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Forced Migration During the Mexican War on Drugs:
Causes and Consequences of Forced Displacement
in Michoacan and Tamaulipas

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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

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Professor Rubén Hernández-León, Chair

From a historical and sociological point of view, this thesis questions, discusses, analyzes, the causes and consequences of forced migration in Michoacan and Tamaulipas. The spiraling of violence due to the evolution of modus-operandi of organized crime, the militarization of the state, and state violence against the citizenry have created the conditions for displacement to occur. Forced migration is a reaction to the violence, insecurity, and impunity becoming the only venue for survival for those who experience violence directly or collaterally. As a result, those who are forcefully displaced due to the uninhabitable conditions in their homeland, abandon their homes for less violent territories leading to their relocation nationally and internationally in search of security

The thesis of Miriam Espinoza is approved.

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University of California, Los Angeles

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This thesis is dedicated to my family who was displaced by organized crime violence in 2007 from Michoacan. To my uncles who were murdered by OCG groups. To their wives and children who were also displaced. To my grandparents who suffered the loss of three sons. To myself who saw the effect the war on drugs not only had on my family, but also my friends and their respective families.

Esta tesis está dedicada a mi familia que fue desplazada por la violencia del crimen organizado en el 2007 desde Michoacán. A mis tíos que fueron asesinados por los grupos criminales. A sus esposas e hijos que también fueron desplazados. A mis abuelos que sufrieron la pérdida de tres hijos. A mí que vi el efecto que la guerra contra las drogas no sólo tuvo en mi familia, sino también en mis amigos y sus familias.

Table of Contents

Introduction

The Mexican War on Drugs has escalated the levels of violence across Mexico claiming the lives of approximately 250,000 people (Pardo Veiras 2019) since its declaration in 2006. The administrations of Felipe Calderón (2006—2012) and Enrique Pena Nieto (2012—2016) have left a trail of blood across the republic as homicides and general violence levels x grew during their presidency terms. The fight against drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) has been futile. Cartels are more powerful than ever before and their violent methods of operation have had serious consequences at the social, economic, and cultural level.

Homicides, extortions, and kidnappings are some of the methods used by Mexican cartels to intimidate rival groups, the government, and the population. The constant warfare between the rival organizations and the government in key geographical territories for the production and trafficking of drugs has affected the way of life of the inhabitants. Residents in violent territories live in constant fear for their lives as they have become victims of the reign of terror inflicted by the unstoppable drug related violence that has reached unprecedented levels across the country. This had led to the displacement of thousands of inhabitants who fled their communities in search of security and safety. Rios Contreras (2014) found that approximately 263,692 Mexicans fled their localities as a consequence of drug related violence. The Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights (CMDPDH) estimates that 346,945 people have been internally displaced by violence, with Chiapas, Guerrero, Michoacan, Oaxaca and Sinaloa being the most affected states. Violence has displaced people individually and en masse across the republic.

Human right violations, arbitrary arrests, weak rule of law, impunity, and corruption by the State has also aided in the development of forced displacement. The State and organized

crime have a long history of working side by side. Cartels have been able to successfully bribe state authorities at the local, state, and national level creating a ring of impunity where criminal organizations can operate freely without government intervention. The fact that the State has also become an accomplice in barbaric crimes conducted by these criminal organizations such as the case of Ayotzinapa where local police aided a criminal gang in the kidnapping, disappearance and muder of 43 students, only shows the complicity of the state (Franco 2019). Such actions have "become a symbol of the violence, impunity and broken rule of law that plagues México" (Franco 2019) reducing the credibility in the government and their ability to protect their citizens. This creates uninhabitable conditions in areas where the State fails to guarantee security for their citizens as it fails to prosecute crimes committed by organized crime. As a result, residents resort to migration in order to escape not only from organized crime violence, but also from state violence.

Today, displacement continues to occur affecting some geographical locations more than others as it has been brought to light that drug-related violence is geographically concentrated. Some territories are more violent than others because of the different dynamics at play and the importance of the territories in the drug trafficking business. For this reason I have chosen Michoacan, a key state in the production of drugs, and Tamaulipas, a transit state vital for the trafficking of drugs. Two completely different geographical areas, one is located in the South West and the other in the North bordering the United States, but who have been the most affected by the war on drugs and forced displacement. This thesis analyzes the cases of both Michoacan and Tamaulipas at the municipal level to better understand the causes and consequences of forced migration. It aims to answer the following questions: What causes forced migration in Michoacan and Tamaulipas? Why are some municipalities affected more than others? What are

the humanitarian consequences of this type of migration? These are questions that need to be answered as forced migration has become a problem of great concern whose causes, consequences, and resolutions have yet to be addressed by the pertinent authorities.

Displacement in Mexico

Displacement in México is not new, however in the last two decades drug-related violence has become a causant of thousands of displacement stories. When former Mexican President Felipe Calderón declared a war against drugs in 2006 there was an escalation of violence in Mexico. The rise of violence caused by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) prompted people to flee for their safety. These people have been coined as internally displaced persons (IDPs), forced to emigrate as a direct consequence of war on drugs violence. According to Luz María Salazar Cruz (2019), internal forced displacement is a process of several mobilizations, of forced migrations over which the time of their duration cannot be predicted. The process entails departure, transit and settlement. The author highlights two types of departure or escape which are *gota a gota* (little by little) and *colectivo* (collectively). The exit *gota a gota* can occur in various ways,

> "(i) rapid and untimely departure and episodic returns when events of direct or indirect local violence against villagers urge them to flee or hide while violent actions—direct and indirect attacks, confrontations, aggressions or intimidations—take place. Initially, after episodic escapes (testimonies in communities of the Sinaloan mountain range, in the Guerrerense, in the Chiapas mountains), the people return after hours or days when the aggressors and their incursions have stopped; they know that it can or will happen again, and without having another defense, they begin to consider a more permanent displacement; and, ii) the planned and/or anticipated departure of the most threatened members, who are mainly men because they represent the defense of the family group and the community, the ownership" (Salazar Cruz 2019, 178).

The collective exit is "organic, it presumes an acknowledgement of the organic insecurity that came with the illegal and violent actors, and that their presence represents an artificial power

beyond the characters themselves "... if it is not those [who have broken into the region], it will be others" (Salazar Cruz 2019, 178). This type of exit is a strategy of protection and defense which guarantees the survival of the group. The author states the methodological limits when it comes to internally displaced persons as the two types of exits, *gota a gota* and *colectivo,* have been permanently in operation for the last twelve years. However, they are not recorded because there is a lack of recognition of IDPs.

Viridiana Ríos Contreras (2014) argues that an unexpected consequence of the drug war has been the migration of Mexicans due to drug-related violence and extortion. Rios Contreras (2014) found a significant amount of migration between 2006 and 2010 "a total of 263,692 Mexicans fled their counties fearing either drug-related homicides (approximately 220 thousand) or extortion (approximately 44 thousand)" (Rios Contreras, 2014, 208). This figure accounts for all the displaced persons in violent and non-violent cities, those who migrated within Mexico and to the United States. Rios Contreras provides a national statistic that quantifies the number of forced migrants generated as a result of the Mexican war on drugs. She claims that this violence has greatly affected migration dynamics "adding a whole new dimension that considers well-being and security issues as fundamental part of migration decisions" (Ríos Contreras 2014, 209). Laura H. Atuesta and Dusan Paredes (2015) analyze whether Mexicans are actually fleeing from violence. They state that there are two internal migration flows within Mexico, "the first one is the migration from nonviolent to violent states, and the second is the migration from violent to nonviolent states" (Atuesta & Paredes 2015, 481). The data shows that "the main destination of the internal migration in Mexico seems to be to states with low levels of violence, regardless of the level of violence in the state of origin" (Atuesta & Paredes 2015, 485). The authors investigate whether wage differentials of IDPs affect the migration decision to states

with different levels of violence. In terms of economic migration, "the wage differential is still statistically significant and positive, meaning that for the group of migrants moving from low- to high-violence states, the economic compensation offered in the place of destination is more important than for the group of migrants moving from violent to nonviolent states" (Atuesta & Paredes 2015, 495). The authors conclude that economic factors do not necessarily drive migrants who are fleeing violence to other violent states,

> "the results suggest that people migrating from violent to nonviolent states are not interested only in the economic opportunities or in the cost of living in the place of destination. If the economic opportunities are worse, or the cost of living is more expensive, they still migrate, suggesting that there are additional factors that are driving this migration. Moreover, these results could support the idea that violence is seen as a negative amenity captured by renting prices: a less violent state could have higher rents than a violent state (and therefore, a higher price differential)" (Atuesta and Paredes, 2015: 495).

Therefore, the economic variables cannot explain the migration flows from violent states to non-violent states which suggests that there is a new migration phenomenon being observed. The authors suggest that displacement by violence could be one of the explanations for this phenomenon. Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera (2013) assesses the effect the Mexican drug war has had on migration, security, and the economy of both sides of the Texas-Tamaulipas border. Correa-Cabrera (2013) reckons that the most violent year for Tamaulipas was in 2010 when 72 migrants were assassinated in San Fernando and later that year 200 buried bodies were discovered in the same area. She states that "the spiraling drug violence and crime has led many to conclude that Tamaulipas has become ungovernable—a "failed state"" (Correa-Cabrera, 2013: 69). She also finds that the drug violence does not transfer into the United States, but rather stays south of the border disregarding all the claims of a possible spillover effect to the other side of

the border. New waves of Mexican and Central American migrants who wish to come into the United States through Tamaulipas oftentimes become victims of organized crime in the area.

According to Correa-Cabrera (2013) the brutal massacre of 72 migrants and the discovery of dozens of drugs and weapons in cities along the Tamaulipas border underlines the severity of the problem (Correa-Cabrera 2013, 74). Furthermore, drug violence has also affected the economic situation in Tamaulipas, "among the sectors that have been hit hard are tourism, real estate, and the construction industry. Tourism and the restaurant industries of Tamaulipas have been tremendously affected" (Correa-Cabrera 2013, 74). Oil companies such as PEMEX had to abandon several gas fields. Gun men place and run checkpoints across the state highways where farmers are severely affected as they have to give in portions of their crops. This has caused families fleeing extortion and threats of kidnapping to migrate to the other side of the border. These studies show that organized crime has an effect on the decision to migrate internally or internationally as civilians have become targets of organized crime and have made the decision to leave in search of the security their locality lacks. The spiraling drug violence has created new migration flows that are not due to economic or employment opportunities, but rather national security issues that have affected the way of life of thousands of Mexicans.

Séverine Durin (2013) argues that increasing homicide rates and other types of violence in states such as Sinaloa, Michoacan, Chihuahua, Guerrero, Tamaulipas, and Nuevo León have forced people to migrate in search of better security conditions (Durin 2013, 155-156). Durin seeks to quantify the estimated displaced population by measuring the number of dwellings uninhabited at a given time frame minus the dwellings that would be expected to be uninhabited in the absence of security problems times occupants per household. She investigates the case of Sinaloa where there was an unprecedented increase in uninhabited dwelling rates in three

municipalities: Elota (55.92%), Ahome (5.29%) and Badiraguato (4.08%). Displacement was generated by the violent clashes among drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). Although forced displacement has been occurring as early as 2007, displacement en masse came to light in 2011 when a dozen people were assassinated by DTOs, but it was not until 2012 that the media recognized the displacement of dozens of families to neighboring towns and cities. For Durin (2013), this only shows the lack of recognition and brings to light that Mexico is not prepared to deal with displaced populations as a consequence of violence. In Sinaloa, the receiving localities of displaced persons fleeing violence could only offer them groceries but lacked other services and long-term solutions.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) aims to quantify displacement related to conflict in Mexico. They state that, “clashes between armed and security forces and organized crime groups, as well as disappearances, kidnappings, forced recruitment, assaults, extortion, threats, arbitrary evictions and serious human rights violations have contributed to forced internal displacement in the country in 2018” (IDMC 2019, 1). The main source that provides IDCM with estimates on displacement numbers is a Mexican NGO, the Mexican Commission for Defense and Protection of Human Rights (CMDPDH) which “systematically collects information on incidents of internal displacement through event-based media monitoring and verifies of these reports using its network of local partners" (IDMC, 2019: 2). The figures of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) accounts for displacement across 25 municipalities where displacement is linked to violence generated by organized crime and drug trafficking. According to CMDPDH, “338,000 people have been forced to move within Mexico due to gang violence” (IDMC 2019, 1). In their article “Forced Displacement Linked to Transnational Organized Crime in Mexico”, IDMC investigates whether there is a link between drug cartel violence and forced

displacement. They state that "forced displacement has been an unseen and undocumented outcome of this violence. No government institution has systematically tracked the extent of the phenomenon" (IDMC 2012, 4). The IDMC investigated whether there is a relationship between violence and migration trends in 12 states where violence is high. They found that "considered together, the 12 most violent states had a negative net migration rate of 55,700 people, and the correlation coefficient between homicides and net migration rate is negative (-0.27). This is evidence that they are experiencing a significant loss of population which may be linked to drug cartel violence" (IDMC 2012: 8). In terms of unoccupied homes, the IDMC questions whether there is a link between unoccupied housing and violence related to organized crime. They conclude that,

> "there was a negative change in the proportion of unoccupied homes over the study period, indicating that there were more in both high and low-violence municipalities at the beginning of the study. In high-violence municipalities, however, the change was very close to zero, while in low-violence municipalities the proportion of unoccupied homes declined by an average of 0.0166 pints" (IDMC 2012, 14).

In a survey conducted by the IDMC regarding displacement in Ciudad Juarez, it was "found that during the first 11 months of 2011, 24,426 people had emigrated from the city as a result of the violence" (IDMC 2012, 16). The findings support previous data collected between 2007 and 2009 where migration flows were prompted by high levels of insecurity.

Nonetheless, Mexico is not the only country in the Americas with IDPs. Central America has also lost percentages of its population as a consequence of drug violence. Everardo Víctor Jiménez (2016) discusses the phenomenon of violence in the Northern Triangle of Central America (Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador) as a generator of forced displacement among the population. The Northern Triangle has the highest homicides rates of Central America which are

linked to organized crime. According to Jiménez (2016), the maras (gangs) and drug traffickers are the principal actors that generate violence in Central America. Initially the *maras* were seen as criminal groups composed of young members which would only steal and rob. However, the network expansion and growth in membership have pushed them to become bigger criminal enterprises that have joined the drug trade,

> "these groups have increased their criminal activity and have thus generated new types of violence that are currently linked to transnational organized crime, thus making both crime and violence greater. Over the years, the maras went from defending their territories and fighting for them to entering the business of trafficking and selling drugs, which has led to more violent patterns of behavior" (Jiménez, 2016: 187).

Honduras has also seen an increase in violence as it has been a key country in the drug trade since the 1970s. The nexus between cartels and drug traffickers across Central America has unleashed a war among cartels as they fight for the control of territories used for the trafficking of drugs. The spiraling violence has become a driver of migration, as it is having a major impact on forced displacement,

> "the *maras*, like the drug trafficking groups, have pushed a large part of the population to be forcibly displaced and, although economic reasons or family reunification are pointed out as causes of displacement, it can be said that violence is the main cause of displacement since it forces many people to move both within and outside the countries of the Northern Triangle of Central America" (Jiménez, 2016: 193).

People have no other choice but to migrate to safer areas within their respective countries or outside of them which has caused a humanitarian crisis in Central America especially in the Northern Triangle as it is predicted that forced migration will continue to increase in numbers. Hiskey et al. (2018) conducted a survey to understand whether crime victimization influences the decision to emigrate from Guatemalan, El Salvadors, and Hondurans They found that for Guatemalans, crime victimization does not emerge as a significant factor influencing

emigrations. However, for Hondurans and Salvadorans crime victimization is a powerful predictor of emigration intentions, “those suffering from crime and insecurity the most in Honduras and El Salvador are precisely those who are most likely to be making plans to leave” (Hiskey et al. 2018, 437). Immigration controls placed by major receiving countries such as the United States do not successfully deter Central Americans from wanting to migrate in order to escape the swelling violence,

> “unfortunately, however, understanding why policymakers in the United States are likely to opt for a strategy of deterrence based on detention and deportation does not make it an effective strategy. What our results point to is the inability of this approach to dissuade that subset of individuals who have directly experienced the cruelties of life in a high-crime context from taking a life-threatening chance to escape that reality” (Hiskey et al., 2018: 442).

Organized crime is not new in Central America, but in the last years drug related violence has increased across this region displacing thousands and leading others to migrate in correlation with violence. This is problematic because it continues to allow organized crime violence to displace thousands of persons internally and internationally.

Forced Migration vs. Internally Displaced Persons

The increase in insecurity in Mexico as a consequence of the war on drugs and the continuous escalation of violence have pushed Mexicans to migrate. Mexicans see the need to leave their homes in search for safety heavens where cartels can no longer interrupt their way of life. Organized crime has disrupted the social lifestyle of many Mexicans who are in fear or have been directly affected by the rising violence. This has caused the displacement of thousands of individuals. Sebastián Albuja (2014) states that displacement of civilians has been a significant effect of the Mexican war on drugs. He explains that overall, “the proportion of people leaving

violent municipalities is four to five times higher than that of people leaving non-violent municipalities with similar socio-economic conditions" (Albuja 2014, 28). According to Díaz Pérez and Romo Viramontes (2019), "displacement caused by violence does not occur in the abstract, but from concrete facts, such as extortion, kidnapping, charging for 'protection', identity theft, assaults, disappearance of family members, links created with criminality (voluntary or involuntary), among many other situations" (18). The decision to leave is linked to an element of force where the affected by the violence directly or collaterally have no other choice but to migrate whether internally or internationally. Those who migrate within the perimeters of the country are termed internally displaced persons (IDP). IDPs are defined as, "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural, or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized border" (Deng, 1999). The literature on displacement as a consequence of organized crime violence focuses on internal forced displacement (IFD) from which IDPs are born. Salazar Cruz (2019) and Díaz Pérez and Romo Viramontes (2019) state that the internal forced displacement (IFD) occurs as a consequence of impunity, corruption, lack of authority and institutional inefficiency of the state and municipal powers to deal with actors involved in regional/local conflicts that are able to create violence achieved through the weakened action of the state apparatus. Salazar Cruz and Alvarez Lobato (2018) describe the causes of forced internal displacement,

> "forced internal displacement" (FID) is presented as a specific phenomenon of migration events. Such displacements are currently due to such causes as: a) internal national or regional armed conflict, with militarized actors linked to de facto powers such as drug trafficking organizations, organized crime and paramilitarism; b) situation of state instability, weakness of political elites, and internal political-military conflict against

> other forces intervening for national control; c) the exercise of de facto power, such as organized crime against the traditional inhabitants of ejidos and rural localities, for the purpose of illegally extracting natural resources (mainly in primary timber, mineral and construction material forests); d) natural disasters; e) conventional disasters (industrial, contagious, fires, nuclear accidents); and f) state-led displacement due to the implementation of national and international mega-projects" (2018, 20).

However, these terms only account for those who are displaced and relocate within the national borders ignoring the far-reaching consequences displacement has on migration flows to the North.

Displacement as a consequence of organized crime violence has forced Mexicans to migrate not only within the republic, but outside of its national borders. Ríos Contreras (2014) states that her displacement figures of 264,692 Mexican drug-violence refugees accounts for all relocations within Mexico from violent to nonviolent cities and relocations from Mexico to the United States. Research shows that the number of asylum cases in the U.S- Mexico border has increased since the beginning of the wars of drugs, but the United States Immigration system has had a hard time recognizing this new wave of immigrants who seek asylum because they fear the criminal organizations. In the Mexico-US border, displaced individuals seeking political asylum are considered refugees. Although the profile and area of residence of asylum seekers coincide with violent areas that have been directly impacted by the drug war, their asylum cases have been rejected as the courts ruled generalized violence was not ground for asylum. Albuja (2014) explains:

> "cases that argued fear of generalized violence or unstable country conditions as the reason for fleeing and as grounds for asylum were rejected. Courts ruled that fear of "general country conditions" or "indiscriminate violence" was not ground for asylum, unless victims are singled out on account of a protected ground. The cases that were successful had specific evidence (names of cartel or police members, hospital or police reports, and witness testimony). They also could demonstrate and articulate why and how they feared persecution (i.e. who would harm them)" (30).

According to the courts, the majority of the Mexican asylum cases have not adequately met the requirements for asylum as established by the Immigration and Nationality Act, because fleeing organized crime violence is not considered a legitimate fear of persecution (Estevez, 2013). The domestic laws on refugees has not been updated since last century, "the United States ratified the 1967 Protocol in 1968 but did not make any changes to its domestic law or policy regarding refugees until 1980, when Congress passed the Refugee Act" (Mann 2012, 156). This has become problematic as new cases and waves of asylum applicants emerge with new scenarios of fear never being considered before. Since asylum is a long, costly, and arduous process many forced migrants are not applying for asylum,

> "due to the definitions of persecution and social group, the delay in processing the applicants (in El Paso about three years), the cost of hiring an attorney, and fear of being detained, denied, and/or sent back to their sending community many Mexicans are not applying for asylum" (Morales et al. 2013, 89).

Morales et al. (2013) refers to those who fled to the United States and who do not maintain a legal status as "refugees without status". These displaced individuals are not considered IDPs because they have crossed an international border, nor are they considered refugees due to a lack of legal status.

For the reasons discussed previously, I use the term "forced migration", "forced migrants", and "forced displacement" to refer to those displaced as a consequence of organized crime violence. These terms acknowledge the fact that forced migrants not only relocate within their native country (IDPs), but also outside of it (refugees and refugees without status). The International Office of Migration (2006) defines forced migration as "a general term to describe a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and IDPs, as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear

disasters, famine, or development projects)" (IOM 2006). Castles (2003) explains that forced migrants are often categorized as refugees, but this term fails to recognize the various reasons that led people to leave their residences,

> "forced (or involuntary) migration includes a number of legal or political categories. All involve people who have been forced to flee their homes and seek refuge elsewhere. Popular speech tends to call them all 'refugees', but this is quite a narrow legal category. The majority of forced migrants flee for reasons not recognized by the international refugee regime, and many of them are displaced within their own country of origin" (Castles, 2003).

However, forced migrations are not to be confused with conventional migration flows that migrate for economic and labor opportunities. Within the forced migration context, we have several factors and experiences by the migrants that influence their involuntary movement across geographical spaces,

> "forced migration differs from the "classical" migration process in several respects, including: the decision to leave is rather an imperative, a way of preserving life; it is not linear, but is - in general - recorded from economic migration to forced migration of several internal displacements that may become cross-border or international; the departure is not in search of economic improvement or to meet relatives abroad, and therefore does not result in the sending of remittances; it is caused by the violation of basic rights that cannot be guaranteed by the State or are violated by it" (Gómez-Johnson, 2015).

The National Human Rights Commission "Special Report on International Forced Displacement (IFD) in Mexico" (2016) provides a model of displacement in which human mobility can result in forced migrations composed of both refugees and internally displaced persons. Thus, forced migration adequately describes the Mexican case of displacement and aims to bring light to a phenomenon ignored by the Mexican state and rejected by institutions for the control of migration flows such as the United States immigration system.

Methodology

For this particular project I will be conducting a case study of Michoacan and Tamaulipas, two states that have experienced the impact and consequences of the militarized war on drugs. Michoacan and Tamaulipas are some of the entities within the Mexican Republic with some of the highest numbers of recorded displacements, but who also house some of the most powerful and violent drug trafficking organizations.

Organized crime group related violence from 2006—2018 published by the *Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública* (SESNSP), will be used to analyze whether drug violence levels have increased or decreased since the start of the Mexican War on Drugs in both entities. To better understand displacement in Michoacan and Tamaulipas data has been collected from the *Instituto Nacional de Geografía, Estadistica e Informatica* (INEGI). INEGI is a powerful database that stores and simplifies statistical information collected from the census and intercensal surveys. Data was collected for a 10 year-period (2005—2015) on intentional homicides and uninhabited dwellings at the municipal level for both entities.

In order to calculate displacement numbers, I will be resorting to Severine Durin's sociological approach. Durin (2013) argues that, "the considerable increase in crime rates in several states in recent years has led to increased victimization, and migration has become a strategy to which people who have felt threatened have resorted. Given that many had to leave their homes uninhabited, one way to analyze their incidence is to observe how the rate of uninhabited homes has behaved at the national, state, and some municipal levels between 2005 and 2010" (163-64). Being able to calculate displacement through uninhabited homes per municipality will give us a clearer understanding of which areas have been impacted the most as

it has been argued that drug related violence is geographically concentrated, and some states and municipalities experience different degrees of violence and subsequently displacement.

The following equation is used to estimate forced displacement:

> *Estimated displaced population = [Dwellings uninhabited (year) - Dwellings that would be expected to be uninhabited in the absence of security problems] x Occupants per household*

Where "*dwellings that would be expected to be uninhabited in the absence of security problem*" is calculated by "multiplying the prevailing uninhabited house rate in (year) by the number of homes in (year)" (Durin 2013). Although the author only analyzed one period 2005—2010, this thesis analyzes two five-year periods, 2005—2010 and 2010—2015. Being able to compare and contrast the findings during both time periods will make it clear whether displacement continues to be a concerning problem in the investigated entities.

In addition to the data collected through INEGI, historical literature, case studies, newspaper articles, and statistical reports have been collected to be able to provide a full analysis of the dynamics at play in Michoacan and Tamaulipas. The historical literature provides background information on the entities' geographical, social, and economic history and how these have been affected by the drug related violence and government decision-making that lead to forced migration. Case studies on violence and displacement carried out in Michoacan and Tamaulipas provide in-depth and detailed examinations of violence and displacement over specific regions and periods of time. These case studies will be used as a base for the examination of forced migration between 2005—2015. Newspapers provide news on current events often highlighting concerning events. Reports by organizations studying forced displacement are a step in the right direction which provide statistical information on recorded displacement numbers reporting reason for displacement, trajectories and destinations of

unknown cases. All these methodological sources will aid the analysis and questioning of forced migration in Michoacan and Tamaulipas at the municipal level.

The Case of Michoacan

Michoacan's land richness and geographical location are both a blessing and a curse. This state is one of the most important agricultural states in Mexico thanks to its varying climate across regions where citrus, coconuts, berries, cane sugar, avocados are grown and exported to international markets such as the US, Europe, and Asia (Maldonado 2012). Geographically, Michoacan's borders six other Mexican states: Guerrero, Jalisco, Colima, Guanajuato, Estado de Mexico, Queretaro, and it is the home to one of the largest and most important national maritime harbors, Lazaro Cardenas. Its natural resources such as ore, gold, and silver have attracted criminal enterprises who exploit the land for income. Michoacan's climate, accessibility to roads, coastline, and resources have made it an attractive state where illegal activities have developed, and organized crime has flourished.

According to Maldonado (2013), during the 1980s when Mexico was experiencing one of the worst economic crises, people in small towns across Michoacan began planting marihuana as a way to sustain themselves in addition to the legal crops. Taking advantage of the fertility of the land many small towns across the Apatzingan belt became what Maldonado coins as "narcopueblos", "because the belt called the Apatzingán Valley borders the western Sierra Madre, many localities there took advantage of their geographical location, tucked away in the mountains, to become drug-towns (narcopueblos) that clandestinely grow drugs while cultivating perfectly legal crops below on the extensive plain" (Maldonado 2013, 49). Untouched by development, small towns across Michoacan have a particular advantage, that is that the rule of

law is weak and practically non-existent. These geographical locations become, “golden triangles” for organized crime and illegal activities,

> “beyond the Tierra Caliente, the Sierra Madre del Sur Mountains, with peaks from 2,620 to 6,560 FASL (800-2,000 m), stretch along the boundary between the states of Michoacan, Jalisco and Guerrero. Some points along those borders are called small 'golden triangles' because the State's security apparatuses simply have no presence there. The main drug production centers are in and around the Sierra, lands rich in forests and woodland fauna and flora that went basically untouched during the post-revolutionary State's development projects” (Maldonado 2013, 49).

The development of roads and access to maritime harbors have connected Michoacan to other states, “it soon facilitated a huge increase in the movement of drugs, not only by land, but also by sea and even air” (Maldonado 2013, 50). The climate, land resources, lack of security, and makes Michoacan a fertile ground for both legal and illegal activities (Abarca 2014). These geographical advantages where legal and illegal activities are bound to flourish reconfigured the territories as violence and disputes arose with both legal and illegal actors fighting for territorial control.

The Evolution of Organized Crime Violence

It is not a secret that drug production in Michoacan grew exponentially as a consequence of the 1980s economic crisis. According to Maldonado (2013) the lack of investment in the development of the region such as budget cuts, agricultural credits, production amounts and guaranteed prices for farmworkers greatly affected the economy, social conditions, and livelihood of *michoacanos*. As a consequence, money-laundering and influx of illegal cash became attractive and an easy way out of the deteriorating social conditions of the time leading to an increase in the cultivation of drugs in the hills and sierras (Maldonado 2013). Criminal organizations saw potential in the production and trafficking of drugs for national and

international markets. As a result, there was a rise in criminal organizations focused on the production and trafficking of drugs. Michoacan, having all the resources for production and access to the Pacific Ocean and federal highways for the trafficking of drugs, became a powerhouse where many OCGs rose to power. From the Milenio Cartel in the 90s to current criminal organizations, Michoacan has long been disputed among various criminal organizations.

One of the oldest organizations, but who paved the way for new ones to rise was the Valencia Cartel most infamously known as the Milenio Cartel composed by the Valencia brothers. The Valencia brothers were able to expand to international markets thanks to the knowledge they had acquired as braceros in their prior trips to the United States and began to traffic Colombian cocaine through Mexico by using the Lazaro Cardenas port as a shipping and receiving destination. However, between 1995—and 2006—party alternation in Mexico caused a major crackdown on established drug trade networks protected by corrupt government officials which paved the way for new militias to arise and expand their area of dominion (Trejo & Ley 2018). According to Trejo and Ley (2018) "the cartels used these militias not only to defend their turf but also to seek to conquer enemy territory" (2018, 928). As a consequence, inter-cartel wars emerged across Michoacan..

The Gulf Cartel used their private and highly trained paramilitary group, *Los Zetas,* to incur in Michoacan and dethrone the Milenio Cartel. This move by the Gulf Cartel caused turf wars among the organizations who aimed to control key geographical points in the trafficking of drugs. *Los Zetas* were known to be extremely violent. The violent side of this organization transferred wherever they went causing blood baths along the way. However, this organization was not a cartel in itself whose main activity was the production and trafficking of drugs. The Zetas introduced other ways of coercion through which they created a source of revenue such as

the implementation of a quota system or "protection fees", kidnapping, and extortion. As Querales-Mendoza (2020) explains,

> "the *Zetas* established a base in Apatzingán and brought to the state of Michoacan their criminal model consisting of controlling the territories through violence and obtaining profits from all the productive activities carried out there. In this way they created a network of extortion and provision of protection services, in parallel with the transfer and consolidation of a local drug market" (Querales-Mendoza 2020, 120).

The modus operandi of this criminal organization changed the way criminal organizations and drug cartels operated as they began terrorizing communities and subdued other cartels through violence. As a consequence, *michoacanos* started to experience different degrees of violence.

New organizations began diversifying the way they operated and financed their organizations as they not only produced and trafficked drugs but adopted methods of coercion that generated cash flow,

> "this mutation of Mexican organized crime has gone beyond a latent tendency towards the diversification of income-generating activities to include, amongst others, kidnapping-for-ransom, product piracy, and extortion. Most importantly, there has been a spill-over effect into societal spheres other than that of criminal markets, provoking scenarios in which organized criminal groups have become constituted as driving forces behind the restructuring of entire regional socio-cultural, economic, as well as political-institutional settings" (Ernst 2013, 4).

In 2006, *La Familia Michoacana,* a self-styled vigilante group, came to light through one of the most violent and shocking acts at the time. Dumping five human heads across the dance floor in a nightclub in Uruapan, Michoacan this new organization made itself known (La Jornada 2006). They pledged to kick the Zetas out of Michoacan because of their atrocious crimes against the citizenry.

Nonetheless, this new organization was not much different from the former OCGs as they continued to produce and traffic drugs, extort, kidnap, and kill, "when the *Familia* was at the height of its power, it was one of the most potent, bloody and powerful of Mexico's criminal organizations, whose activities ranged from drug trafficking and kidnapping to extortion and

racketeering" (InSight Crime 2020). The constant confrontations and classes between the Zetas and *La Familia Michoacana* caused a lot of turmoil in Michoacan. Felipe Calderón, former governor of Michoacan, and president elect of the 2006 presidential election was aware of the ongoing clashes between these organizations. Later that year he decided to launch a war on drugs by deploying thousands of military troops to different regions across México, "with this in mind, on December 10, the start of the Joint Operation Michoacan was decreed and five thousand military and police were sent to the state" (Querales Mendoza 2020, 120).

In 2011 a new group rose to power, *Los Caballeros Templarios* who happened to be a splinter group of *La Familia Michoacana* and who subsequently drove the former out of Michoacan. This new organization was not much different from the previous ones because they continued to adopt and implement the same patterns of intimidation and violence. According to Insight Crime, the Knights Templar benefited the most from extortion fees as they began extorting legal businesses across the region,

> "in addition to drug trafficking, the Knights receive a large amount of income from extorting businesses in their areas of influence. This is yet another legacy of the *Familia,* which at its peak was estimated to have charged "protection fees" from 85 percent of legal businesses in Michoacan state. The Knights' extortion activities are aided by its influence over local government officials, achieved through intimidation, and handing over kickbacks from drug profits" (Insight Crime, 2020).

The war on drugs did not stop the violence in Michoacan and many authors argue that it had an opposite effect causing an increase rather than a decrease in violence. Data collected from the *Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública* (SESNSP) illustrates the number of drug related crimes from the beginning of the war in 2006 to 2018. From 2006 to 2015 there was a slight increase in the number of reported kidnappings with 2013 being the highest at 194. Between 2006—2009 there was an increase in extortion at the time *La Familia*

Michoacana reigned. Nonetheless, when *Los Caballeros Templarios* came to power in 2011 the data showed yet another increase and subsequently decrease in extortion by the time the organization became severely fractured in 2015. Although kidnapping and extortion are serious crimes, the data outshines it by illustrating a drastic increase in reported homicides within the 12-year period. From 2016 to 2018 the number of reported homicides doubled in comparison to the previous years.

Figure 1: Organized Crime related violence in Michoacan
Source: SESNSP

As illustrated, the war on drugs has become extremely violent and bloody which cannot go unnoticed. These numbers not only fail to show any progress towards peace, but also ignores the consequences violence has had on the lives of residents in these territories. One of the biggest phenomena that has failed to be acknowledged is how the war and criminal organizations have caused citizens to leave their homes for safer towns and cities. Drug related violence reconfigures the way of life in violent territories where the state fails to provide the resources and protection which force the people to migrate. Forced migration in Michoacan shall be discussed, questioned and analyzed through the evaluation of uninhabited dwellings.

Empty Homes in Michoacan

In the last decade, there has been an increment in the number of uninhabited dwellings. According to data collected from INEGI between 2005 and 2010 rate of uninhabited homes in Michoacan decreased from 19.1% to 16.9%, but from 2010 to 2015 it increased by 2.6 percentage points, 16.9% to 19.5%. In the past, uninhabited dwellings have been a source used to calculate displacement as researchers have found a correlation between victimization and uninhabited households (Durin 2013).

Some areas across Mexico are more affected than others by forced displacement. These disparities also occur at the municipal level. For this reason, data on Michoacan at the municipal level was collected through INEGI's intercensal counts, censal counts, and national housing inventory. As discussed before, Durin's (2013) equation on displacement has been used to measure forced displacement in Michoacan at the municipal level. *Table 1* (See Appendix A) shows the municipalities with displaced populations who left their places of residence between 2005 and 2010. Morelia (32,348) , Zamora (3,171), Cheran (3,037), among other municipalities have the highest numbers of displacement. According to the data, between 2005 and 2010 an approximate total of 48,261 (1.1%) people were displaced in Michoacan, in 20 out of 113 municipalities with a total population of 4,351,037.

From 2010 to 2015 displacement numbers continued to grow. *Table 2* (See Appendix B), shows the municipalities where displacement is estimated to occur due to habitation rates. Morelia (28,823), Chilchota (6,298), Acuitzio (5,113), Zamora (4,938), Cotija (3,350), Los Reyes (2,940) are at the top of the list of municipalities that have high numbers of displaced populations. With a reported population of 4,599,104 in the state of Michoacan, between 2005 and 2010, 2.6% (118,261) of its population were displaced. Out of the 113 municipalities that

compose the state of Michoacan, 88 of them report displacement numbers while the rest do not. In comparison to the previous quinquennial period, displacement numbers in Michoacan increased by 145% from 2005—2010 to 2010—2015. This further shows that displacement in this specific state of the Mexican Republic is a serious problem that needs to be questioned, analyzed, and addressed.

The following are cases of mass displacements that were recorded in Michoacan by journalistic accounts between 2010—2015. According to the IDMC,"in the state of Michoacan, in May 2011, a confrontation between the *La Familia* cartel and one of its branches, known as the Knights Templar, caused the displacement of up to 2,000 people from the towns of Pizándaro, Vicente Guerrero, Purépero and Paredes Dos" (2011, 5). This forced migration was caused by the violence generated by drug trafficking organizations who constantly fight for territorial control (El Vigia, 2011). In the municipality of Tepalcatepec, its inhabitants are also leaving the town. The mayor states that he knows at least 100 families who have left the municipality, but states that only those with enough resources are able to leave while the poor have no other option but to stay (Expansion 2013). In 2013, it was also reported that at least 100 families left Aquila, Michoacan for Colima. That same year, Coahuyana received 200 forced migrants from the municipalities of Aquila, Coalcoman and Chinicuila (CNDH 2016, 52). Durin states that, "by 2013, it is estimated that between 10,000 and 15,000 people will be displaced, and among the main expelling municipalities were Aguililla, La Huacana, Coalcomán, Chinicuila, Buenavista, Tepalcatepec, Aquila and Los Reyes" (Durin 2019, 128). However, not every case of forced displacement is recorded. Individual displacements are less likely to be recorded or acknowledged by the authorities and media. Therefore, the data gives us a better look at forced displacement through uninhabitation whether individually or en masse.

The effects of forced displacement also vary from municipality to municipality. In Michoacan 2005—2010 and 2010—2015, the municipalities that were affected most by displacement are those who have high percentages of uninhabitation. Municipalities such as Santa Ana, Coeneo, Huaniqueo, Tarimbaro, Churintzio, Zinaparo, Morelos, Tlazazalca, Jimenez, and Chucandiro (See Appendix A and B), more than a quarter of the houses are uninhabited. Yet, cases of mass displacement occur in municipalities where organized crime violence is highly concentrated. Tierra Caliente and the Sierra Region are powerhouses for organized crime. Tierra Caliente is a highly disputed región as it grants access to Guerrero, a production zone where poppies are cultivated, and Jalisco, a corridor for trafficking. The municipalities of Arteaga, Aguililla, Coalcoman, Coahuyana, Aquila have also shown cases of displacement as they are a mining region of great importance, "it is also the area where the most executions, forced disappearances, extortion and kidnappings at the hands of criminals have been recorded" (Siempre 2015).

Violence and Forced Displacement

The statistics regarding displacement in Michoacan illustrate a problem that has expanded since 2005. Some municipalities are losing thousands of their inhabitants, but why are *michoacanos* leaving their residences and where are they going? According to various authors, the spiraling of violence as a consequence of organized crime and the war on drugs is the major cause of displacement among the population. The forced migrants either migrate to closer localities that might be safer, other states within the republic, and even to other countries.

Violence has played a crucial role in the forced displacement of locals who are vulnerable to the doing of criminal actors. According to Zepeda Gil (2017), *Los Caballeros Templarios* consistently used violence against the population to be able to maintain territorial control. Such

actions have had serious consequences as entire towns in the Sierra region have been forcefully displaced due to the uninhabitable conditions created by the violence exerted not only through homicides and kidnappings, but also extortions which greatly affect the economic livelihood of the residents,

> "…the Knights Templar used violence against the civilian population to maintain control of what was happening in the municipalities. On more than one occasion, upon simple suspicion of an alliance with another criminal organization, the Templars would disappear people from the communities. Semeí Verdía adds that, faced with the magnitude of the acts of intimidation carried out by the Templars against the indigenous community members of the Nahuatl coast-sierra of Michoacan, entire populations left the municipalities of Coahuayana, Aquila, and Coalcomán to seek refuge in Tecomán, Colima, as displaced by the violence" (Zepeda Gil 2017, 197).

Protection "fees" which are otherwise extortion, forced disappearances, kidnappings, beheadings, dismemberment of bodies, mass shootings, are some of the actions committed by organized crime to inflict terror among the population. Such methods have increased insecurity levels in Michoacan. As a result, entire families and communities in Michoacan have sought to migrate to other areas to escape territories controlled by organized crime.

Municipalities with major numbers of estimated displaced populations in the analyzed periods 2005—2010 and 2010—2015 also show high levels of violence. *Figure 3* illustrates the levels of violence per municipality in Michoacan between 2006 and 2015. For example, Morelia, the capital of Michoacan, is one of the most important plazas in the drug trade business. Morelia is a highly disputed territory among organizations whose constant battles have exacerbated the levels of violence. According to INEGI's data on intentional homicides, Morelia is the entity with the highest number of homicides within the 10 year period.



Figure 2. Intentional Homicides per municipality in Michoacan (2006-2015).

Source: INEGI

Los Reyes, Uruapan, and Zamora are major agricultural cities from berries to avocadoes which have seen an increase in the levels of violence and forced displacement as criminal organizations in their diversification of illicit business have disrupted these industries through financial extortion, kidnappings, and homicide. Municipalities in the Tierra Caliente region, also show high levels of violence as it has become a disputed territory among the criminal organization as this región provides access to Jalisco and Guerrero, two states key in the production and trafficking of drugs. Zepeda Gil (2018) finds an increase in homicides in Tierra Caliente which he attributes to its agro-industrial importance, proximity to important ports, strong intervention by the the state, and the presence of criminal organizations such as *La Familia Michoacana* and *Los Zetas* which have transformed it into a violent territory.

Although the data does show an increase in the number of forced migrants in some municipalities more than others it does not track the destination of these displacees. In 2014, a non-profit organization in Mexico, the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Rights (CMDPDH), decided to track cases of mass displacement across the republic and the destination of such individuals. In all of their annual reports, Michoacan appears to be affected

by cases of mass displacements. In 2017 the CMDPDH recorded two cases of mass displacement in Michoacan in the municipalities of Apatzingan and Mugica. In the first case, it is estimated that at least 300 indigenous families, 1,200 people, were forcefully displaced due to violence generated by organized crime in Michoacan, "it was reported that indigenous families arrived in Aguascalientes and some have subsequently migrated to other states to seek out some source of livelihood" (2018,54). In the second case of displacement another 115 people arrived in Tijuana from Apatzingan, Mugica and other municipalities. The reason for their displacement was due to the violence generated by organized crime and drug trafficking organizations in their communities. They arrived at this border town with the intention of applying for asylum in the United States. In 2018, another 3 cases of mass displacement were published by the CMDPDH (2019). A total of 240 people from Michoacan were forced to migrate to other areas within the country. All three cases were caused by organized crime violence. According to the report, 40 families, 168 people, were forced to migrate from Paracuraro to Antunez due to the constant battles between OCGs in the community. In the second episode, Buenavista and Aguililla where the affected municipalities were 32 families, 82 people were forced to migrate to Tijuana, Baja California. Another 15 families, 62 people, also migrated to Tijuana later that year in a third episode of mass displacement (2019, 103). Once more in 2019, the CMDPDH published another report regarding cases of mass displacement across Mexico and Michoacan continues to encounter the same problem which is losing their residents due to violence. In 2019, 704 people were displaced in 3 episodes in which Paracuaro, Buenavista, and Aguililla were the municipalities affected by the forced migration. In the first episode of 2019, 100 families were forced to migrate,

> "the families were forced to move and abandon their homes and belongings in the face of constant confrontations between armed groups linked to drug trafficking (according to some sources, these were disputes between the New Generation Jalisco Cartel and *Los Caballeros Templarios*). It is estimated that 400 people were displaced from these communities, whose main activity is agriculture and where today we see houses and plots of land burned. Although all people Some displaced women had to flee involuntarily to safeguard their lives and integrity, some reporting that they had received a direct "invitation" from criminal groups to leave their homes in order not to be shot, while others reported that they were forcibly removed from their homes, which were subsequently burned. In Ordeñitas, 14 people were also reported missing" (CMDPDH 2020, 110-111).

They migrated to Paracuaro's municipal capital where they had no place to sleep until a local church decided to house them. In the second case of displacement, 50 families, 190 people were forced to migrate as a result of violent clashes between DTOs in La Ruana and Buenavista. These families left no trail and it is unknown where they migrated. In May 2019, another case of mass forced migration took place in Aguililla in which a total of 30 families, 114 people were displaced once more due to the uninhabitable situation created by OCG violence. It is also unknown where these families ended.

In addition to organized crime related violence, the state and their governing bodies at the state, municipal, and local level are also to blame for the insecurity levels, the soaring levels of violence across the entity, and the displacement of thousands of individuals. It is argued that in Michoacan there is collusion between authorities and criminal organizations. Cartels often bribe government officials to be able to operate their illicit business with impunity. Wolfesberger (2017) states that the municipal police in Michoacan has increasingly been involved in the activities of organized crime. Not only do they act on the behalf of many of these organizations, but also commit a series of human right abuses towards the citizenry,

> "members of the state institutions disposes rural civilians of their property…The federal police and soldiers enter homes without warrants and take everything they can

> carry…members of the armed forces or the police "produce" criminals, constructing accusations and documentation of illegal practices arbitrarily and manipulating police reports to justify arrests, house searches, and even extrajudicial killings" (Wolfesberger 2017, 96).

Querales-Mendoza (2019) tells the story of the Orozco-Medina family who were displaced after a series of attacks. In 2007, José Iván Orozco was arbitrarily arrested and in 2008 Leonel Orozco was also illegally apprehended without a warrant by so called authorities. The Orozco-Medina family were extorted in exchange for the life of Leonel, but even though they paid the extortion fee they were not able to get their loved one back to safety. Not only were the family members taken illegally, but the military continued to harass the Orozco-Medina family as they patrolled within close proximity of their residence. The mother/wife explains that in Michoacan it is almost impossible to tell the difference between police or criminals as the collusion and corruption is deeply rooted across the state. As a result 3 families, 20 people, left Nuevo Zirosto and headed for the United States.

Forced migration as a consequence of the generated violence by criminal groups in the state of Michoacan continues to be a concerning humanitarian problem. It has been reported that these families and individuals often lack a place where to stay as they have left all their belongings behind and tend to sleep in the streets, churches, and shelters. Since 2006, Mexico has experienced a continuous wave of violence which the government and their respective governing bodies have failed to control at the national, state, and municipal level. Style-like militias *Los Zetas*, *La Familia Michoacana*, *Los Caballeros Templario*s, *Los Viagras*, and *Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación* are responsible for the spiraling of violence and forced displacement in Michoacan. The violent methods cartels employ, inter-cartel wars, the war on drugs, and the corrupt government have caused many *michoacanos* to forcefully migrate from areas of conflict to other cities/towns within the state, nationally, and internationally. These people who are either

individuals or whole families often leave unnoticed or in massive groups abandoning their residences to never return.

The Case of Tamaulipas

Tamaulipas is located in the northeast part of Mexico. Being a border state, Tamaulipas geographical location is of major importance not only to the state itself, but to the rest of the nation. Its proximity to the United States has made of Tamaulipas a transit state for various commodities, migrants, firearms and drugs going from south to north and vice-versa:

> "the state of Tamaulipas—with its long border with the United States and its long coastline along the Gulf of Mexico—has a key strategic geographic location for drug and human trafficking going north towards the US and arms trafficking going south to Mexico and Central America. The state's main border cities (Nuevo Laredo, Miguel Alemán, Reynosa, Río Bravo, and Matamoros) are the closest points of entry for traffickers who operate in the ports of Quintana Roo, Yucatán, and the Gulf of Mexico, as well as the most important ports in the Pacific between Puerto Madero and San Blas. Tamaulipas, with 18 international bridges from Nuevo Laredo to Matamoros, has more border crossings to the US than any other Mexican state" (Correa-Cabrera 2014, 420).

Organized crime has been able to flourish in this location as it has access to the Gulf of Mexico and the United States making it an attractive state for the development of both legal and illegal businesses from agriculture, manufacturing, to drug trafficking. Tamaulipas has long been under the control of one of the most powerful cartels in Mexico, the Gulf Cartel or *Cartel de Golfo* whose humble beginnings date back to the 1930s taking part in the smuggling of illegal substances such as alcohol to the United States during the prohibition era (Correa-Cabrera 2014). However, in the 1970s the cartel became politically active and diversified their smuggling operations by trafficking new profitable substances such as cocaine, methamphetamines, marihuana, and heroin into the neighboring country. The state's geographical location, various ports of entry, and interactive border towns made it possible for the Gulf Cartel to traffic large amounts of drugs and become the middlemen between Colombian cocaine and the desired

destination. The partnership between Colombian cartels and the Gulf Cartel is to be held responsible for the explosion of the Gulf Cartel's power and wealth (Brophy 2008).

The Rise in Violence

The power and wealth amassed by the *Cartel del Golfo* opened the doors for major corruption of government officials at the local and state level helping secure drug trafficking routes (Brophy 2008, 253). This aided the creation of a complex network of corruption between the cartel and Tamaulipas authorities at all levels of government. The cartel not only bribed and corrupted official authorities, but also employed violent methods to secure territorial control. They used armed paramilitary organizations such as *Los Zetas* to "secure their domination of illegal activities in Tamaulipas through blood and fire" (Correa-Cabrera 2014). As discussed previously, *Los Zetas* were sophisticated killers with a military background that introduced gruesome acts of violence in order to intimidate and conquer territory. This organization introduced mass killings, beheadings, extortions, kidnappings, car bombs, grenade attacks among other atrocious crimes (Nava 2011). Nevertheless, the partnership between the Gulf Cartel and *Los Zetas* did not last as the latter decided to part ways circa 2007 and achieved complete emancipation in 2010, "the divorce between these organizations laid the groundwork for the development of different forms of organized crime in the state, and as a result, the levels of violence increased as these two criminal syndicates began to compete" (Correa-Cabrera 2014). To make matters worse, military forces were sent to Tamaulipas resulting in the escalation of unprecedented levels of violence.

Data collected from the SESNSP shows the organized crime related homicides, extortion, and kidnappings in Tamaulipas from 2006 to 2018. The data shows a slight, but constant increase in kidnappings and extortion during the period collected. This is a direct result

of the system of diversification of revenue that *Los Zetas* implemented and continue to practice. On the other hand, the rise in homicides between 2009 to 2012 are a direct result of the constant battles at the time of the split of the Gulf Cartel and *Los Zetas* in addition to the ongoing Mexican War on Drugs. During this period the number of reported homicides quintupled and although violence in terms of OCG related homicides deescalated by 2013, it doubled again between 2016 and 2018.



Figure 3: Organized Crime Related Violence in Tamaulipas

Source: SESNSP

Tamaulipas has become one of the bloodiest and most dangerous states of Mexico. It is the home of historically powerful cartels and has long been a state of major interest in the smuggling of illegal substances into the United States. The explosion of drug trafficking in Mexico, the rise of drug trade organizations, the subsequent declared war on drugs, and the constant warfare for territorial control have made Tamaulipas "no-man's land". Insecurity levels have increased and the open warfare between *El Cartel del Golfo* and *Los Zetas* has led to massive displacements of people (Cabrera-Correa 2014). Being a transit corridor for drugs, commodities, and migrants, forced migration in this state is an important topic of discussion. In order to understand why people are leaving we have to take into consideration the dynamics at

play. The following section discusses and questions forced migration during the Mexican War on Drugs in the state of Tamaulipas.

Uninhabited Houses and Forced Displacement in Tamaulipas

Severine Durin's methodology for the estimation of displacement figures in Mexico was once more used in order to investigate the case of Tamaulipas. Through data provided by INEGI on the number of households and their condition of inhabitation, it was possible to estimate displacement in Tamaulipas. Inhabitation in the state has become a concerning problem as statistics show a relative increment in the number of uninhabited households in the years 2005—2010—2015. According to the data collected, the rate of uninhabited dwellings at the state level constantly increased during the period of study, 16.2%—2005, 18.1% —2010, 21.2%—2010.

According to the data, it is estimated that between 2005 and 2010 approximately 91,623, 2.8% of the population reported in 2010 (3,268,554) have abandoned their homes. Out of the 43 municipalities that compose Tamaulipas, 22 report displacement (See Table 3). Some municipalities are affected more than others, for example, Reynosa, Matamoros, Tampico, and Rio Bravo, Nuevo Laredo among others have extensive numbers of forced migrants in comparison to the municipalities of Miguel Aleman, Valle Hermoso and Victoria who receive the displaced populations. An example of forced migration is the case of Ciudad Mier, in the municipality of Mier, whose inhabitants were threatened in 2010 by *Los Zetas* and were told to abandon their homes or face the consequences (La Jornada 2010). As a result, 200 families were displaced to Miguel Aleman. In the data, Mier appears as one of the top municipalities with an estimated displaced population of 385. Around the same time Camargo also experienced forced migration, "but not only people from Mier have left their homeland, also in Camargo there have

been reported cases of entire families who have decided to leave their community and go to Ciudad Alemán or have left Tamaulipas altogether" (La Jornada 2010). Carmargo is the 7th municipality with the highest numbers of forced migrants (See Table 3).

From 2010 to 2015, the estimated displaced population increased from 91,623 to 106,954. With a population of 3,453,525, 3.1% of Tamaulipas inhabitants have left their homes due to security concerns. Residents in the municipalities of Reynosa, Matamoros, Tampico, Nuevo Laredo, Rio Bravo continue to leave their homes (See Appendix D, *Table 4*). These municipalities have high rates of crime and insecurity. According to intentional homicide data by INEGI (See Figure 4), Nuevo Laredo, Victoria, Matamoros, San Fernando, Reynosa, Tampico, Altamira are the municipalities with the highest numbers of reported homicides between 2010—2015.



Figure 4: Intentional Homicides per Municipality in Tamaulipas (2006—2015).

Source: INEGI

In 2011, in San Fernando, 72 migrants were executed by *Los Zetas* making it one of the worst massacres in modern day history. These terror driven actions increase the insecurity levels within a given territory inflicting fear upon people who opt to leave their hometowns rather than wait to become the next victims. Thus, forced migration numbers tend to be higher in municipalities

with higher rates of violence and where atrocious acts often drive not only individuals, but mass out-migration of entire families. The cases of mass displacement in Mier and Camargo, and the massacre occurring in San Fernando, Tamaulipas are only two examples of how violence has generated forced migration.

Tamaulipas being a transit state, has experienced high numbers of displacement. Municipalities such as Reynosa, Altamira, Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo, Rio Bravo and Mier, all located in northern Tamaulipas, have high rates of uninhabited dwellings (See Appendix C and D). Correa-Cabrera (2014) attributes the high labels of violence in these municipalities to their geographical importance in the drug trafficking business,"the territorial control of Tamaulipas by the Zetas and the Gulf Cartel is in a constant state of flux. The war for strategic plazas such as Matamoros, Reynosa, Nuevo Laredo, Tampico, and Ciudad Victoria is particularly violent and clashes among the criminal organizations and between these and the Mexican army and navy are frequent" (Correa-Cabrera 2014, 428). Since all these municipalities border Texas, they are of vital importance for criminal organizations who traffic into the United States, the biggest consumer of illicit narcotics.

Forced Migration in Tamaulipas

Violence in Tamaulipas has reconfigured the way of life of many residents. As the cartels battle for territorial control the citizens suffer the consequences of their actions. Today, Tamaulipas is known to be one of the most violent states of Mexico with "high levels of homicide, robbery, extortion, kidnapping, missing persons, and internal migration due to insecurity" (Almanza-Avedaño et al. 2018). In addition, the corruption of government officials with the Cartel del Golfo and *Los Zetas* make it almost impossible for the residents to seek justice, "in these conditions of generalized violence, fleeing was many people's response to being

victimized, for fear of being the next victim, or as a form of resistance to the prevailing militarized order and general violence" (Durin 2019, 183). Thus, residents in areas of conflict are forced to migrate in order to save their lives and the lives of their loved ones recurring to migration as the only viable option for survival.

Severine Durin (2019), in her recently published book "Salvese quien pueda" shines light on many stories of displacement that became invisible. Durin (2019) states that the post-victimization trauma, the fear of becoming a victim in a public space, the fear of being the next target of kidnapping and extortion by the perpetrators, and economic devastation all lead to forced migration. She recalls that at the beginning of the war on drugs and as a consequence of the violent cartels and the kidnappings of businessmen, many businesses in Tamaulipas relocated to the other side of the border, in Texas.However, she highlights that only those who had the financial resources were able to escape the violence while the rest were doomed in Tamaulipas.

Tamaulipas has suffered the loss of thousands of inhabitants who have been forcefully displaced and have had to migrate to other areas of the country or into the United States. Although the data only illustrates displacement figures between 2005 and 2015, forced migration in these states continues to occur. According to the CMDPDH (2019), a recent case of mass displacement occurred in Reynosa Tamaulipas where 140 people were forced to migrate due to drug related violence,

> "the last case is in Congregación Garza, in Reynosa, Tamaulipas, where last Sunday, an armed group attacked a family, resulting in the death of three people, including a minor. In the attack, three minors and an older adult were also reported injured. Concern about the situation of violence forced at least 40 families to leave their homes because they felt unprotected by the authorities" (Infoabe 2019).

The inability of the state of Tamaulipas to grant security to their residents is largely due to the inability to control cartels. Furthermore, state authorities at different levels protect cartels more

than their own citizens as many are bribed by DTOs in a effort to operate freely without being prosecuted, "corruption facilitates the operation of Mexico's vast and powerful criminal-business enterprises while simultaneously debilitating the state's efforts to confront them" (Morris 2012, 29). This has resulted in unprecedented levels of violence and crimes that are ignored by the state. Such actions have led researchers to consider Tamaulipas a failed state that fails to protect the rights and lives of their constituents,

> "the extremely high levels of violence and inability of the government to effectively combat drug trafficking and organized crime in Tamaulipas has raised serious—and quite legitimate-concerns. The cartels have become so powerful and the forces of the black market for drugs and other illicit goods so overwhelmingly that the state became extremely violent as the Mexican government continues to lose the battle against the drug cartels. Such high levels of insecurity and the inability of the state enable one to argue that Tamaulipas fits into the failed state—or at least failed zones within the state—category as the government has not been able to ensure citizen security and implement the rule of law" (Rosen & Zepeda 2016, 91).

Under the circumstances, Tamaulipas' residents find themselves unable to secure safety within their areas of residence as they know that organized crime groups are immune to the rule of law and the state will fail to provide justice and security. In such a way, OCG related violence and weak rule of law propels out-migration leading to the displacement of thousands of individuals who fear for their lives.

Humanitarian Consequences of Forced Migration

In the previous sections, we have touched upon the statistics of displacement and reasons behind forced migration. However, the literature fails to provide an adequate explanation of the humanitarian consequences caused by forced displacement. What happens to those who are forced to migrate? Unfortunately, forced migrants face a lot of obstacles once displaced. Many abandon their houses and livelihood immediately after experiencing events involving traumatic

violence. They take with themselves as much as their hands can hold. Others take nothing and never look back. In that event, forced migrants often lack identification documents, financial resources, a place to shelter, and support from state institutions, "in Mexico, in addition to being in conditions of extreme vulnerability due to the loss of physical protection, of their livelihoods, in the search for a safer place they are exposed to new risks and lack access to public services, housing, employment and education" (Infoabe 2019). The displaced populations often rely on their own resources and networks for the movement across towns, cities, states, and borders. According to the International Displacement Monitoring Center forced migrants "found housing by going to live with close relatives, a further example of the family network providing support" (IDMC 2012, 20). However, not everyone has the same resources or networks and many find themselves in vulnerable positions with no housing, financial resources, or family to resort to.

Those who have been able to migrate to the United States without having to cross the border undcomuneted or through the arduous process of asylum are more than privileged. Durin (2019) states that those who have been forcefully displaced and have found refugee in the United States through visas, citizenship, and cross-border permits are at an advantage as those are critical resources in the process of relocation. Yet the majority face another reality. In recent mass displacements, forced migrants who have migrated to Tijuana in hopes of relocating to the United States continue to lack security, housing, employment, and healthcare (CMDPDH 2017, 2018, 2019). The local governments have not taken any action regarding this devastating problem; it is non-profit and religious organizations who receive the forced migrants, individually or en masse, because the pertinent authorities do not recognize it as a problem.

The gruesome fact that Mexico as a nation does not recognize forced displacement has left forced migrants in the shadows fighting for their survival. This has serious consequences as

the state fails to provide adequate resources for these victims, “in the absence of a public policy for the care of this type of victim, a structural fence has been created that significantly reduces the possibilities for people to name the experience they are going through; to denounce the perpetrators or to become politicized” (Querales-Mendoza 2020, 125). As a result, forced migrants are left on their own with no protection, security, or resources to ease the transition into their new lives. When displacement occurs, forced migrants have to use their own resources to figure out what their next step is as there is no official support from any governmental institution. Those who seek refuge in international borders also lack recognition from international governments. According to Durin (2012), between 2006 and 2010 40,000 Mexican citizens applied for political asylum in the United States and Canada. However only a small percentage has been granted political asylum. In 2013, Mexico was the second highest alyssum seeker producing country, however the grant rate for Mexican asylum cases plummeted from 23 percent to nine percent between 2008 and 2013 under the Obama administration (Cabot 2014, 364). Christopher White (2012) states that in 2011 out of 6,011 applications by Mexican nationals only 104 were granted resulting in a success of 1.7 percent rate. Leticia Calderón Chelius (2014) states that in “2009, there were 254 Mexican asylum seekers in the US. In 2010 there were 2,973, and in 2011 6,133 of whom only 104—2% of those requesting it—were granted asylum” (31). Between 2006 and 2017, approximately 79,716 Mexicans applied for asylum (U.S. Department of Justice: FY 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009—2013, 2012—2016). The reason for such a low rate of asylum approval is due to the outdated requirements for asylum under the Refugee Act of 1980. Under this act, forced migration as a consequence of drug related violence is not considered an eminent threat unless the migrant(s) can “demonstrate a fear of persecution on account of one of five grounds: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or

membership in a particular group" (Cabot 2014, 367). The majority of forced migrants fail to fulfill this last clause as many do not have proof of being persecuted as they often leave without notice, do not report to the authorities if they experienced violence, and/or are not part of any protected social, religious, or ethnic group. This further invisibilizes and undermines the severity of a problem that has impacted the lives of many Mexican citizens not only in Michoacan and Tamaulipas, but at the national and international level.

Forced migrants who migrate to the United States without applying for asylum or without any documentation also live in precarity. Just like forced migrants within the Mexican national borders, undocumented forced migrants in the United states, because of their unauthorize status, run the same risks as those in Mexico. They lack access to healthcare, employment, housing, education, and many public services. They live in the shadows in a country that is not home far away from their homeland, where another language is spoken. Relying on social and family networks, forced migrants are able to relocate internationally. However, because of the historical migration of Mexicans to the United States for economic and labor reasons, the migratory journeys of forced migrants are mislabelled by the Mexican government,

> "one of the situations that has reduced the visibility of forced displacement in the context of the drug war is that people with previous experiences of economic migration to the United States rely on that knowledge to leave their homes after being threatened. This choice reduces the visibility of forced displacement and mobility is recorded under economic migration figures. The superimposition of the economic migration narrative on the denunciation of forced displacement is favored by local governments and the federal government to, on the one hand, keep the flow of remittances from the United States to our country constant and, on the other hand, to deny the discourse of the victims by saying that people are not fleeing because of violence but are leaving Mexico to work in the neighboring country" (Querales-Mendoza 2020, 115).

The continuous efforts to invisibilize forced migration as a consequence of drug-related violence keeps these populations, who have experienced violence first-hand or collaterally, abandon the

place they call home, leave their families behind, and migrate to foreignt countries to live in the shadows, vulnerable. For these reasons, researchers who study forced displacement argue that recognizing the existence of forced displacement and stigmatizing their magnitude is crucial to advancing the humanitarian resolution of the problem (Durin 2013, Querales-Mendoza 2020). The humanitarian impact of forced migration should be further studied, analyzed, and discussed to highlight the consequences of displacement and encourage governments at the local, state, national and international level to develop policies and create institutions for the assistance of displaced populations.

Michoacan vs Tamaulipas

Michoacan and Tamaulipas are two states that have suffered from forced displacement as a consequence of the swelling levels of violence. These entities are home to major criminal enterprises such as *Los Zetas, La Familia Michoacana, Los Caballeros Templarios, Cártel del Golfo*. Such organizations have inflicted fear in the population, rival organizations, and the government through gruesome acts of violence which have exacerbated the levels of violence in both states. The reconfiguration of the geographical spaces through violence has caused violent territories to become uninhabitable for its residents, as a result people find themselves in the need to migrate to safer territories.

Both states have high numbers of forced displacement. The data shows that between 2005—2010 1.1% of the population in Michoacan was displaced while Tamaulipas shows a displacement margin of 2.8% within the same period. In 2010—2015, displacement in Michoacan doubled to 2.2% while Tamaulipas increased to 3.1%. Geographically Tamaulipas is a much smaller state with only 43 municipalities and a smaller population than Michoacan, who

has a total of 113 municipalities. This means that forced displacement is greater in Tamaulipas than Michoacan.

When displaced, forced migrants from Tamaulipas and Michoacan have different advantages. *Michoacanos,* due to the geographical location of the state (South West) are more than likely going to relocate within the national borders because international relocation requires time, financial resources, and social and family networks for the movement across borders. On the other hand, forced migrants from Tamaulipas often relocate in the United States because of the geographical proximity . *Tamaulipenses* also have another advantage which is the access to tourist visas, temporary border passes, US citizenship and established networks on both sides of the borders through family or acquaintances which ease access into the US. Although *michoacanos* are not close to an international border, they have started to migrate to border cities such as Tijuana in hopes of applying for asylum or as a temporary destination before migrating to the United States. Forced migration is not limited to national borders, research has shown that these migrants also relocate internationally further highlighting the extent of the problem in which michoacanos and tamaulipenses are not only abandoning their homes, but also their country.

Conclusion

Michoacan and Tamaulipas are states of crucial geographical importance in the production and trafficking of drugs. The geography, rich land, proximity to international borders, lack of governance makes these two territories perfect for the development of illicit businesses. Those who control these geographical spaces control a big portion of the drug business, thus why drug cartels constantly fight against rival groups for territorial control, bribe and work in conjunction with state authorities and use violent methods of intimidation. Such actions have led

to the forced displacement of those who experience violence firsthand or who constantly live in fear of becoming the next target. It is evident that the number of forced migrants who have left their houses uninhabited as a consequence of the violence has increased in the last decade and a half.

Insecurity levels, organized crime violence, and state violence and impunity become drivers of forced migration. Residents are more likely to be displaced from an area of conflict or after having experienced an act of violence that threatens their lives. Hence some municipalities are more affected than others because of the different levels of violence experienced by the citizens within those geographical spaces. Municipalities with high numbers of uninhabited dwellings and displaced populations also face high levels of violence. Thus, these localities become uninhabitable for the residents who constantly experience violence directly or collaterally. As a result, they resort to migration as the only option for survival in hopes to relocate to safer areas within the country and internationally. More forced migrants are migrating to border cities in hopes to apply and receive political asylum from the United States reveals that not only do they not feel safe in their communities, but find the rest of the country, who ignores their cry for help and security, uninhabitable.

To conclude, the inability of the state and its governing bodies to control criminal organizations, implement the rule of law, and protect their citizens have led authors to consider both Michoacan and Tamaulipas failed states. When the government fails to recognize the forced displacement of their citizens internally and internationally due to the quelling violence generated by drug cartels and the failed war on drugs, it creates a humanitarian crisis. The lack of institutions, resources, and basic human necessities such as shelter, food, healthcare, employment, and education greatly affects the post-displacement journeys of forced migrants.

This has serious humanitarian consequences as those who are forced out of their areas of residence have to start from zero, rely on their own resources, live in the shadows, experience post-traumatic stress disorder, and are unable to go back to the place they once called home. Local, state, national, and international governments need to recognize and treat the problem that is not only affecting Michoacan and Tamaulipas but the whole country, where forced displacement numbers have been in the rise for the last 14 years.

Appendix A

Table 1: Estimated Displaced Populations per Municipality in Michoacan (2005—2010)
Source: INEGI

Municipality	Total # of Dwellings	# of uninhabited dwellings	% of Uninhabited Dwellings 2005	Total # of Dwellings 2010	# of uninhabited Dwellings 2010	Average # of Occupants per Household 2010	Estimated Displaced Population
Morelia	207,541	33,046	15.9%	256,642	49,314	3.84	32447
Zamora	51,993	8,479	16.3%	62,223	10,969	3.89	3196
Cherán	4,585	718	15.7%	6,006	1,630	4.41	3041
Penjamillo	6,415	820	12.8%	7,359	1,755	3.7	3013
Churintzio	3,264	406	12.4%	3,460	931	3.32	1662
La Piedad	27,873	4,860	17.4%	34,069	6,360	3.94	1653
Tlazazalca	4,341	794	18.3%	4,375	1,123	3.36	1085
Epitacio Huerta	4,461	511	11.5%	5,175	718	4.06	508
xtlán	5,056	893	17.7%	4,901	996	3.78	493
Ocampo	4,754	436	9.2%	5,809	588	4.7	260
Senguio	4,241	553	13.0%	5,266	743	4.4	248
Purépero	5,531	1,004	18.2%	6,056	1,134	3.74	130
Susupuato	2,163	432	20.0%	2,601	548	4.35	124
Santa Ana Maya	4,551	1,486	32.7%	5,024	1,670	4.03	119
Nocupétaro	2,203	398	18.1%	2,427	465	4.19	111
Coeneo	9,145	2,470	27.0%	9,220	2,519	3.74	107
Nuevo Urecho	2,160	289	13.4%	2,546	362	3.89	83
Tangamandapio	6,648	1,012	15.2%	7,767	1,199	4.58	76
Taretan	3,434	402	11.7%	4,156	495	3.87	33
Huaniqueo	3,987	1,305	32.7%	4,239	1,393	3.36	19

Appendix B

Table 2: Estimated Displaced Populations per Municipality in Michoacán (2010—2015). Source: INEGI

Municipality	Total # of Dwellings 2010	# of uninhabited Dwellings 2010	% of Uninhabited Dwellings 2010	Total # of Dwellings 2015	# of uninhabited Dwellings 2015	Average # of Occupants per Household 2015	Estimated Displaced Population
Morelia	256,642	49,314	19.2%	234590	53083	3.6	28823
Chilchota	10,380	1,277	12.3%	6904	2314	4.3	6298
Acuitzio	3,593	427	11.9%	2286	1550	4	5113
Zamora	62,223	10,969	17.6%	55583	11133	3.7	4938
Zitácuaro	44,142	5,674	12.9%	27542	4449	4	3635
Cotija	7,869	1,307	16.6%	5572	1856	3.6	3350
Los Reyes	19,341	2,308	11.9%	13903	2413	3.9	2940
Jiquilpan	13,709	2,834	20.7%	9440	2721	3.6	2770
Purépero	6,056	1,134	18.7%	5440	1739	3.7	2665
Sahuayo	22,373	2,756	12.3%	19748	3044	3.9	2384
Uruapan	93,373	11,919	12.8%	88880	11950	3.9	2358
Ecuandureo	5,784	1,412	24.4%	1967	1111	3.4	2145
Yurécuaro	8,826	1,176	13.3%	6985	1435	4.2	2118
Tarímbaro	34,921	11,556	33.1%	18835	6820	3.6	2114
Tangancícuaro	12,818	1,756	13.7%	6659	1441	3.6	1904
Pátzcuaro	25,256	3,538	14.0%	19503	3195	4.1	1898
Zacapu	23,626	3,536	15.0%	18899	3327	3.8	1894
La Piedad	34,069	6,360	18.7%	27214	5574	3.8	1876
Marcos Castellanos	4,585	745	16.2%	11095	2258	4.1	1866
Venustiano Carranza	7,995	1,102	13.8%	6491	1394	3.6	1798
Churintzio	3,460	931	26.9%	1980	1034	3.2	1604
Chavinda	4,403	951	21.6%	2821	1039	3.5	1504
Arteaga	6,461	718	11.1%	3623	751	3.8	1324

Ario	10,426	1,254	12.0%	5205	949	3.9	1260
Zináparo	1,924	572	29.7%	1795	865	3.3	1093
Angangueo	2,918	234	8.0%	1340	360	4.3	1086
Contepec	9,947	1,065	10.7%	1445	422	4	1069
Tlalpujahua	8,919	837	9.4%	1239	369	4.2	1061
Morelos	3,591	1,184	33.0%	1879	895	3.7	1019
Puruándiro	23,517	4,262	18.1%	11752	2368	3.9	929
Tanhuato	5,059	957	18.9%	2944	787	3.9	897
Pajacuarán	7,090	1,764	24.9%	4850	1413	3.9	805
Tuxpan	7,836	1,027	13.1%	3004	600	3.9	805
Tlazazalca	4,375	1,123	25.7%	1635	661	3.3	796
Jiménez	6,369	1,749	27.5%	2075	803	3.4	793
Huandacareo	4,711	1,090	23.1%	2880	888	3.5	776
Quiroga	8,473	1,543	18.2%	6183	1312	4.1	763
Marcos Castellanos	24,435	3,892	15.9%	3520	773	3.5	743
Tzintzuntzan	4,968	1,142	23.0%	2534	759	4.1	724
Aporo	973	102	10.5%	768	257	4.1	724
Cuitzeo	8,911	1,332	14.9%	5027	917	4.2	695
Jacona	19,132	2,815	14.7%	17873	2792	3.9	633
Erongarícuaro	4,408	552	12.5%	965	272	4	605
Paracho	10,618	1,698	16.0%	7724	1372	4.2	575
Jungapeo	5,676	709	12.5%	1611	340	4.1	569
Indaparapeo	4,777	664	13.9%	2984	549	4.2	564
Villamar	7,772	1,616	20.8%	3259	822	3.7	534
Tangamandapio	7,767	1,199	15.4%	6421	1113	4.3	524
Aguililla	5,761	1,158	20.1%	3143	767	3.8	514
Tingüindín	4,824	795	16.5%	2478	541	3.7	491
Charapan	3,685	716	19.4%	3300	759	4.1	483
Chucándiro	2,431	712	29.3%	1352	542	3.3	482

Cherán	6,006	1,630	27.1%	5686	1650	4.5	481
Zinapécuaro	17,448	3,817	21.9%	6214	1481	3.9	474
Nuevo Parangaricutiro	4,999	409	8.2%	4133	449	4.2	466
Irimbo	4,682	957	20.4%	2862	687	4.1	418
Aquila	6,079	568	9.3%	624	154	4.3	411
Briseñas	3,424	532	15.5%	2398	478	3.9	411
Penjamillo	7,359	1,755	23.8%	1417	451	3.6	407
Charo	5,948	644	10.8%	1571	261	4.2	382
Turicato	9,312	1,310	14.1%	3392	572	3.8	360
Lagunillas	1,861	376	20.2%	998	291	3.9	349
Copándaro	3,014	676	22.4%	1140	343	3.9	341
Tacámbaro	19,904	2,388	12.0%	9420	1215	4	339
Cojumatlán de Régules	3,750	780	20.8%	2469	594	3.8	306
Senguio	5,266	743	14.1%	808	185	4.3	305
Susupuato	2,601	548	21.1%	1124	311	4.1	304
Vista Hermosa	6,379	890	14.0%	3320	538	4	299
Ixtlán	4,901	996	20.3%	1649	414	3.7	292
Tancítaro	8,159	951	11.7%	1873	282	4.1	261
Angamacutiro	5,230	1,198	22.9%	1830	483	3.7	236
Ocampo	5,809	588	10.1%	1718	224	4.4	220
Nocupétaro	2,427	465	19.2%	1299	302	4	212
Epitacio Huerta	5,175	718	13.9%	653	146	3.8	211
Juárez	3,991	521	13.1%	1220	209	3.9	194
Salvador Escalante	11,976	1,190	9.9%	6396	677	4.2	174
Coeneo	9,220	2,519	27.3%	1575	476	3.6	164
Peribán	6,750	527	7.8%	4217	370	4	163
Tingambato	3,943	551	14.0%	3865	578	4.2	159
Coalcomán de Vázquez Pallares	6,132	1,281	20.9%	3923	858	3.8	146
Nahuatzen	7,645	1,126	14.7%	6573	992	4.6	110

Tumbiscatío	2,287	352	15.4%	851	153	4	88
Nuevo Urecho	2,546	362	14.2%	617	104	3.7	60
Huaniqueo	4,239	1,393	32.9%	1155	396	3.2	53
Álvaro Obregón	6,492	1,106	17.0%	2721	476	4	50
Tepalcatepec	8,212	1,560	19.0%	5346	1026	3.5	37
Tuzantla	4,986	883	17.7%	934	174	3.9	34
Tzitzio	2,673	434	16.2%	446	76	4.3	15

Appendix C

Table 3: Estimated Displaced Population per Municipality in Tamaulipas (2005—2010)
Source: INEGI

Municipality	Total # of Dwellings 2005	Uninhabited Dwellings 2005	% of Uninhabited 2005	Total # of Dwellings 2010	Uninhabited Dwellings 2010	Average # of Occupants per Household	Estimated Displaced Population
Reynosa	170,695	31,075	18.2%	229,771	51,895	3.6	36235
Matamoros	151,961	27,087	17.8%	175,211	35,415	3.7	15480
Tampico	95,486	9,333	9.8%	102,643	12,987	3.5	10341
Río Bravo	35,949	6,560	18.2%	44,440	10,260	3.8	8172
Altamira	57,596	13,702	23.8%	83,047	21,642	3.7	6975
Nuevo Laredo	113,709	21,671	19.1%	132,555	26,531	3.8	4819
Camargo	7,779	1,810	23.3%	7,693	2,868	3.4	3665
Ciudad Madero	63,219	7,536	11.9%	69,316	9,014	3.4	2554
Gómez Farías	37,512	4,601	12.3%	40,307	5,231	3.6	1034
Mier	3,039	691	22.7%	2,825	759	3.3	385
Méndez	1,892	226	11.9%	1,840	312	3.5	323
Mainero	6,091	734	12.1%	6,577	869	3.3	252
San Fernando	20,195	3,713	18.4%	21,016	3,930	3.7	244
Villagrán	2,303	205	8.9%	2,296	272	3.5	237
González	2,629	221	8.4%	2,928	308	3.8	235
Bustamante	1,840	154	8.4%	2,071	209	4.4	157
AntiguoMorelos	2,719	243	8.9%	2,976	309	3.6	155
Güémez	13,019	1,844	14.2%	14,350	2,071	3.7	142
Burgos	2,038	286	14.0%	2,025	325	3.4	139
Miquihuana	1,124	146	13.0%	1,253	170	3.9	28
Cruillas	989	250	25.3%	866	227	3.3	27
Palmillas	659	74	11.2%	724	88	3.5	23

Appendix D

Table 4: Estimated Displaced Population per Municipality in Tamaulipas (2010—2015)
Source: INEGI

Municipality	Total # of Dwellings 2010	Uninhabited Dwellings 2010	% of Uninhabited Dwellings 2010	Total # of Dwellings 2015	Uninhabited Dwellings 2015	Average # of Occupants per Household	Estimated Displaced Population
Reynosa	229,771	51,895	22.6%	236261	58743	3.5	18838
Altamira	83,047	21,642	26.1%	81743	25340	3.5	14132
Matamoros	175,211	35,415	20.2%	167189	37600	3.6	13703
Victoria	102,306	10,923	10.7%	99213	14079	3.6	12550
Nuevo Laredo	132,555	26,531	20.0%	134459	28786	3.7	6933
El Mante	1,073	94	8.8%	31099	4783	3.3	6793
Río Bravo	44,440	10,260	23.1%	41272	11097	3.5	5489
Tampico	102,643	12,987	12.7%	102652	14604	3.3	5332
Ciudad Madero	69,316	9,014	13.0%	69524	10553	3.3	4989
Gustavo Díaz Ordaz	1,516	37	2.4%	4449	1250	3.1	3538
Miguel Alemán	9,891	1,499	15.2%	8772	1933	3.2	1931
Mier	2,825	759	26.9%	2807	1345	2.9	1713
San Fernando	21,016	3,930	18.7%	13018	2769	3.4	1138
Xicoténcatl	8,415	1,230	14.6%	3931	899	3.3	1071
González	2,928	308	10.5%	9139	1257	3.6	1064
Jaumave	8,637	831	9.6%	1959	472	3.7	1049
Soto la Marina	9,164	899	9.8%	3728	667	3.2	964
Padilla	4,792	514	10.7%	3055	580	3.4	858
Jiménez	4,775	322	6.7%	1879	380	3.3	836
Aldama	10,510	1,247	11.9%	4770	815	3.2	797

Tula	8,183	954	11.7%	3266	567	3.9	726
Guerrero	5,175	420	8.1%	1759	313	2.6	433
Mainero	6,577	869	13.2%	662	203	3.1	358
Palmillas	724	88	12.2%	579	166	3.4	325
Burgos	2,025	325	16.0%	751	195	3.1	231
Abasolo	4,245	694	16.3%	2062	405	3.4	231
San Carlos	3,302	291	8.8%	549	117	3.3	226
Antiguo Morelos	2,976	309	10.4%	1174	181	3.4	201
Llera	3,127	539	17.2%	1530	311	3	142
Casas	1,477	102	6.9%	704	85	3.6	131
Méndez	1,840	312	17.0%	608	133	3.1	93
Cruillas	866	227	26.2%	401	132	3.2	86
Villagrán	2,296	272	11.8%	664	88	3.2	30
Miquihuana	1,253	170	13.6%	760	108	3.9	19

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