

UCLA

UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Title

Citizenship Education in Comparative Perspective: Cross-national Variation in the Effects of Family Background on Adolescents' Civic Outcomes

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6qz4k4st>

Author

Kim, Hyung Ryeol

Publication Date

2013

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

Citizenship Education in Comparative Perspective:
Cross-national Variation in the Effects of Family Background on Adolescents' Civic Outcomes

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Education

by

Hyung Ryeol Kim

2013

© Copyright by

Hyung Ryeol Kim

2013

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Citizenship Education in Comparative Perspective:
Cross-national Variation in the Effects of Family Background on Adolescents' Civic Outcomes

by

Hyung Ryeol Kim

Doctor of Philosophy in Education

University of California, Los Angeles, 2013

Professor Carlos Alberto Torres, Chair

By utilizing the data from 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS), this dissertation examines the extent to which countries vary in the pattern and magnitude of the discrepancy in civic outcomes among adolescents from differing family backgrounds. Among the many family background characteristics that may shape adolescents' civic outcomes, I focus on two dimensions—family socioeconomic status (SES) and immigration background. I test hypotheses on how specific country-level factors, including (1) inequality of political voice by social class, (2) between-school segregation along socioeconomic lines, and (3) exclusionary/inclusionary policies on immigrant integration, mediate cross-national variations in the pattern and magnitude of civic disparities associated with family background. The results of this study underscore the intervening roles of politics, schooling, and public policy that modify the ways that the family of origin leaves a legacy for adolescents' civic outcomes. I find that in countries where citizens share relatively equal political voice, irrespective of their socioeconomic positions, adolescents from less advantaged SES families show higher levels of civic

empowerment than their similarly situated counterparts in countries where citizens at the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy are marginalized in politics. Countries' socioeconomic gaps in adolescents' civic outcomes are also systematically linked with degrees of between-school segregation along socioeconomic lines. While civic knowledge gaps by family socioeconomic levels are larger in countries with higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation, the corresponding gaps in citizenship self-efficacy and school-based civic participation are less substantial in these same countries. Finally, the findings indicate that an immigrant child or immigrant offspring in countries with more inclusionary immigration policies shows higher levels of civic competence and empowerment than his similarly situated counterpart in countries with more exclusionary immigration policies. Ultimately, this dissertation claims that the tendency for privileged families and their children to take greater civic advantages can be counteracted by transforming the pattern of cleavages in societies and the ways that such cleavages are institutionalized.

The dissertation of Hyung Ryeol Kim is approved.

Douglas M. Kellner

Val D. Rust

James Tong

Michael H. Seltzer

Carlos Alberto Torres, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2013

Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my family, especially...

to my dearest husband, Changho for being always there for me throughout the entire doctorate

program,

to my loving parents, Dad and Mom, for their endless love and support throughout my life,

to my sister, Hyungmin, for her understanding and encouragement,

to my mother-in-law, late father-in law, and the families of Changho for their patience;

to Bokdong for being my best cheerleader.

Table of Contents

| | |
|---|-----------|
| CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| Statement of the Problem | 1 |
| Objective of the Dissertation | 4 |
| Organization of the Dissertation | 9 |
| CHAPTER 2 DATA | 13 |
| Background..... | 13 |
| Participating Countries and Target Populations | 14 |
| Sampling Design..... | 15 |
| Data Collection and ICCS Instruments | 16 |
| CHAPTER 3 MACRO-LEVEL POLITICAL INEQUALITY AND THE IMPACT OF FAMILY SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND ON ADOLESCENTS' CIVIC OUTCOMES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 31 COUNTRIES | 19 |
| Introduction | 19 |
| Family Socioeconomic Background and Inequalities in Adolescents' Civic Outcomes | 21 |
| From Generation to Generation: Cross-national Variation in the Effect of Family Socioeconomic Background on Adolescents' Civic Outcomes | 24 |
| Research Questions | 26 |
| Data Source..... | 27 |
| Selection of Countries for Comparison..... | 27 |
| Measures..... | 28 |
| <i>Outcome Variables</i> | 28 |
| <i>Individual-level Variables</i> | 30 |
| <i>Country-level Variables</i> | 34 |
| <i>Missing Values</i> | 37 |

| | |
|--|------------|
| Analytic Approach | 38 |
| Results | 41 |
| <i>Descriptive Statistics</i> | 41 |
| <i>Mediating Effects of Home Civic Learning Environments</i> | 43 |
| <i>Cross-national Variations in the Effect of Parental Education</i> | 49 |
| Discussion and Conclusions | 57 |
| | |
| CHAPTER 4 SOCIOECONOMIC SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE IMPACT OF FAMILY SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND ON STUDENT CIVIC OUTCOMES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 28 COUNTRIES | 93 |
| Family Socioeconomic Background, Children’s Schooling, and Civic Outcomes | 96 |
| Socioeconomic School Segregation and Inequalities in Civic Outcomes..... | 99 |
| <i>Cross-national Variation in Socioeconomic School Segregation</i> | 100 |
| Data | 106 |
| Selection of Countries for Comparison | 106 |
| Measures..... | 107 |
| <i>Individual-level Variables</i> | 109 |
| <i>Country-level Variables</i> | 110 |
| <i>Missing Values</i> | 115 |
| Analytic Approach | 116 |
| Results | 121 |
| <i>Cross-national Differences in the Degree of Socioeconomic School Segregation</i> | 121 |
| <i>The Likelihood of Attending Low SES Schools</i> | 122 |
| <i>The Effects of Family SES and Other Individual-level Characteristics</i> | 123 |
| <i>The Relevance of Socioeconomic School Segregation for Cross-national Variation in the Effect of Family SES</i> | 128 |
| <i>Supplementary Analyses</i> | 136 |
| Discussion and Conclusions | 140 |
| | |
| CHAPTER 5 CIVIC ORIENTATIONS OF IMMIGRANT AND NATIVE ADOLESCENTS IN 24 COUNTRIES: THE IMPORTANCE OF IMMIGRATION POLICY CONTEXT..... | 173 |

| | |
|---|------------|
| Introduction | 173 |
| A Resource Model Approach to Explaining Differences in Civic Orientations and Participatory Patterns among Immigrant-origin and Native Adolescents..... | 177 |
| Immigration Policy Contexts Affecting the Civic Integration of Young Immigrants | 182 |
| Hypotheses..... | 186 |
| Data | 187 |
| Selection of Countries for Comparison..... | 187 |
| Measures..... | 188 |
| <i>Outcome Variables</i> | 188 |
| <i>Individual-level Variables</i> | 190 |
| <i>Country-level Variables</i> | 194 |
| <i>Missing Values</i> | 196 |
| Analytic Approach | 196 |
| Results | 201 |
| <i>Descriptive Statistics</i> | 201 |
| <i>Differences in Family Background and Political Socialization Experiences</i> | 203 |
| <i>Source of Differences in Civic Orientations between Immigrant-origin and Native Adolescents</i> | 207 |
| <i>The Relevance of Immigration Policy Contexts for Cross-national Variation in the Effect of Immigration Status</i> | 219 |
| <i>Supplementary Analyses</i> | 228 |
| Discussion and Conclusions | 230 |
| CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION..... | 274 |
| Research Questions Revisited..... | 274 |
| Macro-level Political Inequality | 275 |
| Socioeconomic School Segregation..... | 277 |
| Governmental Policy Context for Immigrant Integration | 280 |
| Limitations to the Research | 283 |

Further Research286

REFERENCES.....289

List of Figures

| | |
|---|-----|
| Figure 1-1 Conceptual Framework | 7 |
| Figure 3-1 Proportions of Parents’ Educational Attainment | 67 |
| Figure 3-2 Relative Effects of Parental Education, Home Literacy and Home Discussion (Internal Political Efficacy) | 81 |
| Figure 3-3 Relative Effects of Parental Education, Home Literacy and Home Discussion (Citizenship Self-efficacy)..... | 82 |
| Figure 3-4 Relative Effects of Parental Education, Home Literacy and Home Discussion (Expected Electoral Participation) | 83 |
| Figure 3-5 Effects of Parental Education on Adolescents’ Internal Political Efficacy, by Country’s Level of Political Inequality | 86 |
| Figure 3-6 Effects of Parental Education on Adolescents’ Citizenship Self-efficacy, by Country’s Level of Political Inequality | 89 |
| Figure 3-7 Effects of Parental Education on Adolescents’ Expected Electoral Participation, by Country’s Level of Political Inequality | 92 |
| Figure 4-1 Forest Plot of the 28 Effect Sizes of Family Socioeconomic Influence on Civic Knowledge Scores..... | 163 |
| Figure 4-2 Forest Plot of the 28 Effect Sizes of Family Socioeconomic Influence on Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores | 164 |
| Figure 4-3 Forest Plot of the 28 Effect Sizes of Family Socioeconomic Influence on Civic Participation at School Scores | 165 |
| Figure 4-4 Scatter Plot of the 28 Effect Sizes of Family Socioeconomic Influence on Civic Knowledge Scores by the Dissimilarity Index for Socioeconomic School Segregation | 166 |
| Figure 4-5 Scatter Plot of the 28 Effect Sizes of Family Socioeconomic Influence on Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores by the Dissimilarity Index for Socioeconomic School Segregation | 167 |
| Figure 4-6 Scatter Plot of the 28 Effect Sizes of Family Socioeconomic Influence on Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores by the Dissimilarity Index for Socioeconomic School Segregation | 168 |
| Figure 5-1 Proportions of Immigrant Students | 240 |
| Figure 5-2 Gaps in Expected Civic Knowledge Scores between Natives and First-generation Immigrants in 24 Countries | 250 |
| Figure 5-3 Gaps in Expected Civic Knowledge Scores between Natives and Second-generation Immigrants in 24 Countries | 251 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| Figure 5-4 Gaps in Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores between Natives and First-generation Immigrants in 24 Countries | 256 |
| Figure 5-5 Gaps in Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores between Natives and Second-generation Immigrants in 24 Countries | 257 |
| Figure 5-6 Gaps in Expected Electoral Participation Scores between Natives and First-generation Immigrants in 24 Countries | 262 |
| Figure 5-7 Gaps in Expected Electoral Participation Scores between Natives and Second-generation Immigrants in 24 Countries | 263 |
| Figure 5-8 Forest Plot of the 24 Effect Sizes of Native/immigrant Differences in Civic Knowledge Scores..... | 264 |
| Figure 5-9 Forest Plot of the 24 Effect Sizes of Native/immigrant Differences in Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores | 265 |
| Figure 5-10 Forest Plot of the 24 Effect Sizes of Native/immigrant Differences in Expected Electoral Participation Scores..... | 266 |
| Figure 5-11 The Expected Native/immigrant Differences in Civic Knowledge Scores among Countries with Inclusionary/Exclusionary Policies on Immigrant Integration | 268 |
| Figure 5-12 The Expected Native/immigrant Differences in Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores among Countries with Inclusionary/Exclusionary Policies on Immigrant Integration | 269 |
| Figure 5-13 The Expected Native/immigrant Differences in Expected Electoral Participation Scores among Countries with Inclusionary/Exclusionary Policies on Immigrant Integration.... | 270 |

List of Tables

| | |
|--|-----|
| Table 2-1 School, Student and Teacher Sample Sizes | 18 |
| Table 3-1 Variables Description | 62 |
| Table 3-2 Descriptive Statistics by Country | 64 |
| Table 3-3 Correlation Matrix for Country-level Variables | 68 |
| Table 3-4 Gaps in Internal Political Efficacy Scores between Adolescents Whose Parents Completed Tertiary Education and Did Not Complete Upper Secondary Education..... | 69 |
| Table 3-5 Gaps in Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores between Adolescents Whose Parents Completed Tertiary Education and Did Not Complete Upper Secondary Education..... | 70 |
| Table 3-6 Gaps in Expected Electoral Participation Scores between Adolescents Whose Parents Completed Tertiary Education and Did Not Complete Upper Secondary Education..... | 71 |
| Table 3-7 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents’ Internal Political Efficacy Scores on Parents’ Education, Home Civic Learning Environments and Controls..... | 72 |
| Table 3-8 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents’ Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores on Parents’ Education, Home Civic Learning Environments and Controls..... | 75 |
| Table 3-9 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents’ Expected Electoral Participation Scores on Parents’ Education, Home Civic Learning Environments and Controls | 78 |
| Table 3-10 Results from Two-level HLM Models of Adolescents’ Internal Political Efficacy Scores | 84 |
| Table 3-11 Variance Components of Two-level HLM Models of Adolescents’ Internal Political Efficacy Scores | 85 |
| Table 3-12 Results from Two-level HLM Models of Adolescents’ Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores | 87 |
| Table 3-13 Variance Components of Two-level HLM Models of Adolescents’ Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores | 88 |
| Table 3-14 Results from Two-level HLM Models of Adolescents’ Expected Electoral Participation Scores..... | 90 |
| Table 3-15 Variance Components of Two-level HLM Models of Adolescents’ Expected Electoral Scores | 91 |
| Table 4-1 Variable Definitions | 147 |
| Table 4-2 Descriptive Statistics by Country | 148 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| Table 4-3 Results from Ordinal Logistic Regression of the Likelihood of Attending Higher SES Schools | 151 |
| Table 4-4 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Civic Knowledge Scores on Family Socioeconomic Status, Other Family Background Characteristics, and Political Socialization Agents..... | 154 |
| Table 4-5 Results from HLM Meta-Analysis..... | 169 |
| Table 4-6 Supplementary Analysis for Adolescents' Civic Knowledge Scores | 170 |
| Table 4-7 Supplementary Analysis for Adolescents' Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores | 171 |
| Table 4-8 Supplementary Analysis for Adolescents' Civic Participation at School Scores | 172 |
| Table 5-1 Variables Description | 235 |
| Table 5-2 Descriptive Statistics by Country | 237 |
| Table 5-3 Correlation Matrix for Country-level Variables | 241 |
| Table 5-4 Comparing Individual and Familial Characteristics of Immigrant-origin and Native Adolescents..... | 242 |
| Table 5-5 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Civic Knowledge Scores on Immigration Status, Family Background, Political Socialization Agents, and Controls | 245 |
| Table 5-6 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores on Immigration Status, Family Background, Political Socialization Agents, and Controls | 252 |
| Table 5-7 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Expected Electoral Participation Scores on Immigration Status, Family Background, Political Socialization Agents, and Controls | 258 |
| Table 5-8 Results from HLM Meta-Analysis..... | 267 |
| Table 5-9 Results from Supplementary HLM Meta-Analysis (Civic Knowledge Scores)..... | 271 |
| Table 5-10 Results from Supplementary HLM Meta-Analysis (Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores) | 272 |
| Table 5-11 Results from Supplementary HLM Meta-Analysis (Expected Electoral Participation Scores)..... | 273 |

Acknowledgements

I would like to express the deepest appreciation to my committee chair, Professor Carlos Alberto Torres, for his continuous and unequivocal support of my doctorate study and research. He has patiently provided the vision, encouragement, and advice necessary for me to navigate through the most challenging task of the first 30 years of my life. This dissertation would not have come to a successful completion without his guidance and patience. I would like to thank Professor Michael Seltzer, who was willing to serve on my doctoral committee at the last moment. His pain-staking effort in revising my statistical data analyses is deeply appreciated. Despite his busy schedules, he has always made himself available to clarify my questions and doubts. I express my gratitude to Professor James Tong for his support and encouragement at various phases of my doctorate study. His instructive suggestions and meticulous comments on the first draft of this dissertation helped to shape and guide its direction. I would also like to thank Professor Douglas Kellner and Professor Val Rust for guiding my research and supporting me along this bumpy but fulfilling road.

Special thanks to my friends, Stephanie, Janna, LiangWen, Inês, Jing, Heeju, Michelle, Yoomi, and all others dear friends at UCLA who have shared moments of pleasure, happiness, and success together for the last four years. I have been truly blessed to have these wonderful friends in my life. I am sure that our friendships will extend well beyond our shared time in Los Angeles.

I owe my deepest gratitude to my parents, whose unconditional love, encouragement and trust have been my driving force behind this journey. I owe my sister, Hyungmin so much for her good wishes. I am also in dept to my in-laws for their patience and understanding. And last,

but not least, to my husband, thanks for being always there and supporting me in every possible way throughout the entire doctorate program.

Vita

- 2007
B.S., Civic and Moral Education
Seoul National University
Seoul, Republic of Korea
- 2007-2009
Teaching Assistant
Department of Education,
Seoul National University
Seoul, Republic of Korea
- 2009
M.S., Civic and Moral Education
Seoul National University
Seoul, Republic of Korea
- 2009-2010
International World Fellowship
The Delta Kappa Gamma Society International
Austin, Texas
- 2011
Lee Memorial Fellowship
Department of Education
University of California, Los Angeles
- 2009-2013
Fulbright Scholar
International Institute of Education
Department of State, USA

2009-

Contributing Member

Paulo Freire Institute

University of California, Los Angeles

Publications and Presentations

Kim, Hyung Ryeol. 2013 “Rethinking the Civic Mission of Schools: A Comparative Study of Family Socioeconomic Status and Student Civic Outcomes in 15 Countries.” *Journal of Korean Ethics Studies*, 89 (6).

Kim, Hyung Ryeol (2013, April 29). *A Comparative Study of Transmission of Political Inequalities across Generations: Rethinking the Civic Mission of Schools*. Paper presented at the 2013 American Educational Research Association (AERA) Annual Meeting, San Francisco, California.

Kim, Stephanie K. & Kim, Hyung Ryeol. 2012. “The Need for Multicultural Education in South Korea.” In *The Immigration & Education Nexus*, edited by David A. Urias. 243-51. Boston, MA: Sense Publishers.

Kim, Hyung Ryeol. (2012, April 26). *A Comparative Study of the Politics of Citizenship Education in South Korea and Taiwan*. Paper presented at the 56th Annual Conference of the Comparative and International Education Society (CIES), in San Juan, Puerto Rico.

Kim, Hyung Ryeol. (2011, May 2). *The Politics of Citizenship Education in South Korea*. Paper presented at the 55th Annual Conference of the Comparative and International Education Society (CIES), in Montreal, Canada.

Kim, Stephanie K. & Kim, Hyung Ryeol. (2010, October 16). *The Need for Multicultural Education in South Korea*. Paper presented at annual Western regional meeting of the Comparative and International Education Society (CIES), in Long Beach, California.

Chapter 1 Introduction

Statement of the Problem

Political inequality of citizen voice¹, in which those citizens who are wealthier, better educated, or who come from more prestigious ethnic or linguistic backgrounds are better represented and more engaged in the political process, has been of great interest to scholars of citizen participation (Aaron, Vigoda, and Samorly 2001; Bartels 2008, 2009; Brady 2004; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Dahl 2006; Fraser and Gerstle 2005; Krugman 2003; Lijphart 1997; McCormick 2006; Milbrath 1977; Oliver 2001; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Solt 2008; Verba, Norman, and Kim 1978; Verba et al. 1993). Because political and other voluntary participation influences who gets what from governments and other institutions, inequality of voice in the form of citizen participation can reinforce the position of the better-off in society while adversely affecting the good of many others. As Lijphart (1997, 1) succinctly points out, “unequal participation spells unequal influence ... the inequality in representation and influence are not randomly distributed but systematically biased in favor of more privileged citizens”. These disparities in political voice on the basis of socioeconomic resources, race or ethnicity emerge early in a person’s life. Adolescents from privileged families are more civically

¹ Political inequality is a multidimensional concept. The American Political Science Association (APSA) Task Force (2004) identified three dimensions of political inequality, that is, citizen voice, government responsiveness, and public policy making. Among them, this dissertation focuses on political inequality of citizen voice—in the form of political and other voluntary participation—for two reasons. First, and above all, the exercise of political voice is at the heart of democracy; by taking part in politics, citizens can select representatives who govern in their names and exert influences on government policy. Second, the extent of political influence (e.g., which individuals and groups can achieve government decisions and policy outcomes that are favorable to them) is notoriously hard to measure, as it is an interactive process that is not directly observable (see, for example, Dahl 2006; Dubrow 2010).

engaged² than those from less privileged families in various types of participatory activities, and are more likely to vote in the future (Verba 2003; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 2003; Verba, Schlozman, and Burns 2005). This pattern also extends to other attitudinal and behavioral correlates of citizen participation, such as civic knowledge, interest, efficacy, and discussion of political and social issues (Flanagan 2004; Kimberly, Dietz, and Grimm 2007; Levinson 2012; Lichter, Shanahan, and Gardner 2002; McFarland and Thomas 2006; Smith 2008). While such findings are mostly derived from US-based research, the same phenomenon has also been reported in countries with vastly different political regimes and different levels of economic development (Hahn 1998; Meeusen 2012; Sherrod, Torney, and Flanagan 2010; Torney-Purta 2002). Given the significance of adolescence in affecting adult political attitudes and behavior (see, among others, Beck and Jennings 1982, 1991; McFarland and Thomas 2006; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996), the disparity in adolescents' civic outcomes³ may create a vicious cycle where the political voices of those less-well-off in society continue to be underrepresented. When underprivileged citizens are demobilized, government is less likely to be responsive to their preferences, and public policy will not reflect their interests (Barber 2004; Bartels 2008, 2009; Lopez 2002; Nieves 2011; Pacheco and Plutzer 2008; Verba 2003).

Previous research has identified several key mechanisms by which the family of origin is linked to adolescents' civic outcomes (see, for example, Beck and Jennings 1982; Verba,

² Citizen participation can take many forms. One basic aspect to consider is that citizen participation may be political or non-political. By virtue of being adolescents, adolescents are not yet fully engaged in adult political activities, such as voting and making campaign contributions. Thus, when it comes to adolescents' participation, I use the term *civic* rather than *political*, as the term *civic* encompasses a wide variety of ways that adolescents participate in relation to diverse issues.

³ An adolescent's *civic outcome* is a broad concept, which includes not only his/her actual engagement in participatory activities but also his/her attitudinal and behavioral correlates of participation, such as civic knowledge, sense of efficacy, and expected likelihood of voting, among others.

Schlozman, and Burns 2005). Behind this line of research is the assumption that the source of civic disparity is not attributable to inequality in legal status. Because in most countries an array of political, economic, and social citizenship is provided on a universal basis, at least formally, the issue at stake is largely a sociological one.⁴ In this regard, previous studies have highlighted how inequalities in “the pathways to civic participation” (Beck and Jennings 1982) begin in adolescence, and persist even into adulthood. As the civic voluntarism model of adult participation points out, adolescents who *are able* to take part, who *want* to take part, and who *are mobilized* to take part are likely to become more civically engaged, but each of these factors is, to some extent, influenced by the legacy of the families in which they are raised (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Janoski and Wilson 1995). For example, the legacy of the parental social class operates through either passing on parental socioeconomic advantages or providing civically stimulating environments at home, as well as through the interaction of the former with the latter (Verba, Schlozman, and Burns 2005). There

⁴ According to T.H. Marshall’s (1965a, 1965b, 1981) influential account, citizenship is essentially divided into three components: the civil (or legal), the political, and the social. The civil or legal component of citizenship concerns individuals’ basic rights required for security and freedom, such as the right to own property, and the right to freedom of speech, religion, and association. The political component of citizenship involves the ability to participate in collective activities that can influence government politics. The social component of citizenship refers to an ability to have access to the society’s resources such as public education, job opportunities, housing, health care, and old-age pensions. Despite its seminal contribution to the development of a theory of citizenship, Marshall’s model of citizenship has come under attack in the last few decades (see, among others, Kymlicka and Norman 1994; Torres 1998, Chapter 4). For the purpose of this dissertation, three sets of criticisms can be identified. First, Marshall saw social reality constituted by a totality of homogeneous individuals, while failing to properly recognize the issues of gender, racial and ethnic hierarchies within society. As a result, he reduced citizenship to a shared identity that would integrate previously marginalized groups—the working classes males—into the “common culture” (Marshall 1965a, 101-2). Second, Marshall’s view has been criticized for its exclusive focus on the passive acceptance of citizenship rights; any theoretical concerns of citizenship should extend beyond passive entitlements to the active exercise of citizenship responsibilities and virtues, such as democratic participation, public-spiritedness, and civility (Galston 1991; Macedo 1990). Lastly, as globalization has placed limits on national sovereignty and state autonomy, Marshall’s narrow conceptualization of citizenship as a common experience, identity and allegiance within a nation-state has also been challenged. In the era of globalization, an adequate theory of citizenship is expected not only to broaden its theoretical perspective beyond conventional geographical borders and cultures, but also to consider issues regarding human rights, regional states and cosmopolitan democracy (Torres 2002). While the notion of citizenship utilized in this dissertation is built upon Marshall’s model of citizenship, I simultaneously attempt to take into account those challenges of conceptualizing citizenship in the face of the increasing social and cultural pluralism of contemporary societies.

has also been ample evidence that the influence of adolescents' family background extends beyond the immediate family to the social institutions in which they are embedded, such as schools. For instance, schools attended by adolescents from privileged families tend to provide more and better opportunities for civic learning, while adolescents growing up in low-income, ethnic minority communities have limited access to volunteering and civic participation (Flanagan and Levine 2010; Hart and Atkins 2002; Jacobsen, Frankenberg, and Lenhoff 2012; Kahne and Middaugh 2008a, 2008b; Kahne and Sporte 2008; Levine 2009; Levinson 2007, 2012). Even so, underprivileged adolescents are not necessarily less civically empowered than their privileged peers. There are numerous ways in which the tendency for the privileged to take greater advantage of participatory opportunities can be counteracted. Historically, the most pronounced way to break the cycle of political inequality has been through the mobilization of social movements (Morrow and Torres 2012; O'Cadiz and Torres 1994; Verba, Schlozman, and Burns 2005). There is no exception to this trend in the offspring of those marginalized groups. When institutional barriers or socioeconomic disadvantages prevent them from taking part in system-directed activities such as voting, underprivileged adolescents have challenged social injustice and exclusion through other out-of-channel protests (see, for example, Austin 2004; Bedolla 2000; Jensen and Flanagan 2008; Maria 2004; Stepick et al. 2002). The use of such nonconventional channels of participation per se, therefore, represents the perceived inadequacy or the unequal availability of regular and legal channels (Verba, Norman, and Kim 1978).

Objective of the Dissertation

This dissertation research is constructed within an international-comparative framework, which posits that the major social institutions influencing the early politicizing process of

adolescents vary in their structures and operating norms across different countries (Sapiro 2004). The family's influence on adolescents' civic outcomes is viewed through this framework in that I take a situated view of the political socialization process by focusing on macro-structural forces that have reciprocal and interactive influences on adolescents' civic development. It is important to note that although this research examines the family's influence on adolescents' civic outcomes, its primary focus is on macro-structural forces *outside of* the family rather than intra-familial settings where a dyadic relationship between parents and children is developed. Within this framework, I claim that the civic advantages that accrue to privileged families and are transmitted to their offspring are not really given at all. Rather, they are socially constructed in the sense that the tendency for privileged families and their children to take advantage of greater opportunities for civic engagement can be overcome by transforming the pattern of cleavages in societies and the way that such cleavages are institutionalized.


The central argument of this research begins with the assumption that *all other things being equal*, we would observe similar patterns of adolescents' civic outcomes across countries. "Because of the capacity of those who are advantaged to extract from any situation more than those who are disadvantaged" (Mortimore 1997, 453), the abundant resources and greater motivations, derived from material and social advantages that the parents possess and confer on their children, make it more likely for adolescents from privileged families to become civically informed and engaged. However, all other things are not equal in actuality, and what may not be equal is related to the intervening roles of *politics, schooling, and public policy* that modify the ways that the family of origin leaves a legacy for adolescents' civic outcomes. As a result, adolescents from less privileged families in some countries are, relatively speaking, more civically informed and engaged than their similarly situated peers in other

countries. As many historical instances manifest themselves, such as the movement for female suffrage and the civil rights movement, politics itself has the potential to break the cycle of the self-perpetuating political inequality. Where citizens can gain and express their political voices on relatively equal terms, those less-well-off in society can use their better political positions to promote the social, economic, and political rights of the underprivileged, which, in turn, would allow their offspring to enjoy higher levels of socioeconomic attainment and political equality. In addition, although it has rarely been explored through a welfare lens, education—or schooling in a more limited sense—has a social policy character in nature. It aims to reduce differences in inter-familial resources such that the effects of family background on adolescents' life outcomes can be constrained (Finch 1984; Peters and Marshall 1996). This is why in most countries the public education system has been viewed as a fundamental social service (Peter, Edgerton, and Roberts 2010). While education is understood as a preventive form of social protection, public policy is compensatory in that it redistributes resources among individuals and families, especially focusing on the needs of those who are at greater risk of failing in a free-market system (Allmendinger 1989). In summation, this dissertation research compares between-country differences in the extent to which political and educational systems, and public policy function as equalizing forces to ameliorate the disparity in civic outcomes between subgroups within a country. Then, it investigates whether these between-country differences correspond to cross-national variations in the pattern and magnitude of the disparity in civic outcomes among adolescents from differing family backgrounds.

In particular, by utilizing the representative data of the world's population of adolescents from the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS), I examine the extent to which countries vary in the pattern and magnitude of the discrepancy in civic outcomes among

adolescents from differing family backgrounds. Among many family background characteristics that may shape adolescents’ civic outcomes, I focus on two dimensions of family background— family socioeconomic status (SES) and immigration background. In exploring the ways that family SES and immigration background influence adolescents’ civic outcomes, I formulate several hypotheses on how specific country-level factors, including (1) inequality of political voice by social class, (2) between-school segregation along socioeconomic lines, and (3) exclusionary/inclusionary policies on immigrant integration, mediate the way that the family of origin is linked to adolescents’ civic outcomes. Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual framework that will guide my dissertation research.

Figure 1-1 Conceptual Framework



In summation, the overall research question and subset questions are as follows:

- What country-level factors do mediate cross-national variations, if any, in the pattern and magnitude of the disparity in civic outcomes among adolescents from differing family backgrounds?
 - 1) How does country-level inequality of political voice by social class condition the effect of family socioeconomic background on adolescents' civic outcomes?
 - 2) How does country-level between-school segregation along socioeconomic lines influence the magnitude of socioeconomic gaps in adolescents' civic outcomes?
 - 3) How does the governmental policy context for immigrant integration shape the way in which immigrant adolescents are socialized into civically oriented citizens in the host country?

This dissertation is a large-scale, quantitative, cross-national study of a large number of countries spanning a wide range of political and social contexts. With respect to understanding how particular country-level macro contexts influence the varying nature of the process of political socialization, this research has some advantages over single-country studies or comparative studies involving only a few countries. That said, its inherently behavioral or technicist approach should be overcome, and thus supplemented with in-depth qualitative research that would enable us to illuminate the ways that adolescents undertake their roles as civically empowered citizens in diverse countries. Some inherent challenges that large-scale international assessment of students' educational outcomes face, as well as suggestions for future research will be discussed accordingly in the conclusion. The overarching goal of this research is not only to broaden the theoretical and empirical scope of the fields of political socialization,

civic education and international/comparative education, but to contribute to, more importantly and utopically, the historical struggles for breaking the self-perpetuating, vicious cycle of political inequality.

Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized in the following sequence. Chapter 2 provides the detailed information on the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS), which is the major source of data for this dissertation.

Chapter 3 examines the source of disparity in civic outcomes among adolescents from different family socioeconomic backgrounds by focusing on the mediating effects of home civic learning environments. More importantly, this chapter also explores how country-level political inequality shapes the pattern of the intergenerational transfer of social class advantages in the civic realm. The results in this chapter indicate that the positive effect of growing up in high SES families on adolescents' civic outcomes, which has been mostly found in the United States and other Western countries, receives only a little support in many other countries. There is also evidence that while home civic learning environments mediate, in part, the effect of family SES on adolescents' civic outcomes, the level of family SES does not entirely determine the extent to which home environments are civically stimulating in most countries. Rather, home civic learning environments are important resources from which adolescents from both low and high SES families can greatly benefit from. The last and most important empirical finding concerns the systematic association between country-level inequality of political voice by social class and the magnitude of family socioeconomic influence on adolescents' civic outcomes. That is, in countries where citizens share relatively equal political voice irrespective of their socioeconomic

conditions, adolescents having parents with less advantaged socioeconomic attainment show substantially higher levels of civic empowerment and engagement than do their similarly situated counterparts in countries where the exercise of political voice is more severely stratified along socioeconomic lines. Ultimately, this chapter highlights the socially constructed nature of the civic advantages that accrue to high SES families and are passed on to their children. It also accentuates that the pattern of transmission of political inequalities across generations can be transformed by politics.

Chapter 4 investigates whether and how socioeconomic school segregation influences the socioeconomic disparity in adolescents' civic outcomes. In countries where schools are highly segregated along socioeconomic lines, students are more likely to be sorted into schools with similarly situated peers in terms of their family socioeconomic origins. Drawing upon arguments made by a number of educational scholars who claim that high SES schools (i.e., schools predominantly serving children from high socioeconomic families) have better overall educational outcomes, I hypothesize that countries with higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation would show larger socioeconomic disparities in student civic outcomes. My empirical analyses produced suggestive, but more complex, findings than were originally hypothesized. While *civic knowledge* gaps by family socioeconomic levels are larger in countries with higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation, the corresponding gaps in *citizenship self-efficacy* and *school-based civic participation* are less substantial in these same countries. I reason that students' civic understanding may be better enhanced in high SES schools, since high SES schools are often characterized by more and better-quality civic curricular and instruction. By contrast, the presence of a large number of schoolmates from similar socioeconomic origins may function as a leveling factor for ameliorating socioeconomic

disparities in students' self-confidence and engagement in participatory activities. I close this chapter by noting two normative implications of these findings. I debunk the commonsensical notion in school effectiveness research that high SES schools are inherently better in regards to their overall educational outcomes. I also criticize the socially decontextualized approach which overemphasizes “the school solution” to equalize civic learning opportunity without contextualizing the lived experiences of students inside schools.

In Chapter 5, I shift attention to another aspect of family background—immigration background. This chapter compares the pattern and extent of differences in civic orientations among immigrant-origin and native adolescents across countries, while accounting for macro-level immigration policy contexts of these countries. One finding reveals that although not universal across all countries, immigrant adolescents tend to have lower civic knowledge and rate themselves less likely to vote than their native counterparts, while at the same time showing higher levels of citizenship self-efficacy than their native peers. Another key finding is that immigrant child or immigrant offspring in countries with more inclusionary immigration policies show higher levels of civic competence and empowerment than those in countries with less inclusionary immigration policies, even net of variations in family resources, political socialization experiences, and other individual characteristics. This mitigating impact of receptive policy contexts on disparities in civic knowledge and expected voting between immigrant and native adolescents is substantial. Similarly, the relative advantage of immigrant adolescents in citizenship self-efficacy becomes stronger in countries where governments are actively involved in public support for immigrants and immigrant families. The findings of this chapter are particularly significant for policymakers and researchers to address what should be done to promote immigrant adolescents' processes of civic integration. If young immigrants are

less civically knowledgeable and engaged compared to their native peers, it might be less attributable to the type of immigrants the host society attracts than to the welcome they are given. With more effective integration policies for immigrants and immigrant families, young immigrants are more likely to enhance their civic competence and contribution to the host society.

The final chapter, Chapter 6, summarizes this research's main findings and contributions to the discipline. In reviewing the findings from the three main chapters, this chapter examines how the international evidence on the relationship between adolescents' civic outcomes, stratification, and equality help us reconsider key concepts central to the study of political socialization and civic education. I also discuss some limitations of this research and how this research's arguments can be further enhanced via subsequent inquiries. Finally, I conclude by offering a few policy implications derived from the main findings of this research and some suggestions for future international comparative research on political socialization and civic education.

Chapter 2 Data⁵

Background

For this dissertation research, I use the data from the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). ICCS 2009 is a cross-sectional, cross-national dataset with individual adolescents as the units of analysis; it is the largest-scale international study on civic and citizenship education ever conducted, including 140,000 eighth-grade (or equivalent) students, 62,000 teachers, and 5,300 school principals from 38 participating countries. ICCS 2009 was built on the two previous IEA studies of civic and citizenship education⁶, while accounting for the new challenges of educating adolescents in changing contexts of democracy, such as globalization, the phenomenal surge of international migration, and the increase in terrorist attacks, among others. ICCS 2009 had a twin focus; adolescents' civic outcomes and the contexts in which adolescents' civic learning takes place. Adolescents' achievement on a test of conceptual understandings in civic and citizenship education measured the not only the cognitive dimension of civic outcomes, but also affective-behavioral dimension—their dispositions, attitudes, perceptions, and activities relating to civics and citizenship. The study also documented variations across countries in these civic outcomes and explored how those

⁵ All the detailed information included in this chapter is drawn from *ICCS 2009 Technical Report* (Schulz, Ainley, and Fraillon 2011), *ICCS 2009 International Report: Civic Knowledge, Attitudes, and Engagement among Lower Secondary School Students in Thirty-Eight Countries* (Schulz et al. 2010), and *ICCS 2009 User Guide for the International Database* (Brese et al. 2011).

⁶ The first IEA study of civic and citizenship education was carried out in 1971 as part of the Six Subject Study (Torney, Oppenheim, and Farnen 1975). The second study, the IEA Civic Education Study (CIVED) was conducted in 1999 with the purpose of setting the empirical foundation of civic education (Torney-Purta et al. 2001; Torney-Purta, Schwille, and Amadeo 1999); an additional survey of upper-secondary students was also conducted in 2000 (Amadeo et al. 2002).

cross-national variations are related to an array of contextual factors, including home environments, school and community contexts, and national characteristics.

Participating Countries and Target Populations

Similar to other IEA studies, IEA invited all countries affiliated with the association to participate, and the authorities in each invited country made a decision whether their country would participate in ICCS 2009 or not. Consequently, 38 countries participated in ICCS 2009; five from Asian countries (Taiwan, Hong Kong SAR, South Korea, Indonesia and Thailand), one from Australasia (New Zealand), 26 countries from Europe (Austria, Belgium/Flemish, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland), and six from Latin America (Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico and Paraguay).

The target population in ICCS 2009 was defined as students in the grade that represents eight years of schooling (Grade 8), which is counted from International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) level 1. The average age of students in Grade 8 was 13.5 years or above at the time of testing; in countries where the average age of students in Grade 8 was below 13.5 years, Grade 9 became the target population. For the ICCS teacher questionnaire, all teachers teaching regular school subjects to the students in the target grade were selected. Included in the teacher sample are those who were teaching the target grade during the time of the assessment, and those who had been hired at school since the beginning of the school year.

Sampling Design

ICCS 2009 used a two-stage cluster sampling procedure whereby students were selected through a two-step sampling process. The first step was to select schools within each participating country. Schools were randomly sampled with probability proportional to size (PPS), meaning that the probability of being selected is proportional to the school size as measured by the number of students enrolled in a school. While the required minimum sample size to achieve the necessary accuracy was judged on the basis of national characteristics, each country was asked to sample at least 150 schools. The second step in the ICCS sampling process was to randomly select one or two target grade classes, and administer questionnaires to all students in that class. As a result, the average number of students in the samples in each country ranged from between 3,000 and 4,500. At the end of this second stage, teachers from the target grade were also randomly sampled. In this way, students and teachers belong to the same schools, but it is unknown which teachers teach which students. The participation rates required for each country were 85 percent of the selected schools, and 85 percent of the selected students within “participating schools”,⁷ or a weighted overall participation rate of 75 percent. While the same criteria were also applied to the teacher sample, the coverage was determined independently of those for the student sample. For more detailed information on sample sizes for each participating country, see Table 2-1.

The sampling design of ICCS 2009 required different selection probabilities at both the school- and at the within-school sampling levels. In order to reflect and compensate the disproportional selection probabilities of schools, students and teachers, appropriate sampling

⁷ A “participating school” refers to a sample school which met the sampling requirement (i.e., at least 50 percent of its students participated in the student questionnaire).

weights were used in the analysis; the decision which weight to choose depended on the type of data used for analysis (i.e., students, teachers, and schools), the level of analysis (i.e., single-level analysis versus multi-level analysis), and the number of countries included. If any unit of response had a large selection probability, a small weight was given, and vice versa. In addition, the sampling weights were multiplied by non-response adjustments; since some sampled schools, students, and teachers refused to participate in the assessment, the sampling weights were adjusted for the sample size loss. Taken together, the final weights were the product of weight factors and adjustment factors that took into account the selection probabilities and non-response patterns at all levels of analysis.

Data Collection and ICCS Instruments

The data collection process proceeded between October 2008 and June 2009. The survey was conducted between October and December 2008 in countries located in the Southern Hemisphere, and between February and May 2009 in countries located in the Northern Hemisphere. To have better participation rates, the teacher survey data collection period was extended in a few countries. In collaboration with each participating country, the International Study Center (ISC) developed an international English version of the ICCS assessment and questionnaires. These materials were subsequently translated and adapted by countries to their languages of instruction. The overarching goal of this translation and adaptation process was to create high-quality instruments that were internationally comparable yet also appropriate to each country's national context and education system. To achieve this goal, all national instruments were subject to a strict international verification process. Ultimately, the ICCS instruments were administered in 31 languages; the two most common languages were English and Spanish.

For students, the following three instruments were administered: the international student cognitive test (80 items measuring civic knowledge, analysis and reasoning), an international student questionnaire (student perceptions about civic and citizenship as well as each student's background characteristics), and a set of regional instruments (the Asian, European, and Latin American regionally instruments). In addition to the international and regional instruments, the IEA allowed participating countries to influence the level of specificity with which students responded to questions regarding their ethnicity, family structure, and religion. In the student questionnaire, 19 countries included the item on ethnicity, 37 countries included the item on family structure, and 28 countries included the items on religious backgrounds. A set of instruments was also administered to teachers and school principals. Teachers were asked to report their perceptions of civic and citizenship education in their schools and to provide information on their schools' organizations and culture as well as their own teaching assignments and background. In a school questionnaire, principals provided information on school characteristics, school culture, and the provision of civic and citizenship education in the school. To gather information about country-level factors that may influence the ways that students develop civic-related dispositions and competences, National research coordinators (NRCs) asked a national expert in each participating country to respond to an online national context questionnaire. The country-level factors that were taken into account on the national context questionnaire include historical background, the structure of education, the political system, civic and citizenship education in the national curricular, recent developments in civic and citizenship education, among others.

Table 2-1 School, Student and Teacher Sample Sizes

| Country | Student survey | | Teacher survey | | |
|--------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| | Originally sampled schools | Participating schools | Participating students | Participating schools | Participating teachers |
| Austria | 150 | 135 | 3385 | 75 | 999 |
| Belgium (Flemish) | 160 | 151 | 2968 | 135 | 1630 |
| Bulgaria | 175 | 158 | 3257 | 158 | 1850 |
| Chile | 180 | 177 | 5192 | 177 | 1756 |
| Taiwan | 150 | 150 | 5167 | 143 | 2367 |
| Colombia | 200 | 196 | 6204 | 188 | 2010 |
| Cyprus | 68 | 68 | 3194 | 66 | 906 |
| Czech Republic | 150 | 144 | 4630 | 147 | 1599 |
| Denmark | 240 | 193 | 4508 | 113 | 928 |
| Dominican Republic | 150 | 145 | 4589 | 145 | 778 |
| England | 160 | 124 | 2916 | 118 | 1505 |
| Estonia | 150 | 140 | 2743 | 133 | 1863 |
| Finland | 186 | 176 | 3307 | 174 | 2295 |
| Greece | 155 | 153 | 3153 | 98 | 1271 |
| Guatemala | 150 | 145 | 4002 | 145 | 1138 |
| Hong Kong SAR | 150 | 76 | 2902 | 101 | 1446 |
| Indonesia | 150 | 142 | 5068 | 141 | 2097 |
| Ireland | 165 | 144 | 3355 | 137 | 1861 |
| Italy | 172 | 172 | 3366 | 168 | 3023 |
| South Korea | 150 | 150 | 5254 | 148 | 2340 |
| Latvia | 160 | 150 | 2761 | 146 | 2077 |
| Liechtenstein | 9 | 9 | 357 | 9 | 115 |
| Lithuania | 200 | 199 | 3902 | 199 | 2774 |
| Luxembourg | 31 | 31 | 4852 | 24 | 290 |
| Malta | 55 | 55 | 2143 | 55 | 900 |
| Mexico | 220 | 215 | 6576 | 202 | 1844 |
| Netherlands | 150 | 67 | 1964 | 22 | 236 |
| New Zealand | 175 | 146 | 3979 | 115 | 1347 |
| Norway | 150 | 129 | 3013 | 73 | 492 |
| Paraguay | 150 | 149 | 3399 | 139 | 1176 |
| Poland | 150 | 150 | 3249 | 150 | 2081 |
| Russian Federation | 210 | 210 | 4295 | 210 | 3081 |
| Slovak Republic | 142 | 138 | 2970 | 139 | 1984 |
| Slovenia | 170 | 163 | 3070 | 164 | 2755 |
| Spain | 150 | 148 | 3309 | 148 | 2017 |
| Sweden | 175 | 166 | 3464 | 156 | 1942 |
| Switzerland | 187 | 156 | 2924 | 144 | 1571 |
| Thailand | 150 | 149 | 5263 | 149 | 1766 |

Note: Table is drawn from Table 6.2. in *ICCS 2009 Technical Report* (Schulz, Ainley, and Fraillon 2011, 64).

Chapter 3 Macro-level Political Inequality and the Impact of Family Socioeconomic Background on Adolescents' Civic Outcomes: A Comparative Study of 31 Countries

Introduction

Since Hyman's seminal book (1959) , *Political Socialization*, first conceptualized the field of study, the centrality of family influence in forming the early civic orientations and behaviors of children and adolescents has received considerable attention by political scientists, sociologists and educational researchers (see, for example, Beck and Jennings 1991; Connell 1972; Davies 1965; Jaros, Hirsch, and Fleron 1968). Traditional understanding of how families influence their children's civic outcomes has mostly drawn from a learning model—one that explores how families transmit civic lessons, both implicitly and explicitly, to their children. However, a burgeoning body of recent research focuses on how civic disparities are shaped across generations by accounting for the *variations* in family background characteristics; the variations in early experiences at home and in schools are associated with the individual's tendencies to think and act civically in particular ways. In this chapter, I consider the impact of family socioeconomic status (SES) and seek to clarify the role of home civic learning environments in mediating the family SES' influence on adolescents' civic outcomes. It should be remembered, however, that the main focus of this chapter is not on the impact of family SES per se. Instead, it highlights how macro-level political inequality shapes the pattern of the intergenerational transfer of social class advantages in the civic realm. In tandem with Verba, Norman, and Kim (1978)'s assumption that political inequality associated with individual motivation and resources are *nested* “in the pattern of cleavages in societies and in the way in which such cleavages are institutionalized in parties and organizations” (Verba, Norman, and

Kim 1978, 19), I attempt to broaden the theoretical and empirical scope of political socialization research.

Differences in country-level inequality of political voice by social class may influence the effect of family socioeconomic background on adolescents' civic outcomes. For example, in countries where the exercise of political voice is severely stratified along socioeconomic lines, low SES parents might be less civically empowered and engaged than their similarly situated counterparts in countries where every citizen has an equal voice regardless of his or her socioeconomic condition. In turn, in countries where citizens share relatively equal political voice, low SES parents may not face the same barriers to providing civically rich home environments for their children as do similarly low SES parents in countries where the political voices of those positioned at the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy are marginalized. Following this reasoning, then, in some countries, children having parents with less advantaged socioeconomic attainment would show lower levels of civic empowerment and engagement than would their counterparts having parents with advantaged socioeconomic attainment, while the corresponding gap might be only negligible in other countries. As such, in this chapter I test whether macro-level political inequality can explain cross-national variations in the effect of family SES on adolescents' civic outcomes.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I consider existing explanations for the effect of family socioeconomic background on adolescents' civic outcomes. Next, I develop an argument explaining why and how country-level inequality of political voice along socioeconomic lines influences cross-national variation in the magnitude of family socioeconomic influence on adolescents' civic outcomes. In the fourth and fifth sections, I discuss data and methods. After

presenting the empirical findings in the sixth section, I conclude with implications and suggestions for future research.

Family Socioeconomic Background and Inequalities in Adolescents' Civic Outcomes

Political inequality of citizen voice, in which those citizens who are wealthier, better educated, or who come from more prestigious ethnic or linguistic backgrounds are better represented and more engaged in the political process, has been of great interest to scholars of citizen participation (Aaron, Vigoda, and Samorly 2001; Bartels 2008, 2009; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Fraser and Gerstle 2005; Krugman 2003; McCormick 2006; Milbrath 1977; Schlozman and Brady 1995; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Solt 2008; Verba, Norman, and Kim 1978; Verba et al. 1993). These disparities in political voice on the basis of socioeconomic resources, race, or ethnicity emerge early in a person's life. Adolescents from advantaged families are more civically engaged than those from less advantaged families in various types of participatory activities, and are more likely to vote in the future; this pattern also extends to other attitudinal and behavioral correlates of participation, such as civic knowledge, interest, efficacy, and discussion of political and social issues (Flanagan 2004; Kimberly, Dietz, and Grimm 2007; Levinson 2012; Lichter, Shanahan, and Gardner 2002; McFarland and Thomas 2006; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Smith 2008; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 2003). Among the various family background characteristics, family SES, which is an index of parents' education, income and occupational prestige, has been recognized as the single most important contributor to this early pattern of civic disparity. Inequalities in monetary and nonmonetary resources that high and low SES families differently possess and pass on to their children account for a significant portion of civic disparities along family socioeconomic lines.

While the effect of family SES on adolescents' civic outcomes was properly recognized in the early studies of political socialization (Greenstein 1965; Hess 1968; Hess and Torney 1967; Jennings and Niemi 1974; Sigel and Hoskin 1981), the mechanisms for understanding this influence have not been well explicated. This lack of attention is due in part to the difficulty of isolating the mechanisms through which the socioeconomic background of the family origin shapes later civic life (Niemi and Sobieszek 1977; Verba, Schlozman, and Burns 2005). As Jennings and Niemi (1974, 22) put it, "the major difficulty with the social stratification approach is that it deals with causes at a second or third remove." Thus, only a paucity of research has investigated how participatory inequalities are shaped across generations by accounting for the influence of family SES. According to this limited but important body of literature, the legacy of family SES operates through at least two different mechanisms and through the interaction of one with the other. On one hand, family SES is an important determinant of the adolescent's own SES (Blau and Duncan 1967; Featherman and Hauser 1978), which is often translated into participatory advantages. The other path is more explicitly political, and has been a central focus of the political socialization and stratification literature. Family SES correlates with the content and quality of civic stimulation provided in home environments. Much of political socialization research has concentrated on between-generation correspondence with respect to the content of civic attitudes and commitments (Beck and Jennings 1991; Bengtson 1975; Campbell 1980; Connell 1972; Friedman, Gold, and Christie 1972; Glass, Bengtson, and Dunham 1986; Kandel and Lesser 1972; Niemi, Ross, and Alexander 1978; Tedin 1974). By doing so, it often views family SES as *noise* that should be controlled for to identify parents' ability to affect their offspring's political choices, such as party identification, voting behaviors, partisanship, political ideology, and candidate preferences, among others. More recently, a few authors have begun to

examine the role of family SES in the intergenerational transmission of civic orientations and behaviors that may facilitate later civic activism. For example, having parents who can afford to fill the house with books, newspapers, and periodicals, or who expose their children to more political discussions and other political stimuli may have consequences for children's civic development (Jennings, Stoker, and Bowners 2009; Lipset 1960; McDevitt and Chaffee 2000; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 2003). Family SES also plays a role in locating adolescents within social milieus that differently mobilize them into the civic realm, because parents and children most likely share the same socioeconomic settings, and thus, they are exposed to the same kind of mobilization efforts (Kahne and Sporte 2008; Meeusen 2012; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Wilkenfeld 2009). As Hess and Torney's (1967) civic learning model alludes, the effects of family SES may be reflected in other unmeasured aspects of child-rearing practices and styles of interacting with children (Bradley and Corwyn 2002; Lipset 1960).

Of course, the link between family SES and adolescents' civic outcomes are not unmalleable. Although family SES is a strong predictor of the offspring's own SES, many adolescents who come from disadvantaged SES families can enjoy high levels of occupational and educational attainment. Family SES also does not always determine the extent to which the home environment is civically stimulating. For instance, parents who are active members of a labor union, or who actively take part in social movements are likely to enrich their home with high levels of civic awareness, regardless of their socioeconomic standing. In addition, despite the family's central role, the early acquisition of civic orientations, skills and behaviors does not occur through the family alone. Adolescents are socialized into politics through such diverse channels as school, the media, peer groups, and youth organizations. Among these channels, the school has been claimed to serve as an equalizing factor of civic preparation by compensating for

the civic disadvantages of adolescents from underprivileged families (Almond and Verba 1963; Campbell 2008; Chui, Curtis, and Lambert 1991; Ehman 1970; Langton and Jennings 1968; White et al. 2008). More importantly, politics per se has the potential to alter the relationship between family SES and adolescents' civic outcomes. Verba, Schlozman, and Burns (2005) found that African-American adults who experienced the civil rights movement during their adolescence reported that they grew up in a civically rich home environment, which had lingering effects on their psychological engagement in politics and civic activism. They showed significantly higher levels of political interest, efficacy, and participation than Anglo whites and Latinos of the same age. This line of reasoning and my empirical findings suggest that the linkage between family SES and adolescents' civic outcomes depends on specific political and societal contexts, which may or may not be generalizable to other contexts.

From Generation to Generation: Cross-national Variation in the Effect of Family Socioeconomic Background on Adolescents' Civic Outcomes

While prior research has contributed to our understanding of the mechanisms through which family SES is linked to adolescents' civic outcomes, relatively little is known about whether such findings are generalizable to different parts of the world outside of the United States. A few studies on the intergenerational transmission of civic orientations and behaviors is available for several European countries (e.g., Hooghe and Claes for the Netherlands, Belgium and France, 2009; Meeusen for Belgium, 2012). These studies often have produced different results from what has been generally assumed in the US-based literature. For instance, Meeusen's study (2012) of Belgian adolescents provided evidence against the notion that high SES families are more effective in transmitting their participation patterns to their children than

low SES families. For adolescents from high SES families, individual interests and motivations were more important predictors of their civic behaviors, while the importance of parental participatory habits outweighed that of individual characteristics for civic activism of adolescents from low SES families. This finding implies that the mechanism linking the socioeconomic background of the family of origin to adolescents' civic outcomes might vary across different national contexts. Countries differ in terms of the extent that economic and cultural resources, which are essential factors for families to function as an effective force in influencing their children's civic development, are distributed equally across families. Moreover, even families with the same SES level would likely display different degrees of civically rich home environments in different countries. As evident in the case of African-American adults who came of age during the civil rights movement, the tendency for those who are advantaged in socioeconomic terms to have greater participatory advantages can be overcome in countries where the political voices of underprivileged citizens are relatively equally represented. In such countries, parents with lower levels of socioeconomic attainment might be more civically informed and engaged than their counterparts with similar levels of socioeconomic attainment in countries where only the socioeconomically better-off dominate the political process. In turn, in countries where citizens share relatively equal political voice irrespective of their socioeconomic positions, low SES parents may not face the same barriers to providing their children with civically enabling home environments as do similarly low SES parents in countries where those positioned at the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy are marginalized in politics. As a result, in some countries, children having parents with less advantaged socioeconomic attainment would show lower levels of civic empowerment and engagement than do their counterparts having parents with advantaged socioeconomic attainment, whereas the corresponding gap might be

only negligible in other countries. Contrary to what the traditional SES model of civic voluntarism often predicts, the civic advantages that accrue to high SES families and are transmitted to their offspring are not really “given” at all. Rather, they are socially constructed in the sense that the tendency for high SES families and their children to take greater civic advantages can be counteracted by changing the distribution of socioeconomic advantages, or politics per se.

Research Questions

On the basis of the above explanations, in this chapter I aim to extend the literature on political socialization and stratification in two significant ways. First, I compare the role of parental education in the intergenerational transmission of civic outcomes across 31 countries. I focus on the educational attainment of parents, because it has been cited as the most important dimension of family socioeconomic influence on children’s learning outcomes in many countries (Myrberg and Rosén 2008). I also explore the degree to which home civic learning environments, as measured by home literacy environments and home discussion on civic matters, mediate the effect of family SES on adolescents’ civic outcomes. Second, I examine whether between-country differences in the extent to which citizens share relatively equal political voice, regardless of their socioeconomic standing, are associated with cross-national variation in the magnitude of family socioeconomic influence on adolescents’ civic outcomes. In other words, is there any systematic association between the magnitude of family socioeconomic influence on adolescents’ civic outcomes and country-level socioeconomic stratification in the exercise of political voice? As discussed earlier, in countries where those at the lower rungs of the socioeconomic ladder are marginalized in politics, parents with disadvantaged socioeconomic

background may function as a less effective force in enhancing their children's civic development than do their similarly situated counterparts in countries where all citizens across the socioeconomic spectrum share a relatively equal political voice. For this reason, the magnitude of socioeconomic disparities in adolescents' civic outcomes is likely to be more substantial in countries with less egalitarian political systems than in countries with more egalitarian political systems.

Data Source

As in the previous chapters, data from ICCS 2009 is utilized for this comparative study. Chapter 2 includes detailed information on the procedures of sampling, test administration, and data collection in ICCS 2009.

Selection of Countries for Comparison

Among the total 38 countries that participated in ICCS 2009, I selected 30 countries for this cross-national study. Countries included in the analyses were: Austria, Belgium (Flemish), Bulgaria, Chile, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Republic of Korea (South Korea), Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Thailand. Seven countries whose net enrollment rates in secondary education were below 70 percent at the time of the data collection or whose information on net enrollment rates were missing were excluded from the analyses to avoid potential biases associated with the sample selection. Given that ICCS 2009 surveyed students

from the eighth-grade (or equivalent) who were enrolled in the school at the time of the data collection, in countries with low enrollment rates, the population of the eighth-grade students might have been different from the population as whole in terms of their individual and familial characteristics (Park 2008). Russia Federation and Slovak Republic were excluded from the analysis because of missing information on net enrollment rates in secondary education. Note that information on family structure was not available for two countries, that is, Malta and Spain. Thus, when treating each country as a separate case in ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses, the family structure variable was not taken into account in Malta and Spain. When estimating two-level HLM models for the pooled data across all 31 countries, the family structure variable was not included in the analyses.

Measures

Outcome Variables

Among diverse civically relevant socialization outcomes, I focused on students' internal political efficacy, citizenship self-efficacy and expected likelihood of voting. The following section elaborates upon the construction of these three outcome measures included in the analysis.

INTERNAL POLITICAL-EFFICACY. Political efficacy is defined as the expectation that citizens believe they have capacity to act effectively in politics (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; Easton and Dennis 1967). In a substantial body of research on citizen participation, political efficacy has been viewed as an important psychological resource functionally linked to political and civic participation (Carlson and Hyde 1980; Cohen, Vigoda, and Samorly 2001;

Finkel 1985; Krampen 1991; Sears 1987). Political efficacy can be divided into two types: external and internal efficacy. The former represents one's individual self-confidence in his/her ability to understand civic matters and influence politics, while the latter indicates one's belief in the responsiveness of the political system (Balch 1974; Craig and Maggiotto 1982; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991). In ICCS 2009, the following items were used to measure internal political efficacy: (1) I know more about politics than most people of my age, (2) When political issues or problems are being discussed, I usually have something to say, (3) I am able to understand most political issues easily, (4) I have political opinions worth listening to, (5) As an adult, I will be able to take part in politics, and (6) I have a good understanding of the political issues facing this country. On the basis of these six items, the scale of adolescents' sense of internal political efficacy was derived, where higher values on the scale reflect a higher sense of internal political efficacy.

CITIZENSHIP SELF-EFFICACY. Citizenship self-efficacy, which relates to the general concept of self-efficacy, is a broader construct than political efficacy (Bandura 2001; Zimmerman and Bandura 1995). Within the ICCS 2009 framework, citizenship self-efficacy was constructed as a adolescents' self-reported confidence to undertake several activities in the area of civic participation, including (1) discussing a newspaper article about a conflict between countries, (2) arguing his or her point of view about a controversial political and social issue, (3) standing as a candidate in a school election, (4) organizing a group of students to achieve/enact changes at school, (5) following a television debate about a controversial issue, (6) writing a letter to a newspaper giving his or her view on a current issues and (7) speaking in front of class about a social and political issue. These items were used to derive the scale of adolescents' citizenship self-efficacy, where higher values on this scale reflect a higher sense of efficacy.

EXPECTED ADULT ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION. Adolescents' intentions to participate in elections upon becoming adults were measured on a single composite scale across all participating countries using item response technique. In the ICCS 2009 student questionnaires, adolescents were asked whether they would vote in local and national elections, and get information about candidates before voting in an election on reaching adulthood. These three items were used to construct the expected electoral participation scale, where higher values reflect a greater likelihood of future electoral participation. Campbell's longitudinal study (2006) suggests that adolescents' intentions to participate in political life correspond to their actual future involvement in politics.

Individual-level Variables

The following paragraphs briefly explain individual-level independent variables included in the analysis. In addition to the measure of family SES, I also controlled for an array of relevant individual and familial characteristics that may codetermine students' civic outcomes. Table 3-1 summarizes the coding schema of each independent variable and the number of cases in the analysis for this study.

FAMILY SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS. I used the index of the highest educational level of either parent in the household as an indicator of students' family socioeconomic background. Socioeconomic status (SES) is a multidimensional concept that has been generally operationalized as an aggregate of economic and cultural capital in families. Among them, the educational level of parents has been identified as the most important dimension of socioeconomic influence on the intergenerational transmission of civic outcomes (Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 2003). In the ICCS 2009 student questionnaire, the index of parental education

was constructed according to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) (UNESCO 2006). I distinguished three educational attainment levels as follows: (1) less than high school completion, (2) high school completion, and (3) completion of a bachelor's or higher degree.

HOME CIVIC LEARNING ENVIRONMENTS. To indicate home civic learning environments, I used two indices: *the number of books at home and home discussion on politics*. First, the index of *the number of books at home* was created on the basis of students' reports of the number of books in home, distinguishing among the following categories: (1) 0 to 100 books, (2) 11 to 25 books, (3) 26 to 100 books, (4) 101 to 200 books, (5) 201 to 500 books, and (6) more than 500 books. Second, the frequency of *political discussions with parents* was included in the analysis as another aspect of home civic learning environment. This is a composite measure adding the two items that asked students how often they were involved in talking with parents about political or social issues and talking with parents about what was happening in other countries. Possible responses to each question were (1) never or hardly ever, (2) monthly (at least once a month), (3) weekly (at least once a week), and (4) daily or almost daily. For multivariate analysis, I created an index as the average of the two items of the frequency of political discussions with parents to represent the overall degree of political discussions between parents and the children.

OTHER FAMILY BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS. In addition to family socioeconomic background, I also included three family background measures in the models: *immigration background, language used at home, and family structure*. Adolescents from immigrant families often lack language skills, and may be unfamiliar with the cultural norms of the host society. They also tend to suffer from adverse economic circumstances and may have a

lower socioeconomic status than their native peers, which negatively correlates with civic learning processes and active citizenship . I used information on the birth countries of students and their parents to construct a dichotomous variable of immigration background. Native students are defined as those were born in the country of survey and who also had at least one parent who was born in that country. Immigrant students are defined as either those born in the country of the survey with both parents in another country, or those who were born in another country with at least one parent also born in another country. When immigrant adolescents speak the language of their origin countries at home, this may hinder the acquisition of the host country's language (Kalmijn 1996; Marks 2005), which is essential for civic lives in their new home. Yet studies in the United States have often supported the opposite interpretation: bilingual immigrant children outperform children who are only fluent in English (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). To account for these effects, I included a dummy variable for adolescents whose families use languages other than the language of test at home. Adolescents who speak the language of instruction at home were the reference group. In addition, although recurrent findings from cross-national studies support the idea that growing up with a single parent is negatively related to adolescents' educational outcomes, the extent to which those in single-parent families perform less well than those in non-single-parent families substantially varies across countries (Park 2007). I included a dummy variable for family structure, which distinguishes single-parent and non-single-parent families, including nuclear families, mixed families, and other types of families.

INFLUENCES FROM OTHER AGENTS OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION. I also controlled for the influences from three agents of political socialization: *school*, *the media*, and *peer groups*. First, as a school-related factor, I controlled for individual students' perceptions of

the openness in their classroom climate for discussion (*openness in classroom discussion*), which represents the extent to which differing perspectives or controversial issues are discussed within the classroom. Second, *media attention* is a combined measure averaging the three items that asked students how frequently they use newspapers, television, and the internet to inform themselves about national and international news. In the same vein, I also included a proxy for the frequency of discussion with peers on national or international matters (*political conversations with friends*). This was measured with an additive index of two items, which asked about conversations with friends regarding political or social issues and what was happening in other countries. When a multi-level model technique is applied to the pooled data across all 31 countries, these three indices were standardized within each country so that they did not reflect international differences.

GENDER. A considerable body of research has confirmed gender disparities in civic knowledge and many aspects of democratic behavior among the adult population: men know more about politics than do women, and men exceed women in political interest, efficacy, and engagement (see, for example, Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; Mondak and Anderson 2004). Yet these disparities do not persist among young citizens. Female adolescents have been found to show higher levels of civic knowledge, but still fall behind their male counterparts in other measures of civic outcomes (Hooghe and Stolle 2004). To account for such gender effect, I controlled for gender using a dummy variable for sex; males are the reference group.

SCHOOL LOCATION. School location was included in the analyses by distinguishing whether a student attend a school located in a city with a population of more than 100,000 (*urban location*, a reference category) or a school located in a less populated area. Due to the

considerably large number of missing cases, a separate category for those with missing information on school location was also created.

Country-level Variables

One of the overarching goals of this chapter is to examine whether between-country differences in the extent to which citizens share relatively equal political voice, regardless of their position in the socioeconomic hierarchy, are associated with cross-national variation in the magnitude of family socioeconomic influence on adolescents' civic outcomes. This goal can be achieved by conducting multi-level analyses which assess how the country-level measure of political inequality conditions the relationship between adolescents' family SES and their civic outcomes.

HOOVER INDEX FOR POLITICAL INEQUALITY. Critical to answering this chapter's main research question is to develop a cross-national measure of political inequality. To summarize a country's level of inequality of political voice along socioeconomic lines in a single number, I drew upon the Hoover index. It has been widely used as a proxy measure of the distribution of income across a population, the distribution of a population across land area, and other applications typically associated with SES and health.⁸ The Hoover index measures the proportion of the variable of interest that would need to be redistributed (e.g., taken from the most educated half of the population given to the least educated half) to achieve complete

⁸ The Hoover index (H) is calculated using the equation as such: $H = \frac{1}{2} \left| \sum_{i=1}^3 \left(\frac{q_i}{q} - \frac{p_i}{p} \right) \right|$, where the first category ($i=1$) includes those who had not completed high school, the second category ($i = 2$) includes those who had completed high school as their highest level of educational attainment, and the third category ($i = 3$) includes those who had completed college education; q_i represents the sum of political interest levels in category i ; p_i is the population of category i ; q represents the total sum of political interest levels across all three categories; and p represents the total population across all three categories. See Hoover (1941) and Plane and Rogerson (1994) for a more detailed explanation of the Hoover index.

equality. Like the Gini index, the Hoover index is bounded by zero (complete inequality) and one (total inequality) so that higher values on the index indicate higher levels of inequality. To construct the Hoover index, I consulted information about parents' interest in politics from adolescents' responses to the student questionnaire in ICCS 2009. Using a four-point scale (from "not interested at all" to "very interested"), adolescents reported their parents' level of interest in politics. Although parents' interest in politics is not assumed to be an iron-clad indicator of their actual engagement in politics, research on citizen participation has consistently shown that interest in politics is an important predictor of diverse forms of political participation (see, for example, Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). A caution is needed, though, to interpret this index, because I rely on adolescents' responses rather than parents' self-report. For example, adolescents' responses might be affected by social desirability response bias (Arnold and Feldman 1981), which means that adolescents may over-report their parents' interest in politics in a way that will be viewed favorably by others. The most conservative interpretation could be that countries with higher values of the Hoover index correspond to higher levels of inequality in political interest among citizens with different socioeconomic (especially educational) attainment. The values of the Hoover index in each country are presented in Table 3-2.

COUNTRY-LEVEL CONTROLS. I controlled for three country-level factors that may render spurious the impact of the Hoover index on the relationship between adolescents' family SES and their civic outcomes. First, each country's level of democracy was taken into account in the analysis, which is a composite index of political rights and civil liberties. Since this kind of information is not directly available from ICCS 2009, data were obtained from Freedom House 2008 (Freedom House 2008). I recoded the original construct so that higher values indicate higher levels of democracy.

The second country-level factor to be controlled is the country's level of economic development as measured by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Originally obtained from the Human Development Report 2009, the information on each country's GDP per capita in 2009 US dollars is available from the statistics table in the ICCS 2009 International Report (Schulz et al. 2010). A country's economic development level is closely associated with the degree to which class structures are differentiated (Buchmann and Hannum 2001), which has a direct bearing on the relationship among socioeconomic stratification, politics and equality. For example, in examining cross-national differences in the extent to which political and socioeconomic hierarchies are closely congruent, Verba and his colleagues (1978) noted that the problems of political participation differ considerably between more and less developed countries. While the problem directly concerns political inequality, where wealth and other non-political privileges are converted into political power in more developed countries, it is related to mobilizing greater citizen engagement in the political process in less developed countries. In developed countries where political parties and electoral politics are well institutionalized, the issue at stake is to what extent every citizen has equal access to political opportunities and has an equal voice over governmental decisions. By contrast, the problem of participation revolves around the issue of infusing democratic orientations and participatory norms into the mass population in less developed countries. If Verba and his colleagues' arguments hold true, the intergenerational transfer of class advantages in the civic realm is likely to be more pronounced in more developed countries. That is, the magnitude of the relationship between family SES and adolescents' civic outcomes is likely to be stronger in more developed countries than in less developed countries. As shown in Table 3-2, all 31 countries included in my analysis are relatively more or less economically developed countries. Thus, in order to take into account

any potential effects associated with the country's economic development level, each country's GDP per capita in 2009 US dollars was included in the analysis.

Finally, I controlled for the country's level of economic inequality as measured by the Gini index. The information comes from the CIA World Fact Book (2011). As suggested in the ongoing controversy over whether economic inequality is an inhibitor (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Anderson and Beramendi 2005; Dahl 2006; Hacker et al. 2005), a fuel of democratic participation (Brady 2004; Meltzer and Richard 1981; Oliver 2001), or a factor that interacts with individuals' own economic condition (Boix 2003; Lukes 2005; Pontusson and Rueda 2010; Solt 2004, 2008), economic inequality has ramifications for the extent to which citizens from diverse socioeconomic positions are equally represented in the civic realm. Given that adolescents' civic development is circumscribed by their parents' civic activism (i.e., civically active parents tend to provide their children with civically rich home environments and thus have civically active children), the country's level of economic inequality may leave a legacy for adolescents' civic outcomes. For example, if economic inequality has a negative effect on civic engagement for the poor, adolescents from less-well-off families in unequal countries are more likely than their counterparts in less unequal countries to encounter less civically rich home environments.

Missing Values

Under the assumption that data on independent variables is missing at random (MAR), I compensated for missing variables using a multiple imputation strategy (Rubin 1987). Before analysis, each missing value on all the independent variables for each country was replaced with three plausible imputations. The only exceptions are school sector and location—separate

categories for those with missing information on school sector and location were created. I imputed both continuous and categorical variables, utilizing a model that incorporated all the variables in our analyses. This multiple imputation strategy only applies to independent variables, not to dependent variables.

Analytic Approach

I used two different modeling strategies for multivariate analyses. First, I conducted ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis to predict adolescents' internal political efficacy, citizenship self-efficacy and expected electoral participation scores by parental education, the two indices of home learning environments, and other individual and family background factors (i.e., immigration background, language used at home, family structure, gender and urban location). In order to take into account the nested structure of data originated from the two-stage sampling framework (Schulz, Ainley, and Fraillon 2011), total student weights (TOTWGT)⁹ were used in the analysis. The primary purposes of this analysis were to examine cross-national variation (1) in the magnitude of the relationship between family SES and adolescents' civic outcomes and (2) in the process of how parental education relates to adolescents' civic outcomes through home civic learning environments. For each country separately, three OLS models are specified as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y \text{ (Civic outcome scores)} = & \\
 \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{high School}) + \beta_2(\text{college}) + \beta_3(\text{gender}) + \beta_4(\text{immigration background}) + \beta_5(\text{home language}) + & \\
 \beta_6(\text{family structure}) + \beta_7(\text{home literacy}) + \beta_8(\text{home discussion}) + & \\
 \beta_9(\text{urban location}) + \beta_{10}(\text{location missing}) + \hat{\epsilon} &
 \end{aligned}$$

⁹ The total student weight is equal to the inverse of the joint probability of selection for a particular student (i.e., the probability that school A *and* class B *and* student C are selected). For more detailed information on sampling weights, see Chapter 2.

After assessing the effects of individual-level variables for each country separately, I applied a multi-level model technique to the pooled data across all 31 countries. I built two-level HLM models which treated students as the first-level unit and countries as the second-level unit for each civic outcome. For these two-level analyses, total student weights (TOTWGT) were also used at the student-level (Level 1). These two-level HLM models examine the extent to which the effect of parental education varies across countries and whether the cross-national variation, if any, is systematically related to the degree of countries' political inequality across socioeconomic lines. Before arriving at the final model, three intermediary models were created within each set of the civic outcome measures. The first model is a null model where no predictors were specified at either the student-level or the country-level. Due to space limitations, only the final model is presented in this section. The student-level equation predicts each civic outcome score for a student i in country j (Y_{ij}) as follows:

$$\text{Student-level: } Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}(\text{high school}) + \beta_{2j}(\text{college}) + \beta_{3j}(\text{female}) + \beta_{4j}(\text{immigration background}) + \beta_{5j}(\text{home language}) + \beta_{6j}(\text{openness in classroom discussion}) + \beta_{7j}(\text{media attention}) + \beta_{8j}(\text{political discussion with friends}) + \beta_{9j}(\text{urban location}) + \beta_{10j}(\text{location missing}) + \gamma_{ij}$$

where β_{0j} represents the average civic outcome score of adolescents with parents who had not earned a high school diploma (a reference category) in country j , controlling for all student-level variables included in the model. β_{1j} is the slope of the dummy variable of high school in country j , which indicates the expected difference in civic outcome scores between adolescents whose parents had not earned a high school diploma and those whose parents had completed high school as their highest level of educational attainment. β_{2j} is the slope of the dummy variable of college in country j , which indicates the expected difference in civic outcome scores between adolescents whose parents had not earned a high school diploma and those whose parents had earned a college degree. r_{ij} indicates a random effect which is unique to each individual student.

β_{3j} through β_{10j} represent the slopes of student-level variables described in the earlier section. All student-level variables, except for high school and college, are centered around corresponding grand means. The two dummy variables of parental education are group-mean centered.

In the country-level equation, the coefficients derived from the student-level equation serve as dependent variables as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \beta_{0j} &= \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\text{Hoover index for political inequality}) + \gamma_{02}(\text{Country - level control}) + \mu_{0j} \\ \beta_{1j} &= \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}(\text{Hoover index for political inequality}) + \gamma_{12}(\text{Country - level control}) + \mu_{1j} \\ \beta_{1j} &= \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{21}(\text{Hoover index for political inequality}) + \gamma_{22}(\text{Country - level control}) + \mu_{2j} \\ & \dots \\ \beta_{3j} &= \gamma_{30} \\ & \dots \\ \beta_{10j} &= \gamma_{100} \end{aligned}$$

The slopes of high school (β_{1j}) and college (β_{2j}) are predicted by the Hoover index for political inequality and country-level controls. Because of multicollinearity among the three country-level controls (i.e., GDP per capita, Gini index and the level of democracy), the country-level control variables are not included in the same equation. That is, the effect of the Hoover index for political inequality was estimated three times with including each of the three country-level control variables one at a time. GDP per capita was logged before entering the models. All other coefficients derived from the student-level equation (i.e., β_{3j} through β_{10j}) are assumed to be constant across countries. To facilitate interpretation, each country-level variable is entered into the model centered around its corresponding grand mean.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics for both independent and dependent variables as specified in the measures section are summarized in Table 3-2. Table 3-2 also presents the national averages of adolescents' internal political efficacy, citizenship self-efficacy, and expected electoral participation scores, along with their corresponding standard deviations. Given that the main focus of this study is how countries vary in the effects of parental education and home civic learning environments on adolescents' civic outcomes, I concentrate on the discussion of the related variables.

Figure 3-1 graphically displays the distributions of adolescents by parental educational attainment in each country calculated from ICCS 2009 data. The proportion of adolescents whose parents had not completed high school is substantial in Thailand (54.1%), Mexico (50.1%), Hong Kong (40.9%), Malta (40.4%) and Colombia (36.5%), while relatively small in the Czech Republic (2.4%), Korea (3.4%), Norway (4.0%), Belgium (4.8%) and Latvia (5.2%). The proportion of adolescents whose parents had completed high school as their highest level of educational attainment is the largest in the Czech Republic (65.6%), followed by Poland (60.8%), Taiwan (47.8%) and Italy (41.3%), whereas smaller in countries including Thailand (16.9%), Malta (18.1%), Norway (19.4%) and New Zealand (19.7%). Approximately half of the adolescents have parents with at least a bachelor's degree or higher in many countries except Hong Kong (22.6%), Italy (28.2%), Thailand (29.1%), Mexico (31.7%), the Czech Republic (32.0%), Austria (32.7%), Chile (38.5%) and Colombia (39.1%). Notable is the exceptionally high percentage of students having parents with a bachelor's degree or higher in some European

countries such as Norway (76.6%), Sweden (71.5%), Belgium (71.2%), Denmark (71.1%) and Latvia (70.2%). It is also interesting to see that relatively large disparities in parental educational attainment are observed in countries with greater economic inequality (e.g., Hong Kong, Mexico, Colombia and Chile).

Table 3-2 also presents the national averages of the two indices of home civic learning environments (*home literacy* and *home discussion*). Note that the home literacy index is measured by the number of books at home, which is distinguished on a six-point scale (*0-10 books* (1), *11-25 books* (2), *26-100 books* (3), *101-200 books* (4), *201-500 books* (5), *more than 500 books* (6)). Countries showing the highest averages of home literacy include Luxembourg (2.83), Estonia (2.82) and Norway (2.77). Mexico (1.45), Colombia (1.46) and Thailand (1.52) demonstrate the lowest averages of home literacy. In addition, the top three countries showing the highest averages of home discussion are Italy (2.36), Thailand (2.34) and Colombia (2.15), whereas Finland (1.69), Belgium (1.73) and Slovenia (1.82) are the countries with the lowest averages. Again, note that the home discussion index indicates the average extent of parental engagement in discussion about domestic and international politics (*never or hardly ever* (1), *monthly* (2), *weekly* (3), *daily or almost daily* (4)). Therefore, even in those countries with the lowest averages, the average levels of parental engagement in political discussion are close to “monthly.” Countries with the highest averages demonstrate fairly similar average levels of parental engagement in political discussion.

In Table 3-2, countries are sorted in descending order of the magnitude of the Hoover index for political inequality. These 31 countries included in my study vary substantially in the extent to which citizens share equal political voice, regardless of their position in the socioeconomic hierarchy—from 0.0108 in Thailand to 0.0455 in Luxembourg. Remember that the Hoover

index would be 0 if parents at different levels of educational attainment have the same share of interest in politics, while it approaches 1 only if parents of attaining high levels of education are interested in politics. That is, countries with higher values of the Hoover index indicate higher levels of inequality in political voice among parents at different levels of educational attainment. As evident in Table 3-3, there is no marked correlation between the Hoover index and other country-level control variables.

Mediating Effects of Home Civic Learning Environments

To explore cross-national variation in the extent to which home civic learning environments mediate the effect of family socioeconomic background—especially parental educational attainment—on adolescents’ civic outcomes, I built four different OLS regression models, one for each outcome measure. In particular, I compared the civic outcome scores of adolescents whose parents had not received a high school diploma and those whose parents had received a college degree. For each country separately, a baseline model (Model 1) estimated the effect of parental education on adolescents’ civic outcomes, controlling only for their individual and family background factors. The second model (Model 2) additionally controlled for the index of home literacy, allowing assessment of the extent to which the effect of parental education is explained by the difference in the number of books at home between adolescents whose parents had not received a high school diploma and those whose parents had received a college degree. In a similar vein, the index of home discussion was added to the baseline model (Model 1) in Model 3. Comparing Model 1 and Model 3 allows assessment of the extent to which the effect of parental education is accounted for by the difference in the level of parental engagement in political discussion between those whose parents had less than a high school diploma and those whose parents had a bachelor’s degree or more. The final model (Model 4)

added the two indices of home civic learning environments to the baseline model (Model 1), simultaneously. For simplicity of presentation, in Tables 3-4, 3-5, and 3-6, only the regression slopes of *College* are presented. These slopes indicate the expected differences in civic outcome scores between those whose parents had less than a high school diploma and those whose parents had a bachelor's degree or more. Full tabular results for the final model (Model 4) are available in Tables 3-7, 3-8, and 3-9, where the two dummy variables of parental education (i.e., *High School* and *College*) are included in the analyses.

Across the four models in each country, Table 3-4 presents the expected differences in internal political efficacy scores between adolescents whose parents had not completed high school and their counterparts whose parents had college education. When controlling only for individual and family background factors, adolescents having college-educated parents show significantly higher levels of internal political efficacy than their counterparts having parents without a high school diploma in all countries except Malta and Thailand. In Thailand, internal political efficacy scores of adolescents having college-educated parents are 1.09 points *lower* than their counterparts having parents without a high school diploma, which is a significant difference. Beyond the overall tendency of the relative disadvantage of adolescents whose parents had not completed high school, there is substantial cross-national variation in the magnitudes of the gaps in internal political efficacy scores by parental education. Among 31 countries, Norway shows the largest gap (4.18 points), followed by Finland (3.56), Denmark (3.54), and the Netherlands (3.38). In Norway, adolescents who have parents with at least a bachelor's degree or higher achieve 4.18 points higher internal political efficacy scores than their counterparts who have parents without a high school diploma, which is close to the half of one standard deviation in internal political efficacy. Although significant, the gaps in internal

political efficacy scores by parental education are negligible in countries such as Bulgaria (0.79), Cyprus (0.78), Colombia (0.76), and Lithuania (0.71). After the two indices of home civic learning environments are added to the baseline model, one at a time, the magnitudes of the gaps are substantially reduced in all countries except Malta and Thailand. In Norway, for example, the magnitude of the gap is reduced by 28% from 4.18 points in Model 1 to 3.03 points in Model 2, while the corresponding gap is reduced by 43% from 4.18 points in Model 1 to 2.40 points in Model 3. In Malta and Thailand, with the addition of the two indices of home civic learning environments, the previously negative effects of having college-educated parents on adolescents' internal political efficacy become more negative (i.e., the magnitude of the gap increases). When the combined impact of the two indices of home civic learning environments are examined in Model 4, in many countries, the magnitudes of the gaps are remarkably reduced even to the degree that the internal political efficacy scores of adolescents having parents with a bachelor's degree or higher are indistinguishable from those of adolescents having parents without a high school diploma. These large reductions indicate that the gaps in internal political efficacy scores by parental education are in large part explained by the disparities in home civic learning environments that exist among children of parents at different levels of educational attainment. However, even after home civic learning environments are taken into account, the positive effects of having parents with a bachelor's degree or higher remain significant in some countries, indicating that parents' level of educational attainment does not entirely determine the extent to which home environments are civically stimulating in those countries. It is also important to note that the top-ten countries in terms of the magnitude of the gap in internal political efficacy scores by parental education are all highly developed countries, while the bottom-ten countries are less economically developed countries. This suggests that the influence of parental education

on adolescents' internal political efficacy tends to be stronger in economically developed countries than in less developed countries.

Table 3-5 shows the expected differences in citizenship self-efficacy scores between adolescents whose parents had not completed high school and those whose parents had college education. In general, parental education has a smaller effect on adolescents' citizenship self-efficacy than it does on their internal political efficacy. That said, when only individual and family background factors are included in the analyses, adolescents having parents who had completed college education display significantly higher levels of self-confidence in civic participation than their counterparts having parents who had not completed high school in all but three countries (i.e., Belgium (Flemish), Mexico and Thailand). There is no significant difference between citizenship self-efficacy scores of adolescents whose parents had not completed high school and those whose parents had college education in Belgium (Flemish) and Mexico. Interestingly, in Thailand, adolescents whose parents had completed high school show significantly lower levels of citizenship self-efficacy than their counterparts whose parents had completed high school as their highest level of educational attainment. In all the other countries, the size of the gap is relatively larger in Denmark (2.69), Norway (2.64), Greece (2.40), New Zealand (2.24), England (2.24), and the Netherlands (2.24), which is approximately equal to a quarter of one standard deviation in citizenship self-efficacy; the corresponding gap is negligible in Chile (0.97), Lithuania (0.91), Bulgaria (0.89), Estonia (0.86), Taiwan (0.80), and Switzerland (0.59). With the inclusion of the two indices of home civic learning environments, the previously significant positive effects of having college-educated parents disappear in many countries. In countries where the effects remain positive and significant, the magnitudes of the gaps are substantially decreased; in Denmark, the country with the largest gap in citizenship self-

efficacy scores by parental education, the gap is decreased by 28% from 4.18 points in Model 1 to 3.03 points in Model 2, and by 36% from 2.69 points in Model 1 to 1.73 points in Model 3. It is with the inclusion of all the two indices of home civic learning environments in Model 4 that the gaps in citizenship self-efficacy scores by parental education are rendered non-significant in many countries. Again, such disappearance of the previously significant positive effects of having college-educated parents indicates that the gaps in citizenship self-efficacy scores by parental education are partially explained by the disparities in home civic learning environments that exist among children of parents at different levels of educational attainment. Although the magnitude is considerably decreased, the effects of having parents with college education remain significant and positive in a few countries even after the inclusion of all the two indices of civic learning environments. This finding suggests that parents' level of educational attainment does not entirely determine the civic richness of the home environments in those countries. It is also interesting to find that the effects of parental education on adolescents' citizenship self-efficacy tend to be more substantial in economically developed countries than in less developed countries.

Table 3-6 displays the expected differences in expected electoral participation scores between adolescents whose parents had not completed high school and those whose parents had college education across the four models in each country. Parental education appears to have a stronger effect on adolescents' expected likelihood of voting than on their internal political efficacy and citizenship self-efficacy. When only adolescents' individual and family background factors are held constant, Model 1 shows that adolescents having parents with college education rate themselves as significantly more likely to vote than do their counterparts having parents without a high school diploma in all countries except Malta, where no significant discrepancy in voting expectations by parental education is found. Among 31 countries, Norway (4.70) shows

the largest gap in adolescents' expected electoral participation scores by parental education, followed by Switzerland (3.75), Finland (3.33), and the Czech Republic (3.31). The size of the gaps is almost equal to half of one standard deviation in expected likelihood of voting. Even in the countries showing relatively smaller gaps, such as Colombia (1.02), Mexico (1.34), Estonia (1.48), and Bulgaria (1.55), the magnitudes of the gaps are not negligible. Moving to Model 2 and Model 3, which additionally control for the two indices of home civic learning environments one at a time, the gaps in expected likelihood of voting between those whose parents had less than a high school diploma and those whose parents had a bachelor's degree or higher are considerably reduced in all countries. As evident in Model 4, however, the positive effects of having parents with college education remain significant in all countries even after the two indices of home civic learning environments are simultaneously taken into account. Once again, this result implies that while the gaps in adolescents' voting expectation by parental education are in part explained by the disparities in home civic learning environments that exist among children of parents at different levels of educational attainment, parental education does not entirely determine the extent to which home environments are civically rich in all countries. Comparing top and bottom countries in the magnitude of the gaps reveals that parental education has stronger impacts on adolescents' expected likelihood of voting in economically developed countries (e.g., Norway, Switzerland, and Finland) than in less developed countries (e.g., Malta, Colombia, and Mexico).

Figures 3-2, 3-3, and 3-4 graphically display the relative effects of parental education, home literacy, and home discussion on adolescents' civic outcomes in each country. In order to facilitate the comparisons, the three variables of parental education, home literacy and home discussion are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Across all 31

countries, the relatively stronger effect of home discussion, compared to those of the parents' education level and having books in the home, is observed. While not universal across all countries, having books in the home tends to have a more substantial impact on all three of adolescents' civic outcomes than having parents of attaining higher levels of educational attainment.

Cross-national Variations in the Effect of Parental Education

To examine the extent to which the effect of parental education on adolescents' civic outcomes varies across countries, and whether the cross-national variation, if any, is systematically related to the degree of countries' inequality of political voice across socioeconomic lines, I built two-level HLM models for each civic outcome. Although the magnitude of the coefficients differs, the main conclusions that emerge from the HLM models are similar across the three outcome measures. Because the focus of the current study is the impact of the Hoover index for political inequality on the relationship between parental education and adolescents' civic outcomes, the effects of other variables are not discussed here. Figures 3-5, 3-6 and 3-7 help illustrate the varying effects of parental education on adolescents' civic outcomes in countries of different levels of political inequality. The predicted civic outcome score in each panel is that of a hypothetical adolescent who has the average individual characteristics of the 31 countries, given that the individual-level variables included in the HLM models were grand-mean centered. The red lines show the predicted effects of parental education for adolescents in the country with the highest degree of political inequality (i.e., Luxembourg); the blue lines show the predicted effects in the country with the lowest degree of political inequality (i.e., Thailand). The steeper slopes represent stronger effects of parental education on adolescents' civic outcomes. The distance between the two lines indicate the

difference in adolescents' civic outcome scores in the country with the highest degree of political inequality versus the country with the lowest degree of political inequality. In sum, Figures 3-5, 3-6 and 3-7 graphically portray the compounding effect of macro-level political inequality in increasing the disparity in adolescents' civic outcomes. The steeper slopes in the country with the highest degree of political inequality suggest that the positive influence of having highly-educated parents on adolescents' civic outcomes is larger for countries with less egalitarian political systems.

Internal Political Efficacy The HLM results for adolescents' internal political efficacy are presented in Table 3-10, where the impacts of the Hoover index on the slopes of parental education (i.e., *High School* and *College*) are listed under the country-level equation. In the absence of other country-level control variables (see Model 3), countries with greater political inequality demonstrate stronger effects of parental education on adolescents' internal political efficacy. The *High School* slope at the student-level in Model 3 (0.29, SE = 0.16) indicates the expected gap in internal political efficacy scores between adolescents whose parents had not completed high school and those whose parents had completed high school as their highest level of educational attainment in a country whose Hoover index is equal to the average value across 31 countries. It is important that the effect of the Hoover index on the *High School* slope is significant and positive (48.97, SE = 17.73). The coefficient of 48.97 indicates that a one unit change in the Hoover index leads to a 48.97-points in the internal political efficacy scale increase in the positive effect of having parents who had completed high school on adolescents' internal political efficacy. Note that countries with the highest and lowest degree of political inequality, Luxembourg and Thailand, respectively, differ by 0.0347 in the Hoover index. Thus, the coefficient of 48.97 means that the expected gap in internal political efficacy scores between

those whose parents had not completed high school and those whose parents had completed high school as their highest level of educational attainment is larger by 1.70 points (48.97×0.0347) in Luxembourg than in Thailand. In a similar vein, the *College* slope at the student-level in Model 3 (1.58, SE = 0.17) indicates the expected slope of *College* in a country whose Hoover index is equal to the average value across 31 countries. That is, in a country whose Hoover index is equal to the average value across 31 countries, adolescents whose parents had received a college degree tend to score 1.58 points higher on internal political efficacy than their counterparts whose parents had not received a high school diploma. The effect of the Hoover index on the *College* slope is also significant and positive (110.51, SE = 30.10), suggesting that a one unit increase in the Hoover index correlates with an increase of 110.51 in the positive effect of having college-educated parents on adolescents' internal political efficacy. More precisely, the coefficient of 110.51 indicates that the expected gap in internal political efficacy scores between those whose parents had not completed high school and those whose parents had college education is larger by 3.83 points (110.51×0.0347) in Luxembourg than in Thailand, which is over a quarter of one standard deviation in internal political efficacy. Even after additionally taking into account the effects of country-level covariates (see Model 4), countries with higher degrees of political inequality still demonstrate larger disparities in internal political efficacy among adolescents having relatively less-educated parents. For example, when the country's economic inequality (as measured by the Gini index) is taken into account, a one unit increase in the Hoover index leads to an increase by a 47.27-points in the internal political efficacy scale in the positive effect of having parents with a high school diploma on adolescents' internal political efficacy. Similarly, a one unit increase in the Hoover index is associated with an increase by 130.27 in the positive effect of having college-educated parents on adolescents' internal political

efficacy. Again, note that Norway (.0421) and Poland (.0176) differ by 0.0245 in the Hoover index. Therefore, when economic inequality is held constant, the expected gap in internal political efficacy scores between those whose parents had not completed high school and those whose parents had completed high school as their highest level of educational attainment is larger by 1.16 points (0.0245×47.27) in Norway than in Poland. The expected gap between those whose parents did not graduate from high school and those whose parents had completed college education is larger by 3.19 (0.0245×130.27) in Norway than in Poland. This magnitude of the gap is over a quarter of one standard deviation in internal political efficacy.

Table 3-11 presents the variance components associated with the two-level HLM models. To assess the practical significance of the statistically significant findings above, I also calculated the proportion of variance explained at both student- and country-levels. Model 1 shows between-country variance in adolescents' internal political efficacy scores when no predictors are included in both student-level and country-level equations. In Model 2, all student-level variables are included in the student-level equation. The results present significant between-country variance in the *High School* (0.63, $p < 0.01$) and *College* (1.94, $p < 0.01$) slopes. Model 3 adds the Hoover index for political inequality in the country-level equation. Including the Hoover index reduces the between-country variance of the *High School* slope by 19.0 percent from 0.63 (Model 2) to 0.51 (Model 3). In the same vein, it reduces the between-country variance of the *College* slope by 38.1 percent from 1.94 (Model 2) to 1.20 (Model 3). In addition to the Hoover index, the inclusion of country-level covariates (Model 4) also contributes to a substantial amount of the reduction in the between-country variance of the *High School* and *College* slopes.

Citizenship self-efficacy Table 3-12 shows the HLM results for adolescents' citizenship self-efficacy. As shown in the third column in Table 3-12 (Model 3), disparities in citizenship self-efficacy among children of parents at different levels of educational attainment tend to be larger in countries with greater political inequality. In regards to the magnitude of the disparities, a one unit change in the Hoover index is related to a 32.23-point increase in the parents' high school diploma effect (32.23, SE = 16.08). The coefficient of 32.23 indicates that the gap in citizenship self-efficacy scores between those whose parents did not graduate from high school and those whose parents had completed high school as their highest level of educational attainment in countries with the highest degree of political inequality (e.g., Luxembourg) is 1.15 points (32.23×0.0347) larger than the corresponding gap in countries with the lowest degree of political inequality (e.g., Thailand). Turning to the effect of the Hoover index on the *College* slope, the effect is also significant and positive (83.55, SE = 29.84). The coefficient of 83.35 means that the gap in self-confidence in civic participation between adolescents those whose parents had not completed high school and those whose parents had college education tends to be 2.90 points (83.35×0.0347) larger in Luxembourg than in Thailand, which is over one standard deviation in citizenship self-efficacy. As evident in the fourth, fifth and sixth columns in Table 3-12 (Model 4), there is a consistent pattern in the effect of the Hoover index on the association between parental education and adolescents' citizenship self-efficacy even after the country-level covariates are taken into account. When the country's economic development level is held constant, for example, the effect of the Hoover index on the *High School* slope is significant (significant at 0.10 level) and positive (19.70, SE = 12.71). Although the size of the effect is not substantial, this result suggests that countries with greater political inequality tend to show significantly larger disparities in citizenship self-efficacy between children of the least educated

and the most educated parents even after their economic levels are held constant. Similarly, the effect of the Hoover index on the *College* slope remains significant and positive (57.05, SE = 19.65) when the country's economic development level is controlled. This indicates that, in terms of adolescents' citizenship self-efficacy, the importance of having college-educated parents increases with the country's level of political inequality along socioeconomic lines, net of the countries' level of economic development.

Table 3-13 displays the variance components associated with the two-level HLM models to assess the extent to which between-country variance in the effect of parental education is accounted for by the Hoover index and country-level covariates. As seen in the second column in Table 3-13 (Model 2), both the *High School* (0.32, $p < 0.01$) and *College* (1.31, $p < 0.01$) slopes vary appreciably across countries, meaning that parental education in some countries has a greater effect on adolescents' citizenship self-efficacy than in other countries. When the Hoover index is included in the country-level equation (Model 3), the between-country variance of the *High School* slope (0.29, $p < 0.01$) is reduced by 10.1 percent; the corresponding percentage of the reduction in between-country variance of the *College* slope (0.92, $p < 0.01$) is 30.3 percent. Finally, including two country-level variables, the Hoover index and country-level covariates one at a time, reduces a substantial portion of the between-country variance of the *High School* and *College* slopes (see Model 4).

Expected Electoral Participation Table 3-14 presents the findings for adolescents' expected electoral participation. Echoing the results for the internal political efficacy and citizenship self-efficacy measures, countries with higher degrees of political inequality demonstrate stronger effects of parental education on adolescents' expected electoral participation. That is, disparities in expected likelihood of voting among children of parents at different levels of educational

attainment tend to be wider in countries with greater political inequality. In terms of the magnitude of the disparities, however, the country-level variable of the Hoover index for political inequality exerts a smaller effect on this expected electoral participation measure than on the internal political efficacy and citizenship self-efficacy measures. Focusing on Model 3 where no country-level covariate is held constant, the *High School* slope at the student-level (0.67, SE = 0.14) indicates the gap in voting expectations between adolescents whose parents had not completed high school and those whose parents had completed high school as their highest level of educational attainment in a country whose Hoover index is equal to the average value across 31 countries. While significant only at the 0.10 level, the effect of the Hoover index on the *High School* slope is positive (24.58, SE = 14.57). This suggests that a one unit change in the Hoover index leads to an increase by 24.58 points on the expected electoral participation scale in the positive effect of having parents who had completed high school on adolescents' expected likelihood of voting. Remember that Luxembourg and Thailand differ by 0.0347 in the Hoover index. Therefore, the coefficient of 24.58 indicates that the expected gap in adult electoral participation between adolescents whose parents had not completed high school and those whose parents had completed high school as their highest level of educational attainment is larger by 0.85 points (24.58×0.0347) in Luxembourg than in Thailand, which is a relatively negligible difference. In a similar vein, the *College* slope at the student-level in Model 3 (2.54, SE = 0.21) indicates the expected gap in adult electoral participation in a country whose Hoover index is equal to the average value across 31 countries. That is, in a country whose Hoover index is equal to the average value across 31 countries, adolescents whose parents had received a college degree achieve scores 2.54 points higher in electoral participation than their counterparts whose parents had not received a high school diploma. The magnitude of the gap is almost equal

to a quarter of one standard deviation in expected voting. The effect of the Hoover index on the *College* slope is also significant and positive (61.37, SE = 24.76), suggesting that a one unit increase in the Hoover index leads to an increase by 61.37 in the parents' college effect on adolescents' expected likelihood of voting. Specifically, the coefficient of 61.37 indicates that the expected gap in adult electoral participation between those whose parents had not completed high school and those whose parents had college education is larger by 2.13 points (61.37×0.0347) in Luxembourg than in Thailand, which is nearly equivalent to one standard deviation in expected voting. As seen in the fourth and sixth columns in Table 3-14 (Model 4), when the country's economic development level and democracy level are held constant, one at a time, the significant positive effects of the Hoover index on both the *High School* and *College* slopes are reduced to non-significance. By contrast, the effect of the Hoover index on the *High School* slope remains significant ($p < 0.10$) and positive (21.23, SE = 12.55) even after the country's economic inequality is taken into account. The Hoover index also exerts a significant and positive effect on the *College* slope with the additional control of the country's economic inequality (55.22, SE = 23.34), meaning that the expected voting advantage of children of college-educated parents is likely to be reinforced in countries with greater political inequality even when the country's economic inequality is held constant.

The second column in Table 3-15 (Model 2) presents that both the *High School* (0.47, $p < 0.01$) and *College* (1.43, $p < 0.001$) slopes vary substantially across countries. This means that the effect of parental educational attainment on adolescents' expected likelihood of voting is stronger in some countries than in other countries. As evident in the third column in Table 3-15 (Model 3), the Hoover index alone accounts for only 0.2 percent of the between-country variance of the *High School* slope (0.46 $p < 0.01$), while it accounts for 11.1 percent of the between-

country variance of the *College* slope (1.27, $p < 0.001$). When the country-level covariates are included in the model (Model 4), the two country-level variables taken together (i.e., the Hoover index and the country-level covariates) explain a sizeable percentage of the between-country variance of the *High School* and *College* slopes.

Discussion and Conclusions

In this chapter, I have examined the source of disparity in civic outcomes among adolescents from different family socioeconomic backgrounds by focusing on the mediating effects of home civic learning environments. In addition, I have also investigated how country-level inequality of political voice across socioeconomic lines shapes the pattern of the intergenerational transfer of social class advantages in the civic realm. My empirical analyses of 31 countries lead to several conclusions. First, although parents' educational attainment, which has been identified as the most important dimension of family socioeconomic influence on children's learning outcomes, has a marked effect on adolescents' civic outcomes (i.e., internal political efficacy, citizenship self-efficacy, and expected likelihood of voting) in all 31 countries, the magnitude of its effect varies across countries. In general, the effects of parental education on adolescents' civic outcomes tend to be stronger in economically developed countries than in less developed countries. Interestingly, in less developed countries such as Thailand, an idiosyncratic pattern of the relationship between parental education and adolescents' civic outcomes is observed. That is, adolescents having lesser-educated parents show higher levels of confidence in their own capacity to understand and engage in politics than their counterparts having highly-educated parents. This finding suggests that the positive effect of having highly-educated parents on adolescents' civic outcomes, which has been widely noted in the United

States and other Western countries, is not generalizable to many other countries. It also supports, in part, the argument that while the problem of political participation directly concerns political inequality in more developed countries, where wealth and other social privileges are translated into political influence, it is related to mobilizing greater citizen engagement in the political process in less developed countries (Verba, Norman, and Kim 1978). However, it must be acknowledged that the classification of countries on the basis of their economic development levels is an extremely simplified dichotomy. A wide range of countries differ in countless ways in reality, and there are often much larger variations *within* countries than *between* them (Buchmann and Hannum 2001). An in-depth, cross-cultural study that incorporates more country-level characteristics such as social, cultural, or religious contexts might be fruitful for better understanding of their relative importance in mediating the ways that parental education influences adolescents' civic outcomes. For example, parents' educational attainment may matter less in developing countries with a culture of collectivism, such as Thailand, where extended family members play a prominent role, or even a more critical role than parents, in influencing children's civic development.

Second, the level of parental education does not necessarily determine the extent to which home environments are civically stimulating in most countries. While home civic learning environments mediate, to some extent, the effect of parental education on adolescents' civic outcomes, the effect of parental education remains significant in most countries even after home civic learning environments are held constant. This finding indicates that parental contributions to their children's civic outcomes cannot be simply reduced to the intergenerational transfer of social class advantages. Rather, home civic learning environments are important resources from which both adolescents from low and high SES families can receive great returns. The

importance of home civic learning environments is further buttressed by the fact that the two indices of home civic learning environments—the number of books at home and the level of parental engagement in political discussions—are far more significant predictors of adolescents’ civic outcomes than the level of parental education in all 31 countries. Such findings also echo Verba, Schlozman, and Burns’s (2005) study which noted that African-American citizens who experienced the civil rights movements during their adolescence were more likely than their Anglo and Latino counterparts to report that they grew up in a civically rich home environment, irrespective of their parents’ socioeconomic attainment, which had enduring effects on their psychological engagement in politics and civic activism. In interpreting the findings, however, there are two points that deserve special attention. First, my measures of home civic learning environments are not extensive enough. I had information about the number of books at home and the level of parental engagement in political discussions. Although important, these measures are far from definitive and only proxies for the civic stimulation parents provide their children. More crucially, I was not able to take into consideration the *contents* of the civic stimulation at home. Considering that the social class differences in home civic learning environments might be more directly reflected in the contents of civic attitudes and commitments that parents consider valuable for their children to hold, one fruitful avenue would be to conduct an ethnographic investigation into the contents of civic lessons that children from different socioeconomic families are given at home. Second, the specific meaning of parent-child discussion on civic matters may vary across countries with different political, social and cultural contexts. There also might be other forms of the home civic stimulation that are widely practiced and effective in some countries but are not taken into account in the ICCS 2009 data.

Caution is needed, therefore, when interpreting the meaning of parental engagement in political discussions across countries.

Last, but most importantly, I began this chapter with the expectation that countries with less egalitarian political systems would show larger socioeconomic disparities in adolescents' civic outcomes than countries with more egalitarian political systems. In countries where the political voice of those at the lower rungs of the socioeconomic ladder are marginalized, parents with disadvantaged socioeconomic background may function as a less effective force in enhancing their children's civic development than do their similarly situated counterparts in countries where all citizens across the socioeconomic spectrum share relatively equal political voice. As expected in my hypothesis, the two-level HLM analyses have found strong empirical evidence of the systematic association between country-level inequality of political voice along socioeconomic lines and the magnitude of family socioeconomic influence on adolescents' civic outcomes. Although the magnitude of family socioeconomic influence differs, the main conclusions that emerge from the two-level HLM analyses are fairly similar across the three civic outcome measures. In terms of both the magnitude of the effect and the amount of variance explained, the *compounding* impacts of country-level political inequality in increasing civic disparities among adolescents from different socioeconomic families are substantial. This finding lends support to my argument that the civic advantages that accrue to advantaged socioeconomic families and are passed on to their offspring are not really given at all. Rather, they are socially constructed in the sense that the tendency for high SES families and their children to take advantage of greater opportunities for civic engagement can be counteracted by changing the distribution of socioeconomic advantages, or politics per se. It also suggests that incorporating theories of micro/macro interaction might provide insights into the source of "the

striking inequalities in political voice that currently characterize our democracy” (Kahne and Spote 2008, 754), and may help bridge the gap between micro and macro emphases in a burgeoning research literature on the sociology of political inequality. Future research may benefit from more elaborate cross-national measurement of political inequality that takes into account the socioeconomic stratification of citizens’ engagement in a wide range of participatory channels, including voting, campaigning, community activities, and demonstrations, among others.

Although useful to illuminate how country-level political inequality has a bearing on socioeconomic disparities in adolescents’ civic outcomes, this chapter’s main findings are limited by their reliance on cross-sectional international data. That is, cross-sectional data of adolescents’ civic outcomes like ICCS 2009 have limitations in ascertaining any causal link between country-level political inequality and socioeconomic disparities in adolescents’ civic outcomes. To derive unambiguous causal inferences, future studies should conduct well-designed longitudinal research that connects childhood to adulthood. Such longitudinal research would enable us to explore whether adolescents who grew up in the countries with higher degrees of political inequality become less engaged and empowered in adult politics. It would also provide data that better support individual-level causal assumptions about the lasting effects of home civic learning environments in early adolescence on adult citizens’ civic activism.

Table 3-1 Variables Description

| Variable | Coding |
|--|--|
| Internal political efficacy | IRT plausible values with mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10 for equally weighted countries |
| Citizenship self-efficacy | IRT scores with mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10 for equally weighted countries |
| Expected adult electoral participation | IRT scores with mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10 for equally weighted countries |
| Gender | 1 = girl; 2 = boy |
| Parental education | The highest International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) level between father's and mother's education 0 = less than high school; 1 = completed high school; 2 = completed college |
| Home literacy | 1 = 0-10 books; 2 = 11-25 books; 3 = 26-100 books; 4 = 101-200 books; 5 = 201-500 books; 6 = more than 500 books |
| Home discussion | A combined measure averaging the two items that asked students how often they are involved in talking with parents about civic issues at home and averaging them 1 = never or hardly ever; 2 = monthly (at least once a month); 3 = weekly (at least once a week); 4 = daily or almost daily |
| Immigration background | 1 = children who were born abroad or born in the country of test but whose parents had been born abroad; 0 = native-born |
| Home language | 1 = speak test language at home; 0 = otherwise |
| Family structure | 1 = otherwise; 0 = single-parent families |
| Openness in classroom discussion | Students' perceptions of openness in classroom discussions. IRT scores with mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10 for equally weighted countries. The higher values reflect perceptions of higher levels of classroom discussion of political and social issues. |
| Media | A combined measure averaging the three items that asked students how frequent they use newspapers, television, and internet to inform themselves about national and international news and averaging them 1 = never or hardly ever; 2 = monthly (at least once a month); 3 = weekly (at least once a week); 4 = daily or almost daily |
| Friend | A combined measure averaging the two items that asked students how often they are involved in talking with friends about civic issues and averaging them 1 = never or hardly ever; 2 = monthly (at least once a month); 3 = weekly (at least once a week); 4 = daily or almost daily |
| School location | 1 = schools located in a city with a population of more than 100,000; 0 = otherwise |
| Location missing | A dummy variable indicating those with missing information on school location variables |

| | |
|--------------------|---|
| Hoover index | The Hoover index of a country's level of inequality in parental interest in politics along socioeconomic lines. Countries with higher values of the index show higher levels of inequality in interest in politics among parents with different educational attainment. |
| GDP per capita | The gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2009 (in 1,000 US Dollars) |
| Gini index | Raging from 0 to 1, high values indicate a higher level of economic inequality. |
| Level of democracy | Composite index of political rights and civil liberties scores of 2008. The higher the score, the higher the level of democracy. |

Table 3-2 Descriptive Statistics by Country^a

| | LUX | NOR | COL | ENG | GRC | CHL | CZE | ESP | FIN | MEX | EST | HKG | NZL | SVN | IRL | AUT |
|--|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Parental education (%) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than high school | 23.7 | 4.0 | 36.5 | 14.1 | 10.7 | 18.1 | 2.4 | 33.5 | 7.4 | 50.1 | 6.9 | 40.9 | 10.8 | 5.3 | 9.8 | 8.4 |
| High school | 33.0 | 19.4 | 24.4 | 37.7 | 34.3 | 43.4 | 65.6 | 19.8 | 37.3 | 18.2 | 33.1 | 36.5 | 19.7 | 32.8 | 29.3 | 58.9 |
| College | 43.3 | 76.6 | 39.1 | 48.2 | 54.9 | 38.5 | 32.0 | 46.7 | 55.3 | 31.7 | 60.0 | 22.6 | 69.4 | 62.0 | 60.9 | 32.7 |
| Female (%) | 51.6 | 50.7 | 53.5 | 51.8 | 51.0 | 51.2 | 46.0 | 50.6 | 51.3 | 52.2 | 50.5 | 48.1 | 49.4 | 49.8 | 48.6 | 51.1 |
| Immigrants (%) | 39.7 | 11.4 | 1.3 | 14.8 | 10.8 | 1.1 | 2.6 | 11.0 | 2.5 | 1.7 | 7.5 | 35.9 | 22.9 | 10.8 | 12.0 | 19.2 |
| Language minority (%) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Single-parent (%) | 16.4 | 11.2 | 37.0 | 17.8 | 18.5 | 25.8 | 16.6 | NA | 15.5 | 26.6 | 23.9 | 13.5 | 19.6 | 15.1 | 15.5 | 16.2 |
| Urban (%) | - | 14.9 | 57.5 | 28.5 | 21.4 | 57.5 | 16.0 | 36.0 | 29.4 | 49.4 | 26.6 | 74.5 | 48.6 | 14.5 | 30.8 | 18.5 |
| Location missing (%) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Home literacy | 2.83 (1.47) | 2.77 (1.31) | 1.46 (1.14) | 2.41 (1.44) | 2.55 (1.31) | 1.79 (1.21) | 2.51 (1.21) | 2.56 (1.30) | 2.48 (1.22) | 1.45 (1.19) | 2.82 (1.26) | 1.87 (1.37) | 2.55 (1.37) | 2.34 (1.27) | 2.40 (1.37) | 2.57 (1.42) |
| Home discussion | 2.09 (.82) | 2.00 (.84) | 2.15 (.87) | 1.88 (.82) | 2.13 (.84) | 2.11 (.90) | 1.84 (.72) | 1.97 (.83) | 1.69 (.72) | 1.91 (.79) | 1.84 (.75) | 2.19 (.88) | 2.09 (.86) | 1.82 (.71) | 2.00 (.86) | 2.10 (.83) |
| Openness in classroom | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Media | 2.30 (.79) | 2.52 (.82) | 2.45 (.66) | 2.20 (.81) | 1.93 (.72) | 2.35 (.69) | 2.47 (.77) | 2.18 (.70) | 2.29 (.82) | 2.16 (.71) | 2.70 (.77) | 2.92 (.80) | 2.11 (.76) | 2.21 (.78) | 2.00 (.77) | 2.28 (.78) |
| Friends | 1.62 (.66) | 1.65 (.72) | 1.74 (.77) | 1.59 (.72) | 1.77 (.76) | 1.57 (.69) | 1.57 (.63) | 1.49 (.62) | 1.55 (.64) | 1.52 (.66) | 1.79 (.71) | 1.80 (.79) | 1.73 (.76) | 1.60 (.63) | 1.53 (.68) | 1.76 (.75) |
| Country mean internal political efficacy score ^c | 46.45 (11.18) | 47.81 (10.86) | 52.31 (8.76) | 49.62 (10.22) | 52.58 (9.48) | 51.34 (10.01) | 44.43 (9.22) | 48.82 (10.15) | 45.06 (10.15) | 51.91 (9.28) | 52.31 (8.76) | 50.54 (8.65) | 49.79 (10.14) | 47.07 (10.85) | 50.67 (10.35) | 50.48 (10.80) |
| Country mean citizenship self-efficacy score ^c | 48.13 (9.85) | 50.14 (10.40) | 52.67 (10.23) | 50.07 (10.86) | 51.92 (9.74) | 51.63 (10.44) | 47.03 (9.43) | 49.29 (10.07) | 45.84 (9.03) | 52.52 (10.33) | 52.67 (10.23) | 49.62 (10.37) | 47.94 (11.26) | 49.74 (10.31) | 48.91 (10.89) | 50.00 (9.51) |
| Country mean expected electoral participation score ^c | 47.43 (10.07) | 51.83 (10.51) | 53.67 (8.89) | 47.48 (10.12) | 50.03 (10.48) | 49.83 (12.37) | 43.70 (10.74) | 51.07 (10.01) | 49.15 (8.75) | 53.05 (9.28) | 53.67 (8.89) | 48.48 (9.91) | 48.89 (9.73) | 49.60 (10.44) | 52.16 (9.89) | 50.65 (9.44) |
| Hoover index ^d | .0455 | .0421 | .0417 | .0393 | .0393 | .0390 | .0389 | .0387 | .0383 | .0370 | .0332 | .0330 | .0328 | .0324 | .0294 | .0294 |
| GDP Per capita (US \$) ^e | 103042 | 82480 | 4724 | 45442 | 27995 | 9878 | 16934 | 32017 | 46261 | 9715 | 15578 | 29912 | 32086 | 23379 | 59324 | 44879 |
| Gini index ^f | 26.0 | 25.0 | 56.0 | 34.0 | 33.0 | 52.1 | 31.0 | 32.0 | 26.8 | 51.7 | 31.3 | 53.7 | 36.2 | 28.4 | 33.9 | 26.0 |
| Level of democracy ^g | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | .67 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | .40 | 1.00 | .29 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Student <i>N</i> (unweighted) | 4616 | 2694 | 5433 | 2784 | 2959 | 5025 | 4476 | 3141 | 3144 | 5913 | 2671 | 2790 | 3709 | 3008 | 3182 | 3296 |

Table 3-2 Descriptive Statistics by Country (continued)

| | DNK | NLD | SWE | ITA | LVA | CHE | CYP | TWN | KOR | BGR | BFL ^b | LTU | POL | MLT | THA |
|--|------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|
| Parental education (%) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than high school | 8.5 | 9.1 | 7.9 | 30.5 | 5.2 | 18.6 | 12.8 | 12.6 | 3.4 | 10.6 | 4.8 | 6.8 | 2.0 | 40.4 | 54.1 |
| High school | 20.4 | 25.7 | 20.7 | 41.3 | 24.5 | 43.4 | 35.3 | 47.8 | 41.3 | 38.8 | 24.0 | 34.1 | 60.8 | 18.1 | 16.9 |
| College | 71.1 | 65.2 | 71.5 | 28.2 | 70.2 | 38.0 | 51.8 | 39.6 | 55.3 | 50.6 | 71.2 | 59.0 | 37.2 | 41.4 | 29.1 |
| Female (%) | 51.6 | 53.3 | 49.9 | 48.0 | 51.6 | 50.0 | 49.3 | 48.1 | 43.4 | 50.9 | 49.6 | 49.3 | 50.3 | 47.4 | 53.6 |
| Immigrants (%) | 11.2 | 12.1 | 18.9 | 7.5 | 6.0 | 25.9 | 8.4 | 1.3 | 0.7 | 1.6 | 11.5 | 4.9 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 1.9 |
| Language minority (%) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Single-parent (%) | 11.2 | 9.7 | 12.2 | 17.5 | 26.3 | 17.2 | 19.0 | 17.2 | 46.6 | 17.0 | 11.7 | 20.1 | 13.4 | NA | 25.9 |
| Urban (%) | 13.1 | 13.5 | 25.5 | 15.2 | 28.7 | 8.5 | 21.2 | 50.1 | 83.4 | 33.5 | 13.7 | 40.2 | 25.2 | - | 34.2 |
| Location missing (%) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Home literacy | 2.38 (1.36) | 2.27 (1.41) | 2.72 (1.34) | 2.35 (1.36) | 2.53 (1.28) | 2.56 (1.33) | 2.44 (1.39) | 2.30 (1.39) | 2.72 (1.31) | 2.24 (1.47) | 1.96 (1.27) | 2.32 (1.26) | 2.63 (1.27) | 2.59 (1.28) | 1.52 (1.13) |
| Home discussion | 2.11 (.83) | 1.83 (.78) | 1.86 (.82) | 2.36 (.87) | 2.21 (.80) | 2.14 (.83) | 2.02 (.84) | 2.03 (.85) | 2.13 (.82) | 2.02 (.84) | 1.73 (.75) | 2.11 (.77) | 2.11 (.81) | 2.07 (.78) | 2.34 (.77) |
| Openness in classroom | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Media | 2.25 (.77) | 2.22 (.78) | 2.35 (.84) | 2.41 (.73) | 2.46 (.70) | 2.35 (.75) | 1.93 (.74) | 2.71 (.76) | 2.28 (.72) | 2.45 (.80) | 2.07 (.73) | 2.57 (.75) | 2.63 (.72) | 2.19 (.77) | 2.58 (.65) |
| Friends | 1.68 (.70) | 1.48 (.62) | 1.57 (.72) | 1.68 (.74) | 1.95 (.76) | 1.68 (.71) | 1.77 (.75) | 1.69 (.75) | 1.64 (.68) | 1.80 (.78) | 1.45 (.60) | 1.79 (.72) | 1.71 (.72) | 1.79 (.73) | 2.19 (.76) |
| Country mean internal political efficacy score ^c | 49.83 (10.59) | 44.73 (10.50) | 47.40 (11.34) | 51.63 (9.55) | 50.49 (7.84) | 48.22 (10.10) | 50.88 (11.14) | 48.77 (9.72) | 47.88 (8.92) | 50.04 (9.75) | 45.09 (10.30) | 51.03 (7.59) | 51.59 (8.94) | 50.83 (10.42) | 54.60 (7.18) |
| Country mean citizenship self-efficacy score ^c | 49.62 (9.60) | 47.73 (9.67) | 49.04 (11.01) | 51.13 (9.20) | 49.05 (8.20) | 47.56 (9.00) | 51.41 (11.46) | 48.17 (10.04) | 55.04 (9.27) | 50.33 (10.14) | 47.01 (8.66) | 49.96 (8.37) | 50.99 (9.39) | 46.55 (11.23) | 53.30 (7.70) |
| Country mean expected electoral participation score ^c | 49.11 (9.08) | 46.56 (9.69) | 49.01 (9.59) | 54.11 (9.19) | 50.22 (9.70) | 47.74 (10.00) | 48.51 (10.92) | 50.84 (9.77) | 48.52 (8.93) | 47.72 (10.45) | 45.54 (9.22) | 51.78 (9.24) | 48.16 (9.85) | 49.27 (9.38) | 54.33 (8.86) |
| Hoover index ^d | .0291 | .0273 | .0270 | .0270 | .0262 | .0261 | .0259 | .0257 | .0238 | .0237 | .0237 | .0220 | .0200 | .0176 | .0108 |
| GDP Per capita (US \$) ^e | 57051 | 46750 | 49662 | 35396 | 11930 | 56207 | 24895 | 29800 | 20014 | 5163 | 42609 | 11356 | 11072 | 18203 | 3844 |
| Gini index ^f | 24.8 | 30.9 | 23.0 | 32.0 | 35.2 | 33.7 | 29.0 | 34.2 | 31.0 | 45.3 | 28.0 | 35.5 | 34.2 | 26.0 | 53.6 |
| Level of democracy ^f | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | .67 | 1.00 | 1.00 | .67 | .67 | .67 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | .20 |
| Student N (unweighted) | 4215 | 1871 | 3321 | 3281 | 2713 | 2804 | 2825 | 5126 | 5222 | 2994 | 2837 | 3839 | 3213 | 2041 | 5154 |

Note: AUT = Austria, BGR = Bulgaria, BFL = the Flemish part of Belgium, CHE = Switzerland, CHL = Chile, COL = Colombia, CYP = Cyprus, CZE = Czech Republic, DNK = Denmark, ENG = England, ESP = Spain, EST = Estonia, FIN = Finland, GRC = Greece, HKG = Hong Kong, IRL = Ireland, ITA = Italy, KOR = South Korea, LTU = Lithuania, LUX = Luxembourg, LVA = Latvia, MEX = Mexico, MLT = Malta, NLD = Netherlands, NOR = Norway, NZL = New Zealand, POL = Poland, SVN = Slovenia, SWE = Sweden, THA = Thailand, TWN = Taiwan.

^a For categorical variables, percentages of students in each category are presented, while means and standard deviations are presented for continuous variables. Values in parentheses are standard deviations. Countries are arranged in descending order of the magnitude of the political inequality index.

^b Data refer to the whole of Belgium.

^c The author's own calculation using the ICCS 2009 data (weighted means).


^d The author's own calculation based on the parents' interest in politics measure in the ICCS 2009 data

^e Data were taken from the ICCS 2009 International Report and originally from the Human Development Report 2009. The reference year is 2008.

^f Data were taken from the World Fact Book (2010) and retrieved on May 15th, 2013 from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2172.html>. The reference years are 1997-2005 in most countries.

^g Data were taken from Freedom House 2008 and retrieved on May 30th from <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2008>.

Figure 3-1 Proportions of Parents' Educational Attainment



Note: Countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of adolescents whose parents had not completed high school.

Table 3-3 Correlation Matrix for Country-level Variables

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|-------------------------|-----|--------|--------|-----|
| (1) Hoover index | 1 | | | |
| (2) ln GDP per capita | .25 | 1 | | |
| (3) Gini index | .05 | -.71** | 1 | |
| (4) Levels of democracy | .11 | .59** | -.78** | 1 |

** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$

Table 3-4 Gaps in Internal Political Efficacy Scores between Adolescents Whose Parents Completed Tertiary Education and Did Not Complete Upper Secondary Education

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | % reduction between Model 1 and Model 4 |
|-------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|---|
| Norway | 4.18 (.52) ^{***} | 3.03 (.52) ^{***} | 2.40 (.47) ^{***} | 1.82 (.47) ^{***} | 56.5 |
| Finland | 3.56 (.36) ^{***} | 2.54 (.37) ^{***} | 2.25 (.32) ^{***} | 1.76 (.33) ^{***} | 50.6 |
| Denmark | 3.54 (.39) ^{***} | 2.33 (.38) ^{***} | 2.09 (.33) ^{***} | 1.65 (.33) ^{***} | 44.7 |
| Netherlands | 3.38 (.50) ^{***} | 2.60 (.51) ^{***} | 2.17 (.47) ^{***} | 1.87 (.47) ^{***} | 55.6 |
| Sweden | 3.15 (.46) ^{***} | 2.27 (.45) ^{***} | 1.78 (.45) ^{**} | 1.40 (.44) ^{***} | 53.4 |
| Austria | 2.99 (.40) ^{***} | 1.65 (.41) ^{***} | 1.70 (.37) ^{***} | .99 (.38) ^{**} | 66.9 |
| Switzerland | 2.88 (.41) ^{***} | 1.67 (.43) ^{***} | 2.00 (.39) ^{***} | 1.28 (.41) ^{**} | 55.6 |
| Luxembourg | 2.84 (.35) ^{***} | 1.56 (.36) ^{***} | 1.79 (.32) ^{***} | 1.17 (.34) ^{***} | 58.8 |
| Ireland | 2.55 (.38) ^{***} | 1.06 (.40) ^{**} | 1.46 (.34) ^{***} | .74 (.36) [*] | 71.0 |
| Italy | 2.43 (.37) ^{***} | 1.28 (.39) ^{**} | 1.54 (.35) ^{***} | .86 (.36) [*] | 64.6 |
| Spain | 2.35 (.37) ^{***} | 1.33 (.39) ^{**} | 1.41 (.34) ^{***} | .97 (.37) ^{**} | 58.7 |
| Poland | 2.33 (.33) ^{***} | 1.40 (.36) ^{***} | 1.43 (.31) ^{***} | .91 (.33) ^{**} | 60.9 |
| New Zealand | 2.32 (.37) ^{***} | 1.57 (.39) ^{***} | 1.33 (.33) ^{***} | 1.04 (.34) ^{**} | 55.2 |
| Czech Republic | 2.28 (.29) ^{***} | 1.52 (.30) ^{***} | 1.38 (.27) ^{***} | .98 (.28) ^{***} | 57.0 |
| England | 2.12 (.40) ^{***} | .91 (.41) [*] | 1.10 (.35) ^{**} | .53 (.36) | 75.0 |
| Korea | 2.03 (.25) ^{***} | .90 (.26) ^{***} | .99 (.23) ^{***} | .43 (.23) [^] | 78.8 |
| Greece | 1.91 (.35) ^{***} | .94 (.37) ^{**} | 1.25 (.33) ^{***} | .67 (.35) [^] | 64.9 |
| Hong Kong | 1.70 (.41) ^{***} | .63 (.43) | .74 (.38) [^] | .25 (.40) | 85.3 |
| Belgium (Flemish) | 1.53 (.42) ^{**} | .89 (.42) ^{**} | .99 (.40) ^{**} | .65 (.40) | 57.5 |
| Chile | 1.52 (.32) ^{***} | .83 (.33) | .69 (.30) [^] | .40 (.31) | 73.7 |
| Latvia | 1.52 (.34) ^{***} | 1.13 (.34) ^{**} | .81 (.31) ^{**} | .59 (.31) [^] | 61.2 |
| Taiwan | 1.43 (.29) ^{***} | .61 (.30) | .47 (.28) [^] | .09 (.29) | 93.7 |
| Estonia | 1.22 (.32) ^{***} | .85 (.32) ^{**} | .33 (.30) | .12 (.30) | 90.2 |
| Slovenia | 1.22 (.41) ^{**} | .49 (.42) | .60 (.38) | .17 (.39) | 86.1 |
| Mexico | 1.01 (.27) ^{***} | .44 (.28) | .70 (.26) ^{**} | .35 (.27) | 65.3 |
| Bulgaria | .79 (.38) ^{**} | .45 (.39) | .32 (.36) | .17 (.38) | 78.5 |
| Cyprus | .78 (.43) [^] | .32 (.43) | .23 (.40) | .01 (.41) | 98.7 |
| Colombia | .76 (.25) ^{**} | .42 (.26) | .43 (.24) [^] | .27 (.25) | 64.5 |
| Lithuania | .71 (.27) ^{**} | .04 (.28) | .23 (.25) | -.13 (.26) | - |
| Malta | -.18 (.48) | -.70 (.50) | -.69 (.46) | -.88 (.47) [^] | - |
| Thailand | -1.09 (.24) ^{***} | -1.33 (.24) ^{***} | -1.38 (.23) ^{***} | -1.51 (.24) ^{***} | 38.5 |

Note: Model 1: control variables only, Model 2: Model 1 + Home literacy, Model 3: Model 1 + Home discussion, Model 4: Model 1 + Home literacy and Home discussion. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Countries are sorted in descending order of the magnitude of coefficients as in Model 1.

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ ^ $p < .10$

Table 3-5 Gaps in Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores between Adolescents Whose Parents Completed Tertiary Education and Did Not Complete Upper Secondary Education

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | % reduction between Model 1 and Model 4 |
|-------------------|------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---|
| Denmark | 2.69 (.35)** | 1.75 (.34)** | 1.73 (.32)** | 1.31 (.32)** | 51.3 |
| Norway | 2.64 (.51)** | 1.62 (.52)** | 1.29 (.48)** | .72 (.49) | 72.7 |
| Greece | 2.40 (.36)** | 1.21 (.38)** | 1.87 (.35)** | 1.00 (.38)** | 58.3 |
| New Zealand | 2.24 (.43)** | 1.39 (.42)** | 1.40 (.43)** | .96 (.43) | 57.1 |
| England | 2.24 (.41)** | 1.14 (.42)** | 1.48 (.40)** | .87 (.40) | 61.2 |
| Netherlands | 2.24 (.46)** | 1.73 (.47)** | 1.41 (.45)** | 1.23 (.46)** | 45.1 |
| Poland | 2.16 (.36)** | 1.24 (.39)** | 1.46 (.34)** | .86 (.37) | 60.2 |
| Sweden | 2.10 (.45)** | 1.34 (.47) | 1.15 (.45) | .74 (.46) | 64.8 |
| Italy | 1.98 (.36)** | .84 (.38) | 1.27 (.35)** | .51 (.36) | 74.2 |
| Finland | 1.95 (.34)** | 1.13 (.33)** | 1.06 (.31)** | .60 (.31) | 69.2 |
| Austria | 1.92 (.36)** | 1.01 (.39)** | 1.02 (.35)** | .55 (.37) | 71.4 |
| Ireland | 1.85 (.41)** | .56 (.41) | .97 (.39) | .30 (.40) | 83.8 |
| Slovenia | 1.71 (.40)** | 1.10 (.41)** | 1.29 (.38)** | .89 (.40) | 48.0 |
| Spain | 1.64 (.37)** | .73 (.39) | .98 (.36)** | .48 (.38) | 70.7 |
| Latvia | 1.62 (.35)** | 1.22 (.35)** | 1.13 (.34)** | .85 (.34) | 47.9 |
| Korea | 1.60 (.26)** | .71 (.27)** | 1.10 (.26)** | .50 (.26) | 68.8 |
| Hong Kong | 1.53 (.51)** | .62 (.54) | .67 (.49) | .28 (.52) | 81.2 |
| Malta | 1.48 (.51)** | .69 (.53) | .99 (.49) | .52 (.51) | 64.9 |
| Luxembourg | 1.32 (.33)** | .81 (.35) | .68 (.33)** | .56 (.35) | 57.6 |
| Colombia | 1.29 (.29)** | 1.09 (.30)** | 1.01 (.28)** | .96 (.29)** | 25.6 |
| Czech Republic | 1.07 (.30)** | .53 (.31) | .39 (.29) | .13 (.30) | 87.9 |
| Cyprus | 1.04 (.44) | .48 (.44) | .61 (.42) | .25 (.43) | 76.0 |
| Chile | .97 (.33)** | .53 (.34) | .34 (.32) | .22 (.33) | 77.3 |
| Lithuania | .91 (.28)** | .42 (.30) | .57 (.28)* | .30 (.29) | 67.0 |
| Bulgaria | .89 (.39)** | .30 (.41) | .56 (.39) | .11 (.40) | 87.6 |
| Estonia | .86 (.34) | .47 (.34) | .29 (.33) | .01 (.33) | 98.8 |
| Taiwan | .80 (.30)** | .19 (.32) | .21 (.30) | -.13 (.31) | - |
| Switzerland | .59 (.35) [^] | .48 (.37) | .04 (.34) | .23 (.36) | 61.0 |
| Belgium (Flemish) | .42 (.36) | .18 (.36) | .09 (.35) | .03 (.36) | 92.9 |
| Mexico | .30 (.30) | -.04 (.32) | .07 (.30) | -.10 (.32) | - |
| Thailand | -1.17 (.26)** | -1.53 (.26)** | -1.39 (.26)** | -1.65 (.26)** | 41.0 |

Note: Model 1: control variables only, Model 2: Model 1 + Home literacy, Model 3: Model 1 + Home discussion, Model 4: Model 1 + Home literacy and Home discussion. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Countries are sorted in descending order of the magnitude of coefficients as in Model 1.

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ [^] $p < .10$

Table 3-6 Gaps in Expected Electoral Participation Scores between Adolescents Whose Parents Completed Tertiary Education and Did Not Complete Upper Secondary Education

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | % reduction between Model 1 and Model 4 |
|-------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---|
| Norway | 4.70 (.58) ^{***} | 3.73 (.60) ^{***} | 3.57 (.55) ^{***} | 2.99 (.57) ^{***} | 36.4 |
| Switzerland | 3.75 (.40) ^{***} | 2.72 (.43) ^{***} | 3.25 (.39) ^{***} | 2.51 (.42) ^{***} | 33.1 |
| Finland | 3.33 (.38) ^{***} | 2.41 (.31) ^{***} | 2.57 (.30) ^{***} | 1.98 (.30) ^{***} | 40.5 |
| Czech Republic | 3.31 (.34) ^{***} | 1.97 (.34) ^{***} | 2.57 (.33) ^{***} | 1.56 (.33) ^{***} | 52.9 |
| Ireland | 3.09 (.36) ^{***} | 1.69 (.36) ^{***} | 2.44 (.35) ^{***} | 1.51 (.35) ^{***} | 51.1 |
| Denmark | 3.02 (.34) ^{***} | 1.84 (.32) ^{***} | 2.12 (.31) ^{***} | 1.67 (.31) ^{***} | 44.7 |
| New Zealand | 2.88 (.36) ^{***} | 2.05 (.37) ^{***} | 2.26 (.34) ^{***} | 1.74 (.34) ^{***} | 39.6 |
| Netherlands | 2.88 (.47) ^{***} | 1.91 (.47) ^{***} | 1.94 (.45) ^{***} | 1.37 (.45) ^{**} | 52.4 |
| England | 2.86 (.38) ^{***} | 1.41 (.38) ^{**} | 2.12 (.37) ^{***} | 1.17 (.37) ^{**} | 59.1 |
| Luxembourg | 2.80 (.31) ^{***} | 1.69 (.32) ^{***} | 2.08 (.30) ^{***} | 1.43 (.32) ^{***} | 48.9 |
| Austria | 2.75 (.35) ^{***} | 1.71 (.36) ^{***} | 1.99 (.34) ^{***} | 1.33 (.35) ^{***} | 51.6 |
| Chile | 2.72 (.38) ^{***} | 2.29 (.40) ^{***} | 2.09 (.37) ^{***} | 1.97 (.39) ^{***} | 27.6 |
| Sweden | 2.62 (.41) ^{***} | 1.90 (.39) ^{***} | 1.82 (.40) ^{***} | 1.41 (.39) ^{***} | 46.2 |
| Taiwan | 2.60 (.29) ^{***} | 1.61 (.30) ^{***} | 1.98 (.28) ^{***} | 1.29 (.30) ^{***} | 50.4 |
| Poland | 2.46 (.37) ^{***} | 1.33 (.40) ^{**} | 1.81 (.36) ^{***} | .98 (.38) [*] | 60.2 |
| Spain | 2.42 (.37) ^{***} | 1.64 (.39) ^{***} | 1.86 (.36) ^{***} | 1.44 (.38) ^{***} | 40.5 |
| Italy | 2.39 (.36) ^{***} | 1.28 (.37) ^{**} | 1.94 (.35) ^{***} | 1.08 (.36) ^{**} | 54.8 |
| Hong Kong | 2.30 (.47) ^{***} | 1.16 (.49) [*] | 1.55 (.45) ^{**} | .87 (.47) [^] | 62.2 |
| Belgium (Flemish) | 2.23 (.38) ^{***} | 1.67 (.38) ^{***} | 1.86 (.37) ^{***} | 1.50 (.38) ^{***} | 32.7 |
| Greece | 2.21 (.39) ^{***} | 1.39 (.42) ^{**} | 1.77 (.39) ^{***} | 1.21 (.41) ^{**} | 45.2 |
| Slovenia | 2.16 (.41) ^{***} | 1.48 (.42) ^{**} | 1.80 (.39) ^{***} | 1.29 (.40) ^{**} | 40.3 |
| Latvia | 2.11 (.41) ^{***} | 1.82 (.41) ^{***} | 1.66 (.40) ^{***} | 1.48 (.41) ^{***} | 29.9 |
| Cyprus | 1.91 (.41) ^{***} | 1.52 (.42) ^{***} | 1.55 (.40) ^{***} | 1.32 (.41) ^{**} | 30.9 |
| Thailand | 1.91 (.30) ^{***} | 1.80 (.30) ^{***} | 1.65 (.29) ^{***} | 1.65 (.30) ^{***} | 13.6 |
| Korea | 1.88 (.25) ^{***} | .82 (.26) ^{***} | 1.29 (.24) ^{***} | .58 (.25) [*] | 69.1 |
| Lithuania | 1.69 (.32) ^{***} | .97 (.34) ^{**} | 1.36 (.31) ^{***} | .85 (.33) ^{**} | 49.7 |
| Bulgaria | 1.55 (.40) ^{***} | 1.06 (.42) [*] | 1.25 (.40) ^{**} | .89 (.42) [*] | 42.6 |
| Estonia | 1.48 (.37) ^{***} | 1.17 (.37) ^{**} | .90 (.36) [*] | .69 (.37) [^] | 53.4 |
| Mexico | 1.34 (.27) ^{***} | 1.09 (.28) ^{***} | 1.18 (.26) ^{***} | 1.04 (.28) ^{***} | 22.4 |
| Colombia | 1.02 (.25) ^{***} | .78 (.26) ^{**} | .84 (.25) ^{**} | .70 (.26) ^{**} | 31.4 |
| Malta | .25 (.43) | -.65 (.44) | -.06 (.42) | -.74 (.43) [^] | - |

Note: Model 1: control variables only, Model 2: Model 1 + Home literacy, Model 3: Model 1 + Home discussion, Model 4: Model 1 + Home literacy and Home discussion. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Countries are sorted in descending order of the magnitude of coefficients as in Model 1.

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ ^ $p < .10$

Table 3-7 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Internal Political Efficacy Scores on Parents' Education, Home Civic Learning Environments and Controls

| | Switzerland | New Zealand | Poland | England | Latvia | Spain | Czech Republic | Greece | Cyprus | Estonia |
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| High School | 2.31*** (.50) | 1.91** (.60) | 1.86^ (1.04) | 1.64^ (.65) | 1.22^ (.66) | 1.20^ (.47) | 1.01 (.93) | .97^ (.57) | .91 (.66) | .86 (.65) |
| College | 2.92*** (.51) | 2.37*** (.54) | 2.71* (1.05) | 1.77* (.67) | 1.61^ (.63) | 1.48*** (.42) | 1.97* (.95) | 1.43^ (.56) | .70 (.65) | .84 (.64) |
| Female | -3.39*** (.34) | -1.04** (.30) | -1.95*** (.29) | -1.07** (.34) | -1.09*** (.28) | -1.62*** (.33) | -1.51*** (.25) | -1.61*** (.32) | -2.67*** (.40) | -1.34*** (.29) |
| Immigrant | 1.76** (.52) | -.11 (.42) | 2.11^ (1.21) | 1.24 (.63) | 2.67 (.67) | .26 (.58) | -.26 (.95) | -.14 (.66) | .92 (.88) | -.79 (.60) |
| Language minority | -1.90*** (.57) | -.36 (.59) | -1.25 (1.20) | .28 (.84) | -.57 (.49) | -.26 (.44) | -1.20 (1.17) | .18 (.88) | -1.74^ (.90) | -.53 (.80) |
| Single parent | -.50 (.45) | .07 (.41) | -.54 (.42) | -.07 (.46) | -.65 (.34) | NA | -.91** (.34) | -.51 (.43) | -.67 (.51) | .35 (.34) |
| Home literacy | .80*** (.14) | .54*** (.12) | .55*** (.12) | .86*** (.13) | .42*** (.11) | .51*** (.15) | .63*** (.11) | .65*** (.14) | .43** (.15) | .45*** (.12) |
| Home discussion | 4.92*** (.21) | 4.94*** (.18) | 4.20*** (.18) | 5.29*** (.22) | 3.54*** (.18) | 4.60*** (.21) | 5.06*** (.18) | 3.78*** (.20) | 4.40*** (.25) | 4.03*** (.19) |
| Urban | -.13 (.64) | .80* (.34) | -1.37*** (.34) | .69^ (.41) | .91** (.34) | -.53 (.36) | -.08 (.34) | -.18 (.41) | -.96* (.49) | -.17 (.35) |
| Location missing | .57 (.51) | -.24 (.44) | - | .28 (.49) | -.28 (.49) | .93 (1.08) | .14 (.45) | .30 (.41) | .04 (.58) | -.36 (.47) |
| Constant | 33.22*** (.83) | 36.06*** (.88) | 39.28*** (1.61) | 36.47*** (1.00) | 40.15*** (.83) | 38.32*** (.67) | 31.62*** (1.51) | 42.88*** (1.11) | 40.44*** (1.23) | 40.97*** (1.05) |
| R ² | .246 | .208 | .189 | .246 | .162 | .168 | .188 | .140 | .129 | .159 |

Table 3-7 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Internal Political Efficacy Scores on Parents' Education, Home Civic Learning Environments and Controls (continued)

| | Netherlands | Denmark | Norway | Slovenia | Malta | Taiwan | Colombia | Hong Kong | Korea | Lithuania |
|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| High School | .79 (.84) | .79 (.64) | .67 (1.27) | .51 (.93) | .44 (.62) | .30 (.40) | .25 (.31) | .21 (.36) | .10 (.60) | -.10 (.52) |
| College | 2.46** (.77) | 2.24*** (.60) | 2.41* (1.26) | .61 (.92) | -.73 (.52) | .34 (.44) | .37 (.28) | .37 (.46) | .54 (.61) | -.04 (.52) |
| Female | -3.13** (.44) | -1.65*** (.28) | -1.99*** (.37) | -2.72*** (.36) | -1.96*** (.44) | -2.15*** (.26) | -1.15*** (.23) | -1.81*** (.30) | -1.85*** (.22) | -1.04*** (.23) |
| Immigrant | 2.96** (.86) | 1.41* (.65) | -.89 (.98) | .12 (.73) | .57 (1.54) | -1.00 (1.43) | .99 (1.98) | 1.09** (.35) | -2.93 (2.03) | .18 (.85) |
| Language minority | -.11 (.90) | -.83 (.81) | 1.29 (1.01) | -1.85* (.90) | 1.00 (.61) | .68* (.35) | .25 (1.23) | .16 (.67) | 1.09 (1.76) | .61 (.58) |
| Single parent | .85 (.74) | .03 (.44) | 1.01* (.62) | -.16 (.51) | NA | -.22 (.35) | -.28 (.25) | .21 (.45) | -.61** (.22) | .10 (.29) |
| Home literacy | .61*** (.17) | .87*** (.11) | .97*** (.16) | .72*** (.15) | .28 (.18) | .44*** (.10) | .24* (.11) | .47*** (.12) | .78*** (.09) | .46*** (.10) |
| Home discussion | 5.11*** (.30) | 6.17*** (.17) | 5.56*** (.24) | 5.85*** (.26) | 4.27*** (.29) | 3.88*** (.16) | 2.99*** (.14) | 3.71*** (.18) | 4.51*** (.14) | 3.61*** (.15) |
| Urban | 1.18* (.65) | -.00 (.43) | 1.41* (.55) | .10 (.54) | - | -.54* (.26) | -.56* (.24) | - | -.60* (.31) | -.77** (.25) |
| Location missing | .78 (.48) | -.36 (.40) | 1.05* (.63) | -.60 (.66) | 4.82** (1.48) | - | 3.41* (1.88) | .22 (.35) | -1.19* (.67) | .01 (.91) |
| Constant | 32.83*** (1.23) | 33.04*** (1.05) | 34.20*** (1.64) | 33.86*** (1.28) | 41.66*** (.97) | 41.59*** (.52) | 46.61*** (1.29) | 42.05*** (.85) | 38.55*** (1.88) | 43.83*** (.78) |
| R ² | .208 | .302 | .235 | .180 | .119 | .133 | .095 | .161 | .221 | .142 |

Table 3-7 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Internal Political Efficacy Scores on Parents' Education, Home Civic Learning Environments and Controls (continued)

| | Ireland | Chile | Italy | Mexico | Belgium (Flemish) | Luxembourg | Finland | Thailand | Austria | Sweden | Bulgaria |
|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| High School | -.11 (.61) | -.12 (.36) | -.24 (.37) | -.31 (.33) | -.32 (.94) | -.37 (.44) | -.53 (.65) | -.76** (.27) | -.78 (.65) | -1.38 (.88) | -1.89** (.67) |
| College | .58 (.60) | .33 (.41) | .70 (.44) | .26 (.29) | .37 (.91) | .92 [^] (.46) | 1.31 [^] (.65) | -1.71** (.25) | .30 (.69) | .34 (.88) | -1.46- (.71) |
| Female | -1.77** (.33) | -.92** (.27) | -2.17** (.30) | -1.93** (.23) | -3.10** (.35) | -3.62** (.30) | -3.05** (.31) | -2.36** (.20) | -3.75** (.36) | -2.82** (.35) | -1.55** (.34) |
| Immigrant | -.48 (.63) | .20 (1.45) | -2.51** (.90) | .18 (.95) | 2.16** (.71) | .32 (.37) | .44 (1.26) | .23 (.88) | -.07 (.68) | .93 (.94) | .32 (1.83) |
| Language minority | -1.64* (.68) | -1.14 (1.51) | 1.24 (1.05) | 1.91** (.71) | -.53 (.70) | -1.26 [^] (.58) | -.43 (.99) | .78- (.46) | -.86 (.73) | .25 (1.02) | 1.25* (.60) |
| Single parent | .17 (.48) | .21 (.32) | .58 (.40) | -.23 (.27) | -.25 (.54) | .29 (.40) | .57 (.43) | -.24 (.25) | -.32 (.46) | -.10 (.60) | .47 (.45) |
| Home literacy | .92** (.13) | .42** (.12) | .79** (.13) | .45** (.10) | .71** (.14) | .77** (.12) | .96** (.14) | .25** (.09) | .94** (.13) | .91** (.14) | .24- (.13) |
| Home discussion | 4.98** (.20) | 4.05** (.15) | 4.06** (.18) | 3.35** (.15) | 4.89** (.24) | 5.11** (.19) | 6.08** (.22) | 1.96** (.13) | 4.96** (.21) | 6.27** (.23) | 3.62** (.22) |
| Urban | .70- (.37) | -.55* (.28) | .13 (.43) | -.44 [^] (.24) | 1.50** (.54) | - | .17 (.34) | -.85** (.23) | .01 (.48) | 1.03 (.45) | -.82* (.38) |
| Location missing | .66 (.60) | .11 (1.29) | -1.96 (1.96) | -.58 (.75) | - | -.47 (.33) | -2.11 (1.46) | .45 (.45) | -.23 (.43) | -.19 (.60) | - |
| Constant | 37.31** (.95) | 41.69** (1.56) | 42.40** (1.13) | 47.96** (.77) | 35.84** (1.16) | 35.28** (.61) | 32.90** (1.24) | 52.82** (.54) | 39.30** (.99) | 34.89** (1.30) | 45.74** (.80) |
| R ² | .218 | .138 | .185 | .097 | .170 | .203 | .266 | .075 | .225 | .253 | .110 |

Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Countries are sorted in descending order of the magnitude of the coefficients of High School.

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ [^] $p < .10$

Table 3-8 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores on Parents' Education, Home Civic Learning Environments and Controls

| | Czech Republic | Latvia | Estonia | Norway | Cyprus | Slovenia | New Zealand | Greece | England | Finland |
|-------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| High School | 1.90 [^] (.99) | 1.86 [*] (.72) | 1.79 [^] (.77) | 1.78 (1.29) | 1.75 [^] (.71) | 1.59 (1.01) | 1.58 [^] (.88) | 1.23 [^] (.60) | 1.10 (.70) | .92 (.60) |
| College | 1.97 [*] (1.01) | 2.41 ^{**} (.70) | 1.53 [^] (.78) | 2.29 [^] (1.25) | 1.58 [^] (.68) | 2.28 [*] (1.00) | 2.07 [*] (.84) | 1.95 ^{**} (.60) | 1.70 ^{**} (.66) | 1.38 [*] (.60) |
| Female | 1.59 ^{**} (.27) | 1.28 ^{**} (.30) | 1.96 ^{**} (.30) | .15 (.37) | 1.36 ^{**} (.43) | 1.56 ^{**} (.36) | 1.38 ^{**} (.35) | .21 (.34) | .97 [*] (.42) | 1.47 ^{**} (.29) |
| Immigrant | -.29 (1.01) | .76 (.76) | .47 (.62) | 1.32 (.95) | .99 (.91) | 1.26 [*] (.69) | 1.16 [*] (.48) | 1.15 [^] (.69) | 1.05 (.72) | .58 (1.21) |
| Language minority | -1.01 (1.22) | .68 [^] (.54) | 1.04 (.90) | .12 (1.01) | -2.31 [*] (.91) | -.95 (.89) | -2.69 ^{**} (.69) | -1.54 [^] (.92) | .40 (.90) | 1.02 (.97) |
| Single parent | .48 (.36) | -.55 (.36) | .44 (.39) | .98 (.61) | -.57 (.56) | -.87 (.50) | -.14 (.47) | -.98 [*] (.44) | -.10 (.52) | -.32 (.41) |
| Home literacy | .41 ^{**} (.12) | .51 ^{**} (.13) | .58 ^{**} (.13) | .95 ^{**} (.16) | .70 ^{**} (.16) | .67 ^{**} (.15) | .82 ^{**} (.14) | .99 ^{**} (.15) | .93 ^{**} (.15) | .88 ^{**} (.13) |
| Home discussion | 3.82 ^{**} (.19) | 2.45 ^{**} (.20) | 2.53 ^{**} (.21) | 4.12 ^{**} (.24) | 3.39 ^{**} (.26) | 3.81 ^{**} (.27) | 4.08 ^{**} (.21) | 2.94 ^{**} (.21) | 3.82 ^{**} (.25) | 4.03 ^{**} (.21) |
| Urban | .04 (.36) | .25 (.37) | -.51 (.37) | .11 (.56) | -.56 (.52) | .02 (.53) | 1.00 [*] (.40) | -.14 (.43) | 1.35 ^{**} (.46) | -.15 (.33) |
| Location missing | .62 (.48) | -.63 (.53) | -.43 (.50) | -.05 (.63) | .22 (.61) | -.00 (.66) | -.80 (.52) | .14 (.43) | 1.07 [^] (.56) | -3.40 [*] (1.39) |
| Constant | 35.23 ^{**} (1.62) | 40.37 ^{**} (.93) | 40.41 ^{**} (1.15) | 37.14 ^{**} (1.61) | 38.83 ^{**} (1.22) | 37.66 ^{**} (1.33) | 31.78 ^{**} (1.11) | 40.24 ^{**} (1.18) | 38.48 ^{**} (1.15) | 36.12 ^{**} (1.19) |
| R ² | .104 | .088 | .087 | .143 | .083 | .095 | .145 | .105 | .137 | .153 |

Table 3-8 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Citizenship self-efficacy Scores on Parents' Education, Home Civic Learning Environments and Controls (continued)

| | Malta | Poland | Switzerland | Sweden | Belgium (Flemish) | Denmark | Taiwan | Lithuania | Mexico | Italy |
|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| High School | .90 (.68) | .84 (1.32) | .81 (.47) | .65 (.97) | .54 (.86) | .46 (.63) | .21 (.43) | .17 (.59) | .14 (.37) | .14 (.37) |
| College | .82 (.56) | 1.67 (1.37) | .80 (.49) | 1.24 (.96) | .49 (.84) | 1.66** (.59) | .05 (.47) | .45 (.58) | -.06 (.34) | .60 (.43) |
| Female | -1.34** (.48) | 2.06*** (.32) | .22 (.33) | 1.39*** (.36) | .64* (.31) | 1.41*** (.27) | -1.26*** (.28) | 2.14 (.26) | -.68* (.27) | .65 (.30) |
| Immigrant | 1.41 (1.65) | -.82 (1.35) | .56 (.49) | .97 (1.04) | 1.77** (.65) | .29 (.64) | -1.04 (1.38) | .28 (.97) | .01 (1.01) | -.77 (.88) |
| Language minority | .60 (.67) | -.39 (1.34) | -.29 (.52) | .91 (1.21) | -.45 (.71) | .00 (.80) | .65^ (.38) | .68 (.66) | -.42 (.82) | -.66 (1.02) |
| Single parent | NA | .24 (.47) | .05 (.44) | -.62 (.60) | -.67 (.49) | -.13 (.43) | -.86* (.37) | -.46 (.33) | -.26 (.31) | .48 (.40) |
| Home literacy | .70** (.20) | .63*** (.14) | -.24^ (.14) | .97** (.15) | .13 (.12) | .83*** (.11) | .40 (.11) | .34** (.12) | .22^ (.12) | .85*** (.12) |
| Home discussion | 4.02** (.31) | 3.25*** (.20) | 3.24*** (.20) | 4.26*** (.24) | 3.08*** (.21) | 3.96*** (.17) | 2.33*** (.17) | 2.61*** (.17) | 2.46*** (.17) | 3.22*** (.18) |
| Urban | - | -.91* (.37) | -.34 (.62) | .88^ (.47) | .87^ (.47) | -.37 (.42) | -.36 (.28) | -.68* (.29) | -.42 (.28) | .73^ (.43) |
| Location missing | 2.68^ (1.61) | - | -.35 (.50) | .45 (.62) | - | -.63 (.39) | - | -2.98** (1.03) | -.25 (.86) | -.48 (1.95) |
| Constant | 37.14** (1.06) | 40.16*** (1.83) | 40.13*** (.79) | 37.39*** (1.28) | 40.90*** (1.00) | 37.40*** (.99) | 43.93*** (.56) | 43.40*** (.88) | 47.69*** (.88) | 40.26*** (1.10) |
| R ² | .099 | .109 | .088 | .140 | .090 | .173 | .049 | .089 | .036 | .134 |

Table 3-8 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Citizenship self-efficacy Scores on Parents' Education, Home Civic Learning Environments and Controls (continued)

| | Netherlands | Spain | Bulgaria | Chile | Austria | Thailand | Colombia | Hong Kong | Luxembourg | Korea | Ireland |
|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| High School | .00 (.81) | -.07 (.49) | -.08 (.71) | -.09 (.38) | -.09 (.61) | -.33 (.30) | -.52 (.36) | -.55 (.45) | -.67 (.43) | -.77 (.68) | -.77 (.69) |
| College | 1.23 (.76) | .45 (.43) | .05 (.75) | .15 (.44) | .47 (.65) | -1.74*** (.27) | .74* (.33) | -.05 (.58) | .09 (.49) | -.22 (.69) | -.29 (.65) |
| Female | .49 (.42) | 1.11** (.34) | 1.75*** (.36) | 1.37*** (.29) | .19 (.33) | -2.11*** (.21) | .12 (.27) | .08 (.38) | -.44 (.28) | 1.12*** (.25) | .80* (.36) |
| Immigrant | 2.04 (.79) | -.77 (.58) | 2.31 (1.96) | .46 (1.63) | .15 (.64) | .88 (.78) | 1.48 (2.43) | .90* (.44) | .30 (.34) | -3.42 (2.20) | .89 (.68) |
| Language minority | -.52 (.81) | .70 (.45) | .36 (.68) | -1.76 (1.63) | -.11 (.70) | .51 (.50) | -1.73 (1.44) | -.09 (.82) | 1.21* (.56) | -4.29* (2.00) | -2.35** (.76) |
| Single parent | 2.07** (.71) | NA | -1.07* (.49) | .27 (.38) | -.22 (.43) | -.08 (.28) | -.42 (.29) | .04 (.58) | -.43 (.37) | -.21 (.30) | -.31 (.52) |
| Home literacy | .37* (.16) | .63*** (.15) | .55*** (.14) | .19 (.13) | .62*** (.13) | .49*** (.11) | .11 (.13) | .42** (.16) | .17 (.11) | .85*** (.10) | .86*** (.15) |
| Home discussion | 3.54*** (.29) | 3.16*** (.21) | 2.44*** (.22) | 3.06*** (.16) | 3.46*** (.20) | 1.38*** (.14) | 2.52*** (.16) | 3.38*** (.22) | 3.26*** (.18) | 2.03*** (.16) | 3.96*** (.22) |
| Urban | -.31 (.63) | -.85* (.37) | -1.01* (.40) | -.51* (.30) | -.95* (.45) | -.56* (.25) | -1.06*** (.28) | - | - | -.36 (.35) | .82* (.40) |
| Location missing | 1.58** (.46) | .50 (1.12) | - | -.45 (1.39) | -.41 (.40) | .25 (.50) | 1.23 (2.23) | .59 (.44) | -.77* (.31) | -.88 (.76) | -.10 (.67) |
| Constant | 37.97*** (1.16) | 41.69*** (.69) | 44.09*** (.87) | 42.68*** (1.69) | 41.10*** (.93) | 51.89*** (.59) | 45.84*** (1.51) | 41.19*** (1.04) | 41.65*** (.57) | 44.58*** (2.13) | 36.49*** (1.05) |
| R ² | .113 | .090 | .058 | .075 | .112 | .045 | .052 | .086 | .080 | .068 | .134 |

Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Countries are sorted in descending order of the magnitude of the coefficients of High School.

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ $\wedge p < .10$

Table 3-9 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Expected Electoral Participation Scores on Parents' Education, Home Civic Learning Environments and Controls

| | Czech Republic | New Zealand | Lithuania | Poland | Austria | Switzerland | Slovenia | Estonia | Malta | Cyprus |
|-------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| High School | 2.20 [^] (1.23) | 2.17 ^{**} (.67) | 2.12 ^{**} (.64) | 2.07 [^] (1.21) | 2.00 ^{**} (.61) | 1.99 ^{**} (.57) | 1.84 [^] (1.02) | 1.81 [^] (.76) | 1.67 ^{**} (.57) | 1.64 [^] (.67) |
| College | 3.60 ^{**} (1.26) | 3.26 ^{**} (.58) | 2.65 ^{**} (.63) | 2.98 [*] (1.22) | 3.10 ^{**} (.64) | 3.93 ^{**} (.53) | 2.90 ^{**} (1.01) | 2.22 ^{**} (.77) | -1.19 (.47) | 2.57 ^{**} (.66) |
| Female | -.06 (.30) | 1.37 ^{**} (.30) | 1.93 ^{**} (.29) | 1.84 ^{**} (.33) | -.79 ^{**} (.31) | -.45 (.36) | .68 [^] (.37) | 1.19 ^{**} (.33) | .34 (.41) | .37 (.40) |
| Immigrant | -2.32 [*] (1.12) | .52 (.41) | -2.38 [*] (1.07) | -1.46 (1.40) | -2.70 ^{**} (.71) | -.67 (.53) | -.77 (.73) | -1.23 [*] (.71) | -1.60 (1.38) | -.91 (.90) |
| Language minority | -1.54 (1.32) | -1.82 ^{**} (.59) | -1.91 ^{**} (.73) | -1.61 (1.41) | -1.01 (.71) | -2.53 ^{**} (.62) | -2.09 [*] (.92) | .12 (.92) | -.20 (.56) | -2.69 ^{**} (.88) |
| Single parent | -.98 (.42) | -1.16 ^{**} (.40) | -1.17 ^{**} (.37) | -.96 (.49) | -.88 [*] (.42) | -1.35 ^{**} (.48) | -1.12 [*] (.57) | -.13 (.40) | NA | -1.12 [*] (.52) |
| Home literacy | 1.61 ^{**} (.13) | .97 ^{**} (.12) | .62 ^{**} (.13) | .87 ^{**} (.15) | .83 ^{**} (.12) | .83 ^{**} (.15) | .83 ^{**} (.15) | .43 ^{**} (.14) | 1.01 ^{**} (.17) | .44 ^{**} (.15) |
| Home discussion | 3.89 ^{**} (.21) | 2.91 ^{**} (.19) | 2.42 ^{**} (.19) | 2.98 ^{**} (.21) | 2.80 ^{**} (.19) | 2.67 ^{**} (.22) | 3.35 ^{**} (.26) | 2.62 ^{**} (.23) | 2.33 ^{**} (.26) | 2.84 ^{**} (.24) |
| Urban | .21 (.41) | 1.62 ^{**} (.34) | -1.40 ^{**} (.32) | -.93 [*] (.40) | -.18 (.44) | .30 (.67) | .33 (.55) | .62 (.41) | - | -.87 [^] (.50) |
| Location missing | .87 (.54) | 1.09 [*] (.45) | -2.48 [*] (1.14) | - | -.42 (.39) | 1.18 [*] (.54) | .28 (.67) | .21 (.55) | -2.40 [^] (1.36) | .02 (.59) |
| Constant | 28.49 ^{**} (1.80) | 34.42 ^{**} (.93) | 41.11 ^{**} (.97) | 35.12 ^{**} (1.93) | 40.85 ^{**} (.96) | 35.96 ^{**} (.86) | 37.06 ^{**} (1.42) | 38.14 ^{**} (1.23) | 41.46 ^{**} (.89) | 37.56 ^{**} (1.17) |
| R ² | .140 | .142 | .088 | .099 | .142 | .133 | .088 | .071 | .070 | .069 |

Table 3-9 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Expected Electoral Participation Scores on Parents' Education, Home Civic Learning Environments and Controls (continued)

| | Netherlands | Ireland | Italy | Mexico | Greece | Finland | England | Colombia | Sweden | Denmark |
|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| High School | 1.22 (.80) | 1.10 (.61) | 1.05** (.37) | .82* (.34) | .81 (.64) | .75 (.59) | .68 (.62) | .63* (.32) | .53 (.71) | .46 (.57) |
| College | 2.28** (.74) | 2.35** (.59) | 1.77** (.44) | 1.30** (.30) | 1.84** (.63) | 2.62*** (.59) | 1.67** (.61) | .97** (.29) | 1.82** (.68) | 2.01** (.53) |
| Female | -.82* (.42) | 1.53*** (.33) | .42 (.30) | .52* (.24) | .76* (.37) | .85** (.28) | -.41 (.35) | -.50* (.24) | 1.35** (.31) | 1.05*** (.26) |
| Immigrant | .42 (.78) | -1.91** (.62) | -5.01*** (1.03) | -2.21* (.97) | -2.93*** (.75) | -2.06* (1.17) | 1.25* (.68) | -1.20 (1.36) | .78 (.99) | -.79 (.62) |
| Language minority | -1.19 (.81) | -2.44** (.68) | -.73 (1.09) | -1.90* (.73) | -.72 (1.00) | .26 (.91) | .30 (.82) | -1.19 (1.27) | -2.58* (.99) | -.98 (.78) |
| Single parent | -.49 (.71) | -.92* (.48) | -.71* (.41) | -1.23*** (.28) | -1.06* (.49) | -1.76*** (.39) | -1.19* (.47) | -.47 (.27) | -.77 (.52) | -.69* (.41) |
| Home literacy | 1.13*** (.16) | 1.17** (.13) | .89*** (.13) | .15 (.11) | .63*** (.16) | 1.13*** (.12) | 1.48** (.13) | .20* (.11) | .98*** (.13) | .90*** (.11) |
| Home discussion | 3.70*** (.29) | 2.70*** (.20) | 1.91*** (.18) | 1.75*** (.15) | 2.48*** (.23) | 3.30*** (.20) | 3.45*** (.23) | 1.55*** (.14) | 3.54*** (.21) | 3.64*** (.16) |
| Urban | .04 (.62) | .83* (.36) | -.19 (.44) | .44* (.25) | .41 (.48) | .59* (.32) | .79* (.42) | -.55* (.25) | .36 (.41) | .39 (.40) |
| Location missing | .71 (.46) | .53 (.60) | 2.42 (1.98) | .25 (.77) | 1.81*** (.48) | -3.81** (1.34) | -1.19* (.51) | 1.88 (1.97) | .23 (.54) | -.02 (.37) |
| Constant | 34.63*** (1.17) | 39.34*** (.93) | 46.24*** (1.19) | 46.99*** (.79) | 40.86*** (1.27) | 39.04*** (1.12) | 36.76*** (1.05) | 49.08*** (1.34) | 35.36*** (1.28) | 36.32*** (1.00) |
| R ² | .152 | .146 | .108 | .037 | .080 | .170 | .191 | .029 | .142 | .184 |


Table 3-9 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Expected Electoral Participation Scores on Parents' Education, Home Civic Learning Environments and Controls (continued)

| | Norway | Bulgaria | Hong Kong | Taiwan | Thailand | Latvia | Spain | Luxembourg | Chile | Belgium (Flemish) | Korea |
|-------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| High School | .41 (1.25) | .39 (.71) | .35 (.44) | .28 (.41) | .24 (.34) | .19 (.86) | .12 (.49) | .10 (.50) | -.06 (.46) | -.18 (.94) | -1.13 [*] (.65) |
| College | 3.35 ^{***} (1.24) | 1.23 [^] (.74) | 1.08 [*] (.54) | 1.52 ^{**} (.45) | 1.71 ^{***} (.31) | 1.63 [*] (.82) | 1.49 ^{**} (.44) | 1.50 ^{**} (.50) | 1.93 ^{***} (.52) | 1.35 (.91) | -.48 (.65) |
| Female | 1.10 ^{**} (.38) | 1.31 ^{**} (.38) | .21 (.36) | .43 (.26) | 1.35 ^{***} (.25) | 1.00 ^{**} (.37) | .06 (.34) | -1.09 ^{***} (.28) | .12 (.34) | -.44 (.33) | .72 ^{**} (.24) |
| Immigrant | -2.92 ^{**} (1.02) | .11 (1.70) | .79 [^] (.41) | -2.81 [*] (1.36) | -4.02 ^{**} (1.19) | -3.28 ^{***} (.87) | -2.41 ^{***} (.58) | -1.42 ^{**} (.36) | -2.19 (1.97) | -.58 (.70) | -2.47 (2.21) |
| Language minority | -.50 (1.14) | .74 (.67) | -1.48 [^] (.82) | .33 (.36) | -1.13 [^] (.58) | -1.15 (.63) | -1.94 ^{***} (.45) | -.46 (.55) | -1.27 (1.93) | -.78 (.69) | -1.83 (1.93) |
| Single parent | -1.06 [^] (.61) | -.15 (.51) | -1.78 ^{***} (.56) | -1.28 ^{***} (.35) | -.03 (.29) | -.76 [^] (.45) | NA | .01 (.38) | -1.77 ^{***} (.39) | -.43 (.51) | -.51 [^] (.26) |
| Home literacy | .99 ^{***} (.16) | .43 ^{**} (.15) | .65 ^{***} (.15) | .81 ^{***} (.11) | .00 (.12) | .36 [^] (.15) | .53 ^{***} (.15) | .79 ^{***} (.11) | .17 (.16) | .74 ^{***} (.13) | 1.03 ^{***} (.10) |
| Home discussion | 3.40 ^{***} (.24) | 2.21 ^{***} (.24) | 2.81 ^{***} (.22) | 2.36 ^{***} (.16) | 1.75 ^{***} (.16) | 2.24 ^{**} (.23) | 2.65 ^{***} (.21) | 3.40 ^{***} (.17) | 3.11 ^{***} (.20) | 3.28 ^{***} (.23) | 2.37 ^{***} (.15) |
| Urban | .74 (.56) | -1.08 ^{**} (.42) | - | -.22 (.27) | 1.14 ^{***} (.29) | -1.14 [^] (.44) | .25 (.37) | - | -1.21 ^{**} (.36) | 1.05 [*] (.50) | -1.16 ^{***} (.33) |
| Location missing | .39 (.64) | - | .98 [^] (.42) | - | -.22 (.57) | -1.08 [^] (.64) | .47 (1.11) | -1.03 ^{**} (.30) | 1.30 (1.66) | - | -2.52 ^{***} (.72) |
| Constant | 39.08 ^{***} (1.54) | 41.84 ^{***} (.88) | 39.07 ^{***} (1.03) | 43.94 ^{***} (.54) | 47.45 ^{***} (.69) | 42.46 ^{***} (1.09) | 42.42 ^{***} (.69) | 39.08 ^{***} (.59) | 42.21 ^{***} (2.00) | 37.10 ^{***} (1.12) | 40.59 ^{***} (2.06) |
| R ² | .147 | .043 | .090 | .085 | .051 | .060 | .083 | .138 | .066 | .099 | .099 |

Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Countries are sorted in descending order of the magnitude of the coefficients of High School.


*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ [^] $p < .10$

Figure 3-2 Relative Effects of Parental Education, Home Literacy and Home Discussion (Internal Political Efficacy)




Note: Countries are sorted in ascending order of the size of the Parental Education slope.

Figure 3-3 Relative Effects of Parental Education, Home Literacy and Home Discussion (Citizenship Self-efficacy)



Note: Countries are sorted in ascending order of the size of the Parental Education slope.

Figure 3-4 Relative Effects of Parental Education, Home Literacy and Home Discussion (Expected Electoral Participation)



Note: Countries are sorted in ascending order of the size of the Parental Education slope.

Table 3-10 Results from Two-level HLM Models of Adolescents' Internal Political Efficacy Scores

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|--|----------------|----------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| <u>Student-level equation</u> | | | | |
| Intercept | 49.44 (.48)*** | 49.39 (.42)*** | 49.36 (.42)*** | 49.32 (.37)*** |
| High school | | .25 (.17) | .29 (.16)^ | .32 (.16)^ |
| College | | 1.45 (.24)*** | 1.58 (.17)*** | 1.63 (.14)*** |
| Female | | -1.85 (.14)*** | -1.85 (.14)*** | -1.85 (.14)*** |
| Immigrant | | .24 (.26) | .24 (.26) | .23 (.26) |
| Language minority | | .15 (.21) | .14 (.21) | .15 (.21) |
| Openness in classroom | | 1.06 (.07)*** | 1.06 (.07)*** | 1.06 (.07)*** |
| Media | | 2.35 (.17)*** | 2.35 (.17)*** | 2.35 (.17)*** |
| Friend | | 1.79 (.09)*** | 1.79 (.09)*** | 1.79 (.09)*** |
| Urban | | -11 (.20) | -11 (.20) | -11 (.20) |
| Location missing | | -20 (.14) | -19 (.14) | -20 (.14) |
| <u>Country-level equation</u> | | | | |
| <i>Effects on the slope of high school</i> | | | | |
| Hoover index | | | 48.97 (17.73)* | 47.27 (15.61)** |
| GDP per capita | | | | 31.55 (15.18)* |
| Gini index | | | | .48 (.15)** |
| Level of democracy | | | | -.02 (.01) |
| <i>Effects on the slope of college</i> | | | | |
| Hoover index | | | 110.51 (30.10)*** | 130.27 (13.69)*** |
| GDP per capita | | | | 64.91 (13.78)*** |
| Gini index | | | | 1.17 (.16)** |
| Level of democracy | | | | -.08 (.01)*** |
| <i>Effects on the intercept</i> | | | | |
| Hoover index | | | -24.56 (56.74) | -15.11 (36.74) |
| GDP per capita | | | | 33.96 (41.83) |
| Gini index | | | | -1.44 (.41)** |
| Level of democracy | | | | .11 (.04)** |
| | | | | -2.31 (1.51) |



Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. *** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ ^ $p < .10$

Table 3-11 Variance Components of Two-level HLM Models of Adolescents' Internal Political Efficacy Scores

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| | | | | Controlling for GDP per capita | Controlling for Gini index | Controlling for level of democracy |
| <u>Student-level</u> | | | | | | |
| <u>variance</u> | | | | | | |
| Intercept | 91.96 | 76.87 | 76.87 | 76.87 | 76.87 | 76.87 |
| High school (df) | | .63*** (30) | .51*** (29) | .34** (28) | .45*** (28) | .43** (28) |
| College (df) | | 1.94*** (30) | 1.20*** (29) | .32*** (28) | .60*** (28) | .62*** (28) |
| <u>Country-level</u> | | | | | | |
| <u>variance</u> | | | | | | |
| Intercept (df) | 5.89*** (30) | 4.38*** (30) | 4.49*** (29) | 3.49*** (28) | 3.67*** (28) | 4.29*** (28) |
| <u>Variance explained</u> | | | | | | |
| <u>(%)</u> | | | | | | |
| High school slope | - | - | 19.0 | 46.0 | 28.8 | 31.9 |
| College slope | - | - | 38.1 | 83.5 | 69.0 | 68.2 |
| Student-level | - | 16.4 | 16.4 | 16.4 | 16.4 | 16.4 |
| Country-level | - | 25.7 | 23.8 | 40.8 | 37.7 | 27.3 |

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ ^ $p < .10$

Figure 3-5 Effects of Parental Education on Adolescents' Internal Political Efficacy, by Country's Level of Political Inequality



Note: Based on the results of Model 4 in Table 3-10 (controlling for GDP per capita). The variables tested are not grand-mean centered.

Table 3-12 Results from Two-level HLM Models of Adolescents' Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|--|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| <u>Student-level equation</u> | | | | |
| Intercept | 49.84 (.54) ^{***} | 49.82 (.65) ^{***} | 49.78 (.60) ^{***} | 49.76 (.60) ^{***} |
| High school | | .33 (.14) [*] | .37 (.14) [*] | .43 (.12) ^{**} |
| College | | 1.17 (.23) ^{***} | 1.27 (.17) ^{***} | 1.35 (.15) ^{***} |
| Female | | .30 (.38) | .30 (.38) | .30 (.38) |
| Immigrant | | .26 (.21) | .26 (.21) | .26 (.21) |
| Language minority | | .19 (.24) | .19 (.24) | .19 (.24) |
| Openness in classroom | | 1.39 (.08) ^{***} | 1.39 (.08) ^{***} | 1.39 (.08) ^{***} |
| Media | | 1.68 (.12) ^{***} | 1.68 (.12) ^{***} | 1.68 (.12) ^{***} |
| Friend | | 1.41 (.12) ^{***} | 1.41 (.12) ^{***} | 1.41 (.12) ^{***} |
| Urban | | -.10 (.12) | -.10 (.12) | -.10 (.12) |
| Location missing | | -.19 (.17) | -.18 (.17) | -.19 (.17) |
| <u>Country-level equation</u> | | | | |
| <i>Effects on the slope of high school</i> | | | | |
| Hoover index | | | 33.23 (16.08)[*] | 27.92 (10.55)[*] |
| GDP per capita | | | | .34 (.14) [*] |
| Gini index | | | | -.04 (.01) ^{***} |
| Level of democracy | | | | 1.25 (.34) ^{**} |
| <i>Effects on the slope of college</i> | | | | |
| Hoover index | | | 83.55 (29.84)^{**} | 58.06 (15.49)^{**} |
| GDP per capita | | | | .67 (.19) ^{**} |
| Gini index | | | | -.07 (.01) ^{***} |
| Level of democracy | | | | 2.65 (.46) ^{***} |
| <i>Effects on the intercept</i> | | | | |
| Hoover index | | | -26.97 (61.67) | -22.50 (60.40) |
| GDP per capita | | | | -1.25 (.33) ^{**} |
| Gini index | | | | .05 (.05) |
| Level of democracy | | | | -2.89 (1.67) [^] |



Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. *** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ ^ $p < .10$

Table 3-13 Variance Components of Two-level HLM Models of Adolescents' Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| | | | | Controlling for GDP per capita | Controlling for Gini index | Controlling for level of democracy |
| <u>Student-level variance</u> | | | | | | |
| Intercept | 95.08 | 85.25 | 85.25 | 85.25 | 85.25 | 85.25 |
| High school (df) | | .32*** (30) | .29** (29) | .22- (28) | .12 (28) | .15- (28) |
| College (df) | | 1.31*** (30) | .92*** (29) | .65*** (28) | .42*** (28) | .41*** (28) |
| <u>Country-level variance</u> | | | | | | |
| Intercept (df) | 5.61*** (30) | 7.02*** (30) | 7.22*** (29) | 6.59*** (28) | 7.25*** (28) | 6.91*** (28) |
| <u>Variance explained (%)</u> | | | | | | |
| High school slope | - | - | 10.1 | 33.1 | 64.1 | 52.6 |
| College slope | - | - | 30.3 | 50.9 | 68.2 | 68.9 |
| Student-level | - | 10.3 | 10.3 | 10.3 | 10.3 | 10.3 |
| Country-level | - | - | - | - | - | - |

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ ^ $p < .10$

Figure 3-6 Effects of Parental Education on Adolescents' Citizenship Self-efficacy, by Country's Level of Political Inequality



Note: Based on the results of Model 4 in Table 3-12 (controlling for GDP per capita). The variables tested are not grand-mean centered.

Table 3-14 Results from Two-level HLM Models of Adolescents' Expected Electoral Participation Scores

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | |
|--|----------------|----------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|
| | | | | Controlling for level of democracy | |
| | | | | Controlling for Gini index | |
| | | | | Controlling for GDP per capita | |
| <u>Student-level equation</u> | | | | | |
| Intercept | 49.99 (.51)*** | 49.89 (.42)*** | 49.86 (.41)*** | 49.83 (.40)*** | 49.77 (.40)*** |
| High school | | .64 (.16)** | .67 (.14)*** | .70 (.15)*** | .74 (.14)*** |
| College | | 2.46 (.23)*** | 2.54 (.21)*** | 2.58 (.19)*** | 2.65 (.17)*** |
| Female | | .49 (.16)** | .49 (.16)** | .49 (.16)** | .49 (.16)** |
| Immigrant | | -1.27 (.46)** | -1.27 (.46)** | -1.27 (.46)** | -1.28 (.46)** |
| Language minority | | -.94 (.38)* | -.94 (.38)* | -.94 (.38)* | -.94 (.38)* |
| Openness in classroom | | 1.50 (.11)*** | 1.50 (.11)*** | 1.50 (.11)*** | 1.50 (.11)*** |
| Media | | 1.92 (.07)*** | 1.92 (.07)*** | 1.92 (.07)*** | 1.92 (.07)*** |
| Friend | | .48 (.07)*** | .48 (.06)*** | .48 (.07)*** | .48 (.06)*** |
| Urban | | .09 (.15) | .09 (.15) | .09 (.15) | .09 (.15) |
| Location missing | | -1.12 (.25) | -1.12 (.25) | -1.12 (.25) | -1.12 (.24) |
| <u>Country-level equation</u> | | | | | |
| <i>Effects on the slope of high school</i> | | | | | |
| Hoover index | | | 24.58 (14.57)^ | 21.23 (12.55)^ | 7.71 (13.28) |
| GDP per capita | | | | | 1.30 (.40)** |
| Gini index | | | | | |
| Level of democracy | | | | | |
| <i>Effects on the slope of college</i> | | | | | |
| Hoover index | | | 61.37 (24.76)* | 55.22 (23.34)* | 31.60 (22.68) |
| GDP per capita | | | | | |
| Gini index | | | | | |
| Level of democracy | | | | | 2.79 (.63)*** |
| <i>Effects on the intercept</i> | | | | | |
| Hoover index | | | -21.42 (66.06) | -15.17 (52.19) | 3.84 (51.84) |
| GDP per capita | | | | | |
| Gini index | | | | | |
| Level of democracy | | | | .07 (.05) | -3.00 (1.99) |



Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. *** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ ^ $p < .10$

Table 3-15 Variance Components of Two-level HLM Models of Adolescents' Expected Electoral Scores

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| | | | | Controlling for GDP per capita | Controlling for Gini index | Controlling for level of democracy |
| <u>Student-level variance</u> | | | | | | |
| Intercept | 92.14 | 82.93 | 82.93 | 82.93 | 82.93 | 82.93 |
| High school (df) | | .47*** (30) | .46*** (29) | .36*** (28) | .37** (28) | .30** (28) |
| College (df) | | 1.43*** (30) | 1.27*** (29) | .80*** (28) | .97*** (28) | .70*** (28) |
| <u>Country-level variance</u> | | | | | | |
| Intercept (df) | 6.48*** (30) | 5.10*** (30) | 5.25*** (29) | 5.08*** (28) | 5.00*** (28) | 4.82*** (28) |
| <u>Variance explained (%)</u> | | | | | | |
| High school slope | - | - | 0.2 | 23.4 | 19.6 | 34.9 |
| College slope | - | - | 11.1 | 44.4 | 32.5 | 51.1 |
| Student-level | - | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 |
| Country-level | - | 21.3 | 22.1 | 21.5 | 22.8 | 25.7 |

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ ^ $p < .10$

Figure 3-7 Effects of Parental Education on Adolescents' Expected Electoral Participation, by Country's Level of Political Inequality



Note: Based on the results of Model 4 in Table 3-14 (controlling for GDP per capita). The variables tested are not grand-mean centered.

Chapter 4 Socioeconomic School Segregation and the Impact of Family Socioeconomic Background on Student Civic Outcomes: A Comparative Study of 28 Countries

Introduction

The civic function of schools, meant to ensure a healthy, democratically aware future citizenry, is frequently overlooked while debate focuses on the lagging academic performance of students. Schools are unique public settings in which students deliberate matters of public concern with other peers across diverse societal groups, and where teachers are positioned to influence students' civic commitments (Torney-Purta 2002). Contrary to this civic mission to educate future citizens, the schooling process often reproduces, or even aggravates, inequalities in civic outcomes by providing differential learning opportunities for students from different family origins. This is especially so when privileged families buy a home in what they believe is the best school district or send their children to private schools, while children from less privileged families are left to local schools located in urban, high-poverty neighborhoods (Holme 2002). When schools are such highly segregated, they differ in numerous ways, including the quality of curricula and instructions, teacher expectations, school climate, and extra personnel resources, among others (Alexander et al. 1979; Coleman et al. 1966; Dronkers and Levels 2007; Gamoran 1992; Ladson-Billings and Tate 1995; Oakes and Lipton 1999; Orfield and Eaton 1996; Portes and Hao 2004; Rumberger and Willms 1992; Willms 1986). Families with low socioeconomic status (SES) and their children are among the most prone to find themselves in these segregated schools. Not only because of their adverse socioeconomic conditions, but also because of macro-level contextual factors, such as the development of market-based approach in

public education, school tracking and residential concentration, children from low SES families are often sorted into schools with high concentrations of similarly disadvantaged schoolmates.

While a growing body of educational research has examined the ramifications of socioeconomic school segregation on civic disparities among students from differing socioeconomic backgrounds (Jacobsen, Frankenberg, and Lenhoff 2012; Kahne and Middaugh 2008a, 2008b; Kahne and Spote 2008; Levine 2009; Levinson 2012), empirical findings are solely based on the US context. Comparable research outside the United States is, to my knowledge, rare. In this chapter, I examine cross-national variations in the magnitude of socioeconomic gaps across three dimensions of student civic outcomes (i.e., *civic knowledge*, *citizenship self-efficacy*, and *school-based civic participation*). This chapter compares degrees of socioeconomic school segregation across 28 selected countries, and investigates whether these cross-national variations in the degree of socioeconomic school segregation correspond to the magnitude of socioeconomic gaps in student civic outcomes. Based on arguments made by a number of educational scholars who claim that high SES schools (i.e., schools predominantly serving students from high SES families) have better overall educational outcomes, I initially hypothesized that countries with higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation will show larger socioeconomic disparities in student civic outcomes. In countries with higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation, low SES students are more likely to be concentrated into schools that have a large number of socioeconomically disadvantaged peers, which may explain the related lag in civic outcomes among low SES students in those countries. By the same token, high SES students in countries with higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation are more likely to derive greater benefits from attending high SES schools, thereby compounding their initial advantages. Empirical analyses produce suggestive, but more complex, findings than

were originally hypothesized. The extent and direction of the systematic linkage varies across the three civic outcome measures. While *civic knowledge* gaps by family socioeconomic levels are larger in countries with higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation, the corresponding gaps in *citizenship self-efficacy* and *school-based civic participation* are less substantial in these same countries. Drawing upon much prior research on school effects, I develop explanations for the systematic, yet varying, associations between country-level socioeconomic school segregation and the socioeconomic gaps across the three civic outcome measures. On one hand, I reason that students' civic understanding may be better enhanced in high SES schools, because high SES schools are often characterized by more and better-quality civic curricular and instruction. On the other hand, students' citizenship self-efficacy and school-based civic participation may be more directly influenced by within-school experiences having to be negotiated with students, such as how students interact with one another as well as with the general social context of their schools, than by between-school variations in civic learning opportunity. Thus, the presence of a large number of schoolmates from similar socioeconomic origins may function as a leveling factor for ameliorating socioeconomic disparities in students' self-confidence and engagement in participatory activities. In the conclusion, suggestions for future research and normative implications are discussed accordingly. I debunk the commonsensical notion in school effectiveness research that high SES schools are inherently better in regards to their overall educational outcomes. I also criticize the socially decontextualized approach which overemphasizes "the school solution" to equalize civic learning opportunity without contextualizing the lived experiences of students inside schools.

Family Socioeconomic Background, Children's Schooling, and Civic Outcomes

The family's central role in forming the early civic orientations and behaviors of children has been extensively explored in much of the literature on political socialization (Beck and Jennings 1991; Berelson and McPhee 1954; Connell 1972; Davies 1965; Hess and Torney 1967; Hyman 1959; Jaros, Hirsch, and Fleron 1968; Jennings and Niemi 1968; Kandel and Lesser 1972). During the 1960s and 1970s, the conventional wisdom among students of political socialization research was that what was learned prior to adulthood remained unstable over long periods of time, and the content of the basic civic orientations were largely family-determined. As some problematic premises and methodological weaknesses have been replaced by a more appropriate understanding of the field (Niemi and Hepburn 1995; Niemi and Sobieszek 1977; Sapiro 2004), the primacy of the family among the agents of political socialization is no longer taken as axiomatic. That said, largely uncontested is the claim that various family characteristics have unambiguous consequences for the civic development of children and adolescents. Among those family characteristics, family SES, which is an index of parents' education, income, and occupational prestige, has been recognized as the most important influence on young citizens' civic orientations, attitudes, and behaviors (Greenstein 1965; Hess 1968; Hess and Torney 1967; Jennings and Niemi 1974; Verba 2003; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 2003; Verba, Schlozman, and Burns 2005).

Researchers have distinguished two dimensions in the ways that family socioeconomic background matter. The first dimension concerns the intra-familial settings where a dyadic relationship between parents and children is developed. Studies related to this dimension typically examined the extent to which family SES correlates with the content and quality of civic stimulation provided in home environments (Beck 1977; Jennings 1974; Verba, Burns, and

Schlozman 2003; Verba, Schlozman, and Burns 2005). The other dimension of the family socioeconomic influence on children's civic development relates to the extra-familial settings where the external social context constitutes a triadic relation with families and children. This dimension of the family socioeconomic influence is the main focus of this chapter. "Because of the capacity of those who are advantaged to extract from any situation more than those who are disadvantaged" (Mortimore 1997, 483), for example, the influence of high levels of monetary and nonmonetary resources that privileged parents possess and pass on to their children often moves beyond the immediate family to the schools the children attend (see, among others, Pong 1998). High SES parents can buy a home in what they believe is the best school district or send their children to private schools, while low SES parents are seen as more passive because they cannot afford to buy a home in a better neighborhood, or because they have limited information on possible educational options (Holme 2002). This process typically results in between-school differences in the socioeconomic composition of the student body, which, in turn, has suggestive consequences for the schools' civic learning environments. According to the literature on school compositional effects, schools with different average socioeconomic levels vary substantially in their overall educational contexts as well (Alexander et al. 1979; Coleman et al. 1966; Dronkers and Levels 2007; Gamoran 1992; Portes and Hao 2004; Rumberger and Willms 1992; Willms 1986). Specifically, schools predominantly serving high SES students often provide better educational environments compared to those serving low SES students in terms of instructional resources, school climate, teacher quality, peer interactions, and other aspects of learning and teaching (Rumberger and Palardy 2005; Rumberger and Willms 1992). For this reason, when low SES students are sorted into schools with high concentrations of similarly disadvantaged schoolmates, they are at greater risk of underachievement, not only because of their

socioeconomic vulnerability but also because of the fact that they attend low SES schools. By the same token, the relative educational advantage of high SES students is reinforced in schools serving larger numbers of high SES students (Jencks and Mayer 1990; Park and Kyei 2010). In other words, a school's average SES (i.e., the average family SES of students attending a school) has a *compositional* effect on students' educational outcomes *over and beyond* individual students' background characteristics, including their own family socioeconomic background. In this context, the extent of the compositional effect associated with a school's average SES has been viewed as a measure of inequality of educational opportunity (Gamoran 1996; Palardy 2013). With regard to the compositional effect on student civic outcomes, empirical evidence has supported similar reasoning. A few US-based studies have documented that schools serving predominantly White, upper-middle class students provide more and better civic learning opportunities, while students attending high-poverty and/or ethnic minority schools have relatively limited access to enriched civic learning programs (Jacobsen, Frankenberg, and Lenhoff 2012; Kahne and Middaugh 2008a, 2008b; Kahne and Spote 2008; Levine 2009; Levinson 2012). For example, in examining the distribution of civic learning opportunities across the US school system, Kahne and Middaugh (2008a) found that the average socioeconomic composition of a school is an important predictor of the likelihood that students have greater access to enriched civic learning programs, regardless of the individual SES levels of students in that school. In particular, students attending higher SES schools were twice as likely to study how laws are made, almost twice as likely to participate in service-learning activities, and one-and-a-half times more likely to have experiences with debates or panel discussions in their civic classes than were student attending average SES schools. In this way, a family's socioeconomic condition exerts a significant influence on the children's civic

development through its interaction with the school-based civic learning settings. Schools provide channels of civic learning opportunities, and families of more and less advantaged socioeconomic backgrounds differently influence their children's entry into and progress through those channels.

Socioeconomic School Segregation and Inequalities in Civic Outcomes

The relevance of the socioeconomic composition of schools for the inequality of student civic outcomes points to one possible mechanism by which family SES is linked to student civic outcomes. That is, the influence of individual students' family SES extends beyond their own families to the schools they attend, affecting the schools' civic learning contexts for *all* students *over and beyond* individual students' background characteristics. This is what has been identified as compositional effects associated with the schools' average socioeconomic level. This significant effect of the socioeconomic composition of schools suggests that socioeconomic school segregation may be in part responsible for relatively poor civic outcomes among students from underprivileged families. When schools are highly segregated along socioeconomic lines, students from underprivileged families are more likely than their privileged peers to attend high-poverty schools, which are, allegedly, characterized by less favorable civic learning environments. Consistent with this reasoning, Levinson (2012) correlated the civic learning opportunity gap among schools of different socioeconomic levels with *de facto* school segregation, which remains as a prominent feature of US society in spite of the decades-long attempts to equalize the share of underprivileged students across schools. Although school segregation is usually viewed in racial terms in the United States, racial segregation is strongly associated with socioeconomic segregation (Rumberger and Palardy 2005). Many schools

heavily attended by ethnic and racial minority students are high-poverty schools, a primary reason why ethnic and racial minority schools show relatively low levels of educational attainment and achievement on average (Portes and Hao 2004). While prior research on school segregation has recognized the independent compositional effect of the ethnic and racial makeup of schools, even net of the school's socioeconomic composition (Rumberger and Palardy 2005; Rumberger and Willms 1992; Van der Slik, Driessen, and De Bot 2006), its effect is not as substantial as that of the socioeconomic composition and varies across different ethnicity and nationality (Park and Kyei 2010; Portes and Hao 2004). It is also worthwhile to note that over the past two decades, re-segregation has been more pervasive along socioeconomic lines than racial lines, primarily due to the widened income gap between low and high SES families in the United States and around the globe (Altonji and Mansfield 2011; Palardy 2013). Despite the importance of the subject and the consistency of findings in the United States, comparable research conducted outside the United States is rare. Hence, an important way of expanding the literature is to examine the degree of socioeconomic school segregation across countries and its linkage with the inequalities of student civic outcomes.

Cross-national Variation in Socioeconomic School Segregation

There is less information available on the systematic processes by which schools are segregated along socioeconomic lines in other countries than in the United States. Yet the positive association between family SES and school location has been reported for many countries. In most countries, students from high SES families are positioned in more privileged school settings compared to their counterparts from low SES families. High SES students have access to privileged school settings not only in terms of better endowed educational resources

and channels of opportunities within schools, but also in terms of types of schools such as the British grammar school, French *lycee*, and German *Gymnasium* (Kerckhoff 1995).

Above all, the most researched institution that has been identified as advancing socioeconomic school segregation is tracking. This generally refers to the placement of students into different school types according to their abilities. In highly stratified educational systems such as those in Austria, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, children are sorted into separate types of secondary schools based on previous performance or ability tests at early ages (e.g., between at the age of 10 and 14) (Brunello and Checchi 2007; Hanushek and Wößmann 2006). Contrary to the North-American contexts where tracking refers to ability grouping or streaming *within* a fully comprehensive schooling structure, in the European context tracking takes the form of separating students into highly differentiated educational segments, including academic and vocational education (LeTendre, Hofer, and Shimizu 2003). Therefore, from exceptionally early ages, students in these continental European countries are divided into separate types of education with different qualifications at the end of each track, and different expectations when it comes to the transition to further education or work. This highly stratified nature of many European educational systems is linked to the ideological underpinning of the continental European countries, where the preservation of status differentials is viewed as one of the major caretakers of social integration. The sharp division of secondary schools usually leads to different occupational destinations and social classes in which each occupation and class retains its own identity and values (Beller and Hout 2006; Peter, Edgerton, and Roberts 2010). Prior scholarship has put this argument to the empirical test, revealing that this early placement into different kinds of educational channels reduces social mobility. In the dominant theoretical and empirical debate on early tracking, it has been identified as a major mechanism through

which family-based inequalities are maintained in school settings. While higher SES parents are more likely to enroll their children in high-status schools that prepare students for university education, low SES parents may enroll their equally talented children in low-status schools that focus on training students for labor markets (Bol and Werfhorst 2013; Brunello and Checchi 2007; Cicourel and Kituse 1977; Oakes 1985; Oakes and Guiton 1995; Page 1991). In summation, in highly stratified educational systems, students from differing socioeconomic origins are segregated into different types of schools that substantially differ in the socioeconomic composition of their student bodies and in opportunities for further education.

Yet schools still differ in their socioeconomic composition of the student body in comprehensive educational systems. As seen in the case of the United States, this is especially so when economic and social resources which parents can invest in their children vary considerably between high and low socioeconomic families. Since people prefer interacting with others similar to them, both in psychological and sociological senses, (a phenomenon known as *homophily*) (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001), greater economic inequality often leads families of different socioeconomic backgrounds to become residentially segregated as well. Due to the preeminence of the concept of “neighborhood schools” across most countries, neighborhood segregation, in turn, results in school segregation (Denton 1995). Prior research has demonstrated that a series of market-oriented approaches, such as charter schools and voucher programs, has intensified school segregation by family SES, as better educated and higher-status parents are more likely to participate in these choice programs (Ball 2003; Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt 2005; Le Grande and Bartlett 1993; Levin 2002; McEwan 2000). Similarly, the quasi-market strategy of funding private schools is also a well-known mechanism for enhancing socioeconomic school segregation (Alegre and Ferrer 2010; Gewirtz, Ball, and Bowe

1995). In other words, because of the great differential in resources available to different socioeconomic families and/or the introduction of quasi-market criteria in the configuration of school systems, countries with comprehensive educational systems can show considerable levels between-school segregation along socioeconomic lines.

Socioeconomic School Segregation and Inequalities in Civic Outcomes

As discussed earlier, the limited but important body of US-based research has revealed that the socioeconomic composition of schools affects student civic outcomes above and beyond individual students' characteristics, primarily because of its correlation with an array of school characteristics, from the quality of civic curricular and instruction to access to community-based civic participation. Further, the compositional effect of a school's mean SES also suggests that the degree to which schools are segregated along socioeconomic lines will be an important predictor of how strongly student civic outcomes varies across family socioeconomic background. In order to investigate whether and how socioeconomic school segregation influences civic disparities among students from different socioeconomic origins, one needs variation in the degree of socioeconomic school segregation. Since school segregation is mostly a national feature with a few regional variations, this study turns to between-country differences in school segregation along socioeconomic lines.

In particular, I hypothesize that between-country differences in the extent to which schools are socioeconomically segregated might be in part responsible for why some countries show smaller disparities in civic outcomes among students from different socioeconomic origins than do others. This hypothesis is based on the reasoning that in countries whose school systems are more segregated along socioeconomic lines, low SES students are more likely to be concentrated into low SES schools (i.e., schools whose average SES of the student body are low) than their

similarly situated counterparts in countries with school systems that are more socioeconomically integrated. In turn, low SES students in countries where they are at greater likelihood of attending low SES schools may encounter less favorable civic learning settings. Low SES students are disadvantaged in this aspect, which may explain the related lag in civic outcomes among low SES students in countries whose school systems are highly segregated along socioeconomic lines. On the opposite side, high SES students in countries with higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation are more likely to be sorted into schools with high concentrations of high SES students (i.e., high SES schools, or schools whose average whose average SES of the student body are high). Where the majority of the student body comes from well-to-do families, students are likely to enjoy greater access to enriched civic learning opportunities and benefit from those high-quality civic learning opportunities. This may also compound the already considerable advantages of students from more privileged families. Taken together, students' civic outcomes are assumed to be more strongly influenced by family SES in countries with school systems that are more socioeconomically segregated.

Caution is needed to formulate such hypothesis, though, because differences in student civic outcomes may be more directly influenced by within-school experiences than by between-school variations. Since the Coleman Report challenged the importance of between-school differences (Coleman et al. 1966), the claim that between-school differences in school resources account for a sizeable portion of individual variations in educational outcomes has been vigorously debated (Downey, Von Hippel, and Broh 2004). Gamoran (1987), among many others, found that variations in student educational outcomes were more cogently explained by students' experiences *inside* schools than by school resources, which they may or may not encounter personally. Relatedly, Bidwell and Kasarda (1980) distinguished between the effects

of *schools* and *schooling*; while the former refers to a context for instruction and learning, the latter indicates the instructional processes within schools that contribute to students' learning. This distinction implies that while we have good reason to believe that students in schools with different average socioeconomic levels have unequal civic learning opportunities, it is premature to assume that these unequal civic learning opportunities exert significant influences on student civic outcomes. Instead, student civic outcomes may have more to do with within-school experiences having to be negotiated with students, such as how students interact with one another as well as with the general social context of their schools. For example, low SES students' civic learning and engagement in school-based civic activities may be facilitated when peers in close proximity are similar in terms of family socioeconomic origins; they feel at less of disadvantages in the company of similarly situated peers, and are less subject to discrimination by teachers and other peers. Put differently, in schools with predominantly upper middle-class students, underprivileged students may suffer from low self-esteem and discrimination. This is what previous research has identified as "the double contextual effect of class composition" (Portes and MacLeod 1996), which indicates the deleterious effect of attending high SES schools for underprivileged students (Kasinitz, Battle, and Miyares 2001; Palardy 2008; Portes and Hao 2004; Stanton-Salazar 2001; Suárez-Orozco 1987b; Zhou and Logan 2003). A similar argument could be advanced in regards to students from high SES families. When high SES students attend schools where those who come from similarly privileged families constitute a large proportion of school peers, the class advantages they brought from their families become less visible and neutralized in school settings. Otherwise, they may benefit more from socioeconomically diverse settings with higher integration, perhaps because in such school settings they receive more favorable treatment from teachers and school officials than their less

privileged peers (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; DiMaggio 1982). Such possibilities thus lead to the alternative hypothesis that the effect of family SES on student civic outcomes may be *weaker* in countries with school systems that are more socioeconomically segregated, not vice versa.

Data

As in the previous chapters, data from ICCS 2009 is utilized for this comparative study. Chapter 2 includes detailed information on the procedures of sampling, test administration, and data collection in ICCS 2009.

Selection of Countries for Comparison

Among the total 38 countries that participated in ICCS 2009, I used data on student civic outcomes of the selected 28 countries. Countries included in the analyses were: Austria, Belgium (Flemish), Bulgaria, Chile, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Thailand. I excluded ten countries from the analysis whose net enrollment rates in secondary education were below 70 percent at the time of the data collection, or whose information on net enrollment rates were missing in order to avoid potential biases associated with the sample selection. Given that ICCS 2009 surveyed students from the eighth-grade (or equivalent) who are enrolled in the school at the time of the data collection, in countries with low enrollment rates, the population of the eighth-grade students might be different from the population as whole in terms of their individual and familial characteristics

(Park 2008). Russia Federation and Slovak Republic were excluded from the analysis because of missing information on net enrollment rates in secondary education. I also excluded the Netherlands, Hong Kong SAR, and Luxembourg from the analyses because those countries had fewer than 50 schools in the final datasets (Schulz et al. 2010). Furthermore, information on family structure was not available for Malta and Spain. Thus, when treating each country as a separate case in ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses, the family structure variable was not controlled for in Malta and Spain.

Measures

Outcome Variables

I used students' knowledge and understanding of civics and citizenship, citizenship self-efficacy and civic participation at school as outcome variables. The following section elaborates upon the construction of these three outcome measures included in the analyses.

CIVIC KNOWLEDGE. Civic knowledge is defined in ICCS 2009 as “knowing about and understanding elements and concepts of citizenship as well as those of traditional civics” (Schulz et al. 2010). In the extant body of literature, civic knowledge is associated with broad forms of civic attributes that give us good reason to care about, encompassing democratic values, civic participation, trust in governments and public institutions, among others (Galston 2001). ICCS 2009 scaled the item scores using item response technique and created five plausible values of civic knowledge assessment set for each participant. This scale was constructed based on the 79 adjudicated international cognitive items, and thus provide internationally comparable results for students' civic knowledge. Together, these five values provide an unbiased estimate of sampling

variances of estimated population parameters. The final parameter estimates are the average of corresponding estimates from the five regressions, and the standard errors are calculated utilizing Rubin's (1987) rule.

CITIZENSHIP SELF-EFFICACY. Political efficacy is defined as the expectation that citizens believe they have capacity to act effectively in politics (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; Easton and Dennis 1967). In a substantial body of research on citizen participation, political efficacy has been viewed as an important psychological resource functionally linked to political and civic participation (Carlson and Hyde 1980; Cohen, Vigoda, and Samorly 2001; Finkel 1985; Krampen 1991; Sears 1987). Citizenship self-efficacy, which relates to the general concept of self-efficacy, is a broader construct than political efficacy (Bandura 2001; Zimmerman and Bandura 1995). Within the ICCS 2009 framework, citizenship self-efficacy is constructed as a student's self-reported confidence to undertake several activities in the area of civic participation including (a) discussing a newspaper article about a conflict between countries, (b) arguing his or her point of view about a controversial political and social issue, (c) standing as a candidate in a school election, (d) organizing a group of students to achieve/enact changes at school, (e) following a television debate about a controversial issue, (f) writing a letter to a newspaper giving his or her view on a current issues, and (g) speaking in front of class about a social and political issue. These items were used to derive the scale of citizenship self-efficacy, where higher values on this scale reflect a higher sense of efficacy.

CIVIC PARTICIPATION AT SCHOOL. While adolescents cannot take part in civic activities in the same ways that adult citizens can do, democratic practices in schools can provide them with an array of valuable opportunities to ascertain the importance of engaging in the democratic system in later adult life. The students participating in ICCS 2009 were asked to report whether

they had participated in six different civic-related activities at school “within the last 12 months,” “more than a year ago,” or “never”: (a) Voluntary participation in school-based music or drama activities outside of regular lessons, (b) active participation in a debate, (c) voting for class representative or school parliament, (d) taking part in decision-making about how the school is run, (e) taking part in discussions at a student assembly, and (f) becoming a candidate for class representative or school parliament. Based on these items, a scale reflecting students’ civic participation at school is derived with the higher values corresponding to higher levels of civic participation.

Individual-level Variables

The following paragraphs briefly explain individual-level independent variables included in the analyses. In addition to the measure of family SES, I also controlled for an array of relevant individual and familial characteristics that may codetermine student civic outcomes. Table 4-1 summarizes the coding schema of the independent variables and the number of cases in the analysis for this study.

FAMILY SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS. To indicate family SES, I used a derived measure of National Index of Socioeconomic Background (NISB) from ICCS 2009. This NISB measure consists of factor scores from a principal component analysis of three variables for each national sample separately: (1) highest occupational status of parents, (2) highest educational level of parents in approximate years of education, and (3) home literacy resources. For students who had missing data for only one of the three indicators, the imputed values were used by regressing the missing value on the other two variables. This imputation procedure was conducted for each country separately. Data on parental occupations were obtained by asking open-ended questions

about the jobs of the student's mother and father. The responses were coded into four-digit ISCO codes, which were converted into the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) (Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Treiman 1992). The highest occupation status of both parents corresponds to the higher ISEI score of either parent or to the only available parent's ISEI score. Higher scores on this index indicate higher levels of occupational status. Similarly, the measure of the educational attainment of each parent was constructed by the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Again, whichever parent's score was higher in the level of educational attainment, or the only available parent's ISCED level, was used as an indicator of parental educational attainment. The index of highest educational level of parents was recoded into approximate years of education. For students who reported that their parents had not completed primary school, for example, a value of two years was assigned on the assumption that most parents who had not completed primary school would have had attended school at least for two years. The index of home literacy resources was created on the basis of students' reports of the number of books in home, distinguishing among the following categories: (1) 0 to 10 books, (2) 11 to 25 books, (3) 26 to 100 books, (4) 101 to 200 books, (5) 201 to 500 books, and (6) more than 500 books. Then, midpoint values of each category were chosen for deriving the index of home literacy resources. The final NISB scores were standardized within each country to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

OTHER FAMILY BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS. In addition to family socioeconomic background, I also included three family background measures in the models: immigration background, language used at home, and family structure. Adolescents from immigrant families often lack language skills, and may be unfamiliar with the cultural norms of the host society. They also tend to suffer from adverse economic circumstances and may have a

lower socioeconomic status than their native peers, which negatively correlates with civic learning processes and active citizenship (Sherrod, Torney-Purta, and Flanagan 2010). I used information on the birth countries of students and their parents to construct a dichotomous variable of immigration background. Native students are defined as those were born in the country of survey and who also had at least one parent who was born in that country. Immigrant students are defined as either those born in the country of the survey with both parents in another country, or those who were born in another country with at least one parent also born in another country. When immigrant adolescents speak the language of their origin countries at home, this may hinder the acquisition of the host country's language (Kalmijn 1996; Marks 2005), which is essential for civic lives in their new home. Yet studies in the United States have often supported the opposite interpretation: bilingual immigrant children outperform children who are only fluent in English (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). To account for these effects, I included a dummy variable for adolescents whose families use languages other than the language of test at home. Adolescents who speak the language of instruction at home were the reference group. In addition, although recurrent findings from cross-national studies support the idea that growing up with a single parent is negatively related to adolescents' educational outcomes, the extent to which those in single-parent families perform less well than those in non-single-parent families substantially varies across countries (Park 2007). I included a dummy variable for family structure, which distinguishes single-parent and non-single-parent families, including nuclear families, mixed families, and other types of families.

INFLUENCES FROM OTHER AGENTS OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION. I also controlled for the influences from three agents of political socialization: school, the media, and peer groups. First, as a school-related factor, I controlled for individual students' perceptions of

the openness in their classroom climate for discussion (openness in classroom discussion), which represents the extent to which differing perspectives or controversial issues are discussed within the classroom. Second, media attention is a combined measure averaging the three items that asked students how frequently they use newspapers, television, and the internet to inform themselves about national and international news. In the same vein, I also included a proxy for the frequency of discussion with peers on national or international matters (political conversations with friends). This was measured with an additive index of two items, which asked about conversations with friends regarding political or social issues and what was happening in other countries. When a multi-level model technique is applied to the pooled data across all 31 countries, these three indices were standardized within each country so that they did not reflect international differences.

GENDER. A considerable body of research has confirmed gender disparities in civic knowledge and many aspects of democratic behavior among the adult population: men know more about politics than do women, and men exceed women in political interest, efficacy, and engagement (see, for example, Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; Mondak and Anderson 2004). Yet these disparities do not persist among young citizens. Female adolescents have been found to show higher levels of civic knowledge, but still fall behind their male counterparts in other measures of civic outcomes (Hooghe and Stolle 2004). To account for such gender effect, I controlled for gender using a dummy variable for sex; males are the reference group.

Country-level Variables

The primary goal of this chapter is to examine whether between-country differences in the extent to which schools are socioeconomically segregated can explain why students in some countries are more civically informed and active than their counterparts of comparable

socioeconomic background in other countries. This goal can be achieved by conducting a multi-level analysis which assesses how the country-level measure of school socioeconomic segregation conditions the association between a student's family SES and his/her civic outcomes.

DISSIMILARITY INDEX FOR SOCIOECONOMIC SCHOOL SEGREGATION. To indicate the degree of socioeconomic school segregation at the national level, I drew upon the dissimilarity index from Massey and Denton (1988)'s study, which is one of the most influential studies in the literature on residential and school segregation (Park and Kyei 2010; Rumberger and Willms 1992).¹⁰ Using information on students' family SES from the ICCS 2009 data, I calculated the dissimilarity index for socioeconomic school segregation, which signifies the proportion of low SES students that would have to move to another school to achieve an equal distribution of low SES students across schools within a country. Low SES students are defined as those whose family socioeconomic indices are below the national average. In this way, higher values on this dissimilarity index correspond to higher degrees of school segregation along socioeconomic lines. The values of the dissimilarity index in each country are presented in Table 4-2.

COUNTRY-LEVEL CONTROLS. I controlled for three country-level factors that may render spurious the impact of socioeconomic school segregation on the relationship between students' family SES and their civic outcomes. The first control variable is the country's level of economic development as measured by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Less developed countries have drawn much attention of comparative education researchers due to the

¹⁰ The dissimilarity index is computed by the following formula: $D = \sum_{i=1}^n [t_i | p_i - P| / 2TP(1 - P)]$ where t_i and p_i are the total population and minority proportion of school i , and T and P are the population size and minority proportion of the whole country, which is subdivided into n school units (Massey and Denton 1988a).

difference in conditions from those of more developed countries; class structures are less differentiated and educational systems are not yet fully institutionalized (Buchmann and Hannum 2001). By far, the most widely-held research on less developed contexts was advanced by Heyneman and Loxely (1982, 1983). In examining how a country's level of economic development shapes the relationship among family, school, and educational outcomes, Heyneman and Loxely found that family socioeconomic background has a much smaller effect than school-related factors on students' educational outcomes in underdeveloped countries, while the reverse pattern holds in developed countries. These findings have offered much guidance for governments and international development assistance agencies on educational investments in developing countries, which has been reanalyzed, replicated and sometimes challenged by the substantial body of scholarly literature utilizing more recent data and more sophisticated techniques (Baker, Goesling, and LeTendre 2002; Hanushek and Luque 2003; Harris 2007; Kamens 1988; Riddell 1989; Schiller, Khmelkov, and Wang 2002). As shown in Table 4-2, all 28 countries included in my analysis were relatively more or less economically developed countries. Thus, in order to take into account any systemic association among the country's economic development level, family socioeconomic background and school-related factors, each country's GDP per capita in 2009 US dollars was included in the analysis.

The second country-level factor to be controlled is the country's level of economic inequality as measured by the Gini index. As discussed earlier, greater economic inequality leads different socioeconomic families to become residentially segregated, which is linked to school segregation along socioeconomic lines (Denton 1995). Moreover, as suggested in the long-held controversy over whether economic inequality is an inhibitor (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Anderson and Beramendi 2005; Dahl 2006; Hacker et al. 2005), a fuel of democratic

participation (Brady 2004; Meltzer and Richard 1981; Oliver 2001), or a factor that interacts with individuals' own economic condition (Boix 2003; Lukes 2005; Pontusson and Rueda 2010; Solt 2004, 2008), economic inequality has ramifications for the extent to which citizens from diverse socioeconomic positions are equally represented in the civic realm. Given that adolescents' civic development is to some extent circumscribed by their parents' civic activism (i.e., civically active parents tend to provide their children with civically rich home environments and thus have civically active children), the country's level of economic inequality may leave a legacy for adolescents' civic outcomes.

Finally, I controlled for the country's level of school differentiation (e.g., the number of educational tracks available for 15-years-old students). Since this kind of information is not directly available from ICCS 2009 data, I consulted several cross-national studies on educational tracking, including Buchmann and Dalton (2002) and Bol and Werfhorst (2013). Schools in highly differentiated educational systems tend to be highly segregated along socioeconomic lines because the placement of students into different educational tracks is influenced by their families' socioeconomic and cultural resources (Bol and Werfhorst 2013; Hanushek and Wößmann 2006; Jenkins, Micklewright, and Schnepf 2008). In this regard, the extent to which the educational system is differentiated may influence the likelihood of students from low socioeconomic families to attend low SES schools.

Missing Values

Under the assumption that data on independent variables is missing at random (MAR), I compensated for missing variables using a multiple imputation strategy (Rubin 1987). Before analysis, each missing value on all the independent variables for each country was replaced with

three plausible imputations. The only exceptions are school sector and location: separate categories for those with missing information on school sector and location were created. I imputed both continuous and categorical variables, utilizing a model that incorporated all the variables in our analyses. This multiple imputation strategy only applies to independent variables, not to dependent variables.

Analytic Approach

Three different modeling strategies were used for multivariate analyses. First, ordinal logistic regression analyses were conducted, for each country separately, to compare the likelihood of attending schools with different socioeconomic levels between students from low and high SES families. The main goal of these analyses is to examine the extent to which students in countries with higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation are more likely to be sorted into schools with similar schoolmates in terms of their family socioeconomic origins, compared to their counterparts in countries with lower degrees of socioeconomic school segregation. Before analyses, I constructed the four categories (quartile) of the schools' socioeconomic levels, which would serve as an ordinal dependent variable (i.e., the lowest SES, low SES, high SES, and the highest SES schools). In addition, to indicate students' family SES, I used information on parental education and occupation. As noted in the measures section, among the levels of father's and mother's educational attainment and occupational status, whichever higher or the only available information were used as indicators. While six levels of educational attainment were originally distinguished in ICCS 2009, I compared three different levels of education (i.e., completed lower secondary or less, completed upper secondary, and completed tertiary). For parental occupation, I distinguished four levels of occupational status,

and constructed four categories (quartile) (i.e., the lowest occupational status, low occupational status, high occupational status, and the highest occupational status). I first constructed a baseline model (Model 1) that estimates the likelihood of attending schools in a higher category as a function of the two family socioeconomic background variables. Then I added three family background characteristics (i.e., including immigration background, home language and family structure), and gender to the baseline model (Model 2). The overall significance of each model was tested by calculating the log likelihood for the constant only model and comparing it to the log-likelihood for a specified model. This likelihood ratio statistics is distributed as a chi-square with degree of freedom equal to the number of parameters in the specified model. All models were significant at more than the .001 level.

Second, I estimated ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models, one for each outcome variable, to determine the effects of family SES, family background characteristics, the influences from two other political socialization agents and gender on student civic outcomes. In order to take into account the nested structure of data originated from the two-stage sampling framework (Schulz, Ainley, and Fraillon 2011), total student weights (TOTWGT)¹¹ were used in the analysis. For each country separately, three OLS models are specified as follows:

$$Y \text{ (Civic outcome scores)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{family SES}) + \beta_2(\text{gender}) + \beta_3(\text{immigration background}) + \beta_4(\text{home language}) + \beta_5(\text{family structure}) + \beta_6(\text{media attention}) + \beta_7(\text{political discussion with friends}) + \hat{\epsilon}$$

After assessing the effect of family SES separately across countries, I utilized a hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) meta-analysis technique (Bowman 2012; Denson and Seltzer 2011;

¹¹ The total student weight is equal to the inverse of the joint probability of selection for a particular student (i.e., the probability that school A *and* class B *and* student C are selected). For more detailed information on sampling weights, see Chapter 2.

Raudenbush and Bryk 2002) to investigate the underlying cause of cross-national variability in the effect of family SES on student civic outcomes that remains after taking into account family background characteristics, the influences from the two other political socialization agents and gender. The purpose of this HLM meta-analysis is to examine whether between-country differences in the extent to which schools are socioeconomically segregated can account for why students in some countries are more civically informed and active than their counterparts of comparable socioeconomic background in other countries, *over and above* their individual-level attributes. The HLMs for meta-analysis consist of two interconnected models that allow us to represent and partition the two sources of variation: (1) the *error* or lack of precision connected with each country's effect size of the family socioeconomic influence on civic outcome¹² and (2) heterogeneity across countries in the *true* effect sizes. Within this framework, the information about each country's effect size estimate is represented in a within-country (level 1) model. For each country, key elements of the within-country model are the estimate of the *true* effect size of the family socioeconomic influence on civic outcome, and an *error* term based on the standard error of the estimate. In addition, a between-country (level 2) model represents the amount of heterogeneity across countries in their true effect sizes. This between-country model enables us to investigate whether the degree to which schools are segregated along socioeconomic lines can underlie such heterogeneity.

Within each set of the three civic outcome measures, five HLM models were built: (1) a fully unconditional model which estimates an overall (average) effect size of family socioeconomic influence on civic outcome and the extent to which effect sizes vary around the

¹² Each country's effect size estimate of family socioeconomic influence on civic outcome is indicated by the regression slope of family SES (β_1), which is derived from the OLS regression model noted above.

overall average, (2) a conditional model in which the dissimilarity index for socioeconomic school segregation is a predictor, and (3)-(5) conditional models in which the three country-level control variables are included, one at a time, in addition to the dissimilarity index for socioeconomic school segregation. Due to space limitation, only the first and last models are presented in what follows.

The First Model. The within-country (level 1) model is a measurement model relating the *estimated* effect sizes from each country to the *true* effect sizes:

$$g_j = \delta_j + e_j \quad e_j \sim N(0, V_j)$$

where g_j is the *estimated* effect size of family socioeconomic influence on civic outcome for country j ; δ_j is a parameter capturing the *true* effect size for country j ; e_j is an *error* term reflecting that g_j is an estimate of δ_j ; V_j is the error variance of g_j as an estimate of δ_j . Since the error variance (V_j) is simply the squared standard error connected with each country's effect size estimate, it is important to note that we already have the information on the magnitude of the error variance.

In the between-country (level 2) model, each country's true effect size of family socioeconomic influence on civic outcome (δ_j) is viewed as varying around the mean effect size (γ_0) as follows:

$$\delta_j = \gamma_0 + u_j \quad u_j \sim N(0, \tau)$$

where γ_0 is the mean effect size across all countries; and u_j is a random effect which represents the deviation of the true effect size for country j from the mean effect size. The variance term τ represents the amount of heterogeneity across countries in their true effect sizes. Because HLM

computes a *weighted* estimate of γ_0 , countries with smaller error variances are given more weight, where the form of the weights is $w_j = \frac{1}{v_j + \hat{\tau}}$.

The Final Model. To assess whether between-country differences in the degree of socioeconomic school segregation are systematically associated with cross-national variation in the effect of family SES on student civic outcomes, the same within-country (level 1) model was built. In addition, the between-country model is developed as follows:

$$\delta_j = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1(\text{Dissimilarity index for school socioeconomic segregation}) + \gamma_2 (\text{Country – level control}) + u_j$$

$$u_j \sim N(0, \tau)$$

where γ_1 represents the expected change in the effect size of family socioeconomic influence on civic outcome with one unit increase in the dissimilarity index for socioeconomic school segregation, holding constant the country-level control variable; γ_2 is the expected change in the effect size of family socioeconomic influence on civic outcome with one unit increase in the country-level control, holding constant the country's level of socioeconomic school segregation. Because of multicollinearity among the three country-level controls (i.e., GDP per capita, Gini index and school differentiation), the country-level control variables are not included in the same equation. That is, the effect of socioeconomic school segregation was estimated three times with including each of the three country-level control variables one at a time. GDP per capita was logged before entering the models. To facilitate interpretation, all predictors in the between-country (level 2) model are centered on their corresponding grand means. Thus, the intercept term (γ_0) represents the effect size of family socioeconomic influence on civic outcome in a country whose dissimilarity index for socioeconomic school segregation and country-level control variable are equal to their corresponding grand means, respectively. u_j is a random

effect associated with each country, and the variance term τ represents the amount of heterogeneity across countries in their true effect sizes that remains after taking into account the country's level of socioeconomic school segregation and the control variable.

Results

Cross-national Differences in the Degree of Socioeconomic School Segregation

As presented in Table 4-2, the dissimilarity index for socioeconomic school segregation in each country ranges from 0.24 in Cyprus to 0.53 in Chile, where higher values on the dissimilarity index correspond to higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation. More precisely, the value of 0.53 in Chile indicates that 53 percent of students whose family's SES is below the national average have to move to another school in order for every school in Chile to share the same proportion of students from low SES families as the proportion for the country as a whole. It is important to note that some countries with comprehensive school systems such as Cyprus (0.24), Slovenia (0.29), Finland (0.30), Denmark (0.31), Sweden (0.31) and Norway (0.32) show relatively low degrees of school segregation by family SES compared to countries whose school systems are highly differentiated, including Austria (0.41), Italy (0.38), Switzerland (0.37) and Greece (0.37). Yet even in countries with comprehensive school systems, some countries schools, such as those in Thailand (0.47), Spain (0.45) and Ireland (0.37), are found to be relatively highly segregated across socioeconomic lines. This substantially high degree of socioeconomic school segregation is attributable to the pattern of residential segregation caused by the great differential in monetary resources available for different socioeconomic families, given higher levels of economic inequality in those countries. For instance, the top-three countries showing the highest degree of socioeconomic school

segregation—Chile (0.53), Bulgaria (0.49), and Thailand (0.47)—are countries with comparatively high levels of economic inequality. The correlation of the dissimilarity index with the Gini index among the 28 countries reveals this relationship more clearly ($r = 0.64$). The national economic level is negatively associated with the degree of socioeconomic school segregation. That is, economically developed countries tend to display relatively lower levels of school segregation along socioeconomic lines ($r = -0.51$).

The Likelihood of Attending Low SES Schools

Table 4-3 presents the ordinal logistic regression results predicting the likelihood of attending schools in a higher category (i.e., more affluent schools or higher SES schools) between students from low and high SES families. Beginning with Model 1, students having parents with higher levels of educational attainment and occupational prestige are more likely to attend schools with large proportions of similarly privileged schoolmates in all 28 countries, with substantial cross-national variation in the magnitude of disparities in the likelihood of attending higher SES schools between students from different socioeconomic families. Remember that countries with the highest and the lowest degree of socioeconomic school segregation differ by 0.29 units in the dissimilarity index (i.e., 0.53 in Chile and 0.24 in Cyprus). In Chile, students having parents who had completed high school as their highest educational attainment (dummy variable, *High School*) are 4.53 times more likely ($4.527 = \exp [1.51]$) to attend schools in a higher category than those whose parents had not completed high school (reference category). Students having parents with college education (dummy variable, *College*) are 17.81 times more likely ($17.814 = \exp [2.88]$) to attend higher SES schools than their counterparts whose parents had not completed high school. In contrast, in Cyprus, students whose parents had completed high school as their highest educational attainment are 2.20 times—about half the size of the

corresponding difference in Chile—more likely ($2.203 = \exp [0.79]$) to attend higher SES schools than those whose parents had not completed high school. Students having parents with college education are 4.18 times more likely ($4.179 = \exp [1.43]$) to attend schools in a higher category in Cyprus, which is almost a quarter of the magnitude of the corresponding difference in Chile. Similarly, students whose parents are in the highest occupational quartile are about 11.59 times ($11.588 = \exp [2.45]$) and 2.48 times ($2.484 = \exp [0.91]$) more likely than those whose parents are in the lowest occupational quartile to attend higher SES schools in Chile and Cyprus, respectively. As evident in Model 2, the effects of parental education and occupation on the likelihood of attending schools with different socioeconomic levels remain relatively unchanged, even after controlling for other individual and family background factors. Altogether, these findings confirm that in countries with school systems that are more segregated along socioeconomic lines, students are significantly more likely to be concentrated into schools with similar schoolmates in terms of their family socioeconomic origins.

The Effects of Family SES and Other Individual-level Characteristics

Tables 4-4 through 4-6 present the effect of family SES on student civic outcomes, controlling for other family background characteristics (i.e., immigration background, home language, and family structure), the influences from two other political socialization agents (i.e., the media and friends) and gender. The basic conclusions that emerge from the OLS regression analyses are quite similar across the three civic outcome measures, although there are considerable cross-national variations in the size and the direction of the coefficients.

Civic Knowledge In line with much prior research, family SES has a strong positive impact on student civic knowledge in all countries, even net of other individual and family background

factors. In Bulgaria, one standard deviation increase in family SES¹³ leads to an increase of 41.99 points in the civic knowledge scale when all else in the model is held constant, which is equal to approximately half the average disparity among the participating countries in ICCS 2009 (100 points).¹⁴ Even in Thailand (19.23 points), the country with the smallest gap in civic knowledge scores by family SES, the size of the gap is close to a quarter of one standard deviation in civic knowledge. Females achieve significantly higher civic knowledge scores than their male counterparts in all countries. Students with immigration background have considerably lower levels of civic knowledge compared to their native-born peers in all countries except England, Poland, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Belgium (Flemish), Latvia and Thailand, where there is no significant difference between civic knowledge scores of immigrant-origin and native students. In all but two countries (Malta and Colombia), students in households where the language of instructions is commonly spoken have significant advantages in civic knowledge. The effect of family structure is less remarkable: growing up in a single-parent family has no significant effect on civic knowledge in some countries except England, Ireland, New Zealand, Poland, Italy, Taiwan, Cyprus, Belgium (Flemish), Mexico, Colombia and South Korea, where its effect is significant and negative.¹⁵ Turning to the alternative sources of students' civic learning, attention to news media has a significant and positive impact on civic knowledge in most countries, with Greece and Colombia being two exceptions. By comparison, the influence of peer groups is less consistent across countries. While students who rated themselves as frequently talking about politics with their friends achieve significantly lower civic knowledge

¹³ Note that the family SES index was coded to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 for each country. Thus, the coefficient of family SES reflects the impact of a one standard-deviation change in the outcome measure.

¹⁴ Note that IRT plausible values for the civic knowledge scale are constructed with a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100 for equally weighted countries.

¹⁵ Note that the information of family structure is not available for Spain and Malta.

scores than those who did not frequently talk with friends in some countries, including Bulgaria, Ireland, Taiwan, Mexico, Colombia and Thailand, the same peer influence is positive in a few other countries, such as Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, Switzerland, Greece, Belgium (Flemish), Finland and Slovenia.

Citizenship self-efficacy For the citizenship self-efficacy measure, the effect of family SES is also positive and significant in most countries, regardless of other individual and family background factors, except Belgium (Flemish), Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Thailand, where no significant impact of family SES is observed. Thailand is the exception and the only instance where family SES is negatively correlated with students' citizenship self-efficacy, indicating that students from high SES families demonstrate significantly lower levels of self-confidence in participatory activities than their peers from low SES families with individual and other family background factors controlled. That said, the effect of family SES is generally small in all countries; the size of the increase in citizenship self-efficacy scores with one standard deviation in family SES ranges between 0.33 points in Lithuania and 1.91 points in Norway. Females demonstrate significantly higher levels of citizenship self-efficacy than their male counterparts in most countries except Malta, Taiwan, Mexico and Thailand. Immigrant-origin and native-born students do not significantly differ in terms of their levels of citizenship self-efficacy in most countries except Norway, England, New Zealand, Slovenia, Spain and Belgium, where immigrant students are more civically efficacious than their native peers. Similarly, immigrant students demonstrate significantly higher levels of self-confidence in civic participation than native students in South Korea and Cyprus. Speaking the language of instructions versus dialects or other languages at home increases a student's level of citizenship self-efficacy in Sweden, Finland, Spain and Taiwan, while this pattern is reversed in Ireland, Greece, New

Zealand, Korea and Cyprus. In all the other countries, the language used at home has no significant impact on students' citizenship self-efficacy. Living with a single-parent family also does not make a difference to students' citizenship-self-efficacy in most countries except Greece, Bulgaria and Taiwan where students from single-parent families have significantly lower levels of citizenship self-efficacy. Importantly, both political discussion with friends and news media consumption have significant and positive impacts on students' citizenship self-efficacy in all countries. Recall that the indices of *news media attention* and *political discussion with friends* have four values to represent the level of engagement in those activities, that is, *never or hardly ever* (1), *monthly* (2), *weekly* (3), *daily or almost daily* (4). Therefore, one unit increase corresponds to a change from the response of *hardly ever* to *monthly*, the response of *weekly* to *daily or almost daily*, etc. For instance, in New Zealand, the country with the largest magnitude of the coefficient for *news media attention*, the coefficient of 3.90 indicates that students who have consumed news media *daily or almost daily* have a score on the citizenship self-efficacy scale that is 3.90 points higher than those who have done so *weekly*, which is more than one quarter of a standard deviation in citizenship self-efficacy. Similarly, in Finland, the country with the largest magnitude of the coefficient for political discussion with friends, the coefficient of 3.04 means that on average, students who have talked about civic matters with their friends *weekly* receive citizenship self-efficacy scores that are 3.04 points higher than the scores of students who have done so *monthly*.

Civic participation at school Echoing the results for civic knowledge and citizenship self-efficacy, family SES has a positive and significant impact on students' civic participation at school in all countries except Estonia, Mexico and Thailand, where no significant participatory gap by family SES is found. The largest gap is 2.25 points in England, followed by New

Zealand (2.14) and Cyprus (2.05), which are close to one standard deviation in civic participation at school. In particular, the coefficient of 2.25 in England indicates that one standard deviation increase in family SES correlates with an increase of 2.25 points in the civic participation at school scale with other individual and family background factors controlled. The magnitude of the coefficients is relatively negligible, albeit significantly positive, in countries like Spain (0.66), Italy (0.61), Chile (0.54) and Lithuania (0.48), while it ranges between 1.84 and 0.76 in all the other countries. Once again, being female versus male has a positive and significant effect on participation in school-based civic activities in all countries. Immigration background has no significant impact on students' civic participation at school in most countries except Czech Republic, Norway, Latvia, and Spain, where immigrant-origin students are significantly less likely than their native peers to participate in school-based civic activities. Bulgaria is the only country where immigrant students demonstrate significantly higher levels of involvement in participatory activities at school compared to their native schoolmates. Net of their immigration status, students whose language spoken at home is a foreign language or dialect as opposed to the language of instruction are significantly less participatory in a few countries, including New Zealand, Cyprus, South Korea, Ireland, and Denmark, while the reverse pattern holds in Finland and Malta; language minority status has no significant impact on students' civic participation at school in all the other countries. The relative disadvantage of living with a single parent is also observed in countries like England, New Zealand, Cyprus, Korea, Finland, Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Lithuania, Estonia, and Mexico, though the magnitude of the disadvantage is generally small in those countries. As with citizenship self-efficacy, having more frequent access to media-based information and peer discussion has significant positive effects on students' civic participation at school in all countries.

The Relevance of Socioeconomic School Segregation for Cross-national Variation in the Effect of Family SES

For each of the three outcome measures, Table 4-7 presents the results of the HLM meta-analyses as specified in the analytic approach section. The three scatter plots in Figures 4-4 through 4-6 demonstrate correlations between effect size estimates and the degrees of socioeconomic school segregation.

Civic Knowledge In the forest plot in Figure 4-1, each country's effect size estimate is represented by a box whose center symbolizes the *magnitude* of the civic knowledge gap by family socioeconomic levels, while the lines coming out from either side of the box indicate the 95% confidence interval. Note that the dotted line in the forest plot corresponds to the *average* of the 28 countries' effect sizes (i.e., the overall magnitude of the civic knowledge gap by family socioeconomic levels across 28 countries). Thus, the non-overlap in 95% confidence intervals for about two-thirds of the countries (i.e., Thailand, Korea, Latvia, Colombia, Mexico, Slovenia, Finland, Belgium (Flemish), Chile, Sweden, Poland, New Zealand, Ireland, England and Bulgaria) suggests that their true effect sizes are likely to vary substantially around the overall average. In contrast, we see that the confidence intervals for the other 13 countries (Cyprus, Greece, Switzerland, Lithuania, Malta, Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Taiwan, Spain, Italy, Denmark and Norway) contain the overall average, signaling that these countries may be fairly homogeneous in terms of their true effect sizes.

As evident in the first column of the civic knowledge measure in Table 4-7, the estimate of the overall (average) effect size is 29.42 with a standard error of 1.11.¹⁶ The estimated value of 29.42 indicates that on average, one standard deviation increase in family SES leads to an increase of 29.42 points in the civic knowledge scale with other individual and family background factors controlled. Constructing a 95% confidence interval helps capture the precision with which the overall average is estimated. The lower and upper boundaries of a 95% confidence interval for this average estimate are 27.31 ($29.42 - 2 \times \sqrt{1.11}$) and 31.53 ($29.42 + 2 \times \sqrt{1.11}$), respectively. It is worth noting that this estimate of the average effect size and its corresponding confidence are similar to the estimate and interval for the average effect size that appears in the forest plot in Figure 4-1. By taking the square root of the estimate of τ and obtaining a standard deviation capturing the variation in the effect sizes (i.e., $\sqrt{31.61} = 5.62$), we can get a better sense of the extent to which the countries differ in terms of their true effect sizes. For instance, a country whose effect size is one standard deviation above the overall average would be 35.04 ($29.42 + 5.62$), whereas a country whose effect size is one standard deviation below the overall average would be 23.80 ($29.42 - 5.62$). Importantly, the random effects result reported at the bottom of Table 4-7 reveal that the countries vary appreciably in their true effect sizes ($\tau = 31.61, p < .001$). This signifies that the magnitude of the civic knowledge gap between low and high SES students is more substantial in some countries than in other countries, even after other individual and family background factors are held constant.

¹⁶ In the analyses for adolescents' civic knowledge scores, I excluded Thailand which is an outlier. As shown in Figure 4-4, Thailand shows higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation among 28 countries, while demonstrating the smallest socioeconomic gap in civic knowledge.

Although the direction of the relationship is positive, the dissimilarity index for socioeconomic school segregation alone (see Model 2) does not have a significant effect on the intercept (23.41, SE = 14.26). In Models 3 through 5, I included the three country-level control variables in the analysis, one at a time, in addition to the dissimilarity index for socioeconomic school segregation. In so doing, I was able to investigate how the effect size of family socioeconomic influence on civic knowledge for a particular country varies according to the degree of socioeconomic school segregation when the country-level control is held constant. For instance, the coefficient of 38.21 associated with the dissimilarity index in Model 3 (38.21, SE = 14.25) indicates that one unit increase in the dissimilarity index correlates with an increase of 38.21 in effect size, holding the country's level of economic development constant. This means that the civic knowledge gap by family SES in countries with higher levels of socioeconomic school segregation, such as Bulgaria, is 8.41 points (38.21×0.22) larger than the corresponding gap in countries with lower levels of socioeconomic school segregation, such as the Czech Republic, after controlling for the country's level of economic development. In other words, in more socioeconomically segregated school systems, variation in student civic knowledge is more strongly based on family socioeconomic background. The results for the variance components (shown at the bottom of the table) indicate that the inclusion of the dissimilarity index and GDP per capita in the model leads to a reduction in parameter variance of 12.4 percent. Similarly, in the model controlling for the country's economic inequality, as measured by the Gini index (Model 4), the coefficient of 38.49 associated with the dissimilarity index (38.49, SE = 17.40) indicates that one unit increase in the dissimilarity index leads to an increase by 38.49 in effect size with the country's economic inequality controlled. Recall that countries with the highest and lowest degree of socioeconomic school segregation differ by 0.29 units in the dissimilarity

index (i.e., 0.53 and 0.24 in Chile and Cyprus, respectively). Therefore, the expected civic knowledge gap between low and high SES students is smaller by 11.16 points (0.29×38.49) in Cyprus than in Chile, after controlling for the country's economic inequality. Put differently, socioeconomic school segregation reinforces the importance of family socioeconomic background for civic knowledge when the country's economic inequality is taken into account. When comparing this Model 4's estimate of τ (29.95, $p < .001$) with the estimate from Model 1 ($\tau = 31.61$, $p < .001$), we see that including both the dissimilarity index and the Gini index explains 5.2% of the total between-country variation in family socioeconomic influence on civic knowledge. Turning to the model controlling for school differentiation (Model 5), the effect of the dissimilarity index on the intercept is positive and significant (44.58, SE = 19.02). This suggests that the effect of socioeconomic school segregation on the association between family SES and students' civic knowledge is persistent, and even becomes stronger, after school differentiation is taken into account. The results for the random effects also demonstrate that the resulting estimate of τ is 26.42 ($p < 0.01$), and the inclusion of the dissimilarity index and school differentiation reduces the between-country variation in family socioeconomic influence on civic knowledge scores by 16.4 percent (from 31.61 to 26.42).

Citizenship Self-efficacy The forest plot in Figure 4-2 displays cross-national variability in effect sizes of family socioeconomic influence on citizenship self-efficacy, along with their associated 95% confidence intervals. It demonstrates that the 95% confidence intervals for most countries (Thailand, Switzerland, Mexico, Colombia, Belgium (Flemish), Chile, Lithuania, Taiwan, Finland, New Zealand, Italy, Greece, Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, England, and Norway) do not contain the overall average of the 28 countries' effect size estimates, as indicated by the dotted line. This non-overlap in the confidence intervals for most countries signals that the

countries vary appreciably in terms of their true effect sizes. Stated differently, the strength of family socioeconomic influence on students' self-confidence in civic participation varies substantially across countries, even after other individual and family background factors are held constant.

As shown in the first column of the citizenship self-efficacy measure in Table 4-7, the estimate of the overall (average) effect size is 0.79 points with a standard error of 0.11. The estimated value of 0.79 indicates that one standard deviation increase in family SES relates to an increase of 0.79 points in citizenship self-efficacy once other individual and family background factors are held constant. To capture the precision with which the overall average is estimated, I constructed a 95% confidence interval: the average estimate's lower and upper boundaries are 0.13 ($0.79 - 2 \times \sqrt{0.11}$) and 1.45 ($0.79 + 2 \times \sqrt{0.11}$) respectively. Again, this estimated average and its associated confidence interval are close to the estimate and interval for the average effect size that appears in the forest plot in Figure 4-2. The random effects result reported at the bottom of Table 8 confirms that the strength of family socioeconomic influence on students' citizenship self-efficacy varies across countries ($\tau = 0.30, p < .001$).

The second column of the citizenship self-efficacy measure in Table 4-7 (Model 2) shows that the effect of the dissimilarity index for socioeconomic school segregation on the intercept is significantly negative (-4.48, SE = 1.21). This indicates that countries with higher levels of socioeconomic school segregation tend to demonstrate *smaller* degrees of disparity in citizenship self-efficacy scores between low and high SES students. In regard to the magnitude of the effect, one unit increase in the dissimilarity index is associated with a 4.48-point decrease in the magnitude of family socioeconomic influence on students' self-confidence in civic participation. Given that countries with the highest and lowest level of socioeconomic school segregation

differ by 0.29 units in the dissimilarity index (i.e., 0.53 and 0.24 in Chile and Cyprus), the size of the gap in citizenship self-efficacy scores associated with one standard deviation increase in family SES in Cyprus is larger by approximately 1.30 points (4.48×0.29) than the corresponding gap in Chile. In other words, in countries with more integrated school systems, the magnitude of family socioeconomic influence on students' citizenship self-efficacy is greater than in countries with more socioeconomically segregated school systems. As evident in the third and fifth columns of the citizenship self-efficacy measure in Table 4-7, even after adding country-level controls of economic development and school differentiation respectively (Model 3 and Model 5), the effect of socioeconomic school segregation is persistent. For example, the coefficient of -2.07 for the dissimilarity index in Model 3 (-2.07, SE = 0.77) indicates that one unit change in the dissimilarity index leads to a decrease by 2.07 in effect size, holding the country's level of economic development constant. Note that the effect size estimate for this citizenship self-efficacy measure shows a positive sign in all countries except Thailand (see Figure 4-2), suggesting that students from high SES families generally show higher levels of self-confidence in participatory activities than students from low SES families. Therefore, the significant negative coefficient of 2.07 means that the size of the gap in citizenship self-efficacy scores associated with one standard deviation in family SES is 0.60 points (2.07×0.29) larger in countries with lower degrees of socioeconomic school segregation, such as Cyprus, compared to the corresponding gap in countries with higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation, such as Chile, when the country's economic development level is taken into account. Similarly, the coefficient of -3.45 associated with the dissimilarity index in Model 5 (-3.45 SE = 1.50) indicates that the magnitude of family socioeconomic influence on students' citizenship self-efficacy is larger by approximately 0.62 points (3.45×0.18) in Korea than the corresponding

magnitude in Thailand when school differentiation is taken into account. By contrast, the effect the dissimilarity index is reduced to non-significance when the country's economic inequality is additionally controlled for (Model 4) (-1.22, SE = 20.39). The results for the variance components (shown at the bottom of the table) demonstrate that a substantial portion of the between-country variation in effect sizes is accounted for by the difference in the degree of school socioeconomic segregation, along with the country-level control. The extent to which the between-country variation is reduced ranges from 32.4 percent in Model 5, 47.9 percent in Model 4 to 51.2 percent in Model 3.

Civic Participation at School Cross-national variation in effect sizes of family socioeconomic influence on civic participation at school, along with their associated 95% confidence intervals, is presented in the forest plot in Figure 4-3. It shows that the confidence intervals for half of the countries (i.e., Latvia, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Austria, Greece, Colombia, Taiwan, Denmark, Malta, Poland, Finland, Ireland, Slovenia and Norway) include the average estimate, as indicated by the dotted line. By comparison, the intervals for Thailand, Mexico, Estonia, Lithuania, Chile, Italy and Spain) lie below the average estimate, whereas the intervals for the Czech Republic, Sweden, Belgium (Flemish), South Korea, Cyprus, New Zealand, and England lie above the average estimate. As with civic knowledge and citizenship self-efficacy, the non-overlap in the 95% confidence intervals implies that those 14 countries tend to vary substantially around the overall average. The other countries whose confidence intervals contain the average estimate are likely quite homogeneous in terms of their effect sizes.

The last set of the results in Table 4-7 presents the findings for the civic participation at school measure. As shown in the first column, the estimate of the 24 countries' average effect size is 1.07 points with a standard error of 0.11, indicating that on average, one standard

deviation increase in family SES correlates with an increase of 1.07 points in civic participation at school once other individual and family background factors are held constant. When constructing a 95% confidence interval, the average estimate's lower and upper boundaries are 1.73 ($1.07 - 2 \times \sqrt{0.11}$) and 0.41 ($1.07 + 2 \times \sqrt{0.11}$), respectively. Once again, this estimate of the average effect size and its corresponding confidence are close to the estimate and interval for the average size that appears in the forest plot in Figure 4-3. The estimate of the random effects variance ($\tau = 0.34, p < .001$) tells us that the countries' effect sizes vary substantially around the mean effect size. This substantial variation in effect sizes signifies that the magnitude of family socioeconomic influence on students' participation in school-based civic activities is more substantial in some countries than in other countries, even after differences in other individual and family background factors are taken into account.

As shown in the second column (Model 2), the level of socioeconomic school segregation is negatively associated with the size of the school participation gap by family socioeconomic levels (-5.58, SE = 1.06). In other words, countries with higher levels of socioeconomic school segregation tend to demonstrate smaller degrees of disparities in school-based civic participation between low and high SES students. Even after the country-level control is taken into account, the effect of socioeconomic school segregation on the relationship between family SES and students' school-based civic participation remains significant, although the level of significance slightly decreases. For instance, the coefficient of -4.43 for the dissimilarity index in Model 3 (-4.43, SE = 1.11) means that one unit change in the dissimilarity index leads to a decrease by 4.43 in effect size, holding the country's level of economic development constant. That is, the magnitude of family socioeconomic influence on students' school-based civic participation tends to be smaller in countries with higher levels of socioeconomic school segregation when national

economic development level is taken into account. More precisely, the coefficient of -4.43 for the dissimilarity index indicates that the socioeconomic gap in civic participation at school is larger by 1.28 points (4.43×0.29) in Cyprus than in Chile when the country's economic development is held constant. Comparing Model 3's estimate of τ (0.20, $p < .001$) to the estimate from Model 1 (i.e., 0.34) reveals that the inclusion of the dissimilarity index and GDP per capita reduces between-country variance in effect sizes by about 41.5 percent. A similar pattern in the effect of socioeconomic school segregation is also consistently observed when the country's economic inequality and school differentiation are additionally controlled, respectively. That is, the effect of family socioeconomic background on students' school-based civic participation tends to be stronger in countries with lower levels of socioeconomic school segregation than in countries with higher levels of socioeconomic school segregation. Including the dissimilarity index for socioeconomic school segregation and the country-level controls also explains a considerable portion of the cross-national variance in effect sizes. The results for the variance components suggest that the inclusion of the dissimilarity index and the Gini index in the model results in a reduction in parameter variance of 38.5 percent, while the dissimilarity index and school differentiation explains 43.2 percent of the total between-country variation in family socioeconomic influence on students' civic participation at school.

Supplementary Analyses

As supplementary analyses, I built two-level HLM models for each country separately and one for each civic outcome measure.¹⁷ These analyses focus on the extent to which student civic

¹⁷ The two-level HLM models, which consider students as the first-level unit and schools as the second-level unit, are as such:

outcome is related to within-school family SES, and the extent to which it is associated with between-school variation in the socioeconomic composition (i.e., the effect of a school's socioeconomic composition). Note that the extent of the compositional effect associated with a school's average SES indicates the degree of between-school inequality in educational resources and learning opportunity (Gamoran 1996; Palardy 2013). Therefore, the greater compositional effect associated school mean SES can be interpreted as the higher degree of inequality between schools with different socioeconomic levels, for instance, in terms of the instructional quality of civic courses and access to civic learning opportunities.

For the civic knowledge measure (see Table 4-8), a significant compositional effect associated with a school's average SES is found in most countries, with substantial cross-

$$\text{Student-level: } Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}(\text{Family SES}) + \beta_{2j}(\text{Female}) + \beta_{3j}(\text{Language used at home}) + \beta_{4j}(\text{Immigration background}) + \beta_{5j}(\text{Single parent}) + \beta_{6j}(\text{Media}) + \beta_{7j}(\text{Friends}) + \gamma_{ij}$$

where β_{0j} represents the mean civic knowledge, citizenship self-efficacy and school-based civic participation scores for school j , controlling for all student-level variables included in the model. r_{ij} indicates a random effect which is unique to each individual student. β_{1j} through β_{7j} represent the slopes of student-level variables described in the measures section. All student-level predictors are centered around their corresponding grand means so that the intercept term (β_{0j}) represents the adjusted mean on each civic outcome measure for school j .

In the school-level equation, the coefficients derived from the student-level equation serve as dependent variables as follows:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\text{AVG: Student family SES}) + \gamma_{02}(\% \text{ Female}) + \gamma_{03}(\% \text{ Immigrants}) + \gamma_{04}(\% \text{ Language minority}) + \gamma_{05}(\% \text{ Single parents}) + \gamma_{06}(\text{AVG: Media}) + \gamma_{07}(\% \text{ Immigrants}) + \mu_{0j}$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10}$$

.....

$$\beta_{7j} = \gamma_{70}$$

The intercept term β_{0j} represents the mean civic knowledge, citizenship self-efficacy and school-based civic participation scores for school j , controlling for all school-level variables included in the model. u_{0j} is a random effect which is unique to each school. The coefficient γ_{01} indicates the slope of school mean SES (i.e. the compositional effect associated with school mean SES) for school j , given that the family SES variable in the student-level equation is centered around its grand mean. Other coefficients (γ_{02} through γ_{07}) indicate the slopes of school-level control and aggregate variables for school j , and are assumed to be constant across schools within each country. To facilitate interpretation, each school-level predictor is entered into the model centered around its corresponding grand mean.

national variations in the magnitude of the compositional effect. Malta has the steepest school mean SES slope among the 28 countries. In Malta, a school with an average socioeconomic level one unit higher than the national mean school SES has a 78.45 point increase in its average civic knowledge score. Stated differently, students who attend a school with an average socioeconomic level one unit higher receive 78.45 higher civic knowledge scores, even net of their own family socioeconomic levels, compared to students who attend a school whose school mean SES is equal to the national mean school SES. By comparison, countries such as Latvia, Greece, South Korea, Finland, Cyprus, and Slovenia have relatively flatter school mean SES slopes. Although non-significant, for instance, Cyprus and Slovenia have negative coefficients, which suggest that there are no significant differences in average civic knowledge scores between schools with different socioeconomic levels. It is also interesting to find that the bottom-four countries showing the flattest school mean SES slope (i.e., Korea, Finland, Cyprus, and Slovenia) are countries with relatively lower degrees of socioeconomic school segregation. With respect to the effect of within-school family SES, which represents the relationship between individual students' family SES and their civic outcomes within schools, there is less consistency across countries.

As seen in Table 4-9, the effect of a school's socioeconomic composition on student citizenship self-efficacy is not significant in most countries except Sweden, Taiwan, Lithuania, Spain, Korea, Mexico, Colombia and Chile. Interestingly, the school mean SES slopes show negative signs in many countries, indicating that a school's average socioeconomic level is *negatively* associated with students' self-confidence in civic participation. For example, in Chile, students who attend a school with an average socioeconomic level one unit higher are expected to have 1.41 lower civic knowledge scores, irrespective of their own family socioeconomic

levels, compared to students who attend a school whose school mean SES is equal to the national mean school SES. In a similar vein, a schools' average socioeconomic level is also negatively correlated with students' school-based civic participation in many countries, including Spain, Chile, Slovenia, Denmark, Mexico, Latvia, Estonia, Korea and Lithuania (see Table 4-10). That is, schools with higher average socioeconomic levels tend to demonstrate *lower* levels of students' engagement in school-based civic activities in those countries. In regards to students' school-based civic participation, the socioeconomic composition effect is not significant in all other countries except Belgium (Flemish), New Zealand, and Czech Republic, where its effect is significant and positive. Again, there are less consistent patterns in the effect of within-school family SES for both the citizenship self-efficacy and school-based civic participation measures.

In syntheses, the results of the two-level HLM models show that a school's socioeconomic composition does not have a significant effect on students' citizenship self-efficacy and school-based civic participation in many countries. In a few countries, a school's socioeconomic composition is even negatively correlated with students' citizenship self-efficacy and school-based civic participation. These findings lend support to my previous assumption that between-school differences in educational resources—factors often cited as a cause of inequalities in student civic outcomes—may not explain much of the variation in students' citizenship self-efficacy and school-based civic participation. Although not directly tested in this chapter, students' citizenship self-efficacy and school-based civic participation may have more to do with within-school experiences, that is, how students interact with other peers as well as with the general social context of their schools. By contrast, a school's socioeconomic composition is found to have a significant and positive effect on students' civic knowledge in most countries with a few exceptions. This finding indicates that between-school differences in educational

resources, such as the instructional quality of civic courses and access to civic learning opportunities, might be systematically related to the distribution of students' civic knowledge by family socioeconomic levels.

Discussion and Conclusions

While the voluminous literature on the sociology of education has focused on how socioeconomic school segregation contributes to inequalities in student academic outcomes, we lack the necessary research to examine whether such findings are generalizable to other educational outcomes, including students' citizenship characteristics. It is only recently that a few US-based studies have extended research inquiry into the ramifications of school segregation on “the striking inequalities in political voice that currently characterize our democracy” (Kahne and Sporte 2008, 754), especially highlighting the unequal civic learning opportunities that exist between schools of varying socioeconomic composition. In this chapter, by turning to between-country differences in the degree of socioeconomic school segregation, I have examined whether and how socioeconomic school segregation influences civic disparities among students from different socioeconomic origins. Although eliciting a more complex answer than was originally expected, my empirical findings have revealed that countries' socioeconomic gaps in student civic outcomes are systematically linked with degrees of school segregation along socioeconomic lines. However, the extent and direction of the systematic linkage varies across the three civic outcome measures. As expected, in countries with higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation, students are more likely to be sorted into schools with similar schoolmates in terms of their family socioeconomic origins than their counterparts in countries with school systems that are more socioeconomically integrated. As a result, countries with

higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation show larger *civic knowledge* gaps by family socioeconomic levels than do countries with school systems that are more socioeconomically integrated. This finding is consistent with the commonsensical notion that “segregating low SES children in schools creates an inherently inequitable learning context” (Palardy 2013, 2). Low SES students who are segregated into low SES schools (i.e., schools serving predominantly students from low SES families) are doubly disadvantaged, not only because of their socioeconomic vulnerability but also because of the fact that they have limited access to enriched civic learning opportunities in their low SES schools. By contrast, the socioeconomic disparities in levels of *citizenship self-efficacy* and *school-based civic participation* are less substantial in countries with higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation than in countries with school systems that are more socioeconomically integrated. This weaker effect of family SES in countries with higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation implies that with respect to their self-confidence in participatory activities and engagement in school-based civic activities, low SES students in countries with higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation—those who are at greater risk of attending low SES schools—may receive a larger school boost than their similarly situated counterparts in countries with lower degrees of socioeconomic school segregation. It also suggests that as far as their citizenship self-efficacy and civic participation at school are concerned, high SES students in countries with lower degrees of socioeconomic school segregation benefit more from their socioeconomically diverse schools than their counterparts in countries with higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation. In summation, students’ citizenship self-efficacy and school-based civic participation are not necessarily better boosted in schools whose average SES of the student body is higher, which are, allegedly, characterized more and better-quality civic learning opportunities. How can I

reconcile such counterintuitive finding with the existing research literature articulating that schools with higher socioeconomic levels tend to be better overall, especially in terms of their educational outputs?

To answer this question, it is important to note that differences in student civic outcomes may be more aptly explained by variations in student experiences inside schools than by between-school variations in a context for civic instruction and learning. In particular, the development of students' self-confidence in civic participation and engagement in school-based civic activities might have more to do with the culture of students and school community (i.e., the ways that students interact with one another and the broader school context) than the organization and instructional dimensions of schooling. By comparison, the quality of classroom-based pedagogy and civic instructions is likely to matter more in regards to promoting students' civic knowledge than the ways that students interact with the broader school community. If this is the case, students' civic understanding—that of both more and less privileged students—may be better enhanced in high SES schools, because high SES schools tend to be endowed with more and better-quality civic curricular and instruction. By contrast, underprivileged students may feel more confident exercising their voices and setting agendas in schools when peers in close proximity are similar in terms of their socioeconomic origins. The homogeneous social makeup would make disparities and discrimination less visible within school settings, spurring students to feel efficacious and to engage actively in the democratic process. By the same token, high SES students attending socioeconomically mixed schools may receive more favorable treatment from teachers, or their non-cognitive characteristics (e.g., speech and style) may be more rewarded in extra-curricular organizations and democratic governance in schools than those of low SES schoolmates (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977;

DiMaggio 1982). However, their home advantages are likely to be attenuated by the presence of a sizeable number of similarly privileged schoolmates to a degree that they become less civically efficacious and less committed to school-based civic activities. Simply put, the presence of a large number of schoolmates from similar socioeconomic origins may function as a *leveling* factor for ameliorating socioeconomic disparities in students' self-confidence and engagement in participatory activities.

Of course, these ideas are hardly the final word, because this chapter has not aimed to identify particular mechanisms by which school-level conditions and students' actual schooling experiences shape their civic outcomes. Instead, it has focused on empirically assessing the degrees of between-school socioeconomic segregation across countries and their linkages with the distribution of student civic outcomes by family socioeconomic levels. Therefore, *why* socioeconomic school segregation matters with respect to its effect on shaping civic disparity along the socioeconomic spectrum is still left as an open question. From the compelling empirical evidence in this study, future research should be directed at unraveling the precise mechanism that might underlie the systematic linkage between the degree of socioeconomic school segregation and the strength of the socioeconomic gaps in student civic outcomes. In particular, causal assumptions can be determined when cross-sectional data such as ICCS 2009 are supplemented with longitudinal research. Such longitudinal design would enable investigation as to whether the socioeconomic composition of schools attended in early adolescence has an enduring effect on adult participation in civic life. Even better, an ethnographic investigation into the civic learning and teaching practices in different socioeconomic schools could illuminate the causal process that may underpin the effects of socioeconomic school segregation (see, for example, Ball 1981; Brantlinger 1991) Ideally, in-

depth qualitative research would help to overcome “the behavioral or technicist approach in which the vessel of the school is studied rather than its content” (Teddlie and Reynolds 2000, 341). For instance, considering that the contents of civic curricular and instruction are not ideologically neutral (see, among others, Apple 1978, 1993; Morrow and Torres 1995), future ethnographic studies should explore how working-class students’ civic understanding is suppressed in classroom settings by the class mismatches between their lived knowledge and official knowledge. In-depth studies that elucidate how purely ceremonial engagement in school governance and out-of-school civic activities force underprivileged students to fit into the existing political system might be fruitful for further investigation into the ways that they feel alienated and marginalized in high SES schools.

I conclude this chapter with two normative implications. First, the findings from this chapter provide suggestive evidence against the notion that high SES schools are *inherently* better in regards to their overall educational outcomes. School effectiveness research has come under fierce criticism for its political convenience “which pathologizes and renders invisible the lived experiences of those studying and teaching in poorer areas” (Thrupp 2001, 8). However, as alluded by my finding that underprivileged students may show higher levels of citizenship self-efficacy and engagement in school-based civic participation when they attend schools with similarly underprivileged peers, low SES schools are by no means ineffective or minimally effective, especially in regards to accomplishing their civic mission to educate future citizens. Rather, what makes those disadvantaged schools ineffective is status ideologies which attribute the disadvantages of low-status schools to supposed deficiencies in their cultural values, not to the deep-rooted discrimination and structural barriers in the existing system (Oakes and Wells 1998; Solórzano and Solórzano 1995). Holme (2002) presents a cogent account of how

privileged parents' school choices are mediated by such status ideologies that emphasize cultural explanations for success and failure. What is notable in her account is that White, upper-middle class parents do not choose schools based on their academic achievement, the quality of curriculum, instructions and teachers, but based on the perceived assumption on the race, ethnicity or socioeconomic status of the student body. As such, schools serving children from privileged families are not necessarily superior to those serving children from underprivileged families. If students attending low SES schools are at higher risk of underachievement, with achievement being defined in multiple terms including academic achievement, educational attainment and civic achievement, it might be much less attributable to the cultures, values and behaviors in those low SES schools than to the socially constructed disadvantages conferred upon schools serving underprivileged students.

Second, the findings of this chapter suggest that without contextualizing the lived experiences of students inside schools, any attempt to address civic disparities through schooling would be insufficient. Arguably, much of recent research on school-based civic education has taken a socially decontextualized approach which overemphasizes "the school solution" to equalize civic learning opportunity while ignoring structural questions on the underlying cause of inequalities. For example, many authors have attributed the source of civic disparity between students from more and less privileged families to between-school inequalities in key educational resources. Then, they have assumed that introducing more challenging civic curricula and better out-of-school civic activities to disadvantaged schools or granting access to high-quality schools to underprivileged families through market-based policies (i.e., school choice programs) could ameliorate existing civic disparities. In so doing, this line of research has uncritically reinforced a societal view that ineffective or minimally effective schools are the cause of much of the ills of

our society, not the symptom of the economic and political structures which schools are built upon. Such buck-passing arguments thus provide ideological support for the neoliberal agenda in education, which places the responsibility for improving education primarily with individual schools and avoids public concern for eradicating structural inequalities (Olmos, Torres, and Van Heertum 2011). However, as my empirical findings imply, increasing the effectiveness of schools or simply reversing segregation by providing unprivileged families with the same educational choices that their privileged counterparts have long had may not be enough to achieve true equality in our young citizens' political voice. If underprivileged students feel less civically efficacious and engaged in high-status schools due to their highly visible disadvantages and discrimination, it would be more appropriate to eradicate the underlying causes of those disadvantages and discrimination rather than to reform school structures and introduce new classroom pedagogical techniques. Although it is undeniable that school desegregation contributes to the advancement of students' understanding of community and citizenship (Jacobsen, Frankenberg, and Lenhoff 2012), desegregation efforts would be less fruitful if they are motivated by policy entrepreneurship without considering the pervasive inequalities in family and community resources and the ways that those inequalities shape students' experiences inside schools.

Table 4-1 Variable Definitions

| Variable | Coding |
|--|---|
| Civic knowledge | IRT plausible values with mean of 500 and standard deviation of 100 for equally weighted countries |
| Citizenship self-efficacy | IRT scores with mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10 for equally weighted countries |
| Civic participation at school | IRT scores with mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10 for equally weighted countries |
| Family socioeconomic status | Factor scores from a principal component analysis of three variables: (1) highest parental occupational level, (2) highest parental educational level, and (3) home literacy resources. The family SES factor scores have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 for each country. |
| Immigration background | 1 = students with immigration background; 1=native students |
| Language used at home | 1 = speak test language at home; 0 = otherwise |
| Family structure | 1 = single-parent families; 0 = otherwise |
| Gender | 1 = female; 0 = male |
| Media | A combined measure averaging the three items that asked students how frequent they use newspapers, television, and internet to inform themselves about national and international news 1 = never or hardly ever; 2 = monthly (at least once a month); 3 = weekly (at least once a week); 4 = daily or almost daily |
| Friend | A combined measure averaging the two items that asked students how often they are involved in talking with friends about political and social issues 1 = never or hardly ever; 2 = monthly (at least once a month); 3 = weekly (at least once a week); 4 = daily or almost daily |
| Dissimilarity index for school socioeconomic segregation | The proportion of students that would have to move to another school to achieve an equal distribution of students across schools in terms of the proportion of students from low and high SES families. |
| GDP per capita | The gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2009 (in 1,000 US Dollars) |
| Gini index | Raging from 0 to 1, high values indicate a higher level of economic inequality. |
| School differentiation | A dichotomous variable that separates countries with a high degree of school differentiation from those with a small degree. |

Table 4-2 Descriptive Statistics by Country^a

| | CYP | CZE | KOR | SVN | FIN | DNK | SWE | NOR | EST | NZL | ENG | BFL ^b | TWN | IRL |
|---|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Family SES | -.01 (1.00) | -.00 (1.00) | .03 (1.00) | .02 (1.01) | .00 (.99) | -.01 (1.02) | -.04 (1.03) | .03 (1.01) | .03 (1.00) | -.02 (1.02) | -.02 (.99) | -.01 (1.00) | .03 (1.01) | .01 (.99) |
| Immigrants (%) | 7.9 | 2.5 | 0.5 | 10.9 | 2.4 | 10.1 | 18.7 | 10.8 | 7.2 | 22.9 | 14.5 | 11.4 | 1.1 | 12.0 |
| Female (%) | 49.3 | 46.0 | 43.4 | 49.7 | 51.3 | 51.7 | 50.0 | 50.6 | 50.5 | 49.4 | 51.9 | 49.6 | 48.1 | 48.6 |
| Language minority (%) | 7.7 | 1.8 | 0.4 | 6.6 | 3.7 | 6.3 | 15.3 | 9.3 | 4.0 | 9.1 | 7.6 | 11.4 | 17.1 | 9.6 |
| Single-parent (%) | 18.9 | 16.7 | 46.5 | 15.4 | 15.4 | 11.5 | 12.2 | 11.1 | 23.9 | 19.4 | 17.8 | 11.7 | 17.1 | 15.5 |
| Media | 1.92 (.74) | 2.47 (.77) | 2.28 (.72) | 2.21 (.78) | 2.29 (.82) | 2.25 (.77) | 2.34 (.84) | 2.52 (.83) | 2.69 (.77) | 2.12 (.76) | 2.20 (.81) | 2.07 (.73) | 2.71 (.76) | 2.00 (.77) |
| Friends | 1.75 (.75) | 1.57 (.63) | 1.65 (.68) | 1.60 (.63) | 1.55 (.63) | 1.68 (.70) | 1.57 (.71) | 1.65 (.72) | 1.79 (.71) | 1.72 (.76) | 1.59 (.72) | 1.45 (.60) | 1.69 (.75) | 1.53 (.68) |
| Dissimilarity index for socioeconomic school segregation ^c | .24 | .27 | .29 | .29 | .30 | .31 | .31 | .32 | .34 | .35 | .35 | .36 | .37 | .37 |
| GDP Per capita (US \$) ^d | 24895 | 16934 | 20014 | 23379 | 46261 | 57051 | 49662 | 82840 | 15578 | 32086 | 45442 | 42609 | 29800 | 59324 |
| Gini index ^e | 29.0 | 31.0 | 31.0 | 28.4 | 26.8 | 24.8 | 23.0 | 25.0 | 31.3 | 36.2 | 34.0 | 28.0 | 34.2 | 33.9 |
| School differentiation ^f | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Country mean civic knowledge score ^g | 453 (93) | 510 (87) | 565 (81) | 516 (87) | 576 (84) | 576 (100) | 537 (99) | 515 (96) | 525 (92) | 517 (110) | 519 (105) | 514 (81) | 559 (94) | 534 (101) |
| Country mean citizenship self-efficacy score ^g | 51.41 (11.46) | 47.03 (9.43) | 55.04 (9.27) | 49.74 (10.31) | 45.84 (9.03) | 49.62 (9.60) | 49.04 (11.01) | 50.14 (10.40) | 52.67 (10.23) | 47.94 (11.26) | 50.07 (10.86) | 47.01 (8.66) | 48.17 (10.04) | 48.91 (10.89) |
| Country mean school civic participation score ^g | 51.92 (11.55) | 47.71 (9.58) | 45.49 (11.12) | 50.82 (9.88) | 48.30 (8.91) | 48.47 (9.91) | 50.43 (9.60) | 54.02 (9.75) | 53.07 (8.91) | 49.09 (10.33) | 50.21 (10.29) | 45.81 (10.63) | 49.88 (9.24) | 50.07 (9.36) |
| Student N (unweighted) | 2882 | 4564 | 5229 | 3014 | 3247 | 4273 | 3328 | 2778 | 2676 | 3761 | 2821 | 2949 | 5135 | 3224 |

Table 4-2 Descriptive Statistics by Country (continued)

| | GRC | CHE | ITA | LTU | COL | POL | LVA | AUT | MLT | MEX | ESP | THA | BGR | CHL |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|
| Family SES | .05 (1.00) | .03 (.99) | .02 (1.01) | .03 (1.01) | .05 (.98) | .02 (1.01) | .10 (.98) | .05 (1.01) | .07 (1.01) | .06 (.97) | .03 (1.01) | .09 (1.03) | .05 (.98) | .17 (1.05) |
| Immigrants (%) | 10.8 | 25.8 | 7.5 | 4.8 | 0.8 | 1.8 | 5.7 | 19.1 | 2.7 | 1.6 | 11.0 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.1 |
| Female (%) | 51.0 | 50.0 | 48.0 | 49.3 | 53.5 | 50.4 | 51.5 | 50.9 | 47.3 | 52.2 | 50.6 | 53.6 | 50.9 | 51.3 |
| Language minority (%) | 5.9 | 20.3 | 6.0 | 5.3 | 0.9 | 1.4 | 8.4 | 15.9 | 17.5 | 2.4 | 19.5 | 4.5 | 10.8 | 0.8 |
| Single-parent (%) | 18.4 | 17.4 | 17.8 | 20.2 | 36.6 | 13.4 | 26.2 | 16.1 | NA | 26.8 | NA | 26.0 | 17.1 | 25.9 |
| Media | 1.93 (.72) | 2.35 (.75) | 2.41 (.73) | 2.57 (.75) | 2.45 (.66) | 2.63 (.72) | 2.45 (.70) | 2.28 (.78) | 2.19 (.77) | 2.16 (.71) | 2.18 (.70) | 2.58 (.65) | 2.45 (.80) | 2.35 (.69) |
| Friends | 1.77 (.76) | 1.68 (.71) | 1.68 (.74) | 1.79 (.72) | 1.74 (.77) | 1.71 (.72) | 1.95 (.75) | 1.76 (.75) | 1.80 (.73) | 1.51 (.66) | 1.49 (.62) | 2.19 (.76) | 1.80 (.78) | 1.57 (.69) |
| Dissimilarity index for socioeconomic school segregation ^b | .37 | .37 | .38 | .38 | .38 | .39 | .39 | .40 | .41 | .41 | .45 | .47 | .49 | .53 |
| GDP Per capita (US \$) ^c | 27995 | 56207 | 35396 | 11356 | 4724 | 11072 | 11930 | 44879 | 18203 | 9715 | 32017 | 3844 | 5163 | 9878 |
| Gini index ^d | 33.0 | 33.7 | 32.0 | 35.5 | 56.0 | 34.2 | 35.2 | 26.0 | 26.0 | 51.7 | 32.0 | 53.6 | 45.3 | 52.1 |
| School differentiation ^e | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Country mean civic knowledge score ^f | 476 (98) | 531 (83) | 531 (88) | 505 (80) | 462 (81) | 536 (99) | 482 (82) | 503 (97) | 490 (95) | 452 (83) | 505 (86) | 452 (77) | 466 (105) | 483 (88) |
| Country mean citizenship self-efficacy score ^f | 51.92 (9.74) | 47.56 (9.00) | 51.13 (9.20) | 49.96 (8.37) | 52.67 (10.23) | 50.99 (9.39) | 49.05 (8.20) | 50.00 (9.51) | 46.55 (11.23) | 52.52 (10.33) | 49.29 (10.07) | 53.57 (7.78) | 50.33 (10.14) | 51.63 (10.44) |
| Country mean school participation score ^f | 55.05 (9.54) | 47.52 (9.54) | 47.22 (9.02) | 48.61 (9.30) | 53.07 (8.91) | 54.08 (8.74) | 49.08 (9.73) | 49.18 (9.31) | 46.57 (9.51) | 49.73 (9.81) | 52.28 (9.00) | 49.96 (9.50) | 47.66 (10.49) | 51.95 (8.69) |
| Student <i>N</i> (unweighted) | 3031 | 2865 | 3308 | 3857 | 5660 | 3217 | 2721 | 3321 | 2059 | 6056 | 3219 | 5173 | 3045 | 5054 |

Note: AUT = Austria, BGR = Bulgaria, BFL = the Flemish part of Belgium, CHE = Switzerland, CHL = Chile, COL = Colombia, CYP = Cyprus, CZE = Czech Republic, DNK = Denmark, ENG = England, ESP = Spain, EST = Estonia, FIN = Finland, GRC = Greece, IRL = Ireland, ITA = Italy, KOR = South Korea, LTU = Lithuania, LVA = Latvia, MEX = Mexico, MLT = Malta, NOR = Norway, NZL = New Zealand, POL = Poland, SVN = Slovenia, SWE = Sweden, THA = Thailand, TWN = Taiwan.

^a For categorical variables, percentages of students in each category are presented, while means and standard deviations are presented for continuous variables. Values in parentheses are standard deviations. Countries are arranged in descending order of the magnitude of the dissimilarity index for school socioeconomic segregation.

^b Data refer to the whole of Belgium.

^c The author's own calculation using the ICCS 2009 data (weighted means).

^d Data were taken from the ICCS 2009 International Report and originally from the Human Development Report 2009. The reference year is 2008.

^e Data were taken from the World Fact Book (2010) and retrieved on May 15th, 2013 from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2172.html>. The reference years are 1997-2005 in most countries.

^f School differentiation is a dichotomous variable that separates countries with a high degree of school differentiation (e.g., the number of different school types available among students in the grade that represents eight years of schooling counted from International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) level 1) from those with a small degree of school differentiation. The

information comes from the ICCS 2009 National Context Survey (2009), Buchanan and Dalton (2002), and Bol and van de Werfhorst (2013).

^gThe author's own calculation using the ICCS 2009 data.

Table 4-3 Results from Ordinal Logistic Regression of the Likelihood of Attending Higher SES Schools

| Coefficient | Chile | | Bulgaria | | Thailand | | Spain | | Austria | | Malta | | Mexico | | Latvia | | Colombia | |
|---------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | MI | M2 | MI | M2 | MI | M2 | MI | M2 | MI | M2 | MI | M2 | MI | M2 | MI | M2 | MI | M2 |
| Intercept | -7.84** (.19) | -7.95** (.37) | -7.57** (.26) | -5.78** (.30) | -6.44** (.17) | -6.04** (.22) | -5.76** (.23) | -6.07** (.24) | -5.68** (.23) | -5.16** (.31) | -5.18** (.26) | -6.66** (.29) | -5.85** (.15) | -4.30** (.24) | -4.86** (.30) | -5.10** (.37) | -5.72** (.15) | -5.71** (.30) |
| Category 1 | -6.18** (.17) | -6.29** (.36) | -6.01** (.24) | -4.15** (.29) | -5.04** (.16) | -4.63** (.21) | -4.26** (.20) | -4.56** (.21) | -4.32** (.22) | -3.80** (.30) | -3.73** (.25) | -5.12** (.28) | -4.46** (.14) | -2.90** (.23) | -3.47** (.29) | -3.71** (.35) | -4.36** (.15) | -4.35** (.31) |
| Category 2 | -4.42** (.16) | -4.52** (.36) | -4.47** (.23) | -2.59** (.28) | -3.47** (.15) | -3.05** (.21) | -2.81** (.19) | -3.10** (.21) | -2.93** (.21) | -2.41** (.29) | -2.53** (.24) | -3.80** (.27) | -3.10** (.13) | -1.53** (.23) | -2.18** (.29) | -2.42** (.35) | -2.98** (.14) | -2.96** (.30) |
| Category 3 | 1.51** (.09) | 1.53** (.09) | 1.27** (.15) | 1.08** (.16) | .85** (.07) | .84** (.07) | .80** (.10) | .81** (.10) | .69** (.14) | .60** (.14) | .66** (.12) | .58** (.12) | 1.09** (.07) | 1.07** (.07) | .58** (.21) | .57** (.21) | .89** (.06) | .90** (.06) |
| Parents' education | 2.88** (.10) | 2.90** (.10) | 2.27** (.16) | 2.10** (.16) | 1.97** (.08) | 1.98** (.08) | 1.48** (.09) | 1.49** (.09) | 1.58** (.15) | 1.52** (.15) | 1.00** (.11) | .91** (.11) | 1.72** (.07) | 1.71** (.07) | 1.58** (.21) | 1.58** (.21) | 1.49** (.07) | 1.51** (.07) |
| Parents' occupation | .57** (.07) | .56** (.07) | .98** (.10) | .89** (.10) | .61** (.09) | .62** (.09) | .58** (.09) | .54** (.10) | .72** (.10) | .70** (.10) | .52** (.12) | .50** (.12) | .69** (.07) | .66** (.07) | .59** (.10) | .60** (.10) | .74** (.07) | .75** (.07) |
| Immigrant | 1.42** (.09) | 1.43** (.09) | 1.83** (.10) | 1.69** (.11) | 1.33** (.07) | 1.30** (.07) | 1.23** (.10) | 1.19** (.11) | 1.29** (.10) | 1.25** (.10) | 1.23** (.13) | 1.14** (.13) | .99** (.07) | .96** (.07) | 1.23** (.12) | 1.24** (.12) | 1.18** (.07) | 1.18** (.07) |
| Language minority | 2.45** (.10) | 2.46** (.10) | 2.58** (.12) | 2.45** (.12) | 1.58** (.08) | 1.56** (.08) | 1.88** (.11) | 1.81** (.11) | 1.92** (.10) | 1.88** (.11) | 1.76** (.14) | 1.65** (.14) | 1.44** (.08) | 1.42** (.08) | 1.60** (.11) | 1.60** (.12) | 1.70** (.08) | 1.71** (.08) |
| Single-parent | .38 (.27) | .38 (.27) | -1.29** (.14) | -.67* (.34) | -1.29** (.14) | -.70* (.23) | -.70* (.23) | -.42* (.12) | -.42* (.12) | .10 (.14) | -.10 (.14) | -1.26* (.40) | -.40* (.20) | -.40* (.20) | -.24 (.16) | -.24 (.16) | .20 (.16) | .20 (.16) |
| Female | .14 (.33) | .14 (.33) | .04 (.10) | .04 (.10) | -.10 (.06) | -.10 (.06) | -.10 (.06) | NA | NA | NA | NA | 1.64** (.13) | 1.64** (.13) | 1.64** (.18) | 1.64** (.18) | 1.64** (.18) | 1.64** (.18) | 1.64** (.18) |
| | -.16* (.06) | -.16* (.06) | .22** (.06) | .22** (.06) | .25** (.05) | .25** (.05) | .25** (.05) | .05 (.07) | .05 (.07) | .14* (.07) | .14* (.07) | -.54** (.09) | -.54** (.09) | -.54** (.09) | -.54** (.09) | -.54** (.09) | -.16** (.05) | -.16** (.05) |
| | .21** (.05) | .21** (.05) | .41** (.07) | .41** (.07) | .25** (.05) | .25** (.05) | .25** (.05) | .05 (.07) | .05 (.07) | .14* (.07) | .14* (.07) | -.54** (.09) | -.54** (.09) | -.54** (.09) | -.54** (.09) | -.54** (.09) | -.16** (.05) | -.16** (.05) |

Table 4-3 Results from Ordinal Logistic Regression of the Likelihood of Attending Higher SES Schools (continued)

| Coefficient | Poland | | Italy | | Lithuania | | Taiwan | | Greece | | Ireland | | Switzerland | | Belgium (Flemish) | | New Zealand | |
|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 |
| Intercept | -4.95*** (.51) | -4.82*** (.60) | -5.08*** (.19) | -5.04*** (.29) | -4.49*** (.22) | -3.88*** (.26) | -5.00*** (.20) | -3.94*** (.22) | -4.73*** (.26) | -4.73*** (.34) | -4.79*** (.23) | -5.33*** (.28) | -4.91*** (.22) | -4.68*** (.26) | -6.51*** (.32) | -6.21*** (.37) | -5.29*** (.23) | -5.03*** (.27) |
| Category 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Category 2 | -3.59*** (.50) | -3.46*** (.59) | -3.76*** (.18) | -3.72*** (.28) | -3.17*** (.21) | -2.56*** (.25) | -3.69*** (.19) | -2.59*** (.22) | -3.36*** (.21) | -3.35*** (.30) | -3.47*** (.23) | -3.99*** (.27) | -3.61*** (.21) | -3.37*** (.25) | -5.13*** (.29) | -3.81*** (.35) | -4.06*** (.23) | -3.79*** (.26) |
| Category 3 | -2.30*** (.50) | -2.16*** (.59) | -2.43*** (.18) | -2.38*** (.28) | -1.77*** (.21) | -1.16*** (.26) | -2.32*** (.19) | -1.19*** (.22) | -2.06*** (.21) | -2.06*** (.29) | -2.21*** (.22) | -2.72*** (.27) | -2.31*** (.20) | -2.07*** (.24) | -3.84*** (.30) | -3.50*** (.35) | -2.83*** (.22) | -2.55*** (.26) |
| Parents' education | .54 (.48) | .58 (.48) | .69*** (.08) | .70*** (.08) | .46*** (.13) | .45*** (.13) | .54*** (.09) | .44*** (.10) | .68*** (.13) | .66*** (.13) | .53*** (.13) | .56*** (.13) | .60*** (.11) | .60*** (.11) | 1.24*** (.23) | 1.02*** (.23) | .65*** (.14) | .64*** (.14) |
| College | 1.73*** (.48) | 1.79*** (.48) | 1.44*** (.10) | 1.45*** (.10) | 1.40*** (.14) | 1.37*** (.14) | 1.48*** (.10) | 1.32*** (.11) | 1.40*** (.14) | 1.38*** (.14) | 1.23*** (.13) | 1.27*** (.13) | 1.24*** (.12) | 1.26*** (.12) | 1.58*** (.22) | 1.35*** (.23) | 1.21*** (.13) | 1.18*** (.13) |
| Parents' occupation | .61*** (.10) | .61*** (.10) | .53*** (.09) | .52*** (.09) | .44*** (.09) | .44*** (.09) | .37*** (.07) | .33*** (.08) | .55*** (.10) | .61*** (.10) | .69*** (.09) | .67*** (.09) | .53*** (.10) | .53*** (.10) | 1.19*** (.10) | 1.14*** (.10) | .82*** (.09) | .82*** (.09) |
| 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | 1.03*** (.10) | 1.02*** (.10) | .96*** (.09) | .94*** (.10) | 1.08*** (.09) | 1.06*** (.09) | 1.14*** (.12) | 1.03*** (.12) | 1.02*** (.10) | 1.08*** (.10) | 1.16*** (.10) | 1.12*** (.10) | 1.12*** (.11) | 1.12*** (.12) | 1.57*** (.11) | 1.49*** (.11) | 1.38*** (.10) | 1.37*** (.10) |
| 3 | 1.31*** (.11) | 1.30*** (.11) | 1.55*** (.11) | 1.52*** (.12) | 1.48*** (.10) | 1.48*** (.10) | 1.60*** (.09) | 1.51*** (.10) | 1.48*** (.12) | 1.55*** (.12) | 1.52*** (.10) | 1.51*** (.10) | 1.62*** (.12) | 1.61*** (.12) | 2.16*** (.11) | 2.07*** (.11) | 1.85*** (.10) | 1.83*** (.10) |
| Immigrant | .23 (.29) | .23 (.29) | -1.11 (.20) | -1.11 (.20) | .35* (.15) | .35* (.15) | -.47 (.37) | -.47 (.37) | .28* (.15) | .28* (.15) | .78*** (.13) | .78*** (.13) | .12 (.11) | .12 (.11) | -.79*** (.16) | -.79*** (.16) | .30* (.09) | .30* (.09) |
| Language minority | .01 (.28) | .01 (.28) | -.02 (.21) | -.02 (.21) | -.55*** (.14) | -.55*** (.14) | -1.00*** (.09) | -1.00*** (.09) | -.10 (.19) | -.10 (.19) | .57*** (.14) | .57*** (.14) | .16 (.11) | .16 (.11) | -.04 (.15) | -.04 (.15) | -.23* (.13) | -.23* (.13) |
| Single-parent | .19* (.10) | .19* (.10) | -.03 (.09) | -.03 (.09) | -.01 (.08) | -.01 (.08) | -.00 (.09) | -.00 (.09) | .04 (.09) | .04 (.09) | -.20* (.10) | -.20* (.10) | -.10 (.10) | -.10 (.10) | -.40*** (.11) | -.40*** (.11) | -.16* (.08) | -.16* (.08) |
| Female | .27*** (.07) | .27*** (.07) | .02 (.07) | .02 (.07) | .08 (.06) | .08 (.06) | -.13* (.06) | -.13* (.06) | -.02 (.07) | -.02 (.07) | .22** (.07) | .22** (.07) | .19** (.07) | .19** (.07) | .01 (.07) | .01 (.07) | -.01 (.07) | -.01 (.07) |

Table 4-3 Results from Ordinal Logistic Regression of the Likelihood of Attending Higher SES Schools (continued)

| | England | | Estonia | | Norway | | Denmark | | Sweden | | Finland | | Korea | | Slovenia | | Czech Republic | | Cyprus | |
|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 |
| Intercept | -4.97*** (.29) | -4.78*** (.33) | -4.20*** (.29) | -3.81*** (.38) | -3.93*** (.30) | -3.80*** (.37) | -3.86*** (.24) | -3.70*** (.29) | -4.73*** (.26) | -3.89*** (.32) | -4.08*** (.23) | -4.76*** (.33) | -3.94*** (.22) | -4.16*** (.33) | -3.00*** (.27) | -3.23*** (.33) | -3.68*** (.33) | -4.04*** (.40) | -3.87*** (.21) | -4.04*** (.26) |
| Category 1 | -3.77*** (.26) | -3.56*** (.33) | -3.05*** (.27) | -2.66*** (.35) | -2.73*** (.29) | -2.60*** (.36) | -2.64*** (.23) | -2.47*** (.28) | -3.50*** (.25) | -2.63*** (.30) | -2.85*** (.23) | -3.33*** (.32) | -2.77*** (.21) | -2.99*** (.32) | -1.83*** (.26) | -2.05*** (.32) | -2.48*** (.32) | -2.84*** (.40) | -2.67*** (.20) | -2.70*** (.26) |
| Category 2 | -2.58*** (.26) | -2.36*** (.33) | -1.79*** (.26) | -1.40*** (.35) | -1.54*** (.29) | -1.42*** (.37) | -1.45*** (.21) | -1.28*** (.28) | -2.28*** (.25) | -1.40*** (.31) | -1.64*** (.23) | -2.32*** (.32) | -1.59*** (.21) | -1.81*** (.32) | -.69*** (.26) | -.91*** (.33) | -1.29*** (.33) | -1.65*** (.40) | -1.54*** (.21) | -1.56*** (.25) |
| Category 3 | .84*** (.18) | .73*** (.18) | .05 (.18) | .02 (.18) | .13 (.23) | .10 (.23) | .39* (.16) | .26* (.16) | .77*** (.17) | .53*** (.17) | .56*** (.15) | .58*** (.15) | .71*** (.16) | .70*** (.17) | -.27 (.20) | -.23 (.20) | .32 (.30) | .43 (.31) | .79*** (.12) | .78*** (.12) |
| Parents' education | 1.33*** (.18) | 1.23*** (.18) | .85*** (.18) | .84*** (.18) | .84*** (.22) | .81*** (.22) | .99*** (.15) | .84*** (.15) | 1.17*** (.16) | .97*** (.17) | 1.03*** (.15) | 1.05*** (.15) | 1.51*** (.17) | 1.49*** (.17) | .51*** (.20) | .57*** (.20) | .91*** (.31) | 1.01*** (.31) | 1.43*** (.12) | 1.39*** (.12) |
| Parents' occupation | 1 | .57*** (.11) | .66*** (.10) | .65*** (.10) | .54*** (.11) | .52*** (.11) | .42*** (.09) | .37*** (.09) | .61*** (.09) | .53*** (.09) | .45*** (.09) | .46*** (.09) | .36*** (.07) | .37*** (.07) | .47*** (.10) | .47*** (.10) | .13* (.08) | .13* (.08) | .46*** (.10) | .48*** (.10) |
| | 2 | 1.10*** (.11) | 1.08*** (.11) | 1.20*** (.11) | 1.07*** (.11) | 1.04*** (.09) | .85*** (.09) | .78*** (.09) | 1.15*** (.10) | 1.02*** (.10) | .86*** (.10) | .86*** (.10) | .78*** (.08) | .79*** (.08) | .83*** (.10) | .84*** (.10) | .84*** (.08) | .85*** (.08) | .59*** (.10) | .65*** (.10) |
| | 3 | 1.66*** (.12) | 1.62*** (.12) | 1.58*** (.12) | 1.56*** (.12) | 1.59*** (.11) | 1.45*** (.09) | 1.38*** (.09) | 1.59*** (.10) | .49*** (.11) | 1.37*** (.11) | 1.38*** (.11) | 1.08*** (.08) | 1.08*** (.08) | 1.07*** (.12) | 1.08*** (.12) | 1.30*** (.08) | 1.31*** (.08) | .91*** (.11) | .97*** (.11) |
| Immigrant | | -.25* (.14) | | -.05 (.15) | | -.18 (.19) | | -.68*** (.15) | | -.32 (.15) | | -.37 (.29) | | .17 (.46) | | .10 (.14) | | .33 (.22) | | .76*** (.15) |
| Language minority | | -.24 (.18) | | -.24 (.19) | | -.06 (.20) | | .02 (.20) | | -.48** (.16) | | .73** (.23) | | .16 (.49) | | .22 (.18) | | .27 (.25) | | .06 (.16) |
| Single-parent | | -.55*** (.10) | | .02 (.09) | | .07 (.11) | | -.17* (.10) | | -.20* (.10) | | .13 (.09) | | .09 (.07) | | -.00 (.10) | | .07 (.08) | | .10 (.09) |
| Female | | -.10 (.08) | | .20*** (.08) | | -.02 (.07) | | -.04 (.06) | | .09 (.17) | | .09 (.07) | | -.26*** (.05) | | .06 (.07) | | -.00 (.06) | | .07 (.07) |

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Category 1=the lowest SES school, Category 2=low SES school, Category 3=high SES school, Category 4=the highest SES school

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ ^ $p < .10$

Table 4-4 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Civic Knowledge Scores on Family Socioeconomic Status, Other Family Background Characteristics, and Political Socialization Agents

| | Bulgaria | England | Ireland | New Zealand | Poland | Sweden | Chile | Norway | Denmark |
|-------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Family SES | 41.99*** (1.93) | 40.95*** (2.19) | 39.31*** (1.79) | 37.41*** (1.66) | 35.33*** (1.76) | 35.07*** (1.72) | 32.92*** (1.25) | 32.39*** (1.96) | 31.48*** (1.53) |
| Female | 27.71*** (3.18) | 21.55*** (3.62) | 18.15*** (3.21) | 27.41*** (3.29) | 33.98*** (3.30) | 21.72*** (3.54) | 13.98*** (2.32) | 23.53*** (3.37) | 11.92*** (2.74) |
| Immigrant | -44.21** (16.44) | -1.29 (6.26) | -34.28*** (6.54) | -8.31* (4.81) | 12.35 (18.71) | -17.29* (7.79) | -10.82 (15.02) | -22.04** (9.62) | -61.79*** (7.45) |
| Language minority | -50.64*** (5.58) | -29.13** (8.47) | -23.72*** (6.91) | -47.39*** (7.97) | -35.72** (14.92) | -23.55** (8.47) | -48.54** (14.00) | -13.03* (9.80) | 16.06* (8.52) |
| Single parents | -.22 (4.66) | -10.63* (4.85) | -10.12** (4.65) | -9.74* (4.40) | -7.98* (5.11) | 8.42 (5.53) | -3.52 (3.24) | -1.13 (6.09) | -4.65 (5.16) |
| Media | 14.63*** (2.35) | 15.37*** (2.47) | 8.52*** (2.29) | 14.93*** (2.66) | 18.54*** (2.63) | 11.74*** (2.20) | 19.24*** (1.78) | 18.11*** (2.24) | 19.64*** (2.25) |
| Friends | -6.07** (2.29) | .56 (3.13) | -5.81* (2.64) | -2.82 (2.55) | .21 (2.45) | 12.06*** (2.75) | -2.02 (1.82) | 1.79 (3.16) | 20.56*** (2.29) |
| Constant | 390.10*** (8.64) | 452.03*** (10.48) | 504.78*** (8.70) | 441.37*** (8.98) | 436.96*** (16.36) | 463.66*** (10.03) | 389.31*** (14.04) | 449.62*** (12.43) | 515.13*** (9.70) |
| R ² | .276 | .209 | .194 | .180 | .179 | .211 | .199 | .190 | .236 |

Table 4-4 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Civic Knowledge Scores on Family Socioeconomic Status, Other Family Background Characteristics, and Political Socialization Agents (continued)

| | Italy | Spain | Taiwan | Estonia | Czech Republic | Austria | Malta | Lithuania | Switzerland |
|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Family SES | 31.26*** (1.58) | 29.79*** (1.45) | 29.51*** (1.29) | 29.09*** (1.68) | 28.48*** (1.31) | 28.11*** (1.65) | 27.39*** (2.25) | 27.03*** (1.30) | 26.54*** (1.73) |
| Female | 17.64*** (2.88) | 19.82*** (3.32) | 24.89*** (2.38) | 31.39*** (3.30) | 20.05*** (2.42) | 18.47*** (3.25) | 40.44*** (3.99) | 30.24*** (2.49) | 12.47*** (3.16) |
| Immigrant | -11.93 (9.24) | -29.97*** (4.74) | -23.22* (14.56) | -38.55*** (6.98) | 2.31 (10.59) | -11.81* (6.92) | -46.55*** (14.54) | -16.52* (9.25) | -17.48*** (4.46) |
| Language minority | -28.75** (9.96) | -17.00*** (4.23) | -22.77*** (3.38) | -33.92*** (10.73) | -18.86 (11.75) | -43.95*** (7.46) | .74 (5.46) | -18.42** (6.18) | -26.19*** (4.91) |
| Single parents | -9.68* (4.20) | NA | -6.59* (3.32) | 3.16 (4.35) | 2.52 (3.42) | -4.88 (4.39) | NA | -5.87 (3.47) | .19 (4.90) |
| Media | 8.17*** (2.13) | 13.76*** (2.15) | 24.17*** (1.85) | 10.56*** (2.27) | 20.11*** (1.70) | 17.89*** (2.32) | 18.53*** (2.82) | 15.25*** (2.02) | 13.85*** (2.39) |
| Friends | 2.17 (2.07) | .14 (2.58) | -4.87** (1.88) | 11.41*** (2.42) | -2.19 (2.09) | 2.68 (2.42) | .22 (2.87) | -3.05 (2.01) | 7.57*** (2.56) |
| Constant | 476.01*** (10.94) | 456.54*** (6.33) | 472.49*** (5.62) | 431.33*** (12.53) | 436.83*** (12.61) | 416.05*** (9.37) | 435.23*** (9.12) | 441.12*** (7.72) | 463.67*** (6.85) |
| R ² | .182 | .194 | .200 | .187 | .157 | .192 | .166 | .201 | .208 |

Table 4-4 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Civic Knowledge Scores on Family Socioeconomic Status, Other Family Background Characteristics, and Political Socialization Agents (continued)

| | Greece | Cyprus | Belgium (Flemish) | Finland | Slovenia | Mexico | Colombia | Latvia | Korea | Thailand |
|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|
| Family SES | 26.29*** (1.84) | 26.11*** (1.62) | 25.42*** (1.52) | 24.44*** (1.47) | 23.10*** (1.64) | 22.72*** (1.02) | 21.85*** (1.16) | 21.78*** (1.70) | 20.66*** (1.35) | 19.23*** (1.08) |
| Female | 32.40*** (3.51) | 41.56*** (3.29) | 6.87* (2.96) | 28.14*** (2.96) | 33.14*** (3.06) | 26.43*** (1.99) | 7.71*** (2.43) | 29.10*** (3.22) | 26.86*** (2.33) | 45.27*** (2.11) |
| Immigrant | -18.95** (7.10) | -3.55 (9.10) | 3.70 (5.86) | -30.53** (11.78) | -13.00** (5.91) | -41.16*** (8.24) | -49.13** (16.84) | -4.49 (7.17) | -67.12* (26.65) | -2.60 (12.60) |
| Language minority | -39.70*** (9.18) | -35.19*** (7.57) | -50.53*** (5.86) | -38.50*** (9.36) | -21.89** (7.70) | -31.82*** (6.49) | -15.75 (10.56) | -40.55*** (5.24) | -45.38* (19.85) | -14.45** (5.22) |
| Single parents | 3.77 (5.12) | -15.56** (4.65) | -6.99 [^] (4.60) | 4.79 (4.43) | -4.27 (4.36) | -8.59*** (2.67) | -6.06** (2.49) | 4.21 (3.88) | -4.93 [^] (2.25) | 3.04 (2.61) |
| Media | 3.92 (2.73) | 11.79*** (2.69) | 13.90*** (2.54) | 8.91*** (2.03) | 19.01*** (2.49) | 8.19*** (1.59) | 2.64 (1.75) | 7.06** (2.93) | 27.25*** (1.86) | 22.66*** (1.84) |
| Friends | 8.17*** (2.42) | .06 (2.53) | 7.05*** (3.18) | 14.33*** (2.56) | 4.91 [^] (2.55) | -12.27*** (1.72) | -7.53*** (1.51) | 1.77 (2.52) | -2.96 (2.01) | -6.83*** (1.44) |
| Constant | 404.00*** (10.72) | 385.00*** (9.45) | 427.75*** (7.91) | 483.29*** (10.38) | 431.92*** (9.67) | 415.80*** (7.57) | 458.65*** (11.34) | 408.90*** (8.16) | 453.96*** (20.15) | 371.04*** (6.42) |
| R ² | .134 | .154 | .173 | .165 | .152 | .138 | .088 | .142 | .175 | .205 |

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ [^] $p < .10$

Table 4-5 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores on Family Socioeconomic Status, Other Family Background Characteristics, and Political Socialization Agents

| | Norway | England | Sweden | Ireland | Denmark | Greece | Italy | New Zealand | Finland |
|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Family SES | 1.91*** (.19) | 1.52*** (.19) | 1.47*** (.19) | 1.45*** (.18) | 1.43*** (.14) | 1.35*** (.17) | 1.18*** (.15) | 1.17*** (.17) | 1.17*** (.15) |
| Female | 1.02** (.37) | 1.42*** (.38) | 1.95*** (.35) | 1.45*** (.36) | 2.11*** (.27) | 1.05** (.34) | 1.09*** (.30) | 1.75*** (.34) | 1.91*** (.29) |
| Immigrant | 2.56** (1.02) | 1.52* (.66) | .52 (.92) | .53 (.67) | -.72 (.64) | .80 (.68) | -.59 (.87) | 1.03* (.46) | .46 (1.21) |
| Language minority | -.34 (1.05) | .60 (.87) | 2.11* (.99) | -1.99** (.74) | .08 (.83) | -1.64* (.90) | -1.04 (.97) | -2.93*** (.68) | 1.91** (.95) |
| Single parents | 1.36* (.59) | -.07 (.51) | -.28 (.59) | -.24 (.51) | -.15 (.43) | -1.05* (.45) | .21 (.39) | -.56 (.45) | -.50 (.41) |
| Media | 2.65*** (.25) | 3.26*** (.26) | 2.83*** (.24) | 3.83*** (.25) | 2.87*** (.20) | 2.56*** (.25) | 2.90*** (.22) | 3.90*** (.25) | 2.14*** (.20) |
| Friends | 2.95*** (.29) | 2.38*** (.29) | 2.96*** (.29) | 1.77** (.29) | 2.69*** (.22) | 1.86*** (.24) | 2.40*** (.21) | 2.70*** (.25) | 3.04*** (.26) |
| Constant | 37.36*** (1.22) | 38.69*** (1.09) | 38.68*** (1.15) | 35.99*** (.94) | 37.64*** (.95) | 41.70*** (1.08) | 38.61*** (1.11) | 31.41*** (.88) | 37.17*** (1.09) |
| R ² | .169 | .153 | .156 | .136 | .181 | .105 | .149 | .174 | .155 |

Table 4-5 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores on Family Socioeconomic Status, Other Family Background Characteristics, and Political Socialization Agents (continued)

| | Slovenia | Poland | Korea | Austria | Cyprus | Malta | Latvia | Spain | Czech Republic |
|-------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Family SES | 1.07*** (.18) | 1.06*** (.16) | 1.00*** (.13) | .92*** (.16) | .90** (.21) | .79** (.25) | .77*** (.15) | .71*** (.17) | .69*** (.13) |
| Female | 1.95*** (.36) | 2.15*** (.31) | 1.52** (.25) | .66* (.33) | 2.01*** (.42) | -.63 (.47) | 1.42*** (.30) | 1.43*** (.34) | 2.06*** (.27) |
| Immigrant | 1.44* (.70) | -.59 (1.51) | -4.80** (1.71) | .11 (.63) | .84 (.91) | 1.72 (1.57) | .66 (.69) | -1.14* (.57) | -.73 (1.00) |
| Language minority | -1.02 (.92) | .67 (1.34) | -5.17* (2.03) | -.32 (.68) | -2.61** (.91) | .97 (.67) | .64 (.52) | .85* (.45) | .50 (1.21) |
| Single parents | -.58 (.52) | .06 (.47) | -.38 (.25) | -.69 (.42) | -.62 (.55) | NA | -.34 (.35) | NA | .44 (.36) |
| Media | 2.10*** (.25) | 2.87*** (.23) | 2.05*** (.20) | 2.46*** (.22) | 2.75*** (.31) | 3.79*** (.33) | 2.48*** (.23) | 2.67*** (.26) | 2.45*** (.18) |
| Friends | 2.54*** (.31) | 1.63*** (.23) | .83*** (.20) | 2.53*** (.23) | 1.92*** (.31) | 2.19*** (.34) | 1.84*** (.21) | 2.79*** (.29) | 2.65*** (.23) |
| Constant | 39.06*** (1.14) | 40.25*** (1.45) | 43.42*** (2.08) | 39.37*** (.88) | 39.40*** (1.11) | 35.47*** (1.04) | 39.34*** (.77) | 39.43*** (.74) | 36.32*** (1.28) |
| R ² | .082 | .111 | .065 | .131 | .080 | .122 | .119 | .099 | .111 |

Table 4-5 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores on Family Socioeconomic Status, Other Family Background Characteristics, and Political Socialization Agents (continued)

| | Estonia | Bulgaria | Taiwan | Lithuania | Belgium (Flemish) | Colombia | Chile | Mexico | Switzerland | Thailand |
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Family SES | .63*** (.15) | .41* (.19) | .33* (.14) | .33* (.13) | .19 (.16) | .16 (.13) | .19 (.14) | .14 (.13) | .02 (.17) | -.54*** (.11) |
| Female | 2.25*** (.30) | 1.74* (.35) | -1.03*** (.27) | 1.92*** (.26) | 1.39*** (.31) | .02 (.27) | 1.44*** (.28) | -.26 (.26) | .91** (.32) | -2.18*** (.21) |
| Immigrant | .80 (.66) | 2.31 (1.89) | -1.75 (1.44) | .20 (1.05) | 1.98** (.63) | -.72 (1.70) | -.13 (1.48) | -.80 (.99) | .63 (.48) | -.31 (.98) |
| Language minority | 1.17 (.82) | -.48 (.62) | .65* (.37) | .84 (.66) | .97 (.62) | -1.23 (1.39) | 1.23 (1.60) | -.23 (.80) | -.06 (.52) | .58 (.51) |
| Single parents | .45 (.36) | -.80* (.48) | -.93* (.37) | -.42 (.34) | -.46 (.49) | -.59 (.36) | -.01 (.33) | -.25 (.34) | -.05 (.43) | -.10 (.27) |
| Media | 1.75*** (.21) | 2.51*** (.25) | 1.62*** (.19) | 1.84*** (.19) | 2.12*** (.22) | 2.37*** (.22) | 2.93*** (.22) | 1.81*** (.19) | 2.36*** (.24) | .92*** (.18) |
| Friends | 1.89*** (.23) | 1.61*** (.25) | 2.28*** (.20) | 1.82*** (.19) | 2.03*** (.28) | 2.34*** (.18) | 2.31*** (.21) | 1.90*** (.20) | 2.43*** (.25) | 1.20*** (.16) |
| Constant | 39.91*** (.99) | 40.93*** (.88) | 41.15*** (.62) | 41.96*** (.81) | 39.77*** (.82) | 41.77*** (1.49) | 39.18*** (1.69) | 45.69*** (.93) | 37.17*** (.79) | 50.32*** (.66) |
| R ² | .099 | .081 | .067 | .091 | .086 | .071 | .086 | .038 | .106 | .042 |

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ ^ $p < .10$

Table 4-6 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' School Civic Participation Scores on Family Socioeconomic Status, Other Family Background Characteristics, and Political Socialization Agents

| | England | New Zealand | Cyprus | Korea | Belgium (Flemish) | Sweden | Czech Republic | Norway | Slovenia |
|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Family SES | 2.25*** (.19) | 2.14*** (.16) | 2.05*** (.20) | 1.84*** (.15) | 1.71*** (.20) | 1.62*** (.17) | 1.44*** (.13) | 1.40*** (.18) | 1.39*** (.17) |
| Female | 3.14*** (.35) | 3.53*** (.31) | 3.86*** (.41) | 2.17*** (.29) | 2.70*** (.38) | 2.05*** (.31) | 3.69*** (.27) | 2.77*** (.34) | 3.71*** (.34) |
| Immigrant | .54 (.61) | -.24 (.44) | -1.59 (.88) | -3.82 (2.57) | .37 (.78) | .43 (.77) | -2.40* (1.01) | -1.66* (.86) | -.37 (.68) |
| Language minority | -.45 (.80) | -2.03*** (.64) | -1.80* (.88) | -4.33* (2.33) | .31 (.76) | -.25 (.83) | .17 (1.18) | .72 (.94) | .85 (.84) |
| Single parents | -1.43** (.47) | -1.34** (.39) | -1.20* (.58) | -.66* (.33) | -.57 (.60) | -.01 (.52) | .05 (.36) | -.29 (.55) | -.12 (.52) |
| Media | 2.79*** (.24) | 2.45*** (.23) | 2.51*** (.30) | 2.87*** (.23) | 1.80*** (.27) | 2.08*** (.21) | 2.00*** (.18) | 3.20*** (.23) | 2.16*** (.24) |
| Friends | 2.15*** (.27) | 2.16*** (.23) | 2.37*** (.30) | 2.95*** (.23) | 2.74*** (.34) | 2.54*** (.27) | 2.24*** (.23) | 1.87*** (.27) | 2.44*** (.29) |
| Constant | 38.80*** (1.00) | 36.90*** (.81) | 39.85*** (1.09) | 29.17*** (2.39) | 37.20*** (1.00) | 40.90*** (.98) | 37.80*** (1.27) | 42.61*** (1.10) | 41.17*** (1.04) |
| R ² | .185 | .175 | .134 | .150 | .092 | .147 | .124 | .173 | .117 |

Table 4-6 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' School Civic Participation Scores on Family Socioeconomic Status, Other Family Background Characteristics, and Political Socialization Agents (continued)

| | Ireland | Finland | Poland | Malta | Denmark | Taiwan | Colombia | Greece | Austria |
|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| Family SES | 1.34** (.16) | 1.20*** (.15) | 1.17*** (.14) | 1.16*** (.21) | .97** (.15) | .96*** (.13) | .87*** (.11) | .84*** (.17) | .82*** (.16) |
| Female | 3.67*** (.31) | 2.54*** (.30) | 4.33*** (.28) | 1.32** (.41) | 1.65*** (.29) | 2.65*** (.24) | 1.37*** (.23) | 1.78*** (.34) | 1.47** (.34) |
| Immigrant | .16 (.57) | -1.07 (1.22) | -.76 (1.17) | -.53 (1.26) | -1.17 (.69) | .02 (1.49) | .62 (1.76) | .13 (.68) | -.10 (.64) |
| Language minority | -1.67** (.65) | 2.02* (.96) | -.07 (1.20) | 2.31*** (.57) | -.91* (.88) | -.50 (.33) | -.24 (1.20) | -1.59 (.90) | -.84 (.66) |
| Single parents | .32 (.45) | -.71* (.41) | -.56 (.43) | NA | -.50 (.45) | -.59 (.36) | -.30 (.27) | -.81 (.44) | -1.17** (.43) |
| Media | 1.85*** (.21) | 1.33*** (.20) | 2.56*** (.21) | 1.89*** (.28) | 1.69*** (.21) | 1.66*** (.17) | 2.09** (.18) | 2.24*** (.25) | 2.04*** (.22) |
| Friends | 2.06*** (.24) | 2.62*** (.26) | 1.73*** (.21) | 2.08*** (.29) | 2.83*** (.23) | 2.20*** (.18) | 2.03*** (.16) | 1.23*** (.24) | 1.91*** (.23) |
| Constant | 40.01*** (.80) | 42.04*** (1.10) | 42.25*** (1.30) | 40.19*** (.88) | 38.39*** (1.01) | 40.08*** (.56) | 43.73*** (1.28) | 46.41*** (1.08) | 39.92** (.87) |
| R ² | .130 | .114 | .166 | .094 | .109 | .114 | .090 | .069 | .094 |

Table 4-6 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' School Civic Participation Scores on Family Socioeconomic Status, Other Family Background Characteristics, and Political Socialization Agents (continued)

| | Bulgaria | Switzerland | Latvia | Spain | Italy | Chile | Lithuania | Estonia | Mexico | Thailand |
|-------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Family SES | .80** (.20) | .78** (.18) | .76** (.18) | .66** (.15) | .61** (.16) | .54** (.12) | .48** (.14) | .26 (.17) | -.02 (.12) | -.04 (.13) |
| Female | 2.82** (.36) | 2.55** (.35) | 4.66** (.35) | 1.86** (.30) | 1.08** (.31) | 2.22** (.23) | 4.47** (.29) | 4.22** (.33) | 1.82** (.25) | 1.28** (.26) |
| Immigrant | 4.21** (1.53) | .73 (.51) | -2.21** (.84) | -1.54** (.50) | -.23 (.90) | -1.89 (1.28) | -.95 (1.13) | .30 (.69) | -.76 (.93) | 2.03 (1.29) |
| Language minority | -.53 (.63) | -.41 (.56) | -.88 (.61) | .21 (.40) | -.66 (1.01) | -.55 (1.36) | .98 (.73) | .43 (.91) | 1.32 (.74) | .23 (.61) |
| Single parents | -.84* (.49) | -.29 (.47) | -.24 (.41) | NA | -1.37** (.41) | -.35 (.27) | -1.32** (.36) | -1.13** (.40) | -.79** (.28) | -.09 (.33) |
| Media | 2.74** (.25) | .51* (.26) | 1.94** (.27) | 2.51** (.23) | 1.48** (.23) | 2.34** (.18) | 1.66** (.20) | 1.46** (.23) | 2.16** (.18) | 1.47** (.22) |
| Friends | 1.39** (.26) | 2.17** (.27) | 1.66** (.26) | 2.19** (.26) | 1.78** (.22) | 1.76** (.18) | 1.35** (.21) | 1.84** (.25) | 2.57** (.20) | 2.12** (.19) |
| Constant | 36.79** (.89) | 40.86** (.85) | 38.11** (.92) | 43.04** (.66) | 39.80** (1.15) | 43.25** (1.42) | 41.04** (.89) | 38.52** (1.10) | 41.80** (.87) | 41.13** (.80) |
| R ² | .098 | .055 | .121 | .100 | .061 | .096 | .115 | .104 | .079 | .060 |

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ ^ $p < .10$

Figure 4-1 Forest Plot of the 28 Effect Sizes of Family Socioeconomic Influence on Civic Knowledge Scores




Figure 4-2 Forest Plot of the 28 Effect Sizes of Family Socioeconomic Influence on Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores




Figure 4-3 Forest Plot of the 28 Effect Sizes of Family Socioeconomic Influence on Civic Participation at School Scores




Figure 4-4 Scatter Plot of the 28 Effect Sizes of Family Socioeconomic Influence on Civic Knowledge Scores by the Dissimilarity Index for Socioeconomic School Segregation




Figure 4-5 Scatter Plot of the 28 Effect Sizes of Family Socioeconomic Influence on Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores by the Dissimilarity Index for Socioeconomic School Segregation




Figure 4-6 Scatter Plot of the 28 Effect Sizes of Family Socioeconomic Influence on Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores by the Dissimilarity Index for Socioeconomic School Segregation




Table 4-5 Results from HLM Meta-Analysis

| | Civic Knowledge ¹ | | | | | Citizenship Self-efficacy | | | | | Civic Participation at School | | | | |
|--|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | M1 | M2 | M3 | M4 | M5 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M4 | M5 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M4 | M5 |
| Fixed effect | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Intercept | 29.42*** (1.11) | 29.42*** (1.07) | 29.43*** (1.00) | 29.43*** (1.03) | 29.42*** (.98) | .79*** (.11) | .79*** (.09) | .79*** (.07) | .80*** (.09) | .99*** (.18) | 1.07*** (.11) | 1.06*** (.09) | 1.07*** (.08) | 1.04*** (.09) | 1.25*** (.16) |
| Dissimilarity index for school socioeconomic segregation | 23.41 (14.26) | 23.41 (14.26) | 38.21* (14.25) | 38.49* (17.40) | 44.58* (19.02) | -4.48** (1.21) | -4.48** (1.21) | -2.07* (.77) | -1.22 (.85) | -3.45* (1.50) | -4.43** (1.11) | -5.58*** (1.06) | -4.43** (1.11) | -4.48** (1.18) | -4.59** (1.46) |
| GDP per capita | | 2.88* (1.57) | | | | .38** (.11) | | | | | | | .18* (.10) | | |
| Gini index | | | | -19 (.13) | | | | | -0.04*** (.01) | | | | | -0.01 (.01) | |
| School differentiation | | | | | -5.48* (2.87) | | | | | -3.4* (.20) | | | | | -3.3 (.21) |
| Random effect | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Variance (df) | 31.61*** (26) | 30.61*** (25) | 27.68*** (24) | 29.95*** (24) | 26.42*** (24) | .30*** (.27) | .22*** (.26) | .14*** (.25) | .15*** (.25) | .20*** (.25) | .34*** (.27) | .21*** (.26) | .20*** (.25) | .21*** (.25) | .19*** (.25) |
| Variance explained (%) | - | 3.2 | 12.4 | 5.2 | 16.4 | - | 27.2 | 51.2 | 47.9 | 32.4 | - | 38.8 | 41.5 | 38.5 | 43.2 |

Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors.

¹ In the analyses for adolescents' civic knowledge scores, I excluded Thailand which is an outlier. As shown in Figure 4, Thailand shows higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation among 28 countries, while demonstrating the smallest socioeconomic gap in civic knowledge.

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ ^ $p < .10$

Table 4-6 Supplementary Analysis for Adolescents' Civic Knowledge Scores

| Country | National mean score (null model) | Mean score (school-level) | Between-school family SES | Within-school family SES |
|------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| MLT | 486.88 (9.47) ^{***} | 487.90 (4.93) ^{***} | 78.45 (15.02) ^{***} | 9.89 (1.79) ^{***} |
| BFL | 502.64 (5.37) ^{***} | 506.98 (3.43) ^{***} | 63.18 (6.76) ^{***} | 9.03 (1.78) ^{***} |
| NZL | 518.34 (6.24) ^{***} | 518.48 (3.97) ^{***} | 60.50 (9.21) ^{***} | 18.33 (1.82) ^{***} |
| CZE | 511.51 (3.91) ^{***} | 511.28 (2.20) ^{***} | 59.23 (5.21) ^{***} | 15.07 (1.62) ^{***} |
| IRL | 527.49 (6.18) ^{***} | 532.53 (3.96) ^{***} | 51.94 (8.41) ^{***} | 24.84 (2.15) ^{***} |
| BGR | 433.20 (7.13) ^{***} | 458.56 (3.96) ^{***} | 47.06 (10.18) ^{***} | 9.67 (2.84) ^{***} |
| CHE | 518.69 (5.72) ^{***} | 525.70 (3.07) ^{***} | 43.33 (5.98) ^{***} | 11.05 (1.74) ^{***} |
| AUT | 500.94 (5.56) ^{***} | 503.30 (3.20) ^{***} | 41.51 (7.16) ^{***} | 14.52 (2.57) ^{***} |
| ENG | 523.38 (6.49) ^{***} | 514.93 (4.07) ^{***} | 40.36 (7.86) ^{***} | 24.49 (2.41) ^{***} |
| TWN | 543.26 (6.33) ^{***} | 554.91 (3.38) ^{***} | 38.31 (8.53) ^{***} | 21.53 (2.06) ^{***} |
| CHL | 473.90 (4.66) ^{***} | 491.40 (2.92) ^{***} | 36.08 (4.39) ^{***} | 11.55 (2.20) ^{***} |
| COL | 464.49 (3.29) ^{***} | 470.36 (2.40) ^{***} | 34.71 (5.65) ^{***} | 9.32 (1.61) ^{***} |
| SWE | 541.26 (5.54) ^{***} | 540.05 (2.88) ^{***} | 34.63 (8.60) ^{***} | 31.05 (2.10) ^{***} |
| EST | 515.59 (4.93) ^{***} | 524.62 (3.23) ^{***} | 32.17 (11.18) ^{**} | 19.24 (2.05) ^{***} |
| MEX | 441.99 (5.64) ^{***} | 458.57 (2.91) ^{***} | 30.13 (4.94) ^{***} | 8.35 (2.02) ^{**} |
| ESP | 508.38 (4.38) ^{***} | 508.13 (2.87) ^{***} | 29.85 (5.70) ^{***} | 16.60 (2.11) ^{***} |
| DNK | 577.57 (3.95) ^{***} | 577.21 (2.43) ^{***} | 27.86 (8.62) ^{**} | 27.36 (1.89) ^{***} |
| NOR | 517.37 (4.28) ^{***} | 522.16 (2.65) ^{***} | 26.69 (6.98) ^{**} | 28.05 (2.30) ^{***} |
| LTU | 487.47 (4.04) ^{***} | 496.80 (2.87) ^{***} | 20.94 (6.77) ^{**} | 20.04 (1.98) ^{***} |
| POL | 530.02 (5.08) ^{***} | 532.96 (3.64) ^{***} | 20.59 (7.65) ^{***} | 26.44 (2.30) ^{***} |
| ITA | 530.78 (3.66) ^{***} | 530.86 (2.54) ^{***} | 17.18 (5.19) ^{**} | 25.79 (2.21) ^{***} |
| THA | 431.26 (5.12) ^{***} | 448.87 (5.11) ^{***} | 15.84 (13.03) ^{***} | 1.64 (2.04) |
| LVA | 470.06 (5.38) ^{***} | 479.33 (4.87) ^{***} | 12.65 (10.75) | 14.55 (2.81) ^{***} |
| GRC | 464.26 (6.30) ^{***} | 475.86 (3.93) ^{***} | 5.49 (9.46) | 21.60 (2.46) ^{***} |
| KOR | 558.61 (3.27) ^{***} | 565.32 (1.79) ^{***} | 4.46 (6.07) | 19.07 (2.11) ^{***} |
| FIN | 575.41 (2.85) ^{***} | 578.08 (2.40) ^{***} | 1.40 (6.95) | 24.95 (1.92) ^{***} |
| CYP | 458.68 (3.29) ^{***} | 458.67 (2.57) ^{***} | -4.57 (8.31) | 25.58 (1.81) ^{***} |
| SVN | 517.34 (2.85) ^{***} | 518.96 (2.63) ^{***} | -6.42 (5.99) | 23.83 (1.82) ^{***} |

Note: Countries are arranged in descending order of the magnitude of the between-school family SES coefficients.

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ ^ $p < .10$

Table 4-7 Supplementary Analysis for Adolescents' Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores

| Country | National mean score (null model) | Mean score (school-level) | Between-school family SES | Within-school family SES |
|------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| SWE | 48.99 (.31) ^{***} | 49.18 (.22) ^{***} | 1.86 (.71) [*] | 1.23 (.27) ^{***} |
| TWN | 48.35 (.34) ^{***} | 48.44 (.22) ^{***} | 1.10 (.61) [^] | .15 (.21) |
| MLT | 47.04 (.40) ^{***} | 47.06 (.31) ^{***} | .92 (.91) | .51 (.26) [*] |
| BFL | 47.41 (.28) ^{***} | 47.29 (.20) ^{***} | .72 (.53) | .05 (.17) |
| CYP | 51.35 (.29) ^{***} | 51.33 (.25) ^{***} | .63 (.84) | .87 (.22) ^{***} |
| GRC | 51.39 (.33) ^{***} | 51.72 (.29) ^{**} | .56 (.57) | 1.22 (.26) ^{***} |
| DNK | 49.68 (.20) ^{***} | 49.63 (.15) ^{***} | .46 (.51) | 1.63 (.19) ^{***} |
| ITA | 51.13 (.34) ^{***} | 51.11 (.24) ^{***} | .46 (.49) | .98 (.22) ^{***} |
| ENG | 50.45 (.33) ^{***} | 50.12 (.21) ^{***} | .34 (.57) | 1.31 (.29) ^{***} |
| NZL | 48.03 (.27) ^{***} | 48.08 (.20) ^{***} | .31 (.40) | 1.11 (.21) ^{***} |
| FIN | 45.67 (.24) ^{***} | 45.76 (.21) ^{***} | .27 (.50) | .99 (.20) ^{***} |
| IRL | 48.47 (.29) ^{***} | 48.66 (.25) ^{***} | .22 (.67) | 1.40 (.29) ^{**} |
| THA | 53.96 (.33) ^{***} | 53.84 (.27) ^{**} | .06 (.66) | -.02 |
| SVN | 49.77 (.24) ^{***} | 49.80 (.23) ^{***} | .01 (.66) | 1.10 (.25) ^{***} |
| BGR | 50.34 (.36) ^{***} | 50.59 (.26) ^{***} | -.01 (.74) | .62 (.34) [^] |
| CZE | 47.05 (.16) ^{***} | 47.03 (.14) ^{***} | -.06 (.37) | .73 (.15) ^{***} |
| POL | 51.12 (.30) ^{***} | 51.15 (.19) ^{***} | -.14 (.39) | 1.04 (.23) ^{***} |
| AUT | 49.81 (.26) ^{***} | 50.03 (.20) ^{***} | -.30 (.46) | .91 (.20) ^{***} |
| CHE | 47.59 (.21) ^{***} | 47.53 (.19) ^{**} | -.32 (.42) | .37 (.28) |
| NOR | 49.90 (.25) ^{***} | 50.19 (.20) ^{**} | -.45 (.66) | 2.13 (.34) ^{***} |
| LVA | 49.12 (.28) ^{***} | 49.28 (.21) ^{**} | -.50 (.62) | .83 (.30) ^{**} |
| EST | 48.07 (.25) ^{***} | 48.21 (.19) ^{***} | -.74 (.50) | .78 (.24) ^{**} |
| LTU | 50.17 (.26) ^{***} | 50.34 (.18) ^{**} | -.88 (.44) [°] | .36 (.20) [^] |
| ESP | 49.39 (.26) ^{***} | 49.44 (.21) ^{**} | -.95 (.48) [*] | .98 (.27) ^{***} |
| KOR | 54.95 (.26) ^{***} | 55.02 (.17) ^{***} | -.97 (.51) [^] | 1.12 (.20) ^{***} |
| MEX | 52.44 (.28) ^{***} | 52.39 (.24) ^{**} | -.99 (.46) [*] | .50 (.22) [*] |
| COL | 52.91 (.28) ^{***} | 52.77 (.17) ^{***} | -1.13 (.37) ^{**} | .35 (.21) [^] |
| CHL | 51.77 (.27) ^{***} | 51.85 (.22) ^{***} | -1.41 (.44) [*] | .69 (.25) ^{**} |

Note: Countries are arranged in descending order of the magnitude of the between-school family SES coefficients.

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ ^ $p < .10$

Table 4-8 Supplementary Analysis for Adolescents' Civic Participation at School Scores

| Country | National mean score (null model) | Mean score (school-level) | Between-school family SES | Within-school family SES |
|------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| BFL | 45.92 (.49) ^{***} | 45.96 (.39) ^{***} | 2.61 (.76) ^{**} | 1.14 (.24) ^{***} |
| NZL | 49.72 (.36) ^{***} | 49.68 (.24) ^{***} | 2.01 (.58) ^{**} | 1.62 (.22) ^{***} |
| CZE | 48.00 (.37) ^{***} | 47.95 (.33) ^{***} | 1.59 (.64) [*] | 1.01 (.14) ^{***} |
| ENG | 50.98 (.51) ^{***} | 50.33 (.27) ^{***} | 1.07 (.65) [^] | 1.77 (.25) ^{***} |
| FIN | 48.45 (.32) ^{***} | 48.59 (.24) ^{***} | .54 (.60) | 1.30 (.19) ^{***} |
| GRC | 55.25 (.36) ^{***} | 55.49 (.32) ^{***} | .49 (.69) | .85 (.28) ^{**} |
| BGR | 47.03 (.46) ^{***} | 47.50 (.39) ^{**} | .08 (1.04) | .67 (.40) [^] |
| SWE | 51.03 (.35) ^{***} | 51.02 (.23) ^{***} | .03 (.61) | 1.59 (.21) ^{***} |
| TWN | 49.43 (.44) ^{***} | 49.89 (.22) ^{***} | -.06 (.58) | 1.13 (.20) ^{***} |
| ITA | 47.69 (.49) ^{***} | 47.40 (.42) ^{***} | -.13 (.92) | .70 (.19) ^{**} |
| CYP | 52.30 (.29) ^{***} | 52.31 (.25) ^{**} | -.21 (.86) | 1.94 (.25) ^{***} |
| IRL | 50.21 (.36) ^{***} | 50.40 (.31) ^{**} | -.22 (.67) | 1.52 (.23) ^{***} |
| NOR | 54.59 (.51) ^{***} | 54.76 (.32) ^{**} | -.48 (.74) | 1.17 (.27) ^{***} |
| CHE | 47.31 (.47) ^{***} | 47.04 (.45) ^{**} | -.47 (1.16) | .63 (.31) [^] |
| COL | 53.79 (.29) ^{***} | 53.82 (.24) ^{***} | -.53 (.57) | .97 (.19) ^{***} |
| POL | 54.74 (.31) ^{***} | 54.69 (.23) ^{***} | -.54 (.48) | 1.39 (.19) ^{***} |
| MLT | 47.62 (.51) ^{***} | 47.68 (.39) ^{***} | -.57 (1.08) | .83 (.21) ^{***} |
| THA | 51.35 (.47) ^{***} | 51.19 (.39) ^{**} | -.68 (1.00) | .70 (.21) ^{**} |
| AUT | 49.63 (.35) ^{***} | 49.65 (.25) ^{**} | -.80 (.55) | 1.05 (.23) ^{***} |
| ESP | 52.55 (.39) ^{***} | 52.61 (.35) ^{**} | -1.44 (.73) [*] | .93 (.25) ^{***} |
| CHL | 52.30 (.29) ^{***} | 52.36 (.22) ^{**} | -1.53 (.41) ^{***} | 1.08 (.25) ^{***} |
| SVN | 51.15 (.27) ^{***} | 51.11 (.23) ^{**} | -1.53 (.66) [*] | 1.66 (.20) ^{***} |
| DNK | 48.80 (.29) ^{***} | 48.70 (.27) ^{**} | -1.56 (.76) [*] | 1.30 (.16) ^{***} |
| MEX | 50.99 (.37) ^{***} | 50.45 (.29) ^{**} | -1.57 (.54) ^{**} | .63 (.24) ^{**} |
| LVA | 49.99 (.49) ^{***} | 49.89 (.42) ^{**} | -2.13 (.87) [*] | 1.12 (.31) ^{**} |
| EST | 48.02 (.56) ^{***} | 47.88 (.46) ^{**} | -2.85 (1.09) [*] | .75 (.20) ^{***} |
| KOR | 45.88 (.34) ^{***} | 45.92 (.27) ^{**} | -3.56 (1.33) ^{**} | 2.13 (.15) ^{***} |
| LTU | 50.13 (.45) ^{***} | 49.72 (.29) ^{**} | -3.72 (.83) ^{***} | 1.35 (.23) ^{***} |

Note: Countries are arranged in descending order of the magnitude of the between-school family SES coefficients.

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ ^ $p < .10$

Chapter 5 Civic Orientations of Immigrant and Native Adolescents in 24 Countries: the Importance of Immigration Policy Context

Introduction

Following the phenomenal surge of international migration during the past two decades, most countries—not only traditional immigrant-receiving countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, but also previously immigrant-sending countries such as Greece, Spain, and South Korea—are hosting a growing population of immigrants, a substantial number of whom are children and adolescents (Martin and Midgley 2003; White et al. 2008). Accompanying their parents to a new country or being born there, vast numbers of these immigrant children and children of immigrants attend schools in their newly found home. Therefore, at the forefront of the recent transformation of the demographic structures are schools (M.Orfield 2002). Whereas the levels of adult immigrant integration are measured by occupational attainment and income, levels of adaptation among young immigrants are captured by educational achievement and attainment such as academic achievement, educational aspiration, and the likelihood of graduating versus dropping out of high school (Zhou 1997). Although it has not received much scholarly attention, the civic participation of child immigrants and immigrant offspring is another important aspect indicating the degree of their integration in the host country. Not only does one of the crucial components of the future of the host society hinge on whether these young immigrants will successfully adapt to their roles as citizens, but their entrance into the civic realm as active citizens also creates opportunities for the development of better representation for these previously marginalized groups (Junn 1999).

Despite the importance of this issue, research examining the nature of the civic lives of immigrant adolescents has been quite limited. While scholarship on immigrant incorporation has increasingly acknowledged the importance of young immigrants' civic integration, it has primarily pertained to either the determinants of naturalization (Bloemraad 2002; Brubaker 1992; Clarke, van Dam, and Gooster 1998; de Rham 1990) and differences in citizenship acquisition across multiple national groups (DeSipio 1996; Liang 1994; Pantoja and Gershon 2006; Portes and Mozo 1985; Woodrow-Lafield et al. 2004; Yang 1994), or their involvement with electoral politics (Bass and Casper 2001; Cho 1999; Hill and Moreno 1996; Kellstedt 1974; Lamare 1982; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989). Only a paucity of research has paid attention to young immigrants' engagement in other forms of participatory activities such as taking stands on political causes (Austin 2004; Bedolla 2000; Jensen 2008; Jensen and Flanagan 2008; Lopez and Marcelo 2008; Schildkraut 2005; Stepick, Stepick, and Labissiere 2008). Few studies have focused on attitudinal and behavioral correlates of civic activism among immigrant-origin adolescents, such as civic knowledge, interest in politics, participatory efficacy, and institutional trust (Flanagan et al. 2007; Fridkin, Kenney, and Crittenden 2006; Lopez 2003; Torney-Purta, Barber, and Wilkenfeld 2006; Torney-Purta, Barber, and Wilkenfeld 2007; Wray-Lake, Syvertsen, and Flanagan 2008). This relative lack of attention is a glaring omission, given that a sizeable proportion of contemporary young immigrants are school-age children who have recently arrived and not are eligible for citizenship acquisition, or have not yet reached voting age. Another gap in the literature is that there have been few systematic cross-national studies on immigrant adolescents' civic integration. Most scholars have conducted single-country analyses with particular focuses on the traditional countries of immigration, or on European contexts. As a result, very little is known about how immigrant

adolescents differ across countries in terms of their patterns of civic activism and orientations, and whether theoretical and empirical propositions are generalizable to national contexts different from those which produced them.

In light of these gaps, my contribution to the existing body of literature is twofold. First, building on a resource model of citizen participation (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Verba et al. 1993), I examine the determinants of civic orientations for immigrant-origin and native adolescents. As will be discussed in detail later in this chapter, many child immigrants and children of immigrants have distinctive civic experiences from their native-born peers. By virtue of being immigrants, they do not have citizenship, or live in mixed-citizenship families where at least one family member was born outside of the country of destination. Immigrant families and their children are often in a disadvantaged position compared to their native-counterparts without immigration background, with respect to access to some kinds of civically relevant resources, such as income, language skills, and educational attainment. However, they are simultaneously better endowed with abundant cultural heritage, practices, and identities, which facilitate their civic awareness and activism. Since adolescents' civic orientations are strong predictors of adult civic participation (Jennings 1974; Neimi and Junn 1998), differences in civic orientations among immigrant and native adolescents are significant predictors of the long-term prospects of young immigrants' civic integration into the host society.

My second contribution is to conduct comparative cross-national research for a better understanding of immigrant adolescents' civic integration. By comparing patterns of civic orientations among immigrant-origin and native adolescents in the 24 selected countries, I examine whether existing theoretical frameworks, developed to account for native/immigrant

differences in civic culture and participation in the United States, can be generalized to other countries. In so doing, I can assess the extent to which causal factors surrounding immigration and citizenship have varied effects across diverse national contexts.

In particular, I compare the association between immigration status and three aspects of civic orientations (i.e. civic knowledge, citizenship self-efficacy, and expected electoral participation) across the selected 24 countries, and investigate the relevance of civic resources for explaining the association. In addition, I also examine reasons for variations in the role played by immigration status in determining adolescents' civic orientations, focusing on country-level immigration policy contexts. I hypothesize that a cross-national variation in immigration policy contexts might be in part responsible for why immigrant-origin adolescents in some countries are more civically knowledgeable and empowered than their similarly situated immigrant counterparts in other countries. Since outright discrimination and social exclusion that young immigrants face in the host societies have enduring effects on their understanding of civil society and their place within it (Jensen 2010; Rumbaut 2008; Sánchez-Jankowski 2002), I expect to find that the degree to which governmental policies on immigrant incorporation is exclusionary/inclusionary would be an important determinant of young immigrants' civic orientations *over and above* their individual and familial characteristics. My findings demonstrate that while the effect of immigration status on adolescents' civic orientations is to some extent explained by differences in family-based civic resources in many countries, a significant cross-national variation persists. My results also confirm that such remaining cross-national variation in the effect of immigration status stems partly from differences in national contexts of governmental policies for immigrant integration. That is, immigrant children and immigrant offspring in countries with more inclusionary immigration policies had higher levels

of civic competence and empowerment than those in countries with more exclusionary immigration policies.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I consider existing explanations for the different patterns of civic activism and orientations between immigration-origin and native-born adolescents. Special attention is given to the extent to which the immigrant-native differences can be accounted for by their differential access to civically relevant resources and varying political socialization experiences. Next, I develop an argument explaining why and how country-level immigration policies influence the way in which immigrant adolescents are socialized into civically oriented citizens in the host country. In the fourth and fifth sections, I discuss data and methods. After presenting the empirical findings in the sixth section, I conclude with several policy implications and suggestions for future research.

A Resource Model Approach to Explaining Differences in Civic Orientations and Participatory Patterns among Immigrant-origin and Native Adolescents

While scholars have long recognized the importance of the civic integration of immigrant adolescents, relatively little attention has been given to the kinds of civic attitudes and behaviors that immigrant adolescents themselves find meaningful and engaging. As discussed earlier, studies of immigrant integration have focused primarily on their rates of citizenship acquisition and secondarily on voting patterns. More recently, there is a growing, albeit still sparse, literature addressing immigrant adolescents' civic engagement in diverse forms of participatory activities other than voting (Austin 2004; Bedolla 2000; Jensen 2008; Jensen and Flanagan 2008; Lopez and Marcelo 2008; Maria 2004; Stepick, Stepick, and Labissiere 2008) and their basic civic orientations (Torney-Purta, Barber, and Wilkenfeld 2006; Torney-Purta, Barber, and

Wilkenfeld 2007), the importance of voting (Lopez 2003), the perception of the government's responsiveness to citizens (Wray-Lake, Syvertsen, and Flanagan 2008), civic commitments (Flanagan et al. 2007), and national identity (Berry et al. 2006; Stepick and Stepick 2002). This line of research has added significantly to our knowledge on young immigrants' civic integration, demonstrating considerably different patterns of civic activism and orientations between immigrant and native adolescents. While immigrant adolescents tend to be less civically engaged in "system-directed" activities such as voting, they are more likely than the native born to engage in "direct" participatory channels such as demonstrations and protests (Junn 1999; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). As Jensen (2010) puts it, "immigrant and non-immigrant youths put their civic and political efforts into somewhat different activities" (Jensen 2010, 427). With respect to attitudinal and behavioral correlates of civic activism, immigrant adolescents tend to have lower levels of civic knowledge and are less likely to vote upon reaching adulthood than their native counterparts. However, they hold more supportive attitudes toward civil and political rights, more critical stances on institutions and nationalism, and higher levels of ethnic consciousness.

Resources have been at the centrality of studies on citizen participation, regardless of whether scholars focus on adult populations (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996), ethnic and racial minorities (Verba et al. 1993), or children and adolescents (Fridkin, Kenney, and Crittenden 2006; Jennings 1974; Neimi and Junn 1998). Here, civically relevant resources include time, income, educational attainment, language proficiency, civic skills, and a complex of resources deriving from participatory activities and socialization experiences. Possessing these resources is an essential pre-condition for any civic activity. To understand why immigrant adolescents differ on civic orientations and participatory patterns in

comparison to their native peers, it is necessary to examine their civically relevant resources and socialization experiences producing those resources. According to this logic, to the extent to which immigrant-origin adolescents are advantaged or disadvantaged in terms of having necessary civic resources compared to their native born peers, we should expect related differences in civic orientations and participatory patterns between immigrant-origin and native adolescents. This argument has been adequately supported by the empirical findings from much of the US-based research. The closest example is Lopez and Marcelo's (2008) survey-based analysis of differences in civic engagement between immigrant and native adolescents. They found that once some civic resources (e.g., mother's educational attainment, language skills, and educational aspirations) and demographic characteristics (e.g., marital status, gender, and race/ethnicity) are held constant, native/immigrant disparities often disappear. Along similar lines, Fridkin, Kenney, and Crittenden (2006) situated the origin of differences in civic orientations between Anglo- and ethnic minority students within ethnic disparities in school and home resources. Torney-Purta, Barber, and Wilkenfeld (2007) shared a similar position. They explained Latino adolescents' lower levels of civic knowledge and intention to vote in terms of their unequal access to family resources and school-based civic learning opportunities, while simultaneously exhibiting that Latino students hold more positive attitudes toward immigrants' rights.¹⁸ A resource perspective also provides an explanation of why immigrant adolescents are more engaged in some forms of participatory activities than others. Immigrant adolescents may be active in direct participatory channels, since a large proportion of civic resources required for the public to engage in boycotts, strikes, rallies and demonstrations differ in significant ways

¹⁸ Although suggestive, we cannot assess to what extent being a native minority is distinguishable from being an immigrant, since both Fridkin et al. (2006) and Torney-Purta et al. (2007) did not distinguish between recent immigrants and native-born minorities.

from the resources required for conventional participation. Attending or leading a protest does not require legal status, nor does it require fluency in the language of the host country, large amounts of money, or personal connections with those in power. This might partly explain why social movements have been the weapon of the marginalized for social change, while indicating the perceived injustice or the unequal availability of more conventional channels (O'Cadiz and Torres 1994).

Although beyond the scope of this study, it is also important to note the role of ethnicity and race in shaping adolescents' civic orientations and participatory patterns. Studies comparing the patterns of civic orientations and participation among adolescents have found independent effects of ethnicity and race, after controlling for other demographic and family background characteristics (Fridkin, Kenney, and Crittenden 2006; Torney-Purta, Barber, and Wilkenfeld 2007). Ethnic or cultural consciousness has been a major driving force behind much of civic activism among adolescents, especially in the face of discrimination and social exclusion (Austin 2004; Bedolla 2000; Jensen 2008; Maria 2004; Stepick et al. 2002). Not surprisingly, immigrant children and children of immigrants often maintain a stronger ethnic and cultural sense of self compared to their native peers with no family immigration history. Even after they cross borders, the home country's cultural heritage and practices may have enduring effects on the ethnic and cultural identities of recent immigrants (Bloemraad 2002; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Wals 2009). Even children of immigrants who were born in the host country are, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent, influenced by their ethnic origin and group social status through ethnic-cultural socialization processes in the family (Alba 1990; Cheng and Kuo 2000; Knight et al. 1993; Quintana and Vera 1999; Rumbaut 1994; Umaña-Taylor and Fine 2004; Waters 1990), and/or experiences with ethnic and racial barriers in the host society (Ogbu 1978, 1991; Portes and

Zhou 1993; Suárez-Orozco 2001; Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 1995; Torres 1998; Zhou 1997). It is against this backdrop that cultural conservatives contend that the massive influx of immigrants would cause a fragmentation of the national identity and subsequent declines in engagement in public life (e.g. Huntington 2004). By contrast, recent evidence challenges such fears of cultural conservatism, demonstrating that young immigrants' multicultural heritages and ethnic identities are more conduits than obstacles for civic consciousness and many forms of civic participation (Jensen 2008). Further, immigrants' cultural identities are "more multifaceted and intricate than what is commonly captured by the historical debate" (Jensen 2010, 431). The developmental patterns of cultural and ethnic identities vary considerably across immigrant generations (Ogbu 1991; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Suárez-Orozco 1987a) as well as across different ethnicities and nationalities (Luo 2006; Nagata 1993; Nagata, Trierweiler, and Talbot 1999; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Therefore, whether being an immigrant is associated with a higher level of ethnic or cultural consciousness is an empirical question to be examined. In turn, given the highly diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds of contemporary immigrants, it is necessary to distinguish immigrant adolescents further on the basis of their ethnicity or nationality when examining their civic orientations and participatory patterns in the destination country.

To summarize, drawing upon a resource model of citizen participation, I have located the source of native/immigrant differences in civic orientations and participatory patterns in disparities in civically relevant resources. By doing so, I can explain why immigrant adolescents are more civically empowered in some aspects of civic orientations and participatory activities than others. Finally, I highlight the importance of ethnicity and race in shaping immigrant

adolescents' civic orientations and activism, since their civic orientations and participatory patterns may vary considerably along ethnic and racial lines.

Immigration Policy Contexts Affecting the Civic Integration of Young Immigrants

The relevance of individual-level determinants for understanding the civic integration of immigrant-origin adolescents is quite well-documented. These individual-level effects partially explain why immigrant adolescents in some countries are more civically empowered and engaged in some destination countries than in others, as well as why immigrant adolescents are more engaged in some kinds of participatory activities than in others. They also account for why immigrant adolescents from certain origins or ethnic groups within a destination country show higher levels of civic consciousness and engagement than those from other origins or ethnic groups. Nonetheless, to my knowledge, there are no systematic analyses of macro-level contextual effects for immigrant adolescents' processes of civic integration. Prior scholarship has focused heavily on those for adult immigrants. Within the existing research on the civic adaptation process of adult immigrants, special attention has been given to whether having high concentrations of co-ethnic peers in the community increase their voting registration or participation rates (Jones-Correa 2001; Portes and Mozo 1985; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Rodolfo, Falcon, and Garcia 1996), how prior political experiences in the home country affect their civic orientations and likelihood to engage in participatory activities (Portes and Mozo 1985; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Wals 2009, 2011), why countries of origin matter in terms of their naturalization rates within single destination countries (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990; Liang 1994; Yang 1994), and the consequences of citizenship regulations on naturalization rates across destination countries (Bloemraad 2002; Brubaker 1992; Clarke, van

Dam, and Gooster 1998; de Rham 1990). Although limited to adult immigrants, this line of research suggests that the contextual characteristics of immigrant communities, origin groups, and destination countries may have *independently unique* effects, even *net of* individual-level attributes. It demonstrates the utility of comparative cross-national research for a more complete understanding of immigrant adolescents' processes of civic integration.

Situated within this literature, this chapter proposes an international-comparative approach to examining the civic integration of child immigrants and immigrant offspring. Among diverse country-level contextual characteristics that may hinder or facilitate young immigrants' civic integration, I particularly focus on immigration policy contexts. Then, I assume that the degree to which governmental policies on immigrant incorporation is exclusionary or inclusionary will be an important determinant of young immigrants' civic orientations *over and above* their individual-level characteristics. Every country has its own distinctive immigration policy set up to accommodate immigrant populations, which is oftentimes based on such coherent national models as 'multicultural' Netherlands and 'assimilationist' France (Joppke 2007), or 'interventionist' Canada and the 'laissez-faire' the United States (Bloemraad 2002). In some countries, immigrant families and their children benefit from favorable policies designed to facilitate their full integration into the host society. Migrant workers and reunited families in such countries can enjoy basic security as well as political and civil rights, while their children can have equal access to high-quality education regardless of their citizenship status. Citizenship regulations create only minor barriers to naturalization, and thus differences in the acquisition of citizenship among immigrants lie in the individual's choice. At the other end of the spectrum, there are countries adopting a more exclusionary stance toward immigration, viewing foreigners and immigrants as temporary residents and favoring policies ultimately helping them return to

their country of origin. Foreign residents in such exclusionary countries face obstacles to having access to a wide range of rights and services. They are also denied adequate representation and participation in civil society. It is even hard for children of immigrants who have lived in these exclusionary countries for many years to acquire citizenship. Of course, countries do not always adopt a coherent stance toward immigration and show significant degrees of heterogeneity within the countries in immigration policy contexts (Freeman 1995; Soysal 1994). For instance, although Northern European countries such as Sweden and Norway have implemented restrictive naturalization policies, they have simultaneously provided quite high levels of public welfare provision for immigrants and immigrant families (Buchmann and Parrado 2006). While citizenship laws in traditional immigrant-receiving countries like the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are much more inclusive, the ranges of social protection and welfare assistance from which immigrants and their families can benefit are relatively limited.

Immigration policy contexts may influence immigrant adolescents' processes of civic integration in two different ways. First, inclusionary immigration policies help increase disposable civic resources among immigrants and immigrant families. Immigrant-origin adolescents in countries with more inclusive naturalization policies, for instance, are more likely to receive full support to acquire citizenship and equally participate in public life compared to their counterparts in countries with more restrictive naturalization policies. School-age immigrant children living in countries where they have the right to a full education and benefit from extra support may master the host country's language faster than do their counterparts in countries where immigrant students are segregated in underperforming schools with other immigrants. In the long term, an array of such supportive immigration policies may allow immigrant parents and their children to achieve socioeconomic parity with their native peers

relatively easily. Second, inclusionary immigration policies can function as a buffer against immigrant disadvantages in the host societies. In so doing, they may make young immigrants less sensitive to their relative lack of civically relevant resources. Although they may possess a lesser amount of civic resources than their native peers in *absolute* terms, immigrant-origin adolescents in countries where state governments support the emergence of an immigrant civil society are more likely to become civically empowered compared to their similarly situated counterparts living in countries where citizenship laws deny immigrants' basic civil and political liberties. Similarly, immigrant adolescents in countries where they occasionally encounter social stigma and discrimination because of their ethnicity, religion, and nationality may be less civically efficacious compared to their counterparts possessing similar levels civic resources and living in countries, where immigrants benefit from equal opportunities and can fight against injustice.

In sum, taking an international-comparative perspective, this chapter highlights the relevance of immigration policy contexts for a more complete understanding of immigrant adolescents' processes of civic integration. Immigration policy contexts play a crucial role in facilitating or hampering young immigrants' processes of civic integration, even net of variations in individual-level attributes. In this sense, I hypothesize that cross-national differences in levels of civic competence and empowerment among immigrant adolescents may correspond to the between-country difference in the degree of exclusionary/inclusionary immigration policies. Inclusionary policy contexts may enable young immigrants to have a larger amount of civic resources relative to their immigrant peers living in countries with more exclusionary immigration policies. Additionally, the relative lack of civically relevant resources should matter

little for young immigrants in countries with more inclusionary immigration policies, because social protection and public assistance can compensate for the lack of civic resources.

Hypotheses

In light of the literature reviewed above, in this chapter I formulate hypotheses as follows:

Hypothesis 1. Differences in civic orientations between immigrant-origin and native adolescents are attributable to their differential access to civically relevant resources. Given the central role of the family in developing civic resources and shaping political socialization experiences that permit the further enhancement of civic resources (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Fridkin, Kenney, and Crittenden 2006), for adolescents, access to civic resources is to some extent determined by their family background characteristics. After controlling for differences in home language, family socioeconomic status and family structure, therefore, native/immigrant differences will be greatly reduced or may even disappear.

Hypothesis 2. Differences in civic orientations between immigrant-origin and native adolescents are due to both their differential access to civically relevant resources and varying political socialization experiences deriving those resources. After controlling for family background characteristics and influences from three political socialization agents (i.e., the school, media, and friends), native/immigrant differences will be largely reduced or may even disappear.

Hypothesis 3. The degree to which governmental policies on immigrant incorporation is exclusionary or inclusionary will be an important determinant of young immigrants' civic

orientations *over and above* their individual-level characteristics. That is, country-level immigration policy contexts can account for a cross-national variation in the effect of immigration status on adolescents' civic orientations, which remains even after taking into account differences in family background and political socialization experiences that exist between immigrant-origin and native adolescents. In particular, an immigrant child or immigrant offspring in countries with more inclusionary immigration policies may show higher levels of civic competence and empowerment than their counterparts in countries with more exclusionary immigration policies.

Data

As in the previous chapters, data from ICCS 2009 is utilized for this comparative study. Chapter 2 includes detailed information on the procedures of sampling, test administration, and data collection in ICCS 2009.

Selection of Countries for Comparison

Among the 38 total countries that participated in ICCS 2009, the analyses were conducted for the following 24 selected countries: Austria, Belgium (Flemish), Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, England, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Spain, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland. I selected these countries mainly because their datasets include substantial numbers of immigrant populations that allowed me to compare civic orientations among immigrant and native-born students. I also excluded countries whose net enrollment rates in secondary education were below 70 percent at the time of testing, or whose information on net

enrollment rates were missing, in order to avoid potential biases associated with the sample selection. Because ICCS 2009 surveyed students from the eighth-grade (or equivalent) who were enrolled in school at the time of testing, the population of eighth-grade students may somewhat differ from the whole population with respect to their individual and familial characteristics in countries with low enrollment rates in schools (Park 2005). By using these selection strategies, I was able to include countries with a variety of economic, social and political contexts, although most of them are European countries (with the exception of New Zealand).

Measures

Outcome Variables

I used students' *knowledge and understanding of civics and citizenship, citizenship self-efficacy, and intentions to participate in elections upon becoming adults* as outcome variables. The following section elaborates upon the construction of these three outcome measures included in the analyses.

CIVIC KNOWLEDGE. Civic knowledge is defined in ICCS 2009 as “knowing about and understanding elements and concepts of citizenship as well as those of traditional civics” (Schulz et al. 2010). In the extant body of literature, civic knowledge is associated with broad forms of civic attributes that give us good reason to care about encompassing democratic values, civic participation, trust in governments and public institutions among others (Galston 2001). ICCS 2009 scaled the item scores using item response technique and created five plausible values of civic knowledge assessment set for each participant. This scale was constructed based on the 79 adjudicated international cognitive items, and thus provide internationally comparable results for

students' civic knowledge. Together, these five values provide an unbiased estimate of sampling variances of estimated population parameters. The final parameter estimates are the average of corresponding estimates from the five regressions, and the standard errors are calculated utilizing Rubin's (1987) rule.

CITIZENSHIP SELF-EFFICACY. Political efficacy is defined as the expectation that citizens believe they have capacity to act effectively in politics (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; Easton and Dennis 1967). In a substantial body of research, political efficacy has been viewed as an important psychological resource functionally linked to political and civic participation (Carlson and Hyde 1980; Cohen, Vigoda, and Samorly 2001; Finkel 1985; Krampen 1991; Sears 1987). Citizenship self-efficacy, which relates to the general concept of self-efficacy, is a broader construct than political efficacy (Bandura 2001; Zimmerman and Bandura 1995). Within the ICCS 2009 framework, citizenship self-efficacy is constructed as a student's self-reported confidence to undertake several activities in the area of civic participation including (a) discussing a newspaper article about a conflict between countries, (b) arguing his or her point of view about a controversial political and social issue, (c) standing as a candidate in a school election, (d) organizing a group of students to achieve/enact changes at school, (e) following a television debate about a controversial issue, (f) writing a letter to a newspaper giving his or her view on a current issues, and (g) speaking in front of class about a social and political issue. These question items were used to derive the scale of citizenship self-efficacy, and higher values on this scale reflect a higher sense of efficacy.

EXPECTED ADULT ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION. Respondents' intentions to participate in elections upon becoming adults were measured on a single composite scale across all participating countries using item response technique. In the ICCS 2009 student questionnaires,

adolescents were asked whether they would vote in local and national elections and would get information about candidates before voting in an election on reaching adulthood. These three items were used to construct the expected electoral participation scale, where higher values reflect a greater likelihood of future electoral participation. Campbell's longitudinal study (2006) suggests that adolescents' intentions to participate in political life correspond to their actual future involvement in politics.

Individual-level Variables

The following paragraphs explain individual-level independent variables included in the analyses. In addition to the measure of immigration background, I also controlled for an array of relevant demographic characteristics, family background, and influences from political socialization agents. Table 5-1 summarizes the coding schema of the independent variables and the number of cases in the analysis for this study.

IMMIGRATION STATUS. I used information on the birth countries of students and their parents to construct a dichotomous variable of immigration background. Native students are those who were born in the country of surveying and who also had at least one parent who was born in that country. Immigrant students can be either those born in the country of surveying with both parents born in another country, or those who were born in another country with at least one parent also born in another country. When an immigrant generation was taken into account in the analysis, I distinguished between first-generation and second-generation immigrants. First-generation immigrants are defined as students who were born in the current country but whose parents were born elsewhere. Second-generation immigrants are defined as students who were not born in the current country and whose parents were also born elsewhere.

FAMILY SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS. To indicate family SES, I used a derived measure of National Index of Socioeconomic Background (NISB) from ICCS 2009. This NISB measure consists of factor scores from a principal component analysis of three variables for each national sample separately: (1) highest occupational status of parents, (2) highest educational level of parents in approximate years of education, and (3) home literacy resources. For students who had missing data for only one of the three indicators, the imputed values were used by regressing the missing value on the other two variables. This imputation procedure was conducted for each country separately. Data on parental occupations were obtained by asking open-ended questions about the jobs of the student's mother and father. The responses were coded into four-digit ISCO codes, which were converted into the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) (Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Treiman 1992). The highest occupation status of both parents corresponds to the higher ISEI score of either parent or to the only available parent's ISEI score. Higher scores on this index indicate higher levels of occupational status. Similarly, the measure of the educational attainment of each parent was constructed by the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Again, whichever parent's score was higher in the level of educational attainment, or the only available parent's ISCED level, was used as an indicator of parental educational attainment. The index of highest educational level of parents was recoded into approximate years of education. For students who reported that their parents had not completed primary school, for example, a value of two years was assigned on the assumption that most parents who had not completed primary school would have had attended school at least for two years. The index of home literacy resources was created on the basis of students' reports of the number of books in home, distinguishing among the following categories: (1) 0 to 10 books, (2) 11 to 25 books, (3) 26 to 100 books, (4) 101 to 200 books, (5) 201 to 500

books, and (6) more than 500 books. Then, midpoint values of each category were chosen for deriving the index of home literacy resources. The final NISB scores were standardized within each country to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

HOME LANGUAGE. When immigrant adolescents speak the language of their origin countries with parents at home, this may hinder the acquisition of the host country's language (Fernandez and Nielsen 1986; Kalmijn 1996; Marks 2005), which is essential for civic integration in their new home. Yet studies in the United States have supported the opposite interpretation: bilingual immigrant adolescents outperform those who are only fluent in English (Mouw and Xie 1999; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Zhou and Bankston 1998). To account for this effect, I included a dummy variable for adolescents whose families use languages other than the language of instructions at home.

FAMILY STRUCTURE. Although recurrent research findings support the idea that growing up with a single parent is negatively related to children's educational outcomes (Pong 1998), the extent to which children in single-parent families perform less well than those in non-single-parent families varies substantially across countries (Hampden-Thompson and Pong 2005; Park 2007). I include a dummy variable for family structure, which distinguishes single-parent and non-single-parent families including nuclear family, mixed family and other types of families.

INFLUENCES FROM POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AGENTS. I also controlled for the influences from three agents of political socialization: *the media*, *school*, and *peer groups*. *Media attention* is a combined measure averaging the three items that asked students how frequently they use newspapers, television, and the internet to inform themselves about national and international news. Aside from the creation of the index of media attention, whether

immigrant origin adolescents use media sources provided with their ancestral language or with the language of the host country is an important issue. However, since the ICCS 2009 survey only allowed for categories that are insufficiently specified for such distinction, I was not able to distinguish between the two different kinds of influences. As a school-related factor, I controlled for individual students' perceptions of the openness in their classroom climate for discussion (*openness in classroom discussion*), which represents the extent to which differing perspectives or controversial issues are discussed within the classroom. Finally, to account for political socialization factors related to peer groups, I also included a proxy for the frequency of discussion with peers on national or international matters (*political conversations with friends*). This was measured with an additive index of two items, which asked about conversations with friends regarding political or social issues and what was happening in other countries.

GENDER. A considerable body of research has confirmed gender disparities in civic knowledge and many aspects of democratic behavior among the adult population: men know more about politics than do women, and men exceed women in political interest, efficacy, and engagement (see, among others, Mondak and Anderson 2004; Campbell and Wolbercht 2006). Yet these disparities do not persist among young citizens. Female adolescents have been found to show higher levels of civic knowledge, but still fall behind their male counterparts in other measures of civic outcomes (Hooghe and Stolle 2004). To account for such gender effect, I controlled for gender using a dummy variable for sex; males are the reference group.

SCHOOL LOCATION. School location was included in the analyses by distinguishing whether a student attend a school located in a city with a population of more than 100,000 (*urban location*, a reference category) or a school located in a less populated area. A separate category

for those with missing information on school location was also created due to the considerably large number of missing cases.

Country-level Variables

One of the primary goals of this chapter is to examine whether between-country differences in levels of civic competence and empowerment among immigrant adolescents correspond to the cross-national variation in the extent of exclusionary/inclusionary immigration policies. This goal can be achieved by conducting a multi-level analysis which assesses how the country-level measures of immigration policy influence the association between an adolescent's immigration status and his/her civic orientations.

IMMIGRATION POLICY CONTEXTS. To indicate the degree to which country-level immigration policies encourage, or hinder immigrants' integration into the host societies, I selected five country-level variables. First, the indices of immigration policy on four areas, including political participation, education, access to nationality, and anti-discrimination, are drawn from the data sources of the Migrant Integration Policy Index II (2007) and the Migrant Integration Policy Index III (2011). In the MIPEX, there are 148 policy indicators on immigrant integration, which have been developed to benchmark current laws and policies against the highest international standards for each of the seven policy areas (i.e., labor market mobility, family reunion, education, political participation, long-term residence, access to nationality and anti-discrimination). These highest international standards are identified as those aimed at achieving equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for all residents. Each policy indicator is a question relating to a specific policy component of one of the seven policy areas. For each answer, there are three options in which the maximum of 3 points are given when

policies meet the highest standards for equal treatment. A score of 2 is given when policies lie halfway to the highest standards, and the minimum of 1 point is given when they are furthest from the highest standards. Based on the answers on 148 policy indicators, countries are scored on the MIPEX 100-point-scale for each policy area, where higher values correspond to more inclusive and supportive immigration policies.¹⁹ For the three indices of immigration policy on political participation, access to nationality and anti-discrimination, I used the data from 2007. Due to the absence of available data, however, I used the data from 2011 for the index of immigration policy on education. Second, to assess each destination country's ideological position on immigration or nationalism, I consulted Benoit and Laver's (2006) study. Using information on party preferences concerning immigration and nationalism, their study developed indicators placing political parties on a left-right ideological spectrum for each country separately. On this scale, higher values represent a more rightist position on immigration (i.e., the party favors policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants return to their country of origin) and on nationalism (i.e., the party promotes a national rather than a cosmopolitan consciousness, history, and culture).²⁰ For each country, I weighted party positions on immigration and nationalism by their vote shares in a specific year (mostly between 2001 and 2004) so that my measure is not unduly influenced by small parties' extreme positions. Because Benoit and Laver's (2006) study presented policy dimensions that are of particular importance to each country, the data of party positions on immigration is not available for such countries as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Slovenia. For these countries, I

¹⁹ On this 0-100 scale for dimensions and policy areas, 0 = critically unfavorable, 1-29 = unfavorable, 21-40 = slightly unfavorable, 41-59 = halfway favorable, 61-79 = slightly favorable, and 80-100 = favorable. For more details on data collection and scale construction, see *Migrant integration policy index III*. (Brussels, Belgium: British Council, 2011).

²⁰ For more details on the wording of questionnaires, see pp. 2-3 in Codebook and Conditions of Use Statement from http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/ppmd/. <http://www.tcd.ie/PoliticalScience/ppmd/>.

constructed the weighted-scale based on party positions on nationalism. Taken together, this measure characterizes a destination country's overall ideological position on immigration or nationalism, where higher values correspond to more rightist stance.

AVERAGE NATIVE CIVIC ORIENTATION SCORE. For each outcome measure, I calculated the average civic orientation score of adolescents who were classified as having no immigration background. I used this measure as a country-level control to account for cross-national variations in adolescents' civic orientations caused by country effects that are not necessarily associated with immigration-related characteristics.

Missing Values

Under the assumption that data on independent variables is missing at random (MAR), I compensated for missing variables using a multiple imputation strategy (Rubin 1987). Before analysis, each missing value on all the independent variables for each country was replaced with three plausible imputations. The only exception is school location: separate categories for those with missing information on school location were created. I imputed both continuous and categorical variables, utilizing a model that incorporated all the variables in our analyses. This multiple imputation strategy only applies to independent variables, not to dependent variables.

Analytic Approach

Two different modeling strategies were used for multivariate analyses. First, I conducted ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses, one for each outcome variable, to examine the individual-level determinants of civic orientations for immigrant-origin and native adolescents. For each country separately, I first estimated a baseline model (Model 1) that examines the effect

of immigration status on student civic orientations, controlling only for gender and urban location. A second model (Model 2) controlled for three family background characteristics, including home language, family socioeconomic background, and family structure, in addition to immigration status, gender and urban location. Comparing the first and second models demonstrates the extent to which the effect of immigration status is accounted for by the differences in home language, family SES, and family structure that exist between immigrant-origin and native adolescents. The final model (Model 3) added to the second model other variables associated with the influences from three political socialization agents (school, the media, and friends). Again, comparing the second and third models shows the extent to which the effect of immigration status is accounted for by differential political socialization experiences between immigrant-origin and native adolescents. In order to take into account the nested structure of data originated from the two-stage sampling framework (Schulz, Ainley, and Fraillon 2011), total student weights (TOTWGT)²¹ were used in the analyses.

After assessing the effects of immigration status separately across countries, I utilized a hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) meta-analysis technique (Bowman 2012; Denson and Seltzer 2011; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002) to investigate the underlying cause of cross-national variability in the effect of immigration status, which remains after taking into account family background, political socialization experiences and other controls. The purpose of this HLM meta-analysis is to examine whether country-level immigration policy contexts can account for a cross-national variation in the magnitude of the differences in civic orientations between immigrant-origin and native adolescents *over and above* their individual-level attributes. The

²¹ The total student weight is equal to the inverse of the joint probability of selection for a particular student (i.e., the probability that school A *and* class B *and* student C are selected). For more detailed information on sampling weights, see Chapter 2.

HLMs for meta-analysis consists of two interconnected models that allow representation and partitioning of the two sources of variation: (1) the *error* or lack of precision connected with each country's effect size of the native/immigrant difference in civic orientation²² and (2) heterogeneity across countries in the *true* effect sizes. Within this framework, the information about each country's effect size estimate is represented in a within-country (level 1) model. For each country, key elements of the within-country model are the estimate of the *true* effect size of the native/immigrant difference in civic orientation, and an *error* term based on the standard error of the estimate. In addition, a between-country (level 2) model represents the amount of heterogeneity across countries in their true effect sizes. This between-country model enables investigation as to whether the degree to which country-level immigration policies are inclusionary or exclusionary can underlie such heterogeneity.

Within each set of the three civic orientation measures, seven HLM models were built: (1) a fully unconditional model which estimates an overall (average) effect size of the native/immigrant difference in civic orientation and the extent to which effect sizes vary around the overall average, (2) a conditional model in which the country-level control (the country-mean civic orientation score of native students) is a predictor, and (3)-(7) conditional models in which the five country-level immigration policy measures are included, one at a time, in addition to the country-level control. Due to space limitations, only the first and last models are presented in what follows.

²² Each country's effect size estimate of the native/immigrant difference in civic orientation is indicated by the regression slope of immigration status (β_1), which is derived from the OLS regression model as follows:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{immigration status}) + \beta_2(\text{gender}) + \beta_3(\text{urban location}) + \beta_4(\text{location missing}) + \beta_5(\text{Home language}) + \beta_6(\text{family socioeconomic background}) + \beta_7(\text{family structure}) + \beta_8(\text{openness in classroom discussion}) + \beta_9(\text{media attention}) + \beta_{10}(\text{political discussion with friends}) + \hat{\epsilon}$$

The First Model. The within-country (level 1) model is a measurement model relating the *estimated* effect sizes from each country to the *true* effect sizes:

$$g_j = \delta_j + e_j \quad e_j \sim N(0, V_j)$$

where g_j is the *estimated* effect size of the native/immigrant difference in civic orientation for country j ; δ_j is a parameter capturing the *true* effect size for country j ; e_j is an *error* term reflecting that g_j is an estimate of δ_j ; V_j is the error variance of g_j as an estimate of δ_j . Since the error variance (V_j) is simply the squared standard error connected with each country's effect size estimate, it is important to note that we already have the information on the magnitude of the error variance.

In the between-country (level 2) model, each country's true effect size of the native/immigrant difference in civic orientation (δ_j) is viewed as varying around the mean effect size (γ_0) as follows:

$$\delta_j = \gamma_0 + u_j \quad u_j \sim N(0, \tau)$$

where γ_0 is the mean effect size across all countries; and u_j is a random effect which represents the deviation of the true effect size for country j from the mean effect size. The variance term τ represents the amount of heterogeneity across countries in their true effect sizes. Because HLM computes a *weighted* estimate of γ_0 , countries with smaller error variances are given more weight, where the form of the weights is $w_j = \frac{1}{V_j + \hat{\tau}}$.

The Final Model. To assess whether the degree to which country-level immigration policies are inclusionary or exclusionary is systematically associated with a cross-national variation in the

effect of immigration status on student civic orientations, the same within-country (level 1) model was built. In addition, the between-country model is developed as follows:

$$\delta_j = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1(\text{Immigration policy measure}) + \gamma_2 (\text{Country mean nonimmigrant civic orientation score}) + u_j$$
$$u_j \sim N(0, \tau)$$

where γ_1 represents the expected change in the effect size of the native/immigrant difference in civic orientation with one unit increase in the immigration policy measure holding constant the country-mean civic orientation score of non-immigrant (native) adolescents; γ_2 is the expected change in the effect size of the native/immigrant difference in civic orientation with one unit increase in the country-mean civic orientation scores of non-immigrant (native) adolescents holding constant immigration policy contexts. Because of multicollinearity among the immigration policy measures, the immigration policy measures are not included in the same equation. That is, the effect of immigration policy contexts was estimated five times with including each of the five country-level policy measures one at a time. To facilitate interpretation, all predictors in the between-country (level 2) model are centered on their corresponding grand means. Thus, the intercept term (γ_0) represents the effect size of the native/immigrant difference in civic orientation in a country whose immigration policy measure and mean civic orientation score of native adolescents are equal to their corresponding grand means, respectively. u_j is a random effect associated with each country, and the variance term τ represents the amount of heterogeneity across countries in their true effect sizes that remains after taking into account the immigration policy measures and the country-mean civic orientation score of native adolescents.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics for both independent and dependent variables are summarized in Table 5-2. Table 5-2 also presents the national averages of student civic knowledge, citizenship self-efficacy, and expected electoral participation scores, along with their corresponding standard deviations.

Figure 5-1 shows proportions of native, first-generation and second-generation immigrant adolescents in each country calculated from the ICCS 2009 data. The percentage of immigrant-origin adolescents varies considerably across countries. High proportions of adolescents from immigrant families were found in Luxembourg (39.6%), Switzerland (25.8%), and New Zealand (22.9%). In contrast, a few other countries, such as Bulgaria (1.6%), Poland (1.7%), and Finland (2.4%), have very few adolescents with an immigration background. While the relative share of second-generation over first-generation is larger in such countries as Luxembourg (27.0%), Switzerland (17.5%), Sweden (12.7%) and Austria (12.7%), immigrant adolescents in Cyprus (1.4%), Spain (1.9%), Ireland (1.7%), and Italy (1.5%) are predominantly first-generation immigrants. The small size of second-generation immigrants may reflect the relatively short history of international migration flow in those countries.

Comparing top and bottom countries in each immigration policy measure exhibits a couple of notable patterns. First, with a few important exceptions, Central European (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovenia) and the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) lags behind in providing well-developed integration policies for immigrants and immigrant families. Czech Republic (13), Poland (13), Bulgaria (17), and Latvia (18) belong to the bottom-four

countries providing the most limited civic opportunities and channels for immigrant populations, while the bottom-four countries having the least receptive educational system to diversity are Bulgaria (15), Malta (16), Latvia (17), and Lithuania (17). Similarly, the bottom-four countries showing the most exclusionary citizenship laws and policies are Estonia (15), Latvia (16), Greece (18), and Lithuania (20). Foreign-born residents and their families in Estonia (18), the Czech Republic (20), and Latvia (25) are also less likely to be protected from discrimination and exclusion than their similarly situated counterparts in other countries. Note that indicating the degree to which immigrants and immigrant families benefit from favorable policies, these indices have values from 0 to 100, where 0 = critically unfavorable, 1-20 = unfavorable, 21-40 = slightly unfavorable, 41-59 = halfway favorable, 60-79 = slightly favorable, and 80-100 = favorable. Therefore, Central European and Baltic countries have, on average, unfavorable or slightly unfavorable policies for immigrant integration. Next, countries that provide favorable conditions for immigrants and immigrant families in one policy area do the same in the other areas. For example, Sweden scores highest on the three policy areas among all 24 countries, including education (77), access to nationality (88), and anti-discrimination (79). As evidenced in Table 5-3, correlations among the country-level immigration policy variable reveal this relationship more clearly. For instance, countries where foreign residents and immigrants can enjoy extensive civic opportunities are also more likely than other countries to promote social integration in education ($r=0.68$), to provide a clear path to citizenship acquisition for immigrants and immigrant families ($r=0.64$), to have strong anti-discrimination laws and equality policies ($r=0.46$), and to hold a more receptive attitude towards immigration ($r=-0.17$).

Differences in Family Background and Political Socialization Experiences

Table 5-3 presents descriptive statistics of native and immigrant adolescents in each country, with particular attention to how immigrant-origin adolescents differ in family background characteristics, interactions with other political socialization agents (e.g., the school, media and friends), and average civic orientation scores compared to their native-born peers. First, beyond the overall tendency of the relative socioeconomic disadvantages of immigrant-origin adolescents, there is a noteworthy cross-national variation in the degree of socioeconomic gaps between adolescents from immigrant and nonimmigrant families. In general, the socioeconomic gap between immigrant and native adolescents in the Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden),²³ continental European countries (Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland), Southern European countries (Greece, Spain, Italy, and Cyprus),²⁴ Central European countries (Slovenia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Poland), and the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) declines in magnitude in that order. In Ireland, New Zealand, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, the average socioeconomic level of immigrant students is even higher than that of native students, though the difference is generally small in those countries. Second, Table 5-3 shows that in all countries except Luxembourg,²⁵ immigrant adolescents are more likely than their native peers to speak a foreign-language at home, with a substantial cross-national variation in the proportions of immigrant students whose language spoken at home is some foreign languages as opposed to the language of the test. The

²³ The only exception is Finland where the socioeconomic differential between immigrant and native students is substantially smaller than its Nordic neighboring countries.

²⁴ Malta is another exception to this trend, since no socioeconomic differential between immigrant and native students is observed in this country.

²⁵ Note that in Luxembourg, the national language (Luxembourgish) was not coded as the test language. Instead, German or French were coded as the test language.

percentage of foreign-language-spoken immigrants ranges from 83.8 % in Estonia to 4.7 % in Poland. Third, I compared the proportions of immigrant and native adolescents from single-parent families, but cannot find a commonality across 24 countries. Whereas immigrant adolescents in Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, and New Zealand are less likely than their native peers to grow up with a single parent, the reverse pattern is found in the other countries. Finally, the comparison of *urban location* reveals that immigrant students are considerably more likely than their native peers to attend schools located in urban areas in most countries except Italy and Bulgaria.²⁶ This replicates the well-known fact that the flow of immigration is largely an urban phenomenon, concentrated in metropolitan cities. In the absence of deliberate recruitment efforts, immigrants tend to enter the labor market through entry-level jobs at the bottom of their respective occupational ladders, and these jobs are often immediately available in large urban cities undergoing rapid economic growth. For this reason, immigrants and immigrant households are disproportionately concentrated in a few metropolitan cities and gradually disperse through the country as they integrate into the host society (Portes and Rumbaut 2006, 37-66).

Turning to the alternative sources of adolescents' civic learning, immigrant students in many countries, including Austria, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Poland and Slovenia, are slightly less likely than their native peers to experience an open classroom climate. By comparison, immigrant students in Belgium (Flemish), England, Spain, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Sweden are more likely to perceive an open classroom climate for discussion than their native peers. However, the difference is negligible in all countries

²⁶ In Luxembourg and Malta, all of the selected schools are classified as urban schools (i.e., schools located in a city with a population of more than 100,000).

except Latvia (-3.18), Lithuania (-3.01), Finland (2.59), and Belgium (Flemish) (2.4), where the magnitude of the difference is almost over a quarter of, one standard deviation in the openness in classroom scale. Next, immigrant-origin and native adolescents do not substantially differ in terms of their levels of attention to media in all 24 countries. Note that the *media attention* index indicates the average frequency with which adolescents use newspapers, television and the internet to follow current events (never or hardly ever (1), monthly (2), weekly (3), daily or almost daily (4)). Therefore, even in Denmark, a country with the largest difference in the degree of media attention between immigrant-origin and native adolescents, the average level of attention to media among immigrants (2.63) is close to “weekly,” while their native counterparts also show a fairly similar level of attention to media (2.21). Similar to the index of media attention, in all 24 countries, immigrant-origin and native adolescents do not show substantially different levels of political discussion with friends. For instance, the immigrant adolescents’ average level of political discussion with friends in Poland (1.98) indicates that they tend to talk with their friends about political and social issues *once a month*; their native peers also show a fairly similar level of engagement (1.71).

The last three rows of Table 5-3 present cross-national variance in native/immigrant differences in civic orientations. On average, students from a non-immigration background score higher than students with an immigration background on the civic knowledge scale; the only exception is Poland where immigrant students score an average of 544, which is 5 points higher than the native-born. The civic knowledge gap between immigrant and native students is smaller in Latvia (-6 points), New Zealand (-11), Lithuania (-17), the Czech Republic (-18), and England (-19), while larger in Ireland (-138), Bulgaria (-91), Finland (-65) and Malta (-61). In Ireland and Bulgaria, the native/immigrant gap in civic knowledge scores is almost equivalent to, or

above the average disparity among the participating countries in ICCS 2009 (100 points).²⁷ In all the other countries, the difference was between 30 and 56 scale points. In contrast, immigrant students achieve lower citizenship self-efficacy scores than their native counterparts in countries such as Luxembourg (-0.03), Lithuania (-0.14), the Czech Republic (-0.23), Denmark (-0.25), Cyprus (-0.27), Spain (-0.56), Greece (-0.6), Poland (-0.92) and Italy (-1.9), although the difference is generally small in those countries (less than a quarter of one standard deviation in the citizenship self-efficacy scale). In all the other countries, immigrant students appear to be more civically efficacious than the native-born, showing considerable cross-national variability in the magnitude of the difference between students from immigrant and nonimmigrant families. Among countries where immigrants show higher levels of self-confidence in civic participation than their native counterparts, the largest difference is 3.31 points in Belgium (Flemish), followed by England (3.24), Sweden (2.67), Bulgaria (2.35), the Netherlands (2.17), and Finland (2.03); in all the other countries, the difference is between 0.5 and 1.5 scale points. A more substantial native/immigrant difference is observed in the expected electoral participation measure. In all countries except England (3.12), New Zealand (1.04) and Bulgaria (0.72), immigrant-origin adolescents rate themselves as less likely to vote than their native counterparts. The size of the gap in expected likelihood of voting between immigrant and native adolescents also varies considerably across countries. The largest gap is 6.38 points in Italy, followed by Greece and Austria, where the difference is 4.18 points and 4.05 points, respectively—such differences are more than half of one standard deviation in the expected electoral participation scale. The magnitude of the gap is relatively negligible in countries like Belgium (Flemish) (-

²⁷ Note that IRT plausible values for the civic knowledge scale are constructed with a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100 for equally weighted countries.

0.31), Sweden (-0.34), and Poland (-0.71), while the difference is between 1 and 3.5 points in all the other countries.

Source of Differences in Civic Orientations between Immigrant-origin and Native Adolescents

Tables 5-5, 5-6, and 5-7 report the results of the OLS models for each of the three outcome measures. Based on these results, Figures 5-3 through 5-8 graphically display cross-national variations in differences in civic orientations among immigrant-origin and native adolescents. Although the effects of family background, political socialization experiences, and other controls are worthwhile to note in their own right, I concentrate on the discussion of the key independent variables of interest.

Civic Knowledge For each country, a baseline model (Model 1) examines the effect of immigration status on civic knowledge, controlling only for student gender and urban location. As shown in each country's first column in Table 5-5, first-generation immigrants exhibit significantly lower levels of civic knowledge than their native peers in all countries except Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Latvia, Malta, Czech Republic, and the Netherlands, where no significant difference is observed between civic knowledge scores of immigrant and native students. Among countries showing significant differences, in Bulgaria, native students achieve 81.87 points higher civic knowledge scores than first-generation immigrants, which is nearly equal to the average disparity one international standard deviation in the civic knowledge scale among the participating countries. Even in New Zealand (21.39 points), the country with the smallest gap in civic knowledge scores between first-generation and native adolescents, the difference is almost a quarter of a standard deviation in civic knowledge. Second-generation immigrants also tend to be less civically knowledgeable than their native peers in all countries

except Spain, Italy, Ireland, England, Latvia, Cyprus, and the Czech Republic, where there is no significant difference between civic knowledge scores of second-generation and native adolescents. Where significant, the civic knowledge gap for second-generation immigrants is typically smaller than for first-generation immigrants in most countries except Denmark, Belgium (Flemish), Estonia, Malta, New Zealand, and the Netherlands, where it is larger. Interestingly, second-generation immigrants in Poland achieve significantly higher scores (24.90) even compared to native adolescents. In general, the civic knowledge gap between second-generation and native adolescents is larger in Malta (76.01), Denmark (69.94), and Bulgaria (69.91), whereas it is smaller among Lithuania (26.02), Slovenia (34.24), and New Zealand (30.58). The blue bars in Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3 correspond to these results, demonstrating the cross-national variations in the magnitude of the civic knowledge gap among immigrant origin and native adolescents when only gender and urban location are controlled.

As a comparison between the blue bars and red bars in Figure 5-2 reveals, taking into account differences in family background characteristics substantially reduces the civic knowledge gap between first-generation and native adolescents. However, the negative effect of first-generation status remains significant in many countries even after family background is considered. The extent to which the included family background variables account for the civic knowledge gap varies across countries. When the family background variables are additionally controlled in Model 2, the difference in civic knowledge scores of first-generation and native students is reduced by over half in Norway, Austria, Greece, Luxembourg, Italy and Switzerland; a relatively small portion of the difference in civic knowledge scores of first-generation and native students is explained by the added family background variables in Bulgaria, Denmark, Slovenia, Spain, Ireland, and England. Further, controlling for family background completely

wipes out the negative impact of first-generation status in some countries, including Sweden, Finland, Belgium (Flemish), New Zealand, and Cyprus. This reduction in, or disappearance of, the negative impact of first-generation status implies that the first-generation disadvantage in civic knowledge is to some extent due to the relative lack of family-based civic resources among first-generation immigrant adolescents, as measured by the family background factors. As we see in Table 5-5, the negative effect of second-generation status is also considerably reduced with the addition of controls for family background characteristics, though they remain significant in all countries except Bulgaria, Sweden, Norway, Austria, Finland, Belgium (Flemish), and New Zealand where the coefficient of second-generation status is pushed well past the boundaries of statistical significance. As a comparison between the blue bars and red bars in Figure 5-3 presents, over half of the civic knowledge gap between second-generation and native adolescents is explained by differences in family background in Slovenia, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, while the degree to which differences in family background accounts for the effect of second-generation status is comparatively small in Malta, Denmark, the Netherlands, Estonia, Greece, and Lithuania. In Poland, the positive effect of second-generation status disappears once differences in family background are taken into account. Again, given the substantial amount of reduction in, or disappearance of, the magnitude of the effects of second-generation status, the civic knowledge gap seems to be driven in part by disparities in family-based civic resources between second-generation and native adolescents in many countries. Even after taking into account differences in family background, the civic knowledge gap is generally more substantial for first-generation immigrants than for second-generation immigrants in all but four countries (Malta, Netherlands, Estonia, and Greece).

Turning to the final model (Model 3), I found that even after holding constant their socialization experiences, both first-generation and second-generation immigrants continue to show lower levels of civic knowledge than their native peers in most countries. However, the pattern of changes in the effect of immigration status varies extensively across countries. On the one hand, controlling for the influences from political socialization agents slightly narrows the civic knowledge gap between first-generation and native students in countries like Bulgaria, Norway, Slovenia, Greece, and Switzerland, suggesting that the disparity in civic knowledge scores is in part driven by differential socialization experiences between first-generation and native adolescents in those countries. The civic knowledge gap between second-generation and native students is also slightly reduced in Slovenia, Estonia, and Lithuania, after controlling for political socialization-related factors. On the other hand, in some countries such as Denmark, Austria, Luxembourg, Spain, Italy, Ireland, and England, the significant negative effect of first-generation status becomes more negative when political socialization experiences are additionally controlled in Model 3. The corresponding increase in the negative effect of first-generation status ranges from 3.3 percent in Austria to 28.2 percent in Luxemburg. Similarly, the previously non-significant impact of first-generation status, which is found in Model 2 in Finland and New Zealand, now turn into significant and negative. Moving to the effect of second-generation status, when political socialization experiences additionally are controlled in Model 3, the civic knowledge gap between second-generation and native adolescents becomes larger in such countries as Malta, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and Greece. The extent to which the civic knowledge gap increases ranges from 6.2 percent in Greece to 32.4 percent in Denmark. In Sweden, Finland, and New Zealand, controlling for students' socialization experiences changes the effect of second-generation status from non-significant to

significant and negative. This increase in the negative effect of immigration status suggests that the immigrant disadvantage in civic knowledge becomes more obvious in some countries once their socialization experiences are considered. Even after the influences from political socialization agents are held constant, the native/immigrant civic knowledge gap is generally larger for first-generation immigrants than for second-generation immigrants in all countries except Denmark, Greece, Estonia, Switzerland, New Zealand, Malta, and the Netherlands.

Citizenship self-efficacy Each country's first set of results in Table 5-6 shows the findings from the baseline model (Model 1), which only controls for gender and urban location. On the basis of these results, the blue bars in Figure 5-4 demonstrate that first-generation immigrants tend to report significantly higher levels of citizenship self-efficacy than their native peers in many countries, including Poland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Sweden, England, Belgium (Flemish), Norway, Malta and the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, where the difference in citizenship self-efficacy scores of first-generation and native students is the largest among the 24 countries, first-generation immigrants score 4.27 points higher than their native peers, which is almost half of one standard deviation in the citizenship self-efficacy scale. By contrast, the first-generation status has no significant effect on adolescents' self-confidence in civic participation in all the other countries except Italy, where first-generation immigrants score 2.15 points (nearly a quarter of a standard deviation on the citizenship self-efficacy scale) lower than their native counterparts. Differences in levels of citizenship self-efficacy between second-generation and native adolescents are not significant in most countries. Where significant, in Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, England, Belgium (Flemish), and the Netherlands, second-generation immigrants have considerably higher levels of self-confidence in participatory activities than their native counterparts. In Belgium (Flemish), where the magnitude of the effect of second-generation is

the largest among the countries showing the significant difference between native and second-generation immigrants, second-generation students scored 3.37 points higher on citizenship self-efficacy than their native peers, which is more than a quarter of a standard deviation. Interestingly, Spain is the only country where second-generation immigrants are significantly less likely than their native peers to be confident in their civic participation. In that country, second-generation immigrants receive citizenship self-efficacy scores that are 3.58 points lower than the scores of native adolescents, which is over a quarter of a standard deviation in the citizenship self-efficacy scale.

As evident in each country's second set of results in Table 5-6, the positive effect of first-generation status remains significant in a number of countries even when family background variables are additionally controlled in Model 2, except in Italy, Sweden, England and Malta, where no significant difference in citizenship self-efficacy scores of first-generation and native students is observed anymore. As a comparison between the blue bars and red bars in Figure 5-4 reveals, the significant positive effect of first-generation status in Model 1 becomes larger in a few countries, among Poland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, and the Netherlands when family background is controlled. More precisely, in Poland, Luxembourg and Norway, the magnitude of the effect of first generation status almost doubles when family background are taken into account; although to a lesser extent, controlling for family background strengthens the positive effect of first-generation status in New Zealand, and the Netherlands. Similar to this pattern, the non-significant effect of first-generation immigrants in Ireland and Bulgaria found in Model 1 becomes positive and significant with the addition of controls of family background; in Italy, the previously significant negative effect of first-generation status turns non-significant. These findings suggest that the relative advantage of first-generation status in some countries is

reinforced after family background is taken into account. The only exception to this pattern is Belgium (Flemish), where the positive effect of first-generation status is reduced by 20 % from 2.34 in Model 1 to 1.87 in Model 2. No significant difference between first-generation and native students is evident in any of the other countries. Moving to the effect of second-generation status, taking into account differences in family background characteristics turns the non-significant effect of second-generation status in countries like Poland, Luxembourg, Slovenia, New Zealand, Denmark and Norway to positive and significant. Among these countries, larger differences in citizenship self-efficacy scores of second-generation and native students are observed in Norway (3.40) and Denmark (2.26), while New Zealand (1.63), Slovenia (1.45), Luxembourg (.73) and Poland (.66) show smaller differences. In all the other countries, the effect of second-generation status remains relatively unchanged after family background is controlled in all other countries, as shown in a comparison between the blue bars and red bars in Figure 5-5. Again, Spain stands out because of its significantly lower levels of self-confidence in civic participation compared to their native peers; second-generation immigrants in Spain achieve citizenship self-efficacy scores that are 3.70 points lower than those of their native peers, which is over a quarter of one standard deviation in the citizenship self-efficacy scale.

As Figure 5-4 graphically presents, even after the influences from political socialization agents are additionally held constant (Model 3), the cross-national variation in the difference in citizenship self-efficacy scores of first-generation and native adolescents persists. Among the countries where the significant first-generation advantage is observed in Model 2 (Poland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Bulgaria and the Netherlands), the positive effect of first-generation status in Poland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Bulgaria and the Netherlands

becomes weaker; in Ireland and Belgium (Flemish), its significant positive effect disappears. Another interesting finding includes the Czech Republic and Estonia, where non-significant differences in levels of citizenship-efficacy between first-generation and native students are now significant and positive, although the differences are significant at the only 0.10 level. With respect to the effect of second-generation status, controlling for adolescents' socialization experiences turns the significant positive effect of second-generation status non-significant in Denmark, Finland, Poland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Sweden, and Norway. By comparison, although second-generation immigrants are still significantly more civically efficacious than their native counterparts, taking into account differences in political socialization experiences reduces the second-generation advantage in self-confidence in participatory activities in England, Belgium (Flemish), the Netherlands, and Slovenia. The extent to which the added political socialization measures reduce the positive effect of second-generation status varies from 1.4 % in Slovenia to 52.7 % in England. Once again, Spain (2.96) still demonstrates significantly lower levels of self-confidence in participatory activities among second-generation immigrants relative to their native counterparts.

Expected Electoral Participation As presented in each country's first set of results in Table 5-7, first-generation immigrants in many countries, including Italy, Norway, Slovenia, Greece, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Austria, Spain, Switzerland, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Cyprus, tend to rate themselves significantly less likely to vote than their native peers. The largest gap is 6.59 points in Italy, which is close to one standard deviation in the expected electoral participation scale, followed by Norway, Slovenia, and Greece where the gaps are 5.58, 5.15, and 4.70 points, respectively; countries showing a relatively small size gap in expected likelihood of voting include Ireland (2.87), Luxembourg (2.61) and Cyprus (2.17). The first-

generation status does not have a significant effect in all the other countries except England, where first-generation immigrants are significantly more likely to vote than the native-born; they score 1.80 points higher on the higher expected electoral participation scale than their native counterparts. With respect to the difference in expected likelihood of voting between second-generation and native students, no significant difference is observed in such countries as Denmark, Poland, Ireland, Cyprus, Finland, Malta, Belgium, Estonia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and Bulgaria. Where significant, the magnitude of the expected voting gap is smaller for second-generation immigrants than for first-generation immigrants in most countries except Austria and Luxembourg, where it is larger.

What is evident from Figure 5-6 is that first-generation immigrants continue to be less likely than their native peers to see themselves as active participants in the electoral process in most countries, even after the family background variables are additionally controlled in Model 2. However, as indicated by the differences in the blue bars and red bars in Figure 5-6, controlling for family background substantially reduces the negative effect of first-generation status on expected likelihood of voting in most countries. This reduction in the negative effect of first-generation status suggests that a significant part of the expected voting gap is explained by disparities in family-based civic resources between first-generation and native students. Among the countries where the effect of first-generation status is significant in Model 1, nearly half of the disparity in expectation of voting is explained by the added family background variables in such countries as Norway, Slovenia, Denmark, Austria, Spain, and Ireland. By comparison, the family background variables account for little of the effect of first-generation status in Greece. Similar to this pattern, taking into account differences in family background pushes the negative effect of first-generation status well past the boundaries of statistical significance in Switzerland,

Luxembourg and Cyprus, and turns the previously non-significant coefficient for first-generation status in Sweden and the Netherlands into positive and significant. In Sweden and the Netherlands, the expected electoral participation scores of first-generation immigrants are now 2.68 points and 2.21 points higher than the scores of their native counterparts, respectively, which are almost a quarter of a standard deviation. The two exceptions to this pattern are the Czech Republic and England. In the Czech Republic, the disparity in expected likelihood of electoral participation between first-generation and native students increases by 0.39 points with the addition of controls of family background; the previously significant positive effect of first-generation status becomes non-significant in England once differences in family background is considered.

Turning to the expected voting gap between second-generation and native students, the addition of the family background measures considerably reduces the magnitude of the expected voting gap between second-generation and native students, or as in many countries, wipes out the negative effect of second-generation status. As seen in Figure 5-7, the degree to which differences in family background characteristics account for the effect of second-generation status is relatively small in Latvia, Italy, and Greece; by contrast, over half of the expected voting gap is explained by the family background measures in Austria, Norway, Slovenia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Spain, Switzerland, and Luxembourg, where no significant difference in expectations of voting between second-generation and native students is observed anymore. Further, the negative effect of second-generation status becomes positive and significant in Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands when family background variables are additionally controlled, indicating that second-generation immigrants in those countries are more likely than their native peers to vote upon reaching adulthood once their family background is

taken into account. In England, the effect of second-generation status becomes more positive after controlling for family background, though the corresponding increase is negligible. In all the other countries, no significant difference in expected likelihood of voting between second-generation and native students is observed. Where significant, the magnitude of the expected voting gap is more substantial for first-generation immigrants than for second-generation immigrants in all countries except Austria. In Sweden and the Netherlands, first-generation immigrants are significantly more likely to vote compared to *both* their native and second-generation peers.

Each country's third set of results in Table 5-7 presents the findings from the OLS models which estimate the effect of immigration status with controlling for family background, political socialization experiences, gender and urban location. As a comparison between the red bars and green bars in Figure 5-6 reveals, taking into account adolescents' political socialization experiences aggravates the first-generation disadvantage in expected likelihood of voting in such countries as Italy, Norway, Denmark, Greece, Czech Republic, Austria, Spain, and Ireland. The degree to which the added political socialization variables aggravates the first-generation disadvantage is negligible in Norway, the Czech Republic, Italy, and Greece, while relatively substantial in Spain, Denmark, and Ireland. Similarly, the positive effect of first-generation status is no more significant with the addition of the political socialization-related measures in Sweden and the Netherlands; in Luxembourg, the previously non-significant effect of first-generation status is now significant and negative. The only exception to this pattern is Slovenia, where the negative effect of first-generation status disappears after adding adolescents' socialization experiences to the model. Among countries showing significant differences, the disparity in expectations of voting between first-generation and native students is the largest in

Italy (5.45), followed by the Czech Republic (4.02), Greece (3.65), and Denmark (3.08); countries with the smaller voting gap include Spain (2.67), Ireland (2.17), Austria (2.14) and Luxembourg (1.26). With regard to the expected voting gap between second-generation and native students, similar patterns are also observed in many countries. For instance, no significant positive effect of second-generation status is found anymore in Denmark, Sweden, New Zealand, and the Netherlands when the political socialization variables are additionally controlled. Similarly, taking into account political socialization experiences widens the expected voting gap between second-generation and native students in Austria, Switzerland, Luxembourg and Finland, although the degree to which the political socialization measures widens the expected voting gap varies from 10.9 % in Austria to 109 % in Luxembourg. In England, the significant positive effect of second-generation status is reduced by 35 % from 3.58 in Model 2 to 2.33 in Model 3, suggesting that the relative second-generation advantage in expected voting becomes smaller once political socialization experiences are held constant. Again, this explanatory pattern is not without exceptions. In Italy, Greece, and Latvia, adding the political socialization measures reduces the disparities in expectations of voting that exist between second-generation and native students, though the corresponding reduction is negligible. Among countries where second-generation immigrants show significantly lower expected electoral participation scores than their native peers, the largest gap is found in Latvia (3.21), followed by Italy (2.93), Finland (2.58), Austria (2.45), and Greece (2.13), which are over a quarter of a standard deviation in the expected electoral participation scales. By comparison, the expected voting gap is relatively small in Switzerland (1.04) and Luxembourg (.90). When the political socialization variables are controlled for, the disparity in expectations of voting is generally smaller for second-generation

immigrants than for first-generation immigrants in all countries except Latvia, Austria, Switzerland, and Finland, where it is larger.

The Relevance of Immigration Policy Contexts for Cross-national Variation in the Effect of Immigration Status

For each of the three outcome measures, Table 5-8 presents the results of the HLM meta-analyses as specified in the analytic approach section. Figures 5-11 through 5-13 graphically demonstrate the expected native-immigrant differences in civic outcome scores in countries with the most and least inclusionary policy on immigrant integration, holding the country-level control constant. Before interpreting the results, there are several points that deserve special attention. First, although first-generation and second-generation immigrants were distinguished in the prior analyses, for the variable of civic orientation, I combine first-generation and second-generation immigrants into a single category for comparison with native adolescents, mainly because the small number of immigrant adolescents in some countries prevents the separation. By doing so, however, I can provide a clearer picture of how adolescents with and without an immigration background differ in terms of their civic orientations, as well as to what extent countries vary in the effect of immigration status on adolescents' civic orientations. Second, because information on the four immigration policy measures (i.e., education, political participation, access to nationality and anti-discrimination) is not available for New Zealand, I present only the results of the HLM meta-analyses on the basis of 23 countries excluding New Zealand (Model 1- Model 6). However, for the HLM model where the immigration policy measure is available for all countries (Model 7), New Zealand is included in the analysis. Lastly, in Model 7, Malta was excluded from the analyses; Malta is an obvious outlier whose score on

the ideological position on immigration index is almost twice as high as the next highest score (Austria).

Civic Knowledge In the forest plot in Figure 5-8, each country's effect size estimate for the civic knowledge measure is represented by a box whose center symbolizes the *magnitude* of the civic knowledge gap between immigrant-origin and native adolescents, while the lines coming out from either side of the box indicate the 95% confidence interval. Note that the dotted line in the forest plot corresponds to the *average* of the 24 countries' effect sizes (i.e., the overall magnitude of the civic knowledge gap between immigrant-origin and native adolescents across 24 countries). Thus, the non-overlap in 95% confidence intervals for the five countries (i.e., Denmark, Estonia, Spain, England and Belgium (Flemish)) suggests that the true effect sizes of these five countries' are likely to vary substantially around the overall average. By contrast, we see that the confidence intervals for all the other countries contain the overall average, signaling that the countries may be fairly homogeneous in terms of their true effect sizes.

As shown in the first column of the civic knowledge measure in Table 5-8, the estimate of the overall (average) effect size is -17.79 points with a standard error of 3.02. The estimated value of -17.79 indicates that on average, immigrant-origin adolescents achieve 17.79 points lower civic knowledge scores than their native counterparts once family background, political socialization experiences and other demographic factors are taken into account. Constructing a 95% confidence interval helps capture the precision with which the overall average is estimated. The lower and upper boundaries of a 95% confidence interval for this average estimate are -21.27 $(-17.79 - 2 \times \sqrt{3.02})$ and -14.31 $(-17.79 + 2 \times \sqrt{3.02})$, respectively. It is important that this estimate of the average effect size and its corresponding confidence are quite similar to the estimate and interval for the average effect size that appears in the forest plot in Figure 5-8. To get a better

sense of the extent to which the countries differ in terms of their true effect sizes, I took the square root of the estimate of τ and obtain a standard deviation capturing the variation in the effect sizes (i. e., $\sqrt{148.50} = 12.19$). For instance, a country whose effect size is one standard deviation above the overall average would be -5.6 ($-17.79 + 12.19$), whereas a country whose effect size is one standard deviation below the overall average would be -29.98 ($-17.79 - 12.19$). Importantly, the random effects result reported at the bottom of Table 8 shows that the countries vary appreciably in their true effect sizes ($\tau = 148.50, p < .001$). This suggests that the magnitude of the difference in civic knowledge scores of immigrant-origin and native adolescents is more substantial in some countries than in other countries, even after the native/immigrant differences in family background, political socialization experiences and other demographic factors are taken into account.

As seen in the second column of the civic knowledge measure in Table 5-8 (Model 2), the country-mean civic knowledge score of native adolescents does not have a significant effect on the intercept ($-0.14, SE = 0.10$), though the direction of the relationship is negative. In the Models 3 through 7, I included the five immigration policy measures one at a time in addition to the country-mean civic knowledge score of native adolescents. In so doing, I investigated how a country's effect size of the civic knowledge gap varies according to each immigration policy measure when the country-mean civic knowledge score of native adolescents is taken into account. For instance, the coefficient of 0.30 associated with the immigrant education index ($0.30, SE = 0.17$) indicates that a one unit increase in the immigrant education index relates to an increase by 0.30 in effect size, holding the country-mean civic knowledge score of native adolescents constant. This means that the civic knowledge gap between immigrant-origin and native adolescents in countries with the most inclusionary educational system for immigrants and

immigrant families, such as Sweden, is 18.6 points (0.30×62) smaller than the corresponding gap in countries with the least inclusionary educational system, such as Bulgaria, after controlling for the country-mean civic knowledge score of native adolescents. The results for the variance components (shown at the bottom of the table) indicate that the inclusion of the immigrant education index in the analysis leads to a reduction in parameter variance of 8.9 percent. Similarly, in the model including the access to nationality measure (Model 5), the coefficient of 0.37 associated with the access to nationality index (0.37, SE = 0.14) indicates that a one unit increase in the access to nationality index correlates with an increase by 0.37 in effect size holding the country-mean civic knowledge score of native adolescents constant. Recall that countries with the most and the least favorable citizenship policies differ by 63 units in the access to nationality index (i.e., 79 and 16 scale points in Sweden and Latvia, respectively). Therefore, the expected civic knowledge gap between immigrant-origin and native students is smaller by 23.31 points (63×0.37) in Sweden than in Latvia, after controlling for the country-mean civic knowledge score of native adolescents. When comparing this Model 5's estimate of τ (83.94, $p < .001$) with the estimate from Model 2 (133.28, $p < .001$), we see that the inclusion of the access to nationality index reduces parameter variance by about 37.0 percent. Turning to the model including the ideological position on immigration measure (Model 7), the effect the ideological position on immigration variable on the intercept is significantly negative (-9.97, SE = 3.89). This indicates that countries with a more conservative stance toward immigration tend to demonstrate a greater degree of disparity in civic knowledge scores between immigrant-origin and native adolescents holding the country-mean civic knowledge score of native adolescents constant. In regard to the magnitude of the effect, a one unit increase in the ideological position on immigration variable is associated with a 9.97-point increase in the native/immigrant civic

knowledge gap, after the country-mean civic knowledge score of native adolescents is held constant. Given that countries showing the least and the most conservative positions on immigration differ by 2.75 units in ideological position on immigration index (i.e., 2.81 and 0.06 points in Austria and England, respectively),²⁸ the civic knowledge gap between immigrant and native adolescents tends to be larger by approximately 27.42 points (9.97×2.75) in Austria than the corresponding gap in England, after controlling for the country-mean civic knowledge score of native adolescents. The results for the random effects also show that the resulting estimate of τ is 72.97 ($p < 0.01$), and about 46.8 percent of the total between-country variance is explained by the *ideological position on immigration* variable. By contrast, the other two country-level immigration policy variables, *the indices of immigrant political participation* and *anti-discrimination*, have no statistically significant effect.

Citizenship Self-efficacy The forest plot in Figure 5-9 displays graphically cross-national variability in effect sizes of the native/immigrant difference in citizenship self-efficacy scores, along with their associated 95% confidence intervals. It demonstrates that the 95% confidence intervals for all but three countries (i.e., Spain, the Netherlands and Norway) contain the overall average of the 24 countries' effect size estimates, as indicated by the dotted line. This overlap in the confidence intervals for most countries signals that the countries are quite homogeneous in terms of their true effect sizes of the native/immigrant difference in citizenship self-efficacy. Stated differently, the native/immigrant differences in levels of self-confidence in civic participation are fairly homogeneous across countries once their family background, political socialization experiences, and other demographic factors are taken into account.

²⁸ Note that Malta is excluded from the HLM meta-analyses in Model 7.

As presented in the first column of the citizenship self-efficacy measure in Table 5-8, the estimate of the overall (average) effect size is 1.29 points with a standard error of 0.22. The estimated value of 1.29 indicates that the citizenship self-efficacy scores of immigrant-origin adolescents are on average 1.29 points higher than those of their native counterparts once family background, political socialization experiences and other demographic factors are taken into account. To capture the precision with which the overall average is estimated, I also constructed a 95% confidence interval: the average estimate's lower and upper boundaries are 0.35 ($1.29 - 2 \times \sqrt{0.22}$) and 2.23 ($1.29 + 2 \times \sqrt{0.22}$) respectively. Again, this estimated average and its associated confidence interval are approximately equal to the estimate and interval for the average effect size that appears in the forest plot in Figure 5-9. The random effects result reported at the bottom of Table 5-8 reveals that the magnitude of the native/immigrant difference in levels of self-confidence in civic participation varies across countries ($\tau = 0.49, p < .05$), although the degree of variability is not substantial.

The second column of the citizenship self-efficacy measure in Table 5-8 (Model 2) presents that the country-mean citizenship self-efficacy score of native adolescents does not have a significant impact on the intercept ($-0.12, SE = 0.13$). However, as seen in the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth columns of the citizenship self-efficacy measure in Table 5-8 (Models 3 through 6) the cross-national variation in effect sizes is significantly related to the between-country difference in immigration policy contexts. For example, the coefficient of 0.02 for the immigrant political participation index ($0.02, SE = 0.01$) indicates that a one unit change in the immigrant political participation index is associated with an increase by 0.02 in effect size, holding the country-mean citizenship self-efficacy score of native adolescents constant. Note that the effect size estimate for this citizenship self-efficacy measure shows a positive sign in all countries except Italy,

Poland, Spain, and the Czech Republic (See Figure 5-9), suggesting that immigrant-origin adolescents generally show *higher* levels of self-confidence in participatory activities than their native counterparts. Therefore, the significant positive coefficient of 0.02 means that the citizenship self-efficacy scores between immigrant-origin and native adolescents are 1.3 points (0.02×65) higher in countries with the most supportive policies to encourage immigrants' democratic participation, such as Norway, compared to the corresponding difference in countries with the least supportive policies, such as the Czech Republic and Poland, after controlling for the country-mean citizenship self-efficacy score of native adolescents. In a similar vein, the coefficient of 0.03 associated with the anti-discrimination index (0.03, SE = 0.01) indicates that the average citizenship self-efficacy score of immigrant adolescents is higher by 2.1 points (70×0.03) in countries with the strongest anti-discrimination laws and equality policies (i.e., Sweden) compared to countries with the weakest anti-discrimination laws and equality policies (i.e., Bulgaria), holding the country-mean citizenship self-efficacy score of native adolescents constant. Although the size of the effect differs, there is a consistent pattern in the effect of immigrant integration policy across all the other policy measures except the ideological position on immigration variable. That is, immigrant adolescents in countries with more inclusionary immigration policies tend to demonstrate significantly higher levels of self-confidence in participatory activities than their counterparts in countries with more exclusionary immigration policies. The results for the variance components (shown at the bottom of the table) also show that each immigration policy measure accounts for a substantial portion of the between-country variance in effect sizes. The extent to which the immigration policy measures explain the between-country variance varies from 84.2 percent in Model 6 to 20.8 percent in Model 4; in Model 6, the resulting estimate of τ is approximately equal to 0 ($\tau = 0.8$, $p > .05$), suggesting that

the countries are fairly homogeneous in terms of the magnitude of the difference in citizenship self-efficacy scores between immigrant-origin and native adolescents once the two country-level variables (the anti-discrimination index and the country-mean citizenship self-efficacy score of native adolescents) are taken into account.

Expected Electoral Participation Cross-national variation in effect sizes of the native/immigrant difference in expected likelihood of voting, along with their associated 95% confidence intervals, are presented in the forest plot in Figure 5-10. It shows that the confidence intervals for nearly all of the countries include the average estimate, as indicated by the dotted line. By comparison, the intervals for two countries, Italy and Latvia, lie below the average estimate, while the intervals for New Zealand, Sweden, the Netherlands, and England lie above the average estimate. As with the civic knowledge and citizenship self-efficacy measures, the non-overlap in the 95% confidence intervals for the six countries implies that those six countries tend to vary substantially in their true effect sizes; the other countries whose confidence intervals contain the average estimate are likely quite homogeneous in terms of their effect sizes.

The last set of the results in Table 5-8 shows the findings for the expected electoral participation measure. As shown in the first column, the estimate of the 23 countries' average effect size is -0.86 points with a standard error of 0.37, indicating that on average, the expected electoral participation scores of immigrant-origin adolescents are 0.86 points lower than those of their native peers after their family background, political socialization experiences and other demographic factors are controlled for. When constructing a 95% confidence interval, the average estimate's lower and upper boundaries are -2.08 ($-0.86 - 2 \times \sqrt{0.37}$) and 0.36 ($-0.86 + 2 \times \sqrt{0.37}$) respectively. Once again, this estimate of the average effect size and its corresponding confidence are also approximately equal to the estimate and interval for the average size that

appears in the forest plot in Figure 5-10. The estimate of the random effects variance ($\tau = 1.74, p < .001$) tells us that the countries' effect sizes vary substantially around the mean effect size. In turn, this substantial variation in effect sizes suggests that the expected voting gap between immigrant-origin and native adolescents is substantially larger in some countries than in other countries, even after the native/immigrant differences in family background, political socialization experiences and other demographic factors are taken into account.

As seen in the second column (Model 2), the country-mean expected electoral participation score of native adolescents is negatively associated with the size of the voting gap between immigrant and native adolescents ($-0.36, SE = 0.18$). That is, the size of the gap in expected likelihood of voting between native and immigrant-origin adolescents tends to be larger in countries where native adolescents achieve higher scores on the expected electoral participation scale. Again echoing the results for the civic knowledge and citizenship self-efficacy measures, the cross-national variation in the magnitude of the difference in expected likelihood of voting between native and immigrant-origin adolescents is significantly associated with the between-country difference in immigration policy contexts. Turning to the effect of the immigrant political participation index on the intercept, we see that the effect is positive and statistically significant ($0.04, SE = .01$). This indicates that the expected voting gap between immigrant-origin and native adolescents tends to be smaller in countries with more inclusionary policies to encourage immigrants' democratic participation. Recall that in Table 5-2, for example, Ireland and Latvia differ by 61 points in the immigrant political participation index. Therefore, the coefficient of 0.04 for the immigrant political participation index means that the native/immigrant gap in expected likelihood of voting is larger by 2.44 points (0.04×61) in Latvia and than in Ireland when the country-mean expected electoral participation score of native

adolescents is controlled. Comparing this Model 3's estimate of τ (.80, $p < .001$) to the estimate from the Model 2 (i.e., 1.74) shows that the inclusion of the immigrant political participation index in the analysis reduces between-country variance by about 54.0 percent. A similar pattern in the effect of immigrant integration policy is also consistently observed across the other four policy variables, though the size of the effect varies. In other words, disparities in expected likelihood of voting between immigrant-origin and native adolescents tend to be significantly smaller in countries with more inclusionary immigration policies than in countries with more exclusionary immigration policies. Each immigration policy variable also explains a considerable portion of the between-country variance in the size of the native/immigrant gap in expected likelihood of voting. The extent to which the between-country variance is accounted for by the immigration policy variables varies across the models, ranging from 56.3 percent in Model 6 to 30.4 percent in Model 4.

Supplementary Analyses

In order to examine how immigration policy variables at the country level shape the relationship between immigration status and adolescents' civic orientations, I built the five HLM meta-analysis models. Within this framework, the effect of immigration policy contexts was estimated five times, one at a time, with the country-level control variable. As noted earlier, I decided to focus on one immigration policy variable at a time because of multicollinearity among the immigration policy variables and the small number of countries. However, such modeling strategy cannot provide information regarding the relative importance of one policy variable versus the other. Which immigration policy exerts stronger influence than the others on attenuating civic disparities between immigrant-origin and native adolescents? To address this question, at least in part, I conducted supplementary analyses that included the two immigration

policy variables in the same equation, along with the country-level control (i.e., the country-mean civic orientation score of non-immigrant adolescents). As a result, the total of ten models was estimated for each outcome measure (see Tables 5-9 through 5-11). In general, the results were quite consistent with the main findings from the previous HLM meta-analyses, though closer inspection yields several noteworthy patterns. Among them, for example, a country's ideological stance toward immigration is consistently relevant for explaining the cross-national variation in disparities in civic knowledge between immigrant-origin and native adolescents, even in the face of controls for other immigration policy variables (except Model 9). It is also interesting to see that the previously significant positive effects of the three immigration policy variables (i.e., immigrant political participation, immigrant education and access to nationality) disappear when the anti-discrimination index is additionally controlled for. This finding may suggest that the importance of anti-discrimination laws and equality policies overrides the importance of the other immigration policy contexts in terms of boosting young immigrants' levels of self-confidence in participatory activities. Another interesting finding shows that the effect of the immigration policy intended to encourage the emergence of immigrant civil society supersedes the effect of any other policy efforts (except the policy designed to facilitate immigrants' integration by countering discrimination) on reducing the native/immigrant gap in expected likelihood of voting. As shown in Table 5-10, for example, when the immigrant political participation index is additionally taken into account, the effects of educational policies specifically designed to meet the needs of immigrant children (Model 1) and supportive naturalization policies (Model 2) are not significant anymore. Although suggestive, the finding that many of the country-level immigration policy variables behave similarly to the previous HLM meta-analyses confirm the robustness of this study's major conclusion, which highlights

the importance of an improved integration policy and a supportive environment in encouraging immigrant adolescents to become more civically aware and engaged citizens.

Discussion and Conclusions

In this chapter I have compared the pattern and extent of differences in civic orientations among immigrant-origin and native adolescents in 24 countries, while accounting for macro-level immigration policy contexts of these countries. Several conclusions can be drawn from my analyses of these 24 countries. First, the nature of the extent and direction of differences in civic orientations between immigrant-origin and native adolescents varies for the three outcome measures. Although not universal across all the countries, immigrant adolescents tend to have lower civic knowledge and rate themselves less likely to vote than their native counterparts, whereas they show higher levels of citizenship self-efficacy than their native peers. In respect to the generational effect, first-generation immigrants are generally more disadvantaged in terms of levels of civic knowledge, self-confidence in civic participation and expectations of voting compared to their second-generation counterparts. These findings stress the importance of understanding adolescents' civic development as multi-dimensional. Put differently, adolescents' preparation for democratic citizenship should be addressed along multiple dimensions of knowledge, interest, efficacy, attitudes, and involvement in diverse forms of participatory activities. For a more complete understanding of immigrant adolescents' processes of civic integration, future cross-national research needs to examine other aspects of young immigrants' civic orientations and activism left unexplored in this study to see if the pattern of cross-national variation found for this chapter would be similar for other measures.

Second, drawing upon a resource model of citizen participation, I have examined whether differences in civic orientations among immigrant-origin and native adolescents can be accounted for by disparities in family resources and differential political socialization experiences. While a sweeping generalization across a wide range of countries is not possible, my findings from the OLS analyses have generally demonstrated that family resources and political socialization experiences cannot fully capture the significant differences in civic orientations between immigrant and native adolescents. In other words, even after taking into account family resources and political socialization experiences, substantial differences in civic orientations between immigrant and native adolescents persist in most countries. This indicates that Hypotheses 1 and 2, which are formulated mostly on the basis of US-based research, can be generalized to some contexts, but would receive only a little support in many other countries. That said, this interpretation of the results requires caution because my measures of family resources and political socialization experiences are not extensive enough. I have used home language, family socioeconomic background, and family structure as proxies for family-based civic resources. I also have considered the influences from political socialization agents by controlling for the individual student's perception of an open classroom climate, the level of media attention, and the frequency of political discussion with friends. Although important, these measures are far from definitive. They also do not encompass other kinds of civic resources and socialization experiences associated with adolescents' civic development, such as citizenship status, civic skills, taking civic-related lessons at school, and participation in the community or various petitioning and protest activities. More crucially, I was not able to take into consideration the important roles of ethnicity and cultural identity in affecting adolescents' civic orientations. This was mainly because a number of countries did not provide sufficiently

specified information or were reluctant to collect data on adolescents' ethnic or racial background. Much prior scholarship has recognized the centrality of young citizens' cultural heritage and ethnic identity as a driving force behind their civic development, while simultaneously identifying considerable disparities in access to civic resources along ethnic and racial lines. Thus, by not taking into account the ethnic or racial background of each adolescent, I might have under- or overestimated the explanatory power of family-based civic resources and socialization experiences. To conduct more robust tests of hypotheses regarding the underlying causes of differences in civic orientations among immigrant and native adolescents, future research may benefit from more elaborate data that distinguishes adolescents further on the basis of their ethnicity, race, or nationality.

Last, but most importantly, this chapter began with the assumption that an immigrant child or immigrant offspring in countries with more inclusionary immigration policies would show higher levels of civic competence and empowerment, even net of variations in family resources, political socialization experiences and other individual characteristics (Hypothesis 3). As hypothesized, my HLM meta-analyses have found strong empirical evidence of the significant role that comprehensive policies about immigrants' integration and acculturation play in mitigating civic disadvantages associated with immigration status. Although the magnitude of specific immigration policy effects differs across the three outcome measures, the main conclusions that emerge from the HLM meta-analyses are fairly similar. In terms of both the magnitude of the effect and the amount of variance explained, the *mitigating* impacts of more receptive immigration policies on disparities in civic knowledge and likelihood of expected voting between immigrant and native adolescents are substantial. Similarly, the relative advantage of immigrant adolescents in citizenship self-efficacy becomes stronger in countries

where governments are actively involved in public support for immigrants and immigrant families. These findings lend support to my reasoning that between-country differences in immigration policy contexts might be correlated with a cross-national variation in the effect of immigration status on adolescents' civic orientations, which remains even after taking into account differences in individual-level attributes that exist between immigrant and native adolescents.

Although useful to illuminate how country-level contexts condition the association between immigration status and adolescents' civic orientations, this chapter's main findings are limited by their reliance on cross-sectional international data. That is, cross-sectional data of student civic outcomes like ICCS 2009 have limitations in ascertaining any causal link between country-level immigration policy contexts and disparities in civic orientations between immigrant and native adolescents. Without more detailed information, it is not feasible to assess to what extent specific policy measures help increase disposable civic resources among immigrants and immigrant families. It is also unclear in what ways comprehensive policies on immigrants' integration have a buffering impact on civic disadvantages associated with immigration status. Therefore, further analysis is necessary to derive unambiguous causal conclusions with respect to the role of inclusionary immigration policy environments in attenuating civic disparities between immigrant and native adolescents. Well-designed longitudinal studies may explore whether immigrant-origin adolescents who grew up in the destination countries with favorable immigration policies become civically engaged and empowered upon reaching adulthood. At the same time, research based on large-scale quantitative data needs to be complemented with in-depth qualitative studies to fully understand

the mechanisms through which specific policy measures mediate the association between immigration status and adolescents' civic orientations.

Importantly, the results obtained in my analyses diverge from what has been portrayed by partisan politics and the right-wing media in the United States. The public image of contemporary immigrants has been colored to a large extent as being composed of people from the Global South whose countries of origin are uniformly poor, undeveloped, uneducated, and thus permanently inassimilable to the mainstream society. A similar perspective has been even found in the scholarly literature based on human capital perspective. It often attributes disadvantages of immigrant citizens to their lower socioeconomic conditions, poorer language skills, and the lack of other human capital characteristics. However, as clearly evidenced by my finding that immigrant adolescents show higher levels of self-confidence in civic participation and do not significantly differ in levels of engagement in the host societies' civic realm compared to their native peers, young immigrants come to their new home with a positive self-image of being responsible citizens and motivated for civic engagement. Thus, what makes the immigration status a civic disadvantage is a series of contextual factors of the host country including restrictive and selective immigration policies that hamper their successful socioeconomic integration and civic participation. If young immigrants are less civically knowledgeable and engaged compared to their native peers, it might be less attributable to the type of immigrants the host society attracts than to the welcome they are given. In sum, the findings are particularly significant for policymakers and researchers to address what should be done to promote immigrant adolescents' processes of civic integration. With more effectiveness of integration policies for immigrants and immigrant families, young immigrants are more likely to enhance their civic competence and contribution to the host society.

Table 5-1 Variables Description

| Variable | Coding |
|---|---|
| Civic knowledge | IRT plausible values with mean of 500 and standard deviation of 100 for equally weighted countries |
| Citizenship self-efficacy | IRT scores with mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10 for equally weighted countries |
| Expected adult electoral participation | IRT scores with mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10 for equally weighted countries |
| Gender | 1 = female; 0 = male |
| Immigration status | For OLS regression analysis: 0= students with no immigration background (native students); 1= first generation immigrants; 2=second generation immigrants. For HLM analysis: 0= native students; 1 = students with immigration background |
| Family socioeconomic status | Factor scores from a principal component analysis of three variables: (1) highest parental occupational level, (2) highest parental educational level, and (3) home literacy resources. |
| Home language | 1 = otherwise; 0 = speak test language at home |
| Family structure | 1 = single-parent families; 0 = otherwise |
| Openness in classroom discussions | Students' perceptions of openness in classroom discussions. IRT scores with mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10 for equally weighted countries. Higher values reflect perceptions of higher levels of classroom discussion of political and social issues. |
| Media attention | A combined measure averaging the three items that asked students how frequent they use newspapers, television, and internet to inform themselves about national and international news 1 = never or hardly ever; 2 = monthly (at least once a month); 3 = weekly (at least once a week); 4 = daily or almost daily |
| Political discussions with friends | A combined measure averaging the two items that asked students how often they are involved in talking with friends about political and social issues 1 = never or hardly ever; 2 = monthly (at least once a month); 3 = weekly (at least once a week); 4 = daily or almost daily |
| Urban location | 1 = urban (a school in a city with a population of more than 100,000); 0 = otherwise |
| Immigrant political participation index | MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policy Index) scores on immigrants' opportunities to participate in host societies' political arena. Higher scores indicate that host societies are more likely to provide immigrants with full support to equally participate in civic life. |

Table 5-1 Variables Description (continued)

| | |
|---|--|
| Immigrant education index | MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policy Index) scores on immigrant children's and children of immigrants' access to educational opportunities in host societies. Higher scores indicate that immigrant students in host countries are more likely to have equal access to educational opportunities. |
| Access to nationality index | MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policy Index) scores on immigrants' opportunities to acquire nationality in host societies. High scores indicate that host countries are more likely to grant immigrants full citizenship. |
| Anti-discrimination index | MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policy Index) scores on government policies of prohibiting discrimination against immigrant groups. Higher scores indicate that governments are more likely to adopt legislation meant to counter discrimination against immigrants. |
| Ideological position on immigration | Political parties' position on immigration policies. Higher scores indicate that countries favor right-wing policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants return to their country of origin. |
| Average non-immigrant civic orientation score | Average civic outcome score of non-immigrant students in each host country. |

Table 5-2 Descriptive Statistics by Country^a

| | AUT | BFL ^b | BGR | CHE | CYP | CZE | DNK | ENG | ESP | EST | FIN | GRC |
|---|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| Immigration status (%) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Native | 80.9 | 88.6 | 98.4 | 74.2 | 92.1 | 97.5 | 89.9 | 85.5 | 89.0 | 92.8 | 97.6 | 89.2 |
| First-generation | 6.4 | 5.1 | 0.8 | 8.3 | 6.5 | 1.3 | 3.8 | 5.7 | 10.2 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 7.2 |
| Second-generation | 12.7 | 6.3 | 0.8 | 17.5 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 6.3 | 8.8 | 1.9 | 6.3 | 1.1 | 3.6 |
| Immigrant political participation index ^c | 33 | 61 | 17 | 58 | 25 | 13 | 66 | 53 | 56 | 28 | 87 | 25 |
| Immigrant education index ^c | 44 | 66 | 15 | 45 | 33 | 44 | 51 | 58 | 48 | 50 | 63 | 42 |
| Anti-discrimination index ^c | 40 | 70 | 80 | 31 | 59 | 20 | 42 | 81 | 49 | 18 | 77 | 50 |
| Access to nationality index ^c | 22 | 69 | 24 | 36 | 32 | 33 | 33 | 75 | 39 | 15 | 54 | 18 |
| Ideological position on immigration ^d | 2.81 | .87 | .75 | 1.07 | 1.27 | 1.09 | 1.27 | .06 | 2.03 | 1.37 | 1.17 | 2.76 |
| Country mean civic knowledge scores ^e | 503 (97) | 514 (81) | 466 (105) | 531 (83) | 453 (93) | 510 (87) | 576 (100) | 519 (105) | 505 (86) | 525 (92) | 577 (84) | 476 (98) |
| Country mean citizenship self-efficacy scores ^e | 50.00 (9.51) | 47.01 (8.66) | 50.33 (10.14) | 47.56 (9.00) | 51.41 (11.46) | 47.03 (9.43) | 49.62 (9.60) | 50.07 (10.86) | 49.29 (10.07) | 52.67 (10.23) | 45.84 (9.03) | 51.92 (9.74) |
| Country mean expected electoral participation scores ^e | 50.65 (9.44) | 45.54 (9.22) | 47.72 (10.45) | 47.74 (10.00) | 48.51 (10.92) | 43.70 (10.74) | 49.11 (9.08) | 47.48 (10.12) | 51.07 (10.01) | 53.67 (8.89) | 49.15 (8.75) | 50.03 (10.48) |
| Female (%) | 50.9 | 49.6 | 50.9 | 50.0 | 49.3 | 46.0 | 51.7 | 51.9 | 50.6 | 50.5 | 51.3 | 51.0 |
| Family SES | .05 (1.01) | -.01 (1.00) | .05 (.98) | .03 (.99) | -.01 (1.00) | -.00 (1.00) | -.01 (1.02) | -.02 (.99) | .03 (1.01) | .03 (1.00) | .00 (.99) | .05 (1.00) |
| Language minority (%) | 15.9 | 11.4 | 10.8 | 20.3 | 7.7 | 1.7 | 6.3 | 7.6 | 19.5 | 4.0 | 3.7 | 5.9 |
| Single-parent (%) | 16.4 | 11.7 | 17.1 | 17.4 | 18.9 | 16.7 | 11.5 | 17.8 | NA | 23.9 | 15.4 | 18.4 |
| Openness in classroom discussion | 47.49 (10.46) | 49.33 (8.82) | 47.80 (10.34) | 47.72 (9.47) | 50.63 (11.24) | 48.87 (8.28) | 54.51 (9.54) | 53.05 (10.37) | 48.02 (9.37) | 50.16 (9.03) | 49.53 (7.98) | 50.80 (9.67) |
| Media attention | 2.28 (.78) | 2.07 (.73) | 2.45 (.80) | 2.35 (.75) | 1.92 (.74) | 2.47 (.77) | 2.25 (.77) | 2.20 (.81) | 2.18 (.70) | 2.69 (.77) | 2.29 (.82) | 1.93 (.72) |
| Political discussions with friends | 1.76 (.75) | 1.45 (.60) | 1.80 (.78) | 1.68 (.71) | 1.75 (.75) | 1.57 (.63) | 1.68 (.70) | 1.59 (.72) | 1.49 (.62) | 1.79 (.71) | 1.55 (.63) | 1.77 (.76) |
| Urban (%) | 18.5 | 13.7 | 33.5 | 8.5 | 21.2 | 16.0 | 13.1 | 28.5 | 36.0 | 26.6 | 29.4 | 21.4 |
| Urban missing (%) | 19.1 | - | NA | 8.9 | 14.0 | 8.4 | 13.6 | 15.3 | 2.7 | 10.2 | 1.2 | 20.7 |
| Student N (unweighted) | 3318 | 2937 | 3002 | 2821 | 2847 | 4560 | 4223 | 2798 | 3204 | 2678 | 3255 | 2975 |

Table 5-2 Descriptive Statistics by Country (continued)

| | IRL | ITA | LTU | LUX | LVA | MLT | NLD | NOR | NZL | POL | SVN | SWE |
|---|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|
| Immigration status (%) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Native | 88.0 | 92.5 | 95.2 | 60.4 | 94.3 | 97.3 | 88.3 | 89.2 | 77.1 | 98.2 | 89.1 | 81.3 |
| First-generation | 10.4 | 6.0 | 0.8 | 12.6 | 0.7 | 1.4 | 3.8 | 4.7 | 14.9 | 0.4 | 2.0 | 6.0 |
| Second-generation | 1.7 | 1.5 | 4.0 | 27.0 | 5.0 | 1.3 | 7.9 | 6.1 | 8.0 | 1.3 | 8.9 | 12.7 |
| Immigrant political participation index ^c | 79 | 50 | 25 | 76 | 18 | 25 | 79 | 94 | NA | 13 | 28 | 75 |
| Immigrant education index ^c | 25 | 41 | 17 | 52 | 17 | 16 | 51 | 63 | NA | 29 | 24 | 77 |
| Anti-discrimination index ^c | 55 | 62 | 50 | 47 | 25 | 27 | 68 | 59 | NA | 35 | 66 | 88 |
| Access to nationality index ^c | 60 | 65 | 20 | 34 | 16 | 26 | 65 | 41 | NA | 35 | 33 | 79 |
| Ideological position on immigration ^d | 1.85 | .73 | 1.27 | 1.76 | 1.46 | 4.54 | 1.18 | 1.21 | 1.02 | 1.07 | 1.20 | 1.07 |
| Country mean civic knowledge scores ^e | 534 (101) | 531 (88) | 505 (80) | 473 (96) | 482 (82) | 490 (95) | 494 (91) | 515 (96) | 517 (110) | 536 (99) | 516 (87) | 537 (99) |
| Country mean citizenship self-efficacy scores ^e | 48.91 (10.89) | 51.13 (9.20) | 49.96 (8.37) | 48.13 (9.85) | 49.05 (8.20) | 46.55 (11.23) | 47.73 (9.67) | 50.14 (10.40) | 47.94 (11.26) | 50.99 (9.39) | 49.74 (10.31) | 49.04 (11.01) |
| Country mean expected electoral participation scores ^e | 52.16 (9.89) | 54.11 (9.19) | 51.78 (9.24) | 47.43 (10.07) | 50.22 (9.70) | 49.27 (9.38) | 46.56 (9.69) | 51.84 (10.51) | 48.89 (9.73) | 48.16 (9.85) | 49.60 (10.44) | 49.01 (9.59) |
| Female (%) | 48.6 | 48.0 | 49.3 | 51.6 | 51.5 | 47.3 | 53.2 | 50.6 | 49.4 | 50.4 | 49.7 | 50.0 |
| Family SES | .01 (.99) | .02 (1.01) | .03 (1.01) | .10 (.99) | .10 (.98) | .07 (1.01) | .06 (.97) | .03 (1.01) | -.02 (1.02) | .02 (1.01) | .02 (1.01) | -.04 (1.03) |
| Language minority (%) | 9.6 | 6.0 | 5.4 | 92.2 | 9.1 | 17.5 | 9.6 | 9.3 | 9.1 | 1.4 | 6.6 | 15.3 |
| Single-parent (%) | 15.5 | 17.8 | 20.1 | 16.4 | 26.2 | NA | 9.7 | 11.1 | 19.4 | 13.4 | 15.4 | 12.2 |
| Openness in classroom discussion | 52.39 (10.84) | 54.27 (8.93) | 49.14 (8.85) | 48.00 (9.39) | 50.43 (8.59) | 46.38 (9.28) | 48.34 (8.65) | 52.36 (10.23) | 53.20 (10.84) | 50.88 (9.85) | 49.97 (9.58) | 51.12 (10.3) |
| Media attention | 2.00 (.77) | 2.41 (.73) | 2.57 (.75) | 2.30 (.79) | 2.45 (.70) | 2.19 (.77) | 2.22 (.78) | 2.52 (.83) | 2.12 (.76) | 2.63 (.72) | 2.21 (.78) | 2.34 (.84) |
| Political discussions with friends | 1.53 (.68) | 1.68 (.74) | 1.79 (.72) | 1.62 (.66) | 1.95 (.75) | 1.80 (.73) | 1.47 (.61) | 1.65 (.72) | 1.72 (.76) | 1.71 (.72) | 1.60 (.63) | 1.57 (.71) |
| Urban (%) | 30.8 | 15.2 | 40.2 | 100.0 | 28.7 | - | 13.5 | 14.9 | 48.6 | 25.2 | 14.5 | 25.5 |
| Urban missing (%) | 8.0 | 0.6 | 2.2 | 29.7 | 12.3 | 2.5 | 44.2 | 8.5 | 15.1 | - | 8.0 | 8.4 |
| Student <i>N</i> (unweighted) | 3188 | 3294 | 3844 | 4641 | 2718 | 2046 | 1876 | 2711 | 3746 | 3222 | 3021 | 3329 |

Note: AUT = Austria, BGR = Bulgaria, BFL = the Flemish part of Belgium, CHE = Switzerland, CYP = Cyprus, CZE = Czech Republic, DNK = Denmark, ENG = England, ESP = Spain, EST = Estonia, FIN = Finland, GRC = Greece, IRL = Ireland, ITA = Italy, LVA = Latvia, LTU = Lithuania, LUX = Luxembourg, MLT = Malta, NLD = Netherlands, NOR = Norway, NZL = New Zealand, POL = Poland, SVN = Slovenia, SWE = Sweden

^a For categorical variables, percentages of students in each category are presented, while means and standard deviations are presented for continuous variables. Values in parentheses are standard deviations.

^b Data refer to the whole of Belgium.


^c Data were taken from the Migrant Integration Policy Index II (2007) and Migrant Integration Policy Index III (2011). Data were retrieved on May 15th, 2013 from http://www.mipex.eu/sites/default/files/downloads/migrant_integration_policy_index_mipex_ii-2007.pdf and

http://www.mipex.eu/sites/default/files/downloads/migrant_integration_policy_index_mipexiii_2011.pdf. The reference years are 2007 and 2011, respectively.

^d Data were taken from Benoit and Laver (2006) and retrieved on May 15th, 2013 from http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/ppmd/PPMD_11apr2006.pdf. The reference years are 2001-2004 in most countries. Larger numbers indicate a tendency to favor the right wing immigration policies, i.e. policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants return to their country of origin as opposed to policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants integrate into the host society.

^e The author's own calculation using the ICCS 2009 data (weighted means).

Figure 5-1 Proportions of Immigrant Students



Note: Countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of immigrant students.

Table 5-3 Correlation Matrix for Country-level Variables

| | (2) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|-----|
| (1) Immigrant political participation | 1 | | | | | | | |
| (2) Immigrant education | .68** | 1 | | | | | | |
| (3) Anti-discrimination | .46* | .36 | 1 | | | | | |
| (4) Access to nationality | .64** | .60** | .46* | 1 | | | | |
| (5) Ideological position on immigration | -.17 | -.31 | -.42* | -.44* | 1 | | | |
| (6) Average nonimmigrant civic knowledge score | .55** | .51* | .08 | .42* | -.22 | 1 | | |
| (7) Average nonimmigrant citizenship self-efficacy score | -.31 | -.23 | .11 | -.18 | -.01 | -.27 | 1 | |
| (8) Average nonimmigrant expected electoral participation score | .28 | -.11 | .08 | .03 | .31 | .17 | .48* | 1 |

Note: Bivariate correlations among all available data points are presented here (pairwise deletion).

** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$

Table 5-4 Comparing Individual and Familial Characteristics of Immigrant-origin and Native Adolescents

| | Austria | | Belgium(Flemish) | | Bulgaria | | Switzerland | | Cyprus | | Czech Republic | | Denmark | | England | |
|--|------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|
| | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV |
| Female (%) | 52.1 | 50.7 | 55.9 | 48.8 | 48.0 | 51.0 | 52.2 | 49.3 | 51.4 | 49.2 | 43.2 | 46.1 | 49.2 | 52.0 | 49.3 | 52.3 |
| Family SES | -.38 (1.10) | .15 (.97) | -.66 (1.24) | .08 (.93) | -.24 (1.03) | .05 (.98) | -.36 (1.07) | .16 (.92) | -.23 (.91) | .01 (1.01) | -.19 (1.23) | .00 (.99) | -.78 (1.17) | .08 (.96) | -.15 (1.15) | .00 (.95) |
| First-generation (%) | 33.8 | - | 44.6 | - | 50.7 | - | 32.2 | - | 82.1 | - | 54.2 | - | 37.8 | - | 39.6 | - |
| Language minority (%) | 74.1 | 2.1 | 35.9 | 4.6 | 46.9 | 10.2 | 58.2 | 7.1 | 49.0 | 4.0 | 57.7 | 0.7 | 44.1 | 0.7 | 44.2 | 1.4 |
| Single parents (%) | 14.9 | 16.4 | 15.4 | 11.2 | 19.0 | 17.0 | 17.5 | 17.3 | 18.8 | 18.9 | 15.7 | 16.8 | 12.7 | 11.3 | 18.7 | 17.6 |
| Openness in classroom discussion | 47.01 (10.80) | 47.59 (10.39) | 51.45 (9.35) | 49.05 (8.71) | 46.43 (11.02) | 47.83 (10.33) | 47.45 (10.09) | 47.81 (9.24) | 50.38 (11.43) | 50.66 (11.23) | 48.85 (8.50) | 48.87 (8.28) | 54.05 (9.64) | 54.56 (9.54) | 53.61 (10.20) | 52.96 (10.40) |
| Media attention | 2.34 (.76) | 2.27 (.78) | 2.16 (.75) | 2.06 (.73) | 2.43 (.87) | 2.45 (.79) | 2.41 (.77) | 2.33 (.75) | 1.99 (.71) | 1.92 (.74) | 2.44 (.84) | 2.47 (.77) | 2.63 (.80) | 2.21 (.75) | 2.52 (.82) | 2.15 (.79) |
| Political discussion with friends | 1.86 (.78) | 1.73 (.75) | 1.68 (.71) | 1.42 (.58) | 1.98 (.94) | 1.80 (.78) | 1.70 (.70) | 1.68 (.71) | 1.89 (.77) | 1.74 (.75) | 1.78 (.80) | 1.56 (.62) | 1.91 (.75) | 1.66 (.69) | 1.82 (.79) | 1.55 (.69) |
| Urban (%) | 29.6 | 15.9 | 37.4 | 10.7 | 29.8 | 33.6 | 14.5 | 6.5 | 21.6 | 21.1 | 36.8 | 15.5 | 22.5 | 12.1 | 57.7 | 23.6 |
| Location missing (%) | 17.0 | 19.5 | - | - | - | - | 8.9 | 8.9 | 10.4 | 14.3 | 8.7 | 8.4 | 19.0 | 13.0 | 13.9 | 15.6 |
| Civic knowledge score | 460 (95) | 516 (96) | 478 (77) | 521 (79) | 381 (112) | 472 (104) | 498 (78) | 540 (78) | 425 (93) | 455 (93) | 493 (94) | 511 (87) | 518 (98) | 582 (95) | 502 (113) | 521 (101) |
| Citizenship self-efficacy score | 50.07 (10.01) | 50.05 (9.44) | 50.07 (8.85) | 46.76 (8.52) | 52.55 (12.80) | 50.20 (10.13) | 48.17 (9.91) | 47.25 (8.70) | 51.09 (11.86) | 51.36 (11.39) | 46.81 (9.08) | 47.04 (9.43) | 49.33 (10.35) | 49.58 (9.57) | 52.84 (10.75) | 49.60 (10.76) |
| Expected electoral participation score | 47.41 (9.45) | 51.46 (9.28) | 45.49 (9.79) | 45.80 (9.16) | 48.29 (11.17) | 47.57 (10.65) | 45.83 (10.69) | 49.10 (9.90) | 46.38 (10.76) | 48.59 (10.95) | 40.48 (9.32) | 43.78 (10.72) | 47.02 (9.82) | 49.19 (8.92) | 50.04 (9.69) | 46.92 (10.14) |

Table 5-4 Comparing Individual and Familial Characteristics of Immigrant-origin and Native Adolescents (continued)

| | Spain | | Estonia | | Finland | | Greece | | Ireland | | Italy | | Lithuania | | Luxembourg | |
|--|------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV |
| Female (%) | 50.5 | 50.6 | 51.1 | 50.5 | 46.9 | 51.4 | 53.7 | 50.7 | 48.4 | 48.7 | 49.3 | 47.9 | 43.9 | 49.6 | 52.2 | 51.2 |
| Family SES | -42 (.88) | .09 (1.01) | .03 (1.02) | .04 (.99) | -.19 (1.09) | .01 (.98) | -.49 (.85) | .11 (1.00) | .05 (1.05) | .01 (.98) | -.40 (.83) | .06 (1.01) | .20 (1.03) | .02 (1.01) | -.47 (.96) | .48 (.83) |
| First-generation (%) | 82.3 | - | 13.2 | - | 54.7 | - | 66.2 | - | 86.0 | - | 80.5 | - | 18.6 | - | 31.8 | - |
| Language minority (%) | 48.7 | 15.9 | 83.8 | 0.3 | 76.9 | 1.9 | 46.9 | 0.9 | 54.2 | 3.5 | 69.9 | 0.9 | 14.0 | 4.9 | 85.8 | 96.4 |
| Single parents (%) | NA | NA | 20.2 | 24.2 | 27.2 | 15.1 | 23.6 | 17.8 | 22.6 | 14.5 | 18.9 | 17.7 | 27.5 | 19.8 | 15.8 | 16.7 |
| Openness in classroom discussion | 48.20 (10.49) | 48.00 (9.22) | 49.47 (9.40) | 50.21 (9.00) | 52.06 (8.87) | 49.47 (7.94) | 49.19 (9.65) | 51.00 (9.67) | 52.85 (10.23) | 52.32 (10.91) | 52.65 (9.54) | 54.40 (8.88) | 46.27 (9.79) | 49.28 (8.74) | 48.30 (9.09) | 47.80 (9.57) |
| Media | 2.27 (.71) | 2.16 (.69) | 2.55 (.82) | 2.70 (.76) | 2.43 (.95) | 2.28 (.81) | 1.92 (.71) | 1.94 (.73) | 2.13 (.83) | 1.98 (.76) | 2.31 (.67) | 2.42 (.73) | 2.51 (.80) | 2.57 (.74) | 2.40 (.78) | 2.23 (.79) |
| Friends | 1.60 (.71) | 1.47 (.61) | 1.85 (.77) | 1.78 (.71) | 1.76 (.78) | 1.54 (.63) | 1.80 (.77) | 1.77 (.76) | 1.72 (.77) | 1.50 (.67) | 1.70 (.73) | 1.68 (.74) | 1.87 (.76) | 1.79 (.72) | 1.60 (.65) | 1.63 (.67) |
| Urban (%) | 38.6 | 35.6 | 34.4 | 26.0 | 58.0 | 28.7 | 24.0 | 21.1 | 34.3 | 30.3 | 13.6 | 15.3 | 51.1 | 39.7 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Location missing (%) | 4.7 | 2.4 | 8.8 | 10.4 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 16.5 | 21.2 | 9.7 | 7.8 | 2.0 | 0.5 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 27.1 | 31.1 |
| Civic knowledge score | 462 (89) | 513 (84) | 485 (91) | 529 (90) | 513 (87) | 578 (83) | 431 (94) | 484 (96) | 404 (104) | 542 (98) | 484 (97) | 535 (86) | 480 (79) | 497 (83) | 457 (84) | 507 (91) |
| Citizenship self-efficacy score | 48.73 (10.52) | 49.29 (9.93) | 48.83 (9.38) | 48.04 (8.32) | 47.92 (11.33) | 45.89 (8.92) | 51.35 (9.92) | 51.95 (9.78) | 49.49 (10.62) | 48.89 (10.90) | 49.44 (9.99) | 51.34 (9.06) | 49.85 (8.84) | 49.99 (8.46) | 48.01 (9.71) | 48.04 (9.54) |
| Expected electoral participation score | 48.56 (10.73) | 51.52 (9.79) | 45.66 (10.64) | 46.65 (8.85) | 48.09 (11.07) | 49.29 (8.69) | 46.20 (11.13) | 50.38 (10.36) | 50.25 (10.59) | 52.55 (9.64) | 48.33 (10.38) | 54.71 (8.87) | 47.44 (9.90) | 51.11 (9.35) | 45.96 (9.95) | 48.89 (9.83) |

Table 5-4 Comparing Individual and Familial Characteristics of Immigrant-origin and Native Adolescents (continued)

| | Latvia | | Malta | | Netherlands | | Norway | | New Zealand | | Poland | | Slovenia | | Sweden | |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV | IMM | NAV |
| Female (%) | 42.8 | 52.1 | 53.3 | 47.1 | 55.3 | 53.0 | 48.3 | 50.9 | 46.8 | 50.2 | 29.7 | 50.7 | 48.7 | 50.0 | 50.4 | 50.0 |
| Family SES | .11 (.93) | .10 (.98) | .07 (1.01) | .07 (1.01) | -.61 (1.24) | .15 (.91) | -.68 (1.12) | .12 (.96) | .04 (1.11) | -.03 (.99) | .07 (1.04) | .02 (1.01) | -.36 (1.01) | .07 (1.00) | -.65 (1.12) | .11 (.95) |
| First-generation (%) | 12.7 | - | 52.3 | - | 32.1 | - | 42.9 | - | 65.1 | - | 25.0 | - | 18.7 | - | 32.3 | - |
| Language minority (%) | 17.5 | 7.8 | 35.8 | 17.0 | 54.9 | 3.6 | 27.3 | 1.6 | 33.6 | 1.9 | 4.7 | 1.4 | 42.5 | 1.8 | 24.3 | 1.5 |
| Single parents (%) | 17.9 | 26.0 | NA | NA | 18.0 | 8.6 | 14.8 | 10.7 | 15.2 | 20.7 | 16.2 | 13.4 | 18.1 | 15.0 | 20.1 | 10.4 |
| Openness in classroom discussion | 47.43 (9.67) | 50.61 (8.50) | 46.30 (12.56) | 46.38 (9.17) | 48.98 (9.50) | 48.25 (8.57) | 51.89 (10.55) | 52.41 (10.18) | 54.15 (10.70) | 52.92 (10.87) | 50.86 (10.57) | 50.88 (9.83) | 49.89 (9.85) | 49.98 (9.55) | 51.89 (10.08) | 50.94 (9.75) |
| Media | 2.50 (.72) | 2.45 (.70) | 2.24 (.81) | 2.19 (.76) | 2.50 (.78) | 2.18 (.78) | 2.67 (.83) | 2.50 (.82) | 2.29 (.76) | 2.06 (.76) | 2.55 (.80) | 2.63 (.72) | 2.08 (.74) | 2.23 (.78) | 2.63 (.82) | 2.28 (.83) |
| Friends | 1.94 (.72) | 1.95 (.76) | 1.92 (.76) | 1.79 (.73) | 1.59 (.68) | 1.45 (.60) | 1.86 (.82) | 1.62 (.70) | 1.89 (.80) | 1.67 (.74) | 1.98 (.85) | 1.71 (.72) | 1.66 (.65) | 1.59 (.63) | 1.79 (.79) | 1.52 (.68) |
| Urban (%) | 48.3 | 27.5 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 33.6 | 10.6 | 34.2 | 12.5 | 70.9 | 41.9 | 28.4 | 25.1 | 24.9 | 13.3 | 53.3 | 19.1 |
| Location missing (%) | 16.9 | 12.0 | 9.7 | 2.3 | 34.3 | 45.8 | 12.0 | 8.0 | 15.1 | 15.1 | - | - | 6.9 | 8.1 | 8.1 | 8.5 |
| Civic knowledge score | 481 (80) | 487 (82) | 435 (104) | 496 (95) | 460 (92) | 502 (99) | 466 (91) | 522 (95) | 507 (110) | 519 (109) | 544 (90) | 539 (99) | 483 (81) | 520 (87) | 493 (98) | 546 (96) |
| Citizenship self-efficacy score | 49.55 (8.68) | 49.01 (8.21) | 47.57 (13.07) | 47.11 (10.97) | 49.37 (9.80) | 47.20 (9.24) | 51.63 (11.11) | 50.04 (10.25) | 49.03 (10.51) | 47.71 (11.31) | 50.03 (10.10) | 50.95 (9.41) | 50.16 (10.25) | 49.77 (10.29) | 51.45 (10.96) | 48.78 (11.15) |
| Expected electoral participation score | 46.42 (9.49) | 50.27 (9.76) | 46.09 (10.73) | 49.57 (9.12) | 46.05 (10.40) | 46.70 (9.53) | 49.14 (11.14) | 52.37 (10.28) | 49.67 (8.93) | 48.63 (9.93) | 47.52 (10.95) | 48.23 (9.87) | 47.75 (11.14) | 49.83 (10.34) | 48.84 (9.99) | 49.18 (9.57) |

Note: IMM = Immigrant students, NAV = Native students. NA = Data is not available. For categorical variables, percentages of students in each category are presented, while means and standard deviations are presented for continuous variables. Values in parentheses are standard deviations.

Table 5-5 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Civic Knowledge Scores on Immigration Status, Family Background, Political Socialization Agents, and Controls

| | Bulgaria | | | Sweden | | | Norway | | | Denmark | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 |
| First generation | -81.87 ^{***} (26.78) | -48.92 ^{***} (22.09) | -44.14 ^{***} (20.55) | -69.89 ^{***} (8.89) | -14.96 (11.40) | -18.49 (11.26) | -69.64 ^{***} (9.74) | -36.29 [*] (12.53) | -32.76 ^{**} (12.02) | -66.67 ^{***} (8.51) | -49.84 ^{***} (10.15) | -54.84 ^{***} (9.86) |
| Second generation | -69.91 ^{***} (24.50) | -31.62 (22.57) | -41.04 (22.57) | -51.84 ^{***} (6.03) | -11.84 (8.11) | -18.07 [*] (7.88) | -47.40 ^{***} (8.40) | -7.94 (10.88) | -14.69 (10.65) | -69.94 ^{***} (7.32) | -47.12 ^{***} (8.24) | -62.38 ^{***} (8.21) |
| Female | 29.50 ^{***} (3.57) | 30.20 ^{***} (3.20) | 19.62 ^{***} (3.09) | 21.27 ^{***} (3.79) | 20.66 ^{***} (3.60) | 15.00 ^{***} (3.52) | 21.04 ^{***} (3.58) | 19.28 ^{***} (3.34) | 18.90 ^{***} (3.30) | 6.99 ^{**} (2.99) | 10.63 ^{***} (2.80) | 8.88 ^{**} (2.69) |
| Urban | 52.01 ^{***} (4.25) | 21.25 ^{***} (3.93) | 22.84 ^{**} (3.75) | 21.27 ^{***} (3.79) | 6.96 [*] (4.47) | 7.37 [*] (4.34) | 21.47 ^{***} (5.47) | 12.60 ^{**} (5.22) | 11.43 ^{**} (5.05) | 34.20 ^{***} (4.95) | 21.19 ^{**} (4.79) | 15.32 ^{***} (4.55) |
| Location missing | - | - | - | 3.80 (6.06) | 7.34 (5.66) | 7.84 [*] (5.48) | 8.94 (6.19) | 9.80 [*] (5.82) | 10.45 [*] (5.64) | -11.95 (4.86) | -11.79 ^{**} (4.62) | -9.35 [*] (4.47) |
| Family SES | | 38.87 ^{**} (1.94) | 34.58 ^{***} (1.84) | | 37.73 ^{***} (1.75) | 33.38 ^{***} (1.72) | | 34.09 ^{***} (1.97) | 30.07 ^{***} (1.96) | | 36.00 ^{***} (1.52) | 29.62 ^{***} (1.56) |
| Home Language | | -53.57 ^{***} (5.63) | -46.45 ^{***} (5.30) | | -21.56 [*] (8.72) | -26.38 ^{**} (8.61) | | -12.84 [*] (9.90) | -14.76 [*] (9.67) | | 16.70 [*] (8.84) | 11.72 (8.56) |
| Single parents | | -1.40 (4.69) | .99 (4.51) | | 7.23 (5.34) | 8.62 [*] (5.28) | | -4.53 (6.19) | -2.05 (6.00) | | -4.21 (5.32) | -2.31 (5.18) |
| Openness in classroom discussion | | | 2.51 ^{***} (.18) | | | 2.00 ^{***} (.18) | | | 1.72 ^{***} (.18) | | | 1.43 ^{***} (.16) |
| Media | | | 10.77 [*] (2.31) | | | 9.68 ^{***} (2.15) | | | 13.56 ^{***} (2.25) | | | 17.21 ^{***} (2.20) |
| Friends | | | -8.12 ^{**} (2.14) | | | 7.63 ^{**} (2.77) | | | -1.23 (3.10) | | | 16.35 ^{***} (2.25) |
| Constant | 446.77 ^{***} (2.61) | 405.95 ^{***} (5.54) | 284.28 ^{***} (10.88) | 533.40 ^{***} (2.80) | 509.29 ^{***} (9.19) | 372.35 ^{***} (12.82) | 512.71 ^{***} (2.93) | 490.37 ^{***} (10.33) | 375.36 ^{***} (14.08) | 580.85 ^{***} (2.57) | 594.59 ^{***} (8.85) | 447.09 ^{***} (13.10) |
| R ² | .089 | .196 | .353 | .055 | .191 | .252 | .044 | .164 | .220 | .056 | .183 | .261 |


Table 5-5 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Civic Knowledge Scores on Immigration Status, Family Background, Political Socialization Agents, and Controls (continued)

| | Austria | | | Finland | | | Slovenia | | | Greece | | | Luxembourg | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 |
| First generation | -65.90*** (7.26) | -24.40** (9.04) | -25.21* (8.74) | -63.54*** (13.05) | -27.19 (14.95) | -30.04* (14.74) | -63.20*** (12.18) | -35.50* (13.35) | -29.76* (13.45) | -59.20*** (6.90) | -21.14* (8.34) | -19.56* (8.38) | -59.13*** (4.15) | -19.76*** (4.29) | -25.34*** (4.22) |
| Second generation | -61.63*** (5.38) | -10.00 (7.74) | -10.51 (7.64) | -56.96*** (16.31) | -21.85 (16.69) | -27.95^ (16.64) | -34.24*** (5.88) | -15.41** (6.16) | -14.07* (6.01) | -40.50*** (10.22) | -21.51*** (9.54) | -22.84** (9.90) | -51.45*** (3.51) | -14.53*** (3.89) | -17.19*** (3.79) |
| Female | 15.68*** (3.46) | 15.28*** (3.38) | 15.28*** (3.32) | 26.76*** (3.21) | 26.21*** (3.08) | 26.78*** (3.02) | 28.82*** (3.29) | 29.35*** (3.19) | 25.96*** (3.17) | 33.01*** (3.70) | 27.03*** (3.43) | 24.70*** (3.56) | 8.72*** (2.95) | 10.46*** (2.77) | 9.76*** (2.74) |
| Urban | 48.59*** (5.19) | 28.94*** (5.39) | 28.85*** (5.28) | 11.30*** (3.38) | -.38 (3.32) | -1.07 (3.28) | 22.10*** (4.61) | 10.87** (4.56) | 6.38 (4.42) | 25.06*** (4.48) | 17.55*** (4.20) | 16.89** (4.05) | NA | NA | NA |
| Location missing | 7.21^ (4.23) | 2.46 (4.02) | 3.93 (3.95) | -30.87* (15.03) | -26.96^ (14.45) | -22.38 (14.36) | -7.15 (6.07) | -6.27 (5.89) | -5.88 (5.76) | -25.38*** (4.65) | -20.96*** (4.31) | -19.58** (4.37) | -18.48*** (3.19) | -20.24*** (2.98) | -19.13*** (2.94) |
| Family SES | 27.95*** (1.80) | 27.95*** (1.80) | 25.77*** (1.76) | 26.53*** (1.45) | 26.53*** (1.45) | 24.49*** (1.47) | 22.45*** (1.71) | 22.45*** (1.71) | 22.77*** (1.67) | 23.23*** (1.79) | 23.23*** (1.79) | 23.71*** (1.81) | 39.71*** (1.58) | 39.71*** (1.58) | 37.98*** (1.55) |
| Home Language | -43.93*** (7.52) | -43.93*** (7.52) | -45.22*** (7.38) | -35.68*** (9.58) | -35.68*** (9.58) | -36.78*** (9.41) | -23.10* (8.30) | -23.10* (8.30) | -19.98* (8.03) | -30.28*** (9.36) | -30.28*** (9.36) | -28.80*** (9.37) | -5.60 (5.74) | -5.60 (5.74) | -3.60 (5.62) |
| Single parents | -6.52 (4.40) | -6.52 (4.40) | -4.62 (4.29) | 4.85 (4.41) | 4.85 (4.41) | 5.75 (4.36) | -8.72* (4.48) | -8.72* (4.48) | -2.50 (4.25) | 3.61 (4.82) | 3.61 (4.82) | 4.63 (4.84) | -5.84 (3.66) | -5.84 (3.66) | -3.68 (3.57) |
| Openness in classroom discussion | 1.04*** (.18) | 1.04*** (.18) | 1.04*** (.18) | .62*** (.18) | .62*** (.18) | .62*** (.18) | 1.57*** (.17) | 1.57*** (.17) | 1.57*** (.17) | 2.46*** (.18) | 2.46*** (.18) | 2.46*** (.18) | 1.03*** (.14) | 1.03*** (.14) | 1.03*** (.14) |
| Media | | 15.96*** (2.30) | 15.96*** (2.30) | 7.74*** (2.04) | 7.74*** (2.04) | 7.74*** (2.04) | 16.63*** (2.45) | 16.63*** (2.45) | 16.63*** (2.45) | 1.47 (2.51) | 1.47 (2.51) | 1.47 (2.51) | 14.13*** (1.91) | 14.13*** (1.91) | 14.13*** (1.91) |
| Friends | | .19 (2.41) | .19 (2.41) | 13.08*** (2.52) | 13.08*** (2.52) | 13.08*** (2.52) | -.35 (2.59) | -.35 (2.59) | -.35 (2.59) | 3.41 (2.36) | 3.41 (2.36) | 3.41 (2.36) | 1.68 (2.26) | 1.68 (2.26) | 1.68 (2.26) |
| Constant | 500.14*** (3.07) | 458.90*** (7.59) | 370.72*** (11.57) | 562.44*** (2.34) | 460.32** (9.51) | 460.32** (9.51) | 503.34*** (2.41) | 482.00*** (8.51) | 371.50** (12.89) | 469.35*** (2.92) | 301.93*** (13.54) | 311.19*** (13.49) | 501.56*** (2.74) | 485.10*** (2.76) | 402.01*** (7.32) |
| R ² | .095 | .185 | .216 | .044 | .138 | .169 | .053 | .120 | .180 | .081 | .209 | .202 | .086 | .227 | .256 |

Table 5-5 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Civic Knowledge Scores on Immigration Status, Family Background, Political Socialization Agents, and Controls (continued)


| | Spain | | | Italy | | | Switzerland | | | Ireland | | | England | | |
|----------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 |
| First generation | -57.04** (5.28) | -36.48** (5.02) | -38.55** (4.96) | -50.13** (6.82) | -17.03** (9.81) | -18.67^ (9.88) | -47.63** (6.62) | -16.34** (6.86) | -15.46** (6.82) | -46.58** (6.13) | -31.75** (7.15) | -33.63** (7.01) | -41.67** (8.87) | -26.71** (9.49) | -30.24** (9.33) |
| Second generation | -12.38 (11.73) | .02 (11.16) | 3.23 (10.99) | -26.44 (13.63) | -1.48 (13.70) | 2.88 (13.51) | -44.86** (4.28) | -15.03** (4.81) | -17.10** (4.72) | -16.37 (14.67) | -22.23 (15.25) | -21.08 (12.89) | -.98 (7.15) | 10.93 (6.81) | 6.13 (6.75) |
| Female | 18.31** (3.39) | 18.56** (3.26) | 15.57** (3.31) | 18.63** (3.10) | 18.01** (2.90) | 12.87** (2.86) | 7.73^ (3.51) | 8.24** (3.37) | 11.13** (3.30) | 19.44** (3.53) | 17.40** (3.23) | 9.70^ (3.20) | 18.00** (3.99) | 19.30** (3.47) | 14.72** (3.52) |
| Urban | 33.46** (3.30) | 19.56** (3.23) | 18.21** (3.22) | 23.00** (4.86) | 5.17 (4.58) | 4.64^ (4.50) | 7.52** (5.79) | -3.48 (5.47) | -3.61 (5.35) | 16.56** (4.40) | 9.78** (4.15) | 9.17^ (4.08) | 8.52^ (4.74) | 6.83 (4.15) | 5.29 (4.16) |
| Location missing | -11.01^ (10.14) | -7.00 (9.68) | -8.71 (9.59) | 17.38 (22.72) | 15.71 (21.65) | 15.16 (21.25) | -5.30 (4.81) | -6.77 (4.55) | -6.44 (4.46) | -16.73** (7.05) | -12.12^ (6.55) | -12.01^ (6.40) | -30.59** (5.85) | -18.58** (4.99) | -16.37** (5.08) |
| Family SES | | 28.52** (1.49) | 27.29** (1.48) | 31.89** (1.58) | | 30.06** (1.57) | | 27.42** (1.84) | 26.58** (1.63) | 38.76** (1.76) | 38.76** (1.76) | 36.47** (1.75) | 42.05** (1.84) | 42.05** (1.84) | 38.03** (2.07) |
| Home Language | | -18.44** (4.29) | -18.72** (4.23) | -27.29** (9.93) | | -22.88** (9.89) | | -25.51** (4.98) | -27.28** (4.89) | -25.63** (7.26) | -25.63** (7.26) | -22.16** (7.08) | -15.55^ (8.52) | -15.55^ (8.52) | -17.10^ (8.41) |
| Single parents | | NA | NA | -10.61** (4.17) | | -8.93^ (4.12) | | .47 (4.75) | 2.84 (4.78) | -11.22** (4.64) | -11.22** (4.64) | -8.88^ (4.50) | -9.19^ (4.71) | -9.19^ (4.71) | -6.45 (4.72) |
| Openness in classroom discussion | | 1.04** (.17) | | | | 1.75** (.17) | | .72** (.16) | | | | 1.95** (.15) | | | 2.48** (.18) |
| Media | | 11.31** (2.17) | | | | 4.98** (2.16) | | 13.70** (2.40) | | | | 4.25^ (2.25) | | | 11.27** (2.39) |
| Friends | | -.52 (2.60) | | | | -.92 (2.01) | | 5.41** (2.59) | | | | -6.90** (2.63) | | | -2.66 (3.07) |
| Constant | 492.03** (2.45) | 479.32** (4.45) | 407.64** (8.88) | 523.66** (2.30) | 500.29** (9.86) | 401.15** (12.88) | 540.33** (2.76) | 513.38** (5.76) | 433.80** (9.85) | 530.52** (2.88) | 598.85** (7.67) | 416.95** (11.22) | 518.79** (3.27) | 501.87** (8.92) | 350.64** (13.13) |
| R ² | .085 | .195 | .217 | .037 | .178 | .214 | .057 | .180 | .211 | .036 | .192 | .238 | .029 | .206 | .279 |

Figure 5-2 Gaps in Expected Civic Knowledge Scores between Natives and First-generation Immigrants in 24 Countries



Note: Countries are sorted in descending order of the magnitude of the first generation status coefficients in Model 1.

Figure 5-3 Gaps in Expected Civic Knowledge Scores between Natives and Second-generation Immigrants in 24 Countries



Note: Countries are sorted in descending order of the magnitude of the second-generation status coefficients in Model 1.

Table 5-6 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores on Immigration Status, Family Background, Political Socialization Agents, and Controls

| | Italy | | | Czech Republic | | | Denmark | | | Greece | | | Slovenia | | | Austria | | |
|--|-------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 |
| First generation | -2.15** (.69) | -.47 (1.07) | -.97 (.98) | -1.56 (1.21) | -2.32 (1.45) | -2.69 [^] (1.39) | -1.36 (.84) | .00 (1.04) | -1.02 (.95) | -.98 (.69) | .71 (.84) | .82 (.87) | -.77 (1.42) | .92 (1.59) | 1.31 (1.54) | -.59 (.81) | .16 (1.02) | -.07 (.89) |
| Second generation | -1.55 (1.30) | -.35 (1.34) | -.38 (1.24) | 1.41 (1.33) | 1.83 (1.34) | 1.22 (.27) | .67 (.65) | 2.26** (.75) | -.03 (.69) | .15 (.95) | 1.07 (.91) | .82 (.91) | .42 (.68) | 1.45 [^] (.74) | 1.43 [^] (.71) | .12 (.50) | 1.12 (.72) | .75 (.66) |
| Female | 1.07** (.32) | 1.06** (.32) | .58 [^] (.30) | 1.85*** (.28) | 1.87*** (.28) | 1.51*** (.27) | 1.70*** (.30) | 1.92*** (.29) | 1.79*** (.27) | .50 (.36) | .52 (.34) | .67 [^] (.34) | 1.39*** (.38) | 1.42*** (.37) | 1.37*** (.37) | -.04 (.34) | -.10 (.34) | .21 (.33) |
| Urban | 1.69*** (.45) | .84 [^] (.46) | .53 (.42) | .02(.38) | -.14 (.38) | -.03 (.36) | 1.16 [^] (.46) | .37 (.45) | -.44 (.41) | .35 (.45) | -.18 (.43) | -.11 (.40) | 1.05 [^] (.55) | .45 (.56) | -.10 (.54) | .10 (.47) | -.85 [^] (.48) | -.97 [^] (.44) |
| Location missing | -.41 (2.08) | -.57 (2.06) | .05 (1.91) | .71 (.51) | .53 (.50) | .27 (.48) | -.62 (.42) | -.61 (.41) | -.30 (.38) | .11 (.46) | .41 (.43) | .28 (.43) | .09 (.69) | .11 (.69) | .11 (.66) | -.12 (.43) | -.43 (.42) | -.18 (.40) |
| Family SES | 1.52*** (.16) | 1.52*** (.16) | 1.02*** (.15) | .88*** (.14) | .88*** (.14) | .67*** (.13) | 2.19*** (.15) | 2.19*** (.15) | 1.33*** (.14) | 1.17*** (.17) | 1.17*** (.17) | 1.13*** (.17) | 1.16*** (.19) | 1.16*** (.19) | 1.12*** (.19) | 1.52*** (.17) | 1.52*** (.17) | .97*** (.16) |
| Home Language | -.14 (1.08) | -.14 (1.08) | -.61 (1.00) | -.61 (1.00) | -.94 (1.29) | -.94 (1.28) | -.52 (.91) | -.52 (.91) | .01 (.82) | -.49 (.95) | -.49 (.95) | -.49 (.95) | -.49 (.95) | -.49 (.97) | -.91 (.96) | .09 (.67) | .09 (.74) | -.32 (.67) |
| Single parents | .06 (.42) | .06 (.42) | .30 (.39) | .25 (.37) | .25 (.37) | -.43 (.36) | -.43 (.47) | -.43 (.47) | -.14 (.43) | -.92 [^] (.45) | -.92 [^] (.45) | -.82 [^] (.48) | -.82 [^] (.48) | -.82 [^] (.53) | -.39 (.35) | -.71 [^] (.45) | -.71 [^] (.45) | -.46 (.42) |
| Openness in classroom discussion Media | .18*** (.02) | .18*** (.02) | .18*** (.02) | .15*** (.02) | .15*** (.02) | .15*** (.02) | .15*** (.02) | .15*** (.02) | .15*** (.02) | .15*** (.02) | .17*** (.02) | .17*** (.02) | .17*** (.02) | .17*** (.02) | .14*** (.02) | .14*** (.02) | .14*** (.02) | .12*** (.02) |
| Friends | 2.58*** (.22) | 2.58*** (.22) | 2.58*** (.22) | 2.20*** (.18) | 2.20*** (.18) | 2.20*** (.18) | 2.33*** (.22) | 2.33*** (.22) | 2.33*** (.22) | 2.43*** (.25) | 2.43*** (.25) | 2.43*** (.25) | 2.43*** (.25) | 1.88*** (.25) | 1.88*** (.25) | 2.28*** (.22) | 2.28*** (.22) | 2.28*** (.22) |
| Friends | 2.12*** (.21) | 2.12*** (.21) | 2.12*** (.21) | 2.38*** (.23) | 2.38*** (.23) | 2.38*** (.23) | 2.44*** (.22) | 2.44*** (.22) | 2.44*** (.22) | 1.69*** (.24) | 1.69*** (.24) | 1.69*** (.24) | 1.69*** (.24) | 2.21*** (.31) | 2.21*** (.31) | 2.29*** (.23) | 2.29*** (.23) | 2.29*** (.23) |
| Constant | 50.53*** (.24) | 49.17*** (1.09) | 30.70*** (1.37) | 46.12*** (.21) | 47.04*** (1.30) | 31.29*** (1.50) | 48.75*** (.24) | 49.12*** (.93) | 30.53*** (1.19) | 51.70*** (.30) | 34.45*** (1.36) | 35.04*** (1.37) | 48.88*** (.29) | 47.82*** (1.01) | 33.69*** (1.37) | 50.03*** (.28) | 50.32*** (.78) | 34.95*** (1.07) |
| R ² | .010 | .035 | .175 | .010 | .018 | .125 | .010 | .058 | .203 | .000 | .130 | .133 | .005 | .019 | .095 | .000 | .022 | .147 |

Table 5-6 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores on Immigration Status, Family Background, Political Socialization Agents, and Controls (continued)

| | Latvia | | | Switzerland | | | Cyprus | | | Spain | | | Lithuania | | | Ireland | | | |
|--|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------|
| | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | |
| First generation | -.50 (2.10) | -.54 (2.09) | .24 (1.98) | .01 (.67) | -.03 (.72) | -.08 (.68) | .02 (.93) | 1.29 (1.01) | .74 (.97) | .04 (.62) | .41 (.64) | -.39 (.61) | .25 (3.83) | .14 (3.81) | .64 (3.22) | .51 (.64) | 1.82* (.80) | .62 (.77) | |
| Second generation | .89 (.78) | .96 (.78) | 1.05 (.74) | 1.35** (.48) | 1.36 (.53) | 1.00 (.56) | -.37 (2.27) | .60 (2.31) | -.33 (2.35) | -3.58** (1.32) | -3.70** (1.32) | -2.96* (1.26) | .93 (1.11) | .92 (1.12) | .74 (1.08) | .36 (1.55) | .24 (1.53) | .60 (1.42) | |
| Female | 1.58** (.31) | 1.59** (.31) | 1.11** (.30) | .06 (.34) | .06 (.34) | .62* (.33) | 1.63** (.44) | 1.67** (.43) | 1.62** (.42) | 1.42** (.36) | 1.40** (.35) | .91* (.35) | 2.53** (.27) | 2.53** (.27) | 1.46** (.26) | 1.50** (.39) | 1.42** (.38) | 1.42** (.38) | 73* (.37) |
| Urban | 1.01** (.31) | .51 (.38) | .30 (.36) | -.58 (.64) | -.70 (.65) | -.63 (.61) | -.44 (.53) | -.78 (.54) | -.60 (.51) | -.35 (.38) | -.99* (.38) | -1.03** (.37) | -.36 (.29) | -.70* (.30) | -.42 (.28) | 1.03* (.43) | 80* (.43) | .54 (.40) | |
| Location missing | -.24 (.55) | -.60 (.55) | -.37 (.52) | -.33 (.52) | -.32 (.52) | -.26 (.49) | .15 (.64) | .02 (.63) | -.02 (.61) | .11 (1.16) | .55 (1.15) | .00 (1.10) | -3.32** (1.07) | -3.59** (1.07) | -2.47* (1.02) | -.47 (.71) | -.25 (.70) | -.29 (.65) | |
| Family SES | .96** (.16) | .96** (.16) | .75** (.15) | .32* (.18) | .32* (.18) | .10 (.17) | 1.14** (.22) | 1.14** (.22) | .91** (.21) | 1.27** (.18) | 1.27** (.18) | .86** (.18) | .66** (.14) | .66** (.14) | .42* (.13) | 1.67** (.19) | 1.25** (.18) | 1.25** (.18) | |
| Home Language | .72 (.54) | .72 (.54) | .84 (.52) | -.36 (.57) | -.36 (.57) | -.03 (.53) | -2.31* (.94) | -2.31* (.94) | -1.86* (.90) | -.05 (.47) | -.05 (.47) | -.75* (.45) | .61 (.68) | .61 (.68) | .68 (.65) | -.25 (.54) | -2.25** (.82) | -1.93* (.78) | |
| Single parents | -.56 (.36) | -.56 (.36) | -.27 (.35) | -.30 (.46) | -.30 (.46) | .07 (.43) | -.84 (.58) | -.84 (.58) | -.73 (.55) | NA | NA | NA | -.65* (.35) | -.65* (.35) | -.32 (.34) | -.63 (.54) | -.63 (.54) | -.25 (.51) | |
| Openness in classroom discussion Media | .11** (.02) | .11** (.02) | .11** (.02) | .13** (.02) | .13** (.02) | .13** (.02) | .14** (.02) | .14** (.02) | .14** (.02) | .15** (.02) | .15** (.02) | .15** (.02) | .13** (.02) | .13** (.02) | .13** (.02) | .18** (.02) | .18** (.02) | .18** (.02) | |
| Friends | 2.26** (.23) | 2.26** (.23) | 2.26** (.23) | 2.02** (.25) | 2.02** (.25) | 2.02** (.25) | 2.21** (.24) | 2.21** (.24) | 2.43** (.31) | 2.39** (.26) | 2.39** (.26) | 2.39** (.26) | 1.58** (.19) | 1.58** (.19) | 1.58** (.19) | 3.47** (.25) | 3.47** (.25) | 3.47** (.25) | |
| Constant | 47.99** (.25) | 48.94** (.56) | 34.96** (1.06) | 47.45** (.27) | 47.79** (.60) | 32.43** (1.10) | 50.75** (.35) | 48.73** (.97) | 34.30** (1.34) | 48.75** (.29) | 49.67** (.50) | 34.14** (1.05) | 48.88** (.21) | 49.71** (.69) | 36.62** (1.03) | 47.83** (.31) | 45.83** (.87) | 28.00** (.76) | |
| R ² | .011 | .025 | .130 | .002 | .002 | .118 | .004 | .016 | .097 | .006 | .022 | .118 | .025 | .031 | .111 | .006 | .031 | .164 | |

Table 5-6 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores on Immigration Status, Family Background, Political Socialization Agents, and Controls (continued)


| | Finland | | | Poland | | | Luxembourg | | | New Zealand | | | Sweden | | | England | | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 |
| First generation | .68 (1.40) | -.78 (1.62) | -1.36 (1.52) | 1.18** (.43) | 2.41*** (.46) | 1.34** (.45) | 1.20** (.43) | 2.45*** (.47) | 1.40** (.45) | 1.40** (.53) | 2.09*** (.58) | 1.20* (.53) | 1.63^ (.96) | 1.80 (1.31) | .52 (1.25) | 2.18** (.91) | 1.63 (1.08) | -0.6 (1.01) |
| Second generation | 2.95* (1.58) | 2.77^ (1.66) | 1.39 (1.55) | -.52 (.34) | .66^ (.38) | .30 (.37) | -.48 (.33) | .73+ (.38) | .38 (.36) | .51 (.70) | 1.63- (.71) | -.35 (.66) | 2.16** (.66) | 2.16** (.66) | 2.13- (.95) | 3.14*** (.74) | 3.13*** (.79) | 1.48* (.73) |
| Female | 1.56*** (.31) | 1.53*** (.31) | 1.69*** (.29) | -.23 (.29) | -.20 (.29) | -.32 (.28) | -.22 (.29) | -.19 (.29) | -.28 (.28) | 1.78*** (.37) | 1.79*** (.36) | 1.19*** (.34) | 1.77*** (.38) | 1.74*** (.37) | 1.37*** (.35) | .83* (.41) | .94* (.40) | .86- (.38) |
| Urban | .71* (.35) | -.07 (.35) | -.21 (.33) | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1.80*** (.42) | 1.50** (.42) | .62 (.38) | 1.57** (.30) | .87^ (.49) | .83^ (.46) | 1.36** (.49) | 1.22* (.50) | .89 (.45) |
| Location missing | -4.19** (1.50) | -3.72* (1.47) | -2.63^ (1.37) | -.38 (.32) | -.46 (.32) | -.41 (.30) | -.38 (.32) | -.46 (.32) | -.43 (.30) | -.99^ (.55) | -.93^ (.54) | -.83^ (.50) | -.02 (.65) | .23 (.64) | .37 (.60) | .17 (.59) | .69 (.58) | .87 (.54) |
| Family SES | | 1.64*** (.16) | 1.18*** (.15) | 1.10*** (.17) | 1.12*** (.17) | .72*** (.16) | 1.12*** (.17) | 1.12*** (.17) | .74*** (.16) | 1.74*** (.19) | 1.74*** (.19) | .98*** (.17) | 2.24*** (.20) | 2.24*** (.20) | 1.39*** (.19) | 2.03*** (.21) | 2.03*** (.21) | 1.37*** (.19) |
| Home Language | | 2.17* (1.01) | 1.88- (.95) | 1.53** (.57) | 1.52** (.57) | 1.71** (.55) | 1.52** (.57) | 1.52** (.57) | 1.69** (.54) | -2.70*** (.73) | -2.70*** (.73) | -2.59*** (.68) | 2.45- (1.01) | 2.45- (1.01) | 1.71^ (.97) | 1.32 (.97) | 1.03 (.90) | 1.03 (.90) |
| Single parents | | -.50 (.45) | -.27 (.41) | -.88* (.39) | -.80* (.41) | -.60 (.37) | -.80* (.41) | -.80* (.41) | -.54 (.40) | -.73 (.47) | -.73 (.47) | -.35 (.44) | -.45 (.62) | -.45 (.62) | -.26 (.57) | -.20 (.54) | -.20 (.54) | -.07 (.50) |
| Openness in classroom discussion | | | 14*** (.02) | | | 15*** (.02) | | | 13*** (.02) | | | 16*** (.02) | | | 19*** (.02) | | | 17*** (.02) |
| Media | | | 1.99*** (.20) | | | 1.54*** (.19) | | | 1.51*** (.19) | | | 3.59*** (.25) | | | 2.61*** (.24) | | | 2.92*** (.26) |
| Friends | | | 2.71*** (.26) | | | 2.14*** (.23) | | | 2.24*** (.23) | | | 2.45*** (.25) | | | 2.50*** (.29) | | | 2.19*** (.29) |
| Constant | 44.84*** (.25) | 47.26*** (1.03) | 31.23*** (1.34) | 48.36*** (.26) | 48.11*** (.28) | 34.29*** (.79) | 48.34*** (.26) | 48.06*** (.28) | 34.33*** (.79) | 46.03*** (.38) | 43.63*** (.81) | 24.17*** (1.14) | 47.57*** (.30) | 49.91*** (1.05) | 30.32*** (1.43) | 48.80*** (.34) | 49.99*** (1.02) | 30.86*** (1.40) |
| R ² | .011 | .045 | .170 | .002 | .013 | .096 | .002 | .013 | .097 | .019 | .047 | .200 | .014 | .053 | .181 | .014 | .049 | .180 |

Table 5-6 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores on Immigration Status, Family Background, Political Socialization Agents, and Controls (continued)

| | Estonia | | | Belgium (Flemish) | | | Norway | | | Bulgaria | | | Malta | | | Netherlands | | |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 |
| First generation | 2.29 (1.74) | 2.23 (1.74) | 2.89 (1.67) | 2.34** (.77) | 1.87* (.86) | 1.32 (.83) | 2.63* (1.24) | 4.83* (1.65) | 4.14* (1.35) | 2.63 (2.59) | 2.71*** (2.55) | 2.17** (2.71) | 3.80* (2.22) | 3.39 (2.30) | 3.27 (2.22) | 4.27*** (1.15) | 4.81*** (1.31) | 3.43** (1.22) |
| Second generation | .52 (.71) | .51 (.71) | .65 (.70) | 3.37*** (.67) | 3.10*** (.76) | 2.02** (.73) | .71 (.89) | 3.40** (1.12) | 1.65 (1.05) | 2.42 (2.30) | 2.54 (2.34) | 1.68 (2.47) | .82 (2.56) | .93 (2.53) | -.09 (2.15) | 1.72* (.77) | 3.12** (.95) | 1.58* (.88) |
| Female | 2.24** (.31) | 2.18*** (.31) | 1.96*** (.30) | 1.02** (.32) | 1.03** (.32) | .86** (.31) | .69* (.40) | .56 (.40) | .80* (.38) | 1.94*** (.37) | 1.93*** (.37) | 1.55*** (.36) | -1.65** (.50) | -1.63** (.50) | -1.02* (.48) | .56 (.44) | .71 (.44) | .76* (.42) |
| Urban | -.06 (.38) | -.46 (.38) | -.17 (.37) | 1.38** (.48) | 1.27** (.49) | .54 (.47) | 1.32* (.59) | .67 (.58) | .42 (.54) | -.73* (.39) | -1.16** (.42) | -.83* (.40) | - | - | - | -.05 (.65) | -.28 (.66) | -.19 (.62) |
| Location missing | .01 (.52) | -.30 (.52) | -.47 (.50) | - | - | - | .03 (.68) | .08 (.66) | -.02 (.62) | - | - | - | 1.22 (1.67) | 1.97 (1.67) | 2.25 (1.56) | 1.78*** (.48) | 1.72*** (.48) | 1.08* (.45) |
| Family SES | .98** (.16) | .98** (.16) | .61 (.15) | .38* (.16) | .38* (.16) | .26* (.16) | 2.39*** (.21) | 2.39*** (.21) | 1.74*** (.20) | .71** (.21) | .71** (.21) | .33* (.20) | 1.22** (.26) | 1.22** (.26) | .65** (.24) | 1.31*** (.23) | 1.31*** (.23) | .75** (.22) |
| Home Language | .57 (.86) | .57 (.86) | .96 (.82) | 1.19* (.66) | 1.19* (.66) | .88 (.63) | -.77 (1.13) | -.77 (1.13) | -.82 (1.04) | .32 (.65) | .32 (.65) | .57 (.62) | .41 (.71) | .41 (.71) | .22 (.67) | -.79 (1.19) | -.79 (1.19) | -.97 (1.01) |
| Single parents | .46 (.37) | .46 (.37) | .45 (.36) | -.58 (.51) | -.58 (.51) | -.37 (.49) | 40 (.63) | 40 (.63) | 1.09* (.59) | -.86* (.60) | -.86* (.60) | -.66 (.48) | NA | NA | NA | 2.15** (.74) | 2.15** (.74) | 2.27** (.70) |
| Openness in classroom discussion Media | .09*** (.02) | .09*** (.02) | .09*** (.02) | .13*** (.02) | .13*** (.02) | .13*** (.02) | 2.35*** (.25) | 2.35*** (.25) | 2.35*** (.25) | 2.35*** (.25) | 2.35*** (.25) | 2.35*** (.25) | 2.35*** (.25) | 2.35*** (.25) | 2.35*** (.25) | 2.35*** (.25) | 2.35*** (.25) | 2.35*** (.25) |
| Friends | 1.75*** (.23) | 1.75*** (.23) | 1.75*** (.23) | 1.88*** (.27) | 1.88*** (.27) | 1.88*** (.27) | 2.90*** (.30) | 2.90*** (.30) | 2.90*** (.30) | 2.90*** (.30) | 2.90*** (.30) | 2.90*** (.30) | 2.90*** (.30) | 2.90*** (.30) | 2.90*** (.30) | 2.90*** (.30) | 2.90*** (.30) | 2.90*** (.30) |
| Constant | 47.03*** (.25) | 47.62*** (.87) | 36.15*** (1.26) | 46.04*** (.23) | 47.22*** (.67) | 33.92*** (1.11) | 49.51*** (.31) | 48.59*** (1.15) | 32.33*** (1.48) | 49.56*** (.30) | 50.09*** (.65) | 37.08*** (1.14) | 47.30*** (.36) | 47.60*** (.72) | 28.78*** (1.52) | 46.37*** (.42) | 45.37*** (1.23) | 30.90*** (1.63) |
| R ² | .018 | .031 | .105 | .020 | .023 | .104 | .005 | .052 | .176 | .006 | .017 | .136 | .006 | .017 | .136 | .016 | .036 | .144 |


*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ ^ $p < .10$ NA = Data is not available.

Figure 5-4 Gaps in Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores between Natives and First-generation Immigrants in 24 Countries



Note: Countries are sorted in descending order of the magnitude of the first-generation status coefficients in Model 1.

Figure 5-5 Gaps in Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores between Natives and Second-generation Immigrants in 24 Countries



Note: Countries are sorted in descending order of the magnitude of the second-generation status coefficients in Model 1.

Table 5-7 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Expected Electoral Participation Scores on Immigration Status, Family Background, Political Socialization Agents, and Controls

| | Italy | | | Norway | | | Slovenia | | | Greece | | | Lithuania | | | Denmark | | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 |
| First generation | -6.59*** (.71) | -5.15*** (1.06) | -5.45*** (1.04) | -5.58*** (1.00) | -2.92* (1.29) | -2.95* (1.20) | -5.15*** (1.47) | -2.83* (1.63) | -2.19 (1.58) | -4.70*** (.74) | -3.35*** (.97) | -3.65*** (.94) | -4.32 (2.85) | -4.09 (2.80) | -3.82 (2.99) | -4.19*** (.80) | -2.24* (.96) | -3.08** (.91) |
| Second generation | -4.66** (1.28) | -3.43** (1.31) | -2.93* (1.28) | -2.14* (.87) | 1.04 (1.09) | -3.1 (1.04) | -1.92** (.68) | -.49 (.74) | -.36 (.72) | -2.87** (1.01) | -2.24* (1.03) | -2.13* (.99) | -2.69* (1.24) | -1.90 (1.24) | -1.92 (1.20) | -.56 (.61) | 1.44* (.69) | -.53 (.65) |
| Female | .75* (.32) | .70* (.31) | .23 (.31) | 1.56*** (.41) | 1.41*** (.39) | 1.55*** (.37) | .56 (.38) | .60 (.37) | .58 (.37) | 1.01** (.38) | .99* (.38) | .95* (.37) | 2.40*** (.30) | 2.39*** (.29) | 1.32*** (.29) | 1.32*** (.28) | 1.55*** (.27) | 1.46*** (.25) |
| Urban | .85* (.45) | -.17 (.45) | -.30 (.43) | 1.67** (.59) | .93 (.57) | .75 (.54) | 1.37* (.56) | .59 (.56) | .08 (.54) | .81* (.49) | .41 (.48) | .36 (.47) | -.69* (.32) | -1.53*** (.32) | -1.19*** (.32) | 1.85*** (.43) | 1.00* (.42) | .31 (.39) |
| Location missing | 2.42 (2.05) | 2.41 (2.01) | 2.47 (1.95) | .22 (.68) | .32 (.65) | -.36 (.62) | .26 (.70) | .30 (.69) | .37 (.66) | 1.78** (.49) | 1.78*** (.48) | 2.10*** (.47) | -2.58* (1.18) | -3.18** (1.16) | -2.09* (1.13) | .00 (.40) | .01 (.39) | .29 (.36) |
| Family SES | 1.82*** (.16) | 1.82*** (.16) | 1.49*** (.16) | 3.00*** (.21) | 3.00*** (.21) | 2.38*** (.20) | 1.54*** (.19) | 1.56*** (.19) | 1.54*** (.19) | 1.38*** (.19) | 1.38*** (.19) | .98*** (.19) | 1.49*** (.15) | 1.49*** (.15) | 1.22*** (.15) | 2.35*** (.14) | 2.35*** (.14) | 1.63*** (.13) |
| Home Language | -.96 (1.05) | -.96 (1.05) | -.33 (1.03) | -.70 (1.05) | -.70 (1.05) | -.88 (1.00) | -1.58* (.94) | -1.97* (.96) | -1.58* (.94) | -.54 (1.08) | -.54 (1.08) | .10 (1.04) | -1.80* (.74) | -1.80* (.74) | -1.43* (.72) | -.14 (.83) | -.14 (.83) | -.63 (.80) |
| Single parents | -.92* (.41) | -.92* (.41) | -.67* (.40) | -1.53* (.63) | -1.53* (.63) | -1.00 (.59) | -1.52** (.56) | -1.52** (.56) | -.71 (.54) | -1.18** (.49) | -1.20* (.51) | -.88* (.49) | -1.18** (.38) | -1.18** (.38) | -.69* (.37) | -.69* (.37) | -.96* (.43) | -.69* (.40) |
| Openness in classroom discussion | .17*** (.02) | .17*** (.02) | .17*** (.02) | .19*** (.02) | .19*** (.02) | .19*** (.02) | .13*** (.02) | .13*** (.02) | .13*** (.02) | .21*** (.02) | .21*** (.02) | .21*** (.02) | .21*** (.02) | .21*** (.02) | .13*** (.02) | .13*** (.02) | .15*** (.01) | .15*** (.01) |
| Media | 1.75*** (.22) | 1.75*** (.22) | 1.75*** (.22) | 2.37*** (.25) | 2.37*** (.25) | 2.37*** (.25) | 2.28*** (.25) | 2.28*** (.25) | 2.28*** (.25) | 2.14*** (.28) | 2.14*** (.28) | 2.14*** (.28) | 2.46*** (.21) | 2.46*** (.21) | 2.46*** (.21) | 2.57*** (.19) | 2.57*** (.19) | 2.57*** (.19) |
| Friends | .25 (.21) | .25 (.21) | .25 (.21) | .85** (.30) | .85** (.30) | .85** (.30) | 1.24*** (.31) | 1.24*** (.31) | 1.24*** (.31) | .22 (.26) | .22 (.26) | .22 (.26) | 2.44*** (.19) | 2.44*** (.19) | 2.44*** (.19) | 1.62*** (.21) | 1.62*** (.21) | 1.62*** (.21) |
| Constant | 54.10*** (.23) | 53.42*** (1.07) | 40.59*** (1.40) | 51.21*** (.32) | 50.52*** (1.08) | 32.27*** (1.46) | 49.37*** (.29) | 47.66*** (.99) | 34.55*** (1.39) | 49.42*** (.32) | 34.24*** (1.49) | 34.24*** (1.49) | 50.93*** (.23) | 49.71*** (.75) | 37.37*** (1.14) | 48.35*** (.22) | 48.11*** (.85) | 31.35*** (1.14) |
| R ² | .034 | .073 | .126 | .019 | .096 | .190 | .007 | .033 | .097 | .021 | .105 | .104 | .020 | .050 | .112 | .015 | .080 | .203 |


Table 5-7 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Expected Electoral Participation Scores on Immigration Status, Family Background, Political Socialization Agents, and Controls (continued)

| | Poland | | | | | | Latvia | | | | | | Czech Republic | | | | | | Austria | | | | | | Spain | | | | | | Switzerland | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------|--|----|--|----|--|-------|--|----|--|----|--|-------------|--|----|--|----|--|--|
| | M1 | | M2 | | M3 | | M1 | | M2 | | M3 | | M1 | | M2 | | M3 | | M1 | | M2 | | M3 | | M1 | | M2 | | M3 | | M1 | | M2 | | M3 | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| First generation | -3.97 (2.83) | -3.36 (4.04) | -1.44 (4.01) | -3.94 (2.60) | -3.66 (2.63) | -2.88 (2.57) | -3.62** (1.38) | -4.01* (1.62) | -4.02** (1.54) | -3.59*** (.68) | -1.95* (.86) | -2.14** (.80) | -3.35*** (.61) | -2.01** (.63) | -2.67*** (.61) | -3.08*** (.73) | -2.79 (.85) | -3.84 (.83) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Second generation | -.06 (1.54) | -.20 (1.52) | -.87 (1.46) | -3.67*** (.92) | -3.39*** (.92) | -3.21*** (.89) | -3.46* (1.53) | -1.52 (1.51) | -1.87 (1.44) | -4.43*** (.49) | -2.21** (.69) | -2.45*** (.66) | -2.50* (1.30) | -1.54 (1.30) | -.97 (1.26) | -2.82*** (.52) | -54 (.59) | -1.04* (.58) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Female | 1.66*** (.35) | 1.74*** (.34) | 1.31*** (.34) | 1.32*** (.37) | 1.32*** (.37) | .77* (.36) | .31 (.32) | .33 (.31) | .03 (.30) | -.85** (.33) | -.89** (.32) | -.68* (.33) | .24 (.35) | .27 (.35) | .18 (.35) | -.64* (.37) | -.60* (.36) | .15 (.36) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Urban | -.29 (.40) | -.97* (.41) | -1.07** (.39) | -.34 (.44) | -1.14* (.45) | -1.18*** (.43) | .27 (.43) | -.19 (.42) | -.10 (.40) | 1.12* (.46) | -.05 (.46) | -.13 (.44) | .92* (.37) | .20 (.38) | .02 (.37) | .88 (.71) | 1.35* (.56) | -.12 (.67) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Location missing | - | - | - | -.73 (.65) | -1.23* (.65) | -1.06* (.63) | 1.04* (.58) | .56 (.56) | .38 (.53) | -.03 (.42) | -.37 (.41) | -.15 (.39) | .41 (1.15) | .50 (1.13) | .35 (1.38) | 1.36* (.57) | 2.28*** (.19) | 1.38* (.54) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Family SES | 1.64*** (.18) | 1.37*** (.17) | 1.37*** (.17) | 1.42*** (.19) | 1.42*** (.19) | 1.27*** (.18) | 2.82*** (.16) | 2.82*** (.16) | 2.51*** (.15) | 1.84*** (.17) | 1.84*** (.17) | 1.40*** (.16) | 1.51*** (.18) | 1.51*** (.18) | 1.18*** (.18) | 1.72*** (.18) | 2.09*** (.19) | 2.09*** (.19) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Home Language | -1.44 (1.48) | -1.44 (1.48) | -.64 (1.41) | -.90 (.64) | -.90 (.64) | -.61 (.32) | -.22 (1.45) | -.22 (1.45) | -.17 (1.37) | -1.27* (.65) | -1.27* (.65) | -1.57* (.65) | -1.78*** (.47) | -1.78*** (.47) | -1.72*** (.45) | -1.84*** (.57) | -1.84*** (.57) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Single parents | -1.20* (.51) | -.90* (.49) | -.90* (.49) | -.81* (.44) | -.81* (.44) | -.54 (.42) | -1.18** (.42) | -1.18** (.42) | -.90* (.39) | -1.07** (.41) | -1.07** (.41) | -1.07** (.41) | NA | NA | NA | NA | -2.27*** (.50) | -1.36** (.48) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Openness in classroom discussion | .14*** (.02) | .14*** (.02) | .14*** (.02) | .16*** (.02) | .16*** (.02) | .16*** (.02) | .15*** (.02) | .15*** (.02) | .15*** (.02) | .12*** (.02) | .12*** (.02) | .12*** (.02) | .10*** (.02) | .10*** (.02) | .10*** (.02) | .10*** (.02) | .01 (.02) | .01 (.02) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Media | 2.84*** (.25) | 2.84*** (.25) | 2.84*** (.25) | 2.06*** (.28) | 2.06*** (.28) | 2.06*** (.28) | 3.06*** (.21) | 3.06*** (.21) | 3.06*** (.21) | 2.44*** (.22) | 2.44*** (.22) | 2.44*** (.22) | 3.26*** (.26) | 3.26*** (.26) | 3.26*** (.26) | 2.74*** (.27) | 2.74*** (.27) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Friends | .62* (.25) | .62* (.25) | .62* (.25) | .69** (.26) | .69** (.26) | .69** (.26) | .93*** (.25) | .93*** (.25) | .93*** (.25) | 1.12*** (.23) | 1.12*** (.23) | 1.12*** (.23) | .31 (.29) | .31 (.29) | .31 (.29) | .75** (.28) | .75** (.28) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Constant | 47.41*** (.26) | 46.27*** (1.48) | 31.72*** (1.68) | 49.50*** (.30) | 49.50*** (.66) | 35.76*** (1.27) | 43.51*** (.24) | 43.51*** (1.45) | 27.55*** (1.64) | 51.75*** (.27) | 50.77*** (.72) | 35.95*** (1.04) | 50.99*** (.29) | 49.63*** (.49) | 37.68*** (1.05) | 48.53*** (.30) | 46.95*** (.62) | 38.45*** (1.21) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| R ² | .007 | .036 | .115 | .011 | .034 | .091 | .019 | .063 | .145 | .032 | .070 | .163 | .010 | .034 | .104 | .017 | .074 | .126 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Table 5-7 Results from OLS Regression of Adolescents' Expected Electoral Participation Scores on Immigration Status, Family Background, Political Socialization Agents, and Controls (continued)


| | Ireland | | | Luxembourg | | | Cyprus | | | Finland | | | Sweden | | | Malta | | |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 |
| First generation | -2.87*** (.57) | -1.52* (.70) | -2.17** (.68) | -2.61*** (.44) | -.19 (.47) | -1.26** (.45) | -2.17** (.89) | -.68 (.96) | -1.18 (.93) | -1.89 (1.55) | -1.89 (1.55) | -2.25 (1.48) | -1.28 (.82) | 2.68* (1.15) | 1.77 (1.11) | -1.09 (2.11) | -1.12 (2.16) | -1.15 (1.90) |
| Second generation | -1.24 (1.45) | -1.46 (1.41) | -1.19 (1.32) | -2.72*** (.34) | -.43 (.39) | -.90* (.37) | -.68 (1.99) | -.46 (2.00) | -.28 (1.91) | -1.49 (1.59) | -1.49 (1.59) | -2.58* (1.52) | -1.10* (.61) | 1.69* (.84) | .52 (.78) | -2.14 (2.63) | -2.10 (2.61) | -2.93 (2.31) |
| Female | 2.12*** (.35) | 2.01*** (.34) | 1.40*** (.33) | -.91** (.30) | -.89** (.29) | -.84** (.28) | .60 (.41) | .64 (.41) | .69* (.40) | 1.01** (.31) | .97** (.29) | 1.12*** (.28) | 1.71*** (.33) | 1.68*** (.32) | 1.35*** (.31) | .16 (.42) | .20 (.42) | .56 (.41) |
| Urban | .97* (.38) | .64* (.38) | .48 (.36) | NA | NA | NA | -.62 (.51) | -1.07* (.51) | -.85* (.49) | 1.58** (.34) | .64 (.33) | .55* (.32) | .93* (.43) | .23 (.42) | .23 (.40) | - | - | - |
| Location missing | .00 (.64) | .30 (.62) | .29 (.50) | -.58* (.32) | -.69* (.32) | -.52* (.30) | .08 (.61) | -.10 (.60) | -.05 (.58) | -4.79** (1.45) | -4.08** (1.41) | -3.14* (1.34) | -.21 (.57) | .06 (.55) | .17 (.53) | -3.89** (1.40) | -3.39* (1.40) | -3.11* (1.34) |
| Family SES | 2.20*** (.17) | 2.20*** (.17) | 1.90*** (.17) | 2.07*** (.16) | 2.42*** (.17) | 2.07*** (.16) | 1.55*** (.20) | 1.55*** (.20) | 1.30*** (.20) | 2.16*** (.15) | 2.16*** (.15) | 1.82*** (.15) | 2.48*** (.17) | 2.48*** (.17) | 1.84*** (.16) | .90*** (.21) | .90*** (.21) | .47* (.21) |
| Home Language | -2.27** (.73) | -2.27** (.73) | -1.97** (.72) | .03 (.57) | .03 (.57) | .29 (.56) | -2.60** (.89) | -2.60** (.89) | -2.01* (.86) | 1.17 (.97) | 1.17 (.97) | .91 (.92) | -1.53* (.91) | -1.53* (.91) | -2.09* (.86) | .32 (.60) | .32 (.60) | -.60 (.58) |
| Single parents | -1.17* (.49) | -1.17* (.49) | -.85* (.46) | -.29 (.43) | -.29 (.43) | .07 (.42) | -1.26* (.55) | -1.26* (.55) | -1.10* (.52) | -1.97*** (.41) | -1.97*** (.41) | -1.76*** (.40) | -.74 (.52) | -.74 (.52) | -.58 (.49) | NA | NA | NA |
| Openness in classroom discussion Media | .17*** (.02) | .17*** (.02) | .17*** (.02) | .15*** (.02) | .15*** (.02) | .15*** (.02) | .14*** (.02) | .14*** (.02) | .14*** (.02) | .11*** (.02) | .11*** (.02) | .11*** (.02) | .16*** (.02) | .16*** (.02) | .16*** (.02) | .13*** (.02) | .13*** (.02) | .13*** (.02) |
| Friends | .26 (.26) | .26 (.26) | .26 (.26) | .95*** (.23) | .95*** (.23) | .95*** (.23) | .38 (.30) | .38 (.30) | .38 (.30) | 1.72*** (.25) | 1.72*** (.25) | 1.72*** (.25) | 1.66*** (.26) | 1.66*** (.26) | 1.66*** (.26) | .64* (.29) | .64* (.29) | .64* (.29) |
| Constant | 51.17*** (.28) | 49.26*** (.78) | 36.52*** (1.11) | 49.19*** (.27) | 48.18*** (.29) | 33.96*** (.78) | 48.48*** (.33) | 42.27*** (.92) | 33.61*** (1.27) | 48.26*** (.24) | 49.97*** (.98) | 37.15*** (1.30) | 48.15*** (.26) | 46.55*** (.94) | 31.24*** (1.25) | 49.00*** (.30) | 42.27*** (.92) | 35.98*** (1.29) |
| R ² | .020 | .075 | .147 | .019 | .063 | .145 | .002 | .027 | .096 | .013 | .081 | .163 | .009 | .073 | .169 | .004 | .012 | .087 |

Figure 5-6 Gaps in Expected Electoral Participation Scores between Natives and First-generation Immigrants in 24 Countries



Note: Countries are sorted in descending order of the magnitude of the first-generation status coefficients in Model 1.

Figure 5-7 Gaps in Expected Electoral Participation Scores between Natives and Second-generation Immigrants in 24 Countries



Note: Countries are sorted in descending order of the magnitude of the second-generation status coefficients in Model 1.

Figure 5-8 Forest Plot of the 24 Effect Sizes of Native/immigrant Differences in Civic Knowledge Scores




Figure 5-9 Forest Plot of the 24 Effect Sizes of Native/immigrant Differences in Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores




Figure 5-10 Forest Plot of the 24 Effect Sizes of Native/immigrant Differences in Expected Electoral Participation Scores





Table 5-8 Results from HLM Meta-Analysis

| Fixed effect | Civic knowledge | | | | | | | Citizenship self-efficacy | | | | | | | Expected electoral participation | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------------------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|-----------------|----------------|------------------|--|
| | M1 | M2 | M3 | M4 | M5 | M6 | M7 ¹ | M1 | M2 | M3 | M4 | M5 | M6 | M7 ¹ | M1 | M2 | M3 | M4 | M5 | M6 | M7 ¹ | |
| Intercept | -17.79*** (3.02) | -17.64*** (2.83) | -17.59*** (2.91) | -18.05*** (2.66) | -17.75*** (2.37) | -17.59*** (2.66) | -16.21*** (2.24) | 1.29*** (.22) | 1.29*** (.22) | 1.28*** (.20) | 1.23*** (.19) | 1.28*** (.18) | 1.31*** (.16) | 1.35*** (.20) | -86* (.37) | -81* (.32) | -87** (.25) | -87** (.28) | -82** (.24) | -74** (.23) | -66* (.30) | |
| Average non-immigrant civic outcome scores | | -.14 (.10) | -.12 (.13) | -.22* (.10) | -.25* (.09) | -.16 (.10) | -.22* (.09) | -.12 (.13) | -.12 (.13) | -.00 (.14) | -.05 (.13) | -.06 (.14) | -.18 (.11) | -.06 (.16) | -.36* (.18) | -.47** (.13) | -.31* (.17) | -.37* (.18) | -.40** (.13) | -.27 (.23) | | |
| Immigrant political participation | | | .01 (.12) | | | | | | | -.02* (.01) | | | | | | .04** (.01) | | | | | | |
| Immigrant education | | | | .30* (.17) | | | | | | .03* (.01) | | | | | | | .04** (.01) | | | | | |
| Immigrants' access to nationality | | | | | .37* (.14) | | | | | | | .03* (.01) | | | | | | .04** (.01) | | | | |
| Anti-discrimination | | | | | | .19 (.16) | | | | | | | .03*** (.01) | | | | | | | .05** (.01) | | |
| Ideological position on immigration | | | | | | | -9.97* (3.89) | | | | | | | -.54* (.31) | | | | | | | -.96* (.55) | |
| Random effect | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Variance (<i>df</i>) | 148.50*** (22) | 133.28*** (21) | 143.91*** (20) | 121.39*** (20) | 83.94*** (20) | 118.43*** (20) | 72.97*** (20) | .49* (.22) | .50* (.20) | .39* (.20) | .40* (.20) | .22* (.20) | .08 (.20) | .35* (.20) | 2.51*** (.22) | 1.74*** (.21) | .80** (.20) | 1.21*** (.20) | .88** (.20) | .76** (.20) | 1.55*** (.20) | |
| Variance explained (%) | | 10.3 | | 8.9 | 37.0 | 11.1 | 46.8 | | | 23.8 | 20.8 | 56.4 | 84.2 | 24.2 | - | 30.7 | 54.0 | 30.4 | 49.4 | 56.3 | 40.4 | |
| Number of countries included | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | |

¹ In the analyses (Model 7), I excluded Malta which is an outlier. Malta has the highest score on the ideological position on immigration index among 24 countries, which is almost twice as high as the next highest score (Austria) (see Figures 1 through 13).


*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ ^ $p < .10$

Figure 5-11 The Expected Native/immigrant Differences in Civic Knowledge Scores among Countries with Inclusionary/Exclusionary Policies on Immigrant Integration




Note: Based on the results of Table 5-8 (the variables tested are not grand-mean centered).

Figure 5-12 The Expected Native/immigrant Differences in Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores among Countries with Inclusionary/Exclusionary Policies on Immigrant Integration



Note: Based on the results of Table 5-8 (the variables tested are not grand-mean centered).

Figure 5-13 The Expected Native/immigrant Differences in Expected Electoral Participation Scores among Countries with Inclusionary/Exclusionary Policies on Immigrant Integration



Note: Based on the results of Table 5-8 (the variables tested are not grand-mean centered).

Table 5-9 Results from Supplementary HLM Meta-Analysis (Civic Knowledge Scores)

| Fixed effect | M1 | M2 | M3 | M4 ¹ | M5 | M6 | M7 ¹ | M8 | M9 ¹ | M10 ¹ |
|--|--|--|---------------------|---|--|----------------------------|---|--|----------------------------|---|
| Intercept | -17.87*** (2.72) | -17.16*** (2.19) | -17.31*** (2.72) | -16.50*** (2.52) | -17.91*** (2.42) | -17.94*** (2.57) | -16.82*** (2.29) | -17.88*** (2.31) | -16.84*** (2.20) | -16.57*** (2.38) |
| Average non-immigrant civic knowledge scores | -.17 (.12) | -.17 [^] (.10) | -.10 (.11) | -.19 (.12) | -.27 [^] (.09) | -.21 [^] (.10) | -.26 [^] (.09) | -.28 [^] (.09) | -.27 [^] (.09) | -.21 [^] (.09) |
| Immigrant political participation | -.18 (.15) | -.26 (.14) | -.14 (.13) | -.04 (.12) | | | | | | |
| Immigrant education | .42[^] (.20) | | | | .11 (.17) | .24 (.18) | .20 (.14) | | | |
| Immigrants' access to nationality | | .52[^] (.13) | | | .32[^] (.15) | | | .51[^] (.22) | .25 (.17) | |
| Anti-discrimination | | | .26 (.17) | | | .12 (.17) | | -.18 (.19) | | .06 (.15) |
| Ideological position on immigration | | | | -9.61[^] (3.92) | | | -9.15[^] (3.71) | | -5.95 (4.47) | -8.97[^] (3.98) |
| <u>Random effect</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Variance (df) | 126.83*** (19) | 74.77*** (19) | 123.72*** (19) | 92.70*** (18) | 91.17*** (19) | 119.80*** (19) | 80.21*** (18) | 89.43*** (19) | 69.84*** (18) | 86.97*** (19) |
| Variance explained (%) | 4.8 | 43.9 | 7.2 | 36.3 | 31.6 | 10.1 | 44.9 | 32.9 | 52.0 | 40.2 |
| Number of countries included | 23 | 23 | 23 | 22 | 23 | 23 | 22 | 23 | 22 | 22 |

¹Malta was excluded from the analyses.

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$

Table 5-10 Results from Supplementary HLM Meta-Analysis (Citizenship Self-efficacy Scores)

| <u>Fixed effect</u> | M1 | M2 | M3 | M4 ¹ | M5 | M6 | M7 ¹ | M8 | M9 ¹ | M10 ¹ |
|--|-----------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| Intercept | 1.21*** (.19) | 1.24*** (.18) | 1.27*** (.18) | 1.26*** (.19) | 1.25*** (.18) | 1.29*** (.16) | 1.28*** (.19) | 1.32*** (.16) | 1.29*** (.20) | 1.35*** (.17) |
| Average non-immigrant citizenship self-efficacy scores | .01 (.13) | -.00 (.14) | -.11 (.14) | .09 (.17) | -.03 (.13) | -.14 (.12) | .03 (.15) | -.18 (.15) | -.03 (.16) | -.14 (.14) |
| Immigrant political participation | .02* (.01) | .01 (.01) | .01 (.01) | .02** (.01) | | | | | | |
| Immigrant education | .01 (.01) | | | | .01 (.01) | .01 (.01) | .03* (.01) | | | |
| Immigrants' access to nationality | | .01 (.01) | | | .02^ (.01) | | | -.00 (.02) | .02* (.01) | |
| Anti-discrimination | | | .03** (.01) | | | .03** (.01) | | .03* (.01) | | .03** (.01) |
| Ideological position on immigration | | | | -.52 (.34) | | | -.45 (.28) | | -.14 (.32) | -.16 (.29) |
| <u>Random effect</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Variance (df) | .40 [^] (19) | .30 [^] (19) | .16 (19) | .29 [^] (18) | .25 [^] (19) | .11 (19) | .33 [^] (18) | .12 (19) | .29 [^] (18) | .11 (18) |
| Variance explained (%) | 21.2 | 41.0 | 68.9 | 42.9 | 49.8 | 77.9 | 34.0 | 76.2 | 43.2 | 77.4 |
| Number of countries included | 23 | 23 | 23 | 22 | 23 | 23 | 22 | 23 | 22 | 22 |

¹ Malta was excluded from the analyses.

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ ^ $p < .10$

Table 5-11 Results from Supplementary HLM Meta-Analysis (Expected Electoral Participation Scores)

| <u>Fixed effect</u> | M1 | M2 | M3 | M4 ¹ | M5 | M6 | M7 ¹ | M8 | M9 ¹ | M10 ¹ |
|---|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Intercept | -.88** (.24) | -.86** (.23) | -.80** (.21) | -.80** (.25) | -.85** (.24) | -.79** (.22) | -.80* (.27) | -.77** (.22) | -.78** (.27) | -.70* (.25) |
| Average non-immigrant expected electoral participation scores | -.45** (.13) | -.44** (.14) | -.46** (.11) | -.40* (.16) | -.34* (.17) | -.36* (.13) | -.24 (.22) | -.39* (.14) | -.36 (.22) | -.37* (.18) |
| Immigrant political participation | .03** (.01) | .03* (.01) | .03** (.01) | .04** (.01) | | | | | | |
| Immigrant education | .01 (.02) | | | | .02 (.01) | .02* (.01) | .04** (.01) | | | |
| Immigrants' access to nationality | | .02 (.02) | | | .03* (.01) | | | .02 (.02) | .04** (.01) | |
| Anti-discrimination | | | .04* (.01) | | | .04** (.01) | | .04* (.02) | | .05** (.01) |
| Ideological position on immigration | | | | -.56 (.54) | | | -.77 (.55) | | -.06 (.57) | -.21 (.54) |
| <u>Random effect</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Variance (df) | .85*** (19) | .66** (19) | .39* (19) | .78** (18) | .84** (19) | .66** (19) | 1.11*** (18) | .77** (19) | 1.06*** (18) | .88** (18) |
| Variance explained (%) | 50.8 | 62.3 | 77.7 | 70.0 | 51.5 | 61.9 | 57.3 | 55.6 | 59.3 | 66.1 |
| Number of countries included | 23 | 23 | 23 | 22 | 23 | 23 | 22 | 23 | 22 | 22 |

¹Malta is excluded from the analyses.

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ ^ $p < .10$

Chapter 6 Conclusion

Using the data from 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS), this dissertation has examined the extent to which countries vary in the pattern and magnitude of the discrepancy in civic outcomes among adolescents from differing family backgrounds. Among many family background characteristics that may shape adolescents' civic outcomes, I have focused on two dimensions of family background—family socioeconomic status (SES) and immigration background. One final theme that emerged from this dissertation is that the tendency for privileged families and their children to take greater civic advantages can be overcome by transforming the pattern of cleavages in societies and the way that such cleavages are institutionalized. In particular, the findings from the three main chapters have confirmed the intervening roles of *politics*, *schooling*, and *public policy* that alter the ways that family backgrounds influence adolescents' civic outcomes. Consequently, adolescents from less privileged families in some countries demonstrate significantly higher levels of civic awareness and empowerment than their similarly situated peers in other countries.

This conclusion proceeds as follows. I will first revisit the research questions of this dissertation. Next, I explain how each chapter's findings provide answers to the research questions, and discuss implications derived from those findings. I conclude with this research's limitations and suggestions for future research.

Research Questions Revisited

The overarching question of this research has been to identify country-level factors that may mediate cross-national variations, if any, in the pattern and magnitude of the discrepancy in

civic outcomes among adolescents from differing family backgrounds. Towards this aim, I have raised the sub-questions as such:

- 1) How does country-level inequality in political voice by social class condition the effect of family socioeconomic background on adolescents' civic outcomes?
- 2) How does country-level between-school segregation along socioeconomic lines influence the magnitude of socioeconomic gaps in adolescents' civic outcomes?
- 3) How does the governmental policy context for immigrant integration shape the way in which immigrant adolescents are socialized into civically oriented citizens in the host country?

Macro-level Political Inequality

In Chapter 3, I examined whether macro-level inequality of political voice by social class can explain cross-national variations in the effect of family SES on adolescents' civic outcomes. In countries where all citizens' political voices are represented on relatively equal terms, low SES parents might be more civically empowered than their similarly situated counterparts in countries where only the socioeconomically better-off dominate the political process. In turn, in countries where citizens share relatively equal political voice irrespective of their socioeconomic conditions, low SES parents may not face the same barriers to providing civically rich home environments for their children as do similarly low SES parents in countries where those positioned at the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy are marginalized in politics. Following this reasoning, I hypothesized that in some countries, children having parents with less advantaged socioeconomic attainment would show substantially lower levels of civic

empowerment and engagement than would their counterparts having parents with advantaged socioeconomic attainment. By contrast, the corresponding gap might be only negligible in other countries.

The results of this chapter showed strong empirical evidence of the systematic association between country-level political inequality and the magnitude of family socioeconomic influence on adolescents' civic outcomes. That is, the compounding impact of macro-level political inequality in increasing civic disparities among adolescents from different socioeconomic families was substantial. More precisely, the magnitude of socioeconomic disparities in adolescents' three civic outcomes (i.e., *internal political efficacy*, *citizenship self-efficacy* and *expected likelihood of voting*) was found to be more substantial in countries with less egalitarian political systems than in countries with more egalitarian political systems. This finding supports my argument that the civic advantages that accrue to advantaged socioeconomic families and confer on their offspring are not really given at all. Rather, they are socially constructed in the sense that the tendency for high SES families and their children to take advantage of greater opportunities for civic engagement can be counteracted by changing the distribution of socioeconomic advantages, or politics per se. It also suggests that incorporating theories of micro/macro interaction can provide better insights into the source of disparities in political voice on the basis of socioeconomic resources, gender, race or ethnicity, and help bridge the gap between micro and macro emphases in a burgeoning research literature on the sociology of political inequality.

Socioeconomic School Segregation

Chapter 4 compared degrees of socioeconomic school segregation across 28 selected countries, and investigates whether these cross-national variations in the degree of socioeconomic school segregation correspond to the magnitude of socioeconomic gaps in student civic outcomes. In countries with school systems that are more highly segregated along socioeconomic lines, low SES students are more likely to be concentrated into schools that have a large number of socioeconomically disadvantaged peers. Low SES students who are at greater risk of being sorted into low SES schools are doubly disadvantaged, which may explain the related lag in civic outcomes among low SES students in countries with higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation. On the opposite side, high SES students in countries with higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation are more likely to be sorted into schools with large concentrations of high SES students. Where the majority of the student body comes from well-to-do families, students often have greater access to enriched civic learning opportunities and benefit from those high-quality civic learning opportunities. This may also compound the advantages of students from more privileged families. Based on this line of reasoning, I initially hypothesized that countries with higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation will show larger socioeconomic disparities in student civic outcomes.

Empirical analyses yielded more complex findings than were initially hypothesized. The extent and direction of the systematic linkage varies across the three civic outcome measures. While *civic knowledge* gaps by family socioeconomic levels are larger in countries with higher degrees of socioeconomic school segregation, the corresponding gaps in *citizenship self-efficacy* and *school-based civic participation* are less substantial in these same countries. To explain the systematic, yet varying, associations between country-level socioeconomic school segregation

and the socioeconomic gaps across the three civic outcome measures, I advanced two arguments. On one hand, the development of citizenship self-efficacy and engagement in school-based civic activities might have more to do with the ways that students interact with one another and the broader school context than the organization and instructional dimensions of schooling. On the other hand, the quality of classroom-based pedagogy and civic instructions is likely to matter more in regards to promoting students' civic knowledge than other civic learning contexts that they encounter in the broader school community. If it were so, students' civic understanding may be better enhanced in high SES schools, because high SES schools are often endowed with more and better-quality civic curricular and instruction. In contrast, underprivileged students may feel more confident exercising their voices and setting agendas in schools when peers in close proximity are similar in terms of their socioeconomic origins. The homogeneous social makeup would make disparities and discrimination less visible within school settings, spurring them to feel efficacious and to engage actively in the democratic process. By the same token, high SES students attending socioeconomically mixed schools may receive more favorable treatment from teachers, or their non-cognitive characteristics (e.g., speech and style) may be more rewarded in extra-curricular organizations and democratic governance in schools than those of low SES schoolmates (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; DiMaggio 1982). However, their home advantages are likely to be attenuated by the presence of a sizeable number of similarly privileged schoolmates to a degree that they become less civically efficacious and less committed to school-based civic activities. Simply put, the presence of a large number of schoolmates from similar socioeconomic origins may function as a *leveling* factor for ameliorating socioeconomic disparities in students' self-confidence and engagement in participatory activities.

The findings of Chapter 4 produce two normative implications. First, it debunks the commonsensical notion in school effectiveness research that high SES schools are inherently better in regards to their overall educational outcomes. School effectiveness research has often been criticized for its political convenience “which pathologizes and renders invisible the lived experiences of those studying and teaching in poorer areas” (Thrupp 2001, 8). However, as suggested by my finding that underprivileged students become more civically efficacious and engaged when they attend schools with similarly underprivileged peers, low SES schools are by no means ineffective, especially with respect to carrying out its civic mission to educate future citizens. If students attending low SES schools are at higher risk of underachievement, it might be much less attributable to the cultures, values and behaviors in those low SES schools than to the socially constructed disadvantages conferred upon schools serving underprivileged students. Second, the findings of this chapter suggest that without contextualizing the lived experiences of students inside schools, any attempt to address civic disparities through schooling would be insufficient. Much of recent research on school-based civic education has taken a socially decontextualized approach which overemphasizes “the school solution” to equalize civic learning opportunity while ignoring structural questions on the underlying cause of inequalities. In particular, many authors have attributed the source of civic disparities between students from more and less privileged families to between-school inequalities in key educational resources. Then, they have assumed that introducing more challenging civic curricula and better out-of-school civic activities to disadvantaged schools or granting access to high-quality schools to underprivileged families through market-based policies (i.e., school choice programs) could ameliorate existing civic disparities. By doing so, this line of research has uncritically supported a societal view that “ineffective or minimally effective” schools are the cause of much of the ills

of our society, not the symptom of the economic and political structures which schools are built upon. Such buck-passing arguments thus provide ideological support for the neoliberal agenda in education, which places the responsibility for improving education primarily with individual schools and avoids public concern for eradicating structural inequalities (Olmos, Torres, and Van Heertum 2011). However, as my empirical findings allude, increasing the effectiveness of schools or simply integrating public schools may not be enough to achieve true equality in our young citizens' political voice. If underprivileged students become less civically efficacious and engaged in high-status schools due to their highly visible disadvantages and discrimination, it would be more appropriate to eradicate the underlying causes of those disadvantages and discrimination rather than to reform school structures and introduce new classroom pedagogical techniques. Although no one would deny that school desegregation contributes to the advancement of students' understanding of community and citizenship (Jacobsen, Frankenberg, and Lenhoff 2012), desegregation efforts would be less fruitful if they are motivated by policy entrepreneurship without considering the pervasive inequalities in family and community resources and the ways that those inequalities shape students' experiences inside schools.

Governmental Policy Context for Immigrant Integration

Chapter 5 explored reasons for variations in the role played by immigration status in determining adolescents' civic orientations, focusing on country-level immigration policy contexts. Outright discrimination and social exclusion, which young immigrants face in the host societies, might have enduring effects on their understanding of civil society and their place within it (Rumbaut 2008; Sánchez-Jankowski 2002). I thus hypothesized that the extent to which governmental policies on immigrant incorporation is exclusionary/inclusionary would be

an important predictor of young immigrants' civic orientations over and above their individual and familial characteristics. That is, immigrant children and immigrant offspring in countries with more inclusionary immigration policies may have higher levels of civic competence and empowerment than those in countries with more exclusionary immigration policies. Immigration policy contexts may influence immigrant adolescents' processes of civic integration in two different ways. First, inclusionary immigration policies help increase disposable civic resources among immigrants and immigrant families. For example, immigrant-origin adolescents in countries with more inclusive naturalization policies are more likely to receive full support to acquire citizenship and equally participate in public life compared to their counterparts in countries with more restrictive naturalization policies. School-age immigrant children living in countries where they have the right to a full education and benefit from extra support may master the host country's language faster than do their counterparts in countries where immigrant students are segregated in underperforming schools with other immigrants. In the long term, an array of such supportive immigration policies may allow immigrant parents and their children to achieve socioeconomic parity with their native peers relatively easily. Second, inclusionary immigration policies can function as a buffer against immigrant disadvantages in the host societies. In so doing, they may make young immigrants less sensitive to their relative lack of civically relevant resources. Although they may possess a lesser amount of civic resources than their native peers in absolute terms, immigrant-origin adolescents in countries where state governments support the emergence of an immigrant civil society are more likely to become civically empowered compared to their similarly situated counterparts living in countries where citizenship laws deny immigrants' basic civil and political liberties. Similarly, immigrant adolescents in countries where they frequently encounter social stigma and discrimination may

be less civically efficacious compared to their counterparts possessing similar levels civic resources and living in countries, where immigrants benefit from equal opportunities and can fight against injustice.

As hypothesized, my findings demonstrate that while the effect of immigration status on adolescents' civic orientations is in part explained by differences in family-based civic resources in many countries, a significant cross-national variation persists. It was also found that such remaining cross-national variation in the effect of immigration status stems partly from differences in national contexts of governmental policies for immigrant integration. That is, more receptive immigration policies mitigate disparities in *civic knowledge* and *likelihood of expected voting* between immigrant and native adolescents. Similarly, the relative advantage of immigrant adolescents in *citizenship self-efficacy* becomes stronger in countries where governments are actively involved in public support for immigrants and immigrant families. These findings supports my reasoning that between-country differences in immigration policy contexts might be associated with cross-national variations in the effect of immigration status on adolescents' civic orientations, which remains even after taking into account differences in individual-level attributes that exist between immigrant and native adolescents. As such, the results of Chapter 5 substantially diverge from what has been claimed by partisan politics and the right-wing media in the United States. The public image of contemporary immigrants has frequently been colored as consisting of people from the Global South, whose countries of origin are uniformly poor, undeveloped, uneducated, and thus permanently inassimilable to the mainstream society. However, as clearly evidenced by my finding that immigrant adolescents demonstrate higher levels of citizenship self-efficacy and do not significantly differ in levels of engagement in the host societies' civic realm compared to their native peers, young immigrants

come to their new home with a positive self-image of being responsible citizens and motivated for civic engagement. Thus, what makes the immigration status a civic disadvantage is an array of contextual factors of the host country such as restrictive and selective immigration policies that hamper their successful socioeconomic integration and civic participation. These findings are significant for policymakers and researchers to address what should be done to promote immigrant adolescents' processes of civic integration. With more inclusive integration policies for immigrants and immigrant families, young immigrants are more likely to become civically competent and empowered citizens in the host society.

Limitations to the Research

This dissertation research has utilized the large-scale, cross-sectional data from a number of countries spanning a wide range of political, social and cultural contexts. In illuminating how country-level macro factors mediate the ways that the family of origin leaves a legacy for adolescents' civic outcomes, this research has some advantages over single-country studies or comparative studies involving only a few countries. As has been pointed out, however, large-scale international assessment of student achievement like ICCS 2009 has some inherent limitations with respect to providing precise information about what actually goes on in diverse social contexts where adolescents' civic learning takes place (Porter and Gamoran 2002). It is also important to acknowledge that the results of this research should not be interpreted as suggesting causal inferences about the impacts of country-level factors.

The first limitation is that this research was not able to address particular mechanisms by which country-level factors influence the association between family background and

adolescents' civic outcomes. In Chapter 3, I did not aim to identify precise mechanisms that might underlie the systematic linkage between macro-level political inequality and the magnitude of the socioeconomic gaps in adolescents' civic outcomes. Instead, I focused on empirically estimating the extent of macro-level political inequality along socioeconomic lines, and its linkage with the strength of family socioeconomic influence on adolescents' civic outcomes. In a similar vein, in Chapter 4, I found that countries' socioeconomic gaps in student civic outcomes were systematically correlated with degrees of school segregation along socioeconomic lines. That said, it is still unclear *why* socioeconomic school segregation matters with respect to its effect on shaping civic disparity along the socioeconomic spectrum. As implied in Chapter 5, depending on national contexts, several immigration policies may interact in a complex way to produce civically oriented citizens in the host society. Again, I was only able to show that between-country differences in immigration policy contexts were correlated to cross-national variations in the effect of immigration status on adolescents' civic orientations. I did not provide a detailed analysis of *in what ways* comprehensive policies on immigrants' integration have a buffering impact on civic disadvantages associated with immigration status.

The second limitation of this research is that some of my measures are not extensive enough to draw solid conclusions. In Chapter 3, to construct the cross-national measurement of political inequality, I drew upon information about parents' interest in politics from adolescents' responses to the student questionnaire in ICCS 2009. Although research on citizen participation has found that interest in politics is an important predictor of diverse forms of political participation (see, for example, Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995), it seems apparent that parents' interest in politics cannot be an iron-clad indicator of their actual engagement in politics. Future research may benefit from more elaborate cross-national measurement of political

inequality that takes into account the socioeconomic stratification of citizens' engagement in diverse participatory channels, including voting, campaigning, community activities, demonstrations, and strikes. In addition, in Chapter 5, I used home language, family socioeconomic background and family structure as proxies for family-based civic resources. I also have considered the influences from political socialization agents by controlling for the individual student's perception of an open classroom climate, the level of media attention, and the frequency of political discussion with friends. Although useful, these measures are far from definitive. They also do not encompass other kinds of civic resources and socialization experiences associated with adolescents' civic development, such as citizenship status, civic skills, taking civic-related lessons at school, and participation in the community or various petitioning and protest activities. More importantly, I was not able to take into consideration the important roles of ethnicity and cultural identity in affecting adolescents' civic orientations. This was mainly because a number of countries did not provide sufficiently specified information or were reluctant to collect data on adolescents' ethnic or racial background. Much prior scholarship has recognized the centrality of young citizens' cultural heritage and ethnic identity as a driving force behind their civic development, while simultaneously identifying considerable disparities in access to civic resources along ethnic and racial lines. Thus, by not taking into account the ethnic or racial background of each adolescent, I might have under- or overestimated the explanatory power of family-based civic resources and socialization experiences.

The last limitation is that this research's main findings are limited by their reliance on cross-sectional data. That is, cross-sectional data of adolescents' civic outcomes such as ICCS 2009 have limitations in ascertaining any causal link between country-level macro contexts and disparities in civic outcomes from differing family backgrounds. For example, the finding of the

mitigating role of comprehensive immigration policies (Chapter 5) does not necessary mean that a policy reform of the United States toward more comprehensive immigration policies will help the immigrant adolescents' processes of civic integration. To derive unambiguous causal inferences, future studies should conduct well-designed longitudinal research that follows up on individuals from adolescence to adulthood. Such longitudinal research would enable us to test whether underprivileged adolescents who grew up in the countries with higher degrees of political inequality become less engaged and empowered in adult politics (Chapter 3). It would also provide data that better support causal assumptions about whether the socioeconomic composition of schools attended in early adolescence has an enduring effect on adult political attitudes and behaviors (Chapter 4).

Further Research

In light of the limitations of this research, ideally, in-depth qualitative research would help address a variety of mechanisms that were not considered in this dissertation but may produce the unexplained influence of family background on adolescents' civic outcomes. For instance, given that the contents of civic curricular and instruction are not ideologically neutral (Apple 1978, 1993), future observational studies should explore how the civic understanding of students from working-class families is suppressed in classroom settings by the class mismatches between their lived knowledge and official knowledge. Another possibility could be an ethnographic investigation into how purely ceremonial engagement in school governance and out-of-school civic activities force underprivileged students to fit into the existing political system. By doing so, I can elucidate the ways that underprivileged students feel alienated and marginalized in high-status schools, as has been suggested in Chapter 4. Similarly, the social class differences in

home civic learning environments might be more directly reflected in the contents of civic attitudes and commitments that parents consider valuable for their children to hold. Thus, one fruitful avenue would be to conduct interviews with the parents and their children from all along the socioeconomic spectrum. It would help me to explore how high and low SES parents exert differential influences on their children's likelihood of acquiring civic attributes that shape later participatory profiles.

Another possibility of expanding this research's theoretical and empirical scope is to include more country-level factors, and/or more contextual levels. First, although this study has particularly focused on the intervening roles of politics, schooling, and public policy, various alternative country-level factors may also matter for the ways that the family of origin is linked to adolescents' civic outcomes. Future studies should consider multiple factors that may have reciprocal and interactive influences on adolescents' civic outcomes, including countries' cultural and historical legacies. For example, parents' educational attainment may matter less in developing countries with a culture of collectivism, such as Thailand, where extended family members play a prominent role, or even a more critical role than parents, in influencing children's civic development. The specific meaning of parent-child discussion on civic matters may vary across countries as well. There also might be other forms of the home civic stimulation that are widely practiced and effective in some countries but are not considered in the ICCS 2009 data. Considering that one of the most profound political markers separating Western democracies is experience of a Communist past (Andersen 2012), it would be also beneficial to explore the role of a Communist past in mediating the effect of family background on adolescents' civic outcomes. Second, because this research has taken into account only two levels (i.e., country and individual), it might be fruitful for future studies to incorporate more

complex contextual levels where adolescents are embedded, such as community and schools. An important task for future cross-national studies is thus to establish substantive ways to investigate multi-level and multi-dimensional determinants of cross-national variations in the effects of family background on adolescents' civic outcomes.

References

- Aaron, Cohen, Eran Vigoda, and Aliza Samorly. 2001. "Analysis of the Mediating Effect of Personal-Psychological Variables on the Relationship between Socioeconomic Status and Political Participation: A Structural Equation Framework." *Political Psychology* 22 (4): 727-757.
- Alba, Richard D. 1990. *Ethnic Identity: The Transformation of White America*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Alegre, Miquel Àngel, and Gerard Ferrer. 2010. "School Regimes and Education Equity: Some Insights Based on PISA 2006." *British Educational Research Journal* 36 (3): 433-461.
- Alesina, Alberto, and Eliana La Ferrara. 2002. "Who Trusts Others?" *Journal of Public Economics* 85 (2): 207-234.
- Alexander, Karl L., James Fennessey, Edward L. McDill, and Ronald J. D'Amico. 1979. "School SES Influences--Composition or Context?" *Sociology of Education* 52 (4): 222-237.
- Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Altonji, Joseph G., and Richard Mansfield. 2011. "The Role of Family, School, and Community Characteristics in Equality in Education and Labor Market Outcomes." In *Whiter Opportunity? Rising Inequality, Schools, and Children's Life Chances*, edited by Greg J. Duncan and Richard J. Murnane, 339-358. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Amadeo, Jo-Ann, Judith Torney-Purta, Rainer H. Lehman, Vera Husfeldt Husfeldt, and Roumiana Nikolova. 2002. *Civic Knowledge and Engagement: An IEA Study of Upper Secondary Students in Sixteen Countries*. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA).
- Andersen, Robert. 2012. "Support for Democracy in Cross-National Perspective: The Detrimental Effect of Economic Inequality." *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility* 30 (4): 389-402.
- Anderson, Christopher J., and Pablo Beramendi. 2005. Economic Inequality, Redistribution, and Political Inequality. Paper presented at Income Inequality, Representation, and Democracy: Europe in Comparative Perspective, at Maxwell School, Syracuse University, 6-7 May 2005.
- Apple, Michael W. 1978. "Ideology, Reproduction, and Educational Reform." *Comparative Education Review* 22 (3): 367-387.

- . 1993. "The Politics of Official Knowledge: Does a National Curriculum Make Sense?" *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education* 14 (1): 1-16.
- APSA Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy. 2004. American Democracy in an Age of Rising Inequality. www.apsanet.org/imgtest/taskforcereport.pdf.
- Arnold, Hugh J., and Daniel C. Feldman. 1981. "Social Desirability Response Bias in Self-Report Choice Situations." *Academy of Management Journal* 24 (2): 377-385.
- Austin, Allan W. 2004. *From Concentration Camp to Campus: Japanese American Students and World War II*. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Baker, David P., Brian Goesling, and Gerald K. LeTendre. 2002. "Socioeconomic Status, School Quality, and National Economic Development: A Cross-National Analysis of the "Heyneman-Loxley Effect" on Mathematics and Science Achievement." *Comparative Education Review* 46 (3): 291-312.
- Balch, George I. 1974. "Multiple Indicators in Survey Research: The Concept "Sense of Political Efficacy"." *Political Methodology* 1 (2): 1-43.
- Ball, Stephen J. 1981. *Beachside Comprehensive: A Case-Study of Secondary Schooling*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2003. *Class Strategies and the Education Market*. London, England: Routledge.
- Bandura, Albert. 2001. "Social Cognitive Theory: An Agentic Perspective." *Annual Review of Psychology* 52 (1): 1-26.
- Barber, Benjamin R. 2004. *Strong democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Bartels, Larry M. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Glided Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- . 2009. "Economic Inequality and Political Representation." In *The unsustainable American state*, edited by Lawrence R. Jacobs and Desmond S. King, 167-196. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Bass, Loretta E., and Lynne M. Casper. 2001. "Impacting the Political Landscape: Who Registers and Votes among Naturalized Americans?" *Political Behavior* 23 (2): 103-130.
- Beck, Paul Allen. 1977. "The Role of Agents in Political Socialization: Theory and Research." In *Handbook of political socialization*, edited by Stanley Allen Renshon, 115-141. New York, NY: The Free Press.

- Beck, Paul Allen, and M. Kent Jennings. 1982. "Pathways to Participation." *The American Political Science Review* 76 (1): 94-108.
- . 1991. "Family Traditions, Political Periods, and the Development of Partisan Orientations." *The Journal of Politics* 53 (3): 742-763.
- Bedolla, Lisa García. 2000. "They and We: Identity, Gender, and Politics among Latino Youth in Los Angeles." *Social Science Quarterly* 81 (1): 106-122.
- Beller, Emily, and Michael Hout. 2006. "Welfare States and Social Mobility: How Educational and Social Policy May Affect Cross-national Differences in the Association between Occupational Origins and Destinations." *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility* 24 (4): 353-365.
- Bengtson, Vern L. 1975. "Generation and Family Effects in Value Socialization." *American Sociological Review* 40 (3): 358-371.
- Benoit, Kenneth, and Michael Laver. 2006. *Party Policy in Modern Democracies* London, England: Routledge.
- Berelson, Bernard, and William N. McPhee. 1954. *Voting*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Berry, John W., Jean S. Phinney, David L. Sam, and Paul Vedder. 2006. *Immigrant Youth in Cultural Transition: Acculturation, Identity, and Adaptation across National Contexts*. Mahwah, NJ: Laurence Erlbaum Associates.
- Bidwell, Charles E., and John D. Kasarda. 1980. "Conceptualizing and Measuring the Effects of School and Schooling." *American Journal of Education* 88 (4): 401-430.
- Blau, Peter M., and Otis Dudley Duncan. 1967. *The American Occupational Structure*. New York, NY: The Free Press.
- Bloemraad, Irene. 2002. "The North American Naturalization Gap: An Institutional Approach to Citizenship Acquisition in the United States and Canada." *International Migration Review* 36 (1): 193-228.
- Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Bol, Thijs, and Herman G. van de Werfhorst. 2013. "Educational Systems and the Trade-Off between Labor Market Allocation and Equality of Educational Opportunity." *Comparative Education Review* 57 (2): 285-308.
- Bourdieu, Pierre, and Jean-Claude Passeron. 1977. *Reproduction in Education, Culture and Society*. Thousands Oakes, CA: Sage Publications.

- Bowman, Nicholas A. 2012. "Effect Sizes and Statistical Methods for Meta-Analysis in Higher Education." *Research in Higher Education* 53 (3): 375-382.
- Bradley, Robert H., and Robert F. Corwyn. 2002. "Socioeconomic Status and Child Development." *Annual Review of Psychology* 53 (1): 371-399.
- Brady, Henry E. 2004. "An Analytical Perspective on Participatory Inequality and Income Inequality." In *Social inequality*, edited by Kathryn M. Neckerman, 667-702. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Brady, Henry E., Sidney Verba, and Kay Lehman Schlozman. 1995. "Beyond Ses: A Resource Model of Political Participation." *The American Political Science Review* 89 (2): 271-294.
- Brantlinger, Ellen. 1991. "Low-Income Adolescents' Perceptions of Social Class Related Peer Affiliations in School." *Interchange* 22 (3): 9-27.
- Brese, Falk, Michael Jung, Plamen Mirazchiyski, Wolfram Schulz, and Olaf Zuehlke. 2011. *ICCS 2009 User Guide for the International Database*. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA).
- Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Brunello, Giorgio, and Daniele Checchi. 2007. "Does School Tracking Affect Equality of Opportunity? New International Evidence." *Economic Policy* 22 (52): 781-861.
- Buchmann, Claudia, and Ben Dalton. 2002. "Interpersonal Influences and Educational Aspirations in 12 Countries: The Importance of Institutional Context." *Sociology of Education* 75 (2): 99-122.
- Buchmann, Claudia, and Emily Hannum. 2001. "Education and Stratification in Developing Countries: A Review of Theories and Research." *Annual Review of Sociology* 27: 77-102.
- Buchmann, Claudia, and Emilio A. Parrado. 2006. "Educational Achievement of Immigrant-Origin and Native Students: A Comparative Analysis Informed by Institutional Theory." In *The impact of comparative education research on institutional theory*, edited by Davaid P. Baker and Alexander W. Wiseman, 335-366. West Yorkshire, England: Emerald Group Publishing.
- Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Campbell, Angus , Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller. 1954. *The Voter Decides*. New York, NY: Row, Peterson & Company.

- Campbell, Bruce A. 1980. "A Thoretical Approach to Peer Influence in Adolescent Socialization." *American Journal of Political Science* 24 (2): 324-344.
- Campbell, David E. 2006. *Why We Vote: How Schools and Communities Shape Our Civic Life*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- . 2008. "Voice in the Classroom: How an Open Classroom Climate Fosters Political Engagement among Adolescents." *Political Behavior* 30 (4): 437-454.
- Campbell, David E., and Christina Wolbrecht. 2006. "See Jane Run: Women Politicians as Role Models for Adolescents." *Journal of Politics* 68 (2): 233-247.
- Carlson, James M., and Mark S. Hyde. 1980. "Personality and Political Recruitment: Actualization or Compensation?" *The Journal of Psychology* 106 (1): 117-120.
- Central Intelligence Agency. 2011. *The CIA World Factbook*. New York, NY: Skyhorse Publishing, Inc.
- Cheng, Simon H., and Wen H. Kuo. 2000. "Family Socialization of Ethnic Identity among Chinese American Pre-Adolescents." *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*.
- Cho, Tam W.K. 1999. "Naturalization, Socialization, Participation: Immigrants and (non-) Voting." *The Journal of Politics* 61 (4): 1140-1155.
- Chui, Tina W. L., James E. Curtis, and Ronald D. Lambert. 1991. "Immigrant Background and Political Participation: Examining Generational Patterns." *The Canadian Journal of Sociology* 16 (4): 375-396.
- Cicourel, Aaron V., and John I. Kituse. 1977. *The School as a Mechanism of Social Differentiation*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Clarke, James, Elsbeth van Dam, and Liz Gooster. 1998. "New Europeans: Naturalisation and Citizenship in Europe." *Citizenship Studies* 2 (1): 43-67.
- Cohen, Aaron, Eran Vigoda, and Aliza Samorly. 2001. "Analysis of the Mediating Effect of Personal-Psychological Variables on the Relationship Between Socioeconomic Status and Political Participation: A Structural Equations Framework." *Political Psychology* 22 (4): 727-757.
- Coleman, James S., Ernest Q. Campbell, Carl F. Hobson, James McPartland, and Alexander M. Mood. 1966. *Equality of Educational Opportunity*. Washington, DC: U.S. Office of Education.
- Connell, Robert W. 1972. "Political Socialization in the American Family: The Evidence Re-Examined." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 36 (3): 323-333.

- Craig, Stephen C., and Michael A. Maggiotto. 1982. "Measuring Political Efficacy." *Political Methodology* 8 (3): 85-109.
- Cullen, Julie Berry, Brian A. Jacob, and Steven D. Levitt. 2005. "The Impact of School Choice on Student Outcomes: An Analysis of the Chicago Public Schools." *Journal of Public Economics* 89 (5): 729-760.
- Dahl, Robert Alan. 2006. *On Political Equality*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Davies, James C. 1965. "The Family's Role in Political Socialization." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 361: 10-19.
- de Rham, Gerard. 1990. "Naturalization: The Politics of Citizenship Acquisition." In *The Political Rights of Migrant Workers in Western Europe*, edited by Zig Layton-Henry, 158-185. London, England: Sage Publications.
- Denson, Nida, and Michael H. Seltzer. 2011. "Meta-Analysis in Higher Education: An Illustrative Example Using Hierarchical Linear Modeling." *Research in Higher Education* 52 (3): 215-244.
- Denton, Nancy A. 1995. "Persistence of Segregation: Links between Residential Segregation and School Segregation." *Minnesota Law Review* 80: 795-824.
- DeSipio, Louis. 1996. "Making Citizens or Good Citizens? Naturalization as a Predictor of Organizational and Electoral Behavior among Latino Immigrants." *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* 18 (2): 194-213.
- DiMaggio, Paul. 1982. "Cultural Capital and School Success: The Impact of Status Culture Participation on the Grades of U.S. High School Students." *American Sociological Review* 47 (2): 189-201.
- Downey, Douglas B., Paul T. Von Hippel, and Beckett A. Broh. 2004. "Are Schools the Great Equalizer? Cognitive Inequality During the Summer Months and the School Year." *American Sociological Review* 69 (5): 613-635.
- Dronkers, Jaap, and Mark Levels. 2007. "Do School Segregation and School Resources Explain Region-of-Origin Differences in the Mathematics Achievement of Immigrant Students?" *Educational Research and Evaluation* 13 (5): 435-462.
- Dubrow, Joshua Kjerulf. 2010. "Cross-National Measures of Political Inequality of Voice." *ASK. Research & Methods* (19): 93-110.
- Easton, David, and Jack Dennis. 1967. "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy." *The American Political Science Review* 61 (1): 25-38.

- Ehman, Lee H. 1970. *Political Socialization and the High School Social Studies Curriculum*. Ph.d. Dissertation, University of Michigan.
- Featherman, David L., and Robert Mason Hauser. 1978. *Opportunity and Change*. Waltham, MA: Academic Press.
- Fernandez, Roberto M., and Francois Nielsen. 1986. "Bilingualism and Hispanic Scholastic Achievement: Some Baseline Results." *Social Science Research* 15 (1): 43-70.
- Finch, Janet. 1984. *Education as Social Policy*. London, England: Longman.
- Finkel, Steven E. 1985. "Reciprocal Effects of Participation and Political Efficacy: A Panel Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 29 (4): 891-913.
- Flanagan, Constance A. 2004. "Volunteerism, Leadership, Political Socialization, and Civic Engagement." In *Handbook of Adolescent Psychology*, edited by Richard M. Lerner and Laurence Steinberg, 721-745. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
- Flanagan, Constance A., Patricio Cumsille, Sukhdeep Gill, and Leslie S. Galloway. 2007. "School and Community Climates and Civic Commitments: Patterns for Ethnic Minority and Majority Students." *Journal of Educational Psychology* 99 (2): 421-431.
- Flanagan, Constance A., and Peter Levine. 2010. "Civic Engagement and the Transition to Adulthood." *The Future of Children* 20 (1): 159-179.
- Fraser, Steve, and Gary Gerstle. 2005. *Ruling America: A History of Wealth and Power in a Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Freedom House. *Freedom in the World* 2008. Available from <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2008>.
- Freeman, Gary P. 1995. "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States." *International Migration Review* 29 (4): 881-902.
- Fridkin, Kim L., Patrick J. Kenney, and Jack Crittenden. 2006. "On the Margins of Democratic Life The Impact of Race and Ethnicity on the Political Engagement of Young People." *American Politics Research* 34 (5): 605-626.
- Friedman, Lucy N., Alice R. Gold, and Richard Christie. 1972. "Dissecting the Generation Gap: Intergenerational and Intrafamilial Similarities and Differences." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36 (3): 334-346.
- Galston, William. 1991. *Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Duties in the Liberal State*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

- . 2001. "Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic Education." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (1): 217-234.
- Gamoran, Adam. 1987. "The Stratification of High School Learning Opportunities." *Sociology of Education* 60 (3): 135-155.
- . 1992. "Social Factors in Education." In *Encyclopedia of Educational Research*, edited by Marvin C. Alkin, 1222-1229. New York, NY: Macmillan.
- . 1996. "Student Achievement in Public Magnet, Public Comprehensive, and Private City High Schools." *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis* 18 (1): 1-18.
- Ganzeboom, Harry B. G., Paul M. De Graaf, and Donald J. Treiman. 1992. "A Standard International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status." *Social Science Research* 21 (1): 1-56.
- Gewirtz, Sharon, Stephen J. Ball, and Richard Bowe. 1995. *Markets, Choice, and Equity in Education*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Glass, Jennifer, Vern L. Bengtson, and Charlotte Chorn Dunham. 1986. "Attitude Similarity in Three-Generation families: Socialization, Status Inheritance, or Reciprocal Influence?" *American Sociological Review* 51 (5): 685-698.
- Greenstein, Fred I. 1965. *Children and Politics*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Hacker, Jacob, Suzanne Mettler, Dianne Pinderhughes, and Theda Skocpol. 2005. "Inequality and Public Policy." In *Inequality and American democracy: What we know and what we need to learn*, edited by Lawrence R. Jacobs and Theda Skocpol, 156-213. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Hahn, Carole L. 1998. *Becoming Political: Comparative Perspectives on Citizenship Education*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Hampden-Thompson, G., and Suet-ling Pong. 2005. "Does Family Policy Environment Moderate the Effect of Single-Parenthood on Children's Academic Achievement?: A Study of 14 European Countries." *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 36 (2): 227-248.
- Hanushek, Eric A., and Javier A. Luque. 2003. "Efficiency and Equity in Schools around the World." *Economics of Education Review* 22 (5): 481-502.
- Hanushek, Eric A., and Ludger Wößmann. 2006. "Does Educational Tracking Affect Performance and Inequality? Differences- in-Differences Evidence Across Countries." *The Economic Journal* 116 (510): C63-C76.

- Harris, Douglas N. 2007. "Diminishing Marginal Returns and the Production of Education: An International Analysis." *Education Economics* 15 (1): 31-53.
- Hart, Daniel, and Robert Atkins. 2002. "Civic Competence in Urban Youth." *Applied Developmental Science* 6 (4): 227-236.
- Hess, Robert D. 1968. "Political Socialization in the Schools." *Harvard Educational Review* 38 (3): 528-535.
- Hess, Robert D., and Judith Torney. 1967. *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children*. Chicago, IL: Aldine Press.
- Heyneman, Stephen P., and William A. Loxley. 1982. "Influences on Academic Achievement across High and Low Income Countries: A Re-Analysis of IEA Data." *Sociology of Education* 55 (1): 13-21.
- . 1983. "The Effect of Primary-School Quality on Academic Achievement Across Twenty-Nine High- and Low-Income Countries." *American Journal of Sociology* 88 (6): 1162-1194.
- Hill, Kevin A., and Dario Moreno. 1996. "Second-Generation Cubans." *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* 18 (2): 175-193.
- Holme, Jennifer Jellison. 2002. "Buying Homes, Buying Schools: School Choice and the Social Construction of School Quality." *Harvard Educational Review* 72 (2): 177-206.
- Hooghe, Marc, and Dietlind Stolle. 2004. "Good Girls Go to the Polling Booth, Bad Boys Go Everywhere." *Women & Politics* 26 (3-4): 1-23.
- Hoover, Edgar M., Jr. 1941. "Interstate Redistribution of Population, 1850-1940." *The Journal of Economic History* 1 (2): 199-205.
- Hyman, H. Herbert. 1959. *Political Socialization*. Glencoe, NY: The Free Press.
- Jacobsen, Rebecca, Erica Frankenberg, and Sarah Winchell Lenhoff. 2012. "Diverse Schools in a Democratic Society: New Ways of Understanding How School Demographics Affect Civic and Political Learning." *American Educational Research Journal* 49 (5): 812-843.
- Janoski, Thomas, and John Wilson. 1995. "Pathways to Voluntarism: Family Socialization and Status Transmission Models." *Social Forces* 74 (1): 271-292.
- Jaros, Dean, Herbert Hirsch, and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. 1968. "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in An American Sub-Culture." *The American Political Science Review* 62 (2): 564-575.

- Jasso, Guillermina, and Mark Richard Rosenzweig. 1990. *The New Chosen People: Immigrants in the United States*. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Jencks, Christopher, and Susan E. Mayer. 1990. "The Social Consequences of Growing up in a Poor Neighborhood." In *Inner-City Poverty in the United States*, edited by Laurence E. Lynn and Michael G. H. McGeary, 111-186. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
- Jenkins, Stephen P., John Micklewright, and Sylke V. Schnepf. 2008. "Social Segregation in Secondary Schools: How Does England Compare with Other Countries?" *Oxford Review of Education* 34 (1): 21-37.
- Jennings, M. Kent. 1974. "An Aggregate Analysis of Home and School Effects on Political Socialization." *Social Science Quarterly* 55 (2): 394-410.
- Jennings, M. Kent, and Richard G. Niemi. 1968. "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child." *The American Political Science Review* 62 (1): 169-184.
- . 1974. *The Political Character of Adolescence: The Influence of Families and Schools*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Jennings, M. Kent, Laura Stoker, and Jake Bowers. 2009. "Politics across Generations: Family Transmission Reexamined." *Journal of Politics* 71 (3): 782-799.
- Jensen, Lene Arnett. 2008. "Immigrants' Cultural Identities as Sources of Civic Engagement." *Applied Development Science* 12 (2): 74-83.
- . 2010. "Immigrant Youth in the United States: Coming of Age among Diverse Civic Cultures." In *Handbook of research on civic engagement in youth*, edited by Lonnie R. Sherrod, Judith Torney-Purta and Constance A. Flanagan, 425-443. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc.
- Jensen, Lene Arnett, and Constance A. Flanagan. 2008. "Immigrant Civic Engagement: New Translations." *Applied Development Science* 12 (2): 55-56.
- Jones-Correa, Michael. 2001. "Institutional and Contextual Factors in Immigrant Naturalization and Voting." *Citizenship Studies* 5 (1): 41-56.
- Joppke, Christian. 2007. "Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe." *West European Politics* 30 (1): 1-22.
- Junn, Jane. 1999. "Participation in Liberal Democracy: The Political Assimilation of Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities in the United States." *American Behavioral Scientist* 42 (9): 1417-1438.

- Kahne, Joseph, and Ellen Middaugh. 2008a. Democracy for Some: The Civic Opportunity Gap in High School. *CIRCLE Working paper #59*: 1-30. <http://www.civicyouth.org/PopUps/WorkingPapers/WP59Kahne.pdf>.
- . 2008b. "High Quality Civic Education: What Is It and Who Gets It?" *Social Education* 72 (1): 34-39.
- Kahne, Joseph, and Susan Sporte. 2008. "Developing Citizens: The Impact of Civic Learning Opportunities on Students' Commitment to Civic Participation " *American Educational Research Journal* 45 (3): 738-766.
- Kalmijn, Matthijs. 1996. "The Socioeconomic Assimilation of Caribbean American Blacks." *Social Forces* 74 (3): 911-930.
- Kamens, David H. 1988. "Education and Democracy: A Comparative Institutional Analysis." *Sociology of Education* 61 (2): 114-127.
- Kandel, Denise Bystry, and Gerald S. Lesser. 1972. *Youth in Two Worlds*. San Francisco, CA: Wiley: Jossey-Bass.
- Kasinitz, Philip , Juan Battle Battle, and Ines Miyares. 2001. *Fade to Black*. Edited by Rubén G. Rumbaut and Alejandro Portes, *Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Kellstedt, Lyman A. 1974. "Ethnicity and Political Behavior: Inter-Group and Inter-Generational Differences." *Ethnicity* 1 (4): 393-415.
- Kerckhoff, Alan C. 1995. "Institutional Arrangements and Stratification Processes in Industrial Societies." *Annual Review of Sociology* 21 (15): 323-347.
- Kimberly, Spring, Nathan Dietz, and Robert Grimm. 2007. Leveling the Path to Participation: Volunteering and Civic Engagement among Youth from Disadvantaged Circumstances. http://www.nationalservice.gov/pdf/07_0406_disad_youth.pdf.
- Knight, George P., Martha E. Bernal, Marya K. Cota, Camille A. Garza, and Kathryn A. Ocampo. 1993. "Family Socialization and the Ethnic Identity of Mexican-American Children." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 24 (1): 99-114.
- Krampen, Günter 1991. "Political Participation in an Action-Theory Model of Personality: Theory and Empirical Evidence." *Political Psychology* 12 (1): 1-25.
- Krugman, Paul. 2003. *The Great Unraveling: Losing Our Way in the New Century*. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Kymlicka, Will, and Wayne Norman. 1994. "Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory." *Ethics* 104 (2): 352-381.

- Ladson-Billings, Gloria, and William F. Tate. 1995. "Toward a Critical Race Theory of Education." *Teachers College Record* 97 (1): 47-68.
- Lamare, James W. 1982. "The Political Integration of Mexican American Children: A Generational Analysis." *International Migration Review* 16 (1): 169-188.
- Langton, Kenneth P., and M. Kent Jennings. 1968. "Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States." *The American Political Science Review* 62 (3): 852-867.
- Le Grande, Julian, and Will Bartlett. 1993. *Quasi-Markets and Social Policy*. London, England: Macmillan Publishers.
- LeTendre, Gerald K., Barbara K. Hofer, and Hidetada Shimizu. 2003. "What is Tracking? Cultural Expectations in the United States, Germany, and Japan." *American Educational Research Journal* 40 (1): 43-89.
- Levin, Henry M. 2002. "A Comprehensive Framework for Evaluating Educational Vouchers." *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis* 24 (3): 159-174.
- Levine, Peter. 2009. "The Civic Opportunity Gap." *Educational Leadership* 66 (8): 20-25.
- Levinson, Meria. 2007. The Civic Achievement Gap. *CIRCLE Working Paper #51*: 1-30. <http://www.civicyouth.org/circle-working-paper-51-the-civic-achievement-gap/>.
- . 2012. *No Citizen Left Behind*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Liang, Zai. 1994. "Social Contact, Social Capital, and the Naturalization Process: Evidence from Six Immigrant Groups." *Social Science Research* 23 (4): 407-437.
- Lichter, Daniel T., Michael J. Shanahan, and Erica L. Gardner. 2002. "Helping Others? The Effects of Childhood Poverty and Family Instability on Prosocial Behavior." *Youth & Society* 34 (1): 89-119.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma." *The American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 1-14.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1960. *Political Man*. Garden City, NY: Double day.
- Lopez, Mark Hugo. 2002. Precursors to Civic/Political Engagement in the Young Adult Years: Evidence from the National Educational Longitudinal Survey. Paper presented at Meetings Sponsored by the MacArthur Network on the Transition to Adulthood, at Washington, DC, December 5-6, 2002.

- . 2003. Electoral Engagement among Latino Youth. <http://civicyouth.org/PopUps/Electoral%20%20Engagement%20Among%20Latino%20Youth.pdf>.
- Lopez, Mark Hugo, and Karlo Barrios Marcelo. 2008. "The Civic Engagement of Immigrant Youth: New Evidence From the 2006 Civic and Political Health of the Nation Survey." *Applied Developmental Science* 12 (2): 66-73.
- Lukes, Steven. 2005. *Power: A Radical View* 2nd ed. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Luo, Baozhen. 2006. "Social Construction of Chinese American Ethnic Identity: Dating Attitudes and Behaviors among Second-Generation Chinese American Youths." *Sociology Theses*: 9.
- M.Orfield, Myron. 2002. *American Metropolitcs: The New Suburban Reality*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
- Macedo, Stephen. 1990. *Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Maria, Sunaina. 2004. "Youth Culture, Citizenship and Globalization: South Asian Muslim Youth in the United States After September 11th." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 24 (1): 219-231.
- Marks, Gary N. 2005. "Accounting for Immigrant Non-Immigrant Differences in Reading and Mathematics in Twenty Countries." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28 (5): 925-946.
- Marshall, Thomas Humphrey. 1950. *Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1963. *Sociology at the Crossroads*. London, England: Heinemann Educational Books.
- . 1965a. *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*. New York, NY: Anchor.
- . 1965b. "The Right to Welfare." *The Sociological Review* 13 (3): 261-272.
- . 1981. *The Right to Welfare and Other Essays*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Martin, Philip L., and Elizabeth Midgley. 2003. Immigration: Shaping and Reshaping America. *Population Bulletin* 58 (2). <http://www.prb.org/pdf/immigrshapingamerica.pdf>.
- Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. 1988. "The Dimensions of Residential Segregation." *Social Forces* 67 (2): 281-315.

- McCormick, John P. 2006. "Contain the Wealthy and Patrol the Magistrates: Restoring Elite Accountability to Popular Government." *The American Political Science Review* 100 (2): 147-163.
- McDevitt, Michael, and Steven Chaffee. 2000. "Closing Gaps in Political Communication and Knowledge: Effects of a School Intervention." *Communication Research* 27 (3): 259-292.
- McEwan, Patrick J. 2000. "The Potential Impact of Large-scale Voucher Programs." *Review of Educational Research* 70 (2): 103-149.
- McFarland, Daniel A., and Reuben J. Thomas. 2006. "Bowling Young: How Youth Voluntary Associations Influence Adult Political Participation." *American Sociological Review* 71 (3): 401-425.
- McPherson, Miller, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M. Cook. 2001. "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks." *Annual Review of Sociology* 27: 415-444.
- Meeusen, Cecil. 2012. The Intergenerational Transmission of Political Participation Patterns. The Moderating Role of Gender and Socio-Economic Status. In *Annual Yitzhak Rabin Memorial Conference in Political Science Edition*. Jerusalem, Israel: Centre for Political Research, KU Leuven.
- Meltzer, Allan H., and Scott F. Richard. 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." *The Journal of Political Economy* 89 (5): 914-927.
- Milbrath, Lester. 1977. *Political participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?* Skokie, IL: Rand McNally.
- Mondak, Jeffery J., and Mary R. Anderson. 2004. "The Knowledge Gap: A Reexamination of Gender-Based Differences in Political Knowledge." *The Journal of Politics* 66 (2): 492-512.
- Morrow, Raymond Allen, and Carlos Alberto Torres. 1995. *Social Theory and Education: A Critique of Theories of Social and Economic Reproduction*. New York, NY: State University of New York Press.
- . 2012. "The State, Social Movements, and Educational Reform." In *Comparative Education: The Dialectic of the Global and the Local*, edited by Robert F. Arnove, Carlos Alberto Torres and Stephen Franz. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Mortimore, Peter. 1997. "Can Effective Schools Compensate for Society?" In *Education, Culture, Economy and Society*, edited by Hugh Lauder, Phillip Borwn and Amy Stuart Wels, 476-487. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mouw, Ted, and Yu Xie. 1999. "Bilingualism and the Academic Achievement of First-and Second-Generation Asian Americans: Accommodation With or Without Assimilation?" *American Sociological Review* 64 (2): 232-252.

- Myrberg, Eva, and Monica Rosén. 2008. "A Path Model with Mediating Factors of Parents' Education on Students' Reading Achievement in Seven Countries." *Educational Research and Evaluation* 14 (6): 507-520.
- Nagata, Donna K. 1993. *Legacy of Injustice: Exploring the Cross-Generational Impact of the Japanese American Internment*. New York, NY: Plenum Press.
- Nagata, Donna K., Steven J. Trierweiler, and Rebecca Talbot. 1999. "Long-Term Effects of Internment During Early Childhood on Third-Generation Japanese Americans." *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 69 (1): 19-29.
- Neimi, Richard G., and Jane Junn. 1998. *Civic Education: What Makes Students Learn*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Nie, Norman H., Jane Junn, and Kenneth Stehlik-Barry. 1996. *Education and Democratic Citizenship in America*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Niemi, Richard G., Stephen C. Craig, and Franco Mattei. 1991. "Measuring Internal Political Efficacy in the 1988 National Election Study." *The American Political Science Review* 85 (4): 1407-1413.
- Niemi, Richard G., and Mary A. Hepburn. 1995. "The Rebirth of Political Socialization." *Perspectives on Political Science* 24 (1): 7-16.
- Niemi, Richard G., R. Danforth Ross, and Joseph Alexander. 1978. "The Similarity of Political Values of Parents and College-Age Youths." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 42 (4): 503-520.
- Niemi, Richard G., and Barbara I. Sobieszek. 1977. "Political Socialization." *Annual Review of Sociology* 3 (1): 209-233.
- Nieves, Sergio. 2011. *The Civic Achievement Gap: A Study on the Civic Knowledge, Skills, and Attitudes of Hispanic Students in Miami-Dade County Public Schools*. PhD diss., Florida International University, United States, Florida.
- O'Cadiz, María del Pilar, and Carlos Alberto Torres. 1994. "Literacy, Social Movements, and Class Consciousness: Paths from Freire and the São Paulo Experience." *Anthropology & Education Quarterly* 25 (3): 208-225.
- Oakes, Jeannie. 1985. *Kepping Track: How Schools Structure Inequality*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Oakes, Jeannie, and Gretchen Guiton. 1995. "Matchmaking: The Dynamics of High School Tracking Decisions." *American Educational Research Journal* 32 (1): 3-33.

- Oakes, Jeannie, and Martin Lipton. 1999. *Teaching to Change the World*. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill College.
- Oakes, Jeannie, and Amy Stuart Wells. 1998. "Detracking for High Student Achievement." *Educational Leadership* 55 (6): 38-41.
- Ogbu, John U. 1978. *Minority Education and Caste: The American System in Cross-Cultural Perspective*. New York, NY: Academic Press.
- . 1991. "Immigrant and Involuntary Minorities in Comparative Perspective." In *Minority Status and Schooling: A Comparative Study of Immigrant and Involuntary minorities*, edited by Margaret A. Gibson and John U. Ogbu. New York, NY: Garland Publishing.
- Oliver, J. Eric. 2001. *Democracy in Suburbia*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Olmos, Liliana, Carlos Alberto Torres, and Richard Van Heertum. 2011. *Educating the Global Citizen in the Shadow of Neoliberalism: Thirty Years of Educational Reform in North America*. Sharjah, United Arab Emirates: Bentham Science Publishers.
- Orfield, Gary, and Susan E Eaton. 1996. *Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of Education and the Harvard Project on School Desegregation*. New York, NY: The New Press.
- Pacheco, Julianna Sandell, and Eric Plutzer. 2008. "Political Participation and Cumulative Disadvantage: The Impact of Economic and Social Hardship on Young Citizens." *Journal of Social Issues* 64 (3): 571-593.
- Page, Reba Neukom. 1991. *Lower-Track Classrooms: A Curricular and Cultural Perspective*. New York, NY: Teachers College Press.
- Palardy, Gregory J. 2008. "Differential School Effects among Low, Middle, and High Social Class Composition Schools: A Multiple Group, Multilevel Latent Growth Curve Analysis." *School Effectiveness and School Improvement* 19 (1): 21-49.
- . 2013. "High School Socioeconomic Segregation and Student Attainment." *American Educational Research Journal*.
- Pantoja, Adrian D., and Sarah Allen Gershon. 2006. "Political Orientations and Naturalization Among Latino and Latina Immigrants*." *Social Science Quarterly* 87 (5): 1171-1187.
- Park, Hyunjoon. 2005. *Cross-National Variation in the Effects of Family Background and Schools on Student Achievement: The Relevance of Institutional and Policy Contexts*. PhD diss., The University of Wisconsin, Madison, United States, Wisconsin.
- . 2007. "Single Parenthood and Children's Reading Performance in Asia." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 69 (3): 863-877.

- . 2008. "Public Policy and The Effect of Sibship Size on Educational Achievement: A Comparative Study of 20 Countries." *Social Science Research* 37 (3): 874-887.
- Park, Hyunjoon, and Pearl Kyei. 2010. "School Segregation and the Achievement Gap between Immigrant and Native Students: A Comparative Study of 18 Countries." *Sociological Theory and Methods* 25 (2): 207-228.
- Peter, Tracey, Jason D. Edgerton, and Lance W. Roberts. 2010. "Welfare Regimes and Educational Inequality: A Cross-National Exploration." *International Studies in Sociology of Education* 20 (3): 241-264.
- Peters, Michael, and James Marshall. 1996. *Individualism and Community: Education and Social Policy in the Postmodern Condition*. Vol. 4. London, England: Routledge.
- Plane, David A., and Peter A. Rogerson. 1994. *The Geographical Analysis of Population*. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons.
- Pong, Suet-ling. 1998. "The School Compositional Effect of Single Parenthood on 10th-Grade Achievement." *Sociology of Education* 71 (1): 23-42.
- Pontusson, Jonas, and David Rueda. 2010. "The Politics of Inequality: Voter Mobilization and Left Parties in Advanced Industrial States." *Comparative Political Studies* 43 (6): 675-705.
- Porter, Andrew C., and Adam Gamoran. 2002. *Methodological Advances in Cross-National Surveys of Educational Achievement*. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Lingxin Hao. 2004. "The Schooling of Children of Immigrants: Contextual Effects on the Educational Attainment of the Second Generation." *Proc Natl Acad Sci USA* 101 (33): 11920-7.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Dag MacLeod. 1996. "Educational Progress of Children of Immigrants: The Roles of Class, Ethnicity, and School Context." *Sociology of Education*: 255-275.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Rafael Mozo. 1985. "The Political Adaptation Process of Cubans and Other Ethnic Minorities in the United States: A Preliminary Analysis." *International Migration Review* 19 (1): 35-63.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Rubén G. Rumbaut. 2001. *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- . 2006. *Immigrant America: A Portrait*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Min Zhou. 1993. "The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 530 (1): 74-96.

- Quintana, Stephen M., and Elizabeth M. Vera. 1999. "Mexican American Children's Ethnic Identity, Understanding of Ethnic Prejudice, and Parental Ethnic Socialization." *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* 21 (4): 387-404.
- Ramakrishnan, S. Karthick, and Thomas J. Espenshade. 2001. "Immigrant Incorporation and Political Participation in the United States." *International Migration Review* 35 (3): 870-909.
- Raudenbush, Stephen W., and Anthony S. Bryk. 2002. *Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis Methods*. Vol. 1. Thousands Oakes, CA: SAGE Publications.
- Riddell, Abby Rubin. 1989. "An Alternative Approach to the Study of School Effectiveness in Third World Countries." *Comparative Education Review* 33 (4): 481-497.
- Rodolfo, O. de la Garza, Angelo Falcon, and F. Chris Garcia. 1996. "Will The Real Americans Please Stand Up: Anglo and Mexican-American Support of Core American Political Values." *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (2): 335-351.
- Rubin, Donald B. 1987. *Multiple Imputation for Non-Response in Surveys*. New York, NY: Wiley.
- Rumbaut, Rubén G. 1994. "The Crucible Within: Ethnic Identity, Self-Esteem, and Segmented Assimilation among Children of Immigrants." *International Migration Review* 28 (4): 748-794.
- . 2008. "Reaping What You Sow: Immigration, Youth, and Reactive Ethnicity." *Applied Development Science* 12 (2): 108-111.
- Rumberger, Russell W., and Gregory J. Palardy. 2005. "Does Segregation Still Matter? The Impact of Student Composition on Academic Achievement in High School." *Teachers College Record* 107 (9): 1999-2045.
- Rumberger, Russell W., and J. Douglas Willms. 1992. "The Impact of Racial and Ethnic Segregation on the Achievement Gap in California High Schools." *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis* 14 (4): 377-396.
- Sánchez-Jankowski, Martín. 2002. "Minority Youth and Civic Engagement: The Impact of Group Relations." *Applied Developmental Science* 6 (4): 237-245.
- Sapiro, Virginia. 2004. "Not Your Parents' Political Socialization: Introduction for a New Generation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 7 (1): 1-23.
- Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2005. "The Rise and Fall of Political Engagement among Latinos: The Role of Identity and Perceptions of Discrimination." *Political Behavior* 27 (3): 285-312.

- Schiller, Kathryn S., Vladimir T. Khmelkov, and Xiao-Qing Wang. 2002. "Economic Development and the Effects of Family Characteristics on Mathematics Achievement." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 64 (3): 730-742.
- Schlozman, Kay Lehman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Schlozman, Kay Lehman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady. 2012. *The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Schulz, Wolfram, John Ainley, and Julian Fraillon. 2011. *ICCS 2009 Technical Report*. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA).
- Schulz, Wolfram, John Ainley, Julian Fraillon, David Kerr, and Bruno Losito. 2010. *ICCS 2009 International Report: Civic Knowledge, Attitudes, and Engagement among Lower-Secondary School Students in 38 Countries*. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA).
- Sears, David O. 1987. "Political Psychology." *Annual Review of Psychology* 38 (1): 229-255.
- Sherrod, Lonnie R., Judith Torney, and Constance A. Flanagan. 2010. "Front Matter." In *Handbook of Research on Civic Engagement in Youth*, i-xiv. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
- Sigel, Roberta S., and Marilyn B. Hoskin. 1981. *The Political Involvement of Adolescents*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Smith, Robert Benjamin. 2008. *Cumulative Social Inquiry: Transforming Novelty into Innovation*. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Solórzano, Daniel G., and Ronald W. Solórzano. 1995. "The Chicano Educational Experience: A Framework for Effective Schools in Chicano Communities." *Educational Policy* 9 (3): 293-314.
- Solt, Frederick. 2004. "Civics or Structure? Revisiting the Origins of Democratic Quality in the Italian Regions." *British Journal of Political Science* 34 (1): 123-135.
- . 2008. "Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (1): 48-60.
- Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu. 1994. *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

- Stanton-Salazar, Ricardo D. 2001. *Manufacturing Hope and Despair: The School and Kin Support Networks of US-Mexican Youth*. New York, NY: Teachers College Press.
- Stepick, Alex, Guillermo Grenier, Max Castro, and Marvic Dunn. 2002. *This Land is Our Land: Interethnic Relations in Miami*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Stepick, Alex, and Carol Dutton Stepick. 2002. "Becoming American, Constructing Ethnicity: Immigrant Youth and Civic Engagement." *Applied Developmental Science* 6 (4): 246-257.
- Stepick, Alex, Carol Dutton Stepick, and Yves Labissiere. 2008. "South Florida's Immigrant Youth and Civic Engagement: Major Engagement: Minor Differences." *Applied Developmental Science* 12 (2): 57-65.
- Suárez-Orozco, Carola. 2001. "Afterword: Understanding and Serving the Children of Immigrants." *Harvard Educational Review* 71 (3): 579-590.
- Suárez-Orozco, Carola , and Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco. 1995. *Transformations: Migration, Family Life, and Achievement Motivation among Latino Adolescents*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Suárez-Orozco, Marcelo M. 1987a. "'Becoming Somebody': Central American Immigrants in US Inner-City Schools." *Anthropology & Education Quarterly* 18 (4): 287-299.
- Suárez-Orozco, Marcelo M. . 1987b. "Towards a Psychosocial Understanding of Hispanic Adaptation to American Schooling." In *Success or Failure? Learning and the Language Minority Student*, edited by Henry T. Trueba, 156-68. New York, NY: Newbury House Publishers.
- Teddlie, Charles, and David Reynolds. 2000. "The Future Agenda for School Effectiveness Research." In *International Handbook of School Effectiveness Research*, edited by Charles Teddlie and David Reynolds, 322-343. London, England: Falmer Press.
- Tedin, Kent L. 1974. "The Influence of Parents on the Political Attitudes of Adolescents." *The American Political Science Review* 68 (4): 1579-1592.
- The British Council, and The Migration Policy Group. 2007. *The Migrant Integration Policy Index II*.
- . 2011. *The Migrant Integration Policy Index III*
- Thrupp, Martin. 2001. "Sociological and Political Concerns about School Effectiveness Research: Time for a New Research Agenda." *School Effectiveness and School Improvement* 12 (1): 7-40.
- Torney-Purta, Judith. 2002. "The School's Role in Developing Civic Engagement: A Study of Adolescents in Twenty-Eight Countries." *Applied Developmental Science* 6 (4): 203-212.

- Torney-Purta, Judith, Carolyn H. Barber, and Britt Wilkenfeld. 2007. "Latino Adolescents' Civic Development in the United States: Research Results from the IEA Civic Education Study." *Journal of Youth and Adolescence* 36 (2): 111-125.
- Torney-Purta, Judith, Carolyn Barber, and Britt Wilkenfeld. 2006. "Differences in the Civic Knowledge and Attitudes of Adolescents in the United States by Immigrant Status and Hispanic Background." *Prospects* 36 (3): 343-354.
- Torney-Purta, Judith, Rainer Lehmann Lehmann, Hans Oswald, and Wolfram Schulz. 2001. *Citizenship and Education in Twenty-Eight Countries: Civic Knowledge and Engagement at Age Fourteen*. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA).
- Torney-Purta, Judith, John Schwille, and Jo-Ann Amadeo. 1999. *Civic Education across Countries: Twenty-Four National Case Studies from the IEA Civic Education Project*. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA).
- Torney, Judith, Abraham Naftali Oppenheim, and Russell F. Farnen. 1975. *Civic Education in Ten Countries: An Empirical Study*. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons.
- Torres, Carlos Alberto. 1998. *Democracy, Education, and Multiculturalism: Dilemmas of Citizenship in a Global World*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- . 2002. "Globalization, Education, and Citizenship: Solidarity Versus Markets?" *American Educational Research Journal* 39 (2): 363-378.
- Uhlener, Carole J., Bruce E. Cain, and Roderick Kiewiet. 1989. "Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s." *Political Behavior* 11 (3): 195-231.
- Umaña-Taylor, Adriana J., and Mark A. Fine. 2004. "Examining Ethnic Identity among Mexican-Origin Adolescents Living in the United States." *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* 26 (1): 36-59.
- UNESCO. 2006. *International Standard Classification of Education: ISCED 1997*. Montreal, Quebec, Canada: UNESCO-UIS.
- Van der Slik, Frans W. P., Geert W. J. M. Driessen, and Kees L. J. De Bot. 2006. "Ethnic and Socioeconomic Class Composition and Language Proficiency: a Longitudinal Multilevel Examination in Dutch Elementary Schools." *European Sociological Review* 22 (3): 293-308.
- Verba, Sidney. 2003. "Would the Dream of Political Equality Turn Out to Be a Nightmare?" *Perspectives on politics* 1 (04): 663-679.

- Verba, Sidney, Nancy Burns, and Kay Lehman Schlozman. 2003. "Unequal at the Starting Line: Creating Participatory Inequalities across Generations and among Groups." *The American Sociologist* 34 (1): 45-69.
- Verba, Sidney, H. Nie Norman, and Jae-on Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, and Norman H. Nie. 1993. "Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States." *British Journal of Political Science* 23 (4): 453-497.
- Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Nancy Burns. 2005. "Family Ties: Understanding the Intergenerational Transmission of Participation." In *The social logic of politics*, edited by Alan Zuckerman, 95-114. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Wals, Sergio C. 2009. *Immigrants' Political Suitcases: A Theory of Imported Socialization*. University of Illinois.
- . 2011. "Does What Happens in Los Mochis Stay in Los Mochis? Explaining Postmigration Political Behavior." *Political Research Quarterly* 64 (3): 600-611.
- Waters, Mary C. 1990. *Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- White, Stephen, Neil Nevitte, André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, and Patrick Fournier. 2008. "The Political Resocialization of Immigrants: Resistance or Lifelong Learning?" *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (2): 268-281.
- Wilkenfeld, Britt. 2009. Does Context Matter? How the Family, Peer, School, and Neighborhood Contexts Relate to Adolescents' Civic Engagement. *CIRCLE Working Paper #64*. <http://www.civicyouth.org/PopUps/WorkingPapers/WP64Wilkenfeld.pdf>.
- Willms, J. Douglas. 1986. "Social Class Segregation and Its Relationship to Pupils' Examination Results in Scotland." *American Sociological Review* 51 (2): 224-241.
- Woodrow-Lafield, Karen A., Xiaohe Xu, Thomas Kersen, and Bunnak Poch. 2004. "Naturalization of US immigrants: Highlights from Ten Countries." *Population Research and Policy Review* 23 (3): 187-218.
- Wray-Lake, Laura, Amy K. Syvertsen, and Constance A. Flanagan. 2008. "Contested Citizenship and Social Exclusion: Adolescent Arab American Immigrants' Views of the Social Contract." *Applied Development Science* 12 (2): 84-92.
- Yang, Philip Q. 1994. "Ethnicity and Naturalization." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17 (4): 593-618.
- Zhou, Min. 1997. "Segmented Assimilation: Issues, Controversies, and Recent Research on the New Second Generation." *International Migration Review* 31 (4): 975-1008.

- Zhou, Min, and Carl Leon Bankston. 1998. *Growing Up American: How Vietnamese Children Must Adapt to Life in the United States*. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Zhou, Min, and John R. Logan. 2003. "Increasing Diversity and Persistent Segregation: Challenges of Educating Minority and Immigrant Children in Urban America." In *The End of Desegregation*, edited by Stephen J. Caldas and Carl Carl Leon Bankston, 185-202. Hauppauge, New York: Nova Publishers.
- Zimmerman, Barry J., and Albert Bandura. 1995. "Self-Efficacy and Educational Development." In *Self-efficacy in changing societies*, edited by Albert Bandura, 202-231. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.