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Forging Royal Bonds:
Dynastic Logic, Reason of State, and Marriage Diplomacy under the Spanish Habsburgs, 1526-
1660

by

Daniel E. Roddy

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

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of the

University of California, Berkeley

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Abstract

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While the political preponderance of the Habsburgs stemmed from the negotiation of marriages to extend their influence and perpetuate their power, the process by which policy was constructed and implemented was far from straightforward. Over the course of successive generations, the Spanish branch of the family undertook sustained efforts to modernize the practice of marriage diplomacy, identifying distinct objectives and altering its strategic approach in response to the rapidly changing international landscape. Drawing from a wide collection of archival and printed sources in Spanish, French, and English, this dissertation shows how deliberations over the viability of proposed matches brought idealist modes of thinking rooted in dynastic logic into conversation with the emerging notion of reason of state. Focusing specifically on negotiations between Spain and two of its rivals, France and England from 1526-1660, it argues that the discursive interaction between various actors sheds light on important questions about the nature of monarchical authority, the function of familial networks, the influence of royal women, and the ultimate aim of a prudent dynastic policy.

For my family

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Introduction

A Medieval Antecedent

In Early Modern Europe, the problems posed by an international political system organized around royal unions were not lost on observers. The renowned humanist Erasmus of Rotterdam openly criticized the peace-making practice, for example, citing its paradoxical tendency to spawn wars of even greater ferocity and intensity among competing families.¹ Disentangling the private and public affairs of royal life, he drew a clear distinction between monarchs' selfish desire to expand their influence and their obligation to safeguard the interests of their subjects. Finally, with striking candor, he laid bare the personal toll charged against generations of young women who found themselves physically displaced by the demands of custom and political necessity. Aware that the historically pervasive reliance on elaborate kinship networks precluded any significant curtailment of the practice, Erasmus did not intend through his criticism to challenge the traditional emphasis on family relationships in the diplomatic realm. Rather, he wanted monarchs to temper their ambitions and look exclusively at strengthening ties with local nobility or neighboring kingdoms.²

In advocating for a return to geographically circumscribed dynastic policies, Erasmus was responding to an ongoing process of radical change in Europe. For centuries, the majority of marriage alliances had been realized at a regional level. While there were obviously exceptions to this trend, for the most part the reality of medieval Europe's highly fragmented political landscape confined the horizons of ambitious rulers. Beginning in the 15th century, however, a new generation of Renaissance princes emerged and set about taming the nobility, centralizing authority, and monopolizing violence. As the state grew in size and complexity so too did the global aspirations of ruling dynasties who saw royal unions not only as a means of perpetuating familial lines and ensuring succession, but also as a viable strategy for extending their sphere of influence and control.

Isabel of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon were the first monarchs in Spain to oversee a more ambitious and far-reaching reorientation of the monarchy's dynastic policy. After their marriage unified two of the Iberian Peninsula's most powerful kingdoms, they focused their collective energy on building up a central bureaucracy, enforcing religious orthodoxy, and completing the Christian reconquest (*reconquista*) of Spain.³ The couple also assumed an active

¹ Erasmo de Rotterdam, *Educación del príncipe cristiano*, Cap. IX, trad. Pedro Jiménez Guijarro y Ana Martín, (Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 1996), pp. 155-158. In 1937, Marcel Bataillon produced what remains the most meaningful study of Erasmus' influence on Spanish society in the 16th century. According to Bataillon, Erasmianism was first brought to Spain in 1522 by the imperial court of Charles V. Embraced by intellectual circles and spread rapidly by print, it soon became an essential feature of Spanish culture. Marcel Bataillon, *Erasmo y España: Estudios sobre la historia espiritual del siglo XVI*, 2nd ed., (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1966).

² Ibid., p. 155. "Yo consideraría mucho mejor para la república que las alianzas matrimoniales de los príncipes se mantuviesen dentro de los límites del reino o, si hubiese que apartarse algo de ellos, que se diesen con los más inmediatamente cercanos, pero sólo con los que son capaces de la fidelidad que exige la amistad."

³ Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, eds. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 76. Machiavelli viewed Ferdinand as the emblematic Renaissance prince; "In our own times Ferdinand of Aragon, the present King of Spain is a notable example. He might also be called a new ruler because, from being a weak king, he has become the most famous and glorious king in Christendom." Although Machiavelli

role on the international stage, aggressively opposing French efforts to establish hegemonic control over Italy.⁴ Previously, Castile and France had been strong allies with a history of collaboration. But, the diplomatic culture soon changed as Isabel and Ferdinand established the first permanent embassies abroad and adopted Aragon's traditional anti-French stance.⁵ In order to supplement ground troops fighting in Italy, they reached out to foreign courts across Europe to negotiate marriage alliances that would effectively surround and isolate the Valois.⁶ The policy proved highly effective. In addition to two unions with its peninsular neighbor, Portugal, Spain finalized two with the Holy Roman Empire in 1496 and one with England in 1509. Altogether, the marriages of Isabel and Ferdinand's children succeeded in bolstering their international reputation and pushing Spanish policy beyond the narrow confines of medieval diplomacy.

While the reinforcement of familial ties with foreign monarchies reaped immediate benefits, the new strategic approach also posed immense risks by raising the political stakes of royal unions. Soon, children were being born with multiple claims to disparate kingdoms, exacerbating the impact that accidents of genetics and chance could have on power alignments. For Isabel and Ferdinand, the gamble made with their anti-French policy proved to have a mixed legacy, paving the way for the establishment of Habsburg rule under Charles V.⁷ Not since the rule of the Caesars had Europe seen so much power accumulated under one head; the culmination of a new political reality characterized by powerful states, large-scale conflict, religious discontent, and dynastic rivalry. At least for Erasmus, who dedicated his critique of royal marriages to Charles V, the source of Europe's rapidly changing and highly volatile international landscape was clear. An overreliance on marriage alliances combined with unfettered ambition had transformed the continent, and not for the better.

The current study is the first to seriously consider how the Spanish Habsburgs, the most powerful branch of the continent's premier dynasty, adapted its primary mechanism for both rapprochement and reproduction to the exigencies of a modern international setting. As a medieval practice for ordering relations between kingdoms, marriage diplomacy was beset by a number of inherent contradictions. Ostensibly aimed at fostering a sense of political solidarity and engendering perpetual peace, it tended to promote political factionalism and provoke violent disputes over territory. The primary means of maintaining an extensive social network of family members and preserving the established line of monarchical succession, its susceptibility to

recognized Ferdinand's achievements, his assessment of the monarch was oftentimes ambivalent. For an insightful article on this ambivalence see Edward Andrew, "The Foxy Prophet: Machiavelli Versus Machiavelli on Ferdinand the Catholic," *History of Political Thought* 11, No. 3 (Autumn, 1990), pp. 409-422.

⁴ The Spanish opposed two French invasions of Italy, the first led by Charles VIII in 1494 and the second led by Louis XII in 1499. Ferdinand's decision to embroil Spain in what later became known as the Italian Wars was heavily motivated by his desire to defend Aragonese interests on the peninsula. In addition to being the king of Sicily, Ferdinand also had a direct claim to the kingdom of Naples, which until 1501 was ruled by the Neapolitan branch of the House of Trastámara. For more on the wars see Michael Mallett and Christine Shaw, *The Italian Wars: 1494–1559*, (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2012).

⁵ Miguel Ángel Ochoa Brun, *Historia de la diplomacia española*, Vol. IV, (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1995), pp. 19-22.

⁶ John Edwards, *Ferdinand and Isabel*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 146-170.

⁷ The grandson of Ferdinand and Isabel through their daughter, Juana, Charles V emerged as heir to the entire Spanish succession— alongside lands acquired from his paternal grandparents in Austria, parts of southern Germany, and the Netherlands— after a series of misfortunes left the House of Trastámara without a legitimate male descendant. For more on the origins of the empire see William Maltby, *The Reign of Charles V*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 6-31.

sudden ruptures and unforeseen consequences posed an enduring threat to the security of individual states and the stability of the international order. These contradictions posed a considerable challenge for Spanish policymakers whose search for controlled and predictable outcomes led them to question dynastic agglomerations' underlying impulse to power and glory. Exploring the process by which policy was constructed and implemented in Spain, this investigation shows that there was a sustained effort over an extended period to modernize the practice of marriage diplomacy so that it could reliably be used to establish durable peace and cooperation, or inversely to advance the monarchy's strategic interests, without compromising the safety of young brides or the well-being of future generations.

The Spanish Habsburgs' pursuit of new unions was oftentimes complicated by pervasive feelings of mistrust and suspicion. Focusing on negotiations between Spain and two of its rivals, France and England, this study invariably confronts the question of how early modern monarchies achieved rapprochement despite the absence of an extra-territorial legal authority or a superior normative institution to ensure accountability. In doing so, it reveals the extent to which rapprochement was driven by an internal, self-perpetuating dynastic logic that predated and continued to exist alongside reason of state logic in the realm of policymaking. Light is also shed on the role played by non-traditional actors in shaping the monarchy's decision to pursue different matches. Royal women, in particular, are shown to have been indispensable not only for facilitating negotiations and generating a sense of diplomatic confidence, but also for rationalizing controversial marriages. Legal experts (*letrados*) also made significant contributions by devising the procedures for safeguarding the monarchical line of succession and by developing a more sophisticated legal and political understanding of marriage diplomacy. Contrary to popular misconception, the Spanish Habsburgs' dynastic policy did not reflect a short-sighted commitment to a strategy of royal inbreeding to maintain their power and authority. It was the product of careful deliberations, calculated decision-making, and meaningful action.

Despite the decisive role that royal unions played in shaping the political map of Europe, the evolution of the practice has not received the same sustained academic attention as other processes of change in the early modern period. In 1955, Michael Roberts coined the phrase "military revolution" to describe how state growth was preceded by technological and battlefield innovations that forever altered the war-making potential of European monarchies.⁸ Later, Geoffrey Parker expanded on this thesis by looking at the reign of Charles V to show how unprecedented problems of cost and scale precipitated the development of advanced bureaucracies better equipped to endure the burdens of conflict.⁹ Since then, political and economic scholars such as Jane Gleason, James D. Tracy, David Parrot, Mauricio Drelichman, and Voth Hans-Joachim have analyzed the rise of complex financial institutions and practices during the period.¹⁰ Historians of diplomacy, beginning with Garrett Mattingly and continued by

⁸ Michael Roberts, *Essays in Swedish History*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967), p. 195. Roberts described the Military Revolution as "a great divide separating medieval society from the modern world."

⁹ Geoffrey Parker. *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

¹⁰ These investigations are unified by a collective resistance against the traditional argument that the rise of the modern state was contingent upon weak financial institutions struggling to foot the massive bills of war. Whether it was the fiscal network used by Charles V to access the wealth of his empire, the development of a strong fiscal-military state to better utilize resources, the use of private contracting as a means of tapping into private credit or the close collaboration between Philip II and his bankers to create sustainable state-contingent debt, they point to one explicit truth; the financial institutions and practices were far more sophisticated than previously imagined, and

countless others including M.S. Anderson and Miguel Ángel Ochoa Brun, have also sought to make sense of the changing configuration of the international political order beginning in the 15th century.¹¹ The establishment of permanent embassies occupied by resident ambassadors is often identified as the most consequential development, allowing the diplomatic methods undergirding interstate relations to become more sophisticated and complicated in scope and application. Regardless of the topic, both seminal scholarship and recent contributions have been unified by a common recognition of the early modern era as a truly a transformative period in which the groundwork was laid for the rise of the modern state.

Inversely, scholars have only recently begun to shed the notion that marriage diplomacy was a relatively static practice compelled by immediate circumstances and irrational calculations. In the 19th century, some prominent scholars including Francois T. Perrens, Francisco Silvela, and Samuel Gardiner focused their attention on the events, intrigues, and negotiations that surrounded important unions.¹² Often providing the only detailed information available on the topic, these studies remain an invaluable reference source for current understandings of the nature of early modern alliance-making. But, the disjointed approach of these early scholars also came with a major drawback; making it difficult to identify the broader connections unifying dynastic initiatives over time.

A recent upsurge in the scholarly appeal of royal unions has somewhat alleviated this problem. Michael Questier and Toby Osborne have both done extensive work on politics, dynasty, and diplomacy in the Duchy of Savoy and England respectively, featuring marital projects prominently in their analysis of each kingdom.¹³ Complementing Questier's work, Valentina Caldari and Sara J. Wolfson have guided research on dynastic policy under the Stuarts over a thirty year period, making an important argument for the primacy of reason of state

continued to evolve throughout the early modern period. For more on this see Jan Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic, and Sweden as Fiscal-military States, 1500-1660*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2002); James D. Tracy, *Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War: Campaign Strategy, International Finance, and Domestic Politics*. Cambridge, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Mauricio Drelichman and Voth Hans-Joachim, *Lending to the Borrower from Hell: Debt, Taxes, and Default in the Age of Philip II*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).

¹¹ During the 16th century, religious divisions and incessant warfare had effectively shattered the illusion, famously supported by Erasmus, that education and high moral principles could unify the Christian kingdoms. The result was a significant shift in understandings of statecraft, foreign relations, and dynastic power amongst educated thinkers and statesmen across Europe. Having witnessed the consequences of allowing dynastic interest and religious zeal to serve as the guiding principles of international order, they strove to develop a new system of orchestrated interests centered on the state. Additional information on this shift can be found in Garret Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, (Baltimore: Penguin, 1964); M.S. Anderson, *The Origins of the Modern European State System*, (London and New York: Longman, 1992); Ochoa Brun, *Historia*, Vols. IV-VIII., (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1995-2006).

¹² Francois T. Perrens, *Les Mariages Espagnols Sous Le Regne De Marie de Medicis (1602-1615)*, (Paris: Librairie Academique, 1869); Francisco Silvela, *Matrimonios de España y Francia en 1615*, (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1901); Samuel R. Gardiner, *Prince Charles and the Spanish Marriage, 1617-1623*, 2 Vols., (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1869).

¹³ Michael Questier, *Dynastic Politics and the British Reformations, 1558-1630*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Toby Osborne, *Dynasty and the Diplomacy in the Court of Savoy: Political Culture and the Thirty Years War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

thinking in the assessment of potential alliances.¹⁴ Finally, John Watkins' illuminating study of the literary legacy of marriage diplomacy from antiquity through the 17th century has provided the first compelling case for the evolution of the diplomatic mechanism over time.¹⁵

In addition to broader studies of the practice in national contexts, scholars have also continued to conduct research on isolated cases. Joan-Lluís Palos and Magdalena Sánchez have led efforts to explore the impact that specific unions had through a process of “cultural transfer” generated by the physical mobility of royal brides.¹⁶ Looking closely at specific case studies, their project brings women to the forefront of historical analysis by accentuating the ways in which they could capitalize on their role as brides to shape the world around them. The work done by others, including Glyn Redworth and Margaret M. McGowan has also shed light on previously understudied marriage projects.¹⁷ Redworth's unique methodological approach to Hispano-English negotiations in 1623, a synthesis of political and social history which he refers to as cultural politics, has proven particularly useful for resurrecting historical actors and recreating the complex “stately dances” behind grand dynastic designs. The collection edited by McGowan moves in a different direction, exploring the unique political, ceremonial and ritual features of the grand Hispano-French double alliance negotiated under Philip III.

Taken together, the extensive research published in recent years reveals a rich historiographical vein ripe for further critical inquiry. One area that remains to be studied in-depth is the long-term development of marriage diplomacy under the Spanish Habsburgs. In contrast to England and the Duchy of Savoy— which have benefited from the broader investigations of Questier, Osborne, and others— work on Spain continues to reflect a traditional emphasis on narrower case studies at the expense of a broader interpretive approach. These publications, which have convincingly demonstrated the value of extending analysis to account for gendered and cultural dimensions, nevertheless have done little to further our understanding of the complicated process by which Spanish dynastic policy adapted to changing circumstances and pressures over time. They also do not clearly demonstrate how different marriage projects were connected or consider the extent to which policy was self-propagating, despite the fact that Spaniards themselves relied heavily on historical precedent when drafting agreements.

As a result, there persists a tendency, both within the scholarship and public opinion at large, to negatively characterize Habsburg marriage diplomacy as generally obstinate, especially on matters pertaining to religion, and lacking in foresight. Redworth's portrayal of the Spanish monarchy during the 1623 marriage negotiations, for instance, heavily emphasizes its dogmatic religiosity, as a result of which it never took seriously a cross-confessional alliance with England.¹⁸ This interpretation, while not entirely wrong, nevertheless fails to account for the energy and imagination behind the determination of Spanish policy. It also does not accurately

¹⁴ Valentina Caldari and Sara J. Wolfson, eds, *Stuart Marriage Diplomacy: Dynastic Politics in their European Context, 1604–1630*, (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2018).

¹⁵ John Watkins, *After Lavinia: A Literary History of Premodern Marriage Diplomacy*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017).

¹⁶ Joan-Lluís Palos and Magdalena S. Sánchez, eds., *Early Modern Dynastic Marriages and Cultural Transfer*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2017).

¹⁷ Glyn Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta: The Cultural Politics of the Spanish Match*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003); Margaret M. McGowan, ed., *Dynastic Marriages 1612/15: A Celebration of the Habsburg and Bourbon Unions*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2016).

¹⁸ Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, pp. 17-28.

represent the fact that each marriage was itself the byproduct of a long, drawn-out process in which the general perception and treatment of royal unions fluctuated in response to a rapidly changing world. Changes in political culture, diplomatic practices, imperial administration, and Europe's confessional landscape raised concerns about the potential of marriages to underpin interstate collaboration, and precipitated the emergence of new ideas and procedures to justify the continued reliance on traditional methods of alliance-making. Spaniards living under the Habsburgs appreciated more than anyone the speed with which a single marriage could topple a kingdom, or give birth to an empire—an unpredictable volatility that they grew to fear, and undertook to tame.


A New Approach to Habsburg Dynastic Policy

The question of how to best study marriage diplomacy was first raised by Paula Sutter Fitchner in a seminal article published in 1976.¹⁹ Hoping to redress the lack of scholarly interest in the topic—which she credited to the inconsistent and often confused rationale informing policy—Fitchner advocated for a structural approach to the study of dynastic marriages. Doing so, she insisted, would allow historians to divorce the practice from the “inadequate rationalizations” that perpetuated its use, and instead demonstrate that it did in fact have a discernible utility. Applying her method to the study of Ferdinand I, the Holy Roman emperor and younger brother of Charles V, Fitchner did not deny that there were a multitude of motivations behind his policy ranging from the acquisition of new territories to the preservation of existing kingdoms. Even more important, though, was the function that royal marriages served in creating a sense of mutual obligation between rulers. Relationships forged through the reciprocal exchange of gifts and children were a vital part of Habsburg diplomacy, both as a way to strengthen strategic alliances and maintain their power and prestige.

Although historians are indebted to Fitchner for her pioneering research, a purely structural approach to the topic has proven inadequate for explaining the whole scope of marriage diplomacy under the Spanish Habsburgs. For example, while the notion of mutual obligation seamlessly lends itself to analysis of royal unions between traditional allies with a shared desire for mutual benefit, it becomes harder to maintain in instances where the motivations behind a marriage were more calculated. Spain negotiated several unions with its continental rival, France, during the early modern period in which professions of brotherly love were at variance with the Habsburgs' propensity to impose asymmetrical terms whenever they had the upper hand. Furthermore, any approach that dismisses the value of analyzing the rationale behind policy will invariably produce an incomplete depiction of its change over time. After all, the Spanish monarchy was not a disinterested participant in an international system bequeathed from previous generations. To the contrary, it evolved alongside the rest of Europe in a process fueled as much by new ideas and past experiences as current political pressures. Increasingly troubled by the dangers posed by an imprudent alliance, the monarchy even sanctioned efforts, beginning in the early 17th century, to reduce or entirely eliminate the possibility of a foreign dynasty inheriting the throne. It was an undertaking that proved impossible to execute, but that can nevertheless be traced in the historical record and used to shed light on an ongoing struggle in Madrid to rationalize controversial marriages.

¹⁹ Paula Sutter Fichtner, “Dynastic Marriage in Sixteenth-Century Habsburg Diplomacy and Statecraft: An Interdisciplinary Approach,” *The American Historical Review* 81, Issue 2, (April, 1976), pp. 243–265.

The main contention made in this work is that the rationale informing Spanish dynastic strategies became increasingly sophisticated as successive generations responded to marriage diplomacy's consistent failure to deliver on its intended goals, and therefore cannot be explained solely by reference to simple calculations of expediency or a single structure underlying the custom. At the root of shifting views about the practice was the emergence of two distinct, coexisting forms of political logic that colored Spanish perceptions of its practical utility. The first of these, hereby referred to as “dynastic logic,” was a uniquely Spanish brand of political idealism reminiscent of medieval attitudes toward marriage diplomacy. Shaped apart from popular discourses, it was characterized by faith in divine providence, familial loyalty, Christian morality, and historical precedent to attain favorable outcomes. For those who subscribed to this idealist strand of thinking, the ultimate objective of policy was expediency and power— an obsessive preoccupation with perpetuating the dominion of the royal house that often required the monarchy to accept immense risks. In part, this project seeks to understand the arguments and conditions that facilitated the persistence of political idealism in Spanish policymaking, thereby impeding the elaboration of a more coherent strategy that prioritized long-term security and stability.



Árbol genealógico de la familia real austríaca, Sadeler, Ægidius, 1629
Biblioteca Nacional de España (BNE), ER/634

The second prevalent logic that came to constitute an advance in Spanish political culture was rooted in the notion of reason of state. In the early 17th century, a growing number of royal officials and legal experts began to advocate policies aimed at consolidating peace and protecting long-term imperial interests. Hoping to reverse the conspicuous decline of Spanish power, they were strategic realists whose consumption of a burgeoning literature led them to rationally confront problems and adopt pragmatic initiatives. In the realm of marriage diplomacy, the influence of this new line of thinking was most clearly seen in the imperial administration's candid acknowledgment of the dangers posed by imprudent unions. There was also a new emphasis on devising a legal procedure for safeguarding the monarchical line of succession. Previously, under Charles V and Philip II, renunciation clauses had only been marginally important in negotiations with rival France, reflecting an approach that readily accepted the risks inherent in the practice in hopes of acquiring new territories. The clauses took on a new significance during the reign of Philip III, however, when realists began to defend them as the best means of settling competing claims and avoiding the tumultuous dynastic struggles of the previous century. On both this point, and several others, "reason of state logic" provided the impetus behind efforts to modernize the practice of marriage diplomacy, transforming it into a reliable tool that could be employed to safely advance imperial interests.

In recent years, there has been a growing recognition that multiple logics underpinned early modern statecraft. Daniel Nexon was the first scholar to identify an alternative "reason of dynasty" as the driving force behind international-political competition between dynastic agglomerations in the early modern period.²⁰ Defined as a form of logic that departed from realist conceptions of rule that centered on state interests, Nexon's notion of dynastic thinking complicated historical accounts that focused exclusively on the role that a reason of state tradition had in separating the art of governing from the sphere of morality and shaping a mental universe of political action. Luc Duerloo later expanded on this idea in his study of political culture during the reign of Archduke Albert VII, arguing that Habsburg grand strategy was the result of a complex negotiation between three competing logics— reason of state, dynasty, and religious— that operated on layered timescales.²¹ Although it fell short of recognizing the potential for these alternative forms to coincide, Duerloo's investigation nevertheless demonstrated how different concerns produced distinct sets of objectives. Most recently, Liesbeth Gevers invoked the notion of dynastic logic in her study of royal wills, tombs, and baptisms in order to explain the development of the Habsburgs' informal rules towards succession.²² Notwithstanding an increasing emphasis on the primacy of the state, Spain continued to possess a complex political culture with multiple, coexisting sets of attitudes, beliefs, and ideas about how to manage the empire.

To a large extent, the history of Spanish diplomacy is synonymous with the prolonged struggle to reconcile the different modes of thought that informed policy. Under Charles V and Philip II, the pursuit of royal unions was imbued with a deep sense of purpose by an unapologetic commitment to enhancing power, acquiring additional lands and titles, and

²⁰ Daniel H. Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009).

²¹ Luc Duerloo, *Dynasty and Piety: Archduke Albert (1598-1621) and Habsburg Political Culture in an Age of Religious Wars*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012).

²² Liesbeth Gevers, "The Miracles of Spain: Dynastic Attitudes to the Habsburg Succession and the Spanish Succession Crisis (1580-1700)," *Sixteenth Century Journal*, XLVI/2, (2015), pp. 291-311.

protecting Christendom. It was an approach marked by a singularity of will that largely stifled any meaningful deliberation about the ill effects of policy, possessing instead many of the features— heavy reliance on kinship networks, faith in the immutability of the dynasty, and a strong emphasis on religious morality— that were later characteristic of dynastic logic. Only under Philip III did a direct challenge to this traditional emphasis on power, glory, and religious imperatives appear in the form of critiques against alliances that endangered the royal patrimony. Thereafter, controversial marriage projects with both France and England were complicated by a discursive interaction between individuals both within and outside the court attempting to make sense of policy and satisfy the often conflicting objectives and priorities represented in the negotiations. Contrary to some contemporary depictions, dynastic and reason of state logics were neither inherently antagonistic nor mutually exclusive. In fact, they demonstrated a remarkable potential to compliment and even reinforce one another as Spaniards devised the optimal strategy for approaching the marriage market.

Methods and Sources

In unraveling the complex history of Habsburg dynastic policy, this study deviates from a historiographical tendency to focus on individual rather than collective contributions to marital projects. Research on imperial Spain has long reflected a keen fascination with powerful, charismatic, and imposing figures. Charles V and Philip II have been the subjects of countless investigations analyzing each and every facet of their political and personal lives, as have the influential favorites (*validos*) and diplomats of the 17th century including the Duke of Lerma and Count of Gondomar.²³ While this emphasis on the impact that individuals had on historical developments is not problematic in itself; it becomes so if allowed to reinforce the misconception that they were the only ones shaping policy. Redworth's analysis of Hispano-English negotiations in the 1620's focuses almost exclusively on Gondomar as the mover and shaker of Spanish operations, while J.H. Elliott similarly gives sole credit to Lerma for breathing life into the 1615 double marriage project with France.²⁴ Examples such as these reveal how questions of cause and effect can be simplified by a methodological approach that elevates the agency and

²³ For a small sample of the existing literature on each of these men see Rafael Carrasco, *La Empresa Imperial de Carlos V*, (Madrid: Ediciones Cátedra, 2015); Tracy, *Emperor Charles V*; Harald Kleinschmidt, *Charles V: The World Emperor*, (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Limited, 2004); Maltby, *The Reign of Charles V*; Hugh Thomas, *World Without End: Spain, Philip II, and the First Global Empire*, (New York: Random House, 2015); José Luis Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero, *Felipe II: la mirada de un rey (1527-1598)*, (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas: Ediciones Polifemo, 2014); Geoffrey Parker, *Imprudent King: A New Life of Philip II*, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2014); Patrick Williams, *The Great Favourite: The Duke of Lerma and the Court and Government of Philip III of Spain, 1598-1621*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006); Antonio Feros, *Kingship and Favoritism in the Spain of Philip III, 1598-1621*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Bernardo José García García, *La Pax Hispánica: Política exterior del Duque de Lerma*, (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996); Juan Durán-Loriga, *El Embajador y El Rey: El Conde de Gondomar y Jacobo I de Inglaterra*, (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación Subsecretaría, 2006); Fernando Bartolomé Benito, *Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, conde de Gondomar: el Maquiavelo español*, (Somonte-Cenero, Asturias: Ediciones Trea, 2005); Enrique Fernández de Córdoba Calleja, *La Casa de Sol del Conde de Gondomar en Valladolid*, (Ayuntamiento de Valladolid, 2004).

²⁴ In the words of Redworth, "...the story of the Spanish match ultimately revolves around a young man's infatuation, a father's indulgence, and a favourite's determination to carve a position for himself in a new reign." Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 5. For his part, Elliott claims that the marriage negotiations only proceeded due to Lerma "shaking off the melancholia and lethargy to which he was prone." J.H. Elliott, "The Political Context of the 1612-15 Franco Spanish Treaty," *Dynastic Marriages 1612/1615*, p. 11.

intentionality of a select few, while minimizing the input and contributions of a large number of other historical actors that had an equally critical part to play in the peace-making process. This study adopts a more inclusive approach, weaving together the actions, decisions, and deliberations of multiple invested parties, including monarchs, diplomats, government officials, theologians, jurists, and royal women, and showing how they challenged or reinforced different ways of thinking about royal unions in Spain.

To date the most egregious omission from the history of Spanish marriage diplomacy has been the extensive role played by royal women. Erasmus may have been one of the first, but he was not the last observer to overlook the contributions of female dynasts or assume that all young brides were tragic figures with no choice but to conform to custom and expectation. Generally, a failure to appreciate the indirect strategies available to women has consigned them to the margins of historical accounts about important unions. The obvious exception to this trend, of course, has been instances in which their direct impact on proceedings was undeniable, such as when Margaret of Austria and Louise of Savoy came together in 1529 to negotiate a peace treaty between their respective families or when Marie de Medici pursued a policy of rapprochement after the assassination of her husband in 1610. Even in these instances, however, their participation has often been overshadowed or outright disparaged by later scholars.²⁵

The incorporation of gender as a category of analysis allows for a more nuanced history of how power functioned and policy was executed. During the 1980s, scholars studying gender thought deeply about its limitations as a theoretical and empirical framework for studying historical processes.²⁶ The question was not whether women deserved recognition for their contributions, but whether “women” as a single category with a unitary meaning was sufficient to encompass their collective experiences. Over time, a consensus emerged that categories of distinction—based on class, race, marital status, sexuality, and other factors—were needed to fully appreciate the real and symbolic relationship between gender and power in specific contexts. Royal women living in the early modern period, for instance, faced a very particular set of obstacles stemming from a general lack of access to formal positions of leadership and a culture of strict social etiquette that limited their autonomy.²⁷ Traditionally, these obstacles were assumed to be formidable enough to impede women’s ability to provide meaningful input in all but exceptional cases. However, once a category of gender was adopted that fluctuated both culturally and historically, it became possible to treat royal women as dynamic and

²⁵ Perrens, *Les Mariages Espagnols*, p. 349. In his seminal account of the marriage of 1615, Perrens blames Marie de Medici for pursuing the impractical alliance; “si Marie de Médicis persista dans son dessein de s’unir aux Espagnols, ce fut donc de sa part obstination de caractère, zèle catholique, petitesse de vues, vanité féminine.”

²⁶ Joan W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” *The American Historical Review* 91, No. 5, (Dec., 1986), pp. 1053-1075. Scott’s article on the role of gender as an analytical category had a major impact on how scholars approached the study of women. An advocate of drawing more heavily from theory, she urged scholars to break down strict notions of male/female, masculine/feminine, and sexuality in order to better appreciate social and political constructions of gender. A central part of this new approach was placing historical actors in the context of broader societal institutions and organizations in order to derive a new understanding of “the sexes, of gender groups in the historical past... to discover the range in sex roles and in sexual symbolism in different societies and periods, to find out what meaning they had and how they functioned to maintain the social order or to promote its change (1054).”

²⁷ Rosemary Radford Ruether, *Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993), p. 63. The early modern period was one in which “the perception of women as marginalized by gender became stronger than the perception of women as divided by class.”

knowledgeable actors with a number of distinct strategies for participating in diplomatic initiatives and shaping broader political developments throughout the period.

Exploring the intersection of gender and politics, this study shows how successive generations of royal women were an indispensable part of, and fully integrated into, the Spanish empire's political system. Recent investigations have shown that royal women had access to a number of strategies for wielding independent influence despite often operating outside of the formal institutions of power. Magdalena Sánchez's work on Habsburg women in the court of Philip III was one of the first to show how they capitalized on familial bonds, patronage networks, and their close physical proximity to the monarch to augment their authority, while at the same time exploiting the languages of piety and affection to disguise the true political nature of their actions.²⁸ Silvia Z. Mitchell, Anne J. Cruz, Mihoko Suzuki, Bethany Aram, Katherine Crawford, Sharon L. Jansen, and others have since traced a long tradition of female authority exercised through both formal channels as queens and regents, and informal channels as wives and mothers.²⁹ One area in which women are shown to have had ample opportunity to exert control was in the construction of new marriage projects, where their venerated status allowed them to voice their preferences, serve their personal agendas, and sway negotiations to achieve a desired result. The current study maintains that this form of active involvement on the part of women was neither exceptional nor peripheral. It was an indispensable part of the Spanish monarchy's diplomatic approach to the marriage market and, oftentimes, a prerequisite for the successful procurement of a new agreement.

A close analysis of primary sources pertaining to royal unions reveals this persistent and dynamic pattern of female participation. Throughout their tenure, the Habsburg monarchy regularly called upon female relatives to serve as intermediaries or as advisors to their local diplomats.³⁰ Credited with a gentle and nurturing disposition, they were respected as natural peacemakers with sincere feelings of personal affection that could supplant the masculine resort to violence and aggression. When it came to handling delicate matters, the monarchy trusted them to act with a precision, alacrity, and fidelity born out of their extensive political knowledge and strong sense of dynastic identity. Whether or not their actions always conformed to expectations, Habsburg women—who in many cases possessed blood ties linking them to both sides of a marriage project—performed indispensable functions, restoring diplomatic confidence, reconciling stubborn differences, and creating the impression that peace was attainable.

As time progressed, perceptions of female power and agency also became crucial for rationalizing controversial marriages. Before the 17th century, the status of the royal women

²⁸ Magdalena S. Sánchez, *The Empress, the Queen, and the Nun: Women and Power at the Court of Philip III of Spain*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

²⁹ Silvia Z. Mitchell, *Queen, Mother, and Stateswoman: Mariana of Austria and the Government of Spain*, (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2019); Anne J. Cruz and Mihoko Suzuki, eds., *The Rule of Women in Early Modern Europe*, (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2009); Sharon L. Jansen, *Debating Women, Politics, and Power in Early Modern Europe*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Bethany Aram, *Juana the Mad: Sovereignty and Dynasty in Renaissance Europe*, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); Katherine Crawford, *Perilous Performances: Gender and Regency in Early Modern France*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Sharon L. Jansen, *The Monstrous Regiment of Women: Female Rulers in Early Modern Europe*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

³⁰ Sánchez, *The Empress, the Queen, and the Nun*, pp. 111-136.

being sent abroad was rarely discussed in any meaningful way. At best, it was a secondary consideration overshadowed by an ostensible preoccupation with engendering perpetual peace and lasting accord. Once faith in the viability of marital bonds to obtain tangible benefits began to wane as a result of realist critiques, however, so too did the presumed justification for exposing the young Spanish Infantas to the dangers of a foreign court. Facing an unprecedented challenge to the logic underpinning the practice of marriage diplomacy, idealists within the Spanish monarchy responded by emphasizing with increasing frequency the idea that the Infantas were astute political agents who could be trusted to move abroad and represent the interests of their natal family— something which had occurred for decades, but which had never been fully articulated or singled out as an explicit objective of policy.

Consequently, considerable more attention was paid in subsequent marriages to the role of the Spanish Infantas, and the conditions necessary to allow them to establish themselves as influential advocates of the Habsburg cause. One major concern was that the royal daughters— often still in their adolescence— might be susceptible to political and religious corruption. There was also a keen preoccupation with protecting certain rights, such as their control over their household and the future education of their children, in hopes of augmenting their personal authority. The Spanish response to these different, but related concerns varied. The monarchy pushed hard for both major and minor concessions in the negotiations, delayed departure dates when necessary, and identified allies living abroad— oftentimes other royal women with ties to the royal family— who could look after and collaborate with the young girls after their arrival. Energy and resources were also spent fashioning an image of the Infantas as effective agents of dynasty predisposed by their inherent piety, irreproachable character, and strength of will to represent both religious imperatives and their family’s interests. A major claim in the present study is that this new way of thinking about female power and agency constituted a particularly robust strand of dynastic logic, stemming from a deeply-rooted belief that an extensive familial network and strong kinship ties were viable strategies for obtaining political advantages.

Apart from royal women, another group that played a major role in shaping dynastic policy was the empire’s leading legal experts (*letrados*). Possessing degrees in civil and canon law, the *letrados* first emerged in the beginning of the 15th century as a distinct class particularly well equipped to advise local rulers and oversee the administrative affairs of key institutions. Before long the royal court, the church, and different legal bodies were staffed by these men of letters, who according to José Antonio Maravall— and later reiterated by Barbara Weissberger— benefitted from their exclusive access to a civil, secular science (*ciencia*) applicable to the art of governance.³¹ In the following centuries, the central place of the *letrados* in society as administrators, advisors, and conduits of new forms of learning, including both humanist and reason of state traditions, only continued to grow. For its part, the Spanish monarchy made a habit of relying on them to analyze and resolve complicated legal issues in special temporary committees (*juntas*). Undoubtedly, the most well-known *junta* was the one called by Charles V in Valladolid to hear the famous debate between Las Casas and Sepúlveda in 1550-61.³² But

³¹ José Antonio Maravall, “Los ‘hombres de saber’ o letrados y la formación de su conciencia estamental,” *Estudios de Historia del pensamiento español* 2, (1973), pp. 355-389; Barbara F. Weissberger, *Isabel Rules: Constructing Queenship, Wielding Power*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), p. 91.

³² For more on this debate see Lewis Hanke, *All Mankind is One: A Study of the Disputation Between Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda in 1550 on the Intellectual and Religious Capacity of the American Indians*, (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994).

other lesser known *juntas* were called throughout the Habsburg tenure, including several during the 17th century in connection with prospective marriage alliances with France and England.

The arguments and conclusions reached by *letrados* on matters pertaining to these unions remains the most understudied feature of Spanish marriage diplomacy. Although it was by no means the first; the most consequential mobilization of legal experts occurred in 1610 amidst ongoing negotiations with the Bourbon dynasty in France. Tasked with establishing the legal basis for the Infanta's renunciation clause, the empire's leading jurists, theologians, and government officials produced opinions (*pareceres*) that varied widely in tone and content. Only a few years later, several more *juntas* were convened to tackle the issues posed by another controversial marriage with England. On this occasion, there was little disagreement between theologians and officials about the benefits of the match. But, the challenge they faced was much greater as they undertook to devise a contractual basis for the first cross-confessional marriage in Spanish history.

In addition to writing about very specific legal issues, *letrados* took advantage of the opportunity presented by the marriage projects to closely scrutinize the underlying justification for the antiquated practice, and articulate real concerns about the dangers that it posed. Lambasting the notions of Christian brotherhood and perpetual peace that had long been at the heart of new alliances, they pushed the monarchy to think in terms of state security, political stability, and long-term benefits. At least initially, the influx of new ideas posed an immense challenge for the monarchy, as it struggled to reconcile an idealist mode of thinking rooted in dynastic interest and religious zeal with the emerging notion of reason of state. As time progressed, however, so too did the sophistication of ideas about the practice, culminating in what amounted to a fully fleshed out treatise on the topic, titled *Consulta referente a la renuncia a la sucesión de la Corona de España: que debe hacer la Infanta María Teresa de Austria, al casarse con Luis XIV de Francia, 1659*, written by the renowned *letrado* Francisco Ramos del Manzano in the latter part of the 17th century.

Evidence of a prolonged process of debate, negotiation, and compromise between the different logics that came to bear on policy can be found throughout an extensive historical record. Diplomatic correspondences, official reports (*consultas*) from the Spanish Council of State, votes (*votos*), legal opinions (*pareceres*), marriage contracts, personal letters, and literary productions show that Spaniards regularly worked through the merits and consequences of controversial royal unions, and attempted to optimize their advantage. For a long time, this meant simply hammering out the most advantageous agreement possible in hopes that fortune would favor the bold. As time progressed, however, the deliberations about policy became much more urgent, and the proposed solutions much more contested. Previously unrelated questions regarding the nature of monarchical authority, the function of familial networks, the influence of royal women, and the ultimate aim of a prudent dynastic policy all came to bear. It was a transformative moment in the history of the Spanish empire, in which Europe's preeminent monarchy struggled to confront and adapt to a rapidly changing international landscape.

Organization

In order to provide a clear and thorough account of the evolution of dynastic policy over time, this study will treat five distinct marriage projects pursued by the Spanish Habsburgs from 1526-1660. Each of the episodes—including four with France and one with England—were selected because of the unique challenges that they posed for the Spanish monarchy. More often than not, the successful elaboration of familial networks was aided by a sense of trust derived from shared familial identity, as later occurred with the Spanish and Austrian Habsburg branches, and/or an authoritative dynastic tradition, such as the one that arose between the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies. The cases analyzed in this study, however, stand out precisely because they lacked any basis for mutual trust, confidence, or respect. Instead, both France and England were recognized as inherent enemies of the empire—a fact which greatly complicated bilateral negotiations and Spanish attempts to rationalize them. At the heart of the present study is a keen interest in understanding how the Habsburgs responded to and overcame their deep-seeded misgivings about their enemies' intentions to finalize international agreements that would send their loved ones to live in foreign, often hostile courts.

Chapter one provides a detailed account of the marriage negotiated between Charles V and Francis I from 1526-1529. First proposed in the wake of the bloody battle of Pavia, the project was hindered from the outset by false promises, calculated deceptions, and outright betrayal. Still, despite an evident lack of sincerity exhibited by both sides, Charles V never wavered in his decision to finalize a union with his sworn enemy. As the chapter demonstrates, the emperor's commitment to a policy of rapprochement stemmed from his unapologetic desire to serve his strategic interests and perpetuate his family's political authority whatever the costs. This was an approach aided by, amongst other things, the intervention of female intermediaries and a basic framework of reliance on the sanctity of contract.

Closely analyzing the negotiations that took place between Spain, France, the Holy Roman Empire, and Portugal from 1566-1570, chapter two makes a case for the persistence of this particular approach to marriage diplomacy throughout the reign of Philip II. Like his father, Philip II was an opportunist who sought through royal unions to augment his personal authority and expand his sphere of influence. Eventually, his personal ambitions culminated in a grand four way alliance between Europe's most powerful monarchies—a project that posed unprecedented problems of scale and tested the limits of what could be achieved through rapprochement. As this episode reveals, the active collaboration of royal women was oftentimes the most crucial factor in determining the workability of increasingly complex arrangements; with Philip II relying heavily on an extensive network of female relatives to realize his grand vision.

Chapter three treats the negotiations that preceded the 1615 double marriage alliance with France. Worried that the Infanta's claim would provide the Bourbons with an indirect claim to the Habsburg inheritance, the monarchy mobilized its leading jurists, theologians, and government officials to determine the legal grounds for permanently divesting her of her right to the throne. It was a decision that had lasting consequences for policy, opening the floor for Spaniards to debate the viability of a risky union. Influenced by the discourse of reason of state, many *letrados* pushed back against rapprochement, citing the dangers that it posed to the empire. The latter part of this chapter analyzes Philip III and the Council of State's response to this

challenge, showing how it required them to reframe the marriage as prudent, politically advantageous act that would not endanger the royal line of succession.

The doomed marriage project arranged between Spain and England in the first quarter of the 17th century is treated in chapter four, which makes a novel argument about how it was perceived and treated in Madrid. Realizing the benefits of the match, the monarchy initially adopted a conciliatory approach despite a lack of papal consent. This reorientation of its dynastic policy away from an anti-Protestant stance received support from leading theologians and officials who set about devising the contractual basis for a binding agreement. In the end, the marriage did fail, but not due to a lack of incentive, creativity, or vision on the part of Spaniards. Rather, it failed due to their inability to overcome—after exhaustive efforts—the serious legal complications posed by an unprecedented cross-confessional agreement.

Chapter five concludes the present study by clarifying the circumstances that culminated in a Hispano-French union by 1660. As it shows, the Spanish decision to proceed with the marriage did not occur out of desperation. Rather, it reflected a careful calculation of long-term risks and benefits, with the monarchy ultimately deciding to preference the latter. At the heart of the decision to finalize the French match was a sophisticated political and legal understanding of marriage diplomacy articulated by the influential *letrado* Francisco Ramos del Manzano. This chapter closely analyzes this new understanding of the practice, arguing that its impact on the policymaking process was enhanced by an unprecedented degree of concordance between the dynastic and reason of state logics.

In popular culture, the common misconception persists that the Spanish Habsburgs' reliance on a shortsighted, somewhat deranged policy of inbreeding led to their extinction.³³ This is a misconception regularly reinforced by historians, who cannot help but describe in lurid detail the physical and mental degeneration of the royal family from Charles V to Charles II— clear evidence of the debilitating effects that incestuous marriages had over time.³⁴ As this dissertation definitively proves, however; the Habsburgs' dynastic policy was neither shortsighted nor deranged. Rather, it was the product of intense deliberations and careful calculations as men and women; policymakers and jurists; kings and theologians undertook to transform a medieval antecedent into a reliable tool of the state. The extinction of the dynasty should not be conflated with the failure of this long, drawn-out process. Nearly a century before the outbreak of the War of Spanish Succession and the rise of the Bourbons, *letrados* warned Philip III that a French match might very well result in a foreign usurpation of the throne. The Habsburgs understood the risks that they were taking— that despite their best efforts to rationalize policy that it might all amount to naught— and made the conscious decision to forge ahead anyway. In an international arena where universal conceptions of power, prestige, and diplomacy were structured around family relationships, they had no other choice.

³³ Andy Hughes, *The Pocket Guide to Royal Scandals*, (South Yorkshire: Remember When, 2011), pp. 57-58.

³⁴ Benjamin Curtis, *The Habsburgs: The History of a Dynasty*. London: Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 161.

Chapter One

“For though the sons of the French king may not yet be of age, such alliances, if now proposed and made, contracted for a future time, would, no doubt, bring forth mutual sentiments of regard and affection in the fathers, who, in hopes of the said marriages taking place, would look upon each other’s honour and interests as their own.”³⁵

In 1529, Emperor Charles V stood before the Royal Council in Madrid and, in dramatic fashion, condemned princes who sought foreign conquests as tyrants.³⁶ The speech was not intended to be a condemnation of war and violence under all conditions. Heir to the proud military traditions of the Habsburg, Trastámara, and Valois-Burgundy dynasties, Charles V extolled the noble virtues of the chivalric ideal and actively sought honor and glory through strength of arms. Rather, the speech was intended to distinguish just from unjust wars, and reconcile his violent engagements on the continent with the Christian imperative of peace. As Charles V’s speech demonstrates, the inherent contradiction of a political system that extolled feats of bravery in combat while preaching the need for reconciliation posed a considerable challenge for early modern princes. Whether motivated by strategic necessity or a personal predilection for warfare, they could hardly avoid taking the field against their spiritual brethren. But, in doing so, they risked transgressing against the known laws of God and undermining the sacred aim of religious unity (*pax Christiana*).³⁷

Nowhere was the complicated relationship between peace and war more evident than in the emperor’s dynastic policy. As a diplomatic mechanism, royal marriages were ostensibly aimed at binding distant families closer together in bonds of mutual affection, resolving competing claims to territorial sovereignty, and perpetuating familial authority. They also provided a means for nonviolent political unification, as demonstrated by Charles V’s grandparents, Ferdinand and Isabel, when they consolidated much of the Iberian Peninsula through their union.³⁸ However, as Charles V knew only too well, royal marriages could also be employed as instruments of aggression and expansion; cementing military alliances, consecrating asymmetrical treaties, and increasing a family’s odds of coming out victorious in the genetic contest for European supremacy. An incredibly astute leader well versed in the intricacies of marriage diplomacy, Charles V developed a dynastic policy that reflected an uneasy compromise between these two approaches. Ultimately motivated by imperial interests, his policy was one of expediency and power in which lasting peace was always identified as the principal motivation, but not always the intended outcome.

³⁵ *Calendar of Letters, Despatches, State Papers Relating to the Negotiations Between England and Spain* (CSP Sp.), Vol. IV—Part I, ed. Pascual de Gayangos, (Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus-Thomson Organization, 1969), p. 264. Margaret of Austria to Charles V in 1529 on the benefits of negotiating further marriages with the French monarchy.

³⁶ Joycelyne G. Russell, *Peacemaking in the Renaissance*, (London: Duckworth, 1986), p. 56.

³⁷ Mia J. Rodriguez, “Obeying the Ten Commandments: The First War between Charles V and Francis I, 1520-1529,” *The World of Emperor Charles V*, eds. Wim Blockmans and Nicolette Mout, (Amsterdam: Editat-the Publishing House of the Royal, 2005), pp. 15-67. Erasmus wrote extensively on the ideal of the *pax Christiana*, which he hoped might be accomplished with the support of secular princes. To this end, he wrote a book dedicated to Charles V on how to be a “good Christian” ruler in a community of peaceful nations. For more on this see Erasmus *Educación del príncipe cristiano*.

³⁸ Edwards, *Ferdinand and Isabel*, pp. 146-170.

Without question, the most ambitious, if not most controversial, marriage authorized during Charles V's reign was between his sister, Eleanor of Austria, and King Francis I of France. Reaffirmed in 1529, the same year that Charles V spoke to the Royal Council, in the Treaty of Cambrai, the marriage promised to bring an end to nearly a decade of conflict and restore the tranquility of Christendom.³⁹ There was also some hope, expressed by the two main architects of the agreement, the imperial regent of the Netherlands, Margaret of Austria, and the French Queen mother, Louise of Savoy, that the unprecedented union would mark a decisive turning point in the continent's political trajectory, ushering in a new era of cooperation between their respective dynasties.⁴⁰

In reality, the wedding of Eleanor to Francis hardly constituted a genuine effort to procure lasting peace. Introduced in 1526 as part of the Treaty of Madrid, a one-sided agreement imposed on Francis after his defeat and capture at the Battle of Pavia, the marriage was first conceived to preserve imperial military gains and advance Habsburg interests.⁴¹ Thereafter, the marriage was marred by betrayal and disagreement beginning with Francis' decision, shortly after his release, to repudiate the marriage in direct violation of his oaths. Although Charles V continued to insist during the preceding years that his sister was in fact the Queen of France, the damage caused by this betrayal was irreversible, confirming forever in the eyes of many that the French monarch was an oath-breaker who could not be trusted. The marriage was ultimately celebrated in 1530, the crowning moment in an intense and drawn out peace process. But by then, it was too late. For both sides, the stubborn feelings of hatred and mistrust that lurked beneath the optimistic façade of lasting accord had sunken their roots too deep, and could no longer be simply expunged by wedding festivities and the ringing of church bells.

The enduring antagonism between Charles V and Francis has long been the subject of intense scholarly interest. Hundreds, if not thousands, of pages have been written about the origins of their rivalry, the Italian Wars, and the personal slights that fueled their mutual disdain.⁴² As a result of this extensive coverage, the two monarchs' struggle for supremacy has

³⁹ For a copy of the peace capitulations settled in Cambrai see Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN), Estado (Est.), legajo (leg.) 2876, Exposición (exp.) 10. A Summary of the Main Articles can also be found in Joycelyne G. Russell, *Diplomats at Work: Three Renaissance Studies*, (Gloucestershire: Alan Sutton Publishing, 1992), pp. 155-158.

⁴⁰ The lives of both women, including their role as peacemakers at Cambrai, have been written about at length in Dorothy Moulton Mayer, *The Great Regent: Louise of Savoy 1476- 1531*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966); Jane de Iongh, *Margaret of Austria: Regent of the Netherlands*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1953); Eleanor E. Tremayne, *The First Governess of the Netherlands Margaret of Austria*, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons— London: Methuen & Co., 1908).

⁴¹ For a copy of the peace capitulations settled in Madrid see AHN, Est., leg. 2876, exp. 9; Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Est., leg. K-1483, B2, folio (fol.) 8. A detailed account of the negotiations can also be found in R.J. Knecht, *Francis I*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 174-191; Ochoa Brun, *Historia*, Vol. V, (Madrid: Ministerios de Asuntos Exteriores, 1999), pp. 148-162; Alonso de Santa Cruz, *Crónica del Emperador Carlos V*, Vol. II, (Madrid: Imprenta del Patronato de huérfanos de intendencia é intervención militares, 1920), pp. 180-220.

⁴² To read more about the rivalry between Charles V and Francis I see Carrasco, *La Empresa Imperial*, pp. 183-199; Tracy, *Emperor Charles V*, pp. 39-49; Dominique Biloghi, "L'affrontement avec la France et les << Guerres d'Italie >> (1515-1559)," *Quelques aspects du règne de Charles Quint, empereur d'Allemagne et roi d'Espagne*, ed. Marie-Catherine Barbazza, (Montpellier: Université Paul-Valéry- Montpellier III, 2005), pp. 115-157 ; Mia J Rodriguez, "Obeying the Ten Commandments"; Kleinschmidt, *Charles V*, pp. 90- 111; Maltby, *The Reign of Charles V*, pp. 32-43; Glenn Richardson, *Renaissance Monarchy: The Reigns of Henry VIII, Francis I, and Charles V*, (London: Arnold Publishers, 2002); Ochoa Brun, *Historia*, pp. 123- 279; Anderson, *The Origins*, pp. 88-138;

become emblematic of a highly unstable pre-Westphalian period in which war was waged solely in the name of dynastic interest.⁴³ Far less attention has been paid, however, to the intermittent peace negotiations initiated by both sides— a lack of coverage that corresponds with Charles V and Francis’ own apparent lack of genuine interest in a permanent settlement. Taking their cue from the monarchs themselves, historical accounts often refer to marriage offers and peace treaties, but, with the exception of the Ladies’ Peace, do not go into great length or treat them as anything more than calculated deviations from otherwise bellicose foreign policies.⁴⁴

This limited analysis of matters pertaining to rapprochement extends to include Eleanor’s marriage to Francis. Although regularly mentioned as an important component of the treaties of Madrid and Cambrai, neither the union nor the forces shaping its settlement have yet to be fully explored as significant historical topics in their own right.⁴⁵ Instead, the marriage is analyzed in conjunction with the many other articles included in the treaties— often being relegated to a position of secondary importance vis-à-vis more contentious issues, such as Charles V and Francis’ competing claims to Burgundy. Moreover, scholars have still not considered the historical implications of the unprecedented match. In this chapter, the underlying assertion is that Eleanor’s union to Francis, as the first marriage alliance concluded with the elder Valois branch, needs to be thoroughly analyzed not just to understand the long-term development of Habsburg dynastic policy, but also to appreciate the resiliency of marriage politics as a distinct mode of diplomacy throughout the early modern period.

In order to explore different features of the negotiations conducted between the Habsburgs and Valois from 1526-1530, the chapter is divided into two parts.⁴⁶ In section one, titled “A Marriage Spurned,” I examine the origins of Eleanor’s marriage and the immediate fallout from Francis’ repudiation of the match. From the outset, Charles V’s interest in the match was motivated by strategic interests and a desire to perpetuate his family’s political authority that he attempted to cover under the guise of lasting peace. Hardly fooled by the public pretense for the union, Francis feigned his own commitment to rapprochement only to break his oath and

Manuel Fernández Álvarez, *Charles V: Elected Emperor and Hereditary Rule*, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975); Royall Tyler, *The Emperor Charles the Fifth*, (Fair Lawn: Essential Books, 1956); Karl Brandt, *The Emperor Charles V: The Growth and Destiny of a Man and of a World-Empire*, trans. C. V. Wedgwood, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1954), pp. 181-281;

⁴³ Anderson, *The Origins*, pp. 88-89; Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, pp. 105-180.

⁴⁴ Jansen, *The Monstrous Regiment*, pp. 81-95; Russell, “Women Diplomats: The Ladies Peace of 1529,” *Diplomats at Work*, pp. 94-152; Ochoa Brun, “Diplomacia femenina,” *Historia de la Diplomacia*, pp. 199-203.

⁴⁵ This lack of coverage stands in stark contrast to other royal marriages during the period. See, for instance, the account of Charles V’s marriage to Isabel of Portugal in Juan Antonio Vilar Sánchez, *1526, Boda y luna de miel del emperador Carlos V: La visita imperial a Andalucía y al reino de Granada*, (Granada: Real Maestranza de Caballería de Granada, 2000).

⁴⁶ Printed primary sources include CSP Sp., Vol. III— Parts I & II and Vol. IV—Part I; *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, Relating to English Affairs, Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice and in Other Libraries of Northern Italy* (CSP Venice), Vols. III and IV, ed. Rawdon Brown, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1869); *Correspondence of the Emperor Charles V and his ambassadors at the courts of England and France: from the original letters in the imperial family archives at Vienna; with a connecting narrative and bibliographic notices of the Emperor and of some of the most distinguished officers of his army and household; together with the Emperor's itinerary from 1519-1551* (CC), ed. William Bradford, (London: R. Bentley, 1850); *Corpus documental de Carlos V*, Tomo II (CDC), ed. Manuel Fernández Álvarez, (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1975); *Correspondance de Marguerite d'Autriche et de ses ambassadeurs à la cour de France: concernant l'exécution du traité de Cambrai, 1529-1530* (CMA), ed. Ghislaine de Boom, (Bruxelles: M. Lamertin, 1935). Primary source documents are drawn from AGS, Est., leg. K-1483, K-1641, K-1643, K-1680; AHN, Est., leg. 2876.

begin negotiating a new marriage with the English monarchy shortly after his release from captivity. While this betrayal did provoke an imperial effort to undermine Anglo-French negotiations, as I demonstrate, it ultimately did little to lessen the emperor's determination to uphold the marriage. In fact, throughout this period of renewed conflict, Charles V and his officials continued to defend Eleanor's status as the rightful Queen of France and push the French to honor their contractual obligations.

Section two of the chapter, titled "A Bid for Lasting Peace," provides a more detailed account of the negotiations conducted between the Habsburgs and Valois. In analyzing these diplomatic exchanges, I argue that the basis of imperial commitment to a policy of rapprochement with France, even after Francis' betrayal, was two-fold. First, it depended on continued adherence to the notion that carefully prepared written agreements could obligate signatories to fulfill their contractual obligations. While actual faith in the sanctity of contract to imbue agreements with binding power was far from absolute—as evidenced by the careful precautions taken to protect Habsburg possessions from treachery—it nevertheless played an important role in minimizing the evident dangers posed by the match and allowing Charles V to pursue a dynastic policy that served his strategic interests. Second, the successful procurement of Eleanor's marriage depended heavily on the participation of royal women. Analyzing the role played by Margaret of Austria both before and after Cambrai, I show how female contributions were vital for restoring diplomatic confidence, reconciling stubborn differences, and creating the impression that lasting peace was attainable. I also make a case for the independent decision-making power possessed by some royal women, who employed different strategies in order to expand their influence and convince their respective sides to come to the bargaining table. Altogether, this section serves to highlight the different forces that shaped dynastic policy during the reign of Charles V, making an unlikely marriage possible and establishing a diplomatic precedent for future marriage negotiations with the French crown.

A Marriage Spurned

The impetus for dynastic rapprochement between the Habsburgs and Valois originated in conflict. In late 1521, Francis I ordered a three-pronged assault on Habsburg territories, with one prong aimed at Navarre, another at the Low Countries, and the final one at Luxembourg.⁴⁷ For a short time, the geographic scope of the conflict, which was largely motivated by the feelings of indignation and resentment that Francis felt after losing the imperial election to Charles V, remained limited to these three fronts.⁴⁸ When Francis missed an opportunity to engage near Valenciennes, however, fighting quickly spread to Italy—a site of intense combat and competing political ambitions since 1494. Eager to extend his authority in Lombardy, Charles V focused his considerable military and diplomatic capacity on dislodging Francis' hold over Milan and organizing an alliance with England and the Papacy to push into French territory. Despite scoring early successes, the decisive confrontation did not come until February 24, 1525 when imperial troops met the French army at Pavia.⁴⁹ The battle proved to be a momentous victory for the emperor in which Francis and several of his prominent nobles were captured. Aware of his precarious position, and likely desperate to escape from the humiliating circumstances of his

⁴⁷ Maltby, *Charles V*, p. 34.

⁴⁸ For an overview of Charles V and Francis competing bids for the imperial title see Anderson, *The Origins*, pp. 91-93.

⁴⁹ Knecht, *Francis I*, pp. 165-172.

detainment, Francis expressed his readiness to engage in peace negotiations shortly after his defeat, going so far as to request a transfer to Spain in hopes of arranging a personal meeting with Charles V.⁵⁰

The centerpiece of the subsequent negotiations was an unprecedented double marriage alliance linking the two dynasties. The possibility of consecrating the peace with royal unions was first advanced by the French upon learning the high price of Francis' release, including a substantial monetary payment and significant territorial concessions.⁵¹ The most controversial of these concessions concerned the relinquishment of all claim to Burgundy.⁵² While military competition between Charles V and Francis was intensified by their rival claims for sovereign power in different regions across Europe, including Italy and Flanders, the dispute over the wealthy Duchy of Burgundy was particularly contentious due to the perception in France that it was vital for their monarchy's international standing.⁵³ Louise of Savoy, the Queen mother of France, underscored early on the difficulties posed by an outright demand for control of the duchy, warning in a meeting with the imperial ambassador, Louis de Praet, that Francis "would rather die in prison than consent to the cession of Burgundy"—a warning which echoed Francis' early proclamation that he "would rather die a prisoner than agree to his [Charles V's] demands and dismember my kingdom."⁵⁴ Their solution was to push for a marriage between Francis and Eleanor, the widowed Queen of Portugal and the emperor's youngest sister, which might serve as a medium for passing control of the duchy down to their children.⁵⁵ In order to further entice Charles V to accept this marriage, and a stipulation whereby both monarchs would "transfer their respective rights to the children born of the said marriage," Francis included a second marriage between the Dauphin, Francis III, and Maria of Portugal, Eleanor's recently born daughter, intended to take place when the Infanta came of age and further establish a lasting tradition of interdynastic collaboration.⁵⁶

Unfortunately for the French monarchy, Charles V had no intention of compromising with his humbled foe. In September 1525, Francis' sister, Marguerite of Angoulême, embarked for Spain with orders to finalize an agreement for his release. The urgency of this mission was compounded by Francis' rapidly deteriorating physical health, which raised fears that he might succumb to the harsh conditions of his confinement.⁵⁷ In order to secure his freedom, Marguerite met with Charles V several times in Toledo, reiterating the concessions already on the table, including the renunciation of all French rights to titles in Italy, Flanders, and the Iberian

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 174; CC, p. 196. Charles V did not immediately respond to Francis' request, but eventually agreed in January 1529 to meet with him in person.

⁵¹ For territorial concessions initially presented to Francis while a prisoner in Pizzighettone, Italy by Duke Charles of Bourbon, Charles of Lannoy, and Adrien de Croy see Ochoa Brun, *Historia*, p. 153; CSP Sp., Vol. III—Part I, p. 62.

⁵² A clear, concise summary of the origins of Francis and Charles V's competing claims in Burgundy, Navarre, Naples, and Milan can also be found in Richardson, *Renaissance Monarchy*, pp. 49-53.

⁵³ CSP, Vol. III—Part I, p. 562.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 464.

⁵⁵ Knecht, *Francis I*, p. 189. The marriage with Eleanor was one of two demands made by Francis. The other was that he be released before the implementation of the treaty so that he could convince his subjects to surrender Burgundy.

⁵⁶ CSP, Vol. III—Part I, p. 464.

⁵⁷ Leonie Frieda, *Francis I: The Maker of Modern France*, (New York: Harper Collins, 2018), p. 190. On the verge of death, Francis was receiving his last rites on September 22, 1525 when the nasal abscess that had debilitated him suddenly burst, sparing his life.

Peninsula and the payment of 350,000 crowns in ransom.⁵⁸ She also spent considerable time with Eleanor in an attempt to befriend the widowed Queen and gain an invaluable ally in the imperial court.⁵⁹ Still, despite her extensive efforts, Marguerite failed to achieve the ultimate objective of convincing Charles V that the issue of Burgundy could only be resolved with a vote from the Paris Parlement, and therefore needed to be treated with leniency in the final agreement. On this point, the emperor remained firm; demanding outright control of the duchy without any special qualification. In November, after Charles V rejected a final offer of 3 million gold crowns in exchange for the designation of Burgundy as a wedding dowry, Marguerite abandoned her mission and departed for France disheartened and defeated.⁶⁰

On January 14, 1526, shortly after the princess' departure, a peace treaty was finalized in Madrid. The terms contained within the treaty were harsh. Among the many concessions, Francis agreed to abandon his claim to all contested territories in Europe, including Burgundy, pay a massive ransom, and surrender over his two eldest sons as hostages until all promises had been fulfilled. Francis also agreed to honor Eleanor as his bride and the new Queen of France. According to the treaty, the marriage was included "so that henceforth the said peace, union, confederation, and friendship is more firm, and to tie and bind it together with kinship and affinity by marriage."⁶¹ The desire to strengthen and prolong amicable diplomatic relations through ties of kinship was commonly cited as the primary incentive for royal marriages. However, as evidenced by Charles V's insistence on highly prejudicial terms, these proclamations often contradicted a political reality in which deep seeded feelings of enmity precluded a mutual commitment to establishing an extended, mutually beneficial relationship. Instead, Charles V incorporated Eleanor's marriage in the treaty as a way to consecrate an asymmetrical agreement which strengthened his position on the continent by replenishing his coffers and affirming his control over contested territories.⁶²

In addition to its immediate diplomatic benefit, the royal union also possessed an inherent long-term potential to extend Habsburg influence into the French heartland. Charles V recognized that each child born by Eleanor would not only possess a close affinity with his royal house through their mother, but also a direct claim to sovereign authority in France. He therefore took careful steps when drafting the marriage capitulations to protect all future offspring. By the terms of the agreement, Eleanor's firstborn son was to be granted the Dukedom of Alençon in France, as well as the additional earldoms and estates of Macon, Auxerre, and Bar-Sur-Seine. Any additional sons were likewise to be "provided dukedoms with both estates and properties equal to those possessed by the other sons born from the said lord king's [Francis] first

⁵⁸ Patricia Francis Cholakian and Rouben Charles Cholakian, *Marguerite de Navarre: Mother of the Renaissance*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 118.

⁵⁹ Mayer, *Louise of Savoy*, p. 213.

⁶⁰ Cholakian and Cholakian, *Marguerite de Navarre*, p. 121.

⁶¹ AHN, Est., leg. 2876, exp. 9, fol. 6v. ["...para que de cada día la dicha paz union confederación y amistad sea mas firme e para atarla e ligarla con parentesco y afinidad de casamiento..."]

⁶² Vilar Sánchez, *1526 Boda y luna de miel*, p. 130. In Charles V's opinion, the Treaty of Madrid was far from a punitive or discriminatory agreement. Quite the opposite, he saw it as a fair peace in which he was simply taking advantage of his political fortune. According to Vilar Sánchez, in a letter to one Spanish nobleman, Charles V "le decía que después de la batalla de Pavía hubiera podido invadir Francia sin problemas, pero que había preferido la paz, bajo la base de la restitución de la Borgoña y de los derechos sobre Nápoles y el Milanesado, a la guerra."

marriage.”⁶³ In the case of Eleanor giving birth to daughters, “each of them shall be entitled to that which is usually provided to the Daughters of the Kings of France.”⁶⁴ In examining peace negotiations between Charles V and Francis in the wake of Pavia, historians have tended to emphasize, with good reason, Burgundy as the most pressing concern for both monarchies. Too little attention has been paid, however, to the long-term objectives of the emperor’s policy in 1526. Charles V took the time to clarify the status of Eleanor’s future offspring vis-à-vis Francis’ living children because he was not just thinking in terms of present acquisitions—although by his own admission these were a primary aim of the treaty— but also in terms of long-term dynastic gains.⁶⁵



Emperor Charles V at the age of two together with his sisters Eleonora and Isabella,
Meister der St. Georgsgilde, 1502,
Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna

As the patriarch of his house, Charles V was personally responsible for perpetuating the dynasty’s power, wealth, and prestige. Several artistic depictions highlight the close personal ties that he maintained with his relatives throughout his life. Nurtured from a young age, these bonds of affection and mutual respect were vital threads in the Habsburg social fabric, underpinning an extensive familial network that provided the basis for collaboration and diplomatic confidence between nations. Given the importance of the family’s network for ensuring their political preeminence, the physical reproduction of legitimate offspring was naturally a top priority. Charles V understood that inherent in the birth of each new child was the promise of political stability, diplomatic clout, and dynastic glory. It was thus necessary to ensure that fruitful unions were arranged and the prerogatives of future generations safeguarded from encroachment by political rivals.

⁶³ AHN, Est., leg. 2876, exp. 9, fol. 7v. [“...proveydos de ducados con cada dos senorios y bienes ygualmente como los otros hijos de primer matrimonio del dicho señor Rey [Francis].”]

⁶⁴ Ibid. [“...abra cada una dellas lo que se suele dar a las Hijas de los Reyes de Francia.”]

⁶⁵ CC, p. 212.



Carlos I de España y Fernando I de Austria, Christoffel Bockstorffer, unknown
BNE, IH/1709/9, Madrid

To this end, Charles V demonstrated an unapologetic determination to extend Habsburg territorial authority and solidify his interests through a calculated oversight of Europe's marriage market. This approach to alliance building was highly impersonal, and could bring Charles V into conflict with foreign allies and family members as he prioritized his dynastic ambitions over diplomatic promises and/or personal feelings of affection. Take for instance, his decision to marry Isabel of Portugal in 1525 despite having sworn on an earlier occasion to marry his niece, Mary Tudor.⁶⁶ The union alleviated the empire's financial strains and strengthened political ties on the Iberian Peninsula, but greatly strained relations with the monarchy of Henry VIII by intensifying the perception of the emperor as disingenuous and insincere.⁶⁷ On a different occasion in 1533, Charles V's dynastic machinations came under direct criticism from his sister Mary of Hungary, who sharply disagreed with his plan to wed his twelve year old niece, Christina of Denmark to the much older Duke of Milan, Francesco II Sforza. On the unscrupulous match, Mary proclaimed;

“It is against nature and God's law to marry off a little girl who cannot yet in any sense be called a woman, and to expose her, herself a child, to all the dangers of the child-bed. I pray you will excuse me, but my conscience and my love toward my niece prompt me to speak plainly.”⁶⁸

The criticism leveled by Mary as a result of her niece's fragile age was well-founded, considering that prospective marriages involving young children were customarily postponed until they reached adulthood. Nevertheless, for Charles V, the promise of bolstering his personal

⁶⁶ For a copy of the letter sent by Charles V to Henry VIII explaining his decision for breaking off the marriage see Tremayne, *The First Governness*, pp. 221-224. For more on Empress Isabel of Portugal see María José Rubio, *Reinas de España Las Austrias*, (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, S.L., 2010), pp. 65-108; Manuel Ríos Mazcarelle, *Reinas de España: Casa de Austria*, (Madrid: Alderababán Ediciones, 1998), pp. 97-121; Jorge Sebastián Lozano, “Choices and Consequences: The Construction of Isabel de Portugal's Image,” *Queenship and Political Power in Medieval and Early Modern Spain*, ed. Theresa Earenfight, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 145-162.

⁶⁷ CSP Sp., VIII—Part I, p. 463. In France, Louise of Savoy attempted to use the negative fallout from Charles V's marriage to her advantage; “She (The Regent) alleged many reasons why his Imperial Majesty ought to secure the French King's friendship... secondly from fear of the English, whose King could not fail to take in bad part the rupture of the marriage with the Princess, his daughter.”

⁶⁸ Quote extracted from Brandi, *Emperor Charles V*, p. 343.

authority in northern Italy far outweighed the risk posed to the young girl. He arranged for the marriage to be celebrated by proxy two months before Christina's thirteenth birthday.

While the emperor might have been able to justify some of his more controversial decisions by claiming that he was reinforcing bonds with strategic allies, he could make no such claim in the case of Eleanor's marriage. There was no historical precedent for a royal union with the elder branch of the Valois, no authoritative tradition for the preparation of a binding agreement, and no reason for Charles V to trust the French to honor their contractual obligations. This latter point was raised explicitly by the empire's influential High Chancellor, Mercurino de Gattinara.⁶⁹ The most vehement objector to dynastic rapprochement with France, Gattinara warned against entrusting a royal Habsburg queen to an enemy who clearly aspired to the ruin of Charles V and his brother Ferdinand.⁷⁰ He feared that sending Eleanor to France would allow Francis to more easily undermine Habsburg interests in Europe, and maybe even advance a rival claim to the succession of the empire. Indeed, with Eleanor by his side, there was nothing to stop Francis from going so far as to make direct attempts on the lives of both Charles V and his brother in order to clear his path to universal monarchy. On January 14, 1526, in a last act of defiance against an agreement that he believed was unenforceable, Gattinara refused to affix the imperial seals to the Treaty of Madrid—a futile gesture that ultimately did little more than drive a deeper wedge between him and the emperor.⁷¹

Gattinara's condemnation of Eleanor's marriage stands out as an early articulation of the enduring doubts and fears that accompanied Habsburg bids to establish a lasting dynastic tradition with France. These were negative sentiments which became more pronounced over time, compounded by the repeated failure of royal marriages to realize the promise of perpetual peace. In 1526, though, few political figures were ready to explicitly challenge the underlying premises and assumptions which orientated policy and legitimized the perpetuation of powerful familial networks. This would only come at the end of the end of the 16th century when the increasing prevalence of reason of state thinking invited Spanish officials to reexamine the political logic that underpin their approach to interstate diplomacy, and dictated their employment of the monarchy's limited dynastic potential. In the meantime, Gattinara was alone in openly insisting that intense feelings of hatred and a lack of diplomatic confidence were grounds for precluding the incorporation of a marriage alliance into the final peace agreement.

Instead, the majority of influential figures involved in the procurement of Eleanor's marriage maintained the illusion, enshrined in the Treaty of Madrid, that the royal union was capable of engendering peace. In February 1526, Charles V travelled to Madrid to meet with Francis for the first time since his capture. In a letter sent to Louise of Savoy, the emperor

⁶⁹ For more on Mercurino de Gattinara and the impact that his idea of universal empire had on Charles V see Rebecca Ard Boone, *Mercurino di Gattinara and the Creation of the Spanish Empire*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2016); John M. Headley, *The Emperor and his Chancellor: A Study of the Imperial Chancellery under Gattinara*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

⁷⁰ Boone, *Mercurino di Gattinara*, p. 108.

⁷¹ Headley, *The Emperor*, pp. 55-57; Manuel Rivero Rodríguez, *La monarquía de los Austrias: Historia del imperio español*, (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2017), p. 68. According to Headley, Gattinara, as a native Italian, wanted the emperor to forge closer ties with the Italians at the expense of the French. He also wanted Charles V to not push for possession of Milan, and to instead focus on Burgundy. For Rivero Rodríguez, Gattinara's opposition was rooted in his stubborn conviction that only one dynasty could reign in Europe; "la reconciliación era imposible dado que la supervivencia de una casa requería la sumisión de la otra."

described a pleasant encounter in which Francis made professions of love and friendship.⁷² Afterward, they spoke for a time, not about the terms of the treaty or the issue of Burgundy, but Eleanor's travel arrangements. Francis expressed his eager desire to see his new bride and requested that she be allowed to return with him immediately to France.⁷³ Initially, the desire to expedite Eleanor's trip had been communicated by Louise of Savoy, an enthusiastic proponent of the royal union who, according to the imperial ambassador in Paris, appeared to genuinely believe that it would reconcile the two monarchies.⁷⁴ In focusing on Eleanor and echoing his mother's request, Francis likely intended to create the impression that he too was sincerely committed to the union. The ploy was only partially successful. Charles V agreed to let the two meet before Francis' departure, but insisted that she travel four to five days behind him and only be delivered once hostages had been exchanged.⁷⁵

As it turned out, Francis had no intention of waiting for his Habsburg bride. Charles V would later learn that, in the weeks before his release, Francis secretly protested the Treaty of Madrid in the presence of close confidants.⁷⁶ Claiming that the injurious agreement had been forced upon him at a moment of vulnerability in which he had been deprived of his sovereign powers, he exonerated himself from the discharge of his contractual obligations, including his marriage to Eleanor. An account of Francis' release reveals the extent to which feelings of mistrust and suspicion persisted in direct contradiction to public professions of love and friendship;

“The French king leaped out of the barke into his boat with such swiftness that his permutation was thought to be done at one selfe instant, and then the King being brought to shore mounted suddenly (as though he had feared some ambush) upon a Turkish horse of wonderful swiftness, which was prepared for the purpose, and runne without stay to St. John de Lus.”⁷⁷

Eleanor, the devout queen who had been led to believe that her new husband's desire to marry was sincere, was the first to be affected by Francis' rapid departure. For several weeks, she waited futilely in Vitoria, a town near the French border, before the realization set in that Francis had no intention of summoning her.

Upon learning of his sister's abandonment in Vitoria, Charles V sent an emissary to urge Francis to act honorably and ratify the treaty. The official chosen for the mission was the emperor's viceroy in Naples, Charles de Lannoy. As the principal architect of the Treaty of Madrid, Lannoy had actively pushed for the settlement of a royal union, going so far as to make private overtures to Eleanor to heighten her interest and garner her support.⁷⁸ Realizing that his great diplomatic accomplishment was on the brink of unraveling, he departed Vitoria, where he

⁷² CC, pp. 216-217.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 214.

⁷⁴ CSP Sp., VIII—Part I, p. 562. As seen in Anderson, *The Origins*, p. 96, faith in Louise's sincerity may have been ill-placed. During her son's imprisonment, she appears to have made efforts to stir up opposition to Charles V in Italy. She also sent an ambassador to the Ottoman court to request support against the emperor.

⁷⁵ CC., pp. 217-218.

⁷⁶ Knecht, *Francis I*, p. 185.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 221. The account of Francis' release was provided by Francesco Guicciardini in his *Storia d'Italia*, perhaps the most insightful history of Italian politics from 1490-1534.

⁷⁸ Brandi, *Emperor Charles V*, p. 235.

had been accompanying the queen, for the French court in Cognac.⁷⁹ The mission failed miserably. Lannoy and Praet, the imperial ambassador, reminded Francis of his commitments to both Eleanor and Charles V, but failed to persuade him to publish the treaty.⁸⁰ To the contrary, their mission convinced Francis of the need to take decisive measures to force Charles V to renegotiate his asymmetrical peace.⁸¹

On May 23, 1526, France formally entered into an alliance, known as the League of Cognac, with Venice, Milan, Florence, and the Papacy.⁸² Ostensibly formed to maintain peace in Christendom and oppose the Ottomans, the League's true aim was to combine the collective military power of its members to reverse imperial gains after Pavia.⁸³ Initially, Francis emerged as an enthusiastic supporter of the League, promising to contribute troops to the fight in the south and to open a second front in Flanders to alleviate pressure on the Italian city-states. Emboldened by the promise of French support, the League initiated military operations in Lombardy in hopes of attaining a quick victory and driving Charles V's small, poorly financed forces out of the region.⁸⁴ The decision to renew conflict with the emperor turned out to be a serious mistake. As Italian members of the League realized, Francis did not intend to embroil his monarchy in another conflict so soon after his release. They were left to fight alone, several among them suspecting that Francis had intentionally misled them into fighting in order to put pressure on the Charles V and improve his negotiating position.⁸⁵

In addition to instigating conflict in Italy, the manipulation of the marriage market also played a major part in the French strategy for challenging Habsburg hegemony and forcing Charles V to soften the terms of peace. Shortly after Francis' release, negotiations began for a union between Francis and Mary Tudor.⁸⁶ As part of the match, Francis sought English aid in procuring the release of his sons and a pledge to provide troops should he invade Flanders. The English monarch, Henry VIII, was happy to oblige.⁸⁷ An ally of Charles V during his initial

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 239.

⁸⁰ Ochoa Brun, *Historia*, p. 163. During their meeting, Francis offered Lannoy rewards and territories in an effort to make up for his broken word and win him over, but was flatly refused. Francis also communicated a willingness to accept the clauses that he found agreeable. In place of surrendering Burgundy, he offered to pay a ransom. For reference to the ransom see Knecht, *Francis I*, p. 207.

⁸¹ Mandell Creighton, *A History of The Papacy during the Period of the Reformation: Vol. V The German Revolt 1517-1527*, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1894), p. 269.

⁸² CSP Venice, Vol. III, p. 557. England was not an official signatory of the league, but members of the league clearly viewed Henry VIII as an ally and hoped that he would join them in their struggle against the emperor. According to the document prepared at Cognac, "an honorable place [was] to be reserved in the league for the King of England."

⁸³ See Headley, "The Imperial Propaganda Campaign of 1526-1527," *The Emperor*, pp. 86-113. Following the formation of the league, Pope Clement VII wrote two papal briefs justifying the resumption of war in Italy against imperial forces and criticizing the emperor for the conduct of his representatives. Around this time Francis also published and sent to the princes of Germany and Italy his own royal *Apology*; a text intended to demonstrate the discriminatory nature of the Treaty of Madrid and justify his failure to fulfill the agreed upon terms. In response, Headley shows, Gattinara launched an imperial propaganda campaign of his own, challenging the claims and arguments made by the Pope and Francis in his book *Pro Divo Carolo*. For Gattinara, Francis' failure to fulfill his contractual obligations constituted an unforgivable violation of good faith.

⁸⁴ Judith Hook, *The Sack of Rome, 1527*, (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan London Limited, 1972), p. 78.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 84; Knecht, *Francis I*, p. 211.

⁸⁶ Anna Whitelock, *Mary Tudor: England's First Queen*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2009), pp. 36-38.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 37. In his initial proposal, Henry VIII offered to relinquish his claim to France and join the League of Cognac in return for a pension, control over Boulogne, and, most importantly, the wedding of Mary to Francis.

conflict with France, he had grown wary of imperial gains and distrustful of the emperor's political intentions—feelings that had been intensified by his Lord Chancellor, Cardinal Wolsey, a vocal critic of the Habsburgs and a strong supporter of dynastic rapprochement with the Valois.⁸⁸

Back in Spain, reports of a possible Anglo-French marriage alliance naturally aroused Charles V's attention. On May 30th, he wrote his imperial ambassador in London, Íñigo de Mendoza, commanding that he take immediate action to disrupt the negotiations. Among other things, Charles V hoped that an appeal to historical ties of friendship and alliance, as well as a defamation of the French monarchy, would be enough to dissuade Henry VIII and Wolsey from shifting their allegiance. With regard to the agreement, the emperor wrote;

“You must represent to the King and Legate how strange it would appear in the eyes of all impassionate men if, after the King of France has so flagrantly broken faith with us, and so badly requited us for our kindness to him, His most Serene Highness the King of England show no, as the most Christian Prince that he is, favour and support him of France in his unjust cause... Indeed, should the King of England act thus, knowing, as he does, from experience the artful designs of the French nothing else could ensue but renewed wars and dissensions, and the kindling of a fiercer flame than ever there was throughout Christendom, to the great offence of God.”⁸⁹

In emphasizing the “the artful designs of the French,” Charles V reinforced the widely held perception, previously expressed by Gattinara, that Francis was an unscrupulous opportunist motivated by self-interest. This negative opinion was already firmly entrenched in England, where only one year prior a widely circulated memorandum, titled the *Vindication of the English*, had been drafted with the support of the English monarchy describing Francis as a ruler “ambitious of territorial aggrandisement” apt to rule Italy “partly from fear, partly by stratagems and deceit.”⁹⁰ With the majority of the population still highly suspicious of the Valois ruler, the public response in England to rumors that Francis might marry the royal princess was critical and angry—so much so that Wolsey was compelled to stage a public rejection of the French offer on account of Mary being only ten years old.⁹¹

Notwithstanding local protests in England, imperial attempts to disrupt the marriage by appealing to feelings of historical solidarity and perpetuating mistrust of France were largely unsuccessful. Negotiations between Francis and Henry proceeded through the year, culminating in a French legation comprised of the Bishop of Tarbes, the Viscount of Turenne, and the President of Paris traveling to England in February 1527 to finalize the agreement.⁹² A few months later, on April 30, an agreement stating that Mary would marry either Francis or, in the case of complications, his second son Henry, the Duke of Orleans, was signed.⁹³ Moreover, a

⁸⁸ CSP Sp., Vol. III—Part II, p. 191.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 223.

⁹⁰ Ibid., Vol. III—Part I, p. 68

⁹¹ Ibid., Vol. III—Part II, p. 178. For a reference to the very different mood that prevailed in France see Ibid., p. 173. “It is held as certain that no agreement will be made in Spain, and that Princess Mary of England will be married to the Most Christian King.”

⁹² Ibid., Vol. III—Part I, p. 109.

⁹³ Ibid., Vol. III—Part II, pp. 171-172; CSP Venice, Vol. IV, p. 57.

pledge was made by Henry VIII to commit troops to fight against Charles V if he did not provide France with better terms. For two weeks, to celebrate the auspicious occasion, festivities were held in which Henry VIII and the French legation drank to perpetual peace.⁹⁴

Although he had taken steps to disrupt their marriage negotiations, Charles V hardly appeared bothered by news of Anglo-French rapprochement. Residing in Spain with his beloved wife Isabel, he focused much of his attention on fulfilling his political obligation to produce an heir and enhancing his image as an imperial Renaissance prince.⁹⁵ On May 21 1527, the same year that construction began on a new imperial palace in Granada, Isabel gave birth to Philip II, thereby ensuring dynastic stability and continuity. For the briefest of moments, the emperor had reason to celebrate. Only news of the sack of Rome by imperial troops in early May was enough to shatter this period of tranquility and rattle Charles V's composure, forcing him to focus his energies on conducting his political affairs and protecting his international reputation.⁹⁶

Charles V's lack of concern regarding the April 30th marriage treaty may have been influenced by the perceived unlikelihood that the agreement would come to fruition. In formal diplomatic exchanges, the French and English often professed their sincere commitment to the union. In one meeting with the English ambassador, for instance, Francis lauded his bride-to-be, proclaiming, "I have as great a mind to her [Mary] as ever I had to any woman."⁹⁷ When it came to actually authorizing the marriage in a formal ceremony, however, neither Francis or Henry VIII appeared to be in any rush. According to the French ambassador, due to her physical immaturity, Mary was at least three years away from being physically mature enough to wed. Henry VIII agreed with the assessment, rejecting a plan proposed by Louise of Savoy that would have required Mary to travel to France to marry Francis as early as August 1527.⁹⁸

In the imperial court, a lack of urgency to consecrate Mary's union corroborated existing suspicions about French and English commitment to the match. The imperial ambassador Mendoza was the first to speculate that the entire project was a ploy designed to intimidate Charles V into accepting new terms lest he find his dynastic designs derailed.⁹⁹ In order to disrupt French and English scheming, he recommended that they devise a stratagem of their own involving a spurious marriage offer to Scotland.¹⁰⁰ As Mendoza explained, Henry VIII was just as skeptical as his discontented subjects about the alliance, and still secretly favored wedding Mary to King James V. Accordingly, if Charles V were to initiate discussions for a union

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 60. The Venetian secretary in London, Gasparo Spinelli, provided a thorough account of the celebration to his brother. On the entrance of Mary, Spinelli wrote "They descended gracefully from their seats to the sound of trumpets, the first of them being the Princess... Her beauty in this array produced such effect on everybody that all the other marvellous sights previously witnessed were forgotten, and they gave themselves up solely to contemplation of so fair an angel."

⁹⁵ Kleinschmidt, *Charles V*, p. 109. For more on Charles V's pleasant stay in Granada during this period see Vilar Sánchez, *1526 Boda y luna de miel*, pp. 51-86.

⁹⁶ Ochoa Brun, *Historia*, p. 184. News of the sack reached Charles V in Spain on June 17, at which time he immediately cancelled planned celebrations for Philip's birth. The sack of Rome is recognized by many historians, including Rivero Rodríguez, as an event that sparked "un cambio radical para el Imperio de Carlos V tanto en su estructura como en sus presupuestos ideológicos y su futuro en el corto y largo plazo." See Rivero Rodríguez, *La monarquía*, p. 69.

⁹⁷ Whitelock, *Mary Tudor*, p. 37.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 37.

⁹⁹ CSP Sp., Vol. III—Part II, p. 187.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 192.

between James and his sister, Mary of Hungary, the English would have no choice but to abandon their French treaty.¹⁰¹ Mendoza's advice was taken seriously by Charles V, who understood that an effective dynastic policy was as much about exploiting the possibility of certain marriages to placate rival monarchies, impede their plans, and exert diplomatic pressure as it was about finalizing advantageous alliances. A short time later, he made contact with the Scottish monarchy to discuss a marriage alliance. Imperial officials pursued these negotiations through the rest of the 1520s, maintaining the threat of diplomatic alignment with the Stewarts to divert Henry VIII's attention north.

A further reason for Charles V to downplay the threat posed by the Anglo-French alliance was the tenuous legal basis on which Francis repudiated his marriage with Eleanor. Before he could enter into a new union with Mary, Francis had to account for the fact that on January 20, 1526, while still a prisoner in Spain, he was officially betrothed in a marriage by proxy ceremony held in his prison cell. Regardless of the circumstances, Francis' participation in this ceremony constituted a solemn commitment before God to enter into the union in good faith—a commitment that could not be violated without assaulting the sacrament of holy matrimony and breaching canon law. On the French attempt to challenge the legitimacy of the union and absolve Francis of the legal consequences of taking on a new bride, the imperial ambassador in London, Íñigo de Mendoza, wrote;

“These ambassadors from France have been trying ever since their arrival to obtain by every possible means the promise of marriage between the Princess and their King, offering more than they either can or intend to fulfill when the times comes, and alleging that the betrothal of the King and Queen of France [Eleanor] is null and void, as no dispensation was obtained, both being, as the say within the fourth degree of consanguinity.”¹⁰²

The ecclesiastical law stipulating legal degrees of consanguinity had its roots in the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, when church officials firmly established the “forbidden degrees” at four.¹⁰³ From that point onward, obtaining special permission from the Pope, in the form of a dispensation, to circumvent this law became standard practice in marriages between Europe's closely related dynasties. The law was less clear, however, regarding whether or not the lack of dispensation was immediate grounds for repudiating a marriage that had already been celebrated—ambiguity which cast doubt over the legality of Francis' plan to wed the English princess.¹⁰⁴

The central figure in determining the legitimacy of Eleanor's status as the lawful queen of France was Pope Clement VII. Similar to England, the papacy had initially allied with the Habsburgs in their fight against the French, but had grown uneasy after imperial military success decisively shifted the balance of power in Charles V's favor. Shortly after Francis' release in March 1526, Clement VII switched sides in the struggle for Italian preeminence, throwing his

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 178.

¹⁰³ Constance Brittain Bouchard, *Those of My Blood: Creating Noble Families in Medieval Francia*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), p. 40.

¹⁰⁴ For documents pertaining to the acquisition of a papal dispensation in 1530 see AGS, Est., leg. K-1641, D4, fols. 2-4.

support behind the military operations of the League of Cognac.¹⁰⁵ As an ally of France, Clement VII absolved Francis of his prior oath to Charles V and supported his interpretation of canon law regarding his union with Eleanor, claiming that the match with Mary was not only legal, but a holy union, or *sancta conjunctio*.¹⁰⁶ This support, so crucial for legitimizing French dynastic policy vis-à-vis England, lasted through the signing of the April 30th agreement, before coming to a sudden and disruptive end with the capture of Clement VII during the sack of Rome.¹⁰⁷ With the papacy now firmly under imperial control, Clement VII had no choice but to alter his position with regard to Eleanor's marriage and advocate alignments favorable to Charles V.

Remarkably, even during this period of renewed dynastic competition, the imperial court never wavered in its insistence that Eleanor's marriage to Francis was legitimate. In official correspondences and exchanges after 1526, Eleanor was referred to as the Queen of France—a title with no formal authority as long as the French monarchy refused to acknowledge it, but which nevertheless enhanced Eleanor's informal influence and reputation. Residing in Spain during this uncertain time in her life, Eleanor played an invaluable role in reinforcing familial ties through her personal relationships with Charles V and other family members, serving, for instance, as the godmother for Philip II during his baptism in Valladolid in June 2.¹⁰⁸ As part of her duties as the nominal Queen of France, she also aided her brother's political initiatives; serving as his representative, defending his interests, and exercising prerogative powers on his behalf. The clearest example of this could be seen in March 1568 when, after learning that France and England had declared war on him, Charles V elected to “take with him the Queen of France (Eleanor), so as to represent his person and authority at the said [Aragonese] Cortes, that he may soon return here, and attend to the business of war.”¹⁰⁹ In engaging with the Cortes, a representative body whose monetary backing was vital for the imperial war effort, Eleanor was directly contributing to the fight against her alleged husband—a conflict of interest that reveals the extent to which the loyalties of royal women were complicated by their status as daughters, sisters, wives, and mothers. In the Habsburg Empire, where Charles V relied heavily on female relatives to govern and manage domestic affairs during times of conflict, Eleanor's status as Queen of France was an important source of prestige, but it did not supersede her duty to defend the interests of her house.

Insisting that Eleanor was Francis' lawful bride did not come without financial risk. During the period in which she resided in Spain, Eleanor accrued considerable debts maintaining a household befitting her social status as the Queen of France. Somewhat perplexed by Eleanor's lifestyle, Martin de Salinas, the ambassador to Archduke Ferdinand, observed that “whether it be on account of the title she bears, or in the hope that her marriage will take place, certain it is that she has kept up a larger household and spent more money than was needed.”¹¹⁰ This behavior

¹⁰⁵ Vilar Sanchez, *1526 Boda y luna de miel*, p. 131. Given his longstanding support for the Pope, Charles V took Clement VII's betrayal hard. For more on Charles V's relationship with Pope Clement VII see Hook, *The Sack of Rome*, pp. 36-48.

¹⁰⁶ Whitelock, *Mary Tudor*, p. 37.

¹⁰⁷ Hook, *The Sack of Rome*, pp. 156-191; Kenneth Gouwens, “Discourses of Vulnerability: Pietro Alcionio's Orations on the Sack of Rome,” *Renaissance Quarterly* 50, No. 1, (Spring, 1997), pp. 38-77; E.R. Chamberlin, *The Sack of Rome*, (London: Batsford, 1979). For a contemporary account of the events that culminated in the sack see Luigi Guicciardini, *The Sack of Rome*, trans. & ed. James H. McGregor, (New York: Italica Press Inc., 1993).

¹⁰⁸ CSP Sp., Vol. III— Part II, p. 220.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 627.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 661.

was implicitly, if not explicitly, encouraged by the emperor who provided Eleanor with advancements on her marriage portion—the total amount of capital and/or goods allotted a woman when entering a marriage—to pay her expenses. On the arrangement, Salinas wrote;

“she has contracted considerable debts and has now applied to the Emperor to advance her part of her marriage portion, amounting to 200,000 ducats. His Imperial Majesty has agreed to pay her 12,000 doubloons (*doblas*) for her annual maintenance as the interest (*juro*) of one half of her dower. The remaining 100,000 ducats to be paid to her by instalments in six years time.”¹¹¹

More than anything else, the emperor’s readiness to invest considerable sums with no guarantee that the French would honor the marriage demonstrates his staunch commitment to the match even in the wake of Francis’ betrayal of the terms of peace and search for a new bride. No doubt, Charles V harbored ill feelings toward Francis for the breaking of his oaths, but he was willing to suppress them if it meant seating his sister on the French throne.¹¹²

A Bid for Lasting Peace

The imperial response to the failure of the Treaty of Madrid conveys the resilience of dynastic politics, as a distinct mode of foreign policy, to engender peace and facilitate interstate relations in a volatile international context. When necessary, controversial marriage alliances could be procured *in spite* of a conspicuous absence of trust, affection, and respect between the negotiating parties.¹¹³ In the context of negotiations for Eleanor’s hand, Charles V had no precedent to guide or inspire him, and no reason to anticipate French adherence to the terms of peace. To the contrary, the unfolding of events after 1526 validated the criticisms leveled by Gattinara against the royal union. Just as he had anticipated, Francis acted treacherously in direct violation of the terms of peace—the second time in thirty years that a French monarch had renounced a treaty and rescinded his promise to marry a Habsburg bride.¹¹⁴ Even still, Charles V never questioned his decision to entrust his rival with the life of his sister.

In part, the resilience of dynastic politics rested on a particular outlook that upheld sanctity of contract. In the 16th century, as the scale and complexity of warfare increased, early modern statesmen and thinkers began focusing more attention on the problem posed by the lack of legal mechanisms to ensure compliance with international treaties. Among them was Machiavelli, whose claim that agreements only had binding power insofar as they served a

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Iongh, *Margaret of Austria*, p. 24. During his personal meeting with Francis in 1526, Charles V is said to have stated, “I would hold you for craven and wicked if you failed the faith I have in you.”

¹¹³ See CSP Sp., Vol. III— Part II, p. 181. A lack of trust was a conspicuous feature of imperial diplomacy with both England and France. In a letter to Charles V written on May 9, 1527, for instance, Mendoza confessed that “he does not trust the legate [Wolsey] one whit more than the King of France; the Legate deals just as craftily with him as the adverse party would, so that he is always obliged to be on his guard.” The emperor’s mistrust was also recognized by Martin de Salinas: “An ambassador from England is expected and another from France. They come, it is said, to make certain proposals for the cessation of hostilities, but there is no believing their words, and though His Imperial Majesty [Charles V] is as desirous as ever for peace, he is not likely to trust them.” Ibid., p. 220.

¹¹⁴ Jansen, *The Monstrous Regiment*, p. 84. As a young girl, Margaret of Austria had been engaged to the French prince, Charles VIII, as part of the 1482 Treaty of Arras. For the next several years, until the French monarchy renounced the treaty in 1491, she lived in the French court where she was prepared for her role as the future queen. With her marriage no longer recognized, she was cast out of the court in 1493.

prince's interests challenged the notion that "moral obligation," extending from a set of common moral values based on shared religious faith, was sufficient to guarantee political accountability in an international community of Christian kingdoms.¹¹⁵ Though the self-serving conduct of Renaissance princes provided more than enough evidence to support this amoral political realism, it took nearly a century before reason of state theorists, such as Justus Lipsius, made Machiavellian principles palatable in Spain.¹¹⁶ In the meantime, Charles V and his officials adhered to the premise that diplomatic agreements couched in religious language had an inherent power to obligate signatories, bound together in a culture of chivalry and honor, to fulfill their contractual obligations so long as the agreed upon terms were strictly followed.¹¹⁷

With respect to Eleanor's controversial marriage, strict compliance with each provision was particularly important for maintaining the sanctity of the written agreement. One of the earliest French attempts to deviate from the Treaty of Madrid came in early 1526 when the Queen mother Louise made an urgent request that Eleanor, in direct contradiction to the carefully laid out plans concerning her exchange, be delivered to Bayonne to be married as quickly as possible.¹¹⁸ The request, though seemingly innocuous, was met with immediate resistance by the imperial ambassador in France, Sieur de Praet, whose deferential but unequivocal recommendation to the emperor read, "notwithstanding that she (Louise) is dealing therein sincerely and openly as I believe, yet, according to my good judgement, it will be safer to adhere strictly to the forms of the treaty."¹¹⁹ Aware that even the slightest deviation might compromise imperial interests and/or later provide grounds for challenging the treaty, Praet remained ever vigilant in his engagement with French officials, treating even the input of respected allies with suspicion. In Spain, Charles V actively encouraged this vigilance and suspicion, sending explicit orders to memorize critical parts of the treaty and take extra precautions to prevent deception.¹²⁰ The exchange of Eleanor for hostages was a particularly sensitive point, with Charles V cautioning Praet to;

"...take especial notice of, and be regardful of the persons of the three children of France, that you make yourself acquainted with the visage, physiognomy, and size and person of each, that when it comes to the delivering of them over according to the treaty, there may be no trickery in substituting one person for another..."¹²¹

Charles V's treatment of the hostage exchange exposes the deep distrust that motivated efforts to enforce strict adherence to contractual obligations. He anticipated French schemes and artifices — notwithstanding Louise's promise that "neither the king nor herself will fail to observe even

¹¹⁵ Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, eds. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

¹¹⁶ For more on this see William Sachs Goldman, "The Political Culture of Empire: The Spanish Council of State and Foreign Policy under Philip III, 1598-1621," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2009).

¹¹⁷ Maltby, *Charles V*, p. 35. On Charles V's earlier acceptance of the Treaty of Madrid, Maltby writes that he "seems to have accepted the lack of guarantees out of chivalric regard for a gentleman's word and because his confessor advised it..." Rivero Rodríguez makes a similar observation about Lannoy, the main proponent of the treaty in the imperial camp; "...Lannoy creía ciegamente en las leyes de caballería y que el soberano francés era sincero al empeñar su honor en el cumplimiento de la palabra dada." See Rivero Rodríguez, *La monarquía*, p. 68.

¹¹⁸ CC, p. 199-200; CSP, Vol. III—Part I, p. 562.

¹¹⁹ CC, p. 201.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 209-210.

the minutest point contained in the treaty”— and took careful precautions to avoid being deceived.¹²²

In addition to enforcing strict adherence to stipulated terms, close and careful scrutiny of the actual marriage documents was also essential to minimize and avoid potential complications. Although Anglo-French negotiations and the declaration of war in 1528 briefly interrupted imperial diplomatic activity in France, the resumption of peace talks one year later quickly brought the issue of authorizing Eleanor’s marriage back to political forefront. Still responsible for holding the French accountable, Praet painstakingly poured over each and every document concerning the union in search of irregularities and discrepancies in the language that might pose problems if left unaddressed. One letter written on March 30, 1529 to the President of Burgundy reveals the kind of issues that might arise. Looking first at the bonds (*seguridades*) stipulated in the case of a marriage dissolution, Praet complained that a promise made by Francis to substitute, if necessary, his own estates with those of the Dauphin had been omitted entirely.¹²³ Second, regarding the receipts (*quitanza*) and assignments of Eleanor’s dowry, he took up issue with unapproved edits to the documents whereby “in lieu of this sentence ‘the said king promises never to aggravate, quarrel or demand anything whatever,’ as the minute bears, the word ‘to demand’ (*demandar*) is erased and instead of it two lines are introduced...”¹²⁴ Finally, and maybe most critically, the date recorded on the letters of security for the exhibition of dowry receipts, totaling 400,000 crowns, was incorrect. Praet did not address this discrepancy in his meeting with the Grand Master of France and royal advisors on the King’s Privy Council, but according to his letter, it was potentially so serious “it may be doubted whether a false statement of this kind would not in after times invalidate the Papal bull itself.”¹²⁵

Once identified, the process of resolving discrepancies in the legal documents was tedious and imperfect. The contracting parties could be petty, manifesting their feelings of mistrust and ill-will in stubborn disagreements over minor details where neither side was willing to back down. In some instances, disagreements escalated into major points of contention that prolonged negotiations unnecessarily and required some sort of compromise to resolve. Naturally, given the lack of an authoritative Habsburg-Valois dynastic tradition and contractual precedents to consult, negotiations surrounding Eleanor’s marriage were especially prone to these kinds of delays. After meeting with Praet in March 1530, French councilors directly contradicted his assertion that the specified discrepancies constituted serious deviations from the agreed upon terms. In challenging Praet’s first point, they pointed out that it was too late to make any changes as the Estates General had already ratified the previous treaties, which moreover did not stipulate that Francis need take additional action. The second point regarding the erasure of a key word was even less serious, with the French insisting “the word *demandar* was of no consequence at all, because the other two verbs [included in the document], ‘aggravar y querellar’ meant one and the same thing.”¹²⁶ Unconvinced by their explanation, Praet pushed back in turn with biting criticism of French diplomatic refinement; “it argues little respect for a princess who is to be their queen, when the King’s principle secretary cannot transcribe a

¹²² Ibid., p. 202.

¹²³ CSP Sp., Vol. IV—Part I, p. 487.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p.488.

document of such importance without making mistakes of that kind and erasing words.”¹²⁷ As the tangible records which would be used to resolve future misunderstandings and provide a framework for further interdynastic collaboration, the written marriage documents needed to be perfect. Anything less— whether it be a misrepresentation of a minor point or a scratched out word— was an unacceptable oversight that might threaten the legitimacy of the royal alliance, and pose imminent danger to the honor and glory of the House of Habsburg.

The incredible lengths to which Charles V and Praet went to enforce strict compliance of Eleanor’s marriage agreement belied its inherent susceptibility to manipulation and its ultimate lack of binding force. Written by hand on fragile bits of paper, the documents needed to authorize a marriage were far from the permanent and indelible sources of authority that their signatories claimed them to be. They could be lost, edited, smeared, misinterpreted, shredded, misplaced, or lost entirely— all outcomes that could be used to cast doubt on the validity of an undesirable union. The most brazen example of this sort of intentional manipulation of the written dynastic record occurred in the context of Henry VIII’s concurrent effort to annul his union with Catherine of Aragon, the aunt of Charles V and Queen of England.¹²⁸ As part of the strategy for procuring the annulment, English diplomats were dispatched to Rome to sow doubt about the validity of the 1503 dispensation issued by Pope Julius II for the impediment of affinity. Once there, they hurled accusations at the imperial ambassador, Micer Mai, claiming that the brief of dispensation authorizing Catherine’s union was a forgery produced by Charles V and his officials in Spain in order to insert favorable conditions.¹²⁹ Citing different bits of evidence to support their allegation, they urged Pope Clement VII to sanction the initiation of divorce proceedings.

Resisting the urge to strike back with anger at this blatant insult to the emperor’s honor, Micer Mai, the imperial ambassador, accounted for alterations to the dispensation by citing common diplomatic practices for making amendments.¹³⁰ He also sorted through historical records, which showed that the original papal dispensation had been sent to Madrid during the reign of Isabel of Castile, to account for the absence of the original dispensation and accompanying amendments in Rome. In response to English diplomats asking why they did not have their own copies on file to corroborate imperial accounts, Micer retorted, “who tells us they are not there, but that the English do not choose to look for them?”¹³¹ The resolution of disputes such as this, where both sides accused the other of forgery and/or the intentional withholding of information, was complicated not only by a general lack of trust, but also by an acute appreciation of the fragility of legal documents. Charles V did in fact have the original papal dispensation in his possession in Madrid. He feared, though, that if he did send it to clear the record, there was nothing to stop Henry VIII from simply having the invaluable, irreplaceable papers disappear.

The disagreement that arose in England over Eleanor’s status as the Queen of France provides a further example of the limited capacity of handwritten documents to serve as sources

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ For more on Henry VIII’s first divorce see J.J. Scarisbrick, “The Struggle for the Divorce,” *Henry VIII*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 198-240.

¹²⁹ Ibid., Vol. III—Part II, p. 972.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 973.

¹³¹ Ibid.

of authority. In the aftermath of Francis' release and repudiation of the Treaty of Madrid, Mendoza worked tirelessly to uphold the validity of Eleanor's marriage in the eyes of the English court and dissuade Henry VIII from engaging in further plotting with French officials. The key pieces of evidence introduced by the imperial diplomat to prove that Eleanor was in fact the Queen were two autographed letters in which she was referred to by Francis as his wife and by Louise of Savoy as her daughter. Cardinal Wolsey who had initially doubted the letters' existence entirely, received the physical copies with unabashed skepticism: "the legate [Wolsey] still persisted in his idea that they had been forged, and in proof thereof produced another one [letter] from King Francis to show the difference in handwritings."¹³² In the ensuing showdown, Mendoza and Wolsey closely inspected the two signatures and debated back and forth whether they had been written by the same hand. The exchange remained civil, described by Mendoza as a "warm and long dispute," in which both sides were careful to make their case without giving cause for offense. "I do not mean to imply that the letters are forged" Wolsey declared in one instance of feigned deference and respect, "I merely wish to observe that the King of France uses two different hands, one for writing us in England and the other for addressing the Emperor."¹³³ Not to be outdone by his adversary, Mendoza highlighted Francis' tendency to use different styles and cited a relevant example. When Wolsey admitted that he was aware of this tendency, Mendoza responded sharply "Perhaps not so well... as would be desirable, since Your Reverence seems to be ignorant of the King's usual ways of dealing, and doubts the authenticity of his letter."¹³⁴ Ultimately, such verbal sparring failed to produce a consensus about the authenticity of the letters—a failure that testifies to both the ease with which some critical documents could be challenged and the difficulty of proving their authenticity. Critically, Wolsey did not need to definitively prove that the letters were forged. Simply raising doubts about their origins was enough to undermine the validity of Eleanor's marriage and activate England's anti-imperial dynastic policy.

Not surprisingly, given their apparent limitations, the principles of sanctity of contract and good faith that informed imperial diplomatic conduct did not preclude practical steps being taken to protect the empire. Faced with the very real possibility of betrayal, Charles V bolstered his decision to pursue a marriage alliance with France by remaining vigilant and preparing contingency plans in order to mitigate the adverse impact of a failed peace. Writing to Isabel, his wife and active regent in Spain, near the final conclusion of Eleanor's marriage, Charles V acknowledged the general lack of confidence in the new treaty before giving explicit instructions to prepare for all possible outcomes;

"...with regard to the prevalent suspicions that the King of France will not fulfill what has been capitulated, I have seen and understand, and certainly think that everything has been thoroughly and prudently examined, because a great deal of vigilance, caution, and care must be shown in a matter of such great quality and importance, and steps taken to prevent and prepare for those things which might occur before they happen..."¹³⁵

¹³² Ibid., p. 183.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 184.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ CDC, p.189. "...como de las sospechas que se tienen que el Rey de Francia no cumplirá lo que está capitulado, he visto y entendido, y por cierto que me parece todo muy bien y prudentemente mirado, porque en cosa de tan gran

In wedding his sister, Charles V did sincerely hope to broker a peace settlement and stabilize Western Europe, at least long enough to confront the Ottoman threat in the east.¹³⁶ After 1526, however, he could no longer downplay the evident dangers posed by the lack of international accountability mechanisms. Careful steps needed to be taken, lest the honor and interests of the dynasty be compromised. A subsequent letter sent to Isabel in December 1530 further reveals the nature of the emperor's strategic approach;

“The Peace and affinity with the King of France persists, and I intend to always make a grand demonstration on its behalf; at my hand it is not broken nor will it be broken and as such she must attend to all that which arises there, always making sure that the borders are sufficiently secured, especially with regard the provisioning of the strongholds.”¹³⁷

Continuing to honor and uphold the terms of peace, while at the same time having Isabel reinforce the borders and arm imperial defenses, allowed Charles V to optimize the chances of diplomatic success without compromising imperial security. But, doing so came at a price; laying bare the hypocrisy of an international system held together by promises of perpetual friendship and faith in the redeeming virtues of shared religion.

Shifting away from the papers and records that authorized peace, the contributions made by royal women were another important factor facilitating an unprecedented wedding of the Habsburg and Valois. Women possessed several traits that made them ideal mediators between the warring kings of Europe. For one, they had an inherently gentle and conciliatory attitude well suited for missions of peace. Not bound by rigid codes of honor or glory, they could humble themselves and seek a truce without conveying weakness or feeling shame. As mothers, sisters, wives, and daughters motivated not by a desire for power or riches, but by feelings of personal affection, they could also be trusted to represent the good interests of their house with prudence. In the context of Eleanor's marriage, the active involvement of royal women on both sides emerged as a particularly crucial feature of the negotiations due to the intense feelings of personal animus and mutual disdain felt by Charles V and Francis. Margaret of Austria, the emperor's aunt and regent of the Netherlands, eloquently articulated the urgency of female intervention in a 1529 letter;

“First, that the bitterness of the reproaches written and spoken on either side were such that ill will and hatred were the inevitable consequences. The hostilities also which ensued were so fierce that neither of the two sovereigns could compromise his dignity by being the first to talk of reconciliation, a challenge having been given

calidad y inportancia deve haver mucha vigilancia, aviso y cuydado y prevenyr y proveer a las cosas que podrían suceder antes que acaezcan...”

¹³⁶ For more on the threat posed by the Ottoman Empire to Habsburg interests in Germany and Eastern Europe during this period see David D. Grafton, *Piety, Politics, and Power: Lutherans Encountering Islam in the Middle East*, (Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2009), pp. 39-46.

¹³⁷ CDC, p. 258. “La paz y deudo del Rey de Francia se continua y siempre tengo nuevas de hazer él grand demonstración dello; por my no falta ny faltará y assy lo deve ella hazer en lo que allá se ofreciere, tenyendo siempre cuidado que las fronteras estén con el buen recaudo que conbiene, especialmente lo *que* toca a las provisiones de las fortalezas...” The importance of strictly following the stipulated terms was emphasized in various letters sent to Isabel. For an example, see *Ibid.*, p. 206. “Todavía como otras veces tengo dicho, es mi voluntad que por *nuestra* parte se guarde lo asentado y que no *haya* falta en ello, y así gelo screvimos remitiéndoles la forma y orden see deve tener en la *execusión* y conplimiento dello.”

and accepted for settling the differences and disputes by single combat. On the other hand, how easy for ladies... to make the first advances in such an undertaking! Secondly, that it is only by a mutual forgiveness of all offences, and the total oblivion of the causes of war... that the idea of peace could be entertained. This could not be thought of or proposed by the princes without sacrifice of what they held most precious, their honour; but ladies might well come forward in a measure for submitting the gratification of private hatred and revenge to the far nobler principle of the welfare of nations.”¹³⁸

By shifting the primary responsibility for generating peace to women, Margaret offered a simple yet brilliant solution to the difficult problem of finalizing an unprecedented dynastic union between hated rivals. In the absence of respect and trust, faith in feminine humility, integrity, and sincerity were to bridge the diplomatic divide and provide the foundation of confidence—a development that would have lasting influence on Spanish Habsburg dynastic policy vis-à-vis France and continental rivals for the next two hundred years.

Before Margaret assumed primary responsibility for representing the empire, royal women in France were already playing a central role in brokering a peace. As has already been mentioned, Marguerite of Angoulême first traveled to Spain in late 1525 in order to meet with Charles V face-to-face and soften his demands—a mission that failed but nevertheless demonstrated her aptitude for diplomacy and refined political skills. She also revealed herself to be a brave and loyal agent of dynasty, helping to arrange failed escape plots for Francis.¹³⁹ In France, the task of negotiation fell to Louise of Savoy, who fulfilled her duty with such a degree of intelligence, enthusiasm, and sincerity that Charles V could not help but be impressed. In letters to Louise, the emperor showed considerable respect, adopting a rhetoric of familial affection and deference; “since I have given back a good brother to the King your son, and am offering you the Queen my sister for a daughter, it appears to me that in order not to present you one son only, I should assume the name which I used formerly to give you, and should again address you as my good mother.”¹⁴⁰ More than just a symbolic gesture intended to generate a feeling of familiarity and shared purpose, recognition of Louise as a matriarchal figure came with expectations that she would treat Eleanor as a daughter. Explicitly touching upon this expectation, Charles V wrote “seeing that I do consider you [my mother], I pray you to act as such to the said Queen my sister, as well as toward myself.”¹⁴¹ The identification of a trustworthy, “familial” ally served to address the fears, articulated by Gattinara, that Eleanor’s safety and wellbeing were being endangered by her marriage to Francis. Normally, the responsibility for looking after a Habsburg bride being sent abroad fell on individuals with shared blood and heritage. But, in this instance, where a lack of prior dynastic ties meant that the Habsburgs did not have any strong genetic link to the French court, it was necessary to fabricate these personal relationships, so vital for maintaining dynastic networks.

On the imperial side, though Margaret did not initially contribute to negotiations, by 1528 she was one of the principal architects of a new peace agreement. Louise was the first to reach out to Margaret to gauge her interest in working together to end the pointless conflict between their two sides. The two women had not seen each other for decades, but shared a special bond

¹³⁸ Quote can be found in Tremayne, *The First Governess*, pp. 253-254.

¹³⁹ Mayer, *Louise of Savoy*, p. 213.

¹⁴⁰ CC, p. 216.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

extending back to 1483 when they both arrived at the French court as foreign brides betrothed to Valois princes. For ten years, until 1493, they had lived side by side, even sharing the same governess for a time, before Charles VIII's repudiation of his contractual obligations sent Margaret home in shame.¹⁴² Still trusting her childhood companion, Louise authorized a secret diplomatic mission to transmit her peace proposal to the Netherlands where, unbeknownst to either Charles V or Francis, Margaret worked with the French ambassador to create the framework for a lasting treaty.¹⁴³ As soon as the new articles were agreed upon, copies were drafted and sent out for formal approval, complete with a carefully prepared preamble clarifying why the two women had taken the initiative to work together. Francis did not hesitate to accept the document, but Margaret had a harder time with Charles V who questioned the durability of peace solely generated by the "will of women" (*volonté de femme*).¹⁴⁴ Fortunately, the emperor's hesitancy to move forward with the proposal lasted only briefly, and by May 1528 he had invested his aunt with full authority to represent him at a final meeting set to take place in the French town of Cambrai.¹⁴⁵

In the month leading up to Cambrai, Margaret prepared by clarifying her negotiating instructions and pushing Charles V to further soften some of his harsher demands. A loyal member of the House of Habsburg, she fully intended to utilize her diplomatic skills, which she confidently believed were superior to Louise's, to negotiate an agreement that favored imperial interests. To this end, letters were sent to key players in Italy "for such faithful reports about the state of Italy as may allow us to profit from our late successes in those parts, and conduct the negotiations accordingly."¹⁴⁶ Taking steps to capitalize on late stage military victories to gain the upper hand at the peace conference did not prevent Margaret, however, from also respecting the need to make the agreement palatable to the French court. The decision to omit the Burgundian question entirely, which Charles V finally agreed to do after years of being told that the French would rather die than lose the kingdom, was a start, but alone was not enough to ensure a favorable outcome at Cambrai.

Hoping to improve the odds of success, Margaret wrote Charles V to reconsider his stance on a few critical points. The first regarded the emperor's orders that, in the case of any French objection, he be written to consider the controversial article and make any necessary modifications. As she pointed out, with calculated humility, this order was entirely impractical, threatening to prolong the negotiations unnecessarily and increase the likelihood of another French invasion of Italy.¹⁴⁷ Three additional minor points were raised in the letter that might pose complications, including the requirement that France obligate Venice to surrender captured fortresses, the request that the 1.2 million crown ransom be paid in specie, and the refusal to procure the obligation of King Joao of Portugal as a form of contractual security.¹⁴⁸ By highlighting these potential points of conflict, Margaret not only succeeded in shaping the terms of peace and increasing her own diplomatic powers, but also taking necessary steps to minimize the chances of another failed treaty.

¹⁴² Russell, *Diplomats at Work*, p. 97.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 105-109; Iongh, *Margaret of Austria*, p. 245; Ochoa Brun, *Historia*, p. 199.

¹⁴⁴ Russell, *Diplomats at Work*, p. 109.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 114-115. As a neutral city outside of both the French and Habsburg sphere of power, Cambrai was an ideal location for a peace conference.

¹⁴⁶ CSP Sp., Vol. IV— Part I, p. 38.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 39-40.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

Beginning with the arrival of both parties on July 5 and spanning three intense weeks, the conference at Cambrai put Margaret and Louise's good-intentioned, feminine diplomacy to its sternest test. Residing in adjoining dwellings that opened into each other, they met every day to address the numerous issues dividing their two houses. In order to limit outside interference, no one, neither their counselors nor the foreign representatives that had flocked from England and Italy, were invited to attend their private meetings.¹⁴⁹ Even still, the negotiations were delicate, almost breaking down entirely at different points over stubborn points of disagreement.¹⁵⁰ Only through an open-minded willingness to explore different options and a stubborn determination to affirm the unity of Christendom did they persevere through contentious political differences, finding common ground in the name of lasting accord. The final treaty, a crowning achievement for which Margaret received general admiration, was ratified by both parties in the last weeks of July.¹⁵¹

Because strict secrecy was observed throughout the conference, no record was kept of Margaret and Louise's verbal interactions, including any conversation that they might have had regarding Eleanor's future. If the final treaty capitulations, authorized during a holy mass held in the Cathedral of Notre Dame on August 5th, serve as any indication, though, her union to Francis was a topic of limited debate. Indeed, both women appear to have been in firm agreement about the need to reinforce peace through familial ties. Spanning less than two pages and buried roughly forty pages deep, the section pertaining to the marriage was short and largely insignificant, serving primarily to reaffirm the terms stipulated in the Treaty of Madrid and address some minor points. The first of these dealt with Eleanor's exchange, requiring Francis to send an ambassador as soon as possible after the formal ratification of the treaty "to ratify and approve to the extent that is necessary everything pertaining to the said marriage."¹⁵² Afterward, Eleanor was to be transported to France in the company of the royal hostages, the Dauphin Francis III and Duke of Orleans Henry II, still being held in Spain.¹⁵³ Two alterations to the earlier agreement were also included in the section. One involved a suspension of the clause that specified the inclusion of the earldoms and estates of Macon, Auxerre, and Bar-Sur-Seine in Eleanor's dowry. The other touched upon the stipulated payment plan for the dowry itself, which needed to be redrawn to account for the fact that the previous time table established in 1526 had

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 38. Trying to limit outside interference, especially from England, was a priority from the start; "It must be said, however, that lest the Cardinal [of England] should wish to be present at the conferences, and thereby hinder or prevent in any way the conclusion of the treaty, the King of France and his mother have both expressed a wish that the meeting should take place as early as possible so as to prevent the said Cardinal from attending, which has accordingly been done." In attendance at the conference were "no less than eight cardinals, ten archbishops, three-and-thirty bishops, four princes of the blood, fifteen dukes, and countless nobles and ecclesiastics of lower rank..." See Iongh, *Margaret of Austria*, p. 247. For more on the Italian and English presence at Cambrai see Russell, *Diplomats at Work*, pp. 122-131.

¹⁵⁰ Mayer, *Louise of Savoy*, pp. 270-271; Tremayne, *The First Governess*, p. 262; Knecht, *Francis I*, p. 219.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 262-263. As it turned out, the terms included in the treaty were only slightly less prejudicial toward the French than those agreed upon in 1526. Charles V did withdraw his demand for outright control of Burgundy, but in return received the promise of a two million crown ransom for the French princes, control of Flanders and Artois, Eleanor's marriage and several other favorable concessions. The response to the conference was mixed, with some openly questioning whether it would generate any lasting good will between the Habsburgs and France; "Some think that the meeting of the two ladies will come to nothing." CSP Sp., Vol. IV— Part I, p. 97. Even after the success of the conference, feelings of skepticism remained high; "The peace is variously spoken of here [Piacenza]; some believe that it will hold good; others that it cannot last; others again that it is a hoax (*tromperie*)." Ibid., p. 241. Catherine of Aragon, Queen of England, was among those who doubted the viability of the new peace. CC, p. 286.

¹⁵² AHN, Est., leg. 2876, exp. 10, fol. 23v.

¹⁵³ CDC, p. 206. The exchange would eventually be set to take place in Vitoria, Spain.

expired. Similar to before, Charles V was required to pay the first half of the 200,000 escudos within six months of the treaty being signed, and the other half within six months of the initial payment.¹⁵⁴ In making these alterations, no mention was made of any additional lands which might be substituted in for the benefit of Eleanor's offspring (given that her first son was no longer entitled to Macon, Auxerre, and Bar-Sur-Seine), or of compensation for the dowry money advanced by the emperor to his sister for her living expenses during the period intervening between the two treaties.¹⁵⁵ There also appears to have been no attempt by Margaret to include more securities in the agreement to protect Eleanor, or to further elaborate the clause by which she renounced all claim to the Habsburg inheritance.

The absence of significant changes to the marriage agreement shows that Francis' betrayal ultimately did little to disrupt the forces shaping dynastic policy. An emphasis on political expediency, the expansion of Habsburg influence, and the acquisition of further territories overshadowed concerns about the personal safety of Eleanor or the French monarchy's own territorial ambitions. For the time, it also precluded explicit recognition of the potential long-term consequences of an imprudent union— something that would occur in the 17th century when government officials and legal experts began to worry aloud about the possibility of a French-born claimant to the Spanish throne and debate whether a renunciation clause was sufficient to prevent foreign usurpation. If such worries existed at all in the case of Eleanor's marriage, they were not evident. To the contrary, the section in the Treaty of Madrid stipulating Eleanor's renunciation of the lands of her grandfather, father, and mother actually contained an exception whereby she might still retain her claim;

“The right that belongs to the Lady Queen to the collateral succession shall only be reserved in the event that the lord emperor and the lord Archduke Don Fernando Infante of Spain his brother departed from this present life without legitimate children, which God through his holy will may not allow, and in the absence of both and all of their heirs and descendants and by no other means.”¹⁵⁶

Regardless of the perceived unlikelihood of Charles V and Ferdinand both dying without offspring, providing Francis with an avenue to the Habsburg inheritance through his wife represented a remarkable gamble in the high-stakes game of dynastic chance. Both Charles V and Margaret were attuned to the risks posed by such a gamble, and Eleanor's renunciation was treated with the utmost care and diligence so as to minimize the possibility of a foreign claim.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ AHN, Est., leg. 2876, exp. 10, fol. 23v.

¹⁵⁵ AGS, Est., leg. K-1483, B2, fols. 9 & 10.

¹⁵⁶ AHN, Est., leg. 2876, exp. 9, fol. 7v. [“...solamente reservado el derecho que la dicha Señora Reyna pertenece a la susseccion colateral en caso que el dicho señor emperador y el señor Archiduque Don Fernando Ynfante de las Españas su hermano pasasen desta presente vida sin hijos herederos lo que Dios por su santa voluntad no permita y en defecto de entrambos y todos los dichos sus herederos y descendientes y no de otra manera.”]

¹⁵⁷ CMA, pp. 124-125. Securing the renunciation was a top diplomatic priority after Eleanor's formal marriage to Francois in July 1530; “Depuis, Madame, Mgr de Praet et nous [Francois de Bonvalot and Philippe de Lalaing] à l'issue du disner, parlames au Roy touchant la renuntiation que ladite Royne devoit donner, selon qu'il est contenu au traicté de Madrid, l'expédition de laquelle, pour l'absence du Conseil, fut remise jusques en ce lieu, où de rechief en a esté parlé. Et si est trouvé quelque difficulté sur ces motz, droit de légitime et supliement d'icelle, lesquieulx ne sont mis audit traicté et, par conséquent, a esté fait refus de passer ce point par ceulx de ce costé. A raison de quoy, ledit Sr de Praet l'a remis à en advertir l'Empereur, ce qu'il faict et nous présentement pour y faire son voulloir, entendu toutes poursuytes nécessaires.” For a copy of the renunciation see AGS, Est., leg. K-1680, H1, fol. 5; Ibid., leg K-1643, D6, fol. 107b.

But, they did not yet have the legal precedent, logical basis, or political incentive to eliminate the possibility entirely. Nor did they have a need to. For centuries, the House of Habsburg had subjected itself to the unpredictable vagaries of dynastic chance with formidable results; piecing together a mighty empire from the personal misfortunes and untimely deaths that had extinguished several of Europe's most powerful medieval families, including the Trastámara and Valois-Burgundy. In 1529, just as it had been for previous generations, assuming a degree of political risk in order to increase the odds of attaining even greater might and glory was accepted as an unavoidable feature of dynastic competition.

If Eleanor's marriage to Francis was indeed only lightly discussed at Cambrai, it nevertheless emerged in the aftermath of the conference as a matter of considerable urgency. For the French monarchy, the desire to summon the Habsburg queen and proceed with the marriage as quickly as possible stemmed from the fact that her departure from Spain was inextricably linked to the release of the Dauphin and Duke of Orleans, who according to reports were receiving harsh treatment from their imperial captors.¹⁵⁸ Fearing for the princes' well-being, Francis and Louise reached out to Margaret, pleading with her to intervene with Charles V and Isabel on their behalf and request that more care be shown toward the boys.¹⁵⁹ Once this was done, additional steps were taken to facilitate their rapid release, with Francis even deferring to the will of the emperor in order to avoid any delays.¹⁶⁰ Unlike in 1526, he also attended to all matters pertaining to his union with Eleanor with great alacrity, wasting no time in ratifying the peace and making the necessary preparations for her arrival.¹⁶¹

On the imperial side, Margaret similarly supported a timely settlement of the marriage. In part, this support was motivated by a well-founded concern that delays might undermine everything that had been achieved at Cambrai. The longer it took to celebrate the marriage, the greater the likelihood of complications or disagreements hindering the terms of peace. In order to avoid delays, Margaret took it upon herself to stay actively involved in the return of the hostages, the greatest obstacle to the union, and the fulfillment of marriage obligations through her

¹⁵⁸ CSP Sp., Vol. III— Part II, p. 627. The order to have the princes "more closely confined and watched" was given by Charles V after the declaration of war in 1528. Eleanor was a notable exception, cherishing her role as the princes' future step-mother and displaying "motherly care" even before their release. For more on this see Katarzyna Kosior, *Becoming a Queen in Early Modern Europe: East and West*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), pp. 166-167

¹⁵⁹ CMA, p. 24. Margaret fulfilled this request, to the great joy and gratitude of the French monarch and his mother; "Une paire d'heure après, Mgr le grant maistre m'envoya dire, par un des secrétaires du Roy, qu'il avoyt parlé au Roy et me mandoit que le Roy et Madame ne regardoient a cy petite choze que cela, et que vous fissiez hardiement faire tout le demeurant prest, à ce point là prés, et que le Roy y Madame estoient fort joyeux des bonnes lettres qu'avez escriptes à l'Empereur y a l'Impératrix pour leurs enfans." An Excerpt from Margaret's letter to Charles V can be found in Tremayne, *The First Governess*, p. 265. Mention of the princes can also be found in CDC, p. 186. Writing to Isabel, Margaret reiterated the benefit of their good treatment; "yo he sabido por vuestras cartas el buen tratamiento que tienen el presente por vuestra cabsa los señores hijos del rey de Francia, de lo qual yo he estado muy alegre, que por esto se podrá cada día aumentar la amistad entre estos príncipes; porque tales mancebos príncipes sin culpa no han de pagar la pena de las enemistades de sus padres y es bien fecho tener respeto porque es la honra del Emperador y vuestra."

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 64. If there were any delays, the French were careful to point out, they would be solely the emperor's fault; "Mgr le légat nous a ramenté tout ce que desjà il nous avoit mis audevant, que le Roy, voyant la voulenté résolue de l'Empereur... pour le recouvrement de ses enfans... Ledit Sr légat a dit et protesté, pour et au nom du Roy, que la délivrance se retarderoit à faulte de l'Emperuer et à sa charge..."

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 26; AGS, Est., leg. K-1643, D6, fol. 114.

representatives.¹⁶² For Margaret, making sure that the wedding was dutifully carried out also had practical political advantages, namely through the establishment of a permanent Habsburg presence in France. The lack of close, influential allies in the French court was particularly acute in 1530 when Margaret tried and failed to mobilize royal support for Catherine of Aragon in England. Although Francis' indifference bothered her, she remained optimistic that his opinion would change once Eleanor arrived; "But we anticipate that, at the coming of the Queen in France [Eleanor], that the King [Francis] will find himself to be more inclined to the assistance of the said Queen of England [Catherine], for the love we anticipate him having for the said Queen of France and her family to protect them knowing that it is her aunt."¹⁶³ Margaret's letter reveals how the elaboration of the Habsburg network was fueled, at least partially, by the expectation that the royal women being sent abroad would be able to effectively represent their family's interests. In Eleanor's case, Margaret anticipated her niece deriving power and influence from her personal relationship with Francis. Fostering feelings of love and affection as his wife, she would be able to not only intervene on behalf of her relatives, but also generate hitherto nonexistent pro-imperial sympathies that would bolster the prestige of the dynasty.

Far from viewing Eleanor's marriage as a momentary deviation from the Habsburgs' traditional anti-French alignment, Margaret intended for it to be the first step in the total reorientation of Charles V's dynastic policy. The idea of supplementing the newly minted peace with more than just one royal union, thereby establishing a lasting marital tradition between the Habsburg and Valois, was first broached by Louise at Cambrai.¹⁶⁴ Her proposal was ambitious, calling for a secret alliance to be sealed by four additional marriages. The suggested couples, which constituted nearly all of the dynastic potential for both royal families, included the Dauphin and Mary of Austria, Philip II and one of Francis' daughters, the Duke of Orleans and Eleanor's daughter, Mary of Portugal, and the Duke of Angoulême and Mary of Hungary. Knowing that she had neither the legal authority nor the political right to proceed with these negotiations, Margaret was nevertheless intrigued by Louise's proposal; seeing it as a singular opportunity to both establish a lasting peace and augment her dynasty's political authority. The many pressing issues and concerns raised at the conference left the two only limited time to discuss the secret alliance, but by the time they departed both were firmly committed to the project.

Notwithstanding her enthusiasm for the unprecedented quadruple alliance, Margaret first needed to represent its advantages to Charles V before she could proceed with the negotiations. Her initial attempt to convince her nephew failed miserably, with the emperor providing "reasons and arguments against such alliances [that] are rather conclusive."¹⁶⁵ Unwilling to give up so easily, Margaret responded on October 2, 1529 in a carefully prepared letter meant to appeal to Charles V's pragmatic political sensibilities and unrelenting desire for personal glory;

¹⁶² Ibid., pp. 56-57, 62-63 & 87-88. The ambassadors sent to France on Margaret's behalf and charged with making sure that the terms of the treaty were fulfilled were Philippe de Lalaing and Francois de Bonvalot. The ambassadors sent by the emperor included Guillaume des Barres, Charles de Poupet, señor de La Chaulx, Luis de Flandes, Señor de Praet, and Jean de la Sauch. For sources revealing the extent to which the return of the princes was complicated by disagreements over the payment of the substantial ransom agreed upon in the Treaty of Cambrai see CSP Sp., Vol. IV— Part I, p. 312; AGS, Est., leg. K-1483, B2, fol. 37.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 91. "Mais nous espérons que, à la venue de la Royne en France, le Roy se trouvera plus enclin à l'assistance de ladite Royne d'Engleterre, pour l'amour que nous espérons il aura à ladite Royne de France et aux siens pour les favoriser, sachant que c'est sa tante."

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 34.

¹⁶⁵ CSP Sp., Vol. IV— Part I, p. 263.

“yet I cannot help thinking that the friendship of France is now more advantageous and necessary... not so much for the tranquility of all your kingdoms, dominions, and subjects, as to enable you to have your way in Italy and Germany, and be dreaded by your neighbors; also to be better assisted in this expedition against the Turk, and whilst thus engaged leave your own dominions in perfect security.”¹⁶⁶

In subordinating the tranquility of Charles V’s lands to his conquests and military aspirations, Margaret laid bare the springs of Habsburg motivation and the logic guiding dynastic policy—a logic that prioritized first and foremost the aspirations of the emperor. But greater might and power were not all that Charles V had to gain. As Margaret went on to point out in the letter, the marriages also promised to provide the emperor with a valuable ally in his battle against heretics in the north, to bring imperial and French honor and interests closer together, and to strengthen his claim to Milan.¹⁶⁷ In response to Charles V’s fears that the negotiations were a ploy to buy time, Margaret responded “if the King’s offer is only intended to buy time, you yourself gain it also.”¹⁶⁸ It would be far more dangerous, she insisted, to reject the plan outright, thereby leading Francis to “naturally conclude that you do not at all value his friendship.”¹⁶⁹ Both contemporaries and historians have maintained that Margaret sincerely wanted to stabilize Western Europe. However, as her letter demonstrates, removing the obstacles that opposed the attainment of peace required more than just a sincere desire to restore the unity of Christendom. It required the ability to frame peace as a favorable condition in which to pursue imperial interests.

In order to further strengthen the case for the marriages, Margaret also reached out to Queen Isabel. The emperor’s admiration for his wife and the corresponding value that he placed on her political input were well known to Margaret, who wrote the queen regularly to discuss sensitive issues and elicit support. Such was the case on December 15, 1529 when Margaret sent a short letter requesting that Isabel help her conserve the necessary authority to continue dealing with France; “but still, because I have some affairs there with regard to which I need your help and favor and assistance for the preservation of my right, I have sent Alonso de Arguello who has been entrusted with my matters to speak with you.”¹⁷⁰ Although the sensitive nature of the negotiations prevented Margaret from including more details in her correspondence, opting instead to send a representative to speak with Isabel in person, her reference to outstanding affairs was clearly meant to allude to the secret alliance. By circumventing Charles V and soliciting aid directly from the empress for a proposal that had already been rejected, Margaret’s actions demonstrate the political influence and independent decision-making power of Habsburg women. Deriving power and authority from their personal relationships, they could develop their own diplomatic agendas, coordinate their efforts, and even prompt changes in dynastic policy.

Eventually, Margaret succeeded in convincing the emperor of the benefits of the grand marriage project. Writing his aunt on January 22, 1530, Charles V invested her with full

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 263-264.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 264.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ CDC, p. 186. “...pero todavía, porque yo tengo allá algunos negocios de que he menester vuestra ayuda y favor y asistencia para la conservación de mi derecho, yo he mandado a Alonso de Arguello que tiene cargo de mis cosas quo os lo hable...”

authority to negotiate on his behalf, dictating alone the future of the dynasty; “As for the powers that I have drafted for the treatment [of the] secret alliances with the Francois... I do not wish to neglect sending them to you, so that...they know more and more the whole confidence that I have in you.”¹⁷¹ The decision to grant Margaret sole responsibility for dealing with the French was at least partly influenced by the Charles V’s preoccupation with the Mediterranean, where he was busy making preparations for his official coronation in Bologna and planning a military offensive against the Ottomans. With the Peace of Cambrai recently signed, carrying out further diplomatic initiatives in France was simply not a priority. Moreover, Margaret had proven herself to be an effective representative of the empire, capable of tackling complex negotiations. In the formal document granting her the necessary powers to negotiate, Charles V specifically cited his aunt’s diplomatic experience, demonstrated at Cambrai, as the basis for his decision;

“Because of the very great, perfect, and entire confidence which we have in our said lady and aunt, as in ourselves, and in her experience and prudence, which was shown in conducting, concluding, and perfecting the said peace made at Cambray, we have by these presents constituted and made our aunt our general and special proxy...”¹⁷²

For the next eleven months, Margaret was the sole arbiter of the Habsburgs’ dynastic policy, possessing the authority to reorient political alignments and shape a lasting peace.

Sadly, Margaret’s vision of a long-term rapprochement between Charles V and Francis was not destined to be fulfilled. Negotiations for the secret alliance did not begin in earnest until the end of summer, delayed by the return of the French hostages and the celebration of Eleanor’s union to the king. By then, Margaret’s physical condition, which had already been a concern during the conference in Cambrai, was rapidly deteriorating.¹⁷³ Incredibly resilient in the last few months of her life, Margaret continued to receive and respond to letters from her representatives in France through the end of the year. Eventually, though, the pain from a lower body ailment became too much to handle, and in November her doctors chose to cut open her swollen leg “to evacuate the humors.”¹⁷⁴ The decision proved to be fatal. On December 1, 1530, less than one year after being entrusted with proxy powers, Margaret’s life was cut short by a wound infection. Before she died, she had time to dictate one last letter to Charles V, naming him as her sole heir and making one final plea; “I commend to you peace, and especially with the Kings of France and England.”¹⁷⁵ In reality, Margaret was the only one with the will and determination to preserve international harmony and, shortly after her death, the grand marriage project came to an end.

Conclusion

In July 1530, the new imperial ambassador in England, Eustace Chapuys, met with the Duke of Norfolk to discuss at length the current state of affairs in Europe. After a time, the

¹⁷¹ CMA, p. 151. “Quant aux pouvoirs dont m’avez escript pour traiter secrètes alliances avec les Francois... n’ay voulu délaisser de les vous envoyer... ils cognoissent de plus en plus l’entière confidence que j’ay en vous.”

¹⁷² Excerpt found in Tremayne, *The First Governess*, pp. 266-267.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

¹⁷⁴ Iongh, *Margaret of Austria*, p. 250.

¹⁷⁵ For a copy of Margaret’s last letter to Charles V see *Ibid.*, p. 251.

conversation naturally turned to the Treaty of Cambrai. Touching upon the forthcoming wedding of the Habsburg and Valois families, Norfolk admitted aloud “that the alliance of the latter [Francis] with your sister (Eleanor) could not be better.”¹⁷⁶ But, as he was careful to qualify, the long-term benefits of the marriage as a medium for lasting peace would only be minimal; “‘In truth’ he added ‘considering the manner in which the emperor had treated the King of France, obliging him to disburse more money than he could really pay, and do many other things by sheer force, I take it that no firm and lasting friendship can really exist between the two, and three years at least must pass before France can recover her strength, and matters be placed on a firm footing as they ought to be.’”¹⁷⁷ Norfolk’s candid assessment of the one-sided treaty and the inevitability of renewed competition provides a striking counter point to the hope and optimism expressed by Margaret and Louise. As it shows, for discerning political observers, proclamations that the lasting accord would be bound “together with kindship and affinity by marriage” was not sufficient to disguise the asymmetrical power relationship and considerations contained in the document. Scoffing at the notion that Eleanor’s marriage was concluded between equals, they asked not if but when conflict would resume. In the end, Norfolk’s prediction was only slightly off. The peace agreement ended up lasting six years before the sudden death of the heirless Duke of Milan, Francesco Maria Sforza, prompted a fresh French invasion of the peninsula.

Even more disappointing than the failure of Eleanor’s marriage to prolong a beneficial state of peace in Western Europe was its inability to fulfill its primary long-term objective of establishing a base of Habsburg influence in the French court. From the moment he swore aloud his marital vows, Francis disliked his new wife; likely viewing her as a reminder of his humiliating defeat at the hands of her brother.¹⁷⁸ For her part, Eleanor did her best to reconcile with the king and to serve as an intermediary between him and the emperor. She also fulfilled her queenly duties with patience and grace, serving as a loving step-mother to her adopted children and a respectable representative of the French monarchy. Still, nothing she did succeeded in winning Francis over. As the years passed, this physical and emotional distance prevented Eleanor from building up her own base of power and influence in the local court. It also precluded any possibility of her giving birth to more children—something that Charles V had clearly anticipated when arranging her union. Toward the end of his life, Francis appears to have regretted his mistreatment of Eleanor, urging his heir, Henry II, to protect her after he had gone. By then, however, it was too late to salvage any political advantage from the marriage. When Francis passed on March 31, 1547, Eleanor was conspicuously absent from his bedside. No one, it appears, had thought it urgent to warn her that her husband was close to death.¹⁷⁹

Despite failing to fulfill its short- term and long-term objectives, Eleanor’s marriage nevertheless had a significant impact on Habsburg dynastic policy. As the first union successfully negotiated with the elder Valois branch, it represented a notable break from the previous tendency to exclusively pursue anti-French alignments, and opened up the possibility of using marital bonds to extend power and influence into the heart of Paris. Over the course of the next hundred and fifty years, the Spanish Habsburgs would finalize five additional unions with France, looking back each time to Eleanor’s marriage as an authoritative precedent for ongoing peace efforts. For the family, the failures of the union were not seen as being demonstrative of

¹⁷⁶ CSP Sp., Vol. IV—Part 1, p. 631.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Knecht, *Francis I*, pp. 237-238.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 418. Eleanor was told after Francis’ death that she had not been informed of his worsening condition because those in attendance had expected him to recover.

marriage politics inefficacy, but rather as a byproduct of an unworkable treaty— something which later generations took into account crafting agreements that were politically advantageous but not so one-sided as to be unworkable.

Chapter Two

In 1570, two consequential marriages were celebrated by proxy in Vienna. The first union wed the Spanish monarch, Philip II, with his niece, Anna of Austria. The second union involved the French monarch, Charles IX, and the second eldest daughter of Emperor Maximilian II, Isabel of Austria. Negotiated in conjunction with one another, the two marriages consecrated a three-way binding alliance between Spain, France, and the Holy Roman Empire intended to permanently reconcile the Habsburg and Valois dynasties after nearly seventy years of intermittent conflict. In uniting the three most powerful Catholic monarchies in Europe, the alliance was also aimed at consolidating their collective power in order to better confront the threat posed by reformed heretics and the Ottoman Empire.

First proposed in February 1569, the project was organized and advanced from the outset by Philip II. As the patriarch of the Habsburg dynasty, Philip II possessed considerable influence over an extensive family network incorporating several monarchies, including the Holy Roman Empire and Portugal.¹⁸⁰ Relatives and close allies in these kingdoms looked to him to orchestrate their diplomatic efforts and oversee the perpetuation of dynastic power on the continent.¹⁸¹ In return, Philip II anticipated a degree of deference to his political will. Given the potential of new unions to either consolidate or expand Habsburg authority, the careful oversight of the marriage market constituted one of his most critical political responsibilities.

Like his father, Philip II's main objective when devising policy was expediency and power. Through the arrangement of strategic unions both inside and outside of Spain, he was able to reinforce bonds of reciprocal affection and mutual responsibility. He was also able to exercise influence abroad in order to maintain his sphere of control and shape the political landscape of Europe. Much had changed in Europe during the preceding four decades since Charles V had sent Eleanor to reside in the Parisian court. The family had been divided into two branches, the existential threat posed by enemies of the Church had grown, and French power and stability had been upset by the onset of religious conflict. Diplomatic methods and informal channels of communication had also had time to mature. But, notwithstanding these developments, the thinking behind policy remained largely the same. Philip II was an opportunist who devised marriage strategies ultimately aimed at serving his personal and political interests.

¹⁸⁰ The vast historiography of Philip II and his reign has only increased since the 400th anniversary of his death in 1998. For selected readings on Philip II from the past two decades see Thomas, *World Without End*; Drelichman and Voth, *Lending to the Borrower from Hell*; José Luis Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero, *Felipe II: la mirada de un rey (1527-1598)*, (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas: Ediciones Polifemo, 2014); Parker, *Imprudent King*; Harry Kelsey, *Philip II of Spain, King of England: The Forgotten Sovereign*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012); Fernando Bouza Álvarez, *D. Filipe I*, (Lisbon: Temas e Debates, 2008); Manuel Fernández Álvarez, *Felipe II y su tiempo*, (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1998); Geoffrey Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998); Juan G. Atienza, *La cara oculta de Felipe II*, (Barcelona : Martínez Roca, 1998); José Tomás Cabot, *La vida y la época de Felipe II*, (Barcelona, España: Planeta, 1998); Henry Kamen, *Philip II of Spain*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997).

¹⁸¹ Antonio Villacorta Baños-García, *Don Sebastián: Rey de Portugal*, (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, S.A., 2001), pp. 29-38. Although the ruling family of Portugal, the House of Avis, possessed its own unique historical and political tradition, decades of intermarriage with the Habsburgs had intensified close kin relationships between the two ruling families.

The unprecedented scale of the 1570 marriage project provides a unique opportunity to explore the complexity and dynamism of early modern dynastic politics. The constituent parts of the project have been analyzed to varying degrees.¹⁸² However, the broad temporal and geographic scope of the negotiations has posed a challenge for scholars. To date, they have yet to produce a comprehensive investigation of Philip II's dynastic policy during the period.¹⁸³ This lack of coverage has made it difficult to trace the relationship between different royal unions. It has also resulted in key contributions being overlooked, in particular those made by an influential network of royal Habsburg women. As I demonstrate in this chapter, many of the prospective matches discussed in the 1560s were intimately linked, and can only be understood if analyzed against the backdrop of broader developments and diplomatic exchanges between Spain, France, the Holy Roman Empire, and Portugal. Working closely with his diplomats and female relatives, Philip II pursued the most ambitious, far-reaching policy ever seen in Europe; testing, in the process, the limits of what could be achieved through rapprochement.

In order to account for the different forces and factors that shaped Philip II's policy in the 1560s, the current chapter is divided into three sections. In section one, titled "Isolating the Valois," I critically examine the Spanish monarchy's diplomatic strategy following the signing of the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559.¹⁸⁴ During this period, I argue, Philip II utilized his position as patriarch of the Habsburg dynasty to organize an anti-Valois coalition. By isolating the French, he hoped to not only deprive his rivals of strategic allies, but also perpetuate his own family's power through the reinforcement of marital bonds between remote relatives. Notably, in analyzing Spanish policy in this chapter, I do not distinguish between dynastic and reason of state logic—a distinction which at least one scholar has recently attempted to locate in the second half of the 16th century.¹⁸⁵ In contrast, I maintain that the dominant political outlook of the Spanish monarchy continued to reflect a traditional emphasis on expediency, familial loyalty, and historical precedent.

Section two of the chapter, titled "Pillars of Dynasty," considers the role played by Habsburg women in elaborating their familial network. Marriage politics during the 1560's cannot be adequately understood without reference to the contributions made by Philip II's

¹⁸² The seminal account of the negotiations remains Alfonso Danvila, "Chapter XVIII," *Felipe II y El Rey Don Sebastián de Portugal* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, S.A., 1954), pp. 175-194. For more on the different unions see Paula Sutter Fichtner, *Emperor Maximilian II*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 105-113; Miguel Ángel Ochoa Brun, "La construcción matrimonial," *Historia de La Diplomacia Española*, V. VI, (Madrid: Ministerios de Asuntos Exteriores, 2000), pp. 254-258; Joseph Patrouch, "Marriage Negotiations and the Tumultuous 1560s," *Queen's Apprentice: Archduchess Elizabeth, Empress Maria, the Habsburgs, and the Holy Roman Empire, 1554-1569*, (Leiden: Brill, 2010), pp. 133-244; Villacorta, *Don Sebastián*, pp. 78-90; Luis Pérez Bueno, "Del casamiento de Felipe II con su sobrina Ana de Austria," *Hispania* 7 (1947), pp. 372-416; William Thomas Walsh, *Philip III*, (London: Sheed & Ward, 1938), pp. 460-487.

¹⁸³ A lack of in-depth coverage of the marriage project has given rise to certain historical inaccuracies. For instance, a recent publication has confused Isabel of Austria, the second daughter of Maximilian and prospective bride of Charles IX, with Isabel Clara Eugenia, Philip II's eldest daughter. See María Mercedes Carrión, *Subject Stages: Marriage, Theatre and the Law in Early Modern Spain*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), p. 69.

¹⁸⁴ This chapter draws extensively from available evidence found in both published and archival sources. The published sources include *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España* (CDI), Tomo XXVI and XXVIII, eds. Marqués De Pidal and Miguel Salvá, (Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de Calero, 1855). Primary source documents are drawn from the AGS, Est., leg. 385, 386, 657, 658, 659, 662, 663, 665, K-1643.

¹⁸⁵ Watkins, *After Lavinia*, pp. 111-142.

female relatives, including his two sisters, Maria and Joanna, and his aunt, Catherine.¹⁸⁶ As I demonstrate in this section, these women possessed a combination of practical political experience and personal influence which allowed them to intervene in negotiations and facilitate compromise between monarchies. Their participation was also crucial for legitimizing marriage projects.




Figure 1: A simplified version of the Habsburg family tree showing Philip II’s relationship to the royal women who played a central role in the marriage projects of the 1560s and their children, including his fourth wife Anna of Austria.

The third and final section, titled “Philip II’s Grand Alliance” analyzes the circumstances that led to a two-way marriage project uniting Spain, France, and the Holy Roman Empire. Despite his aversion for all things French, Philip II had no choice but to abandon his anti-Valois strategy in 1568 after two royal deaths in Spain radically altered the European marriage market. His response to this sudden alteration, which threatened both domestic and international stability, was to terminate all prior marriage negotiations between his close allies in order to orchestrate a new project incorporating the French monarchy. In attempting to justify the alliance, Philip II relied heavily on Habsburg women to create the impression that the sudden change was both necessary and beneficial— claims which ultimately failed to convince the Portuguese to support the endeavor. In the final part of the section, I closely examine the negotiations between each monarchy, revealing how diplomatic exchanges with France were complicated by the lack of an authoritative precedent and pervasive feelings of mistrust. To overcome these challenges, I argue, both the Habsburgs and Valois regularly invoked fictitious memories of collaboration and excluded controversial articles in order to facilitate agreements which were mutually acceptable.

¹⁸⁶ Kamen, *Philip II of Spain*, p. 202. The contributions made by women to Philip II’s reign have long been overlooked. Take, for instance, Joanna, whom Kamen writes has “...always [been] relegated to the background by historians because she abstained from any political role after her short regency in 1554-9...”

Isolating the Valois

The signing of the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559 ushered in a period of relative peace and political stability for the Spanish Empire. Notably, the agreement resolved the Italian dispute in favor of Philip II, temporarily bringing an end to long-standing hostilities with the Valois.¹⁸⁷ The untimely death of Henry II shortly after the signing of the treaty further neutralized France's war-making capacity, and allowed Habsburg continental hegemony to endure undisturbed through the early 1560s.¹⁸⁸ During this time, Philip II and his ministers consolidated the monarchy's position at home through the founding of a permanent capital in Madrid and the construction of a royal palace outside of the city, known as the Monasterio y Sitio de El Escorial.¹⁸⁹ While construction, elaboration, and ornamentation of the court and its urban surroundings took considerable time to complete, twenty one years in the case of El Escorial, the establishment of a fixed presence in the heart of Castile facilitated the trend toward greater centralized authority and bureaucratization.

Outside of the Iberian Peninsula, attention was paid to fashioning Philip II's role as defender of the Catholic faith. With the Spanish presence in Italy left unchallenged, diplomatic efforts revolved around securing a foothold in Rome through increased patronage of ecclesiastical clients and financial backing of a sympathetic faction of cardinals.¹⁹⁰ This commitment to extending military protection to the Papacy increased pressure on Spain to confront the Ottoman Empire, whose growing naval power posed an imminent threat to the Italian peninsula. In response to the brazen military aggression of Ottoman forces, Philip II committed his own naval forces to the defense of the Mediterranean, including a military operation in 1565 led by the viceroy of Sicily to lift the siege of Malta.¹⁹¹ The conflict, which was characterized by sporadic fighting until the Holy League's decisive victory at the Battle of Lepanto six years later, allowed Philip II to manifest his commitment to combating enemies of the Church, while also consolidating control over his kingdoms of Naples and Sicily.

With the impending threat of an Ottoman invasion jeopardizing Spanish interests in the south, Philip II relied heavily on marriage politics to maintain Habsburg preeminence in mainland Europe. Over the course of the 1560s, several royal children from prominent families came of age. Included among the marriage candidates were three heirs, Don Carlos of Spain, Sebastian of Portugal, and Charles IX of France, and three daughters of equal repute, Anna of Austria, Elisabeth of Austria, and Marguerite of France. Due to the potential of each prospective union to shift continental power alignments, the question of how to configure the marriages was of utmost concern for every monarchy looking to improve their international position and expand their influence. For Philip II, the optimal strategy aimed at reinforcing marital bonds between Spain, the Holy Roman Empire (HRE) and Portugal in an effort to isolate the French.

¹⁸⁷ Álvarez, *Felipe II y su tiempo*, pp. 331-342. Philip II and his French counterpart, Henry II, inherited the conflict between Charles V and Francis I over strategic control over Italy. For more on the Italian War that lasted from 1551-1559.

¹⁸⁸ R.J. Knecht, *Catherine de' Medici*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 54-58. Henry II was killed during a jousting tournament staged in celebration of the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis.

¹⁸⁹ The origins and historical significance of the palace are written about extensively in Henry Kamen, *The Escorial: Art and Power in the Renaissance*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2010).

¹⁹⁰ Thomas Dandeleit, *Spanish Rome, 1500-1700*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), p. 62.

¹⁹¹ For more on the military campaign see Hugo A. Cañete, *Los Tercios en el Mediterráneo. Los Sitios de Castelnuovo y Malta*, (Málaga: Ediciones Platea 2015).

This strategy, which closely mirrored the one implemented by his great-grandparents, Ferdinand and Isabel, at the end of the 15th century, offered several advantages.¹⁹² First, political isolation provided an effective means of prolonging French international passivity while Spanish attention was diverted elsewhere. Operating under the presumption that the ceasefire with the Valois was only temporary, Philip II wanted to delay the next inevitable outbreak of conflict for as long as possible.¹⁹³ An additional advantage, related closely to the first, was that the reinforcement of ties with the Austrian Habsburgs and Portuguese Avis, two monarchies closely related to Philip II, promoted interfamily cooperation and coordination. This was vital for Spanish security because both the HRE and Portugal were strategically located near and/or with access to vulnerable holdings in the Netherlands, Italy, and the New World. Only by maintaining a sense of interdependence and shared purpose with distant relatives could Philip II hope to protect these possessions and keep his far-flung empire intact.

Finally, Philip II advocated an anti-Valois strategy in hopes of attaining even greater glory. Members of the Habsburg house possessed a unique conception of time, faith and identity which hinged on the notion that the dynasty and its members occupied fundamentally distinct temporal realms.¹⁹⁴ Mortal man lived in mutable and finite time, known as the *tempus*, while the dynasty existed in an immutable, infinite continuum inhabited by angels and otherworldly beings known as the *aevum*.¹⁹⁵ For those, such as Philip II and his relatives, who subscribed to this notion, actions and achievements in the *tempus* only possessed meaning in so far as they contributed to the glory of an enduring dynastic tradition that extended beyond the temporal limits of the human lifespan; an intimate link between personal achievements and the perpetuation of the Habsburg line that contributed to a sense of community, loyalty, and shared interests among members.

While there were, of course, pragmatic motivations for Philip II to reinforce ties with the HRE and Portugal, a desire to perpetuate the dynasty provided the ideological underpinning for his policy. He understood that each and every royal child bore in their blood a latent potential to unite disparate kingdoms under the rule of a single authority. His own empire and political preponderance, byproducts of the realization of this latent potential four decades earlier in the inheritance of Charles V, served as his permanent reminder. The mere preservation of his father's hereditary fortune was not enough, however. Philip II actively engaged in marriage politics in order to guard the monarchical line of succession and expand the territorial patrimony to be left to his progeny or, inversely, to obstruct attempts by his enemies to increase their odds of coming out victorious in the genetic contest for European supremacy.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹² Edwards, *Ferdinand and Isabel*, pp. 146-170.

¹⁹³ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 429. Given their long standing rivalry, few doubted that war would one day resume between Spain and France. For this reason, any condition demanding that the HRE observe strict neutrality in the future was off limits; "y que S.M. Ces'a' no hubiese de dejar la amistad y hermandad del Rey nuestro, ni estar neutral en caso que sucediese algun desabrimiento ó guerra con el Rey de Francia."

¹⁹⁴ Fernando Bouza Álvarez, "Introducción," *Cartas de Felipe II a sus hijas*, (Madrid: Ediciones Turner, S.A., 1988), p. 16.

¹⁹⁵ Pasquale Porro, "Angelic Measures: 'Aevum' and Discrete Time," *The Medieval Concept of Time: Studies on the Scholastic Debate and its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. Pasquale Porro, (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 131-159.

¹⁹⁶ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 492. The need to produce legitimate offspring in order to ensure the survival of the royal blood line was never far from Philip II's mind. Take, for instance, the emphasis that Philip II placed on producing a

During the first half of the 1560's, the primary focus in Madrid was on identifying a suitable partner for Philip II's son, Don Carlos. There was little indication that Carlos possessed any of the attributes needed to one day govern his father's empire. He was an obstinate young man, marred by a sickly disposition and a propensity for violence which had only been exacerbated by the serious head wound that he had received from an accidental fall in the royal residence in 1562.¹⁹⁷ Still, in spite of the young prince's unsavory character, the political necessity of securing the monarchical line of succession was too great to ignore. Soon after Carlos turned sixteen, Philip II initiated informal negotiations with foreign courts. Several royal women were considered viable candidates, including Marguerite of Valois, Anna of Austria, Mary Queen of Scots, and even Joanna, the prince's aunt.¹⁹⁸ Ultimately, though, the decision was made in 1565 to marry Carlos to Anna, thereby tightening bonds with the HRE.¹⁹⁹ At least, this was the assumption in Vienna where locals celebrated news of Philip II's commitment to an agreement. After years of waiting, at times with vocal impatience, they had finally succeeded in linking their fortunes with Spain.²⁰⁰

The feelings of relief and joy that stemmed from the new marriage were short-lived. At some point during the summer of 1564, observers were alarmed to note a drastic change in the prince's personality.²⁰¹ Whereas previously Carlos had demonstrated a degree of emotional and physical restraint, his behavior suddenly became erratic and unpredictable. In the eyes of Philip II and those closest to him, the sudden alteration was further proof that Carlos was not fit to lead. Discreetly, they undertook with limited success to restrain his actions and conceal his conduct from the international community, including the Austrian Habsburgs. Even with Carlos' mental state rapidly deteriorating, Philip II was reluctant to terminate negotiations with the recently anointed Holy Roman Emperor, Maximilian II, due to a well-founded fear that dissolving the marriage would drive him to strike a deal with France.

Privately, Maximilian II and many in the Austrian court shared Philip II's distrust of the Valois. But, the looming threat of an Ottoman invasion outweighed any personal misgivings that they might have had about accepting aid from an otherwise disreputable source.²⁰² Shortly after Maximilian II assumed the throne, murmurings in favor of a union between Anna and the French King, Charles IX, had already been detected and relayed back to Philip II, arriving shortly before he announced his son's union and likely contributing to the decision.²⁰³ Thereafter, in order to preserve a united front against the Valois, Philip II maintained the impression abroad that he sincerely intended to see the union through while, at the same time, actively working at home to subvert Carlos' plans to leave Spain.

new heir after the death of Don Carlos and Isabel of Valois in 1568; "hallándome yo con tan poca sucesion y ninguna de varon, la obligacion que tengo á mis reinos y estados."

¹⁹⁷ Parker, *Imprudent King*, p. 182. The fall is often credited with the rapid deterioration of the prince's condition.

¹⁹⁸ Fernando Bruquetas Manuel Lobo, "Las Aspirantes al Matrimonio y las Relaciones Internacionales," *Don Carlos: Príncipe de las Españas*, (Madrid: Ediciones Cátedra, 2016), pp. 193-212.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

²⁰⁰ CDI, Tomo XXVI, pp. 543-544.

²⁰¹ Bruquetas, *Don Carlos*, p. 337.

²⁰² The *scripto* of Maximilian II, AGS, Est., leg. 662, fol. 118. ["...no pude dexar de saber el gran peligro que carga sobre los ambos de su Ces'a' Mag'd' por la vecinidad deste muy poderoso y comun enemigo de los chrianos."]

²⁰³ CDI, Tomo XXVI, p. 543. "y en las necesidades presentes entiendo muchas murmuraciones hasta decir algunos que si este Emperador tomase alianza con el Rey de Francia podria ser que por medio anduviesen las cosas del turco mas asesegados."

Before long, this delicate balancing act was complicated by French determination to execute their dynastic policy. The premature death of Henry II had initially jeopardized the Valois family's grip on power. His heir, Francis II, died shortly after assuming the throne and his second son, Charles IX, was only a young boy unprepared to inherit his monarchical responsibilities or address the rising tide of religious agitation between Catholics and Huguenots.²⁰⁴ Fortunately for the monarchy, the queen mother, Catherine de Medici, was well equipped to safeguard royal authority.²⁰⁵ A bold and resourceful leader, she avoided embroilment in intense court rivalries and guided the regency through a bloody outbreak of internal violence in 1562 (the first chapter in the country's religious wars). She also spearheaded diplomatic efforts to find marriages that would improve the monarchy's international position and assure the future of the Valois line.

Early on, the search for allies proved unsuccessful as foreign agents and sympathetic allies, such as the Spanish Queen, Isabel of Valois, failed to garner local support for agreements involving Carlos or Anna. Undeterred by this slow start, Catherine de Medici revised her strategy in time to present a grand marriage project to her daughter at their reunion in Bayonne in 1565.²⁰⁶ The new project was comprised of two parts. First, Charles IX and Marguerite of France would enter into a double marriage alliance with two of Maximilian II's children. Second, the Duke of Orleans, Henry III, would marry the Portuguese Infanta Maria. In no position to authorize such an ambitious project, and under direct orders not to respond, Isabel avoided the conversation before eventually departing with the matter left unresolved.

Catherine de Medici's decision to broach the topic of marriages at Bayonne in a bid for Philip II's support reveals the degree of influence that he possessed as patriarch of his extensive familial network. Members of the Habsburg dynasty, including both immediate and distant relatives, relied on a social hierarchy to rank the status of each individual within their network and regulate international relations. Within this social hierarchy, every member was expected to contribute to the lasting glory of the dynasty, but only a select few wielded the power to dictate policy and orchestrate diplomatic efforts. During his lifetime, Charles V had been the sole patriarch, followed by his brother, the Emperor Ferdinand. Indeed, only in 1564, after Ferdinand's death, did Philip II assume his place as the uncontested head of the dynasty. Thereafter, in fulfillment of this role and his obligation to the political preponderance of his kin, Philip II maintained regular correspondences with relatives, often supporting their activities in return for a degree of deference to his political will. Admittedly, the Austrian Habsburg and Avis dynasties were still distinct political regimes with their own prerogatives and political interests, and relatives in both did challenge Philip II over disagreements. But, for the most part, recognition of his preeminent position within the dynasty's social hierarchy— not to mention his immense political power— generated a sense of obligation to follow his lead in broader European affairs.

Alarmed by what he perceived to be a hostile encroachment on his sphere of influence, Philip II moved to undermine the French marriage project by supplanting it with one that aligned

²⁰⁴ For more on the wars of religion that gripped France for much of the second half of the 16th century see R.J. Knecht, *The French Wars of Religion 1559-1598*, (Harlow: Longman Group Limited, 1989).

²⁰⁵ Kathleen Wellman, "Catherine de Medici: King in All but Name," *Queens and Mistresses of Renaissance France*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2013), pp. 225-274.

²⁰⁶ For more on Isabel of Valois' reunion with her mother see CDI, Tomo XXVIII, pp. 427-432.

with his dynastic strategy. While respect for Philip II's status had driven Catherine de Medici to reveal her plans at Bayonne, her pursuit of advantageous alliances was not contingent on his approval. In fact, diplomatic activity was only temporarily stalled after her bid for support backfired. By 1566, French diplomats were arriving in the HRE and Portugal to speak directly with each respective monarchy about the possibility of rapprochement.²⁰⁷ These were discussions which Catherine de Medici attempted to hide from Philip II, who she rightfully feared would impede her efforts. The French diplomat sent to Portugal, for instance, arrived under the pretense of resolving a dispute in the Madeira Islands—an attempt at dissimulation which utterly failed. What the French queen mother did not know was that early reports from the HRE had already informed Philip II of her intention to bypass him. And, by the time her diplomat arrived in Portugal, he was already in the process of brokering an alternative marriage between Sebastian of Portugal and Isabel of Austria in order to obstruct French diplomatic efforts. In response to Catherine de Medici's overtures, Philip II had his representative, Alonso de Tovar, remind the Portuguese to not promise any more than was necessary to "take advantage of them."²⁰⁸ Refusal to do so would constitute an affront, Tovar warned them, particularly in light of Philip II's efforts to negotiate an alliance that was mutually beneficial.²⁰⁹ The implication of the Spaniard's message was hardly subtle: toe the dynastic line or face the consequences.

As the monarch of Spain, Philip II possessed no legal authority to dictate a marriage between Sebastian and Isabel. Therefore, he was careful to adopt a rhetoric of kinship that not only emphasized dependent relationships (i.e. Maximilian II as his brother and Sebastian as his nephew/son), but also framed his intervention in terms of love and brotherhood. As seen in a message intended for the Austrian Habsburgs in September 27, 1567, this was a rhetorical approach that often blurred the lines between familial obligation and political action; "the blood and kinship and natural love that there is between us compels us to desire and obtain the harmony and well-being of our houses."²¹⁰ Collaboration between Spain and Portugal was described in similar terms; "...the kinship and brotherhood that exists, and being so shared and intertwined the harmony and establishment of [Philip II] and [Sebastian] and [the] posterity of their houses, one cannot proceed without the other..."²¹¹ By highlighting the natural bonds and shared interests of the Spanish Habsburgs and their distant relatives, Philip II affirmed the notion that the present and future security of each house was intertwined. The negotiation of a new marriage alliance made sense given the need for continued collaboration. Only by working together, reinforcing implicit expectations of devotion and affection through a new agreement, could they ensure "the preservation and growth of kinship and close alliance that there is between us."²¹²

Inversely, the French marriage project was depicted as a disingenuous scheme. The military aggression of the Valois monarchs during the first half of the 16th century had generated widespread feelings of mistrust and suspicion. These were feelings mobilized by Spain in order

²⁰⁷ For French activity in Portugal see *Ibid.*, p. 457. For French activity in the HRE see Maximilian II to French ambassador, AGS, Est., leg. 662, fol. 133, 6 May 1566; Philip II to Chantone, *Ibid.*, leg. 663, fol. 101, 27 Jan 1566.

²⁰⁸ Philip II to Alonso de Tovar, *Ibid.*, leg. 385, fol. 120, 23 Feb 1567. ["aprovecharse dellos."]

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.* In Philip II's words, ["sería hacerme a mi agravio."]

²¹⁰ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 469. "pues la sangre y deudo y natural amor que hay entre nosotros nos obliga á desear y procurar el bien y el establecimiento de nuestras casas."

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 437. "...el deudo y hermandad que hay, y siendo tan comun y conjunto el bien y establecimiento de S.M. [Philip II] y V.A. [Sebastian] y posteridad de sus casas, que no puede andar lo uno sin lo otro...."

²¹² *Ibid.*, p. 448. "y á la conservación y aumento de deudo y estrecha amistad que hay entre nosotros."

to elicit support.²¹³ A reoccurring assertion in letters and conversations with both the HRE and Portugal was that the Valois dynasty was their natural enemy, incapable of just and honest dealings.²¹⁴ Correspondingly, offers of peace and friendship were empty promises made with the intent to undermine their political solidarity and hasten their defeat. Philip II claimed as much in instructions for his diplomat, Luis Venegas de Figueroa, writing "...they want to get through our gates and make a pledge with all of us to better advance the contemptible intention and [bad] will that they hold against us."²¹⁵ While marriage negotiations between relatives were predicated, at least rhetorically, on a familial commitment to collective security, French dynastic overtures were denounced as an extension of their bellicose foreign policy; "...all of these marriages are advanced so that they may inflict damage with this kinship tie that which they have not been able to [inflict] being enemies."²¹⁶ Catherine de Medici's initial request that Genoa, the strategic Italian port city, be granted as a dowry and the political dispute over the Madeira Islands were cited as proof of France's commitment to challenging Habsburg/Avis geopolitical interests and sovereignty claims.²¹⁷ The attempt to disrupt the French through rhetorical juxtaposition worked. By September 1567, both Portugal and the HRE had turned to Spain for guidance, and were discussing the possibility of surrendering the power to finalize an agreement on their behalf.

A significant obstacle preventing Philip II from realizing his alternative plan to reinforce familial ties was his physical distance from sites of negotiation. The establishment of a fixed court in Madrid precipitated changes not only in the nature of Spanish kingship, from charismatic to bureaucratic leadership, but also in the ways in which diplomacy was conducted. Unlike his father, Charles V, whose extensive travels allowed him to interact with foreign leaders, Philip II communicated almost exclusively through written correspondences. In retrospect, this shift toward a more impersonal and highly mediated approach to interstate interactions was the logical consequence of the empire's increasing administrative and diplomatic sophistication. At a time when visibility was still crucial for generating political confidence, however, Philip II's inaccessibility was problematic because it raised concerns about his sincerity in the context of ongoing negotiations, and complicated the finalization of the marriage agreements. In particular, Maximilian II had insisted early on that any final resolution be postponed until the Spanish monarch arrived in the Netherlands so that they could settle the terms in person.²¹⁸ When a temporary postponement of the royal trip in September 1567 turned

²¹³ Bosque de Segovia to Dietrichstein AGS, Est., leg. 657, fol. 11, Aug 1566. ["y no dudo q el Rey de Francia avra sentido no salir con la empresa que comenzaria a encaminar para tantos effectos...saliendo [lo] ella en util suyo, y daño de nostros, y de nra casa, y para obviar a todo lo q el pudiere tramar contra el emperador mi hermano."]

²¹⁴ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 464. "y por la antigua enemistad que siempre á nuestra casa han tenido el poco fundamento que en tal deudo y amistad se podrá hacer."

²¹⁵ Ibid., p. 450. "...se nos quieren meter por las puertas y tener prenda con todos nosotros para proseguir mejor la ruín intencion y voluntad que nos tienen."

²¹⁶ Ibid., p. 428. "...todos estos casamientos los procuraban por hacerle daño con este parentesco, que no le han podido siendo enemigos."

²¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 427 & 449.

²¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 430 & 437. At least outwardly, Philip II appears to have grasped the dangers of physical isolation for his foreign policy. In 1567, plans were underway for a royal trip to northern Europe. As part of this trip, which was mainly intended to address local unrest in the Netherlands, preparations were made for Philip II to meet Maximilian II in order to finalize the prospective marriage agreements; something which the Emperor had insisted they do in person.

out to be indefinite, though, Philip II was faced with the difficult task of orchestrating diplomatic efforts and engendering goodwill from afar.²¹⁹

From his fixed capital in Madrid, Philip II relied heavily on his agents to alleviate apprehensions and execute his dynastic vision. The resident ambassadors, Alonso de Tovar and Hernando Carrillo in Portugal and Perrenot de Chantone in the HRE, were the first points of contact responsible for gauging foreign interest in rapprochement and introducing the prospective marriage.²²⁰ They were also tasked with obstructing French efforts to gain ground before additional diplomatic support could be sent from Spain.²²¹ This additional support came in the form of special, temporary ambassadors with explicit instructions to oversee negotiations and settle disagreements.²²² Both Luis Venegas de Figueroa and Gomez de Figueroa (The Duke of Feria), sent to the HRE in 1567 and Portugal in 1568 respectively, were men of repute whose status lent weight to their mission. As part of their assignment, the two officials met regularly with local officials in order to assess the political terrain and discuss the terms of the marriages.²²³ They were also charged with communicating Philip II's sincere desire to mediate fair terms through declarations of familial affection and promises of protection from French reprisals—a vital task in light of the monarch's physical absence.²²⁴

Of course, the mediation of fair terms was rarely an easy endeavor. In particular, a stubborn dispute arose early on over the dowry amount to be paid to Portugal. Maximilian II maintained that he was incapable of paying the high sum that customarily accompanied Portuguese royal marriages.²²⁵ He also refused to match France's reported offer of 300,000 ducados. Advocates of the marriage did their best to find a compromise, pushing for both sides to agree to an amount that ranged from roughly 1/2 to 1/3 of what Catherine de Medici had promised.²²⁶ But even this proved too much for Maximilian II, who insisted on an even greater discount.

In making diplomatic overtures, Philip II also counted on support from allies residing abroad. A major advantage in negotiating with monarchies that had deep historical links with Spain was that it was easier for local officials to subscribe to the notion that dynastic

²¹⁹ For the letter informing Hernando Carrillo of the delay see *Ibid.*, pp. 466-467.

²²⁰ Ochoa Brun, *Historia*, p. 257. Alonso de Tovar was replaced by Hernando Carrillo as resident ambassador of Portugal in 1567.

²²¹ The *scripto* given by Alonso de Tovar to Sebastian of Portugal, AGS, Est., leg. 385, fol. 6, 1567.

²²² Chantone to Joanna, *Ibid.*, fol. 31, July 1567. Temporary and permanent ambassadors worked together to arrange the marriage.

²²³ For the instructions presented to Luis Venegas see CDI, Tomo XXVIII, pp. 438-456; AGS, Est., leg. 385, fol. 85 & 86, 14 May 1567. For the instructions presented to the Duke of Feria see *Ibid.*, fol. 163, 19 Feb 1568.

²²⁴ Luis Venegas to Philip II, *Ibid.*, leg. 665, fol. 18, 6 Nov 1567. [“Y assi bolvi con el y en su presencia dixe a el emp'or' todo lo que VM'd' me manda en respuesta de la buena voluntad con que ha holgado de convenir con la de (de) VM'd' en el negocio del casamiento de Portugal...]

²²⁵ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 451. Early on, Philip II anticipated problems arising from the traditional Portuguese dowry demands and attempted to resolve it before it escalated; “habeis de pasar á otro punto de mucha importancia, que es lo del dote, en que en Portugal están muy altos y han hecho grande incapié, como llevais entendido por todo lo que de allá se nos ha escrito... que el Emperador mi hermano declare hasta donde podrá llega el dote que ha de dar á su hija para concluir este casamiento, y ansí os encargamos y mandamos que trateis este particular con el Emperador muy de veras.”

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 475. Philip II wanted Maximilian II to agree to 1/2 of the French dowry amount; “diciendo que en Francia daban trecientos mil ducados, os encargo mucho que hagais todo el esfuerzo posible para que el Emperador se alargue á mas de lo que ha ofrescido, procurando que llegue á ciento y cincuenta mil ducados.”

collaboration was vital for their strategic interests. After all, many of the men had themselves served under Charles V, married into Spanish families, and/or supported Philip II's religious policies. Such was the case in 1567 when Spanish diplomats broached the topic of a Portuguese-HRE match. While not everyone approved of the proposal, such as Sebastian's Regent Cardinal Henry of Evora, the support of the majority of influential nobility in each court was enough to preclude any serious consideration of striking a deal with the French.²²⁷ In Portugal, the Archbishop of Evora, Don Julianes de Acosta, and Jorge de Silva were just a few of the powerful figures who emphasized the need to maintain friendly relations with Philip. As Acosta, the retired ambassador of Charles V, argued "that it is not in the King's [Sebastian] interest to spurn the kinship and alliance that he has with [Philip] because between France and Castile there can be neither friendship nor true peace."²²⁸ For Acosta, Sebastian's marriage came down to choosing sides. Certain of the inevitability of conflict between Castile and France, he was wary of pursuing any agreement which might pit them against their powerful neighbor. Arguments such as these were indispensable for Philip II. Not only did they echo his rhetoric, but they also imbued the elaboration of his dynastic policy with an even greater sense of urgency. Still, despite their crucial contributions, Philip II could only trust foreign nobles to a limited extent. After all, they were not family.

Pillars of Dynasty

Before Philip II inherited the throne in 1556, his father, Charles V, negotiated several marriages with important implications for the future of Spanish diplomacy. The first significant round of marriages came in 1525 when he finalized a double alliance with Portugal. By the terms of the agreement, Charles V married his first cousin, the Portuguese Infanta Isabella, while Charles V's sister, Catherine of Austria, travelled to Lisbon to betroth the Portuguese monarch, John III. In negotiating interdynastic unions with Portugal, Charles V reaffirmed traditional ties between the House of Habsburg and Avis that stretched back to the first Habsburg emperor, Frederick III, and his wife, Eleanor of Portugal, in the 15th century.²²⁹ The treaty also corresponded with traditional marriage politics in Iberia aimed at the unification of the peninsula. Although Spain only comprised part of his expansive empire, Charles V was committed to realizing this vision of a unified Iberia upon his ascension to power. In addition to the double alliance in 1525, two of his three children celebrated Portuguese marriages. The first came in 1543 when Philip II married the Portuguese Infanta, Maria Manuela. Less than ten years later, in 1552, Charles V promised his youngest daughter, Joanna of Austria, to the Prince of Portugal, João Manuel, in an attempt to sustain amicable relations with Portugal after Maria Manuela's untimely death. Both marriages proved to be fertile, albeit short lived matches that resulted in the birth of two heirs, Don Carlos of Spain and Prince Sebastian of Portugal.

²²⁷ Ibid., p. 433. "Bien tengo entendido que los hombres honrados y cuerdos están mas en este negocio del Emperador que no en el de Francia..."

²²⁸ Ibid. "y que al Rey [Sebastian] le conviene no desabrazarse del deudo y amistad que tiene con VM [Philip II] porque como entre Francia y Castilla no puede haber amistad ni paz verdadera."

²²⁹ Frederick III was the first Habsburg to become Holy Roman Emperor. He was the father of Maximilian I and great-grandfather of Charles V. For more on him see Paul-Joachim Heinig, "How Large Was the Court of Emperor Frederick III?," *Princes Patronage and the Nobility: The Court at the Beginning of the Modern Age, c. 1450-1650*, eds. Ronald G. Asch and Adolf M. Birke, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 139-156.

The only child that Charles V did not initially marry with Portugal was his eldest daughter, Maria of Austria. Instead, Maria betrothed her first cousin, the future Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian II, in 1548.²³⁰ While the decisive split between the Spanish and Austrian branches of the Habsburgs did not come until Charles V's abdication in 1556— which saw the partitioning of his empire between his son and brother— the aging emperor understood that the cultural, linguistic, and geographic divides between his children and distant members of the dynasty had the potential to undermine the Habsburgs' shared sense of identity and familial unity.²³¹ Moreover, the proliferation of reformed thought in Northern Europe raised fears that the northern branch of the Habsburgs might be susceptible to heresy.²³² A marriage between Maria and Maximilian II thus served to not only reinforce the ties that bound the dynasty together, a strategy of intradynastic marriages which would become increasingly prevalent as the pool of potential suitors in Europe began to shrink, but also ensure that Catholicism remained the dominant form of religious expression in Vienna.²³³

In addition to leading active religious lives, Habsburg women were also expected to play overtly political roles. All three of the royal women sent abroad by Charles between 1525 and 1552 occupied positions of significant authority. In Portugal, Catherine actively worked to change court culture during her tenure as Queen by contributing to the creation of a massive library in Lisbon and serving as a patron of humanist art and learning.²³⁴ A champion of women's intellectual capacities, she invited a number of the most celebrated female humanists of her day, including Joana Vaz and Públia Hortênsia de Castro, to reside in court and educate her children. She also took advantage of Portugal's monopoly of trade with the East, which afforded her access to some of the finest imports into Europe, to establish unrivaled collections of porcelain, exotic animals, and unique plants that transmitted her power to the rest of the continent through ambassadorial notes and personal gifts.²³⁵ As a result of her actions,

²³⁰ For more on Maximilian II see Fichtner, *Maximilian II*. For more on Maria see Vanessa de Cruz Medina, "'In service to my Lady, the Empress, as I have done every other day of my life': Margarita of Cardona, Baroness of Dietrichstein and Lady-in-Waiting of Maria of Austria," *The Politics of Female Households: Ladies-in-waiting across Early Modern Europe*, eds. Nadine Akkerman and Birgit Houben, (Leiden: Brill, 2014), pp. 99-119; Sánchez, *The Empress, the Queen, and the Nun*; Patrouch, *Queen's Apprentice*.

²³¹ For more on relationship between the two Habsburg branches see Ochoa Brun, *Historia*, pp. 96-144.

²³² CDI, Tomo XXVIII, pp. 481-482; Joanna to Philip II, AGS, Est., leg. 659, fol. 54.

²³³ The expectation of Maria to move abroad to promote the faith foreshadowed the later expectation of Spanish Infantas to serve as active spiritual agents tapping into their inherent devotion and piety to execute missions of conversion. This was a role, however, that Spaniards would only begin to define at the beginning of the 17th century in an attempt to justify marriage diplomacy with nations afflicted by heresy. For Charles V, as well as for Philip II, the thought of endangering their daughters in cross-confessional marriage alliances was still beyond the realm of possibility. If Maria was tasked with ensuring that her Habsburg cousins continued to adhere to Catholic teachings through her presence and pious example, it can only be assumed that her father had already minimized the possibility that the Austrian branch would disavow their oaths and repudiate their loyalty to the Holy Roman Church. For more on this topic see Chapter 3-4.

²³⁴ Annemarie Jordan Gschwend, "Joana de Castilla y Catalina de Austria: La formación de la colección de la reina en Tordesillas y Lisboa," *Joana I de Castilla, 1504-1555. De su reclusión en Tordesillas al olvido de la Historia. I Simposio Internacional sobre la Reina Joanna de Castilla. Tordesillas (Valladolid), 23-24 de Noviembre 2005*, ed. Miguel Angel Zalama, (Valladolid: Ayuntamiento de Tordesillas, 2006), pp. 143-171; *Ibid.*, "Catherine of Austria: a Portuguese Queen in the Shadow of the Habsburg Court?," *Portuguese Studies Review* 13, (1-2), (2005), pp. 173-194.

²³⁵ Veronika Sandbichler, "Elements of Power in Court Festivals of Habsburg Emperors in the Sixteenth Century," *Ceremonial Entries in Early Modern Europe: The Iconography of Power*, eds. J.R. Mulryne, Maria Ines Alverti, and Anna Maria Testaverde, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2015), p. 177. In one grandiose gesture of affection typical of

Catherine's personal reputation grew throughout her tenure and, upon the death of her husband John III in 1557, she assumed the role of queen regent. Afterward, Catherine took on direct responsibility for administrative functions in accordance with her position, sanctioned by Charles V, as regent over her grandson, Sebastian of Portugal.²³⁶ Even after Sebastian came into his majority and began to express his independent will, Catherine's status as a matriarchal figure within the dynasty was enough to ensure that her political influence in Portugal and abroad remained intact through the 1560's.²³⁷

In neighboring Spain, successive generations of female rulers paved the way for Maria and Joanna to assume positions of political authority by the middle of the 16th century. Isabel of Castile was the first female sovereign of a unified Spain, ruling alongside her husband, Ferdinand, but maintaining sole control in the kingdom of Castile over tax collection, military and ecclesiastical appointments, and the summoning of troops.²³⁸ After her death in 1504, Isabel was succeeded by Joanna of Castile, or *la loca*, whose purported mental instability confined her to a monastery but who nevertheless remained *de jure* queen during her lifetime.²³⁹ Finally, Maria and Joanna's mother, Isabella of Portugal, reigned from 1529-1532 and 1535-1539 as regent for Charles during his military campaigns.²⁴⁰ Her tenure was marked by strong leadership and testified once again to women's capacity for prudent governance and effective decision-making. It also left a lasting impression on Philip II, whose close relationship and deep reverence for his mother inspired his confidence in the political acumen of female family members.²⁴¹ For the rest of his life, Philip II demonstrated an unwavering trust in his sisters and daughters to act as trustworthy allies with whom he could consult and petition support. For their part, Maria and Joanna also internalized their mother's approach to political affairs, actively inserting themselves through direct participation and indirect strategies into ongoing matters of state.

Maria and Joanna's earliest opportunity to acquire political experience came while serving as regents of Spain. As the eldest, Maria was the first to be selected by Charles V to govern alongside her husband, Maximilian II, while Philip II traveled through Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands from 1548-1551.²⁴² The presence of Maria's husband may have circumscribed her overall autonomy, but her contributions nevertheless remained invaluable as she helped Maximilian II navigate Spain's complex and unfamiliar political terrain. Eventually,

Catherine, she sent her favorite grandson, the five year old Don Carlos of Spain, a baby elephant to serve as a companion and playmate.

²³⁶ Félix Labrador Arroyo, "La casa de la reina Catalina de Portugal: Estructura y facciones políticas (1550-1560)," *Miscelánea Comillas. Revista de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales* 61, (2003), pp. 203-252; José Maria de Queiroz Veloso, "A política castelhana da Rainha D. Catarina de Austria," *Estudos históricos do século XVI*, (Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa da Historia, 1950), pp. 19-133; Joaquim Verissimo, "A regencia de D. Catarina," *Historia de Portugal, 3, O Século de Ouro, 1495-1580*, (Lisbon: Editorial Verbo, 1977), pp. 58-60.

²³⁷ Duke of Feria to Philip II, AGS, Est., leg. 385, fol. 164, 27 Oct 1568.

²³⁸ Giles Tremlett, *Isabella of Castile: Europe's First Great Queen*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2017); Barbara F. Weissberger, "Tanto monta: The Catholic Monarchs' Nuptial Fiction and the Power of Isabel I of Castile," *The Rule of Women*, eds. Cruz and Suzuki, pp. 43-63; Peggy K. Liss, *Isabel the Queen: Life and Times*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania University Press, 2004); Weissberger, *Isabel Rules*.

²³⁹ María A. Gómez, Santiago Juan-Navarro, and Phyllis Zatlin, eds., *Joanna of Castile: History and Myth of the Mad Queen*, (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2008); Aram, *Joanna the Mad*.

²⁴⁰ For an overview of female Habsburg regents in Spain see Jansen, *The Monstrous Regiment*, pp. 67-110.

²⁴¹ Álvarez, *Felipe II y su tiempo*, pp. 629-643.

²⁴² Parker, *Imprudent King*, pp. 26-40. The tour was an opportunity for Philip II to gain experience in European politics, and contributed to his love of Renaissance culture.

Maria left for Germany where she resided for several decades as the Holy Roman empress and gave birth to sixteen children. Still, the impression in the Spanish court of Maria's political capability remained positive, and, upon the death of Maximilian II, she was considered to serve as Philip II's regent in either the Netherlands or Portugal.²⁴³ When neither of these two options materialized, Maria quickly established herself as a force in Madrid upon her return in 1581. In addition to serving as representative for her brother at different points, she also resided atop an influential court faction that actively advocated for pro-Habsburg policies.²⁴⁴

Joanna did not have to wait long after Maria's departure in 1551 before she was similarly called upon to govern Spain. The urgent need to find another regent arose in the fall of 1553, after marriage negotiations with England raised the prospect of Philip II moving to London to rule alongside Mary Tudor.²⁴⁵ Fully aware of the dangers posed by vacating the Spanish throne for the second time in the span of five years, Philip II turned to his recently widowed younger sister to rule his domains. In 1554, Joanna left behind her infant son, whom she would never see again, and her claim to regency powers in Portugal to fulfill her dynastic obligation.²⁴⁶ For the next five years, until her brother's return in 1559, she governed Spain as sole sovereign. Left with instructions on how to proceed, and in constant communication with both Philip II and Charles V, Joanna was still able to express an independent will that took into account first and foremost the well-being of her kingdoms.²⁴⁷ When Philip II wrote her repeatedly for money for his ventures abroad, for instance, Joanna did not hesitate to point out that there was nothing to send and deny his request. In governing, she also adopted an active approach to domestic issues, such as the threat posed by reformed religion. After reports arrived of Lutheran activity in Valladolid, she oversaw a quick and harsh response with several of the perpetrators executed for their impiety.²⁴⁸ Overall, Joanna's tenure of rule was marked by a remarkable degree of success on par with her female predecessors. Not only did she protect her brother's political prerogatives and maintain the Habsburgs' monarchical authority, but she also secured religious uniformity, vital for the dynasty's claims of legitimacy, on the peninsula. Clearly, Philip II appreciated Joanna's achievements and, after his return, he continued to value her input and entrust her with responsibilities in the government of the empire.²⁴⁹

The strategic location of politically experienced Habsburg women both at home and abroad greatly aided the execution of policy. Early modern marriage politics were often self-perpetuating as the successful negotiation of an alliance increased the likelihood of a similar agreement in the future. In part, this can be explained by the establishment of a contractual framework for the resolution of any disagreements that also served as a positive historical precedent for future diplomatic conduct. The richer the tradition of intermarriage, the easier it

²⁴³ Jansen, *The Monstrous Regiment of Women*, p. 107.

²⁴⁴ The pro-Habsburg faction is written about extensively in Sánchez, *The Empress, the Queen, and the Nun*.

²⁴⁵ Philip II served as King of England and Ireland from 1554-1558. During this time, he resided in the royal English court alongside his Queen Mary Tudor. For more on his reign see Benton Rain Patterson, *With the Heart of a King: Elizabeth I of England, Philip II of Spain, and the Fight for a Nation's Soul and Crown*, (New York: St Martin's Press, 2007).

²⁴⁶ Anton Villacorta Baños-García, *La Jesuita: Joanna de Austria*, (Barcelona: Ariel, 2005); For brief account of her regency see Danvila, *Felipe II y El Rey Don Sebastián*, pp. 63-67.

²⁴⁷ Jansen, *The Monstrous Regiment*, p. 106.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁹ For an example of an impassioned letter written by Joanna regarding Spanish policy in Germany see Joanna to Philip II, AGS, Est., leg. 659, fol. 54.

was for the Spanish monarchy to overcome feelings of mistrust and engage in fruitful negotiations. Another consequence of a consistent dynastic policy was the rise of factions in royal courts that coalesced around the foreign-born Infantas and advocated for Habsburg interests. During the eighty-year period preceding Portugal's incorporation into Philip II's empire, from roughly 1500-1580, there were only 10 years in which a Spanish-born Infanta did not reside in the Portuguese court. By way of contrast, Spanish Infantas only resided 17 years in France and 24 years in England during the same period. Consequently, Philip II could anticipate a far greater degree of local support for his advances in Lisbon than he could in Paris or London, where the Infantas failed to establish their presence as influential political players and foster lasting pro-Spanish sympathies. Familial ties with the Austrian Habsburgs also ensured that Spanish advances received positive reception in Vienna, where Maria's presence helped to minimize any potential misunderstanding caused by the recent division of Charles V's empire and facilitate close relations between the two factions.

Throughout his reign, Philip II maintained regular correspondences with his aunts, sisters, and daughters in order to inform them of his objectives and coordinate their collective efforts to advance familial interests. In return, he expected them to provide him with information about foreign affairs and sway the decision-making process in his favor. In writing letters to family members across Europe and interceding on their dynasty's behalf, women were actively involved in the execution of grand designs and the perpetuation of Habsburg power.²⁵⁰ In light of the dynasty's dependence on marriage politics to expand its authority, the most significant contribution of women arguably came in the negotiation of new alliances. After identifying an advantageous match, Philip II invariably reached out to female family members in order to solicit their support in advancing the new proposal. He also elected to send direct messages to update them on changes in his schemes and, if necessary, justify a new course of action.

In order to facilitate collaboration between Habsburg women and Spanish agents, ambassadors often received explicit orders detailing the diplomatic relationships they were expected to establish with foreign queens. In this way, female contributions worked in conjunction with ambassadorial activities conducted through formal diplomatic channels. Diplomats in both the Holy Roman Empire and Portugal received orders from Philip II to frequently consult with Empress Maria and Queen Catherine respectively in order to assess the local political climate and devise a plan of action.²⁵¹ Feria's letters show that he relied heavily on Catherine's advice, structuring his interactions with Sebastian around her input. On one occasion, he was even careful to postpone his own treatment of the marriage because he had not yet consulted the queen; "and because until I had spoken with the queen it was not prudent to come to specifics, I managed to excuse myself from the discussion as best and most gently as I knew how and I went to the queen's chamber."²⁵² Chantone and Venegas similarly took Maria's advice into account when engaging in talks with Maximilian II, avoiding certain points and

²⁵⁰ Henry Kamen, "El secreto de Felipe II: Las mujeres que influyeron en su vida," *Torre de los Lujanes: Boletín de la Real Sociedad Económica Matritense de Amigos del País* 32, (1996), pp. 53–64.

²⁵¹ For examples regarding Maria see CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 453; Luis Venegas to Joanna, AGS, Est., leg. 665, fol. 28, 6 March 1568. For example regarding Catherine see CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 470; Philip II to the Duke of Feria, AGS, Est., leg. 385, fol. 163, 19 Feb 1568.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, fol. 164, 27 Oct 1568. ["y porque hasta hablar a la reyna no convenia venir a particularidades, procure de salirme de la platica lo mejor y mas duclemente que supe y fui me a la posento de la reyna."]

pursuing others based of her council.²⁵³ The actions of both diplomats demonstrate the high regard in which Habsburg women living abroad were held. They were perceived as sources of knowledge and insight, capable of providing crucial information that could make the difference between success and failure of diplomatic missions.²⁵⁴

Personal relationships provided royal women with another avenue to influence negotiations. Courtly halls, holy places, and bedchambers became sites of political activity as Habsburg women, denied access to formal political institutions by the constraints inherent in early modern prescriptions of female behavior, engaged with local authorities in unofficial settings to advocate different initiatives. Generally, this indirect strategy was most effective when targeted at close relatives. In Vienna, Maria largely focused her persuasive efforts on her husband in order to advance talks and secure greater concessions. This was an approach supported by Philip II, who urged Maria in the wake of a disagreement over her daughter's dowry to shed her initial preference to proceed with caution and "arrange with the emperor to concede in this [matter] as much as possible."²⁵⁵ Joanna partook in a similar interaction with Sebastian, albeit from a distance, urging him to align Portuguese interests with Spain by pursuing marriages authorized by Philip. In both instances, Maria and Joanna's physical and/or emotional proximity to foreign monarchs allowed them to interject themselves in diplomatic proceedings and facilitate compromise.

Notably, Philip II's reliance on female relatives was not limited to informal channels, but extended to include their direct participation in formal negotiations. Unlike Maria and Catherine, Joanna did not reside abroad during the height of marriage negotiations in the 1560's. Consequently, she was unable to directly engage with foreign officials on behalf of her son and dynasty. With Catherine entrusted with representing the Habsburgs in Lisbon, Joanna instead worked from Madrid to support her brother's efforts to orchestrate a grand European alliance.²⁵⁶ In the case of the dowry dispute that arose between Portugal and the HRE in 1567, Joanna coordinated efforts from Madrid to find a mutually agreeable resolution for both parties. To this end, she took a proactive role in diplomatic exchanges that included reaching out to Spanish officials, providing updates, and delivering additional orders. In September 1567, Philip II referred his agents to Joanna on all matters pertaining to the dowry; "I am not contributing any more [other] than to refer to what the princess, my sister, is writing, who has wanted to take the lead to treat the resolution of this matter."²⁵⁷ The designation of Joanna as the central authority and single point of contact on a major diplomatic issue thrust her to the forefront of Habsburg

²⁵³ Capitulation to send to Chantone, *Ibid.*, leg. 663, fol. 142. ["Sera bien que vos [Chantone], o Luis Venegas lo sepais de mi hermana [Maria] y siendo assi, con su orden y parescer hablareis en ello al emperador, en la forma y por los terminos que ella os lo mandare."]

²⁵⁴ Joanna also maintained regular correspondences with foreign officials about everything from the status of negotiations to the physical health and appearance of a prospective bride. For an example involving Anna's health and concerns that a recent bout of smallpox may have scarred her face see Chantone to Joanna, *Ibid.*, leg. 385, fol. 32, 20 July 1567. ["... pues q el emperador se detiene hasta que la princesa Ana acabe de convalescer, que le han sobrevenido las viruelas, de las quales ya esta con hasta mejoría, pero hasta agora no se puede decir qual quedara la cara, todavia como el mal no ha sido muy vehemente, y va pasando ya, es de esperar que no le hara gran daño..."]

²⁵⁵ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 471. "...procure con el Emperador que tienda la mano en esto todo lo posible." The actual letter can be found at AGS, Est., leg. 385, fols. 92 & 93.

²⁵⁶ Philip II to Alonso de Tovar, AGS, Est., leg. 385, fol. 119, 13 Feb 1567. At the end of one letter, Philip II scribbled explicit orders that the official political correspondence be made available for Joanna to review.

²⁵⁷ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 470. "no les escribo yo ninguna cosa mas de remitirme á lo que la Princesa mi hermana les escribe sobre ello, la cual ha querido tomar la mano para tratar de la resolucion deste punto."

strategic planning. More than a dutiful follower motivated by a sense of familial obligation, Joanna was an active collaborator with Philip II taking her own initiative to procure her son's marriage.

Maria also played an active role in the negotiation of her daughters' marriages. Throughout her life, Maria was endowed with considerable authority over Spanish agents. This authority was directly authorized by Philip II, who trusted her to operate in the best interests of their dynasty. In response to one request by Maria that an order sent to the *comendador mayor* be confirmed, Philip II responded; "a particular order of mine was not necessary in order that he on this matter and in all matters serves your highness [Maria], indeed all of my servants are obliged to serve you as they would me."²⁵⁸ Despite being the empress, Maria was still treated by the Spanish monarch as an extension of himself; a clear sign that he never doubted their mutual respect and shared sense of purpose.

When difficulties arose in the negotiations, Philip II did not hesitate to appeal to the empress for her support. During the dowry dispute, for instance, he had Luis Venegas request Maria's aid in securing a greater amount; "speak with the Empress my sister, and tell her what I wish to see have finally settled on this transaction, and what is agreeable for all of us."²⁵⁹ In response, Maria began urging Maximilian II to increase the dowry. The intervention worked. In March, 1568, after months of negotiating and Maria working behind the scenes, the emperor finally reconsidered his original position. According to Luis Venegas in a letter written to Joanna, Maximilian was willing to offer a dowry equivalent to 100,000 ducados, which was "in agreement to what the empress told him."²⁶⁰ The letter goes on to state that Maria would have been willing to push for more, but thought that anything greater would be impossible to secure and considered it better to not impose an obligatory amount on her husband.

The status of royal women as mothers made them ideal intermediaries in the negotiation of new marriages. As a result of differences in gendered expectations during the early modern period, female participation in political processes was often framed in a way that corresponded with women's domestic or spiritual duties. In wielding political authority, Catherine, Maria, and Joanna were depicted as dutiful wives, sisters, and mothers whose possession of natural characteristics such as affection, passivity, and nurturance made them ideal placeholders.²⁶¹ These depictions, which belied their actual authority, allowed them to assume greater responsibilities without contradicting their subordinate position within the patriarchal system.

In the context of marriage politics, the representation of women as loving mothers invested in the well-being of their children created the impression that they could be trusted to perform diplomatic functions with sincerity and prudence. In a letter written by Philip II to his German ambassador, Luis Venegas, 1567, the Spanish monarch reminded him that he should continue to work closely with his sister Maria and trust her in negotiations for a Portuguese match as a result of "the love and affection that she owes to the placement of her own

²⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 472. "no era menester órden particular mia para que en esto y en todo lo demás sirva a V.A. [Maria], pues todo mis criados la han de servir como á mi propia persona."

²⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 473-474. "hableis á la Emperatriz mi hermana, y le digais que por lo que desea ver acabado de asentar este negocio, y por lo que á todos conviene."

²⁶⁰ Luis Venegas to Joanna, AGS, Est., leg. 665, fol. 28, 6 March 1568. ["conforme a lo que la emperatriz le dixo."]

²⁶¹ For more on the depiction and activities of royal Habsburg women see Sánchez, *The Empress, the Queen, and the Nun*, pp. 36-60.

daughter.”²⁶² Philip II similarly framed Catherine’s contributions in motherly terms, claiming that he chose to disclose all information to her so that she “as mother and lady of all, [could] guide and lead with her considerable prudence and Christianity.”²⁶³ For Maria and Catherine, the socially prescribed role of maternal caregiver had political implications as their responsibility to look after their offspring extended to the formulation and execution of policy.

Art enhanced the positive perception of Habsburg women as caring mothers whose political involvement stemmed from an inclination to safeguard their children’s interests. Philip II, Catherine, Joanna, and Maria were united across vast distances by a mutual appreciation for Renaissance visual culture. They understood that in addition to being aesthetically pleasing, art provided a means of molding the dynasty’s image and projecting its power and wealth to the rest of the continent. Beginning with the reign of Charles V, artistic production under Habsburg patronage flourished the period’s most celebrated artists, including Titian, Antonis Mor, Alonso Sánchez Coello, and Sofonisba Anguissola, devoted their attention to private commissions depicting a range of themes and subjects. Arguably the most popular genre of painting, alongside religious imagery, was portraiture.²⁶⁴ There was a voracious demand for lifelike depictions of royal figures, both male and female, to decorate local courts and send abroad to relatives and foreign monarchies as signs of affection and diplomatic goodwill. The most common commissions for asserting the commanding presence of the subject were individual portraits. However, group portraits were also commissioned in which the interaction of different subjects served to define socially acceptable relationships and confirm gender roles.

An example is the portrait of Joanna and a young, unidentified girl produced by Anguissola in 1561. In the image, the 26 year-old princess, shown wearing solemn black attire to mark her status as a mourning widow, gently draws the child closer in an affectionate gesture that communicates the close bond between the two. The gesture is reciprocated by the child as she leans closely toward Joanna, partly enveloping herself in the folds of the black dress as if to take shelter from the observer. The portrait, which presents the princess assuming motherly responsibilities to protect and care for the child, is significant in light of Joanna’s separation from Sebastian during his infancy. Deprived of the opportunity to raise and nurture her own son, Joanna continued to perform and embody feminine characteristics associated with motherhood such as looking after her nieces, Isabel Clara Eugenia and Catherine Michelle.²⁶⁵ Her image as a natural caregiver sincerely devoted to the well-being of her charge, in conjunction with the interest she consistently showed in her son’s development through a personal collection of his portraits, authorized her participation in political affairs tied to Sebastian’s monarchy.

²⁶² CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 474. “y con el amor y entrañas que debe á la colocacion de su propia hija.”

²⁶³ Ibid., p. 490. “como madre y señora de todos, gué y encamine con su mucha prudencia y cristiandad...”

²⁶⁴ Sheila Ffolliott, “‘The Italian ‘Training’ of Catherine de Medici: Portraits as Dynastic Narrative,” *The Court Historian* 10, Issue 1, (Oct., 2005), pp. 37-53. A convincing argument is made for the importance of royal portraiture in developing the notion of dynasty for young women destined to be married abroad.

²⁶⁵ Villacorta, *Don Sebastian*, p. 96.



Joanna of Austria and a Young Girl, Sofonisba Anguissola, 1561-1562,
Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum, Boston

Maria's possession of motherly instincts was similarly emphasized in artistic depictions. Although they were less common in the 16th century, portraits of a royal family provided a way to illustrate legitimate descent and convey the impression of political stability. They also revealed the family dynamics and role relationships within the immediate household. One of the most notable family portraits of the period was Giuseppe Arcimboldo's depiction of the Austrian Habsburgs in 1563. In contrast to the restrained and somber portrayal of Joanna, Arcimboldo's painting vividly captures a moment of meaningful interaction between different members as they assume their socially prescribed place before the observer. To the right, Maximilian II stands aloof with one hand gently holding the hilt of his sword. His physical distance from his children is conspicuous, signaling the ideological dissociation between manhood and domestic obligations such as childrearing. Maria, on the other hand, hovers closely over her children with one reassuring hand gently caressing the head of Anna, her eldest daughter and the future wife of Philip. The closest in proximity, Anna appears wary to distance herself from Maria as she maintains contact with her leg and proceeds to mirror her pose exactly. Far from a sign of weakness or lack of character, her hesitancy to distinguish herself from her mother testifies to the intimate connection between the two as the empress imbues her daughter with regal confidence and an understanding of her responsibilities as a female Habsburg. Maria possesses a similar bond with her youngest child, Ernest, whose fixed stare communicates a clear preference for motherly attention. Although he is destined as a male to one day break away, he is naturally drawn as an infant to the love and nurturance provided by Maria. Indeed, only Rudolf, the eldest son and heir to the throne, proceeds to distance himself as he reaches longingly for his father. His

actions and gaze reveal his fixation with Maximilian II and mark his emergence as a young man destined to rule. But, even as Rudolph begins to embrace a new, masculine role as heir to the throne, he leans on Maria for support—a gesture indicting the enduring importance of their relationship. As an attentive, caring mother, Maria was expected to play an integral role in the lives of all her children by supporting their political endeavors, looking after their interests, and securing advantageous marriages.



Maximilian II and His Family, Giuseppe Arcimboldo, 1563,
Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna

The approval of royal mothers was often a vital aspect of legitimizing alliances. Since royal mothers were thought to be sincerely concerned with the best interests of their children, their endorsement of a specific proposal was often interpreted by observers as evidence of the marriage's equitable or advantageous nature. Philip II recognized this fact, emphasizing the active collaboration of his female relatives in order to create a positive impression of his marriage schemes. In the context of negotiations being conducted in the late 1560s, the monarchy's most vital collaborator was Joanna because she allowed Philip II to validate his insistent claim that he was negotiating an agreement in the best interests of the Portuguese monarchy.²⁶⁶ This was a claim that came under heavy criticism after 1569 when Philip II, in a sudden move at odds with his staunch anti-Valois strategy, terminated the nearly finalized agreement between Portugal and the Holy Roman Empire in favor of a new marriage project that incorporated the French. Anticipating objections to this disruptive change, which undermined

²⁶⁶ *Apuntamientos* of royal junta, AGS, Est., leg 662, fol. 33, 26 Feb 1569. [“pide muy afectuosamente a su Al’a’ tome la mano como tan buena hermana para q entre el [Philip II] y su sobrino [Sebastian] se accomoden como el negocio lo pide de suyo y es forcoso.”]

nearly two years of diplomatic negotiations, Philip II wrote Catherine two detailed letters explaining the decision and how she should respond to opposition. In an attempt to defend the new arrangement, Philip II was careful to emphasize Joanna's involvement;

“it is good that Your Highness [Catherine] understand that this was communicated to the princess, my sister, as a mother who is principally affected by this matter, and having very well understood, [she] has concurred and agreed to the same as your majesty will understand in more detail from her letters.”²⁶⁷

Joanna's close personal investment in the marriage “as a mother” privileged her input in the ultimate decision to formulate a new alliance. By articulating her support, she allowed Philip II to downplay his role and give the new marriage project a degree of legitimacy that it did not otherwise possess.

Philip II's Grand Alliance

The first indication that the Portuguese-HRE match might fail was continuing uncertainty over the status of Don Carlos' marriage to Anna of Austria. Philip II's effort to delay the treatment of this marriage, beginning in 1565, was a source of frustration in Vienna, where reports detailing Don Carlos' infatuation with Isabel contradicted Spanish claims that the prince was not yet inclined to marry.²⁶⁸ Even the Spanish monarch's most loyal supporter, his sister Maria, could not help but express her disappointment. Alongside her husband she yearned, even if Don Carlos was slightly mad, to “[have] her daughter reside in the company of the princess [Joanna]” and treated with “love and respect.”²⁶⁹ Still, despite growing frustration abroad, Philip II consistently avoided treating the matter. In 1567, before sending Luis Venegas to negotiate Sebastian's betrothal to Isabel, he gave explicit orders to sideline Don Carlos' marriage by insisting that it was uncontested and therefore did not require urgent attention.²⁷⁰ By way of contrast, French designs to supplant Isabel with Marguerite meant that the new agreement needed to be finalized as quickly as possible. This attempt to keep the two marriages separate utterly failed to impress Maximilian II, who refused to surrender powers to finalize the Portuguese union.²⁷¹

Maximilian II's insistence on settling Anna's marriage before proceeding with Isabel's was intensified by alarming news about Don Carlos. No longer inclined to idly accept his son's increasingly violent and unpredictable behavior, Philip II oversaw a dramatic late night operation

²⁶⁷ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 499. “es bien que V.A. [Catherine] entienda que esto se comunicó con la Princesa mi hermana como madre á quien tan principalmente este negocio toca, y habiéndolo muy bien entendido ha convenido y concurrido en lo mismo como V.A. lo entenderá mas en particular por sus cartas.”

²⁶⁸ Ibid., Tomo XXVI, pp. 542 & 545.

²⁶⁹ Luis Venegas to Joanna, AGS, Est., leg. 665, fol. 28, 6 March 1568. [“habiendo de estar su hija en compania de la princesa (Joanna).”]; “[amor y respecto.”]

²⁷⁰ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 453. “como no importa ni va nada tratar de la conclusion del un casamiento para la resolucion del otro, pues deste del Principe mi hijo podremos tratar de los dos juntos como mas hubiere de convenir el gusto y satisfacion del Emperador, principalmente que no hay quien en esta nos ponga sombra ni impedimento ninguno para que le concluyamos cuando mejor nos estuviere al uno y al otro, como lo hay en estotro de Portugal, por las razones que se os han declarado.”

²⁷¹ Luis Venegas to Philip II, AGS, Est., leg. 665, fol. 2, 6 Feb 1668.

on January 18, 1568 to personally issue his arrest.²⁷² News of the night's events sent shock waves throughout the leading courts of Europe. In Vienna, Maximilian II's first instinct was to dispatch a representative to Spain to assess the situation.²⁷³ But with cooler heads ultimately prevailing, he instead chose to express his dismay to Venegas and politely request that Philip II explain his actions.²⁷⁴ He also took the additional step of temporarily forestalling all negotiations with Portugal, claiming that the union was all but finalized and thus did not require additional treatment until Don Carlos' status had been resolved.²⁷⁵

With his entire dynastic plan on the verge of collapse, Philip II had no choice but to drastically alter his policy. In March, Venegas warned Joanna that Maximilian II still had a French proposal on the table that he would likely accept if his deal with Spain fell through.²⁷⁶ Philip II responded by throwing his weight behind this new union and offering to oversee the negotiations in a calculated effort to maintain his grip over the rest of Europe;

“In light of the Lord permitting that, with so much personal anguish, the talks regarding the prince [Don Carlos] come to an end, it seems to me that the Princess Anna should be given to France, which is in effect, outside of the [marriage] here, that which is the best and most paramount for Christianity given the quality and grandeur of that king and kingdom... and considering it fitting, I will intervene and treat the arrangement with the same goodwill that I would if she was my own daughter.”²⁷⁷

²⁷² Bruquetas, *Don Carlos*, p. 341. The arrest was a dramatic affair in which Philip II stormed into the room donning full armor and flanked by influential councilors.

²⁷³ Luis Venegas to Philip II, AGS, Est., leg. 665, fol. 2, 6 Feb 1668. [“Que entendiendo que el emperador queria embiar persona suya a interceder con su M'd' en este caso, hablo Luis Venegas a la emperatriz la qual le dixo, que era assi, pero que lo havia dilatado el emp'or' hasta saber la voluntad de su M'd'...”] Catherine had a similar response in Portugal, expressing her desire to travel to Spain personally to assess the circumstances of Don Carlos' arrest. See Chantone to Philip II, *Ibid.*, leg. 658, fol. 3, 28 July 1568. [“...que la Reyna de Portugal [Catherine] havia querido yr a Castilla para entender bien lo que passava en esto del recogimiento del Principe mi s'r', y que esto se havia desviado no obstante que es abuela.”]

²⁷⁴ Philip II to Chantone and Luis Venegas, *Ibid.*, leg. 663, fol. 201, 22 Jan 1568. [“Sino que con razon se deve considerar y creer, que las dichas causas deven haver sido tales, y tan urgentes, que han requerido por remedio, un termino tan estrecho y demostracion tan grande, como la que se ha hecho, y que la particularidad dellas, entendeis se la comunicaremos mas adelante, con el amor y synceridad que agora les comunicamos, lo que se offresce, pues es el que requiere nra buena y verdadera hermandad.”] While Philip II did send a general letter to the HRE at the end of January, he closely guarded the details of Don Carlos' imprisonment even from his closest allies. To this end, Chantone and Luis Venegas were given specific orders to hinder any plans which Maximilian might have to send an official to Spain to further investigate the matter. Instead, they were to provide a vague explanation for the imprisonment. For transcriptions of the letters sent by Philip II to Pope Pius, Maximilian II, Maria, and Catherine see Álvarez, *Felipe II y su tiempo*, pp. 416-419.

²⁷⁵ Luis Venegas to Joanna, AGS, Est., leg. 665, fol. 28, 6 March 1568. [“pero que le havia parescido suspenderla, hasta saber la voluntad de su Mag'd' en lo de su hija major, que seria con brevedad, y que al negocio no le importava, pues estando en el estado que estava havia poco que hacer en el.”]

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.* [“Y tiene por cosa cierta que en hallando el negocio impossibilitado yra a dar en Francia, lo que plegue a Dios no permita por el grandissimo mal y daño que desto se seguiria a la Christiandad.”]

²⁷⁷ Philip II to Chantone, *Ibid.*, leg. 663, fol. 107, 22 May 1568. [“Que pues Dios ha permitido que, con tanto dolor mio, cesse la platica del Principe, me parece que se deve dar a Francia la Princesa Anna, pues en efecto, fuera de lo de aquí, es aquello lo mejor y mas principal de la Christiandad por la qualidad y grandeza de aquel Rey y Reyno... y que teniendolo por bien, yo me interporne y tratare el negocio con la misma voluntad que si fuera mi hija.”]

For a short time, Philip II's endorsement of a French match succeeded in calming tensions, even after his son's mysterious death on July 24, 1568. Satisfied that his eldest daughter's future was guaranteed, Maximilian II entrusted his younger brother, the Archduke Charles II, to travel to Madrid to settle Isabel's marriage to Sebastian.²⁷⁸

Unfortunately, while the archduke's journey was underway, the Spanish monarchy suffered another major blow. On October 3, 1568, Isabel of Valois died during childbirth. The sudden loss devastated Philip II, capping what later historians would refer to as his *annus horribilis*.²⁷⁹ It also raised concerns in the royal court about a potential succession crisis. Compelled to suppress his grief by the imperative need to produce a legitimate male heir, Philip II moved quickly to reconfigure the marriage market yet again lest he jeopardize the perpetuation of Habsburg authority in Spain.

Discussions revolving around an entirely new set of unions began shortly after Charles II's arrival on December 10, 1568. In an early meeting, Philip II politely interrupted the archduke to point out that the state of affairs had changed and needed to be taken into account, hinting at the possibility of a new marriage between him and his eldest niece, Anna of Austria.²⁸⁰ Maximilian II and Maria, who had always preferred a Spanish suitor for Anna, were elated by the offer and quickly accepted. Eager for things to proceed smoothly, they also agreed to surrender all authority to settle Isabel's marriage.²⁸¹

At this point, Philip II was no longer interested in settling an agreement between Portugal and the HRE. Far more pressing was the political and religious necessity of preventing a marital alliance between the French monarchy and Protestant princes in Germany, which would likely occur if Philip II offended Charles IX by depriving him of his intended bride.²⁸² In order to make Anna available, Philip II decided to cancel Isabel's marriage to Sebastian and promise her to the French king. Sebastian, in turn, would marry Marguerite of Valois, thereby uniting the four nations "that are the heads of Christianity in the temporal realm... so that within it they might preserve peace and universal tranquility."²⁸³ Throughout the month February, Philip II had a

²⁷⁸ Maximilian II to Philip II, *Ibid.*, leg. 658, fol. 1, 27 July 1568. The decision to send Charles II, which was originally made while Don Carlos was alive, did not come without controversy. Both Chantone and Luis Venegas did everything in their power to dissuade Maximilian II, including petitioning Maria's help, but to no avail. Their petition can be found at Chantone to Philip II, *Ibid.*, fol. 3, 28 July 1568. For the instructions given by Maximilian II to the Archduke see *Ibid.*, leg. 662, fol. 81.

²⁷⁹ Álvarez, *Felipe II y su tiempo*, p. 395.

²⁸⁰ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 484. "hubiese causado tanta novedad en las cosas, respondió S.M. así al señor archiduque como al cardenal que en ninguna manera se podría pasar adelante en la plática destes matrimonios sin reimitirlo y escribirlo al Emperador y Emperatriz sus hermanos."

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 485-486. "que la orden que tenia era que si S.M. queria para si la Princesa Ana no se dispusiese de Isabel, sino que totalmente se reservase y se le remitiese."

²⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 493. "y aunque en otro tiempo y estado de cosas el quedar el Rey de Francia excluido y ofendido no fuera de tanta consideracion, en el que al presente se hallan las de aquel reino y Rey lo es tan grande, que nos obliga á todos los Príncipes que somos cristianos y católicos á mirar mucho en ello... se teme seria persuadido y atraido en esta ocasion por los malos, que con mucha solicitud lo procuran en su reino, á que casase en Alemania, como se le ha ántes de agora tratado y movido, de que asimismo resultaria el concertarse con los herejes y rebeldes de su reino."

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 487. "que son las cabezas de la cristiandad en lo temporal... para que en ella se conserve la paz y tranquilidad universal."

special council (*junta*) of four trusted advisors confer with Charles II and the French ambassador, the Cardinal of Guise, to hammer out the details of the new project. Noticeably absent from the discussion was any representative from Portugal. Although Joanna was tacitly involved, eventually throwing her weight behind the new agreement, she did not participate in formal talks on behalf of her son.²⁸⁴ For their part, Sebastian and his court only came to learn of the alterations after they had been settled, and Philip II deemed it prudent to inform them.

Anticipating strong objections in Portugal, Philip II reached out to his aunt Catherine for her support in facilitating acceptance of the new alliance. Besides presenting the change in dynastic alignments to Sebastian and Cardinal Henry in a positive light, Catherine was entrusted with reaching out to members of the court to garner backing for the initiative before news reached the Portuguese Council of State. On the crucial task, Philip II wrote, “and together your Majesty will see that before this matter is introduced to the council or more people offer their opinion, it will be best to have forewarned the King [Sebastian], the Cardinal [Henry], and some others that see it’s agreeable.”²⁸⁵ The plan to have Catherine spearhead the formation of an amenable coalition reflects a general recognition of women’s potential to orchestrate support and shape political outcomes through informal channels such as kinship and patronage ties. Philip II had good reason to fear that the disruptive termination of Sebastian’s marriage with Isabel would negatively impact relations with the Portuguese monarchy by shaking their trust in Spanish sincerity and goodwill.²⁸⁶ He thus relied on Catherine to reach outside her immediate family circle to create an atmosphere amenable to his policy.

In a similar fashion, Philip II anticipated Catherine exercising considerable control over negotiations between Portugal and France. During the pursuit of strategic marriage agreements, a special ambassador was often dispatched to work alongside the resident ambassador for the duration of negotiations. After the change in marital plans after 1569, however, Philip II did not send any additional agents to Lisbon. The reasons for this break from tradition were twofold. First, Philip II’s trust in Catherine to win over necessary allies and work in conjunction with Sebastian and resident Spanish officials to guide negotiations obviated the need to send further support; “all of which Your Majesty will guide and lead with her prudence to obtain the desired result, and I did not find it necessary to send somebody to treat this matter.”²⁸⁷ Secondly, Philip II wanted to create the impression that the impetus for the new marriage agreement had not originated in Spain, but in Portugal with Catherine and Sebastian; “it is better that people

²⁸⁴ *Apuntamientos* of the royal *junta*, AGS, Est., leg. 662, fol. 38. [“Esta respuesta vera su M’d’ si sera conveniente comunicarla a ls S’ra’ Princesa antes q se de al Car’al’ de Guisa, que cierto parece seria razon por todos respectos procediendo su Al’a’ como procede, mayormente haviendose de dar aviso a Portugal de lo q aquí se responde a franceses como parece de deve hacer.” Philip II’s response to this point in the margins simply reads “es muy bien.”] Philip II did make the decision before hand to warn his sister of his plans to alter the agreement, in large part due to the large role that she was going to play communicating with Portugal on behalf of Spain.

²⁸⁵ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 500. “y juntamente mirará V.A. si antes de meterse este negocio en consejo ni venir con él a parescer de mas personas, será bien tener muy prevenido al Rey, El Cardenal, y algunos otros que viere que conviene.”

²⁸⁶ *Apuntamientos* of the royal *junta*, AGS, Est., leg. 662, fol. 91, 15 Feb 1569. The roles played by Catherine and Joanna in legitimizing the marriage went hand in hand; [“Con el ser’mo’ Rey de Portugal es justo que su Mag’d’ cumpla en efecto y en demonstracion por la ser’ma’ Princesa su madre y de la ser’ma’ Reyna su abuela y por el mismo.”]

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.* [“todo lo cual guiara y encaminara V.A. con su prudencia para lo traer al fin que se desea, y no me ha parescido que convenia enviar persona a tratar deste negocio.”]

presume that everything has originated and been proposed by the will of Your Majesty and the King, my nephew, and with his input.”²⁸⁸ By presenting Catherine as the main architect of dynastic policy, Philip II hoped to avoid upheavals in Sebastian’s court and estrangement with the Portuguese nobility. Clearly, he understood that Catherine occupied a privileged place in the diplomatic realm as a result of her motherly attributes and natural predisposition to serve her grandson and his patrimony without political bias.

Despite Philip II’s attempt to portray the grand alliance in a positive light, Catherine was less than enthusiastic about the Spanish-initiated project. Expressing discontent or opposition was another way for royal women to shape policy. In communicating with one another, the Habsburgs employed a language of reverence and affection that reinforced emotional bonds. The language also contributed to a sense of shared purpose in the context of ongoing political exchanges that allowed the perception of unity to persist in spite of disagreement. As a result, disputes rarely resulted in the disruption of diplomatic collaboration. To the contrary, the potential to articulate contradictory opinions maintained a degree of accountability on the part of distant family members. By the 1560’s, Philip II ostensibly possessed the sole authority to determine the appropriate strategy for perpetuating Habsburg power. Nevertheless, royal women were capable of formulating their own positions and exerting pressure if they disagreed with his choices. Catherine expressed her disapproval by calling attention to the blatant contradictions between Philip II’s words and actions;

“although the grounds are the ones that your majesty has stated, and what one should believe and anticipate from your majesty and his love for the lord King my grandson, still many times it just so happens that the way of things damages their substance.”²⁸⁹

It was only natural, she pointed out, that Portuguese officials begin to question Spanish sincerity. The strength of Habsburg commitment to collaboration was enough to procure Catherine’s pledge to support the new strategy. Still, the tone of her letter shows that dynastic initiatives could be fraught with disagreement, and that Philip II had to be cautious to not overextend his authority as the Habsburg patriarch.²⁹⁰

Another demonstration of women’s potential to shape policy occurred with Joanna’s opposition to any plans for her remarriage. In a period where a monarchy’s capacity to formulate new alliances and extend their influence was predicated on the availability of eligible female relatives, royal women regularly entered into new relationships after the death of their first husband. Those left widowed at a young age were even more likely to remarry as they were still able to bear children, thereby fulfilling a principal dynastic obligation. Joanna proved to be an exception to this trend; never remarrying after the death of João Manuel when she was

²⁸⁸ Ibid. [“entendiendo es mejor que se presuponga que todo ello se ha comenzado y propuesto de voluntad de V.A. y del Rey mi sobrino y con su comunicación.”]

²⁸⁹ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, pp. 503. “porque aunque los fundamentos de V.A. fuesen los que dicen, y lo que de V.A. y de su amor se debe de creer y esperar para con el señor Rey mi nieto, todavía muchas veces acontece el modo de las cosas danificar la sustancia dellas.”

²⁹⁰ Catherine to Philip II, AGS, Est., leg. 386, fol. 10, 13 March 1569. [“...todavía le [Sebastian] parece qye fuera muy acertado el tratarse por diferente modo, pues la forma del tratar las cosas, suele damnificar la substancia dellas, y siendo este casamiento de francia el mismo que con muchas razones le dissuadio su M’ d’ proponiendole el de Ysabel...”]

nineteen years old. To some extent, Joanna's enduring status as an unmarried widow resulted from the indispensable political role she played as regent of Spain, and a lack of suitors after 1554. Her marital availability took on a new political significance in 1569, however, when Philip II's commitment to a union with Anna resulted in a shortage of Habsburg women to appease the French and Portuguese. Three years younger than Mary Tudor had been when she married Philip II, Joanna was still a viable candidate for a French marriage. Anticipating Portuguese arguments to this effect, Philip II informed Catherine that Joanna's remarriage was non-negotiable because "I see my sister so determined to not listen or deal with such discussions that I did not propose it, and even if I did propose it I am certain that she will not want to hear it."²⁹¹

Joanna's opposition to a French match, and Philip II's deference to her position, proves that Habsburg women were not merely political pawns. There was a degree of freedom in their capacity to express opinions and pass judgment on the proceedings that would dictate their marital status. This was input that male authorities, who relied heavily on women for the advancement of state projects, were inclined to take into account when strategizing the employment of dynastic potential. Whether out of personal preference or a keen awareness of the lack of agency afforded French queens, Joanna adopted an uncompromising stance vis-à-vis her remarriage that she communicated to effectively obstruct any diplomatic effort to send her abroad. Notably Philip II saw no need to provide any additional information besides Joanna's opposition to justify taking her marriage off the table. Both domestically and internationally, there was a keen appreciation for Joanna's influential position within the dynasty and the independent authority that she wielded as a result of her political involvement.

In addition to implicating his aunt and sister in order to minimize his own hand in the scheme, Philip II went to great lengths to frame the marriage as an act in the service of God. A principal motive for the new project was to prevent the damage that would arise from excluding Charles IX from marriage negotiations.²⁹² After all, Isabel was the only bachelorette available to ensure the perpetuation of a Catholic monarchy in France. Without her, the French would have no choice but to form an alliance with heretics and rebels.²⁹³ Sebastian, on the other hand, did have alternative partners to choose from. In arranging the new alliances, Philip II was merely doing what was prudent and necessary in order to unify the forces of Western Europe against their common enemies.²⁹⁴

At least outwardly, Sebastian appeared amenable to arguments defending a union with Marguerite of Valois. In March, he wrote his mother to inform her that he intended to accept the

²⁹¹ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 497. "veo á mi hermana tan determinada en no oír o tratar semejantes pláticas, que ni yo lo propornía, ni aunque se lo propusiese soy cierto que no lo querrá oír."

²⁹² *Apuntamientos* of royal junta, AGS, Est., leg 662, fol. 33, 26 Feb 1569.

²⁹³ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 498. "es que las cosas de aquel Rey y reino estaban entónces en muy diferente estado, y no corrian el peligro en lo de su casamiento y en el concertarse con sus herejes y rebeldes, y por el consiguiente en el daño de la religion en que agora están, que es uno de los principales motivos que se deben tener, demás que á la sazón no tenia de que ofenderse el Rey de Francia."

²⁹⁴ Cardinal Henry to Philip II, AGS, Est., leg. 386, fol. 16, 14 March 1562. The potential for the three-way alliance to provide the foundation for a holy league against heresy was emphasized in correspondences between Spain and Portugal. ["...para atajar a estas heregias y hereges que por nro pecados tienen tan oprimidos la Christiandad, y para hacer una union y liga para acabarlos del todo, y para levantar y esforzar los buenos christianos que estan tan derribados, sin que aya cosa humana que deshaga tan buenos propositos y fundamentos."]

new agreement.²⁹⁵ In explaining the decision, he cited his shared commitment with Philip II to serve God and Christendom. Even more important for Sebastian, though, was Joanna's involvement in the new agreement. As he explained, "always for your will and your advice I should have the utmost respect considering the great love that Your Majesty has for me, and I have for you."²⁹⁶ Sebastian's emphasis on the familial love and respect that he shared with his mother, and the corresponding desire to align his political decisions with her council, highlight the political significance of their relationship. Although Sebastian's subsequent actions would make it clear that he never had any intention of marrying Marguerite, he was cautious to outright reject the input of his mother as a result of her status and reputation. This would not only have constituted an unacceptable deviation from the language of affection that underpinned interstate collaboration, but also an assault on the notion that royal women possessed unrivaled sincerity and integrity in diplomatic exchanges. Obviously, Sebastian was not obligated to follow Joanna's advice. Nevertheless, he still had to be careful to maintain the illusion of obedience, as evident in his final proclamation; "I consider it redundant to agree with your highness on matters pertaining to the interests of me and my affairs...and I would never want to do anything contrary to your highness other than what is to be expected from a son who bears so much love and high regard."²⁹⁷

In reality, Sebastian had little intention of following through with the marriage. Despite his outward expressions of affection and obedience, Sebastian never forgave Philip II for terminating his marriage to Isabel. These were feelings of resentment which he continued to harbor well into the year, withholding powers to negotiate his new marriage with Marguerite while simultaneously maintaining his commitment to the agreement.²⁹⁸ The justification advanced by Sebastian and his officials for this contradiction in words and action was Philip II's inability to provide a contract with definite terms and lingering doubts about the French monarchy's capability, as a result of ongoing religious conflict, to honor their contractual obligations.²⁹⁹ Catherine had already made it clear in her initial letter in March that the Portuguese anticipated a substantial dowry and significant concessions from the French on a number of points, including boundaries, trade, and recent conquests. They also wanted a favorable resolution to the lingering dispute over the Madeira Islands.³⁰⁰ Sebastian made regular reference to these demands, insisting that he would only grant his ambassador, Francisco Pereira, the authority to proceed with the marriage after they were met.³⁰¹

Sebastian's refusal to send special powers to negotiate before an agreement had been reached effectively obstructed any possibility of a French alliance. In an emphatic letter written in August, Philip II tried to explain that terms favorable to Portugal could only be arranged after

²⁹⁵ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 513. A report from Hernando Carrillo in April also confirmed that Sebastian, Cardinal Henry, and Catherine were pleased about the match.

²⁹⁶ Sebastian to Joanna, AGS, Est., leg. 386, fol. 12, 15 March 1569. ["Pues siempre a su voluntad y a su consejo he de tener más respecto que a todo considerando el grande amor que VAl'a' me tiene, y el que yo la tengo."]

²⁹⁷ Ibid. ["tengo por escusado acordar a V Al'a' lo que me conviene a mi y a mis cosas... ni yo lo querria hacer nunca en otra a V Al'a' sino en que se sirva de mi como de hijo que tanto amor y con tanta razon le tiene."]

²⁹⁸ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 521. "El Rey ha estado muy sentido desde el principio que se trató este negocio, y tambien debe de haber sido ayudado de algunos como se ha parecido."

²⁹⁹ Hernando Carrillo to Philip II, AGS, Est., leg. 386, fol. 38, 24 Aug 1569; Ibid., fol. 60, 23 Sept 1569.

³⁰⁰ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, pp. 505-506. "y tambien confío que no se le olvidaria el caso de la isla de la Madera en el cual hasta hoy tan poco satisfaccion el Rey de Francia tiene dado á S.A."

³⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 515 & 519.

Pereira was provided permission to arrange the marriage. The matter was of the greatest urgency, he insisted, due to the potential for delays to lead to suspicion and misunderstandings.³⁰² At least initially, Philip II did not seriously think that Sebastian would turn down such a prestigious marriage. He was far more worried that the French, who he believed cared little where their daughters ended up as long as it served their political ends, would be the first to back out of the arrangement.³⁰³ In part, this failure to appreciate Sebastian's determination to undermine his marriage stemmed from Carrillo's characterization of the young monarch as an immature ruler acting out. He knew that Sebastian had been deeply offended, but likened it to an infant pouting over a toy.³⁰⁴ Philip II, in turn, did not realize until it was too late that Sebastian's refusal to comply was more than just a case of childish obstinacy.³⁰⁵

The failure of the Portuguese-French marriage shows that a sense of familial loyalty was not always enough to ensure interstate collaboration. The feeling of betrayal that pervaded the Portuguese court was not unfounded. Even Philip II could not help but admit that his nephew was justified in feeling resentment for how events had transpired.³⁰⁶ Nevertheless, there was still an expectation that Sebastian would suppress these negative sentiments and trust in the wisdom of blood relatives, including Catherine and Joanna, who had greater political experience.³⁰⁷

As it turned out, Sebastian was not inclined to abide by the unwritten rules of deference and mutual support that underpinned the Habsburg familial network. A stubborn and prideful young man, he instead moved to consolidate his power and undermine outside efforts to dictate Portuguese policy. Evidence of Sebastian's desire for political independence can be seen in the marginalization of his aunt Catherine. Writing to Joanna to communicate the king's decision to spurn a French alliance, Catherine lamented;

“...My advice yields little to no benefit in this matter, because it is neither asked of me nor wanted from me, and they do not communicate matters so that I may offer my opinion on them, but rather they inform me after they have been handled and determined.”³⁰⁸

³⁰² Philip to Hernando Carrillo, AGS, Est., leg. 386, fol. 41, 7 Sept 1569. [“No puedo dexar de advertirle, que es mucha consideracion, si conviene en esta coyuntura de la capitulacion de su casamiento, meter estas materias. Porque lo primero no se puede dubdar que sera ocasion de dilacion... y con dilacion podrian sobrevenir tales impedimentos y novedades, que impidiessen y turbassen todo lo que esta tractado.”]

³⁰³ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 529. “y que en Francia estiman en tan poco la colocacion de las hijas, que tornádoles mas comodo, se les da muy poco, por no las casar con Reyes cino con culaquiera otro que sea mas á su propósito.”

³⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 522. “me parece que sean como ninos que en estas quejas y sentimientos, que se sosiegan con un juguete.”

³⁰⁵ Sebastian to Joanna, AGS, Est., leg 386, fol. 57, 27 Sept 1569. [“Yo no he de casar ni embiar para esto los poderes sino con mucho credito y reputacion mia y con provecho de mis Reynos... pues de la [casamiento] de francia esta todo tan cerrado y impossibilitado allende de otras consideraciones de mayor importancia...”]

³⁰⁶ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 524. “(aunque me pudiera con razon resentir, y ofender y quedar desobligado)...”

Sebastian was not alone in feeling that Philip II had acted disingenuously in the terminating the previous marriage project. According to Fichtner, “the torturous marriage negotiations over Don Carlos has also exposed the continuing mistrust between the emperor and the king of Spain. See Fichtner, *Maximilian II*, p. 113.

³⁰⁷ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, pp. 503 & 508. Initially, Sebastian had been inclined to follow Joanna and Catherine's advice. Both royal women were credited with convincing him to pursue his first marriage with Isabel of Austria.

³⁰⁸ Ibid., pp. 556-557. “...es de muy poco fruto ó de ninguno mi consejo en estos negocios, porque ni á mí me lo piden, ni lo quieren de mí, y no me comunican las cosas para que yo diga mi parescer en ellas sino para hacérmelas saber después de hechas y determinadas.”

The thorough exclusion of Catherine from the decision-making process undermined Philip II's influence by depriving him of a key ally in Sebastian's court. Without Catherine, there was no means of organizing local support or creating the illusion that dynastic initiatives were being generated within Portugal. Sebastian still respected Joanna, writing her a personal letter to politely, but firmly inform her that she no longer need to represent him in negotiations.³⁰⁹ But, the physical distance between the two meant that Joanna's direct influence was limited. With the input of the two royal women closest to Sebastian curtailed, the marriage between Sebastian and Marguerite was effectively dead by September 1569.

Portugal's withdrawal from the grand alliance did not drastically alter the status of ongoing negotiations between Spain, France, and the HRE. Initially, Philip II had pushed for a three-way alliance in which each marriage was treated as one. As he explained, this approach was intended to address the diplomatic fickleness of the French. By tying all three marriages together, France would be forced to honor its commitments on all fronts or risk incurring the wrath of Spain and its allies—an ambitious, innovative attempt to impose binding obligations between the four great monarchies of Christendom.³¹⁰

In order to facilitate the complicated process of linking the marriages, all three marriage negotiations were to be conducted in Madrid where diplomats from each respective nation would meet under Philip II's watchful eye. With the exception of Portugal, the plan worked. By July 1569, France and the HRE had, or were in the process, of conferring powers to their diplomats.³¹¹ And, by the time Sebastian communicated his stubborn refusal to accept the marriage, negotiations were well underway.³¹² At no point did any of the three remaining monarchies consider cutting their agreements short as a result of Portuguese non-compliance. Since Sebastian and Marguerite's marriage had been treated separately from the start, considered by all as a foregone conclusion, it was easy to carry on, simply transforming the grand alliance into a two-way binding agreement involving the three remaining powers.

The close affinity of the two Habsburg branches allowed negotiations between Spain and the HRE to proceed relatively uncontested. The only real point of contention was over the economic features of the marriage. While a dowry of 100,000 escudos was accepted by the two parties, there was slight disagreement over the form of payment and the counter-dowry to be provided in the form of a marriage gift (*arras*) and donations.³¹³ Already financially burdened, the Austrian Habsburgs wanted to break from tradition on both counts; delaying the split payments of the dowry by one year and raising the counter-dowry to 100,000 to effectively offset their expense. Philip II, likely out of a combination of financial interest and devotion to tradition, was not so willing to break from established precedent. In the end, the disagreement proved to be a minor inconvenience as the two parties agreed to delay the dowry payments by one year and

³⁰⁹ Sebastian to Joanna, AGS, Est., leg. 386, fol. 57, 27 Sept 1569. [“Y assi lo tengo assentado con el parescer de la Reyna [Catherine] mi s'ra' y con mi consejo, y es escusado tratarse ya agora mas por mi parte deste casamiento.”]

³¹⁰ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 527. “el hacer dependiente mi negocio y el de los otros Príncipes y disposicion de todos, del suyo, y que asimismo he tenido en esto fin á que su particular se tratase con mas beneficio suyo, teniendo á franceses debajo desta necesidad.”

³¹¹ Copies of the power sent from France and the HRE to negotiate the marriage can be found at AGS, Est., K-1643, D6, fol. 53, 30 July 1569 & *Ibid.*, fol. 54, 2 Sept 1569.

³¹² Sebastian to Joanna, *Ibid.*, leg 386, fol. 57, 27 Sept 1569.

³¹³ Maximilian II on the marriage capitulations, AGS, Est., leg. 662, fol. 88.

raise the counter-dowry from 33,000 to 50,000. Thereafter, Maximilian II maintained his commitment to deferring to Philip II on the major points of the marriage alliance.

Although she did not have the same degree of personal influence outside of Portugal, Joanna made significant contributions to advancing a marriage between Philip II and Anna. Powerful figures within the Spanish monarchy agreed that Joanna's consent (*consentimiento*) was just as vital for legitimizing the grand alliance in Vienna as it had been in Lisbon. Moreover, they agreed that her participation in ongoing negotiations between Spain and the HRE would positively contribute to the procurement of an acceptable agreement. To this end, Philip II was urged in February 1569 by the council of four to write the emperor and empress, "referring to what Princess [Joanna] writes, insisting that she wanted to take the lead as sister to everyone."³¹⁴ The diffusion of responsibility and elevation of Joanna's input shows that participation in diplomatic exchanges took many forms. In this instance, the recognition of Joanna as a loyal and loving sister to both Philip II and Maria opened up the potential for her to serve as an intermediary. Even if Joanna did not want to contribute to the procurement of the marriage, the council stated, she should be obligated to publicly state her support "for the empress [Maria] to be more easily persuaded."³¹⁵ Evidently, the close personal connection between the two sisters, reinforced early in their childhood, had significant political implications in so far as it facilitated the rapid acceptance of new initiatives and alignment of dynastic objectives. With the help of his sisters, Philip II was able to achieve with the HRE what he had failed to achieve in Portugal—a rapid and seamless transition to a new marriage agreement without suspicion or misunderstanding.

As the mother of the two princesses being married, the Empress Maria had even greater responsibilities than her sister. In many ways, her role was a continuation of the one she had fulfilled since the initiation of diplomatic talks in the mid-1560s. She interceded on Philip II's behalf with her husband, Maximilian II, and regularly collaborated with the Spanish ambassadors in order to coordinate their efforts. Now personally invested in the project as one of the prospective husbands, Philip II communicated with Maria through Joanna, likely in order to conceal Maria's collusion and protect her from criticism. In order to ensure that Joanna accurately represented Philip II's will, the content of her letters was carefully circumscribed. Joanna did have a limited degree of agency in drafting her letters whereby "she shall do this service of her own accord [but ultimately] had to handle and arrange [matters] in agreement with what best serves His Majesty [Philip II]"³¹⁶ The restriction of Joanna's letters shows that there were limits on royal women's political participation. While they could oversee negotiations and even express disagreement, they could not directly challenge or contradict the political agenda determined by kings and emperors.

The aspect of the marriage agreements most often discussed in connection to Maria was her daughter's travel plans. Figuring out how to transport Anna and Isabel to Spain and France respectively was a major preoccupation complicated by the question of which future queen

³¹⁴ Memorial of the royal junta, *Ibid.*, fol. 89, 10 Feb 1569. ["...remitiendose a lo que la Princesa [Joanna] scriviere, diciendo que ha querido tomar la mano como hermana a todos."]

³¹⁵ *Ibid.* ["para que la emperatriz [Maria] se incline mas facilmente"]

³¹⁶ *Ibid.* ["...aya de hacer este officio como de suyo, se ha de regular y ordenar conforme a lo que su M'd' fuere servido."]

would take precedence in the exchange.³¹⁷ Although Anna was older and thus more deserving of precedence, Philip II knew that the French were unlikely to tolerate Isabel assuming a position of secondary importance in ceremonies and celebrations. The solution proposed by Philip II was for Maria to accompany her daughters on their trip. According to arguments prepared in Spain, there were several reasons to consider this option. For one, “the issue of precedence poses no difficulty coming [each princess] with their mother, as she [Maria] will oversee the order based on age.”³¹⁸ Maria’s uncontested authority in the domestic sphere, particularly over matters pertaining to her children, meant that she was capable of dictating the order of her daughters without inviting controversy from the French. In addition to precluding any possibility for dispute over precedence, Maria’s attendance also offered clear financial benefits by obviating the need to send additional officials or, even worse, sending Anna and Isabel on separate routes.³¹⁹ Philip II acknowledged that sending Maria would constitute both a political and personal hardship for Maximilian II, but hoped that the emperor would be enticed by the promise of alleviating his financially burdened monarchy.

Finally, Maria traveling to Spain offered an unparalleled opportunity for the reinforcement of solidarity and collaboration between the two Habsburg branches. The original route proposed for Maria and her daughters passed through the port of Genoa, where Philip II planned to have a fleet waiting under Don Juan of Austria, before dropping Isabel off on the coast of France and ending with Anna’s deliverance in Barcelona. Philip II imagined meeting Maria in Barcelona alongside Joanna in a long anticipated reunion, after which the three siblings would celebrate his wedding to Anna;

“with such great satisfaction and fulfillment of everyone...and it would be such gift and testament of love for the Princesses [Anna and Isabel] his daughters, and a presentation and meeting much approved and of great esteem in the world.”³²⁰

The language used to describe the reunion reveals that the feelings of affection and admiration that underpinned the Habsburg social network were often sincerely felt. Indeed, Philip II hardly attempted to conceal the fact that his desire to see Maria was, at least in part, personal.

³¹⁷ Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 66; M.S. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 58. Disputes between Spanish and French representatives over precedence in foreign courts and diplomatic exchanges were very common during the early modern period. The rivalry was particularly fierce in the papal court and at the Council of Trent in 1562 when the Spanish directly challenged France’s traditional precedence. For a primary source example of a dispute that arose between Spanish and French ambassadors during this period see *Asientos*, AGS, Est., leg. 659, fol. 23.

³¹⁸ *Apuntamientos* of the royal *junta*, *Ibid.*, leg. 662, fol. 31, 21 July 1569. [“No se representa dificultad en lo de la precedencia viniendo con su madre, pues ella guardara la orden de la edad.”].

³¹⁹ Philip II to Luis Venegas, *Ibid.*, leg. 663, fol. 177, 2 July 1569. [“...el venir mi hermana y traer sus hijas escusa mucha...del gasto.”]

³²⁰ Memorial of *Apuntamientos*, *Ibid.*, leg. 662, fol. 85. [“con tanta gran satisfacion y contentamiento de todos...y seria de tan regalo y testimonio de amor para las ser’mas’ Princesas sus hijas, y una demonstracion y jornada muy aprobada y de mucha estimacion en el mundo.”]

The emotional bond between Philip II and Maria also had important political implications, as revealed in further discussions of the benefits that her presence would have for diplomatic efforts. On this aspect of the reunion, the argument was made;

“the opportunity for your Catholic Majesty and the empress, his sister, to see each other and communicate, in addition to [contributing to] the[ir] shared fulfillment, would be a great benefit to the establishment, and settlement of many things that matter for shared benefit of all, and particularly that [matter] which pertains Prince Rudolph.”³²¹

The potential for Maria to serve as a representative of her husband and negotiate on behalf of the HRE was readily acknowledged by the Spanish monarchy. The specific reference to Prince Rudolph’s future marriage to Philip II’s eldest daughter, Isabel Clara Eugenia, also served to highlight the special role that Maria played in the determination of her son’s marital status and broader dynastic alignments.³²² Her location at the center of negotiations for this strategic marriage, which was extended to Maximilian II as a way to further incentivize his compliance and strengthen familial bonds, reveals that a royal mother’s prerogative to look after her children, and the political power that it afforded, could extend over the course of years and even decades. Often, the conclusion of one agreement ushered in a new round of negotiations and maternal involvement.

To Philip II’s disappointment, Maximilian II ultimately decided against having Maria travel to Spain. Efforts to persuade the emperor continued through August 1569, culminating in an offer to delay the payment of Anna’s dowry, or other financial incentives, should he change his mind. Writing Luis Venegas on the matter, Philip II confessed;

“I still long so greatly for my sister’s arrival, and it would bring me so much happiness to see her that I have seen fit to inform you that if you come to see that the cost [of the journey] could complicate her arrival then you are to look into offering some means or proposal that would allow her to come. For instance, I could wait some longer period of time for the dowry payment so that those funds could instead be used now for this purpose... or some other proposal that you with your good sense and understanding could think of for this end and propose...”³²³

³²¹ Ibid. [“Que es el poderse ver y comunicar su Mag’d’ Cath’ca’ y la emperatriz su hermana, que demas del contentamiento comun, seria de tanto effecto para el establecimiento, y assiento de muchas cosas que al benefico comun de todos importan, y particularmente lo que toca al Principe Rudolfo.”]

³²² Philip II to Maria, Ibid., leg. 663, fol. 40, 8 Feb 1570. Even at this early date, Maria was Philip II’s main point of contact regarding this prospective match.

³²³ Philip II to Luis Venegas, Ibid., fol. 177, 2 Aug 1569. [“todavia desseo yo tanto la venida de mi hermana y serieme de tanto contentamiento verla q me ha parescido advertiros que si entendieredes q la costa podria dificultar su venida veais de proponer alla algun medio o forma para que huviesse con que venir, como seria que yo esperasse algun tiempo largo por los dineros de la dote a fin que se pudiesse servir agora dellos para este effecto... o otra alguna forma q vos con vra cordura y buen entendimiento podreis pensar a este proposito y proponerla...”]

Once it became clear that Maximilian II could not be persuaded, however, Philip II resigned himself to working with Maria from afar to arrange acceptable travel arrangements for Anna.³²⁴ In March 1570, Venegas was given orders to inform the empress that Ottoman naval activity in the Mediterranean had necessitated a change in plans.³²⁵ Now, instead of traveling south through Genoa, Anna would be sent west through Flanders where she would be received by the Duke of Alba before sailing down the coast of France.³²⁶ In making preparations for the journey, Maria was urged to give explicit orders to the person or persons accompanying Anna to bypass neighboring principalities and immediately return home after delivering her at the border.³²⁷ Fearing the consequences of Catholics fraternizing with reformed princes, Philip II relied on his sister to prevent sustained contact between the two parties in Germany, thereby safeguarding Habsburg interests in the region.

While Philip II engaged in relatively straightforward negotiations with his Habsburg relatives, the incorporation of France into the two-way alliance was complicated by a lack of diplomatic precedent. When drafting a new marriage agreement, diplomats relied heavily on prior contracts to reconcile the conflicting customs and traditions of different kingdoms. The longer the history of intermarriage, the more likely they would have access to a record of adjustments and compromises that they could utilize as a point of reference. In the case of the Habsburgs and Valois, however, decades of intense conflict and rivalry impeded the development of an authoritative dynastic tradition.³²⁸ In fact, the families had only successfully finalized two alliances in the 16th century: the 1530 union between Francis I and Eleanor of Austria, and the 1559 union between Philip II and Isabel of Valois. Although these marriages did provide limited support, with Philip II ordering prior marriage capitulations to be made available for reference, their overall utility was hindered by the fact that both had been consecrated in the wake of French military defeat.³²⁹ In contrast, Isabel's marriage to Charles IX was arranged during a period of peace when the French were less unlikely to agree to conditions that they deemed prejudicial. Early on, the Austrian ambassador, Baron Adam von Dietrichstein, recognized the challenges posed by the negotiations writing, "the manner and conditions in which marriage capitulations are negotiated and arranged are very different (2), and every kingdom and people has their features and own customs."³³⁰ Ultimately, the success of the grand alliance came down to the reconciliation of these differences and the preparation of an agreement that both monarchies were willing to accept.

³²⁴ *Apuntamientos* of the royal *junta*, *Ibid.*, leg. 662, fol. 31, 21 July 1569. ["No habiendo de venir la Princesa Ysabel con la emperatriz, se le ha de advertir q mire mucho en las mugeres y personas que havran de yr a francia con su Alterza que sean quales se requieren."]

³²⁵ Philip II to Luis Venegas, *Ibid.*, leg. 663, fol. 188, 20 March 1570.

³²⁶ For more on Anna's journey see María José Del Río Barredo, *Madrid, Urbs Regia: La Capital Ceremonial De La Monarquía Católica*, (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2000).

³²⁷ Philip II to Luis Venegas, AGS, Est., leg. 663, fol. 188, 20 March 1570. ["...hablando con ella [Maria] con la confianza que puedo, le pido y supplico muy de veras, que en la orden que se huviere de dar a la persona /o/ personas q huvieran de yr hasta flandes en acompnamiento de la Reyna [Anna]... para que no entren en aquellos estados, sino que hecha la entrega, se buelvan desde la raya."]

³²⁸ CDI, Tomo XXVIII, p. 464. References to Habsburg-Valois history often emphasized rivalry; "...por nuevos y antiguos ejemplos... y por la antigua enemistad que siempre a nuestra casa han tenido."

³²⁹ *Consulta* for Philip II, AGS, Est., leg. 662, fol. 34, 10 July 1569. ["Y para acabar de apuntar lo del matrimonio de su M'd' es necesario ver los capitulos matrimoniales de la Reyna nra S'ra' si los tiene, o, decir donde se hallaron."]

³³⁰ Dietrichstein on marriage capitulations, *Ibid.*, fol. 120. ["...son tan diferentes los modos (2) y condiciones, con que se tratan y conciertan capitulos matrimoniales, que cada reyno y nacion tiene sus particulares y propias costumbres."]

The negotiation of Charles IX and Isabel's union began in earnest in October 1569. Several Spaniards were in attendance during the exchange, including the Cardinal of Singuenza and Doctor Velasco as representative (*diputado*) of Philip II and the king's secretary, Gabriel de Cayas, as official record keeper. For the most part, though, the complicated discussion of specific conditions was delegated to the resident diplomats of France and the HRE stationed in Madrid, Baron de Fourquevaux and Dietrichstein respectively.³³¹ Similar to talks between the two Habsburg branches, the main points of contention were financial in nature. With regard to specific aspects of the marriage contract, the French initially demanded a dowry of 400,000 escudos to be paid in halves at the time of consummation and one year removed.³³² In return, they offered lands and estates as security for the dowry at a taxable yield of 5%, and a widower's pension (*doario*) of 70,000 livres a year in rent.³³³ For their part, the Austrian Habsburgs wanted to limit their dowry to 100,000 florins first due one year after consummation.³³⁴ They also wanted significant compensation from France, including a 7% taxable yield and a substantial counter-dowry and wedding gift (*arras*) to accompany Isabel's *doario*. If they did not agree to this last demand, Dietrichstein was instructed to push for a *doario* set at twice the original offer, or roughly 140,000 livres a year.³³⁵

Throughout the negotiation of Isabel's marriage, Fourquevaux and Dietrichstein drew from the historical record to justify their demands. In pushing for a dowry of 400,000 escudo, for instance, Fourquevaux made sure to mention that it was the same amount given to Philip II during his 1559 marriage to Isabel of Valois. Reference was also made to Eleanor's dowry of 300,000 escudo in order to put their request for a large sum in perspective.³³⁶ In defense of their demand, Dietrichstein argued that the Austrian offer of 100,000 florins already constituted a substantial offer twice the amount ever granted by the late Emperor Ferdinand.³³⁷ The fact that the Spanish had agreed to a smaller dowry, thereby breaking from their tendency to give and demand exorbitant payments, was also highlighted as further reason to accept the offer.

³³¹ For the primary sources referenced in order to reconstruct negotiations see AGS, Est., K-1643, D6, fols. 56 & 57; Ibid. leg. 662, fols. 119, 121 & 123. Dietrichstein had originally arrived in Madrid in 1563 as imperial ambassador tasked with finalizing the marriage between Anna and Don Carlos.

³³² Fourquevaux on French demands, Ibid., fol. 121, 27 Oct 1569.

³³³ Parrott, *The Business of War*, p. xvii. The livre was the principal form of French currency (3 French livres= 1 Spanish escudo).

³³⁴ Maximilian II's response to the marriage capitulations, AGS, Est., leg. 662, fol. 119. The distinction between florines and escudos in dowry discussions was not insignificant. The conversion rate between a German florin and Spanish escudo was roughly 1.5 florin=1 escudo. Parrott, *The Business of War*, p. xvii. This estimation is corroborated by primary source evidence from 1568 in which 150,000 florins were equivalent to 100,000 escudos. Luis Venegas to Joanna, Ibid., leg. 665, fol. 28, 6 March 1568.

³³⁵ Maximilian II's response to the marriage capitulations, Ibid., leg. 662, fol. 119. [“dara lugar a la peticion de su Mag'd' Ces'a' en lo de la contradote y arras según la costumbre de Alemania, o, que en caso que no quiera apartarse de la de su Inclito Reyno de francia, aumentara el dicho Doario en una gran suma, conveniente a tal Princesa...que si se tuviere cuenta con la grandeza, dignidad y estado Real de ambas partes, y con el valor de los francos, que no sera mucho doblar el entretenimiento de los dichos sesenta mill francos.”]

³³⁶ Fourquevaux's response to the marriage capitulations, Ibid., fol. 123, Oct 1569. [“Aunque de devia esperar que la dote seria de la misma suma que la que la Reyna Leonor llevo, que fue de trecientos mill escudos.”]

³³⁷ Maximilian II's response to the marriage capitulations, Ibid., fol. 119. [“...M'd' Ces'a' excede en mucha parte, o, casi en la mitad de la cantidad, que hasta agora se ha acostumbrado dar por los predecesores de su Inclita casa y particularmente por el emperador Fernando su padre en casamiento de hijas, ques la suma de cien mill florins del Rin.”]

Another dispute rooted in conflicting customs was the Austrian desire to include a counter-dowry and *arras*. These payments or gifts, which stipulated sums to be paid in instances of widowhood, were included in Habsburg marriage agreements in order to ensure the well-being of the royal brides being sent abroad. They were not utilized in France, however, where the *doario* served an equivalent purpose by bestowing substantial lands and estates on widowed queens. Dietrichstein's attempt to include both customs in the final contract was immediately met with resistance. In politely but firmly contesting the demand, Fourquevaux called attention to generations of French queens, including Catherine de Medici, who had received the same fixed *doario*.³³⁸ He also referenced, once again, Isabel of Valois' marriage, reminding Dietrichstein how the French had incorporated *arras* into the contract out of respect for Spain's unique payment forms. Naturally, it made sense that the Austrian Habsburgs, in turn, honor French marriage customs. Disputes over the financial features of the agreement show how, in the absence of an authoritative dynastic tradition, diplomats appealed to a wide range of historical examples in order to orient the discussion and gain the upper hand in negotiations. These examples constituted a political memory of collaboration which did not always reflect reality, but which was nevertheless essential for facilitating the reinforcement of royal bonds between rival monarchies.

In the context of Habsburg-Valois relations, the fiction of Christian solidarity and commitment maintained by both sides belied pervasive feelings of mistrust. Ostensibly, the two-way alliance was aimed at engendering peace among the great powers of Christendom so that they might focus their collective might against the Turks and reformed heretics. Philip II and his officials, at least, framed the project in such terms. In reality, there were very few, if any, figures affiliated with the Habsburgs who believed that the marriage was more than a temporary respite from their enduring conflict with the Valois. Fearing a renewed outbreak of war, Maximilian II pushed for the inclusion of a special article within Isabel's marriage agreement whereby, "in case of a rupture between your Majesty [Philip II] and France, the emperor would not have to maintain neutrality but rather could stand by your Majesty."³³⁹ Naturally, such a blatantly biased article had the potential to undermine the sense of shared purpose underpinning the two-way alliance, and the decision was ultimately made to not discuss military contingencies should conflict resume with France.

Somewhat ironically, given the stated objective of confronting non-Christian forces, a similar decision was made with regard to the Ottoman Empire, a strategic partner of the Valois since 1536. Still facing the threat of an eastern invasion, Maximilian II had initially demanded that Charles IX swear a solemn oath to terminate his treaty with the Ottomans in the case of an attack. The demand, alongside his request for the full restitution of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, constituted the emperor's ideal terms—a bid to reclaim his father's losses during the previous decade and shore up his kingdom's exposed western flank.³⁴⁰ Doubtful that the French would honor this commitment, Philip II advised strongly against any treatment of the unholy Franco-Ottoman union. Doing so, he feared, would do more harm than good;

³³⁸ Fourquevaux's response to the marriage capitulations, *Ibid.*, fol. 123, Oct 1569.

³³⁹ Points raised in HRE negotiations, *Ibid.*, fol. 35. ["en caso de rotura entre su M^d'[Philip II] y Francia no avia de guardar neutralidad el emperador sino estar de la parte de su M^d'"]

³⁴⁰ For a copy of Maximilian II's initial demands see *Ibid.*, fols. 73-74.

“In the article regarding the alliances of the King of France with the Turk, it is thought that advancing this talking point will bear little fruit, it being obvious that they will neither leave this bad alliance... nor will the King of France promise it or fulfill it... they would not gain anything more than the indignity and indecency of both majesties, and it would be a condition that everyone would consider little honored.”³⁴¹

In forging agreements with their traditional rivals, the Habsburgs had to be careful not to include articles which might be violated or ignored, thereby compromising the legitimacy of the marriage contract. They instead focused on negotiating terms which were both advantageous and mutually agreeable. The decision to omit any reference of the Ottomans, while seemingly insincere, allowed Philip II to procure his two-way alliance without actually putting France’s alleged adherence to friendship and solidarity, which had no basis in reality, to the test.

In spite of the many differences separating their respective monarchies, Dietrichstein and Fourquevaux eventually produced an equitable agreement. This achievement was due in large part to Philip II, who closely followed the progression of negotiations and offered advice on each article under discussion. By the terms of the marriage, France agreed to accept a smaller dowry and a delayed payment option beginning one year after consummation.³⁴² For their part, the Austrians agreed to pay the 100,000 dowry in escudos, a currency slightly stronger than the florin. They also accepted the initial offer for a dowry security set at 5% and a *doario* of 70,000 livres. Remarkably, both Philip II and Maximilian II were willing to make concessions in spite of their shared hatred of France. As their actions demonstrate, Habsburg preeminence in Europe derived from more than just good fortune. When necessary, members of the dynasty were not only able to effectively coordinate their actions and adapt to changing circumstances, but also temporarily suppress their moral, political, and religious imperatives if it contributed to the elaboration of their familial network

Conclusion

In the early months of 1572, the great Venetian painter Titian began working on the most iconic allegorical representation of Philip II produced in his lifetime. In the painting, Philip II proudly stands at the forefront adorning parade armor and gently lifting the much-anticipated heir, Ferdinand, conceived shortly after Anna’s arrival in Spain. Looking upward, the king’s gaze is fixed on “Winged Victory” as she descends from the heavens to graciously bless the young prince, a symbol of the perpetuation of the Habsburg dynastic line, and deliver a banderole bearing the prophetic message *Maiora tibi* (“Greater things for you”). In the corner cowers the shackled and defeated Turk, shamefully glancing away in deference to his distinguished company. An ostentatious celebration of both the great victory at Lepanto and the

³⁴¹ Memorial of *Apuntamientos*, Ibid., fol. 85. [“En el articulo de la amistad del Rey de Francia con el Turco, se considera que de moverse esta platica de sacara poco fructo, siendo cierto que ni ha dexar esta mala amistad... ni el Rey de Francia lo prometera ni lo cumplira... no se sacaria otra cosa que indignidad y indecencia de ambas magestades, y seria capitulo que en todas partes pareceria poco honrrado.”]

³⁴² Fourquevaux’s response to the marriage capitulations, Ibid., fol. 134, 10 Jan 1570. [“El dote de cient mill escudos de ha de pagar en dos terminos es assaber los cinquenta mill al cabo del ano, justamente, contandose desde el dia de la consumacion del matrimonio y los otros cinquenta mill escudos dentro del fin del ano siguiente, de manera que contando del dia de la dicha consumacion toda la entera cantidad de los dichos cient mill escudos sera pagada y entregada dentro de tiempo y termino de dos anos.”]

birth of Philip II's son in 1571, the painting testifies to the great heights of glory and splendor that the Spanish empire attained within only a year of successfully negotiating a two-way marriage alliance with France and the Holy Roman Empire.



Philip II Offering the Infante don Ferdinand to Victory, Titian, 1573-1575
The Prado Museum, Madrid

Unfortunately for Philip II, the good fortune stemming from his successful dynastic policy was short lived. The first blow to peace and fraternity on the continent came in 1572 when thousands of Dutchmen, unimpressed by their monarch's attempt to unite Christian forces against enemies of the Church, rose up in support of William of Orange and his army of 20,000 men.³⁴³ To make matters worse, news surfaced at roughly the same time of a failed conspiracy, supported by Philip II, to assassinate the Queen of England, Elizabeth I. The conspiracy, known as the Ridolfi plot, was an utter embarrassment with far-reaching diplomatic consequences for Spain, including the alienation of their only reliable ally in Europe, Emperor Maximilian.³⁴⁴ The failed assassination plot also drove England to strengthen ties with France in order to pose a stronger front against Habsburg hegemony. With one envoy proclaiming that in England "there are no other speeches but with war in Spain" and Huguenot leaders pressing the French monarchy to go to the aide of Dutch rebels, Philip II found himself isolated and besieged well before Titian had time to complete his masterpiece.³⁴⁵

Although Philip II's grand alliance failed to generate lasting accord among the great monarchies of Christendom, it remains a powerful reminder of the dynamism of early modern dynastic politics. As this chapter has demonstrated, Spanish policy after the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis was primarily aimed at isolating the Valois. This strategy prevailed until approximately 1568, when a string of untimely deaths precipitated significant changes in the royal marriage market. In order to maintain a position of preeminence over his strategic allies and address his own political obligation to produce an heir, Philip II deemed it prudent to

³⁴³ Parker, *Imprudent King*, p. 210.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 205-208.

³⁴⁵ Kamen, *Philip II of Spain*, p. 140.

abandon his previous anti-Valois stance and incorporate France into a new marriage project of his personal design. This sudden change did not come without controversy, which Philip II attempted to mitigate with the help of influential female relatives intimately involved as mothers, wives, and sisters in the elaboration of their dynasty's familial network. While Habsburg women played a critical role in the reinforcement of ties with traditional allies (something which admittedly failed to procure Portuguese compliance), negotiations with France posed a unique challenge due to the lack of an authoritative precedent. To overcome this challenge, I argue, both the Habsburgs and Valois regularly invoked fictitious memories of collaboration. When necessary, they also made a point of excluding controversial points with the potential of undermining the legitimacy of the marriage contracts. As a whole, the chapter demonstrates that the negotiation of Philip II's grand alliance was far from straightforward. Rather, it resulted from the diplomatic flexibility and political imagination of actors, both men and women, forced by the volatility of early modern life to navigate rapidly changing circumstances in order to enhance the power and prestige of their dynasty.

Chapter Three

“This is what agrees with justice and reason [and] appears to me will be enough, but between great kings there is no certain thing because they put law and reason only in arms and when the instance occurs that he finds himself powerful enough to take possession of the kingdoms he never usually takes notice in reasons nor in orders of law because they say that they are above all laws and their fathers could not take from them the succession of the kingdoms that were theirs, and as such one cannot stop fearing that in this instance there will be wars.”³⁴⁶

When Philip III inherited the throne in 1598, the imperial commitment to dynastic glory and territorial aggrandizement was still alive and well. Like his father and grandfather, Philip III initially longed to expand Habsburg influence to distant corners of the globe. To this end, he funded ambitious projects of his own, such as the naval expedition of Pedro Fernández de Quirós aimed at exploring and conquering a vast territory, *Terra Australis*, rumored to exist in the western Pacific.³⁴⁷ He also oversaw a renewed military campaign in the Dutch provinces in hopes of decisively crushing local resistance to Spanish rule.³⁴⁸ Over the course of the next decade, however, the monarchy’s failure to obtain tangible benefits from its endeavors forced Philip III to seriously consider the long-term sustainability of an aggressive foreign policy. Gradually tempering expectations for what could be achieved, Philip III and his favorite (*valido*), the Duke of Lerma, developed a new approach to international relations characterized by a preoccupation with preservation and containment.³⁴⁹ As part of this new approach, aimed first and foremost at keeping the empire intact, they orchestrated strategic diplomatic efforts to reconcile with traditional rivals and secure a temporary suspension of conflict on the continent—efforts which were largely successful and culminated in a prolonged period of peace known as the *Pax Hispanica*.

The radical shift in the Spanish monarchy’s strategic approach was accompanied by an equally radical shift for its dynastic policy. First proposed in 1610, the earliest marriage project pursued by Philip III was a double alliance with France involving the male heirs, Philip IV and Louis XIII, and eldest daughters, the Infanta Anne of Austria and Isabel of Bourbon, of each respective monarchy. The first grand two-way agreement orchestrated between the two crowns,

³⁴⁶ *Parecer* of Diego de Aldrete, British Library (BL), Additional (Add.) 14000, fol. 817r. [“Esto es lo que conforme a justicia y razon me parece q seria bastante pero entre tan grandes Reyes no ay cosa segura porque ponen el derecho y rrazon solo en las armas y quando succede el caso que se halla poderoso para tomar porsí posesion de los reynos nunca suele reparar en rrazones ni en disposiciones de derecho por q dice q son ellos sobre todas las leyes y que sus padres no les pudieron quitar la sucesion de los reynos que eran suyos, y ansi no se puede dejar de temer que en ese caso habria guerras...”]

³⁴⁷ For more on the voyage see Kevin Sheehan, “Voyaging in the Spanish Baroque,” *Science in the Spanish and Portuguese Empires, 1500–1800*, eds. Daniela Bleichmar, Paula De Vos, Kristin Huffine, and Kevin Sheehan, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 233–246.

³⁴⁸ Paul Allen, *Philip III and the Pax Hispanica 1598–1621: The Failure of Grand Strategy*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 141–155.

³⁴⁹ Unlike his father, who preferred to jealously protect his prerogatives and micromanage imperial affairs, Philip III relied heavily on the Duke of Lerma, when altering the formal composition of the imperial bureaucracy to incorporate capable individuals whose adherence to a newly emerging political culture gave them a unique perspective on the acute problems facing the empire. For recent revisionist historiography centered on the Duke of Lerma see Williams, *The Great Favourite*; Feros, *Kingship and Favoritism*; García García, *La Pax Hispánica*.

the proposal was a departure from historical precedent intended to establish a dynastic link with France's new royal family and propel the amelioration of bilateral relations between the traditional rivals.³⁵⁰ The only Hispano-French marriages negotiated during a period of peace, they were also intended to perform an important preventative function; forestalling the outbreak of conflict by bolstering the Peace of Vervins established in 1598.³⁵¹ Previous unions arranged by Charles V and Philip II had professed to be for perpetual friendship and amity, but were in reality largely one sided treaties imposed on the French in the wake of military victories. The marriages of Philip IV and Isabel and Louis XIII and Anne, on the other hand, were treated with a particular emphasis on fair terms and conditions in hopes that transparency and equality in the contracts would prevent either side from challenging them in the near future.

The most contentious issue to emerge during the negotiation of the double alliance was the renunciation of Anne's claim to the Habsburg inheritance. Viewed as a necessary precaution to protect the monarchical line of succession from foreign claims, renunciation clauses had been included in earlier marriage agreements with the Valois. But, these earlier examples—products of an age in which monarchs readily accepted the risks inherent in marriage alliances in hopes of acquiring new territories—had been far from rigid, including Eleanor's renunciation in 1530 which explicitly allowed for a contingency in which her inheritance rights might still extend to her French-born offspring.³⁵² In the case of Anne's marriage, though, Philip III was no longer willing to overlook such legal loopholes, nor passively agree to stipulations that might one day facilitate the rise of a new ruling dynasty. Aided by the Council of State, he instead pushed for a complete and thorough renunciation of all the rights possessed by the Infanta—an unprecedented demand that forced Spaniards to confront many questions regarding the efficacy of marriage alliances, the nature of monarchical power, and the basis of international order.³⁵³

³⁵⁰ For more on traditional Habsburg policy see Robert J.W. Evans, *The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1550–1700: An Interpretation*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); Dorothy Gies McGuigan, *The Habsburgs* (New York: Doubleday, 1966); Adam Wandruszka, *The House of Hapbburg: Six Hundred Years of a European Dynasty* (New York: Doubleday, 1964); Magdalena S. Sánchez, *The Empress, the Queen, and the Nun*.

³⁵¹ Frédérique Pilleboue and Claudine Vidal, eds., *La paix de Vervins, 1598, textes réunis par Claudine Vidal et Frédérique Pilleboue*, (Amiens: Fédération des sociétés d'histoire et d'archéologie de l'Aisne, 1998).

³⁵² For more details on Eleanor's renunciation see Chapter One, pp. 41-43.

³⁵³ The administrative innovation with the greatest impact on Spanish foreign policy was Philip III's expansion of the authority of the Council of State. Traditionally, historians have presented Philip III's reliance on Lerma and different governmental councils as evidence of an ineffectual ruler more inclined to hunt than to rule his empire. Recently, however, a revisionist school has emerged that presents Philip III's administrative innovations, including the appointment of a favorite and the expansion of the Council of State, as a harbinger for the subsequent rise of powerful, absolutist states. Some even contend that increasing reliance on councils may have been inevitable as the changing nature of early modern statecraft necessitated a diffusion of responsibility to effectively govern political entities burdened by unprecedented problems of scale. Williams, *The Great Favourite*, pp. 265-266. Regardless of whether Lerma or Philip III expedited this development, the impact of the Council of State on Spanish international conduct was profound. Goldman argues that if there was peace, it "was concluded because the men of the Council of State believed that peace was the most powerful arrow in Spain's diminished quiver..." Goldman, "The Political Culture of Empire," pp. 8-9. While such an argument may place too much emphasis on the singular role of Council of State, it nevertheless sheds light on the extent to which early 17th century foreign policy was the result of a collaborative effort in which the king, favorite, and council worked in unison to realize the same vision. This proved especially true after 1610 when García García observed increased activity from Philip III, who "procuró asistir personalmente a casi todas las reuniones del Consejo de Estado sobre la materia," and Lerma, who "participó de forma muy activa en las consultas, realizando entrevistas con embajadores y supervisando en sus menores detalles todos los preparativos protocolarios y cortesanos relacionados con los dobles matrimonios." García García, *La Pax*

The double marriage alliance negotiated between the Spanish Habsburgs and French Bourbons between 1610 and 1615 has generated considerable scholarly interest. In the past, these marriages were presented negatively by French historians who understood them to be the consequence of an imprudent queen mother, Marie de Medici, driven by pride, vanity, or ignorance to forsake French interests.³⁵⁴ The rapidity with which Louis XIII abandoned his mother's pro-Habsburg position and instigated the outbreak of fresh hostilities after his ascension was cited as evidence of the marriages' impracticality. More recently, historians have offered a less critical portrayal of the marriages, celebrating instead their innovative political and cultural features.³⁵⁵ Within this new historiographical tradition, the marriages are seen as being emblematic of a Spanish effort, orchestrated by Philip III's *valido*, the Duke of Lerma, to reorient the monarchy away from entrenched political alignments. In breaking from diplomatic precedent, Lerma intended to craft a dynastic policy that prioritized peace and the wellbeing of the state.³⁵⁶

Although recent studies of the marriages have provided important insights, the radical nature of the dynastic project and its broader political implications have yet to be fully explored. From the outset of negotiations, the double marriage alliance was a deeply problematic proposition that many Spaniards, including Philip III and the Council of State, genuinely feared would jeopardize the long-term security of the empire. These were feelings of apprehension that had been conspicuously absent during the previous century, and which stemmed from a candid acknowledgement of the dangers posed by imprudent matches. For the first time, officials influenced by the doctrine of "reason of state" openly admitted the possibility of the Habsburgs not emerging victorious in their genetic gambles, and set about restructuring the legal framework

Hispánica, p. 91. Consequently, my treatment of the Hispano-French dynastic negotiations in this chapter does not emphasize the role of any one figure. Instead, it offers a comprehensive examination of the official correspondences and dispatches produced by the numerous individuals involved in order to reveal the logic that guided their conduct and underpin their support of the agreement. For traditional portrayals of Philip III see Henry Kamen, *Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492-1763*, (New York: Harper Collins, 2003); J. H. Elliott, *Imperial Spain, 1469-1716*, (London: Penguin Books, 2002); John Lynch, *Spain under the Habsburgs: Spain and America*, Vol. II, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969). For additional revisionist portrayals of Philip III's reign see Santiago Martínez Hernández, *El Marqués de Velada y la corte en los reinados de Felipe II y Felipe III: Nobleza cortesana y cultura política en la España del Siglo de Oro* (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 2004); Sánchez, *The Empress, the Queen, and the Nun*; For information on the Council of State see Goldman, "The Political Culture of Empire"; Ricardo Gómez Rivero, "Consejeros de Castilla de Felipe III," *Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español* 74, (2004), pp. 97-138; Feliciano Barrios, *El Consejo de Estado de la monarquía española, 1521-1812* (Madrid: Consejo de Estado, 1984); Janine Fayard, *Los miembros del Consejo de Castilla (1621-1746)*, (Madrid: Siglo XXI de España Editores, 1982).

³⁵³ Williams, *The Great Favourite*, p. 266. The impact of the Council of State and other governmental councils on the Spanish empire was not limited to foreign policy. According to Patrick Williams, the domestic sphere was also transformed as "the new vitality of councils and Cortes encouraged wider public discussion about the nature and values of government as the new levels of taxation led to new levels of debate; the reign of Philip III became something of a golden age of political discourse."

³⁵⁴ To date, the most thorough and influential study of the double marriage alliance remains Francois T. Perrens, *Les Mariages Espagnols Sous Le Regne De Marie de Medicis (1602-1615)*, (Paris: Librairie Académique, 1869). For another useful study see Francisco Silvela, *Matrimonios de España y Francia en 1615*, (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1901).

³⁵⁵ For an incredibly thorough primary source bibliography see McGowan, *Dynastic Marriages*.

³⁵⁶ Sánchez, *The Empress, the Queen, and Nun*, pp. 115-116.

of royal unions to minimize the chances of a foreign family supplanting local rule.³⁵⁷ In this way, the fears generated by the Hispano-French marriages in the first quarter of the 17th century precipitated an irreversible shift in Spanish dynastic policy and the thinking behind it, as those involved set about transforming royal unions from a tool employed indiscriminately by the dynast into a calculated tool of the state.



L'échange des princesses de France et d'Espagne sur la Bidassoa à Hendaye, le 9 novembre 1615,
Pierre Paul Rubens, 1622-1625,
Louvre Museum, Paris

In order to explore the Spanish monarchy's unique treatment to the 1615 double alliance and its long-term impact, the current chapter is divided into two parts. In section one, titled "Rethinking Habsburg Policy," I examine the Spanish court's initial treatment of the grand marriage project, including efforts to determine the legal grounds for authorizing Anne's renunciation.³⁵⁸ As I show, apprehensions over the match stemmed from the fact that Spain, but not France, recognized female succession and the passage of hereditary rights through cognatic lines. Justifiably worried that the double marriage would provide the Bourbon family with a distant claim to the Habsburg patrimony through Anne without providing any reciprocal opportunity in return, Philip III and the Council of State mobilized the empire's leading legal experts (*letrados*) to determine the necessary procedures for permanently divesting the Infanta and her descendants of their inheritance rights.

³⁵⁷ On reason of state and Spanish political culture see Goldman, "The Political Culture of Empire"; Harald E. Braun, *Juan de Mariana and Early Modern Spanish Political Thought*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007); J.A. Fernández-Santamaria, *Natural Law, Constitutionalism, Reason of State, and War*, vol. III-IV, (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2005); *Ibid.*, *Reason of State and Statecraft in Spanish Political Thought, 1595-1640*, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1983); *Ibid.*, "Reason of State and Statecraft in Spain (1595-1640)," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 41, No. 3, (Jul-Sep., 1980), pp. 355-379.

³⁵⁸ This chapter relies on extensive archival research drawn from AGS, Est., K-1427, K-1452, K-1453, K-1462, K-1609, K-1615, K-1617; BNE, MS 3207, fols. 153-164; BL, Add. 14000, fols. 799r-888r.

Closely analyzing the subsequent opinions (*pareceres*) produced by jurists, theologians, and important government officials, I show how many of the experts called upon by the monarchy ended up writing about much more than just the legal basis for Anne's renunciation. Confronted with the difficult task of imbuing an abstract agreement with binding power, they expanded the scope of their work to account for relevant factors, such as Spain's historical relationship with France, and to consider pertinent questions, such as the practical utility of royal unions for procuring lasting peace.³⁵⁹ In the end, opinions varied widely, with some insisting that Anne's renunciation could be made legally binding. But, as the section demonstrates, the majority of *letrados* denied the possibility of securing the act, thereby threatening the new marriage arrangement. Such a challenge was novel in the elaboration of the Spanish Habsburg familial network and, I argue, was the result of the impact that reason of state thinking, as well as the general shift in the monarchy's grand diplomatic strategy, had on dynastic policy. At the same time as statesmen and thinkers set about reorienting Spain's international approach toward preservation and containment, so too did they begin to talk about royal unions in terms of state security and long-term interests. In doing so, they opened up the potential to openly debate the viability of risky marriages.³⁶⁰

In section two, titled "A Dynastic Worldview," I examine the Spanish monarchy's decision to pursue Anne's marriage in spite of the evident risks involved. Outwardly, the *pareceres* written about the renunciation validated Philip III and the Council of State's initial opposition to any arrangement involving the Infanta. By the time they began to arrive in 1612, however, the monarchy's stance toward the marriage had shifted from pragmatic concern to unconditional support.³⁶¹ The basis for this profound shift, I maintain, was the monarchy's views on succession, family (royal women in particular), and the monarchy's historical legacy with France. For the Spanish, the unlikelihood of Anne ascending the throne, the dependability of familial bonds, and the continuity of the Hispano-French marital tradition constituted the basis of a "dynastic logic" that reframed the double marriage alliance as a prudent diplomatic maneuver that corresponded with precedent and promised to secure numerous advantages for the empire.

In considering the impact that non-political factors had on policy, this chapter complicates the common scholarly assumption that Anne and Philip IV's marriages were solely the byproduct of changes in Spain's political culture. Such an assumption, while not entirely wrong, nevertheless fails to fully appreciate the impact that dynastic logic— inherited from previous generations and shaped apart from popular political discourses— continued to have on Spanish conduct on the international stage. Positive perceptions of female power and agency, for instance, were crucial for minimizing the perceived risks of the match and rationalizing the

³⁵⁹ On fundamental changes in political thought, governance, and diplomacy see Watkins, *After Lavinia*; Miguel Ángel Ochoa Brun, *Historia de la diplomacia española*, vol. VII, (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1995); Richard Tuck, *Philosophy and Government, 1572-1651*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Gerhard Oestreich, *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, vol. I, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

³⁶⁰ Williams, *The Great Favourite*, p. 266. This process of change was not restricted to dynastic policy. According to Patrick Williams, the domestic sphere was transformed during the reign of Philip III as "the new vitality of councils and Cortes encouraged wider public discussion about the nature and values of government as the new levels of taxation led to new levels of debate; the reign of Philip III became something of a golden age of political discourse."

³⁶¹ Until now, historians have had trouble explaining this sudden shift. For instance, Elliott credits Lerma "shaking off the melancholia and lethargy to which he was prone" and pushing negotiations forward in the face of Spanish apprehensions. Elliott, "The Political Context," p. 11.

controversial marriages. Accounting for the persistence of a particular dynastic mindset in the context of the negotiations that took place from 1610-12 promises to correct this oversight and explain the Habsburgs' willingness through the 17th century to repeatedly enter into imprudent marriages that threatened to undermine their grip on power. It also serves to enrich current understandings of the complicated, imperfect process by which modern forms of political thought competed with, and were informed by, archaic modes of thinking in the diplomatic realm and beyond.

Rethinking Habsburg Policy

During the first decade of the 17th century, the Spanish monarchy shifted its foreign policy away from an emphasis on military aggression toward an emphasis on peace. The Treaty of London settled in 1604 brought an end to nearly twenty years of conflict with England, restoring formal diplomatic ties with King James VI and stifling his support for the rebellious Dutch provinces.³⁶² In France, there were sporadic talks of a royal union between the children of Philip III and Henry IV intended to bolster the treaty signed at Vervins in 1598.³⁶³ After Spanish forces under Ambrogio Spinola failed to deliver a decisive blow against the Dutch by 1609, the monarchy even managed to temporarily suspend fighting in the Low Countries with the Twelve Years' Truce.³⁶⁴ For the first in more than thirty-five years, the famed *tercios* did not have an enemy to fight.

Almost immediately, the Spanish monarchy's newfound commitment to peace was put to the test. On March 25th 1609, disagreement broke out over the right of succession to the Duchy of Jülich, Berg, and Cleves.³⁶⁵ Convinced that the Habsburgs intended to take possession of the duchy in order to strengthen their hold over the Low Countries, Henry IV acted decisively and aggressively to disrupt their hegemonic position. In addition to mobilizing troops to support the Protestant claimant to the Duchy of Jülich, Berg, and Cleves, he also conspired with the Duke of Savoy, Charles Emmanuel I, to combine their forces for a joint assault on Spanish Italy. On April 10th, Henry IV and Charles Emmanuel I sealed their new alliance with the Treaty of Brussol, which laid out the plans for a new royal union between the two houses. It also confirmed their shared commitment to declare war at the soonest possible date and establish Charles Emmanuel I as the new King of Lombardy with dominion over Milan and Montferrat.

In Spain, Philip III scrambled to assuage Henry IV's fear of being encircled and dissuade him from sparking yet another costly war. But, he could only watch helplessly as his attempts to

³⁶² Melinda J. Gough, "Dynastic Marriage, Diplomatic Ceremonial and the Treaties of London (1604–05) and Antwerp (1609)," *Stuart Marriage Diplomacy: Dynastic Politics in their European Context, 1604–1630*, eds. Valentina Caldari and Sara J. Wolfson, (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2018), pp. 287-302.

³⁶³ Francois T. Perrens, *Les Mariages Espagnols*, pp. 3-45. According to Perrens, the double marriage alliance secured under Marie de Medici was not a decisive break from France's previous approach. Rather, it was the culmination of the negotiations began by Henry IV in 1602. Even at this early date, the Constable of Castile was emphatically warning against any marriage involving the eldest daughter of Spain. García García, *La Pax Hispánica*, p. 90.

³⁶⁴ Peter Brightwell, "The Spanish System and the Twelve Years' Truce," *The English Historical Review* 89, No. 351, (Apr., 1974), pp. 270-292.

³⁶⁵ For information on the Jülich War of Succession see Olaf van Nimwegen, *The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions, 1588-1688* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2010), pp. 201-207; Anderson, *The Origins*, pp. 205-209.

convey amicable intentions were repeatedly rebuffed by an antagonistic French court.³⁶⁶ On May 8, the Spanish Council of State warned that the time had come, or was near, for Philip III to inform the Papacy and Spain's allies of French machinations against the Catholic cause and public peace.³⁶⁷ The Council also advised the king to contact the Grand Duke of Tuscany to remind him of his obligation to aid Spain in its defense of Milan.

Henry IV's assassination on May 14, 1610, less than a week later, dramatically altered the orientation of Spanish dynastic policy. The first news of the incident to reach Madrid came from the Spanish ambassador, Iñigo de Cárdenas, who informed Philip III that the French monarch was unceremoniously stabbed three times in the chest by a man claiming to have been possessed by the devil.³⁶⁸ Less than an hour later, Henry died mute with blood loss and unable to deliver a last confession.³⁶⁹ Upon hearing the report, Philip III immediately moved to build trust and confidence with the new royal regent, the queen mother Marie de Medici, in order to facilitate the renewal of marriage negotiations.³⁷⁰ Within the Council of State, disagreement raged over the instructions that should be given to the Duke of Feria, a temporary ambassador being sent to France to deliver Philip III's condolences and felicitations (*pesame and placeme*), regarding the topic of marriage.³⁷¹ Some members, including the Marquis of Velada, feared that a forthright broaching of the topic would be perceived as a sign of weakness.³⁷² Others, including

³⁶⁶ Philip III to Iñigo de Cárdenas, AGS, Est., K-1452, A59, fol. 103, 6 May 1610; *Consulta* of the Council of State, Ibid., K-1427, A38, fol. 23, 8 May 1610; Roland Mousnier, "Appendix 8: Contents of the Last Audience Given by the King to the Spanish Ambassador," *The Assassination of Henry IV: The Tyrannicide Problem and the Consolidation of the French Absolute Monarchy in the 17th Century*, trans. Joan Spencer, (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), pp. 380-381. For more on the tensions between Spain and France see Antonio Eiras Roel, "Política francesa de Felipe III: las tensiones con Enrique IV," *Hispania* 31, (1971), pp. 245-336.

³⁶⁷ *Consulta* of the Council of State, AGS, Est., K-1427, A38, fol. 23, 8 May 1610. ["...que estando estas materia de mobimientos de francia y Saboya tan adelante parece que es ya tiempo, o lo sera muy presto de dar...al Papa y a los Principes amigos de negocio tan grande ordenado un papel grave y decente...manifestando quan sin Razon y sin poder alegar quexa ni ofensa de nra parte muebe, El Rey de francia, estas inquietudes en su perjuicio y de la causa Catholica y assi mismo de a la Paz publica..."]

³⁶⁸ Iñigo de Cárdenas to Philip III, Ibid., K-1462, A68, fol. 144, 17 May 1610. For the king's response roughly one month later, see Philip III to Iñigo de Cárdenas, Ibid., K-1452, A59, fol. 106, 12 June 1610. For more on Cárdenas see Alain Hugon, *Au Service du Roi Catholique: Honorables Ambassadeurs Et Divins Espions*, (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2004), pp. 181-186.

³⁶⁹ For a detailed account of Henry IV's assassination see Roland Mousnier. *The Assassination of Henry IV*.

³⁷⁰ Philip III to Iñigo de Cárdenas, AGS, Est., K-1452, A59, fol. 109, 4 July 1610. ["que en qualquier ocasión destas o otras q aya acudays luego a la Reyna a offrecerla asistencia mia para su minor quietud de manera q entienda q en España no se quieren inquietudes de francia sino lo q a la Reyna mas combenga, y la advertireys que pues puede fiar de la ayuda de España se tenga fuerte en no conceder las cosas injustas q le pidieren y fueren en daño de la Religion Catholica."]

³⁷¹ An early reference to the Duke of Feria's journey can be found at Philip III to Iñigo de Cárdenas, AGS, Ibid., fol. 106, 12 June 1610. Originally, the Duke of Feria was supposed to leave immediately. However, disagreement in the Council of State delayed his departure by nearly two months.

³⁷² Perrens, *Les Mariages Espagnols*, p. 294. The opinion was voiced that the Spanish were dealing with "gens qui voient trop aisement de la faiblesse dans sec actes de bonne amitie." In Velada's words, an indirect approach would entail, "Bornons-nous... à conseiller à la reine de choisir les avis les plus sains, quand même ils seraient de moindre autorité, parce que si, dans ces commencements, elle montre de la résolution et du cœur, il en sortira ce qu'elle voudra; sinon, elle sera comme un Dux de République, exposée à suivre des conseils dangereux et à perdre le respect de ceux qui doivent lui obéir et la servir." For the Council of State's careful treatment of Feria's journey and the reopening of marriage negotiations see *Consulta* of the Council of State, AGS, Est., K-1427, A38, fol. 39, 20 July 1610.

the Duke of Lerma, championed Spain taking the initiative toward reopening negotiations.³⁷³ Ultimately, Philip III adopted a direct approach to the marriage question despite not knowing whether the French court was receptive to Spanish dynastic overtures or whether it had inherited Henry's obstinacy to peace.³⁷⁴

In adherence to common diplomatic procedure, the Duke of Feria received two sets of instructions regarding his ambassadorial conduct. Within the public set of orders, sixteen points were included ranging from condolences for Henry's death, felicitations for Louis XIII's ascension and reaffirmations of Spain's commitment to peace, to more worldly affairs, such as the military situation in Jülich.³⁷⁵ Due to the delicacy of the matter, orders pertaining to the marriages were reserved for the private set of instructions. These seventeen additional points, meant only for the eyes of Feria, provided the diplomat with a clear outline of Spanish dynastic designs. Upon advancing the topic of marriage, he was to emphasize the continuity of the project, as began and desired by Henry IV, and the unrivaled promise that it had to "reunite the two powers and establish a perpetual peace and confederation for the greater good of Christendom and the enhancement of the Catholic faith."³⁷⁶ With regard to the details of the marriages, Philip III spurned the earlier arrangement advanced by Henry IV in favor of his heir, Philip IV, and second eldest daughter, Mary, marrying Marie de Medici's two eldest children, Louis XIII and Elizabeth. Under no circumstances was Feria to allow France to substitute Philip's eldest daughter Anne for Mary, conclude its marriage agreement with the Duke of Savoy, or secure a marital link with the Duke of Lorena; three scenarios which the Spanish feared would result in an outbreak of fresh hostilities.

The exclusion of Anne from the double marriage alliance was the most consequential of these scenarios to subsequent negotiations between Spain and France. Despite Feria's appeal to the formulaic justification for most early modern unions, namely perpetual peace and the greater good of Christendom, his private instructions indicated that, from the outset, the Spanish monarchy was aware of the danger posed by a French match. This danger was rooted in conflicting legal traditions whereby royal women could inherit the throne in Spain, but not in France where Salic law stipulated that all lands must pass through the male line. If necessary, Feria was instructed to reiterate this difference and to maintain that, as a result, Philip III's second daughter was equivalent to Marie de Medici's first. The possibility of Anne renouncing her rights to the throne was also to be rejected by Feria due the likelihood that this act would lead to wars and dissensions in the future and thus thwart the double marriage alliance's proclaimed purpose. If the Spanish had immediate political objectives best served by the activation of its

³⁷³ Perrens, *Les Mariages Espagnols*, p. 295.

³⁷⁴ *Consulta* of the Council of State, AGS, Est., K-1427, A38, fol. 43, 10 Aug 1610. While Marie de Medici appeared to have peaceful intentions, Spaniards were still unsure if she was susceptible to ministers hostile to Spain. ["Que procurara que la Reyna de Francia entienda lo que debe y ha menester a VM'd", que a ella se le conoce buena intención, pero ay ministros que la divierten."]

³⁷⁵ Philip III's public instructions for the Duke of Feria, AGS, Est., K-1452, A59, fol. 113a-b, 8 Aug 1610. The instructions covered the Duke's initial contact with the queen mother and boy king, Louis XIII, as well as his communication with Iñigo de Cárdenas, the Princes of Blood, the papal nuncio, and Archduke Albert VII. Details of the public instructions can also be found in, Perrens, *Les Mariages Espagnols*, pp. 296-297.

³⁷⁶ Philip III's private instructions for the Duke of Feria, AGS, Est., K-1452, A59, fol. 116, 8 Aug 1610. ["...para reunir las dos potencias y stablecer una perpetua paz y confederacion para mayor bien de la Christiandad y aumento de la Religion Catholica."]

dynastic potential, it did not necessarily justify the acquisition of an irresponsible peace that would jeopardize the long-term security of the empire.

Philip III was forced to reevaluate this stance once it became apparent that the French were unwilling to entertain unequal terms. In Paris, initial diplomatic efforts revealed that the royal regency was sympathetic to rapprochement. Marie de Medici even agreed to abandon Henry IV's original insistence on a dowry that included the Low Countries.³⁷⁷ The condition that proved divisive, however, was the exchange of Marie de Medici's eldest daughter Elizabeth for Philip III's second eldest Mary. Worried that the impasse might lead to renewed tensions, Philip III decided in October to concede the point and reconfigure the marital exchange to include children of equal rank.³⁷⁸

Although the inclusion of Anne in the double marriage project was problematic, Philip III was reluctant to alienate the French court. Less than a year earlier, Spain had been on the brink of war and, while Henry IV's death had prevented an immediate outbreak of conflict, the international situation did not immediately stabilize. Marie de Medici continued to honor some of her late husband's policies, including his commitment to aid the Protestants in their fight for the Duchy of Jülich, Berg, and Cleves.³⁷⁹ She also waited to disavow the Treaty of Brussol and sever ties with the Charles Emmanuel I until Philip III's intentions were clear. As it turned out, the Spanish king was determined to do whatever it took to frustrate the Duke of Savoy's plans to instigate a war in Italy and establish himself as King of Lombardy. Believing that a double marriage alliance was necessary to prevent a Savoyard-French alliance, Philip III moved forward with talks *in spite* of the complications posed by conflicting legal traditions. At the same time, he trusted legal experts to work quietly behind the scenes to establish irrefutable grounds for permanently excluding Anne from the legitimate line of succession.

In October 1610, the Council of State requested that a number of celebrated jurists and government officials submit written *pareceres* in order to determine whether Anne could renounce her royal claim and, if so, by what legal procedures.³⁸⁰ Formally trained and educated in Spanish universities, the collection of learned men constituted a formidable intellectual force possessing a thorough mastery of civil law and its practical application, as well as a strong knowledge of history and dynastic custom. Writing through the end of the year, Gil Ramirez de

³⁷⁷ García García, *La Pax Hispánica*, p. 90.

³⁷⁸ The official letter granting Iñigo de Cárdenas power to negotiate the marriages on Philip III's behalf can be found at AGS, Est., K-1617, C4, fol. 4, 29 Oct 1610.

³⁷⁹ Jack A. Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior: The Life and Times of Henri de Rohan, 1579–1638*, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), p. 26. Around the same time that Feria broached the topic of a marriage agreement, 12,000 French soldiers were marching north to lay siege to the army of Leopold V, a member of the Austrian Habsburg royal family and cousin of Philip III. The decision to invade Jülich annoyed Philip III, but did not immediately threaten the Spanish empire. He chose not to respond to the escalation of fighting; a decision which clearly reflected the diverging interests of the Spanish and Austrian branches by the beginning of the 17th century. For more on the diplomatic relationship between the two branches see Magdalena S. Sánchez, "Dynasty, State, and Diplomacy in the Spain of Philip III," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1998).

³⁸⁰ The Council of State's request for *pareceres* was first made in October 1610 and can be found at AHN, C, leg. 759-2. Responses were submitted from jurists including Gil Ramirez de Arellano, Diego de Aldrete, Gabriel Trejo Paniagua, Hernando de Villagomez, Gabriel Enríquez, el Fiscal Molina, and Gilimon de Mota, as well as from government officials including the President of Castile Juan Bautista de Acebedo, the President of the Hacienda Fernando Carrillo, the Marques of Laguna, and the Constable of Castile. The lists of names and brief description of the *pareceres* can be found in García García, *La Pax Hispánica*, pp. 92-93.

Arellano, Diego de Aldrete, Gabriel Trejo Paniagua, Hernando de Villagomez, Gabriel Enríquez, el Fiscal Molina, Gilimon de Mota, the President of Castile Juan Bautista de Acebedo, the President of the Hacienda Fernando Carrillo, and the Marques of Laguna drafted separate *pareceres* for the monarchy. Once completed and compiled by the Council, they were then distributed to a special committee (*junta*) of theologians convened by the Duke of Lerma to examine their main arguments and interpretations through the lens of canon law. Afterwards, the members of the *junta*, including Philip III's confessor (*Padre confessor*) Fray Luis de Aliaga, Fray Jeronimo de Tierra, Diego Granero, Pedro de Herrera, the Bishop (*Obispo*) of Orens Sebastian de Bricianos, Doctor Castillo, and Fray Jeronimo de Florencia, produced *pareceres* of their own which, together with those of lay officials, constituted the authoritative legal reference materials informing the monarchy's diplomatic efforts.³⁸¹

Throughout this drawn out process, the work done by experts to ascertain the feasibility of including a binding renunciation in the Infanta's marriage agreement was complicated by the novelty of the precautionary measure. For nearly a century, the Spanish Habsburg approach to marriage politics had been characterized by an oftentimes reckless disregard for the dangers inherent in marriage politics, as successive monarchs finalized alliances with the intention of expanding their familial network and acquiring new territories. During this period, limited renunciation clauses were included in some unions deemed especially problematic, such as Eleanor's marriage to Francis I, but for the most part the monarch's indiscriminate pursuit of advantageous marriages was carried out without any attempt to mitigate long-term risks. The task began in 1610, however, was aimed specifically at eliminating unintended consequences from dynastic policy making. For the first time, Spaniards openly acknowledged the possibility that they might not emerge victorious in their genetic gambles, and that France might benefit from the same process whereby "the crown and the kingdoms which have been enlarged by marriages as is well-known."³⁸² In order to avoid the consequences that accidents of birth or personality might have on territorial alignments, they sought a means of permanently preventing a rival monarchy from acquiring a distant claim. The challenge facing Spanish legal experts was finding this means without any contractual or historical precedent; curtailing in the process the dynastic ambitions that usually motivated the negotiation of royal unions.

The first obstacle preventing adequate resolution of the inheritance issue was a French legal tradition that precluded Elizabeth and her descendants from the Bourbon throne. Castilian laws embraced the legitimate right of both male and female claimants to inherit royal authority. While the expectations of Habsburg women may have differed from that of their brothers, this did not indicate that their divinely bestowed blood right to monarchical power was circumscribed by their gender. In fact, the Infantas possessed a great deal of power as claimants and all diplomatic negotiations surrounding them were conducted with great reverence towards their status. By contrast, the rules governing royal succession in France were grounded in Salic laws of primogeniture that only acknowledged the legitimacy of male descendants and the preservation of divine monarchical authority through the paternal bloodline.³⁸³ Female members

³⁸¹ Duke of Lerma to Antonio de Arostegui AGS, Est., K-1609, B91, fol. 1, 20 Sept 1611. Upon receiving all the *pareceres*, the Duke of Lerma ordered a new *junta* of theologians to read them and offer their own opinions.

³⁸² *Parecer* of Fernando Carrillo, BL, Add. 14000, 803r. ["...la Corona y Reynos los quales an sido engrandecidos por cassamientos como es notorio."]

³⁸³ During this period in time, French jurists were actively attempting to ground royal authority in a blood right that functioned independently of worldly institutions and decrees. For more information on French succession laws and

of the French royal house, including Philip IV's prospective wife Elizabeth, were denied the opportunity to occupy the throne or pass that right down to their sons. These different legal traditions were understandably a point of considerable concern for experts who had to anticipate French challenges to their legal formulations. One jurist in particular, Arellano, opened his *parecer* with a stern warning to keep the discussion of Anne's renunciation secret from the king and kingdom of France.³⁸⁴ The negative assessment of the marriage as an unbalanced agreement in which Spain had much to lose and little to gain may have been well founded, but the French were unlikely to concede the point without raising significant objection.

Unfazed by the high likelihood of French opposition, legal experts unanimously confirmed that Anne's renunciation was a legally justifiable course of action. In responding to one source of objection, namely that the canonical text used to justify the act was not received in France, Gabriel Trejo Paniagua rebuffed; "first off, we do not care that in France this text is not received, being that it is in Spain."³⁸⁵ In regard to the question of legal authority, Paniagua's stance was unequivocal. The act of renunciation was a domestic issue falling within the purview of Castilian jurisdiction whereby "they had to judge the contract according to the law received in Spain."³⁸⁶ Such an assertion spoke to a discernible resolve to not let foreign pressure undermine the monarchy's legal prerogative to dictate the unfolding of Habsburg succession.

This resolve pervaded the writings of Paniagua's peers, who likewise maintained the unwavering conviction that justice and reason authorized the monarchy's mission to prevent a belligerent and heretical France from inheriting the Spanish empire. Pedro de Herrera warned that with a French successor, "the French would be preferred and to the foreigners would be given the prizes and favors that are currently enjoyed by natives, and the said King would try to enrich his states and the expense of Castile, and would impoverish this monarchy passing there [France] the riches of its kingdoms."³⁸⁷ Castilian anxieties over foreign usurpation were deeply rooted in historical experiences that had demonstrated the rapidity with which power could change hands and violence break out in the peninsula. Evidently, many Spaniards feared that the French would execute the same hostile, self-serving takeover that their forefathers had anticipated from Charles V.³⁸⁸ In fact, Herrera insisted, the only force preventing the tide of French aggression from overwhelming all of Europe was Castilian military strength. French

the ways in which it differed from French customary law see Matthew Gerber, *Bastards: Politics, Family, and Law in Early Modern France*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 75-82. For more information on the early history of Salic law in France see Daisy Delogu, *Theorizing the Ideal Sovereign: The Rise of the French. Vernacular Royal Biography*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), pp. 85-91.

³⁸⁴ *Parecer* of Gil Ramirez de Arellano, BL, Add. 14000, fol. 813r. ["Pero que aviendose de haver secretemente y sin ciencia y sabiduria del Rey y Reyno de Francia, no faltaran dificultades con que la pretenderan hacer invalida y inficaz para escluir a la senora Infanta, y mucho menos a los hijos y decendientes de este matrimonio de la sucesion de estos Reynos por decir que aviedno se diferir por derecho de sangre no se puede divertir ni pervertiren perjuicio del de la primogenitura, del qual no puede los Reyes de España escluir a sus hijos y decendientes."]

³⁸⁵ *Parecer* of Gabriel Trejo Paniagua, *Ibid.*, fol. 808v. ["La primera que no nos importa q en francia no estubiese recibido aquel texto, estando lo en españa."]

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, fol. 808v. ["...se havra de juzgar el contracto según el derecho recebido en españa..."]

³⁸⁷ *Parecer* of Pedro de Herrera, *Ibid.*, fol. 835r. ["serian preferidos los franceses y a los estrangeros se dara los premios y mds de q agora goza los naturales, y el dho Rey trataria de enriquecer sus estados a costa de los de Castilla, y procuraria enflaquecer esta monarchia pasando alla los riquezas destos reynos."]

³⁸⁸ Aurelio Espinosa, *The Empire of the Cities: Emperor Charles V, the Comunero Revolt, and the Transformation of the Spanish System*, (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 46-70.

inheritance of the Spanish Habsburg patrimony would mean that “it could be rightly feared that no Christian prince nor even still the Roman church would have their estates secured.”³⁸⁹

Similar anti-French sentiments were voiced by Diego Granero, who worried about the harmful impact that French rule would have on Spanish religion.³⁹⁰ In his estimation, the French were a people predisposed toward ruling foreign territories in a ferocious and cruel manner as evidenced by their brief occupation of Sicily in the twelfth century.³⁹¹ This disposition resulted from a distinct humor that prevented them from living in peace and tranquility, and by the heretics that populated their nation.³⁹² Given their belligerent nature and impiety, their presence “would be a thing very harmful to the Christian Republic of Spain.”³⁹³ For Granero, and others contemplating the issue at hand, foreign usurpation threatened to disrupt the perpetuation of an undisturbed Catholic ideal and mutate the very essence of Spanish religious identity. Spain and France were negotiating marriages that would ostensibly bring the crowns together in perpetual peace, but the future was still framed in terms of competing political identities, conflicting national interests, and irreconcilable moral positions.

Confident that they had solid grounds for proceeding with Anne’s renunciation, the next step was to establish an indisputable foundation upon which the act of forfeiture could be permanently guaranteed. This proved to be far more difficult than Philip III or the Council of State may have anticipated as numerous *letrados* opined that the act could neither be secured under Spanish law and tradition nor under the normative framework of international relations. Of course, there were a select few who argued that there were grounds for an agreeable resolution to the inheritance issue. However, they often lacked the critical expertise needed to fully appreciate the implications of a specific proposition. According to the *pareceres* submitted between July 1611 and January 1612, there were three possible solutions to the issue at hand.

The forthright approach was to have Anne, upon turning twelve, voluntarily renounce all of her rights to inherit the throne. Arellano, a proponent of this idea, supported his conclusion by alleging that the precedent for challenging the laws of primogeniture and renunciation had already been established on two different occasions; when Charles V successfully divided his empire between Ferdinand and Philip II and when Philip III renounced his right to the Low

³⁸⁹ *Parecer* of Pedro de Herrera, BL, Add. 14000, fol. 836v. [“justissimamente se podia temer q ningun principe christiano ni aun la Iglesia Romana ternia su seniorio seguro...”]

³⁹⁰ The apprehensions felt by Herrera and Granero were widely shared. For another example see *Parecer* of Fernando Carrillo, *Ibid.*, fol. 802v. [“Y pues Todos son conformes en que seria la Ruina destos Reynos y su Religion si francia en ningun acontecimiento los governase.”]

³⁹¹ *Parecer* of Diego Granero, *Ibid.*, fol. 849r. [“los franceses... son bravos y feroces con las naciones estranas quando se podran de ellos... y no quiero poner desto muchos exemplos sino solo uno y es que apoderados del Reyno de Sicilia.”] Others similarly presented Sicily as an example of France’s tendency to severely oppress foreign territories. For one example, see *Parecer* of Geronimo de Tiedra, *Ibid.*, fol. 845v. For more information of Norman control of Sicily under William III see Donald Matthew, *The Norman Kingdom of Sicily*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

³⁹² *Parecer* of Diego Granero, BL, Add. 14000, fol. 849r. [“Son tambien los franceses de diverisimo humor, y trato de los Españoles de suerte que moralmente hablando no pueden vivir en paz y sosiego, tambien son muchissimos los hereges que alli ay pernicios grandemente y son muchos de ellos Atheystas.”]

³⁹³ *Ibid.*, fol. 850v. [“...que seria cosa perniciosicima a la Republica Cristiana de España.”]

Countries in favor of his sister Isabel Clara Eugenia.³⁹⁴ As many jurists and theologians were careful to point out, though, the contentious point was not whether Anne could legally renounce her claim, but whether her renunciation would extend to her descendants. On this point, the near consensus view was that, while someone could reject their own inheritance, no single individual had the right to disinherit their child of their birth right. Hernando de Villagomez wrote on the subject;

“Because in them (Castile y Leon and Spanish kingdoms) they succeed by succession and blood right, and as in primogeniture, and their head, and by custom, and law of Spain and its statutory code. It is by legal inheritance, to each one of them and by their own person, and law, that they are entitled to this succession, and they cannot be stripped nor prejudiced this by the Senora Infanta with her renunciation.”³⁹⁵

Anne’s blood, the very same blood that would one day flow through the veins of her children, carried with it a right to power enshrined in law and custom. In the educated opinions of men like Villagomez, an act of voluntarily renunciation, regardless of the legal formulation, was futile because the child’s hereditary claim transcended the will of the mother.

Another unlikely option proposed to the Council of State was to divorce the act of renunciation from the specific circumstances of Anne’s marriage and pass a law that would serve to guide Spanish dynastic politics in the future. Such a measure was enthusiastically advocated by theologians, including Pedro de Herrera, Luis de Aliaga, Geronimo de Tiedra. and Diego Granero, who agreed that domestic legal action held the greatest promise of yielding a clear and decisive solution to the inheritance problem. Of course, the matter fell outside the realm of theology and some were careful to admit that the details of drafting the law hinged on a jurist or administrative expertise.³⁹⁶ Unfortunately, secular *letrados* reached a far different conclusion on the feasibility of enshrining the right to disinherit the Habsburg patrimony into Spanish law. As both parties observed, the monarchy could pass two potential laws of various scope; a general law applicable to all instances in which a Spanish princess married into a kingdom where primogeniture excluded women or a particular law reserved only for France. The general law would be far too dangerous warned the President of the Hacienda, Fernando Carrillo, who recognized the implications of challenging the basis of rightful inheritance and legitimate authority for a monarchy notoriously shaped through marriage diplomacy.³⁹⁷ Gilimon de Mota, a jurist who otherwise acknowledged the advantages to be wrought by a new law, singled out

³⁹⁴ *Parecer* of Gil Ramirez de Arrelano, *Ibid.*, fols. 814r-815v. In light of these examples pertaining to “present and vested monarchs,” Arellano argued, the renunciation of Anne’s remote claim was a justifiable act that the Pope would surely support.

³⁹⁵ *Parecer* of Hernando de Villagomez, *Ibid.*, fol. 820v. [“Porq como en ellos se succede Por succession y derecho de sangre, y como en mayorazgo, y cabeza de ellos, y por costumbre, y derecho de españa y de la partida, y es mayorazgo legal, a cada uno de ellos y por su propria persona, y derecho, le toca el de esta successsion, y no se le puede quitar ni prejudicar la S Infanta con su renunciacion.”]

³⁹⁶ *Parecer* of Pedro de Herrera, *Ibid.*, fol. 837r. [“Esto no es de mi facultad allanarlo has los juristas.”]; *Parecer* of Geronimo de Tiedra, *Ibid.*, fol. 848v. [“respondo q esto no pertenece tanto a theologo, como al consejo y Cortes de su Mag’d’, q como tan sabios y tan experimentados en el gobierno, daran la forma a la ley q mas convenga.”]

³⁹⁷ *Parecer* of Fernando Carrillo, *Ibid.*, fols. 803r-804v.

Portugal as the kingdom most likely to secure a rapid withdrawal from the empire.³⁹⁸ Although Habsburg authority had remained relatively stable outside the tumultuous Low Countries, there were few illusions about the devastating consequences that devising a legal channel to contest the family's claims of legitimacy would have on the unity of the royal patrimony.

In the face of such repercussions, a law specific to France appeared favorable because it would limit the potential for disparate kingdoms to push for independence. There was also the added benefit of having a permanent mandate in place to inform rapprochement with France in the future. But, as jurists recognized, the monarchy would still have to contend with the issues posed by passing the new law. After all, the Spanish empire was not a uniform political entity governed by an all-encompassing legal structure.³⁹⁹ If the Habsburgs did succeed in establishing a large degree of political conformity through far-sweeping imperial institutions (i.e. viceroyalties, audiencias and the Inquisition), they still had to compete with local laws, regional privileges and native institutions. Spanish possessions in Italy, including the kingdom of Naples and Sicily and Milan, and Flanders were identified by Carillo as being particularly problematic regions due to the formers' status as feudal dependencies of the papacy and the latter's refusal to acknowledge formal renunciations.⁴⁰⁰ Regardless of the political and diplomatic advantages to be wrought from a particular law reserved only for France, the peculiar constitutional nature of the empire made it an unlikely proposition.

The final option considered within the *pareceres* was to incorporate the renunciation of Anne and her descendants within the marriage capitulations. In light of the impracticality of the available alternatives, jurists such as Hernando de Villagomez championed this as the most reasonable proposal.⁴⁰¹ For all intents and purposes, marriage capitulations were meant to serve as a bilateral agreement with the power to obligate both signatories to honor their respective commitments. In regard to Anne's renunciation, the inclusion of a special clause excluding her and her descendants from the throne would be legally binding for both Spain and France. This was an important distinction from the other two solutions, which would have been devised and implemented independently from France. If Spain could persuade Louis XIII to swear to honor the renunciation in an international agreement, however, it would ensure that the legal power to resolve future inheritance disputes resided firmly in Madrid. An added incentive for the utilization of the marriage capitulations was that the Spanish could have them confirmed by the Pope, thus enhancing the binding force of the agreement's resolutions.⁴⁰² In an international arena where justice only extended to those with the power and authority to give force to their

³⁹⁸ *Parecer* of Gilimon de Mota, *Ibid.*, fols. 830v-r. [“y de camino quanto al de portugal convendria advertir que podra facilmente apartarse de la corona de castilla...”] Philip II's claim to the Portuguese throne, which he used to justify his invasion and eventual incorporation of the kingdom into his empire, came through his mother. For more on this see Parker, *Imprudent King*, pp. 266-268.

³⁹⁹ J.H. Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” *Past and Present* 137, (1992), pp. 48-71.

⁴⁰⁰ *Parecer* of Fernando Carrillo, BL, Add. 14000, fols. 803r-804v.

⁴⁰¹ *Parecer* of Hernando de Villagomez, *Ibid.*, fol. 820r. [“Para conseguirle mas plenamente en todo lo q se pretende, y excluirlos tambien a ellos, Parece se podria hacer por via de pacto y capitulacion matrimonial hecha entre sus Mag'des' y Alt'as' capitulando expresamente.”]

⁴⁰² Randall Lesaffer, “Peace treaties from Lodi to Westphalia,” *Peace Treaties and International Law in European History From the Late Middle Ages to World War One*, ed. Randall Lesaffer, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 22-29. Signatories of peace treaties in pre-Westphalian Europe commonly submitted themselves to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the pope in order to enhance the binding nature of the agreement. The breaking of the oath that confirmed the peace treaty was considered to be a major sin (perjury) and violators could be punished at the Papal court's discretion.

appeal, the prospect of augmenting Spain's legal and moral position through papal arbitration was critical.

In the end, not even the promise of a marriage agreement consecrated by the Pope was enough to alleviate apprehension over French intentions. Of the fifteen experts consulted by the Council of State, only four unequivocally confirmed that Anne's renunciation could be permanently secured.⁴⁰³ Outwardly, the rejection of any settlement to the inheritance issue, and thus the marriage itself, appeared to stem from deep seeded mistrust of France. Diego de Aldrete, for instance, concluded his *parecer* with a bleak assessment of the Spanish crown's bid for an equitable peace;

“This is what agrees with justice and reason [and] appears to me will be enough, but between great kings there is no certain thing because they put law and reason only in arms and when the instance occurs that he finds himself powerful enough to take possession of the kingdoms he never usually takes notice in reasons nor in orders of law because they say that they are above all laws and their fathers could not take from them the succession of the kingdoms that were theirs, and as such one cannot stop fearing that in this instance there will be wars.”⁴⁰⁴

As Aldrete insisted, the path toward resolution was clear. However, the realities of an international arena void of any reliable mechanism to ensure collective adherence to treaties meant that justice was, and would always be, subject to the whims of kings. Regardless of the council's attempt to act in accordance with reason, its final judgment would likely ring hollow in the ears of later generations whose foreign policy decisions would shun historical promises in favor of present impulses. In such a state, where monarchical ambitions were commensurate to the power of their armed forces, it was impractical to invest one's hope in the promise of lasting peace.

Many of Aldrete's peers reached similar conclusions in their *pareceres*. The general consensus was that Philip III was legally justified in soliciting his daughter's renunciation, and had a number of avenues for obtaining it, but ultimately had no way to secure French adherence to his ultimate decision. Faced with the high likelihood that conflict would resume in the future, they prioritized the preservation of the empire over a second marriage that they believed offered little benefit. After all, Carrillo reminded the Council of State, “any good motive that can be

⁴⁰³ My final count was complicated by the lingering doubts that often surfaced. For instance, Hernando de Villagomez, whom I do not count as an unequivocal supporter, appeared to have endorsed the possibility of renunciation and the marriage, but ends his work confessing his suspicions about French vassals and ministers and deferring the final decision to the king. See *Parecer* of Hernando de Villagomez, BL, Add. 14000, fol. 821r. In the official summary of jurist *pareceres*, the Council of State largely ignored the doubts and qualifications included by legal experts, see *Consulta* of the Council of State, AGS, Est., K-1609, B91, fol. 12b, 24 Jan 1612.

⁴⁰⁴ *Parecer* of Diego de Aldrete, BL, Add. 14000, fol. 817r. [“Esto es lo que conforme a justicia y razon me parece q seria bastante pero entre tan grandes Reyes no ay cosa segura porque ponen el derecho y rrazon solo en las armas y quando succede el caso que se halla poderoso para tomar porsí posesion de los reynos nunca suele reparar en rrazones ni en disposiciones de derecho por q dice q son ellos sobre todas las leyes y que sus padres no les pudieron quitar la sucesion de los reynos que eran suyos, y ansi no se puede dejar de temer que en ese caso habria guerras...”]

imagined in this marriage can be obtained by marrying the Prince our lord with the House of France but not to the contrary the King of France with the daughter of the his Majesty.”⁴⁰⁵

The advancement of a prudent policy by Spanish legal experts marked a profound shift in the empire’s dynastic engagement with France. As seen in earlier chapters, Habsburg apprehensions over French intentions were not without precedent. During the marriage negotiations in 1570, Philip II spent a considerable amount of time assuaging the fears of Maximilian II in order to coax him into marrying his daughter Elizabeth. Philip II’s father, Charles V, also famously withheld Eleanor from Francis I until the very last minute for fear that France would pull out of the marriage. In neither case, though, did a lack of trust undermine negotiations or prevent Habsburg women from being married without a thorough renunciation of their inheritance rights. Quite the contrary, the Spanish monarchy actively pursued politically advantageous marriages with their greatest rival in spite of the inherent dangers and the unlikelihood that the agreements would engender lasting peace. The *pareceres* written expressly for the Council of State and Philip III by jurist, officials, and theologians reveal the extent to which political attitudes had shifted by the beginning of the 17th century. For the first time, Spaniards wavered in their acceptance of a treaty with potentially disastrous consequences as an unassailable feature of Habsburg policy.

The impetus for this shift came largely from the impact that changes in political culture had on the logic that governed Spanish foreign relations. During the reign of Philip II, a “Catholic reason of state” informed Spanish conduct on the international stage, including marriage diplomacy, and underpinned Spanish grand strategy. This political outlook was grounded in a traditional, contractual view of government whereby a good king was expected to act in accordance with the moral guidelines of Ciceronian prudence; upholding truth and honesty as the pillars of policy, identifying the good and evil forces in the world, and defending Catholicism at all cost.⁴⁰⁶ Many of the wars and diplomatic ploys conducted in the second half of the 16th century were aimed at executing this high moral responsibility. Philip II and his imperial agents saw it as their fundamental mission to challenge any and all heretical forces that sought to rupture the link between the spiritual and the mundane. The state was a vessel for the execution of this divine mandate, a means for realizing a righteous end. While the state needed to be maintained so as to readily serve this purpose, its well-being was not necessarily an end in itself.

By the turn of the century, however, the discourse that dictated the rationale of Spanish foreign relations came under pressure from a new, rational strain of political thought. Proponents of this new reason of state were far keener to look after the monarch and ensure that his power, embodied in the state, was guarded from the storms and assaults of imprudence and religious zeal. The most influential expression of this new discourse was the work of Justus Lipsius.⁴⁰⁷ His principal achievement, *The Politica: Six Books of Politics or Political Instruction*, translated into Castilian in 1604, was widely read and appreciated for its development of a theory that

⁴⁰⁵ *Parecer* of Fernando Carrillo, *Ibid.*, fols. 803v-r. [“Pues qualquiera caussa de bien q se pueda imaginar en este cassamiento se consuirse cassandose el Principe nro senor con la cassa de francia pero no al contrario el Rey de Francia con hija de VM’ d’.”]

⁴⁰⁶ Feros, *Kingship and Favoritism*, p. 23.

⁴⁰⁷ Goldman, “Political Culture of Empire,” pp. 23-58.

reconciled the ignoble prince of Machiavelli with high moral, Christian ideals.⁴⁰⁸ Lipsius, who both respected and despised Machiavelli, agreed that the primary aspiration of a prince should not necessarily be the indiscriminate defense of faith. He disagreed, though, with his predecessor's construction of a brutal international landscape in which nefarious and immoral acts could be justified if they enhanced the glory of the prince.⁴⁰⁹ Instead, Lipsius argued for an uninhibited utilization of monarchial authority dictated by reason and aimed at maintaining the well-being of the kingdom and its subjects. This objective was rooted in a Tacitean definition of prudence that stood in stark contrast to the Ciceronian definition of prudence that had prevailed in the previous century and demanded an active defense of Catholicism. Adopting the former notion as the underlying principle for their political outlook, select Spaniards promoted the preservation of peace and stability at home in order to effectively guard Catholicism and realize Spain's foreign policy objectives abroad.

Within the *pareceres*, the tension between conflicting political discourses manifested itself in different opinions over what dynastic politics were ultimately meant to achieve. Diego Granero was a theologian deeply disturbed by the malevolent temperament and unethical disposition of the French. He openly acknowledged the dangers posed by Anne's renunciation to Spain and the rest of Europe. Nevertheless, Granero was one of the few to openly endorse the marriage. For him, the decision hinged on the responsibility that he ascribed to the Spanish Habsburgs to actively defend and promote the interests of Christendom. This responsibility was intimately linked with dynastic identity and grounded in a rich historical tradition that transcended the individual and extended before and beyond the contingencies of the present. Within his work, Granero included a thorough articulation of this viewpoint, claiming that;

“...the hereditary lords of the House of Austria must be great defenders of the faith and Christian religion as was seen in the great monarch Charles V and in the very Catholic Philip II and in his great lord Philip III, in the given case and other similar ones they must have an extensive view that they perceive from afar, and upset the obstacles that can arise and the attacks, because it does not benefit in their states disturbance in regard to the faith and Christian Religion.”⁴¹⁰

Granero's recognition of the dynasty's transcendent obligation to be active defenders of the faith, over a decade after Philip II's death, reaffirmed the principles of Ciceronian prudence that continued to shape opinions formulated in the service of dynastic policy. Despite the evident risks involved for the assemblage of kingdoms that comprised the Spanish Empire, the marriage with Louis XIII had the potential to benefit the faith by prolonging peace between its two preeminent kingdoms.

⁴⁰⁸ More information on Machiavelli's impact on the Spanish reason of state tradition can be found in Keith David Howard, *The Reception of Machiavelli in Early Modern Spain*, (Woodbridge: Tamesis, 2014), pp. 97-128.

⁴⁰⁹ Justus Lipsius, *Politica: Six Books of Politics or Political Instruction*, trans. Jan Waszink, (Assen, Netherlands: Royal Van Gorcum, 2004 (1589)), p. 231. Lipsius writes of Machiavelli, “Most of them are full of ignorance and a wealth of words. With the exception of one, Machiavelli, whose genius I do not despise, sharp, subtle, and fiery as it is; and if he had only directed his Prince on the straight path toward that great temple of Virtue and Honor!”

⁴¹⁰ *Parecer* of Diego Granero, BL, Add. 14000, fol. 850r. [“...los señores herederos de la Casa de Austria avian de ser grandes defensores de la fee y Religion Christiana como se vio en el gran monarca Carlos 5 y en el Catolicissimo Rey Felipe 2 y en su serenissimo hijo Felipe 3, en el caso puesto y otros semejantes deben tener tan larga vista que miren de lejos, y estorven los tropiezos que pueden suceder y los ataques, porque no aya en sus estados turbacion en lo que toca a la fee y Religion Christiana.”]

Adherents of Tacitean reason of state, on other hand, envisioned a different approach to marriage diplomacy ground in their understanding of the prudent application of monarchical authority. Like Granero, their perception of dynastic responsibility transcended present political concerns and extended perpetually into the future. However, for them, the ultimate objective of a sensible dynastic policy was to serve the interests of the state. This opinion was held by a number of experts whose manifest preoccupation with maintaining the well-being of the empire evidenced the influence that the political discourse of reason of state had on dynastic considerations.⁴¹¹ Carrillo opened his work with a reminder that “his majesty, as Lord King and Father, is compelled to look after the wellness of his Kingdoms and the posterity of his descendants, not placing in first place or [considering] only the rest and peace during the days of his Majesty’s life... if not also adjusting and securing the same for that to come.”⁴¹² In distinguishing between a transitory peace that was politically expedient for the monarch and a lasting peace that would ensure the long-term security of the state, Carrillo challenged the underlying rationale that every union had the latent potential to engender perpetual feelings of good will that would bring Europe closer the realization of a single universal *Res publica christiana*. Under such pretexts, any marriage, regardless of how disagreeable, could be rationalized as morally justified. Once the well-being of the state became a major criterion for assessing the merits of policy, though, it became far more difficult to simply dismiss the pitfalls of a Hispano-French alliance. In the case of Anne’s marriage, the likelihood that the agreement would endanger the state and invite foreign competition for the throne outweighed any of its present political advantages.

The promotion of a prudent policy that did not necessarily align with Philip III's immediate interests constituted an unprecedented move to transform the royal marriage from a tool of the dynasty into a tool of the state. In the previous century, international relations were largely dictated by individual monarchs who monopolized diplomatic processes and whose foreign policies were dominated by familial concerns. While some may have sincerely believed in the ideal of the *Res publica christiana*, the promise of perpetual peace contained within each marriage agreement rang hollow in the face of interminable power struggles.⁴¹³ Yet by the early 17th century, increasingly sophisticated bureaucracies around Europe interested in stabilizing international relations no longer found it practical to allow their foreign policies to be shaped solely by dynastic ambitions.⁴¹⁴ In Spain, this impulse fell short of directly challenging royal prerogatives. Carrillo, for instance, did not dare to question the Habsburg family’s ultimate authority to dictate the elaboration of their familial network. Rather, it meant reconsidering the notion that a transitory peace invariably served the interests of the royal family. On this point, he wrote, “every rational father works for his houses and descendants postponing his own personal

⁴¹¹ Watkins, *After Lavinia*, p. 11. Across Europe, not solely in Spain, it was “the emergence of *raison d’etat* that disentangled the erotic lives of princes from the destiny of nations.”

⁴¹² *Parecer* of Fernando Carrillo, BL, Add. 14000, fol. 799r. [“que Vm’d’ como señor Rey y Padre esta obligado al bien de sus Reynos y posteridad de su descendencia no puniendo en primer lugar ni Reparando, en solo el descance y paz por los dias de la vida de VM en esto presente que oy corre, sino tambien ajustando y asegurando esto mismo en lo benidero.”]

⁴¹³ Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 167.

⁴¹⁴ Watkins, *After Lavinia*, p. 6. He argues that “the gradual shift from a foreign policy invested in dynastic interests to one grounded in the interests of the individual state” was a gradual, ongoing process that began with the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis.

wellness having the other more glorious and appealing.”⁴¹⁵ With regard to the prudent application of royal authority, the monarch was only deemed rationale when he exercised his power in the service of future interests that may have stood at odds with immediate political necessity.

For Carrillo, the interests of the Spanish Habsburgs were identical to those of the state. His *parecer* consistently reiterated the association between the “wellness of his Kingdoms and the posterity of his descendants” and the importance of the monarch tending to both. In this way, Carrillo intimately bound together the well-being of the state and dynasty so that any action deemed beneficial to the former could accordingly be regarded as advantageous for the latter. While few other jurists or theologians were as explicit as the President of the Hacienda in making this association, their repeated emphasis on the marriage’s potential negative impact suggests that they were also favorably disposed toward protecting the long-term interests of the state. Accordingly, dynastic policy could only be regarded as favorable if the individual marriages were objectively opportune for Spain. A marriage that procured an expedient peace, but left the empire susceptible to foreign usurpation, was inadvisable because it was injurious to the kingdoms and people that made up the royal patrimony.

Perhaps the most striking result of this attempt to formulate a pragmatic policy was that it carved out space for the impartial assessment of the utility of marriage alliances. During the zenith of Habsburg power in the previous century, born in large part by the family’s fortuitous maneuvers, marriages were readily accepted as an efficacious instrument of diplomacy. Once Spaniards began to discuss the ultimate objective of royal unions in the context of Anne’s renunciation, though, they also began to reassess the capacity of each union to obtain practical results for the empire. Looking closely at the Habsburgs’ recent history, they recognized that these agreements were largely ineffective. The bishop of Orense, Doctor Castillo and Padre Jeronimo de Florencia cosigned a *parecer* in which they opposed changing Spanish law to facilitate the union “because they have not been able to attain the public good that is envisioned in the conservation of peace through similar bonds of marriage.”⁴¹⁶ As such, the renunciation and subsequent marriage was likely to “open the door for greater wars.”⁴¹⁷ Within this unapologetic assessment of the futility of royal unions, the three esteemed theologians captured the growing skepticism around a diplomatic practice that often proved inadequate for establishing durable peace or serving the “public good” (i.e. wellbeing of the state). They also demonstrated the potential for individuals in direct contact with the principal organs of imperial government to openly criticize the key mechanism for ensuring dynastic continuity.

Incidentally, the harshest criticism leveled against marriage diplomacy came from within the Spanish bureaucracy. Included with the collection of *pareceres* sent to the Council of State in 1611 was the vote (*voto*) of the Constable of Castile in which he wrote;

“The marriages of such great scale do not generate as much friendship amongst enemies, as enmities amongst friends, [and] if they are counterbalanced in the

⁴¹⁵ *Parecer* of Fernando Carrillo, BL, Add. 14000, fol. 800v. [“Todos los padres cuerdos trabajan para sus casas y descendencia pospuniendo su bien particular tiniendo el otro mas glorioso y apeticible.”]

⁴¹⁶ *Parecer* of Bishop of Orense, Doctor Castillo and Padre Jeronimo de Florencia, Ibid., fol. 842v. [“porq el bien publico q se representa de la conservacion de la paz con otros vinculos semejantes de matrimonios no se ha podido conseguir.”]

⁴¹⁷ Ibid., fol. 842v. [“y se abre puerta para mayores guerras...”]

present, it is with detriment to the future. They distract violence for a brief period, [but] they do not extinguish it and, because it is repressed, and not extinguished, it reawakens greater.”⁴¹⁸

The Constable’s comment reflects his keen appreciation of the adverse consequences that often resulted from alliances that fell outside of traditional political alignments. These agreements, which had the potential to upset the international power structure, strained relations with allies who saw their status threatened by the shifting balance of influence. In the case of Anne’s union, the Austrian Habsburgs opposed a Hispano-French double alliance because they feared that it would weaken the familial ties that facilitated collaboration and cooperation between the two branches.⁴¹⁹ Furthermore, the Constable’s critique reiterated the sentiment that marriages sacrificed future security for present benefit.⁴²⁰ Regardless of how the agreement was constructed, or the caution with which both powers maintained a semblance of equality, the repressed feelings of animosity would inevitably reemerge more violent than before.

In order to contain this violence and limit the intensity of conflict, the Constable recommended that the Council of State develop a pragmatic policy aimed at safeguarding the long-term interests of the empire. Notably, this entailed recognizing France as Spain’s natural enemy and abandoning the monarchy’s unwavering commitment to indiscriminate marriage diplomacy. Under no circumstances, the Constable insisted with elegant prose and a force of conviction that set his work apart, did it benefit Spain to enter into marriage agreements with its antagonistic northern neighbor.⁴²¹ Indeed, only demonstrations of strength, as opposed to familial bonds of affection, would be sufficient to ensure the security of the empire. The alternative would bring destruction to Spain and leave its lands desolate.

A Dynastic Worldview

The Constable’s *voto*, in combination with the *pareceres*, presented the Spanish court with a convincing case against Anne’s betrothal. As seen within Philip’s private instructions to Feria, the monarch was apprehensive over the prospective match as early as August 1610. This negative sentiment was shared by the Spanish Council of State, whose short warning to the king to not entertain any agreement involving the Infanta, one month before he drafted his instructions, likely swayed the king’s opinion.⁴²² Within their report (*consulta*), the council reminded Philip III that, “it is very worth considering that peace attained through marriages never lasted longer than was beneficial for both sides of which there is considerable evidence

⁴¹⁸ *Voto* of the Constable of Castile, *Ibid.*, fol. 861r. [“Los matrimonios de tan grande esfera no producen quiza tanta amistad entre los enemigos, como enemistades entre los amigos, si se contra pesan iguales en lo presente, es con perjuicio de lo futuro, las iras por un breve espacio los entretienen, no las extinguen y porque esta represadas, y no extinguidas renacen mayores.”]

⁴¹⁹ Sánchez, *The Empress, the Queen, and the Nun*, p. 116; García García, *La Pax Hispánica*, p. 92.

⁴²⁰ *Voto* of the Constable of Castile, BL, Add. 14000, fol. 862v. [“el alargar los males... donde se crecen, es siempre ignorancia, por gozarlo lo presente se pierde la memoria de lo pasado y la providencia de lo futuro.”]

⁴²¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 861r. [“O Señor! En tanto que el Rey de Francia sera uno emulo, lo tendres siempre por enemigo, la paz q deja mira a la emulacion, no esta lejos de convertirse en guerra. No allo otro freno para domar este cavallo, sino el de hacerle temer con las victorias, u debilitarle con las disenssiones.”]

⁴²² *Consulta* of the Council of State, AGS, Est., K-1615, C2, fol. 6, 21 July 1610. [“lo combiene es que hija mayor de españa de ninguna manera se de a francia por el peligro de subceder Rey de Francia... es punto de gran consideracion por el peligro en que pondrán estos reynos de subceder muchos trabajos y calamidades.”]

from those [marriages] made in France and from what can be seen now in Savoy.”⁴²³ In citing Spain’s failed attempts at rapprochement with France and the Duke of Savoy in the past, members of the council revealed the same aversion to the indiscriminate employment of their monarchy’s dynastic potential that the Constable later echoed in his work. Their warning also confessed a general lack of faith in the attainability of lasting peace; an opinion that aligned with many jurists and theologians. Given the widespread opposition to Anne’s marriage, a majority confirmation by celebrated legal experts that her renunciation would likely lead to conflict provided more than enough justification for the reconsideration, if not total discontinuation, of negotiations.

In fact, the Council of State received the *pareceres* in January 1612 with a passivity that stood in stark contrast to the adamant stance assumed two years earlier. The council’s response was largely dictated by the Comendador Mayor de Leon, Juan de Idiaquez. After complimenting the authors for the quality of their work and their faithful service to the monarch, he addressed the jurists and theologians’ lack of agreement and insisted they form a new *junta* with a single vote (*voto común*) to guide the monarch’s resolution of the inheritance issue.⁴²⁴ For Idiaquez, the plurality of opinions resulted from insufficient access to complete and updated information. Therefore, he recommended that an account (*relación*) be drafted by Philip III’s secretary Antonio de Arostegui on the status of marriage negotiations and on the arrangement of Anne’s renunciation to better inform the *junta*’s fresh deliberations. This initiative was popular with other members, who similarly prioritized the finalization of the legal matter over the long-term interests of the empire.⁴²⁵

Idiaquez’s claim that jurists and theologians were uninformed about the advanced status of Spanish diplomatic efforts was not baseless. Due to the considerable number of political enemies opposed to the alliance with France, Marie de Medici and her advisors insisted that Philip IV’s marriage be kept strictly secret.⁴²⁶ This precondition was initially met with suspicion by Philip III, who questioned the French decision to hide one marriage and publish another. Nevertheless, he agreed to honor Marie de Medici’s request as long as strict equality and secrecy

⁴²³ Ibid. [“es muy para considerar que nunca Duro paz que se hiciese por cassamientos mas de lo que le[s] estubo bien a las parttes de que ay vastantes pruebas por los echos en francia y lo que se vee agora en saboya.”] The citation can also be found in García García, *La Pax Hispánica*, p. 306 and Elliott, “The Political Context,” pp. 10-11.

⁴²⁴ *Consulta* of the Council of State, AGS, Est., K-1609, B91, fol. 12c, 24 Jan 1612. [“junte de nuevo los mesmos pa q vean los *pareceres* de todos y consideran largamente la materia y hagan un voto comun resumido y el Presidente lo embie a VM’d’ por voto comun de aquella junta.”]

⁴²⁵ Ibid. In response to the *pareceres*, the Duque of Infantado responded; [“si todos los letrados concluyen q ni por ley ni por renunciacion no queda segura la del derecho de la s’ra’ Infanta a estos Reynos tendria por lo mas acertado lo menos ofensible a francia.”]

⁴²⁶ Philip III to the Count of Castro, Ibid., K-1615, C4, fol. 36, 15 Aug 1611. [“Dias ha q se trata de platicas de casamientos del Principe mi hijo con la Infanta mayor de francia y de aquel Rey con la Infanta Dona Ana mi hija mayor... por q últimamente me ha scrito que por averle predido la Reyna de francia y sus ministros q se guardase mucho secreto.”] The Spanish court was aware of the threat posed to the marriage by detractors. See Philip III to Iñigo de Cárdenas, Ibid., K-1452, A59, fol. 137, 24 Oct 1610. [“lo que conviene es concluyr los casamientos quanto antes para atajar las tracas y designos de los que por danados fines pretenden estorvarlos.”] For a wonderful overview of the political turmoil in France see Nicolas le Roux, “A Time of Frenzy: Dreams of Union and Aristocratic Turmoil,” *Dynastic Marriages 1612/15*, pp. 19-38.

was maintained for both agreements.⁴²⁷ Thereafter, information regarding the progression of marriage negotiations was carefully concealed from anyone that resided outside of official diplomatic circles.⁴²⁸ Amongst those deprived of access to sensitive materials were the legal experts convened by the Council of State to consider the renunciation. In September 1611, when theologians met to examine jurist *pareceres* and offer their own opinions, they were unaware that the double marriage alliance had already been agreed upon roughly 5 months prior on April 30.⁴²⁹ As a result, many of their final conclusions implied a high degree of political flexibility that no longer existed from the perspective of statesmen within the council.

The Council of State thus took it upon itself to guide the new *junta* of legal experts in their resolution of the inheritance issue. In addition to recommending that a detailed *relación* be drafted, Idiaquez delineated the range of acceptable solutions. The introduction of a general law, which proved to be the most popular course of action amongst theologians, was emphatically dismissed due to complications posed by the legal plurality of the empire, as well as concerns that the gesture would insult the French and taint the alliance. Instead, partiality was shown toward the drafting of a formal renunciation that would be inoffensive. Ironically, Idiaquez had initially claimed the *pareceres* were “on matters of law and theology, those that enter the council so varied in what they declare, that it is difficult to be able to choose the best [option].”⁴³⁰ But, this did not prevent him and other members of the council, who had resigned themselves to the impossibility of securing an irrefutable renunciation, from dictating the legal procedure that would govern Spain’s interaction with France.

To some extent, the Council of State’s revision of their original position stemmed from their resolute commitment to adapt dynastic policy to immediate political necessity. Charles Emmanuel I’s activities during the months after Henry’s death were enough to convince many statesmen that he still posed a threat to the preservation and extension of the precarious *Pax Hispanica*.⁴³¹ While Henry’s assassination had the effect of thwarting an imminent invasion, it

⁴²⁷ Philip III to Iñigo de Cárdenas, AGS, Est., K-1452, A59, fol. 168, 1610/11. [“q estos cassamientos se han de prometer y publicar a un mismo tiempo y no el uno antes q el otro por ningun caso y assi mismo os encargo q su pudieredes encaminar q se capitulen en las dos cortes a un mismo tpo sin q preceda otra escritura secreta...pero si por respetos de alla y mucha instancia de la Reyna bieredes q conviene no escusar la secreta en tal caso os permito q la hagays con q no paseys de la promesa...”]

⁴²⁸ Philip III to Iñigo de Cárdenas, Ibid., K-1615, fol. 26, 17 June 1611. Exceptions were made for important international allies of the Spanish Habsburgs when it became apparent that the secret was too difficult to maintain. In June 1611, Philip III ordered Cárdenas to privately inform Archduke Albert and the Pope about the marriage negotiations.

⁴²⁹ Ibid., K-1643, D7, fol. 61b. Although several matters, including the specifics of Anne’s renunciation, still needed to be resolved, the secret articles for the double marriage alliance were concluded by the French ambassador, Nicolas de Neufville (the Senor of Villeroy), and Iñigo de Cárdenas in Fontainebleau on April 30, 1611. Within the articles, both sides agreed to maintain strict secrecy until the final agreements were reached. [“esperando que dios permita que se venga a una entera y final conclusion, que desde agora se aga passe y entregue de una parte y otra una escritura, conteniendo promessa y declaracion de nra buena voluntad en este particular para ser tenida secreta hasta que se resuelva entre nosotros de publicar y manifestar los dhos casamientos.”]

⁴³⁰ *Consulta* of the Council of State, Ibid., K-1609, B91, fol. 12c, 24 Jan 1612. [“en materias de derecho y theologia, tan diferentes de lo q profesan los q entran en este consejo, no se puede acertar a elegir lo mejor.”]

⁴³¹ *Consulta* of the Council of State, Ibid., K-1427, A38, fol. 43, 10 Aug 1610. The Duke Savoy was still petitioning France to lend him troops to invade Italy in August, three months after Henry’s assassination. The Duke of Savoy also placed pressure on Marie de Medici to honor Henry’s marriage agreement into October. Ibid., fol. 48, 12 Oct 1610. For Philip III’s explicit orders to [“desbanecer y excluyr del todo el casamiento de Saboya”] see Philip III to Ingio de Cardenas, Ibid., K-1615, C2, fol. 13, 30 Oct 1610.

was imperative that Elizabeth be secured for Philip IV in order to undermine the political machinations of the Duke of Savoy and neutralize the threat that he posed to Italy. Juan Idiaquez had admitted as much on an earlier occasion when he proclaimed;

“In the case... where one would absolutely wish to treat marriages, one must be content with the eldest of the daughters of France, not because of her age, because the younger would be more suitable for the prince of Spain, but because it is necessary to take Madame away from the heir of Savoy.”⁴³²

French insistence on maintaining strict equality in marriage negotiations left the Spanish with little choice but to suppress their initial apprehensions in order to advance diplomatic efforts. This was the case in 1610 when Philip III extended royal powers to Cárdenas and, evidently, was still the case in 1612 when the majority of *pareceres* confirmed that Anne’s renunciation could not be permanently guaranteed.

Even more important than political necessity was the influence that attitudes towards succession, family, and historical precedent had on the determination of policy. Despite changes in Spanish political culture toward a greater valorization of the state, the monarchy and its officials found it difficult to discard a deeply rooted mode of thinking that analyzed and understood developments through the lens of dynastic interest. This was a dynamic mindset that evolved alongside newly emerging political discourses, at times working in conjunction with them and at other times contending with them. The latter proved to be true in the context of Anne’s betrothal to Louis XIII as the Spanish monarchy’s perception of the marriage was heavily influenced by a logic that effectively downplayed the negative ramifications that the agreement might have on the empire. Instead, Philip III and his officials emphasized the unlikelihood of the Infanta ascending the throne, the dependability of familial bonds, and the continuity of the Hispano-French dynastic tradition.

The Spanish Habsburgs’ notion of the rightful succession decreased the perceived feasibility of Anne’s ascension. Over the course of the 17th century, the royal family adopted informal rules towards succession that differed from those enshrined in law.⁴³³ These informal rules stemmed from a process whereby the Spanish monarchy’s belief in the eternal destiny of the dynasty gradually intensified over time, and came to dictate its perception of acceptable successors. As part of this process, royal women, including Anne, faced discrimination from fathers who downplayed their political status in anticipation of male heirs. Upon her birth, Anne was styled Infanta, rather than Princess, despite being the rightful heiress to the throne because

⁴³² Perrens, *Les Mariages Espagnols*, p. 295. “Dans a le cas, disait le grand commandeur de Léon , où l'on voudrait absolument traiter des mariages, il faut s'en tenir à l'aînée des filles de France, non à cause de son âge, car celui de la cadette serait plus convenable pour le prince d'Espagne, mais parce qu'il est nécessaire d'enlever Madame à l'héritier de Savoie.”

⁴³³ Geevers, “The Miracles of Spain.” The main idea presented in this paragraph is influenced by the impressive research of Liesbeth Geevers, who studies royal wills, tombs, and baptisms in order to trace the development of the Spanish Habsburgs’ informal rules towards succession. Geevers is more interested in the impact that informal rules had on the Spanish succession crisis and fails to take her examination of Anne beyond a brief discussion of her birth. Nevertheless, her findings are critical to understanding the ways in which Spanish officials resolved themselves to the prospect of marrying Anne to the French.

contemporaries were confident that many children would follow— a subtle distinction that served to relegate the new child to a position of far less importance within the dynasty.⁴³⁴

The Council of State was the governmental body that translated this attitude towards succession into diplomatic action by utilizing Anne's perceived distance from the throne to justify her renunciation. One concern expressed by a very small number of legal experts was that the deprivation of the Infanta's inheritance right was a deeply prejudicial act. Idiaquez disagreed with this assessment, instead indicating that her acquisition of the French kingdom was adequate compensation. He also took the opportunity to address the unlikelihood that Anne would ever come to power, arguing that "the succession is possible but uncertain and very doubtful as the Madam has four male underage brothers from whom it is expected from God that Your Majesty sees a very long legacy."⁴³⁵ This argument resonated with the rest of the council. For instance, when it was his turn to speak, the Marques of Velada proclaimed that "although it is such that it is a great thing that is being renounced, it is doubtful that the occasion [of Anne's succession] arises finding your Majesty with four male sons that God would be served to protect for benefit of his church and for all of Christianity."⁴³⁶ Words such as uncertain (*incierto*) and doubtful (*dudoso*) worked to diminish Anne's claim and alleviate apprehensions over the inherent dangers of the royal match. Instead, Idiaquez and Velada emphasized their unwavering faith that the Habsburg cause was righteous and dynastic succession overseen by God. The birth and survival of male heirs underpinned this faith and validated the belief that the future was guaranteed by divine providence. While neither entirely dismissed the possibility of Anne's ascension, they did not consider it serious enough to ruin a prestigious and politically advantageous alliance.

Of far greater concern for those negotiating the marriage was Anne's continued allegiance to her natal family. During the previous century, Charles V and Philip II had relied heavily on their sisters, mothers, and aunts to facilitate peace negotiations and generate a sense of good will and diplomatic trust.⁴³⁷ This expectation of feminine loyalty and service persisted through the reign of Philip III, where the notion that Anne was an effective agent of dynasty provided alternative grounds for rationalizing her union. Spaniards anticipated her moving abroad and representing Habsburg interests. They also clearly expected her to mitigate any risks that stemmed from her marriage, and to stand by her renunciation of the Spanish inheritance. Touching upon this critical responsibility, one jurist worried aloud that, given the Infanta's young age, the French might "persuade or compel" her to turn against her house and challenge her renunciation— a well-founded fear that Philip III did not take lightly.⁴³⁸ For the most part, however, the Spanish monarchy demonstrated a resounding confidence in Anne's ability— as

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

⁴³⁵ *Consulta* of the Council of State, AGS, Est., K-1609, B91, fol. 12c, 24 Jan 1612. ["lo de los subcessores es contingible pero incierto y muy dudoso pues tiene SA quatro Hermanos varones y de menor edad y de quien se espera en dios vera VM'd' muy larga subcession."]

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.* ["aunque es assi q es tan gran cosa lo q se renuncia es muy dudosa q subceda el caso hallandose VM'd' con quatro hijos varones q Dios será servido de guardar los pa bien de su iglesia y de toda la xpiandad."]

⁴³⁷ Sánchez, *The Empress, the Queen, and the Nun*, p. 113.

⁴³⁸ *Parecer* of Diego de Aldrete, BL, Add. 14000, fol. 816v. ["Y si bien es verdad q aunq se haga esta renunciación con todas estas fuerzas con todo eso se puede temir que quando llegase el caso de suceder la s'a' infanta en estos reynos, podria siendo persuadida o compelida pedir al summon pontifice o a otra prelado de francia relaxacion deste juramento o sacarla el rey y despues pedir la s'a' infanta restitucion contra esta escritura de renunciación diciendo aver sido lesa y damnificada enormísimamente en aver renunciado la sucesion de tantos y tan grandes reynos."]

long as she was adequately prepared to resist corrupting influences— to move abroad and establish herself as an independent political force in the Parisian court.

Given the critical importance of cultivating the Infanta's sense of allegiance, the Spanish monarchy took careful precautions to not rush her departure. Originally, Philip III agreed to send his daughter to France four to six months after her twelfth birthday— the legal age required for her to voluntarily renounce her right to the Spanish inheritance.⁴³⁹ Upon further consideration, however, the decision was made to postpone the Infanta's departure until she had reached a more mature age. In a letter to Iñigo de Cárdenas, Philip III explained;

“...for the danger that there could be as a result of an early delivery, in which some wicked agent plants in the Infanta things that are in opposition to our holy Catholic Faith. That so no such thing may occur as a result of her tender age, it would be agreeable to extend that delivery two more years such that she will have turned fourteen when delivered.”⁴⁴⁰

Philip III and his officials acknowledged the struggles and perils that Anne would face in a French match. In addition to being separated from her family at a vulnerable age, she was expected to traverse great distances to a religiously divided kingdom with a long tradition of hostility toward the Habsburg cause. Nevertheless, in only postponing Anne's departure by two years, Philip III exhibited confidence in the strength and dependability of well cultivated familial bonds.⁴⁴¹

Something that historians have tended to overlook is the causal relationship between the Habsburgs' unwavering faith in their dynastic network and the pursuit of risky, ineffectual marriage alliances that fell outside of traditional political alignments. In the case of Anne's marriage to Louis XIII, Philip III's sense of certainty that traditional values of loyalty and service could be instilled in his daughter before her departure reinforced his decision to conclude negotiations with France. From a young age, the identities of royal Spanish children were formed against the backdrop of a clearly defined collective identity. The dynasty was a source of support, pride, purpose, and meaning— built up and reinforced by the images and symbols that surrounded Anne and her siblings as they grew older. This particular upbringing is best represented in an image produced in 1622. Depicting Anne's younger brother, Charles of Austria, gazing upon a painting of his namesake, Charles V, it conveys the close relationship between the past and present. For the young Infante, the painting appears to be both intimidating and captivating; a powerful reminder of his family's past glory and achievements. The

⁴³⁹ Philip III to Iñigo de Cárdenas, AGS, Est., K-1615, C2, fol. 35, 13 Aug 1611. [“Depues de aver firmado el desposorio q va con esta en respuesta de lo q ultimamente me scrivistes en materia de cassamientos, he resuelto q la entrega de la Infanta Dona Ana mi hija se haga quatro o seys meses despues que aya cumplido doce anos q es la edad necesaria para q haga la renunciacion q esta assentada.”] For another reference to the Infanta's age see Philip III to Baltasar de Zuniga Ibid., K-1453, A59, fol. 73, 11 June 1612. [“estas se han ydo continuando y con el favor de Dios estamos de acuerdo en que la entrega de la Infanta mi hija en Francia sea en cumpliendo 12 años...”]

⁴⁴⁰ Philip III to Iñigo de Cárdenas, Ibid., K-1615, C2, fol. 37, 17 Aug 1611. [“...por el peligro que podria aver haciendo la entrega temprano, en q alguna mala criada sembrase en la Infante cosas contra nra S'ta' fee cat'ca' que por su tierna edad podria no caer en ello holgaria q se alargase la tal entrega otros dos años de manera q tuviese catorce cumplidos quando se entregase.”]

⁴⁴¹ On Anne's early years and relationship to her family see Anne Kleinman, *Anne of Austria: Queen of France*, (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1985), pp. 3-8.

representation of his great-grandfather also serves to inspire, as the words written above Charles V's head *virtutem ex me* (learn virtue from me) convey expectations for future attitudes and behavior. These same expectations were extended to Anne, who like her brothers, was raised in the shadow of her predecessor's mighty legacy.



Retrato de Carlos de Austria, Pedro Perret, 1622,
BNE, IH/722/1, Madrid

The private instructions that Philip III wrote for Anne upon the conclusion of the double marriage alliance transmitted his expectations. Altogether, the short document was intended to be read several times and serve as a guide for the Infanta's moral and political conduct.⁴⁴² First and foremost, Philip III emphasized the importance of religious piety and moral principles and encouraged his daughter to draw inspiration from the virtuous life of her late mother, Margaret of Austria. Like her mother— an influential force in the Spanish court during her lifetime who directly challenged the Duke of Lerma for access to the monarch— Anne was also expected to take on political responsibilities and use her close proximity to the king to further pro-Habsburg initiatives. In addition to challenging heresy and persuading her husband to do the same, she was charged with preventing a war between Catholic princes and dissuading the French from aiding domestic disturbances. If war did break out between France and Spain, Anne's role as Louis XIII's wife was to publicly support him. In private, however, Philip III made it clear that she was to remain loyal to Spain, "but secretly you must offer prayers, alms, and the rest of the diligences deemed necessary so that it does not continue forward."⁴⁴³

⁴⁴² An overview of the private instructions' content can be found in Kleinman, *Anne of Austria*, p. 18. They are also mentioned in Sánchez, *The Empress, the Queen, and the Nun*, p. 113. I have utilized a copy found at BL, Add. 14000, fols. 882r- 885v.

⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*, fol. 883r. ["pero en lo secreto hareis haber oraciones, limosnas, y las de mas diligencias que pareciere para que no passe Adelante."]



Queen Margaret of Austria, Bartolomé González y Serrano, 1609,
The Prado Museum, Madrid

In further service of the Habsburg cause, Philip III urged Anne to reach out to her relatives and integrate herself into the family's international network. He also encouraged her to raise her children in the same fashion that she and her brothers had been raised, implying an emphasis on Catholic piety and an equally strong sense of familial loyalty— a crucial domestic function that promised to give rise to a new generation of French royalty with close ties to the Spanish monarchy. Should she need support or advice, Philip III urged his daughter to turn to trustworthy individuals whose loyalties were not inherently French. The assumption that Anne would play a political and domestic role independent of her husband reframed the marriage as a prudent diplomatic maneuver that corresponded with the Habsburg strategy for extending their political influence.



Infanta Anne and Philip IV, Juan Pantoja de la Cruz, 1607,
Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna

Another important figure in assuaging Spanish apprehensions and facilitating negotiations was Anne's mother-in-law, Marie de Medici. The queen mother's positive perception in Spain derived from her personal affiliation with the Habsburgs. This connection stretched back to 1539, when the Grand Duke of Tuscany Cosimo I married Eleanor of Toledo,

the daughter of Charles V's viceroy in Naples.⁴⁴⁴ One of the eleven living children born to that marriage was Grand Duke Francesco I, Marie de Medici's father and the heir to Cosimo's title. Francesco's wife was the Archduchess Joanna of Austria, the youngest daughter of the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand I and the niece of Charles V. Familial bonds were reinforced once again in 1608 when Marie de Medici's first cousin, the Grand Duke Cosimo II, married the Archduchess Maria Maddalena of Austria.⁴⁴⁵ Through both her paternal and maternal lines, Marie de Medici thus belonged to a long standing tradition of intermarriage and mutual support that linked her family with the House of Austria.

From the Habsburg perspective, this personal affiliation set Marie de Medici apart and predisposed her to loyal service. During the 16th century, the Habsburgs' inconsistent policy toward the Valois had failed to establish a permanent presence in the French court. This failure complicated the family's diplomatic efforts, which relied heavily on royal women to not only represent their interests and influence the formulation and execution of administrative decisions, but also engender the feelings of trust that were crucial to the process of international negotiation and arbitration. Marie de Medici's position at the helm of the French government after Henry's assassination created the impression that the monarchy finally had someone in Paris to fulfill this function.⁴⁴⁶ Early reports from Iñigo de Cárdenas confirmed Marie de Medici's good intentions, and the Council of State approved his proposal to persuade her to take a pro-Spanish position, albeit under the condition that he proceed with moderation.⁴⁴⁷ Philip III also mentioned the French queen mother in his public instructions to the Duke of Feria in 1610, underscoring the trust that he was to show and maintain with Marie de Medici as a result of her heritage and the renewal of ties that came with Cosimo's marriage.⁴⁴⁸ As these examples reveal, the Habsburgs' conception of their international network, or "familial system," extended to incorporate distant relatives. Consequently, the same logic that bolstered Philip III's faith in Anne's unwavering

⁴⁴⁴ Mary A. Watt, "Veni, sponsa. Love and Politics at the Wedding of Eleonora di Toledo," *The Cultural World of Eleonora di Toledo: Duchess of Florence and Lorena*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 18-39.

⁴⁴⁵ For more on this marriage see Maria Galli Stampino, "Maria Maddalena, Archduchess of Austria and Grand Duchess of Florence: Negotiating Performance, Tradition, and Taste," *Early Modern Habsburg Women: Transnational Contexts, Cultural Conflicts, and Dynastic Continuities*, eds. Anne J. Cruz, Maria Galli Stampino, (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 41-58. The Grand Duke of Tuscany played a critical role in the successful negotiation of the marriage alliance. Alongside the papacy, represented by nuncios in Paris and Madrid, Cosimo served as intermediary (*medianero*) between the Spanish and French. Reference to his role can be found throughout official correspondences and agreements. See, for example, Philip III to the Duke of Pastrana, AGS, Est., K-1617, C4, fol. 6 2 July 1612.

⁴⁴⁶ Hugon, *Au Service du Roi Catholique*, p. 60. Marie de Medici is credited with temporarily alleviating anti-Spanish sentiments in France; "Pendant la minorité de Louis XIII, l'hispanophobie ne change pas mais se fait plus discrète. La personnalité de Marie de Médicis contribue largement à cette modération."

⁴⁴⁷ *Consulta* of the Council of State, AGS, Est., K-1427, A38, fol. 43, 10 Aug 1610. While Marie de Medici was well intentioned, Cárdenas feared that she might be led astray by hostile French ministers. Therefore, he proposed using both encouragement and fear to win her over; ["...ay ministros que la divierten, y qualquiera miedo obra en ella, y assi juzga Don Inigo que es menester animarla por una parte y poner la miedo por otra."] The Council of State was far more cautious and, although they did not outright reject Cárdenas' recommendation, they advised that he proceed with moderation; ["se le encargue a Don Inigo que ande en estas cosas con moderacion por q no parezca ruego."]

⁴⁴⁸ Points to include in the instructions for the Duke of Feria, *Ibid.*, K-1452, A59, fol. 112, Aug 1610. ["La confianza particular q ha de mostrar y tener con la Reyna madre del Rey de parte de sus Mag'des' parte por el parentesco de antes por la via de la casa [Austria], y parte por el ducado agora renovado por la Gran Duquesa."]

devotion to familial interests similarly demanded that Marie de Medici, as a blood relation, be regarded as a loyal sympathizer to the Habsburg cause.⁴⁴⁹



Marie de Médicis avec son fils Louis XIII, Charles Martin, 1603,
Museum of Fine Arts, Blois

In Spain, the positive perception of Marie de Medici's genuine intentions helped to bridge the mistrust that divided the two countries and keep negotiations on track. For instance, when controversy arose surrounding the French proposal to treat the publication of Anne and Philip IV's marriages differently Philip III deferred blame from the queen mother onto bad-intentioned councilors (*consejeros mal intencionados*).⁴⁵⁰ By the monarch's own admission, this incident provided "sufficient reason to startle me and unravel the talks."⁴⁵¹ Nevertheless, he chose to forgive the offense by citing, amongst other things, the good intentions that he recognized in Marie de Medici. On a later occasion, Philip III's respect for her prompted him to forsake his adamant insistence on following diplomatic custom and agree to her demand that Anne and Elizabeth's dowries be raised by one hundred thousand escudos.⁴⁵² All in all, Marie de Medici was rarely suspected of resorting to trickery, deception, or disingenuous artifices. Instead, her transgressions were forgiven and her demands deliberated by a Spanish monarchy that trusted her to conduct herself with integrity and sincerity in the diplomatic sphere.

The Spanish monarchy's trust in Marie de Medici also manifested itself in the domestic sphere, where she was meant to serve as a bastion of support in Anne's acclimation to the French

⁴⁴⁹ Sánchez, *The Empress, the Queen, and the Nun*, p. 115. As she has recently observed, "a familial system like that of the Habsburgs rested upon the premise that all family members would be committed to the protection and promotion of the family."

⁴⁵⁰ Philip III to Iñigo de Cárdenas, AGS, Est., K-1452, A59, fol. 168, 1610/11. ["me he maravillado mucho de q salgan agora con semejantes circunstancias y desyualdades inovando en lo acordad, lo qual no puedo creer q nace de la Reyna sino q son imbenciones de consejeros mal intencionados guiados de sus fines particulares por no ver unidas y conformes estas coronas..."]

⁴⁵¹ Ibid. ["bastante ocasion para estranarme y desfiar las platicas."]

⁴⁵² Ibid., K-1615, C2, fol. 65, 19 April 1612. ["Y en quanto a lo de los 100V de los Dotes q la Reyna dessea se añadan parece q seria bien seguir el exemplo de los Dotes passados como esta platicado pero si la Reyna gustare mucho q se añaden podreys decir q no desavendremos en esto."]

court. Even before the onset of negotiations, Marie de Medici had demonstrated a conspicuous affection for her future daughter-in-law that was exemplified by the portrait that she hung of the young girl in her dining hall.⁴⁵³ This served as reassurance that Anne would have wise council and protection from Spain's political enemies while living abroad. In his private instructions, Philip III urged Anne to honor Marie de Medici and to take heed of her advice;

“Toward your mother-in-law you should also possess the love and reverence of which you are required, holding her for a Mother with whom you regularly seek advice because in addition to being who she is and possessing prudence and experience, the love that she has had wishing for you as a daughter that you will not forget, will ensure that her advice will always be good and what is agreeable.”⁴⁵⁴

Philip III's words display a sincere admiration for the queen mother that extended beyond diplomatic formality. Marie de Medici was to take on the role of Anne's mother, her affection for her daughter-in-law blossoming over time into active collaboration between the two.⁴⁵⁵ Ideally, the arrangement would ease the burden of Anne's political and domestic obligations, as well as guide her gradual development into an experienced European head of state capable of serving the interests of her family.

In addition to the critical role played by women, negotiations were bolstered by the Spanish monarchy's appreciation of the historical ties that bound its empire together with the French royal family. The mutual feelings of loathing and mistrust that characterized Hispano-French diplomatic relations in the 17th century could be traced back to Ferdinand's implementation of an Aragonese foreign policy orientation in the 15th century.⁴⁵⁶ Challenging French designs in Italy and utilizing marriages to politically isolate the Valois were the pillars of Ferdinand's diplomatic efforts and consigned Spain to an ongoing power struggle for military preponderance in Europe. However, Aragon was only one of the kingdoms that comprised the empire and, although it had arguably the greatest impact on Hispano-French relations, its diplomatic tradition did not dominate the historical narrative. In 1612, the monarchy drafted a list recording every marriage alliance, including those considered but not finalized, between the Spanish and French royal houses stretching back to the Visigoths.⁴⁵⁷ The remarkable document, which was purportedly hand-written by Philip III and organized around the different kingdoms

⁴⁵³ *Consulta* of the Council of State, *Ibid.*, K-1427, A38, fol. 6, 13 Feb 1610. Anne's portrait was hung in the French court months before the initiation of marriage negotiations. On January 27, 1610, it was at the center of an embarrassing incident between Cárdenas and Marie de Medici. Details of the incident can also be found in Perrens, *Les Mariages Espagnols*, p. 278.

⁴⁵⁴ Philip III to Anna, BL, Add. 14000, fol. 884r. [“A vra suegra abeis de tener tambien el respecto amor y rreberencia que debeys, tiniendola por Madre con quien le ordenario os aconsejareys porque de mas de ser quien es y de las partes que tiene de prudencia y experienciã, el amor q os a tenido deseando os por hija que nunca obidareys, la encaminara a que sea siempre su consejo sano y el que conbenga.”]

⁴⁵⁵ Philip III to Iñigo de Cárdenas, AGS, Est., K-1453, A59, fol. 142, 10 Nov 1612. [“En lo de la cassa q trata de hacer la Reyna, es de creer q aviendo dado muestras de tan buen gobierno lo continurara en no apartarse de sus hijos siendo tan tierna hedad, y vos podriades darla a entender esto y a lo q la obliga fiar yo mi hija de quien la ha de ser tan buena madre...”]

⁴⁵⁶ Edwards, *Ferdinand and Isabel*, p. 24.

⁴⁵⁷ Philip III, “Hijas de Reyes y de personas reales de españa que casaron con Reyes y personas reales de Francia, y las de Francia con las de españa,” BNE, MS 3207, fols. 153-164.

that comprised the Iberian peninsula, counted over ninety entries linking France with the Goths, Castile y Leon, Aragon, Navarre, Portugal, Oviedo y Leon, and the counts of Castile. Details regarding each marriage were minimal, with the entries only mentioning the names of the royal men and women involved and their family affiliations, indicating that the list was not meant to serve any practical purpose.

Rather, the list served a symbolic purpose as a tangible representation of the Spanish monarchy's dynastic outlook. For those orchestrating Anne's marriage, a diplomatic tradition with France existed apart from the prevalent one of permanent mistrust and invariable conflict. This tradition, rooted in marriage diplomacy, was marked by an enduring legacy of good will and amicable relations that stretched back centuries and testified to the potential for rapprochement between the two states. As the list demonstrates, the empire's composite nature greatly enhanced the flexibility of Spanish policy by providing different avenues for representing the past and framing imprudent marriages that might otherwise have been rejected. In isolation, the union was an unnecessary course of action that imperiled the long-term security of the empire. When considered against the backdrop of a broader historical record, though, it appeared to be a conventional move that aligned with established diplomatic precedent between the two royal houses. Notably, the Spanish did not seem to mind that the legacy portrayed in the list was only marginally Habsburg.⁴⁵⁸ As the rulers of Spain, the family had the right to lay claim to a past that stood at odds with their political experiences—a right that served an invaluable function in the execution of their political vision.

Regarding the practical application of this dynastic legacy, the Spanish regularly sought to draw from the past to resolve disputes and bolster diplomatic efforts. The first attempt to utilize an earlier marriage occurred with the jurists' examination of Blanche of Castile's marriage to King Louis XIII of France in the 13th century. According to some historical accounts, Blanche was the eldest daughter of Alonso VIII and rightful heir to the throne of Castile upon his death. But, in order to avoid a union of the crowns, Blanche renounced her claim in favor of her sister, the great Queen Berengaria. One jurist, Paniagua, corroborated this narrative and expressed confidence that it served to justify Anne's renunciation of her royal claim.⁴⁵⁹ Paniagua's stance proved to be unpopular with other jurists, however, who challenged the veracity of the historical accounts. Within their *pareceres*, Fernando Carrillo and Gil Ramirez Arellano claimed that Berengaria was Alonso's eldest daughter and that Blanche had never been required to renounce her right to the throne.⁴⁶⁰ Consequently, the episode could not be presented as justification for subsequent political or legal actions. In the end, this dispute proved to be irrelevant as the French commitment to honor Spanish demands regarding Anne obviated the need to legitimize the renunciation. Still, it serves as a revealing demonstration of how the issues that arose during the negotiation of alliances were incorporated within a broad historical purview that had the potential to provide precedents for their favorable resolution.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid., fol. 155. A mere five entries pertain to the Habsburgs. For three marriages (including two proposed and one finalized) in connection to the daughters of Philip the Handsome. For marriages considered during the reign of Charles V and Philip II see Ibid., fol. 161.

⁴⁵⁹ *Parecer* of Gabriel Trejo Paniagua, BL, Add. 14000, fol. 807r. [“y asi el exemplo de doña Blanca hace mui aproposito de nuestro caso pues segun la mas comun opinion de las historias parece q la toco la sucesion y no fue admitida porq no se juntasen las dos coronas.”]

⁴⁶⁰ For Fernando Carrillo see Ibid., fol. 802r. For Gil Ramirez Arellano see Ibid., fol. 814r.

This remained the case throughout 1612, as the Spanish intermittently turned to historical precedents to expedite finalization of the double marriage alliance.⁴⁶¹ In January, the Duke of Lerma brought the unresolved matter of Anne's treatment by the French ambassador before the Council of State. Uncertainty revolved around whether she should be treated as Queen upon the publication or final agreement (*capitulación*) of her marriage to Louis XIII. The opinions given by council members in response varied with some, such as the Duke of the Infantado, conceiving of a scenario in which the publication of the marriage should mark the official conversion of the Infanta into the Queen of France.⁴⁶² Others, such as the Marques of Velada, were more hesitant to support the publication date considering the potential for changes to still occur in the marriage arrangement after the event.⁴⁶³ As a result, he deferred to the wishes of the king and advised him to look to Spaniard's treatment of Queen Isabel, over fifty years previously, for a model of conduct.⁴⁶⁴ Fortunately for the Spanish, the matter was resolved one month later without incident when letters from Cárdenas confirmed French orders to their diplomatic agent to honor Anne as his queen upon the publication of the marriage agreement, despite the fact that "the Duke of Alba nor Ruy Gomez de Silva nor the Cardinal of Agamont nor the Bishop of Arras treated the Queen Lady Isabel as their majesty until the [marriage] capitulations had been issued."⁴⁶⁵ Historical precedents, while an invaluable source of reference, did not present axiomatic rules for diplomatic conduct or the elaboration of corresponding rituals. Instead, they provided conventional behavior patterns that contemporaries could appropriate for prevailing circumstances or disregard in favor of an alternative approach.

Months later, the Spanish once again deemed it prudent to turn to the record in order to definitively settle negotiations. Although news of the marriages was published in Spain on February 2 and in France on March 25, diplomats contended over the marriage contracts and the composition of the wedding gifts (*arras*) into spring. In regard to the marriage contracts, the Spanish were inclined to use the agreement of Philip II and Isabel, which included 17 points, as a template. The French disagreed and presented a new marriage contract with 43 points, many of which Cárdenas complained were "of little substance and detrimental."⁴⁶⁶ Much of the month of April was thus spent reducing the French to Spanish terms; an effort aided significantly by Marie de Medici. Still, Cárdenas feared the French's natural tendency towards suspicion and invention and, upon sending the new contracts to Madrid, warned the monarchy of the need to respond

⁴⁶¹ Although secret articles had been agreed upon by Iñigo de Cárdenas and Nicolas de Nueville on April 30 1611, committing both signatories to the agreement, there were still a number of important points that needed to be resolved.

⁴⁶² *Consulta* of the Council of State, AGS, Est., K-1609, B91, fol. 14, 26 Jan 1612. ["que si la publicacion ha de ser en forma q se ha de dar la nora buena a la s'ra' infante parece obligacion mudalle la cortesia pues si se llega a Bessar la mano por Reyna de Francia no se puede escussar el tratarla como tal."]

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.* ["q aunque en la publicacion de casamientos entre tan grandes Reyes, no se puede dudar el del efecto, todavia no estando hecho se puede temer novedad."]

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.* ["assi es bien saber la voluntad de VM'd' en lo que queda dho y tendria por acertado q se preguntase a don Inigo de Cardenas como trataron en francia a la Reyna Dona Ysabel quando estuvo concertada de casarse con su M'd' q (aya gloria)."]

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, fol. 26a, 6 March 1612. ["el duq de Alva ni Ruy Gomez de Silva ni el Cardenal de Agamont ni el Obispo de Arras no trataron de Mag'd' a la Reyna Dona Isabel hasta q estuvieran otorgadas las capitulaciones."] According to Cárdenas' reports in February, there were rumors that the French council was inclined to postpone the official recognition of Anne's title to correspond with Spanish precedent. Nevertheless, their final instructions to their ambassador ordered him to begin addressing Anne as Queen of France on March 25, or sooner should he find himself in her presence.

⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, fol. 34, 6 May 1612. ["de poca sustancia y perjudiciales."]

with haste.⁴⁶⁷ He also requested that orders be sent to the archive in Simancas or other parts to “look for the capitulations and contract of the Infantas of Castile, Aragon, and Portugal [that] had been wed with the kings of France and to see what been settled within them.”⁴⁶⁸ Several council members weighed in on Cárdenas’ letters, including the Duke of Lerma, who advised the Spanish ambassador to accept the marriage contracts in their current form and arrange the arras in accordance with the customs of each respective country.⁴⁶⁹

Cárdenas’ conduct in negotiations and Lerma’s response reveal the extent to which Spanish policy, with its reliance on precedent, was self-propagating. Marriage alliances relied on previous generations for their successful negotiation and, in turn, contributed to the historical record that would serve later generations. For the Spanish, rapprochement did not result from diplomatic innovation. On the contrary, it was a typically conservative policy that relied on the incorporation of pre-written contracts and established customs to imbue new agreements with a sense of familiarity and legitimacy, and facilitate their rapid acceptance by political figures such as Cárdenas and Lerma.

Conclusion

On July 30, 1612, Spanish and French diplomats finalized the double marriage contract that would ostensibly bind their respective countries together in perpetual bonds of peace and good will.⁴⁷⁰ Included within the final contract were two critical articles that established the legal foundations upon which Anne forfeited her right to the Spanish inheritance.⁴⁷¹ Determined to make the act as legally binding as possible, the Spanish monarchy had opted for the incorporation of a renunciation clause within the marriage contract (article 5) and a personal renunciation from Anne upon turning twelve years old (article 6).⁴⁷² According to article 5, comprising over three pages of redundant legal language deemed sufficient by *letrados* to authorize the act, Anne, her children, and every descendent thereafter perpetually surrendered their claim to the Spanish throne regardless of foreign laws or extenuating circumstances. The only exception to this arrangement was if Anne should find herself widowed and childless, in which case the exclusion would be voided and the Infanta’s claim restored pending her return to Spain or remarriage. Previous deliberations had already established the impossibility of permanently guaranteeing the renunciation. Still, the articles included within the marriage contract were adequate enough to appease the Spanish monarchy and conclude diplomatic

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid., fol. 37a, 20 May 1612. [“Dice lo que conviene responderle con brevedad a lo de las capitulaciones que de alla ha embiado, pues quanto mas a prissa se caminar en esto sera mejor para el buen efecto del negocio, por ser alli muy faciles en sospechar sin mas fundamento de lo que la imaginacion de su natural les pone delante.”]

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid. [“buscar las capitulaciones y asiento de las Infantas de Castilla Aragon y Portugal han cassado con los Reyes de francia y ver lo que en esto se ha asentado.”]

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid., fol. 37b.

⁴⁷⁰ Kleinman, *Anne of Austria*, p 15. The marriage contracts were signed in Madrid on August 22, 1612 and in Paris three days later.

⁴⁷¹ The marriage contract between Louis XIII and Anne can be found at AGS, Est., K-1617, C4, fol. 12, 30 July 1612.

⁴⁷² Despite the age stipulated in the contract, Anne did not renounce her claim until 1615 when she was fourteen. The renunciation can be found at Ibid., fols. 24a-c.

negotiations. A little over three years later, on October 18, 1615, the two marriages were celebrated in Burgos and Bordeaux.⁴⁷³

As anticipated by political realists within Spain, the optimistic spirit inspired by the lavish wedding celebrations and the promise of peace was short lived. Unlike his mother, Louis XIII was not inclined to deviate from France's traditional antagonism toward the Habsburgs nor honor verbose commitments to perpetual peace. With the outbreak of the Thirty Years War in 1618, the reemergence of Spanish power, and the rise of Cardinal Richelieu, Spain once again found itself at odds with a French court whose political influence and military potential were cause for considerable concern.⁴⁷⁴ Anne, who the king neglected shortly after her arrival in Paris, was unable to do much to represent the interests of her royal house. For decades, she led a difficult existence marked by alienation and hostility from rivals, including her mother-in-law Marie de Medici and Cardinal Richelieu, vying for the ear of the king. Only with the death of Louis XIII in 1643 and Anne's obtainment of the royal regency, which the king had attempted to prevent, did the young Infanta acquire the power and influence that long eluded her.

Although the marriage negotiations conducted from 1610-12 failed to engender lasting peace between the Spanish Habsburgs and French Bourbons, they nevertheless serve as an invaluable demonstration of the ways in which the emerging notion of reason of state complicated the formulation of dynastic policy. Spanish *letrados* ordered by the Council of State to consider Anne's renunciation acknowledged the risks posed by her marriage. Many advocated for a new approach that prioritized the long-term security and stability of the empire. The monarchy was not receptive to a radical departure from tradition, however, and overcame its own initial apprehensions by appealing to deeply entrenched ideas about succession, family, and historical precedent. Notably, the tensions that existed between the different modes of thought that informed policy were not lost on observers. In the aftermath of Philip IV and Anna's marriages, Spaniards undertook to reconcile realist and idealist perspectives on marriage diplomacy and its utility in a new age.

⁴⁷³ Elliott, "The Political Context," pp. 12-13. In addition to Anne's age, there were several political reasons for the delay.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

Chapter Four

“It does not follow that they must allow that they [Catholic princes] marry heretical women but rather that Catholic daughters marry heretical Princes. From this fortune, heretics could not come to the provinces of Catholics, but Catholics would go to the provinces of the heretics. And this is not only not an issue but could be useful for the conversion of heretics to our Holy faith and Religion.”⁴⁷⁵

For nearly a decade, from 1614-1623, the Spanish and English monarchies engaged in dynastic negotiations with important implications for the future of Post-Reformation Europe. If concluded, the marriage not only promised to unite the bulwark of Catholicism with the foremost Protestant power, but also to establish the diplomatic procedure and contractual basis for authorizing a cross-confessional alliance. At the center of negotiations were King Philip III's second eldest daughter, the Infanta Maria, and King James I's only son and heir, Prince Charles I. Baptized into opposing churches and raised under highly different religious circumstances, the two made an unlikely match. Never before, in the nearly 100 years since Martin Luther posted his 95 theses, had the Roman Catholic Church sanctioned a marriage between royal children of different confessions. The stakes were too high, however, for the Spanish monarchy to simply permit a lack of precedent to disrupt their policy. Apart from the larger implications for the practice of interstate diplomacy, the treaty promised to strengthen Spain's geopolitical position by neutralizing a major rival with competing interests in both Europe and the Americas. Without the marriage, the Count of Gondomar warned in 1619, there would be no way to prevent the outbreak of future conflict and keep the *Pax Hispanica* intact.

The anticipated spiritual ramifications of the match provided an even loftier incentive for rapprochement. In 1617, Doctor Montesinos, a celebrated jurist, wrote a *parecer* in which he argued that marriages between Catholic princesses and Protestant princes offered an unparalleled opportunity for the infiltration of heretical strongholds across Europe. Royal brides were to serve as active agents of the faith, spearheading Counter-Reformation initiatives and facilitating the reunification of Christendom. The first princess expected to undertake this responsibility was Maria who, despite being only eight year old when negotiations began, was nevertheless ascribed an inherent piety that predisposed her toward a mission of conversion. In sending the Infanta to London accompanied by her household, the Spanish monarchy intended to establish a religious sanctuary where Catholics would be free to worship and participate in holy rituals. Over time, the presence of this sanctuary would work in conjunction with a general decree of religious tolerance, promised by James, to liberate the oppressed masses living in England.⁴⁷⁶ Maria, for her part, would be entrusted with converting her husband, Charles, and providing their children

⁴⁷⁵ *Parecer* of Doctor Montesinos, AGS, Est.), leg. 2518, fol. 28, 12 Feb 1617. [“no se sigue haya de dispensar con que ellos se cassen con mugeres herejes sino q las hijas Catholicas se cassen con Potentados o Principes herejes y desta suerte no vendrian herejes a las Provincias de los Catholicos sino yrian Catholicos a las Provincias de los herejes y esto no solo no es inconveniente pero antes podria ser util para la conversion de los herejes a nuestra Santa fee y Religion.”]

⁴⁷⁶ For more on King James see W.B. Patterson, *King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

with proper religious instruction. In this way, she would be able to ensure the coronation of a Catholic monarch to lead the country within one to two generations.

Of course, not everyone agreed that sending the Infanta to England would benefit the faith. From the outset, the staunchest opposition to the marriage came from Rome where the residing pope, Paul V, refused to support any agreement until Charles converted to Catholicism. This stiff opposition to cross-confessional rapprochement was highly problematic for Spain due to the necessity of securing a papal dispensation to authorize the royal union. Reluctant to jeopardize the monarchy's reputation as a pious institution deeply intertwined with religious devotion, but determined to execute his policy, Philip III did not openly clash with Paul V or challenge his verdict. Instead, he organized the empire's most celebrated theologians to work behind the scenes to consider the challenges posed by religious differences and devise a legal solution for resolving them.

The effort made by Spanish theologians to formulate the contractual basis for a cross-confessional marriage remains one of the most understudied aspects of the Spanish match. The past fifteen years have seen a resurgence of scholarly interest in the political dimensions, interpersonal relationships and cultural misunderstandings that comprised the Hispano-English marriage project. In 2003, Glyn Redworth completed the first major study of the Spanish Match in over a century.⁴⁷⁷ Three years later, in 2006, the findings of a Stratford-upon Avon conference on Charles' journey to Spain in 1623 were made available after the publication of a collection of eleven insightful essays.⁴⁷⁸ Each of these research projects have enriched our understanding of the remarkable attempt by state officials and ambassadors to bridge the diplomatic divide that formed in the wake of Europe's permanent religious rupture. Redworth's investigation has also proven useful for explaining why the marriage failed. Still, notwithstanding these recent contributions, critical analysis of the "Spanish perspective" remains limited. In part, this lack of coverage stems from a tendency within the historiography to represent intriguing figures, such as Gondomar or the Duke of Olivares, as the sole arbiters of the Spanish empire's political destiny.⁴⁷⁹ The direct and indirect contributions made by other historical actors, including

⁴⁷⁷ Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*. Before Redworth's investigation, the most thorough account of the marriage could be found in Gardiner, *Prince Charles and the Spanish Marriage*.

⁴⁷⁸ Alexander Samson, ed., *The Spanish Match: Prince Charles's Journey to Madrid, 1623*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).

⁴⁷⁹ Hispanists are partially to blame for these omissions as they have lagged behind their English colleagues in challenging the prevailing historical interpretations of the Spanish Match. Instead, they have focused most of their investigative work on further elaborating the image of the Count of Gondomar; a figure whose protracted appeal to historians may only be surpassed by Philip II. Durán-Loriga, *El Embajador y El Rey*; Bartolomé Benito, *Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña*; Enrique Fernández de Córdoba Calleja, *La Casa de Sol del Conde de Gondomar en Valladolid*, (Valladolid: Ayuntamiento de Valladolid, 2004); Enrique Fernández de Córdoba Calleja, *El Pazo de Gondomar. Cinco siglos de una familia*, (Diputación de Pontevedra: Servicio de Publicaciones, 2002); José García Oro, *Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, Conde de Gondomar y Embajador de España*, (Santiago de Compostela: Xunta de Galicia, 1997); Carmen Manso Ponte, *Don Diego de Sarmiento de Acuña, erudito, mecenas, y bibliófilo*, (Santiago de Compostela: Xunta de Galicia, 1996); Luis Tobío Fernández, *Catro ensaios sobre o conde de Gondomar*, (Orense: Patronato Otero Pedrayo, 1991); Ibid., *Gondomar y los católicos ingleses*, (La Coruña: Seminario de Estudios Gallegos, 1987); Ibid., *Gondomar y su triunfo sobre Raleigh*, (Santiago de Compostela: Editorial de los Bibliófilos Gallegos, 1974); José María Castroviejo and Francisco de Paula Fernández de Córdoba, *El conde de Gondomar. Un azor entre ocasos*, (Madrid: Prensa Española, 1967); Ciriaco Pérez Bustamante, "El Conde de Gondomar y su proyecto de invasión de Inglaterra," *Escorial: revista de Cultura y Letras*, II, (Enero, 1941), pp. 17-29; Francisco Javier Sánchez Cantón, *Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, conde de Gondomar*, (Madrid: Academia de la Historia, 1935).

theologians, government officials, and women, are only mentioned briefly or ignored entirely. Scholar's fascination with the period after 1620, when the monarchy had already assumed an uncompromising stance in the negotiations, also explains why it has tended to be overlooked.⁴⁸⁰ Once a broader approach is adopted, however, it quickly becomes evident that the most consequential developments for the monarchy's dynastic policy occurred before 1620, during which time Spaniards took seriously the prospect of a cross-confessional alliance and undertook to finalize a union that would have radically altered the political trajectory of Europe.

This chapter closely analyzes the ongoing effort from 1614-1619 to overcome the unique challenges posed by Maria's marriage. Limited critical engagement with important primary sources, namely the *pareceres* produced by theologians for the direct consumption of government officials, has resulted in many misunderstandings about the decision to pursue an alliance with England.⁴⁸¹ The first persistent error is that the contributions made by theologians were inconsequential because they were not informed beforehand about Paul V's staunch opposition to a cross-confessional union.⁴⁸² While it is true that the Council of State intentionally withheld Paul V's verdict from the *junta* of 1615, two years later theologians were granted access to the document and adjusted their views accordingly. The second error, stemming in part from the first, is that Spain was invariably determined to pursue a hardline approach with England characterized by the imposition of the strictest religious concessions possible.⁴⁸³ The most contentious religious concession was the demand of liberty of conscience, which would have required England to pass a law granting Catholics unlimited freedom to worship and express their faith without repercussion. At the outset, James made it clear that England would never accept such a rigorous demand, and Spain initially agreed with Gondomar's suggestion to substitute in a lighter demand of religious tolerance. For roughly three years, the majority of Spanish officials and theologians, including those aware of Paul V's verdict, demonstrated considerable diplomatic flexibility as they pursued a conciliatory approach toward negotiations with England. Eventually, a breakdown of diplomatic confidence did lead to a change in Spain's approach, but only after another two years of debate.

The first section of this chapter, titled "The Cross-Confessional Dilemma," will consider the rationale behind Philip III's decision to adopt a conciliatory approach, and disregard papal warnings against a marriage alliance that posed evident dangers to the Infanta. Not only did the move require the reorientation of dynastic policy away from the anti-Protestant stance that had

⁴⁸⁰ For examples produced by English scholars see Thomas Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolutions: English Politics and the Coming of War, 1621-1624*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989). A similar trend can also be seen among Spanish scholars. The great diplomatic historian, Miguel Angel Ochoa Brun, ignores the negotiations that took place from 1614-1619 entirely. According to his seminal study, the plan for Maria's marriage only came to the forefront after Gondomar's second trip to England in 1620. Miguel Ángel Ochoa Brun, *Historia de la Diplomacia Española, La Edad Barroca*, vol. VII, (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación Subsecretaria, 2006), p. 99. For additional examples, see Rafael Rodríguez-Moniño Soriano, *Razón de estado y dogmatismo religioso en la España de XVII: negociaciones hispano-ingleses de 1623*, (Labor: Barcelona, 1976); Carlos Puyuelo y Salinas, *Carlos de Inglaterra en España: un príncipe de Gales busca novia en Madrid*, (Madrid: Escelicer, 1962).

⁴⁸¹ Primary source evidence is drawn from the AGS, Est., leg. 2513, 2514, 2518, 8341 and libro 369, 373. It also draws from a 1624 account written by a theologian involved in the negotiations. Francisco de Jesús, *El Hecho de los tratados del matrimonio pretendido por el Príncipe de Gales con la serenísima Infanta de España, María* (Tratados), ed. Samuel R. Gardiner, (London: Camden Society, 1869).

⁴⁸² For the most recent iteration of this view see Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 17.

⁴⁸³ Ochoa Brun, *Historia*, p. 100. On the general perception of a cross-confessional alliance with England, he writes, "En España, se miraba con recelo o con repugnancia la alianza con el inglés protestante."

prevailed since Charles V, but it also forced the king and his council to think deeply about the fundamental assumptions underpinning their strategic assessment of the marriage market. As the section will show, during the first part of Philip III's reign, his monarchy was strongly opposed to the notion of cross-confessional rapprochement. As time progressed, however, several monarchies, including Spain, began to question whether religious solidarity was a necessary prerequisite for the elaboration of dynastic networks. In response to news from London that an Anglo-French alliance was soon to be finalized, Philip III softened his previous insistence on Charles' conversion and liberty of conscience. For the next three years, the majority of Spanish officials and theologians expressed confidence in the viability of a conciliatory approach as they devised the contractual basis for a binding agreement.

The basis for this confidence was a synthesis of reason of state and dynastic logic that did not exist during concurrent negotiations with France. The Spanish monarchy was keenly aware of the large number of political advantages to be acquired from an English alliance. At the same time, there was a strong sense among those working on the project that familial bonds and historical precedent were enough to ensure that the union would achieve the desired outcomes. The most important strain of dynastic logic revolved around positive *perceptions* of female power and agency. Maria, in particular, was expected to represent the Habsburgs' political and religious interests and effect positive changes in the English court—expectations which had no basis in reality, but which nevertheless served to rationalize the controversial match.

In the second section, titled “An Impossible Demand,” I will examine the circumstances that led Spain to abandon a conciliatory approach by 1619. Although support for a lighter demand of religious tolerance remained strong through the first part of the 1610s, the monarchy struggled to find adequate legal solutions for authorizing a cross-confessional alliance. As time passed, this failure fueled growing skepticism among those who opposed making any concessions to England. In calling attention to the English monarchy's long history of persecution of royal women and their lack of obligation to honor political commitments, these skeptics revealed themselves to be staunch political realists with well-founded concerns about the lack of international enforcement mechanisms to ensure that Spanish interests were protected. Their solution to the absence of trust and accountability was to not to devise a fair and equitable procedure, but to push for the greatest number of binding securities possible and insist on demands, namely liberty of conscience and Charles' conversion, that they knew were unacceptable for the English. While this opinion remained marginal at first, more individuals began to express support for stricter concessions as diplomatic confidence in the English waned, and tensions between Catholics and Protestants increased following the outbreak of the Thirty Years War in 1618.⁴⁸⁴ By 1619, Philip III's conciliatory approach was abandoned entirely when the decision was made to feign a continued willingness to compromise, while secretly pushing for liberty of conscience; a duplicitous strategy that resulted in political miscommunication and the breakdown of negotiations four years later. One of the overriding claims of the chapter is that political idealism, in the form of dynastic logic, was fundamental to the successful negotiation of new marriages. Unfounded faith in a marriage's potential to succeed explains why monarchies continued to enter into agreements that were often ineffective and unpredictable. Even dynastic logic was not enough, however, to mitigate the evident risks posed by entering into an

⁴⁸⁴ For more on the conflict see Peter H. Wilson, *The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).

unprecedented agreement with no discernible binding force. The match failed not because of a lack of incentive or vision, but rather because Spaniards lost faith in the marriage's potential to succeed under fair and equal conditions.

The Cross-Confessional Dilemma

In 1604, the English Queen, Anne of Denmark, secretly approached the special Spanish ambassador, Juan Fernandez de Velasco, with a plan to marry her son, Prince Henry, and Philip III's eldest daughter, the Infanta Anne.⁴⁸⁵ As the leader of the peace delegation working on the Treaty of London, Velasco did not have time to work out the details of the match. But, he did appreciate its political significance at a time when Philip III was committed to pursuing a peaceful foreign policy. Upon the successful conclusion his diplomatic mission, Velasco drafted a secret set of instructions to inform the resident ambassador, Don Juan de Tassis, about the queen's desire for a marriage alliance, and to advise him on how to proceed.

From the outset, confessional differences posed the single greatest obstacle to dynastic rapprochement. Like previous Spanish monarchs, Philip III was a staunch adherent of the Catholic religion who took seriously his role as the principal defender of the faith.⁴⁸⁶ James, on the other hand, was a professed Protestant who rejected both the spiritual authority of the Pope and the notion that marriage was a holy sacrament.⁴⁸⁷ According to Velasco, the only way to overcome this "impediment of religion" was for the English prince to convert to Catholicism. After all, he pointed out;

"It is impossible that His Majesty can pass over nor can anyone on his part listen to such a proposal, he being the principal column of the Church, and being so Catholic in his profession and in reality, and these titles being so esteemed in the crown of Spain that his own subjects would not consent to the Most Serene Infanta marrying a prince of a different religion."⁴⁸⁸

Velasco's concern that Philip III's subjects would reject a cross-confessional marriage sheds light on the major challenge facing Spanish policymakers in the age of reformed religion. Regardless of their strategic assessment of viable initiatives, they had to first and foremost act in a way that corresponded with public expectations of the monarchy as the "principal column of the Church." In the realm of marriage diplomacy, this served to narrow the potential pool of

⁴⁸⁵ Anne of Denmark was a Danish Catholic who had scandalously converted from Lutheranism a decade earlier. Consequently, she did not harbor the same hatred for Spain as a generation of Elizabethan Protestants whose struggle to define England's role on an expanding geopolitical stage spanned the better part of half a century. During this period, relations with Spain were marked by rivalry and conflict as the small island nation molded its political and cultural identity largely in response to Habsburg hegemony. With the death of Elizabeth and accession of James I, however, the English crown began to shed its uncompromising attitude toward its great rival. For more on this topic see Eric J. Griffin, *English Renaissance Drama and the Specter of Spain: Ethnopoetics and Empire*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).

⁴⁸⁶ Carlos M. N. Eire, *From Madrid to Purgatory: The Art and Craft of Dying in Sixteenth-Century Spain*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 359.

⁴⁸⁷ Throughout his life, James demonstrated an avid interest in a wide range of religious matters. For more on the influence that his religiosity had on religious culture in England see James Doleman, *King James I and the Religious Culture of England*, (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2000).

⁴⁸⁸ Francisco de Jesús, *Tratados*, pp. 104-105.

suitors and impede the move toward a more flexible approach that subordinated the long-standing desire for Catholic unity to the secular interests of the state.⁴⁸⁹

Outside of Spain, the papacy placed additional pressure on Philip III to pursue an orthodox dynastic policy that did not violate confessional boundaries. During the first part of his reign, Philip III saw his relative power and prestige steadily decline in Rome. Unlike previous popes, Clement VIII had not adopted a strictly pro-Spanish stance, instead opting to strengthen relations with France after reconciling Henry IV to the Church in 1595.⁴⁹⁰ He had also moved to increase the number of neutral cardinals in the city and augment the strength of the Papal States by absorbing, with French support, the fiefdom of Ferrera. By the time Clement VIII died in 1605, Philip III was eager to restore his privileged position and ensure the continuation of Spanish supremacy in Rome. He fostered close relations with the new pope, Paul V, supporting him in a dispute with Venice in 1607 and reinforcing the image of Spain as a loyal servant and protector of the Holy See.⁴⁹¹ The Spanish monarchy also showed careful deference to Paul V's judgments, including one in 1608 against a cross-confessional alliance being discussed between James and the Duke of Savoy, Charles Emmanuel.⁴⁹²

With his own agreement with England temporarily stalled by religious differences, Philip III watched closely as James probed the marriage market. Letters from his new resident ambassador, Don Pedro de Zúñiga, in 1608 informed him that the potential Savoyard match involved Charles Emmanuel's heir, the Prince of Piedmont, and James's daughter, Elizabeth. According to the English king, the marriage was partially inspired by his respect for the ancient House of Savoy. Of even greater importance, though, was Charles Emmanuel's shared heritage with the Spanish Habsburgs.⁴⁹³ Throughout his life, James expressed an adamant desire to resolve the religious divisions in Europe and establish a lasting peace between the Christian kingdoms. Before he could realize his lofty vision, however, the self-styled *Rex Pacificus* (king of peace) believed he needed to reconcile with Europe's preeminent monarchy. To this end, James demonstrated strong support for a Hispano-English match, using appeals to the natural advantages of an alliance and inquiries about the status of the Infanta to transmit his peaceful intentions to Madrid.⁴⁹⁴

Notwithstanding James' outward enthusiasm for a royal union, Philip III hesitated to treat the matter without papal support. This stance was reinforced by news from France that Henry IV had outright rejected the possibility of a marriage alliance with James on account of the

⁴⁸⁹ For more on the ways in which religious differences complicated early modern diplomacy see Albert J. Loomie, "Toleration and Diplomacy: The Religious Issue in Anglo-Spanish Relations, 1603-1605," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 53, No. 6, (1963), pp. 1-60.

⁴⁹⁰ Dandeleit, *Spanish Rome*, p. 95.

⁴⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 103-104.

⁴⁹² *Consulta* of the Comendador Mayor de Leon, AGS, Est., leg. 2513, no fol., 30 April 1608. ["...por lo q el Papa mostro no gustar del casamiento del Principe de Piamonte con la infanta de Inglaterra fue de parecer q no se tratase mas deste negocio."]

⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*, no fol. 24 de May 1608. ["q estimava la casa de Saboya por su antigüedad y grandeza, pero muchissimo mas por el parentesco con tan grande monarca como VM'd."]

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid.* ["Que entre VM'd' y el no avia pretensiones en los Reynos [Flandes] como el la tiene en Francia y que assi le parecia mas facil el estrecharse y a unarse mucho y desta manera lo deseava, que le pregunto mucho por la S'ra' Infanta."]

controversial Oath of Allegiance of 1606, which had rejected Pope Paul V's authority to depose kings.⁴⁹⁵ According to a Spanish account, Henry IV had insisted;

“that the [marriage] which he could otherwise conclude with England was not possible because his master [King James] with his new publication had greatly diverted the hearts of all Catholic princes and, although he [Henry IV] for the love that he bears [James] had succeeded in reducing the Pope's outrage, things had arrived at a point where neither he nor others could continue to treat such a matter having [James] written that the Pope was the Antichrist and thus that all Catholic princes were children of the Antichrist. Consequently, none of them dared or could marry their children with England without going against [good] conscience and sparking a public scandal for the whole Catholic Church.”⁴⁹⁶

Unwilling to be outdone by the French, the Council of State advised Zúñiga to respond in a similar fashion should the topic of marriage be raised again.⁴⁹⁷ For the time being, a policy of cross-confessional rapprochement was simply too radical to pursue.

Undeterred by Philip III's hesitation to open up negotiations, James sent his ambassador John Digby to Madrid in 1611 to formally present a new marriage proposal. The offer called for a double marriage alliance between Henry and the Infanta Anne on one hand, and the Prince of Piedmont and Elizabeth on the other. Philip III was tempted by the offer, even if he was keenly aware that the second match was only included to further incentivize Anne's betrothal to Henry.⁴⁹⁸ Unfortunately, his daughter's hand had already been promised to Louis XIII. The Council of State briefly deliberated whether or not to inform Digby, in light of their promise to Marie de Medici keep Anne's marriage a secret, before ultimately agreeing that Philip III was within his right to notify him in a succinct manner that similar talks were underway with France.⁴⁹⁹ They also worked with the king to prepare a counter-offer, inserting Philip III's second eldest daughter, Maria, in place of Anne.⁵⁰⁰ In England, James was pleased with the offer

⁴⁹⁵ The Oath of Allegiance was devised by James in the wake of the infamous Gunpowder plot, an assassination attempt organized by English Catholics. The oath was designed to tame James' Catholic subjects and ensure that their loyalty to the papacy did not supersede that of the king. For more on the oath see Conal Condren, “The Oath of Allegiance of 1606,” *Argument and Authority in Early Modern England: The Presupposition of Oaths*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 269- 289.

⁴⁹⁶ *Consulta* of the Council of State, *Ibid.*, no fol., 17 Feb 1609. [“que el que pudiera hacer con Inglaterra no avia lugar por que su amo con este nuebo libro avia desbiado mucho de si los corazones de todos los principes catolicos y que aunque el por el amor que le tenia avia procurado mitigar el animo del Papa agora avian llegado las cosas a termino que ni el ni otros podían continuar estos officios por aver el escrito que el papa hera antechristo y que assi hera consiguiente q todos los principes catolicos heran hijos de ante xpo por lo qual ninguno dellos osava ni podia cassar sus hijos con Ynglaterra sin yr contra la conciencia y dar un escandalo publico a toda la yglesia catolica.”]

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid.* [“sera bien advertir a Don Pedro de Cuniga q si le ablaren en material de casamiento responda por aquel mismo language.”]

⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, no fol., 5 July 1611. [“en Inglaterra quieren esto [Savoyiid marriage] para encaminar mejor lo del casamiento de aquel Principe con la S'ra' Infanta Dona Ana.”]

⁴⁹⁹ *Ibid.* [“Uno pedir a la S'ra' Infanta Dona Ana para q se case con el Principe de Gales, y esto esta en el estado que se save y sino huviera pedido secreto la Reyna de Francia se le pudiera responder luego a este embaxador de Inglaterra, pero pues ya havra recibido Don Inigo el último despacho que se le embio con la respuesta de aquel no havra q guardar mas secreto y se le podra decir comedidamente que VM'd' ha comenzado la amistad de los Reyes de Francia con quien esta prendado.”]

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, no fol., 12 Nov 1611. [“que no podia hacer ahora mas que offerer la segunda Infanta con palabras de tanta demostracion de amor y llaneza que el Rey estimo en mucho esta respuesta.”]

but expressed concerns about the age of the Infanta and his own son's conversion, which he had been told was non-negotiable.⁵⁰¹ He was also worried that pursuing Philip III's second eldest daughter might make him appear inferior to France. With the English king thus conflicted, marriage talks stalled for the second time since 1604.⁵⁰²

Meanwhile, James invested renewed energy in his negotiations with the Duchy of Savoy. In 1613, Charles Emmanuel asked Philip III to review the marriage agreement that his diplomats had worked out with the English. Unaware that the Duke was already on the verge of signing the document, the Council of State ordered a special junta to meet at the home of the Cardinal of Toledo and Inquisitor General, Don Bernardo Sandoval de Rojas to review its provisions.⁵⁰³ Once convened, the *junta* was alarmed to learn that no steps had been taken to secure Prince Henry's conversion. The agreement also failed to procure liberty of conscience, which would have allowed individuals the freedom to openly worship and confess their faith. Within their *consulta*, the *junta* emphatically dismissed the marriage on religious grounds, "as the conditions offered for it in favour of the Catholic religion were so moderate and superficial, that the acceptance of them would be a great disgrace and danger to it."⁵⁰⁴ Philip III forwarded this final verdict, which contradicted the opinions of Italian *letrados*, to Charles Emmanuel and Paul V.⁵⁰⁵ As the bulwark of Catholic orthodoxy, the Spanish monarchy simply could not afford to support an agreement that did not meet their demands for conversion and other major concessions.

In 1614, only one year later, Philip III reconsidered his hardline stance when news arrived that James had turned to Marie de Medici in search of a suitable match. The prospect of an Anglo-French alliance was cause for considerable concern due to its potential to undermine Spanish influence in northern Europe and threaten their possessions in the Netherlands. There was also the fear, articulated by the Spanish ambassador in London, the Count of Gondomar, that a marriage between Charles and a principality inhabited by non-Catholics would precipitate the collaboration of all heretics in Europe.⁵⁰⁶ In an attempt to disrupt the union, the Duke of Lerma met with the French ambassador in Madrid to warn him of the many disadvantages that it posed

⁵⁰¹ Ibid. ["respondio Don Alonso que las mugeres presto se criaban y que VM'd' no podia dar su hija a Principe que no fuese Catholico."]

⁵⁰² Ibid. ["que era contra el pundonor que siempre han tenido de no ser inferiores a Francia."] An account of James response can also be found at Ibid., libro 369, fols. 1r-2v.

⁵⁰³ Francisco de Jesús, *Tratados*, p. 109.

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁵ *Consulta* of the Council of State, AGS, leg. 2513, no fol., 14 Feb 1612. Two years earlier, Charles Emmanuel had convened his own legal experts to consider the possibility of finalizing a cross-confessional marriage without Paul V's. Their final consensus had confirmed that the marriage would be valid even without a papal dispensation. ["...a cerca de la platica de casamiento del Principe de Piamonte con aquella Infanta, ha entendido de un seniorio del Duque de Saboya que vino con el embaxador que traya firmas en blanco para concluyrlo como pudiese y pareceres de grandes letrados de Italia, que seria valido el matrimonio a un que no concurriese en el la dispensacion del Papa."]

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid., leg. 2518, fol. 1, 8 Aug 1614. ["es cierto que biendo cerrado este camino concluyran con francia o con alguna en Alemania y se estrecheran en nuebas ligas deshaciendo todo punto los catolicos y esforcaran el tratado que han comenzado muy de veras y con su sumo secreto de hacer su concilio entre todos los erejes de europa."] For an overview of Gondomar's character see Durán-Loriga, *El Embajador y El Rey*, pp. 49-51. For a detailed recount of his time in London from 1614-1618 see Ochoa Brun, *Historia de la Diplomacia Española*, pp. 91-97.

for the regency of Louis XIII.⁵⁰⁷ He also drew attention to France's history of religious violence, pointing out how;

“the murder of its [France's] Kings by villains, and especially of one so valorous as Henry IV were the judgments of God occasioned by such actions as the Queen is about to commit if she arranges this marriage without obtaining the approbation of His Holiness.”⁵⁰⁸

On the English side, Gondomar enticed James to abandon the match by softening Spain's previous demands and entertaining, for the first time, a marriage agreement that did not require Princes Charles' conversion or liberty of conscience. James was intrigued, promising in return to use his power to implement a policy of religious toleration for Catholics and guarantee the establishment of a public chapel for Maria.⁵⁰⁹ With both sides making concessions, negotiations proceeded forward and, for the first time in a decade, the contractual basis of the alliance began to take form. For his part, Gondomar was confident that the marriage was attainable, and, in an audacious move, took it upon himself to bypass the Council of State and directly request orders from Pope Paul V on how to proceed.⁵¹⁰

Unimpressed with Gondomar's report, Paul V provided four reasons for Spain to omit any arrangement that did not demand Charles' conversion. The first two reasons addressed the human element within a marriage that would subject innocent souls to heretical influences. By way of her husband, Paul V argued, Maria would be “exposed to a clear risk of losing the faith.”⁵¹¹ Likewise, Maria's children would either come to stray from Catholicism, or be raised to follow the religious example set by Charles. For the papacy, both Maria and her children were passive agents residing within a patriarchal structure where ultimate religious authority resided with the male head of the household. As such, it was difficult to conceive of a scenario in which marriage would not lead to a perversion of faith. Equally alarming for Paul V was the impact that sustained relations with England would have on religious observance in Spain. In his third reason, he argued that opening the door to “commerce and communication” (*comercio y comunicación*) would jeopardize Catholicism's position of uncontested dominance on the peninsula. Finally, he criticized English kings who “hold divorce to be lawful, and practice it when their wives do not give them any children.”⁵¹² Unlike his previous reasons, which were all connected to the pernicious influence of reformed religion, Paul V's fourth reason derived from

⁵⁰⁷ Francisco de Jesús, *Tratados*, p. 110. On his visit with the French ambassador, Lerma wrote, “The Ambassador of France visiting me yesterday, I told him... that I was much surprised that this had been done without any account being given to the Vicar of Jesús Christ, and without his licence; and that the Queen Regent had contented herself with a private chapel for those persons who were to accompany her daughter, making the number less than that which would have gone from Spain with the Infanta; so that when these either died or returned home, in a short time the Princess would find herself alone in the midst of heretics... a terrible matter indeed thus to deliver up to such evident danger a girl of eleven or twelve years.” Lerma would also go on to warn that the marriage was clearly a ploy by English heretics to inspire the French Huguenots to rise up once again.

⁵⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

⁵⁰⁹ *Consulta* of the Council of State, AGS, Est., leg. 2518, fol. 1, 8 Aug 1614. [“y le han dado a entender q la capilla en palacio seria tan publica como la q VM'd' tiene en M'd' celebrandose en ella los officios divinos con toda publicidad y solenidad y podrian alargarse a dar toleracion de Religion a los Catolicos que es todo lo que el Rey puede hacer por agora.”]

⁵¹⁰ Francisco de Jesús, *Tratados*, p. 113.

⁵¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 114

⁵¹² *Ibid.*

antipathy for the English monarchy as a disingenuous institution characterized by an odious historical and legal tradition stretching back to the scandalous transgressions of Henry VIII. It was therefore foolish to expect England to honor its diplomatic agreements, or for liberty of conscience to have any lasting impact on the island.

Despite Paul V's unequivocal stance on the matter, the Spanish monarchy was reluctant to allow France and England to forge stronger ties. Philip III and the Council of State listened to Gondomar's claim that James could not make major religious concessions without jeopardizing his throne.⁵¹³ As they were informed, the predominantly Protestant Parliament would never agree to a law granting liberty of conscience, nor would they passively accept the conversion of the heir. But, James did have the power to pass a decree of religious toleration without parliamentary support.⁵¹⁴ This was enough, Gondomar insisted, to ensure that an English nobility secretly sympathetic to Catholicism would eventually overthrow heresy.⁵¹⁵ Trusting in this report, the Council of State recommended that a *junta* be convened to determine the legality of a marriage agreement between Charles and Maria that did not require the prince's conversion or liberty of conscience. To aid in its deliberation, the *junta* was provided every document connected to the negotiations with the exception of Paul V's rejection letter, which the Council of State likely feared would sway the *junta* away from the desired outcome.⁵¹⁶

The Spanish monarchy's decision to retract its insistence on strict religious demands and to censure the papal verdict was influenced by a new form of political logic that prioritized pragmatic initiatives over religious imperatives. The betrothal of an Infanta to a non-Catholic prince would have been an unthinkable proposition during the reign of Philip II regardless of the benefits of cross-confessional rapprochement. Velasco's response to Queen Anne in 1604 and Spanish disapproval of an Anglo-Savoyard match reflected Philip III's continued adherence to a policy of strict religious conservatism during the early part of his reign.⁵¹⁷ Nevertheless, by 1614 the prevalence of reason of state thinking in the formal hierarchy of power had made an alliance with Protestant England theoretically possible. Thereafter, Philip III led efforts to defend the

⁵¹³ *Consulta* of the Council of State, AGS, Est., leg. 2518, fol. 1, 8 Aug 1614. [“luego porq si tal se capitulase demas de abenturar a perder el Rey y su Hijo la Vida y Reyno, pareceles q es gran mengua y afrenta.”]

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.* [“no puede el Rey dar libertad de conciencia por ley pero puede dar la tolerancia suspendiendo la execucion de todas las leyes contra catolicos.”]

⁵¹⁵ *Ibid.* [“Casi toda la nobleza de aquel Reyno son Catolicos en su corazon.”]

⁵¹⁶ *Consulta* of the Council of State, *Ibid.*, libro 369, fol. 13r, 30 Aug 1614. [“Lo q paresciere en la Junta q Vmg'd' manda q se tenga sobre esta materia en casa del Cardenal de Toledo donde no sera bien se vea esto q esrive el Conde de Castro porque no los embarace sino lo demas...”]

⁵¹⁷ It is possible that the Spanish monarchy never intended to support an Anglo-Savoyard match, and that their policy of religious obstinacy had ulterior political motives. As demonstrated within the previous chapter, the Spanish were wary of Charles Emmanuel, who in 1610 nearly finalized a double marriage with France that would have committed both signatories to a joint invasion of Italy. Indeed, Anne's controversial marriage to Louis XIII was in many ways an attempt to curb Savoy's dynastic ambitions. Similarly, Spain's eventual opposition to a marriage between England and Savoy on religious grounds can be interpreted, at least in part, as an attempt to limit the power and prestige of the notoriously unreliable Duke. The English, left largely in the dark about the terms and conditions of the Hispano-French double alliance, miscalculated the close affiliation between Spain and Savoy as a result of the Duke's prior marriage with the deceased Infanta Catalina. The Spanish, rather than correct this error, allowed England to believe that Savoy was the key to peace in order to prolong negotiations and absorb both governments without making binding commitments. They were also careful to emphasize the importance of papal support and repeatedly cite Paul V's unwavering opposition to the union of a Catholic prince and Protestant princess to avoid an open endorsement of the marriage. Only after Spain's tactics became untenable, and the threat of an Anglo-French alliance became evident, did the monarchy divert from papal policy. For more on this point see Chapter Three.

legality of a cross-confessional marriage, and to convince the Pope to award a dispensation. He did not want to pursue any course of action that might taint his image or compromise the monarchy's status as a deeply religious institution with respect for the established laws and customs of the Catholic Church. But, at the same time, he questioned the merits of a dynastic outlook which held religious uniformity to be nonnegotiable, even when it came at the expense of his empire's interests. The result was an unprecedented attempt to develop a definite procedure, with a justifiable rationale, for pursuing marriage alliances across confessional lines.

There were a number of additional incentives, beyond merely disrupting an Anglo-French marriage, for Philip III's readiness to deviate from diplomatic precedent. First, there was a sensible appreciation of the immediate benefits of an alliance that would reconcile Spain with a major rival on the continent. Beginning in the 1560s, English privateering in the Atlantic brought the monarchy of Elizabeth I into direct conflict with Philip II. Outright war broke out several decades later in 1585 when a military expedition under the Earl of Leicester landed in the Netherlands to support Dutch forces rebelling against Spain, setting the stage for the failed invasion of the Spanish Armada in 1588.⁵¹⁸ Intermittent fighting in the Netherlands and on the high seas prolonged a war that proved costly for Spain and only came to an end with the Treaty of London in 1604.⁵¹⁹ Still, additional measures were needed to prevent a fresh outbreak of hostilities, and curtail English incursions into the New World, which—after the founding of Jamestown in 1607—had become arguably one of the biggest concerns of strategic realists in the capitol.⁵²⁰

A marriage alliance offered the most promising avenue for peace because it would restore the bonds of affection that had once united the two royal houses. The perception of England's sincere desire for dynastic rapprochement served as reassurance that an advantageous agreement could be negotiated without comprising imperial interests or instigating domestic opposition.⁵²¹ Celebrating the benefits of the match, one anonymous Jesuit theologian proclaimed, "there is hope that once these marriages are finalized the insolence and audacity of the Dutch will be squashed, the peace with France strengthened, the oceans calmed and freed of pirates, [and] the Indies made more secure."⁵²² The cumulative effect of these political advantages was to be a "very great and secure peace" for the monarchy.⁵²³

⁵¹⁸ For a brief overview of the rivalry between England and Spain in this period see Parker, *The Grand Strategy*, pp. 158-280.

⁵¹⁹ Melinda J. Gough, "Dynastic Marriage, Diplomatic Ceremonial and the Treaties of London (1604–05) and Antwerp (1609)," *Stuart Marriage Diplomacy: Dynastic Politics in their European Context, 1604–1630*, eds. Valentina Caldari and Sara J. Wolfson, (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2018), pp. 287-302.

⁵²⁰ Summary of the *Parecer* of Fray Antonio de Sotomayor, AGS, Est., leg. 2518, fol. 27. ["quanto a los bienes temporales, no se representan los que se pueden adquirir, sino lo males que se pueden evitar como son las perpetuas guerras con Inglaterra, y con los que se le allegan, particularmente en el mar, en la carrera de Indias, y en las mismas Indias."] For more on how the Spanish monarchy, and in particular the Council of State, responded to the founding of Jamestown see William Sachs Goldman, "Spain and the Founding of Jamestown," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 68, No. 3, (July 2011), pp. 427-450.

⁵²¹ A paper on the advantages of Maria's marriage by a Jesuit priest, AGS, Est., libro 369, fol. 3r. ["La Reyna y la mayor parte del consejo y todo el Reyno asi Herejes como Catholicos desean que se case con españa..."]

⁵²² *Ibid.*, fols. 4v-4r. ["Y tambien se espera que hecho estos casamientos se rreprimen la ynsolencia y osadia de los olandeses, y las paces de franceses seran mas firmes, los mares mas quietos y libres de cosarios, [y] las Indias mas firmes..."]

⁵²³ *Ibid.*, fol. 4r. ["muy grande y segura paz"]

In addition to strengthening his *Pax Hispanica*, Philip III intended for Maria and her household to serve as a spearhead for the Catholic faith. Eighty years after Henry VIII was named the head of the Church of England, the impression remained that reformed religion subsisted on the immorality of a small minority and the fear and ignorance of the vast majority. Faced with persecution, the English population simply did not have the opportunity to renounce their error and embrace the one true religion. Maria's marriage provided this opportunity by establishing a sanctuary for Catholic worship in the heart of the royal court. Here, the Infanta would nurture sympathy for her faith and inspire a dramatic shift in the spirits (*animos*) of all those around her.⁵²⁴ This would, in turn, pave the way for the nation's acceptance of Catholicism, and bolster Spanish operations aimed at bringing about the conversion of the English monarchy.⁵²⁵ With unwavering conviction, the same Jesuit theologian insisted that Maria's presence in England provided "the most powerful and effective means that there is today not only for the conversion of the Kingdoms that are subjected to the crown of England, but also for the universal wellbeing and peace of all Christendom"⁵²⁶ At the international level, the reintegration of England as a peaceful partner with a shared set of values promised to facilitate the normalization of relations with its Catholic neighbors. It would also contribute to the political stabilization of Europe by strangling Protestant strongholds in Holland, France, the Holy Roman Empire, and Denmark that subsisted on English aid.⁵²⁷

Spain's twofold justification for an English match belied a keen awareness of the risks posed by the controversial arrangement. The *junta* that met in 1614 was quick to point out that the success of Maria's mission was contingent upon her freedom to worship, and recommended that Philip III push for a policy of religious tolerance one year before Maria's departure as a protective measure. Even with this precaution, they admitted, there was no precedent for the alliance and considerable time would be needed to negotiate the conditions related to the Infanta's safety.⁵²⁸ Members of the *junta* also tackled the legal basis for authorizing a marriage that was, by all accounts, inadmissible. The suppression of Paul V's negative verdict did not

⁵²⁴ Ibid., fol. 4v. ["Porque piensan que estando en la corte de Inglaterra la S'ra' Infanta con toda su familia de Catholicos asi de la nacion Inglesa como española con ampla livertaden todo lo que toca al exercizio de nra religion catholica se hara grande mudanza en los animos del Rey, y del Principe y de toda la corte; y muchos seran catholicos teniendo la ocasión de ver mas de cerca y de ynformarse de la verdad de nra sancta fee."]

⁵²⁵ Ibid. On the Iberian Peninsula, a select number of youths were imported from England and enrolled in universities to be educated as priests and state officials. Others were recruited to serve in the Spanish royal forces in the Netherlands and fight against Protestant armies. Eventually, all were expected to return to their native country to promote the interests of Catholicism and ease relations with the Spanish crown. ["los medios que hasta aquí sean hussado... que son el criar la jubentud Inglessa en las universidades de estos Reynos para que despues de bien ynstruidos en virtud y letras buelban a su patria a pedicar siendo sacerdotes, o a servir la republica y ser provechosos ministros en ella en estado seglar, y los que siguen la guerra su Mag'd' les mandara asentar en su real exercito en flandes."]

⁵²⁶ *Consulta* of the Council of State, Ibid., leg. 2518, fol. 1, 8 Aug 1614. ["el medio mas poderoso y eficaz q el dia de hoy puede haver no solamente para la conversion de los Reynos que estan sujetos a la corona de Ynglaterra sino para el vien universal y paz de toda la cristiandad."]

⁵²⁷ Ibid. ["porq con esto los demas quedaran unidos y no teniendo asistencia olandeses las fuerzas del Archiduque Alberto bastaran para reducillos y El Rey de Francia a sus Ugantoes, y el Imperio a sus protestantes, Polonia a Suebia y la autoridad y yntercesion de VM'd' de aquel Rey y su exemplo a Dinamarca"]

⁵²⁸ *Consulta* of the *Junta* of theologians and jurists, Ibid., libro 369, fol. 26r, 21 Sept 1614. ["el tiempo yra descubriendo antes de la efectucion deste matrimonio... para asegurarse mas VM'gd' porq sin preceder esta experiencia aunq tuviera la s'ra' Inffanta hedad para casarse luego no aconsejara la junta a VM'gd' efectuara el matrimonio."]

preclude an honest assessment of Maria's marriage to Charles. The *junta* concluded, without the benefit of papal guidance, that dynastic rapprochement with England was prohibited by divine and natural law.⁵²⁹ It did not agree with Paul V, however, that the problems posed by the illegality of the marriage were insurmountable. Even after the Council of State rescinded its initial order to suppress information, thereby providing access to the papal verdict by 1617, several continued to argue that there was an avenue for authorizing the marriage. In their opinion, the legality of the marriage came down to the safety of the Infanta and the benefits of the match. As long as Spain devised an agreement that protected Maria and her children from heretical influences and furthered the interests of Catholicism, the pope was within his right to grant a dispensation.⁵³⁰ This was the initial stance adopted by Philip III, who exhibited considerable faith in the marriage alliance to procure all of its political and religious objectives.

Philip III's positive stance hinged upon a synthesis of reason of state and dynastic logic that did not exist during concurrent negotiations with the French. In Anne's case, apprehensions over the implications of her claim for the future of the royal patrimony were at odds with the monarchy's faith in divine providence, familial bonds, and historical precedent to safeguard imperial interests. Ultimately, the monarchy was persuaded by its unfounded conviction in the latter to proceed with the marriage in an instance of political idealism triumphing over political realism in the realm of policymaking. In Maria's case, there was no disagreement in the logic that underpinned the monarchy's decision to pursue the marriage. The principal reason for this difference is that Maria's marriage had the clearly defined set of political and religious objectives, beyond the formulaic pretext of perpetual peace, which Anne's marriage had lacked.⁵³¹ At the same time, dynastic logic succeeded in creating the impression, much as it had during French negotiations, that the marriage was bound to achieve all desired outcomes.

One influential strain of dynastic logic revolved around Maria's individual capacity to resist the corrupting influences of the heretical English court. In contrast to Paul V, Spaniards did not perceive the Infanta to be a passive vessel inevitably susceptible to religious perversion. Instead, she was portrayed as a resilient figure capable of residing in London undisturbed. As Federico Xedler summed up in a *parecer* written for the Council of State in 1615;

“there is no danger of perversion on the part of Catholic Lady Infanta morally speaking as a result of her unshakeable faith, as well as her blood, her education,

⁵²⁹ Ibid., fol. 25v, 21 Sept 1614. [“Textos sagrados... y gravissimos autores y con algunos concilios q trata desto prohibiendo el casarse Catholicos con Herejes y q no se podia dispensar en aquel caso por ser contra derecho natural y divino.”]

⁵³⁰ Ibid. At no point in their *consulta* did the junta convened by the Council of State challenge the Jesuit priest's positive assessment of the match or consider the likelihood of it failing. Instead, they reiterated the many advantages to be reaped from the establishment of a public chapel with regular mass and divine services for both the good of the Catholic Church and the security of the Spanish empire. They also argued that religious tolerance was just as vital as liberty of conscience; [“que lo que asegura todo esto es la tolerancia de la religion... que esto no es de menor ymportancia q la livertad de conciencia.”]

⁵³¹ A major criticism leveled by *letrados* against Anne's marriage was that it did not achieve anything that Philip IV's marriage to Elizabeth of Valois did not already achieve. For more on this see Chapter Three.

as well as her parents for her reputation and honor [and] for the very Catholic company she will take”⁵³²

As the daughter of Philip III, Maria possessed a deeply rooted allegiance to Catholicism that derived from a combination of proper religious instruction and a propensity for deep faith characteristic of the Habsburg bloodline. This would be enough, it was thought, to ensure that the Infanta’s allegiances remained intact. After all, to imply that the Infanta’s moral integrity was assailable would have been to challenge the inherent religiosity of her dynasty.

The Infanta’s safety would also be secured by contractual conditions included in the final marriage treaty. Articles Two and Three of the “Necessary Concessions” (*Conveniencias Precisas*) drafted by the 1617 *junta* of theologians directly addressed Maria’s legal status.⁵³³ In a clear attempt to prevent coercion, Article Two dictated that all members of the English court, including the king and prince, swear an oath against the use of violence to persuade her or her household to convert. In this way, the Infanta’s humble sanctuary would be free from direct assault, allowing her to worship without interference. According to the Article Three, Maria would be granted the power to determine the composition of her own household. This power would not only include the freedom to appoint both her immediate servants and their servants, but also establish an internal oversight position occupied by a bishop with the right to enforce strict Catholic orthodoxy and dismiss transgressors. Finally, the article stipulated that members of Maria’s household be allowed to “wear their proper habit” and receive legal protection from harassment. At least initially, Philip III would elect members of his daughter’s household due to her young age. Eventually, though, the plan was for Maria to inherit this responsibility, thereby increasing both her authority and autonomy in the local court.

The perception of Maria’s incorruptibility was directly linked to her image as an inherently pious figure with a refined sense of religious obligation and familial duty. From early childhood, the Infantas were raised to be models of piety and personal devotion. While their formal education did include lessons on reading and writing, a strong emphasis on religious instruction dominated the curriculum.⁵³⁴ Their daily lives were similarly organized around acts of worship, visits to holy institutions, and other activities meant to instill a strong Catholic grounding.⁵³⁵ From the Spanish perspective, the Infantas possessed an inherent holiness that, when carefully cultivated, had the potential to surpass their contemporaries in sincerity and raise them to an elevated spiritual status. In rare instances, they were even thought to have access to intercessory powers. Maria’s mother, Margaret of Austria, lived an exceptionally pious life and during her funeral the priest encouraged people to pray to her for help consulting with the

⁵³² *Parecer* of Federico Xedler, AGS, Est., leg 2518, fol. 11, 16 Jan 1615. [“no hay peligro de perversion de parte de la Senora Infanta catolica moralmente hablando asi por su fee tan arraygada como por su sangre como por su educacion como por sus padres por su {credito} y honrra por la compania tan catholica q llevara.”]

⁵³³ Francisco de Jesús, *Tratados*, pp. 298-305.

⁵³⁴ Martha K. Hoffmann, *Raised to Rule: Educating Royalty at the Court of the Spanish Habsburgs, 1601-1634*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2011), p. 56. The education became less rigorous over time as a greater emphasis was put on religious content.

⁵³⁵ Tanya J. Tiffany, “‘Little Idols’: Royal Children and the Infant Jesús in the Devotional Practice of Sor Margarita de la Cruz (1567-1633),” *The Early Modern Child in Art and History*, ed. Matthew Knox Averett, (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 44-47. Maria would form a particularly strong bond with the Descalzas Reales Convent, where her aunt Sor Margarita de la Cruz resided, that would last for the rest of her life.

saints.⁵³⁶ Maria lost her mother when she only five years old, but she was raised, alongside her sister, Anne, with the expectation that she would consult the book on Margaret's life and model her behavior on the queen's example.⁵³⁷ This would prepare both sisters for the challenges they would face in foreign courts and ensure that they remained loyal to the moral virtues and principles of their youth.



Annunciation, Juan Pantoja de la Cruz, 1603,
The Prado Museum, Madrid

The image of the Infantas as inherently pious figures with deep reverence for matters of the faith was further enhanced by artistic representations. Beginning in the 16th century, the Spanish monarchy began to commission divine portraits (*retratos a lo divino*) in which members of the royal family were depicted as biblical figures reenacting scenes from scripture. The genre remained popular in the court of Philip III, where artists such as Juan Pantoja de la Cruz produced allegorical paintings aimed at elaborating the image of the Habsburgs as a dynasty intertwined with religious devotion.⁵³⁸ An example of Pantoja's work includes the *Annunciation* (1605), in which the Infanta Anne is portrayed as the winged Archangel Gabriel delivering news of Jesus' conception to the Virgin Mary, made to resemble Queen Margaret. The painting captures the Infanta's purity and innocence in her youthful appearance and presents her to the audience as a symbol of divine grace gently hovering above the startled Virgin. With Anne, like all royal Habsburg women, there is the sense that she is unburdened by the imperfections that drive mankind to sin. At the same time, she possesses a natural authority as she extends her arm forward to deliver the Lord's message in fulfillment of his holy command. In presenting Anne as

⁵³⁶ Sánchez, *The Empress, the Queen, and the Nun*, p. 77.

⁵³⁷ Upon leaving for France, Anne was reminded by Philip III to regularly consult the book written about the life of her mother and to use her model as a mirror for her on conduct. Anne and Maria likely had an intimate familiarity with the text as the author, Diego de Guzman, was their royal tutor. For more on Diego de Guzman and the Infanta's education see Hoffman, *Raised to Rule*, pp. 58-61.

⁵³⁸ Queen Margaret commissioned Juan Pantoja de la Cruz to produce at least two other paintings, *Birth of the Virgin* and *Adoration of the Shepherds*, that located the events surrounding the birth of royal children in sacred contexts. For more on this see Maria Cruz de Carlos Varona, "Representar el nacimiento: Imágenes y cultura material de un espacio de sociabilidad femenina en la España altomoderna," *Goya: Revista de arte* 319, (2007), pp. 231-245. During the reign of Philip III, the tendency to liken the royal children to Christ was supported by Sor Margarita de la Cruz and the Descalzas Real. Tiffany, "'Little Idols': Royal Children and the Infant Jesús," pp. 35-48.

an active agent of the faith, the painting foreshadows the role that she, and her sister Maria, would later be expected to fulfill as devout and pious Infantas tending to religious duties and supporting the efforts of the church.

Personal portraits also played an important role in elaborating the image of the Infantas as models of piety and virtue. Portraiture was the most common form of artistic representation in the Spanish court, especially during the 17th century when the greatest artists of the era produced several laudatory depictions of the royal children at different stages of their lives. Maria, for instance, was portrayed no fewer than five times before turning 25 by artists as renowned as Juan Pantoja de la Cruz, Bartolomé González y Serrano, and Diego Velázquez. Like Pantoja's *Annunciation*, these paintings were intended to promote a positive perception of the Habsburg monarchy, and were shared with all levels of Spanish society through engravings, emblems, and collection books.⁵³⁹ They also served to delineate the formal roles and personal attributes of the Infantas and their male siblings. The different representations of the two genders can most clearly be seen in a pair of paintings completed around 1612 by Bartolomé González y Serrano, a student of Pantoja who emerged as the royal court's favorite artist after his instructor's death in 1608. Within the paintings, which portray the Infanta Maria with the Infante Carlos, and the Infanta Anne with the heir apparent Philip IV, the body language of Philip III's sons convey strength and confidence as they stand unsupported gently gripping the hilt of their swords. Only young boys, they nevertheless possess the spirit of men of action and authority destined to lead the empire in matters of politics and war. In contrast, the Infantas adopt an unassuming pose leaning on furniture for support and gently holding a handkerchief or small, likely religious text; items appropriate for royal women whose activities were confined to domestic and sacred spaces. The conspicuous crosses on their chests serve as a reminder of the Infantas' deep piety and religious devotion, while their rigid attire indicates a sophisticated sense of modesty and propriety. Consigned to a non-political role within the court, they emit an air of authority that derives not from their military prowess or political leadership but from their status as future Queens naturally imbued with a spirit of holiness and purity.



Infanta Maria and Infante Carlos (left) and *Infanta Anne and Philip IV* (Right),
Bartolomé González y Serrano, 1612,
Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna

⁵³⁹ Robert Goodwin, *Spain: The Centre of the World 1519-1682*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), p. 267.

A portrait of Maria painted by González in 1617 shows that the perception of the Infanta changed only slightly as she matured and became the focal point of diplomatic efforts in England. Once again, Maria is portrayed to the audience leaning slightly on a chair and gripping a lacework handkerchief. Donning a dress that closely resembles the one worn by her sister Anne five years previously, she remains a model of piety and virtue above reproach and free from corruption. The only noticeable difference is the Infanta herself; a young woman by early modern standards who, at twelve years old, was allowed to legally marry. Portraits such as this served an invaluable political function as diplomatic gifts sent to foreign courts as gestures of friendship and goodwill.⁵⁴⁰ For many young royals, the portraits often provided the only glimpse of their future spouse, and monarchies insistently sought after them during marriage negotiations. In turn, diplomats were careful to record foreign reactions to the portraits. The prospective spouses' reaction was especially significant not because affection was an essential component of dynastic unions, but rather due to its potential to serve as reassurance that the bride would be well treated and placed in a position to represent the interest of her natal family. In the case of marriage negotiations with England, news of Charles' positive reaction to Maria's portrait was relayed to Madrid where it contributed to a sense of optimism in the Infanta's capacity to serve as an agent of the faith and prompt religious change.



The Infanta Maria, Bartolomé González y Serrano, 1617,
Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna

⁵⁴⁰ *Consulta* of the Padre Confesor and Count of Gondomar, AGS, Est., leg. 2518, fol. 42, 13 Jan 1619. In 1619, a junta comprised of Gondomar and the Padre Confesor recommended that a collection of gifts, including portraits, be sent to the English court. It is very likely that a copy of this portrait of Maria, or one very similar, was included. [“seria conveniente q VM’d’ mostradose agradecido a todo le hiciesse agora otra presente de cavallos, paxaros, arcabuzes, retrattos y otras cosas... lo qual parece que seria agusto de su amo, y que solamente parezca senal de amor q para el Rey de Inglaterra sera de mucha estimacion y ayudara mucho a confirmarse en la esperanza y seguridad conque conviene q viva de la amistad de VM’d.”] For more on Hispano-English gift exchanges see Magdalena de Lapuerta Montoya, “Arte y diplomacia: El retrato y los enlaces matrimoniales,” *La Monarquía de Felipe III: La Corte*, vol. III, eds. José Martín Millán and María Antonietta Visceglia, (Madrid: Fundación Mapfre, 2008), pp. 585-591; Gustav Ungerer, “Juan Pantoja de la Cruz and the Circulation of Gifts between the English and Spanish Courts 1604/5,” *Sederi* 9, (1998), pp. 59-78;

Maria's strict spiritual upbringing and her propensity, as a Habsburg woman, for deep religiosity made her an ideal agent for religious conversion. To some extent, Maria's role was intended to be one of passive obedience to her consigned duties in the domestic sphere. By participating in regular acts of devotion and holy rituals, Maria would be deviating little from established conventional behavior for royal women. In addition to generating conversion through her pious example, though, Maria was also expected to adopt an active role in promoting the faith, especially with regard to Charles.⁵⁴¹ Within Madrid, there existed the perception, corroborated by prior experiences, that wives had a greater capacity for reducing their husbands to their faith.⁵⁴² According to the *junta* of 1614, it therefore stood to reason, "that the Prince will be reduced to the [religion] of the lady Infanta."⁵⁴³ In support of their conclusion, the *junta* underscored Charles' young age and reports from Gondomar detailing his sympathetic disposition toward Catholicism. Both were viewed as proof, rooted in Holy Scripture, that the prince's conversion at the hands of his wife was inevitable. Little attention was paid to the fact that the Maria was six years younger than Charles, or that she was only a young child during negotiations. She was perceived as having an influence over the future king that would allow her to dictate his religious orientation and, by extension, that of his entire kingdom.

Another principal expectation of Maria was tied to her role as the mother of any future offspring. Within the Spanish court, the education of the royal children often fell within the purview of the queen's responsibilities in the domestic sphere. This responsibility was particularly important in the early years when new members of the dynasty were introduced to the strict etiquette, religious observations, and courtly rituals that comprised everyday life, but could also extend into their formal studies. In the classroom, queens were able to provide input and directly influence their children's development without fear of overstepping their consigned position in court. Maria and Anne had witnessed this firsthand during their own childhood, as Queen Margaret carefully tended to their religious education.⁵⁴⁴ The same had been observed in England where Anne had played a prominent role in the early life of Charles and, it was commonly believed, instilled a deeply rooted sympathy for Catholicism.⁵⁴⁵ In Madrid, the example of Anne was widely cited as proof of the religious influence that a devout mother could have in spite of the irreligious atmosphere.

Similarly, Maria was expected to take an active part in her children's early lives and directly oversee their proper religious instruction. It was assumed that the Infanta would one day

⁵⁴¹ *Parecer* of Doctor Montesinos, AGS, Est., leg. 2518, fol. 28, 12 Feb 1617. ["tambien se puede esperar que la S'ra' Infanta mediante la divina gracia con sus oraciones y con otros medios podra ser instrumento para q el Principe de Gales se convierta a nra S'ta' fee."] *Parecer* of Fray Francisco de Jesús, Ibid., fol. 31, 5 Feb 1617. ["Que en este matrimonio se podria esperar mas, la conversion del marido hereje, por la fuerza grande que de suyo tiene la persuasion de la muger."]

⁵⁴² *Parecer* of Federico Xedler, Ibid., fol. 11, 16 Jan 1615. ["por la experiencia q tenemos segun las historias no solo no ay peligro moral de q ella se pervertira antes puede aver viva esperanza q por su medio se reducira el Principe..."]

⁵⁴³ *Consulta* of the *Junta* of theologians and jurists, Ibid., libro 369, fol. 26v, 21 Sept 1614. ["aquel Principe se reducira a la [religion] de la senora ynfanta."]

⁵⁴⁴ Hoffman, *Raised to Rule*, p. 58. The similarities between Margaret's religious upbringing and that of her daughters suggest that she had a significant role to play in structuring their education. She also made a habit of occasionally showing up their classes to oversee their lessons.

⁵⁴⁵ *Consulta* of the Council of State, AGS, Est., leg. 2518, fol. 1, 8 Aug 1614. ["y considere teniendo muy presente q se trate de reducir a un niño q tiene tantas señales de ser Catolico Hijo de madre que lo es."]

act upon a strong inclination, as a pious Catholic, to raise her children properly.⁵⁴⁶ This inclination, in conjunction with the natural affection and deference owed by children to their mother, would provide the basis for a meaningful and lasting effort to instill Catholic beliefs and practices.⁵⁴⁷ Some did fear that competition between the Infanta and Charles over their children's religious instruction might lead to tension and discord within the marriage.⁵⁴⁸ Therefore, the Padre Confesor recommended that a special condition be included in the final marriage treaty granting the Infanta power to reside over the early education of any future offspring.⁵⁴⁹ In accordance with his recommendation, Article Five in the subsequent *Conveniencias Precisas* of 1617 demanded that, in addition to being baptized Catholic, the children's "education till the years of discretion may belong to the Lady Infanta."⁵⁵⁰ The article also stipulated that the Infanta be granted the authority to personally select the nurses, servants, tutors, and masters attending the royal children. In this way, Maria would be able to manage every aspect of her children's upbringing and prescribe proper religious content. In order to further solidify Maria's influence, the last part of Article Five prohibited attempts to persuade or compel the future heir and his siblings from Catholicism, or to obstruct their rightful claims to succession in retaliation. Spaniards understood that Maria might fail in her effort to convert Charles, but were willing to gamble that, even if she did fail, the conversion of the English monarchy might one day be achieved through the influence she wielded over her children.⁵⁵¹

The presence of England's Catholic queen, Anne of Denmark, also alleviated apprehensions over the match. Before sending a royal daughter to live abroad, trustworthy individuals were often identified who might aid the Infantas upon their arrival. Generally,

⁵⁴⁶ *Parecer* of Federico Xedler, *Ibid.*, fol. 11, 16 Jan 1615. ["Porq la educacion de la prole aunque difficilmente en fin puede salir buena con tales esperanzas q basta pues con ellas aconsejava Santo Pablo q la muger fiel no se apartase del marido infiel para reducirle y criar bien sus hijos."] For more on the power and influence of Habsburg mothers see Silvia Z. Mitchell, "Habsburg Motherhood: The Power of Mariana of Austria, Mother and Regent for Carlos II of Spain," *Early Modern Habsburg Women: Transnational Contexts, Cultural Conflicts, Dynastic Continuities*, eds. Anne J. Cruz and Maria Galli Stampino, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 175-196.

⁵⁴⁷ Summary of the *Parecer* of Fray Antonio de Sotomayor, AGS, Est., leg. 2518, fol. 27. ["el gran cuydado que ha de haver en su crianza, y el amor a la Madre."] *Parecer* of Federico Xedler, *Ibid.*, fol. 11, 16 Jan 1615. There was also the hope, expressed by Xedler, that James and Charles might die leaving Maria as sole religious authority over the royal offspring; ["mas si acaso como puede acontecer muriese el Rey o Principe y quedase ella enteramente con el cargo de criarlos como lo vemos ahora en la Reyna de Francia."]

⁵⁴⁸ *Parecer* of Doctor Luis de Tena, *Ibid.*, fol. 18, 17 May 1615. ["la potencia del padre es Mayor y la astucia del demonio tan grande que hallando esta puerta avierta incitara al dicho principe para q todos los hijos los haga hereges fuera que seria un seminario de perpetua discordia entre marido y muger prebeniendo cada uno traer su hijo a su modo de religion."]

⁵⁴⁹ Summary of the *Parecer* of Fray Antonio de Sotomayor, *Ibid.*, fol. 27. ["Que a los hijos huviere desete matrimonio los dexen en perfecta libertad... y q su primera ensenaza sea por cuenta de la Senora Infanta."]

⁵⁵⁰ Francisco de Jesús, *Tratados*, p. 300.

⁵⁵¹ *Consulta* of the Council of State, AGS, Est., libro 369, fol. 28r, 27 Nov 1614. ["la Reyna de Inglaterra es Catholica y su camara catholicissima y en estas dos personas abria de yr a parar la Princessa q ayuda mucho para facilitar el yncombiniente de q el marido tire siempre asi a la muger y a la prole y al amistad q generalmente professa Ynglaterra con España."] The plan to have Maria exercise influence, as an active spiritual agent, over both Charles and her future offspring shows how *perceptions* of female power and agency came to play a role in marriage diplomacy. Philip III and his officials understood that the influence that women possessed in the domestic sphere as a result of their status as devout wives and mothers could translate into real power in the political sphere, and they counted on this as reassurance that the marriage would succeed in advancing the interests of church and state. After all, dynastic thinking dictated that as long as Maria was allowed to act and worship freely within her prescribed space in the English court she would remain loyal to her family and faith.

Spaniards looked for members of the foreign court who shared a blood affinity with the Habsburgs, as they had with Marie de Medici, and could therefore be expected to share the dynasty's objectives. In instances where no family member was readily available, however, the monarchy was capable of devising an alternative criterion for the identification of potential allies. For her part, Anne descended from an influential Protestant dynasty, the House of Oldenburg, with considerable power in the Nordic countries but with no tradition of intermarriage with the Habsburgs from which to derive a shared sense of affection or duty.⁵⁵² Instead, the positive perception of Anne stemmed from her status as a practicing, faithful Catholic with a sincere desire to reconcile with Spain.⁵⁵³ After approaching Velasco in 1604, Anne remained a vocal advocate of dynastic rapprochement and maintained close contact with the resident Spanish ambassadors, often meeting with them in private to discuss the possibility of a marriage alliance. This culminated in a dramatic meeting with Gondomar in 1614 in which the Queen proclaimed, once again, her desire for a marriage between Charles and Maria and her determination to die a Catholic.⁵⁵⁴ The Council of State was moved by her words, ordering that Gondomar's account be sent to Rome in hopes that it might even be enough to convince Paul V to grant a dispensation.⁵⁵⁵

Anne's professed allegiance to Catholicism made her a natural ally in Spain's effort to negotiate major religious concessions. Although Anne was prevented from personally engaging in ongoing diplomatic negotiations by her gender, her status as queen afforded her a remarkable degree of influence over important figures within the English court. In particular, Anne was thought to have persuasive powers over James, which she might use to solicit support for the Catholic cause.⁵⁵⁶ In a letter to Gondomar, the Council wrote "that it is very advisable to obtain any benefit that you can get from the Queen of England on the subject of religion, by way of intercession with her husband."⁵⁵⁷ Reference to the queen's ability to indirectly secure religious concessions by interceding with her husband once again reflects a keen appreciation for the indirect power strategies that women wielded independent of male authorities and in the service of their own calculated interests.⁵⁵⁸ Of course, there was no guarantee that Anne's interests

⁵⁵² Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 11. In her communication with the Spanish ambassador, Anne liked to point out that she possessed a small amount of Habsburg blood. For more on Anne see Susan Anne-Dunsley, *Anna of Denmark and Henrietta Maria: Virgins, Witches, and Catholic Queens*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Ethel Carlton Williams, *Anne of Denmark: Wife of James VI of Scotland, James I of England*, (London: Longman, 1970).

⁵⁵³ *Consulta* of the Council of State, AGS, Est., leg. 2518, fol. 1, 8 Aug 1614. ["q contra la bateria de los escoceses para case al principe en francia la dan mayor los ingleses y la Reyna para que sea en espana."]

⁵⁵⁴ *Ibid.* ["Assi mismo dice Don Diego lo que paso con aquella Reyna [Anne] con ocasion de la carta q la dio de VM'd' y que es mucho lo q VM'd' la deve y desea que su Hijo case en espana, y para esto le refirio las diligencias que havia hecho para desviar el tratado de francia que le afirmo a Don Diego que havia de vivir y morir Catolica."]

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid.* ["tambien le parece que de la carta q trata del coloquio q Don Diego tubo con aquella Reyna se saque todo lo que le dixo, aproposito de lo que desea este casamiento y q he de morir catolica, y q esto se embie al Conde de Castro para q lo vea su Santidad todo."]

⁵⁵⁶ Diego Pirillo, "Marginal Diplomatic Spaces During the Jacobean Era, 1603-25," *Early Modern Diplomacy, Theatre and Soft Power: The Making of Peace*, ed. Nathalie Rivere de Carles, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 169.

⁵⁵⁷ *Consulta* of the Council of State, AGS, Est., leg. 2518, fol. 20. ["que este muy advertido de procurar el beneficio que se pudiese sacar de la Reyna de Inglaterra, en estas materia de religion, por via de intercesion con su marido."]

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, leg. 2514, fol. 73, 13 Feb 1616. In addition to pushing for a Spanish match for her son, Anne also actively campaigned for a marriage between her nephew, the Prince of Denmark, and Philip III's third daughter. ["Que en algunas audiencias que estos dias ha tendio con la Reyna le ha mostrado muy gran desseo de encaminar casamiento

would align with those of Spain. In approaching Anne, the Council urged Gondomar to proceed with caution lest he cause some damage and lose his good standing with the Queen.⁵⁵⁹ She was far too important for the future to lose to an avoidable offense.

Anne's most important contribution would come as a political ally of the Infanta. Many of the religious concessions devised by theologians were aimed at creating a Catholic sanctuary in the English court where Maria could maintain a pious lifestyle similar to the one she had in Madrid. Most of the inhabitants of this sanctuary, handpicked first by Philip III and then by Maria, would be Spaniards and all would be Catholics. At the same time, though, Spaniards understood the importance of Maria reaching out to influential individuals within the court and forming the personal alliances that would enhance her political influence. Anne was identified as the most suitable ally for the Infanta as a result of her enthusiasm for all things related to both the Church and Spain.⁵⁶⁰ Early on, the Council of State expressed the necessity of the Infanta reaching out to Anne and her "very Catholic mistress of robes" (*catholicissima camarera*).⁵⁶¹ These personal relationships directly challenged the assumption, articulated by Paul V, that the marriage would endanger the Infanta. Not only would they provide Maria with moral guidance and support as she performed her religious duties, but also insulate her from the threats of heresy. Anne would also be able to aid Maria after she came into power, supporting her effort to convert Charles and prompt the implementation of more conciliatory foreign policy toward Catholic forces in Europe.

A long history of amicable diplomatic relations, that transcended the most recent decades of conflict, provided additional assurance that a cross-confessional match would not endanger Maria. Despite forty years of fighting, the Spanish did not appear to harbor the same mistrust for the English in 1614 as they had shown toward the French in 1610.⁵⁶² The war waged between the two monarchies was presented as an aberration contradicting a tradition of peace and collaboration.⁵⁶³ In the words of the Council of State, "the friendship that England generally professes to Spain has been proven on many past occasions and the wars that preceded the day of peace will be so forgotten it will be as if they had never occurred."⁵⁶⁴ The council's reference to previous demonstrations of friendship reveals the flexibility of dynastic logic, as it once again drew from historical precedents, which may have contradicted with political realities, to legitimize a problematic course of action. Their insistence that conflict might be erased from collective memory also displayed faith in peace to expunge the recent feelings of mistrust, fear,

del Principe de Dinamarca su sobrino con hija tercera de VM'd' diciendo que esta era cosa que ella no se atrevia a proponella a Don Diego como a embaxador de VM'd' sino como a amigo."]

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid., fol. 20, 23 Nov 1616. ["en que se ha de gobernar Don Diego con la destreza que sabra, por que no la haga daño, ni el pierda el lugar que tiene con ella."]

⁵⁶⁰ *Parecer* of Federico Xedler, Ibid., fol. 11, 16 Jan 1615. ["por el bien lado q le hara la suegra siendo tan aficionada a las cosas de la iglesia catolica y especialmente de espana."]

⁵⁶¹ *Consulta* of the Council of State, Ibid., libro 369, fol. 28r, 27 Nov 1614. ["la reyna de Inglaterra es Catholica y su camarera catholicissima."]

⁵⁶² Summary of the *Parecer* of Fray Antonio de Sotomayor, Ibid., leg. 2518, fol. 27. ["que no porque Francia aya tenido esta correspondencia, se ha de presumir lo mismo de Inglaterra, donde aun los naturales de los hombres, son diferentes que los de Francia."]

⁵⁶³ For a brief overview of Hispano-English relations from the reign of Charles V through Philip III see Durán-Loriga, *El Embajador y El Rey*, pp. 51-57.

⁵⁶⁴ *Consulta* of the Council of State, AGS, Est., leg. 2518, fol. 7, 27 Nov 1614. ["la amistad q generalmente professa ynglaterra con Espana de q se a hecho gran prueba en muchas occassiones pasadas y las guerras posteras el dia de la paz quedaron tan olvidadas como si nunca las huviera havido."]

and hostility and restore normal diplomatic relations. Notably, many Spaniards did not recognize the policies of the Protestant monarchy to be a genuine reflection of England's inherent character. They trusted the English to honor the terms and commitments of an alliance that would be structured to protect the Infanta. But, of course, this opinion wasn't shared by all.

An Impossible Demand

In 1616, officials in Lisbon granted a short poem by Carlos Serafino warning against dynastic rapprochement with England license to print.⁵⁶⁵ Written in a style typically found in the devotional literature of the period, the poem details a Catholic woman's escape, with the aid of saintly intercession, from the hands of a devious English Lutheran.⁵⁶⁶ The woman, named Maria, is presented to the audience as a "vessel of nobility" (*vaso de nobleza*) who obediently fulfills her domestic chores by day and faithfully guards her pious love for Saint Carlos Borromeo, the former Archbishop of Milan, by night. Inversely, the Englishman is presented as the embodiment of immorality; an unholy man whose perverted sense of faith allows him to sin without remorse. In addition to lying about his origins and deceitfully carrying a rosary, he disingenuously enters into marriage negotiations with Maria's mother promising to care for her daughter with imaginary riches and wealth. He even goes so far as to accept the mother's condition to swear a holy oath before Saint Carlos to honor Maria as his wife.

What follows is a period of personal anguish for Maria as she slowly comes to learn of the Englishman's deception. A pious Catholic, her greatest dismay does not come upon discovering that her kidnapper was already married or that she was acquired to be a slave, but that she was sailing to England to serve heretics. Her arrival in, "that miserable Kingdom" (*aquel Reyno miserable*) brings more hardship as accusations of her being a Catholic "harlot, Papist, villain" (*perra, papista, villana*) result in her being beaten and confined. Salvation only comes with the intervention of Saint Carlos, who answers the girl's prayers and delivers her from certain death to her mother. The poem ends on a positive note with the Englishman returning to Lisbon with false tales of Maria's wellbeing, only to be confronted by the young girl and brought to justice.

Written two years after Philip III initiated efforts to devise the legal framework for a cross-confessional alliance, Serafino's poem shows that doubts surfaced early on about the viability of an English match. To a large extent, these doubts derived from the notion that non-Catholics were under no moral or legal obligation to honor promises sworn in the Catholic tradition. In a political context characterized by the conspicuous absence of an extra-territorial legal authority or a superior normative institution to ensure accountability, bilateral cooperation often came down to a matter of trust. Familial affection, honor, and historical precedent were all contributing factors, but, for many monarchies, the foundation of mutual diplomatic confidence was shared religious beliefs.⁵⁶⁷ Peace treaties and marriage contracts were couched in religious

⁵⁶⁵ *Parecer* of Doctor Montesinos, AGS, Est., leg. 2518, fol. 28, 12 Feb 1617. The Spanish were not able to maintain the secrecy of their negotiations with the English secret. ["pues ya es publico en muchas partes que se trata en espana deste matrimonio."]

⁵⁶⁶ Carlos Serafino, *Ibid.*, libro 373, fols. 79r- 82r. Written in Spanish, published in Lisbon, and dedicated to a Milanese saint, the poem testifies to the cosmopolitan nature of the Spanish empire and the continuing popularity of saintly devotion into the 17th century.

⁵⁶⁷ Andrew Philips, *War, Religion and Empire: The Transformation of International Order*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 144-145. See also Andrew C. Thompson, "After Westphalia: Remodeling a Religious

language which may have been formulaic, as many 17th century officials were well aware, but nevertheless served to imbue the document with a binding power that legitimized the agreements. For generations, the language remained relatively fixed as both parties entered into negotiations with similar expectations for how the documents would be framed. In the case of Maria's marriage, however, the status of English Protestants beyond the jurisdiction of papal authority and ecclesiastical law meant that they were under no obligation to honor the contractual antecedents that underpinned interstate diplomacy. This raised the possibility that they, like Serafino's villain, might one day rescind their previous commitments to the detriment of the Spanish monarchy.

Naturally, any attempt by the English to violate their contractual obligations was exacerbated by Maria's vulnerable position in the foreign court. While the Infanta was held in high regard as an exceptionally pious figure, no one disputed the necessity of including safeguards in her marriage contract to protect her from the advances of English heretics. As long as these provisions were respected, she would be free to wield her influence as wife and mother in the service of Church and dynasty. But, as Serafino's poem illustrates, there was little that the Spanish could do to ensure the Infanta's safety once she was in English hands. The tale of Saint Carlos' divine intervention served as a warning of the tragic fate that awaited Maria in an immoral land openly hostile to Catholicism.⁵⁶⁸ A queen in title, her individual agency would nevertheless be circumscribed by the laws and customs of a patriarchal societal structure that granted all authority to her Protestant husband. Alluding to the Infanta's impotency as Charles' wife, her namesake in the poem laments, "It would be better and healthier to be the slave of a Christian than the Queen of England"⁵⁶⁹

Some theologians consulted by the Spanish monarchy shared Serafino's skepticism about marrying the Infanta with a Protestant. As subjects of Philip III, all of the learned experts called upon to weigh in on Maria's marriage were obligated to seriously contemplate the terms and conditions necessary to authorize a cross-confessional agreement. Even those who disagreed with the *junta's* positive assessment of the marriage in 1615 were expected to put their own preferences aside in the service of the crown. Still, the fact that theologians had to support the monarchy's diplomatic efforts did not mean that they had to agree with the monarchy's policy. In fact, a small number of theologians used their *pareceres* as a medium to express their acute concerns. These opinions, which closely aligned with those of Paul V, were largely void of dynastic logic as the writers challenged representations of women as active agents and England as a land inhabited by oppressed Catholics awaiting Spanish relief. Instead, they presented the Infanta and Queen Anne as passive pawns with limited agency and the English monarchy as an immoral institution ruling over a sinful population. While no individual outright condemned the marriage, they were careful to qualify their contributions. After writing four pages warning the monarchy of the dangers of the match, for example, one anonymous writer claimed that he would consider the matter, "if God is now served and reason of state requires that these

Foreign Policy," *War and Religion after Westphalia, 1648–1713*, ed. David Onnekink, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 47-67.

⁵⁶⁸ *Parecer* of Doctor Luis de Tena, AGS, Est., leg. 2518, fol. 18, 17 May 1615. ["antes se pone a peligro y no pequeño la familia catholica de la senora infanta llebandola a tierra de hereges a donde ay tanta libertad en materia de sensualidad que la simple fornicacion no se tiene por pecado."]

⁵⁶⁹ Carlos Serafino, *Ibid.*, libro 373, fol. 80r. ["que mejor fuera, y mas sano ser esclava de un christiano que Reyna de Inglaterra."]

inconveniences do not impede the execution of the marriage.”⁵⁷⁰ In framing dynastic rapprochement with England as imprudent and qualifying their contributions, the few theologians averse to the match offered a striking counterpoint to the positive depiction of Maria’s marriage as a venture bound to succeed.

A recurring point of concern was the precarious status and limited power of the English Queen. Just as many turned to historical examples to prove that women were more likely to convert their husbands, so too did others call attention to a controversial history surrounding the English monarchy’s mistreatment of royal women. The first great offender was Henry VIII, a contemporary of Charles V whose scandalous divorce of Catherine of Aragon over eighty years before remained a source of resentment in Spain. One critic of the marriage speculated that Henry would have put Catherine to death if he had had grounds to do so, and was quick to remind his readers that his second wife, Anne Boleyn, lost her life at the hands of a public executioner (*Berdugo publica*). James own mother, Mary Queen of Scots, met a similar fate roughly fifty years later when Queen Elizabeth ordered her beheading for the sole purpose, it was argued, of preserving and expanding the Calvinist religion.⁵⁷¹ Most recently, James was accused of having threatened his wife, Anne, to proceed with caution on matters of religion because “laws in England were little in favor of women.” All of these examples served as proof that “in England women although they may be Queens have few privileges and for things of little importance they are repudiated, divorced and have their lives ended at the pleasure and whim of the Kings, their husbands.”⁵⁷² Concerns regarding Maria’s status in the English court were exacerbated in light of the role that she was expected to play as an influential spiritual agent in the lives of her husband and children. Should she fail to acquire large degree of independent agency, there was always the potential that her marriage might achieve the opposite result than the one intended; leading to the birth of a heretical prince whose legitimate claim to the Spanish throne might serve to instigate future conflict.

The reputation of the English monarchy and its subjects as irreligious, and the corresponding negative security implications, was another major source of concern. During much of the early 17th century, Spanish officials and *letrados* attempted to integrate reason of state principles into the monarchy’s approach to international politics. Despite the desire to subordinate religious imperatives and monarchical ambitions to imperial interests, though, they never intended to implement a purely secular foreign policy. Indeed, every diplomatic maneuver, regardless of the underlying intention, had to be framed as a pious act aimed at benefiting both Spain and Christendom.⁵⁷³ In contrast, England’s heresy allowed for them to adopt a political philosophy that only underscored royal power and temporal gains.⁵⁷⁴ According to Luis de Tena,

⁵⁷⁰ Paper on the English match, *Ibid.*, libro 369, fol. 58r. [“Agora si dios es servido y la razon de estado lo requiere que no obstante todos ynconvenientes se haga el matrimonio.”]

⁵⁷¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 56r. [“todo el mundo save que esto fue solamente para la preservacion y acrecentamiento de la rreligion calvinista.”]

⁵⁷² *Ibid.*, fol. 57v. [“en Inglaterra las mugeres aunque sean Reynas tienen pocos privilegios y que por cosas de poca ymportancia las repudian, dejan, y las quitan las vidas al gusto y antojo de los Reyes sus maridos...”]

⁵⁷³ *Consulta* of the *Junta* of theologians, *Ibid.*, leg. 2518, fol. 33, 27 Feb 1617. Spaniards tended to look negatively upon those who acted solely in the interests of state. Take for example theologians assessment of Henry IV in 1617, [“se entiende no fue Catholico, y que las demostraciones que hizo de tal fue por razon de estado pare conserbar el Reyno que alcanzo.”]

⁵⁷⁴ John Pocock, “England,” *National Consciousness, History, and Political Culture in Early-Modern Europe*, ed. Orest Ranum, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 103. Spanish depictions of English political

one of the theologians openly critical of Maria's marriage in 1615, the foremost political doctrine in England was written by Niccolò Machiavelli, and argued that the nation was only obligated to honor its word as long as it coincided with the well-being of the "temporal republic" (*la república temporal*).⁵⁷⁵ The obvious consequence for Spain was that there was nothing to prevent England from violating their treaty at the first opportune moment. In a warning later echoed in Serafino's poem, Tena wrote, "it is unlikely that those who do not obey the faith and word of God will obey those of men regardless if they are kings."⁵⁷⁶ Once again, the viability of Maria's marriage came down to a matter of trust in the binding power of language to authorize agreements. For those who interpreted Protestants' rejection of Catholic orthodoxy as a violation of their commitment to the "faith and word of God," there could be little faith in their capacity to honor their commitments to promises and obligations that bound together nations.

The solution to the many inconveniences posed by the match was stricter religious concessions. The conciliatory approach adopted by Spain after 1614 entailed reaching an agreement with England that did not require liberty of conscience or Charles' conversion. In part, Spain was motivated by the urgent need to disrupt an Anglo-French match and secure an alliance that would bring the empire many additional political advantages. An equally compelling reason to accept lighter demands was the impression created by dynastic logic that the marriage would inevitably accomplish all of its intended goals. In instances where theologians did not subscribe to a perspective underpinned by dynastic logic, however, there was little reason to believe that the marriage would succeed without the "greatest securities possible." In the thirteenth point offered in his *parecer*, Luis de Tena deviated from his colleagues by demanding a general law of liberty of conscience approved by both James and his Parliament. To justify the demand, Tena remarked with biting criticism, "but to reduce it [the demand] to only secret tolerance and even then not [contractually] stipulate it, is to want to trick us like children."⁵⁷⁷ A skeptic of English sincerity from the beginning, Tena insisted that the notion that James lacked legislative power was a ploy. Only by adopting a hardline approach, which pushed for the strictest religious concessions, could the Spanish monarchy avoid falling victim to English trickery.

Luis de Tena's criticisms show that not all Spaniards embraced a synthesis of dynastic and reason of state logic. In the uncertain realm of marriage diplomacy, political idealism played a vital role in the successful negotiation of new unions. While it did not always reflect historical reality, dynastic logic nevertheless helped to assuage the apprehensions produced by the lack of control over future outcomes. In many cases, such as could be seen in the context of Hispano-English negotiations, a sense of optimism in the marriage's potential for success provided the basis for diplomatic compromise. For those not prepared to invest their hopes in the inherent power of women or historical bonds of friendship, however, the only option was to push for an asymmetrical agreement that mitigated risks by securing the maximum number of advantages possible. In many instances, the arguments made by staunch political realists were tainted by

culture were not far off. In the words of John Pocock, "English humanists were the first... to see themselves as secular political beings outside the citadel of supreme power."

⁵⁷⁵ *Parecer* of Doctor Luis de Tena, AGS, Est., leg. 2518, fol. 18, 17 May 1615. ["es muy dificultosa de hallar porque según la doctrina de Machiabelo que alla se practica en tanto ay obligacion de cumplir la palabra aunque sea en materia de religion, en quanto conviene para la conservacion de la republica temporal y con este color se pueden eximir de quanto ofrecieren."]

⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid.* ["quien no guarda la fe y palabra de dios poca seguridad ay de que las guarde a los hombres aunque sean Reyes."]

⁵⁷⁷ *Ibid.* ["pero reducillo a solo tolerancia secreta y aunque esta no se capitule es querernos enganar como a ninos."]

misinformation stemming from an intransigent hostility toward reformed religion.⁵⁷⁸ But, even still, they had considerable appeal. First, an anti-English stance closely aligned with the views of Paul V, whom all Spaniards agreed needed to authorize the marriage. Second, and more importantly, a hardline approach was a more pragmatic response to the difficulties posed by a cross-confessional agreement with no basis for collective security. As negotiations progressed, the Spanish response to a growing lack of faith in English sincerity was to increase the odds of success by increasing their demands and closing the doors to compromise.

Despite early warnings, the Spanish monarchy only gradually came to appreciate the challenges posed by the absence of a legally binding procedure to authorize Maria's marriage. Indeed, for at least three years, from 1614-1617, a synthesis of reason of state and dynastic logic prevailed as Spaniards took for granted the idea that all political and religious objectives could be achieved as long as the marriage contract was adequately structured. This delay can be credited to the persistence of Hispano-English diplomatic confidence, which derived not from shared religious beliefs, but rather trust in the English monarch. In a report to the Council of State in 1614 regarding the best method for gauging English sincerity, Gondomar explained "the way was to trust in King [James], compelling him with love and high estimations of his person."⁵⁷⁹ Many experts agreed, with one claiming, "I see no greater security than the word and oath of the King of Great Britain and the Prince his son."⁵⁸⁰ The image of James as a trustworthy monarch whose high moral character could serve as the linchpin for ongoing diplomatic efforts was promoted by Gondomar, whose respect for the monarch derived from the close bond that the two had developed during his tenure in London. In James, Gondomar saw a kindred spirit with a sincere desire for peace that was only frustrated by the restrictions imposed on him by Parliament.⁵⁸¹ As long as James remained in power, Gondomar reassured officials in Spain, England could be trusted.

Just because the Spanish monarchy was amenable to cross-confessional dynastic cooperation, however, did not mean that the challenges posed by the unprecedented alliance were any less daunting. In late December 1614, the Duke of Lerma received news from Gondomar that Lord Digby was en route with a new marriage proposal. Within the letter, Gondomar recommended that Lerma organize theologians to meet with the English ambassador to resolve the religious differences posed by the alliance. The meeting was enough to convince Philip III of the need to further deliberate the terms of the arrangement, and the order was given for theologians to form another *junta* under the supervision of the Cardinal of Toledo.⁵⁸² In order

⁵⁷⁸ *Parecer* of Fray Pedro de Herrera, *Ibid.*, leg. 8341, fol. 51, 5 April 1615. One skeptical theologian for instance, erroneously insisted that Protestants sanctioned bigamy. ["tiene y ensena dos errores entre todos. El uno q un hombre casarse con dos mugeres."]

⁵⁷⁹ *Consulta* of the Council of State, *Ibid.*, leg. 2518, fol. 1, 8 Aug 1614. ["el modo era fiarlo de aquel Rey obligandole con amor y hacer mucha estimacion de su persona."]

⁵⁸⁰ Anonymous warning against the English match, *Ibid.*, libro 369, fol. 37r. ["no veo mas seguridad q la palabra y juramento del Rey de la gran Bretana y del principe su hijo... que sea de contentar con lo dho."]

⁵⁸¹ For description of the unlikely friendship of between King James and the Count of Gondomar see Ochoa Brun, *Historia*, pp. 87-88; Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, pp. 39-50.

⁵⁸² Philip III to the Duke of Lerma, AGS, Est., leg. 2518, fol. 12, 15 Jan 1615. ["Su Mag'd' me a mandado decir a VSJ q oyga al embaxador de Yngalaterra acerca de la platica que esta movida de casamiento de aquel Principe en espana como VSJ save, y las propicisiones que hiciere, tocante al acomodamiento de nra religion en aquel Reyno... y q despues que le ayan oydo, los Junte VSJ en su cassa y traten y confieran en la materia con la consideracion a que obliga la importancia della para q en conformidad de lo que pareciere a la Junta, se escriba al

to inform their responses, each member was individually updated on the current status of negotiations before they came together on February 8th to officially address the topic. On March 13, they had produced the first agreement with specific conditions pertaining to the Infanta's safety and the status of Catholicism. Digby tentatively received the new agreement, approving some of the points but avoiding a "general proposition which related to the common benefit of the Catholic religion."⁵⁸³

Despite the promising start to 1616, Paul V's opposition to the match continued to loom large. In May, the Duke of Lerma received a letter from Digby informing him that the English had broken off dynastic negotiations with the French. The move came at the behest of James after meeting only slight opposition in the English court, where the opinion remained popular that a marriage with the Habsburgs was more "honorable and profitable" than one with a dynasty in France that had only recently ascended to power.⁵⁸⁴ In return for their sign of good faith, James urged Philip III to obtain a pledge from the pope to grant a dispensation. Having not yet received a confirmation of James' acceptance of conditions favorable to Catholicism, officials in Madrid were hesitant to reach out to Paul V prematurely.⁵⁸⁵ When a last ditch effort by the Duke of Lerma failed to persuade James' to accept the conditions drafted by theologians, however, Philip III felt that he had no choice but to write his papal ambassador, Cardinal Borgia, to relay his request to Paul V. The request, which included updates on the status of negotiations and promises from Philip III to only agree to the marriage with papal consent and sufficient evidence that James would honor his commitments, was still not enough to convince Paul V to adopt a more flexible attitude toward the treaty. In criticizing the match, the pope proclaimed, "that he could not help but condemn this marriage, as I have done on other occasions... as unlawful, and exposed to mortal sin, and great dangers as a result of the interaction and communication with heretics, from which there would result great scandal and bad precedent for other princes."⁵⁸⁶ In justifying his rejection, Paul V cited the four reasons given two years earlier. He also insisted, once again, that Spain secure Charles' conversion and liberty of conscience. Only after England agreed to these two conditions, which would serve to redress past grievances, advance Catholic interests, and restore diplomatic faith, would he grant the dispensation.⁵⁸⁷

Paul V's insistence on stricter demands closely coincided with a growing sentiment that James could not be trusted to fulfill his religious promises. In 1616, the General Baptist leader Thomas Helwys was sent to prison, where he quickly succumbed to the wretched conditions, for urging the king to grant liberty of conscience.⁵⁸⁸ The unforgiving punishment of Helwys and

papa dando le quenta, y suplicándole aconseje a su Mag'd' lo q tuviere por mas conviniente, para el mayor aumento de la Religion Catolica q es el fin que a su M'd' obliga a tratar dello."]

⁵⁸³ Francisco de Jesús, *Tratados*, p. 124.

⁵⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸⁵ *Consulta* of the Council of State, AGS, Est., leg. 2514, fol. 77, 18 June 1616. ["y en lo que dice que dessean alla que VM'd' tuviesse alguna prenda del Papa de que dispensara, podra responder, que a su S'd' no se le puede pedir que dispense, sin que se le digan los puntos en que ha de dispensar, y en aviendo se le dando se tiene por cierto que dispensara, siendo cosa que tanto toca a VM'd.'"]

⁵⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, fol. 20, 23 Nov 1616. ["no puede dexar de reprobear este matrimonio, como otras veces lo ha hecho... por ser illicito y es puesto a pecado mortal, a grandes peligros por el tratto y comunicacion de Herejes de que naceria gran escandalo y mal exemplo a los demas principes."]

⁵⁸⁷ A copy of the Cardinal Borgia's letter to Philip III recounting his meeting with Paul V can be found in Francisco de Jesús, *Tratados*, pp. 128-129.

⁵⁸⁸ Joe Early Jr., *The Life and Writings of Thomas Helwys*, (Macon: Mercer University Press, 2009), pp. 43-45.

other religious dissenters, including Catholics, alarmed Spaniards, who began to doubt the sincerity of James' commitment to religious toleration.⁵⁸⁹ A letter from Gondomar written on September 30, roughly three weeks before the papal verdict, painted an alarming image of James as a political opportunist who desired the "temporal gains" that came with a Habsburg alliance but abhorred the idea of conceding ground to Catholicism. If it was up to James, the letter stated, the marriage would be "clogged with such clauses and conditions that the Catholics may find no advantage in them."⁵⁹⁰ The negative image of James was further reinforced by critics of the marriage. One particularly scathing depiction of the monarch written by an anonymous author accused him of being the greatest opponent of Catholicism in all of Europe, as evidenced by the religious persecution carried out under his rule. If James did feign a desire for peace, the author stated, the true intention was undoubtedly to distract Spain from plans to cause significant harm to Philip III.⁵⁹¹ With little hope that James would voluntarily comply with any religious demands, the viability of Spain's cross-confessional policy by 1617 hinged on the establishment of a new foundation of trust that might guarantee compliance with all the terms of the marriage agreement.

One option for Spaniards was to adopt a faith based approach to ongoing diplomatic efforts with England. An advocate for this opinion was Antonio de Sotomayor, the confessor to the royal children (*Padre Confesor*) and one of the empire's leading theologians. Held in high regard for his expertise, Sotomayor's was selected, alongside Francisco de Jesús, Doctor Montesinos and Federico Xedler, to write a *parecer* for the *junta* of 1617.⁵⁹² In his response, Sotomayor maintained a positive overall assessment of the marriage as a prudent dynastic maneuver that could be fortified with adequate religious concessions. These concessions, which he carefully identified, closely resembled the lighter, more conciliatory Spanish demands of 1615.⁵⁹³ The English would still be required to abide by an agreement that benefited Catholicism, but they would not be required to concede liberty of conscience or Charles' conversion. The justification for Sotomayor's approach was his belief that James' bad health would soon result in his demise. Upon his death, Charles would ascend the throne and lead the nation's Catholics forward in tandem with Maria and Queen Anne; a pro-Habsburg triumvirate with which diplomatic confidence could be restored.⁵⁹⁴ In the meantime, Sotomayor encouraged Spaniards to derive their trust not from shared religious beliefs or the personal integrity of the English

⁵⁸⁹ *Consulta* of the *Junta* of theologians, AGS, Est., leg. 2518, fol. 33, 27 Feb 1617. ["Y parecele que por lo menos las seguridades que se ayan de tomar de Inglaterra han de ser muy grandes, por que este Rey Jacobo quando fue de Escocia a Inglaterra muerta la Reyna Isabel, ofrecio muchas cosas a los Ingleses Catholicos, y no solo no les cumplio ninguna pero la persecucion que les ha hecho y hace, ha sido mas rigurosa apretandola con nuevas leyes, y executandolas tanto las suyas como las que antes avia puesto la Reyna Isabel con mayor rigor."]

⁵⁹⁰ Francisco de Jesús, *Tratados*, p. 130.

⁵⁹¹ Paper on the English match, AGS, Est., libro 369, fol. 58r. ["no es creyble que de corazon trata de dho casamiento sino antes que con alguna astucia procurara traerlo emplatica y entretenerlo para con mayor disimulacion armar y hacer algun daño notable a su Mag'd' Catholica como al solo y unico pilar de la Iglesia Catholica."]

⁵⁹² *Consulta* of the Council of State, *Ibid.*, leg. 2518, fol. 3, 7 Dec 1616. The *junta* was comprised of the Cardinal of Toledo, El Padre Confesor, Fray Joseph Gonzalez, Padre Federico Xedler, Fray Diego de Herrera, and Doctor Montesinos. Due to their absences, Philip III ordered in his own hand that Fray Gonzalez be replaced by Antonio de Sotomayor and Fray Herrera by Francisco de Jesús. For an account of their first meeting see *Consulta* of the *Junta* of theologians, *Ibid.*, fol. 23, 26 Jan 1617.

⁵⁹³ Summary of the *Parecer* of Fray Antonio de Sotomayor, *Ibid.*, fol. 27.

⁵⁹⁴ *Ibid.* ["En el Rey, de cuya poca salud y desordenes se puede esperar poca vida, y entrando el Principe a Reynar con el favor de la Reyna su Madre tan afecta a los Catholicos, la ayuda de la Senora Infanta, el esfuerzo de muchos fieles... y con el que el Rey nro señor dara."]

monarch, but from divine grace.⁵⁹⁵ By attempting to replace England with God as the foundation of diplomatic confidence, Sotomayor offered a creative, albeit impractical, solution to the dilemma of authorizing a cross-confessional alliance with no basis for mutual trust.

Faith in divine grace was to be supplemented by the inclusion of additional security measures into the marriage agreement. Like Sotomayor, Doctor Montesinos and Francisco de Jesús favored a moderate response to diminishing confidence in the English.⁵⁹⁶ This response consisted of a willingness to still accept the lighter demand of religious tolerance as long as the English agreed to stricter conditions surrounding Maria's departure.⁵⁹⁷ In Francisco's opinion, the marriage was made unequal by the fact that the English were under no obligation to fulfill their commitments after Maria arrived in England. Similarly, Montesinos expressed doubt that the English would abide by the terms of the treaty without being legally compelled. Their solution, which Sotomayor and Xedler also proposed, was to demand that religious tolerance be implemented in England immediately after the marriage capitulations were signed, and no fewer than two to four years before Maria's arrival.⁵⁹⁸ This period would be sufficient to gauge whether the English intended to keep their promises without compromising Maria's safety or Spanish interests.⁵⁹⁹

Another option proposed by Juan Federico Xedler was for Spain to adopt a hardline approach to ongoing negotiations. Years after Maria's marriage failed to materialize, Francisco de Jesús published an account of the marriage negotiations in which he took credit for encouraging Philip III to reinforce a demand of liberty of conscience with adequate security.⁶⁰⁰ In reality, Xedler was the only one of the four primary theologians at the start of 1617 to outright advocate for the tougher religious concession. As Xedler proclaimed, "tolerance is not enough, instead [we] must clearly request liberty of conscience, making the King and his parliament

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid. ["confiar en la divina gracia, a quien este negocio se deve remitir."]

⁵⁹⁶ Their *pareceres* can be found at Ibid., fols. 28 & 31.

⁵⁹⁷ *Parecer* of Doctor Montesinos, Ibid., fol. 28, 12 Feb 1617. In making this argument, I am deviating from conventional arguments that insist on Spaniard's stubborn commitment to a demand of liberty of conscience. Sotomayor and Montesinos did both mention this as an option, but neither definitively committed to stricter religious concessions. Instead, they left room open for the Spanish to accept an agreement with religious tolerance, a crucial distinction that many historians have overlooked. In his 1617 *parecer*, Montesinos wrote, ["por haver visto la fraude con que el embajador del Rey de Inglaterra habla me parece ser necesario anadir... que haga en el Reyno de Inglaterra y se concede libertad de conciencia, o, por los menos se haga ley, o, decreto publico en aquel Reyno de tolerancia de los Catholicos."].

⁵⁹⁸ Consulta of the *Junta* of theologians and jurists, Ibid., libro 369, fol. 26v, 21 Sept 1614. The original period of time proposed by the junta of 1614 was one year. ["q asi podia haver mucha rrepugnancia no se propone esto como condicion forcossa sino por cosa muy combiniente pudiendose en caminar en algun tiempo antes como un año sera muy necesario..."]

⁵⁹⁹ *Parecer* of Fray Francisco de Jesús, Ibid., leg. 2518, fol. 31, 5 Feb 1617. ["Que aunque todo esto no hace esperanza cierta de la conversion de aquel Principe y de aquel Reyno, por lo menos lo asegura con gran probabilidad."] Even with this additional security, Francisco de Jesús admitted that there was still a chance that the mission to convert Charles and England would fail; a striking admission that testified to the feelings of uncertainty that accompanied dynastic initiatives.

⁶⁰⁰ Francisco de Jesús, *Tratados*, p. 133. "When, after reference to particular authorities and arguments, Fray Francisco de Jesús, the King's Preacher, urged the necessity of taking sufficient security for the liberty of conscience..." The theologian's actual opinion can be found at *Parecer* of Fray Francisco de Jesús, AGS, Est., leg. 2518, fol. 31, 5 Feb 1617. It shows that he supported ["una publica y general tolerancia"] which he defended by citing how in the age of Saint Gregorio ["sola la tolerancia comenzo la conversion de aquel Reyno."]

[pass] a law about it, and starting one or two years before the presentation of Lady Infanta”.⁶⁰¹ Xedler’s claim that religious tolerance was insufficient to authorize Maria’s marriage marked a definitive departure from his previous commitment to compromise. Originally, Xedler had been an advocate for cross-confessional rapprochement.⁶⁰² Unlike his peers, however, Xedler did not hesitate to alter his stance and push for terms that took into account the lack of trust that existed with England. For Xedler, the only way to ensure the success of the treaty was to draft “a pact with the greatest force possible... because there must be little trust in the words of heretics.”⁶⁰³ Admittedly, the measure with the greatest force to guarantee the success of the marriage was Charles’ conversion, but even Xedler knew that this demand was impossible. In the absence of an ideal arrangement, liberty of conscience offered the most promising solution for addressing the problem posed by the treaty.

Despite the appeal of a Xedler’s hardline approach, Spanish theologians were still hesitant to commit to an outright demand of liberty of conscience. On February 27, the *junta* of 1617 met for a second time in the house of the Cardinal of Toledo to consider the *pareceres* written by Sotomayor, Francisco, Montesinos, and Xedler. The first issue addressed was the state of the agreement devised by theologians in 1615, which the *junta* concluded was insufficient to protect the Infanta. Their solution was for Spain to “enter into a new treaty with England, adding what is now said in the opinions.”⁶⁰⁴ In order to ensure that the English abided by the conditions of the new treaty, the *junta* added that “the securities that they must take from England must be very great.”⁶⁰⁵ The ambiguous language used with regard to religious concessions and additional securities stemmed from the *junta*’s general lack of certainty on how to proceed with rebuilding diplomatic confidence with a Protestant king. On the one hand, the *junta* did not find Sotomayor’s faith based approach convincing, and directly contradicted his claim that James’ death would lead to a pro-Catholic monarchy.⁶⁰⁶ On the other hand, they were still not ready to fully endorse Xedler’s stricter approach, as made evident in their warning that an unmodified oath of fidelity might impede “liberty of conscience or tolerance.” Reference to both concessions indicates that many theologians still considered, in spite of the *junta*’s negative perception of James and English Parliament, religious tolerance to be an acceptable basis for cross-confessional cooperation.

⁶⁰¹ Summary of the *Parecer* of Federico Xedler, *Ibid.*, fol. 35, 1615. [“Que no basta tolerancia, sino que se pida claramente libertad de conciencia, haciendo el Rey y su parlamento ley sobre ello, y que comience uno o dos años antes de la entrega de la Senora Infanta.”]

⁶⁰² *Consulta* of the *Junta* of theologians and jurists, *Ibid.*, libro 369, fol. 24r, 21 Sept 1614. When Philip III first convened a *junta* of theologians to discuss a cross-confessional alliance between England and the Duchy of Savoy in 1613, Xedler was the only one to weigh in favor of the union. [“Que quando se trato del matrimonio de la S’ra’ Princesa de Savoya fue toda la Junta de parescer (ecepto del Padre Juan Federico) q no se devia ni podia en conciencia ttratar del...”]

⁶⁰³ Summary of the *Parecer* of Federico Xedler, *Ibid.*, leg. 2518, fol. 35, 1615. [“que aya pacto con las mayores fuerzas que se pudiere.”]

⁶⁰⁴ *Consulta* of the *Junta* of theologians, *Ibid.*, fol. 33, 27 Feb 1617. [“sera menester entrar en nuevo trattado con Inglaterra, anadiendo lo que agora se dice en los pareceres que se han leydo.”]

⁶⁰⁵ *Ibid.* [“las seguridades que se ayan de tomar de Inglaterra han de ser muy grandes.”]

⁶⁰⁶ *Ibid.* [“no queda prevenido el peligro enteramente respeto de que su edad y poca salud no dan esperanza de vida larga, lo qual dificulta mas la materia, porque si sucediesse el caso, quanto antes entrasse el gobierno del Reyno, en manos de un Rey mozo hereje, y mal criado, sin experiencia en los negocios, y casi sin propia voluntad , y que no tendra sino la de sus ministros, que todos son Herejes.”]

With the *junta* vacillating on the how to proceed, the Spanish responded to incoming reports from London with a new found skepticism. By all accounts, Gondomar succeeded in hiding the fact from James that the opinion in Madrid had swayed firmly against him by 1617. On March 31, James ordered a special commission of members of his Privy Council to discuss the state of negotiations and offer their opinion on the benefits of the marriage. The conclusion reached by those in attendance was unanimously in favor of the match, with the *consulta* proclaiming “there was no marriage or union in the world more desirable for that Prince and that it was thus just, and honorable to procure it.”⁶⁰⁷ In a gesture undoubtedly meant to please the Spanish, the commission also indicated that it was willing to go as far as possible on the matter of religion. The Council of State’s response to James’ commission and his plans to send Digby to Madrid to settle the agreement was less than enthusiastic. The decision was made to relay Gondomar’s update to the *junta* so that the new information could be taken into account in their deliberations. Along with the update, the Council sent a frank reminder that “if it were necessary to devise an exit from the deal there could be no better avenue, more smooth and appropriate, than the difficulty that his Holiness would present.”⁶⁰⁸ Unconvinced by what it interpreted to be another demonstration of false sincerity by James, the Council began considering for the first time how it might bring an end to marriage negotiations without offending the English. Papal opposition, previously a source of frustration, provided the perfect pretext for Spain to make a smooth exit. Should the *junta* conclude that there was no way to secure her safety and legally authorize the treaty, a third option was now available.

The Council of State did not have to wait long for the *junta* to deliver their response. In early September, theologians completed a revised draft of the new *Conveniencias Precisas*. By and large, the list of concessions was consistent with previous demands as dynastic logic remained at least partially relevant to the ways in which Spaniards perceived the marriage. There was one change, however, with important implications for Philip III’s policy. Article Six called for “free use of the Catholic religion according to the use of the holy Roman Church.”⁶⁰⁹ This freedom was to be guaranteed by the suspension of all laws against Catholics and, more importantly, the introduction of a “new law and a public and general decree.” In drafting the article, theologians were careful to avoid making an explicit demand for “liberty of conscience.” In fact, the written use of the phrase can only be found in the conditions to be requested “by way of convenience.”⁶¹⁰ Still, careful wording was not enough to fool educated readers who fully understood the intended impact of an article that called for the “free use” of religion and significant changes in English law. Upon reading the *conveniencias*, the Cardinal of Toledo and confessor to the King, Luis de Aliaga, wrote to Philip III claiming that “the sixth [article] in which liberty of conscience is recorded, is most substantial, and all of the others are mere consequences.”⁶¹¹ With the 1617 *conveniencias*, the consensus among the empire’s leading

⁶⁰⁷ *Consulta* of the Council of State, *Ibid.*, leg. 2514, fol. 87, 29 April 1617. [“...q no avia en el mundo casamiento ni union mas conveniente para aquel principe y que assi era justo, y honroso el procurarlo, y pedirlo públicamente embiando persona a ello.”]

⁶⁰⁸ *Ibid.* [“si fuere necesario dar salida al negocio no puede aver camino, mas suabe y a proposito, que la dificultad, que pondra su Santidad.”]

⁶⁰⁹ Francisco de Jesús, *Tratados*, pp. 300-301

⁶¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 303. Article 2 states that “Conditions which are to be asked by way of convenience.”

⁶¹¹ *Consulta* of the Cardinal of Toledo and Padre Confesor, AGS, Est., leg. 2518, fol. 38, 16 Sept 1617. [“la 6ª en que se contiene la libertad de conciencia es la sustancial, y todas las demas, son como consecuencias.”] Luis de Aliaga served as Philip III’s confessor from 1608-1621. He was originally recommended by the Duke of Lerma, but

experts decisively and irrevocably turned against the adoption of a conciliatory approach. Thereafter, only the strictest possible religious concession would suffice to protect Maria and realize the marriage's political and religious aims.

The decision to incorporate a demand of liberty of conscience was the logical consequence of the *junta*'s new outlook. Unfortunately, there are no sources detailing the debates that took place among theologians during the seven months that separated the February *consulta* and September *conveniencias*. Nevertheless, a close look at the *consulta* reveals that while the *junta* was vacillating on the right course of action, it had already incorporated some of the realist arguments first articulated by skeptics of the marriage. The biggest source of concern was the English monarch. According to the report, James had failed to fulfill his promises to Catholics upon ascending the throne. Instead, he had instituted a rigorous policy of persecution whereby new anti-Catholic laws were introduced to supplement discriminatory Elizabethan laws. As a result, the *consulta* explained, "without letting ourselves be governed by general rules for heretics, but instead by the acts of this King whom we must trust, we must acknowledge the minimal security of hoping that he will fulfill what he offered."⁶¹² The evident contradiction in James' long winded promises and domestic policy shattered the notion that diplomatic confidence could be founded upon trust in the monarch's personal integrity.

The only prospect more troubling than a throne occupied by James was a throne prematurely occupied by his adolescent heir. Whereas Sotomayor had envisioned Anne playing an active role upon James' death, the *junta* made sure to point out that the queen only played a limited role in government.⁶¹³ As a result, she simply would not be powerful enough to stand against the nation's Protestant Parliament and ensure compliance to previous commitments. A more likely scenario surrounding James death would involve influential ministers stepping in to consolidate their influence and manipulate the "young, heretical, badly raised" Prince. In raising doubts about the Queen's capacity to exercise independent power and influence, theologians struck at the very heart of a line of dynastic logic that insisted that Maria would be able to utilize her position to advocate for Catholicism and represent Habsburg interests. The new perspective held that while royal women were consequential, they held only a marginal capacity to shape England's political destiny.

Despite religious experts now pushing for stricter concessions, Philip III and his officials took longer to reach a consensus on how best to proceed. The year 1618 was marked by tense negotiations between Digby and Luis de Aliaga in which the English ambassador came under heavy pressure to respond to theologians' demands for liberty of conscience. Digby was not prepared to accept harsher terms, however, and progress came to a standstill. Meanwhile, two parties with conflicting opinions had formed among members of the Council of State. The first party admitted that considerable work remained to be done, but were hopeful that the marriage would eventually be settled. Not surprisingly, the officials who held this opinion, such as the

later turned against him. His political activity and previous relationship with Lerma made him many enemies in the court and eventually led to his banishment after the King's death. Hoffman, *Raised to Rule*, pp. 88-89.

⁶¹² *Consulta* of the *Junta* of theologians, AGS, Est., leg. 2518, fol. 33, 27 Feb 1617. ["sin governarnos ni guiarnos por reglas generales de Herejes, sino por las obras deste mismo Rey de quien se ha de fiar, avemos de sacar la poca seguridad de la esperanza que se debe tener de que cumplira lo que ofreciere."]

⁶¹³ *Ibid.* ["quando bien sobreviviase la Reyna Madre, y alcanzase de dias a su marido, no seria poderosa para hacerlo cumplir... por la poca mano que tienen las Reynas en Inglaterra."]

Duke of Infantado and Marques de Laguna, still appeared to trust in James's personal integrity. They also continued to argue that religious tolerance would be sufficient to protect the Infanta. In a special council convened in 1618, the Duke of Infantado wrote that, "the King will only be able to offer [religious] permission and tolerance of worship and so they should proceed with the matter with this presumption."⁶¹⁴ Continued support for a conciliatory approach reveals the persistence of dynastic logic among some high ranking ministers. The reason for this persistence can be found in the complexity of the Spanish monarchy's political outlook. Realist and idealist modes of thinking were neither mutually exclusive nor always clearly divisible. While one may have been more prevalent in a given context, both were at the heart of every debate and policy decision. This made it possible, even in an atmosphere of growing skepticism, for there to endure a sense of optimism that the odds of success were in Spain's favor.

The opinion expressed by the second party within the Council was that dynastic rapprochement with England was unattainable. The foremost figure to rise in support of this opinion was the Duke of Lerma, who announced to the Council of State in early 1617 that Maria's marriage with Charles was effectively over and that she would instead be marrying an Austrian cousin. Of course, in light of Maria's young age, this was still several years away. In the meantime, he added, it was in Spain's best interests to prolong negotiations for as long as possible. This approach was supported by Don Baltasar de Zúñiga, a key minister and uncle to the future Duke of Olivares. As one of three members of the special *junta* convened in 1618, alongside the Duke of Infantado and Marques of Laguna, Zúñiga proclaimed "in this negotiation he has always proceeded with little hope in arriving at the conclusion and that which he holds as convenient is to not dismiss the whole talk."⁶¹⁵ Lerma and Zúñiga advocated for the maintenance of diplomatic talks, even when they thought the marriage was effectively dead, in order to delay the negative political ramifications that would result from a sudden breaking of ties. Throughout the 1610s, reports poured in detailing French attempts to entice James to return to the arrangement that he nearly finalized with Marie de Medici. Gondomar did an effective job of maintaining the upper hand by actively sabotaging their efforts, but Spaniards knew that the French offer was still on the table.⁶¹⁶ Recent developments in the Holy Roman Empire also raised fears that if Spain rescinded the offer there would be nothing to stop James from sending aid to his son-in-law, Frederick V of the Palatinate.⁶¹⁷

⁶¹⁴ *Consulta* of the Council of State, *Ibid.*, libro 369, fol. 53r, 6 Feb 1618. ["El Rey de Inglaterra no es parte para que se cumpla lo de la libertad de conciencia aunque ofrezca por ser cosa que toca al parlamento y el Rey solo podra dar la permission y tolerancia del uso y asi se debia caminar en la materia con este presupuesto."] The Marques of Laguna agreed with this assessment. ["y en quanto a lo de la libertad de conciencia es asi que el Rey de Inglaterra no es poderoso porque lo ha de hacer Parlamento."]

⁶¹⁵ *Consulta* of the Council of State, AGS, Est., libro 369, fol. 54v, 6 Feb 1618. ["en este negocio siempre sea ydo con poca esperanza de venir en la conclusion y lo que sea tenido por conveniente es no despedir la platica del todo."]

⁶¹⁶ *Ibid.*, leg. 2514, fol. 79, 6 Aug 1616. ["y en carta de primero de Julio tratta el mismo Don Diego de la instruccion que se avia dado para Francia al Varon de Hey, y acaba con decir que se le avise lo que respondera, caso que le buelvan a preguntar, si VM'd ha mandado hacer las diligencias en Roma, y la dispusicion que se halla en su S'd porque teme que viendo dilacion en esto bolveran los mal intencionados la platica de Francia con mas fuerza y effetto."]

⁶¹⁷ *Ibid.*, libro 369, fols. 85r, 4 Oct 1620. Frederick V was a central figure in the beginning of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), which was slowly beginning to take shape in northern Europe. The crowning of Frederick V, a Protestant, as the King of Bohemia was controversial and instigated a direct confrontation with the Austrian Habsburg Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II. Some members of the Spanish Council of State credited Frederick

The final resolution of the many conflicting opinions finally came in January 1619 as a result of the collaborative effort of the Count of Gondomar and Luis de Aliaga. Although several *juntas* had been called during the previous six years, none had sought to resolve the difficulties posed by Maria's marriage by bringing theologians together with state officials. In many ways, this lack of coordination explains the internal confusion that plagued the monarchy after 1617. Everyone it seems had a different response to diminishing diplomatic confidence and the lack of legal procedures for ensuring political accountability. With Gondomar's return to Madrid, however, Philip III saw a unique opportunity to clarify the status of negotiations and determine once and for all his strategy moving forward. In December, Gondomar and Luis de Aliaga met for the first time to discuss their experiences and draft an update for their king.

By January, they had put the final touches on a remarkable *consulta* that succeeded in synthesizing all of the opinions circulating Madrid.⁶¹⁸ On the one hand, many of the observations made in the document, especially those regarding James, reflected the realist thinking that prevailed among those pushing for a hardline approach. The English monarch was lying, Gondomar and Aliaga insisted, about his lack of sufficient power to enact a law of liberty of conscience. English history demonstrated, from Henry VIII to Queen Mary to Queen Elizabeth, that the English were a mercurial people willing to change their religious persuasion at the whim of their ruler. James' refusal to accept the stricter concession was a personal choice, stemming from his hostility toward Catholicism. On the other hand, the document displayed an underlying optimism in the marriage's potential for success. This was an optimism that was directly tied to the Infanta, whom both Gondomar and Aliaga still thought could be an influential political actor under the right conditions. The responsibility of the Spanish monarchy was to ensure that the Infanta was put in a position to realize her full political potential independent of outside assistance.⁶¹⁹

The solution recommended by Gondomar and Aliaga was for Spain to adopt a hardline approach while feigning a continued willingness to compromise. In the end, the challenges posed by a lack of diplomatic confidence with England were too great to ignore. An asymmetrical agreement comprised of the strictest demands and greatest securities possible was the only way to ensure that James and his Parliament fulfilled their end of the bargain. Still, Gondomar and Aliaga were worried, and rightfully so, that presenting England with a blatantly unequal treaty would drive them into the arms of the French. The only option left for Spain was to turn to a strategy of duplicitous diplomacy whereby Spain openly acknowledged the possibility of accepting a conciliatory agreement while secretly pushing for liberty of conscience. The justification for this new approach was a short conversation between Gondomar and Digby in which the Englishman had claimed that "the best means of obtaining that which we wished was to proceed little by little, gaining ground, and engaging him [James] in such way that at last he

V's rise to his marriage with Elizabeth Stuart, and blamed themselves for not preventing the union. ["y pone el Conde en consideracion los incombiniente que han resultado de haverse cassado la hija de aquel Reyno con el palatino siendo facil haverlo estrobado quando se tratava dello, y encaminando que casara con algun principe catholico que VM'd' quisiera, y que seria bien ver si hagora se pudiese hacer lo mismo con el principe de Gales y escusar que elija lo que puede estar peor a la Religion Catholica."] For more on Frederick V and the Bohemian Revolt see Wilson, *The Thirty Years War*, pp. 269-313.

⁶¹⁸ A copy of the *consulta* can be found in Francisco de Jesús, *Tratados*, pp. 305-313. See also *Consulta* of the Padre Confesor and Count of Gondomar, AGS, Est., leg. 2518, fol. 42, 13 Jan 1619.

⁶¹⁹ Ibid. ["no casara en ninguna manera su hija con principe que tuviesse vasallos inobedientes, pues no lo siendo no viniera a ser Reyna, y quando lo fuera lo seria con poca seguridad."]

would be obliged to concede it all.”⁶²⁰ With many Spaniards still hopeful that Maria’s marriage might accomplish its intended objectives, but unwilling to accept the inherent risks that accompanied every dynastic arrangement, Digby’s advice offered a viable strategy for moving forward. Neither Gondomar nor Aliaga appeared to harbor any reservations about responding to a lack of diplomatic confidence with disingenuous tactics. After all, they were only doing what was necessary to serve God and the Spanish empire.⁶²¹

Conclusion

Negotiations between Spain and England dragged on for four years after the decision to intentionally deceive the English on the point of liberty of conscience. Naturally, the English remained hopeful during this period that an agreement was attainable. The greatest victim of Spanish deception was the young Charles with whom Gondomar had formed a close relationship at James’ behest. Desperate to marry the Infanta, the prince approached the Spanish ambassador with a remarkable offer whereby “if, upon my [Gondomar’s] arrival in Spain, I should advise him to come and place himself in your Majesty’s hands, and at your disposition, he would do it, and come to Madrid incognito with two servants.”⁶²² The only thing more startling than Charles’ proposal to travel to Spain in order to secure the finalization of the marriage was his decision to secretly proceed with the plan in 1623. Both contemporaries and historians have dedicated considerable attention to the circumstances of Charles’ clandestine journey to Madrid. Filled with lavish celebrations and solemn promises, the Prince’s extended stay suggested for many both inside and outside of Spain that the end of marriage negotiations was near.⁶²³ Indeed, before setting sail Charles conceded to all Spanish religious concessions. In order to seal the alliance, he also granted over proxy powers to Philip IV and agreed to a marriage celebration ten days after the award of a papal dispensation. By all appearances, Spain’s insistence on stricter religious concessions had been a success.

In reality, the potential for a cross-confessional alliance between Catholic Spain and Protestant England came to an end with the decision to adopt an uncompromising approach in 1619. Thereafter, negotiations were marked by mistrust and deception as the Spanish did their best to delay negotiations for as long as it took to acquire a concession of liberty of conscience. To this end, the Spanish were greatly aided by papal opposition because they were able to blame the postponement of the marriage on the difficulties involved in securing a dispensation. Of course, Gondomar was careful to hide the fact that the delays were due in part to secret orders to the Spanish representative in Rome, the Duke of Albuquerque, to stall the Papacy for as long as possible. As time passed, Spanish confidence in their plan began to wane. On his death bed in

⁶²⁰ Ibid. [“para conseguir lo mismo que se deseava era ir poco a poco ganando tierra, y empenandole de manera que al cabo se hallava obligado a concederlo.”]

⁶²¹ Francisco de Jesús, *Tratados*, pp. 322-323. Proof that the Spanish monarchy endorsed a duplicitous approach can be found in a letter written by Philip III to Gondomar in 1620. In the letter, he wrote “this marriage is not to be effected on any terms short of the concession of liberty of conscience in England, with security for it being actually granted. Nevertheless, on account of the danger which there is lest we speak clearly on this matter to them the negotiation may be at once broken off, and because of the convenience of keeping it on foot this summer, I have thought fit that you should try to entertain them as long as the season lasts with that which I have written you in the other letter, and with whatever other reasons may occur to you.”

⁶²² Ibid., p. 183.

⁶²³ For detailed coverage of Charles’ journey see Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, pp. 100- 133.

1621, Philip III confessed that he no longer supported dynastic rapprochement with England.⁶²⁴ Afterwards, the new favorite of Philip IV, the Duke of Olivares, did his best to bring an end to negotiations without instigating retaliation. His plan to negotiate a new marriage between Charles and the daughter of the Holy Roman Emperor, Maria Anna, held promise, but came to end when the prince landed in Spain. A convincing argument has been made that Spaniards interpreted Charles' arrival as a sign that he was willing to convert and accept stricter religious concessions, which explains a resurgence of interest in the marriage in 1623.⁶²⁵ By then, however, years of deception by the Spanish had corrupted the negotiations beyond repair. As soon as Charles realized the extent of religious demands, he disingenuously agreed to whatever was necessary to hasten his departure.⁶²⁶ What he failed to mention was that neither he nor his father had any intention of agreeing to terms that they had steadfastly refused to consider since 1614. While hopes remained high in Spain through the end of the year, all chances for a Hispano-English alliance dissipated on September 18, 1623 when Charles' ship set sail.

This chapter has argued that the Spanish decision to take an uncompromising approach to marriage negotiations was not inevitable. From 1614-1617, the majority of Spanish officials and theologians supported the finalization of an agreement that was acceptable for both parties. By the terms of this agreement, England would still have been expected to concede major religious concessions in connection to Maria and her children, as well as improve the condition of Catholics by ending persecution and granting religious tolerance. However, Spain would have refrained from insisting on the two demands that James was not prepared to accept, namely liberty of conscience and Charles' conversion. Support for this conciliatory approach was bolstered by a synthesis of reason of state and dynastic thinking, which led many to perceive the marriage as an advantageous arrangement inevitably bound to benefit the immediate and long-term interests of both the empire and the church.

As it turns out, though, arguments which emphasized the inherent power of women and the value of historical bonds were not enough to surmount the obstacles posed by an unprecedented cross-confessional agreement. Skeptics of the marriage were quick to point out that without adequate securities, there was no way to ensure that James would abide by the terms and conditions of the treaty. Their solution was to abandon a conciliatory approach and push for the strictest concessions possible in order to protect Philip III's political, personal, and religious interests. In this way, a demand for liberty of conscience unfolded over time as trust in England began to wane and Spaniards struggled to devise a legally binding procedure for authorizing a heretical alliance. The fact that Philip III eventually adopted a hardline approach, and chose to hide his true intent from the English, should not be cited as proof of the Spanish monarchy's lack of political ingenuity, integrity, or dogmatic religiosity. It resulted from the difficulties that diplomatic innovation posed for early modern nations struggling to adapt to a rapidly changing world.

⁶²⁴ Ibid., p. 67.

⁶²⁵ Ibid., p. 89.

⁶²⁶ Ibid, pp. 120-121.

Chapter Five

November 1st, 1661 was a day of both mourning and celebration, resounding with contradictory cries of pain and jubilation as Spaniards and Frenchman bore witness to a decisive shift in dynastic fortunes. In Madrid, Philip IV's sole surviving heir, the young prince Philip Prospero, died at the age of three. Lamenting the loss of his child to his spiritual advisor, Philip IV wrote;

“I confess to you, Sor María, that my grief is great, as is natural after losing such a jewel as this. But in the midst of my sorrow, I have tried to offer it to God, and to submit to His divine will; believing most earnestly that He will order all things for the best, which is the most important thing. I can assure you that what grieves me even more than my loss is that I see clearly that I have angered God, and that these punishments are sent in retribution for my sins.”⁶²⁷

A deeply religious and sentimental man, Philip IV often struggled to come to grips with the personal tragedies and political defeats that littered his reign.⁶²⁸ But no loss was felt more deeply than that which occurred on November 1st. With the king aging rapidly, the death generated legitimate fears about the future of the Spanish empire and his family's long-term survival. Facing the imminent possibility of dying without having secured the monarchical line of succession, Philip IV could do little more than pray, having faith in divine providence that a healthy boy would be delivered in the twilight years of his life.

Meanwhile, in Paris, on the exact same day that Philip IV lost his heir, his eldest daughter and queen of France, Maria Theresa, gave birth to her first child, the dauphin Louis. Providing the Bourbon monarchy with political and dynastic security, the prince's arrival was hailed throughout France. The news was also positively received in Spain, where it provided a small degree of solace to the grieving king. What Philip IV did not realize at the time, however, was that the birth would have far-reaching consequences for his family's grip on power. After all,

⁶²⁷ Philip IV, *María de Jesús de Ágreda: Correspondencia con Felipe IV: Religión y Razón de Estado*, (Madrid: Castalia Editorial, 1991), p. 231; “Confiesoos, Sor María, que ha sido grande, pues haber perdido tal prenda lo pide así; pero en medio de este gran dolor he procurado ofrecérsele a Dios y conformarme con Su divina voluntad, creyendo verdaderamente que lo que dispone Su Providencia es lo que más importa.” The above translation is taken from Martin Andrew Sharp, *The Court of Philip IV: Spain in Decadence*, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1907), p. 491.

⁶²⁸ For a wonderful source revealing Philip IV's innermost thoughts, worries, and reactions see the full collection of Philip IV's exchange with his spiritual advisor, as well as Ana Morte Acín, “La política exterior de la Monarquía Hispánica en la correspondencia de Felipe IV con Sor María de Ágreda,” *Tiempo de cambios: guerra, diplomacia y política internacional de la Monarquía Hispánica (1648-1700)*, ed. Porfirio Sanz Camañes, (Madrid: Editorial Actas, 2012), pp. 143-165. In addition, there are a number of insightful studies about the monarch and his reign that have been produced over the years; Alfredo Alvar Ezquerro, *Felipe IV. El Grande*, (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2018); José Alcalá Zamora and Queipo de Llano, *Felipe IV. El hombre y el reinado*, (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia-Centro de Estudios de la Europa Hispánica, 2005); R.A. Stradling, *Philip IV and the Government of Spain 1621-1665*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, *Política y Hacienda de Felipe IV*, (Madrid: Ediciones Pegaso, 1983); José Alcalá Zamora and Queipo de Llano, *Razón y crisis de la política exterior de España en el reinado de Felipe IV*, (Madrid: Fundación Universitaria Española, 1977).

running through the young dauphin's veins was royal Habsburg blood, and with it a hereditary right to their extensive patrimony.⁶²⁹ This was a right that the Spanish had sought to excise from the French line of kings only a few years earlier with the inclusion of a renunciation agreement in Maria Theresa's marriage contract with Louis XIV.⁶³⁰ By way of this agreement, the Infanta voluntarily repudiated both her claim and that of all her future offspring to her father's extensive empire. But, as the renowned *letrado* Francisco Ramos del Manzano had warned Philip IV before agreeing to the union, there was little they could ultimately do to enforce the renunciation should the monarchy one day find itself without a legitimate heir—an outcome that the Spanish monarchy temporarily avoided with the birth of Charles II in November of 1661.⁶³¹ Unfortunately, the prince proved to be frail and sickly boy. In one final twist of fate, he died thirty-nine years later on November 1st, childless and enfeebled, paving the way for the emergence of a new dynasty in Spain.

Maria Theresa's marriage to Louis XIV exemplified a political system in which royal families regularly engaged in a high-stakes game of chance in order to expand their influence, acquire new territories, and ensure their survival. Played at the highest level of international politics, this genetic contest was somewhat curtailed in the early 17th century when Spanish kings shifted their dynastic policy away from an obsessive focus on territorial aggrandizement to one aimed primarily at reinforcing diplomatic ties with strategic allies and preserving the vast Spanish empire. Still, as Philip IV was all too aware, even after the incorporation of precautionary measures, such as strict renunciation agreements, to reduce the negative fallout of imprudent marriages, there was still the potential for a spell of bad luck, untimely deaths, and genetic misfortunes to decisively shift the balance of power in Europe. In fact, before agreeing to marry his daughter, Philip IV first spurned the idea of a French match, citing the lack of a male heir and the danger that this posed to the royal succession. Only after the birth of his son, Philip Prospero, did the union enter into the realm of possibility—a sudden change of heart that corresponded with setbacks on the battlefield. Two years later, an agreement to wed the Infanta was reached in spite of the Spanish monarchy's immense vulnerability, requiring the king to wager the future security of the empire on the survival of one young, sickly prince.

Since its formal celebration on June 9th, 1660, the royal wedding of Maria Theresa remains arguably the most thoroughly studied royal union in the early modern period. To a large extent, sustained scholarly interest has been fueled by the match's immense historical significance; consecrating the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659), providing the Bourbon dynasty with a claim to legitimate political authority in Spain, and serving as a catalyst for the War of Spanish Succession (1701-14).⁶³² As historians have long pointed out, the most consequential

⁶²⁹ Herbert H. Rowen, *The King's State: Proprietary Dynasticism in Early Modern France*, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press), pp. 94-96.

⁶³⁰ Emmanuel van Meteren, *Instrumento de la renunciacion que otorgò la serenissima infanta doña Maria Theresa un dia antes de casarse con el rey christianissimo, su fecha de 2 de junio de 1660 en Fuenteravia*, (1663). The document can be found at BNE, Sede de Recoletos, Sala de Cervantes, VE/26/13.

⁶³¹ Francisco Ramos del Manzano, *Consulta referente a la renuncia a la sucesión de la Corona de España: que debe hacer la Infanta María Teresa de Austria, al casarse con Luis XIV de Francia, 1659*, (1740). Located in BNE, Sede de Recoletos, Sala de Cervantes, MSS.MICRO/7211.

⁶³² References to the marriage are littered across early modern European historiography, but for more on the marriage and its fallout see José I. Benavides, *Milicia y diplomacia en el reinado de Felipe IV: Marqués de Caracena*, (León: Akron Historia, 2012); Miguel Ángel Ochoa Brun, *Historia de la Diplomacia, VIII: La Edad Barroca II*, (Madrid: Biblioteca Diplomática Española, 2006); Jesús María Usunáriz, *España y sus tratados*

feature of the marriage was the critical “moyennant” clause in Maria Theresa’s renunciation, which made the agreement contingent upon the full payment of her dowry.⁶³³ Whether the inclusion of the clause was an intentional stroke of genius on the part of the French, or an unintentional loophole later capitalized on by Louis XIV to push his grandson’s claim to the throne is not altogether clear.⁶³⁴ However, most historians have tended to agree that the marriage was a decisively one-sided defeat for the Habsburgs, reflecting both their weakened position vis-à-vis continental rivals and the precipitous decline of their empire’s vitality and power.⁶³⁵

As this chapter maintains, scholarly interpretations that link Maria Theresa’s marriage to the fall of the Spanish empire no longer adequately explain the impetus behind Philip IV’s adoption of a pro-French dynastic policy. Recent research has shown that Spain, far from being a debilitated shadow of its former self, continued to possess reserves of political, economic and military strength through the end of the 17th century.⁶³⁶ This resiliency has often been overlooked

internacionales, 1516-1700, (Pamplona: EUNSA, Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, S.A., 2006), pp. 332-398; Francisco Martín Sanz, *La Política Internacional de Felipe IV*, (Segovia: Libros en Red, 2003); Abby E. Zanger, *Scenes from the Marriage of Louis XIV: Nuptial Fictions and the Making of Absolutist Power*, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1997); Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, eds., *The Treaties of the War of the Spanish Succession: An Historical and Critical Dictionary*, (Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1995); Rafael Valladares Ramírez, “El Tratado de Paz de los Pirineos: una revisión historiográfica (1888-1988),” *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma. Serie IV: Historia Moderna*, Núm. 2, (1989), pp. 125-138. William James Roosen, “The Origins of the War of Spanish Succession,” *The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Jeremy Black, (Edinburg: John Donald, 1987), pp. 151-175; Claude Dulong, *Le mariage du Roi-Soleil*, (Paris: Albin Michel S.A., 1986); Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, “España ante la paz de los Pirineos,” *Crisis y Decadencia de la España de los Austrias*, (Barcelona: Ariel, 1984), pp. 155-193; Rowen, *The King’s State*, pp. 93-122; Henry Kamen, *The War of Spanish Succession, (1700-1715)*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969); Juan Francisco de Cárdenas, *La misión de D. Antonio Pimentel (Lyon-Paris 1658-59) y el cardenal Mazarino y D. Luis de Haro frente a frente en la Isla de los Faisanes*, (Bilbao: Patronato de la Universidad de Deusto, 1955); Arsène Legrelle, *La Diplomatie Française Et La Succession D’Espagne: Le Premier Traité de Partage (1659-1697)*, (Braine-le-Comte: Imprimerie Zech et Fils, 1895); Philip Henry Stanhope, *History of the War of the Spanish Succession in Spain*, (London: J. Murray, 1836).

⁶³³ William James Roosen, *The Age of Louis XIV: The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1976), pp. 17-18.

⁶³⁴ For the latter argument see Legrelle, *La Diplomatie Française*.

⁶³⁵ The origins of this highly critical historical interpretation lie in Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, *Historia de la decadencia de España: Desde el advenimiento de Felipe III al Trono hasta la muerte de Carlos II*, (Madrid: Librería Gutenberg de José Ruiz, 1910). Despite important revisions since, the notion that the peace was a byproduct of the empire’s decline has remained persistent. On this point, Kamen writes “The century of Spain’s imperial preponderance— from 1560 to 1660—collapsed under irreversible debt, and the military success of 1652 could not mask the decay within. From the mid-sixteenth century, when the imperial build-up had been undertaken in the face of overwhelming financial insufficiency, the problem never ceased to worsen. Spanish imperialism, it seemed, was doomed from the start: and perennial poverty forced peace through treaty in 1609, 1648 and 1659.” Henry Kamen, *Spain, 1469- 1714: A Society of Conflict*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 202. Of course, not all historians agree with this conclusion. Domínguez Ortiz, for example has insisted that the peace, far from an embarrassing defeat, constituted “una honorosa transacción entre un vencido digno y un vencedor moderado.” Domínguez Ortiz, “España ante la paz de los Pirineos,” pp. 192-193.

⁶³⁶ Christopher Storrs, *The Resiliency of the Spanish Monarchy, 1665-1700*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Ibid., *La diplomacia española durante el reinado de Carlos II: una Edad de Oro o ¿quizá de Plata?*,” *Tiempo de cambios: guerra, diplomacia y política internacional de la Monarquía Hispánica (1648-1700)*, Ed. Porfirio Sanz Camañes, (Madrid: Editorial Actas, 2012), pp. 21-54. Recent work done by Silvia Z. Mitchell on the regency of Mariana of Austria has also served to transform the way in which historians understand the last decades of Habsburg rule. As Mitchell has demonstrated, in the aftermath of Philip IV’s death, Mariana of Austria wielded a considerable degree of power and influence in her position as regent of the Spanish monarchy, leading the empire out of dire

entirely by historians, who have studied the later reign of Philip IV and Charles II through the lens of decline and infirmity.⁶³⁷ In hopes of providing an important corrective to the decline narrative, the current chapter argues that Philip IV and his officials did not support Maria Theresa's marriage simply out of political desperation, or as the result of a myopic outlook that prevented them from perceiving the risks inherent in the match. Rather, the Spanish monarchy supported the alliance precisely because they were confident that the gamble would pay off, ultimately serving their interests and augmenting the influence and prestige of the dynasty.

Drawing from a wide range of primary sources including diplomatic correspondences, private letters, a royal *consulta*, published treatises, and art, this chapter shows how the Spanish monarchy's perception of the Infanta's marriage was informed by a range of factors that worked together to bolster their confidence in the viability of the agreement.⁶³⁸ For Philip IV in particular, a man deeply conscious of his place within a long dynastic tradition, Maria Theresa's marriage was neither a reckless decision nor a radical deviation from standard diplomatic practice.⁶³⁹ It was an act that corresponded with Habsburg policy stretching back to Eleanor's marriage to Francis in 1530. In order to shed light on the nature of Spanish commitment to the marriage, the current chapter is divided into two parts. In part one, titled "An Unlikely Proposal," I examine the early origins of the marriage and the circumstances that precipitated the Spanish monarchy's acceptance of the incredibly risky proposal. Naturally, the birth of Philip Prospero in 1658 was a major turning point in the negotiation of the marriage, as were defeats on the battlefield and rebellions in discontented corners of the empire. Together, the events provided Philip IV with the heir that he needed to secure his dynasty's future and an increased sense of urgency to bring the conflict to an end. A third equally critical factor, though, for assuaging

financial and political straits and realizing a dynastic policy favorable to her son, Charles II. Mitchell, *Queen, Mother, and Stateswoman*; *Ibid.*, "Habsburg Motherhood."

⁶³⁷ The precipitous fall of the Spanish empire has long fascinated historians, who have attempted to locate its origins in the century preceding the death of Charles II. See R. A. Stradling, *Europa y el declive de la estructura imperial española, 1580-1720*, (Madrid: Cátedra, 1983); Alcalá-Zamora, *Razón y crisis*; J.H. Elliott, "Self-Perception and Decline in Early Seventeenth-Century Spain," *Past & Present* 74, (1977), pp. 41-61; Michel Devèze, *L'Espagne de Philippe IV: 1621-1665 : Siècle d'Or et de Misère*, 2 Vols., (Paris: Société d'édition d'enseignement supérieur, 1970-1971); J.H. Elliott, "The Decline of Spain," *Past and Present* 20, (1961), pp. 52-75; José Deleito Y Piñuela, *El Declinar De La Monarquía Española*, (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1955); E.J. Hamilton, *American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934); Martin Andrew Sharp, *The Court of Philip IV*.

⁶³⁸ The primary sources include both published and unpublished archival resources. AGS, Est., K-1618, K-1622, K-1623; Manzano, *Consulta referente a la renuncia a la sucesión de la Corona de España*; Andrés García de la Iglesia, *Relacion verdadera de la feliz llegada de los señores Reyes de Francia a la ciudad de Paris, ostentacion, y grandeza con que fueron recibidos en aquella Corte de toda la Nobleza della, acompañamiento, y festivo aplauso, con que fue recibida la Magestad Christianissima Doña Maria Teresa Bibiana de Austria, de todos sus vasallos*, BNE, Sala de Cervantes, MSS/2388 (H.205R.-208V.), 1660; Madame de Motteville, *Memoirs of Madame de Motteville on Anne of Austria and Her Court, Vol. III*, trans. Katherine Prescott Wormeley, (Boston: Hardy, Pratt, and Company, 1902); François-Auguste Mignet, ed., *Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne sous Louis XIV (épuisé) ou Correspondances, mémoires et actes diplomatiques concernant les prétentions et l'avènement de la maison de Bourbon au trône d'Espagne*, vol. I, (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1842); Maria Theresa, Philip IV, and La Condesa de Paredes de Nava, *Cartas de la Infanta Doña Maria Theresa, Hija de Felipe IV y Reina de Francia, a La Condesa de Paredes de Nava*, eds. Carmen de Travesedo and Evaristo Martín de Sandoval, (Madrid: Moneda y Credito, 1977); María de Jesús de Ágreda y Philip IV, *Correspondencia*; Don Luis de Haro, *Letters from the Pyrenees: Don Luis Méndez de Haro's correspondence to Philip IV of Spain, July to November 1659*, ed., Lyn Williams, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2000).

⁶³⁹ Philip IV, *Correspondencia*, pp. 187-188.

Spanish apprehensions was the contributions made by royal women. Focusing first on Maria Theresa and then Anne of Austria, the chapter shows how both looked favorably on the marriage and took steps early on to communicate their feelings and facilitate amicable relations. The role played by Anne, the queen mother of France, as a mediator between her natal family and son was particularly crucial, as she garnered support for the union abroad and strengthened the impression in Spain that they had a close ally in the French court.⁶⁴⁰ With her backing, negotiations were able to overcome many of the early challenges that emerged and stay on track.⁶⁴¹

Section two of the chapter, titled “An Ill-Fated Alliance,” explores in greater depth the different strands of political thought informing Spanish dynastic policy. The central document used to shed light on the Spanish perspective is a *consulta* drafted by the court’s leading *letrado* Francisco Ramos del Manzano. Written for Philip IV and Don Luis de Haro, the monarch’s *valido* (favorite), this understudied document embodies the mature and sophisticated political and legal understanding of marriage politics that had emerged in the 17th century.⁶⁴² As I demonstrate, this was an understanding underpinned by an unprecedented synthesis of reason of state and dynastic thinking, which ultimately served to trivialize real and present dangers. Earlier in the century, during the arrangement of Anne’s marriage, many jurists and theologians, who were worried about the long-term interests of the empire, opposed the alliance because there was no legal precedent for the renunciation or reason to believe that it would be honored by the French. Manzano’s innovation was not to deny the dangers inherent in the match, but to instead employ reason of state ideas, such as the notion of *causa pública* (public welfare), to show how the renunciation was not only beneficial to the common good but also capable of being established with binding power. At the same time, Manzano’s work was also clearly influenced by the idealist strands of thought that comprised the dynastic worldview and took for granted the immutability of Habsburg power and preeminence.⁶⁴³ Like Philip IV and other important statesman, Manzano did not seriously consider the possibility of Philip Prospero dying or the monarchy being left without an heir—a reckless oversight that led Spaniards to overestimate their chances of coming out victorious in yet another dynastic gamble.⁶⁴⁴

⁶⁴⁰ For insightful studies of Anne see Marie-Catherine Vignal Souleyreau, *Anne d'Autriche: La jeunesse d'une souverain*, (Paris: Flammarion, 2006); Antonia Fraser, *Love and Louis XIV: The Women in the Life of the Sun King* (New York: Doubleday, 2006); Kleinman, *Anne of Austria*; Claude Dulong, *Anne d'Autriche: Mère de Louis XIV*, (Paris: Gallimard, Folio Histoire, 1985); Paul Robiquet, *Le coeur d'une Reine. Anne d'Autriche, Louis XIII et Mazarin*, (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1912).

⁶⁴¹ Kleinman, *Anne of Austria*, pp. 266-269. To date, Anne of Austria’s role in the marriage project remains a relatively understudied component of the negotiations. Even studies dedicated solely to her only briefly discuss the role she played in procuring the union.

⁶⁴² For more on Don Luis Méndez de Haro see Rafael Valladares, ed., *El mundo de un valido, Don Luis de Haro y su entorno (1643-1661)*, (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2016); Andrés Gamba Gutiérrez, “Don Luis de Haro, el valido encubierto,” *Los Validos*, ed. José Antonio, (Madrid: Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, 2005), pp. 277-309; Marqués del Saltillo, “Don Antonio Pimentel y la Paz de los Pirineos,” *Hispania*, XXVI, (1947), pp. 24-124.

⁶⁴³ Stradling, *Philip IV*, p. 284. On Philip IV’s political outlook and dynastic worldview, Stradling writes, “his was a fundamentally optimistic obstinacy, a holding fast to the belief that God would find a way to the achievement of the paz honesta.”

⁶⁴⁴ This is an argument that was first advanced by Liesbeth Geevers, who argues that the prevalence of dynastic logic in the monarchy of Philip IV precluded a realistic appreciation of the dangers he was incurring with his daughter’s marriage. Geevers, “The Miracles of Spain,” pp. 291-311.

The final part of section two covers the negotiations conducted by Haro and Cardinal Mazarin through November 1659. Given the complexity of the negotiations, the current chapter only focuses on matters pertaining specifically to Maria Theresa's marriage agreement, omitting other concerns that were treated as part of the separate, albeit closely connected, peace treaty. In this section, I show how Haro possessed a pragmatism that, similar to Manzano, shared certain features of both realism and idealism. At times, this approach brought him into conflict with officials back in Madrid who disagreed with Haro about the ultimate objective of the monarchy's dynastic policy. Still, in spite of repeated clashes with both Mazarin and officials at home, Haro was ultimately able to employ a number of different strategies to finalize a marriage contract that, contrary to what some may believe, was far more favorable than many at the time thought possible.⁶⁴⁵ Altogether, the chapter works to make sense of the Spanish decision to enter into an agreement that they knew posed an imminent threat to the monarchical line of succession—a risk not unlike many that they had gladly accepted in the past.

An Unlikely Proposal

At the moment of its inception, the royal union between Louis XIV and Maria Theresa appeared to be a very distant possibility. With their respective monarchies having spent the better part of two decades locked in incessant warfare, feelings of mistrust and animosity were at an all-time high. To make matters worse, Philip IV lacked a legitimate male heir, further raising concerns about the long-term implications of rapprochement with the Bourbons for the Habsburg inheritance. First introduced in 1656 by the French ambassador, Hugh de Lionne, as part of a list of respectable peace terms, the marriage received a firm, albeit not resounding, rejection from the Spanish monarchy.⁶⁴⁶ While there were some members of the Council of State who considered Queen Mariana's young age sufficient to guarantee the inevitable birth of a prince, and thus supported the marriage, Philip IV refused to consider any arrangement subject to the whims of fortune. Reaching out to his ministers on the matter, he wrote; "I have sacrificed much more than was necessary for the sake and tranquility of Christendom [...]; but the French have asked of me things so unreasonable and drab that I could not concede to them without neglecting my honor and royal patrimony."⁶⁴⁷ With Philip IV thus firmly decided, there was little that his valido, Luis de Haro, could do to salvage the peace project. Hoping to find an alternative solution, Haro met with Lionne regularly over the course of three months, doing his best to advance a slightly less prestigious, albeit still respectable, marriage with Prince Philippe, the Duke of Anjou—a compromise that utterly failed to spark French interest.⁶⁴⁸ Frustrated by Spanish obstinacy on the issue of the Infanta's marriage—as well as Philip IV's stubborn refusal to forsake his close friendship with the rebellious Prince of Condé—Lionne eventually left

⁶⁴⁵ For more on Cardinal Mazarin see G.R.R. Treasure, *Mazarin: The Crisis of Absolutism in France*, (Milton Park: Taylor and Francis, 1995); Pierre Goubert, *Mazarin*, (Paris: Fayard, 1990); Georges Dethan, *Mazarin, un homme de paix à l'âge baroque (1602-1661)*, (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1981).

⁶⁴⁶ Letters written by Lionne during his diplomatic mission in Madrid can be found in *Collection de Documents Inédits*, pp. 34-37.

⁶⁴⁷ Quote extracted from Usunáriz, *España y sus tratados*, p. 338; "he sacrificado mucho más de lo que era menester por el bien y la tranquilidad de la cristiandad [...]; pero los franceses me pedían cosas tan irrazonables y anodinas, que no podía concedérselas sin abandonar el honor y la propiedad real."

⁶⁴⁸ Jonathan Brown, *Collected Writings on Velázquez*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009), p. 176.

Spain having achieved very little in the way of his desired diplomatic outcome.⁶⁴⁹ For the time being, the war dragged on with no immediate end in sight.⁶⁵⁰

The first significant breakthrough in the peace process came one year later when Queen Mariana gave birth to Spain's long awaited heir, Philip Prospero. Celebrated throughout the empire in a joyous outpouring of relief and happiness, the birth did not immediately act as a catalyst for rapprochement.⁶⁵¹ But, by supplanting Maria Theresa's claim to the Spanish throne, it did mollify the perceived dangers of a marriage alliance with France. This change in perspective proved critical the following November when the Duchess of Savoy travelled to Lyon to discuss a union between her daughter, Margaret, and Louis XIV.⁶⁵² Ostensibly orchestrated by France's chief minister, Cardinal Mazarin, to force a Spanish response, the match greatly alarmed Philip IV— who proclaimed aloud in the presence of the Infanta “That cannot be, and shall not be.”⁶⁵³ — and prompted efforts in Madrid to interrupt the negotiations. Moving quickly lest the Bourbons secure a powerful new ally in their ongoing conflict, Philip IV dispatched a special envoy, Don Antonio Pimentel, with orders to reopen peace talks and arrange a marriage with the Infanta.⁶⁵⁴

Entering Lyon on the same day as the Savoyard court, Pimentel arrived just in time to deliver his monarch's offer. Careful not to be detected, — his trip had been conducted without the proper diplomatic passport— he reached out to a close companion to arrange a meeting with Mazarin. This first point of contact proved to be incredibly fruitful. Appearing openly enthusiastic about the prospect of both a ceasefire and a Spanish bride, the Cardinal warmly welcomed Pimentel and, afterwards, rushed to Queen Anne to relate the happy news; ““Good news Madame! ‘Eh what?’ exclaimed the queen; ‘can it be peace?’ ‘More than that, madame! I bring your majesty both peace and the infanta.”⁶⁵⁵ In reality, Mazarin was hardly pleased by the offer and, behind his outward displays of enthusiasm, met the alternative marriage proposal with contempt. Princess Margaret of Savoy was the cousin of his niece, Marie Mancini, and thus a far more advantageous match for him personally than one with a Habsburg daughter. Reluctant to abandon the Savoyard marriage entirely, he clung to the hope that Louis might still marry Margaret should negotiations with Spain fall through— a hope that he communicated to the Duchess of Savoy. But, in the meantime, the Spanish union was far too prestigious to dismiss solely on account of his personal preference. Left with no other option, he began to meet secretly with Pimentel to hammer out the details of the new alliance.

⁶⁴⁹ Ochoa Brun, *Historia*, p. 45; Morte Acín, “La política exterior,” p. 161. Letters to Sor María appear to indicate that Philip IV was willing to concede to his daughter's marriage in return for the full pardon of the Prince of Conde, although the sincerity of his commitment is dubious. This contradiction in words and action is similarly pointed out in Alvar Ezquerro, *Felipe IV*, p. 502.

⁶⁵⁰ For more on the war see David Parrott, “The Cause of the Franco-Spanish War of 1635-59,” *The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Jeremy Black, (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers LTD, 1987), pp. 72-112.

⁶⁵¹ Maria Theresa, *Cartas*, p. 428. Philip IV's desperation for a healthy heir was apparent to all, including the young Maria Theresa, who wrote in 1651 at the age of twelve; “cada dia estamos esperando el parto de la Reyna yo con mucho alborozo para tener un hermano por el gusto de mi padre.” For more on this see Hume, *The Court of Philip IV*, pp. 456-462.

⁶⁵² Ochoa Brun, *Historia*, p. 45.

⁶⁵³ Motteville, *Memoirs*, p. 159.

⁶⁵⁴ For detailed coverage of Pimentel's mission see Benavides, *Milicia y Diplomacia*, pp. 591- 608.

⁶⁵⁵ Motteville, *Memoirs*, p. 163.

Extending through the French court's temporary stay in Lyon and return to Paris, the diplomatic mission executed by Pimentel succeeded in producing a preliminary peace agreement. As part of this original document, signed on June 4th, the two sides agreed to wed Maria Theresa to Louis XIV thereby binding together Europe's two most powerful families.⁶⁵⁶ However, notwithstanding the political significance of the match, very little time was spent discussing critical details. The Infanta's renunciation, for example, was not mentioned at all in an inexcusable oversight that led the French to believe that none would be included in the marriage contract.⁶⁵⁷ The Infanta's dowry was also only minimally addressed, with Mazarin tentatively agreeing to accept the transfer of strategic strongholds as payment, but neither side taking the time to detail what this would look like or how it might impact the relinquishment of French military positions. By and large, these omissions on Pimentel's part resulted from the envoy being outmatched in talks with Mazarin and Lionne. Overwhelmed by their wit and tenacity on critical issues related to the peace, he conceded considerable ground, took unauthorized liberties and agreed to objectionable conditions that outraged Philip IV and the Council of State. The final result was a peace agreement that they could hardly agree too without significant alterations—a task left for Luis de Haro to fulfill in an extended peace conference scheduled to take place with Mazarin at the border town of Fuenterrabía during the following year. Entrusted with realizing the first dynastic union between the two crowns in over four decades, Haro departed for the frontier in the summer of 1659 determined to represent Spanish interests and secure favorable terms for his monarchy.

From the outset, Maria Theresa's marriage was the diplomatic centerpiece around which Spanish hopes for an equitable peace revolved. With his monarchy having suffered a massive military setback at the Battle of the Dunes in 1658 and desperately struggling to suppress rebellions in Portugal and Catalonia (to say nothing of the shortcomings of Pimentel's mission), Haro faced an uphill battle against an adversary who was predisposed to deal with the Habsburgs harshly.⁶⁵⁸ For one of the few times in over two hundred years, the Spanish diplomat did not have the upper hand in peace talks with the French. Nevertheless, even at this moment of political vulnerability, Haro retained one incredibly potent bargaining chip; the Infanta's hand. Touching upon the urgent desire felt in France for the royal union in response to Haro's fears that Mazarin might try and disrupt it, the king's Secretary of State, Fernando de Contreras, wrote; "It shall not be so easy for the cardinal to overcome the difficulty of not treating the different points in light of the hatred and danger that he would incur with his artifices against his master's will and against all of the acclaim of the nation and Christendom."⁶⁵⁹ French enthusiasm for a Spanish bride provided Haro with considerable leverage in negotiations. Keenly aware that the unsuccessful acquisition of the marriage would constitute an unacceptable diplomatic failure for Mazarin, he was able to wield the match to his advantage and place considerable pressure to soften certain conditions.

Meanwhile back in Madrid, the young Infanta whose fate hung in the balance of political forces beyond her control embraced her dynastic obligation. Growing up, Maria Theresa was a

⁶⁵⁶ Domínguez Ortiz, "España ante la paz de los Pirineos," p. 187.

⁶⁵⁷ Dulong, *Le mariage*, p. 100.

⁶⁵⁸ Philip IV, *Correspondencia*, pp. 218-220; Usunáriz, *España y sus tratados*, p. 340.

⁶⁵⁹ Fernando de Contreras to Luis de Haro, AGS, Est., K-1623, fol. 54, 25 Aug 1659. ["No ha de ser tan facil al Cardenal el poder saltar la Valla de apartar uno y otro cargandose el odio y el peligro que le resultaria de sus artificios contra la voluntad de sus propios amos y contra toda la aclamacion de los Pueblos y de la xpiandad."]

model of noble refinement and holy devotion. She was also an astute observer of the happenings around her, taking careful note of new developments in the royal court and abroad.⁶⁶⁰ Naturally, updates regarding her own potential marriage were particularly compelling, as she yearned to wed Louis XIV and assume her place in the Parisian court; “she had in her heart a presentiment which told her that the king [Louis XIV] was to be her husband, and she alone knew that she was entirely worthy of him...”⁶⁶¹ Although Maria Theresa desperately wanted the match, going so far as to quietly whisper Philip IV’s words “That cannot be, and shall not be” over and over to herself, a strict sense of obedience to her father’s will prevented her from taking steps to directly involve herself in negotiations.⁶⁶² In one instance when a French diplomat attempted to secretly pass the Infanta a note from Louis XIV against Philip IV’s orders, she dutifully spurned the letter, insisting “I cannot receive it without my father’s permission; but he tells me that everything will be arranged.”⁶⁶³ Of course, deference to the king’s authority did not prevent Maria Theresa from communicating her personal preference to French officials. Urged to send some word to Louis, she responded “What I say for the queen my aunt may be understood for the king.” On another occasion, near her wedding day, the Infanta paid her compliment to her aunt before also adding “of her own impulse... ‘And to the King also.’”⁶⁶⁴ Regardless of whether they were made openly or subtly, declarations of affection between suitors were important for overcoming feelings of mistrust and facilitating the successful arrangement of new unions. Relatedly, Maria Theresa’s indirect expressions of fondness for Louis were more than just polite formalities aimed at pleasing her prospective husband. They were the actions of an independent agent which served to generate a sense of goodwill and reinforce the positive perception of the Infanta’s preferred match.⁶⁶⁵

Outside of the Spanish court, Maria Theresa also maintained a regular correspondence with Anne, her aunt and the queen mother of France. Although the strict gender divisions of courtly society prevented the Infanta from freely communicating with her suitor, she faced no such restrictions when it came to interacting with physically distant relatives. In fact, quite the opposite, the writings of personal letters played an integral part in the life of every Habsburg, allowing them to cultivate close relationships with other members of their familial network and preserve a sense of shared identity. For royal women, the exchange of messages also provided an opportunity to freely express personal feelings and sentiments, as was made evident when Maria Theresa indicated that the emotions she felt for Louis XIV were the same as those she had written to her aunt. Both during and after marriage negotiations, Maria Theresa and Anne utilized letters to reinforce the bond that they would share living alongside one another in the

⁶⁶⁰ Maria Theresa, *Cartas*, pp. 425 & 429.

⁶⁶¹ Motteville, *Memoirs*, p. 159.

⁶⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

⁶⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶⁵ Stradling, *Philip IV*, p. 295. The claim that I make here runs counter to depictions of the Infanta as a mere pawn of her father’s foreign policy. Stradling, for example, states that, “Nothing could better demonstrate the nature of the king’s resolution over Portugal than the fate of Maria Theresa and her dowry. The treaty provided for the sum of half a million escudos in gold, to be paid in three installments, the last of which fell due in August 1661. In the event, none was paid. Hard pressed to raise the asientos de dinero for the campaigns against Portugal— an annual average of some five times this sum— Philip could find no bankers willing to provide for his debt to Louis XIV. If it would bring about the restoration of Portugal, he was evidently willing to permit the prolonged humiliation of his daughter in an alien court... a clear sacrifice of prestige to the paramount needs of territorial and patrimonial.”

French court. Take, for example, the letter sent by the queen-mother days before the Infanta's wedding;

“Madame my Daughter and Niece— Your Majesty can easily believe the satisfaction and joy with which I write, in giving to you the name which I have desired all my life to give you... Nothing remains for me to wish except to see the happy day I have so longed for, when I can say to Your Majesty in another manner than by written words how much love and tenderness I feel for you.”⁶⁶⁶

Anne's letter, which Maria Theresa cherished and later kept among her personal papers, reveals the human side of dynastic politics. Behind power struggles and bids for political supremacy, there were people whose genuine desire to see these marriages executed and family members reunited provided further impetus for rapprochement. On the importance of having her aunt in France, Maria Theresa confessed, “for me there is no greater solace than to have such a good aunt, who I will always cherish in the place of mother, and I will most willingly refer to as such.”⁶⁶⁷ The sense of familiarity and intimacy transmitted through letters served as a source of comfort for members of the dynasty, and, in the case of the Infanta, confirmed that she would have a close ally in her new home.

With regard to her public perception, considerable time and effort was spent shaping the image of Maria Theresa as an effective agent of dynasty. Beginning in the early 17th century, Spaniards addressed growing concerns about the risks posed by imprudent marriages by emphasizing more and more the agency, irreproachable character, and religious devotion of Spanish Infantas. Far from pawns vulnerable to the corrupting influences of foreign courts, they were instead presented as respectable players in their own right, capable of representing both religious imperatives and their family's interests. Given the evident dangers posed by a French match, propaganda reaffirming Maria Theresa's vigor, dignity, and personal poise were particularly important for rationalizing her union. During the early part of her life, several prints were produced depicting the Infanta on horseback. Part of a Roman imperial iconographic tradition first imported into Spain from Italy by Charles V, equestrian portraits were incredibly common in the court of Philip IV where they were utilized to represent the power and prestige of the Habsburg dynasty.⁶⁶⁸ Striking a confident pose in those where she appears, Maria Theresa embodies both the strength and gravitas of her bloodline, as well as the elegance, grace, and proper comportment expected of a royal daughter. She rides side saddle and adorns elaborate costumes in observance of traditional feminine etiquette, but at the same time assumes a position of authority and control. Showing her gripping the reins and, oftentimes, a riding crop, the images privilege her independent agency in posture and gesture. Viewed by an extensive audience in a variety of formats, these positive depictions of the Infanta enhanced the general perception of her character, and engendered a sense of optimism that she would be able to establish herself as an independent political force after moving abroad.

⁶⁶⁶ Motteville, *Memoirs*, p. 195.

⁶⁶⁷ Maria Theresa, *Cartas*, p. 434. “que para mi no ay mayor consuelo que tener tan buena tia y siempre la tendre en lugar de Madre y se lo llamare de muy buena gana.”

⁶⁶⁸ Brown, *Collected Writings*, pp. 151-152 and 256-259. For more on the origins of this imperial iconographic tradition and the important role it played in dynastic strategies see Thomas Dandeleit, *The Renaissance of Empire in Early Modern Europe*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 31-36.



*Retrato de María Teresa de Austria, Frederik Bouttats, 1656,
BNE, IH/743/4, Madrid*



*Retrato de María Teresa de Austria, Anónimo francés, 1660,
BNE, IH/743/5, Madrid*



Retrato de María Teresa de Austria (mislabelado), unknown, BNE, IH/743/24, Madrid

For further confirmation of the power that would be accessible to Maria Theresa as Louis' wife, Spaniards needed to look no further than the queen mother Anne of Austria. Married to Louis XIII in 1615, Anne's tenure as a central figure in the French court spanned over four decades, including a seven-year period as regent during her son's minority. In that time, she developed a reputation for bending others to her will and stubbornly defending her son's rights, interests, and prerogatives. On the queen-mother's persuasive nature, one contemporary observer, Madame de Motteville, wrote; "Her eyes are perfectly beautiful; in them the sweet and serious, the grave and gray, are mingled charmingly; their power has been fatal to many illustrious private individuals, and nations have felt to their detriment the influence those eyes have had upon men."⁶⁶⁹ Like many of her predecessors, Anne derived power and influence from her role as intercessor with the king. Privileged in her physical proximity and close personal relationship with Louis, who looked to her for advice and guidance, she was able to provide input, persuade strategic actors, and sway matters of state. Indeed, part of the reason that Mazarin opposed a Habsburg union was that he worried Maria Theresa would follow in her aunt's footsteps and pose a formidable threat in court; "...he feared if the infanta came to France she would follow the example of the queen her aunt, who hated Cardinal Richelieu, and make intrigues against him."⁶⁷⁰ Conscious of traditional gendered expectations, Anne attempted to conceal her involvement in French affairs from the public behind an image of grace, humility,

⁶⁶⁹ Motteville, *Memoirs*, p. 126.

⁶⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 173. For more on Anne and Mazarin's complicated relationship see Colquhoun Grant, *Queen and Cardinal: A Memoir of Anne of Austria and of her Relations with Cardinal Mazarin*, (London: John Murray, 1907).

and strict devotion— a strategy commonly employed by Habsburg women in positions of authority— but it nevertheless persisted even after her regency powers had expired.

One critical area where Anne continued to play a major role was the shaping of her son's dynastic policy. The sister of Philip IV and mother of Louis XIV, Anne had personal ties to both the Habsburgs and Bourbons and for many years longed for a wedding of the two houses.⁶⁷¹ Understanding that this match was impossible as long as the Spanish throne lacked an heir, she contented herself with idle wishing; "She [Anne] had always passionately longed for peace, and for the Infanta of Spain as the only princess worthy of marrying the king. But from the way in which she had hitherto spoken of this it was easy to see that she wished it without hoping for such a result."⁶⁷² In addition to a Spanish match, Anne also looked favorably on the exiled English princess Henrietta d'Angleterre, having grown fond of the young woman during her time in the French court. But, even this respectable union was a distant second in the mind of the queen-mother, whose desire to reconcile with her natal family became much more realistic after the birth of Philip Prospero.⁶⁷³

Before she could realize her dynastic vision, however, Anne first had to confront the threat posed by Mazarin's Savoyard alliance. Always conscious of her public perception, Anne was careful not to openly criticize the marriage or the prospective bride. Quite the contrary, she feigned support for the marriage as long as it conformed to Louis' wishes— a dignified approach which utterly failed to mask her true feelings from keen observers. Touching upon the topic, Madame de Motteville noted, "It is certain, however, that the sentiments of her soul went so far as aversion to the marriage, and that she seemed to us to agree to it only because her will was always entirely submissive to that of the sovereign Master of kings."⁶⁷⁴ Notwithstanding her outward allegiance to Louis and his ultimate decision, Anne did what she could behind the scenes to get her way, including making a last second decision to travel to Lyon with the French contingent to try and disrupt the match. As it turned out, her decision to undergo the journey was pivotal, delaying the journey by fifteen days and buying Pimentel time to travel north; "those few days gave time for the person who came from Spain to propose the marriage with the Infanta to reach Lyon in time to break off that with Savoie."⁶⁷⁵ News of the Spanish offer was an incredible relief for Anne, who had all but given up hope that the match would ever come to fruition.⁶⁷⁶ Wasting no time on the matter, she and Mazarin moved at once to introduce the proposal to Louis, ultimately securing his blessing to pursue it further.

⁶⁷¹ Hughes de Lionne, *Négociations*, p. 34. The queen mothers's "forte passion" for the marriage was a point of emphasis from the start of negotiations.

⁶⁷² Motteville, *Memoirs*, p. 150.

⁶⁷³ Benavides, *Milicia y Diplomacia*, p. 591. Spanish lack of interest in the match in the period immediately following Lionne's failed mission were a source of frustration for the queen mother; "Las negociaciones acerca del posible matrimonio entre Luis XIV y la infanta María Teresa estaban en situación de absoluta atonía desde que dos años antes fracasaran las gestiones de Lionne en Madrid y la reina Ana se sentía cada vez más frustrada y furiosa ante el silencio de Madrid y el exhibicionismo de Maria Mancini y Luis, que no ocultaban su enamoramiento."

⁶⁷⁴ Motteville, *Memoirs*, p. 155.

⁶⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

⁶⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 161. "...she was sad at losing finally the hope that her niece the infanta might give her grandchildren who would be of her blood on both sides."

Although Anne was not physically present during negotiations, her ability to represent the benefits of a Spanish match and facilitate amicable relations between the two sides played an indispensable part in their success. During this period, with Louis' gradual emergence as a capable and assertive leader, Anne began to see a gradual diminishment in her political influence. Disagreements with Mazarin over the king's affair with the Cardinal's niece— which resulted in a permanent estrangement after the queen-mother brutally rejected the notion that the relationship might be taken seriously— further undermined her authority in the court.⁶⁷⁷ Faced with a situation where “she could not now prevent herself from seeing that she no longer had any influence, or from feeling pained by its loss,” she nevertheless continued to insert herself into matters pertaining to the king's marriage.⁶⁷⁸ To this end, at least by her own estimation, she was incredibly successful, taking credit for undermining the Savoyard marriage in Lyon; “she was convinced that without her the king would have married the Princess Marguerite; for he would at once have so strongly committed himself that when the offers of Spain were received it might have been difficult to meet them as they deserved to be met.”⁶⁷⁹ In addition to edging Louis toward the Infanta, Anne also made sure to actively engage with Spanish representatives. After Pimentel arrived in Paris, for instance, the queen-mother met with him in a private audience likely to learn more about his mission and make preparations for its favorable outcome.⁶⁸⁰ Anne also hosted Don Juan of Austria, the illegitimate son of Philip IV, on his return from Flanders, “[receiving] him at the Val-de-Grace, and [feeling] no doubt much joy in seeing one of her own blood.”⁶⁸¹ Pulling him aside to meet in total secrecy, the queen-mother spoke to the governor of the Netherlands for nearly an hour before taking him to see the king. As these private audiences demonstrate, even while Anne's relative influence in her son's court was diminishing, she still played a crucial role easing relations and keeping diplomatic efforts moving forward.

In Spain, Anne's participation in the marriage project also lent considerable weight to the enterprise, assuaging fears about French machinations and bolstering confidence in the good benefits of the agreement. Despite not having seen each other in over forty years, Philip IV and Anne managed to maintain the strong personal bond established during their early childhood. This bond was particularly crucial for Philip IV, who had a considerable amount to lose not only politically but also personally. Knowing that Anne resided in the French court, however, made it easier for the Spanish king to frame the marriage in positive terms whereby he would not be delivering Maria Theresa over to Mazarin or other hostile agents, but rather his sister; “where I will hand her over to her aunt, who notifies me that she greatly desires to see me resting assured that I do not lack nor have I ever lacked the affection of a good brother.”⁶⁸² Critically, even though time and distance had seen their interests diverge, Philip IV continued to hold Anne in high regard and view her as a close familial ally with shared objectives. In the context of peace negotiations, Philip IV's perception of his sister had immense implications because it was

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 171-172.

⁶⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 180.

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 169

⁶⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 172

⁶⁸¹ Ibid., p. 173. For Philip IV explaining how he originally sent Don Juan to lift the spirits of his vassals see Philip IV, *Correspondencia*, p. 213. For more on Don Juan see Ignacio Ruiz Rodríguez, *Don Juan José de Austria en la Monarquía Hispánica: Entre la política, el poder y la intriga*, (Madrid: Dykinson, 2007).

⁶⁸² Philip IV, *Cartas*, p. 423. “donde se la entregare a su tia la qual me escribe q esta con gran alborozo para verme y a buen seguro q no me falta a mi ni pues no a faltado en mi jamas el cariño de buen hermano.” Diplomatic correspondences also emphasized the fact that Maria Theresa was to be handed over specifically to Anne. For an example see Luis de Haro to Don Fernando de Contreras, AGS, Est., K-1622, fol. 66, 27 Sept 1659.

thought that Anne's genuine commitment to the match would be sufficient to rein in Mazarin. Touching upon this point in a letter sent to Haro, the monarch maintained "that is not likely that the Cardinal [Mazarin] dares to disrupt the peace in light of the strong desire that the King and Queen possess for the marriage."⁶⁸³ Although she was not physically present during the negotiation of Maria Theresa's marriage, Anne still did have the opportunity to actively contribute through her correspondences with Hugh de Lionne and Mazarin, who opted to write to the king and queen-mother to buy time and seek council on difficult issues.⁶⁸⁴ Spaniards were all too aware of Anne's contributions and the added pressure that she brought to bear on the Cardinal to finalize the union— something they counted on working to their advantage at the peace conferences being held in Fuenterrabía.

Held on August 19, 1659, the third conference between Haro and Mazarin did little to inspire confidence in the viability of a strategic marriage alliance. Having spent the first two meetings resolving minor details, Haro found his opponent to be uncooperative and evasive when the time finally arrived to get down to business, writing afterward that the Cardinal spent the six long hours actively avoiding any concrete treatment of the marriage conditions in favor of a more general discussion of the fortresses to be exchanged in the final peace.⁶⁸⁵ For Haro, the apprehensions naturally produced by this refusal to treat the union were compounded by the fact that Pimentel had not once discussed specific marriage conditions with the French during his time in Louis XIV's court—a surprising revelation that Haro only appears to have learned after arriving in Fuenterrabía and questioning Pimentel directly. In light of these two developments, Haro could not help but confess that he continued to harbor strong feelings of mistrust (*recelo*) rooted in the impossibility of finalizing a peace with total security, as well as his fear that the French "on the subject of the terms for the marriage, they will propose to me one [a demand] so exorbitant that it will undermine the treaty due to it being impossible to grant."⁶⁸⁶ Still, despite his personal misgivings, Haro pledged to suspend any final judgment of French intentions until they did something to confirm his suspicions. In the meantime, doing his best to treat the negotiations with patience and open-mindedness, he emerged from the first conference with three major conclusions. The first was that the main impetus for dynastic rapprochement in France was coming from Anne and Louis XIV, whose demand for the marriage must have been significant to override stiff opposition from Mazarin. The second was that the greatest obstacle to the marriage continued to be the Cardinal himself, whose actions and words proved beyond a doubt that he still favored a Savoyard alliance that "for his security and self-interest should be deemed most convenient."⁶⁸⁷ Finally, he related how the general outlook among the French contingent was bleak, with their conversations revealing that they, like Haro, generally doubted the attainability of a workable peace.

In spite of the bad impression left by their early encounter, Haro and Mazarin began making headway with the marriage when, less than a week later, they came together to discuss

⁶⁸³ Fernando de Contreras to Luis de Haro, *Ibid.*, K-1623, fol. 54, 25 Aug 1659. ["que no es tan facil que el Cardenal [Mazarin] se atreva a romper la Paz con el gran deseo que el Rey y la Reyna tienen del casamiento."]

⁶⁸⁴ Lionne, *Négociations*, pp. 35-37. Also see Luis de Haro to Philip IV, AGS, Est., K-1623, fol. 55, 26 Aug 1659.

⁶⁸⁵ Luis de Haro to Philip IV, *Ibid.*, fol. 49, 20 Aug 1659. ["siempre se ha apartado de entrar en la materia, y solo ha ponderado las muchas Plazas que se nos buelven en consideracion deste casamiento, q es lo que ultimamente me va poniendo en mayor recato."]

⁶⁸⁶ *Ibid.* ["en materia de condiciones del casamiento, me propongan alguna tan exorvitante que pueda turbar el tratado por ser imposible de conceder."]

⁶⁸⁷ *Ibid.* ["para su seguridad y combeniencias propias devia de juzgar por mas combeniente."]

the renunciation clause to be included in the final agreement. The first day of debate, hosted on August 23rd, lasted five hours with both sides pushing for terms favorable for their respective crowns. Appreciating the dangers posed by a distant French claim, Haro stubbornly insisted on the incorporation of an indisputable, legally binding renunciation of all of the Infanta's claims to the Habsburg inheritance.⁶⁸⁸ Mazarin, for his part, clearly did not anticipate such stiff resistance, and vehemently pushed for a clause far less rigid and comprehensive than the one made by Anne in 1612. With neither side willing to give ground, the intense debate over the renunciation eventually spilled over onto the 24th before an exasperated Mazarin opted to write Anne and Louis to inform them of the impasse and seek their advice. Writing Madrid, Haro defended his obstinacy in negotiations with the Cardinal by claiming; "I can do nothing else but stubbornly resist on every point, like I am currently doing, and I will continue to do so leaving them without the remotest hope that I could ever be persuaded to tolerate such prejudicial demands."⁶⁸⁹ In Haro's opinion, Pimentel's prior lack of success had directly resulted from his failure to stand his ground in negotiations against the aggressive and unrelenting Mazarin, who was not afraid to raise his voice, throw fits, and make menacing threats to get his way.⁶⁹⁰ If the Spanish continued to concede on important points, he insisted, Mazarin would continue to "believe that they will be able to get with whatever they want by merely threatening to break the peace."⁶⁹¹ Therefore, it was imperative that they adopt a new approach of unrelenting defiance aimed at reining in the Cardinal and stiffening Spain's sagging diplomatic backbone. Given their vulnerable international position, adopting such an approach obviously came with considerable risks as it required Haro to walk a fine line between war and peace and accurately call Mazarin's bluffs. Nevertheless, the *valido* remained confident that Mazarin's threats were empty and through sheer force of will he could compensate for Spain's weak position and settle on terms favorable for Philip IV.⁶⁹²

More than just an attempt at improving Spain's bargaining position, Haro's decision to act firmly and decisively without first consulting Madrid was also intended to limit the input of imprudent voices in the capital. Unlike in 1612, when Philip III summoned celebrated jurists and theologians to consider the legality of Anne's renunciation, the Spanish monarchy was caught unprepared in 1659 for the question of how to effectively sever Maria Theresa's claim to the throne.⁶⁹³ Left without specific orders for how to treat the renunciation, to say nothing of a well-developed legal framework to operate within, Haro did what he deemed necessary to protect the

⁶⁸⁸ Luis de Haro to Philip IV, *Ibid.*, fol. 55, 26 Aug 1659.

⁶⁸⁹ *Ibid.* ["Yo no puedo hacer otra cosa, que resistir constantemente a todos, como lo hago, y lo hare sin dejarles la mas remota esperanza de que yo puedo jamas ser persuadido a consentir en semejantes perjuicios."]

⁶⁹⁰ Luis de Haro to Don Fernando de Contreras, *Ibid.*, K-1622, fol. 41, 26 Aug 1659. ["al Cardenal no le pueda quedar ninguna esperanza de haverme de vencer sobre ellos ni con la consecuencia ni con las amenazas como lo hacia en todo tan facilmente con Pimentel."]

⁶⁹¹ Luis de Haro to Philip IV, *Ibid.*, K-1623, fol. 55, 26 Aug 1659. ["creer que se han de salir con quanto quisieren yntentar, con solo amenazarnos que romperá la Paz."]

⁶⁹² *Ibid.* ["y aun pasan ellos mismos [franceses] a creer, que el Cardenal no la ha podido impedir, aunque lo ha deseado."]

⁶⁹³ *Consulta* of the Council of State, *Ibid.*, K-1618, fol. 37, 29 Aug 1659. From the outset, the Spanish Council of State's main priority was concluding the marriage negotiations as quickly as possible. To this end, they paid little attention to the renunciation, instead opting to merely copy Anne's earlier document. ["es de parecer el Consejo no se deve poner muchos embarazos en el sino ordenar a Don Luis este constante en que las capitulaciones que se hicieron en esta ocasion no han de tener mas hechura que el copiar las que se hicieron quando el cassamiento de la S'ra' Reyna Dona Ana..."]

long-term interests of the crown. In acting without explicit instructions, the valido knew that he was likely deviating from the general consensus of the Council of State— something he openly acknowledged in a letter to Fernando de Contreras; “I believe that if it had first been voted on by that Council of State, it is possible that they would have advised that I proceed with less resolve.”⁶⁹⁴ As Haro’s comments reveal, not all of the counselors advising the king shared the same pragmatic appreciation of the dangers of the French match. In fact, their input reflected the same blind faith in the inevitability of Habsburg preponderance that had informed dynastic policy in the previous century. On the persistence of this line of thinking in the council, Haro wrote;

“Considering that some of those who are part of the Council were of the opinion that the Lady Infanta should be given to the Christian King when your majesty did not have a male son, I do not believe that be it would be too great a leap for them to now be of the opinion that no renunciation be drafted, and that we do not contest this point the same as others.”⁶⁹⁵

The potential for dynastic and reason of state logic to come into conflict persisted through the reign of Philip IV, manifesting itself in disagreements over which issues should take priority in the negotiation of new royal unions. These disagreements were particularly significant in the context of Maria Theresa’s negotiations as they placed constant pressure on Haro— who otherwise preferred to take his time and secure every possible advantage— to take a less rigid stance on key points and finalize the agreement as quickly as possible.

Even more physically taxing for Haro than the pressure from Madrid was that placed on him by Mazarin. On August 27th, the French cardinal opened another conference, lasting between six to seven hours, by informing Haro that for both Anne and Louis “his resistance [on the point of the renunciation] appeared to be outside the realm of reason, and contrary to what had always been implied.”⁶⁹⁶ Given the importance of the union for the successful procurement of peace, however, they were willing to reduce their demands in hopes of finding a compromise. By the terms of their new offer, Maria Theresa would be allowed to renounce her claims to Castile, the Indies, Aragon, and Italian territories, but would have to retain her rights to the Low Countries. Finding the new proposal equally distasteful, Haro immediately and unequivocally rejected it as a prejudicial arrangement. As he explained, not only would it be unfair for Philip IV to treat one dominion differently from the rest, “nor have those subjects done anything to merit his Majesty demonstrating any less devotion and care with regard to their union and preservation with this crown than [he shows] to any of the other [kingdoms].”⁶⁹⁷ Continuing to stand firm on this point, even in the face Mazarin’s idle threats, Haro made it clear that he could not in good faith address any further issue as long as the French continued to insist on a demand

⁶⁹⁴ Luis de Haro to Don Fernando de Contreras, *Ibid.*, K-1622, fol. 40b, 23 Aug 1659. [“Creo que si se ubiera votado primero en esse Consejo de Estado, fuera posible que ubieran aconsejado que se procediera con menos resolucion.”]

⁶⁹⁵ *Ibid.* [“Algunos de los que estan en el que fue de Parecer de que se diera la Señora Infanta al Rey Xpianisimo quando su Mg’d’ no tenia hijo varon no creo que reparara aora mucho en ser de parecer que no hiciera ninguna renunciacion, y que no se disputara tanpoco este punto como otros.”]

⁶⁹⁶ Luis de Haro to Philip IV, *Ibid.*, K-1623, fol. 56, 28 Aug 1659. [“les havia parecido muy fuera de razon mi resistencia [con la renunciacion], y muy contraria a lo que siempre se havia supuesto.”]

⁶⁹⁷ *Ibid.* [“ni aquellos vasallos havian merecido que VMag’d’ les mostrase menos amor y cuydado de su union y conserbacion con esta corona que ninguno de todos los otros.”]

that was utterly impossible to accept. In the end, Haro's obstinacy had the desired effect, with Mazarin finally agreeing to accept a thorough renunciation—a hard-won victory that had driven Haro to confess after the first week of negotiations that "I have never seen myself so fatigued in body and spirit or more pressed for time."⁶⁹⁸

An Ill-Fated Alliance

With the successful settlement of the renunciation issue, it fell to one of the empire's leading experts, Francisco Ramos del Manzano, to provide the legal justification for Maria Theresa abandoning her rightful claim. A renowned jurist serving as one of Spain's plenipotentiary ambassadors during negotiations with France in 1659, Manzano was in an ideal situation to advise the Spanish monarchy. Possessing a combination of formal legal training, prolific historical knowledge, and practical political experience, he was capable of synthesizing vast amounts of information, sorting conflicting arguments, and providing sound judgments supported by concrete evidence. His *consulta*, written to provide Haro with more information about the "political convenience, justification, and history of similar renunciations" and then later read in its entirety by Philip IV, provided the most comprehensive and insightful account of Habsburg dynastic policy vis-à-vis France written during the early modern period.⁶⁹⁹ Spanning a little over sixty-eight double-sided folios and covering a range of topics, it reveals how by the middle 17th century marriage politics was being treated in a more conscious and sophisticated way in hopes of accentuating its advantages and minimizing the evident dangers that it posed to both the Spanish Empire and Europe's international order.⁷⁰⁰

In opening his *consulta*, Manzano first took the time to defend the monarchy's continued reliance on marriage diplomacy, as well as acknowledge its practical limitations. For Manzano, the value of royal unions resided in their singular ability to facilitate interstate relations and engender peace. Emphasizing these benefits, the opening lines of his *consulta* read;

"The marriages between royals have always been and appeared to be the most natural link for strengthening the union and relationship between the Kings and their kingdoms, and the political medium best suited for restoring and establishing peace when they have been severed by the outbreak of war."⁷⁰¹

A student of history, Manzano pointed out how initially these bonds were forged at a local level between the different Iberian kingdoms before eventually extending, after the rise of the Habsburgs, to also include the French monarchy. Still, just because they were the most effective medium for procuring peace did not mean that royal unions were always arranged in good faith. Brutally frank about rulers' natural preoccupation with glory, power and territorial aggrandizement, Manzano recognized that all ages had witnessed the blatant abuse of these alliances to conceal disingenuous political designs and personal ambitions. As a result, the peace

⁶⁹⁸ Luis de Haro to Don Fernando de Contreras, *Ibid.*, K-1622, fol. 41, 26 Aug 1659. ["jamás me he visto más fatigado de cuerpo y espíritu ni más estrecho de tiempo."]

⁶⁹⁹ Manzano, *Consulta*, fol. 1r. ["combeniencia política, justificación, y histtoria de semejantes renunciaciones."]

⁷⁰⁰ Rowen, *The King's State*, pp. 98-102. Manzano's work would come into direct conflict with treatises produced by French jurists, such as Rene Bilain.

⁷⁰¹ Manzano, *Consulta*, fol. 2r. ["Los casamientos entre las personas reales siempre han sido y parecido el vinculo mas natural para estrechar la union y correspondencia entre los Reyes y sus reynos, y el medio mas proporcionado y politico para restituir y establecer la paz quando se ha llegado avider con la rotura de una Guerra."]

made by marriages could hardly be expected to last; “these bonds are stretched, and sustain with weakness and short duration the peace between kingdoms, and are easily broken or are loosened when confronted by the interests of sovereignty and state.”⁷⁰² Marriages forged between nations and kings with “an ancient and established rivalry,” such as that existing between Spain and France, were highlighted as being particularly susceptible to disingenuous motives, with Manzano likening attempts to unite ancient enemies to trying to blend iron and mud.⁷⁰³

In defending the merits of marriage diplomacy, in spite of its evident limitations, Manzano’s *consulta* deviated notably from earlier opinions written by Spanish jurists and theologians. For those summoned to consider Anne’s marriage in 1612, the impossibility of securing lasting accord through marital ties was enough to convince many that a renunciation clause was insufficient to prevent a foreign claim. It also undermined their confidence in rapprochement with France. Influenced by a new political pragmatism, rooted in reason of state thinking, that laid bare the lies, hypocrisies and insincerities that had previously justified royal unions, they supported a dynastic policy that prioritized the empire’s well-being over short-term interests of honor, glory, and power. Manzano agreed with the basic premise underlying his predecessors’ criticism of a French match— namely that royal unions were inadequate to engender peace or provide long-term benefits— but disagreed with their conclusion that such alliances were solely detrimental to the interests of the state;

“Notwithstanding these misgivings arising from the limited stability and security of peace consecrated with marriages between kings with different or conflicting interests, they should never be held in contempt... because they are without a doubt the most dignified motive and pretext for bringing an end to conflict and introducing peace between kings, as well as for exiting from a war that is not easy to end on account of reputation... it cannot be denied that although the peace attained through marriages between princes cannot be firmly ensured nor be used to root out the passions and maxims of monarchial interest and state, it attains at the very least the present benefit of temporarily suspending them from being carried on.”⁷⁰⁴

Ignoring the notions of perpetual goodwill, divine providence, and Christian brotherhood, Manzano emphasized the potential of strategic peacemaking between rival monarchies to relieve the crushing burden of a costly war. In doing so, he sought to lay bare the real motives behind Habsburg dynastic policy, readjust contemporary expectations for what could be achieved through a wedding of two royal houses, and frame rapprochement in a way that reflected political realities. Given that these alliances were temporary, lasting only as long as it took for the marriage to be finalized and one side to recuperate their losses, he advised in an adjoining point (*consideración*) that patience be shown in negotiations in order to prolong them as long as

⁷⁰² Ibid., fols. 5v-r. [“estos lazos los estrechan, y zinen con devilidad, y poca duracion para la paz de los Reynos, y que facilmente se rompen, o, aflojan en llegando a encontrarse con intereses de la soberanía y estado.”]

⁷⁰³ Ibid., fol. 6r. [“una antigua y profesada oposición.”]

⁷⁰⁴ Ibid., fols. 6r- 7v. [“Sin embargo destos recelos de la poca estabilidad y seguridad de paces firmadas con casamientos entre Reyes de diferentes o contrarios intereses, nunca se deve desestimar... porq sin duda es el motibo o el pretexto mas decoroso para deponer las Armas y introducir la paz entre los Principes y para salir de una guerra de que no es fácil retirarse con reputación... no puede negarse que aun para la paz con los casamientos entre Principes aunque ni la aseguran durablemente, ni desarraigan las pasiones y maximas de sus yntereses y estado, se consigue a lo menos el veneficio presente de suspenderlas en la ejecución y que las adormezca por algun tiempo...”]

possible and thereby “with the benefit and duration of the peace attain as quickly as possible the advantage that it promises.”⁷⁰⁵ In rationalizing the intentional prolongation of peace proceedings, the *consulta* articulated a distinct brand of political pragmatism that shedded the passivity of earlier generations, who had hesitated to reject outright the notion of perpetual peace, and called for the active manipulation of royal unions to secure advantages.

Manzano’s support of royal unions strategically arranged with continental rivals did not preclude recognition of the evident dangers that these arrangements posed. When entering into new diplomatic agreements, the Spanish invariably had to account for the lack of binding power that the documents possessed. Touching upon this concern in his second adjoining point, Manzano explained how even in instances where strenuous pains were taken to draft detailed clauses, there was still a potential for controversy; “irrespective of how many chains and knots included in clauses to increase their firmness and the strength of the contract, there is never a shortage of ways to escape from their obligation.”⁷⁰⁶ The problem posed by an absence of mechanisms to ensure that international agreements were honored and effectively implemented was particularly acute when dealing with the French, whose long history of disingenuous dealings and dishonorable breaches of contract were a major source of concern.⁷⁰⁷ Drawing from the Habsburgs own historical record to support this characterization, Manzano showed how during the previous marriage alliance several powerful French statesman had attempted to undermine the legality of Anne’s renunciation even after it was finalized on the grounds of her age and Spain’s lack of Salic law. He also included evidence from earlier sources that represented the extent of French ambitions and their true motivation for pursuing rapprochement, namely the overthrow of Habsburg power and the unification of the crowns.⁷⁰⁸

Given the vulnerability of any agreement signed with the French to arbitrary termination or withdrawal, the Spanish monarchy ultimately had to determine whether the political rewards of Maria Theresa’s marriage outweighed the risks. For generations, accepting the potential negative ramifications of an ill-fated alliance had been an unavoidable feature of dynastic politics between both traditional allies and continental rivals. In fact, during the previous century, Habsburg rulers had arranged several unions with the French, including Eleanor’s marriage to Francis in 1529 and the unfulfilled match between the duke of Orleans, Charles II, and the Infanta Maria, sealed in 1544, without the added legal protection of an unconditional renunciation clause.⁷⁰⁹ In addition to these two marriages, there was also the medieval union between Louis VIII and Blanche of Castile. Citing these three examples in his *consulta*, Manzano warned that the French might try and reference the historical record in hopes of undermining Anne’s renunciation in 1612 and attaining more advantageous terms; “the French take advantage of these examples in order to contrast them with the renunciation of the Lady Queen Dona Anne, and expect that today the Lady Infanta will not renounce [her claim] like in

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid., no fol. [“con el veneficio, y duración de la paz asegurar quanto antes para su estado la ventaja que ha pretendido.”] The folio has no page number, but is located between fols. 7-8.

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid., fol. 8v. [“por mas cadenas y nudos de cláusulas que se añaden para firmeza y fuerza de un contrato, nunca le faltan formas que mudar aproteo para escapar de su obligación.”]

⁷⁰⁷ Ibid., fol. 8r. In the words of one outside scholar cited in the *consulta*, Frenchman were [“sotiles y pleyteosos y muy engañosos y dañossos a todos aquellos que han pleytear con ellos.”]

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid., fols. 9r-11v.

⁷⁰⁹ Ibid., fols. 11v.-16r.

the other three instances.”⁷¹⁰ Still, despite this difficulty and the added complications posed by a lack of binding force in the renunciation, Manzano weighed in favor of the marriage. His reason for supporting the union was simple; if the majority of Spanish statesman had decided forty years earlier to support Anne’s marriage in spite of the dangers, then it only made sense that they pursue Maria Theresa’s marriage in the present. After all, the current alliance, he insisted, promised even greater rewards than its predecessor; “with even greater reason on this occasion in which the advantage and present benefit of the peace that will be attained with this marriage, obliges one to treat it.”⁷¹¹ Juxtaposing the 1659 match with the double alliances signed in 1612 allowed Spaniards to downplay the evident risks posed by Maria Theresa’s betrothal. Everyone understood that the new alliance placed the monarchical line of succession under direct threat of a foreign usurpation. But, by reframing the union as a prudent diplomatic initiative that corresponded with a successful historical precedent, they were able to make sense of their policy and proceed with the project.

Having made a case for the pursuit of Maria Theresa’s marriage, Manzano next focused on the political justification and legal foundations for the renunciation. According to the Spanish jurist, the pretext for the Infanta’s repudiation of her claim to the Habsburg inheritance was the great benefit that it would provide to the public welfare (*causa pública*)— a concept inherited from Roman law that was used to represent the well-being of the state and its constituent kingdoms, and whose application to dynastic politics was likely catalyzed by the emergence of reason of state thinking earlier in the century.⁷¹² More specifically, the origins of *causa pública* as the underlying justification for a thorough renunciation could be found in a critical section in Anne’s previous marriage documents which stated; “and for what matters for the public state and conservation of both crowns, being so large that they shall not unify nor be allowed to unify by resolutions, and on the basis of equality and advantage that is intended.”⁷¹³ Upon closer examination, Manzano insisted that the short passage contained three distinct arguments, each tied to public welfare, that remained pertinent to Maria Theresa’s renunciation. First, and most critically, the incompatibility of the Spanish kingdoms and France meant that any attempt to unite the two would inevitably result in “considerable turmoil and ruin.”⁷¹⁴ For the well-being of Spaniards— who history had shown could not bear the French yoke— it was vital that they remain independent. Second, the unification of the two crowns and the rise of a hegemonic power would spell disaster for Europe’s international order— an argument that forsook the Habsburgs’ earlier pretensions to universal monarchy. As Manzano clarified, while the notion of one universal monarch and a unified Christendom may have appealed to some, its actual realization would require the destruction of numerous monarchies. It would also likely result in a unified coalition of smaller states “to stand against it in the way that this same designation unjustly attributed by its contenders to the most dignified house of Austria has provoked the zeal

⁷¹⁰ Ibid., fol. 16r. [“los franceses se valiesen de estos exemplares para contraponerlos al de la renunciacion de la Señora Reyna Dona Ana, y pretender que oy no renuncie la Señora Ynfanta como no se renuncio en los tres referidos.”]

⁷¹¹ Ibid., fol. 17r. [“Con mas razon en esta ocasion en que la combeniencia y el veneficio presentte de la paz que con este cassamiento se consigue, obligo a tratar del.”]

⁷¹² Howell A. Lloyd, *Jean Bodin, 'This Pre-Eminent Man of France': An Intellectual Biography*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 46.

⁷¹³ Manzano, *Consulta*, fol. 19r. [“y por lo que ymporta al estado publico y conserbacion de ambas coronas, que siendo tan grandes no se junten y queden prevenidas las decisiones que podria haver de juntarse, y en razon de la ygualdad y combeniencia que se pretende.”]

⁷¹⁴ Ibid., fol. 20r. [“notable turbacion y ruina.”]

and armed and unified opposition of the majority of European powers.”⁷¹⁵ Finally, there was the imperative need to maintain strict equality (*ygualdad*) between the contracting parties. As a result of French Salic law, which excluded French princesses from inheriting the throne, the incorporation of a renunciation clause was the only way to ensure that both sides were on an even foot and consecrate their good will toward one another.⁷¹⁶

Manzano was firmly convinced that if the notion of *causa pública* could justify the repudiation of a royal claim in 1612, then so too could it justify a similar act in 1659. After all, the former was made during a period of peace, while the latter was being arranged in the wake of 24 years of bloody conflict thereby amplifying its positive impact. When it came time to consider the legal foundations (*fundamentos jurídicos*) of Maria Theresa’s renunciation, Manzano heavily emphasized the fact that the marriage was being arranged “with the ultimate objective of the public cause of peace and universal good” to counter French objections.⁷¹⁷ For instance, there was their insistence that the renunciation was invalid because it was prejudicial to the inheritance rights of the Infanta and her descendants. By Manzano’s own admission, this objection was “in all honesty, the most substantial according to the known rules of law.”⁷¹⁸ Nevertheless, he insisted, even if the clause was prejudicial “the cause of peace as much as that of the public good must overrule and be shown preference before any and all rights and particular interests.”⁷¹⁹ Manzano’s defense of the legality of the Infanta’s renunciation represents the apogee of Spanish reason of state logic vis-à-vis marriage politics— a fully elaborated legal discourse that maintained that the public good and well-being of the state provided sufficient grounds for thoroughly excising God-given dynastic claims. Previously, when notions of lasting accord and brotherhood justified imprudent alliances, it would have been difficult to defend such a thorough renunciation without exposing the obvious hypocrisy of the monarchy’s policy. Indeed, all of the historical examples provided by Manzano to establish the precedent for such agreements failed to capture the scale and complexity of what the Spanish sought to achieve with Anne and Maria Theresa. Once it became possible, though, to conceive of marriage politics as an instrument of the state and not solely of the dynasty, so too did it become possible to rationalize both the inclusion of contractual safeguards in marriage capitulations to protect the monarchial line of succession, and the development of a legal framework to preserve these safeguards.

The final half of Manzano’s *consulta* considered the provisions and supplementary clauses most critical for augmenting the binding power of the renunciation. Throughout a tenure marked by a heavy reliance on marriage politics to expand their influence and reinforce their authority, the Habsburgs had to repeatedly contend with the same persistent problem; how to obligate foreign kingdoms to continue honoring vital agreements, such as a renunciation, even after it was no longer advantageous for them to do so. More often than not, the monarchy’s preoccupation with this problem— which stemmed from the lack of international mechanisms to hold states accountable—manifested itself in a discernible obsession with historical precedent and contractual details. Ambassadors and statesman painstakingly poured over each and every

⁷¹⁵ Ibid., fols. 22v-r. [“para oponersele de la manera que este mismo [designio injustamente atribuido por sus emulos a la Augustísima cassa de Austria le a suscitad siempre los zelos y la enemistad armada y unida delas demas potencias de europa.”]

⁷¹⁶ Ibid., fol. 23v.

⁷¹⁷ Ibid., fol. 25r. [“por fin principal la causa publica de la paz y bien universal.”]

⁷¹⁸ Ibid., fol. 28v. [“a la verdad mas considerable segun reglas legales conocidas.”]

⁷¹⁹ Ibid., fol. 29r. [“la causa de la paz como publica deve preponderar y preferirse a quales quier derechos y ynttereses particulares.”]

word in order to correct errors and ensure that the framing of the terms corresponded with earlier models. In addition, careful steps were taken to increase the perceived legitimacy of the treaty in order to bolster its binding power. Hoping to safeguard the long-term interests of the Spanish empire in this way, Manzano made several recommendations for how the monarchy should proceed. For example, with regard to how the renunciation agreement should be framed vis-à-vis the peace treaty, he insisted that the two must be inextricably linked so as to ensure that the benefit of *causa pública* derived from the peace could likewise be identified with the renunciation.⁷²⁰ He also pushed Philip IV to solicit approval of the act from the empire's constituent kingdoms, and to fight for the inclusion of a clause requiring the Paris Parliament to ratify it before the marriage was celebrated.⁷²¹

The most controversial recommendation involved Pope Alexander VII, whom the jurist adamantly insisted should also play a central role in blessing and approving the Infanta's renouncement of a royal claim. This addition—modeled after the 12th point in Anne's marriage capitulations—was problematic due to the French monarchy's tendency to jealously guard its political prerogatives and oppose any exercise of papal authority in secular affairs.⁷²² It was also complicated by Alexander's prior lack of involvement in the peace proceedings, which would naturally make it more difficult to justify his sudden intervention in a key issue. These complications aside, papal support was critical for obtaining the compliance of Sicily and Naples and for strengthening the final agreement. As Manzano explained, with a papal dispensation and apostolic approval “enough will have been obtained for Sicily and Naples to support the renunciation of Sicily and Naples, and with the inclusion of the referred to points in the brief of dispensation, they will be confirmed...which is the best and most effective way of confirming according to the recognized rules of law.”⁷²³ During the 17th century, the majority of Europe's powerful kingdoms, including France, gradually distanced themselves from papal control and asserted their sovereignty in dynastic matters. Mindful of the stakes of royal marriages for state interests, they challenged the Pope's authority to determine who could marry, and thus shape diplomatic alignments on the continent. In contrast, the Spanish continued to respect the Pope's legislative and judicial power over marriage, seeking his public support in the elaboration of the Habsburg familial network.⁷²⁴ Contrary to what Manzano wrote, this was a reliance on Rome that ultimately did Spain a disservice by not only narrowly shrinking the marriage market, but also complicating their acquisition of new alliances.

Despite the confident impression conveyed throughout the *consulta* with regard to the attainability of a binding renunciation, in the end, Manzano could not help but acknowledge the ultimate susceptibility of the agreement to forces outside of the monarchy's control. The Spanish monarchy was no stranger to the fickleness of fate nor did it fail to appreciate the ease with which an unexpected tragedy could alter the trajectory of their empire.⁷²⁵ The well-read jurist

⁷²⁰ Manzano, *Consulta*, fols. 37v-38r.

⁷²¹ *Ibid.*, fols. 39v-48v.

⁷²² *Ibid.*, fol. 50r.

⁷²³ *Ibid.*, fol. 52v. [“se habra obtenido la suficiente para apoyo [de la renunciacion de Sicilia y Napoles, y con la ynsersion de lo referido en las otras del Breve de la dispensacion quedaran confirmados... que es la mejor y mas eficaz forma de confirmacion segun reglas conocidas de derecho.”]

⁷²⁴ *Consulta* of Council of State, AGS, Est., K-1618, fol. 124, 7 Dec 1659. A copy of the letter sent to Pope Alexander VII requesting a papal dispensation can be found at Luis de Haro to Philip IV, *Ibid.*, K-1623, fol. 68, 1 Sept 1659.

⁷²⁵ Felipe IV, *Correspondencia*, pp. 198-199; Stradling, *Philip IV*, pp. 239-245.

revealed as much in his writings, qualifying his legal argument and recognizing the impossibility of fully guaranteeing the monarchial line of succession;

“In the first place as deserves to be recognized, the providence of Kings and their Ministers in the marriages of their sons and daughters outside of their kingdoms has not always prevented with capitulated renunciations the cases in which by the lack of male offspring of the royal line that the succession of the crowns came down to the daughters or sisters, and through their persons to foreign princes, both their husbands and descendants.”⁷²⁶

Regardless of the legal precautions taken to authorize the Infanta’s renunciation, the binding power of the agreement was contingent upon the physical reproduction of healthy male heirs. If Philip IV failed to fulfill this key dynastic obligation, thus securing the monarchial line of succession, there was no way to prevent France from pursuing a claim through his daughter or her descendants. It is surprising, given the importance of the renunciation for the long-term stability of the empire, that Manzano did not write about the dangers posed by this contingency at greater length. In fact, he only treated the matter— which foreshadowed with striking accuracy the political consequences of the Infanta’s marriage and the extinguishment of the Habsburg line in Spain— on the one occasion cited above.

Manzano’s avoidance of the only contingency which could effectively undermine Maria Theresa’s renunciation indicates a synthesis of reason of state and dynastic logic in the context of negotiations with France. As a whole, the *consulta*, with its careful consideration of the long-term interests of the empire, was clearly more influenced by the former line of thinking. At the same time, however, the work communicated a conspicuous faith in the immutability of the Habsburg dynasty, most evident in the assumption that the recent birth of a male prince, Philip Prospero, was sufficient to ensure that the rightful line of succession remained unbroken. Touching upon the critical role played by the heir apparent in making his eldest sister’s marriage possible, Manzano reminded his reader how “it was first excluded because your Majesty did not have a legitimate heir to succeed and then upon having him, the possibility of the treaty opened up mindful of the risk ... that the succession of this monarchy was exposed to for the sake of peace.”⁷²⁷ The political significance of Philip’s birth was immediately recognized by Spanish officials.⁷²⁸ He was a Godsend— a prince whose very name, Prospero, celebrated an auspicious beginning and a destiny of foreordained greatness. Although several of these same officials continued to recognize the risks posed by a French match after the prince’s birth, their unwavering conviction that his legitimate rule would be preserved by divine providence

⁷²⁶ Manzano, *Consulta*, fol. 18r. [“En primer lugar como quiere que se reconozca ser así, que no siempre la providencia de los Reyes y sus Ministros en los casamientos de hijas o hermanas, fuera de sus reynos han prevenido con renunciaciones capituladas los casos en que a falta de los varones de la linea real podria venir la sucesion de las Coronas a las hijas o las hermanas, y por sus personas a principes extrangeros sus Maridos o descendientes.”]

⁷²⁷ *Ibid.*, fol. 17v. [“primero se excl[uyo] porque S.M. no tenia sucesion de Principe varon y despues teniendole, se hizo abertura a este tratado con ponderacion del riesgo... que con el se exponia la sucesion de esta Monarquia por el bien de la paz.”]

⁷²⁸ Brown, *Collected Writings*, p. 177. Before the prince’s birth, Philip had proclaimed aloud to the Marquis de La Fuente, “estando la monarquía acometida de tantos y tan fuertes enemigos [...] dándonos Dio hijos varones, no hay duda de que este matrimonio seria convenientísimo.”

precluded prudent risk assessment or preparation of contingency plans in case the throne was left vacant without an heir.

Faith in the immutability of the Habsburg dynasty was such that not even the death of a royal prince was enough to precipitate a reconsideration of the Infanta's union. On December 23, 1658, one year after the birth of Philip Prospero, a second royal son was delivered and christened by the name of Ferdinand Thomas Charles. Although the child was sickly, he did much to bolster the impression that the Spanish monarchy possessed divine favor and approval. The Infante's birth also had important implications for dynastic policy, creating even greater distance between Maria Theresa and the Habsburg inheritance.⁷²⁹ Unfortunately, Ferdinand only survived ten months before dying on October 22, 1659. News of his death travelled quickly to Fuenterrabía, where it immediately complicated the finalization of Maria Theresa's marriage, but not as a result of doubts or misgivings in the Spanish camp. First touching upon the ill-timing of the tragedy, Haro wrote;

“I cannot help but tell your Majesty that the accident that occurred these days... in that court, occurred at the worst possible juncture having been at the same time that the location of the Lady Infanta's betrothal and the evacuation of the strongholds was being debated.”⁷³⁰

In communicating with the monarch, Haro did his best to be respectful of his personal loss, and not provide grounds for further emotional grief.⁷³¹ But, his main priorities continued to be the marriage and doing whatever it took to secure advantageous terms. If the prince's death was consequential at all, it was because it had occurred shortly before the signing of the peace treaty and marriage capitulations, interrupting in the process settled terms regarding the Infanta's betrothal (*desposorio*) and the exchange of strategic fortresses— two points which the valido hoped to resolve separately.

For the French, however, separating the death of the prince from ongoing negotiations was not so easily achieved. Citing newfound fears that the uncertainty of life might lead the Spanish to betray their original promises, Mazarin fought to prolong the final signing of the agreements in order to alter the established terms;

“[the death] which caused very serious harm and forced them to try and get out of that which we almost had agreed upon regarding both things, appearing to them that, with it being possible in the uncertainty of things in this life the sudden occurrence of a similar accident, they deemed it beneficial to not restore the strongholds until the Lady Infanta had already been married.”⁷³²

⁷²⁹ Stradling, *Philip IV*, p. 294.

⁷³⁰ Haro, *Letters*, p. 133. “no puedo dexar de decir a VMg'd' que el accidente sucedido estos dias... en essa corte, sobrevino en la peor coyuntura de quantas pudiera suceder por haver sido al mismo tiempo que se estava disputando aqui sobre el plazo del Desposorio de la Señora Ynfante y de la evaquacion de las Plazas.”

⁷³¹ Luis de Haro to Don Fernando de Contreras, AGS, Est., K-1622, fol. 95, 28 Oct 1659.

⁷³² Haro, *Letters*, p. 133. “Lo qual causò gravissimo perjuicio y les obligò a intentar salirse afuera de lo que ya teniamos cassi ajustado en razon de ambas cosas, pareciendoles que, siendo posible en la incertidumbre de las cosas desta vida el sobrevenir otro accidente semexante, les combenia no restituir sus Plazas hasta que la señora Ynfante se hallase despossada.”

Regardless of whether Mazarin's reaction resulted from genuine apprehension or simple political opportunism, his reference to "otro accidente semexante" shows that at least one party took seriously the possibility of Philip Prospero dying young. Conversely, the Spanish, led by the otherwise prudent Haro, continued to ignore the political implications of the Infante's premature death, or consider what might happen should the heir apparent meet a similar fate. To do so would have meant more than just laying bare their monarchy's present vulnerability. It would have meant abandoning a centuries-old dynastic outlook that took for granted the immutability of the royal line and admitting the ephemeral nature of Habsburg power—a mental leap that Spaniards were not prepared to take. Instead, Haro and his compatriots doubled down on Maria Theresa's marriage, entrusting the fate of the empire to the forces of providence, and storing faith in the promise that the sole living heir would survive and his progeny flourish.⁷³³

After the Infanta's renunciation, the second most critical point discussed at Fuenterrabía was the dowry to be paid to France. Bled dry by two decades of conflict, the Spanish monarchy appreciated its limited financial means and sought early on to arrange a settlement that would forestall an outright transfer of wealth. Initially, this desire for an alternative form of payment appeared to bear fruit, with Pimentel receiving a verbal commitment from Mazarin to accept a transfer of key fortresses in lieu of specie. By the time the topic was broached again on August 27th, however, circumstances had drastically changed. This time around, Mazarin, no doubt still irritated by Spanish obstinacy on the renunciation issue, pushed for an impossibly high dowry price of 2,000,000 escudos, "giving as his reason the desire to increase to this amount... no only the many strongholds that we would be returned... but the other motive... that times had changed significantly and that all things were now more expensive."⁷³⁴ Confounded by this exorbitant demand, Haro's first reaction was to reference Pimentel's settlement. But, in doing so, he failed to take into account the fact that France had also recently agreed to surrender fortresses to Spain, thereby nullifying the earlier deal. Realizing his error, Haro changed tactics in the heat of the moment, countering the French demand with an offer of 500,000 thousand escudos, or the amount "that they have given on other occasions."⁷³⁵

Even though this new offer seriously undercut his original demand, Mazarin found it difficult to challenge outright Haro's reference to historical precedent. More so than any other instance of Hispano-French rapprochement, Maria Theresa's union was heavily influenced by prior contractual engagements between the two crowns. The treaty of Anne and Louis XIII was particularly authoritative, with both sides using it as a template when framing and organizing the new marriage agreement. Always on the lookout for opportunities to gain the upper hand, Haro also employed Anne's treaty for more crafty purposes; citing tradition to undermine unprecedented French demands and improve his negotiating position.⁷³⁶ With respect to the

⁷³³ The optimism surrounding Philip Prospero was evident in Spanish correspondences. See, for example, AGS, Est., K-1622, fol. 98. ["oy hace dos años que estaba su Mag'd' sin ningun hijo con una guerra muy sangrienta y peligrosa sustentada contra todo el poder del mundo y sin ninguna esperanza de paz y oy se halla con un principe de dos años muy lindo y con la Paz quando menos podia esperarse."]

⁷³⁴ Luis de Haro to Philip IV, Ibid., K-1623, fol. 56, 28 Aug 1659. ["dando por razon para querer aumentar hasta esta cantidad... no solo las muchas Plazas que se nos restituian.. sino otro motibo... que fue el ser muy diferentes los tiempos y baler aora mucho mas todos los precios de las cosas."] The dowry amounted constituted a decisive break from precedent. For more on this see Legrelle, *La Diplomatie Française*, pp. 119-120.

⁷³⁵ Luis de Haro to Philip IV, AGS, Est., K-1623, fol. 56, 28 Aug 1659. ["quese han dado en otras ocasiones."]

⁷³⁶ Fernando de Contreras to Luis de Haro, Ibid., fol. 54, 25 Aug 1659. Haro was encouraged to use Anne's agreement to his advantage; ["para quando se llegue a las condiciones del casamiento pidiendo alguna que sea

Infanta's dowry, reference to previous dowry payments shifted the responsibility for justifying any deviation from standard practice to Mazarin, who had a hard time rationalizing such a steep price. His main pretext, which he reiterated in response to Haro's counter offer, was that the 2,000,000 escudos was fair in light of inflation over the past forty years—a fiscal concern which the Spanish ambassador hardly thought appropriate for such a regal occasion. In response to Mazarin's claim that the price of the escudo had changed over time, Haro declared, unabashed; "I told him that if those to be married were ordinary people, intending to buy food to eat with the dowry, than such a consideration would have merit but between such great Kings it was a very outrageous point to raise."⁷³⁷ The juxtaposition of royalty and pauperism served to trivialize the final dowry amount and make it difficult to insist on more money without appearing indigent. In defense of a smaller dowry, Haro also highlighted his own monarch's generosity; "that I would venture to say that your Majesty would hardly take note of sending each year the lady Infanta and her husband amber gloves and Spanish horses worth much more than this difference matters."⁷³⁸ Left with little recourse other than venting his frustration, Mazarin raised his voice to point out all that Spain had to profit from the marriage, but failed in the end to regain the upper hand. When the conference finally concluded, Haro retired to his residence confident that he would be able to reduce the dowry as long as he continued to stand firm.⁷³⁹

Notwithstanding Haro's successful push for a smaller payment, the French ultimately succeeded in coming out on top on the dowry issue. Exhausted after the intensive round of negotiations conducted on August 27th, Haro and Mazarin spent several days recovering their strength, writing letters, and preparing to clash once again. Arriving at the seventh conference on August 30th, the two well-rested diplomats picked up right where they had left off; debating the dowry size for another two to three hours. True to his word, Haro did not budge from his original position, insisting throughout the discussion that "...it was not agreeable that on this point they exceed that which was custom..."⁷⁴⁰ And, just as he had predicted, his obstinacy paid dividends, with Mazarin finally agreeing to accept a smaller sum; "[Mazarin] has finally agreed to the 500,000 escudos that are customary, and that were reciprocally given from party to party in the past marriages of your Majesty and the current Lady Queen of France."⁷⁴¹ By all means, this favorable settlement should have marked a notable victory for Spanish diplomacy, and was indeed celebrated as such by the Spanish Council of State.⁷⁴² Shortly after the dowry price was set, however, a fateful order was issued that would have lasting consequences for the empire when Don Pedro Coloma and his team, comprised of Joseph Gonzalez and Juan Francisco

insoportable dice su Mg'd' que en esto... no se puede pasar de lo que se capitulo en el de la S'ra' Infanta D'a' Ana..."]

⁷³⁷ Luis de Haro to Philip IV Ibid., fol. 56, 28 Aug 1659. ["le dixé que si los que se casavan fueran unas personas ordinarias, que huvieran de comprar de comer con el dote, pudiera tener lugar aquella consideracion pero que entre tan grandes Reyes era muy indigna de representarse."]

⁷³⁸ Ibid., ["que yo juzgava que VMg'd' repararia muy poco en embiar cada ano a la senora Infanta y a su marido en guantes de ambar y en caballos de espana mas de lo que podia importar esta diferencia."]

⁷³⁹ Luis de Haro to Fernando de Contreras, Ibid., K-1622, fol. 40b, 23 Aug 1659. ["les hace creer que se an de salir con quanto quisieren yntentar con solo amenazarnos que se rompera la Paz, y esta no es tan facil de romper como alla se juzga o se teme."]

⁷⁴⁰ Luis de Haro to Philip IV, Ibid., fol. 61, 30 Aug 1659. ["...no vendria en que en esto se excediese de lo que era de estilo..."]

⁷⁴¹ Ibid. ["(Mazarin) ha quedado finalmente combenido en los 500v escudos que son de costumbre, y se dieron recíprocamente de parte a parte en los casamientos pasados de VM'd' y de la Señora Reyna presente de Francia."]

⁷⁴² *Consulta* of the Council of State, Ibid., K-1618, fol. 46, 4 Sept 1659.

Ramos, were commanded to draft the marriage capitulations. A capable group of experienced statesman, they nevertheless proved to be no match for their French counterpart, Hughes de Lionne, who in helping to draft the capitulations inserted a critical clause in Article 4 which made the Infanta's renunciation contingent (*moyennant*) upon the full payment of her dowry.⁷⁴³ A seemingly minor alteration to the legal framing of the contract, the infamous "moyennant clause" slipped by Coloma and others, who may not have fully appreciated their monarchy's dire financial straits, without raising immediate concerns. Eventually, though, Spanish officials would come to realize the disastrous implications of their oversight when, after the death of the last Habsburg monarch, Charles II, in 1700, Louis XIV cited Spain's failure to pay Maria Theresa's dowry as grounds for disputing her renunciation, advancing his own claimant for the throne, and paving the way for the rise of the Bourbon dynasty in Spain.

In the meantime, with the marriage successfully negotiated, Haro and Mazarin set about arranging the details for the wedding ceremony. Far from straightforward, the arrangement of Maria Theresa's journey to France was complicated from the outset by unreasonable demands, conflicting expectations, and persistent feelings of mistrust. On the same afternoon that they settled the dowry, Mazarin requested that plans be made for Maria Theresa to arrive in Fuenterrabía no later than October— an unreasonably short time table given the gravity of the event and the amount of preparation demanded by custom. Unequivocal in his response, Haro communicated "together all of the difficulties, or better said, impossibilities that this would pose."⁷⁴⁴ Among the obstacles preventing an early celebration was the lack of a papal dispensation, which neither party had yet requested from Rome, but which the Spanish, for the reasons later illuminated by Manzano, deemed critical for authorizing the union. Nor had the French yet performed the customary first step of sending a high ranking ambassador to Madrid to ask for the Infanta's hand, thereby formally demonstrating their commitment to the match. After Mazarin proposed realistic solutions to these two obstacles, Haro further strengthened his case for delaying the ceremony by discussing the complicated logistics involved in the venture, and poor weather to be expected in winter. Given the bare minimum time it would take to prepare for the Infanta's departure, she would not have been able to embark on her one month journey until November, to which Haro added "It would not be treatable or advisable for her Highness to come walking through lands so rough and cold during December, when maybe it is possible that the passageways are closed by snow."⁷⁴⁵ Naturally, travelling in such harsh conditions constituted an unnecessary risk, and posed a very real threat to Maria Theresa's life. Rather than "risk her health in the act," Haro cautioned postponing the trip until March when the trip could be executed with "the greatest comfort and safety of the lady Infanta's health."⁷⁴⁶

Besides the multiple reasons identified for delaying the celebration, there were also practical, diplomatic advantages to be gained from a protracted engagement. Haro's letters to Philip IV show that, in spite of his promise to work with an open mind, he struggled to fully overcome his distrust of Mazarin. Continuing to suspect that the Cardinal was opposed to a Spanish alliance, and thus capable of derailing the peace, he advised the greatest caution be taken

⁷⁴³ For more on Coloma and Lionne's negotiations see Dulong, *Le mariage*, pp. 104-107.

⁷⁴⁴ Haro, *Letters*, p. 28. "juntamente todas las dificultades, o, por mejor decir imposibilidades que en esto podia haver."

⁷⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50. "[no] seria tratable ni conveniente que S.A. viniese caminando por tierras tan asperas y frias por Diciembre, quando quiza seria posible que se le cerrasen los Puertos de Niebe."

⁷⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 50. "aventurar su salud en ello"; "mayor comodidad y seguridad de la salud de la Señora Infanta."

with every aspect of the Infanta's marriage. This included the wedding date, which Haro feared would compromise Spanish interests if performed too early. Touching upon this this point, he wrote;

“I would not dare to council your Majesty to allow the lady Infanta to leave Spain until all the points have been fulfilled and the strongholds that shall be restituted by this treaty are delivered because the marriage is what makes the Peace and the security that we have for its attainment, and if they find themselves with her Highness[Maria Theresa] in San Juan de Luz, I would not dare to guarantee your Majesty, according to everything that I have been able to learn about this government, that they will fulfill their obligations.”⁷⁴⁷

Due to the impossibility of holding the French accountable once they had acquired their new queen, Haro encouraged Philip IV to obtain every possible concession, including the procurement of strategic fortresses, before surrendering over his daughter. This was advice that Philip IV subsequently took, approving efforts to delay the wedding date for as long as was necessary. For the rest of the peace proceedings, the marriage, as the component “that makes the Peace and the security that we have for its attainment,” provided Haro with his strongest bargaining chip.⁷⁴⁸ Aware of how desperately Anne and Louis wanted the union, and the pressure this placed on Mazarin, he employed it to gain negotiating leverage and procure better conditions in the final peace treaty.⁷⁴⁹

With Haro actively taking steps to prolong Maria Theresa's departure, it took two additional months to settle the final marriage agreement. Many of the issues first identified were resolved without too much disagreement, including the request for a papal dispensation, which both parties addressed by drafting and sending letters with the exact same format.⁷⁵⁰ Shortly after, Mazarin also agreed to postpone Maria Theresa's exchange until spring, although not before “he began to lament the disturbance that this would cause the King and Queen, and to bemoan that he did not know how he should go about telling them.”⁷⁵¹ However, not all of the disputes were so easily worked out. By far the most difficult to resolve was when the French special ambassador should depart for Madrid and formally ask for the Infanta's hand—a traditional measure impeded by confusion on the Spanish side about how to proceed. For his part, Haro thought it best to delay the mission in order to buy time in the negotiations. To this end, he rejected the first French ambassador due to his low rank and then then did everything in his power to prevent the departure of the second candidate, the Duke of Gramont, until after the peace articles were finalized.⁷⁵² Not content with this approach, Philip IV ordered his valido to

⁷⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 51. “yo no me atreviera a aconsejar a VMg'd' que hasta que este executada en todo y entregadas con efecto las Plazas que se restituyen a VMg'd' por este tratado, permita VMg'd' que la S'ra' Infanta salga de españa. Porque el casamiento es el que hace la Paz y la prenda que tenemos para ella y si se ven con S.A. en San Juan de Luz, yo no me atreviera á asegurar a VMg'd', segun todo quanto he podido reconocer deste Gobierno que haya de tener cumplimiento.”

⁷⁴⁸ Ibid. “que hace la Paz y la prenda que tenemos para ella.”

⁷⁴⁹ Luis de Haro to Don Fernando de Contreras, AGS, Est., K-1623, fol. 63, 30 Aug 1659. [“segun lo que he experimentado hasta aora que es el camino de la resolucion y de la fuerza el q se deve seguir.”]

⁷⁵⁰ Luis de Haro to Philip IV, Ibid., fol. 62, 20 Aug 1659, & fol. 67, 1 Sept 1659.

⁷⁵¹ Ibid., fol. 85, 12 Sept 1659. [“se puso a lamentarse del aborto que esto havia de causar al Rey y a la Reyna, y a discurrir en que no savia como se lo havia de embiar a decir...”]

⁷⁵² Ibid., fol. 73, 3 Sept 1659.

take his intervention even further, postponing Gramont's trip to Madrid until after the peace treaty had been signed and all of the French strongholds evacuated.⁷⁵³ Immediately realizing the impossibility of this demand, Haro tried to have it rescinded, revealing once again the extent of uncertainty and apprehension underlying the peace proceedings, "I must represent to your Majesty that I judge that this [command] will be impossible to attain because the same precautions that we most justly want to take... they too will for the same reason want to take so as not to deliver them [the strongholds] without being assured of the marriage."⁷⁵⁴ As a seasoned diplomat, Haro understood that just as the Spanish had no reason to trust the French to honor their commitments after acquiring Maria Theresa, likewise the French had no reason to trust the Spanish until the marriage was settled. This was a mutual distrust that needed to be accounted for if there was to be any hope of signing an agreement.⁷⁵⁵ Unfortunately, by the time Philip IV saw his valido's letter and softened his position, it was too late to make the necessary changes. Haro had no choice but to represent his original orders to a predictably exasperated Mazarin, complicating their negotiations by giving further credence to fears of duplicity.⁷⁵⁶

Confusion about how to approach the Infanta's marriage further reveals the lack of consensus within the Spanish monarchy on the fundamental objectives of their dynastic policy. For those in the Council of State solely committed to representing monarchical interests, Maria Theresa's marriage provided a singular opportunity to impose a one-sided agreement—something which Spain had successfully done in the past—on their continental rival. Misguided by the illusion of Spanish superiority, they proposed impossible conditions that failed to take into account their empire's dire situation, and jeopardized the attainability of peace. This attitude was stubbornly countered, however, by others, including Haro, who recognized not only the imperative need for a respite, but also Spain's relatively weak negotiating position. Ultimately hoping to construct a mutually acceptable agreement, Haro utilized different strategies to maximize his limited bargaining power without pushing Mazarin beyond what was feasibly possible. And, for the most part, he was able to execute this approach without being undermined by rivals in Madrid. But, as seen with the issue of Gramont's departure, there were moments in which Philip IV sent orders clearly influenced by the former attitude to the detriment of the negotiations.

Haro's response when this occurred, at least in private correspondences, could be explosive. After receiving his new instructions regarding the Infanta's proposal, he lamented;

"I do not understand how there can be a man in the world capable of thinking or even imagining that the French are capable of coming around to conclude the Peace and sign it and turn over the strongholds that are restored through it, and all when the Lady Infanta has not only not been married, but has not even been

⁷⁵³ Ibid., fol. 82, 9 Sept 1659.

⁷⁵⁴ Ibid. ["debo representar a VMg'd' que juzgo que esto sera imposible de conseguir por que los mismos resguardos que nosotros queremos justamente tomar...querran ellos con la misma razon tomar para no entregarlas sin quedar asegurados del casamiento."]

⁷⁵⁵ Ibid., fol. 83, 11 Sept 1659; *Consulta* of the Council of State, Ibid., K-1618, fol. 59, 16 Sept 1659.

⁷⁵⁶ Luis de Haro to Philip IV, Ibid., K-1623, fol. 85, 12 Sept 1659.

formally requested or granted, and I venture to ask whoever takes the lead in the thrust of this advice if they are not acting on the Cardinal's behalf."⁷⁵⁷

In Haro's opinion, the plan advocated by the Council of State was not merely the byproduct of differing opinions. It was outrageous enough to be considered tantamount to sabotage, or at the very least extreme ignorance. Continuing to hurdle insults at members of the council he deemed responsible for a demand so irrational that it embarrassed him to even introduce it, Haro proclaimed, "the speeches reflecting this line of reason contained in the *consulta* do not appear to be the speeches of counselors, nor of men, but rather of children who have still not finished their schooling."⁷⁵⁸ While the combination of various strains of political thought in Spain was crucial for rationalizing the Infanta's marriage, at the same time there was still the potential for these different modes of thinking to manifest their differences in heated disagreements over policy.⁷⁵⁹ When this occurred, the responsibility for representing the more pragmatic course of action often fell on Haro.⁷⁶⁰

Despite the many complications encountered along the way, the two sides continued to meet regularly and make steady progress toward concluding a mutually acceptable agreement. On September 30th, the Infanta's marriage capitulations, thoroughly reviewed by the Spanish diplomatic team, were drafted.⁷⁶¹ These capitulations were made with only slight alterations,

"following to the highest degree possible the model of the Lady Infanta Dona Anne, today the Most Christian Queen."⁷⁶² The installment plan for paying off the dowry was also modeled after historical precedent, with the Spanish agreeing to follow the example set by Philip II and Isabel of Valois whereby the full amount would be covered in three lump-sum payments over eighteen months. In possession of a working draft of the final agreement, Haro spent the month of October making necessary changes to the legal documents in order to increase their binding power. For instance, time was spent with Mazarin comparing their plenipotentiary powers in order to ensure that the final copies accurately reflected both their authority and the circumstances of the negotiations.⁷⁶³ Article 23 of the Paris treaty was also entirely rewritten in order to more closely bind the peace together with the Infanta's marriage—a safety measure strongly advocated by Manzano in his *consulta*. The critical passage in the rewritten article entwining the two separate agreements read;

⁷⁵⁷ Ibid., K-1622, fol. 50. ["yo no se como pueda haver havido hombre en el mundo que aya llegado a pensar ni a ymaginar que franceses puedan venir en concluir la Paz y en firmarla y en entregar las Plazas que restituyen por ella y que la Senora Infanta este no solo sin desposar, pero sin haverse pedido ni concedido, y yo quisiera preguntar a quien guia la Danza destes Consejos, si estubiera en el pellejo del Cardenal."]

⁷⁵⁸ Ibid. ["los discursos que en esta razon se contienen en aquella consulta no parecen discursos de consejeros, ni de hombres sino de criaturas que no an salido todavia de la escuela."]

⁷⁵⁹ *Consulta* of the Council of State, Ibid., K-1618, fol. 35, 24 Aug 1659. Members of the Council of State repeatedly expressed gratitude for Haro's handling of the negotiations, while at the same time expressing frustration with how long they were taking. For more on Haro's position in the court vi-a-vis other ministers see Stradling, *Philip IV*, pp. 261-268.

⁷⁶⁰ Fernando de Contreras to Luis de Haro, Ibid., K-1623, fol. 54, 25 Aug 1659. Philip IV entrusted Haro with a considerable degree of leeway during the negotiations; ["dice su Mg'd' que le parece bien que... se gobierne al pie del hecho con la resolucion q biere que combiene pero que esto sea en los limites de no romper el Tratado..."]

⁷⁶¹ Luis de Haro to Philip IV, Ibid., fol. 94, 30 Sept 1659. ["Han los visto... por si tubiesen algo que advertir de lo que requiere la solemnidad del derecho para mayor firmeza y seguridad de lo contratado."]

⁷⁶² Ibid. ["siguiendo quanto ha sido posible el exemplar de la Senora Infanta Dona Ana, hoy Reyna Christianisima."]

⁷⁶³ Luis de Haro to Philip IV, Ibid., fol. 99, 4 Oct 1659.

“they have produced on the same day as the date as that of the present treaty another private treaty about the conditions of the said marriage and time of its celebration to which they refer, which although exists separately possesses the same strength and force as the present treaty of Peace, comprising the main part and most precious jewel offered for its greater security and duration.”⁷⁶⁴

Although Maria Theresa’s renunciation was not explicitly mentioned in the article, the primary motivation for reframing the relationship between the peace and marriage was to further reinforce her exclusion from the royal line of succession.⁷⁶⁵ The French would be less likely, it was thought, to challenge the legality of the renunciation in the future if doing so meant fatally undermining the legitimacy of an advantageous treaty.

In addition to carefully scrutinizing the final draft of each relevant document, Haro also spent the month of October surmounting the last few obstacles standing in the way of rapprochement. In late September, after weeks of Spanish interference, Gramont embarked for Madrid to deliver Louis IV’s wedding proposal.⁷⁶⁶ As the final symbolic gesture preceding the signing of the marriage capitulations, the ambassador’s mission held immense political significance and brought a heightened sense of urgency to wrap up the negotiations. The resolution of some of the matters still left on the table was aided by precedent. For instance, Haro had to determine the location where Maria Theresa would celebrate her marriage vows (*desposorio*), eventually settling on the town of Burgos “where they celebrated that of the Infanta Dona Anne in 1615.”⁷⁶⁷ Other matters, such as figuring out how to record the order of witnesses (*testigos*) observing the public reading of the marriage agreement, proved to be far more complicated. Wary to slight Spain’s proud noble class by violating their strict code of precedence, Haro sent a list to Philip IV of “all of the people of the highest rank and quality that assist me and will then be here” and requested specific instructions for how to properly arrange them by rank.⁷⁶⁸ This was a request that he had to send yet again two weeks later after taking issue with Philip IV’s claim that there had been no ranking of witnesses in Anne’s marriage capitulations.⁷⁶⁹ Given the importance of precedent for royal unions, such a blatant misreading of the historical record constituted a transgression that could not be simply overlooked. Politely addressing the error in his letter to the king, Haro clarified that while the Spanish grandees had not been listed in order, the rest of the officials included in the capitulations and renunciation had

⁷⁶⁴ Ibid., fol. 119, 17 Oct 1659. [“han hecho el mismo dia de la data deste presente tratado otro tratado particular sobre las condiciones de dicho casamiento y tiempo de su celebracion a que se remiten, el qual aunque sea seperado tiene la misma fuerza y vigor que el presente tratado de Paz, como la parte mas principal y la Prenda mas preciosa para su mayor seguridad y duracion.”]

⁷⁶⁵ Ibid., fol. 118, 17 Oct 1659.

⁷⁶⁶ Ibid., fol. 101, 4 Oct 1659. For more on Gramont’s mission see Dulong, *Le mariage*, pp. 108-130; Tomás Domínguez Arévalo, “Embajada del Duque de Gramont (1659),” *Revistas de Historia y de Genealogía española* IV, Núms. 7 y 8, (julio y agosto de 1915), pp. 289-297.

⁷⁶⁷ Haro, *Letters*, p.72, “donde se celebró el de la S’ra’ Infanta Dona Ana” in 1615.”

⁷⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 76. “. . . todas las Personas de mayor grado y calidad que me asisten y se hallaren entonces aquí.” For more on Haro’s hesitancy to touch the matter see Luis de Haro to Don Fernando de Contreras, AGS, Est., K-1622, fol. 93, 19 Oct 1659.

⁷⁶⁹ Haro, *Letters*, p. 123.

been. Consequently, he still considered it prudent to seek a “precise and clear order of what the royal will would have him do so that he can carry it out as is required.”⁷⁷⁰

Another complicated topic which demanded considerable attention was the exchange of strategic military fortresses. Although Philip IV eventually withdrew his insistence that French forces evacuate all of their strongholds before Gramont’s diplomatic mission, his subsequent demand that they instead do so before Maria Theresa’s departure from Madrid proved only slightly less impractical. Worried that introducing this one-sided requirement too early might raise unforeseen complications, Haro at first opted to avoid it entirely;

“knowing the dispute that would be caused by him expecting that the evacuation of the strongholds be carried out before the delivery of the lady Infanta and even before she was married, I deemed it best to avoid entering into this negotiation until all of the Articles of Peace were completely adjusted.”⁷⁷¹

Indeed, only during the second week of October, after the marriage and peace treaties had been drafted, did the Spanish ambassador finally begin making preparations to broach the topic. In his opinion, the best plan of action was to acknowledge outright the lack of trust between the two sides. As he pointed out in a letter to Philip IV— written to request detailed orders, but in which he included clear recommendations for what to expect— regardless of how they organized the exchange, there was simply no way for either side to surrender strategic military installations without exposing themselves to considerable risks.

To make matters worse, Haro anticipated further disagreement over Maria Theresa’s scheduled departure. Just as the Spanish had attempted to mitigate their vulnerability by originally demanding a thorough evacuation before she left Madrid, so too did Haro expect the French to protect their interests by insisting that they wait until after the Infanta was out of Spain before fulfilling their obligations. As he saw it, there was only one viable solution to this impasse;

“it will be necessary to take hostages from one part and the other because the delivery of the strongholds has been arranged to occur on the same and hour, and in light of the fact that one party could fulfill the order in good faith and the others delay, it appears that it is always necessary to make some preparations for this danger and it appears that there is no other means other than to take hostages.”⁷⁷²

Hardly a dignified step to take amidst the celebration of a royal wedding, the exchange of hostages nevertheless provided a practical means of reducing the overall risk incurred by each monarchy. Moreover, there was historical precedent for the measure being taken in the context of

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 124. “...orden precisa y clara de lo que es su real Voluntad que se haga para que yo la execute como debo.”

⁷⁷¹ Ibid., p. 111. “sabiendo la alteracion que le ha de causar que yo pretenda la ebaquacion de todas las Plazas antes de la entrega de la s’ra’ Infante y aun antes que se despose, me parecia combeniente ir huyendo de entrar en esta platica hasta que se hallasen enteramente ajustados todos los Articulos de Paz.”

⁷⁷² Ibid., pp. 111-112. “...sera necesario tomar reenes de una parte y otra porque se ajuste la entrega de las Plazas en un mismo dia y a una misma hora, comoquiera que los unos podrian ejecutarla de buena fee y los otros suspenderla, parece que siempre es menester tomar algun resguardo contra este peligro y no parece que puede [sic] haver otro que el de los Reenes.”

dynastic negotiations, dating back to 1526 when Charles V retained two French princes until Francis' union with Eleanor. Like then, the Spanish needed to find a way to account for the uncertainty inherent in dealings with the French, even if doing so contributed to a glaring contradiction between stated goals and action.

In the end, despite facing persistent doubt and chronic mistrust, Haro and Mazarin succeeded in settling the impasse. On October 27th, at the twenty-first recorded conference, a rough outline for how to exchange the fortresses was approved. Undergoing alterations in the subsequent weeks as the ambassadors continued to hammer out important details, the initial plan called for an evacuation of all strongholds twenty days after the ratification of the treaty.⁷⁷³ The French also agreed to surrender over valuable hostages to ensure that they fulfilled their end of the agreement. In return, France was permitted to retain control over key strongholds— eventually named Roses and Cadaqués in Catalonia— until the Infanta arrived at the border.⁷⁷⁴ Later on, it was also agreed that the rest of the strongholds in Italy and Flanders were to be returned immediately after the ratification of the marriage and peace.

With this major obstacle no longer standing in the way, the stage was set for representatives from the two monarchies to meet and formalize the two agreements. Occurring on November 7th, the official signing of the documents was a joyous occasion marking the end of decades of conflict and promising to restore tranquility to Christendom.⁷⁷⁵ Standing before the gathering, Coloma had the honor of reciting the marriage agreement to all those in attendance. An even more memorable role, though, was played by Mazarin, who allowed the document to be read in Spanish and, in an unprecedented act of deference to his new Queen, Maria Theresa, strode to Haro's desk to sign it. While there were a few points of disagreement stemming from the death of Ferdinand Thomas Charles which persisted up to and through November 7th, they were not serious enough in the end to undermine the agreements;

“All of these difficulties together, which arose at the end of the negotiation, have received my close attention as I am sure your Majesty can easily understand; but having found the means to oppose them by all the methods and means that I deemed necessary, finally God saw fit to have the peace signed.”⁷⁷⁶

Refusing to relinquish any ground, Haro stubbornly defended all that he had attained until the final hour. It was a remarkable diplomatic victory— one in which the *valido* had succeeded in constructing a peace far more agreeable than many previously thought possible.⁷⁷⁷

Nonetheless, rapprochement with France came at a cost. Politically, the Spanish monarchy entered into an agreement that posed an inherent threat to the Habsburg line of

⁷⁷³ Luis de Haro to Philip IV, AGS, Est., K-1623, fol. 132, 28 Oct 1659.

⁷⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, fol. 134, 1 Nov 1659.

⁷⁷⁵ For a copy of the marriage capitulations see Marriage capitulations, *Ibid.*, K-1618, fol. 121b, 27 Nov 1659. A brief overview of the main points in the two agreements and an accessible copy of the Treaty of the Pyrenees can also be found at Usunáriz, *España y sus tratados internacionales*, pp. 343-395.

⁷⁷⁶ Haro, *Letters*, p. 134. “Todas estas dificultades juntas, sobrevenidas en el ultimo termino desta negociacion, me han tenido en el intimo cuydado que V^oMag^od^o juzgara facilmente; pero haviendome procurado oponer â ellas por todos quantos caminos y medios he juzgado que podia combenir, finalmente ha sido Dios servido de que la Paz quede firmada.”

⁷⁷⁷ *Consulta* of the Council of State, AGS, Est., K-1618, fol. 103, 2 Nov 1659. Philip IV's original orders to Haro had been to “mejorar las condiciones lo más que fuere posible.” Ochoa Brun, *Diplomacia*, p. 50.

succession. Regardless of the precautionary measures undertaken to exclude Maria Theresa and her offspring from the throne, her renunciation only possessed force as long legitimate male heirs resided in Madrid. If Philip IV failed to produce and raise a son, as Manzano explained in his *consulta*, there would be little to stop the French from challenging the document and supporting their own claimant to the throne. Moreover, the Spanish accepted certain unfavorable conditions which further threatened the long-term security of the empire— a feature of the union in 1659 which contrasted sharply with earlier agreements negotiated at the height of Spanish hegemony. The most consequential of these conditions was the 500,000 escudo dowry, which may have corresponded with historical precedent, but nevertheless placed a crushing financial burden on an already insolvent monarch. Acknowledging the sacrifices made by Philip IV after the November 7th meeting, Haro wrote about “the just and holy zeal with which your Majesty has succeeded (sacrificing so many of his own interests) in providing this universal repose to his kingdoms and to all of Christendom.”⁷⁷⁸ In complimenting the king for sacrificing his own interests for the greater good of his kingdoms and Christendom, Haro explicitly evoked a Spanish notion of reason of state which called for the subordination of personal ambitions to the well-being of the empire. In the same breath, he alluded to the importance of dynastic stability in order for the good benefits of the marriage to be realized; “granting [God] to your Majesty and to the prince out lord a very long life and succession, as all of your servants and vassals must request and need.”⁷⁷⁹ The framing of the marriage as a benevolent act inextricably linked to an uninterrupted succession reveals once again how Spanish acceptance of the Infanta’s marriage, in spite of evident disadvantages and long-term risks, was reinforced by blends of political realism and idealism.



Las Meninas, Diego Velázquez, 1656
The Prado Museum, Madrid

⁷⁷⁸ Haro, *Letters*, p. 133. “y el justo y santo celo con que VMag’d’ ha procurado (sacrificando tantos intereses propios) dar este unibersel reposo a sus Reynos y a toda la christiandad...”

⁷⁷⁹ Ibid. “concediendo [Dios] a VMag’d’ y al Principe n’ro’ s’r’ muy larga vida y dilatada sucesion, como todos sus criados y Vassallos se lo devemos pedir y lo hemos menester.”

Reference to the sacrifices made in the name of peace may have also been intended to include personal loss. Philip IV was an affectionate father who deeply loved each of his children and felt personally invested in their health and development. This was a close affinity with his family readily perceived by those who resided in the court and immortalized by Diego Velázquez in his masterpiece *Las Meninas*.⁷⁸⁰ Completed in 1656, three years before the onset of negotiations in Fuenterrabía, the painting is primarily centered on Margaret Theresa and her entourage. Directly behind the Infanta's right shoulder, however, Philip IV can also be seen reflected in the mirror alongside his queen, Mariana of Austria. Attentively overlooking the lively scene, the monarch conveys through his presence an active interest in his youngest daughter's life, as well as feelings of deep and personal attachment. Although their relationship was never represented in a painting, Philip IV was equally fond of his eldest daughter, Maria Theresa. Referred to in one account as "one of the lights of Philip's eye," the Infanta brought considerable joy to her father's life, especially in the wake of the many untimely deaths that afflicted the royal household.⁷⁸¹ Naturally, given this emotional connection, the prospect of sending her to a foreign court from which she would likely never return was a source of considerable grief for Philip IV, who sought solace in the great benefits that the marriage would reap; "I assure you that ever since I began to appreciate that my daughter might be the only medium for peace (without which there would be none), I offered up to all the pain that it would cause me to separate from her in order to acquire so much good for Christendom and some relief for my poor vassals."⁷⁸² As Philip IV's comment shows, the expectation that the Infanta's union would serve the interests of Christendom and the empire did not only play a major role in rationalizing policy vis-à-vis France. It also served as a source of comfort, alleviating some of the sadness felt by families torn apart by duty, honor, and dynastic necessity.

Still, despite efforts to justify the match, overcoming the permanent separation proved to be difficult in the days and weeks after Maria Theresa's departure. The heartache felt by Philip IV was shared with those close to the family, including his close spiritual advisor, Sor Maria. Writing to Philip IV after he escorted Maria Theresa to the border, Sor Maria lamented, "what touched me the most was the sacrifice made by your Majesty leaving such a precious jewel and returning without her. Believe me your Majesty, my dearest lord, that you were accompanied in such a painful act with considerable tears and affectionate compassion."⁷⁸³ Personal letters reveal the deep sense of personal loss that accompanied each dynastic union. Although loved ones never questioned the fundamental importance of royal unions for facilitating interstate relations, they could hardly avoid the trauma of sudden ruptures in familial life. Tears were shed and gestures of affection were exchanged at the moment of separation. Afterwards, they found different ways of coping with their heartache. In one instance, on September 10, 1660, months removed from Maria Theresa's marriage, the Spanish court celebrated her birthday as if she were still present; "you have celebrated the birthday of your charge [Maria Theresa], while here they

⁷⁸⁰ Brown, "On the Meaning of *Las Meninas*," *Collected Writings*, pp. 47-76.

⁷⁸¹ Andrés García de la Iglesia, *Relación*, p. 2. "una de las lumbres de sus [Felipe's] ojos."

⁷⁸² Philip IV, *Cartas*, p. 422. "os asseguro q desde q enpeze a juzgar q podia ser mi hija el unico medio para la paz (sin la qual no se havra) ofreci a Ntro. el dolor q me causaria apartarme della por conseguir tan gran bien para toda la cristianidad y algun alivio para estos pobres vassallos."

⁷⁸³ María de Jesús de Ágreda, *Correspondencia*, p. 229, "Lo que me enterneció mucho fue el sacrificio de dejar V.M. tan amable prenda y volverse sin ella. Crea V.M., señor mío carísimo, que le he acompañado en acto tan doloroso con mucha copia de lágrimas y afectuosa compasión..."

have as well as if she were still present and although the loneliness has been great, recognizing the good that has been attained by sending her away from home it [the loneliness] turns into joy and relief.”⁷⁸⁴ In addition to celebrating important life events as if nothing had changed, family members stayed in contact through letter writing. Philip IV maintained a regular correspondence with Maria Theresa not only in hopes of extending his informal political influence to the French court, but also to see how she was faring in her new home. Early on, the updates written by the new Queen of France were positive, focusing on her close relationship with Louis XIV and the love that they shared.⁷⁸⁵ The news comforted Philip IV, no doubt putting at ease any misgivings that he might have still had about the match, and encouraging a sense of optimism that the relationship would ultimately benefit his dynasty.

Conclusion

The celebration of Maria Theresa’s wedding was truly a family affair. Drawing together the leading figures from both monarchies, the event harkened to a bygone time when reigning monarchs moved freely throughout the continent in order to visit distant relatives and meet with foreign dignitaries face to face. An artist’s rendition of the first meeting between the two courts at the Isle of Pheasants on June 7th, 1660 reveals the convoluted familial ties that underpin the new union. Standing front and center, Philip IV greets his nephew and recently designated son-in-law, Louis XIV, with grace and the utmost respect. Afterward, Philip IV would recall the positive impression left by the young French monarch, describing him as a “pleasant young man of good upbringing.”⁷⁸⁶ Standing directly behind Louis, to the left of Cardinal Mazarin, is Philip IV’s beloved sister Anne, no doubt overjoyed to be reunited with her natal family, and to see her long awaited dynastic vision finally come to fruition. On their happy reunion, the Spanish king wrote; “However harsh the discomforts of the road, I bore them for the pleasure I felt when I arrived to see my sister; I found her very good and in strong spirits, and we were very content to see one another after forty five years apart.”⁷⁸⁷ Last, but certainly not least, Maria Theresa is depicted trailing behind her father and preparing to meet her first cousin and husband for the first time. Portrayed wearing the elaborate white Spanish hoop, the Infanta both awes and shocks onlookers with her physical beauty and horrid fashion; “...her clothing was horrible... and their *guard- infanta* (hoop), was a semi-round and monstrous machine... nevertheless, in spite of her garments, we perceived her beauty— an infallible mark of its greatness.”⁷⁸⁸ Cultural differences aside, the royal encounter was an immense success with both the exchange and wedding ceremony going off without a hitch.⁷⁸⁹ Reinforcing blood bonds between the two great houses

⁷⁸⁴ Philip IV, *Cartas*, p. 424, “habreis celebrado los años de vra ama aqui se a hecho como si estuviera presente aunq la soledad a ssido mucha pero reconociendo el bien q se a conseguido con hecharla de cassa se convierte en alegria y consuelo.”

⁷⁸⁵ Philip IV, *Correspondencia*, p. 227.


⁷⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 213. “muy gentil mozo de buenas partes.”

⁷⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 227. “Por bien empleadas di las descomodidades del camino por el gusto que tuve cuando llegué a ver a mi hermana; halléla muy buena y harto entera, y estuvimos muy contentos de vernos juntos tras cuarenta y cinco años de ausencia.” In truth, the reunion was far less joyful than Philip IV recalled, with the king greeting his sister with cold formality. Accounting for her role in the war against her natal family, Anne proclaimed, “I think your Majesty will pardon me for having been such a good Frenchwoman: I owed to the king, my son, and to France.” Kleinman, *Anne of Austria*, p. 271.

⁷⁸⁸ Motteville, *Memoirs*, pp. 200-202.

⁷⁸⁹ AGS, Est., K-1623, fol. 101. It was agreed during the negotiations that Maria Theresa would shed her Spanish clothes as soon as she entered France.

and settling nearly four decades of conflict, it gave those who dreamed of lasting peace a reason to hope.



Entrevue des deux rois sur l'île des Faisans, Jacques Laumosnier, Late 17th century
The Tessé Museum, Mans

In reality, the meeting of Europe's mighty kings bore little more than empty words and false promises. At last coming into his own, Louis XIV turned out to be an ambitious man with an appetite for both military conquests and beautiful women. Although initially enamored with his new bride, like many of his predecessors, he eventually began to treat her with cold indifference—a shift in his personal life that corresponded with Louis assuming an increasingly hostile stance vis-à-vis Spain. By the mid 1660's, only a few short years after the royal union, pro-French jurists were already producing treatises attacking Maria Theresa's renunciation in hopes of providing Louis with grounds for an invasion of strategic Habsburg territories. In Spain, the responsibility for countering these legal arguments once again fell to Francisco Ramos del Manzano, who produced a massive treatise of his own aimed at upholding the conditions agreed upon at Fuenterrabía.⁷⁹⁰ Intelligent, logically organized, and well-argued, the treatise was nevertheless too little too late. Just as Manzano had warned in his original *consulta*, there was nothing to stop an ambitious king from finding, or if need be inventing, the loopholes necessary to challenge an unfavorable agreement that ran counter to his military aspirations. On May 24th, 1667, French forces invaded the Spanish Netherlands, plunging Western Europe once again into another short period of ruinous conflict.⁷⁹¹ In the end, the perpetual peace engendered by rapprochement only lasted seven short years.

As a dynastic policy initiative, Maria Theresa's marriage was a complete and utter disaster. Not only did it fail to fulfill most of its primary objectives and soften political differences, but it also posed a threat to the Habsburg patrimony by paving the way for a French

⁷⁹⁰ Francisco Ramos del Manzano, *Respuesta de España al tratado de Francia sobre las pretensiones de la Reyna Christianissima: año M.DC.LX.VII.*, 1668. Located in BNE, Sede de Recoletos, Sala de Cervantes, 2/17399.

⁷⁹¹ John A. Lynn, *The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714*, (London and New York: Longman, 1999), pp. 105-108.

usurpation of the Spanish throne. After Philip IV died in 1665, leaving the crown in the hands of his sickly infant son, Charles II, this outcome appeared imminent. But, the monarchy, led in large part by the incredibly astute and capable queen-regent Mariana of Austria, proved far more resilient than previously imagined. For another roughly four decades, the Habsburgs clung to life and fought to maintain their relevance on the international stage, only coming to an end with the death of Charles in 1700. Then, and only then, was Louis able to capitalize on his earlier marriage to the Spanish Infanta and the children she bore him, pushing his grandson's claim and overseeing, after many more years of bloody conflict, the emergence of a new dynasty in Spain.

As this chapter has shown, the Spanish decision to go through with Maria Theresa's marriage was not simply the result of an imprudent diplomacy or political desperation. The act was rooted in nearly two hundred years of historical precedent, and shaped by modes of thinking that were a fundamental part of the monarchy's worldview. Before negotiations began, Philip IV and his statesman readily perceived the risks inherent in a French match and, for the most part, agreed that the arrangement should be avoided. Only after the birth of a male heir several years later did they agree to take the match seriously, at which time the perception of the marriage was enhanced by the contributions of key royal women, namely Maria Theresa and Anne of Austria, who greatly desired the union. Moving forward into negotiations, the Spanish approach— as personified by both Luis de Haro and Francisco Ramos del Manzano— reflected what can best be characterized as a concordance of reason of state and dynastic thinking. On the one hand, the men did their best to represent Spanish interests and craft an agreement that safeguarded the monarchical line of succession. At the same time, however, they also subscribed to a dynastic outlook that took for granted the power and immutability of the Habsburgs, and served to minimize the evident dangers posed by the alliance. All in all, Haro did negotiate an agreement that was relatively favorable; no small feat considering the obstacles posed by a determined adversary and repeated disagreements with officials in Madrid. But, even still, there was nothing that the *valido* could do to protect his monarchy from the whims of fate. For two centuries, the Habsburgs had wielded their dynastic potential to their advantage, utilizing marriages to acquire disparate kingdom and expanded their political influence. Through a combination of cunning and good fortune, they had out lasted the Trastamara, Valois, and Tudor. By 1700, however, the Spanish Habsburgs' good fortune had come to an end and with it their tenure as the kings and queens of Europe's mightiest empire.

Conclusion

On November 1, 1700, observers at the Royal Alcázar of Madrid watched helplessly as their enfeebled king, Charles II, died childless. As the last direct male descendent in the monarchical line of succession, Charles II's death precipitated an international crisis over control of the Spanish empire. In Vienna, the late king's Austrian relatives defended the claim of Charles VI, the son of the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I, while in Paris, the ambitious Sun King (*le Roi Soleil*), Louis XIV, insisted that his grandson Philip, Duke of Anjou, was the legitimate heir to the throne.⁷⁹² With the fate of Europe and much of the colonized world at stake, continental powers scrambled to choose sides in the dispute, with most supporting the Austrian Habsburgs in their struggle against mighty France. The resulting war was devastating. Waged on battlefields across the Atlantic World, it cost hundreds of thousands of lives, bankrupted several governments and permanently shifted political alignments on the continent. Even the victor, Louis XIV, was not left unscathed. Lying on his deathbed in 1715, two years after the end of the conflict that had exhausted him financially and militarily, he cautioned his young grandson and successor; "I have loved war too much: do not imitate me in this respect, or in my expenditure, which was too great."⁷⁹³ An aggressive dynast who had spent a lifetime fighting to enhance his power and prestige, the Sun King came to appreciate in his final days something that Spanish policymakers had long since recognized: the need to balance personal dynastic ambitions with the well-being of the state.

The accession of a French Bourbon king in Spain did not constitute a political failing on the part of previous rulers. One hundred years earlier, legal experts (*letrados*) warned Philip III that his double marriage alliance with France might one day allow a foreign dynasty to take possession of his patrimony. Insisting that a renunciation clause was not sufficient to permanently divest the Infanta's descendants from their right to the throne, they hesitated to support the match. Later, when Philip IV married his daughter, Maria Theresa, to Louis XIV, the *letrado* Francisco Ramos del Manzano made a similar observation, albeit with a different conclusion. As he pointed out, there was nothing to prevent the French from defending an indirect claim if the legitimate line of succession came to an end. Thus, while he backed a match protected by a renunciation clause, he was also careful to acknowledge the ultimate limitations of legal safeguards should future generations fail to reproduce. Both kings and their councils listened to these opinions, which foreshadowed with striking accuracy the War of Spanish Succession. They understood that it was impossible, regardless of the binding commitments included in a marriage contract, to guarantee that their dynastic initiatives produced the intended results. In accepting these risks, the Spanish Habsburgs were not exceptional. Nor were they the first dynasty to be undone by forces outside of their control.

If the violent transition from Charles II to Philip V reveals anything, it is that the practice of marriage diplomacy was much more than an ornamental feature of Early Modern statecraft.

⁷⁹² For more on the succession crisis that unfolded after the death of Charles II see Henry Kamen, "The Disputed Succession," *Philip V of Spain: The King who Reigned Twice*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), p. 1-33.

⁷⁹³ The quote was extracted from Peter Burke, *The Fabrication of Louis XIV*, (New Have and London: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 122.

The consequences were real, and the negotiation of royal unions at the very heart of questions regarding monarchical power, political legitimacy, and international order. Spanish policymakers appreciated the far-reaching implications of the practice, and over time developed an increasingly mature understanding of how it could best be used to either facilitate interstate cooperation or to advance the monarchy's strategic interests. Controversial alliances with the French and English provided particularly fertile ground for challenges to the basic assumptions underpinning a dynastic worldview, and for debates about what could be achieved through rapprochement. Notwithstanding the heightened political stakes of royal unions between large, powerful states and empires, they remained the primary mechanism for perpetuating the dynasty and preserving its authority until Charles II's last breath.

As the current study has demonstrated, the political aspirations of the Spanish Habsburgs reached their zenith in the 16th century under the rule of Charles V and Philip II. Both father and son aspired to absolute power and continental hegemony. To this end, they closely monitored the marriage market and employed strategies aimed at bolstering their personal authority, augmenting their prestige, and expanding their sphere of influence. In an age of unrestrained dynastic ambitions, the successful procurement of controversial unions often hinged on the participation of royal women, who were able to mediate disputes, generate a sense of diplomatic confidence, and convey a sincere commitment to peace. In 1529, Margaret of Austria assumed the lead in marriage negotiations with France on behalf of the emperor. Roughly forty years later, Catherine of Austria, Maria of Austria, and Joanna of Austria made equally vital contributions in support of a grand four-way marriage alliance between Spain, the Holy Roman Empire, France, and Portugal. Marriage diplomacy was at all times a collaborative enterprise, requiring coordination and a shared sense of purpose among members of the dynasty, as well as a general willingness on the part of all to assume immense political risks in the name of power and glory.

At the turn of the 17th century, Philip III deviated from his predecessors' commitment to a policy of military aggression and territorial aggrandizement. As part of his new strategy aimed at peace and imperial retrenchment, he negotiated a new round of marriages with rival monarchies in Paris and London. He also convened jurists and theologians to consider the legal issues posed by the controversial agreements, and to develop procedures for minimizing their unintended consequences. At the root of subsequent debates about policy were alternative dynastic and reason of state logics. Idealists in the monarchy remained preoccupied with expediency and power, storing renewed faith in divine providence, familial loyalty, Christian morality, and historical precedent to attain favorable outcomes. They also placed a heavy emphasis on positive perceptions of female power and agency, insisting that young Infantas would grow up to be active agents of dynasty. Realists, on the other hand, warned against imprudent alliances and pushed the king to prioritize the long-term stability and security of the empire over his personal interests. They sought to modernize the practice of marriage diplomacy, transforming the royal union from a tool of the dynast into an effective tool of the state. Reconciling these two distinct modes of thinking proved difficult, and a well-articulated synthesis was only produced by Manzano several decades later during the reign of Philip IV.

Although the fears of political realists did eventually come to fruition, the extinction of the Spanish Habsburgs did not signal the immediate loss of everything that they had built and achieved. The empire survived the War of Spanish Succession largely intact; losing control over

territories in Italy and Netherlands, but retaining control over extensive colonial possessions.⁷⁹⁴ It also continued to possess surprising reserves of strength, as exemplified by the monarchy's ability to amass an armada of 439 ships and 36,000 soldiers to invade Sicily shortly after the end of the war.⁷⁹⁵ Despite the origins of their bloodline, the Spanish Bourbons operated separately and independently of France, charting an independent course for the empire. They passed reforms and regulations in an effort to modernize the imperial apparatus, and infuse it with new dynamism. Advantageous unions were also arranged with powerful dynasties on the continent, as the next generation of Spanish monarchs continued to rely on royal unions to reinforce political ties, produce children, and enhance the monarchy's prestige.

On May 10, 1713, after considerable opposition from the Council of State, Philip V succeeded in introducing French Salic Law into Castile. The motivation behind the importation of the civil law code, which prevented any female descendent or her offspring from inheriting the throne, was simple; prevent, at all costs, the extension of legitimate claims to foreign dynasties.⁷⁹⁶ In an instant, Philip V resolved nearly a century of debate on how to minimize the risks posed by the monarchy's dynastic policy. Of course, there were many who resented the radical break with centuries of precedent, viewing it as a betrayal of Spain's proud tradition of strong female monarchs dating back to the pre-Christian era.⁷⁹⁷ But, for those who sought to tame the volatility of marriage diplomacy, the new law was a welcome step toward political stability. With his family's grip on power thus secured, Philip V pursued prestigious marriages for his children in Italy, France, and Portugal, forging in the process a familial network as powerful and influential as any seen under the Habsburgs. In the end, this active participation in dynastic politics provided an important line of continuity with the previous regime. The royal family had assumed a different name, but its primary strategy for reproduction and rapprochement had remained the same.

⁷⁹⁴ Christopher Storrs, "Felipe V: Caesura or Continuity," *Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era (1700-1759)*, ed. Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso, (Leiden: Brill, 2013), p. 14. Spain would regain control of Naples and Sicily in the 1730s during the War of Polish Succession.

⁷⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, *The Spanish Resurgence, 1713-1748*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2016), p. 6.

⁷⁹⁶ Kamen, *Philip V*, p. 82.

⁷⁹⁷ John D. Bergamini, *The Spanish Bourbons: The History of a Tenacious Dynasty*, (New York: Putnam, 1974), p. 187.

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