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On the deep structure of social affect: Attitudes, emotions, sentiments, and the case of “contempt”

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Abstract: Contempt is typically studied as a uniquely human moral emotion. However, this approach has yielded inconclusive results. We argue this is because the folk affect concept “contempt” has been inaccurately mapped onto basic affect systems. “Contempt” has features that are inconsistent with a basic emotion, especially its protracted duration and frequently cold phenomenology. Yet other features are inconsistent with a basic attitude. Nonetheless, the features of “contempt” functionally cohere. To account for this we revive and reconfigure the sentiment construct using the notion of evolved functional

specialization. We develop the Attitude-Scenario-Emotion (ASE) model of sentiments, in which enduring attitudes represent others' social-relational value and moderate discrete emotions across scenarios. Sentiments are functional networks of attitudes and emotions. Distinct sentiments, including love, respect, like, hate, and fear, track distinct relational affordances, and each is emotionally pluripotent, thereby serving both bookkeeping and commitment functions within relationships. The sentiment contempt is an absence of respect; from cues to another's low efficacy, it represents them as worthless and small, muting compassion, guilt, and shame and potentiating anger, disgust, and mirth. This sentiment is ancient yet implicated in the ratcheting evolution of human ultrasociality. The manifolds of the contempt network, differentially engaged across individuals and populations, explain the features of "contempt", its translatability, and its variable experience – as "hot" or "cold", occurrent or enduring, and anger-like or disgust-like. This rapprochement between psychological anthropology and evolutionary psychology contributes both methodological and empirical insights, with broad implications for understanding the functional and cultural organization of social affect.

Keywords: affect, attitudes, bookkeeping, commitment, contempt, emotions, evolution, morality, respect, sentiments

1. Introduction

Contempt contributes to many of the challenges confronting a globalizing world, including human rights abuses such as slavery, human trafficking, and sexual exploitation; intractable ethnic conflicts attended by displacement and genocide; intolerance of diversity and minority voices; and insoluble political divisions sustained by disparagement and obstructionism. At a more intimate scale, contempt may be the best predictor of divorce (Gottman & Levenson, 1992), and it animates both parties during breaches of community expectations (Rozin, Lowey, Imada & Haidt, 1999). Understanding the causes, consequences, and cures for contempt is a critical problem with clear applications. Yet, contempt is an enigma, empirically and theoretically neglected relative to comparable emotional phenomena (Haidt, 2003). What data there are raise more questions than they answer. We seek to fill these lacunae by challenging the paradigmatic assumptions of modern contempt research, with broad implications for understanding the functional and cultural organization of affect.

1.1. "A special case"

The modern contempt literature crystallized around the debate over basic emotions in social psychology. Ekman and Friesen (1986) famously showed that college students in ten cultures select translations of "contempt" to label a distinct facial expression, the unilateral lip curl. For many scholars, this elevated contempt to the pantheon of basic emotions; a complex "contempt" concept was designated a universal human emotion with evolved design features, including rapid onset and brief duration (Ekman, 1992). The apparent absence of evidence of the unilateral lip curl in non-human primates suggested that contempt may even be uniquely human (Ekman & Friesen, *ibid.*).

Ekman and Friesen's (1986) provocative claims largely defined the focus of subsequent contempt research. While their study occasioned critiques (Izard & Haynes, 1988; Russell, 1991a,b,c) and replies thereto (Ekman & Friesen, 1988; Ekman, O'Sullivan & Matsumoto, 1991), the initial contempt-as-emotion thesis remains ubiquitous. Dominating the relatively small contempt literature (Haidt, 2003), numerous studies have explored the form and universality of contempt expressions (Alvarado & Jameson, 1996; Haidt & Keltner, 1999; Matsumoto & Ekman, 2004; Matsumoto, 2005; Rosenberg & Ekman, 1995; Rozin et al., 1999; Wagner, 2000). Debates in this literature have largely concerned methodological details, the empirical strength of emotion-expression correspondences, or the specific assumptions of the basic emotions approach, not contempt's status as an emotion. Studies on the antecedents and consequences of contempt have likewise assumed that "contempt" refers to a discrete emotion similar in kind to anger and disgust (e.g., Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Laham et al., 2010; Rozin et al., 1999). Some authors have questioned whether "contempt" picks out a psychological primitive. Prinz (2007), for example, argues that contempt is a blend of disgust and anger, while others (e.g., S. Fiske et al., 2002; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005) see contempt as superordinate to, or synonymous with, these other emotions. These studies maintain that contempt is a prototypical emotion, albeit not a basic one.

The contempt-as-emotion literature has produced inconclusive, even perplexing, results. Contempt is not uniquely associated with the unilateral lip curl, but is associated with a range of facial, postural, and behavioral expressions, including a neutral face (Izard & Haynes, 1988; Wagner, 2000). The relationship of contempt to anger and disgust remains elusive, and is aptly described as "nebulous" (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). In empirical studies, contempt is often explicitly collapsed with other putative emotions such as disgust and hate (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2007; Mackie et al., 2000), making clean inferences difficult. Complicating matters, some results suggest that English-speaking participants are confused, or at least

in disagreement, as to the meaning of the term “contempt” (Haidt & Keltner, 1999; Matsumoto, 2005). Other documented properties of contempt are altogether anomalous for an emotion, basic or otherwise: contempt has a relatively enduring, even indefinite, time course (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011), and it can be phenomenologically “cold”, or distinctly unemotional (Haidt, 2003; Izard, 1977; Miller, 1997). Confronted with such results, Rosenberg and Ekman (1995) characterized contempt as a “special case” among putative basic emotions, nevertheless maintaining the underlying contempt-as-emotion thesis.

Here we develop a novel approach to contempt that challenges the contempt-as-emotion thesis, as well as existing alternatives, including the contempt-as-attitude approach (Frijda, 1986; Mason, 2003), and those that would altogether deny the existence of any natural kind *contempt* (e.g., L. Barrett, 2006a). Each of these approaches has merits, but each leaves some evidence unexplained. Our perspective integrates them, explaining extant data and opening novel directions for future inquiry. We use contempt as a case study to develop a broader argument about the evolved architecture of basic affect systems and the patterning of folk affect concepts.

1.2. Folk affect concepts and basic affect systems

We begin with three premises. First, we distinguish between cultural representations of affective phenomena and the underlying behavior regulation systems of affect – that is, *folk affect concepts*, such as emotion terms and ethnopsychological theories, and *basic affect systems*, neurocognitive “survival circuits” (LeDoux, 2012) with phylogenetic legacies far deeper than human language and symbolic capacities (Darwin, 1872; Fessler & Gervais, 2010; Panksepp, 1998; Parr et al. 2007). Basic affect systems are built from “core affect” (Russell, 2003) and other domain-general core systems (L. Barrett, 2013),

but they evince higher-level evolved design for solving particular adaptive problems (Nesse, 1990; Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Kragel & LaBar, 2013; see also H.C. Barrett, 2012). Folk affect concepts need not correspond to these discrete functional systems (Scarantino, 2009). Emotion language has many uses, being performative and political as much as veridical of experience (Besnier, 1990; Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990; Sabini & Silver, 2005), and folk affect concepts can dissociate from basic affect systems; some cultures lack words for coherent emotional experiences, while some gloss several distinct experiences with one word (Breugelmans and Poortinga, 2006; Fessler, 2004; Haslam and Bornstein, 1996; Levy, 1973). “Contempt” is a folk affect concept. Much research on contempt is research on the term “contempt” and its particular meanings and uses for English speakers. This has frequently been equated with investigating the nature of *contempt*, a putative basic affect system. Recognizing this slippage and distinguishing these projects is a first step in resolving ambiguity in the contempt literature. Here, we use quotation marks to indicate folk affect concepts (e.g., “contempt”), and italics for basic affect systems (e.g., *contempt*); the folk meanings of such terms serve only as intuitive anchors and do not delimit functional hypotheses about the postulated systems so labeled.

Second, a theory of the computational architecture of basic affect systems is needed to explain individual and population variation in the content of folk affect concepts, including “contempt”. Although basic affect systems and folk affect concepts dissociate, their relationship is not arbitrary. The contents of folk affect concepts derive in part from temporal and causal contingencies in embodied emotional experience (L. Barrett, 2006b; Lyon, 1996; Niedenthal, 2008; Russell, 1991a; White, 2000). Such experience is patterned by basic affect systems interacting with local threats and opportunities, mediated by cultural resources for appraisal and affect regulation (Markus & Kitayama, 1994; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). While the content of folk affect concepts is fluid with respect to underlying networks of basic affect systems (Haslam & Bornstein, 1996), that content should vary predictably with the

engagement of basic affect systems by social and ecological processes -- for example, by the frequencies and local meanings of emotion-evoking events. By specifying the underlying networks of basic affect systems, and considering the social, ecological, and historical contexts in which these systems operate, one can potentially explain the unique constellations of meanings associated with folk affect concepts (Lutz & White, 1986), as well as changes and variation in their content across time and space. Unpacking the network of basic affect systems underlying “contempt” is the central goal of this paper.

Finally, it is possible to develop constructive hypotheses about the functional architecture of basic affect systems. While concepts such as “emotion” and “affect” invoke folk affect concepts (Lutz 1988; Russell, 1991a), basic affect systems need not be defined using the everyday content of such concepts (Royzman et al., 2005; see also Fehr & Russell, 1984). As in adaptationist approaches to the emotions (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009), evolutionary, functional, and comparative considerations can guide the stipulation of basic affect systems and provide grounded criteria for predicting and evaluating their existence (Darwin, 1872; Fessler & Gervais, 2010). Analytic tools include reverse engineering observed phenomena to determine potential function; task analysis of proposed functions to predict design features; consideration of ancestral adaptive problems to predict additional features; cross-species comparison to distinguish conserved and derived features; and ontogenetic and cross-cultural data on developmental canalization and phenotypic plasticity. Increasingly, the functional organization of proximate neural systems can also be interrogated. We use these tools synergistically in inferring the form and functions of *contempt*.

1.3. Contempt as a sentiment

Taking inspiration from an early and largely forgotten literature in social psychology, we argue that *contempt* is most profitably understood neither as a discrete emotion, nor as an attitude, but as a *sentiment*: a functional network of discrete emotions moderated across situations by an attitudinal representation of another person (McDougall, 1937; Shand, 1920; Stout, 1903; see also Frijda et al., 1991; Scherer 2005). “Sentiment” once vied with “attitude” to be the “main foundation of all social psychology” (see Allport, 1935). Sentiments were thought to differ from attitudes in important ways, being more concrete in their object, more enduring, more consciously accessible, and hierarchically organized. Most importantly, sentiments were recognized as emotionally pluripotent, moderating a range of emotions towards their object across situations. The paradigmatic sentiment is *love*, which “cannot be reduced to a single compound feeling; it must organize a number of different emotional dispositions capable of evoking in different situations the appropriate behavior” (Shand, 1920:56); that is, under different scenarios *love* leads to *joy*, *contentment*, *compassion*, *anxiety*, *sadness*, *anger*, and *guilt* (Royzman et al., 2005; Shaver et al., 1996; Storm & Storm, 2005; see also Lutz, 1988). Other candidate sentiments include *liking*, *hate*, *fear*, and, we will argue, *respect*, an absence of which defines the sentiment *contempt*. Contempt thus constitutes a case study in the deep structure of social affect, the largely neglected architecture of emotions underlying the regulation of social relationships.

We theorize three kinds of basic affect systems, defined by their distinct forms and social-relational functions: *attitudes*, identified as enduring affective valuations that represent relational value; *emotions*, identified as occurrent affective reactions that mobilize relational behavior; and *sentiments*, identified as higher-level functional networks of attitudes and emotions that serve critical bookkeeping (Aureli & Schaffner, 2002; Evers et al., 2014) and commitment (A. Fiske, 2002; Gonzaga et al., 2001; Fessler & Quintelier, 2013) functions within social relationships. These systems interface through *affect*, a representational format for information about value (Tooby et al., 2008). Affect is a “feeling”

component of emotions and a representational currency of attitudes. Through affect, emotions update attitudes towards particular people, while attitudes moderate emotions across situations; sentiments are the attitude-emotion networks that emerge from these interactions. The functional organization of these systems, engaged by local social and cultural processes, helps explain the variable patterning of folk affect concepts.

On our account, “contempt” is a folk affect concept anchored by a sentiment, *contempt*. This sentiment, like *hate*, is a “syndrome of episodic dispositions” (Royzman et al., 2005:23), the function of which inheres in linking perceived relationship value to emotion moderation across contexts. *Contempt* specifically represents another as having low intrinsic relational value as cued by their practical or moral inefficacy and expendability, and it entails devaluing and diminishing them. *Contempt* moderates diverse emotions across contexts, potentiating *anger*, *disgust*, and *mirth*, and muting *compassion*, *guilt*, and *shame*. These emotions implement relational behaviors that are adaptive vis-à-vis someone of low value, including intolerance, indifference, and exploitation.

By hypothesis, the breadth and variation in the meaning of “contempt” derives from the manifolds of this functional network in interaction with individual and cultural differences. Across varying timescales, from psychology experiments to cultural change, the meaning of “contempt” is fluid with respect to which aspects of this functional network are salient: the “hot” emotions of *anger* and *disgust*, “cold” indifference to another’s suffering or victimization, or the enduring core representation of another’s worthlessness and inferiority. The American English “contempt” concept has likely come to emphasize emotion dispositions such as anger and disgust at the expense of a hypocognized (Levy, 1984) representational core as this sentiment has become increasingly morally objectionable in a so-called “dignity culture” (see Leung & Cohen, 2011).

This framework explains the coherence of the various features ascribed to “contempt” in the literature – it is hot and cold, occurrent and enduring, translatable yet varying, with a range of expressive avenues across situations. The contempt-as-sentiment approach illustrates how evaluative sentiments invite spurious study as basic emotions, producing inconsistent results. More generally, our approach revives the sentiment construct, foregrounding the reciprocal functional relationship of attitudes and emotions and thereby bridging their mutually isolated literatures. This elucidates the patterning of affect in social relationships and the grounded pathways traveled by folk affect concepts across cultures and over the course of sociolinguistic change. Our argument is a rapprochement between evolutionary psychology and psychological anthropology for the sake of understanding a biologically cultural species.

2. The features of “contempt”

Modern research on contempt generally involves characterizing the folk affect concept of “contempt” and its nearest translations in other languages. Examining this research, and characterizing the patterning of the “contempt” concept – including its use by contempt scholars – provides clues to the underlying architecture of basic affect systems. We adduce from the literature eight features of “contempt” (see Table 1). These features cannot be fully accounted for by existing theories, motivating our mapping of “contempt” onto a *sentiment*.

2.1. *Contempt is intentional or about an object*

Contempt is directed towards a particular object or class thereof (Frijda, 1986). Unlike disgust (e.g., Wheatley & Haidt, 2005) and anger (e.g., DeSteno et al., 2004), contempt appears not to be susceptible to priming or misattribution (e.g., Tapias et al., 2007). Contempt “tags” others (Fessler & Haley, 2003;

Hutcherson & Gross, 2011), inhering in representations of them more than in a systemic mode of operation in the perceiver.

Eight features of “contempt”	Supporting References
1. Intentional, or about an object	Hutcherson & Gross (2011); Mason (2003)
2. An enduring evaluation of a person, anchored by character attributions	Fischer & Roseman (2007); Hutcherson & Gross (2011)
3. Follows from cues to another’s low relational value, such as norm violations, incompetence, personal transgressions, and out-group position	Rozin et al. (1999); Laham et al. (2010); Hutcherson & Gross (2011); Caprariello et al. (2009); Fischer & Roseman (2007)
4. Entails loss of respect and status diminution	Haidt (2003); Sternberg (2003); Miller (1997); Hutcherson & Gross (2011)
5. Creates “cold” indifference through diminished interest and muted prosocial emotions	Izard (1977); Sternberg (2003); Rozin (1999); Haidt (2003); Debreuil (2010)
6. Associated with “anger” and “disgust,” which are among the proximate causes, concomitants, and outcomes of “contempt”	Alvarado & Jameson (1996); Frijda et al., (1989); Rozin et al., (1999); Shaver et al., (1987); Smith & Ellsworth, (1985); Ekman et al., (1987); Storm & Storm (1987); Fischer & Roseman (2007); Hutcherson & Gross (2011); Laham et al. (2010); Mackie et al. (2000); Marzillier & Davey (2004)
7. Can be expressed in many ways, including non-facial modalities	Alvarado & Jameson (1996); Rozin et al. (1994); Ekman et al. (1987); Wagner (2000); Ekman & Friesen (1986); Matsumoto & Ekman (2004); Izard and Haynes (1988); Darwin (1872); various ethnographic accounts (see pp. 16)
8. Leads to intolerance, exclusion, and relationship dissolution	Fischer & Roseman (2007); Mackie et al. (2000); Gottman & Levenson (2000)

Table 1. Eight features of “contempt”, documented or argued for in the literature, that a complete theory of “contempt” must explain.

2.2. Contempt is an enduring evaluation

Contempt entails a relatively enduring change in feeling toward its object (Sternberg, 2003). Fischer and Roseman (2007) found that contempt increased over a period of days, with short-term anger giving way

to longer-term contempt. Hutcherson and Gross' (2011) participants explained the undesirability of being an object of contempt in terms of its duration or difficulty of resolution relative to both anger and moral disgust. Many investigators (e.g., Mason, 2003) hold that contempt is anchored by enduring attributions about character traits; Roseman (2001) distinguishes anger and contempt according to their appraised problem types, where that underlying contempt is intrinsic to the person appraised.

2.3. Contempt follows from cues to low relational value

A number of antecedents have been associated with contempt. These include violations of community expectations (Laham et al., 2010; Rozin et al., 1999), incompetence (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011), immorality (S. Fiske et al., 2002), badness of character (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), and out-group or minority status (Brewer, 1999; Izard, 1977; Mackie et al., 2000), especially when perceived competition, superiority, and in-group strength pertain (Caprariello et al. 2009). These causes have in common that the targeted actor or group is a low-value or even worthless relationship partner (Fessler & Haley, 2003). This may follow from their unpredictability, unreliability, inefficacy, incompetence, impoverishment, incompatibility, or replaceability.

2.4. Contempt entails loss of respect and status diminution

Following from another's cues to low relationship value, contempt emerges as a two-part representation: respect is lost (Haidt, 2003; Laham et al., 2010), and the other is viewed as beneath oneself (Miller, 1997; Smith, 2000; Wagner, 2000; Keltner et al., 2006). Whereas respect for an other follows from efficacy and competence (Wojciszke et al., 2009), contempt follows from their absence (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). Whereas respect involves "looking up to" someone (A. Fiske, 1991),

contempt involves “looking down on” them (Miller, 1997), even seeing them as less than human (Sternberg, 2003; Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al., 2007). Contrary to claims that contempt blends anger and disgust, of the three, only contempt is empirically associated with feelings of superiority (Hutcherson and Gross, 2011).

2.5. Contempt creates “cold” indifference

Authors frequently refer to contempt and its concomitants as “cold”, a polysemous folk metaphor. One meaning of “cold” refers to the absence of intense qualia in contempt, in contrast to the “hot” experience of anger or disgust (Rozin et al., 1999; Haidt, 2003). Another meaning of “cold” refers to the absence of empathic concern and “warm” prosocial emotions in contempt (Haidt, 2003; Mason, 2003; Dubreuil, 2010). Participants appear to blend these two facets when reporting relatively cool sensations associated with contempt (Nummenmaa et al., 2014). Nonetheless, Frijda et al. (1989) found that “contempt” events are associated with “boiling inwardly” (see also Fischer, 2011); below we explain how contempt may sometimes involve this experience.

2.6. Contempt is associated with anger and disgust

In studies with various probes and outcome measures, contempt clusters primarily with anger, and secondarily with disgust (Alvarado & Jameson, 1996, 2002; Frijda et al., 1989; Rozin et al., 1994, 1999; Shaver et al., 1987; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), although some researchers report the reverse (Ekman et al., 1987; Nummenmaa et al., 2014; Storm & Storm, 1987). Many stimuli or situations simultaneously evoke contempt with anger or disgust (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Laham et al., 2010; Mackie et al., 2000; Marzillier & Davey, 2004; Rozin et al., 1999; Tapias et al., 2007), while the

display of disgust is among the behaviors associated with contempt (Fischer and Roseman, 2007). Contempt and disgust are considered together most commonly because both are associated with action tendencies to exclude or avoid another person (Mackie et al., 2000; S. Fiske et al., 2002). Others have considered anger, disgust, and contempt together because all three are “other-condemning” and motivate hostility (Haidt, 2003; Izard, 1977; Sternberg, 2003). Many authors argue that contempt either is a form of anger or disgust, or is built from them (e.g., S. Fiske et al., 2002; Lazarus, 1991; Ortony et al., 1988; Prinz, 2007).

2.7. Contempt has many expressions

In studies of facial expressions, the term “contempt” consistently produces low agreement across subjects (Matsumoto & Ekman, 2004; Russell, 1991b,c; Wagner, 2000). The term has been associated with the canonical expressions for both “anger” (Alvarado & Jameson, 1996; Rozin et al., 1994) and “disgust” (Ekman et al., 1987). “Contempt” is also chosen to label a neutral expression in the absence of a “neutral” label choice (Wagner, 2000). “Contempt” is the predominant label chosen for the unilateral lip curl (Ekman & Friesen, 1986; Matsumoto & Ekman, 2004), but “anger” and “disgust” are also often chosen (Haidt & Keltner, 1999; Matsumoto, 2005; Russell, 1991b,c); in free response, this expression is rarely labeled “contempt” (Alvarado & Jameson, 1996; Ekman & Friesen, 1986; Haidt & Keltner, 1999; Matsumoto & Ekman, 2004; Russell, 1991c). The unilateral lip curl is linked to the kinds of situations that elicit contempt (Matsumoto & Ekman, 2004; Rozin et al., 1999), but “contempt” is rarely used to label these situations in free-response tasks. This is not due to unfamiliarity with the term (Wagner, 2000), but may be due to uncertainty regarding its meaning (Haidt & Keltner, 1999; Matsumoto, 2005; Rosenberg & Ekman, 1995).

Beyond facial expressions, research links contempt with a downward gaze and tilted-back head, postures associated with dominance displays and assertions of superiority in animals (see Darwin, 1872; Izard and Haynes, 1988; also Frijda, 1986). In addition to linking contempt to a non-human snarl reminiscent of the unilateral lip curl, Darwin (1872) foregrounded derisive laughter and turning away as expressions of contempt associated with the other's insignificance (see also Fischer, 2011; Roseman et al., 1994).

In the ethnographic literature, numerous behaviors and expressions that show a lack of respect are parochially interpreted as indexing contempt, including ignoring someone (e.g., Turnbull, 1962), throwing sand at someone (e.g., Thomas, 1914), spitting at or near them (e.g., Handy, 1972), swearing at them (e.g., Campbell, 1964), sticking one's tongue or lips out at them (e.g., Pierson, 1967), and displaying one's buttocks or genitalia to them (e.g., Archer, 1984). In American English, "contempt of court" refers to disregarding the rules, etiquette, or orders of a court of law (Goldfarb, 1961) – that is, "contempt" is inferred from disrespectful, irreverent behavior.

2.8. Contempt leads to intolerance, exclusion, and relationship dissolution

Contempt is associated with diverse action tendencies; it has been classed among the "appraisal dominant" emotions, meaning that it can be better predicted from antecedent appraisals than from consequent action readiness (Frijda et al., 1989). Nonetheless, the motivations and action tendencies associated with contempt have usually been characterized as rejection and exclusion (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Frijda, 1986; Roseman et al., 1994). Retrospectively reported contempt events are associated with the goals of social exclusion, coercion, derogation, rejection, and verbal attack (Fischer and Roseman, 2007). A composite of "contempt" and "disgust" partially mediates reported willingness

to move away from an out-group, while anger mediates willingness to move against (Mackie et al., 2000). More broadly, contempt may serve to reduce interaction with those who cannot contribute to the group (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011), leading to mockery, exclusion, and ostracism (Dubreuil, 2010). Haidt (2003) argues that “contempt motivates neither attack nor withdrawal” (858), instead pervading later interactions, diminishing prosocial emotions and leading to mockery or disregard (see also Miller, 1997). Consonant with these motivational and behavioral outcomes, an important consequence of contempt is relationship dissolution (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). Famously, contempt is one of the “four horsemen of the apocalypse” in predicting divorce (Gottman & Levenson, 1992). Finally, contempt is implicated in some of the most heinous of human behaviors. Sternberg (2003) suggests that contempt plays a role in propaganda campaigns designed to foment hate, and implicates contempt in the calculated massacres of Hutus, Jews, and Armenians (see also Izard, 1977).

3. What “contempt” is not

The eight features of the folk affect concept “contempt” demand explanation. Why do they cohere? How is it that they show regularities across populations despite frustrating researchers with low consensus across participants? Several existing approaches offer explanations to these questions. However, none of them explain the full feature set of “contempt” and its translations. As existing theories cannot adequately account for these features, we offer a novel explanation below.

3.1. “Contempt” is not a basic emotion

One explanatory approach, exemplified by Ekman and Friesen (1986), maps the folk affect concept “contempt” onto a basic emotion, *contempt*. This is the approach, at least implicitly, of most contempt

researchers (e.g., Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Rozin et al., 1999). A related approach, which does not assume basic emotions, maps “contempt” onto an emergent yet cross-culturally salient “modal emotion” *sensu* appraisal theorists such as Scherer (2009; see also Colombetti, 2009).

Although contempt evinces features of a prototypical emotion profile, including elicitors, phenomenological concomitants, and motivational and expressive outcomes, other features of contempt do not sit comfortably within a basic emotion or appraisal theory approach: contempt is a relatively enduring representation rather than a fleeting occurrent response; it shows no evidence of diffuse systemic effects, as in priming or misattribution; it often involves a marked absence of emotion, as in “cold” indifference to another’s suffering or threat; and its expressions are diverse across contexts. Despite important cross-cultural regularities (Ekman & Friesen, 1986; Haidt & Keltner, 1999; Rozin et al., 1999), agreement on the meaning of “contempt” is also uniquely low for a putative basic emotion (Rosenberg & Ekman, 1995). “Contempt” does not map cleanly onto a natural kind emotion.

3.2. “Contempt” is not an attitude

Another approach proposes that “contempt” is an attitude of indifference or rejection towards an object, person, place, or idea viewed as having low value (Frijda, 1986; Mason, 2003). In standard frameworks, attitudes are like emotions in that they are intentional, or about particular objects, but longer lasting – emotions are fleeting responses-in-context, while attitudes are enduring representations (Clore & Schnall, 2005) that involve little arousal (Russell & Barrett, 1999). The structure of attitudes is generally thought to include affective representations (e.g., prejudice), cognitive representations (e.g., stereotypes), and behaviors (e.g., discrimination) (see Breckler, 1984; Eagley &

Chaiken, 1993; Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960). These three channels are themselves treated as equally evaluative and unidimensional – from like to dislike, from good to bad, and from approach to avoidance, respectively.

This account could explain why contempt is often devoid of emotional arousal, and how it moderates relational behavior across time and situations. However, current attitude theory cannot account for the emotional texture of contempt. The attitude literature is largely isolated from the emotion literature, and investigates global evaluations lacking the diverse emotional and behavioral outcomes of contempt. In contrast to the affectively neutral concomitants of indifference, the associations between contempt and anger and disgust remain opaque on the attitudinal account (Fischer, 2011).

3.3. “Contempt” is not an untethered construction

Yet another approach to “contempt” could be developed that assumes neither discrete basic emotions nor attitudes. Although they have not been applied to “contempt”, psychological constructionist theories of emotion offer one option. According to one prominent constructionist theory, the Conceptual Act Model (L. Barrett, 2006b; Lindquist, 2013; see also Russell, 2003), the features of “contempt” should hang together only because that natural language term chunks the otherwise continuous stream of “core affect” – i.e., valence and arousal – into a conceptual schema that integrates concomitant processes across these and other “core systems”. On this account, there is no unifying feature of experience that characterizes all cases of contempt; those affective experiences labeled as tokens of contempt vary widely in their specific features, and individuals and populations vary in their prototypical “contempt” concepts. This approach could account for variation in the meaning of “contempt”, while providing scope for the enduring time course of “contempt” tokens.

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429 In a psychological constructionist approach, a word such as “contempt” is necessary to anchor the
 430 coherence of the features categorized as a single emotion; without this anchor for statistical learning,
 431 there is only the continuous stream of core affect. However, this or comparable words do not appear
 432 necessary for experiencing together the features of “contempt”. In a study of anger, Fridhandler and
 433 Averill (1982) found that unresolved anger towards a formerly valued relationship partner, dispositional
 434 attributions of their shortcomings, and low estimation of the other’s value and character were
 435 associated with having “less need or affection for the offender” and a “cooling of the relationship with
 436 the instigator”. While these results closely parallel those of Fischer and Roseman (2007) for “contempt”,
 437 the word was never used as a prompt. Similarly, the unilateral lip curl is associated with the same kinds
 438 of eliciting situations as “contempt” yet without using that word as a prompt (Matsumoto & Ekman,
 439 2004; Rozin et al., 1999). In addition, as we will detail below, the features of “contempt” cohere as a
 440 dispositional social stance in clinical primary psychopathy, suggesting that their co-occurrence is far
 441 from arbitrary. Finally, a constructionist approach has trouble explaining the translatability of
 442 “contempt” across diverse populations (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1986). The features of “contempt”
 443 appear to functionally stick together even without that word acting as conceptual glue.

444

445 The features of “contempt” are not merely a conceptual construction around core affect. They also
 446 approximate neither a basic emotion nor an attitude. Nonetheless, each of these approaches has merit.
 447 The basic emotions approach highlights the motivational and expressive components of contempt. The
 448 attitude approach can account for the object specificity and durability of contempt. And a
 449 constructionist approach is necessary to understand how basic affect systems might manifest as folk
 450 affect concepts. Synthesizing these perspectives, we argue that the features of “contempt” are aspects
 451 of an underlying *sentiment*: a functional network of diverse basic emotions moderated by an attitudinal

representation of a person. This network evinces statistical regularities across disparate emotional and behavioral outcomes anchored by a common attitudinal core. On this account, the major limitation of the discrete emotions paradigm in the affective sciences is not the assumption of evolved design at a higher level than “core affect” (*sensu* L. Barrett, 2006a) – it is the under-appreciation of an even higher level of functional organization across discrete emotions in the service of social relationship regulation.

4. Sentiments and the structure of folk affect concepts

4.1. Sentiments

A higher level of functional design among emotions was appreciated a century ago by British social psychologists exploring consistency in individual personalities and values despite variable behavior across contexts, i.e., “character” (Shand, 1920; Stout, 1903; McDougall, 1933). Shand (1920) distinguished three levels of character: *instincts*, or simple embodied impulses; *primary emotions*, or systems of instincts that organize particular behaviors; and *sentiments*, which organize and direct emotions across situations with respect to particular relational objects. Sentiments were enduring dispositions to respond emotionally towards their objects in ways consistent with the value of that object. *Love* and *hate* were prototypical sentiments; they potentiated *happiness*, *anger*, *fear*, and *sadness* in quite opposite, yet appropriate, situations, to preserve or destroy their objects, respectively. For Shand, these primary emotions shared the “innate bond” (42) of a sentiment toward a particular object.

Despite being hailed as “the main foundation of all social psychology” (McDougall, 1933), the sentiment construct fell from use (though see Heider, 1958). Sentiments were contrasted with “attitudes” (see,

e.g., Cattell, 1940; McDougall, 1937), which, following Allport (1935), were embraced by American social psychology. The abstractness and generality of the attitude construct likely helped it gain wider use, especially in experimental studies of impersonal attitudes towards stereotypes, products, and political positions. Other reasons for the waning of “sentiment” likely included behaviorist opposition to the “hormic” teleology of sentiments; greater reliance on evolutionary (especially Lamarckian) reasoning by proponents; and associations with discredited, yet logically distinct, theories of parapsychology and eugenics (see, e.g., Asprem, 2010).

Below, we remodel the sentiment construct in line with the modern tenet of evolved functional specialization (H.C. Barrett & Kurzban, 2006). Doing so resolves debates about both the structure of social affect and the sources of variation in folk affect concepts, “contempt” included, thereby both organizing a large body of existing findings and generating discriminant predictions.

4.2. The Attitude-Scenario-Emotion (ASE) model of sentiments

We propose the Attitude-Scenario-Emotion (ASE) model of sentiments (see Table 2). This model specifically addresses social affect, emphasizing the adaptive problems of social relationship regulation (A. Fiske, 2002; Fessler & Haley, 2003). We leave open the potential generality of this model for non-social affect. The model includes three kinds of basic affect systems distinguished by their forms and functions: *attitudes*, *emotions*, and *sentiments*.

Construct	Functional Features	Operational Indicators	Representative Predictions
Attitudes	Object-specific affective representations	<i>Pragmatic language</i> : “feelings about” or “feelings for” someone <i>Phenomenology</i> : can be “coldly” considered	Relatively difficult to misattribute to other objects or prime towards others No necessary concomitant arousal while introspecting a current attitude
	Enduring representations	<i>Time course</i> : relatively stable	Outlasts the formative event or information
	Track and summarize cues to another’s social-relational value	<i>Structure</i> : orthogonal dimensions track different fitness affordances <i>Time course</i> : change with new, valid cues to fitness relevance <i>Phenomenology</i> : awareness of valuation, not necessarily of formative cues	Possibility of ambivalence towards someone, with corresponding reaction time decrements Highly informative events can alter previously stable or longstanding attitudes Possibility of confabulated justification
	Moderation of emotion-eliciting appraisals	<i>Structure</i> : attitude + belief about object’s actions/fate = motivational outcome	Indirect effects; emotion elicitation is required to implement action
Emotions	Contingent reactions to specific scenarios	<i>Pragmatic language</i> : “feelings because of” some event <i>Outcomes</i> : identified principally with a motivation apt for addressing scenario	Can be more easily misattributed and primed Behavioral outcome modified by contextual constraints & affordances
	Occurrent	<i>Time course</i> : relatively fleeting	Lasts as long as the eliciting scenario; when latter is prolonged, leads to <i>moods</i>
	Systemic	<i>Structure</i> : coordinated recruitment of relevant systems across the organism <i>Phenomenology</i> : relatively “hot”, includes arousal and action-implementation systems	Identifiable through multivariate pattern classification Cannot be introspected dispassionately except after the fact
Sentiments	A functional affect network of attitudes and emotions Attitudes moderate emotions; emotions update attitudes Emotional pluripotence of attitudes	<i>Structure</i> : stable attitudinal core and diverse fleeting emotions across scenarios <i>Phenomenology</i> : conflation of emotions and attitudes due to reciprocal causal and temporal connections <i>Outcomes</i> : diverse motives, behaviors and expressions across scenarios	“Context-dependent universals” of Attitude X Scenario X Emotion interactions Individual and population variation in conceptual emphasis on attitudinal core or emotional antecedents and outcomes Can be inferred in varying social contexts from different emotion expressions

Table 2. The major features of the Attitude-Scenario-Emotion model of sentiments, including the constructs, functional features, operational indicators, and sample predictions from the model (see section 6, below).

503

504 In our model, *attitudes* are enduring yet tentative representations of social-relational value (e.g., Fazio,
 505 2007). Attitudes are set or updated by cues of relational value, then index or proxy that value through
 506 time, moderating behavior regulation systems in light of it. In their form attitudes approximate Internal
 507 Regulatory Variables (IRVs; Tooby et al., 2008): “indices” or “registers...whose function is to store
 508 summary magnitudes...that allow value computation to be integrated into behavior regulation” (253).
 509 Tooby et al. propose that IRVs are ubiquitous across levels of the mind, operating in hierarchical systems
 510 that aggregate and summarize information at higher levels as a function of outputs from lower levels.
 511 Attitudes are IRVs operating at a particularly high, and potentially introspectively salient, level of the
 512 social mind.

513

514 Attitudes solve a key adaptive problem of social relationships: conditioning social behavior on the fitness
 515 affordances – or likely costs and benefits – associated with others. Anyone can approach, offer aid,
 516 inflict harm, or die. But the fitness consequences of such events depend on who is involved – on
 517 whether they are kin, ally, leader, mate, stranger, or enemy, and on the costs and benefits to self that
 518 such categories entail. Fitness affordances are not objective properties, but are relative to a perceiver’s
 519 traits, resources, and current state, requiring subjective representation (see Cottrell et al., 2007; S. Fiske
 520 et al., 2002; Tooby et al., 2008). Moreover, appraised threats and opportunities are often not presently
 521 observable but are grounded in past events that revealed an other’s skills, propensities, and affiliations.
 522 Hence, enduring yet tentative summary representations should commute the past into the present and
 523 subjectively weight the value of others. In the ASE model, attitudes serve this function.

524

525 In the ASE model, attitudinal representations guide action, but emotions implement action. Following
 526 adaptationist and social-functional approaches (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Ekman, 1992; Keltner et

al., 2006; Nesse, 1990; Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009), *emotions* are contingent, occurrent, and coordinated shifts across the cognitive, motivational, and movement systems of an organism, creating a state of action readiness (Frijda et al., 1989). Each emotion is a mode of operation for the organism, contingent on a particular appraisal of circumstance. Functionally, each emotion facilitates adaptive behavior vis-à-vis its eliciting circumstance. In the ASE model, this adaptive behavior regulation occurs primarily in the present, although one function of emotions may be to update attitudes for the future (Baumeister, Vohs, & DeWall, 2007; Tooby et al., 2008). We consider canonical *moods* to be emotions temporally tailored to address protracted threats and opportunities. As with other emotions, their form is systemic and pervades thought and action (see Clore & Schnall, 2005; Frijda, 1994; Schimmack et al., 2000).

Among the diverse behavioral functions served by emotions, many regulate behavior within social relationships (Fessler & Haley, 2003; A. Fiske, 2002; Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Keltner et al., 2006; Kitayama et al., 2006; Tooby et al., 2008). The specialized relational functions of discrete emotions include building (*gratitude*) or repairing (*guilt*) cooperative relationships, and acknowledging reduced status (*shame*) or elevating another's status (*admiration*) in a hierarchy. Some emotions function as subjective commitment devices (Fessler & Quintelier, 2013) that proxy (A. Fiske, 2002) and motivationally weight relational value (Fessler & Haley 2003; Frank, 1988; Gonzaga et al., 2001; Hirshleifer, 1987). By hypothesis, these mechanisms help sustain long-term relationships by countervailing a host of short-sighted cognitive biases and external temptations and by motivating relational investment and repair (A. Fiske, 2002). Emotions are not separate from cognition, but function, in part, through cognition as contingent shifts in trade-offs, time horizons, and sensitivities (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000).

In the ASE model, *sentiments* are higher-level functional networks of attitudes and emotions; each sentiment is an attitude state and the various emotions disposed by that representation. Within relationships, or towards particular people, the functions of attitudes and emotions are complementary and intertwined. Attitudes “bookkeep” and represent another’s relational value to self. These representations adaptively moderate emotions across scenarios involving another’s actions and fortunes, such as their approach, departure, or death, imbuing such events with self-relevant meaning. Emotions then implement adaptive behavior. One overarching function of each sentiment – of the emotional syndrome of each attitude – is to implement commitment to the value of the relationship represented by that attitude: positive attitudes regulate emotions to build and sustain valuable relationships, while negative attitudes regulate emotions to minimize the costs of, and maximize the benefits extracted from, costly relationships. Sentiments are thus the deep structure of social affect, the largely unstudied networks of attitudes and emotions that pattern affect within social relationships.

4.3. The diversity of sentiments and their emotional outcomes

Our model of sentiments includes several additional hypotheses. First, we propose that there are distinct sentiments, subserved by distinct attitude dimensions, that represent the distinct kinds of costs and benefits afforded by sociality – just as there are distinct emotions for implementing distinct behavioral tendencies. As with emotions, each sentiment likely has a distinct evolutionary history and taxonomic distribution (see, e.g., Fessler & Gervais, 2010), as well as partially dissociable neural bases (e.g., Panksepp, 1998).

The social world presents many distinct fitness threats and opportunities that cannot be collapsed into a single summary representation of goodness or badness, liking or disliking (see Bugental, 2000; Kenrick et

al., 2010; Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2008; Rai & Fiske, 2011). Correspondingly, existing findings indicate that there are likely more attitude dimensions than traditionally assumed. Results support orthogonal positive and negative attitude dimensions (Cacioppo et al., 1999), distinct dimensions of “liking” and “respect” for tracking affiliation and efficacy, respectively (S. Fiske et al., 2007; Wojciszke et al., 2009; see also White, 1980), and possibly four or five different positive forms of regard (e.g., infatuation, respect, attachment, and liking; Storm & Storm, 2005). Those few emotion researchers who have addressed attitudes and/or sentiments likewise propose some beyond liking and disliking, including love, respect, and hate (Frijda, 1994; Lazarus, 1991; Royzman et al., 2005; Scherer, 2005).

Integrating these deductive and inductive approaches suggests a provisional set of sentiments – social attitude dimensions, corresponding to distinct social-relational affordances, whose states potentiate unique constellations of emotions. We highlight the positive dimensions *love*, *liking*, and *respect*, and the negative dimensions *hate* and *fear*. The positive dimensions correspond to distinct though potentially correlated positive fitness affordances: fitness dependence on an other (*love*; Shaver et al., 1996; Roberts, 2005), the receipt of benefits from an other (*like*; S. Fiske et al., 2007; Wojciszke et al., 2009; Trivers, 1971), and an other’s efficacy (*respect*; S. Fiske et al., *ibid.*; Wojciszke et al., *ibid.*; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Chapais, 2015). The negative dimensions correspond to distinct kinds of threat or cost imposition: *hate* tracks an other’s ongoing cost imposition, including zero-sum advantages relative to self (Royzman et al., 2005), while *fear* tracks an other’s willingness and ability to inflict costs under certain circumstances (Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Evers et al., 2014). A given value on one of these dimensions has the functional role of indexing a magnitude of that affordance and moderating behavior regulation systems, including emotions, to manage it. Each of these dimensions can range in value from nil to high, and each is named for its high value. However, the absence of value on a dimension can be

functionally significant, and can be linguistically marked or otherwise psychologically or socially salient.

Below we make this case for an absence of *respect*, which we identify with *contempt*. In addition, multiple orthogonal dimensions of attitudes can create composite sentiments. For example, equal amounts of liking and disliking can lead either to indifference (when neither is appreciable) or to ambivalence (when both are appreciable; Cacioppo et al., 1999.).

A second hypothesis of the ASE model is that each attitude state is emotionally pluripotent, disposing diverse emotions towards its object, thereby constituting a sentiment. Each emotion, in turn, might play a role in numerous sentiments. The functional logic is straightforward: each attitude-by-scenario interaction creates an adaptive problem best addressed by a particular emotion. Such events might include an other's approach, achievement, misfortune, or death, injuring them oneself, their witnessing one's own transgression, and so on. Each of these scenarios has unique fitness implications within a relationship, and each means very different things across relationships depending on how the person involved is valued. For instance, if *love* proxies fitness dependence on an other, as cued, for example, by indispensable coalitionary support, then the death of a loved one should lead to a response that solicits social support to mitigate that potential fitness decrement (e.g., *sadness*; Keller & Nesse, 2006). In contrast, if *hate* proxies an other's ongoing costs to self, as cued, for example, by their monopolization of resources, then the death of a hated one should evoke a positively reinforcing response (e.g., *schadenfreude*; Hareli & Weiner, 2002; van Dijk et al., 2006). The emotional pluripotency of sentiments explains the lack of direct behavioral correspondence between attitudes and behavior – appraised situations and emotions intervene (see, e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Mackie et al., 2000).

Though a central feature of the early sentiment construct (e.g., Shand, 1920), emotional pluripotency departs radically from most recent discussions. These assume a one-to-one correspondence between

emotions and sentiments, with sentiments being mere latent emotions awaiting reinstatement by the sentiment object (e.g., *hate* as latent *anger*; Frijda, 1994; Lazarus, 1991; see also Averill, 1991; Clore & Ortony, 2008). Instead, following Royzman et al. (2005), we maintain that each sentiment disposes multiple discrete emotions conditioned on the actions and fortunes of the attitude object. A negative sentiment such as *hate* can dispose positive emotions such as *joy* at another's suffering, while a positive sentiment such as *love* can dispose negative emotions such as *sadness* at another's death -- there is no simple one-to-one correspondence that depends on previous association for emotion elicitation. Instead, there is an adaptive grammar of emotions within relationships resulting from the dispositions of attitudes across social scenarios. Nonetheless, it may be that some sentiments have proprietary emotions among their dispositions that function like latent emotions -- for example, an emotion *love* disposed by an attitude *love* (Frijda, 1994; Shaver et al., 1996), contributing to the unique structure of the sentiment *love*. Similarly, the sentiment *fear* may include a particularly strong association between an attitude *fear* and an emotion *fear*. In future work it may therefore be prudent to notate polysemous scientific language when referring to a sentiment network (e.g., FEAR_S, LOVE_S), or to its component attitude (e.g., FEAR_A, LOVE_A) or proprietary emotion (e.g., FEAR_E, LOVE_E).

4.4. The deep structure of folk affect concepts

The ASE model is a novel rapprochement between evolutionary psychology and psychological anthropology: it maintains that human social affect has an evolved, functionally-specialized architecture, while theorizing the pathways through which this architecture finds variable conceptual and cultural manifestation. Folk affect concepts are patterned by embodied experience, which is itself patterned by the engagement of basic affect systems by local ecological, social, and cultural circumstances. The

structure of sentiments – as functional networks of contingent attitudes and emotions – allows many experientially-grounded sources of variation in folk affect concepts.

The ASE model implies that folk affect concepts can vary in whether they emphasize the distinctness of discrete emotions experienced across sentiments, or the relational significance of attitude states that anchor multiple emotions within sentiments. This difference may map onto the contrast in affect concepts of relatively individualistic and collectivistic cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; White & Kirkpatrick, 1985), but it needn't be static or absolute. Tran (2015) describes recent changes in Vietnamese ethnopsychologies in and around Ho Chi Minh City spurred by neoliberal reform policies, decollectivisation, and rising consumerism. Alongside the traditional folk notion of "sentiment" (*tinh cam*), which emphasizes durable feelings *for* others, relational states, and interpersonal obligations, there is an emerging folk concept of "emotion" (*cam xuc*) that emphasizes discrete and differentiated internal experiences *because of* exposure to things and people.

Folk affect concepts may also vary in the prototypical emotions associated with particular attitudes, as a result of different social scenarios tending to occur within relationships. For example, *love* can lead to a host of acute emotions, such as *contentment* and *grief*, but which are most salient may vary across individuals or populations. Lutz (1988) describes the concept of "love" (*fago*) in Ifaluk, a low-lying Micronesian atoll. In this interdependent community with low relational mobility and high extrinsic mortality, *love* as dependence most saliently begets compassion, sadness, longing, pity, and other concomitants of loss, separation, vulnerability, and obligation. In contrast, *love* in populations with high relational mobility and low extrinsic mortality may lead most saliently to contentment, joy, and other positive consumatory experiences, as in the canonical English concept of "love".

The ASE model also indicates that folk affect concepts may vary in whether varieties of an emotion are distinguished based on their attitudinal antecedents (e.g., “schadenfreude”), and in whether they are suffused with particular relational values and expectations. For example, Tran (2015) describes the distinction in modern Vietnamese between “happiness” (*hạnh phúc*), traditionally linked with the fulfillment of relational expectations, and “joy” (*niềm vui*), a newer concept expressing satisfaction from self-motivated choice. Likewise, the concurrence of distinct sentiments within relationships may vary across populations. Concepts that capture the conjunction of *respect* and *fear* may be alien to those in putatively meritocratic and egalitarian societies without ascribed hierarchies, but they are salient where dominance and subordination are valued facets of social life (e.g., Indonesia; Fessler, 2004). Finally, clusters of related affect terms may correspond to different contextual or behavioral manifestations of particular sentiments. In the case of *contempt*, such terms might include “scorn”, “disdain”, “sneering”, “defiance”, “anger”, “disgust”, “derision”, and “haughty” (Darwin, 1872; Izard, 1977).

The principal implication of the ASE model for folk affect concepts is that variation in such concepts comes not only from the historical and experiential vagaries of categorization or social construction. To a significant and verifiable extent, it also results from the manifolds of sentiments. Networks of contingent attitudes and emotions create many degrees of freedom for differences in the actual engagement of basic affect systems, and in their conceptual representation across words, individuals, and populations. Nevertheless, variation in folk affect concepts should be predictably patterned, following the joints of sentiments as these are differentially engaged by local circumstances and systems of meaning.

5. The deep structure of “contempt”

The ASE model of sentiments, and its implications for folk affect concepts, can explain the coherence of the features of “contempt” as well as variation in their manifestations across studies, individuals, and populations. We begin by fleshing out the basic affect systems of the sentiment *respect*, which largely define the sentiment *contempt*. We then detail how this sentiment explains the features of “contempt” and effectively organizes the extant findings in the contempt literature.

5.1. The sentiment respect

Of the multiple meanings of “respect” (Langdon, 2007), most are consistent with an underlying sentiment that tracks an other’s practical and moral efficacy in domains relevant to the evaluator (S. Fiske et al., 2002; Wojciszke et al., 2009). These standards are subjective, defined relative to the evaluator’s goals, abilities, and social options, but they can stem from shared criteria defining a social role. Ultimately, respect facilitates forming mutualisms with efficacious individuals (see also McClelland, 2011) by motivating tolerance of, and interest in, their continued functioning, and facilitating prosocial emotions (e.g., *compassion*, *guilt*, and *shame*) that foster engagement and mitigate harm done to them. Increasing levels of respect track an other’s relative expertise in relevant cultural domains, which makes the other an increasingly valuable source of information and positive externalities. While minimal respect engenders tolerance and interest in an other’s continued functioning, increasing respect motivates increasing concern, deference, and imitation (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), as well as followership and support (Van Vugt, 2006). *Respect* is implicated in many of the social behaviors that constitute human ultrasociality, including reciprocal relationships (Trivers, 1971), prestige-biased cultural learning (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), and followership in the resolution of coordination problems (King et al., 2009; Price & Van Vugt, 2014). In each case, *respect* plays a role in assortment by indexing which individuals are competent norm adherents, potential sources of cultural skills, and

capable leaders. *Respect* is one proximate mechanism that may implement strategies modeled as explanations for the evolution of cooperation, including partner selection (e.g., Hruschka & Henrich, 2006) and indirect reciprocity (e.g., Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004).

5.2. *The sentiment contempt*

If *respect* is necessary for many human social behaviors, then an absence of *respect* should be functionally significant. We identify the absence of *respect* as the sentiment *contempt* (Figure 1). By hypothesis, the core of *contempt* is an attitude state that represents an other's low intrinsic value to self due to their inefficacy in adhering to social-relational standards; they have either failed to establish their worth, or shown themselves unworthy of previous positive valuation. This attitude state is constituted by a lack of felt *respect* and by the cognitive schema of "looking down on" someone, leading to indifference, intolerance, and exploitation through emotion moderation. Together, these dispositions minimize the costs incurred from poor relationship partners and maximize the benefits extracted from them.

Contempt potentiates two clusters of emotion dispositions. First, the prosocial emotions supported by *respect* are muted, leading to cold indifference and exploitation, i.e., *contempt* undermines emotions that implement subjective commitment (Fessler & Quintelier, 2013) to valuable relationships. The target may be ignored, and, as their welfare is not valuable, empathy and *compassion* are not engaged. There is no valuable relationship for *guilt* to preserve as a disincentive to exploit the other, nor is there a relationship for *guilt* to repair following a transgression (Baumeister et al., 1994; Fessler & Haley, 2003); any benefit taken is a net benefit lacking a countervailing cost. Moreover, the target's approval is not important and their knowledge of one's own transgressions should not motivate *shame*. Accidents

befalling them are not perceived as serious for oneself, as no valuable relationship is thereby threatened, potentiating mirth and Duchenne laughter (Gervais & Wilson, 2005).

Figure 1. A schematic representation of the hypothesized sentiment *contempt*. Relational cues to an other's inefficacy and low value establish an attitudinal representation of an other that is an absence of *respect*; they are worthless and below oneself. This creates two clusters of emotion dispositions: muted prosocial emotions such as *compassion*, *guilt*, and *shame*, and potentiated hostile emotions including *anger*, *disgust*, and *mirth*. These emotions create both the "cold" and "hot" aspects of contempt phenomenology, and implement indifference, exploitation, intolerance, and exclusion.

Second, the hostile emotions mitigated by *respect* are instead potentiated in *contempt*, leading to intolerance and exclusion. Any actual or potential cost imposed by the other – including proximity as a cue to cost imposition – registers as a net cost, disposing *anger* and behaviors that will deter the other in the future (see, e.g., Sell et al., 2009). The target also presents costs that can be mitigated through the co-opted avoidance tendencies of *disgust*. These costs include culture contamination – inadvertently copying the practices that may have earned that person contempt in the first place – and image infection, or stigma-by-association (e.g., Neuberg et al., 1994).

Contempt can be inferred from expressions and behaviors associated with its various emotion dispositions, especially as these diverge from civil interaction – being unmoved by another’s joy, reacting aggressively to a minor transgression, or laughing at another’s misfortune. *Contempt* is associated with the unilateral lip curl (Ekman & Friesen, 1986), a mild threat display given the proximity of someone not valued and hence potentially costly (Darwin, 1872; Izard & Haynes, 1988). Not surprisingly, within an established relationship, these dispositions and expressions initiate relationship dissolution.

There is convergent empirical support for this model of *contempt*. Mounting evidence indicates that empathy and concern are moderated by social closeness and relationship value (e.g., Cikara & Fiske, 2011; Hein et al., 2010). These effects are both direct and mediated by reduced motivation to perspective-take (Batson et al., 2007) and affiliate (van Kleef et al., 2008). There is also evidence that increasing someone’s power (Lammers & Stapel, 2011) or social capital (Waytz & Epley, 2011) increases their indifference and dehumanization towards distant others, consistent with *contempt*. The down-regulation of concern by those high in relative efficacy is evident in increased rule breaking, exploitation, and cheating by wealthier individuals (Piff et al., 2012). Likewise, increased physical formidability

enhances anger reactivity (Sell et al., 2009). The coincidence of in-group love and out-group indifference (Brewer, 1999) is explicable as outgroup *contempt* abetted by in-group interdependence and solidarity.

Contempt is plausibly the default social sentiment in psychopathy. Clinical psychopaths are characterized by a constellation of anti-social traits and behaviors, including “cold” affect, arrogance, interpersonal manipulation, impulsivity, irresponsibility, and both reactive (anger-based) and instrumental aggression (Blair et al., 2005; Hare, 1996; though see Reidy et al., 2011). Psychopaths thus appear *contemptuous* in all of their interactions: arrogant, without guilt, empathy, shame, or social sadness; exploitative, reactively intolerant, and blaming others – all adaptive dispositions vis-à-vis someone held in *contempt*. Supporting this, clinical psychopaths are capable of empathy but are usually unmotivated to empathize (Meffert et al. 2013), while subclinical psychopathic traits predict the conditioning of concern and relational investment on another’s manifest relational value (Arbuckle & Cunningham, 2012; Gervais et al., 2013; Molenberghs et al., 2014).

Lending discriminant value to our approach, *contempt* differs markedly from *hate*, though they are often conflated (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2007). Described as “inverse caring” (Royzman et al., 2005), *hate* represents an other as actively competitive or threatening, and motivates harming an other and delighting in their misfortune. In contrast, *contempt* is not the inverse of caring, but merely its absence – it disposes instrumental exploitation and reactive aggression towards a devalued other, but does not intrinsically motivate harming or annihilating them. A wide variety of harmful acts are motivated not by intrinsic motives to harm the other, but as a means to other ends. This implicates *contempt* instead of *hate* in many so-called “hate crimes” and “cold-blooded killings,” as *contempt* makes the condemned vulnerable to use by the contemnor in satisfying extrinsic goals, including rape, theft, and attempts to signal formidability or in-group commitment.

5.3. The evolution and phylogeny of contempt

How might *contempt*, as the absence of *respect*, have evolved? To start with, *respect* must be a derived capacity within a species' neurocognitive repertoire. Species lacking this capacity – plausibly the prevailing pattern in the animal kingdom, especially among non-social animals – merely evince *pseudocontempt* in their intolerance and indifference to conspecifics. Among social species capable of differentiated relationships involving interest, tolerance, coordination, and reciprocity among non-kin (including “friendships”), we might expect that *respect* evolved to facilitate the establishment and maintenance of valuable relationships with efficacious others. In such species, *respect* could be gained or lost, making *contempt* relationally significant.

The ancestral form of respect (*protorespect*) may have been directed up dominance hierarchies towards especially efficacious conspecifics, motivating interest and investment in exchange for the benefits uniquely available from those of high rank (Chapais, 2015). This system – involving “looking up to” another – may have co-opted a physical size schema with even deeper phylogenetic roots in force-based agonistic interactions (A. Fiske, 1991; Holbrook et al., 2015), just as the emotion systems *protopride* and *protoshame* were coopted from dominance hierarchies for use in prestige hierarchies (Fessler, 1999; 2004). The cognitive side of *contempt* – “looking down on” another – likewise finds a plausible homologue in dominance hierarchies (Darwin, 1872; Frijda, 1986; Izard & Haynes, 1988), especially towards lower-ranking conspecifics that cannot deliver benefits upwards and fail to earn *respect*. Dominant individuals in many species act contemptuous towards replaceable and low-ranking conspecifics – indifferent, intolerant, even exploitative – while showing *respect*-like tolerance and cooperation in more valuable relationships (e.g., Smuts & Watanabe, 1990; see Chapais, *ibid.*). To the

extent that high rank is contingent on the support of subordinates, mutual respect may change the quality of dominance interactions and hierarchies (Boehm, 1999; Chapais, *ibid.*). The interaction of positive yet asymmetrical levels of respect could sustain a legitimate status hierarchy, involving upwards support, deference, followership, and propitiation, and downwards *noblesse oblige* and pastoral responsibility, approximating the Authority Ranking (AR) relational model (Fiske, 1991).

Beyond a capacity for conditional *respect*, in a few species we might expect further derived mechanisms that facilitate social tolerance and the discovery of mutualisms on a larger or faster scale. Two possible mechanisms are an elevated baseline level of *respect* towards conspecifics, and prepared, one-shot cue-based learning. Such mechanisms are plausibly found in humans, owing to the co-evolution of risk-pooling, obligate cultural learning, expanding social networks, and ratcheting interdependence (e.g., Hill et al., 2011; Tomasello et al., 2012). *Contempt* can be implicated in facilitating the evolution of human ultrasociality once prestige and community expectations gained a foothold in our lineage. *Contempt* implements low-cost or indirect punishment, such as exclusion from cooperative ventures, potentiating social selection (Boehm, 2012; Nesse, 2007). Specifically, *contempt* as relative devaluation should have selected for strategies for its avoidance – including adherence to norms for the sake of predictability in joint enterprise (Fessler, 1999, 2007), social niche differentiation and the cultivation of worth to others (Sugiyama & Sugiyama, 2003; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996), and socio-cultural competence culminating in leadership and prestige (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Price & Van Vugt, 2014; Chapais, 2015). Efficacy in adhering to community moral expectations could likewise engender *respect* and mitigate contempt (see Rozin et al. 1999). It may be the significance of *lost* respect, especially for moral failings, that makes *contempt* particularly salient in human social life; that is, *contempt* may be a uniquely human moral sentiment, but only insofar as humans are unique in their moral expectations. One upshot of this phylogenetic history may be a kludgy solution to relational tracking that evinces phylogenetic legacies

in its proximate instantiation (Fessler & Gervais, 2010), including bleeding across the bases for *contempt*, as illustrated by metaphors of possessing “weak” moral fiber, engaging in “low” actions (Lakoff, 1995), or having a “small” intellect.

5.4. The deep structure of “contempt”

The ASE model of the sentiment *contempt* lays the groundwork for understanding the features of the folk affect concept “contempt” (see Table 1). “Contempt” is parsimoniously explained as a conceptual schema patterned by *contempt* as we have characterized it; it is anchored by a relatively stable attitude state and incorporates, to variable degrees, the cues, emotions, experiences, and behaviors causally linked with that attitude. In other words, the folk affect concept “contempt” is a conceptual and cultural construction built on and by the functional structure of the sentiment *contempt*.

“Contempt” is (1) object-focused and (2) enduring. These are basic features of attitudes as enduring representations of the value of particular people or objects. “Contempt” specifically results from (3) cues of another’s physical, cultural, or moral inefficacy, and entails (4) loss of respect and status diminution. These features are key aspects of the function of *contempt* as a representation of another’s low relational value to the perceiver. This attitude is facilitated by attributions that the other is unable to change, hence the salience of character attributions as beliefs that support “contempt”. The phylogenetic analysis of *contempt* suggests a source domain for the representational feature of “looking down on” someone.

“Contempt” is associated with (5) “cold” indifference. This conceptual metaphor follows from the role of *contempt* in reducing the “warm” feelings associated with friendship, respect, and committed

relationships (Kövecses, 2003); *contempt* undermines emotional engagement and compassion, thus potentiating “cold-blooded” treatment. In other situations, “contempt” is associated with (6) *anger* and *disgust*. This is the second, “hot” constellation of emotions potentiated by *contempt*. Experienced as “boiling inward” in Frijda et al.’s (1989) study, these emotions mitigate costs incurred from low-value partners. Anger and disgust may be also involved in the establishment of *contempt*. Anger gives rise to *contempt* when intrinsic attributions and low control attend relational transgressions (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; see also Fridhandler & Averill, 1982). Disgust and contempt co-occur when the same information that cues low value also cues a threat that can be addressed through avoidance.

That *contempt* moderates diverse emotions and behaviors explains why (7) “contempt” can be expressed in so many ways – a mild threat signaling “stay away” (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1986); largeness or a downward glance signaling “I’m better than you” (e.g., Izard & Haynes, 1988); disappointment signaling “you’re not good enough for me” (e.g., Russell, 1991c); anger (e.g., Alvarado & Jameson, 1996), disgust (e.g., Ekman et al., 1987), indifference (e.g., Wagner, 2000), and laughter (e.g., Miller, 1997) as emotion dispositions that index *contempt* in context; and also ridicule, disrespect, vulgarity, and a lack of shameful modesty in the other’s presence, which index lack of regard for them. Finally, the outcomes associated with “contempt” – (8) intolerance, exclusion, exploitation, and relationship dissolution – follow from the emotional dispositions created by *contempt*, which function to minimize the costs incurred, and maximize the benefits extracted, from low-value individuals.

The ASE model of *contempt* thus organizes the existing contempt literature and makes sense of the eight features that cohere in the “contempt” concept. This includes the findings for which contempt has been labeled a “special case”, most notably individual variation in the meaning of “contempt”, diverse expressions, both “hot” and “cold” phenomenology, and “nebulous” association with anger and disgust.

In addition to shedding light on existing data, the ASE model generates predictions about how the “contempt” concept should be patterned across studies, individuals, cultures, and social ecologies. In the next section we flesh out these predictions and future directions, after which we develop more general implications of the ASE model for studies of basic affect systems and folk affect concepts. In evaluating the utility of the ASE model, we stress that it makes predictions about the structure and variation of folk affect concepts where few if any other theories do. Folk affect concepts are the most directly observable affective phenomena and the most experience-near for participants, lending added value to any theory that can explain and predict their form.

6. Predictions and Future Directions

6.1. Predicting variation in contempt and “contempt”

In addition to explaining the coherence of the features of the “contempt” concept, the ASE model of the sentiment *contempt* hypothesizes many dimensions along which the meaning of “contempt” can vary or change over time. This multifaceted architecture explains the lack of consensus on the meaning of “contempt” (Rosenberg & Ekman, 1995; Matsumoto, 2005), while generating predictions and insights into variation and change in “contempt” and related folk concepts.

In the ASE model, attitudes and emotions are tightly linked causally as well as temporally. Owing to this functional dependency and close association in experience, attitudes and emotions should be readily conflated in folk affect concepts (Frijda et al., 1991). Nonetheless, it should be possible to probe sentiments for their distinct functional components. For example, at the synchronic level of psychology experiments, the meaning of “contempt” should be fluid as different frames or primes make salient

different aspects of the underlying sentiment – not only the “hot” or “cold” emotion constellations of *contempt*, but also whether it resembles an emotion or an attitude. Asking about “a time” one felt contempt should foreground the occurrent emotionality of contempt establishment or situational reactivity. In contrast, asking about a person towards whom one feels contempt should foreground the enduring evaluation of the relationship and its cold consideration. More broadly, a productive line of research might explore the malleability of affect concepts, and whether apparent individual or cultural differences in affect concepts can be erased or reversed through the foregrounding of different aspects of relational experience grounded in emotions or attitudes.

The ASE model also suggests that the same sentiment may manifest differently in different relationships if the targets share a core fitness affordance (e.g., inefficacy for *contempt*) but differ in other affordances or social contexts. For example, within individuals but across their relationships, “contempt” likely takes different forms. If one person held in contempt is frequently encountered, and is thought to impinge on the contemnor, contempt will be suffused with the “hot” constellation of *anger* and *disgust* dispositions. In contrast, a condemned person whom is rarely encountered may be coldly considered. *Contempt* may also co-occur with other attitudes. If someone low in efficacy is nonetheless a source of fitness benefits (e.g., via relatedness), *contempt* may co-occur with *love*, buttressing pro-social emotions and creating experienced “pity”. In contrast, if someone of low moral efficacy evinces cues to cost imposition and competition, they may also be *hated*, amplifying *anger* and adding resentment and spiteful motives to experienced contempt. On its own, *contempt* should not potentiate schadenfreude-like pleasure at another’s misfortune (see, e.g., Cikara & Fiske, 2012), but instead indifference, or Duchenne laughter only if their misfortune satisfies the incongruity condition of humor (Gervais & Wilson, 2005) (see Fig. 1).

While *contempt* is distinct from *hate*, it should insidiously facilitate *hate* by generating credulity toward portrayals of the other as threatening, even evil (Sternberg, 2003). The cost/benefit ratio of believing vilifying information about an other hinges on the value of the other as a potential relationship partner. If, as in *contempt*, the other is presently represented as worthless, then the costs of erroneously believing new false denigrating information are low, as no benefits are forsaken; conversely, the costs of erroneously rejecting true derogatory information will be high, as threats to the self are overlooked. When uncertainty attends decision-making, evolved systems should be biased toward the less-costly error (Haselton & Nettle, 2006). Hence, *contempt* should enhance credulity toward vilifying information. Writ large, *contempt* creates an attractor (Sperber, 1996) for villifying information, and is implicated in the success of propaganda campaigns and “witch hunts”, especially those directed at contemned statuses, minorities, or outsiders.

Because sentiments subjectively represent the fitness affordances of others, they should be calibrated to individual differences in variables that influence one’s own relative value and the value of social relationships more generally. Individual differences in sentiment profiles – differences in emotion dispositions created by differences in attitude baselines – may be an important yet overlooked source of so-called trait emotions and personality differences. This implies that, across individuals, there should be differences in proneness to *respect* and *contempt* that influence the varieties of “contempt” experienced. Clinical psychopathy may be an extreme case of obligate *contempt* across relationships. More usually, these differences will be a function of one’s own perceived efficacy and value relative to others. For example, high resource-holding power should circumscribe the number of others deemed valuable, making one “contemptuous”. High resource-holding power in a steep, unstable social ecology should sensitize one to threats to resources from others, making “contempt” relatively “hot”. In contrast, a stable dominance hierarchy insulates those at the top from such threats, while making them

enduring sources of costs for those on lower rungs; in the thermodynamics of rigid hierarchies, “cold” contempt should sink, while “hot” contempt rises.

Within populations, folk affect concepts should be fluid over time, influenced by changes in the lived costs and benefits of social relationships, as well as shifting normative discourses pertaining to self, society, and morality. The turn towards “emotion” in urban Vietnamese ethnopsychologies (Tran, 2015), discussed earlier, indexes the increasing salience of discrete *emotions* per se, a shift apparently driven by urbanization, market integration, and individualization. Historical shifts may also occur with respect to particular sentiments. For example, the predominant meaning of “contempt” and its nearest translations may be fluid over historical time. We suggest that one reason for the common conflation of “contempt” with “anger”, “disgust”, and “hate” is that successive civil rights movements in America have undercut the public legitimacy of *contempt*. Many such movements are responses to *contempt* and hinge on counter-claims to dignity and *respect* – from the “unalienable rights” listed in the Declaration of Independence, to the Declaration of Sentiments at Seneca Falls that “all men *and women* are created equal” (Stanton, 1848/2007; emphasis added), to the more recent affirmation that #BlackLivesMatter. In the moral discourse of a “dignity” culture (Leung & Cohen, 2011), all people have, and ought to be treated as though they have, inviolable rights and worth. This prescribes *respect* and renders illegitimate, even contemptible, looking down on or treating as worthless many historically condemned statuses – a pattern that potentially explains the more than five-fold decrease over the last two centuries in the proportion of words in English-language books that are ‘contempt’ (Google Ngram: Michel et al., 2010). In this context, only those universally viewed as morally depraved – such as Nazis, pedophiles, or, within political parties, the other political party – remain legitimately and publicly contemptible. This normative stance conflates in discourse and experience *contempt* and *hate* and their conjoint emotional outcomes *anger* and *disgust*. It may even “unmark” many cases of cold contempt,

making them even more insidious, for instance in implicit racial biases. If this account is correct, differences in the texture of “contempt” should be evident in comparisons of the corpuses of early and recent American English, older and younger Americans, and American and British English speakers, wherein modern American contempt should be relatively “hot” and bound up with *anger*, *disgust*, and *hate*. Generally, any transition from an autocracy to a democracy should be accompanied by a shift in the content of the nearest cultural model of *contempt* away from the cold, matter-of-fact representation of inferiority, towards hot emotional reactions to the trampling of rights and dignity.

Across populations, folk affect concepts should also vary in systematic ways. For example, the nearest translations of “contempt” will vary in content as a function of differences in social organization and the frequencies of particular relational events, in addition to local moral discourses. In contrast to the “hot” contempt of dignity cultures (see above), “contempt” will take on cold tones of disappointment and indifference in contexts where failings or essentialized differences are common grounds for devaluation. This includes honor cultures, in which respect has to be earned, and *contempt* plays a legitimate role in everyday social life (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 1986). In populations with low relational mobility and high interdependence – for example, some “face” cultures (e.g., Doi, 1973) – contempt will be infused with pity from the parallel engagement of *love* by that interdependence. In autocratic stratified settings, “contempt” should involve cold instrumentality directed downwards, and hot indignation and resentment directed upwards. “Reverence” as the conjunction of *love* and *respect* may be more common in social structures with freely-conferred status differences, while such societies may lack terms, common elsewhere, for the composite sentiments of *respect* and *fear*. Specific variables of interest that might influence the manifestation of *contempt* and other sentiments include the structure, size, and fluidity of social networks, levels of risk pooling and collective action, rates of within- and between-group violence, and the presence of interaction rituals that cue different relational affordances

– in short, any variable that influences the perceived costs and benefits of social relationships. As with individual differences, we would implicate culturally variable sentiment profiles as a source of genuine cultural differences in emotional proclivities and social behavior. Nonetheless, there should be deep similarities across populations in the contingencies that obtain between particular valuations of relationships and the emotional concomitants of those relationships in particular appraised scenarios – that is, “context-dependent universals” (Chapais 2014) in attitude-scenario-emotion linkages.

6.2. General ASE predictions and future directions

The preceding predictions about folk affect concepts hinge on the underlying structure of basic affect systems as characterized in the ASE model of sentiments, especially our model of *contempt*, which exemplifies the structure of sentiments and the consequences of this structure for folk affect concepts. Of course, our predictions about variation in concepts of “contempt” could be wrong without imperiling the underlying model of *contempt*, if, for example, our assumptions about the relationship of basic affect systems and folk affect concepts are mistaken. Likewise, our specific model of *contempt* could be wrong without imperiling the more general ASE model of sentiments; *contempt* may not be an absence of *respect*, or it may not be a sentiment at all. For these reasons, it is worth sketching more general empirical contributions of the ASE model as well as metatheoretical virtues of this approach.

The ASE model distinguishes attitudes and emotions by their computational form and function. In so doing, it pioneers an explicit evolutionary psychological approach to attitudes to complement that which exists for emotions (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1990; Nesse, 1990). The venerable attitude literature has continually reconsidered the nature of its own constructs and redefined “attitude” across the years (Allport, 1935; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; see Gawronski, 2007). Emphasizing form-function fit, functional

specialization, and the adaptive problems of personal social relationships, the ASE model extends this tradition in the direction of consilient social theory.

Empirically, there are a number of operational indicators that may be used to distinguish attitudes and emotions (summarized in Table 2, column 3). For example, in natural language use, the object-specificity of attitudes should manifest in statements regarding “feelings about” someone, while the more diffuse and systemic operation of emotions should manifest in statements regarding “feelings because of” some event. Phenomenologically, it should be possible to introspect present attitudes coldly and dispassionately, while emotions remain relatively “hot” during their operation. As enduring representations, attitudes should have a relatively stable time course updated only by new object-relevant information, while the course of emotions should be relatively fleeting, lasting only as long as the eliciting scenario (however protracted). Structurally, attitudes are principally evaluations of someone and require only that object (real or imagined) for their activation. In contrast, the structure of emotions is that of systemic mobilization without necessarily a clear object, but instead patterned changes across the organism (Kragel & LaBar, 2013). No single heuristic is likely to clearly distinguish emotions and attitudes in all cases; their casual and temporal dependencies, which mask their distinction in folk affect concepts, will likewise complicate scientific attempts to empirically disentangle them (see also Frijda et al., 1991). For example, this may explain why “hate” and “anger” are not reported to vary in their duration (Royzman et al., 2005) – if *hate* requires *anger* (among other emotions) to mobilize action, and if *anger* can follow recurrently from *hate*, then their conceptual representations may well overlap. Distinguishing attitudes and emotions in such folk affect concepts will require carefully crafted probes that assess the statistical clustering of multiple functional features across measures, including self-reports, physiology, neural signatures, and behavior.

The ASE model invites a host of novel questions about the psychological and functional interactions of emotions and attitudes. The attitude and emotion literatures have remained largely isolated for a half century; little research has explored how attitudes articulate with the appraisal processes theorized in the emotion literature, or how and when emotions influence attitudes (though see, e.g., Cunningham et al., 2007; Clore & Ortony, 2008). Considering how attitudes articulate with emotion-eliciting appraisals can inform relational models of appraisal, which attempt to specify the information that influences appraisal processes (see Smith & Kirby, 2009). For example, the valence or intrinsic pleasantness of a stimulus (see Scherer, 1999), important in the front end of appraisal, potentially cleaves closely to the evaluative representations of attitudes. Attitudes may play a direct role in appraisal by coordinating goals or more proximate motives vis-à-vis attitude objects (Shand, 1920; Frijda, 1994). Attitudes may also influence attention and perspective-taking, mediating, for example, empathic concern (Batson et al., 2007). Likewise, attitudes may influence ascriptions of causal locus, including ascriptions of intent for behaviors with positive versus negative outcomes (e.g., Peets et al., 2008). Reciprocally, emotions may update attitudes. This idea is central to the latent-emotion approaches to attitudes and sentiments (see also Baumeister et al., 2007), but conceptualizing attitudes as Internal Regulatory Variables, each updated by diverse emotions, greatly expands this underexplored area (see Tooby et al., 2008).

Two additional hypotheses of the ASE are 1) the existence of diverse orthogonal dimensions of interpersonal attitudes, and 2) the emotional pluripotency of attitude states. Together these features motivate the characterization of sentiments as higher-order attitude-emotion networks, and constitute key criteria for distinguishing sentiments from stand-alone attitudes or emotions. Sentiments should have some of the functional attributes of attitudes described above – including intentionality and durability – but will “feel” respectively like attitudes or emotions depending on circumstances. One signature of sentiments will be the tendency of people to infer them from diverse emotional

expressions. For example, *love* may be indexed by *joy*, *anger*, *fear*, or *sadness* in different contexts. This is readily testable in a modified emotion recognition paradigm with social-relational framings. Rather than asking which emotion a pictured person feels, researchers might ask how the pictured person feels *about* another person given their expression at that person's fate or action – a smile at that person winning the lottery or dying, for example. A similar paradigm, measuring emotional reactions to scenarios with a manipulation of target identities, could be used to characterize the precise emotional grammar for different values of each putative attitude across events. Distinct attitudes should produce divergent emotional outcomes under at least some circumstances – such as *envy* or *schadenfreude*-like *joy* following from *hate* but not *contempt*, or approach-induced anxiety that scales with *respect* but not *love*. Under our reconceptualization of interpersonal attitudes, it is unclear that any will be simple attitudes with only one emotional disposition. We have focused on *respect* and *contempt* as the anchors of one among many attitude dimensions, merely sketching a larger set of dimensions, and general functional links among cued affordances, attitudinal representations, and emotional dispositions. In doing so, we sought a middle ground between parsimony and functional specialization. Much more research will be necessary to catalogue and characterize the pantheon of sentiments, in particular in personal relationships. Most work on the dimensionality of attitudes has focused on stereotypes and impersonal judgments, arguably a distinct domain with its own adaptive problems and functional structure (see Fiske & Fiske, 2007 for discussion).

One fruitful line of research into the diversity of attitude dimensions might investigate their interactions and conjoint emotional outcomes within relationships. Because individuals are multifaceted, different features of an other may be represented via different attitudes, and these may conflict. For example, an actor may both *love* a close kinsperson and hold the other in *contempt* for the latter's divergent politics, a conflict that can produce "pity" due to the conjunction of (perceived) superiority and affection

(Fessler, 1999) – a quite different prediction from that which limits the objects of contempt to the “lowest of the low” (i.e. Cuddy et al., 2007). Children may be a common object of such affectionate contempt across populations. While this may seem counterintuitive given the Western folk affect concept of “contempt”, consider that, by the same logic, *hate* and *respect* can likewise intersect, as, for example, in the sentiments of a military leader toward a skilled and formidable foe. Some intersections of attitude dimensions may be common, while others are unlikely or even incommensurate, owing to the clustering of relational affordances in the world. What terms are there in the world’s affect lexicons for mixed-attitude relationships? If more than hyperbole, a “love/hate relationship” would illustrate the upper boundary of information summarization in the social mind, providing evidence of ambivalence at the coexistence of competing relational affordances, such as dependence and exploitation.

Interpersonal ambivalence may be an important signature of the multi-dimensionality of attitudes (Cacioppo et al., 1999). It also distinguishes the ASE from the theory that there is a single streamlined summary variable regulating self-other tradeoffs (i.e., the Welfare Tradeoff Ratio; Tooby et al., 2008). Studies of reaction times in social decision making could quantify the magnitude of ambivalence from different combinations of attitude states, while priming studies that foreground different facets of targets should be able to increase or reduce such ambivalence experimentally.

The ASE model links to and extends a growing literature in primatology on cost/benefit bookkeeping within social relationships (*sensu* Silk, 2003). Researchers studying social bonds, reciprocity, and assortment in non-human primates have proposed that emotions are the proximate mechanisms that track relational costs and benefits, adaptively regulating social behavior without explicit cognitive account keeping (e.g., Aureli & Schaffner, 2002; Evers et al., 2014; Schino & Aureli, 2009). The ASE model clarifies the functional systems in question, distinguishing the complementary forms and functions of bookkeeping attitudes and commitment emotions in networks of sentiment. Highlighting a

deep but previously unappreciated connection between bookkeeping and commitment, the ASE model grounds the commitment functions of emotions, including social engagement versus disengagement (Kitayama et al., 2006), or affiliation versus distancing (Fischer & Manstead, 2008), in antecedent bookkeeping indices of relational value. In so doing, the ASE model provides a novel lens for investigating the neurobiological bases of social relationship regulation.

The functional features of sentiments map closely onto the functional properties of some neuroendocrine systems, facilitating contingent behavior across social-relational contexts (Trumble, Jaeggi, & Gurven 2015). The ASE model creates a framework for testing how particular hormones and neural networks represent relationship value, update such representations, or implement behavior conditionally on such representations. For example, the proposed functions of the neuropeptide oxytocin range across these processes, including social memory, social bonding, and modulated tolerance, trust, and parochialism (Insel, 1992; Kosfeld et al., 2005; De Dreu et al., 2011). However, a careful examination of the evidence in light of the ASE model suggests that the functions of oxytocin are not the attitudinal encoding of value itself, but are specifically *emotion*-like, implementing a mode of behavior conditional on an existing representation of value (e.g., Crockford et al., 2013), or updating that representation given new cues to relationship value (e.g., Wittig et al., 2014). Evidence that oxytocin tracks relationship quality (e.g., Holt-Lunstad et al., 2014) should not be taken as evidence that oxytocin is in some sense *the* bond or attitude. Instead, we suggest it is moderated by a separate index of relationship value – an *attitude* – and implements adaptive behavior (e.g., tolerance, trust, investment) within a relationship thus indexed. The effects of exogenous oxytocin do appear contingent on other evaluative representations, such as those tied to group membership (De Dreu, 2012; though see Leng & Ludwig, 2015), suggesting that simply boosting oxytocin does not get one a bonded relationship; changes to the representation of the relationship, or the attitude, may be necessary.

1160

1161 What neural systems, then, encode relationship value and moderate the release of, and the effects of,
 1162 oxytocin and other neurotransmitters? Insight into social-relational valuation may be gained from
 1163 pathologies thereof, as in psychopathy or Frontotemporal Dementia. Though typically conceptualized as
 1164 pathologies of emotion, we reconceptualize these as *sentiment* disorders in which atypical attitudinal
 1165 representations disrupt downstream social emotions. Previous work on these conditions can thus be
 1166 interpreted as nominating candidate neural networks for encoding social valuation (or *attitudes*),
 1167 including the basolateral nucleus of the amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, anterior
 1168 insula, and superior temporal pole (see Anderson & Kiehl, 2012; Filippi et al., 2013; Yoder et al., 2015).
 1169 These areas are key components of the “salience network” (Seeley et al., 2007) regulating the
 1170 motivational import of social information, in line with a proposed function of attitudes. How these areas
 1171 relate to the regulation of neurohormones – their release and effects, for example – is a key outstanding
 1172 question for the neural implementation of sentiments. The construct of sentiment disorders can also
 1173 challenge received wisdom. For example, rather than an empathy deficit disrupting the development of
 1174 attachment in psychopathy (Blair et al., 1997), an inability to value others may be primary in
 1175 psychopathy and underlay psychopaths’ diminished empathy and resistance to socialization.

1176

1177 We have characterized sentiments as systems of endogenous affect that regulate social-relational
 1178 behavior. This is not to say that the engagement of these systems within any given relationship is the
 1179 only determinant of behavior within that relationship. Strong norms backed by punishment, or
 1180 obligations and expectations linked to reputation, can channel and constrain social behavior, motivating
 1181 generosity, or disincentivising exploitation, even in the absence of compassion or respect. At the same
 1182 time, the existence of norms such as “hate the sin, not the sinner” suggests that communities often
 1183 need norms to countervail the endogenous tendencies of social attitudes (Wilson, 2002). Despite

1184 extensive research on the individual and societal determinants of relational dynamics, the nature of the
 1185 psychological interactions between these influences on social behavior remains under-researched. What
 1186 work there is suggests significant cultural variation in the relative weight of relational attitudes and
 1187 internalized role expectations in determining social behavior. For instance, among Indian participants,
 1188 an internalized sense of duty can abet prosociality even within relationships that are devoid of warmth,
 1189 thus establishing two pathways to “intrinsically” motivated prosocial behavior (Miller & Bersoff, 1998;
 1190 Miller et al., 2011). However, the interaction of sentiments and internalized norms is likely more
 1191 intertwined than such cases suggest; internalization itself may be mediated by sentiments towards
 1192 community members generally, or towards authority figures (including supernatural agents) in
 1193 particular. Theorized as a psychological commitment device evolved to enhance norm conformity and
 1194 the social benefits thereof (Fessler, 2007), the internalization of norms should hinge on the perceived
 1195 fitness affordances of the holders of normative expectations. This is because the fitness benefits of
 1196 internalization apply only vis-à-vis those whose judgments are valuable as means to social, cultural, and
 1197 material resources. In other words, the costs of *not* internalizing norms follow from the negative
 1198 judgments of valuable allies or authorities. This implies that, over and above cultural variation in
 1199 normative expectations, individual and cultural differences in the internalization of norms may reflect
 1200 variation in *respect* for authority, or *love* for other group members, producing differences in the
 1201 commitment emotions regulated by these attitudes. This, in turn, predicts variation in the success of the
 1202 social control of sentiments; *love* or *respect* for authorities or other critical third parties may be
 1203 necessary to curb the enactment of *contempt* or *hate* in other social contexts within the group, and to
 1204 direct such antisocial sentiments towards rival out-groups. Dramatic changes in an individual’s
 1205 circumstances vis-à-vis a group, with corresponding changes in the relational value of group members,
 1206 may alter the degree to which norms are internalized as a function of changes in sentiments: a sudden
 1207 rise in an actor’s coercive power may lead to a decline in their *respect* for authority and the motivational

import of previously motivating norms, while defeat and assimilation by an outside group may lead to the abandonment of prior norms in favor of those of the new group on which one becomes dependent (cf. Cantor & Price, 2007).

7. Summary & Conclusion

Employing an adaptationist approach to the mind while taking transmitted culture seriously, we have sought to clarify the form and functions of contempt, a phenomenon that has resisted simple explanation. Decomposing the folk affect concept “contempt” into its eight component features reveals characteristics that cannot be fully accounted for by models that depict contempt as a basic emotion or by those that seek to explain it as an attitude. Rather, the features of “contempt” functionally cohere and map onto the basic affect systems of a *sentiment* – a network of basic emotions moderated by an attitudinal representation of social-relational value. The Attitude-Scenario-Emotion (ASE) model of sentiments details this construct, including the diversity of functionally-specialized attitude dimensions, and the emotional pluripotency of each attitude state. The sentiment *contempt* represents an other as worthless and below oneself, and potentiates both indifference to an other’s concerns and intolerance of their presence and any costs associated with them. The features of the folk affect concept “contempt” are the variably-experienced manifolds of this functional network – which may be more or less “cold”, more or less enduring, and experienced in conjunction with other sentiments such as *love* or *hate*. Though not simple, our explanation of contempt is parsimonious, explaining all the features of the folk affect concept “contempt” with reference to one high-level basic affect system, *contempt*.

This approach suggests a number of methodological and empirical insights, illuminating how “contempt” can be probed to reveal different features of the underlying sentiment, and shedding light on both when

1232 variation in “contempt” is to be expected and how corresponding folk affect concepts compare across
1233 social and temporal scales. More generally, the ASE model of sentiments has many virtues.
1234 Characterizing emotions and attitudes in complementary functional terms should facilitate engagement
1235 between emotion researchers and attitude researchers, connecting these mutually-isolated literatures.
1236 While the ASE model focuses on the role of attitudes in moderating emotions, it leaves room for the
1237 dynamic feedback of emotions on attitudes (see, e.g., Tooby et al., 2008). The computational-functional
1238 ASE model can be grounded in comparative neuroscience and can help clarify our understanding of the
1239 representational and motivational functions of different neural systems, including neuropeptides, the
1240 “salience network”, and the etiologies of emotion-related disorders. The model links psychological
1241 research to the comparative literature in primatology, fleshing out candidate proximate mechanisms for
1242 models of social evolution, and foregrounding enduring social relationships – the ancestral cornerstone
1243 of human adaptation – in the evolution and functions of social affect. By jointly considering evolved
1244 psychological architecture, the content of emotion lexicons, and genuine cultural differences in
1245 attitudes, emotions, and social behavior, this synthetic approach unifies the insights of evolutionary
1246 psychology, psychological anthropology, and cultural psychology – a necessary consilience if we are to
1247 understand humans as a biologically cultural species.
1248

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