominately Greek with hints of Turkish features: Themistocli Dourmeli, Manuel Beynoglidi, Alexandre Aridriadi, Démétre Trakérogliidi, Constantin Holologa.²² The language of

²⁰ YE 1854/55/1A, pp. 12-3, #6599. Athens, 23 November/ 9 December 1854. Letter in French from Baron Forth-Rouen to Mavrokordatos.

²¹ Thomas W. Gallant, "Greek Bandit Gangs: Lone Wolves or a Family Affair?," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 6 (1988): 283-4.

²² BOA HR.TO 481/60. Constantinople, 1 December 1855. Letter in French from Ion Ghica to Fuad Pasha, Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, concerning piracy on Samos.

correspondence has a major impact in the appearance of names and can lead to errors in identification.

The following list of suspects in Greece shows several layers of network.²³

List of the accused:

Ιωάννης Μανώλης Μαύρων	Ioannis Manolis Mavron
Νικόλαος Καζόλης	Nikolaos Kazolis
Μανώλης Μοσχονάς	Manolis Moschonas
Ιωάννης Τζέτος	Ioannis Tzetos
Χριστόδουλος Σαπουνάς	Christodoulos Sapounas
Γεωργής παππά Στρατής Σκοπελίτης	Georgi Pappas Stratis Skopelitis
Κώτζος Λιάκου	Koutzos Liakou
Μανώλης Γ. Μποναφής	Manolis G. Bonaface
Γεώργιος Κώστας	Georgios Kostas
Σαντούλας Αντωνίου	Santoulas Antoniou
Χαράλαμπος Κοφτερός	Charalampos Kofteros
Αλεξίου Διακοκκόλας	Alexiou Diakokolas
Μιχαήλ Κατσούλης	Michael Katsoulis
Ιωάννης Βουλής	Ioannis Voulis
Νικόλαος Κατζιώτης	Nicholas Katsiotis
Δημήτριος παππά Ελισσαίου	Dimitrios Pappa Elisaίου
Κάρας Δημήτρης Ν. Μαργιός	Kara Dimitri N. Marios
Ιωάννης Δ Χαλέπης	Ioannis D Chalepis
Χριστόδουλος Ιωάννου Σπύρου	Christodoulos Ioannou Spyrou
Κωνσταντίνος Ιωάννου Σπύρου	Konstantinos Ioannou Spyrou
Κωνσταντίνος παππαδίτζας	Konstantinos Pappaditzas
Μανώλης Παλαμάρης	Manolis Palamaris
Μιχαήλ Διαμαντής Καφετζής	Michael Diamantis Kafetzis
Μιχαήλ Ραφαλιάς	Michael Rafalias
Γεώργιος Π. Στρατής	Georgios P. Stratis
Ζαχαρίας Μιχαήλ	Zacharias Michail
Γεώργιος Δεληγεώργης	Georgios Deligeorgis
Αναστάσιος Κοντραφούρης	Anastasios Kontrafouris

There are some individuals with the same surname, suggesting a close familial relation. The names seem to be mostly Greek, but there are some instances where foreign names could appear Hellenized. Could Rafalias be Raphael? Tzetos Jet? Names like Zachary Michael are ambiguous.

²³ YE 1855/55/1A, pp. 56-7, #3917. Syros, 8 March 1855. Council report on suspects of piracy off the coast of Syros and Andros.

Michael Kafetzis (Turkish: *kahveci*, meaning coffee seller) has an ambiguous Christian personal name and a Turkish occupational surname. The accused could all be Greek, or they could be drawn from different ethnicities. Ultimately, determining one way or another by imposing current understandings of ethnicity does not allow for a deeper understanding of these individuals. They may have operated in a multi-ethnic world, but they did not necessarily view it that way. Religious identity remained a more visible and important marker of identity. That could be visible through name, dress and action.

Identity is complicated and multifaceted. In 1848, Greek-Ottoman (*Rum*) pirates were pillaging Moroccan pilgrims passing through Egyptian waters for the Hajj. Britain assisted with the Ottoman-Egyptian suppression of these pirates by sending over a warship from the Ionian Islands. The captain that was sent to fight these *Rum* pirates appears in the Ottoman documents as Corciyo Kaliga, or Giorgios Kalligas.²⁴ Simultaneously, we have ethnically Greek pirates from the Ottoman Empire attacking Muslim pilgrims to the Ottoman Empire. And tasked with combatting the pirates and protecting the Moroccan pilgrims was an ethnic Greek captain in the British fleet, likely from the Ionian Islands.²⁵ The raids existence initially seems to suggest a sharp line of religious conflict in the Ottoman Empire. This wisp of sectarianism is immediately complicated by the nature of the captain who restored order to the region and defeated the pirates. This incident is perhaps better viewed from a lens of personal profit and imperial control rather than religious conflict. Pilgrims have always been easy prey to ne'er-do-wells along their routes of passage. These travelers were from a faraway land, not neighbors with whom the

²⁴ BOA A.MKT 148/12. 13 September 1848. Document in Ottoman Turkish to the Vali of Egypt.

²⁵ Kalligas was a very common name on Kefalonia, one of the Ionian Islands.

pirates would daily interact. Likewise, Kalligas was simply a captain from the nearest corner of the British Empire able to send aid.

Pirates relied on forming personal connections with numerous individuals. They did not exist alone at sea, forever separate from society. They needed shelter, both for themselves and their ships. They had to have trading partners with whom to fence their goods. They required informants who could signal to them when they were safe and when they were threatened by a nearby patrolling warship. The shepherd Darba Constandi who aided the Epirote pirates mentioned earlier in this chapter provided many of these services.

In October it was understood with the names Dimitri Dalaban, Manuelo and Giovanni former insurgents. They fled Sernik to Kero-Chori, and went to Skiathos and Skopelo where they recruited three new companions of the insurrection, Giorgi, Anthony of Hydra, and Hiero Constanti of Hypsara. Thus to the number of seven they were stricken on the delago island they found the shepherd Darba Constandi who gave them food. When you came to this island with your schooner, the same shepherd advised them to conceal their boat and join each other in the mountains. They thus escaped your surveillance, and when you were far off, they were able to raise their boat and establish their cruise in the surrounding islands in the time that bad weather held them up for a few days.

In this interval they plundered a Chiote schooner from Salonica, and before they went to Macedonia they committed new acts of piracy, rewarding the Constandi shepherd by giving him a share of their first booty. He received two of the meal of flour, chestnuts, apples, a blanket, a double-breasted jacket, and a gun. This shepherd must be arrested and punished for his relations with the brigands. Admitting that he had the strength to give them provisions, nothing can excuse him for having saved his wretches by warning them of your arrival, or of having shared the proceeds of their theft.

If I had not found you, I would have thought it my duty to arrest Darba Constandi myself; But I am persuaded that you will think, as I do, that the act of complicity with which he has been guilty will not go unpunished; And all that remains for me

is to render the Admiral commanding the French forces responsible for the information I am communicating to you by this letter.²⁶

As a reward for his aid, the pirates bestowed upon him a share of their booty. Even in this period when organized corsairing societies are no more, there were people who proved themselves willing accomplices to piracy. Shepherds are notorious for living outside the realm of the state and affiliating with criminals who do the same. There were two main factors in Constandi's cooperation with the pirates. One was making a profit, even if it was from agricultural products and other supplies. The other was the cost of not cooperating. Were he to earn their ire, his flock would make an easy, tasty meal for the pirates, to mention nothing of his own personal safety. For those living on the margins of society, siding with pirates and bandits over the state often posed less risk.

Captives or Corsairs?

Traditional networks for ransoming captives faded away alongside the societies that profited from the practice. As has already been shown in chapter two, when a pirate was captured, one common defense was to claim that he had been captured and forcibly pressed into the service of pirates. The case of Dimitris Koutzoukos is a significant one, because it either shows continued existence into the 1850s of a market for ransom or that the captured pirate could

²⁶ YE 1854/55/1B, #337, pp 189-91. The Captain of the Frigate *Solon* writing to the commander of the goletta *Mathilde*. Skiathos, 27 December, 1854.

reasonable deceive the authorities that he had been a victim of ransoming, among the crew only to be sold off.

In March, Demetre Coutzoucos, a resident of Syra, a peaceful and well-known citizen, was taken by pirates on his way to Skyros to fish. After a thousand instances the pirates finally known to release one of the three mates of the captured ship in order to bring to the family of Coutzoucos some help; But they retained the latter and the two sailors in order to make them useful for the maneuver.²⁷

The Corsairs were arrested a little later by a French war-ship along with the unfortunate Coutzoucos and his companions. They were transported to the island of Rhodes, where they were indistinctly booked by the Ottoman Authorities.

The Commander of the French Vessel informed of Coutzoucos' representatives of his innocence and of the injustice he had experienced in confusing him with the pirates, said to have been written to the Admiral who had invited the Consul of France to Syra and has submitted information. M. Guerin having collected at the port office of that island the best information on Coutzoucos's account, had to transmit them to the Admiral.

Nevertheless, the poor prisoner still gets imprisoned at Rhodes, where he writes to his family that, confounded with the corsairs, he undergoes the same treatment as these criminals.

The mother of Coutzoucos and those of the families of the two sailors imprisoned with him come to arrive in Athens to implore the assistance of the Government to favor their liberation.

The French Minister is kindly requested to recall this affair to the Admiral and to hasten these acts of justice by his intervention in favor of Coutzoucos and the two sailors unjustly confounded with the pirates.²⁸

²⁷ Maneuver could be interpreted as gambit or manipulation.

²⁸ YE 55/1/1854. #5145. pp 126-7. Athens. 9/21 September 1854. Letter from the Hellenic Royal House to Baron Forth-Rouen of France.

Forth-Rouen's description of the incident offers some understanding of ransom during the 1850s. As already mentioned, there was no longer an existing system of ransom. This is confirmed when we see that pirates needed to release one of their captives to inform the families and community of the others who had been taken captive. No longer was there a standardized network of middlemen that would handle ransom exchanges. If a pirate was to receive ransom payments for his captives, they would need to handle the exchange themselves. For both parties, this greatly increased the risk of the encounter. Either side could set up the other. The families of the victims could notify the authorities and have them lay in ambush to capture the outlaws, or the pirates could overwhelm the families, take the money, and kill, capture, or otherwise incapacitate the ransom-payers. A great deal of trust was necessary for such a system based on direct contact to pay ransom to work. Mistrust was much easier to come by, which is one of the key distinctions between early modern and modern piracy. In the past, ransoming captives was one of the main sources of profit from piracy. Without ready markets for captives, the entire ransom economy fell apart.

As far as Koutzoukos and the other sailors being considered pirates, even from this narrative clearly favoring his release, we see that his contemporaries were suspicious. The Ottoman garrison at Rhodes and the French Navy both saw fit to imprison Koutzoukos along with the rest of those captured on the pirate ship. Only the Greek Kingdom showed interest in arguing that Koutzoukos should be released. The Greek port official of Ermoupoli, writing in July to the Ministry of the Navy, took Koutzoukos's story as true.²⁹ The defense of his position of innocence rested on his mother's plea that he was a man of good character.

²⁹ See YE 1854/55/1B. pp. 128-130, #1047. Ermoupoli, 21 July 1854. Letter in Greek from the Limnarch Milaras of Ermoupoli to the Hellenic Ministry of the Navy.

This incident provides evidence that pirates still seemed to be interested in taking captives up to the 1850s, likely for ransom or more generally as a bargaining chip or a hostage for leverage. Later chapters will show that this practice faded away as the century moved along, pirate crew sizes shrunk, the economy steadily improved, and ready access to markets for ransom and slavery diminished. As ransom practices and crew sizes changed, the other characteristics of piracy remained relatively static throughout piracy's decline over the century. Pirates continued to draw upon and interact with similar segments of the general populace. The state, Greece in particular, continued to exploit them during periods of rebellion in the Ottoman Empire by driving them into the neighboring seas. The landmark for the legislative shift against piracy came at the end of the Crimean War. In the 1856 Treaty of Paris, international law turned against the main form of state-supported piracy – privateering.

Appendix: Thomas Wyse's Critique of the Greek Trial of Pirates

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your official Notes of the 9/21 and 12/24 Instant with their enclosures, in answer to mine of 25th July, respecting the encounter of her Majesty's Steamer *Triton*, with a Boat, filled with armed Greeks, off the North East Coast of Euboea, and the complaint made of their escape, with the permission of the local authorities, with a request on my part that an investigation should be instituted without delay, into the statement in question.

In reply you inform me that such an investigation had taken place by order of the Greek Government under the direction of the local Authorities, and that the result had been that the parties had not been held quietly, and you enclose me the depositions in which this conclusion is formed.

After a minute analysis of this evidence (rendered difficult by its voluminous character, and the careless manner in which it seems to have been collected and drawn up), I must confess that it presents to my mind any other impression than that of a conviction of its accuracy or the good faith of the persons to whom it was entrusted.

The first point which strikes me, is the omission or denial of the important charge of Lieutenant Lloyd on which the whole case rests, and the little pains taken to ascertain how far either are well grounded.

For about a week previous to the arrival of the *Triton*, a Pirate boat, is stated by Mr. Leeves, (copy of whose letter, I have the honour to enclose) to have been seen hovering about the village of Corbatzi, and have been fired on by the coast guard at daylight on the 26th June while cruising off the North East Coast of Euboea. Lieutenant Lloyd of Her Majesty's Steamer *Triton* informs Captain Marios in his official letter, (copy of which I have also the honour to enclose) that he observed a caique to shorten sail and pull in for the land. Chase was immediately given, and a boat was sent to overhawl her. It was found that the crew had deserted her, and retired to the Bush, and upon the Boats boarding her, a number of Greeks well-armed, made threatening gestures by pointing guns, and pistols at the Boat's Crew, where upon this immediately returned to the ship and being reinforced by another boat manned and armed, pulled in shore, and on nearing the land, a sharp fire was opened on them from the Jungle, which was returned with shell and shot from the ship, and small arms from the boats, under cover of which the caique was towed off to the ship.

Knowing several of the Proprietors in the vicinity, from whom he had previously learned that a horde of pirates were constantly infecting the adjacent creeks, Lt. Lloyd went to inform them of his capture of the boat, and that the pirates still remained on their lands, without the means of escape, and it was arranged that they should muster the peasantry and proceed to the point where the pirates had retired, and that he himself should return to the spot by Sea.

Lt. Lloyd adds, that by this means 15 of these lawless fellows were captured, all armed with guns, pistols, and knives, that they were given over to the Greek Police, and marched off to Oreos; He immediately returned to Volo.

Now this statement which is circumstantial and clear, on their first being questioned who they were, and what was their business by Balagiapoulos, "Special Assesseur" of the Village of Agriovatani, is limited to the assertion that they had been chased by an English Ship, and compelled to land. When afterwards examined, the same Assessor of Agriovatani, (who could have known nothing but what he heard from these men,) on being asked at his examination whether any of the 15 men had fired on the English, replies promptly ("No, they did not fire"), (ὄχι δεν εσυρωβόλησαν). At Corbatzi the 15 men repeated their story, but apparently at greater length. They stated that on their way to Oreos for which place they were bound, they fell in with an English Steamer, which sent out a boat to examine them. They affirmed, that they had showed their papers, and told them, they belonged to Karitasso's band, and had come from Macedonia. The boat, on this, returned to the Steamer, but a few instants after, made its appearance a second time, accompanied by another boat, both fully armed, and being pursued by these boats, and fired on by Cannon from the Steamer, they were compelled to land and abandon their boat. On the Assessor of Corbatzi asking them if they had offered any resistance to the English, they replied "No Brother, if we had wished to offer resistance, and especially to the English, we should not have come here,

nor do we know for what motive they fired on us and why they pursued us in such a manner since we showed them our papers and they saw we were honest men, and the more so, as we were in a position to resist them had we wished them not to approach us.” In their examination before the commissioner of Police of Istiaion. C Nicolaides by name they declared, they had been stopped and subsequently set at liberty by the *Triton*.

Though the facts stated by Lieutenant Lloyd were in great measure before them in my letter, and this evidence is not only at variance with the statement of Lieutenant Lloyd but with that of each other no cross examination or confronting of witnesses or any other means usually adopted to elicit truth, were adopted; of the various depositions taken, not one is from any person who had been witness of the encounter nor from any of the 15 men in the caique, but from the assessors or local authorities themselves, who repeat hearsay evidence, or verbal evidence given to themselves, they having a direct interest in quashing evidence or modifying it so, as to furnish a case to their own advantage.

The same inaccuracy or looseness is to be detected in their statements respecting the capture and detention of the men in question.

Taking the evidence however even as it stands, it does not appear that they had, as they have stated, had of their own accord presented themselves.

The assessor of Agrobotani goes out with his armed villagers to pursue them he takes them with him to Agriovotani, and then sends them on under care of a national guard (to whom he entrusts a letter for the baron) to Kerochori. On their way they are met by the assessor of Corbatzi Demetrius Louzos by name accompanied by Mr. Wild the Proprietor of Corbatzi, a gendarme and a number of armed villagers, in consequence of the information received from the Lt. Lloyd who had come round to Corbatzi that the Pirates were on shore without any means of escape. Mr. Wild

however having gone off to the *Triton* where he received from Lt. Lloyd a detailed account of the affray, and which Mr. Wild afterwards repeated to Mr. Leeves, he found that the 15 men who had been given in charge to the gendarme and the gendarme to whom they had been entrusted and whom Mr. Wild had directed to wait his return, had all gone on to Kerochori. On the same evening Lt. Lloyd sailed for Volo, with the Caique in tow, and under the full impression they the 15 men had, under the escort of the Greek Gendarmerie or Police, been given over to the proper Greek Authorities, to be dealt with accordingly. On their arrival however the same evening at Kerochori, it would seem that their number had unaccountably diminished from 15 to 9. They were, after a short and inefficient examination by the Commissary of Police, recognized as "Patriots" and not as "Pirates," and received passports from the Police, five for Atalanta, and the other four for Lamia.

It is to be observed that the assessors of Agriovotani and Corbatzi neither read nor write.

There is sufficient in what I have just stated to justify distrust in both, in the proceedings and the animus in which they have been conducted, and to call from the Greek Govt., who can only have on object, the sincere and vigorous accomplishment of the ends of Justice, a fresh inquiry under different guidance, into the whole affair.³⁰

³⁰ YE 1854/55/1 A, pp 116-130. #4964. Athens, 30th August, 1854. Letter in English from Thomas Wyse, the British Ambassador, to Mr. A. Mavrokordatos, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Chapter 5: Increased Enforcement and the Persistence of Piracy, 1856-1869

The Crimean War ended in 1856 with the Treaty of Paris. As part of the more comprehensive program to keep the peace, Great Britain, France, Prussia, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Greece, the Ottoman Empire, and forty-eight other nations signed the Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, which sought to unify international maritime law. The measures agreed to were as follows:

1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished;
2. The neutral flag protects enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war;
3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag;
4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.¹

The opening statement of this document sounded the death-knell for legitimate maritime-raiding.² A grand coalition, including the world's maritime colonial powers, agreed to ban the practice of licensed plunder. Attacking a ship was now only legal when the two nations were at war, and any merchandise from neutral states was not a legitimate prize. Additionally, the requirement of blockades to be effective would stop squadrons from declaring a false blockade to

¹ Declaration Respecting Maritime Law. Paris, 16 April 1856.

² The United States refused to sign the treaty, as Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution clearly invested Congress with the ability "to declare War, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal and make Rules concerning Capture on Land and Water." The Northern States began to regret this decision when the Southern Confederacy deployed privateers during the Civil War. The United States was among the last states to adhere to the Treaty of Paris and its ban on privateering, doing so at the century's end during the 1898 Spanish-American war. See Daniel Heller-Roazen. *The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations* (New York: Zone Books, 2009), 89-90.

plunder passerby ships at random. Trade routes would be made impassable, not simply preyed upon. Thus, much of the incentive for seeking letters of marque was lost.

These regulations more clearly defined what actions were acceptable for regular naval officers to take. They also clashed with some longstanding maritime traditions that captains considered legitimate. This chapter, in part, looks at the actions of one such captain— Augustus Charles Hobart-Hampden, who for over a decade cruised the Eastern Mediterranean. In his years as a captain, he skirted the bounds of maritime law as laid out by the Treaty of Paris, first by acting arguably as a privateer, literally, ordering his men to go undercover as pirates, and later by playing with the definition of piracy so as to label a hostile, neutral ship that broke his incomplete blockade as an act of piracy. Recognizing privateering as illegal moved the line that maritime military entrepreneurs skirted between piracy and privateering. No longer could marauders pillage ships at sea while claiming legitimacy from a state. Likewise, traditional naval vessels could no longer safely cross the line and act as irregulars without fear of stirring diplomatic trouble.

Naval reforms accompanied the changes to international maritime law during this period. The Ottoman Empire under the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz expanded and modernized its naval forces. The British Royal Navy also further concerned itself with securing the peace in Ottoman waters. Both of these policy changes brought about an increased capacity to enforce maritime laws and suppress piracy. On the other hand, the 1860s were a time wracked by the instability caused by the expulsion of King Otto from Greece, the *Risorgimento* in neighboring Italy, and a rebellion on Crete. These regional political convulsions created security challenges that local powers responded to by increasing their maritime security capabilities. Increased naval military presence alone did little to dissuade Aegean islanders from seeking their fortunes via plunder.

Shifting legal circumstances alone did not reduce the frequency of piracy occurring in the Eastern Mediterranean. While the Greek and Ottoman economies remained relatively stagnant throughout the 1850s and 60s, reports of piracy appeared at the same rates as before the Crimean War. It was not until those economies took off in the 1870s that fewer individuals decided to take to the account, committing piracy, and instead picked up the plow to participate in the cash-crop craze. The next chapter will discuss the current boom's growth of the Greek economy and its correlation to a halving of reports of piracy by decade.³

Period	Ottoman Empire, All Seas	Ottoman Mediterranean	Greece
1841-55	11	9	14
1856-69	9	9	11
1870-84	10	1	9

Figure 5.1: Comparison of documents pertaining to piracy in BOA and YE over fourteen-year periods.

When looking at the occurrence of piracy reported in the archives of the Ottoman Prime Ministry and the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a few trends become apparent. The first is that in the four decades following the implementation of the Ottoman *Tanzimat* reforms which began in 1839 with the Edict of the Rose Garden, the rate of piracy in the Ottoman Empire as a whole remained level. Neither the *Tanzimat* nor the Treaty of Paris triggered a significant reduction in piracy in the Ottoman Empire. When filtering the data by region, it becomes

³ This halving is when examining rates of piracy by decade, as seen in Figure 1.4 in chapter one.

apparent that prior to 1870 nearly all of Ottoman reports of piracy during the mid-nineteenth century record episodes that took place in the Mediterranean, whereas after that year nearly none did. It is likely that the opening of the Suez Canal and the redirection of trade routes was a major cause of the shifting locations of piracy. Likewise, as will be discussed in the next chapter, unequal economic growth allowed the Mediterranean region to reap the bounties of being the only region capable of producing currants and raisins. While Anatolia was able to meaningfully engage with these market opportunities, other regions of the empire languished in financial chaos. Over the same forty-three-year period, Greece experienced a slow, gradual decline in piracy. However, reports of piracy in the Greek archives continued to occur at higher rates than with their Ottoman neighbors.

Captain Hobart's Failed Covert Anti-Piracy Operation

The Treaty of Paris was a legal response to an experienced reality: state-sponsored piracy was officially designated as a thing of the past. So, when British naval forces disguised themselves as pirates in 1862 (see below), this blurred a line that could be interpreted as privateering — an activity only recently made criminal. Captain Hobart, the man responsible for organizing this clandestine operation, frantically sought to prevent the Ottomans from making any such connection to privateering by putting them on the defensive with complaints of his own. An accusation from the Royal Navy was a worry that no pasha would wish for.

Augustus Charles Hobart-Hampden, first stationed on the HMS *Foxhound* in the Mediterranean in the early years of the 1860s, was a captain of the British Royal Navy. Prior to

becoming an officer, he was part Britain's global abolitionist efforts to hunt slaver ships in the south Atlantic.⁴ Despite being employed in a noble cause, his own sympathies did not focus on the moral rectitude of human trafficking and slavery, but rather on adventure. Between his stints in the Mediterranean and during the American Civil War, he aided the Confederacy by running supplies past the Union blockade. Had he felt strongly on the issue of ending the slave trade, he would not have aided one of its last strongholds. His moral compass was centered around profit and adventure, not philanthropy.

It is worth examining Hobart in more detail because he will feature prominently in this chapter: First in 1862 when he devised a brash plan to covertly hunt pirates and lashes out when that plan ends in catastrophe, and again in 1867 when he used his own experience of running blockades to gain Ottoman naval commission to stop Greek blockade runners from supplying the rebellion in Crete.⁵

On May 16th, 1862, Edward, the Prince of Wales, arrived in Rhodes as part of his grand tour through the Mediterranean. British officials in the region scrambled to prepare an itinerary with which to honor his royal highness. The British Consul, Robert Campbell, arranged to bring the prince incognito, under the alias of Baron Renfrew, into the city of Rhodes for a visit to some ancient Phoenician ruins on a nearby island.⁶ Campbell forwarded a report that day to the Foreign Office in London stating that three days earlier a pirate trabaccolo had left from Cape

⁴ Hobart-Hampden's autobiography has been published under two titles. See, Augustus Charles Hobart-Hampden, *Hobart Pasha: Blockade-running, Slaver-hunting, and War and Sport in Turkey* (Outing Publishing Company, 1915); and Hobart Pasha, *Sketches from my Life, by Hobart Pasha* (Longmans, Green, & Company, 1886). The contents of both works are identical.

⁵ See chapter 17, "I Enter the Turkish Navy" in, Hobart-Hampden, Augustus Charles. *Hobart Pasha: Blockade-running, Slaver-hunting, and War and Sport in Turkey*. Outing Publishing Company, 1915.

⁶ TNA, FO 78/1534, Campbell to Russell, Rhodes, May 16, 1862. No 25.

Crio and pursued a bombard from Scio around the islands of Simi and Seskli.⁷ The report continued that during the afternoon in which the report was delivered, a trabaccolo flying the Ionian flag attacked a Samiote vessel close to an uninhabited island near Symi. The pirate vessel was described as having a dark-colored hull capable of carrying 25-30 tons, sails of various shades and cuts that were swapped out often, a crew of nine men outfitted in western clothing, and as being registered as a merchant ship. The report ends with rumors of a second, smaller trabaccolo roving the seas around Halki and Kastellorizo and notifying London that Commander Augustus C. Hobart was deployed in pursuit of the pirates. A later report described the suspected pirate ship as follows:

This vessel has hanging outside her, harpoons, and other fishing gear, has always on board a quantity of sugar, coffee, salt &, the whole, of course, for the purpose of deception, and hoists sometimes the Greek, sometimes the Ottoman, but more generally the Ionian flag. She is accompanied by two small boats called Paranzelle, in the fore part of which, close to the bows of each, is a cabin where the arms and ammunition are kept concealed. Her master has large eyes, wants one of his front teeth, is slightly marked with the small pox, has long light coloured moustaches shaved off under the nose. Her crew consists of 17 men of which only six are put down in the Bill of Health.⁸

The British fleet stationed in the area was concerned about the danger of pirate activity with royalty in the area, but the commanders sensed an opportunity to impress their future king. To truly create a good impression, they needed to go above and beyond what normally would have been expected of them.

⁷ TNA, FO 78/1534, Campbell to Russell, Rhodes, May 16, 1862. No 26. Cape Crio was the location of Knidos, an ancient settlement on the far western end of the Datça peninsula. Scio is the Italian name for the island of Chios. The Oxford English Dictionary defines trabaccolo as “an Italian ship of medium size; a small coasting vessel.” A trabaccolo is a sailing vessel typically found in the Adriatic, usually around twenty meters in length.

⁸ TNA, FO 78/1534, Campbell to Hobart, Rhodes, May 26, 1862.

One day after the prince's visit, Captain Augustus Hobart of the HMS *Foxhound* planned to eliminate the pirate threat. To avoid the possibility of local informants notifying the pirate ship of his fleet's movement, a small crew would purchase a trabaccolo and attempt to go undercover as pirates to pursue their quarry. Lieutenant Doughty was responsible for leading the operation and was assigned a crew of eight men. He was to cruise around Knidos, one of the suspected pirate haunts, while Hobart would lead the *Foxhound* to patrol Symi and Lieutenant Montager was to patrol around Marmaris, northeast of Rhodes. During this time period, there were pirates operating outside of Kastellorizo, who remained at large.

On May 20, the Ottoman Governor-General was patrolling the Anatolian coast with his steam warship when he came across a vessel that seemed to match the description of the one marauding the region: a trabaccolo with a host of men dressed in European fashion. Immediately he set upon and captured it and its crew. The men, who appeared to be pirates, were bound, tossed into the hold, and tortured for two hours without any attempt at interrogation. The captives' protests that they were indeed Englishmen on an anti-piracy expedition themselves fell upon deaf ears. The Ottoman officers suspected that their naval uniforms, insignia, and other property had been stolen. After several hours, the pasha came to accept that perhaps the suspects were indeed Englishmen. The Ottomans confiscated the British weaponry and gave leave to the crew to return to the *Foxhound*.

The following morning, Lt. Doughty hobbled back to Hobart and told him what had transpired. This put Hobart in a pickle. On one hand, he had created a potential diplomatic disaster by recklessly ordering a covert operation in Ottoman territory, an act that could be construed as an irregular military action, in this case privateering, in violation of a number of treaties. On the other hand, he had enough British pride and pomp to make any foreigner fear an

offended Englishman. He chose to avoid giving any explanation of his actions by expressing outrage over the Ottoman actions against his crew. All he had to do was level accusations about “barbarous Turks” attacking “civilized Englishmen.” Hobart demanded that the Ottoman Governor General punish the men responsible for attacking his crew, overlooking the issue that those men were acting correctly in attacking what, to all appearances, were pirates and not British naval forces. Whether Hobart’s chastisement of the Ottomans was rooted in arrogant bravado or carefully calculating how to cover his own faulty decisions cannot be determinately settled. In his report, he seems conscious of the fact that this incident could have created a flash point between Britain and the Ottomans were it not resolved quickly. Whether he realized that at the time that he demanded retribution against the Ottomans who tortured his undercover sailors remains unknown.

After his first tour of duty in the Mediterranean, Hobart took a hiatus from the Royal Navy to enrich himself by running the Union blockade of the South during the American Civil War. The next mention of him being in the Mediterranean is in 1867 when Grand Vizier Fuad Pasha hired him to replace Admiral Sir Adolphus Slade as the Naval Advisor to the Ottoman government at the rank of vice admiral, about which more will be said later in this chapter.

Increasing Violence in Piracy

Piracy in the modern era was more violent than its early modern incarnation. In previous centuries, established ransom networks offered an avenue for pirates to safely barter off their captives. The erasure of both these intermediaries and slave markets removed a viable means for

pirates to profit from human trafficking. Combined with the risk of captives passing on information to naval patrols, the benefit of guaranteeing the security of captives vanished. It became more expedient to slay rather than enslave victims of a raid.

The case of Giovanni Strati captures the changing shape of piracy in the middle of the nineteenth century. As the established networks of human trafficking and redemption disappeared, pirates such as Strati had less to be gained by preserving the lives and property of his victims.

Giovanni Strati was a pirate from Kefalonia. His crew was largely composed of foreigners with connection to the region, and they sailed under the Ionian flag. He mostly operated around Chios, and he had his ship's papers signed at both Salonica and Syros.⁹ Thus, he could show to either Ottoman or Greek authorities that his ship was a legitimate merchantman. While the waters he sailed in belonged to Greece, crossing from the Ionian to Aegean meant that Greek, Ottoman, British, and Ionian authorities all became involved and interested in his capture.

Strati caught public attention when he robbed two ferry boats. After securing his loot, he scuttled the captured vessels rather than keeping them for ransom or to increase the size of his fleet. This signals a few things. First, he was only interested or able to run a small operation. He did not see continued or enlarged profit by adding more ships to make a small armada. Perhaps this was from fear of over-saturating the seas with pirates, or perhaps he was simply uncomfortable with setting up an expanded chain of command where he was not there to control his crew. A small illegal enterprise was more easily concealable as legitimate through false

⁹ This information is according to the deposition of Miridine Lindi to the British Ionian colonial authorities. He claimed that he met Strati in Salonica in 1860. YE 1868/55/1: #5066, pp. 53-4, 73-5. Salonica is present-day Thessaloniki

papers and a change in colors. Second, he was not confident in being able to secure ransom.

When piracy was supported by society at large, networks were set up that could help the victims recover their family and property from their captors for a fee.¹⁰ In this time period, when piracy was reduced to such a low level, there was no way for a pirate to safely negotiate with those interested in the return of goods and persons. If Strati were to engage in such negotiations, there was nothing to prevent the navy from showing up to capture or kill him. Third, this loss of an avenue for the exchange of persons and property made piracy inherently more violent.

Traditionally, pirates had relied primarily on fear as a threat to make their prey surrender without resistance. A victim of piracy would expect financial loss, and possibly a loss of freedom, but there was little for pirates to gain by executing their captives or scuttling their ships when these represented potential profits. The value of these lives and ships was greatly reduced without the possibility of profits from ransoming. Thus, this form of piracy without a safe haven on land was inherently more violent and destructive.

Increased levels of violence appear in other instances as well. The pirate Koutsoura, whom the Ottoman authorities apprehended in 1860 after years of pillaging the Dodecanese, was widely believed to have murdered all his captives.¹¹ Piracy was no longer primarily a threat to one's livelihood; it became a threat to one's life.

¹⁰ Eyal Ginio, "Piracy and Redemption in the Aegean Sea during the first half of the Eighteenth century," *Turcica* 33 (2001): 135-147.

¹¹ TNA, FO 78/1534, Campbell to Russell, Rhodes, December 17, 1860.

Abdülaziz's Naval Expenditures and Otto's Expulsion

In 1861 Sultan Abdülmecid passed away and his brother Abdülaziz rose to take his place. Abdülaziz viewed the navy as a critical feature of Ottoman defense and implemented reforms to both modernize the Ottoman Navy and expand it to be among the world's largest. The Ottoman Navy had not grown on such a scale since the times of Süleyman the Magnificent.¹² Size, however, was not everything.

Sultan Abdülaziz had an amateur interest in naval affairs but did not personally have or adequately surround himself with advisers experienced enough to oversee the efficiency of his spending on naval matters. Englishmen like Augustus Hobart were brought in to help guide Ottoman naval efforts. During much of his tenure as a high ranking naval adviser beginning in 1867, his reforms for officer training were simply for the recruits to translate British ship handling manuals without ever heading out to seas and putting any navigational principles into practice. Just as the sultan's hires proved ineffective, so did his purchases. Abdülaziz was willing to purchase ships with all the latest technologies of the era, whether or not they were practical or even useful. The result was a hodgepodge of various cutting-edge ships that were selected by how innovative and exciting the ships' salesmen made them out to be rather than chosen with concern for cost or how well they would complement the goals of the Ottoman Navy.¹³

Abdülaziz's spendthrift upgrade of Ottoman naval forces drained the treasury. In 1874, the Sublime Porte declared bankruptcy. The coming financial crisis would freeze the Ottoman

¹² Daniel Panzac. *La marine ottomane: de l'apogée à la chute de l'Empire, 1572-1923* (CNRS, 2009): 330-40.

¹³ Bernd Langensiepen and Ahmet Güleriyüz, *The Ottoman Steam Navy, 1828-1923* (Conway Maritime Press, 1995), 3.

Navy in the state it was at the end of Abdülaziz's reign in 1876.¹⁴ The enthusiastic spending on a military meant to preserve Ottoman sovereignty did just the opposite. In 1881, Ottoman finances were placed under the strict control of European powers running the Ottoman Public Debt Administration.

Greece did not expand its navy between 1853 and 1873, but it did upgrade some of its ships to account for advances in steam-engine technology. By 1873 the fleet contained two ironclads and a number of steam-powered ships of war.¹⁵ Compared to the sultan's lavish spending on his fleet, the Hellenic Navy's expenditures during this time were modest.

By 1861, the Bavarian monarchy in Greece was in hot water. The *Megali Idea* was stalled by the Great Powers agreeing to protect the integrity of Ottoman territory to preserve the balance of power and curtail Russian expansionist ambitions. Greeks frustrated by these setbacks to irredentism turned to violence. In 1861, radical nationalist university students unsuccessfully plotted to assassinate Queen Amalia, who had yet to produce an heir, and in early 1862 elements of the military revolted in Nafplion. The Bavarian dynasty managed to control these revolts, and in an attempt to better understand the public frustration, King Otto embarked on a tour of the Peloponnese in October of 1862. While he was out of the palace, several army garrisons revolted throughout Greece and the Hellenic Royal Navy mutinied.¹⁶ When Otto tried to return to the palace, a naval blockade in Piraeus prevented him from doing so. When Greece's Protecting Powers confirmed that they would not come to the king's rescue, Otto was forced to flee the country on a British warship. The lack of a clear heir, one of the reasons for his overthrow, also

¹⁴ Panzac, *La marine ottomane*, 330.

¹⁵ C. Paizis-Paradellis, *Hellenic Warships 1829-2001* (2002).

¹⁶ Thomas W. Gallant, *The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, 1768 to 1913: The Long Nineteenth Century* (Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 141-3.

meant that for a period Greece would be without a head of state. Six months would pass before King George of Denmark would be selected to replace Otto's Bavarian dynasty.

The beginning of King Otto's reign of Greece was marked by an increase of piratical activity, and so was the end of his rule.¹⁷ The revolts that resulted in the expulsion of the king led to a temporary weakening of the Greek state's security apparatus. The chronicles of the Hellenic Navy describe this as a period when peripheral regions experienced a surge of banditry and piracy.¹⁸ The ministry of foreign affairs archive does not reflect such a surge with instances of international piracy.¹⁹ This tells us that the surge of violent robbery was primarily domestic in nature, both in terms of perpetrators and victims. During the chaos of the dynastic transition, Greeks were robbing Greeks.

The Blockade-Runner *Arkadi* and Greek Violations of International Maritime Law

Greece's strategy for irredentist expansion was rooted in a contradiction. On an official level, Greece could not openly engage in warfare with a much larger and more powerful Ottoman Empire and expect any level of success, so it maintained an official policy of neutrality and cooperation. On an unofficial level, Greece fostered popular organizations that aimed to incite Ottoman Greeks to revolt in favor of union with the Hellenic Kingdom. The tension

¹⁷ See the Hellenic Navy website, Ekaterini Fakalou, <http://www.hellenicnavy.gr/el/istoria/istoria-tou-pn.html>; and Kaitē Arōnē-Tsichlē, *Αγροτικές εξεγέρσεις στην Παλιά Ελλάδα [Rural Revolt in Old Greece]* (Papazēsēs, 1989), cited in Gallant, *The Edinburgh history of the Greeks*, 123.

¹⁸ Dimitris G. Fokas, *Χρονικά του Ελληνικού Β. Ναυτικού, 1833 – 1873. [Chronicles of the Hellenic Royal Navy 1833-1873]*. (Documents of the General Headquarter of the Royal Navy, 1923), 216.

¹⁹ The archives of the Hellenic Navy would likely offer evidence of the piracy claimed in their chronicles. Unfortunately, I was unable to attain access to that archive while I was conducting research in Greece.

between these two positions during the 1866-1869 Cretan revolt threatened to either end Greece's official neutrality or to alter the interpretation international maritime law concerning blockades.

In August 1866, rebellion once again broke out on Crete. After a brief period of relative success, the rebels' luck eventually started to run out. On September 13, the Ottoman Navy enacted a blockade of the island in order to slow down the flow of supplies from Greece to the rebels. Trade ships were only allowed to dock at the five ports of Herakleion, Spinalonga, Rethymno, Chania, and Souda, and the Ottoman Navy reserved the right to inspect any ships found in the vicinity of Crete.²⁰ Greek ships routinely disregarded the Ottoman blockade and smuggled arms and irregulars to the island.

On October 21, the rebels' situation became dire. A group of Cretan insurgents had retreated to the Arkadi monastery along with civilian women and children, numbering around four hundred in total. Western war-correspondents had embedded themselves within the Ottoman forces to report on developments. As the Ottomans surrounded the refuge and closed in on their foes, the rebels decided that rather than surrender to the Ottomans, they would have everyone gather around the gunpowder stores and commit an explosive mass suicide. The journalists' cables would ensure that it was an explosion heard around the world.

On July first of the following year, the *London Times* reported an incident of the Greek ship *Arkadi*, named after the infamous incident that would bring western attention to the Cretan uprisings, claiming to be neutral attempting to run past the Ottoman blockade of Crete.

²⁰ Fokas, *Chronika*, 240.

The Ottomans claimed the right to examine neutral ships for illegal goods, particularly weapons and ammunition, that were being smuggled in to Crete to arm the insurgents. Greece was officially neutral, as the conflict was an internal Ottoman affair, and the Greeks claimed the right as neutrals to bypass the blockade.

When the Ottoman Navy stopped the *Arkadi* for inspection at the nearby island of Antikythira, it hoisted the Greek flag, opened up its hidden cannon doors, and opened fire on the Ottoman steamer. Ottoman authorities argued that this action constituted an act of piracy and held the Greek government responsible. Greece's relationship with its protecting powers, France, Great Britain and Russia, limited the Ottomans' ability to retaliate against Greece's flagrant violations of international maritime law. Indeed, *The Times* reflects this when it writes that the Great Powers would prevent the Islamic empire from declaring war upon a Christian state for legal satisfaction. Were the Ottomans to inflict damage upon Greek national ships, that could potentially trigger war with the protecting powers.

The Greeks and Turks concur in their statements of the facts of the case; it is only in characterizing these facts and in the reasoning deduced from them that they differ. The Greeks state their case thus: -- The *Arkadi*, having landed a cargo of volunteers, arms, and ammunition within the line of an effective blockade, and having on board men in the service of the Cretan insurgents and petty officers of the Greek Royal Navy, was pursued by an Ottoman man-of-war, which fired to bring her to. Two Ottoman frigates were in sight. The Ottoman captain endeavoured to enforce the right of search, but the *Arkadi* ran out to sea and resisted. A running fight was carried on until the Greek blockade-runner found shelter in a Greek port. The Greeks say that the blockade-runner was so well armed, and fired into the Ottoman man-of-war with so good an aim, that the Turks had 11 men killed, among whom there were two officers. The blockade-runner had only one man killed and two wounded. The Greeks consider that the Turks were guilty of a gross infraction of neutrality, because they pursued the *Arkadi*

into Greek waters, and remained for some hours off the entrance of the port of Cerigotto, where she sought the shelter of neutrality.²¹

Greek naval chronicles confirm that the *Arkadi* was one of several ships smuggling munitions and irregulars to Crete.²² It is important to note that the Greek defense of their actions was not to proclaim that the *Arkadi* was a legal merchant ship innocent of any wrongdoing, but rather to redirect blame towards Ottoman pursuit of the ship and to raise issues of areas of legal jurisdiction. Cerigotto is an alternate name for Antikythera, a minuscule island off the northwestern shore of Crete which only supports a population in the double digits. The *Arkadi* managed to find sanctuary there, as it was on the Greek side of the maritime frontier between the Ottoman Empire and Greece. Greek diplomats had led the Ottomans to believe that it was illegal for an Ottoman ship to pursue a blockade runner within four miles of any non-Ottoman island.²³ Likewise, since the Treaty of Paris, a blockade was only considered legal if it was effective. Since the violating party managed to get away, Greece could claim to have done nothing wrong as the blockade its ship escaped would be rendered illegitimate. In many ways, the brevity and simplicity of language in the Declaration of Paris left it open to such interpretation as all its core tenets could be worked around legally.²⁴

The Turkish Government, taking a different view of the case, declares that the blockade of Crete has been all along conducted in strict conformity with the principles of international law as it has been laid down by Christian nations, and that it has taken for its guide in all doubtful points the conduct of the United

²¹ "Greece And Turkey." Times [London, England] 1 July 1867: 5. *The Times Digital Archive*. Web. 14 Apr. 2017.

²² Fokas, *Chronika*, 239-40.

²³ See Hobart-Hampden, *Hobart Pasha: Blockade-running*, 200; and, Fokas, *Chronika*, 240-41.

²⁴ Francis Raymond Stark, *The Abolition of Privateering and the Declaration of Paris*. Vol. 8. No. 3 (Columbia University, 1897), 153-160.

States of America during the blockades that arose out of the insurrection of the Southern States. The Turks say that they treated the *Arkadi* as having all the rights of a neutral engaged in blockade running. While she was landing a cargo for the insurgent States of Crete (it seems the Cretans have three provisional Governments), they endeavoured to exercise the right of search in order to ascertain whether her proceedings were legal or illegal. The blockade-runner, trusting to her wonderful speed and powerful armament, hoisted the Greek flag, opened her concealed ports, ran out her rifled guns, and directed heavy fire on the Ottoman steamer, which was a small vessel. The Turks argue that by this conduct the *Arkadi* has forfeited her rights as a neutral blockade-runner, and ought to be regarded as a pirate. The Turkish Admiral sent an officer on shore at Cerigotto to deliver a protest, but as he could find nobody to whom he could deliver it, he posted it up on the wall of the townhouse. The Ottoman Government asserts that the Greek Government is bound to treat the *Arkadi* as a pirate, and appeals to the three Great Powers, the protectors of Greece, who prevent the Sultan from declaring war on a Christian State for legal satisfaction.²⁵

Up until this point the journalist had offered a summary of events from both Greek and Ottoman perspectives. Rather than simply reporting the facts, the author had an argument all along, stating that backing the Greek position would shift the balance of international law to favor states neutral to a conflict. His analysis was clearly rooted in a religion based civilizational world-view.

Cretan blockade-running threatens to modify the law of nations for the benefit of neutrals. The naval engagement which occurred between a Greek merchantman and a Turkish man-of-war, in the opinion of the people of Syra, establishes the principle that a blockade-runner is entitled to carry guns and a numerous crew to serve them, and that she can legally resist the right of search by a blockading squadron, even when pursuit is commenced in the blockaded waters, if she can succeed in getting out of these waters. There is no doubt, as they say at Syra, that this enlargement of the rights of neutrals will prove conducive to the extension of Christian commerce and Christian civilization in the Levant.

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²⁵ "Greece And Turkey." Times [London, England] 1 July 1867: 5. *The Times Digital Archive*. Web. 14 Apr. 2017.

Humanity may, perhaps, require that Mussulman navies should not in future be allowed to exercise the rights of blockade against orthodox insurgents, though this would be a violation of the principle of religious equality in Turkey which is so dear to Russia. Diplomacy and hypocrisy may, however, overcome all difficulties.²⁶

What we see reflected here is a clear bias in favor of Christendom. The author would prefer to change the rules that all nations must abide by before allowing an Islamic state to gain an edge over a Christian one in any circumstance. The author of this article was British, not Greek. The Greek violations of the Ottoman blockade in Crete did little to impact the lives of Englishmen, yet the author immediately and unabashedly took the side of the Greeks, even when they openly and brazenly violated a legally established blockade. Britain was a neutral party in this conflict, which again was in theory an entirely domestic Ottoman affair. Yet, when international law as agreed upon benefited an Islamic empire over a Christian state, the rules changed. These treaties primarily served as a veneer to legitimate European hegemony, and the moment they impeded that goal, they were quickly tossed aside. Of course, this was a piece of journalism prone to sensationalism and was not an official policy memo. Nonetheless, the *London Times* was the premier paper of its day, and not a fringe publication out of sync with the British populace.

While Britain remained officially neutral yet sympathetic to the Greeks and Cretan rebels, Captain Augustus Hobart returned to the Mediterranean after years of running blockades for the Confederates during the American Civil War. Ever the profiteer and still unable to find a post as captain in the British Navy downsized after the Crimean War, he saw an opportunity to

²⁶ "Greece And Turkey." *Times* [London, England] 1 July 1867: 5. *The Times Digital Archive*. Web. 14 Apr. 2017.

further enrich himself. This time, rather than helping Greeks run the blockade, he pitched to Fuad Pasha, the Ottoman minister of foreign affairs, that he could help strengthen the Ottoman blockade of Crete.²⁷ Hobart's plan involved bending international law to favor the Ottomans, and Fuad Pasha was pleased to hear of a way to have these laws favor the Ottomans. Hobart was enlisted in the Ottoman fleet, not as a captain, but as a vice admiral.

In his memoir, Hobart recounts how he nearly reproduced the *Arkadi* incident with another Greek ship violating the Ottoman blockade. He approached the blockade runner *Enossis* and fired a blank, a signal for the suspect ship to show its flag, whereupon the Greek ship fired its cannon at the Ottoman Warship. Hobart considered this an act of piracy and pursued the *Enossis* through Greek territorial waters to Syros. He then stayed with the suspect ship until a trial could be had so they would not run off and unload their cargo on Crete.²⁸ The last part is the only way that Hobart's plan differed from the *Arkadi* incident. Previously, Ottoman warships had only stayed a few hours, and when they broke their post the blockade runner had managed to escape. Remaining vigilant in Greek waters until a trial could be convened led to Hobart's initial success and helped him gain further prestige in the Ottoman ranks.

As the *Arkadi* had escaped its trial, the same ship continued to smuggle guns and fighters to Crete. Nearly two months later on August 20th, the Ottoman Navy was able to bring an end to the nuisance the *Arkadi* caused. The Sublime Porte commissioned a new, speedy ship of its own: the *İzzeddin*. Orders were given to Vice Admiral Hobart to captain it, whereupon she was

²⁷ Hobart-Hampden, *Hobart Pasha: Blockade-running*, 200-201.

²⁸ Hobart-Hampden, *Hobart Pasha: Blockade-running*, 204-7.

quickly able to intercept and capture the *Arkadi*. Rather than simply return or scuttle her, the Ottomans redeployed her as an Ottoman warship.²⁹

For his aid in improving the efficacy of the blockade and suppressing the Cretan rebellion, Hobart was promoted to rear admiral of the Ottoman fleet. He eagerly adopted the moniker “Hobart Pasha” and enjoyed the luxuries of Ottoman nobility while enthusiastically adopting a radically pro-Turkish narrative.³⁰ For all his enthusiasm and early success for the Ottomans, he turned out to be one of Sultan Abdülaziz’s less effective hires. As mentioned before, he took little interest in actively reforming the Ottoman Navy.

Ultimately, Greek violations of the Ottoman blockade as a neutral party failed to hold international attention as long or strongly as needed for diplomats to seriously discuss reforming maritime law. The Great Powers were not adequately concerned by Christian Greece being on the wrong side of the law in relation to the Islamic Ottoman Empire to modify international law for all nations.

Italian Unification and Adriatic Piracy

Over the early years of the 1860s, Giuseppe Garibaldi’s *Risorgimento* made great strides in unifying the fragmented kingdoms of the Italian peninsula. What was once a series of minor

²⁹ Langensiepen and Güleriyüz, *The Ottoman Steam Navy*, 4.

³⁰ The last chapters of his memoir display specifically Turkish, not Ottoman, nationalism. He denies any Turkish wrongdoing in massacres of Bulgarians and says things such as “Always take up your quarters in a Turkish village, if possible, in preference to a Greek village. At the former you will find the traditional hospitality of the Oriental, even among the very poor people, practised in every sense of the word; whilst in the latter you will be exploité... to the last degree, even to the pilfering of your cartridges.” Hobart-Hampden, *Hobart Pasha: Blockade-running*, 228, 248.

kingdoms and colonies of various imperial powers became a contender on the regional stage. A unified Italian state presented new mercantile opportunities. At the same time, it had to learn the ropes of dealing with both domestic and international security challenges. Much as the Italian *carabinieri* had to deal with bandits plaguing the Italian countryside, so too did the new state need to deal with piracy, with Italians both conducting and being the victims of piracy.

On August 6, 1863, Italian pirates assaulted the Greek merchant brigantine *Suzanna* captained by Theodoros Orfanos at cape Zafferano just east of Palermo. This started a whirlwind of diplomatic correspondence as both countries had recently had a regime change: unification in Italy, and the coronation of King George in Greece. Initial reports claimed that the pirates were aboard two ships carrying forty men. Two months later, the Italian Navy had apprehended fifteen of the pirates led by Raffaello and Salvatore Versaci. An auditor sequestered their booty and returned to Orfanos his portion.³¹ He was not their only victim. In this instance, it was Italian inability to patrol its seas that led to the raid of a neutral, foreign merchant ship. Five years later, Italy's failure to secure its seas would lead to Italian shipping being attacked by foreign raiders.

On August 16, 1868, the Italian legate Chevalier Joseph Bertinatti wrote to the Ottoman minister of foreign affairs, Fuad Pasha. He complained about the Italian ship *Angelo dell' Abbondanza* (Angel of Abundance) being attacked in the Ionian Sea outside of Cotrona (Modern-day Crotone) by three Turkish pirates one month earlier in July and requested that the Ottomans do whatever is necessary to ensure such acts of piracy are not again committed. Meanwhile, the Italians sent the royal corvette *Varese* to patrol the Ionian Sea.³² The Ottoman

³¹ YE 1863/55/1: #5133, pp. 32-33; #6003, pp. 42-44.

³² BOA HR.TO 277/35. Bertinatti (who also appears as Butinatti) was the former *charge d'affairs* of the Kingdom of Sardinia who had conducted diplomacy as far away as with the United States in 1860. He found his position as a diplomat continued in the unified Kingdom of Italy.

archives contain no copy of a response to Bertinatti. They only contain a translation of the letter into Ottoman.

This is an interesting case as it is one of the few instances where a foreign power accused Ottoman/Turkish pirates of leaving imperial waters to raid in foreign ones. Of course, the Ottoman Empire at this time still held onto much of its southern Balkan territories, so the Ionian Sea was as much Ottoman as it was Italian or Greek. This particular raid happened off the shore of southern Italy. This was deep enough into Italian territory to be outside of any waters which the raiders might have thought were contested neutral or in another country entirely. Naturally, plundering fifteen tons of goods from a ship is a crime regardless of jurisdiction, so the culprits would have been unconcerned with whether this would become a diplomatic snafu or not. Unfortunately, lack of additional correspondence suggests that these marauders were not found by the authorities, so we cannot confirm the initial reports that the pirates were indeed “Turks,” be that word meaning Ottoman subjects, Muslims, or ethnic Turks. Were those reports correct by any of those definitions, this incident would seem to prove the exception to the observable trend regarding culprits of piracy in the post-Barbary Mediterranean.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that shifting domestic and international law alone did little to reduce the number of pirate raids in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Treaty of Paris outlawed privateering, and Sultan Abdülaziz greatly modernized and expanded Ottoman naval forces. In the debates about how to deal with piracy, including those taking place in the twenty-first

century, there is often a political divide in terms of strategy. On the one hand, you have hawkish politicians and military officials advocating for increased legal pressure and military action as the path to eliminating pirates. On the other hand, there is a more humanist and economical approach that aims to eliminate piracy and other criminal activity by creating better legal options, either through availability of peaceful professions or through enrolling these individuals in the state's security forces.

The period examined in this chapter shows the results of legislating against maritime crime and increasing enforcement without any noticeable change in economic condition. In short, people continued to turn to piracy at the same rate. Additionally, the new maritime laws were not evenly applied. The British advocated changing international maritime laws before allowing those laws to favor the sultan's blockade of Crete over the brazen violation of that blockade by Greece, a Christian nation. During the 1860s, the Eastern Mediterranean only experienced increased legislation and enforcement, but not an increase in prosperity that could ripple through society and offer opportunities for economic success through all strata of society.³³ While legislating against piracy alone would not solve the problem of piracy, it did create a culture where piratical activities were frowned upon, in particular by the state. Obviously, states had always opposed pirates, labeling them as the enemies of civilized society; yet it used to be *par de course* to co-opt these crews as corsairs and privateers. This practice had already been fading, but the Treaty of Paris formalized the move away from employing privateers in state naval forces. While piracy was no longer legally acceptable, it was still

³³ While Greek economic success in the period is largely attributable to currant exports, the tertiary industry of shipping created invisible earnings comparable to those brought in by the agriculture bubble. When the currant-bubble popped, the shipping sector was able to adapt and continue growing. See, Gelina Harlaftis and George Kostelenos "International Shipping and National Economic Growth: Shipping Earnings and the Greek Economy in the Nineteenth Century," *The Economic History Review* 65, no. 4 (2012): 1426.

economically viable to turn to this crime. Pirates could no longer straddle the law in hopes of employment as privateers, but they could choose to operate wholly outside of it.

Appendix: The *Times of London* article on Cretan Blockade-Running

The news from Crete is unfavourable to the insurgents. Omar Pasha has defeated the Christians, and, driving them from one position after another in the mountains to the north of the elevated valley of Lasethe, has forced the rocky barrier and rendered himself master of this important and almost impregnable district, which the Cretans looked upon as a second Sphakia. In the final struggle the Pasha reports the loss of the volunteers and Cretans at 500 killed, and his own loss at only 30 killed. The Christians console themselves for this great disaster, which renders Omar Pasha undisputed master of the half of the island that lies to the east of Mount Ida [Current day Psiloritis], by reporting that Mehemet Pasha has been taken prisoner with 1,000 wounded *in the western part of the island*, and that Ismael Pasha is dead of his wounds. If the Russian Government be sincere in its wish to serve the Cretans, it would do well to form a plan that it can carry into execution without delay.

Cretan blockade-running threatens to modify the law of nations for the benefit of neutrals. The naval engagement which occurred between a Greek merchantman and a Turkish man-of-war, in the opinion of the people of Syra, establishes the principle that a blockade-runner is entitled to carry guns and a numerous crew to serve them, and that she can legally resist the right of search by a blockading squadron, even when pursuit is commenced in the blockaded waters, if she can succeed in getting out of these waters. There is no doubt, as they say at Syra,

that this enlargement of the rights of neutrals will prove conducive to the extension of Christian commerce and Christian civilization in the Levant.

The Greeks and Turks concur in their statements of the facts of the case ; it is only in characterizing these facts and in the reasoning deduced from them that they differ. The Greeks state their case thus: -- The Arkadi, having landed a cargo of volunteers, arms, and ammunition within the line of an effective blockade, and having on board men in the service of the Cretan insurgents and petty officers of the Greek Royal Navy, was pursued by an Ottoman man-of-war, which fired to bring her to. Two Ottoman frigates were in sight. The Ottoman captain endeavoured to enforce the right of search, but the Arkadi ran out to sea and resisted. A running fight was carried on until the Greek blockade-runner found shelter in a Greek port. The Greeks say that the blockade-runner was so well armed, and fired into the Ottoman man-of-war with so good an aim, that the Turks had 11 men killed, among whom there were two officers. The blockade-runner had only one man killed and two wounded. The Greeks consider that the Turks were guilty of a gross infraction of neutrality, because they pursued the Arkadi into Greek waters, and remained for some hours off the entrance of the port of Cerigotto, where she sought the shelter of neutrality.

The Turkish Government, taking a different view of the case, declares that the blockade of Crete has been all along conducted in strict conformity with the principles of international law as it has been laid down by Christian nations, and that it has taken for its guide in all doubtful points the conduct of the United States of America during the blockades that arose out of the insurrection of the Southern States. The Turks say that they treated the Arkadi as having all the rights of a neutral engaged in blockade running. While she was landing a cargo for the insurgent States of Crete (it seems the Cretans have three provisional Governments), they endeavoured to

exercise the right of search in order to ascertain whether her proceedings were legal or illegal. The blockade-runner, trusting to her wonderful speed and powerful armament, hoisted the Greek flag, opened her concealed ports, ran out her rifled guns, and directed heavy fire on the Ottoman steamer, which was a small vessel. The Turks argue that by this conduct the Arkadi has forfeited her rights as a neutral blockade-runner, and ought to be regarded as a pirate. The Turkish admiral sent an officer on shore at Cerigotto to deliver a protest, but as he could find nobody to whom he could deliver it, he posted it up on the wall of the townhouse. The Ottoman Government asserts that the Greek Government is bound to treat the Arkadi as a pirate, and appeals to the three Great Powers, the protectors of Greece, who prevent the sultan from declaring war on a Christian State for legal satisfaction.

I believe the above is a correct statement of the case from the adverse points of view, and I suppose the law officers of the three protecting Powers will be called upon to decide who is wrong. The diplomatic proceedings of France, Russia, Italy, and Prussia, which have by their recent note to the Porte taken the Cretan insurrection under their patronage, hold out some hopes that the hostilities in Crete will soon cease. How far the intention of these Powers will support the views of the Greeks concerning the rights of blockade-runners and the privileges of neutrality is a matter of doubt. Humanity may, perhaps, require that Mussulman navies should not in future be allowed to exercise the rights of blockade against orthodox insurgents, though this would be a violation of the principle of religious equality in Turkey which is so dear to Russia. Diplomacy and hypocrisy may, however, overcome all difficulties.

The Ottoman Government has probably already addressed a note to the Governments of Austria, Great Britain, and America, appealing to them for a clear interpretation of the present

state of the law of blockade, the rights of blockade-runners, and the privileges of neutrality as recognized by their jurisprudence.³⁴

³⁴ "Greece And Turkey." Times [London, England] 1 July 1867: 5. *The Times Digital Archive*. Web. 14 Apr. 2017.

Chapter 6: Currants, Capital, and the Decline in Piracy, 1870-1896

The Eastern Mediterranean became deeply integrated into the world economy during the 1870s. The Suez Canal had been carved into the Egyptian landscape in 1869, and thus became a gateway connecting the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. Some of the piracy that plagued the Mediterranean began to spill over into the narrow corridor of the Red Sea.¹ A global ecological phenomenon caused by the phylloxera epidemic led to devastation in western Europe and an agricultural boom in the Eastern Mediterranean. Increased trade led to new economic opportunities, and these led to a significant decrease in regional piracy as people took to the land instead of taking to the account as pirates.

Phylloxera decimated western European vineyards, but the plague never reached the Aegean. As a result, for roughly the last third of the nineteenth century Greece was the sole European exporter of currants, grapes, and wine. The Greek economy benefited enormously from this position. As economic conditions improved, it became more popular and profitable to take to the land and begin farming cash crops. This created an easy opportunity to generate wealth within a legal framework. Many people that would have otherwise turned to piracy instead turned to the vineyards or related tertiary industries with raisins as their new *raison d'être*.

This type of agriculture-based economic growth would primarily benefit the land-owning class. As both Greece and the Ottoman Empire were largely semi-peripheral agrarian societies, this still encompassed large swathes of the population. In 1871, the landowning class in Greece

¹ For an example of piracy in the Red Sea, see: BOA Y.A.HUS 164/130 concerning the British capture of a pirate ship in Ottoman territorial waters in the Red Sea in 1880.

greatly expanded as a result of land reforms. Tenant-farmers and temporary workers would have also profited from this increased commercial activity, even if they did not own their own farm.

Over his several tenures as prime minister, Trikoupis sought to rapidly industrialize Greece in what would now be considered a Keynesian attempt to grow the economy out of debt. This created jobs for the urban working class, and so rural dwellers left the countryside for Athens in droves.² The working class could also head out to the fields to take part in the current economy as temporary labor.

This chapter first shows the reduction in piratical activity in the Mediterranean beginning in the 1870s. It then argues that this reduction was primarily a result of improvement in the regional economy under a political context when Greece and the Ottoman Empire were cooperating with a common goal of ending piracy in the region. In the Ottoman Empire, the peasant economy continued to grow even as the state finances languished and were placed under the control of the Public Debt Administration. The chapter ends by considering the disparate emigration situations in the two states, how those policies impacted the regional economy, and how those demographic flows figured into the economic opportunities of the working class.

The Decline of Piracy in the Late Nineteenth Century

Only three cases of Mediterranean piracy appear in the Ottoman archives during this period. The first was in 1883 when the Ottomans tracked a British-state pirate-flagged armored

² Thomas W. Gallant, *Modern Greece: From the War of Independence to the Present, second edition* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 141.

steamship named *Cockatrice* (*İnglizi devletinin kokatreis nam korsan bandıralı... çerhli vapuru*) from Kalas to Malta, suggesting the Ottomans viewed them as privateers.³ The second occurred the following year, when the Ottomans described a Greek privateer ship heading from Odessa to Piraeus in similar terms.⁴ Lastly, in 1887, Ottoman naval forces pursued and captured a Greek ship suspected of committing acts of piracy around Samothrace and İmroz (present-day Gökçeada).⁵

While these cases represent a dramatic decrease in Mediterranean piracy, Ottoman domains were not free from the scourge. After the opening of Suez Canal, trade through that region sharply increased, and so did the piracy that leached off it. Eight instances of piracy in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf are reported in the Ottoman Prime Ministry archives during the period 1870-96. The first decade of the twentieth century saw over twenty cases reported in the Red Sea alone. For comparison, in the period covered in this dissertation until this chapter, 1830-69, only one case of piracy in the Persian Gulf in 1847 and none in the Red Sea appear in the Ottoman Prime Ministry archives.⁶

The Ottoman archives failed to pick up on two cases of transnational piracy in Ottoman waters during the 1870s. First, in 1877, fourteen Greek pirates were caught raiding the island of Rhodes. Ottoman gendarmes quickly responded to the threat, and after killing the pirate chieftain, the remaining pirates surrendered to local authorities.⁷ The second occurred in 1878,

³ BOA Y.PRK.ASK 19/54.

⁴ BOA Y.PRK.ASK 22/66.

⁵ BOA Y.PRK.ASK 42/46.

⁶ For the 1847 case, see BOA A.MKT 79/36. It is worth remembering the limits of this archive. The Ottoman Prime Ministry archives, much like those of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are more likely to track major incidents that draw international attention. Purely domestic affairs that solely involve Ottoman subjects are unlikely to appear in this archive. Study of local piracy and other crimes requires access to regional archives and archives of the proper authorities, be that navy, coast guard, police, or gendarmerie.

⁷ YE 1877/55/1 p. 24.

when “corsairs” attacked the anchored Ottoman ship *Saint Nicholas* in the Dardanelles, near Berguz (present-day Umurbey).⁸ This document appeared in the archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the Ottoman and Greek states were actively cooperating in securing their land and sea borders to prevent criminals from gaining asylum by crossing jurisdictions.

Cooperation between the Greek Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire had evolved and intensified ever since Greece became a sovereign state and an international border was drawn to separate the southern tip of the Balkan Peninsula from the rest of the Ottoman Empire. In his study of Greek and Ottoman policing of their shared border, Gavrilis traces the evolution of the interaction between the two boundary regimes from chaos and little cooperation in the immediate aftermath of the Greek Independence War to the 1850s when joint action, treating the borderland as a mutually policed zone, and sharing of intelligence became frequent.⁹ By the 1870s, the two states increased their cooperation but began viewing the border as a line rather than a shared zone.¹⁰ A line could be demarcated on the land, but maritime borders are more slippery. The impetus for both states to snuff out international crime came in 1871.

That year, Greece experienced international embarrassment after brigands killed a group of British and Italian aristocrats. This incident, known as the Marathon murders or the Dilessi murders, caused the entire country to appear wild and unable to police its lands. It became a massive point of contention with Britain.¹¹ To satisfy its ally and protecting power, Greece

⁸ YE 1879/55/1 p. 27. Berguz, or Bergos, is present-day Umurbey and is located on the eastern shores of the Dardanelles roughly 30 kilometers northeast of the city of Çanakkale, Turkey.

⁹ George Gavrilis, *The dynamics of interstate boundaries* (Cambridge University Press, 2008), see especially chapter 3.

¹⁰ Gavrilis, *The dynamics of interstate boundaries*, 86-9.

¹¹ Britain treated Greece during this time as a crypto-colony, granting legal autonomy but retaining economic dominance. See, Kalliopi Kefalas, "Amnesty and Conflict of Interest in the Dilessi Murders (1870)," *Chronica Mundi* 11.1 (2016): 120-145.

implemented a wide-scale suppression of banditry in the following years that succeeded in reducing banditry to tolerable levels.¹² The Ottoman Empire followed suit, eager to avoid similar western criticism.¹³

The cases of piracy that appear in the Greek archives confirm a high level of cooperation between Greek and Ottoman officials to root out piracy at sea in the same way that Greek forces strove to end banditry on land. On October 15, 1879, Tevfik Pasha, then Ottoman Ambassador to Athens, wrote to his Greek counterpart that the pirate Spiros Vlavianos was found in the environs of Iraklia and Schoinoussa, just south of Naxos.¹⁴ One hundred days later, Theodoros Deliyannis, at the time serving as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote back to Tevfik confirming that the Hellenic authorities had succeeded in the capture of the pirate Spiros near Syra. In the same span, Ottoman forces in the Archipelago were able to identify two shepherds who served as his accomplices, Manolis and Yorghis.¹⁵ In order to facilitate the trial of these two for being accessories to Vlavianos's crimes, Greek and Ottoman officials were eager to share intelligence and resources to bring peace to their shared seas.

It should be noted that at this point, both states had experienced longstanding mutual peace. Other than nominally declaring war against the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War, an action which resulted in the immediate British occupation of Athens and no actual fighting between the two Mediterranean militaries, the Greek Kingdom and Ottoman Empire had

¹² See, Thomas W. Gallant, *The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, 1768 to 1913: The Long Nineteenth Century* (Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 152; Romilly Jenkins, *The Dilessi Murders* (Prion Books, 1998); John S. Koliopoulos, *Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, 1821-1912* (Clarendon Press, 1987); Rodanthi Tzanelli, *The 'Greece' of Britain and the 'Britain' of Greece: performance, stereotypes, expectations and intermediaries in 'Neohellenic' and Victorian narratives (1864-1881)* (VDM Verlag Dr Muller, 2009).

¹³ Gavrilis, *The dynamics of interstate boundaries*, 87.

¹⁴ YE 55/1/1879, p. 11.

¹⁵ YE 55/1/1880, pp 23-8.

maintained a state of peace since the establishment of Greek independence, going back fifty years. Even as Greek irredentism was entering the state's diplomatic rhetoric by 1879, the Sublime Porte sated the Greek lust for Ottoman lands by ceding Thessaly to Greece in 1881, bloodlessly granting the province in the hopes of continuing peaceful relations.¹⁶ Thus, it should be no surprise that in this historical period these states would be willing to work together to achieve regional harmony and suppress international crime.¹⁷

Phylloxera, Currant Monoculture, and Economic Growth

During the last third of the nineteenth century, the entire Mediterranean economy was temporarily transformed by the introduction of an aphid from North America known as phylloxera. The name translates as “dry leaf” for the effect of killing the roots of vines which serve as their primary source of food. Vineyards in Spain, France, and Italy were devastated by the swarm. For unknown reasons, the insects never spread to Greek and Anatolian vineyards.¹⁸ Saved from the scourge, Aegean farmers found themselves with a monopoly of production over the popular and profitable grape and wine markets. To take advantage of this opportunity, farmers ripped up their grains and replaced them with vines. Seeking to maximize profits during this period, the Greek state drained its swampy lowlands, implemented land reform to place farmers on those new productive lands, and placed a 25% export tariff.

¹⁶ Theodore A. Coulombis, John Anthony Petropoulos, and Harry J. Psomiades. *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: an historical perspective* (Pella Publishing Company, 1976), 29.

¹⁷ This would not always be the case. For a historical moment when Greece would be willing to encourage criminality in the lands and seas of the Ottoman Empire, see the following chapter on piracy during the 1897 war.

¹⁸ Gallant, *The Edinburgh history of the Greeks*, 256.

Viticulture is more labor-intensive than olive production. Owners of currant-plots would need to hire fieldworkers to tend to and harvest the grapes, a job that requires more care and more time than the brief period required to harvest olives or other fruit.¹⁹ The shift to currant monoculture greatly increased the demand for labor. This included both unskilled seasonal labor needed to harvest the grapes, and more skilled labor for related tertiary markets, such as barrel production, lumber, and transport to support the growing market.²⁰

In 1871, Prime Minister Alexandros Koumoundouros implemented sweeping land reforms in Greece. The Greek state sold national lands to the public in a manner that restricted the ability of wealthy families to envelop lands into their plantations as they had in the 1833 redistributions under King Otto, and instead allowed the number of small and medium scale land-owners to rise. While these distributions began in 1871, it was not until the end of the decade that the distributions had fully passed through the state bureaucracy and the new plots began to bear fruit. Recently established banking systems, alongside an influx of foreign capital, helped to distribute loans to prospective landowners.²¹ At the same time, many peasant farmers were only able to purchase a small plot of land and were unable to remain solvent through substandard harvests. Crop yields in Greece could vary greatly year to year, so over time these small plots would be sold from desperation to large landowners in a return to rural economy

¹⁹ For a table of the type and amount of annual care required to tend to currant vines, see table V.1 in Alexis Franghiadis, *Peasant agriculture and export trade: currant viticulture in Southern Greece, 1830-1893* (PhD Thesis, Florence: European University Institute, 1990), 221.

²⁰ Gallant, *The Edinburgh history of the Greeks*, 258-9.

²¹ Thanasis Kalafatis, "Η αγροτική οιονομία: Όψεις της αγροτικής ανάπτυξης [The Agriculture economy: Aspects of Rural development]," in *Ιστορία του νέου ελληνισμού* [History of New Greek Hellenism] 1770-200: Volume 5, 1871-1909 (Athens: Greek Letters, 2003), 71-78.

reminiscent of the *latifundia* estates.²² Still, overall profits grew substantially and were distributed more horizontally across Greek society than they had been in the past.

The increase in agriculture activity was both top-down and bottom-up. The state was responsible for draining the swamps on state lands, such as Lake Kopais in Boeotia.²³ Unlike many of the *mulk* lands in the Ottoman Empire, Greeks landowners privately owned their lands, so they were active in constructing terraces, draining wetlands, and other long-term investments to increase the arable land in their position.²⁴ These investments, which were intended to corner the currant market, had a secondary effect of boosting olive oil production. It is common practice in Greece to lay vines between rows of olive trees, as the two do not compete intensively for resources. Greek olive oil production mirrored currant production in the second half of the nineteenth century.²⁵ The proportional growth of the olive oil export sector still accounted for a smaller portion of the economy than currant exports, which during the 1870s and 1880s accounted for over half the revenue from all Greek exports.²⁶

Two thirds of agricultural grants given to landowners between 1883 and 1892 were given for production of raisins, showing their dominance in the Greek economy.²⁷ This trend towards monoculture paid off in the short and middle term, but it led to disaster once European vineyards recovered and France imposed the Méline tariff to slash imports and protect its recovering wine

²² Gallant, *The Edinburgh history of the Greeks*, 243.

²³ To be specific, the Greek state footed the bill for French and English companies to come in and drain Lake Kopais. While the change from wetlands to plains eliminated a major source of malaria and increased arable lands, the regional ecology was destroyed, along with local industries that had relied on harvesting eel and fish from the lake. See, David Idol, "The 'Peaceful Conquest' of Lake Kopais: Modern Water Management and Environment in Greece," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 36 no. 1 (May 2018): 71-95.

²⁴ David Idol, "Commercial Agriculture and the Landscape of Capitalism in Nineteenth-Century Greece," *EuropeNow* (2017), issue 7.

²⁵ See figures 7.14 and 7.17 in Gallant, *The Edinburgh history of the Greeks*, 256, 261.

²⁶ For a comparison of the value of currant exports compared to the value of all exports in Greece, see Appendix V in Franghiadis, *Peasant agriculture*, 320.

²⁷ Kalafatis, *The Agriculture economy*, 74. See, Table 2.

industry which resumed exporting to the global economy. No longer able to compete with the recovered vineyards in France and western Europe, Greece's economic outlook plummeted.²⁸ Lack of economic diversification meant that Greece could not handle the collapse of one of its sectors. In 1893, Prime Minister Harilaos Trikoupis addressed the Parliament, and began his speech with laconic prose: "Regretfully, we are bankrupt."

Whereas this era ended in Greece with bankruptcy, in the Ottoman Empire it started with it. Starting in 1851, the Reşid Pasha sought to renew the Porte's coffers with loans from European states. Sultan Abdülmecid rebuffed the attempt, fearing the empire would become addicted to the loans, unable to shake off its debt, and susceptible to further foreign interventions.²⁹ Once the Crimean War started, its constant escalation forced the Ottomans to borrow funds to cover military expenditures. At first, the terms of the loans held favorable conditions for the Ottomans, as the British and French were interested in having a strong Ottoman bulwark against the Russians in the Crimean War, but over time the interest rates became more predatory. As the initial spate of loans agreed to by the sultan were in the context of military necessities rather than economic growth, the Ottomans did not experience the economic growth required to gain a net profit and pay off the interest. The problem deepened under the reign of Abdülaziz.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Sultan Abdülaziz undertook a number of costly reforms of the Ottoman military, with a particular emphasis on the navy. As these were largely in the form of purchases from foreign dockyards, the Sublime Porte's purse was draining into

²⁸ Socrates D. Petmezas, "Export-dependent Agriculture, Revenue Crisis and Agrarian Productivity Involvement. The Greek Case (1860s-1930s)," *Histoire & Mesure* (2000): 331-2.

²⁹ For a discussion of the Ottoman path to bankruptcy, see chapter 4 of Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914* (IB Tauris, 1993), 100-121.

foreign coffers. In order to pay off the interest on long term loans, the Ottomans were pulling higher-interest short term loans. In 1875, the Ottoman Empire was unable to procure all the funds for a major loan payment and entered bankruptcy. The following year, all loan payments had ceased. Sultan Abdülaziz was deposed in May of 1876 and found dead in the palace weeks later. He was briefly succeeded by Sultan Murad V, whose reign only lasted the summer before being deposed and replaced by Sultan Abdülhamid II.

Seeking to recover previous investments made in the Ottoman Empire, European diplomats convinced Abdülhamid to issue the Decree of Muharram, which established the Public Debt Administration in 1881. The PDA was a bureaucracy led by an Anglo-Franco-German troika meant to control Ottoman finances and extract state revenue to pay off the delinquent debt.³⁰ To accomplish this, they implemented a number of taxes in the Ottoman Empire which were to be paid directly to the PDA. As the returns on Ottoman investments resumed, European companies embarked on new projects in the Ottoman domains, such as the construction of railroads and mines. European investors were able to guarantee profits, as the Ottoman Empire agreed to pay the shortfall between realized and expected profits on many projects.³¹ As its role in Ottoman finances grew, so too did its size; by the start of the First World War, the PDA had a larger staff than the Ottoman Ministry of Finance.

As in Greece, the Ottomans had also implemented banking reforms that allowed extensions of rural credit for agriculture. While the Ottoman Empire had enacted land reforms in

³⁰ Each of these states also backed banks in the Ottoman Empire, funneling capital to projects in the interests of those states. The French controlled the Imperial Ottoman bank, which in addition to issuing banknotes and credit also promoted granting railway construction contracts to French firms. The Deutsche Bank, back unambiguously by Germany, promoted sales of German armaments from manufacturers like Krupp. The National Bank of Turkey, back by Britain, worked with the other two banks to ensure they would not undercut each other when offering extortionist interest rates on loans to the Ottomans. Owen, *The Middle East in the world economy*, 195.

³¹ Owen, *The Middle East in the world economy*, 192-3, 197.

1858 and 1867, much of the land remained as state land (*mulk*), and tenants would need to obtain official permits to adjust crop production or build new structures.³² Additionally, there was an economic disincentive, as the tenants did not own the land, so they would not profit from investments for long term gain. Only wealthy owners of *çiftlik* estates were able to fully benefit from the recent agricultural changes. It is these estates that generated much of the local economic profits while the imperial finances languished.

Reşat Kasaba argues that the expansion of the capitalist world economy to include the Ottoman Empire, particularly the *zimmi* merchants, led to a period of growth in the Ottoman coastal cities that were most connected to global trade networks.³³ He provides a table that expresses the trade, both imports and exports, of İzmir in 1988 British pounds sterling. From 1839-60, Smyrniote exports go from a low in 800,000 in 1846 to a high of 2,888,840 in 1856, averaging around 1.7 million British pounds of exports for recorded years. After 1860, the value of exports very quickly doubled and remained stable at approximately 4.1 million pounds sterling.³⁴

³² Owen. *The Middle East in the world economy*, 118-19.

³³ Reşat Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the world economy: The nineteenth century* (SUNY Press, 1988), 105.

³⁴ See Table A1 in Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the world economy*, 120-21.




Figure 6.1: Raisin export quantity and calculated value in İzmir based off Table A5 in Kasaba, Reşat. *The Ottoman Empire and the world economy: The nineteenth century.* (SUNY Press, 1988), 126




Figure 6.2: Based off data in Roger Owen. *The Middle East in the world economy, 1800-1914.* (IB Tauris, 1993), 111, 201

Reşat Kasaba's appendix is useful for understanding the changing tides of trade over the nineteenth century. Table A2 shows the price and quantity of exports from the Ottoman Empire to the United Kingdom of particular goods, including raisins and opium. Beginning in 1856, opium exports began to skyrocket from around 20,000 pounds sterling the previous year to 361,000 in 1872.³⁵ The Crimean War temporarily drove up the price of raisins, and Ottoman merchants responded to market pressure by upping their exports to England. Ottoman raisin exports to the United Kingdom increased threefold during beginning in 1870, but prices did not inflate as one would have expected from the phylloxera epidemic. Table A5 shows price and export tonnage from İzmir specifically. When comparing prices of currants versus their revenue (see figure 6.1 above), we can see that increased revenue was primarily driven by an increase in production and export quantity, rather than primarily by price. The increase in market price that currants would fetch, while significant, was not exorbitant.

As both states increased exports of commodities, they witnessed innovations in and expansion of merchant shipping. From 1860 until the end of the century, maritime transportation gradually both moved away from sailing and to steam. During this period, the ratio of sailing versus steam ships calling upon İstanbul's harbor went from an 80/20% split, respectively, to 5/95%. Yet at the same time, there was no gross reduction of sailing ships. This demonstrates the dramatic rise in shipping that took place over these decades.³⁶ Exact numbers and timing vary by country, but these figures reflect a more enthusiastic adoption of steam technology in the Ottoman Empire than much of Europe and the west.³⁷

³⁵ See Table A2 in Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the world economy*, 122-3.

³⁶ Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 120.

³⁷ For Western figures on the adoption of steamships, see Gelina Harlafti, "*Η ιστορία της ελληνόκοκτητης ναυτιλίας το 19ο και 20ό αι. [The history of the Hellenic merchant marine in the 19th and 20th centuries]*," (Nefeli 2001), cited in Gelina Harlafti, "Η εμπορική ναυτιλία: Η μετάβαση από τα ιστιοφόρα στα ατμόπλοια. [The

When job opportunities were created on land for production of cash crops, so too were merchant-maritime jobs created to transport those goods to European markets. These increases had a synergistic effect of increasing legitimate labor and trade opportunities on both soil and sea. In Greece, agriculture and shipping were the leading sectors of economic development during the nineteenth century.³⁸

Emigration from the Ottoman Empire to the New World remained a trickle throughout most of the nineteenth century, with less than 100 Ottoman subjects appearing in the immigration records of the United States, Brazil, and Argentina in any given year until the end of the century. This was due to a ban on emigration that remained in place until 1896/7.³⁹ This conservative emigration policy kept around a greater population than the economy would naturally retain, boosting the supply of cheap workers and increasing the competition for non-skilled labor. Once the emigration ban was lifted, thousands of Ottoman subjects would leave the sultan's domains each year.

In contrast, Greek subjects would emigrate from their motherland at greater rates. This led to labor shortages which in turn forced landlords to create better economic incentives to lure tenants to work their land.⁴⁰ This in turn made economic growth more horizontal, where both proletariat and bourgeoisie stood to profit off economic gains. Thus, an entrepreneur making their living illegally would have a greater incentive to try a lawful line of work. Traditionally,

Merchant Fleet: The Transition from Sailboats to Steamships],” in *Ιστορία του νέου ελληνισμού* [History of New Greek Hellenism] 1770-200: Volume 5, 1871-1909 (Athens: Greek Letters, 2003), 96.

³⁸ Gelina Harlaftis and George Kostelenos, "International shipping and national economic growth: shipping earnings and the Greek economy in the nineteenth century," *The Economic History Review* 65.4 (2012): 1426.

³⁹ Kemal H. Karpat, "The Ottoman Emigration to America, 1860–1914," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 17, no. 2 (1985): 181.

⁴⁰ Alexis Franghiadis, "Land tenure systems, peasant agriculture and bourgeois ascendancy in Greece, 1830–1914," in Edhem Eldem and Socrates Petmezas, eds., *The Economic Development of Southeastern Europe in the 19th century* (Athens: Alpha Bank, 2011), 101-136.

having enough capital to be a landlord would be the only way to effectively profit off of an agricultural enterprise, while the field-workers would be mere subsistence farmers. The economic boom coinciding with low population density form continuous emigration and following Greece's 1871 land-redistribution program created the conditions that would make it reasonable to till a small plot of land and realize profits of substance rather than subsistence.

The increase in economic activity preceded the drop in Aegean piracy by a few years. The delay was likely due to the human element of taking time to enter a new developing field. It takes time to adjust to new market opportunities, especially when agriculture is involved. A newly planted grape vine takes years to reach maturity and bear fruit. It follows that there would be a delay before entrepreneurs could partake in the currant cash-crop craze and realize a return on their capital.

In the previous chapter, we saw that legal reforms and increased enforcement of maritime law were put into place, but that the rates of piracy did not decrease significantly. It was only with increased economic opportunities that piracy diminished. This has a parallel with twenty-first-century piracy in Indonesia. Sumatran pirates were notorious for raiding the straits of Malacca in the early years of the new millennium. After the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami that devastated the region and took over 200,000 lives, countless foreign-aid dollars flowed in for the reconstruction of society. Remarkably, regional piracy was almost eradicated as would-be pirates found it more profitable to work in the reconstruction of a society that was experiencing greater capital flows than before the disaster. Writing on the matter, Catherine Zara Raymond states that "economic development must be encouraged among the coastal areas of

Indonesia and Malaysia in order to reduce unemployment, and corruption of local officials also needs to be addressed. However, antipiracy measures already in place should not be neglected.”⁴¹

The same is true of nineteenth-century Mediterranean piracy. In both instances the region had been plagued by piracy, several regional and global efforts were made to combat the problem without fully successful results, and in both cases the greatest success followed economic improvement that filtered down to the lower classes. While enforcement capabilities were useful for reducing piracy, it is worth remembering that Sultan Abdülaziz’s infatuation with modern warships was a large part of what brought economic ruin upon the Sublime Porte. The growth of the agrarian economy as well as tertiary industries and expansions of the banking sector in both Greece and the Ottoman Empire allowed for an increase in the Aegean economy. This made it more profitable to partake in licit trade surrounding the current boom than to take to marauding the seas.

⁴¹ Catherine Zara Raymond, "Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait: A Problem Solved?," *Naval War College Review* 62.3 (2009): 40.

Chapter 7: Piracy during the 1897 Greco-Ottoman War

This chapter shows how the Greek and Ottoman states perceived and reacted to wartime piracy at the fin de siècle by focusing on the 1897 Greco-Ottoman war. The incidences of wartime piracy were intrinsically and justifiably linked more to suspicion of enemy involvement in encouraging maritime raiding across the border than piracy occurring during times of peace. After offering a brief background concerning frequency of reported piracy and issues of contention leading up to the war, I assess the condition of both navies and states at the start of the conflict. By 1897, both states had declared bankruptcy. The difference was that the empire had done so in 1875, while Greece did not until 1893. Ottoman austerity, then, as opposed to Greek debt-spending led to the Greek Navy being better prepared for war. Rather than discussing the naval battles between the respective fleets, this study focuses primarily on two incidences when unidentified Greek ships raided the Ottoman Aegean coastline after the truce had been concluded but before the peace treaty was finalized. Both cases are discussed in documents found in the Ottoman Prime Ministry archives and were referenced in Greek-British diplomatic correspondence and intelligence reports.

During its retreat from Thessaly, the Greek army opened up prisons to allow brigands to hamper Ottoman attempts to administer the occupied territories. The appearance of Greek pirate ships in Ottoman waters after a decade of their absence suggests that this was consistent with Greek efforts to challenge Ottoman security capabilities during the cease fire by generating criminal activity. I argue that the use of maritime irregulars advanced Greece's goal of weakening the Ottoman security apparatus, but, by subjecting Aegean and Macedonian Greeks to violence at the hands of raiders from the Greek Kingdom, the policy weakened Greece's long-

term goal of inspiring Ottoman-Greeks to rebel. The chapter ends by contextualizing piracy's position in relation to the irregular warfare on land that became common in late nineteenth-century Macedonia.

Background to the War

In the last third of the nineteenth century, the expanding global economy reached a level of volume that necessitated an increased level of security, enforcement of which led to a decline in piracy.¹ The frequency of reports about piracy recorded by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined from several cases each year before 1870 to six cases per decade, or just over one every two years. The number of documents pertaining to Mediterranean piracy in the Ottoman Prime Ministry archives drop to zero throughout the 1870s, and with only two cases appearing in the 1880s, and the three cases that will be discussed in this chapter all occurring in 1897, during and in the immediate wake of war between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. Wars and demobilizations are known to cause spikes in piracy, either during their duration by employing and encouraging pirates to raid the enemy state or in their aftermath by creating unemployed sailors with military skills.² It does not appear that is the case here. The Greek Navy

¹ As the scale of trade increased, seafarers could invest in military ships to protect a large merchant convoy, or ultimately have a navy effectively patrol an entire area to ensure the safety of unarmed maritime traffic. See John L. Anderson, 'Piracy and world history: An economic perspective on maritime predation', *Journal of World History*, 6.2 (1995), p. 182.

² David J. Starkey, "Pirates and Markets," in C R Pennel, ed., *Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader*, (New York: NYU Press, 2001): 107-124.

remained mobilized while peace negotiation took place, so there would be no sudden surge in unemployed sailors.

Prior to the outbreak of war between Greece and Turkey in 1897, the last documented incident of Greek piracy in Ottoman waters was recorded ten years earlier, in 1887 off the coast of Samothrace.³ Counting non-Greek piracy in Ottoman seas, the last case to appear in the Ottoman Prime ministry archives was an English pirate ship in 1890 outside of Fao.⁴ The Ottoman archives show three incidences of Greek piracy upon their shores in 1897, one during the war and two during the period of armistice and peace negotiations.

The Greek irredentist gaze had fixated upon Crete ever since the Greek War of Independence. Many Cretans had risen up then, and many more continued to rise up in subsequent rebellions against the Ottomans. After Egypt handed back Crete to the Sublime Porte in 1841, Crete came to be ruled by a series of corrupt rulers who ignored imperial edicts aimed at improving life for Ottoman Christians. This led to a series of rebellions in 1866-9, 1875-8, and 1895-8. As a result of the Russo-Turkish War, the 1878 Treaty of Berlin established autonomy and self-governance to the island which nominally remained part of the sultan's domains. This was known as the Halepa pact. The Christian populace gained many rights, including use of Greek as an official language, the right to bear arms and join the gendarmerie, the right to control some of their own finances, and amnesty for those who took up arms in rebellion. The agreement pacified the Cretans until the terms were again violated in 1889 and the autonomy granted under the Halepa pact was rescinded. Crete was returned to direct Ottoman rule, this time under Cevat

³ BOA Y.PRK.ASK 42/46.

⁴ Modern day Al-Faw, Iraq, situated on the Persian Gulf. BOA Y.PRK.ASK 62/22.

Şakir Pasha.⁵ In 1895, Şakir Pasha formally suspended the civil liberties of Cretan Christians. This fomented discontent and within a year caused another full-scale rebellion on Crete.

In the same year, the conservative Theodoros Deliyannis became Prime Minister of Greece. After his generation-long rivalry and several years rotating power with his liberal rival Harilaos Trikoupis, the Greek economy that had skyrocketed because of the currant trade became bankrupt in 1893 as European vineyards recovered and American viticulture took off. With things beginning to look dim economically, Deliyannis decided to win Greece a nationalist victory. Hosting the first Olympic games satiated the national pride of Greeks, but only one year later the pride of reviving the Olympics faded and the people once again grew restless. Deliyannis had expansionist aspirations to both his south and north. He sent irregular forces, largely recruited through the irredentist organization National Defense, south to assist the Cretan rebellion against the Porte and encourage the island's unification with Greece. After stirring up trouble in Crete and enraging the Sublime Porte, he sent thousands of irregulars north into Macedonia on March 24, followed up by the Greek army on April 18 in a failed attempt to further the *Megali Idea*.

The Greek invasion of Macedonia was an unmitigated failure. The war lasted only a month and Greece lost every single battle. Rather than gain territory, Greece had lost Thessaly to Ottoman occupation. A refugee crisis started as people fled from enemy forces and attempted to retreat into territories still held by Greece. Greece exacerbated the problem by sending bandits into Ottoman-occupied Thessaly to stick a thorn into Ottoman attempts to enforce order. These bandits proved more of a plague to the resident populace than the administration, so the flow of

⁵ He was also known as Kabağağlızade Ahmet Cevat Pasha. After his reign in Crete, he would go on to become grand vizier to Sultan Abdülhamid II.

refugees south into the Hellenic Kingdom continued. On the May 20, Deliyannis signed a ceasefire with Sultan Abdülhamid II. King George demanded Deliyannis resign for bringing Greece to ruin. When Deliyannis refused, George replaced him with Dimitrios Rallis as Prime Minister.

The Condition of the Fleets

The Ottoman Empire still stood among the great imperial powers of the late nineteenth century, and it had an army to match. The one area where the Ottoman military was bluffing its strength was at sea. The Ottoman Navy had become decrepit since the 1877-78 Russo-Ottoman War. Lacking funds due to stringent payments imposed by the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, one of the major austerity measures the Sublime Porte undertook was to pull funding from expensive military projects. Warships ranked at the top of this list, as they were truly titanic undertakings of their times. Whereas Sultan Abdülaziz recognized the importance of naval power and opened up the coffers for the *kapudan paşa* (grand-admiral), Sultan Abdülhamid's hands were tied by severe budgetary constraints.⁶ The money needed to build and maintain a modern navy simply was not there. As such, the Ottoman Navy could not properly maintain its vessels. By the time 1897 rolled around, years of lying dormant in the Golden Horn left their cannons rusty and the crews green. Only two ironclads, the *Mesudiye* and the *Neçm-i Şevket*, along with the torpedo-boats *Berkefşan* and *Peleng-i Derya*, were fully operational at the

⁶ Kaori Komatsu, "Financial problems of the navy during the reign of Abdülhamid II," *Oriente modern* 20.1 (2001): 209-219.

war's start.⁷ The majority of the Ottoman fleet dated back to the 1860s and had only last exercised in formation in 1877.⁸ The Ottoman Navy had mobilized to try to limit Greek infiltration of Crete, but the warships had rotted over decades of neglect since their last use. The guns had mostly rusted through, and in some even the steam engine struggled to carry the ship on. The few functioning ships made their way to the island but could only be used as a symbol of Ottoman naval power: impressive on the outside, but defunct to those who knew their inner workings.

At the onset of Greek hostilities, the Ottoman fleet put on an exercise to practice engaging with an enemy fleet. Foreign naval advisers deemed this exercise to be a total failure, as the aim and reload time of the Ottoman fleet would allow any competent enemy ship close enough to inflict severe damage upon the Ottoman fleet while risking little as the Ottoman cannonade would splash harmlessly into the sea.⁹

Between the Keynesian debt-spending of Harilaos Trikoupis and the militaristic conservatism of Theodoros Deliyannis, Greece had managed to produce and maintain a modern navy. On paper, the Greek Navy was far more prepared for war than the Ottoman Navy. Between 1889 and 1892, Greece built three coastal defense ships capable of going seventeen knots which were named after the islands that provided its revolutionary war-fleet: the *Hydra*, *Psara*, and *Spetsai*. All three were either undergoing major modifications or being overhauled in French shipyards from the winter of 1897. When Greece declared war upon the Ottomans, it seems no one had consulted the navy to confirm the condition of the fleet or set up a war plan. High value

⁷ Bernd Langensiepen and Ahmet Güleriyüz, *The Ottoman Steam Navy, 1828-1923* (Conway Maritime Press, 1995): 8-9.

⁸ Hedley Paul Willmott, *The Last Century of Sea Power: From Port Arthur to Chanak, 1894-1922*, Vol. 1 (Indiana University Press, 2009), 35.

⁹ Langensiepen and Güleriyüz, *The Ottoman Steam Navy*, 9.

Ottoman targets such as Salonica which were vulnerable to maritime harassment were largely untouched by the Greek fleet. The main wartime actions of the Greek fleet were to bombard Preveza with its gunboats and cruisers, assault a few low-value targets, and attempt to demolish coastal railways outside Thessaloniki. Once the war began to turn in favor of the Turks, the Greek Navy's primary duty became to transport retreating Greek troops back to the kingdom.¹⁰

While neither the Greek nor Ottoman fleet was ready to fight an effective naval engagement, the Greek fleet was more capable of patrolling the seas, controlling shipping, and limiting enemy fleet movement. Of course, this was only because the enemy fleet was barely seaworthy. This dominance over the waves also meant that Greece could effectively counteract maritime crime such as smuggling and piracy, should it choose to do so. The majority of the functioning Greek fleet was light gunboats and torpedo boats. These were fast and useful in littoral combat, particularly against piracy. Large warships could not pursue smaller vessels into shallow waters and often lacked the speeds to pursue pirate skiffs even in open seas.

Greek naval superiority led the Ottomans to avoid direct confrontation at sea and to opt to supply their army by land whenever possible. The Ottoman Navy largely remained outside of the conflict. The Greek army was getting crushed on land, and the navy was unable to produce a decisive sea-battle against the skittish Ottoman Navy. Despite the naval advantage laying with Greece, on May 14th the Ottomans managed to capture several Greek pirate ships (*Yunan korsan gemileri*) in the Aegean.¹¹ This was the first instance of Greek piracy the Ottomans had dealt with in a decade, but the details were hidden in the fog of war.

¹⁰ Willmott, *The Last Century of Sea Power*, 32-33.

¹¹ BOA Y.PRK.PT 12/10.

Concern over Irregulars while Drafting Peace

Near the end of the war the Ottomans had placed 3,000 Albanian irregular troops at the Anatolian coastal town of Çeşme.¹² The Greek military noticed this movement and feared that they would be sent to Chios, a largely Grecophone and Orthodox island still under Ottoman control which lay under Greece's irredentist gaze. Painful memories of the brutal Ottoman punishment of Greek rebellion on that same island three quarters of a century before were burned into the Greek and western collective consciousnesses.

Part of this fear was justifiable, as Albanian irregular troops were notoriously more chaotic than Turkish regulars. The following report is from the town of Kitros, just north of Mt. Olympus, part of the Ottoman territory invaded by Greece.

Great tranquility reigns in this district. The Greek fleet no longer harries the coasts, and the Ottoman troops preserve their conciliatory attitudes towards the Christian inhabitants.

A battalion of Anatolian Rediffs [reserve troops], the 4th of the 26th regiments, under the command of Bimbashi Selim Bey, quartered partly on my property at Kitros, and partly in the surrounding villages, behaves admirably, and the soldiers lay hands on nothing, not even an egg...

Persons coming from Thessaly state that the Albanian volunteers there have pillaged and sacked many properties, several of which belong to Turkish Notables, and even to the Civil List of the Sultan.

There seems to be some truth in it, for it has been noticed that Albanian, passing through Caterina on their return from the war, had in their possession not only cattle, but valuable objects which they tried to sell in the market.¹³

¹² Great Britain. Parliament. *Correspondence respecting the Negotiations for the conclusion of peace between Turkey and Greece*. 1898. Doc #29

¹³ Great Britain. Parliament. *Correspondence respecting ... Turkey and Greece*. #53.

The report dates to June 1, 1897, just one week after the cessation of open hostilities. We can easily see how the Greeks had distinct expectations between Ottoman regular and irregular soldiers. The same holds true for Ottoman concerns between Greek regulars and irregulars.

When it became clear Greece would lose the war, rather than surrender the land peacefully, the Greek army sought to despoil what they could and maximize the headache of Ottoman officials seeking to enforce order. Greek authorities in Larissa opened up the prisons and allowed freed brigands to engage in open pillage. Greek officials intended to do the same in Volos, but local townsmen resisted to the point of open rebellion. Ultimately, Greek authorities transferred the prisoners of Volos to Athens rather than unleashing them upon the city.¹⁴

After the Ottomans regained control of Thrace, they sent their troops further south into Thessaly. As the Greek army was totally routed, there was no effective military limit to how far the Ottoman forces could push. The only limit was what could be politically feasible and reasonable to the Great Powers that guaranteed Greece's independence. The empire tempered its ambition and pushed only for the re-annexation of Thessaly, which had been peacefully ceded to Greece in 1881 in order to appease Greek irredentism. Clearly the initial goal of bestowing Greece a territory to satiate its expansionism did not lead to long-lasting peace, so the Sublime Porte requested the territory back. Additionally, when Thessaly was handed over to Greece, Greece also became responsible to pay off that province's portion of the Ottoman debt. Facing its

¹⁴ Great Britain. Parliament. *Correspondence respecting ... Turkey and Greece*. #56, Inclosure 2. May 25, 1897.

own financial struggles, Greece never fulfilled this condition. It began to look like the Ottoman Empire would grow as a result of Greece's attempted war of expansion.¹⁵

Greece reacted to this possibility by increasing its effort to despoil Thessaly in order to stick a thorn into the Ottoman occupation. British intelligence reported that the mountains northwest of Trikala were held by insurgents armed by the Greek *Ethniki Etaireia*. These rebels were provided with arms but without food, so they resorted to pillaging the countryside to sustain themselves. Unfortunately for the locals, this pestilence did not stop with stolen grain. The rebels turned into vicious marauders as they expanded from thievery into captive-taking. For example, at one point they demanded a ransom of twenty thousand drachmas from the family of a wealthy Jew they had abducted. The author of the report claims that such despicable activities curbed the rebellious enthusiasm of the Greeks living under the Ottomans. Locals viewed these provocateurs as "not merely patriots or political agitators, but robbers and brigands."¹⁶

In the summer following Thirty Days' War all did not remain calm on the seas. While the May 20 armistice had been declared and diplomats were gathering in İstanbul to discuss the final terms of peace, a scourge that had bypassed settlements on the Ottoman Aegean coastlines for a decade had returned. Already once during the war had they make an appearance and what should have been a peaceful summertime was interrupted by two more pirate raids.

The second raid of the year occurred on the twenty-first of May. Just one day after the ceasefire was signed, a steamboat of the Nemçe Postal company was heading on its delivery route from İstanbul to Karaağaç. It was passing in front of Mt. Athos when Greek pirate ships

¹⁵ Great Britain. Parliament. *Correspondence respecting ... Turkey and Greece*. #78, Inclosure.

¹⁶ Great Britain. Parliament. *Correspondence respecting ... Turkey and Greece*. #163, June 30, 1897. Inclosure: Detailing the state of the Turkish Occupation of Thessaly.

approached and seized the steamboat. The pirates brought the prize ship to Tirekili. Upon receiving news of this incident, the Nemçe Post sent a telegram to Mehmed Ali, the captain of Karaağaç's port.¹⁷ No official Ottoman reply is included in the archives. Either this was handled at a local level or the incident was ignored by the Sublime Porte which was more focused on wartime and occupation logistics. Either way, the Ottomans did not consider the incident a breach of the ceasefire, or at least one worth resuming combat over. For this to be the case, Ottoman officials must have taken the telegram at face value that even though the ship was manned by Greeks, they were pirates and thus not taking orders from the state.

Concerning regular naval activities at sea, Greece sent over ships to harass the Anatolian littoral immediately after the cease fire despite British suggestions to avoid making any move that might appear hostile to the Ottomans.¹⁸ It may be the case that the previously mentioned Greek “pirate ships” that the Ottomans documented were the same ships involved in this report. The timing matches up, and the locations are not terribly far from each other. As neither of these reports provided ship names, a definite link cannot be drawn. If these were the same ships, then Greek warships operated in a piratical manner. If not, then Greek pirates acted opportunely, and Greek warships were brazenly risking shattering the newfound peace by anchoring in Ottoman territory.

With both sides on edge over enemy irregulars and desperate navies, terms of armistice were drawn up with particular reference to these fears.

¹⁷ BOA Y.MTV. 157/91.

¹⁸ Great Britain. Parliament. *Correspondence respecting ... Turkey and Greece*. Doc #29.

Terms of the Armistice at Sea

1. The Greek fleet shall quit Ottoman waters and those of the littoral occupied.
2. Vessels flying either the Ottoman or a foreign flag shall be free to enter and leave Ottoman ports and ports to the north of the line of demarcation fixed by the Armistice Convention of the 22nd May, and shall not be subject to visitation.
3. Navigation remains free for the ships of the two belligerent Parties, provided that merchant-ships shall not enter the ports of the opposing Party.
4. Navigation in the Gulf of Arta remains free for both Parties.
5. The Ottoman Government undertakes not to reinforce its armies of operations by sea by the introduction of munitions, instruments of war, or troops.
6. The revictualing of the army shall be effected twice a week through ports under Ottoman rule.
7. The violation of occupied or national territory, by bands of irregulars, whose formations by the State can be proved, shall be regarded as a violation of the armistice.
8. The non-observance of paragraphs or clauses of the said Convention or Appendix shall involve the rupture of the present armistice, and the offending State shall bear the responsibility.¹⁹

Many of these articles directly address both the completed and feared use of military irregulars. The very first article, for example, directly addresses Greece's use of maritime irregulars on the Anatolian coast. That the Ottomans describe these ships as pirate ships in their internal correspondences and yet refer to them here as part of the Greek fleet is important for understanding their view of piracy near the close of the nineteenth century. To them, there remained little distinction between the enemy state's fleet and vessels employed in the service of that fleet. To the Ottomans, a *korsan* was not necessarily totally separated from state connections as the term pirate suggests in English, where the entire point of employing rhetoric about privateers is to dodge responsibility for their actions.

¹⁹ June 6, 1897. Terms of the Armistice at Sea. Great Britain. Parliament. *Correspondence respecting ... Turkey and Greece*. #48.

Articles two, three, and four at first seem to discourage naval blockade and normalize trade relations, but neither state had a navy powerful enough to enact an effective blockade to begin with. With a smaller fleet, it is more effective to return to the practice of seizing enemy ships, both mercantile and military. These practices fall more under the prize-taking rules of early-modern privateers than the total blockade and contraband running conducted by larger modern navies. Thus, these articles target use of irregular maritime troops during the war.

Article five also seems to be a standard clause that would apply to restricting the reinforcement of the regular standing army. The context given by Greek correspondences show that this clause was really meant to prevent the feared movement of Albanian irregulars to Chios and other islands. Article six allows the Ottoman Empire to maintain their occupation of Thessaly in a way that would not stoke fears of further invasion deeper into Greece.

Lastly, article seven goes out of its way to condemn the use of irregulars by both sides. This codifies into law the aforementioned perception of irregulars as simply another branch of the regular armed forces whose actions the state was equally responsible for. It also suggests that this perception was not uniquely Ottoman, but rather consistent with broader trends in international law. Britain, France, and Russia were the guarantor powers of Greek independence and played a major role in negotiating any treaty Greece was a part of. They would draft resolutions that helped shape a world in the interests of European imperial powers, be those interests about maintaining the balance of power between the imperial powers, extending their colonial and mercantile reach, or seeking stability in international waters.

While the western imperial powers had a hand in negotiating the terms of peace between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, they did not assume all the agency in those terms. For example, the armistice effectively created a maritime demilitarized zone which mimicked legislation the

Ottomans forced the British to agree to a century before. During the mid-eighteenth century, British privateers repeatedly attacked French shipments in the Ottoman Eastern Mediterranean. This disrupted grain shipments from North Africa and led to famine within the empire. The Sublime Porte demanded that the British cease these raids by threatening to implement shariah law at sea. The British kowtowed to the sultan and acquiesced to the establishment of a no-combat zone which effectively stretched what the Ottomans considered their territorial waters from merely hugging the Ottoman coastline to the entirety Eastern Mediterranean Sea.²⁰ These norms created by Ottoman diplomats continued to be the basis of maritime peace accords into the early twentieth century.²¹

The armistice at sea would be honored for two months before pirates from Greece would violate Ottoman territory for the third time in a year. On August 12th, three caiques and two skiffs appeared on the shores of Limnos. Seven marauders (*korsan eşkiyası*) from Greece disembarked at the Kondia (Greek: Κοντιά, Ottoman: قونديه) marina and began pillaging the village of Kondias. Captain Süleyman led a contingent of Ottoman reserve troops to capture the raiders and pacify the area. When the Ottoman guards engaged with the pirates, one of the reserve sergeants fell in battle. Most of the pirates managed to return to their ships and speed away. The Ottoman reserves requested backup and embarked in pursuit of the pirates. They chased them as far as Mytilene before losing track of the lighter and faster pirate ships.²²

²⁰ Michael Talbot, “Ill-Treated by Friends’: Ottoman Responses to British Privateering in the Mid-18th Century” (Presentation, *Sylvia Ioannou Foundation Conference: Corsairs and Pirates in the Eastern Mediterranean, 15th-19th c.*, Athens, Greece October 18, 2014).

²¹ In the present day, we have returned to considering territorial water to being a certain distance from controlled land. Exactly how far that distance is has caused fierce debate and tension between Greece and Turkey, almost leading to war in the Aegean in several instances. The reach of territorial waters has been considered 6, 10, or 12 nautical miles at various points over the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Currently, further reach from the shoreline favors Greece as it controls almost all the Aegean islands.

²² BOA Y.MTV 164/253.

Back on Rhodes, the governor of the Archipelago Province wired a telegraph to İstanbul requesting steamships able to travel at speeds of at least fourteen knots. He argued that given that the Archipelago province consisted of thousands of islands, these speedy warships should be supplied to the imperial army, reserves, and police for the securing the sea routes and the prosperity of his province's inhabitants.

Linguistic Evidence

The Ottoman Turkish language is rich in ways to describe its relations to various peoples but vague when it comes to separation of pirates and privateers. Thus, we need to pay close attention to attached adjectives and other contextual clues present in the documents if we are to understand the relations between these raiders and the state of Greece. To begin with, all of the Ottoman documents examined in this chapter describe the raiders in one way or another as *Yunan korsanlari*. The term *Yunan* is used specifically to refer to Greeks from the kingdom. Ottoman-Greeks are referred to as *Rum*. Ottoman documents from other periods that deal with piracy committed by Greeks indigenous to the empire either call them *Rum korsani* or *ızbandut*, a specialized term specifically used for Ottoman-Greek pirates.²³ Given the consistent textual preference for the term *Yunan*, it is clear that the Ottomans viewed these individuals as being foreigners encroaching into Ottoman space rather than rebellious *Rum*.

²³ The root of *ızbandut* comes from the Turkicization of the Italian word *sbandito*, meaning an exiled or banished person.

Their relation to the Kingdom of Greece is harder to determine from Ottoman documentation. *Korsan* could describe anything from pirates acting totally independent of the state, to privateers, to mutineers. One of the documents places the word *eşkiya* or brigand after *korsan*. The term brigand-pirate seems to suggest that these individuals had less of a connection to the state. Unfortunately, the historical context muddies even that assertion. Contemporary to this period, Turkey-in-Europe was overrun by Greek and Bulgarian brigands who were sent over by their parent state in a terror campaign for Ottoman Christians to form identities as Greeks or Bulgarians. *Eşkiya* was used to describe these troupes of outlaws who were irregulars sent over from their respective states. Thus, the pirates presented in these case studies cannot be considered as regular military troops, but they could be considered as either opportune outlaws or military irregulars.

The Deleterious Effect of Irregular Raids on *Rum* Sympathies with Greek Irredentism

How effective was the use of maritime military irregulars during this war for Greece? Certainly, their use caught the attention of diplomats, as the treaties of armistice at sea seem to focus on reigning in the deployment of these irregulars. Ultimately, the Greek-Ottoman border ended up shifting slightly in the favor of the Ottomans. From the standpoint of an expansionary war, that places the entire war effort as a massive failure. But given how poorly the war went for Greece, ending near where they started is in a way a victory. The failures of the Greek military led to a wartime Ottoman occupation of Thessaly supported by legitimate Ottoman concerns about reversing their former concession of the province to a state that spat in the face of the

good-willed effort to bring peace and stability to the region. As a concession to Ottoman concerns of Greece not paying its share of Thessaly's debt, the peace treaty placed a four million Turkish lira war indemnity upon Greece as well as placing the kingdom's finances under the financial control of an international committee.²⁴

The people of Mytilene and Limnos experienced Ottoman policies similarly. They shared similar demographics and were administratively placed in the same province. Mytilene and the other islands in the northeastern Aegean experienced a *Pax Ottomanica* during the last seven decades of Ottoman rule. The Ottomans founded public goods projects such as schools and fountains. The economy was growing at a strong rate, but it was the wealthy and middle-class *Rum* elite that were able to most benefit from these changes, as most of the poor, both Christian and Muslim, were left behind.²⁵ These upper-class Ottoman Christians cultivated a Greek ethnic identity with which they could argue for national rights. At the same time as the Ottomans improved the economy and implemented reforms, they also experienced some failed reforms. Attempts to regulate shipbuilding and sponge diving generated discontent among the Greeks who were employed in those fields, and many Ottoman-Greeks who worked in the affected industries uprooted and moved across the Aegean to Greece.²⁶ Martin Strohmeier takes the position that Aegean Greek dissatisfaction with Ottoman policy not only pushed them away from attempts to form an Ottoman nationalism, *osmanlılık*, but pushed them closer towards adopting a Greek

²⁴ See article 2 of the *Preliminaires de Paix* in appendix V of Theodore George Tatsios, *The Megali idea and the Greek-Turkish war of 1897: the impact of the Cretan problem on Greek irredentism, 1866-1897* (New York, 1984), 253. The terms agreed upon during the preliminary peace negotiations were considered binding in the final peace treaty.

²⁵ Maria Mandamadiotou, *The Greek Orthodox community of Mytilene: between the Ottoman Empire and the Greek state, 1876-1912* (Oxford; Berlin: Lang, 2013).

²⁶ Martin Strohmeier, "Economy and society in the Aegean province of the Ottoman empire, 1840-1912," *Turkish Historical Review* 1.2 (2010): 185-188.

national identity.²⁷ Maria Mandamadiotou argues that this discontent has been misinterpreted as suggesting that they desired unity with the Greek kingdom, when instead they sought more rights within an Ottoman imperial framework. She defends this viewpoint by examining newspapers of the Greek community of Mytilene and highlighting their enthusiasm for the 1908 Young Turk revolution and the restoration of the Ottoman constitution.²⁸

If we are to trust the British intelligence reports about local sentiments in the conflict zones, Greece failed to win hearts and minds by deploying irregulars into Ottoman controlled lands. This certainly would also be the case at Limnos, where Greek marauders shattered the tranquility of the northern Aegean islands. Armed incursions, whether they were of the brigands on land or pirates at sea did not emblazon the image of a heroic captain unifying a disparate people upon the minds of Ottoman-Greeks. If anything, contact with such scoundrels undid any positive ideas from the kingdom that might have been brought by Greek merchants or travelers.

Benefits of Deploying Irregular Troops

Irregular troops provide some positive benefits to the state. They were cheaper to outfit and maintain, obscure the strength and identity of that branch of the state's armed forces, and could undermine the enemy state's guarantee of security to its subjects. For these reasons, Greece

²⁷ Strohmeier, "Economy and society in the Aegean," 164-195.

²⁸ Mandamadiotou, *The Greek Orthodox community of Mytilene*.

had a history of using irregular troops such as during its revolution, the Crimean War, and during attempts to instigate rebellion in Crete.²⁹

Irregulars are cheap when compared to a standing army. The state only needs to pay them in times of conflict. It does not need to outfit said fighters excepting in some cases their weapons, and many times the men of violence who find themselves employed in the shadows of the state provide their own arms. Irregulars are given neither quarter nor training by the state. The state does not provide them with rations, and thus also saves on the expensive maintenance of secure supply lines. All they really expect from the state is a paycheck, either directly or from the proceeds of prizes taken. Of course, given all these deficiencies irregulars cannot be expected to effectively wage war against a standing army. This concern is why said irregulars are generally directed against undefended civilian populations. A band of pirates or brigands can expect to overwhelm a small provincial police force and then plunder unopposed. This targeting of civilians leads to a disdain among the populace for what they see as brutish cutthroats, the enemy of all. This is where the benefit of plausible deniability becomes important. Greece could deny agency in the actions of these men. As we saw in the 1897 armistice at sea, the burden of proof was upon the offended entity to connect the armed irregular incursion of their territory to the other state.

In military strategic terms, deploying irregulars conceals the size and strength of your armed forces. It makes it harder for the enemy to gauge exactly how strong or even who their enemy is. If reports come in about a village being attacked behind the front lines, the attacked state needs to be able to pull armed personnel to secure the area. Irregulars can feign attacks on

²⁹ Romilly Jenkins, *The Dilessi Murders* (Prion Books, 1998), 14.

areas to lead a number of enemy combatants on a chase, thus reducing the number of soldiers the enemy state has ready for battle. When irregulars are able to overwhelm an enemy, they could topple the local government and replace it with a miniature puppet-state, as Greek brigands did repeatedly in Thessaly in 1878.³⁰

Lastly, irregulars weaken the enemy state's claim on a monopoly on violence. When the state struggles to provide security to its people, a door opens for other parties to claim the ability to offer that tranquility. For example, Egypt's legitimacy was harmed when its government was unable to effectively stop bandits from terrorizing the countryside. This Egyptian failure fueled Britain's claim in the 1880s that its colonial domination over Egypt would prove to be more effective at providing security. When the British too failed to suppress brigandage, they also lost the claim of being able to offer tranquility to Egyptians.³¹ When Greek pirates arrived in Limnos, Greece could claim that it did not give direct orders or even that those were domestic Ottoman pirates and that the sultan was failing to subdue the menace. The Kingdom of Greece suggested that perhaps it might do a better job than the Porte, as the British initially claimed in Egypt. At the time, such a Greek claim would have seemed particularly weak in the international sphere. The Dilessi murders of 1870 proved Greece incapable of stymieing brigandage even just outside its capital. Yet, for all the international condemnation, Britain did not force Greece to change its constitution or implement any particular reform.³² More recently, in the mid-1890s, the Sublime Porte drew international opprobrium by resorting to excessive violence to suppress Armenian revolts in eastern Anatolia. Part of managing the claim of a monopoly on violence was showing

³⁰ Thomas W. Gallant, *Modern Greece: From the War of Independence to the Present*, second edition (Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 103-105.

³¹ Nathan Brown, "Brigands and State Building: The Invention of Banditry in Modern Egypt," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32 (April 1990): 258-281.

³² Jenkins, *The Dilessi Murders*, 183-5.

that the power to use violence could not only be wielded by the state, but also effectively controlled.

Controlling the Narrative

Naturally, the Ottoman administration and local newspapers would also be able to contribute their own versions of the events in the archipelago. The 1890s were a transitory period when instantaneous long-distance communication was possible, but not as evenly applied as today. Given the information technology at the time, the only way for a message to travel faster than a person could carry it was by telegraph. Unlike telephones in the twentieth century, telegraph stations were still few and far between. A person or private entity could not expect to have their own telegraph and operator. The few public telegraph stations that existed would be easily monitored by the state. Telegraphs were considered to be relatively private lines of communication compared to the telephone, which more people could listen in on. Telephone lines only began expanding in western Europe during the decade preceding the Greco-Ottoman War. Underwater telephone lines were first laid down in the English Channel in 1891 and by 1898 only 31,600 telephones were installed in France.³³ Given that the Ottoman request for backup was transmitted from Rhodes, we can ascertain that the Ottomans had laid down telegraph lines between Rhodes and İstanbul. This suggests that in 1897 the Ottomans had not yet laid down telephone lines between any of the Aegean islands and İstanbul and that minor

³³ Stephen Kern, *The culture of time and space, 1880-1918* (Harvard, 2003), 188, 214.

islands like Limnos did not have their own telegraph stations. The provincial capitals were connected by undersea wire to the capital, but such projects could not be carried out in the thousands of islands in the Ottoman Aegean. While the Sublime Porte had limited instantaneous communication capability to its island holdings, Greece would not have had any such means.

Occasional Greek visitors from the kingdom would not dominate a narrative of events that could explain pirates and other irregulars as nationalist heroes. Locals had negatively experienced the events themselves and published about events in their own autonomous press. Outside of the lived experiences, the Ottomans were able to more easily offer their version of events and explain how their forces valiantly fought off the pirates, even risking their lives to martyr themselves for the safety of the locals. The Ottomans had an established, stable presence on the northeast Aegean islands. There were no oppressive governors that led to discontent and rebellion as had happened on Crete. Without any acts of Turkish repression, the Greek Kingdom had no chance of convincing locals to turn against the Turks. The people of Limnos and Mytilene felt no Turkish yoke tightening around their neck.

States domestically deployed propaganda portraying irregulars as noble bandits trying to unite the nation. For example, in the Cretan city of Rethymno, Greece has placed statues glorifying Cretan irregulars who participated in the Macedonia conflict. The epigraph on the statue of Evangelos Frangiadakis, a captain of over five hundred men during the Cretan uprisings and guerrilla chieftain during the Macedonia conflict and 1897 Greco-Turkish War, reads "Bloody freedom / flies high and judges / and crowns all those more / who are fighting for peace."³⁴ While Frangiadakis also participated in the Cretan uprisings locally, most of his

³⁴ The inscription can be found on the statue in the municipal gardens in Rethymno, Crete. In Greek, the text reads "ΕΥΑΓΓΕΛΟΣ ΚΥΡ. ΦΡΑΝΓΚΙΑΔΑΚΗΣ / 1869 - 1951 / ΠΕΝΤΑΚΟΣΙΑΡΧΟΣ ΚΡΗΤΙΚΩΝ ΑΓΩΝΩΝ /

military service was spent among bands of irregulars deployed in Ottoman Macedonia. Crete was the focal point of Ottoman misrule in the post Greek revolution Aegean. This created groups of disgruntled men of violence who were willing to fight against the Ottomans, be their end goal independence or *enosis* (unification) with Greece. The Greek Kingdom was able to direct these men as irregulars to Macedonia, where the Orthodox inhabitants did not undergo the same oppression as the Cretans and thus had no interest in rising up against the empire. Monuments glorifying the actions of these irregulars are readily found in Crete and the contemporary territories of the Greek Kingdom. In these lands bands of irregulars were seen as freedom fighters.

In the Ottoman Aegean and Macedonia, where these irregulars were deployed to rather than drawn from, guerrillas like Frangiadakis were no heroes. The bands that Greece armed in Ottoman lands were primarily recruited from local brigands offered a salary. As Cretans were sent over, they eventually accounted for one third of armed bands roving the region. Even the local brigand-bands, to say nothing of the laypeople, avoided the Cretan squads which they viewed as more violent and unruly.³⁵ Cretans and Greeks from the kingdom were outsiders and troublemakers. They upset the largely peaceful social order of the region where Christians and Jews were allowed to hold land, trade, and even share holy places with Muslims.³⁶

ΑΡΗΓΟΣ ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΙΚΟΥ ΚΑΙ / ΕΛΛΗΝΟΤΟΥΡΚΙΚΟΥ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΥ / Η ΜΑΤΩΜΕΝΗ ΛΕΥΤΕΡΙΑ / ΠΙΣΤΑ ΨΗΛΑ ΚΑΙ ΚΡΙΝΕΙ / ΚΑΙ ΣΤΕΦΑΝΩΝΕΙ ΚΑΘΕ ΠΙΟ / ΠΟΥ ΜΑΧΕΤΑΙ ΓΙΑ ΕΙΡΗΝΗ.

³⁵ Dimitris Livianos, "Conquering the Souls': Nationalism and Greek Guerrilla Warfare in Ottoman Macedonia, 1904-1908," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 23.1 (1999): 195-221.

³⁶ Bülent Özdemir, "Position of the Muslims in Salonica during the Reform Period: 'Rulers' or 'Ruled'?", in *Ottoman reforms and social life: reflections from Salonica, 1830-1850* (Istanbul, 2003), 1-7.

Contextualizing Piracy within the Violence in Macedonia

The pirate ships that unexpectedly appeared in Ottoman waters in 1897 served Greek national interests in a mostly different way than irregular brigands deployed to Macedonia did. The main similarity to irregulars in Macedonia in terms of benefit to Greek irredentist goals was that a piratical presence undermined the Ottoman security apparatus. Ottoman provincial officials requested expensive war steamers from a financially constrained Ottoman Empire to be able to secure the shipping lanes and provide a greater sense of security to their islander subjects. It wouldn't be until 1905 when the Ottoman Navy would be able to finally update its fleet and fulfill such requests.³⁷ Such struggles are familiar to any state attempting to display power over a vast territory. Providing the illusion of power over a densely populated urban center or over heavily trafficked routes and passages is relatively easy. When the Ottomans parked their rotting fleet off the coast of Crete, they were able to project the image of having hulking warships covered in armor. Hidden were the rusty inner workings and the greenness of the crew. It was trickier to actually provide security for the thousands of islands in the Archipelago province.

The security challenges posed by these few pirate raids in the Ottoman Aegean were overshadowed by Greek and Bulgarian irregular bands roaming around Macedonia forcing peasants to identify with their branch of the church or suffer very immediate consequences. Ottoman rule in Macedonia was thinly held together by an attempt to spread nationalism through institutions such as education. The Sublime Porte had set up many public schools to provide general education and instill a sense of Ottoman national identity. But they also allowed a great

³⁷ Willmott, *The Last Century of Sea Power*, 34.

deal of autonomy to private educational institutions. Greece took advantage of the ease of access to alternative education to fund private schools to try to instill Greek nationalism within the Greek elements of the populace. They had a two-fold strategy: one was aimed at the middle class and elites with a more traditional education to better understand Hellenic identity, and the other targeted poorer Greeks. These Greek schools attempted to fill the minds of the relatively uneducated peasantry with hatred of Greece's rivals, at this time Bulgaria in particular. The general idea was to have an educated elite rule over a bloodthirsty mob of peasants that would be on the front lines of Greek expansionism.³⁸ In a world where a person's religion was their nationality, these violent bands were linked directly to the state whose nation they wished to expand.

The main distinction from Greek irregulars in Macedonia was that the pirates did not seem to be documenting attempts to establish a particular religious and national identity among the people. The pirates did not establish a presence over any sort of duration in the territories they raided, nor did they appear to try to talk to the locals at all. Instead, pillage seemed to be the main focus. Having filled their coffers, Ottoman documents suggest they were quick to leave. Additionally, given the few reports we have, it appears that the pirates did not return to raid the same area twice in this period.

For the Rallis government, the opportunity to undermine the Ottoman claim to security was worth rolling the dice on whether Greece would be blamed for these attacks. If the attacks were connected to the Greek state, Greece could have been asked to pay further indemnity, cede more territory, or make other concessions. For its various violations of the treaty, Greece had to

³⁸ İpek K. Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties: Religion, Violence and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878–1908* (Cornell University Press, 2013), 71.

pay the Ottoman Empire an additional hundred thousand Turkish liras on top of the four million lira war indemnity.³⁹ It seems the Ottomans greatly suspected that the pirate crews that appeared during and after the war were Greek because that is how they refer to them in their internal correspondences. This suspicion was not directly reflected in the treaty agreements which spoke of irregulars in neutral terms while laying out restriction for specific states in other sections of the treaty.

Greece had two main strategies for irredentist expansion. The first was to instill a sense of Greek identity among the *Rum* by educating them to be Greek then inspire them to rise up against the Ottomans and demand union with their Hellenic brethren. Greek pirates pillaging Ottoman-Greeks hurt that goal. The second goal was much simpler: military conquest. Greece had tried and failed in this regard during the 1897 war but would ultimately succeed in the 1912-13 Balkan Wars. The nation-building project in Macedonia proved to be fruitless as victory was won through a four-way alliance against the Ottomans.⁴⁰ Victory was won by forcing Turkish troops to defend too much at once. In this way, both bands of Macedonian irregulars and pirates roving Ottoman waters served Greek interests in the same way: forcing Ottoman forces to run around and expend limited resources, weakening their security apparatus. Ultimately, the decision to utilize pirates and other irregulars was more out of concern for military strategy and creating chaos in Ottoman lands than to inspire the will for *enosis* among the *Rum*. The 1897 war

³⁹ See article 8 of *traité de paix définitif* in appendix V in Tatsios, *The Megali idea*, 265.

⁴⁰ While Greece effectively doubled in size from these territorial acquisitions, its grasp on these territories remained tenuous. During the First World War, Greece nearly split in two during a political divide that placed royalist supporters, located primarily in “Old Greek” territories that were incorporated in Greece since the nineteenth century, against supporters of Eleftherios Venizelos, located primarily in the “New Greek” territories acquired from the Ottomans in the twentieth century. Venizelos was elected Greek Prime Minister in 1910. He hailed from Crete, which formally unified with Greece during the Balkan Wars after achieving autonomy in 1898 as a result of the 1897 Greco-Ottoman War. While the union between Old and New Greece wound up lasting, the cement did not dry quickly.

ended in defeat for Greece, and the use of irregulars on land and at sea weakened the desire of Ottoman Greeks to embrace the same Greek state that had allowed brigands and pirates to freely raid the countryside during the Greek army's occupation.

Epilogue: Why was this All Forgotten?

This dissertation has shown that piracy never went away in the Mediterranean during the nineteenth century. Why then, did it fade from historical memory? Was it an intentional project of forgetting a chaotic past in order to place Greece, Turkey, and the other post-Ottoman states among the “civilized” nations of the earth? Or was it simply that the cases of piracy after 1830 remained relatively minor, less able to enthrall the imagination as romanticized versions of the pirate fleets of Hayreddin Barbarossa or even the Greek-revolutionary pirates at Gramvousa have managed to do centuries later? Perhaps the omission has to do with the entire study of piracy, a field which is easily corrupted by the allure of pleasing those eager to hear romantic stories of libertine, seafaring rogues. A handful of sailors stealing mundane items like foodstuffs, a blanket, a jacket, and a gun is a less interesting story than plundering ships filled with Spanish gold or cutthroats serving as the soldiers in a holy war in the islands of the Mediterranean.¹

From an academic standpoint, many of the contributions the study of piracy has to offer to understanding what turns men to violent thievery has already been covered by studies of banditry. Some explanations are found in economic pressure,² a culture of honor and violence,³

¹ For the incident where a shepherd received those basic items as his share of the loot for supporting piracy, see YE 1854/55/1B, #337, pp 189-91. The Captain of the Frigate *Solon* writing to the commander of the goletta *Mathilde*. Skiathos, 27 December, 1854.

² For an example of mid-nineteenth-century industrial development creating economic equality that impoverished farmers while enriching railways workers, thus causing the peasants to turn to banditry, see, Basil C. Gounaris, "Peasants, Brigands, and Navvies: Railways Dreams and Realities in the Ottoman Balkans," *European Journal of Economic History* 34.1 (2006): 215-245.

³ “The literature on honor in the Mediterranean is vast. The major works consulted were J. Davis, *People of the Mediterranean: An Essay in Comparative Social Anthropology* (London, 1977); Anton Blok, "Rams and Billy-Goats: A Key to the Mediterranean Code of Honour," in Eric R. Wolf, ed., *Religion, Power and Protest in Local Communities: The Northern Shore of the Mediterranean* (Amsterdam, 1984), 51-70; David D. Gilmore, ed., *Honor and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean* (Washington, D.C., 1987). Those arguing against such a view include Michael Herzfeld, "Honour and Shame: Problems in the Comparative Analysis of Moral Systems," *Man* 15 (1980): 339-51; Herzfeld, "The Horns of the Mediterraneanist Dilemma," *American Ethnologist* 11 (1984): 439-54;

kin-group pressure,⁴ state weakness,⁵ primitive rebellion,⁶ and unemployment stemming from military demobilization, loss of land, and mass urban migration.⁷ Nathan Brown has shown the political use of denying banditry's existence from the narrative to legitimize both the colonial and indigenous state's rule over a territory.⁸ That piracy has been successfully erased from the narrative during a period when Britain colonized or otherwise inserted itself into the affairs of the states of the Eastern Mediterranean is a poignant reminder of their successful cleansing of the historical memory. All involved parties, be they Greek, Ottoman, or British, were concerned with making their subjects feel like their state could better protect them from outlawry and violence than their competitors. If people feel like outlaws are ever-present, they question if the state functions as intended or if there is a better alternative to govern them. No state wanted to appear weak.

This dissertation is not the first academic work to cite cases of Mediterranean piracy after 1830. There have been a small number of articles that have referred to pirate raids late in the

Josep R. Llobera, "Fieldwork in Southwestern Europe: Anthropological Panacea or Epistemological Straightjacket?" *Critique of Anthropology* 6 (1986): 25-33; Victoria A. Goddard, "From Mediterranean to Europe: Honour, Kinship and Gender," in Goddard, Josep R. Llobera, and Cris Shore, eds., *The Anthropology of Europe: Identity and Boundaries in Conflict* (Providence, R.I., 1994), 57-92." See, Thomas W. Gallant, "Honor, masculinity, and ritual knife fighting in nineteenth-century Greece," *American Historical Review* 105.2 (2000): 375. Also see, Thomas W. Gallant, *Experiencing Dominion: Culture, Identity, and Power in the British Mediterranean* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 95-148.

⁴ Thomas W. Gallant, "Greek Bandit Gangs: Lone Wolves or a Family Affair?," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 6 (1988): 269-290.

⁵ See, Frederick Anscombe, "Albanians and 'Mountain Bandits'," in Frederick Anscombe, *The Ottoman Balkans 1750-1830* (Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006), 87-113.

⁶ Hobsbawm's chapter on social banditry in *Primitive Rebels* is widely credited as having opened the banditry debate in academia. Eric Hobsbawm, *Primitive rebels: Studies in archaic forms of social movement in the 19th and 20th centuries* (Manchester University Press, 1971), 13-29.

⁷ Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Cornell University Press, 1994), 152-153.

⁸ Nathan Brown, "Brigands and State Building: The Invention of Banditry in Modern Egypt," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32 (April 1990): 258-281.

century but did not contextualize them among broader trends concerning piracy.⁹ Spyridon Argyros wrote the one academic work that focuses on piracy that shows evidence of a single pirate raid in the Aegean that occurred after the dust of revolution had settled. In 1860, Greek pirates were raiding Ottoman Limnos and had already attacked the wealthy village Portianon and tortured the family of the *Rum* Efthimios Kellari. When they approached the village Atsiki, the villagers deceptively greeted the pirates with gifts and alcohol, distracting them while they rang the church bells to summon gendarmes from the local Ottoman garrison. Upon their arrival, the Ottoman troops slew three of the pirates, including their leader, and drove the rest away to the jubilation of the local villagers.¹⁰ Argyros does not contextualize this 1860 raid as part of a broader continuation of piracy after the revolution. Instead, he treats it as a mere curiosity.

This dissertation is the first study of piracy itself that corrects the story of piracy's decline in the region. One common and useful method for telling history is to use a chrono-thematic narrative. By assigning a main theme to a period of time, students of history are often better able to discern a main characteristic for each place and time. The downside of this method, is that it can distort or cover up blemishes in that narrative. In this case, corsairing has been a dominant theme in the discussion of the early modern Mediterranean. It was a useful foil to discussing themes of conflict, sovereignty, international relations, religion, maritime commerce, and population movements (renegades going to North Africa and ransom networks). Because the majority of piracy in the early modern Mediterranean could be categorized as *corso*, scholars

⁹ Martin Strohmeier, for example, identifies a number of cases of piracy in the 1860s, and briefly discusses piracy as part of the Aegean economy during those years. He did not, however, realize the importance of these cases upending the historiography of Mediterranean piracy. See, Martin Strohmeier, "Economy and society in the Aegean province of the Ottoman empire, 1840-1912," *Turkish Historical Review* 1.2 (2010): 189-90.

¹⁰ Spyridon F. Argyros, *Η Πειρατεία από τον 1500 Π.Χ. Έως το 1860, Ιστορία και Θρύλος [Piracy from 1500 B.C. to 1860, History and Legend]* (Athens, 1963), 267.

have neglected studying other forms of piracy. Once corsairing societies entered the dustbin of history, the other forms of piracy that persisted continued to be neglected. The era of imperial negotiations with violent groups of the periphery had passed, and the nineteenth century was to mark the era of states' consolidation of power.¹¹ Pirates did not fit this grand narrative put forth both by the states themselves and the historians that followed. But they did exist, and even if they did not actively consider themselves to be what Eric Hobsbawm has coined "primitive rebels" consciously resisting expanding state powers, their very existence creating violence at the boundaries of state reach at least unconsciously contested state centralization.

This study began with a French literary reference from the mid-nineteenth century to piracy in the Mediterranean and will end with a contemporary Greek literary reference. To Alexandre Dumas and the readership of *The Count of Monte Cristo*, piracy belonged only in the realm of fiction. He needed to explain to his readers how and why they should assent to imagining their continued existence. Contemporary to Dumas and writing to a Greek audience, Pavlos Kalligas did not need to make any such distinction when including pirates in his novel *Thanos Vlekas*. When the protagonist took to the Aegean Sea in the chapter titled "the crossing," it seemed only natural that he would find himself on a ship of pirates and smugglers.¹²

The Greek courts know which side their bread's buttered on. Look, I've been up before them twice. First time for piracy – I came out smelling like a rose – the second time for barratry. They claimed I faked jettisoning the cargo, found me guilty, and treated me to a six-year stretch. Two month later I gave a pal of mine

¹¹ For an overview of these broad historical trends over the long nineteenth century, See Eric Hobsbawm's trilogy: Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Revolution: 1789-1848* (Hachette UK, 2010); Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Capital: 1848-1875* (Hachette UK, 2010); Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Empire: 1875-1914* (Hachette UK, 2010).

¹² Paulos Kalligas, *Thanos Vlekas: A Novel* (Northwestern University Press, 2001). The original Greek version was published in 1855.

half of what was left over from the so-called jettison and received complete pardon.¹³

The Greek audience was familiar with the realities of piracy that plagued their own sector of the sea and would expect that pirates encountered only a light sentence given their prevalence alongside systemic corruption and inefficiency. While over the course of the nineteenth century the power and wealth of the Greek and Ottoman states grew and piracy correspondingly declined, it was not until the twentieth century that the Mediterranean was truly free from maritime piracy.

¹³ Kalligas, *Thanos Vlekas*, 41.

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