

THE MASMUDA BERBERS AND IBN TUMART: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION OF THE RISE OF THE ALMOHAD MOVEMENT

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Introduction

In the second half of the fourteenth century, 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun defined *'asabiyya*, or group feeling, as an indispensable element fostering unity and strengthening ties of loyalty within a given group, allowing its members "to fight and die for each other."¹ *'Asabiyya*, primarily based on consanguineous ties, provided individuals with protection for their lives, while at a higher level of social organization, namely that of the tribe, it provided the cohesion necessary for the establishment of "royal authority" and "royal superiority."²

A correlated element within *'asabiyya* is that of religion, for when individuals "are turned toward the truth and reject the world and whatever is false, and advance toward God, they become one in their outlook. Jealousy disappears. Mutual co-operation and support flourish."³ However, religion is but a coloring providing only additional strength to an existing group feeling; therefore, even prophets have to rely on *'asabiyya* in order to achieve their religious reforms.⁴

Ibn Khaldun's theses, as presented in the *Muqaddimah*, derived from his study and empirical analysis of the rise and fall of Berber and Berbero-Arab political movements in the Maghrib. Thus, from Ibn Khaldun's perspective, any political movement in the Maghrib must have as its foundation a conglomeration of individuals, bound by consanguineous ties, and organized around the pursuit of a given interest or goal. In cases where religious scholars and reformers attempt the imposition of their orthodox beliefs over society, success will ultimately depend on the degree to which these reformers have incorporated their beliefs to the existing group feeling and interest of the audience.

Two and a half centuries before Ibn Khaldun expounded his theories, a messianic, puritanical, political movement emerged in the High and Anti-Atlas mountains of Morocco, areas surrounded by the Hauoz/Marrakesh plain, the Sus Valley and the Sahara. The Almohads, or al-Muwahhidun,⁵ appeared in the 1120s as a Masmuda Berber theocratic state based on the religious teachings of Muhammad ibn Tumart (1080?-1130). With the emergence of the Almohads, a long

that lasted until the 1140s and which established the foundations for Almohad control over the destinies of the Maghrib, Ifriqiya, and al-Andalus for close to 130 years.

The Almohads were the second Berbero-Islamic dynasty to achieve political predominance over most of the western Islamic lands, close to five centuries after the first Arab-Muslim raids in North Africa (647 A.D.) and the arrival of Islam to these lands. As their predecessors the Almoravids, who were the first Berber politico-religious movement to seize power over western Islam (eleventh and twelfth centuries), the Almohads began as a religious, puritanical movement calling for the reform of Berber practices and customs seen as non-Islamic. Through their rule, Islam penetrated the entire Maghrib, even into areas which had remained only slightly Islamized or outright non-Islamic, though three and a half centuries had lapsed between the Arab conquest and the rise of the Almoravids.

In considering the rise of the Almohads as a religious and political movement in Magribi history, the forces behind it must be understood. Was it simply the zealous desire and preaching of Ibn Tumart, calling for the establishment of the pure *ummah* in this world, that drew the support of the Masmuda Berbers to his movement? Or were there pressing socio-economic, political, or even ecological reasons that prompted this support? If so, what then was the reality of the Masmuda Berbers' world that might have aided the rise of the Almohad movement and their subsequent political takeover in the Maghrib and Andalus?

With these questions in mind, a survey of primary and secondary sources on the Almohads, as well as of ethnographic literature on the Masmuda Berbers, will reveal that the Masmuda Berbers' surrounding environment was one of a precarious balance between survival and extinction, a balance in which the mountain communities ultimately relied upon the control of several outposts in the plains north and south of their habitat. The disruption or destruction of this nexus would have left the Masmuda mountaineers deprived of indispensable staples such as grains and salt, and of their seasonal transhumance to lower altitudes and to the foothills. With the Almoravids controlling the Hauoz/Marrakesh plain and the Sus Valley, with the arrival of Ibn Tumart to the Atlas, and the summary attempts by the Almoravids at eliminating Ibn Tumart, the networks with the plains on which the Masmuda depended for their survival must have been severed, activating patterns of internal defense and relief but at the same time creating a communal sense of desperation and despair, essential for the rise of a millennial movement of the magnitude of the Almohads.

The purpose of this study will be to present the socio-economic and political patterns of Masmuda Berber organization, and to identify the events surrounding the arrival of Ibn Tumart to the Atlas and the

subsequent policies of the Almoravids toward Ibn Tumart. These policies destroyed the socio-economic and political ties the Masmuda Berbers had with the lowlands. An analysis of the Almohad movement's organization, as devised by Ibn Tumart, will also be presented in order to illustrate the integration of indigenous patterns of organization that facilitated the collectivization of the Masmuda around Ibn Tumart and his preaching.

Altogether, Ibn Tumart indirectly created the circumstances on which he was to capitalize. Through this, the Masmuda Berber population of the High and Anti-Atlas united along tribal and confederate lines redefined by Ibn Tumart's messianic teaching and claims, and achieved the overthrow of the Almoravid ruling dynasty and the establishment of the Almohad-Masmuda empire.

I. A Revision of Older Interpretation of the Rise of the Almohad Movement

No single aspect of Almohad history has been as oversimplified and neglected as the process and circumstances giving way to the Masmuda Berbers' adoption of Ibn Tumart's preaching and *jihad*. For the most part, medieval and contemporary historians have based their theses concerning these events either on possession of a Machiavellian personality by Ibn Tumart or on innate qualities and characteristics of the Masmuda Berbers, channelled by Ibn Tumart in order to achieve political power in the Maghrib.

Abu Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahid al-Marrakushi, writing in the 1220s, a time when the decadence of the Almohad empire was already noticeable, attributed the adherence on the part of the Masmuda to Ibn Tumart's teachings to his shrewd, vicious mind. Without revealing his political pretensions, namely, his desire to overthrow the Almoravid dynasty, Ibn Tumart preached his doctrines, especially that of the infallible Mahdi,⁶ to the Masmuda Berbers. Once he felt confident of their allegiance and devotion, he proclaimed himself Mahdi, and thus undertook the divine mission of establishing the kingdom of God on earth. On the part of the Masmuda, it seems that little else could have been expected from them, for Ibn Tumart's knowledge left them in awe, allowing him to control and manipulate their innate inclination toward violence and the shedding of blood.⁷

Echoing this position a century later, Ibn Abi Zar' referred to how the pseudo-miracles performed by Ibn Tumart seized the imagination of his followers to the point that they "would not undertake anything without his ordering so."⁸ In an event later reiterated by Orientalist historians such as Millet,⁹ Ibn Tumart ordered several of his

followers to be buried alive, taking the necessary precaution to ensure them with a supply of oxygen. Ibn Tumart then proceeded to summon the Almohad community and, in an attempt to rebuild his credibility and legitimacy after the Almohad's defeat at the Battle of al-Buhayra (1130), Ibn Tumart asked the 'dead' soldiers their whereabouts. Fascination engulfed the Almohad ranks as they heard their deceased comrades declare the magnificence of Paradise, which they had achieved by fighting and dying for the Mahdi of God. Ibn Tumart cleverly destroyed all the evidence of his trickery; that is, he then deprived those buried of their needed oxygen.¹⁰ In all, Ibn Abi Zar' conveyed the picture of a ruthless zealot and power-hungry schemer who could not have failed in his machinations, given the utter ignorance of his audience and following.

A more enlightened account is provided by Ibn Khaldun and his *History of the Berbers*. Ibn Khaldun did provide a framework for understanding the emergence of the Almohad movement and the support received by Ibn Tumart from the Masmuda. A state of hostilities and almost outright war existed between the Masmuda Berbers and the Almoravids, as attested by the initial purpose given to Marrakesh: a military outpost from where the Almoravids could "subdue their [the Masmudas'] audacity through continually repeated attacks."¹¹ Ibn Khaldun also pointed to the affiliation of several Masmuda tribes to Ibn Tumart as the result of the Almoravid attacks aimed at his assassination.¹² However, this support would have been short-lived, for once the immediate threat had been dealt with, any sort of extra-tribal association would have been dismantled. Thus, the question of how Ibn Tumart maintained their allegiance or, in other words, what forces deemed it necessary for the Masmuda Berbers to give Ibn Tumart their allegiance, remains unanswered.

The theses of al-Marrakushi and Ibn Abi Zar', on the one hand, and those of Ibn Khaldun, on the other, have provided the basis for the theories expounded by most contemporary historians concerning the formative years of the Almohad movement. Regretfully, aside from Ambrosio Huici Miranda,¹³ most historians have echoed the views of the former two. Thus, most Almohad-related literature has centered around the life and person of Ibn Tumart, neglectfully undervaluing the role played by the Masmuda Berbers in this early stage of the movement.

On a political level, both Le Tourneau¹⁴ and Marçais¹⁵ indicated that although no grievance appeared to exist against Almoravid rule on the part of the Masmuda Berbers, their adherence to Ibn Tumart's teachings and political plots stemmed from their customary opposition to all centralized power. Marçais established an analogy between the Almohads and other politico-religious forms of dissension in North

African history, such as the Donatists and the Kharijis.¹⁶ Nonetheless, their exposition of political antagonism on the part of the Masmuda were not buttressed with the existing realities of the Masmuda's habitat, but were based on a barbaric opposition to any civilizing entity, whether it was the Almoravids or the French themselves. Likewise, Marçais' theory relied on a generalization that, while partly asserted, underscores and disregards the effects of an extraneous rule on a society such as that of the Masmuda. The adoption of an unorthodox religious belief does not occur based simply on the desire to oppose the belief of the ruling elite. Le Tourneau's theory reflects the underlying belief of an ignorant, savage-like group, perennially feuding with the Lamtuna Berbers, core and foundation of the Almoravid empire.¹⁷

Ethnically, the origins of the Almohad movement have been delineated as a consequence of an innate violence of the Masmuda just waiting to explode. Millet encapsulated this belief when asseverating that Ibn Tumart, as soon as he "had returned to his childhood's milieu...rediscovered in his heart the old yeast of barbarism, more sour [now] than eased, after years of wandering and persecution."¹⁸ Less overt than, but equally committed as, Millet appear the convictions of Montagne¹⁹ and Le Tourneau,²⁰ highlighting an ethnic, racist antagonism between the Masmuda and the Lamtuna Berber confederations. However, this position disregards the usual "ethnic"-related violence that accompanies all indigenous revolutionary movements, especially when the ruling elite differs from the subjects in culture and idiosyncrasy. In this case, the Sahara-based Lamtuna Berbers conquered and occupied the neighboring lowlands of the Atlas mountains, where the Masmuda Berbers controlled emporia through which essential commodities and staples were shipped into the mountains. Montagne reflected on this Khaldunian thesis,²¹ but Montagne's belief ultimately attributed the adherence of the Masmuda to Ibn Tumart's creed to their ever-present ethnic antagonism.

On the economic side, Abun-Nasr proposed the hypothesis of a desire on the part of the Masmuda to migrate to the fertile lowlands of Morocco, using Ibn Tumart's doctrine as a means to topple the Almoravid regime.²² Nevertheless, no attempt was made on his part to illustrate the reasons for this lust. Thus, his thesis is fundamentally based on a sudden impulse that coincided with the presence of a religious reformer, Ibn Tumart, who provided legitimacy to the Masmuda's aspirations. In a counter-theory, as stated above, Montagne pointed at the economic decline of the Masmuda-held cities in the lowlands with their occupation by the Almoravids. In the case of those in the Hauoz/Marrakesh plain, their decline is simply pictured as the result of the founding of Marrakesh by the Almoravids.²³ However,

Montagne did not elaborate on this idea, neither by explaining what he meant by economic decline nor by indicating how this economic decline affected the livelihood of the Masmuda Berbers. Consequently, Montagne's view of the economic decline of Masmuda cities is relegated to a minor plane in his theory on the rise of the Almohads, which he saw being dominated by other elements.

Altogether, it is in the realm of religion, markedly infiltrated by ethno-political allusions, that most contemporary historians have built their theories on the emergence of the Almohad movement; pivotal to these theses is the person of Ibn Tumart. At the simplest level, Basset and Terrasse attributed the success of Ibn Tumart in rallying the Masmuda Berbers in a *jihad* against the Almoravids to the fact that he belonged to an Imgharem family;²⁴ Ibn Tumart's preaching, which in and of itself captivated the imagination of the Berbers, was the more revered for the social, religious and political standing enjoyed by Ibn Tumart's family. Unfortunately, this would only affect the life of the village, not of a confederation.²⁵

Similarly, Le Tourneau asserted that Ibn Tumart's "eloquence was indeed capable of moving the simple-minded Berbers,"²⁶ thus enabling Ibn Tumart to use religion for "what he surely. . . had in mind—the overthrow of the Almoravid empire."²⁷ Levi-Provençal, for his part, elaborated on the evolution undergone by Ibn Tumart during his career—from a religious reformer to a political figure. This Paulistic experience took place immediately after Ibn Tumart's arrival to the Maghrib, but was only ensured success as his and his propagandists' messianic preaching spread among the High Atlas Berbers who, "as other less-developed people, remained in many ways but big children."²⁸

In an attempt to expand on these ideas, Millet propounded the three steps followed by Ibn Tumart to achieve the unfettered allegiance of the Masmuda Berbers. First, Ibn Tumart had to constantly pound into the minds of his followers their divine predestination to rule the world. After all, "a chosen people is ready to believe their invincibility."²⁹ Second, Ibn Tumart had to captivate the imagination of his followers, and what better way than by staging all sorts of miracles, from "dead" soldiers praising Paradise to a "brute" reciting of the Qur'an all of a sudden?³⁰ Last, but not least, for those who were still recalcitrant, the fastest and simplest solution Ibn Tumart could have counted on was their elimination. Purge them from the movement!³¹ Millet described what many, in disgust, would have branded as a Machiavellian despot, for "in his [Ibn Tumart's] eyes. . . the end justified the means. . . [especially when] the means reflected on the barbarism of those whom he addressed."³² However, there are

recurrent flaws in Millet's argument. First, he, as well as other scholars, relied on the idea of a perfect marriage between the simpletons and the eloquent rhetoricians, without realizing that the simpletons might have had very pressing and palpable reasons to throw themselves into the arms of the snake charmer. Second, they overlooked the fact that the purges, while historically accurate, revealed that the adherence of many Masmuda Berbers was response to motives other than Ibn Tumart's fairy tales.

The last interpretation to be considered here is Ambrosio Huici Miranda's, as expounded in his *Historia Política del Imperio Almohade*. Huici Miranda recognized the complexity of forces shaping the rise of the Almohads; yet the bottom line of his argument centered on the credibility Ibn Tumart had of his own mission, which was but legitimized by the submission and veneration given to him by the Masmuda Berbers.³³

According to Huici Miranda, Ibn Tumart capitalized on "the tendency of Maghribians to venerate and revere their great men,"³⁴ an inclination which proved instrumental in his proclamation as Mahdi in 1121. Nonetheless, as in any other human society, leaders are only successful when playing off their charisma, or as Arabic historians and philosophers would have termed it, their *baraka*, against the expectations of their followers. Thus, charisma is as dependent on the response of those looking up as it is on him who is projecting it down. The degree of veneration and esteem derived from a group by its leader reflects but the appeal his person and ideas have, especially in attenuating and easing the immediate needs, worries and concerns of his following, whether it be at a platonic or a down-to-earth level. At all moments, Ibn Tumart deserves recognition for his eloquence, charisma and shrewdness: but in and of themselves, these qualities amount to little if there is no fertile ground on which to bear fruit, which necessarily must be found in the existing Almoravid-Masmuda status quo.

Huici Miranda, similarly, acknowledged the intensification of Almoravid military pressure on the Masmuda population from the moment Ibn Tumart sought refuge among his kinfolk.³⁵ However, while rightly identifying Almoravid expectations to be gained through this policy,³⁶ he overlooked the fact that this policy would also have exacerbated the ethnically-projected political antagonism of the Masmuda towards the Almoravids, resulting from the upset of already-weakened economic and social network patterns of the mountain communities with those of the plains. In a related issue, Huici Miranda pondered the survival of Ibn Tumart's religious and political movement after his death, a matter that was aggravated by the control exercised over the organization by a foreigner, 'Abd al-Mu'min.³⁷ As a rule,

Berber societies are organized along clannish and tribal lines, but within this genealogical stiffness, adoptions are common and well-accepted,³⁸ adoptions which could be strengthened through marital bonds. Likewise, the pluritribally-composed Ansar would have provided the links necessary for the consolidation of Almohad power,³⁹ playing off kinship obligations, no matter the degree to which they were stretched, against the alien oppression of the Almoravid ruling elite.

Finally, Huici Miranda accepted the purges conducted in 1130 as a sign of a non-absolute and unfettered allegiance to Ibn Tumart on the part of several Masmuda individuals and tribal factions.⁴⁰ Unfortunately, he attributed this dissent, with a stroke of his pen, to "old folks, hesitant to undertake the adventure [Ibn Tumart's political opposition to the Almoravids] and afraid of Almoravid retaliation," while ascribing the purges to "ambitious and chivalry-minded youngsters rushing to embrace the Mahdi's cause."⁴¹ Huici Miranda only named the tribes that joined the Almohad movement during its formative years, but never examined the causes leading them up to their membership. The purge of 1130, as well as others conducted during the reign of 'Abd al-Mu'min (1130/33-1163), acknowledges the existence of more tangible reasons guiding the Masmuda Berbers into the Almohad establishment than simply a religious conviction.

The person and preaching of Ibn Tumart created a series of conditions which affected the political, economic and military status quo in the High and Anti-Atlas; the responses given by the Almoravid regime and the Masmuda Berbers to these ultimately account for the formation and rise of the Almohad movement and the subsequent fall of the Almoravid empire. Military and religious persecution of Ibn Tumart by the Almoravids enacted Berber networks of kinsmen's protection, as Ibn Tumart made his way from Marrakesh, through the High Atlas, to his native Igilliz in the Anti-Atlas. The ensuing blockade established by the Almoravids on the Anti-Atlas provided the catalyst for further Masmuda cohesion, which in turn allowed for the proclamation of Ibn Tumart as Mahdi. Ibn Tumart's migration to the High Atlas unfolded through the consanguineous ties of his disciples, the Ansar, with the different tribes and factions in the mountains. The Almoravids responded to this by imposing tight control, militarily and economically, over the Masmuda population of the High Atlas, occasioning further unification among them as resources became scarcer and their supply lines with the plains were severed. As before, this only aided Ibn Tumart in incorporating the Masmuda tribes into his movement.

In all, Almoravid attempts to stamp out Ibn Tumart created the circumstances necessary for the implementation of confederate socio-economic and defensive networks among the Masmuda, which were in turn capitalized on by Ibn Tumart. Thus, a historical, ethnographic

approach to the formative years of the Almohad movement will provide concrete answers to the emergence of this movement.

II. An Ethnographic Interpretation of the Rise of the Almohad Movement

The occupation by the Almoravids of the Hauoz/Marrakesh plain and the Sus valley in the 1050s and 1060s marked the early stages of Almoravid control over Maghribian destinies. This occupation was characterized by the acquisition of Masmuda-held cities, such as Aghmat-Urika,⁴² and by the founding of Marrakesh as the political and religious center of the Almoravid Empire. Regardless of the forces behind this latter event,⁴³ the settling of the Almoravid ruling elite in this city also determined its rise as the predominant emporium between Northern Maghrib and the Western Sudan, a predominance enhanced by Almoravid control of the Saharan trade termini in both of these regions⁴⁴.

Thus, Marrakesh affected the existing political, social and economic patterns of the Masmuda Berbers in this area. Politically, and in conjunction with Almoravid dominance over the Sus, Marrakesh served as a post from which some restraint could be exerted over the unsubdued Masmuda communities of the High and Anti-Atlas. This restraint could also be achieved by manipulating the social ties these communities had with their fellow Masmuda of the lowlands, and which were instrumental for the economic well-being of their societies. For the most part, however, the High and Anti-Atlas Masmuda Berbers were left unmolested after initial attempts to subdue them.⁴⁵ The nominal Almoravid control over them restricted itself to sporadic raids and to tax-collecting expeditions; contacts between Masmuda from the mountain and the plain, from transhumant migration to trade, continued with the only significant difference being the neighboring political giant extending its preeminence over the lowlands. The ease with which Ibn Tumart reached the High Atlas in 1120, after the disputation at Marrakesh and before the conception by the Almoravids of an expedient policy toward him, attests to this free and unrestricted movement from the lowlands to the highlands, and vice-versa.

In 1120, Ibn Tumart and his retinue reached Marrakesh after years of travelling through al-Andalus, the Middle East and the Maghrib.⁴⁶ By this time, Ibn Tumart had adopted as his personal task the purification of Maghribi religious practices. As most of these practices (namely the consumption of alcohol, the use of musical instruments in religious ceremonies and events, etc.) were considered a departure from the established and sanctioned Islamic doctrine, their suppression remained the duty of all true believers. In essence, Ibn

Tumart's presence in Marrakesh was but another stop in his return journey to his home; what magnified this event was the fact that his preaching, like in other cities he had visited, attracted the attention of the local ruler who, in this case, happened to be none other than 'Ali b. Yusuf, the emir of the Almoravids.⁴⁷ Two verifiable encounters between Ibn Tumart and 'Ali b. Yusuf took place during the former's stay at Marrakesh: one at the main mosque of the city, the other during the disputation Ibn Tumart held against Maliki and Almoravid *fuqaha*.⁴⁸ The result of these encounters was the expulsion of Ibn Tumart from Marrakesh, and his resuming the trip back to his native Igilliz, reaching Igalwan at the steps of the High Atlas range.

At this point, a change in Almoravid policy toward Ibn Tumart occurred, which determined the course of the ensuing events. An attempt was made to have Ibn Tumart return to Marrakesh and, when this failed, the Almoravids assumed a position aimed at eliminating Ibn Tumart, not because of his being a political troublemaker, but a religious heretic. By then, Ibn Tumart had entered the High Atlas and received the protection of the Hazraja tribe;⁴⁹ this, for all practical purposes, was the first instance of Masmuda sanctuary offered to Ibn Tumart, through the enactment of kinsmen obligations, Abu Ibrahim Isma'il b. Isallali al-Hazraji being a follower of Ibn Tumart and member of the Hazraja.⁵⁰

As Ibn Tumart made his way to his native Igilliz, several Masmuda tribes were recruited. But most important for the future of the movement was the incorporation to Ibn Tumart's retinue of members of these tribes, such as Abu Hafs 'Umar b. Yahya al-Hintati, of the Hintata tribe, and Abu Musa 'Isa b. Musa al-Sawdi, of the Sawda tribe.⁵¹ By the time Ibn Tumart arrived at Igilliz in 1120-21, he had finally adopted a challenging posture against Almoravid political authority. This political challenge and opposition should be seen within the context of Islamic political thought, where no distinction is made as to what belongs to Caesar and what to God.⁵² By its very nature, an attack on Almoravid religious orthodoxy would necessarily question the political legitimacy of their rule. Therefore, these early conversions to Ibn Tumart's doctrine by diverse Masmuda tribal factions and tribes did have as their foundation a religious conviction which equally translated into political activism.

In Igilliz, Ibn Tumart immediately found the protection of his tribe, the Hargha. Under this aegis, Ibn Tumart preached what he considered orthodox Islam, a symbiotic doctrine of analogical interpretation of the Qur'an, Mu'tazili and 'Ash'ari teachings, and Shi'i dogmas, especially that of the infallible Mahdi.⁵³ In Ramadan 515 AH, 1121, Ibn Tumart was proclaimed Mahdi by his ten closest disciples, the Ansar, and his proclamation was accepted by his fellow Hargha

Berbers.⁵⁴ Several elements were indispensable in this event, namely, pre-Islamic religious practices that had been assimilated by popular Islam in the Maghrib, and the historical development of the medieval Maghrib, mostly delimited by political and religious events and crises in the East.

Pre-Islamic and pre-Christian religious practices among the Berbers, as with any other human society, revolved around nature, seen as a battlefield of good versus evil. Both of these forces effected their designs throughout nature's elements, as well as through their abodes: trees, rocks, etc.⁵⁵ Within this environment, man attempted to control those forces of evil detrimental to his survival by mastering the support and assistance of the forces of good.⁵⁶ In a community, certain individuals would acquire control over nature and its feuding forces; their role within these communities thus assumed a political facet which translated into protection of villagers' lives, crops, herds, health and well-being. As such, these individuals had a position of preeminence among Berbers, a position deserving veneration and obedience in life and death.⁵⁷

The survival of these practices under, and their incorporation into, Christianity and Islam stemmed from the peripheral rank of the Maghrib, and within it its mountainous regions, in the political, religious and economic structures of the empires expounding these creeds. Likewise, the survival of these practices was ensured by the existence of similar beliefs among heterodox interpretations of Christianity and Islam, such as Donatism, Khariji, and Shi'ism, all of which caused a political and religious antagonism toward the ruling elites, whether Roman, Umayyad or 'Abbasid. After the seventh century, the suppression of dissident religious groups by the Umayyads and the 'Abbasids in the East, combined with the lack of direct control over the Maghrib, resulted in the flight of hundreds of dissidents to the western Islamic lands, bringing with them their heterodox religious beliefs as well as their political disgust for the existing governments.⁵⁸

Thus, Ibn Tumart's proclamation as Mahdi enjoyed the benefit of the favorable ethnographic and historical trends in the Maghrib. The Masmuda Berbers of the High and Anti-Atlas had remained only slightly Islamized by the time Ibn Tumart returned to Igiliz, therefore allowing these ancient practices and customs to survive and assume pseudo-Islamic forms. Similarly, official Islam was the Islam of the urban centers and of the Bled al-Makhzen,⁵⁹ while dissident Islam was that of the peripheral areas and of the Bled al-Siba.⁶⁰ Therefore, political antagonism was always present among oppressed groups, which channelled this antagonism under the banners of religious righteousness and orthodoxy.

This historical milieu accounted for Ibn Tumart's proclamation, but as the Almohad movement grew in size and strength, more circumstantial factors came into play. To begin with, the Almoravids, following a period of inaction due to political crises in al-Andalus,⁶¹ resumed their attempts to eradicate the growing opposition in the Atlas. In 1122, the Almoravid governor of the Sus, Abu Bakr b. Uribal, launched an attack against the Masmuda of the Anti-Atlas. After an initial victory, the Almoravids faced increasing resistance which had at its heart Ibn Tumart, and achieved the withdrawal of the Almoravids. A second attack was launched the following year, and reached its apex in the siege of Igilliz. However, the siege was relieved, and victory over the Almoravids secured, as the Hintati tribe aligned itself with the Almohads. Huici Miranda, basing his argument on the *Nazm al-Juman*, credited Hintati support for the Almohads for their conversion to Ibn Tumart's teaching. While not dismissing this, for it indeed accounted for Hintata's adherence to Ibn Tumart's movement, Huici Miranda overlooked the fact that a member of the Hintata formed part of Ibn Tumart's Ansar, and the Hintata's response should also be attributed to their obligation to defend their kinsmen from any external threat.⁶² Ibn Tumart continued, throughout this ordeal, to send missionaries to the different Masmuda clans in the Atlas;⁶³ these missionaries must have relayed the precariousness of Ibn Tumart's and his fellow Masmuda Berbers' situation at Igilliz.

Following the siege of Igilliz, ca. 1124-1125, Ibn Tumart moved his center of operation to Tinmallal, in the High Atlas. Huici Miranda provided the explanation of a need for an easier town to defend from which to continue his struggle. He misconstrued the different versions presented by North African historians and chroniclers in relation to this transferal, and concluded that though Ibn Tumart might have been invited to Tinmallal by its inhabitants, his ensuing massacre of them poses inherent questions as to the nature of their allegiance and commitment to the Almohads.⁶⁴ However, ethno-political and defensive traditions among the Berber population in the Atlas mountains, regarding the incorporation of an individual to the core of Berber communities, could and can only be envisioned within established patterns, namely those of adoption and protection against a hostile force, in this case the Almoravids.⁶⁵ Huici Miranda, citing the *Kitab al-Ansab*,⁶⁶ identified the population of Tinmallal as belonging to several Hargha factions, their kinsmen constituting by then a sizeable part of Ibn Tumart's following. These groups would have granted asylum and support to Ibn Tumart, as a fellow Harghi. Therefore, their suppression and extermination must have resulted from a lukewarm religious commitment to the Almohad cause.

Ibn Tumart's relocation in the High Atlas meant that the Almoravid regime refocused its repressive policies on that area. By 1126, a series of fortresses had been built, effectively blockading any movement in or out of this mountain range.⁶⁷ This blockade was accompanied by continuous Almoravid incursions into the Atlas, all having as their goal the emasculation of the Almohad movement and Masmuda dissent. The Masmuda Berbers responded in two ways: militarily, against both the Almoravids and the Almohads, and ethnographically, adopting Ibn Tumart as their confederate leader and the Almohad creed as their cause. However, both responses had an equal determinant factor: the dislocation by the Almoravid blockade of Masmuda economic networks extending to the plains. By establishing a blockade, the Almoravids targeted the supply of needed staples and commodities received by Masmuda highlanders from the plains, while they threatened to destroy the mountaineers' main source of purchasing power—their herds.⁶⁸ As in other instances in Maghribian history,⁶⁹ the ruling power in the lowland used blockades to prevent transhumant migration by the mountaineers, devastating their herds through winter's inclemencies, thus bringing about the neutralization of their political rebelliousness.

Militarily, the Masmuda responded primarily to the pressures imposed by Almoravid blockades and raids. The outbreak of hostilities between the Almoravids and the Masmuda predetermined the unification of the component tribal factions among the latter. Similarly, economic hardship would have prompted the revival of intra-faction relief and welfare networks. These, however, might have been impaired by the growth of the Almohad movement. On the one hand, the Almohads increased their missionary activities among the Masmuda, bringing about retaliatory raids on the part of the Almoravids. As indicated by Huici Miranda,⁷⁰ several Almohad missionaries were assassinated by Masmuda factions, actions avenged by retaliatory raids of the Almohads. Thus, in some cases, the Almohads posed as serious a threat as the Almoravids for many Masmuda communities in the High Atlas. On the other hand, as Masmuda communities under siege reached out for the support of their kinsmen, they found oftentimes that these had joined the Almohads, and required in return for their assistance their conversion to the Almohad dogma and thus their political submission to Ibn Tumart. These groups experienced several years of hostilities with both feuding powers, hostilities that almost resulted in their extermination or forced integration into the Almohad movement, as was the case for the Haskura.⁷¹

Conversely, these same circumstances favored the assimilation of various tribal factions into Ibn Tumart's movement. The need to relieve the economic blockade imposed by the Almoravids drew together

the different branches of any given Masmuda tribe. In the cases of Hintati and Sawdi factions, the existence of kinsmen factions within the Almohads enhance their incorporation and their handling of the blockade. The Almohads' creed provided, likewise, a cohesive ideological framework through which repelling the Almoravids became possible. By 1127, the Almohads had taken the offensive, aiming, first of all, at the Sus valley, where they occupied the city of Tasrirt,⁷² thus breaking the blockade imposed on the High Atlas. By 1129, the Almohads had extended their domination through the High Atlas, defeating and expelling the Almoravids.

Almohad success in expelling the Almoravids from the Atlas and in cracking their blockade eliminated the immediate threat hovering over the Masmuda and ostensibly normalized the daily life of highland communities. This presented a challenge to the unity and strength of Ibn Tumart's movement, for as the danger posed by the Almoravids dissipated and the transit in and out of the mountains reopened, extra-cantonal and extra-villager networks of defense and welfare began to be dismantled. The elemental unit of Masmuda social, economic and political organization was and is the village; villages in any given region or valley will constitute a canton, a conglomeration of which will form the tribe, and tribes the confederation.⁷³ However, any of the higher structures will only be enacted during periods of crises; the crisis being over, these structures will revert to their simplest component, the village.⁷⁴ Therefore, as a virtual return to Masmuda-Almoravid *status quo* occurred by 1129, the strength of the Almohad movement must have shown signs of decline. A situation like this, then, demanded effective action from Ibn Tumart and the Almohad leadership.

In 1130, Ibn Tumart summoned the tribes belonging to the Almohad movement and ordered the massacre of what were considered lukewarm followers. In essence, these and future purges served two purposes: first, they reasserted the ultimate religious and political goals of the movement by setting an example of what would happen to those with little commitment to these goals; and second, they secured the continual support of those loyal groups by assuring them of the righteousness of their cause and their actions. Immediately after this purge, the Almohads launched an attack against the Almoravid-controlled Hauoz/Marrakesh plain. This offensive, with its ultimate siege of Marrakesh and the Almohad defeat at al-Buhayra, aspired to divert the Masmudas' attention from the purges, as stated by Huici Miranda.⁷⁵ However, this maneuver also rekindled hostile Almoravid policies toward the High Atlas population, who answered by re-enacting their defensive confederate alliance. All in all, and for the remaining years of Almoravid rule, the inability of the Almoravid empire to effectively destroy all opposition in the highlands created a vicious cycle

of exacerbation for the Atlas population. By placing the highlanders in economic isolation, the Almoravids actually prepared the ground for the Almohads to exploit the situation either through faith or force. This vicious cycle even accounted for the survival of the movement after the death of its leader, Ibn Tumart, in 1130, for it created the circumstances necessary for Masmuda Berber unification.

Consequently, the rise of the Almohad movement must be understood and seen as a dynamic interplay of diverse ethnographic forces and human actions over a long period of time. Only victory over the Almoravids and the ensuing Almohad takeover guaranteed the survival of the movement out of the Atlas, for they had built upon the precarious conditions created by Almoravid attempts at suppressing them. In addition to Masmuda patterns of organization, two other elements must be accounted for in understanding the rise of the Almohads: namely, the political organization of Ibn Tumart's movement and the millennial nature of his teachings.

With the growth of the Almohad movement, Ibn Tumart addressed the issue of providing his following with a long-lasting and adhering organization that would enable the movement to achieve its religious and political goals. Within this organization, Ibn Tumart retained absolute powers in his role as the infallible Imam, the Mahdi. But to secure the undying loyalty of his followers, Ibn Tumart had to devise an organization compatible with those existing among the Masmuda Berbers of the High Atlas, thus making the Almohad movement a Masmuda movement, and the Almohad creed a Masmuda creed. Both the Jama'a (Council of Ten)⁷⁶ and the Ahl Khamsin (Council of Fifty)⁷⁷ were composed mostly of Masmuda tribal chieftains, giving advisory power to each Masmuda tribe within the movement. The members of the Jama'a, also known as the Ansar (in a distinct allusion to Prophet Muhammad's first disciples) provided an influential mean through which diverse tribes were incorporated to the Almohad ranks.⁷⁸ The Jama'a and the Ahl Khamsin reflected the traditional Berber modes of political and defensive organization, with the significant variant of instituting a supreme leader to the Masmuda confederation: the Imam Mahdi Ibn Tumart.⁷⁹

An important element in the Almohad hierarchy, as created by Ibn Tumart, was the preservation of the autochthonous lower echelons of Berber organization, especially those pertaining to the village and the canton (or *taqbilt*). However, Ibn Tumart infused Almohad missionaries into these, thus guarding against any deviation in their beliefs and laxity in their commitment. Ultimately, these Berber patterns of local organization, when faced with mounting Almoravid hostility, emasculated their own autonomy in favor of tribal and confederated

interests, the representatives of which were functionally invested with offices within the Almohad infrastructure.

Nonetheless, all this organization, all allegiance to the movement, and the entire success of the Almohad movement relied on Ibn Tumart's conviction in his divine mission and, in equal terms, on the Masmuda's conviction that their times were the end of times, and that they had the obligation to establish the true *ummah* in this world. Islamic messianism has its roots in Judeo-Christian conceptualization of the ends of time. For that matter, Sunni Islam preaches the advent of God's *ummah* guided by a hypothetical council of scholars (*mujtahids*), ensuring the orthodoxy of the community of believers as Jesus faces the Dajjal in the glorious and final encounter between good and evil. Shi'i conceptualization, on the other hand, differs in that it provides for the absolute rule of the infallible imam from the house of Muhammad.⁸⁰

Maghribi history portrays scores of instances when groups empowered by a millennial frenzy have toppled existing political establishments, many of which were themselves the product of a similar pursuit for the perfect and godly society. The Idrisid and Fatimid dynasties had as their foundations the beliefs of a society guided by divinely chosen and invested leaders from the house of the Prophet. Likewise, a movement such as the tenth- and eleventh-century Barghawata,⁸¹ itself a tribe of the Masmuda confederation, emerged through millennial beliefs and strict observance of religious practices, whether proper to Islam or not. But as throughout medieval European history,⁸² these movements were realized among groups whose socio-economic vulnerability made them easy prey to hardship and disasters such as famine. Added to this, an eschatological doctrine would furnish a reason for and an answer to the calamities of life, with a unique consequence of transforming "a collective sense of impotence and anxiety and envy," into a "frantic urge to smite the ungodly."⁸³

The person and teachings of Ibn Tumart accounted for both the conditions afflicting the Masmuda Berbers of the Atlas mountains and the majestic doctrine uniting them in overthrowing the perpetrators of so much evil. The destruction of Masmuda socio-economic connections to the lowlands, emanating from the Almoravid blockade aimed at the elimination of Ibn Tumart, was purportedly presented by him as a punishment exacted from them by God for their religious laxity and for their conformity with the heretic practices of the existing political power in the Maghrib. Within this chastising preaching, a light of hope shone perspicuously. Obscured as it might have been, a *hadith* had announced the coming of the Mahdi to the West at the end of the fifth century of the Hijra.⁸⁴ The increasing graveness of Masmuda life, and the constant repetition of this *hadith* by Ibn Tumart and his propagandists, paved the way for his proclamation as that awaited Mahdi who would establish the

society where "their wrongs would be righted and their enemies cast down."⁸⁵

The Masmuda Berbers had been consequently entrusted with the mission of assisting the infallible imam in establishing the *ummah* of God. This did not allow for halfheartedness from within, nor tolerance without the community of believers. The Almoravids, staunch supporters and believers of the Maliki teachings and Qur'anic interpretation, had invested the essence of God with an anthropomorphic nature. Ibn Tumart, ascribing his preaching on this subject to Mu'tazili doctrines, negated this anthropomorphism in favor of the unitary conception of God and the analogical interpretation of Qur'anic passages expounding physical qualities to God, branding Maliki literalism of these passages as among the most demeaning offenses against God.⁸⁶ In all, not only were the Almoravids oppressing and destroying the Masmuda, but they were possessed of erroneous beliefs about God, beliefs that demanded correction either by sincere conversion to the true beliefs, or by the expiatory blade of the sword.

For an entire decade prior to his death, Ibn Tumart guided the Masmuda Berbers down a path of religious and political activism, zealotry and pragmatism. A reformer at first, the deafness of his audience drove him to the conclusion that, as any other true believer, he should and would fight iniquity and heresy with his tongue and sword. But his success was determined by events that he indirectly created and which mobilized a fractionalized society; his message capitalized on these conditions and provided the legitimacy and cohesiveness that led to an Almohad-Masmuda final victory over the Almoravids.

Conclusions

The forces and circumstances molding the rise of the Almohad movement have remained only superficially addressed by most historians. The need to reassess these arises from the continual misinterpretation of Berber mores and idiosyncracies. The lack of objective understanding of socio-economic and political patterns of organization and behavior among the Masmuda Berbers has resulted in medieval chroniclers focussing on legitimizing their employers' political ambitions, with little regard for historical accuracy. Almohad-related literature, from nineteenth- and twentieth-century Orientalists, has oftentimes legitimized French and European imperialist interests in the region by portraying the Berber population as savage sub-humans.

An analysis of the existing works on Maghribi history, society, and ethnography reveals that though additional research and studies are called for, a series of dislocations of the economic networks among

Masmuda population in the lowlands and highlands occurred as a result of Almoravid policies in the early 1120s. This dislocation enacted tribal and confederate defensive and relief mechanisms, which provided the milieu necessary for the Almohad movement to hatch. Increased and continuous pressure by the Almoravid, and a realignment of Ibn Tumart's preaching along messianic rhetoric, led to his proclamation as Mahdi in Ramadan 1121.

For the remainder of the 1120s, several elements combined to guarantee the growth of the Almohads: first, economic deprivation occasioned by Almoravid blockade of the Atlas mountains, interfering with the trade supply routes providing grains to the highland communities, as well as with the seasonal transhumant migration; second, the enactment of confederate defensive policies by the Masmuda, in an attempt to counteract the military incursions against and raids on them by the Almoravids; third, and parallel to the preceding, the enactment of welfare networks aimed at coping with the hardship imposed by the blockade and the scarcity of essential commodities and staples coming from the plains; fourth, the devising of an Almohad hierarchy by Ibn Tumart, which effectively capitalized on the traditional patterns of Masmuda organization; and fifth, the expounding of a religious, messianic creed legitimizing Masmuda anger against an oppressive and aggressive political and military establishment. All these forces should be held accountable for the rise of the Almohad movement and for the support received by it from the Masmuda Berber population in the High and Anti-Atlas.

Even after Ibn Tumart's death in 1130, these forces prevented the disintegration of the movement. For one, 'Abd al-Mu'min continued the wars against the Almoravids, who extended their blockade throughout those mountainous areas occupied by the Almohad-Masmuda.⁸⁷ Similarly, Berber religious traditions, namely the transfer of *baraka* from a leader to his closest disciples, legitimized 'Abd al-Mu'min in the eyes of the Masmuda.⁸⁸ Finally, the utilization of confederate socio-economic, political and defensive networks, tainted with an eschatological ideology and purified by political pragmatic purges, led the Almohads to an ultimate and definite victory over the Almoravids in 1147.

In conclusion, Ibn Tumart and his successor, 'Abd al-Mu'min, must be seen as leaders who, while committed to their divinely ordained mission, skilfully maximized the circumstances they helped to create. But, in all, an understanding of the success of the Almohads remains to be found in an understanding of those who composed the movement, the Masmuda Berbers of the High and Anti-Atlas.

¹Abd ar-Rahman Ibn Khaldun, *Muqaddimah* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1981, p. 123.

²*Ibid.*, p. 108.

³*Ibid.*, p. 126.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 126-128.

⁵al-muwahhidun, a name ascribed by Ibn Tumart to his followers, refers to those who believe in the doctrine of the unity of God, as opposed to the Maliki literal interpretation of those Qur'anic passages granting God corporeal attributes. See Rachid Bourouiba, *Ibn Tumart* (Algiers: SNED), 1974, pp. 83-87; I. Goldziher, *Introduction au Le Livre De Mohammed Ibn Toumert* (Algiers: Imprimerie Orientale Pierre Fontana), 1903, pp. 54-62.

⁶On Ibn Tumart's conceptualization on the Mahdi, see Bourouiba, *Ibn Tumart*, 89-91; Goldziher, *Introduction*, p. 21. For a general view, see *The Encyclopedia of Islam* (Leiden: E.J. Brill), Vol. III, pp. 111-115.

⁷Abu Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahid al-Marrakushi, *Kitab al-Mu'yib fi taljis: Ajbar al-Magrib* (Colección de Crónicas Arabes de la Reconquista, Tetuán: Editora Marroquí), 1955, pp. 145-150.

⁸Ibn Abi Zar', *Rawd al-Qirtas* (2nd ed., Valencia: J. Nácher), 1964, Vol. II, p. 353.

⁹See René Millet, *Les Almohades: Histoire d'une dynastie berbère* (Paris: Société d'Éditions Géographiques, Maritimes et Coloniales), 1923, pp. 18-19.

¹⁰Ibn Abi Zar', *Op. Cit.*, p. 363.

¹¹Ibn Khaldun, *Histoire des Berbères* (Paris: Librairie Oientaliste), 1927, Vol. II, p. 72.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 171.

¹³See Huici Miranda, *Historia Política del Imperio Almohade* (Tetuán: Editora Marroquí), 1956.

¹⁴See Roger Le Tourneau, *The Almohad Movement in North Africa in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1969, pp. 10-18.

¹⁵See George Marçais, *La Berbérie Musulmane et l'Orient au Moyen Age* (Aubier: Éditions Montagne), 1946, p. 254.

¹⁶*Loc. Cit.*

¹⁷Le Tourneau, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 12-13.

¹⁸Millet, *Op. Cit.*, p. 16.

¹⁹Robert Montagne, *Les Berbères et le Makhzen dans le sud du Maroc* (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan), 1930, p. 29.

²⁰Le Tourneau, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 12-13.

²¹Montagne, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 38, 60.

²²Jamil M. Abun Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1980, p. 108.

²³Montagne, *Op. Cit.*, p. 38.

²⁴Henri Basset and Henri Terrasse, "Sanctuaires et forteresses almohades: I. Tinmel," in *Hesperis*, IV (1924), p. 22.

²⁵For a concise presentation of amghar, see Ernest Geller and Charles Micaud (eds.), *Arabs and Berbers* (Lexington: Lexington Books), 1972, pp. 59-66.

²⁶Le Toruneau, *Op. Cit.*, p. 29.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 24.

²⁸See Évariste Levi-Provençal, *L'Islam d'Occident* (Paris: Editions G. P. Maisonneuve), 1948, pp. 257-280, quote on p. 266.

²⁹Millet, *Op. Cit.*, p. 17.

³⁰*Loc. Cit.*

³¹*Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

³²*Ibid.*, p.16.

³³Miranda, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 52-95.

³⁴*Ibid.*, p.63.

³⁵*Ibid.*, p.65.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 76.

³⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

³⁸See H. Bruno and G.H. Bousquet, "Contribution à l'étude des pactes de protections et d'alliance chez les Berbères du Maroc Central," in *Hesperis*, 33 (1946), pp. 353-370.

³⁹The Ansar was the advisory council formed by Ibn Tumart's first ten disciples. For a list of their names, see Levi-Provençal, *Documents Inédits d'Histoire Almohade* (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste), 1928, pp. 48-51; Ibn Abi Zar', *Op.Cit.*, pp. 350-51.

⁴⁰Miranda, *Op.Cit.*, p. 78.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 79.

⁴²Montagne, *Op.Cit.*, p. 60.

⁴³Ibn Abi Zar', *Op.Cit.*, pp. 296-297; Ibn Khaldun, *Op. Cit.*, p.72.

⁴⁴See Samir M. Zoghby, *The Impact of the Western Sudanic Empires on the Trans-Saharan Trade: Xth-XVth Centuries* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International), 1976, pp. 63-104; Montagne, *Op.Cit.*, p. 60

⁴⁵Ibn Khaldun, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 71, 73, 84.

⁴⁶Miranda, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 28-52; Bourouiba, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 19-49.

⁴⁷Miranda, *Ibid.*, pp.38-52; Bourouiba, *Ibid.*, pp. 31-44.

⁴⁸Miranda, *Ibid.*, pp. 52-59.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 60.

⁵⁰Levi-Provençal, *Op. Cit.*, p.49.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁵²Ernest Geller, *Muslim Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1981, p. 1.

⁵³For a thorough study on Ibn Tumart's doctrine, see Goldziher, *Op.Cit.* For a more condensed presentation, See Bourouiba, *Op.Cit.*

⁵⁴Miranda, *Op. Cit.*, p. 63.

⁵⁵See Abraham I. Laredo, *Berbères y Hebreos en Marruecos* (Madrid: instituto de Estudios Africanos), 1954, pp. 93-100; Alfred Bel. *La Religion*

Musulmane en Berbérie (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner), 1938, pp. 75-76.

⁵⁶See G.H. Bousquet, *Les Berbères* (Paris: Presse Universitaires de France), 1974, pp. 96-101.

⁵⁷Gabriel Camps, *Berbères Aux Marges de l' Histoire* (Paris: Editions des Hesperides), 1980, pp. 220-21.

⁵⁸Bel, *Op.Cit.* For Christian heresies and their anti-Roman imperialist connotations, see Marguerite Rachet, *Rome et les Berbères: un problème militaire d'Auguste à Dioclétien* (Brussels: Latomus Revue d'Etudes Latines), 1970; and Geoffrey Grinshaw Willis, *Saint Augustine and the Donatist Controversy* (London: S. P. C. K.), 1950.

⁵⁹The Bled al-Makhzen defined those areas of the Maghrib under direct control of the existing government. These areas mostly represented the lowlands, where the established political power could exert military control, levy taxes, etc.

⁶⁰The Bled al-Siba, or land of dissent, has traditionally represented the Maghribian highlands where, due to their topography, have remained inaccessible to and isolated from the lowland's centers of power.

⁶¹Miranda, *Op.Cit.*, p. 77.

⁶²See Montagne, *La Vie Sociale et la Vie Politique des Berbères* (Paris: Editions du Comité de l'Afrique Française), 1931, p. 54.

⁶³Miranda, *Op.Cit.*, p. 75.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, p. 71.

⁶⁵Montagne, *La Vie.*, pp. 54-61.

⁶⁶Miranda, *Op.Cit.*, p. 72.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, p. 76.

⁶⁸Jacques Berque, *Structures Sociales du Haut-Atlas* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France), 1978, pp. 101-102; Najet Pacha, *Le Commerce au Maghreb du XIe au XIVe siècles* (Tunis: Publications de l'Université de Tunis), 1976, p. 50.

⁶⁹See Joseph Bourrilly, *Éléments d'Ethnographie Marocaine* (Paris: Librairie Coloniale et Orientaliste Larose), 1932, p. 165; J. Célérier, "La Transhumance dans le Moyen-Atlas," *Hesperis*, VII (1927), p. 67. Both Bourrilly and Célérier pointed to the military blockade established by the French forces in 1922-23 against the Beni Mguild of the Middle Atlas. According to Célérier, out of an average of 300 to 400 heads per herds, only 10 survived that winter, forcing the submission of the Beni Mguild to the French authority. In a similar story, the Marinids blockaded the transhumant migration of the Seksawa from the High Atlas, in 1353. The result of this action, as in 1923, was the submission of the highlanders to the lowland government. See Berque, *Op.Cit.*, p. 59.

⁷⁰Miranda, *Op. Cit.*, p. 76.

⁷¹For the Almohad hostilities against the Haskura, see Miranda, *Ibid.*, p. 76. The Haskura later integrated the Almohad movement, as revealed by their representation in the Ahl Khamsin and the Almohad military hierarchy. See Levi-Provencal, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 52-53, 67.

⁷²Miranda, *Op. Cit.* p. 76.

⁷³Montagne, *La Vie.*, pp. 49-50.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

⁷⁵Miranda, *Op.Cit.*, p. 79.

⁷⁶See note 39, above.

⁷⁷For a breakdown of the different tribes' members in the council, see Bourouiba, *Op.Cit.*, p. 79; Levi Provençal, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 53-71.

⁷⁸See note 39, above.

⁷⁹See Montagne, *Op.Cit.*, p. 55.

⁸⁰See note 6, above.

⁸¹On the Barlghawata, see Abu Ubayd al-Bakri, *Description de l' Afrique Septentrionale* (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve), 1965, pp. 259-271.

⁸²For a comprehensive study on messianic movements in medieval Europe, see Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium* (New York: Harper & Brothers), 1961.

⁸³*Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

⁸⁴Le Tourneau, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 25-26; Miranda, *Op.Cit.*, p. 63; and al-Hulal al-Mawshiyya, *Colección de Crónicas Arabes de la Reconquista* (Tetuán; Editora Marroquí), 1952, p. 128.

⁸⁵Cohn, *Op. Cit.*, p. 7.

⁸⁶See Henri Massé, "La Profession de Foi ('aqida) et les Guides Spirituels (morchida) du Mahdi Ibn Toumart," *Mémorial Henri Basset: Nouvelles Etudes Nord-Africaines et Orientales* (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner), 1928, pp. 105-121.

⁸⁷Miranda, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 105-128

⁸⁸On the transmission of baraka and other blessings, see Bel, *Op.Cit.*, p. 105; Vincent Crapanzano, *The Hamadsha: A Study in Moroccan Ethnopsychiatry* (Berkeley: University of California Press), 1973, pp. 19, 30-56.