Title

Contesting Governance in the Global Marketplace: A Sociological Assessment of British Efforts to Build New Markets for NGO-Certified Sustainable Wood Products

Author
McNichol, Jason

Publication Date
2000-01-03

Contesting Governance in the Global Marketplace:
A Sociological Assessment of British Efforts to Build New Markets
for NGO-Certified Sustainable Wood Products

Draft Spring, 1999
(Please do not cite or distribute without prior permission.)

Jason McNichol
University of California
Department of Sociology
410 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
E-mail: mcnichol@socrates.berkeley.edu

ABSTRACT

Recent years have seen an explosion of new attempts to develop and implement voluntary third-party certification programs to encourage environmentally and socially responsible production practices for globally traded commodities. This study seeks to shed light on the nature and potentials of these new para-regulatory forms by using a sociological institutional approach to examine one of the most long-standing and successful attempts to develop a market for certified products. A close look at the British effort at building new markets for certified wood products contrasted against the relative failure of its counterpart in the United States reveals that causal factors from three analytic dimensions-- political economy, regulatory style/conventions, and diffuse cultural attributes-- together offer a compelling explanation for the recent British success. The findings suggest that the analytical approach adopted here may be of use in explaining trajectories of efforts in other contexts, including the United States.

I. Introduction and Overview

> "I've been to trade shows in England and the U.S., and the difference is like night and day. In England, there were several hundred people at the show, and the industry people were excited and saying that singing on to certification didn't just make ethical and moral sense-- it made business sense. In the U.S., most retailers are afraid of it, and industry is screaming that it is interfering with efficiency and look what a fine job they do without regulation." Paraphrased comments from director of major U.S. wood certification firm, interviewed 19 February 1998.

At a time when conventional state-based regulation has been increasingly seen as either an inefficient or inappropriate means to regulate social and environmental standards in global commodities trade, voluntary third-party certification and labeling (hereafter C&L) programs have become popular, if controversial, tools to encourage sustainable development around the world. These efforts, which usually involve a "seal of approval" on the final product to indicate that a set of social and environmental performance criteria have been met in the production phase, have emerged around a number of major commodities, ranging from wood products, agricultural goods, and textiles, to footwear, footballs, and even rugs (see Kruijtbosch 1997; Economist 27 Feb. 1999 for recent examples). Advocates of these programs believe they are a necessary adjunct to conventional regulation at a time when increasingly global and competitive commodity markets are leaving national governments less willing or able to enforce social and environmental standards. But the track record of these efforts has been mixed, and supporters and critics alike wonder if, how, or when third party certification and labeling will become a regular feature in the regulatory environment around global commodity trade.

The present study is part of a larger Ph.D. project that attempts to shed light on the potentials and limitations of C&L programs as viable para-regulatory forms by tracing and comparing divergent national-level outcomes of one of the most longstanding and successful international third party C&L programs to date: the case of "well managed" wood products. While most mobilizations to develop C&L programs are still too fluid and new to offer case histories of success or failure, international efforts to develop such programs for "sustainable" wood products now have a reasonably long and established history. More dramatically, these efforts have met with markedly divergent levels of successful market-building and institutionalization in different consumer countries. The present exercise offers a preliminary sociological analysis of what many observers consider to be the most successful national-level outcome to date—that of the United Kingdom.

The next section begins with a brief overview of the history certification and labeling programs and a common definition of what a “successful” effort might look like. After characterizing the international context and justifying a comparison between outcomes in Britain and the United States, the third section briefly outlines the limits of existing social science approaches in explaining the cases at hand and sets forth a synthetic analytical frame of strategic action in market governance fields that informs the empirical analysis. After making brief notes on method, I move to a descriptive and analytical review of the British case based on evidence I have analyzed to date. The paper concludes with early speculation about what the British case might tell us situated within a broader comparative framework that includes North America.

II. Experiments in Sustainable Market-Building: Third Party Certification and Global Commodities

Discussion and mobilization around plans to introduce certification and labeling of forest products has been apparent in the international community for several years (Pease 1992; Varangis, Crossley et al. 1995; Merino Perez 1996; Oliver 1996; Vallejo 1996; Wright 1996; Hansen 1997; Mater 1997; Wilson and Malin 1997). The 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development produced a number of intergovernmental and NGO-sponsored documents arguing for the need to involve key stakeholders at the local, national, and international levels in developing programs to encourage responsible production practices for environmental and socio-economic well-being of involved communities through market mechanisms. Since that time, international conferences and research efforts have been sponsored by a number of interest groups, including trade organizations, academic and applied forestry research groups, intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations and World Bank, and even national government entities, such as the Canadian environment and development ministry (Palmer 1996;Cesar-Centeno 1996).

This recent interest and discussion regarding the potentials of certification has been accompanied by a number of efforts to launch new certification and labeling programs. Programs vary in sponsorship, scope, and participation of stakeholders, ranging from industry-sponsored codes of conduct adhered to voluntarily in "good faith," to statutory and third party production process monitoring and chain-of-custody certification subject to national, regional, and/or international standards (for overviews see Varangis, Crossley et al. 1995; Merino Perez 1996; Oliver 1996; Hansen 1997; Mater 1997; Wilson and Malin 1997). Perhaps the most innovative, controversial, and significant of these efforts have been those attempting to build new markets in major consumer countries for products certified and labelled by independent monitoring groups as meeting a broad set of environmental and social sustainability standards that are interpreted and monitored by national and regional bodies. North American, Western European, and several emerging economy countries (such as South Africa), in addition to Japan, have all seen the introduction of C&L programs for wood products in their domestic marketplaces in the 1990s. These programs attempt to go beyond previous efforts to build alternative niche markets (like fair trade stores) and instead seek to integrate independently-verified production condition and practice standards into dominant trade networks. While the current state of affairs of these programs is fluid and controversial, consensus is building among sympathetic observers regarding the characteristics necessary for a viable C&L market to flourish.

What Would a Successful C&L Program Look Like?

Before moving on to a discussion of recent empirical trends and the comparative cases at hand, it would be helpful to first articulate what an ideal-typical success in building a market might look like. While major stakeholders still argue over normative definitions of a "successful" third party C&L program, existing literature from public policy and marketing quarters converges in underscoring the following general qualities (Upton and Bass 1996; see Wasik 1996 and Ottman 1998 for illustrations of convergence among "green management" and marketing writers):

1. A successful C&L market would need to be perceived as legitimate by all major stakeholders, including consumers, retailers/suppliers, business interests, NGOs, and governments. Aspects of legitimacy include trust in the ability of monitoring bodies to evaluate and accredit objectively, agreement upon all participants that the rules-of-the-game are consistent and fair; and perceptions among stakeholders that the standards themselves are fair to all parties.
2. A successful C&L market would need to be sufficiently institutionalized to be stable and predictable to parties involved. Unstable, unpredictable, and uncertain market forms are not viable.
3. A successful C&L market would need to have generated sufficient effective demand and incentives for supply and distribution to be profitable to participants.

4. A successful C&L market would need to be consistent with, complementary to, and perhaps mutually enforced alongside existing regulatory standards at national and international levels.

These qualities can be summarized into a working definition of ideal-typical success: *Success is evident when monitoring, oversight, and certification become institutionalized in a regulatory regime as a legitimate, significant, and normatively desirable set of new relationships and practices among stakeholders*. This conceptualization of success, articulated by business, governmental, and NGO observers living in a world of *realpolitik*, actually captures well the central components of a broader sociological frame regarding market-building that will be introduced below.

With this understanding of success in hand, experiences around the world in building C&L markets in major consumer countries appear checkered, indeed. In general, industry and government-sponsored programs have sprung up in a number of countries at the same time that (and largely in response to) third party NGO C&L programs have garnered more support. In several of these cases (such as in Canada), mobilization and competition between national government, industry-sponsored, and NGO or intergovernmental third party programs to develop market share and legitimacy continue. In a few countries, such as Britain and Sweden, government regulatory bodies have attempted to synchronize their efforts with the dominant umbrella international NGO program (the Forest Stewardship Council) to develop consistent standards and harmonize certification criteria. Demand among retailers and consumers (including government procurement agencies) for C&L products is currently modest but varies considerably from country to country, and is usually higher in countries that have better established, consistent, and government sanctioned programs.

While only history will tell us how strategies for building-in sustainable production practices into wood markets through new experiments in alliance-building and oversight will turn out, the dominant coalition supporting such efforts, the Forest Stewardship Council and its associated accreditors, industry supporters and other allies, has had notable success in providing the infrastructure, incentives, and mobilization of perceived demand to coordinate a world market for wood products certified to be produced under environmentally, socially, and economically responsible conditions.[1] But while the FSC arguably stands as the most successful effort thus far to organize a certified market for a global commodity, perhaps most striking about its experience are the divergent paths national-level trajectories for certified wood products have followed. This divergence is perhaps most apparent when one considers the radically different levels of success found in the United States and the United Kingdom-- two countries with some parallel sets of conditions and influences, but with very different levels of successful integration of major retailers and suppliers into an effective market

The United States and Britain stand out as intriguing cases for a careful follow-through of the international effort at certification for a number of reasons. Recent events in Britain-- toward major retail support for a large class of C&L wood products alongside government support and harmonization of national standards-- make the British case probably the closest to an unqualified success thus far. While several other countries, like Sweden, have witnessed government and private industry support for independent monitoring and certification, the British case appears more stable and proportionally more successful in putting certified products on store shelves. Even more important for purposes of a fruitful and viable sociological comparison, the British case stands in marked contrast to a politically and culturally quite similar country-- the United States-- that has floundered in almost inverse proportion to the degree that Britain market has flourished. In the United States, industry-sponsored and multiple NGO programs continue to vie for domination of a small and fragmented C&L market, industry is for the most part overtly hostile and well-organized against third party monitoring, and government efforts to legitimate and harmonize regulatory standards are virtually non-existent.[2]

C&L efforts for wood products in the United States have been recently characterized by a number of observers as highly politicized, fragmented, and largely unsuccessful in building a stable and legitimate market (Varangis, Crossley et al. 1995; Lagniappe Letter 1996; Sullivan 1996; Trickell 1996; Hansen 1997; Mater 1997; Wilson and Malin 1997). A number of competing initiatives have been introduced by major industrial players, domestic and transnational NGOs, and intergovernmental organizations. Larger timber interests argue that third-

---

[1] Space limitations prohibit a more lengthy description of the Forest Stewardship Council.

party certification programs are inefficient, redundant, and also constitute barriers to free trade. The U.S. government and individual states have made contradictory and ambiguous moves in regard to supporting independent C&L programs. Polls and informal observations of consumer attitudes suggest that, while the American public is relatively sympathetic to sustainability concerns, trust and interest in certified products is low.

The situation for certified wood products in Britain currently evidences a move toward institutionalized and rationalized, state-mediated, and relatively successful development of a stable market. The British government has recently announced a plan to develop a national forest plan consistent with and accredited by the major third party international C&L initiative developed by the Forest Stewardship Council (Department of Environment 1991; Department of Environment 1993; Cesar-Centeno 1996; European Report 1996; Oliver 1996; Sugal 1996; Mater 1997; National Home Center News 1997; Wilson and Malin 1997; personal interview 2 July 1998). Furthermore, major retailers and buyers groups have already committed to widespread purchasing of FSC-certified wood products in the very near future. While British consumers may be confused and hesitant about green marketing claims, and some business interests are still hostile to such initiatives, major retailers expect the availability of certified "good stewardship" wood products will continue to grow in the next few years.

III. The Dilemma: Limits of Existing Approaches[3]

What strikes the sociological observer perhaps most immediately about the divergent domestic outcomes of certified markets for wood products in Britain and the United States is how difficult they are to explain using conventional social science explanations of relative success and failure of social change in overseeing markets in general and environmental/social production conditions in particular. While a number of social scientists have broadly theorized the relationships between the market form and social and environmental sustainability, no single approach provides a satisfying explanation of the cases at hand.

---

[2] Recent evidence collected for the United States case in early 1999 suggests that efforts to legitimate FSC-accredited certification and labeling are beginning to make small inroads into the industry, but this characterization is still accurate for the period in question in the study (1990-1998) (personal interview, 29 April 1999).

[3] This theoretical overview only touches on the broad traditions relevant to the topic at hand and is not intended as a thorough exposition.

Critical Political Economy

Critical political economy perspectives on markets and sustainability tend to focus on how political and economic power hang together in capitalist development and ultimately undermine environmental and social well-being (for recent examples, see Dickens 1992; Benton 1989; O'Connor 1994; Bunker 1992; Sachs 1994; O'Connor 1998; O'Connor 1994; Peet and Watts 1993; see also comments made in Pieterse 1997). Since most adherents to these schools of thought do not take struggles over sustainable markets seriously (because, in their eyes, the capitalist market relation is unsustainable in the first place), most would have a difficult time entertaining the possibility that a successful re-negotiation of power and influence over a commodity market could be undertaken.

A more general line of political-economic reasoning might explain the divergent experiences in the two countries by noting that the United States has a powerful and well-organized domestic timber industry, whereas in Britain the forestry sector is a small and economically weak. While such a sectoral political-economic approach intuitively appears compelling, a more careful reading of the British case reveals that domestic woodland owners have historically enjoyed a disproportionate amount of influence in government circles; it appears theoretically premature to assume away their potential influence *a priori*. Furthermore, expanding the comparison to other national contexts, we see that the Canadian timber industry is proportionally larger and even better organized than its United States counterpart; yet, Canadian struggles over certification programs have shown far more compromise and change in approaches to regulation of the sector. And in Sweden, while several large timber interests and a high number of smaller landholders are actively involved in wood exports, a government-business-NGO coalition has recently completed negotiations to launch a national certification program that meets internationally-recognized FSC criteria.

Capitalist Revisionism and Neo-Classical Approaches

Literature falling under what I term capitalist revisionism argues that, under the right conditions, capitalist relations of production and trade can be compatible with, if not generative of, improved environmental and social well-being (e.g., Hawken 1993; Lewis 1992; Daly and Cobb 1989; Jacobs 1992). Such arguments have moved considerably beyond a neo-classical economic focus on "getting prices right" and have turned toward an emphasis on how productive-organizational, political-institutional, and even cultural dimensions of human activity condition how markets behave and are regulated. While this tradition is diverse and multidisciplinary, the variant most often developed to assess the nature and potential for C&L programs focuses on how increasing demand for responsible production practices in advanced consumer societies can drive changes in producer behavior through the market mechanism.

>From an economic effective demand perspective, success is evident when information regarding environmental and social externalities not captured in the cost of a product is conveyed in a legitimate, cost-effective form that allows consumers to respond by exercising their second-order utilities to minimize these hidden costs (Wasik 1996; Ottman 1998). Unfortunately, from this point of view it is not at all clear why the British experiment in C&L for wood products would be so much more vigorous than in the U.S. A number of consumer surveys conducted in Britain and the United States during the early 1990s found comparable levels of environmental concern and willingness to pay for green products between the two countries. While most existing survey research is not directly comparable across national contexts, an appraisal of existing information suggests that American consumers demonstrate high levels of salience for environmental concerns relative to other social issues, and also have higher disposable incomes than British citizens. Furthermore, willingness to pay for C&L products in Britain (the “green premium”) and salience of environmental concerns more generally actually fell in the mid-1990s after peaking in 1989-90-- precisely during the period that the C&L program sponsored by the FSC was beginning to hit the shelves of stores (National Consumer Council; 1996a, 1996b, 1997). If anything, survey data suggests that American consumers would provide a more receptive base for certified wood products than the British.

Regime and State-Society Relations Approaches

Yet another set of approaches that might attempt to explain divergent national trajectories in how markets and environmental concerns relate can be loosely described as a macro-comparative state-society analytic strategy. Scholars adopting this approach recognize that national modes of institutionalizing and constructing relationships between governments, markets, and social groups vary historically (e.g., Evans 1996a, 1996b,1995; Dobbin 1994; Evans et al 1985; Vogel 1986). These historically-dependent modes (e.g., national capitalisms) condition how different nations react to similar pressures or external events.

At the comparative macro level, most comparative regime approaches tend to see the United States and Britain very similarly (for an excellent review and a notable exception, see Vogel 1986). Both countries underwent major transitions toward decreased regulation and more liberalized markets, along with broader ideological shifts toward market-based solutions to social problems in the 1980s. Both countries were early industrializers with now well-established consumer cultures and liberal capitalist regimes. Existing typologies of state-economy-society relations often group the United States and Britain together, for instance as individualistic (versus communitarian), as neoliberal/laissez faire (vs. command and control), or pluralist (versus corporatist) (Vogel 1986; Dobbin 1997). But in making general claims about the relative similarities in state structures, these typologies fail to identify aspects of political culture whose variation may help explain differential outcomes in regulatory processes. More institutionally-oriented comparative approaches that focus on regulatory style and national political-institutional legacies go further in providing empirical analysis of differences, but they do not focus their lens on how national regulatory governance over particular markets can be contested and changed by new actors (please see fn. 5, below).

More specific social science explanations that might address the comparative social construction and politicization of environmental problems also do not readily provide an explanation for the divergent outcomes. In contemporary analyses of the politics of consumption and production in the environmental and social justice arenas, British and American experiences and characteristics are superficially quite similar. Both countries saw large mobilizations around social justice and environmental controversies beginning the in the mid-late 1960s and growing for the next decade; both witnessed governmental responses toward establishing and institutionalizing new environmental bureaucracies in the 1970s; and both served as major consumer issue-arenas around third world and global environmental issues in the late 1980s and early 1990s (McCormick 1991; Murphy and Bendell 1997). Drawing upon simpler variants of conventional or new social movement theory or recent work in the politics of consumption, then, does not easily lend itself to explaining the apparent disjunctures between the British and American experiences (Laraña et al. 1994; Buttel 1992).

IV. Toward A Sociological Institutional Perspective On Market Governance

Existing meta-theoretical approaches to understanding contestations over sustainability in global commodity markets provide us with a number of useful clues about analytical dimensions to consider, but they fail to provide a satisfying framework for examining the cases at hand. Specifically, most substantive treatments of sustainability and capitalist market relations still have not given us analytical purchase over how to think sociologically about the construction of a sustainable market. Lacking in most approaches is a more sophisticated understanding of how contestations over how a market should operate are forged by competing interests in distinctive political-cultural environments where existing relations of power condition, but do not always determine, how the rules (in this case, over third party certification and labeling) will be constructed. Political-economic approaches are right to take seriously how economic and political power hang together, while state-society approaches are useful in demonstrating that capitalist relations can take distinctly national forms. Other recent contributions from social constructivists and adherents to new global sociologies have also helped map out how transnational practices, institutions, and social movements as well as ideas can affect how policies are formulated.[4] But the emergence and divergent national trajectories taken by recent C&L efforts for wood products suggest that only a framework that can articulate how these variables interrelate with one another dynamically over time to challenge and/or reproduce mutual understandings of governance will provide the basis

[4] The larger dissertation project investigates these contributions in more detail. For reviews of constructivist/discursive contributions, see Redclift and Benton (1992) and Buttel (1992). For excellent reviews of recent trends in local-global theorizing, see Pieterse (1997), Martin and Beittel (1998), Sklair (1994, 1995) and Genov (1997). A provocative recent appraisal of the powers of idea and information in international social movements can be found in Keck and Sikkink (1998). The attached bibliography also lists additional substantive treatments from these and other perspectives.

for a satisfying explanation. Fortunately, recent developments in sociological institutionalism and economic sociology provide us with a set of tools to do so.

A Working Framework of Strategic Action in Market Governance Fields

Recent work among non-rational choice neo-institutionalists and other scholars contributing to the emerging field of economic sociology has argued for an integration of a general theory of institutions into a framework for understanding market dynamics (for an appraisal of the field of economic sociology, see White 1981; Granovetter 1985; Smelser and Swedberg 1994;Swedberg 1997). Recent scholarship has focused specifically on how markets are constituted (or constructed) as institutions that are maintained and transformed through social relationships, shared meanings, and the strategic action of skilled actors. Neil Fligstein and his colleagues have perhaps made the most comprehensive attempt thus far to integrate social movement, political process, and network perspectives into analyses of stability and change of markets as social technologies (Fligstein and McAdam 1995; Fligstein 1996, 1997, n.d.).

Fligstein and other neo-institutionalists who question how new social arenas (such as markets) come into being and are maintained and transformed over time focus on how various groups interact to negotiate new rules and fields of action.   For Fligstein and McAdam (1995), new social arenas (or strategic action fields) are forged by political contestations that construct rules, interests, and the distribution of resources among various groups. Once in place, new arenas are organized around "local rules of action" and conditions of membership (i.e., a culture). In a related formulation of markets as politics, Fligstein (1996) argues that political action during the formation of markets resembles social movements, where firms struggle to mobilize resources and establish conceptions of control that will define how a market will be organized.   In this and in more recent (1997, 1998) work, Fligstein develops a general theory of action that outlines how shared meanings, resources, and social skill of institutional entrepreneurs interact to help explain both stability and change in institutions (including markets).

Departing from this sociological understanding of markets, and integrating the substantive and theoretical insights from the other approaches outlined above, I develop a synthetic model of market governance fields that provides a conceptual blueprint from which to understand contestations over certification and labeling programs.

This model joins substantive insights from recent scholarship in comparative studies of governance and regulation with the meta-theoretical postulates evident in a sociological institutional approach to markets[5]. I argue that C&L struggles are best understood as taking place within strategic action fields primarily (although not exclusively) at the domestic level, where rules, resources, and meanings over how a market will be regulated and who will do it are contested and/or reproduced. There are two major dimensions to the model: its overall understanding of markets as arenas of strategic action (or fields); and its assumptions about how power, interest, and agency interrelate.

Notion of Fields

1. Transnational contestations over market governance are best understood as taking place within overlapping strategic action fields (which I call market governance fields) at the national and international levels. Markets primarily exist as material-organizational forms within regional and national contexts, but they draw together actors and constitute fields of interaction across countries, as well.

2. These fields are constituted by actors who have stakes in the institutional form of market governance for a given commodity and who orient themselves to one another in their strategic actions.

3. The "market" is constituted through the material-productive-consumptive relationships of the commodity chain embedded in and constituted by rules, meanings, and relationships institutionalized in the governance structure emergent in national and transnational fields.

4. A stable governance field is characterized by the reproduction of a set of shared understandings and corresponding institutional structures that govern who will control a market and how regulations will be implemented.

5. A governance field can change when the legitimacy of normative claims, shared understandings, and institutional structures is contested by skilled social groups that question the existing order and mobilize material, organizational, discursive, and political resources to redefine rules-of-the-game. The dynamics of change can be understood through a political process model introduced in recent social movement scholarship (e.g., McAdam 1982).

Interest, Agency, and Power (Preferences, Constraints, And Opportunities):

Actors engage in purposeful, goal-directed behavior. An actor's behavior at any given time reflects his/her optimal decision based on an evaluation of sets of motivators, goals, and constraints to deliberation at any given time.

Preferences (motivators, goals) are socially conditioned and cannot be imputed *ex ante*. While preferences for high quality and low cost among consumers, and profit maximization among producers and suppliers, are likely to be commonly held, they are not fixed, straightforward, nor safe to assume

[5] A range of substantive investigations in the tradition that might loosely be called comparative governance informs my model (Wilkinson 1996; Storper and Salis 1996; Dobbin 1994; Vogel 1986; Streek and Schmitter 1985; Cohen and Rodgers 1992; Nowacek 1997; and Laumann and Knoke 1989).

sociologically. How actors come to understand what their interests are is, of course, the bread and butter of most contemporary social science theorizing.

Ideas, norms, and culture matter to the degree that they shape how actors understand their world and interests. Collectively shared meanings also constitute the principal means by which institutions are reproduced. Therefore, to the degree that shared meanings can be wrested, challenged, and revised by challengers to reflect new political and organizational needs, they help constitute struggles over power.

The social construction processes that inform how actors understand their interests and preferences are intricately related to the processes that construct and embed market forms.

Power can be economic, political, or cultural/ideological in nature; it can also inhere in institutional structures.

Institutional entrepreneurs and charismatic individuals with high levels of social skill can play important catalytic roles during crises of market governance. Abilities to persuade, reframe, and mobilize networks and other forms of social capital to help convince other actors to cooperate can serve as sources of power when individuals who possess them have the political opportunity to do so.

Towards An Explanatory Framework For Britain

While the synthetic model outlined above does not delineate testable hypotheses for the conditions necessary for success in a C&L regime, it does provide us with an important set of tools that we can apply to the British case. At the methodological level, it asks that we assess how C&L struggles over wood products in Britain unfolded at all levels of the analysis, from the retailer selling the product, to trade associations, to government agencies, to producers, to international-level influences. It also demands methodologically that we not assume *ex ante* what different actors understood to be in their "best interest" but rather focus on how understandings of self-interest are reproduced or changed over time. Substantively, it suggests that we must examine how pre-existing relations of power and control in the governance field set up the conditions for new regulatory challenges to be introduced. Yet, at the same time, it asks that we carefully observe how existing regulatory rules changed over time as a result of challenge and re-negotiation by institutional entrepreneurs with social skill and new forms of influence. Furthermore, it demands that we monitor how shared meanings and institutional forms constitute the social environment in which these challenges have taken place, including prevailing conventions and regulatory styles as well as cultural influences operating within national contexts.

V. METHODOLOGY

Primary data for this preliminary case study were collected during an extended visit to the United Kingdom during the summer of 1998. Primary sources included interviews with individuals in major stakeholder groups (n=12), archives from NGOs and government agencies, observations from attendance at major industry events, and content analysis of specialty and general press coverage from the period 1989-97 (n=260) gathered from national news databases and press archives maintained by major stakeholders. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with the primary individuals in ten businesses and NGOs who played central roles in the struggle over third party certification. Additional interview data from conversations with government, business, and NGO representatives was derived from research conducted by Murphy and Bendell (1996) and Murphy (1997). Archival research consisted of collecting and analyzing records of meetings between stakeholders, internal position papers and documents, and correspondence with other interest groups from 1990-1997 housed in the collections of the major NGO involved and in the archives of the current national office of the major international certification NGO. Secondary sources included existing analyses and interviews conducted by other scholars studying environmental politics in Britain and North America.

VI. A Brief History Of Struggles Over Third Party Certification And Labeling Of Wood Products In Britain: 1989-98[6]

Rainforests and Retailers: Boycotts and Eco-Labeling Command Attention 1985-91

Like most other advanced consumer countries, Britain witnessed widespread growth in public concern and mobilization over global environmental issues in the late 1980s. Increased recognition of dangers from a thinning ozone layer, global warming, and rainforest destruction, coupled with domestic toxic accidents, food scares, and the aftermath of the Chernobyl incident, all contributed to a notable rise in public sympathies and NGO mobilization over environmental issues (National Consumer Council 1996a; Murphy 1998). At the governmental level, too, environment and sustainability issues rose in prominence. Margaret Thatcher herself became a leading proponent of sustainability, and drew further inspiration from moves in the European Union to introduce Community-wide rules on wildlife, eco-labeling of green products, and life-cycle standards for waste disposal (McCormick 1991). During this time, English media concern was especially acute around the plight of tropical rainforests and their peoples (personal interview 29 June 1998). Well-organized and highly effective environmental NGOs, especially Friends of the Earth, mobilized large numbers of grassroots groups to support a tropical timber ban and shun retailers who stocked tropical wood products (Friends of the Earth 1996; Murphy and Bendell 1997). Even the future king, Prince Charles, urged the public to stop buying tropical timber (Independent Feb. 8 1990). By early 1990, consumer support for environmental issues and green purchasing had reached an all-time high, and a number of producers and retailers were beginning to make environmental claims on their products (National Consumer Council 1996a, 1996b, 1997)

In January of 1990, the marketing director of Britain's largest do-it-yourself chain, B&Q, was asked at a press conference whether he could identify where his company's tropical wood products came from. His embarrassment at not knowing, coupled with several high-profile mock "chainsaw massacres" staged in front of several stores, helped speed the appointment by the director of B&Q of a new environmental manager who would address the tropical timber question (Knight, 1998; Murphy and Bendell 1996; Murphy 1998; B&Q 1995; Knight 1996).

At about the same time, one of the strongest and most respected national NGOs, WWF-UK, launched a series of "forest seminars" seeking to bring producers, importers, and retailers together to discuss ways to work together to solve forest sustainability issues (personal interview 22 June 1998; Murphy 1998; WWF archive documents). These meetings marked a broader sea-change in NGO-business relations around environment and sustainability concerns: retreating from their formerly antagonistic stance, environmental NGOs, like the government, were increasingly interested in working with dominant business interests to develop joint solutions to environmental problems.

It was at one of these meetings that brought business and environmental groups together that Francis Sullivan, WWF-UK's forest director, and Alan Knight, B&Q's newly-christened environmental manager, first sat down together in 1990 to contemplate a joint response to the timber sourcing problem (personal interview 6 July

---

[6] In the analysis that follows, individual references to particular interviews, press coverage, and archival documents are only cited to substantiate specific events or claims and to offer examples. A complete bibliography of press citations, public

1998; personal interview 22 June 1998). Frustrated with what they saw as a limited and naive understanding among boycotters of how to grapple with sustainable forestry issues in the timber trade more broadly (including what they considered to be the ineffectiveness of the tropical timber boycott, itself), the two had hatched a plan within several months to form a WWF-sponsored buyers group of businesses committed to purchasing an increasing share of timber products from well-managed forests and developing a credible third-party certification and labeling scheme to do so (B&Q 1995; Independent 8 Dec. 1991).

Buyers Group Growth and the Emergence of the FSC: 1991-96

In early 1991, WWF-UK formally announced the formation of the 1995 Buyers Group, committed to buying timber products exclusively from “sustainable” sources by 1995 (WWF 1996). Two of the leading DIY retailers and the leading supermarket chain had already joined, and the group had enlisted a total of 15 members. The alliance was committed to certification of commonly agreed upon performance criteria by a credible third party to ensure that standards were met in the production setting. WWF-UK would serve as both partner and watchdog to ensure that group members complied with their commitments, and would also help coordinate plans to implement a credible third party certification program. Participants in the program heralded its founding as a tribute to the new spirit of partnership between business and environmental NGOs in ensuring sustainable development around the world (Independent 8 Dec. 1991).

Efforts to develop NGO-based third party certification of wood products were not unique to the United Kingdom at the time, but the British buyers group did serve as an important catalyst in consolidating competing initiatives into what would become the transnational Forest Stewardship Council (personal interview 22 June 1998; Upton and Bass 1996; WWF 1996). Activists and entrepreneurs had met in the United States to discuss plans for an international umbrella certification NGO in 1990, and an ENGO (Rainforest Alliance) and private consulting firm had also been developing certification and labeling programs in the early 1990s (personal interview 2 July 1998). But the buyers group, backed by the eagerness of retailers to develop certified suppliers

---

documents, and interviews that inform the analysis is available from the author upon request.

to help meet their commitments, helped catalyze (both financially and institutionally) the negotiations that would lead to the formation of the Forest Stewardship Council.

In July 1993, the Forest Stewardship Council was founded in Toronto (to be later headquartered in Oaxaca, Mexico) by an alliance of environmentalists, indigenous and human rights groups, and timber industry entrepreneurs --including retailers-- as a non-profit, non-governmental initiative to coordinate voluntary national and regional accreditation efforts for "well managed forests" certified to meet a common set of environmental, social, and economic criteria (Forest Stewardship Council 1995a; 1995b). These criteria would be customized to regional conditions but would apply broadly to forestry practices in both the developing and developed world. The buyers group, whose membership had grown to 24 companies by the end of 1993, was committed to sourcing products exclusively from FSC-certified suppliers by 1995 (Independent 17 Mar. 1994; Guardian 17 Mar. 1994). By early 1994, a national NGO, the Soil Association, was accredited as an FSC-sanctioned certifier for the United Kingdom, and accreditation was also proceeding for certifiers headquartered in North America.

While the buyers group enjoyed increasing support among retailers and NGOs in the early years, it was not without its critics or competition. Domestic timber industry groups, working through the Timber Trade Federation and the Forest Industry Council of Great Britain, sought to develop their own best practice standards compatible with existing national legislation implemented by the government Forestry Commission. In March of 1994, the FICGB attempted to pre-empt the FSC scheme by introducing its own eco-label (Guardian, 17 Mar. 1994). But the FICGB program did not incorporate broad socio-economic and environmental performance standards or third party auditing, nor was it applicable outside the United Kingdom. As the FSC buyers group grew and gained recognition from the EU and UK governments, the domestic industry trade groups continued to voice their opposition (e.g., Timber Trades Journal 29 June 1996; The Field 1 Sept. 1996).

Certification Hits the Streets: Launch of the Label and Confict with Domestic Industry

On February 21st, 1996, 150 representatives from the timber and paper industries, retail, media, and the government attended the official unveiling of the FSC trademark, which would be placed on products certified by an FSC-accredited third party on store shelves in the coming months (Timber Trades Journal, 1 Mar. 1996). The event was well-covered in both general and specialty presses, and would enjoy widespread support during the coming months in newspaper editorials and consumer advice columns (e.g., Paper Europe, March 1996; DIY Week, March 1-8 1996). The buyers group had now enlisted the participation of over 47 companies, representing about 22% of UK wood use, who had already certified about 4% of their product lines (BBC Wildlife, March 1996). Jonathan Porritt, a leading environmentalist in Britain, joined the WWF-UK/FSC buyers group in encouraging domestic producers to discuss ways to cooperate in building demand and supply for FSC-certified products. Representatives of domestic industry were invited by Porritt and others to participate in the national FSC working group seeking to draft national standards suitable for UK producers. Advocates of the program were encouraging critics to see the opportunity as a win-win situation, where domestic producers could also reap the benefits already enjoyed by importers who were meeting growing demand for certified wood.

In the late summer of 1996, Peter Wilson, chief executive of the Timber Growers Association, penned an editorial in a leading national timber trade journal that crowned the growing rift between domestic producers and the buyers group. In a sweeping condemnation of the WWF/FSC effort, Wilson condemned what he saw as an unnecessary and undemocratic imposition of special interests on the world's forest producers. Commenting on a recent WWF Forests For Life seminar advocating FSC certification held in Brussels, he added:

> "I am not sure what the average WWF supporter would have made of last month's affair in Brussels but, despite the title, the seminar is basically akin to a well orchestrated Nazi rally save that instead of the Third Reich it is the Mexico-based Forest Stewardship Council that is being promoted." (Timber Grower, Autumn 1996: p. 9).

Wilson's Nazi comment, while certainly more extreme in tone than most disagreements over the WWF/FSC effort, nonetheless typified the reaction of domestic timber interests as they watched the buyers group grow in scope and lobby for FSC-certified products in the domestic producer market (especially over charcoal). Frustrated producers found kindred spirits in other international efforts to develop industry-controlled voluntary management criteria that did not specify performance standards. Several competing international initiatives were on the horizon, inspired by growing popularity of ISO14000 and other management systems among dominant industry players and intergovernmental bodies (e.g., Builders' Merchants News 1 June 1997; Cornish Times 26

Sept. 1997; Professional Builders Merchant 1 Nov. 1997). Domestic producers also attempted to undermine the FSC effort by sending a letter of complaint to the British government and EU claiming that the program violated fair trade rules under the World Trade Organization because it sought to create an arbitrary monopoly on certification (by specifying in its agreement that only the FSC was credible and demanding 100% compliance from members by 2000) (personal interview 22 June 1998; ENDS Report, May 1996; Timber Trades Journal, 1 May 1996). The buyers group responded by assuring supporters that it did not intend to create a monopoly and rewording the membership agreement with language that could not be legally construed as violating international law (Timber Trades Journal, 22 June 1996; personal interview 22 June 1998). Nonetheless, critical statements from industry representatives condemning the FSC effort were a frequent in press releases through 1997.

During this time of marked tensions with domestic industry, the UK government found itself in an awkward and contradictory position. On the one hand, the government had actively encouraged the development of voluntary eco-labeling to encourage sustainable production practices, and had even convened a short-lived Eco-labeling Board to draft legislation ensuring the legitimacy of green claims after a well-publicized series of fraudulent labels were exposed by WWF and other watchdog groups in the early 1990s (Department of Environment 1991, 1993; Independent 10 Jan 1990; 3 July 1990). The government had also provided financial support to a variety of pro-certification NGOs and actively consulted with WWF-UK/FSC about ways to improve domestic woodland regulations. Furthermore, in June of 1996 the House of Commons issued a press release publicizing official approval of the international FSC scheme “until worldwide standards are agreed” (Timber Trades Journal 1 July 1996). On the other hand, the main governmental body responsible for domestic forestry standards, the Forestry Commission, had long held close and friendly ties with domestic producers, and also maintained that its own standards were sufficient and credible by themselves (personal interview 2 July 1998; Independent 17 March 1994; Timber Trades Journal 1 Apr. 1996; 26 Apr. 1996; 27 Apr. 1996; for a more recent example, see the exchange in the House of Lords of 9 June 1998). During 1996 as efforts to develop a national FSC standard unfolded, members of the Forestry Commission urged FSC supporters to carefully consider whether adding additional requirements to the UK forestry standard was necessary or useful (Timber Trades Journal, 4 May 1996).

The Consolidation of a New Regulatory Regime

In March of 1997, the Forestry Commission announced a plan to bring domestic producers and FSC advocates together to draft a new UK Forest Standard that "could be compatible with the FSC" (Landscape Design, Sept. 1996; Timber Trades Journal 1 Oct. 1997). Representatives of the Forestry Commission had met with both domestic industry and FSC representatives for several months to hash out a compromise to work together. This breakthrough only added to the continuing success of the buyers group in gaining legitimacy and membership during the year. By mid 1997, the group had grown to include more than 2.3 billion British pounds per year (over 3.8 billion US$) in wood products sales, and had come to be known as "one of the widest reaching environmental initiatives by a charity of all time" (Murphy and Bendell 1997). A leading consulting firm estimated in 1997 that the rate of growth in demand for certified products was poised to increase 10-20% per year, or roughly 7-10 times the rate of growth for the wood products market more generally (Delphi 1997). The new government support for the FSC effort at home was followed by news in July that the parent international FSC organization headquartered in Mexico would receive a grant of 490,000 British pounds from the European Union (Paper Europe July 1997).

In the months that followed, domestic timber interests were still voicing resistance to the FSC protocol. Nonetheless, by late 1997 it was becoming increasing clear to observers that domestic industry and FSC supporters were more willing to cooperate and compromise. In January of 1998, the Forestry Commission launched the new UK Forestry Standard and urged the FSC to consider further consultation before issuing its own standard (Timber Trades Journal 20 January 1998). The new Forestry Standard incorporated several major demands originally made by FSC, and as of July, 1998, FSC supporters were confident that a joint standard for their domestic program was on the horizon (personal interview 2 July 1998).

The positive developments on the domestic fronts for national certification in the UK were accompanied by a number of trends in 1997 and 1998 that bode well for a strong and stable market for third-party certified well managed wood products. At a time when EU and industry-backed eco-labeling programs were either failing or mired in hopeless controversy (for overviews, see Independent 11 Nov. 1997, 23 Nov. 1997), the FSC could brag that its UK buyers group had by the beginning of 1998 come to account for over 1/4 of the UK's consumption of forest products among its 80+ members (ENDS Report, Jan 1998). Today, members are still committed to sourcing exclusively from certified sources by the year 2000 (personal interview 2 July 1998). FSC advocates have also been careful to note the many ways in which third party certification is compatible with, and in fact complementary to, other types of regulatory oversight being developed through ISO and national and intergovernmental initiatives. The WWF/FSC effort has therefore been able to enjoy substantial growth without appearing to encroach on existing national and intergovernmental regulatory bodies. And, to top it all off, the leading retail entrepreneur of the effort, Alan Knight, was awarded in 1998 the highest government honor in the land for his certification work: the "Order of the British Empire." According to most definitions of success in building a new C&L regime, then, the FSC/WWF-UK effort would appear to have done quite well, indeed.

VII. Making Sense of British Success: A Preliminary Analysis

In light of tenets of the synthetic approach developed above, a cursory overview of the history of the successful C&L effort in Britain leads us to focus on three related loci of analysis: (1) relations of power, influence, and control in the British wood products market; (2) the ways in which different actors came to understand that working together to support a C&L program for wood products was in their "best interest"; and (3) how prevailing modes of interacting and struggling over new regulatory "rules-of-the-game" among competing groups shaped the manner and extent to which they succeeded. A model of strategic action in market governance fields suggests that uncovering the character and relationships between these three dimensions --- political economy, value orientations and the constitution of self interest, and prevailing regulatory style and conventions of governance—may go a long way in helping us understand what the British experience can tell us practically and theoretically about the potentials and limitations of C&L programs more generally.

The Big Picture: Political Economy Of The Wood Product Market Governance Field

Leading Retailers And Their Power

The story of British success in building a market for certified wood products is very much a story about a powerful alliance between leading retailers and powerful NGOs in the political-economic arena. The buyers group was literally born out of a series of conversations "over a pint of beer" between the environmental manager of the leading do-it-yourself retailer (DIY), B&Q, and the forest program director of World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF-UK) in 1991 about long-term solutions to the tropical timber problem (personal interview, 6 July 1998). In a matter of months, this informal dialogue had grown into an initiative sponsored by several retailers with a large market share who, backed by one of the largest and most well-respected national NGOs, politely but firmly began to approach their suppliers with requests that they work towards certification (personal interviews 6 July, 10 July, 30 July 1998). Suppliers, sensing that the dominant buyers of their products were working in tandem, faced either a potential loss of their customer base or an accommodation to the retailers' demands.

A number of structural characteristics of the wood products sector in the United Kingdom help explain the inspiration behind and relative ease of this early effort to mobilize the supply chain to cooperate. Most obviously, the fact that several major DIY retailers controlled a large market share for British wood sales-- while rendering them highly vulnerable to media campaigns concerning purchasing practices-- also provided very real material leverage for their negotiations with one another and with suppliers. As can be seen in Table 1, the top six retailers in the DIY sector in the early 1990s together enjoyed almost 35% of total national sales, with the leading name, B&Q, retaining almost 14%. The DIY sector had also enjoyed a substantial boom in gross sales during the late 1980s and early 1990s, entering an increasingly competitive but lucrative stage by the time the buyers group got started (Murphy and Bendell 1997). When the environmental manager of B&Q teamed up with WWF-UK to make a move towards independent certification of its wood products, competitors quickly appreciated the potential public relations benefits of joining the effort (personal interviews 30 June 1998; 30 July 1998; Murphy 1998). Perhaps more importantly, they also appreciated the potential loss of market share they might suffer from embarrassment or humiliation at a later stage for not joining. As a result, within a year of B&Q's decision to strike an alliance with WWF, the second and third leading DIY outfits joined the new buyers group, to be followed by the remaining leaders in the succeeding year.

Once the buyer's group was supported by the dominant sellers in the industry, the alliance enjoyed substantial leverage in pressuring suppliers to participate in efforts to move toward independent third party certification. As the environmental manager of a leading DIY has observed, suppliers who faced some of their biggest customers working in tandem to demand cooperation or run the risk of being "de-listed" (i.e., discontinued) felt, quite reasonably, compelled to cooperate (personal interview 6 July 1998). But the relative financial strength and size of the leading retailers also allowed them to provide a number of more positive, facilitative incentives and forms of support for their suppliers to seek compliance. B&Q, from a very early stage, actively worked with suppliers to hash out strategies for getting certified, providing seed money for pilot projects and helping to pay for early certification visits by an FSC-accredited certifier (B&Q 1995; personal interview 6 July 1998). The relative financial strength of other competitors also allowed them to channel expertise and resources toward their suppliers; large retailers saw such activities as worthwhile investments to guarantee sources of certified wood as well as improve other aspects of quality control in sourcing (personal interviews 22 June 1998; 10 July 1998; Murphy and Bendell 1997).

The Domestic Timber Industry

The structure and relatively small share of the total UK wood products market occupied by domestic owners and suppliers also appears to have shaped the trajectory of the retailers' efforts. While the UK served as the third biggest single national supplier of wood products to the domestic market, its relative share was dwarfed by the total imports from other parts of Europe and elsewhere. Table 2 provides a breakdown of national sources for the UK wood market in the mid-1990s (WWF-UK data). In the first few years of the effort, producers and contractors targeted by the group were scattered around the world and did not have a strong power-base in UK politics. In the beginning phase, pressure for certification was largely focused on tropical imports; the focus of criticism and pressure had yet to fall on domestic producers. And, when buyers group advocates sought certification for temperate or boreal forest products, they first worked with Scandinavian suppliers who were already actively pursuing certification. By the time the buyers group and allied NGOs actively turned their attention towards domestic producers in 1996-7, these domestic interests found themselves surrounded by a retail industry that had already made considerable progress toward reforming the market more broadly. Domestic interests thus faced a momentum of pro-certification forces that had been carefully nurtured among dominant supply networks, suffering a path-dependent consequence (specifically, a fairly developed and sophisticated challenge to their self-governing authority) of their marginal importance to the broader market that originally occupied the buyers group's attention. To make matters worse, the largest single owner of productive woodlands in the UK was the UK government; buyers group members were in fact major customers of the government, and these members wanted certified wood (personal interview 22 June 1998). Thus, while domestic producers did enjoy a longstanding strong relationship with national and local governing authorities in the United Kingdom, their relative power in the marketplace was partially undermined by the early strong success in bringing foreign sources (such as Sweden) on board.

Strength And Legitimacy Of Non-Governmental Organizations

While the relative power of retailers in the UK wood products sector is an obvious and compelling piece of the explanatory puzzle, without resource-rich and politically high-profile NGOs to legitimate and facilitate their efforts, it is unlikely the retailers would have succeeded by themselves. Powerful NGOs were instrumental to the story in two ways: first, by having the strength and influence to launch the highly effective boycott and public humiliation campaigns demanding accountability that precipitated the first buyers group meetings; and, second, by throwing their weight behind the move toward third party certification itself as the buyers group sought to develop a legitimate infrastructure of certification and labeling of well-managed forest products. By the early 1990s, both more radical and more mainstream environmental NGOs had grown to considerable stature in the UK, economically and politically (McCormick 1989; Murphy 1997). Friends of the Earth, the dominant actor behind the initial timber boycotting and inflatable chain-saw demonstrations, had grown enormously in membership the late 1980s. The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the central NGO figure in the UK buyers group, had by the launching of the effort grown to have one of the largest operating budgets and memberships of any NGO in Britain. Furthermore, by 1990 it was perceived as one most widely consulted and legitimate NGO interest group in national governmental meetings, working papers, and consultative processes more broadly.

Simply put, WWF-UK served as the ideal partner to legitimate and shepherd-through the retailers' desire to develop workable and believable certification programs for their suppliers. The strength and stature of WWF-UK continued to grow during the development of the buyers group, and WWF-UK continues to reign as the most powerful and respected environmental NGO in Britain.

The relative power and influence enjoyed by Friends of the Earth, WWF-UK, and other NGOs that supported the move toward certification was more than just a consequence of their size and resources. In Britain, large NGOs have come to enjoy a quasi-official status as interested and involved parties in matters of national policy (McCormick 1997). The government, by regularly consulting NGOs as major stakeholders and often involving them as agents of policy implementation, has helped legitimate them as major players in debates over regulatory policy. WWF-UK, in particular, has been supported both financially and institutionally by the government, but even Friends of the Earth (a far more radical environmental organization) enjoyed consultative status in the 1980s during the hey-day of the tropical timber boycotts.

The influence wielded by WWF-UK and its allies was also bolstered by another favorable institutional means of support: a highly supportive and involved parent organization along with other actors at the international level who were eager to promote third party certification for sustainable development. WWF-International actively supported the United Kingdom effort in a number of ways, and sought to help coordinate worldwide supply and demand for certified products (personal interview 22 June 1998; Timber Trades Journal 15 June 1996; 22 June 1996). Policy trends among intergovernmental agencies and in other parts of the world, typified in activities associated with the UN Earth Summit in 1992 and its follow-up in 1997, also lent increasing legitimacy (and, quite often, grant money) to ENGO efforts, including WWF International and WWF-UK (Timber Trades Journal, 15 June 1996; 1 Sept. 1997; 14 Mar. 1998; 15 Mar 1998) .

Interestingly, while the British government clearly played a role in conditioning the pre-existing distribution of power in the wood product governance field, as an actor in its own right it appears to hold little agency in the story over certification and labeling of wood-products. While I will argue below that regulatory style and conventions of governance evident in British politics catalyzed the uniquely successful trajectory of the effort, my interviews with the individuals largely responsible for the development of the buyers group along with prior research consistently paint a picture in which the government as an active agent is barely visible.

The Importance of Political-Economic Influences

The relative power exercised by big retailers over their supply chains, a disadvantaged domestic producer sector, and the strength of dominant NGOs certainly provided necessary conditions for success of the certification effort. But a political-economic portrait still leaves several questions unanswered. First, while matters of power and market structure help explain in part why retailers felt compelled to address the problem of timber sourcing and why they succeeded, they do not explain why the retailers chose to invest so much time and money in sponsoring a third party performance certification program when they could have taken a much easier path of voluntary best practice standards or other less cumbersome approaches to appeasing public worries. Wood sellers and producers in other countries, such as the United States and Canada, faced similar pressures by rainforest action groups in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Yet, they responded by supporting far less demanding management standards without third party oversight or performance criteria-- programs that were cheaper, less controversial, and less cumbersome to implement (personal interview 20 Feb. 1998; Wagner 1997; Bratlovich 1997; Moss 1997). Secondly, a static political economic explanation also cannot make full sense of how and why the domestic timber industry alliance came to have a change of heart about its cooperation with the buyers group: how and why did the FSC effort later succeed in transforming national regulatory standards toward third-party certification acceptable to an international NGO when national politics over woodlands had been historically dominated by domestic landowners and their allies? Lastly, what exactly was the role of the state in this story? Was it as absent in early stages as a cursory history of the NGO-retailer alliance suggests, and how and why did it come on board later in encouraging compatible national standards? These big questions speak to the limits of the political-economic explanation: it does not explain sociologically how different actors understood what they wanted and how they went about getting it.

Convergence on a Theme: Culture and the Constitution of "Self Interest"

The successful development of a C&L regime in Britain is as much a story about a convergence of self interest around a common goal as it is about a powerful alliance. Let us begin with the retailers. The motivations behind early and later retailer interest in the buyers group are complex. Certainly, the initial conversations between the environmental manager of a leading DIY retailer and WWF were inspired in part by store-front demonstrations and embarrassing press coverage of the retailer's ignorance. Leading retailers' early interest was spurred on by a desire to improve public relations and protect against future exposes of supplier misconduct, and retailers that followed suit were worried in part about losing market share and getting bad publicity for being laggards. But my interviews with the individuals responsible for making these decisions, as well as prior research done by others, suggests that how retailers understood their self interest often extended beyond short-term concerns over profit and also changed over time.

The first environmental managers to come to the table and discuss certification with WWF and form the buyers group believe they did so for reasons that were as much for good morals as good business. Perhaps most obviously, several of the leading environmental managers had conservationist backgrounds and had previously worked with NGOs or state agencies in pollution control or land management. Alan Knight of B&Q himself was a conservationist by training. Consistently, managers explain their actions to others in decidedly normative tones: third party certification was "the right thing to do" (and that government was incapable and inefficient at achieving it); they were convinced that public perceptions of what was right or moral were slowly shifting and that corporate citizenship was evolving; they believed the participating in the program would boost staff loyalty and good cheer within the firms; they felt there were a number of second-order benefits in the supply chain (better quality, transparent business practices, etc.); and they felt that if they did not develop a credible system of independent certification themselves, then surely national or international regulations would force a far less efficient and effective incarnation upon them. These entrepreneurial managers also saw themselves as bringing to the negotiations a shared new generational eagerness to make good environmental conduct compatible with good business practices. In fact, the leading early entrepreneurs claim that they had moved to address timber sourcing issues in their firms even before the public relations debacles had come to pass.

Interviews and archival research about the attitudes and strategies among other stakeholders reveal a convergence around similar themes. Early supporters among importers, NGOs, and government bodies have explained their motivation as having been both strategic and moral-- strategic because they felt that market-based and industry-centered solutions were more effective means to support sustainable development for forests and their peoples, and moral because they firmly believed that such efforts were the right and decent thing to do. Why was third party certification for "good stewardship" the right and decent thing to do? Because, in their view: (a) with newfound awareness about the plight of forest peoples, global warming, species extinction, etc., no self-respecting person (consumer or otherwise) would willingly participate in making things worse; (b) these problems were not going to go away (although they might disappear from the newspapers for a while); and (c) it was up to "us" (e.g., NGOs, retailer/managers, CEO of AssiDoman in Sweden) to do something about it. This common set of goals encouraged business and non-governmental interests to see each other as potential allies and engage in a new partnership to develop a certification program. Interestingly, both before and after the New Labour government took power, the British government, too, embodied this spirit in a number of policy statements, glossy reports, and press conferences where it proclaimed itself (and the British people) as the world leader in paving the way to a more environmentally and socially responsible future for the planet-- a chance for Britain to rise once again to glory for humanity, not to mention to capture an increasingly large export market. Perhaps equally tellingly, in their early refusals to cooperate with plans to introduce third-party certification to British woodlands, timber growers and their allies took great pains to demonstrate that they, too, shared these interests and, in fact, had practiced the "most sustainable forestry in the world" for decades.

It would seem that, while some of these motivations claimed by participants were narrowly economic, others were more puzzling. Critics of cultural explanations in social theorizing point out that "culture" is often used as a black box for variables that cannot be successfully explained. But my investigations of the English case thus far suggest that shared meanings-- manifested as generalized beliefs, attitudes, and ways of orienting oneself to other social actors and the world at large-- be taken very seriously. This is most apparent when one appreciates the character of the early entrepreneurs-- they were predominately younger "can do" progressive capitalists who were much less cynical about NGO-business relations than their predecessors, held firm convictions about the virtues of sustainability, and had little patience for the state. Any pretense that they were exclusively acting out of corporate self interest for a green premium or increased market share quickly falls away when one notes that they held little faith that consumers would pay more for certified products (and available survey data supports them); in fact, the continuing goal of the DIY market leader is to reach a point where the label disappears because everything is certified and the consumer does not have a choice. Interestingly, most retailers who signed on to the buyers group early-on see themselves as missionaries of sorts, helping the public to act in its own best interest. According to a leading DIY environmental director:

> “It is my ambition to ensure that in a few years time we don't have an advantage from it [labeling]. Because once it's mainstream, it doesn't matter. You know, we don't have a PR advantage by not complying with all health and safety legislation in this country. But we'd have a massive PR disadvantage if we killed someone in a store because a truck fell on them, or smashed a customer’s dog. It's to make it as mainstream as, let's say, testing on electrical products” (personal interview, 6 July 1998).

In a manner that is less measurable but nonetheless palpable in my findings, broader shared cultural frames also appeared to work in favor of reconciliation among a number of disparate interests. This is most apparent in the more moderated ways in which competing groups approached reconciling environmental/social interests with production, sales, and consumption of goods and services. In a content analysis of articles mentioning certification and labeling issues in major newspapers and trade journals between 1989 and 1997 (n=259), virtually all had only positive things to say about better information and more transparency concerning the origin of products-- few if any observers argued that encouraging sustainable and ethical production standards was a dishonorable endeavor or bad for business. While more reactionary statements were often made by representatives of timber growers about the "unholy alliance" between retailers and the WWF and the "fascism of greenies," the assumption that industries need to be accountable to broad moral standards shared by their customers and society at large was never challenged, nor was it seen as an attack on the right of businesses to make a profit.

Responsibility, Decency, and the Countryside: Diffuse Cultural Orientations

Where did these shared orientations come from? Given that there had been a clear and consistent convergence in the late 1980s and early 1990s in attitudes toward the value of "sustainable markets" jointly governed by business, NGOs, and government in Britain, we must then ask why and how these sentiments first bore fruit around wood products in Britain and not elsewhere or in other sectors. Certainly, other advanced capitalist countries were participating in the same public debates about the virtues of sustainability, and the increasing attractiveness of helping people and the environment through the market mechanism was hardly limited to Britain. Thatcherite reforms away from an interventionist and regulatory state and toward entrepreneurial private initiative were typical of neo-liberal reforms in the United States, as well. And, within Britain, a number of other C&L issue arenas were also competing for attention (including fair trade coffee and chocolate, child labor, and cooperatively-grown produce). Some additional clue may lie a consideration of diffusely held cultural orientations about the countryside, questions of the common good, and the plight of third world peoples.

A number of scholars have noted that the countryside occupies a special and heartfelt place in the British psyche, similar to the status on forests in Germany and wilderness in the United States. Indeed, even in Victorian times the British public (urban as well as rural) was concerned about the dwindling landscape of rural spaces at a time when industrial urban centers were expanding rapidly (McCormick 1994). Clearly, a long history of a dense population occupying a relatively small land mass has meant that concerns over management and preservation of rural areas are nothing new to British politics (see, also, Vogel 1986). Concerns over rural land use have always been among the most common and strongly held environmental worries among citizens (along with pollution), so it should come as no surprise that programs that attempt to balance competing needs in wood production would find a sympathetic audience among influential British businesspeople and policy-makers.

Boundaries between public and private, much like between self-interest and the common good, appear decidedly blurrier in Britain than they are among its colonial offspring across the Atlantic. Even today, all land in Britain is, legally speaking, still owned by the Crown (McCormick 1994). And, while private property exists in today's Britain de facto, a North American would still be surprised at the persistence of widespread concerns over public access and input into decisions about land use made by private individuals and firms. For instance, the pastime of walking on centuries-old paths that criss-cross through the domains of private citizens is still popular in rural areas, and has merited its own interest-group label ("ramblers" who ramble through the countryside). Local authorities also enjoy a particularly active role in deciding the fate of new industrial or agricultural projects within their precinct, sometimes vetoing plans of private firms on private lands in the name of the common good.

British concern over common good issues extends beyond the country's borders; the government, media, and NGO community have long kept public attention directed towards quality-of-life issues in the developing world, as well (personal interview 29 June 1998). During the late 1980s and early 1990s this attention was especially directed toward the plight of forest peoples and importance of "sustainable livelihoods" for vulnerable Third World populations (for a good overview of the UK government's position on these issues, see published information pamphlets put out by the Department for International Development).[7] While academic observers can only speculate where such predilections come from (be they remnants of colonial paternalism or channeled British hopes for a renewed proud and noble role in international politics), all major retailers I interviewed commented that they joined the C&L effort in part because *to not* be able to assure customers that store products were made under humane and sustainable conditions would surely be terribly wrong, irresponsible, and just plain stupid. As Alan Knight of B&Q has remarked,

> "How many people do you know who would knowingly keep their hi-fi so loud that they kept their neighbor's baby awake... and actually say, 'Yes, I know I'm keeping my neighbors baby awake, but I don't give a shit, in fact I'm going to turn it up a bit louder, cause I really do what to bug up that person's life. ' And the odd nutter who does do like that, how long do they get away with it, before they get a broken nose?" (Knight 1998)

Mr. Knight's comments here are typical of the reflections of other respondents and press characterizations of the cause for third party certification of wood: people felt very strongly that it was "the right thing to do." My interviews as well as prior research into environmental politics in Britain suggest that sympathies about sustaining rural areas, a natural inclination to consider the welfare of others whenever possible, and a sense of shared responsibility about effects on the developing world helped naturalize the cause for timber certification

[7] The British retail marketplace has long had a strong niche for socially and ethically responsible products from the developing world. The Body Shop, founded by Anita Roddick in the United Kingdom well before the current fascination

among proponents and, to a lesser extent, foes, as well. There is certainly no way to assess the relative importance of these influences; but it follows from a counter-factual though experiment that, in the absence of these favorable frames, pro-certification advocates would certainly have had a more difficult time persuading others to join-in.

Quasi-Corporatism and the Politics of Compromise

Thus far we have seen that pre-existing relations of power and a favorable convergence around shared self-interest help explain why a number of key stakeholders were poised to support the C&L effort. But we have yet to fully understand how they went about doing so. Certainly, policy-makers and social scientists alike can point to a number of cases where well-regarded policy intentions fail because politics in the real world manage to scuttle them. Even in the ultimately successful British case, a number of difficult and seemingly intractable conflicts emerged over the course of the C&L program's development-- between retailers and their suppliers, between buyers group members and domestic industry, between domestic industry and government, and, at very early stages, between business interests and environmental NGOs, themselves. Yet, somehow stakeholders in the market managed to work through these issues over time when, all the while, the political-economic and cultural context did not substantially change. How did they do it?

Competitive Cooperation

At a very early stage in the process, environmental managers of leading competitors in the retail industry met informally to discuss common strategies to influence their suppliers. They shared normative convictions that certification for well managed wood products was justified on moral and scientific as well as business grounds, and believed that their collective best interest as market leaders would be best served through limited cooperation in pressuring suppliers and supporting the development of an international NGO (the FSC). But perhaps most remarkably, these managers were able to use existing institutional channels and informal opportunities to meet together and develop common strategies in spite of the fact that they represented competing firms. At the same

---

with ethical trade, was arguably the first retail chain endeavor anywhere in the world to successfully capitalize on such sentiments.

time that they were working for firms that were attempting to squeeze one another's profits and increase market share, these entrepreneurs managed to capitalize on their channels of contact and relative freedom within the firm to consult with their colleagues at the same time. Such successful coordination was made possible in part by the variety of associational ties in government and industry fora (including WWF-sponsored workshops), but it was also enabled by the relative flexibility afforded to companies under formal and informal British business conventions.[8] As a leader of the North American buyers group seeking advice remarked upon being told of these coordinated efforts when visiting the United Kingdom, in the United States fears of anti-trust legislation and the appearance of collusion would prevent competitors from ever mounting a similar attempt there (personal interview 17 July 1998).

Interestingly, a variant of competitive cooperation was also evident in competing NGO campaign managers' willingness to coordinate and complement one another's official position on certification so as to present a consistent voice towards supporting the FSC. More radical NGOs, especially Friends of the Earth, maintained their highly antagonistic stance on tropical imports, but they also carefully coordinated their PR positions on the certification effort to strengthen public appearances of solidarity and integrity within the NGO community. NGOs with varied ideological and political commitments met regularly to coordinate the division of labor and prevent intra-movement in-fighting that might reduce their effectiveness. Furthermore, perhaps inadvertently but perhaps deliberately, more radical NGOs' extreme positions on issues frequently allowed room for more moderate groups to appear more "reasonable" and attractive to adversaries in industry and government, thus increasing the likelihood for successful compromise. Several insiders and academic observers have noted that Friends of the Earth's near-universal condemnation of tropical timber imports in 1989-90 provided the necessary room for WWF to step forth as a more moderate and industry-friendly partner in pursuing certification.

Mostly Closed Doors

[8] It should also be noted that these managers enjoyed wide latitude within their companies to pursue certification. They also held relatively powerful positions and maintained close relations with chief executives.

Competitive cooperation between stakeholders was made possible in part by the relative privacy and informality of interaction. In a spirit far afield from nominally free, open, democratic process, the majority of key meetings and negotiations between NGO, retailer, and other actors occurred in semi-private settings, off public record, and out of the spotlight of the media. The semi-private settings where most important compromising and planning took place allowed stakeholders to negotiate and interact largely free of the ideological and institutional constraints of their respective organizations. The stylized oppositional tactics that characterize charged public policy debates within command-and -control regulatory environments (seen most clearly the United States and to a lesser extent in Britain) frequently gave way in these un-official interactions to frank, personal, and pragmatic wranglings over acceptable compromises, away from regulatory supervision, stockholders, or boards of directors. Even the UK government's ongoing presence in conversations over certification and labeling came mostly in the form of meetings and consultative projects where ministries sought and assessed the views of competing stakeholders largely for their benefit and only secondarily for disclosure to Parliament or the public.[9] The FSC itself, founded in Toronto in 1993 and permanently headquartered in Oaxaca, Mexico shortly thereafter, was also similarly fashioned out of a series of meetings between different groups of stakeholders around the world in an ad-hoc fashion.[10]

Flexible Pragmatism

Key actors among stakeholder groups have emphasized the importance of a flexible pragmatism in resolving conflict over the course of the program's development. Repeatedly in interviews, respondents have attributed successful negotiation to the ability of participants to engage in frank but reasoned dialogues during times when economic or ideological antagonisms might have dictated otherwise. Words like "reasonable, " "decent," and "fair-minded" come up spontaneously on a regular basis when key actors describe their successful

---

[9] Of course, interest groups' public positions as captured in media outlets were often far more unyielding and extreme in tone than were their more private reckonings.

[10] It is worth noting that, while the existence of the FSC, itself, is a tribute to flexible pragmatism, many member of the UK buyers group worry that the inflexibility of some "extreme" and "ideological" interests threaten its future existence. Recent

interactions with antagonistic parties. Existing research on the WWF/FSC Buyers Group in the UK describes these interactions as embodying a new spirit of flexibility and partnership among interest groups that had previously been at logger-heads with one another. This flexible pragmatism is often associated with the negotiating talents of a handful of individuals at particular times and places who helped rescue negotiations from failure. In the early years of the buyers group, Alan Knight of B&Q and Francis Sullivan of WWF-UK nurtured a fragile alliance that was initially roundly criticized by prospective participants on all sides of the debate. And later, as domestic producers pitched a very nasty battle against the buyers group, two particular officials of the Forestry Commission was widely credited with facilitating a compromise that few observers anticipated.

A Facilitative State

The state facilitated the launching and consolidation of third party certification in two major respects--through its passive influence on regulatory norms and through its active role as an organizational catalyst for compromise. Most obviously, Thatcherite regulatory reforms and a general shift toward support of private and market-based solutions to growing environmental problems provided (albeit passively) a supportive national environment for certification proponents to mobilize largely free from the fetters of state supervision. But domestic and international governmental bodies also appeared to play an important catalytic role through two additional influences. First, early-on in public and policy debates about eco-labeling and sustainable development, both the European Commission/Parliament and UK Government bodies actively entered into the fray by launching early consultative sessions and issuing recommendations about legislation to enforce and standardize environmental claims. After the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992, dominant intergovernmental development agencies officially encouraged new market-based regulatory alternatives, and the UK and EU governments publicly sought to demonstrate leadership in developing national and international standards. Buyers group and FSC advocates saw the FSC program as a means to anticipate and strengthen these shifts for the benefit of both businesses and the environment. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the UK government

---

international meetings of the FSC in Mexico have been characterized by many buyers group participants as failures for these very reasons.

played an active role in bringing competing interests together in consultative status as disagreements over national forestry standards came to a head in 1996-97.

From the emergence of the buyers group on through the conflict with domestic industry over the national forestry standard, the government provided both institutional and material support for competing stakeholders to come to the table, argue out their differences, and resolve them through governmental channels. The Forestry Commission; Department of Environment, Transport and Regions; and Department of Trade and Industry regularly commissioned consultative reports, working groups, and official meetings of competing interests during negotiations over a new National Forest Standard.[11] Representatives of major NGOs and business interests in Britain have repeatedly commented in interviews that they are regularly asked by the government to consult on provisional policy recommendations, strategic planning, and possible regulatory reforms, often early-on in the process before such documents are introduced in Parliament or made public. While the battle for third party certification of wood products was largely waged outside of governmental channels, the government played both an active and passive role in providing the institutional space for stakeholders to hash out differences and construct new shared understandings of how a C&L program would work.

Regulatory Style And Conventions: Quasi-Corporatism, The Art Of Compromise, and Skilled Entrepreneurs

The findings outlined above, suggesting that competitive cooperation, flexibility, semi-privacy, and a facilitative state helped constitute the social mechanisms by which the certification effort succeeded, together suggest a distinctive set of conventions and regulatory style in the British struggle over certification and labeling of wood products. They suggest that contestations over regulation were largely waged between representatives of stakeholder groups seeking compromises through state-sanctioned but largely private channels. These characteristics bear a remarkable resemblance, perhaps not surprisingly, to a distinctively British form of quasi-corporatism that has been noted by a handful of other scholars studying different sectors and times (for

[11] The number of government agency queries and conversations that have flowed between agencies and major players in the C&L program is truly impressive from a U.S. standpoint. Several interviewees spontaneously produced recent consultative correspondence with government by simply picking up documents already on top of their desk or in a nearby file drawer.

provocative and distinct examples, see Dobbin 1997 and Vogel 1986). Other studies have found that Britain's regulatory style has long favored voluntary, informal, and "reasonable" efforts to encourage affected interests and industries to resolve their problems largely free from a strong-arm regulatory superstructure of the state (McCormick 1991). As one pair of observers has remarked, in Britain "most political activity is bargained in private worlds by special interests and interested specialists." And, as McCormick (1991) found in his extensive research on British regulatory politics, regular consultation with "affected and recognized interests is a cultural norm within the British Political Arena" (p. 21). In a country often associated with a paternalistic and strong state relative to its English-speaking peers, non-state actors enjoy a particularly prominent role in the politics over regulation in Britain.

Similarly, the strong art of compromise apparent in the successful building of a market for third party wood products in Britain appears far from unique when other comparative studies are brought into the analysis. That many respondents in interviews described themselves and other successful negotiators as "reasonable," "moderate" and "decent," and their persona-non-grata foes as "extreme" and "ideological" appears less of a coincidence of the case at hand and more an appraisal of successful British conflict resolution. Heavy-handed polemics and adversarial politics may have their place in Britain, but not in the meeting halls where regulatory reforms actually take place. In particular, the case suggests that skilled bridging-actors, or institutional entrepreneurs, have regularly played a pivotal role in bridging the rifts between competing interests and persuading dominant actors to join-in. Perhaps the greatest tribute to the corporatist art of compromise in the case at hand can be found in the tardy but nonetheless remarkable shift in the position of the Timber Trade Federation (the major domestic producer group) regarding FSC-certification of British woodlands.

Putting It All Together

In the summer of 1998, the same trade association leader that had two years earlier described a WWF/FSC event as akin to a "Nazi war rally" could be found attending the mid-year WWF/FSC buyers group

---

Likewise, during archival research at the offices of major NGOs I was equally impressed with the extent to which these government departments had communicated with a wide range of interest groups from a very early stage.

conference in Wales, surrounded by his former enemies as he heard about the potentials of FSC-certified markets and toured certified woodlands in the Welsh countryside (personal observation 17 July 1998). The trajectory of this change-of-heart for domestic producers captures in microcosm the major findings of this preliminary analysis. While the domestic timber industry enjoyed support in government circles for its resistance to the FSC effort, by the mid-1990s it faced a formidable challenge from an alliance that had succeeded in mobilizing widespread participation among retailers and foreign suppliers through a series of ad hoc, semi-formal actions. The government, as both arbiter and constituent of prevailing British sentiments surrounding regulatory policy, attempted to reconcile the rift by facilitating informal and formal exchange and urging compromise (Timber and the Environment, 15 March 1997). The domestic industry found itself in a political-cultural climate where the need for sustainable forestry was taken for granted, and where national and international governmental bodies looked increasingly favorably upon efforts to provide consumers with credible information about where their products came from. After several months of foot-dragging by industry and government on the issue, two high-level Forestry Commission staff (one new, one old) capitalized on their many ties with industry and decided to mount a concerted campaign to strike a compromise. Their determination and skill helped open up the institutional space and develop the momentum that would ultimately lead to a the successful harmonization of national and FSC standards (Oliver 1997; personal interview 2 July 1997).

VIII. Concluding Thoughts

The British story of the development of third party certification of wood products is not a simple one, but in its complexity it lends credibility to the sociological approach advocated here and also substantiates it. A cursory review of the facts leaves no doubt that both a favorable power-base and changes in public sentiments (i.e., demand) were necessary for the effort to succeed. But these preconditions are only a part of the tale: during the period, relations of power shifted, as did the forms in which power was harnessed; diffusely held cultural orientations were invoked and refracted in useful ways; perceptions of self-interest changed; prevailing styles of regulation and governance facilitated heretofore unknown compromises; and particular individuals endowed with strong convictions and enviable social skill capitalized on opportunities to re-define rules-of-the-game during critical periods.

Juxtaposed to the British case, the early history of third party certified wood markets in the United States appears doomed. In the United States, domestic producers enjoy considerably more economic and political power, retailers feel less vulnerable to boycotts in a country where brand-names matter much more, and an adversarial and open regulatory style has exacerbated antagonisms and ideological posturing (personal interviews 20 Feb. 1998, 4 April 1999; 27 April 1999). Yet, very recent developments in the United States suggest that many of the same sources of agency found in Britain have begun to exercise influence in the domestic U.S. marketplace. North American buyers group advocates have actively learned from the British experience, and are now beginning to fashion alliances and incentives for dominant players to join in a manner that is, at one and the same time, both uniquely American and un-American (personal interview, 27 April 1999; personal observation 16-17 July 1998). Within the constraints posed by pervading domestic legal, regulatory, and cultural currents, a new American buyers group entrepreneur is experimenting with the quiet art of compromise while fine-tuning his group's image to garner more industry support. Although the cultural frames and political techniques he and his allies are attempting to harness are quite different than those that have worked so well in the UK, the current analysis suggests that the eventual success or failure of the effort will turn on how well stakeholders manage the same class of challenge-- regulatory, political-economic, and cultural-- in their struggles. Given the much less hospitable industry structure and regulatory style prevalent in the United States, it would appear that the U.S. buyers group and its supporters face an uphill battle, indeed.

Table 1: Market Share Occupied by Six Leading Do-It-Yourself Retailers in the United Kingdom, 1993 (Murphy 1996)

1.	B&Q	13.8%
2.	Texas Homecare	8.1%
3.	Do It All	4.6%
4.	Homebase	3.1%
5.	Wickes	2.8%
6.	Great Mills	2.5%

Table 2: Breakdown of National Sources of Wood Products Sold in the United Kingdom (Based on Total Purchasing By Members of the Buyers Group provided by WWF-UK)[12]

Sweden	21.28%
Finland	18.78%
UK	14.83%
Unspecified	8.09%
France	6.85%
Canada	4.42%
South Africa	3.76%
USA	2.98%
Germany	2.28%
Brazil	2.25%
Other	14.50%

[12] Data on distribution of wood purchasing volume is based on total purchases from buyers group members, only a fraction of which is currently certified. While data on distribution of total purchasing volume for the full UK market is not available to the author at this time, there is good reason to suspect that the buyers group distribution serves as a valid proxy. Existing estimates of the total reliance on imports for the UK wood market are put at 85%, and most observers assert that Sweden and Finland are the primary single-country sources of wood for the UK market.

Working Bibliography

Adams, Richard. 1990. "The Greening of Consumerism." *Accountancy* 105:80-83.

Agarwal, Bina. 1992. "The Gender and Environment Debate: Lessons from India." *Feminist Studies* 18:119-158.

Alexander, Jeffrey. 1997. "The Paradoxes of Civil Society." *International Sociology* 12:115-133.

Ayres, Jeffrey M. 1997. "From Competitive Theorizing Towards a Synthesis in the Global Study of Political Movements." *International Sociology* 12:47-60.

Banker Ltd. 1997. "CSFI Power To the Green Stuff." *Banker* 147:12.

Bass, Stephen. 1996? "Principles of Certification of Forest Management Systems and Labeling of Forest Products." in *International Conference on Certification and Labeling of Products from Sustainable Managed Forests*. Australia?: Australian Department of Primary Industries and Energy.

Beck, Ulrich. 1992. *The Risk Society*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Beckerman, Wilfred. 1992. "Economic Growth and the Environment: Whose Growth? Whose Environment?" *World Development* 20:481-496.

Benton, Ted. 1989. "Marxism and Natural Limits: An Ecological Critique and Reconstruction." *New Left Review* 178:51-86.

Blaikie, Pierce M. 1985. *The Political Economy of Social Erosion in Developing Countries*.

Blakie, Pierce and H. Brookfield. 1987. *Land Degradation and Society*.

Bonacich, Edna, Lucie Cheng, Norma Chinchilla, Nora Hamilton, and Paul Ong. 1994a. *Global Production: The Apparel Industry in the Pacific Rim*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Bonacich, Edna, Lucie Cheng, Norma Chinchilla, Nora Hamilton, and Paul Ong. 1994b. "Global Production: The Apparel Industry in the Pacific Rim." . Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Boudon, Raymond. 1997. "The Moral Sense." *International Sociology* 12:5-24.

Bratkovich, Stephen. 1997? "Green Certification." USDA Forest Service Northeastern Area and Private Forestry.

Brennan, Timothy. 1997. "Markets, Information, and Benevolence." *Economics and Philosophy* 10:151-168.

Browder, John. 1995. "Deforestation and the Environmental Crisis in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 30:123-137.

Bruyn, Severyn T. 1991. *A Future for the American Economy: The Social Market*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bryce, Robert. 1994. "'Green' Lumber Ties Forest Products, Environmentalists." Pp. 9 in *Christian Science Monitor*.

Bunker, Stephen. 1992. "Natural Resource Extraction and Power Differentials in a Global Economy." in *Understanding Economic Process*, edited by S. Ortiz and S. Lees: University Press of America.

Buttel, Fred. 1995. "Sustainable Development." . Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Buttel, Fred H. 1986. "Sociology and the Environment: The Winding Road Toward Human Ecology." *International Social Science Journal* 109:337-356.

Buttel, Fred H. 1992. "Environmentalization: Origins, Processes, and Implications for Rural Social Change." *Rural Sociology* 57.

Buttel, Fred H. and Peter Taylor. 1992. "Environmental Sociology and Global Environmental Change: A Critical Assessment." *Society and Natural Resources* 5:211-230.

Cairncross, Francis. 1991. *C*, Edited by C. t. Earth. London: Business Books and The Economist Books, Ltd.

Cairncross, Frances. 1995. *Green, Inc.*: Earthscan.

Carter, Meg. 1997. "The World According to Fair Trading." in *The Independent*.

Castells, Manuel. 1996. *The Rise of the Network Society*. Cambridge, MA and Oxford, England: Blackwell.

Catton, W. R. Jr. 1980. *Overshoot*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Catton, W. R. Jr. and R. E. Dunlap. 1978. "Environmental Sociology: A New Paradigm." *American Sociologist* 13:41-49.

Cesar Centeno, Julio. 1996. "National Institutional Arrangements for the Certification of Forest Management." in *Economic, Social, and Political Issues in Certification of Forest Management*. Malaysia.

Charlet, JF. 1994. "Francophone Organization Analysis." *Organization Studies* 15:47-80.

Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 1989. *Global Formation: Structures of the World Economy*: Blackwell.

Clarke, Gerard. 1998. "Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Politics in the Developing World." *Political Studies* XLVI:36-52.

Cohen, Joshua and Joel Rogers. 1992. “Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance.” *Politics and Society* 20:383-472.
Coop-America. 1999. “National Green Pages: A Directory of Products and Services for People and the Planet.” Coop America, Washington, D.C.
Couch, Stephen and Steve Kroll-Smith. 1997. “Environmental Movements and Expert Knowledge: Evidence for a New Populism.” *International Journal of Contemporary Sociology* 34:185-210.
Cronon, William. 1991. *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West*. New York: Norton.
Daly, Herman and John Cobb. 1989. *For the Common Good*. Boston: Beacon.
Darnovsky, Marcy. 1996. “The Green Challenge to Consumer Culture: The Movement, the Marketers, and the Environmental Imagination.” Dissertation Thesis, History of Consciousness, University of California, Santa Cruz.
Delphi International. 1997. “Forest Stewardship: Who Wants It?” Delphi International Limited, London.
Department of Environment. 1991. “The Government's Response to tthe Eighth Report From the House of Commons Select Committee on the Environment.” . London: Secretary of State for the Environment.
Department of the Environment. 1993. “Making Markets Work for the Environment.” . London: HMSO.
Dickens, Peter. 1992. *Society and Nature*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Dobbin, Frank. 1997. *Forging Industrial Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Donaher, Kevin (ed.). 1996. *Corporations are Going to Get Your Mama*. Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press.
Duff, Charles 1993. “Management Systems: A Foot in Both Camps.” *Environment Risk*, pp. 27-29.
Dunlap, Riley and William Jr. Catton. 1994. “Struggling with Human Exemptionalism: The Rise, Decline, and Revitalization of Environmental Sociology.” *The American Sociologist* 25:5-30.
Economist, The 1999. “Sweatshop Wars.” *The Economist*, pp. 62.
Ehrlich, Paul R. 1975. *The Population Bomb.* Rivercity, Mass: Rivercity Press.
Ellis, Richard and Fred Thompson. 1997. “Culture and the Environment in the Pacific Northwest.” *American Political Science Review* 91:885-897.
Entman, Robert M. 1993. “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.” *Journal of Communication* 43:51-58.
Escobar, Arturo. 1992. “From Organism to Cyborg: Notes on the Political Economy of Biology, Nature, and Sustainable Development.".” in *Paper presented at the Werner-Gren Symposium*. Baja California Sur: Mexico.
Esty, Daniel. 1999. “Toward a Multi-Frame World: Boundaries in Environmental Law and Policy.” Yale Law School and Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, New Haven.
European Report. 1996. “Environment: WWF Urges Extension of Forest Certification.” .
Evans, Peter. 1995. *Embedded Autonomy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Evans, Peter. 1996a. “Government Action, Social Capital and Development: Reviewing the Evidence on Synergy.” *World Development* 24:1119-1132.
Evans, Peter. 1996b. “Introduction: Development Strategies Across the Public-Private Divide.” *World Development* 24:1033-1037.
Evans, Peter and John Stephens. 1988. “Studying Development Since the Sixties: The Emergence of a New Comparative Political Economy.” *Theory and Society* 17:713-745.
Evans, Peter B, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. 1992. “Bringing the State Back In.” . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ferrara, Alessandro. 1997. “The Paradox of Community.” *International Sociology* 12:395-408.
Finnemore, Martha. 1996. “Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism.” *World Politics* 50:325-47.
Fligstein, Neil. 1990. *The Transformation of Corporate Control*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Fligstein, Neil. 1996. “Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions.” *American Sociological Review* 61:656-673.
Fligstein, Neil. 1997. “Fields, Power, and Social Skill: A Critical Analysis of the New Institutionalisms.” *Unpublished Manuscript: University of California at Berkeley* .
Fligstein, Neil. (n.d.). *Ruling Markets: An Economic Sociology of Capitalist Societies*. Berkeley, CA: Unpublished Manuscript.

Fligstein, Neil and Doug McAdam. 1995. "A Political-Cultural Approach to the Problem of Strategic Action." *Unpublished Manuscript, University of California* .
Forest Stewardship Council. 1995a. "FSC Process Guidelines for Developing Regional Certification Standards." Forest Stewardship Council, Oaxaca.
Forest Stewardship Council. 1995b. "FSC Protocol for Endorsing National Initiatives." Forest Stewardship Council, Oaxaca.
Forest Stewardship Council. 1996. "Forest Stewardship Council Principles and Criteria for Natural Forest Management." Forest Stewardship Council, Oaxaca.
Forsyth, Keith, David Haley, and Robert Kozak. 1997. "Customer Attitudes Towards Environmentally Sound Wood Products In the British Columbian Home Improvement Market." LTS International and University of British Columbia, Edinburgh, UK and Vancouver, Canada.
Fox, Jonathan. 1996a. "How Does Civil Society Thicken? The Political Construction of Social Capital in Rural Mexico." *World Development* 24(6):1089-1103.
Fox, Jonathan. 1996b. "How Does Civil Society Thicken? The Political Construction of Social Capital in Rural Mexico." *World Development* 24:1089-1103.
Francis, John. 1993. *The Politics of Regulation: A Comparative Perspective*, Edited by G. Peele. Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell.
Freedland, Jonathan. *Bring Home the Revolution: How Britain Can Live the American Dream*: Fourth (4th Estate).
Friedland, Roger. 1990. "Beyond the Marketplace: Rethinking Economy and Society." . Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Grutyter.
Friends of the Earth. 1995. "The Good Wood Guide." Friends of the Earth, London.
Genov, Nikoli. 1997. "Four Global Trends: Rise and Limitations." *International Sociology* 12:409-428.
Gereffi, Gary. 1994. "The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains: How U.S. Retailers Shape Overseas Production Networks." in *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism.*, edited by G. Gereffi and M. Korzeniewicz. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
Gereffi, Gary. 1995. "Global Production Systems and Third World Development." in *Global Change, Regional Response: The New International Context of Development.*, edited by B. Stallings. New York: Cambridge Univesity Press.
Gereffi, Gary, Miguel Korzeniewcz, and Roberto Korzeniewcz. 1994. "Introduction: Global Commodity Chains." in *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism*, edited by G. Gereffi and M. Korzeniewicz. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
Global Trade And Transportation 1993. "How Green is "Green"." *Global Trade and Transportation*, pp. 9.
Granovetter, Mark. 1985. "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness." *American Journal of Sociology* 91:481-510.
Guha, Ramachandra. 1990. *The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant REsistance in the Himalaya*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Hansen, Eric. 1997. "Forest Certification." *Forest Products Journal* 47:16-22.
Hawken, Paul. 1993. *The Ecology of Commerce*: Harper Business.
Hecht, Susana and Alexander Cockburn. 1993. *The Fate of the Forest: Developers, Destroyers, and Defenders of teh Amazaon*. New York: Harper Perennial.
Holmwood, J, H Radner, G Schultze, and P Sulkunen. 1995. "Constructing the New Consumer Society." . London: MacMillan.
Humphrey, Craig R. and Fred H. Buttel. 1982. *Environment, Energy, and Society*. Malabar, Florida: Krieger Publishing.
IIED. *Towards a Sustainable Paper Cycle* .
International, EcoSourcing. 1997. "Ecolabels." .
Ipsen, Erik. 1997. "Selling the Doorjamb and Seeing the Forest." Pp. 9 in *International Herald Tribune*. London.
Jackson, Cecile. 1995. "Radical Environmental Myths: A Gender Perspective." *New Left Review* 210.
Jacobs, Michael. 1992. "The Limits to Neoclassicism: Towards an Institutional Environmental Economics." .
Jasanoff, Sheila. 1997. "NGOs and the Environment: From Knowledge to Action." *Third World Quarterly* 18:579-594.
Joas, Hans. 1996. *The Creativity of Action*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.

Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Kiekens, Jean-Pierre. 1997. "Certification: International Trends and Forestry and Trade Implications." Belgium? IFF.
Kingdom, Government of the United. 1990? "Government's Report on Green Issues, White Paper." .
Knight, Alan. 1996? "A Report on B&Q'w 1995 Timber Target." *Professional Seminar Series (Cambridge Environmental Initiative)* 9:34-44.
Knight, Alan P. 1995. "How Green is My Front Door?" B&Q plc, Hampshire, UK.
Knight, Peter. 1996. "Forests for Life: Eco-Label: The Mark of Good Management." Pp. 16 in *The Observer*.
Korzeniewicz, Miguel. 1994. "Commodity Chains and Marketing Strategies: Nike and the Global Athletic Footwear Industry." in *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism*, edited by G. Gereffi and M. Korzeniewicz. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
Kruijtbosch, Martine. 1997. "Rugmark: A Brief Resume of Concept to Reality for Visual Gurantee of Carpets Made Without Child Labour." India Committee of teh Netherlands.
Lagniappe Letter. 1996. "Big Forestry Project Fights Challenges form Environmentalists." in *Lagniappe Letter*.
Lam, Wai Fung. 1996. "Institutional Design of Public Agencies and Coproduction: A Study of Irrigation Associations in Thailand." *World Development* 24(6):1039-1054.
Larana, Enrique, Hank Johnston, and Joseph Gusfield. 1994. "New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity." . Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Lele, Sharachandra. 1991. "Sustainable Development: A Critical Review." *World Development* 19:607-621.
Lewis, Martin. 1992. *Green Delusions*. North Carolina: Duke University Press.
Lewontin. 1991. *Biology as Ideology*: Harper Perennial.
Limited, Delphi International. 1997. "Forest Stewardship: Who Wants It?" Delphi International Limited, London.
Lowry, Robert C. 1995. "Nonprofit Organizations and Public Policy." *Policy Studies Review* 14:107-116.
Lynch, Julie W. 1997. "Environmental Labels: A New Policy Strategy." *Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy* 12:121-123.
Mackay, Donald G., Paul V. Ellefson, and Charles R. Blinn. 1996. "Creating Better Timber Harvests." *Journal of Forestry* 94:27-31.
MacWilliams, Cosgrove, Smith, Robinson. 1997. "Messages and Communications Strategies for Certified Wood and Sustainable Forestry in the United States." MacWilliams, Cosgrove, Smith, Robinson.
Martin, William G. and Mark Beittel. 1998. "Toward a Global Sociology? Evaluating Current Conceptions, Methods, and Practices." *The Sociological Quarterly* 39:139-161.
Mater, Jean1. 1997. "Reinventing the Forest Industry." *Forest Products Journal* 47:20-24.
McAdam, Doug. 1982. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
McCormick, John. 1991. *British Politics and the Environment*. London: Earthscan.
McMichael, Philip. 1990. "Incorporating Comparison Within a World-Historical Perspective: An Alternative Comparative Method." *American Sociological Review* 55:385-397.
Merchant, Carolyn. 1992. *Radical Ecology*. New York and London: Routledge.
Merino Perez, Leticia. 1996. "Analysis of Social Elements in Forestry Certification." Pp. 11 in *Economic, Social, and Political Issues in Certification of Forest Management*. Malaysia.
Meyer, John, John Boli, George Thomas, and Francisco Ramirez. 1997. "World Society and the Nation-State." *American Journal of Sociology* 103:144-181.
Mintu-Wimsatt, Alma and Hector Lozada. 1996. "Green Marketing in a Unified Europe." . New York and London: Haworth.
Morris, James. 1982. "Public Affairs in the United States and Europe: A Comparison." *Journal of General Management* 7:48-53.
Moss, Anne. 1997. "Is Certification Smart?" *Furniture Design and Manufacturing* November:46-56.
Murphy, David and Jem Bendell. 1997. *In the Company of Partners: Business, Environmental Groups, and Sustainable Development Post-Rio*. Bristol (England): Policy Press.
Murphy, Dale D. 1999. "The Dynamics of Global Regulatory Competition." .
Murphy, D. F. 1996. "DIY-WWF Alliance: Doing it Together for the World's Forests." School of Policy Studies, University of Bristol, Bristol.

Murphy, D. F. 1998. “Partnerships in Paradox (Provisional Title).” Ph.D. Thesis, School of Policy Studies, University of Bristol, Bristol.
Murphy, Raymond. 1994. *Rationality and Nature: A Sociological Inquiry into a Changing Relationship*: Westview Press.
Nash, Jennifer and John Ehrenfe 1996. “Code Green: Business Adopts Voluntary Environmental Standards.” *Environment*, pp. 16-44.
National Consumer Counci (UK). 1996. “Shades of Green: Consumers' Attitudes to Green Shopping.” National Consumer Council, London.
National Consumer Council (UK). 1996. “Green Claims: A Consumer Investigation into Marketing Claims About the Environment.” National Consumer Council, London.
National Consumer Council (UK). 1997. “Consumers and the Environment.” National Consumer Council, London.
National Home Center News. 1997. “B&Q Exec Speaks at U.N. Earth Summit.” Pp. 34 in *National Home Center News*.
Nature, World Wide Fund for. 1993. *Truth or Trickery? Timber Labeling Past and Future*. Godalming, Surrey: World Wide Fund for Nature.
Norgaard, Richard. 1994. *Development Betrayed*. New York: Routledge, Chapman, and Hall.
O'Connor, James. 1988. “Capitalism, Nature, Socialism: A Theoretical Introduction.” *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism* 1:11-38.
O'Connor, Martin. 1994. *Is Capitalism Sustainble?*: Guilford.
O'Malley, Pat. 1993. “Containing our Excitement: Commodity Culture and the Crisis of Discipline.” *Studies in Law, Politics, and Society* 13:159-186.
Oliver, R. J. W. 1996. “Progress in Timber Certification Initiatives World-Wide (Part 2).” Forests Forever, ?
Oosterhuis, Frans, Frider Rubik, and Gerd Scholl. 1996. *Product Policy in Europe: New Environmental Perspectives*. Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1997. “Eco-Labeling: Actual Effects of Selected Programs.” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris.
Ostrum, Elanor. 1996. “"Crossing the Great Divide: Coproduction, Synergy, and Development".” *World Development* 24(6):1073-1087.
Ottman, Jacquelyn. 1998.
Green Marketing: Opportunity for Innovation. Chicago: NTC/Contemporary.
Ozanne, Lucie K. and Richard P. Vlosky. 1997. “Willingness to Pay for Environmentally Certified Wood Products: A Consumer Perspective.” *Forest Products Journal* 47:39-48.
Palmer, John. 1996. “Monitoring Forest Practices.” Pp. 31 in *Economic, Social, and Political Issues in Certification of Forest Management*. Malaysia.
Payne, Rodger A. 1995. “Nonprofit Environmental Organizations in World Politics: Domestic Structure and Transnational Relations.” *Policy Studies Review* 14:171-182.
Pearce, David et al. 1989. *Blueprint for a Green Economy*. London: Earthscan.
Pease, David A. 1992. “Can Managed Forests Save the Environment?” *Forest Industries* 119:16-18.
Peet, Richard and Michael Watts. 1993. “Introduction: Development Theory and Environment in an Age of Market Triumphalism.” *Economic Geography* 69:227-252.
Peluso, Nancy. 1992. “Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Control and Resistance in Java.”
Pezzoli, Keith. 1996. “Sustainble Development: A Transdisciplinary Overview of the Literature.” in *Joint International Congress of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning and the Association of the European Schools of Planning (July 25-28)*. Toronto, Canada.
Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. 1997. “Going Global: Futures of Capitalism.” *Development and Change* 28:367-382.
Platt, Irene. 199? “Report: Forest Stewardship Council UK Consultative Process.” Forest Stewardship Council, Llanidloes, Wales.
Plson, Shila 1996. “Cutting with Conscience: Sustainable Harvested 'Certified' Wood is Gaining Popularity.” *E*, pp. 42.
Polanyi, Karl. 1944. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. Boston: Beacon Press.
Princen, Thomas and Matthias Finger. 1994. *Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the local and the Global*. London and New York: Routledge.

Prudencio, Rodrigo. 1996. “Informed Consumers Can Protect the Planet.” Pp. 19 in *Christian Science Monitor*.
Ragin, Charles. 1987. *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Rao, Hayagreeva. 1998. “Caveat Emptor: The Construction of Nonprofit Consumer Watchdog Organizations.” *American Journal of Sociology* 103:912-961.
Redclift, Michael and Ted Benton. 1994. “Social Theory and the Global Environment.” . London and New York: Routledge.
Rock, Stuart 1989. “Are Greens Good for You?” *Director*, January, pp. 40-43.
Rotherham, A. A. 1993. “The Forest Stewardship Council.” *Forestry Chronicle* 69:637.
Rothstein, Richard 1996. “The Starbucks Solution: Can Voluntary Codes Raise Global Living Standards?” *The American Prospect*, July-August, pp. 36-42.
Sachs, Wolfgang. 19?? “Global Ecology and the Shadow of "Development".” in *Global Ecology,* edited by W. Sachs. London?: Zed Books.
Salzman, James. 1991. *Environmental Labeling in OECD Countries*. Paris: OECD.
Sassen, Saskia. 1988. *The Mobility of Labor and Capital*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Sassen, Saskia. 1991. *The Global City*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Saunders, Peter and Colin Harris. 1990. “Privatization and the Consumer.” *Sociology* 24:57-75.
Scher, Abby. 1997. “Green Labels: Can They Build a New Marketplace?” *Dollars and Sense* 211 (May-June):22-25, 46-47.
Schnaiberg, Alan and Kenneth Alan Gould. 1994. *Environment and Society*: St. Martin's Press.
Schneider, David 1996. “Good Wood: Can Timber Certification Save the Rain Forest?” *Scientific American*, June, pp. 36-38.
Shiva, Vandana. 1994. “The Greening of Global Reach.” in *Global Ecology*, edited by W. Sachs: Zed Books.
Silber, Ilana Friedrich. 1995. “Space, Fields, Boundaries: The Rise of Spatial Metaphors in Contemporary Sociological Theory.” *Social Research* 62:323-355.
Simon, Julian. 1981. *The Ultimate Resource*. Princeton:: Princeton University Press.
Simula, Markku. 1996. “International and Institutional Arrangements for Certification of Forest Management and Eco-Labeling of Forest Products.” Pp. 15 in *Economic, Social, and Political Issues in Certification of Forest Management*. Malaysia.
Sklair, Leslie. 1994. “"Global Sociology and Global Environmental Change".” in *Social Theory and the Global Environment*, edited by M. Redclift and T. Benton. London and New York: Routledge.
Sklair, Leslie. 1995. *Sociology of the Global System*. London: Prentice Hall, Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Smelser, Neil and Richard Swedberg. 1994. “The Handbook of Economic Sociology.” . Princeton and New York: Princeton University and Russell Sage Foundation.
Smith, David A. 1994. “Uneven Development and the Environment: Toward a World-System Perspective.” *Humboldt Journal of Social Relations* 20:151-175.
Spillman, Lyn. 1995. “Culture, Social Structures, and Discursive Fields.” *Current Perspectives in Social Theory* 15:129-154.
Storper, Michael and Robert Salais. 1997. *Worlds of Production: The Action Frameworks of the Economy*. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.
Sugal, Cheri. 1996. “Labeling Wood.” *World Watch* 9:29-35.
Sullivan, Don. 1996. “Repackaging the Forest Industry's Image.” *Canadian Dimension* 30:24.
Swanson, Stevenson. 1997. “Forest Treaty Out on Limb at Earth Summit.” Pp. 13 in *Chicago Tribune*. Chicago.
Swedberg, Richard. 1997. “New Economic Sociology: What Has Been Accomplished, What Is Ahead?” *Acta Sociologica* 40:161-182.
Szymankiewicz, Jan. 1993. “Going Green: The Logistics Dilemma.” *Logistics, Information Management* 6:36-43.
Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. “Power in Movement.” .
The Rainforest Alliance. 1997. “SmartWood Program Description.” .
Thrupp, Lori Anne. 1993. “Political Ecology of Sustainable Rural Development: Dynamics of Social and Natural Resource Degradation.” Pp. 47-73 in *Food for the Future: Conditions and Contradictions of Sustainability*, edited by P. Allen. New York: Wiley and Sons.
Thurow, Lester. 1992. “Communitarian vs. Individualistic Capitalism.” *The Responsive Community* 2:24-30.
Thurston, Charles W. 1995. “Chile's Industry Poised for Growth.” *Journal of Commerce* October 30:14A.

Trickell, Oliver 1996. “Legal Axe Hangs Over Green Timber.” *New Scientist*, May 18.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. 1997. “Commodities and Agriculture: Sweden Annual Forest Report.” U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Upton, Christopher and Stephen Bass. 1996. *The Forest Certification Handbook*. Delray Beach, Fl: St. Lucie Press.
Vallejo, Nancy. 1996. “Potential Economic, Social, and Environmental Impacts of Certification.” in *Economic, Social and Political Issues in Certification of Forest Management*. Malaysia.
Varangis, Panayotis, Rachel Crossley, and Carlos Primo Braga. 1995. “Is There a Case for Tropical Timber Certification.” World Bank, Washington D.C.
Veldman. 1994. *Fantasy, the Bomb, and the Greening of Britain*: Cambridge.
Vogel, David. 1986. *National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United States*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Vogel, David. 1995. *Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Wagner, Michael 1997. “Building Forests, Growing Homes.” *Amicus Journal*.
Wapner, Paul. 1995. “Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics.” *World Politics* 47.
Wasik, John. 1996. *Green Marketing and Management: A Global Perspective*. Cambridge and Oxford: Blackwell Business.
Waterman, Peter. 1996. “Beyond Globalism and Developmentalism: Other Voices in World Politics.” *Development and Change* 27:165-80.
Weissman, Arthur. 1997. “Greener Market Place Means Cleaner World.” *Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy* 12:116-120.
White, Harrison. 1981. “Where Do Markets Come From.” *American Journal of Sociology* 87:517-547.
Whitmeyer, J. M. 1997. “Mann's Theory of Power-- A (Sympathetic) Critique.” *British Journal of Sociology* 48:210-225.
Wilkinson, John. 1996. “Recent Convergencies in French Social Science: An Exploration of the Convention Theory Approach with a Consideration of Its Application to the Analysis of the Agrofood System.” . Unpublished Manuscript: Paris, France.
Wilson, Alex and Wilson Malin 1997. “Wood Products Certification: A Progress Report.” *Environmental Building News*.
Wood Technology 1997. “Quotas or No, America Will Buy Canada's Wood; US Import Quotas on Canadian Lumber May Boost Prices, But Underlying Market Factors Remain: Demand Continues to Outgrow US Mills' Capabilities.” *Wood Technology*, July-August, pp. 24-27.
World Resources Institute. 1994. “Recent History of International Inter-governmental Forest Policy-Making.” World Resources Institute, Washington D.C.
World Resources Institute. 1997. “Forests: Economic and Trade Policy.” , vol. 1997: World Resources Institute.
Worldwide Fund for Nature (UK). 1996. “The WWF 1995 Group: The Full Story.” Worldwide Fund for Nature, Godalming, Surrey.
Wright, Martin. 1996. “Forests for Life: Economic Aid: Development Without the Destruction.” Pp. 13 in *The Observer Supplement*.
Yearley, Steven. 1991. *The Green Case*: Harper Collins.
Yudice, George. 1995. “Civil Society, Consumption, and Governability in an Age of Global Restructuring: An Introduction.” *Social Text* 45:1-25.
Zarocostas, John. 1996. “Coalition Introduces Logo to Identify Products from Well-Managed Forests.” *Journal of Commerce* February 23:3A.
Zarrilli, Simonetta, Venna Jha, and Rene Vossenaar. 1997. “Ecolabeling and International Trade.” . London and New York: MacMillan and St. Martin's.