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From "Murder Capital" to National Model: A Mixed-Methods Study of Gun Violence Dynamics in Richmond, California

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Criminology, Law and Society

by

Melissa Barragan

Dissertation Committee:
Associate Professor Keramet Reiter, Co-Chair
Professor George Tita, Co-Chair
Professor Mona Lynch
Professor John Hipp

2020

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DEDICATION

For

my parents,

who have shown me the meaning of dedication, persistence, and compassion

and

all those that have been traumatized by gun violence and are fighting to put an end to the bloodshed

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is quite a surreal moment to finally be writing this acknowledgements section. After seven long and enriching years, I can proudly submit my dissertation and conclude this chapter in my professional journey. This final product, and the overall feat of obtaining a PhD, would have not been possible without a number of people.

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questions that have formed the foundation of my dissertation, and how to then pursue those questions using statistical analyses. Thank you for your patience, timely and thorough feedback, and willingness to guide me through this process. Other faculty that have been a valuable source of support throughout my PhD journey include: Cheryl Maxon, Susan Coutin, Sora Han, and John Dombrink. All four of you, in both big and small ways, have shown me how to be a compassionate leader and academic, and, importantly, how to translate my commitments to diversity and social justice into my ethos and practice as a scholar and professor.

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

From "Murder Capital" to National Model: A Mixed-Methods Study of Gun Violence Dynamics in Richmond, California

By

Melissa Barragan
Doctor of Philosophy in Criminology, Law and Society
University of California, Irvine, 2020
Associate Professor Keramet Reiter, Co-Chair & Professor George Tita, Co-Chair

Up until the late 2000s, Richmond was considered one of the most violent cities in the nation. However, over the last ten years, the city has reduced its homicide rate by nearly seventy percent. Integrating ethnography and historical description with longitudinal crime analysis, this dissertation traces Richmond's transformation by examining the local-level conditions and processes have shaped violence dynamics in the city since the turn of the century.

Considering first the role of community structure, quantitative analyses suggest that racial/ethnic change, and Black population loss in particular, was the strongest predictor of gun violence patterns in the city pre-homicide decline (2003-2009), whereas young adult population change was the strongest predictor of gun violence patterns in the city post-decline (2009-2017). Given that Black population loss also emerged as a leading explanation within my interviews, I leveraged my qualitative data to unpack why this specific form of racial/ethnic transition is related to gun violence patterns in the city. In addition to identifying three sources for displacement that have unduly impacted Richmond's Black community – including housing access and affordability, intensified law enforcement pressure, and exposure to gun victimization – my findings indicate that these processes matter for gun violence insofar as they reconfigure the group-based, place-based, and/or kinship-based networks that can either trigger or prevent gun violence. However, contrary to theoretical assumptions, further analyses reveal that these

social and demographic shifts have not entirely undermined informal social control processes. Since the mid-2000s, the city has built a robust network of community-based strategies that aim to reduce gun violence via social service provision and community capacity-building. By documenting the nature and development of this network, I argue that the city may have minimized the crime-inducing consequences of continued Black displacement and residential instability in the 2010s because residents and local leaders were able to devise a variety informal crime control strategies that did not rely upon traditional forms of within-neighborhood or within-group engagement. The theoretical and policy implications of my findings are discussed, specifically as they relate to collective efficacy development, racialized displacement, and community-based gun violence prevention in urban cities.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Interpersonal gun violence takes an incredible toll on Americans, claiming thousands of lives each year. In 2018, there were 14,504 homicides, 72% of which were committed using a firearm. Though the precise circumstances motivating a killing will vary, two key factors unite most gun-related homicides in the U.S. The first is racial disproportionately. Recent national figures suggest that Black men, on average, are 14 times more likely to die by firearm homicide than White men (Riddell et al., 2018). Comparing gun death rates across U.S. states between 2008 to 2016, Riddell et al (2018) also found that Black men had a homicide rate that was 9 to 57 times higher than that of their White male counterparts, highlighting a second key feature of gun related homicide: geographic clustering. In 2015, over half of all gun homicides were located in just 127 cities, which contain just a quarter of the nation's population (Aufrichtig et al., 2017). Shifting their focus down to neighborhoods, this report also found that roughly a quarter of gun homicides were located in 1,200 census tracts within these very same cities, capturing an even smaller segment (1.5%) of the country's population.

David Weisburd (2014) calls this spatial phenomenon the "law of crime concentration." Echoing the above findings, he argues that a considerable proportion of crime, including gun violence, tends to cluster in a narrow bandwidth of meso- (e.g., neighborhoods) and micro-places (e.g., street-segments) within a given region. Numerous studies, since the 1990s have confirmed this sociological fact across both contexts and crime types (e.g., Andresen & Malleson, 2011; Andresen et al., 2017; Braga et al., 2011; Friedson & Sharkey, 2015; Griffiths & Chavez, 2004; Groff et al., 2010; Sherman, 1995; Weisburd et al., 2012; Wheeler et al., 2016). For example, David Weisburd and colleagues (2004) found that from 1989-2002, 50 percent of crime incidents

in Seattle could be traced back to a mere 4.5 percent of street segments, with most crime concentrated in the same areas for the duration of their observation period. Anthony Braga and colleagues (2010) found similar trends in Boston: between 1980-2009, gun violence incidents were stable and concentrated in less than 5 percent of street segments throughout the city. Though neither of these two studies explore the local factors that predict the spatial patterning of crime, one of the most consistent findings within the neighborhood crime literature is that places with higher levels of socioeconomic disadvantage, racial minority composition, residential instability, and racial/ethnic heterogeneity are more likely to see higher rates of violence (e.g., Heitgerd & Bursik 1987; Hipp 2007, 2010, 2011; Hipp et al., 2009; Krivo et al., 2010; Morenoff & Sampson, 1997; Morenoff, Sampson, & Raudenbush, 2001; Peterson, Krivo, & Harris 2000; Peterson & Krivo, 2010; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Sampson, 2012; Warner & Rountree 1997).

Interestingly, despite the wealth of research documenting where crimes tend to concentrate and why, scholars have spent much less time exploring how and why local crime patterns *change* over time (Friedson & Sharkey, 2015), especially when it comes to gun violence (See Braga, 2003; Braga et al., 2010; Griffiths & Chavez, 2004; Tita & Abrahamse, 2004; Valaskik et al., 2017 for some exceptions). This is a glaring gap within the research considering that gun violence has substantially declined nationally since the peak of the epidemic in the early 1990s (Blumstein & Wallman, 2000; Cooper & Smith, 2011; Fowler et al., 2015). There have also been critical economic and demographic changes over the last 15 years, including increased immigration, the Great Recession, and the consequent foreclosure crisis, all of which have serious implications for both community structure and crime (Jargowsky, 2014; Kirk & Laub, 2010; Krivo et al., 2018; Zhang & Logan, 2016). Given these broad structural changes and extant research on the spatial patterning of crime, there is a critical need to "go local" (Aufrichtig et al.,

2017) not just to determine if/how of gun violence has changed in response to a shifting structural landscape, but also to better understand the solutions that can prevent gun violence in light of these transformations. This dissertation takes up this task of going local, but it also goes deep by quantitatively *and* qualitatively examining the various local-level conditions and processes that have shaped gun violence dynamics in the city of Richmond, California.

PRESENT STUDY

Located in the most northern part of the San Francisco Bay Area, Richmond is a small, majority-minority city of about 110,000 residents. I selected Richmond in part because of its size and the fact that most local gun violence studies focus on the same large metropolitan areas and, often, similar interventions employed within those areas, including Chicago, Boston, and Los Angeles (e.g., Braga, 2003; Braga et al., 2010; Braga et al., 2008; Braga et al., 2014; Griffiths & Chavez, 2004; Fontaine et al., 2017; Kirk & Papachristos, 2015; Papachristos et al., 2007; Tita et al., 2011; Valaskik et al., 2017). Yet I ultimately chose the city as site for my analysis because of its persistent history with gun violence, especially after the turn of the century. Like many other places across the country, Richmond observed considerable declines in homicide in the mid-to late 1990s, much of which can be attributed to a drop in gun violence. Nonetheless, the city still remained exceptionally violent for most of the 2000s, with 2009 marking the city's most fatal period that decade. That year, the city recording a homicide rate of 45 deaths per 100,000 residents – nearly 1.5 times higher than their rate in 2000, and nine times higher than either national or state averages[1].

Then, seemingly overnight, Richmond's trajectory with gun violence changed. Since their peak homicide year in 2009, the city has observed a whopping 67% decrease in homicides –

[1] Roughly 85% of all homicides during this time period were also committed with a firearm.

a level of decline that is unmatched even by other similarly violent cities in the region (Beckett et al., 2019). With these notable and steady reductions in gun crime, Richmond has effectively moved from being one of the most violent cities in the state to one that is now seen as a leader in both gun violence prevention and policing. For example, the city's Peacemaker Fellowship – which is a city-run street outreach and mentorship program – has received state and national acclaim given both its holistic approach to violence reduction (Jones, 2018; Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, 2016; McLively & Nieto, 2019), and the fact that homicides have decreased have alongside the program's implementation since 2010 (Advance Peace, 2020; Matthay et al., 2019; NCCD, 2018; Wolf et al., 2015). In terms of policing, the city has also been lauded for its ability to rebuild trust within a place long mired by tense police-community relations, with its success heralded by residents, community leaders, violence experts, and even former Attorney General Loretta Lynch (Lynch, 2016; Romney, 2015).

These positive developments, particularly given the city's volatile and rather anomalous history with gun violence, ultimately beg the question of why: Why did gun violence suddenly go up in the early 2000s, and why did it start to progressively decline after 2010? In my attempt to go both local *and* deep, I also examine how the city has worked to address gun violence over the last two decades, focusing not just on discrete interventions, but also the actors, organizations, contextual factors, and relationships that have shaped the city's history with gun violence prevention over time. By leveraging both qualitative and quantitative data and methods to address these questions, this study provides a longitudinal, comprehensive, and grounded portrait of local gun violence dynamics that is seldom captured in the either the gun violence or neighborhood crime literature. This study also provides a theoretical and methodological roadmap for scholars interested in examining gun violence production and prevention in other

contexts, especially in places observing increased socioeconomic inequality and demographic transition

METHODOLOGY

Combining ethnography and historical description with statistical analyses of crime data, this study provides an in-depth mixed-methods case study of gun violence dynamics within Richmond, California. In focusing broadly on the dynamics of gun violence, I specifically document the historical, structural, and relational forces that have influenced gun violence patterns and prevention strategies in Richmond since the early 2000s. Below, I provide a general overview of my logic for employing a mixed-methods case study design, as well as descriptions of each data source and method used to answer the study's main research questions.

Utilizing a Case Study & Mixed-Methods Logic

This study utilizes the extended case study method, which leverages ethnography to analyze how particular social situations or problems operate in relation to broader structural forces (Small, 2009, p. 19). In-depth exploration of unique or deviant cases also provides opportunities to develop and extend theory (Burawoy, 1991). I position Richmond as a type of deviant case given how its trajectory with gun violence after 2000 stands in stark contrast to both national and state trends. Though I cannot say whether Richmond is representative of all other similar, deviant cases, both the methodological approaches and theoretical foundations established through this study can be used to refine existing theories if new and/or conflicting findings emerge (which they do), as well as inform new case studies in other contexts and/or statistical analyses with larger samples (Burawoy, 1991).

While my decision to utilize an extended case study approach was intentional, I did not actually set out to conduct a mixed-methods project that would involve both qualitative and

quantitative analysis. I had initially settled on conducting an ethnography because many of the questions that I was interested in exploring around relational engagement and social process were more suited to qualitative investigation (e.g., how local stakeholders work to formally and informally address gun violence, and how these responses change over time). During the course of my fieldwork, I developed relatively strong rapport with the Richmond Police Department such that they offered to provide me with historical, incident-level gun crime data if it would assist me in my endeavors. I accepted the opportunity, not only because this type of gun crime data is hard to come by, but also because several themes had emerged within my interviews that could be further assessed through quantitative exploration, including respondent observations that demographic and housing-related changes had contributed to shifting gun violence patterns in the city. Thus, while the final approach used for this study reflects a mixed-methods design, it emerged from an iterative data collection and analytic process that allowed me to rigorously examine stakeholder and theoretical hypotheses around local crime change via in-depth fieldwork, statistical analysis, and triangulation.

Qualitative Sources & Methods

One of the key goals of this study is to understand Richmond's varied history with gun violence. While quantitative methods are useful for studying aggregate trends in gun violence and for identifying the range of factors that are statistically associated with such trends, they do not lend themselves well to studying gun violence as a dynamic and relational process. What I mean by this is that violence reflects a breakdown in both structural *and* social relations that shape and shift with time. Gun violence prevention is also enacted within a historical, structural, and relational context that cannot fully be accounted for in isolated programmatic studies, which is an incredibly common approach within gun violence research. To more comprehensively

understand the forces that both trigger and prevent gun violence, I chose to leverage the power of ethnography (consisting of both in-depth interviewing and observation) and historical analysis.

Between October 2017 and January 2018, I conducted in-depth interviews with 56 community stakeholders, as well as 30 observations of various community events, spending approximately 150 hours in the field in Richmond. Stakeholders specifically included residents, community leaders (e.g., organizers, staff within local non-profits, and clergy), city officials, police, and other legal actors (e.g., prosecutors and public defenders). Observations consisted of city council meetings, police ride-alongs, and participation in different activities associated with local prevention efforts. During the course of my fieldwork, I became most embedded with the city's Ceasefire initiative, which is a nationally-recognized approach to prevention that uses community-police partnerships to identify and support individuals believed to be involved in and/or at-risk for gun violence (Braga et al., 2004). My interactions consisted of regular participation in weekly prayer walks to raise awareness about the initiative, working group meetings, and anti-gun violence block parties organized by volunteers involved with the program. In fact, I met about a third of my respondents through these various activities, with the remaining participants identified through either purposeful or snowball sampling.

The primary function of my interviews was to obtain insights regarding the causes and consequences of gun violence that were grounded in the lived experiences of people who reside and/or work in the city. Interviews were also used to identify the formal and informal strategies, both past and present, that the city has employed to address gun violence, including details on the development, goals, activities, and impacts of local efforts. Ethnographic observations supplemented these data, and were particularly useful in highlighting how certain violence prevention strategies operated in real time; the relational dynamics between community actors;

and the successes/challenges associated with implementation (e.g., tensions between resident organizers and with law enforcement). To protect the confidentiality, most participants were assigned pseudonyms or are unnamed and given only general descriptors (e.g., community leader) if only one person was interviewed for a given agency, organization or program.

Archival records, on the other hand, were gathered to provide historical context and to verify details within my own observations or those of my respondents. In total, I gathered nearly 130 newspaper articles and reports that speak to gun violence incidents and patterns; the policing of gun violence in Richmond; and community-based responses to gun violence in the city since the early 2000s. Some of these resources were provided by respondents, but most were collected using targeted web-based searches to follow-up on a discrete incident or prevention strategy that emerged in an interview (e.g., a police sting of a local gang), or to obtain information on local processes that respondents suggested were related to gun violence in the city (e.g., displacement, demographic change). Analyses and findings derived from these qualitative sources appear in Chapters 3 and 4 of the study.

Quantitative Data & Methods

Statistical analyses were conducted in order to provide an additional layer of structural explanation within my study. Crime data were provided by the Richmond Police Department, and consists of three types of gun-related incidents: homicide, attempted homicide, and assault with a firearm. During the 15-year observation period, the city recorded a total of 2,018 gun crimes, including 332 homicides, 70 attempted homicides, and 1616 assaults. I created a composite gun violence measure for each year that includes all three crimes in order to account for the relative rarity of gun violence events. To adjust for annual fluctuations in crime, I also

created measures that averaged total gun crime counts over three years for the time points that bookend each observation period (e.g., 2003-2005 & 2007-2009).

Neighborhood structure data was gathered from the 2000 and 2010 U.S. Census, and the 2016 American Community Survey 5-year Estimate. Though most neighborhood crime studies use Census tracts as their unit of analysis, Richmond is a relatively small city with less than 30 tracts. By focusing on the block group level, I was able to increase my sample size (n=70) and maximize variation across neighborhoods. Considering my interest in capturing the impact of local structural change on crime and the infrequent nature of gun violence, the block group unit also allows me to capture meaningful differences in violence and neighborhood structure at a relatively small geographic scale. The specific neighborhood characteristics that were used in my analysis reflect those that are typically included in neighborhood crime studies, such as: racial/ethnic composition (e.g., percentage Black and White residents in a block group); racial/ethnic heterogeneity; an index measure for concentrated disadvantage; an index for residential stability; the percentage of young people ages 15-29; and, finally, block group population. Measures were computed to capture temporal change for each characteristic from 2000-2010 and 2010-2016.

Combining crime and Census data sources, I employed OLS regression analyses to assess the relationship between neighborhood structural change and gun violence change across two discrete time periods: 2003-2009, to capture Richmond's era of increasing gun violence, and 2009-2017, to reflect the city's more recent experience with gun violence decline. As I discuss next, these findings are presented in Chapter 2 of my study; but they are also explored in Chapter 3 by way of leveraging my qualitative sources. This method of triangulation enabled me to both assess the validity of my findings across sources, as well identify an array of novel and nuanced

explanations that can help advance theoretical and practical understandings on both gun violence production and prevention in urban communities.

OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION

The following chapters reflect three separate analyses that illuminate the various historical, structural, and relational forces that have shaped violence dynamics in Richmond since the turn of the century. Chapter 2 turns to the issue of structure by statistically examining the association between neighborhood change and gun violence change in Richmond between 2003 to 2009 (Period 1), and then 2009 to 2017 (Period 2). Echoing prior neighborhood crime studies, I specifically assess whether changes in neighborhood racial/ethnic composition, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, residential stability, concentrated disadvantage, youth and young adult composition are predictive of gun violence patterns across these two time periods. In contrast to most studies that find a positive relationship between racial/ethnic change and crime, I find a *negative* relationship between Black, Latino, and Asian population change and gun violence in Period 1. Black population change was actually the strongest predictor of violence changes in my analysis, such that *decreases* in Black composition were associated with *increases* in gun violence. This relationship was also moderated by changes in Latino composition and residential stability, highlighting the interdependence of racial/ethnic and residential instability in shaping local gun violence patterns. Interestingly, these findings did not hold for Period 2; instead, changes in youthful composition were most related to gun violence changes in the second period (2009-2007). More pointedly, I found a positive relationship between these two variables such that places observing increases in their youthful population were more likely to see increases in gun crime over this time period, which is consistent with other studies.

Chapter 3 pivots to my qualitative sources in order to unpack the unique relationship between Black population change and gun violence in Richmond, as this theme also emerged as a key explanation for shifting gun violence patterns within nearly two-thirds of my interviews. Since 2000, Richmond has lost approximately 42% of its Black population. Though there are certainly many factors that can account for this massive shift, stakeholders largely framed the issue as a process of racialized displacement that has resulted from distinct housing, law enforcement, and victimization-related pressures. The national foreclosure crisis in the late 2000s and subsequent housing affordability crisis in the San Francisco Bay Area, for example, were cited as major factors for displacement given how each has heavily impacted the city's Black community. Heightened policing and punishment schemes around gang and gun violence have also pushed out Black residents – but particularly young, Black, justice-involved males – by legal, rather than economic force. Gun victimization, on the other hand, has worked to displace Black residents out of fear or by, literally, placing them in a coffin. In addition to inducing residential instability, analyses suggest that these forces have shaped interpersonal gun crime patterns by disrupting specific types of social relations that can either trigger (e.g., networks among young, Black gang-involved youth) or prevent (e.g., relationships and trust among neighboring Black residents) gun violence.

Chapter 4 transitions more pointedly to the theme of prevention to examine the nature and development of what I call Richmond's anti-gun violence reduction network. This network includes established *organizations*, such as non-profits and city agencies like the Office of Neighborhood Safety; formalized crime control *programs* developed in partnership with local institutions; as well as less formal *community actions* (Sampson et al., 2005) organized by residents with and without the help of local institutions (e.g. temporary protests, community

forums). It also comprises active and defunct strategies in order to capture the evolution of informal social control efforts in Richmond since the early 2000s.

While neither respondents nor any other data source actually identified the existence of a unified network, I ultimately settled on this term because of how strategies are bound together by purpose, history, and relationship. For example, some of the networks' current initiatives were the immediate by-product of past initiatives, whereas others leveraged the social capital and momentum generated by former efforts to devise new strategies. Though the development of the network was slow, it gradually grew from one community action to the next. Over time, residents, in partnership with local organizations and city leaders, were able to secure the political will and resources to get numerous programs and organizations off the ground – some of which have now become key institutions in the city in terms of their efforts to support violence reduction. While my data limits me from drawing any causal arguments, I argue that the city may have been able to stave off the crime-inducing consequences of continued Black displacement in the 2010s because residents were able to devise informal crime control strategies that did not rely solely on within-neighborhood or within-group ties.

Chapter 5 concludes by discussing the contributions of this study. By engaging in a mixed-methods approach that combines ethnography, historical description and statistical analysis, my dissertation provides new insights on the dynamics of neighborhood change and crime. It particularly teases out the relationship between racial/ethnic change and crime by locating the pathways and mechanisms that seem to link Black displacement to gun violence in Richmond. Though I do not know how many other places are experiencing similar processes of Black displacement, my findings highlight how socioeconomic disinvestment and disparities in surveillance and punishment within minority communities can intersect to shape not only

patterns of gun violence, but also racialized processes of physical and social exclusion. This dissertation also sheds new light on the development of collective efficacy around a specific problem like gun violence. Local non-profit, capacity building organizations were particularly integral to facilitating this social and cultural process and are important sites for future academic inquiry, especially for scholars interested in examining how informal social control operates in a shifting socioeconomic and demographic landscape.

I also provide a series of policy recommendations that call attention to the importance of developing a comprehensive, multi-pronged approach to gun violence prevention that emphasizes individual and community development. While this type of model certainly takes time (and money) to build, I argue that it must attend to the social, psychological and material needs of shooters and victims *as well as* the families and community members that are left to cope with trauma of gun violence, yet are too often left out of the violence prevention equation. This approach also demands investment in strategic capacity-building among community members and local organizations to not only provide a buffer against sudden or ongoing residential instability, but also to build new social norms around violence prevention that can balance and/or resist law enforcement efforts that are most often focused on containment and confinement.

CHAPTER 2

PREDICTING PATTERNS OF GUN VIOLENCE IN RICHMOND, 2003-2017

The United States experienced a dramatic escalation in gun violence in late 1980s through the early 1990s, with gun-related homicide reaching its peak in 1993 at roughly seven homicides per 100,000 people (Pew Research Center, 2013). Much of the sharp increase in homicide during this time period is attributable to a rise in gun violence in urban communities, and among young men of color in particular (Cooper & Smith, 2011). Scholars have cited growth in the illicit drug trade, along with increased social and economic isolation within the inner city, as key contributors to these patterns (Anderson, 1999; Kennedy, Braga, & Piehl, 2001; Moore & Tonry, 1998 ; Venkatesh, 1997). Given trends at the time, some academics (e.g., Diulio, 1995) warned of an impending surge in youth violence even worse than what we had already witnessed, yet their prediction was never realized: by 2000, the gun homicide rate had dropped by 46%, returning the country to lethal violence rates it had not seen since the early 1960s (Cooper & Smith, 20011).

Nearly three decades later, national and state gun homicide rates are lower than they ever were at the height of the gun violence epidemic. Nonetheless, gun violence remains a pernicious problem. To start, interpersonal gun violence continues to disproportionately impact Black and Latino communities, exacerbating existing inequalities in violence exposure and pre-mature death, despite overall declines in violence across the nation (e.g., Fowler et al., 2017; Kalesan et al., 2019; Riddell et al., 2018; Violence Policy Center, 2016a, 2016b). Studies have also found that there is a small, but notable cross-section of places that have observed considerable *increases* in homicide since the start of the millennium. Boston, for example, experienced a resurgence in gun violence between 2004-2008, with much of the increase limited to just 3% of

street segments in the city, most of which already had high rates of gun crime prior to 2004 (Braga et al., 2010). Lauren Krivo and colleagues (2018) report similar trends in their more recent and expansive multi-city study of crime patterns in the post-crime decline era. Specifically, they find that roughly 5% of nearly 2700 neighborhoods observed increases in their homicide rates between 2000-2013. Consistent with prior studies, these places were characterized by higher initial rates of concentrated disadvantage and markers of residential instability, like vacancies. They were also more likely to observe a worsening of these two social ecological conditions over time. The vast majority of increasingly violent neighborhoods were predominantly Black as well, demonstrating that countertrends to the crime decline were highly racialized. Unlike most neighborhood crime studies that rely on static or cross-sectional community characteristics to predict crime trends (e.g., percent Black in 2000), Krivo et al (2018) demonstrate the importance of assessing how neighborhood *change* impacts local *changes* in crime, like homicide – particularly in places that seem to defy general patterns.

This chapter utilizes a similar approach to examining longitudinal gun violence dynamics in Richmond, California – a city that has observed both volatile and uncharacteristic trends in gun violence since the turn of the century. Located in the northern most part of the San Francisco Bay Area, this small urban city rounded out the start of the millennium with a homicide rate of 29.2 murders per 100,000 residents, nearly six times higher than national and state averages (See Figure 2.1). The City of Los Angeles – which has consistently led the state in the number of homicides given its sheer size (Pear et al, 2018) – maintained a homicide rate 2-3 times lower than Richmond's throughout the 2000s, observing steady declines for most of this time period. By contrast, Richmond saw its homicide rate nearly double by the end of the decade. Then, in 2010, the city began to change course. In just one year, Richmond experienced a 56% decrease

in its homicide rate and has continued on a path of steady decline since then, recording about 67% fewer homicides between 2010-2017 when compared to the city's peak period in 2009.

FIGURE 2.1 HOMICIDE RATES IN RICHMOND V. COUNTRY, STATE, LOS ANGELES (2000-2017)



Drawing upon nearly two decades of Census and crime data, this chapter examines the relationship between neighborhood change and gun violence change in Richmond in order to better understand the city's varied history with gun violence. Specifically, I examine how changes in the structural conditions of Richmond neighborhoods, like racial composition, concentrated disadvantage, and residential stability, predict changes in gun crime across two distinct time periods: 2000-2009, Richmond's period of increasing gun violence, and 2009-2017, Richmond's period of decreasing gun violence. Given that most neighborhood crime studies tend to utilize static rather than changing structural characteristics as covariates, I also run a separate series of models that include such measures alone and in combination with change variables. Contrary to extant research, my findings suggest that changing, not static, neighborhood conditions are most predictive of gun violence patterns across both periods, with variations in racial/ethnic change demonstrating the strongest relationship to violence changes in Period 1, and change youthful resident composition yielding the strongest impact in Period 2. Findings for racial/ethnic change – and Black change in particular – were not consistent in Period 2 models,

suggesting that neighborhoods may have achieved a greater modicum of racial and residential stability in the 2010s. The overall narrow range of significant findings across models also suggests that there were other important variables affecting gun violence in the city that do not reflect traditional structural explanations and/or cannot be captured by administrative data, which I explore further in Chapters 3 and 4.

To help theoretically situate this chapter, I provide a brief review of literature on neighborhood change and crime, with a focus particularly on violent crime given the nature of gun violence. I then discuss the data and methods employed for this analysis, followed by my results, and a discussion of the implications of my work for future research on gun violence and the nexus between neighborhood change and crime more broadly.

UNDERSTANDING NEIGHBORHOOD STRUCTURE, CHANGE, AND CRIME

Social disorganization theory has been the primary theoretical framework used to explore the relationship between neighborhood structure and crime. With its roots in the Chicago school, early theorists like Shaw and McKay (1942) found that youth delinquency was highest in urban core neighborhoods characterized by low socioeconomic status, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, and residential mobility. They argued that these three structural factors created opportunities for increased delinquency – and by extension, increased crime –by disrupting the social organization of a community.

Sampson & Groves (1989) refined the theory by identifying informal social control as the precise mechanism linking community structure to crime, which they and others have measured in terms of social ties, social cohesion, organizational participation, and collective efficacy (e.g., Sampson & Groves, 1989; Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 1997). Within this framework, the social and economic isolation produced by concentrated disadvantage works to increase crime

insofar as it diminishes the capacity of residents to engage in crime prevention – whether that is watching for signs of crime and disorder in one's immediate neighborhood, or by intervening in broader initiatives outside the neighborhood (Peterson and Krivo, 2010; Sampson 2012; Sampson and Wilson, 1995). Consistent or high rates of residential instability can also create conditions ripe for crime by disrupting the social networks or relationships that support informal social control (Bursik, 1999; Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 1997). Similarly, changes in racial/ethnic composition may invite fear, tension, and mistrust between culturally distinct groups, which also has implications for a community's ability to maintain effective self-regulation (Kubrin et al., 2009).

Studies over the last thirty-five years have consistently found a strong positive relationship between these various structural characteristics, mechanisms, and crime (e.g., Heitgerd & Bursik 1987; Hipp 2007, 2010, 2011; Hipp, Tita, & Greenbaum, 2009; Morenoff & Sampson, 1997; Peterson, Krivo, & Harris 2000; Peterson & Krivo, 2010; Sampson, 2012; Warner & Rountree 1997). Despite this long tradition of research, scholars rarely assess the impact of neighborhood change on subsequent changes to crime, as most studies use static measures to examine crime trends cross-sectionally (Kirk & Laub, 2010; Krivo et al., 2018). Part of this oversight is methodological given the challenge of gathering and accessing longitudinal crime data. Yet there are also key theoretical obstacles that have stymied neighborhood change and crime analyses.

Social disorganization theorists assert that urban growth and change are fundamental precursors to social disorganization and crime; but, the theory also assumes that the social ecological structure of a neighborhood remains largely stable over time (Shaw & McKay, 1942). This latter assumption has guided most research examining variations in neighborhood and/or

city-level crime patterns. However, as several early studies in the social ecological tradition have demonstrated, neither cities nor neighborhoods are impervious to change (e.g., Bursik, 1984, 1986; Bursik & Webb, 1982; Heitgerd & Bursik, 1987; Taylor & Covington, 1988). For example, in a study examining the twenty-year histories of Los Angeles County's highest crime neighborhoods, Schuerman and Kobrin (1989) found that most of these places were not characteristically high crime at the start of 1950s. Instead, these areas evolved into moderate and high-crime neighborhoods with each subsequent decade, particularly as minority composition, single-family structure, residential mobility, and the female workforce increased. Bursik and Webb (1982) report similar results in their study of delinquency patterns in Chicago neighborhoods between 1940-1970: increases in non-white population, foreign born population, and household density were associated with increases in youth delinquency between 1950-1970. Importantly, the authors demonstrate that changes in delinquency were most salient in neighborhoods that observed the most rapid racial change, leading them to conclude that "it is the nature of change that is related to delinquency rather than the groups involved" (p.39).

As with any complex social phenomena, neighborhood change does not exist in a vacuum. Major social, economic, and political transitions between the 1950s and 1970s likely prompted the changes in neighborhood structure that the above authors found. These developments include pre- and post-war Black migration from the south to northern and western cities, like Richmond (Farely, 1968; Moore, 2000); as well as increased suburbanization and white flight during the 1970s as de-industrialization and economic disinvestment worsened in major urban hubs (Frey, 1980). Legacies of institutionalized racism have ensured the continued social and economic marginalization of high crime neighborhoods since then. But just as history

has taught us before, local crime contexts can and do shift in response to broader social and economic forces.

STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND CRIME IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

Since the start of the millennium, the country has observed a new wave of social and economic change that has implications for neighborhood crime. Economic inequality, for example, has surged over the last twenty years, eliminating the substantive reductions in poverty that the country observed in the 1990s (Iceland & Hernandez, 2016; Jargowsky, 2014). The U.S. has specifically seen an 50% increase in the number of high poverty tracts since 2000; a more substantial increase in high poverty neighborhoods within smaller metropolitan and micropolitan[2] areas; and a geographic "delustering" of poverty, more generally, across the nation. The Great Recession of the late 2000s also brought with it increased rates of unemployment, particularly within minority and immigrant communities already exposed to greater economic hardship (Owens & Sampson, 2013).

Another key impact of the Recession was an increase in housing instability via rising foreclosure and vacancy rates. As with other economic fallouts, the foreclosure crisis disproportionately impacted Black and Latino populations (Hall et al., 2015; Rugh & Massey, 2010). Hall and colleagues (2015), for example, found that predominantly Black and Latino neighborhoods had roughly 8 more foreclosures per 100 housing units than White neighborhoods between 2005 to 2012, with nearly half of all minority neighborhoods in their study characterized as having high foreclosure rates. Other studies have also found that Black and Latino groups have yet to fully regain the wealth that they lost during the Recession given that most minority wealth is concentrated in home ownership (Korchar & Cilluffo, 2017).

[2] Micropolitan cities are those with 10-50,000 residents; whereas smaller metro areas are classified as those with a population between 250,000 to 500,000 (Jagowsky, 2014).

The racial/ethnic landscape of American neighborhoods has changed tremendously since the 2000s as well. Much of this change has come through a rise in immigration, specifically among Latinos and Asians (Logan & Zhang, 2010). Indeed, scholars have documented a rise in "global neighborhoods" over the last twenty years where all four major racial/ethnic groups (White, Asian, Black, Latino) live in relatively close proximity (Logan & Zhang, 2010; Zhang & Logan, 2016). Though this growing level of diversity has decreased segregation in some neighborhoods and regions of the county, minority segregation still persists at relatively high levels. For instance, in their analysis of 20 metropolitan regions across the country, Logan and Zhang (2010) found that roughly 50% of Black residents and 40% of Latinos continued to live in neighborhoods without a white presence. In fact, there was a six-fold increase in the number of predominantly Latino neighborhoods between 1980 and 2010; a two-fold increase in the number of Black and Hispanic neighborhoods; and a three-fold increase in the number of Black, Hispanic, and Asian neighborhoods. Thus, while the overall number of all-white communities is down, persistent and growing minority segregation remains a key concern, especially when access to resources, like quality schools and employment, continues to be shaped by race and place.

Interestingly, the new millennium ushered in a period of unprecedented crime decline, with most studies finding that the crime drop was felt across the nation (e.g., Andresen et al., 2017; Friedson & Sharkey, 2015; Wheeler et al., 2016). With few exceptions, scholars have largely failed to examine if or how changes in neighborhood structural characteristics have impacted crime patterns at the local level *after 2000,* as crime continued to decline even in the face of massive social, economic, and demographic change (see Boggess, 2017; Griffiths & Chavez, 2004; Hipp et al., 2009; Stults, 2010 for studies using data up to 2000, which captures

earlier periods of decline). One such exception is Hipp and Kubrin (2017). Focusing on Los Angeles city neighborhoods between 2000-2010, they examine how changing patterns of income inequality and racial composition have shaped crime trends in the city over time. With respect to violent crimes, they found that increases in racial/ethnic heterogeneity, ethnic churning, and Black composition were associated with increased rates of aggravated assault, whereas increases in Asian and Latino composition were associated with a decreased rate of assault over the decade. They also found that the effect of neighborhood inequality on crime was dependent on racial/ethnic heterogeneity. Thus, consistent with social disorganization propositions, the authors conclude that the residential turnover (and the potential disruption to local ties and trust) brought about by racial/ethnic change was most predictive of crime trends; yet these forces also seemed to mediate the impact of other structural characteristics, like economic inequality.

Krivo and colleagues also examine the neighborhood change/crime change nexus post crime-drop, yet unlike Hipp & Kubrin (2017), they examine whether neighborhood characteristics are predictive of specific crime trajectories (e.g., high and increasing homicide versus moderate and declining homicide). Combining crime and Census data from eighteen cities with populations over 100,000, they find that increases in socioeconomic disadvantage, vacancies, and young male population composition were associated with increased rates of homicide by 2013, but only among neighborhoods that had higher rates of homicide in 1999. They also demonstrate that neighborhoods with higher initial levels of disadvantage, foreclosure, vacancy, percent Black, and percent Latino were more likely to observe increasing homicide trends, again if murder rates were already high at the start of the observation period. High and increasing immigration and total population levels, on the other hand, decreased the likelihood that a neighborhood would see increasing homicide rates over time. Though neighborhoods with

increasing homicide trends were in the minority (roughly 5% of the total sample), they represent an important countertrend to homicide patterns post-crime decline that are seldom are studied in their own right. As such, findings underscore that attention to changes in local neighborhood conditions can help scholars better understand why some neighborhoods have observed divergent or uncharacteristic crime trajectories in the post-crime decline era.

PRESENT ANALYSIS

The present analysis provides an initial step at understanding how changes in neighborhood structural characteristics do or do not predict changes in gun violence within Richmond neighborhoods. As noted previously, homicide patterns in Richmond represent a curious anomaly when contrasted to national, state, and other city homicide trends since 2000. During the first decade of the century, Richmond observed steep increases in homicide, most of which were gun fatalities. By the end of 2010, however, the city cut its homicide rate by more than half. Richmond has fortunately been able to maintain lower (though still relatively high) homicide levels through most of the 2010s. Descriptive analysis of Census data also indicates that the city has observed a drastic decrease in their Black population, losing roughly 42% of its Black residents since 2000. The Latino population, on the other hand, has increased by about 50%. Additionally, like other majority-minority populations cities across the county, Richmond was deeply affected by the housing crisis of the late 2000s, with foreclosures spiking by more than 600 percent between 2005 and 2008 (Bissell & Moore, 2018; Dreier et al., 2014). To make matters worse, the city is now facing a housing affordability crisis that has implications both for residential instability and racial/ethnic change, as low-income Black residents are being displaced at higher rates than any other demographic in the city (Verma et al., 2018). In light of such considerable social and economic transition, the present analysis examines whether changes

in neighborhood structural characteristics, like racial/ethnic turnover and residential instability, predict neighborhood gun violence patterns across two time periods: Period 1 (2000-2009), and Period 2 (2009-2017). The first period is reflective of increasing gun violence trends across the city, whereas the second period captures the city's more recent trend of gun violence decline.

Overall, this analysis contributes to a small but recently growing literature that uses longitudinal data to explore the consequences of neighborhood transition for changing levels of crime. Additionally, by explicitly focusing on a city that represents a countertrend to continuing crime declines post-2000, this study provides important insights into how scholars can think about the structural forces that shape atypical gun violence patterns in the new millennium.

DATA AND METHODS

Data

This study uses gun crime data for 70 block groups in Richmond from 2003-2017. Though most neighborhood crime studies use Census tracts as their unit of analysis, Richmond is a relatively small city with less than 30 tracts. By focusing on the block group level, I was able to increase my sample size and, therefore, maximize variation across neighborhoods. Average block group population size was relatively consistent across Census time periods, ranging from 1,467 residents to 1,562 residents.

Crime data was provided by the Richmond Police Department, and includes three types of gun-related incidents: homicide, attempted homicide, and assault with a firearm. All gun data were geocoded using ArcGIS 10.7.1 and aggregated for each block group by year and type of incident. Approximately 94% of incidents were successfully matched to a specific address. The final data set includes a total of 2018 gun crimes: 332 homicides, 70 attempted homicides, and 1616 assaults.

Dependent Variables

Count data for all three types of gun incidents were used to create a composite gun violence measure by year. To minimize annual fluctuations, I also created three-year gun crime averages for the start and end points that bookend Period 1 and Period 2: 2003-2005, 2007-2009, and 2015-2017. The final dependent variable measures[3] used in this analysis capture change in the average number of gun crime incidents across times points for a given period. Crime measures are not computed as rates given the small size of block groups and the rarity of gun violence incidents. Instead, population size is directly included as a control variable in my models. Descriptive data for gun crime averages and change measures are provided in Table 2.1.

TABLE 2.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF GUN VIOLENCE TRENDS BY TIME PERIOD

	Mean	SD	Range
Average (2003-2005)	1.92	2.37	0-11.33
Average (2007-2009)	2.94	2.67	0-17.33
Average (2015-2017)	1.31	1.58	0-8.33
Change Period 1 (2003-2009)	1.02	2.29	-3.33 - 11
Change Period 2 (2009-2017)	-1.63	2.63	-14.67 - 1.33
Spatial Lag Period 1	1.02	1.20	-1.22 - 4.53
Spatial Lag Period 2	-1.64	1.74	-7.13 - .56

Source: Author's compilation using U.S. Census Data and Richmond Police Department crime data

Independent Variables

Neighborhood structural characteristics were derived from the 2000 U.S. Census, the 2010 U.S. Census, and the 2016 American Community Survey 5-year estimates[4]. Mirroring prior neighborhood crime studies, the neighborhood covariates used in this analysis include: racial/ethnic composition; racial/ethnic heterogeneity; socioeconomic disadvantage; residential

[3] Both dependent variables are non-normally distributed, with the Period 1 measure having a positive skew, and the Period 2 variable holding a negative skew. However, diagnostic tests suggest that quadratic transformations did not improve normality, so I kept the original form for each variable.

[4] To accommodate changes in boundaries, spatial interpolation was used to fit the data to 2010 Census block groups.

stability; the percentage of residents between the ages of 15-29 (hereafter, youthful composition); and population level. All neighborhood characteristic change measures were generated by calculating the difference in values between 2000-2010 for Period 1, and 2010-2016 for Period 2. Initial level predictors include 2000 and 2010 measures only. Descriptive statistics for all covariates are provided in Table 2.2.

Two approaches are used to measure the effect of racial/ethnic composition and change on gun violence: the percentage of a specific racial/ethnic group in a neighborhood and racial/ethnic heterogeneity. Racial composition measures reflect the percentage of Black, Latino, and Asian residents in a block group, with percentage White and Other race as the reference category. Racial/ethnic heterogeneity is computed using the Herfindahl index that is inclusive of these five different racial/ethnic groups (Gibbs and Martin, 1962). Racial/ethnic composition measures were included to capture the effect of racial composition change for specific group on crime. Given that the reference category is White/Other Race, a specific increase in percent Black, Latino, or Asian assumes a similar decrease in percent White/Other race. On the other hand, an increase in the reference category would have the opposite effect on crime by assuming a decrease in percent Black, Latino, or Asian. The racial/ethnic heterogeneity measure, however, is not concerned with specific group change, rather it assesses if differences or changes in group diversity are related to crime.

Concentrated disadvantage is captured using an index inclusive of three different neighborhood conditions: the percentage of individuals below the poverty line, percentage of single-parent households, and average household income. The index was created for each Census period using principal factor analysis. All analyses yielded a single factor with an Eigen value above 1. Variables were also standardized to adjust for differences in measurement, and to

simplify interpretation of coefficients. Higher values on the index represent increased levels of socioeconomic deprivation, while lower values indicate less disadvantage.

The residential stability measure was also created using principal factor analysis and includes the percentage of homeowners in a block group and the average length of residence for each household (Hipp, 2011). Standardized measures were computed for each Census period. All analyses confirmed the presence of a single factor, with Eigen values above 1. Higher values on this index indicate greater residential stability, whereas lower values indicate more residential volatility. The last substantive demographic measure included in my models is for youthful composition. The life-course literature suggests that most crime tends to be committed by individuals between the ages 15 and 29. As such, my measure of youthful composition includes the number of block group residents within this age bracket.

Method

Given that outcome measures represent change in gun violence and can hold negative values, it was not appropriate to estimate models using negative binomial regression, which is commonly used for count data consisting of rare crime events like homicide. Instead, I use linear regression methods to model the effect of neighborhood structural change on gun violence in Richmond between 2003-2009 and 2009-2017. My first set of models include only change covariates, as well as spatial lags. Model 1 functions essentially as my base model, with Model 2 introducing an interactive term for Black and Latino population change. I include this specific interaction because much of the transition in racial/ethnic composition across the city can be characterized by Latino population increase and Black population decrease[5]. Though there were

[5] Interactions for other racial/ethnic group combinations – e.g., change Black by change Asian, and change Latino by change Asian –were also tested. Neither yielded statistically significant results and, thus, are not presented in final models.

substantive changes within the city's White and Other race population (the reference category for racial/ethnic composition), Black/White, Latino/White and Asian/White transition was not as common. Analyzing the effect of racial/ethnic change only in reference to White turnover may, therefore, produce misleading results. A significant interaction term suggests that the effect of Black population change on gun violence varies by levels of Latino population change. By including the interaction term, the change in percent Black coefficient should be interpreted as the unique effect of Black transition only when Latino population change is zero and all other covariates are held constant. The same logic applies to the coefficient for change Latino.

Model 3 also brings in an interaction term, though in this case it examines whether changes in Black composition are mediated by changes in residential stability. As prior reports have found, Black neighborhoods in Richmond have been unduly burdened by housing access and affordability crises both pre- and post- Recession (Dreier et al, 2014; Moore, Gambhir, & Tseng, 2016; Verma, DaSilva & Zuk, 2018). If racial changes in the city are related to gun violence patterns, it is important to understand if these changes are dependent on simultaneous decreases in homeownership and length of residence – the two measures that comprise the stability index. With the interaction term, the change Black coefficient should be read as the unique impact of Black population change when neighborhoods experience no change in residential stability. A significant interaction term, on the other hand, would suggest that the effect of Black population change on gun violence differs by levels of residential stability.

Considering neighborhood stability assumptions within social disorganization theory, my second set of models examine the relationship between neighborhood structure on gun violence by using only initial level predictors for each designated time period, such as percent Black in 2000 and 2010. My third and final set of models include both change and initial level variables

in order to most accurately capture the unique impact of neighborhood change on gun violence trends in the city (Kubrin & Herting, 2003; Stults, 2010). Model results are presented by time period in Tables 2.3 and 2.4.

Understanding that crime tends to geographically cluster (Weisburd, 2014), Moran's I tests were conducted in GeoDa to check for spatial autocorrelation in my dependent variables; both of which were statistically significant. In order to select the most suitable model that can adjust for this issue (e.g., spatial lag, spatial error, or neither), I ran all OLS models with spatial test diagnostics in GeoDa. Three out of eight models indicated the presence of a lag only; 3 indicated both lag and error issues; and two indicated no spatial lag or error issues. Spatial models were selected according to results from LaGrange Multiplier (LM) and Robust LM Tests (Anselin, 2005). Results indicated that a spatial lag model was appropriate for all six models that demonstrated spatial correlation. The two models that do not include a spatial lag are the Period 1 model with only initial level predictors, and the Period 1 model with all predictors. The remaining six models include a spatial lag for the corresponding dependent variable (see Table 2.1 for descriptive statistics on these measures).

Spatial lags represent the averaging of gun violence changes in all block groups adjacent to the focal block group, and were constructed with a row-standardized spatial contiguity matrix that utilizes the queen criterion (Velez et al., 2015; Peterson & Krivo, 2010). Spatial lag data were then imported back into Stata, where I performed the regression analyses presented in this chapter. Overall, spatial models allow me to me to account for the potential confounding effect of spatial autocorrelation in the variable of interest, which for purposes of this study is gun violence change.

TABLE 2.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS BY TIME PERIOD

	2000	2010	2000-2010	2010-2016
% Black	34.17[a]	24.82	-9.34	-4.33
	(-22.61)[b]	(19.15)	(15.97)	(12.10)
% Latino	28.18	40.85	12.67	2.23
	(17.16)	(21.92)	(14.89)	(16.43)
% Asian	11.60	12.40	.78	1.33
	(8.16)	(10.37)	(9.13)	(10.62)
Racial/Ethnic (RE) Heterogeneity	61.41	59.59	-1.82	.23
	(12.43)	(13.05)	(12.86)	(13.01)
Socioeconomic (SE) Disadvantage[c]	0	0	0	0
	(1)	(1)	(.64)	(.73)
Residential Stability[c]	0	0	0	0
	(1)	(1)	(.76)	(.64)
% Ages 15-29	21.05	20.89	-1.5	-.27
	(6.16)	(8.10)	(9.09)	(8.09)
Population Size	1562.59	1467.76	-94.83	46.81
	(1172.49)	(748.26)	(1114.46)	(421.59)

Source: Author's compilation using U.S. Census Data

Notes: [a] Mean ; [b] Standard deviation; [c] Standardized measures

RESULTS

Predicting Changes in Gun Violence – Period 1 (2003-2009)

The first set of models presented below examine the relationship between change in neighborhood structural characteristics and change in gun violence during Period 1. Turning first to the relationship between racial/ethnic change and gun violence, Model 1 indicates a relatively strong and negative relationship between changes in Black composition and gun violence in Richmond. Specifically, results suggest that a 1SD increase in percent Black over the first decade of the century is associated with a .52 SD decrease in gun violence from 2003-2009 ($p<.01$). However, understanding that gun violence during this time period reflected more increases than decreases, and Black population change reflected more decreases than increases, it is important

to interpret results in the opposite direction, meaning that a 1SD *decrease* in percent Black is also associated with a .52 SD *increase* in gun violence, holding all other variables constant. Changes in Asian composition were negatively associated with gun violence trends in the city as well, yet the effect for this minority group transition is not as strong as it is for shifts in Black composition ($\beta = -.253$, $p<.05$). The positive spatial lag effect in this model also indicates that gun violence changes are spatially dependent, such that increases in gun violence in one neighborhood are associated with increases in gun violence in adjacent neighborhoods. Lastly, though coefficients are in the expected direction, changes in concentrated disadvantage, residential stability and youthful composition are not statistically related to changes in gun violence for Period 1.

Model 2 in Table 2.3 introduces the interaction term for Black/Latino transition to assess if the effect of Black population change on gun violence is moderated by simultaneous changes in Latino composition. Results demonstrate that the interaction is not only significant ($\beta = -.640$, $p<.01$), its inclusion reduces the effect of change Black to non-significance ($\beta = -.150$, $p>.05$). Additionally, change in Latino composition is now statistically significant ($\beta = -.341$, $p<.05$), as is change in concentrated disadvantage ($\beta = .217$, $p<.05$). The unique effect for change Latino suggests that a 1 SD *increase* in a neighborhood's Latino population is associated with a .15 SD *decrease* in gun crimes when Black population change is zero and other variables are held constant. This result is generally consistent with past research finding that increases in Latino population are associated with decreases in certain types of violent crime, like aggravated assaults (Hipp & Kubrin, 2017). The effect for concentrated disadvantage is also in the expected direction given prior studies: increases in neighborhood socioeconomic deprivation between 2000-2010 result in more gun crimes during Period 1, net of controls.

To assist with interpretation of the interaction term, I plot the predicted change in gun violence for different levels of Black and Latino population change. The decrease category reflects change in either Black or Latino composition that is 1SD below the mean, whereas the increase category captures changes that are 1SD above the mean for each group. As seen in Figure 2.2, neighborhoods with high decreases in their Black population (a loss of roughly 25% or more) observed the most notable increases in gun violence during Period 1, and this increase was relatively consistent by levels of Latino change. By contrast, neighborhoods with high increases in both their Latino and Black populations were more likely to see substantial *decreases* in gun violence for Period 1 – a rather unexpected finding given prior research demonstrating a positive, not negative relationship between Black population gain and violence (e.g., Hipp & Kubrin, 2017; Morenoff & Sampson, 1997). The effect of Black and Latino change on gun violence, thus, looks quite different depending on the degree and type of racial/ethnic transition – with more extreme changes associated with either greater increases or decreases in gun violence.

Model 3 introduces another interaction term to see if the effect of change Black on gun violence varies by changes in residential stability. In addition to finding a significant interaction effect, the main effect for change Black is reduced by nearly half ($\beta = -.330$, $p < .05$). Figure 2.3 specifically plots this interactive relationship: places that saw average to high decreases in their Black population uniformly observed increases in gun violence, regardless of changes to residential stability. However, the steepest increases in gun violence were within neighborhoods that saw both high decreases in their Black population *and* high decreases in residential stability, translating to increase of about 2.2 gun crimes between 2003-2009. Additionally, when compared to the disaggregated effects of Latino population change on gun crime in Figure 2.2, it

appears that neighborhoods with high levels of Black population loss and residential instability were most vulnerable to gun crime increases during Period 1. Though it is unclear from this analysis whether residential instability preceded Black population loss, what is clear from Model 3 is that there is a symbiotic relationship between these two types of neighborhood changes – and that when paired together, they considerably heighten the level of a gun violence within a community over time.

FIGURE 2.2 INTERACTION FOR CHANGES IN BLACK & LATINO COMPOSITION (2000-2010), MODEL 2



Model 4 provides a useful comparison for Models 1-3 by examining how static (as opposed to changing) neighborhood characteristics explain gun violence trends during Period 1. Contrary to theoretical expectations, neither concentrated disadvantage nor residential stability in 2000 are associated with violence patterns for Period 1. Percent Black, however, is positively and strongly related to gun violence trends– and it is the only variable that has any statistically significant relationship to such patterns net of controls ($\beta = .505$, $p<.01$). This model also explains much less variation in gun violence changes ($R^2 = .217$) when compared to Models 1

through 3 (R^2 = .354, R^2=.466, and R^2= .454, respectively), suggesting that start of decade neighborhood conditions are not as predictive of later trends as are changes to such conditions.

FIGURE 2.3 INTERACTION FOR CHANGES IN BLACK COMPOSITION & RESIDENTIAL STABILITY (2000-2010), MODEL 3



Models 5 and 6 provide the most robust tests of the effect of neighborhood change on gun violence in Richmond for Period 1. After accounting for initial levels, most change variables in both models are no longer statistically significant. The only variable that retains significance is Model 5 is the interaction for Black and Latino change (β = -.609, $p<.05$). Consistent with Model 2, the effect of Black/Latino change on gun violence remains most pronounced for neighborhoods that have experienced either high increases (gain above 2.2%) or high decreases (loss below 25%) in their Black population (Figure 2.4). The most notable difference across models is that there is less variability in gun violence patterns for places that observed average changes in their Black population, regardless of the level of Latino transition. Lastly, for Model 6, I find that the interaction effect for Black population and residential stability change is also statistically significant (β = .455, $p<.05$), with interaction effects also mirroring those from Model 3. Taken together, analyses across all six models indicate that Black population change in

Richmond is the strongest and most consistent predictor of gun violence changes for Period 1, and that this effect is largely mediated by changes in Latino composition and residential stability.

FIGURE 2.4 INTERACTION FOR CHANGES IN BLACK & LATINO COMPOSITION (2000-2010), MODEL 5



FIGURE 2.5 INTERACTION FOR CHANGES IN BLACK COMPOSITION & RESIDENTIAL STABILITY (2000-2010), MODEL 6



TABLE 2.3 PREDICTING CHANGES IN GUN VIOLENCE BY NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS, PERIOD 1 (2003-2009)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	β	R SE	β	R SE	β	R SE	β	R SE	β	R SE	β	R SE
2000-2010 Change												
% Black	-.523**	.026	-.150	.024	-.339*	.019	-	-	-0.02	.028	-.110	.019
% Latino	-.190	.021	-.341*	.190	-.102	.020	-	-	-0.2	.031	.034	.027
% Asian	-.253	.027	-.271*	.035	-.188	.025	-	-	-0.3	.037	-.151	.033
RE Heterogeneity	.011	.020	.054	.024	-.029	.020	-	-	0.199	.045	.041	.034
SE Disadvantage	.200	.391	.217*	.345	.207	.385	-	-	0.222	.472	.218	.481
Residential Stability	-.200	.429	-.115	.324	.029	.370	-	-	-0.11	.397	.065	.449
% Ages 15-29	.047	.026	.141	.023	.100	.023	-	-	0.165	.032	.155	.033
Population Size	-.042	.000	.037	.000	-.028	.000	-	-	0.044	.000	-.029	.000
Spatial Lag	.285**	.158	.266**	.151	.311**	.171			-	-	-	-
ChBlack*ChLatino			-.604**	.001					-0.609*	.001		
ChBlack*ResStability					.392**	.016					.455*	.017
2000 Initial Levels												
% Black							.505**	.017	.155	.016	.230	.020
%Latino							.280	.024	.184	.023	.085	.022
% Asian							.006	.036	-.049	.044	-.017	.043
RE Heterogeneity							-.064	.024	.042	.031	.001	.033
SE Disadvantage							-.104	.488	.008	.574	0.074	0.605
Residential Stability							-.104	.307	-.106	.319	-.116	.350
% Ages 15-29							-.171	.057	-.060	.052	-.073	.057
Population Size							-.065	.000	-.075	.000	-.182	.001
Intercept	.251	.320	.393	.236	.177	.289	.486	1.65	.099	2.23	1.34	2.34
R2	.354		.466		.454		.217		.450		.483	

Source: Author's compilation; *p < .05 , **p < .01, ***p < .001; N=70

TABLE 2.4 PREDICTING CHANGES IN GUN VIOLENCE BY NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS, PERIOD 2 (2009-2017)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	β	R SE	β	R SE	β	R SE	β	R SE	β	R SE	β	R SE
2010-2016 Change												
% Black	-.122	.036	-.090	.035	-.106	.036	-	-	-.176	.037	-.169	.043
% Latino	-.171	.022	-.074	.025	-.161	.032	-	-	-.163	.031	-.247	.039
% Asian	.191	.033	.216	.033	.190	.382	-	-	.132	.040	.112	.413
RE Heterogeneity	-.130	.024	-.055	.0226	-.125	.026	-	-	-.016	.026	-.092	.039
SE Disadvantage	.041	.359	.037	.351	.042	.679	-	-	.071	.81	.076	.511
Residential Stability	.004	.387	-.022	.384	-.013	.412	-	-	.012	.410	.013	.529
% Ages 15-29	.198*	.029	.211*	.030	.196*	.029	-	-	.093	.026	.109	.049
Population Size	-.243	.001	-.247	.001	-.238	.001	-	-	-.207	.001	-.195	.001
Spatial Lag	.603***	.184	.583***	.181	.600	.187			.412***	.140	.410**	.197
ChBlack*ChLatino			.169	.001					.145	.001		
ChBlack*ResStability					-.037	.032					-.051	.029
2010 Initial Levels												
% Black							-.090	.018	-.172	.022	-.163	.027
%Latino							-.129	.014	-.244	.023	-.289	.030
% Asian							-.071	.034	-.032	.027	-.011	.044
RE Heterogeneity							.086	.037	.045	.044	.011	.042
SE Disadvantage							-.101	.236	-.070	.507	-.084	.54
Residential Stability							-.222	.412	-.053	.347	-.041	.422
% Ages 15-29							-.215*	.030	-.125	.039	-.087	.057
Population Size							-.013	.000	-.070	.000	0.059	.000
Spatial Lag							.381**	.146	-	-	-	-
Intercept	-.160	.201	.010	.223	-.149	.215	.972	2.26	2.04	3.10	2.12	3.37
R2	.469		.493		.470		.460		.568		.555	

Source: Author's compilation; Notes: *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***p < .001; N=70

Predicting Changes in Gun Violence – Period 2 (2009-2017)

Results for Period 2 are considerably different from Period 1 (See Table 2.4). Changes in racial/ethnic composition, for example, are not statistically associated with gun violence trends in Period 2. In fact, aside from the spatial lag ($\beta = .603$, $p<.001$), youth composition is the only structural change variable that is statistically related gun patterns for this period. Specifically, a 1 SD increase in young residents ages 15-29 is associated with a .20 SD increase in gun violence ($\beta = .198$, $p<.05$). This finding is consistent with prior research that has found a positive relationship between the amount of young people in a neighborhood and crime.

Given the lack of any unique effects for racial/ethnic change in Model 1, it is not surprising that both interaction terms fail to reach significance in Model 2 ($\beta = .169$, $p>.05$) and Model 3 ($\beta = -.037$, $p >.05$). Youthful population change, however, remains statistically significant in both of these change models. Specifically, findings indicate that a 1SD increase in youthful composition is associated with a . 211 SD (Model 2) and .196 SD (Model 3) increase in gun crimes, net of controls.

Model 4 transitions to examining the effect of structural conditions at the start of 2010 on gun violence changes for Period 2. Like Models 1 though 3, youthful composition is the only neighborhood characteristic statistically associated with gun violence changes, yet in this context, the relationship is negative: neighborhoods with higher levels of young people in 2010 were more likely to observe decreases in gun violence by 2017. When paired alongside the positive effect for youthful population change in prior models, this latter finding seems to indicate that young people were more likely to move out of neighborhoods that saw greater decreases in gun violence during Period 2. Indeed, according to descriptive analyses, neighborhoods that experienced above average decreases in their youthful population saw an

average decrease of 2.6 gun crimes between 2009 to 2017, whereas all remaining block groups saw a decrease of about 1.15 gun crimes. Mean differences in gun violence change between these two groups are statistically significant ($t=2.30$; $p<.05$).

The last two models include all neighborhood covariates and spatial lags for Period 2, varying only by the type of interaction included. Neither initial nor changing youthful composition retain significance in either Model 5 or 6. In fact, the only variable that remains statistically significant is the spatial lag ($\beta = .412$, $p<.001$). Ultimately, these final models reveal that variations in gun violence in Period 2 may be explained more by space (i.e., where a neighborhood is located) than either initial or changing neighborhood structural characteristics. It also suggests that there were other more impactful forces at play during this second time period, such as informal and formal social control efforts, that are not captured by administrative data.

DISCUSSION

This study assumes a longitudinal approach to examining gun violence patterns in Richmond, California over the last fifteen years. During this time frame, Richmond has observed both dramatic increases and decreases in gun violence that defy national and state trends. Importantly, the city's variable history with gun violence has occurred alongside other key transformations, including rapid racial/ethnic change and increased residential and economic instability brought on by the Great Recession. This study, thus, aimed to explore whether changes in the socioecological conditions of Richmond neighborhoods were predictive of gun violence changes in the city over time. It also provides a test of the neighborhood stability thesis within social disorganization theory by examining if static versus change measures are more or less predictive of gun violence trends in Richmond.

To start, results indicate that neighborhood change models captured more variability in gun violence patterns than static models, particularly in Period 1. For example, roughly 22% of the variation in gun crime in Period 1 was explained by static measures versus 35- 47% for models that included only change measures. Though differences across models in Period 2 were less notable than Period 1, change models explained about 3% more variation than static models. Few studies to my knowledge have tested the impact of both static and change measures, and results are generally mixed, with some finding that static measures have more explanatory power than change measures (e.g., Kubrin & Herting, 2003; Krivo et al., 2018), and others finding the opposite (Stults, 2010). Rather than dismiss the potential role of neighborhood change for crime given these variable findings, the present analysis underscores the need to further examine whether and how changes to the socioecological structure of neighborhoods impact subsequent changes in crime – and if results might vary by crime type (e.g., gun crimes versus non-gun crimes, homicides versus robberies, violent crime versus non-violent crime).

In addition to documenting notable differences across model types, I also found that the neighborhood conditions that were most predictive of gun violence trends varied by time period. For instance, racial/ethnic change was strongly and consistently associated with gun violence patterns in Period 1, yet such changes failed to demonstrate the same effect in Period 2. This inconsistency may be related, in part, to the scale of racial ethnic change prior to and after 2010. During the first decade of the century, neighborhoods lost, on average, about 9% of their Black population while gaining about 13% more Latino residents. According to interaction analyses, neighborhoods that observed changes mirroring overall trends (i.e., a decrease in percent Black, and an increase percent Latino) were also more likely to see gun violence increase by 2009. By the end of 2016, however, the average level of Black population change had decreased by half;

and the level of Latino change had decreased by 500% (See Table 2.1). Null findings across all racial/ethnic change measures for Period 2 indicate that neighborhoods may have achieved a greater sense of stability in racial/ethnic composition after 2010, and any destabilizing effects from prior transitions may have leveled out by then. Thus, as some scholars have previously argued, it may be that the velocity and level of racial/ethnic change in Richmond was more consequential for gun violence than the overall in- and out-migration of specific groups (Bursik & Webb, 1982; Kapis, 1978).

Nonetheless, the race-specific findings for Period 1 are still striking considering that most other studies have documented a *positive, not negative,* association between Black and/or Latino change and violent crime (See Boggess, 2017 for exception). Hipp & Kubrin (2017), for instance, found that increases in both Black and Latino representation were associated with increased robbery rates in Los Angeles neighborhoods from 2000-2010. Krivo and colleagues (2018) report similar directional trends for varying types of homicide trajectories in eighteen different cities. Scholars have convincingly argued that the relative size of a neighborhood's Black and Latino population tends to be associated with increased crime because of how such characteristics tap into unmeasured structural disadvantages like weakened community institutions, poor schools, and economic disinvestment (Krivo et al., 2018; Peterson & Krivo, 2009; Velez et al., 2015). By extension, increases in Black and/or Latino concentration may increase crime because the level of relative disadvantage also increases in these neighborhoods. However, within Richmond, *decreases in Black* concentration and simultaneous *increases in Latino* concentration were associated with *increases* in gun crimes, even after controlling for socioeconomic disadvantage. When contrasted to the extant literature, these findings are rather perplexing in how they at once support and negate existing research. It could be that other

studies would find similar results if they also explored interactive effects between Black and Latino change. However, no study to my knowledge has either tested or reported this type of interactive relationship between minority group change. Given that many Black neighborhoods remain segregated from Whites but are becoming increasingly integrated with minority populations, like Latinos and Asians (Logan & Zhang, 2010; Zhang & Logan, 2016), it is important that scholars further examine the independent and interactive relationship between minority composition and crime in order to better understand the impact of America's shifting racial/ethnic landscape for neighborhood social processes, like crime.

Yet beyond assessing whether such a relationship exists in other contexts, it is also critical to consider why specific changes in minority concentration were associated with both increases *and* decreases in gun crime for Period 1. Like general residential instability, racial/ethnic transition and heterogeneity can generate mistrust, intergroup tensions over power and place, or simply missed opportunities for connection given a lack of familiarity with new neighbors (Flippen, 2001; Hipp, 2009; Tach, 2014). These issues may result in crime (albeit indirectly) if they lead to social disengagement and, hence, lowered levels of collective efficacy (Sampson & Groves, 1989; Sampson et al., 1997). Though I did not find any independent effects for racial/ethnic heterogeneity in my statistical analyses, interviews with key stakeholders in Richmond – which I discuss at length in Chapters 3 and 4—provide some support for this hypothesis in that newer Latino residents did not appear as invested in the informal prevention of gun violence as long-standing Black residents. To put it bluntly, compared to other issues like immigration and school quality, the Latino residents that I interviewed did not see gun violence as a problem that warranted their specific intervention – as inter-group violence was rare and most gun victims and perpetrators were Black, not Latino. This racialized form of engagement

was not just limited to Latino residents either. Some of the Black residents and leaders that I came to know during the course of my fieldwork commented on the lack of Latino involvement in their collective efforts – but most were unclear as to whether or how they should bridge the racial divide because they, too, acknowledged racial disparities in victimization and exposure. Though these findings are certainly limited to Richmond's context, they nonetheless provide fresh insights into how and/or why racial/ethnic differences (and heterogeneity) may stymie informal crime control efforts. Further qualitative study of minority change in urban communities is critical to disentangling the local effects of racial/ethnic transition for both crime and crime prevention in places undergoing similar transitions (See Flippen, 2001 for example of a study on white to Latino transition).

Moreover, as findings from Model 3 support, a good portion of the effect of Black population change in Period 1 was explained by an interactive relationship with residential stability. Neighborhoods that experienced higher residential instability and larger decreases in their Black population also observed greater increases in crime during Period 1. These findings in many ways confirm theoretical expectations regarding residential instability in that higher levels of residential turnover can have destabilizing and crime producing effects when concentrated within particular communities. My findings are also consistent with Boggess' (2017) study of racial/ethnic change and crime in Los Angeles between 1990-2000. She, too, finds that racial/ethnic change is strongly correlated with changes in homicide, and that levels of residential instability mediate this relationship, leading her to conclude that neighborhoods experiencing both forms of residential instability are particularly vulnerable to crime because of the distinct effects that each process have for the informal social control. I discuss this theme at length in Chapter 3, where I argue that the rapid displacement of Richmond's Black community

in the 2000s may have inadvertently worked to increase gun crime by weakening the friendship, kinship, and community bonds that are key to maintaining effective neighborhood regulation. Thus, consistent with social disorganization theory, my findings suggest that neighborhood-level changes in racial composition may affect crime insofar as they are able to transform the social context in which crime operates.

Whereas racial/ethnic change was a strong predictor of gun violence in Period 1, both initial and changing levels of youth composition were most related to gun violence patterns for Period 2. Most studies that include age-related measures tend to focus on young males and/or changes to this population as opposed to young resident composition more generally. Such an analysis was not possible for this study given limitations within block group data. Nonetheless, my results are still largely consistent with this research (e.g., Krivo et al., 2018; Velez et al., 2015) in that increases in youthful composition are associated with increases in gun violence. One notable deviation is that neighborhoods with higher levels of young residents in 2010 were more likely to observe decreases in gun violence by 2017. Given that most gun crime is both spatially concentrated and demographically concentrated among young people, it could be that high violence neighborhoods had more young people to begin with. Abnormal changes in youthful composition within these neighborhoods may, therefore, drive the relationship between young resident composition and gun violence.

Lastly, while this study provides new insights regarding the impact of neighborhood structural change on crime after 2000, it is not without its limitations. First, data were collected and analyzed for a single city, so generalizing results too broadly can be problematic. Additional studies on other cities and/or neighborhoods that represent countertrends to the general crime decline of the 21st century are needed to assess whether and to what extent findings in Richmond

may translate to different contexts. That said, even if the patterns found in this study are entirely unique, deviant cases like Richmond still warrant special consideration given the severity of gun violence as both a social and public health problem. Another limitation is the unit of analysis, and the absence of more precise socioeconomic and housing-related Census data at the block group level. Unemployment and vacancy data, for example, are not available within block group data sets, and both are key indicators of economic and housing stability within a community. Such data is available at the Census tract level, yet I chose not to use this level of analysis because it would reduce my sample size considerably. Null and/or inconsistent findings regarding the effect of concentrated disadvantage and residential instability may, thus, reflect data limitations rather than the general concepts themselves. Future analyses will consider methods of reconfiguring tract data to the block group level – and merging new data sets on foreclosure rates – to see if the inclusion of additional economic and housing variables would yield different results.

CONCLUSION

Overall, findings from the present analysis provide some support for the neighborhood stability thesis in that only few neighborhood conditions changed drastically enough to produce notable variations in gun violence. Nonetheless, results also demonstrate that neighborhood conditions do in fact change over time. Findings call particular attention to the role of racial/ethnic change in shaping gun violence patterns within Richmond. Rather than assume that this type of change operates independently from other social ecological conditions, this study highlights the importance of testing for interaction effects. I specifically find that the effect of Black population change on gun violence is mediated by simultaneous changes in Latino composition, as well as changes in residential stability. This study also demonstrates how

neighborhood change effects can vary by time period, as initial levels and changes to a neighborhood's youthful population were most predictive of gun violence patterns in Period 2. Though significant findings were limited primarily to these measures, this analysis highlights the value of using longitudinal data to explore the consequences of neighborhood change for changing levels of gun violence in the new millennium.

CHAPTER 3

"IN PRISON, DEAD OR GONE":

BLACK DISPLACEMENT AND GUN VIOLENCE IN THE CITY

*"A lot of people **moved** out, a lot of people **died,** a lot of people went to **jail.** All the real ones are gone now, I guess. It started declining after that." (Laron, Black Male Resident)*

Prior to World War II, Richmond, California's Black population was less than one-percent; with most of this population concentrated in a small, rural neighborhood on the outskirts of the city (Rogers, 2011). This all changed with the 1941 arrival of the Kaiser Shipyards, one of the country's largest producers of naval ships during the war. Black (as well as White) migrants from southeastern states like Texas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma, came to the city by the thousands to meet the demands of this growing war time industry. By 1946, just one year after the war, the city reached a peak population of about 110,000 residents – up from just 23,000 in 1940 – and nearly 13% of the population was now African American (Moore, 2000).

Though wartime efforts brought with it a booming economy, the city quickly experienced a post-war bust as work on the Kaiser Shipyards finished (Moore, 2000). Within weeks after the war ended, much of the temporary, segregated housing built for nonwhites was razed. Some Black residents were re-located to temporary public housing, others moved into recently unoccupied bungalows built for White workers, while yet another group built modest homes with materials from the decommissioned shipyards in the increasingly segregated neighborhood of North Richmond (Soskin, 2018). With a decline in economic investment, unemployment soared, racial tensions mounted, and violence began to escalate (Moore, 2000). As whites left the city in

masses, more Black migrants moved in. By 1980, Black residents made up 47% of Richmond's population, making them single largest racial group in the city (Bay Area Census, N.D). For the next 30 years, African Americans would remain the largest minority and racial group in Richmond, making it one of the largest Black enclaves on the west coast.

Contemporary Richmond, much like its post-war predecessor, remained plagued by high crime, unemployment, and uneven investment in housing and other infrastructure throughout the late 20st century. Though some of the city's most entrenched social and economic problems – like violence and unemployment – have improved in recent years, much of this change has come on the heels of sweeping demographic changes – only this time, flight from Richmond has been of *Black residents*. Since 2000, the city has lost nearly 42% of its Black population, all while observing a near 50% increase in its Latino population; the White population, on the other hand, decreased by about 17%. Despite being marginally aware of these demographic changes at the outset of my fieldwork, I did not expect my respondents to identify demographic change as a key explanation for shifting gun violence patterns in the city. As such, there were no questions about race, racial change, or demographic change on my interview guide – and I refrained from including related questions during instrument refinements in order to organically assess how prevalent the issue was among Richmond stakeholders. Overall, the theme of demographic change emerged inductively in 68% (32/47) of my interviews.

Interestingly, respondents focused almost exclusively on the pattern and potential causes of Black *out*-migration, not Latino *in*-migration, when asked to describe the forces that have shaped gun violence in Richmond since the early 2000s. This preliminary finding drove me to test for the influence of racial/ethnic change in my statistical models examining gun violence trends between 2003-2017 (See Chapter 2). To my surprise, my quantitative analyses largely

confirmed my respondents' observations: Black population change is indeed related to gun violence changes in the city. Specifically, my analyses suggest that Black population loss is associated with increasing gun violence in neighborhoods during the first decade of the century; and this relationship is moderated by both changes in residential stability and changes in Latino population at the neighborhood level, even after controlling for characteristics like concentrate disadvantage. However, continued Black displacement in the 2010s was not associated with gun violence changes after the city's peak gun violence period in 2009. Because Black demographic change repeatedly emerged as a theme during interviews, my qualitative data provide a unique opportunity to explore the potential pathways and mechanisms that have shaped the Black displacement/gun violence nexus in Richmond; and, to assess the extent to which my findings confirm or diverge from existing explanations.

Drawing upon 47 interviews with community leaders, residents, and law enforcement actors – as well as dozens of newspaper articles and reports on related sub-themes– this chapter examines three distinct, but inter-related issues that help to contextualize the relationship between Black population change and gun violence in Richmond: housing access & affordability; heightened policing and punishment; and concentrated gun victimization and trauma. As numerous stakeholders noted, these forces have worked to both directly and indirectly push out Black families and individual residents by shaping their willingness and/or ability to stay in the city. However, the impact of Black displacement on gun violence has not unilaterally been in one direction. Some stakeholders claimed, for example, that the targeted displacement of young Black men via incarceration and restrictive probation/parole conditions has decreased gun violence in the city by disrupting the interpersonal networks and conflicts that are often leveraged to incite violence, like territorial feuds between gangs. Other stakeholders, by

contrast, argued that displacement effectively worked to *increase* gun violence in the city by destabilizing the social relations and networks that are key to *preventing* gun violence, including trust and cohesion across neighbors and within families. Taken together, my findings suggest a complicated (and controversial) relationship between racialized displacement and gun violence – one that is neither entirely positive nor negative, and that seems to depend largely on how it works to weaken different types of social relations in the city.

In the next section, I provide a brief overview of the distinct literatures that I used to situate the present analysis, including research on the direct and reciprocal effects of residential turnover for crime, as well as studies that examine the impact of justice involvement for residential mobility and crime. I then discuss the data and methods used for this analysis, followed by my findings. I conclude by considering the implications of my analysis for the prospects of continued gun violence in Richmond, and future research on race, crime, justice involvement, and mobility.

MOBILITY, RACE, AND CRIME

Studies have frequently explored the relationship between residential turnover, racial/ethnic composition, and crime at both the city and neighborhood level (e.g., Bursik, 1986; Hipp, 2010, 2011; Liska & Bellair, 1995; Liska et al., 1998; Morenoff & Sampson, 1997; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Xie & McDowell, 2010). Indeed, these two independent structural variables are foundational to social disorganization theory, one of the leading frameworks used to study local crime rates and patterns (Kubrin et al., 2009). According to the theory, residential turnover can affect crime by disrupting the social networks that support informal social control processes in a neighborhood (e.g., Kornhauser, 1978; Sampson and Groves, 1989). For example, the more residentially stable a neighborhood, the greater the likelihood that neighbors will

develop relationships, look out for each other's children, and monitor for signs of disorder– all of which are positive indicators of effective neighborhood regulation (Bursik, 1999; Sampson et al., 1997). Residentially unstable neighborhoods, on the other hand, may not enjoy the same social benefits due to a lack of familiarity with and/or mistrust of one's neighbors. Changes in racial/ethnic composition can also affect crime through a similar process in that racial/ethnic difference may invite fear, tension, and a sense of competition between culturally distinct groups (Kubrin et al., 2009). Under these circumstances, the creation of the relationships and trust that undergird informal social control are stymied, and crime may increase as a result.

Studies that explicitly examine the impact of residential turnover on city-level crime rates generally report a statistical relationship between the crime and residential mobility, with some studies finding differential effects by demographic group. For example, Cullen and Levitt (1999) found that a 10% rise in crime was associated with a 1% decline in central city population among cities with more than 100,000 residents. Highly educated households and those with children were also more likely to move, though they found no differences by race. Sampson and Woolridge (1986), on the other hand, found that crime had a negative effect on both net migration and population change for both White *and* Black populations – though their sample included cities with more than 250,000 residents. Unlike these prior studies which look at crime rates broadly, Liska and Bellair (1995) differentiate by crime type and find a reciprocal relationship between robbery rates and crime in cities between 1950-1990. Specifically, they show that start-of-decade robbery rates increased the percentage of non-white city residents by the end of each decade under observation. Racial composition, on the other hand, only had a significant effect on crime in the 1980s.

Though findings are largely consistent with city-level studies, research examining the migration-crime relationship at the neighborhood level documents more variable effects by race/ethnicity. For instance, when looking at the dynamic relationship between crime change and racial/ethnic change in Chicago neighborhoods between 1970 and 1990, Morenoff and Sampson (1997) found that high homicide rates at the start of a decade predicted both Black *and* white population loss, yet increases in homicide in focal and nearby neighborhoods led to Black population *gain* in the following decade. The authors contend that Black Chicagoans with greater means may have been able to "flee the immediacy of crime, [but] were not able to escape the spatial encroachment of crime" like White residents, who most often fled the city all together. Hipp (2011) finds similar patterns of entry and exit in neighborhoods several decades later, and in a greater number of cities: Whites are more likely to leave neighborhoods with high crime rates than Blacks, and they're also less likely to enter neighborhoods with increasing crime rates; Latinos and Blacks, however, are more likely to enter higher-crime neighborhoods. Hipp (2011) argues that the differential movement of Black and Latino residents into high-crime neighborhoods is likely a reflection of historical forces, like segregation and housing discrimination, that have limited the options and mobility patterns for minorities, particularly for Black Americans (Fischer & Massey, 2004; Frey & Farley, 1996; Massey & Denton, 1993; Massey, Gross, & Shibuya, 1994; Massey & Hajnal, 1995; Turner et al, 2000).

Changes within local and national housing markets are also key factors to consider when thinking about the relationship between race/ethnicity, crime and mobility. For example, while the Great Recession of late 2000s increased poverty, foreclosures, vacancies, and unemployment in most communities, the housing and economic downturn impacted the nation's Black and Latino communities the hardest (Baumer et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2015; Owens & Sampson,

2013; Jayasundera et al., 2010; Rugh & Massey, 2010). As an involuntary move, foreclosures have the potential to increase crime by suddenly destabilizing the resident relationships and networks that are foundational to informal social control. Though findings on the foreclosure-crime nexus are mixed (Kirk & Hyra, 2012), studies suggest that that housing foreclosure rates increase neighborhood crime rates either directly (Ellen et al., 2011; Immergluck and Smith, 2006), or indirectly through increased vacancies (Cui & Walsh, 2015). Few scholars have examined if the foreclosure-crime relationship varies by the racial/ethnic make-up of neighborhoods. Krivo et al (2018) provides one exception, finding that Black neighborhoods were more likely to see homicides and burglaries increase post-recession if they also observed an increase in their levels of housing vacancy and foreclosure. Nonetheless, it is still unclear if the Recession and consequent housing crisis has in any way produced larger scale displacement of specific minority groups within a neighborhood or city.

Moreover, because neighborhood crime is patterned by race and space, it is important to think about how victimization might impact the racialized patterning of residential mobility and displacement. Unfortunately, research in this area is limited[6]. On the one hand, several studies have found a positive relationship between residential mobility and both property victimization (e.g., burglary) and violent victimization (Dugan, 1999; Xie &McDowell, 2008). However, only two studies to my knowledge, have examined the impact of crime victimization on racial/ethnic change (Xie & McDowell, 2010, 2014). Contrary to expectations, Xie & McDowell (2010) find that direct victimization does not lead to racial/ethnic turnover in neighborhoods, yet indirect victimization (measured as crime victimization experiences in nearby households) does increase

[6] While studies of national housing projects, like Moving to Opportunity and Hope VI, do not directly examine the impact of victimization on mobility, neighborhood violence and safety concerns are two of the leading factors that motivate the relocation decisions of the program's low-income (and often minority) participants (See Briggs et al., 2010; Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011).

the likelihood of White-to-Black turnover. In a follow-up study, Xie & McDowall (2014) also find that property, not violent victimization, increased the mobility of Black households. On the other hand, ethnographic research, like Rosen's (2017) study of family life in a predominantly Black Baltimore neighborhood, documents that Black residents are responsive to both violent and property crime victimization. Specifically, she finds that direct victimization (e.g., home invasion) *and* indirect victimization (e.g., assault of a neighbor) prompted moves among nearly 16% of the families in her study.

Given that the focus of the current project is to understand explanations for gun violence patterns in Richmond, and not residential mobility specifically, my data does not allow for a systematic assessment of moving decisions among individual Black residents in the city. Yet as I discuss later, interviews did generate rich hypotheses that reflect and expand upon the above research. For instance, respondents pointed to gun violence exposure and victimization as key factors motivating Black displacement via fear and death. They also cited the foreclosure crisis, public housing demolition, and rising housing costs within the San Francisco Bay area as contributors to Black displacement. Importantly, stakeholders provided insights into how the Black displacement resulting from these different pressures has worked to shape gun violence patterns in the city over time. This is an important consideration given that there is little research on contemporary Black displacement or flight from urban spaces, the forces motivating such displacement, and the implications of this racialized change pattern for local crime.

JUSTICE INTERACTIONS & RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY

Research on the consequences of justice involvement – from police stops to parole experiences to imprisonment – has proliferated in the past twenty years. This interest has been motivated by a dramatic growth in imprisonment (Mauer, 1999); studies documenting the racial

inequities produced by both incarceration (Western, 2006) and policing (Epp et al., 2014; Geller et al., 2014; Fagan, 2010, 2012); and the collateral costs of such practices for individual, family, and community outcomes (Braman, 2007; Comfort, 2007; Mauer & Chesney-Lind, 2002; Wakefiled & Wildeman, 2014). This latter area of study is particularly relevant to the present analysis given how respondents characterized Black displacement as a consequence of justice-related experiences, policies, and actions.

Understanding how far and deep the collateral costs of justice interactions can be, this hypothesis from respondents was not entirely surprising. For example, scholars have found that incarceration reduces wages over the life course (Western, 2006), while also increasing the risk of mortality, contraction of infectious diseases (Massoglia, 2008; Patterson, 2013), and the likelihood of mental health problems (Baillargeon et al., 2009; James & Glaze, 2006; Schnittker, 2006). With respect to family outcomes, studies have also documented the adverse consequences of paternal incarceration for marriage, socioeconomic stability, neighborhood attainment, and children's psychosocial development (Huebner, 2005, 2007; Leibbrand et al., 2019; Wakefiled & Wildeman, 2014; Wildeman et al., 2013; Wildeman & Turney, 2014). Frequent and adverse policing experiences have similarly negative effects for the mental health of young African American men (Geller et al., 2014), and the proliferation of legal cynicism among residents in disadvantaged and minority communities (Brunson, 2007; Brunson & Weitzer, 2009; Gau and Brunson, 2009; Carr et al, 2007) – both of which have implications for the persistence of violence via decreased citizen cooperation with legal authorities (Kirk & Papachristos, 2011).

Research examining the direct effects of justice involvement for residential outcomes, however, is much more limited. The Urban Institute's *Returning Home* project, which tracked cohorts of released prisoners to better understand life after prison, is one of the first major studies

on the topic. Researchers found that 34-54% of parolees wound up in different neighborhoods within their first year of release, and this change was consistent across local contexts (La Vigne & Parthasarathy, 2005; Visher & Courtney, 2007). Other studies have also found that those with a history of incarceration are more likely to experience homelessness (Gellar & Curtis, 2011; Metraux et al., 2007) and live in even more disadvantaged neighborhoods after prison relative to those they resided in pre-prison (Massoglia et al., 2013, Warner, 2016). Less research has examined the precise impact of incarceration on individual mobility decisions *or* family mobility decisions. Warner (2015) is the only study, to my knowledge, that has explored this question with respect to former prisoners. Using the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, Warner finds that the odds of moving doubled for those with an incarceration history, and that incarceration remained a significant predictor of residential mobility for Black, but not White men, after controlling for individual and neighborhood-level factors. Using the Fragile Families and Wellbeing Study, Leibbrand and colleagues (2019) also find that recent paternal incarceration increased both the number of moves and probability of moving for families net of controls.

Considering the above findings and extant research suggesting that incarceration most acutely impacts Black men and their families (e.g., Western, 2006; Wakefield & Wildeman, 2014), it is certainly possible that the mobility patterns of racial minorities are also disparately impacted by incarceration. Additionally, because residential mobility has the potential to weaken neighborhood ties and cohesion, the forced physical re-location of residents via incarceration may also increase crime at the local level. Indeed, this latter hypothesis forms the foundation of Rose & Clear's (1998) coercive mobility framework, which contends that incarceration makes a neighborhood more criminogenic by increasing residential instability and undermining informal

social control. Studies examining the coercive mobility thesis at the neighborhood level are few, but results are generally consistent: places with higher rates of prison releases are more likely to observe higher rates of crime in the short-term (Clear et al., 2003; Hipp & Yates, 2009) and long-term (Dhondt, 2012). Prison admissions are associated with higher rates of neighborhood crime as well, but only in high incarceration neighborhoods (Clear et al., 2003; Dhondt, 2012; Renauer et al., 2006). Drakulich and colleagues (2012) also find that neighborhoods with higher parolee rates are more likely to observe lower levels of collective efficacy and higher rates of violent crime, though the effect is largely indirect, as housing stability and labor market variables mediate this relationship. Chamberlin (2018), by contrast, examines the relationship between change in the number of parolees within a neighborhood and annual changes in crime. As Rose and Clear (1998) hypothesized, she finds that higher levels of parolee concentration are associated with increases in both housing vacancies and crime (property and violent), and that this relationship is also reciprocal – i.e., more parolees in a neighborhood leads to more vacancies, more crime, and vice versa.

What is generally lacking in the coercive mobility literature is an assessment of how probation – as opposed to parole – may also work to impact residential mobility. Like parole, probation functions as a key pathway toward imprisonment given how it increases opportunities for targeted surveillance, arrest, and, hence, incarceration (Phelps, 2013). Indeed, recent analyses suggest that both probation and parole violations account for nearly 45% of annual prison admissions, with roughly one-quarter attributed solely to technical violations (11% for probation and 14% for parole) (Justice Center Council on State Governments, 2019). In California, probation violations actually account for a greater share of annual prison admissions than parole violations (20% v. 13%, respectively), suggesting that this arguably less restrictive form of

community supervision is a particularly critical (though less understood) mechanism for prison cycling (Justice Center Council on State Governments, 2019). Yet beyond the potential for forced mobility via incarceration, probation may also coerce mobility through restrictions on where and with whom a probationer can live. When probationers are unable to return to their primary residence or neighborhood as terms of their supervision, other housing barriers associated with having a criminal record history may be exacerbated (e.g., being blocked from the public housing market for certain convictions or from the private housing market for criminal history; see Gellar & Curtis, 2011; Fontaine & Biess, 2012; Purtle et al., 2020). As I will discuss later, geographic and association-based probation restrictions have become particularly prevalent among young people convicted of gun and gang-related crimes – and this has implications both for the residential mobility of probationers but also for gun violence.

PRESENT ANALYSIS

This chapter works to bridge the distinct, but complimentary literatures cited above in order to better understand how and why group specific mobility patterns – like Black displacement– may be related to gun violence patterns in Richmond over time. We know that residential instability often impacts Black and poor communities more severely than others, that there is a reciprocal relationship between residential instability and crime, and that informal social control is the theoretical mechanism linking these two neighborhood processes. We also know that Black people in this country are burdened by higher rates of violent victimization, incarceration, community supervision, and home foreclosure – and that these macro and micro forces increase the likelihood of residential mobility and neighborhood instability. What studies often fail to do is examine how the aforementioned social, economic, and legal factors might *intersect* to shape racialized patterns of displacement in a neighborhood and/or city, and

consequently, crime. Combining archival and key stakeholder interview data, along with descriptive analyses of Census data, this chapter complicates existing understandings of the race-crime-mobility nexus by examining how issues of housing, policing, punishment and victimization work in isolation and in tandem to affect both Black displacement and gun violence in Richmond.

DATA & METHODS

The present chapter relies primarily upon interviews and secondary sources to construct a grounded theoretical analysis of Black displacement and gun violence in Richmond over the last twenty years. Interviews with key stakeholders provide the starting point for my analysis, where I draw upon respondents' lived experiences and observations to identify potential explanations for gun violence changes in the city. Archival documents, such as reports and newspaper articles, provide an additional source of data that helps validate, contextualize or supplement participant hypotheses. Lastly, to better understand respondent claims around Black displacement, I conducted descriptive analyses of Black population change by specific sub-groups (e.g., Black men, young Black men) and time periods. This method of triangulation allows me to corroborate respondent hypotheses and to develop a more nuanced theory of Black displacement in Richmond that is informed not just by aggregate trends, but by the everyday experiences and observations of community experts. Importantly, my data allow me to explore how and why racialized displacement might help account for shifting gun violence dynamics in Richmond, and potentially other cities experiencing similar trends. Descriptions of each data source, and the analytic strategy employed for this chapter's analysis, are described in turn.

Data

The present analysis draws primarily on data from 47 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders that live and/or work in the city of Richmond, California. Key stakeholder groups include residents, city leaders (e.g., council members), community leaders (e.g., program directors/staff, clergy), and legal actors from city and county agencies (e.g., police, district attorneys, public defenders). Given that the overarching goal of the project was to understand how stakeholders make sense of and intervene upon gun violence in the city, I began participant recruitment by contacting leaders in different organizations or agencies explicitly working to affect gun violence. This included the city's police chief, city officials like the city manager and city council, and directors of several non-profits specializing in violence intervention. Upon successful completion of these interviews, I engaged in snowball sampling to identify additional city officials, legal actors, community leaders, and residents for participation.

The majority of respondents were male (62.5%), and racially Black (42.8%) or white (26.6%). Over two-thirds of participants were also current (51.8%) or former (16.1%)) residents, most of whom have witnessed first-hand the demographic shifts and changes in gun violence that they describe in their interviews. Those without residential attachments to the city had considerable knowledge of Richmond's gun violence dynamics as well given the nature of their work (e.g., law enforcement; community engagement). Indeed, the vast majority of non-resident participants (n=13/18) had either worked for or with the city (e.g., via programmatic partnership, or as a county service provider) for at least a decade at the time of our interview.

The in-depth and semi-structured nature of my interviews, therefore, allow me tell a collective story about gun violence change in Richmond that is emergent and grounded in the diverse expertise of my participants (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2012). Interview questions varied by stakeholder, but all protocols covered three central themes: 1) participant explanations of gun

violence patterns in Richmond; 2) participant knowledge of and involvement with past and present gun violence reduction strategies; and 3) participant perceptions of police-community relations and law enforcement efforts to address gun violence. The findings presented in this chapter emerged largely in response to questions pertaining to the first theme. Specifically, I asked respondents to identify what they believed were the most significant factors shaping gun violence in the city, and whether these driving forces have changed with time. I also asked them more pointedly to identify explanations for gun violence declines since 2010. The protocol did not ask participants about demographic change; rather Black displacement emerged inductively as key explanation to the aforementioned questions.

Interviews were conducted face-to-face in either a participant's office or at local cafes, and averaged about one hour and half in length. Most interviews were also conducted individually, though two were interviews conducted as focus groups, for a total of 47 separate interviews and 56 participants. All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Pseudonyms are used for most participants, even public officials, to protect the anonymity of my respondents. In some cases, general descriptors are used as well (e.g., community leader) if only one person was interviewed from a given organization, agency or program.

Secondary sources, including reports and newspaper articles, were used to contextualize the theme of Black out-migration, and particularly the explanations for displacement offered by participants. For example, participants at times referenced specific police operations to situate their discussion of heightened enforcement and the displacement of young Black men. When the dates and/or names of the operation were provided, I conducted a web-based search to obtain information that could corroborate their accounts or provide additional details. More generally, I conducted web-based searches on Black migration and displacement out of the city to assess

whether and how the topic was discussed in the media and/or among academic audiences. Time bounded (2000-2017), key word searches were conducted using Lexis Nexis and Access NewsBank databases for terms such as: Black population, displacement, migration, gentrification, and Richmond. Several research reports on displacement and gentrification from the UC Berkeley's Urban Displacement Project and Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society were also identified in my search, and are used to further characterize the nature of Black displacement in Richmond. In total, the present analysis includes: 16 (mostly local) newspaper articles and reports on demographic change and Black displacement in the city; 19 articles and reports on heightened law enforcement efforts; and 16 articles and reports exploring shifting gun violence patterns in Richmond since 2000.

My final data source includes Census data on Black population change between 2000-2017 at the city level. I combined demographic data on the city's Black population using the 2000 decennial census, and 5-year ACS estimates for 2010 and 2017. Using Excel, I calculated changes in citywide Black population by time period (e.g., 2000-2010), by gender, and by gender plus age group (e.g., changes in Black male youth composition ages 15-19 from 2000-2010). Findings from this descriptive analysis are used to verify and supplement respondent observations, as some pointed to general displacement of the city's Black population during our interviews whereas others cited more specific sub-population changes by gender and age group.

Analytic Strategy

Findings for this chapter emerged from a multi-stage, inductive, and iterative coding process. The first stage consisted of open coding in order to identify the most salient themes in my interview data. It was during this stage that the themes of Black population change and displacement emerged. Indeed, these two inter-related topics surfaced as one of the top three

explanations for changing gun violence patterns in the city – but particularly declines in gun violence since 2010. Specifically, displacement surfaced in 68% of interviews (n=32/47), and among nearly 59% of participants (n=33/56). This theme was discussed in all of my interviews with Black (n=8) and White residents (n=3), but not Latino residents (n=8). It was also a prominent theme among legal actors (n=14/17) and community leaders (n=9/15).

The second stage of coding focused on identifying theoretical explanations for demographic change and displacement as discussed by my respondents. Four subthemes were identified, including: 1) housing (e.g., rising costs, gentrification, lack of affordable housing, foreclosure crisis); 2) justice experiences (e.g., incarceration), 3) law enforcement practices and policies (e.g., targeted policing of gang and gun-related crime; restrictive probation conditions), and 4) safety concerns and victimization. The third stage of coding was focused on a closer read of the data within these four subthemes, particularly for how each theme was used to contextualize changes in gun violence patterns. It was through this latter process that I chose to merge themes two and three, as they were often discussed in related ways – e.g., targeted enforcement has led to increased incarceration and displacement, or resident difficulties in managing restrictive probation conditions has encouraged displacement. As such, findings in the following section are presented according to three theoretical explanations provided by respondents: housing; law enforcement, and victimization. In total, the housing subtheme emerged in 48% of interviews, law enforcement in 53% of interviews, and victimization in 25% of interviews.

FINDINGS

Themes surrounding racial/ethnic change surfaced early in my data collection. In addition to not anticipating the theme, I was taken aback at how consistently participants described this

ecological process in terms of residents being either "in prison, dead, or gone." This exact phrase surfaced in just nine interviews, yet many respondents described a similar sequencing or patterning of forces that effectively worked to change the racial/ethnic make-up of Richmond. Importantly, they characterized Black population change in Richmond as a process of displacement, emphasizing the strain and/or force underlying an individual or family's decision to ultimately leave the city. In the following sub-sections, I unpack how respondents made sense of racial/ethnic change in the city by examining: 1) how they connected issues of housing, victimization, and law enforcement to Black displacement, and 2) how they then related each pathway for displacement to changes in gun violence. As I highlight in each section, the key mechanism linking Black displacement to gun violence is a disruption of key social relations.

Housing Access, Affordability & Displacement

After steadily rising for most of the 2000s, homicides in Richmond peaked in 2009 at forty-seven murders per 100,000 residents. Two-thousand and nine also marked the peak of the housing and financial crisis across the country. Numerous studies have found that Black and Latino households were disproportionately impacted by the economic downturn, as they both experienced higher foreclosure rates than Whites (Jayasundera et al., 2010). Black and Latino Americans are also still reeling from the crisis in that they have been unable to regain the wealth that they lost at rates comparable to Whites (Pew Research Center, 2017). Richmond was no exception to these broader trends: a recent study found that Richmond had the 15th highest incidence of underwater mortgages in the state of California. Nationwide, they ranked 66th relative to the other top 100 cities hit hardest by the recession (Dreier et al., 2014).

Given this context, respondents understandably discussed the displacement of Black residents in relation to the housing crisis of the late 2000s. Yet it was not just the loss of

"grandma's house" (Derek, Community Leader) that pushed a growing number of Black families out of the city, it was also the lack of affordable housing (Bissell & Moore, 2018). Since the early 2000s, numerous public housing developments in the city have either been razed or vacated due severe dilapidation and safety concerns (Ioffee, 2015). Easter Hill, located in a historically Black neighborhood in south east Richmond, was one of the first to go as part of a city revitalization project (Weinstein, 2003). The mixed-income development put in its place was opened a couple years later in 2006, yet as Officer Paul noted during our interview, "not everyone moved back in." Part of this decision may have been driven by choice, yet there was also an obvious problem of availability – Easter Hill had 300 units, whereas Richmond Village (the new development) had 200 units, with about 115 apportioned for low-income residents (Nibbi Brothers General Contractors, n.d.). Las Deltas, located in the historically Black neighborhood of unincorporated North Richmond, is one of the more recent public housing demolition projects that respondents pointed to. Since the 2010s, the county housing authority has been working to "permanently re-locate" residents out of the aging and rundown apartments that make up Las Deltas; yet unlike Easter Hill, no new homes or apartments are slated for construction to make up for the loss of affordable units (Contra Costa Housing Authority, 2017). Residents are, instead, being provided housing vouchers to use in the private market, or they are being moved to public housing outside the city. While it is beyond the scope of this analysis to assess the precise impact of public housing demolition on Black displacement, descriptive analyses of Census data are rather telling: the block group that Easter Hill was located in has lost about 25% of its Black population since 2000; whereas North Richmond has lost about 56% of its Black population since 2010.

Compounding the problem of subsidized housing availability are rising housing costs in the San Francisco Bay Area. Located just north of San Francisco and Oakland, Richmond for many years remained one of the most affordable housing markets in the region, in part because of its reputation as a high crime and environmentally hazardous city (Moore et al., 2016). While the onset of gentrification has been much slower in Richmond than its sister cities to the south, several of the Black community leaders that I interviewed noted that they have been effectively locked out of homeownership because "nothing is being sold at listing price" (Malcom). Supporting their assessments, a recent report found that house flipping in Richmond spiked considerably after the foreclosure crisis and that flipping rates remain higher than they were pre-crisis (Bissell & Moore, 2018). Rental prices have also increased substantially since the Recession, and even more in historically Black neighborhoods like the Iron Triangle (16.8%), Parchester Village (20.5%), and South East Richmond (47%) (Verma et al., 2018). These neighborhoods have observed some of the largest declines in low-income Black households, too, suggesting that both low-income Black residents and communities have shouldered the brunt of the rising housing cost burden in the city.

According to respondents, neighboring cities in eastern, more suburban parts of the county, like Antioch and Pittsburg, have become the go-to destinations for Black residents leaving Richmond. As Officer Ricardo explained to me, both those with and without housing vouchers have left the city because they are essentially able "to get more bang for their buck" in the suburbs: "In Richmond you might get a 2-bedroom apartment but if you move to Antioch you'll have a house." Chandra, a veteran attorney working within the county, noted that the recession helped facilitate this cross-county migration pattern:

> When the real estate market went bananas here, there was a ton of building that went on. And since Antioch, Brentwood, Oakley, there's space out there, a number of subdivisions

> went in; and then, the market crashed. So, there was this surplus of available housing out there…and homeowners who had no one to move into their homes then [started to] participate in Section 8 housing.

Though no study to my knowledge has explicitly tracked the residential mobility of Richmond's Black residents, Verma et al's (2018) analysis of county migration patterns provides some validation of respondent assessments. Specifically, they found that between 2000-2015, Richmond observed considerable decreases in their share of low-income Black households all while Antioch and Pittsburg observed "simultaneous and concentrated increases" of the same population (p.4). Taken together then, both interview data and secondary sources indicate that Black displacement from Richmond has largely been a by-product of the housing crises pre- and post-recession. Respondent explanations linking Black displacement to shifting gun violence patterns in the city, however, are more complicated.

Some participants – including Chandra quoted above – argued that the general displacement of Black families within the city has affected gun violence because young Black men – the group most at-risk for victimization and involvement in gun violence – may also get displaced if their family is priced out of the housing market. For example, when asked to identify the different factors that have contributed to declining gun violence in the city, Roger – a seasoned county attorney – stated:

> **R**: I think people [are] aging out. I think better intelligence and focused prosecutions. And I think changing demographics. Most of the gun violence is driven by Blacks in Richmond. Over the years there has been some Latino violence, and some southeast Asian skirmishes, but they rarely ever skirmish with the Blacks...Blacks shoot at each other.
>
> **I**: So how is that decreasing gun violence?
>
> **R**: Well, Richmond's Black population is going down and there are a lot fewer younger Black guys around than there used to be.

As I pushed Roger to further explain his understanding of this process, he pointed to the housing boom and bust of the late 2000s, and how the Black community was most affected by these broader economic forces – consistent with both participant and recent academic analyses of housing dynamics in the city (Bissell & Moore, 2018; Verma et al., 2018). Jerry, a local pastor, also commented on housing pressures when explaining recent shifts in gun violence, stating that:

> The social economic has adjusted to the point where a lot of the people who once lived here is moving out. So them guys [that were engaged in violence] ain't hanging around no more…It just cost too much to live in the Bay area.

When taken at face value, these types of claims are reductionist in how they naturalize gun violence in Richmond as a Black problem: if you remove Black families, and Black young people in particular, a decline in gun violence will follow. Both Black and White respondents noted that this type of assessment was controversial (and even uncomfortable to acknowledge), yet they insisted that Black displacement from the city has played an important role in reshaping gun violence dynamics in the city. As such, completely dismissing the central hypothesis in their argument – that Black displacement is related to gun violence – because it is problematic would discount the empirical reality that gun violence in the city has indeed gone down (at least after 2010) as the city has continued to lose thousands of Black residents. The key question, then, is *why*.

Upon further inspection, analyses seem to suggest that Black displacement is related to gun violence because it has promoted a significant disruption to and reconfiguration of social relations in the city, both between residents and with law enforcement. For example, police officers described Easter Hill not just as a public housing development, but as a "territory" that residents "fought for" (Officer Paul). Turf wars between Easter Hill (a former Southern Richmond gang) and other gangs/groups in the city led to considerable violence in the area from

the 80s through much of the early 2000s. This dynamic reportedly changed, however, once the development was razed. According to a several officers, the Easter Hill demolition indirectly worked to affect gun violence by challenging inter-generational conflicts and claims to space, and consequently, the willingness among newer generations of youth to engage in similar types of disputes:

> Once upon a time they knew what the battle was for, but now 3 generations out, 4 generations out they don't know what they are fighting for…so when people moved in after [the city] rebuilt it… they[the younger generation] didn't have the same purpose for being there like the older folks did. (Officer Paul)

Unfortunately, I do not have gun violence data before 2003 to compare gun crime trends pre and post-demolition. However, data from 2003-2006 (period of demolition and construction) to 2007-2009 (post-construction and move-in of new residents) do suggest an average decline in the number of gun violence incidents within block group that Easter Hill is located in. However, gun violence in most surrounding block groups, and in the city more generally, increased. Though these findings are speculative, they are consistent with prior studies that have found temporary violence increases in surrounding neighborhoods following the demolition of a public housing project (e.g., Hagedorn & Roush, 2007; Popkin et al., 1999; Suresh & Vito, 2007). Additionally, they point to a new hypothesis: public housing demolition, in the long term, may reduce gun violence if the inter-generational, gang-related conflicts associated with that complex and neighborhood are not continued or re-ignited by incoming residents.

Another inter-generational social dynamic that has reportedly changed as a result of housing-related forces is police-community relations. Like many other urban minority communities, Richmond has a long history of resident mistrust of law enforcement and the consequent cultural belief that cooperation with the authorities may do more harm than good (Barragan et al; 2016; Brunson, 2007; Carr et al., 2007; Gau & Brunson, 2015). Though many

stakeholders acknowledged that relations have improved over the years, some participants cynically attributed this change to an influx of new residents via gentrification rather than to conscientious efforts made by police to repair their relationship with the Black community:

> We have been so damn gentrified that most of the people who didn't trust the police are not here anymore…you got all these newbies moving in buying up property, and they're calling the police because "it's scary to be out here, somebody's gonna get shot." (Renee, Community Leader)

Malcolm – a long-time resident and local community leader– offered a similar explanation, stating that police-community relations have seemingly improved because "what you got [now] is a population that has not had the type of strained and tense relations with police." Following research on legal cynicism (e.g., Kirk & Papachristos, 2011), Renee are Malcom are essentially arguing that gun violence may have decreased alongside Black displacement because newer residents– including lower-income, Latinos and more affluent Asians and whites – do not have the same historical conflicts with law enforcement as the Black community, and thus, are more willing to trust and cooperate with the authorities if and/or when a gun crime occurs. While further research would need to confirm if trust and/or cooperation with police increased in neighborhoods that observed higher rates of Black displacement, these observations preliminarily suggest that gun violence patterns may change if the social relations shaping legal cynicism are also reconfigured. In this case, that reconfiguration was brought about by a drastic change in racial/ethnic composition via a racialized process of housing displacement.

Lastly, while in the minority, it is also important to note that some respondents discussed housing-related displacement in relation to gun violence *increases.* For example, Renee argued during our interview that gun violence started to escalate in the early 2000s because street crime dynamics had shifted from being organized – where "OGs" (i.e., older gangsters) would call the

shots on who got killed if "a youngster did something in another community" – to disorganized where "you didn't even need permission" on who to go after anymore. As she explains in the following excerpt, OGs started to leave the city in the early to mid-2000s, and their absence created a type of power vacuum among the younger generations left behind:

> If you were from central you could go to North Richmond and shoot dice, but then after a while it became a risk because you would have guys going to North Richmond thinking it was still cool to navigate that space and get killed shooting dice. And so, it started to like become a different dynamic. You started to see the gun violence pick up, pick up, and spiral out of control. Once it was no longer okay to move around the city fluidly like I remember being able to do as a kid [in the 90s]…then that's when the gun violence got really bad. Then you had the migration of folks to Sacramento. So like people were getting all these section 8 vouchers now and they moved out to Sacramento. And a lot of older guys who were controlling the streets [in the 90s] were moving out to Sacramento with they baby mommas and now they leaving the youngsters in charge. With nobody there to control it, it got out of control…That's how I lost [a close loved one] in 2005.

I cannot go back in time and determine the degree to which OGs proactively diffused violence by regulating youth behavior, yet other studies have documented a comparable pattern of violence acceleration when structured criminal activity is disrupted by housing-related displacement (Hagedorn & Rauch, 2007; Popkin et al., 1999). Routine activities theory also suggests that the absence of capable guardians creates ripe opportunities for youth to engage in crime (Felson & Cohen, 1980), even if such guardians are themselves engaged in criminal activity (e.g., Patillo-McCoy, 1990). Social disorganization theory similarly suggests that residential turnover weakens social bonds and, thus, the capacity for informal social control (Sampson & Groves, 1989). Whether OGs and their "baby mamas" left the city as a result of housing pressures or other forces, descriptive analyses of Census data do partially confirm Renee's observations: over one-third of Black men and women ages of 30-44 left the city between 2000-2010. With the exception of young children under the age of 14, no other age demographic saw nearly the same

rate of decline in Black residents during this time period[7]. Statistical analyses from Chapter 2 also confirm Renee's assessment in that Black displacement was only statistically associated with gun violence trends pre-2010, as gun violence and Black displacement were on the rise.

Overall, the above findings point to a complex relationship between housing, Black population loss, and gun violence in Richmond. As numerous stakeholders and reports suggest, housing access and affordability issues have disparately impacted poor Black residents and neighborhoods. It is not surprising, then, that Black residents have been displaced at a much higher rate than any other racial or ethnic group in the city. According my analyses of Census data, the city lost about 27% of its Black residents between 2000-2010 (as the foreclosure crisis grew and peaked out), and another 28% between 2010-2017 (as housing costs have exponentially increased). Though the White population decreased by about 15% between 2000-2010, it has remained stable since then; the Latino population, on the other hand, has grown by nearly 60%. One of the consequences of this racially disparate process of displacement has been the disruption of key social relations, but particularly the inter-generational networks and conflicts that can either incite or prevent gun violence. These networks and conflicts are kinship-based, group-based (e.g., between predominantly Black cliques and gangs) and place-based (e.g., within housing complexes or neighborhoods with higher concentrations of Black residents). Stakeholders also point to a reconfiguring of police-community relations in light of demographic change: new, non-Black residents may not have the same adverse experiences with police, and hence, may be more willing to cooperate with law enforcement in their new community. Taken together, the relationship between housing and gun violence that respondents described is largely

[7] To calculate changes in sub-group populations by race and age, I used the 2000 Decennial Census and 2010 5-year ACS Estimates: 2010 sub-group count – 2000 sub-group count/2000 sub-group count.

indirect, as is the relationship between Black displacement and gun violence in that both seem to be mediated by changes to specific types of social relations.

Law Enforcement, Punishment, & Displacement

Law enforcement was cited as another key force shaping both Black displacement and gun violence dynamics in just over half of my interviews. This theme is inclusive of policing, prosecution, sentencing, and incarceration, and individual respondent experiences with law enforcement. Though stakeholders did not always cite each thematic component together or within the same interview, respondents did tend to agree that a) the policing and surveillance of groups and individuals believed to be involved in gun violence has increased, and b) punishments have become more severe and far-reaching, affecting not just the lives of the individual gun carrier, shooter or alleged gang member, but entire families and communities as well.

With respect to policing, respondents described a notable shift toward the targeted surveillance and punishment of gang and gun-related crime in the late-2000s under newly-hired police chief, Christopher Magnus. As Officer Steve noted during our interview, prior to Chief Magnus, the Richmond Police Department's (RPD) "historical response to gun violence was enforcement saturation." Following a shooting, for example, the Department would flood the immediate area with cops for "30-45 days," stopping residents for minor violations like an "air freshener in the rearview mirror…just to see who they are and what they're up to" (Officer Steve). In the Magnus era (2006-2016), however, the department shifted from a policy of "broad based sweeps" and "indiscriminate contact" (Elaine, Former Resident) to one of targeted enforcement geared towards the select few individuals and groups believed to be engaged in gun violence. This tactical transition was facilitated by the creation of special investigation detective

(SID) units that prioritized gang and gun violence. The RPD also increased coordination with other local agencies via regional taskforces during Magnus' tenure, which has allowed law enforcement to gather more precise intel and to assemble stronger cases for prosecution. Officers noted that in Richmond, taskforce efforts have focused primarily on Black gangs and on stings of the known and alleged gang members in these groups.

Changes in policing tactics have also been accompanied by an increase in punishment, but particularly the incarceration and sentencing of those believed or known to be involved in illicit gun activity. Residents, community leaders, city officials and law enforcement regularly acknowledged this "harsh reality" (Mya, City Official) in our interviews. On the one hand, community leaders like Jerry – a local pastor – agreed that it was important to lock up the "handful of bad actors" that were causing serious harm in the community. On the other hand, stakeholders also acknowledged that "a lot of people are getting a lot more time, too" (Nick, Community Leader). Gang-related policing and punishment schemes have been central to this expansion in punishment – and to the displacement of young Black men in particular given that they are the key demographic targeted by such policies.

Gang enhancements were cited as *the* legal strategy that has worked to put both peripheral and key players away for "a lot of years" (Rashad, Community Leader). Implemented in 1993 through the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act, gang enhancements can ratchet up a sentence from anywhere between one year to life depending on the base crime. Per policy, the enhancement can be applied if the prosecution can prove that the crime in question was committed "at the direction of, in association with, or for the benefit of a criminal street gang" (California Penal Code 186.22). While some residents and community leaders reluctantly acknowledged that gang enhancements can indeed help a "community feel safe for a long period

of time from a menace" (Terry), they also noted that the punishment scheme can lose legitimacy when applied too broadly. Community leaders like Eli, for example, strongly disagreed with how gang labels were assigned to youth in the first place:

> When I think about what our young people are expressing, they just grew up in the neighborhood. I might not have wanted to be a part of it, but because I live here, I go to school here, I'm getting picked on and jumped by other people…I pull a little closer to the guys in my neighborhood. And now, one person goes down and gets this gang label, and now if something happens to me, I'm labeled as that as well.

Craig – who has grown up in Richmond his entire life – says he has been mislabeled as a gang member by police for the exact reasons noted above: his associations and where he lives. He also described a recent experience where he and several friends were facing up to eight years in prison for a gun found in a car during a police stop. However, it was not necessarily the idea of punishment that Craig disagreed with; it was the threat of the gang enhancement, especially because he did not see himself as a gang member. Thus, for Craig, Eli, and others, the consequence of overly broad categorization and application is that young people may get swept up on increasingly punitive charges when they are not the serial shooters or prolific gang members that the law, in their opinion, should be used to target. For Lauren (Community Leader), this is why she believes that "in predominantly low-income neighborhoods we see the highest rate of incarceration with gang enhancements" where law enforcement is "not only focusing on a target group, [they] are focusing on poor people, people of color, and destroying a whole culture of people."

Interviews with law enforcement actors largely confirm resident and community leader beliefs that gang enhancements are a regularly used tool in their arsenal for combatting both gang and gun violence. However, unlike the residents and community leaders quoted above, police officers and district attorneys unequivocally viewed gang enhancements as critical to

crime prevention. For instance, in response to a question around the use of wire-taps within gun prosecutions, Officer Joaquin noted that the STEP Act became the "real hammer" that officers could use to bust young men for their affiliation, regardless of whether or not they pulled the trigger or physically had a gun on their person, as in Craig's case above.

> Normally when you take a guy to court… he is going to be sitting there with a suit on and a tie on looking like your brother…what the STEP Act allows you to do with the gang-enhancement is it allows you to bring in all of this other evidence that shows you the affiliation…So now, no matter how you are looking in this chair, I'm looking at your Facebook and I see you wearing bandanas, I see you throwing up signs, I see you at your homeboy's funeral, you guys are all wearing Cs' on your hat… That's what's helped us here because…[say] you have three guys driving in a car that is a part of a gang and you find one gun in the car. Whose gun is it? It's the gang's gun. And guess what, they all go to jail. Without the gang enhancement that would never happen.

It is not clear from my interviews how often Richmond police officers and local district attorneys have historically used the STEP Act to charge suspects. However, there are indications that prosecution became increasingly punitive since the late 2000s. In 2010, for example, the city council approved funds to hire a full-time prosecutor exclusively for Richmond – a position that still exists to this day – in order to more aggressively prosecute gun crimes, particularly misdemeanors, as a means of building future felony cases (Fischer, 2010). Cheryl, a long-time defense investigator, also shared that gang enhancements have been regularly used since the mid-2000s, though gang-related enforcement has become "much more rabid" in recent years because both the district attorney's office and the Richmond Police Department have "very, very established gang units." Indeed, according to my discussions with local DA's, the Community Violence Reduction Unit – the division tasked with prosecuting most gun-related crime in the county— included gang enhancements on nearly two-thirds the gun charges that they reviewed in 2017.

Yet regardless of the scope of STEP Act or general gun prosecution, officers bluntly acknowledged that gun and gang-related enforcement efforts have contributed to the displacement of residents, especially young Black males. As Officer Joaquin stated during our interview, "there has been law enforcement displacement just as there has been social displacement, economic displacement, and they are gone." He continued by describing exactly who "they" are:

> This is not a popular thing to say but…violent crime in this community, it's a Black male problem, not Black women, not Black old people. Young Black men are shooting each other. So, when that demographic moves out, and those numbers go down and violent crime also goes down, there is a correlation. [It's] not a pretty correlation, it is not something you want to shout from the mountaintops but there is a correlation.

Descriptive analyses of Census data confirm Officer Joaquin's general observation of young Black male displacement in the city: nearly 53% of Black male youth between 15-19 years of age left the city from 2010-2017; and about 30 % of young Black men between 20-24 years of age also left the city during the same time period[8]. This is not only a substantial rate of loss when compared to other age groups within the Black community, it is a much greater rate of loss among similarly aged youth of different races and ethnicities[9]. Importantly, the number of young Black males leaving the city increased by about a factor of two when compared to figures from the prior decade (2000-2010).

Strategic enforcement efforts targeting Black gangs, members, and associates since the late 2000s may have contributed to the displacement of this younger sub-population, as Officer Joaquin suggests above. Practices include both heightened surveillance by local police and

[8] To calculate these descriptive figures, I used the 2010 and 2017 5-year ACS Estimates: 2010-2017 sub-group change = (2017 sub-group count – 2010 sub-group count)/2010 sub-group count.

[9] Among Black males, youth between 15-19 years old saw the largest decrease in their respective sub-group population; followed by youth ages 10-14 (48%). White youth also saw a relatively large decrease in representation of adolescents 15-19 (69%), whereas Latino males in the same age group increased by about 16% and Asian males by about 27%. However, for men ages 20-24, White, Latino and Asian groups all saw *increases* of 38%, 62% and 17%, respectively.

regional taskforce operations that leverage county-wide resources. In fact, there were two high-profile stings of identified Black gangs just before I started conducting my fieldwork in October 2017 (Kelly & Gatrell, 2017; KTUV, 2017). During a televised press conference for one operation, viewers were shown a poster of about 65 men – all of whom appeared to be Black men – that were either arrested as part of the operation or were considered known associates of the gang (KTUV, 2017). I do not know if all six of the arrested men were ultimately incarcerated and removed from the city, yet according to some of my respondents, freedom from a cell does not necessarily preclude displacement. Malcom, who works closely with street-involved youth, noted that he has personally seen how stings exert pressure on *anyone* associated with the gang, stating that "even the ones that have not gone to jail end up leaving Richmond because of the 'harassment,' the bullying from law enforcement." Laron – a young resident who lives in a public housing development associated with one of the 2017 operations – also commented on this during our interview, suggesting that law enforcement (and the "gang unit" in particular) has essentially run out most tenants that they believe are affiliated with a gang: "Everybody's gone so you don't got no one to harass no more. All they chasing is the ghost of the Manor; ain't nobody here but kids."

Resident and community leader concerns with heightened policing and punishment practices (even if arguably more discriminate, according to police) is partly reflective of historical tensions between the city's Black community and law enforcement. Several police officers noted that the Department's prior hot spot/saturation approach had damaged the Department's legitimacy within the community:

> If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail…You're out there getting the guys off the corner, but you're also maybe getting the guy that's going to the local store to go buy the groceries…It just really hurt our community relations (Officer Lorenzo).

As numerous studies have found, if residents believe that local authorities are unfairly targeting, charging, and/or interacting with residents from a certain community or group, they are less likely to trust and cooperate with the police in the effort to solve a case (Brunson, 2009; Carr et al., 2007; Gau & Brunson, 2015). Studies have also found that legal cynicism explains why lethal violence can persist in some neighborhoods despite overall declines in a city (Kirk & Papachristos, 2011). Renee – a local community leader – commented on this dynamic during our interview:

> Gun violence in the city of Richmond, historically, is because of retaliation shootings. And that came out a lack of trust for law enforcement to actually hold people accountable, and people not trusting the police anyways just by the way they used to police. Every Tuesday they used to have the "bike boys" where they would just raid our community, come through deep, dirty paddy wagon, dirt bikes and everything running up in all the homes. And it was every Tuesday no matter what. That was the culture I grew up in.

Renee and others recognized that the department has made important strides at minimizing aggressive enforcement and improving police-community relations. However, most residents and community leaders that I interviewed remained critical of law enforcement because of both direct and indirect experiences with aggressive policing.

Respondent critiques of law enforcement were also informed by a perceived over-reliance on policing and incarceration to address gun violence in the city. As Lauren (Resident & Community Leader) suggests below, incarceration is rather blunt instrument when trying to save lives, especially when the collateral costs of such a strategy go unaddressed:

> [Incarceration] just gets people off the streets…it just moves people from one place to another. And it leaves a void…I think that a lot of those things have taken people out of the community and away from families for long periods of time causes a lot of damage to the families. This goes back to services being in place for not only the offender, but the offender's families. A lot of times, the other people, the residual of the gun violence is not looked at.

Both Renee and Lauren have dedicated years of their lives to improving resources for those impacted by gun violence and incarceration. However, much of the advocacy and coordinated services that they have and others have fought for did not start to take shape (and see success) until the late 2000s (See Chapter 4). This is not to say that informal social control was entirely lacking or ineffective prior to this time period; rather it may have been strained by the consistent displacement of Black residents– both through incarceration and the housing pressures described earlier – *and* the legacy of mistrust for law enforcement within the city's Black community. Absent healthy police-community relations and a robust social safety net that could catch and support the would-be shooter and families left behind, it is not entirely surprising that the city observed escalating gun violence throughout much of the 2000s as Black displacement increased.

Policing and incarceration, however, are not the only justice-related mechanisms that residents and community leaders cited in their discussions of resident displacement and changing gun violence dynamics; they also pointed to restrictive probation and parole conditions. For instance, Cheryl noted that a young person's alleged gang affiliation can still impact the type of probation conditions set by their presiding judge, even if the "enhancement doesn't stick":

> At sentencing, a judge will impose gang terms and almost always the gang terms are not to associate with members of the gang…And that's one of the biggest arguments with our kids and grown people who want to plead, which is to say, "Look, now when you go to your home to visit your mother, you're going to do the time. They're going to stop you. Then, you're in violation of your probation, right? So, you're going to do the time anyway."

Malcom– quoted earlier regarding his concerns over recent police stings– echoed Cheryl's observations regarding probation and plea bargains, noting that gang-related punishments are: "One of the ways that the system keeps them [young Black men] incarcerated because…if you're seen on the corner, if you're busted again, you're going in." Indeed, another community leader

that regularly works with young men labeled as gang members argued that gang-related probation conditions are so ubiquitous that they ultimately serve as de-facto gang injunctions, another heavily critiqued legal tool that is used to restrict the movement, behavior, and associations of alleged gang members (Queally, 2018).

To be fair, though, Malcolm and others did recognize the potential public safety benefits of geographic and association-based probation conditions. As Nick, a community leader that works with Richmond youth, noted during our interview, selective incapacitation can indeed reduce gun violence:

> I think a lot of it [gun violence declining] is just removing cats from the neighborhood. They have stay away orders where they are released under the condition that they stay out of Richmond. Now you may have a few that come in and out, but for the most part they put a lot of those people out of Richmond. And so, if you're not here…if you've been known for shooting five people a year and now you gone, all of a sudden, those numbers start to look really good.

Janet, a resident and former teacher, also agreed that a person could reasonably be barred from the city if "they have continuously broken the law and aren't showing any improvement." Yet she also believed that such restrictions should be regularly evaluated to account for rehabilitative efforts (e.g., if the probationer "has taken a life skills class" or is actively searching for employment). Chris – a formerly incarcerated resident – was much more skeptical about the efficacy of geographic and association-based parole conditions for reducing crime. Echoing Rose & Clear's (1998) coercive mobility thesis, he firmly believes that by such policies generate displacement and "cause more crime in the community due to the fact that they [those on probation or parole] may not have anywhere to live." Daniel – who actively works with young men involved with or victimized by gun violence – was also critical of gang-related probation conditions, calling them an "absurd" legal strategy that effectively keeps certain probationers "away from the younger community [they] actually even feel safe in." As other stakeholders also

noted, he argued these types of punishments fail youth because they are applied too broadly ("anytime you get a bunch of Black folks together, [police] call them a gang"), but also because they assume that such relationships are maintained only for criminal purposes. Thus, while law enforcement may view displacement as an inevitable cost for violating community supervision terms, concerns from residents and community leaders underscore how compliance might also jeopardize the safety and stability of probationers, parolees, and the community overall.

Although knowing how many people have been displaced as a result of heightened and focused enforcement in Richmond is elusive, my analyses suggest that the policing and punishment of gun violence seems to disparately impact the city's Black community, as Black boys and men are the most common targets of gun-related enforcement efforts. For many residents and community leaders, the displacement produced by law enforcement presents a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the physical removal of dangerous individuals can minimize future gun violence by disrupting anti-social networks and the potential for retaliation. On the other hand, displacement can also disrupt the *pro-social* networks of young Black men when they are incarcerated and/or when they are prevented from re-establishing bonds with friendship or other kinship networks because of restrictive probation/parole conditions (Venkatesh, 2002). These bonds are particularly important to the re-integration process, as justice-involved people often rely on these social networks to obtain housing, employment, and referrals to other forms of assistance (e.g., Fontaine & Biess, 2012; Fontaine et al., 2012; Nelson et al., 1999; Rose & Clear, 1998; Visher & Courtney, 2007). As several respondents pointed out, incarceration also weakens informal social supports within families and among neighbors. This social "void", as Lauren described it, has implications for violence by minimizing the capacity for justice-involved individuals to successfully re-integrate, but also by limiting the general

capacity of residents to engage in informal social control as they manage the many social, economic, and emotional challenges created by their loved one's incarceration (Clear et al., 2001). While few studies have empirically explicitly investigated this link, one Seattle-based study found that higher rates of parolees in a neighborhood are associated with lower levels of collective efficacy and high rates of crime, suggesting that community supervision (and the cycling of residents in and out of prison) can indeed damage the social fabric of neighborhoods that are disproportionately affected by justice-involvement, much like my respondents suggest (Drakulich et al., 2012).

Victimization, Safety & Displacement

Gun victimization is the third most common pathway for displacement that respondents identified in their discussions of population change and gun violence change in the city. Between 2003-2017, there were roughly 410 homicides in Richmond, 83% of which were the result of gun violence. There were also 1,750 assaults with a firearm during the same time frame. Like in most other urban areas, the threat of gun violence is not evenly distributed across the city. According to my interviews with law enforcement and community leaders, the vast majority of gun victims in the city are young Black men between the ages of 18-35. Gun violence is also geographically concentrated, with nearly 50% of gun crimes in Richmond is located in just 10 out of 70 block groups throughout the city. All but one of these block groups was predominantly Black in 2000; yet by 2016 only one maintained a Black majority. In fact, these block groups lost about 30% of their Black residents on average between 2000-2016, compared to an average of about 10% for all other neighborhoods, suggesting that both gun violence *and* Black displacement are spatially concentrated in a select few neighborhoods.

While gun victimization may be only one of a multitude of reasons that Black residents have fled the city, safety concerns were nonetheless cited as a key factor encouraging mobility. Several respondents noted during our interviews that relocation provides residents with an opportunity for a fresh start, allowing them to escape not only potential victimization, but also the sense that they must carry a gun to stay safe. As Daniel highlights in the excerpt below, relocation helped a prior mentee resume the crime-free path that he had set out for himself after getting temporarily derailed following a friend's death:

> [My mentee] was doing everything he was supposed to do…He was going to college then, and he wanted to move to stay out the way, but one of his close friends died. He [then] came to the funeral. He had made up his mind on how he was trying to live so he wasn't on some "rah-rah lets go get who did this," but he also knows, "I'm in Richmond at a funeral, somebody could slide through, I got to get to and from." So, he had a pistol on him. Then, when police seen him they was like, we know he has a pistol on him, caught him, had a gun, went to jail, got out, then he got back on track in school. And he's like, "I got to get out of here 'cause I can't even do school here cause this type of shit." So, we found a way to help him, to get him out of here, and to get to school.

This young man's experience provides a prime example of how the threat of gun victimization can place a young person at the edge of compliance into non-compliance with the law. It also demonstrates how such threats can force mobility if a person genuinely fears for their safety, and/or landing in the cross hairs of the justice system when trying to actively protect their life.

However, it is not only those currently or formerly involved in "the game" that feel pressured to move. Shereen lost one of her two sons to gun violence a few years prior to our interview. Though she expressed feeling safe and does not have plans to leave the city, she understands that young Black men in Richmond – including her living son– do not enjoy the same sense of security – either from police or the individuals they may have beefs with. "People get tired of looking over their shoulder", she said, "especially if they're not doing that anymore or don't do it all. They [the police and other residents] just label them, you know? That's like a

target on their back, [so] a lot of them move away." Laron – who is in his early 30s and has lived in Richmond most of his life – has lost upwards of 40 people to gun violence, including his brother. At the time of our interview, he was contemplating a move for the very reasons that Shereen mentioned above: "I've lost too many people close to me. And I definitely don't' wanna die like that…When I was [out of state], it just felt free. I [could] walk around everywhere without looking over my shoulder. I didn't even have to worry about the police because they don't know me." I asked Laron if his chronic exposure to gun violence had ever motivated him to get a gun; he said yes, but that he never followed through, stating that "at the end of the day, it's not really worth it." Yet gun or no gun, he still felt perpetually unsafe, rating his level of safety at a 4 (on a scale of one to ten), but his "mind at 1" because of the repeated, vicarious trauma that he had experienced.

Practically speaking, relocation out of concern for one's safety has the potential to diffuse violence by essentially removing a person who might otherwise be victimized or who might themselves victimize another person if carrying a gun. Several respondents, like Craig quoted below, noted that shootings have largely fizzled out in the past couple of years because these high-risk individuals and conflicts are "gone":

> What was going on [before] is not going on anymore. Or it's not as much. Usually, it would be there wasn't a day where you didn't hear gun shots. Or there wasn't a day where we didn't have to worry about the rollas pulling up and we going to jail. Now, everything is just, like, gone. It's just like normal days now. Police don't come through no more, people don't come through no more.

Whether the people that Craig is thinking of left the city for safety reasons or for fear of getting caught up in the cycle again is unclear. Nonetheless, there was a shared sentiment among younger residents and community leaders working with youth and young adults that violence

was down because "all the real ones are gone" (Laron)– gone because they have moved, gone because they have been locked up, or gone because they have been killed.

Death by gun violence, unlike displacement to another city for either safety, financial, or legal reasons, constitutes an absolute form of displacement. Gun mortality in urban areas is also a rather distinct form of mortality displacement because of how it can fuel the cycle of retaliation, and consequently, the persistence of lethal violence. As Elaine (Former Resident) explained during our interview, gun violence in Richmond has largely been the result of either "longstanding interpersonal beefs that have gone on for generations and generations," or of newer conflicts that have emerged from territorial, geographic-related disputes (e.g., You're from North, I'm from South, so we don't like each other). Yet for several respondents, it is not just "bad blood" (Officer Ray) that can incite gun violence in the wake of a person's death, it is also the trauma that might leave a person feeling that "the only way that they can alleviate their pain or to feel better is to hurt someone else" (Nick, Community Leader). Indeed, most community leaders working with gun violence perpetrators and/or victims argued that unaddressed trauma was one of the key reasons that gun violence remained a problem in the city, even if it has gone down:

> [Gun] violence is just result of years of little to no investment in trauma and mental health services…the city never had the infrastructure to foster communities recovering from that type of stuff. I mean the community as a whole suffers a trauma, right, from gun violence, but its people that perpetuate the violence that have been traumatized…I'm a victim today and tomorrow I'm the perpetrator because I'm not gonna be a victim anymore, and that's been the challenge (Renee, Community Leader).

As I in discuss in Chapter 4, several community organizations and groups have started to take on the issue of trauma and healing, as well as interpersonal retaliation, yet these resources did not exist in any formal way prior to 2008. For most of the 2000s, the city's primary approach for addressing gun violence was law enforcement. Thus, as gun violence steadily increased and

peaked out in 2009, victims and families were largely left to navigate the social and psychological hurdles that gun violence produces on their own – and relocation is one of the strategies that Black residents have employed to cope with these challenges.

Interestingly, though, death was also cited as an explanation for recent declines in gun violence. For better or for worse, Craig shared that he precisely does not carry a gun anymore because death has permanently displaced the people and conflicts that previously made him feel unsafe:

> Pretty much, the people I was messing with…they're dead. Our generation went and passed…[but] if stuff was still like it was back then, I would still be carrying. The police would not stop me because at the end of the day that's my life.

While loss of life is by no means a desirable outcome, Craig points to a bleak reality that numerous residents acknowledged –albeit reluctantly – when discussing gun violence changes in the city. More pointedly, Craig's assessment points out that absent both formal and informal supports that could help minimize the threat of victimization and the perceived need to carry a gun, the death of rival functions as one of the few mechanisms that can help ensure a person's sense of safety. At the end of the day, recurrent and concentrated death among a specific population– much like incarceration and housing-related displacement — can shape the trajectory of interpersonal gun crime in a community by altering the social conditions that work to both trigger and prevent gun violence.

DISCUSSION

The findings I present within this chapter provide preliminary hypotheses explaining how and why Black displacement may be related to gun violence changes in Richmond. I specifically identify three distinct, but inter-related pathways for residential displacement that have disproportionately impacted the city's Black community. Pre- and post-recession housing

pressures have pushed hundreds, if not thousands of residents out of the city since the mid-2000's. According to stakeholders and several external studies (e.g., Verma et al., 2018; Bissell & Moore, 2018), the city's low-income Black community has been particularly affected by these market forces. While law enforcement displacement does not operate on the same scale as housing-related displacement, my findings also suggest that policing and punishment practices aimed at deterring gang and gun violence have resulted in the targeted displacement of young Black men in the city. These young men have been displaced both through incarceration (as Black gangs and cliques are the central targets of heightened enforcement schemes) and though restrictive probation/parole conditions that limit the ability of certain justice-involved people to stay in the city. Gun victimization – both fatal and non-fatal, direct and indirect – is the third and final pathway for Black displacement that stakeholders identified during our interviews. Within this context, residents are pushed out of the city either because they are afraid of falling victim to gun violence, or because they are dead. The emotional and physical toll of gun violence, however, does not affect the city equally, and it is for this reason that gun victimization can be characterized as a form of racialized displacement.

One overarching mechanism that may account for the perceived *and* statistical relationship (see Chapter 2) between Black displacement and gun violence is a disruption of social relations. As several stakeholders pointed out, gang-related policing and punishment schemes have helped to disrupt the immediate cycle of retaliation by physically removing (or incapacitating) the individuals believed or known to present a serious danger to the city. Consistent with classic deterrence theory, law enforcement stakeholders also contend that the continuous disruption of local criminal networks and conflicts has worked to decrease gun crime by signaling to would-be perpetrators not only that they will be caught, but that they will be

punished to the fullest extent of the law. Housing and victimization-related displacement affects gun violence much in the same way, albeit less directly: if young people involved in or at high-risk for engaging in gun crime move and are no longer around, the threat of gun violence is minimized, as most gun-related conflict in Richmond is intra-racial, rooted in place-based rivalries and tensions (e.g., between Black neighborhood groups/gangs/cliques), and incited by young people.

On the other hand, my findings also suggest that the forces motivating Black displacement may have damaged the very social relations that are key to preventing gun violence. For example, the foreclosure crisis and subsequent housing affordability crisis has displaced countless Black families in Richmond – and consequently, the pro-social bonds and attachments that these residents have within their community. As the social disorganization tradition contends, the social ties that residents have to their neighbors and local institutions are foundational to the informal control of crime – and if these ties get continually disrupted, so too does a community's capacity to engage in collective action (Sampson & Groves, 1989; Morenoff & Sampson, 1997). In a similar vein, while gang-related probation conditions are designed to limit a probationer's likelihood of reoffending by dictating where or with whom a probationer can live or associate with, these practices remove such persons from the friendship and kinship networks that can help to both keep them safe and ensure their successful reintegration. Incarceration can also strain the relationships of those left behind, especially if they isolate themselves from family, neighbors, and community life more generally (Rose, Clear, & Ryder, 2001). These bonds are critical not only to managing the trauma of incarceration, but also for establishing social cohesion and trust, both of which are essential to community crime control. Thus, consistent with social disorganization explanations (e.g., Sampson et al., 1997) and Rose

and Clear's (1998) coercive mobility thesis, it is quite possible that gun violence at the turn of the century increased as Black neighborhoods and families experienced heightened instability and fractured social networks. Though my data only allow me to infer such a theoretical relationship, separate analyses of the city's informal crime control landscape do indeed confirm that collective efforts to control gun violence were stagnant during much of the 2000s, as Black displacement from the city began to rise (See Chapter 4).

IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH

Further research is needed to more precisely examine whether and how the economic, social, and legal forces identified in this chapter intersect to shape racial/ethnic turnover in Richmond, and in other communities that have previously or are currently experiencing disparate levels of racialized displacement. The gathering of various data sources to conduct an integrated analysis of these processes may be challenging, but it is certainly possible. For example, to examine how criminal justice and housing-related forces affect racialized displacement and violence in a neighborhood and city, scholars could leverage Census data as well as data on prison admissions, jail admissions, parolee and probationer levels, housing foreclosures, and local crime rates. Hospital data can also be included in such analyses to more comprehensively measure the level of fatal and non-fatal gun victimization observed in neighborhoods, as crime data provides only limited snapshot of the type of gun victimization that a community experiences (e.g., Matthay et al., 2019; Rowe et al., 2019).

In addition to culling data from national and/or state data sets, there is also a need for new longitudinal studies that can examine the social processes that seem to mediate the relationship between crime and racialized displacement. One existing model is the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods, along with similar studies in other cities (e.g., Seattle,

Los Angeles), that include repeated measures of collective efficacy and social ties among residents. However, in light of the findings from the present study, I also encourage researchers to measure residents' direct and indirect experiences with the justice system and victimization, and the relationship between such experiences for collective efficacy and decisions to leave/stay in one's neighborhood or city. Both justice involvement and victimization are incredibly common realities within urban, minority – and particularly Black – neighborhoods, yet few longitudinal studies[10] capture both types of experiences, along with dynamic social processes known to mediate the crime-residential instability link like collective efficacy.

Longitudinal studies that follow households or individuals can also assess a larger question that this study was not able to address, and that is time to mobility. Past research has found that Black residents are less likely to move than Whites when exposed to violent victimization (Xie & McDowall, 2010, 2014). These studies have used 6-month time frames to assess the relationship between victimization and mobility, yet because of the various historical, social and economic forces that inhibit moves (e.g., segregation, social attachments, costs), it could be that that this relationship is delayed for Black residents. Uprooting your entire family is not an easy decision, especially if you have set up deep roots in your community. It also takes time to save money and/or find placement in another public housing unit if that is a family's primary source for housing. As such, to further unpack the seemingly non-existent relationship between violent victimization and mobility found in other studies (Xie & McDowall, 2010, 2014), scholars must pay greater attention to time and the barriers and opportunities that allow for residential moves among Black residents that have directly and indirectly experienced violent crime victimization.

[10] The Fragile Families and Well-Being Study is a notable exception and could be adapted to focus on families within a particular city (as opposed to across the nation).

In-depth case studies can assist in this endeavor by allowing researchers to better assess the daily impacts of victimization and justice-involvement for residents living in high-crime communities. Interview-based studies, for example, can explore whether and how community supervision, and particularly probation, works to displace individuals and families from their neighborhood and/or city; and if the restrictions placed upon these people (e.g., where and with whom one can associate with) actually achieve their intended purpose of deterring illegal gun possession and disrupting the social conflicts that give rise to violence, as some stakeholders in this study suggested. Understanding the wide-ranging impacts of probation is especially important in today's reform context as more jurisdictions embrace expanded community supervision as a decarceration reform strategy (Phelps, 2013; Justice Lab, 2018).

Qualitative studies can also critically explore how direct and indirect gun victimization affects the mental health of residents, and the navigational strategies that they use to ensure their safety – whether that is moving to a new city, like my respondents suggest, taking a different route to school, or even possessing a gun (Barragan et al, 2016; Rosen, 2017; Shedd, 2005). Importantly, this type of study can help researchers identify interventions that reflect the needs and concerns of gun victims and justice-involved individuals so that fear for one's safety and/or the threat of legal sanction does not result in displacement. As several respondents repeatedly pointed out during our interviews, without understanding and addressing "the residual" of either victimization or justice involvement, high crime communities will remain vulnerable to both to the threat of violence and displacement.

CONCLUSION

Overall, the present study provides a deep dive into the dynamics of gun violence within Richmond, California – a city that has observed racially disparate levels of violence alongside

rapid sociodemographic change. Though many scholars have explored why racial composition tends to positively correlate with local crime rates, few have examined whether or how changes in racial/ethnic composition also relate to crime. Had stakeholders in this study not repeatedly turned my attention to the issue of demographic change, and Black displacement in particular, I may have also done the same. Yet as their discussion of gun violence dynamics make clear, racial/ethnic change is not just a variable to be controlled for; it is a phenomenon that warrants explicit and careful attention, even if difficult.

Integrating in-depth interviews, with document and descriptive statistical analyses of Black demographic change, this paper identifies a distinct set of pathways and mechanisms that link Black displacement to gun violence in Richmond. According to stakeholders that live in and/or work in the city, Black residents and neighborhoods in Richmond have been increasingly burdened by pre- and post-recession housing crises, as well as intensified surveillance, punishment, gun injury, and mortality. Stakeholders also pointedly highlight that these forces, for better or for worse, have shaped gun violence patterns in the city by altering the social context in which gun violence operates. This is not to say, however, that the displacement of Black residents should be a welcomed strategy for addressing crime. Rather, findings from this study should provide local leaders with a moment of pause, especially given that Black displacement in Richmond is ongoing. What this study ultimately highlights is how socioeconomic disinvestment and disparities in surveillance and punishment within minority communities intersect to shape not only patterns of gun violence, but also racialized processes of physical and social exclusion. These forces, however, are rarely examined in an integrated, or in-depth fashion as done here. As such, this paper provides scholars and policymakers with a framework to think more critically about the structural, institutional, and interpersonal forces that might shape racialized

displacement processes within their own community; and, ideally, space to identify solutions that can insulate vulnerable communities from the threat of displacement.

CHAPTER 4

DEFINING, DEVELOPING, AND SUSTAINING RICHMOND'S ANTI-GUN VIOLENCE NETWORK

On June 21, 2005 nearly 600 residents and community leaders packed city hall chambers to demand that elected officials address the rising tide of gun violence in Richmond. While only midway through the year, the city had already recorded a total of 17 homicides, eight within the month of June alone (Bender & Hill, 2005). Two-thousand and five also marked the fourth straight year that Richmond had observed an increase in their homicide rate, returning the city to figures it had not seen since the mid-1990s.

As a response, then councilmembers Maria Viramontes and John Marquez put forth a state of emergency proposal. "To declare a local state of emergency is to embrace the feelings of so many families," Viramontes said, "what we need right now is immediate help to solve our problem" (Bender & Hill, 2005). However, most council members, including current mayor Tom Butt, disagreed: "What we have here is not an emergency; it's a chronic problem." Former mayor Irma Anderson also argued that the declaration – most often reserved for riots and natural disasters – would spread undue panic as well as tarnish the city's already troubled reputation. She pointed to history as well, stating that such actions have historically been used to suppress rather than help minority communities. According to news reports, nearly 80 residents and community leaders – many of whom had lost loved ones to gun violence – provided several hours of testimony in hopes of moving the council to action. Many residents in attendance seemed to support the proposal, too, signaling both their frustration and desperation, shouting "How many does it take?" and "When is enough, enough?" (Bender, 2005).

After a long and tense meeting, and continued deliberation the following morning, the council voted 7-2 to abandon the state of emergency plan. The council voted, instead, 8-1, to allocate $1.9 million to policing and $1.4 million to community centers and youth programs. Funding for these two crime prevention efforts would come from Measure Q, a half-cent tax approved by voters in 2004 to make up for the short-fall in city services following widespread budget cuts the prior year (Bender, 2005).

Though the protests at city hall in June 2005 were informal and occurred several years before the city would record any downward trends in gun violence, analyses for the present study suggest that this informal community action marked a shift in how residents, community leaders, and city officials discussed and mobilized around the issue. Indeed, community mobilization is one of the leading factors that respondents – including residents, community leaders, police, and city officials – offered to explain why gun violence began to decline in the late 2000s. Grassroots protests, like the above demonstration in 2005, put pressure on city leaders to research and develop alternative strategies to gun violence prevention, resulting in the creation of the city's Office of Neighborhood Safety two years later. Community-led actions have also inspired the development of several non-profit organizations that work to heal and empower those that have experienced or are at-risk of gun violence, as well as a host of other initiatives aimed at building community capacity to better understand and address the problem. Only a few of these efforts have been formally evaluated, yet there was still a consistent narrative across stakeholders that community crime fighting has made a difference in the city.

This chapter tries to assess what that difference or impact is by way of examining the nature and development of the community-based strategies that comprise what I am calling Richmond's anti-gun violence reduction network. Integrating three types of qualitative data

sources – including interviews, observations, and documents - this chapter describes what this network look likes, identifying the types of organizations, strategies, and actions that comprise the network; the key actors and relationships that have been central to getting different initiatives off the ground; and the social and political factors that seem to have enabled and constrained the long-term success of specific initiatives.

Overall, my findings suggest that Richmond's network is composed of a variety of informal and formal strategies that aim to directly and indirectly affect gun violence. Though some of the strategies that I include in the network are no longer operational, I demonstrate how both past and present efforts are bound together by history, purpose, and relationship. Temporary grassroots community actions, for example, laid the relational foundation necessary for building the broader and more comprehensive strategies that animate the network today. Parochial organizations (i.e., non-profits), and ties across such organizations, were also central to this process by providing the human, social and political capital that could facilitate local capacity building and the daily work of gun violence intervention. My findings also suggest that ties with public actors and agencies have enabled the growth and sustainability of the network's longest-running strategies. Funding politics and mistrust of law enforcement, on the other hand, have presented key roadblocks for some of network's leading initiatives. Taken together, findings in this chapter demonstrate how Richmond residents, community leaders, and public actors have engaged in systemic social organization (Hunter, 1985), working to develop not just a robust community-based network to support gun violence reduction, but also a strong sense of collective efficacy (Sampson et al., 1997) over time.

In the next section I provide an overview of the research on informal social control – which has largely framed criminological understandings of community crime control– and how I

position this analysis within that broader literature. Whereas most studies rely either on administrative data or program evaluations to examine the nature of informal social control in a neighborhood or city, this study engages what I call a ***historical and relational mapping of community crime-fighting*** that incorporates a range of community actors, types of interventions, and importantly, an analysis of the local conditions that shape and support a community's informal crime control landscape. After attending to the literature, I then move on to my findings and conclude by considering both the theoretical and practical implications of Richmond's efforts for informal social control, collective efficacy, and community-based models for violence prevention.

SOCIAL TIES, ORGANIZATIONS, AND INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL

Criminologists have long been interested in how communities work to self-regulate or informally control crime. Generally speaking, informal social control consists of the individual and collective actions taken by residents to disrupt crime and disorder in their respective block, neighborhood, or city (Janowitz, 1975; Kornhauser, 1978). According to the systemic model of neighborhood crime, a community's capacity to engage in self-regulation is shaped by the nature and density of social ties across the private, parochial, and public spheres of a given neighborhood or locale (Bursik & Gramsik, 1993; Hunter, 1985). The private level consists of intimate relational groups, such as family, friends, and acquaintances, whereas the parochial level captures the relationships developed or rooted in larger community networks, such as schools, churches, and voluntary organizations. The public level is comprised of relationships with public actors and entities outside of the neighborhood, such as city government and the police. Translated into practice, a community with strong private ties would have residents that are willing to personally supervise neighborhood youth and to intervene in local squabbles or

signs of disorder. Similarly, a community with strong parochial ties would observe high participation in local organizations that can serve as a source of mutual aid and support to address issues like crime. Strong public ties to local elected officials and police, on the other hand, could be leveraged to obtain political support and the resources to develop more formalized interventions. Hunter (1985), one of the early theorists of the systemic model, has argued that all three levels of control must operate together to maintain effective self-regulation.

Yet like any social phenomena, informal social control does not exist in vacuum. Impoverished communities, for example, may lack the municipal resources and political capital to develop and fund community-based efforts, and residents in such communities may have little time to invest in their neighborhood watch group or any other variation of informal crime control as they juggle competing personal demands (Carr, 2005; Jones, 2018; Putnam, 2000; Vargas, 2016). Moreover, given that the formation of strong private ties takes time, systemic theory also hypothesizes that residential mobility can destabilize such ties or prevent the formation of new ones– both to neighbors and local organizations – because of a lack of familiarity (Sampson et al., 1997). Similarly, racial/ethnic heterogeneity can inhibit collective efforts if such differences are used to signal distrust or fear of one's neighbors (Sampson & Groves, 1989). Theoretically, then, communities plagued by concentrated disadvantage, residential instability, and high racial/ethnic diversity are more likely to be socially and economically isolated, and hence, would not be engaged in – or at least have a much harder time engaging in – both individual and collective efforts to control crime (Sampson & Groves, 1989; Sampson et al., 1999).

Empirical tests of systemic theory over the past twenty years have consistently found that the structural conditions of a neighborhood – namely those identified above – are indeed related to factors theorized to shape informal social control. Such factors include a social ties to

one's neighbors; membership or participation in local organizations; neighborly trust; common values or shared expectations; and a willingness to intervene in local problems like delinquency, crime, and disorder (Bursick, 1999; Kirk & Papachristos, 2011; Morenoff et al., 2001; Sampson et al., 1997; Sampson et al., 1999; Wickes et al., 2017). According to Morenoff and colleagues (2001), the first two factors capture a resident's social network in a neighborhood and, thus, their *individual* resource potential to ensure public order. The latter three factors, on the other hand, reflect *neighborhood-level* factors that create the basis for collective efficacy.

Like individual efficacy, collective efficacy is task-specific, such that the trust, shared expectations, and a willingness to intervene should be understood and measured with respect to a defined problem (Sampson et al., 1999). Since the construct was first developed and tested in the late 1990s, studies have consistently found that collective efficacy is a more robust predictor of local crime trends than one's social ties in the community (Morenoff et al., 1997; Sampson et al; 1997; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998; Sampson & Raudenbush, 2001). As Morenoff and colleagues (2001) argue, "while social networks might foster the social conditions that make collective efficacy flourish, they are not sufficient for the exercise of informal social control" (p. 521). What is also needed is a sense of mutual trust and cohesion in a community, as this then shapes a person's disposition to become engaged in a local crime control effort, like gun violence prevention.

Beyond research on private ties and collective efficacy, there is also a growing body of work that examines the role of local organizations (as opposed to individuals) in shaping a community's capacity to control crime. As noted previously, organizations are presumed to impact local crime control efforts – and by extension, crime – by providing a medium through which social capital can be created and leveraged to develop strategic crime control efforts,

particularly with public agencies and actors (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993). Organizations also provide a space to bring together otherwise dissimilar people (e.g., by race, class, gender, religion) to develop community leadership, and to communicate and negotiate shared expectations around public safety (Carr, 2005; Putnam, 2000; Saegert et al., 2002; St. Jean, 2007; Triplett et al., 2003; Vargas, 2016). Importantly, they provide a means through which residents and other local guardians can work to directly intervene on crime, whether through structured after-school activities with local youth, a neighborhood watch program, or violence intervention work with local gang members (Carr, 2005; St. Jean, 2007; Vargas, 2016).

Research that has empirically examined the organizations-crime link can generally be divided into two camps: studies that examine residents' actual and hypothetical participation in community organizations, and studies that examine organizational presence and type. Though the first group of studies has found general support for the idea that greater parochial participation is associated lower rates of both property and violent crime (see Sampson and Groves, 1989; Rosenfeld et al., 2001), as some scholars have argued, such findings tell us little about how a community's broader organizational infrastructure (or lack thereof) may be related to crime (Slocum et al., 2013). Criminology scholars have generally operationalized the concept of organizational infrastructure in terms of the presence, total number, and/or type of local non-profit and civic organizations that can influence collective efficacy – including churches, libraries, schools, recreational centers (e.g., Sampson, 2005, 2012; Slocum et al., 2013; Wo, 2016, 2019; Wo et al., 2016). Findings from empirical studies assessing a neighborhood or city's organizational infrastructure, however, have been mixed. For example, Beyerlein and Hipp (2005) found that a greater percentage of mainline Protestant and Catholic congregations were associated with lower rates of various types of crime, whereas a greater percentage in evangelical

Protestant congregations increased crime. Some studies have also found that the number of social and civic organizations in a neighborhood are negatively correlated with violent crime (Lee & Ousey, 2005; Lee, 2008) and property crime (Wo et al., 2016), yet others find that the presence of such organizations is not associated with local crime trends at all (Moreonff et al., 2001; Wo, 2019).

One explanation for these mixed findings is that certain organizations may have greater crime reducing effects than others, yet when clumped together with all community organizations in a locale or in broad categories (e.g., social service agencies, religious groups), such effects may be muted (Slocum et al., 2013). Studies that focus on the non-profit sector (as opposed to business establishments[11] or religious congregations), and that define organizational type more narrowly, have provided greater support for the theorized crime-reducing benefits of community organizations. For example, Peterson and colleagues (2000) found that recreation centers were associated with decreases in violent crime in Columbus, Ohio, but only in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods. Similarly, in their study of the South Bronx, Slocum et al (2013) found that organizations that focus on childhood well-being, like Head Start centers, were associated with neighborhood decreases in property crime. Political groups and advocacy organizations, on the other hand, were associated with decreases in violent crime. Sharkey et al (2017) provides perhaps the most compelling evidence for the impact of non-profit organizations and crime given the large sample size (264 cities) and longitudinal scope of their study (1990-2013). The specific organizations that they include focus on crime prevention, substance abuse treatment, social and recreational activities for youth, neighborhood development, and job

[11] For example, studies have found that alcohol outlets (e.g., bars and liquor stores) and banking institutions are associated with increases in property and/or violent crime (Scolum et al., 2013; Wo et al., 2016), whereas "third places" like coffee shops and cafes are associated with decreases in crime (Papachristos et al., 2011; Wo et al., 2016).

training/workforce development for disadvantaged groups. Specifically, they find that neighborhoods with at least ten of these organizations observed a "9 percent reduction in their murder rate, a 6 percent reduction in their violent crime rate, and a 4 percent reduction in their property crime rate" (p. 1214).

Taken together, the above findings suggest that 1) private ties and membership in local organizations do indeed condition the informal social control-crime nexus, yet such ties on their own are not enough to produce informal social control; 2) general neighborly trust and willingness to intervene on local issues of disorder and crime – i.e., collective efficacy – also conditions a community's ability to exercise informal social control; and 3) local organizations do in fact have crime-reducing benefits, yet this effect varies by the type (not number) of organizations present in in a neighborhood, county, or city. Reflecting on these findings alone, there is ample evidence to support systemic theory claims that private and parochial levels of control matter for shaping a community's capacity to control crime.

However, knowing *whether* such a relationship exists tells us little about *how* local organizations and/or social ties/networks work to affect the daily lives of residents and crime on the ground. Indeed, with respect to the role of community organizations, Slocum et al (2013) suggest that scholars need more information on "the number and strength of ties" organizations have to one another and to "external actors inside and outside the community"; how organizations "interact with each other to enhance or mitigate their crime control capacity"; and the people who participate in these organizations (p. 207-208). Most of the aforementioned studies also tend to focus on private and/or parochial levels of informal social control, often neglecting how public ties and actors also factor into informal social control efforts. Put simply, to fully understand if and how systemic social organization operates in practice, researchers must

examine how the different layers of public, parochial, and private control work together to affect informal social control and crime in a neighborhood and/or city. The present study addresses this call using ethnographic methods.

CASE STUDIES OF COMMUNITY CRIME CONTROL EFFORTS

Given the in-depth nature of ethnography, qualitative case studies of crime control efforts have greatly expanded our understanding of how informal social control functions in varying local contexts. For example, in his case study of the Beltway – a largely white, but increasingly diverse neighborhood in Chicago - Patrick Carr (2005) found that private acts of informal social control, like admonishing neighborhood kids for loitering, were sporadic and irregular, even among long-time residents that theoretically would be the most likely to intervene. Nonetheless, his analyses suggest that this "failure" to intervene at the private level did not preclude the development and success of other community-led interventions aimed at addressing disorder and crime in the neighborhood. For instance, through their advocacy in a local problem-solving group supported and funded by the city, Beltway residents were able to develop a neighborhood watch group to address emerging crime and disorder issues, like graffiti; and create a court advocacy group to support crime victims. Carr (2005) argues that as demands for the average family changed (e.g., rise in dual-earner families, less adult supervision of youth), and as the demographic make-up of the Beltway changed, the problem-solving group provided time-strapped, new and old, familiar and unfamiliar residents with the opportunity to engage in community activism. The key to such activism was not intimate or parochial ties, he argues, but public actors and entities that were able to sponsor and facilitate community-led efforts. Put differently, the informal social control efforts that Beltway residents engaged in owed their

existence and efficacy to their links with public agencies outside the neighborhood. Carr (2005) calls this type of secure, bounded, and more formalized community activism new parochialism.

Vargas's (2016) case study of violence in Little Village– a predominantly Mexican enclave in the city of Chicago – showcases similar instances of new parochialism, yet his study also demonstrates how competitive relationships between different community actors can work to both prevent and cause violence. Specifically, he found that residents on the Eastside of Little Village had much more strained relationships with local gang members (private ties), local community organization leaders (parochial ties), and police (public ties) than their fellow residents on the Westside, which ultimately translated to increased isolation, stunted community action, and violence in Eastside blocks. The Westside also had a more robust non-profit network than the Eastside, which provided a source for both social and political capital as residents devised campaigns and strategies to address violent crime. He attributes much of this organizational inequality to gerrymandering practices that effectively divided the Eastside from the Westside not only in terms of political representation, but also municipal resources. Lastly, Vargas found that competition between local non-profits and public agencies, including neighborhood public schools, at times stymied efforts, and that this conflict was often rooted in personal chasms between organization leaders and/or differences in ideology about who is "most qualified" to do the actual work of violence prevention (i.e., gang members or non-gang members). Jones' (2018) case study of the Fillmore neighborhood in San Francisco documents very similar dynamics of competition and disagreement over whose role it is "save the neighborhood," with tensions arising largely in response to legitimacy and, consequently, power differentials between well-oiled non-profits in the community and more informal actors that are also engaged in crime prevention.

Leverentz and Williams' (2016) ethnographic analysis of informal crime control efforts across three communities further demonstrates how local context can shape the types of public and parochial partnerships formed by residents. Factory Town, a historically white but increasingly diverse working-class community outside of Boston, engaged in what they call "public alliances" where residents collectively engaged in crime discussions on a limited basis, relying instead on traditional forms of policing to address crime. By contrast, community responses in the two majority-minority cities that they examined focused on "mobilizing parochial ties while negotiating tenuous and contested public ties," mainly with local law enforcement (p.12). Residents in both of these cities called for greater community involvement to address crime and violence precisely because they did not trust the police or local politicians to act on their behalf. Explicit community-public partnerships, including an anti-gun violence program that brought Black clergy and police together to address the problem, were also viewed with skepticism because of the perception that they were still, nonetheless, "police-led". Unlike Carr's (2005) new parochialism model that is rather race agnostic, Leverentz and Williams (2016) conclude that "a community's racial composition shapes its responses to crime because of how it impacts relationships with formal systems of social control" – where trust is stable, public actors and agencies are seen as a reliable partner and source for crime control, yet where trust is tenuous, community-led action is seen as the most appropriate response to ameliorating the problem (p.22) – a dynamic that I also found and discuss later.

Program studies, by contrast, shed light on how private, parochial, and public levels of control work to reduce crime in the everyday – albeit within the context of a single intervention. For example, the Boston Ceasefire model is explicitly designed to bridge all three levels of control by including residents, police, and community organizations in the focal neighborhood or

city. The cornerstone activity of Ceasefire programming is the call-in, where stakeholders communicate a unified message that the shooting must stop (Braga et al., 2018). Resident participation is also believed to provide a sense of legitimacy to the intervention, as many of those involved are often are survivors of gun violence or have been previously engaged in gun violence themselves. Community leaders, which typically include clergy and staff from local service agencies, provide an additional layer of support in the form of case management or resource referral. Police, on the other hand, identify the target population and provide the proverbial "stick" (i.e., surveillance and punishment) to the resource "carrot" within the intervention. Continuous meeting and collaboration between these different stakeholder groups is another hallmark of the initiative. This type of relationship building is often fraught with tension and mistrust, yet some studies have found that residents and community leaders do come to develop positive relationships with one another, and with law enforcement – even if such collaborations are short-lived (Braga et al., 2008; Brunson et al., 2015; McLively & Nieto, 2019). Importantly, program evaluations find that implementation is often associated with reductions in gun violence in both the focal neighborhoods and/or among groups or gangs targeted for intervention (Braga et al., 2013; Braga et al., 2014; Braga et al., 2018; Fontaine et al., 2017; Papachristos & Kirk, 2015; Papachristos et al., 2007; Sierra-Arevalo et al., 2015).

Other strategies, like Cure Violence, leverage private, parochial and public controls to address gun crime as well, yet they do not actively engage law enforcement as program collaborators (Jones, 2018). Using a public health framework, violence is approached as an epidemic, where the primary goals are to reduce risk by interrupting transmission (i.e., retaliation) and changing community norms (Cure Violence, 2018). The main parochial partners in the Cure Violence model are local community organizations that provide a home base for the

program, as well as staff salaries, training, and support for the program (Webster et al., 2012; Delgado et al., 2017). Public entities, like a city mayor's office, provide political support (and at times funding) to develop the initiative. Police are contracted only a limited basis, if at all (e.g., to conduct background checks on employees) (See Webster et al., 2012). The backbone of the Cure Violence model are the residents, as they are the stakeholders responsible for conducting the street outreach and community mobilizations efforts that form the heart of the program. This may translate to walking around the neighborhood to catch up on any rumors of potential retaliation; diffusing retaliation; and identifying and enrolling "clients" within the program (Delgado et al., 2017; Webster et al;2012; Skogan et al., 2009). Like Ceasefire, evaluations of Cure Violence models across the country suggest that the intervention is typically effective at reducing shootings and gun injuries in its target communities (Delgado et al., 2017; Henry, et al., 2014; Jensen et al., 2016; Skogan et al., 2009; Webster et al; 2012)

The ethnographic case studies and program evaluations described above showcase how neighborhoods and cities across the country are engaged in a variety of informal social control efforts that resemble systemic social organization. Program evaluations provide detailed insights on how local organizations, public agencies, and residents actively collaborate to bring a program to life and how staff engage in the daily work of violence reduction. However, given their discrete programmatic focus, program evaluations tend to be fairly ahistorical and do not provide much insight into what crime control efforts existed before or alongside the program under study. One reason to extend our view beyond a single program is that violence intervention programs often come and go (See Bieler et al., 2016), and programmatic studies tend to constrain scholarly attention only to larger scale strategies. Informal crime fighting efforts, however, happen on multiple levels; and outside the context of formal programs. Taking stock of prior

initiatives (what they were, who was involved, why they failed/succeeded) can also help scholars better understand the nature, development, and impact of current programmatic efforts; and the depth of collective efficacy around a specific issue like gun violence.

Ethnographies on community crime control have in many ways attended to these shortfalls in program evaluation by documenting the organizational (e.g. non-profit), programmatic (e.g., gang violence interruption), and non-programmatic (e.g., meetings) strategies that residents, community leaders, and public actors engage in to address crime. These studies have also offered new frames for understanding the configuration of social ties that shape local come control efforts, including new parochialism (Carr, 2005) and the community-public partnership typology developed by Leverentz and Williams that attends to race and place (2016). Importantly, they have provided more nuanced methodological approaches that allow researchers to better appreciate the relational dynamics of complex and localized social problems like interpersonal violence (Vargas, 2016; Jones, 2018). This is precisely why I decided to employ ethnography as my primary methodological strategy for studying gun violence dynamics in Richmond, as this method has historically provided valuable and grounded insights into the broader ecology (i.e., relationships, people, networks, organizations) of community crime control that is often elusive within either quantitative studies or program evaluations of community interventions.

PRESENT ANALYSIS

Like I stated at the outset of this chapter, Richmond stakeholders identified community mobilization as a key explanation for gun violence declines in the city since the late 2000s. This chapter works to unpack this assessment by examining informal crime control in Richmond over the past two decades, namely as it pertains to gun violence. Drawing upon key stakeholder

interviews, ethnographic observations of community mobilization activities, and archival documents, this chapter specifically addresses the following three questions:

1) What types of collective efforts has Richmond engaged in to reduce gun violence since 2000, and how have these efforts changed with time?
2) Who is involved in these efforts, and what practices or strategies do they engage in to affect gun violence?
3) What issues and factors have shaped the development and sustainability of collective efforts aimed at reducing gun violence?

By leveraging varied data sources, I was able to identify a robust network of informal crime controls strategies that aim to both directly and indirectly reduce gun violence in the city. This network includes established *organizations*, such as non-profits and city agencies, formalized crime control *programs* developed in partnership with local institutions, as well as less formal *community actions* (Sampson et al., 2005) organized by residents with and without the help of local institutions (e.g. temporary protests, community forums). It also includes active and defunct strategies in order to fully capture the evolution of informal social control in Richmond. While neither respondents nor any other data source identified the existence of a unified anti-gun violence network, I ultimately settled on this term to highlight how interpersonal and interorganizational relationships give shape to and help maintain Richmond's community crime-fighting landscape. As I discuss later, some of the networks' current initiatives were the immediate by-product of past initiatives, whereas others leveraged the social capital and momentum generated by former efforts to devise new strategies. Given the study's aim to examine how informal social control around gun violence has transformed over time, analyses also provide rich insights into the social and political conditions that have enabled and constrained collective efforts in the city, including public alliances with elected officials as well as mistrust between law enforcement, community leaders, and residents.

It should be noted that I would not have been able to detail neither the breadth nor depth Richmond's anti-gun violence network if I relied solely upon administrative or survey data, as many studies have done in the past (e.g., Rosenfeld et al., 2001; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Sampson et al., 1997; Slocum et al., 2013; Sharkey et al., 2017; Wo et al., 2016). Importantly, I would not have been able to document the fluid and integrated nature of community crime control in Richmond. This study, thus, provides an instructive model for scholars interested in advancing the study of informal social control – not just as a representation of ties, trust, or organizations in a community – but as historically contingent, relational, and dynamic process.

DATA & METHODS

Data

The present analysis draws upon interview and observation data, as well as reports and articles that discuss anti-gun violence efforts since the early 2000s to construct a *historical and relational mapping of community crime-fighting* in Richmond. Between October 2017 through January 2018, I conducted 47 in-depth semi-structured interviews with 56 key stakeholders that reside and/or work in the city. Stakeholder groups include residents (n=19), community leaders (e.g., organizers, staff within local non-profits and clergy; n=15), city officials (e.g., council members; n=5), police (n=11), and other legal actors (e.g. county prosecutors and public defenders; n=6). Considering general project aims of identifying and understanding the nature of gun violence prevention in the city, I began participant recruitment by contacting leaders within the different organizations and agencies that were currently engaged in violence reduction work. This included the police chief, directors of city agencies and non-profit organizations that house violence intervention strategies, as well as city officials like the city manager that oversee city-

sponsored violence reduction efforts. Using recommendations from these respondents, I engaged in snowball sampling to identify additional stakeholders for participation.

All interviews were conducted face-to-face in a mutually convenient location, like a participant's office, local café, or community center. Interviews averaged about one hour and half in length, with some running as short as 45 minutes and other as long as two and a half hours. Most interviews were also conducted individually and in English, though two were conducted as focus groups to accommodate participants' schedules (one in English and one in Spanish). All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Pseudonyms are used for all participants, even public officials, to protect the anonymity of respondents. In some cases, general descriptors are used as well (e.g., community leader) if only one person was interviewed from a given organization, agency or program.

The majority of respondents are male (62.5%), and racially Black (42.8%) or White (26.6%). Over two-thirds (n=38) of participants are also current (51.8%) or former (16.1%) residents, most of whom had knowledge of and/or participated in one or more of the informal social control strategies identified in this chapter. Those without residential attachments were still quite informed about Richmond's informal crime control landscape. In fact, most non-resident participants (n=13/18) had either worked for or with the city (e.g., via programmatic partnership, or as a county service provider) for ten or more years at the time of our interview.

The types of questions asked during interviews varied by stakeholder group, but all protocols addressed three general themes: 1) participant explanations of gun violence patterns in Richmond; 2) knowledge of and involvement with past and present gun violence reduction efforts; and 3) perceptions of policing and other related law enforcement practices, like gun-related punishment for illegal gun possession and use. Participants directly involved in gun

violence reduction work were also asked to describe the rationale and/or logic that inspired the particular initiative that they were a part of; the goals and activities of said initiative; who participated in development and implementation; funding; relationships among stakeholders; challenges to implementation; and impacts. Overall 46 out of 56 participants were able to offer explicit insights regarding one or more strategy within the network. As such, these 46 interviews anchor the present analysis.

Observations supplemented my interview data by providing insights into how local stakeholders thought about and responded to gun violence in the everyday. I conducted 24 observations of various community gatherings and activities, including city council meetings, policing town halls, Ceasefire program meetings and call-ins, and other events, like anti-gun violence block parties and prayer walks. With the exception of city council meetings, I learned about all other events and activities from my respondents. Indeed, the vast majority of these activities were hosted by or coordinated in conjunction with the city's Ceasefire initiative, whom I interacted most closely with during fieldwork. In total, I spent about 40 hours observing meetings and/or actively participating in events with other Ceasefire volunteers, and another 7 hours at city council meetings during my four months of ethnographic data collection. When possible (e.g., during a meeting), detailed fieldnotes were written on the spot to capture the number, gender, age, and race/ethnicity of participants; issues discussed/addressed; language used; and interpersonal dynamics between participants. If notetaking was not possible (e.g., during Ceasefire's weekly night walks), I immediately recorded voice memos following the observation to assist with notetaking at a later time.

Archival data was also collected to provide historical context. In total, I gathered 129 documents that speak to gun violence incidents and patterns; the policing of gun violence in

Richmond; and community-based responses to gun violence in the city since the early 2000s. Program reports, evaluations, and other related documents were identified on websites from local community-based organizations and city agencies; some reports were also provided directly by participants (N=23). Newspaper articles were collected using time-bounded (2000-2017), key word searches in Lexis Nexis and NewsBank Access World databases, which compiles articles from both local and national news outlets. The specific key words searches used to curate a selection of articles focused on community efforts included: names of key events and/or initiatives identified by respondents during interviews (e.g., New Gethsemane Church shooting, Richmond NOW, Ceasefire, Ground Zero); and other combined searches that include terms like gun violence, prevention, community organizing, and Richmond, CA. This search generated a total of 31 articles that focus specifically on community-driven efforts to address gun violence in Richmond. All of the aforementioned data was uploaded, coded, and analyzed in Atlas.ti software.

Analytic Strategy

The findings presented in this chapter emerged from a multi-stage and iterative coding process known as abduction, where the goal of analysis is to generate new theoretical insights relative to extant theories (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). The first stage consisted of identifying the landscape of anti-gun violence reduction efforts in Richmond during my designated time period (2000-2017). Because my analysis focuses on informal social control efforts aimed at reducing gun violence, one of the key criteria that I established for identifying anti-gun violence initiatives is that they must include residents as a key stakeholder or partner in the initiative's development and/or implementation. I also narrowed the pool of potential interventions by limiting my scope to strategies that: a) were initiated in direct response to gun violence, b)

prioritized gun violence reduction as a central goal within their work, or c) regularly partnered with other organizations or interventions in the city that directly focus on gun violence prevention. Interventions and community-based organizations that provide general youth support services, housing, or employment services but have no explicit connections to gun violence reduction are not included.

In total, I identified 24 different strategies that met the above criteria. Of the 24 strategies, 15 were in operation while I was conducting fieldwork. These strategies include entire non-profit organizations, city agencies, formal programs, and community actions or events (See Appendix A for a description of each strategy). The vast majority of the catalogued strategies were discussed by at least one participant during interviews and/or observations, with only three identified through secondary sources. I kept a running list of the strategies mentioned during interviews in order to guide the creation of subsequent coding schemes. I also used this list to conduct follow-up web searches that could further historicize the development of different initiatives, particularly for those that were no longer operational or were found solely via document analyses.

The second stage of coding focused on identifying themes surrounding each initiative's development, and the relationships between different actors and initiatives within the network. As such, I created codes for each initiative and for topics like: strategy activities, development, enabling conditions, challenges, funding, agency relationships, community relationships, and evaluation. After coding interviews, fieldnotes, and documents line-by-line, I then conducted in-depth analysis of each of the aforementioned codes in order to generate a typology of community-based gun violence prevention efforts that would best capture the format, focus, and strategic activities of the network's varied initiatives. This second round of in-depth coding also

allowed me compare and contrast development processes across initiatives, as well as identify the conditions that seem to have enabled and constrained their implementation. However, the following analysis does not go into depth about the development of all network initiatives; instead, I provide examples of strategies that best reflect the theme under discussion**.**

FINDINGS

As with any intervention, the strategies in Richmond's gun violence reduction network were not developed at once or overnight. Though some participants noted that other community interventions directed at gun violence did exist in the mid-1990s[12], analysis suggests that Richmond began to develop this network in the early 2000s. As gun violence began to creep back up in 2002, the primary intervention that Richmond had for combatting gun violence was policing. The findings in this chapter discuss how residents, in collaboration with local non-profits, clergy, city officials, and police, have worked to rectify this gap in attention to and services toward community-based gun violence prevention over the last 15 years.

The first sub-section outlines what the network looks like by identifying the format, focus, and strategic activities that unite Richmond's varied anti-gun violence reduction efforts. The second sub-section describes how different strategies in the network were developed, highlighting both the social ties and partnerships that characterize the city's community-led efforts. The final sub-section concludes with a discussion of sustainability and the specific conditions that seem to have influenced the success of the city's longer-running initiatives.

Defining the Network

[12] The East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership was the only initiative mentioned during interviews. This effort was a five-year a public-private coalition of non-profits, law enforcement, and local elected officials that focused on reducing gun violence in several cities across the East Bay. A string of shootings in June 1993 inspired the creation of the collaborative, though the Partnership serviced 21 jurisdictions in the East Bay, including Oakland and Berkeley.

My finding that Richmond has developed an integrated network of gun violence prevention strategies emerged inductively from my analysis. Labeling the city's varied system of informal social control strategies, a network was also purposeful. Initially, I had used the term community-based infrastructure because of how the strategies worked to provide a fundamental foundation for prevention. However, as noted earlier, infrastructure is often used to describe city and/or neighborhood institutions, like non-profits, churches, and volunteer organizations (e.g., Sampson 2005; Slocum et al., 2013; Wo et al., 2016; Vargas, 2016). Though such organizations have certainly been critical to Richmond's ability to develop informal crime control strategies, the city's gun violence prevention landscape reflects much more than established organizations; it also includes formalized programs and organic, resident-led community actions. Importantly, analyses revealed that the identified strategies were not just a haphazard compilation of activities and organizations focused on reducing gun violence; rather they seemed to be bound together by numerous interpersonal and inter-organizational relationships. Identifying these relationships also exposed the dynamic qualities of the network in that connections between initiatives traversed time. Incorporating both operational and defunct initiatives within the network, thus, allowed me to capture the temporal and relational breath of the city's diverse set of anti-gun violence strategies.

Moreover, while all network strategies were selected because of their commitment to gun violence prevention, they varied in terms of their format (e.g., program v. organization), strategic focus, and strategic activities. As such, I created a network typology that captures these different characteristics.

Direct Strategies

Analyses suggest that strategies can be separated largely into two groups: those that work to directly intervene upon gun violence, and those that work to indirectly intervene upon gun violence. I define the city's direct interventions as those that were initiated as an explicit response to gun violence, and where gun violence reduction is a central focus of the work for that intervention. Thirteen of the 24 interventions identified are direct strategies – and seven were running during my fieldwork period. The strategic activities of these direct interventions include:

A. Providing social, material and emotional ***support to those currently involved with guns***, and disrupting gun violence when necessary;
B. Providing social ***support for those identified as at-risk*** for becoming involved in gun violence due to prior gun and/or gang-related criminal history;
C. Providing social and material ***support for direct and indirect victims*** of gun violence (without necessarily the assumption that these individuals are "at-risk"); and,
D. ***Advocacy and capacity building*** around the issue of gun violence.

As Table 4.1 notes, few direct interventions work with those involved in or at risk of gun violence (n=3). Nonetheless, some of the city's longest-running initiatives – including the Office of Neighborhood Safety and their Peacemaker Fellowship – have focused on serving these populations.

Like other cities affected by high rates of lethal violence, Richmond has implemented both public health and focused-deterrence models that work with young men known or suspected to be involved with illegal gun activity. The Office of Neighborhood Safety (ONS) represents the former approach. Since launching in April 2008, the ONS of has coordinated numerous strategies that focus on influencing outcomes at both the individual and community-level. The ONS' community-level activities have included conflict mediation and service referral among youth; conflict mediation in neighborhoods highly affected by gun violence; emotional support to shooting victims; and keeping a general "finger on the pulse" of the community (Wolf et al., 2015). The Office's main individual-level strategy is their Peacemaker Fellowship. Established

in June 2010, the Fellowship utilizes street outreach workers, known as Neighborhood Change Agents (NCA), to identify and mentor young men currently involved with illegal gun activity or who the NCA's suspect may become a target for victimization. Similar to other street outreach models like Cure Violence, the NCA's are typically formerly incarcerated, street-involved men that have personal ties to the Richmond community and are familiar with the social and cultural dynamics that commonly affect local gun violence dynamics, such as rivalries between different neighborhood groups and tenuous relationships with local institutions. In general, the 18-month Fellowship provides intensive mentorship, skill-building opportunities, and financial resources for those that wish to turn their lives around. The specific components of the Fellowship include: 1) Life-mapping or individualized goal-setting; 2) Daily mentorship by ONS staff; 3) Social service provision and connection; 4) Transformative travel experiences; 5) Financial incentives, paid after meeting set goals on one's life map; 6) Access to an elder circle for additional mentorship; and 7) Job placement assistance (ONS Staff interviews). The NCA's are in the field most of the day, checking in with current Fellows, as well as building new relationships with other local youth and men that they believe might benefit from the Fellowship (See Wolf et al., 2015 for a more detailed review of the Fellowship's different strategies).

Another city-wide program that engages individuals involved in or at-risk for gun engaging in illegal gun activity is Richmond's version of Operation Ceasefire. Unlike the Peacemaker Fellowship, Ceasefire does require collaboration with the local police department to identify their program's target population and to coordinate key activities of the program, like the call-in. Consistent with other Ceasefire models, the program's target population includes people on probation or parole with a history of gun offenses and/or who are suspected of being involved in gang activity (Braga et al., 2018). This candidate list is updated on a regular basis

and is provided to the Ceasefire working group for purposes of coordinating the call-in, which has been held once to twice a year since early 2012. The working group – which includes representatives from the city's faith-based community, leaders from local non-profit organizations, general residents not affiliated with an organization, and law enforcement – also meets on a weekly basis to discuss updates regarding candidates that have attended or will be invited to upcoming call-ins; recent shootings and/or murders; follow-up with the survivors and family members of such shootings; service provider changes or updates (e.g., identifying a new probation-friendly employer to attend the call-in); and upcoming community events that the program could help support and/or where they could enlist further community engagement (e.g., neighborhood council meetings).

One of the more unique features of the program is the "non-traditional" call-in where 4-6 non-law enforcement stakeholders – including the program's case manager and coordinator– meet one-on-one with a potential participant to introduce the program. The "non-traditional" call-in was created in 2015 as a "soft-hand off" to the more tense "traditional" call-in that includes multiple law enforcement actors, like probation, Richmond police, and a county district attorney. As one Ceasefire member said, "It's about building connections" with potential participants so that the first message they receive is one of "opportunity and support", rather than a "we see you, we know you are" threat of surveillance and punishment (Fieldnote, 11/08/17). During my fieldwork, I was able to observe one non-traditional call-in. Four out of the eight individuals invited to the meeting (all of whom were young Black men on probation) showed up. While interest and engagement from each of the participants varied, the meetings essentially functioned as a needs and goals assessment rather than an informational about Ceasefire. Stakeholders also offered brief insights into their own backgrounds – including prior

involvement with the illicit activity– and how their goals as community representatives are to provide participants with the relevant supports to achieve their stated goals, including "getting off that paper" (i.e., probation or parole) (Fieldnote, 11/08/17).

TABLE 4.1 DIRECT STRATEGIES

	Strategic Activities			
Initiative Name	Supports for those with active gun involvement	Supports for those at-risk of gun involvement/victimization	Supports for gun victims	Advocacy and capacity building
Office of Neighborhood Safety (ONS)	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**
Peacemaker Fellowship	**X**	**X**	**X**	
Beyond Violence (BV) & Restorative Pathways Project at RYSE (R2P)			**X**	
Operation Ceasefire		**X**	**X**	**X**
Ya-Neema Healing Circles			**X**	
Healed by Kosua			**X**	**X**
Save Our Sons & Daughters				**X**
Ground Zero			**X**	**X**
Not Today				**X**
Tent City				**X**
Black-on-Black Crime Summit				**X**
City Hall Protest				**X**
Youth Needs Assessment				**X**

Advocacy and capacity building is also a central aim of Richmond's Ceasefire initiative. Over the past six years, community leaders and residents have coordinated weekly "night walks[13]" to raise awareness about and support for the program; they have erected vigils to honor

[13] Each night walk typically started and ended at a local church, lasted about one hour, and was located in one of a handful of neighborhoods commonly affected by gun violence. All walkers wore neon colored vests, carried hand-made signs saying, "Honk for Peace!", "Alive & Free", and chanted (in call-and-response form) phrases like,

gun violence victims; and they have helped families navigate access to county crime victim services. Resident volunteers, clergy, and a few paid organizers from CCCISCO—a local inter-faith organization— have been the primary coordinators and participants of these efforts. Started in 2013, weekly night walks are the program's longest running advocacy and capacity building activity. In the first few years, Ceasefire stakeholders shared that participation ranged anywhere between 15-30 people, with Black residents comprising the majority of walkers, followed by Black clergy. During the course of my fieldwork, I participated in six different night walks. With one exception, walks were attended by 2-5 residents, 1-2 church leaders, and 3-5 non-resident allies that had become involved with the program through their local church. Seven of these walkers called themselves the "core walkers" given that they had consistently participated in the walks for the past three to four years, "rain or shine," as one walker, Patricia, stated. This core group was also predominantly white; and four were non-residents – a rather drastic change from years prior, which some attributed to resident burnout, volunteers moving out of the city, and disenchantment with the program's progress. Yet regardless of the group's racial composition, the walks worked to build collective efficacy around the issue of gun violence that transcended neighborhood and city boundaries by offering a space for people build new relationships and a sense of trust, not only in each other, but in Ceasefire. The walks also provided a platform for residents to become involved on either a regular or sporadic basis because the events were consistent. Importantly, the strategy gave residents a way to engage in informal social control that did not jeopardize their relationships with any relatives or friends that might actually be

"Cease-fire! Alive and free!" With the exception of the first walk, most of the residents we encountered and talked to during the walks were older adults (ages 35-60). On the rare occasion we did engage youth, responsiveness was mixed – with some youth telling us to "get the hell out of here" and others stopping to talk, engage, and commend the work of the walkers.

engaged in the violence – which some scholars have argued can stymie community crime control activities (Pattillo-McCoy, 1999).

Prior to Ceasefire, there were many other advocacy and capacity building efforts aimed at affecting gun violence. Indeed, this has been the main goal and outcome of most direct strategies in the network. As noted in Appendix A, the duration and scope of these efforts has varied, but they typically involve resident and community leader engagement in a local campaign against gun violence. Not Today, for example, was a single, 24-hour event led by Richmond's faith community that brought together residents, six religious congregations, and number of community organizations to protest gun violence. Each participating parish served as a "light house" that offered activities for youth, information booths on health and education resources, and a space for "prayer and reflection" (Aguirre, 2008). As some participants noted, it was the first time they saw people from different racial and ethnic groups, and across religious organizations, come together to take a stand against gun violence (Aguirre, 2008). However, this would not be the last time.

In the aftermath of a shooting at a local church during a funeral in 2010, many of the same clergy that organized Not Today gathered once again –this time with the support of city funds and agencies, like the Office of Neighborhood Safety – to launch Ground Zero (Bernard, Community Leader). Though the initiative only ran for a single year, the effort was designed to build alliances between residents, city agencies, and local capacity building organizations, like CCISCO, in order to more effectively address gun violence. Strategies included community needs assessments, resource referral, and relationship building – the latter which proved to be useful as clergy united for a third time to advocate and launch yet another initiative – Operation Ceasefire.

Indirect Strategies

Indirect strategies within Richmond's anti-gun violence network are those that seek to improve individual and community-level conditions that contribute to the persistence of gun violence (See Table 4.2). The strategic activities of the selected interventions include:

A. Providing ***wrap-around support services for city youth***, including education and career assistance, therapy, and case management
B. Providing ***wrap-around services for the city's re-entry population***, including county resource navigation, housing placement assistance, job training, and legal assistance
C. ***Improving police-community relations,*** and
D. ***Advocacy and capacity building around issues of community health***, including youth service provision, criminal justice reform, and gun violence

While there are definitely more organizations and initiatives in the city that fit the above criteria, I chose to only include those that have developed and/or maintained a partnership with the direct strategies that I identified, as these inter-organizational ties are central to the network. For example, in the face of rising gun violence and an overall lack of youth support services in the city, the RYSE Center was explicitly founded to provide youth with a space to "decompress, feel safe…build relationships, [and] change the reasons why young people were being shot" (RYSE Center, N.D., p. 6). Over the past ten years, the RYSE center has modified and expanded its programming, yet as one staff shared during an interview, it has always remained focused on youth empowerment and creating healthy spaces where city youth can thrive. Currently, the Center provides a range of education, career, and psychological support services, as well as opportunities for youth to develop and engage in advocacy efforts centered around social justice issues, like access to healthier foods, school discipline, and gun violence. RYSE also partners with the ONS and other direct strategies in the network, like the Beyond Violence program, to provide a continuum of care for youth and young adults injured and/or traumatized by gun violence. One RYSE Staff interviewed for this project explained that the vast array of supports

that the Center provides, from the "hospital-based program (Beyond Violence)…to case management…to education and career development…to re-entry services from youth coming out of juvenile hall…is gun violence prevention."

TABLE 4.2 INDIRECT STRATEGIES

	Strategic Activities			
Initiative Name	Wrap-around services for youth	Wrap-around services for re-entry population	Improving police-community relations	Advocacy and capacity building
RYSE Center	**X**			**X**
Safe Return		**X**		**X**
Re-entry Success Center		**X**		**X**
Policing Town Halls			**X**	
CCISCO				**X**
Richmond NOW Campaign				**X**
Rubicon		**X**	**X**	**X**
Alive & Free	**X**		**X**	**X**
Richmond PAL	**X**		**X**	
Terrence Kelly Youth Foundation	**X**			
Richmond Improvement Association		**X**		**X**

Whereas RYSE works with youth and young adults to both directly (via Beyond Violence) and indirectly affect gun violence (via wrap-around supports), Safe Return and the Re-entry Success Center work with adults transitioning back to the community after incarceration. Like RYSE, these two organizations use integrative models of support in that they provide a space for the re-entry population to receive social, legal and material assistance (e.g., job training and placement, affordable housing information, assistance with record

sealing/expungement) that can help them remain safe and, ideally, free from illicit gun activity. Safe Return was also founded in collaboration with the Office of Neighborhood Safety and CCISCO, a Richmond-based interfaith organization (devuono-powell et al., 2016; Safe Return, N.D), in order to better identify the needs of and secure resources for justice-involved individuals in Richmond. Though they do not currently collaborate with the ONS on any specific programming, they serve as a community voice for ONS' respective population, namely those that are currently and formerly involved with illegal gun activity. Since their founding, Safe Return has been a steady partner of Ceasefire, has worked with several county boards/steering committees focused local criminal justice reforms, and has led numerous, successful campaign efforts, including two citywide "ban the box" ordinances for employment and housing (Clayton, 2017; devuono-powell et al., 2016).

CCISCO is another non-profit organization that has been central to the city's anti-gun violence network, and particularly the development of Ceasefire. The Contra Costa Interfaith Supporting Community Organization (CCISCO) is a "multi-ethnic, multi-generational, interfaith federation of 25 congregations across Contra Costa county" (CCISCO, 2011). Established in 1996, CCISCO has organized residents, community organizations, and the faith community in Richmond around numerous social justice issues, including immigration reform, health care access, and criminal justice reform. CCISCO became directly involved in local gun violence reduction efforts in 2010 as a result of their Richmond NOW campaign, a community action that I also include in the network and discuss in greater detail in the following section.

Developing the Network

Just as important as what Richmond's anti-gun violence network looks like (and does), is how it came to be. Yet discussing the origin story of each initiative in the network is beyond the

scope of this chapter. Instead, I explain how several strategies and organizations in the network were developed, highlighting specifically the role that different types of actors and relationships played in getting the city's informal crime control efforts off the ground. By documenting the overlapping history and inter-personal and inter-organizational relationships that shaped network strategies, I also am able to document how collective efficacy around gun violence in the city has been progressively built over time.

Figure 4.1 provides a visual – though limited– representation of the density of relationships across the network strategies that were operational while I was conducting fieldwork. According to my analyses[14], most cross-strategy relationships were ongoing and consistent, whereas some were no longer active, and others were more sporadic. What this figure also starts to capture is that ONS, CCISCO and Ceasefire have been key conduits within the network. The level of interconnectedness that they have managed to develop over the years is due to their respective organization's focus on advocacy and capacity building, not just around gun violence, but other justice related issues like re-entry. For example, while ONS has since narrowed their programmatic to focus the social and behavioral development of young people victimized or involved in illicit gun activity, they were initially tasked with serving as a coordinating body for violence reduction in the city. As such, they organized resident and organizational working groups, like the Greater Richmond Community Reintegration Collaborative, to begin building community capacity around issues that were key to perpetuating the cycle of gun violence, like incarceration and unsuccessful re-entry (Safe Return, N.D.). Though the Collaborative eventually ended, the conversations from this coordinated action

[14] I assessed the nature of an inter-strategy relationship by asking about partnerships during interviews; though I also supplemented my analyses with web searches and documents related to each strategy. It is certainly possible that I missed one or more ties, or the nature of a tie (e.g., active v. historical). At the very least, this figure portrays a minimum of social ties and relationships.

revealed a gaping hole in the city's knowledge and ability to support justice-involved residents. The Collaborative also helped to build relational capital across formerly incarcerated residents, city agencies (ONS), and local non-profit organizations (CCISCO) – all of which were leveraged to develop the Safe Return Project the following year (Safe Return, N.D).

FIGURE 4.1 OPERATIONAL NETWORK STRATEGIES



Bottom-up Strategies

My findings suggest that Safe Return, like most of the network's initiatives, assumed a bottom-up approach to development in that they were/are fueled either entirely or in large part by local residents and community-based organizations. For example, all but six of the strategies within the network (ONS, Beyond Violence, the Re-Entry Success Center, the Policing Town

Halls, Rubicon, and Alive & Free) were *initiated* by residents alone or in collaboration with local non-profit organizations. For example, in the aftermath of a shooting at a funeral in September 2006, the Richmond Improvement Association – a now defunct social service agency in Richmond – organized several neighborhood encampments with two goals in mind: 1) to call public attention to the gun violence epidemic in the city, and 2) to keep watch and potentially deter gun crimes in areas that were known to be hot spots for gun violence (Johnson, 2006; Wilmot, 2007). The encampments, collectively known as "Tent City," were set up in 4 different locations and brought together nearly 1000 residents, local clergy, and other community leaders over the course of the 6-week long demonstration (Johnson, 2006). The National Guard and other local stores donated tents and other necessary supplies for setting up camp, while residents and hospitals, like Kaiser, donated food. Though this community action was short-lived, according to several study respondents and media coverage of the demonstration, it did succeed in "galvanizing the community" and in establishing a dialogue around the issue of gun violence, particularly with youth passing through the camps and older residents from rival areas of the city that had were formerly street-involved and wanted put an end to the carnage (Wilmot, 2007).

Another more recent example of a bottom-up intervention is the Ya-Neema Healing Circle. Founded in 2016 by a Richmond resident, the Healing Circle was started to fill a gap in support and services to families affected by gun violence. Prior to starting the Circle, the founder volunteered as a Rapid Responder with city's Ceasefire program where she would follow up with family members after the shooting or death of a loved one to assist with vigils, funeral arrangements, and/or connections to county-provided victim services. Having also struggled with the trauma and pain of losing a family member to gun violence, she believed that the healing process needed to go beyond that initial follow-up. She ultimately decided to create an informal

support group – which she operates and funds on a volunteer basis— to assist people in a more consistent manner.

> When I started this, I notified all those people in my phone that I had been texting for all those years. And then I also invited some clergy, psychologists and I had an introductory type presentation [where] I invited maybe 50-75 people, including families and victims and community members. Whoever showed up, showed up to get an introduction. We did a survey to find out what people wanted to do. If they needed services themselves, or if they were willing to host a group, why did they show up – those kind of questions...And I had a friend, she's a psychologist that I consulted with, so it was a few people that I consulted with that would help me take it from here, to here, to there."

Since hosting that first informational in 2017, the founder shared that participation has grown largely because of word of mouth, with attendance ranging between a handful to twenty residents during the Circle's monthly meetings.

The RYSE Center – which is a now well-established community-based organization with vast city, county, and state partnerships – would also not exist if were not for grassroots mobilization. In 2003, with the assistance of the Youth Center in Oakland, a team of Richmond youth designed and conducted a Youth Needs Assessment of nearly 1,500 residents in the city (RYSE Center, N.D., pg. 4). According to a RYSE staff interviewed for my project, a string of shootings that year "fueled young people to organize with adults to come up with a solution." The primary need that youth identified was a "safe space [that had] programs and services that would support young people" – which at the time was woefully lacking in the city (Jeremey). Indeed, it took nearly two years before any political leader took serious interest in creating a new youth center – and that leader was county supervisor John Gioia. In addition to securing the building that would eventually house the RYSE Center, Gioia had the "political network" that helped bring "interested stakeholders" –including funders—to the table (RYSE Center, N.D., p. 5). Soon after this partnership was established, the planning and fundraising process began in earnest, with youth still guiding the ship alongside "adult allies" like Youth Center staff, Gioia,

regional funders, and other community leaders. This process was slow, and a "learning curve" for some of the adult and public partners, like Gioia, who were unaccustomed to "young people dictating" the agenda (RYSE Center, N.D., p. 7). Since their founding in 2008, RYSE continues to have resident youth shape the Center's priorities. As a staff explained to me during our interview, all programs at RYSE – including their gun violence-related efforts and partnerships with local hospitals and city agencies – are "vetted" by Center youth, demonstrating how this established and well-resourced community organization is still very much led by city residents.

The development of the RYSE Center also points to another key finding in my analysis, which is that community actions, like the Youth Needs Assessment, have played a central role in creating the social and political capital necessary for building broader, and more comprehensive strategies. Ceasefire provides another illustrative case study of this process in that it was also informed by distinct a community action – the Richmond NOW Campaign. As the final campaign report states, Richmond had long been "marked by targeted disinvestment and restrictive barriers to opportunity [that] led to isolated, segregated and divided communities, and [a] prevalence of violence and hopelessness" (CCISCO, 2011, p. 8). Richmond NOW was launched as a means to rally the community and develop a comprehensive strategy that could provide "safety and opportunity for all residents"(p.5). Gun violence was at the center of the report's public safety proposal, calling for "equal partnership with law enforcement and city government offices to implement the Ceasefire initiative" (p. 5). After nearly 10-months of organizing, the Campaign proved to be successful: CCISCO obtained both law enforcement and ONS support to assist with the development of Ceasefire the same year the report was released.

Before hosting the first Ceasefire call-in the following year in 2012, CCSICO leveraged much of the interpersonal and interorganizational social capital that they had developed through

the Richmond NOW campaign to coordinate an intensive outreach strategy for Ceasefire. The purpose of the new campaign was two-fold: to help garner buy-in and participation from local residents and organizations, and to ensure that program design and implementation was informed and "run by the community, not law enforcement" (Travis, Community Leader). As other scholars have noted elsewhere (e.g., Jones, 2018; Rios, 2011), Ceasefire has not always enjoyed the most positive reputation among communities of color given the program's emphasis on surveillance and punishment, and the close ties that it requires with law enforcement. Understanding this history, CCISCO organizers trained about 100 organizers to engage their fellow residents in dialogue about how they would like to see the program structured. According to one of the lead organizers that I interviewed, they had close to 1500 people participate, as well as over a dozen churches. While most participating stakeholders limited their involvement to the outreach effort, the relational capital developed during the campaign did prove useful in identifying a steady stream of volunteers and faith organizations that remained committed to Ceasefire. Indeed, the vast majority of residents and non-resident allies that I interviewed or encountered during fieldwork were brought in through their local church or though their relationship with CCISCO, demonstrating how durable these parochial ties have been to sustaining community engagement with Ceasefire – and to helping the program implement their objectives more generally.

Top-Down Strategies

Though most strategies have been initiated in a bottom-up format, either through resident activism or non-profit leadership, there are several "top-down" strategies in the network that got their start because of public leadership and investment. For example, the Beyond Violence program was established in 2010 by John Muir Health – a not-for-profit health care provider and

Contra Costa County's only trauma center—to offer individualized case management and follow-up care to young patients recovering from interpersonal violence injuries, like gunshot wounds (Community Leader Interview). Being Richmond's primary violence prevention agency, the Office of Neighborhood Safety was the program's first city partner. However, because of "capacity issues," partnership was transferred from ONS to RYSE two years later. As one RYSE staff explained:

> We have a case manager [in house], we have somebody that would be able to go to the hospital as an intervention specialist, we have a licensed therapist on site, we have access to legal support…kind of all of it…[And] ONS was a partner that we worked with since inception; we just had more capacity to take it on, and we knew the city needed [a program like Beyond Violence].

Since starting their partnership with John Muir, the RYSE Center has also established a complimentary, in-house gun victims services program known as the Restorative Pathways Project (R2P) in order to reach survivors missed by the BV program. An individual with a gunshot injury would only be identified by the hospital as a potential candidate for services if they were a) hospitalized at John Muir with a trauma-level wound, and b) was between the ages of 15-24 years old. Given the Center's positive reputation in the city and with the BV program, they started to receive "community referrals" from local organizations who were in contact with recent shooting victims, as well as other local hospitals. Rather than turn these people away for not being a formal BV participant, RYSE expanded its range of services to any young person that has been victimized by gun violence and has the courage to ask for help in managing their trauma. Overall, the Beyond Violence program provided RYSE with a platform to identify and engage with gun violence victims that they might not have otherwise come into contact with, as well as a new regional partner with whom they could collaborate with to more comprehensively attend to the needs of Richmond's young community. The partnership also showcases how

regional and public institutions, like a hospital, can facilitate the work of community-based gun violence prevention – albeit with the support of more locally-based organizations that have existing ties with the program's target community.

The Office of Neighborhood Safety was also created because of public leadership and investment, though in this case that public agency was Richmond's City Council. Following the protests at city hall in June 2005 and the failed state of emergency declaration described at the outset of the chapter, city leaders came together to brainstorm a solution to the rising gun violence problem in the city. Mark, a veteran city official, recounted this important development during our interview:

> We got together with all the department heads and we just kind of brainstormed over a series of weeks and a few meetings different ideas…We came up with over 150 recommendations and presented them to the city council…and they listened. One city councilmen said, "It seems to me with a list like this or with all this activity that we really need an anti-violence czar, somebody who is going to take all these ideas and implement them." And that was the genesis of the Office of Neighborhood Safety. Never knowing what it was going to do exactly, but that was the idea…And I think the good thing was that we realized it wasn't just a police department problem. And that was, without really identifying it, but that was a really transcendent notion…It was the idea that you get all of the management group together and you say, this is our biggest single problem and none of you will be successful in what you want to get done unless we deal with it; so, we all need to deal with it…And everybody bought in.

In 2006, the City Council approved $185,000 in funding to hire a consultant that would help the city devise a targeted, non-law enforcement strategy to address the city's gun violence problem (Geluardi, 2007). One year later, the consulting team – which came from The Mentoring Center in Oakland –gave their final recommendations: to develop and sustain an office dedicated to violence prevention for at least 10 years, and to develop prevention efforts that were informed by detailed neighborhood analyses of violent crime. Funding for the Office was approved in July 2007, with the lead consultant for the project, Devonne Boggan, hired as the director several

months later. According to my interviews with city officials and ONS staff, the City Manager's Office oversees hiring and funding for ONS, which includes approximately $1 million each year for staff salaries and facility-related expenses like office space. Funding for the Office's strategic activities, such as the Peacemaker Fellowship, comes from philanthropic and state grants, including the California Board of State and Community Correction's Cal VIP initiative.

Moreover, it is important to note that although the ONS is a formal city agency, the success of the program relies as much on private and parochial ties as it does on its ties with public officials, like the City Manager and City Council. The ONS has historically partnered with local non-profit organizations like the RYSE Center and CCISCO for purposes of training and social service referral. They have also collaborated local non-profits to design new strategies outside of ONS that are also geared toward gun violence reduction (e.g., Safe Return, Ground Zero). Private, or personal, relationships with city residents, on the other hand, are leveraged to support the Office's most direct violence intervention activities – the Peacemaker Fellowship and violence disruption after a shooting. As Eli (ONS Staff) explains in the following excerpt, youth involved in gun violence often have "trust issues". To gain entrée with and trust from young residents that may benefit from the Fellowship, staff have to leverage any and all relationships with the community:

> Maybe you know them because they from Richmond, or you may know their uncle, their mother, their father. You use all the resources that you can to get them to understand… [that] all you want is the best [for them]. And that's why our word has to be good in the streets. If we say we are going to do something, we have to do it because we don't want to hear, "Oh those fools in ONS, they say they were going to do this and never did it or came through." Being consistent and being something that most of these young people haven't had access to, and that's a male or female that cares about you and doesn't want anything from you…to even comprehend that is difficult.

The social currency that the program develops through their outreach efforts with young residents is ultimately what allows them to "gather, assess, and act on vital information regarding

community violence on an ongoing basis" (NCCD, 2018). Derek, another ONS staff, noted during our interview that this information is particularly key when trying to disrupt a potentially violent situation:

> If I'm hearing little Tommy was involved in last week's shooting, I will go and find little Tommy, especially if a have a relationship with little Tommy. I go sit down and talk to him: "I'm not saying what you did was wrong. I'm just trying to get an understanding why you do what you do." And then from that understanding, I say: "If you let me show you some different ways [of handling that conflict] maybe we can work something out so you don't have to put yourself in that position again."

Frank, a former Fellow that I interviewed, echoed Derek's sentiments when I asked him to describe ONS' approach to violence reduction, simply stating that "they understand…Sometimes with ONS, we didn't want to hear what they was saying. It was like they were always on us, even when we wasn't listening or when we messed up. They weren't people who were going to snitch on us. We knew we could come to the ONS if there was a problem." Importantly, this trust and relationship with ONS staff extended beyond formal participation in the Fellowship. Staff explained to me that former fellows are free to come back to the office whenever they need support, whether that includes a ride to the DMV or in Frank's case, a ride to a job interview, which actually happened the same day as our project interview.

Thus, while Beyond Violence and the ONS were founded by public organizations –a hospital and governmental entity, respectively – both strategies are still very much driven by the community, where the actual work of gun violence prevention is done by current and former residents familiar with those most affected by gun violence, or by leaders within community organizations that have deep roots within the city more generally.

Sustaining the Network

Since I concluded fieldwork in late January 2018, the number of active strategies in the network has gone from 15 to 11. The efforts that remain operational are by and large the

agencies and organizations that work to indirectly reduce gun violence, and the discrete strategies within those organizations that work to directly reduce gun violence. To be fair, however, some strategies were not meant to have a long shelf-life, particularly community actions like Tent City and Not Today, in that were primarily designed to build awareness and community engagement around gun violence. In some cases, though, community actions did indeed result in something more formal and lasting in nature – such as how the Richmond NOW Campaign inspired the creation of Ceasefire and how the Youth Needs Assessment led to the founding of the RYSE Center. Though time is not necessarily the best measure to determine the success of a program, it is nonetheless important to understand how and why a community control intervention is sustained or discontinued, especially when the problem driving that community action persists.

One of the more common features across the network's more stable (i.e., longer-running) strategies is that they have developed and maintained strong relationships with local political leaders. County Supervisor John Gioia, for instance, has been a steadfast champion of violence prevention (as seen with RYSE) and a vocal supporter of the city and county's justice-involved population. In 2017, the Re-Entry Success Center, a "one-stop shop" of services for formerly incarcerated individuals living in Richmond, faced increased pushback from the county sheriff over accountability. Gioia openly decried the sheriff's actions as "revenge" against Rubicon (a network strategy and holder of the Re-entry Center contract) because they had opposed a proposal for a county jail expansion. After a heated debate – and some unfavorable media coverage – the contract was renewed by the county board of supervisors (Nieves, 2017; Richards, 2017).

Financial and political support from the City Manager's Office and the City Council has also been integral to sustaining the city's Office of Neighborhood Safety, especially as it has faced criticism from local law enforcement and the media. A key event that highlights this tension and that came up numerous times across city leader, police, and ONS staff interviews was the infamous "fight at city hall." In October 2011, roughly one year after the Fellowship was launched, several young men from rival groups went to city hall to meet with ONS staff . They "exchanged some heated words in the parking lot" that led to a fist fight once inside ONS offices (Derek, ONS Staff). Though the actual damage from the fight was minor – "one broken nose and a few punches" to be exact (Eli, ONS Staff) – the story was anonymously leaked to the media by someone in law enforcement. As Mark, a city official, recounted during our interview: "This is when it was disclosed that the city was 'paying some people not to shoot some people'" – an overly simplistic misnomer that is still levied against the program to this day.

Yet more consequential than the negative media attention was the fact that relations between the ONS and police seemed to worsen after the city hall fight. ONS staff refused to tell the police who was involved in the squabble given how such an act could dismantle the trust that they had built with Fellows and other young people in the community. However, for some of the officers that I met with, this incident only proved their theory: ONS staff were "corrupt" and not really "out the game" like they said they were because they were more interested in protecting "criminals" than anything else (Fieldnote). Some officers also expressed frustration with what they perceived as a lack of effectiveness, as the only formal study at that point had been a process, not outcomes-based evaluation (see Wolfe et al., 2015 for more information). Recent popular media attention seemed to generate pushback from law enforcement as well. For instance, while I was conducting fieldwork, there was a small segment on the infotainment news

program, "The Daily Show" about ONS, the Fellowship, and its slated replication in Stockton, California. During a Ceasefire Working group meeting, the officers that were present in the room disparaged the segment and scoffed at the idea that ONS and the Fellowship – and not strategic police work or other community interventions, like Ceasefire – were the "real reasons" as to why gun violence has gone down in the city (Fieldnote). Most other Ceasefire volunteers nodded their heads, but they rarely spoke negatively about the ONS during interviews or informal conversations since they were essentially working toward the same goal, just with different methods.

City officials assumed a similar stance: despite complaints among law enforcement and some residents, political support remained strong. Part of their willingness to embrace the Fellowship and ONS was ideological, as many believed that gun violence prevention should be approached from a public health perspective, with law enforcement providing one – though not only – solution to the problem. Support was also rooted in experience and faith in the ONS' logic model. For instance, Ron shared during our interview that he was unbothered by the "turf" issues concerning ONS and police, and by the "elusive metrics[15]" that police or other critics pointed to because:

> At the end of the day, you just have to go with your gut…It's clear that the homicide rate in Richmond has been turning downward since ONS…but you tell people that and they're like, "Well, it's been trending down all over the U.S.; that's part of the national trend. Show me the proof they're effective." You can't do it. But neither can you show that it's not working. And it's not costing us that much…[so] I'm going to continue to support it.

[15] While Matthay et al., 2019 was not out while I was conducting fieldwork, this study provides new quasi-experimental evidence demonstrating that reductions in gun assaults and homicide are statistically related to ONS implementation – confirming existing claims and descriptive analyses by ONS staff and city officials that the program has indeed been effective (See Advance Peace, 2020; NCCD, 2018; and Wolf et al., 2015 for process and outcome evaluations). Sacramento and Stockton, who have since replicated the Fellowship model, have also recently released outcomes analyses that support the Fellowship's positive impact at reducing gun violence (Coburn & Fukatome-Lopez, 2019, 2020).

Taken together, analyses suggest that ONS and the Peacemaker Fellowship have been able to weather criticisms and tensions in part because political leaders have created a necessary buffer between otherwise oppositional city agencies. Given this level of political support – and the receipt of additional state funding in 2019 to replicate the Fellowship elsewhere – the Office will likely be around for the foreseeable future[16].

As a formal community-police intervention, the city's Ceasefire program has also enjoyed relatively stable backing from local political leadership, like the police chief, local assemblymen, and city council. However, unlike ONS, Ceasefire is not directly supported by the city's general fund; rather, the city *indirectly* funds Ceasefire by paying for "law enforcement staffing and overtime" (City Official). Funding for program coordination, service provider participation, and case management has largely come from two grants: one two-year grant in 2011 and another two-year grant in 2016. A reliance on soft money brings with it a host of problems, including financial uncertainty once a grant cycle lapses. Yet the funding issues that Ceasefire faced were not so much about the source of funding (or even gaps in funding), rather they centered around *who* controlled the funding once received, and *how* that money was ultimately spent.

Much of what I have gathered about how funds were allocated comes from interviews with police officers and community leaders involved with the strategy, and descriptions of funding streams and challenges were relatively consistent across stakeholders. According to several Ceasefire volunteers, city officials, and law enforcement involved with the project, money from the first grant supported "staffing within law enforcement"; "a chairperson for the

[16] As of 2019, the Peacemaker Fellowship program – under the guidance of former ONS director, Devone Boggan and his non-profit organization, Advance Peace –have been implemented in Sacramento and Stockton. Both cities received similar state funding through the Board of State and Community Corrections Cal VIP grant program.

working group"; "some community-based organizations"; and travel for training. A dedicated coordinator and case manager position was not funded until the second grant came through in 2016, even though the community was promised a paid coordinator position with the first grant. By this point, however, tensions with law enforcement *and* within Ceasefire's organizing team had intensified. Malcolm, a Ceasefire Volunteer bluntly said during our interview that "the community was actually played by the city":

> Ceasefire is making this impact, right; they have all these people around the table. But then they [the police] get this grant, they get this money, and the majority of that money went to law enforcement for overtime! How do you sustain that type of engagement in the community when people can't pay their rent, [and] don't have jobs? It's a no brainer! When you get money to sustain a program like that, it should not go to law enforcement. From day one the money began to go to law enforcement, and from day one law enforcement held Operation Ceasefire…and their plan was to do exactly what I believed has been done: that money went to overtime, to busting guys, and to surveillance.

Renee, a local community leader, expressed similar concerns with funds allocation, yet she also pointed to a decrease in community representation once it was determined that certain service providers and community leaders would not receive funding:

> Let's just be honest…Ceasefire had a lot of money attached to it in the beginning. People were at the table, clergy, service providers. Everybody thought they were gonna get some money, so everybody was on board. But when the money didn't come through, you had a lot of people walk away from the table. Especially faith leaders…[And] with community governance dwindling, it was more in control of law enforcement.

The frustrations expressed by community leaders are understandable – for nearly five years, the program had no official coordinators, and volunteers had to balance life and other competing demands with their commitments to Ceasefire. However, there also seemed to be a sense of betrayal and broken promises– both from law enforcement and the community itself, as Jerry, a local pastor, articulated:

> I think the agendas that the [different community leaders] brought to the table shifted, and it shifted away of from being authentically concerned about these young men who

> are out here in the streets shooting themselves to, what's in it for me? And as you probably observed, whenever you see things happen, it's easier to blame people than it is to take responsibility. And we just never saw folks stepping up taking responsibility for the deteriorating state of our mission.

On the one hand, the above quote illustrates the expectation by some community stakeholders that commitment to the "mission" should not be swayed by compensation, or the lack thereof. On the other hand, as Malcolm argued earlier, people cannot work for free, especially when they do not have steady employment to begin with. What's more, when the time came to hire two staff for Ceasefire, community leaders felt that they did not have final say in the decision – reinforcing yet again that the perception that police had ultimate control over the initiative.

This dynamic between police and community is not new; Richmond, like many other high-crime communities, has a long and complicated history with law enforcement (e.g., Jones, 2018; Leverentz and Williams, 2016; Vargas, 2016). Though some residents, police, and community leaders admit that relations are better than they were in the 1990s and early 2000s, general mistrust of law enforcement was a key roadblock to Ceasefire's development and long-term sustainability. From the very beginning, community leaders shared that they were afraid that steady collaboration with law enforcement would jeopardize the legitimacy of their organization and/or their own professional reputation among the justice-involved populations that they served. There were also several incidents that occurred during Ceasefire's early implementation years that fanned the flames of mistrust. For example, several Ceasefire stakeholders noted that the city hall fight referenced earlier pushed ONS staff to sever their relationship with the initiative, even though they were one of the original partners, because continued partnership would demand collaboration with police. There was also a police sting that involved several call-in participants and, consequently, heightened stakeholder reluctance to affiliate with the program:

> There was a major law enforcement action where they [the police] wire tapped several gang member's telephones and they were swooped up. Because of the heat that the community was giving law enforcement behind that action, a lot of the partners just walked away from the table because they didn't wanna stand unified and be known as an agency working with law enforcement who just swept up 12 African-American men on conspiracy charges. You were taking grave marketing risk, so a number of people walked off. (Nick, Community Leader)

Though some police officers that I interviewed recognized the backlash produced by the sting, it was ultimately a blow they were willing to take. Indeed, Officer Ricardo argued that the sting captured exactly what the program was designed to do: "Ceasefire is there to help, and these guys obviously don't want help. So, we are going to go out and take them off the street just like we said we were." Though blunt, this officer is in many ways correct given Ceasefire's logic model: if participants do not comply with the law, police are expected to "pull every lever" at their disposal to ensure not just swift, but increased punishment.

What the above example highlights is that community stakeholder disagreement about the sting, and law enforcement participation more generally, was not just a manifestation of legal cynicism, it was a disagreement over program objectives, participant roles, and expectations. It became clear over the course of my fieldwork that one camp of community stakeholders wanted to implement a Cure Violence model, where law enforcement was only leveraged or involved as a last resort. Others advocated for the Ceasefire model, and were willing to "sit at the table" and work with police not because they wanted heightened or even targeted enforcement, but because they understood that the repair of police-community relations was essential to improving public safety within Richmond overall. Indeed, several stakeholders, like Jerry quoted below, noted that improved relationships between police and community leaders was one of the key outcomes of the Ceasefire:

> We worked hard to build trust among the working group, between the community stakeholders, and law enforcement. We learned early that for us to be effective out here

> in the streets, we better get ourselves together around this table. It's like basketball. If you don't have a good locker room, when you go out on the court, you ain't gonna to have a good team. So, we did the locker room work...And over the course of them years, meeting every week, I mean we wouldn't even take off in the summer, we built trust.

Had some semblance of trust not been built, it is highly unlikely that stakeholders would have remained at the table for as long as they did. It is also unlikely (at least according to some participants that I interviewed) that other subsequent community actions – like protests against the county's proposed jail expansion – would have been successful.

> We were able to get the fucking [police] Chief to oppose the jail because of the relationships we had built with him through Ceasefire; and because of the credibility we built...It was the first ever jail expansion that was defeated in the state of California in the era of realignment…Literally the Chief was the deciding vote…The relational capital that we all developed [through Ceasefire] made a fundamental difference (Travis, Community Leader).

The tensions stakeholders described (and that I also observed first hand) reveal the immense challenges that communities of color experience when devising partnerships with law enforcement. While community leaders may have learned to trust some law enforcement actors though Ceasefire, their collaboration also inadvertently damaged the trust that these leaders had established with the communities that they most closely served. These tradeoffs, some might argue, are necessary if relations are to be mended and progress be made. Nonetheless, as Nikki Jones (2018) and other scholars (e.g., Leverentz & Williams, 2016; Vargas, 2016) have found in their own work on community crime-fighting, "the intertwining of law enforcement and 'the community'" may ultimately continue "to exacerbate fault lines" if the work being done serves more to facilitate young people's containment and confinement than their personal development (p.171).

Despite frustrations and disappointments, many of the Ceasefire stakeholders that I interviewed vowed to continue their work against gun violence even after grant funding was set

to expire in June 2018. Though they were unsure whether they would continue with the Ceasefire model or something else entirely, volunteers did consistently vocalize in interviews and in meetings that the grassroots work needed to continue. In an effort to avoid some of the tensions experienced at the outset of development, they also generally agreed that the community needed to regain control of the effort, leverage youth in the next stage of planning, and increase Latino representation in Ceasefire (Fieldnote). In fact, when I ended fieldwork in late January 2018, a group of ten residents and community leaders were organizing an appreciation event that would both recognize those that had been involved with Ceasefire throughout the years, and serve as a brainstorming event to discuss what the next phase of community engagement around gun violence in Richmond could look like. I met with several of these Ceasefire stakeholders in July to follow up on the grant's expiration and next steps. The appreciation event, unfortunately, was put on hold after a revered community leader passed away, and after several community leaders moved away. Mistrust between community leaders, and with law enforcement, also seemed to taint stakeholders' willingness to get involved in a new effort, especially if power dynamics between the two groups did not change.

DISCUSSION

In June of 2019, nearly one year after I completed all fieldwork activities, *The Guardian* released its first report from a year-long investigation that examined gun violence reduction in San Francisco Bay Area from 2007 to 2017. Their project, much like my dissertation, was launched in efforts to explore "the dynamics behind the decline, as well as the people and programs helping to curb the violence" (Beckett et al., 2019). Richmond is one of several cities that they highlight in their investigation. In their own consultation with residents, community leaders, and experts, their reports largely echo the findings I present in this chapter – "investment

in local prevention strategies" has been a "key change" driving gun violence downward in Richmond and the greater Bay Area. Their reports highlight grassroots, resident-led initiatives – including an active shooter training organized by a resident from a Richmond housing complex – as well as more formal strategies like ONS' Peacemaker Fellowship. Yet despite this well-deserved attention to local intervention in the Bay, the journalists on this project failed to capture the history and breadth of gun violence prevention efforts in Richmond and the other cities that they showcased in their study. Though this may be hard to do in the context of an investigative series, academics rarely do better, as they also tend to focus on a limited number and type of programs, like Ceasefire or hot-spot policing, when studying gun violence prevention.

This chapter provides a model for examining community crime control in a more holistic and grounded way by considering the organizations, formal programs, grassroots community actions, relationships, and shifting contexts that have inspired the development of local gun violence prevention in a particular city. If I had taken the common approach of analyzing a single program, like ONS or Ceasefire, I would not have been able to document how residents and community leaders have progressively built a diverse, community-based network around gun violence reduction over the last fifteen years. I would have especially missed the informal community actions that brought residents together to demand change. As Sampson et al (2005) argue, by taking stock of informal organizing efforts in a neighborhood or city scholars are better able to "chart the variable nature and community structure of collective action" (pg. 675). Importantly, this approach can push scholars expand what they think "counts" as crime prevention – providing space to appreciate what some might otherwise characterize as "inefficient" or "ineffective" crime control measures simply because are designed to be temporary (Putnam et al., 2004, p.270). By constraining our empirical attention to a single

program, or even a characteristic of informal social control (e.g., trust, ties, collective efficacy), scholars may ultimately underestimate and/or mischaracterize the breadth, depth, and power of collective crime fighting capacity in a given community.

My findings also demonstrate that community actions around gun violence in Richmond helped to establish the relational foundation necessary for building broader and more comprehensive strategies. The Youth Needs Assessment, for example, informed the creation of the RYSE Center, a multi-service non-profit that addresses gun violence through mentorship, counseling, and youth engagement. By contrast, grassroots efforts like Richmond NOW and Ground Zero directly and indirectly facilitated Ceasefire's development by building key relationships among clergy such that when CCISCO began to advocate for Ceasefire and request that the faith community take part, organizers did not have to build such relationships (or a baseline level of trust) from scratch. To put this process in more sociological terms, the aforementioned community actions allowed residents and clergy to develop "bonding social capital" among each other, whereas Youth Together and CCISCO provided the space to develop "bridging social capital" among actors, organizations, and city agencies outside of one's immediate community (Putnam et al., 2004).

In addition to demonstrating the pivotal role of grassroots community action, my findings speak to the power of the parochial in building community capacity generally and around gun violence specifically. CCISCO was integral to Ceasefire, yet they also helped train the resident organizers that founded Safe Return, the Ya-Neema Healing Circle, and the Save our Sons and Daughters group (See Appendix A). Youth Together provided moral support and human resources to the Richmond youth that conducted the Youth Needs Assessment, and became a steady partners in the creation of the RYSE Center. Faith-based organizations were also

instrumental in the development of over half of the initiatives in the network – as they brought both their human and social capital to support advocacy and capacity building campaigns around gun violence.

At times, parochial organizations also partnered with public agencies and actors, like the Richmond Police Department or County Supervisor's Office, in order to get an initiative off the ground. Generally speaking, these public actors and agencies provided burgeoning grassroots efforts with the political and financial resources to grow from an informal community action into a formal program or community organization (e.g., RYSE and ONS). Ceasefire was the only initiative in this group that required their public agency partner to maintain an active role in their program's implementation. Consistent with other ethnographies of community crime control (e.g., Jones, 2018; Leverentz and Williams, 2016), this type of public-parochial partnership proved challenging because of long-standing tensions between the police and community. Even though stakeholders actively worked to break down these barriers through informal meetings, the Ceasefire working group, and quarterly Policing Town Halls that Ceasefire helped to organize (See Appendix A), collaboration with the police ultimately came at the cost of greater resident participation and further cynicism around partnership, especially from youth, young adults, and those with prior justice system involvement.

While my findings do not suggest any one path for making a police-community partnership effective, they do provide several key lessons – namely around funding – for other cities considering such violence prevention options and that also have a history of strained police-community relations. First, funding for the partnership should not be controlled by the police, even if they do receive a portion of it, because of how it can further reinforce the power differentials between law enforcement and the community. The Ceasefire model in neighboring

Oakland provides a key example of how this can be done: the city manager's office directly allocates funding to police, while service provider funding is managed by Oakland Unite (OU), a division of the city's Human Services Department (McLively & Nieto, 2019). This type of funding structure may create more bureaucracy, but it can help minimize the perception that the effort is run by the police. This brings me to my second lesson: local city councils must commit to funding the partnership (even if partially). In Oakland's case, city funding was available because of a voter-approved parcel tax known as Measure Y (and later Measure Z). This funding stream provided not only a more stable source of revenue, it helped to incentivize a level of accountability among city stakeholders (McLively & Nieto, 2019).

One potential barrier to such an investment in Richmond was that the city was already underwriting the Office of Neighborhood Safety; and Ceasefire was seen as a secondary, though complimentary gun violence reduction initiative. Lacking such skin in the game there was little motivation for the city to act as a buffer between law enforcement and the community, as it had with ONS, when tensions flared between volunteers, residents, and police. As such, when funding is provided, coordinators must budget for at several full-time, civilian staff to support implementation of program activities from the get go. The Richmond Ceasefire program did not gain any dedicated, paid staff until nearly four years after implementation. It is no surprise then that community leaders felt like they had little control over the program, as their value in the effort was not officially acknowledged via compensation like it was for police. At the end of the day, funding politics seemed to undermine the very real work and progress that had been made in building trust between law enforcement, residents, and community leaders within the Ceasefire partnership. Understanding such challenges, it is important for stakeholders to create a fair and

inclusive funding structure when developing police-community partnerships like Ceasefire (See McLively & Nieto, 2019 for examples from Oakland).

It is also important that cities not put all their proverbial eggs in one basket. Richmond has benefited from having a diverse network of gun violence reduction strategies that attacks the problem from different angles – from working with young trauma victims through the Beyond Violence Program, to helping the parents of gun violence victims cope through the Ya-Neema Healing Circle and Healed by Kosua (Akosua, 2019), to providing intensive mentorship to those directly involved with gun violence via the Peacemaker Fellowship. Identifying needs and developing interventions to work with the many populations affected by violence has been a gradual process – yet what all of the aforementioned strategies have in common is that they were developed with the help of non-profits and in partnership with people closest to the problem – city residents. As such, my findings suggest that there must be increased public and private investment for non-profit organizations dedicated to building community capacity. These organizations can teach residents how to build trust and social capital with government officials, residents, and community organizations; how to assess community needs and develop local campaigns that respond to such needs; and how to apply for and navigate external funding processes that can help sustain their agendas (Sharkey, 2018). When you invest in building relationships, and in training people how to advocate for themselves and their community, there will likely be spillover effects beyond the initial initiative that inspired collective action (Putnam, et al., 2004; Tran et al., 2013). Richmond provides a strong case for this, as they now have these types of strong capacity-building organizations (e.g., RYSE, Safe Return, Re-Entry Success Center, ONS), many of which were inspired by the problem of gun violence, and by public

safety concerns more generally. Today, these organizations work to address not just violence, but a variety of social injustices experienced by the city's most vulnerable populations.

Lastly, from a more theoretical standpoint, my findings suggest a need to re-examine the role that community organizations play in shaping in collective efficacy, crime patterns, and community crime control. At the moment, the study of collective efficacy centers largely around the individual resident– are *you* willing to intervene in a local squabble between youth; do *you* participate in any local community groups; do *you* trust your neighbors, etc. Yet as my study – and others (e.g., Sampson, 2012; Vargas, 2016) – have shown, collective efficacy is not just a manifestation of resident willingness or action, or a lack thereof. Collective efficacy – i.e., trust, cohesion, and willingness to engage – also exists *within* community organizations, and importantly, is facilitated by community organizations.

Recent studies assessing the impact of organizational density and funding on local crime patterns have started to attend to this empirical gap in the literature (e.g., Wo, 2016; Wo, 2019; Wo et al., 2016). However, my findings suggests is that it is not just the number of organizations (or how much money they bring in) that matters for building a community's capacity to engage in informal social control; what also matters are the organizations' explicit crime prevention activities, and how they work to connect residents and other institutions in the city, as these ties and activities are the conduits for linking both familiar and unfamiliar residents and community leaders that share common interests (Sampson & Graif, 2009; Tran et al., 2013). This finding and theoretical insight is not entirely new, but it is rather underappreciated in the study of informal social control, as Robert Sampson – one of the founding fathers of the collective efficacy– has argued (Sampson, 2013). Consistent with my findings here, he also found an "organizational effect" in his study of collective efficacy in Chicago, and contends that a more appropriate

conceptualization of the theory in the modern city is "cosmopolitan efficacy" – as it considers the distinct role that non-neighborhood organizations play in creating the interpersonal and interorganizational ties that can facilitate social cohesion and trust (Sampson, 2013, p. 21).

Though Richmond is much smaller than Chicago, it still faces many of the same social ills and dynamics of the larger modern metropolis, including increasing gentrification, segregation, and inequality. Not surprisingly then, Richmond residents –much like those in other urban areas (Leverentz and Williams, 2016; Sampson, 2012; Sharkey, 2018; Vargas, 2016) – have relied on community organizations to assist them in their fight against gun violence. Thus, as we move the study of collective efficacy forward, it is critical that scholars examine the cross-cutting ties, trust, and sense of cohesion among both individuals and community institutions in both neighborhoods and cities, whether the big, medium, or small (See Tran et al., 2013 for example on cross-cutting ties). As I have demonstrated with this study, one way to do this is by historically and relationally mapping what a city's informal crime control landscape looks like, as this process can reveal not only the breadth and depth of social ties among actors and organizations, but also the challenges and successes associated with developing and leveraging these ties to combat a problem like gun violence.

CONCLUSION

Despite recent changes in Richmond's gun violence reduction network, and the suspension of other strategies prior to my fieldwork activities, my findings suggest that Richmond has developed a robust multi-pronged approach to community-based gun violence reduction that involves varied forms of community engagement and public partnership. By employing a historical and relational mapping approach to studying community crime fighting in Richmond, this chapter demonstrates how city stakeholders have engaged in systemic social

organization and progressively built a deep sense of collective efficacy around the issue of gun violence. My analysis also demonstrates that parochial ties and organizations are the backbone to Richmond's gun violence reduction network, as it was the relationship-building and advocacy by residents and local community leaders that moved the city to invest in alternatives to gun violence prevention.

Importantly, Richmond was able to build a strong network to combat gun violence notwithstanding substantial demographic change and residential turnover (See Chapters 2 & 3). Though the development of Richmond's capacity to informally control crime was slow, it gradually grew from one community action to the next. Over time, residents, in partnership with local organizations and city leaders, were able to secure the political will and resources to get numerous programs and organizations off the ground – some of which have now become key institutions in the city in terms of their efforts to support violence prevention. Thus, while my data limits me from drawing any causal arguments, it is indeed possible that the city was able to stave off a resurgence of gun violence 2010s because the community mobilized itself to demand and realize change.

CHAPTER 5

CONTRIBUTIONS AND LESSONS FOR THE FIELD

When I stopped conducting fieldwork at the end of January 2018, there had not been a single homicide in Richmond that month. In fact, the last gun-related murder in the city was on November 14, 2017, after two people were fatally shot in a relatively quiet and safe neighborhood on north side of Richmond. The homicide lull extended for nearly four and a half months, which according to police records dating back to the 1970s, was unprecedented (Hurd, 2018). By the end of 2018, Richmond ended up rounding out the year with 17 murders, and another 17 in 2019, allowing the city to keep pace with its trajectory of gun violence decline since the start of the decade (Bay Area News Group, 2018, 2019; Hurd, 2020).

The general purpose of the present study was to examine how Richmond has moved from being one of the most infamously violent cities in the state to one that is now praised for its incredible and sustained reductions in gun-related crime. I pursued this question by engaging a diverse set of data sources and methods to identify the precise structural and relational forces that have shaped the city's varied history with gun violence since the turn of the century. Chapter 2 explores whether and to what extent to changes in neighborhood structural characteristics, like residential stability and concentrated disadvantage, have affected gun violence trends in the city from 2003-2017. I find that racial/ethnic change, and Black population change in particular, is the strongest predictor of gun violence patterns in the city pre-homicide decline (2003-2009), whereas young adult population change was the strongest predictor of gun violence patterns in the city post-decline (2009-2017). With respect to the former finding, I also document how changes in Latino composition and residential stability mediate the effect of Black population

change on gun violence, underscoring the importance of accounting for interaction effects when examining the relationship between neighborhood structure and crime.

Chapter 3 further unpacks the issue of racial/ethnic transition by turning to my qualitative sources, including in-depth interviews with community experts, newspaper articles, and reports. I focus specifically on the theme of Black displacement, which my respondents also characterized as a leading explanation shaping recent gun violence trends. In addition to identifying three sources for displacement that have unduly impacted the city's Black community – including housing access and affordability, intensified law enforcement pressure, and exposure to gun victimization – my findings indicate that these processes seem to matter for gun violence insofar as they weaken the social relations that can either trigger or prevent gun violence. The targeted displacement of young Black men via incarceration and restrictive probation conditions, for instance, has the potential to decrease gun crime by incapacitating dangerous individuals and by disrupting the place and group-based conflicts that commonly incite gun violence. However, these enforcement efforts can also strain the friendship and kinship networks that are central to the successful re-integration of justice-involved individuals, and to the informal social control of crime. Housing and victimization-related displacement can similarly disrupt social relationships within families and among residents that live in the neighborhoods most impacted by high residential turnover and violence.

Taken together, findings from these first two chapters identify a glaring and challenging social transformation that, for better or for worse, is related to gun violence patterns in the city. Since 2000, Richmond has lost almost half of its Black population. Contrary to what some other studies have found (e.g., Hipp & Kubrin, 2017; Morenoff & Sampson, 1997), Black population loss was statistically associated with a trend of *increasing, not decreasing* gun violence from

2003-2009. This relationship was particularly pronounced in places that observed large increases in their Latino population and greater levels of residential instability. Considering respondent discussions of Black displacement and social disorganization hypotheses regarding the consequences of racial/ethnic transition for crime, it is well within reason to conclude that gun violence increased between 2003-20009 (at least in part) because *ongoing displacement heightened social, not just residential, instability within Richmond's predominantly Black neighborhoods*. While it is not solely up to Black residents to informally control gun violence, social networks tend to be homophilic, and most incoming residents within high displacement neighborhoods have been Latino (McPherson et al., 2001). Trust and social cohesion among new and unlike neighbors also takes time develop, yet time is unfortunately not something that residents can force or manipulate. Concentrated Black displacement in the 2000s may have , thus, indirectly increased gun violence by making it difficult for residents, both old and new, Black and non-Black, to engage in effective neighborhood regulation.

Respondent claims that Black displacement was associated with decreased, rather than increased gun violence in the 2010s, however, were not supported by my statistical analyses. This inconsistency does not mean the continued out-migration of Black residents was insignificant; indeed, my findings point to an array of consequences for individual, family and community well-being. Rather, my findings seem to suggest that the city's development of a robust anti-gun violence network may have helped minimize the adverse consequences of continued displacement, both for gun violence and informal social control, by providing a platform for residents to engage in collective crime fighting strategies that did not rely solely on traditional within-neighborhood or within-group ties.

As I demonstrate in Chapter 4, this calculus started to shift in the mid-2000s as residents began to strategically demand change from local leaders, law enforcement, and their fellow residents. Temporary grassroots community actions, like Tent City in 2006, provided a platform for resident engagement that crossed neighborhood, religious, racial, and generational boundaries. Mobilization efforts, like the Youth Needs Assessment (2003) and the Richmond NOW Campaign (2011), also brought together residents and local organizations around a common purpose, generating both the momentum and relational capital necessary to build broader and more comprehensive strategies. Indeed, some of the city's longest-running strategies were informed by community actions – including the RYSE Center and Operation Ceasefire. These two efforts, along with the 22 other initiatives that I include in the city's anti-gun violence network, have managed to directly and indirectly affect gun violence by diffusing retaliations; providing social, material and emotional support to those traumatized by gun violence; creating new spaces to collaborate with and repair police-community relations; and by building community capacity to identify, design, and implement solutions that can more holistically reduce gun-related harm. Richmond's anti-gun violence network has, therefore, created numerous opportunities for marginalized residents to build a sense of collective efficacy outside their immediate neighborhood *and* in the midst of sweeping demographic change.

On that note, I want to emphasize that Black displacement emerged as a key finding within both my statistical and qualitative analysis because Black communities (for more reasons than I can fully explore here) have long been subjected to economic disinvestment, surveillance, and punishment – and consequently, gun violence, victimization, and the threat of displacement either by fear or force. The relationship that I identify reflects this history, and is not by any means a desirable or inevitable social reality. Even if the targeted removal of those that have

caused harm in the community helps to minimize retaliations or improve residents' perceptions of safety, these gains will likely be short-lived if there is not a social safety net in place to help young people productively manage the anger and pain that gun violence produces, and if left unaddressed, might otherwise lead them to pick up a gun. These supports may also, in return, reduce the frequency of racialized displacement – at least with respect to law enforcement and victimization-related pressures – because fewer people will arguably find themselves victimized and/or in the cross-hairs of law enforcement. As I previously discussed, Richmond has progressively built a social safety net for young people that are active or on the fringes of gun involvement; for individuals and families victimized by gun violence; and for individuals returning to the community from prison and jail. In this sense, this case study provides both a cautionary tale around Black displacement and gun violence, as well as a practical resource for residents and community leaders working to develop a community health and development-oriented approach to gun violence.

Theoretical Implications

Richmond's history with gun violence since the turn of the century is in many ways unique in that the city experienced a rapid increase in gun violence in the early 2000s while other cities observed the opposite trend. This escalation of gun violence lasted about ten years, with the city finally experiencing some reprieve after 2010. While there may not be many other cities with stories similar to Richmond's, this study provides several valuable lessons for scholars interested in advancing the study of neighborhood change and crime in the new millennium.

First, this study emphasizes the importance of attending to racial/ethnic transition within the study of local crime patterns in the post-crime decline era. Within Richmond's context, I specifically find that Black population loss was associated with increases in crime between 2003-

2009, and that this relationship was most pronounced in neighborhoods that also experienced simultaneous increases in residential stability and Latino composition. With the exception of Boggess (2017), who examines the mediating role of residential stability for racial/ethnic churning and crime in Los Angeles neighborhoods, no study to my knowledge has explored whether compositional changes in *one minority group* (e.g., Black) vary by changes in residential stability, or by changes in *another* minority group (e.g., Latino). This latter oversight presents a considerable gap in the literature given that Black Americans are increasingly living alongside Latino and Asian Americans in majority-minority neighborhoods and cities (See Logan & Zhang, 2010; Zhang & Logan, 2016). If scholars are to fully appreciate how racial/ethnic transition impacts crime in the new millennium, it is important that they consider the independent and interactive relationship between minority composition and crime across contexts and time periods (e.g., 1990-2000 v. 2000-2010 v. 2010-2020).

This study also extends the literature on informal social control in several key ways. For example, by considering a wider variety of engagement platforms and attending to both context and relationship, this study documents how a city like Richmond – a place affected by high crime, adverse police community relations, and rapid racial/ethnic transition – has managed to develop and sustain a robust network of anti-gun violence strategies over time. My findings particularly highlight the role of grassroots community action and resident collaboration with local non-profits in pushing city stakeholders to develop a deep sense of collective efficacy around the issue of gun violence prevention. That said, whereas most collective efficacy studies tend to focus on the individual resident and their willingness to control crime within their immediate neighborhood, this study demonstrates how collective efficacy is also generated in relationship with residents, local leaders, and organizations *outside* of one's neighborhood.

Moving forward, it is critical that scholars take stock of the cross-cutting ties, trust, and sense of cohesion that exists not just among individual residents, but also among organizations and actors within a city and/or region. In doing so scholars can more accurately capture the breadth, depth and power of a community's crime fighting capacity. Historically and relationally mapping the nature and development of a neighborhood and/or city's informal crime control landscape provides a novel approach for achieving this goal.

Moreover, while my findings support theoretical propositions that informal social control mediates the relationship between racial/ethnic transition and crime, my findings suggest that this effect varies largely by the types of social relations that are changed in the process. That is, if racial/ethnic change disrupts the anti-social and place-based networks that are commonly leveraged to incite gun violence, e.g., neighborhood gangs/cliques, crime may decrease as a result. However, violence might also increase if residents' pro-social networks are disrupted by concentrated racial/ethnic transition, as these friendship, kinship, and institutional ties are central to generating neighborhood social cohesion and collective efficacy. More explicit, in-depth research is needed to examine how racial/ethnic change restructures social relations on the ground, and consequently, how these changes impact both informal social control and crime.

Last but not least, this study provides a foundation for how researchers can further conceptualize and study processes of racialized displacement, especially Black displacement within urban communities. Incarceration, justice involvement, and victimization are rarely cited as sources of residential displacement (see Beckett & Herbert, 2010; Rose & Clear, 1998 for exceptions), perhaps because they impact only a small share the population. Instead, much of the literature has focused on pressures that are related to housing (e.g., foreclosure, housing costs, demolition, eviction), transit (e.g., highway construction), and urban investment/disinvestment

within a local community (see Zuk et al., 2015 for a review of the literature). However, as past studies (e.g., Rosen, 2017; Xie & McDowell, 2010) and the present analyses suggest, violent crime victimization does indeed place increased pressure on an individual or family to move for safety reasons. Black families are especially vulnerable to these pressures given that they are more often subject to violent crime victimization (and gun victimization, in particular) than any other racial/ethnic group. Incarceration, parole, and probation, as described in this study and elsewhere (Rose & Clear, 1998; Dhondt, 2012; Drakulich et al., 2012), can also coerce mobility by physically and unwillingly removing an individual for an extended period of time (i.e., though incarceration) or by establishing legal conditions (i.e., through geographic and association-related probation restrictions) that limit an individual or family's ability to reasonably stay in their home and/or community for fear of sanction. Nonetheless, justice-involvement and victimization pressures are rarely couched in terms of displacement – which is a process that occurs when a person or household is unable to remain at their current residence for reasons that are beyond their control (Zuk et al., 2015). By including crime victimization, incarceration, and justice involvement in the study of racialized displacement, scholars can think more broadly about the structural, institutional, and interpersonal forces that shape not only individual mobility decisions, but also general community processes like residential instability, racial/ethnic change, and violence.

Policy Implications

As Nikki Jones (2018) argues in her book, *The Lost Ones,* violence prevention in urban communities must transition from being a model of that relies primarily on containment and confinement to one that emphasizes capacity-building, particularly among young people and the disenfranchised. She cites Richmond's Office of Neighborhood Safety as a promising model

because of how it approaches violence prevention through a lens of "engagement, encouragement, and, above all things, love" (p.173). National organizations, like the Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, have also have acknowledged the benefits of the ONS and Peacemaker Fellowship model (Giffords Law Center, 2019; McLively & Nieto, 2019). Indeed, the approach has proven to be so compelling that two other cities in California – Sacramento and Stockton – have also created city offices with their own versions of the Fellowship and have started to see some success in shooting reductions (Coburn & Fukatome-Lopez, 2019, 2020). Investment in a city-sponsored agency dedicated to violence prevention, and that could focus exclusively on supporting young people at highest risk for gun violence, is a powerful starting point for any city looking to develop a community-based strategy to gun violence prevention. But, as findings from the present study demonstrate, it is just that – a starting point.

Gun violence is not a problem that can be addressed with a single solution because the ecology of gun violence involves more than just the shooter and the victim. Law enforcement is a part of this ecology, as are the families and communities that are forced to cope with the physical, social, and psychological costs of gun violence, whether in the form of victimization, the incarceration of loved one, or by living with a heightened sense of fear. Over the past 15 years, Richmond has developed a community-based approach to gun violence prevention that works with the various actors and institutions that make up this broader ecology. In addition to ONS and the Fellowship, Richmond has the RYSE Center and Beyond Violence program, both of which connect gun victims to resources that could aid in their physical and psychological recovery. While Ceasefire is no longer operational, this strategy provided a platform for robust community engagement, as well as a space to proactively repair tenuous police-community relations. Safe Return and the Re-Entry Success Center, on the other hand, have become central

advocacy and resource hubs for the city's justice involved population – whom, like young people, are vulnerable to the threat of arrest, incarceration, and gun violence when not adequately supported.

All of these strategies have been essential to helping the city *develop a multi-pronged and comprehensive approach to gun violence prevention that does not rely solely on containment or confinement*, *nor on a single program*. Importantly, most of the actions, programs, and strategies that I include in Richmond's network have prioritized the cause of individual and community development. With this in mind, I outline a series of recommendations for other communities and cities that are interested in designing or refining their own community-based approach to gun violence.

1. *Advocate for and invest in the development of local capacity building*. Though some scholars and violence prevention experts have argued that it's important to "start first" with discrete strategies that target the individuals at highest risk for violence, my findings (like those from other recent studies e.g., Vargas, 2016; Giffords Law Center, 2019) suggest that these types of interventions often get their start as the result of robust community mobilization. Both residents and local organizations came together through community actions like the Richmond NOW Campaign and Youth Needs Assessment to not only demand that city leaders invest in alternatives to crime prevention, but also to identify and design solutions that were more in-line with their needs and values as a community. Put simply, if community engagement has proven to be such a powerful catalyst for inspiring the various initiatives that are now lauded as violence prevention models, both communities and funding agencies should advocate for and invest in the development of local capacity building. For funders, this means prioritizing ventures that

will train residents to become local leaders that can develop advocacy campaigns, conduct community research, and collaborate with city leaders to realize agendas that are informed by community voices. For residents and/or organizations looking to start or refine a discrete violence intervention, this means integrating capacity-building as both a strategic aim and outcome of said strategy. Without a consistent focus on engagement and capacity-building, community-based prevention strategies may lose the support of residents, as well as buy-in from current or incoming city leaders that may or may not believe in supporting the community's chosen strategy. At the end of the day, community mobilization is what ultimately keeps political will for community-based intervention alive.

2. *Create a city-funded office (much like the ONS) that can focus exclusively on the social, emotional, and human development of the small group of young people that are actively involved in or at highest-risk for gun violence.* The ONS, much like Cure Violence, has been successful because it has been able to maintain clear boundaries from law enforcement, and because it gainfully employs a full staff of community members that can commit to the daily work of violence prevention. These community members typically have close ties to residents, the city, and street life. Some also have prior criminal histories. As one ONS staff member jokingly said during our interview, this is one of the few jobs where having a criminal record is actually desirable. While this hiring approach may ruffle some feathers, familiarity with and/or prior involvement in illicit activity is a valuable asset for the street outreach workers that are tasked with building trust among a group of people that are largely skeptical of government actors and entities. The hiring of individuals with criminal record histories also symbolically communicates

that the city values its justice-involved constituents, and that they have an important role to play in addressing the violence that they may have once been involved with. Moreover, having a city-sponsored office does not mean that all operations need to be fully funded by the city, but this should include salaries and building or office-related costs. This type of financial commitment can help prevent (or at the very least slow) program extinction if and/or when soft money dries up, yet it can also help the city to develop a system of accountability and transparency by way of systematic review (e.g., annual outcome and expenditure reports) to ensure the program goals are being met. In Richmond, the City Manager has allocated $1-1.5 million per year to support the program through the city's general fund. City leaders in Los Angeles also use general city funds to support the Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development, which has anchored the city's approach to community-based violence prevention over the last 13 years (See Advancement Project, 2011). Oakland and San Bernardino, on the other hand, have funded their respective city offices of violence prevention using funds from local tax measures. Though ballot measures may help generate funds in the short-term, these types of initiatives often include sunset periods, which can put local programs in financial jeopardy if the measure is not renewed. That said, if a city takes this approach, it is critical that they develop a long-term strategy that makes room for a more permanent and recurring appropriation from the city's general fund.

3. *Develop interventions that purposefully provide resources – financial, social, and psychological – to gun violence victims, including family members.* The existing financial services that a city or county provides (e.g., through a state-funded victims compensation fund) are woefully inadequate because they depend on successful prosecution for an

injured party to file a restitution claim. However, when put against a backdrop of tenuous police-community relations, successful prosecution can be quite challenging. Gun violence victims often need immediate support, and both formal programs and informal social support groups can provide valuable resources that do not rely on the legal system. The Ya-Neema Healing Circle and Healed by Kosua are two informal support groups that I identified in my research, and they have primarily helped mothers and women that are struggling with the loss of a loved one to gun violence. Beyond Violence, on the other hand, is a formal, hospital-based program that provides individualized case management services for gun victims as they transition back to the community. As the adage goes, hurt people hurt people, and if the physical and mental health of gun victims and their families are not prioritized, gun violence will remain an intractable problem.

4. *When employing a focused-deterrence model that relies on regular police-community collaboration, it is important that funding for the partnership remain separate from law enforcement, and that sufficient funds be allocated to hire a dedicated team of community workers that can commit to executing program goals.* As I discussed in Chapter 4, funding politics exacerbated already fragile relations between law enforcement and Ceasefire volunteers because the police department controlled all funding received to implement the program. Though funds were apportioned to support the time of some organizational volunteers, and eventually two paid civilian staff from 2016-2018, a significant share of funding went to police overtime. However, law enforcement are not tasked with engaging the program's target population on a regular basis via case management, nor with executing most other strategic activities for the program (e.g., coordinating the call in; identifying community resources for clients; setting up vigils for

gun victims; educating the community about Ceasefire). If community members are not fairly compensated for their time, the program not only runs the risk of poor implementation, it can further fan the flames of mistrust between law enforcement and the community. To avoid these potential pitfalls, cities should administer funding streams so that budget allocations are made by a more neutral body like the City Manager's Office (See McLively & Nieto, 2019 for additional lessons on how Oakland, California's Ceasefire has managed funding as well as police-community relations).

Moreover, given the salient theme of racial/ethnic change and Black displacement within my findings, I encourage city officials and community leaders to take stock of how local policies and practices might encourage racialized displacement. Richmond-based non-profits and community leaders have recently started this process by working with regional organizations to assess local migration patterns and the scope of gentrification in Richmond, as well as to identify strategies that can promote community belonging rather than displacement (See Bissell & Moore, 2018; Moore et al., 2018). Community stakeholders have also developed various housing campaigns focused on access and affordability issues in the city, including an initiative that resulted in the passage of local rent control ordinance. These are all necessary and noteworthy activities that can help the city develop inclusive housing policies and minimize the threat of displacement, particularly among the city's most vulnerable populations.

As my findings suggest, it is also important that local leaders center justice-involvement in policy conversations around housing and racialized displacement. Incarceration, for example, temporarily displaces residents from their community and result not just in housing instability for a family (Leibbrand et al., 2019), it can progressively erode the social relations and trust that

undergird neighborhood collective efficacy (Drakulich et al., 2012). Exclusionary practices, like geographic and association-based probation restrictions, can also set the stage for displacement by effectively criminalizing the social and geographic ties that enable housing stability and belonging. If your mother, for example, lives in an apartment complex that is associated with an identified gang, you are violating the terms of your probation if you return home. If your brother, cousin, or friend is labeled a gang member, you are violating your probation if you have contact with them. Relocating to another city under these conditions ultimately constitutes a form of displacement because of how the threat of legal sanction makes this response a more viable option than staying put. The aforementioned probation restrictions can also result in the targeted, racialized displacement of minority groups given that Black and Latino residents in urban communities are more likely to be subject to increased surveillance, policing, and punishment. Thus, even if displacement is the unintended consequence of criminal justice policy, it is still important for local leaders to consider how strategies aimed at deterring and/or punishing of gun-related crime may facilitate the disparate removal of Black residents or other demographic groups.

Moving Forward

Despite Richmond's many successes around gun violence reduction, all respondents shared that the city still has a lot of work to do. People are still being shot, young men are still being aggressively policed and punished, and families are still being displaced. As one city employee and former resident posed at the end of our interview, the looming question at the forefront of her mind and that of other residents, organizers, and city leaders is: "What's going to happen to Richmond next now that violence has declined?" How does the city pursue violence prevention without displacing its most socially and economically vulnerable residents? How

does the city responsibly promote economic development within a context of rising housing costs and gentrification? As I previously explained, community stakeholders are starting to tackle these questions in robust, community-driven ways. Continued in-depth research on violence reduction and community development is needed to understand the impact of these policies and/or local decisions. The aforementioned questions also present important areas of inquiry for academics interested in examining the future of gun violence production and prevention in other contexts, especially in places observing increased socioeconomic inequality and demographic transition. By leveraging a diverse set of qualitative and quantitative data and methods, this study provides a strong methodological and theoretical foundation for exploring these issues.

APPENDIX A. NETWORK STRATEGY DESCRIPTIONS

Format	Initiative Name	Description	Dates
Organization	Re-Entry Success Center	Re-entry service hub that provides the formerly incarcerated with social support and information regarding employment, housing, substance abuse treatment, education and training opportunities, and legal services that may help their transition back to society. The Center is funded by Assembly Bill 109 (i.e., re-alignment) money from the state.	2015-Present
	Safe Return	Advocacy and capacity-building organization that works to reform local and state criminal justice practices. The organization trains formerly incarcerated folks to lead advocacy efforts; hosts informational and community building activities that can improve support for the formerly incarcerated; and serves as a representative voice for Richmond's formerly incarcerated population on county and city-run committees around criminal justice issues.	2010-Present
	Office of Neighborhood Safety (ONS)	City office of gun violence prevention. Strategies include(d) street & school outreach; violence interruption; community partnerships; and criminal justice activism/participation. (Note: Office opened in late 2007, but outreach did not begin until April 2008)	2008-Present
	RYSE	Created by and for youth, RYSE offers an array of social, educational, and emotional support services for Richmond youth. All of RYSE's programmatic areas have advocacy and leadership components, with a focus on improving the overall well-being city youth. Program areas include: Education & Justice; Youth Organizing; Community Health; and Media, Arts, & Culture.	2007-Present
	Richmond Police Activities League (PAL)	Provides a variety of youth development, and crime intervention and prevention programs for youth ages 10-18. Programming includes mentorship, life skills classes, literacy classes, sports and recreation, and field trips. Have prior partnerships with the ONS and RYSE focused explicitly on crime prevention via mentorship, counseling, and recreation.	1982-Present
	CCISCO (Contra Costa Interfaith Supporting Organization)	A multi-ethnic, multi-generational, interfaith federation of 25 congregations across Contra Costa county. Established in 1996, CCISCO has organized residents, community organizations, and the faith community in Richmond around numerous issues, including gun violence, immigration reform, health care access, criminal justice reform, and other community improvement projects. CCISCO was the primary organization that helped develop and implement Operation Ceasefire in Richmond.	1996-2018

	Terrence Kelly Youth Foundation	The Foundation provides community outreach for children and youth ages 5 – 17 through a variety of cultural, educational and community outreach programs. Foundation was created after Terrance Kelly was gunned down in Richmond. Landrin Kelly, Terrance's father and founder of the organization, was killed in an assault in 2017, leaving the future of the organization uncertain.	2005-2017
	Richmond Improvement Association	Faith-based service and advocacy organization focused on addressing social problems in the city, like violence and the reintegration of the formerly incarcerated. They helped coordinate various anti-gun violence community actions in the city in mid-2000s, including the Black-on-Black Crime Summit and Tent City.	1999-n.d.
Program	Peacemaker Fellowship	Street outreach and mentorship model run by the ONS that provides intensive social support and services to a select group of individuals involved with or at-risk for gun violence. The Fellowship lasts approximately 18-months, and includes mentorship from ONS staff and local elders; life mapping; education and job training and placement assistance; substance abuse treatment; travel opportunities; and financial incentives.	2010-Present
	Beyond Violence Program (BVI) & Restorative Pathways Project (R2P)	The Beyond Violence program is a hospital-based intervention program that provides trauma patients ages 14-25 who are victims of intentional injuries, including gun injuries, with a case manager to assist with follow-up care and their transition back into the community. The programs is run by John Muir Health in partnership with the RYSE Center, which provides the case management for Richmond patients through their Restorative Pathways Project.	2010 – Present
	Operation Ceasefire	Focused deterrence model that targets individuals with a history of gun and/or gang activity for intervention. Utilizes police-community partnerships to provide deterrence message and services for those that wish to participate. Community building and campaigning around the issue of gun violence are also a core component of the strategy, including weekly "night walks" & vigils for gun violence victims.	2011-2018
	Policing Town Halls	Funded by a state community policing grant, the Policing Town Halls were intended to build dialogue between law enforcement and the community. Town halls typically involved a panel of speakers, including local Richmond police, the local District Attorney's office, community organization leaders, faith leaders, and residents.	2016-2018

Community Actions	Ya-Neema Healing Circles	Initiative organized by a Richmond resident to provide a therapeutic space for those directly & indirectly victimized by gun violence. Assistance with county resource navigation (e.g., Victims of Violent Crime fund) also provided. Initiative is an outgrowth of Operation Ceasefire activities.	2017-Present
	Healed by Kosua	Initiative organized by a Richmond resident to provide healing spaces for mothers that have lost loved ones to gun violence. The group also provides activities and nutrition for youth in the community.	Present
	Save Our Sons & Daughters	Initiative organized by a local pastor to gather community members and local resources that could raise awareness about gun violence. Activities focused largely around block parties and community building.	2017-2018
	Richmond Now Campaign	A one-year campaign led by CCISCO to canvass the Richmond community and "develop a total plan for safety and opportunity." The plan, which included a call to law enforcement and the city to implement Operation Ceasefire, was the result of over 1750 "relational meetings" with residents and research meetings with public officials, policy experts, and elected leaders.	2011
	Ground Zero	Initiative created following a high-profile funeral shooting at New Gethsemane Church in Richmond. Designed to build alliances across city agencies (i.e., ONS) and Richmond's faith-based community to better address gun violence. Strategies included community needs assessments, relationship building, and resource referral.	2010
	Not Today	24-hour vigil that brought together 6 parishes, residents, and community organizations to protest gun violence. Activities and booths hosted at each church that provided information on housing, education, and health.	2008
	Tent City	6-week long encampment organized by the Richmond Improvement Association and residents to call attention to the city's gun violence epidemic and keep watch of neighborhoods heavily affected by gun violence.	2006
	Black-on-Black Crime Summit	One-day conference organized by the Richmond Improvement Association to provide a forum for understanding and developing solutions to address gun violence. Conference attendees included 35 community groups, clergy, residents and police officials.	2005
	City Hall Protest	Gathering of nearly 600 residents at city hall on June 21, 2005 to demand that the city do something to addressing rising violence in the city. Residents provided testimony regarding the impact of violence on their lives.	2005
	Youth Needs Assessment	Youth-led survey of nearly 1,500 Richmond youth to determine what they need to feel safe and secure in the city. The Youth Center in Oakland served as "adult allies" and helped youth in the process. The assessment provided foundation for creation of the RYSE Youth Center.	2003

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