

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

"War by other means"

Military base return and the local politics of realignment on Okinawa Island

1995-present

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Urban Planning

by

Daniel Akihiro Iwama

2023

© Copyright by

Daniel Akihiro Iwama

2023

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

"War by other means"

Military base return and the local politics of realignment on Okinawa Island

1995-present

by

Daniel Akihiro Iwama

Doctor of Philosophy in Urban Planning

University of California, Los Angeles, 2023

Professor Karen N. Umemoto, Chair

Since WWII Okinawa Island has remained one of the densest global outposts of US militarism.

Over seventy-percent of all US military land throughout Japan is concentrated in Okinawa

Prefecture – the formerly independent Ryukyu Kingdom – on less than one-percent of the

country's land base. This dissertation examines the phenomenon of Indigenous repossession

that occurs when militarized land is reclaimed by those from whom it was dispossessed.

Specifically, I ask: *What has been the effect of military base return on Okinawans' relationships*

with land and strategies of resistance under the US and Japanese governments' post-1995

regime of base realignment? Using a mixed-methods embedded case study methodology and

eighteen months of fieldwork including discourse analysis, interviews and social movement

participation I present three substantive sections. My historical entry-point is an archival study of

militarist dispossession in the first decade of US military occupation following the Battle of

Okinawa. Then, I offer two contemporary embedded cases. The first of these examines the

return of the US Army's Awase Meadows Golf Club in Kitanakagusuku Village and its subsequent redevelopment into what at the time was Okinawa's largest Western-styled shopping mall. The second case study examines the sit-in against the construction of a new "replacement facility" in the northern village of Henoko, which was made a necessary condition for the yet unrealized return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Ginowan City under the US-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa's *Final Report*. I argue that the return of military land produces no necessary reversal of the territorial alienation and uneven exposure to violence that Okinawans have experienced over seventy-eight years of military occupation. Instead, novel forms of occupation and continuities of colonial violence emerge even in periods of purported demilitarization. Okinawans participate flexibly in this regime of return, negotiating mainstream planning processes and participating in protest to realize myriad benefits from economic empowerment to cultural reconstruction in the wake of Japanese and American colonialisms. Findings from this dissertation emphasize the necessity of understanding the procedural dynamics of military land reform in conjunction with the larger political frame of reterritorialization in which resurgent Indigenous peoples are engaged.

The dissertation of Daniel Akihiro Iwama is approved.

Ananya Roy

Ayano Ginoza

Keith Lujan Camacho

Karen N. Umemoto, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2023

For my grandmothers,
Takako Uehara & Colleen Brass

Table of Contents

List of Tables	viii
List of Figures	ix
Abbreviations and Explanations of Terms	x
Acknowledgements	x
Biographical Sketch.....	xiii
Chapter One: Introduction.....	1
Methodology: Defining the Case	10
Guiding Questions	10
Positionality and Research in the Homeland as Sukubun.....	11
Single-Embedded Case Study	18
Description of the Case	19
Data & Collection Methods.....	32
Chapter Two: Reconfiguring the Military Frontier.....	40
Recovering Militarized Land	40
Bases, Planning and Territory Effects.....	48
Chapter Three: “War by Others Means”: Planning Militarist Dispossession on Okinawa Island (1945-1955).....	56
Introduction.....	56
Colonial Formations	59
Towards a Legal Identity	62
Controlling Movement to Settle Land	67
From Occupation to Governance	76
Birth of a “landed gentry”.....	89
Returning “the Ferro-Concrete Structures of a Western Civilization”	92
Conclusions	99
Chapter Four: Fighter Jets to Food Courts: Flexible Repossession of a Military Leisure- scape	103
Prologue	103
Introduction.....	104
Portrait of a “Host” Community: Kitanakagusuku Village	105
Base History & Background of Return.....	108
Post-war marketization of Okinawan land	113
Landowners’ Memories & Political Orientation.....	119
Redevelopment Process	123
Militarized Land Readjustment.....	128
Preparing Fields for Malls (“live, rent, sell”).....	129
Consensus-based decision-making	133
Repairing Unnatural Ecologies.....	137
Conclusions.....	140
Chapter Five: Resistance to Realignment.....	144
Introduction.....	146
Burden reduction or “bait”?.....	151
“Killing the dead twice”	156

Women speaking.....	162
Limits of participation.....	168
Conclusion.....	171
Chapter 6: Conclusion	174
Appendix A: Sample Interview Rubric	184
Appendix B: Enumeration of Research Interactions.....	186
Appendix C: Japan MoD normative process of land return	189
References	190

List of Tables

1	Land Returns: 1996, Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report....	28
2	Land Returns: 2013, Consolidation Plan for Land Return South of Kadena Airbase...	29
3	Land Returns: 1990, "23 Cases".....	30
4	Interviews.....	36
5	Participation Events.....	38

List of Figures

1 Zones of Realignment, Okinawa Island.....	20
2 Geographic Scope: Okinawa Island military coverage and realignment focus.....	26
3 Cover Image of the XXIV US Marine Corps Action Report.....	63
4 US Military Government Map of redistricted Okinawa Island.....	69
5 Controlling Movement: Okinawa Master Plan, Base Development.....	73
6 Disapproval of Release Area (map).....	75
7 Disapproval of Release Area (communique).....	75
8 Jurisdiction vs. Leased land 1945-1950.....	82
9 Pre-/Post-War Landscape Contrast	97
10 US Forces Awase Meadows Golf Club Redevelopment, Kitanakagusuku Village... ..	107
11 AEON Mall Okinawa RYCOM: Commemorative plaques.....	112
12 Japan MoD Rental Payments to Military Landowners: Nationwide vs. Okinawa.....	115
13 Contract vs. No Contract Military Land Landowners (Okinawa Prefecture).....	115
14 Realtor Billboard: "Buying Military Land!".....	118
15 Awase Meadows Golf Club, land readjustment.....	130
16 US Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma - Henoko Relocation.....	148
17 Gamafuyā Press Conference.....	160

Abbreviations and Explanations of Terms

ADC	Application for Design Change
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure Program
DoD	US Department of Defense
FRF	Futenma Replacement Facility
Front of the Gate	Literal translation of “ <i>gēto mae</i> ,” in reference to the gathering location of the Henoko sit-in
GI	Government Issue. Colloquialism for military personnel
GRI	Government of the Ryukyu Islands
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MCAS Futenma	US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma
MG	Military Government
MoD	US Ministry of Defense
ODB	Okinawa Defense Bureau
OPG	Okinawa Prefectural Government
OWAAMV	Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence
POW	Prisoner of War
RYCOM	US Army’s Ryukyus Command
SACO	US-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa
SCC	US-Japan Security Consultative Committee
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
Sukubun	Responsibility (Uchināguchi)
Two Governments	Barring further qualification, I refer to the US and Japan, as in the popular usage of “ <i>nichi-bei ryō seifu</i> ” (Japan-US both governments)
UN	United Nations
USFJ	United States Forces Japan
USCAR	United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands

Acknowledgements

In the course of writing this dissertation, I've incurred too many debts to track. To those who have been alongside me as I've moved through this work and whose names I've failed to include here, please forgive me and know that I owe you as much as I do anyone else.

At UCLA my committee offered unparalleled support. Karen Umemoto taught me about community research and always mentored beyond the usual suite of academic assistance. Keith Camacho lit my path back to the Pacific, and was unwavering in his encouragement and reliability. Ananya Roy sharpened my critique; this dissertation would still be a dull instrument were it not for her imprint upon it. I am deeply grateful for the comradery and support I received from my peers. In particular, Kenton Card, Jessica Bremner, Hilary Malson, and Aaron Lopez could always be counted on to break me out of the fiction of solitude.

Fieldwork in Okinawa would not have been possible without family and community holding me up. I am deeply grateful for my Uehara family who opened their homes to Megan and I, and Shirado family for their consistent graciousness. Kohei Ōshiro and our dojo family often animated our evenings. Countless moonlit lessons were received from Masaki Tomochi on history and politics. The company of Wesley, Julie and Alaya Ueunten was always deeply appreciated. Shinako Oyakawa and family opened their doors and hearts to us. Keiko Yonaha offered masterful assistance while I was still fumbling my way through legal and technical jargon. Osamu Unten helped us make our home at Ryu-Dai. David Kim and Miki Dezaki offered fellowship and regular stimulating conversations over charbroiled fish collars. Marius Palz was a chosen sibling who often helped dredge my thoughts up into greater clarity. My deepest gratitude extends to Ayano Ginoza and family for their warmth and kindness. In Ayano, I could not have asked for a more incising and critical mentor at the University of the Ryukyus.

I received generous funding over the course of this work. I acknowledge invaluable contributions from: the Social Science Research Council who supported my fieldwork with an

International Dissertation Research Fellowship with funding from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation; a Doctoral Fellowship from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada; and the UCLA Terasaki Center for Japanese Studies who supported my enrollment in the Inter-University Center for Japanese Language Studies.

In Vancouver, my energies were restored with every visit home. To my parents, for endless love and support, and to my brothers and their families for the constant reminders of what's most important in life, thank you. In my own home, which traversed two islands and three countries along this journey, one voice has never left my side. Megan, nothing is possible without your love and unfailing ability to ground me. I owe you everything.

Reader, for any errors in the document before you I alone am responsible.

Biographical Sketch

Daniel Akihiro Iwama received his Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy and Masters of Arts in Urban and Regional Planning from the University of British Columbia. His academic interests relate to land and planning history, decolonization, and the role of planning in processes of Indigenous repossession. He is committed to demilitarizing the Ryukyu Archipelago, where his current research examines the dynamics of land reform under colonial regimes of militarized “return.”

Chapter One: Introduction

On December 12, 2016 US Ambassador to Japan, Carole Anne Kennedy, sat on stage alongside US Forces top-brass, and top Japanese officials Tomomi Inada and Yoshihide Suga to celebrate the return of four thousand hectares of military land in the Yanbaru Forest of northern Okinawa Island. The return of the Northern Training Area, Kennedy said, “demonstrat[ed] America’s continued determination to reduce our footprint of our presence here in Okinawa, while maintaining our security commitments to the entire nation of Japan.” She greeted Okinawans¹ in their native tongue, “haitai!”, thanked Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, at the time the Cabinet’s Minister in Charge of Reducing the Base Burden in Okinawa, for his “personal commitment to the welfare of the citizens of Okinawa,” and the police officers and construction workers who completed the project in “record time, under challenging conditions.”

In her speech, Inada, then Abe cabinet Defense Minister, took a locally-focused tac. She zeroed in on the emergency landing of a US Forces helicopter in shallow waters off the coast of Nago City, some six days earlier, and the construction of six new helipads in Kunigami and Higashi Villages. “In response to [the emergency landing], the ministry of defense will continue working to give consideration to the living environment with the local communities, by avoiding flying over communities in cooperation with the US side.” Inada’s comments helped to understand the reason behind the most glaring absence of the day, in then Okinawa Prefectural Governor, Takeshi Onaga, who told the Japan Times the day after the event that he thought the return “wouldn’t change the situation much.” Instead of attending the return ceremony, Onaga was found arm in arm with 4,100 protestors elsewhere in Nago City, contesting the very issues that Inada had shaped her speech around, namely continued helicopter emergencies and other

¹ Throughout the dissertation I use Okinawans, Uchinānchu, and Ryukyuan in the historical-political context where each dominates, and offer explanation where necessary.

human insecurities stemming from proximity to military training exercises.

This opening vignette brings to light the complexity of military land-return in Okinawa. Why would an Okinawan governor who had only the year prior argued at the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva (2015) that Okinawans' "rights to self-determination and human rights have been neglected" citing base-related impacts directly, then turn around and protest the celebration of a return of such a large portion of heavily militarized land? This dissertation will address this question, and in the process illuminate the lived experiences of those struggling with the continuous reformations of militarized land in the Pacific. There are at least 625 military bases occupied by the US outside of its ostensible boundaries in the territories it manages and foreign countries with whom it holds Status of Forces Agreements.² For countless local people around the world who are forced to play "host" to these fortifications, their role in global geopolitics is often limited to an expectation that they provide their land without resistance, and acquiesce to the negative externalities of militarism. Pacific islands, where Indigenous peoples' assertions of sovereignty are continuously suppressed and circumscribed by colonial governments, are unevenly implicated as "hosts" to the presence of the US Military (Davis, 2011).

Since 1945, Okinawa Island has been an exceptionally concentrated example of extraterritorial US militarism. Thirty-one US bases are peppered throughout the prefecture, cordoning off vast expanses of prime agricultural land and places of spiritual significance behind barb-wire fences. Since 1995, when Okinawans rallied island-wide demanding peace and demilitarization in response to the heinous rape of a twelve-year old school-girl by three US servicemen, the US-Japan Security Alliance has operated multiple plans for the return of base land in the name of "burden reduction," under the auspices of the US-Japan Special Action

² David Vine suggests that when accounting for all bases excluded from the US DoD's official tally, approximately 800 is a realistic estimate of extraterritorial US bases world-wide (Vine, 2015, p. 13)

Committee on Okinawa's Final Report [*sako saishu hōkoku*]. Focusing on local people's changing relationships with land, this dissertation investigates the following question:

What has been the effect of military base return on Okinawans' relationships with land and strategies of resistance under the US and Japanese governments' post-1995 regime of base realignment?

Two registers of significance – Indigenous reterritorialization and critical study of post-military environments – distinguish this study as important to the development of planning knowledge. Regarding the former, Okinawans have been recognized globally as one of Japan's two Indigenous populations since they began participating at the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations in 1996 (Yokota, 2015). Domestically, calls for greater autonomy over local political matters and the emergence of groups like the The Association of Comprehensive Studies for Independence of the Ryūkyū Islands (ACSILs) obviate an increasingly visible omission of Okinawans from Japan's nascent politics of Indigenous recognition which currently only accounts for the Ainu of *Ainu Moshiri* (Hokkaido Prefecture). The fact that the United States Forces Japan (hereafter USJF) and the rapidly swelling Japan Self Defense Forces remain intent on concentrating the vast majority of their military training activities on stolen Okinawan land brings academic inquiry concerning the role of the state in processes of Indigenous repossession in colonized places elsewhere into conversation with such processes in Okinawa, where a dispossessed minority call for land back. Concerning the second category of scholarly relevance, this dissertation ultimately supports Woodward's contention that in "post-military landscapes" we can observe the longevity and endurance of military power as a landscaping agent" (2014, p. 46). In this regard, the urgency addressed here is an imminent need to understand how the violence and environmental catastrophe inherent in militarism endure and take new forms under conditions of purported demilitarization.

I build two related arguments throughout the dissertation. The first is that in Okinawa the territorialization of the military is a structural effect that reproduces environmental destruction

and the alienation of Indigenous peoples from their land even in situations where individual cases of base return suggest the opposite. Here, I use “structure” in the sense of Patrick Wolfe’s theorization of the process of settler colonialization as being built upon the institutionalized dismantling of Indigenous life in a manner that is inconsistent with an interpretation of colonial settlement as an “event” (Wolfe, 1994, p. 96). The structural nature of militarist dispossession in Okinawa was made possible by a seminal process of settlement whose violent dispossessions were initially exacted via brute force, then gradually became delivered through the vehicle of modernist rational planning. Also facilitating this process was a much older imperialist consideration of Okinawans as lesser Japanese national subjects that dates back to the archipelagic former kingdom’s forced incorporation into the Japanese nation state in 1879 and as a vassal state before that. Today, while Okinawa exists formally as a prefecture of Japan, it’s colonial residue features most prominently staunch Japanese support for the concentration of approximately seventy percent of the US Forces Japan (USFJ) military base network in Okinawa, which consists of merely 0.6 percent of Japan’s national land base.

Referencing two contemporary cases of military base reform, the second argument I will make is that Okinawans participate actively in the political economies of base realignment, maneuvering for the realization of diverse benefits – what I call “flexible repossession” – including economic empowerment, environmental protection, alternative views of security, and cultural reconstruction, depending on case specific suites of opportunities and contingencies. Tania Murray Li (2014) has argued for a contingent understanding of land as being defined not only by what it is, but also by its myriad uses and affordances. Demonstrating Li’s sentiment clearly, when bases close and new ones are constructed, Okinawans interrupt narrow understandings of land-as-property or land-as-nation. Communitarian planning strategies structured on ancestral place-based lineages blend provisions of capital with those of attachment. Resurgent Indigenous cultural practices, systematically disassembled under Japanese assimilationist policy, are expressed in sites of protest on the fringes of swelling

militarized territory. By focusing on the various ways by which Okinawans exercise these forms of agency over planning outcomes concerning the repossession of their traditional lands, I simultaneously refuse an analytical frame that pivots around militarism itself as the logic of most concern in struggles for self-determination and demilitarization in the Pacific.

This dissertation has both theoretical and practical implications for the studies of military base return and conversion. While the return of MCAS Futenma and related base build-ups across the Pacific – spurred in large part by the mid-1990s uprisings in Okinawa – will amount to the largest extraterritorial reconfiguration of US military land in the post-Cold-War era, base conversion is far from an isolated phenomenon. Base closures on the continental US proliferated in the 1990s under the banner of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) program. Abroad, too, between the Obama Administration’s “Pacific Pivot,” and a shift in the US defense strategy away from large standing bases towards smaller “lily pad” bases in strategic clusters, historic spatial configurations of US military occupation are changing. As these realignments continue this dissertation underscores the necessity of analyzing base return in relation to subsequent processes of remilitarization in regions where realignment has tended to produce new forms and continuities of militarism rather than its abatement. This is especially true of Pacific Islands like Okinawa and Guåhan/Guåhan (Guam), which have been assigned nicknames of American nostalgia like “Keystone of the Pacific,” and “Tip of the Spear,” figuring prominently in the historical myths at the core of the US’s geopolitical identity.

The dissertation is built around four substantive sections. In Chapter Two I construct my theoretical framework of Reconfiguring the Military Frontier, by bridging one body of scholarship on the planning of military base conversions with another that theorizes the making of territory as a political-geographical category. Whereas mainstream international relations scholars have tended to understand territory primarily in terms of the interstate system (Agnew, 1994; Martin, 2022), territory is also an effect of Indigenous peoples’ decolonial movements moderating the dispossessive spatial practices of state planning. This contingent view of territory as an effect is

particularly visible on the edges of regulated spatial boundaries undergoing processes of redefinition, and does not presume an inevitable and exhaustive association between territory and state space. To outline the practical gap that this dissertation seeks to fill, Chapter Two also covers a planning and geography literature regarding what happens in processes of military base reform. Here, ecological and economic development outcomes of base redevelopment dominate. This emphasizes a need for more research into the continuities of military spillover effects in the “post-military landscapes” brought into being through processes of base closure.

I offer a geographical history of militarist dispossession in Chapter Three, focused on the first decade of the US’s post-war occupation of Okinawa Island. Empirically, I rely mostly on the archival documents of Okinawa’s three post-war US military governments, housed in the Okinawa Prefectural Archives. A focal argument I build in the chapter is that when it is nested into the organs of national governments, even hyper local planning exercises that appear to be far removed from the political centers of state power should be understood for the ways that they actively make real the territorial features of colonial states. Contemporary Okinawa appears incongruent with other places where militarism and settler colonialism mingle because since reversion to Japanese prefectural status, the nation most directly served by the fact of the military’s presence in Okinawa is different – while no less permanently settled – than that which builds and benefits from the dominant constructions of race and economy. In US military outposts like Guåhan (Guam) and Hawai’i, best understood in a geopolitical sense as subjected but territorially exceptional to the political configurations of identity and land in the metropole, military goals have historically required either nominal or substantive incorporation of CHamorro and Kanaka ‘Ōiwi into the political structure of the US. For example, speaking of Hawai’i, Juliet Nebolon explains that the WWII US Military Government “vaccinated individuals in order to maintain Hawai’i as an uncontaminated military outpost and produce able “Americanized” bodies that could contribute to US defense efforts” (Nebolon, 2017). In other words, the military’s land project and the biopolitical project of the US nation-state are collapsed. Post-

reversion Okinawa on the other hand, remains incorporated into the imperialist racial hierarchy, schemes of economic dependence, and territorial project of one nation (Japan), while the main beneficiary of the military's vast occupancy in their islands is another (the United States).³ My intention in Chapter Three is to unpack a formative moment in the intimacy between US military imperialism and Japanese colonial occupation in Okinawa which has since matured.

Importantly, I employ an often-referenced aphorism augmented by Michel Foucault, which is that "politics is the continuation of war by other means" (2003, 15). That is, that even if the sheer violence of militarized territorialization which figured prominently in the US's early occupation of Okinawa, became obfuscated by the technocratic management of the USCAR which emerged thereafter, this was the same as "a pseudopeace that [was] being undermined by a continuous war, of a perpetual relationship of force" (17).

In Chapter Four I present an original case of military base redevelopment in the conversion of the former Awase Meadows Golf Course into what at the time was Okinawa's largest Western style shopping center. Among other regions similarly militarized, Okinawa is distinguished by an abundance of privately leased base land, constituting the most prevalent form of tenure alongside national, prefectural, and city/town/village jurisdiction. Nearly forty-percent of the military footprint throughout the prefecture remains privately owned, leased by the Japanese Government from displaced landowners, and then provided free to the US military pursuant to Article 2 Section 1(a) of the current US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement which stipulates that "The United States is granted, under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the use of facilities and areas in Japan" (*Status of Forces Agreement*, 1960). "Military landowners" [*gunyō jinushi*] are widely held by observers of militarism in

³ This is not to suggest that Japan does not benefit territorially from the US military presence in Okinawa, nor that the US has no impact upon race in Okinawa (for an extensive account of US influenced miscegenation politics in occupied Okinawa, see Annmaria Shimabuku's 2010 dissertation (2010b); only, that the *primary* recipient of military power, as a resource generated in Okinawa, is the US, while the most forceful systems of racialization and political economy upon Okinawans' daily lives is Japan.

Okinawa to be (at best) silently complicit in the structure of military occupation given their role as mostly contracted lessors to the USFJ and (at worst) an aggressive lobby of profiteers for the continued presence of the US and Japanese militaries. Using primary qualitative research conducted with an association of dispossessed owners of military land in Kitanakagusuku Village who managed their own land's redevelopment along with planners and other redevelopment professionals, I argue for a more moderate, context-specific description of their role, informed by first hand interaction. Hometown landowners [*furusato jinushi*] can be disarticulated from new investor-owners of who purchase military land on the open real-estate market as an investment commodity. Many of the former still display a longing for reterritorialization, even in spite of a sense that in the course of war and close to a century of occupation, the memorialized places of their ancestors "are no more." The Kitanakagusuku landowners engaged strategically in land readjustment processes [*tochi seiri jigyo*]. This allowed them to flexibly seize otherwise disparate benefits such as private sale and small-scale communal use, despite the mall's development ultimately perpetuating the villager's alienation from land rather than reversing it.

In the dissertation's final chapter, I present findings from extensive participant observation of the globally well-known sit-in against the development of a new sea-based US Marines facility, at the gates of Camp Schwab in Henoko Village of Okinawa Island's northern Yanbaru region. The development of the new base was made a condition for the return of the highly contested, Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (hereafter MCAS Futenma), in the population dense and highly urbanized central Okinawa Island Ginowan City. So, while US and Japanese military officials continue to emphasize the "returning" nature of MCAS Futenma, the elderly Okinawans protesting the new offshore base meant to replace it illuminate a critical contradiction underlying the SACO Final Report as a regime of nominal land return; their resistance exposes how the two governments claim to be responding to calls from Okinawans to reduce their uneven base-related burden, while paradoxically strengthening their military

partnership and “lethality” in the region at the same time. In order to highlight the ways that this territory effect is produced dialectically, my entry-point to the sit-in is not the protest itself, but the US and Japanese governments’ 2020 application to change the design for the new base, which threatened the security of the remains of war-dead in its ever-expanding need for reclamation soils. My understanding of the sit-in highlights the various opportunities it presents to its mostly elderly Okinawan women members, which range from the revitalization of Indigenous languages to more material objective of obstructing construction materials into the construction site.

Conclusions to the dissertation attend to practices of base conversion and theories of militarism and base restructuring. There is a regretful panacea in the base conversion literature concerning the experiences of repossession and redevelopment when they occur outside of the continental United States, and even less when they concern Indigenous peoples regaining jurisdiction over dispossessed land. Attachment to land appears to wane with time and strictly regulated lack of access. When this becomes coupled with extended durations of financial compensation backed by heavily resourced governments, land return may occasion new forms of occupation by commercial tenants rather than the resumption of substantive forms of direct occupation. Furthermore, in the Indigenous islands of the Pacific, which remain disproportionately affected by extraterritorial US basing, the example of Okinawa suggests that land return may be swiftly followed by new formations of military occupation and ecological disaster. Together, these findings emphasize a need to refocus critical research concerning militarized repossession upon the continuities and transfigurations of violence that ensue when bases close.

Methodology: Defining the Case

Guiding Questions

The specific question around which the research revolves asks:

What has been the effect of military base return on Okinawans' relationships with land and strategies of resistance under the US and Japanese governments' post-1995 regime of base realignment?

Planning is at the center of analysis, given its instrumentality in the dispossession and colonial territorialization of land wrested from Indigenous peoples (Sandercock, 2004). This is apropos of postwar Okinawa, where Japan conceded to the US military's enclosure of Okinawa Island as a densely militarized outpost of US empire. Even when land is reclaimed by Indigenous peoples and territory is reconfigured, government planning has been criticized as a conduit for the neoliberalization of Indigenous peoples' relationships with land, perpetuating Indigenous peoples' alienation from it (Tomiak, 2017). The research question above builds on this work by directing analysis towards the limits of planning in processes of restitution.

Over the course of the dissertation, I am attentive to the following sub-questions:

- 1. How were planning techniques used by the US military in the postwar decade to establish and govern new territorial jurisdictions?*
- 2. How do the dispossessed owners of military land negotiate and shape the outcomes of base redevelopment?*
- 3. What is the effect of Okinawans refusing the conditions of land return on related processes of territorialization?*

In answering the main question, I observe both of what John Friedmann called the social reform and social mobilization traditions of planning (1987, 75). The reformist tradition is primarily concerned with strengthening the state's capacity for social guidance via tools of scientific rationality, most of which are either legal, geographical, or communicative/procedural. This

tradition is broad enough to house what Porter calls a “colonial culture of planning,” where planning is genealogically derived from the process of colonial settlement, embedded in government, and destabilizes Indigenous peoples’ relationships with their ancestral land bases (2016, 149).

In contrast to social reform, Friedmann explains the social mobilization tradition as a type of political expression organized “from below”; that is, occurring outside of the state apparatus. Within the social mobilization tradition exists “a politics of disengagement carried on by ‘alternative communities’ that demonstrate to others new ways of living” (83). In the dissertation, I am attentive to the unsanctioned utopian movements that coalesce in opposition to programs of military land return which are riddled with contingencies of new militarization in Okinawa. The peoples’ sit-in against a new base at Henoko, framed by the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (hereafter, SCC) as a “replacement facility” for the return of MCAS Futenma, which I cover in Chapter Five, is one example of a social mobilization planning variant occurring in Okinawa in the domain of base return.

Positionality and Research in the Homeland as Sukubun

I grew up in Canada in a mixed Uchinānchu (person of Okinawa Island) family active in the ongoings of the small community of diasporic Okinawans on the unceded lands of the xʷməθkʷəy̓əm (Musqueam), Sk̓wx̓wú7mesh (Squamish) and səliłwətał (Tsleil-Waututh) peoples known today as the City of Vancouver. I spent many a winter and summer in the small prairie city of Prince Albert with my Mother’s family – a convergence of Métis-Cree and German Mennonite ancestry common to that region of Treaty 6 territory – but my most formative immersion was on the Pacific coast with my father’s immediate family all of whom had immigrated to Vancouver from Naha in 1971, a year before Nixon would trade Okinawa back to

Sato's Japan in exchange for an informal covenant that the US forces would be allowed to remain in Okinawa.⁴

Much of this dissertation is inspired by memories of my childhood. In the early stages of designing this research, I recalled digging through a box of family ephemera in the basement of my grandparents' house on Vancouver's eastside, and coming upon my grandmother's US Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (hereafter USCAR) passport. This document had been issued to her by the USCAR as they were to all Okinawans living under post-war occupation who sought to travel. Holding the passport, I wondered why I had never heard of the country "USCAR." I remembered digging deeper through the box, finding pictures of her, some of which showed her smiling in front of militarized check-points, and others showing her inside of military bases where curiously she appeared beaming with pride. Having returned from a childhood in Japan-occupied Taiwan to find her island home incinerated, I never understood why she looked so happy in those pictures.

I was fortunate as a boy to be able to trace my father's path back to his native island on a number of occasions. When I was young these experiences were lackluster. My brothers and I fished and dove off of piers. We ate octopus we caught from the sea. I felt at home in Okinawa. The *soba obasan* (noodle shop aunties) welcomed me, and the ocean welcomed me. To a seven-year-old Okinawa was paradise replete with adventures of the sort I couldn't have imagined in Vancouver. Spiny monsters of the deep, coral cuts on my feet, base towns, and fighter jets. When I close my eyes and think back to that time, I see lions dancing on *goza* mat under the moonlight. My father teaching me to make a whistle from a scraped-out *adan* seed. I

⁴ In Nixon's Public Papers of the Presidents it is recorded of these reversion talks that: "As a result of their [Japan Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and US President Richard Nixon] discussion it was agreed that the mutual security interest of the United States and Japan could be accommodated within arrangements for the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan...The president and the Prime Minister agreed also that the United States would remain under the terms of the Treaty of mutual Cooperation and Security such military facilities and areas in Okinawa as required in the mutual security of both countries" (Sato & Nixon, 1969).

remember a dozen of us cramming into my aunt Michiko's *gaijin-jyūtaku* ["foreigners" housing] in Ōjana where she lived after marrying a military officer named "Herb." I smell goat.

As years passed, I started to reflect on experiences that made Okinawa unique to me. I rode one day with my Okinawan-American cousin to pick up my grandmother's sister from a slot-machine parlor on a military base, Hiroshi flashing an ID to the camouflaged GI at the gate to get us in. I was once gifted a bomber-style jacket with crossed US and Japan flags on the back. During a time when my parents couldn't afford new clothes for my brothers and I, I loved that jacket, so I never understood why my mother wouldn't let me wear it to my Karate practice in Kin Town. What my mother knew and I didn't, was that only a few years earlier in Kin Town, three Americans had raped a girl only five years older than me. The girl, who shortly thereafter bravely reported the crime, sparked an uprising against the military that in turn sparked many of the reconfigurations of politics and land that I analyze in this dissertation.

With all this history in mind, the notion that I could be a "neutral observer" is beyond the scope of reason. The research comes out from within me, just as I come out from within Okinawa along paths of migration, empire and colonialism. Unsurprisingly, there were numerous times in the field when my identity was the source not only of conveniences (to be sure, those were many) but of tremendous difficulty. As a first-generation Canadian I inherited numerous privileges which my few relatives who remained on our island did not. I was afforded quiet nights, free of the rumble of low-flying Apache and Osprey helicopters, an advanced education, and the freedom to have chosen a career path while unconstrained by the inevitable allure of base-work. My ability to "say no" to the military has never been obscured by a colonized notion that the military is exactly what's keeping our proverbial heads above water. This is what I thought of one day when after holding up Henoko Village traffic for fifteen minutes alongside sit-in members against the new base, a local teenager riding shot-gun in a jam-packed sedan flipped his middle finger at us all while driving passed the anti-base demonstration.

The sometimes popular notion of an Okinawa uniformly opposed to the presence of the military is inconsistent with my private, small, and mixed-up Okinawa. In my Okinawa, aunties go on base to service inkjet printers in offices, and marry non-Okinawans hoping they can leave. Sometimes they do, moving to the States for a few years before coming back divorced. Uncles work in laundromats on Camp Hansen. Here, some vote for the LDP who support the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty because it means no change and change hasn't treated Okinawa well in the past. And so, as the dissertation before you progressed and my commitments in the field deepened, my participation in public displays of antimilitarism and curiosities regarding local politics threatened familial relations which were already in a state of reconstruction.

In a fieldnote dated February 2, 2021, which I titled "taking off the veil," I reflected on a night of political activity that blurred the lines between research and life exceptionally well, all the while trying to untangle what I was researching from what I believe in from who I am. I had found myself election canvassing alongside Henoko sit-in members through the Nishihara Ward of Urasoe City, in support of a mayoral candidate seeking to unseat the pro-base incumbent, Tetsuji Matsumoto:

We make our way to the Oyama intersection in the middle of Urasoe City. A-San puts an enormous sign in my hand, which reads "military" (*gun*). I look to my right, then to my left, and realize I'm holding the centerpiece of a letter chain spelling out, "we – don't – want a – military port – in our – beautiful sea" (*chura-umi-ni-gunkō-ni-iranai!*). I'm carried away by the excitement of it all, before I see media cameras and realize the intersection is absolutely flooded with political candidates and their supporters. I start to entertain anxious questions. What if Mayor Matsumoto who I interviewed last week and may want to interview again, passes and sees me campaigning for his rival? What if my family see me on TV and decide they're done with this Canadian of theirs? (Fieldnotes, January 4, 2021)

My anxieties about my family relations swept me away from being able to fully register the political significance of that moment and many others like it. As the official opposition in the mayoral race, Irei Yuki, a young single Okinawan mother, had gained the support of Governor Tamaki and had tapped into a sizeable groundswell given her opposition to proposals to relocate Naha Military Port to Urasoe City, which Incumbent Matsumoto had recently capitulated to in a tripartite agreement with the Okinawa Prefectural Government (OPG) and Naha City government. A pivotal shift in the base politics of the region hung in the balance, and I was preoccupied imagining the consequences of upsetting a delicate familial peace.

These fieldwork anxieties obviated my positionality as being in the penumbra of Okinawan society, both an “in-” and “out-sider” in academic parlance. This fact was often at the center of my thinking as I oscillated between regular family obligations like cleaning my family mausoleum in Naha’s Shikina Reien cemetery and performing ceremony for my grandmother who is interred here, and nearby data collection events like interviews and participation at Henoko. I drew guidance from various Indigenous researchers to help me understand my particular situation. Māori scholar Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s explication of the Indigenous insider was especially instrumental here:

At a general level insider researchers have to have ways of thinking critically about their processes, their relationships and the quality and richness of their data and analysis. So too do outsiders, but the major difference is that insiders have to live with the consequences of their processes on a day-to-day basis for ever more, and so do their families and communities. For this reason insider researchers need to build particular sorts of research-based support systems and relationships with their communities. They have to be skilled at defining clear research goals and ‘lines of relating’ which are specific to the project and somewhat different from their own family networks. Insider researchers also need to define closure and have the skills to say ‘no’ and the skills to say ‘continue.’ (Smith, 2013)

I developed a “line of relating” to fields of my work that focused on the multitude of responsibilities I carried as an Okinawan crossing back over an invisible border of great consequence, between those to seek to understand Okinawa from outside of the islands, and those who understand Okinawa from the inside through embodied practices of relation and survival.

In the Uchināguchi variant of the Ryukyuan language family Indigenous to the lower half of Okinawa Island where my ancestors lived for centuries before there was an Okinawa *Prefecture* to speak of, *Sukubun* is a word used to connote one’s responsibility or duty. With the methodological advice from Smith in mind, I began searching for networks that simultaneously helped me realize my own *sukubun* as a diasporic Indigenous researcher committed to decolonization in his homeland, while at the same time heeding the action that it compelled me towards. Spaces for maneuver began to present themselves. If the elders at the front-of-the-gate protesting the new base needed bodies in chairs, and my relatively small network of family and friends enabled me to support this action in a way that was less personally compromising than for other young Okinawans, then contentious politics would become a major space of research and activism for me. I joined online study groups of Okinawans in the diaspora, who valued regular updates that I could provide from the Front of the Gate at Camp Schwab. I developed a practice of writing regular reports including COVID updates, real-time counts of how many trucks had entered the base on a given day, occasional flare-ups in security stand-offs, as well as reflections on quotidian aspects of the standoff. The following is one such update:

The weather changed a lot today. From chilly and overcast, to sunny and warm. *Katabui* is when it’s “raining over here, but sunny over there.” Henoko weather was *katabui* today.

Spirits were high. The prefectural state-of-emergency has ended officially, so Henoko buses are running. Everyone was very excited to be gathering together again.

There were about 30-40 people. 12 on the 9 a.m. Henoko bus from Kencho. The presence of mics and speakers injects a lot of energy. It's hard to do call-and-repeat chants without them. I uploaded lyrics and a video of a new Henoko song which is my new favorite. I don't think anyone has written *sanshin kun kun shi*⁵ for it yet, so members might appreciate an instrumental if anyone is up to the task – I'm presuming this. We talked a lot about Gushiken San's hunger strike.

There was conflict in the third round today. A new police manager used excessive force with U San⁶ who is the lead MC at the gate on Wednesdays (Takazato San MCs the camp). This led to a prolonged shouting match between sit-in members and the police, who tried to drown each other out across bullhorns. The officer kept shouting that it was "for our own safety." U San* kept retorting that the protest follows known patterns which the police are made aware of, so no physical force should be necessary.

On the way back to our busses, we gathered to observe three marines posted at Schwab's main gate with assault rifles. Even the site managers said that they hadn't seen that type of posturing for months. Some had never seen it before.

I'm sorry I do not have a truck count today. I forgot to get numbers from the site-managers at the end of the day. I'll ask Takazato San and provide two next week.

Seemed to be more than usual. I'm posting some photos from the day below.

I hope you are all well. (Correspondence, March 3rd, 2021)

Developing relationships with politically interested groups of Okinawan diaspora in part through these regular updates constituted one "line of relating" which [was] specific to the project" that enabled me to achieve research goals, while attending to my *sukubun* as a returned Okinawan committed to a demilitarized future.

⁵ Sheet music for the three-stringed Okinawan instrument, *sanshin*

⁶ Pseudonym. Hereafter, the first instance of every pseudonym will be noted with an asterisk (*)

Single-Embedded Case Study

I had initially conceived of this dissertation as an ethnography of repossession. I realized shortly after beginning my research that this was an inappropriate methodological choice for numerous reasons. I underestimated the strength of the relationship between base return and remilitarization, which has been increasingly prominent in Okinawa. While grassroots resistance to military build-up constitutes a distinct field of planning action, in some cases involving unique actors, and could be interpreted as severable from land return as a research topic, this world of protest stems from and is necessary to the same state-led return plans that I sought to understand, and was therefore indispensable to the project. “That’s important,” one Henoko sit-in member commented of my dissertations’ concentration on base redevelopment planning, “but make sure you talk about the real problems here” (personal communication, 2021). What I understood him to mean, to borrow from Flyvbjerg (1996), was that there is a *realrationalität* to the planning of military realignment in Okinawa – a rationality of actual planning and political action underneath a nominal one – which is masked by a discourse of benevolent improvement. I needed a methodological adjustment to hold in view both sides of this conjuncture: one of landowners, government planners and national law managing the resumption of Okinawan jurisdiction over formerly occupied land, and another of resistance against the military landscapes forcefully being built in their place (Figure 1).

Yin (2003, 43) explains that the single-embedded case study research design is strategic when one case has multiple constituent parts, each which illustrates a different essential aspect of it. He offers the example of a hospital as the case being investigated, where various clinical services and staff groups might each constitute an embedded unit. Because in the study at hand I was seeking not only to highlight two core aspects of return (base conversion and remilitarization) but to engage a wide range of actors unique to each, Yin’s

embedded case study methodology was more appropriate than a traditional ethnographic approach. Instead of elucidating a world – one of protest, or one of return – I would appropriate the US military’s verbiage of “realignment” in my construction of a case study with two interdependent worlds of significance.

Case study research has drawn critique for a perceived lack of generalizability to other research contexts. Comparativists in the social sciences, for example, have championed “large *n*’s,” arguing that single case studies, selected on the dependent variable (i.e., because they express the phenomenon under study particularly well), are of no credible inferential value (Geddes, 1990, 2003). Bent Flyvbjerg has retorted that “one *can* often generalize on the basis of a single case...but formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas ‘the force of example’ is underestimated” (Flyvbjerg, 2006 my emphasis). The present case was selected according to what Flyvbjerg calls “extreme” or “deviant” case selection, because being militarized so densely and the locus of so much resistance to militarism, Okinawa Island presents “more actors and more basic mechanisms” than typical cases for close study (Ibid, 229). Like Flyvbjerg, Yin too subscribes to the principle of extreme or unique case selection. In the following section, I make a political and research “case for the case,” and explain the chronological and geographical binding of the case study.

Description of the Case

The case is one of Indigenous struggles with military realignment. Two registers of significance distinguish this study as important to the development of planning knowledge. The first is that the restoration of land dispossessed in the process of colonization is of great importance to geographically situated Indigenous peoples engaged in struggles against colonialism (Tuck & Yang, 2012). To illuminate the structural coloniality of the military’s presence in Okinawa, Chapter Three will detail the material processes by which US forces

Figure 1

Zones of Realignment. Pictures 1-4 illustrate return; picture 5, new enclosures. 1) Camp Zukeran, West Futenma Housing Area, Ginowan City; 2/3) MCAS Futenma, Eastern Road, Ginowan City; 4) Camp Zukeran, Shirahi River Section, Chatan Town; 5) Sit-in members gather at the gates of Camp Schwab, Henoko Village, Nago City.



solidified their occupation of Okinawa Island in the postwar decade. Here, the US military exploited the political and juridical gray-space of the USCAR using an alchemy of Japanese and US legal conventions to justify its seizure of and territorialization of new base land. For the Okinawans who now have these lands returned to them when bases close, repossession has helped reconstruct Indigenous spatial practices and language traditions in some cases (Chibana 2018, 154), and bolstered commercial and rentier capitalism in others (Iwama, 2021). These cases fit within a larger frame of research examining the legal- and identity-related dynamics involved in Indigenous repossession (Altman & Markham, 2015; Tobias & Richmond, 2016; Tomiak, 2017). Importantly, processes of repossession often carry the risk of becoming abstracted in the exclusionary and individualizing conduit of private property when land struggles otherwise premised on ontological notions of freedom (e.g., from capitalism, colonialism, militarist occupation and so on) become movements for just “possession,” enclosing them in juridical frameworks reoriented away from their former more substantive concerns (Roy 2017; Blatman-Thomas 2019).

The second register of significance belonging to the case of Indigenous struggles with military realignment, is that what Rachel Woodward (2014) calls “post-military landscapes” are in fire need of greater geographic and planning-related study. Whereas the vast majority of research concerning returned military facilities tends to interpret these spaces as bearing a hard break with the past, Woodward contends rather that “these sites enable us to draw [conclusions] concerning the longevity and endurance of military power as a landscaping agent” (46). Put another way, how do the activities, facilities and violence of militarism and its imprints upon the land endure or simply move and take new forms despite the fact of a base’s return? How does the durability of these structures change our very understanding of terms like “return” and “demilitarization”? Relatedly, in this dissertation I heed Lisa Yoneyama’s (2016) urging that we disavow a heretofore rigorous “epistemic injunction against making explicit associations between the US military settlement in Okinawa and Japanese colonial annexation.” Rather, in

my analysis of nominally “post”-military landscapes, I remain focused on important continuities of militarist hegemony and much older forms of Japanese assimilation and colonialism in Okinawa.

In addition to the post-military landscape’s nature, its production is in need of expanded research. The scope of existing planning research on base conversion is in large part limited to cold-war closures on the US continent where there have been massive post-Cold-War efforts towards base draw-down and redevelopment under the auspices of the Department of Defense’s Base Realignment and Closure Program (hereafter BRAC), all backed by massive congressional budget allocations (Kim 2018, p. 340).⁷ Because these “domestic” bases are not politicized in terms of extraterritoriality and occupation by foreign troops, their closure tends to be resisted by surrounding communities (Hill Thanner & Segal, 2008). Thus, related research is often directed at post-military economic recovery, sustainability outcomes, and procedural aspects of brownfield redevelopment, but often omits larger political questions. However, in extraterritorial contexts where US military basing unevenly effects Indigenous peoples whose sovereignties are already suppressed through generations of suppression by colonial states (Davis, 2011), base return is politically configured to the contrary, by people’s movements for demilitarization, an agonistic politics of repossession, and resistance to military build-ups stemming from land returns conceded by the US and its allied militaries.

I will first explain the chronological binding of the case, and then its geography. The year 1995 saw five separate attacks of extreme violence against women carried out by US military servicemen in Okinawa (Takazato et al., 2016). In one of these cases, a 24-year-old insurance

⁷ Over four rounds of base realignment and closure between 1990 and 2001, US Congress allocated \$21.3 billion dollars to fund “construction, planning and design, civilian severance pay, permanent change in station, transportation of things, and other costs related to the realignment or closure of the subject bases” (U.S. DoD 2019, 4). The specific budget allocations were: BRAC I: \$2.4 billion; BRAC II: \$4.9 billion; BRAC III: \$7.2 billion; and BRAC IV: \$6.6 billion (p. 5).

clerk in Ginowan city was killed with a hammer. The remaining four cases were rapes, one of which was of the 12-year-old girl by three servicemen that re-ignited the “Island-Wide Struggle” (*shimagurumi tōsō*) for demilitarization in the prefecture, and triggered the emergence of the two governments’ land return commitments which this case study is focused on. While the school girls’ rape tends to be invoked metaphorically to symbolize Okinawa’s broader, historical, and ongoing subordination by Japan and the US (Angst, 2001),⁸ critical Okinawan feminists have problematized this instrumental deployment. Ginoza (2022) explains cogently that to “use” the girl’s rape in this way trades the bravery she exhibited in coming forward with her claim for a narrative of victimization while at the same time obfuscating the experiences of countless other women who have borne the brunt of military’s sexual violence in Okinawa in favor of a single example.

The intensity of sexual violence in 1995 is indeed exemplary of a longstanding pattern of violence and discrimination unevenly affecting Okinawan women relative to Japan.⁹ Particularly moved by the brave girl’s rape, 85,000 people gathered in Ginowan to voice their opposition to the continuation of US bases. Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence (OWAAMV) formed in November of the same year and along with the International Women’s Network Against Militarism asserted a non-militarized conceptualization of “genuine security” defined by ecological sustainability, cultural survival and human dignity (Akibayashi & Takazato, 2009). Also in the same year, thirty-five landowners refused to renew their military leases up for

⁸ Angst explains of the girl that, “Her pain was transformed into a symbol of national subjugation with its own narrative: the concerns of Okinawans are routinely ignored, and Okinawa, as the feminized body politics, remains a site of contestation between contending political powers, local and international” (247).

⁹ The concentration of US base land on Okinawa as compared with the Japanese mainland is meticulously tracked and reported on annually by the OPG. In 2021, 70.3 percent of the area of all US bases in Japan was “hosted” in Okinawa Prefecture, which comprises only 0.6 percent of Japan’s national land base (Okinawa Prefectural Government 2022, 1). In 2017, the Ryukyu Shimpō framed this comparison another way, noting that for every 1000 residents of the Japanese mainland, there were 0.086 US Marines living alongside them, whereas for every 1000 residents of Okinawa Prefecture, there were nearly 18 US Marines within the prefecture (Ryukyu Shimpō, 2017).

renewal, the leases eventually being forcefully ratified in a supreme court ruling under Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama. Then governor, Masahide Ota, who had backed the landowners' action, formulated the Base Return Action Program (*kichi henkan akushon puroguramu*), a land-use and economic development plan outlining the complete demilitarization of Okinawa by 2015 (Okinawa Prefectural Government, 1996). The Washington Post, New York Times, and Los Angeles Times all covered the unrest.

The uprising pressured both the US and Japan to propose new base closures, and to revisit existing land-return proposals which though already agreed upon had gone untouched. "Burden reduction" (*futan keigen*) emerged as common verbiage in the discourse of the US-Japan-Okinawa geopolitical triangle.¹⁰ Under global pressure to act, the US Department of Defense and the Japanese Ministry of Defense formed the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in November of 1996, to take hold of burden reduction, overwriting the Ota administration's Base Return Action Program, which had been the first such return plan to be advanced by an Okinawan government.¹¹ After a year of deliberations, an interim report and the ceremonious renewal of the US-Japan Joint Security Declaration, SACO released their Final Report (*sako saishū hōkoku*) in December of 1996 (1996). The SACO Final Report proposed four major areas of action: adjustments to training and operational procedures; implementation of noise reduction initiatives; improvements to the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA); and land return.

A day after the release of the SACO Final Report, Ambassador to Japan and former Vice President, Walter Mondale, told the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan that the rape

¹⁰ It is critical to note that the popularization of "burden reduction" discourse has naturalized the notion that Okinawans have but two options to choose from: burden, or less burden.

¹¹ Arasaki explains of the pivot from Ota's Base Return Action Program to the SACO Final Report: "While the Okinawa people were demanding reduction in the size of the bases only as a first step toward the total removal of the bases, the two governments, pretending to concede somewhat to the people's demands substituted their seemingly plausible scheme for the people-demanded base reduction" (2001, p. 107).


had been a wakeup call to take “long overdue steps to respond to Okinawan concerns” (Mondale, 1996). Mondale’s framing suggested a new era of land return and burden-reduction in Okinawa. Thus the SACO Final Report, per-se, is not the focus of this case-study, as it was only an expression of an ostensible epochal turn. Instead, it is the year, 1996, that is the important lower limit on the research.

To narrow my inquiry geographically, the case concentrates on central Okinawa Island (Figure 2). Drawing again from Flyvbjerg’s methodological emphasis on the “force of example,” and the merit of extreme cases, the research value of this geographic scope is in the density and durability of US militarism in the region. Shimabuku observes that when one separates the location of US Forces Japan facilities regionally, Okinawa Prefecture emerges as the densest militarized region in the world (2019, 152).¹² The public soundscape of central Okinawa Island evokes an experience less akin to being surrounded by military bases, as much as living on one. Although numbers inevitably fail at describing the textures of human insecurity, prefectural statistics begin to paint a picture of the condition of every-day life in the region (Okinawa Prefectural Government, 2022). While eight-percent of the entire area of Okinawa Prefecture is occupied by US military bases, in central Okinawa Island that figure is twenty-three percent. Seventy-six percent of the military footprint in this central region remains on land leased by the Japanese government from private landowner families, with the majority of Okinawa’s 45,258 owners of military land being located here, illustrating the extent of postwar dispossession and the relative concentration of Okinawans in the central region. Four of the eight municipalities in central Okinawa Island have over thirty percent of their jurisdiction exclusively occupied by military bases. Eighty-two percent of Kadena Town remains behind the fences of military bases. “The southern half of Okinawa island does not really contain a series of bases, but should be

¹² While this observation is true of currently ‘inhabited’ extraterritorial basing sites, it registers Diego Garcia vacant of its Indigenous Chagossians whose wholesale displacement by the US military is covered extensively by David Vine. The Chagossians continue to be displaced from their native archipelago.

Figure 2

Geographic Scope: Okinawa Island military coverage and realignment focus



classed as a single military base complex,” US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, N.F. Twinning observed in 1959, “all the facilities are now located in an area 35 miles long by 2.5 to 19 miles wide” (Twinning 1959, 005). Save for a few key facilities located in other Okinawan islands or training sites in the Yanbaru region, Twinning’s observation remains as true today as it did in 1959.

From 1996, land return on Okinawa Island expanded as a planning context characterized by calls for “burden reduction,” ostensible concessions from the SCC, and uprisings against the terms of return. There have been three main government frameworks of planning action behind the return of military land in this period. The first was the December, 1996 *SACO Final Report* itself (Table 1). The centerpieces of the Final Report were proposals for the return of MCAS Futenma, approximately half of the Northern Training Area, and the closure of Naha Military Port. The second return framework was the *Consolidation Plan for Land Return South of Kadena Airbase* (hereafter, Consolidation Plan), released in April of 2013 (U.S DoD, 2013) (Table 2).¹³ The Consolidation Plan was a site plan characterized by proposals for the return fourteen base sections south of Kadena Airbase, all contingent on the relocation of military functions mostly within Okinawa Prefecture. The Consolidation Plan was described by the SCC as a “life of the alliance plan,” pre-empting future pushes for land return. Finally, the uprisings of 1995 breathed new life into a June, 1991 return plan, the so called 23 Cases, which outlined twenty-three returns across seventeen facilities (Table 3). Because once they are agreed upon, land returns often occur late or fail to materialize at all, several facilities or sections thereof were repeatedly included in more than one of these main frameworks. The progress of each of these three return plans is tracked annually by the OPG, with data provided by the Okinawa Defense Bureau.

To answer the question of how planning has mediated the relationship between people

¹³ The English name of the plan is the *Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa*

Table 1*1996: Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report*

Facility Name	Full/Partial Return	Facility Area	Area of Return	Unreturned Area	Relocation Notes
Futenma Airfield	Full	1188.55	1188.55	1176.20	Relocate to sea-based facility within Okinawa
Northern Training Area	Partial	9851.88	9851.88	0.00	6 Osprey Helicopter landing pads constructed in remaining land
Aha Training Area	Partial	1186.08	1186.08	0.00	n/a
Ginbaru Training Area	Full	148.26	148.26	0.00	n/a
Sobe Communication Facility	Full	130.96	130.96	0.00	n/a
Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield	Full	471.96	471.96	0.00	n/a
Camp Kuwae	Partial	244.63	244.63	150.73	8000 m ² relocated to auxiliary army facility within Okinawa
Senaha Communication Facility	Full	150.73	150.73	0.00	3000 m ² relocated within Okinawa
Makiminato Supply Area	Partial	7.41	7.41	0.00	
Naha Port Facility	Full	140.85	140.85	140.85	Whole facility relocation to sea-based facility within Okinawa
Relocated Housing Areas	Partial	205.09	n/a	71.66	
Total			13521.31	1539.43	

* All areas expressed in total acreage as of 1996

** Source: Okinawa Prefectural Government, 2020

*** Where Area of Return is less than Original Facility Area but a Full return is noted, sections of the facility have been returned since it's original establishment

Table 2*1990: "23 Cases"*

Facility Name	Full/Partial Return	Original Facility Area	Area of Return	Unreturned Area	Relocation Notes
Northern Training Area	Partial	21795.40	1185.57	0.00	n/a
Yaedake Communication Station	Partial	9201.14	47.44	0.00	n/a
Camp Schwab	Partial	5201.88	1.24	0.00	n/a
Camp Hansen	Partial	13043.98	408.45	0.00	n/a
Onna Communication Station	Partial	155.92	154.19	0.00	n/a
Kadena Ammunition Storage Facility	Partial	7727.21	356.56	105.26	n/a
Chibana Site	Partial	37.31	0.25	0.00	n/a
Tori Communication Facility	Partial	823.82	9.39	0.00	n/a
Kadena Airfield	Partial	5083.52	5.19	0.00	n/a
Sunabe Storage Warehouse	Full	0.74	0.74	0.00	n/a
Camp Kuwae	Partial	277.74	98.84	5.00	n/a
Camp Zukeran	Partial	1905.61	115.89	1.24	n/a
Futenma Airfield	Partial	1230.05	10.38	0.00	n/a
Makiminato Auxiliary Supply Facility	Full	0.25	0.25	0.00	n/a
Marines Office	Partial	13.10	11.12	0.00	n/a
Naha Refrigeration Warehouse	n/a	Building Only	0.02	0.00	n/a
Army Fuel Storage Facility	Partial	370.15	10.63	0.00	n/a
Total			2522.61	900.00	

* All areas expressed in acres

** Source: Okinawa Prefectural Government, 2021

Table 3*2013: Consolidation Plan for Land Return South of Kadena Airbase*

Facility Name	Full/Partial Return	Area of Return	Unreturned Area	Relocation Notes
Camp Zukeran (Western Futenma Residential Area)	Partial	317.50	0.00	
Camp Kinser (Northern Road)	Partial	6.11	0.00	
Camp Kinser (area around gate 5)	Partial	12.21	0.00	
Camp Zukeran (Portion of the warehouse area in the engineering area)	Partial	61.06	0.00	Administrative offices, maintenance shops, storage buildings, etc. relocated within Okinawa
Camp Kuwae	Full	415.20	415.20	Naval hospital, middle school, and family housing relocated within Okinawa
Camp Zukeran (Lower Plaza Housing Area)	Partial	140.43	140.43	Family housing relocated within Okinawa
Camp Zukeran (Portion including the Kishaba Residential Area)	Partial	30.53	30.53	966 new housing units to be built, and 32 units relocated within Okinawa
Camp Zukeran (Industrial Corridor)	Partial	378.56	378.56	Seven instances of various army and marines functions/facilities relocated within Okinawa; One US Marines function (logistics support) relocated outside of Japan
Makiminato Supply Area (Camp Kinser): Part including the majority of the Warehouse Area	Partial	787.65	769.34	Four instances of various Army and Marines functions/facilities relocated within Okinawa
Naha Port Facility	Partial	341.93	341.93	Whole facility relocation to sea-based facility within Okinawa
Kuwae Tank Farm #1 (Army Fuel Storage Facility)	Partial	97.69	97.69	Three Marines and air force functions/facilities relocated within Okinawa
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma Airfield	Full	2936.91	2906.38	Whole facility relocation to sea-based facility within Okinawa; III Marine Expeditionary Force (5000 Marines/1300 family members) relocated to Guam
Additional Areas of Camp Kinser	Partial	n/a	n/a	n/a
Remaining Areas of Camp Kinser	Partial	867.03	867.03	
Remainder of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)	Partial	350.88	350.88	One Marines function and one American Forces Network facility relocated within Okinawa
Shirahi River Area (Camp Foster)	Partial	0.99	0.99	One Marines function relocated within Okinawa
Area south of the Industrial Corridor (Camp Foster)	Partial	1.24	1.24	Six Army and Marines functions/facilities and one school bus service relocated within Okinawa; one Marines logistics function will relocate outside of Japan
Total		6745.92	6300.20	

* All areas converted to acres

** Source: United States Department of Defense, 2013

and land in processes of military realignment, the units of analysis the case study observes are actual return events that have taken place since 1996. My description of “return events,” rather than “returns,” points to the fact that the actual nature of return is diverse, some “returns” occurring as agreed upon, and others being delayed for various reasons, the belabored construction replacement facilities chief among them. The first unit of analysis is the 2010 return of the US Army Awase Meadows Golf Club (hereafter, Awase Meadows) in Kitanakagusuku Village, and its subsequent conversion into AEON Mall Okinawa Rycom, what at the time of development in 2014 was Okinawa’s largest American style shopping mall (Figure 2). The return of Awase Meadows was first conceded in the 23 Cases plan, but as Chapter Four explains, sat unaddressed altogether until the Clinton administration gained renewed interest in the return (provided a new golf-course would be built) in the face of the 1995 uprising.

In addition to the convenience of having been granted a rare opportunity of extended research engagement with the Awase landowners whose jurisdiction was restored in the return, the Awase project was selected as an embedded case for numerous reasons. First, since the golf club had already been redeveloped at the time of research, it vividly illustrates the actual processes of land assembly and conversion which military bases in Okinawa go through when the military leaves. Second, the impacts of landowners’ persistent ownership of occupied base land, and the colonial politics of dependency which they are subject to set Okinawa apart from other research concerning military base redevelopment in the region.¹⁴ Thus, primary research with the Awase landowners provided a critical understanding of how planning’s engagements with property may intercede in the restoration of Indigenous people’s jurisdiction over formerly occupied land.

¹⁴ Germany and South Korea are often-compared case studies. In Germany, the United States assumed ownership of its base land following the war, so when bases close there, the federal government manages the redevelopment process (Bonn International Center for Conversion, 1995). In South Korea, Nam explains that dispossessed land owners lay claim to approximately one-quarter of US Forces South Korea base land, but the Government of South Korea has been reticent to acknowledge any of those claims (2006, 618).

The case study's second unit of analysis is the ratified, yet still unrealized return of MCAS Futenma in densely urban Ginowan City, which I analyze through the advance construction of its "Futenma replacement facility" (FRF) in Oura Bay, off the coast of Henoko Village in the northern city of Nago (Figure 2). Since the 1990s, the proposal to shutter MCAS Futenma due to the long-list of military-related "incidents" stemming from the urban base, has cast Okinawa into an international spotlight as a center of US imperialism. The Japanese Ministry of Defense's relentless advance of the FRF's construction atop the precious corals of Oura Bay (Palz, 2021), has further illuminated Okinawa's positionality as a discriminated periphery to Japan and "toxic junk heap" to the pentagon (Mitchell, 2013a).

The rationale behind the selection of the MCAS Futenma return/Henoko relocation as the second embedded case, is that rather than being exceptional, the relocation illustrates another basic characteristic of land return in Okinawa: the densification of military facilities and functions under the auspices of return, commonly taking the form of "relocation within the prefecture" (*kennai isetsu*). A cursory comparison of the 1996 SACO Final Report (Table 1) with the 2014 Consolidation Plan (Table 2), gives context to a shift from "return" to "realignment" that has occurred in Okinawa, as return concessions have become increasingly and ironically housed in plans focused on strengthening the US-Japan military partnership. My participation with the movement against the Henoko FRF at the gates of US Marines Camp Schwab and analysis of planning policy related to the relocation are the empirical basis of the second embedded case.

Data & Collection Methods

Between 2021 and 2022, I spent approximately eighteen months in central Okinawa Island, following the activities and inactivities of military land return. My aim was to produce a historicized and phenomenological understanding of planning and military land-reform that have been prevalent in the post-1995 period. I used a mixed-methods and mostly qualitative data

collection approach, blending archival and policy analysis, in-depth interviewing, and participant observation.

As many have, I spent several months pouring over the declassified US military archive detailing the occupation period, which are now housed in the Okinawa Prefectural Archives in Haeburu City of Okinawa Island. The collection is a trove of defense minutia, policy discourse, legal documentation and photographic evidence of US military governance in Okinawa throughout the period of de-jure occupation. Upon Japan's resumption of jurisdiction over Okinawa in 1972, the collection had been taken out of Okinawa to be housed at the US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in Washington, D.C.. It wasn't until 1997 that the collection was transferred to Okinawan management under the curatorship of University of the Ryukyus professor and scholar of the occupation period, Etsujiro Miyagi. I drew particular inspiration from one occupation narrative heavily informed by the archive, written by Miyagi himself, Masahide Ota and Hiroshi Hosaka in 1987.¹⁵ I designed this phase of the research to provide a provisional answer to the question: *how were techniques of planning used by the US military in the decade following the Battle of Okinawa to establish and govern its territorial jurisdictions?*

Because for purposes of this dissertation, my historical interests were limited to the seminal formation of military bases rather than their sedimentation over long periods of time, I constrained materials searches to the years of 1945 to 1960. This chronology was also based on the Armed Services Committee of the US House of Representative's Price Commission of 1955, which was assembled to determine a solution to the US's problem of land acquisition in Okinawa, and the collapse of the US military's "one-time buyout" campaign in 1958 which I address in subsequent chapters. I took lead from existing planning research which investigates the role played by policy texts at the interface of Indigenous communities and systems of

¹⁵ The full title of this report is: *A Comprehensive Study on U.S. Military Government on Okinawa (An Interim Report)* (Ota et al., 1987).

planning that are embedded in colonial state apparatuses (Barry & Porter, 2012). I used a conventional geographic understanding of scale (global, national, local, micro) to organize my materials searches, all of which related to land. At the level of geopolitics, I focused my search on war-time discourses which delineated and made real the militarized postwar geography of the Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands. At a lower scale, I reviewed US policy discourses contemplating the future legal character of Okinawa under US occupation. I then homed my search on the actual ordinances, special proclamations and internal communications of all three military governments (Provisional Naval (1945-1946), Army (1946-1951), then USCAR (1952-1972)) which were empowered throughout occupation. I used local newspapers and formal petition documents written by Okinawans and their representatives to enable a more relational analysis of dispossession and territory making.

There are a number of caveats concerning scope and methodological decisions of Chapter Three that must be addressed. First, my intention in the present work was to focus mostly on the colonial territorializations of the US and its armed forces, specifically on Okinawa Island in the postwar decade. The first corollary of this is that I sacrifice a fulsome account of the counter-movements, particularly the dynamics of the All Island Struggle (*shimagurumi-tōso*), which sought to destabilize the US Forces' "Land Acquisition Program." This scope decision also fails to deeply engage with Okinawan land ethics or worldviews, which would otherwise have better illuminated the stakes of the land conflicts under investigation. I engage with counter-movements and the stakes of decolonization in Okinawa later in the dissertation, but in Chapter Three I am foremost concerned with understanding how militaries colonize land. My shortcomings also include the inability to provide a complex picture of the postwar reterritorializations which affected other islands in the Ryukyu Archipelago, such as in the Yaeyama Island Group (*guntō*), where the Battle of Okinawa and then US-backed relocation campaigns also resulted in vast territorial reconfigurations. Finally – perhaps most consequentially – I fail to offer a complex understanding of the interdependence of the US and

Japanese colonial presence, which enabled Okinawa's extended occupation and continues to be pivotal to the military-related environmental injustice wrought by those two countries in Okinawa today.

A second group of research limitations relates to my use of the military archive itself, which I found to be fraught with contradiction and bias, in animating the narrative of this chapter. The discourses of powerful movement actors and planning officials of USCAR and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI), are prominent; accounts of those they governed are conspicuously absent. Even amongst the Okinawans who are present in this collection, the voices that ring out loudest belong to GRI executives and prominent landowner representatives-cum-politicians. Women, children, and those without property in land all tend to exist in this archive only to the extent that they are represented by someone else. The archive's inability to give voice to past generations, and those who perished in the Battle of Okinawa also resounded. The struggle for land and sea documented before you was/is not for soil and water per se, but for what the humanist geographer, Yi-Fu Tuan, called *place*. "The strongest bond to place is of a religious nature," Tuan wrote, "one of kinship, reaching back in time from proximate ancestors to distant semi-divine heroes, to the gods of the family hearth and of the city shrines" (1979, 418). To have limited the scope of my archival survey to the world of the living is an irredeemable shortcoming that I don't know how to resolve. Once archival work was complete, interviewing and participation became the predominant data collection methods of Chapters Four and Five respectively. Having received only a conversational command of Japanese from home-life and only having undertaken formal Japanese language study as an undergraduate, intensive language learning was necessary to reach the level of speaking and reading fluency that would allow interviews to be conducted independently and to interpret primary documents and pertinent literature. I completed the Inter-University Center for Japanese Language Studies' summer intensive program and undertook extensive independent study with the aid of tutors. Still, for interviews which I deemed "technical," being held with government officials and expert

planners, I was accompanied by an academic interpreter who aided when clarification was necessary and who I compensated financially as an expert and through in-kind support of their own academic endeavors. Certain expansive academic texts remained out of reach, though I developed a high level of reading fluency in those related squarely to the topic of inquiry.

Interview sampling was conducted strategically at first, and then by convenience and snowballing methods through previous interviewees and new acquaintances in the field. In total, forty-three interview solicitations were made and thirty-six interviews were conducted, yielding an eighty-four percent response rate (Table 4). Interview target groups consisted of: original

Table 4

Interviews

Interview Group	(n=)
Landowners	5
Community	11
Academic	7
“Experts”	13
Total	36

owners and intergenerational beneficiaries of military land; community members engaged in activities related to military land reform; academics specialized in military land and politics in Okinawa; and an “expert” group, which consisted of government planners, politicians and one real-estate professional specializing in military land sales. All interviews were conducted according to requirements outlined by the University of California, Los Angeles’ Ethics Review Board for Human Research (IRB#19-001539), including board-approved recruitment and oral consent scripts which I created in both English and Japanese. A sample interview rubric is enclosed as Appendix A. In the text of the dissertation, I have assigned all interlocutors who aren’t well-known figures or public servants pseudonyms in order to protect their anonymity,

while maintaining the either Okinawan or Japanese character of the original names. The first instance of each pseudonym is denoted with an asterisk.

The eventual receding of my strategic sampling approach in favor of snowballing and convenience methods produced some bias into my data resulting in the perspectives of the elderly being privileged over those of youth and diaspora. This was most prominent in community and landowner interviews. Of the interviews I ended up using in the dissertation, the majority of community interviews were conducted with elderly individuals, and I was unsuccessful altogether in forming relationships with younger generation landowners. There are two areas of the dissertation that are possibly affected by this bias. One argument I make throughout the work, but especially in Chapter 4, is that place attachment wanes as forced alienation from land persists through generations, carrying with it built-environment consequences when former bases are returned and redeveloped. While the perspectives of elderly landowners and military land data substantiate this argument for present purposes, further research with new beneficiaries of military land titles will strengthen this argument greatly. Additionally, the absence of rigorous research with younger Okinawans and those in diaspora regarding the politics of repossession leave any conceptualization of “claiming” land regrettably confined to legal and sometimes colonial forms of entitlement.

In my social movement research, I underestimated the extent to which I would be drawn into direct participation in the movement against the FRF at Henoko. As my engagement with the protest movement increased, so too did my participation in protest actions and planning events that were adjacent to the Henoko movement but still pertained to militarized land reform generally, helping to elucidate the role of social mobilization in the dissertation context. In total, I participated in 38 such events (Table 5). When I classed an event as “protest,” it was usually characterized by the organized and direct blockading of military resource flows with human bodies. Like Sasha Davis (2021), my coming to understand the anti-base blockade not as a mere interruption of the otherwise free flow of resources, but as productive sites of

Table 5

Participation

Activity	(n=)
Planning Event (Protest)	30
Planning Event (Community)	8
Total	38

territorialization and cultural reconstruction is documented in Chapter Five. Participation events were almost always preceded and followed by the audio-recording of a fieldnote.

The “Henoko bus,” which was my entry point to participation in the Henoko movement, became an important connector linking me to political events which were directly relevant and adjacent to the Henoko issue. The bus, which transports protestors daily from Naha City to the gates of Camp Schwab and back again after a day of demonstrations against the FRF, has been cogently described by Lummis (2019, p. 3) as a “training ground for speaking publicly about issues that matter.” Lummis’s explanation of the bus as a venue that sometimes provides sit-in members with their first opportunity to publicly correct the assumptions about Okinawa held by Japanese visitors to the protest, characterizes the vehicle as a potentially radical political site. As my relationships with sit-in members and bus riders grew stronger, I was invited to myriad events which dovetailed with the Henoko movement including: study groups analyzing the potential ecological fallout of another forthcoming replacement facility proposed to take the place of the Naha Military Port slated for closure since the 23 Cases plan of 1991; a rally targeting an FRF design change proposed by the Okinawa Defense Bureau in light of a soft seafloor; and attendance at a political rally backing an anti-base mayoral candidate in a central Okinawa Island municipality. Events such as these enriched relations in the field and my understanding of the contemporary political context and stakes of military land reform on

Okinawa Island. A complete enumeration of interview and participation events is enclosed as Appendix B.

Analysis and writing required oscillating between individual pieces of primary data and what I understood to be the broader meaning of the research subject. All interview recordings and fieldnotes were first translated and transcribed by myself using the qualitative data management software MaxQDA. Most of the data was then coded using a two-step sequence of qualitative analysis that Babbie calls “open” and “axial” coding (Babbie, 2015, 423). Open codes were assigned to interview data in order to identify emergent categories, and once this was complete those were merged through a round of axial coding to produce a shorter list of the most salient themes. For instance, open codes like “military base return causes drop in land price” and “military bases help Okinawa” were eventually merged into the axial code of “Structure of Dependency.” Once I had developed an understanding of which interviews, archival materials, and participation events were most critical to the arc of the dissertation, I stopped this process of data coding and began structuring and writing the dissertation.

Chapter Two: Reconfiguring the Military Frontier

In this dissertation I understand planning in contemporary colonial contexts as a practice of statecraft whose violent colonial origins become masked, rather than replaced, by technocratic practices of government and discourses of improvement. This process of subduction is demonstrated in the arc of my chapters, where the dispossessive logic motivating the US military's original settlement in Okinawa reproduces even in moments of land return. Thus, my theoretical framework bridges two bodies of scholarship: one that details the procedural aspects of military base redevelopment, but that has been unfortunately silent regarding the political and territorial consequences of those jurisdictional reforms; and another that theorizes the production of territory – both by states and by regular people – but has not always been empirical in its observation of actual spatial practices. “Reconfiguring the military frontier” is a call for a recognition that while military land reform is indeed a procedural planning phenomenon, it is also always illustrative of the profound social repercussions of shifting frontiers whether the focal object be spatial exercises of state power or the ways in which Indigenous peoples contest and limit them.

Recovering Militarized Land

“Military base redevelopment” usually refers to a specific process whereby an outpost of a military is decommissioned following the ceasing of its activities there, and the formerly used land is re-purposed following a period of land-use planning, for new, non-military related purposes. Investigations of conversion processes in the US focus overwhelmingly on economic recovery as the prime indicator of success. These cases spotlight stories of communities who fear the loss of their base for reasons of job loss and community break-up. Research on the local impacts of base conversion off of the North American continent focus on how

demilitarization movements shapeshift and make their impacts in response to or in anticipation of military restructurations. These “extra-territorial” cases also focus upon the policies which define the terms of the relationships between military “host” nations and the US, and the impacts they have on issues of environmental accountability.

As others have noted, the bulk of the literature on base redevelopment favors coverage of closures in US contexts (Kim, 2018). The five campaigns of military base closures under the US Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC) inspired research on the economic effects of base closures on surrounding communities (US Office of Economic Adjustment, 1990; McCurry, 2003). When military bases close, this research found job growth in the post-redevelopment period to be likely despite the fears of local community members. Still, some communities surrounding long-standing military bases resist closure, anticipating economic downturn (Hill, 2000; Hill Thanner & Segal, 2008). These concerns may not be unfounded. While the number of jobs tends to increase in the post-military period, the nature of the job environment changes favoring higher trained new entrants to the local economy, and displacing long-time workers (Kibel, 1997; Woodward, 2004).

Historicized and race- and gender-conscious analyses of the impacts of military base conversions also exist. These studies demonstrate the disproportionate effects that base closures can have on low income and ethnic minority communities (Matsuoka, 1997; Dillon, 2014). Dillon found at the redevelopment of the US Navy’s Hunters Point Shipyard in Northern California that the US Navy, who was singularly concerned with meeting that project’s environmental targets, dissolved the community advisory board when they deemed it to have become “too political” in its analysis of intersecting social problems (Dillon 2014, p. 1214). For that African American neighborhood, which the Navy had consistently failed to employ, “how many truckloads of waste” being removed from the redeveloping shipyard was “inseparable from the question of who is driving those trucks.” Elsewhere, Lindsay Dillon utilizes Rob Nixon’s

concept of “slow violence” to understand the important continuities of geographically uneven environmental harms that can wreak havoc in the post-redevelopment period (Dillon, 2015).

The ecological aspects of base redevelopment have seen sustained attention in the literature. For a review of the environmental impacts of military land-uses, Woodward (2004) offers a fulsome account, while noting that research has suffered from a lack of reliable information. Woodward observes that over five-hundred polluted sites were found under the first two rounds of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission on the continental US, twenty-five of which were noted to be among the most hazardous polluted areas in the country (Woodward, 2004, p. 77). For Woodward this illustrates the fact that in many cases, militarism’s most insidious environmental effects are not fully known until after military bases are closed and returned. Keisuke Mori observes that the military’s rampant pollution of Okinawan environments with Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) has coincided with increased community activism and local media coverage in spite of the Japanese government and US military’s concerted efforts to cloak their polluting activities (Mori, 2022, p. 169). Known as “forever chemicals” for their inability to biodegrade, the persistence of PFAS pollutants in “post”-military environments calls into question the very viability of military remediation.

In domestic contexts, base redevelopment has been considered one facet of “brownfield” redevelopment, tied in with the managed redevelopment of other closed or closing large industrial sites (Kibel, 1997; Eisen, 1998; Kushner, 2005). Responsibility for military site remediation tends to exist in a legal penumbra, as litigation is rarely pursued against governments for environmental accountability at bases (Kushner 2005, p. 896). Burden-of-cost debates are a fixture of military redevelopment projects, especially abroad where the US is prone to abrogating its environmental responsibilities (Wegman & Bailey, 1994). Troubling a human-environment dichotomy, Havlick (2011) has covered the proliferation of military-to-wildlife conversions in rural areas. What Havlick terms “ecological militarism” describes processes by which contaminated former militarized environments are cordoned off from human

engagement while gradually becoming havens for wildlife proliferation, and subsequently reintroducing limited human visitation.

Community planning has also received focus in the base conversion literature, with sustained attention to the impact of participatory approaches on project outcomes. Because of the geopolitical and multi-scalar nature of base conversion, engaged stakeholders will include municipal and national governments, various military branches, community groups of all stripes, and effected community members at large. For Bagaeen, inclusive planning processes are critical to realizing sustainability principles in redevelopment (2006). Ponzini and Vani (2014) are more measured in their consideration of participatory planning in two Italian case studies. “With the exception of discursive and symbolic dimensions,” those authors argue, “it is difficult to expect... the divergent goals of national and local government and unequal distribution of costs and benefits of redevelopment to be ideal conditions for collaboration to influence military base redevelopment” (Ponzini and Vani 2014, p. 70). Hansen et. al. (1997) identify broad-based citizen participation in conversion processes as a key to efficient processes, whereas disproportionate participation of government officials will lead to process delays when political agendas conflict in intergovernmental planning efforts. Observing the community planning of Naha City’s Shintoshin (“New Urban Center”) – formerly the US Forces’ Makiminato Housing Area – Kageyama (2016) explains that in Okinawa these processes may in fact open up space for some women to redefine prescribed gender roles despite their being a minority among military landowners due to the continued prevalence of Okinawan customary land inheritance traditions of *tōtōmē* (patriarchal mortuary tablets).

Little has been written directly about the relationship between the land use aspects of military restructuring and urban development politics in the Asia-Pacific region. Important exceptions include Inoue’s ethnography of military realignment politics in Henoko Village on Okinawa Island (2007) and Martin’s research concerning Pyeongtaek City’s leveraging the expansion of US Army Garrison Humphreys in support of its urban growth agenda (2018).

Outside of these exceptions, research in Asia-Pacific tends to relate to people's demilitarization movements, leading to a sizable literature examining mobilizations against bases and base redevelopment in: Okinawa (Akibayashi & Takazato, 2009; Ueunten, 2010; Ginoza, 2015; Chibana, 2018), the Philippines (Simbulan, 2009), Guåhan (Guam) (K. L. Camacho, 2011; Na'puti & Bevacqua, 2015; Bevacqua, 2017), Hawai'i (Kajihiro, 2009; Osorio, 2014); and South Korea (Yeo, 2010; Martin, 2018; Kim & Boas, 2019). In Okinawa, Guåhan (Guam), and Hawai'i in particular this research highlights the intimacies of colonial erasure and militarism, which cooperatively undermine situated Indigenous peoples' assertions of self-determination, unevenly subjecting them to human insecurity (also see Davis 2011). Contributions to this corpus tend to identify transpacific relationships and gender and Indigenous justice as important pathways to demilitarization while often incorporating such axioms into the research process itself (Fukumura & Matsuoka, 2002; K. Camacho & Ueunten, 2010; Cachola et al., 2019).

Foreign base conversions are distinguished in part by their subjection to Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) between the United States and "host" nations, which outline the terms by which the US operates its bases abroad. SOFAs tend to absolve the US from land remediation responsibilities upon base closure. Article 4, Section 1 of the US-Japan SOFA declares that:

The United States is not obliged, when it returns facilities and areas to Japan on the expiration of this Agreement or at an earlier date, to restore the facilities and areas to the condition in which they were at the time they became available to the United States armed forces, or to compensate Japan in lieu of such restoration. (*Status of Forces Agreement*, 1960)

The SOFA held between the US and the Republic of South Korea includes a boiler-plate copy of this provision, relieving the US from shouldering remediation costs upon exit (Republic of Korea, 1966). Because of a hard-fought provision added to South Korea's SOFA in 2001 prescribing greater accountability on the part of the US, and owing to the relatively prolific antimilitarist

sentiment spread throughout that country, the US has reluctantly played a more active role in military land remediation in South Korea than in Japan (Sakurai, 2013).

In the Okinawan context, the result of the US DoD's abrogation of its environmental responsibilities has been disastrous, centering considerations of environmental protection in base conversion processes. Between 1998 and 2015 at Kadena Air Base alone, the US Air Force spilled 40,000 liters of jet fuel, 13,000 liters of diesel and 480,000 liters of sewage into the public environment (Mitchell, 2013b). Because of endemic under-reporting of pollution events to Japanese authorities (a mere 23 of the 206 pollution events that took place between 2010 and 2014 were actually reported at Kadena Air Base), unanticipated remediation costs tend to prolong conversion timelines. For example, in the redevelopment of today's "Hamby Town" district of Chatan Town (*hambī* being a Japanese transliteration of Humvee), a 20-million-yen price tag was attached to the removal of 187 barrels of unknown toxins (Mitchell, 2016, p. 2). In 1981 at MCAS Futenma in the City of Ginowan, hundreds of barrels of agent orange were found buried where they had been stored during the Vietnam War, exposing Okinawans and US Forces personnel alike to highly toxic environments (Mitchell, 2012). Its common practice for the US to refuse independent environmental assessments of its extraterritorial outposts and the DoD has refused access to its own environmental findings, obstructing remediation planning for bases slated to be returned (Mitchell, 2015; Nagamine, 2019). Woodward (Woodward, 2004, p. 54) contends that military secrecy is a significant factor behind base conversion receiving so little attention in the social sciences and public policy analysis generally.

In Okinawa, the perception that the military's presence produces vast economic benefits is exacerbated by the problem of poverty, dividing the political field when bases undergo return and conversion. This plays on the vulnerabilities imposed by a structure of colonial dependency which is upheld by the US and Japanese governments. Koya Nomura explains:

...the Japanese government has repeatedly intimated that, if Okinawa cooperates and continues to welcome the U.S. bases on its soil, economic aid will be extended.

Cooperation and unemployment are intertwined. The Japanese government continues to exploit fear of unemployment and Okinawans' "premonition of violence" to guarantee the acceptance of U.S. bases." (2002, p. 117)

This "candy and whip" (carrot and stick) relation exploits the economically vulnerable and political-social elites alike. State-backed sweetheart deals have been used to tremendous effect in driving forward the new base in Henoko Village of Nago City – local amenities in exchange for a "cooperative, base-tolerant spirit in a few corners of a stubbornly anti-base city" (McCormack 2016, 16). Mohawk political scientist Taiaiake Alfred (2009, p. 75) explains of other Indigenous contexts that suppressing Indigenous economies is the handmaiden to planned dependency on colonial states: "with near complete personal and communal dependency on funds transferred from the state, Native communities are subject to perpetual coercion, and can challenge state power only at the risk of extreme economic and social deprivation."

To be sure, the *perception* that widespread base return might spell Okinawa's economic ruin has proven more resilient than actual dependency on military spending itself. The OPG notes that whereas in 1965 base-related income in Okinawa was 30.4%, in 2014 the same measure was merely 5.7% (2018c, p. 12). Conversely, the government predicts a multiplier of eighteen for both direct economic effect and number of jobs created with the closure of five select facilities in central Okinawa Island.¹⁶ Naha's Shintoshin provides a strong and often-referenced economic case for return. Formerly the Makiminato Housing Area, the facility was returned by the US Military in 1987, and heavily infilled throughout the early 2000s. Today, Shintoshin is a center of urban employment, connected inter-regionally by monorail and bus, and home to a number of commercial and residential developments, along with key public institutions like the new Okinawa Prefectural Museum and Naha City government offices. With

¹⁶ Camp Kuwae, Camp Zukeran, Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Makiminato Service Area, and Naha Military Port.

ninety-fold and thirty-fold increases in employment and financial productivity respectively, Shintoshin is an important example of Okinawa's ability to operate in the absence military-related revenue sources (Okinawa Prefectural Government, 2018c). Importantly, Kakazu points out that not all regions of Okinawa can expect to experience equal success in base redevelopment. In northern communities like Ginoza Village and Kin Town, base receipts still account for as much as 35% of local economies, suggesting that transitioning to a post-base local economy in the rural north will be more challenging in these areas than in heavily urbanized central Okinawa Island (2012, p. 331). So, illustrating Alfred's warning above regarding the costs of Indigenous communities interrupting the status-quo, for many inside of Okinawa, the military's departure remains complicated by concerns for retaining the material means of sustaining life whether actually or as a matter of perception.

A growing consideration for military land reuse in Okinawa has arisen alongside a trend of articulating the case for demilitarization in terms of suspended economic potential rather than culture or ontology. This thinking gained significant momentum in the 1990s, with Masahide Ota's prefectural administration Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept, which included a phased "Action Program" for the return of all US Military Bases by 2015. The plan repositioned Okinawa from the periphery of Japan to the center of a globalizing East Asia, with the OPG making its case for stronger connections to proximal markets (Okinawa Prefectural Government, 1996; Yamazaki, 2005, p. 28). Complementarily, citing the redevelopment of Awase Meadows Golf Club in Kitanakagusuku Village which I explore in depth in Chapter Five, Ryūkyūan economist and independence activist, Yasukatsu Matsushima, notes that "so long as there are bases here, economic activity is extremely hampered. If land can be returned and the market economy can develop sectors like tourism, we should see big growth in the economy" (2019, p. 63). Also challenging the notion that Ryūkyūan independence would lead to economic collapse, Okinawa International University professor, Masaki Tomochi, estimates a 1.25-fold increase in Okinawa's prefectural economy, provided the removal of all bases and central government subsidies to the

prefecture. “in Ryūkyū (Okinawa), it’s not a base economy that we have,” Tomochi explains, “but a base ‘un’ economy” (2017, p. 23).

There are categorical problems with how the available literature on base conversion is divided between “domestic” and “foreign” which this dissertation will attempt to address. For example, despite continual reminders of the persistence of their own sovereignties, and being some of the world’s most vocal opponents of US Militarism, Hawai’i, Guåhan (Guam), Okinawa, and Indigenous nations of North America tend to be excluded from research concerning the actual processes and outcomes of base closure and military realignment as they manifest at a regional-level. Exceptions to this lacuna include Hooks and Smith who isolated Native American reservations and used a negative binomial regression to determine a significant spatial overlap with highly toxic closed military sites (2004, p. 572). Otherwise, this lacuna tacitly collapses the interests of polities forcefully incorporated into colonial nation-states into the research areas that dominate domestic base conversion research like economic development, job-recovery, and participatory planning. In turn, this relegates phenomena like decolonization, Indigenous cultural and political resurgence, and myriad other opportunities and challenges unique to Indigenous peoples repossessing militarized places as extraneous to the analytical frame of base conversion. The main contribution this dissertation will make in redressing this gap is its attention to the continuities of militarism that occur the wake of base closure, and that are particularly present in colonized sub-national regions like Okinawa where the dominant form of environmental injustice is militarism.

Bases, Planning and Territory Effects

Foreign military bases are important test-cases for observing the dynamics of territory. They exist outside of the ostensible boundaries of the US, but operate as de-facto extensions of American space, blurring conventional notions of political domesticity and foreignness with

which territory theorists have historically been very concerned. Geographers have variously called bases “simulacrum of suburbia” and “little Americas,” referencing not only their extraterritorial reproduction of American built forms, but also their provision of cultural experiences which provide the sensation of being “state side” (Gillem, 2007; Vine, 2015). The very existence of foreign bases is only made possible in the first place by the capture of land which is facilitated by the application of Euro-American urban planning tools like surveying, orthogonal mapping, law, and demography, all of which have been highly instrumental to the seizure of Indigenous people’s land by colonizing states (Blomley, 2003; Yiftachel, 2006). Therefore, to understand the territory effects of foreign military bases historically requires that we review territory scholarship in tandem with that which covers the dispossessive functions of planning.

Foucault’s genealogy of territory in the 17th century convention of the nation-state was highly influential in the proliferation of territory-related geography scholarship. In his Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78, *Sécurité, Territoire, Population*, Foucault treated territory as a condition rather than an effect of state sovereignty:

From the Middle Ages to the sixteenth century, sovereignty is not exercised on things, but first of all on a territory...these territories may be fertile or barren, they may be densely or sparsely populated, the people may be rich or poor, active or idle, but all these elements are only variables in relation to the territory that is the very foundation of the principality or of sovereignty. (Foucault, 2007, p. 134)

Rather than emphasizing the social dynamics of territoriality, Foucault observes a historical primacy of territory itself, whose seizure was critical to the consolidation of sovereignty. Foucault goes on to use Alexandre Le Maître’s *La Métropolitée*, to explain that the spatial limits of a sovereign’s territory were coterminous with its ability to administer influence and punishment from the capital over vast distances. This is apropos of postwar US military governments’ in Okinawa establishment of “military districts,” which became the local unit of American power.

Out of the 1648 Westphalia Treaties emerged what Foucault calls a “pluralist Europe,” broken up into small territorialized nations in which power, rather than being utilized solely to expand the borders of empire, is refocused inwards to produce national subjects via technologies of government and population control.

Statist models of territory where the relationship between the sovereignty of states and territory, rather than the relational and often violent production of politicized spatial enclosures, continue to be the focal point in the pertinent scholarship. John Agnew’s outlining of the “territorial trap” (Agnew, 1994) continues to be a bulwark against this tendency, and consisted of three assumptions he saw as virtually endemic to territory scholarship: (1) states are assumed to be unitary bounded units of sovereign space conforming to ideal-types rather than dynamic and historical geographic formations; (2) a tendency toward analyzing the territoriality of nation-states through dichotomous scales such as national/international and domestic/foreign, obscuring the ability to view territory at different scales; and (3) the territorial state is considered to be a fact that is both posterior to and completely exhausting of society, so “the main contours of society are seen as coincident with the borders of the state.” Agnew argued subsequently that navigating out of the territorial trap is critical to understanding new, micro scale effects of territory which are not necessarily co-extensive with the nation-state (Agnew, 2008).

There are many accounts of territory not bound to state sovereignty, which get us closer to an understanding of what is going on spatially when unsanctioned organizations of people assert alternative visions of space. A heterodox though long-standing view on the topic understands territory as a set of relational social practices (Brighenti, 2006). This perspective was first advanced by mid-century ethologists who believed that non-human territorial relations could teach us about human territoriality. Rather than describing territory as an a-priori “state space,” ethologists like Von Uexküll (1934), Robert Ardrey (1966), and Konrad Lorenz (1963) argued the “instinct thesis,” according to which territory was a product of the defensive impulses of culture groups. Von Uexküll, for example, described “reflex republics” where a sort

of civil peace saw the “tender suction feet of the sea urchin are never fallen upon by the biting, grasping pincers.” (1934) This line of explanation failed to respond to charges of biological determinism and an understanding of territory that was solely focused on aggressive response.¹⁷

Both statist approaches to territory (territory as spatialized sovereignty) and biological reductionist approaches (territory as defensive instinct) are problematic for understanding the specific spatial politics of military realignment explored in this dissertation. The former fails to account for unsanctioned territorialisations against oppressive states. “Territory is not only produced by the modern state,” argues Halvorsen, “it is resisted, (re)appropriated and (re)defined in the course of diverse grassroots struggles” (2018). As I show in Chapters Three and Five, organized dissent against military redevelopment have born new and productive forms of territory which do not house the state but refuse it. On the other hand, ethological instinct theses insufficiently account for territorial objectives such as decolonizing language practices and place-based community relations, which do not necessitate control over or ownership of space.

Social movements often attempt to realize political objectives inherently tied to specific places, and have thus received more attention in the past decade as territorial productions in their own right (Halvorsen et al., 2019). Much of this territory scholarship is inspired by Latin-American intellectual traditions that have a longer history of considering non-state territories. Whereas all social movements can be thought of as socio-spatial movements, insofar as they take place in and through space (physical or otherwise), only those whose primary aims are the

¹⁷ For example, regarding the biological determinism of the ethologist tradition, take Konrad Lorenz (1963, 253) on intergroup territoriality: “The balanced interaction between all the single norms of social behaviour characteristic of a culture accounts for the fact that it usually proves highly dangerous to mix cultures. To kill a culture it is often sufficient to bring it into contact with another, particularly if the latter is higher, or is at least regarded as higher, as the culture of a conquering nation usually is. The people of the subdued side then tend to look down upon everything they previously held sacred and to ape the customs which they regard as superior.”

apprehension of space might be considered socio-territorial movements. Social movements, explains Zibechi, “tend to develop territorial roots,” giving way to new forms of social relationships which in turn produce new territorialities (Zibechi, 2012). The collectivization of movements to apprehend space, by translocal groups of solidarity and education is one defining characteristic of socioterritorial movements (Routledge, 2015; Davis, 2017). Sassen understands territoriality as a sort of complex capability and social movements as territories which construct sub-national territories impregnated by power and claim-making (2013, p. 39).

The militarization of land and reconfigurations of bases occasion vast reconfigurations of jurisdiction. Because the instruments of urban planning are active in both the seminal dispossessions which militarize space and the bureaucracies of base return, research concerning the planning-territory nexus is critical to understanding the dynamics of base realignment. State-based urban planners have at a basic level been instrumental in eroding Indigenous people’s control over their custodial land-bases (Porter, 2016). To borrow from Raffestin, planners perform a “moderating” role by receiving directives from the state regarding territorial formation, then apply geographic sciences to establish new boundaries, assert jurisdictional authority and replace Indigenous forms of socio-spatial organization with those based on Lockean notions of “highest-and-best use.” Whereas the longest history of planning theory was regrettably naïve about systems of power in which planners could be embedded (Friedmann 1998, p. 247), a later turn in planning scholarship giving more attention to the “sinister” applications of the profession helped redress this gap. For instance, Yiftachel (1998, 2) understands the “social control” function of all planning work to be impregnated to some extent with the potential for “repression, constraint, exploitation and oppression.” The most drastic realization of planning thought in the last thirty-years has been a reckoning with the role that the field has played in territorializing the colonial nation-state.

In situations where planners are politically charged by their embeddedness in government, planning can undermine Indigenous peoples’ jurisdiction while cloaking itself in

discourses of development and progress. Stanger-Ross argues that what he calls “municipal colonialism” is constituted by the institutionalizing of settler territorial claims in the apparatus of city planning (2008, 544). Heather Dorries improves this analysis by explaining that even where urban planning might appear to “municipalize” colonial dispossession, it is important to understand such processes as always serving the consolidation of the colonial state which houses regional scales of government (2012). Planning’s instrumentality in the making of territory is not limited to these geographies. Comparable histories are found in Morocco (Rabinow, 1989); Ainu Moshiri/Hokkaido (Hirano, 2015); Chile (Ugarte Urzua, 2019) and more. The present case is no different. Indeed, in the post-war decade the US Far East Command administered planning educations through schools of military government, to advance what were de facto postwar nation-building projects in the Ryūkyūs under the auspices of “reconstruction.” In Chapter Five, elderly Okinawans contest a program of environmentally catastrophic remilitarization administered by Japanese state authorities in the name of “burden reduction” and “return.”

Among the various scientific tools planners use, maps have arguably been the most corrosive to the ability of Indigenous peoples to remain connected with their ancestral lands. Cartographers surveying land desired by the new sovereign establish boundaries around and within the colony, rendering it legible to state appropriation and to enclosure as private property. “Property required a location, and maps were the means of establishing it,” explains Harris (2004) of the creation of the Indigenous reserves in Canada which topographically outlined the miniscule spaces zoned for Indigenous land and life, negatively defining all other spaces as accessible to colonial settlement. Similarly in what is now the United States, crude mapping procedures supported the 1887 General Allotment (Dawes) Act, which outlined parcels of 40 to 160 acres for distribution to Indigenous allottees, designating all remaining lands as spaces of settlement (Shoemaker 2003, 740). Winichakul notes of France and Siam’s nineteenth century contest over the Lao region, that modern mapping techniques were the means by which

Indigenous chiefdoms in the border regions were forcefully “transformed into integral parts of the new political space defined by the new notions of sovereignty and boundary” (1997, 129). “Another ultimate loser” of the French and Siamese territorial cartographies in the Lao region, argues Winichakul, was “indigenous knowledge of political space. Modern geography displaced it, and the regime of mapping became hegemonic.” Similarly, Edney (1994) documents what he calls the 19th century “cartographisation of the [British] military,” or “map mindedness,” whereby military planners widely adopted cartographic practices, being enthused by “the ease with which the map could substitute for the territory” (19). On the frontier, cartography may either advertise the boundaries of territory secured militarily, and thereby the extents of the colonial state, or outline zones of capital and resource extraction outside of the metropole but available to it.

Despite Agnew’s injunction of the “territorial trap” dominant research on the dynamics of territory remain highly concerned with the state. Instead, this dissertation attempts to build on what Bridget Martin calls a “critical territories approach”. From this view the imperial sovereignty of nations is understood as “dialectically inflected, refracted, co-constituted, and limited in myriad ways by other forms of power in particular conjunctures, especially through encounters with local and Indigenous peoples” (Martin, 2022, p. 4). What is of most concern here, argues Martin, is not necessarily the shapeshifting borders of countries per se, but the structurally dispossessive mechanics of American foreign basing, which feeds on “the routine separation of people from land” (p. 5). Most germane to this perspective are interpretations of territory which are mostly concerned with the actual practices of appropriating and enclosing space. For example, Brighenti’s analysis reinforces the centrality of boundaries, arguing that territory can only be understood in context by examining their social production (Brighenti, 2006). Relatedly, Raffestin offers a descriptive model of territorial production in which the territorial-ist and the “mediators” they make use of bundle sets of capacities together in order to convert unmodified environments into controlled territories (Raffestin, 2012). As such, territory should not be

understood as necessarily violent or dispossessive, but a contingent effect that is often brought into existence through processes of both.

As I noted in the section, *Description of the Case*, the research design was adjusted in response to calls from community members to focus on two related areas of politics and action, each critical to the central research question: normative redevelopment processes, and people's movements against the conditions of return. Accordingly, this section has brought to light what is already understood of the most salient considerations in the redevelopment of military bases, and the key debates and intellectual genealogy of territory as a geographical category. In doing so, this section has also outlined critical lacunae. The enduring impact of militarist dispossession as a structural logic on redevelopment outcomes, the unique experiences of resurgent Indigenous peoples as they reclaim long occupied and militarized lands, and the specific role that rent plays in shaping Indigenous experiences of repossession are areas of study that will significantly improve our understanding of base redevelopment. In my conclusions I will return to the ways in which this research has begun to redress these gaps. The next section begins this project, offering a history of militarist dispossession under US occupation.

Chapter Three: “War by Others Means”: Planning Militarist Dispossession on Okinawa Island (1945-1955)

Introduction

It is not uncommon to hear well-intentioned observers of military-related problems in Okinawa make remarks like “all of Okinawa Island is a military base.” While such statements are often based in sentiment, they are not surprising given that thirty-one fortifications of the US and its allied militaries – some seventy-percent of all such outposts in Japan – remain in the prefecture, having been erected in 1945 atop stolen land. So profuse and noxious was military land-use in postwar Okinawa that in 1959, US military planners conducted a “single site” feasibility study in which they considered cordoning off entire sections of the island and consolidating all facilities in the region within them.¹⁸ Of course, unevenly effecting Okinawans as an archipelagic Indigenous minority within the Japanese nation state, such a delineation would today be tantamount to what scholars of environmental racism would call a “sacrifice zone” where the aggregate environmental impact of noxious land-uses on marginalized groups are ignored, resulting in the concentrated toxification of Indigenous and racialized communities (Bullard 1993, 200). Whereas the US and Japanese governments have in the past treated their militarization of Okinawa as an ahistorical natural fact, it was of course produced; this chapter explores the material processes underlying its production with special attention paid to the first decade of de-jure military occupation of Okinawa Island¹⁹ following WWII.

¹⁸ The full name of the study was, *Study as to the Feasibility of Concentrating U.S. Military Installations in Okinawa in a Single Area*. (Booth, 1959). The proposal was ultimately abandoned in light of “increased vulnerability, popular animosity, and dollars for the formation of such an enclave” (Ibid, 14)

¹⁹ I am concerned specifically with Okinawa Island and those smaller islands in its immediate vicinity, such as Ie Island.

Before I proceed, it will help to distinguish the postwar context of Okinawa from Japan. The United States' postwar occupation of Japan's "main islands" was brief and followed abruptly by the restoration of that country's sovereignty on April 28, 1952. By contrast, inspired by US presidential executive order, and lubricated by a strategic re-invocation of Okinawan-Japanese difference, US military rule of the Ryukyu Islands stretched well into the Vietnam War era (1945-1972). During the first five years of this formative period of occupation, US military jurisdiction over its base landscape metastasized to nearly 45,000 acres. Although US forces landed on the shores of Yomitan Village at the dawn of the Battle of Okinawa as a warring institution, sometime thereafter it assumed an additional function as a technocratic one. To secure the islands as a durable outpost of US empire, three successive US military governments' modus operandi was a form of Indigenous land acquisition which exhibited a settler-colonial logic of "destroying to replace" (Wolfe, 2006). This was made possible first by catastrophic violence, and then by cartographic science and a new legal regime. The new landscapes of geography and law were written onto the land atop layered histories of Ryukyuan socio-spatial organization and a protracted Japanese colonial presence.

For purposes of analysis, I will outline my understanding of the concepts of jurisdiction and urban planning which I use heavily throughout the chapter. I will borrow from Richard Ford's understanding of jurisdiction as a "bundle of practices," which create legal identities (e.g., citizen) and distribute power (e.g., franchise) based on maps and political boundaries (Ford 1999, p. 858). I will rely on Oren Yiftachel's definition of planning as "the public production and regulation of space, including the formulation, content and consequences of state spatial policies (2000, p. 419). This framework was advanced by Yiftachel in his early contribution to a reconceptualization of the discipline as being motivated not by goals of equitable social development, but often by the uneven exercise of state power against the social interests of less powerful minority populations. I will also borrow from John Friedmann's understanding of planning as being fundamentally concerned with the linkage of "scientific and technical

knowledge to action in the public domain” (1987). Together, these definitions will aid an understanding of planning’s nefarious possibilities when geographic sciences are linked to violent action under conditions of colonial settlement.

The question I focus on in this chapter asks, *what were the techniques of planning used by the US military in the decade following the Battle of Okinawa to establish and govern its territorial jurisdictions?* Relying mostly on the US military government archival materials located in the Okinawa Prefectural Archives, I make a series of related conclusions. First, I will argue that from the conclusion of the Okinawa War (June, 1945) through the ratification of the Peace Treaty with Japan in 1951 (hereafter, The Treaty), the techniques of planning gradually assumed the role of a vessel, in which the administration of physical violence that is necessary to establishing US military bases, was embedded in and masked by the operations of government; a linkage of the *knowledges* of policy and mapping to the *action* of violence. Second, I will argue that United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands government exploited what they lamented as the “ambiguous” political status of Okinawa, by importing the American legal convention and handmaiden of mid-century Euro-American redevelopment planning, eminent domain, as a basis for their land acquisition procedure, while withholding accompanying conventions of “just compensation” otherwise guaranteed to Americans by the same legal precedents. This obviated USCAR’s interpretation of Okinawa as a pseudo-American public of convenience, where in the absence of any nation’s constitutional protection, aspects of US and Japanese law could be imported or neglected to acquire and establish jurisdiction over Okinawan land.

This chapter draws from the body of scholarship in geography concerning the nature of territory, as well as the planning literature about the profession’s application in processes laden with power that result in the dispossession of Indigenous peoples. Territory has been variously defined as the spatial extent of state sovereignty, and as a collection of relational practices that produce and police spatially bounded identities (Elden, 2010). Meanwhile, planning scholars

and geographers have documented the harnessing of planning's constituent practices, particularly cartography and law, towards acquiring land from situated Indigenous peoples (Blomley, 2003; Porter, 2016). By bridging these two bodies of scholarship, one argument I intend to make implicitly, which has been argued for by other planning scholars,²⁰ is that when it is nested into the organs of national governments, regional or local level planning work should be viewed in light of the ways that it "makes real" the territorial features of the colonial state. Importantly, I also employ an often-referenced aphorism augmented by Michel Foucault, which is that "politics is the continuation of war by other means" (2003, 15). That is, that even if the violence of militarized territorialization became cleansed in the technocratic sciences of USCAR governance, this was the same as "a pseudopeace that [was] being undermined by a continuous war, of a perpetual relationship of force" (Ibid, 17).

Colonial Formations

What is commonly known as the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa in fact consists of a universe of minute localities each defined by their own social structures, place-based histories and relationships with worlds living and unliving. Okinawa Island (*Okinawa hon-shima*) is the largest island in the Ryūkyū Archipelago, which stretches south-east from Japan's Kyushu Prefecture towards Taiwan. Among the Japanese prefectures, though, Okinawa is the smallest. Therefore, Okinawa Island has had a dual identity over time: as the seat of monarchy in the era of the unified Ryukyu Kingdom, and as a peripheral region of the Japanese nation state since 1879. While archival evidence dates human occupation of the Ryukyu Archipelago to at least 32,000 years before present, contemporary Okinawan history generally draws reference to three pre-colonial eras, being the periods Gusuku (12th-14th century), Three Kingdom (1322-

²⁰ Here, I am thinking of Dorries' (2012) reminder of the hardening of geopolitical power that stems from what might otherwise appear as "municipalized" exercises of colonial encroachment.

1429), and the Ryūkyū Kingdom (1429-1879) (Miyagi and Takamiya 1983, 47; Takamiya et al. 2016, 416).

By the late 1800s, the unified Ryūkyū Kingdom had seen numerous kings over two Shō dynasties, as a suzerain sovereignty. The Satsuma Bakufu of Kagoshima had invaded the kingdom in 1609, initiating a subordination to Japan that coupled with its already long-standing filial piety to China. This triangular geopolitical structure maintained the kingdom's administrative independence despite a long history of tribute obligations, for nearly three centuries. However, the Meiji government's abolishment of the feudal *Han*-system in 1871 in favor of a consolidated nation-state (Akamine 2016, 502), and settler colonial expansion into Ainu Moshiri (Hokkaido Prefecture) on principles of terra-nullius (Hirano, 2015), were harbingers of the southern kingdom's undoing. With increased visitation to the Ryūkyū Kingdom by foreign emissaries, Meiji grew anxious that global powers would fail to acknowledge the pedigree of its jurisdiction over the kingdom, which was fundamentally different than the "container" model of Westphalian territorial sovereignty spreading throughout Western Europe and the Americas (Taylor, 1994; Mizuno, 2009). Despite already having abolished feudal domains, Japan designated the Ryūkyū Kingdom a Han in 1872, deposing and granting titles to the Ryūkyū king Shō Tai, and in 1879 unilaterally incorporated the Ryūkyū Han into the Japanese nation state as Okinawa Prefecture.

The kingdom's annexation was contested from the outset. One instance of this refusal was a well-documented secret envoy from Okinawa Island's Motobu Port to Fuzhou in December 1876, petitioning for an intervention in the takeover (Uemura 2003, 120). Annexation was promptly followed by a battery of assimilatory socio-political reforms under the auspices of the *Ryūkyū Shōbun* ("disposition" of the Ryukyus) intended to fashion "proper" Japanese subjects out of Okinawans. Under the governorship of Narahara Shigeru (1892-1908), Japanese language was institutionalized, banned were *hajichi* hand tattooing among women and walking barefoot, and private property in land was instituted (Taira 1997; Heinrich 2004; also see Lieban 1955). In schools, the *hōgen fuda* (dialect-tag), a Japanese colonial counterpart

to the Welsh-knot, was hung around the neck of children caught speaking Ryūkyūan languages. To the same effect, explains Heinrich (2004, 159), imitation clothes-lines were installed in some classrooms, so that phrases uttered in Ryūkyūan could be written on paper silhouettes of clothing articles to be symbolically cleansed. These dense social-political reforms were critical to consolidating the modern Japanese state. “Depicting some aspects of Okinawan society as ‘behind,’” argues Julia Yonetani, “justified a Japanese civilizing mission to assist Okinawa, as the ‘old’ Japan, in transforming anew to become like *naichi* [see translation below] through education” (2000, 24).

After the contested incorporation of Okinawa into the Japanese nation-state, World War II brought about the second revolutionary change in the young prefecture’s trajectory. Okinawans sometimes use the phrase “sacrifice-stone” (*sute ishi*) to describe how the region – historically considered “outer-land” (*gaichi*) along with colonies like Korea, vis-à-vis Japan’s “inner-land” (*naichi*) – figured into the Japanese Imperial Army’s WWII strategy, as a physical shield against the allied powers advancing from the Philippines under General Macarthur. If the Japanese considered Okinawa Island a sacrifice-stone, then the US thought it a stepping-stone. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that seizing and militarizing the island could facilitate subsequent attacks on the Japanese mainland. Indeed, on the cover of the XXIV US Marine Corps’ post-hoc action report from the Battle of Okinawa, a young marine is displayed with bayonet in hand, stepping on Okinawa Island which is portrayed as a stepping stone towards Japan on the horizon, engulfed in the flames of a burning imperial flag (Figure 3). According to “Plan Fox,” a landing on the central west coast of Okinawa Island was advantageous because military planners predicted they could overtake Japanese airfields in the central Okinawa Island’s villages of Yomitan and Kadena within five days of landing (US Department of the Army, 1945).

At 8:30 a.m. on April 1, 1945, US Army and Naval forces made their landing on Okinawa’s west coast, a day curiously assigned the military code “love day” (Buckner 1945, 12).

133 naval ships had converged in a single bay overnight. After a morning of indiscriminately shelling the island, an event Okinawans remember as the “hurricane of steel,” 65,000 troops descended on the island (Hodge 1945, 176). Over the ensuing three months, the Battle of Okinawa destroyed life without prejudice. In a particularly horrific collective wartime memory, Okinawan survivors recall being ordered by Japanese officers hiding alongside them in caves, to death by mass suicide as a US victory appeared increasingly probable. Nearly the entire landscape of Central and Southern Okinawa, including the records and objects of history, were incinerated in the course of battle, while estimates of Okinawan civilian casualties suggest that of a population of approximately 300,000 94,000 perished far outstripping military deaths of either Japan or the US. In the seared flesh and ashes of outright war, a battle for land would ensue this time fought with weapons of policy and scientific rationality.

Towards a Legal Identity

On the continental US, a land-rush had broken out following the bombing of Pearl-Harbor in support of the war effort. Ship building, ammunition storage, live-fire training, naval mooring, all required the Department of Justice’s immediate use of often privately held land. Between 1939 and 1943 such condemnation cases skyrocketed from 879 to 4,683 (Just 1944, 286). On the continental US, these “takings” were rationalized by appealing to principles of eminent domain and condemnation, which had long standing histories in American planning and US common law, tracking to the American Declaration of Takings Act of 1931. The logic underpinning eminent domain expounded the merits of Americans suspending their fifth and fourteenth amendment property rights in service to the higher “public interest.” After the war, this expectation was projected out across the US’s postwar empire of bases, while related constitutional protections like the assurance of “just compensation” remained on the continent, an entitlement of “real” Americans. In other words, beyond the fringe of ostensible US territory, it wasn’t the constitution per se that “followed the flag,” but only an unqualified expectation that

Figure 3

Cover image of the XXIV US Marine Corps Action Report



America's new colonial subjects would serve their overlords with land.

The first legal period relevant to the arguments I make here is bound by the conclusion of the Battle of Okinawa in 1945 and the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Japan (Peace Treaty hereafter) which restored Japan's political sovereignty in 1952. At the Cairo Conference of December, 1943, attended by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill, it had been concluded that upon dissolution, the Japanese Empire would be stripped of any territories which it had "taken by violence or greed," and all the Pacific islands it had taken since 1914 and the beginning of World War I (*Cairo Declaration*, 1943). Whether Japan's 1879 annexation of Okinawa was viewed by the allied heads of state as satisfying the criteria of "violence or greed" has been subject to debate (Ota 1987, 297). Nonetheless, in the end, Japan's "residual sovereignty" over the Ryūkyū Archipelago was acknowledged in spite of various alternative political orders contemplated for Okinawa, including being placed under Chinese sovereignty and international territorial administration (Masland, 1943). This acknowledgement thrust Okinawans into a legal liminality: on one hand, as an ostensibly non-colonial force the US was compelled by international law to reproduce Japanese legal norms in the regulation of daily life to the greatest extent possible; on the other, all laws in Okinawa were made subject to the exigencies of the US's military mission on their newest conquered Pacific island.

What military officials described as Okinawa's "confused status" prior to 1951, was in fact a jurisdictional grey-space exploited by the US Naval Military Government (MG hereafter) to allow the greatest lenience possible for land acquisition through the selective interpretation of international law. In these early days of occupation in Okinawa, US Forces' appealed to the International Law of Belligerent Occupation codified in Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, as the juridical basis of their presence in both Okinawa and Japan. In particular, Hague Convention IV Section III, Military Authority Over the Territory of the Hostile State, provided for the occupation of enemy territory (Regulations concerning the Laws

and Customs of War on Land., 1907). Both of these conventions contained strong private property protections, prohibiting “pillage” and providing for due compensation where property had been requisitioned.²¹ These protections were initially reflected in MG Proclamation 1, the “Nimitz Proclamation,” which declared American jurisdiction over the *Nansei Shōto* (South-East Islands): “your existing customs and property rights will be respected and existing laws will remain in force and effect except insofar as it may be necessary for me in the exercise of my powers and duties to change them” (Nimitz, 1945a).

The tone of MG policy on Okinawa quickly shifted, subordinating the norms of international law to the precept that the US’s right to hold Okinawan land had been “won by right of conquest” (Headquarters Ryukyu Command, 1954). In MG Proclamation No. 7, which established the role of the MG’s Custodian of Property, Admiral Nimitz centered the right of the MG to seize private property without compensation:

“Private property” which under international law is subject to seizure without compensation includes all private property which under international law is subject to seizure without compensation, and also all private property which the Custodian of Property determines to be private property which in international law is subject to seizure without compensation. (Nimitz, 1945b)

The foregrounding of a right possessed by the MG to seize private property without compensation was a remarkable manipulation of the relevant international laws. The International Law of Belligerent Occupation was clearly deferential to the Hague’s axiomatic prohibition on the confiscation of private property. It defines three forms of property taking -

²¹ Hague Article 46 placed private property alongside “family honor, rights and the lives of persons...and religious convictions” as among those things which “must be respected” in occupation, and strictly prohibited the confiscation of property; Hague Article 47 stated that “pillage is formally forbidden” (Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land., 1907). To the extent that the Law of Belligerent Occupation addresses the outright seizure of property without due compensation, it does so in a prohibitive fashion, whereas usufruct (usury rights, leaving title in the original owner) are promoted as alternative to outright seizure.

requisition, expropriation, and seizure – only the last of which grants as an exception, the ability to take property without compensation under very circumscribed conditions (Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land., 1907). Furthermore, the tautological wording of Proclamation No. 7 allowed for the widest possible interpretation of what counted as land that could be got, licensing unilateral declarations of military jurisdiction over approximately half of Okinawa Island in the first year of postwar occupation.

Despite American nationalism peaking on the heels of war's end, dissenting arguments were made from the US for a more thorough extension of the constitution's fifth and fourteenth amendments, both of which guarantee freedom from the deprivation of property without due process of law, to Ryukyuan in light of the forced and uncompensated requisitions that had already taken place. Agricultural economist and former Bureau of Indian Affairs staffer, Dorothy C. Goodwin, was commissioned to propose a solution to the problem of land shortage in Okinawa. Goodwin's report, "Ryukyu Islands: Land Tenure Practices and Problems," laid accountability for profuse displacement vulnerability at the foot of the US's metastasizing base network and the unpredictability of the MG's land requisitions. She blamed policies like the MG's one-mile exclusionary zone, according to which no Ryukyuan structure could be constructed or modified within a one-mile frontage of any military facility, for systematically displacing families when houses were damaged by perennial typhoon. Goodwin argued for an extension of "American property concepts" to Ryukyuan, and for a more reasonable reading of the property sections of Hague Convention IV, specifically its restriction of occupying forces' land requisition activities to situations where such taking was "imperatively demanded by the necessities of war" (1949, 24).²² Despite her relatively sober analysis, Goodwin's flagship policy recommendations

²² It is also notable that Goodwin was one of the first military analysts to foresee a class of "remittance men," that would emerge from a system of military land rent-compensation. Goodwin was significantly focused on the large population of tenant farmers that had been created by base-related displacement, and whose "assignment" to lands owned by larger and less effected landowners had been managed by the MG. In a footnote, Goodwin argued that if

emphasized the importance of clarifying legal title, and for the MG to consider systematic mass emigration of Ryukyuans from Okinawa Island to the Yaeyama Archipelago to resolve the problem of land scarcity. Even the most clear-eyed policy scientists on the US side, then, failed to dispel a logic of removal which has been foundational to the practice of American imperialism when new land is on the table, from the Trail of Tears to the removal of the Chagossians from Diego Garcia.

Controlling Movement to Settle Land

Within the legal liminality examined in the previous section, the MG began enacting military jurisdiction in Okinawa through an extensive redistricting program reliant upon civilian movement controls and MG law. In October of 1945, MG Directive 12 sliced Okinawa Island into twelve civilian districts superimposed upon the previous POW camps (Figure 4) (*1945 Military Government Ordinances*, 1945). Seven of these were located within northern Okinawa Island, cordoning off of the entire region above MG Highway 6 as “Military Government Areas.” Intent on making a democratic showcase of Okinawa, MG officials directed that “Mayors” and local assemblies be elected by district residents, though it has been noted that the general destitution of daily life in the districts made it so that few were enthused by the prospect of enfranchisement under such conditions (Okinawa Prefectural Government, 1995). Directive 12’s rudimentary redistricting map was the first public cartographic assertion of exclusive US military jurisdiction in Okinawa.

rents were afforded directly to these displaced persons farming tenant land, then the “assigners” would argue for their removal, no longer seeing the need to provide land to their displaced countryfolk for subsistence farming (Goodwin 1949, 26). Goodwin’s observation that this would result in a rentier class formation was highly prescient. Wendy Matsumura (2020, 5) also makes note of Goodwin’s report in her chronicle of the world-making practices of the women residents resisting displacement at the famed *Isahama tōsō* (Isahama Struggle).

MG districts were small enough to serve as the locus of jurisdictional enforcement under the new legal regime. Special Proclamation No. 5, Article II, defined the jurisdictional nature of the district over “territory, persons, and offenses” (Buckmaster, 1946). Territorially, jurisdiction was understood as the spatial limits of each MG District criminal court’s ability to inflict legal punishment, so some of the earliest MG Directives were mandates on District Commanders to establish rudimentary regional prisons. All offenses carrying punishment of under thirty-days fell under the jurisdiction of the MG District court, presided over by an MG-appointed judge. All people, except for those subject to US law or those of its allies, were under the legal jurisdiction of the district. This, of course, uniformly implicated Ryukyuan, as non-Ryukyuan Japanese were re-patriated to Japan following the war in short order. Both the nationality of law and the spatial extents of jurisdiction were fungible in the event that military requirement called for changes to either.²³ Similarly, jurisdiction was unconditionally co-extensive with the spatial limits of the district regardless of any changes the Military Government made to them.

Although in some cases, MG Districts bore geographic semblance to Indigenous spatial divisions, most did not.²⁴ Furthermore, the assignment of residents to specific districts was highly arbitrary, a function of the massive center-north/center-south displacement occasioned by the Battle of Okinawa. As of March 9 1946, MG reports counted 78,376 individuals residing in MG Districts who remained dislocated from their home regions (Firman, 1946).²⁵ In Jizuza (Ginoza) District alone, 35,543 residents were listed as originating in areas within MG Districts elsewhere. 44,887 individuals who were noted as pre-war residents of the Koza MG District in

²³ Special Proclamation No. 5, Article III Section 2 states that the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure was to be binding within each MG District “to the extent that such rules do not conflict with the provisions of this Proclamation or any other Proclamation, or regulation published, or promulgated by the Military Government” (Buckmaster 1946, 1)

²⁴ The boundaries of Chinen District, for example, approximated those of Chinen *Magiri*, the Ryukyuan administrative category of the pre-Meiji land reforms.

²⁵ It should be noted that this number calculates displacement by MG District, and not Aza according to their Indigenous boundaries. Because of the small size of most Aza, being the smallest unit of traditional geography in Okinawa, it is reasonable to assume that if counted by Aza, the number of displaced peoples would be much larger.

central Okinawa Island were dispersed across various MG Districts elsewhere. Furthermore, a collection of MG policies prevented Okinawans from moving freely outside of their assigned district, so independent return was infeasible. For instance, in 1946, MG Special Proclamation No. 4 prohibited all civilians from leaving their assigned districts and from “loitering about any military installation” without military authorization, under penalty of “fine or imprisonment, or both, or other punishment as the court may determine” (United States Navy Military Government: Proclamation No. 4, 1946).

Unsurprisingly, petitions for return to ancestral villages began almost as soon MG Districts were settled. The Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI), which had been established in April as a puppet counterpart to the MG to project a mirage of Okinawan self-governance, was appealed to by some district residents to advocate for their return. This was the case for 384 refugees from the southern capital of Naha, who were mostly commercial and industrial tradespeople, displaced to northern Ginoza District where they were inadequately trained for work in the agricultural local economy. Kōshin Shikiya, the first appointed Civilian Governor (*Chiji*) of Okinawa appealed to the MG Deputy Commander on their behalf as follows:

At present, the Naha people are scattered all over this island, and the majority of them are now suffering from hardships of life far more than any other village people because before the war they were mostly commercial or industrial laborers and wage-earners...I hereby petition for your permission to move the Naha people who are in the Ginoza district to some suitable area where these able-bodied Naha people, 384 in number, can work for nearby military units. (Shikiya, 1946)

Employment mismatch in the areas where certain refugees had been relocated, then, was among the reasons appealed to by displaced Okinawans for return to home villages.

There is little evidence that such requests were heeded by the MG.

In other cases, displaced individuals organized themselves without GRI support, to appeal for their own return. Eight representatives of Chatan Village, whose 12,004 villagers had

been scattered across ten military districts submitted one such formal petition on April 20, 1946 (Arakaki et al., 1946). The insufficiency of arable land was chief among the reasons cited by the Chatan Petitioners for their return to the villages Kuye, Yara, Irei, Kuwae, Tamayose, and Chatan, to prepare fields for rice and sweet potato production. In the cramped conditions of the military districts, “the lack of green vegetables,” explained the petitioners, “has also forced the people to gather edible grasses and sea-weeds which are now scarce, too. The resettlement of the people is the only solution to relieve them from this miserable state.” (Ibid 1946, 290-91) The petitioners went so far as to offer their own deputation in protecting military installations growing in their home villages against unauthorized personnel, in exchange for their resettlement. Therefore, in addition to employment mismatch, the insufficiency of arable land, over which the military’s exclusive use would eventually approximate 20%, was chief among the arguments made by Okinawans petitioning for return to their homes.

Resettlement requests were routinely denied by the Resettlement Officer of the MG General Affairs Office. Usually, rejections of resettlement petitions cited proximity of the home villages to planned, in-construction, or already existing military facilities as reasons for denying villagers’ return. The coincidence of base locations and village sites was caused principally by three factors: (1) sudden land shortages caused by the base construction campaign; (2) a large influx of postwar Okinawan returnees; and (3) the military’s need of flat land for airfield development, which was also the most prized cultivating land. Sometimes the rationale undergirding the MG’s rejection of resettlement requests was punitive rather than based solely on spatial limitations. In December, 1947, Resettlement Officer Raymond A. Matthews issued one such rejection to a request from displaced Yomitan villagers, proclaiming they would not be allowed to resettle in their village because of “the failure of Okinawans to stay within established boundaries elsewhere” (Matthews, 1947).


As a result of this system of civilian containment, the MG was able to convert central Okinawa Island into a planned zone of dense base construction. By January 1946, the US Navy

Office of the Engineer's classified *Okinawa Master Plan, Base Development*, was charting the construction of thirty-six different installations on Okinawa Island alone, including airfields, tank farms, ammunition storage facilities, hospitals, harbor facilities, depots, roads, and government headquarters (US Army, Corps of Engineers, 1946) (Figure 5). Even after MG General Administrative Order No. 1 issued on May 23 1946 relaxed the system of military passes, granting Okinawans free movement throughout the portions of the island north of MG Highway 6 and south of MG Highway 44, movement in the center of the island remained tightly circumscribed (Circulation of Civilians, 1946). The Master Plan's call for the deployment of 3,009 engineers from the Army Corps of Engineers to support the base construction campaign is testament to its behemoth scale (Barrows 1946, 21).

Resettlement of Okinawans interned in MG Districts to central Okinawa Island villages began in earnest in October, 1945, and was purported to have been "completed" by the end of 1946 (Fisch 1988, 91). The notion that resettlement was ever truly completed is a fiction often unaddressed. Among those who returned to central Okinawa Island to find it converted into a veritable military compound, many encountered an inability to return to their actual pre-war places of residence finding them already converted to base land. This was illustrated best by restrictions placed on Okinawan residence and farming activities on military frontages. In 1949, Military Government (MG) Directive 3, for example, directed under threat of 5,000 JPY fine or 6 months imprisonment, that building permits would only be granted to Okinawans if the proposed structure was outside of a one-mile radius of military housing areas and was not within any area designated as forbidden to the Ryukyuan public (Green 1949, 2). MG Directive 17, issued 6 months later, doubled the fine and imprisonment maximums to violators of Directive 3's one-mile radius exclusion. Only 3 months later, MG 21 laid out a network of 11 major roads and highways cutting across central Okinawa, upon or adjacent to which essential farming activities, including any sort of cultivation itself, was to be strictly prohibited.

Figure 5

January, 1946: US Military Government Office of the Engineer's Okinawa Master Plan, Base Development, tracking the construction of thirty-six military installations in Central Okinawa during civilian containment south of Military Highway 6 and north of Military Highway 44 (lower high-lit boundary).



Note: Map care of Okinawa Prefectural Archives

The experience of petitioning in vain for return to home village sites also continued to be common into the 1950s. Having been released from northern MG Districts and “resettled” in central districts which were more proximal to their home villages yet not within them, refugees would petition for return only to receive notice that large runway easements and other military buildings were being planned for the areas in question. In these cases, it was customary for Ryukyu Command Headquarters, to furnish the Resettlement Officer of the MG Office of General Affairs with a rudimentary site plan, displaying the land being requested for release overlapping with a given military facility, and an order to inform the petitioners in question that their request had been rejected (Figures 6 & 7).

As a result of spatial controls on where Okinawans could be and then where they could perform certain activities, the US Army Corps of Engineers was able to carry out construction activities pursuant to the evolving US Post-War Base Masterplan, which had been kept out of view of the Okinawan public. Review of the declassified January 1946 version of this plan and related construction progress reports show that nearly all base construction was focused within central Okinawa, where the largest pre-war resident population and arable land-base had been concentrated (Figure 7). Airways at Futenma (Ginowan), Kadena (Kadena/Chatan), and Yontan (Yomitan) were priority sites, seized from the Japanese Imperial Army who had already completed the displacement of Okinawans from those village sites in the lead up to the Battle of Okinawa, and around which large easements and land for related infrastructures would need to be secured. This was consistent with US military planners’ pre-invasion intentions expressed in March, 1945’s “Operation Iceberg,” to develop Okinawa as a strategic basing site from which to launch further attacks on the Japanese mainland, and looking forward, as a staging location for the Korean war and the US’s Pacific offense against communist developments in Russia.

From Occupation to Governance

When the Treaty of Peace with Japan was ratified on the 8th of September, 1951 Japan's sovereignty over its main islands (deemed those that lay north of the thirtieth-parallel) was restored while Okinawa remained under the thumb of US military rule. With global attention on their post-treaty occupation, it became important to US DoD officials that their land acquisition strategy be consonant enough with local law so as not to appear overtly colonial, while not so detached from US constitutional law that they be viewed as operating in a juridical vacuum. Procedurally, the American tradition of enacting eminent domain through condemnation proceedings would become the "grid of intelligibility" upon which land requisitions would be rationalized inside of the MG apparatus. There was already precedent for the application of the US Constitution's fourteenth-amendment property protections to cases of the US seizing foreign property without just compensation. So, as land requisitions in Okinawa ramped up in the mid-1950s with Eisenhower's 1954 proclamation that "we shall maintain indefinitely our bases in Okinawa," military land policy was expressly fashioned after the American Declaration of Takings Act of 1931 to shield the MG from charges of theft and unconstitutionality: "While in legislating for a conquered country," one US Supreme Court ruling found, "he [the Governor of the Ryukyu Islands] may disregard the laws of that country, he is not wholly above the laws of his own" (quoted in Krieger 1956, 4).

It was not just in the process of acquiring land that MG officials sought to balance the influence of Japanese and US legal traditions, but in the type of title under which requisitioned land was held. In a 1956 memorandum written by Marvin G. Krieger, chief of the US Judge Advocate Corps' Lands Division, Krieger proposed the use of "superficies" interest as the type of title most suited to the land needs of the US in Okinawa. Superficies, explained Krieger, was an extreme form of usufruct, whose interpretation could be stretched to allow maximum land

destruction and length of possession by the US as the superfiary, while leaving only “bare legal title” in the Okinawan landowner themselves:

A superfiary ordinarily is required to restore the land to the same condition as it was when acquired. Inasmuch as the United States will probably destroy much of the value of given parcels of land, especially for agrarian use, it is advisable to compensate the owners for the land as if it would never be returned to discharge specifically the United States from the obligation referenced above [of ever having to return land]. (Krieger 1956, 2)

To Krieger, who like most MG officials paid lip-service to the existence of a pre-Japanese legal tradition in Okinawa but practically centered Japanese law as the precedent of import, the separation of ownership rights in Japan, of land on one hand and the fabrications atop land on the other, lent itself to the MG’s application of superficies. Officials imagined landowners could be placated by the retention of title to the earth and “just compensation” alone, while the reality of military land-use would inevitably and consciously be environmentally catastrophic and so long-term that superfiary interest would effectively approximate de-facto fee-title.

Two Peace Treaty articles were especially consequential in the US’s acquisition of Okinawan land. Chapter II, *Territory*, Article 3, designated the US, who had already been governing Okinawa under provisional naval (1945-1946), then army (1946-1951) governments since 1945, as the sole administering authority of the *Nansei Shoto*. Here, the Treaty declared that “the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters” (Treaty of Peace with Japan, 1951). Article 3 officially severed Okinawa from Japan, endowing jurisdiction over the islands to the US, who would ultimately opt to govern the territory as the US Civil Administration of the Ryukyus rather than a UN trusteeship. Furthermore, Article 3 would

prove to be the legal basis of USCAR's exercise of eminent domain powers in Okinawa, despite it not containing explicit references to eminent domain.²⁶

The second Peace Treaty article that effected land-relations in postwar Okinawa was Chapter V, *Claims and Property*, Article 19. Here, Japan:

Waive[d] all claims of Japan and its nationals against the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of the war or out of actions taken because of the existence of a state of war, and waives all claims arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of any of the Allied Powers in Japanese territory prior to the coming into force of the present Treaty. (Treaty of Peace with Japan, 1951, p. 71)

The problem for Okinawans was that the loss of land which carried on in the six years between the conclusion of war and the ratification of the peace treaty did not stem from a state of war at all; it was symptomatic of a new American imperialism in the Pacific. By the time the Peace Treaty came into effect, Okinawans who had sold or rented their land to the US military under duress, or who had had lands provisionally taken only to be returned to them virtually unusable for agricultural purposes, had already been arguing for fair compensation for six years. Article 19 left these claimants with no government to claim recourse against, the US and Japan both arguing that the Ryukyuan pre-treaty claims were the responsibility of the other. A legal report commissioned by The Okinawan Association to Acquire Compensation for Damages Prior to Peace Treaty in 1958, explained that by diverting Okinawan land claims to Japan, the US was attempting to "have its cake and eat it too[:]" the Ryukyuan are forbidden to deal with the Japanese Government as their government and yet on these matters they are encouraged to do

²⁶ The preamble to USCAR Proclamation No. 26, ratified December, 1953, which established a legal pathway for military land rental payments to Okinawan landowners as a step towards forcing their compliance with leases, stated that: "Whereas, by virtue of *the power of eminent domain conferred upon the United States by Article 3, Chapter II, of the Treaty of Peace with Japan*, the Armed Forces of the United States, subsequent to 28 April 1952, occupied and used certain other real estate needed by the United States forces" (Ogden 1953, emphasis added)

so; the Japanese [Ryukyuan] are offered the liabilities of sovereignty with none of the rights” (Stitt and Hemmendinger, 1958).

Compensation for taken land and the dynamics of new land acquisitions were at the crux of what was beginning to be called “the Okinawa land problem” in US Congressional proceedings and military planning circles.²⁷ The first phase of dispossession had been justified according to The Hague Convention IV on the Laws and Customs on War on Land; in short: global conflict and conquest thereafter. By contrast, occupation in peace time needed to be sanctioned according to the military’s selective extension of US constitutional principles to Okinawans, particularly concerning relations of private property. Okinawan land could no longer simply be taken behind the veil of ostensible war; lease or purchase from landowners which presented a veil of consent would have to be executed with USCAR.

The Directive for United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, issued by the US DoD’s Far East Command which had formed in 1947 to manage the occupations of Korea and Japan, was explicitly concerned with establishing a defensible basis for the acquisition of more Okinawan land. The directive, issued on April 30, 1952, mandated that:

The Deputy Governor will secure title to any additional real estate or facilities required permanently by the United States Government by purchase from the owners, either Ryukyuan, Japanese or other nationality, or through condemnation. This property will be acquired through negotiated purchase if possible. If it cannot be purchased at reasonable terms or if the owners refuse to negotiate, condemnation proceedings will be instituted. (Ridgeway, 1952).

The USCAR Directive provided an influential precedent for subsequent military land policies illustrating the same kind of constrained notion of property right. This was the most accentuated

²⁷ It should be noted that this discourse of the “Okinawa problem” has been both erroneous and tragically resilient through time, having always been short-hand for the puzzle of how the US and Japan could unproblematically wrest land from Okinawans where there is so little to be got.

point of embarkation for a US ethos of occupation, which offered all the benefits of liberal, postwar democracy on one hand, and on the other eschewed any sort of rigor to back up those offerings whatsoever. As far as property rights were concerned, military requirement would prevail in any and all cases where an Okinawan “owner” attempted to exercise them against the US.

Ananya Roy has written convincingly of a “doubleness of empire.” Differentiated from the *double* in the double-colonialism often discussed in Okinawa which connotes the inter-dependency of the US and Japan vis-à-vis Okinawan subjugation; Roy’s “doubleness of empire” contends that the “ills of war and empire” are frequently offered alongside of and assuaged by the “band-aid of reconstruction” (2006, 13). That is, that empire is distinguished not merely through its destructive tendencies, but in an inclination towards creating something in the shadow of what once was. It is crucial here to recognize how the Directive for USCAR and so many subsequent dispossessive policies empowering the US “Land Acquisition Program,” were embedded in an overt campaign of postwar reconstruction. Just as USCAR took land away, it considered its own benevolence in establishing democratic self-governance in military districts, reconstructing a system of public education, building roads, setting new economic mores and so on. Therefore, the “doubleness of empire” provides a coherent logic for understanding the rapid pivot from gratitude to refusal in Okinawan public opinion towards their US occupiers: It was not that the military traded a productive ethos for one of destruction and the feelings of the occupied swayed in turn; making and destroying were two fundamental aspects of US imperialism in Okinawa and so many other Pacific islands during the postwar era.

Regardless of ongoing reconstruction efforts, the military’s crisis of securing and maintaining their land base was paramount. A comparison between the area of jurisdiction established in the first five years of occupation, with the amount of land that was actually leased, gives context to this problem leading into the USCAR era (Figure 8). As chronicled in the previous section, the military’s jurisdiction climbed from nothing in March of 1945, to


approximately half of Okinawa Island by June of the same year owing first to the displacement of Okinawan civilians in war, and then through restrictions placed on their mobility. The precipitous decline in military jurisdiction between 1945 and 1948 was accounted for by gradual releases of land for purposes of resettlement, particularly throughout 1946. Critically, the establishment of title of any sort wasn't pursued by the military until after they had already asserted jurisdiction through discursive claims in the form of rudimentary maps, "implied leases," and autocratic policy. Extraterritorial extensions of American legal precedents for this backward type of acquisition were invoked, though not perfectly mirrored, in 1931's Declaration of Takings Act, which was established to minimize due process and furnish the US government with privately held land as quickly as possible (Just 1944, 289). For the military, then, the meaning of "acquisition" actually took two forms: securing new land wherever needed, but more urgently, to legitimate their possession of land they had already claimed in haste. While the work of reducing the disparity between claimed and leased land proceeded throughout the early years of occupation, by 1950, 20,000 acres of unleased land remained claimed as US jurisdiction in military base plans.

There were two types of land-compensation issues being dealt with in the early years of the USCAR era. As explained above, for lands that had been requisitioned prior to the Peace Treaty, compensation went unaddressed altogether, neither the US nor Japan claiming to be the responsible party.²⁸ In 1958 there were still approximately 78,000 Ryukyuans claiming unpaid leases with the US military, totaling \$35,448,671.87 USD (\$341,977,875.94 2022

²⁸ In an attempt to redress this injustice, two "solatium" payments were made by the Government of Japan: one in 1953 in the amount of 3 million JPY (\$157,311 2022 USD), and another in 1957 in the amount of 1 billion JPY (\$52,436,924 2022 USD), both of which were to be returned in the event of payment of the leases from the US.

Figure 8

Military land in Okinawa 1945 - 1950 (pre-Peace Treaty): Jurisdiction vs. Leased Area



Note: Data assembled from: the Okinawa Association to Acquire Compensation for Damages Prior to Peace Treaty (1961); and USCAR (1947). Care of the Okinawa Prefectural Archives

USD).²⁹ This figure represents claims for lease payments (the cost of occupying land) alone. When losses which occurred *upon* the land – those related to the actual activities of militarism – were factored (i.e., buildings, crops, seawalls, destruction of arable land, costs incurred restoring released land, lost wages, etc.), pre-Peace Treaty Ryukyuan claims against the US amounted to \$47,146,817 (\$454,831,380 2022 USD). Where direct compensation was being provided by USCAR, forced or otherwise, the US DoD's postwar coffers were too limited to provide even minimally justifiable compensation to landowners. The USCAR Land Acquisition Commission's go to calculus was six percent of the total value of "comparable property," which in the yet reconstructing landscape of postwar Okinawa, famously yielded assessments so low that one-*tsubo*'s³⁰ monetary value could not afford purchase of a single pack of cigarettes.

Questions of how much land would be required for USCAR's basing effort, and for how long it would be occupied loomed large. Both of these considerations evolved, like many other aspects of military governance in Okinawa, on a gradual basis in response to cold-war developments, making USCAR activities highly unpredictable to Okinawans. The earliest tactical plans for the US's invasion of Okinawa were in fact also base plans, but none of them saw beyond the establishment of three airfields and none foresaw a permanent presence; their postwar counterparts changed tone considerably:³¹

The permanent post war base development plans are still being formulated. They will call for such improvements as reinforced concrete and stone buildings for all installations, paved roads, central power plants, improved communications and other

²⁹ Data for this specific claim is taken from a report entitled *The Pre-Treaty Ryukyus Land Claims: Petition and Brief*, commissioned by The Okinawan Association to Acquire Compensation for Damages Prior to Peace Treaty, drafted by Washington, D.C., attorneys Stitt and Hemmendinger (1958), and submitted to the US Secretary of State and US Secretary of Defense on December 19, 1958. Different figures were forwarded by the Okinawa Times, quoted by Higa (1963, 420), of 82,145 claimants for some \$22 million USD.

³⁰ Approximately 3.3 m²

³¹ See the Directive for Base Development Plan, from the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Ocean Areas, on April 22, 1945. (McMorris, 1945)

necessary facilities to bring Okinawa and Ie Shima to the normal standards of a permanent Army Base. (US Army, Corps of Engineers, 1946, p. 1)

The classified *Okinawa Master Plan: Base Development*, assembled by the Military Government in January 1946, called for the deployment of 31,113 Army and Marine troops, and 3,009 engineers from the Army Corps of Engineers to support the development of thirty-six installations spread throughout Central Okinawa (Barrows, 1946). By the turn of the 1950s, the US was already settling into its new self-ascribed identity as the global arbiter of democracy, and Okinawa, its “Keystone of the Pacific,” was seen as a critical geography from which to project force against communist strongholds in North Korea and Russia. Inspired by Dwight D. Eisenhower’s State of the Union pronouncement of a permanent presence in Okinawa, the following year the US Navy released its *Master Plan, Okinawa*, accounting for a total of eighty installations, only twenty-six of which were now noted as temporary (Eisenhower, 1954; US Navy, 1954).

Land-acquisitions were supported by a cascade of policies sanctioned by the Department of the Army. A first-order concern was establishing a system of land titling and property transfer that was legible to USCAR officials. “If there is a delay in the establishment of land titles,” the Director of the Office for Occupied Areas wrote from Washington DC, “then there will also be a delay in the condemnation of and payment for the land” (1951). It bears flagging again here the degree to which the contours of possession had been interrupted by the battle of Okinawa. A June, 1955 editorial commented that

In the case of central and southern Okinawa, the change is so remarkable that it is considered fitting to say that everything was wiped out by the war and a new society established under new conditions, rather than to say that the past Okinawan society was influenced by the stationing of American forces here. (Ryukyu Shimpo, 1955)

The edges of a cane field, the gate of a house, a legal record, the extent of a river or the shoreline itself; all the normal markers which signified which lands were under one’s care had

been erased or paved over in the course of war. Therefore, a collection of USCAR proclamations and directives between 1950 and 1953 focused evenhandedly on (re-)indoctrinating Okinawans into a culture of exclusionary private property, and establishing legal title between individuals and specific tracts of land, in order to make manageable their eventual requisition by USCAR.³² While USCAR Special Proclamation No.4, *Possessory Rights in Land*, remarked that through the work of the Central Committee for Determination of Land Title, “virtually all real property in Okinawa Guntō has been completed,” it wasn’t until 1953 that this was actually achieved (Brighter 1951, 1).

Still, a legal apparatus was needed to guide the acquisition of Okinawan land through the disposal of private property. To redress this, USCAR Ordinance 109 was issued on April 3, 1953, affecting three main areas of property acquisition by: (1) appointing the USCAR District Engineer as the administrative body responsible for managing land acquisition; (2) establishing the United States Land Acquisition Commission; and, most significantly, (3) prescribing a process of forced acquisitions when willful lease/sale was not offered by land owners themselves (USCAR 1953). The refusal of Okinawans to willfully lease or permanently sell lands to USCAR had proven to be a formidable obstacle in the smooth roll-out of the postwar base plans. Ordinance 109 allowed USCAR to surmount this challenge by carrying out de-facto eminent domain proceedings through what they called Declarations of Takings.

At first blush, Ordinance 109 appeared in stark contrast with the US’s management of Okinawa as a de-facto nation-building project and showcase of American democracy. But it was the law’s application of the principles of national servitude which had undergirded the American Declaration of Takings Act of 1931, which allowed Ordinance 109 to pass the democratic test.

³² USCAR Special Proclamation 4, *Possessory Rights in Land*, issued on April 16, 1951 outlined the rights of land ownership, which mainly pertained to the conditions under which a designated owner could exercise eviction proceedings against a non-owner inhabiting their land. The proclamation specifically highlighted “war emergency” as the reason for “numerous Okinawans using and living on lands....without legal consent from claimant owners,” with no mention of the impact of base development on land shortages and crowding (Brighter, 1951).

To the minds of USCAR officials, the military had liberated Okinawans from the tyranny of imperialism; as grateful beneficiaries of a new quasi-American political order, they, like the “full-fledged” Americans who had furnished land in service to their country in the past, would be subject to the occasional suspension of their assigned property rights in exchange for their “freedom.”

According to Ordinance 109, when a given landowner refused to lease their lands, the District Engineer would administer a Notice of Intent, outlining the lands being sought by USCAR and a monetary value assessment, which was in all cases determined by the US Land Acquisition Commission itself. If an owner refused to agree with the terms of the Notice of Intent within thirty days, then a Declaration of Taking would be filed concerning their land. The issuance of a Declaration of Intent automatically triggered the transfer of jurisdiction from the landowner to the USCAR Land Registry Office, and the deposit of the assessed monetary value – in all cases, deemed “just compensation” – into the Bank of the Ryukyus for the landowner to access. If landowners wished, they were able to launch an appeal to a Declaration of Taking. However, in the case of appeals, only the assessed value of the land in question, and not the fact of the taking itself, would be eligible for reconsideration. Furthermore, the Land Acquisition Commission was staffed entirely of commissioners appointed by the Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, rather than an equally representative body of Okinawans, so while appeals to Declaration of Takings were launched regularly by landowners, they were generally viewed as a fool’s errand. Miyagi (1987, 44) explains that even when a Ryukyuan counterpart to the USCAR Land Acquisition Commission, the Okinawan Land Commission, was established by USCAR in response to demands from the Okinawan public for fair assessment, it was seen as a placating development and the ability to challenge USCAR’s Declarations of Takings remained in doubt.

Because USCAR officials had delegated the actual work of producing and registering land titles to Okinawans through the Central Committee for Determination of Land Title , they were relatively unfamiliar with the actual geographies to which Declarations of Takings

pertained. Extensive topographical maps and aerial photography had been accumulated by military planners and the successive postwar military governments since well before the Battle of Okinawa, but these rarely detailed on-the-ground conditions. As CHamoru scholar Tiara R. Na'puti (2019, 5) has explained of military site plans for the Live Fire Training Range in Ritidian, Guåhan (Guam), this type of military cartography tends to: “ignore the profound impact of militarization and peoples’ relationships with dynamic oceanic and land environments.” Similarly, USCAR map legends often symbolized lived space, what they described as “built up areas,” as empty blocks, if at all. Therefore, extensive surveying work conducted by the District Engineer was required in order to complete Declarations of Takings, and the budgeting and material allocations that would be required by future military development once land had been acquired.

In the background of the policy developments driving forward USCAR’s land-acquisition campaign, landowners had been closely attentive to increasing forced removals that were already ensuing pursuant Ordinance 109. Violent evictions of villagers from the Maja and Nishizaki Wards of Ie Island, where sixty-percent of the island had been allocated to military jurisdiction, birthed the colloquialism “bayonets and bulldozers” for the tactics of the military’s land acquisition process, and subsequently the first *shimagurumi tōsō* (all island struggle) against the requisitions. Ie island, it was argued by the military, was the “only” viable location to practice a “new bombing technique” requiring a nearly 2000-acre zone of clearance (United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 1955). Similar refusals at the villages of Oroku and Isahama occasioned crop-bulldozing and violent removals. At Oroku, the District Engineer, empowered by Ordinance 109, had unilaterally issued a Declaration of Taking for a section deemed necessary to the opening of Naha Air Base and subsequently deposited two-year lease fees into the accounts of its landowners. With intentions to begin use of the facility on January 1st, 1954, the military didn’t notify Oroku villagers’ of their intention to build over their land until September 10, 1953. On November 26, the District Engineer notified the Mayor of Oroku that the area was to be cleared, and exactly a week later on December 4th forced 250 Oroku

villagers off their land at the point of bayonet, granting no lenience to harvest crops (Ibid, Tab D, 1). In all of these cases, the military claimed argued that it had already exercised a tacit jurisdiction over the villager's lands through what they termed "implied leases," and the villagers had been permitted to continue farming activities with notice of the military's intent to develop the lands in the future. Military communications make it clear that the issuance of implied leases functioned to criminalize Okinawans who for the "transgression" of remaining in place, deeming them interlopers on land no longer theirs.

Where assignment of "implied leases" could be enacted by means as hollow as the production of a map, military surveying carried potentially life-threatening consequences. Citing the removals at Isahama and Iejima, many landowners refused USCAR entry when the chief of the Real Estate Division requested access citing Ordinance 109. Between August 15th and December 15th of 1955, twenty-seven such entrance requests were delivered to municipal mayors throughout Okinawa, who USCAR expected to persuade resistant landowners that surveys could not be assumed in all cases to be a precursor to removal. Okinawan-American Lawyer, Lincoln T. Taira, represented the majority of Ginowan Son landowners in their refusal on August 30th, 1955, when they organized a petition "opposing the topographic survey, which they fear is a prelude of eventual land requisition by the United States of America" (L. T. Taira, 1955). Chaired by Choko Kuwae, the United Association of Municipal Land Committee (*shi-cho-son gunyōtochi rengōkai*) similarly organized their resistance to Ordinance 109 surveying by the USCAR District Engineer. Also writing in August of 1955, Kuwae summarized the landowners' grounds for refusal:

Consent to the proposed land survey without any clear reason shown is feared possibly to result in compulsory relocation just like in the cases of Ieshima [Ie Island (Ie Jima)] and Isahama...an entry permit may be used assuming the eventual conclusion of land lease contract or the lease acquisition through the expropriation procedure under CA Ordinance No.109, the landowners cannot know whether or not (a) their lands suffer

topographical or geological change; (b) any damage be caused upon improvements or other properties attached to the land concerned, if so, how much damage? (Kuwae, 1955)

However, having anticipated widespread resistance, USCAR had already issued an amendment to Ordinance 109 on August 18, 1955, allowing the District Engineer to apply directly to USCAR for permission to enter Okinawan land, bypassing the need for permission from landowners themselves. Securing a legal right of entry to Okinawan land for surveying purposes, which lubricated USCAR's land acquisition bureaucracies, was only a matter of the military amending its own fungible legal code.

Birth of a "landed gentry"

Between 1953, when Ordinance 109 was issued, and 1960, the military's jurisdiction expanded by approximately a thousand acres per-year.³³ Obstructing this land grab was the resistance of landowners to their own dispossession, and the inability of the US Department of Army establish ownership through the acquisition of fee simple title. A specific form of leasehold with precedent in Japanese common law, "Superficiary" interest, was considered to be a solution to both of these problems. According to superficiary interests, the "superficiary" (lessee) uses the land of an owner for an exceptionally long duration of time, having the freedom to use the airspace and earth below the land to their liking. When in 1954, the US Army Far East Command petitioned the US Department of State's Director of Foreign Buildings Operations, William P. Hughes, for the ability to acquire fee-simple title to an additional four-hundred acres of land on Okinawa Island, Hughes urged the use of superficiaries rather than outright

³³ The *Summary of Conference: GAIROA Projects in the Ryukyus*, notes a 1954 land-base of 41,912 acres; in 1959, the USCAR communique, *DATT no. 1151, U.S. Agency Average Holdings – Ryukyus*, noted a land-base of 49,282 acres.

purchase, recommending that lease terms of 999 years be sought (Hughes, 1954). Here, the Department of State interpreted the 1950 Japanese Civil Code's understanding of superficiary title as being functionally akin to outright ownership. Thus, even though superficiary interests were technically leasehold, they were interpreted by the Ryukyuan public as a campaign for "lump-sum buyouts" (*ikkatsu barai*).

The GRI threw its support behind the landowners' plight, expanding the wedge between GRI and USCAR. A four-point platform in opposition to the military's land requisitions was put forward by the Council of Four Organizations, which in 1954 consisted of the GRI, the Ryukyu Legislature, the Mayor's Association, and the Landowner's Federal Committee (A. Shimabuku, 2012a):

1. Just valuation of requisitioned lands;
2. Yearly rental rather than lump-sum payments;
3. No further requisitioning of Okinawan lands by the US Military; and
4. Compensation for damages

In May of 1955, GRI Chief Executive, Shuhei Higa, led a Ryukyuan delegation to Washington D.C. to petition the Department of State to intervene in the land struggle and recognize the four principles. Briefly conceding to the delegation, the Department of State ordered a temporary moratorium on lump-sum buyouts, dispatching a special commission to Okinawa, chaired by Melvin Price, to survey military land problem and propose recommendations as to its alleviation.

The Price Commission's findings made overt a prevailing, though heretofore obscured, sentiment in USCAR and the US Department of State, that the agrarian pre-war Okinawan had been backward and in need of civilizing. In the Price Report's *Beneficial Features of United States Occupancy* section, commissioners decried the merits of the historic wages being earned by those in military-related employment, and the fact that "permanent buildings on paved streets are replacing the narrow dirt roads of Naha" (M. Price 1956). The issue of inadequate compensation for taken lands, the commissioners concluded, was just the consequence of an

agitating minority, easily swayed by “demagogic confusion” (7660). These conclusions were built atop colonial interpretations of Indigenous peoples as being inherently lazy and counterpoised with progress (Matsumura 2020, 11). In particular, the prospect of conceding to Okinawan calls for annual rentals at fair value was identified by the commissioners as “transcend[ing] any socialistic theory of compensation” they could think of, and would lead to the emergence of what they called a “landed gentry.” In the end, the Price Commission’s recommendations only put force behind the military’s effort to acquire superficial interests through lump-sum buyouts.

At the center of the conflict over the Price Commission was an argument about the value of land itself. In the *Ryukyuan Rebuttal to the Price Commission’s Recommendations*, landowners brought to light what they called a “fundamental difference in thought” between Okinawan and US society:

We make a living in the passage of spiritual cultivation and society of the U.S. was established in the material cultivation... in Okinawa, land was inherited from ancestors and should be transferred to descendants. The land has not only the value of property but history and spirits of ancestors. Okinawans express strong opposition to the loss of land even if they had nothing to do with the land being requisitioned.” (Price 1956, p. 108)

Without adequate realization of this “fundamental difference,” landowners argued there would never be a resolution to the land problem. Wendy Matsumura has argued cogently that at the heart of this “fundamental difference” was landowners’ recognition of “what Marx called the ‘great secret’ of capitalism,” namely, that “the very notion of a ‘sufficient price for the land’ was a fiction” (2020, p. 11).

The Price Commission’s backing of the military’s land acquisition program incited massive unrest throughout Okinawa. Yamazaki (2003) notes that nearly half-a-million people participated in organized protest against the military’s lump-sum-buyouts between June and

August of 1956. the US was pushed to accept the rental relationships in 1958 and commenced leasing agreements with landowners *en-masse* (Tanji 2007, p. 74). Under the heading “Elimination of Determinable Estates and Conversion to Indefinite Leaseholds,” a US Department of the Army memorandum read:

The U.S. is prepared (in case a more satisfactory solution can be found) to cease further acquisition of determinable estate, to relinquish any determinable estate acquired in the past, and to abandon completely the single payment system...Landowners who have already accepted single payment, in full or in part, may convert to an indefinite leasehold with annual rents. (US Department of the Army, 1958)

The collapse of the one-time buyout lobby was a major win for Okinawan landowners. Upon the resumption of Japanese jurisdiction over Okinawa in 1972, the responsibility for paying US military land leases along with all other monetary costs associated with hosting US bases, passed to Japan’s Defense Agency, which to this day, under the auspices of the Japanese Ministry of Defense, negotiates annual increases in lease value with displaced landowners.

Returning “the Ferro-Concrete Structures of a Western Civilization”

While the period covered in this chapter is generally remembered for the extent of the US Forces’ requisitions of Okinawan land, it also saw the first struggles emerge concerning the condition of, and processes by which land was returned to Okinawans. As the edges of bases became fortified and master plans depicted a clearer image of the Central Okinawa base network in its entirety, lands unused by US forces were released to their owners. By 1958, landowners’ claims against the US and Japanese governments for compensation for “restoration of released land” in the pre-peace treaty period, concerned 4,207,236 tsubo (3436.8 acres) (1958, 103). The first policy governing how the military returned land in occupied Okinawa came on September 6, 1946, in Memorandum No. 22. The law read:

Upon notification by the property authority that an installation is to be abandoned, the Public Works Department will assume custody. Buildings will not be dismantled or removed, nor will equipment be taken from the site without the written permission of the Director of Public Works...Buildings and equipment will not be given to the Okinawan Native Government or to local communities by any Military Government agency other than Public Works. (Cairns, 1946)

Later comments made by Lieutenant General, Donald P. Booth, illuminate the thinking informing the military's land return policy: "the customs and mores of a predominantly rural people," Booth explained, "will to a great degree preclude their effective use of vacated United States Forces housing, barracks or warehouse areas and those other ferro-concrete structures of a western civilization." Here, we see the racist and imperialist logic of the occupying forces in their characterization of the Okinawan, who they deemed biologically precluded from the ability to utilize "western/civilized" infrastructures to their benefit.

Since the pre-war planning for the Battle of Okinawa the military had engendered a racist disposition in their understanding of Okinawan society. This extended to their assessment of land use in the prefecture. The military considered the customs of the Amami island group, north of the thirtieth parallel and severed from the Ryūkyū Kingdom by the Satsuma domain, to be "essentially Japanese." South of the thirtieth parallel was a different story. Whereas "Chinese influence is marked in the cities...the aboriginal strain is still noticeable among the rural people" (Masland 1943, p.2a). Deficiencies in exports and a reliance on importing rice and tea staples from Japan were fodder for what they described as a "backward" economy (Ibid, 7). Even prior to Masland's Descriptive Survey of the prefecture, military pupils in civil affairs training schools – the would-be governors and officials of US postwar territory – were being trained in Okinawa area-studies which had been informed by Japanese literature on Okinawa, and thus reproduced Japan's own anti-Okinawan racisms. This was how the perceived "backwardness" of Okinawans, illustrated in the Meiji Government's assimilationist policies towards the new

prefecture, and in moments of spectacular racism such as the “Jinruikan Incident” where Okinawans were displayed alongside Indigenous peoples of Taiwan and other new imperial subjects at the Fifth Domestic Industrial Exposition of 1903, became engrained into the institutional psyche of US military rulers. Ultimately, these characterizations of a regressive people apart from Japan, benefited not only the separation and then dense militarization of the islands now relegated to the peripheries of sovereignty, but ultimately, the colonial logics of civilization and progress which unified the military’s laws regarding land acquisition and return.³⁴

In the absence of measures for US accountability in land restoration, the reasons for Okinawan landowners’ petitioning for compensation on returned lands were diverse. Today, the US Military is widely known as the single greatest polluter in the world, though this is often obfuscated by war-time/peace-time distinctions which discount war-time polluting to a higher degree as “necessary.” In the postwar decade, however, Ryukyuan receiving their land back after the military deemed them unnecessary, were on the front lines of a global education in the long-winded fallout of militarism. In many cases, environmental contamination on returned base-land was direct, akin to war itself. Dismembering and loss of life due to the roughshod dismantling of unexploded ordnances left in villages of Ie Island were notorious. Arsenic poisoning in villages led in some cases to the death of entire families drawing from wells used as ammunition storage in their absence, as was the case on Iheya Island (Mitchell, 2020).

Less directly than ordnances and chemical poisoning, degradation and removal of top soils and surfacing of farmland with runway concrete, undermined farmers’ ability to provide for themselves and their families. The military’s policy of ceasing lease payments to landowners immediately upon return, left them virtually no life-line. Owners of land at returned airfields and ammunition storage facilities rendered useless for agricultural purposes regularly filed petitions

³⁴ For more on the ways in which “sovereign nation-states have...handcuffed American freedom of military action,” and thus directed US Forces’ basing efforts towards places of “exception” where sovereignty has been routinely contested by Indigenous peoples, see Sasha Davis’s *The US military base network and contemporary colonialism* (2011, 5).

to USCAR who categorically cited Article 19 of the Peace Treaty, waiving all pre-treaty claims, in their refusal to help remediate lands which had been requisitioned prior to 1951. As was the case at the Yonabaru/Nishihara Airfield, USCAR's refusal to provide remediation assistance was made in spite of their own awareness that because "legal confirmation" of their occupation of the airfield wasn't given until 1953, their own designation of landowners claims as "pre-treaty," was legally unsound (R. A. Gaiduk, personal communication, April 13, 1959).

In a 1956 photo-album detailing what its authors called the "actual conditions of the land released by the military"(Unknown, 1956) the experience of repossessing militarized land is explained as follows:

It is not an easy task to restore the land to a farm as it was. They have to break the thickly paved concrete, and then collect and put aside the stones under it. Having used the land at an unreasonably low rate, the military released the land with no compensation for its restoration, when the land finally became useless. This has driven the landowner concerned into a state of distress. The restoration of the land to its original state will require more amount of expense than that of the price of the land itself...Being attached to their land on which their ancestors have long lived, and to acquire their means of life, these farmers continue to break the concrete. " (Unknown, 1956)

Though the author of this photobook is unclear,³⁵ we can ascertain from its narrative and photo documentation some nuance regarding the context of return. The first half of the book details several design characteristics of agriculture and everyday life as they related to land and the environment. Shown are homes with low-sloping roofs surrounded by built-up coral walls, and

³⁵ Based on the format and date of the photo-album, it is likely that it was drafted by the Government of the Ryukyu Islands second delegation to Washington in 1958, attended by Thoma Jugo, and nine other members from GRI, civic organizations including the Land Federation, and civil society at large, to petition U.S. government directly for assistance in the land-struggle.

extensive networks of sea-walls protecting villages from typhoon; agricultural terraces, divided so as to provide sustenance for numerous families on small tracts; long frontages separating village sites from the ebb and flow of the sea (Figure 9). The second half of the book descends into a detailed documentation of the state of lands released from military use: a farmer stands next to a burlap sack and a sledgehammer on the ground, while he swings a pick-axe into the concrete of a paved-over field; the coastal breakwater washes over a demolished sea-wall threatening Mizugama in Kadena Village; damaged Okinawan mausoleums are shown, with accompanying text underscoring the need for new sloped lands for reconstruction.

In the postwar context of militarized land returns, the notion of improvement played a double role. On one hand, it was clear that Okinawans were deemed by the military to be too incompetent to productively utilize infrastructure left standing on released base land. On the other, when it suited the USCAR officials, “improvements” to land, such as roads and structures built by the US Corps of Engineers, were accounted for in the military’s value assessments, in order to reduce their financial accountabilities to Okinawan landowners. USCAR wrote to American Consul General to Tokyo, Ronald A. Gaiduk, detailing the contest over compensation for the Yonabaru/Nishihara Airfield, which was returned to landowners by the US in an unremediated state:

It will be recalled that during the July, 1958 land negotiations in Washington, it was the view of the Department of the Army that “improvements provided by the United States which enhance the value of the land” would relieve the United States of any obligation for restoration or payment of damages in lieu of restoration. It was the Ryukyuan view that a fair procedure must be established to determine in each case what constituted “improvement.” (R. A. Gaiduk, April 13, 1959)

The question of whose interpretation of improvement wins out is not insignificant to the process of colonization. The “destroy-to-replace” tendency of settler colonialism is justified by a subscription to terra-nullius whose ideological foundation is improvement. Indigenous ways of

Figure 9

Pre-/post-war landscape contrast. Low-pitched roofing and dense growing spaces illustrate sustainable landscape design. Where machine-assisted reclamation was not available, owners of returned land were left to peel back the concrete of formerly militarized landscapes by hand and rudimentary farming implements.



Note: Image care of the Okinawa Prefectural Archives (doc. code: 0000105561)

being, which tend to be rooted in the material, spiritual and genealogical *use* value of land, are always found by colonizers to be in what Sherene Razack calls a “natural state of decay” (2015). This contributed directly to concealing the military’s deconstruction of the situated and land- and sea-based lifeways of many Okinawans, by celebrating a transition from farming and fishing to wage-labor in the military economy and from “narrow dirt roads” to “permanent buildings on paved streets.”

The release of base land in the early occupation period emerged as a policy “contact zone,” to borrow from Pratt (1991), in which vastly different land ethics confronted one another. For Okinawans, land has never constituted an alienable two-dimensional plane appropriated through one’s labor alone. Traditionally interpreted as the site of ancestral connection, one’s land as the means of reproducing life and as the “resting place of the soul” will be explained with greater depth in the next chapter. By contrast, US military governments demonstrated a Lockean interpretation of land, in which its possession (or requisition) could be justified by the prospect of a more “industrious and rational” use.³⁶ Therefore, according Okinawans petitioning for the restoration of their lands and seas in order to resume pre-war forms of labor became understood by the military as advocating for a regressive state of affairs.

The return of land destroyed by the military with no financial compensation or remediation assistance, emerged in the postwar decade as the reverse side of land requisitions, constituting the two-sides of the “land problem.” In the worst cases, land was toxic or laden with the remnant weapons of war which killed and maimed Okinawans left to clean their lands with their bare hands. Otherwise, the violence of return was less direct. Even where

³⁶ In Chapter 5, *On Property*, of Locke’s Second Treatise of Civil Government, Locke states that “rational” labor is the only criteria which justifies one’s possession of land, thereby licensing land’s alienation wherever that criteria is deemed absent: “God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them for their benefit, and the greatest conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational, (and labor was to be his title to it)” (Locke 2000, 10).

military officials appealed to their physical developments – the “ferro-concrete structures of a western civilization” – as “improvements” which absolved them of the need to compensate landowners, military policy was to prevent those same developments from being used by Okinawans who were deemed incapable of using them. Thus, a racial hierarchy formed through these early returns. “Improvement” was not a “tide to lift all boats,” but rather a marker which reinforced the progressiveness of the military as saviors while paradoxically entrenching notions of the “backward” Okinawan. It is important to establish this understudied history of return, not to demonstrate how the US military’s processes of land return have improved since the postwar era, but to establish a foundation for understanding the ways in which it has remained the same.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I set out to understand how techniques of planning were used by US military officials to acquire and perform territory on Okinawa Island in the first decade of occupation. Importantly, refusals to the military regimes were launched in the form of petitions and acts of protest not sanctioned by military governments. This shows how territorial jurisdictions are not singular, and replaced sequentially when challenged by a new territorial order. Rather, jurisdiction is like the metaphor offered by Pasternak (2014, p.148), of the various systems of the human body being represented as transparencies layered atop one another. Despite the military landscape appearing as a true hegemon under the US-Japan SOFA legal regime, Okinawan territorial claims and land-based practices persist, contesting and layering beneath it. This becomes apparent when focusing on the fungible, anxious beginnings of military territory, and upon the alternative visions of land asserted by its opponents.

The main argument that I have tried to put together here is that, as the US Force’s occupation of Okinawa progressed through the ratification of the Peace Treaty, the techniques of rational planning took the place of direct force as the dominant mode of violence necessary to

the territorial form of the base. I do not mean that after the ratification of the Treaty, the actual violence of hunger, dispossession and death abated as a less violent reality entered the fray; but that, in a Foucauldian sense of “politics as the continuation of war by other means,” policy, maps and government became the new expression of the bullets, shrapnel and compelled suicide which reigned supreme between April and June of 1945 (2003, p.15). This was an expression of what has been called the “dark side” of planning, the underbelly of a profession otherwise considered progressive or reformist (Yiftachel, 1998).

The transition of war to politics as the harbinger of death and destitution – what I would like to reformat as “*planning as war by other means*” – began with what Graham has called *place annihilation*, in the militarized destruction of Okinawa Island and its people. “Urban ‘planning’ in many colonized cities,” notes Graham, “often amounts to little but the planned devastation and bulldozing of indigenous cities to underpin the strategic control of the occupiers” (2004, p.171-2). Indeed, US and Japanese forces’ wholesale destruction of central Okinawa Island provided a great convenience to the US Corps of Engineers’ postwar base boom, by ensuring the death of so many Okinawans. Punitive civilian containment policies ensued thereafter. Because through MG Directive, the legislating of large civilian exclusion zones and then prohibitions on Ryukyuan construction activities were offered alongside economic reconstruction measures and educational reform, the sheer violence of these policies became obfuscated by what Roy calls empire’s “band-aid of reconstruction” (2006, p.13).

After the Peace Treaty was ratified, the USCAR’s governing of Okinawa assumed a permanent posture. Under global scrutiny and austere postwar budgets, the extraterritorial deployment of the American tradition of eminent domain, which had until then been couched in a continental ethos of national service, provided a juridical basis for the outright taking of land and the solidification of discursive jurisdictional claims. Only, those now subjected to this legal convention were guaranteed neither “just” compensation, nor the protection of any constitution. The implementation of so-called Declaration 109, expressly derivative of the US 1931

Declarations of Takings Act, was only possible thanks to roughshod land-titling, and mapping projects which required forced access to Okinawan land. When faced with Ryukyuan resistance to survey-related land access, the military autocratically forged new land laws to relieve them of the need for landowners' consent, demonstrating the dispossessive concert of legal regimes and planning in colonial contexts. The assumption of an authority presumed to be pre-political, or which transcends and has the ability to create law itself, makes all the difference here; it ensures that no matter how much Indigenous peoples resist their dispossession, there always exists an authoritative discourse to legitimate the taking of their land.

But if brute force became masked in the bureaucracies of planning and military law, how can we account for removals which were enacted at the point of bayonet and in the path of bulldozers well into the post-Treaty period? A possible answer lies in the fact that these post-Treaty standoffs expressed a type of violence whose nature is perennial, and necessary to an irresolvable territorial contest between what Ford describes as “synthetic” and “organic” communities vying for jurisdiction (1999, p. 859). Whereas, the occupants of synthetic jurisdictions are “mobile and rootless...there is no independent reason for their existence,” organic jurisdictions are occupied by Indigenous peoples enclaved with one another upon their specific homelands (861). As Matsumura explains of the removals from Isahama in January, 1955:

Eviction meant a loss of access to the commons, understood both as a communally managed material site and more broadly as a series of localized, everyday relations that bonded people together over a set of social, political and economic resources that were adjudicated outside the purview of state authorities (2020, p.8)

Being what Ford would describe as “organic communities,” to whom the specificity of place is paramount, villagers could not simply uproot themselves in these cases to move to new land. The “rule” guiding the administration of violence in such conditions suggests that once structures of the state like technocratic planning are established, that violence be embedded in

them. An “exception” which might prove this rule is that so long as fleet-footed colonizers in pursuit of synthetic jurisdictions are locked in contest with villagers whose emplacement is primarily ontological, then not only is this standoff structural (Wolfe 1994, 96), but it will occasionally express itself through outright violence.

Chapter Four: Fighter Jets to Food Courts: Flexible Repossession of a Military Leisure-scape



Okinawan mausoleum remains standing behind new luxury condominiums on the southern edge of AEON Mall Okinawa RYCOM, Raikamu (formerly Higa) District. Photo © Iwama

Prologue

There is an eight lane turn into the north entrance of AEON Mall Okinawa RYCOM, which now occupies the former site of the US military's Awase Meadows Golf Club in Kitanakagusuku Village. The intersection is so immense that it requires multiple crossing guards on a Saturday, supplementing the existing traffic lights in order to make it work smoothly. When I visit the mall, I prefer to approach it from the south. I drive north through Chunjun and Higa Districts, past pockets of old concrete *gaijin jūtaku* (foreigner housing). I continue up through Kitanakagusuku Village, and notice some of these old single-story concrete structures, remnants of old military housing, repurposed as tourist cafes. I drive past one simply called "USCAR." I stop at another for coffee, and see they're also selling mid-century Herman Miller furniture. The last turn I take before arriving at the mall on my southern route, sends me past a

lone Okinawan mausoleum in a field. The mausoleum stands in stark contrast with the backdrop of luxury condominiums belonging to the mall redevelopment behind it. Their parking lots are full of Toyota Altezzas and Nissan Skylines, all bearing the Y-license plates of military drivers bound by Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

Introduction

The redevelopment of closed military facilities can pose myriad opportunities and challenges to the communities within and atop which bases have been built. This chapter offers a case study of one such redevelopment: The return of US Marine's Awase Golf Club and its subsequent redevelopment as AEON Mall Okinawa RYCOM (hereafter RYCOM Mall), which at the time of its 2014 opening was the largest such Western-style shopping mall on Okinawa Island. For the dispossessed landowning families who remain landlords but now to a commercial tenant rather than the military, the land-use transition raises important questions regarding experiences of repossession. I engage the question of, *how do organizations of owners of military base land effect the outcomes of base redevelopment under the current regime of return and realignment?* My analysis includes multiple research engagements with the dispossessed Awase landowners themselves, who branched off from their regional landowners' organization to manage the project. To situate the case in a more fulsome context of base redevelopment, I utilize interviews with government planners, real-estate professionals specializing in military land sales, and other landowners concerning redevelopment in the Okinawa Island context generally.

I make three related arguments in the course of the chapter. First, landowners utilize a method of land "readjustment" (often referred to in Anglo-European planning traditions as "land assembly") through which the legal boundaries of the returned facility are revised and parcels are traded amongst themselves in order to retain control of their ancestral places while yielding

substantial portions of it to commercial investment. This practice, what I came to call “flexible repossession,” allows landowning families to remain attached to sites of collective ontological value, while establishing an economic development stream that breaks from the structure of military dependence circumscribed by the US and Japanese governments. Second, the legal landscape reflective of daily life in the prewar era is maintained beneath militarized land-uses throughout occupation, and becomes exposed when jurisdiction is returned to landowners. In the course of readjustment, uniform and orthogonal boundaries of property are established anew, overwriting the former property contours and completing a process of landscape alteration initiated at the dawn of occupation. Finally, I argue that landowners’ contemporary relations with their enclosed villages obviates an attitudinal blend of “longing for land” on one hand, and considering it forever lost on the other. As time passes, attachment to place wanes among landowners and their beneficiaries. When bases close and landowner families are forced to decide between selling their land, returning to it, or renting it to a new tenant, this waning sense of attachment increases the likelihood of commercial redevelopment and continued dislocation from the land of the family.

Portrait of a “Host” Community: Kitanakagusuku Village

Rycom Mall like the golf course before it easily disappears memories of the villages upon which it is sedimented. Semblances of Okinawa are presented to shoppers. The behemoth mall’s low-pitched roofs dawn patently Okinawan red roof-tiles. The centerpiece of the structure is an over-sized aquarium showcasing a glimpse of the island’s underwater fauna. The tank’s resident leopard shark swimming tight circles ad-nauseum is a living façade of the gargantuan whale shark who is virtually synonymous throughout Asia with the Okinawa vacation. Because these mirages of Okinawan life and design typologies perform a bait-and-switch, eliding interaction with Okinawa outside of a commercialized vacuum, the question of

exactly where the mall is is a critical launching point into an examination of its nature and production as a “post”-military landscape.

Kitanakagusuku Village extends from the center of Okinawa Island to Nakagusuku Bay and the Pacific Ocean on the village’s eastern shore (Figure 10). Prior to the installation of Japan’s city-town-village (*shi-cho-son*) classification in Okinawa, both Kitanakagusuku Village and Nakagusuku Village to its south belonged to Nakagusuku Magiri following the Ryūkyūan *magiri/shima* geographical division (E. Miyagi & Takamiya, 1983). Following the Battle of Okinawa the northern twelve districts of what had by then become Nakagusuku Village, were separated, forming Kitanakagusuku (“North”-Nakagusuku) Village in 1946, and occupied by the US military according to the Hague Conventions on War on Land. 349 acres of the village were enclosed by eleven US Military facilities, the largest of which were Camp Zukeran and Camp Foster, which were amalgamated as Camp Zukeran in 1972.³⁷

The population of Kitanakagusuku Village was 17,162 in 2018, spread across fourteen districts (*aza*).³⁸ Whereas before WWII, land-use in the area was dominated by sugarcane farmland, today tourism is a significant driver of the local economy with over thirty-percent of village jobs in either wholesale/retail trades or the service industry (Kitanakagusuku Village, 2022). This high proportion of service industry jobs has stayed relatively stable over the previous seven national censuses (1985 – 2015), whereas historically prevalent agricultural households have declined by 77.2 percent over the same period (Kitanakagusuku Village 2021, 18). Kitanakagusuku villagers earn slightly more than Okinawans generally, making an average per-capita income of 2.3 million JPY per year (\$17,271.65 USD) compared to the prefectural

³⁷ The military facilities originally located in the village were: Awase Residential Area; Zukeran Residential Area; Community Line; Kubasaki School Area; Highway and Roads Facility; Legion Club; Awase Storage Facility; Camp Zukeran; and Awase Golf Course.

³⁸ In this chapter, I make frequent use of the geographic administrative unit of the *Aza*, which is a small-scale unit akin to village or hamlet. The fourteen Kitanakagusuku Village *Aza* referred to here include: Adaniya, Atsuta, Misaki, Yagibaru, Waniya, Kishaba, Shimabuku, Zukeran, Chunjun, Toguchi, Oshiro, Ishihira, Ogidō, and Higa (now *Raikamu*)

Figure 10

Kitanakagusuku Village: US Forces Awase Meadows Golf Course redevelopment



per-capita mean of 2.39 million JPY (\$16,343.55 USD).³⁹ Both fall well below the same measure across the country, however, with the average Japanese worker earning 3.2 million JPY (23,081.68 USD) in 2017.⁴⁰

As a densely militarized place, nearly eight-percent of Kitanakagusuku Village's municipal budget is accounted for by military-related subsidies (Okinawa Prefectural Government, 2021). One group of these subsidies targets environmental improvements pursuant to the *Law Concerning the Improvement of Living Environments in Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities*, and includes provisions such as residential soundproofing projects and support payments for unexploded ordnance removal. A second category of base subsidies is distributed by Japan directly to municipalities and individuals who are especially impacted by the presence of bases. This second category includes rental payments for property under the use of the military, and transfers to municipalities to support the common practice of purchasing base land from military landowners when land is returned for the construction of public infrastructure.

Base History & Background of Return

US Army Awase Meadows Golf Club sprawled between 1948 and 2010 over Kitanakagusuku Village's Aza Higa, only one of the US forces' 170 luxury golf-courses around the world (Gilson, 2013). The club was as good a sign as any that the extraterritoriality of the US Forces' empire of bases is not limited to defense infrastructure, but characterized by numerous recreational facilities like movie theatres, grade schools, bowling alleys, and country clubs. Whereas prior to WWII, it was mostly base-adjacent red light districts that served purposes of satisfying the "rest & relaxation" whims of foreign deployed US forces, between 1946 and 1950, family accompaniment became regularized as a means of quelling sexual violence and related

³⁹ Kitanakagusuku Village (2018, p.22)

⁴⁰ Okinawa Prefectural Government (2018, p.1)

unrest between American GIs and local residents of “host nations” (Vine, 2015, p. 84). In David Vine’s base research, military planners euphemistically described on-base recreational facilities like Awase Meadows as “retainment benefits,” critical to the leisure experience of families accompanying US Forces members on overseas deployment (2015, p. 95). Observing the sprawling land-use patterns of overseas bases, Mark Gillem describes these foreign base spaces as “simulacrums of suburbia” (2007, XV1). Gillem notes that per-capita the US Air Force possesses more than double the golf-course land than exists on the continental United States (Gillem, p.95).

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began constructing Awase Meadows Golf Club in Camp Zukeran in 1948 when military requisitions of arable land were at their height (Fisch 1988, p.177). Membership to the club was limited to US Forces personnel, while Okinawans were only permitted on the golf course if invited by members as guests, or while employed as caddies. During the Price Commission’s land hearings, US officials fought for the retention of Awase Meadows, justifying it to the commission as follows:

The maximum income that could be obtained from this land by intensive production of mixed vegetables would be \$28,000 per year...at the present time the course employs 101 full time Okinawan employees and 200 caddies. These employees are paid approximately \$60,000 per year. It thus appears that it is to the advantage of the Okinawan economy to have the land used as a golf course rather than farm land.
(Burchett, 1955)

Thus, the military used a wage rationale in concluding that it was in the best interest of Okinawans to have the Golf Course remain in place: a one-sided recognition of use- versus exchange-value of land. In petitioning the Price Commissioners to favor their use-value for the site as a golf-club, US officials argued that when it came to the Okinawans, it was the high wage rate they could draw from the land and not its historic use as a village and farm site which was the point to focus upon.

The characteristics of the land upon which Awase Meadows sat was not unique among other sections of base-land in central Okinawa. Located within Camp Zukeran and spanning 47.85 acres of mostly arable dry-farm land, the golf course mostly occupied Aza Higa, but also overlapped with the Azas of Chunjun, Yagibaru, and Shimabuku. The distribution of land tenure at the golf course was also characteristic of the region, with 84.8% of the facility being privately owned land, tying 375 historic landowners in leases to the golf course (Okinawa Defense Bureau, 2010; Okinawa General Bureau, 2019). Pursuant to the US-Japan SOFA Article Two, these landowners were paid annually by the Japanese Ministry of Defense, who provided the land in turn to the US Department of Defense to use at no cost. Prior to the return of the facility, two small sections of the Golf Course along its perimeter had been appropriated previously by the OPG and Kitanakagusuku Village to restore public road access through the facility.

The return of Awase Meadows Golf Course had been pushed for by the OPG since the mid-1980s, when then governor Junji Nishime included the facility in his land return requests made as a part of his delegation to the US in 1986 (Okinawa Defense Bureau, 2013; National Diet Library, 2021). It wasn't until the following administration of Masahide Ota, that the SCC announced the return of Awase Meadows in a June, 1990 ad-hoc meeting where the return of twenty-three cases across seventeen facilities were agreed upon (the so-called "23 Cases" agreement, see Table 3). However, by 1995 nearly half of these agreed upon returns remained unaddressed. Of the 23 Cases, there were three of special concern to Governor Ota because of the particular threat they posed to local residents' safety: the returns of Naha Port and Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, and the ceasing of live-fire training over Prefectural Highway 104 (Ota 2000, p.157). Awase Meadows would go untouched altogether until the 1995 rape incident, subsequent uprisings and the establishment of the SACO re-energized efforts for base closure.

Amidst the growing anti-military sentiment of 1995-6, the SCC faced global pressure to advance returns in Okinawa. Chalmers Johnson penned a February, 1996 L.A. Times editorial entitled *U.S. Bases on Okinawa: a Case of Colonial Overlordship*, in which he referred to Awase


Meadows specifically as a “caricature of the last days of the British Raj,” alongside tongue-in-cheek speculation that the Clinton administration had designs on returning the recreation facility, for which a logical geopolitical case for retention could hardly be made, as a “breakthrough” in quelling local unrest (Johnson, 1996). Sure enough, the SCC conceded that so long as a replacement golf course could first be constructed within the Kadena Ammunition Storage Facility, then the land at Awase Meadows could be returned to its original Kitanakagusuku Village owners. Following the replacement facility’s environmental impact assessment process between 2001 and 2004, the Okinawa Defense Bureau completed construction of Taio Golf Course, a larger golf club spanning 88.2 acres (Okinawa Defense Bureau 2010, 2). In 2010 Awase Golf Course was finally released by the US Forces, constituting one of the largest sections of military base land to be returned to landowners since the Japanese Government’s 1972 resumption of control over Okinawa.

In April of 2015, in the shadow of the former Awase Meadows Golf Club, “AEON Mall Okinawa RYCOM” was opened, paying dual homage to the Japan-based shopping mall developer, AEON Mall Corporation, who now occupies the site, and the US DoD’s Ryūkyū Command, which had been centered in Kitanakagusuku Village during the US Forces’ de-jure occupation of the prefecture. Within the mall, there are few signs of the facility’s identity through time. In a nondescript bathroom corridor next to the second floor “dining terrace,” there is a plaque (Figure 11) which reads:

Until the Second World War, Kitanakagusuku Village’s Higa District existed on the current site of AEON Mall Okinawa RYCOM. Following the war, in 1945, the US military requisitioned the land and turned it into a golf course (commencing operations in 1948). By the time the land was returned on July 29th, 2010, it had been used as such for over 65 years. Also occupying Chunjun and Yagibaru districts, the AWASE Meadows Golf Club was a 5,833 yard, 18-hole, par-70 course spanning 468,000 m². While the course was specialized for military use, Okinawan golfers could attend as visitors.

Figure 11

AEON Mall Okinawa RYCOM: Commemorative plaque (left); Photo of golfers at the former US Forces Awase Meadows Golf Club (right)



Note: Photos © Iwama

While local news spilled much ink over the conversion of a military golf course into Okinawa's newest Western-style shopping mall, the plaque is remarkable in that it alerts readers to a longer history of dispossession and emplacement of villagers upon the land where the mall sits. What is made important to its reader is not just the standard narrative of a mall supplanting a military facility, but that the golf course had also supplanted villages. Posted next to the commemorative plaque is a photo in which an Okinawan caddy in a conical sun hat holds a bag of clubs, watching over a group of golfers teeing off down a fairway of otherwise prime farmland, towards a huddle of low-pitched Okinawan houses in the distance.

Located within Kitanakagusuku Village and bordering Okinawa City, where fourteen and thirty-four percent of the municipal footprints are occupied by bases respectively, Rycom Mall's clientele are notably American: on-base highschoolers taking their lunch "off-base" at McDonalds and window shopping the Gap; teenage marines buying stacks of Nike sneakers; newly deployed military families escaping the sun and gathering household basics at the dollar store; and returning military families picking up Okinawa-themed souvenirs at the visitor's center. I had several conversations with shopkeepers who intimated that English proficiency was a merit-worthy consideration in the job application process. Related to traditional "camp towns" on the outskirts of US bases around the world whose sex trades respond to military demand, Rycom Mall is formally "off-base," yet overwhelmingly amenable to US tastes and desires – in Okinawa, yet inexorably outside it.

Post-war marketization of Okinawan land

In order to provide sufficient context to this chapters' empirical engagement with landowners' experiences, some background on the contemporary economic context of military land ownership in Okinawa is necessary. Today, lease payments to owners of military land throughout Japan consumes a tremendous portion of the public funds the Japan MoD spends

financing the presence and realignment of US Forces Japan. For now, I will not make a distinction between “contract” landowners who acquiesce to direct lease ratification with the government, and “contract refusing” (*keiyaku kyohi*) landowners whose compliance is compelled by force of Japanese national law. Within the sum of Japanese national funds paid to owners of military land across Japan, rent to Okinawan landowners accounts for the majority of allocations. Approximately 150 billion JPY (about \$1 billion USD) is paid out annually to landowners, over sixty-percent of which lands in Okinawa where the vast majority of base land in Central Okinawa Island (seventy-six percent) is leased by private owners. Although relatively stable, rent paid to landowners across the country has fluctuated somewhat, falling in certain years and showing no change in others. By contrast, military land rent to Okinawans does not decline. Demonstrated in Figure 12, rents for military land in Okinawa have not fallen once since 1995, increasing on average by two-percent annually as a result of Okinawan landowners’ negotiations with the MoD; this despite overall Okinawan land prices (averaged across all documented land-uses) falling precipitously in the same period. The uniformity of these increases represents what the Okinawan economist, Yasuo Kurima, first detailed as the “political price” of military land in the prefecture pointing to its exchange value being uniquely affected by a mechanism of political cooptation.

The majority of landowners who willfully renew their leases with the MoD every twenty years are a populous and rapidly increasing population. Within the twenty-year renewal period, rents are distributed to “contract-landowners” annually during the festive Obon season in August. While the regional factions of the Okinawa Military Land Landowners’ Federation (*Okinawa Ken Gunyōchi Nado Jinushikai Rengōkai*) into which landowners are organized, perform lobbying functions which advance their interests through government negotiations, these groups are historically rooted in shared villages and also perform important community functions like the management of pooled resources. The balance between contract landowners’ previous year’s lease value and the

Figure 12

Japan MoD rental payments to military landowners: Nationwide vs. Okinawa





Figure 13

Contract vs. no contract military land landowners (Okinawa Prefecture)



Note: Data assembled from the MoD report, *Okinawa ken no beigun oyobi jietai kichi tōkei shiryōshō* (Statistics Yearbook: US Military and Japan Self-Defense Forces Bases in Okinawa) and statistics on no-contract landowners provided to me in an unpublished report by Oshiro Takayuki at the Okinawa Defense Bureau.

current year's negotiated increase is distributed to them annually between October and March (personal communication, 2021). In 1998, there were 29,564 contract landowners. By 2018, their population had risen to 50,926 (Figure 13). This population explosion is attributed to various causes, one of which is the death of the first and second generations of displaced Okinawan landowners and their subsequent bequeathing of occupied land to multiple family beneficiaries. Another cause of landowner population increase is the sub-division and sale of land to investor-owners throughout Japan who are drawn to the consistent appreciation of militarized land in Okinawa as a lucrative investment product.

The social standing of military landowners in Okinawa cannot be divorced from considerations of poverty and marginalization in the prefecture. In an OPG (2018a) primer for the Okinawa public detailing the salient facts concerning the US military presence in the prefecture a section is devoted to the question, "*I heard military landowners are rich, but is it true?*" The report details the history of forced land requisitions, recalling the struggles at Ie Island and Isahama, then offers a breakdown of military land incomes by group. In 2015, 57.4% of landowners received less than one-million JPY (approximately \$7000 USD), 19.9% received between one- and two-million JPY, while only 7% made over five-million JPY (approximately \$35,000 USD). In a 2015 survey conducted by the Okinawa Military Land Landowners Federation of 655 landowners belonging to three of its member associations, the most common expenses for which respondents said they used their military land incomes was on daily living expenses and tax payments (2015).

While for the majority of landowners, military rents alone do not provide substantial wealth, the political price of base land and the reliability with which the government makes payment has resulted in military land being perceived as a secure long-term investment, which is changing the political economy of military land in Okinawa. "Military land loans" are now provided eagerly by major banks to holders of military land leases in light of base land being considered especially trustworthy collateral. A cottage industry has emerged facilitating the

private sale of occupied lands that few have ever seen. At busy intersections in municipalities like Urasoe, Ginowan and Naha, realtors advertise competitive advantages like the absence of realtor fees, speedy transaction times, and ample listings (Figure 14). As a result of this frenzied market, the portion of contract landowners who reside outside of Okinawa is rapidly increasing. The Ryukyu Shimpo (2019) reported that in the seven years between 2012 and 2019, the number of such landowners from outside of Okinawa increased by a factor of 1.44, from 2786 to 4027, now representing nearly ten-percent of all contracted landowners.

Outside of contract landowners, there is a diverse minority of those who reject lease contracts with the MoD and are thus re-subjected to their forced dispossession with each renewal period. The Okinawan historian and anti-war landowner, Moriteru Arasaki, explains that contemporary organizations of anti-war landowners emerged in the movement against the construction of urban warfare training grounds inside of Camp Hansen in the 1980s, and gained momentum in 1990 on the heels of Masahide Ota's election to the governor's office (2005, p.121). It was that year, when one landowner divided his land in MCAS Futenma into one-tsubo selections selling each parcel to a different member of a five-hundred person coalition of anti-war allies. Thus 1990 saw five-hundred new members of the "One-Tsubo Anti-War Landowners Association" join seventy no-contract landowners, already organized as the Anti-War Landowners Association, broadening the anti-war coalition whose primary mode of resistance was subverting the property form of base land. Because One-Tsubo Anti-War Landowners had organized under the slogan "*from military land to places of life and produce!*" membership was originally limited to Okinawa residents, who could conceivably re-occupy base land. Soon, however, membership opened to those outside of the prefecture, notably in the Kantō Region, where solidarity action for the demilitarization of Okinawa was strong (Arasaki, 1995, p. 153). Contrasted with the sharp rise of contract landowners, the population of no-contract landowners is relatively stable. In 1998 the population of such landowners was only 3000, and had by 2018 grown only to 4156. Because the Japanese and US governments' forced use of uncontracted

Figure 14

“Buying Military Land!” Realtor billboard at Ginowan City intersection, central Okinawa Island



Note: Image © Iwama

land for military purposes requires that the state resort to using the federal Land Expropriation Law, the Japanese government uses various measures of economic compulsion to draw no-contract landowners into contract ratification. The allure of financial arrangements uniquely afforded to contracted landowners like more frequent payments and compensation levels being tied to the specific characteristics of one's own land rather than to the average rental values of the base it belongs to, results in the cooptation of landowners into a contracted and therefore tacitly consenting position, limiting the growth of anti-war landowner coalitions.

Landowners' Memories & Political Orientation

Gushi* (83) and Uehara* (92), both members of the Kitanakagusuku Village Military Land Landowners Association and of the group of Awase landowners who developed the mall, remember the war years well. I meet Gushi alongside a small group of Kitanakagusuku military landowners in their village offices situated beside a US veterans' motorcycle club, and across the street from the fences of Camp Zukeran and the men's enclosed villages. Gushi, who was in a leadership role of the association at the time of Awase Meadows' return, was six years old during the Battle of Okinawa and recounted a memory common among war survivors in Okinawa of hiding in turtle-shell mausoleums (*kame-kobaka*) during the ground-fighting. Upon war's end, the young Gushi would be carted between various prisoner-of-war camps before returning to his ancestral village. "We ended up atop the mountain around Isa. Then, somehow we ended up going to Fukuyama in Yanbaru. Then from Fukuyama to Adaniya. Then from Adaniya....it was like that over and over again. Even though I was only six, I remember it all" (Kitanakagusuku Landowners, personal interview, May 21, 2020). Ten years later, the peak of the military land-grab was no less vivid for Gushi. Now a first year high school student, his teacher Mr. Maehara took him and his class to bear witness to the US military's forced

dispossessions and crop bulldozing at Isahama. There, Gushi remembers watching the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers demolishing homes and fields while elderly villagers fled.

In discussing the redevelopment of the golf course with the Kitanakagusuku landowners, I heard what I understood as expressions of “longing for land” which was discordant with how Okinawan landowners are often discussed in most literature concerning them. Take Gushi, for example: “If the Battle of Okinawa hadn’t have happened, it would be wonderful if you could still live over there. It’s still great land. It’s high up, it’s cool. But the military’s in there so there’s nothing much we can do about it” (Kitanakagusuku Landowners, personal interview, May 21, 2020). Also in tension with a dominant characterization of landowners as uninterested in military base closure, was my conversation with real-estate agent and military land-sales specialist, Kamizato* concerning the redevelopment of the West Futenma Housing Area, which also belonged to Camp Zukeran and is currently undergoing redevelopment. “The number of people who don’t want to sell [their land] is larger,” Kamizato told me, “they haven’t been able to use that land since they were born, so [compared with those who want to sell] the people who want to actually use it is great” (Realtor, personal communication, May 15, 2020).

Dispossession and anti-Okinawan discrimination by Japanese authorities were both dominant themes in my conversation with Kitanakagusuku landowners. I asked Gibo*, a seventy-seven year old land-owner from the Kishaba area of Kitanakagusuku Village, who was three-years-old during the Battle of Okinawa, to tell me about his family and his land:

We came back from Yanbaru to Kitanakagusuku in June 1945, and the US military was already here in Kitanakagusuku! Kishaba, too, had already become a base. Everyone from that village, Shimabuku, couldn’t get in. In Higa too, even now we cannot return. It’s still this way. Our birthplaces are no more. The US military occupied Okinawa straight through, for 28 years or so. Then because of our unfortunate ‘return to the fatherland’ Japan, we Okinawans became Japanese again. But if you really go back, us Okinawans are not Japanese (Kitanakagusuku Landowners, personal communication, May 21)

Gibo's feeling that as owners of military land, their "birthplaces are no more" (*mō jibun tachi umareta toko mō nakunatta, sa*), is notable because in the physical sense, the locations he refers to indeed still "are." However, as the holder of legal title to a section of militarized land which has been occupied, toxified, and enclosed since 1945, lamenting the loss of something irretrievable is a part of the man's identity.

As an elder to both Gushi and Gibo, Uehara was already a college junior at the University of the Ryukyus during the All-Island Struggle, and participated in resistance against the Price Commission and USCAR's lump-sum buyout campaign. Uehara recalls his anti-military activism as a member of his university club. As an external affairs officer, Uehara had been given the responsibility of delivering a summary of his club's opinions on the Price Commission's proposals to the nascent Okinawa Military Landowners Federation. "We officers were outraged by the proposal and thought we should oppose it," Uehara recalled. When I asked after the motivation for his group's resistance, he responded plainly, "well, because it was a one-time payment; 'we'll give you this [money] and you won't have any land anymore, the US would just buy it all up' (Uehara, personal communication, June 4, 2020). The outrage of Uehara's university club was similarly directed towards Okinawan politicians who supported the USCAR regime: "Toma Jugo [then Naha City Mayor] used to tell us that we should comply with USCAR, so in our Ryu-Dai [University of the Ryukyus] protests we'd occasionally stop and yell out 'Thoma Jugo, resign!' That was our Sprechchor,⁴¹ we had two at the time, along with 'down with the Price Commission!'"

When I meet Uehara and Gushi a second time, we're sitting in an A&W in Aza Yagibaru in Kitanakagusuku Village. From the burger shop, I can see Rycom Mall atop a hill in the near distance. Directly across the street from us, we look over the Lower Plaza section of Camp

⁴¹ German noun translating literally to "chorus of voices." Sprechchor is used widely in Japan (*shupurehiko-ru*) to denote the call-and-response form of chant typically animating sites of protest (Manabe, 2013)

Zukeran, plywood covering the windows of the vacated suburban military homes, the entire landscape completely overgrown in sub-tropical foliage. Poised for return in 2024, the US military's seizure and use of Lower Plaza had paid no mind to the facility's overlapping of both Okinawa City and Kitanakagusuku Village. The two municipalities are now forced to collaborate with one another on the redevelopment. After meeting with the larger Kitanakagusuku landowners' group, I wanted to talk more and was thus invited to join Gushi and Uehara as they gathered for business. Gushi was meeting with his elder, Uehara, to give him his earnings statement and updates on value adjustments for his military landholdings. Both men are well passed retirement age, yet toting briefcases and impressive amounts of paperwork.

When Gushi hands Uehara his earnings statement for the year, Uehara barely glances at it before passing it over to show me. In 2019, land at Camp Zukeran fetched 1,998.13 JPY per-m² (approximately \$15.00USD) (Okinawa Defense Bureau, 2020). Assuming an even roughly equal personal land-holding of 62000 m² (6.2 ha) an average Awase landowner's family would have received 3.2 million JPY (approximately \$24,000 USD) in 2019. To use Gushi's words, their "pestering" the Japan Ministry of Defense, Uehara's earning statement shows that amount to have climbed a total of 0.34% since the previous year. For their landlessness, Awase landowners share a little more than one Kitanakagusuku worker's annual salary among three generations of family members that have elapsed since 1945. This corroborates OPG efforts to combat public perception of landowners as a uniformly wealthy economic class.

Holding Uehara's earnings statement, I realize that these two elderly men are being forced to manage a drastic shift in a long-established economic-political order, from militarism to commercialism, along with the myriad existential questions that accompany the repossession of land and what to do with it. An Okinawan student-interpreter, Higa*, who had assisted in a public engagement process for a different base conversion project, had previously helped me understand possible challenges facing landowners like these. "I think it's hard," Higa told me. "The families are always arguing with each other. How should we use or not use this land. Who

should we give it to? Who should we sell it to? It's a problem, this land. But originally, this was sacred land to the *Jinushi* [landowner] family and the community. But this ongoing colonization – seventy-five years of military occupation, created this whole different system, which created this...trouble land, it's like *mondai tochi* [problematic land]" (Higa, personal Interview, April 23 2020).

Gushi and Uehara were educated and politicized by their participation in the USCAR era land struggles. As eldest sons of military landowning families in Kitanakagusuku Village, their direct experiences of war and requisition shaped their political outlook as they inherited titles to their family's land. Gushi, for example, recounted that his teacher, Mr. Maehara, who had brought he and his classmates to witness the Isahama Struggle, was fired by the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) which was beholden to USCAR, for his actions and thereafter transitioned into work as a clerk at Naha City Hall. Similarly, Uehara remembered USCAR threatening to close the University of the Ryukyus, which USCAR had opened and funded, if the leaders of clubs like his were not expelled for initiating participation in the movements against the Price Commission. His anti-USCAR stance comported with his opposition to Okinawan leaders like Toma Jugo who would go on to succeed Higa Shuhei as the Chief Executive of the GRI in 1956. For both men, a life of accumulating experiences like these has positioned them against the military per se in spite of their being coopted into a system that supports its presence.

Redevelopment Process

By the time Awase Meadows Golf Course was released by the US military in 2010, the subgroup of Awase landowners whose specific lands were implicated in the return had already branched off from their regional landowners group and conducted extensive pre-planning for the return. This reflected a theme across the return cases I found, which was a high amount of landowner independence in the redevelopment processes, supported by local government

planners in the surrounding municipalities. Awase landowner, Oyama*, celebrated his groups' independent action in completing the Awase conversion in seven years, attributing their expedience to a lack of government involvement: "us landowners did this by ourselves," he said. "When our land was handed back to us, we moved as quickly as possible. We didn't go to the village office asking for favors. We prepared by putting together our own group" (Kitanakagusuku Landowners, personal communication, May 21, 2020).

Nearly all the planners I spoke with agreed that base conversion in Okinawa was first and foremost a private matter supported but not led by local governments. In the case of Awase, municipal planners supported the process by assembling the first draft of a zoning plan for the golf course's redevelopment area, while the landowner group produced all five of the subsequent revised site-plans independently (Kitanakagusuku Village Planners, August 11, 2020). Although the Kitanakagusuku Village planners I interviewed did not expand at length upon their minimal role in the actual redevelopment process, I gained a more complicated perspective from Shimabukuro, a redevelopment planner in Chatan Town, which is also occupied by Camp Zukeran and preparing for returns contained in 2013's Consolidation Plan:

We can't just leave this entirely up to them [landowners]. We're in a position of expertise concerning fields like law and land adjustment. It would be ideal if we could work through these things together, but there are also landowners who just don't want to do anything at all. I really think that that stance, that way of thinking makes it hard. They're attending to their responsibilities, sure, but on our side we have to balance not wanting to leave it entirely up to them against not playing too heavy of a role. That's what's been so difficult with Zukeran (Shimabukuro, personal interview, 2020).

Shimabukuro's concern for striking the right balance in Chatan Town's support for the redevelopment process reminded me of something I'd heard in an interview with redevelopment planners at Ginowan City. There, Agarie had told me that as a seasoned planner, his impression was that it was mostly citizens without military land and local governments who were

interested in using returned military land for community benefits. By contrast, landowners, Agarie said, were mostly concerned for securing the continuation of their rents (Agarie, personal interview, February 6, 2019).

In light of the relative autonomy with which military landowners manage the redevelopment of returned bases, the OPG and municipal governments petition for greater control over redevelopment outcomes through the acquisition of land in advance of return (*senkō shūtoku*) using funds appropriated from the tax-funded Lump-Sum Subsidy for the Promotion of Okinawa (*Okinawa Shinkō Ikkatsu Kōfukin*). The prefectural planners I interviewed expressed that this type of acquisition involves great tact given the historic origin of military landowners as a political class who collectively represent such a salient aspect of contemporary Okinawan history: the theft and occupation of land. When I asked one such OPG planner, Shinoda, to expand upon his experience of acquiring returning military land from landowners, he said:

This is, well, I think you understand the situation. The US military just came in and took this land with bulldozers. Emotionally and ethically, we can't just say [to landowners] "land please!" Legally speaking, we could take it, but we absolutely don't. (T. Shinoda, personal interview, September 17, 2020)

While Shinoda's statement regarding municipal acquisition is brief, there are two important layers to consider. On one hand, the planner is adamant that acquiring land from landowners must be navigated with a sensitive awareness of history. On the other, he underscores the legal ability of the OPG to requisition land with or without the consent of landowners themselves, underscoring the Japanese national government's ability to control land-matters in Okinawa through the prefectural system.

The notion that military landowners in Okinawa are motivated primarily by the continuation of lease payments is not without company. Land leases consume the largest portion of the Japanese Government's multifaceted "host"-nation support to Okinawa, ballasting

a politics of cooptation common to colonial situations elsewhere. Speaking from the contemporary Canadian context and drawing on Frantz Fanon's experiences in Algeria, Mohawk scholar Taiaiake Alfred contends that the strategic destabilization of Indigenous peoples' capacity for autonomy and cultural vitality is inherent to colonial occupation. The denial of services to rural communities and state-backed raids on Indigenous fishing camps, for instance, spurred urbanization fashioning formerly independent and community based fishers into a large stock of urban cannery workers heavily dependent on the Canadian state (Alfred 2009, p. 75). The vehicle of military land rent functions to much the same effect in the relationship between Japan and Okinawa. Although as a centrally-located urban economy, military receipts in Kitanakagusuku Village account for a lower proportion of public revenue than in northern municipalities,⁴² the conclusion of landowners' lease payments was still described to me by one Urasoe City planner as "the landowners' greatest risk" (Maehara, personal interview, September 19, 2019). This has been the source of occasional derision of landowners in the occidental literature concerning base politics in Okinawa.⁴³ It is especially important to consider the role of compensation and political cooptation at notably high-value facilities like Camp Zukeran, where annual rental payments totaled 8.49 billion JPY in 2018, making it the third-highest compensated military base in Okinawa, following only Kadena Airbase and Kadena Ammunition Storage Area.

The return of military bases occasions the conclusion of rents to landowners, jeopardizing their income in the transition to whichever land-uses followed the military. As a bulwark against possible financial hardships when bases close, the Okinawa Military

⁴² According to the OPG's 2021 Military Statistics Yearbook, only 5.6 percent of Kitanakagusuku Village's public revenues were related to military subsidies in 2020. By way of contrast, in the northern village of Ginoza, that statistic was 33.7 percent (Okinawa Prefectural Government 2021, 49).

⁴³ Cooley and Marten, for instance, cite the tendency for base return plans to trigger drops in military land values, in concluding that "it is understandable why landowners, then, want to see the bases remain open" (2006, 574).

Brownfields Law⁴⁴ had historically provided government-backed rental extensions to landowners over the course of a three year period beginning on the day of the military's release of land (*Special Measures Act*, 1995). However, by the same law's decree environmental remediation plans were to be implemented by the Japanese Ministry of Defense during that same period. As a result, payments to landowners which had been intended to support their transition to post-military land-uses were being distributed while their land was still under remediation and inaccessible to them. To redress this overlap, on April 1, 2012 the Brownfields Law adopted changes advocated for by the landowners' lobby, delaying the three-year rental extension period to now begin on the day that landowners actually regained possession after the remediation period. This legal change allowed the Awase landowners to navigate the construction of the mall and to begin receiving rentals from their new tenant, AEON Mall Japan, prior to the conclusion of their state-backed rental extensions (Kitanakagusuku Landowners, personal communication, May 21, 2020).

Another consequence of rent-stoppage occasioned by base closure is that landowners insist on an expedient transition to post-military, revenue-generating land-uses. This can have both procedural and built-environment outcomes. To Awase landowners it appeared like too much government involvement, and relative disorganization among landowners had drawn out the redevelopment of the former Makiminato Housing area into Naha's Shintoshin. "It took Naha 27 years" Gushi told me, "it took too much time to reach consensus among the landowners." Similarly, "American Village" in Chatan Town, developed atop the US military's released Hamby Airfield, took ten years to complete (Namba 2016, p.384). By limiting the scope of wider public involvement, and beginning the land readjustment process with what landowners called a "rocket start" a year before the military released the land, the Awase landowners managed an

⁴⁴ The law's full name is the Special Measures Act Concerning Promotion of Effective and Appropriate Utilization of Sites Formerly Used by Military Forces in Okinawa Prefecture (*Okinawa ken ni okeru chūryū gunyouchi atochi no yūkōkatsu tekisetsuna riyō no suishin ni kansuru tokubetsu sochi-hō*)

unprecedentedly fast redevelopment from return in July, 2010 to the opening of the shopping mall in April, 2014 (Kitanakagusuku Awase Area Planning Association, 2018).

Militarized Land Readjustment

With the return of the golf club the Awase landowners, few of whom have memories of the pre-war era, were faced with the goal of marketing their land to new commercial proponents in order to continue the stream of rental payments their families had grown used to over the course of nearly eighty years of occupation. In order to prepare their land for investment, the owners group retained independent consultants specialized in a process of “land readjustment” (*kukaku seiri*) common in Japan. In land readjustment, a group of owners of what is usually agricultural land amalgamates their holdings, and replots the entire area according to “regularized” (i.e., orthogonal) parcels in order to make the legal property landscape more legible to commercial developers, while donating mutually agreed upon amounts of land for the development of public infrastructure like roads and drainage networks (Sorensen 2000, p.219). Rapid post-war urbanization in both Germany and Japan drove the popularization of land readjustment as a means of transitioning urban fringes away from agrarian land-use typologies. It is commonly understood by participants in land readjustment that any losses of land incurred in the process of parcel regularization will be compensated for through real-estate appreciation and commercial development in the post-adjustment period (Yanase, 2013). Despite the central and southern regions of Okinawa Island having urbanized steadily since WWII, military enclosure has restricted the ability of occupied land to urbanize, retaining the agricultural property arrangement of the pre-war period. This made land readjustment an especially useful tool for the Awase landowners, whose specific navigation of the process is detailed in the following section.

There are a number of factors that make land readjustment a potentially effective tool in

the base conversion process. First, there is a scarcity of land in central Okinawa Island available for infrastructure development, which is caused primarily by the presence of sprawling military base landscape. Without the acquisition of new public land from willing landowners, possibilities for making widespread benefits of returned bases is limited. Second, being held over from the small-farm dominated pre-war period, the property landscape of returned bases is usually not amenable to the occupancy of single large area tenants like shopping malls who have the capital to satisfy landowners' desires for continued compensation without at least some re-organization. As one Kitanakagusuku landowner said:

See before the war this area was fields and rice paddies. You could use a hundred tsubo just like that. But if you tried to do that now, you couldn't. You can't build a house just like that. You have to have roads, you have to have drainage. So, that's why we broke up this area. We sold the land that we broke up and put it to good use. (Kitanakagusuku Landowners, personal communication, May 21, 2020)


Finally, the land readjustment process creates the possibility of landowners splitting their land holdings between portions they'd like to sell, and those they want to keep. This is particularly relevant to young beneficiaries of military land who may have less substantive connection with their inherited lands than their parents or grandparents, yet who are not willing to part with it entirely. As Chatan Town planner, Shimabukuro, remarked of landowners in his district: "for the sell/rent/use split, it's about 20% 20% 20%, and a lot of people just don't know" (Shimabukuro, personal interview, 2020).

Preparing Fields for Malls ("live, rent, sell")

Due to the exclusivity of military jurisdiction over eight decades, the legal boundaries of the Awase landowners' properties had retained the winding form amenable to the small farming lots that their parents and grandparents had fought for (Figures 15.1 & 15.2). The spatial

Figure 15

Awase Meadows Golf Course Land Readjustment, Kitanakagusuku Village. (1) March, 1945 villages/farms prior to requisition by US Forces; (2) Post-requisition locations of military land leases; (3) Land allocations redistributed through land adjustment process; (4) AEON Mall Okinawa RYCOM (center), Central Tokushukai Hospital (top), Kitanakagusuku Villagers' Gymnasium (right)



Note: Images courtesy of the Kitanakagusuku Awase Area Planning Association report: Concerning the Land Readjustment Efforts for the Awase Lands (2018)

organization of the villages had reflected the contours of daily life. Three *uganju* (places of worship) existed in Aza Higa: *kaniman utaki*, *hija nu tūn* and *nichi gami*, prior to being relocated to make way for the golf course's parking lot (Namba 2016, p.391). A main road had bisected the district, connecting south to Ginowan City's Nanmachi Street (now similarly enclosed by military fences) which had been used in both royal processions of the Ryūkyū court and everyday conveyance. Faced with the forthcoming return, today's Awase landowners used land readjustment to reformat the boundaries of this pre-war landscape into an orthogonal typology to prepare it for private investors and the development of public amenities (Figure 15.3).

When I had met I met with the group of Kitanakagusuku landowners who led the redevelopment of the mall, Gushi had explained his group's experience of land readjustment concisely:

We got all the landowners together and asked "do you agree? do you disagree?" For the people who wanted to continue to rent, we'd say "okay but you'll have to transfer a little land," For the people who still wanted to develop their own building, we'd say "we're transferring you over here." We took every landowners' wishes in that way, and through that sort of 'adjustment,' we ended up with this [plan]. (Kitanakagusuku Landowners, personal interview, May 21, 2020)

What Gushi was describing to me was the production of a zoning plan consisting of specialized tenure zones of "sell" and "rent" through the process of land adjustment, and subsequent allocation of each landowners' holdings into each zone. Many of the Awase landowners wished to continue generating rent with some of their land and to sell off the remainder, while a minority hoped to live upon and directly use it. Thus, it had been determined from before the return that the largest section of the project area was going to be a commercial zone in the center of the site (the future location of the mall), with one smaller zone being reserved for lands to be sold off and another reserved for communal use. For the Awase landowners, this meant that tenancy and dislocation would still be the logic ruling the largest portion of the site, only rather than the

military economy it would be large Japanese commercial economies managing their land as tenants. A given landowners' individual holdings would then be divided among the zones in accordance with their family's wishes. The redefinition of the property landscape according to orthogonal plots allowed land use zones and individual parcels to be divided linearly and for landowners to fairly navigate trades among one another.

The widespread popularity of Okinawan military landowners' in splitting their interests between selling and holding on to land is partially due to the passing of landowner generations over the course of the occupation period. Vividly illustrating this was Okuma*, an owner of land at the Naha Military Port, descendant of fishers from the area and Henoko sit-in member, who commented upon the Henoko bus one Wednesday that for young beneficiaries of military land leases, attachment with those lands wanes with time (Okuma, personal communication, October 14, 2020). Okuma made a distinction between who he called "hometown landowners" (*furusato jinushi*) on one hand, and younger landowners inheriting land on the other. Though the population of military landowners is radically increasing with time, Okuma's impression was that those who bore a substantive connection with land is declining, rendering the military land problem for those beneficiaries as one squarely about "compensation" (*hoshō mondai*). So, when land returns, the desire to sell off portions of land that had been entirely rented while under occupation, is at least partially resultant from long-term dislocation.

The popularity of dividing returned base land into "buy" and "lease" sections increases in step with the growth of the military landowner population. According to the planners I talked with, the rapid increase in the population of military landowners is attributable to landowners sub-dividing their lands to pass them on to multiple family beneficiaries or sold off to investors. Again, Ginowan City planner, Agarie, explained this to me as follows:

As for the growth [in landowner population], for example if you've inherited big land, when you go to sell that land it'll be difficult. So, you'll subdivide it and then sell. For example, if you had a thousand square-meters, you could split it up into 200 square-

meter sections, sell it off, and one landowner becomes five. (Agarie, personal interview, February 6, 2019)

Whether disposed of through investment or through intergenerational bequeathing, substantive attachments and memories of land are degraded in transfer. Consequently, pre-war physical touchstones such as *uganju* or historically significant roadways threaten to become less meaningful as landscaping agents as military occupation extends.

With the boundaries of their land adjusted, the Awase landowners pursued various proponents to occupy the centermost commercial zone. Under 98% agreement, a request was put forward by the landowners group in September, 2002 to the recently opened Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology to occupy the site, but was ultimately abandoned when university leadership chose Onna Village as the home of the new graduate university instead (Okinawa Federation of Military Landowners 2019, p.12). Disappointed, the group entertained bids from thirty companies throughout 2004, before selecting the prominent mainland-based shopping mall developer, AEON Mall Japan, as their next tenant. Negotiations between the landowners and AEON yielded a rental price slightly higher than that which had been paid by the Japanese government during the military period. Based on 2020 rent levels, landowners at Camp Zukeran were receiving 485.27 JPY (\$3.67 USD) per-tsubo for their land, whereas AEON offered 555 JPY (\$4.20 USD) per-tsubo (Okinawa Military Landowners Federation 2018, 17).⁴⁵

Consensus-based decision-making

In navigating the process of land-adjustment, military landowners utilize an ethos of consensus-based decision making. Matayoshi, an Urasoe City planner working on base returns

⁴⁵ I computed the Japanese Government's per-tsubo rent level from annual rental data contained in the OPG's military statistics yearbook (2021). I drew AEON Mall Japan's rent to the Awase landowners from their presentation to the Okinawa Military Landowners Federation in 2018, in which they disclose the offer of 555 JPY per-tsubo from the company.

in his own city, explained this in the particular historical context of Okinawa:

You know, in Okinawa, in Japan, the way of thinking is that more than the individual, the decision-making power of the village is more important. This is collective decision making. This is the way of Japan, but even more so in Okinawa. A long time ago, the Aza used to assemble and make decisions together. Without any doubt of the collective, people would side with the decision of the group. (Matayoshi personal interview, September 19, 2019)

Matayoshi located the decision-making ethos of the land adjustment process within the long history of aza-based decision-making. In doing so, the planner drew historical connections between the practice of base conversion and a tradition of collective resource management that extends back beyond the Meiji government's installation of private property in Okinawa.⁴⁶

While this process of “consensus building” (*gōi keisei*) was described by many planners as the most difficult step in the process of militarized land readjustment, it is aided by certain factors. The first of these is the historic place-based organization of landowners themselves. The landowner group that redeveloped the Awase facility were joined together in what Namba (2016) calls an “association-type” hometown organization (*asoshiēshon-gata kyōyūkai*), in this case mostly rooted in the Aza Higa villages which were supplanted by the golf course. Association-type hometown organizations are distinguished by their membership being genealogically exclusive to descendants of a village's original members, and by their collective management of shared land and resources. Because in their land requisitions, the US military did not discriminate between areas that were privately owned by villagers and those like *uganju*, where sacred rites were held and that were managed collectively, individualized military land-rents for such places are to this day pooled and managed by designated Aza representatives (Namba, 2016, p. 391; Okuma Interview, August 8, 2021). When bases return, this continued

⁴⁶ For a concise summary of collective land management in the Ryūkyū Kingdom period, see Nakachi (1993) in Japanese, and Matsumura (2015) in English.

exercise of shared property management facilitates collective decision making, and provides for local interests beyond individualistic rent-generation. In the Awase redevelopment, this was illustrated by landowners' contributions of land for the development of the new Kitanakagusuku Villager's Gymnasium.

The second related factor which aids in landowners' consensus-building process is the staging of returns in multiple sections as opposed to at once in their entirety. Like seven out of the eleven SACO returns, Awase Meadows Golf Course constituted a return of one part of a base, specifically only about eight-percent of Camp Zukeran's total footprint rather than the entire facility. Nakandakari, a Yomitan Village planner who was knowledgeable about the redevelopment of the Yomitan Airfield, explained the relationship between partial returns and deliberative process to me:

The [Yomitan] airfield was returned in pieces. If it was returned in one piece, it would be hard because we wouldn't have enough money to develop it. For the landowners, local villagers and village officers there would be too many people involved in the process. It would be hard to build consensus. So, this part was returned first, and we could focus in a short period on this part and invest the money in it for development. Then, the next part and the next, just like that. (Nakandakari, personal interview, June 23, 2020)

Here we can see how like the Yomitan Airfield, the return of Awase Golf Course as one-section of Zukeran, spatially co-extensive with Aza Higa limited the individuals involved in the conversion to an already associated group of land-owning village kin, facilitating the development of consensus among them.

In addition to minimizing the scope of public engagement in the redevelopment process, piecemeal returns directly oppose the calls of the peace movement for complete base return. Former University of the Ryukyus political scientist, Masaaki Gabe, explained to me that issuing piecemeal returns allows the US and Japanese Governments to promote a discourse of return while circumventing the actual return of whole bases:

This process happens on the government to government level, they don't care about any local system because they're under pressure to return some land for political reasons. So, they need a number. A square meter. That's the point. So, where? They'll calculate the square-meters of land, and that's good enough. [They say] 'we'll return a bunch of land,' even though it's [just] the tip of it. A bunch of tips. (Gabe, personal interview, February 25, 2020)

In the course of my fieldwork, I heard many activists and academics echo Gabe's reflection on the political motives behind the Japan and the US's tendency towards partial return. The piecemeal approach obviates a politics of distraction underpinning SACO return commitments, like meal crumbs brushed off the table's edge.

Developing consensus was a belabored process in spite of Awase Meadows having spatially coincided with pre-associated village communities. At its base, the process of land readjustment involves an abstraction of the historic landscape in the interest of market preparation. If the entirety of an Awase landowner's family lands were in the zone of the forthcoming shopping center yet they wanted to sell off or otherwise use a portion of it, they were asked to choose substitute lands elsewhere in the site. However, dedicated land-uses like the rights-of-way through the site formerly purchased by Kitanakagusuku Village and the prefecture, limited the availability of viable relocation areas. To work through these complications, the Awase group held six expert-led study groups and three "return and redevelopment" discussion meetings before the military's release of the land, and several other land adjustment and working-group meetings prior to their actual repossession (Kitanakagusuku Awase Area Planning Association, 2018). In a 2018 retrospective presentation on the shopping mall development, a Kitanakagusuku landowners representative recalled that "the most difficult part of advancing the project was dealing with people who wouldn't get back to us" (Okinawa Military Landowners Federation 2018, p.18). So, in order to expedite the process, the leaders of the redevelopment group established a policy assigning preferences for relocation sites based

on the extent of a given landowner's involvement in the process to incentivize participation.

Repairing Unnatural Ecologies

The period between land being released by the military (at which point jurisdiction is taken up by the OPG) and landowners themselves regaining jurisdiction over land is especially consequential. It is during this period that the Japanese Department of Defense carries out remediation work through its Okinawa Defense Bureau. As explained in Chapter Three, Okinawans' earliest experiences with the US military returning land were characterized by hardships borne of having to remediate lands themselves with no assistance from either Japanese or US military government. The Military Brownfields law established the DoD's responsibility to restore land back to its original condition prior to landowners resuming jurisdiction over it. Now, according to the normative process, when bases close landowners continue collecting rent while they wait for land to come back to them clean.

As happens at all US bases in Japan that close, when Awase Meadows was vacated, US forces offloaded its responsibilities for site remediation to the Japanese government and simply walked away. This partially explains Chalmer's Johnson's declaration that "the richest prize in the US empire is still Japan" (2000, 59). Aside from Japan providing all land used by the US military free of charge, the tremendous deal qualifying Johnson's statement allows the US to waive all responsibility associated with remediation. SOFA Article Four states unequivocally that upon returning land, the US is not required to restore returned base land to its original condition (*Status of Forces Agreement*, 1960). Since the post-war period, this has been a major sticking point in Okinawa, where the military's polluting activities have ranged from haphazard burials of chemical weapons like agent orange, to more acute misdeeds like abandoning undetonated weapons leading to numerous gruesome deaths of Ie Island villagers following the war. In 2017, the continuation of this culture of avoidance led Governor Onaga Takeshi's administration to

formally request extensive revisions to the US-Japan SOFA, calling for land-use information disclosure and pre-return access rights for purposes of environmental survey (2017, p.4).⁴⁷

Despite having been a golf-course, which among military land-uses is an environmentally low-impact use relative to alternatives like ammunition storage, the Awase site was found to be heavily polluted. In their survey of the golf course, the ODB discovered nearly 9000 rounds of munitions and an undetonated World War II land mine (Allen & Sumida, 2010). The Okinawa Prefectural Assembly aptly understood these findings in the broader context of munitions cleanup still ongoing from the Battle of Okinawa, which between 2008 and 2010 had involved the locating and extraction of 7.9 tons of munitions, costing 1.3 billion JPY (\$9.7 million USD) (Matayoshi, 2010). In addition to munitions, the Okinawa Times reported that when returned, the former golf course had been found overgrown with fallen trees and similar obstacles (Okinawa Times, 2012). Gushi expressed his Awase group's frustration, remarking in that article that if any more obstacles were discovered in the site that the redevelopment process would become even further drawn out.

Once the soil of the former golf course had been cleaned, the Awase landowners successfully completed the mixed use development, with high-end condominiums and the a new Kitanakagusuku Villagers' Gymnasium flanking the mall. This appears to conflict with existing research suggesting that contaminated military sites like ammunition storage facilities and runways are half as likely to result in community use than relatively less contaminated counterparts like housing areas (Ashley and Touchton 2016, p.409). Instead, toxic military sites tend to engender isolated land-uses like industrial plants. This may bode well for the future of

⁴⁷ Specifically, that request proposed the following changes regarding return measures: 1) that environmental surveys and cost-sharing be discussed by both governments in advance of return; 2) that the US military share land-use and pollution histories with local governments; 3) that local governments be made aware of all pollution incidents, and be granted access for purposes of monitoring; and 4) that the preceding right to conduct in-base surveys be ensured whenever a cultural artifact is discovered during excavation.

publicly accessible commercial opportunity in Okinawa, but given Japan and the US's tendency towards poor remediation efforts, it is more likely to be quietly causing insidious toxification of human environments.

Awase's rapid conversion to widespread use raises a host of issues, one of which is the question of how clean the returned land really is. The ODB has faced widespread criticism concerning the quality of its environmental assessment of post-military landscapes. Between 2013 and 2015, they were criticized by multiple experts for minimizing the extent of soil toxicity when over a hundred dioxin-contaminated barrels were excavated under a former military site that had become a public soccer field in Okinawa City (Kawamura, 2015). More recently, grassroots research has revealed the returned portion of the Northern Training Area to remain heavily contaminated despite a Japan Ministry of Environment nomination document for the area's designation as a UNESCO World Heritage Site, declaring it to be "free from soil contamination and water pollution" (Yoshikawa & Kawamura, 2019). Both of these cases suggest that between the US's complete abrogation, and the Japanese government's haphazard management of environmental restoration procedures, post-military landscapes like Rycom Mall likely remain highly toxic despite their transition to new, publicly accessible land uses.

Lastly, while the Brownfields Law's assignment of remediation responsibilities to Japanese authorities relieves landowners of their historic responsibility for restoring stolen land themselves, it downloads the costs of cleanup to the Japanese taxpayer, Okinawan and non-Okinawan alike. This has been the source of consternation among Okinawans who shoulder a higher effective tax burden per capita than the Japanese average, and thus pay more for restoring their own land which has been held under lock and key for nearly eighty years. Here, thinking through land relations via a yet unrealized juridical model of Indigenous right may be instructive. The downloading of remediation costs through taxation to Okinawans forces them to shell out for the return of land that was unceded, both at the point of Japanese territorial

annexation and the US military's occupation. Indigenous scholars have observed in other contexts this type of market-based repossession, which requires that Indigenous peoples buy their own traditional lands back from colonial jurisdiction (Tomiak, 2017). On one hand, this establishes a structural problem of payment within the nature of the established remediation process when bases close. This also incites a more nuanced problem whereby land-owning and non-land-owning Okinawans pay equally in the remediation of land, while the management and redevelopment benefits of redevelopment projects mostly accrue to the property owner.

Conclusions

Using the process of land-readjustment, Awase landowners exercised a flexible repossession of the Awase Golf Club, blending commercialized leasing with communitarian land-uses like the Kitanakagusuku Villagers' Gymnasium. This ensured both the continuation of rent-generation alongside wider reaching community benefits. In terms of built-environment effects, the 2010 return uncovered a prewar legal landscape, whose contours and boundaries had remained molded to the cultivation practices, residential patterns and spiritual landmarks of daily life. The re-organization of this landscape, rendering it legible to investment by companies like Aeon Japan, could be viewed as the completion of a process of commercial reorganization where land becomes virtually tantamount to its exchange value. At the same, in her engagement of the question, *what is land?*, Tania Murray Li (2014, 6000) urges that we consider the "non-essential quality of resource assemblage" when Indigenous peoples arrange blends of life- and capital-generating resources upon their custodial lands. This non-essentialist interpretation allows us to understand the blending of commercial development with landowners' retention of title and shared community amenities at military base redevelopments like Awase Meadows.

Considering the extent of criticism that owners of military land in Okinawa have received characterizing them as co-conspirators in the perpetuation of the dense US Military presence in Okinawa, there is regrettably little research showing an interest in their perspectives. Landowners in the postwar era who struggled to remain in control of their land base deployed diverse yet notably ontological arguments to remain emplaced. Land had “not only the value of property but history and spirits of ancestors” and attachment not to land per se, but to one’s specific land was paramount (M. Price, 1956, p.15). Conversations with the landowners involved in the Awase redevelopment obviate a land relation that is mostly rooted in memories of removal. Their political and social identities are heavily influenced by memories of the Battle of Okinawa, the loss of land that occurred under USCAR occupation, and the discrimination that has continued to marginalize Okinawa in the post-reversion era. Yet, the consonant longing for land (“it would be wonderful if you could still live over there. It’s still great land”), stands in great contrast with a sense that as *places*, the memorialized lands of their forebearers no longer exist (“our birthplaces are no more”). Too often commentators have foregone critical recognition of this liminality in favor of a presumption that to hold a military land contract implies willful consent, without duly considering the politics of cooptation and forced dependency that undergird landowners’ choices to hold contracts or to refuse them.

The disposition of loss is highly consequential for built environment outcomes when military bases close and land is returned. Whether former bases become fields for the resumption of farming activities, art galleries dedicated to antimilitarism, or large American style shopping malls may turn on the durability of landowners’ attachment to place. It could be, as I heard Okuma remark on the bus to Henoko, that in contrast to “hometown landowners” who bear direct memories of place, that beneficiaries of military land will with every passing generation be more receptive to disposing of land to the highest bidder. This model of large-scale commercial redevelopment may indeed be the display of economic development needed to change the tide of public opinion among those yet unconvinced of Okinawa’s ability to

function beyond military-generated revenues. However, if Okuma's admonition that distance and time erode substantive relations with land, then the historical emplacement upon specific lands and specific seas, which distinguishes Okinawans both politically and ontologically will itself slip further away with every section of base land returned by the military.

The literature concerning the redevelopment of military bases has been unfortunately naïve to the relationship between the often violent formation of military bases and the dynamics of redevelopment processes and outcomes when they are returned. The case of base redevelopment presented in this chapter demonstrates that the return of military land to Okinawans occasions more than the mere reform of toxic brownfield sites. When bases close, subjugated landscapes re-emerge risking permanent loss, and dispossessed people and their families become engaged in decisions of ontological consequence under extreme economic constraints.

The utilization of land readjustment as the Awase landowners' planning strategy of choice lent itself well to a unique situation where the will of the landowners themselves was to reorganize the property landscape, and the decision between "holding on" or "letting go" could not be considered a discrete choice. There are nonetheless, serious problems which go unaddressed by this system, pointing to the need for further study. First, the transition from military to commercial tenancy forces landowners to expedite the conversion process, which in this case led to the institutionalization of punitive policies to incentivize participation from landowners who had been reluctant to engage. Furthermore, while the limitation of stakeholders in the redevelopment process to those who held private ownership title facilitated the development of consensus, it precluded participation from non-propertied stakeholders. Here it bears noting that while the US military did install private property upon Okinawan land which they found unilaterally held in common, they powerfully reinforced pre-existing propertied aspects of land management in Okinawa through the rentier system that emerged from the post-war land struggle. As a consequence of property relations being consolidated through the

military land rent system, the disempowerment of Okinawans without property in land is intensified through cases like the Awase redevelopment where participation is highly circumscribed by considerations of ownership.

Chapter Five: Resistance to Realignment



*Two sit-in members cross the street after being forced off the line at the “Front of the Gate.”
Henoko Village, Nago City. Photo © Iwama*

Prologue

At 11:20 a.m., Takazato Suzuyo notifies the group under the tarps of the sit-in in Henoko Village, that the second round of dump-trucks is about to arrive from the Awa Quarries with sediment for the new base. Members of the sit-in prepare themselves. Towels, long brimmed caps, sun glasses and masks emerge from backpacks. Today, Uchima* is lining the inside of her bucket hat with a large shell-ginger (*sennin*) leaf, a trick she promises will help keep our heads cool. Taking note, Yoshimura* helps Takeshi* fit one under his own cap, which hangs out the back to help shield his neck from the sun. They walk together to the Front of the Gate (*gēto mae*).

When the sit-in members reach the gates of US Marines Camp Schwab, whose sea-based expansion they are here to contest, they take their places, sitting in small red Coleman

camping chairs in front of an otherwise unremarkable entrance to the base. A group of private security guards awaits standing double-file with arms held behind their backs and chests out. They wear pressed blue polyester uniforms, neon green reflector vests and helmets with ear pieces. Their skin is deep brown, tanned from their constant surveillance of every gate to Camp Schwab, and each entrance to the Nago City shipping ports of Ryukyu Cement Company who produces the new base's in-fill material.

Mrs. Nakano*, who was a teacher before retiring, moves forward and faces the sit-in members, most of whom are in their sixties and seventies, to direct a choreographed routine of radio calisthenics. Usually reserved for grade school sports-days and the morning regimens of office workers, the display seems an odd fit for a standoff with the military. But, the hot sun and day-long proceedings are physically draining and require a sort of athleticism. Mrs. Nakano instructs the crowd on how to perform the stretching routine without having to leave one's seat or set down one's placard. With signs in hand, the track-suited limbs and torsos of elders, pivot right then left then up and down, then repeat.

In the meantime, thirty-five Ryukyu Cement dump trucks led by police escort arrive from their cross-island journey from the Awa mountain quarries on the westcoast. A loud monosyllabic shout comes from behind the gate and a contingent of thirty prefectural police spills out from within the base. The sit-in members, today at least one of whom is in their eighties and survived the Battle of Okinawa, are flanked by the large bodies of young men in polished combat boots once again. There are at least another dozen officers observing the scene from a popup tent just inside the gate. On the periphery of this spectacle, one of the sit-in elders, among the few from Nago City, is putting a hand-trowel to a patch of overgrown weeds growing out from under the fence of the base.

Once the dump trucks have assembled, each sit-in member is approached by officers, and given the option to leave the gate's entrance willfully or to be removed by force. Some pretend not to hear once, and then again, and finally rise and leave their post at a snail's pace,

feigning (embellishing, perhaps) a bad back or a limp leg. Others refuse to be moved altogether, and are lifted up by their four limbs and carried out of place. As members are forced out of position, they assemble to the sides of the gate and across the street. Two elderly women, dressed in floral-print caps and wraps, cross while holding each other in one another's arms.

The sprechchor follows: "opposed to the new base!" (*shin kichi hantai*); "give us back Okinawa!" (*Okinawa wo kaese*); and others. Song ensues: a Japanese-English duet of Martin Luther King Jr.'s *We Shall Overcome*, and Hiroji Yamashiro's remix of the 1968 Paris riots anthem, *Now is the Time to Stand* (*imakoso tachi agarō*).⁴⁸ With the base's entrance exposed, the trucks file in with their sediment and machinery to carry out this round of dumping. "Go home trucks!" (*danpu kere*), "take your soil home!" (*dosha motte kere*). The trucks will make two more trips across Okinawa Island today, both of which will be met by the same practiced resistance. As sit-in members slowly make their way back to the tent to rest, sing, and share lunch before the next round, three young marines with freshly buzzed tops share a cigarette and take in the spectacle from a hillside, behind a barb-wired fence.

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I illuminated how one formal landowner association managed a base redevelopment process pursuant to the return commitments which emanated out of the 1996 uprisings. I now turn to a critical conjuncture, in the type of new militarization upon which many SACO land return commitments are contingent. I examine the sit-in against the construction of the new base off the coast of Henoko Village in the northern Yanbaru region of Okinawa Island. The base's completion has been made a necessary condition for the return of MCAS Futenma, a highly toxic and "accident"-ridden Marine Corps facility located in the middle of the dense urban centre of Ginowan City (Figure 16). While global attention has often been


⁴⁸ The original title of the song is *Ah! Le Joli Mois De Mai a Paris*

singularly concerned with the prefecture-wide mobilization against the new base at Henoko, the relocation of military facilities and functions within the prefecture is unexceptional in Okinawa. Examples now abound where rather than base closure heralding real reductions in military impacts, it is instead as Woodward (2014, p.46) argues, the “endurance of military power as a landscaping agent” that is becoming the new concern. So, this chapter is my attempt to draw research concerning the politics of emerging military enclosures into that which looks at base closure per se and the reclamation of land by Indigenous peoples. Importantly, I view the territory of base realignment through a relational lens. I refuse an analytical frame solely dependent on the forms of political and physical forces which expand the state’s two-dimensional terrain, and instead consider the territory effect of state power continuously interacting with and being limited by Indigenous protest.

The chapter revolves around the question: *What is the effect of Okinawans refusing the conditions of land return on related processes of territorialization?* As pointed to in Chapter One, I had been admonished by an elder under the tents of the Henoko sit-in, that focusing on base redevelopment was important, but that without “focus on the real problems here” the dissertation was destined to remain incomplete. I understood the “real problems” as it were to mean the problem of new military development happening under the auspices of the SACO Final Report, and the violence inflicted upon those seeking to obstruct the flow of base construction materials into the site or to reveal the dynamics of compulsion which lubricate the force of militarist dispossession. As my fieldwork progressed, this dynamic unfurled continuously, with moments where the real costs and machinations of military expansion were exposed, appearing in regional and occasionally national media, then receding back into relative opacity thereafter. There was the Okinawan butterfly researcher, Akino Miyagi, who had her Higashi Village

Figure 16

US Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma - Henoko Relocation



home raided and electronic devices confiscated by Okinawa Prefectural Police for her efforts at exposing rampant pollution in the portion of the Northern Training Area that was returned in 2016 (A. Miyagi et al., 2019; Endo, 2021). And there was the Law for the Regulated Investigation of Significant Lands, which was passed by the National Diet on June 18th, 2021, increasing the State's investigation powers on private properties and land owners within one-kilometer of military construction sites, drawing criticism from the Peace Movement and progressives throughout Japan (Ara, 2021; Japan Times, 2021). There was Irei Yuki, whose 2021 Urasoe City mayoral campaign, which vocally leaned on her refusal of a relocation facility for the Naha Military Port, failed to overcome then Prime Minister Yoshihide's Suga heavily resourced backing of the pro-base incumbent Tetsuji Matsumoto. These episodes of suppression occurred continuously as I participated at Henoko, further obviating the need to widen my frame of research to understand the reality of base closure in Okinawa, which is to say the new forms of militarization it relies upon.

In its focus on the relational production of territory and on the limitations that people's movements place upon state expansion, the chapter builds on what Bridget Martin calls a "critical territories approach" (Martin, 2022). Whereas prevalent research observing the US military's global empire of bases focuses heavily on the interstate system, a critical territories approach, argues Martin:

views American imperial sovereignty as dialectically inflected, refracted, co-constituted, and limited in myriad ways by other forms of power in particular conjunctures, especially through encounters with local and Indigenous peoples and in ways made most apparent through spatial projects. (Martin, 2022, p. 4)

That is, there is nothing about the political territorialization of space which necessitates that the expansion of be the primary geographic unit of interest. The miscarriages of democracy and spectacular violence required to carry out construction of the new base at Henoko have perhaps illustrated US militarist dispossession and the growing military power of the Japanese state

most vividly. Beyond the daily head-on skirmishes, police officers dispatched from Japan to riot-squads in Okinawa have been caught on record shouting anti-Indigenous epithets at Okinawans (e.g., *dōjin*, a pejorative connotation of “Aboriginal”), while securing the peripheries of contested military spaces (Kyodo, 2016). However, often unacknowledged are the ways in which the slow and persistent resistance of the sit-in itself, tempers and re-articulates the encroaching spatial project of the two governments. Thus, in this chapter, I advance a critical territories project by observing a territory effect which, as Brighenti (Brighenti, 2006, p. 75; emphasis added) contends, can only be understood in terms of a concurrent “plurality of [spatial] strategies,” interacting with one another. My emphasis on the notion of territory-as-effect echoes and reaffirms the notion that territory is itself not an organic object. Elsewhere, Brighenti offers the following example, which is especially poignant to this dissertation: “it does not make much sense to affirm that ‘the state extends its power over a territory’ because that ‘territory’ is precisely the *effect* of a specific social relation which includes power relations” (Brighenti, 2010, p. 57). It is in this sense that I examine the territory effect being produced at the Front of the Gate.

The chapter begins with a critical historical overview of the re-emergence of the plan for the new base at Henoko as a condition for the closure of MCAS Futenma. Under the auspices of “realignment” this commitment to base relocation within Okinawa has enabled the US military to claim that it is responding to calls from Okinawans to reduce their base-related burden, while paradoxically strengthening their military partnership and “lethality” in the region. I then describe the two governments’ Application for Design Change (ADC), which continues to threaten the security of the yet unreturned remains of war-dead by proposing to source new reclamation soils from the southern region of Okinawa Island to fill a soft-seabed. The remainder of the chapter observes how, mostly through women’s leadership of the sit-in on Wednesdays, the reconstruction of aspects of Okinawan culture historically suppressed and systematically assimilated into Japanese national norms, is animating the space of the Henoko sit-in. Recent

work by Davis (2021) has suggested that beyond merely blocking the movement of military resources, the Henoko sit-in members seek to block “broader circulations of imperial (state) power and capital accumulation.” My analysis adds to this argument by suggesting some ways in which decolonizing language work is a spatial and place-based characteristic of the sit-in whose principle objective remains the collapse of the base project and an Okinawan landscape amenable to genuine security, rather than preparations for war. In the final section of the chapter, I examine some of the tradeoffs that come part-and-parcel with a broad base of participation in the Henoko movement, in particular the potential of abundant non-Okinawan participation to obfuscate decolonial possibilities of the movement.

Burden reduction or “bait”?

Following the uprising of 1996 in response to the effusive military-related sexual violence of 1995 it was Ambassador to Japan and former US Vice President, Walter Mondale, who proclaimed the significance of the SACO Final Report which was released in December 1996. Mondale declared that the previous year’s rape had been a wakeup call to take “long overdue steps to respond to Okinawan concerns” (Mondale, 1996). The SACO clearly stated that its return commitments would “reduce the impact of the activities of US forces on communities in Okinawa” (US DoD and Japan MoFA 1996, p.1). However, the two governments went on to explain that “at the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of US forces in Japan.” Thus, the Final Report was an early harbinger of the two governments’ paradoxical assertion of their ability to mitigate Okinawans’ base-related insecurities while concurrently strengthening their Asia-Pacific defense posture. Indeed, the plan’s dedicated appendix detailing the return of MCAS Futenma, which has been the origin of an endless stream of base-related spillover effects given it’s urban and population dense-location,

consisted in fact mostly of provisions for the relocation of training activities to a “sea-based facility” elsewhere in Okinawa.

A location for the replacement facility was disclosed in 1997, alerting residents of Nago City in which Henoko Village is located, to the possibility of a new base in their vicinity. Stirred by the prospect of the facility, Nago City held a municipal referendum that year. While that plebiscite saw 82.45% of the city’s eligible voters take a 51.64% position against the heliport, the determination was overruled by then Nago Mayor, Tetsuya Higa followed closely by his resignation: “At the same time as I accept this heliport,” Higa declared, “I humbly end my political career” (Okinawa Times, 2019). Nevertheless, under the governorship of the staunchly anti-base Masahide Ota, the relocation plan did not reach agreement at local, prefectural, and national government scales until Ota was ousted in 1998 by conservative challenger Keīchi Inamine (McCormack & Norimatsu, 2018, p. 98).

With support from all levels of government in hand, the Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau (predecessor to the ODB) designed a site plan for the sea-based facility atop Oura Bay, and moved to begin preliminary survey and construction work in 2004, inciting the current movement against the new base (Kikuno & Norimatsu, 2010). Norimatsu and Kikuno detail that when 400 protestors gathered at the seminal stand-off to obstruct dump trucks from porting construction materials into Camp Schwab, local fishers were deputized with generous buy-outs from the Okinawa Defense Bureau to informally ensure the safe movement of infill sediment and other construction materials over sea instead.⁴⁹ This incited waterborne anti-base resistance, which grew into the construction of sea-based scaffolding towers in Oura Bay whose all-day occupation by protestors was necessary to prevent defense staff from commencing drilling activities (2010, 4).

⁴⁹ For a more detailed account of the role that local Okinawan fishers, deputized by the Okinawa Defense Bureau, play in monitoring military construction zones, see: Kohatsu, 2023, p. 11

These post-millennium efforts at building a base atop Oura Bay, known colloquially as the Galapagos of Asia after its unique biodiversity, exhibit the very limits of militarism's ecological, humanitarian and spiritual threats. Botched coral transplantation schemes, the decimation of a known grazing site for the endangered Okinawan Dugong, in-fill plans detailing the need for tens-of-thousands of piles to be driven into the coral substrate, the implication of infill soils containing the bones of war dead considered by Okinawans to be sacred. The ever growing list of atrocities that the construction of the FRF over top the pristine Henoko coast has thus far necessitated is a scrolling list of unconscionable environmental injustices. Yet, these most recent plans for the militarization of Oura Bay are not the first of their kind. It was revealed by the Okinawan architect and peace activist, Yoshikazu Makishi that in fact the base had been a twinkle in the eye of the US Forces since a 1966 Master Plan of Navy Facilities on Okinawa first envisioned such a facility, spreading popular doubt in the very notion of Henoko as a "replacement" facility (2006, p.3). In 2006, the original plan for the new base found new life in the two governments' *Transformation and Realignment for the Future* plan:

Both sides, bearing in mind the strong request from residents of Okinawa for early return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, as well as the preference that any Futenma replacement facility (FRF) be located outside of Okinawa prefecture, considered options to satisfy these requests while maintaining deterrence capabilities...both sides concluded that the FRF must be located within Okinawa prefecture where rotary wing aircraft currently stationed at Futenma Air Station will be near other elements with which they operate on a regular basis. (Rumsfeld et al., 2005, p. 6)

The L-Shaped facility pushed forward in the Transformation and Realignment report was modified in 2006 with a site-design featuring dual V-shaped runways, and a cost-sharing plan according to which Japanese tax-payers would foot the bill for the new base's construction as well as costs associated with the similarly consequent base build-up in Guåhan (Guam).

Behind the steady rollout of the two governments' Henoko strategy, grassroots resistance against the new base evolved in step. In 2014, when construction officially started, involving mass soil and equipment shipments into the base, the current iteration of the sit-in began. Without the tarps or benches which adorn the Front of the Gate today, sit-in members sat on the pavement at the base's entrance, locking arms to prevent construction vehicles from entering the site, only to be forcefully moved off the front line. Riot police and the private security firm, ALSOK, established grid-iron cages at the edges of the gate to prevent sit-in members from returning to the gate. Removals were forceful, often involving arrests and protestors being hauled off to the Nago City Jail. One day at the Front of the Gate, elderly members swapped stories of being manhandled during these early days, sharing pictures taken on flip-phones of bruised limbs and other injuries incurred at the hands of riot squads dispatched from the mainland.

So long as the US and Japan continue to assure Japanese and Okinawan publics that the local mitigation of military impacts can be achieved at the same time as the US-Japan military partnership is strengthened, then there will always be some portion of society who believe Okinawa is indeed getting safer in spite of new bases being built and old ones not closing. Okinawan historian Moriteru Arasaki (2001) has described the underhanded bait-and-switch of return for realignment as a "treacherous tactic," which allowed the two governments to adopt a more explicit focus on strengthening their military partnership:

While the Okinawa people were demanding reduction in the size of the bases only as a first step toward the total removal of the bases, the two governments, pretending to concede somewhat to the people's demands, substituted their seemingly plausible scheme for the people-demanded base reduction. Thus, what was proposed was consolidation of bases accompanied by some reduction in the acreage of military enclosure. (p. 107)

A 2012 SCC Joint Statement (Clinton et al., 2012) took Arasaki's treacherous tactic one step further by "de-linking" the ongoing military buildup in Guåhan (Guam) from the construction of the new base at Henoko altogether. In the face of Henoko protest tactics sharpening, and new knowledge concerning environmental impediments to the new base's construction, the DoD wasn't going to let these intractable obstacles interrupt their plans for force expansion across the Pacific.

"It's just moving [bases] around, and making more effective functions." Sitting in her Naha City offices, this is how Suzuyo Takazato explained SACO realignment to me (Takazato, personal interview, February 18, 2021). Few are as aware of how the military has impacted Okinawa than Takazato. Born in Japan-occupied Taiwan and returning to US-occupied Okinawa when she was ten-years-old, Takazato's political consciousness began developing on a university exchange to the Philippines. It was there that the former Naha City counsellor and founding member of the feminist peace collective, Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence (OWAAMV), was exposed to global problem of militarism and its uneven impacts on women dealing with the sexual violence of Marines and bases on the ground. Takazato went on:

...yeah, it's a realignment, but, [only to] promote the US-Japan Security Treaty relationship...So, actually this is the real purpose. You know, 'reduce the burden of Okinawan people,' but just to give some....esa, esa [bait]. Just as they say they're doing this for the sake of the Okinawan people, they do the exact opposite thing to us. They're making fools of us.

I seized upon Takazato's framing of the SACO Final Report return commitments as "bait," as a poignant metaphor for understanding the approach taken by the US and Japanese governments to addressing Okinawan calls for peace. Indeed, in the background of "returns" like the commitment to shutter Futenma, the efforts of the Prime Minister's office at enticing leaders of municipalities most affected by the new base at Henoko, to capitulate to new facility proposals

by granting development subsidy “wish-lists” in their ridings, have been well-documented (McCormack, 2016, p. 16). In the next section I give a textured account of the extents to which the two governments have gone in recent years to drive forward the new base at Henoko amidst discourses of return.

“Killing the dead twice”

On April 21st, 2020 the MoD applied to the Okinawa Prefectural Government for approval to a change its construction plan for the new base at Henoko. The “Application for Design Change” (hereafter, ADC) accounted for a new understanding of how deep Oura Bay’s seafloor was, and thus provided for more extensive ocean reclamation efforts than had been permitted in the previous plan. Because prefectures are granted significant legal autonomy in Japan, the MoD was forced to appeal to national law requiring consent from governor Denny Tamaki for the ADC. This ostensible tradition of local autonomy is routinely evacuated of legal integrity in Okinawa when higher courts overturn progressive governors’ anti-base positions. The application for design change was no different. Tamaki’s rejection of the proposal was overturned by LDP Land-Minister, Tetsuo Saito, with a legally-binding order that Tamaki approve the application on April 28th, 2022. This section details the application for design change, in order to lay bare the machinations of State territorialization that the Henoko movement is advocating for an alternative to.

The sit-in at Henoko seeks to obstruct the trucks belonging to Ryukyu Cement Company from carrying soil and construction equipment into Camp Schwab for the fabrication of the new base. In rain or shine, from Monday to Friday protestors sit in Coleman camping chairs at the base’s gate, positioned between the trucks seeking entry, led by police escorts on one side and the US military, Okinawa Prefectural Police, and private security firms on the other. The metric that sit-in members use to assess their effectiveness is the number of trucks entering the base,

counted meticulously by sit-in members, and the level of completed reclamation work. At the time of writing, 73% of the Henoko Village side of the construction plan has been infilled. This has only amounted to 12% of the total required in-filling, leaving over 80% of the job to be completed on the Oura Bay side, where work has yet to begin.

Initial designs for the base had called for the insertion of piled revetments to an estimated seafloor depth of 25 meters. Difficulties followed shortly when in the process early reclamation work it was discovered that the seafloor over the Oura Bay side of the construction site was soft. To borrow from the popular Okinawan YouTuber, Yūzō Takayama, who regularly covers base and cultural politics and who released a spoof music video entitled “*mayo kichi* [mayo base]” in Fall of 2020 just as news of the soft-seabed was breaking, the new base’s seafloor was soft as “mayonnaise” (Takayama & Miyū, 2019). Rather than the 25 meters initially estimated by the MoD, new research revealed a distance of 90 meters between Oura Bay’s sea-level to the bottom of the “mayo”-esque substrate. It is now believed that 77,000 piles would need to be driven into the seafloor to support the new base from such a depth (Kitaueda 2020, 19).

The application for design change became a lightning rod in base politics in the spring of 2020. It wasn’t so much the need for more earth itself, but where the Okinawa Defense Bureau proposed it would extract the earth from that roused the Okinawan public. The existing design plan had called for reclamation soils to be drawn from six southern prefectures across seven different areas, only implicating the northern areas of Motobu Town, Nago City and Kunigami District as extraction sites on Okinawa Island. Nonetheless, Ryukyu Cement’s Awa Quarry has over the course of decades already decimated the coast in service to the new base. In light of the new understanding of the consistency of the soft-seafloor, the ADC would take a geographically less expansive, but more intense approach to quarrying activities in Okinawa, most voluminously targeting 31,596m³ of soil to be extracted from the southern region of Okinawa Island in Yaese Town and Itoman City (Kitaueda, 2020, p. 72). However, the Battle of

Okinawa had seen this same southern coast refashioned into a death-scape in 1945 as Japanese forces were pushed southward by advancing US troops. Thus, the concentration of general causalities, as well as several wartime events at the core of Okinawa's collective memory took place here, like the death of the storied Himeyuri Student Nurses, and mass civilian suicides urged on by Japanese soldiers compelled by a no-surrender ethos. Thus, the soils in the areas identified by the application were known to be mixed with high concentrations of the yet unearthed remains of war-dead. When the application emerged in April, its opposers argued that that the new approach would likely mean utilizing the bones of dead civilians yet to be reunited with their families for the new base's substrate.

"Killing the dead twice" was how Okinawan volunteer archaeologist, Takamatsu Gushiken put it, as he sat down in Citizen's Plaza on the frontage of the OPG head offices in Naha on March 1st to begin his hunger strike against the design change proposal. For the past four decades, Gushiken had led a group of volunteer archaeologists, Gamafuyā,⁵⁰ in excavating caves located in the southern region of Okinawa Island, to unearth and return the bones of those killed in the Battle of Okinawa to their families. In a press conference I attended three days into his hunger strike, Gushiken told the Japan Foreign Correspondents Club that the new insecurity of the remains was an issue that transcended the usual limits of Okinawa's base politics (Figure 16). "This isn't about pro- or anti-base positions," Gushiken said, "it's an issue of human rights" (Fieldnote, March 4, 2021). Later, in an informal conversation with myself and a group of friends, Gushiken reiterated this universalist framing. He explained that while in some cases his team has been able to discern the nationality of human remains by matching the heights of different ethnic groups with the length of femur bones, it was nonetheless likely that the earth in question contained the remains of American war-dead as well as Japanese and Okinawans (T. Gushiken, personal communication, 2021).


⁵⁰ In the Uchināguchi variant of the Ryukyuan language family, *gama* means cave, while *fuyā* means those who dig. Gamafuyā, then, translates as "those who dig in caves."

The issue of sacred bones falling under the insecurity of the ADC, is part and parcel with the larger process of territorialization being activated in service to the new base. Just as securing the base's reclamation area from waterborne factions of the Henoko sit-in has required the two governments unilaterally expand their oceanic exclusionary zone (Ryukyu Shimpo, 2014), Gamafuyā were the first to witness the unannounced enclosure of their primary excavation area. The MoD had proceeded with readying the site for soil extraction even advance of a prefectural decision on the ADC. This was obviated when Gamafuyā, who had uncovered the teeth of elders in the area of Itoman City targeted by the plan in September, abruptly lost access to the site when the ODB began early deforestation for the development of sediment quarries in two months later (Gushiken, 2020). Both the expansion of the marine exclusion zone and the pre-judicial enclosure of Gamafuyā's excavation site illustrate the relationality and contingency of territory as an effect rather than an organic spatial artifact (Brighenti, 2006; Raffestin, 2012). Territory is made in processes that delimit and regulate access to space, using who Raffestin has called "mediators." In contested and inchoate processes of territory, the labor of mediators who use force or tactics of resistance that may or may not be legitimated through laws of the state are met by competing political projects like the Henoko sit-in. This interface then reveals the negotiated nature of territorialization, which gives advantage to whichever side asserts an optimal alchemy of power and space.

Pressure was heaped on Governor Tamaki to shoot down the ADC. Anti-base coalitions, the general public, and Okinawan diaspora had been resolutely persuaded by Gamafuyā and Gushiken's admonition of "killing the dead twice." There were two other hunger strikes staged in the Citizen's Plaza in Naha through the rest of the Spring. At the Henoko sit-in slogans like "No Design Change!" (*sekkei henkō to-ranzo*) animated the Front of the Gate, while the Henoko Bus shuttled sit-in members from the Gate in the morning to Nago City Hall to take in municipal councilors speaking against the application, and back again for afternoon blockades. On April 16th, I joined a smattering of peace activists and Gushiken, who by that time had concluded

Figure 17

Gushiken Takamatsu of Gamafuyā (right) and Kitaueda Atsushi of the Okinawa Citizens' Network for Peace (left) give a press briefing on day three of Gushiken's hunger strike in protest of the MoD's Application for Design Change.



Note: Image © Iwama

his hunger-strike citing critical health conditions, to hear Denny Tamaki express his opposition to the plan in principle at a prefectural press conference. All of this energy led to a global petition carried out against the ADC, whipping sit-in members into a frenzy. “I submitted two [petitions],” sit-in member Shima* proclaimed one morning while enroute to the gate on the Henoko Bus, “one for me and one for my ancestors!” (Fieldnote, November 20, 2020). Mobilizing their respective communities, volunteers succeeded in collecting 17,857 petitions from Okinawa and across the world by the end of September, exceeding the expectations of prefectural officials (Ryukyu Shimpo, 2020).

I interviewed the professor, Henoko activist and Okinawan Environmental Justice Project executive director, Hideki Yoshikawa, regarding ecological aspects of the design change. Born in Nago City to a family of teachers and receiving advanced degrees in Canada and the US, Yoshikawa has dedicated his life to advancing the peace movement by exposing environmental fallout of the military’s presence in Okinawa. While opposition to the Futenma-Henoko relocation has consumed the lion’s share of his activism, Yoshikawa had devoted significant energy recently to unveiling the severely polluted state of the nearly half of the Northern Training Area, which was returned in 2016 pursuant to SACO Final Report. Yoshikawa treated the emergence of the soft-seafloor issue at Henoko as a kind of happy accident, insofar as it had created a new environmental and bureaucratic obstacle to the base’s advancement. “It makes me feel hopeful,” Yoshikawa said, “it’s like nature is collaborating with us.” (Yoshikawa, personal interview, March 5, 2021).

Appearing to deliver on Yoshikawa’s hopes, Denny Tamaki’s official refusal of the application for design change finally came down on November 25th, a year-and-a-half after the MoD had submitted their original application. The reasons the governor cited in his refusal were three-fold: (1) the MoD had offered inadequate research concerning the deepest points of the seafloor and potential risks associated with its disturbance; (2) the impact of the proposal on the ecology of Oura Bay and endangered Dugong was not adequately considered; and (3) the plan

bore no apparent relation to the expeditious closure of Futenma Airbase, on which the reclamation project had always been at least expressly contingent on (Tamaki, 2022). Nowhere in the governor's refusal was found mention of Gushiken, Gamafuyā or the bones of the soils in question being mixed with the bones of the dead.

Women speaking

The advancement of the Japanese state's ADC has not only required more land, deeper drilling, and more environmental destruction in its pursuit of the new base at Henoko; it has implicated the sacred bones of yet unclaimed war-dead in the process. In light of the destructive force with which the military seeks to territorialize itself through these uses of the MoD, how do we understand the territory effects when Okinawans moderate that force? This section helps answer this question by providing an understanding of the ways in which situated cultural practices are being reconstructed alongside the execution of the military blockade in Henoko Village among a cohort of mostly elderly Okinawan women. I draw from a variety of relevant theoretical and empirical literatures. Sasha Davis has helped to articulate the blockade as a site whose social productivities exceed the interruption of state resource flows (2021). Wendy Matsumura's analysis of the post-war struggle in the Okinawan village of Isahama (2020, p.8) reinterprets women farmers' resistance as a world-building project rather than a mere reaction to encroaching military enclosure, an interpretation which helps us contextualize the actions of the women at Henoko whose interventions, I argue, should be understood similarly. Additionally, in the reterritorialization of contested geographies, Anthias reminds us that the critical roles women play in liberatory struggles are often completely masked by the fiction that their contributions are limited to birthing and mothering men on the front-lines (1989, 159).

Women have often occupied a contradictory position in Okinawa. Since before Japanese colonization and continuing to varying extents into the present, spiritual life has been overseen

by women through their role as intermediaries (*yuta*) and priestesses (*noro*) (Nelson, 2008). Men on the other hand have remained the primary beneficiaries of land, a patriarchal custom assured through the continued use of Indigenous mortuary tablets called *tōtōme* (Takazato, 2015). Even where women have performed central functions in Okinawan spiritual life, this has historically been highly instrumental to maintaining the power of a patriarchal Ryukyuan monarchy. This critical feminist perspective was especially pronounced in my interview with Takazato:

I consider this very strongly, I'm an Uchinānchu, but I'm a feminist. And I am really against imperialism, and imperialism is the hierarchy of the people and the family system. This a very strong family system. And the emperor is at the top. (S.Takazato, personal communication, February 18, 2021)

The pervasiveness of patriarchy in Okinawa has led to military land reform being a highly patriarchal affair; this in spite of the sexual violence experienced by women being a focal impetus of base-related discontent and women themselves often comprising the largest cohort on the front-lines of the peace movement. Thus, while women have always been highly influential in Okinawan social movements, their influence has often coincided with their systematic disempowerment.

Critical Okinawan feminists like Ayano Ginoza have worked alongside women like Takazato at length, interpreting their feminisms as essentially anti-nationalist and anti-imperialist. “Any unquestioned usage of the nomenclature applied to Ryukyu and Okinawa,” Ginoza contends, “actually maintains the colonial formation of an island nation-state. This formation operates through the system of patriarchy that sustains the militarized coloniality in contemporary Okinawa” (Ginoza, 2022). Like Takazato, Ginoza problematizes common yet ahistorical interpretations of the Ryūkyū Kingdom as having been a matriarchal polity based singularly on the spiritual positions women have always held in Okinawan society. “Even with those who are for independence,” Takazato remarked in our interview, “I’m curious what kind of

independent nation they're dreaming of without any discrimination...so I don't want to be independent kingdom. Please, I'm a woman!" (Takazato, personal communication, February 18, 2021). I interpreted Takazato's speech as not being unaligned with movements for greater measures of political autonomy, nor a rally cry against Okinawa's bubbling Indigenous movement. Rather, I understood her critique of Okinawan nationalisms as a defense of criticality. Her point is that freedom will not come of simply replacing one nation for another, but only of systematically deconstructing the historically entrenched relations of power that limit the scope of life's possibilities for those on the margins.

Considering the gendered discrimination baked into political and cultural spheres it is unsurprising, then, that what is informally known as "Women's Day" (*josei no hi*) at the Front of the Gate is a relatively recent convention in the regular operations of the Henoko sit-in. In 2016, after the prominent Henoko activist, Hiroji Yamashiro, had fallen ill with cancer the All Okinawa Council arranged their regional factions across a weekly schedule to ensure that the key protest sites remained attended. Observing a complete absence of women in the management of the site despite their making up a majority of sit-in members, Takazato proposed that on Wednesdays, women would be the primary managers of the Henoko sit-in under the umbrella of the Okinawa Citizen's Network for Peace (*heiwa shimin renraku kai*) interrupting an otherwise male-dominated protest dynamic. Now, it is almost entirely Okinawan women on Wednesdays facilitating discussion aboard the Henoko bus, MC'ing the usual proceedings between rounds at the gate, and singing from the Henoko song-book to keep spirits high.

The designation of Wednesdays as Women's Day at the gate opened up space for relatively new protestors who unlike Yamashiro did not have extensive experiences with protest. This was the case for Kyōko*, who I met under the tarps of the Henoko sit-in. Kyōko was seventy-years-old when I met her, not an unusual age amongst the majority of grey-haired sit-in members at the Camp Schwab demonstration. Born as one of nineteen children in a family of sugarcane farmers from Tomigusuku, Kyōko described how a second life as an activist and the

relationships, education and purpose which came with it, helped to fill the void left by her mother's passing:

When I turned sixty, I felt like I couldn't do anything. My mom had just died, and I felt like my spirit had been taken out of me. A mother's care is so important...Right around then was when the protests at Nodake were starting to happen for the Osprey. So, we'd all gather and gather, getting together every day. We learned a lot of things about Okinawa. It was impressive how much information everyone brought in [to those gatherings]. We were all going "is that so? Is that so?" just learning about the realities of Okinawa, sharing articles from the newspapers and so on. I went to Nodake about once-a-week on the first bus in the morning, for about a year-and-a-half. (Kyōko, personal interview, 2021)

The conflict over "Osprey," referred to by Kyōko was over the US Air Force's deployment of dual-propeller vertical lift-off Osprey Helicopters to Okinawa in 2012. The Nodake Gate of MCAS Futenma where much of the demonstrations against the deployment were concentrated became a place where Kyōko sharpened her political consciousness. "I never thought that life in Okinawa was normal," she told me of her growth as an activist, "but I just had a mentality that nothing could be done." By the time I met Kyōko, she was a regular attendee on Wednesdays at the gate and a boisterous contributor to song and debate.

Kyōko is full of energy at Henoko. I took special note of her enthusiasm on an otherwise unremarkable Wednesday as she led sit-in members during a sleepy lunch hour through the chorus of a new addition to the Henoko songbook, *Henoko acha no uta* (the song of the Henoko commuter). She sung in fluid and confident Uchināguchi, with Takazato encouraging her via electric keyboard. This image seems a far cry from a younger Kyōko, who by her own estimation had been politically disengaged and embarrassed for Okinawan words to escape her mouth. Kyōko shared this with me one morning as the two of us drove to Henoko together up the Okinawa Island Expressway with the Henoko buses on pandemic pause. This was one of

many sit-in hiatuses called by the All-Okinawa Council in 2020 in order to protect elderly protestors from infection. However, as a testament to the efficacy of the protest tactics, managers of the sit-in had observed drastic increases in the number of dump-trucks entering and exiting the Awa Quarries and Shiokawa Port amidst the sit-in hiatuses. So, for committed activists like Kyōko the necessity of their presence at the gate only intensified under pandemic conditions. Vaccinated, negatively tested and tightly masked, the two of us shared stories as we made our way to the gate in my rust-bucket hatchback with the windows down.

The fact that any use of Ryukyuan languages is found at Henoko suggests some subversion of the historical movements to eliminate them. On our drive to Henoko together, Kyōko had recalled witnessing her elementary school classmates having “dialect-tags” (*hōgen fuda*), a Japanese colonial counterpart to the Welsh-knot, hung on their necks for speaking Uchināguchi. Upon the Ryūkyū Kingdom’s late 19th-century incorporation into Imperial Japan, Ryukyuan languages were forcefully replaced by Japanese as the language of education and bureaucracy (2004, p.157). This process, Heinrich explains, was achieved not so much by policing the institutionalization of Japanese, which occurred gradually, as much as it was affected by the enforced prohibition of Ryukyuan languages in schools and offices. To similar effect as the dialect-tag, says Heinrich, imitation clothes-lines were installed in some classrooms, so that phrases uttered in Ryukyuan languages could be written on paper silhouettes of clothing articles to be symbolically cleansed (2004, p.159).

Kyōko is not alone in deriving joy from exercising her command of Uchināguchi at the gate. In a discussion I had with former Naha City Counsellor and sit-in member, Miyagi Emiko, in her Naha-based print shop, she intimated that it always felt good for her to speak Uchināguchi when announcing at Henoko on Wednesdays. On one of my first days at Henoko, it was Miyagi herself on the bullhorn addressing private security guards and Okinawa Prefectural Police as they swarmed sit-in members to forcefully remove them. Smiling up at the officers as they spilled out of the base, Miyagi gently bounced her knees and waved her arms

melodically as she spoke, gesturing to each member of the contingent as if to say, “welcome brother, you’ll go right here, and you’ll go right there”:

*Yonna gwa shio, yonna gwa yonna gwa, yonna gwa birando; gohun kakiti... eh, eh, eh,
nīchan, gohun kakiti kimisōri*

(Hey, now, slow down, slow down, slow down; just take five minutes brother, just take five minutes)

Moving on from choreographing this round of the stand-off, Miyagi led a Japanese-English bilingual duet of the American civil rights anthem, *We Shall Overcome*, before turning her commentary on history. In her speech, she drew attention to some of the sit-in members’ lived experiences in the Battle of Okinawa, and rejected the continued use of Okinawa as a site of war-preparation: “not one of us can forgive the fact that today’s situation is no different from that of 74 years ago. That’s why we sit here” (fieldnote, September 25, 2019).

The confidence displayed by Miyagi, Kyōko, Takazato and dozens others like them who attend Women’s Day at the gate was not easily come by. One of the costs of Kyōko’s newfound political consciousness was her subjection to regular acts of physical violence at the hands of state authorities and private security firms alongside other protestors. To be sure, while the blockades at the Awa Quarry and Shiokawa Port have continued to be highly confrontational and forceful with protestors there routinely being chased down and handled directly by prefectural police, the nature of the standoffs at Henoko have by most accounts become banal over the course of the protest. Some site managers give convivial waves to dump truck-drivers as they move into the base through the blockade. I heard rumors of protest site-managers meeting dump truck drivers themselves for drinks after days of facing off against one another in protest. One morning, sit-in members lamented the last day on the job for an Okinawan police chief who, consensus had it, had respectfully managed his role on the opposite side of the standoff. In spite of these practiced pleasantries, the history of all of these confrontations is unequivocally one of violence. Kyōko herself recalled to me of the early days of the struggle at

the Nodake gate, the patterned cycles of being rounded up, forced into the riot police's "kamaboko" trucks,⁵¹ and held for hours without the dignity of bathroom breaks, before being released late into the night. At the outset of the Henoko struggle, sit-in members locked arms and sat on the concrete, only leaving their station when apprehended by riot police and contained in stockades established on either side of the gate to allow dump-trucks into the site.

Limits of participation

In his article, *We're not so good at running...but we still know how to sit*, Doug Lummis (2019) provides a cogent explanation of the current state of the sit-in. That the demonstration is now mostly attended by pensioners who have developed a culture of communing on the Henoko Bus and under the sit-in tent at "Henoko University," is attributed by Lummis mostly to the natural rhythms of life. The youth work when the trucks roll. Meanwhile, mainland participation in the sit-in is dense. According to Keisuke,* a Tokyo transplant and monk who moved to Okinawa a decade ago in order to live out what he understands to be his responsibility as *Yamatunchu* (one of *Yamato* [Japan], and not Okinawa), the recent mainland population under the tent of the sit-in on a given day can be as high as half.

It's very important for Okinawans to initiate movement...If you come from outside the prefecture you're not supposed to assume a leadership position. I don't know about the past, but that's how it is now (Keisuke, personal communication, September 25, 2020)

Over the course of a year, I saw more than one visitor from outside of Okinawa come and go, making a day at Henoko a part of their visit to the island. I met a university group of over twenty-students from the mainland on a fieldtrip at Henoko, speaking to protestors about their

⁵¹ Japanese riot police regularly employ the use of "kamaboko" trucks, named for the resemblance of their shape to Japanese fish-cakes of the same name.

experiences and taking pictures at the gate. I saw tourists, strayed from the normal coastal route, pull their rentals over to ask a few questions, take a few pictures, and then roll on.

Like Keisuke, there are other mainlanders who have spent longer and more serious engagements in the Henoko movement. Monks of various orders, US veterans-turn-peace activists, academics, and professional engineers have all lent support to the sit-in whose active members seem to appreciate it. Dr. Kitaueda, a civil engineer from the mainland, is a key expert, producing educational materials for the Okinawa Citizens' Network for Peace, and Dr. Miyahashi, a University of the Ryukyus plant ecologist, has been a key informant to the nascent movement against similar military-related reclamation on Urasoe City's Westcoast.

Yoshikawa, who had illuminated the soft-seafloor issue for me offered a pragmatists' perspective on movement support from mainlanders:

If you're constrained by identity politics in Okinawa, like, 'I don't want to deal with the Japanese,' there's no way we can do anything...I focus on environmental issues, very intentionally, that's my project. If you really focus on environmental issues, you need to have experts, biology and those topics. Unfortunately for Okinawans, we don't have many of those. So, you really have to collaborate with people from mainland Japan.

(Yoshikawa, personal interview, March 5, 2021)

Yoshikawa, who often works with academics at the University of the Ryukyus elaborated that for students coming up as undergraduates at the university with interests in the marine sciences, advisors tend to steer them away from research projects located on the west-coast, away from the politicized Oura bay. This problem is exacerbated by the disproportionate representation of Japanese versus Okinawan academics in high-ranking positions at the University of the Ryukyus. This aversion of senior researchers to engage research topics that spatially overlap with regions of struggle subsequently inhibits the development of Indigenous experts with scientific knowledge of the ecologies of concern. "I wish we had more Okinawan experts in these fields," Hideki went on, "but, it's a small place."

Okinawans are acutely aware that the involvement of mainlanders in the Henoko movement bears upon the limits of the movement itself. One way in which these stakes can be articulated is in the framing of the goals of the movement as targeting the relocation of bases outside of the prefecture, or the eradication of military bases altogether. The relocation of Futenma to Henoko, and every other “return” contained in the SACO Final Report, constitutes examples of “within-prefecture return” (*kennai isetsu*). The reverse position, relocation to the mainland (*kengai isetsu*) was historically unpopular due to its potential to alienate allies from Japan, but gained popularity after Japanese Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, embraced the position (which he would later disavow) in his 2009 election run (Norimatsu 2011; Kinjo 2019).

The political implications of *kengai* and *kennai isetsu* are the difference between a decolonial stance in Okinawa, and the enfranchisement of Okinawans themselves as an aggrieved minority. The former – the *no bases anywhere* position – explains Shimabuku, collapses Okinawa’s interests into those of Japan and washes away any sense of Okinawa as a polity with geopolitical interests of its own:

...when Okinawa protests to Japan, the Japanese simply transform the protest into an issue of conservative versus progressive politics internal to the nation-state, and completely overlook its character as a problem of Japanese colonial domination vis-à-vis Okinawa that occurs irrespective of party politics (Shimabuku, 2012, p.136)

Conversely, *kengai isetsu* recognizes a boundary of political consequence between Okinawa and Japan. Furthermore, it suggests a recalibration of a center-periphery relationship in which Japanese people extract vast quantities of military defense and tourist leisure from Okinawa while shouldering a marginal fraction of the associated human insecurities and environmental enclosure that go hand in hand. Ushī Chinin describes this unevenness as the “255-fold burden of the next place” (*ta chīki no 255 bai no futan*), calculated as Japan’s per-capita military presence as a proportion of Okinawa’s (Chinin, 2013, 32). If, goes the argument, as a Japanese person you benefit from the presence of the US military in Okinawa and you are concerned with

the struggle of the Okinawan people, then *take some of these bases home with you when you leave*.

Still, there is a material need for people to stand-off against trucks at the gates of Camp Schwab, and a seventy-five-year-old problematic framing of militarism in Okinawa as an “Okinawan problem” that won’t change without collapsing the psychological distance of Japanese people from the root of the problem. Following a group of mainlanders to Okinawa on a protest-tour, in which they took part in various forms of action against the Henoko base, Sakuma found that the experience allowed these “tourists” to “reframe militarism as a basis for their own activism” (2021, 8). I observed a handful of such re-framings happening at Henoko. For example, a lawyer from Fukuoka, visiting Okinawa and Henoko for the first time, remarked to sit-in members in his introductory remarks, that his vision of an Okinawan tropical paradise was immediately exploded upon driving north from Naha International Airport through Central Okinawa, where military bases and flight-paths are most concentrated (Fieldnote, October 14, 2020). Yet as Sakuma notes of the protest-tour, despite these individually transformative experiences, historic problem of Japanese colonialism may still go unaddressed in the protest sphere.

Conclusion

Okinawans and their allies who return to Henoko day after day contest not only the specific base they organize outside of, but the terms of land return as it has rolled out under the SACO Final Report per se. Whereas the post-Cold War base closures on the continental US under the Base Realignment and Closure Program have resulted in a net reduction in military impacts, in Okinawa return has only given way to new formations of militarism. Some of the US and Japanese governments’ “post-military landscapes” in Okinawa are distinguished by conditions of intractable pollution, left behind the militaries under a SOFA that fails to hold them

accountable for remediation. This is currently the case with the returned portion of the Northern Training Area, which despite its toxic condition is currently under consideration for distinction as a UNESCO World Natural Heritage Status. Other post-military landscapes, like the contingent connection of Henoko and MCAS Futenma, are emerging as conjunctures of promised land returns and the sites of new enclosure framed as necessary in their wake. For Davis (2011, p.7), the disproportionate reliance of the US military on sites like Okinawa, Guåhan (Guam) and Hawai'i for this type of durable military presence boasts a striking irony: that "the US is using territories denied basic rights of freedom and self-determination to use military force that, ostensibly, is being used to promote these same values." It is no different in Okinawa, where the US tacitly relies on Japan's historical and continued suppression of Okinawan political and cultural identities, as the substrate top which to build a type of uneven military exposure that doesn't go away, even when it seems to. This is why analyses of the politics of military enclosure of the sort chronicled in this chapter are essential to the study of base return in Okinawa.

To return to the question from which this chapter departed, we now have some understanding of how territory is made when Okinawans refuse the terms of military base return. As Brighenti (2006, p.66) argues, it is a specific set of "relational phenomena" that performs territory here, rather than a particular geomorphic expression of swelling state-sovereignty. The case of the new base at Henoko is after all an especially hazardous context for what Agnew called the "territorial trap" (1994), insofar as it has given way to expansive analyses primarily concerned with "dueling" states (US-China), or "client" states (US-Japan), eliding most consideration of this advancing military enclosure as its production is experienced from the perspective of the Okinawans on the front line. The members of the sit-in at Henoko, however – newly minted activists in their own right – are performing territory by attending to the exigencies of placed-based Okinawan cultural reconstruction, and anti-imperialist notions of genuine security, challenging centuries of colonialism and assimilation in the process. By doing so, they

offer critical analyses of what Lisa Yoneyama calls “transwar connectivities.” This is what is happening as Miyagi announces at the Front of the Gate in Uchināguchi words that carried exacting punishment under Japanese assimilationist policy, that the reason they’ve assembled is “the fact that today’s situation is no different from that of 74 years ago.” These activist strategies of song, language, and relation, are the tactics being used to confront the violence of what some have called the “perpetual condition” of militarized dispossession. By doing so, sit-in members are drawing together networks of small islands across the Pacific where the territories of military realignment are similarly impregnated by resurgent Indigenous movements.

Chapter 6: Conclusion



Stairwell atop the Sakima Art Museum. Photo © Iwama

From the concrete staircase atop Sakima Michio's art museum in Ginowan City, I look out over the vastness of MCAS Futenma and the East China Sea. Many people I met over the course of this research explained to me that the land where this base was built had once been some of the most fertile in Okinawa, which from this perspective is quite easy to see. A tremendously flat and vividly green expanse presents itself, zippered up-and-down by aircraft runways and hangars enclosed on all sides by barb-wired fence. Osprey helicopters sit double file, propellers down, awaiting orders. I look down from the museum's staircase, which was designed by the Okinawan peace activist and architect, Yoshikazu Makishi, and see that the barbed fence of the base sits only a couple feet from the footing of the staircase and the museum itself. I am standing on a border between empires. But Sakima's stairwell momentarily fulfills its purpose, liberating me of the fenced-in perspective common to central Okinawa.

We had come to the museum to talk to Sakima about the land on which his museum and his family's turtle shaped mausoleum (*kame kōbaka*) sit. To see it from an aerial perspective is

to realize that the parcel gouges a small and irregular convex into the otherwise contiguous fence line of MCAS Futenma. When a younger Sakima returned to his native island having grown up in Japan's Kumamoto Prefecture, he found that the land passed to him from his ancestors to steward had been partially enclosed behind the fence of the gargantuan base. That portion of his land – the future site of his museum – had become as all US military land in Okinawa was made during occupation, off limits to Sakima as non-military personnel. His dream of using his land to open a museum dedicated to peace and designed according to Indigenous Okinawan design principles of *fu-sui*, was apparently stifled.

Sakima tells me of how, having finally settled back in Okinawa, he relished all opportunities to walk his land and to be amongst his forbearers. "I felt like my feet already knew the land," Sakima tells me, "I was a little nervous to stand in front of my ancestors, but I felt safe and proud to be there" (Sakima, personal communication, September 27, 2019). Only one thing was left to be done in order start his journey of establishing the Sakima Art Museum on his family's land. Sakima needed to get half of it back from the US military.

"They showed me this." Sakima pulls out a flow-chart provided to him by the Okinawa Defense Bureau when he began his fight for repossession, illustrating the SCC's administrative process of land return (Appendix C). I'm amazed at the dizzying complexity of the chart. Applicants' return requests pass through two Japanese Government bureaus and councils before review by the Okinawa Defense Bureau, and the US forces using the lands in question. From there, successful applications would move through the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Defense before additional reviews by a site-specific committee and the US Forces Japan. If the preceding reviews were acknowledged and approved by the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee, applications would then move on to a bilateral review by the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and a US Government representative, before a final decision could be made and the physical process of remediation and handover could begin.

Committed to pursuing all possible means of land return, Sakima submitted the requisite Return Request, but three years would elapse before he learned that the petition hadn't even made it to the stage of review by the Joint Committee. It wasn't until political will emerged at Ginowan City Hall for a municipal museum coincided with Sakima meeting an Okinawan American realtor working on MCAS Futenma and another Okinawan working at the ODB, that progress was finally made on his return request. In 1994, Sakima succeeded in having his land returned and opened the Sakima Art Museum housing a specialized collection focused on "making peace through art," financed mostly from saved up rental payments he'd received as a military landowner.

The museum's centerpiece is the largest, wall-sized panel of the fourteen panel work, *Pictures of the Battle of Okinawa (Okinawasen No Zu)*, painted by the late couple Iri and Shun Maruki. At first glance the enormous work presents a jarring yet indiscernible splash of black, red and blue. It's only as one sits and engages closely and slowly with the work that the death-scape presents itself in full effect. Naked and dismembered bodies of women and children, rapists in Japanese imperial army caps, and the bayonets of American soldiers. The scene horrifically draws viewers into one of the many caves of southern Okinawa Island that turned into zones of mass suicide as the Battle of Okinawa drew to a close and Japanese imperial forces compelled Okinawans to mass suicide lest they face capture by the US Forces. The work of the painting is remarkably unintellectual, its purpose materializes not in viewers' minds but in their stomachs and tear-ducts.

I choose the preceding narrative as an entry point to these conclusions deliberately as it demonstrates the possibility of the processes and outcomes that can animate the return of militarized land. In the course of the research I asked every planner I interviewed who was involved in base return whether there were examples they could share of Okinawans initiating repossession rather than waiting for the SCC to announce plans for return. All of them struggled to recall instances of such "bottom-up" action, lamenting that the return of military land is a

waiting game. This dissertation has given a textured account of the type of large-scale commercial land uses that can characterize post-military landscapes when redevelopment occurs within compensatory political regimes which have extended over long periods of time. By contrast, the story of Sakima Art Museum is a critical reminder that exceptionally subversive forms of repossession abound: Sakima's unsanctioned fight for return; "tacit farming" (*mokunin kōsaku*) practices among Okinawans who refuse to quit farming their lands despite their being enveloped by bases; even the place-based cultural practices documented in Chapter Five occurring at the sit-in against the new base at Henoko demonstrate forms of culturally specific and non-proprietary forms of repossession.

I set out at the beginning of the dissertation to answer the question, *what has been the effect of military base return on Okinawans' relationships with land and strategies of resistance under the US and Japanese governments' post-1995 regime of base realignment?* Situating my study in a larger frame of inquiry, the phenomenon of base closure has been a global one, spurred by shifts in post-cold war geopolitics and in response to the uprisings of local people. I have argued through the course of the dissertation that in the case of Okinawa Island, the return of base land produces no necessary reversal of the territorial alienation that Okinawans have experienced over the course of seventy-seven years of military occupation. When bases close, militarism assumes new forms of occupation, whether it be through commercial tastes or entirely new enclosures. Thus many formally "post-military" landscapes produced in the course of base closure remain occupied in novel ways or subjected to the negative environmental effects of endless preparations for war. The particular position that Okinawa occupies in the US geopolitical imagination, the rigor of the US Forces' post-war land campaign, and the Japanese government's systematized disregard for Okinawan life together are an alchemy for perpetual state of occupation. However, I have also argued that the agency Okinawans exercise in the limited spaces for maneuver afforded by the SACO policy context – whether on the front-lines of protest or in formal bureaucracies of base conversion – obviates a flexible activation of a range

of important life-lines, from the recovery of Indigenous language capabilities to economic self-determination.

In Chapter Three, “War by other means,” I examined the history of military dispossession, and thus the pedigree of occupation on Okinawa Island with particular attention to planning’s role in the formation of territory. I argued that in the wake of near complete destruction, the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands assembled a dispossessive legal regime, reliant primarily on the importation of mid-century American urban planning conventions like eminent domain, condemnation, and declarations of takings all of which were being used to great effect on the US continent to advance urban renewal projects in racialized communities. This allowed the USCAR to justify their metastasizing “land acquisition program” according to law and colonial notions of progress.

In a comparative assessment of colonial property regimes, Brenna Bhandar develops a concept of “racial regimes of ownership” to explain the co-constitution of racial production and private property regimes in the settler colony (2018). Racial regimes of ownership advance dispossessive colonial projects relying on systems of title-by-registration, and become expressed through the notion of improvement and through what Bhandar calls a “logic of abstraction”:

This logic of abstraction effectively transformed the idea of property (in land) as a socially embedded set of relations premised on use, political hierarchies, and exchange, to a commodity vision of land that rendered it fungible in the same way as any other commodity (2018, p.97)

Conclusions in Chapter Three chronicled the emergence of the property form of base land in Okinawa, which relied on both title-by-registration and an understanding of Okinawan racial identities as counterpoised with the progress of militarist development. So, this property form which continues to influence and polarize Okinawan society can be understood as a racial regime of ownership abstracting from Indigenous forms of land relation, and at the same

configuring Japanese and US military participants as forward-facing contra the “agrarian” Okinawan stubbornly attached to use-oriented conceptions of land. The interruption wrought by the racial regime of ownership is how one makes sense of transition from landowners of the post-war era arguing against the military’s sweeping requisitions on ontological and spiritual bases, while the problem of militarism for some of their descendants today risks becoming – to use the words of my interviewee Okuma – merely a “problem of compensation.”

Chapter Four, “Fighter jets to food courts,” was concerned with how dispossessed owners of military land negotiate and shape the outcomes of base redevelopment when land returns. Here, I showed that the return of formerly militarized land in Okinawa unearths landscapes and jurisdictional configurations of the pre-military era, while simultaneously occasioning economic and existential crises for landowners whose ancestral homes were dispossessed in service to the US Military. I developed the notion of “flexible repossession,” where Indigenous owners participate in bureaucracies of return, mixing commercial leases with communitarian land uses to ensure the wellbeing of themselves, their families and communities. Complicating this process of repossession is the fact that in order to minimize the harm caused by the discontinuation of land rent, which over the course of nearly a century of occupation families who own military land have grown dependent upon with thanks to aggressive campaign of state-imposed dependency, militarized tenancy becomes replaced by a form of commercial tenancy which remains highly serving of military interests. Thus, while jurisdiction has formally been resumed, the shopping mall perpetuates a state of alienation which obviates the continuation of militarized land use atop a formally post-military landscape.

Contentious political resistance remains a forceful response to the prevailing regime of return under the SACO agreement that relies on the relocation of facilities within Okinawa rather than base closure per se. Thus, in Chapter Five, “Resistance to Realignment,” I asked how refusing the conditions of return may be creating new possibilities and limitations for territory and cultural reconstruction. Through extensive participation and interviews with sit-in members,

I argued that the protest provides space for elderly Okinawan women to destabilize their lived experiences of colonial assimilation and anti-Okinawan sentiment by practicing culture while at the same time asserting a vision of place based on notions of genuine security rather than a perpetual condition of war. Therefore, the territory effect of greatest concern at the Front of the Gate is not merely one of a militarized frontier pushing forward, but a dialectic of state power being moderated by Indigenous resistance.

I have drawn Okinawa into the research about the repossession of formerly militarized land, which has heretofore been regrettably silent regarding the reality of continued military effects on the ostensibly post-military landscapes of Indigenous places, and what local people are doing to confront this continued hegemony. It is, as Epeli Hau'ofa recognized of other Pacific Islands decades ago, as if our geometric smallness could reasonably suggest a lack of influence over larger political structures. However, as Hau'ofa explains:

The idea that the countries of Polynesia and Micronesia are too small, too poor, and too isolated to develop any meaningful degree of autonomy is an economistic and geographic deterministic view of a very narrow kind that overlooks culture history and the contemporary process of what may be called *world enlargement* that is carried out by tens of thousands of ordinary Pacific Islanders right across the ocean – from east to west and north to south, under the very noses of academic and consultancy experts, regional and international development agencies, bureaucratic planners and their advisers, and customs and immigration officials – making nonsense of all national and economic boundaries, borders that have been defined only recently, crisscrossing an ocean that had been boundless for ages before Captain Cook's apotheosis (Hau'ofa, 1994, 151; emphasis added)

While Hau'ofa was bringing attention to the plights of Polynesian and Micronesian island contexts, it is much the same in Okinawa. The struggles born out in the processes of reterritorialization that occur when bases close or relocate, only become visible by

disarticulating Okinawa from Japan (or, for that matter, Hawai'i and Guåhan from the US), and revealing the inadequacy of the Nation in its geographical spectacularism as the primary frame of analysis. It is not the quantitative smallness of the sit-in at the Front of the Gate in Henoko Village that matters most, but the enormity of the world-making carried out by its members that in the end will prove the most obstructive to the expansion of contemporary American imperialism.

My findings make contributions to the planning and geography literatures concerning military base conversion. We already know a great deal about how bases are redeveloped. We know that when bases close on the continental US, local economies change, failing to bring old workers along. We know that as the world's greatest polluter the US military leaves behind toxic landscapes whose remediation it only attends to when under tremendous political pressure and those who stand to benefit most from remediation are Americans. Our understanding of what happens when the military landscapes being reconfigured are those which have been brought into existence through processes of violent dispossession is much less clear. We know even less about these processes when political landscape atop which bases have been built is one of an already colonized Indigenous minority. This dissertation has provided an understanding of redevelopment outcomes that can be expected in these contexts. In situations where there have been extended periods of leasehold, problems of dependency and alienation are exacerbated with time. This may increase the likelihood that large-scale commercial tenancy is seen as the most viable among landowners whose personal connections to land become tenuous over long periods of occupation, and whose livelihoods have become reliant on new forms of rent introduced by the military economy.

The litany of environmental injustices wrought upon the Okinawan Islands is scrawling and growing every year. Investigating the territorial transformations which have emanated out from the SACO Final Report, this dissertation has focused on but one aspect. As the development of the new base at Henoko proceeds, new Henokos will emerge in step. The coral

reefs of Urasoe City's east coast, which have already managed to survive the major commercial industrialization of that urban fringe, will in the future become the basis of another major struggle rivaling Henoko in scale. As I complete this dissertation, revelations concerning military base-related spillovers of perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS) and perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) – so called “forever chemicals” due to their inability to biodegrade – are emerging on a monthly basis in the central region of Okinawa Island. These mass-scale pollution events recall the title of the dissertation before you. When militaries return long occupied lands, the violence of war does not recede into obscurity but merely dawns new forms which local people continue to live with and die from long afterwards. If this dissertation points to a single need for further research it is not to the need for a better understanding of the processes by which base closure gives way to post-military land-uses; but to an imminent need for us to better understand the transmutations of militarization in its ostensible absence.

Appendix A: Sample Interview Rubric

Sample Rubric: Community / Activist Interview

Topic	Question
Housekeeping	Ethics statement, ask for recording or notes - either is fine
Introduction	I've been participating at Henoko for about a year. Do you have any questions for or about me? 今まで私は大体1年間辺野古座り込みに参加したので私への質問か聞きたい事がありますか？ Could you tell me a little about your background? _____さんの個人履歴を少し教えて下さい。
Movement	How and why did you begin your participation in the peace movement? どのように、そしてなぜ_____さんは沖縄の平和運動に参加始まったんでしょうか？ How have you seen the movement change over time? 現在まで沖縄の平和運動が変わりましたが？変わったら特にどういう風に？ What's the biggest issue facing the Peace Movement right now? 今の沖縄平和運動に直面の最大問題は何でしょうか？
Henoko	Could you tell me a little bit about gender and Okinawan-ness at Henoko? 辺野古座り込みに関してジェンダーやうちなんちゅアイデンティティーを少し教えて下さい。 e.g., What is the story of <i>josei-no hi</i> ? 例えば、辺野古で水曜日の“女性の日”のストーリーは何でしょうか？ e.g., Is the leadership of All-Okinawa, or the day-to-day sit-in, Okinawan? Is this important or not important?

	例えば今のオール沖縄会議や辺野古 ^{にちじょうかんぶ} 日常幹部は殆どウチナンチュ？そのことは大事かあんまり大事じゃないか どう思ういますか？
	What is the story of the Shimagurumi-Bus?
	辺野古バスのストーリーについて少し教えて下さい。
Identity	What does it mean to be an Okinawan?
	_____さんにとってはウチナンチュのアイデンティティーをどういう意味があるんでしょうか？
	What does 'land' mean to Okinawans?
	ウチナンチュたちにとっては”土地”はどんな ^{がんちく} 含蓄をしますか??
Land/bases	What is your vision for the future of Okinawa?
	沖縄の未来に対する_____さんの最大の望むは少し説明を出来ますか？
	What are your thoughts about relocation within the prefecture (“kennai isetsu”)? I’m particularly interested in the relationship between ‘base return’ and ‘new base construction’.
	“県内移設”ということは_____さんの考え方はなんでしょうか？私の具体的な興味は基地返還か後地利用と新基 地建設の関係です

Appendix B: Enumeration of Research Interactions

Interviews

Date	Interview Group	Name (if applicable)	Pseudonym (if applicable)	Affiliation
2019/09/16	Academic	Matsushima Yasukatsu		Ryukoku University
2019/09/17	Community Member	n/a		Association of Comprehensive Studies for Independence of the Lew Chewans
2019/09/17	Planner	Shinoda Takuya		Okinawa Prefectural Government
2019/09/18	Community Member	n/a		Yomitan son henshūshitsu [Yomitan Village History Editorial Office]
2019/09/19	Planner	Matayoshi Toshiaki; Maehara Nobuhiko		Urasoe City Government
2019/09/23	Planner	Agarie Nobuharu		Ginowan City Government
2019/09/23	Planner	Ginowan Base Planning		Ginowan City Government
2019/09/27	Landowner	Sakima Michio		Sakima Art Museum
2019/09/27	Planners	n/a		Nago City Government
2020/02/25	Academic	Gabe Maasaki		University of the Ryukyus
2020/02/26	Academic	Manabu Sato		Okinawa International University
2020/04/20	Academic	Tomochi Masaki		Okinawa International University
2020/04/21	Community Member	n/a	Higa	Association of Comprehensive Studies for Independence of the Lew Chewans; Student
2020/04/21	Community Member	n/a		Indigenous Peoples Group
2020/04/21	Community Member	n/a		Association of Comprehensive Studies for Independence of the Lew Chewans; Student
2020/04/21	Community Member	n/a		Cultural Practitioner / Student-Activist
2020/04/28	Academic	Tomochi Masaki		Okinawa International University; Association of Comprehensive Studies for Independence of the Lew Chewans
2020/05/04	Landowner	n/a		Various
2020/05/07	Landowner	Makishi Yoshikazu		n/a
2020/05/15	Real Estate Agency	n/a	Kamizato	Ginowan City-based real estate corporation
2020/05/21	Landowner	n/a, n/a, n/a	Gushi, Gibo, Oyama	Kitanakagusuku Son Gunyōchi nado Jinushikai [Kitanakagusuku Village Military Land Landowners Association]
2020/06/11	Landowner	n/a, n/a	Gushi, Gibo	Kitanakagusuku Son Gunyōchi nado Jinushikai [Kitanakagusuku Village Military Land Landowners Association]

2020/06/15	Planner	Shimabukuro Shohei		Chatan Town Government
2020/06/23	Planner	Tōyama; Nakandakari		Yomitan Village Government
2020/07/27	Planner	Nakamoto Yamauchi		Okinawa Prefectural Government
2020/08/11	Planner	n/a		Kitanakagusuku Village Government
2020/09/25	Community Member	n/a	Keisuke	Kadena Peace Action
2020/10/07	Politician	Matsumoto Tetsuji		Urasoe City Government
2020/12/17	Community Member	n/a	Kyōkyo	Heiwa shimin renraku kai [Okinawa Citizens for Peace]
2021/02/21	Community Member	Takazato Suzuyo		Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence
2021/05/03	Community Member	Yoshikawa Hideki		Center for Environmental Justice, Okinawa
2021/06/06	Community Member	n/a		n/a
2021/06/15	Academic	Ginoza Ayano		University of the Ryukyus
2021/07/14	Academic	Manabu Sato		Okinawa International Universty
2021/08/08	Landowner	n/a	Okuma	Heiwa shimin renraku kai [Okinawa Citizens for Peace]
2021/08/25	Politician	Nakagawa Kyōki		Liberal Democratic Party Okinawa
2020/04/15	Landowner	n/a	Uehara	Kitanakagusuku Son Gunyōchi nado Jinushikai [Kitanakagusuku Village Military Land Landowners Association]

Participation

Date	Code	Details
2019/09/25	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Protest
2020/03/16	Anti-Base Protest	Ryukyu Cement Protest
2020/03/30	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Protest
2020/06/12	Anti-Base Protest	Kadena Protest
2020/06/17	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2020/06/19	Anti-Base Protest	Kadena Protest
2020/06/24	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2020/07/01	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2020/07/08	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2020/07/15	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2020/07/22	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2020/09/04	Anti-Base Protest	Kadena Protest
2020/09/09	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2020/09/16	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2020/09/23	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2020/09/30	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2020/10/07	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2020/10/14	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2020/10/21	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2020/10/28	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2020/11/04	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In

2020/11/11	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2020/11/18	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2020/11/25	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2020/12/02	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2020/12/09	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2020/12/12	Anti-Base Protest	Nago City Council/All Okinawa Council gathering regarding the Application for Design Change
2021/01/13	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2021/02/03	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko/Awa/Shiokawa
2021/02/03	Anti-Base Protest	Henoko Sit-In
2019/09/20	Community Event	Indigenous Peoples Group gathering
2020/05/16	Community Event	Tamaki deni-san tōku kyaraban tsutsu uraura no kai [Denny Tamaki's Global Talk Caravan]
2020/06/13	Community Event	PFOAS Water Tour
2021/02/04	Community Event	Urasoe Mayoral Campaign Rally (Irei Yuki)
2021/02/08	Community Event	N/A
2020/10/04	Planning Event	University of the Ryukyus; Urasoe City
2020/10/31	Planning Event	Naha gunkō henkan Urasoe isetsu shichō setsumeikai [Mayoral town-hall on the return and relocation of Naha Military Port to Urasoe City]
2020/11/08	Planning Event	Urasoe nishi kaigan kangaeru kai [Association for Considering the West Coast of Urasoe City]

References

- Agnew, J. (1994). The territorial trap: The geographical assumptions of international relations theory. *Review of International Political Economy*, 1(1), 53–80.
- Agnew, J. (2008). Borders on the mind: Re-framing border thinking. *Ethics & Global Politics*, 1(4), 175–191. <https://doi.org/10.3402/egp.v1i4.1892>
- Akamine, M. (2016). *The Ryukyu Kingdom: Cornerstone of East Asia*. University of Hawaii Press.
- Akibayashi, K., & Takazato, S. (2009). Okinawa: Women's struggle for demilitarization. In C. Lutz (Ed.), *The bases of empire: The global struggle against US military posts* (pp. 243–269). Pluto Press.
- Alfred, G. R. (2009). *Peace, power, righteousness: An indigenous manifesto*. Oxford University Press, USA.
- Allen, D., & Sumida, C. (2010, September 17). Thousands of ammo rounds found on former military golf course on Okinawa. *Stars and Stripes*.
<https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/okinawa/thousands-of-ammo-rounds-found-on-former-military-golf-course-on-okinawa-1.118495>
- Altman, J., & Markham, F. (2015). Burgeoning Indigenous Land Ownership: Diverse Values and Strategic Potentialities. In *Native Title from Mabo to Akiba: A Vehicle for Change and Empowerment?* <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajph.12286>
- Angst, L. I. (2001). The Sacrifice Of A Schoolgirl: The 1995 Rape Case, Discourses of Power, and Women's Lives in Okinawa. *Critical Asian Studies*, 33(2), 243–266.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14672710122284>

- Anthias, F., & Yuval-Davis, N. (1989). *Woman-nation-state*. Springer.
- Ara, T. (2021). *Jūyō tochi nado chōsa kisei hōan ni taisuru kaicho seimei [President's statement opposing the Law for the Regulated Investigation of Significant Lands]*. Japan Federation of Bar Associations.
<https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/document/statement/year/2021/210602.html>
- Arakaki, M., Irei, S., Kasegawa, K., Nakamura, K., Onaha, Z., Nagamine, Y., & Teruya, S. (1946). *Resettlement to Chatan-Son—A Petition for* (R00165446B). Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Arasaki, M. (1995). *Okinawa hansen jinushi [The Okinawan anti-war landowners]*. Kōbunken.
- Arasaki, M. (2001). The struggle against military bases in Okinawa – its history and current situation. *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 2(1), 101–108.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14649370120039506>
- Arasaki, M. (2005). *Okinawa gendai shi [contemporary Okinawan History]*. Iwanami Shinsho.
- Ardrey, R. (1966). *The territorial imperative*. Atheneum New York.
- Ashley, A. J., & Touchton, M. (2016). Reconceiving Military Base Redevelopment: Land Use on Mothballed U.S. Bases. *Urban Affairs Review*, 52(3), 391–420.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087414568028>
- Babbie, E. R. (2015). *The practice of social research*. Nelson Education.
- Bagaeen, S. G. (2006). Brownfield sites as building blocks for sustainable urban environments: A view on international experience in redeveloping former military sites. *URBAN DESIGN International*, 11(2), 117–128.
- Barrows, R. G. (1946). *Okinawa Base Command Historical Report* (0000111510). US Army Corps of Engineers; Okinawa Prefectural Archives.

- Barry, J., & Porter, L. (2012). Indigenous recognition in state-based planning systems: Understanding textual mediation in the contact zone. *Planning Theory*, 11(2), 170–187. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1473095211427285>
- Bevacqua, M. L. (2017). Guam: Protests at the Tip of America's Spear. *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 116(1), 174–183. <https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-3749592>
- Bhandar, B. (2018). *Colonial lives of property: Law, land, and racial regimes of ownership*. Duke University Press.
- Blatman-Thomas, N. (2019). Reciprocal Repossession: Property as Land in Urban Australia. *Antipode*, 51(5), 1395–1415. <https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12570>
- Blomley, N. (2003). Law, property, and the geography of violence: The frontier, the survey, and the grid. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 93(1), 121–141.
- Bonn International Center for Conversion. (1995). *Report 4: Restructuring the US Military Bases in Germany: Scope, Impacts and Opportunities*. Bonn International Center for Conversion. https://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/report4.pdf
- Booth, D. P. (1959). *Single Area Installation Study, Okinawa (U) (211Bb023)* [Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense]. United States Department of Defense; Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Brighenti, A. (2006). On territory as relationship and law as territory. *Canadian Journal of Law & Society/La Revue Canadienne Droit et Société*, 21(2), 65–86.
- Brighenti, A. (2010). On Territorology: Towards a General Science of Territory. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 27(1), 52–72. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276409350357>

- Brighter, R. S. (1951). *United States Navy Military Government: Special Proclamation No. 4, Possessory Rights in Land* (Fukoku, fure, shirei nado ni kansuru shorui [documents concerning ordinances, proclamations and orders]). Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Buckmaster, E. (1946). *United States Navy military government: Special Proclamation No. 5* (Fukoku, fure, shirei nado ni kansuru shorui [documents concerning ordinances, proclamations and orders]).
- Buckner, S. B. (1945). *Tentative Operations Plan No. 1-45: Iceberg* (Okinawa ken kankōbutsu [Okinawa Prefectural Publication]). US Army, Headquarters Tenth Army; Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Bullard, R. D. (1993). *Confronting environmental racism: Voices from the grassroots*. South End Press.
- Burchett, G. P. (1955). *Statement of Justification of Land Occupied by Awase Meadows Country Club* (Dainiji sekai taisen bei shireibu bunshō [Documents of the WWII US Occupying Forces Headquarters]). United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus, Office of the Deputy Governor; Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Cachola, E.-R., Grandinetti, T., & Yamashiro, A. (2019). Demilitarizing Hawai'i's multiethnic solidarity: Decolonizing settler histories and learning our responsibilities to 'Āina. *Critical Ethnic Studies*, 5(1–2), 68. <https://doi.org/10.5749/jcritethnstud.5.1-2.0068>
- Cairns, N. A. (1946). *Memorandum No.22: Disposition of evacuated military establishments* (Beikokumin seifu to no ōfuku bunsho no kanri ni kansuru shorui [USCAR documents concerning the management of correspondence]). Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Camacho, K. L. (2011). Transoceanic flows: Pacific Islander interventions across the American empire. *Amerasia Journal*, 37(3), ix–xxxiv. <https://doi.org/10.17953/amer.37.3.m372lun15r8p420m>

- Camacho, K., & Ueunten, W. (2010). Determining Oceania: A Commentary on Indigenous Struggles in Guam and Okinawa. *International Journal of Okinawan Studies*, 1(2), 85–104.
- Chibana, M. (2018). An artful way of making Indigenous space. *Verge: Studies in Global Asias*, 4(2), 135–162. JSTOR.
- Chinin, U. (2013). *Shiranfūnā no bōryoku [The violence of feigned ignorance]*. Miraisha.
- Clinton, H., Panetta, L., Genba, K., & Tanaka, N. (2012). *Joint statement of the security consultative committee*. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/pdfs/joint_120427_en.pdf
- Cooley, A., & Marten, K. (2006). Base motives: The political economy of Okinawa's antimilitarism. *Armed Forces & Society*, 32(4), 566–583.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X05283557>
- Davis, S. (2011). The US military base network and contemporary colonialism: Power projection, resistance and the quest for operational unilateralism. *Political Geography*, 30(4), 215–224. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2011.04.003>
- Davis, S. (2017). Apparatuses of occupation: Translocal social movements, states and the archipelagic spatialities of power. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 42(1), 110–122. <https://doi.org/10.1111/tran.12152>
- Davis, S. (2021). Beyond obstruction: Blockades as productive reorientations. *Antipode*, n/a(n/a). <https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12722>
- Dillon, L. (2014). Race, waste, and space: Brownfield redevelopment and environmental justice at the hunters point shipyard. *Antipode*, 46(5), 1205–1221.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12009>

- Dillon, L. (2015). War's remains: Slow violence and the urbanization of military bases in California. *Environmental Justice*, 8(1), 1–5. <https://doi.org/10.1089/env.2014.0014>
- Dorries, H. J. (2012). *Rejecting the “false choice”: Foregrounding Indigenous sovereignty in planning theory and practice*. University of Toronto.
- Edney, M. H. (1994). British military education, mapmaking, and military “map-mindedness” in the later Enlightenment. *The Cartographic Journal*, 31(1), 14–20.
<https://doi.org/10.1179/caj.1994.31.1.14>
- Eisen, J. B. (1998). Brownfields policies for sustainable cities 1999 symposium: The nexus between environmental justice and sustainable development. *Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum*, 9(2), 187–230.
- Eisenhower, D. D. (1954). *Annual message to the congress on the state of the union, January 7th, 1954*. Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Museum & Boyhood Home.
https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/file/1954_state_of_the_union.pdf
- Elden, S. (2010). Land, terrain, territory. *Progress in Human Geography*, 34(6), 799–817.
- Endo, T. (2021, June 15). Okinawa police blasted for searching home of researcher exposing US military waste issues. *Mainichi Daily News*.
<https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20210615/p2a/00m/0na/019000c>
- 1945 *Military Government ordinances*, U.S. Naval Military Government Okinawa (1945) (testimony of Royal Firman).
- Firman, R. (1946). *Resettlement Information: Non-resident Population, by Districts*. US Naval Military Government; Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Fisch, A. G. Jr. (1988). *Military government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945-1950*. Center of Military History United States Army.

- Flyvbjerg, B. (1996). Commentary: The dark side of planning: Rationality and “realrationalitat.” In *Explorations in Planning Theory* (p. 562). Routledge.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five misunderstandings about case-study research. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 12(2), 219–245. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800405284363>
- Ford, R. T. (1999). Law’s territory (a history of jurisdiction). *Michigan Law Review*, 97(4), 843–930.
- Foucault, M. (2007). *Security, territory, population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78*. Springer.
- Foucault, M., Bertani, M., Fontana, A., Ewald, F., & Macey, D. (2003). “Society must be defended”: *Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976* (Vol. 1). Macmillan.
- Friedmann, J. (1987). *Planning in the public domain: From knowledge to action*. Princeton University Press.
- Friedmann, J. (1998). Planning theory revisited*. *European Planning Studies*, 6(3), 245–253. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09654319808720459>
- Fukumura, Y., & Matsuoka, M. (2002). Redefining security: Okinawa women’s resistance to US militarism. *Women’s Activism and Globalization: Linking Local Struggles and Transnational Politics*, 239–266.
- Gaiduk, R. A. (1959, April 13). *United States Return of Yonabaru Airfield to Ryukyuan Landowners* [Personal communication].
- Geddes, B. (1990). How the cases you choose affect the answers you get: Selection bias in comparative politics. *Political Analysis*, 2, 131–150. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/2.1.131>
- Geddes, B. (2003). *Paradigms and sand castles: Theory building and research design in comparative politics*. University of Michigan Press.

- Gillem, M. L. (2007). *America town: Building the outposts of empire*. University of Minnesota Press.
- Gilson, D. (2013, December 13). The budget deal is a big win for the Pentagon. *Mother Jones*. <https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/12/pentagon-budget-deal-charts-cuts/>
- Ginoza, A. (2015). *Dis/articulation of ethnic minority and Indigeneity in the decolonial feminist and independence movements in Okinawa*.
- Ginoza, A. (2022). Archipelagic feminisms: Critical interventions into the gendered coloniality of Okinawa. *Critical Ethnic Studies*, 7(2). <https://manifold.umn.edu/read/ces0702-07/section/1f30ad41-550a-4df2-9448-4b84f160090a>
- Goodwin, D. C. (1949). *Ryukyu Islands: Land tenure practices and problems* (GHQ/SCAP bunsho [GHQ/SCAP documents]). Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, National Resources Section; Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Agreement regarding the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (SOFA)*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (1960) (testimony of Government of Japan). <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/2.html>
- Okinawa ken ni okeru chūryū gunyouchi atochi no yūkōkatsu tekisetsuna riyō no suishin ni kansuru tokubetsu sochi-hō [Special Measures Act Concerning Promotion of Effective and Appropriate Utilization of Sites Formerly Used by Military Forces in Okinawa Prefecture]*, (1995) (testimony of Government of Japan). https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/search/elawsSearch/elaws_search/lsg0500/detail?lawId=407AC1000000102
- Graham, S. (2004). Postmortem city. *City*, 8(2), 165–196. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1360481042000242148>

- Green, J. P. (1949). *United States Military Government directive No. 3: Building permits* (Fukoku, fure, shirei nado ni kansuru shorui [documents concerning ordinances, proclamations and orders]). Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Gushiken, T. (2020). “*Senbotsusha no ikotsu ga fukumareteiru dosha wo Henoko shinkichi kensetsu ni tsukawasete ha arimasen*”: *Shūkyōsha kyōdō seimei he no kansha to rentai no meseiji* [Message of gratitude and solidarity for the joint statement from religion-affiliated individuals, “Do not permit the use of soil mixed with the remains of war dead for the construction of the new base at Henoko”]. Gamafuyā.
- Halvorsen, S. (2018). Decolonising territory: Dialogues with Latin American knowledges and grassroots strategies. *Progress in Human Geography*, 030913251877762. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132518777623>
- Halvorsen, S., Fernandes, B. M., & Torres, F. V. (2019). Mobilizing territory: Socioterritorial movements in comparative perspective. *Annals of the American Association of Geographers*, 109(5), 1454–1470. <https://doi.org/10.1080/24694452.2018.1549973>
- Hansen, K. N., Skopek, T. A., & Somma, M. (1997). The fundamentals of local policy implementation In military base redevelopment. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 27(4), 377–397. <https://doi.org/10.1177/027507409702700405>
- Harris, C. (2004). How did colonialism dispossess? Comments from an edge of empire. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 94(1), 165–182.
- Hau’ofa, E. (1994). Our sea of islands. *The Contemporary Pacific*, 6(1), 148–161. JSTOR.
- Havlick, D. G. (2011). Disarming nature: Converting military lands to wildlife refuges*. *Geographical Review*, 101(2), 183–200. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1931-0846.2011.00086.x>

- Headquarters Ryukyu Command. (1954). *History of United States land acquisition in Ryukyu Islands* (General Records, 1952-1969). Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
http://www2.archives.pref.okinawa.jp/opa_archive/data/S1060xx/319-00062-00014-003/319-00062-00014-003.pdf
- Heinrich, P. (2004). Language planning and language ideology in the Ryūkyū Islands. *Language Policy*, 3(2), 153–179.
- Higa, M. (1963). Okinawa: Recent political developments. *Asian Survey*, 3(9), 415–426.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/3023462>
- Hill, C. (2000). Measuring success in the redevelopment of former military bases: Evidence from a case study of the Truman Annex in Key West, Florida. *Economic Development Quarterly*, 14(3), 267–277. <https://doi.org/10.1177/089124240001400306>
- Hill Thanner, M., & Segal, M. W. (2008). When the military leaves and places change: Effects of the closing of an army post on the local community. *Armed Forces & Society*, 34(4), 662–681.
- Hirano, K. (2015). Thanatopolitics in the making of Japan's Hokkaido: Settler colonialism and primitive accumulation. *Critical Historical Studies*, 2(2), 191–218.
- Hodge, J. R. (1945). *Ryukyus: XXIV CORPS ACTION REPORT*. US Army; Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Hooks, G., & Smith, C. L. (2004). The treadmill of destruction: National sacrifice areas and Native Americans. *American Sociological Review*, 69(4), 558–575.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240406900405>
- Hughes, W. P. (1954). *Communique from William P. Hughes, US Department of State, to Thomas A. Neary, Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs and Military Government* (Beikoku

- kokuritsu kōbunshokan [National Archives and Records Administration]). Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Inoue, M. S. (2007). *Okinawa and the US military: Identity making in the age of globalization*. Columbia University Press.
- Iwama, D. (2021). Tides of dispossession: Property in militarized land and the coloniality of military base conversion in Okinawa. *Okinawan Journal of Island Studies*, 2, 93–114.
- Japan Ministry of Finance. (2001). *Zainichi gasshūkoku guntai no yōni kyōsuru kokuyu zaisan no toriatsukai ni tsuite [Concerning the management of national property provided to the United States Forces Japan]*.
https://www.mof.go.jp/about_mof/act/kokuji_tsuutatsu/tsuutatsu/TU-20010330-1322-14.pdf
- Japan Times. (2021, June 14). Okinawa activists fear land-purchase bill will hit anti-base movement. *The Japan Times*.
<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/06/14/national/crime-legal/onikawa-land-plan/>
- Johnson, C. (2000). *Blowback: The costs and consequences of American empire*. Macmillan.
- Johnson, C. (1996, February 16). U.S. Bases on Okinawa: A Case of Colonial Overlordship. *Los Angeles Times*. <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1996-02-16-me-36493-story.html>
- Just, C. R. (1944). Condemnation procedure during World War II. *George Washington Law Review*, 12(3), 286–301.
- Kageyama, H. (2016). Community building in Naha Shintoshin; Okinawa from the view of gender studies. *Geographical Review of Japan Studies*, B 89(1), 26–31.

- Kajihiro, K. (2009). Resisting militarization in Hawai'i. *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle Against US Military Posts*, C. Lutz, Ed, 299–331.
- Kakazu, H. (2012). *Island sustainability: Challenges and opportunities for Okinawa and other pacific islands in a globalized world*. Trafford Publishing.
- Kawamura, M. (2015). *Okinawa Defense Bureau's report on Okinawa City soccer field raises questions*. Citizens' Network for Biodiversity in Okinawa.
<http://okinawaoutreach.blogspot.com/2015/05/okinawa-defense-bureaus-report-on.html>
- Kibel, P. S. (1997). The urban nexus: Open space, brownfields, and justice. *Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review*, 25(3), 589–618.
- Kikuno, Y., & Norimatsu, S. O. (2010). Henoko, Okinawa: Inside the sit-in. *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 8(8). <https://apjif.org/-Kikuno-Yumiko/3306/article.html>
- Kim, C. J. (2018). Bases that leave: Consequences of US base closures and realignments in South Korea. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 48(2), 339–357.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2017.1397728>
- Kim, C. J., & Boas, T. C. (2019). Activist disconnect: Social movements, public opinion, and US military bases in East Asia. *Armed Forces & Society*, 0095327X19864127.
- Kinjo, I. (2019). *Uchinānchu toshite Nihonjin wo ikiru: Kichi hikitori de bōryoku wo tatsu [Being Okinawan, living as Japanese: Ending violence by claiming bases]*. Kaihō Press.
- Kitanakagusuku Awase Area Planning Association. (2018). *Awase tochi kukakuseiri jigyo no torikumi ni tsuite [Concerning the land readjustment efforts for the Awase land]* (p. 2) [Unpublished Brief].
- Kitanakagusuku Village. (2018). *Tōkei Kitanakagusuku [Kitanakagusuku statistics]*.
https://www.vill.kitanakagusuku.lg.jp/material/files/group/6/ikkatu_202204.pdf

- Kitanakagusuku Village. (2021). *Dai yonji kitanakagusuku son kokudo riyō keikaku* [Kitanakagusuku Village national land use plan: 4th edition].
- Kitanakagusuku Village. (2022). *Heisei 30 nenban kitanakagusuku tōkei shon* [2018 Kitnakagusuku Village Statistics Book].
<https://www.vill.kitanakagusuku.lg.jp/kakuka/kikaku/kikaku/data/1466.html>
- Kitaueda, T. (2020). (*kaisetsu*) *Henoko · henkō shinseishō no naiyō to montdai ten* [Overview: *Henoko: Contents and problems concerning the application document*]. Okinawa Citizens for Peace.
- Kohatsu, T. (2023). Looking through a territorial lens: Militarization and local fishers' everyday livelihoods in Okinawa. *Territory, Politics, Governance*, 1–18.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2022.2159509>
- Koya, N. (2002). Colonialism and nationalism: The view from Okinawa. *Okinawan Diaspora. Honolulu: U of Hawai'i*, 112–119.
- Krieger, M. G. (1956). *Acquisition of land in the Ryukyu Islands (memorandum for Chief, International Affairs Division, JAGO)* (General Records, 1952-1969). United States Army; Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Kushner, J. A. (2005). Brownfield redevelopment strategies in the United States. *Georgia State University Law Review*, 22(4), 857–876.
- Kuwae, C. (1955, August 29). *Petition to the compulsory land surveys*. Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Kyodo. (2016, October 19). Police officer dispatched from Osaka insults protesters in Okinawa. *The Japan Times*. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/10/19/national/police-officer-dispatched-osaka-insults-protesters-okinawa/>

- Lieban, R. W. (1955). The land system of Kudaka Island. *Sociologus*, 5(2), 150–156. JSTOR.
- Locke, J. (2000). *Concerning civil government, second essay*. Alex Catalogue.
- Lorenz, K. (1963). *On aggression*. Routledge.
- Lummis, C. D. (2019). We're not so good at running ... But we still know how to sit: On the political culture of Okinawa's anti-base sit-in. *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 17(23), 8.
- Makishi, Y. (2006). *US dream come true? The new Henoko sea base and Okinawan resistance*. 4(2), 4.
- Manabe, N. (2013). Music in Japanese antinuclear demonstrations: The evolution of a contentious performance model. *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 11(42–3).
- Martin, B. (2018). From camp town to international city: US military base expansion and local development in Pyeongtaek, South Korea. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 42(6), 967–985. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12698>
- Martin, B. (2022). American imperial sovereignty and militarised land dispossession during the Korean War. *Geopolitics*, 1–30. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2022.2124159>
- Masland, J. W. (1943). *The Ryukyu (Liuchiu Islands): A descriptive survey, including alternative solutions* (RG59 Records of the Office of Assistant Secretary and Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 1941-48, 50, Records Relating to the Far East, 1941-47). US Department of State, Division of Special Research; Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Matayoshi, S. (2010). *Proceedings of the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly*. <https://www2.pref.okinawa.jp/oki/gikairep1.nsf/GoZentai/20100404000000?OpenDocument#20100404070060>
- Matsumura, W. (2015). *The limits of Okinawa*. Duke University Press.

- Matsumura, W. (2020). Postwar reconfigurations of the US empire and global military occupation: Struggles against enclosure in Okinawa. *Journal of Historical Sociology*, n/a(n/a). <https://doi.org/10.1111/johs.12261>
- Matsuoka, M. (1997). Reintegrating the Fiatlands: A regional framework for military base conversion in the San Francisco bay area. *Capitalism Nature Socialism*, 8(1), 109–124. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10455759709358726>
- Matsushima, Y. (2019). Beigun seiken to okinawa [Military government and Okinawa]. *International Understanding (Kokusai Rikai)*, 44, 51–76.
- McCormack, G. (2016). Japan's problematic prefecture – Okinawa and the US-Japan relationship. *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 14(17), 28.
- McCormack, G., & Norimatsu, S. O. (2018). *Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- McCurry, J. W. (2003). Military base redevelopment: From swords to ploughshares. *Site Selection Magazine*, 48(6). <https://siteselection.com/issues/2003/nov/p688/>
- McMorris, C. H. (1945). *Establishment of ADJOURN, directive for base development plan* (Dai Niji sekai taishen bei shireibu bunshō [Documents of the WWII US Occupying Forces Headquarters]). Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Ocean Areas; Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Mitchell, J. (2012). Agent orange at Okinawa's Futenma Base in 1980s. *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 10(25), 6.
- Mitchell, J. (2013a). Okinawa—The Pentagon's toxic junk heap of the Pacific. *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 11(47). <https://apjff.org/2013/11/47/Jon-Mitchell/4039/article.html>

- Mitchell, J. (2016). Contamination at largest US Air Force base in Asia: Kadena, Okinawa. *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 14(9), 15.
- Mitchell, J. (2020). *Poisoning the Pacific: The US Military's secret dumping of plutonium, chemical weapons, and agent orange*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Mitchell, J. (2013b, December 4). Pollution rife on Okinawa's U.S.-returned base land. *The Japan Times Online*. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/12/04/national/pollution-rife-on-okinawas-u-s-returned-base-land/>
- Mitchell, J. (2015, September 16). *Pentagon blocks report on "toxic contamination" at base outside Okinawa capital*. The Japan Times.
<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2015/09/16/issues/pentagon-blocks-report-toxic-contamination-base-outside-okinawa-capital/>
- Miyagi, A., Tashiro, Y., Urano, K., & Nakato, N. (2019). *Waste of the U.S. Military in the returned land of Yanbaru (yanbaru henkan atochi ni okeru beigun heikibutsu)*. Informed-Public Project Okinawa. <http://ipp.okinawa/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ce95c812e2d55f36ed48660b39dda4f3.pdf>
- Miyagi, E. (1987). The Land Problem (1952-1958). In *A comprehensive study on U.S. military government on Okinawa (an interim report)* (pp. 36–87). College of Law and Letters, University of the Ryukyus.
- Miyagi, E., & Takamiya, H. (1983). *Okinawa reskishi chizu [The historical atlas of Okinawa]*. Kashiwa Shobō.
- Mizuno, N. (2009). Early Meiji policies towards the Ryukyus and the Taiwanese aboriginal territories. *Modern Asian Studies*, 43(3), 683–739. JSTOR.
- Mondale, W. (1996, December 3). *U.S.-Japan relations*. Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, Tokyo Japan. <https://www.c-span.org/video/?77130-1/us-japan-relations>

Mori, K. (2022). Resilience of the Community against Environmental Pollution: The Knowledge Production Process of Local Activism on PFAS Contamination on US Military Bases in Okinawa. *Okinawan Journal of Island Studies*, 3(2), 159–175.

Circulation of civilians, no. General Administrative Order No.1 (1946).

Murray Li, T. (2014). What is land? Assembling a resource for global investment. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 39(4), 589–602.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/tran.12065>

Nagamine, M. (2019). Residents near MCAS Futenma concerned by high concentrations of PFOS/PFOA in water, U.S. military refuses on-base investigation. *Ryukyu Shimpo*.

<http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/2019/04/23/30262/>

Nakachi, S. (1993). The features of “rent in and out of farmland” under the Jiwari system in Okinawa in the Meiji era. *The Agricultural History Society of Japan*, 26.

https://doi.org/10.18966/joah.26.0_1

Nam, C. (2006). Relocating the U.S. forces in South Korea: Strained alliance, emerging partnership in the changing defense posture. *Asian Survey*, 46(4), 615–631.

<https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2006.46.4.615>

Namba, T. (2016). Conversion of the closed military bases led by “kyoyukai as associaiton” in Okinawa: The concept and reality of kyoyukai (). *Japanese Sociological Review*, 67(4), 383–399.

Na’puti, T. R. (2019). Archipelagic rhetoric: Remapping the Marianas and challenging militarization from “A Stirring Place.” *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, 16(1), 4–25. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14791420.2019.1572905>

- Na'puti, T. R., & Bevacqua, M. L. (2015). Militarization and resistance from Guåhan: Protecting and defending Pàgat. *American Quarterly*, 67(3), 837–858.
<https://doi.org/10.1353/aq.2015.0040>
- National Diet Library. (2021). Okinawa no beigun shisetsu · kuiki no henkan jōkyō [The current state of military facility and area return in Okinawa]. *Issue Brief*, 1152, 14.
- Nebolon, J. (2017). “ Life Given Straight from the Heart”: Settler Militarism, Biopolitics, and Public Health in Hawai'i during World War II. *American Quarterly*, 69(1), 23–45.
- Nelson, C. T. (2008). *Dancing with the dead*. Duke University Press.
- Nimitz, C. W. (1945a). *United States Navy Military Government: Proclamation No. 1* (Military Government Proclamations, 1945-1950). Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Nimitz, C. W. (1945b). *United States Navy military government: Proclamation no. 7. Custodian of property* (Military Government Proclamations, 1945-1950). Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Norimatsu, S. O. (2011). Hatoyama's confession: The myth of deterrence and the failure to move a marine base outside Okinawa. *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 9(9).
<https://apjpf.org/2011/9/9/Satoko-Norimatsu/3495/article.html>
- Ogden, D. A. D. (1953). *Compensation for use of real estate within military areas* (Fukoku, fure, shirei nado ni kansuru shorui [documents concerning ordinances, proclamations and orders]). Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Okinawa Defense Bureau. (2010). *Haisai*. Japan Ministry of Defense.
<https://www.mod.go.jp/rdb/okinawa/05haisai/h22/pdf/128.pdf>
- Okinawa Defense Bureau. (2013). *Haisai*. Japan Ministry of Defense.
<https://www.mod.go.jp/rdb/okinawa/05haisai/h25/pdf/25.4haisai144.pdf>

- Okinawa Defense Bureau. (2020). *Shisetsu tanka hyō: Reiwa gannen [Facility price table for 2019]* [Unpublished Report]. Japan Ministry of Defense.
- Okinawa General Bureau. (2019). *Kyanpu zukeran (awase gorufu jō chiku): Henkan atochi no gaiyō nado [Camp Zukeran (Awase Golf Course area): Outline of returned land redevelopment]*. 1.
- Okinawa Prefectural Government. (1995). *Okinawa: The 50 Years of the Postwar Era*.
- Okinawa Prefectural Government. (1996). *Kichi henkan akushon puroguramu sōan [Draft base return action program]*. Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Okinawa Prefectural Government. (2018a). *Keizai keisan kara mita ken keizai no ugoki [Movement of the prefectural economy from an economic calculation perspective]*.
Okinawa Prefecture Planning Department Statistics Section.
<https://www.pref.okinawa.jp/toukeika/accounts/2018/acc4.pdf>
- Okinawa Prefectural Government. (2018b). *Okinawa ken no beigunkichi no gimon wo wakariyasuku kaisetsu: Okinawa kara tsutaetai beigunkichi no hanashi [An easy to understand explanation regarding your concerns about American bases in Okinawa]*.
- Okinawa Prefectural Government. (2018c). *What Okinawa wants you to understand about the U.S. Military Bases*. Okinawa Prefectural Government, Washington D.C. Office.
- Okinawa Prefectural Government. (2021). *Okinawa ken no beigun oyobi jietai kichi tōkei shiryōshō [Statistics yearbook: US Military and Japan Self-Defense Forces bases in Okinawa]*. <https://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/syogai/toukeishiryousyur2.html>
- Okinawa Prefectural Government. (2022). *Okinawa ken no beigun oyobi jietai kichi tōkei shiryōshō [Statistics yearbook: US Military and Japan Self-Defense Forces bases in Okinawa]*.
https://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/documents/r3_toukei_1_gaikyo2.pdf

- Okinawa Prefecture Military Landowners Federation [Okinawa Ken Gunyōchi nado Jinushikai Rengōkai]. (2015). *Gunyōchi ryō ga Okinawa keizai he oyobosu keizai kōka chōsa [An economic impact survey of the effect of military land fees on the Okinawan economy]* [Survey].
- Okinawa Prefecture Military Landowners Federation [Okinawa Ken Gunyōchi nado Jinushikai Rengōkai]. (2018). *2018 Landowners Federation Seminar Report (tochiren seminā 2018 hōkokusho)*.
- Okinawa Prefecture Military Landowners Federation [Okinawa Ken Gunyōchi nado Jinushikai Rengōkai]. (2019). *Tochiren seminā 2019 hōkokusho [2019 Landowners Federation seminar report]*. <https://www.okinawa-tochiren.jp/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/918bf356906efae1753e809ba083b5f3.pdf>
- Okinawa Times. (2012, March 23). (Awase) hikiwatashi enki / bōeikyoku tōboku nado mitsukaru [(Awase) Handover delayed / Defense Bureau discovers fallen trees and the like]. *Okinawa Times*.
- Okinawa Times. (2019, February 3). 「Min'i」 jitsugen he: Jyūmin tōhyō no genba kara (22) Nago shimin tōhyō tōhyō kekka to gyaku no handan [Realizing the peoples' will from the site of the referendum: The results of the Nago Citizens' Referendum and an opposite judgement]. *Okinawa Times*. <https://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/381072>
- Onaga, T. (2017). *Nichibei chī kyōtei no minaoshi ni kansuru yōsei [A request concerning revisions to the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement]*.
- Osorio, J. K. (2014). Hawaiian souls: The movement to stop the US military bombing of Kaho'olawe. In N. Goodyear-Ka'opua, I. Hussey, E. Kahunawaika'ala, & K. Wright (Eds.), *A Nation Rising: Hawaiian Movements for Life, Land, and Sovereignty* (pp. 141–142).

- Ota, M. (1987). The U.S. occupation of Okinawa and postwar reforms in Japan proper. In R. E. Ward & Y. Sakamoto (Eds.), *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation*. University of Hawaii Press.
- Ota, M. (2000). *Okinawa no ketsudan [Okinawa's determination]*. The Asahi Shinbun Company.
- Ota, M., Miyagi, E., & Hosaka, H. (1987). *A comprehensive study on U.S. Military Government on Okinawa (an Interim report)*. College of Law and Letters, University of the Ryukyus.
<http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12000/13849>
- Palz, M. (2021). Okinawan coral politics, Henoko Base construction and a Japanese political strategy of ignorance. *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 19(24).
<https://apjif.org/2021/24/Palz.html>
- Pasternak, S. (2014). Jurisdiction and settler colonialism: Where do laws meet? *Canadian Journal of Law & Society / La Revue Canadienne Droit et Société*, 29(2), 145–161.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/cls.2014.5>
- Ponzini, D., & Vani, M. (2014). Planning for military real estate conversion: Collaborative practices and urban redevelopment projects in two Italian cities. *Urban Research & Practice*, 7(1), 56–73. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17535069.2014.885743>
- Porter, L. (2016). *Unlearning the colonial cultures of planning*. Routledge.
- Pratt, M. L. (1991). Arts of the contact zone. *Profession*, 33–40.
- United States Navy Military Government: Proclamation No. 4, (1946).
- Price, M. (1956). *Report of a special subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee House of Representatives following an inspection tour October 14 to November 23 1955* (Seifu hōkokushorui [Government Reports]). United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services; Okinawa Prefectural Archives.

- Rabinow, P. (1989). *French modern: Norms and forms of the social environment*. University of Chicago Press.
- Raffestin, C. (2012). Space, territory, and territoriality (S. A. Butler, Trans.). *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 30(1), 121–141. <https://doi.org/10.1068/d21311>
- Razack, S. (2015). *Dying from improvement: Inquests and inquiries into indigenous deaths in custody*. University of Toronto Press.
- Facilities and areas and the status of United States Armed Forces in Korea: Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea*, (1966) (testimony of Republic of Korea).
- Ridgeway, M. (1952). *Directive for United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands* (Administrative Files, 1967-1970). US Army Far East Command; Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Cairo Declaration*, (1943) (testimony of Franklin D Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-Shek, & Winston Churchill). https://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryō/01/002_46/002_46tx.html
- Routledge, P. (2015). Territorialising movement: The politics of land occupation in Bangladesh. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 40(4), 445–463. <https://doi.org/10.1111/tran.12087>
- Roy, A. (2006). Praxis in the time of empire. *Planning Theory*, 5(1), 7–29. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1473095206061019>
- Roy, A. (2017). Dis/possessive collectivism: Property and personhood at city's end. *Geoforum*, 80, A1–A11. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2016.12.012>

Rumsfeld, D., Rice, C., Machimura, N., & Ohno, Y. (2005). *Transformation and realignment for the future*. United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee.

<https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html>

Ryukyu Shimpō. (1955, June 21). Military Base and Farming Villages. *Ryukyu Shimpō*. Okinawa Prefectural Archives.

Ryukyu Shimpō. (2014, July 3). Henoko oki, seigen suiiki kakudai seifu kanpō kokuji

[Government publication announces the expansion of the water exclusion zone off-shore of Henoko coming into effect]. *Ryukyu Shimpō*. <https://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/preentry-227934.html>

Ryukyu Shimpō. (2017, May 14). *Okinawa no futando, hondo no 209 bai fukki 45nen, kichi naki shima tōku* [Far from an island of no bases; Forty-five years after reversion, Okinawa's share of the burden 209-times that of the mainland]. 琉球新報デジタル.

<https://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/entry-495450.html>

Ryukyu Shimpō. (2019, June 9). Okinawa kengai zaijū no gunyō jinushi ga 6 nen de 1.4 baizō 18 nendo wa zentai no 9%, teikinri no antei shisan de tōshi mokuteki mo [The number of military landowners living outside Okinawa doubles 1.4 times in 6 years: Reasons include stable assets with low interest rates for investment purposes]. *Ryukyu Shimpō*.

<https://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/entry-933265.html>

Ryukyu Shimpō. (2020, November 29). 「Henoko」 sekkei henkō ni 1man 7857 ken ikensho

Okinawa ken ga kakuteichi, gaikoku go jogai [17,857 petitions against the Henoko design change confirmed, excluding foreign languages]. *Ryukyu Shimpō*.

<https://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/entry-1233044.html>

Sakuma, S. (2021). Souvenirs of solidarity: Toward an Okinawa-centered politics of demilitarization. *The Asia-Pacific Journal| Japan Focus*, 19(8), 15.

- Sakurai, K. (2013). Environmental restoration of former US military bases in Okinawa. *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 11(47). <https://apjif.org/2013/11/47/Sakurai-Kunitoshi/4038/article.html>
- Sandercock, L. (2004). Commentary: Indigenous planning and the burden of colonialism. *Planning Theory & Practice*, 5(1), 118–124.
- Sassen, S. (2013). When territory deborders territoriality. *Territory, Politics, Governance*, 1(1), 21–45.
- Sato, E., & Nixon, R. (1969). *Joint Statement of Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and U.S. President Richard Nixon*. Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard Nixon. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1969-book1/pdf/PPP-1969-book1.pdf>
- Shikiya, K. (1946). *A petition for relief for the Naha people residing within Ginoza District* (Beikokumin seifu to no ōfuku bunsho no kanri ni kansuru shorui [USCAR documents concerning the management of correspondence]). Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Shimabuku, A. (2010). *Securing Okinawa for Miscegenation: A Historical and Literary Discourse Analysis of Amerasians in Okinawa, 1945-2000* [Cornell University]. <https://ecommons.cornell.edu/handle/1813/14805>
- Shimabuku, A. (2012a). Sovereignty and performativity in the wake of a crumbling Japanese empire: Okinawa's all-island struggle. *International Journal of Okinawan Studies*, 3(1), 63–80.
- Shimabuku, A. (2012b). Transpacific colonialism: An intimate view of transnational activism in Okinawa. *The New Centennial Review*, 12(1,). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41949770>
- Shimabuku, A. M. (2019). *Alegal: Biopolitics and the unintelligibility of Okinawan life*. Fordham University Press.

- Shoemaker, J. A. (2003). Like snow in the spring time: Allotment, fractionation, and the Indian land tenure problem. *Wisconsin Law Review*, 729.
- Simbulan, R. G. (2009). Peoples movement responses to evolving US military activities in the Philippines. In C. Lutz (Ed.), *The bases of empire: The global struggle against US military posts* (pp. 145–180).
- Smith, L. T. (2013). *Decolonizing methodologies: Research and indigenous peoples*. Zed Books Ltd.
- Sorensen, A. (2000). Land readjustment and metropolitan growth: An examination of suburban land development and urban sprawl in the Tokyo metropolitan area. *Progress in Planning*, 53(4), 217–330. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-9006\(00\)00002-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-9006(00)00002-7)
- Stanger-Ross, J. (2008). Municipal colonialism in Vancouver: City planning and the conflict over Indian reserves, 1928-1950s. *Canadian Historical Review*, 89(4), 541–580.
- Stitt and Hemmendinger. (1958). *The pre-treaty Ryukyus land claims* (RG59 Office of the Legal Advisor, East Asian Affairs Branch, Subject and Country Files, 1941-62) [Legal Report]. The Okinawan Association to Acquire Compensation for Damages Prior to Peace Treaty; Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Taira, K. (1997). Troubled national identity: The Ryukyuans/Okinawans. In M. Weiner (Ed.), *Japan's minorities: The illusion of homogeneity* (pp. 140–177).
- Taira, L. T. (1955). *Memorandum for Chief, Acquisition Branch concerning concurrence to conduct topographic survey on lands located in Ginowan Son*. Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- Takamiya, H., Hudson, M. J., Yonenobu, H., Kurozumi, T., & Toizumi, T. (2016). An extraordinary case in human history: Prehistoric hunter-gatherer adaptation to the

- islands of the Central Ryukyus (Amami and Okinawa archipelagos), Japan. *The Holocene*, 26(3), 408–422. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0959683615609752>
- Takayama, Y. & Miyū (Directors). (2019, October 5). *Mayo Base (mayo kichi)* [Video]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O_1LzXphxUk
- Takazato, S. (2015). The past and future of Unai, sisters in Okinawa. In *Voices from the Japanese Women's Movement* (pp. 133–143). Routledge.
- Takazato, S., Miyagi, H., Minamoto, H., Francis, C., Akibayashi, K., & Fukumura, Y. (2016). *Postwar U.S. Military crimes against women in Okinawa 1945.4—2016.5* (p. 30). Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence.
- Tamaki D. (2022). *Disapproval of application of change in the design of the reclamation work of the Futenma Replacement Facility construction*. Okinawa Prefectural Government. <https://dc-office.org/post/1606>
- Tanji, M. (2007). *Myth, protest and struggle in Okinawa*. Routledge.
- Taylor, P. J. (1994). The state as container: Territoriality in the modern world-system. *Progress in Human Geography*, 2(18), 151–162.
- Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land., Convention (IV), The Hague, 18 (1907). <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=4D47F92DF3966A7EC12563CD002D6788>
- Tobias, J. K., & Richmond, C. (2016). Gimiigiwemin: Putting knowledge translation into practice with Anishinaabe communities. *International Journal of Indigenous Health*, 11(1), 228–243.

- Tomiak, J. (2017). Contesting the Settler City: Indigenous Self-Determination, New Urban Reserves, and the Neoliberalization of Colonialism. *Antipode*, 49(4), 928–945.
- Tomochi, M. (2017). Zenkichi tekyo oyobi hojokin teppai go no ryūkyū (okinawa) keizai ni kansuru kōsatsu [A study of the Ryukyuan (Okinawan) economy after the elimination of all military bases and subsidies]. *Journal of the Association of Comprehensive Studies for Independence of the Lew Chewans: ACSILs*, 3.
- Tuan, Y.-F. (1979). Space and place: Humanistic perspective. In *Philosophy in geography* (pp. 387–427). Springer.
- Tuck, E., & Yang, K. W. (2012). Decolonization is not a metaphor. *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society*, 1(1), 1–40.
- Uemura, H. (2003). The colonial annexation of Okinawa and the logic of international law: The formation of an 'indigenous people' in East Asia. *Japanese Studies*, 23(2), 213–222.
- Ueunten, W. I. (2010). Rising up from a sea of discontent: The 1970 Koza uprising in US-occupied Okinawa. *Militarized Currents: Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific*, 91–124.
- Ugarte Urzua, M. (2019). *Normative worlds clashing: State planning, indigenous self-determination, and the possibilities of legal pluralism in Chile*. University of British Columbia.
- Treaty of Peace with Japan, no. 1832 (1951).
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20136/volume-136-i-1832-english.pdf>
- United Nations (Director). (2015). *17th meeting 30th regular session of Human Rights Council*.
<http://webtv.un.org/watch/item4-general-debate-17th-meeting-30th-regular-session-of-human-rights-council/4499977721001/?term=csw&lan=original>

United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands. (1953). *CA ordinance No. 109 land acquisition procedure* (Fukoku, fure, shirei nado ni kansuru shorui [documents concerning ordinances, proclamations and orders]). Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
http://www2.archives.pref.okinawa.jp/opa/OPA600_RESULT_BUNSYO.aspx?cont_cd=A000007661&src_keyword=ordinance&keyword_hit=ordinance

United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands. (1955). *Factual Data Concerning Specific Incidents and Conditions Related to the Okinawa Land Problem* (ULE0000309). Okinawa Prefectural Archives.

Unknown. (1956). *Actual conditions of the land released by the military* (02-B-14-02). National Archives and Records Administration; Okinawa Prefectural Archives.

US Army, Corps of Engineers. (1946). *Okinawa master plan: Base development*. Okinawa Prefectural Archives.

US Department of Defense & Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (1996). *SACO final report*.
<https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco1.html>

US Department of the Army. (1945). *Tenth Army action reports: Ryukyus campaign* (Dainiji sekai taisen bei shireibu bunshō [Documents of the WWII US Occupying Forces Headquarters]). Okinawa Prefectural Archives.

US Department of the Army. (1958). *Digest of new land policy: Ryukyu Islands*. Okinawa Prefectural Archives.

U.S. DoD. (2013). *Okinawa ni okeru zainichi beigun shisetsu chīku ni kansuru tōgō keikaku [Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa]*. United States Department of Defense.

- U.S. DoD. (2019). *DoD base realignment and closure*. United States Department of Defense.
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/05_BRAC/FY2023_BRAC_Overview.pdf
- US Navy. (1954). *Master plan, Okinawa, part "B"* (Ryukyu kankei bunsho [The Ryukyus Papers]). Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
- US Office of Economic Adjustment. (1990). *Civilian reuse of former military bases: Summary of completed military base economic adjustment projects* (p. 39).
<https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA229443.pdf>
- Vine, D. (2015). *Base nation: How US military bases abroad harm America and the world*. Metropolitan Books.
- Von Uexküll, J. (1934). *A foray into the worlds of animals and humans: With a theory of meaning*. U of Minnesota Press.
- Wegman, R. A., & Bailey, H. G. Jr. (1994). The challenge of cleaning up military wastes when U.S. bases are closed. *Ecology Law Quarterly*, 4, 865–946.
- Winichakul, T. (1997). *Siam mapped: A history of the geo-body of a nation*. University of Hawaii Press.
- Wolfe, P. (1994). Nation and miscegenation: Discursive continuity in the post-Mabo era. *Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice*, 3.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/23171805>
- Wolfe, P. (2006). Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native. *Journal of Genocide Research*, 8(4), 387–409.
- Woodward, R. (2004). *Military geographies* (Vol. 45). John Wiley & Sons.

- Woodward, R. (2014). Military landscapes: Agendas and approaches for future research. *Progress in Human Geography*, 38(1), 40–61.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132513493219>
- Yamazaki, T. (2003). Politicizing territory: The transformation of land struggle in Okinawa, 1956. *Jimbun Kenkyu*, 54, 31–65.
- Yamazaki, T. (2005). A south in the north: The politics of democracy in Okinawa, Japan. *The Politics of Democracy in the Global South*, 41.
- Yanase, N. (2013). *Understanding kukaku-seiri (land readjustment)* (p. 11). Ashikaga Institute of Technology. <https://www2.ashitech.ac.jp/civil/yanase/lr-system/UNDERSTANDING%20KUKAKU.pdf>
- Yeo, A. (2010). US military base realignment in South Korea. *Peace Review*, 22(2), 113–120.
- Yiftachel, O. (1998). Planning and social control: Exploring the dark side. *Journal of Planning Literature*, 12(4), 395–406. <https://doi.org/10.1177/088541229801200401>
- Yiftachel, O. (2000). Social Control, Urban Planning and Ethno-class Relations: Mizrahi Jews in Israel's "Development Towns." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 24(2), 418–438. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.00255>
- Yiftachel, O. (2006). *Ethnocracy: Land and identity politics in Israel/Palestine* (2853621). University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Yin, R. K. (2003). *Case study research: Design and methods*.
- Yokota, R. M. (2015). The Okinawan (Uchinānchu) indigenous movement and its implications for intentional/international action. *Amerasia Journal*, 41(1), 55–73.
- Yonetani, J. (2000). Ambiguous traces and the politics of sameness: Placing Okinawa in Meiji Japan. *Japanese Studies*, 20(1), 15–31.

Yoneyama, L. (2016). *Cold war ruins*. Duke University Press.

Yoshikawa, H., & Kawamura, M. (2019). *NGO evaluation and recommendations regarding the nomination of NPOI for world natural heritage*.

Zibechi, R. (2012). *Territories in resistance: A cartography of Latin American social movements*. AK press.