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DECENTRED THEORY, CHANGE AND NETWORK GOVERNANCE

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Introduction

Governance is often defined as self-organizing, inter-organizational networks. Of course, people define governance in all kinds of ways. Nonetheless, social scientists typically appeal to inexorable, impersonal forces such as the functional differentiation of the modern state or the marketization of the public sector to explain the shift from hierarchy to markets to network governance. We will invoke the Anglo-governance school as an illustration of such a positivist approach to network governance. We also will offer a decentred alternative to such positivist approaches. To decentre is to focus on the social construction of a practice through the ability of individuals to create, and act on, meanings; it is to unpack a practice in terms of the disparate and contingent beliefs and actions of individuals (Bevir and Rhodes 2003: chapter 4). When we decentre governance, we challenge the idea that inexorable, impersonal forces are driving a shift from bureaucratic government to networks. We argue, instead, that governance and networks are constructed differently by many actors against the background of diverse traditions.

After decentring governance theory, we turn our attention to the analysis of network dynamics. We contrast the mainstream accounts of the conditions under which networks change, succeed and fail with a decentred account. We also provide a brief illustration of how ethnography helps us to recover meanings among network actors. Finally, we criticise comprehensive accounts of governance, suggesting that a decentred theory prompts us to study the everyday practices of situated agents whose beliefs and actions are informed by traditions and expressed in stories.¹

Positivist approaches to network governance

Behind the idea of network governance, there usually lurks the idea that its emergence reflects something akin to a logic of modernization – a logic of functional specialisation and institutional differentiation. Entrenched institutional patterns purportedly ensured that neo-liberal reforms lead not to markets but to the further differentiation of policy networks in an increasingly hollow state. Social scientists typically use a concept of differentiation here to evoke differences based on function. Because they use differentiation in this way, they offer broadly positivist accounts of governance. They treat governance as a complex set of institutions and institutional linkages defined by their social role or function. They make any appeal to the contingent beliefs and preferences of agents largely irrelevant.

In Britain, positivist accounts of network governance challenge the Westminster model (Rhodes 1997a, 2000; Richards and Smith 2002; Stoker 1999, 2004, and for discussion Marinetto 2003). They capture recent changes in British government in a way the Westminster model cannot. They start with the notion of policy networks or sets of organisations clustered around a major government function or department. These networks commonly include the professions, trade unions and big business. So, the story continues, central departments need such networks to cooperate in delivering services. They allegedly need their co-operation because British government rarely delivers services itself; it uses other bodies to do so. Also, there are said to be too many groups to consult so government must aggregate interests; it needs the legitimated spokespersons

for that policy area. The groups in turn need the money and legislative authority that only government can provide.

Policy networks are a long-standing feature of British government; they are its silos or velvet drainpipes. The Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher sought to reduce their power by using markets to deliver public services, bypassing existing networks and curtailing the 'privileges' of professions, commonly by subjecting them to rigorous financial and management controls. But these corporate management and marketization reforms had unintended consequences. They fragmented the systems for delivering public services, creating pressures for organisations to co-operate with one another to deliver services. In other words, marketization multiplied the networks it aimed to replace.

Commonly, packages of organisations now deliver welfare state services. Positivist accounts of governance thus concentrate on the spread of networks in British government.

They tell us not only that fragmentation created new networks but it also increased the membership of existing networks, incorporating both the private and voluntary sectors.

They also tell us that the government swapped direct for indirect controls, so central departments are no longer either necessarily or invariably the fulcrum of a network. The government can set the limits to network actions: after all, it still funds the services. But it has also increased its dependence on multifarious networks.

The Anglo-governance school conceives of networks as a distinctive co-ordinating mechanism notably different from markets and hierarchies and not a hybrid of them. They associate networks with characteristics such as trust. In their view, trust is essential because it is the basis of network co-ordination in the same way that commands and price

competition are the key mechanisms for bureaucracies and markets respectively (see Frances et al 1991: 15, and Powell 1991). Shared values and norms are the glue that holds the complex set of relationships in a network together. Trust is essential for co-operative behaviour and, therefore, the existence of the network. With the spread of networks there has been a recurrent tension between contracts on the one hand with their stress on competition to get the best price and networks on the other with their stress on co-operative behaviour. Other key characteristics are said to be reciprocity and interdependence (Rhodes 1997b).

In short, the Anglo-governance school tells us a story of fragmentation confounding centralisation as a segmented executive seeks to improve horizontal co-ordination among departments and agencies and vertical co-ordination between departments and their networks of organisations. An unintended consequence of this search for central control has been a hollowing out of the core executive. The hollowing out of the state suggests the growth of governance has further undermined the ability of the core executive to act effectively, making it increasingly reliant on diplomacy. The state has been hollowed out from above by for example international interdependence, and from below by for example marketization and networks, and sideways by agencies. Internally the British core executive was already characterised by baronies, policy networks and intermittent and selective co-ordination. It has been further hollowed out internally by the unintended consequences of marketization, which fragmented service delivery, multiplied networks and diversified the membership of those networks. Externally the state is also being hollowed out by membership of the EU and other international commitments.

Decentring network governance

A decentred theory of network governance explores the institutions of governance by studying the contingent meanings that inform the actions of the individuals involved in all kinds of practices of rule. Positivist accounts of network governance focus on issues such as the objective characteristics of policy networks and the oligopoly of the political market place; they stress power-dependence, the relationship of the size of networks to policy outcomes, and the strategies by which the centre might steer networks. To decentre governance is, in contrast, to focus on the social construction of patterns of rule through the ability of individuals to create meanings in action. A decentred approach changes our conception of governance. It encourages us to examine the ways in which patterns of rule, including institutions and policies, are created, sustained, and modified by individuals. It encourages us to recognise that the actions of these individuals are not fixed by institutional norms or a logic of modernization, but arise from the beliefs individuals adopt against the background of traditions and in response to dilemmas.

A decentred theory highlights the importance of beliefs, traditions, and dilemmas for the study of governance (see Bevir and Rhodes 2003 and 2006). Any existing pattern of rule will have some failings. Different people will have different views about these failings since they are not simply given by experience but rather constructed from interpretations of experience infused with traditions. When the perceived failings of governance are in conflict with people's existing beliefs, such failures pose dilemmas. Such dilemmas push people to reconsider their beliefs and the traditions informing those beliefs. Because people confront these dilemmas against the background of diverse traditions, there arises

a political contest over what constitutes the nature of the failings and what should be done about them. Exponents of rival positions seek to promote their particular sets of theories and policies. This contest then leads to a reform of governance. So, any reform can be understood as a contingent product of a contest of meanings in action.

The reformed pattern of rule established by this complex process will display new failings, pose new dilemmas, and be the subject of competing proposals for reform. There will be a further contest over meanings, a contest in which the dilemmas are often significantly different, and the traditions have been modified from accommodating previous dilemmas.

All such contests take place in the context of laws and norms that prescribe how they should be conducted. Sometimes the relevant laws and norms have changed because of simultaneous contests over their content and relevance. Yet while we can distinguish analytically between a pattern of rule and a contest over its reform, we rarely can do so temporally. Rather, the activity of governing continues during most contests, and most contests occur partly within local practices of governing. What we have, therefore, is a complex and continuous process of interpretation, conflict, and activity that produces ever-changing patterns of rule.

A decentred theory of network governance entails a shift of topos from institutions to meanings in action. It suggests positivist approaches to governance tend to restrain the centrifugal impulse of narratives of network governance. Positivist approaches reduce the diversity of network governance to a logic of modernization, institutional norms, or a set of classifications or correlations across policy networks. Their proponents tame an

otherwise chaotic picture of multiple actors creating a contingent pattern of rule through their conflicting actions.

A decentred theory implies that network governance arises from the bottom-up. Any pattern of governance is a product of diverse practices made up of multiple individuals acting on all sorts of conflicting beliefs which they have reached against the background of several traditions and in response to varied dilemmas. A decentred theory leads us, then, to replace aggregate concepts that refer to objectified social laws or institutions with one's that we craft to explain the particular beliefs and actions of interest to us. It inspires narratives of traditions and dilemmas. So, what does this decentred theory tell us about the analysis and management of change in the networks.

The analysis of change in networks

Current explanations of how networks change appeal to inexorable, impersonal forces such as the functional differentiation of the modern state or path dependency. They rely on exogenous, not endogenous, causes, arguing, for example, that networks create routines for policy making and change is incremental (Marsh and Rhodes 1992, 261). They identify four broad categories of change: economic, ideological, knowledge and institutional, and all are external to the network. Indeed, the most common and recurrent criticism of policy network analysis is that it does not, and cannot, explain change (for a summary of the argument and citations see Richardson 2000). So, policy network analysis stresses how networks limit participation in the policy process; decide which issues will be included and excluded from the policy agenda; shape the behaviour of actors through

the rules of the game; privilege certain interests; and substitute private government for public accountability. It is about stability, privilege and continuity.

There have been several efforts to build the analysis of change into governance networks (see for example Marsh and Smith 2000; Richardson 2000; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). We focus on decentred analysis because it offers both an explanation of change in networks and the appropriate tools of analysis.

A decentred theory prompts a shift of topos from institution to individual and a focus on the social construction of policy networks through the ability of individuals to create meaning (Bevir and Rhodes 2003, chapter 4). It thereby encourages us to look for the origins of change in the contingent responses of individuals to dilemmas. As noted earlier, a dilemma arises for an individual or institution when a new idea stands in opposition to an existing idea and so forces reconsideration. Because we cannot read-off the ideas and actions of individuals from objective social facts about them, we can understand how their beliefs and actions, and social practices change only by exploring the ways in which they think about, and respond to, dilemmas. An analysis of change and developments in government must take place through a study of relevant dilemmas. We build change into the heart of our account of networks by exploring how individual actors respond to dilemmas and reinterpret and reconstruct traditions.

Ethnography studies individual behaviour in everyday contexts; gathers data from many sources; adopts an 'unstructured' approach; focus on one group or locale; and, in analysing the data, stresses the 'interpretation of the meanings and functions of human action' (paraphrased from Hammersley 1990, 1-2). The task is to write thick descriptions of our

‘constructions of other people’s constructions of what they are up to’ (Geertz 1973, 9, 20-21; see also: Bevir and Rhodes 2003 and 2006; Heclo and Wildavsky 1974; Richards and Smith 2004).

We cannot provide a detailed exploration of change in networks here. Any such account would need to recognise that individuals have several antidotes to, and coping mechanisms for, challenges to their belief systems. Such challenges can take the form of responding to different beliefs or to the actions of others and any response will be affected by the salience of those beliefs and actions for the several parties. Also, analyses of network dynamics require an understanding of how beliefs are constructed both in the complex patterns of social interaction and the handed-down traditions. However, we can illustrate both our theory and methods ‘in action’ by a brief analysis of managing networks.

Managing change in networks

Under what conditions do networks succeed, and under what conditions do they fail? How do we manage networks so they are successful and do not fail?

The mainstream literature on networks can muster a long list of conditions fostering networks (for citations see Rhodes 2006a). Networks are said to thrive where markets and hierarchies fail, where trust and reciprocity characterise the relationships between organisations, where management is by negotiation, not command, and where there is a substantial measurement of agreement on at least the means and probably the ends of policy. Also, as with any other form of public sector management, success depends on the

relevant information, skills and resources. When actors husband information and resources, when in effect they refuse to share, then the cooperation that defines networks is unlikely to be forthcoming. The mainstream literature also identifies several other more specific conditions under which networks are said to arise.

Actors need reliable, 'thicker' information, or local knowledge.

Quality cannot be specified or is difficult to define and measure.

Commodities are difficult to price.

Professional discretion and expertise are core values.

Service delivery is localised.

Cross-sectoral, multi-agency cooperation is required.

Monitoring and evaluation incur high political and administrative costs.

Implementation involves haggling (or disputes over who owns the policy).

Equally the mainstream literature suggests that networks, like all other resource allocation mechanisms, are not cost free and identifies the conditions under which they will fail.

When closed to outsiders and unaccountable for their actions.

When they generate conflicts: between individual and organisational
commitments,

local and national public expectations,

flexibility and rules, and

network goals and national regulators.

When they serve private interests, not the public interest, and are hard to hold to account.

When they cannot be to steered

When they conflict with other governing structures.

So, the task confronting governments is to create the conditions that foster networks (or bureaucracies, or markets) and to steer them so that, for example, they remain accountable and do not flounder through internal conflicts. How do you manage in inter-organizational contexts where, in sharp contrast to intra-organisational contents, no manager can impose objectives on the other participating organizations? The normal answer is by hands-off management and through persuasion where independent actors agree objectives; senior management does not set them. There has been an upsurge of advice from both academics and consultants on what to do to run a network (and for a comprehensive review of tools for network governance, see Salamon 2000). We give two examples (see Boxes 1 & 2). Box 1 draws on American experience.

Box 1: Ten Lessons on How to Manage Your Network.

- Be representative of your agency and network.
- Take a share of the administrative burden.
- Operate by agenda orchestration.
- Recognise shared expertise.
- Stay within the decision boundaries of your network.
- Accommodate and adjust while maintaining purpose.
- Be as creative as possible.
- Be patient and use interpersonal skills.
- Recruit constantly.
- Emphasise incentives.

Source: Agranoff 2003: 29.

Or, in the same vein, but based on UK experience, Box 2 provides the following pearls.

Box 2: Local practical solutions

- Explore and agree the objectives of cross-boundary working.
- Develop a shared understanding of what the network is *for*.
- Develop an appropriate shared strategy.
- Clarify roles, expectations and responsibilities for all players.
- Create a culture in which cross-boundary working is likely to succeed.
- Create appropriate shared service delivery systems.
- Have a clear idea of what success would look like.

Source: Goss 2001: 97-100.

As Perri 6 et al (2002: 130) point out network management ‘is not rocket science’, and it is hard to disagree. But a decentred theory raises more fundamental objections. Typically,

policy-oriented work on governance treats hierarchies, markets, and networks as fixed structures that governments can manipulate using the right tools. A decentred theory undercuts this idea of a set of tools we can use to manage networks. If networks are constructed differently, contingently, and continuously, we cannot have a tool kit for managing them. In short, there is no essentialist account of networks which can be used to provide a tool kit for managing networks.

A decentred theory encourages us to foreswear management techniques and strategies but, and the point is crucial, to replace such tools with learning by telling stories and listening to them. While statistics, models, and claims to expertise all have a place in such stories, we should not become too preoccupied with them. On the contrary, we should recognize that they too are narratives about how people have acted or will react given their beliefs and desires. No matter what rigour or expertise we bring to bear, all we can do is tell a story and judge what the future might bring. In a decentred approach, to generalise means to diagnose and make informed conjectures. We cast conjecture in the form of narratives or stories. Policy analysis is a form of storytelling. So, for a decentred theory to produce policy advice, we must tell stories that answer the following questions (and for a more detailed discussion see Bevir et al 2003). What stories do we tell? What is the plot of our story? Who are the leading characters? What are the informing metaphors? What proverbs do we use?

The road to understanding change network governance lies in decentred accounts focusing on the political ethnography of networks to generate narratives that give due recognition to the creative individual. Networks are constructed by individual actors and

not created by governments or imposed by the researcher. As researchers, we write constructions about how other people construct the world.

So, how do we write these constructions? We use the example of management reforms in the police service to provide an illustrative example (Fleming and Rhodes 2005). The research draws on interviews with 27 senior and middle-level officers and managers, and on focus group discussions. The reforms were understood by the respondents as a shift from command and control bureaucracy through markets to networks, and the shift posed some acute dilemmas. Their key problem was not the limitations of working with contracts or any other governing structure but rather the attempt to balance apparently contradictory demands. They know how to rewrite the rulebook, manage a contract, or work with neighbourhood watch but they struggle to reconcile these ways of working, believing they conflict and undermine one another. We illustrate briefly both their views on the limits networks and on the conflicts between networks and other ways of working.

There is commitment from those who see community networking as the future.

I think the community policing thing is a good idea – I think it works – the problem of course is that it is hard to keep people in the same place for significant periods, but I think it's good, I think it's good for the community. We come up with lots of initiatives – we are good at that – but we are poor finishers – too many goals really. I think we should hit on three things and do them.

Even the traditional copper sees some virtue in a more integrated approach.

A whole of government approach might consider bringing all services under the police umbrella – ambulance, fire, security, so for example if there was a major football game. The events planner could ring one number and organise police officers, St John's Ambulance, private security; traffic coordination. A policy like this would give us a better response to things too. The others might not have the powers but they would have the powers to detain until we arrived or at least provide a liaison point with the police on the ground. It would give us much better surge capacity.

But there is also a clear stereotype that the police focus on crime and see networking as soft.

Police don't want to get into the crime prevention stuff though. No one wants to do these jobs – they want to leave it to the warm and fuzzies. Police want to wear their underpants on the outside and save the world – they want to make the person pay. Culture has changed to some extent but it is still influenced by older people.

People who are attracted to the policing role often have that mindset.

They also see the conflict of ideas in reform and it manifests itself in an aversion to change and criticisms of the leadership but several managers are all too well aware of the contradictions. One officer makes the point with brutal simplicity: 'Terrorism is a problem – it doesn't go with the ideology of community policing and crime management'. Some officers appreciate the dilemmas they confront and recognise the need to fit their managerial strategies to the context.

Command and control is situational. In my team, I don't have subordinates. I have team members. Years ago a constable wouldn't speak to a superintendent – this is not the case now. I invite their ideas and input and encourage them to talk to me. If they are happy I have a productive working team. However, as I said, it's situational. Fighting fires is a good example. As a commander, when I want something done, it isn't up for negotiation, I tell the troops. We have to rely on command and control in these situations.²

Mainstream accounts of police reform use 'police culture' as an explanatory variable (see Chan 1997). As Davies and Thomas (2003: 682-3) point out, police organisations are resistant to change because of 'a co-existence of formalized bureaucratic and standardised working practices, with a deeply entrenched and pervasive occupational culture' of hierarchical subordination. However, these interviews with officers suggest that conflict between incompatible ideas simply makes it too easy for dynamic conservatism to win out. Reform is impeded not by recalcitrant actors – although it often is – or by police culture – which can act as a brake - but more importantly by the dilemmas created by the irreconcilable ideas of bureaucracy, markets and networks. The central dilemma of police reform is this unholy trinity (and for a more detailed discussion see Jessop 2000 and Rhodes 2006b).

In sum, a decentred theory of networks provides: a critique of mainstream accounts of how networks change; an alternative conception of networks as constructed differently, contingently, and continuously; a storytelling alternative to the mainstream tool kit for

managing networks; and an alternative to the techniques of positivist social science by using ethnographic methods focus on the creative individual as the agent of change.

Conclusions

Positivist accounts of network governance, including those of the Anglo-governance school, aspire to be comprehensive. Social scientists typically aim to provide a general account of what network governance looks like and why. For example, governance is often characterised by multiplying networks replacing the bureaucratic hierarchies of the welfare state. Such comprehensive accounts of network governance identify one or more defining features. This defining feature then acts as a central focus that allegedly explains other pertinent features of network governance. For example, the spread of networks allegedly explains the greater reliance of states on ‘trust’ and ‘diplomatic’ styles of management, or it embraces the search for co-ordination through joint ventures, partnerships, and holistic governance. Similarly, networks succeed where there is trust, reciprocity, cooperation and agreement.

What do such comprehensive accounts imply about the nature of network governance? They imply, first, that we can define ‘governance’ by reference to one or more of its essential properties, such as multiplying networks, where we can define a network by the interdependence of its members (whether people or organizations). They imply, second, that these essential properties are general ones that characterise all cases of governance: so, we will find governance in its new guise if and only if we find a spread of networks, or we will find networks if and only if we find interactions based on trust across organisations. They imply, finally, that these essential properties can explain at least the

most significant other features of network governance. A comprehensive account of network governance makes sense, even as a mere aspiration, only if these implications are valid. But why would we assume that network governance has one or more essential features?

A decentred theory implies there is no comprehensive account of network governance. There is no necessary logical or structural process determining the form governance or the success or failure of networks. Rather, an adequate theory of change and networks should accept that networks both arise from and change as a result of diverse actions and practices inspired by varied beliefs and traditions. Patterns of rule arise as the contingent products of diverse actions and political struggles informed by the beliefs of agents as they arise against the backcloth of traditions. This conclusion applies whether we are talking about the civil service, public sector reform, or the rise and fall of specific networks.

Once we reject the idea of a comprehensive account of network governance, we can no longer define it by any allegedly essential properties. Rather, we understand general concepts such as network governance by using them in cases. Their meaning derives from the ways in which we use them in various contexts. What is more, the absence of a comprehensive account of network governance suggests there are no set ways in which we must – or must not – use the term. There need be no single feature shared by all those cases or narratives to which we would apply the general term ‘network governance’.

We understand ‘network governance’ as a set of family resemblances. Wittgenstein (1972) famously suggested that general concepts such as ‘game’ should be defined by

various traits that over-lapped and criss-crossed in much the same way as do the resemblances between members of a family – their builds, eye colour, gait, personalities. He considered various examples of games to challenge the idea that they all possessed a given property or set of properties – skill, enjoyment, victory and defeat – by which we could define the concept. Instead, he suggested that the examples exhibited a network of similarities, at various levels of detail, so that they coalesced even though no one feature was common to them all.

We do not master such family resemblances by discovering a theory or rule that tells us precisely when we should and should not apply it. Our grasp of the concept consists in our ability to provide reasons why it should be applied in one case but not another, our ability to draw analogies with other cases, and perhaps our ability to point to the criss-crossing similarities. Our knowledge of ‘network governance’ is analogous to our knowledge of ‘game’ as described by Wittgenstein: it is ‘completely expressed’ by our describing various cases of governance in and through networks, showing how some cases can be considered as analogous to these and others cannot.

No doubt some of the family resemblances that characterise network governance derive from a focus on meaning in action and apply to all patterns of rule. A decentred theory highlights, first, a more diverse view of state authority and its exercise. All patterns of rule arise as the contingent products of diverse actions and political struggles informed by the varied beliefs of situated agents. So, the notion of a monolithic state in control of itself and civil society was always a myth. The myth obscured the reality of diverse state practices that escaped the control of the centre because they arose from the contingent

beliefs and actions of diverse actors at the boundary of state and civil society. The state is never monolithic and it always negotiates with others. Policy always arises from interactions within networks of organisations and individuals. Patterns of rule always traverse the public, private, and voluntary sectors. The boundaries between state and civil society are always blurred. Trans-national and international links and flows always disrupt national borders. In short, state authority is constantly being remade, negotiated, and contested in widely different ways within widely varying everyday practices.

Second, these everyday practices arise from situated agents whose beliefs and actions are informed by traditions and expressed in stories. In every network, we can identify traditions, often embodied in rituals and routines. Actors pass on these traditions in large part by telling one another stories about how things are done, and about what does and does not work. For example, British civil servants are socialized into the broad notions of the Westminster model, such as ministerial responsibility, as well as the specific ways of doing things around here; they are 'socialized into the idea of a profession', and learn 'the framework of the acceptable' (Bevir and Rhodes 2006, chapter 7). Network governance is not any given set of characteristics. It is the stories people use to construct, convey, and explain traditions, dilemmas, and practices.

A third family resemblance is that the central state has adopted a less hands-on role. Its actors are less commonly found within various local and sectoral bodies, and more commonly found in quangos concerned to steer, co-ordinate, and regulate such bodies. A decentred theory suggests, crucially, that such steering, co-ordination, and regulation take many diverse forms. In Britain, the pre-eminent example is 'joined-up' government as the

Blair government seeks to devise policy instruments that integrate both horizontally across central government departments and vertically between central and local government and the voluntary sector (Bevir 2005: 83-105).

A decentred theory provides: a grasp of the family resemblances that contribute to a general characterisation of network governance; a distinctive analysis of change in networks; and an emphasis on the role of storytelling in network management.

Nonetheless, it denies any logic to the specific forms that network governance takes in particular circumstances. It resolves the theoretical difficulties that beset the positivist alternatives. It avoids the unacceptable suggestion that institutions fix the actions of individuals in them rather than being products of those actions. It replaces unhelpful phrases such as path-dependency with an analysis of change rooted in the beliefs and practices of situated agents. And yet it allows political scientists to offer aggregate studies by using the concept of tradition to explain how they come to hold those beliefs and perform those practices.

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Notes

¹ "On the limits of both rational choice theory (as in Hertting, chapter X) and historical institutionalism (as in Peters, chapter x), see Bevir 2005: chapter. 1. For fuller discussion of a normative or ideational strand of institutionalism (as in Peters, chapter X), see Adcock *et al.* 2006. On the differences between post-structuralism (as in XXXX, chapter X) and our approach see Bevir 2004. On traditions and the analysis of institutions see Rhodes 2006c. For a symposium in which we discuss our approach with scholars inspired by positions akin to rational choice, new institutionalism, and post-structuralism, see Finlayson *et al.* 2004.

² All quotes from Fleming and Rhodes 2005: 199-200, and 2003. See also Fleming 2006, forthcoming.