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Humanitarian Empire: The Red Cross in Japan, 1877-1945

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by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Humanitarian Empire: The Red Cross in Japan, 1877-1945

by

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Doctor of Philosophy in History

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Professor Takashi Fujitani, Chair

This dissertation presents a critical perspective on modern practices of humanitarianism by following histories of the imperial-era Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS) from its inception in 1877 until the formal dissolution of the Japanese empire in 1945. In the decades after its founding the JRCS became the most prominent humanitarian institution in the Japanese empire and the largest national Red Cross society in the world, drawing its leaders from among the most powerful of the ruling elites as

well as the imperial family. As an state-sanctioned voluntary organization for the relief of human suffering, the JRCS continuously promoted the philosophies and institutions of humanitarianism by applying them across a wide range of political, social, and economic spheres. I argue that the leadership of the JRCS in efforts to rescue the sufferers of war, natural disasters, and disease made it an exemplar of humanitarian imperialism, or the continuous expansion of political domination by state and non-state agencies which operated according to a logic of promoting the life, health and well being of ordinary people.

JRCS humanitarian thought and activity formed a key element of the ideology and institutions of imperial rule through five key conceptual categories—nation, law, production, hygiene, and gender. Chapter one shows how humanitarianism became an important element of Japanese nationalism by tracing changes in the early historiography of the origins of the JRCS during the Satsuma Civil War of 1877. Chapter two looks at affinities between practices of international humanitarian law and imperialism through the writings of Ariga Nagao—JRCS director, battlefield lawyer, and scholar of public administrative law. Chapter three argues that the JRCS relied upon and bolstered capitalistic ideas of wealth production through the representation of capital, land, and labor as sources of profit. Chapter four narrates the entry of the JRCS into the field of hygiene education. Chapter five concludes the work by analyzing the figure of the Red Cross nursing woman in the constitution of imperial gender subjectivities.

Introduction

Humanitarian Imperialism

The Red Cross Society of Japan has laid down Patriotism upon its foundation, as it is the most impressive expression to populize (sic) such an institute in Japan. However that may be, the result is the same. We have failed to find any difference between our Society and others in actual Red Cross works. For, patriotism and humanity practically unite in all that concerns the aid of the sick and wounded soldiers or of sufferers in general, with no distinction of nationality or party.

--*Red Cross in the Far East*, 1907

Humanitarianism, in its most general, common sense meaning, refers to moral sensibilities calling for benevolent conduct towards socially distant others in need. Various forms of humanitarianism advance different ways of imagining the social world outside of one's immediate experience and offer guidelines for how to act towards, and what to expect from others whom one does not know personally. Though there are many different kinds of humanitarians, all of their actions are based on the premise that the strong and wealthy have a moral responsibility to mitigate or prevent the suffering of the weak and impoverished.[1] Humanitarianism asks us to recognize ourselves in the suffering other and to treat them as we would wish to be treated. It has been an important part of the larger Enlightenment movement to "remake the world so that it better served the interests of humanity."[2]

On the surface, then, humanitarianism appears to be diametrically opposed to imperialism—the domination and exploitation of weaker peoples by stronger ones. Now

1 Keith Tester, *Humanitarianism and Modern Culture* (University Park, Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 2010), viii.

2 Craig Calhoun, "The Imperative to Reduce Suffering: Charity, Progress, and Emergencies in the Field of Humanitarian Action," in *Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics*, ed. Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, 73-97 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 76.

discredited as an ideology, the injustices of imperialism have been exposed in all of its various historical forms. We associate imperialism with military conquest, slavery, colonial rule, and racism, among other forms of violence. We understand imperial domination to increase, rather than mitigate the suffering of subordinate peoples. For the most part there is no expectation that the imperialist see him/herself in the suffering other nor act with compassion. Rather, imperialism works by grounding political domination in human difference or identity, the binary opposition of "us" and "them" which Edward Said finds so "dear to the nationalist and imperialist enterprise."[3]

The phrase "humanitarian imperialism" thus presents a contradiction. However in both theoretical terms and in the historical record the two concepts have proven quite compatible. The link between the two is universalism. As a system of moral thinking, humanitarianism operates according to Immanuel Kant's "categorical imperative," wherein actions can be judged as good or bad depending on whether or not they would create irrationalities if carried out universally as "laws of nature."[4] Like Kant's system of morality, the humanitarian incitement to act encourages us to imagine humanity as a single abstract whole and use it as the basis for rationally deducing proper behavior. This concept of universal humanity implies particular epistemological assumptions for the humanitarian. The suffering of others can be known and mitigated precisely because all humans are supposed to share certain universal values, capacities, emotions, and desires, including rationality. Offering medical relief to sick and wounded soldiers on the battlefield, helping disaster victims, and preventing the spread of contagious disease all

3 Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1993), xxiv.
4 Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and, What is Enlightenment,* trans. with an introduction by Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan, London: Collier Macmillan, 1990), 456.

count as morally good acts because they are means which adhere to the end of promoting the well being of humanity as an abstract whole.

While imperialism does work through the production of binary oppositions of identity, in its modern incarnations it also depends strongly on universalism. The epistemological foundation of imperialism includes the assumption that conquered populations can be known and made into productive and loyal imperial subjects, that Said's "we" is not so radically different from "them" to preclude some level of mutual understanding and cooperation. Human difference, in modern imperial ideology, is a matter of a developmental gap, wherein conquered peoples occupy a less advanced position or earlier stage in the putatively universal movement of all societies towards modern civilization.

When empires represent themselves as universal models for civilization, humanitarianism supplements this rhetoric with the universalizing language of morality. They compete to become the superior example of the rational universal moral form. This combination of humanitarianism and imperialism produces a formula for the thoroughgoing intervention of empires into the values, ideals and daily lives of their subjects. If, for Kant, morality—the rational self-restraint of desire—constituted the highest form of freedom for individuals, modern projects of empire entailed the paradoxical move to spread such rational self-restraint by force. By embracing the contradiction encapsulated in "humanitarian imperialism" we remember that one, there are political stakes involved in the very conceptual foundations of humanitarianism, and two, modern imperial power cannot fully acknowledge itself as such. Rather, it must always partially conceal itself behind rhetoric of moral tutelage.

This dissertation elaborates on these points through an examination of the ideas and practical activities of the Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS) from its inception in 1877 until the formal dissolution of the Japanese empire in 1945. It concerns the notion, put forth in the JRCS publication *Red Cross in the Far East* that "patriotism and humanity practically unite" through humanitarian action. It is thus about the ways that humanitarianism as form of moral sensibility helped define the unity of the Japanese nation, as well as its responsibilities towards socially distant others in an international community. The dissertation also examines how Japanese Red Cross humanitarians promoted the development of the nation's economy, morality, and physical health in order to better meet those responsibilities as a civilized member of that community. Most importantly, it recounts the JRCS's joining of humanitarianism and imperialism to support visions of Japanese tutelary dominance over the peoples of East Asia. In short, I argue that JRCS humanitarianism was part and parcel of Said's definition of imperialism: "the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory."[5]

My study is in dialogue with a growing body of literature on the ideals, practices and history of humanitarianism. Over the last decade increasing numbers of journalists, social scientists, historians, legal scholars, and political philosophers have turned a great deal of attention to this field. At the same time, humanitarian organizations and aid workers themselves have become involved in public debates over the means and ends of humanitarian activity, leading to an extended period of what Michael Barnett and Thomas Weiss call "soul searching" about what humanitarianism aims to accomplish, its

5 Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 8.

principles, and its relation to politics.[6] As a result there has been a large spike in publications about humanitarianism. For a conservative estimate, between 2002 and 2012 at least two thousand new books were published on humanitarianism and related issues in English alone.[7] The key topics within this larger category are human rights and human rights organizations, African nations and economic development, health management, humanitarian emergencies and interventions, international law, Islam, refugees, state building, and war. However, as Michael Barnett notes in his recent survey of the history and historiography of humanitarianism, there are relatively few works on humanitarian activity prior to the 1990s.[8] Those which do exist tend to be institutionally-oriented, or "official" histories. They focus on the achievements of particular humanitarian organizations and the deeds of their heroes, and the JRCS is no exception in this regard.[9]

Nevertheless, a critical idiom in scholarship on humanitarianism has emerged which takes history seriously. This idiom is what I term the "humanitarian imperialism" critique. These works have been the most provocative of the few recent critical perspectives on both contemporary and historical humanitarianism, which confirm my sense that the JRCS was just one of many examples of the historical conjunction of humanitarianism and imperialism. For example, Gil Gott puts the coexistence of humanitarianism and imperialism into historical context by examining the anti-slavery

6 Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, "Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present," in *Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics*, ed. Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, 1-48 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 3-5.

7 For example, a keyword search using "humanitarianism" in the Worldcat database restricted to 2002-2012 returns 2212 entries for Univ. of California libraries.

8 Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011), 7; Barnett, "Humanitarianism: A Brief History," 15-22.

9 The publications by the JRCS itself fall into this category, such as the Nihon Sekijūjisha, *Nihon Sekijūjisha shashikō* [Japanese Red Cross Society historical manuscripts] (Tokyo: Nihon Sekijūjisha, 1915). Also see Yoshikawa Ryuko, *Nisseki no sōshisha Sano Tsunetami*, [Sano Tsunetami, founder of the Japanese Red Cross] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2001).

movement in Africa during the 19th century. He argues that: "The record of nineteenth-century European imperialism in Africa is remarkable for its blending of humanitarian thought and action with a callous, sometimes bloodthirsty aggressiveness."[10] Similarly, Ian Tyrrell has recently argued that humanitarian missionary work abroad formed an important part of American imperialism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[11]

In the contemporary moment, a few writers such as Michael Ignatieff and Niall Ferguson have, each in their own way, attempted to rehabilitate the notion of empire largely using humanitarian rationales. For Ignatieff humanitarianism plays a key role within a contemporary form of imperialism he terms "empire lite"—the assertion of political and economic dominance by advanced industrialized states through democracy-building and economic development projects in failed states and impoverished nations. Ferguson, by contrast, advocates a return to full-blown British-style imperialism and colonialism to prevent lawlessness, civil conflict, government corruption, and to support free markets—all of which are goals that he justifies in humanitarian terms.[12] However, for most scholars, the concept of empire is an unredeemable shorthand for injustice, slavery, violence, and authoritarianism. As such, to call contemporary humanitarian philosophy and institutions imperialistic is to offer a provocation to reflect on the unstated assumptions behind humanitarianism as well as the unintended, but very real, consequences of humanitarian activity which do not live up to its ideals. To speak of

10 Gil Gott, "Imperial Humanitarianism: History of an Arrested Dialectic," *Moral Imperialism: A Critical Anthology*, ed. Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, 19-38 (New York: New York Press, 2002), 19. Also see Howard Temperly, "Anti-Slavery as a Form of Cultural Imperialism," in *Anti-Slavery, Religion, and Reform: Essays in Memory of Roger Anstey*, ed. Christine Bolt and Seymour Drescher, 335-50 (Folkestone, Eng.: W. Dawson; Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1980).

11 Ian Tyrell, *Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

12 *M*ichael Ignatieff, *Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan* (London: Vintage, 2003); Niall Ferguson, *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World* (London: Allen Lane, 2003), xx.

humanitarian imperialism in the present is to confront the problem noted by Keith Tester, that "common-sense humanitarianism" is "a postcolonial yet imperial metropolitan narration of vestigial Western hegemony in the world."[13]

Michael Barnett's recent book, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism,* is the first sustained attempt to follow humanitarian imperialism from its historical manifestations to the present. His account of origins and development of humanitarianism confirms that what he calls the "humanitarian governance" of aid and development organizations has indeed been undemocratic. Furthermore humanitarianism has been largely a matter of attending to the emotional (and sometimes material) needs of the giver, rather than the receiver.[14] In these senses the humanitarian imperialism label works well.

At the beginning of his study Barnett notes that the literature on the history of humanitarianism suffers from a significant gap, an observation that also motivates my study.[15] Research on the origins of humanitarian institutions in the early and mid-19th century, such as Gott's, is rarely connected to the rapid growth of humanitarianism in the 1990s in a sufficient manner. Late 19th and early 20th century history requires a more sustained treatment in regards to humanitarianism, amd the imperial-era JRCS is a crucial missing link between the "imperial humanitarianism" of the 19th century and that of today.

This link is important not simply as a matter of filling up the historical record in an effort to be complete. Antiquarianism aside, the lack of historical work done in this

13 Tester, *Humanitarianism and Modern Culture*, 47.
14 Barnett, *Empire of Humanity*, 221, 223.
15 Ibid., 7.

field does not itself justify the need for the present study. Rather, the significance of this particular historical moment is clear when we see how the difficulties the JRCS and its supporters faced, the fields in which it sought to intervene, and its approaches to gathering and developing resources bear striking, if unexpected, resemblances to the present situation for humanitarian organizations and humanitarian-minded individuals. JRCS humanitarians confronted the dilemma of close cooperation with states versus independence from "politics." They pursued immediate emergency relief during disasters while also grappling with the notion that long term structural change or developmental policies were also important for mitigating human suffering. They focused on children and women as both the targets and performers of humanitarian action, and they also made nutrition, hygiene and disease prevention an important means for improving the everyday lives of ordinary people. If we are to truly understand the place of humanitarianism within the history of the present, a close following of the history of the imperial-era JRCS provides a necessary bridge between scholarship on the imperial humanitarianism of the 19th century described by Gott and the kinds of criticism leveled at the the United States and European powers for pursuing "humanitarian imperialism" since the end of the Cold War.

The emergence of the idea of correlating humanitarianism with imperialism as a way of critiquing the contributions of non-governmental organizations to the constitution of a new, U.S. dominated, post-Cold War international order has much to do with the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001. Those who took seriously the notion that terrorism and terrorist organizations were not simply the result of religious fanaticism or so-called cultural differences looked for deeper structural and

social explanations for these attacks. Works such as Chalmers Johnson's *Blowback* and its sequels helped expose the U.S. policy decisions which created deep resentment around the globe during the 1990s and turned the U.S. into what he termed "an empire of bases" which invites violent acts of retaliation.[16]

Critical perspectives on humanitarianism and human rights promotion have contributed to our understanding of the 9/11 attacks and their context by further elaborating on this imperialistic connection. David Rieff, for example, has criticized contemporary humanitarian organizations for failing to maintain a necessary neutrality, impartiality, and independence vis-a-vis the major industrialized, wealthy nation-states which provide their funding. Noting that since the 1990s official pronouncements of US policymakers have increasingly used the language of humanitarianism to justify overseas military deployments, Rieff condemns the contemporary surge of humanitarian interventionism as sharing definite "rhetorical similarities" to the language of 19th century imperial domination.[17] In a similar vein, scholarly opinion is deeply divided about the use of the concept of human rights to justify military interventions in civil wars and efforts to stamp out practices such as female genital mutilation, widow suicide, and racial discrimination using the tool of international law.[18] U.S. policymakers' use of the

16 Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000); Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004*)*.

17 David Rieff, *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003), 66.

18 Holly Maguigan, "U.S. Policy on 'Female Genital Mutilation': Threat of Economic Pressure Internationally, Enactment of Criminal Sanctions at Home," in *Moral Imperialism: A Critical Anthology*, ed. by Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, 241-254 (New York: New York Press, 2002), 245; Kevin R. Johnson, "The Moral High Ground? The Relevance of International Law to Remedying Racial Discrimination in U.S. Immigration Laws," in *Moral Imperialism: A Critical Anthology*, ed. Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, 285-299 (New York: New York Press, 2002). Also see Costas Douzinas, *Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism* (New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007).

language of rights to justify military deployments overseas and failure to prevent ongoing violations of the rights of P.O.W.s, women, racial minorities, immigrants, and laborers domestically exposes the U.S. commitment to rights as a sham. Scholars have thus condemned the U.S. use of humanitarianism and human rights justifications and both a cover for its more self-serving motives and as a way of participating in "moral imperialism."[19] Often "incidents" such as prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib or Guantanimo Bay, civilian massacres by occupation soldiers, or military accidents which kill innocent bystanders or damage property serve as evidence proving the truth of American hypocrisy about its foreign policy aims. To these authors, the US is guilty of using a facade of universal humanitarian concepts to hide the particularism of its demand for exceptional treatment as the arbiter of world affairs.[20]

In this, policymakers for the US and its allies find themselves in a very similar situation to that of the leaders imperial Japan. In particular, the history of humanitarianism in imperial Japan puts the question of the necessary entanglement between universalism and particularism at the center of the inquiry. If, as critics claim, the US is currently guilty of advancing its own exceptional interests on the basis of the superiority of its humaneness, then the same applies, just as forcefully, in the case of imperial Japan. While advancing a humanitarian rationale for the conquest and occupation of foreign communities, they created the conditions for thoroughly inhumane actions taken against peoples under their military rule. On this basis both have recently been put on trial in the court of scholarly opinion. At the same moment during the 1990s

19 Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol and Christy Gleason, "Introduction," in *Moral Imperialism: A Critical Anthology*, ed. Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, 1-16 (New York: New York Press, 2002), 6.
20 Noam Chomsky, *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo* (London: Pluto, 1999).

when humanitarian and human rights organizations were struggling to deal with genocide in Rwanda and massacres in Bosnia, historians began researching and writing a great deal about the "incidents" committed by the Imperial Japanese Army during the Asia-Pacific War. These include the massacre of over 200,000 people in Nanjing in 1937, the mass enslavement of women into a forced prostitution regime euphemistically called the "comfort women" system, and the mistreatment of prisoners of war, including the testing of biological weapons on captives.[21]

As a member of the smaller sub-set of historical works which have begun to grapple with the larger implications of the development of humanitarian organizations and humanitarian activity, this dissertation is intended to provide a conceptual history. It recounts key episodes from the JRCS past in order to explain the emergence of humanitarianism as one set of common sense expectations about the relations between superiors and inferiors, haves and have-nots. In essence, I am using the JRCS as a way to describe the creation of the conditions of possibility for the contemporary debates about the humanitarian institutions and their role in the constitution of global orders. In other words it illustrates one important moment in the long development of an international culture of humanitarianism.

The phrase "humanitarian imperialism" itself already contains the assertion that humanitarianism and politics are inherently connected. Barnett characterizes the political rationale of humanitarianism as "paternalistic." Quoting Edmund Burke, Barnett explains

21 For some examples, see Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking: the Forgotten Holocaust of World War II* (New York: BasicBooks, 1997); Yuki Tanaka, *Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); Philip Towle, Margaret Kosuge and Yoichi Kibata, editors, *Japanese Prisoners of War* (London, New York: Hambledon and London, 2000; Sheldon H. Harris, *Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-1945, and the American Cover Up* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

that humanitarianism helped popularize the notion that "All political power which is set over men . . . ought to be some way or other exercised for their benefit."[22] This formulation has certain advantages in helping explain the JRCS's strong ties to the Japanese imperial family and its role in promoting the notion of benevolent imperial rule. Paternalism does describe the reasoning behind the JRCS organization and suggests one way that Japan's rulers earned the consent of the ruled using humanitarian rhetoric.

However useful the concept of paternalism may be, it does not do as well at grasping the directionality or developmental ethos inherent in humanitarian imperialism. That is, imperial humanitarian rule was not simply about creating and enforcing laws for the good of imperial subjects, but its advocates claimed that it would lead those subjects to develop internal capacities to rule themselves. It taught others to realize their humanity by rationally understanding themselves as national subjects, as laborers, as women/men, and as beings vulnerable to disease. To better grasp this tutelary aspect of humanitarianism, I argue that the conceptual apparatuses described herein are best understood in reference to what Michel Foucault has termed "governmentality," or the "conduct of conduct" of populations through political economic knowledge and institutions of security.[23] The idea of governmentality attempts to grasp the most important way that modern societies have rethought political rationality—the principles at work in the exercise of power. Humanitarianism has been an important concept, among many others, which pushed this transformation in the expectations and assumptions about the means and ends of rule. In my formulation, humanitarian imperialism takes its proper

22 Barnett, *Empire of Humanity*, 61.

23 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977-1978, trans. G. Burchell (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 108-109, 193, 230.

place alongside pastoral power, biopolitics, policing, and security, all of which have provided important rationales for bringing about the constitution and management of populations via "technologies of the self."[24]

This work is not the first to note how Foucault's concepts of governmentality and biopolitics can help explain the historical significance of various forms of humanitarianism. Didier Fassin's insightful piece titled "Humanitarianism: A Nongovernmental Government" has already proven the fruitfulness of a Foucaultian analysis of humanitarianism. Through his examination of the history of Doctors Without Borders (MSF), various movements to prevent lead poisoning in France, and policy statements by the United States and the United Nations regarding military interventions, Fassin asserts that "humanitarian reason" constitutes "a broader political and moral logic at work both within and outside state forms." It is a matter of "the administration of human collectivities in the name of a higher moral principle that sees the preservation of life and the alleviation of suffering as the highest value of action." From this insight, Fassin is able to describe a process by which "the state has been humanitarianized . . . it has developed a humanitarian rhetoric and politics to describe its own governmental practices." He uses the term "humanitarian government" to characterize this development.[25]

William Walters takes this notion of "humanitarian government" and develops a new concept, the "humanitarian border" to explain the materialization of humanitarian

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24 Ulrich Bröckling, Susanne Krasmann, and Thomas Lemke, "From Foucault's Lectures at the Collège de France to Studies in Governmentality: An Introduction," in *Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges,* ed. Ulrich Bröckling, Susanne Krasmann, and Thomas Lemke, 1-33 (New York: Routledge, 2011), 2.

25 Didier Fassin, "Humanitarianism: A Nongovernmental Government," in *Nongovernmental Politics*, ed. Michel Feher, 149-159 (New York: Zone Books, 2007), 151-2.

zones designed to relieve the suffering of refugees legally or illegally crossing national boundaries "a matter of life and death."[26] Through humanitarianism, borders have become the sites of the production of knowledge which not only facilitates the policing and control of populations, but also "problematize the border as a site of suffering, violence, and death, and a political zone of injustice and oppression."[27] As Walters argues, humanitarianism deploys familiar forms of medical, legal, social, psychological, and spiritual expertise to produce these forms of knowledge but also introduces a deep political ambivalence into their workings. Since it attempts to understand the unfolding of short duration crises according to a higher moral imperative, humanitarian action seeks to make visible the hidden and the neglected according to an ethics of witness which can serve to challenge the legitimacy of the formal political system. Thus, "governmental practices emanate not from a centre of official authority but in contexts of contestation and politicization."[28]

The research presented herein challenges the existing literature on humanitarianism, empire, and governmentality by pointing our attention towards the constitution of the concepts of humanitarian imperialism in everyday life. While the Red Cross carried out humanitarian relief in response to crises of a temporary nature—wars, natural disasters, outbreaks of epidemic disease—the mitigation of suffering in general required a thoroughgoing, long term effort to transform the values and behavior of humanity as an abstract whole. Red Cross thought and activity sought to foster an

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26 William Walters, "Foucault and Frontiers: Notes on the Birth of the Humanitarian Border," in *Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges*, ed. Ulrich Bröckling, Susanne Krasmann, and Thomas Lemke, 138-164 (New York: Routledge, 2011), 138.
27 Ibid., 150.
28 Ibid., 153-4.

orientation towards productivity and loyalty in ordinary people by working though, and reinforcing, the key concepts of nation, law, production, hygiene, and gender. These became the most important elements of humanitarians' universal moral philosophy which so strongly drew upon Kant's belief in the rational self-regulation of individuals towards the end of promoting humanity in the abstract.

A Moral Institution

If "humanitarian imperialism" describes the larger social and cultural context unfolding during the years from 1877 to 1945, the Japanese Red Cross Society itself is best characterized as a quasi-state institution for moral reform. Many would have challenged this characterization at that time. In formal terms, the JRCS was simply a state sanctioned voluntary organization for the relief of wounded and sick soldiers in war. Constituted in law by imperial decree in 1887, it received its funding from both the imperial house and ordinary donors. Mandated to perform medical relief for wounded and sick soldiers regardless of their nationality, it carried out its mission under the authority and direction of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy.

This original mandate, however, quickly expanded to include disaster relief activities, efforts to counteract epidemic diseases, and an engagement with general social problems in ordinary civilian life. As the JRCS proved its effectiveness in wartime relief, doctors, professors of law, government bureaucrats, teachers, religious authorities, agriculturalists, and literature experts sought to advance their own causes by incorporating them into the sphere of organized humanitarianism. The JRCS journals provided a key forum wherein such experts and authorities argued for the relevance of a

wide variety of issues to the humanitarian ideals and organization of the JRCS as well as their significance to the prestige and wealth of the empire as a whole. They did so largely by asserting the need to transform the way ordinary people conducted their daily lives. In other words, they used the JRCS to propagate new moral sensibilities and popularize so-called modern practices in homes and workplaces throughout the empire.

By 1913 the Society was carrying out work in an extremely diverse array of fields and seeking to educate people in all manner of topics. Readers of the February issue of the *Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*, for example, found articles discussing womanhood and nursing, disease treatment and prevention, Red Cross developments in Europe, education, national history, as well as the promotion of agriculture and industry.[29] *Journal* issues also often included reviews of recent literary works, poetry contests, serialized translations of foreign literature, and short stories.[30] By any measure a

29 For some examples, see Kankawa Kimiko, "Nihon joshi no tokuchō" [Merits of Japanese women], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 304 (February 10, 1913): 36-37; Ecchi Gorudingu, "Kangofu ha subekaraku hinsei wo yūsubekikoto" [By all means nursing women must have character], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 304 (February 10, 1913): 7-10; Yoshimoto Hanafusa, "Tokushi kangofujinkai ni taisuru kibō" [Aspirations for the charity nursing women association], Nihon Sekijūji [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 304 (February 10, 1913): 3-5; Ozawa, "Kekkaku yobō mondai ni tsuite"; Inoue Toyotarō, "Bōkoku sandaishikkan" [Three diseases which ruin nations], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 304 (February 10, 1913): 45-47; Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Benpisuru hito ni atae (shōzen)" [For those who get constipation (continued)], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 304 (February 10, 1913): 42-44; Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Kokusai iin no shinjigyō." [New work at the international committee], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 304 (February 10, 1913): 16-17; Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Doitsu sekijūji kokumin ryōyōjo" [German red cross national clinic], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 304 (February 10, 1913): 11-12; Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Barukan sensō to kakkoku sekijūji" [The Balkan war and each country's red cross], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 304 (February 10, 1913): 10; Shimada Saburō, "Shinjidai ni tekisuru kyōiku" [Education for a new era], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 304 (February 10, 1913): 28-31; Katō Hiroyuki, "Wagakuni bunmei no senku Sakuma Shozan sensei." [Sakuma Shozan the forerunner of our civilization], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 304 (February 10, 1913): 27-28; Sudōgi Uemon, "Ushi no hanashi (shōzen)" [Discussion of cows (continued)], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 304 (February 10, 1913): 35-39; Ikeda Kenzō, "Jitsugyōka no hiketsu" [Keys to success in industry], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 304 (February 10, 1913): 35-36; Yokoi Tokiyoshi, "Nōgyō to seinen" [Agriculture and youth], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 304 (February 10, 1913): 33-35; Sano Yoshisaku, "Nihon no shōgyō dōtoku" [Japanese business morality], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 304 (February 10, 1913): 32.

30 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Bunen" [Literature anthology], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*]

publication which could include “Merits of Japanese Women,” along with “Discussion About Cows,” “Japanese Business Morality,” “The Tale of Don Qixote” and advice “For Those Who Get Constipation” was indeed the definition of eclectic.

Based on this evidence, the JRCS appears to have developed an all-inclusive style of humanitarian thinking. They exemplified United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees Jean-Pierre Hocke's assertion in 1986 that “any action which is addressed to and motivated by the concern and well-being of human beings is 'humanitarian.'”[31] Under this expansive definition JRCS leaders could include literature, agriculture and industry alongside battlefield and disaster relief as humanitarian concerns. Furthermore, its leaders developed an organizational hierarchy which contained a powerful telos of growth. By centralizing overall policy-making at Society headquarters but decentralizing recruitment and revenue collection at the level of the prefectural branches, the JRCS constituted the Empire's population as an open field for the expansion of humanitarianism through local initiative. In other words, both the philosophy and practical organization of the JRCS not only complemented the rhetoric and institutions of formal state imperialism, but it also constituted a powerful empire of its own in terms of its ability to mobilize labor power and finances. As a form of quasi-state apparatus, it sought to order and regulate the daily activities of ordinary people in the empire according to the moral imperative of promoting the well-being of humanity.

To best understand humanitarian imperialism, this dissertation begins the work of

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307 (May 10, 1913): 48; Nihon Sekijūjisha, “Haiku,” *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 307 (May 10, 1913): 48; Konagai Kaitarō, “Don Gizoote no hanashi” [The tale of Don Qixote], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 304 (February 10, 1913): 40-42; Kusakawa Sokin, “Yoshiyasu Mokumoto wo tō” [Questioning Mr. Yoshiyasu Mokumoto], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 278 (December 5, 1910): 35-6.

31 Quoted in Barnett, *Empire of Humanity*, 207.

tracing the lines of expansion and the continuities between these eclectic interests in order to grasp the multifarious forms of Red Cross thought (*sekijūjishugi*) and Red Cross work (*sekijūjijigyō*) as a complex amalgamation of moral ideals and practices. I focus on five conceptual categories which were most essential to humanitarianism in the imperial era—nation, law, production, hygiene, and gender. JRCS humanitarians advanced their work by appealing to these interrelated concepts as guideposts for proper conduct.

These five conceptual categories are by no means exhaustive, but do correspond to some of the interests of scholars who have carried out research on the imperial-era JRCS so far. Kurosawa Fujitaka has examined the Red Cross in Japan from the perspective of international diplomacy and law, focusing on JRCS work with refugees during the Siberian Intervention.[32] Similarly Gordon Daniels' "Humanitarianism or Politics?: Japanese Red Cross Nurses in Britain, 1915-1916," examines the work of the JRCS during World War I as an important part of the empire's diplomatic strategy. Margaret Kosuge has looked to JRCS history to elucidate changes in the Imperial Japanese Army's conduct in war and the state's use of the Red Cross organization and symbolism as a means to mobilize the nation.[33] Likewise Kita Yoshito has traced the organizational evolution of the JRCS through its participation in war relief during the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), the Boxer Uprising (1899), and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5),[34] and general works on the various armed conflicts of the empire often include

32 Kurosawa Fujitaka, "Shiberia shuppei to Pōrando koji no kyūshutsu" [The Siberian intervention and the rescue of the Polish orphans], in *Nihon sekijyūjisha to jindō enjo* [*The History of the Japanese Red Cross Society and Humanitarian Assistance*], ed. Kurosawa Fujitaka and Kawai Toshinobu, 197-226 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2009).

33 Nobuko Margaret Kosuge, "Religion, the Red Cross, and Japanese Treatment of POWs," in *Japanese Prisoners of War*, ed. Philip Towle, Margaret Kosuge and Yoichi Kibata, 149-162 (London and New York: Hambledon and London, 2000); Nobuko Margaret Kosuge, "The 'non-religious' red cross emblem and Japan," *International Review of the Red Cross* 849, March 31, 2003: 75-93.

34 Kita Yoshito, "'Bunmei no sensō' toshite no nisshin sensō," in *Nihon sekijyūjisha to jindō enjo* [*The*

a discussion of the JRCS.[35] Olive Checkland has problematized the patriotic appeals made by the JRCS while John Hutchinson includes the JRCS as a leader of a worldwide movement which made the Red Cross an accessory to militarism.[36] In addition, JRCS history figures prominently in narratives about the nursing profession and changes in gender ideals, including Kameyama Michiko's *Nihon Sekijūjisha to kangofu* [The Japanese Red Cross Society and nursing-women] (1983), and Aya Takahashi's *The Development of the Japanese Nursing Profession: Adopting and Adapting Western Influences*.[37]

Though the language of morality tied these eclectic subjects and activities together as "humanitarian," the meaning of the term "morality" was actually one of the most contested philosophical topics at the time of the founding of the JRCS. In 1883 Inoue Tetsujirō published the influential *A New Theory of Ethics*, which sought to develop a replacement for the Neo-Confucian and Buddhist moral systems which, he claimed, had suffered from a crippling loss of authority during the preceding decades. He, along with others, lamented the onslaught of works praising the acquisition of knowledge over

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History of the Japanese Red Cross Society and Humanitarian Assistance], ed. Kurosawa Fujitaka and Kawai Toshinobu, 65-86 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2009); Kita Yoshito, "Byōinsen no katsuyakushita hokushin jihen," in *Nihon sekijyūjisha to jindō enjo* [*The History of the Japanese Red Cross Society and Humanitarian Assistance*], ed. Kurosawa Fujitaka and Kawai Toshinobu, 87-104 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2009); Kita Yoshito, "Jyuneebu jōyaku teiyaku kokukan no nisshin sensō," in *Nihon sekijyūjisha to jindō enjo* [*The History of the Japanese Red Cross Society and Humanitarian Assistance*], ed. Kurosawa Fujitaka and Kawai Toshinobu, 105-140 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2009).

35 Stewart Lone, *Japan's First Modern War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); S.C.M. Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perception, Power, and Primacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Naoko Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

36 Olive Checkland, *Humanitarianism and the Emperor's Japan, 1877-1977* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); John F. Hutchinson, *Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).

37 Also see Kawaguchi Keiko and Kurokawa Ayako, *Jūgun kangofu to Nihon Sekijūjisha: sono rekishi to jūgun shōgen* [Military nurses and the Japan Red Cross Society: history and campaign testimony] (Kyōto: Bunrikaku, 2008). Additional works about JRCS nursing women will be discussed in chapter five.

virtue. The creation of the academic discipline of ethics (*rinrigaku*) as well as the national morality (*kokumin dōtoku*) movement were the results of philosophers' dissatisfaction with a perceived excess of profit and pleasure seeking in modern society as well as their recognition that past moral philosophy was inadequate to the challenge of modern individualism and materialism. Inoue was one of many thinkers who tried to apply natural scientific concepts—evolution, in his case—to establish universal criteria for "goodness" in order to prevent the "collapse of morality." Their philosophical struggles had practical consequences as well, as philosophers began to try to spread their new notions of proper moral conduct through the medium of "morality societies" during the 1880s.[38]

Like the morality societies, JRCS humanitarianism was very much a product of this moment of turmoil for moral philosophy. In its initial manifestations the JRCS invoked a utilitarian version of morality which strongly echoed Nishi Amane's assertion, in 1873, that goodness followed from the cultivation of the "three human treasures" of health, wisdom and wealth for the maximization of human happiness.[39] Indeed, these three categories encapsulated the expanding JRCS agenda quite well. Not only did the immediate act of performing impartial battlefield relief for the sick and wounded soldiers serve the purpose of increasing human health and happiness directly, but for the Red Cross morality also meant cultivating wisdom and wealth in order to advance human capacities for carrying out such relief in the future. Furthermore, like *rinrigaku* and

38 Richard M. Reitan, *Making a Moral Society: Ethics and the State in Meiji Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2010), 3-4, 14-15, 46-48.

39 Nishi Amane, "The Three Human Treasures," *Meiroku Zasshi* [*Journal of the Japanese Enlightenment*] 38 (June, 1875), trans. William Reynolds Braisted, 462-467 (Japan: University of Tokyo Press, 1976), 463-4. Nishi's work is discussed by Reitan in *Making a Moral Society*, 31-33.

kokumin dōtoku, JRCS humanitarianism claimed universal applicability at the same time it sought to contribute to the establishment of a particular Japanese moral spirit. It thus advanced a kind of cosmopolitan nationalism which became an accessory to imperialism.

The existing works on imperial era JRCS history offer important criticisms of the organization's failures, and many of these relate back to its utilitarian moral framework. Authors have taken the Society to task for its failure to prevent the deeply inhumane actions of the Imperial Army and the Japanese government, its nationalistic orientation, the lack of knowledge about international humanitarian law among JRCS workers and the general Japanese public, as well as the inability of the JRCS to create a culture of humanitarianism within the imperial military.[40] Such critiques are limited, however. For one, since many of them proceed from the desire to explain the end point of the Asia-Pacific War, they are overly teleological. Flaws or contradictions in the philosophy and organization of the JRCS simply become signs foreshadowing the bitter conclusion.

In addition, my dissatisfaction with the existing work on JRCS history has to do with the fact that scholars have, for the most part, been too willing to accede to orientalist stereotypes that Japanese society, culture, and politics were insufficiently developed or lacking in Christian values for true humanitarianism. While noting that Japan was successful in industrializing its economy and building a powerful military, for decades since the end of World War II the mainstream historical literature has maintained the modernization-theory perspective that Japanese moral values were never quite modern enough. If one accepts this finding, then imperial Japanese institutions and practices

40 Kosuge, "Religion, the Red Cross, and Japanese Treatment of POWs"; Matsukura Tetsuya, *Gendai no seiiki nihon sekijyūji: hōshisha no zeni o uragiru kyozō to jitsuzō* [The Japan Red Cross as modern sanctuary: image and reality in the betrayal of public servants' good intentions] (Tokyo: Orijin shuppan sentā, 1984), 163-7. Checkland, *Humanitarianism and the Emperor's Japan*, 86-92, 95-100.

simply become fascist—incommensurable with the liberal democratic tradition represented by the US. Furthermore, if Japanese values are to blame, then it becomes pointless to study Japanese humanitarianism, since such a thing would have been, by definition, morally compromised from the start. Indeed, many of the few existing English-language works on Japanese Red Cross Society history revolve around the question of the Society's failure to prevent prisoner abuse, civilian massacres and other atrocities carried out by the imperial Japanese military during its many overseas wars. Olive Checkland's *Humanitarianism and the Emperor's* Japan, the sole monograph-length work on JRCS history in English, explains the failings of "Japanese" humanitarianism by claiming that military and political elites caused a resurgence of feudal traditions in the 1920s and 1930s. These traditions included warrior virtues (*bushido*) and absolute loyalty to one's lord. In other words, in mainstream scholarship the problems of the JRCS were caused by a national culture which was hostile to humanitarianism.[41]

While blaming militarists and nationalists for undermining humanitarianism does draw our attention to the fact that lives were (and are) at stake in attempts to define culture, existing scholarship on the JRCS short-circuits a deeper investigation into the specific contexts in which people made such attempts. Relying on cultural explanations, as if ordinary people simply transmitted concepts of *bushidō*, the institution of the emperor, or so-called feudal values from the past obscures the significance of JRCS history. Instead, if we consider these as products of their time it becomes clear that the problems of humanitarianism in Japan had much more to do with global political, economic, and social forces than any special defects in Japanese modernity. While we

41 Checkland, *Humanitarianism and the Emperor's Japan*, 95-97.

must remain attentive to the specifics of the JRCS case, the fundamental factors shaping its development were shared across the world.

From this perspective, John Hutchinson makes a crucial insight about the importance of the JRCS in the wider comparative, international history of humanitarianism. Hutchinson points out that starting in the first decade of the 20th century, humanitarian leaders in European and the United States felt that the JRCS was, in fact, a model national Red Cross Society and used its example to carry out reforms of their own national societies. Furthermore, up until the 1940s most considered Japan a responsible and valuable member of the international diplomatic community and "the envy of the Red Cross world."[42] Following Hutchinson's lead, I seek to examine the details of how, or in what ways, the JRCS may have served as a model for "Western" humanitarianism. This reopens the question of the significance of humanitarianism in the Japanese empire. Rather than marginalize JRCS history by making the problem of inhumane behavior a narrow effect of "Japan's" peculiar brand of ultra-nationalism and insufficient modernization, I insist that the JRCS conducted fully modern, philosophically sophisticated, and organizationally effective humanitarian activity. It led the way as a utilitarian moral institution operating both domestically and in the international sphere. The time is ripe for a re-evaluation of the ways in which the problematic histories of the imperial era JRCS are representative of larger problems in the system of sovereign nation-states, industrial capitalism, and the constitution of socially oriented non-governmental organizations generally.

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42 Hutchinson, *Champions of Charit*y, 209.

The Organization of this Study

Rather than narrating JRCS history in a linear fashion through the exposition of chronologically divided eras, this study is organized topically, according to the primary conceptual categories which organized humanitarian ideals and practice. Instead of presenting a comprehensive time line of JRCS activity it closely examines key episodes to better follow the unfolding of the categories and concepts involved with what JRCS leaders called "Red Cross-ism" (*sekijūjishugi*).

Chapter one addresses the concept of the nation as a an integral element of humanitarianism. While some humanitarian organizations may today claim transnational status, the Red Cross was a decidedly *inter*national movement. The members of the Geneva Convention were nation-states which authorized the creation of each relief Society along national lines. For the JRCS, writing national histories of humanitarianism became an important project to justify its participation in this international movement. While many have asserted that nationalistic particularism stands in opposition to humanitarian universalism, chapter one follows the production of histories by and about the JRCS to argue that nationalism and humanitarianism were, in fact, complementary. Historical narratives concerning the founding of the precursor to the JRCS, the *Hakuaisha* (Philanthropic Society), emphasized the mutually supportive nature of loyalty to the Emperor and the commitment to humanitarianism. Furthermore, JRCS historians also contributed to the invention of the national tradition of *bushidō*, or warrior virtue, by emphasizing its humanitarian aspects. According to the official narratives, the founders of the *Hakuaisha* profoundly contributed to the production of the Japanese nation as a unified moral community grounded in a commitment to supporting its benevolent and

nurturing imperial ruler.

Chapter two focuses on international humanitarian law. It examines affinities between practices of international humanitarian law and imperialism through the writings of Ariga Nagao—legal scholar, JRCS director, and battlefield lawyer. Ariga depended heavily on the idea of "moral submission" to advance the idea that the imperial military was a humanitarian force for civilizing the people living on the East Asian continent. According to his plans, through the humane military administration of continental lands occupied in war, the imperial Japanese army would earn the moral approval of the people living in these areas. The figure of the JRCS battlefield lawyer worked to create the sense that Japan was an exemplary member of the Geneva and Hague Conventions, and was working tirelessly to cultivate the health, wisdom, and wealth of foreign populations in its occupied territories, protectorates, and colonies.

Chapter three traces the economics of humanitarianism. It argues that the JRCS operated through and promoted the spread of the institutions and ethos of industrial capitalism. The Red Cross advocated diligent labor, the development of land, and the accumulation of capital not only as necessary elements of disaster preparation and response, but also to advance the production of wealth across the empire as a whole. It cast the productive use of these commodities as a moral virtue while erasing the social relations of exploitation standing behind interest, rent, and wages as the three forms of profit in capitalism. This process of commodity fetishization fed into imperialism by obscuring the unstable nature of capitalism. It required the export of manufactured goods and capital abroad in order to sustain the profitability of domestic businesses, which in turn led to political demands for military intervention abroad in defense of capitalists'

property and investments.

Chapter four elaborates on the concept of humanitarian imperialism by recounting the history of JRCS involvement with one of the most prevalent justifications for colonial domination—hygiene. The JRCS attempted to prevent disease by correcting people's diet, clothing, exercise habits, and general cleanliness. The most important of the JRCS's hygienic improvement programs was the campaign to prevent and eliminate tuberculosis, which began in the early 1910s. Paying particular attention to the tuberculosis campaign, this chapter explains how hygiene educators attempted to convince audiences that not only did hygiene prevent disease, but the act of making oneself and one's surroundings clean was beautiful, felt good, and made for harmonious and morally correct social relations.

Chapter five follows the gendering of humanitarian imperialism through the figure of the Red Cross nursing woman. An outpouring of literature about the experiences of the "angels in white" during the fifteen year war in East Asia (1931-1945) made her a prominent symbol of virtuous womanhood. The Red Cross nursing woman's sacrifices and disciplined purity produced a compelling humanitarian mother figure and savior of the empire as she became the face of Red Cross work during the extended crisis of wartime.

Besides offering the concept of humanitarian imperialism as a methodological innovation over past works on the JRCS, this study incorporates heretofore underutilized primary sources. Rather than relying on the heavily edited *Nihon Sekijūjisha shashikō* [*Japanese Red Cross Society Historical Manuscripts*], I examine the less mediated daily activity logs (the *Nihon Sekijūjisha nisshi*) as well as the unedited reports and

correspondence files found within the Japanese Red Cross Society Documents archive in the Red Cross Historical Document Room at the Japanese Red Cross Society Toyota College of Nursing in Toyota, Japan. These give a much more pronounced sense of the setbacks and contingencies—the roughness and unevenness of the JRCS narrative—than scholars have so far introduced into treatments of JRCS history.

Most importantly, I make ample use of the JRCS journals, a historical source which has been mostly neglected by researchers. First published in December of 1891, the *Journal of the Japanese Red Cross* and its successor *Hakuai* (Philanthropy) appeared monthly (some years semi-monthly) through the end of the empire in 1945. They kept Society members and the general public informed about the day-to-day activities of the prefectural JRCS branches and hospitals, speeches by the Society's top executives, as well as news from Red Cross societies around the world. *Journal* readers learned about Red Cross disaster relief work carried out across the empire, JRCS membership statistics by prefecture, trips taken by top JRCS leaders to observe and promote Red Cross work across the globe, and the Society's work developing the necessary financial, material and human resources to carry out relief work during wartime. Furthermore, as the table of contents described above suggests, the journals educated readers on a variety of subjects pertaining to everyday life. Obviously the JRCS journals are a source which has been edited, but they were edited in quite a different way than the *Historical Manuscripts*. Rather than attempting to fix and preserve the JRCS story for posterity, the journals were designed to assert the continuing relevance of humanitarianism month after month. They thus speak more directly to the immediate social and cultural contexts within which humanitarian activity took place.

In sum, the JRCS was a utilitarian moral institution. It began with the simple humanitarian goal of rescuing wounded soldiers on the battlefield without distinction for friend or foe. However this relatively modest mandate soon became much more open-ended. As advocates of various moral causes witnessed Red Cross successes at mobilizing support and carrying out medical relief in wartime, they continuously pushed the JRCS to expand its boundaries. For the most part the JRCS leadership obliged, developing an organization with expansive reach and local power which served as a linchpin for the ideologies and institutions of imperialism.

Chapter 1

Reassuring Fratricide

Remembering the Satsuma War and the Historiography of the Origins of the Japanese Red Cross Society in the National Imaginary

> Although they have made the Imperial Army their enemy, [the Satsuma rebels] are still people of the Empire. They are children of the imperial house—injured, sitting, waiting for death, abandoned, hoping for some show of human sympathy.
> --Sano Tsunetami and Ogyū Yuzuru, "Petition to establish the Hakuaisha"

> Having to 'have already forgotten' tragedies of which one needs unceasingly to be 'reminded' turns out to be a characteristic device in the later construction of national genealogies.
> --Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*

Writers narrating the history of the Japanese Red Cross Society immediately face the question which vexes all historical writing: where to begin? In this chapter I argue that historians' decisions to designate one or another origin for Red Cross humanitarianism in the archipelago exposed various political agendas at work in the writing of JRCS history during the imperial era. Foremost among these agendas was bolstering an aggressive, militaristic concept of Japanese nationalism. While earlier writers often chose to start JRCS history with the official adoption of the Red Cross name in 1887, by the end of the first decade of the 20th century the dominant narrative adopted a far more perilous episode to explain the modern origins of humanitarianism in Japan—the Satsuma War of 1877. From 1906 official histories began to focus on the *Hakuaisha,*

Sano Tsunetami and Ogyū Yuzuru's ad-hoc voluntary society for the relief of soldiers wounded in the conflict, as Japan's first modern humanitarian organization and the precursor to the JRCS.

In doing so, they advanced a particular way of remembering the "forgotten" Satsuma War which transformed it into what Benedict Anderson calls a "reassuring fratricide." That is, the dominant mode of JRCS history writing made the Satsuma Rebellion into a "war between brothers," an ephemeral and unnatural state of affairs destined to be resolved through the reconciliation of both sides within the nurturing embrace of the national-familial community.[1] Specifically, the new official narrative rehabilitated the memory of the Satsuma rebels by emphasizing how they were worthy of humanitarian rescue efforts because of their loyalty to the emperor, their valor on the battlefield, and their self-sacrificing ethos. They became one of many representations of the positive aspects of warrior virtue or *bushidō* to be retained as a foundation for Japan's unified national culture and aggressive imperialism. The decision to begin JRCS history with the Satsuma War thus effaced the deep social and political differences, the contradictory utopian and revolutionary hopes, as well as the pervasive points of anti-state resistance exposed during the conflict. It meant forgetting the complicated social and cultural diversity among the various communities of the archipelago in favor of the reassuring notion of a singularly loyal, brave, and disciplined nation united under the benevolent humanitarian rule of the imperial house.

Humanitarian history proved particularly well suited to this project of selective forgetting and remembering essential to nationalism. JRCS humanitarianism already

1 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, New York: Verso, 1991), 199-201.

depended on the proliferation of representations of human suffering just like many other kinds of national narratives which attempted to appeal to people's sense of shared suffering to strengthen national consciousness. The Red Cross ethos of strict neutrality and impartiality in the relief of suffering also functioned to depoliticize the representation of the Satsuma War, turning the conflict (and war in general) into an unfortunate, but unavoidable tragedy. Furthermore, JRCS humanitarianism promoted the idea of generosity in the treatment of defeated foes, which further reinforced the interpretation of the war as a "family affair," and later writers found parallels between this idea and samurai chivalry.

At the same time, however, the excavation of Satsuma War history in the service of a nationalistic humanitarian narrative proved to be a perilous operation. As Ernst Renan observed: "progress in historical studies often constitutes a danger for [the principle of] nationality. Indeed, historical inquiry brings to light deeds of violence which took place at the origin of all political formations."[2] In their attempts to have their readers remember the Satsuma War as a reassuring fratricide, JRCS historians inadvertently dug up the same historical material used by anti-state activists in their struggles against the authoritarian rule of the Meiji oligarchy. Counter-histories written by members of the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement and various right-wing organizations also sought to constitute a national imaginary through the narratives of shared suffering, but in their case it was the shared suffering of ordinary people under the injustice and tyranny of the administrative-bureaucratic state. By showing that the Satsuma rebels were found worthy of imperial humanitarianism, the dominant historiography of the JRCS inadvertently

2 Ernst Renan,"What is a Nation?" reprinted in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi Bhabha. 8-22 (London: Routledge, 1990), 11.

reopened a path for these critics of the government to speak for the ghosts of Saigo Takamori and his army, thus attempting to restate the justness of their case. In this way the JRCS and its history became the contested grounds for continuing struggle about the meaning of civil conflict in modern Japanese history. While the dominant narrative provided support for the characterization of the Meiji period as a time when Japan, under the wise guidance of the state, replaced its outmoded institutions of feudal rule but retained its unique martial samurai virtues as a necessary element of Japaneseness, enduring counter-narratives haunted this smooth history by recalling episodes of government arrogance, injustice and brutality.

Furthermore, when writers put official JRCS history to use in legitimating imperial rule as life-affirming and just, they created a narrative structure requiring the acknowledgment and subsequent denial of state violence. It thus put into place a system of constraints on the words and actions of imperial leaders. While the imperial state continued to commit acts of inhumane brutality, in order to sustain the national narrative it became crucial for imperial leaders to at least speak as if a commitment to humanitarianism was an essential aspect of Japanese nationhood. The appearance of any negligence on the part of Japan's leaders became the occasion of harsh criticism.

The Slippery Origins of the Red Cross in Japan

Until the first decade of the 20th century the Satsuma War was effectively forgotten in JRCS history. Sano Tsunetami, for example, omitted any mention of the *Hakuaisha* in his 1891 "Congratulatory address on the publishing of the *Journal of the Japanese Red Cross Society*," a speech reprinted in the inaugural issue of the *Journal.* His

address was full of recollections from the past, but Sano chose to discuss his two trips to Europe and the work he did getting the government to sign the Geneva Convention in 1876 rather than recount the Satsuma War. He focused exclusively on the JRCS connection to humanitarianism in Europe and the cosmopolitan nature of Red Cross work.[3]

Similarly, Shimizu Shun's 1902 retrospective "The Japan Red Cross Society's Past, Present, and Future" dismissed the importance of the *Hakuaisha* by noting that at its height it only had 956 members. For Shimizu the adoption of the Red Cross name in 1887 and recognition by the International Committee of the Red Cross was the true beginning of humanitarianism in Japan. He explained how Sano Tsunetami was inspired to organize the Society by observing Red Cross work during his trips to Europe but mainly stressed the importance of bold leadership in 1887. Due to the lack of support in Japan, "pushing forward with the JRCS [in 1887] was really the height of daring."[4]

At the time of Shimizu's article, however, publicists for the JRCS were beginning to discover the usefulness of remembering the Satsuma War. There were two reasons why it made an attractive starting point for JRCS history. First, in 1902 JRCS leaders wanted to use the occasion of the twenty-five year anniversary of the founding of the *Hakuaisha* to hold a publicity-raising celebration. The first of many such celebrations, the twenty-five year anniversary event in 1902 was considered important enough by JRCS leaders that they postponed it specifically to give Prince Kanin, the honorary head of the JRCS,

3 Sano Tsunetami, "Nihon Sekijūji hakkan shukuji" [Congratulatory address on the publishing of the Journal of the Japanese Red Cross], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 1 (December 26, 1891): 1-3.

4 Shimizu Shun, "Nihon Sekijūjisha no kako genzai oyobi shōrai" [The Japan Red Cross Society's past, present, and future], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 114 (September 15, 1902): 8-9.

time to return from his trip in England and attend.[5] Combining the twenty-five year celebration with the yearly general meeting, JRCS leaders, prominent members of the peerage, and foreign dignitaries all gave speeches to the assembled crowd of thousands (see figure 1.1 for a photograph of the celebration grounds).[6] As is the case even today, the empress herself made an appearance at the meeting/celebration (see figure 1.2 for a photo of the empress's ceremonial entry gate). Like the various weddings, wedding anniversaries, war parades, and funerals comprising what T. Fujitani calls Japan's "modern imperial pageantry," the JRCS meetings and celebrations created the sense that even ordinary people could earn the opportunity to see, and be seen by, the imperial family.[7] By paying one's membership fees to the JRCS, even the humble laborer might receive the benevolent gaze of the empress. Thus these kinds of commemorative celebrations proved crucial in attracting new dues-paying members and they garnered donations from both corporate and private sources. This made them extremely important to the fiscal growth of the organization. So immediate practical interests made it useful for the JRCS to start remembering the Satsuma War in 1902.

Second, re-narrating the Satsuma War from the perspective of humanitarianism provided a way to domesticate the international Red Cross. It attempted to establish Red Cross thought and practice as an indigenous or national tradition linked to the twin ideals of benevolent imperial rule and samurai virtue. This change became more and more evident as the JRCS began to publish more comprehensive, book length histories through

5 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Nijyūgonenki shukuten enki ni tsuite" [Concerning the 25-year celebration postponement], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 107 (February 15, 1902): 16.
6 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Shukuten kiji" (Celebration report), *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 116 (November 15, 1902): 22-25.
7 T. Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan* (Berkeley. University of California Press, 1996), 105-155.

the end of the 1900s and the 1910s. In 1903 the JRCS published the *Nihon Sekijūjisha enkakushi* [History of the Japanese Red Cross Society] which devoted twenty two pages to the the work of the *Hakuaisha* during the Satsuma War. Kawamata Keiichi re-edited much of the material in the *Enkakushi* and published it in 1908 as the *Nihon Sekijūjisha hatatsushi* [History of the growth of the Japanese Red Cross Society]. This volume was repeatedly re-issued and eventually even translated into English in 1919 as *The History of the Red Cross Society of Japan* since it had become the canonical source for early JRCS history. In 1915 the Society also began publishing editions of the series called the *Japanese Red Cross Society Historical Manuscripts* every ten years. The title of these volumes was misleading. Rather than simply compiling source documents from the JRCS archives, the editors of the *Japanese Red Cross Society Historical Manuscripts* actually wrote new interpretations of JRCS history. The first edition began by explaining Red Cross work in Europe but quickly moved to a discussion of the special circumstances which shaped the Red Cross in Japan including its founding in the Satsuma War.[8] These works treated the founding of the *Hakuaisha* as an integral episode in JRCS history.

The new dominant historical narrative proceeded as follows.

On April 6, 1877, two months into the Satsuma War, senators (*gikan*) Sano Tsunetami and Ogyū Yuzuru sent a petition to their powerful patron Iwakura Tomomi, Minister of the Right. The petition offered a novel representation of the continuing civil war as humanitarian crisis.

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8 Nihon Sekijūjisha, *Nihon Sekijūisha enkakushi* [The history of the development of the Japanese Red Cross Society], Tokyo: Hakuaisha, 1906, 291-312; Kawamata Keiichi, *Nihon Sekijūjisha hattatsushi* [History of the growth of the Japanese Red Cross Society] (Tokyo: Nihon Sekijūjisha hattatsushi hakkojo, 1908); Kawamata Keiichi, *The History of the Red Cross Society of Japan* (Tokyo: Japanese Red Cross Society, 1919); Nihon Sekijūjisha, *Nihon Sekijūjisha shashikō*, 24-146.

> Regarding the subjugation of the insurgents in this uprising in Kagoshima prefecture, it is really not an easy affair. . . . Already forty days have passed since the insurgents' initial attack and the situation in the conflict area is such that it appears the government forces' casualties will be extremely numerous. . . . One must feel a deepening pity for prisoners and the dead. However, without efforts to restore their health, the wounded will be left in excruciating circumstances. Lost in the space between life and death, a multiplicity of methods must be exhausted to lead the wounded on the path to rescue. As for the government, it maintains nursing and medical treatment capacity. However, when fierce battles are a daily occurrence the wounded gradually increase [beyond existing relief capacity].[9]

By the time they wrote their petition, Sano and Ogyū could see that the Satsuma War would not be "an easy affair." The crisis arose from the indeterminate condition of multitudes of battlefield wounded, who were, as they claimed, "lost in the space between life and death." Sano and Ogyū pitied, but did not target prisoners taken unharmed or those who immediately died in combat. Rather, those in the intermediary condition—wounded, but not dead yet—presented an opportunity for humanitarians to act decisively in a protective role.

They asked for government permission to create a civilian voluntary organization, the *Hakuaisha,* for the relief of wounded on the battlefield and modeled it on Europe's national Red Cross societies. The new organization's leaders would collect donations of money and goods from concerned individuals and use them to hire and supply teams of medics dispatched to the battlefield. On the surface, then, the petition simply identified wounded soldiers as a problem and presented a voluntary relief organization as an easy way to immediately bolster the military's deficient medical capacity. It strongly appealed

9 Hakuaisha, "Kessha oyobi shomu kankei shorui" [Documents related to the society and the disposition of its business], unpublished Japanese Red Cross Society archive, file A1-1, 1877, Japanese Red Cross Society Headquarters Collection, Japanese Red Cross Society Information Plaza, Tokyo, Japan. This source was also reprinted in the Nihon Sekijūjisha, *Nihon Sekijūjisha shashikō*, 94-96 and Kawamata, *The History of the Red Cross Society of Japan*; 32-35.

to budget-conscious leaders worried about incurring any debt in the war effort.

The *Hakuaisha* would not only assist the government forces however. Sano and Ogyū's petition to Iwakura made the Satsuma Rebellion into a humanitarian crisis by specifically pointing out that the rebels would suffer also, and that they, too, deserved rescue.

> Not only can we anticipate that the insurgent's casualties will double those of the government forces, their relief efforts will not be well organized. With a multitude of injured left across the hills and fields, struggling in the rain and dew, to hesitate to offer assistance to these comrades would be a great miscarriage of justice (*taigi no ayamari*). Although they have made the Imperial Army their enemy, they are still people of the Empire. They are children of the imperial house (*sekishi*)—injured, sitting, waiting for death, abandoned, hoping for some show of human sympathy.[10]

With all the rhetorical skill they could muster, the two Senators attempted to humanize the disloyal, claiming that they too—not only the government soldiers—were worthy of medical aid on the battlefield. Sano and Ogyū dared to call the insurgents "children of the imperial house," and included them as "people of the Empire" rather than rendering them outside of the national community.

The use of the phrase "children of the imperial house" gets to the heart of the recasting of the Satsuma War as a reassuring fratricide in JRCS history. Like the term for "nation" in English, the Japanese word *kokka* (a compound of the characters for "country" and "house") implied nativity.[11] Japanese nationality indicated a social relationship established by having been born and raised in a family belonging to the extended genealogical group which traced its ancestry back to the men who served the first emperor Jimmu two thousand years earlier. Sano and Ogyū based their call for

10 Ibid.

11 This point is discussed in Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception,* trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 127-8.

"human sympathy" towards the Satsuma rebels on the fact that the rebels did not reject the eternal rule of the imperial family, but simply disagreed with the current government leadership. This interpretation of the Satsuma War elevated the position of the emperor as the patriarch who lent stability to the national family through his benevolent oversight even while his "children" quarreled over state policy.

Sano and Ogyū's petition thus made a subtle statement about the purpose of government. By authorizing the *Hakuaisha* the state would embrace the larger purpose of shepherding human lives in peril towards the "path to rescue." Advancing an ideal of humanitarian rule, the *Hakuaisha* established a baseline requirement for the state to restore the minimal conditions of human existence in wounded enemies—biological life. In doing so it formally and directly introduced human life into the calculations of governance, but promised nothing more. The *Hakuaisha* provided a new means to incorporate the voluntary contributions of financially well-off individuals to this larger objective.

However, as in any good narrative, the founders of the *Hakuaisha* did not achieve their goal without encountering difficulty along the way. Sano and Ogyū's petition to Iwakura met stiff resistance within the government ministries. Iwakura himself hesitated to push forcefully for its adoption and henceforth he rejected the proposal letter two weeks later on April 23.[12] Historians of the JRCS have generally attributed this failure to a general belief among government officials that the idea of impartial relief for the wounded was unrealistic given the circumstances of civil war.[13] Historians have also

12 Nihon Sekijūjisha, *Nihon Sekijūjisha shashikō*, 93-94.

13 Kurosawa Fujitaka, "Kindai Nihon to sekijūji" [Modern Japan and the Red Cross], in *Nihon sekijyūjisha to jindō enjo* [*The History of the Japanese Red Cross Society and Humanitarian Assistance*], ed. Kurosawa Fujitaka and Kawai Toshinobu, 1-38 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press,

argued that government ministers were suspicious of the Christian connotations of the Red Cross.[14]

Yet Iwakura—personally quite sympathetic to Sano and Ogyū's position—saw a way for the two Senators to use the state's assumption of emergency wartime powers to their advantage. The government had assigned Prince Arisugawa as commander-in-chief of the imperial army, granting him full authority over military operations for the duration of the war. As Iwakura explained, Arisugawa had the power to authorize any battlefield operations, including voluntary relief efforts for wounded soldiers. If Sano and Ogyū were able to convince Arisugawa of the necessity for a voluntary relief organization, then his permission to perform relief work on the battlefield would make the existence of the society an already-accomplished fact. On May 3 Sano presented his petition to the Prince and received permission to establish the *Hakuaisha* for the purpose of carrying out impartial medical relief for sick and wounded soldiers on the battlefields of Kyūshū.[15] With Iwakura's help, Sano and Ogyū had sidestepped bureaucratic opposition with a direct appeal to the authority of the imperial family.

It would be easy to overstate the scope of the *Hakuaisha's* humanitarian intervention in the Satsuma War. Only sixteen people attended its first meeting to organize relief work on June 25, 1877. They contributed a variety of goods to the organization, including three tables, a lamp, a chest of drawers, and two chairs along with a total of 1700 yen to purchase medical supplies and hire surgeons. The relief work was

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2009), 19; Kawaguchi, *Jūgun kangofu to Nihon Sekijūjisha*, 262.

14 Kosuge, "Religion, the Red Cross, and Japanese Treatment of POWs," 152; Kameyama Michiko, *Nihon Sekijūjisha to kangofu* [The Japanese Red Cross Society and nursing women] (Tokyo: Domesu Shuppan, 1983), 44.

15 Kawamata, *The History of the Red Cross Society of Japan,* 35-36; Nihon Sekijūjisha, *Nihon Sekijūisha enkakushi*, 132-141; Nihon Sekijūjisha, *Nihon Sekijūjisha shashikō*, 96.

necessarily limited.[16]

The *Hakuaisha's* symbolic value far exceeded its relatively small practical activity. The historiographical efforts of the late 1900s and 1910s made Prince Arisugawa's humanitarian gesture into a formative event in the history of modern Japan, casting the imperial house as the ideological center of a benevolent regime. A prime example of the continuing use of the episode was the artistic rendering titled *Arisugawa's Permission to Establish the Hakuaisha at the Governor's Mansion* (see figure 1.3) that was commissioned by the JRCS and put on display in the JRCS museum in the 1930s.[17] The painting depicts the figure of Sano Tsunetami bowing to the Prince, who is flanked by military officers. The image strongly advanced a representative politics of piety. Not only did Sano receive legitimacy for his humanitarian project by bowing to the authority of the Prince, but the Prince and the state he represented received legitimacy through their figurative bow to the principle of benevolence and care towards the nation that Sano represented. Official representations thus emphasized the disinterested, neutral, non-political character of humanitarianism, showing how the actions of humanitarians, like those of the emperor himself, transcended local loyalties, bureaucratic factionalism, and party conflict. The dominant interpretation of the founding of the Hakuaisha represented the success of Sano's project as the natural result of his loyalty to the benevolent imperial family and its wider concern for all of the "children of the imperial house."[18]

16 Hakuaisha, "Hakuaisha nisshi" [Hakuaisha log], unpublished Japanese Red Cross Society archive, file A1-22, 1877, Japanese Red Cross Society Headquarters Collection. Japanese Red Cross Society Information Plaza, Tokyo, Japan, entries for June 25 and June 26, 1877.

17 Nihon Sekijūjisha, *Sekijūji hakubutsukan an'nai* [Guide to the Red Cross museum] (Tokyo: Nihon sekijujisha, 1934), 29. Also see Kurosawa, "Kindai Nihon to sekijūji," 22.

18 Nihon Sekijūjisha, *Nihon Sekijūjisha shashikō*, 89-146; Nihon Sekijūjisha, *Nihon Sekijūisha enkakushi*, 11-30; Kawamata, *Nihon Sekijūjisha hattatsushi*, 61-71.

Struggles to Create a National Tradition

JRCS historians' move to remember the *Hakuaisha* coincided with a larger movement in historical thinking to recuperate the Satsuma War and the leader of the Satsuma rebels, Saigō Takamori, into the dominant national narrative. As Mark Ravina argues, the story of Saigō's "principled resistance to the Meiji state" and his death had come to carry a "heavy symbolic burden" as he "represented an alternative to a statist, bureaucratic, and centralizing vision of modern Japan." Ordinary people and intellectuals alike "identified with Saigō's rebellion and mourned his death as a triumph of autocracy."[19] The rewriting of JRCS history to include the *Hakuaisha* complemented the efforts of conservative journalists, textbook writers, and public leaders to make Satsuma War history compatible with the narrative of Japan as a strong, prosperous, civilized, expanding nation-state and efface the acts of brutality carried out by Meiji regime during its first decade of existence.

The invented tradition of *bushidō* served as the point of exchange between Red Cross humanitarianism and nationalist ideology in the reworking of Satsuma war history. The discourse on *bushidō* asserted the importance of samurai virtues as an integral component of "Japanese" morality and it also emerged at the same time in the first decade of the 20th century when the JRCS was rewriting its own history. As a major part of this discourse, national ideologies recast Saigō Takamori into a legendary paragon of samurai virtue to try to channel popular enthusiasm towards Saigō into loyalty to the Meiji state and its militaristic agenda.[20] Writers for the JRCS participated in this surge of

19 Mark Ravina, "The Apocryphal Suicide of Saigō Takamori: Samurai, Seppuku, and the Politics of Legend," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 69, no. 3 (August 2010): 692.
20 Ibid., 716.

interest by attempting to forge both direct and indirect links between Red Cross humanitarianism and *bushidō.*

Many of those links were apparent in the official JRCS histories. The 1903 *Nihon Sekijūjisha enkakushi*, for example, began its section on the founding of the *Hakuaisha* with the claim: "The spirit of Red Cross work coincides with that of bushido."[21] The ideal of loyalty to one's lord, for one, appears both in the story of Sano's visit to Arisugawa, and also in the explanation of the rebel's worthiness of rescue. As a former samurai himself, these histories elevated Sano as a model for how Japanese people should transfer the loyalty they had felt towards their local lord during the Tokugawa period to the modern emperor of the whole nation. According to the new narrative, it was largely the deep devotion Sano felt towards the emperor and empress which compelled him to go to great lengths to carry out their humanitarian will.[22]

Similarly, the representation of Saigō and the Satsuma rebels underwent a change as JRCS writers began to use concepts from *bushidō* to describe their actions. This is most obvious in the creative translation of Sano and Ogyū's petition which appeared in Kawamata's 1919 *The History of the Red Cross Society of Japan.* As discussed earlier, the original petition described the Satsuma rebels as "people of the empire" and "children of the imperial house."[23] However, Kawamata or his unnamed translator took the liberty of adding the additional phrase "retainers of the same lord," to the description in 1919.[24] This wording created the impression that the Satsuma rebels also embodied the positive

21 Hakuaisha, *Nihon Sekijūjisha enkakushi*, 131.
22 Nihon Sekijūjisha, *Nihon Sekijūjisha shashikō*, 90; Kawamata, *The History of the Red Cross Society of Japan,* 32-33;
23 Hakuaisha*,* "Kessha oyobi shomu kankei shorui."
24 Kawamata, *The History of the Red Cross Society of Japan,* 34.

samurai virtue of loyalty applied in the modern context of imperial rule. The reassuring fiction that they were ultimately reconciled with the oligarchy through the humanitarian intervention of the imperial house erased the radical political and social challenge posed by the Satsuma rebellion.

Another key aspect of *bushidō* referenced in JRCS histories was respect for one's adversaries. Both *bushidō* and international humanitarian law provided rules for ensuring the humane treatment of belligerents at war. The Red Cross commitment to rescuing the sick and wounded regardless of whether they were friend or foe mirrored the "show of human sympathy" that the true samurai demonstrated by weeping at the death of a foe.[25] And as his biographer noted, Sano was said to have shed tears at the news of the Satsuma War.[26] For both the samurai and the humanitarian, war was only something to be carried out with reluctance and circumspection according to the dictate that "we should own as enemies in war only such as prove worthy of being friends in peace."[27]

Respect for one's adversaries thus related to another key value, sincerity. Sincerity implied a commitment to act based on an emotional, rather than purely reason-based engagement with the world. While it was possible to argue for the rationality of contributing to charitable causes such as Red Cross humanitarianism, for the most part writers did not try to explain JRCS history in those terms. Rather, the selflessness of Red Cross members could only be explained as a matter of deep compassion for the "miseries" of others[28] and what Soejima Taneomi called "good faith." In his 1901 article

25 Nitobe Inazō, *Bushido: the Soul of Japan: an Exposition of Japanese Thought*, tenth edition (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1906), 35.
26 Honma Rakukan, *Sano Tsunetami den: kaigun no senkaku nihon sekijujisha no chichi* [The life of Sano Tsunetami: pioneer of the navy, father of the Japanese Red Cross Society] (Tokyo: Jidaisha, 1943), 179.
27 Nitobe, *Bushido*, 35.
28 For examples, see Nihon Sekijūjisha, *Nihon Sekijūjisha shashikō*, 91; Kawamata, *The History of the Red Cross Society of Japan,* 32.

simply titled "Instruction," the former foreign minister and home minister Soejima lamented the loss of samurai sincerity among Japanese to readers of the *Journal of the Japanese Red Cross.* Calling the current generation "fussy" (*yakamashii*) he advocated the so-called return to moral education which "engraved values on the heart" directly rather than guiding conduct through reason.[29] Humanitarianism, like *bushidō*, was something which ought to be felt. For this reason Sano and his propensity to weep made an excellent analogue to Henri Dunant, who also stressed the importance of an emotional engagement with the work of humanitarian relief in circumstances which were often, in his words, "seizing on our sympathies and shaking all the most sensitive fibers of our being."[30]

Besides the references, subtle and direct, to *bushidō* in the official JRCS histories, articles on the topic began appearing frequently in the JRCS journals in the decades after the turn of the 20th century. Soejima was merely the first of many writers who used JRCS publications to air their views on the nature and importance of Japan's warrior virtues. In accord with the nature of the JRCS as part of an international organization, these articles tended to seek out parallels between *bushidō* and warrior ethea in other times and places. An eight-article series in 1909-1910 by the literature professor Seikan Gakuto provocatively titled "Ancient Roman Bushidō" exemplified this tendency. Seikan argued that Japanese warrior virtues were analogous to the Stoic thought of Seneca, and thus deserved scholarly treatment as a serious philosophical system.[31] As was the case with

29 Soejima Taneomi, "Kyōdō" [Instruction], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 103 (October 15, 1901): 2-5.

30 Jean-Henry Dunant, *A Memory of Solferino* (reprinted on the International Committee of the Red Cross website, 1986. http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/p0361 (accessed October 10, 2010)), 73-74.

31 Seikan Gakuto, "Ko roma no bushidō" [Ancient Roman bushido"], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 264 (October 5, 1909): 26-27.

Nitobe Inazō and his famous English-language book *Bushido: the Soul of Japan*, knowledge of Western European "traditions" of humanitarianism, Christianity, as well as Greek and Roman philosophy prompted writers in Japan to try to identify similar forms in their own pasts.

This comparative international perspective on understanding *bushidō* came with a danger, however. The closer one looked at foreign examples and attempted to enumerate the elements constituting *bushidō* as a unified system of thought, the more one came to realize that there was nothing unique about the so-called unique Japanese samurai virtues. Writing in the December 1910 issue of the *Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*, Yuhara Motoichi challenged his readers with exactly this problem: "If one were to simply make analytical list of virtues and tell everyone that this is *bushidō*, then *bushidō* would be by no means particular to Japan." Drawing on examples from both China and Western Europe, Yuhara argued that loyalty and filial piety, valor, chivalry, and the disregard for one's own life that were characteristic of *bushidō* were common in all kinds of foreign legends, popular stories, and official histories. Despite the mass of texts claiming otherwise, the nature of *bushidō* as a system of Japanese national morality could not be found in the obvious places.[32]

To attempt to resolve the aporia of the universality of *bushidō's* values and its particularity as the essence of Japaneseness, Yuhara resorted to the classificatory metaphor of fish.

> Even though they are both the same variety of fish, sea breams from the inland sea taste completely different from those from open seas. . . . Japanese *bushidō* is the same. China and the West have *bushidō*, but when

32 Yuhara Motoichi, "Bushidō no shumi" [Flavors of bushido], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 278 (December 5, 1910): 22.

> we compare those examples similarities and differences appear. This is to say that the flavor of Japanese *bushidō* is different from Chinese or Western *bushidō*.[33]

In other words, while the surface appearance of the various systems of martial virtue seemed similar, a deeper analysis was required to discern the particularity of the Japanese case. Since the content of this national ideology was difficult to define in straightforward, positive terms, Yuhara's use of the categories of surface and depth provided a means to supplemented it with a description of what Japanese *bushidō* was not. It was definitely not Chinese nor Western *bushidō.*

To finally describe the unique content of Japanese *bushidō*, Yuhara ends up invoking a number of additional categories which further elaborated on the concept of sincerity. However, in their vagueness they ultimately failed to address the difficult question of uniqueness he had posed in a convincing manner. Yuhara claimed that Japan's *bushidō* was unique in demanding the avoidance of "uncleanliness" and "ugliness." Furthermore it was about loving the "splendid" and the "pure." He wrote: "What does the warrior find most disagreeable? It is uncleanliness and vulgar conduct."[34] To summarize Yuhara's analysis, a deeper core of aesthetic sensibility lay beneath the surface qualities of loyalty, chivalry, and valor in *bushidō.* The love of the splendid and the pure accounted for the warrior's other-worldly orientation; his disregard for money, his rejection of comfortable living, and his righteous confidence. Ultimately it was these values which Yuhara and the other nationalist ideologues found most important for sustaining imperial expansion and national vigor. *Bushidō* made worldly sacrifice into a national tradition. Although it was still unclear how this differed from moral philosophies of other societies,

33 Ibid., 23.
34 Ibid., 24.

for Yuhara it was a matter of faith that the Japanese aesthetic sense grounded a unique national morality sufficient for success in the competitive international order.[35]

The JRCS supported the efforts of writers such as Yuhara because the maintenance of a large relief organization also demanded a great deal of voluntary sacrifice on the part of its subscriber-members. As a monthly feature of the JRCS journals the Society made positive examples out of members who had contributed significantly despite facing difficult financial circumstances in their own lives. With names such as "Flowers of Sincerity," "Beautiful Stories," and "Spirit Brocade" the monthly columns made a virtue out of the disregard for wealth by recounting stories of families in financial difficulty who had still managed to make donations to the Red Cross.[36] As the name "Spirit Brocade" suggested, although they could never afford to wear real brocade, in spirit these humble JRCS members were every bit the equal of the wealthy nobles with photos gracing the pages of the journal in elegant and expensive garb. In one example the JRCS journal editors praised Komatsuzaki Harunosuke, who:

> lived in Ibaraki prefecture, Nihiharu District, Sekikaha Village. He had an innate disposition that was deeply charitable and had an abundantly chivalrous spirit. So that there was never any spare cash in the family. Levity was prohibited and frugal diligence encouraged. Any saved money he gave to charity, public enterprises and other commendable activities. This makes him an exemplar.[37]

Describing Komatsuzaki as "abundantly chivalrous" made him more than a simply a diligent and industrious man. It made him the embodiment of the new warrior spirit applied to the realities of everyday life.

35 Ibid.

36 For examples, see Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Sekishin no hana: no Arima Sōgorō shi" [Flower of sincerity: farmer Arima Sōgorō], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 103 (October 15, 1901): 30-36; Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Kokoro nishiki" [spirit brocade], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 123 (June 15, 1903): 21-23.

37 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Kokoro nishiki," 21-22.

Nationalist ideologues thus found the JRCS supportive of attempts to apply so-called martial virtues of the samurai to the conduct of everyday life. Humanitarianism complemented *bushidō* as a way to encourage ever greater sacrifices by ordinary people for the sake of the empire. The novelist and playwright Yanagawa Shunyō effectively captured the trajectory of *bushidō* from the empire's battlefields to its businesses and homes in his article for the *Journal of the Japanese Red Cross* in 1910 titled "Ordinary Bushido." Here he observed that although a great deal of ink had been used explaining how *bushidō* accounted for the empire's recent military successes, most had missed the fact that "its practice is no means limited to war." Instead, he argued that *bushidō* applied to "any class, any occupation, . . . business, manufacturing, men, women." He called it a "family-state morality" composed of two main elements; integrity and modesty. In other words, "from now on *bushidō* should not only appear in times of emergency but must be carried out in ordinary conduct."[38] This deliberate widening of the scope of *bushidō* from war to peace mirrored the narrative of the samurai class itself, which historians argued had transformed from warriors to bureaucratic functionaries during the peaceful years of Tokugawa rule.

Through its contributions to the creation of the moral tradition of *bushidō* the JRCS made humanitarianism a part of the official nationalism of modern Japan. Much like the donations to the veterans relief funds which proliferated at the time of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), the contributions of ordinary people to the JRCS provided nationalist ideologues with examples to demonstrate proper Japanese behavior. As historian Saya Makito relates about "Beautiful Stories" of charitable donations by the

38 Yanagawa Shunyō, "Heiso no bushidō" [Ordinary bushidō], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 275 (September 5, 1910): 17-18.

poor which were published in newspapers at the time:

> the most important information . . . conveyed through such stories—regardless of how much credence one places in their truthfulness—was the image that patriotic fervor and a belief in the sacrifice for 'the sake of the nation' had trickled down to the most humble levels of the population.[39]

According to the new national ethos of *bushidō*, a mutual commitment toward humanitarianism and charitable work connected the imperial family to all of the people of Japan. By elevating the figures of Saigō Takamori and Sano Tsunetami as paragons of loyalty, chivalry, sincerity, and self-sacrifice, the new JRCS histories worked to bolster the image of a Japanese people unified with their emperor in a humanitarian national tradition.

Humanism and Imperialism

Despite the emphasis on peacetime applications of warrior virtues, we must not forget that the modern ideology of *bushidō,* along with its partner Red Cross humanitarianism, advanced a new, aggressively imperialistic concept of the national community. While it was not always stated so openly in the JRCS histories, the historical rehabilitation of Saigō and the Satsuma rebels entailed the reopening of the question which led to his initial break with the dominant faction of leaders in 1873. That question was the *seikanron*, the debate over whether or not to attack Korea for an alleged diplomatic slight against the Japanese emperor. By pardoning Saigō in 1889, remembering the humanitarian aid extended to his wounded soldiers, and recasting him as a paragon of warrior virtue, the state and its ideologues also necessarily reintegrated

39 Saya Makito, *The Sino-Japanese War: and the Birth of Japanese Nationalism*, trans. David Noble (Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2011), 101.

Saigō's desire for Japanese military action on the East Asian continent into the dominant national narrative. It became a simple matter of timing. In 1873 Saigō was wrong to push for imperial expansion, but by the 1900s Japan's wartime victories and aggressive acquisition of overseas territories became evidence that Saigō's was simply ahead of his time. This way of remembering the Satsuma War within the narrative of empire made Saigō's plans for conquest into a harbinger of Japan's expansive future.

One group of nationalistic writers who strongly embraced the humanitarian rehabilitation of the Satsuma rebels were the right-wing ideologues associated with the *Genyōsha* (Dark Ocean Society) and the *Kokuryūkai* (Black Dragon Society). These secret societies exemplified a line of anti-oligarchic nationalism which combined a humanistic concern for popular rights with the advocacy of aggressive Japanese imperialism. The *Genyōsha*, for example, sought to realize both "freedom and popular rights" *(jiyūminken)* and "nationalism" (*kokkashugi*).[40] It proclaimed as its goals "to revere the emperor, to love and respect the nation, to defend the people's rights."[41] Seeking to capitalize upon the renewed interest in Satsuma War history in the first decade of the 1900s, right-wing historians were quick to trace their political ancestry to Saigō via the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement of the 1880s.

Since the new narrative of the founding of the JRCS showcased the episode in which Sano and Ogyū had to circumvent the authority of the Meiji bureaucrats and appeal directly to Prince Arisugawa, it put the Red Cross into an odd kinship with the far

40 Unno Hiroshi, *Himitsu kessha no Nihon shi* [Secret societies in Japanese history] (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2007), 189.

41 E. Herbert Norman, "The Genyōsha: A Study in the Origins of Japanese Imperialism," *Pacific Affairs* 17 (September, 1944): 261-284. Reprinted in *The Japan Reader, vol 1: Imperial Japan, 1800-1945*, ed. Jon Livingston, Joe Moore, and Felicia Oldfather, 355-367 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), 357.

right organizations which opposed the Meiji oligarchy. Both used humanistic premises and representations of the benevolent concern of the imperial family to ground programs of political advocacy. Like the humanitarians' assertion that the state ought to sponsor battlefield relief for wounded rebels as "children of the imperial house," anti-government resistance movements of the 1870s and 1880s used the idea of popular rights to justify their opposition to the state's social reform policies. In this way the JRCS was akin to the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement's *Jiyūto* (Liberal Party). Both existed outside of the formal bounds of the state, but sought to introduce a calculus of human life and death into the guiding principles of imperial rule. They aimed to restrict the regime's use of state institutions, such as the army and police, to carry out violence. At the same time they appealed to the shared humanity of rulers and ruled to guide the creation of state policy.

In 1914 Matono Hansuke, owner of the newspaper Kyushu Daily Report (*Kyushu Nippo*), lower house Diet representative of the *Jiyūto* (Liberal Party), and leading member of the *Genyōsha*,[42] published his biography of Etō Shimpei. This work effectively captured the coexistence of humanism and militarism in the history of right wing opposition to the government. Like Saigō Takamori, Etō Shimpei was a leader in the Restoration but left government service due to his disagreement with the dominant faction's decision not to attack Korea in 1873. Returning to his native home in Saga prefecture, Etō joined a movement of former samurai who attacked government offices on February 16, 1874 in an attempt to roll back the new regime's progressive reforms and push forward a punitive attack on Korea. This came to be called the Saga Incident (*Saga*

42 Ibid., 365.

jiken). Matono's biography recounted in detail the events leading up to the revolt, the overwhelming military response ending it, and the subsequent trials and executions of Etō and his allies. Whereas nationalist writers reworked Saigō into an exemplar of *bushidō*, however, Matono cast Etō as a martyr for liberal humanism.

Although it bore directly upon the subsequent history of the Satsuma War, the story of the Saga incident did not appear in the official JRCS histories except in passing. As a fellow Saga native, Etō's fate was certainly on Sano Tsunetami's mind as he formulated his plans for a humanitarian intervention in the Satsuma War three years later.[43] Etō exemplified the use humanistic principles—human rights, in his case—to establish limits on executive or bureaucratic state authority and hold Meiji leaders accountable to the judiciary. This also entailed regulating the state's power to use violence. At the same time he also identified with the plight of former samurai and pushed for aggressive imperial expansion. The many parallels between Etō's story and the new narrative of the JRCS makes the absence of the former in the histories of the latter odd. By re-situating the Saga incident within the history of humanitarianism in Japan I hope to reckon with the unacknowledged debt owed by the *Hakuaisha* to Etō.

Etō's work as the minister of justice and councilor in the ministry of state (*daijōkan*) had made him an outspoken proponent of the concept of human rights in the reform of the Meiji state. The official narratives of the samurai uprisings of of the 1870s lumped Etō and Saigō together as representatives of "hotheaded" warmongering and "fanatical" samurai values while validating the policies of Ōkubo Toshimichi and the dominant faction as more restrained and deliberate in their approach to national

43 See Honma, *Sano Tsunetami den,* 164 for evidence of Sano's distress concerning the instigation and handling of the Saga Incident.

strengthening and foreign affairs.[44] In Matono's account, and that of contemporary historian Daniel Botsman, Etō Shimpei was no simple "hotheaded" reactionary. During his time leading the ministry of justice, he oversaw sweeping changes to prisons and attempted to create a judicial system which functioned on the principle of the separation of powers. Etō consistently championed Western legal reforms, including the writing of a civil code based on a French model.[45] His also had contentious relationships with the other Meiji oligarchs. As justice minister, he had initiated investigations of corrupt officials in the other ministries. These investigations uncovered incriminating evidence against members of Ōkubo's faction.[46] This is one of the reasons why Matono claims that Ōkubo's harsh prosecution of the Saga rebels took on the character of a personal grudge (*shifun*).[47]

Taken as a whole, it becomes apparent that Etō connected all of his projects together using the concept of rights. When he made claims for the legitimacy of the actions taken by his ministry, his government, or his fellow Saga insurgents, he invariably represented them as actions taken in defense of rights. For example, in 1872 he pressed for the prosecution of the captain of a Peruvian ship (the Maria Luz) carrying Chinese indentured servants for treating them inhumanely and violating their rights. Although the government's actions in this case angered Western countries, Etō justified

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44 Augustus H. Mounsey, *The Satsuma Rebellion: an Episode of Modern Japanese History*, (London: Jon Murray, 1879. Reprint, Washington D.C.: University Publications of America, 1979), 63. Secondary sources have also embraced this interpretation. See Richard Sims, *Japanese Political History since the Meiji Restoration, 1868-2000* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 37. For similar interpretations from the perspective of JRCS history see Yoshikawa, *Nisseki no sōshisha Sano Tsunetami*, 74-75; Checkland, *Humanitarianism and the Emperor's Japan*, 3.

45 Daniel V. Botsman, *Punishment and Power in the Making of Modern Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 152-4.

46 Donald Calman, *The Nature and Origins of Japanese Imperialism: A Reinterpretation of the Great Crisis of 1873* (London, New York: Routledge, 1992), 252-269.

47 Matono Hansuke, *Etō Nanpaku*, vols. 1 and 2 (Tokyo: Nanpaku Kenshōkai, 1914), 606.

them as humanitarian.[48] Likewise in 1872 Eto's justice ministry enacted the Emancipation Decree for Prostitutes, which banned all forms of "indefinite labor service" as coercive violations of the "right to freedom and autonomy."[49] He also established a law that gave citizens the right to sue officials in court. When speaking of administrative reform, he consistently did so with the goal of protecting rights and educating the nation's people about their rights.[50] Etō thus employed a rights-based paradigm of government to establish limits to state authority in a liberal political philosophical mode.

Along with this humanistic concern about establishing the proper bounds for state authority, Etō also deployed the language of national or sovereign rights in advocating war against Korea. His "Manifesto" penned on February 13, 1874, just three days before he and the other insurgents attacked the government offices in Saga, claimed that there was an intrinsic connection between sovereignty and civil rights:

> If national sovereignty is to be realized, it means to follow the ideals of civil rights and perfect them in practice. On this basis war and peace are decided and treaties for voyages of trade are made. If for even one day the nation loses its rights, it would result in a disadvantage to its people. Even now, here, there are those who spit on our nation. . . . Thereafter, even women and children will heap scorn upon it. In that way, we will become people whose civil rights are lost. Already Koreans rejected our country's diplomatic document and insulted our envoy. We suffered their overbearing attitude and lack of manners. From the Emperor above to the million-billion below, we received an unprecedented insult. Accordingly, the Imperial court decided on a policy of conquering Korea by force. Hearing this, there are none in the entire country who are not roused to action.[51]

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48 Igor R. Saveliev, "Rescuing the Prisoners of the Maria Luz: the Meiji Government and the 'Coolie Trade', 1868-75," in *Turning Points in Japanese History*, ed. Bert Edström (Richmond: Japan Library, 2002), 76.

49 Daniel V. Botsman, "Freedom without Slavery? 'Coolies,' Prostitutes, and Outcastes in Meiji Japan's 'Emancipation Moment,'" *The American Historical Review* 116.5 (December, 2011): 1323-1347.

50 Etō Shinpei, "Shihōshōsaku" [Justice ministry policy], in *Nanpaku Etō Shinpei iko, zenshū, ge* [Nanpaku Etō Shinpei posthumous manuscripts, vol 2], 49-50 (Tokyo: Yoshikawahanshichi, 1900).

51 Etō Shinpei, "Geki" [Manifesto], in *Nanpaku Etō Shinpei iko, zenshū, ge* [Nanpaku Etō Shinpei posthumous manuscripts, vol 2], 67-68 (Tokyo: Yoshikawahanshichi, 1900).

Although his reasoning is difficult to follow, first Etō connected sovereignty and civil rights through the mechanism of trade—if foreign nations failed to respect the rights of Japan as a nation, then the Japanese people would, as individuals, receive mistreatment in their economic dealings with foreigners. However, when he spoke of "heaping scorn upon the nation" Etō did not specify that he was referring to foreigners at all. The "women and children" he referred to were "here" (*koko*). His more immediate fear, it seems, was that the people living on the archipelago themselves would fail to honor the nation. More concretely, they would fail to respect the government and the laws which protected everyone's civil rights. In other words, Etō made the international situation important because of possible ramifications on the domestic situation.

It is doubtful that most ordinary people cared much about the diplomatic situation with Korea at that time and the idea of "the entire country . . . roused to action," was simply a rhetorical exaggeration by Etō. However, the dynamic between civil conflict and aggressive imperial policy, first identified here, underlay much of the empire's subsequent expansion. If we closely follow the implications of what Etō was claiming, we can see how he was making it important for the state to take punitive action against Korea in order to maintain domestic order. The *seikanron* debate was only the first time that a prominent figure argued that the turbulent social situation demanded external military aggression. The key point is that Etō's formulation and the later rhetoric surrounding the JRCS both contribute to our understanding of the histories of the social causes of imperialism. In time the Empire's oligarchs found foreign wars essential to the maintenance of their own power, since wars fostered a sense of national unity and

quelled, if only temporarily, the recalcitrance of the political parties in the Diet as well as ordinary people who had been shut out of the political process. As Frederick Dickenson observes, Yamagata Aritomo and the other imperial military leaders found their plans for expanding the army and navy repeatedly stymied by budget restrictions imposed by the Diet in the years following the Russo-Japanese War. The "corrosive effects of peace" included demands for lower taxes and fiscal restraint, increased franchise, and the inclusion of elected politicians at the highest levels of decision making.[52]

Although the official histories portrayed the government's actions during the Saga Incident as a defensive response to the insurgent's attacks on February 16, the insurgents claimed that the were defending themselves against the government's soldiers dispatched the prior week. Either way, the outcome of the resulting battle was never in doubt. Severely outnumbered, the insurgency was forced into a guerrilla war after losing its first pitched battle with the ten-thousand strong imperial expeditionary force led by Ōkubo himself. By March 1st the imperial army had killed or captured the remaining insurgents and pacified Saga.[53]

Matono's biography best expressed the liberal humanist attack on Meiji authoritarianism in his description of the ensuing arrest, trial, and summary execution of Etō and his allies. The section of Etō's biography titled "The treatment of Etō and the misuse of juridical powers," outlined an incisive critique of the kind of state power that Ōkubo created when he declared martial law and invoked a state of exception to deal with the Saga insurgency. Since this critique aimed to establish limits on the capacity of

52 Dickenson, *War and National Reinvention*, 26-28.

53 Stephen Vlastos, "Oppositional Movements in Early Meiji, 1868-1885," in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, volume 5, ed. Marius B. Jansen, 267-431 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 389-390.

the state to commit violence, it contained a basic similarity with the Red Cross. Matono's narration of the Saga Incident and the history of the JRCS origins in the Satsuma War ran on a parallel trajectory. Both narratives entailed the recasting of modern Japanese history as a struggle to temper the coercive powers of the state so that they served the larger purpose of promoting the life, health, and prosperity of the nation.

First, Matono noted that the court which convened on April 8 to convict Etō was not a part of the ministry of justice proper, but was instead the creation of Home Minister Ōkubo. The government called it an "extraordinary court" (*rinji hōtei*), wherein Ōkubo's hand picked judges administered a law written that week by Ōkubo himself. Matono even pointed out that Ōkubo's diary showed him "drafting" that law on the night of the 8th:

> so the initial questioning was carried out without the final law. The court had already referenced parts of it that day. Not only is this is absolutely against legal principles, it easy to see that this was an absurd injustice which went against common sense. . . . Given the reality that there is no way that such a bill could be completed during nighttime conferences for two to three hours a day after hearings, that there even was a bill prior to the commencement of the Etō's hearing can only be a matter of conjecture.[54]

Essentially Ōkubo rewrote the law in the middle of the trial. In this way Motono argued that the judiciary became "the arbitrary tool for the atrocities of despots."[55]

Motono continued by further lamenting the breakdown of the separation of powers:

> The use of the extraordinary court was definitely a loss for the judicial authorities. . . . [The government] relied entirely on the administrative official Home Minister Ōkubo, while also suppressing the power of the judiciary. *Juridical powers are sacred. When they are made to be one part —an appendage of—executive power, it is regrettable* (emphasis in

54 Matono, *Etō Nanpaku*, 605.
55 Ibid., 606.

original).[56]

Etō, Motono, and the writers for the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement in general advocated the separation of powers, especially judicial power, as a necessary precondition for rights. By definition only an independent judiciary could adequately defend people's rights against government abuses. Recently Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin have argued that the expansion of executive authority is a necessary part of "the modernization of society and the need for governmental involvement in an ever-growing number of areas of human activity." Even so, they recognize that historically such expansions have occurred largely during crises, when people seem willing to sacrifice democratic checks and balances for the sake of immediate government action.[57] Once enlarged through emergency powers, however, executive authority more often remains enlarged even after the emergency is over.

In the case of Meiji Japan, by blurring of the categories of state power the extraordinary court produced a legal aporia. Matono grasped this fact eloquently when he noted that, in contrast to the treatment of the Tokugawa loyalists following the Boshin civil war:

> [Etō] Nanpaku and his allies alone were treated using a law outside of the law. . . . Consequently the name was designated 'extraordinary court,' without any substance of a court at all.[58]

This "law outside of the law," this court "without any substance of a court," provided the most visible manifestation of an ambiguous legal zone created by the crisis-induced state of exception. The law called for the suspension of its own operation in order to put a new,

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56 Ibid., 607.

57 Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, *Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 8.

58 Matono, *Etō Nanpaku*, 609-10.

extra-legal law into operation. In a confusing and paradoxical way, the court's decisions were thus simultaneously legal and illegal. The government sought to enact a law to manage the necessities of the moment, the facts of insurgency, precisely through the legal aporia constituted through this state of exception. Stated differently, the application of the law required something that the law, as a universal rule, itself could never provide—a decision on its own applicability in any particular case. The decisions of the extraordinary court provided the appearance of due process, deflecting attention away from the fact that Ōkubo had already made the crucial decision, the executive decision, to suspend the law for Etō's case.[59]

For Matono, this legal aporia had a very particular historical meaning. Ōkubo created the extraordinary court according to "emergency martial law powers" (*gunhoutekihijouken*), which Matono likened to "using a militaristic apparatus" (*budanteki kikai*).[60] He found this combination of political and military rationales for government repugnant precisely because it hearkened back to the Tokugawa shogunate, when warriors ruled using an all-encompassing martial law. The extraordinary court represented a serious regression. It meant turning back the clock of civilization and returning to the barbarous past.

> Concerning the law in effect in our country at that time, as justice minister Etō had compiled a new, unified law code in December of 1871 . . . and it was a considerable advancement. . . . Since the Meiji Restoration Japan had been steadily progressing towards civilization, but with this Saga incident it disgracefully regressed back to the former state of affairs—to a despotic government. The Saga incident ultimately marked our history with a stain which can never be wiped away.[61]

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59 The situation strongly resembled those described in Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

60 Matono, *Etō Nanpaku*, 609.

61 Ibid., 606-7.

The “former state of affairs” meant that a military administration held undifferentiated state powers, making it “despotic.” By contrast the differentiation and specification of powers made modern, civilized governments democratic. History was supposed to move from the former towards the latter, but the Saga incident had proven otherwise. Matono condemned Ōkubo since: “Committing these illegalities poisoned the people's morals and sentiments, creating a problem that the government will be dealing with for eternity.”[62] They had left a “stain” on Japan's otherwise laudable advancement in the adoption of modern legal practices.

The court's punishment seemed deliberately chosen to reinforce this correlation between the state of exception and past warrior rule. After a summary two-day trial, they executed Etō by decapitation and left his head exposed on a stake. This was the harshest, most demeaning, most infamous punishment carried out under the former legal system of the Tokugawa shogunate. In a gruesome gesture Ōkubo arranged for Etō's head to be photographed and prints made available for sale and put on display in cities and towns across the islands.[63] Matono condemned these actions in the strongest terms.

> The barbarism of the government which I am referring to here was the photographing of Etō's exposed head and the sale of those pictures publicly in towns. It was not enough that the government already dealt with him using a terrible punishment outside of the law. I can only say that the extreme inhumanity of this atrocious act of photoing of the severed head and selling it exceeds the capacity of words to describe.[64]

Again, Matono stressed the extra-legal nature of the legal proceedings. In addition, he used this episode to restate Freedom and Popular Rights activist's use of the the concept

62 Matono, *Etō Nanpaku*, 614.
63 Botsman, *Power and Punishment*, 163-4.
64 Matono, *Etō Nanpaku*, 611-2.

of humanity to critique the oligarchic Meiji state. By calling its actions "inhuman," Matono rendered the government as a kind of alien power which imposed its retrogressive "barbarism" on the common people. Since language, or "words," the epitome of shared human capacity, proved insufficient to grasp the reality of the government's "barbarism," this interpretation forced a wedge between the "inhuman" government and the people. For Matono and the Freedom and Popular Rights activists, anyone who could conceive of committing such an act—an act which defied humanity's common capacity for language—must indeed be something other than human. The meaning of Etō's execution thus directly challenged the justness of Meiji oligarchic rule. Matono rejected the idea that "setting a precedent" should override the humane treatment of Etō and his allies. By decrying Etō's execution as "offering up a sacrifice" (*gisei ni kyōshitaru*) in such a negative way Matono tried to reassert the sacredness of life and the need to respect the dead. For Matono: "The gruesome punishment of exposing severed heads was simply unbelievable."[65]

In sum, by invoking the image of Etō's bloody head making a "stain" on Japanese history, Matono exemplified the liberal critique of the Meiji state's unrestrained capacity for violence. Like the humanitarianism of Sano and Ogyū, the human rights-based discourse of Etō Shimpei, as well as the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement and the right-wing societies which followed all advocate a humanistic politics which prioritized the individual and collective lives of the nation as the highest moral value and the main object of governance. Henceforth politics itself came to revolve around questions of how to best ensure the continuing "life" of the nation. As with Etō, the later participants in

65 Ibid., 608-9.

imperial politics often answered such questions by preaching the virtues of foreign policies which aggressively advanced Japanese interests in East Asia or outright militarism.

Opinion Podiums and Outrage

Concomitant with the rewriting of the narrative of JRCS history in the first decades of the 20th century ran a monthly feature in the JRCS journals, called "*Rondan*," meaning "opinion podium," where writers could submit op-ed pieces for publication. The editors also included recurring sections called "Story-telling," (*kōdan*) and "Exemplum" (*kunwa*) where contributors regaled readers with tales of bravery or moral rectitude. Since the new history of the JRCS explained that the Society originated in what was essentially an effort by private citizens (or officials acting outside of their authorized capacities) to alter state policy, the idea of the "opinion podium" symbolized the story of the entire movement. Both implied the creation (or reproduction) of a public sphere of discussion wherein individuals freely carried out what Foucault called liberalism as a "form of critical reflection on governmental practice."[66]

A typical example of the way that bureaucrats, educators, monks, doctors, and military officers took advantage of the journal's function as an opinion podium was public law specialist Kakei Katsuhiko's article "The National Polity of the Empire" ("Teikoku no kokutai") in the January, 1914 issue of *Hakuai*. He proclaimed:

66 Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-1979*, trans. G. Burchell (Basingstroke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 321-322. For an explanation of this quote and the importance of liberalism to the application of biopolitical logic in the creation of a "a public sphere that reflects about governmental practices, inquires into their pros and cons, and criticizes their possible excesses" see Thomas Lemke, "Beyond Foucault: From Biopolitics to the Government of Life," in *Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges*, ed. Ulrich Bröckling, Susanne Krasmann, and Thomas Lemke, 165-184 (New York: Routledge, 2011), 176.

> The national polity of the empire means living according to the principle of the kind and peaceful spirit which exists in each individual's inborn nature. . . . [It means that] people high and low will come to have mutual love and respect. Guided by our trust in each other at last we will be exalted in essence as one in body and soul. From the first, the people of the empire were born sharing in this national polity. Consequently from the first they were without selfish motives and they made a strenuous effort to ground it in the principle of great love. To speak of great love is to speak of philanthropy (*hakuai*). It is the same as the spirit of the Red Cross.[67]

From Kakei's deeply humanistic perspective Red Cross members exemplified the kind of self-disciplined approach to social life necessary for individuals to sustain a national community. The Red Cross was no different from the national polity because it encouraged trust, unselfishness, and "great love." Kakei explained that each person's "kind and peaceful spirit" must moderate and control their "wild and violent spirit" in order for all to unite in "mutual love and respect."[68]

JRCS rhetoric associated humanitarianism with the nation so often that eventually most writers felt no need to directly justify using the JRCS journals as a medium to advocate their particular nationalistic agendas. Thus in 1919 home ministry section chief Nagata Hidejirō used *Hakuai* to publish his article decrying democratic thought as a temporary fad. He claimed that its advocates were "running wild" and "derailing" the nation by blindly adopting so-called democratic ideas into politics, law, economics, education, religion, and society. Nagata warned that unless the proper guidance of cooler heads prevailed, the eternal national polity of Japan would be lost in the ephemeral rush of vulgar populist democratization.[69]

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67 Kakei Katsuhiko, "Teikoku no kokutai" [The national polity of the empire], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 315 (January 10, 1914): 28.
68 Ibid.
69 Nagata Hidejirō, "Waga kokutai to demokurashii" [Democracy and our national polity], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 390 (October 10, 1919): 21.

Likewise in 1916 the historian and professor of literature Shiratori Kurakichi found the JRCS willing to publish on "Protecting the national polity and Western thought" ("*Kokutai yōgo to seiyō no shisō*"). Ostensibly the editors of *Hakuai* agreed with Shiratori's message concerning the need to prevent the so-called individualistic thought of the West from ruining Japan's beautiful custom of putting the family first. They must have assumed that Shiratori included the Red Cross in his category of beneficial Western ideas that did not contradict the national polity, even though he never explicitly said so. Indeed, like so many who wrote for the JRCS, Shiratori never addressed the question of why he specifically targeted Red Cross members with his nationalistic message. Delivered without any explanatory contextual comment, such articles made it seem natural to expound upon on the so-called essence of the national polity in a humanitarian organization constituted according to foreign models.[70]

Depending on the editorial policy in effect at the time, the "opinion podium" quality of the JRCS journals could also provide a space for barely-veiled criticism of the government's policies. Yamada Tokiyoshi's 1910 article titled "The charitable spirit of Koreans" ["Chosenjin no jiaishin"] was perhaps the best example of this. Yamada identified himself as an instructor in animal husbandry. On the surface his article addressed a typical topic in humanitarian literature—the humane treatment of animals. He began with the simple assertion that Koreans had a superior animal training ability because of their strong love for the animals in their care. Thus Korean horses, he claimed, were docile and easy to care for. Yamada quickly turned this into a scathing contrast with Japanese horses, which behaved violently and bit their Japanese handlers precisely

70 Shiratori Kurakichi, "Kokutai yōgo to seiyō no shisō" [Protecting the national polity and Western thought"], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 354 (January 10, 1916): 25-26.

because they were treated badly and unloved. He concluded bluntly:

> Recently in our country there are many who are measuring the improvement and development of cattle and horses by counting the propagation of good breeds. But at the risk of being insulting, instead of improving cattle and horses, I want to improve the cattle and horse handlers.[71]

Was this article simply about horses and horse handlers? Given the context of the time, it is difficult to imagine that journal readers would not have understood it more figuratively. Exactly one year earlier, in October 1909, a Korean nationalist had shot and killed the empire's highest colonial authority on the peninsula, Governor-General Itō Hirobumi. The assassination was an act of protest against Japan's annexation and military rule of Korea. To discuss Koreans, violence, and charity in this manner on the one year anniversary of the violent death of arguably the most powerful man in East Asia made for an unmistakably contentious statement. If readers took animal handling as a metaphor for colonial rule, then Yamada's condemnation of Japanese horse trainers voiced a clear humanitarian critique of the Japanese government's violent methods in Korea.

Yet Yamada did not repudiate the overall idea of colonial rule itself, only the particular Japanese practice of it. Love may have been an improvement over cruelty, but if the metaphor holds true then according to Yamada Koreans were still just horses in need of training. The humanitarian critique of empire did not call for democracy or respect for Japan's colonized peoples as sovereign political equals. Rather, it called for the perpetuation of Korean subjugation under colonial tutelage on a more humane basis. The “opinion podium” served the purpose of encouraging debate within safe limits which did not challenge the wider logic of imperial humanitarianism.

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71 Yamada Tokiyoshi, “Chosenjin no jiaishin” [The charitable spirit of Koreans], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 276 (October 10, 1910): 16.

By asserting that imperial rule ought to accord with the principles of love, *bushidō* or other humanitarian ideals, and insisting on the free, voluntary nature of people's contributions to the nation via participation in the public sphere, the JRCS also contributed to opening up a space for critique which could easily be appropriated and used directly against the Society's leaders themselves. This critique took the form of a deeply moralizing counter-narrative to the official JRCS story. Grounded in a sense of outrage over cases where self-proclaimed humanitarians failed to live up to their own ideals, right-wing critics denounced the JRCS of the 1900s and 1910s as having been usurped by the oligarchy. They accused JRCS leaders of a wide range of acts of graft, perjury, and other forms of malfeasance as evidence that the organization no longer represented the ideal of the unity of the emperor and his people. Rather, the problems that they identified made the Society into a model for the selfish plundering of the nation's wealth at the hands of self-aggrandizing oligarchs. They made the JRCS leadership stand for the abusive bureaucratic state structure, while JRCS members were akin to the ordinary suffering people of the nation. Like Matono, they derided the lack of juridical independence and the compromised state of human rights enforcement in the empire.

Perhaps the most famous of these critics was Kita Ikki, the right-wing advocate of state socialism. In a striking section labeled “The blood tax and rights” (*chizei to kenri*), his 1906 book *The Theory of Japan's National Polity and Pure Socialism* offered homage to the suffering of conscript soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army during the Russo-Japanese War. Written to the soldiers, in the second person, it excoriated government officials who used their Red Cross positions frivolously.

With bandages leaking fresh blood only to uselessly fertilize the winter

> grass, have you a single grain of rights? In the shadow of the falling moonlight, you all remember your loving wives and children back home. While you stand in the outpost, the state minister, in the name of the Red Cross, goes hunting for prostitutes, taking the world as his playground. In front of the single grave marker where thousands of lives were simply left, you offer a flower from the field and shedding tears of farewell bravely salute with your fist.[72]

Here Kita aimed to incite moral outrage at the hypocrisy of the empire's officialdom. The state minister (likely implying Matsukata Masayoshi, JRCS president at the time) was part of the Red Cross, which claimed to carry out relief for soldiers on behalf of the nation. However those claims proved false, since "thousands of lives were simply left" on the battlefield. Worse, rather than working to address the soldiers' continuing suffering from their "bandages leaking fresh blood," the state minister instead wasted the nation's resources, using Red Cross money to support his habit of patronizing prostitutes. Kita wrote his description to convey a maximum sense of injustice toward the government's abuse of authority.

Right-wing muckraker Miki Rin similarly took the JRCS leadership to task in his 1916 book, *White Mice of the Japan Red Cross Society, or Peeling the Leek Skin*. Using a wide variety of crude insults and derogatory metaphors, he accused Vice President Baron Ozawa Takeo, "the schemer," of turning the JRCS into a corrupt "hotbed of demons" (*fukumaden*). Miki, the self-proclaimed "onigai sensei" ("master beyond the demons") expressed his extreme anger at Red Cross officials' betrayal of the nation's trust.[73]

In voicing his critique Miki took the position of a humanitarian himself, denouncing the JRCS leaders as false humanitarians.

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72 Kita Ikki, *Kokutairon oyobi junsei shakaishugi* [*The Theory of Japan's National Polity and Pure Socialism*] (1906), http://www7b.biglobe.ne.jp/~bokujin/shiryou1/kokutairon3.html, 390.

73 Miki Rin, *Nihon Sekijūjisha no shironezumi ichimei rakkyo u no kawamuki* [White mice of the Japan Red Cross Society, or peeling the leek skin] (Tokyo: Daijibō, 1916), 10, 14, 30.

> In particular, the officials of the Japanese Red Cross Society hang out the golden signboard of philanthropy and charity but do not conduct themselves in a philanthropic and charitable way. . . . When something happens that goes against the principles of the Red Cross, they do not even apologize.[74]

Finding that the Red Cross leaders failed to "conduct themselves" in the same manner that they tried to conduct others, Miki turned the ideology of humanitarian nationalism against its proponents. The logic of his accusations mirrored that of Kita Ikki. In the name of the royal family and the Japanese people Miki condemned the JRCS as part of a larger attack on the misgovernment of the empire's "bureaucratic cliques."[75]

Specifically, Miki charged officials with systemic graft, falsifying evidence, blasphemously disrespecting the Imperial family, and abusing the JRCS members. His "catalog" (*mokuroku*) of corruption listed twenty-three pages worth of incidents that roughly fell into the following categories; abuse of travel expenses, skimming Society funds, appropriating funds for personal uses, wasteful management decisions, accounting errors, deliberate accounting fraud, cronyism, constructing excessively ostentatious facilities, and speaking of the imperial military with disrespectful words.[76]

Miki also accused the Red Cross leaders of abusing the judicial system. He claimed that weak evidence brought against Ozawa's enemies stood up in court, while strong evidence against him failed.[77] He attributed this mainly to the failure of the courts to treat members of peerage in the same manner as commoners.

> Standing there in their splendid ornamentation they simply state their social status and position. Even if they have committed a crime, from the first their goodness is trusted too much. Whatever they may have done,

74 Ibid., 3.
75 Ibid., 10.
76 Ibid., 45-69.
77 Ibid., 23-24.

they cannot be prosecuted.[78]

Worse, Miki claimed to have suffered personally from Red Cross leaders' abuse of police authority.

> I had decided to exterminate the white mice of the Red Cross in 1913 and was writing the section of the book 'Peeling the Leek Skin' when right away the battle started. As soon as the shots began, things got unfortunate. I became suspected of committing extortion concerning the Red Cross Society and was put under house arrest for seven months in a rural town. Even though I was innocent from beginning to end, because of this my household was ruined.[79]

Like Matono Hansuke's portrayal of Etō Shimpei's life, Miki cast himself as a victim of an unjust system of rule by law. By assuming this position, Miki inverted the official humanitarian reading of imperial government, making the Red Cross Society into a cynical facade covering the abuse of bureaucratic authority and the peerage system. In other words, the peers leading the JRCS not only failed to adhere to their own professed humanitarian values, their false humanitarianism deliberately concealed the systemic violence required to maintain their rule.

Furthermore, Miki argued that these corrupt elites had rendered the press powerless to check such abuses. Citing cases in Europe and America when investigative journalists had brought powerful politicians to heel, Miki lamented the ineffectiveness of journalism in Japan.

> Motivated by the incident with Prof. Ueno, the Tokyo newspapers lined up their brushes and attacked the internal crimes of the Red Cross Society. The *Mainichi*, *Yamato*, and *Mantō* newspapers let out a large battle cry, and it became a war for justice. However, while they were aiming, the enemy, the white mice ring leaders of the Red Cross Society had already changed the face of the leek skin. Nonchalantly, without feeling the least bit of anguish, they somehow retained their current position. In this way

78 Ibid., 16.
79 Ibid., 13.

> not only did the authority of newspapers disappear, those men became more and more arrogant in their crimes.[80]

Miki's argument operated according to the liberal-democratic assumption that the freedom of the press was an essential check on the tyranny of bureaucratic authority. Compromised by the inability for the judicial system to guarantee such fundamental rights, journalists were unable to perform this essential role. In this way criticisms of the JRCS implicated the entire state system. In critics' minds, the JRCS served as a synecdoche for the nation suffering under an oppressive bureaucratic-administrative regime.

Criticism against the JRCS from the radical right thus upheld the principle of the emperor-led humanitarian nation, but disagreed with its actual implementation and the choice of leaders. Writers like Kita Ikki and Miki Rin attempted to claim the humanitarian high ground by exposing the corruption of JRCS presidents and vice-presidents such as Matsukata Masayoshi and Ozawa Takeo. According to their reasoning, nothing could be further from humanitarian sensibilities than betraying the public's trust by using charitable donations for self-enrichment. They advanced a deeply moralizing mode of critique that operated through the logic of creating outrage through the exposure of misdeeds. The shocking language used by these authors complemented perfectly their strategy of shocking their readers with stories of official malfeasance. These stories constituted yet another rewriting of JRCS history. They countered the narrative of Sano's righteous defense of humanitarian principles against the Meiji oligarchy with a narrative of the organization's corruption and fall under oligarchical authority.

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80 Ibid., 145-6.

Conclusion

When official JRCS historians integrated the Satsuma Rebellion into narratives of Japanese humanitarianism they effectively recast it as a reassuring fratricide. As the context for a heroic act of compassion—the founding of the *Hakuaisha*—the civil war became infused with new political significance. The story of the timely intervention of the imperial family and Sano Tsunetami's loyal service rendered the Satsuma rebels as human lives worthy of rescue. Regardless of their disagreements with the current government, Saigo Takamori and his followers deserved humane treatment as they, too, embodied the martial spirit of the Japanese nation. Official JRCS history writers made the Society into an ideological quasi-state apparatus by promoting the idea that all Japanese had been reconciled under benevolent imperial rule through a shared culture of humanitarian *bushidō*. They thus invoked the spectacle of the rebels' suffering bodies to suture the splits in the national body created by the violence of civil war.

As such, this humanitarian recuperation of the Satsuma rebels served to articulate the concept of the Japanese nation as a singular, undifferentiated population united under the emperor. The typical humanitarian commitment to maintaining a neutral, a-political stance towards war relief entailed the erasure of the deep political differences underlying the conflict as well as the radical alternative social configurations that the revolt made possible to imagine. JRCS history was most definitely history “written by the winners” in that it reinforced the grand narrative of Japan having become a successful industrial capitalist nation-state under a strong administrative-bureaucratic government. The many revolts, civil wars, and anti-government “incidents” of the 1870s and 1880s were rendered as temporary fights among siblings who would eventually be reconciled through

the forgiveness of the imperial family. Humanitarianism and nationalism strongly complemented each other in the continuing discourse on the history of the Japanese empire.

These research findings challenge the conclusions of contemporary scholars who treat the JRCS fusion of humanitarianism and nationalism as an aberration or defect. Olive Checkland, for example, in seeking to explain the empire's atrocities during the Asia-Pacific War writes that in the 1930s: “the JRC was increasingly brought under military control, . . . [and] the humanitarian traditions which Japan had painstakingly established over sixty years of international endeavor were cast aside.”[81] For both Kurosawa Fumitaka and Kosuge Nobuko, this apparent weakness stemmed from precisely the fact that Sano Tsunetami and Ogyū Yuzuru established the *Hakuaisha* during a civil war, rather than a war with a foreign nation. Kosuge argues that: “rather than honoring international law, humanitarianism in civil war was more a factor in pressing for reconciliation between winners and losers.”[82] The common assumption is that the universalism inherent in the Red Cross injunction to rescue sick and wounded soldiers without discrimination towards friend or foe could not coexist with strong nationalist sentiments. In short, according to the generally accepted wisdom, the irreconcilable contradiction between humanitarianism and nationalism, or universalism and particularism, weakened Japanese respect for international law and turned the idea of

81 Checkland, *Humanitarianism and the Emperor's Japan*, 90. For other similar assessments of JRCS history see Hutchinson, *Champions of Charity*, 207-8; Kosuge, “The 'non-religious' red cross emblem and Japan,” 79-80; Kosuge, “Religion, the Red Cross, and Japanese Treatment of POWs,” 152-3; Kawaguchi, *Jūgun kangofu to Nihon Sekijūjisha*, 291-8.

82 Nobuko Margaret Kosuge, “Hakuaisha kara nihon sekijyūjisha e” [From the Hakuaisha to the Japanese Red Cross Society], in *Nihon sekijyūjisha to jindō enjo* [*The History of the Japanese Red Cross Society and Humanitarian Assistance*], ed. Kurosawa Fujitaka and Kawai Toshinobu, 39-64 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2009), 40; Kurosawa, “Kindai nihon to sekijūji,” 17-23.

conducting war in a humane manner into a mere facade, a tool for imperialists in the bureaucracy and military to advance their agenda.

Instead, the narrative which emerged out of the first major spurt of official JRCS history writing in the first two decades of the 20th century shows that humanitarianism and a nationalism shared a common conceptual foundation. They both depended upon the same concept of the nation as an undifferentiated population of vulnerable bodies. The humanitarian commitment to relieving suffering regardless of the political affiliation of the victim reinforced modern strategies of government which sought to render individuals as a-political beneficiaries of policies which ensured health, life, and prosperity. By insisting on the deep significance of the humanitarian efforts of Sano Tsunetami and Ogyū Yuzuru as loyal servants of the imperial house during the Satsuma War, historians of the JRCS neutralized the challenges posed by radically different conceptions of what Japan ought to become. Turning the Satsuma War into the origin of Japanese humanitarianism they effectively effaced the radical differences between the dominant ideology of Meiji "civilization and enlightenment" and alternative social and political orders articulated through struggles for local autonomy.

Having adopted the humanitarian high ground, however, state officials and their history writers became vulnerable to moralizing critiques which challenged their credentials as exemplars of humanity, justice, and sincerity. In particular, right-wing nationalist historians fought against the official JRCS histories by insisting that their readers remember the brutal acts of violence carried out by the state against its opponents during the years of civil uprisings. Furthermore, critics used the JRCS to point out incidents of corruption by the oligarchy in the attempt to discredit and unseat them as the

premier servants of the imperial house. Accordingly, the meaning of the JRCS and its history proved a heavily contested subject in imperial Japan.

Figure 1.1. *Nihonsekijūjisha daijūichikai sōkai oyobi sōritsu nijūgonenki shukuten shikijō no e* (Picture of the Japanese Red Cross Society Eleventh General Meeting and the 25th Anniversary Commemorative Celebration Hall). Photo by Yamamoto Seiyō, *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 116 (November, 1902). Courtesy of the Japanese Red Cross Society.



Figure 1.2. *Dō shikijō kōgōheika gogyōkei gotsūkōmon no e* (Picture of the gate for the passage of the empress to attend at the celebration hall). Photo by Yamamoto Seiyō, *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 116 (November, 1902). Courtesy of the Japanese Red Cross Society.

Figure 1.3. *Arisugawa sōtokumiya hakuaisha sōritsu gokyoka* [Arisugawa's Permission to Establish the Hakuaisha at the Governor's Mansion]. Artist unknown, courtesy of the Japanese Red Cross Society.

Chapter 2

Civilized and Humanitarian Wars

the Red Cross and Military Administration in International Law

> The doctrines of humanity, Philanthropy and brotherhood were taught by Confucius, but never before had they been understood by the Chinese, upon the whole, till they came to witness what our Society did in relieving the sick and wounded of both belligerents in the Sino-Japanese war, the Boxer Trouble, and the late [Russo-Japanese] war. . . . There is no question that the Red Cross will be one of the mediums to enlighten the Chinese, and this is the primary object of our Society so far as China and Korea are concerned.
>
> --Baron Ozawa Takeo, *The Red Cross in the Far East,*1907

> When a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military opponents.
>
> --Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology*

Common sense understandings of humanitarianism tend to situate it in opposition to militarism and more in alignment with peace movements. According to this assumption, for example, the Nobel Committee justified its selection of Red Cross founder Henri Dunant for the Peace Prize in 1901, as well as its decision to award the prize to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) twice for war relief work in 1918 and 1944. Indeed, this common sense notion of humanitarianism has been reinforced in Nicholas Berry's recent book on the ICRC which argues that abolishing war is the "unstated mission" of the Red Cross movement.[1]

No wonder humanitarians and their supporters have recently been thrown into a state of deep uncertainty to learn that their relief efforts in places such as Rwanda and

1 Nicholas O. Berry, *War and the Red Cross: The Unspoken Mission* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

Bosnia during the 1990s actually served to prolong and worsen violence in these areas.[2] Furthermore, some humanitarians and their supporters have come to strongly lament policymakers' uses of humanitarianism to describe military deployments in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Critics such as journalist David Rieff argue that some of the blame rests with humanitarian NGOs themselves, who began to call for, and rely upon, the military protection of the U.S. and the other European powers to carry out relief and aid activities. Nevertheless, he expresses outrage at the Bush administration's "high moralizing rhetoric" since the so-called "humanitarian wars" have been themselves responsible for humanitarian crises and deaths. While he does not deny the need for war, Rieff condemns the notion that one can justify war as "taking lives to save lives." He writes: "Humanitarian war should be seen as a contradiction in terms, not an increasingly sought-after 'solution' to the ills of the world."[3]

This chapter seeks to further develop the critique of the notion of humanitarian war by following its use by Japanese imperialists. Not only did writers and artists use the language and imagery of humanitarianism to justify the forceful expansion of the Japanese empire, but the concrete, practical activities of the JRCS helped sustain the fighting capacity of the imperial army and navy during the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), World War I (1914-18), the Siberian Intervention (1918-22), and the fifteen year Asia-Pacific War (1931-45). Seen in this light, the application of the Geneva and Hague Conventions in the empire's wars was less a pacifistic attempt to limit violence outright, and more about managing violence,

2 Barnett, *Empire of Humanity*, 178, 183; Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security* (London: Zed Books, 2001), 5, 107.
3 Rieff, *A Bed for the Night*, 204, 258.

disciplining it to more efficiently serve the needs of the state. The JRCS was not the only humanitarian organization to function this way. It was only, perhaps, the most successful. As John Hutchinson argues, in the first two decades of the 20th century the JRCS provided a ready model for many other states, such as the U.S. and Great Britain, that sought to create a similar "flourishing national enterprise dedicated to supporting military aggression and territorial expansion."[4]

Rieff's outrage about the combination of humanitarianism and militarism in foreign policy statements of the major world powers today is justified. However, the many historical precedents in which this pair coexisted quite easily deserve a more sustained analysis. It is easy to simply dismiss "humanitarian war" as mere propaganda for contemporary European and American states, as it was for imperial Japan. However its reappearance in the post-Cold War moment signals the continuity of underlying assumptions making it possible to justify military conquest in the interest of humanity. Why does the idea of "taking lives to save lives" continue to present such a powerful appeal to modern sensibilities?

There are many explanations for the willingness of ordinary people to endure personal hardship in support of states' wars of imperialism of the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. The economic rationales first given by Vladimir Lenin in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* showed how both the laborers and bourgeoisie of imperialistic nations benefited from the "superprofits" available through the exploitation of colonial labor.[5] Recent work by Ken Kawashima has confirmed how Koreans

4 Hutchinson, *Champions of Charity*, 209.

5 Vladimir Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline,* in *Selected Works,* vol 1, 667-766 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1963), the "Marxists Internet Archive," http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/ 1916/imp-hsc/. preface section V.

constituted this kind of exploited colonial labor force in imperial Japan[6] The same could be said for the Taiwanese and Chinese who fell under Japanese rule. Furthermore, Japanese industrialists pushed for aggressive imperial expansion to secure protected markets for their products, raw materials to feed industry, and food products to feed the metropolitan population.

In addition to the perceived economic benefits of imperialism, strategic military concerns also compelled people to wage war. Defying the common sense conclusion that as an island nation Japan was particularly defensible, from a very early date military advisers convinced top leaders that Japan was, in fact, particularly vulnerable to attack. Accordingly authorities such as Yamagata Aritomo popularized the notion that Korea was "a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan," and thus belonged within Japan's "line of advantage" if not its "line of sovereignty." The empire conducted war and the occupation of areas on the continent to create a stronger defensive position for the home islands.[7]

However, a willed misrecognition about these two rationales for imperialism obscured their ruthless nature. On the one hand, Japanese imperial rhetoric stressed the economic benefits of colonial administration to colonized peoples. Integration into the empire brought job opportunities, profits from trade, and the development of industrial infrastructure. On the other hand, imperialists explained the military conquest and occupation of neighboring territories as necessary for the protection of those territories and the people living there against Western imperialism. Through colonialism, the empire

6 Ken Kawashima, *The Proletarian Gamble: Korean Workers in Interwar Japan* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009).

7 Mark R. Peattie, "Introduction," In *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, 3-52 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 8, 15. Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

would create modern state institutions which would eventually become strong enough and civilized enough to resist foreign intrusion independently. In other words, a "humane" or "humanitarian" imperialist propaganda disavowed self interest as a motive and instead played up the sacrifices made by the metropole on behalf of the colonies. It was a way of justifying empire which strongly paralleled Rudyard Kipling's "The White Man's Burden." Rich and powerful nations had a moral obligation to militarily occupy poorer and weaker peoples in order to administer economic development and military security.[8] The ideal of the humanitarian empire worked to recast the meaning of imperialism from a project of national aggrandizement to one of national sacrifice for the weak and impoverished.

To better grasp the development of this ideology of humanitarian war this chapter focuses on the idea that military conquest was necessary for the purpose of protecting vulnerable populations and territories. Contemporary mainstream discourse has come to understand this as the only legitimate purpose of war and the only one justified under international law. However, even prior to the formal legal prohibition of aggressive war with the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928, the notion of war as a form of humanitarian military intervention proved a compelling reason to fight. I will be examining closely the writing of JRCS leader Ariga Nagao, a long time member of the board of directors of the JRCS, representative to numerous International Committee of the Red Cross meetings and the Hague conferences, expert on constitutional and international law, social scientist, scholar of Chinese literature, and the Imperial Japanese Army's most famous battlefield

8 Rudyard Kipling, "The White Man's Burden," reprinted in *Joseph Conrad and Rudyard Kipling, Heart of Darkness, "The Man Who Would be King" and Other Works on Empire*, ed. David Damrosch, 20-21 (New York: Columbia University, 2006).

lawyer. An extremely prolific writer, Ariga's works included books on sociology, psychology, history, philosophy, constitutional law, religion, literary theory, art, Confucianism, social Darwinism and diplomacy. He was fluent in French and English, and proved an outspoken advocate for Japanese imperial expansion under the logic of humanitarian military intervention.

From this large body of works, I examine several which show the development of the idea that Ariga put forth in his well-known account, *The Sino-Japanese War from the Perspective of International Law,* that the imperial Japanese army must be liked and respected "as do the weak their protector" so that occupied peoples demonstrate "moral submission" towards the empire.[9] Ariga developed the logic of humanitarian empire in his works on the practical application of international humanitarian law (*Senji kyugo ni kanshi kokusaihōjō chūi yōten* [Essential points regarding wartime relief in international law], 1904), public administration (*Gyōseigaku* [Public administration](1895), and *Gyōseigaku kōgi* [Lectures in public administration] (1890)), his *Bunmei sensō hōki* [*Laws and Customs of Civilized Warfare*] (1904), and *Hogokoku ron* [On the Protectorate] (1906). These works trace the connections between the concepts and institutions comprising Japan's humanitarian war apparatus. The international legal norms of civilized war and humanitarianism in battlefield conduct, the political science of public administration, and the logic of military occupation and administration inherent in mandate territories and protectorates all served to advance the practices and ideologies of humanitarian empire.

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9 Ariga Nagao, *Extracts from La Guerre Russo-Japonaise au point de vue du droit international d'apres les documents officiels du grand État-major japonais (section historique dela guerre de 1904-1905 par Ariga Nagao* (Washington: Division of International Law of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1942), 69.

However, by following the Hague conventions and associating the legal administration of empire with humanitarianism, Ariga introduced a point of tension into imperial discourse. The need for enforcement measures, or punishments, to uphold the law in occupied territories worked against the humanitarian ethos of impartial and non-judgmental rescue. Punishment as a means for implementing legal administrative regimes and humanitarianism which disavowed justice-seeking complicated imperial humanitarianism. The tension between these two was significant because it established the conditions under which ordinary people—soldiers, nurses, doctors, laborers—carried out war atrocities. It also shaped observers' condemnations of atrocity.

The Geneva Convention: Humanizing War

Early Meiji elites put a great deal of faith in what they called "the law of nations" or international law. The statement of purpose for the Iwakura Mission, a trip taken by top officials in 1871-2 to the United States and Europe, claimed that:

> The law of nations enables the nations of the earth to maintain their powers of independence and sovereignty and stand amid the ranks of the other nations without disturbing the balance of power. . . . It alone makes it possible to contain the power of both strong and weak, and control that of the many and the few, so that the just laws of nature and of man are served.[10]

Identifying Japan with the "weak" and "the few," leaders such as Iwakura Tomomi seemed eager to embrace international legal standards as a means to protect their new government from invading foreign traders and armies alike. Mastering the principles of international law seemed to offer one way for the Japanese state to reverse the unequal

10 Takii Kazuhiro, *The Meiji Constitution: The Japanese Experience of the West and the Shaping of the Modern State,* trans. David Noble (Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2007), 4.

treaties imposed by the U.S. and European nations with their odious most favored nation, extraterritoriality, and fixed tariff clauses.

At Iwakura's meeting with Germany's Bismark, however, the “Iron Chancellor” disabused his guests of this notion, describing a world where the strong used the law when it suited their purposes, but ignored it when it went against their interests.[11] Accordingly Japan's leaders felt it important to study international law not only has a defensive measure against the major powers, but also to manage relations with Japan's weaker neighbors. During the 1880s scholars such as Ariga Nagao took up the study of international law, and by the 1890s imperial policymakers had embraced the idea of using it instrumentally to legitimate the empire's own attacks against China, Korea, Taiwan, and Russia.

The humanitarianization of militarism in the Japanese empire thus began in earnest in the 1880s with the government's effort to gain international recognition by becoming a signatory of the Geneva treaty of 1864. This first “Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field” led to the Hague Conventions (1899, 1907), the Washington Naval Treaty (1922), the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925), the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), and the updated Geneva Convention of 1929. As the first multilateral treaty system, it is arguably the ancestor of the League of Nations and United Nations as well. The Geneva Convention called for the establishment of national Red Cross societies for the impartial care of war wounded. To meet this requirement, Sano Tsunetami, in consultation with top

11 Ibid., 42.

government officials such as Iwakura Tomomi and Itō Hirobumi, carried out reforms of his *Hakuaisha* [Philanthropic Society] to make it suitable to become the Japanese Red Cross Society (JCRS) in 1886.[12] In addition to building up the material resources for relief capacity in the form of hospitals, ships, train cars, and storehouses, the JRCS and its patrons in the state bureaucracy sought to develop the necessary human resources for wartime relief. Humanitarian operations required expert personnel in two important fields. One was scientific medicine. The other was international law. Ariga was one of many scholars who took up the task of studying the European systems of international treaties and the legal norms governing their implementation.

The government and the JRCS called upon these scholars to explain the ramifications of international law for the conduct of war and war relief. For example, at the start of the Russo-Japanese war in February of 1904, Ariga gave a lecture to the Society directors and medical chiefs at the headquarters of the JRCS. In his lecture Ariga reviewed the two existing bodies of international humanitarian law—the Geneva Convention of 1864 and the Hague Conventions of 1899—and offered a commentary on putting them into practice. The Society recorded this speech and later published it as a kind of handbook for the JRCS medical corps dispatched to the war front, titled *Essential Cautionary Points Regarding Wartime Relief from the Perspective of International Law.*

Ariga began by noting that forty years had passed since the drafting of the Geneva Convention so these laws required reinterpretation and special handling. Since these "formed the basis of all Red Cross work," it was important to understand each relevant

12 For more in-depth accounts of the imperial government's efforts to join the treaty, see Kosuge, "Hakuaisha kara nihon sekijyūjisha e"; Kitano Susumu, *Sekijyūji no furusato: jyuneebu jyoyaku wo megutte* [The birthplace of the Red Cross: a return to the Geneva convention] (Tokyo: Yūzankaku, 2003), 95-118.

article correctly in its contemporary context. After reciting each article, Ariga recounted its history, explaining how they had been interpreted in past wars and the complications that arose for the warring parties (see Appendix 1 for a translation of the text of the 1964 Geneva Convention).[13] Essentially, the Geneva Convention sought to regulate the activity and movement of medical resources in war. The articles primarily addressed the handling of medical personnel and facilities without making a clear separation between medics, doctors, and supplies which were part of the armed forces proper. As article eight shows, this was largely a matter of creating a shared understanding to enable cooperation between opposing military commanders. Such an understanding was necessary to carry out mutually beneficial activities such as exchanges of prisoners (article six) or when withdrawing armies left medical facilities and personnel in place so that existing patients of the withdrawing army would not have their condition aggravated by transport and new patients of the occupying army could use the facilities as well (articles one through four). Article three attempted to ensure that any kind of medical personnel could continue working even if they were captured by enemy forces. Only article five specifically suggests a role for civilians or volunteers in providing spontaneous relief for sick or wounded soldiers.

To supplement the military's medical capacity, especially for the relief of enemy casualties as mandated in article six, the authors and signatories of the Geneva Convention understood that each signatory would develop a national Red Cross society—a voluntary relief organization to dispatch relief personnel to specific units of the armed

13 Ariga Nagao, *Senji kyugo ni kanshi kokusaihōjō chūi yōten* [Essential cautionary points regarding wartime relief from the perspective of international law], Japanese Red Cross Society internal publication, 1904, 2.

forces according to military orders. Red Cross societies were responsible for transporting war wounded from the battlefield to medical facilities and providing treatment for them under the authority of military officers. The difference between military doctors and medics and those belonging to Red Cross societies was very unclear in practice. As article seven states, both the military medics and Red Cross Society medics wore red cross armbands and flew red cross flags to show their neutral status. Red Cross medics, doctors, and eventually nursing women all had titles which equated to military ranks during wartime deployments. Both Red Cross personnel and military medics trained together during large scale army and navy exercises. The JRCS personnel wore Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) uniforms, making it practically impossible to tell the difference between the two until nursing women (unknown in the military proper) with their distinctive white gowns became main JRCS contribution to military medicine during WWI. In war time the two organizations intermixed to such an extent that JRCS nurses and medics commonly served under military surgeons and the two largely shared transportation and logistics facilities. Thus the national societies were conceived of primarily as auxiliary medical corps for the military.

In a very important sense, however, we can also see in the Geneva Convention how the military became an auxiliary of humanitarianism. Since article six uses the passive tense: "Wounded or sick combatants, to whatever nation they may belong, shall be collected and cared for," the Convention makes all medics, doctors, and nurses—not merely Red Cross personnel—responsible for caring for wounded and sick combatants of the enemy army. While it is doubtful that enemy casualties were ever actually collected and cared for with the same level of attention as friendlies, this ideal of humanitarian war

grounded a characteristic modern expectation about the conduct of military activity. It added the contradictory imperative for the military to heal and rebuild where it also sought to injure and destroy.

In addition to educating policy makers on international humanitarian law, lawyers with expertise in this field donned IJA uniforms, joined the units on campaign and advised commanders on prohibited and permitted tactics. They were called to serve in this capacity starting with the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, and again during the eight nation military intervention in China during the 1899 Boxer Rebellion, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, World War I, the Siberian Intervention of 1918-22, and the fifteen-year war (1931-45). The specifics of the language used varied in each case, but the idea of the Red Cross lawyer on the battlefield worked to "usurp" the "universal concept" of humanitarianism, to use Carl Schmitt's phrase.[14] They aimed to create the sense that not only would the army conform to the law's mandate to respect the lives and property of wounded enemies and non-belligerents in the war zone, but it also that the army would serve as a disciplined instrument for realizing the goals of "advancing civilization," "aiding the weak," "rectifying the world order," or any number of other justifications for war. Ariga Nagao was the most famous of these imperial JRCS battlefield lawyers. He published and distributed numerous reports and accounts of the wars in Japanese, French and English, and maintained close contact with journalists and the International Committee of the Red Cross to ensure that the international community understood that the Japanese empire was taking its humanitarian commitments

14 Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, trans. George D. Schwab (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985 [1922]), 54.

seriously.[15]

Red Cross battlefield lawyers such as Ariga made imperial humanitarian propaganda particularly effective during the Russo-Japanese War. Naoko Shimazu explains: “In order to ensure total compliance of Japan to international law, international lawyers were dispatched to every division within Japan's Manchurian Army.”[16] In this role, these experts on the Geneva treaty and Hague conventions presumed to advise Imperial Army officers on practically every facet of military operations. Whether the generals actually wanted to listen to their advice is a matter of historical debate, but the presence of lawyers meant that military and civilian authorities were constrained in the kinds of statements that they could make about the conduct and aims of the war. They had to at least speak as if the army were fighting for principle of humanity.

Lest we doubt whether or not anyone really cared about such concerns, we need only remember that the era around the turn of the century was also the moment when newspapers and news reporting were becoming global phenomena. Journalists swarmed to the site of battles in order to report to audiences in Europe and the United States. If the power of lawyers to influence military strategy was questionable, at the very least they proved their usefulness to the empire by mediating between the generals and the reporters. Battlefield lawyers such as Ariga kept tabs on war correspondents and tried to

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15 Ariga Nagao, *La guerre Sino-Japonaise au point de vue du droit international, par Ariga Nagao,... ouvrage accompagné d'une préface par M. Paul Fauchille* [The Sino-Japanese War from the point of view of international law, with a preface by Paul Fauchille] (Paris: A. Pedone, 1896); Ariga Nagao, *La guerre Russo-Japonaise au point de vue du droit international d'apres les documents officiels du grand État-major japonais* [The Russo-Japanese War from the point of view of international law including official documents from the central government of Japan] (Paris: A. Pedone, 1908); Ariga Nagao, *The Japanese Red Cross Society and the Russo-Japanese War* (London: Bradbury, Agnew and Co., 1907); Frederic Villiers, “The Truth about Port Arthur,” *The North American Review*, vol. 160, no. 460 (March 1895): 325-331.

16 Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War,* 168.

ensure the most favorable representations of Japanese imperialism in world opinion.[17] They acted as an informal extension of the state's official censorship apparatus.

"Humanity" appeared for the first time to justify military action carried out by the IJA during the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5. In this case commentators often characterized the conflict as a matter of Japan protecting Korea and bringing "civilization" to a so-called stubborn China which was stuck in its ancient ways. Mutsu Munemitsu, foreign minister at the time, recalled the common sentiment at the start of the war:

> Everyone agreed that a chivalrous nation like ours should not hesitate to extend a helping hand to a friendly neighbor like Korea, even if it implied some hardship for us. Later when war with China had already begun, it was asserted that we were fighting for the cause of justice and humanity, aiding the weak and checking the powerful.[18]

Mutsu contrasted this popular assessment of the war with that of government officials and the foreign ministry, which censured China in more specific terms. He argued that Qing representatives' claims (and the claims of some Korean officials) that they participated in a special, age-old tributary relationship were unsustainable in the modern international system. China's foreign policy "made a mockery" of conventional definitions of suzerainty because it concurrently disavowed any responsibility or obligation for the security of Korea yet asserted a special authority to determine the Korean state's foreign affairs.[19]

Leaving aside the question of the veracity of Mutsu's account, his repeated use of

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17 Daniel C. Kane, "Each of Us in His Own Way: Factors Behind Conflicting Accounts of the Massacre at Port Arthur," *Journalism History*, 31 (1) (Spring, 2005): 26.

18 Mutsu Munemitsu, *Kenkenroku: A Diplomatic Record of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-95*, ed. and trans. with historical notes by Gordon Mark Berger (Princeton: Princeton University Press; Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1982), 29.

19 Ibid., 12-13.

the term “responsibility” to describe the proper relationship of a superior over an inferior dovetails with his description of the popular notion that “justice,” and “humanity” provided legitimate reasons for fighting with China. He argued that China's unclear relationship with Korea had indirectly caused all of the troubles on the peninsula because it allowed China to shirk its responsibility to help Korea develop a proper administrative-bureaucratic state. Japan, the responsible, “friendly neighbor” made this its goal in the interest of self-defense but also as a matter of principle.[20] By the conclusion of the war, foreign observers seemed largely convinced by such logic. *The New York Times* went so far as to proclaim: “The time has come now when it should be realized that the continued existence of China, under present methods, is a standing menace to the peace of the world.”[21]

The narrative presented here thus agrees with Stewart Lone's assessment that the Sino-Japanese War exemplified a transformation in the means and ends of war in a global historical sense.

> In the shift from wars of booty to wars of ideology, and from mercenary to national armies, there arose a greater need for some motivating idea to strengthen the nation-in-arms; the simple goal of survival had natural merit but even better was a war in defense of some principle or against some form of tyranny. In the case of Japan's war with China, the principle was that of 'civilisation' versus 'barbarism,' and the defense of the weak, in this case Korea, against despotism.[22]

To fight in the defense of principle meant the disavowal of self interest and the representation of war as a form of sacrifice carried out for good of humanity. It implied a historical narrative which strongly coincided with that of humanitarianism and the Red

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20 Ibid., 32-36.
21 Quoted in Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War*, 237.
22 Lone, *Japan's First Modern War*, 58.

Cross. Both claimed to represent a movement toward humanity's self-realization through the regulation of relations between the strong and weak. “The defense against tyranny” was simply a more general version of the humanitarian injunction to “impartial relief for battlefield wounded.”

Ten years later, the Russo-Japanese War propaganda bound humanitarianism and militarism only more tightly. Utagawa Kokunimasa's 1904 print titled “Medical Treatment of Casualties at the Greater Japan Red Cross Field Hospital During the Russo-Japanese War” (figure 2.1) was an outstanding example of the dominant narrative rendering of the Russo-Japanese War as a humanitarian project. In the foreground, wearing the black uniforms of the Imperial Japanese Army, medics from the JRCS tend to wounded Russian soldiers using plentiful stocks of bandages and medicines. A similar scene is reproduced in miniature in the background to show the extensive nature of the humanitarian effort.[23]

Utagawa implies several propaganda messages here. The Russian soldiers are prostrate, looked down on by the Japanese authorities who clearly occupy the physical and moral high ground. The material wealth of the Japanese empire is also on display. Lastly, it shows the excellent medical knowledge, skill, bravery and discipline of the Empire's battlefield medics. In other words, the print constitutes an argument that the empire's conduct of war was just and humane.

Furthermore, the print is not silent on the wider aims of war either. The small inset in the center at the top is the linchpin of the narrative. Here, two “savage Russian

23 Utagawa Kokunimasa “Nichiro sensō dainihon sekijūji nosen byōin fushōsha kyūryō no e” [Medical treatment of casualties at the Greater Japan Red Cross field hospital during the Russo-Japanese War] (1904).

soldiers" (*Rokoku yabanhei*) are viciously abusing two figures in civilian garb. The Russo-Japanese War was fought on neither Russian nor Japanese soil, but was a war over the two powers' conflicting economic and strategic ambitions which took place on the Asian continent. Therefore the figures represent China and Korea, specifically the civilian residents of Manchuria and the area around the Yalu River, where the Tzar's government had forced leaseholds and economic concessions from Japan's two closest neighbors. It was this area, the southern coast of Manchuria around Port Arthur, where Japanese imagined their Imperial Army soldiers fighting to rescue Chinese and Koreans from the abuse of the Russians. And, unlike the "savage" invaders, the Japanese could be trusted to administer the liberated territory humanely, as they had humanely treated even their Russian enemies.

This kind of humanitarian interpretation of the events of the Russo-Japanese War proved so powerful that it dominated the imaginations of commentators across the globe. As Naoko Shimazu relates: "The symbolic value of Russian PoWs, JRC nurses and the Red Cross flag for international propaganda was such that they became objects of iconography in Japan and abroad. These images helped Japan to demonstrate worldwide their 'civilized' mission."[24] Stories of Russian prisoners of war receiving excellent treatment in Japanese hands made headlines along with those of Russian amputees who received prostheses donated by the Japanese imperial house and fitted by JRCS doctors (see figure 2.2).[25]

Teresa Eden Richardson, an English nurse who volunteered to work for the JRCS

24 Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War,* 171.
25 Nihon Sekijūjisha, Fronticepiece, *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 148 (November 10,1904): fronticepiece.

during the war gushed:

> The Red Cross Society of Japan is apparently unbounded in its sphere of usefulness, for in the future it will not confine itself to that country alone, but like Kwannon [sic], the goddess of Mercy, will stretch out beneficent hands and bring untold blessings to the shores of Korea and Manchuria. The scheme of organisation [sic] which is now being considered will, it is hoped, spread into China as well, and may be the commencement of an era of higher civilisation [sic] in all these countries. China is awaking out of her sleep of centuries, like a huge Rip van Winkle, and through the mist of ages is beginning to gain a glimpse of the great possibilities lying in her path. Before the advance of education, old superstitions and theories will sink more and more into oblivion; and if a long era of peace should succeed Japan's victorious campaign [in the Russo-Japanese War], other Eastern nations will look to her as their pioneer and leader.[26]

Here Richardson equated humanitarianism with civilization, progress, and the Japanese nation. She and most others saw no difficulty in spreading it through military conquest. For her Japan's victory was simply an event to be celebrated and emulated by those seeking to overcome "old superstitions and theories" and realize "great possibilities" in a subsequent "long era of peace."

The JRCS "scheme of organization" Richardson referred to did indeed spread in a very direct fashion when the society built Taiwanese, Korean and Manchurian branches. Equally important, however, was the indirect spread of the JRCS humanitarian "scheme" of fusing patriotism and humanitarianism as nations across the globe looked toward Japan as a model for reforming their own Red Cross societies. John Hutchinson argues in *Champions of Charity* that during the Russo-Japanese War: "the Japanese society was becoming the envy of the Red Cross world, especially in Great Britain and the United States."[27] Perhaps the most prominent example of a Westerner's appreciation of JRCS

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26 Teresa Eden Richardson, *Japanese Hospitals During War-Time. Fifteen Months with the Red Cross Society in Japan* (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1905), ix-x.

27 Hutchinson, *Champions of Charity,* 209.

accomplishments was that of Mabel Thorp Boardman, de facto leader of the American Red Cross (ARC) from 1905-15. As I discuss in chapter four Boardman used the JRCS system of charitable endowments as a model for reforming the finances of the ARC. Boardman also admired the humanitarian militancy of the JRCS and its intermixing of the language of morality and war. For example, Boardman reprinted the following poem by the Empress of Japan in her 1915 history of the international Red Cross movement as an "expression of the Red Cross principles:"

> Universal love
> Overflowing the boundaries
> Of the Empire
> Even unto strange lands
> Marches onward. How glorious the age![28]

Here, as with Richardson's "beneficent hands" of Kannon stretching out, we have the idea of spacial expansion, of "overflowing boundaries." In this case imperial expansion was a vehicle for the spread of universal love, linked through a military metaphor of "marching onward." Through this example Boardman urged the re-imagining of military action as a form of humanitarianism. Whereas the Geneva convention had begun as an innovation in techniques and rationales for the organization of relief, by 1915 Red Cross humanitarianism had come to directly authorize violence in war. The problem was not only that Red Cross societies provided material, financial, and ideological support for war, but that war itself became a humanitarian endeavor.

The Hague Conventions: Civilized Warfare

The Hague Conference of 1899 expanded on the articles of the Geneva

28 Mabel Thorp Boardman, *Under the Red Cross Flag at Home and Abroad* (Philadelphia and London, J. B. Lippincott company, 1915), 226.

Convention. Based on this new body of international humanitarian law, Ariga published his textbook-like treatise on the subject of the conduct of belligerency, titled *Laws and Customs of Civilized Warfare*, on May 22, 1904. This was roughly three months after Japan's attack on Port Arthur, which started the war with Russia. It covered everything from means of harming the enemy (including gun calibers and composition of ordinance), to prisoners of war (in the past they were treated like criminals but no longer), to sieges, coastal bombardment, and the capture and trial of spies. Following the main section of the text Ariga provides a partial translation of the Hague conventions, titled "Conventions Related to the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare" (*Rikusen no hōkikanrei ni kansuru kisoku*).[29] On the surface, the book provided an outline or guide to follow when advising the IJA about international humanitarian law. Reading critically, it becomes apparent that Ariga was grappling with a number of contradictory ways of thinking about war. Civilized warfare was Ariga's way of reconciling Carl von Clausewitz's conception of war as "an act of force which theoretically can have no limits,"[30] and the implications of the Geneva Conventions that the conduct of war ought to conform to the needs of humanity.

Besides its comprehensiveness, the most striking aspect of Ariga's presentation was his assertion, in the very first pages of the book, that the ends of war, not the means, determined whether or not it should be considered civilized:

> Today's wars are not the same as past wars, which were fought for the purpose of contesting sovereign position, to conquer neighboring countries' territory, or to subjugate religious heretics. They are carried out for the great

29 Ariga Nagao, *Bunmei sensō hōki* [Laws and Customs of Civilized Warfare] (Tokyo: Kinkōdō Shoseki, 1904), 63-4, 71, 141, 261, 357.

30 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Parets (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 76.

> purpose of the nation-state. To speak of the great purpose of the nation-state is to speak of the development of the people of the nation. To promote the development of the nation sufficiently it is necessary to have associations with foreign nations. . . . However, if by chance one nation's development necessitates something which is at complete odds with what another needs. . . they must contend with arms until one side's will is bent in surrender to the other. There is nothing wrong with surrender. Without recourse to surrender, one faces the destruction of one's existence, the termination of one's will, and the end of one's spirit. War which occurs according to these circumstances may be deemed civilized war. . . . civilized warfare is a clash of will with a foreign country over the development of the nation's people.[31]

For Ariga, this basic realism informed his entire project: as populations (divided along national lines) sought to fully realize their own development, war between states became an unavoidable necessity. According to this logic conflicts were inherent in the international system of sovereign nation-states, and civilized war was the means by which to resolve such crises.

Furthermore, victory in violent conflict proved the vitality of the nation as a living force and a concept. War demonstrated the nation's virile masculinity as it struggled to overcome the challenge of survival in a hostile world of competing peoples. The Darwinistic overtones are unmistakable in Ariga's presentation of the means and ends of civilized warfare. Yet Ariga's war was civilized precisely because it did not result in the total extermination of the loser, or genocide. Rather, the final resolution of the conflict comes through surrender. Surrender was essential to the very definition of civilized warfare, and it paralleled Ariga's idea of “moral submission” in military administration. Like good administration of the local residents of occupied territories, civilized war was supposed to produce a transformation in the thinking of the ordinary people of the defeated nation. “Bending one's will,” meant the end of the loser's concept of nationhood

31 Ibid., 3-4, 7.

in favor of another which included the loss of territories, trade concessions, influence in foreign states, reparations, or whatever else was at stake in the conflict. Rather than a Darwinian genocidal eradication of the weaker people, loss in a civilized war meant the destruction of the weaker national ideal. As the surrendering side recognized the moral superiority of the victor, biological life continued even though communal life would be profoundly changed.[32] The civilized ideal of surrender in war created a dilemma, however, which I will discuss below.

According to Ariga, the Russo-Japanese War exemplify the principles of civilized war based on his analysis of the economic, geographic, and demographic conditions shaping the conflict. He wrote: "Russia is a vast country with a numerous population, but somehow the populace does not develop. The main reason for this is their lack of ice-free ports." Russia's refusal to withdraw forces sent into China during the 1899 Boxer Uprising and acquisition of a leasehold in Port Arthur made sense economically and strategically as a remedy for this defect of geography. Similarly, Ariga writes: "the independence and territorial integrity of both China and Korea are necessary conditions for the future development of the Japanese nation. We cannot yield even one step to Russia, so we go to war."[33] Both sides of the conflict acted "for the great purpose of the nation-state," therefore making the conflict civilized.

It was clear that to be civilized, and hence worthy of the humane treatment outlined in his text, the purpose of violence must be the defense of life represented in the principle of the nation. The question that arises is: did the translation of war aims to the

32 A similar point is made in Elaine Scarry, *The Body in Pain: the Making and Unmaking of the World,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 131-3.

33 Ariga, *Bunmei sensō hōki*, 5.

realm of ideas logically lead to significant limitations on the use of violence? The implications of defining civilized war in this manner are mixed. Just because civilized war was a "clash of will . . . over the development of the nation's people" did not make it any less brutal. To demonstrate why, we must look closely at the three fundamental principles of civilized behavior in war which Ariga derived from the basic definition of civilized war as a matter of "the great purpose of the nation-state."

The first principle sent an ambiguous message:

> As a rule, in civilized war there is no impediment to using any means necessary, no matter how violent, to bend the enemy's will to even the slightest degree. One misstep and the development of our nation will be broken, and from a moral perspective there is nothing greater than the development of the nation. Accordingly, everything done must suit our morals. Only methods which go beyond that required to achieve victory are considered cruel, so in choosing the means of war there is no need for restraint.[34]

Ariga's purpose in writing the book was to explain laws and customs of warfare, which one would reasonably assume should establish limits for what could be done on the battlefield, but he starts by asserting that "there is no need for restraint." Ariga, like Clausewitz, wanted his readers to appreciate war as an act of force with potentially limitless destructiveness.

However, Article 22 of the 1899 Hague Convention stated: "The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited."[35] How did Ariga begin to circumscribe what was "required to achieve victory?" The second fundamental principle elaborated on boundary between necessity and cruelty.

The objective of war is to break the enemy's will. That will is decided by

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34 Ibid., 7-8.

35 "Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899," reprinted by The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/hague02.asp, Article 22.

> the enemy government in the place of the nation's people. To force the issue, armies and navies are used. Therefore warfare is conducted to destroy the enemy's army and navy. There must be no act which is not necessary to the purpose of making the enemy government yield voluntarily. It goes without saying that soldiers are a dangerous weapon. They cannot be allowed to go beyond this necessity [of destroying the enemy military]. Beyond this necessity lie the ravages of behavior that we cannot allow in civilized war. This second principle thus prohibits causing suffering to peaceful people who are not part of the army or navy [civilians], or ill-treatment towards prisoners of war or sick or wounded soldiers who have given up their weapons.[36]

In civilized war the belligerents limited their acts of violence to military targets. Ariga placed both civilians as well as soldiers who no longer bore arms—having surrendered or become incapacitated—outside of the sphere of necessary violence.

Nevertheless, there was a deep problem with Clauzwitz's conception of war—that the demonstration of a superior capacity for violence will induce the enemy to freely abandon the claims which compelled them to fight. Typically discussion of war assumes that power operates in such a simple manner, that victory in a contest of injuring will make the enemy recognize, for themselves, the superiority of the will that they face and modify their self-defined idea of development accordingly. However, there is no necessary logical connection between the destruction of a state's military forces and the capitulation of the people of the nation. In actual practice, the even when a state's formal army and navy are destroyed, hostilities continue as ordinary people take up arms and form long lasting insurgencies.[37] Ariga's formulation reproduced this logical disconnect when he claimed that armies and navies carry out the destruction of the enemy military in order to "force" the enemy government to surrender "voluntarily." The jarring juxtaposition of the contradictory terms "force" and "voluntary" in this passage indicates

36 Ariga, *Bunmei sensō hōki*, 8.
37 Scarry, *The Body in Pain,* 114.

that Ariga attempted to grapple with this same problem inherent in the definition of war as a contest of violence. The dead and wounded bodies which constituted the immediate results of unrestrained military operations do not surrender "voluntarily" in the same way as the enemy nation-state must in principle number two.

For Ariga, humanitarianism resolved the problem by transforming a simple military victory into a moral victory. His third principle mandated positive steps that belligerents must take to elevate war into something more than a simple contest of violence:

> As a rule, by staying within that which is necessary in order to attain the objectives of civilized war—that is, destroying the enemy country's army and navy thus breaking their government's will—there is no establishment of a relationship of hostility between our nation's people and the opposing nation's people. The enemy is simply another human being. He is still a human being with whom we have established a general relationship. Therefore that association must absolutely be carried out with the same humanity, philanthropy, and justice as in ordinary days. This is the third principle. For examples of adopting it in practice, peaceful people in occupied territories must be protected. Prisoners, the hungry and the cold must be delivered from their suffering. Sick and wounded soldiers must be relieved without discrimination for enemy or friend.[38]

Here Ariga introduced the philosophical starting point of humanitarianism, the impartial relief of human suffering, no matter its cause nor the political affiliation of the victim. Ariga did not designate impartial relief as a special function of philanthropy or Red Cross societies—which he almost never mentions in this particular text. He mandated a protective function for the armed forces as a whole.

In sum, Ariga's principles of civilized war attempted to grapple with problems inherent in the common assumption that war, as a contest to out-injure the opponent, carries within it the means of enforcing its own results. As Elaine Scarry observes, this

38 Ariga, *Bunmei sensō hōki,* 8.

assumption has virtually never been substantiated historically.[39] The results of any particular military engagement were, and are, only very rarely unequivocal. Even when they are—as it turned out in the Russo-Japanese War when the Imperial Japanese Navy decisively defeated the Russian Navy in the battle of Tsushima—it was not enough to compel the enemy government to surrender. Furthermore even if the enemy government surrendered, that was not enough to compel the enemy nation to bend its will in recognition of the victor's claims for developing its economy and defense. Battlefield violence alone could not accomplish these tasks. Ariga brings in humanitarianism into the definition of civilized warfare to suture the gap between the idea of military victory and superiority of national will. Ariga's use of the language of "humanity, philanthropy, and justice" to describe necessary attributes of the victorious belligerent means that victory no longer entailed simply out-injuring the enemy military, but also in being the better humanitarian.

Regimes of Public Administration, Civil and Military

If, according to the new humanitarian consensus "peaceful people in occupied territories must be protected,"[40] Ariga left the details of how the empire ought to accomplish this unexplained in his works on civilized war. The freshly minted Hague Conventions made this question particularly urgent by further specifying that occupying armies were obligated to restore public order and safety in occupied areas.[41] The Russo-Japanese War was the first practical application of these new legal mandates, and one

39 Scarry, *The Body in Pain,* 96-100.
40 Ariga, *Bunmei sensō hōki,* 8.
41 "Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899," Article 43.

outcome of the conflict was that the Imperial Japanese Army became a public administration department with statute-making authority over the occupied territories of Korea and Manchuria. Ariga's account of the Russo-Japanese War stands out for its emphasis on the justice enforcement and other administrative tasks carried out by the IJA in its occupation of Manchuria.[42] Rather than mainly placing restrictions on military action by declaring certain weapons or tactics illegal, the system of international humanitarian law made significant positive demands on the military.

The work of governing a population required a different kind of expertise than the soldier's usual job of fighting battles, so where did military forces turn for leadership in carrying out these new tasks? Professor Ariga was particularly suited for advising the IJA about the work of "restoring public order" since he had carried out study of the field of public administration in Europe during the 1880s. His research trip culminated in a textbook in 1890 (*Gyōseigaku*) and a lecture series at Waseda University which he compiled into a massive 1154-page tome and published in 1895 (*Gyōseigaku kōgi*). By examining his war accounts in juxtaposition with his works on general public administration, we can trace the overlapping assumptions and expectations about military and civil responsibilities which took place under the overall rubric of humanitarianism. Taken in conjunction with Mutsu's claim that Japan had a duty to promote the adoption of modern, "civilized" forms of statecraft for the peoples of East Asia, it becomes clear that Ariga's work for the army formed one part of a larger ongoing imperialist project.

Ariga's works advanced the notion that public administration should constitute and nurture the bodies of human populations. He wrote: "administration is nothing but

42 Ariga, *Extracts from La Guerre Russo-Japonaise*, 69.

the determination of areas of advantage for the purpose of the safety of the nation and the development of the lives of its subjects in general." The laws comprising the government's administrative bureaus thus took as their rationale the protection and nurturing of human life as collective life. Two institutions bore responsibility for this collectivity. First, "it was the Emperor who bestowed upon us united rule" in the form of a constitutional government in 1889. Second, however, was legislative authority, which governed the creation and operation of the administrative agencies "as determined by the nation's will." This definition of public administration established the population (nation) as both the source of administrative authority (through law which manifests the nation's will) and that which must be made to prosper as the objective of administrative action.[43]

Ariga's presentation of the purposes and means of public administration repeated almost verbatim the Austrian professor of political economy, Lorenz von Stein. Ariga visited Dr. Stein in July 1887, following Itō Hirobumi, Yamagata Aritomo, Prince Arisugawa, and a whole host of notable figures in the Imperial government who also made the "Stein pilgrimage." As Takii Kazuhiro describes, Stein had a "unique organic theory that construed the state as a distinct human personality" formed from "the community" (*Gemeinschaft*). It was "a society that possesses the nature of the human body."[44] Ariga was thus working from a conception of collective human bodies in which they could be made healthy and strong through a science of public administration in the same way that individual human bodies could be made healthy and strong through the science of medicine.

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43 Ariga Nagao, *Gyōseigaku kōgi* [Lectures in public administration] (Tokyo: Shinzanshashuppan, 2008. Originally published Tokyo: Kōhōkai, 1895), 1-2.

44 Takii, *The Meiji Constitution*, 70-79, 107-8, 74.

The "areas of advantage" Ariga had in mind encompassed a wide variety of topics. His interests included local self-government, policing, hygiene, education, agriculture, forestry, hunting, mining, engineering, labor, manufacturing, and transportation. In each case, public administration was about "taking into account external circumstances" and applying "properties" to "real conditions" in order to make these areas serve the purpose of strengthening the nation. Public administration depended entirely on expert knowledge of the relevant "proprieties" and "real conditions," as well as "external circumstances" for each area. The latter, he argues, is especially necessary given the uncertainty and unpredictability of the world. It would be "absolutely unpleasant" he writes, if contingencies such as fire, flooding, disease or vicissitudes in the productivity of crops, the labor power of humans, or world economics harmed the life of the nation. On the basis of this specialized expertise, administrators needed to exercise independent power "within the scope provided by the law."[45]

Ariga also affirmed the necessity for administration to act independently according to their expert knowledge "on the occasion of an emergency (*kinkyū*) situation" when:

> [The administration department] suspends difficult to execute laws and issues statutes itself. Concerning this responsibility, it is necessary for the the executive who decides on such stipulations to do so freely, as it would be unfair to be given the responsibility but made to follow the plans of others. . . . Without exception when facing such a situation a special determination must be made. If it is decided by law in advance then there will be difficulties from the outset.[46]

Here Ariga defends the principle of the legal exception: the administrator must have the power to act flexibly in response to the needs of the moment. Predetermined contingency

45 Ibid., 2-3.
46 Ibid., 4.

plans will simply fail to take everything that might happen into consideration.

The Russo-Japanese War produced exactly this kind of emergency situation in which army officers found themselves administering large sections of territory and their inhabitants in Manchuria. In this case the inhabitants of the occupied territory were the "external circumstances" which could create "unpleasant" conditions for the army. Ariga reported that military police of various army divisions imposed martial laws which were "innumerable and of infinite variation" in occupied areas of Manchuria, justifying them as necessary protection for the Imperial Japanese Army against threats.[47]

> The exercise of martial law is, in our opinion, a means of legitimate defense for an army in a foreign country. If the army were operating in national territory, the existing laws would suffice to protect it, and it could entrust the application of such laws to tribunals which would not fail to suppress every act injurious to the security of the army. But in a foreign country the army itself must have the right to make the law and to apply it because, on the one hand, there can be no certitude that the laws of the country where the army is operating will suffice to protect it in all circumstances; and on the other hand, in the cases where such laws are sufficient, there will be no certitude that the tribunals will apply them or have the necessary authority to assure their execution.[48]

A number of ironic assumptions were at work in this statement. First, the fact that the needs of the army took precedence over the needs of the population went without mentioning, even though the two were most certainly in conflict. The occupying army forcefully requisitioned food, labor, housing, or other supplies as necessary for it to continue combat operations to the detriment of the local residents. In other words, the occupation itself violated the law. Rather than recognize that the material hardships created by the illegal military occupation generated the very resentment and hostility that led to "acts injurious to the security of the army," instead this problem was displaced to

47 Ariga, *Extracts from La Guerre Russo-Japonaise*, 6.
48 Ibid., 1.

the register of the "sufficiency of laws" and their enforcement. However this problem too was caused by the occupation itself. The "necessary [legal] authority" to enforce laws was compromised by the fact of war and military occupation in the first place. So Ariga's assertions are quite circular, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of threats to the army's security. The "defensive" and "protective" aims of the war justified the means of imposing martial law on the civilian inhabitants of occupied territories.

Occupation laws prohibited resisting IJA orders, joining the enemy and fighting against the IJA without a proper uniform, spying for the enemy, providing false directions to IJA soldiers, spreading false information or rumors, causing disturbances or riots, posting placards speaking out against the IJA, holding meetings, printing publications, aiding the enemy, destroying or stealing military materials; destroying telegraph lines, railroad tracks, bridges, canals, or the military mail; looting the battlefield; sabotaging water, provisions, or electric lights; counterfeiting, "adopt[ing] a rebellious attitude" concerning requisitions, possessing unauthorized arms or ammunition, entering forbidden areas, digging trenches in the mountains; inspecting, drawing, or writing descriptions of points on land or sea, assassination, robbery, trading in opium, and civil disobedience. Punishments included fines, confiscations of property, imprisonment and execution.[49] The above list is striking for the way it enumerates acts which compromised the army's ability to take and use local resources (water, food, transportation and communication infrastructure).

Most importantly, the administration of martial law over civilian populations in occupied territories did not only serve to protect the IJA. Rather, Ariga also argued that

49 Ibid., 11, 18-20, 25.

martial law constituted an improvement over the pre-existing laws for the occupied people. He explained that the so-called Chinese threats to the army originated from the inadequacy of local laws. In other words the Manchurian population lacked proper government. Though the Hague convention stated that occupying armies should respect the laws of the occupied country, Ariga justified IJA disregard for them since: "Chinese penal laws, being at times of a rather backward nature, ought not to be applied, even though they constitute the local law of the country."[50] In this formulation IJA occupation worked to benefit the population by overriding "backward" laws with modern martial law. When the IJA forced local officials to carry out a census, policing, public hygiene projects, and food distribution to the poor, Ariga bragged to international humanitarian community that these were improvements which provided a practical education in modern public administration for the Chinese.[51] In short he represented the imperial army occupation as a humanitarian intervention to civilize the government of Manchuria.

Despite the material deprivations that its presence created, the disruptions to social life that it caused, and the ever present threat of violence that accompanied it, the occupying army had to be perceived as a friendly force which worked in the interest of the local inhabitants.

> To attain more easily the object pursued by the military administration, it was necessary to lead the Chinese little by little to like and respect our army as do the weak their protector. If the inhabitants come to respect and to like us, they would submit more willingly to our orders, would also give us more exact warning of the presence of spies, and finally, would better guard the telegraph lines, railways, etc. But in order to attain this end, it was necessary above all for us to have friendly sentiments toward them and indeed to do everything that they desired. Here again was a case where the measures taken in the interest of our army were equally in the

50 Ibid., 27.
51 Ibid., 27, 55-77.

> interest of the inhabitants. It lay absolutely and solely with the ability and genius of each commissioner of military administration to find some means of effecting moral submission.[52]

This term "moral submission" neatly encapsulates the second, more subtle, objective of public administration—the self-subjectification of the charges in the care of its institutions. That is, the police, hospitals, communications and transportation systems, schools, and all the other administrative bureaus aimed not only to protect and foster the lives of the people, but also took on the paradoxical task of inducing a free change in their attitude—toward the acceptance and active collaboration with authority. As a result, the military administrators had to show restraint in the exercise of authority, or at least pretend to do so. At its core, then, the logic of administration was the subordination of power to principles. In theory the administrators acted in accord with principles of benevolent tutelage, while the population recognized the principle of "moral submission" to authority.

However, military administration also entailed the exact opposite of "friendly sentiments." When the administrators decided that the governed population was incorrigible, the logic of public administration authorized harsh measures. This occurred when saboteurs repeatedly cut the IJA's telegraph lines.

> Russian placards, written in the Chinese language, stated that each time the telegraph lines were cut the country would be burned within a radius of 50 li (1 li = 2/3 km) and the inhabitants massacred. The Japanese army did not go that far. For an army operating in a country such as China collective punishment is, however, very useful and even indispensable.[53]

By pointing out the brutality of Russian policy, Ariga artfully avoided spelling out exactly

52 Ibid., 69.
53 Ibid., 11.

what kinds of collective punishment the IJA carried out, even though he supported the idea of collective punishment in general. Ultimately, the term "punishment" exposes the potential racism and brutality inherent in the logic of public administration—whether Russian or Japanese. It was a term which reappeared years later in the late 1930s to describe a far less ambiguous imperial undertaking. When top cabinet members discussed the Army's invasion of China (which included the Rape of Nanjing in 1937), they referred to it as the "war of punishment."[54]

In short, Ariga works addressing the treatment of the populations of occupied territories expressed the idea that proper military action served modern humanitarian purposes. Ariga's assertion in *Laws and Customs of Civilized Warfare* that "peaceful people in occupied territories must be protected"[55] justified the army's work in the public administration of such spaces. He mandated a protective role for the military in defending the "peaceful people" from crime, disease, and want in general. As he explained in a lecture to the JRCS leaders in 1904, the Geneva conventions advised army generals to act "charitably" (*jizen*) toward the residents of occupied territory.[56] Ariga's attitude demonstrated the hubris of imperialism—the assumption that one has the competence to judge the government of others and attempt to reform it for their own good. And should they resist, then that competence included the power to judge them unfit for life.

Mandates and Protectorates

The Hague Convention authorized the military administration of occupied

54 E. Bohr, *Hirohito: Behind the Myth* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989), 199.
55 Ariga, *Bunmei sensō hōki,* 8.
56 Ibid., *Senji kyugo ni kanshi kokusaihōjō chūi yōten*, 10.

territories during the Russo-Japanese War. As the conflict progressed, Ariga began to imagine a more permanent administrative role for the empire's military which extended into the postwar peace. Through its work rebuilding the political, economic and social systems of these areas, Ariga imagined that rule by the IJA would not only reverse the injury and damage caused by the wars, but bring new prosperity and civilization to the occupied populations in peacetime. Success in war imposed a moral burden on the winner. Rather than simply equating victory with the taking of spoils, Ariga promoted the idea that the empire ought to assume responsibility for developing the health, knowledge, and wealth of its war ravaged neighbors even as it worked to develop their capacities to resist Western intrusion.

The international legal mechanisms for incorporating occupied territories under imperial governance were the mandate territory and the protectorate. First, Ariga's 1905 *Manshū inin tōchiron: Ariga hakushi jinchū chojutsu* [On the Manchurian mandate: writings by Ariga Nagao from the battlefront] pushed for the post-war establishment of a Japanese mandate, or military government, in Manchuria. Second, his 1906 book *Hogokoku ron* [On the Protectorate], sought to employ a variety of cases to provide historical precedents for Korea becoming Japan's protectorate—which was one consequence of the various treaties ending the war. These two institutions of international law—the mandate and the protectorate—became Ariga's means to recast the empire as not only defending its own interests, but also those of the local populations, which the Chinese and Korean governments appeared unable or unwilling to defend unaided. Through these mechanisms of international law, which he asserted had long histories in Europe, Ariga envisioned the IJA transcending its temporary role as charitable benefactor

in northeast Asia and becoming a permanent defensive bulwark against Western imperialism. Through this connection, Ariga represented the aggressive military expansion of the empire as a humanitarian project dedicated to preserving the order and stability of East Asia. The Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars were thus like "the savage wars of peace" described by Rudyard Kipling.[57] Ariga's representation of war encapsulated the profound irony observed by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri that: "Although the practice of Empire is continually bathed in blood, the concept of Empire is always dedicated to peace—a perpetual and universal peace outside of history."[58] Essentially, the ends of benevolent administration and protection against the vicissitudes of international relations justified the violence carried out against anyone who might oppose the empire.

Ariga's argument for the incorporation of Manchuria into Japan's empire as a mandate territory rested on a straightforward premise:

> Originally China . . . did not fulfill its responsibilities and allowed Russia to make use of this area to prepare for a war against Japan. Because the preparations did not cease, for the reason of self defense Japan used its military to expel the Russian soldiers.[59]

Ariga thus claims that war with Russia was a matter of preserving the peace. He suggested that China had a kind of neighborly obligation to keep its territory clear of anyone making "war preparations." He concluded: "[China's] treatment of Manchuria was not proper," so the territory required Japanese administration in the future.[60] Under mandate rule the population of this region would learn to fight to defend itself from

57 Kipling, "The White Man's Burden," 20.
58 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 2000), xv.
59 Ariga Nagao, *Manshū inin tōchiron: ariga hakushi jinchū chojutsu* [On Manchuria as a Mandate Territory: writings by Ariga Nagao from the battlefront] (Totsukamura (Tokyofū): Wasedadaigaku shuppanbu, 1905), 11.
60 Ibid.

foreign incursion, and thus work to stabilize the international order against potential conflicts.

Ariga called for a form of hybrid legal administration in the Manchurian mandate. He explained that the territory and population would formally remain a part of China, but that Japanese officials would govern on behalf of the Qing emperor. He claimed this arrangement had a number of consequences, some advantageous, others less so. It would not be necessary to republish maps because Manchuria would remain a part of China. It would not be necessary to use Japan's solar calendar. State ceremonies would be based on various Chinese examples, and Japanese residing in Manchuria would stop using Japanese national holidays. It would be necessary to use the Chinese flag for formal purposes, while officials representing Japan proper would be the only ones to use the Japanese flag. It would be necessary to use Chinese currency for commerce, but for convenience others could be used as well. The Manchurian natives would remain Chinese nationals so they would continue to have a duty to the Qing Emperor. On the basis of a treaty authorized by the Qing emperor, they would thus submit to Japan's mandate rule. Manchurian natives, while submitting to Japan's mandate rule, must make payments of taxes as commanded. Also conscription into Japanese-led military forces would possible if circumstances required it, with the consent of the Qing emperor. If Manchurian natives were to be conscripted for service in the Chinese army, it could only be done with the consent of Japan. Authority over justice administration would be carried out locally in Manchurian courts by Japanese officials. They would not be executing Japanese Imperial Law, but the law of the Chinese empire. Diplomatic authority would be largely within the sphere entrusted to Japan. Finally, mail, telegraph, rail and other systems of traffic were

to be set up by Japan but in peace time used by both Japan and China.[61]

As the above list shows, Ariga imagined a system of administration which defined, protected, and promoted a particular mode of life—the so-called Chinese or Qing customs and practices. Ariga would have had Japanese judges presiding at Chinese courts, Japanese police enforcing Chinese laws, and Japanese officials presiding over Chinese ceremonies as if the people living on the Asian continent needed training, or a tutelary model, in how to become themselves. The plan assumed that mandate administrators would make better Chinese than the residents of Manchuria. Ariga explained that despite the history of the region as the homeland of the Qing:

> *people of Manchurian origin lack character. The singular source of the disease we face is that there is no one rising into the imperial Chinese government today who will safeguard the interests of Manchuria.* It goes without saying that rule over Manchuria positively must not be left to Manchurians (emphasis in original).[62]

Ariga's justified his plan calling for the Japanese administration of Manchuria by appealing to the idea of the commonality of East Asian cultures under Confucianism. His earlier works on Confucian literature[63] were thus crucial to his later articulation of the "anti-imperialistic imperialism" of protectorates and mandated territories. Ariga's sinology promoted the study of Chinese culture internationally in the same manner that he imagined the Japanese empire promoting the development of the Chinese and Korean societies falling under its protection. By asserting that Japanese mandate rule ought to be carried out according to Chinese custom Ariga's plan promoted the value of Confucian culture at the same time that it asserted that the Japanese emperor was the true heir to the

61 Ibid., 36-7.
62 Ibid., 32.
63 Ariga Nagao, *Shina seikan* [True perspective on China] (Tokyo: Gaikō Jihōsha Shuppanbu, 1918 [1885]).

tradition of benevolent Confucian rule. Thus from his early efforts to speak for, and in defense of, an imperiled "Eastern" civilization, to his later assertion of the rightfulness of Japanese hegemony in the region, Ariga appealed to the universalistic assumptions behind humanitarianism and international law to justify Japanese imperial domination of Asia.

On the Protectorate likewise grapples with the issue of compromised sovereignty. In this review of 23-years of historical precedents for protectorates in international law, Ariga asserted that the system of international relations required protectorates of various types to ensure the safety of smaller, weaker nations against the strong. In theory the weak voluntarily agreed to sacrifice sovereignty until they could carry out the administrative reforms necessary for a strong state and military, especially tax reform. Casting Japan as the protector of the weak in northeast Asia, he invoked the ideas of guardianship, patronage, and care to describe why Korea's assent to imperial protection would ensure peace in the region.[64]

Ariga intended the work to serve as a guidebook for imperial bureaucrats, who were supposed to use the historical knowledge presented to form effective policies. While he did not spell out the policies of long-term imperial rule over Korea and Manchuria, Ariga's works attempted to establish an initial legal framework and overall structure of colonialism. While he was most interested in the initial conflict and the military occupation of territories, the logic of protective imperialism established the initial conditions under which the colonial Governor-Generals built their regimes in Korea and Taiwan and the IJA created the puppet state of Manchukuo in the 1930s.[65] As the title

64 Ariga Nagao, *Hogokoku ron* [On the protectorate] (Tokyo: Waseda Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1906), 2.
65 Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 23, 29.

"Governor-General" suggests, these were military rulers who reported directly to the emperor. Colonial administration was by no means a democratic project. Showing a contempt for deliberative assembly typical of the dominant group of Meiji oligarchs, Ariga dismissed any Diet role in colonial policy making, writing that the Korean protectorate was: "an issue that must not be left to mere political debate."[66] For Ariga, administration was best left to experts versed in the western discipline of political economics and knowledgeable about international standards. Elected politicians had little or nothing to contribute to the project of humanitarian imperialism.

Conclusion

The findings presented here confirm and expand upon Alexis Dudden's argument that pre-WWI institutions of international law provided tacit, if not explicit, support for Japanese imperialism.[67] Ariga Nagao's writings demonstrate how the Red Cross ethos of impartial relief for human suffering and the regulation of the means and ends of interstate violence—as codified in the Geneva Conventions and other laws of war—became a pillar of imperial ideology. The larger discourse on administration defined the many spheres in which crises in the international order required diligent management—in the conduct of hostilities, the implementation of martial law in occupied territories, and in the ideal of civilized government in its widest sense. For Ariga humanitarian war provided the remedy for emergencies brought about by conflicts over the resources necessary for national development, and Japan's handling of such emergencies became the grounds for

66 Ariga, *Hogokoku ron*, prologue 3.
67 Alexis Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005).

international support for this new “pioneer and leader” in East Asia.

To fully grasp the importance of humanitarianism in the legitimization of empire, one need only remember the ferocity of debate concerning its opposite—atrocity—in both the history and the historiography of pre-WWII Japan. Though Ariga could, with justification, claim that the empire was a forthright participant in the movement to humanize war, critics accused the IJA and colonial administrators of committing serious, endemic lapses in humane conduct. From the use of collective punishments in Manchuria to the use of corporal punishments such as whipping in Korea, observers denounced occasions when military and colonial law appeared to shift too quickly from a life-cultivating mode to a brutal life-destroying mode.

One important example of the critique of the empire's conduct came about in response to the IJA's murder of civilians at Port Arthur during the Sino-Japanese War. The ensuing outcry in the international press provoked a response which demonstrated the empire's simultaneous disregard and extreme sensitivity toward humanitarian concerns. S. C. M. Paine devotes several pages to what became known as the Port Arthur Massacre in his recent book on the Sino-Japanese War, explaining that: “By the time that Japanese troops reached Port Arthur, [their] reputation for restraint had preceded them.” However, Chinese soldiers had killed and mutilated the bodies of Japanese prisoners and left them on public display, causing the IJA regiments entering the city to commit what one observer called a “diabolical orgy of murder and mutilation, rape, lust, and rapine” against the townspeople for four days. Major newspapers around the world picked up the story and “threatened to undo Japan's meticulously crafted public image as the only

civilized nation in the far east."[68]

It is east to see how observers, then and now, might dismiss the the imperial government's claims to carry out humanitarian war according to the norms of civilized conduct as simply false propaganda. Nevertheless, the discourse of international humanitarian law did place real constraints on what generals and policymakers could say about the means and ends of war. Incidents such as the massacre at Port Arthur had to be covered up, denied, or explained away, lest they be used by a rival power to "usurp" the "universal concept" of humanitarianism against the empire. And so the imperial government had to work to keep the facts unclear. Denouncing any indiscriminate killings, it vowed to investigate the event at the same time it questioned the newspaper reports as exaggerations. The investigation had no appreciable findings.[69]

Since imperial advocates like Ariga linked humane behavior so strongly to the right to govern, lapses became dangerous not only to the victims, but to the entire imperial project. They required explanations that justified violence by reaffirming its defensive or protective nature. Later Ariga would try to justify the IJA's behavior by using international humanitarian law itself. He argued that China continuously violated the norms of civilized war, which made it too difficult for Japan to abide by the Geneva Conventions unilaterally.[70] Indeed, as Bismark was first to point out, there was no general expectation that signatory states would have to uphold the various instruments of international humanitarian law in their dealings with non-signatories.[71] Japan had become

68 Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War*, 210-214.
69 Ibid., 213.
70 Ariga, *La guerre Sino-Japonaise*, 5-7, 85-7.
71 See the "Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899," Article 2.

one of the strong, using international law as it suited its interests.

Ariga's writings suggest we reconsider how the history of the JRCS bears on the continuing problem of imperialism's complicity with institutions of international humanitarian law and global cooperation. Primarily, Ariga's engagement with European political economic thought and the field of public administration points to the deeply transnational character of humanitarian imperialism and how it was imbedded in the shifting ideals of statehood and proper governance. International competition over the usurpation of the universal concept of humanity induced empires to make administration an integral part of war. At the same time, it introduced the contradiction between the impartiality of humanitarianism and punishment as the means of enforcing modern administration. If atrocity remains one of the central concepts by which we judge modern war, it is precisely because we have not resolved the conflict between humanitarianism and justice.

Figure 2.1. Utagawa Kokunimasa's “Medical treatment of casualties at the Greater Japan Red Cross field hospital during the Russo-Japanese War.”



Figure 2.2 The fronticepiece for the *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 148 (November 10, 1904).

Chapter 3

Capital, Land, Labor

the Economics of Red Cross Humanitarianism

> In China no farmer, no merchant and no other business-men can ever come into contact with any Government officers, who hold themselves aloof from the common people and look down on such business-men as slaves. Nevertheless, I made opportunities for them to meet together regardless of any rank, all under the banner of the Red Cross. . . . I can hardly express here how much the [businessmen] enjoyed such privileges.
>
> --Ozawa Takeo, "Report on his Second Trip to Manchuria and Korea," 1907

A quick look at the biographies of both Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS) leaders and leaders of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva reveals strong connections between an interest in business and an interest in humanitarianism from the late 19th to the early 20th centuries. Both Sano Tsunetami and Matsukata Masayoshi, the first and second presidents of the JRCS, served as ministers of finance for the Meiji government. They implemented policies which privatized state industrial ventures and encouraged investment by private corporations in the 1880s. As the above epigraph shows, Ozawa Takeo, vice president of the JRCS during the 1900s and 1910s, boasted about how he had used the Red Cross to advance the status of the merchants and "business-men" of China.[1] Gustave Moynier, the longest standing president of the ICRC, came from a "bourgeois background," and most famously Henri Dunant became involved in the battle of Solferino while seeking the support of Napoleon

1 Ozawa Takeo, "Baron Ozawa's Report on His Second Trip to Manchuria and Korea," *The Red Cross in the Far East, Bulletin No. 1*, ed. Togo Masatake, 134-136 (Tokyo: The Red Cross Society of Japan, 1907), 135.

III for a business deal in 1859.[2] Early Red Cross humanitarians thus often shared a deep involvement with capitalistic ventures and a certain bourgeois sensibility which placed a high value on individual entrepreneurship.

The prevalence of this shared interest calls into question the categories commonly used to distinguish the Red Cross and other humanitarian organizations from business enterprises. While we commonly think of "voluntary" or "non-profit" organizations as distinct from, or even superior to, standard for-profit corporations, the two sides overlap much more than they diverge. Not only did the JRCS function much like a business corporation in terms of its everyday operation and practical activity, but it also sought to reproduce a set of assumptions and expectations about the means and ends of production and economic exchange. To borrow Max Weber's phrasing, Red Cross humanitarianism promoted "the spirit of capitalism."[3]

The connection between the economics of the Red Cross and the logic of modern industrial capitalism is significant because it suggests a material basis for the ideology of humanitarian imperialism. This is to say that the idea of the humanitarian empire did not originate only from the discourses on national culture discussed in chapter one nor the imperatives of regional defense discussed in chapter two. Rather, humanitarian imperialism, like imperialism generally, was also a response—or solution—to internal instabilities inherent in capitalist societies. Following Karl Marx, John Hobson observed over a century ago that capitalism was a dynamic system in which the means of production concentrated in the hands of the bourgeoisie, while the rest, the proletariat,

2 Hutchinson, *Champions of Charity*, 12-13.
3 Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (London, New York: Routledge, 2001).

depend on the sale of their own labor to earn the means of their subsistence. As such, it tended to create conditions in which the products of industry could not possibly be consumed by the workers producing them. At the same time productivity was constantly increasing, capitalist society suffered from chronic under-consumption. For this reason companies sought to capture markets abroad and capital tended to seek an outlet for investment abroad. The protection of such investments necessitated military intervention which led to war and conquest.[4]

JRCS relief work not only facilitated such military intervention, but the JRCS contended with the same constraints as the capitalists. It exhausted its domestic subscriber market owing to the fact that ordinary people largely struggled to survive on subsistence wages and had no disposable income to donate. To cultivate its domestic subscriber base it promoted bourgeoisie values among laborers and encouraged the accumulation of disposable income. JRCS literature made diligent labor, the accumulation of capital, and the development of land into virtues, thus contributing to the commodification of these three key factors of production. To supplement the domestic subscriber base, the JRCS was quick to seek out new subscribers among the residents of Japan's newly conquered formal and informal empires by establishing branch offices and medical facilities in Taiwan, Manchuria, and Korea. In addition, the JRCS benefited greatly from imperialism because its subscribers participated in what Hobson called a "false economy" of excessive profits driven by export sales in the markets of politically subordinate foreign countries.[5] By delving into the economics of the Red Cross, this chapter thus argues that Red Cross humanitarianism operated within, and reinforced

4 John Hobson, *Imperialism, a Study* (New York: Gordon Press, 1975), 81-82.
5 Ibid., 87, 93.

industrial capitalism as a continuously expanding social organization of productive activity which depended on imperialism to correct its own internal imbalances.

Capital

> "Capital manifests itself as capital through self-expansion."
> --Karl Marx, *Capital, Vol. 3*

On March 6, 1903 the members of the JRCS Standing Council received for their review an organizational restructuring plan so controversial that archivists subsequently filed its details and the ensuing deliberations by Council members as "secret documents" in the JRCS archives. Written by JRCS Vice-President Ozawa Takeo at the behest of Sano Tsunetami's successor, President Matsukata Masayoshi, the "Shagyō seiri no hōshin" ["General policy of restructuring Society work"] called for comprehensive change. It consisted of five sections, including: "#2 Personnel and material preparation," "#3 Peacetime work," "#4 Recruiting for society deficiencies," and "#5 Reducing expenses." At the top of the list for reform however, was "#1 Capital accumulation" (*shikin no chikuseki*).

By no coincidence, the "General policy of restructuring Society work" appeared at the crucial turning point in the history of capital in Japan. Economic historians of Japan agree that early Meiji enterprise (from the 1870 to 1900) suffered from an acute capital shortage. A wild inflationary-deflationary oscillation of the late 1870s and early 1880s was one symptom of this larger problem. The capital shortage also meant low worker productivity, low wages, low government revenue, and a weak domestic market unable to

generate adequate demand for mass-produced goods.[6] By the first decade of the 1900s, however, sufficient capital had accumulated that investors began to push for foreign outlets for their money. When the South Manchuria Railway Company made its initial public offering of stock in 1906, the demand for shares exceeded the supply by over a thousand-fold.[7] This episode decisively signaled the end of capital scarcity and the beginning of capital surplus in Japan. The restructuring plan demonstrated how the JRCS functioned within both of these two phases of capital in Japan. In the era of scarcity, the JRCS worked to accumulate capital by collecting dues from ordinary people all across the empire and banking them for times of emergency. In the era of excess, the JRCS made humanitarian endowed funds into a model for interest-bearing capital, what Marx called the "most externalized and most fetish-like form" of "relations of capital" as "self-expanding value."[8]

First, Ozawa's plan strove to limit the organization's humanitarian commitments in order to better accumulate capital for the society. Introducing the plan, Ozawa argued that the JRCS had spread itself too thin with projects unrelated to its primary mission: wartime relief. Ozawa called for systematic cost-cutting measures and refocusing on

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6 For an examples of Marxist perspectives on the shortage of capital, see Jon Halliday, *A Political History of Japanese Capitalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), 22; E. Herbert Norman, *Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E.H. Norman* (New York, Pantheon Books: 1975 reprint), 241. For a modernization theory perspective, see William W. Lockwood, *The Economic Development of Japan: Growth and Structural Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 165, 178. For an explanation of how the capital shortage created a lack of interest in foreign investment see Peter Duus, "Economic Dimensions of Meiji Imperialism: The Case of Korea, 1895-1910," in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, 128-172 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 149.

7 Ramon H. Myers, "Japanese Imperialism in Manchuria: The South Manchuria Railway Company, 1906-1933," in *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937*, 101-132 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 104.

8 Karl Marx, *Capital: a Critique of Political Economy*, ed. Friedrick Engels (New York: International Publishers, 1959), vol. 3, http://www.marxists.org/archive/ marx/works/1894-c3/index.htm, chapter 24.

wartime relief preparations.[9] He wrote: "the company's [*kaisha no*] capital is reduced to a truly tiny amount because of the deficit expenditure situation."[10] Instead, Ozawa and his boss Matsukata aimed to reverse the flow and build up special funds at the Society headquarters. They intended these funds to serve as the source of "unmatched economic security, for an unmatched reliability of society operations" in the JRCS.[11]

Red Cross societies, by their very nature, were capital accumulation machines. The general need to stockpile supplies and funds during peacetime followed from the Red Cross's representation of humanitarian emergencies as occurring without warning and its stance that timeliness of relief was paramount. As Henri Dunant recognized in his *Memory of Solferino* (the book which inspired the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1863): "immediate action is essential, for help which will save a wounded man today will not save him tomorrow, and if time is lost gangrene takes hold and carries off the patient." Furthermore: "In this age when surprise plays such an important part is it not possible that wars may arise . . . in the most sudden and unexpected fashion?" Therefore, relief societies must be "always organized and ready for the possibility of war."[12]

For the JRCS, readiness meant reserve hospitals staffed with expert medical personnel, as well as stockpiles of bandages, medicines, and surgical tools. In 1908, for example, the Society reported that it had the following prepared for emergency use: 3,849

9 Ozawa Takeo, "Shagyō seiri no hōshin" [General policy of restructuring society work], in Himitsu Shorui March 6, 1903, file 286, Japanese Red Cross Society Documents, Museum Meiji Mura Collection, Red Cross Historical Document Room, Japanese Red Cross Society Toyota College of Nursing, Toyota, Japan, 1.

10 Ibid., 14. Here, either by error or on purpose, Ozawa reversed the usual characters for Society--社会 [*shakai*]—and instead wrote 会社 [*kaisha*] which means "company" or "corporation," revealing the lack of distinction between humanitarian enterprise and entrepreneurial enterprise for JRCS leaders.

11 Ibid., 4.

12 Dunant, *A Memory of Solferino,* 29, 27.

relief personnel, two hospital ships, 853 medical implements, clothing worth four hundred thousand yen, and supplies of 92 medicines among "137 miscellaneous articles worth ¥27,453.68."[13] Most importantly, the Society needed money to purchase necessary goods and services to meet the contingencies of any particular disaster. The thinking of JRCS logistics specialists in this area was nothing new. It paralleled that of agriculturalists such as Ninomiya Sontoku who had, since the premodern period, urged villages to save up surplus grain in bumper years for use during times of famine. Indeed, the management of famine and the accumulation and use of relief funds was a common topic of discussion in JRCS reports and journal articles, year after year.[14] Elites and commoners alike understood that emergency relief stores were crucial prerequisite of the slogan "rich nation, strong army" advocated by nationalist ideologues.

As its name *Hakuaisha* [Philanthropic Society] suggests, the precursor to the JRCS relied a great deal on the relatively large donations of select wealthy individuals, especially its patrons in the imperial house.[15] The Hakuaisha's first year report (for 1877) included no less than 24 donations of 100 yen or more out of a total of 197 donations of various types of goods and quantities of cash.[16] These were large sums considering that typical farming households had to survive on incomes of one yen or less per month.

When the Japanese government signed the Geneva Convention in 1887, however,

13 Red Cross Society of Japan, "Relief Personnel and Materials Now in Readiness," *The Red Cross in the Far East, Bulletin No. 2*, 42 (Tokyo: The Japan Times Publishing Office, 1908): 42.

14 For two examples see Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Beikoku daitōryō no kyōkō kyūsai gekibun" [The American president's declaration on famine relief], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 180 (March 1, 1906): 9-10; Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Kita shina kikin risaisha kyūgo ikken" [North China famine victim relief case], unpublished Japanese Red Cross Society archive, file 3180, 1921, Japanese Red Cross Society Documents, Museum Meiji Mura Collection, Red Cross Historical Document Room, Japanese Red Cross Society Toyota College of Nursing, Toyota, Japan.

15 Kawaguchi, *Jūgun kangofu*, 285-6.

16 Hakuaisha, "Hakuaisha daiichi hōkoku" [Philanthropic society report number one], unpublished Japanese Red Cross Society archive, file A1-22, 1877, Japanese Red Cross Society Headquarters Collection, Japanese Red Cross Society Information Plaza, Tokyo, Japan.

the newly renamed Japanese Red Cross Society modified its approach, setting up channels for the collection of small-quantity subscription dues from large numbers of less affluent members of the nation.[17] In 1887 Sano set a target of one Society recruit for every 400 people in the general population but by 1907 the proportion was closer to one in forty.[18] As Vice-President Ozawa mentioned in the "General policy of restructuring Society work," recruitment was the direct responsibility of each local JRCS branch, as they "expanded in every direction."[19] The branches initiated, and headquarters supported, various efforts to spread humanitarian ideas to rural and urban residents alike. They solicited dues-paying subscribers and forwarded a fixed percentage of that money to headquarters. Regular members (*seishain*) paid three yen per year for ten years before becoming fully vested lifetime members. *The Red Cross in the Far East* described the arrangement as follows:

> The chief function of the Local Branches is the recruiting of the members and the collecting of the subscriptions, but the income so obtained is taken into the central treasury, a comparatively small portion only being left for the use of the Local Branches. A portion of the personnel and supplies of the Society is provided for in the provinces, but is entirely at the disposal of the Headquarters, and no relief of the sick and wounded in time of war or political disturbance can be carried out unless under the control and guidance of the governing body in Tokyo. . . . (1) 40 percent of the income of the prefectures where there are headquarters of Army Division, or Naval Stations, is reserved for the Local Branches, the remainder going to the Headquarters; (2) in the rest of the prefectures 35 percent goes to the Local Branches and (3) in Formosa and Hokkaido 54 percent goes to the Local Branches.[20]

In this system, gathering subscription dues from all classes of local society and

17 Kosuge, "Hakuaisha kara nihon sekijyūjisha e," 45-7.

18 Togo Masatake, "The Red Cross Society of Japan," *The Red Cross in the Far East, Bulletin No. 1*, ed. Togo Masatake (Tokyo: The Red Cross Society of Japan, 1907), 4, 6-7.

19 Ozawa, "Shagyō seiri no hōshin," 1.

20 Red Cross Society of Japan, "Sketch of the Organization of the Red Cross Society of Japan," *The Red Cross in the Far East, Bulletin No. 1*, ed. Togo Masatake (Tokyo: The Red Cross Society of Japan, 1907): 38-40.

forwarding them to headquarters was commonly conceived of as the labor (*rō*) of branch presidents and vice-presidents.[21] Since according to the Society regulations the state-appointed prefectural governor automatically became the president of each prefecture's Red Cross branch, the collection of subscriptions became a sort of voluntary tax payment. It was a way to extract additional revenue from the countryside and concentrate it in the hands of the central authorities.

Still, even with the lower donation amount and the ten year payment plan, getting potential members to make the needed donations was not easy. One powerful tool that headquarters used to promote recruitment was the statistical average. It published a monthly chart ranking each prefecture according to its proportion of JRCS members. Since it divided the number of JRCS members in each prefecture by that prefecture's population, anyone using this chart could, at a glance, compare the success of recruitment efforts between branches.[22] As a result, it turned the work of gathering members into a heated competition between the prefectures. *Yomiuri*, a national newspaper, picked up on this in a 1903 article and added fuel to the fire by calling out the biggest winners and losers in the recruitment game: "Looking at the proportion of Society members to population, the highest is Shiga prefecture, at one member out of every thirty three residents. The lowest proportion overall is Taiwan, but among the main islands it is Miyagi prefecture."[23] Like nations, prefectures thus strove for recognition as champions of humanitarianism by encouraging broad participation by their inhabitants.

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21 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Shain jōkyō: Saga shibu sōkai," 26.

22 For one example see, Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Nihon Sekijūjisha shain tōkeihyō (hachigatsu chōsa)" [JRCS member statistics chart (August survey)], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 103 (October 15, 1901), 2-5..

23 *Yomiuri Shimbun* [Yomiuri Newspaper], "Sekijūjisha no ryūun" [The prosperity of the Red Cross society], June 19, 1903: 5.

While it sorted the humanitarian from the non-humanitarian prefectures extremely effectively, the chart also inadvertently exposed the fundamental difficulty JRCS recruiters encountered—poverty. It was no coincidence that prefectures in the Tōhoku (north-east) region, such as Miyagi, occupied five out of the seven slots at the bottom of the chart. The Tōhoku area may have been the least humanitarian according to the chart, but it was also the poorest, with a difficult climate and geography for cultivation. It also had extremely high levels of tenancy, or, more specifically "parasite landlordism" [*kisei jinushi*], the concentration of land ownership in the hands of a very few. In Miyagi, for example, landlords with holdings of greater than 122 acres owned almost fifteen percent of the arable land. On the opposite end of the spectrum, in chart-topping Shiga prefecture, landlords owned less than 1% of the land.[24] As long as large percentages of the population lived at, or near, subsistence levels of income, the mass recruitment of JRCS members would remain difficult. Improving this situation meant working towards general economic growth and promoting diligent labor and thrift among the poor.

In addition to broadening its subscriber base, the JRCS became aggressive in requesting government contributions to mitigate costs. Various government agencies, especially the military departments, responded by helping the JRCS with non-financial assistance. For example the imperial Army allowed the JRCS to borrow its logistical facilities to move relief materials,[25] and the imperial Navy donated unused blankets to the JRCS.[26] While the national budget never included direct subsidies for the Red Cross,

24 Araki Moriaki, *Tennōsei to jinushisei, jō* [Emperor system and land ownership system, vol 1] (Tokyo: Hanawa Shobō, 1990), 59.

25 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Nisshi, Meiji 22 nichi 1 gatsu shi 6 gatsu" [Log, 1889 January to June], unpublished Japanese Red Cross Society archive, file A1-32, 1889, Japanese Red Cross Society Documents. Japanese Red Cross Society Headquarters Collection, Japanese Red Cross Society Information Plaza, Tokyo, Japan, entry for April 5.

26 Ibid., entry for February 4.

according to Miki Rin the Home Ministry provided a hidden subsidy to the JRCS by purchasing 1500 extra copies of the Society's journal *Hakuai* each month during the 1910s.[27]

However the most reliable contributor to the JRCS effort continued to be the imperial house. For example, the first item in the 1904 "JRCS Operations Results Document" proudly noted that the Emperor and Empress had continued their yearly donations of 10,000 yen towards JRCS headquarters office operations and 10,000 yen towards the JRCS headquarters' hospital.[28]

While capital accumulation fit the overall mission of the JRCS and the idea of saving for emergencies, Ozawa and Matsukata's "General policy of restructuring Society work" put a new operation into effect. Accumulation, in their new style of disaster preparation, was no longer a matter of simply amassing wealth "for a rainy day," but it involved the self-expansion of capital through interest. In addition to building physical infrastructure and training relief workers directly, the plan called for the JRCS to reinvest a large portion of the contributions it received into government bonds, insurance policies, and interest-bearing savings accounts. While the JRCS and its branch offices had been sporadically involved in the purchase of such financial instruments in the past, the restructuring plan integrated them into Society finances in a much more thoroughgoing manner.

Financial investments served three purposes. First, as interest-bearing capital, the JRCS special funds earned provided additional income by which to finance JRCS

27 Miki, *Nihon Sekijūjisha no shironezumi*, 49-51.
28 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Nihon Sekijūjisha jimu seiseki sho" [JRCS operations results document], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 141 (October 15, 1904): supplement, S1.

operations. In this sense, capital accumulation became a continuous, open-ended, directional process by which JRCS administrators, through the mechanism of investment banking, set money into motion for the purpose of its own self-generation. Second, JRCS financial investments made capital available to bankers and insurance company operators for them to reinvest in industrial ventures. As Johannes Hirschmeier points out, Meiji elites worried that wealth would be wasted if left to so-called unproductive uses such as luxury consumption, hoarding, or "traditional" trading activities.[29] The JRCS offered one means by which to channel it into modern industries such as textile factories and railroads. Third, the purchase of bonds provided capital for the government's military buildup. Whereas previously the government had funded the war against Satsuma by simply printing more money, during the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars they turned to war bonds, which, like JRCS membership itself, imposed a kind of voluntary tax on the populace.

Matsukata's ten year plan represented the culmination of this new approach to humanitarian finance. From very early on the JRCS regularly used its stores of funds to purchase government-issued bonds. In 1892, for example, the Kyoto branch submitted a general query to headquarters concerning how to report the purchase of bonds in its accounting records. In the headquarters' response, the examples it used to illustrate the proper accounting of bonds assumed a five to ten percent return on investment per year on 100-yen bonds.[30] Matsukata's ten-year plan massively expanded this practice. By 1904

29 Johannes Hirschmeier, *The Origins of Entrepreneurship in Meiji Japan* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1964), 12.

30 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Nisshi, Meiji 25 nichi 1 gatsu shi 4 gatsu" [Log, 1892 January to April], unpublished Japanese Red Cross Society archive, file A1-38, 1892, Japanese Red Cross Society Documents, Japanese Red Cross Society Headquarters Collection, Japanese Red Cross Society Information Plaza, Tokyo, Japan, entry for April 7. For other early issues related to public bonds see the entries for March 21, 1893 (binder A1-41) and February 24, 1895 (binder A1-47).

JRCS-owned assets included over 3,773,271 yen worth of public debt bonds.[31] The purchase of these bonds diversified the JRCS asset portfolio and, in the opinion of the JRCS leaders, offered a secure and reliable source of income. It also provided the government with easy cash to purchase ships and arms for its military build-up prior to, and during, the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5).[32]

The most immediate precedent for the ten year plan was the International Committee of the Red Cross' Augusta Fund. Writers followed the workings of this fund closely in the pages of the JRCS journal. Established in 1890 by a grant of 100,000 francs from the German Empress Augusta, wife of Wilhelm I, the Fund sat unused, accumulating interest, until the representatives from the various national Red Cross societies could finally agree on rules to govern its use at the 7th Worldwide Red Cross General Meeting in 1902. Ariga Nagao, Japan's representative to the 1902 meeting, included a section on the rules deliberations in his official report which was subsequently reprinted for the general JRCS readership in the JRCS journal. The rules stipulated that the original 100,000 francs would not be used for humanitarian purposes. However each national society could submit petitions to an ICRC-appointed central committee requesting a portion of the interest earned on those funds. The committee reviewed the petitions once a year and made disbursements based on demonstrated need.[33] The Augusta Fund was thus a precursor to the many famous philanthropic foundations such as the Rockefeller Foundation (established in 1913), the Ford Foundation (1936), and the

31 Ibid., "Nihon Sekijūjisha jimu seiseki sho," S11.
32 For a discussion of the importance of war bonds during the Russo-Japanese War see Duus, "Economic Dimensions of Meiji Imperialism," 142-3.
33 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Gaihō: Augusuta kikin no rishi shiyōhō kisoku seitei" [Foreign news: establishment of regulations for the use of interest from the Augusta fund], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 123 (June 15, 1903): 41-43.

Gates Foundation (1994) which were all paid for and named after particular wealthy individuals or families. These were modern versions of the charitable endowment, an institution which operates on the principle of accumulating funds and reinvesting them for a profit.

Despite Vice President Ozawa's claims to the contrary, JRCS administrators' efforts to broaden the organization's revenue base had yielded consistent budget surpluses at both the national headquarters and the local branch office levels. The Mie prefecture branch office provides one representative example. Ranked ninth out of the fifty three branches in Red Cross member density (one out of every fifty three residents was a member), the Mie branch was slightly above average for total members with 19,093 as of August, 1900. Its budget for 1903 showed 12,819 yen in "special savings," 4,032 yen in "branch capital" and a 2,075 yen "temporary balance" carried forward from the previous year. It anticipated increasing the "special savings" to 13,981 yen, and the "branch capital" to 5,917 for 1904.[34] Aggregate capital for all branch offices in the empire totaled 299,135 yen in 1903 and they generally produced revenue surpluses in all prefectures.[35]

At headquarters, the 1903 Operations Results document already showed large budget surpluses. Totaling all three categories of "base capital" (*konki shihon*, later translated as "Permanent Funds"--capital for Matsukata's ten-year plan), "reserve capital" (*jōgi shihon*), and "special capital" (*tokubetsu shihon*), the JRCS carried over 6,060,267 yen in capital from 1902. 1903 income for these three categories totaled 3,177,020 yen

34 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Mie shibu yosan" [Mie branch budget], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 121 (April 15, 1903): 3.

35 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Honnendo shibu yosan" [Current year branch budgets], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 121 (April 15, 1903): 3.

with a balance carried forward to 1904 of 7,310,821 yen.[36] The JRCS budget for 1905, drawn up at a moment when a swift end to the war with Russia could not be predicted, still carried forward a previous year (1904) surplus of 7,160,031 yen and estimated that even given 3,246,987 yen in emergency war expenditures, 6,405,629 yen would be carried forward to 1906.[37] The JRCS was able to generate these surpluses year after year because of the peculiar structure of humanitarian business. Unlike a typical firm in the manufacturing, construction, transportation, or agricultural sectors, the JRCS did not face the uncertainty of whether or not it would be able to find a market for its products. It could always tailor the intensity of its relief activities to match the assets available at the moment of emergency, reducing benefits if funds were insufficient. In short, the Society would only run at a loss if it deliberately decided to do so.

Subsequently, the Augusta fund and Matsukata's ten year plan became widely emulated models for financing humanitarian activity both in Japan and other nations. In 1912 the Japanese Empress Shōken donated 100,000 yen to the ICRC, through the JRCS, as a "Fund for the Encouragement of Relief Work in Time of Peace." Granted on the only condition that "the capital shall remain undiminished and only the interest be expended for the purpose of encouragement,"[38] the Empress entrusted the management of the fund entirely to the ICRC, claiming no special privileges for Japan's national Society.

Furthermore, under the leadership of its second president, Mabel Thorp Boardman, the American Red Cross also became famous for using endowment funds for

36 Ibid., "Nihon Sekijūjisha jimu seiseki sho" S4-S5.
37 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Sanjū hachi nendo yosan" [1905 year budget], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 152 (January 10, 1905): 20.
38 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Proposition of the Japanese Red Cross Society Concerning the Fund for the Encouragement of Relief Work in Time of Peace," *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 296 (June 10, 1912): 2.

providing for the "perpetual upkeep" of facilities.[39] In an 1911 speech to current and prospective members Boardman advocated the use of interest-producing funds for her own Red Cross Society. Boardman also noted the limitation of this kind of financing, however, arguing that funds were only good for so-called "small emergencies," meaning peacetime disasters. She believed that natural disaster response did not require massive amounts of capital and could be adequately dealt with using only the interest from funds. War, by contrast, was a kind of ultimate emergency during which no resource could be left unused. She argued that a drive for new donations would again be necessary in wartime.[40]

However, the JRCS had already tested Boardman's claim during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5). During that conflict, the JRCS leaders proved so adamant about their capital accumulation plan that they refused to spend any of Matsukata's Permanent Funds even while the battles raged. Instead, they relied on wartime patriotic fervor to bring in new subscriptions and extraordinary one-time donations in order to finance humanitarian activities. As discussed in chapter two, these activities included dispatches of medical personnel into conflict areas on the continent, the transportation of casualties from the various battlefields back to the archipelago, and the care of wounded Russian prisoners. The *Red Cross in the Far East* advertised the JRCS effort as a major feat of administrative skill:

> Scarcely had we begun carrying out this ten years' plan when the Russo-Japanese war broke out, which having necessitated the expenditure of some 5,000,000 yen for relief work, the project to increase the Permanent Fund

39 Gwendolyn C. Shealy, *A Critical History of the American Red Cross, 1882-1945: The End of Noble Humanitarianism* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2003), 64.

40 Mabel Thorp Boardman, "Hozon to sekijūji no shugi" [Preservation and Red Cross principle], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 286 (August 5, 1911): 6.

> was set back two years behind. Vice-President Ozawa who directed the relief department as its temporary chief, managed the entire business so well that in spite of an extraordinarily heavy expenditure for work he was able to accomplish its end without causing any depletion in the Permanent Funds so far accumulated. Therefore, as soon as peace was restored, the Society started again in 1906 to carry on its ten years' plan as originally arranged, and while naturally in consequence of the war we had had to be two years behind, the fulfillment of the plan was now to be effected in 1914 instead of 1912. [41]

In other words, Ozawa and Matsukata had successfully reversed the means and ends of humanitarian response, subordinating the immediate relief of human suffering to the long-term development of a sound financial position. War was no longer just a grave humanitarian emergency, but also an economic inconvenience to be managed.

Thanks to the diligence and generosity of its members, by 1914 the JRCS completed the accumulation of Permanent Funds and Vice-President Ozawa enjoyed the stable financial base that he had long desired. It was at this moment that the full implications of the ten years' plan became clear. Ozawa's subordinate, Fujimoto Shaku, remarked in a private conversation: "Even if for some reason [JRCS] membership does not increase by a single person over what we already have, the interest on our fifteen million yen alone is enough to ensure the livelihood of the headquarters' employees so we do not care about any [public] criticism."[42] Financial soundness, in effect, was another expression for insularity. For Fujimoto and Ozawa the JRCS had transferred some of its dependence on the fickle generosity of direct contributors to financial markets. As *The Red Cross in the Far East* put it, the JRCS had entered its "consolidation period."[43] If the humanity of actual humans could not be relied upon to support the JRCS, then at least

41 The Red Cross Society of Japan, "The carrying out of the ten years' plan," *The Red Cross in the Far East*, *Bulletin No. 3*, 46-48 (Tokyo: The Red Cross Society of Japan, 1910), 47-8.
42 Miki, *Nihon Sekijūjisha no shironezumi,* 20-1.
43 The Red Cross Society of Japan, "The carrying out of the ten years' plan," 47.

humanity's creation—the modern capitalist economy—would prove adequate. By any measure the ensuing results were impressive, even though the new use of finance also meant a new, unacknowledged vulnerability to the vicissitudes of financial markets.

The JRCS ten year plan thus exemplified a new sensibility about the economics of charitable work. On the one hand, it incorporated mass participation in the effort of capital accumulation directly, through subscriber dues. On the other hand, its reinvestment of those funds helped develop an array of new financial techniques and institutions which were integral to building modern industrial enterprise. These instruments, such as bonds and interest-bearing savings accounts, also distributed risk more widely, but did so through the abstract medium of financial markets. In this way, charity became social in a modern sense. It was dependent not only on the generosity of individuals, but also on the overall movement of the economy in general. The lesson was simple. If gathered in sufficient quantities and invested wisely, money could be made to reproduce itself. As long as the overall economy continued to grow and inflation kept low, the JRCS could use this excess to fund its operations indefinitely.

Land

> The monstrous power wielded by landed property, when united hand in hand with industrial capital, enables it to be used against labourers engaged in their wage struggle as a means of practically expelling them from the earth as a dwelling-place. One part of society thus exacts tribute from another for the permission to inhabit the earth, as landed property in general assigns the landlord the privilege of exploiting the terrestrial body, the bowels of the earth, the air, and thereby the maintenance and development of life.
>
> --Karl Marx, *Capital, Vol. 3*

On June 28, 1890, JRCS President Sano took a day trip to visit a cow pasture. Of course this was no ordinary cow pasture. Part of the second imperial estate (*dai ni goryōchi*) in Minamitoshima (later renamed Shinjuku), on the western edge of metropolitan Tokyo, the pasture bordered the section of the Estate recently granted to the the JRCS for use in constructing the first Red Cross central hospital. The purpose of Sano's visit was simple. The JRCS needed to assess the possibility of using the section of the pasture adjoining the new hospital grounds to build a quarantined ward for patients with infectious diseases. In May of 1889 Sano had written to the Estate director Yamamoto Seijū inquiring about possibly using the site.[44] Apparently unsatisfied with the results, in February of 1890 Sano restated his case in another letter, sent directly to imperial household minister Viscount Hijikata Hisamoto.[45] This time he received a response from the imperial estate representative stating that from the estate's perspective there were no impediments to carrying out the construction project and that Sano should visit and see the site in person if he had any concerns about its suitability. We can imagine exactly how the visit went, since the reply letter Sano penned on his return to headquarters was explicit. Thanking the Estate for its correspondence, he withdrew the request to use the site, stating: "as sanitary spaces, the infectious disease rooms require fresh air. With a cow pasture so nearby the air is dirty and the stench will invade the patients' rooms."[46]

As absurd as the image of a cow pasture in Tokyo seems today, this episode reveals the deeply troubled physical condition of Japan's capital in the early Meiji period.

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44 Nihon Sekijūjisha. "Nisshi, Meiji 22 nichi 1 gatsu shi 6 gatsu," entry for May 10.
45 Ibid., entry for February 14.
46 Ibid., entry for June 28.

As T. Fujitani relates, during the 1860s the exodus of feudal lords, the shogun, and the commoners working in industries that supported them had reduced Tokyo's population by more than half of its high of 1.3 million. The abandonment of the former feudal estates, together with the absence of any reconstruction effort following the destruction of the imperial palace by fire in 1873, meant that large sections of the city had been left derelict. Beyond the newly reconstructed Ginza area, Tokyo was overgrown with untended foliage. It was the site of badger dens, mulberry tracts, and cow pastures.[47]

Throughout the imperial era the JRCS worked to improve the condition of land by developing the area around Tokyo and the rest of the empire. As a part of its overall effort to build humanitarian relief capabilities it helped integrate land into a tripartite social configuration characteristic of modern capitalism. In the middle, the Society collected its membership dues and accumulated its interest-bearing funds, functioning much as a capitalist landlord or real estate investor. It initiated and managed a process of land improvement by borrowing sites from the largest landed property holder of the empire—the imperial family. It then employed laborers both in the process of capital investment in the land and in conducting humanitarian relief action. By inquiring into its land usage practices, the importance of the JRCS in the constitution of these three groups—landed property, capitalist landlords, and laborers—becomes clear.

The story of the construction of the first JRCS central hospital at Minamitoshima in 1890 illuminates lines by which Red Cross humanitarianism was involved in the historical transformation of land into a socially constituted commodity. At the beginning of the Meiji era it was not clear that Tokyo would become the imperial capital. Besides

47 Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy,* 38-41.

the untended condition of the land, during the 1870s and early 1880s Sano Tsunetami himself disparaged the city for the character of its inhabitants, describing them as "cold-hearted" and "wallowing in extravagances." In 1878 he had issued a policy recommendation in his capacity as a member of the Senate (*genroin*) that the government should move the capital to Honjō, in Saitama, to rectify the physical and moral deficiencies of Tokyo.[48] By 1890, however, Sano had resigned himself to Tokyo's continuation as the imperial capital. The palace had finally been rebuilt in 1888 and, along with the Palace Plaza, Hibiya Field, Aoyama Military Parade Field, and Ueno Park, secured Tokyo's status as the new symbolic center of the nation.[49] The construction of the Red Cross hospital in 1890 helped to further rectify the dilapidated condition of the city's landscape at the same time Sano promoted Red Cross humanitarianism as a means to rectify the city's morals.

The mutually supportive relationship between the JRCS and the imperial house is nowhere more evident than in the Society's struggles to acquire land. Throughout the modern period JRCS leaders aspired to build facilities across the empire. In 1908, for example, the JRCS publicized its ambitious long-term plan for the construction of a comprehensive system of hospitals covering each prefecture, even in areas lacking major military bases.[50] As the story of the cow pasture suggests, however, early on the JRCS faced major challenges finding places to build its hospitals, offices, and warehouses. Unclean air was one possible problem, but the more pervasive issue of fractured land ownership also complicated the process of procuring sites suitable for building the kinds

48 Ibid., 41.
49 Ibid., 82.
50 *Yomiuri Shimbun* [Yomiuri Newspaper], "Sekijūji shibu byōin" [Red Cross branch hospitals], April 27, 1908: 2.

of large facilities that JRCS leaders envisioned.

To be sure, the JRCS sometimes received land donations from members or other benefactors, however the leaders did not find these suitable for construction. For example, on May 6, 1890, President Sano received a letter from Takei Morishi, chief of the JRCS committee for Tottori prefecture.

> One of our regular members has made a one-time donation of arable land separate from and in addition to his member subscription. In this case, is it necessary to ask the opinion of the donor whether or not we must keep this land as it is, or can we just sell it and put the money into savings? I would like to inquire into the advantages and disadvantages of doing so and whether or not there are any regulations concerning this in our charter.[51]

In this letter Takei only offers two ideas concerning the use of this land; leaving it "as is" or selling it. He does not consider developing this piece of land into a hospital or storehouse for relief materials as even an option. This might be explained by its remote location. Tottori was a heavily agricultural prefecture located in Southwestern Honshu on the Sea of Japan, 680 kilometers (400 miles) from Tokyo and far from other major ports or connecting highways. Access to the site would have been terribly inconvenient. Simply selling the land would also make it easier to determine what kind of recognition and status the Society would grant the member for his donation, since these were set according to yen amounts. Sano estimated that the sale of the land in Tottori might not yield more than fifty yen, meaning that the land donated was probably only a small plot.[52] With only a small plot, the Society would be unable to use it effectively to build a hospital, for example, without purchasing adjoining plots. Adjoining plots were bound to be small as well. In the 1870s the Meiji regime had removed all restrictions on the sale of

51 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Nisshi, Meiji 23 nichi 1 gatsu shi 6 gatsu," entry for May 11.
52 Ibid.

land and so farmers had sub-divided their fields into smaller and smaller sections as debt forced them to liquidate holdings peace-by-piece. Large landowners might hold a great deal of land in total, but it was often scattered in small plots across a wide area. This invited the comparison that one American economist made in 1923: "The average Japanese farm consists of just about three acres. In the United States the average farm contains 148 acres - about fifty times as much."[53] E. H. Norman argued that the "atomization" of farm land created "an insurmountable barrier to any attempt at large-scale mechanization or revolution in agricultural technique."[54] It also made it extremely difficult to acquire the kind of wide, contiguous plots necessary for building large, centralized facilities for the JRCS.

Sano's firm reply to Takei's inquiry reassured him that there were no specific regulations regarding the liquidation of land donations and instructed him to act according to the circumstances. That is, the situation depended on both the social status of the donor and the disposition of the land itself. Was it fertile or relatively unproductive? Did it have unpaid taxes assessed to it or other "troublesome" conditions attached? Ultimately, Sano implied that sale of the land was permitted and even preferred.[55]

Rather than use donated land or negotiate sales with groups of landowners, JRCS leaders requested the support of the imperial house to find wide, expandable construction sites. JRCS histories proudly boasted about the numerous land-related favors it had received from the imperial house for use in constructing its facilities. In the name of the

53 Daniel H. Buchanana, "The Rural Economy of Japan," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 37, No. 4 (August, 1923): 548.
54 Norman, *Origins*, 260-3.
55 Nihon Sekijūjisha. "Nisshi, Meiji 23 nichi 1 gatsu shi 6 gatsu," entry for May 11, 1890.

Emperor it could forcibly remove whoever or whatever had been using the land and build its hospitals. In 1879 the Hakuaisha received permission to construct its first headquarters building on the grounds of an imperial villa in Azabu City, on the Eastern border of Tokyo. In 1886, as part of the government's decision to enter the Geneva treaty, the Society built a new headquarters and its first permanent hospital on the grounds of the imperial palace at Kōjimachi Ward, in Tokyo (present day Chiyoda Ward).[56] To increase relief capacity and provide more opportunities for training medical personnel the Society built its first central hospital at the imperial estate in Minamitoshima, which opened in 1892 with a grand ceremony including fireworks and an appearance by the Empress.[57]

When the Red Cross central hospital opened its doors in 1892, it showcased the wealth and benevolence of the Empress and her family. This situation invites the question: how did the Emperor come to possess such large tracts of land? Acquiring and developing estates donated from the imperial house would have been unimaginable prior to the 1868 coup d'état. As it turns out, moneylenders and wealthy landowning peasants were not the only ones grabbing land during the economically tumultuous 1880s.

In 1882 the Emperor's personal estates covered 1,000 cho (approximately 2,450 acres). By 1890 that number had reached 3,650,000 cho (8,942,500 acres). From its relatively obscure and economically dependent status in the feudal order under the Tokugawa Shogun, the Emperor became, in the words of one critical scholar, “the largest parasitical landlord in Japan.”[58] Under the direction of Restoration leader Iwakura Tomomi, the imperial house received a large percentage of land appropriated by the

56 Kosuge, “Hakuaisha kara nihon sekijyūjisha e,” 45-6, 61.
57 Nihon Sekijūjisha. “Nisshi, Meiji 25 nichi 5 gatsu shi 8 gatsu,” entries for June 13, 15, 17, and 25.
58 Halliday, *A Political History of Japanese Capitalism*, 44.

government from farmers defaulting on their taxes. Fearing imminent revolution, he pushed a policy of expanding the imperial estate until it could pay for the entire armed forces and police on its own. Worse, the imperial house accelerated agricultural foreclosures by taking over large tracts of privatized communal land—land poorer farmers relied upon for subsistence activities like gathering wood and grazing livestock such as cattle.[59] Fortunately for the JRCS, these former communal lands tended to come in larger parcels perfect for use in building hospitals, offices, or warehouses.

Having these newly appropriated properties in the hands of the Emperor put them in a legally ambiguous relationship to the government since, according to the 1889 constitution they were outside of the control of the elected diet and not a part of the administration's budget. This situation proved convenient to high-ranking and well-connected members of the peerage who could petition the imperial family for favors through the imperial household ministry. Such powerful men asked the emperor or empress directly for assistance with various projects—especially ones of a charitable or humanitarian nature—bypassing the messy politics of diet budget proceedings. In this way the imperial house became a prominent provider of emergency poor relief, especially from the 1870s through the 1910s when fiscal conservatism dominated the bureaucracy and Diet, stalling the implementation of comprehensive poverty relief legislation for years.[60]

Count Sano Tsunetami earned his rank during the Meiji restoration and cemented his ties with the court during his time on the Iwakura mission and through his work

59 Ibid., 43-44.
60 Sheldon Garon, *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1997), 34-49.

promoting industrial exhibitions in Japan. JRCS accounts emphasize his close relationship with the Empress, to whom he reported the Society's relief and financial results reports in person in the imperial palace and from whom he received the ceremonial hairpin which became the Society crest.[61] Prince Matsukata Masayoshi also cultivated strong ties to the imperial family. He had numerous audiences with the emperor and even hosted the emperor and empress at his residence in 1887.[62] As further evidence of the closeness between the JRCS and the imperial Family, in 1891 the imperial household agency issued two permanent gate passes to the Red Cross hospital for doctors or nurses to use in the case of urgent medical necessity.[63] With this kind of access to the imperial house, JRCS officials found it easier to petition them for land usage rights rather than to try to purchase it from reluctant farmers, make requests through local government offices, or pass legislation in the diet. The ease with which the imperial household agency acceded to JRCS requests shows the agency's eagerness to put these newly appropriated lands to use, but also its limited administrative capacity to manage them closely.

Here the JRCS stepped in to act as an investor and landlord for the imperial property holder. For example, when the imperial family bestowed grounds for a new headquarters and central hospital, as announced on September 14, 1889, it meant starting capital improvements almost from scratch.[64] During the Tokugawa era the bakufu,

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61 Kosuge, “Hakuaisha kara nihon sekijyūjisha e,” 52-3.

62 Haru Matsukata Reischauer, *Samurai and Silk: a Japanese and American Heritage* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986), 101-3.

63 Nihon Sekijūjisha, “Nisshi, Meiji 24 nichi 1 gatsu shi 6 gatsu” [Log, 1891 January to June], unpublished Japanese Red Cross Society archive, file A1-36, 1891, Japanese Red Cross Society Documents, Japanese Red Cross Society Headquarters Collection, Japanese Red Cross Society Information Plaza, Tokyo, Japan, entry for May 21.

64 Nihon Sekijūjisha, “Nisshi, Meiji 22 nichi 7 gatsu shi 12 gatsu” [Log, 1889 July to December], unpublished Japanese Red Cross Society archive, file A1-33, 1889, Japanese Red Cross Society

daimyo, and village authorities typically decreed common lands off-limits to logging or other uses that might radically change the environment. Common lands served as foraging grounds for famine-stricken or poor farmers who often sent family members to collect nuts, grass, mushrooms, or other food supplies of desperation. JRCS purposes required many such radical changes to the environment. Above and beyond the construction of the actual structures, JRCS leaders sought to develop the land, rendering it suitable not only for the project of relieving human suffering, but increasing the value of the land on behalf of the imperial house.

First, the woods needed clearing. Fully aware of the magnitude of change to the area that cutting the estate's ancient oak trees would produce, Sano twice made special requests to the imperial household agency to confirm that the JRCS had the emperor's permission: first in November, 1890 for initial construction of the main hospital building;[65] second in February, 1891 after Sano decided not to try to build the contagious disease annex in the cow pasture and instead clear out more forest, this time at the neighboring third imperial estate. For the JRCS, trees were ultimately just an "impediment" (*sashi*) to its expanding construction program.[66] The imperial household agency did not disagree.

Next, the JRCS initiated various transportation and communication-related infrastructural upgrades. The existing road to the hospital construction site required repair

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Documents. Japanese Red Cross Society Headquarters Collection, Japanese Red Cross Society Information Plaza, Tokyo, Japan, entry for September 14.

65 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Nisshi, Meiji 23 nichi 7 gatsu shi 12 gatsu" [Log, 1890 July to December], unpublished Japanese Red Cross Society archive, A1-35. 1890. Japanese Red Cross Society Documents. Japanese Red Cross Society Headquarters Collection, Japanese Red Cross Society Information Plaza, Tokyo, Japan, entry for November 12.

66 Ibid., "Nisshi, Meiji 24 nichi 1 gatsu shi 6 gatsu," entry for February 14.

and paving for the easy access of ambulance carts.[67] The headquarters required a new access road and electrification.[68] In 1890 the JRCS petitioned the Tokyo metropolitan police department to add a carriage stop outside of the front gate of the hospital for patient and staff use.[69] Furthermore, the grounds required constant maintenance, including tree and shrub pruning, gutter repair, and the repair and improvement of washed out roads leading to and from the facility.[70] Lastly, the JRCS contributed to the ever-expanding web of communications systems as it sought out means to coordinate disaster response more effectively. In 1892 it had telephone lines installed for the hospital and the president's office for just this purpose.[71]

By developing the land in this manner, Sano created a win-win situation for the JRCS and the imperial household agency. Sano both relieved the agency of some of the burden of managing the massive areas that it had suddenly acquired and fulfilled Iwakura's original vision of using the land to support the military. It built infrastructure and facilities that supported both humanitarian action and industrial enterprise. Thanks to the JRCS, the imperial house could look forward to owning a vastly more valuable piece of land and, more importantly, be able to charge much higher rents on it and the surrounding areas.

The commodification of land was demonstrated in the most direct way when the JRCS relocated away from a site, because it left behind structures that immediately went up for rental to private businesses. For example, the JRCS made a deal with the imperial

67 Ibid., "Nisshi, Meiji 23 nichi 7 gatsu shi 12 gatsu," entry for November 26.
68 Ibid., "Nisshi, Meiji 24 nichi 1 gatsu shi 6 gatsu," entries for June 15 and May 6.
69 Ibid., entry for June 6.
70 Ibid., "Nisshi, Meiji 25 nichi 1 gatsu shi 4 gatsu," entry for April 4.
71 Ibid.

household ministry concerning the approximately 1.4 acres of land where the old JRCS hospital once stood. Still formally a part of the imperial palace at Kōjimachi, the land did not revert to the control of the ministry once the JRCS left. Instead, the JRCS leaders rented it out and used the income thus generated, over 82 yen per month, to fund operations at the new hospital.[72] Showing its commitment to preserving so-called Japanese traditions while promoting economic development, the organizations the JRCS chose as tenants were the School of Basic Training in Business (*shōgyōsoshūgakko*) and a noh theater.[73]

Labor

> It is one of the civilizing aspects of capital that it enforces surplus-labor in a manner and under conditions which are more advantageous to the development of the productive forces, social relations, and the creation of the elements for a new and higher form than under the preceding forms of slavery, serfdom, etc. . . .
>
> --*Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 3*

On August 20, 1911 Gunma prefecture, a largely agricultural area northwest of Tokyo, suffered heavy flooding. As it always did in such cases, the JRCS immediately put its relief capacity to use. It dispatched a relief corps to the scene which consisted of a doctor, a medic, a director, and two boatmen who conducted relief cruises of the inundated areas on a daily basis. The JRCS log entry reported that once the water level

72 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Nisshi, Meiji 24 nichi 7 gatsu shi 12 gatsu" [Log, 1891 July to December], unpublished Japanese Red Cross Society archive, file A1-37, 1891, Japanese Red Cross Society Documents, Japanese Red Cross Society Headquarters Collection, Japanese Red Cross Society Information Plaza, Tokyo, Japan, entry for October 3.

73 Ibid., entry for September 5, 1891.

had lowered on September 2: "at each flood area we set up a doctor, a nurse, and a laborer (*ninpu*) to carry out relief."[74] This trinity of doctors, nurses, and laborers (boatmen included), comprised the workers of the Red Cross. Through their labor—transporting, diagnosing and treating patients, hauling and distributing supplies, clearing wrecked structures, surveying disaster sites, and repairing damaged infrastructure—these men and women made humanitarian disaster response possible.

However, unlike most businesses the JRCS did not simply employ the existing labor force to carry out productive activity . Rather, it was intimately involved in the social constitution of labor as a value producing activity in the first place. The JRCS strove to educate a nation of diligent laborers as a matter of urgent necessity not only to grow its own membership base and strengthen its finances, but as a humanitarian gesture to rescue the people of the empire from poverty. Writers for the JRCS sought to show that with hard work anyone could become an important contributor to the Red Cross. In doing so it advanced what Marx called the "form of illusion" that the wages of labor were a source of wealth akin to interest and rent. Such representations obfuscated the reality that the employer's appropriation of surplus value made labor into a form of exploitation. This exploitation entailed the concentration of wealth in the hands of the capitalists, who thereby enjoyed an increased ability to spend accumulated profits on humanitarianism. In short, the dogged persistence and incessant repetition of the JRCS in touting the importance of the financial contributions of laborers exposes the fact that the Society's mission to incorporate the entire nation as members was structurally impossible. It elevated its working-class members as paragons of humanitarianism precisely because

74 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Gunma shibu suisai kyūgo" [Gunma branch flood disaster relief], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 279 (January 5, 1911): 38.

they were so rare. Instead, the main share of membership revenue continued to come from the bourgeois and landed property holders, who were best able to pay thanks to the wealth-concentrating effects of capitalism as a social organization of production.

The story of Endō Niitarō, published in the June, 1903 issue of the *Journal of the Japanese Red Cross* typified the Society's praise for its less affluent, laboring members:

> Yamagata people are humble but their sincerity is high. For example there is the adopted son of Mr. Endō Toyoji, Niitarō. Of trustworthy disposition, he was a diligent person. While the house's main business was raising cows, Niitarō worked as a day laborer transporting charcoal. Gradually his earnings increased so he was able to sustain the family. He was moved to become a JRCS regular member when he overheard talk about Society operations from his employer—JRCS sub-division chief Shibuyase Ijirō. He submitted some portion of the 1-year 3 yen subscription in February. He makes sandals at night so he will easily meet the next 8-months' payments.[75]

Endō's story contained a number of common assumptions which rendered wage labor morally good. First, the journal's editors saw no problem in Endō's apparent abandonment of the family's hereditary work—raising cattle. Instead it praised him for laboring in an occupation which offered "increased earnings." The account thus emphasized the advantages of flexibility and the willingness to seek out new opportunities in the labor market rather than relying on an occupation which required the family to own its own means of production. Unfortunately job instability, labor migration, and loss of control over working conditions were the trade-offs that characterized this new, more profitable employee life.

Second, the account unproblematically treated Endō's wages as if they were the value produced from each full day of his labor. This value, the account stressed, was enough to support his family and it specifically mentioned that his extra night labor

75 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Kokoro nishiki," 21-23.

would provide the funds for Society donations so as to not jeopardize them. This simple notion of labor as a wealth producing activity obscured its historically specific social character in capitalism. The wages laborers received did not calibrate directly to their productivity over the time they spent working. Rather, the employer could only pay the laborer a wage which always tended toward subsistence level, appropriating the surplus value of the laborer's work as a matter of course. In other words, the circumstance that less than a full day of labor was necessary to keep the laborer (and her or his family) clothed, fed, and sheltered for 24 hours: "does not in any way prevent him from working the whole day."[76] Here, the JRCS praised Niitarō, a "sincere," "trustworthy" and "diligent" model for laborers who received his day's wages—sufficient to sustain his family—as if his whole working day produced them, even though the ever-increasing productivity of industry made it clear that a worker ought to be able earn a living wage laboring far less time than she or he had done in the past.

Put differently, this kind of labor appeared to have an advantage (over raising cattle, for instance) in that the laborer's wages varied in direct proportion to time worked and productivity. As the article on Niitarō claimed, he could increase his income in a regular, predictable, fashion as he received more and more days of work and became a better and better hauler. Unfortunately the situation was rarely so rosy. As one observer noted: "If, in their eagerness for more pay, workers increased their efficiency, the employer would lower the piece-work rate." Furthermore: "Both wages and hours tended to be highly irregular and variable, being set by the employer without reference to any

76 Karl Marx, *Capital: a Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1990 [1976]) vol. 1, 300-1.

standard practice."[77] Increased productivity and longer hours benefited the employer most of all, since it reduced costs on a per-unit basis. From the perspective of the JRCS this outcome was more than acceptable, since wealthy factory owners, landowners, and other employers also became JRCS members and donated large sums to become "honorary" rather than standard members.

Lastly, the relationship between Endō and his employer was rendered completely benign, since "he was moved" when he "overheard" talk of the Society. Accordingly, the decision to donate to the JRCS was completely voluntary on the part of Endō, in accordance with his "spirit." The idea that Niitarō's sincere spirit was moved by humanitarian ideals may have made for a "beautiful story" (*bidan*), to use the JRCS journal's appellation, but a member's decision to donate to the Red Cross did not take place in an empty vacuum of abstract concepts (humanity, civilization, nation). It involved a messy world of personal obligation, economic interest, and exploitation. The stakes in this decision were high on both sides of the transaction. The state-appointed governor of each prefecture automatically became the president of that prefecture's Red Cross branch so they and their officers were generally powerful, affluent men with ties to the central bureaucracy. As the membership charts demonstrated, Red Cross participation became one easily visible measure of the prefecture's (and its governor's) contribution to the Empire. For the worker, newly freed to sell her or his labor on the market and thereby rendered newly vulnerable and dependent on the products of others, 3 yen per year made for a very serious investment. It also came to mean recognition as "trustworthy" and

77 Okochi Kazuo, *Labor in Modern Japan* (Tokyo: The Science Council of Japan, 1958), 11-12. A similar point is made by Andrew Gordon when he notes that laborers tended to initiate disputes in order to limit management's power to discriminate over wages. See Andrew Gordon, *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1991), 204.

"diligent"—qualities highly desired by employers. In this situation, the ideal of the voluntary contribution, as directly opposed to compulsory taxes, for example, breaks down.

The JRCS did not limit its promotion of labor to such stories of exemplars. They published numerous articles that took the more direct approach of exhorting better laboring behavior. The October, 1910 issue of the *Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*, for example, made labor a minor theme of the issue, including two back-to-back articles on proper work ethics. The first, Inoue Tomoichi's "The diligence and indolence of people and the rise and fall of nations" (*Hito no kinda to kuni no seisui*) took the form of a travel narrative. The author, a top bureaucrat in the Home Ministry who had also served as prefectural governor of Tokyo, recounted a trip to Europe and the working habits of people in various countries there. He was astonished by the honesty in England, where the restaurants used an honor system for billing customers and the bankers allowed him to touch the gold coins in the vault. He wrote that due to the "civic virtues" and "honesty" of the "English gentlemen," they "eliminate useless labor and things proceed more efficiently." Inoue represented Italians, by contrast, as a dishonest bunch. Purchasing a train ticket from Rome to Berlin he was cheated into paying almost double the ticket price. He concludes:

> When circumstances like these two can be found—one country [England] is increasingly prosperous in the sunlight, while in the other [Italy] is withering in decay—the reason is obvious. The effort and managerial skill of the English is utterly reliable. When I face my fellow Japanese countrymen, I greatly hope that each will contribute to the nation with strength and skill from now on.[78]

78 Inoue Tomoichi, "Hito no kinda to kuni no seisui" [The diligence and indolence of people and the rise and fall of nations], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 264 (October 5, 1910): 16, 17.

Inoue thus makes labor the key to understanding the essence of a people's national character. Honest, hard work decided the fate of the nation.

The second article of the pair used examples from closer to home. Soeda Juichi's "Japanese working habits reformed" (*Aratametaki Nihonjin no shigotoburi*) started by reprimanding the Emperor's subjects for their indolence: "Japanese—and I am ashamed to admit that I am included in this category—do not like work, hate labor exertion, and are better at lying about idle. This is simply the usual custom."[79] Soeda, a banker, industrialist, and an expert in economics who worked for the Ministry of Finance, extended the analysis of labor's role in constituting national character by seeking the origins of Japan's work ethic in its national history:

> The first thing I want to improve is an evil holdover from the feudal period —bad working habits which we are still not rid of. The so-called warriors conducted themselves with such arrogance, like when they leisurely used a toothpick after eating, or were strolling around idly, that to see them as admirable would be a mistake.[80]

Many authors for the JRCS saw *bushido*—the warrior ethos—as an inspiration for JRCS humanitarianism and a model guiding the conduct of the people of the modern nation. Soeda, however, found the actual warriors themselves lacking any praiseworthy qualities. Harkening back to the final decades of the Tokugawa shogunate, the situation Soeda described reflected the impoverished state of the government at the time. Unable to provide official positions for samurai, the government left them in a bind. Due to caste restrictions, they were forbidden from working in other professions and were indeed often simply idle. Soeda's argument thus typified bourgeois critiques of *ancien régimes*

79 Soeda Jyuichi, "Aratametaki nihonjin no shigotoburi" [Japanese working habits reformed], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 264 (October 5, 1910): 17.
80 Ibid.

across the globe as ineffective, parasitic, and corrupt. The ruling class was simply living off the work of farmers, artisans, and merchants and contributed nothing to society's productivity.

Soeda found that in Japan's case, unlike Europe, vestiges of the old society lived on—corrupting the modern nation with bad working habits:

> Comparing foreigners to Japanese, the difference is the Japanese people's lack of enthusiasm in work. Foreigners are apt to remark: 'When I rely on Japan's gardeners, no only do they arrive late in the morning, they smoke tobacco, chat with each other, and the time they spend actually working is short. Also in the afternoon they leave early which is bothersome.' When I mention it, it turns out that it is not just one foreigner, but many Japanese also have had the same experience. In that way, no one can tell when Japanese are working or playing. Lately it seems to have decreased, but previously there were often shopkeepers playing *go* in storefronts.[81]

Here, Soeda arrived at what he considered the heart of the matter—that Japanese, and "Orientals" (*tōyōjin*) in general, did not make a clear enough distinction between work time and leisure time. This lack of time discipline not only meant that workers' thoughts would be unfocused and that productivity would suffer, but that it was a major inconvenience for the employer as well. Soeda's complaints echoed those of the employers Andrew Gordon studied who also found that workers lacked diligence. Workers loafed in the workplace, faked illness, changed jobs often, and generally had "a lax attitude toward hours, rules, and holidays."[82] Indeed, from the perspective of the Red Cross there was little evidence of the kind of Protestant-style work ethic which Robert Bellah claimed existed from the Tokugawa era.[83] Rather, industrialist humanitarians made it their project to produce such an ethic through education.

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81 Ibid., 18.

82 Andrew Gordon, *The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan: Heavy Industry, 1853-1955* (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University 1985), 27-28.

83 Robert Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion: the Values of Pre-industrial Japan* (New York: Free Press, 1957).

Unlike Inoue, however, Soeda did not ground his ultimate appeal for reformed labor in the notion that the people's work ethic would decide the fate of the nation. Instead he appealed to the self-interest of the laborers themselves. He concluded: "Whether laboring or playing or doing anything, if it is not well separated activity will not progress, and that is bad for the body (*karada no tame ni warui*). For that reason I think that Japanese people absolutely must be trained to alternate work duties and leisure well."[84] In the interest of maintaining her or his own healthy body, then, the Japanese laborer required instruction on how to mentally focus on one activity at a time. In sum, Soeda's argued that the compartmentalization of time and the work-leisure separation typical of modern life had to be ingrained in the population. By learning how tame their own unruly habits, Soeda envisioned the Japanese overcoming the feudal past and realizing their own potential as embodied, laboring individuals.

Not simply a pulpit from which to preach the theoretical benefits of labor improvement, the JRCS promoted concrete activities that put such ideas into practice as well. From the 1910s onward the JRCS became more and more involved in what they termed "social relief." In the 1920s the JRCS journal *Hakuai* began a monthly feature called "Social News" (*Shakai jihō*). Here one could find a variety of labor-related information regarding both social research and related relief organizations. In March of 1930, for example, the journal advertised a work program in Tokyo to employ "vagrants" (*furōsha*) staying at the free lodging house in Hamazono. The city provided a 50,000 yen grant to start the program and the JRCS ostensibly advertised it to help find volunteers to staff it and employers to provide job opportunities.[85]

84 Soeda, "Aratametaki nihonjin no shigotoburi," 18.
85 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Shakai jihō: muryō shukuhakujo de jusan" [Social news: free lodging house work

Red Cross societies also organized labor projects directly. The JRCS took particular inspiration from the German Red Cross Society in such social relief work. A 1913 report titled "The German Red Cross labor plantation" (*Doitsu sekijūji rōdōen*)—part of a series outlining Red Cross peacetime activities in various countries worldwide—typified this trend. Here, the global Red Cross tuberculosis prevention and elimination effort served as the pretext for a whole array of interventions in the working and living practices of agricultural laborers. The report explained:

> Even when provided with a water supply and drainage to complete their sanitary facilities, laborers residing in cramped, unventilated, and poorly lit houses must be rescued else they succumb to the tyranny of tuberculosis. Faced with this reality, recently there has been a sudden increase in discussion among Germans about the need to raise the position of laborers. . . . to improve the results of efforts in eliminating tuberculosis, the national disease.[86]

I will discuss at length the Red Cross tuberculosis prevention and elimination campaign of the 1910s and 1920s in chapter four, but for now I wish to note that hygiene was one of the most common rationales for constituting laborers as a class of targets in need of humanitarian response. More importantly for the current discussion, the German Red Cross labor plantation not only aimed to reform laborers' hygienic practices, but their labor practices as well. Like Soeda, the Red Cross plantation organizers promoted the idea that labor, if done properly, had health benefits to the individual.

The first labor plantation was established in 1901 by the German Red Cross Patriotic Women's Society at Sharlottenburg, a western suburb of Berlin. Families suffering from tuberculosis could apply to live and work at the plantation. Since the

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program], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 514 (March 10, 1930): 29.

86 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Doitsu sekijūji rōdōen" [The German red cross labor plantation], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 304 (February 10, 1913): 13.

number of applicants constantly exceeded capacity, a lottery determined which families were accepted. Residents farmed the land collectively under the direction of a supervisor:

> Cultivators work their allocated plots from morning when the stars are out and return home in moonlight. Not only do they work diligently in plowing so that the harvest will allow them to raise their family well, but they also do side work raising poultry. With those profits they can live without worry.[87]

As we found in the story of Niitarō and Soeda Juichi's essay, effective labor was no different than the effective use of time.

To ensure proper time discipline, the German Red Cross organized the plantation with surveillance in mind. A hedge surrounded the whole plantation and two perpendicular roads divided the rectangular area into roughly uniform sections of 250-300 square meters each, and: "In the open area at the crossroads there is a rest area for young farmers and a playground for children. The supervisor's room is also in that vicinity."[88] In this way the supervisor commanded a view of the entire operation and the roads in and out from a central position.

Furthermore, the plantation administrators co-opted the laborers themselves into the surveillance effort:

> Each of the 10-15 partitions of land has so-called guard work. Cultivators get elected to the necessary but tedious positions of guard woman and guard man. The two guards deal with all of the general affairs related to the cultivated land. Only major problems are submitted to the supervisor. The supervisor and guards have a meeting once a week to communicate the week's issues and to discuss any proposals from the cultivators.[89]

Through this system of rotating guard duty, the agricultural laborers ostensibly learned first-hand what it meant to properly manage time for the purpose of optimizing labor's

87 Ibid., 14.
88 Ibid., 13.
89 Ibid., 14.

productivity. In doing so they were supposed to internalize the value of long working hours, punctuality, and profit.

So while these projects assumed the absolute universal necessity of labor in the constitution of human society throughout history, they also asserted that new, more efficient work habits must be taught in order for workers to profit from the sale of their labor in the modern world. Not only was the suffering of laborers a social emergency according to humanitarian ideals, but persistent and widespread poverty challenged JRCS plans to expand membership from its limited base among propertied elites. Thus humanitarian efforts to reform labor practices affirmed the view that laborers could, and did, receive wages in excess of their subsistence needs—whether these resulted from an extension or the working day proper, through sidelines, or both. To "raise the position of laborers" was also to involve them in the process of capital accumulation necessary to produce the kind of wide donor base that would ensure a regular, predictable income for the Red Cross. Laborers generally did not simply accept such education at face value however. As Gordon argues, when industrialists claimed that workplace discipline and harmony were essential Japanese customs, workers typically responded with skepticism.[90] By the 1920s industrialists lamented that the effort to produce a docile working population through education had achieved little success.[91]

Furthermore, the JRCS strongly exemplified the "civilizing" aspect of capital in its own labor management practices. The nursing women who constituted its most prominent source of labor symbolized devotion to their profession and extreme self-sacrifice. As *The Red Cross in the Far East* explained:

90 Gordon, *The Evolution of Labor Relations*, 7.
91 Ibid., *Labor and Imperial Democracy*, 18.

> In our [Japanese] society, the relation between the sexes is such that outside the sphere of family relationships a woman cannot volunteer herself to nurse a man unless in the capacity of a hireling, much like the amahs for children. . . . only the women of inferior classes could be induced to come into hospital wards and nurse whatever patients chanced to be there. But this was not what the Red Cross Society wanted. What it wanted was a class of refined ladies with intelligence and self-respect, devoting themselves to the work, not for pay, but for patriotism and humanity.[92]

Besides exposing a strain of cynicism in its elitist dismissal of the "inferior classes," this passage makes it clear that proper labor ought to accomplish more than earn wages. It accounts for the nature of surplus-labor as a form of exploitation for, in Marx's terms "the development of the productive forces" by representing it as voluntary, as in "for patriotism and humanity." Rather than paying nursing women a competitive wage, the JRCS instituted a contract system. In exchange for a free nursing education course, the nursing women agreed to make themselves available for "call-up" to serve in relief operations for a set number of years. The JRCS made their situation correspond to that of military reservists rather than paid workers.

The official representations of the nursing woman may have reinforced the idea that they toiled "not for pay," but this did not mean that it only applied to women. In constituting the nursing woman as a model worker, the Red Cross discourse exposed how the incitement to labor in general entailed not only the idea that labor produced wealth, but also the assignment of moral worth to work. That is, the discourse also posited an emotional wage for a job well done. Labor was supposed to be a matter of "devotion" as well as calculation for both men and women. Furthermore, as the JRCS advocacy of the German labor plantation showed, labor was a way to improve physical health as well.

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92 The Red Cross Society of Japan, "Sketch of the Organization." 40-41.

Through its public praise for laboring members, publications on reforming labor, and use of nursing women, the JRCS made all manner of labor into an important element in advancing the Red Cross mission of promoting the life, health and wealth of humanity.

Conclusion

Despite its putative status as one of the first voluntary, non-profit organizations in imperial Japan, the JRCS operated within, and reinforced, industrial capitalism as a social organization of production for profit. The Society enabled industrialization in a very practical way by accumulating capital for investment and developing transportation and communication infrastructure. More importantly, it advanced the conceptual categories through which ordinary people came to understand economic life. It represented capital, land, and labor as independent, natural sources of wealth by developing its interest bearing financial instruments, managing land for rent, and educating society about the virtues of wage labor. In short, the JRCS was intimately involved in the creation of what Marx called a "very mystical social form."[93] In this form, the historically specific social relations constituted by the capitalist economy disappeared beneath the surface appearance of the commodities of capital, land, and labor. Rather than recognize the exploitation at work in capitalism, the JRCS embraced the categories of capital, land, and labor as adequate and appropriate resources for humanitarian action.

Imperialism was one consequence of this turn to industrial capitalism. JRCS leaders and members became interested in intervening militarily and socially in neighboring countries due to the system's underlying contradictions. Since wages always

93 Marx, *Capital, Vol 3.*, chapter 48.

tended toward subsistence levels as long as the national economy remained relatively closed, ordinary workers in Japan could not help but under-subscribe to (or under-consume) humanitarianism. Capital concentrated in the hands of the bourgeoisie landlords and industrialists, making JRCS membership mostly an affair for upper and middle class residents of the wealthiest prefectures. From the 1900s on, just as capitalists began looking for more profitable areas abroad in which to invest, the JRCS aimed to cultivate subscribers among the middle and upper classes of the colonized peoples. This meant pursuing a kind of civilizing mission in which the concepts and ethos of capitalism followed closely behind the conquering armies.

Chapter 4

Battling the Demon of Disease

Red Cross Hygiene and Care for the Modern Body

> It is the duty of medical science to conduct mankind. Positioned at the center of human endeavor, I believe the doctor's work is the most noble of all. The reason that doctor's work is the most noble is that, from the perspective of human life, it is the most necessary.
>
> --Yamane Shōji, "Eisei"

> From the perspective of medicine and public health, Japanese elites successfully avoided Western colonization in part by acquiring the ability to colonize themselves.
>
> --Ruth Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*

In 1907 the delegates to the International Committee of the Red Cross general meeting in London declared the start of a worldwide Red Cross campaign against tuberculosis. In 1910 articles explaining the disease and its history in Japan began appearing in the Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS) journals. Writers declared tuberculosis a threat to the working class, the nation's children, and the Imperial Army and Navy. In 1913 JRCS vice-president Ozawa Takeo asserted: "Among Red Cross peacetime work the most serious is that of TB prevention and eradication."[1] Infectious disease had displaced natural disaster in the number two rank (behind war) of crisis-causing phenomena for the imperial Red Cross. In 1914 army senior physician first class and JRCS secretary Tanaka Yatarō declared that the spread of tuberculosis in the empire's

1 Ozawa Takeo, "Kekkaku bokumetsu jigyō ni tsuite" [Concerning tuberculosis extermination operations], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 310 (August 10, 1913): 1.

schools had reached "emergency" (*kinkyū*) proportions.[2]

Just as JRCS leaders made natural disasters into humanitarian crises during the 1890s and 1900s, during the 1910s they turned to infectious diseases as the next category of the causes of suffering to target. The expansionary logic of humanitarianism played itself out in the vigorous Red Cross "campaign to prevent and eliminate tuberculosis." Yet the campaign's results were never satisfactory. The persistence of the disease throughout the imperial era meant continuing and expanding efforts to not only build up tuberculosis treatment capacity, but also to educate the population in hygienic thought and practice generally. The efforts included the establishment of isolation wards and treatment centers, scientific research towards a vaccine, and, most significantly, a plan to promote hygienic education using lectures, the dissemination of pamphlets and other texts, and the display of visual images in the form of posters.

The first half of this chapter examines the thirty-year JRCS campaign to prevent and eliminate tuberculosis as a paradigmatic moment in the constitution and promotion of modern hygienic sensibilities in the empire. The campaign generated and reinforced new meanings and practices of *eisei* [hygiene or sanitation] as the everyday conduct of cleanliness and the awareness of the existence of disease-causing microorganisms. It rendered disease not only a challenge for medical science, but also a educational problem which required the intervention of experts to correct the so-called unhealthy habits of the ignorant and the poor. The campaign thus represents the creation and proliferation of expert knowledge regarding the proper care of bodies and the management of their bacterial interactions with others. The second half of this chapter follows the expansion

2 Tanaka Yatarō, "Gakko ni okeru haikekkaku yobō bokumetsu no hōsaku dō" [Plan for preventing and eliminating lung tuberculosis in schools], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 322. (July 10, 1914): 7.

of JRCS interest beyond the specific disease of tuberculosis into general hygiene along two paths. One was the creation of the League of Red Cross Societies and the Japanese Junior Red Cross, both of which endeavored to fight disease by making cleanliness a sign of beauty and virtue. The second path was the constitution of nutritional hygiene as an important sub-field of hygiene.

In evaluating all of these Red Cross forays into managing disease, the imperialistic undertones of hygiene discourse are unmistakable. Disease immediately threatened the health of imperial soldiers and sailors and thus compromised the empire's war making capacity. It made young men unfit for conscription and young women unfit for child-bearing, thus compromising the future strength of the armed forces. From this immediate worry about military strength, doctors and hygiene experts promoted the ideal of health—in general—into a sign of civilization, scientific progress, genetic fitness, and the discipline of the empire's population. At a symbolic level, national prestige was an important stake in the struggle with disease. Politically, the elimination of tuberculosis promised to vindicate imperial rule and advance Japan's standing among its peers in the international Red Cross movement as a whole. It was thus a crucial element of a nationalistic narrative in which Japan's victory over disease signaled its overcoming of the past and entry into modernity.

The history of the JRCS work in hygiene thus confirms recent scholarly findings concerning the importance of hygiene to empire. Ruth Rogaski's *Hygienic Modernity,* for example, argues that hygiene (*eisei*) became: “a key rationalization for Japanese imperialism” through her examination of the policies enacted by the hygiene bureau of the Tianjin Provisional Government during the joint foreign occupation of the Chinese

city 1900-2 and the Japanese occupation in 1937-45. She writes: "hygiene was a cornerstone of a modernity imposed by occupying armies. At the same time, hygiene became the most basic constituent of an indelible rhetoric of Chinese deficiency."[3] Similarly, Todd Henry complicates the narrative of Japanese rule in Korea by showing how colonial authorities used hygiene both as a marker of racial difference and as a means to assimilate colonized peoples.[4]

The urgency of the disease management project for humanitarian imperialists is made even clearer when we consider the paradoxical relationship between scientific medical knowledge and politics. From the perspective of military leaders and capitalists, the techniques and discourse on modern hygiene served as important tools for producing strong soldiers and productive workers, but at the same time it offered a deeply ambivalent perspective on modern social life which could serve as the basis of a critique of, rather than vindicating imperial rule. Hygienic knowledge, informed by epidemiology, made visible the undeniably modern conditions which encouraged the spread of disease and the proliferation of new diseases. Epidemiological methods made it possible to trace the origins of infection, showing how the massive increases in commerce, travel, and rural-urban migration continuously introduced new and dangerous diseases to local populations from outside. Industrialization produced disease-causing pollution and forced workers to labor in factories and mines where conditions rendered them vulnerable to disease. The concentration of populations in urban areas strained the capacities of local governments to provide clean water as well as garbage and waste water disposal—

3 Ruth Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-port China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 147, 168.

4 Todd Henry, "Sanitizing Empire: Japanese Articulations of Korean Otherness and the Construction of Early Colonial Seoul, 1905–1919," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 64, No. 3 (August 2005): 639-675.

leading to the spread of communicable diseases. Perhaps most damning, hygiene discourse exposed the widening gap in living conditions and health between the rich and poor. As such it enabled a certain critical position versus the state and the system of industrial capitalism. It offered a way to begin to imagine a radically different, more healthful and egalitarian social order.

The JRCS campaign to prevent and eliminate tuberculosis as well as its later promotion of hygienic education thus became the battleground for a fight between those who conducted research which gestured, in ways subtle and overt, towards this social-critical potential of medical knowledge and those who tried to ensure that such a perspective would never rise to dominance. The success of this latter group is evident in the individualizing rhetoric of hygienic instruction, that each person was responsible for maintaining her or his own health by being attentive to germs in her or his daily activities. These doctors advanced a bourgeoisie agenda by insisting that disease epidemics were evidence of the weakness of individual morality and self-discipline, rather than a weakness of the social system. They instructed children and their mothers in proper behavior with the expectation that ordinary people would learn to discipline themselves both for self-preservation and out of a sense of obligation to everyone around. This made hygiene much more of a coping or survival strategy than a revolutionary creed. Indeed, the radical potential of hygienic knowledge appeared trapped beneath a dominant impulse to teach people how to accommodate themselves to the transformed realities of work life and family life. Hygiene experts may have come to recognize the disease-ridden condition of modern society, but mostly their solution was to teach people to survive within, rather than change it.

Background—The Many Meanings of Hygiene

The campaign to prevent and eliminate tuberculosis of the 1910s, 20s and 30s deployed the concept of hygiene (*eisei*) in a new and subtly different manner than it had been used in the past. Like the English terms "hygienic," or "sanitary," the JRCS first used "eisei" (衛生) to designate any medical relief work carried out for the army or navy during wartime. The official designation for medical work done for the military during combat operations was "*eisei jimu hōjo*" (hygiene/sanitary duty assistance) and a Red Cross officer with the title "Battlefield Hygiene (*eisei*) Director" coordinated such services during the Sino-Japanese war.[5] Also, the JRCS called the work carried out by its units of doctors and medics accompanying the army "hygiene," in reports such as the "Group one hygiene results for the North China incident" published in the *Journal of the Japanese Red Cross* in 1902 which contained statistics on the number of patients treated and their death rates.[6] This understanding of *eisei* persisted such that in 1914 Shimose Kentarō, chief of the Army Medical School, predicted a great increase in the difficulty of carrying out "Hygiene duties in wartime" (*Senji ni okeru eisei kinmu*) during the upcoming European war. This was due to the advent of high explosive ordinance, land mines, barbed wire, machine guns which, he felt, would demand a whole new level of ingenuity and determination from Red Cross doctors and medics on the battlefield.[7] In this sense, *eisei* included any kind of medical work carried out for soldiers, including

5 Hakuaisha, *Nihon Sekijūjisha enkakushi*, 351, 335. Kawamata Keiichi translated *eisei* as "sanitary" in his 1919 English translation of the *Nihon Sekijūjisha hattatsushi* called *The History of the Red Cross Society of Japan*, 132.

6 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Hokushin jihen no eisei seiseki ichihan" [Group one hygiene results for the North China incident], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 111 (June 15, 1902): 53-54.

7 Shimose Kentarō, "Senji ni okeru eisei kinmu" [Hygiene duties in wartime], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 328 (November 10, 1914): 17-19.

first-aid, surgery, long-term rehabilitation, or the treatment of disease.

In battlefield hygienic work the Red Cross had its greatest success in the area of disease prevention. During the decades around the turn of the 20th century new methods of germ management in military medicine produced a radical reduction in the number of soldiers lost to infectious disease. In the casualty statistics from the Taiwan expedition (1874) and the Sino-Japanese War (1894), typhus and cholera killed far more soldiers than did enemy attacks. However, from the Boxer Rebellion (1899), to the Russo-Japanese War (1905) hygiene work by the Red Cross and the Army and Navy medical corps reversed this ratio. By the Russo-Japanese war gunshot wounds accounted for the largest proportion of Imperial Army soldier deaths.[8] Disinfection work alone thus made the Red Cross a tremendous asset to the military in its efforts to keep its soldiers in a battle-worthy, healthy condition.

During the late 1890s and early 1900s writers began to promote a new meaning of *eisei* in the Red Cross journals which focused on disease prevention and elimination. Hygiene became a matter of disease-prevention mainly through cleanliness, but also through diet and exercise. Doctor-administrator Yamane Seiji was one of the most aggressive of these hygiene writers. Yamane wore many hats in Imperial Japan. He was Medical Director of Police, an elected member of the Lower House of the Imperial Diet, and founder of the Shiritsu Nihon Igakko (precursor to the Nippon Medical School). In a series of articles in the *Journal of Japanese Red Cross* in 1902 he pushed doctors to take

8 Kita, "'Bunmei no sensō' toshite no nisshin sensō," 75-79; "Byōinsen no katsuyakushita hokushin jihen," 99; Chida Takeshi, "Gunbu Hiroshima to senji kyūgo" [Militarized Hiroshima and wartime relief], in *Nihon sekijyūjisha to jindō enjo* [The History of the Japan Red Cross Society and Humanitarian Assistance], ed. Kurosawa Fujitaka and Kawai Toshinobu, 141-174 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2009), 152, 164.

more active roles in managing the health of the nation. To demonstrate the urgency of this project, he elevated infectious diseases to the position of most dangerous humanitarian emergency for the Red Cross.

> What we call acute infectious diseases are truly frightening. To explain why, acute infectious diseases snatch away our lives with a suddenness that nothing can match. Life is our most important possession. . . . There is a comparison to be made that the world's tsunamis and earthquakes are frightening in this way as well. One might think that earthquakes kill an extreme amount of people all at once, but neither earthquakes, tsunamis, nor war compare to acute infectious diseases.[9]

Cholera, typhus, dysentery, diphtheria, pox, scarlet fever, black plague, yellow fever, and influenza made up the host of acute infectious diseases that Yamane argued were "most frightening." He also warned that chronic infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, leprosy, and sexually transmitted diseases, while less frightening, still constituted a major threat because they "ruin the country little by little."[10]

For Yamane, treatment was not the best answer to overcoming the emergencies posed by infectious diseases.

> If in one house there is an infectious disease patient they they must employ a doctor quickly. Oh dear, an honorarium is necessary. An examination fee is required. A fee for medicine is required. In addition nursing is used. The house suffers from a quarantine. The members of the house cannot leave to do their work. When things happen this way they create extreme hardship for the family. Subsequently, when cholera breaks out in more than one house, cities and towns use enormous amounts of money employing quarantine inspectors and carrying out various duties. People are forced to put many counter-measures into place exhausting all of their means.[11]

Emphasizing the economic effects of infectious diseases, he stressed that treating them

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9 Yamane Seiji, "Eisei: hakusen byō yobō dan" [Hygiene: discussion of infectious disease prevention], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 114 (September 15, 1902): 44.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., 45.

ruined household finances, municipal finances, and even national finances since foreign nations refused to import goods manufactured in epidemic-stricken areas.[12]

Instead, the key was to prevent such diseases from spreading to epidemic proportions in the first place. This meant quickly identifying and isolating the initial cases and imposing strict measures for handling patients and their everyday lives. In cases of cholera, for example, patients were by no means to be allowed to return to their residences or workplaces, but must instead remain in the quarantine wards of hospitals specially designed for that purpose. Their clothes, eating utensils, bathroom items, or anything they touched must be sterilized, or better yet incinerated. Using a military metaphor, Yamane argued that the caregivers of cholera patients must be as ruthless as the Russians were when they employed a scorched-earth strategy against Napoleon. They must "cut off the disease's food supply" through the use of caustic lime and other disinfectants on all drains and rubbish bins.[13]

Yamane also connected hygiene and the work of scientific medical doctors to a much larger perspective on human history and civilization. He asserted that one simple characteristic differentiated so-called "savage" societies from modern, civilized ones such as Japan. In modern civilized societies doctors assume overall responsibility for managing infectious disease.

> The progress of scientific medicine and the identification of the causes of infectious diseases went together. With the establishment of national hygiene laws came the recognition of doctors' responsibility for infectious disease. Moreover doctors took responsibility for the prevention of infectious diseases not just for themselves but for the public. Therefore, in

12 Ibid., 45-46.

13 Yamane Seiji, "Eisei: hakusen byō yobō dan tsuzuki" [Hygiene: discussion of infectious disease prevention continued], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 116 (November 15, 1902): 51-53

> taking on these responsibilities doctors have the highest position in socially-oriented work. In relation to the general public they have exclusive possession of a unique authority.[14]

In Yamane's figuration, doctors' unique authority stemmed not only from their specialized knowledge and skills in healing the human body, but also from their commitment to reforming the relations between society's members. Doctors were, above all, public servants. Their success controlling infection through the management of the transmission of germs from one person to another—a kind of social relation—represented the entry point from which doctors had demonstrated their competence to engage the social formation as a whole.

Such an engagement would require doctors to continuously reform everyday habits in a wide host of fields according to the latest scientific findings. Yamane praised doctors for their work advocating the consumption of meat and moving the residents of the archipelago away from the reliance on grains. He suggested that doctors next target clothing reform, since many people's clothing "did not conform to the established rules of physiology."[15]

Furthermore, while the doctor's responsibility for human society was "extremely heavy," the doctor also performed the "most noble" work guiding people's everyday habits precisely because the modern world had become so stressful.[16]

> Intercourse increases incessantly among societies pursuing progress and civilization. The movement of the world becomes more and more complicated every day. Such a life creates an increasingly heavy burden on our minds and bodies, making it difficult to stay fit for work and consumption. For that reason it is necessary to recognize that the

14 Yamane Seiji, "Eisei: ifuku kairyō to ishi no sekinin" [Hygiene: clothing reform and the responsibility of physicians], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 110 (May 15, 1902): 45.
15 Ibid., 47.
16 Ibid., 45.

phenomenon of illness will tend to increase.[17]

Yamane's thus suggested that modern life contained a deeply ambivalent relationship to bodily health. On the one hand techniques of modern scientific medicine made the identification and treatment of disease possible in powerful new ways. On the other hand, modern social life also rendered humans more vulnerable to illness by imposing its excessive "burdens."

In this way Yamane's works exemplified the newly emerging sensibility concerning *eisei.* No longer only a term used to refer to the medical treatment of wounded or sick soldiers, the idea of hygiene advanced by Yamane and others focused on the prevention of the spread of disease through cleanliness as well as the maintenance of health through proper diet and clothing. It made doctors into more than just healers. It made them into authorities on social reform. In this role they might offer diagnoses of the unique problems society faced in the modern world of industrializing nation-states. Their reform agenda also, at times, became a form of social critique wherein doctors lamented the continuing impoverishment of the urban and agrarian working classes caused by industrial capitalism and the policies of the imperial state. However, As Andrew Berry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose point out, even when scientific medicine grounds social critique, doctors "serve to act in the interests of good government."[18] The Red Cross campaign to prevent and eliminate tuberculosis built on this new meaning of *eisei* to proliferate the message of good government and good self-government to an extent that earlier Red Cross doctors would not have even imagined.

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17 Ibid.

18 Andrew Berry, Thomas Osborne, Nikolas Rose, "Introduction," in *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-liberalism, and Rationalities of Government*, ed. Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, Nikolas Rose (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 10.

The Campaign to Prevent and Eliminate Tuberculosis

By the early 1910s tuberculosis had become clearly recognized as what William Johnston calls "the modern epidemic" of the archipelago.[19] As one writer for the JRCS journal alarmingly declared in 1915: "The people of Japan have many enemies, but the one to be afraid of is lung tuberculosis. . . In the city of Tokyo one person dies from tuberculosis every hour."[20] JRCS officials also used what they learned as participants in the global Red Cross movement to emphasize the seriousness the tuberculosis problem. For example, in 1913 Vice-president Ozawa related: "That problem [of tuberculosis] is often coming up at worldwide Red Cross meetings. In 1907 at the 8th International Convention, the Red Cross finally decided to put an all-out effort into resolving it. Accordingly each European Red Cross society has gradually put its power into this [tuberculosis prevention and elimination] work."[21] For Ozawa, the time had come for Japan to join the worldwide battle against tuberculosis under Red Cross leadership.

The JRCS began its concrete work on tuberculosis prevention and elimination in 1913. This work eventually included the construction of tuberculosis sanatoriums in Osaka, Hyogo, Aichi, Gifu, Fukushima and Kagoshima, isolation wards at the central and branch hospitals of the Red Cross, and funding for tuberculosis research.[22] On the whole,

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19 William Donald Johnston, *The Modern Epidemic: A History of Tuberculosis in Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 1995).

20 Tōyama Chinkichi, "Ichijikan ni hitori ate taosareru haikekkaku" [In one hour one person is struck down by lung tuberculosis], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 335 (March 10, 1915): 14.

21 Ozawa, "Kekkaku bokumetsu jigyō ni tsuite," 1.

22 The Japan Times, "The Prevention of Tuberculosis," in *XVth International Red Cross Conference, Tokyo, October 1934*, 42 (Tokyo: Japan Times Ltd., 1934), 42; The Japan Times, "Tuberculosis Research Work," in *XVth International Red Cross Conference*, Tokyo, October 1934, 43 (Tokyo: Japan Times Ltd., 1934), 43.

the JRCS followed the suggestions made by Home Ministry hygiene section chief Kobashi Ichita in his 1913 article in the JRCS journal titled "An opinion related to tuberculosis prevention." Here Kobashi called for an organically integrated national tuberculosis management program in which the central government, local voluntary organizations, national tuberculosis prevention groups, the Saiseikai (Imperial Gift Charity Association), and the JRCS each performed a number of specialized functions in accord with their unique capacities. The role of the Red Cross was to use its experience and expertise building hospitals and logistical facilities to oversee the siting and construction of sanatoriums. It would also provide staffing and administration in both sanatoriums and tuberculosis isolation wards of hospitals across the empire. As part of this overall responsibility, the Red Cross would first enforce the strict isolation of TB patients from others. Second it would conduct surveys of TB patient statistics; and three, make determinations of which patients were impoverished in order to offer them charity treatment and other assistance as available.[23] In carrying out these tasks, the JRCS capitalized on its unique position as an officially-sanctioned voluntary organization to mediate between the state and local anti-tuberculosis organizations.

In regards to the structure of the anti-tuberculosis efforts within the JRCS, the burden for anti-tuberculosis work fell largely on the shoulders of the local branches. The central JRCS hospital did contribute to the isolation and treatment of tubercular patients, however headquarters made the prefectural JRCS offices responsible for carrying out tuberculosis prevention and elimination work appropriate to local conditions on their own initiative. Headquarters made its contribution mainly as a consultant, statistician, and

23 Kobashi Ichita, "Kekkaku yōbō ni kansuru iken" [An opinion related to tuberculosis prevention], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 309 (July 10, 1913): 6-7.

publicist for the efforts of the branch offices. For example it boasted about the subsidization of tuberculosis treatment for the poor, the dispatch of traveling clinics into rural areas to treat patients who had no access to a hospital or sanatorium, and the staffing of nurses in local hospitals, sanitariums, or private homes where infected patients resided, all of which were carried out by the Shizuoka branch office of the JRCS. The Hyōgo prefectural JRCS carried out free diagnosis at its Kobe clinic and Himeji hospital in addition to building a sanatorium in Kobe which, according to one description, was "favoured with sanitary surroundings, fresh air, and bright sunshine full of ultra-violet rays." The JRCS in Chiba paid special attention to the plight of poor children when it built the Red Cross seaside boarding school at Tomiura in 1924. Students at the Red Cross school had a special diet, exercise regimen, and outdoor activity schedule designed to strengthen them against tuberculosis infection.[24]

However the most visible aspect of the JRCS campaign to prevent and eliminate tuberculosis was its production and distribution of hundreds of pamphlets, articles, and posters on hygiene, as well as the sponsorship of public lectures, "propaganda by flying machines," and movies on the topic.[25] This hygienic "propaganda" sought to replace existing conceptions of tuberculosis with the latest findings of bacteriology. Hygienists imagined themselves using modern scientific medicine to enlighten the uneducated masses and liberate them from the tyranny of dark superstitions. The idea of tuberculosis as an infectious disease transmitted through microscopic germs directly contradicted older conceptions of tuberculosis as a hereditary illness. Indeed, this older hereditary

24 The Japan Times, "The Red Cross in the Prefectures," in *XVth International Red Cross Conference, Tokyo, October 1934*, 44-50 (Tokyo: Japan Times Ltd., 1934), 44.
25 The Japan Times, "The Prevention of Tuberculosis," 42.

explanation attached a powerful social stigma to tubercular patients and their families, making them unable to find marriage partners and continue the family line. As a result many patients refused to see doctors who were known to diagnose tuberculosis and instead only saw doctors who deliberately misdiagnosed it as "catarrh" or "pneumonia."[26] A large part of the hygienists' campaign was the effort to convince patients and doctors that tuberculosis was not a matter of heredity and that it must be correctly diagnosed as an infectious disease in order to treat it and prevent it from spreading. The campaign promised to rescue the infected and their families from the disgrace brought about by outdated "unscientific" beliefs.

If the evidence points to 1913 as the approximate start of the main JRCS push into the area of tuberculosis prevention and elimination, this timing raises a difficult question. The new idea of hygiene as disease prevention had already been popularized by writers such as Yamane ten or more years earlier. At that time government statisticians were already aware of the massive scale of tuberculosis and its mode of transmission via infected seasonal migrant workers.[27] The European representatives to the ICRC made their resolution to tackle tuberculosis in 1907. So why did it take until 1913 for the JRCS to initiate any concrete steps toward mitigating this rampant disease?

The official JRCS explanation, reproduced in English for an international audience in 1915 proceeded as follows:

> The Society, even early in its history, had not neglected relief work in cases of public calamity; but as two great wars and the Chinese political affairs had successively engaged its most serious attention within a space of little over then years, there was not enough energy left for the Society to do much relief work in times of peace. Since the Russo-Japanese War,

26 Johnston, *The Modern Epidemic*, 55.
27 Ibid., 80-83.

> however, we have devoted ourselves most assiduously to the readjustment of affairs of the Society so that we could gradually develop its work in this direction.[28]

In other words, the JRCS had been too busy trying to manage the consequences of armed conflict to attend to the problem of infectious disease.

Still, this official explanation for the timing of the outpouring of discussion on tuberculosis is unsatisfying. With all due respect to the institutional inertia which makes it difficult for large organizations to pursue new priorities, eight years (1905 to 1913) seems too long given that the JRCS had already proven itself capable of rapid response in cases of natural disaster and war. If the explanation given in *The Red Cross in the Far East* were sufficient, one would expect to see writers urging the JRCS to move in the direction of peacetime work such as disease control years earlier, probably as soon as the war ended in 1905. Instead we find a sudden outbreak of discussion on tuberculosis six years later. Only one article was published on the topic in the JRCS journal in the entire year of 1910. In 1911 they published three, and in 1912 four. This rapidly became a flood of articles in 1913, starting with the March issue when the *Journal of the Japanese Red Cross* started publishing three to four articles on tuberculosis per month. These articles described the establishment of tuberculosis treatment facilities in Europe, methods of prevention, and plans for organizing the nation's medical resources into an effective tuberculosis defense.[29]

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28 Red Cross Society of Japan, "Relief Work in Cases of Public Calamity," *The Red Cross in the Far East, Bulletin No. 5* (Tokyo: "The Hakuai" Publishing Office, 1915): 62-63.

29 For some examples, see Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Ōshū ni okeru kekkaku yobō jikō" [Tuberculosis prevention matters in Europe], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 305 (March 10, 1913): 14-17; Noda Tadahiro, "Kekkaku yōbō ni tsuite" [Concerning tuberculosis prevention], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 351 (July 10, 1916): 11-15; Kitajima Taichi, "Hai kekkaku yobō ni tsuite" [Concerning lung tuberculosis prevention], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 305 (March 10, 1913): 11-14; Tanaka Yatarō, "Nihon sekijūjisha ni oite shisetsusentosuru kekkaku yobō jigyō wa nan no hōmen yori chakushu subekika" [From what direction must tuberculosis prevention efforts instituted

So the question remains: why did the JRCS suddenly become interested in tuberculosis prevention and elimination in early 1913? The chronic nature of tuberculosis certainly accounts for some of the delay in addressing this specific disease. Since tubercular patients could expect to live with the disease for many years, Yamane himself admitted tuberculosis was "less frightening" than the more immediately fatal diseases such as typhus or cholera.[30] Johnston argues that tuberculosis' chronicity strongly contributed to the government's overall lackadaisical policy toward fighting the disease.[31]

For the JRCS, another important factor came from the nature of its membership structure and financial outlook. Members most commonly committed to paying dues according to a ten-year subscription plan. Since the JRCS received an incredible surge in membership during the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War, in 1913 it faced the prospect of a steep revenue drop-off as those millions of membership subscriptions matured in 1914-5. JRCS leaders thus needed an issue that would garner new member subscriptions and make up for the shortfall or else they would be forced to cut local personnel and facilities. As I discussed in chapter four, the Society ensured the continued operation of its headquarters through the use of interest on its Special Fund, but it still relied upon membership dues to pay for the hospitals and stockpiles of relief materials it built and staffed across the empire. In 1913 the incredible expansion of facilities that the JRCS carried out during and after the Russo-Japanese War was threatened by the loss of subscription dues ten years later, but if the JRCS could prove itself effective in managing tuberculosis, it would gain new dues-paying members to replace the old.

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at the Japanese Red Cross Society proceed?], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 306 (April 10, 1913): 4-8.

30 Yamane, "Eisei: hakusen byō yobō dan," 44.

31 Johnston, *The Modern Epidemic*, 182-3.

The other factor that certainly contributed to the JRCS decision to embark on tuberculosis prevention and elimination activity in 1913 was the establishment of the Japanese White Cross Society (JWCS) in 1911, a charity organization dedicated entirely to dealing with the tuberculosis epidemic. This new "Cross" Society sent doctors and nurses to homes, schools, and factories to diagnose and treat tuberculosis cases and it also built an open-air school for infected children.[32] In order to better compete for donation money and not be overshadowed by the new color of cross, the JRCS adopted the White Cross' anti-tuberculosis purpose for its own.

To argue that the timing of the JRCS campaign to prevent and eliminate tuberculosis had more to do with the organization's internal financial situation and less to do with the contemporary understanding of the severity of the tuberculosis epidemic is not to dismiss the campaign as insincere. The opportunism displayed by JRCS leaders does not invalidate the powerful message of hygienic education and its offer of hope to all who feared the uncertainty of life in world of rampant contagion.

Hygienic Crusade

It is not surprising that writers came to describe the campaign to prevent and eliminate tuberculosis using military metaphors. In the absence of an enemy nation to fight, the JRCS advanced the notion that disease-causing germs made equally dangerous opponents. This new war against infection would be waged not only on the battlefield proper, but in the kitchens, bedrooms, schools, streets, trains, barracks, and factories of

32 The Japan Times, "The Prevention of Tuberculosis," 42. For more about the activities of the White Cross Society, see Johnston, *The Modern Epidemic*, 235-4, 247.

the empire. Fighting "the demon of disease," as one writer put it,[33] meant making every imperial subject a front-line combatant in a conflict no less important to the fate of the empire. The use of war as a metaphor brought with it a certain logic of escalation. During the 1910s Red Cross efforts to manage the tuberculosis epidemic expanded into a much wider program of action. It became a campaign to radically transform the general bodily habits and moral sensibilities of the all of the empire's subjects.

One of the more common militaristic characterizations of the tuberculosis epidemic described the disease as an attack upon the people of the empire. Perhaps the most forceful user of this kind of military metaphor to describe the tuberculosis epidemic and the Red Cross response was Tanaka Yatarō. His article "Nihon sekijūjisha ni oite shisetsusentosuru kekkaku yobō jigyō wa nan no hōmen yori chakushu subekika" ("In what direction must tuberculosis prevention efforts instituted at the Japanese Red Cross Society proceed?"), appeared in the April 1913 issue of the JRCS journal. It made a strident call to arms against the menace of tuberculosis:

> Every year tuberculosis creates ten thousand vengeful ghosts out of our countrymen. We truly ought to be trembling with fear. . . . In our country's present crisis (*kokuka no kyuu ni*) we are compelled to raise the banner of tuberculosis prevention and elimination and hold it up forcefully against the invading forces of the disease. We must put in order military accoutrements for the purpose of dispatching troops and advancing along the roadway [toward the enemy]. . . . To create an enduring and sound plan, we must untiringly, step by step, without yielding, advance our attack against the fortress of the enemy, the tuberculosis army. If we do not, it will be difficult to achieve results to match the financial and human strength used in the effort.[34]

By rendering the hygienic project as a new war, Tanaka attempted to produce a patriotic

33 *Bōsanbōnobe* [Staff officer statement], "Sensō to kokumin no taikaku" [War and the nation's physique], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 340 (August 10, 1915): 35.
34 Tanaka, "Nihon sekijūjisha ni oite," 4.

fervor for tuberculosis prevention and elimination in his readers. For Tanaka the role of the JRCS in hygiene mirrored its role in wartime. By using military metaphors, he signaled that the JRCS would try to recreate the kind of zeal which led to the mass outpouring of financial support for humanitarianism during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. Rather than war against Russia, however, this time the people of the empire would contribute to a campaign against tuberculosis.

Home Ministry Hygiene Office chief Kobashi Ichita similarly deployed a military metaphor when he asserted in 1913 that: "The Red Cross Society must do its best to implement counter-measures related to tubercular patients among elementary school teaching staff, thus *defending* against the harm done by the *invasion* of tuberculosis among children" [italics added]. Here the anti-tuberculosis effort assumed the nature of an exercise in military strategy. Children constituted society's weak point in need of special defense against the invading force of disease. The "measures" Kobashi had in mind were extensive medical inspection of all school teachers and the strict isolation and treatment of the infected since tuberculosis was their number one cause of death.[35]

However prevention, rather than treatment, still made the best defense. Hygienists endlessly repeated Kobashi's suggestion that non-governmental charity organizations had a major role to play in disease prevention.

> These groups must work primarily to arouse public opinion on tuberculosis prevention and spread awareness of the problem among the general citizenry. They should use such things as public lectures and magic lantern shows to accomplish this. Also, it is imperative that they make more effective use of newspapers and magazines to publish articles on tuberculosis prevention and eradication. . . . An effort must be made to reduce the danger of the virus' spread by appealing to each individual patient's spirit of prudence and public virtue. Like all great work

35 Kobashi, "Kekkaku yōbō ni kansuru iken," 7.

> tuberculosis prevention and eradication is not necessarily dependent only on government officials. Without general citizens' recognition of the necessity of prevention and assistance, it is impossible to carry out such work successfully.[36]

Hygienic discourse sought to make everyone a soldier in the war on infectious disease. Much like service as a military conscript, personal attention to hygiene could prove one's "public virtue" and loyalty to the nation.

Furthermore the Red and White Cross Societies, along with the numerous local tuberculosis prevention associations, incited participation in the hygienic regime by making charitable donations a patriotic duty as well. Not only could imperial subjects show their devotion through proper washing, food preparation, and by making use of spittoons filled with disinfectant, but also by voluntarily donating money to help teach their neighbors to do the same. As Miyagawa Yoneji would explain in 1934, only with: "the perfection of the official and private systems of *crusade* against tuberculosis" [italics added] did the empire begin to have success in reducing epidemics.[37] The Red Cross campaign for the prevention and elimination of tuberculosis was thus extremely efficient for the government. Not only did its hygienic message push responsibility for combating the disease on to the people, it also made them pay for their own re-education themselves.

Like in many wars, the goals of the campaign for the prevention and elimination of tuberculosis could not be easily defined nor the enemy seen. It was a virtual war in which experts measured success statistically by the reduction of deaths and the lowering of infection rates, but it lacked dramatic moments of confrontation. Since tuberculosis bacteria themselves could not be seen, they made poor enemies. Hygiene experts had to

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36 Ibid., 8.

37 Miyagawa Yoneji, "Research Work in Epidemics," In *XVth International Red Cross Conference, Tokyo, October 1934*, 29 (Tokyo: Japan Times Ltd., 1934), 29.

make the metaphor of war compelling by transferring the notion of tubercular infection to more immediately perceptible objects, persons, locations, and situations. The idea of dirt or dirtiness, as opposed to cleanliness, was by far the most important of these. While tuberculosis germs could not be seen or felt, hygiene discourse strove to impress upon people how dangerous germs existed in visible human by-wastes such as expectoration. In this way the campaign against tuberculosis took on the character of a campaign against dirty habits, objects, and places.

The 1918 meeting of the Japan Tuberculosis Prevention Federation (*Nihon kekkaku yōbō rengō*) in Ishikawa prefecture was typical of this widening of the anti-tuberculosis campaign. The JRCS journal reported that the very first agenda item was "The problem with elementary school children and cleaning" (*Shōgaku jidō no sōji mondai*). The participants discussed a report by the Kanazawa City Tuberculosis Prevention Association which showed the defects of existing cleaning methods performed by elementary school students in their classrooms. Accordingly the Federation passed a resolution to petition the government to put changes in cleaning practice into law.[38]

Many of the JRCS anti-tuberculosis activities operated according the common assumption that the countryside was most advantageous for avoiding tuberculosis infection because of its clean air. Home ministry hygiene department medical chief and professor of medicine Noda Tadahiro noted that the home ministry's statistical study of tuberculosis mortality rates showed an especially high rate among those employed in factory work such as printers and textile manufacturers. The disease caused forty-five percent of all factory worker deaths. Since the majority of silk and cotton spinners were

38 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Nihon kekkaku yōbō rengō kai" [Japan tuberculosis prevention federation meeting], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 374 (June 10, 1918): 16.

women, they suffered from a disproportionally high risk of death from tuberculosis. Agricultural workers, stock farmers, sericulturalists, woodsmen, fishermen, and salt-makers had relatively few deaths from tuberculosis. For Noda these results reinforced the idea that factory-filled cities had dirty air, making them prone to spreading dangerous germs and impeding the recovery of tubercular patients in comparison to the clean and healthy environment of the countryside.[39]

Furthermore, in the countryside the cleanest air came from the ocean, so anti-tuberculosis organizations built their facilities on beaches. The Japan White Cross Society, for example, boasted about the "excellent results" obtained at its open-air school for tubercular children located on Kowada beach in Kanagawa. Similarly, the Chiba prefectural branch of the JRCS built its school for tubercular students on the seashore and the Shizuoka, Saitama, and Mie branches sent tubercular children to nearby beaches for "Summer Sanatoriums." The Kanagawa branch established its sanatorium on the beach near Yokohama city because there: "climactic and atmospheric conditions are most suitable."[40]

Seaside locations held another advantage for schools and "Summer Sanatoriums" in that they made it convenient to get children into the water. As court physician Doctor Kashimura Teiichi argued in a 1910 article for the Red Cross journal, ocean bathing not only contributed to bodily cleanliness in general, it also strengthened the skin's power to protect against respiratory illness.[41] He thus contributed to the evolving discussion of the

39 Noda, "Kekkaku yōbō ni tsuite," 12.
40 The Japan Times, "The Prevention of Tuberculosis," 42; "The Red Cross in the Prefectures," 44, 46-47, 50.
41 Kashimura Teiichi, "Kanbō to sono yobō (tsūzoku jikken yōshōhō)" [Colds and their prevention (popular experimental hygiene method)], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 268 (February 5, 1910): 28-29.

health benefits of bathing begun in issue 240 of the *Journal of the Japanese Red Cross.* In this issue, dated August 20, 1908, two articles on bathing appeared. The first, Haga Eijirō's lecture titled simply "Bathing" strongly advocated using the water from hot springs for both bathing and drinking. The sulfur, carbonation, and other minerals in hot springs water helped heal skin injuries and diseases while its cleansing power improved overall health and digestion when drunk.[42] In the second article, "Information on ocean bathing," Takahashi Kinji described the beach in terms that made it a veritable fountain of good health through cleanliness.

> Washing off grime in such a wide expanse of water, purifying the lungs in thousands of miles of wind, the day's pains flow far away in the salt water of the ocean. It is quite enjoyable. From the perspective of hygiene it has merits too. . . . Bathing in seawater is effective against gastrointestinal illness, liver disease, diseases of the uterus, skin disease, etc. Ocean air has an especially high quantity of oxygen and low carbon dioxide. There are hardly any miasmas, harmful gas or things floating in the air, so it is good for the lungs. For that reason it oxidizes your body, promotes your appetite, increases constitution. Moreover it helps the spirit.[43]

The Japanese Red Cross thus contributed a sense of dramatic conflict to the hygienic education movement. It created a war in which half of the battle was making people associate uncleanliness with disease and cleanliness with health. Furthermore these associations were to be made at a visceral level. As Otokuni Taisuke asserted in 1914, children: "must be trained to feel that dirty shoes are disagreeable and cannot be put on."[44] Only then would people become the perfect soldiers in the fight against disease. They would do the right thing instinctively.

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42 Eijirō Haga, "Kōwa: nyūdō (zoku)" [Lecture: bathing (continued)], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 240 (August 20, 1908): 10-14.

43 Takahashi Kinji, "Kaisuiyoku no kokoroe" [Information on ocean bathing], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 240 (August 20, 1908), 28.

44 Otokuni Taisuke, "Eisei shisō ni toboshii kodomo no shochi" [The treatment of children poor in hygenic thought], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 318 (April 10, 1914): 47.

Posters and Politics: Red Cross Hygiene and International Health Education

As a project for reforming the way people thought about disease, the campaign to prevent and eliminate tuberculosis inspired a much wider movement to promote hygienic education in general. As a 1934 article claimed: "considering the present situation of hygiene here in Japan, the Japanese Red Cross Society has recognized the necessity of giving the whole population of Japan the so-called hygienic education."[45] However the modern scientific-medical idiom of hygiene and health education continued to struggle with a difficult overriding question: how does one convince audiences of the reality of phenomena which cannot be directly perceived—mainly germs and infection? From the perspective of audiences, this question might be rephrased: how did scientific medicine offer a better account for seemingly unpredictable contingencies of sickness and health? Since one cannot actually sense the entry of airborne or food-borne bacteria and viruses into the body it is no more possible for any individual to empirically verify the cause of any particular illness using scientific-medical explanations than religious or spiritual ones. The hygiene education materials discussed in this section—Japanese Red Cross Society "Junior Red Cross Posters" from the interwar period—suggest that during the 1920s the global discourse on hygiene education sidestepped these challenges by promoting a vision of hygienic sociality which supplemented cause-and-effect explanations with affect. In other words, hygiene educators attempted to convince audiences that not only did hygiene prevent disease, but the act of making oneself and one's surroundings clean was beautiful, felt good, and made for both harmonious and

45 The Japan Times, "Red Cross Activities," in *XVth International Red Cross Conference, Tokyo, October 1934*, 20-23 (Tokyo: Japan Times Ltd., 1934), 22.

morally correct family relations.

Following World War I the international Red Cross movement as a whole faced the challenge of maintaining relevance in an era when world leaders advanced a public discourse of universal peace. The creation of the League of Nations in 1919, the signing of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact which prohibited aggressive war, and the popular notion that WWI had been "the war to end war," caused some to question the need for a voluntary organization founded on the ideal of impartial relief of wounded soldiers on the battlefield during wartime. Andre Durand writes that "Public opinion, believing that the First World War would also be that last and that the League of Nations would keep the world at peace through arbitration and negotiation, sometimes looked upon the wartime activities of the Red Cross as archaic."[46]

In addition, epidemics returned to popular consciousness as frightening, immediate threats to humanity. The physical deprivations of wartime, the demobilization of millions of soldiers, and the mass immigration of displaced populations following the war created an environment ripe for the spread of infectious disease. In 1918 and 1919 a viral illness dubbed the "Spanish Influenza" became a pandemic, killing roughly 250,000 people in Japan and 25 to 30 million people worldwide. Unlike typical flu viruses, this one seemed to affect healthy young adults as much as the very old and very young, resulting in ironic cases where soldiers who had survived the horrors of battlefield succumbed to sickness on their return home.[47] Furthermore, Red Cross historian Caroline

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46 Andre Durand, *From Sarajevo to Hiroshima: History of the International Committee of the Red Cross* (Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 1984), 155. Also see David P. Forsythe, *The Humanitarians: The International Committee of the Red Cross* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 35.

47 Geoffrey W. Rice and Edwina Palmer, "Pandemic Influenza in Japan, 1918-1919: Mortality Patterns and Official Responses," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 19 (2)(1993): 389-90, 393.

Moorehead recounts that by 1920:

> A third of Poland's 38 million people were seriously ill, four million of them with tuberculosis. Typhus and influenza were decimating the Ukraine. In Vienna, there were said to be 100,000 starving children. Whether from Hungary or Czechoslovakia, Serbia or Montenegro, . . . unless something was done, and done at once, deaths in the months to come would far exceed those of the war just coming to a close.[48]

To focus the efforts of humanitarians on such peacetime threats and to capitalize on the humanitarian relief capacity built up during wartime, in 1919 national Red Cross societies belonging to the victorious Allied countries formed the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. This Geneva-based organization aimed to supplement the International Committee of the Red Cross and its original focus on war relief. The League expanded peacetime humanitarian activities by coordinating relief for emergencies such as famines, epidemics of infectious diseases, and natural disasters. It promoted the creation of youth Red Cross societies in each member nation and its publications preached the virtues of hygienic education. The League's leaders thus aimed to create "an enlarged programme of action in the general interest of humanity" for the Red Cross movement, emphasizing peacetime activity in the new world without armed conflict.[49]

The JRCS was one of the League's founding members and a major collaborator with the new organization's projects. One of these was the dissemination of printed materials on hygienic education, or "propaganda," as many called it. Artist K. Sakai painted a series of seventeen posters on hygiene for the Junior Red Cross Society of Japan which the Society submitted to the League for inclusion in a pictoral supplement of "propaganda" materials printed in the February 1925 issue of their journal, *The World's*

48 Caroline Moorehead, *Dunant's Dream: War, Switzerland, and the History of the Red Cross* (London: HarperCollins, 1998), 265.

49 Georges Milsom, "The History of the Red Cross," *The World's Health* 3.1 (January 1922): 23, 20.

Health (see figure 4.1). Six out of the seventeen were published along with poster series titled "Advertising Health in Italy." The so-called Japanese "Junior Red Cross Posters" became extremely popular among doctors and health educators worldwide thanks to the League's publicity. The JRCS received many requests for these posters for various national Red Cross society officials, public health officials, junior Red Cross society leaders, and even insurance industry representatives. The JRCS responded by sending prints free of charge. They thus made appearances at expositions, clinics, and Red Cross offices from Belgium, Shanghai, Canada, the United States, and Great Britain, to Estonia and New Zealand in 1925 and 1926.[50]

In two separate thank-you letters addressed to JRCS President Hirayama, Dr. Ward Brindton of the Division of Tuberculosis of the United States Department of Public Health expressed the hygiene world's enthusiasm for the Japanese "Junior Red Cross Posters." He found them "very practical and to the point" and easy to display in the Division's exhibit at the 1926 Tuberculosis Conference at the Great Sanitorium at Mont Alto, Pennsylvania. He also offered the following praise to the JRCS: "Your country is becoming so active in these health matters, that we are apt to point to what you are doing as an incentive for greater activity over here."[51] Hygiene experts thus associated Japan with vigorous intervention by public and private institutions in matters of bodily cleanliness and fitness, making it a model for hygienic educational efforts worldwide.

What made these "very practical and to the point" images so attractive? How can

50 Nihon Sekijūjisha, *Insatsu, kankō, chizu, posutaa rui* [Printings, publications, maps, posters], unpublished Japanese Red Cross Society archive, files 3561-2, Japanese Red Cross Society Documents, Museum Meiji Mura Collection, Red Cross Historical Document Room, Japanese Red Cross Society Toyota College of Nursing, Toyota, Japan, index numbers 17, 23, 57, 59-61.

51 Ibid., index number 42.

we use them to understand hygiene posters as a genre of art? The comments accompanying the advertisement of the posters in *The World's Health*, titled "Teaching Health to Juniors of Japan," offered one clue to help us grapple with these questions.

> While reducing the element of formal teaching to the minimum, these posters offer a series of positive suggestions that carry with them that promise of satisfaction-in-accomplishment which is the object of the poster-maker's art. In complete harmony with the views of the leading students of child psychology, these posters tell nothing of disease. Emphatically they are *health* posters. Each one makes its individual appeal in terms of the positive ideal of abundant vitality (italics in original, see figure 4.1).[52]

For the League, these posters contributed to hygienic education's goal of making activities such as hand-washing, teeth-brushing, fly-killing, chewing food, and doing house chores beautiful and enjoyable in themselves.

The posters deliberately avoided any kind of imagery that might frighten the audience by directly showing disease as the consequence of poor hygiene. This avoidance of sickness and death was by no means specific to K. Sakai's work or Japan. Moorehead recounts that in *The World's Health*:

> Competitions for posters proclaiming healthy habits were launched, with directions that the artists must avoid horror ('Fear is not a healthy emotion'). There were to be no 'delirious alcoholics with staring eyeballs' and certainly no 'louse gathering up a whole country into his hairy clutches.'[53]

In the name of health the journal's editors thus banished representations of sickness and death. Since "fear is not a healthy emotion," according to the Red Cross such things should simply be forgotten.

Instead the posters tried to make hygiene into its own end, by showing how it

52 League of Red Cross Societies, "Teaching Health to Juniors of Japan," pictoral supplement to The World's Health (February, 1925).
53 Moorehead, *Dunant's Dream*, 264.

provided “satisfaction-in-accomplishment” in elegant and colorful brush strokes. Taking a closer look at the poster titled: “Wash your hands before meals and chew your food well” (*Shokuji no mae ni wa wasurezuni te o araimashō. Soshite yoku kande tabemashō*) (figure 4.2) we can see how the posters sought to accomplish this. It depicts a boy enjoying a meal with an inset image of hands washing. This image appears relatively straightforward in representing the boy's smiling face as he eats a healthful variety of food with his clean hands. He wears a fine kimono and eats from neatly arranged plates. Being clean and healthy was beautiful and felt good too. Thus the posters' representations of bodily aesthetics and their affective properties was crucially important. The subjects had to be actively engaged in hygienic activities and demonstrate healthiness while doing so. The posters thus operated according to the expectation that rather than fear or revulsion, a good feeling of clean healthiness could be created in the minds of viewers by demonstrating the self-satisfying nature of hygienic work in an attractive way.

Two parts of this first image warrant further note. One, the inset shows a faucet with running water, rather than a basin of well-drawn water. Two, the boy eats at a *chabudai* or small table, rather than with an individual tray. As Jordan Sand discusses in the book *House and Home in Modern Japan*, these were two major changes in household practice promoted by modernizing reformers and symbols of the new middle-class domesticity of the interwar period.[54] By incorporating such elements into the images hygienic education universalized a very particular bourgeois sensibility about domestic life.

Another poster (figure 4.3), subtitled “Don't use a handkerchief or towel that has

54 Jordan Sand, *House and Home in Modern Japan: Architecture, Domestic Space, and Bourgeois Culture, 1880-1930* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2003), 86-89, 33-39

been used by others" (*Tanin no tenugui ya hankachi o tsukainai yō ni shimashō*) demonstrates this point further. The poster shows the boy drying his hands using a white towel with his name, Tarō, written on it, while his sister, Haruko, washes her hands at the bathroom sink. The whiteness of the towels symbolized cleanliness,[55] and the hygienic educational message here confirms Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney's observation that for Japanese, uncleanliness is the result of contact with other people, or in her words "dirt consists of the excretion of others."[56] The goal of hygiene was to eliminate the transfer of disease-causing germs from one person to another, and it did so by teaching people to associate dirtiness with human contact.

This idea of separate towels thus introduced the notion of hygienic individuality within the home. It made each person the owner of his or her special bathroom items, which were preferably marked as such. Strictly separating family members and their germs meant that each person had her or his own individual fate regarding sickness and health. The double message inherent in this image meant the displacement of notions of communal property with the idea of personal, private property that was an extension of one's own body and germs. In scientific-medical terms, one must maintain vigilance so as not let others' germs invade the body just as one should not cause one's own germs to invade others. In the language of hygiene education, clearly separating and marking off each person's property and respecting that division led to healthy living.

By offering a re-imagined sense of social relations mediated through infectious but invisible germs attached to particular individual bodies and their possessions,

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55 Concerning the sudden popularity of white as the color of hygiene in the 1920s, see Sand, *House and Home in Modern Japan*, 71-73.

56 Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, *Illness and Culture in Contemporary Japan: an Anthropological View* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 22.

hygienic education made cleanliness a moral imperative. From the perspective of hygiene discourse children must learn to manage the dirt produced by, and tending to attach to, their bodies from the outside for the sake of family, friends, nation, and ultimately humanity as a whole. Ohnuki-Tierny argues: "This clean feeling is not only personally most desirable and satisfying, . . . it is one of the most cherished moral values in contemporary Japan. . . . the same expressions are used to describe cleanliness in the hygienic as well as the moral sense."[57] Attention to hygiene meant attention to, and respect for those around you. It meant being good.

Lastly, the poster captioned "Gladly do whatever is asked of you." (*Ishite tsukerareneta koto wa nandemo yukai ni shimashō*) (figure 4.4), makes this connection between cleanliness and morally correct social relations clear. At first the overall message appears somewhat out of place compared to the others since the caption has no specific relation to hygienic practice, but seems to be more a matter of simple discipline. Looking closely at the image, however, we can see that the boy has a broom in his hand, indicating that the adult woman—probably his mother—is asking him to sweep. So the practice of cleanliness and hygiene in this image was the vehicle for fostering a sense of obligation to others in general. Hygienic morality reconstituted domestic social hierarchies through the collective practical project of managing uncleanliness.

It almost goes without saying that this form of hierarchy, or this form of childhood, could not exist without the family having bourgeois social status. For a child to be a non-laboring family member who mainly stayed in the home when not attending school meant affluence. The mother's intricately tied *obi*, or kimono sash, and the large

57 Ibid., 35.

garden which the boy is being asked to sweep further suggest that the family being portrayed as a universal model for hygienic behavior is one with ample financial means.

The Japanese Red Cross Society "Junior Red Cross Posters" convey particularly well the key tropes of the hygiene poster genre of art. The posters aimed to make cleanliness a beautiful, pleasurable, and moral part of healthy modern domesticity. Comparing them with but one of hundreds of possible examples from outside of Japan, the American Social Health Association's 1922 poster "Be Clean" (figure 4.5) shows many of the same attributes. The caption neatly summarizes the point of hygiene posters: "Without cleanliness there can be no real attractiveness."[58] Rather than frighten viewers with grotesque images of dirtiness or the effects of disease, the Red Cross sanitized the representations so that the purpose of creating healthy, clean people matched their content of joyful healthiness and clean living. In doing so, these posters drew upon and reinforced a form of bourgeoisie domesticity as universal, promoting an ethos of hygienic individuality as the ideal form of social relation.

Nutritional Hygiene and Social Critique

On the whole, the JRCS aligned its hygienic crusade to accord with government policy which emphasized the management of tuberculosis through sanitoria and hygienic education. However the combined efforts of the government, the Red Cross, and local philanthropic organizations never came close to achieving their stated aims of eliminating tuberculosis throughout the empire. Statistics provided by the JRCS in 1934 showed that mortality from tuberculosis had declined in the twenty years since the start of the

58 American Social Health Association, "Be Clean," 1922, University of Minnesota Libraries, Social Welfare History Archives.

campaign, but not by much. In 1910 the death rate was 22.4 people out of 10,000. In 1931 it was 18.6 per 10,000.[59] The most that the campaign's organizers could claim was a partial victory.

While such statistics were useful at providing a general reader with an idea of the campaign's overall progress, tuberculosis researchers needed a more nuanced picture of the spread of the epidemic in order to understand why sanitoria and hygiene education did not seem to be having the desired effect. They sought to understand the disease as a social phenomenon in the social scientific sense, meaning that it spread differently depending on economic statuses, genders, locations, ages, and occupations of the host populations. Using these types of analytical categories, researchers determined that, contrary to the association of cities with dirtiness and disease, by the 1920s the tuberculosis situation in industrializing urban areas had improved, while impoverished rural areas continued to worsen with increasing rates of infection.[60] Hygiene experts produced a variety of explanations for this striking differential in anti-tuberculosis results. For some the increasing rates of rural infection were evidence that the educational project was incomplete, and that the government, JRCS, and local voluntary organizations should redouble their efforts to instill proper hygienic thought the entire population, including the rural population.[61]

Others, however, found this explanation unconvincing since the educational program already did target rural locations with lectures and printed materials. Instead, the failure of the tuberculosis prevention and elimination efforts in rural areas was the result

59 The Japan Times, "The Prevention of Tuberculosis," 42.
60 Johnston, *The Modern Epidemic*, 102.
61 The Japan Times, "Red Cross Activities," 22.

of those areas' relative impoverishment. Hygiene experts came to understand the disease in that way that Johnston so clearly points out, that: “sickness and death from tuberculosis were and remain an accurate barometer of living standards in any population.”[62] In other words, those who attempted to grapple with the problem of tuberculosis began to recognize that it could not be solved by hygiene education alone, but only with a transformation in the material conditions of society generally. This realization led some hygiene experts to take up daily life reform as the means to carry out such a transformation. Nutrition proved to be the most crucial area where hygiene experts made visible the deep divides separating the life chances of various groups such as urban laborers, bourgeoisie, outcasts, and the rural poor to name but a few. JRCS nutrition experts embraced the concept of social change in the reformist, rather than revolutionary mode through their efforts to bring healthy food into the diets of ordinary people.

Around the turn of the 20th century muckraking journalists introduced the language of “the social” to grasp the particularities of poverty in a modern industrializing capitalist economy. Yokoyama Gennosuke's 1899 book *Nihon no kaso shakai* [Lower class society of Japan], a collection of reports he wrote for newspapers during the late 1890s, popularized the use of the notion of social class as a way to critique economic injustices.[63] As research on the suffering of the urban poor more and more visible, wealthy donors established private charitable associations to help the homeless and unemployed. Furthermore, during the first two decades of the twentieth century socially-minded politicians and state bureaucrats began to fight battles with their liberal

62 Johnston, *The Modern Epidemic*, 102.
63 Yutani Eiji, “Introduction,” In *Nihon no Kaso Shakai of Gennosuke Yokoyama*, 1-156 (Ph. D. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1985).

counterparts over the use of government policies such as poor relief and labor laws to manage social problems.[64] As such, they too used the concepts of the modern academic disciplines of the social sciences to articulate their agenda.

Social activists and reformers also made the Japanese Red Cross Society into an actor in this burgeoning field of social reform. In 1930 it became kind of clearinghouse for information on welfare and social reform organizations and their activities when it started publishing short bulletins in a new "Social News" column of its monthly journal. It reported on the activities of municipal social work departments, free lodging work programs, and the construction of a municipally managed dining hall in Tokyo.[65] The column also contained news about philanthropic organizations outside the empire such as the Rockefeller Foundation.[66]

As the above example of the dining hall suggests, hygienically minded reformers made diet and nutrition a major focus of attention. Standing at the intersection of the growing discourse on social problems and the outpouring of concern with disease, nutritional hygiene became an important sub-field of hygiene from the 1910s onward. Among nutritionists, the idea of improving the nation's diet stood in as a metonym for the idea of improving the living conditions of the poor in general. As such, dietary reform promised to address one of the most important conditions making tuberculosis a continuing threat to the empire.

In 1934 Saiki Tadasu, a hygienist from the Imperial Government Institute for

64 Garon, *Molding Japanese Minds,* 39-49.

65 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Akasaka nado shakai jigyōbu" [Social work departments in Akasaka, etc], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 513 (February 10, 1930): 28; "Shakai jihō: muryō shukuhakujo de jusan," 29; Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Shiei shokudō kensetsu" [Municipally managed dining hall establishment], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 513 (February 10, 1930): 29.

66 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Rokkufera zaidan no shakai shisetsu" [Social institutions of the Rockefeller foundation], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 513 (February 10, 1930): 29.

Nutrition writing for *The Japan Times* in its coverage of the 1934 International Red Cross Meeting in Tokyo, summarized the way nutritional hygiene had come to understand its purpose over the past twenty years when he argued that the proliferation of nutritional knowledge exerted a beneficial influence on society. This beneficial influence included a "moral aspect," which meant that: "The gap between the life of the rich and the poor is narrowed by nutritious food." Furthermore nutritional education and reform offered a way to avoid class conflict. Due to its influence: "The spirit of harmonious co-operation [between rich and poor] has begun to prevail."[67] In other words, improving the diet of the poor not only reduced disease, but it would also relieve some of the dysfunctional aspects of the conflict ridden imperial-capitalist system without revolutionary change.

Saiki's approach to dietary reform also reflected the nutritionists' shift in tactics. By the 1930s they had moved away from using private charitable organizations to depending on and reinforcing the state's capacity to regulate healthful food production and distribution. For example, he leveled a critique at the modern food processing industry when he denounced their purchases of "toxic . . . polishing powder used for polishing rice and barley" from chemical manufacturing firms.[68] These polishing powders contained talc—a cancer-causing substance which consumer groups and government departments of food and drugs are still trying to ban around the world today. Experts like Saiki thus came to recognize that industries required active regulation to prevent them from compromising the overall project of creating a healthy population. Hygiene education alone could only achieve so much. To fully carry out their "moral" mission of

67 Saiki Tadasu. "The Nutrition Institute," In *XVth International Red Cross Conference, Tokyo, October 1934*, 34 (Tokyo: Japan Times Ltd., 1934), 34.
68 Ibid.

creating the "spirit of harmonious co-operation" hygienists had come to rely on forceful state measures.

Twenty years earlier, the Red Cross discourse on nutrition looked quite different even though it shared the same goal of social reform. Dr. Furūda Kōtarō's 1915 speech "Delicious and inexpensive food" (subsequently published in the JRCS journal *Hakuai*) demonstrated the deeply egalitarian and humanitarian impulse of hygiene discourse. He begins his argument with a premise that can best be described as the nutritionists' *cogito*: "The necessities of life—clothing, food, shelter—are the most serious matter for human beings. This cannot be stressed enough. Among these necessities food is the most crucial."[69] While it may seem self-evident if understood within the specific discourse of the biological sciences, this claim made for a troubling, ambiguous premise when applied to social life in general.

On one hand, it enabled those who lacked the necessities of life to make claims for better treatment a matter of social justice. Like Saiki and other nutritionists Furūda presented himself as a kind of champion of the working person. For construction workers and other heavy laborers, the problem of finding "delicious and inexpensive food" acquired a much greater urgency than a worker at a clerical-type position since the laborer required higher levels of nutritional intake to sustain her or his higher level of physical activity. At the same time, Furūda argued that factory workers, especially women textile workers, did not get enough physical exercise because they were shut in a room all day long. This led to them having sickly constitutions, blue-colored faces, and a

69 Kōtarō Furūda, "Yasukute umai tabemono" [Cheap and inexpensive food], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 341 (September 10, 1915) 44.

frightening predisposition for developing lung diseases.[70]

On the other hand, by making life's biological necessities so important, nutritional hygienists such as Furūda implicitly dismissed national political life as somehow less "serious." Indeed, Furūda proceeds with his advocacy of boiled barley and rice, miso soup and tofu as Japan's best "delicious and inexpensive" types of food by completely ignoring any possible tension between individual and national interest, since: "Selecting inexpensive and delicious food is extremely desirable for each individual and each nation as well."[71] He sought to naturalize the connection between the nutritional education of industrial and agricultural workers and the larger project of national strengthening and unity. The Red Cross nutritional reform effort was thus quite egalitarian, because it made the dietary choices of all individuals, even impoverished laborers, important to national society. At the same time it meant that the right to dispute government policy would be sacrificed in favor of a full belly.

The unproblematic and depoliticizing alignment of individual nutrition and national strength ultimately leads Furūda to embrace a deeply ambivalent vision for social reform in general. This ambivalence comes to the fore in his conclusion, which stresses the need for all humans to balance nutritional intake with forms of physical activity:

> The secret of the robust bodied . . . is working a lot and eating a lot. . . . In protecting one's bodily health, nutrition intake and exercise must be in harmony. . . . Those such as laborers, construction workers and workmen must have extremely robust bodies and gain weight. This is a desirable harmony of nutrition and exercise. If only such a harmony is achieved will boiled barley and rice be an appropriate form of nutrition. . . . For construction workers and workmen four or five meals a day with side

70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., 44.

> dishes is perfectly fine. . . . If you think through it this way, the conclusion is that "inexpensive and delicious food" means working harder and eating more. Working hard is definitely its own reward. Even though some individuals say that our nation has no delicious food to offer, I want us, the entire nation, to work hard and eat a lot.[72]

Here Furūda reveals how nutritional hygiene discourse understood that the twin process of food consumption and physical activity formed the conditions for robust health. Working hard became "its own reward" because it led to eating more and "strengthening the body." By positing labor as "its own reward" in terms of health, this formulation of hygiene pointed toward the author's unstated desire to make labor into something more than a means for economic survival. As champions of the working person, hygiene experts such as Furūda were asserting that labor, especially factory labor, must be reformed to make it a healthful activity for the laborer rather than a "hateful" existence commonly described as similar to being a prisoner in jail or an ascetic at a Zen temple.[73]

However, this inherent potential of the nutritionists' critique of modern diet and work to lead to a radical reassessment of the assumptions behind the idea of labor was undermined by the entirely non-confrontational manner of Furūda's suggestions. He finds no fault in the government or the food industry for creating the conditions in which laborers did not seem to be able to eat enough. When Furūda concludes: "I want us, the entire nation, to work hard and eat a lot," it makes nutritional education more of a tactic by which individuals might discipline themselves and seek personal satisfaction in accommodating their habits to the existing system of production and consumption. He did not challenge the idea of wage labor in capitalism per se, but simply sought to

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72 Ibid., 45.

73 Yokoyama Gennosuke, *Nihon no Kaso Shakai of Gennosuke Yokoyama*, trans. Eiji Yutani (Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1985), 260-1.

mitigate its unhealthful consequences.

Events of the subsequent three years turned Furūda's reformist vision of a harmonious society made healthy by ample work and ample diet into a pipe dream. World War I created unprecedented opportunities for exporting manufactured goods to European nations, making the textile industries in particular extremely profitable. However, the wartime industrial boom did not profit everyone equally. Factory owners and merchants vaulted upward into a new class of newly-rich, while massive inflation eroded the real wages of laborers and public servants such as police and teachers. Rapid economic growth thus widened the gap in living standards between rich and poor by causing the prices of necessities to skyrocket. Finding inexpensive and delicious food had become impossible. This situation, combined with a poor harvest and a government appropriation of rice supplies to feed the Imperial Army's Siberian intervention led to a spike in the price of rice and other foodstuffs in 1918. That August, city dwellers carried out mass protests against the government and violent attacks on merchants in an uprising now called the 1918 Rice Riots.[74]

That spring, when rice was a growing concern on everyone's minds, Kishimoto Yuuji, Doctor of Veterinary Medicine, published his six-part series of articles in the JRCS journal on the disease beriberi. Kishimoto sought to understand the cause of this mysterious disease which had plagued both the military and rural areas of the empire and was somehow connected to the consumption of polished white rice. He estimated that it had caused from seven to fifteen thousand deaths per year between 1902 and 1911, and that increases in the death rates directly corresponded to years of poor weather and poor

74 Michael Lewis, *Rioters and Citizens: Mass Protest in Imperial Japan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1990), 1-3.

harvests, meaning that beriberi manifested a problem of diet.[75]

Kishimoto identified the symptoms of beriberi as numbness of the limbs, swollen feet, and an enlarged heart.[76] However, at that time scientists had not isolated vitamins as necessary supplementary micro-nutrients, so Kishimoto did not recognize beriberi as a vitamin B deficiency.[77] He acknowledged the generally accepted connection between the consumption of a diet of polished white rice and beriberi, but then erroneously explained the connection through his "autotoxicity" theory. He claimed that polished white rice contained a "beriberi poison," which could be neutralized by consuming wheat, barley, sorghum, brown rice, or rice bran.[78]

Even with his mistaken understanding, however, Kishimoto recognized that beriberi deaths were completely avoidable:

> Essentially the disease called beriberi is a simple disease to treat. If the treatment is proper it is absolutely nothing that one should die from. Accordingly the mortality rates should not be as high as these statistics show. . . . Dosages of rice bran alone can serve as beriberi medicine.[79]

Kishimoto's "should" here marked his move to a prescriptive form of address. Based on the humanitarian premise that all people deserve relief from suffering, he argued that the failure to prevent beriberi deaths was not necessarily a failure of modern medical technique, but of the wider socio-economic system in which it was embedded. As a Doctor of Veterinary Medicine, Kishimoto admitted that he lacked the qualifications to

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75 Kishimoto Yuuji, "Tsūzoku kakke shinbyōgenron" [New theory of the etiology of common beriberi], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 371 (March 10, 1918): 33.

76 Kishimoto Yuuji, "Tsūzoku kakke shinbyōgenron (san)" [New theory of the etiology of common beriberi (three)], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 375 (July 10, 1918): 29.

77 For an analysis of earlier efforts of medical doctors to explain beriberi see Christian Oberlander, "The Rise of Western 'Scientific Medicine' in Japan: Bacteriolocy and Beriberi," in *Building a Modern Japan: Science, Technology, and Medicine in the Meiji Era and Beyond*, ed. Morris Low, 13-36 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

78 Kishimoto, "Tsūzoku kakke shinbyōgenron," 34-35.

79 Ibid.

speak as an expert on human disease. However, as a resident of agricultural Japan, he could speak from personal experience about the effects of famine on the human and animal populations in rural areas and had even treated workers in his own household afflicted with beriberi.[80]

Kishimoto's assessment also contained a subtle, but telling, critique of capitalism in general. He asserted that:

> Everyone recognizes a close connection exists between beriberi and rice. Since rice has a beriberi poison which some ingredient in wheat can cure, researchers are deeply investigating this connection. However scholars researching this problem are not perfectly clear about the relationship between the two, and unfortunately many reports are not given the opportunity to be published [in medical journals proper] because the research *has not resulted in any profit*.[81]

In other words, informal investigators such as himself had learned a great deal about beriberi through clinical research, but the larger medical establishment was largely uninterested in their findings because no profit could be made from a disease that was treatable with such simple items as wheat or rice bran. Without the prospect of pharmaceutical patents, the profit-hungry medical industry was less than enthusiastic about beriberi. Spurned by the regular medical journals, Kishimoto took his message somewhere he felt that the logic of profit did not rule—the Red Cross. By implication Kishimoto was saying that his estimated one million beriberi sufferers per year deserved better treatment than the existing profit-driven economic system was able to provide. He subtly pushed for doctors to make volunteerism an important part of medicine, using the Red Cross as his preferred message bearer. While on the surface he was merely describing his informal experiments dealing with the “autotoxicity” phenomenon in

80 Ibid., 36.
81 Ibid., italics added.

animals, Dr. Kishimoto was also prescribing stronger medicine for larger social ills.

Conclusion

In terms of the institutional development, the growing involvement of the JRCS in efforts to manage infectious diseases in the general population of the empire was a natural offshoot of its wartime and natural disaster relief work. It built upon already existing Red Cross competencies in diagnosis and treatment as well as epidemiology. It ensured the continuous peacetime use and maintenance of facilities primarily designed for war purposes and gave medical personnel valuable training opportunities in preparation for wartime service. For the ideology of humanitarian empire it served an even more important purpose. The placement of tuberculosis clinics and hospitals throughout the empire symbolized the conquest of a most dangerous enemy—the invisible germs that directly threatened the health and life of ordinary people of the empire. Modern medicine paired with epidemiological knowledge promised to eradicate the plagues of the past, and this utopian vision made all of society's members important participants in creating a healthier future.

By taking up the call to arms against infectious disease the Red Cross extended its reach from the battlefield and the natural disaster site to daily life in kitchens, the bathrooms, train cars, and anywhere else that people labored, ate, or otherwise came into contact with others. Hygiene education, a major segment of the JRCS effort to fight disease, operated according to a logic of individual empowerment. Rather than highlighting how social change had created conditions under which diseases flourished, hygiene experts advanced the notion that diseases could be conquered by instilling

personal habits of cleanliness and nutrition in children. In this way hygiene education fit best into a social reformist, rather than revolutionary agenda. It tried to teach people how to survive by living beautiful and moral lives according to the new bourgeoisie ideal of the clean, healthy and harmonious family. Nutritional education made dietary recommendations which aimed to help workers increase both their productivity and food consumption rates. As such, the history of the JRCS anti-tuberculosis campaign and its offshoots in the areas of general hygiene and nutritional hygiene further demonstrates the deep affinity between humanitarian activity and the liberal strains of capitalist thinking outlined in chapter three. The Red Cross signified rescue from sickness without necessarily involving any effort to address the underlying social causes of epidemics.

Yet the knowledge produced by scientific medical discourse could not be appropriated for the defense of the status quo so easily. Doctors and other experts continued to gesture towards the need to look at disease as social, not just an individual moral problem. The crusade against disease exposed detailed information about of the material conditions of all of the empire's people in their specificity. Researchers began to understand the health consequences of life in the new and dangerous modern world of crowded, germ-filled factories, trains, tenement houses, and farming villages. Since living conditions played such an important role in determining the spread of disease, poverty itself became a matter of hygienic concern, leading to the possibility of a subtle critique of the industrial-capitalist order and an altogether ambivalent perspective towards modernity which remains with us today. As experts on disease prevention, rather than simple healers, modern doctors and hygiene experts developed the authority to address not only individual sickness, but sicknesses of the entire social body. Rather than a

radically democratic solution to the dysfunction of the industrial capitalist and nation-state systems however, their perspective entailed rendering the issues involved as problems of technique. That is, they sought to understand society as a complex of dynamic forces which could, and should, be regulated and optimized for the good of both ordinary people and the rulers. So while they may have taken issue with specific state policies and bemoaned particular instances when the overriding demand for profit led to unhealthy social outcomes, medical experts were careful not to question the need for state authority as such, nor the liberal proscription of civil society as the putative sphere of individual freedom.

Figure 4.1. “Teaching Health to Juniors of Japan” in *The World's Health*, February, 1925. (Images courtesy of the Japanese Red Cross Society, Museum Meiji Mura Collection, Japanese Red Cross Society Toyota College of Nursing.)

Figure 4.2. “Wash your hands before meals and chew your food well.”

Figure 4.3. “Don't use a handkerchief or towel that has been used by others.”

Figure 4.4. “Gladly do whatever is asked of you.”



Figure 4.5. "Be Clean," American Social Health Association, 1922. (Courtesy of the University of Minnesota Libraries, Social Welfare History Archives.)

Chapter 5

Angels in White

The Imperial Japanese Red Cross Nursing Women at War

In July of 1937 the Imperial Japanese Army initiated a full-scale invasion of China, turning what started as a small skirmish near Beijing into the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). For the Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS), this entailed an intensification of the relief activity that had been underway since fighting began on the continent during the Manchurian Incident in 1931. The JRCS mobilized its relief units to work in field hospitals, hospital ships, and metropolitan military hospitals for the duration of what officials called the "China Incident." However Red Cross doctors, medics, nursing-women, and transporters were not the only ones working overtime during these years. Authors began writing and compiling a great number of biographies, newspaper reports, memoirs, novelized war accounts, and poetry anthologies on the subject of wartime service in the Red Cross. The Red Cross publishing house itself also went into action, turning out these kinds of books in great numbers. What are we to make of this wartime literary outpouring? How did it differ from earlier discourses on wartime humanitarian action? The predominance of the figure of the nursing-woman (*kangofu*)[1] strongly distinguished these representations from earlier literature on wartime humanitarian service. Often called the "angels in white" (*hakui no tenshi*), imperial Red

1 Here I use the more direct, or literal translation of the term *kangofu* into "nursing woman" rather than the more common and elegant English equivalent "nurse" in order to draw attention to the gender specific nuance of the term in Japanese.

Cross nursing women became a ubiquitous presence in books, newspapers, and movies. They were brave, self-sacrificing, skilled, disciplined, and beautiful as they tended to wounded and sick soldiers fighting for the empire.

When the JRCS established its first training program for nursing women in 1891, their numbers were extremely small in relation to the number of male medics employed by the JRCS to perform essentially the same work. Yet even then the idea of women working directly as skilled and authoritative participants in the empire's military adventures inspired intellectual and popular discussion out of proportion to their numbers. Over the subsequent decades, the ratio of women to men working for the Red Cross reversed, so that at the time of the greater East Asia War there were very few male medics. Scholars have discussed this phenomenon of the feminization of JRCS relief work by analyzing the history of the official policy statements which continuously widened the JRCS efforts to recruit women and pushed to expand the sites to which they could be deployed, starting with military hospitals, to hospital ships, to field hospitals.[2]

Rather than attempting to grasp the lived experiences of nursing-women, however, this chapter instead outlines the political implications of wartime literature which made the image of the Red Cross nursing-woman an important part of imperial gender ideology and a symbol of humanitarianism. I ask: what were the political consequences, intended and otherwise, of making women the face of imperial humanitarianism? While the image of the angel in white did serve as a crucial tool for

2 Kawaguchi, *Jūgun kangofu to Nihon Sekijūjisha*; Kawai Toshinobu, "Dai ichiji sekai taisen to kangofu no kaigai haken" [The first world war and the dispatch of nursing women overseas], in *Nihon sekijyūjisha to jindō enjo* [*The History of the Japanese Red Cross Society and Humanitarian Assistance*], ed. Kurosawa Fujitaka and Kawai Toshinobu, 175-196 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2009).

imperialists to promote a self-sacrificing style of womanhood which functioned to strengthen military capacity and the defense of Japan's colonial possessions, when Red Cross leaders and government officials showed that wartime service was proper and honorable work for women it also inadvertently placed them in a position from which they spoke as authorities not only about the glory of the empire's war, but also about its problems. As a humanitarian figure the nursing-women could speak out about the suffering that she both witnessed and endured herself. Yet her critique of war largely failed to disturb the dominant imperial ideology. This was because, for the most part, the humanitarian critique targeted the evils of war in general, and had no response when imperialists made claims to be fighting to end war. In fact, the humanitarian critique of war fit well with the empire's propaganda line which justified Japan's war as an effort to bring peace to East Asia. The angel in white thus cut an ambiguous figure. On the one hand she stood for loyalty and self-sacrifice for the empire. On the other hand her stories also tended to evoke a certain sadness about the horrors of war.

The wartime gendering of Japanese Red Cross humanitarianism through this figure of the angel in white took place within two interrelated contexts. First, these representations reflected the immediate material and ideological realities of total war. Representations of angels in white served as a form of propaganda. They aimed to demonstrate how women made contributions as mothers and as laborers to the war effort which were crucial to the success of the empire. Angel in white imagery thus bolstered the state's maternalist and productivist rationales for mobilizing women as "reproductive soldiers" and "warriors in the economic war."[3] By explicitly gendering such appeals,

3 Chizuko Ueno, *Nationalism and Gender*, trans. Beverly Yamamoto (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2004), 44.

imperialists constituted womanhood as a category of difference while simultaneously inviting women to participate in the war as equals. It offered women stakes in the war's outcome. As nursing woman Okada Teiko asserted: “It is the woman's country. This is our empire.”[4]

Second, the angels in white cannot be understood without reference to the longer history of modern transformations of gender ideals. A number of intersecting factors made womanhood a source of deep anxiety for many of the most powerful men in the empire. Capitalists were worried about the reproduction of a docile labor force so they promoted the idea of women's natural role as mothers and educators. Military officers were concerned about the health of conscripts so they supported the association between women, motherhood, and hygiene. Nationalist ideologues made women and their social status into a crucial marker of civilization and progress. The proliferation of references to angels in white of the late 1930s and 1940s thus followed decades of effort by Western missionaries, nationalist intellectuals, and feminists to popularize the idea that women were crucial participants in the social and economic life of the Japanese empire.[5]

The imperial-era Japanese Red Cross Society, much like contemporary humanitarian non-governmental organizations, shared this nationalistic concern with making women into productive and reproductive assets for the empire. However, whereas today humanitarians speak of the need to raise the status of women in impoverished

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4 Okada Teiko, *Byōinsen jyūgunki* [Chronicle of war service on a hospital ship] (Tokyo: Shufunotomosha, 1942), 121.

5 Sharon H. Nolte and Sally Ann Hastings, “The Meiji State's Policy Toward Women, 1890-1910,” in *Recreating Japanese Women, 1600-1945*, ed. Gail Lee Bernstein, 151-174 (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1991); Mara Patessio, *Women and Public Life in Early Meiji Japan: The Development of the Feminist Movement* (Ann Arbor: The Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan, 2011), 14, 20; Marnie S. Anderson, *A Place in Public: Women's Rights in Meiji Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2010), 62, 67.

societies by educating them about topics such as hygiene, contraception, home economics, and the environment, writers for the JRCS spoke about teaching proper "Japanese women's virtues." For example, Kanō Jigorō claimed in a 1910 article for the JRCS journal:

> Womanly virtues are beauty, chastity, obedience, working hard, and doing home economics. These developed from thousands of years of Japanese history. These virtues win wars. Now days it is popular to speak highly of European and American womanly virtues, criticizing the old Japanese ways. But those criticisms demonstrate a superficial perspective. Women raised in bushi [warrior] families are superior. It is fine for women to learn about the world as academic subjects, but should keep their pure Japanese virtues.[6]

Then and now the politics of humanitarianism and gender are the same. In each case the so called advancement of the status women meant forcing the particular model of conduct held by a privileged minority onto others by claiming it held universal applicability. Samurai womanly virtues became Japanese womanly virtues, which then became the virtues of all women. Kanō's rendition omits the fact that historically "*bushi* families" comprised less than ten percent of the population of the archipelago, making his claim that they were "Japanese" virtues questionable at best.

If we consider the nursing woman as another member in the genealogy of modern female cultural constructs which included the New Woman, the Modern Girl, and the Cafe Waitress as described by Miriam Silverberg[7] we can ask: what kind of heroine did she make? By taking a close look at the conceptual associations involved with the terms "angel" and "white" I hope to provide a sense of the political stakes involved in

6 Kanō Jigorō, "Nihon no futoku" [Japan's women's virtues], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 276 (October 5, 1910): 15.

7 Miriam Silverberg, "The Cafe Waitress Sang the Blues," in *Erotic Grotesque Nonsense: the Mass Culture of Japanese Modern Times*, 73-107 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); Miriam Silverberg, "The Modern Girl as Militant," in *Recreating Japanese Women, 1600-1945*, ed. Gail Lee Bernstein, 239-266 (Berkeley: Univeristy of California Press, 1991).

producing idealized gendered types and the ambiguity inherent in the strategy of official discourse in holding forth the wartime experiences of nursing women as exemplars. Although the pathos evoked by narratives of angels in white could be read as a critique of war, for the most part their suffering bolstered propagandists' efforts to depict personal sacrifice as a necessary part of empire's "grand war to create a new world order."[8]

The Birth of a Genre

Red Cross nursing women appeared in works of fiction, biographies, newspaper articles and other expository prose long before the second Sino-Japanese War. Tarao Yuki argues that the nursing woman first appeared as a prominent character-type in literary works about the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-5). Novels such as Higuchi Ichiyō's *Anya* [Dark Night], made nursing women a symbol of a femininity engaged in the work of advancing the Japanese nation. She was a model for women to emulate in order to become active participants in the collective project of empire. By 1908 the idea of nursing women had become so commonplace that Natsume Soseki could unproblematically include one in his novel *Sanshiro* as a supporting character to the other modern women who were the central focus of the story.[9]

The literature on angels in white of the late 1930s and 1940s differed from the earlier texts in that they often featured the nursing women themselves telling their stories.

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8 John Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 205.

9 Tarao Yuki, "'Anya' to Nisshin sensō moto no jyosei hyōshō" ["'Dark Night' and the symbol of women in the Sino-Japanese War"], in *Gengo jōhō kagagaku* [Language and information sciences], 127-147 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku daigakuin sōgō bunka kenkyūka gengo jōhō kagaku senkō, 2007); Lee, Nam-Keum. "Mō hitori no 'mori no onna': Sanshiro ni okeru kangofu hyōshō o megutte" [Another "Forest Woman": through the representation of the nurse in Sanshiro], *Ningen bunka sōsei kagaku ronsō* 11 (March 30, 2009), 143-151 (Tokyo: Ochanomizu daigakuin ningen bunka sōsei kagaku kenkyūka, 2009).

Rather than merely being spoken about, during the Asia-Pacific War JRCS nursing women spoke out about their experiences. It was the birth of the genre of autobiographical military nursing woman memoirs. Part travelogue, part war journal, and part poetry anthology, the military nursing woman memoir became a prominent fixture in wartime literature which persisted into the postwar era.

Travel was a key trope of this new literary form and the nursing woman made a brave and hardy traveler. While the JRCS did assign many nursing women to work in military hospitals on the Japanese archipelago, almost all of the memoirs and biographies were about angels in white who had to travel long distances in the course of their work. Most commonly this involved service on a Red Cross hospital ship. The Imperial Japanese Army used such ships to transport sick and wounded soldiers back to the metropole. Ōtake Yasuko's *Hospital Ship* (1939), Sugiyama Ritsuko's *Journal of a Military Nursing Woman Chief* (1941), and Okada Teiko's *Chronicle of War Service on a Hospital Ship* (1942)[10] attempted to convey a sense of hospital ship life for military nursing women. They were filled with stories of the hardships and dangers they repeatedly faced on their many ocean voyages. These included seasickness, homesickness, sleep deprivation, overwork, storms, shipwrecks, and shortages of food. Sugiyama's "Hospital Ship Song" recounted:

> Nursing women caring for,
> The Emperor's soldiers' sicknesses and wounds,
> We women are called to duty.
> Red crosses on our arms,
> Burning red with the color of sincerity.

10 Ōtake Yasuko, *Byōinsen* [Hospital ship] (Tokyo: Joshi bunensha, 1939); Sugiyama Ritsuko, *Jūgun kangofuchō no shuki* [Journal of a military nursing woman chief], (Tokyo: Yugawakōbunsha, 1941); Okada, *Byōinsen jyūgunki.*

On land or sea the nursing women,
Follow an unchanging path of diligent work.
The hospital ship's mission is weighty.
Red crosses on our arms,
Burning red with the color of sincerity.

Rough waves on the great ocean,
I have become seasick.
I vomit blood but continue my work nursing.
Red crosses on our arms,
Burning red with the color of sincerity.

Battling tempests, sea fog,
Even as enemy planes assail our ship,
We are intent on our duty to transport patients.
Red crosses on our arms,
Burning red with the color of sincerity.[11]

Nursing women memoirs were clear to indicate that even while carrying out this difficult work, the life of an angel in white also included elements of adventure and memorable encounters with the foreign and novel. Moriya Misa later remembered going ashore to shop in Hong Kong while the ship took on patients. Here double-decker buses became the stage for an ongoing drama between the occupying Japanese who insisted on taking the best seats and the occupied Chinese: “The first word in Japanese that the Chinese learned was '*bakayarō*' [idiot]. The first word in Chinese that the Japanese learned was '*meifuaazu*' [it cannot be helped].”[12] Travel was thus both hardship and adventure, with novel challenges to be overcome and exciting stories ripe for retelling to others.

The physical dangers of war compounded the hardship for nursing women. As Sugiyama's poem relates, the angels in white on hospital ships often became the target of

11 Sugiyama, *Jūgun kangofuchō no shuki*, 1-2.
12 Moriya Misa, *Jūgun kangofu no mita byōinsen, Hiroshima: aru yōgo kyōyu no gentaiken* [A hospital ship and Hiroshima observed by a military nursing woman: formative experiences for discourse on nursing education] (Tokyo: Nōbunkyō, 1998), 152-3.

air attacks. Hospital ships also struck sea mines and were damaged or sunk by torpedoes.[13] Because of the fluidity of combat operations conducted by naval and air forces in the Greater East Asia War, nursing women on hospital ships could rapidly find themselves in the middle of battles. As Senda Kakō notes, nursing women were vulnerable to attack in exactly the same manner as the male soldiers and sailors of the empire.[14]

The hardship and danger only increased for nursing women assigned to military hospitals in occupied areas. Furuya Itoko's *White Robed Spirit* (1940), a collection of draft poems written on campaign, made this abundantly clear. *White Robed Spirit's* short, impressionistic entries read like a diary or war journal. During her deployments to China and Manchuria, Furuya and her fellow angels in white faced difficulties with unsafe tap water, freezing winter cold, blistering summer heat, and famine.[15]

> For two or three days there was a shortage of portable food and the hunger was agonizing.
> Remembering our warrior spirit, we say we shall endure the shortage together.[16]

So not only did the nursing women face the same hardships and dangers as soldiers, Furuya portrays them as sharing the same "warrior spirit." In this way she idealized the collective endurance of suffering. For her the angel in white was, above all, a heroine who could be relied upon to render loyal service to the nation even in the face of adversity.

The seriousness of this effort to proliferate images of nursing women as models of

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13 Ibid., 152.
14 Senda Kakō, *Jūgun kangofu: tsūkoku no dokyumento hakui no tenshi* [Military nursing women: documents lamenting the angels in white] (Tokyo: Futabasha, 1975), foreward.
15 Itoko Furuya, *Hakuidamashii* [White robed spirit] (Tokyo: Shūhōenshuppanbu, 1940), 6, 81, 91, 118-9.
16 Ibid., 118.

loyalty and self-sacrifice cannot be overstated. The expenditure of resources to publish these works was significant given the context of wartime rationing of paper and printing supplies in general. Like the blatantly racist and violent images and messages discussed by John Dower in *War Without Mercy*,[17] the empire's leaders found representations of angel in white crucial to inspiring support for the total war effort from the entire population. Unlike the propaganda Dower discusses, however, literature about Red Cross nursing woman also worked well within the empire's later policy of disavowing racial difference.[18] For imperialists the wartime support of the JRCS, an officially sanctioned humanitarian organization, signaled the alignment of the empire's war conduct and aims with the interest of humanity. In other words, nursing woman narratives were another form by which the empire usurped the universal concept of humanitarianism for use against its military opponents.

However, elevating the image of the nursing women as an authoritative speaker about the war had an unintended consequence for imperial propagandists. Angels in white often spoke in terms that cut two ways. Their words and lives might help marshal support for the empire, but at the same time they could be read as criticisms of war as well. The propagandistic nature of the genre was made obvious by JRCS leaders' attempts to manage the reception and interpretation of the stories of angels in white. To ensure that these Red Cross lives would be understood correctly, JRCS officials wrote introductory sections to the works. These endorsements by men such as the JRCS Vice President Nakagawa Nozomu lent the memoirs and biographies an aura of officialness, and like the

17 Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 195-200.
18 T. Fujitani, *Race For Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans During WWII* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2011), 48-49.

cartoonists, writers, and administrators Dower discusses, these men framed the empire's war as the most noble enterprise of arranging the peoples of East Asia into their "proper place."[19] In the introductory essay to *Hakuidamashii*, titled "Listening to the Heart," Nakagawa described the conflict with China as:

> a 'war of punishment' against those who disturb the peace of East Asia. It cannot fail to make its mark on world history and the annals of humanity. It is a holy war, not a war to invade the weak or conquer a people, but a war to construct a correct world.[20]

Nakagawa made clear that the reader should understand the hardships described by Furuya as proof that the Red Cross nursing women's commitment to this great work of "construct[ing] a correct world" for all of humanity. It was a war to bring peace.

Some nursing woman memoirs did follow the propaganda script quite closely. Okada Teiko's *Chronicle of War Service on a Hospital Ship*, for example, unambiguously describes the Red Cross hospital ship as a "ship of joy." It was a place where the sick and wounded soldiers of the empire could eat familiar food, hear friendly and familiar voices, and sleep peacefully as a kind of reward for their service. To reinforce this idea the book opens with a photo montage which included a picture of a group of nurses and wounded soldiers talking, smiling, and relaxing on the ship deck (see figure 5.1). This idea of the "ship of joy" clearly aimed to convince young men to enlist by showing that the people of the empire would lavish care upon them if they happened to be hurt while serving in the war.[21]

Stories of angels in white were more than just state propaganda however. Despite

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19 Dower, *War Without Mercy* 262-266.
20 Nakagawa Nozomu, "Kokoro no koe o kiku" [Listening to the heart], introduction to *Hakuidamashii* [White robed spirit], by Furuya Itoko (Tokyo: Shūhōenshuppanbu, 1940).
21 Okada, *Byōinsen jyūgunki*, 3-5.

the efforts of Nakagawa and others to manage the interpretation of the image of the nursing woman, she refused to remain within official bounds. Her narratives retained a certain ambivalence which opened up possibilities for critical readings. Hosoda Chitora's *Under the Red Cross Flag: a Poetry Anthology* (1944) included several such pieces. Her poem "Red Cross Flag," for example, seemed to offer a straightforward official imperialistic propaganda message. The first verse read:

> The Red Cross flag
> Still flutters with the morning's breeze in central China.
> Beneath this beautiful flag
> We hygiene corps members
> Weep at the honor of offering up our lives
> For the emperor.[22]

The poem appeared to make "offering up" one's life for the emperor into a great honor. However Hosoda's use of the verb "weep" (*naku*) throws the meaning into doubt. It is possible to weep with joy (*ureshinaki*), but also with sadness or suffering. Indeed the latter readings spring to mind first, creating an unsettling image wherein the "honor" of dying for the emperor became a painful irony.

> Or take, for example, Hosoda's "After a Fierce Battle," which begins:
>
> The setting sun on the continent,
> Dyes the fields crimson.
> It is hard to believe that the voices of the guns have ceased on both sides.
> Wounded comrades in arms
> Are now quietly on top of stretchers.
> It was a fierce battle.[23]

Here the propagandist's spectacle of glorious death in battle has been displaced from literal representation to symbolic, as the crimson dye from the setting sun evokes the

22 Hosoda Chitora, *Sekijūjiki to tomoni: shishū* [Under the red cross flag: a poetry anthology] (Tokyo: Shitokayōnosha, 1944), 49.
23 Ibid., 57.

spilling of blood obliquely. In the silent aftermath only the wounded (but alive) remain in view, illuminated by a setting, not rising, sun which casts a foreboding light over the scene from the very first line. Given that imperialistic symbolism—including the rising sun and *hinomaru* flags—equated Japan with the sun, Hosoda's setting sun lent itself to a very critical reading. If we take the battle "on the continent" as a metaphor for the history of the war as a whole, the setting sun foreshadowed defeat and the end of the empire. Furthermore the empire's legacy would be fields dyed in crimson and wounded men too injured and exhausted to do anything but lay quietly. Nursing woman and poet Hosoda transformed the meaning of the fierce battle/war from excitement and adventure to tragedy by anticipating an ending which was so overdue that it was "hard to believe" when it finally arrived. Indeed, if we take into account the fighting in Manchuria which began in 1931, Hosoda wrote the poem the imperial army had been fighting in China for over twelve years.

However, imperialist ideology easily subsumed the critical potential of nursing-women narratives by incorporating anti-war sentiment into its own rhetoric. As further evidence of this fact we must note that the image of the angel in white continued to be an important literary figure even after Japan's defeat during the war. However in the postwar era the imperial Red Cross nursing woman tended to present themselves as symbols of the Japanese people's victimization. Only then, after the empire's end, could nursing-women come to represent not only the suffering of war, but suffering caused by the imperial state. This trope of national victimhood appears most prominently in memoirs of nursing women struck by atomic bombs in Hiroshima or Nagasaki, such as Yukinaga Masae's *Mushroom Cloud: The Journal of a Japanese Red Cross Military Nursing*

Woman and Moriya Misa's *A Hospital Ship and Hiroshima Observed by a Nursing Woman: Formative Experiences for Discourse on Nursing Education.*[24]

Thus postwar works on the angel in white emphasized her victimization by the imperial state and made her stories into a critique of militarism. Authors such as Senda Kakō argued that the nursing women sent to suffer and die in during the Greater East Asia War were essentially the victims of a great fraud. Trusting in the propaganda message of a righteous communal mission of world rectification, the angels in white were tricked into sacrificing themselves for a government which ultimately abandoned and betrayed them by leaving them to be captured or die on the continent. Published in 1975, Senda's *Military Nursing Women* issued a clarion call of support for organizations of former military nursing women which were seeking restitution from the Japanese government for the unjust suffering they endured.[25]

The following analysis seeks to deepen our understanding of the new genre of nursing woman memoirs by tracing the conceptual associations invoked by the terms "angels" and "white." Just as the ambivalent image of the nursing-woman ultimately failed to offer an adequate critique of imperialism, these two complex terms integrated humanitarian concerns into new forms of imperial womanhood.

Angels

The practice of representing nurses as angels was by no means particular to the

24 Yukinaga Masae, *Kinokogumo: Nisseki jūgun kangofu no shuki* [Mushroom cloud: notes from a red cross military nursing woman] (Tokyo: Ōru Shuppan, 1984); Moriya, *Jūgun kangofu no mita byōinsen, Hiroshima.*

25 Senda, *Jūgun kangofu*. Kawaguchi Keiko and Kurokawa Ayako make a similar argument in *Jūgun kangofu to Nihon Sekijūjisha.*

Japanese empire. The American Red Cross used angels and even a fertility goddess to represent relief activity on the covers of its magazines.[26] Florence Nightingale, the most famous female nurse and a popular figure across the globe, had been called the "Angel of Crimea" by her British patients in the Crimean War[27] and her life story was retold countless times in every variety of media. The late 1930s were especially prolific in Nightingale-themed works. These included the American film titled *The White Angel* in 1936, which became popular in Japan,[28] and new biographies were also published by Lytton Strachey in 1938, and Mary Andrews in 1939.[29]

The Japanese Red Cross Society consistently incorporated Florence Nightingale into its own mythology, making her a model for imperial humanitarian femininity. To cite but a few earlier examples, the story of her work received a ten page treatment in the chapter of the *History of the development of the Japanese Red Cross Society* titled "The Crimean War and Nightingale's heroic deeds." In 1905 the *Journal of the Japanese Red Cross* featured an article series titled "Remembering the brave women of Crimea," which prominently featured Nightingale. Again from 1909 to 1913 the Japan Red Cross Society journal serialized a thirty-six part biography of Nightingale written by Machida Kumao.[30]

The implicitly Christian assumptions and imagery involved with these angelic renderings of Florence Nightingale combined with the early prominence of Christian

26 Hutchinson, *Champions of Charity*, pictoral essay entries 17, 20.
27 Narahara, *Hakui no tenshi jūgun kangofu*, 13.
28 William Dieterle, director, *The White Angel* (America: Warner, 1936); *Yomiuri Shimbun* [Yomiuri Newspaper], "Tsūzoku na denkimono: waanaasha, hakui no tenshi" [Popular biographical writings: Warner Company, The White Angel], November 5, 1935: 5.
29 Lytton Strachey, *Florence Nightingale*, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1938); Mary Raymond Shipman Andrews, *A Lost Commander: Florence Nightingale* (S.I.: Doubleday, 1939).
30 Hakuaisha, *Nihon Sekijūjisha enkakushi*, 21-31; Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Crimea no jojōbu wo omō (1)" [Remembering the brave women of Crimea, part 1], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 155 (February 15, 1905): 21-24; Machida Kumao, "Furorensu, Naichingeeru" [Florence Nightengale], serialized in *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 264 (October 5, 1909) to 311 (September 10, 1913).

missionaries as sponsors of nursing education for women in Japan,[31] might lead one to expect that the Christian version of angelhood would predominate. It did not. Rather, Takahashi Aya's research has shown that early remediations of Florence Nightingale's story emphasized certain virtues such as filiality and chastity that Confucian scholars found laudable.[32] Adapting Nightingale's life narrative to this Confucian perspective made her more akin to a sagely model of ritual propriety than a divine servant. Takahashi's emphasis on the Confucian renderings of the lives of women nurses supports the notion that charity, as most commonly conceived, did not exist in East Asian societies because these societies lacked Christian principles:

> There was no Christian culture or equivalent religious culture as a prerequisite for nursing development in Japan. It was inevitable, therefore, that Japanese charitable nursing could neither flourish nor become influential in the furthering of nursing development. The charitable nursing societies quickly shifted to a largely commercial format for survival purposes, and they had little influence on the direction of the mainstream development of hospital nursing. Had there been a wider charitable culture, the Japanese development might have been different.[33]

Her analysis of nursing women education in Japan thus makes the claim that the premodern expansion of so-called Confucian cultural sphere in East Asia created societies lacking universalism or an ethos of charity.

A closer look at the literature on angels in white strongly challenges the idea that secular humanitarian institutions such as the Red Cross lacked appropriate correlates in religious thinking. While wartime representations of angels in white did not draw upon Christian imagery, that does not mean that they lacked any notion of universal love or

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31 Patessio, *Women and Public Life*, 99.

32 Aya Takahashi, *The Development of the Japanese Nursing Profession: Adopting and Adapting Western Influences* (London, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 43-45.

33 Ibid., 28.

charity. On the contrary, the angelic imagery of nursing women in the empire in late 1930s and 1940s invoked rich associations with Kannon, a Buddhist divinity of universal salvation.[34] In addition, angels in white were deified by institutions of state Shinto, making Red Cross nursing women both the saviors of individual soldiers in life as well as the selfless protectors of the empire as a whole in death. They did not differ substantially from Euro-American nursing angels in offering the prospect of rescue for those in danger, nor with the nationalistic images of the angels which protected Christian nations at war.[35]

In 1940 Yagisawa Ken published *Red Cross Flag: the Life of Takeuchi Kyoko, a Record of an Angel in White Killed in the Line of Duty* which offered a clear demonstration of the strong conceptual affinity writers made between Red Cross nursing women and divine beings. Takeuchi Kyoko worked as a nurse for the Japanese Red Cross Society and was dispatched to mainland China to in 1937. She served in the military hospital in Shanghai and field hospitals along the battlefront. She caught cholera from working in the infectious disease ward and died in 1938.[36] A montage of two photographs printed on the inside of the cover of this book explained exactly how Takeuchi was an angel in white. On the upper left Yagisawa placed a picture of Takeuchi on the day of her departure to the battlefront. On the lower right, a photo of a small statue of a robed figure overlaps with the photo of Takeuchi. A caption explains: "'Miss Takeuchi was no doubt an incarnation of Kannon,' wrote a wounded solder who had been returned to life by her

34 Tarao Yuki also notes the predominance of Kannon references in literature about nursing women in "'Anya' to Nisshin sensō moto no jyosei hyōshō," 128-131.

35 For example, see Judith Ann Giesberg, *Civil War Sisterhood: The U.S. Sanitary Commission and Women's Politics in Transition* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2000), viii-x.

36 Ken Yagisawa, *Sekijūjiki: junshoku kiroku hakui no seitenshi takeuchi kiyoko no shōgai* [Red cross flag: the life of Takeuchi Kyoko, a record of an angel in white killed in the line of duty] (Tokyo: Kōfūkan, 1940).

warm nursing care, and he sent this statue of Kannon in white to her bereaved family."[37] The soldier's miraculous experience of returning from the dead at the Takeuchi's hands proved to him that she was literally a divine being in human form.

This common association of nursing-women with the deity Kannon, specifically the image of the Kannon in white (*hakui no kannon*), needs further explanation. Kannon was first a powerful spiritual being in the Buddhist pantheon, a bodhisattva—or human which had achieved Buddhahood but voluntarily remained in the material world in order to help others in need. Sometimes represented as male, other times female, the characters of Kannon's name (観音, to observe and sound) indicate her/his special divine power to hear when a suffering believer called the deity's name in total faith. Kannon would then appear in an appropriate form to rescue the sufferer from harm or danger.[38]

Kannon, the Compassionate, was the archipelago's most popular bodhisattva,[39] though few may have recognize her/him as specifically, or exclusively part of Buddhism. Recent research has revealed that the idea of Kannon was particularly suitable for translation into diverse systems of belief. During the Tokugawa era Christians needed to hide their faith from the feudal authorities. Many used Kannon imagery to replace that of the Virgin Mary and Child, thereby creating the "Maria Kannon."[40] Kannon belief also figures prominently in many recent examples of the founding of new religious sects in

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37 Ibid., inside cover.

38 Ian Reader, *Religion in Contemporary Japan* (London: Macmillan, 1991), 209. For one explanation of the adaptation of the concept of Kannon (*Guan Yin*) from Indian and Tibetan contexts to Chinese and Japanese contexts see John Blofeld*, Bodhisattva of Compassion: The Mystical Tradition of Kuan Yin* (Boston: Shambhala, 1977), 38-44.

39 John Nelson, "From Battlefield to Atomic Bomb to the Pure Land of Paradise: Employing the Bodhisattva of Compassion to Calm Japan's Spirits of the Dead," *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, 17:2 (2002): 151.

40 Taiyo Kazutoshi. "A Historical Study on Faith in Kannon or the Goddess of Mercy," in *The Annual Report of Academic Research*, vol. 6, 243-262 (Shizuoka: Shizuoka Eiwa Gakuin University, 2008).

Japan, including the The Church of World Messianity (*Sekai Kyusei-kyo*) in the 1920s-30s and Agon-shu in the 1970s.[41] As Mark Mullins observes: "the multiple forms and functions of Kannon in Japanese history indicate that this figure has now transcended its identity as a Buddhist bodhisattva and become a more generalized member of the Japanese pantheon of protective and benevolent gods and spirits."[42]

The application of Kannon belief and use to Red Cross nursing-women is yet another example of this figure's flexibility. The history of association between the two stretched back to the 1890s, when the Japanese Red Cross first trained nursing-women and deployed them in wartime service. In a figurative mode, the *History of the Development of the Japanese Red Cross Society* described nursing-women as Kannons in white while relating the Meiji Empress' initiative in creating a positive image for nursing women during the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894-5:

> Her Royal Highness [Empress Meiji] made qualified noble wives of various families engage in practical work of nursing. Thus the world's conception of nursing-women was greatly changed. This is evidenced by the facts of their current high standing. In 1894, when nursing-women first arrived in Hiroshima, the townspeople sneered at these Kannons in white. . . . However, contrary to their expectations, [with the involvement of the Imperial family and these noble ladies] the townspeople were emotionally touched by the nursing women's management of [patients'] daily needs and activities.[43]

According to this narrative, just as the unbeliever may be skeptical of Kannon's powers at first, so too were the people of Hiroshima skeptical of nursing women. Thanks to the benevolent guidance of the Empress, however, people soon learned to have faith in their

41 Mark R. Mullins, "The Many Forms and Functions of Kannon in Japanese Religion and Culture," *Dharma World* (April 2008), Kosei Publishing, http://www.kosei-shuppan.co.jp/english/text/mag/2008/08_456_4.html.

42 Ibid.

43 Hakuaisha, *Nihon Sekijūjisha enkakushi,* 488-9. This episode is also discussed by Chida Takeshi in his chapter "Gunbu Hiroshima to senji kyūgo," in *Nihon sekijyūjisha to jindō enjo,* 141-174.

new modern saviors.

Of the divine gendered characteristics incarnated in nursing women, universal humanitarian love figured most prominently. Humanitarian love was an affective tie to another person with whom one had no direct social relationship. Authors used Buddhist language to convey this message. For example, one of Henri Dunant's Japanese-language biographers rendered him as "love's incarnation" (*jiai no gongen*) by writing his life-story as a quest to relieve the suffering of others whom he did not know. As with Kannon, abstract concepts such as love became embodied in humanitarians as authors applied the Buddhist concept of incarnations to understand humanitarian work. According to this biography, because Dunant was brought up by a charitable father and a loving mother, even from an early age he showed the knowledge and virtue of a great man. Even to his very last days he "traveled the four seas" to carry out philanthropy.[44]

While this earlier biography presented Dunant as an exceptional man because of his deep compassion for the suffering, the wartime figure of the angel in white attempted to make maternal love into universal love and turn it into an essential feminine quality of Japanese women. Take, for example, Morita Matsuko's 1941 *Love's Forward March: Shanghai Special Relief Corps*. In her chapter titled "Thinking of the Children," she describes the difficulties the war created for the inhabitants of central China. In the military hospital in Shanghai where she worked, the cholera treatment room was disinfected and became an examination room for sick or injured war refugees. Starting from ten o'clock in the morning over one hundred of these civilian victims arrived per day, compounding the work that the nursing women were already doing caring for sick

44 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Jiai no gonge Dunant ō no seihate" [The life of venerable old man Dunant, love's incarnation], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 278 (December 5, 1910): 18-21.

and wounded soldiers. Like Kannon, the nursing women had to hear patients' pleas for help in the patient's own language, so for that purpose they began studying Chinese until late at night. Among the refugees were children who were often simply malnourished. One time Morita secretly took leftover rice from the commissary and gave it to some refugee children who had only water for the past three days.[45]

On another occasion a young refugee mother with a nursing infant came into the hospital. She said her baby was sick and asked for medicine. Not having any pediatrics doctors, Morita and the pharmacist were uncertain how to proceed with diagnosing and treating the baby. They inquired further into the situation. It had only been one month since birth and the baby "had lost weight, its face becoming wrinkled." They diagnosed it as simply malnutrition caused by the mother's insufficient diet. Morita gave them some condensed milk from the cholera treatment supplies and after drinking it the baby was sleeping soundly. The pharmacist also gave the mother a vitamin injection to help her milk supply. Morita noticed, however, that while waiting in the examination room the young mother barely glanced at the other refugees, obviously not wanting to talk to them even though many of them were also young women of her age. Initially Morita thought: "She is quite a cold woman isn't she?" but then reconsidered her judgmental attitude: "It is only natural. Her own situation by itself is quite a heavy burden." In other words the young mother was too absorbed with her own problems to want to hear or become involved with the concerns of others. With this series of episodes Morita set up a contrast between the supposedly warmer Japanese Red Cross nursing women who worked to help all of the children as universal mothers, and the "cold" Chinese war refugees only looked

45 Morita Matsuko, *Ai no shingun: shanhai tokubetsu kyūgohan* [Love's forward march: Shanghai special relief corps] (Tokyo: Shūhōenshuppanbu, 1941), 86-88.

after their own children. Morita concluded by recounting: “I thought, 'If peace does not return soon, what will happen to the refugees' lives in the future?' and I became very sad.”[46]

Like the bodhisattvas who forfeited their passage to nirvana in order to aid others, Red Cross angels in white were icons of sacrifice. Returning to the story of Takeuchi Kyoko, it becomes clear that the JRCS and military authorities expected nursing women to carry out one of the most dangerous duties in war zones—caring for patients of deadly infectious diseases. Even after the tremendous reduction in infection rates over the preceding decades, many imperial soldiers and sailors still caught cholera, typhus, dysentery, scarlet fever, malaria and other infectious diseases during the greater East Asia war. Takeuchi's death demonstrated the fact that managing the spread of disease by working in quarantine hospital wards made nursing women very likely to catch disease themselves and die.[47]

Beyond the military hospitals and hospital ships, the JRCS also dispatched nursing women to contain epidemics among the local civilian population as well. As Narahara Harusaku relates in *Military Nursing Women the Angels in White,* the JRCS sent nursing-women to Manchuria to prevent the spread of bubonic plague in 1940. Narahara argues that since the authorities knew quarantine work was so dangerous, sending nursing women on this kind of mission was a deliberate sacrifice. Though some of the angels in white were almost certain to contract the disease and die, officials justified their deaths as necessary for preventing the further spread of the plague to the imperial army regiments

46 Ibid., 88-89.
47 Yagisawa, *Sekijūjiki.*

stationed in Manchuria.[48] Following the war many surviving nursing women strongly protested such treatment and advanced the notion that the deliberate sacrifice of their colleagues and friends was unjust. Forming the Association of Former Japanese Red Cross Nursing Women, they published critical biographical works such as *Red Cross Military Nursing Women: Youth Sacrificed on the Battlefield,* in which nursing women provided eye-witness testimony about the suffering they and their co-workers had endured.[49]

At the time, Red Cross officials joined imperial bureaucrats and politicians in attempting to make sacrifice narratives a predominant expression of communal solidarity. These narrations worked by using a kind of grammatical slight of hand to transform the personal self-sacrifice of Kannons in white into sacrifices carried out by the community. They made sacrifice constitutive of an "us." For example, in 1941 JRCS Vice President Ishihara Hirofumi published *The White Robes Which Do Not Return*, a compilation of bibliographical anecdotes about eight JRCS nursing women who died while on duty during the war. His preface outlined his purpose in writing the book:

> As long as the incident [the Second Sino-Japanese War] continues, it is necessary to offer up at the sacred altar of Yasukuni precious sacrifices of these goddesses. I believe that from now on the traces of their lives should not be lost, and for this purpose I have compiled this volume. It is my wish that we continue our reverence for these loyal dead for all eternity.[50]

By using passive grammar ("it is necessary") Ishihara attempted to produce a communal

48 Narahara, *Hakui no tenshi jūgun kangofu,* 88-89.

49 Moto nisseki jūgun kangofu no kai [Association for former military nursing women], *Nihon sekijūji jūgun kangofu: senjō ni sasageta seishun* [Red Cross military nursing women: youth sacrificed on the battlefield] (Tokyo: Moto nisseki jūgun kangofu no kai, 1988).

50 Ishihara Hirofumi, *Kaeranu hakui* [White uniforms which do not return] (Tokyo: Bunmeishahan, 1942), reprinted in Haga Noboru, *Nihon jinbutsu jōhō taikei, dai 5 kan (josei giten hen 5)* [Survey of information on the personalities of Japan, volume 5 (women's biographies 5th compilation)], 399-483 (Tokyo: Kōseisha, 1999)), 406.

"us" which recognized the necessity of sacrifice, and was constituted by such recognition. In this kind of nursing woman narrative, it was no longer only a matter of demonstrating that angels in white sacrificed themselves for others, but of asserting the nation's ownership over their bodies as objects that "we" must sacrifice. Ishihara's book was but one of the many biographical works which celebrated the sacrifices of nursing women as way to try to reaffirm the communal solidarity of the people of empire.[51]

Ishihara's reference to the imperial state's practice of deifying Red Cross nursing women who died while carrying out duties in wartime by enshrining them at Yasukuni Shrine further strengthened this notion of the nation as sacrificer. As Takahashi Tetsuya argues, Yasukuni Shrine was (and continues to be) the focal point of political leaders' efforts to "spiritually mobilize" the nation. The modern practice of enshrinement at Yasukuni, a state Shinto shrine, made war dead, male and female, into Japan's protective gods. They were worshiped by the government's highest figures, including the emperor and prime ministers, since according to nationalists' logic: "if political leaders do not acknowledge death as 'precious' or express 'thanks and gratitude' in public, the state will ultimately be unable to mobilize the people for war."[52]

Takahashi relates that in 1941 The Society to Honor the Women of Yasukuni published *Women of Yasukuni*, which explained the gender implications of the Yasukuni

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51 For additional examples see Nihon Sekijūjisha, *Shina jihen kyūgoin bidan* [Beautiful tales of relief corps in the China incident, volumes 1-5] (Tokyo: Nihon Sekijūjisha, 1938), reprinted in Haga, Noboru. *Nihon jinbutsu jōhō taikei, dai 5 kan (josei giten hen 5)* [Survey of information on the personalities of Japan, volume 5 (women's biographies 5th compilation)], 9-34 (Tokyo: Kōseisha, 1999); *Nihon Sekijūjisha, Daitōa sensō kyūgoin bidan dai rokushu* [Beautiful tales of relief corps in the greater east asia war, vol 6], (Tokyo: Nihon Sekijūjisha, 1943), reprinted in Haga Noboru, *Nihon jinbutsu jōhō taikei, dai 5 kan (josei giten hen 5)* [Survey of information on the personalities of Japan, volume 5 (women's biographies 5th compilation)], 265-338 (Tokyo: Kōseisha, 1999).

52 Tetsuya Takahashi "The National Politics of the Yasukuni Shrine," in *Nationalisms in Japan*, ed. Naoko Shimazu, 155-180 (New York: Routledge, 2006), 158.

system as follows:

> Among these many gods there are a little over 50,000 female gods. These gods are in no way inferior to the male gods and are strong women like guardian angels protecting the country. We have established the Yasukuni Society to Honor Japan's Guardian Angels, and have investigated the achievements of these loyal and brave women. . . . the rise or fall of the nation depends particularly on the readiness of women.[53]

JRCS Vice President Ishihara's preface, then, was intended to remind readers that the state had included the same Red Cross angels in white which his book memorialized among the fifty thousand women enshrined at Yasukuni. The state Shinto system thus rendered these nursing women as angels through a different mechanism than Kannon's boddhisatvahood. In death they became celebrated Shinto "goddesses" which protected the country at war.

In an effort to combat the interpretive ambivalence of nursing women narratives as exemplified in poetry anthologies, the Red Cross officials who wrote or edited books memorializing the lives of deceased nursing women made clear that such memories were not intended to create feelings of grief or loss. Rather, reminding the readers about the deaths of angels in white, like those of imperial soldiers, was supposed to be a way of honoring their sacrifice and making their mothers proud or even cheerful about their daughters' contribution to the empire.[54] Like Yasukuni Shrine, the nursing women narratives aimed to transform private grief at the death of a loved one into public joy for the glory of the nation-state.[55]

In sum, the idea of nursing women embodying the powerful self-sacrificing savior divinity Kannon or becoming "guardian angels" through their enshrinement at Yasukuni

53 Quoted in Takahashi, "The National Politics of the Yasukuni Shrine,"161.
54 Ishihara, *Kaeranu hakui*, 7; Nihon Sekijūjisha, *Shina jihen kyūgoin bidan, 69-70*.
55 Takahashi, "The National Politics of the Yasukuni Shrine," 164-6.

Shrine made them into vitally necessary contributors to the survival of the empire. Total war required total sacrifices. As Okamura Etsuko's biographer wrote, even a nursing-woman's body did not belong to her:

> Her father told her: 'If you follow your wish and are able to enter the nurse training center your body and everything you have will not be your own. You will have already offered it to the nation. It is the same as being a soldier. If that is your intention, you must make your body strong, study hard, and work with a great amount of effort.' . . . Her senior students praised her: 'When we asked her to do something, no matter how difficult, she showed no expression of distaste, but did it with pleasure.'[56]

Angelhood was thus an important element of imperialist ideologues' and humanitarians' efforts to (re)produce feminine qualities of love and sacrifice as effective forces protecting the empire and the world from the hardships of war. While in hindsight it would be easy to read these narratives as a subtle critique of imperialism, when authors exalted the contributions of an idealized angelic icon they recuperated her into the ideology of imperialism as a powerful new source of strength to protect the nation and humanity from its enemies.

White

In the wartime discourse on Japanese Red Cross nursing women, the whiteness of their uniforms became an important symbol of beauty and purity. As Takahashi Aya argues concerning the adoption of white as the standard color for nursing uniforms in the 1890s: “The colour white was not only significant to maintain cleanliness in hygienic terms, but it also carried symbolic meanings of orderliness, nobility, and 'untaintedness.'”[57] Extending Takahashi's analysis to the wartime era, we can see how

56 Okamurakai, *Okamura etsuko den*, 96, 103.
57 Takahashi, *The Development of the Japanese Nursing Profession*, 71.

whiteness of the nursing woman's uniform related to a particular feminine body aesthetic. This aesthetic sensibility made the attention to physical beauty an important part of humanitarian care. At the same time, whiteness continued to signal sexual discipline, but the purpose of that discipline shifted from the maintenance of a strict division between nursing women and patients to nurses' management of patients' reintegration into the productive and reproductive economies of the empire. As such, the extension of the quality of whiteness to soldier patients, called "heroes in white," represents the creation of a regime of tutelary observation in which both patients' and nursing women's bodies required attentive self care.

Wartime nursing women narratives from the late 1930s and early 1940s appropriated a language of beauty-through-humanitarianism from a long genealogy of Japanese Red Cross Society promotional writing. During the 1910s the JRCS journals featured a monthly column titled "Beautiful Tales of Entering the [Japanese Red Cross] Society." It included stories such as the following:

> As a widow Mrs. Umiuchi Moto of the town Maizuru in the Kasa district of Kyoto had a small business selling tobacco. Her household finances were not wealthy, but she had charitable intentions so she kindly supported [JRCS] headquarters' work [as a volunteer]. Even considering of her long time affiliation with headquarters, on account of the lack of means at home it was impossible for her to realize her real hopes [of becoming a JRCS member]. However, she stayed dedicated to becoming a society member and somehow, alongside her main business, did bleaching and polishing work little-by-little. This way she was able to store up a small amount of money and become a society member. Like this, she is truly commendable among other exemplars so President Ōmori of the Kyoto Branch sent her a certificate of commendation and a wooden cup award to publicly recognize such virtue.[58]

In these stories beauty was a matter of dedication, self-sacrifice, and a humanitarian spirit

58 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Nyūsha bidan" [Beautiful tale of entering the society], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 331 (December 25 1914): 19.

which were moving or impressive emotionally. In this way the Meiji Empress's donations to the Society during the Russo-Japanese War were also virtuous and beautiful, along with "beautiful" (*utsukushii*) youth groups which taught so-called beautiful customs (*bikan*) like filial piety to the youth of the empire starting in the 1910s.[59] Like the beauty of Dunant's universal humanitarian love, the earlier beautiful tales of the JRCS did not connote a gendered aesthetic, since both men and women could exemplify this kind of beauty.

The symbol of the wartime angel in white transformed this ideal of spiritual humanitarian beauty into a strongly gendered beauty inherent in particular female bodies. A series of six volumes of "beautiful tales" (*Shina jihen kyūgoin bidan* and *Daitōa sensō kyūgoin bidan*) totaling over a thousand pages published by the Japanese Red Cross Society (*Nihon Sekijūjisha*) during the war years exemplified the move to connect spiritual beauty to physical beauty via whiteness. In volume one they printed a poem, titled "Inspired by Angels in White," written by a soldier-patient in a Red Cross field hospital which associated nursing women with mothering. It began:

> The angel in white is my affectionate mother.
> A pestering child restlessly wanting milk,
> I am revealed to be but a fawning figure.
> The brave boy child of Japan too,
> Is laid low by injury and disease.
> Day and night the nursing work,
> Exhausts the angels in white.[60]

Like others, the author represents the "inspiring" beauty of the nursing women in this tale

59 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Kōgōheika no gobitoku" [The beautiful virtue of the empress], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 143 (August 15, 1904): 16; Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Utsukushiki seinen dantai" [Beautiful youth [boy's] association], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 269 (March 5, 1910): 16; Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Funbō kunpū: kitokunaru seinen dantai" [Sweet smelling summer breeze: praiseworthy youth groups], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 270 (April 5, 1910): 34.

60 Ibid., *Shina jihen kyūgoin bidan dai ichishū*, 49.

through the repetitive use of the color white.

Also, like most works published by or endorsed by the Red Cross, this poem likened the nurse-patient relationship to that of a mother to child. As nursing woman Okada Teiko insisted, although there were stories about nursing women having problems of affectionate love in magazines at that time, those were mistaken. She explained to her civilian audience that women fall into two types, the prostitute-type and the mother-type, and that the Japanese tradition is generally the mother-type.[61] In this way the discourse on angels in white sanctioned a notion of femininity in which women's sexuality was disciplined to only serve the purpose of motherhood.

As Okada's *A Chronicle of War Service on a Hospital Ship* confirms, those who spoke as authorities on nursing women and their work had a long history of struggling against the notion that they were similar to prostitutes.[62] During the East Asia War many nursing women felt an even stronger need to differentiate their work as a form of mothering due to the Imperial Army and Navy's implementation of the so-called comfort women system. *Jūgun ianfu*, or "military comfort women" were mostly young Korean women coerced or tricked by imperial authorities into becoming sexual slaves in "comfort stations" set up by the military branches across the war zone. Although the authorities have always claimed that it was a form of voluntary prostitution, evidence has shown that it essentially amounted to the systematic rape of hundreds of thousands of abductees in the name of "comfort" (*ian*, which can also be translated as "recreation") for soldiers.[63]

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61 Okada, *Byōinsen jyūgunki*, 27, 50.
62 Takahashi, *The Development of the Japanese Nursing Profession*,
63 George L. Hicks, *The Comfort Women: Japan's Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1995).

Comforting patients was also one of the objectives of the work done by military nursing women (*jūgun kangofu*), and the Red Cross in general. For example, in 1920 the JRCS managed the evacuation and repatriation of Polish orphans from Siberia. During the orphans stay in Japan, the JRCS held several "recreational gatherings" (*iankai*) for them.[64] So nursing labor and sex work shared a certain terminology which created a strong conceptual affinity between the two.

For many nursing women, the white uniform provided the most important line of defense against being mistaken for a comfort woman. Perhaps the most telling evidence of the importance placed on the white uniform and the unease felt by nursing women towards comfort women appears in Moriya Misa's memoir, published in 1998. Moriya uses her postwar freedom to include controversial material that would most likely have been censored had she published it under the imperial regime. In one of the episodes she describes her hospital ship taking on comfort women as passengers en route to mainland China which, we must note, was a clear violation of the Geneva Convention in addition to a human rights violation. She writes:

> It was also around this time that we had to take military comfort women aboard the ship. They were loaded into the ships hold together with the baggage, and they secretly enjoyed the evening cool in the shade of the hatch. The women wore flashy rayon dresses and we nursing women wondered about them at first. We only knew that they were called "Miss P" and we had no idea about the kind of existence they led. Not understanding their background [as unwilling sexual slaves], my coworker said with indignation, 'I saw them disembarking wearing white.'[65]

In other words, the army was disguising comfort women as nurses and illegally using

64 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Iankai" [Recreational gatherings], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 402 (October 10, 1920): 19; Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Jidō iankai" [Children's recreational gatherings], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 408 (April 10, 1921): 12.

65 Moriya, *Jūgun kangofu no mita byōinsen, Hiroshima*, 153.

hospital ships to transport them to the war front. The nursing women on the ship mistakenly thought that the comfort women were camp-following prostitutes. The nurses' indignation came when the army gave the comfort women white clothes to hide them, thereby blurring the visual distinction between the "flashy" colored dresses of prostitutes and the "pure" white uniforms of the nursing women.

During the 1890s, when JRCS nursing education was in its infancy and male medics outnumbered nursing women, the Society fought the association between nursing and prostitution by taking steps to remove gender from the representations of nursing women altogether. They did this through strict discipline. As Takahashi notes: "The nurse was expected to be a genderless person within the '*ie*' [household] hospital for whom the [Japan Red Cross] society, because it was so strictly organized, could provide and maintain institutional order and respectable peace."[66] Red Cross nursing women lived in a "nurses' sanctuary," a separate building on the hospital grounds where no men were allowed. The nursing women also lived under a strict curfew and constant surveillance. As part of their training the Society taught them the Osagawara method of etiquette used by women of noble families. Their training also including formal speech and an aloof deportment. Under no circumstances were they to accept any kind of gratuities or gifts from patients. As a result conscript soldiers, many of whom were farmers or urban laborers, complained about nursing women's "snobbish" attitude during the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars.[67] In other words, the JRCS nursing women were simply professionals valued for their deep commitment to working for the nation as well as their medical expertise.

66 Takahashi, *The Development of the Japanese Nursing Profession,* 69.
67 Ibid., 64-68, 48.

Following the Russo-Japanese War some nursing educators and other officials in the JRCS began to advance the notion that nursing women were especially effective at nursing precisely because of their femininity. This coincided with the expansion of nursing training programs to increase the number of women nurses and strongly contributed to the social reconstruction of modern gender ideologies. A vast number of articles appeared in the JRCS journals during the 1910s arguing about the proper role of nursing women in Red Cross relief work. Perhaps the most striking of these was an anonymously published three part article series from 1913 titled *Advantages and Disadvantages of Women Nursing.* The series claimed to set the record straight on the feminization of Red Cross nursing as a global phenomenon by referencing an article published in the German Red Cross Society journal extolling the virtues of women nurses. The author claimed that women made superior nurses because of their inherent kindness.[68]

JRCS founder Sano Tsunetami and writers for the JRCS journals advertised nursing education as a means to address the defect of "Japanese women," who lacked the proper understanding that a "woman's calling" was philanthropic work.[69] Needless to say, they all operated under essentializing assumptions that certain characteristics were inherently feminine and others masculine. Claims about these assumed characteristics persisted until the years of the Greater East Asia War, and contributed to the tense conceptual affinity between prostitution and nursing work.

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68 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Fujin kango no rigai (ichi)" [Advantages and disadvantages of women nursing (part one)], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 307 (May 10, 1913): 13-15; Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Fujin kango no rigai (ni)" [Advantages and disadvantages of women nursing (part two)], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 309 (July 10, 1913): 10-12; Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Fujin kango no rigai (san)" [Advantages and disadvantages of women nursing (part three)], *Hakuai* [Philanthropy] 310 (August 10, 1913): 11-14.

69 Nihon Sekijūjisha, "Nihon fujin no shuppei shisō" [Japanese women's thought concerning the relief of soldiers], *Nihon Sekijūji* [*Journal of the Japanese Red Cross*] 105 (December 15, 1901): 10-12.

One of these essentially female characteristics was beautiful speech.[70] In her memoir Okada Teiko compared the superior speech of male medics to that of nursing women. A male medic might have the following exchange with a patient:

> 'Does it hurt?'
> 'It does not hurt.'
> 'Stay well.'
> 'Okay.'

Okada remarked: "It [the male medic's speech] is not lacking in care. It is not lacking in kindness." However, a nursing woman would instead say:

> 'Well, I am sure you are in some pain aren't you?'
> 'No, no I am all right.'
> 'Please keep yourself strong and endure but a bit longer.'
> 'I will be fine.'[71]

According to Okada this vaguely defined womanly way of speaking to patients demonstrated superior empathy and affect. These were important because, Okada claimed, patients in military hospitals and hospital ships were different: "The difference from patients in regular hospitals is that there is a complicated psychology involved. That is to say, there are many who suffer mental pain."[72] Traumas of combat injured not just the bodies, but the minds of soldiers. In order to treat this "mental pain" nursing women were asked to play card games, put on shows, play music, or otherwise entertain the soldiers. This idea of treating psychological damage thus reversed the earlier injunction for nursing women to maintain a professional aloofness from patients. The photograph from the beginning of Okada's book (see figure 5.1) demonstrates that according to this new ideal the "angels in white" were supposed to socialize with their patients, the

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70 For an explanation of the production of the notion of gendered speech see Miyako Inoue, *Vicarious Language: Gender and Linguistic Modernity in Japan.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).
71 Okada, *Byōinsen jyūgunki*, 100.
72 Ibid., 26.

"heroes in white" (*hakui no yūshi*) as part of their work.[73]

In light of this new entertainment function for nurses, the "beauty" in the aforementioned JRCS *Beautiful Tales* took on an additional nuance. In addition to poetry and witness testimony, the compilers of these volumes commonly used of photographs of individual "angels in white" (albeit with a few rare examples of male doctors and medics) to create a particular visual style which advertised both their humanitarian and physical beauty. Entries on these nursing women often combined their concise life history in list form with statements from JRCS authorities about their conduct in war and the portrait photograph. For example, see figure 5.2 which reads:

> Number 21. Kyoto branch affiliate relief nursing-woman Nishikawa Shigeno. Short biography:
> -Born March 8, 1913, the third daughter of Nishikawa Sunjirō. Japanese family registry in the Ikegami large sub-division, Kitajo small sub-division number 44 of Shinjō village, in the Hani district of Kyoto prefecture.
> -March 12, 1930, accepted as a relief nursing student at the Kyoto branch [of the JRCS].
> -April 1 of the same year, entered the Osaka branch hospital nurses' training school.
> -Graduated August 28, 1933.
> -April 1 of the same year, appointed as a relief corps nursing woman.
> -April 8 of the same year, received an official appointment as a nursing woman at the Kyoto branch clinic.
> -August 18, 1939, called up as personnel of the Japan Red Cross Society Third Relief Corps. Assigned to the army hospital ship Tatsuokimaru. . . .
> [74]

The inclusion of the photographs as a prominent component of the *Beautiful Tales* indicates that physical beauty had become a key attribute for demonstrating the fitness of Red Cross nursing women for the duty of treating the "mental pain" of wounded and sick imperial soldiers and sailors.

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73 Ibid., fronticepiece.
74 Nihon Sekijūjisha, *Shina jihen kyūgoin bidan dai sanshū*, 148-9.

In this, the similarities of the work of nursing women to comfort women were too great to deny. Research conducted in the postwar era by Senda Kakō suggests that both military authorities and journalists sometimes failed to recognize the difference between nursing women and comfort women. In a chapter titled “Infamous Affairs and The Military's Knowledge” he explains two cases in which angels in white were associated with “breaches of public morals.” In the first, he recounts a how a well-known journalist reported that JRCS nursing women stationed in the Philippines turned to prostitution in order to feed themselves during the severe famine there in 1944. Senda's investigation of army records found that this report was in fact “baseless.” The unidentified journalist had mistaken comfort women for nursing women, of which there was no evidence of being stationed at the base where the alleged incidents occurred.[75]

Senda's second case, by contrast, resulted in two courts martial and was thus well documented in the imperial army's records. It took place at the Ninth Southern Army Hospital in Indonesia in 1944. The hospital chief, an imperial army officer, was tried and convicted of multiple counts of rape and attempted rape of the Red Cross nursing women stationed there. According to the court testimony, the chief systematically ordered nursing women to report to his official residence over the course of several months where he raped them, claiming that performing sex acts were part of their duty. He even ordered the head nursing women to write up a chart of each nursing woman's menstrual period so he could better manage the timing of their visits. After hearing that the nursing women were afraid of visiting the hospital chief's residence, one of his subordinates finally confronted him about it, resulting in both being tried in courts martial. The subordinate

75 Senda, *Jūgun kangofu*, 109-112.

was sentenced to a year of imprisonment for insubordination and threatening a superior officer. The chief was sentenced to three years of penal servitude.[76]

So while nursing woman Okada may have insisted that Japanese nursing women were like mothers, the affective labor carried out by nurses or their "comforting," as the euphemism termed it, kept causing them to appear in the so-called incidents of breached "public morals" such as these. Senda stops his analysis at these kinds of cases and does not comment on love affairs between nurses and their patients, other than to say that such affairs were between "private" individuals and thus not "scandalous."[77] However, such an easy dismissal of the issue of romantic love sidelines the very public and political decisions creating the context of assumptions and expectations in which nursing women and patients interacted. Blurring the strict focus that earlier forms of nursing professionalism placed on medical treatment, the angels in white had become agents for the re-socialization of wounded and sick soldiers. By attempting to treat the soldiers' psychological damage, the nursing women functioned as guides through the indistinct zone between military life and civilian life. Their work to "comfort" aimed to rehabilitate and reintegrate casualties as productive and valued assets of the empire.

Those who spoke for and about nursing women may have attempted to make the whiteness of their uniforms symbolize chastity, but such recurring disavowals of sexuality also served to continuously remind readers of precisely that sexuality which was being disavowed. Rather than simply repressive chastity, perhaps it is better to recognize that whiteness represented a sexuality which authorities administered to serve a particular social agenda. As Michel Foucault observes in *The History of Sexuality*,

76 Ibid., 113-118.
77 Ibid., 109.

bourgeois sexual morality was not simply a matter of exorcizing perversion and retaining reproductive sexuality. Rather: “it provided itself with a body to be cared for, protected, cultivated and preserved from the so many dangers and contacts, to be isolated from others so that it would retain its differential value.”[78] The whiteness associated with both the nursing women and their patients marked their differentiation as bodies in transition from the zone of combat to the home front. Turning once more to the photo in Okada's book (figure 5.1), we can see that above all nursing women carried out the crucial work of supervising patients. This supervision ensured that the patients' own behavior advanced, rather than hindered, the process of healing their bodily wounds and illnesses as well as the psychological trauma of combat. The Red Cross nursing women served in an official capacity to remind patients to care, protect, cultivate and preserve their “white robed” gendered bodies.

Conclusion

The angels in white provided an attractive and inspiring face for JRCS relief work during the greater East Asia War. Authorities made her a model for all women to follow in dutifully but cheerfully sacrificing themselves for the survival of the empire and its soldiers. As the incarnation of divine being in life and a protective war goddess in death, the image of the Red Cross nursing woman also reassured prospective conscripts, as well as their families and friends, that the empire remembered and comforted its fallen soldiers and sailors. She offered to escort war casualties from the battlefield and help reintegrate them into the home front as honored contributors to the nation.

78 Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, an Introduction*, trans. by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 123.

Wounded and suffering bodies were an unstable signifier however. When authorities introduced representations of self-sacrificing nursing women and wounded soldiers to the public by publishing memoirs, biographies, poetry anthologies, and newspaper articles, they needed to restrict the interpretation of these narratives to make them match official propaganda purposes. The suffering and deaths of angels in white to disease, their poetry, and the images of battle and its aftermath could lend themselves to readings that were critical of war. Instead, imperial ideology embraced the anti-war rhetoric of humanitarianism by representing the goal of war as peace and order. Imperial ideology thus nullified the potential challenge of pacifistic readings of the image of the angel in white and made her an ally in the empire's effort to rectify the injustices of the world.

Only in the postwar era did angels in white speak out from their privileged position an create a critical commentary on the conduct of the empire. As vital contributors to the empire, they occupied a place of prominence, but those who wrote as, and about, nursing women sought to displace the designation “savior” with the adjective “victim.” Narratives of the lives of angels in white became a powerful way to draw attention to the injustice of imperial policies and the individual suffering of Japanese people under the fascist regime.

Ultimately, both the descriptors “savior” and “victim” elide the third term to complete an adequate critique of the gender implications of the wartime imperial system. That term, one which never appears in the discourse on the angels in white, is “perpetrator.” What has been effaced in both wartime and postwar accounts are episodes such as the following, in which Japanese Red Cross nursing women cheerfully assisted in

the murder of Chinese prisoners though vivisection, or the "operation exercises," remembered by an imperial army doctor:

> I pushed that farmer and said, "Go forward!" . . . He shouted "*Ai-ya-a! Ai-ya-a!*" as if he knew that if he lay down he was going to be murdered. But a nurse then said, in Chinese, "Sleep, sleep." She went on, "Sleep, sleep. Drug give"—Japanese style Chinese. . . . He lay down. She was even prouder than me. She giggled. The demon's face is not a fearful face. It's a face wreathed in smiles.[79]

The doctor's testimony reveals how, for those whom the empire deemed unnecessary or unworthy of life, the face of the angel in white was one of cruelty, a demon's face.

As Lisa Yoneyama has argued, feminized war memories such as the ones invoked in postwar angel in white literature: "conveniently produce a forgetfulness about how Japanese women's feminine subjectivities were, and have continued to be, interpellated as imperialist and militarist."[80] It is just as dangerous to accept the notion that nursing women were merely victims of a militaristic regime as it is to take the official propaganda narration of their existence as divine saviors at face value. I hope to have offered an explanation of the war time phenomenon of angels in white literature which accounts for their compelling nature as propaganda, but also remains attentive to their uncontainable excesses of signification and contributes to the unsettling of this crucial piece of modern nationalist gender ideology.

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79 Haruko Taya Cook and Theodore F. Cook, *Japan at War: An Oral History* (New York: The New Press, 1993), 147.

80 Lisa Yoneyama, *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 196.

Figure 5.1. Nursing women socializing with patients in Okada Teiko's *Byōinsen jyūgunki* (1942).



其二一

日本赤十字社福島支部長 従四位勲三等 君島清吉

京都支部所属救護看護婦 西河しげの

（一）小歴

一、大正三年三月八日本籍京都府船井郡新庄村大字池上小字北所四四西川才治郎三女として出生

一、昭和五年三月十二日京都支部救護看護婦生徒に採用

一、同年四月一日大阪支部病院看護婦養成所に入學

一、同八年三月廿八日卒業

一、同年四月一日救護看護婦に任用

一、同年四月八日京都支部療院看護婦拜命

一、昭和十二年八月十八日日本赤十字社第三救護班要員として召集、陸軍病院船龍興丸に配屬、塘沽、秦皇島、大連より傷病者還送業務に従事し、門司、宇品、大阪へ回航すること實に二十八回、風雨、寒暑を厭はず、激浪と闘ひ、疫癘を恐れず熱心職務に盡瘁中不幸にして病に罹る。

一、同十三年十月十七日大阪陸軍病院赤十字病院に入院

一、同年十月廿一日午後九時四十五分死亡

Figure 5.2. “Number 21, Kyoto branch affiliate relief nursing-woman Nishikawa Shigeno” in *Beautiful Tales of Relief Corps in the China Incident, Vol 3*, by the Nihon Sekijūjisha.

Conclusion

Inspired by scholarly criticism and "soul searching" about the troubles of international humanitarianism in the post-cold war world, the essays presented here have explored affinities of Red Cross thought and practice with modern imperialism. In contrast to many contemporary critics, the analysis offered herein refuses to read the history of humanitarianism as a narrative of the fall from a purity of political neutrality and independence from considerations of power into a position of complicity. Rather, it insists that practice and philosophy behind one of the most successful early humanitarian organizations—the Japanese Red Cross Society—contained deep political implications encapsulated by the concept "humanitarian empire."

Chapter one traced changes in the early historiography of the origins of the JRCS, showing how humanitarianism became an important element of Japanese nationalism. By embracing the Satsuma War as the origin of the Red Cross in Japan, official historians for the JRCS transformed the violent conflicts of the 1870s into "reassuring fratricides." Erasing the deep social and political differences underlying the conflicts, histories of humanitarianism in the early imperial era worked to produce the sense that ordinary people of Japan were connected through a history of shared suffering. Furthermore, by embracing the Satsuma rebels as worthy, if misguided, members of the nation, JRCS history also helped (re)invent the warrior ethos of *bushidō* as a humanitarian creed adequate to explain both Japan's uniqueness and its successful imperial expansion in East Asia.

Chapter two argued that international humanitarian law, and the wider system of

international relations within which it existed, encouraged the political domination of weaker states by stronger ones in the name of stability and defense. The Geneva and Hague Conventions helped justify the representation of war as a humanitarian endeavor, while the institutions of mandate territories and protectorates gave imperialism the appearance of legal sanction. Ariga Nagao's writings demonstrate that top military and civilian leaders considered Red Cross relief work important in both physically sustaining the fighting strength of the empire's army and navy, but also sustaining its claims to the moral high ground. It gave imperialists a way to represent the Imperial Japanese Army as a force for creating civilized public administrative regimes in East Asia and a defender of humanity against Western imperialism.

Chapter three explained the economics of the JRCS and how it helped constitute the basic conceptual categories of capitalist production—capital, land, and labor. The Society actively cultivated these commodities to realize profits in the forms of interest, rent, and wages for itself and its members. In doing so, it reinforced the classical economic notion that the forms of capital, land, and labor naturally produced wealth on their own, independent of the historically specific social relations of modern industrial capitalism. Nominally a non-profit organization, the JRCS nonetheless relied upon the same fundamental mechanisms as business corporations to finance its humanitarian relief operations. The affinity between humanitarianism and capitalism was significant to imperialism precisely because the fetishization of these commodities obscured the unstable nature of the domestic economy. The exploitation inherent in labor-capital relations made it impossible for workers to consume most of the products of modern industry, necessitating the sale of such excess goods in foreign markets and the

corresponding move of speculative capital into colonial investment opportunities. Neither of these could be accomplished without the threat of a robust military action to ensure the security of the capitalists' property in Korea, Taiwan, and China.

Chapter four followed the JRCS engagement with scientific-medical projects to promote hygiene, another key rationale for imperialism. The international Red Cross movement made hygiene a key area of humanitarian activity through its campaign to prevent and eliminate tuberculosis begun in 1907. JRCS publications also advocated clothing, dietary, and behavioral reform as part of a larger project of hygienic education. This made doctors into important authorities on social problems, but their scientific-medical perspective largely dismissed the possibility of systemic social reform in favor of a conception of disease as a matter of individual moral failing. As such, it provided justification for imperialists ideologies of Japanese superiority and fitness to politically dominate and "civilize" the peoples of East Asia.

Chapter five concluded with an analysis of the figure of the Red Cross nursing-woman as a symbol of humanitarian imperialism in the literature of the Asia-Pacific War. As an "angel in white," she evoked qualities of universal love, self-sacrifice, purity, and beauty to supplement imperialists' representations of war as necessary to ensure peace, justice and order. Writers made the nursing-woman into a spiritual being by associating her relief work with Kannon, Buddhist bodhisattva of compassion and also recounting how her enshrinement transformed her into a protective war goddess in death. While post-war treatments of the experiences of nursing-women rendered her a symbol of the victimization of the Japanese people at the hands of the militaristic state, a careful reading of the literature on the "angel in white" confirms the idea that the JRCS was part

of a larger effort to give women authoritative roles as active contributors to the project of empire.

Nation, law, wealth production, hygiene, and gender thus acted as the most important conceptual categories linking humanitarianism and imperialism in discourse by and about the JRCS. Through these categories Red Cross relief work bolstered both the ideology and practice of Japan's military aggression, political domination, and economic exploitation of neighboring peoples. As such, the history of the JRCS presents a cautionary tale for those who expect humanitarianism to simply relieve suffering and create a more just world. While the impulse to spontaneously aid others in need—as in the story of Henri Dunant in Solferino—deserves praise, the creation of permanent institutions dedicated to humanitarianism carried with it certain dangers. If humanitarian rationales can justify forceful military interventions in foreign societies, if humanitarian practices abide by, or even bolster, the political and economic subordination of the weak by the powerful, then any such efforts required a strong commitment to vigilant self criticism. The history of organized humanitarianism shows that aid almost never came without strings attached, and the moral obligation to try to fix the world's ills was part and parcel of imperial hubris.

Lest someone object that the JRCS does not appropriately exemplify the humanitarian movement as a whole, I have emphasized the points of exchange between the JRCS and the wider international Red Cross movement. Not only did JRCS leaders hold that their Society was not fundamentally different from any other national Red Cross Society, but with its successes conducting relief operations during the Sino-Japanese War, the Boxer Rebellion, and the Russo-Japanese War, it became an important model for

other Societies to emulate. Furthermore, while it is important to attend to the specifics of Japan's historical development, the narratives of the JRCS reaffirm the commonality across nations of experiences within the global system of modern imperialism. Like all empires, imperialists in Japan pushed for wars of conquest in order to realize its unique national destiny, to fortify its defenses against hostile foreign powers, to provide a means for its industrial manufacturing enterprises to sustain their profitability, and to spread medical-hygienic civilization. For these reasons the JRCS and Japan are by no means exceptions to the trends of world history from the 19th century to the first half of the 20th.

My focus on categories emphasized the continuity of ideology and practice across the metropole-colony divide. In other words, this dissertation does not find the JRCS treatment of colonized populations and its rhetoric towards them to differ fundamentally from its position towards “mainland” Japanese. Nevertheless, future research might fruitfully take up questions of colonialism with more precision, asking: exactly what kinds of humanitarian relief activity did the JRCS carry out in the colonies? What specific measures did they employ to make colonial subjects into active contributors to humanitarianism? We already know that so-called “tropical diseases” were of great concern to the JRCS hygiene efforts in Taiwan during the late 1890s and 1900s. The JRCS also contributed to famine relief and epidemic disease control in northeast China during the first decades of the 20th century. How else did humanitarian relief activity (re) constitute the nation, law, capitalism, hygiene, and gender in colonial settings? To what extent, if any, did the JRCS recruit and train colonial subjects as nursing women and medics?

Ultimately, this study has sought to establish the importance of humanitarianism to a form of imperial hubris which was eminently bio-political. Humanitarian imperialism asserted the superiority of the Japanese empire on the basis of its claims to foster the health and life of its subject populations. The JRCS was part and parcel of a global movement which called for action to relieve suffering according to the logic of universal brotherhood, but as Michael Barnett has shown, humanitarianism is also very much about providing emotional rewards to the givers of relief.[1] The dominance of humanitarian imperialism demonstrates that there are ideological rewards for the giver as well. By providing medical assistance to enemy soldiers, by carrying out the reform of public administrative law in occupied territories, by promoting the productive use of capital, land, and labor, by pursuing hygiene education efforts, and by making nursing-women into active agents for the rehabilitation of wounded and sick imperial soldiers, the empire claimed the right to act on behalf of others, with or without their consent.

1 Barnett, *Empire of Humanity*, 221, 223.

Appendix

The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, 1864[1]

Article 1. Ambulances and military hospitals shall be recognized as neutral, and as such, protected and respected by the belligerents as long as they accommodate wounded and sick. Neutrality shall end if the said ambulances or hospitals should be held by a military force.

Article 2. Hospital and ambulance personnel, including the quarter-master's staff, the medical, administrative and transport services, and the chaplains, shall have the benefit of the same neutrality when on duty, and while there remain any wounded to be brought in or assisted.

Article 3. The persons designated in the preceding Article may, even after enemy occupation, continue to discharge their functions in the hospital or ambulance with which they serve, or may withdraw to rejoin the units to which they belong. When in these circumstances they cease from their functions, such persons shall be delivered to the enemy outposts by the occupying forces.

Article 4. The material of military hospitals being subject to the laws of war, the persons attached to such hospitals may take with them, on withdrawing, only the articles which are their own personal property. Ambulances, on the contrary, under similar circumstances, shall retain their equipment.

Article 5. Inhabitants of the country who bring help to the wounded shall be respected and shall remain free. Generals of the belligerent Powers shall make it their duty to notify the inhabitants of the appeal made to their humanity, and of the neutrality which humane conduct will confer. The presence of any wounded combatant receiving shelter and care in a house shall ensure its protection. An inhabitant who has given shelter to the wounded shall be exempted from billeting and from a portion of such war contributions as may be levied.

Article 6. Wounded or sick combatants, to whatever nation they may belong, shall be collected and cared for. Commanders-in-Chief may hand over immediately to the enemy outposts enemy combatants wounded during an engagement, when circumstances allow and subject to the agreement of both parties. Those who, after their recovery, are recognized as being unfit for further service, shall be repatriated. The others may likewise be sent back, on condition that they shall not again, for the duration of hostilities, take up arms. Evacuation parties, and the personnel conducting them, shall be considered as

1 For the full English text see International Committee of the Red Cross, Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field. Geneva, 22 August 1864.

being absolutely neutral.

Article 7. A distinctive and uniform flag shall be adopted for hospitals, ambulances and evacuation parties. It should in all circumstances be accompanied by the national flag. An armlet may also be worn by personnel enjoying neutrality but its issue shall be left to the military authorities. Both flag and armlet shall bear a red cross on a white ground.

Article 8. The implementing of the present Convention shall be arranged by the Commanders-in-Chief of the belligerent armies following the instructions of their respective Governments and in accordance with the general principles set forth in this Convention.

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