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Author

Hernandez Sanchez, Yajaira

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Plant a SEED: The Effects of Entrepreneurship Programs on Immigrants

Yajaira Hernandez Sanchez

UC Center Sacramento

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Introduction

The Bracero¹ Program was an executive order created in 1942 with the intent of allowing Mexican men to legally be able to work in the United States (U.S.) through short contracts. Men approved into the Bracero Program were promised wages comparable to those of their native counterparts, free housing, work for at least $\frac{3}{4}$ of the time they were there, and decent meals, however, many contractors disregarded these promises (Pinzon, 2024). Workers were kept under horrible conditions; often going months without employment, paying rent for lodging, receiving extremely low wages, and being exposed to dangerous chemicals while working. There are multiple layers to the Bracero Program, and, while it did not meet expectations, it was the first to open up employment opportunities for immigrants in the United States.

Folks today see the value of immigrants and advocate for them, whether that be through protests demanding their rights, or bipartisan legislation opting for work visas. In recognizing that immigrants have an “affinity” for hard labor, and are one of the biggest contributors to the economy, people seem to forget that they too can be innovators.

There have been various programs and agencies created to aid entrepreneurs, for example, the Small Business Administration (SBA). The SBA was created in 1953 and today works in response to the need for a place to provide assistance to small business owners and protect their interests (Small Business Administration). The SBA has been successful thus far, creating various programs outside of itself. One of its greatest accomplishments has been the creation of Small Business Development Centers (SBDCs), which serve the broad population of small businesses and are found nationwide.

In 2020, the California Legislature approved the first small business development program whose target population was immigrants and people with limited English proficiency.

¹ Spanish word for a “laborer who works with his arms.” (Kratz, 2024).

The Social Entrepreneurs for Economic Development (SEED) Initiative is a state-level program that provides recipients with resources, such as microgrants and training, to become entrepreneurs. Its purpose is to challenge the narrative that immigrants exceed only in manual jobs. This initiative was formed when there was a need identified for a program that catered to these communities within California.

SEED is a relatively new program, while SBDCs have been around for a while. This could explain the reason as to why there hasn't been much research conducted on SEED. This prompts the question; does the implementation of programs like the Social Entrepreneurs for Economic Development (SEED) Initiative affect the success of immigrant-owned businesses? It is possible that people have felt that the impact made by this initiative isn't large enough.

This paper seeks to answer the question; do immigrant-owned businesses that participated in the SEED initiative have higher success rates than those that didn't? To answer this question, this study compared the success scores of IOBs across California from 2020 to 2024 that participated in the SEED initiative to IOBs that didn't, and then compared them to IOBs that received services from a SBDC. This study had two main results. The first being that non-SEED recipient IOBs tended to have higher success scores than IOBs that were SEED recipients. The second being that SEED recipient IOBs and SBDC client IOBs had similar success scores with SEED's IOB's scores having a higher median score. This paper concludes with a discussion of what these results imply in regards to the SEED Initiative, as well as small business entrepreneurship as a whole, and limitations to the study. It also discusses potential next steps.

Context & Significance

As we know, entrepreneurship, and specifically small business entrepreneurship, is a very important component of the U.S. economy (Dunne et al., 2021). Entrepreneurship researchers typically focus on two types of entrepreneurs: opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs, the latter commonly being viewed as inferior (Hill, 2024). Necessity entrepreneurs tend to be minorities who become self-employed due to the low number of available jobs for them. They start businesses not exactly because they see an opportunity with lots of potential, but rather because they need to provide for their families. It could be argued that this is why Hill (2024) mentions that folks often believe necessity entrepreneurs bring in less revenue, and have less growth potential (Dencker et al., 2009; Maas & Herrington, 2007).

This negative connotation causes policy makers to focus on encouraging and supporting opportunity entrepreneurs rather than necessity entrepreneurs, who make positive economic contributions despite being overlooked (Hill, 2024). This ignorance is also the root cause as to why they often face many barriers in trying to make their businesses succeed. Some of these include, but are not limited to, unequal access to financial capital, unequal access to resources, and discrimination.

Due to these issues, the U.S. created the Small Business Administration, hoping to connect entrepreneurs with local business services and resources. (Wiggins et al., 2021). Over time, the SBA began tailoring their services to be more accessible and created various programs outside of itself, one of the largest being the Small Business Development Centers found across the country. SBDCs are hosted by academic institutions, and funded partially by the U.S. Congress, their main goal being to offer zero-cost services in business consultation (Dunne et al., 2021). Aside from the SBA, the United States Chamber of Commerce (USCC) crafted programs

for minorities, such as the Hiring Our Heroes program, the Native American Enterprise Initiative, the Women Taking the Lead program, and the Next-Gen Business Partnership.

While immigrants might be able to fit into a few of the above aspects, there isn't one program that would be able to cater to them all. The SBDCs seem like they would be able to serve the broad immigrant population, but unfortunately they fall short of their needs for two main reasons. The SBA, which funds SBDCs, defines a small business as a firm making anything less than \$2.5 million dollars, and employing less than 100 employees; these numbers change depending on the type of business (U.S. Small Business Administration, 2022). SBDCs also don't have the same effect on rural areas that they do in urban ones (Dunne et al., 2021). The rural areas are typically where most necessity entrepreneurs are located, but SBDCs have a hard time understanding the needs of these communities in order to provide them the right assistance.

Given that the set of requirements to receive assistance through a SBDC are broad, we can't be sure that IOBs that become SBDC Clients aren't barely meeting the requirements. These business owners could have already had money saved up, or previous higher education, and success from their business might wrongly be attributed to the services of a SBDC. We also can't be sure that these businesses are representative of the immigrant community as a whole, given that SBDCs are more present in urban areas, IOBs that are also SBDC Clients could have an easier time accessing other resources as well. Due to the reasons stated above, this paper sees SEED as a better fit in assisting immigrant entrepreneurs.

The SEED Initiative accounts for some of the problems IOBs would face as SBDC clients, as outlined above. For example, most SEED recipients are found in underserved areas

such as the Central Valley, as seen through Figure 1, in comparison to the majority of SBDCs immigrant success stories being from Los Angeles or the Bay Area.




Figure 1: SEED Recipients per Assembly District. Source: California Immigrant Policy Center and ICON CDC.

This initiative currently operates solely within California, which is the leading state in progressive policy, often setting the example for the rest of the states. It is also worth mentioning that California is the 4th largest economy in the world. This is primarily due to immigrants, as Governor Newsom has repeatedly said, who in 2023 made up 27% of California's population, which is almost double what it is in other states (Cuellar Mejia et al., 2025). SEED was created to address the difficulty of gaining access to capital and business coaching for immigrants. It has already helped over 100 immigrant-owned businesses during the time it has been operating (almost five years). In comparison to SBDCs, SEED isn't inclined to serve primarily folks in urban areas.

This paper highlights the importance of extending, or recreating, this program in other states. By bringing more awareness to this initiative there is hope that additional folks will be able to take advantage of this opportunity.

Literature Review

SEED has only been operating since 2020 and not much, if any, research has been done on it. However, there is literature surrounding the need for programs such as this one and the effects of other small business development programs.

The literature proves that the need for small business development programs has always been present, especially for necessity entrepreneurs. It's a fair point to wonder why people seek to become self-employed instead of looking for wage-employment when it is extremely difficult to become entrepreneurs, but the reason as to why people still do it is because the benefits far outweigh the costs. Wadhwa (2009) highlights this; showing that between the years of 1995 to 2005, immigrants in the U.S. generated \$52 billion in revenue and created 450,000 jobs. They are willing to go through the struggles because becoming self-employed means they can successfully create income for themselves and their family, avoid unemployment, and increase their social participation (Vandor & Franke, 2018).

Shortly after the founding of the SBA, President Nixon created the Minority Business Development Agency in response to the commitment of the federal government to grow America's minority businesses (Minority Business Development Agency). This, as well as the various other small business development programs mentioned previously, were meant to provide folks with money, make sure loans were safe, give advice, help owners become better in their jobs, and give them opportunities to meet other people such as themselves (Kumar & Singh, 2024).

These programs can then be evaluated to see if they did what they intended to. For example, Lyons and Zhang (2017) studied the effects of Next 36, an entrepreneurship training and incubation program for undergraduate students in North America. They wanted to investigate if certain minority groups, specifically women of color, might be differentially affected by the program. This was studied through comparison of entrepreneurial activity between people who applied to the program, and were accepted, to those that applied, were finalists, but weren't selected. To measure entrepreneurial activity, they tracked whether or not finalists became entrepreneurs shortly after the conclusion of the program and whether they continued operating their business in the long run.

Similarly, a group of researchers studied the effects of the Micro-Entrepreneurship Support Program (MESP) in Chile through a randomized experiment (Martinez. et al., 2018). This is the program most similar to SEED on which research has been done, however, it is based on a developing country (Chile) rather than a developed country (U.S., where SEED is based). MESP provides asset transfers and business training to low-income individuals, their goal being to assist them in acquiring the skills and capital required to generate income through self-employment by developing their own businesses. They evaluated the effects of MESP on employment, income, assets, business practices, and other business outcomes, such as self-employment and wage employment, after participation in the program.

The results of both of these studies demonstrated that these types of small business development programs do what they were meant to. Lyons and Zhang (2017) found that accepted minorities were, on average, more likely to pursue ongoing startup activity compared to those who were simply finalists. In other words, Next 36 successfully aided women of color in founding, and continued operation, of their small business in the long run. Martinez et al. (2018)

found that participation in the MESP program increased employment and earnings in the long term. Most importantly, the study of MESP highlighted that programs, including financial transfers and training, targeting individuals in low-income countries showed positive effects extending up to three years after the end of the program.

As is apparent from the literature, small business development programs seem to be effective, but there isn't plentiful research of their effects on developed countries or immigrants. The previous studies analyzed the effects of such programs on students (Next 36), and on women from Chile (MESP). As Martinez. et al (2018) bring up, there is less clarity on if these types of programs would have the same effects on more developed labor markets, such as the one in the United States. This is also noted in the study of Next 36; studies of policy interventions with a goal of increasing entrepreneurship have focused on developing economies where the barriers are more severe than those faced by entrepreneurs in high income countries (Lyons and Zhang, 2017). To this, it could be said that they might be underestimating the barriers for excluded folks in the United States, and arguably, since the article was written in 2017, various aspects of society, and the economy, have since then changed.

This study seeks to fill these noticeable gaps in the literature. Through analyzing the effects of SEED on IOBs, and then comparing them to IOBs that either received no support, or received services from SBDCs, it hopes to showcase that SEED is successful in addressing the problems surrounding necessity entrepreneurs. This paper differs from others in the literature such in that it analyzes the effect of a small business development program in a developed country. As Hill (2021) also mentioned, policy makers' focus falls more on opportunity entrepreneurs, this study does the opposite, and pins the focus on supporting necessity entrepreneurs, specifically, immigrants.

Theory and Hypothesis

This study proposes two hypotheses regarding the research question. The first being that participation in the SEED initiative produces immigrant-owned businesses that are more successful. The initiative requires recipients to complete training modules that teach them how to successfully run their business in addition to awarding them a micro-grant. SEED's combination of training and micro-grants gives upcoming entrepreneurs knowledge about what makes a small business successful, and prepares them financially to handle the burdens of managing one. The micro-grants almost act as incentives for people to complete the training modules. In order to receive the money, the training must be completed, and in the end it is a win-win situation: the IOB receives the grant, and they are more knowledgeable about what will help their business in the near future. My operational hypothesis is that participation in the SEED Initiative leads to an increase in the success of immigrant-owned businesses.

The second hypothesis is that participation in the SEED initiative creates more successful immigrant-owned businesses than produced by SBDCs. SEED is maneuvered in a way that seeks to support primarily immigrant entrepreneurs, whilst the SBDC doesn't have the same focus. SEED has more perks, and is more attractive to IOBs because of the combination of training and microgrants that they offer. Through participation in SEED, IOBs will learn more about how to manage their business, and receive money to help them do so. While SBDCs provide a lot of knowledge, and training, money is needed in order to put the training to use, and they aren't able to provide it easily. My operational hypothesis is that participation in the SEED Initiative produces higher success rates for immigrant-owned businesses than partaking in services offered by SBDCs.

Research Design and Methods

This study analyzed 42 IOBs in California from the years of 2020 to 2024 through a small-n study with a most similar design. The unit of analysis is 42 individual immigrant-owned businesses in California. There were 16 IOBs that were SEED recipients, 10 IOBs that received services from a SBDC, and 16 IOBs that didn't receive help from either. For both hypotheses this analysis used the same SEED Recipient IOBs identified.

The independent variable for the first hypothesis is the participation status of the immigrant-owned business, coded as a dummy variable (0 = SEED Recipient IOB, and 1 = non-SEED IOB). The control group here was the SEED Recipient IOBs, and the treatment group was the non-SEED IOBs. To measure the independent variable, 16 IOBs that received no assistance from SEED, as well as 16 SEED recipient IOBs were identified across California. Finding this data was quite difficult because of the scarcity of data on immigrants as a whole. Due to this, I built my own data set, drawing from multiple sources.

A spreadsheet containing data on SEED Recipients from the California Immigrant Policy Center was used to find IOBs from different California counties that participated in SEED. There wasn't any randomization on selecting the businesses themselves; businesses were chosen on the basis of them mentioning they were immigrant-owned on their "About Us" page, or a page being primarily in Spanish. Sixteen SEED Recipient IOBs from this spreadsheet were chosen in the following counties: Alameda, Fresno, Kern, Los Angeles, Merced, Monterey, Orange, Sacramento, San Bernardino, San Diego, San Francisco, San Joaquin, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Sonoma, and Stanislaus.

This study decided to prioritize finding businesses in the same counties as the SEED Recipient IOBs to make the samples more comparable. Cities were generated through Arimo

Travel's *Random City in California (Random Generator)* (Arimo Travels, 2025) until one came up in the counties needed, and matches were found for almost all counties previously mentioned. To identify if these businesses were IOBs, the same process as mentioned before was used. Sixteen non-SEED IOBs were found in the previous counties mentioned, with the following changes made: instead of Merced, Contra Costa; and instead of Sonoma, Napa.

The independent variable for the second hypothesis is the program of participation, also coded as a dummy variable (0 = SEED Recipient IOB, and 1 = SBDC Client IOB). The SEED Recipient IOBs functioned as the control group, while the SBDC Client IOBs were the treatment group. To measure this, 10 SEED Recipient IOBs were found, as well as 10 SBDC Client IOBs that received services from a California SBDC.

From the 16 previously chosen SEED Recipient IOBs, 10 were selected for this sample. Businesses were chosen mainly on how well they would compare to the SBDC IOBs. The IOBs chosen resided in the following counties: Alameda, Fresno, Los Angeles, Merced, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, San Joaquin, San Mateo, and Stanislaus.

Through the various Client Success Stories on the many California SBDC websites, 10 IOBs were chosen. The same process in identifying whether they were an IOB applied here. The SBDC Client IOBs chosen were located in the following counties: Alameda, Los Angeles, Marin, Madera, Merced, Monterey, San Diego, San Francisco, San Luis Obispo, and Ventura. These IOBs were chosen before finalizing the selection of SEED Recipient IOBs which is why the counties don't match completely between the groups.

For both hypotheses there was no specific reason as to why the counties were chosen, but this investigation did attempt to ensure that the IOBs analyzed weren't all in close proximity to each other to try to control for the influence of unaccounted for variables.

The dependent variable in both hypotheses was the success score of the IOBs, measured through an index created by this study (see Appendix B for further information on index construction). It would be difficult to analyze the success of the businesses without one because it's not easy to quantify success, however, through the creation of an index, success becomes standardized, allowing it to become comparable across observations.

This index measured the number of social media accounts, number of good reviews from 2020-2024, whether the business had an impact on their community, number of employees, organic website traffic (U.S. and worldwide) from 2020-2024, and flexibility of life (measured through an index created by this study, see Appendix B). Success is subjective, but I found that these variables were the most feasible to find data for.

The measurement of each variable was as follows. To measure the number of social media accounts, this study examined how many, out of these four, social media sites businesses had accounts for: Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and Twitter. To measure good reviews, Facebook, Google, and Yelp were used; a review was recognized as good if it was of 4 stars and above on Google and Yelp, and on Facebook if it gave a positive recommendation. To identify if an IOB had made a community impact, comments on their social media, or reviews that indicated so were sought. It was difficult to find data on the number of employees, so most of the time educated guesses were made on the average number of employees based on the type of business. If the number of employees was found, it was typically through LinkedIn or ZoomInfo. To measure organic website traffic I would input the IOB's website into Semrush and download the data for their organic traffic in the U.S. and worldwide. This data typically showed the amount of organic traffic per month, which I then added from 2020-2024 and divided by 60

(number of months) to find the website traffic. I did this for both data sets downloaded for each business.

The index for calculating the flexibility of life of the IOBs measured whether they took off holidays, rested well, relaxed when needed, attended important events, and participated in other hobbies they enjoyed (if applicable). To find data for this variable, various social media platforms of the IOB owners (if found) were used to locate personal information. From there, my own judgement was used in allocating points for each variable for each individual business.

Controls used in both hypotheses were the length (in years) of residence in the U.S. of the business owner up until the end of 2024, number of children they have, partisanship of the county they live in, and length (in years) their business had been operating up until the end of 2024.

The measurement for the controls was as follows. The “About Us” or “History” page of the IOB’s website was used to try to identify the number of years the owner had been in the U.S., as well as their personal social media. This was important to account for because someone that has been living here for a while could have savings, and this extra money is always helpful in whatever issues may arise. To measure the number of children, I looked through their personal social media accounts as well. When someone has children, they typically know of the popular trends and could be helpful in increasing the success of the IOB. To measure county partisanship, the results of the 2024 General Presidential Election for that county were observed. This variable was coded as a dummy variable where 0 = Democratic County, and 1 = Republican County. This is important because the partisanship could very well define how promoted SEED, as well as other entrepreneurship programs, are where people live. The number of years of business operation was also measured through the IOB’s “About Us” page if a year of establishment was

found. If one wasn't available on there, I would look for when their Facebook page (if they had one) was established, or their first post on Instagram. Someone that has been running a business for a long time is more likely to have a better idea of what works, and doesn't, for their business.

Two major data sets, one for each hypothesis, were created, both with most of the same information for the observations. The variables in these data sets were the name of the business, status (SEED Recipient, SBDC Client, neither), success score, county, county partisanship, U.S. organic traffic, worldwide organic traffic, flexibility of life score, number of good reviews, number of employees, number of social media accounts, U.S. residence years, establishment year, number of children, and years of business operation.

Results

For the first hypothesis, the opposite results were found than what was originally predicted. The success scores of SEED Recipient IOBs were lower than those of non-SEED IOBs. As seen through Figure 2, non-SEED IOBs had a higher median success score than SEED Recipient IOBs. The box-and-whisker plot also demonstrates that the success scores of SEED Recipient IOBs had a smaller range than those of non-SEED IOBs. This range demonstrates that there was more variety in success scores for IOBs that weren't SEED Recipients, whereas SEED Recipient IOBs tended to have more similar success scores. On average the success scores for SEED Recipient IOBs was 12.90, while the mean for non-SEED IOBs was 16.55.




Figure 2. Data Source: California Immigrant Policy Center, Semrush, and Yajaira Hernandez Sanchez.

The regression analysis, which basically tells you about the relationship between two variables, for this hypothesis found that holding county partisanship, U.S. residence years, years of business operation, and number of children constant, the model predicted that when an IOB didn't participate in SEED their success score would increase by approximately 11.2 points (see Appendix A). These results were not statistically significant.

The results for the second hypothesis, in a way, proved what was predicted. As seen through Figure 3, SEED Recipient IOBs had a higher median success score than SBDC Client IOBs. Both groups, however, had similar ranges in success scores. The average success score for SEED Recipient IOBs was 14.16, and the mean success score for SBDC Clients was 13.04.




Figure 3. Data Source: California Immigrant Policy Center, Semrush, and Yajaira Hernandez Sanchez.

Through the regression on this hypothesis, the model predicted that, accounting for county partisanship, years of business operation, and number of children, when an IOB became a SBDC Client their success score would decrease by approximately 1.95 points (see Appendix A). The variable of U.S. residence years was omitted here because there wasn't enough information found to yield an analysis. This result was also not statistically significant.

When examining if any controls had a correlation with success scores, a weak positive correlation was found for both hypotheses between the number of years of business operation and success scores, as seen through Figures 6 and 7. This correlation for the first hypothesis was approximately 0.49, and for the second it was 0.36. The correlation for the second hypothesis is missing one data point because no years of business were found for that observation.




Figure 6: Scatterplots Detailing the Relationship between Length (in years) of Business Operation and Success Scores for SEED Recipient IOBs and non-SEED IOBs. Data Source: California Immigrant Policy Center and Yajaira Hernandez Sanchez.



Figure 7: Scatterplot Detailing the Relationship between Length (in years) of Business Operation and Success Scores for SEED Recipient IOBs and SBDC Client IOBs. Data Source: California Immigrant Policy Center and Yajaira Hernandez Sanchez.

Discussion and Implications

This study sought to answer the question of, do immigrant-owned businesses that participated in the SEED Initiative have higher success rates than those that didn't? The first hypothesis centered on the idea that IOBs that participated in SEED would have higher success scores than IOBs that didn't. The results offered the opposite conclusion; finding that, on average, non-SEED IOBs had higher success scores than SEED Recipient IOBs. Another pattern identified was within the spread of the data for both groups (see Figure 2). Non-SEED IOBs tended to have a wider range of success scores which could mean that there's something in the error term unaccounted for causing inconsistent success scores. However, for SEED Recipient IOBs, the smaller range of scores could mean that the initiative produces consistent results across their recipients. The results from the regression analysis (see Appendix A) associating an increase in success scores when an IOB isn't a SEED Recipient were not statistically significant, therefore no conclusions can be drawn from the observed relationship.

For the second hypothesis, it was predicted that SEED Recipient IOBs would have higher success scores than SBDC Client IOBs. In a way, the results reflected this with SEED Recipient IOBs having a higher median success score, as well as a higher average success score. However, the ranges of success scores for both groups weren't that visually different. This could imply that both programs, SEED and SBDCs, produce consistent results among their clients. The results of this regression analysis (see Appendix A) predicted a decrease in success scores when an IOB became a SBDC Client. This is congruent with the hypothesis, however, not statistically significant.

The weak positive correlation found in both hypotheses between the length (in years) of business operation and success scores is understandable. Businesses that had already been

operating for a long period of time before 2020 had a better opportunity to earn higher success scores because they had more experience running their business, and further time to gain a good clientele.

The results of this study weren't completely consistent with the hypotheses, but are nonetheless important to examine. Further research needs to be conducted on the effect of SEED and SBDCs on immigrant-owned businesses. Although these results were not statistically significant, it doesn't imply that SEED is ineffective. SEED still serves the underserved communities (see Figure 1).

Limitations

The biggest limitation for this study was the small sample size; the first hypothesis had a sample size of 32, and the second, one of 20. These make it difficult to draw out meaningful relationships among variables.

The second limitation was the lack of data. It was extremely difficult to find data on the variables measured, in specific, U.S. residence years, and number of children. There is no certainty that all data reported is 100 percent accurate, especially with the educated guesses on the number of employees, which could have tainted the relationships observed.

It would have been great to be able to account for citizenship status of the IOBs, but collecting data on that, especially in California, isn't popular. This would have been helpful because citizens tend to have more resources at their disposal than non-citizens. It would have also been nice to find more information on IOBs based in the Central Valley, but this was difficult for all three groups.

Instead of merely researching and trying to find data online, conducting in person interviews, or surveys, could prove helpful for this type of analysis.

Conclusion

This study examined the effect of the Social Entrepreneurs for Economic Development Initiative on immigrant-owned businesses' success in California, and then compared it to the success of non-SEED IOBs and Small Business Development Center Client IOBs.

The results found were that, on average, non-SEED IOBs had higher success scores than SEED Recipient IOBs, and that SEED Recipient IOBs, on average, had slightly higher success scores than SBDC Client IOBs. The regression analyses administered predicted that, for the first hypothesis, holding all else constant, when an IOB didn't participate in SEED, their success score would increase. For the second hypothesis, the model predicted that, holding all else constant, when an IOB became an SBDC client, their success score would decrease. These results were not statistically significant, therefore no generalizations can be made through these outcomes.

Small business entrepreneurship programs are definitely important nonetheless because they strive to assist excluded communities, such as immigrants. This study sought to fill in the gaps in the literature by studying the effects of a small business entrepreneurship program in a developed country on immigrants. There are definitely possibilities for further research to be conducted down the line to really understand this relationship, but this could be a good start.

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Appendix A.

Regression Tables

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	P-Value
(Intercept)	17.5485	4.437	0.00749**
Status	11.1941	5.3453	0.08113 .
County Partisanship	1.0826	4.3095	0.81003
U.S. Residence Years	-0.2513	0.1744	0.1998
Years of Business Operation	0.5342	0.2236	0.05408 .
Number of Children	-3.0613	1.4837	0.08469 .
N-Size	32		
R-sq.	0.2909		

Table 1: Regression of Success Scores on Status and County Partisanship, U.S. Residence Years, Years of Business Operation, and Number of Children for SEED and non-SEED IOBs.

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	P-Value
(Intercept)	12.4703	2.8453	0.000892***
Status	-1.9531	4.3345	0.660317
County Partisanship	2.342	6.267	0.71514
Years of Business Operation	0.466	0.3528	0.211258
Number of Children	-1.5513	3.5063	0.666045
N-Size	20		
R-sq.	-0.03561		

Table 2. Regression of Success Scores on Status and County Partisanship, Years of Business Operation, and Number of Children for SEED Recipient and SBDC Client IOBs.

Appendix B.

Indexes

The Success Index allocated a maximum of 10 points to each variable it measured. The amount of points given to a variable was then multiplied by the assigned weight for that variable. Once this was done for each variable, all the points were added together to find the success score of the IOB, with the maximum score possible being a 27.

Success Index			
Variable	Percentage	Max. Points for Category	Max. Points for Index
Number of Social Media Accounts	30%	10	3
Number of Good Reviews from 2020-2024	30%	10	3
Community Change	70%	10	7
Number of Employees	40%	10	4
Organic Web Traffic (U.S.)	50%	10	5
Organic Web Traffic (Worldwide)	50%	10	5
Flexibility of Life	50%	10	5
Total			27

Variables and Score Guide for Index

Good Reviews Score Indicator		Number of Employees Score Indicator		Organic Web Traffic Score Indicator	
Number of Good Reviews	Points	Employee Count	Points	Traffic per Month (2020-2024)	Points
0-50 reviews	3	0-5 employees	2	0-50 views	2
50-300 reviews	6	5-10 employees	4	50-100 views	4
300-500 reviews	8	10-20 employees	7	100-500 views	7
500+ reviews	10	20+ employees	10	500+ views	10

Social Media Score Indicator		Community Change Score Indicator	
Accounts	Points		
1	2	Yes	10
2	4		
3	7		
4	10	No	0

Flexibility of Life Index

Flexibility of Life Index			
Variable	Percentage	Max. Points for Category	Max. Points for Index
Takes Off Holidays	20%	5	1
Rests Satisfactorily	30%	5	1.5
Relaxes When Needed	50%	5	2.5
Attends Important Events	70%	5	3.5
Partakes in Hobbies (if applicable)	20%	5	1
Total			9.5

