Title
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Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6pf6z1gc

Journal
International Migration Review, 48(3)

ISSN
0197-9183

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Publication Date
2014

DOI
10.1111/imre.12067

Peer reviewed
Mobilization by Different Means: Nativity and GOTV in the United States

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We compare the impact of 15 randomized get-out-the-vote (GOTV) field experiments on naturalized and U.S.-born voters. We find that mobilization increased turnout among U.S.-born Latinos, but had no measurable effect among Latino naturalized citizens. In contrast, GOTV increased turnout among naturalized Asian Americans but had no measurable effect among U.S.-born Asian Americans. Race politics scholars have long argued that the terms we use to describe ethnорacial groups mask significant internal heterogeneity. We show how this heterogeneity affects voter mobilization, demonstrating the importance of seeing nativity and national origin as critical lines of demarcation that affect how certain individuals are mobilized to participate in politics.

Coverage of the 2012 presidential election made much of the importance of the “Latino” and “Asian-American” vote for Barack Obama’s re-election. These ethnорacial categories include not only a variety of national origin

1An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the May 4, 2012 meeting of the Politics of Race, Immigration and Ethnicity Consortium (PRIEC), San Diego, CA. We are grateful to Jane Junn, Benjamin Bishin and other PRIEC participants, as well as the anonymous reviewers of International Migration Review, for their helpful comments. This research was funded by The James Irvine Foundation as part of its California Votes Initiative (CVI). For more information on the CVI, see http://www.irvine.org/grantmaking/our-programs/californiademocracy/civicengagement/californiavotesinitiative. The James Irvine Foundation bears no responsibility for the content of this article.

2We use the terms “Latino” and “Asian American” to describe two ethnорacial groups discussed in this article. We understand that all such terms are imprecise, but for the sake of clarity we would like to explain how we are defining and using them here. The word “Latino” is used to describe all individuals, foreign and U.S.-born, who have ancestry in any of the Spanish-speaking nations of Latin America. We choose to use that term instead of “Hispanic,”
groups, with varied migration histories, but also encompass multiple generations of individuals of Latin American and Asian origin. Little popular coverage of the election considered these differences; instead journalists and pundits treated each group as monolithic with a singular set of political issues and preferences. Scholars often similarly fall into the “demography is destiny” argument put forward by Judis and Teixeira (2002), who claimed that the mobilization of Latino and Asian-American voters would lead to a new Democratic majority by 2008. While increasing academic attention has been given to intra-group diversity within these ethnoracial groups, they are still largely treated as cohesive voting blocs when it comes to discussions of turnout and vote choice. But, given the diversity within these groups, to understand their political preferences and behavior, we need to know how responses to political mobilization can vary across national origin and nativity.

Little scholarly research has considered how a voter’s nativity influences how he or she will respond to a voter mobilization effort. Scholars exploring mobilization have emphasized how opportunities for mobilization vary across ethnoracial groups, but generally have not considered the role because Hispanic is sometimes referenced to include individuals from the Iberian peninsula, which is not the population targeted by the community organizations mobilizing voters in this article. We use Asian American, to describe all individuals, foreign and U.S.-born, who have ancestry in the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, or the Pacific Islands. We realize that the terms refer to individuals who are diverse in terms of phenotype, national origin, nativity, class, and a variety of other characteristics and that there are important overlaps across these groups. Using these terms, we are classifying Latinos and Asian Americans as ethnoracial social groups. Such a classification does not require that all individuals from that group share the same interests or characteristics, but rather simply that they be similarly situated (to other group members) within the U.S. racial hierarchy in ways that affect their social, political, and economic opportunity structures (García Bedolla, 2009:4).

Although we believe it important to distinguish across national origin within each of these pan-ethnic groups, unfortunately the voter file makes it impossible to determine national origin for Latinos based on surname. We therefore only provide national origin analysis for the Asian-origin registered voters in this study.

We choose the term “ethnoracial” to describe these groups in order to capture the intersection between race and ethnicity. Scholars have long debated which is the more appropriate term to describe group experiences. The word race presupposes a common biological or genealogical ancestry among people. Ethnicity places more of an emphasis on cultural practices than on common genetic traits. Many scholars use the terms race/ethnicity or ethnorace to describe the ways in which factors often attributed to culture, such as language, can be racialized. In other words, ascriptive attributions can be based on linguistic or cultural practices that are not “racial” (or biological), but still can have racialized consequences. Because we believe the lived experiences of the populations being mobilized in these campaigns include both racialized and ethnic/cultural traits, we describe them as ethnoracial groups.
played by nativity (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Leighley 2001). Looking at political behavior more broadly, studies in the race and politics field have demonstrated that race and nativity can affect political attitudes and voting patterns (Tate, 1993; Dawson, 2000; Kim, 2000; García Bedolla, 2005; Abrajano and Alvarez, 2010; Wong et al., 2011; Hajnal and Lee, 2011). Although these studies have enhanced our understanding of civic attitudes and engagement among these varied populations, little of this work has looked specifically at how the impact of voter mobilization is affected by nativity.

In terms of the relationship between nativity and turnout, previous studies have shown that turnout among naturalized voters in the U.S. has changed over the past two decades. Early research on Asian Americans and Latinos found that naturalized citizens were less likely to participate in elections than were U.S.-born citizens (DeSipio, 1996; Tam Cho, 1999; Shaw, de la Garza, and Lee, 2000; Lien et al., 2001). This pattern seems to have changed with the passage of Proposition 187 in California in 1994. Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura (2001), looking at Latino turnout in California, Florida, and Texas in 1996, found that naturalized citizens voted less frequently than their U.S.-born counterparts in the latter two states, but that newly naturalized voters in California were far more likely to have voted, a finding they attributed to the state’s “highly politicized ethnic environment” (2001:745). This effect has remained to the present day and has expanded to naturalized voters in other states (Barreto, 2005; Ramakrishnan, 2005). Turnout among naturalized Latino and Asian Americans now regularly surpasses that of U.S.-born citizens. Most scholars attribute this change to the U.S.’ anti-immigrant political environment (DeSipio, 2011).

Over the past three decades, anti-immigrant rhetoric has increased significantly in the U.S. In their 2008 analysis of immigrant-related speech, the Anti-Defamation League found

The demonization of immigrants has … created a toxic environment in which hateful rhetoric targeting immigrants has become routine … This anti-immigrant propaganda and rhetoric, once the domain of hate groups, is now part of the lexicon used by anti-immigration advocacy organizations, politicians and media figures considered mainstream (Anti-Defamation League, 2008:1–2).

\(^5\)This initiative would have restricted access to education and health services for unauthorized immigrants and its placement on the California state ballot prompted the most significant mass mobilization of Latinos in the state since the Chicano movement in the late 1960s.
It is important to note that these anti-immigrant frames are not applied to all immigrants in the same ways. Latino immigrants, in particular, are the targets of this rhetoric. For example, in their analysis of talk radio hate speech, Noriega and Iribarren (2011:10) found that Latino immigrants were regularly constructed as criminals and therefore as a threat to the American public. Anthropologist Leo Chavez (2008) argues that scholars and pundits expressing concerns about immigration in general are often referring to Latino immigration in particular. He labels claims that Latinos cannot be assimilated and are a threat to U.S. polity the “Latino threat narrative.” Thus, within this historical moment, the Latinization of the immigrant narrative has made the “immigration problem” (for those who believe there is one) a “Latino” problem (see also Huntington, 2004).

The political engagement of Latino naturalized voters must be understood within this context of racial threat. Political scientists have long emphasized the importance of racial threat to understanding group voting behavior and racial attitudes (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999; Oliver and Wong, 2003; Tolbert and Grummel, 2003; Gay, 2006). One critique of this framework is that it assumes that groups actually exist, that group members believe their fates are linked, and that competition among groups is zero sum (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999:17). Although this critique is valid, we would argue that for marginal groups to be motivated to engage politically, feelings of group threat need only be accompanied by feelings of individual efficacy and a sense that their social group is worthy of their political effort (García Bedolla, 2005).

For purposes of the analysis presented here, we are simply pointing out that the current political environment has been negative for Latino immigrants and that Latino immigrants themselves are highly aware of these negative frames. In a recent poll by the Pew Hispanic Center, 70 percent of foreign-born Latinos reported discrimination as a major problem facing Latinos, compared to fewer than half of the U.S.-born. In addition, more than a third of Latinos polled cited immigration status as a major source of discrimination among Latinos (López, Morin and Taylor 2010). In response to this environment, Spanish-language media has been delivering the message to immigrant Latinos eligible for naturalization that they need to naturalize and vote in order to be able to speak for those Latino immigrants for whom that option is not available.

Thus, the political environment for naturalized voters in 2006 and 2008 included, at least for Latino immigrants, an environment of racial
threat they were highly aware of. Little research has examined how this context affected naturalized voters’ receptivity to voter mobilization efforts. One exception is Ramakrishnan (2005:140–2), who, examining multiple elections, geographic locations and immigrant communities, found that mobilization mattered for naturalized voters, but that its effect on turnout was weak and inconsistent compared to the effects of immigrants’ feelings of racial threat. The questions we ask in this paper are as follows: “How did this particular confluence of factors affect the impact of voter mobilization efforts on naturalized Latino voters?” “Can we expect to see the same patterns among naturalized Asian-origin voters?” “Or does the particular “Latinization” of the immigration debate make Latino naturalized voters sui generis?”

To answer these questions, we compare the impact of get-out-the-vote (GOTV) mobilization on naturalized and U.S.-born voters across three electoral cycles using randomly selected treatment and control groups of registered voters. The context for these elections—Southern California in 2006 and 2008—was unique for Latino immigrants in that it immediately followed the immigrant marches of 2006 and the Ya Es Hora naturalization and voter mobilization efforts spearheaded by Latino-serving organizations and media outlets. For Asian immigrants, even though “discrimination based on race or ethnicity is a normative experience for Asians in the United States” (Yip, Gee, and Takeuchi, 2008:787), research from that time period suggests that Asian immigrants did not feel as threatened by the Sensenbrenner bill (H.R. 4437) as Latinos and did not consider themselves to be situated in a politically threatening context in 2006 and 2008 (Junn and Masuoka, 2008; Rim, 2009). Thus, the Latino and Asian-American voters targeted in the experiments described here were situated within different electoral contexts, despite sharing geographic space and time.

We posit that these contextual differences will affect Latino and Asian-origin immigrants’ receptivity to a GOTV contact. In other words, we hypothesize that both nativity and national origin will affect the

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6H.R. 4437, entitled “The Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005,” was a bill in the 109th United States Congress that attached criminal penalties to unauthorized entry into the U.S. and also made it a crime to assist unauthorized migrants. It was passed by the United States House of Representatives on December 16, 2005 by a vote of 239–182 (with 92% of Republicans supporting, 82% of Democrats opposing), but did not pass the Senate. It was also known as the “Sensenbrenner Bill,” for its sponsor in the House of Representatives, Wisconsin Republican Jim Sensenbrenner.
impact a mobilization contact will have on Latino and Asian-origin voters’ propensity to turn out to vote. This hypothesis is unique within the GOTV literature, which largely assumes that GOTV contact will have a similar impact on voters regardless of their nativity, racial background, and/or gender. In previous work, we argue that voters’ social location influences their propensity to be mobilized (García Bedolla and Michelson 2012). With this analysis, we are expanding on that work to test the effect of nativity on mobilization efforts.

**GETTING OUT THE LATINO AND ASIAN-AMERICAN VOTE**

In the months leading up to the June and November 2006 and February, June, and November 2008 elections, we worked with a variety of groups in Southern California to mobilize low-propensity Latino, mixed Latino/African-American and Asian-American communities to vote. The target pools included both U.S.-born and naturalized citizens, who were randomly assigned to either receive a door-to-door or telephone contact or to the control group. Overall, the efforts were quite successful, producing statistically significant impacts on turnout. Here, we focus on the observed differences between U.S.-born and naturalized individuals targeted in those field experiments.

The experiments described here were conducted as part of The James Irvine Foundation’s California Votes Initiative (CVI), a multiyear project designed to increase electoral participation among low-propensity voters in Central and Southern California. We used randomized field experiments to isolate treatment effects. Once pools of targeted registered voters were identified by each community organization, individuals from those lists were randomly divided into treatment and control groups through the use of a computerized random number generator, clustered by household. The mobilization efforts then targeted all individuals in the treatment groups, although not all individuals in the treatment groups were successfully contacted. After each election, turnout rates (using validated voter information from the relevant county registrars’ offices) for the treatment and control groups were compared, taking into account contact rates (the number of individuals in the treatment groups successfully contacted). Random assignment ensures that subjects in the treatment and control groups have the same demographic makeup and the same underlying propensity to vote. It also holds constant any other mobilization activity that might have occurred during the studied
elections, as individuals in both the treatment and control groups have an equal likelihood of having been targeted by such efforts.

For each campaign described here, we examine intent-to-treat effects, the differences in turnout between the treatment groups and the control groups, as well as treatment-on-treated effects, the effect of the treatment on those who actually received it. This distinction arises due to the failure-to-treat problem, whereby some people assigned to the treatment group are not successfully contacted. As the failure to contact is not random (some individuals are simply easier to contact and therefore possibly easier to turn out), it must be controlled for. Gerber and Green (2000) describe how to correct for this problem using 2SLS analysis with “contact” as an explanatory variable and “assignment to the treatment group” as an instrumental variable. Consistent with other subsequent research using field experiments to test GOTV campaign effectiveness, we adopt this approach in the analysis below.

Overall, the CVI included more than 268 experiments, many of which were small in scope and/or whose impact did not reach traditional levels of statistical significance (for a discussion of all the CVI experiments see García Bedolla and Michelson 2012). The impact of the 268 CVI GOTV experiments varied widely, and many did not move voters to the polls. Examining those experiments is thus not particularly helpful, as we have nothing to compare—effects for both U.S.-born and naturalized target voters were negligible. For example, for the November 2008 election, NALEO conducted GOTV phone banks in six counties: Fresno, Kern, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, and San Bernardino. The effort in Fresno was successful and is included here. In the other five counties, we do not observe statistically significant differences in turnout between the treatment and control groups. Examining each of those five experiments for subgroup effects confirms there were no statistically significant increases in turnout among either U.S.-born or naturalized citizens. Therefore, we do not include those five experiments in this analysis. In June 2006 and June 2008, CCAEJ conducted door-to-door efforts in both Riverside and San Bernardino counties. The efforts in Riverside, their core area, were successful and powerful and are included here for subgroup analysis. The efforts in San Bernardino, in contrast, were less successful, and we find no effects for either U.S.-born or naturalized citizens. We therefore do not include those experiments in this analysis.

Examining experiments for subgroup differences, such as nativity and ethnoracial group, requires an effective voter mobilization campaign
that was sufficiently large in scope to allow for subgroup sizes large enough for detailed analysis by nativity and to retain sufficient statistical power to measure those subgroup effects. In addition, because of data collection variation across the county registrars, for some experiments we were unable to obtain information about voter nativity and/or ethnorracial group. Thus, we limit our analysis here to the 15 CVI experiments that (1) included an overall pool of at least 1,000 (treatment plus control); (2) generated a statistically significant effect on turnout; and (3) where we had adequate nativity and ethnorracial information for included voters. Although immigrants can be of any race or national origin, here we focus solely on Latino and Asian-American naturalized voters because they made up the largest proportion of immigrant voters targeted by the CVI efforts.

We now describe the 15 CVI experiments. We then present the results of the separate experiments as well as meta-analysis by nativity and ethnorracial group. We should note that there are differences among the experiments in terms of the nativity data available. The percentage of voters in each pool for which information about place of birth was available ranges from a high of 100 percent to a low of 72 percent (see Table 1).

### Table 1
**CVI Campaigns Examined for Nativity Effects**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Treatment-on-treated effect</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>p-Value</th>
<th>% FB available*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Campaigns targeting Latinos or mixed Latino/African-American communities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2006 – CCAEJ Riverside</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td>43.1*</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2006 – SCOPE</td>
<td>15,367</td>
<td>6.6*</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008 – CCAEJ Riverside</td>
<td>5,970</td>
<td>15.7*</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2006 – SVREP</td>
<td>25,862</td>
<td>9.3*</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2008 – NALEO Los Angeles</td>
<td>34,086</td>
<td>12.3*</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2008 – LA Voice</td>
<td>3,165</td>
<td>10.4*</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2008 – NALEO Fresno</td>
<td>12,492</td>
<td>18.7*</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Campaigns targeting Asian-American communities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008 – APALC Chinese American</td>
<td>12,216</td>
<td>5.4*</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008 – APALC Japanese American</td>
<td>2,153</td>
<td>19.9*</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008 – APALC Korean American</td>
<td>5,336</td>
<td>9.9*</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008 – OCAPICA Chinese American</td>
<td>3,207</td>
<td>12.6*</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008 – OCAPICA Filipino American</td>
<td>3,656</td>
<td>16.1*</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008 – OCAPICA Korean American</td>
<td>4,746</td>
<td>13.2*</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008 – OCAPICA Vietnamese American</td>
<td>14,862</td>
<td>10.9*</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *p < 0.05, one-tailed.

*Percentage of pool for which nativity information is available.
We exclude from this analysis those target voters for whom we do not have nativity information.

**THE EXPERIMENTS**

The experiments we analyze here were conducted by community organizations working to mobilize voters during the five statewide elections held in California from June 2006 to November 2008. Before each election, we met with each organization to customize a randomized GOTV field experiment targeting low-propensity ethnoracial voters in their communities of interest. The CVI organizations provided us with lists of registered voters that comprised their target pools, using their own criteria for identifying the low-propensity ethnoracial voters they hoped to move to the polls. We randomly divided those lists into treatment and control groups, and the organization’s volunteers then worked to contact the voters on the treatment lists to encourage them to vote. Individuals on the control lists were not contacted. After each election cycle, the results were analyzed and shared with the groups and their affiliates to build on lessons learned for the next election cycle. The participating organizations included the following: the Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice (CCAEJ); Strategic Concepts in Organizing and Policy Education (SCOPE); the PICO National Network (PICO); the Southwest Voter Registration Education Project (SVREP); the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO); the Asian Pacific American Legal Center (APALC); and the Orange County Asian Pacific Islander Community Alliance (OCAPICA).

All of the experiments were conducted as part of the California Votes Initiative, and each participating community organization generated its own non-partisan scripts. Mobilization efforts were conducted using bilingual canvassers, in both English and Spanish when reaching out to Latino voters and in multiple Asian languages (Cantonese, Japanese, Korean, Mandarin, Tagalog, and Vietnamese) and English when reaching out to Asian-American voters. For further information about the experiments, including a discussion of their overall effectiveness, see García Bedolla and Michelson 2012.

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7Because this initiative was funded by The James Irvine Foundation, a private foundation, all the mobilization efforts described here were non-partisan. By non-partisan we mean canvassers were not asking target voters to support any particular candidate, party, or ballot initiative.
After each election, we collected validated contact information from the participating groups, purchased validated voting information from relevant county registrars, and compared turnout among those in the treatment and control groups, estimating both intent-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-on-treated (TOT) effects.\textsuperscript{8} The results of the various GOTV campaigns are shown in Table 1. In each case, the groups’ GOTV efforts had statistically significant and substantively large effects, moving sizeable numbers of low-propensity ethnoracial voters to turn out to vote.

Considerable portions of each of these experimental pools were made up of naturalized voters. In order to test whether observed differences in turnout between U.S.-born and naturalized voters were due to different responses to mobilization, we now turn to the subgroup analyses of each experiment by nativity. For the experiments conducted by CCAEJ and SCOPE, which targeted mainly Latino and African-American ethnoracial communities, we limit our analysis to Latino voters, excluding African Americans and those for whom no information on ethnoracial group is available.\textsuperscript{9}

RESULTS

We first looked at the overall rates of turnout for the targeted pools of voters, comparing turnout among the foreign-born to that of the U.S.-born. Turnout among the foreign-born far exceeds turnout among the U.S.-born in all but one of the 15 experiments, from a low of 1.9 percentage points up to a high of 22.8 percentage points. Consistent with recent scholarship (see DeSipio, 2011), we find that in almost all cases

\textsuperscript{8}In addition to conducting the quantitative analysis described here, for the 2008 electoral cycle we fielded over two dozen multilingual field observers to monitor organizational canvassing and provide narrative reports of their experiences. In all, we collected over 3,000 hours of field notes delineating how these efforts were carried out. For this reason, we are confident in the contact information provided by the groups discussed in this article. For a complete description of the qualitative aspect of this study, see García Bedolla and Michelson, 2012, chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{9}We identified Latino voters by merging the state voter file with the U.S. Census Bureau’s Spanish surname list. Although the use of this list underestimates the total Latino population (because some Latinos do not have Spanish surnames), the U.S. Census Bureau estimates the surname list captures 93.6 percent of all Hispanics, with fewer than 5 percent falsely identified. For a full explanation of the list and its methodology, see Word and Perkins (1996). We do not include Asian-American naturalized voters in our analysis for these groups because they comprised such a small number of the target voters.
Latino and Asian-American naturalized citizens were more likely to vote than their U.S.-born counterparts. In all but one instance, turnout among the foreign-born exceeded turnout among the U.S.-born. In the one case where foreign-born turnout did not exceed that of the U.S.-born, the difference is negligible (Table 2).

Because our data are from randomized field experiments that only mobilized those randomly assigned to a treatment group, we are able to ascertain whether or not these differences are attributable to differences in the effects of mobilization. Because Latino and Asian-American communities in California are very different in terms of their median age and other descriptive characteristics, we include in our analysis the covariates available in the voter file: age, age squared, gender, vote history (for the four or five previous elections), permanent absentee voter status, and Republican and Democratic partisanship.

Looking first at U.S.-born Latino voters, estimated treatment-on-treated effects for two of the three door-to-door efforts are both statistically significant and substantively large. The exception is the SCOPE effort in South Los Angeles, where the campaign’s overall success seems to have been restricted to the African-American subsample. For the four phone banks targeting Latino voters, two show a significant effect on U.S.-born voters only, while the NALEO effort in Los Angeles was only effective at getting naturalized voters to the polls.

The results are quite different for the efforts targeting Asian-American voters, all of which were phone banks. Here, only two of the eight efforts effectively moved U.S.-born voters to the polls, while seven clearly mobilized foreign-born voters. Overall, the results indicate that both door-to-door and phone bank GOTV can move significant numbers of low-propensity ethnoracial voters to the polls, but with important differences by national origin and nativity (Table 3).

Although turnout among the foreign-born was higher than among the U.S.-born for both Latinos and Asian Americans, our findings suggest that what drove turnout varied by national origin. Among Latinos, naturalized voters in the treatment groups did not turn out to vote at significantly higher rates than those in the control group, suggesting that the Latino foreign-born were not necessarily mobilized by their GOTV contact, but rather by the larger political environment. Asian-American naturalized voters, on the other hand, were moved to the polls by these GOTV efforts, resulting in significant differences in turnout between the treatment and control groups.
### TABLE 2
DIFFERENCES IN TURNOUT FOR LATINO AND ASIAN U.S.-BORN AND NATURALIZED CITIZENS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election/Group</th>
<th>Turnout among Entire pool</th>
<th>Turnout among Treatment group</th>
<th>Turnout among Control group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campaigns targeting Latino or mixed Latino/African-American communities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCAEJ June 2006</td>
<td>20.7 (126/609) 6.0</td>
<td>22.5 (111/493) 5.1</td>
<td>12.9 (15/116) 10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOPE</td>
<td>34.1 (265/777) 22.8</td>
<td>33.9 (202/596) 22.4</td>
<td>34.8 (63/181) 24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCAEJ June 2008</td>
<td>9.3 (52/557) 5.1</td>
<td>12.9 (33/255) -0.03</td>
<td>6.3 (19/302) 9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVREP</td>
<td>28.0 21.8</td>
<td>28.4 21.4</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NALEO LA Feb 2008</td>
<td>43.0 (4,124/14,757) 21.8</td>
<td>43.2 (3,460/12,182) 10.0</td>
<td>40.9 (662/2,575) 8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA Voice</td>
<td>56.3 (813/1,445) 10.8</td>
<td>60.0 (272/453) 8.7</td>
<td>54.5 (541/992) 11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NALEO Fresno</td>
<td>46.0 7.2</td>
<td>46.8 (3,460/12,182) 6.8</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election/Group</th>
<th>Turnout among Entire pool</th>
<th>Turnout among Treatment group</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campaigns targeting Asian-American communities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APALC Chinese Am. June 2008</td>
<td>7.5 (210/2,812) 4.3</td>
<td>8.8 (79/897) 4.6</td>
<td>6.8 (131/1,915) 11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APALC Japanese Am. June 2008</td>
<td>13.4 (229/1,714) 3.6</td>
<td>15.8 (103/653) 6.3</td>
<td>11.9 (126/1,061) 4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APALC Korean Am. June 2008</td>
<td>7.8 (88/1,125) 14.3</td>
<td>7.9 (42/535) 16.6</td>
<td>7.8 (46/590) 4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCAPICA Chinese Am. June 2008</td>
<td>8.6 (99/1,146) 1.9</td>
<td>10.4 (37/355) 3.3</td>
<td>7.8 (62/791) 9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCAPICA Filipino Am. June 2008</td>
<td>6.3 (35/555) 3.8</td>
<td>11.3 (8/71) 1.4</td>
<td>5.6 (27/484) 4.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCAPICA Korean Am. June 2008</td>
<td>7.4 (72/980) 6.8</td>
<td>7.4 (22/297) 10.5</td>
<td>7.3 (50/683) 5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCAPICA Vietnamese Am. June 2008</td>
<td>10.8 (254/2,347) 14.2</td>
<td>10.0 (39/390) 17.4</td>
<td>11.0 (215/1,957) 24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APALC Chinese Am. Nov. 2008</td>
<td>66.9 3.9</td>
<td>67.6 (1,987/2,800) 3.9</td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mobilization by Different Means
In order to test the degree to which the statistical heterogeneity between results of these studies is related to the nativity and ethnorace of the targeted populations, we conducted a meta-analysis regression. As shown in Table 4, we find substantively large and statistically significant effects for U.S.-born Latinos and Asian-American naturalized citizens, while for foreign-born Latinos and U.S.-born Asian Americans the treatment estimates are smaller and fail to reach statistical significance. The strongest effect, for U.S.-born Latinos, indicates that these GOTV efforts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiment</th>
<th>TOT, U.S.-born</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>p-Value</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>TOT, foreign-born</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>p-Value</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campaigns targeting Latinos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2006 – CCAEJ Riverside</td>
<td>36.4*</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2006 – SCOPE (Los Angeles)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>0.965</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>0.392</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008 – CCAEJ Riverside</td>
<td>21.3*</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>1,736</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>0.522</td>
<td>773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2006 – SVREP Los Angeles</td>
<td>12.1*</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>14,187</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>0.922</td>
<td>4,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2008 – NALEO Los Angeles</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>21,818</td>
<td>14.6*</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>7,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2008 – LA Voice</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>1,445</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2008 – NALEO Fresno</td>
<td>20.9*</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>9,187</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>0.270</td>
<td>2,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaigns targeting Asian-American communities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008 – APALC Chinese Am.</td>
<td>6.8*</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>2,668</td>
<td>5.7*</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>5,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008 – APALC Japanese Am.</td>
<td>23.1*</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>1,373</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008 – APALC Korean Am.</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>1,076</td>
<td>12.8*</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>2,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008 – OCAPICA Chinese Am.</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>1,094</td>
<td>10.2*</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>1,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008 – OCAPICA Filipino Am.</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>16.1*</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>2,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008 – OCAPICA Korean Am.</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>0.925</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>12.6*</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>3,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008 – OCAPICA Vietnamese Am.</td>
<td>-7.5</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>0.644</td>
<td>2,178</td>
<td>11.5*</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>11,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2008 – APALC Chinese Am.</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.572</td>
<td>6,314</td>
<td>9.6*</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>5,435</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the household level. *p<0.05, one-tailed. Some campaigns targeting Latinos (by CCAEJ, SCOPE and LA Voice) also targeted non-Latinos; those individuals are excluded from this analysis. SCOPE was much more effective at moving U.S.-born African Americans to the polls, with an estimated treatment effect of 8.0 percentage points (SE = 2.4) for U.S.-born black voters. Models include age, age squared, gender, voter history (for four or five elections), permanent absentee voter status, and partisanship dummies for Republicans and Democrats. Shaded numbers are the coefficient estimates that reach the traditional level of statistical significance, as indicated by the asterisks.
increased their turnout by 12.84 percentage points (SE = 2.67). For foreign-born Asian Americans, the estimate is 9.46 percentage points (SE = 1.57). For U.S.-born Asian Americans, the treatment effect estimate of 5.24 percentage points (SE = 2.6) approaches statistical significance, driven by the very large effect among Japanese Americans in the APALC June 2008 experiment, but falls short of the traditional $p<0.05$ level. The treatment effect estimate for foreign-born Latinos is 7.6 (SE = 4.12).

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

In recent years, participation among naturalized voters has consistently surpassed that of the U.S.-born, reversing earlier historical trends. This is reflected in the base turnout rates of the 15 experiments examined in this article. Across all but one all these experiments, naturalized voters turned out at significantly higher rates than the U.S.-born. Yet, little experimental work has considered how the impact of nativity can vary within and across national origin groups. Our analysis shows that U.S.-born Latino and naturalized Asian-American voters were more likely to be moved by a GOTV contact than U.S.-born Asian-American voters or naturalized Latino voters. Arriving at a causal explanation for these differences falls beyond the scope of this study. But we can say with confidence that these differences exist and, given the random assignment within each of these studies, they are not due to chance. To us, these findings suggest the importance of political context to understanding when and for whom GOTV works.

Another important part of the equation, then, is the larger political context within which these voting decisions must be situated. Immigrant integration is a complex process that has been fraught with controversy throughout U.S. history (Jacobson, 1998; Ngai, 2005). What that history has shown is that context affects the social and political incorporation of immigrants. It is important to note that naturalized voters are immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meta-treatment effect</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>p-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino U.S.-born</td>
<td>12.84*</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino foreign-born</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td>4.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian-American U.S.-born</td>
<td>5.24*</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian-American foreign-born</td>
<td>9.46</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Meta-regression performed using Stata metareg. Model (4,26) F: 17.50 ($p<0.000$).

$^*$ $p<0.01$.

Bolded numbers are also those noted with asterisks as reaching statistical significance.
who have chosen to naturalize, which may make them especially predisposed to engage in politics. Yet, we should not overstate that point, given that just two decades ago naturalized voters voted at lower rates than the U.S.-born, suggesting important contextual change. Our findings suggest that the same anti-immigrant context can have a different impact on different groups of naturalized voters. We contend that this is due to differences in how immigration is racialized. Because the larger political environment in 2006 and 2008 was so heated in terms of immigration rhetoric, the naturalized Latino voters in the control group did not necessarily need a GOTV contact in order to turn out to vote—they were mobilized by the political context and feelings of racial threat. Thus, their turnout rates were similar to naturalized Latinos in the treatment group who did receive a GOTV contact.

That sense of racial threat may not have been as strong for naturalized Asian-American voters, but their responsiveness to their GOTV contacts suggests that the political context may also have made them receptive to the GOTV message. We should note that for the Latino and Asian-American naturalized voters in this study, these types of voter contact are rare. Thus, it is possible that Asian-American naturalized voters responded to this contact in part because of its novelty. But, that does not explain why that same novelty would not have made Latino naturalized voters in the treatment group turn out at significantly higher rates than those in the control group. We posit that the political climate is a big part of why we see these differences across different groups of naturalized voters.

Among U.S.-born Latinos and Asian Americans, again we see differences across groups, with GOTV contact having a greater impact on the voting behavior of U.S.-born Latinos. While also aware of the anti-immigrant political environment, U.S.-born Latino voters, perhaps because they are not themselves immigrants, needed additional motivation to go to the polls; the GOTV contacts provided that motivation. Among Asian Americans, we found that the impact of GOTV varied by national origin, with Chinese and Japanese American voters most likely among U.S.-born Asian Americans to be moved to the polls by a GOTV contact. In Los Angeles, where these experiments were conducted, the Chinese and Japanese communities are the most established, with long histories of political activism and mobilization (Junn, 2008; Junn and Masuoka, 2008). It is possible that that history affects these voters’ responsiveness to GOTV contact. At the very least, our analysis suggests that voters’ national origin, generation, geographic location, and the electoral context affected their receptivity to being turned out to vote.
The different effects for Latino and Asian voters indicate that there may be different political socialization processes at work within different U.S. ethnoracial groups. Lien et al. (2001) note that Asian immigrants are quicker to naturalize than other immigrants. They also differ in that they tend to emigrate for political rather than economic reasons and tend to have higher educational and/or occupational backgrounds than Latino immigrants. They also have been racialized very differently within the American political system (Kim, 2000; De Genova, 2006). Latino immigrants have had a very different history within the U.S. and tend to migrate with a different experiential and educational profile than Asian-origin immigrants (Junn, 2008; García Bedolla, 2009). We argue these differences affect how these voters perceive and are affected by the broader political context. Race politics scholars have long argued that the terms we use to describe ethnoracial groups mask significant internal heterogeneity. Our analysis provides empirical evidence of those differences, showing the importance of seeing nativity and national origin as critical lines of demarcation when considering when and why certain individuals are mobilized to participate in politics.

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