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Publication Date

1994

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March 1993

TOWARD CULTURAL INSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM

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TOWARD CULTURAL INSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM

The design of institutions depends on what kinds of institutions one wishes to design--a legislature, a bureaucracy, a common property resource. This is self-evident. What is not obvious is that the design of institutions depends also on the kinds of elements one believes go into the making of institutions. It is the repertoire of institutional elements at our command that limits and directs our efforts at design. There is no getting away from it; one cannot design institutions with properties that are presumed not to exist in the sense that these elements are not in our common repertoire.

Yet the social sciences suffer from a poverty of institutional elements. Indeed, for all practical purposes, there are only two--markets (or competitive individualism) and hierarchy (or stratified collectivism). Whether it is Sir Henry Maines' famous move from status to contract (hierarchy to markets) or any other locution, they all speak to the movement from the hierarchical collectivism of the Middle Ages to the market capitalism of modernity. The same two institutional forms predominate.

It is long past time to expand our extremely limited repertoire of institutional elements. The trick, I think, is to keep the important ones we have (markets and hierarchies) while crafting new ones from the same intellectual matrix. This, I claim, has been done by cultural theorists building on the work of Mary Douglas. After providing justifications for adding egalitarianism and fatalism to our common list of institutional elements, I shall show how their presence stands to improve institutional design.¹

By far the biggest blind spot in political theory in general, and rational choice explanations in particular, is the failure to treat fatalism and, especially, egalitarianism as cultural institutions (viable ways of life whose adherents share values justifying preferred patterns of social relations) on a par with hierarchies and markets.

Consequently, though there are scattered studies of egalitarian organizations, there is no study of egalitarianism as a phenomenon in its own right, especially by its advocates.²

Respectable reasons exist for the neglect of egalitarianism as a subject for analysis by historians and social scientists. The "greats" of sociology and anthropology from Montesquieu to Parsons were concerned (consumed might not be too strong a term) with the movement from the collectivism-cum-hierarchy of the middle ages to the capitalism-cum-competitive individualism of modern market-oriented societies. But why should contemporary social scientists follow their constricting example? For one thing, history keeps throwing up examples of groups devoted to egalitarianism. How understand the early American party system, the abolitionists, the populists, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, or modern environmentalism without understanding the yet-to-be discussed dynamics of egalitarian social organization?³ (Why, for instance, was the Rio Summit punctuated by calls for vast international redistribution of resources if its avowed objective was to preserve the existing natural environment?) In the United States there has been initiation and resurgence of groups devoted to greater equality of condition, including most but not all that call themselves feminist, civil rights, animal rights, gay rights, children's rights, on

and on. In both Western Europe and the United States, environmental "green" groups have proliferated and prospered. Yet their supporters in the social sciences have noticed but not analyzed the common devotion of these groups and movements to radical egalitarianism.

Why should special attention be paid, it could be said in response, to groups that do not rule anywhere? Besides, it appears absurd to many with egalitarian sympathies to think of egalitarianism as a powerful force when there is so much inequality and so little done (in their estimation) to counter it. In response, I note the considerable effort to equalize incomes in parts of Western Europe and the strong push toward greater social equality in the United States. Without feminism, the social scene of the 1970s and 1980s would be unrecognizable. The considerable success of environmental groups is hard to deny, though some with very high expectations manage this feat.

Though we do not see egalitarians in power very often, except for heads of environmental agencies (and the vice president of the United States), there are two striking modern instances that cry out, as it were, against the neglect of radical egalitarianism--the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and the Red Guard during China's Cultural Revolution. There is no doubt that these movements, which resulted in the second holocaust of our time in Cambodia and in tens of millions of deaths and beatings and tortures in China, were justified in radical egalitarian terms by people who prided themselves on living the egalitarian way.⁴ My point is not to put down egalitarianism; all ways of life have their horrendous side, viz. the

hierarchies of Nazism and communism. Rather, I wish to emphasize the importance of studying egalitarianism as one of the cultures essential to human experience.

If possible, fatalism has suffered from even greater neglect than egalitarianism, the only full-length study known to me being Edward Banfield's The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, set in southern Italy.⁵ But why study people who believe there is nothing they can do to improve their well-being? The most important reason is that fatalists comprise a culture, including their own preferred form of social relations--noncooperation--and their own cultural bias (or ideology or cosmology) holding that since physical nature operates at random and human nature is unpredictable, the best thing is to stay out of harm's way. Though individuals may have experiences disposing them to believe that personal effort will be fruitless, they themselves internalize a fatalistic cultural bias and thus come, in Gramscian parlance, to constitute part of their own condition. No doubt disapproval of this way of life by practically everyone, individualists, egalitarians, and hierarchists, constituting together the active cultures, helps explain the neglect of fatalism whose followers, in any event, try to keep themselves inconspicuous. My guess is that equality-minded political theorists are disinclined to offer fatalists a separate organizational status for two interconnected reasons: (1) they are loathe to legitimize inequality as a genuine preference for anyone, and (2) they prefer to view fatalists as oppressed people who, when liberated and educated, will become active participants in an egalitarian collective.

Yet the importance of fatalism can hardly be doubted. Fatalists are the people whose apathy makes some commentators believe that democracy, or at least a democracy based on extensive participation, is unfeasible. Fatalists are also the people others have in mind as the reserve army of the alienated, ripe for revolution against inegalitarian institutions. That each culture constructs a view of apathy favorable to itself is obvious from conflicts in the literature, hierarchists finding apathy to signify approval, egalitarians disapproval of the existing polity, with individualists saying people will participate when (a la Anthony Downs) they feel it is worth their while. These vastly differing views of fatalistic behavior make a huge difference in appraising existing or new designs for democracy. In the next section I shall explain why I think cultural theory, based on the "grid-group" typology of Mary Douglas, adds variety to theorizing about institutions so as to constitute a more complete and powerful understanding of politics.

Mary Douglas: Doubling Organizational Variety

Among Mary Douglas's contributions to social science, four stand out in my mind as especially important for understanding institutions. I begin with her continuing effort to (re)introduce egalitarianism back into social science both as a category of analysis and as a way of life with the same viability as competitive individualism and hierarchical collectivism. Her second contribution is her separation of "culture" from "country," so that it is no longer necessary to treat everyone within a given geographic and

governmental jurisdiction as if they shared the same values, beliefs, and preferences, e.g., Adenauer and Hitler, Ralph Nader and Milton Friedman. Instead, with her grid-group typology, Douglas doubled the organizational variety in the social sciences (a) by adding egalitarianism and fatalism while (b) retaining individualism and hierarchy, (c) placing both on the same matrix, so these ways of life (and thus their contributions to politics) can be compared at the same level of analysis.

Douglas's third contribution is to join the prevailing definitions of culture into a more analytically powerful synthesis. Most definitions conceive of culture as equivalent either to mental products--values and beliefs--or to material products--social relations, artifacts, and technologies. Douglas combines them by defining cultures so that values and beliefs are never left alone, suspended in mid-air, without anything to uphold them. Instead, the values and beliefs, the cultural biases, are always attached to the social relations they legitimize. By joining justifications to relations, it becomes possible to attach functions to cultures instead of entire societies, thereby avoiding function mongering, as if all acts had positive consequences for the existing society.

Her fourth contribution is the creation of a genuine typology in which categories of cultural institutions come from dimensions rather than disconnected lists. Saying that one observes a number of cultural institutions is not as valuable as relating each culture to the others through common dimensions. Thus the group dimension tells us how strongly individuals are tied to each other and the grid dimension tells us how constrained those individuals are by social

norms. Mary Douglas's grid-group diagram, in which categories of cultures are constructed out of two dimensions--strength of group boundaries and degree of social incorporation, follows:

		GROUP	
		Weak	Strong
GRID	Strong	Fatalism (isolation)	Hierarchy
	Weak	Individualism	Egalitarianism

To go further we need to codify these four contributions by stating explicitly what Thompson, Ellis, and I call the requisite variety condition.⁶ Cultures can never be entirely eliminated because they depend on each other for their existence. Thus egalitarians could not exist without inequalities produced by markets and hierarchies to oppose; hierarchies would lose their rationale without individualist, egalitarian, and fatalist disorder to overcome; individualists require a modicum of hierarchical order to stabilize property relationships; fatalists need the more manipulative cultures to get around, and hermits cannot separate themselves from a nonexistent society. Which is to say that cultural institutions exist as a set, some waxing, others waning, but never one alone. It follows that efforts to destroy rival cultures (viz. the Soviet Union's near elimination of egalitarian and individualist forces) are bound to be counterproductive.⁷

Egalitarianism as a Cultural Institution

What could be wrong with living a way of life based on equality of condition? Since childhood I cannot remember a use of equality that was not golden, overwhelmingly and unalloyedly good. "Leveling" might be bad, though we never took it seriously because where we were it never happened and, in communist countries, where we mistakenly thought it did, leveling was the least of their outrages. The upshot was a powerful albeit unstated assumption that increases in equality of condition were always desirable. Some wondered whether too great equality might weaken incentives to exert work effort. Equality, as was often said in my school and college days, might be impractical but no one ever demurred from the proposition that, if achievable, a life of equality would be supremely wonderful. The shared premise was the more equality the better. Not true, at least not true if experience of groups and polities trying to practice equality of condition is taken into account.

Because egalitarianism is not now studied as a culture in and of itself, except by Mary Douglas and Steve Rayner and a few others who use cultural theory in their analyses,⁸ the propositions that follow are generally unknown to social scientists. Yet they are substantiated by many accounts of egalitarian groups in different times and continents who employ quite different levels of technology. These propositions are, so far as I know, entirely unknown to rational choice theorists.

Because equality of condition is the major if not the sole value distinguishing egalitarians from others, for instance, it becomes the ideological boundary separating the good inner center from the evil (i.e., unequal) institutions outside. It follows that egalitarians find it more difficult to compromise than adherents of other ways of life because they conceive giving up even part of equality as tantamount to abandoning their way of life. Indeed, their rhetoric is full of charges of selling out.

Because egalitarians believe that humankind is born good but corrupted by evil institutions, so that good egalitarians will talk themselves into agreement, they take persistent disagreement as a sign of corruption in that each side accuses the other of being enemy agents, hidden hierarchs, the worse for being duplicitous, political oreos, radishes, bananas, apples, one cultural color on the outside and another on the inside. One consequence is continual expulsions. Another is driving conflict underground as genuine disagreement cannot be tolerated.⁹ Thus we observe the anomaly of groups professing a genuine belief in continuous public discussion of all issues being unable to discuss differences openly among themselves.

From identifying their boundaries with equality of condition, it also follows that, when in power, egalitarians are disposed to adopt extreme measures against supporters of inequality. How, one wonders, did the Khmer Rouge justify to themselves killing over a million of their own people? By denying, a cultural analyst would reply, that these were their own people. How? By casting them as

beyond the boundary of the true egalitarian; anyone who was in any way different was transformed from "us" to "other."

Though their groups are usually small and often despised, so that, in democratic nations, egalitarians often identify themselves with civil liberties, it is equality of condition not the right to compete they care most about. This preferential option toward equality of condition accounts for feminist efforts to censor pornography and the phenomenon called political correctness through which sanctions are imposed on those who say things upsetting to people in protected categories.

A major reason egalitarian groups find it difficult to maintain agreement is that most do not approve of majority rule, conceiving it as coercing the minority, hence inegalitarian, preferring instead consensus.¹⁰ When discussion leads to consensus, it produces prodigies of participation; when not, there are splits. It is belief in the desirability of consensus as egalitarian, by the way, that leads to the interminable meetings those who participate in egalitarian groups know all too well from personal experience.

Because of their tendency to fission, and their mission to discomfort the establishment, egalitarians are often under attack. Yet their low grid structure signifies that no one can act for anyone else. Consequently, maintenance of membership in a group based on voluntary consent rather than authority becomes difficult. Hence egalitarian groups exaggerate the ills of the establishment (the death of the earth, the one-molecule-can-kill theory of cancer causation) in order to persuade their members it is worse outside. These apocalyptic themes serve the dual purpose of trashing those whose

inequalities deserve it and, hopefully, keeping membership intact.

Dealing with external attack and internal dissidence is especially difficult when the group involved explicitly rejects leadership as implying followership and thus a form of inequality. It is not easy to make decisions in groups that will not recognize either authority (as in hierarchy) or majority rule (as in individualism).¹¹ How, I ask, can a social scientist do institutional analysis without the slightest awareness of egalitarianism? The intellectual cost of ignoring fatalism is also substantial.

Fatalism as a Cultural Institution

Because fatalists believe the world operates at random, so there is no outguessing Mother Nature, they conclude that there is no gain to be had from cooperation. Because they believe that people can't be trusted, they calculate that, even if they did gain, others would take it away. Like the adherents of all other institutions, therefore, fatalists have their own cultural bias through which they justify their preferred pattern of social relations, a pattern of isolating themselves from society in which other institutions dominate so that, as they see it, getting out of harm's way is the best they can do.

Leaving fatalism out of the picture has many adverse consequences for students of institutions. One is inability to resolve one of the recurrent dramas of recent centuries-- the unrequited love affair between egalitarians, who perceive revolutionary potential in downtrodden fatalistic people only to be rejected by indifference and

hostility. Why, egalitarians wonder, do fatalists retreat (think of the experience of the Narodya Volya and later the Bolsheviks with Russian peasants) as soon as they advance? Why aren't these radicals treated as liberators? Students of cultures will understand that fatalists do not discriminate between the good guys and the bad guys. They are equal opportunity loathers who think that representatives of the active cultures are out to get them. People who believe that they cannot act to improve their position as a matter of fundamental principle, which fatalists do, are unlikely to believe in salvation from any earthly source.

Neglect of fatalism also leads to misappreciation of market competition, which is to say that isolates are mistaken for individualists. True, adherents of both cultures believe in bargaining for themselves (or their extended selves, family units) but one disbelieves in cooperation and the other favors cooperation via networks formed through bargaining.

What difference does doubling the conceptual variety of the social science by adding egalitarianism and fatalism make to institutional analysis? A lot.

Let us take two of the most frequently used examples from the rational choice literature, Mancur Olson's free riders and, it seems, everyone's Prisoner's Dilemma. A simple exercise will reveal the disabilities of considering all institutions as more or less the same as compared to a pluralistic analysis of cultural institutions. The exercise consists of trying out the practice at issue in four cultural institutions to see if the usual solutions fit. (Clue: they don't.)

Hierarchies are set up to prevent free riding; if there is a

functioning hierarchy in which the people involved believe in its values, it commands fulfillment of obligations. Following the rules of the Limited Liability Company, individualists receive compensation in proportion to their contribution. Fatalists would like to ride free but they will not invest anything, believing that all will come to naught. Only under egalitarianism are the conditions of free ridership met, namely, unequal contributions but equal votes. Instead of the usual overly general discussion of free riding, therefore, there is a more interesting and precise proposition that can be tested and (I should add) falsified.¹²

Try the same routine on the Prisoner's Dilemma. Hierarchists would confess; though they might in weakness commit crimes, they would understand that, in their institution, the parts are expected to sacrifice for the whole. In hierarchies, the good of the whole is supposed to prevail. As for individualists and fatalists, they are part of "low-grid" cultures whose adherents would refuse to play by the rules of the game. No right to communicate, no legitimate game. In response, it could be said that PD is a game and players, if they wish to play, must abide by the rules. Yet PD is touted as the universal game expressive of a major conundrum of all social life. How universal can it be if subscribers to two cultural institutions can't play?¹³

In cultural terms, the Prisoner's Dilemma is a fatalistic game. Only among fatalists would defection be a culturally appropriate move. Distrustful of human nature, certain that others will do them in if they don't beat them to the punch, fatalists would find it

rational not to cooperate with each other but with the authorities so as to get what seems like a better deal.

For the most part, components of executive branches are treated as if they were bureaucratic hierarchies and legislatures are considered to be markets. This poverty of institutional forms, I have been arguing, should be enriched by introducing cultural institutional pluralism in the form of egalitarianism and fatalism.

Economic Growth and Political Democracy

Let us suppose that a country or a region fails to grow economically. Why? The contemporary answer essentially is "too much hierarchy and too little market individualism." But now we have a larger, culturally more pluralist repertoire to draw from. Now we can ask whether the peoples involved are too fatalistic. After all, if people believe that nothing they do can improve their condition, they are unlikely to try. They will not save today to invest tomorrow. What might be done? One could seek to arrange small positive experiences, such as small grants, to give people confidence. One might see if the distribution of income is so skewed that individuals cannot progress. But there would be no point in urging individualistic solutions upon fatalistic people.

Another place to look for resistance to economic growth is egalitarianism. Is there too little, so that most people are too poor to invest, or is there too much, so that resources are redistributed as fast as they can be accumulated?

Suppose we wish to create or maintain democracy. A cultural perspective makes the association between capitalism and democracy become clearer. For if democracy is defined as alternation in office, it requires citizens who believe in competition for its own sake. The total lack of participation by fatalists ("don't vote, the government always gets in") makes their presence in large proportion antithetical to democracy. Seeking to escape from responsibility, fatalists will abandon democracy at the first opportunity. The older view that non-participation somehow supports those who run government might apply to passive non-interference, but not to the lack of active support when times are tough.

Egalitarianism is both essential to and inimical to democracy. It is essential in that democracy cannot flourish without constant criticism. It is inimical, as in Weimar, when the chorus of criticism reaches such levels that support collapses. The egalitarian identification of compromise with moral corruption also makes it difficult for them to participate in coalitions supporting democracy.

While exclusive hierarchies are antithetical to democracy, because they cannot stand disagreement, inclusive hierarchies, welcoming a wide range of statuses, strengthen democracy. In general, the steeper the hierarchy, the fewer values and statuses it encompasses, the fiercer it becomes toward outsiders.

One of the all-time great questions is whether remaining rich depends on having lots of money to begin with or is a product of institutions that encourage wealth-enhancing behavior. A brilliant test of these rival propositions has been conducted by Robert Putnam

in Making Democracy Work (Princeton Press, 1993). In 1970 Italy was divided into fifteen regions. Putnam and his collaborators arranged all sorts of tests of the administrative competence and democratic character of governments in these regions. Then they discovered a study of the formation of choral societies a hundred years before. Those regions that were wealthier but evidenced little group formation were relatively less democratic, less effective, and less wealthy. Those that were poorer but showed high rates of group formation were richer, more competent, and more democratic. In cultural terms, those regions whose people were most individualistic and which therefore were able to organize cooperative forms of activity did the best. Conversely, the more narrowly hierarchical regions did the worst.

A Design for Deficits

Mary Parker Follett talked about integrative solutions that made all the major players feel that they had been well served. Here I shall outline an institutional innovation that, if followed, would likely reconcile participants in the great budgetary struggles of the current era. The innovation consists of a norm and a rule for its implementation. The norm is that spending should not increase faster than the growth of national product. Thus, if there were a spending budget of \$100 billion, and the economy grew by 3 percent, in the following year expenditures could rise to \$103 billion. The purpose of this norm is to solve the deficit problem slowly over time while reconciling the rival armies.

One side is concerned largely with production and cares very little for distribution. From that side one hears how excessive government expenditures are harming initiative, the economy, and much else besides. From the other side, one hears almost no concern about the creation of wealth but massive concern about its (re)distribution. Inequality is the mother of all evils. These two ideological ships pass in the night without hardly a word of understanding or reconciliation between them. Mutual hostility and non-comprehension appear to be the order of the day.

This norm would allow spending to increase substantially over time, thus pleasing the redistributors, while gradually reducing the deficit and guaranteeing the wealth creators that they will not be eaten out of house and home. More precisely, redistribution would depend on production; instead of the rival goals interfering with each other, it would be understood they were interdependent. Hopefully, redistributors would complain at corporate board meetings that companies were not doing enough to increase national product, and agreement on the norm would reduce complaints about the size of government.

The redistributors are, of course, egalitarians, and the producers are individualists. What about the other cultures? Hierarchists like order and stability, and would be satisfied if spending and revenue came into closer hailing distance. And fatalists who, if they have to choose, prefer sufficient order so they can get out of the way of whatever is coming, will also be happier.

The implementing rule would be the one followed in the Senate for the 403B provisions of the Budget Reform Act; these provide that

when a spending ceiling is passed, it is divided among the large expenditure accounts and a subceiling is maintained for each. The crucial point here is that if one waits until total spending exceeds the norm, as the House does under the Fazio rule, it is not possible to pinpoint responsibility. By maintaining discipline within subcategories, the well-known Pay As You Go principle (PAYASUGO) is established: spending that exceeds the subceiling must be offset either by agreement on a new revenue source or on cuts elsewhere in the national budget. This is as close to institutionalizing the economic doctrine of opportunity costs as might be imagined. It is not that the various contestants would necessarily grow to like each other or converge in values, but rather that these rules would seem better to them than current alternatives so that, as these rules are followed, their views on what is desirable spending policy would converge far more than they do today. A new equilibrium is (hopefully) established.

Another way of looking at the problem is that under the current budget system no participant has a guarantee that the others will not use whatever resources are cut from his program. The spending norm and PAYASUGO provide the guarantees of mutual sacrifice essential for cooperation in spending policy.

Only fatalists disbelieve in cooperation in principle. They are not among the budget players. Hierarchists believe in top-down cooperation, but no budget player is in a position to issue and enforce commands. Egalitarians seek cooperation by consent among equal actors. Individualists cooperate by mutual agreement. Both individualists and egalitarians share a low prescriptive grid, that is,

no one can tell them what to do. Thus consent requires either that all contribute (say to deficit reduction) equally, or that at least, all consent. PAYASUGO within subcategories is a mechanism for changing rules so as to facilitate that consent.

Elsewhere I have written about why the item veto as usually proposed is unlikely to reduce public spending.¹⁴ One reason, now self-evident, is that liberal presidents may want more spending rather than less and use the item veto to accomplish that purpose. Another reason, less obvious, is that the necessity of providing a two-thirds majority to override a presidential veto might well lead to the creation of larger and larger logrolls in order to gain the necessary votes. These larger logrolls would, of course, greatly increase in cost as more participants are added.

There are, however, two changes in provisions that would make the equilibrium result likely to include less spending. One is the combination of an item veto with a spending limit of the kind described above. Once a president is constrained by a spending limit rule, the point of a veto is either to limit spending or to alter priorities and not to increase them. A second change would be a sliding-limit veto. As things stand, there are projects that cannot be vetoed because they are on committee reports rather than appropriations bills. It is also difficult to beat the "George Washington monument" ploy in which something absolutely essential is sacrificed ostensibly on the altar of spending reduction. By enabling presidents to cut rather than necessarily eliminate items, the hand of the chief executive would be measurably strengthened.

If we look at the item veto in cultural context, it is evidently a measure designed to make presidents more hierarchical by giving them greater legal authority. This assumes, however, that presidents operate in a hierarchical context. As the presidencies of George Washington, John Adams, and Jimmy Carter, among others, show, the efforts of hierarchically-inclined presidents to behave as if the entire society were hierarchical are counterproductive when most people, as in the United States, are either individualistic or egalitarian. In the case of contemporary liberal Democrats, this assumption would prove even more self-stultifying as the party's adherents are far more egalitarian than they are hierarchical. One could expect that such a president would be excoriated for abuse of power. Drastic spending limits would give presidents formal authority that would outrage their supporters. But a sliding-scale item veto might enable presidents to make the necessary compromises while keeping their party together.

What difference does it make, I ask in conclusion, if one seeks to extinguish any part of cultural variety? The loss of requisite variety, in W. Ross Ashby's terms, is catastrophic. Four contemporary instances come to mind. The effort of Julius Nyerere and his party in Tanzania from the 1950s through the 1970s to eliminate competitive individualism from the economy led to its virtual collapse, with attendant poverty and misery. The attempts by the Cambodian Khmer Rouge and the Chinese Red Guard to make egalitarianism dominant by driving out fatalism, hierarchy, and individualism led to vast destruction. A comparable effort, this time to make the

Communist party hierarchy hegemonic, led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Whatever may be said about different types of cultural pluralism, cultural monism is a disaster.

NOTES

¹Because all life is social life, so that even individuality is socially constructed, "in the beginning" there were cultures. In Cultural Theory we argue at length that only four cultures are socially viable in that they bring together preferred patterns of social relations with cultural biases to justify them, each essential to the other. We also discuss the mechanisms that lead to a path of change from one to the other, a discussion substantially richer than those concerned solely with the change from the hierarchy of the Middle Ages to the individualism of modernity.

²Honorable, partial exceptions include Jo Freeman, "The Tyranny of Structurelessness," in Freeman, ed., Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies (New York: Longman, 1983), pp. 202-214; and Andrea J. Baker, "The Problem of Authority in Radical Movement Groups: A Case Study of Lesbian-Feminist Organization," The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1982), pp. 323-41, in that they recognize an egalitarian syndrome with problems of its own.

³On the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian parties, see the literature cited in Richard Ellis and Aaron Wildavsky, Dilemmas of Presidential Leadership from Washington through Lincoln (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1989), especially Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978); Joseph L. Blau, ed., Social Theories of Jacksonian Democracy (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1954). On abolitionism see Lawrence J. Friedman, Gregarious Saints: Self and Community in American Abolitionism, 1830-1870 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); and Richard Ellis and Aaron Wildavsky, "A Cultural Analysis of the Role of Abolitionists in the Coming of the Civil War," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 1990), pp. 89-116. On populism, see Gary Lee Malecha, "Understanding Agrarian Fundamentalism: A Cultural Interpretation of American Populism," in Dennis Coyle and Richard Ellis, Politics, Policy and Culture, forthcoming. On SNCC see Emily Stoper, "The Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee: Rise and Fall of a Redemptive Organization," in Jo Freeman, ed., Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies (New York: Longman, 1983), pp. 320-24. On Friends of the Earth, see Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 132-39.

⁴For literatures and discussion, see "The Missing Way of Life: Egalitarianism and Fatalism," Chapter 12, in Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 223-232.

⁵Edward Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: Free Press, 1958).

⁶Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, Cultural Theory.

⁷John Clark and Aaron Wildavsky, The Moral Collapse of Communism: Poland as a Cautionary Tale (San Francisco: Institute of Contemporary Studies, 1990); and Clark and Wildavsky, "Why Communism Collapses: The Moral and Material Failures of Command Economies Are Intertwined," Journal of Public Policy, vo. 10, no. 4 (1991), pp. 361-90.

⁸See, for instance, Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), Chapters VI and VII; Steven Rayner, "The Rules That Keep Us Equal: Complexity and Costs of Egalitarian Organization," in James G. Flanagan and Steve Rayner, eds., Rules, Decisions, and Inequality in Egalitarian Societies (Broffield: Avebury, 1988), pp. 20-42; David Bloor, "Polyhedra and the Abominations of Leviticus: Cognitive Styles in Mathematics," British Journal for the History of Science 11, 39 (1978), pp. 245-72; Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1970); idem, "Cultural Bias," in Mary Douglas, In the Active Voice (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), pp. 183-254; Richard Ellis and Aaron Wildavsky, Dilemmas of Presidential Leadership from Washington through Lincoln (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1989), idem, "A Cultural Analysis of the Role of Abolitionists in the Coming of the Civil War," Comparative Studies in Society and History 31, 1 (1990), pp. 89-116; John G. Gager, "Body-Symbols and Social Reality: Resurrection, Incarnation and Asceticism in Early Christianity," Religion 12 (1982), pp. 345-63; Jonathan Gross and Steve Rayner, Measuring Culture: A Paradigm for the Analysis of Social Organization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); Gerald Mars, Cheats at Work: An Anthropology of Workplace Crime (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982); Gerald Mars and Michael Nicod, The World of Waiters (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983); Steve Rayner, "The Perception of Time and Space in Egalitarian Sects: A Millenarian Cosmology," in Mary Douglas, ed., Essays in the Sociology of Perception (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), pp. 247-74; Michiel Schwarz and Michael Thompson, Divided We Stand: Redefining Politics, Technology and Social Choice (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1990); Michael Thompson, "Among the Energy Tribes: A Cultural Framework for the Analysis and Design of Energy Policy," Policy Sciences 17 (1984), pp. 321-39; idem, "Welche Gesellschaftsklassen sind potent genug, anderen ihre Zukunft aufsuoktroyieren? Und wie geht das vor sich?" (Which social category is able to impose its vision of the future? And how does it do this?), in Lucius Burckhardt, ed., Design der Zukunft (Berlin: Dumkont International Design Centre, 1987), pp. 58-87; Michael Thompson and Aaron Wildavsky, "A Cultural Theory of Information Bias in Organizations," Journal of Management Studies 23, 3 (1986), pp. 273-86; idem, "A Poverty of Distinction: From Economic Homogeneity to Cultural Heterogeneity in the Classification of Poor People," Policy Sciences '9 (1986), pp. 163-99; Aaron Wildavsky, "Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation," American Political Science Review 81 (1987), pp. 3-21; Daniel Polisar and Aaron Wildavsky, "From Individual to System Blame: Analysis of Historical Change in the Law of Torts," Journal of Policy History 1 (1989), pp. 129-55.

⁹In an analysis of a number of radical groups in England, Steve Rayner observes that one made special institutional arrangements to legitimate

factionalism (Rayner, "Rules that keep us equal"). Observing its proneness to splits, and that a related gay group, Act Up, split over the question of whether it was sufficient to help sufferers from AIDS or there had to be international liberation from hierarchies before an oppressed people could be helped, Queer Nation institutionalized practices, like keeping comments humorous, and roles, like interveners, who can stop proceedings before they get out of hand, to mitigate their usual tendencies. See Brendon Swedlow and Aaron Wildavsky, "Is Egalitarianism Really on the Rise?" in Wildavsky, The Rise of Radical Egalitarianism (Washington, D.C.: American University Press, 1991), pp. 63-

¹⁰See Betty H. Zisk, "Coalitions among Peace and Environmental Groups: A Comparative Study of the Impact of Local Political Culture," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, August-September 1989.

¹¹See Aaron Wildavsky, "A Cultural Theory of Leadership," in Bryan D. Jones, ed., Leadership and Politics: New Perspectives in Political Science (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1989), pp. 87-113; and Richard Ellis, "Explaining the Occurrence of Charismatic Leadership in Organizations," Journal of Theoretical Politics 3 (July 1991), pp. 305-19.

¹²See my "On the Social Construction of Distinctions: Risk, Rape, Public Goods, and Altruism," in Michael Hechter, Lynn A. Cooper, and Lynn Nadel, eds., Toward a Scientific Understanding of Values (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993).

¹³See my "Indispensable Framework or Just Another Ideology? Prisoner's Dilemma as an Antihierarchical Game," Rationality and Society, vol. 4, no. 1 (1992), pp. 8-23.

¹⁴Aaron Wildavsky, "Item Veto without a Global Spending Limit: Locking the Treasury after the Dollars Have Fled," Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy, vol. 1, no. 2 (1985), pp. 165-176.

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