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As the Guns Turn Inward: Civilian Management of Security Agents in Internal Armed Conflict

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by

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Dedicated to Louis Boudreaux, the first scholar in my life

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

As the Guns Turn Inward: Civilian Management of Security Agents in Internal Armed Conflict

by

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When internal armed threats emerge, capable of holding territory, threatening the lives of citizens and undermining national sovereignty, every armed bureaucracy of the state becomes relevant. This includes an actor whose internal deployment has historically threatened democracy: the military. This study undertakes comparative analyses of two democracies which have defied expectation, Colombia and Mexico, to understand what civilian governments are able to do once military guns turn inward. I find that the presence of a viable alternatives to the military, which I describe with the term "alternative security forces" curbs military autonomy when this rival agent enjoys the same level of access to the commander-in-chief which the armed forces does. To understand the dynamics between civilian governments, militaries, and alternative security forces, I employ a multi-agent adaptation of the principal agent framework. I find that disputes between militaries and alternative security forces not only provide opportunities for civilians to increase their management over security policy, but also incentivize civilians to become more knowledgeable and proactive regarding internal security.

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A Tale of Two Capitols: The Sieges of Mitú and Culiacán

On November 1, 1998, the citizens of Mitú, Colombia woke to gunfire and mortar shells. Mitú, the capital of the Vaupés department, was latest target of a resurging and consolidating Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia (FARC). The leftist insurgency had in recent years entered the vacuum left behind by the "grand cartels" of Medellín and Calí, swelling its ranks, seizing control of the cocaine trade, and encircling the national capital of Bogotá in with plans to demoralize the armed forces prior to an invasion of the city. The first targets in the taking of Mitú were not soldiers. Instead, the FARC followed on a strategy it had developed and reused since the inception of its insurgency in 1964: launching the assault on Mitú by first taking its police stations (Policía Nacional 2018).[1] "We were prepared to fight with firearms, but the guerrillas attacked us with rockets and gas cylinders" one police officer recounted (ibid). The FARC's assault on Mitú proved sophisticated and brutal. Remembered as "the Night of the Jaguars," the invasion of Mitú by the FARC was the first time a guerrilla group had taken control of a departmental capital. A force of 1,500 guerrillas met a force 120 police officers, who overwhelming and capturing in them in the early hours of the invasion.

On October 17, 2019, the citizens of Culiacán, Mexico faced a similar crisis. After the capture of Ovidio Guzmán, son of El Chapo Guzman, the Cartel of Sinaloa laid siege to the city, capital of the state of Sinaloa. Like the FARC, the Cartel of Sinaloa targeted armed agents of the state. The cartel's reprisal against the state saw an alarmingly swift

[1] "Mitú: La Noche de los Jaguares." Policía Nacional de Colombia. 2018.

mobilization of 700 sicarios, who overwhelmed the national guard and even seized the barracks where the families of army personnel were living.[2] Images broadcast across Mexican media showed a degree of sophistication in the cartel's weaponry, from automatic rifles to armored vehicles, which allowed it to overwhelm Mexico's National Guard and Army alike.[3] A combined joint operation by the Colombian Army and National Police was able to retake Mitú and force the FARC out of the city, but the government of Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador ultimately opted to release Ovidio Guzmán.[4] As of the time of writing, there is little indication that there is any serious effort to recapture Ovidio Guzmán.

The captures of Mitú and Culiacán, two subnational capital cities, are vivid illustrations of the unenviable moments governments face in internal armed conflicts. When an armed threat can convert portions of state territory into violent fiefdoms, challenging sovereignty and threatening the lives of citizens alike, governments must respond. Letting armed challengers go unchecked allows them to gather resources, swell their ranks and consolidate territorial control (see Stedman 1997).[5] In this time, the lives of

[2] "Durante Operativo En Culiacán, Sicarios Atacaron Unidad Habitacional Militar." Uno TV, October 30, 2019. https://www.unotv.com/noticias/portal/nacional/detalle/durante-operativo-en-culiacan-sicarios-atacaron-unidad-militar-164384/.

[3] "Weapons Used by Sinaloa Cartel Sicarios in Culiacán, Mexico - Armament Research Services (ARES)." Armament Research Services (ARES) - Armament Research Services is a specialist technical intelligence consultancy offering arms & munitions research/analysis services., October 18, 2019. https://armamentresearch.com/weapons-used-by-cartel-sicarios-in-culiacan-mexico/.

[4] "El Chapo: Mexican President Says Police 'Did Right' to Free Drug Lord's Son." BBC News. BBC, October 18, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-50101739.

[5] See Stedman's article for an assessment of how armed groups can abuse state inaction. Though Stedman's analysis is focused on peace agreement processes, there is little reason groups could not exploit state inaction even if a lack of response is concurrent with a peace process.
Stedman, Stephen John. "Spoiler problems in peace processes." International security 22, no. 2 (1997): 5-53.
As this study will show, the Colombian State learned exactly this lesson in its talks with the FARC in Caguán.

citizens are threatened, and the sovereignty of the state is contested. This is an untenable position for any state, let alone a democratic one. But across the world democracies, faced with a high-capacity internal threat must rely on an actor who can also pose a threat to human security and democratic stability: their military.

My dissertation turns to a region where internal deployment of the military has long been a precondition for a military coup: Latin America. Scholars, particularly those analyzing the cold war politics of the region, have made very clear the dangers of asking militaries to begin repressing the citizens they would otherwise protect (Nordlinger 1997; Stepan & Van Oystaeyen 1988).[6] The region is rife of cases where militaries came to resent their missions, as well as the authorities and populations who granted them these missions (Nordlinger 1977). It is little surprise then that skepticism regarding the internal deployment of the military remains a feature of Latin American scholarship and, on occasion, politics (Diamint 2015).[7] Not only might militaries pose a threat to democratic governance once internally deployed, but they also pose a very real risk to the human rights of citizens (Pion-Berlin 2017).[8]

From 1999-2002, the FARC used its "safe zones" to launch attacks against the government and solidify its control of the cocaine trade.

[6] Nordlinger, Eric A. Soldiers in politics: military coups and governments. Prentice Hall, 1977.
Stepan, A. C., & Van Oystaeyen, F. Rethinking military politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton University Press, 1988.

[7] Diamint, Rut. "A new militarism in Latin America." Journal of Democracy 26, no. 4 (2015): 155-168.

[8] Pion-Berlin, David. "A tale of two missions: Mexican military police patrols versus high-value targeted operations." *Armed Forces & Society* 43, no. 1 (2017): 53-71.

But the grim and puzzling reality for many nations is that internal military deployment is not a death knell to democracy, but instead interwoven with the democratization process. The following table summarizes the most similar conditions of two such Latin American democracies: Colombia and Mexico. Both nations have faced high levels of internal armed threats, though Colombia has faced a much greater variety of threats.[9] Both are loci of the international war on drugs, and both have been the receipt of US aid and pressure during these armed conflicts. And in both cases, democracy endures alongside the internal armed deployment of these armed forces.

[9] Colombia and Mexico, it may be argued, face armed threats of two entirely different natures. Comparing the two cases does, after all, risk an over-simplification of the dynamics of violence in both countries by equating militarized drug cartels with political insurgencies. These two types of threats do indeed have distinct aims: insurgencies seek to overthrow the state and control governance, while militarized drug cartels are primarily profit-seeking. Colombia has faced partisan insurgencies such as the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN), right-wring paramilitary groups such as the "United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia" (AUC), and the "grand cartels" of Calí and Medellín. In comparison, Mexico's threats have been primarily criminal in nature, though the ability of these groups to affect governance through bribes and through violence has demonstrated that they are hardly "apolitical" (Ley & Trejo).

Table 1: Security Conditions in Colombia and Mexico

Case	Types of Internal Armed Threats	Influence of War on Drugs	Military Internal Deployment	Level of Civilian Management Power
Colombia	Militarized Drug Cartels; Leftist Insurgencies; Right-Wing Paramilitaries	US pressure to militarize anti-drug operations beginning in the 1960s	High	High
Mexico	Militarized Drug Cartels	US pressure to militarize anti-drugs operations since the 1960s	High	Low

However, the outcome of interest this dissertation varies. Established wisdom in civil-military relations (CMR) literature holds that once an internal armed threat emerges, and militaries are deployed to fight them, civilians will lose power over their armed forces. Though it is not the case that civilians will lose their political supremacy over the armed forces, they are expected to cede control of military operations, doctrines and even policy drafting (Desch 2001). And yet I have found that in Colombia, civilians have continuously inserted themselves into security politics since 1991. I find in Mexico that civilians have struggled to institutionalize their management of the armed forces, and that most have

elected to simply shirk their responsibilities as commanders in chief and grant the military wide-reaching autonomy. Why?

This dissertation finds that while the relationships between governments and their militaries is usually dyadic, the conditions of internal armed conflicts introduce a third actor. In internal armed conflicts, every armed state bureaucracy becomes relevant, especially those who likewise report to the president or chief executive. Centrally controlled police and paramilitary forces, who I call alternative security forces (ASFs) constitute an important third actor, who under the right conditions increase civilian management power. When ASFs are *viable* alternatives capable of providing security services and successes that the military cannot, and when they enjoy the same level of access to their commander-in-chief as the military, civilian management increases. Viability and equal access are two jointly sufficient conditions, though neither alone will result in increased civilian managerial power.

My dissertation conceptualizes and measures the balance of power between governments, militaries, and ASFs by employing a multi-agent adaptation of the principal-agent (P-A) framework. In this framework, detailed in the table below, civilian governments are the principals and have two rival agents: militaries and alternative security forces. The presence of ASFs not only breaks the military's monopoly on the ability to provide state-sanctioned force against internal armed threats, but also helps overcome the knowledge gap between militaries and civilian governments (see Rahbek-Clemmensen et al 2012).[10]

[10] Rahbek-Clemmensen, Jon, Emerald M. Archer, John Barr, Aaron Belkin, Mario Guerrero, Cameron Hall, and Katie EO Swain. "Conceptualizing the civil–military gap: A research note." *Armed Forces & Society* 38, no. 4 (2012): 669-678.

Disputes between these agents will provide civilians in government chances to receive information which militaries may otherwise covet themselves. These disputes will also create junctures where civilians, particularly presidents, may insert themselves into security policymaking by making decisions in favor of particular agents. This decision-making power constitutes an opportunity which would not exist in the absence of a rival agent to the military, and can translate into an expansion of civilian management when exercised correctly.

In looking to Mexico and Colombia, I focus on alternative security forces and their effects on civilian management power. In Mexico, the first alternative to the military at the national level was created in 1999. The Federal Preventative Police (PFP) remained active until 2008, when President Felipe Calderón replaced them with the more simply named Federal Police (PF). In Colombia, I examine only one ASF, because since 1954 the Colombian National Police (CNP) have been the only centrally controlled alternative to the armed forces. I find that the CNP were able to provide operational successes, demonstrating its viability, and in 1991 gained the same level of access to the president as the military. In contrast, Mexican ASFs struggled to prove their viability, and in 2012 lost their access to the Mexican President. Consequently, Mexico's armed forces have continued to operate with autonomy. At the time of writing, there is no nationwide alternative to the military in Mexico.

Table 2: ASFs in Colombia and Mexico

Country	ASFs	Acronym	Years Active
Mexico	Federal Preventative Police	PFP	1999-2008
Mexico	Federal Police	PF	2008-2018
Colombia	Colombian National Police	CNP	1954-present

Though there are other potential collaborators for central governments, these three forces are the only ones which meet the criteria for an alternative security force. It is true that Mexico has other police forces, including state and municipal police. It is likewise true that pro-government paramilitary and vigilante movements have been powerful actors in the internal armed conflicts of both nations. However, alternative security forces are alternatives to the same commander in chief as the armed forces: the president. Police and paramilitaries outside of the president's chain of command cannot be deployed by the central government in lieu of the armed forces, and as such are excluded from this study.

In this introduction and theory chapter, I will begin with two literature reviews: one of the military in internal deployment and another of the principal-agent framework in civil-military relations. I then provide a more detailed explanation of what alternative security forces, as well as their theoretical relationship with the armed forces. I then operationalize the independent and dependent variables of my study, and provide this study's hypotheses. I conclude by offering a roadmap of this manuscript.

Motivation for the Study: ASFs, Internal Deployment in Latin America and Civil Military Relations

The prevailing wisdom of civil-military relations literature holds that civilian governments are more likely to lose control of militaries deployed internally than those deployed externally. Michael Desch posits that external threats actually incentivize civilians to become more interested in national security, narrowing knowledge gap between them and pushing civilians to assert greater control over their armed forces. In contrast, Desch posits that an internally deployed military will be more likely to intervene into politics as civilian institutions will be weakened and divided by internal armed conflict (Desch 1998, 393-394).[11]

Desch's supposition is well founded, though not a universal truth. Internally deployed militaries have, in the past, threatened the lives of citizens and the stability of democracies. Internally deployed militaries in Chile came to disdain their democratically elected civilian overseers, and made political pacts with civilian opposition to install their own military governments (Linz 1978; Bawden 2016).[12] President Isabella Peron likewise deployed the Argentine armed forces prior to their overthrow of her regime in 1976 (Brennan 2018).[13] In both cases, military regimes targeted not only insurgents, but democratically elected politicians and their supporters. However, militaries used their

[11] Desch, M. C. (1998). Soldiers, states, and structures: The end of the Cold War and weakening US civilian control. *Armed Forces & Society*, *24*(3), 389-405.
[12] Linz, Juan José. *Crisis, breakdown & reequilibration*. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

[13] Bawden, John R. The Pinochet generation: The Chilean military in the twentieth century. University of Alabama Press, 2016.
Brennan, James P. Argentina's Missing Bones: Revisiting the History of the Dirty War. Vol. 6. Univ of California Press, 2018.

expansive and self-granted mandate as the guarantors of national stability to target students, journalists, indigenous populations, immigrants, and other vulnerable groups. In Argentina, this resulted in nearly an entire generation d[i]sappeared, with at least 30,000 people unaccounted for.

In Latin America in particular, the dangerous ideological reorientation of the armed forces when their guns turn inward is well documented. The military of Brazil, for instance, used the existence of insurgencies and mass protests as evidence that democracy and its elected leaders were ineffective and weak (Stepan & Van Ostaeyen 1988). Chillingly, the leaders of the armed forces did not make such proclamations behind closed doors, but instead wrote them into the training materials of new officers and cadets (ibid). The conceptualization equating of "social unrest" with "national insecurity" was common throughout the region, and contributed to a perverse form of "new" military professionalism wherein the armed forces imagined themselves both separate from and above the political strife of democratic politics (Finer 1974). The internal deployment of the armed forces then engendered a hostility towards civilian leaders and citizen populations which legitimized not only military rule, but the gross excesses of this rule as well. It is little wonder then that contemporary scholars have well-founded skepticism and fears regarding any internal operations for their armed forces (Diamint 2015).

But Latin America has been overgeneralized and stereotypes as a region of coups, and scholars risk generalizing to the point of overlooking important regional outliers. For two Latin American countries, internal deployment of the military and democratization unfolded simultaneously. Rather than an internal deployment preceding a coup, civilian

leaders have ordered their militaries to the jungles and the streets, and democracy has survived. Such democracies, to be sure, have been characterized with adjectives. The compelling descriptor of "violent" democracy characterizes these regimes as ones in which the procedural dimensions of democracies, such as elections taking place, but where substantive dimensions such as citizen liberties are not uniformly respected (Whitehead et al 2010).[14] While the purpose of this dissertation is not to understand or criticize the failings of these democracies, it must be noted that for all of their excesses, these regimes have not fallen to military coups. This indicates that while internal deployment for the military may be harmful for democracy, it is not fatal.

This study focuses on two Latin American outliers, whose militarization is intimately tied to their democratization processes. The first case is Colombia, one of Latin America's oldest continuous democracies. The country experienced only one military dictatorship once in the twentieth century, and a brief one at that. Since 1958, Colombia has faced a variety of internal security threats: ranging from leftist insurgencies to militarized drug cartels to mixes of the two. And throughout these threats, democratically elected civilian regimes have persisted "despite insurgency" (Áviles 2009). All political violence in the country has been carried out under the auspices of civilian, not military, authority, as even Colombia's 'Dirty War' was incentivized by civilian leadership which conflated the dangers of student protests with those of insurgency (Rovner 2017).[15] Though presidents

[14] Whitehead, Neil L., Jo Ellen Fair, and Leigh A. Payne. *Violent Democracies in Latin America*. Duke University Press, 2010.

[15] Sáenz Rovner, Eduardo. "Diplomacia del narcotráfico y de los derechos humanos en el gobierno de Julio César Turbay en Colombia, 1978-1982 (The Diplomacy of Drug Trafficking and Human Rights During Julio César Turbay's Government in Colombia (1978-1982))." *Available at SSRN 3011927* (2017).

did find like-minded military commanders to carry out internal repression operations for their behalf, it must be noted that the orders came from presidents, not from the barracks.

My second case is Mexico, where democracy is much younger. Though the exact beginning of Mexico's democratization is contested, there is a consensus that democratization was fully realized in 2000, when an opposition leader one the presidency.[16] What preceded this important victory was an uninterrupted, 71-year authoritarian regime. Under the hegemony of the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI), an expansive authoritarian network governed the country from 1929 to 2000, carefully controlling elections and both discretely and overtly deploying soldiers and secret police officials against political foes. However, unlike other nations in Latin America, the military stayed out of the leadership for the overwhelming majority of the PRI's history. Since 1946, when a civilian controlled entered into the presidency and became the defacto leader of the PRI, a "pact" kept the military out of politics (Camp 1992). Officers would remain out of politics, and in turn civilians would not involve themselves in the innerworkings of the military.

[16] There are a few important caveats to this statement. Mexico's democratization could be said to have began in 1988, when the opposition won national seats in the legislature. Presidents Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) and Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) both softened control of elections. Zedillo in particular removed the office overseeing elections from partisan control, paving the way for equal competition between political parties at every level. However, the election of Vicente Fox in 2000 broke the PRI's 71-year hold on the presidency and constitutes the most substantive milestone in Mexico's democratization so far.

Table 3: Democratization in Colombia and Mexico

Case	Democratization Year	Preceding Authoritarian Regime Type	Duration of Preceding Authoritarian Regime
Colombia	1958	Military Dictatorship	4 years; 1953-1957
Mexico	2000	One Party Dictatorship	71 years; 1929-2000

Though the nature and duration of the preceding authoritarian regimes in Mexico and Colombia differ, both are standouts in a region where militaries governed politics. However, as stated earlier, conventional wisdom would hold that these cases are the most likely to see weakened civilian control of the military, due to their history of internal armed violence. At the very least, one would imagine that civilian control was uniformly bad or weakened in both cases. I find, however, that civilian governments in Colombia have been much more assertive and successful in managing their security forces than their counterparts in Mexico. This is to say that not only does internal deployment of the military not doom democracy, but that there is also a variance of the power of civilian governments across a universe of internally violent cases.

Table 4: Civilian Management and Indicators in Mexico and Colombia

Case	Civilian Management Power	Indicators
Mexico	Low	Military domination of ministries of defense and navy; militaries prevailing in civil-military disputes; formal and informal military autonomy.
Colombia	High	Civilian minister of defense; civilians prevailing in civil-military disputes; only informal military autonomy.

While I will provide more details in the conceptualization portions of this chapter, and in my empirical case studies chapters, I forecast some of my findings in the above table. Civil-military relations in Mexico are characterized by broad autonomy. The military still enjoys wide-ranging autonomy, legal impunity and an unchallenged, dominant role in internal security (see Diez-Nicholls 2006; Lopez-Gonzalez 2009; Grayson 2013 and the edited volume "Los grandes problemas de Mexico).[17] Though the Mexican constitution, for instance, affords the legislature oversight powers over the military, a Minister of Defense has only appeared before congress once since the country's transition to democracy since

[17] Díez, Jordi, and Ian Nicholls. *The Mexican Armed Forces in Transition*. ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST CARLISLE BARRACKS PA, 2006.
López-González, Jesús A. "Civil-Military Relations and the Militarization of Public Security in Mexico, 1989–2010: Challenges to Democracy." In *Mexico's Struggle for Public Security*, pp. 71-97. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012.
Grayson, George W. *The Impact of President Felipe Calderón's War on Drugs in the Armed Forces: The Prospects for Mexico's "Militarization" and Bilateral Relations (Enlarged Edition)*. Lulu. com, 2013.

2000 (Díez 2008).[18] More concerning, the ministries of defense and navy are both lead by active-duty military personnel. Much of the military's autonomy is legally enshrined, though some civilian presidents have simply neglected their duties to use

However, this is not the case in Colombia. Since 1991, the minister of defense has been a civilian. Even prior to this transition however, presidents would assert this power by dismissing popular military officers who publicly criticized them (Dufort 2013) and subjected the military to legislative oversight when evidence of military abuses became particularly egregious. Moreover, Colombian presidents have time and time again shown that they can manage the military's internal operations to a degree that their counterparts in Mexico have not. President Pastrana mandated the military accept the unpopular conditions which came with his efforts to negotiate with the FARC in Caguán, President Uribe oversaw operations on the battalion level (Marks 2007), and President Santos was able to force the military to accept negotiations with the FARC.[19] These are indicators of civilian strength and supremacy, not unconditional military autonomy. When autonomy has been granted, especially after 1991, it has been the product of a presidential unwillingness to assert their power rather than any military gain in new power.

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[18] Díez, Jordi. "Legislative oversight of the armed forces in Mexico." *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos* 24, no. 1 (2008): 113-145.

[19] This is not to suggest, as will be elaborated, that civil-military relations has been ideal in Colombia. President Santos, despite his successful negotiation with the FARC, has been criticized by civil-society sectors for granting the military protections from prosecution. This accusation should be analyzed with two important ironies: the first being that many soldiers have voluntarily submitted themselves to the JEP (Colombia's special jurisdiction for peace). The second is that critics within the army, retired and active, have explained that they feel that the peace agreement was harder on the military than the FARC. Thus, there are tensions, and these tensions are greater than those which exist in peacetime nations.

What explains the degree to which civilians can manage their armed forces during an internal conflict? Is it the case that Desch is unconditionally correct, and that civilians have little hope of expanding their control of the armed forces once a high-level internal threat emerges? As suggested above, no. Civilian authority over the armed forces varies across nations facing internal threats. While Colombia's civil-military balance leaves much to be desired, these deficiencies cannot be explained away by a lack of civilian oversight capabilities. In Mexico, where a "pact" of non-interference governed relations between Mexico's civilian and military elite (Ai Camp 1992), poor civilian authority has persisted despite changes to the threat environment. What then, if not threat-levels, explains the ability of civilians to exercise their institutional power over their armed agents in contexts where these armed agents have opportunities, and indeed incentives, to act outside of civilian preferences?

These were the original motivating questions of this study, which turned to the potential role for alternative security forces in tilting the balance of power in favor of civilian policymakers. Did these armed bureaucracies, outside of the military hierarchy and reporting to the same civilian principal, explain in part the ability of Colombian civilians to exert greater management over their security agents than their counterparts in Mexico? Certainly, their presence in the conflict must have some meaning, as their very existence challenges the military's monopoly over security.

While some scholars have included non-military forces in their analyses of civil-military relations, these studies have not envisioned a potential competition between these forces and the military. For instance, scholars of "coup-proofing" have focused on parallel

military forces as counterbalances against military coups. These forces, reporting directly to often autocratic leaders, exist outside of the military's hierarchy and exist to deter military defection (in the form of rebellion or coup) or to control the military through spying (Trinkunas 2000).[20] Quinlivan, in his quintessential study of coup-proofing in the Middle East, calls attention to parallel military organizations with special loyalties to authoritarian leaders (Quinlivan 1999).[21] These organizations, charged with political repression and the monitoring of organizations such as the military are outside the hierarchy of the armed forces, and recruited and formed on the basis of these "special loyalties" (Quinlivan 1999). Dictators can use these forces to serve as checks on the military, particularly in policing the political loyalties of officers. An example outside of the Middle East can be found in Augusto Pinochet's Chile, where the Dirrecion Nacional de Intellegencia (DINA) circumvented other junta members to report directly to General Pinochet (Remmer 1989).[22]

Secret police forces, as described by Quinlivan and others, are a different type of security body than those focused on in this study. While secret police are charged with monitoring political dissidence and repression, alternative security forces are focused on public security and internal order without any mission of political policing. They are state bureaucracies, subject to the supervision of a central government, which along with the

[20] Trinkunas, Harold A. "Crafting civilian control in emerging democracies: Argentina and Venezuela." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 42, no. 3 (2000): 77-109.

[21] Quinlivan, James T. "Coup-proofing: Its practice and consequences in the Middle East." *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999): 131-165.

[22] Remmer, Karen L. "Neopatrimonialism: The politics of military rule in Chile, 1973-1987." *Comparative Politics* 21, no. 2 (1989): 149-170.

military embody Weber's principal of the state's legitimate monopoly of force. These are centralized police and paramilitary forces, subject to the same principal as the military and, in the context of an internal conflict, are charged with similar missions and responsibilities.

Recently, other scholars have included such bodies in their studies of civil-military relations. These scholars have, however, only focused on these forces to examine if they are under military control or not (Croissant et al 2013). The assumption, credible and echoing the coup-proofing logic of Quinlivan and his peers, is that if these forces are outside of military control then this is a gain for civilian control. To be sure, this is an important measure of military power. If a military has control of police forces, this means it is performing duties which should under normal circumstances be performed by civilians. As this study's analysis of Mexico will show, militaries can influence the degree to which non-military security bodies are separate from the armed forces. In Mexico, the military has been particularly adept at outmaneuvering rival ASFs, evidenced most recently in the dissolution of the Federal Police.

However, such conceptions do not account for the potential that these forces have agency of their own, independent of civilian overseers and military competitors. The fact that the military is not in control of a police force does not mean that this force will be any less inclined to shirking, to undermining civilian oversight and even violating human rights. While the police not being under military control means that the military does not have an expanded security portfolio, it does not mean that civilian control over the military and rival forces cannot be uniformly poor.

When these bodies exist, they present an alternative agent for civilian governments to consult. Civilians then have an opportunity to use the existence and capabilities of these forces to expand their control over security affairs. Contrary then to the supposition that internal threats doom civilian control, I argue that a multi-agent framework including militaries and ASFs can be used to understand under what conditions civilian authority is not only maintained, but even expanded during periods of internal threat.

The Principal-Agent Framework and Civil-Military Relations Literature

Principal-Agent Framework in Civil-Military Relations

To analyze the relationships between security forces (ASFs and militaries) and democratic governments, this study builds on the principal-agent (P-A) framework adapted for civil-military relations by Peter Feaver (see Feaver 1998; 2003).[23] Feaver imports the P-A framework from economics, where it has been used to analyze the interactions between two or more actors wherein one actor (the principal) has authority over the others (the agents) (Braun & Guston 2003).[24] Feaver's application of the principal-agent framework comes from his critique Samuel Huntington. Feaver argues that Huntington's *Soldier and the State* does not sufficiently account for the strategic, day-to-day interactions between civilians and their militaries (Feaver 2003; Sowers 2005). Short of outright insubordination and blind loyalty, militaries may attempt to influence civilians (particularly presidents) to

[23] Feaver, P. D. (1998). Crisis as shirking: An agency theory explanation of the souring of American civil-military relations. *Armed Forces & Society*, *24*(3), 407-434.
Feaver, Peter. *Armed servants: Agency, oversight, and civil-military relations*. Harvard University Press, 2009.

[24] Braun, Dietmar, and David H. Guston. "Principal-agent theory and research policy: an introduction." *Science and public policy* 30, no. 5 (2003): 302-308.

issue orders more in line with their own institutional preferences (Feaver 2003). They may also "slow roll" the implementation of presidential orders, "shirking" instead of "working."

The benefit of employing the P-A framework to civil-military relations is to detect and analyze this behavior. P-A framework analyses are particularly useful when principals contract agents who, while subordinate, have specialized knowledge which the principal does not. A dilemma where principals must rely on agents to provide them accurate information, or to perform a job according to their specifications, is called "the moral hazard" in P-A literature, while the potential selection of a "bad" agent is referred to as "adverse selection" (Braun & Guston 2003).[25] Principals contract agents, who have special knowledge and capabilities which enable them to carry out tasks that principals desire but cannot complete themselves.

The importation of the P-A framework into civil-military relations is a useful fit because the problem of the moral hazard between military officers and their civilian superiors is especially pronounced. The "information gap" between civilians and militaries stems precisely from the fact that there are separate military and civilian spheres. Militaries and their officers are experts in the use of state-sanctioned violence, weaponry, and tactics, and as "the boots on the ground" have an advantage regarding what intelligence they gather and what information they share with civilians (Rahbek-Clemmensen 2012). For their part, civilians may have expertise in the management of government as well as any number of economic, political and social issues. However, it is increasingly rarer for civilian leaders in democracies to have prior military experience, or that they have gone through the

[25] Braun, Dietmar, and David H. Guston. "Principal-agent theory and research policy: an introduction." *Science and public policy* 30, no. 5 (2003): 302-308.

specialized education of military officers. Civilians will likewise have concerns outside of national security, such as providing on their campaign promises and running for reelection (Huntington 1957). There are then high incentives to delegate national security and policymaking to the military (see Pion-Berlin et al 2019), and ample opportunities for militaries to take advantage of their principal's divided interests.

While I agree that the principal-agent framework is an important analytical tool for analyzing the relationships between governments and their militaries, my study joins critics of Feaver who draw attention to the shortcomings of his analysis. Civil military relations studies have, traditionally, focused "on the interplay between two actors, a nation's political masters and it's armed forces" (Sowers 2005). Civil-military relations, as the name implies, has been traditionally imagined, theorized and studied as a dyadic model between two sets of actors. Though useful, a two-actor conception is an oversimplification. In his study of a multi-national operation in Kosovo, Thomas Sowers examines a problem faced by many militaries and military personnel: the need to report to multiple authorities in international operations (Sowers 2005). Sowers uses Feaver as a jumping off point, examining the problem of a multi-principal model to show that military nationality influences its institutional culture, and therefore its perception of monitoring (ibid). Similarly, Burk has critiqued Feaver's use of the P-A framework with the following language:

> "In reality civil-military bargaining over civil-military issues is complicated by the sheer number of civilian and military actors mobilized to participate in the bargaining process. It is unclear whether the model can accommodate this complexity and maintain its predictive power" (Burk 1998, 459).[26]

[26] Burk, James. "The logic of crisis and civil-military relations theory: A comment on Desch, Feaver, and Dauber." *Armed Forces & Society* 24, no. 3 (1998): 455-462.

Notably, these scholars confine themselves to the limitations of P-A framework in addressing a problem of multiple *principals.* Certainly, this is a theoretical puzzle in need of addressing, as civil-military relations studies tend to use the executive branch and the armed forces as their units of analysis and "the state" as the arena in which these units interact. In reality, there are a multitude of civilian actors who interact with their nations armed forces, from civilian policymakers in legislative and judicial branches to ordinary citizens on the ground. The problem of the servant with two masters is certainly worth exploring, but it is not the only limitation or unresolved question posed by Feaver's application of P-A to civil-military relations.

To quote Sowers, "The shackles of a two-actor model need to be broken" (Sowers 2005). However, Feaver's critiques have thus far primarily focused on the problem of multiple principals without theorizing, or considering, that there might be situations in which there are multiple agents as well. In typical dyadic modeling of civil-military relations, civilians would be "stuck" with the problem of "adverse selection" simply because there is only one military. Without an alternative to the military, there is no marketplace of agents.

The lack of a marketplace of agents was not lost on Feaver, who wrote:

> "Of course, there is an anomaly in applying the principal-agent framework to the civil-military setting. There is not really a market of agents; the civilian cannot hire from many different militaries to do its work." -(Feaver 2003, 314).

Feaver's admission may be truer in external wars, where civilian governments must rely on the armed forces to deliver violence abroad. However, I will show that it is entirely inaccurate when a military's guns turn inward to fight an internal threat. There, the

missions between militaries and their alternatives will overlap, contributing to a structural competition which proves advantageous to civilian management power.

The Marketplace of Security Agents and Alternative Security Forces

Having made the claim that there is indeed a marketplaces of agents, it is necessary to explain under what conditions this market exists and who the military's rival agents are. It is incorrect, for instance, to suggest that any armed agent is meaningful or even possible alternative to the military. Meaningful, or viable alternatives to the military will be able to defend themselves from militarized threats. Possible alternatives will be available to the same commander in chief as the armed forces: the president. What would such forces look like, and where might they be found?

To begin answering this question, I ask what makes militaries unique bureaucracies. For all subsequent criticisms, Samuel Huntington should be credited with defining and describing militaries as bureaucracies of experts of violence management (Huntington 1957). Militaries are institutions staffed with trained professionals who have knowledge of the use of lethal force, unique weaponry which maximizes force. The term "militaries" is a term synonymous with "armed forces," in most countries consisting of an army, navy, and air force.[27] Militaries are characterized as institutions with strict hierarchies, and a strong "espiritu de corps," a sense of collective identity distinct from other organizations.

The goods and services provided by a nation's armed forces are related first and foremost with a nation's security. They include the use of force for deterrence, providing a

[27] Other nations include other forces under their armed forces. The United States recently created its "Space Force," for instance.

"show of force" to dissuade a rival nation from using its own force, and providing lethal force against armed enemies. While it is true that militaries can provide a variety of services, ranging from providing school supplies to building national infrastructure (see Rut Diamint 2015 and Dufort 2013) the military's ability to carry out state-sanctioned violence distinguishes it from other state agencies.[28]

Two primary considerations should be given to assessing whether a force is indeed an "alternative security force:" (1) Does a potential alternative security force have military-like capabilities? Is it able to provide security goods comparable to the military? Are its personnel trained in state-sanctioned lethal force and battle tactics? Is it capable of meeting the same threats as those faced by the military? (2) Does the force exist under a similar hierarchy as that of the military relative to civilian principals? Is this force a nationalized, centralized force which reports to the same commander-in-chief that the armed forces do?

Though not present in the US context, nationalized paramilitary police forces are not uncommon across the world. More famous examples include the French Gendarmerie, the Italian Carabinieri and the Guardia Civil of Spain (Vizcaíno 2019). Though developed in diverse historical contexts, these forces have the following features in common: (1) in states of emergency they transfer to the command of the minister of defense, (2) they have military-like capacities and training, and (3) they are separate from the police and the military in peace time. These "hybrid forces," are characterized by Pion-Berlin describes as having "a military character and police sensibilities," and are prepared to serve as auxiliaries of the military in exceptional circumstances (Pion-Berlin 2017, 123).

[28] Diamint, Rut. "A new militarism in Latin America." *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 4 (2015): 155-168.

They have participated, along with their nation's militaries, in UN Peacekeeping Operations and, in the case of Spain and its Guardia Civil, the war in Afghanistan.[29]

Globally, I identify two types of security structures where alternative security forces are present: a three-force structure and a two-force structure. In a three-force structure, there are at least three centrally controlled security forces available to the president: a police, a military, and a gendarmerie. Though three-force structures are more common in Europe and former French Colonies, there is a notable example in Latin America: Argentina. Argentina has a National Police, a Military and a Gendarmeria originally created to patrol rural areas, but which has evolved into a force which receives military equipment and training (Gendarmeria Nacional).[30] The force has a military-like hierarchy, training and even function. In 1982, Argentine Gendarmes were deployed to fight the British in the Malvinas, and still may serve as an auxiliary branch of the military in a national emergency such as an invasion. As of writing, the force reports to the Minister of Security, a civilian appointed by the President. But, in the case of an invasion, command of the force transfers to the minister of defense.

[29] Dirección General de la Guardia Civil. "La Guardia Civil Finaliza Su Misión De Asesoramiento a La Policía Afgana." Accessed May 20, 2022. https://web.archive.org/web/20180818022446/http://www.guardiacivil.es/va/prensa/noticias/5532.html.

[30] Gendarmeria Nacional. "Historia." Accessed 1/5/2021. https://www.argentina.gob.ar/gendarmeria/historia

Table 5: Types of Security Structures

Force Type	Description	Examples
Third Force	This force is militarized but with policing jurisdictions, duties and capabilities. It is referred to as a "third force" because it exists independent of other hierarchies, including that of a military and a police.	The Carabinieri in Italy, the Guardia Civil in Spain, the Gendarmerie in France, the Argentine Gendarmerie
Centralized Hybrid Police	These are police forces with military capabilities, centralized under the jurisdiction of the executive branch.	The Chilean Carabineros, the Colombian National Police, the Mexican Federal Police

However, Argentina is an outlier in Latin America, as most countries in the region do not have three distinct, nationally controlled security forces. Instead, these nations' police forces take on military characteristics, such as training with heavy weaponry and military ranks. A prominent example of this phenomena is Chile, whose Carabineros resemble France's Gendarmerie more than a municipal police force. Though the Carabineros are in charge of preventative police, every member is trained to use heavy weapons, and receives several months of military training. Like the gendarmeria in

Argentina, it can serve as an auxiliary to the military in the instance of an invasion or war (Esparza 2015).

Mexico and Colombia, the selected cases of this dissertation, most resemble a two-force model. Neither country has a "third force," though attempts to create them will be discussed in my empirical case chapters. Instead, both countries police forces with varying degrees of military characteristics such as training, missions, and hierarchies. In Colombia, the National Police have developed and have maintained-like culture, having military rank and even allowing individuals to complete military service through the police (Esparza 2015). In Mexico, attempts to create alternative security forces resulted in first the Federal Preventative Police and then the Federal Police. The viability of these forces, however, as will be discussed, left much to be desired, and as of the time of writing there are no alternative security forces in Mexico.

This is not to claim, however, that there are no police in Mexico. Indeed, municipal and state police remain absent, albeit perhaps deficient, in the country. However, there are conditions which forces must meet in order to be considered alternatives to the military, and conditions which must be met for civilians to consider themselves as such. The subsequent section will detail both sets of conditions.

Defining and Identifying Alternative Security Forces

While certain forces have a latent capacity to be alternatives to the military, civilians will not always consider themselves as such. In peacetime, militaries will be oriented for external missions, whereas other forces such as police and gendarmes will be deployed internally. The concepts of "national security," the security of the nation and its sovereignty,

and "public security," the security of individual citizens and their livelihoods, will be neatly separated. Police will conduct traffic patrols, issue citations, conduct criminal investigations and if necessary, criminal raids. Soldiers will participate in international exercises, and focus on operational preparedness in case of wars. The duties of all security forces neatly separated, there will be no need to consider any one force to be alternative to the other.

It is when an internal armed threat proves capable of taking and holding territory that every armed bureaucracy of the state will become relevant. It is true that a low-intensity conflict, one isolated to a particular region or even neighborhood, may not rise to the level of a national security threat. However, when an armed threat is pervasive, attacking government forces from multiple fronts and able to push the state out of its own territory, policymakers will need to respond with military deployment. And it is in such circumstances, when militaries and police are deployed alongside each other, that policymakers will need to consider which force receives which jurisdictions, missions, and resources. This is a condition of "mission overlap," created by the existence of a high-level internal armed threat.

However, while every armed bureaucracy is relevant in these circumstances, it is not the case that every armed bureaucracy is an ASF. To be an "alternative" to the military, a force must first be separated from the military's hierarchy. Though there may, for instance, be a highly capable and professional military police, deploying such individuals to fight internal threats is still a military deployment. If a force is not separated from the military, then it cannot be considered a true alternative. Secondly, an alternative security force must be available for the same central government as the armed forces. Though forces separated

from a central government, such as state and municipal police forces, may be relevant and important players in an internal armed conflict, they are under the command of subnational governments and outside presidential authority. As such, they cannot be considered to substitute for soldiers. The same goes for vigilante squads and non-state paramilitary forces.

"Mission Overlap" and a Theory of Multi-Agent Competition

My theory is one of a structural competition created by mission overlap. "Mission overlap" refers to a scenario created by an internal armed threat in which the missions of militaries and alternatives security forces blur, while structural competition refers to the relationship between these agents and their principals. Any two agents who share the same principal with limited resources will be in competition for these resources. More than any cultural animosity, the competition between these agents, as well as militaries and ASFs will be motivated by the structure of the relationship between themselves and their principal. Mission overlap and structural competition both initiate a causal mechanism which is self-reproducing, in which rivals attempt to demonstrate their capacity to be successful, and to lobby their principal with information which they believe could benefit their own institutional interests.

The nature of this structural competition necessitates an innovation to the principal-agent framework, introducing alternative security forces as a rival agent to the military and using a multi-agent framework to conceptualize and analyze the competition between them. While the idea of rivalries are not new to civil-military relations, the literature only accounts for interservice rivalries. Rivalries between the army and navy in the United States, for

instance, allowed civilian leaders to create new oversight mechanisms over all military services (Huntington 1961). These rivalries have also benefited civilians overseeing a transition to democracy, allowing reformers to move hostile militaries away from political power by playing military branches against each other (Trinkunas 2001). Armies and navies can also inform on each other, acting as "fire-alarms" to civilian overseers by bringing problems to the principal's attention which agents would otherwise hide (Feaver 2003).

My theory builds on these arguments by constructing a theory of military-ASF competition which only exists in cases of internal armed conflict, where mission overlap is the widest. While mission overlap is often built into the rivalries between armies and navies even in peacetime situations, it is only in internal armed conflict that ASFs and militaries will share responsibilities. When this occurs, a competition between them will initiate and civilians will have an opportunity to reap the benefits of this competition. My study will focus on civilians in the executive branch, particularly presidents themselves. Though I have said that there are criticisms, and legitimate ones at that, of not looking to the powers of competing civilian principals such as congresses, courts, and perhaps even voting publics (if militaries and police are in fact the guarantors of constitutional liberties), presidents have an immediate decision-making power which these other principals do not. They may issue operational commands, oversee strategy, and are the first civilians to consume and make decisions on intelligence related to national security. As the shared commander in chief of both militaries and ASFs, presidents may decisively end disputes between the two agents.

Table 6: Actors and Interests

Actor	Description	Principal or Agent	Roles
Civilians	Civilians in the executive branch, including the president and relevant advisors within a security cabinet and ministry of defense	Principal	Receives information, makes decisions, assigns roles and allocates resources
Military	A nation's military branches, including an army, navy and air force	Agent	Carries out operations, collects intelligence, reports to principal.
Alternative Security Forces	Nation-wide paramilitary or police agencies outside of the military hierarchy and reporting directly to a president.	Agent	Carries out operations, collects intelligence, reports to principal.

However, the mere presence of an ASF is not sufficient condition for civilians to increase their management power. Two variables, which will conceptualized further in the

following section, must be present for civilian management power to increase: (1) ASF viability and (2) a level equal of access to the commander in chief. If ASFs are not viable alternatives, capable of defending themselves from armed threats, of generating useful intelligence, and providing other security goods and services to civilians, then they are not useful alternatives. Choosing between an ASF which is easily overwhelmed and unreliable in the field or a reliable military, presidents are likely to defer to the armed forces. The second, and perhaps most novel variable, is an equal level of access. While this variable and its operationalization will be discussed in the subsequent section, I will forecast its importance by saying that competition between ASFs and militaries is only useful for presidents if they are aware of disputes in the first place. If one agent cannot make their case to the principal, or if one agent has more direct and equal access to the principal, it is likely that the president will prefer to the agent who can lobby them the easiest.

A final note is before a more thorough discussion of the operationalization and conceptualization of these variables has to do with limits of this model. The independent variable of this dissertation is civilian management, the ability of the president to exercise managerial power over all security agents. Regrettably however, presidents have a power which their agents do not: they may walk away. Presidents do not always make use of their ability to manage their armed forces, and may themselves shirk their responsibilities as commander in chief by delegating their responsibilities away or by abdicating them entirely. While the focus of this study is not to understand why presidents shirk, the fourth chapter of this dissertation provides evidence for possible answers.

Key Concepts

Dependent Variable: Civilian Management

The dependent variable of this dissertation, civilian management, refers to the ability of civilians to insert themselves into security policymaking. This is distinct, from "civilian control," a concept used to refer to varying degrees through which civilians can control their armed forces and the extent to which they actually do control them. It is also distinct from "civilian supremacy," a concept described to refer to a military's acceptance of their civilian government as the legitimate and ultimate political authorities of their country. The definition of weak civilian control is contested, but it has been said that the mere acceptance of civilian supremacy is more a baseline for control than consolidated control (Croissant et al 2010).[31] Militaries may accept civilian rule, and civilians may elect not to interfere in the military or actively exercise their power over it in exchange. Indeed, such a "pact" governed Mexico for nearly three quarters of a century (Camp 1992).

Instead, management is a proactive exercise of power. It is presidents who receive intelligence briefings, and make decisions according to their preferences and the details of these deliberations. It is presidents inserting themselves into policy drafting, overseeing operations, monitoring missions and making decisions regarding the direction of security policy and deployments. When civilians take part in this process often, management is high. When they do not ever, or rarely, civilian management is low. My definition is in line with existing definitions of civilian management, such as "Keeping the actions [of the

[31] Croissant, Aurel, David Kuehn, Paul Chambers, and Siegfried O. Wolf. "Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism: Conceptualizing civilian control of the military in emerging democracies." *Democratization* 17, no. 5 (2010): 950-975.

military] within a permissible range and glued to stated political objectives" (Pion-Berlin & Arceneaux 2000).[32] Civilian control and civilian supremacy are both preconditions for the existence of civilian management.

Figure 1: Operationalization and Indicators of Civilian Management



The above figure shows indicators of civilian management, but and also why process tracing and qualitative data are critical in detecting it. As stated earlier, civilian management is a proactive process when compared to civilian control and civilian supremacy. Laws may be in existence, for instance, which designate the president as a commander in chief. However, presidents may not always behave with the responsibility and attention their office warrants. Civilians may neglect, and they may shirk themselves. They may for instance, avoid security policy, or delegate their supervision responsibilities

[32] Pion-Berlin, David, and Craig Arceneaux. "Decision-makers or decision-takers? Military missions and civilian control in democratic South America." *Armed Forces & Society* 26, no. 3 (2000): 413-436.

away. Qualitative data which opens up the black box of policymaking is necessary in asking who was in the room, and in confirming what occurred there.

Independent Variable 1: ASF Viability

As stated in a preceding section, the mere presence of an ASF is not enough to determine whether or not it is a useful agent to deploy alongside or in lieu of the armed forces. An ASF which is repeatedly overwhelmed, unreliable (perhaps even traitorous), and inefficient will struggle to prove its worth relative to a disciplined and effective armed forces. Even should both agents be unreliable, presidents are more likely to defer to an inefficient military than an inefficient ASF, as military deployment is often one way to shore up political legitimacy and because soldiers are often more popular than their alternatives (Pion-Berlin & Carreras 2017).[33]

To assess an ASF's viability, it is useful to begin with the most apparent questions. Is the force trained to defend itself? Does it have the adequate weaponry to do so? Is it a force large enough to be deployed nationwide, or is it a small, elite force concentrated in one contested zone or geographic area? While I argue that size is the least significant factor in assessing viability (a force only needs to be large enough to fight a threat, not to counter-balance the military in a 1:1 ratio), I argue that more substantive question of a forces preparation for internal armed threats is a greater indicator of viability.

But if an ASF is to win its competition with the armed forces, and to be considered a viable alternative, then it also needs to provide services and goods which the military

[33] Pion-Berlin, David, and Miguel Carreras. "Armed forces, police and crime-fighting in Latin America." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 9, no. 3 (2017): 3-26.

cannot. If the competition, after all, is to be decided on which agent can use the highest levels of force, militaries will always win. ASFs then need to provide civilians with something indispensable that militaries are not trained for. Examples include intelligence collection, the discretionary use of force (limited force) and criminal investigative capacities integral to turning over captured non-state actors to a judicial process.

Figure 2: Operationalization and Indicators of ASF Viability



In defining and operationalizing viability, this dissertation will ask to what degree an ASF is an organization equipped to meet an armed threat and to perform military-like operations when called for. This dissertation will look for the presence and robustness of specialized divisions with an ASF, specialized training and equipment. Size of the organization is an important dimension, both relative to the army but also relative to the

armed threat it faces. The latter, I would warn, is the more important condition. It is not the case that states always deploy the military because a police force, for instance, is not large, but because the police are ineffective. If a force is small but effective, then it may very well be considered a viable alternative.

The most important indicator for viability is, in line with the notion of effectiveness being a function of a dyadic relationship between an armed advisory and its armed forces, is the ability to produce success with the independence of the military or to produce successes which the military could not accomplish alone. In this regard, a viable ASF can both compete with and compliment the military. If an ASF cannot function without the military, or without the supervision of the military, one cannot consider it to be a viable and may question its nature as an "alternative."

Independent Variable 2: Level of Access

The second independent variable of this study is critical, and deceptively straight forward. Militaries and ASFs share a commander in chief in the president. As rival agents, they lobby for their attention, and compete to produce successes in order to receive resources, missions, and recognition. In the process, presidents can exploit the presence of two agents to become more informed of security policy options, and exercise their power in resolving disputes, assigning missions, and overseeing operations. However, all of this is contingent of civilians being aware of disputes in the first place.

If one agent has easier, or perhaps even unfiltered levels of access to the commander in chief, there is no parity of competition. The agent with greater access to the principal will inherently have an advantage, and the agent who does not may find

themselves marginalized. In presidential administrations, unequal access can lead to disproportionate amounts of influence. This is true not only of militaries, but any state bureaucracy and its ministers. As Donald Rumsfeld supposedly used his private access to President George W. Bush to affect policy, any agent can make themselves more competitive if they are able to more frequently and directly lobby their principal (Feaver 2003).

"Level of access" then is determined by the number of civilian "buffers" between an armed bureaucracy and the commander in chief. This study uses the descriptor "buffers" because these individuals and their offices represent breaks between what would otherwise be a direct line from the leadership of agent bureaucracies to the civilian principal in the executive branch. In this dissertation, these buffers represent the authority of the commander in chief. The more buffers exist between agents and principals, the less agents will be able to "make their cases" to civilian commanders in chief. To have an equal level of access, armed bureaucracies need the same number of buffers between themselves and a civilian principal. If they do have the same number of buffers, they will need to partner with the occupants of these positions to best make the case for them.

Operationalizing "Level of Access"

This variable is determined by the number of individuals which the leaders of a government bureaucracy, this case armed bureaucracies, must go through to report to the commander in chief. In most liberal democracies, the norm is for executives to appoint a national minister of defense or equivalent position to exercise oversight of security agencies

(Bland 2001).[34] In these democracies, police agencies are likewise separate from military bodies and are overseen by another, separate minister (ibid). In ideal cases, ASFs and militaries would report to separate cabinet-level appointees. These appointees would, in theory, also enjoy the same level of access to a civilian commander in chief, though civilians may favor one over the other as a result of competition or pre-existing political biases.

If level of access is equal, we will see an equal number of ministers or "buffers" between the leadership of armed bureaucracies and the commander in chief. If level of access is unequal, one security force will have more individuals in oversight positions between themselves and the commander in chief. While an equal level of access allows both a military and an ASF to provide civilians with intelligence and advice, as well as equal opportunities to lobby for resources, an unequal level of access will mean one body inherently enjoys the ear of the executive more than the others. This can be used to marginalize other forces, or at the very least outmaneuver them in competition.

Figure 3: Possible Arrangements for Equal Access



[34] Bland, Douglas L. "Patterns in liberal democratic civil-military relations." Armed Forces & Society 27, no. 4 (2001): 525-540.

The above figure outlines two possible arrangements for levels of equal access. In the first, an ASF reports to a separate minister, with the military reporting to a minister or secretary of defense. The of these forces, through a Joint Chiefs or equivalent position, are able to report to their minister. Both ministers are cabinet level appointees, and thus have a similar level of access to the commander in chief. In the second, both an ASF and a military share a minister.

Neither model is based purely on theory, but instead on previously covered institutional configurations between armed security bodies. The former is a model which applies to Argentina, Chile, France, Italy, and other nations in peacetime. In times of crisis, such as an invasion, the jurisdiction of both forces passes to the Ministry of Defense. This is true in each of the mentioned nations.

Figure 4: Possible Levels of Unequal Access



The above figure is more theoretical than the first one and offers possibilities as to what unequal access looks like. In both figures, there are cabinet-level appointees which command authority over security forces. Special attention must be paid to, however, the

"sub-ministerial appointee," who is the second buffer between either a military or an ASF. This appointee is different from a Joints Chief or equivalent position in an ASF, but rather another civilian appointee outside of the hierarchy between both institutions. This within-ministry appointee acts as the chief civilian whip between armed agents and their principal, but also has a principal above them in the form of the Ministerial appointee. This uneven playing field means one force enjoys greater and more direct access to a commander in chief than the other.

Case Selection and Methodology

This study selects two cases: Colombia and Mexico as positive and negative cases respectively, for a most-similar case design It employs process tracing, from the initiation of an internal conflict to the present and data collected from semi-structured interviews conducted over the course of six months fieldwork, three in Mexico City and three in Bogotá.

Colombia and Mexico are unique in Latin America. The two-share cultural and historical contexts with most countries in the region. Both are largely Catholic, both are mid-level income countries with similar amounts of state capacity, and both have institutional legacies from Spanish colonialism. Both countries have, unlike many of their Latin America, face armed internal threats with the ability to challenge the state. Much of this violence is rooted in the illicit narcotics market. While Colombia's internal conflict predates its cocaine boom, the arrival of the cocaine trade to Colombia acted as an accelerate for already escalating amounts of violence. As a consequence of their links to the cocaine trade, both nations have been of unusual strategic interest to the United States,

which cooperates with Colombia and Plan Colombia and with Mexico in the Mérida Initiative.

This is not to suggest that Colombia and Mexico are identical. There are several important differences which cannot be dismissed in any informed comparison. Colombia's current democracy is substantially older than Mexico's, having transitioned to democracy in 1958 and lasting since. Though Mexico's democratic transition began in the late 1980s with the loosening of electoral laws, most scholars agree that the election of Vicente Fox in 2000 represents the country's most important democratization moment. Colombia is a centralized state, whereas Mexico is a federal system.

Furthermore, the nature of the threats facing Colombia and Mexico are different. Historically, leftist insurgents have been among the principal challengers to the Colombian state since 1964. Groups such as the FARC, the ELN, and M-19 have represented existential threats to the Colombian state, albeit the ELN to a considerably lesser degree. While insurgent groups have political interests, the drug traffickers do not aspire to replace the state. In assessing how a threat might be dealt with, policymakers should fully acknowledge the political interests of insurgents, which can be manipulated and exploited. This was key to both the agreement between the Colombian state and the FARC and it's earlier 1989 agreement with M-19. This route does not exist with cartels, and what negotiations have taken place between the state and the cartels have been informal, decentralized, and secretive.

This does not mean though, that these threats cannot be compared at all. Specifically, in their ability to carry out violence. The takings of Mitú and Culiacán make

clear that these threats are of a similar degree, if not a similar nature. Cartels in Mexico have had no small success in recruiting from former military officials and arming themselves with military grade weaponry. The most notorious example of this was "Los Zetas," which began as the enforcement arm for the Cartel del Golfo. This groups leadership was composed almost entirely of elite former Mexican military commandos, who began as mercenaries prior to separating from the Cartel. At one point it became the largest cartel in terms of territorial influence, known for excessive brutality tied to military training with the elite Guatemalan military unit 'the Kaibiles.'

Colombia's complicated threat environment has now seen the "marriages" between its guerrilla and narco threats. The origins of this "marriage" begin almost immediately after the migration of the international cocaine to Colombia and has been evidenced in some of the country's most brutal episodes. M-19's seizure of the Palace of Justice in 1985, remembered as the *Holocaust* of the Palace of Justice in Colombia, was reportedly carried with the support of drug lord Pablo Escobar. The FARC and ELN both elected to participate in this trade as well, and by the mid-1990s the FARC had transformed itself to the largest cocaine trafficking organization in the world. Currently, the ELN fights against paramilitaries for control of key parts of the trade.[35] For this reason, while it can be argued that Mexico's cartels and Colombian insurgents are not the *exact* same type of threat, it cannot be argued that they are dissimilar either.

[35] "ELN." InSight Crime, January 27, 2022. https://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/eln-profile/.

The role of the narco-trade, and the extent of subsequent violence make these two the most similar nations in contemporary Latin America. However, this dissertation will show that Colombia has had remarkable successes where Mexico has not. Colombia has dismantled the cartels of Medellín and Calí, reduced the size of the FARC and ultimately pressuring the group to the negotiation table, and confined the ELN to isolated parts of the nation. In contrast, Mexico's homicide rate continues to go up and the size of its cartels continues to grow.

To find an explanation for Colombia's successes and Mexico's setbacks, this dissertation will look to another condition Mexico and Colombia do not share: the presence of a viable alternative to the military. While the Colombian National Police developed into a force with warfighting, intelligence collection and policing duties which not only rivaled the military's capacities, but in the case of intelligence surpasses, Mexico's most viable ASF, the Federal Police were unable to produce similar capacities. This struggle to produce successes, escape public perceptions of corruption, and present the executive branch with evidence that this force could operate independently of the military meant that Mexican civilian leaders had incentives to continuously rely on the military and to grant it autonomy. Because of this, Mexican civilians have struggled to exercise their management capacities, given that there are no viable alternative agents to consult.

Both cases also allow for within-case process tracing to determine whether one causal variable proposed in this study is more important than the either. The independent variables of this dissertation, ASF viability and level of access are not sufficient conditions for increased civilian management. I make this argument because at times, within both

cases, levels of access and ASF viability have varied. In Colombia, the viability of the National Police preceded an increased level of access through the advent of the 1991 constitution. Indeed, as this dissertation will show, Colombia's first civilian defense minister, Rafael Pardo was made aware of the CNP's viability by the military itself, indicating that it was a robust and growing organization well before the gain of a civilian defense minister. And though the access of the Federal Police was elevated during the Calderón administration, its inability to produce results incentivized Peña Nieto downgrade this level of access. Accordingly, while neither condition is sufficient on its own, both appear to be jointly sufficient.

Process tracing and data collected from interviews will provide an explanation for how these successes were reached in Colombia but were alluded in Mexico. In Colombia, archival data regarding the development of the military and police are found in the "Memorias de Ministro de Defensa," annual reports from the Minister of Defense (previously the ministry of war). This sort of data is difficult to replicate in Mexico, where (1) the conflict is much newer and (2) where the armed forces have been far less forthcoming.

Elite-level interviews with personnel of the armed forces were difficult in Mexico. Nearly every respondent requested anonymity, which I am ethically required to provide. The reasons for this are conflicting, but it appears that most Mexican military personnel seem to believe that talking to researchers could be risky for their career. This was particularly true in fall of 2019, when I was in the field. Shortly after the attack on Culiacán, retired General Carlos Gaytán publicly criticized AMLO's decision to release Ovidio

Guzmán, setting off a new wave of civil-military tensions between the President and retired officers.[36] Two scholars Mexican scholars with relationships to military commanders alluded to the existence of a warning sent out from the Obrador administration that public criticisms would be met with punishments, and cited this as a reason which officers were even more reluctant to speak than before.

To circumvent this problem, I spoke to individuals who were "around" the military. This included influential members of presidential cabinets, former Federal Police officers, journalists, academics with ties to the military and civilian security experts. As best as possible, I have tried to uncover the military perspective and present it as accurately as possible in my Mexico chapter.

Unexpectedly, the Colombian military was far more forthcoming. Whereas my fieldwork in Mexico overlapped with a civil-military crisis, in Colombia I found that officers were looking to bridge the Civil-Military gap by telling their side of the story. Colombian scholars had paved the way for a renewed "opening" of the military in the wake of the FARC's 2016 peace deal (see Borrero 2019; Cimadevilla 2019; Pizarro 2019) and commanders were far more willing and even eager to talk to me than their counterparts in Mexico.[37] The same was true of high-ranking police officers, whether from the Carabineros,

[36] "Critical Speech by Former General Reveals Rift between Amlo, Military." Mexico News Daily, November 5, 2019. https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/critical-speech-reveals-growing-rift-between-amlo-military/.

[37] These three works were a point of pride not only of the authors, but of the armed forces themselves. In my experience, officers were proud of their cooperation in producing these works. The three works are called "the gold collection" of the armed forces, and come highly recommended for those interested in the Colombian Armed forces and its experience during their nation's conflict.

DIJIN or the staff of the National Police's Museum, whose archives I was allowed to access.

The purpose of within-case process tracing is to identify and understand causal mechanisms, in this dissertation the effects of ASF presence, viability and level of access on civilian management. Such a process would allow for the detection of causal process operations ("CPOs") which indicate an effect on ASF viability on the ability of civilians to oversee and manage internal security politics. Process tracing in this dissertation is done through the use of archival materials, primary sources such as newspapers, laws, presidential statements, and the biographies of relevant individuals, as well as secondary resources such as scholarly works, journalist accounts.

Process tracing is also important for opening the "black box" of policy deliberation and implementation. A small-N, comparative study allows for an in-depth analysis into a causal process than a larger-N study, but also allows for a clearer analysis of relations between relevant actors. To utilize this, my study also employs semi-structured interviews. In conducting interviews, I elected to let respondents take our conversations where they would like to go. This allowed for a freer conversation, and also allowed for respondents to provide a broader picture of what they considered relevant to the questions asked of them.

Political elites were particularly important for this study, as they were the individuals present in the interactions between civilians, military commanders and ASF leadership. These interviews were critical to opening up the black box in terms of not only how a process occurred, but of perceptions from actors as they were occurring. They provided a

look into the relationship between actors as it exists on paper, that is as it is defined by law, but also how informal relationships hampered or facilitated the interactions between actors.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1*:* If mission overlap occurs, ASFs and militaries enter into a structural competition, then civilian management increases.

Null Hypothesis 1*:* ASFs do not affect civilian management when mission overlap exists.

This is the most foundational hypothesis of my dissertation. Its null hypothesis is that these forces have no effect on civilian management. The purpose of this hypothesis is to (1) challenge a dyadic conception and (2) test the agency of security forces outside of the military.

If these forces have an effect on civilian management, we expect to see civilian policymakers consulting ASFs to carry out missions at the expense of the military autonomy. We would see, in the deliberations in the executive branch, considerations given to what forces should have what missions and how those missions were carried out.

If there was no effect on civil-military relations from these forces, we would see, across cases, that militaries are unaffected by ASFs. While we may see variation on levels of civilian oversight, ASFs would be uniformly marginalized or ignored by civilian and military political elites.

Hypothesis 2*: If an ASF is viable, then it will have a greater effect on civilian management.*

Null Hypothesis 2*: ASF viability has no effect on civilian management of internal security.*

This hypothesis expands on the first. While an ASF may be present, its presence alone is not a guarantee that it can increase the potential for civilian management, let alone

in a way which tips the balance of power in favor of civilians. Though an ASF is another tool for civilians to consult, it is not always the case that it is a useful tool. If an ASF is ineffective, it is more likely that civilians will defer to the military.

"Viability" concerns an ASFs ability to effectively provide security goods for civilian principals. "Security goods" here refers to carrying out missions and achieving goals on behalf of civilian principals. A viable ASF will be able to deter and eliminate threats, and do so in a way which conforms or at least partially conforms with civilian principals. In certain respects, a viable ASF will need to "outperform" the military, either by providing better services than the military or services which the military cannot.

Were the null hypothesis true, we would see no variation of civilian management even if an ASF is viable. Ready and able security bodies would be sidelined in favor of the military, regardless of their ability to carry out missions according to civilian preferences.

Hypothesis 3*: If an ASF has the same level of access to a commander in chief as the armed forces, then civilian management becomes more likely.*

Null Hypothesis 3*: Level of access to civilian principals has no effect on an ASF's success.*

Militaries enjoy many advantages that other security bodies do not. They are symbols of the nation, often held in high regard by civilian policymakers and citizen populations. They are also large armed bureaucracies, with the greatest technical capacity for force in the nation. Even in consolidated democracies, militaries enjoy easy access to elected officials.

All of this is to suggest that if an ASF is to compete with the military, the level of competition must be equal. ASFs will be able to compete with the military most

successfully when they have the same number of individuals between their leadership and relevant civilian policymakers. If it is the case, for instance, that ASFs have to report to both a Subminister of Police and a Minister of the Interior, this indicates that there will be two "gaps" between its leadership and a chief executive. In this case, if the military only needs to report to a Minister of Defense, this constitutes one "gap." Because the military enjoys more uninterrupted access to civilian principals in this hypothetical case, we can expect that ASFs would have more difficulty in presenting their case to civilian principals. The military will have a less difficult time, and because of this will be able to assert more dominance over internal security.

Should the null hypothesis be true, we would see a variety of possible scenarios. One is an ASF which is distant from civilian policymakers but still exerts influence. Another is a situation where an ASF has equal access to a President but is still largely marginalized.

Rival Hypotheses

Rival Hypothesis 1*: As civilian management increases, ASF viability increases.*

The purpose of this rival hypothesis is to test for the possibility of reverse causality. Is it the case that rather than ASF viability contributing to civilian management, it is the case that civilian management contributes to viable ASFs? Normatively, scholars might hope that this is the case, as it is an indicator of strong civilian leadership being able to create security bodies without any preconditions. This dissertation will test this rival hypothesis through process tracing, looking to see which variable came first.

Rival Hypothesis 2*: Increasing threat levels cause higher rates of civilian delegation and increased military autonomy.*

The purpose of this hypothesis is to test the conventional wisdom articulated by Desch. When democratic governments face a threat capable of toppling their institutions, they are more likely (according to this line of thinking) to delegate to the military in order to preserve national integral and restore order.

Should this hypothesis prove true, we would expect the following: civilian management to decline when internal insecurity increases and for civilian delegation to rise under the same conditions. We would expect this to be true in all cases and can test this hypothesis with both within-case and cross-case comparisons. Within a case, we might compare the levels of threat in a country in the same country when it was less threatened. Across cases, we can compare cases with high-threat levels and low-threat levels to test whether there is variance regarding levels of civilian delegation and/or military autonomy.

Rival Hypothesis 3*: Levels of US interest determine civilian management.*

This is an influential hypothesis, and particularly important in studying Latin America generally and Mexico and Colombia specifically. This theory has been put forward particularly in the case of Colombia, where prominent academics have pointed to civilian control as being the product of the interests of global capitalism (Avilés 2009). Plan Colombia, likewise, has been largely portrayed as the product of US interests in the country, and been emphasized as a causal mechanism in the effectiveness of the Colombian Army during the Uribe presidency.

Including this hypothesis in a comparative study of Mexico and Colombia allows for a testing of the effect of US influence in both cases.

Roadmap

The rest of the dissertation will proceed as follows. Three empirical chapters will analyze the development and attempted developments of alternative security forces and their impacts on civilian management. In Colombia, I will show that the Colombian National Police benefited from their military tutelage, along with a decision by the armed forces in the 1970s to cease participation in counter-narcotics operations. The cessation of these military operations allowed the police to have a wider portfolio of missions than the military, which continued to focus on counter-insurgent operations even as M-19 and the FARC began to link with the cartels. The police's experience in this conflict resulted in a complex organization, resembling more a gendarmerie than a civilian police force, with specialized branches who could provide services the military could not. These successes predated an intensified civilian interest in security affairs in the 1990s, and provided civilians with a new avenue to manage security policy.

In Mexico, the armed forces have proven adept at outmaneuvering its civilian competitors. The primary cause of this is an uneven level of access to the commander in chief. This problem was rectified in 2006, when Felipe Calderón elevated the position of Minister of Public Security and centralized non-military security forces into the Federal Police. However, these gains were temporary, as interpersonal conflicts caused by this decision damaged the reputation of the Federal Police. Consequently, the administration of Enrique Peña Nieto marginalized the Federal Police by moving it under the Ministry of the

Interior and abolishing the Ministry of Public Security. While the move may seem appropriate to observers who note that the Latin American norm is a centralized police subject to a Ministry of the Interior, the move placed two civilian buffers between the Federal Police and President Peña. This set the stage for a decision by Andrés Manuel López Obrador to abolish the Federal Police entirely and replace it with a National Guard, a nominally civilian force controlled and staffed by soldiers and marines.

A comparative chapter will focus on the conclusions drawn by process tracing. It will show that the contrary to popular wisdom, security forces can be developed in times of conflict, as the Colombian National Police were. It will also show that one way for an ASF to secure the attention of civilian leaders is to provide services which the military cannot, thereby permanently carving in o the military's security monopoly. While the CNP had a long history of successes, the PF in Mexico were less able to show successes, particularly any independent of the military, in the 2008-2012 period. President Peña, to his credit, did employ civilian experts to create a "Gendarmerie" division within the Federal Police, but this success was undermined by the institutional marginalization of the same force. This chapter will also test alternative hypotheses, showing that while the influence of the United States is important in the analyzing the relationships between actors, it is not a sufficient condition for heightened civilian management. While there is not enough evidence to wholly dismiss US influence from the story, there is also not enough to say it explains the story entirely.

The final chapter will offer future research agendas informed by this dissertation. The first proposed agenda looks to analyze the relationships between centralized security

forces in low-threat environments. New developments in Chile and Argentina, countries were narco violence is low, but narcotics consumption is rising, have seen mission overlap occur where it has not before. The second proposed agenda looks to analyze the relationship between security forces in the Northern Triangle, a Latin American subregion where violence is particularly high but where "mid-level threats," rather than drug trafficking organizations or insurgents, are the principal antagonists. Finally, an agenda beyond Latin America is proposed, looking to the Philippines and India in particular as fruitful cases.

Chapter 2: Mexico: Institutional Marginalization and Military Supremacy

Case Introduction

For the majority of the twentieth century, Mexico was governed by a single-party dictatorship which did not hesitate to orient its armed forces inward. Soldiers were used to replace police forces, to deter criminal activity, and to exert the authority of the president over other potential contenders for power. Since the transition to democracy in 2000, the need for a centrally controlled security force to serve as an alternative to the military at the federal level has been widely recognized by scholars, activists and even presidents. As narco trafficking organizations metastasized into cross-continental criminal enterprises with proven military capabilities, a law enforcement gap at the national level became more and more apparent.

The first attempt to create an alternative security force came in 1999, when President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) created the Federal Preventative Police (PFP). In 2008, President Felipe Calderón attempted to update Mexico's alternative security forces by creating a new, streamlined police force more simply called "Federal Police" (PF). But while the need for an alternative security force has been widely recognized, Mexico's central government has historically leaned on the armed forces, particularly the army, for internal security goods. Though the navy has become increasingly prominent in king-pin operations (see Pion-Berlin 2017), the army has had the most personnel deployed across the country.[38] Furthermore, at the time of writing, all nation-wide alternatives to the military

[38] David Pion-Berlin, "A tale of two missions: Mexican military police patrols versus high-value targeted operations," *Armed Forces & Society* 43, no. 1 (2017): 53-71.

have been abolished and a National Guard ("Guardia Nacional" or "GN") under the auspices of the Mexican Army.

This chapter shows that while attempts to build ASFs have been significant and laudable, Mexican ASFs struggled to prove their viability and, at a critical juncture, could not maintain equal access to their commander in chief relative to the military. While most Latin American defense ministries are headed by civilians and oversee all branches of the armed forces, Mexico has two bifurcated ministries, the Secretariat of the Defense and the Secretariat of the Navy (Pion-Berlin 2003).[39] Beginning in the long, single-party dictatorship of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), civil-military relations in Mexico have been governed by a "pact" between civilian elites and the leaders of the armed forces (Camp 1992).[40] The "pact," sometimes an informal agreement between elites and sometimes codified into law, maintained that civilians would not interfere in the innerworkings of the armed forces, and in turn the armed forces would not intervene into politics. This meant that the leaders of the secretariats of defense and the navy would be active-duty generals and admirals respectively. Military occupation of these cabinet-level appointees has continued into democratization, and results in direct, uninterrupted access to the commander in chief.

[39] David Pion-Berlin. "Defense Organization and Civil-Military Relations in Latin America," *Armed Forces and Society* 35, no. 3 (2009), 562-586).

[40] Camp, Roderic A., and Roderick Ai Camp. *Generals in the Palacio: the military in modern Mexico*. Oxford University Press on Demand, 1992.

Table 7: ASFs in Mexico, 1999-2000

Agency	Years Active
Federal Preventative Police (PFP)	1999-2008
Federal Police (PF)	2008-2019

In contrast, when alternative security forces in Mexico have existed, they have either not been viable, or had an unequal level of access relative to the armed forces. As Mexico's first ASF, the Federal Preventative Police (PFP) were not a viable alternative to the military for reasons to be elaborated on in the case study sections of this chapter. In Mexico's first security arrangement, beginning in 2000 and continuing to 2012, Mexico's ASFs were represented by the Secretary of Public Security (SPP). This was a cabinet-level appointee, who had regular access to the president. This position was less powerful during the presidency of Vicente Fox (2000-2006), than that of Felipé Calderón (2006-2012), whose Secretary of Public Security became a source of significant reform and controversy. This arrangement changed in 2012, when President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018) made the decision to dissolve the Secretariat of Public Security and create a new position, the Commissioner of Public Security to the Secretary of Government. This meant that while the Federal Police had two civilian leaders between themselves and the president, the military services had none. Though the Federal Police were a more viable alternative relative to the preceding PFP, it lost equal access to the president during the sexenio of President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018).

Figure 5: Mexico's Principal-Agent Models, 1999-2018



Furthermore, while certain civilian leaders, notably President Felipé Calderón (2006-2012) took advantage of the ASF-military competition to insert themselves into internal security policy deliberations, I find that the rivalry between the military and ASFs was bitter and zero sum. This made coordination between agents more difficult, and has contributed to a long pattern of hostility and a lack of cooperation between military and police forces in Mexico. I argue that while competition will always present an opportunity for civilians to insert themselves into security policy by creating decision-making junctures, it does not necessarily translate into new security successes on the ground.

I analyze the relationships between Mexico's presidents, its armed forces, and its alternative security forces from 2000 to the present. I begin with 2000, the year Vicente Fox broke the PRI's 71-year hold on the presidency, and continue through to the present administration of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). Because democracy is relatively young in Mexico, and because presidents are not illegible to run for re-election, I

undertake comparisons across presidential administrations (called "sexenios" in Mexico) and treat these administrations as distinct units of analysis.

The chapter proceeds as follows: the first section details the conditions of Mexico's institutions prior to democratization. Troublingly, though perhaps predictably, the civil-military norms of the 71-year long PRI dictatorship ossified and, for the most part, survived through democratization. This includes the use of the military by presidents to replace local police forces, and the use of internal military deployment as a deterrent for political rivals and criminal enterprises. Attention is also given to the last three PRI presidencies, the 1980-2000 period in which three presidents increased the use of the armed forces to fight criminal cartels. I also discuss Ernesto Zedillo's presidency (1994-2000) and the attempt to create the first nationwide alternative to the military: the Federal Preventative Police (PFP).

The following section discusses the relationships between presidents, militaries and ASFs in democratic Mexico, and treats each presidential administration (henceforth called "sexenio") as an analytical unit. I find that President Vicente Fox squandered an opportunity to reform the PFP, leaving it with deficiencies that weakened it as a viable alternative to the military. Namely, denying the PFP the ability to receive criminal complaints and conduct criminal investigations meant that it was hardly an effective agent to combat narcotrafficking. As fighting drug cartels became a priority for President Calderón, I find that his empowering of a new ASF, the Federal Police lead to disagreements within his cabinet. These disagreements incentivized Calderón to be a hands-on manager of internal security, and perhaps the most proactive manager of civil-military relations in Mexico's history. But as the Federal Police was becoming an increasingly viable alternative,

I find that Enrique Peña Nieto made a critical decision to remove it from his presidential cabinet. Delegating authority over ASFs to his Secretary of Government (Mexico's equivalent of Minster of the Interior and Vice President), Peña took away his own power and marginalized the police, making it difficult to the inform the president of reforms which he himself ordered.

In my last section, I detail how this set the stage for the current presidency of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). I argue that AMLO's decision to dissolve the Federal Police and replace it with a military-controlled national guard has expanded the military's internal security footprint far more than his predecessors. I find that while security reform after AMLO might be possible, AMLO's eventual successor will have an extremely difficult process to face if they choose to fulfill the long-promised demilitarization of Mexico's internal security.

Militarization Before Democratization: the Military in the PRI Dictatorship

The Military, the Revolution, and Internal Security

The use the military for internal security and policing began long before Mexico's transition to democracy, even though its civil-military norms are outliers in Latin America. During the Cold War, when military regimes emerged across South and Central America as a response to creeping fears of communism, Mexico's armed forces remained loyal to a government of civilian elites. These elites, the leaders of the Institutionalized Party of the Revolution (PRI), managed a network of political patronage and corruption which systematically excluded opposition opportunities to run for election and violently suppressed protests. While the military was not the exclusively provider of internal repression for the

regime, presidents would use their control of the military to reassert power over potential political rivals.

To understand why the military did not intervene into politics, its participation in internal security operations, and the long-standing absence of a nationwide alternative to the armed forces, it is worthwhile to begin with an analysis of the military's relationship with the PRI. The first generation of PRI leaders were the participants, survivors, and leaders of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1921). The power vacuum created by the collapse of the central government saw the emergence of several revolutionary leaders, each of them in command of their own armies and each of them having their own post-revolutionary political ambitions. In the wake of President Álvaro Obregón's (1920-1924) assassination in 1928, General Plutarco Calles created the precursor organization to the PRI, the National Revolutionary Party (PNR). The organization was, at first, a way for Calles to share power with his fellow revolutionary elites while simultaneously controlling the organization as "el jefe maximo."[41] However, the Party survived Calles' tenure as kingmaker, and morphed into an authoritarian political party in which a series of elites oversaw and managed their own succession (Camp 1992).

For some experts, this meant the PRI had (or has) a unique relationship with the Mexican military. José Ríos Figueroa, a scholar of constitutional courts, described the relationship between the military and the PRI's political organization as that between a parent and child. [42] Others have said that there was more distance between the PRI's civilian

[41] (Diez & Nicholls 2006, 8).

[42] Interview conducted on 10/1/2019, Mexico City

and military elite, pointing to the ascension of Miguel Alemán (1946-1952) as Mexico's first civilian president in 1946 as a moment of no return for civil-military relations (Diez & Nicholls 2006). Ríos Figueroa notes, however, that while the military never did retake the presidency of the country after Alemán's ascension, they kept the presidency of the PRI as a political party until 1965 (Rios Figueroa 2016).[43]

Though it is not appropriate to say the PRI was military political party, such as many regimes created in Latin America to legitimize their rule, it is appropriate to say that the military was a key pillar of support during the dictatorship. However, unlike many authoritarian regimes, the military was not controlled via ideological indoctrination (see Taylor 2003), the military under the PRI was governed by what could be best described as an "agreement."[44] Once Alemán ascended to the presidency in 1946, no more generals would occupy to the presidential palace. In return, civilian political elites would leave the military to its own devices, not interfering in promotions, operations, or doctrine (Camp 1992). Under the PRI regime, an agreement was reached between civilians in government and military leaders: civilians in the PRI government would not interfere in the military's internal affairs, and in return the military would not intervene in politics (Camp 1992).

While the military operated with wide autonomy during the PRI dictatorship, it's interests often aligned with those of political elites, namely presidents. For their part, authoritarian presidents were recognized by military commanders as their constitutionally

[43] Ríos-Figueroa, Julio. Constitutional courts as mediators: Armed conflict, civil-military relations, and the rule of law in Latin America. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

[44] Taylor, Brian D. Politics and the Russian army: civil-military relations, 1689-2000. Cambridge University Press, 2003.

legitimated commanders. This "exclusive subordination" to the president meant that the president, and the president alone, was the only civilian who could exercise anything resembling control of the armed forces (López Gonzalez 2012).[45] As such, there was no greater demonstration of presidential political supremacy than the deployment of the armed forces both to repress nascent rebellions and deter potential rivals (Diez & Nicholls 2006, 10; Rea & Ferri 2019). While some observers note that the internal role of the armed forces were "temporary affairs," and that the army "returned to its barracks promptly after" (Diez & Nicholls 2006) others note that the army had been used, through its presence alone, to deter criminal activity in some regions (interview with Bernardo Leon).[46] Most notoriously, the Mexican Armed Forces played an active and bloody role in the 1968 Tlatelolco Massacre. Though the exact number of casualties is unclear, recently declassified documents suggest that the event was pre-planned, that members of the Presidential Guard shot at soldiers with sniper rifles to "spook" them into firing on student protestors. While the military was not the only participant in Mexico's Dirty War, its participation remains a historical fact.

In contrast to Mexico's highly centralized military forces, who were exclusively subordinated to the president, Mexico's police forces were fragmented and often subject to the control of the president's rivals. Control of law enforcement fell to lower-level PRI officials or, in rare cases, members of opposition parties who managed to secure local or

[45] López-González, Jesús A. "Civil-Military Relations and the Militarization of Public Security in Mexico, 1989–2010: Challenges to Democracy," In *Mexico's Struggle for Public Security*, (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

[46] Interview with Bernardo León, conducted in Mexico City on December 5th, 2019

state-level office. It was not uncommon for different police forces to be loyal to distinct and particular partisan principals and to attack their political rivals.[47] These firefights between police forces fed a (not incorrect) public perception that police were more affiliated with the corruption networks of local political and criminal actors than they were with the rule of law. Part of the "Pax Priista," local and state-level police often tied local government and criminal groups together, allowing politicians to monitor if not outright control the drug trade.[48]

Though the military was not immune from corruption, presidents deployed the armed forces to deter criminal operations and to signal their sovereignty over rival politicians. Rather than rely on local police, for instance, in 1948 army troops were deployed to destroy marijuana crops in Sinaloa.[49] Such operations, however, were carried out with multiple purposes. Presidents in Mexico City were far less concerned with drug trafficking networks than domestic opposition, and these operations were also designed to assert the presence of the central government as much or more as they were to deter criminal behavior.[50] As the United States became more interested in aggressively pursuing drug cartels, these operations became performances for both domestic and international audiences.

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[47] Diane Davis, "Undermining the rule of law: Democratization and the dark side of police reform in Mexico," *Latin American Politics and Society* 48, no 1 (2006): 55-86.

[48]The term "Pax Priista" comes from Mónica Serrano and Paul Kenny. See: Paul Kenny and Mónica Serrano, "Mexican State and Organized Crime: An Unending Story," In *Mexico's Security Failure*, (Milton Park, UK: Routledge 2013).

[49] Paul Kenny and Mónica Serrano, "The Mexican State and Organized Crime," 38.

[50] Ibid.

When significant law enforcement reform came in 1988, it only strengthened military power relative to the police. While President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) increased army operations against narco trafficking through 'Plan Condor' (Diez & Nicholls 2006, 33); his successor Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) expanded the army's authority over internal security by granting soldiers primacy in the fight against cartels. As part of his National Development Plan, President Salinas increased military assistance to the attorney general's office, though it is now widely understood that "the word 'assistance' [in Salina's National Development Plan] was a synonym for replacement."[51] Salinas decreased the power of civilian law enforcement by repeatedly replacing "corrupt" police officers with "on-leave military" personnel, while paying no mind to the necessity of creating a national police force. It is impossible to ignore pressure from the United States government to likewise deploy the military, as experts Monica Serrano and Marco Palacios claim that de la Madrid and Carlos Salinas "little choice than to elevate drug trafficking to a national security threat and openly declare the war on drugs" (Palacios & Serrano 2010).

However, it was not lost on Salinas' successors that the military was not a perfect fit for the fight against the growing cartel threat. The void left by any civilian alternative led to the question of what, exactly, the legal role for the armed forces in Mexico should be. It was ultimately the final President of the PRI dictatorship, Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), who undertook the first major campaign to create a robust, viable civilian alternative to the military.

[51]Jesús A. López-González, "Civil-Military Relations and the Militarization of Public Security in Mexico," 77.

The Federal Preventative Police: Mexico's First ASF

Ernesto Zedillo took office in 1994, a year of unprecedented levels of internal violence and political uncertainty. On news years' day, 1994, the Zapatistas, a Marxist guerrilla movement claiming it's ideological inspiration from Mexican revolutionary, Emiliano Zapata, group seized towns throughout Chiapas. The assassination of key political figures, notably Luis Donaldo Colosio, who was Carlos Salinas' first choice to replace for the PRI's presidential candidate, also indicated rising levels of insecurity for Mexico's citizens and its political class. Faced with an internal armed Marxist movement, the military was quickly deployed to Chiapas. There, it would face public scrutiny as a lack of human rights training and preparation would become increasingly evident (Wager & Schultz 1995).[52]

However, it was not only the Chiapas crisis which led to an expanded military presence in internal security. Though Felix Gallardo, the head of the cartel of Guadalajara, was arrested in 1989, his cartel broke off into powerful organizations who increasingly challenged the Mexican state and each other. Zedillo, who surprised political figures by undertaking a reformist agenda in which he dismantled the PRI's centralization of power, paid particular attention to the links between regional PRI bosses and powerful narcotraffickers. In 1995, in response to a security crisis brought on by ties between cartels and local PRI officials, President Zedillo sent in the army in a large-scale patrol operation to the state of Chihuahua (Interview with former Zedillo advisor).[53] That same year, the

[52] Wager, Stephen J., and Donald E. Schulz. "Civil-military relations in Mexico: the Zapatista revolt and its implications." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 37, no. 1 (1995): 1-42.
[53] Interview conducted October 17, 2019, in Mexico City.

military began arresting high-profile drug lords without consulting local state governments or police, arguing that these officials were too corrupt to be trusted (Lopez-Gonzalez 2009; Chabat 2010).[54] That same year, Zedillo deployed the army to assume policing duties in Mexico City, presumably due to distrust the local police (Alvarado and Zaverucha 2010).[55] Though there was some legislative opposition to the use of the armed forces in internal security, the practice continued throughout the Zedillo presidency and continues to this day.

The need to deploy the military highlighted institutional problems at the highest levels of Mexico's government. The President could not rely on the state or municipal police, who were often themselves links in the chains binding the cartels and local PRI bosses together. Despite this, the use of the military remained contentious. Embarrassments from the Chiapas conflict did not help the reputation of the armed forces, and the only federalized law enforcement branch at the outset of the Zedillo Presidency was the Highway Police. Recognizing the need for a non-military, federal civilian security force, the Zedillo administration set about work to create the PFP, which would in turn serve as the "seed" organization for future Mexican ASFs.

The administration declared its intent to create the force in 1997, and it was officially founded in 1999. In that year, the PFP numbered at 11,000 personnel, with 5,000

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[54] López-González, Jesus Alberto. *Politics of civil-military relations in Mexico: A historical and institutional approach*. London School of Economics and Political Science (United Kingdom), 2009.; Jorge Chabat, "La respuesta del gobierno de Calderón al desafío del narcotráfico: entre lo malo y lo peor," in *Los Grandes Problemas de México: Seguridad Nacional and Seguridad Interior,* eds Arturo Alvarado & Mónica Serrano, (Mexico City, Mexico: Colegio Del México, 2010).

[55] Alvarado, Arturo, and Jorge Zaverucha. "La actuación de las fuerzas armadas en la seguridad pública en México y Brasil: una visión comparada." *Seguridad nacional y seguridad interior, México, El Colegio de México* (2010): 228-264.

coming from the military, 4,000 from the former federal highway police and one 1,000 from the newly created national police academy (Sabet 2010).[56] President Zedillo particularly drew on the military police to staff the new organization, much to the chagrin of the ministry of defense. These personnel were placed not under the control of the attorney general, the chief law enforcement officer within the executive, but rather the minister of the interior, a branch of government which notably lacked the expertise or even legal ability to conduct criminal investigations.

This is an example of one of several problems which made the PFP an inadequate ASF. Fox continued to move soldiers and marines to the force, and Vice Admiral (Alvarado & Zaverucha 2010). The majority of the force's commanders also came from the military (ibid). Notably, nearly half of its members were military recruits, and the first commander was an active-duty navy Vice Admiral Wilfrido Robledo, who stayed on as the head of the force throughout the Fox presidency (Alvarado & Zaverucha 2010). The majority of the force's commanders also came from the military (ibid). This was the first large transfer of military personnel to another nominally civilian force, a practice which would continue through the Fox Presidency and would reoccur throughout Mexico's attempts to create ASFs. It was also the first indication that the military was interested in directly controlling its potential competition. The Federal Preventative Police would remain active until 2008, and the inadequacies of the force will be discussed in detail in the succeeding section.

[56] Sabet, Daniel. "Police reform in Mexico: Advances and persistent obstacles." *SHARED RESPONSIBILITY* 247 (2010).

Era	Summary
1929-2000	In the long dictatorship of the PRI, the internal use of the armed forces was common. During the dictatorship, the military remained under the exclusive control of president. Police forces, however, were under the control of mayors and governors, some of whom were presidential rivals. Military deployments were often used to punish these rivals, and to supplant their authority by replacing police officers. Increased pressure from the United States in 1970s and 80s led to an increased effort to fight narcotraffickers. Towards the end of the regime, the first alternative security force, the Federal Preventative Police, was created.

After Democratization: Military, ASFs and Presidents in Democratic Mexico

Vicente Fox and the First ASF-Military Competition

Vicente Fox's election in 2000 is widely recognized as a high point for Mexico's democratization because Fox did not belong to the PRI. Fox instead belonged to the National Action Party (PAN), a conservative neo-liberal party which stood as the PRI's oldest opposition party. Though Fox entered with a popular mandate, he assumed the presidency in an increasingly complicating security environment. Though it is true that homicide rates in Mexico were declining, criminal cartels had begun amassing resources, among them military-style weaponry.[57] There was then an imperative need to

[57] Guillermo Trejo, and Sandra Ley, *Votes, drugs, and violence: The political logic of criminal wars in Mexico*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

simultaneously complete Mexico's democratization, perhaps even bringing those complicit in the violent excesses of the PRI dictatorship, and reform law enforcement to prepare for an increasingly sophisticated criminal threat.

To this end, Fox ordered the creation of a new secretariat which would oversee the Federal Preventative Police, the Secretariat of Public Security (SPP). The new ministry would be headed by a secretary of public security, reporting directly to the president. The move was a step forward in establishing the autonomy of ASFs in Mexico, and did increase the level of access civilian reformers had to president. To head the new secretariat, Fox appointed Dr. Alejandro Gertz, an experienced and controversial expert of anti-drug trafficking policy who had worked in the administration of President Miguel de La Madrid. At the same time, Fox continued the tradition of confirming military heads of the secretariats of defense and the navy and also made the puzzling decision to appoint army officer General Rafael Macedo to the position of Attorney General.

Though Fox inherited a PFP of roughly 11,000 recruits, the force lacked the ability to receive criminal complaints and conduct criminal investigations. Legally, the PFP were *only* a preventative police force, and were lacked key capacities to pursue criminal threats. This deficiency was not lost in Alejandro Gertz, who with Bernardo León, attempted a reform which would overhaul the PFP's capacities and empower it to investigate criminal threats. The attempted reform was one of the first clashes between military officials and law enforcement reformers in a presidential cabinet, and resulted in Gertz's resignation in 2004.

León describes a confusing separation of power between civilians and military officials over Mexico's law enforcement. According to León General Macedo struggled to separate himself from the army, and would show deference to General Gerardo Clemente Vega, Fox's minister of defense, in cabinet meetings (Interview with Bernardo Léon).[58] "You had this weird moment," León describes, "Where Dr. Gertz was in charge of the PFP, a largely militarized force. And General Macedo was in charge of the Attorney General's office, the chief civilian law enforcement office." This meant that the military had a significant advantage in controlling both the methods by which state force could be exercised and the mechanisms through which it was enforced. The Gertz-León plan was pitched to Vicente Fox, who would only approve of the PFP's expansion of powers if he received unanimous consent from his cabinet. Succinctly, León says "the three military men objected. So, Gertz left [his position]."

Competition between the armed forces and an ASF did present President Fox with an opportunity to exert decision-making power. However, Fox made the curious decision to instead delegate the decision to his cabinet, mandating unanimous approval which essentially doomed any potential rival to the military. There are two reasons which Fox did so, the first being that the PFP was not a viable alternative to the military. According to a study by José Luís Piñeyro, 5,000 officials deserted from the PFP between 1999 and 2006 (Piñeyro 2012).[59] This represented nearly half of the force which Ernesto Zedillo left the new president with. Furthermore, allegations of corruption and a public perception of

[58] Interview conducted December 5, 2019, Mexico City
[59] Piñeyro, José Luis. "Las fuerzas armadas mexicanas en la seguridad pública y la seguridad nacional." *Los grandes problemas de México* 15 (2010): 155-190.

ineffectiveness dogged the PFP, and it is not difficult to imagine that President Fox himself shared these societal perceptions. Instead, President Fox sought to create his own security force, the Federal Investigative Agency (AFI), billed as a "Mexican FBI" and under the operational control of the Attorney General's Office. That General Macedo controlled this force is no accident, but meant that the force could hardly be considered an alternative to the military if it was in fact in the portfolio of an army general.

But another factor which ultimately doomed the PFP was Fox's own leadership preferences. The "exclusive control" of the president over the armed forces continued past democratization, with the military outright refusing to cooperate with other civilians even in the presidential cabinet. Fox had earlier attempted to create four cabinet sub-ministers, one of which would oversee security on behalf of the president. However, the new president quickly discovered that the agencies who would be beholden to such a minister detested the idea, and began fighting with each other over who would have control. In light of this inner-cabinet squabbling, Fox claims that he "Had to cancel the whole thing" (Deare 2017).[60] Fox described his governing style as conflict-averse, telling scholar Craig Deare "My philosophy, my style of management and governing is always on the style of peace, harmony, democracy, dialogue, negotiating and not using the stick" (Deare 2017).

Thus, though Fox entered government as a critic of the PRI's use of the military for internal security, he continued this tradition. Furthermore, his placement of an army general over civilian law enforcement actually expanded the military's internal role, leading

[60] Craig A Deare. A Tale of Two Eagles: The US-Mexico Bilateral Defense Relationship Post Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).

one scholar to call the Fox administration "militarization at its zenith" (López-González 2010).[61] Investigations into the military's role in the PRI dictatorship were abandoned, and in 2005, the president deployed the army to patrol the streets of Nuevo Laredo, which faced increasing drug violence. That same year, Fox initiated Operación Mexico Seguro, a wide-spread military operation to fight narcotrafficking. This set the stage for his successor to fight the cartels far more aggressively.

Sexenio	Summary
Vicente Fox, 2000-2006	Vicente Fox is elected the first president outside of the PRI, and proposes reforming the military and law enforcement. Under his administration, the new position of Secretary of Public Security is created to oversee the Federal Preventative Police. But the PFP are not viable because they cannot receive criminal complaints and conduct criminal investigations. Fox ultimately does not take advantage of competition between the military and PFP, opting instead to favor the military for law enforcement and internal security.

Felipé Calderón: Militarization with Parallel Civilianization

Felipé Calderón succeeded Vicente Fox in a now notoriously close election. Also like Fox, Calderón was a longtime member of the PRI's opposition, and had previously

[61] Jesús A López-González, "Civil-Military Relations and the Militarization of Public Security in Mexico, 1989–2010: Challenges to Democracy," In Mexico's Struggle for Public Security, (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

criticized the PRI's reliance on the military for internal security.[62] Unlike Fox, whose electoral victory was seen as a watershed moment for democratization, Calderón's electoral margin was razor thin. As mayor of Mexico City, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) became Fox's biggest rival and entered the presidential election of 2006 as the favorite. After losing to Calderón by 243,934 votes, AMLO attempted to delegitimize Calderón's presidency by declaring himself "the legitimate president of Mexico." AMLO loyalists in Congress went so far as to barricade the doors of their chamber to prevent Calderón's inauguration, and broke into fistfights as the president shouted his oath of office over them.[63]

Calderón's critics have suggested that it was this narrow electoral win, and the threat to his legitimacy posed by AMLO, motivated Calderón's quick escalation of military deployment more than any real security threat.[64] After all, though Calderón had campaigned comparatively little on the issue of drug trafficking, the president quickly pivoted to the issue shortly after his inauguration. His declaration of a national emergency appeared carefully choreographed, and declared only days after his inauguration (López-González 2010). Calderón, inaugurated on December 1st, 2006, launched "Operacíon Michoacan" on live television ten days later on December 11th, dressed in military fatigues as he deployed troops to combat crime in his home state. By the end of his presidency,

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[62] Jesús A. López-González, "Militarization of Public Security in Mexico," 90-91.

63 "Chaos Reigns in Calderón's Day," *LA Times,* December 2, 2006

64 Paul Kenny and Mónica Serrano, "Mexican State and Organized Crime: An Unending Story," In *Mexico's Security Failure*, (Milton Park, UK: Routledge 2013).

over 45,000 combat troops would be deployed across Mexico and as many as 120,000 lives would be lost.[65]

Calderón's defenders, particularly his advisors, portray a more complicated reason for the president's decision to expand troop presence so greatly across Mexico. They describe a "perfect storm" with internal and external pressures contributing to what even defenders describe as a tragic and bloody period of Mexican history. Alejandro Hope, who worked as a security advisor in the Calderón administration, pointed to three international conditions beyond Mexico's control: the rising price of cocaine in the United States, the end of the assault weapons ban in the same country, and the successful counterinsurgent efforts of in Colombia.[66] Other Calderón advisors echo a sense of urgency within the administration, explaining in interviews, "You have to understand, the plan was never to rely on the military. But the north was gone."[67]

Surprisingly, I found that while Calderón did in fact increase troop presence across Mexico, he also invested more resources and political clout in building alternatives to the military. An analysis of the dynamics of Calderón's security cabinet reveal ASF-military relations and deliberations which were contentious and bitter, much as they were in the previous Fox administration. But unlike Fox, Calderón did not appear to be conflict averse, and took advantage of the opportunities provided to him to become more informed of security policy, narrow the information between himself and his security agents, and

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65 Calderón, L., Heinle, K., Rodríguez Ferreira, O., & Shirk, D. (2019). (rep.). *Organized Crime in Mexico: Analysis Through Time 2018* (pp. 1–62). San Diego, CA: Justice in Mexico.

[66] Alejandro Hope, "Violencia 2007-2011: La tormenta perfecta," *Nexos* (2003).

[67] Interview with Calderón advisor 1, conducted October 17, 2019, Mexico City.

reform security in the process. Specifically, Calderón's decision to empower his Secretary of Public Security, Genaro García Luna, and the friction which this created with the military, increased his power over security policy deliberations and politics.

Shortly after becoming President, Calderón announced that he found the PFP to be an unsatisfactory and unreliable agent, and would seek to replace the force with a new national police force. This force would serve as an alternative to the military, and would attempt to fill the nation-wide law enforcement gap which had been left unattended for the duration of the PRI dictatorship. In 2008, this new force was created and named, quite simply, the "Federal Police" (PF). Even personnel from the AFI, Fox's creation which was previously managed under army auspices, would be folded into the new force.

With six divisions (Investigation, Intelligence, Science, Antidrug, Federal Forces and Regional Security) with 19 subdivisions within them, the PF was inarguably a technical improvement over the previous PFP (CIES 2012). Emphasis was placed in particular on regional coordination, and the office of regional security was to coordinate with governors, state, and local security forces (CIES 2012, 56-57). In theory, this would reduce friction between different levels of law enforcement and thusly increase the reliability of state and municipal forces who were not directly within the president's authority. This critical step forward was, admittedly, shorter than Calderón's original proposal of unifying the police, but could have been significant in expanding the capabilities of the Federal Police to coordinate with and collect intelligence from state and municipal police. To this end, President Calderón also implemented "Plataforma Mexico," the nation's first national

registry of criminal data, which would become available to every law enforcement agency (CIES 2012).

Intelligence, both its production and its analysis, was likewise critical in the vision for the force. This is reflected in the reports from the Secretary of Public Security published in 2012, meant to properly and fully articulate the vision and accomplishments of not only the Federal Police, but the entire "new model" of policing advocated by the Calderón administration as well. Article 8 of the Federal Police Law (LPF) outlined the definition of "undercover operations," including both the use of non-police citizen informants and the use of officers operating under false identities to infiltrate criminal organizations (CIES 2012, 32). A subdivision for undercover operations operated under the auspices of the force's intelligence division, and all other divisions were responsible with generating information to send to the intelligence division for analysis. This constituted a "cycle of intelligence," whereby operations would be planned and ultimately carried out through the Federal Force division, sometimes in conjunction with other forces.

Likewise, the jurisdictions of the Federal Police were greatly increased as well. Under the Calderón administration, the goals of Alejandro Gertz and Bernardo León were realized, and all police forces (including the Federal Police) were empowered to conduct criminal investigations. Calderón's prioritization of the Federal Police resulted in a massive hiring push, as Calderón left a force of 37,000 in 2012, more than triple the amount of PFP Vicente Fox left (Esparza 2022).[68]

[68] Esparza, Diego. Policing as a Vocation: Centralization, Professionalism, and Police Malfeasance in Latin America. University of California, Riverside, 2015.

However, the gains of the Federal Police were not permanent. While this is in large part due to the policies of Enrique Peña Nieto, events in the Calderón administration evidence (1) that President Calderón actively worked to diminish the military's security monopoly and (2) that the rivalry between the military and the Federal Police as an ASF became contentious and zero-sum. Particularly due to the personality of Genaro García Luna, the relationship between military and police leadership became one in which agents prioritized their own institutional interests over that of national security.

Sources familiar with the security council describe tough meetings, and a perhaps overly ambitious head of public security who was not afraid to butt heads with the secretaries of defense and the navy. "Say what you will about Genaro," Alejandro Hope, a former Calderón advisor, told me, "But he had a vision."[69] As the preceding discussion has shown, García Luna's vision was both ambitious and admirable. However, according to Guillermo Valdés, the head of CISEN (Mexico's intelligence agency) under Calderón, García Luna's reputation and personality preceded him. "Genaro even wanted to take control of CISEN," Valdés explains, "Calderón had to intervene and tell him: 'Genaro, no.'"[70]

This episode is indicative of the role ASF-military competition plays in incentivizing presidents to become more aware of internal security policy, to digest intelligence, and mandate policy shifts according to their preferences. Feuds between García Luna and other security council personnel, particularly the military, also prompted Calderón to (1) attend

[69] Interview with Alejandro Hope, November 15, 2019, Mexico City.

[70] Interview with Guillermo Valdés, December 11, 2019, Mexico City.

security cabinet briefings himself on a weekly basis and (2) empower and add new civilians to his security advisory council (Valdés). In managing disputes between his security agents, Calderón likewise made decisions to empower (or at the very least attempt to empower) the Federal Police as a potential alternative to the military, and mandated that the security cabinet send him one centralized intelligence report (Valdés). Mandating that they do so meant a decrease in autonomy, but came at the cost of even more contentious relationships with the Federal police going forward.

Evidence shows that the army, in particular, was skeptical of Genaro García Luna from the beginning period. As early as 2006, soldiers briefed President Calderón on potential ties between García Luna and drug traffickers. Calderón chose to keep García Luna on despite these warnings, but the decision came with both costs and benefits. On the one hand: García Luna was one of the most seasoned and experienced civilian law enforcement officers in Mexico, a wunderkind and rarity in a nation with notoriously unreliable police. On the other, García Luna's confrontational personality bled into his public persona, and by 2012 rumors were already swirling that the Secretary of Public Security had amassed a wealth well beyond his salary. In 2019, García Luna was arrested for drug trafficking in Dallas, Texas.

On the ground, the Calderón administration did attempt to create cooperation and balance between the armed forces and the Federal Police. This is evidenced in the Bases de Operaciones Mixtas (BOMs), facilities where federal police officers and armed forces personnel lived together. Operations from these bases included the arrest of high-value targets, where naval and army personnel would surround the Federal Police so that they

could conduct the arrest (Interview with Miguel Garza).[71] While some may laud this as an example of a clear separation of duties, it is in reality a very superficial degree of cooperation. Sources familiar with the BOMs described a hostile environment, in which it was rare for soldiers and police officers to mingle (Interview with Miguel Garza). Resentment was common, and on the ground it was often unclear who had jurisdiction and authority over who. One source, an expert on policing in Mexico, described a scene in which Federal Police officers chased a man fleeing a shooting only for him to arrive at an army (ibid) barracks, where his fellow soldiers sheltered him. In turn, soldiers could arrest Federal Police. While other experts told me that the relationships improved over time, for the majority of the Calderón sexenio there was nothing but daylight between the Federal Police, the Navy, and the Army in particular.

This culture of a zero-sum competition impeded the ability of Federal Police and military personnel to cooperate. Though the competition between the two forces did allow Calderón to insert himself into security policy deliberations, and to increase his power over his agents, a lack of cooperation resulted in clumsy and half-successful operational successes against criminal threats.

During the Calderón sexenio, police participated in 16 high-value arrest operations (Grayson 2013).[72] Of these operations, 7 were joint operations with the army, and 9 were operations carried out by the Federal Police on its own (ibid). Four of the "solo" operations, were in Mexico City, though the army participated in the capture of two high

[71] Interview with Miguel Garza, October 22, 2019, Mexico City.
[72] Grayson, George W. The Impact of President Felipe Calderón's War on Drugs in the Armed Forces: The Prospects for Mexico's "Militarization" and Bilateral Relations (Enlarged Edition). Lulu. com, 2013.

value targets in the capital as well. The number of operations, however, is far eclipsed by those of the army in the same period. The army participated in a total of 68 operations, and the navy participated in 11 such missions, most of which occurred during the years 2011 and 2012 (ibid). This suggest that while the Federal Police developed its capacity to operate against drug cartels independently, that is in a manner without supervision or cooperation from the army, that the army's size and readiness served as an advantage. In parts of the nation where the Federal Police had not yet established a presence, or against threats particularly militarized, the military branches remained a more ready and viable option for policymakers.

The military, however, continued to enjoy resources that the Federal Police critically lacked. Critically, throughout the drug war and to this day, the armed forces are the only agency allowed to purchase weaponry on behalf of the Mexican state. According to Manelich Castilla, one of the final commissioners of the Federal Police, this made the dynamic between the institutions "complicated" as the Federal Police began to receive more military equipment (interview Manelich Castilla).[73] Though military-style training and equipment was available to the Federal Police, the force was significantly smaller than the armed forces. At the outset of the Calderón sexenio, the army had roughly 200,000 personnel. In 2012, the figure had increased to 329,750, nearly ten times the size of the Federal Police when the force was at its largest (World bank).[74]

[73] Interview with Manelich Castilla, November 19, 2019, Mexico City

[74] *Mexico military size 1985-2022*. Macro Trends. (n.d.). Retrieved May 18, 2022, from https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/MEX/mexico/military-army-size#:~:text=Mexico%20military%20size%20for%202017,a%203.26%25%20increase%20from%202013.

Table 8: Size of the Federal Police Compared to the Armed Forces

Year	Federal Police Size	Armed Forces Size
2010	30000*	331,750
2012	38285**	329,750
2018	37293**	348,000

Sources: * The Economist. **Animal Politico[75] All other data provided by world bank.

The above table shows the sheer disparity the size of the Federal Police when compared to the armed forces, composed of the army and navy. What it does not show is that in 2005, the final year of Vicente Fox's presidency, a massive recruitment surge took place in the armed forces, increasing from 204,000 recruits to 280,000 by the end of the year (world bank). Though President Calderón's hiring surge was a step in the right direction, the armed forces enjoyed an ability to both and retain individuals that the Federal Police did not. This would become apparent after the Calderón sexenio, when the Federal Police languished under a President which did not favor them as Calderón had.

Furthermore, the institutional split between the army and navy created competition not only between civilian and military security agents, but within the armed forces as well. Increasingly, the navy demonstrated its own capacity to carry out specialized security operations, and became very instrumental in capturing or killing cartel leaders (Pion-Berlin 2017). While this, in theory, should have created an opportunity for the Federal Police, the

[75] Angel, A. (2018, October 3). *Con todo y gendarmería, la policía federal tiene ahora mil agentes menos que al inicio del sexenio*. Retrieved May 18, 2022, from https://www.animalpolitico.com/2018/10/policia-federal-menos-agentes-epn/; The Economist Newspaper. (n.d.). *Under the Volcano*. The Economist. Retrieved May 18, 2022, from https://www.economist.com/briefing/2010/10/14/under-the-volcano; World Bank. (n.d.). *Armed Forces personnel, total - mexico*. Retrieved May 18, 2022, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1?locations=MX

competition between the army and navy only incentivized the navy to narrowly define its missions and limit them to kingpin operations. In competing with the army, the navy surpassed both the army and the Federal Police with seemingly little effort.

And, unfortunately for the Federal Police, patterns of corruption which plagued state and municipal forces manifested at the Federal as well. Botched missions, evidence of corruption and public abuses did grave danger to the institution's reputation. When asked about persisting problems with the institution's reputation, Manelich Castilla said "This is because many of stories are true."[76] Coupled with the institution's lingering, perceived ties to the PRI, Calderón's own conservative PAN ideology, and rising levels of violence, the police were viewed to be too tainted and too corrupted to be reliable for the military. The recent arrest of García Luna on charges of drug trafficking has not helped this perception.

At the end of the Calderón administration, notable efforts had been made to create the most robust ASF Mexico had seen since the transition to democracy. The Federal Police was legally empowered, was in the process of developing forensic and intelligence capacities which the military did not have, and was receiving military-style training for limited operations. Critically, Calderón's elevation of the force's secretary to the level of security cabinet allowed this civilian ASF the same level of access to the president. While competition occurred, at the highest levels of leadership this competition resulted in animosity which the leaders of the military would not forget. And, with the changing of the President, the armed forces had a new opportunity to lobby their commander-in-chief.

[76] Interview Manelich Castilla, November 21, 2019

Sexenio	Summary
Felipe Calderón (2006-2012)	Felipe Calderón is elected to the presidency by a narrow margin and promptly makes the decision to escalate military deployment across Mexico. Calderon creates the Federal Police in 2008, centralized law enforcement. However, his Secretary of Public Security, Genaro Garcia Luna often clashes with the military in security deliberations. While these disputes force Calderón to become a more hands on manager of internal security, it also contributes to animosity towards to Federal Police on part of the military.

The Peña Nieto Era: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back

President Enrique Peña Nieto (EPN) came into power as the first democratically elected PRI President. Candidate Peña largely moved away from emphasizing the war on drugs, which had become increasingly unpopular with the Mexican public. Instead, the new President campaigned on economic growth and liberalization, intentionally moving away from the bellicose language of President Calderón. The final Commissioner of Public Security, Renato Sales, described this as an intentional practice of the President, who de-emphasized war-like language because he believed that militarization had increased levels of violence and human rights abuses (Interview with Renato Sales).[77]

[77] Interview with Renato Sales, December 9, 2019.

EPN's imminent election, however, put his incoming administration at odds with the outgoing Calderón philosophy. Calderón advisors, eager to reform policing further, recall being told by governors that they were hesitant to cooperate with the administration because "the PRI candidate" seemed to be at odds with their proposals (Interview with Guillermo Valdés). Beyond this, EPN made the decision to eliminate the cabinet-level position of Secretary of Public Security, replacing it with the position of "Commissioner of Public Security." This office would report not to the President, but to the minister of the Interior, Osorio Chong.

Interpretations of this move could vary. On one hand, many observers would be correct in observing that in a majority of nations where a centralized police force exists, these forces are concentrated under the portfolios of Ministers of the Interior or Justice. Though some scholars and observers have come to call Ministries of the Interior as "Ministries of Fear," the National Police of France and Spain both operate under the authority of Ministries of the Interior. Observers would then note, with some degree of correctness, that the move was in line other consolidated and more established democracies. Defenders of the move, such as Renato Sales, said that it was to empower the Minister of the Interior so that they could better coordinate law enforcement efforts with governors and mayors (Renato Sales).

Conversely, other observers within Mexico correctly noted that empowering the Ministry of the Interior at the expense of other cabinet-level appointees was a practice used during the PRI dictatorship. Indeed, the moved seemed to be a return to the configuration of Ernesto Zedillo, who first placed the Federal Preventative Police under this ministry.

Guillermo Valdés, Calderón's head of CISEN, said that Peña Nieto made the decision because "Genaro [García Luna] was bad." The Federal Police did indeed, for better and for worse, exist under the shadow of its first leader. Tensions between García Luna and the military heads were not forgotten, and Renato Sales confirmed that there was a perception in the armed forces that President Calderón favored the Federal Police (interview with Renato Sales). The justifications for Peña Ñieto's move are then as follows: (1) to empower a minister of the interior who could better coordinate with leaders outside of the Federal executive branch; (2) a move to restore an "equilibrium" between the Federal Police and the Armed Forces and (3) an attempt to de-escalate the violence of the war on drugs.

Regardless of the justification, the move meant that the Federal Police had not one, but two civilian whips between themselves and the President, first the commissioner of public security and then the Minister of the Interior. Osorio Chong came to represent Peña Nieto in the security cabinet, meaning that it was an extremely rare occasion that the Federal Police gained direct access to the President. According to Manelich Castilla, it was not uncommon for the President to learn about the Federal Police from the military (interview with Manelich Castilla). When the level of access between the military and the Federal Police was unequal, "The President simply doesn't know what's going on." (Manelich Castilla). Despite any justification, this imbalance between ASFs and the military is essential in understanding why the gains of the Federal Police in either the Calderón or Peña sexenios were permanent.

Because, indeed, there were considerable gains in the Peña sexenio. Above all, the President, his advisors, and the leadership of the Federal Police should be rightfully

credited with the creation of the seventh division of the Federal Police: The Gendarmerie. The creation of the division resulted in the recruitment of 5,000 new recruits of "elite profiles" (interview with Gendarmerie expert 1).[78] The corps also took on impressive missions, targeting not only narco-traffickers, but cartels transitioning from the traffic of drugs to that of endangered species, illegally obtained lumber, and other criminal activity (interview with Gendarmerie expert 2).[79] Though media sources were quick to criticize the Gendarmerie after its initial deployments, the reality of the division, the process which went into its creation and its prospective future, have not been properly reported.[80]

This is, in large part, due to confusion generated by Peña Ñieto's own administration. Peña Nieto announced the creation of the force shortly after becoming President-elect, in what appeared to be a spur-of-the-moment announcement in a state visit to France on October 17, 2012. Dr. Álvaro Vizcaíno, one of the intellectual authors of the gendarmerie, describes the announcement as one made in France in part because EPN was seeking the advice and input of the French government in creating the new force (Vizcaíno

[78] I would here note important context about the timing of my fieldwork and the Gendarmerie. The Federal Police was in the process of being wholly dissolved when I arrived in Mexico, and many expressed an unease about the future of their employment. Because of this unease, the majority of sources who spoke to me about the Federal Police and the Gendarmerie in particular wished to remain anonymous. It is my ethical obligation to them as a researcher to safeguard their identities, and in this regard I cannot give information to identifying information such as rank.

[79] Interview on December 27, 2019

[80] There is one notable exception, which I would be arrogant to not comment on. Dr. Álvaro Vizcaíno Zamora, one of the principal civilian architects of the Gendarmerie, has published a fantastic work of social science in "Gendarmería y otras soluciones para la Seguridad Pública y la Seguridad Interior." Along with a comparative, global analysis of Gendarmeries across the world, Dr. Vizcaíno provides a detailed account of the creation of the Gendarmerie in Mexico, and makes a compelling case that the force was on track to become a huge advancement for civilian security capacity.
Other think tanks in Mexico have written about the Gendarmerie, but English-language analysis remains wholly absent. This an error this dissertation hopes to correct.

2018, 209).[81] The day following EPN's announcement from Paris, Senators asked a question of a EPN campaign aid, who explained that the Gendarmerie would be 40,000 recruits from the Ministries of Defense and Navy (Vizcaíno 2018, 211). However, as Vizcaíno makes clear, EPN's announcement was quite different from that of this campaign official. No official estimate of the number of recruits had been given by the President, and the President also made no reference to a transfer of military officials to the force (Vizcaíno 2018, 212).

Individuals involved with the creation of the Gendarmerie detail the process by which it was created. One expert, who worked in various positions within both the Calderón and Peña administrations, explained that Calderón had envisioned a "federal support force" composed of 10,000 transfers from the army and navy (interview Gendarmerie expert 1). According to a former technical security advisor of President Calderón, the military "would not accept a civilian commander who was not the President. And they told the President [Calderón] this" (interview with Calderón technical security advisor). To be fair, the military had reason to be reluctant to transfer its personnel. Personnel in the military were not only trained military-style warfare, but are also guaranteed pensions. The army and navy were both reluctant to contribute to such a project, and would only do so if the government could match these economic benefits (Gendarmerie expert 1).

[81] Vizcaíno A (2020) Gendarmería y otras soluciones para la Seguridad Pública y la Seguridad Interior. Mexico City: Ubijus Editorial.

Because of this, there was a need to establish a Gendarmerie well outside the military's hierarchy. The army and navy's reluctance would, under other circumstances, have presented an unequivocal gain for a civilian ASF. However, evidence indicates that Peña Nieto delegated much of the development of the force, and that the President himself was not as interested as his initial declaration suggested. Álvaro Vizcaíno, a security expert brought on by the administration, describes his initial idea for the force, creating a force outside of the hierarchy of the military and the federal police and creating a "third force" separate from both (Vizcaíno 2018). He notes that this is the configuration in most countries where "hybrid forces" exist, and that the original purpose of the French Gendarmerie was to patrol rural areas. In interviews, Gendarmerie officials aligned with Vizcaino's vision, saying "The military is for the border. The police are for the city. The Gendarmerie is for everywhere else" (Interview with Gendarmerie Expert 1). However, budget constraints made the creation of an entirely new organization difficult, and in 2013 it was decided to create the Gendarmerie as the seventh division of the Federal Police (Vizcaíno 2018, 212-213).

From 2013 to 2014, the recruitment process was completed. Of an initial 133,155 applicants narrowed to 18,000 after interviews. After further screening, 4,850 applicants completed their training (Vizcaíno 2018, 218). Critically, Gendarmerie officers had military training, a month-long course where gendarmes recruits learned from navy officers (Vizcaíno 2018). Two final notes of interest are relevant to assessing the Gendarmerie as both an increase to Federal Police capacities and as a potential alternative security force: Gendarmerie officials note that the cooperation of France was instrumental in developing

the force, and that the French Gendarmerie also sent instructors to Mexico in order to train the force (interview with Gendarmerie expert 1). However, leaders of the force also received training from the Colombian National Police, with 82 leaders of the new division receiving this training in 2014 (Vizcaíno 2018, 219).

This consultation of foreign experts is one indication of the quality of recruits produced through the Gendarmerie's training, and was a point of pride for the force's members and commanders. Commenting on its commanders, the force had two commissioner generals from 2014 to 2019: Manelich Castilla and Benjamín Grajeda. Dr. Castilla himself was a product of international learning and instruction, having received training from the Canadian Mounted Police and the Colombian National Police. After he was promoted to be the final commissioner of the Federal Police in the Peña sexenio, Benjamín Grajeda succeeded him. Commissioner Grajeda's background is also unique. Grajeda transferred from the navy to lead the gendarmerie. Having previously stated that the transfer of military officers to lead civilian security agencies is problematic, observers may ask if the appointment of a naval officer to lead the Gendarmerie is an indicator that the force was not separate from the military.

Grajeda was well aware of this problem and gave particular attention to the creation of a new "espiritu de corps" separate from the military and from the rest of the Federal Police. "By the time we were done," one advisor close to Grajeda explained, "The corps identified as 'gendarmes' and the organization had a sense of unique identity" (interview with Gendarme expert 2). Institutionally, also, it should be noted that Grajeda in fact reported to Manelich Castilla when the latter became the commissioner of Federal Police.

That is to say, though Grajeda's began his career in the Navy, he (1) did not retain his naval position when assuming command of the gendarmerie and (2) was transplanted to a civilian hierarchy where his immediate commanding officer was also a civilian. More than the PFP then, which was headed by a vice-admiral who only nominally reported to a secretary of public security, the Gendarmerie was thoroughly imbedded in a civilianized hierarchy, as were its commanders. Most important in assessing its independence from the armed forces was the fact that, again, recruits were civilians with no previous background in security agencies. Unlike the PFP, the Gendarmerie was a "blank-slate," which meant it would not face any problem of conflicting loyalty. Had the force become larger, it is quite likely that it would have become a viable alternative to the military.

Though the gendarmerie was rapidly trained and deployed as a force separate from the military, the division and the federal police as a whole suffered a deficit relative to the armed forces. Manelich Castilla, the first head of the force and later the commissioner of national police, noted that the military had been reluctant to participate in the force's development. Castilla called the relationship between the armed forces and police "complicated," and cited military reluctance to give two months of training to gendarmes as evidence. In commissioner Castilla's words: "Their [the military's] training was sacred, and they did not want the Federal Police to replace them, which is what they thought might happen" (Castilla Interview).

Furthermore, the size of the Federal Police did not increase during the Peña sexenio. Calderón left office with a force of 37,000 and, despite the creation of the Gendarmerie, so did Peña Nieto. At the same time, the army and navy both continued to

increase their ranks. This meant that rather than a permanent force, like the French Gendarmerie, the division was a reactive force with limited preventative capabilities. Though it had many successful operations, it remained the case that the army had to be relied upon for a more permanent presence.

Most fundamental of all, however, was Peña's aforementioned to move the Federal Police farther away from the President. Manelich Castilla affirmed that the military retained greater access to the President, and said the following regarding the consequences: "Compare it to a university. If you have a dean who is only listening to two senior faculty, then decisions will continue to go the same direction, regardless of what junior faculty are doing...many times, the President learns about their police from their military" (Castilla).

The distance from the Presidency, as well as a halt in the institution's recruitment numbers, placed the Federal Police (including the Gendarmerie division) at a distinct disadvantage to the armed forces. The secretaries of the army and the navy regained the direct access to the President they had enjoyed during the Fox sexenio, while the Federal Police lost the access it had gained in the Calderón sexenio. Though the force gained new technical capacities, its institutional marginalization allowed for the military to regain its security monopoly, and with it, profound influence over security policy.

Sexenio	Summary
Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018)	Enrique Peña Nieto makes two contradictory moves. First, the president orders the creation of the Federal Police's Gendarmerie division. Though the division increases the Federal Police's viability, Pena also moves the Federal Police out of the presidential cabinet. This allows the military to dominate internal security policy making.

Analysis: Civilian Management, ASF-Military Competition in Mexico

This chapter has covered three different attempts to create a viable ASF. A viable ASF is (1) beholden to the same civilian principal, hence an "alternative" and (2) able to compete with the military in the provision of "security services." To perform favorably in this competition, an ASF needs to be able to provide services comparable to the military and goods which the military cannot. If competition is only based on the ability to provide military-style force on behalf of the state, the military is in an unrivaled position of supremacy. ASFs also need to be on as equal a playing field as possible with the armed forces. This means that they need the same level of institutionalized access to the principal which they are competing with the military for, the President. That Mexico has had both multiple attempts to create an ASF and multiple institutional shifts which dictated how Presidents received information allows for a within-case comparative analysis about the determinants of ASF-military competition.

As was stated in the introduction, the need for a viable, federal, and civilian security force was not lost on Mexican policymakers. However, from 1911 to 1999 security forces

had been fragmented, disorganized, and under the command of governors and mayors rather than the national government. The one exception to this rule were the armed forces, split between the secretaries of the army and navy. Because of this, it was not uncommon to use the military as a deterrent for criminal activity and as a mechanism to assert the presence of the Federal government in cases where the loyalty of governors and mayors was suspect (interview Bernardo León; Calderón Technical Security advisor). But as drug trafficking increased in the 1980s and 1990s, it became clear that a civilian force would be needed to deal with criminal activity.

To this end, the three documented attempts to creating a civilian ASF were attempts to create a national police which could deter, prevent and (eventually) investigate the federal crime of drug trafficking. The first attempt was in the creation the Federal Preventative Police, created by Ernesto Zedillo, continued by Vicente Fox, and active from 1999-2009. The second was the Federal Police, created during the sexenio of Felipé Calderón and active from 2009-2019. The third notable attempt was the creation Gendarmerie division within the Federal Police, active from 2014-2019 and created during the sexenio of Peña Nieto. As the Gendarmerie was a division within the Federal Police, the viability of the PF overall should have increased in the Peña sexenio. However, institutional marginalization meant that the Gendarmerie division was two steps forward, and one step backward for the PF. The military thus continued to dominate internal security with an excised influence over internal security policy.

Table 9: Assessing Mexican ASFs 1999-2000

Force	Years Active	Strengths	Weaknesses
The Federal Preventative Police	1999-2009	The PFP was the first attempt to create a centralized, civilian ASF which could respond to the drug threat. However, the force was largely ineffective.	The PFP's greatest weakness was that it lacked the authority to conduct criminal investigations. This lack of legal authority also hampered its ability to gather intelligence. Furthermore, over half the force came from the military branches, and its commander was a vice-admiral. Leading to questions about how separate the division was from the armed forces.
The Federal Police	2009-2019	The PF was a far more robust attempt at creating a civilian ASF. The force had six specialized divisions, with particular attention given to intelligence gathering and analysis. Furthermore, it was legally empowered to conduct criminal investigations. The Force also had better equipment, including black-hawk helicopters, and equal access to the President.	Though strengthened to over 33,000 personnel, the PF was still dwarfed by the size of the army and navy. Furthermore, political scandal followed the PF, damaging its public reputation.
The Federal Police, Gendarmerie division	2014-2009	The Gendarmerie was a new division within the Federal Police of about 5,000 recruits. Members were scrutinized in a long screening process, organized in a military-like hierarchy, and given specialized military training.	Because of its size, the Gendarmerie could not be placed uniformly across the country. While this was in the prospective plan developed by the Gendarmerie, the force was ultimately dissolved along with the Federal Police.

The PFP, the first ASF in Mexico, was hindered in becoming fully viable first and foremost due to its legal constraints. Unable to conduct criminal investigations, the force lacked the ability to provide a key security good which the military could not. Instead, the body was purely preventative in nature, equal parts of the highway police and military police stitched together and under the operational command of a vice admiral. Intelligence capacities were instead handled by CISEN, and investigations were the exclusive purview of the AFI, which though headed by a civilian operationally was under the command of General Macedo in his capacity as attorney general.

The Federal Police were designed to be a more robust replacement for the PFP, and according to Calderón advisors, potentially to be a force which could facilitate a return of the military to its barracks. Unlike Vicente Fox, Felipé Calderón had an interest in creating a centralized civilian security force, and made security one of the planks of his presidential campaign. Compared to his predecessors and to his successors, Felipé Calderón more routinely exercised his authority to oversee security policy. He did this by bringing in more civilian security advisors into his security cabinet, regularly attending meetings of the security cabinet, mandating the creation of a centralized ASF in the form of the Federal Police and ordering cooperation between security forces.

The Gendarmerie division, for its part, was modeled after "hybrid forces" across the world. It was a semi-militarized division, where recruits received two months of military training. The process of its creation, from 2013-2014, saw the cultivation of highly professional and deployment produced results in areas where the Gendarmerie was deployed. However, the division was too small to establish a permanent presence in its

areas of deployment, and at 5,000 recruits it had not yet gained the sort of personnel necessary to be a more traditional Gendarmerie.

Table 10: Mexican ASFs and Their Respective Secretariats, 1999-2019

Sexenio	ASF	Ministry	Relevant details
Ernesto Zedillo	PFP	Secretariat of the Interior (1999)	The PFP was only active and under the command of the Ministry of Interior for one year.
Vicente Fox	PFP	Secretariat of Public Security	Vicente Fox created the position of Minster of Public Security in 2000 and separated the PFP from the Ministry of Interior. Rather than to reduce military influence, this was done in large part to differentiate himself from preceding PRI governments, who had extremely empowered ministers of the interior
Felipe Calderon	PF	Secretariat of Public Security	Felipe Calderon kept the Secretary of Public Security as a cabinet-level appointee, appointed a civilian attorney general, and concentrated civilian law enforcement in the hands of the SSP. By placing the SPP in the security cabinet and mandating that the cabinet, rather than individual ministers, brief him, Calderon placed the Federal Police on an institutionally equal playing field to the military.
Pena Nieto	PF and Gendarmerie	Secretariat of the Interior	EPN abolished the position of SSP and created the new position of "commissioner of public security" which was placed under the ministry of the interior. This meant the Federal Police lost equal access.

Competition between ASFs and the military nearly always favored the armed forces. The earliest indicators explaining why come from the Fox sexenio. From the account of Bernardo León it is evident that Fox's Secretary of Public Security wanted to expand the powers of the PFP so that the force could conduct criminal investigations. This would facilitate the collection of intelligence and an overall more proactive, rather than purely preventative, function for the PFP. That the attorney general at the time, General Macedo, opposed the measure could be dismissed as any other public functionary trying to retain their power. However, that he sided *with* the other two military members of the cabinet suggests a corporate interest in curtailing the power of civilian security agents.

Calderón succeeded where Fox did not, and through efforts to reform Article 21 of the constitution, not only created the Federal Police but empowered them to conduct intelligence and investigation work. In the latter, the Federal Police expanded their presence in joint operations with the military. The Bases de Operaciones Mixtas (BOMs) allowed for a minimal cooperation between members of the armed forces and the federal police, whereby the army (and sometimes navy) would establish a perimeter for the Federal Police so that police officers could arrest high-value targets.

Competition increased in the Calderón administration between the armed forces and the Federal Police, and the competition was ultimately quite bitter and hostile. This was particularly true at the highest levels of the institution, where the personality and ambition of Genaro García Luna in part fed military fears of being replaced. Unlike Fox, however, Calderón the disputes between his agents incentivized Calderón to intensely involve himself in security affairs, and ultimately mandate that all security advisors brief him

collectively, rather than individually. This exertion of power, while it limited military autonomy and provided the Federal Police (particularly Genaro García Luna) an advantage over the military, did contribute to a zero-sum logic of competition between the military and ASFs. Though Calderón has largely been remembered as the President who did the most to militarize Mexico's internal security, his efforts to create a civil-military balance and to create a robust ASF indicate that along with any process of militarization was a parallel process of civilianization.

However, partisan politics and the personal politics of the President did much to undermine the work which Calderón began. Enrique Peña Ñieto's decisions to (1) remove the secretary of public security and replace it with the position of commissioner of public security beneath the minister of interior and (2) to "de-militarize" security policy came with the consequences of greatly expanding the military's influence over internal security policy.

This level of influence began to decline in the Calderón era. García Luna's domineering presence and the mandate that the military share information with the entire security cabinet indicates the unrivaled supremacy it had enjoyed in the Fox era was no longer unrivaled. Particularly, President Calderón's meetings not only with the secretary of public security but with the head of the federal police as well (interview with Gendarmerie Expert 2), meant that the military could no longer dominate the president's time and attention. Consequently, it could not unilaterally influence security policy.

Conversely, while Peña Nieto could distance himself from security politics by removing the position of Secretary of Public Security from the cabinet, he could not do so with the secretaries of defense and the navy. Indeed, outgoing secretaries of defense and

the navy have the privilege of meeting with president elects and of recommending their successors (interview with Gendarmerie Expert 2). This meant that the military had an unequal influence over EPN even prior to his inauguration. The ability to recommend a list of successors, and some degree of certainty that their replacement will indeed come from this list, is also indicative of a degree of guaranteed continuity which the armed forces have relative to their civilian competitors.

Because their level of access to the executive was not uniform across sexenios, Mexican alternative security forces have struggled to consolidate. This studies have shown that Presidents have the capacity both to lift these agencies up, as Calderón did, and to isolate them, as Peña Nieto did. Calderón's interest in security, that is his own personal vision, included a gradual end of a military presence in public security. While Peña Nieto and his administration should be credited with the creation of the gendarmerie, distancing the Federal Police from the presidency meant that access to the president was extremely unequal. The competition between the armed forces and the federal police then largely skewed in the armed forces' favor and ultimately set the stage for the competition's final resolution in the presidency of Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador.

Conclusion: AMLO, the Guardia and the End of ASF-Military Competition

In 2018, AMLO finally entered into government on a newly created political party, MORENA. With MORENA taking both chambers of congress, AMLO enjoyed a super majority and a wider mandate than that of Vicente Fox, Felipe Calderon, or Peña Nieto. Understandably then, there was strong speculation that the new President's relationship with the military and other security forces would be a departure from those of his

predecessors, particularly as the newly elected President campaigned on a promise of "abrazos, no balazos" (hugs, not bullets) and repeated criticism of the "War on Drugs," which he affiliated with longtime political adversary Felipe Calderón.

This speculation was further increased in the dramatic and quick creation and deployment of the President's proposed new security force, the Guardia Nacional (National Guard). Creating the Guardia was something that AMLO had previously spoken about before as a candidate,[82] but soon became one of the most apparent and alarming about faces of his presidency. Early on, the President and MORENA alike argued that the force should be placed under military, rather than civilian control. Ultimately, the creation of the force was approved unanimously in the senate only *after* the Lopez Obrador administration agreed to place the Guardia under civilian command.[83] AMLO opted to give oversight of the force to long-time confidant Alfonso Durazo, who was appointed to the position of Secretary of Public and Citizen Security, a cabinet-level position comparable to the SSP which AMLO restored.

However, the operational command of the force fell to an army commander, General Bucio. Because operations were to be headed by a military commander, many respondents suggested that the Guardia was nothing more than an extension of the military. "Durazo will not be able to control Bucio," one security expert said (interview with former

[82] "Mexican President-Elect's Party Presents National Guard Plan." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, November 20, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-politics/mexican-president-elects-party-presents-national-guard-plan-idUSKCN1NP2MZ.

[83] "Mexico's National Guard Won't Be Military-Led, in Government Step-Down." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, February 21, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-politics-military/mexicos-national-guard-wont-be-military-led-in-government-step-down-idUSKCN1QA31C.

technical security advisor). Alejandro Hope notes the Guardia's budget indicates that there is no plan to civilianize the force. "They [the Obrador administration] are saying that the force is going to be civilianized, that's a lie. We know that because the disclosed budget mentions nothing about creating new positions. And you have to create the position before you offer it...$3.8 billion pesos have been set aside for the Guardia. That's nothing. $2.8 billion are in wages. But none for permanent wages, no investments infrastructure. The rest of the money is bonuses given to join the Guardia. This is exactly what the military wanted." (Interview with Alejandro Hope).

At the time of writing, the Guardia remains overwhelming military in composition. According to the think tank Causa en Común, which investigates and studies security in Mexico, as of April 2020 only 31% percent of the Guardia's personnel came from the dissolved Federal Police (Causa en Común 2020). The exact number at this time was 18,240 former PF personnel in the Guardia, with none of them of holding officer positions. Eligibility for officer ranks in the Guardia mandate 18 previous years in a security institution, and because the Federal Police was only 11 years old, this meant no PF or Gendarmerie officer was eligible to maintain a command position if they entered the Guardia (interview with Manelich Castilla). This indicates a systematic exclusion of civilians from the Guardia, and the subordination of civilians who did join the Guardia to military authority.

Explaining AMLO's decision, it appears that military access to the President-elect, along with biases against police, were as formative for AMLO as they were for EPN. According to Manelich Castilla, who was present in the outgoing EPN administration as

Commissioner of the Federal Police, AMLO was unexceptional compared to other Mexican Presidents as they prioritize relationships with the armed forces. "The relationship [between the President and the armed forces] needs to be perfect," according to Castilla, "I never briefed AMLO. But Cienfuegos [outgoing secretary of defense] did. He had a lot of meetings with the armed forces." Alejandro Hope also implied that an October 2018 meeting between General Cienfuegos and President-elect Obrador may have heavily influenced AMLO's decisions regarding both the Guardia and the Federal Police.

The result now, is that the army and navy have legally enshrined their security monopoly. Guardia personnel transferred from the military remain part of the army and navy, "on loan" from the military for a period of five years (Causa en Común 2020). This puts the military in a position of new, unprecedented leverage, where it may be in a position to argue at the end of the Obrador sexenio that it must continue overseeing the development of the Guardia. And, despite his opposition to a 2017 Internal Security Law, AMLO recently approved laws which grant the armed forces extensive legal roles in internal security, including the ability to conduct arrests.

As of writing, the ASF-military balance of the Obrador administration seems to be far worse than any of the sexenios covered in this chapter. The armed forces have succeeded in eliminating their competition entirely, due to unequal access to the President. Significant gains have then been entirely erased. Short of a complete reversal on part of the President, it appears that Mexico's military has secured an unrivaled monopoly over internal security.

However, not all experts are equally pessimistic. One Gendarmerie commander explained to me, "the Guardia has what the Gendarmerie did not. Public support, budget, political will. I hope that the next President does not abolish the Guardia, because then we are back to square one" (interview with Gendarme expert 2). According to statements from Secretary Durazo, the Guardia is attempting to increase its civilian ranks. While this is a step forward, the military's advantage in this balance of power is likely to continue as long as the overwhelming majority of experts and commanders advising the president come from the armed forces.

Chapter 3: The National Police of Colombia: ASF Viability and Competition

Case Introduction

Colombia's internal conflict, ongoing since 1958, has become the longest such conflict in the western hemisphere. Though Colombia's largest lasting leftist insurgency, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) demobilized in 2016, the Ejercito Nacional de Liberacion (ELN), FARC dissidents, rightwing paramilitaries and the Cartel of Sinaloa remain. Throughout the conflict Colombia's democracy has been uninterrupted, though the intensity of violence has ebbed and flowed. Colombia's armed threats have varied in both their ideologies and goals but share a common capacity for military-style violence which was used to attack the state. The presence and capacities of these threats has warranted the continued internal deployment of the armed forces. However, at no point in time could the armed forces claim to have a monopoly over internal security, or to have a set of missions that it alone could carry out. Indeed, the Colombian National Police (CNP) have been an available option for civilian policymakers since 1960, when the CNP was separated from the military's command. Its viability as an ASF greatly increased in response to the variety of missions the CNP was forced to accept, largely due to military reluctance. Military reluctance to participate in anti-drug operations in particular gave the police greater autonomy, and greater incentives to improve its intelligence capacities. This led to the National Police not only becoming a completely autonomous agent but developing intelligence capacities which surpassed those of the armed forces. This viability has in turn given civilians a chance to more closely involve themselves in internal security politics, even when the military has protested. By breaking the monopoly which the armed

forces would otherwise enjoy, the presence of the police has facilitated new opportunities to manage security which would not exist otherwise.

The presence of this viable ASF would, under most circumstances, provide an alternative an alternative channel for civilians to consult and control in managing internal security policy. However, Colombia historically had two major obstacles in its relationship between the military, the police, and the armed forces. The first was that until 1991, only army commanders occupied the position of minister of defense. The second was an entire political class who shirked their security responsibilities, as politicians (including presidents) had been uninterested in the internal conflict. Historically, presidents have also favored either heavily militarized responses to violence, or to keep the armed forces at a distance out of either disinterest or discomfort (Dufort 2013; Ivey 2021).[84] Though the police gained greater access to the President in 1991, when a civilian minister of defense was appointed (Pardo 1996), commanders in chief after Gaviria squandered the institutional power a multi-agent framework gave them.[85] Instead, presidents Samper and Pastrana either clashed with their militaries or avoided them entirely. The arrival of Álvaro Uribe, however, demonstrates that the management capacity was latent, and that all the two-agent model needed was a principal ready to exercise and expand this power.

[84] Dufort, Philippe. "Las políticas desarrollistas de Alberto Ruiz Novoa a principios de 1960: ¿Se podría haber evitado medio siglo de guerra." *Estudios en Seguridad y Defensa* 8, no. 16 (2013): 31-46.
Ivey, Andrew. "The Post-Conflict Colombian Military Looks for a Development Role." *War on the Rocks* (2021).

[85] Pardo, Rafael, 1996. De Primera Mano. Colombia 1986-1994: Entre conflictos y Esperanzas. Grupo Editorial Norma

Figure 6: Colombia's Principal-Agent Models, 1953-1991



The above figure outlines Colombia's multi-agent model, which I describe as a "two-force model." Beginning in 1953, when the military assumed governance during "La Violencia" through 1960 the military directly oversaw the creation and deployment of the police. In 1960, President Lleras removed the police from the direct operational supervision of the commander of the armed forces, and created an arrangement in which both agents reported directly to the minister of defense. Historically then, the military has enjoyed unequal access to the executive branch relative to the police, though many presidents have simply opted to keep both forces at a distance, effectively denying access to the executive to both agents.

However, this chapter finds that the viability of the national police preceded equal access to the president, providing evidence that ASFs may develop rival capacities to the armed forces even when executives shirk their responsibilities. Because the military has

been described as a "garrisoned force," opting to limit their missions as much as possible, the police were forced to develop special divisions to combat specific threats. Examples include: the Carabineros, a police division augmented after 1958 to fight criminal bands, COPES, an elite urban police squad created in response to the rise of the guerrilla group M-19 and DIPOL, an intelligence police created to fight the Cartel of Calí. At a critical juncture, as M-19 and the Cartel of Medellín simultaneously became existential threats, police intelligence capacities began to overtake that of the military. This forced a more equal relationship between the two security agents, even before the arrival of a civilian defense minister in 1991.

Table 11: Examples of Specialized CNP and the Threats They Were Created For

Police Division	Function	Threat Responding to
DICAR	Rural Policing and Combat	Bandaleros and rural guerrilla violence
COPES	Urban counter terrorism	M-19
DIJIN	Intelligence collection and counter-narcotics operations	Drug trafficking, Cartel of Medellin
DIPOL	Intelligence collection, analyzation and sharing	Cartel of Cali

This chapter begins with historical process tracing examining how the CNP developed into a viable ASF as a direct consequence of the need to respond to diverse threats. In understanding the relationships between the police and military, and their civilian principal, I begin my analysis in the period 1953-1958. Though this period predates Colombia's transition to democracy, it is the foundation of the police's paramilitary capacities and anti-guerrilla role. From roughly 1965 until 1981, the police existed in what I call "subordinate autonomy" relative to the armed forces. I use this term because while the police were under the formal command of an active duty general in the personage of the

defense minister, they were also separated from the military hierarchy and ministers of defense did not typically interfere in the organization or protocols of the police. Though mission overlap was wide at this time, competition between the military and police was minimal, even though there was some institutional tensions and rivalries.

In 1981, the army formally renounced its role in counter-narcotics operations, ceding these missions to the police and in doing so giving them a wider portfolio of internal security missions. While the army abandoned counter-narcotics to the police, the police remained involved both in counter-narcotics and counter-insurgent operations. The experience of the CNP in counter-narcotics would result in the development of "transferrable skills," namely human intelligence collection that became relevant in the 1990s, the most violent period in Colombia's recent history. In the aftermath of a conflict resembling an all-out war between the Colombian government and the Cartel of Medellín, the police further institutionalized its intelligence capacities in the creation of a new division: DIPOL. This intelligence capacity would become very important in the final offensives against the FARC, in which infiltration and kingpin operations carried out by the police (sometimes with assistance from or to the armed forces) quickly decapitated FARC leadership and pressured the group to the negotiation table.

Table 12: Time Period and Police Threats

Time Period	Threat	Police Role and Relationship with the military
1953-1958	Civil War	Military Auxiliary Force, under military command
1958-1964	Internal Armed Groups, "Bandoleros" and leftist guerrillas	Military Auxiliary Force, separated from military command but not military influence
1964-1972	Leftist guerrillas	Separated from the military, but still subject to military control in joint operations
1972-1981	Leftist guerrillas, marijuana trafficking, urban kidnapping networks	Separated from the military, but still subject to military control in joint operations
1981-1990	The Cartels of Medellin, Cali, Paramilitary groups, and leftist guerrillas	Separated from the military, operations carried out independently without military oversight
1990-1997	Cartels of Medellin, Cali, and the FARC	Separated from the military, operations carried out independently without military oversight, contribution of intelligence to joint operations
1997-present	FARC	Separated from the military, lead intelligence contributor to joint operations

Table 13: Military Police Relations From 1953-Present

Period	Inter-Agent Relationship
1953-1960	The National Police serve as the fourth division of the military, and are included in the military hierarchy as such. Military control is total.
1960-1981	The National Police are separated from military command in 1960 and a Police Academy Graduate becomes director of the National Police in 1965. The police are, however, subordinate to the military in joint operations. Because the military does not interfere in the inner workings of police promotion and doctrine development, this relationship is described as "subordinate autonomy."
1981-1991	The Military declares it will no longer involve itself in counter-narcotics operations, ceding internal security missions to the police. In this time period, the police build on intelligence and combat capacities as a response to rising threats.
1991-present	With the arrival of Rafael Pardo as the first civilian minister of defense since "La Violencia," the police now enjoy equal access to the president through the minister of defense. The police build on their intelligence capacities and become the dominant intelligence body in the country. Though institutional rivalries persist throughout this era, combined police-military operations become very successful. Presidents and ministers who take on a more aggressive management role tend to force this cooperation.

In assessing the viability of the Colombian National Police, this chapter turns to operations carried out with the armed forces along with independent operations. Viability is indicated in either (1) the ability to carry out successful operations or (2) contributing to operations which the military would be unable to perform on its own, indicating a *critical role* played by the police. While the CNP began life as an institution subordinate to the armed forces, the army's withdrawal from counter-narcotics operations meant the police had an entire set of missions the military had ceded. The police developed an anti-narcotics expertise which ultimately, the military was forced to rely on. This is indicated the creation of the "Bloques de Busqueda," and the fact that the military itself came to civilian of Defense Rafael Pardo with the idea of a joint military-police task force (Pardo 1996). The police also were able to demonstrate independent successes in their campaigns against the cartels of Medellín and Calí, which garnered the attention and support of both domestic and international political actors. The police experience in these campaigns became increasingly relevant as the FARC coalesced into a hybrid threat, with ambitions to both overthrow the government and to amass wealth from the narco-trade. The viability of the national police became increasingly on display in the ability of the CNP to infiltrate FARC cells, locate leaders, and coordinate strikes with the armed forces.

1953-1958: Military Tutelage and Dictatorship

The contemporary Colombian National Police can trace its origins to "La Violencia," a ten-year civil war which lasted from 1948-1958. In this period the police were recruited, trained, and overseen by the army, whose goal was to create an auxiliary force which could support anti-guerrilla operations. These were subordinate not only the army,

but to military dictator Rojas Pinilla. The period set the tone for the relationship between the police and the military for decades and defined the police as an anti-insurgent force well before either the FARC or ELN emerged as insurgent threats.

Efforts to overhaul Colombia's police forces came immediately after "the Bogotazo," a serious of riots which brought Bogotá to standstill. Upon seeing police officers participate in the riots, conservative President Mario Ospina Pérez dissolved all existing police forces and called in the army to restore order to Bogotá (Aparicio 2018, 47; Esparza 2015).[86] After order was restored, Ospina Pérez ordered the creation of a new police force. However, these police were viewed to be conservative partisans, and thus widely distrusted by citizens (Aparicio 2018, 48). This distrust only increased when Ospina Perez was succeeded by Laureano Gómez Castro, a fascist sympathizer, and media mogul who many blamed for inciting conservative violence against liberals (Borrero 2019, 51).[87] Gómez only occupied the presidency briefly, from 1950-1951, before poor health forced him to give the remainder of his term to his vice president, Roberto Urdaneta Arbelaez. However, the prospect of Gómez's potential return to the presidency in 1953 proved to so frightening that conservative and liberal political elites gave support to Colombia's only military dictator of the 20th century: General Rojas Pinilla.[88]

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[86] Aparacio, Juan. La Ideología de la Policía Nacional de Colomba en los años 60 y 70. Policía Nacional Escuela de Postgrados de Policía. Bogotá, 2018.
Esparza, Diego. Policing as a Vocation: Centralization, Professionalism, and Police Malfeasance in Latin America. University of California, Riverside, 2015.

[87] Borrero, Armando. De Marquetalia a las Delicias. Planeta. Bogotá, 2019.

88 The context of the Panilla coup is worth discussing. Gomez had abdicated the presidency for health concerns, leaving the office to his vice president, Roberto Urdaneta Arbeláez. However, once Gómez's health began to improve, he announced he would return to the Presidency. It was Gómez's return to politics which turned the public, the political elites, and the military to General Panilla, who carried out his coup with popular backing.

Pinilla's regime, though certainly a dictatorship, enjoyed a brief and fruitful period of popular support.[89] Pinilla is credited with several surprising moves, among them accelerating the development of a professional, non-partisan police force.[90] At the beginning of La Violencia, the army's (the most relevant military body at the time) position was unenviable. The institution was not prepared to assume permanent policing duties in the nation's capital. At 5,000 recruits found itself wholly unprepared to fight a civil war, let alone an insurgency (interview with Dr. Pacheco).[91] For General Pinilla, the police would serve to alleviate some of the burdens suffered by an army overwhelmed by and unprepared for an internal conflict. The new centralized police, under the direct management of Pinilla and the military, would work with the army to restore public order and reassert the dominance of the central government. The creation of a capable police force became imperative and could not wait for an end to violence.

Dr. Javier Torres, one of the most learned security experts and academics in Colombia, is more familiar with military tutelage over the police than most.[92] "Every instructor at the Santander Academy [the principal academy for training police] was a military officer. My father, who was a general, was the rector of the academy in this period"

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89 At this time, and for the majority of Colombia's history, the Army has been the most relevant branch of the armed forces.

90 In fieldwork, I noticed that Panilla was a prominent figure in the National Police's own self-image. His portrait is displayed prominently in the National Police Museum, for instance, and he is talked about by police officers as a great contributor to the institution.
Panilla also opened the way for women to be police officers, granted women the right to vote, expanded the welfare state through the very popular apprenticeship agency "SENA."

91 Interview with Dr. Pacheco conduct March 9, 2020, in Bogotá, Colombia.

92 In this interview, Dr. Torres revealed that his father was the rector for the General Satander Academy, and that he was a General in the Army while serving in this position.

(interview with Javier Torres).[93] Torres says the army even utilized similar recruitment patterns for the national police as it did for its own soldiers, drawing new police recruits from the same regions where it recruited its soldiers (interview with Javier Torres). However, not every member of the national police during this period came to the institution with a blank slate. While officers from older police institutions had largely been filtered out, the army still used some of its personnel to command police operations. Captain Juan Aparicio notes that the military was wary of partisanship developing in the police ranks and hoped the transferring of soldiers to police ranks could prevent greater partisanship (Aparicio 2018, 51).[94] Aparicio credits this military tutelage for allowing the National Police to created "free from the partisan conflict [of La Violencia]" (Aparicio 2018, 55).

Despite the relationship of tutelage, soldiers remained skeptical and wary of police officers. The participation of the Bogotá police in the Bogotazo, and the defection of police officers to liberal guerrilla bands had a lasting impression on military members. One retired police general, General Rodrigo Londoño who was one of the first cadets trained at General Santander during this period of military tutelage described the relationship as tense. "The soldiers did not like us," explains General Londoño, "Because the police were killing them."[95] General Londoño refers to the participation of police in the violence,

[93] Interview with Dr. Javier Torres conduced February 14, 2020, in Bogotá, Colombia.

[94] However, Aparicio also notes that the army was very wary that any partisanship developed by the police could transfer to the police. Even a military in crisis such as Colombia's at the height of a civil war will be at least somewhat resistant to transferring its personnel.

[95] General Londoño interview conducted February 18, 2020, in Bogotá, Colombia

notably within the Chulavistas but also within liberal paramilitary and guerrilla bands across the country as a factor which created animus within members of the armed forces.

The recruitment of police continued throughout the conflict, though professionalization was greatly accelerated by military dictator Rojas Pinilla. Not only were intense efforts made to rapidly professionalize the police (Esparza 2015, 162), but they were deployed in war operations alongside the military.[96] This meant that very early on the police developed a military-style capacity for violence, though the force did not overtake the army in "La Violencia." Critically, it was also Pinilla who planted the first seeds for the police's intelligence capacities, which would come to surpass those of the military. Decree of 1814 of July 10, 1953 mandate the creation of "F-2," a specialized police division which would be separate from the army and serve as "political police" (DIJIN 2013).[97] Though founded with seemingly dictatorial motives in mind, as an intelligence cell which would report directly to Pinilla, F-2 served as the first laboratory of police intelligence during both La Violencia and the early years of the national front government, when the police formally moved out of the army's command, though not its shadow or sphere of influence.

[96] Esparza, Diego, and Antonio Ugues. "The Impact of Law Enforcement Centralisation and Professionalisation on Public Opinion of the Mexican Police." Journal of Politics in Latin America 12, no. 1 (2020): 104-120.
[97] *DIJIN: 60 años.* Policía Nacional: DIJIN. Bogotá, 2013.

Era	Summary
1953-1958	The Colombian National Police were formed after all other police in the country disbanded. They were first created as a military branch, under the command and tutelage of the armed forces. Because they were subordinate to the military, they did not yet constitute an alternative security force. F-2, the first police intelligence unit, was created as a political police loyal to military dictator General Rojas Pinilla.

However, it cannot be said that the police constituted a true "alternative" to the military during military rule. While it is possible that army leadership was looking forward to a return to the barracks and may have seen the police as force which could have enabled them to do so, the army also maintained a dominant role in internal security. Given that General Pinilla was a military dictator, it is unsurprising that the army would be given a dominant role in internal security, and that the formation of any other security body would primarily serve to benefit the army. Thus, rather than an "alternative" force, the police were a "supporting" force during the Pinilla dictatorship. Though the police shared a set of missions with the military, there was little possibility of competition if it remained under the control and supervision of the army. I would then characterize the police throughout the Pinilla dictatorship as a police subordinate to the army, with no institutional autonomy and by virtue of a military dictatorship, no access to a civilian principal.

The National Front Government: The "Subordinated Autonomy" of the National Police

Though the police were quickly removed from the military's chain of command three years after the transition to democracy, it remained a marginalized force within the defense ministry. The Ministers of Defense were army generals, who prioritized the armed forces and did not interfere in the promotion or training of police officers. This meant that the National Police were free to, or rather forced to, develop anti-insurgent and anti-crime capacities and doctrines independent of the army. However, the army assumed control of all joint operations, and often treated police officers with a degree of disdain in doing so. While the viability of the police increased in this period, its marginalization within the defense ministry meant an unequal level of access to civilian executives, who often preferred highly militarized responses to all public security threats (see Dufort 2013; Ivey 2021).

Era	Threats and descriptions
1959-1974	The two dominant threats are "bandoleros" and leftist guerrilla movements. From 1959-1964, the bandoleros were considered the primary threat. In 1964, both the FARC and the ELN formally launch their insurgency. However, both movements are considered to be lesser threats than the bandoleros.

Popular protests, coordinated by a coalition of elites from the Liberal and Conservative parties ousted Pinilla.[98] The Liberal and Conservative elites, who had been the antagonists of "La Violencia," agreed to a power sharing agreement called "The National Front" in which the two parties would rotate the presidency for a four-year term and split their cabinets equally between members of each party beginning in 1958. Because the number of cabinet-level ministers was odd, an army general, supposedly a non-partisan individual, would occupy the Ministry of Defense.

The first National Front President, Alberto Lleras Camargo, was skeptical of the military's non-partisan nature. Two years into his administration, a coup plot was uncovered. Though details of the 1960 coup plot remain scant, scholars have speculated that it contributed to the so-called "Lleras doctrine," in which Lleras stated that civilians would not interfere in military affairs to avoid corrupting the military with partisan politics, and that the military would not interfere in politics for the same reason (Borrero 2019, 30-33). The Lleras doctrine has been largely understood as a "pact" between the military and the government and is often cited as one reason why the civil-military gap remained wide in Colombia until the 1991 constitution. It has also been interpreted as a concession to the armed forces, and critics have suggested that Lleras' intentions to keep the military out of politics were well-meaning, it led to a military that continues to struggle in defining its societal role (see Borrero 2019).

[98] "Colombians Overthrow Dictator, 1957." Colombians overthrow dictator, 1957 | Global Nonviolent Action Database. Accessed May 20, 2022. https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/colombians-overthrow-dictator-1957.

This criticisms in mind, Lleras Camargo took steps to limit the military's dominance over internal security. As a previous Minister of the Interior in pre-Violencia Colombia, he had experience as a cabinet member with jurisdiction over a National Police outside of military jurisdiction.[99] During his presidency, Lleras acted to increase the size and capacity of the police so it could serve as a "counterweight" to the military (Londoño 1993; interview with Juan Aparicio).[100] In 1960, the same year as the discovered coup plot, Lleras issued Decree 1705, which moved the police out of military hierarchy (Pardo 1960).[101] Juan Aparicio writes:

> "The government of Alberto Lleras looked at the army with a certain resentment, and for this reason put more emphasis and more resources in other armed forces, to give a power equilibrium between them [the police and the army] and thus avoid skirmishes with the army." (Aparicio 2018, 52)[102]

[99] Indeed, as a previous Ministry of the Interior, Lleras had control over the police forces which preceded the the National Police created by the military.

[100] Londoño, F. (1993). Historia de la Policía Nacional de Colombia. En A. Valencia, *Historia de Las Fuerzas Militares en Colombia* (vol. 6, pp. 51-471). Bogotá: Planeta.
Interview with Dr. Juan Aparacio conducted on January 9, 2020 in Bogotá, Colombia.

[101] However, Alberto Lleras stopped short of overhauling the military and civilian control entirely. Though skeptical of the military, Lleras is also known for defining civil-military relations in Colombia with the "Lleras Doctrine." After leaving power, civilian control of the military became enshrined in the "Lleras Doctrine," named after a speech President Alberto Lleras (the first National Front President) gave to the armed forces on May 9, 1958 (Borrero 2019, 28). In his speech, Lleras praised the armed forces, noting in language very similar to Samuel Huntington that the military mind is different, and that the character the military is defined by rigor and discipline. And, as with Huntington, Lleras argued for a form of civil-military control which would separate the military from politics and civil-intervention. The President explained: "Politics is the art of controversy, excellent at that. Militancy is the art of discipline. When the Armed Forces enter politics, the first thing they lose is their unity, because it allows controversy to enter their ranks." (Borrero 2019, 31)

[102] Lleras Carmago was concerned with balancing against in the military in a way that his immediate predecessors and successors were not. Indeed, as will be shown, even political elites of the liberal party tended to lean on the military. Along with making moves to increase the autonomy of the police, LLeras Carmago also created a new intelligence/security agency, the Department of Security Administration (DAS). The new agency would report directly to Lleras Carmago, and was put under the control of liberals who had either been forced out of the army or retired from the institution.

Figure 7: Colombian Ministry of War Organization, 1961



Source: "Memoria del Ministro de Defensa Al Congreso Colombiana, 1961"[103]

Lleras did not go as far as to move the police to the ministry of interior, where the pre-Violencia police had been. While it is unclear if there were political reasons for not going so far (i.e. the possibility that moving the police back to the ministry of interior would have triggered a military revolt), there were also practical reasons for not going so far. Though most conservative and liberal partisans had agreed to demobilize, armed internal threats still challenged the fragile Colombian state. The most immediate threat were armed bands of opportunistic criminals, commonly referred to as "bandaleros," who used the aftermath of La Violencia to personally enrich themselves and conduct campaigns of terror in the countryside. These bandaleros posed a security threat and were a top concern both of civilian politicians and the leadership of the army and police (Briscoe 2006).[104] In an

[103] Archival material from the Archivo del Congreso in Bogotá, Colombia.
[104] Briscoe, Charles H. "Plan Lazo: Evaluation and Execution." Veritas, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2006.

interview with General Londoño, the bandaleros were described as murderers, terrorizing citizens, and waging small wars with the consolidating state government. "They were killing everyone," Londoño explained, "There was no ideology [motivating them]."

The bandaleros were, in the eyes of the Colombian government, an untenable security threat. For their part, military leaders indicated that they believed the police would be essential in combating these groups and restoring national order (Montoya 1959; Pardo 1960).[105] In 1959, General Montoya Saíz wrote that "the public force, and in particular the army and the national police have reorganized themselves, studied new procedures and developed new doctrines which have resulted in very satisfactory results in their performance in the tenacious labor of combating violence and exterminating the focos of bandalerismo within our national territory" (Montoya 1959).[106] Montoya in the same memorandum said the police were particularly adept at securing both urban and rural areas, and that the Carabinero unit had been especially effective in aiding the army in its operations (Montoya 1959).

General Pardo, the minister who followed, echoed this assessment. In 1960, General Pardo said of the National Police: "The Police developed into a great force and performed magnificently in maintaining security and in the relevant questions of public order. The Commando de la Policia has done everything possible to ensure that its

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[105] Alfonso, Montoya. Memoria del ministro de Guerra al Congreso de 1959; Bogotá, 1959.
Pardo, Rafael Hernandez. *Memoria del ministro de Guerra al Congreso de 1960.* Ministro de Guerra; Bogotá, 1960.

[106] Of interest: General Montoya was the final minister of defense for the national government and the first one in National Front government. He however, did not maintain the position long and was soon replaced by General Pardo.

members are dignified and respectable" (Pardo 1960). General Pardo's language, like that of General Montoya, shows military leadership was continuing to groom the police as a support ore replacement force for the army.[107] Rather than the role of the police being an auxiliary force for the army being a civil war era state of exception, this role would continue into the post-war consolidation process. If this decision were made to maintain control or primacy over the CNP, it had an unintended, long-term consequence: There would be no internal security mission which was *exclusively* the responsibility of the military. Rather than the military assuming policing duties, the police were assuming military duties. By grooming the police, the military made its future competitor.

However, even though President Lleras made moves to separate the police from military influence, the military did maintain some control over the force throughout his presidency. Though, for instance, the commandant of the police was to report directly to the minister, this commandant was a member of the armed forces. Army Major General Saulo Gil Ramirez was appointed as commandant of the national police by the military junta in 1958, and continued in his position throughout the Lleras presidency (Directores Nacional de la Policia de Colombia 2003).[108] In 1965, control of the force passed to a graduate of the Santander police academy, Major General Bernardo Camacho Leyva

[107] Conceptually, there is some distinction between the two threats. In *Forgotten Peace*, Robert Karl describes 'bandaleros' as criminal bands, opportunistic users of violence who took advantage of the absence of the state during La Violencia. Guerrillas were more partisan in nature, usually liberal or even communist.

[108] It is important to note that the story Saulo Ramírez and his appointment is as complicated as the greater context of Colombian security institutions in the 1950s. General Ramírez had experience in the army, the navy and had actually retired from the military before joining the police in 1951. As such, he had a soldier's background, but ascended through police ranks. This is different than his successor, who was a graduate of the General Santander Police Academy.

(Directores de La Policia Nacional de Colombia, 2003).[109] General Camacho is described as being a fierce defendant of the police's autonomy from the military (ibid), but several factors hindered the police's development as alternative security force, the foremost being that the ministry of defense would retain control of the police.[110] These ministers, who were members of the army themselves, prioritized the army's budgetary needs at the expense of not only the police, but other military branches (Esparza 2015).

Furthermore, when in joint operations, the army could and did assume command of police battalions. This was formalized in 1964, when Minister of War Gabriel Rebeiz Pizarro issued a directive in 1964 mandating "the operational control of the police by the army where a convergence of missions exists" (Tovar 2009, 171).[111] General Henry Medina, a retired army intelligence expert, explained that the army dominated joint operations for much of Colombia's history. "An army officer, regardless of their rank, could come into an area and immediately assume control of the police" (interview with General Henry Medina).[112]

Coordination with the army and police resulted in the destruction of the bandaleros. General Pardo writes that the Carabinero division was particularly useful in this regard (Pardo 1960). However, in a pattern which would become a reoccurring feature of Colombian history, the bandalero threat ended at the same time another threat rose. Demobilizing guerilla forces, some with ties to the Colombian communist party, began

[109] Directores de la Policía Nacional de Colombia: 1891-2004. Revista Nacional de Policia de Colombia, 2003.

[111] Tovar, Álvaro Valencia, *Mis adversaries guerrilleros.* Planeta: Bogotá. 2009

[112] Interview with General Henry Medina conducted on February 11, 2020 in Bogotá, Colombia

consolidated their power as "independent republic." As these groups launched attacks against the state, members of both the military and the police were targeted. As early as March 1964, the guerrilla leaders of the "Independent Republic of Marquetalia" began attacking police officers in a campaign against the state (Tovar 2009, 102).[113]

The existence of these independent republics proved intolerable for political elites in Bogotá, who directed security forces to eliminate the threat. The "independent republic of Marquetalia," given its links to the Communist Party of Colombia and the perceived growing threat of international communism, was of particular concern to the central government. The operation to retake Marquetalia and drive the communists into the forests, launched in May 1964. Called "Operación Sobrenia" by the armed forces and "Operación Marquetalia" by the FARC, it would become the foundational myth of the FARC, whose leaders survived the military attack and retreated into more isolated zones of the country. While the operation has been the subject of military histories (see the bibliography of Valencia Tovar) and an often-cited historical episode in the FARC's propaganda, less attention has been paid attention to the role of the Colombian National Police. According to Charles Briscoe, the National Police were intimately involved in Operación Marquetalia. Elite police troops joined the army and air force in the operation, cordoning areas while the army retook control (Briscoe 2006). Their presence in

[113] After the threat of bandalerismo had been dealt with, attention shifted to "the independent republics" of Colombia. The "independent republics" were largely communist in nature, and the Lleras Camargo administration thought it would be better policy to simply ignore them, so that these forces would demobilize (Tovar 2009). The conservative civilian and military elites, however, believed the independent republic to be an existential threat to the admittedly fragile Colombian State. "Marquetalia," mentioned here as the site of guerrilla aggression against the Colombian Police, is particularly important as the most senior leaders of the FARC credited military intervention into the Republic as the inspiration for their guerrilla movement. Thus, the police have, since even before the organization's consolidation, been a target of the FARC.

Marquetalia indicates that since its inception, the FARC has been a threat fought by both the military and the police.

Out of a mixture of self-defense, civilian disinterest, and the leadership of ministers of defense from the army, the national police needed to develop their own anti-guerilla tactics and practices. While these tactics had much in common with those of the army, instruction and training came from within the police (interview with police historians).[114] Though the army remained the most powerful security institution both technically and politically, the autonomy of the police permitted the institution to create its own security doctrines. In 1973 for instance, the police began distributing its own counter-guerrilla manuals, an indication that their anti-guerilla capacities were (1) becoming a core part of the organization's identity and (2) were developing independent of the army (DIJIN 2013).

Along with general counter-insurgent combat skills, the CNP was building on its intelligence capacities to meet the insurgent threat. Army General Álvaro Valencia Tovar describes undercover police operations against the ELN, which foreshadow the practices which would become relevant against all internal threats. Police officers would pretend to be passengers on buses, wearing civilian clothes, in anticipation of an expected hijacking by guerrillas (Tovar 2009, 171). From these captured sources, new information and intelligence could be extracted. This ability to go "undercover" would prove integral in determining the Colombian National Police's role in counterinsurgency, and how it would come to rival the military as an alternative security force.

[114] This particular interview was with police historians who were members of the force. They opted to not be credited by their names, and per IRB regulations I am respecting those wishes.

In the National Front era, the relationship between the police and the military was changing. While Alberto Lleras made the decision to formally separate the police from the military chain of command, the new arrangement kept the police under the Minister of Defense. A high-ranking general, these officials would prioritize budget and funding for the armed forces (Esparza 2015). While the army would have more political power (despite its supposed apolitical nature), its operational capacities were already not that far ahead of the police. Though armed with greater military technology, the army in this period consisted of little more than 35,000 personnel relative to the police's 33,000 (Briscoe 2006). This narrow gap in personnel, along with a shared mission and a reluctance to continue its internal security role, meant that the CNP very quickly became involved in counterinsurgency and developed capacities the military did not have. This has led some scholars to go so far to suggest that the CNP has *always* been the most involved force in Colombia's counterinsurgency (see Bruneau 2004 & Briscoe 2006).

The police were hampered by a level of unequal access to the chief executive. While Lleras may have had in mind to make the police a counterweight to the military, the army remained the preferred security forces of subsequent national front presidents, who preferred conservative officers to helm national security (Ivey 2021). Presidents preferred to keep their military at a distance and opted to delegate security to these officers. This would set a precedent of principal shirking and would characterize an era of civilian-granted military autonomy. Part of this autonomy, however, extended to the police who would expand their mission as threats to the nation continued to change; while conversely

the army would work to reduce its security profile even when invited to expand by civilian governments.

Era	Summary
1958-1974	Though the first National Front president, Alberto Lleras Camargo, separated the police from the military command, the police would remain subordinated to the military. The Carabineros assumed a rural combat role, but presidents were not especially interested in the internal conflict after Operación Marquetalia. Consequently, the police developed its counter-insurgent capacities with autonomy. Legally, the military had a right to assume command of police operations where the two forces cooperated, though it did not have the authority to interfere in the core organization of the police.

1974-1982: The Marijuana Boom, End of the National Front, and the Rise of M-19

Three growing threats defined the relationship between civilians, the military and the CNP in the decade following the National Front. The first threat came from protests and civil society movements, which challenged the legitimacy of the liberal and conservative parties. Presidents, regardless of their ideology, tended to favor a heavily militarized response to protests, authorizing the armed forces to engage protests, shut down schools and engage in Colombia's dirty war (Rovner 2001).[115] The second threat was, to a certain extent, connected to the first. While Colombia was not exceptional in that military

[115] Rovner, E. S. (2001). Colombia and the United States. Narcotics traffic and a Failed Foreign Policy. *Análisis Político*, (42), 113-114.

commanders and political leaders saw links between communist insurgents and protests movements, the armed insurgency was changing. Whereas the FARC and ELN had largely been a rural insurgencies, a new type of urban guerrilla, younger and often more educated than their counterparts in the FARC, emerged in the 1970s. Responding the supposedly rigged presidential election of Rojas Pinilla in 1970, the Movimiento de Abril 19 (M-19) would present the most challenging guerrilla movement the country had seen yet. The third threat was the arrival of international narcotics trade to Colombia, beginning with a marijuana trade localized to the northeast coast of the country. While this threat was far less violent and extensive than the cocaine trade which would follow it, the army's participation in counter-marijuana operations would prove to be an embarrassing one. After the army's withdrawal from these operations, the police were left as the only security agent available to carry out extensive counter-narcotics operations.

Era	Threats
1974-1982	The FARC and ELN remained relatively small threats, as the dominant "threats" of this era were protest movements and marijuana traffickers on the Caribbean coast. During this time period, M-19 began to consolidate, though it would become a much bigger threat in the 1980s.

By this time, the CNP were far more separated from the armed forces than in the post-Violencia. A whole generation of graduates from the General Santander Academy had come to staff the police's leadership positions, meaning that army officials no longer staffed these positions. In 1973, the police issued its own counter-insurgent manuals, drafted by police commanders and outside the military hierarchy (DIJIN 2013). Likewise, the police began intelligence collection capacities. One reason the police began to quickly outpace the army in intelligence was that it had a greater proximity to the population, and therefore a greater proximity to criminal networks (interview with General Londoño). In the view of General Londoño, who led the police's intelligence service in the late 1950s, intelligence gathering is more inherent in policing than it is soldiering, as it involves on-the groundwork and interaction with local communities (ibid). Evidence suggests that General Londoño is correct in his assertion, and the CNP took to intelligence more naturally than the military.

The gap between army and police intelligence first became apparent in the "Bonanza Marimbera." The "Marijuana boom" was concentrated in the Caribbean coast, in the regions of La Guajira and the Sierra Maestra de Santa Marta, mostly consisting of

farmers, middlemen and buyers in urban Colombia and the United States (Britto 2020).[116] The decentralized nature of the marijuana trade allowed formers to make extra money as traffickers paid to grow "Santa Marta Gold" on their land, a practice which incentivized participation in the Marijuana trade with relatively little cost. By 1975, DAS, another Colombian intelligence agency, estimated that 80% of farmers in La Guajira had decided to grow marijuana on their land (La Semana).[117]

The National Police was the first agency to become aware of the growing marijuana trend and its potential impact on Colombia. As early as 1968, the Police identified the Barranquilla international airport as a major hub in a budding marijuana trade, and in 1972 cited an unusual uptick of United States citizens in the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta as an indication of internationalization (National Police 2019, 280).[118] In the General Diagnostic Order of Public Order, delivered to President Misael Pastrana (1970-1974, conservative party) the police reported that "Colombia is the producer of the best marijuana in the world," and that trafficking along the Caribbean coast had contributed in part to a nation-wide rise in crime (Britto 2020, 153). To address increased trafficking, the police recommended the use of intelligence, cooperation with the United States, stationing anti-narcotics checkpoints across the country and the singing of extradition treaties (Britto 2020, 155). In response to this report, President Misael Pastrana expanded the number of civilians on the President's

[116] Britto, Lina. Marijuana Boom: The Rise and Fall of Colombia's First Drug Paradise. Univ of California Press, 2020.

[117] "Bonanza Marimbera, Adios!" Semana.com Últimas Noticias de Colombia y el Mundo, September 1, 2020. https://www.semana.com/especiales/articulo/bonanza-marimbera-adios/988-3/.

[118] Policía, Narcotráfico y Crimen: Economías criminales y su implicación en la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana. Policía Nacional de Colombia. Bogotá, 2019

security council, which came to include representatives from the Ministries of Justice, Foreign Relations, Defense and with DAS and the National Police (Britto 2020, 156). While Pastrana expanded civilian presence on the security council as a response to the growing marijuana trade, a confluence of variables prompted his successor, President Alfonso López Michelsen (1974-1978), liberal party) to militarize counter-narcotics efforts.

Though the police had greater intelligence on counter-narcotics than other agencies, López Michelsen favored General José Joaquín Matallana the army official appointed to lead the Deparmento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS) (Britto 2020, 157-158). Michelsen explained to President Carter that DAS would be his preferred agency to counter marijuana trafficking, though USAID said "'DAS has not yet developed an active campaign towards narcotics suppression, and its efforts are lagging far behind both the National Police and Customs" (Britto 2020, 158).

The assessment from USAID indicates that the National Police were outpacing DAS and the army alike. But Lopez Michelsen seemed to lean heavily on the military to tackle most internal security threats, whether minor or major ones. Corruption scandals, social upheaval and popular uprisings threatened the President's legitimacy. In the face of a national strike in 1977 the President used the military for political repression, rather than solely relying on the police or DAS (Rovner 2012; Dizard 2018).[119] It is less surprising then, that Lopez Michelsen continued to expand the mission of the military even though the

[119] Dizard, Jacob Goodman. "The paradox of militarization: democratic oversight and military autonomy in Mexico and Colombia." PhD diss., 2018.

police were more equipped to handle anti-narcotics operations, as Michelsen's internal security policy in general was to involve the military even over the protest of officers.

However, it is also at this moment that Colombia's civil-military relations became the most frayed since the transition to democracy. Military officers were extremely reluctant to participate in the new missions granted to them by López Michelsen, and leadership made no secret of this. Displeased with López Michelsen's perceived misuse of the military in policing (anti-narcotic, criminal and political) several high-ranking officers signed a critique of the President in 1975 (Alternativa 1977; Britto 2020, 171).[120] That year, López Michelsen also dismissed General Valencia Tovar, then the most popular officer in the military, for his criticisms that the President could not solve "basic social problems" (New York Times 1975; Dufort 2013).[121] Writing of the divide between López Michelsen and his commanders, the magazine *Alternativa* wrote, "Ironically, it is the political elites [of Colombia] who tend to favor arms, while the military tends to favor persuasion." (Alternativa 1977). It is important to note then, that rather than the product of military autonomy, a repressive response to social unrest in Colombia was an endeavor carried out at the behest of and with the blessing of political elites.[122]

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[120] "F.F. A. A.: Negocios generales." *Alternativa* no. 118. Bogotá, Colombia. 1977

[121] Howe, Marvine. "In a Year, President Lopez Could Not Deliver Promised Reforms." The New York Times. The New York Times, July 20, 1975. https://www.nytimes.com/1975/07/20/archives/in-a-year-president-lopez-could-not-deliver-promised-reforms.html.

[122] The rift between political elites and military commanders in Colombia has consistently contributed to the continuation of the worst practices of the internal armed conflict, but those of the Lopez Michelsen presidency are emblematic. General Valencia Tovar, a developmentalist officer with a view that the internal conflict could not be solved with violence alone, issued scathing criticisms of López Michelsen, who viewed the protests against his presidency to be a true threat to his regime. The firing of Valencia Tovar is in keeping with much of Colombian history, and indicates a civilian preference for repression, rather than a purely military one.

López Michelsen's use of the military for policing duties was ill-received by many officers, who blamed what they saw as participation in law enforcement operations as a root cause for corruption. Corruption scandals became more public in this time period, with casualties including Defense Minister General Varón Valencia, who had to resign after illegally importing car, army officers who involved themselves in arms and emerald trafficking, and even air force officials and navy officers involved in illegal trafficking networks (Alternativa 1977). The military during the López Michelsen presidency found itself in an "ethical storm," and officers were quick to echo Valencia Tovar's criticisms of the militarization of internal security being a root cause. López Michelsen even lost the support of General Matallana, who left DAS over protest that he was not selected to become the new commander of the armed forces after Tovar (Britto 2020). These scandals and tensions escalated under López Michelsen's successor, Julio Turbay.

Turbay, like Michelsen, responded to rising instability by granting more missions and authority to the military. For instance, in response to perceived communist aggression from M-19 and the Colombian Communist Party, expanded the authority of military courts so that suspected guerrillas could be tried in military courts (Dizard 2018). On November 1, 1978, President Turbay launched the "Two Peninsulas campaign," a joint operation between the Colombian armed forces and law enforcement in the United States focused on disrupting the flow of marijuana from La Guajira to Florida. The campaign saw an escalated presence of military personnel in La Guajira and the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. 6,500 soldiers were deployed to the Caribbean coast, patrolling roads, and replacing civilian authorities to quash the narcotics trade (Britto 2020,174).

Predictably, this surge exposed army personnel to increased bribery, to the point that it became more lucrative to participate in the marijuana trade than to fight it. It was not uncommon for soldiers to market themselves as a protection racket for traffickers, and increasingly, military officers themselves began coordinating the trade in the region. One informant told the CIA, for instance, that the military extorted $2.8 million from one trafficker to return their marijuana after it was impounded and to protect it as it was loaded onto boats (CIA). Dr. Javier Torres describes this as a breaking point for the army and its leadership, who determined that that the institution could not weather further scandal "[Involvement in the Caribbean coast] resulted in an enormous scandal. One of the generals in charge of the operation actually fled to Panama" (interview with Javier Torres).

Corruption was only one aspect of why the army was reluctant to get involved in anti-trafficking operations, and why many contemporary commanders are reticent to fully embrace a permanent anti-narcotics role. Retired Army General Henry Medina explains, "Whenever I go to an international conference, I'm always asked 'how could your military be involved in counter-narcotics?' It's not prestigious" (interview with General Medina). From 1978-1980, in the wake of increased scandal, military members became more vocal in complaining that they were being tasked with the "work of law enforcement" (Britto 2020,175). In 1980, the army formally ended its involvement, using the high-profile M-19 seizure of the Dominican embassy as an excuse to reorient itself to exclusively fighting guerrilla threats (Britto 2020, 180-181).

The military withdrawal from anti-narcotics operations had direct consequences for its relationships with civilians and police. To civilians in government, the withdrawal was a

line in the sand, a signal that the military would not prioritize and quite possibly refuse missions unrelated to communist insurgency. Commanders were exhausted that involvement in internal repression and anti-narcotics operations had exposed the institution to scandal and corruption, and M-19's 1980 seizure of the Dominican embassy represented the perfect moment to define a clear, contained role in internal security.

But the cessation of counter-narcotics operations meant that civilian authorities would have to invest new attention to the National Police, who remained the only domestic security institution available. The failure and embarrassment of both the armed forces and DAS meant that the CNP would have to assume counter-narcotics responsibilities alone. It is important to note, however, that the police were not untouched by corruption. As consequence of the military's withdrawal from counter-narcotics was the creation of Specialized Service of the Antinarcotics Police through resolution 2743 in April of 1981, which would serve to address the failures of the Two Peninsula's campaign (DIJIN 2013, 79; 25 years).[123] Specialized police units to patrol La Guajira and Magdalena were created, as well as special anti-narcotics police until directly under the control of the attorney general (La Semana).

Simultaneously, the National Police were engaging a new, urban threat which necessitated institutional adaption. As the marijuana trade began to explode in the Caribbean, new kidnapping networks emerged in Bogotá. As the Colombian state looked to unleash the army in the north of the country, conditions in the capital meant that the

[123] 25 years of Frontal Fight Against Drug Trafficking in Colombia. Policía Nacional de Colombia. Bogotá, 2019.

police would not only need to continue its counter-narcotics missions, but to develop new practices which would allow for the infiltration and dismantling of these networks (DIJIN 2013, 79). In response, the police formed new anti-kidnapping units (GOES). The GOES proved integral in neutralizing these networks, the most notorious of which was infiltrated and dismantled in 1977 (DIJIN 2013). This capacity would become even more relevant as other armed groups increased their use of kidnapping to finance their armed struggles against the state.

While the army opted to narrow its mission scope, citing the rise of M-19 as its reason, the mission of the police expanded. And, as the guerrilla threat merged with the criminal threat, this meant that the police would also be forced to confront M-19 as well. As early as 1982, the police were involved in operations targeting the organization, cooperating with the army's counter-intelligence brigade to gather information on members of the organization's high council (DIJIN 2013, 79). As M-19 continued a practice of kidnapping, particularly in urban areas, police operations against the group expanded.

In the 1970s, the military ceded ground which the police were called upon to pick up. This led to an increased skill set, responding both to the withdrawal of the army and the increasing diversification of threats. The military's withdrawal from anti-trafficking operations meant that the police would have to assume duties to combat drug production and smuggling, and the rise of kidnapping networks meant that the police would also be called upon to disrupt criminal networks in Bogotá's underground. As M-19 rose to be the most prominent national threat in 1990s, the police were further involved in anti-guerrilla

operations. All of this set the stage for a new threat, which the police were the only security body remotely capable of meeting.

Era	Summary
1974-1981	Because the army ended its counter-narcotics involvement, the national police remained the only viable anti-narcotics force. The police also created anti-kidnapping divisions (GOES), in an effort to thwart an expansion of urban crime. Both this would become relevant to future police operations against M-19. Despite rising viability, however, the Presidents of this era favored a response to growing threats, namely protests, with a highly militarization response. The army maintained its political primacy in internal security. When, however, it withdrew from counter-narcotics operations, this primacy was eroded.

1982-1991: Escalating Violence and Police/Military Responses

The National police describe the marijuana traffickers of the "Bonanza Marimbera" as "first-generation" cartels. They describe the marimberos as clan-based, and characterize their decline as the result of fratricidal, inter-clan violence (National Police 2019). General Rosso José Serrano of the CNP describes the marimberos as a threat which never penetrated the country's interior, and who never rose to the level that they constituted a threat to state stability (Serrano & Gamboa 1999, 43).[124] Serrano also explains

[124] Serrano, R. J., & Gambao, S. (1999). Jacque mate: De Como la Policia le gano la Partida a "el ajerdecista" y los carteles del narcotrafico. Grupo Editorial Norma.

that during the 1970s, the guerrillas were much less a threat to state stability than what would follow, writing "They were guerrillas with revolvers, not mortars or bombs" (Serrano & Gamboa 1999, 44).

Era	Threats and descriptions
1982-1991	The Cartel of Medellin and M-19 become the existential threats to internal security and national stability. Both had the capacity to target not only Colombia's citizenry, but it's political elite and urban centers as well. While the Cartel of Medellin began an all-out war with the National Police, M-19 proved capable of defeating the military and outmaneuvering police until 1986.

What came next, the "second generation of cartels," would prove to a challenge that challenged state stability and sovereignty. Whereas the violence of the marijuana trade was localized to the Caribbean coast, and mostly employed against rival traffickers, the violence of the cocaine boom was far more indiscriminate, public, and widespread. Unlike the urban kidnapping networks in Bogotá, the cartels could raise an "army of murderers to kill police," while simultaneously corrupting not only security forces, but the entire justice system (DIJIN 2013, 79). The arrival of the cocaine trade in Colombia transformed the challenges facing the Colombian state, overlapping with the ascent of M-19.

The first major success against the Cartel of Medellín proved a precursor for the level of violence to come. On March 10, 1984, the Colombian National Police raided the

cartel's cocaine-processing megacomplex, Tranquilandia (DIPOL 2015).[125] The raid surprised police authorities, who were caught off guard by the evidence of the technological capabilities and the financial wealth of Cartel (DIPOL 2015). The complex came with its own water supply and electrical grid, along with air strips and dormitories for workers. A total of 45 people were arrested in the raid, and 13.8 tons of cocaine seized. Police officials who participated in the operation had family members assassinated by the Cartel of Medellín (Serrano & Gamboa 1999, 46). And on April 30, 1984, only one month after the Tranquilandia raid, Pablo Escobar fired his first shot in a declaration of all-out war with the Colombian government in the assassination of Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara (Sánchez 2017).[126]

As the Cartel of Medellín began to consolidate as a threat which could challenge the state, so too did M-19. In 1983, as M-19 became a greater urban presence, a new police directorate was founded specifically to target the group, the Directorate of Judicial and Investigation Police (DIJIN 2013). At its founding, the directorate included anti-kidnapping and extortion subunits, as well as operational groups to combat "crimes against country, life, and public faith" (DIJIN 2013). DIJIN would emphasize intelligence processing and gathering, building off of lessons learned in infiltrating kidnapping networks (DIJIN 2013, 79). These abilities, outside of the army's skillset at the time, secured the police a vital role in internal security politics.

[125] La semilla de la paz: DIPOL, 20 años al servicio del Colombia. Policía Nacional de Colombia. Bogotá, 2015.
[126] Sánchez, Julio Cristo. Oscar Naranjo: El General de las Mil Batallas. Planeta. 2017.

While DIJIN would become a crown jewel of the CNP, it was far from the only specialized body to develop as a direct result of M-19's ascent. In 1984, the Commando de Operaciones Especiales y Antiterrorismo (COPES) was created. COPES was originally conceived of as an urban counter-terror cell, inspired as much by M-19 aggression as that of the cartels (interview with police experts).[127] This unit would participate in one of the bloodiest intersections of narco and guerrilla violence intersected: the taking of the Palace of Justice in 1985. COPES police commandos landed their helicopters during the retaking of the Palace of Justice, where it was the first force to interact with the M-19 rebels who had taken hostages.[128] However, once guerillas rejected police negotiations, the army was authorized to enter the Palace of Justice, with COPES police commandos accompanying them. The retaking of the Palace of Justice remains one of the blackest marks on the Colombian government. In the retaking, 12 of Colombia's 25 supreme court justices were killed, and papers relating to the extradition of several high-ranking drug lords were burnt.

The siege and its aftermath constituted one of the most severe civil-military crises since the transition to democracy. The crisis forced Defense Minister General Miguel Vega to testify before congress in 1986, although neither he nor any military officers involved in the attack faced any immediate consequences for disappearances which occurred in the raid. While the attack on and the retaking of the palace of justice was understood to be a success for neither the army nor the police, it did demonstrate an urgent need to increase

[127] This data may be found at the National Police Museum in Bogotá.
[128] The history of the retaking of the Palace of Justice is incredibly contentious. According to police sources, COPES was rejected by M-19, who wanted to negotiate with the armed forces. However, we also know that COPES commandos entered the supreme court with the military, so any degree of plausible deniability of abuses is questionable at best.

the technical capacities of both organizations. Furthermore, it represented one of the most direct attacks on the Colombian government in the nation's history, and intensified civilian interest in security issues.

In the wake of the palace of justice seige, the police continued to expand its capacities through the creation of new elite units to fight the nation's growing threats. In 1987, the police's anti-narcotics unit was expanded, with the creation of new intelligence units and the acquisition of helicopters for rural operations (Samuido 1987, 37;).[129] In 1989, the police created yet another new and elite force: the Commandos Jungla, to serve as its elite combat troops in the fight against narcotrafficking (25 Years Fighting). At its founding, the commandos responsibilities focused primarily on kingpin operations and rural combat include "special action against high value targets" and "rural combat" (25 Years Fighting).

These specializations led to the police delivering high-profile successes against both M-19 and narcotraffickers. In 1986, Alvaro Fayyad, a high-commander in M-19 was killed in the Quinta Paredes neighborhood of Bogotá, after his cell had been infiltrated by the police's anti-kidnapping network, GOES (El País 1986).[130] After the palace of justice siege, Fayyad had become a priority target for both the army and police (Sánchez 2017). That same year, police killed Gustavo Arias Londoño, another important cofounder and military

[129] Samuido, Rafael. *Memoria al Congreso 1986-1987*. Ministro de Defensa, 1987; Samuido, Rafael. *Memoria al Congreso 1987-1988*. Ministro de Defensa, 1988.

[130] Prieto, Martin. "La Policía Colombiana Siega La Vida De Álvaro Fayad, Máximo Dirigente Del Grupo Guerrillero M-19." El País, March 14, 1986. https://elpais.com/diario/1986/03/15/internacional/511225205_850215.html.

leader in the organization (El País 1986).[131] In 1989, the Cartel of Medellín was likewise dealt a severe blow by the CNP when its military leader, Gonzola Rodriguéz Gacha, was killed in a police operation.

Comparatively, the army had suffered high-profile defeats. In 1984, the army was defeated in M-19 at the Battle of Yarumales. The loss began a public discourse about the possibility, or impossibility of a military victory against the group. Eduardo Pizarro, writing as both an academic well-versed in the internal conflict and as someone with family members both in M-19 and the military, describes a stalemate between the armed forces and M-19 (Pizarro 1986).[132] He writes:

> "The experience developed over two decades or more of counterinsurgent war, has increasingly shown the physical impossibility of destroying the armed movement, given the extreme dispersion of guerrilla fronts. An army obligated to distribute its forces in innumerable brigades, battalions, and stations across an immense territory, without the ability to concentrate its forces in one zone has a reduced efficacy...The Armed Forces have in Colombia a capacity to control public order, but not a capacity to totally annihilate guerrilla groups." (Pizarro 1986).

The army struggled fighting a war on multiple fronts, and against multiple enemies. While the police proved adept at kingpin operations, particularly in urban areas, the army's struggled to even contain M-19, let alone diminish the group. Certainly the Palace of Justice Siege undermined any credible claim that it was capable of conducting major urban operations in a reliable way. Furthermore, the armed forces were still very reluctant to

[131] "La Policía Mata Al Jefe Militar Del M-19 Colombiano." El País, July 24, 1986. https://elpais.com/diario/1986/07/25/internacional/522626420_850215.html.

[132] Pizarro, Eduardo. "¿Puede El Ejercito Derrotar Al M-19?" Semana.com Últimas Noticias de Colombia y el Mundo, September 1, 2020. https://www.semana.com/especiales/articulo/puede-el-ejercito-derrotar-al-m-19/7122-3/.

involve themselves in counter-narcotics operations even as the narco-threat increased. According to a US army intelligence report in 1990, the Colombian government remained "reluctant to use the Army in anticocaine operations for fear of the corrupting influence of the wealth of these drug gangs" (US Army Intelligence 1990).[133] This concern was shared by military leaders, who had learned hard lessons from earlier deployments against pot-growers. Ultimately, President Virgilio Barco (Liberal, 1986-1990) overrode the concerns of military leadership because he was convinced that the police's anti-narcotics effort had been "paralyzed" by "corruption and fear" (US Army Intelligence 1990). This led Barco to retire 28 police high commanders and replace them with newer, cleaner recruits (Sánchez 2017, 75). However, Barco's concerns about "police paralysis" are not reflected in the institution's increased specialization and adaptation.

In this era, evidence suggests that the police were on equal footing to approaching the military's viability at it related to the two most immediate threats: M-19 and growing narco violence. M-19, pressured by the police in urban centers and the armed forces in its rural camps, ultimately negotiated with the Barco administration and demobilized in 1989. The elimination of Alvaro Fayyad by the police represented one of the most significant attacks on the group's leadership and proved that the national police could carry out missions on behalf of civilians and independent of the armed forces. Likewise, that the police were one of the only forces available to undertake narcotrafficking operations meant that the CNP's mission was expanding at the same time as the threat was rising.

[133] "Country Report: Colombia" US Army Intelligence. 1990. National Security Archives.

While the police were increasing in their viability, it appears that that this was not sufficient to gain the wholesale trust of civilian political leaders, as evidenced by President Barco's pessimistic assessment of the police towards the end of his presidency. When the national police gained a more equal access to the president, corruption, both perceived and real, within the national police would be better understood.

Era	Summary
1981-1991	M-19 and the Cartel of Medellin brought the internal conflict to Colombia's urban centers and to Colombia's political elite. During this time, the police expand their specialization as an ASF through the creation of DIJIN and COPES, intelligence and urban counter-insurgent police respectively. They are able to generate major operational successes in the deaths of Alvaro Fayyad of M-19 and Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha (alias 'El Mexicano') of the cartel of Medellin. By comparison, the army suffers military defeats. However, the crisis escalated to such a point that President Barco orders the military back into counter-narcotics operations. Though neither the military nor the CNP proved capable of dismantling either threat, and though both forces were disrupted by corruption scandals, the police developed new capacities while responding to internal threats.

The 1990-2002 Presidencies: The Rise of the Police Warrior and the Marginalization of the Armed Forces

The three presidencies between 1990 and 2002 entailed major steps forward for civilian management, as well as considerable steps backward. While President Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994) made security a centerpiece of his campaign and presidency, presidents Samper and Pastrana struggled to maintain tenable relationships with either the armed forces or the CNP. While Cesar Gaviria and his civilian minister of defense, Rafael Pardo, acted as coordinators, mediators and principals to the police and military, Ernesto Samper was largely absent. Pastrana, though successful able to subordinate military and police operations to his political agenda of negotiating with the FARC, made little effort to involve himself or his ministers in the planning of operations and structuring. The consequence was that while both the CNP and, frankly, the military both increased their viability as security agents, two consecutive civilian presidents declined to exercise their management role.

Era	Threats and descriptions
1990-2002	Colombia's most violent decade. The Cartels of Medellin and Cali emerged as the greatest threats of the early 1990s, but leave a vacuum after their collapse. This vacuums become occupied by a diversity of armed actors, among them the Cartel of Valle Norte, right-wing paramilitaries, and the FARC. The FARC in particular benefited from new revenue from the cocaine trade, and transformed itself to carry out its greatest attacks against state forces in a decade.

If President Barco hoped the involvement of the army would prove any less corruptible than the police when he made the decision to order the army back into counter-narcotics operations, President Gaviria learned this would not be the case. Succeeding Virgilio Barco, Gaviria inherited an exploding security crisis. Though M-19 demobilized, violence from the Cartel of Medellín and paramilitaries continued. Three presidential candidates were assassinated in the 1900 presidential elections: Luis Carlos Galán, Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, and Carlos Pizarro Leongómez. Galán's assassination was especially traumatic for Colombia. Police General Oscar Naranjo explains: "[Galan's assassination] invoked a great feeling of impotence because Pablo Escobar and the Cartel of Medellín seemed like real demons who wanted to sink Colombia and not only bury its best men and women, but to also bury the values and principals of our society" (Sánchez 2017).

Naranjo, and other security officials, viewed the cartel of Medellín to be an entity at war with the state. For its part, the Cartel of Medellín made no secret of that it intended to wage a private war against members of the army and police. Through "Plan Pistola" Pablo Escobar launched a campaign of terror against the CNP, killing at least 737 agents in Medellín alone, and forcing the army to escort police officers to conduct patrols (Pardo 1996). The assassination of Galán, a friend and political patron of President Gaviria, forced Gaviria to campaign on a promise to bring the cartel to justice. Once Escobar, under the custody of the army, escaped his prison in 1992, Gaviria took person offense and made neutralizing the drug lord a top priority (Sánchez 2017; Farah 1996).[134]

Though the military had been brought in by Barco, the army's intelligence wing was threadbare, with intelligence units staffed 'indiscriminately' by NCOs who rarely had a background, or even an interest in intelligence (Herrera; Porch). Furthermore, if civilians had been concerned about police corruption, the public revelation that members of the army, who had been given charge of Escobar's prison, collaborated in his escape proved that the army was not more immune to corruption or coercion (El Tiempo 1992).[135] Neither force appeared more immune or more trustworthy than the other.

Army leadership, in light of the failures to neutralize Escobar, became self-critical of their past shortcomings. Though army leadership did not explicitly tell Minister Pardo that they were failing, they did admit to needing the help of the CNP and went so far as to

[134] Farah, Douglas. "The Crackup." The Washington Post. WP Company, July 21, 1996. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/magazine/1996/07/21/the-crackup/9b50c781-16c6-40e5-aa93-82e882972959/.

[135] "Militares Ayudaron En Fuga De Pablo Escobar Gaviria." El Tiempo, July 26, 1992. https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-165437.

suggest the creation of a mixed force between soldiers and police officers. This new command, in which police and military elements would operate separate from the command of their respective forces and under the direct auspices of the Minister of Defense, would be called "Bloques de Busqueda." Pardo explains: "The key idea came from the army: create a joint command between the police and the army, making sure that neither force needed to submit to other" (Pardo 1996). This is an admission of both the police's importance by the army, and an acknowledge of it as an equal rather than a supporting force.

The Bloques were an innovation in that they were a "mixed force" of police and military recruits, with two commanders, reporting directly to the Minister of Defense (Sánchez 2017; Pardo 1996, 447). Training was extensive, and recruits needed to not only move away from their families but change the names of their spouses and children so that they would be more difficult to blackmail (El Tiempo 1993). In an autobiography, Pardo describes the thinking behind the force's creation: the army had more recruits, but the police had the best intelligence (Pardo 1996). However, experience with corruption in both forces had delivered incomplete results and made cooperation between the forces difficult at times as officials on both sides distrusted each other.

Although the Bloque de Busqueda for the Cartel of Medellín was considered a public success, corruption and interservice rivalries continued. Retired Army Colonel Velasquez, then the military commander of the Bloque de Busqueda against the cartel of Calí explained that in working with the police he learned "The police were very corrupt"

(interview Colonel Velasquez).[136] Velasquez also criticized Pardo's involvement of the police in internal security, which he said further militarized the police (ibid). But not all military commanders felt the same. Brigadier General Rafael Torres, then commanding operations against paramilitaries on behalf of the marine infantry, explained that the police's cooperation with his unit helped his recruits learn about human rights law (interview with General Rafael Torres).[137] "The police were a link to the legal apparatus of the state," he explains, "and it made understanding the legality of what we were doing easier" (ibid). Like other military commanders, General Torres said the use of police intelligence was critical for military operations. "Some of our most successful operations were operations carried out by the air force and coordinated by the police (ibid)."

But attention is warranted to Colonel Velasquez's assessment. While the Bloque de Busqueda for the Cartel of Medellín was prominent, and principally targeted an enemy of the armed forces, the police, the political class, and the citizenry at large, the Cartel of Calí was a different sort of threat. The leadership of Calí first split from Escobar because his total war against the government brought unwanted attention to their operations, and preferred to corrupt and coopt the state rather than fight it (Farah 1996). A mix of intimidation, monetary funds, and the promise of intelligence about Escobar resulted in a devil's bargain between members of the CNP and the Cartel of Calí. This alliance of temporary convenience would come under great scrutiny during the following presidency,

[136] Interview with Colonel Velasquez, January 14, 2020, Bogotá, Colombia

[137] Interview with General Rafael Torres, January 23, 2020, Bogotá, Colombia

when the corruption Colonel Velasquez spoke about was publicly exposed and forced a wave of early police retirements.

In the Gaviria presidency, the nation's formative experiment with the transition both to the 1991 constitution and to a civilian ministry of defense, the viability of the national police increased with the rise of threats. Escalating levels of violence necessitated a state response, and the police were the more viable agency to pursue it. This is not to say that the military's role was irrelevant, or that corruption was eliminated from police ranks. But, that recommendations for the Bloques came from the military, and not the police indicates that the military was aware that it was not up to the task of meeting threats alone. This is corroborated in interviews with military experts, who agree that the intelligence capacities of the police were critical and that they were outpaced by the military.

Pardo's appointment to the position of minister of defense meant that police access to the president would no longer be filtered through a military prism. Likewise, the general of the police would report to a civilian, rather than a military figure. And the viability of the police meant that Pardo would need to participate in more meetings with his security officials. Furthermore, Pardo seemed to exercise extensive control over the police, spearheading a profound wave of professionalization reforms (Esparza 2015). This necessitated more involvement on his part in general, which resulted in greater meetings with police and military officials. This indicates increased management on part of civilian government.

Stagnation and Civilian Disinterest: Samper and the Unavailable Executive

Though Gaviria and Pardo made the initial steps in civilianizing oversight over the military and police, the Samper administration was marred by early corruption scandals that undermined its relationship with the armed forces. While the police continued its campaign against the Cartel of Calí, who became the primary target of state forces after Escobar's death, evidence that the newly elected president received money from the cartel emerged shortly after his swearing in. The "Proceso 8000" scandal overshadowed Ernesto Samper's presidency, affecting his relationships between the police, the military and even the United States (Dugas 2001).[138] While this crisis created an opening for the police to increase its viability as the ASF, and for the army to begin a process of arduous internal reform, it also contributed to Samper's near total abdication of operational control or oversight of either forces. In this period, the viability of both agents increased even as civilian management declined because of presidents who denied both security bodies direct access to them.

The civilian sector of the defense ministry was immediately affected by the scandal when Fernando Botero Zea, Samper's first defense minister who had served as his campaign's financier, was arrested in 1996 for accepting cartel money on behalf of the Samper campaign. Military confidence in the president declined, and for his part, Samper appeared to be uncomfortable in his role as commander in chief. "He would find excuses to not be briefed by the security council," General Mora Rangel describes. "He would

[138] Dugas, John C. "Drugs, lies, and audiotape: The Samper crisis in Colombia." *Latin American Research Review* 36, no. 2 (2001): 157-174.

leave meetings early if he could" (Interview with General Mora).[139] This contributed to an increasingly outspoken hostility from the armed forces, whose members were confused and worried that their commander in chief and defense minister alike had been compromised.

The United States, horrified and convinced that Samper's campaign had accepted cartel money, made a point to punish Samper personally (Farah 1996).[140] In 1994, the year Samper assumed the presidency, the US Senate unanimously approved a bill which would make aid to Colombia conditional on the government's ability to fight narcotrafficking (Gutkin 1994).[141] In 1996, in a bipartisan agreement, the United States' congress decertified Colombia's status as an ally in the war on drugs (Farah 1996).[142] It was described as a personal rebuke of Samper, "A decertification not of Colombia, but of President Samper" (ibid). The United States went so far as to reject Samper's visa, a measure usually reserved for war criminals. Uncomfortable with his armed forces and implicated in a narco-scandal, Samper refused to resign and was kept in power by a Congressional Commission controlled by his own party. Communication between the United States was difficult, often

[139] Interview with General Mora conducted on February 20, 2020 in Bogotá, Colombia. Audio available.

[140] As early as 1994, the United States government confronted Samper over his involvement with the Cartel of Calí. Throughout his presidency, Samper maintained that he was unaware of the contributions from the Cartel of Calí, and argued that he was the victim of an international smear campaign carried out by international neoliberal elites. For further reading, see Dugas 2001.

[141] Gutkin, Steven. "Senate Drug Bill Imperils U.S. Ties with Colombia." The Washington Post. WP Company, July 17, 1994. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/07/17/senate-drug-bill-imperils-us-ties-with-colombia/4341d3c3-fae3-442e-8c69-825b70c8b019/.

[142] Farah, Douglas. "U.S.-Bogota: What Went Wrong? This Is a Decertification Not of Colombia, but of President Samper'." The Washington Post. WP Company, March 3, 1996. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/03/03/us-bogota-what-went-wrong-this-is-a-decertification-not-of-colombia-but-of-president-samper/d46219cd-2c84-4eef-b041-632121cddab0/.

impossible. One of the few Colombian institutions which enjoyed the confidence of the United States was the Colombian National Police.

The institution had been lauded in recent years by U.S. officials, who had been cooperating with the police since the army abandoned its counter-narcotics role in 1981. International cooperation between the police and the United States increased during the Gaviria Presidency. International cooperation was again extended in 1994, when DIJIN became a member of Interpol. While there were practical reasons for this development, it would have the consequence of the police assuming yet another role which the army could not: a diplomatic role. To this end, police General Rosso Jose Serrano became an unofficial diplomat between the United States and Colombia, leading Samper to acknowledge that the police were his "lifeline" to the US during his presidency (interview with Javier Torres). Looking back on the era, police General Oscar Naranjo goes farther: saying that that Rosso Jose Serrano was "the real ambassador to Washington" (Sánchez 2017, 131-132).

This in turn, translated to better intelligence and thus better performance on the ground. Even as the US became more aware of Samper's drug trafficking connections, the Colombian National Police successfully turned their attention from the Cartel of Calí. In 1995, the CNP captured Miguel and Gilberto Rodriguez, the Cartel of Calí's leaders (DIJIN). Later in the year, the Cartel's third in command, 'El Chepe,' was also captured by the police (ibid). With the cartel of Calí's leadership dismantled, the cartel quickly faded from the position it had enjoyed in the brief two years after Pablo Escobar's death.

With DIJIN assuming more international duties, the CNP created a new intelligence branch in 1995: DIPOL. DIPOL would develop off of the lessons learned from the successes of the Bloque de Busqueda, emphasizing recruitment based on merit, anonymity, and cooperation with other branches of the police. "DIPOL is unusual," one officer told me, "DIPOL is unusual, in that it members are selected to join. They are selected and recruited this way. Because of this, we have an immense human capital. Recruits are selected based on their analytic abilities and their intrepidness, their ability and willingness to take risks. In this way, they are selected as either potential analysists or one our operatives" (Interview with DIPOL).[143] Investment in DIPOL began immediately, with a pooling of experts across the institution who were capable of undercover operations or intelligence analysis. The division did not operate in isolation, but became responsible for sending intelligence and communicating with other divisions in the CNP. Meanwhile, the army struggled to reform its operational structure, let alone its intelligence. "I am sure you have heard this," the same DIPOL operatives confided, "But the army rotates intelligence directors far more often than we do" (DIPOL).

As divisions in the Colombian National Police were often created in direct response to specific threats, DIPOL was created as a response to the Cartel of Calí. According to Oscar Naranjo, one of the earliest heads of the division: the idea became to separate the intelligence functions of DIJIN away from those of the judicial police, leading to "pure intelligence" (Sánchez 2017). As an architect of the division, Naranjo was influenced by the DEA, the CIA, and The New York times, comparing journalism to intelligence collection

[143] Interview with DIPOL staff, conducted on March 16, 2020 in Bogotá, Colombia.

in a 2017 interview (Sánchez 2017). Comparing cold-war era intelligence to that needed to fight the Cartel of Calí, Naranjo says: "Old intelligence was based on the power of a secret and the strength of a system to accumulate secrets, but with the internet, the media and virtuality, now the secret is not what makes the difference, but instead the capacity to process information (ibid)." For this reason, the first hundred recruits to DIPOL were purely analysts, who did not directly participate in operations. Naranjo, with the support and supervision of General Serrano, produced results within eight months of DIPOL's creation: locating and arresting of the Calí kingpins (Sánchez 2017). Ironically, the quick dismantling of the Calí Cartel t is popularly attributed to Generals Serrano and Naranjo, not the Samper administration.

This is, in part, because Samper's relationship with the police was strained. Though evidently more comfortable with the police than the army, Samper distrusted Naranjo and was either suspicious or jealous of General Serrano's "special relationship" with the United States. According to Naranjo, the President wanted him fired and told Serrano that he was "a bad type" (Sánchez 2017). When Serrano responded that Naranjo was a good man who had his trust, Samper's response was curt: "Fine general, do what you want, I don't know" (Sánchez 2017). Naranjo ultimately stayed on and claims that President Samper became much friendlier towards him after the successes against the Cartel of Calí.

Management capacities were disrupted by Samper himself, who distanced himself from the military and clashed with his police. Further complicating his management capacities were not only the Botero scandal, but that no steady hand replaced Botero after he was forced to resign as minister of defense. Instead, Samper had a different minister of

defense for every year of his presidency. This meant civilianization of the defense sector continued to lag, even as the viability of the national police increased. Lacking in competent and consistent managers and left with a President who seemed nervous about even meeting with them, the armed forces and police alike were left to their own devices.

In this presidency, the CNP greatly increased its viability, particularly due to the formation of DIPOL and the clear provision of operational successes in dismantling the Cartel of Calí. Though the army's participation against the Cartel of Calí had been initially praised, the institution became mired in the same corruption as the police. By insulating DIPOL as an intelligence collector and processor, rather than as field agents exposed directly to the cartel of Calí, the CNP further augmented its intelligence capacities by systemizing and professionalizing it. DIPOL would immediately turn its attention towards the final remaining cartel, the Cartel de Valle Norte. In this time, the armed forces also began a process of introspection and restructuring, though unlike the relatively quick consolidation of DIPOL, this process would take much longer and would not bear fruits until the early 2000s.

Though the viability of the CNP certainly created new opportunities for Samper to manage internal security, the president did not exercise this power. Instead, evidently nervous and hostile, Samper shirked his responsibilities and preferred to delegate internal security affairs to General Serrano, who quickly became the hero of his administration. But tensions with the armed forces proved untenable, and though no coup materialized, President Samper's scandal evidently met that the president only had a distant relationship with commanders, consequently hindering any management potential.

Pastrana: Politics Before Security

The Samper presidency set the stage for the Colombia's widest civil-military rift. Shortly after the arrest of Fernando Botero Zea, his successor as Minister of Defense, Juan Esguerra was forced to tell the press that there were no plans for a coup.[144] However, scholars contend that this was at least in part a lie, as concerned officers were discussing the possibility of a coup with civilian political elites (Dugas 2001). The talk never materialized into action, and the armed forces made no moves to remove or even threaten Samper. Nonetheless, Samper's commander of the armed forces, General Bedoya made the remarkable decision to run for the presidential elections in 1998, running on a rebuke of Samper and a promise to perform "a coup through the ballot box" (Schemo 1997).[145]

Bedoya's president run, though very unsuccessful, was based on widespread military grievances. Corruption amongst the political class, an inattentiveness to internal security and specifically a misunderstanding about the nature and threat of the FARC, the army's oldest enemy. "We understood the FARC once as an adversary with political goals," says General Henry Medina, "The organization changed substantially when cocaine trafficking became part of its economy. Whatever respect we had for an adversary vanished." Colonel Pattaquiva is more critical, "The FARC became the largest cartel in the

[144] "Colombian Minister Denies Coup Plans." UPI. UPI, October 10, 1995. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1995/10/10/Colombian-minister-denies-coup-plans/4575813297600.

[145] Schemo, Diana Jean. "In Colombia, Support Grows for a Candidate with a Hard Line." The New York Times. The New York Times, November 2, 1997. https://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/02/world/in-colombia-support-grows-for-a-candidate-with-a-hard-line.html.

world," he says.[146] Military officers were quickly realizing that the FARC, as an organization, was changing. Consequently, they were averse to any negotiations.

If Samper set the stage for this rift, Andres Pastrana built on it by running as the candidate who could finally bring peace to Colombia. Pastrana, who narrowly lost to Samper in 1994, cast himself as the president who could finally bring peace to Colombia by negotiating with the FARC. He went so far as to meet with Manuel Marulanda, the legendary founder of the organization, during his campaign. Despite reservations from the military, the prospect of peace was popular with a violence-weary electorate, and Pastrana won the presidency with a mandate to pursue talks.

However, it quickly became apparent to everyone, but Pastrana that the talks were doomed before they began. The FARC's Rather than preparing for negotiations, the FARC was reaping the fruits of a long-percolating process. In 1982, the group held its seventh conference, in which it shifted its goal from fighting a war of guerrillas to a war of positions. The group also decided to tax all goods going through its territory, the so-called "revolutionary tax" would involve the organization in the cocaine trade as times an ally and at times an enemy of the country's major cartels. But while the bulk of the incomes of the cartels of Medellín and Calí went towards the personal enrichment of its leadership, the FARC funneled the bulk of its funds into its armed struggle. The massive infusion of cash and arms, as well as the vacuum left after the cartel of Calí's collapse, fundamentally transformed the organization. While the organization numbered around 4,000 in 1986, it

[146] Interview conducted on February 5, 2020, in Bogotá, Colombia.

increased to 16,000 recruits in the Pastrana presidency (Stanford).[147] The seizure of Mitú in 1998, and the encirclement of Bogotá represented both the fruits of the FARC's new influx of resources and its decision to move from a war of guerrillas to a war of positions.

Tragically, the President seemed uninterested in any warnings of a growing threat. War weary himself, and elected by war weary voters, hopes for peace talks in Caguán were high. Pastrana, to gain the FARC's confidence, agreed to withdraw state forces from even more portions of national territory. The move was not only opposed by the military, Pastrana's minister of defense: Rodrigo Lloreda, as well (Rabasa 2001).[148] Lloreda has been described by Armando Borrero as one of the most component defense ministers in Colombia's history (interview with Armando Borrero), and his departure from the cabinet meant that army leadership had no advocate in the presidential cabinet.

While Pastrana was certainly within his right, as a civilian executive, to order his state security agents to stand down, ignoring of their concerns created disastrous results. In 2001, he ordered the creation of the Caguán DMZ, a parcel of 42,000 square kilometers that ceded national territory the size of Switzerland to the FARC. When talks opened in 2001, President Pastrana announced their beginning next to an empty chair. Manuel Marulanda, the FARC's commander, had stood him up (Bajak 1999).[149]

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[147] "MMP: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)." FSI. Accessed May 19, 2022. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/revolutionary-armed-forces-colombia-farc#highlight_text_14694.

[148] Rabasa, Angel. "The Americas: Colombia's Rebels Talk Peace but Make More War." RAND Corporation, July 13, 2001. https://www.rand.org/blog/2001/07/the-americas-colombias-rebels-talk-peace-but-make-more.html.

[149] Bajak, Frank. "Colombia Leader Opens Peace Talks." AP NEWS. Associated Press, January 8, 1999. https://apnews.com/article/ac10b26d53df51edd46d5e314da19b1c.

Nonetheless, the police and military accepted the orders of their commander in chief to stand down. Firefights between the armed forces, police and FARC continued in this period, as the guerrillas rejected Pastrana's call for a ceasefire, but the absence of major operations ironically gave the military the same opportunity it gave the FARC: time to adjust, self-evaluate, and strengthen. As commander of the armed forces under Pastrana, General Rangel Mora oversaw these changes, which army commanders call the largest change to military practice and doctrine since Plan Lazo (interview with Rangel Mora). The restructuring included the formation and training of new rapid-response mobile battalions in 1999 (the FUDRAS), new anti-narcotics battalions in 2000, and modernization of air capacities (of all three branches), giving the military much-needed technical improvements (Interview Rangel Mora; Briscoe 2006). According to Mora, discussions of the restructuring had begun during the Samper administration, but formalized during Pastrana's presidency. However, the chief executive did not involve himself in the process. "At the end of his presidency, he [Pastrana] claimed that the restructuring of the armed forces was one of his greatest accomplishments," Mora says. "He was never involved."

In contrast, police operations against the cartels accelerated. Oscar Naranjo, still in his capacity as the head of DIPOL, says that he had very little issue with the demobilization zone Pastrana created, which led to a "a very difficult conversation with the army" (Sánchez 2017). For Naranjo, the decision was a relatively easy one, as there were only 28 police officers in the region and the police had other threats to pursue: namely the cartel of Valle Norte and remaining "cartelitos." In 1999, the Colombian National Police executed "Operacíon Milenio," which saw the arrest of 35 of Colombia's most high-profile drug

traffickers. Described by Director Rosso Serrano as "The most significant success since the dismantling of the Cartel of Calí," the operation is a demonstration of the police's capacity to work internationally. The operation involved coordination with the CIA, Europol and saw coordinated arrests and espionage operations not only in Colombia, but in Mexico and Ecuador as well.[150]

While the police proved its viability as an anti-narcotics force, it also suffered an enormous defeat at the hands of the FARC. The FARC's seizure of Mitú in 1998, the departmental capital of Vaupés, resulted in the kidnapping of 61 police officers, the last of whom would not be freed until 20017. General Oscar Naranjo said of the attack: "For the police, without a doubt, it was a strike to heart of our dignity and honor" (Sánchez 2017). That the army was necessary to reclaim the city showed that the police could not replace the military wholesale, though the two institutions to compensate for each other and work together in reacting to the threat.

Pastrana's management of the military and police appears to have been similar to that of his predecessor, though it is very important to note that operational objectives were subject to the president's political agenda. Though officers resigned in protest over the cessation of territory, the military as an institution accepted the president's orders. Pastrana and his defense ministers were also briefed on high-value operations, and could access information about operations. The management channels, and tools, existed for a hands-on manager. However, Pastrana's greater projects of peace with the FARC and the signing

[150] Lozano, Pilar. "Una Operación Coordinada Por La CIA Desmantela El Mayor Cartel Del Narcotráfico Colombiano." El País, October 13, 1999. https://elpais.com/diario/1999/10/14/internacional/939852013_850215.html.

of Plan Colombia meant the President paid less attention to operations and more attention to international diplomacy and politics. The channels, however, remained for a president who would take a greater interest in security.

Era	Summary
1990-2002	Because narcotraffickers became the greatest security threat in the early 1990s, and the police had the most narco-fighting capacities, the CNP took on a much more prominent role in internal security. This is manifested in the joint operations of the Bloque de Busqueda, and the police operations which neutralized the Cartels of Medellin and Cali. The CNP's creation of DIPOL solidified its intelligence supremacy, and was critical in the neutralization of the cartels of Cali and the Valle de Norte. However, the growing FARC threat was in part exacerbated by the vacuum left behind by these cartels, as well as the political agenda of President Andres Pastrana. Though the police were viable, and though minister of defense were civilian, Presidents Samper and Pastrana distanced themselves from their security agents. Consequently, a space for autonomy subordinate to a political agenda (negotiations with the FARC) limited operations against the group while creating a time for the military to modernize and restructure.

Micro-Managing Principal: Álvaro Uribe and Total War Against the FARC

The two presidential terms of Álvaro Uribe were a stark departure for Colombia's civil-military relations. Other than Gaviria, who involved himself in the operations against Pablo Escobar, Uribe stands out as a president who not only managed, but micro-managed operations. The viability of the national police, the product of decades of responding and adapting to specific threats, made management of internal security easier and more extensive. Though it cannot be said that Uribe's management resulted in normatively "good" outcomes, as the administration was in office during the False Positives scandal, it contributed to the decline and ultimately defeat of the FARC, which would be completed by his successor Juan Manuel Santos.

Uribe was an unusual candidate, in that he made security the central plank and issue of his campaign. Though Uribe campaigned as an outsider, his experiences as governor of Antioquia foreshadowed his interest in security and his management style. "I first met him [Uribe] when he was governor of Antioquia," Army Colonel Velasquez recalls. "I was off put by his tone with the military, and the way he tried to involve himself in our operations. It was unusual." As the head the military component of the Bloque de Busqueda for the Cartel of Calí, Colonel Velasquez was particularly wary of potential corruption in civilian politicians, and Uribe himself, who as governor of Antioquia was rumored to have connections to paramilitary groups.[151] Both his efforts to manage the

[151] As the previous note indicates, these were far from rumors. Colonel Velasquez, who was ultimately forced to retire for bringing allegations that his superior officer was in cooperating with paramilitary groups, would have personal reasons to be offended by Uribe's ties.

military, particularly a special group which operated in intense secrecy, and his collaboration with paramilitary groups characterized Uribe's anti-FARC vision: one which utilized every available state resource to combat leftist insurgencies.

In his 2002 inauguration speech, even as the FARC shelled Bogotá from a site one mile away from the presidential residence, Uribe explained that ending the conflict with the group was his top priority. In speech, the newly elected president proclaimed even as FARC mortars fell on Bogotá, "The world must understand that this conflict needs unconventional, transparent and imaginative solutions" (Forero 2002a).[152] Immediately, his administration passed a one-time "war tax," to modernize and recruit more personnel into the army and national police (Forero 2002b).[153] He also successfully convinced the Bush administration to free up funds from Plan Colombia, previously only given on the condition that they would be used exclusively to fight narcotrafficking, for the fight against the FARC (Ticker 2003; NSA).[154] The release of funds acted as a catalyst for a process began in 1997, when the armed forces began its own restructuring process. While General Mora, who oversaw the armed forces during the final Pastrana years and early Uribe years,

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[152] Forero, Juan. "Explosions Rattle Colombian Capital during Inaugural." The New York Times. The New York Times, August 8, 2002. https://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/08/world/explosions-rattle-colombian-capital-during-inaugural.html.

[153] Forero, Juan. "Burdened Colombians Back Tax to Fight Rebels." The New York Times. The New York Times, September 8, 2002. https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/08/world/burdened-colombians-back-tax-to-fight-rebels.html.

[154] Tickner, Arlene B. "Colombia and the United States: From counternarcotics to counterterrorism." *Current History* 102, no. 661 (2003): 77. Donald Rumsfeld was particularly amenable to the idea of linking anti-FARC operations to the war on terror, writing to Paul Wolfowitz: "It seems that there is some legislative change we may need or interpretation, so that we can deal with terrorism in Colombia using the capabilities that were authorized for drug funds. It seems to me the problems are intermixed."
See NSA archives: "Snowflake."

describes Plan Colombia as a "happy coincidence," it is clear that the funds from Plan Colombia allowed the fruits of the military's restructuring to grow more quickly.

Both security agents, the CNP and the armed forces, and civilians in the ministry of defense were strengthened during Uribe's terms. A new effort to "civilianize" the ministry of defense began early in the administration, though the process was not an easy or uncontentious one, particularly under Uribe's first minister of defense, Marta Lucía Ramírez, who frequently clashed with both the Commander of the Armed Forces (General Mora) and the Director of National Police (General Campo) (Bruneau 2004; Sánchez 2017). Despite early tensions, the Uribe Ministry of Defense has produced prominent political figures in Colombia who remains relevant even at the time of writing. Marta Lucía Ramírez is the current Vice President of Colombia, and Juan Manuel Santos, Uribe's Minister of Defense for the majority of his second term, was twice elected president.

Efforts to civilianize the ministry involved the consultation of experts both from Colombia and the United States. Armando Borrero, a prominent academic of Colombia's military and its history in the conflict, became an advisor and confidant of Minister Lucía Ramírez. He describes a competent civilian defense minister, but one who inherited a difficult competition between the police and military. "Defense Ministers tend to prefer their people, and their people are the military" (interview Borrero).[155] Borrero claims that Lucía Ramírez attempted to give equal time to both the military and the police, but was overwhelmed by the sheer volume of information and personnel. "For this reason," Borrero explains, "I put forward the idea of a sub-minister for the police. However," he

[155] Interview with Armando Borrero conducted between January-March 2020, in Bogotá, Colombia.

adds with some humor, "The military response to my proposal was 'well we want one too.'"[156] This observation clashes with members of the armed forces leadership, who told a visiting team of American assessors in 2004 that they believed the national police had more access to the minister than in the past (Bruneau 2004). While Uribe usually interceded on behalf of his minister of defense to resolve these disputes, the Lucía Ramírez left the defense ministry in 2003, as did Generals Mora and Campo. Despite her personal clashes with General Campo, Lucía Ramírez did successful initiate a restructuring of the police, indicating that the police remained more amenable to civilian management than the armed forces.

This opened the space for more civilianization, though Uribe's first presidency resembled his immediate predecessors in that the Ministers of Defense did not stay in their roles for long. Teams were brought in, however, to advise ministers and force leaders on the creation of new doctrines, among them human rights. In her role, Juanita Goebertus was part of a team which worked with security forces to update human rights training and doctrine. While Goebertus acknowledges that clashes between the police and military took place, largely as a result of institutional rivalries, she also reflects that the presence of the police facilitated easier interactions with the armed forces. "It is always easier meeting with the military when the police are present." Juanita Goebertus explains, "They are sort of

[156] It should be noted that multiple accounts suggest that Lucia Ramírez clashed both with the commander of the Armed Forces, General Rangel Mora, and the director of the National Police, General Campo. Accounts suggest that Uribe would intercede on behalf of his minister of defense in these clashes, and at least Mora Rangel felt the defense minister was involving herself in too many military operations (see Bruneau 2004 and the firsthand account from police General Oscar Naranjo). All three retired in 2003, ending a venomous relationship at the top of Colombia's defense ministry.

'translators.'"[157] Goebertus does add however, that much of the relationship between civilians and security agents depends on the personalities involved, as some commanders are more amenable to civilian oversight than others (ibid).

Both the police and military benefited from Uribe's political agenda in that their technical capacities increased, and operational successes were yielded. While he continued the armed force's modernization push, the president also established police stations in every municipality in Colombia. For this effort, reforms to the rural division of the police, the Carabineros were undertaken early in the administration. As part of a pledge to build and staff police stations in every municipality, 10,000 new carabineros were recruited from 2004-2005 (Uribe 2005).158 In 2006, the division was renamed 'the directorate of carabineros' (DICAR) and a new subdivision of elite mobile squads (EMCAR) was created as well. DICAR and its subdivisions benefited from new counter-insurgent and rural combat training from the United States (Finlayson 2006).[159] In this period, the police were responsible for both retaking territory for the central government and in occupying it afterwards, using the Commandos de Jungla for kingpin operations and the Carabineros to re-establish order once territory was retaken (Finlayson 2006).

Both the viability of the military and police dramatically increased under Uribe. Likewise, the size of both the army and the military expanded under the Uribe Presidency, with the army increasing to a force of 180,000 and the police to 160,000 personnel by 2006

[157] Interview conducted in Bogotá, February 19, 2020.

[158] Uribe Echavarria, Jorge Alberto. Memoria de Ministro de Defensa 2005.

[159] https://arsof-history.org/articles/v2n4_word_to_learn_page_1.html

(Finlayson 2006). However, the police continued to be the force with the most reliable intelligence capacities in the country. Its capacities for infiltration, as well its abilities to coordinate with international actors, became a crucial component of the government's campaign against the FARC. The police led operations, independent of the army, to infiltrate FARC cells, locate its leadership and, when possible, capture them. Examples include the 2004 capture of Rodrigo Granada, the 'chancellor of the FARC' who was arrested in Caracas by Colombian police officials (Sánchez 2017). This became more relevant as the Uribe strategy shifted from one of purely military offensive to one which targeted FARC leadership through the use of intelligence and counterintelligence.

Police operations against the FARC intensified in 2008. Martín Sombra, a high-ranking FARC commander was captured after three years police operations which included undercover work, the tracking of luxury items to FARC camps, and human intelligence sources (DIJIN). The police also worked with military forces to conduct raids on FARC camps, after infiltration and location operations. In 2008, joint police-military operations, called "combined operations" by Colombian security forces included operations Gibraltar, Baricada Sur, Dignidad and Fenix (DIJIN).

Fenix was by far the most consequential and controversial anti-FARC operation of the Uribe presidency, consequential in that it neutralized the critical FARC leader "Raul Reyes" and controversial in that it occurred outside of Colombia (DIJIN). Raul Reyes, an ideological leader and the second in command of the FARC's secretariat (only behind Manuel Marulanda) had been a high-profile target in Colombia for decades. Once proof began to emerge that Reyes was located in Ecuador, Juan Manuel Santos began centralizing

the intelligence and security divisions within the ministry of defense to pursue him. "The success of the operation should go to Santos," says Oscar Naranjo, "He supervised all intelligence operations and worked to reduce institutional jealousies [between the army and police]" (Sánchez 2017).

Once the national police verified that Reyes' location in Ecuador, Santos sought approval from Uribe for the operation. The air force struck Reyes' camp, and a contingent of army and police personnel raided across the border into Ecuador. The Ecuadoran authorities, taken by surprise, immediately ordered the arrest of all Colombian security personnel who participated in the read. According to Naranjo, police commandos ran for six straight hours to cross back into Colombia and avoid arrest (Sánchez 2017). Though the operation caused a diplomatic crisis, it also dealt a critical blow the FARC and demonstrated a resolve to attack senior leaders wherever they might be. Ecuador, long regarded as a FARC safety net, was no longer safe.

Police participation in the operation, as well as Santos' use of institutional rivalries to oversee the operation demonstrates a high degree of civilian management. Santos role as an institutional referee, mitigating what Naranjo calls "institutional jealousies" shows that the presence of a rival agent presents a competent manager with opportunities to exercise greater management over agents in competition. The success of Operación Fenix shows that part of a successful operation hinges on civilian authorities settling disputes between agents, and forcing cooperation to produce results.

However, while civilian management by certain defense ministers increased (particularly Juan Manuel Santos), Uribe undermined other civilians by exercising *personal*

management of operations. The President became notorious for his hands on management of the armed forces. Colonel Velasquez, then retired from the army but attentively watching the President, recalls Uribe's "listening tours" and his involvement of the military in them. "He [Uribe] would go to a municipality and listen to the complaints of citizens and then turn to an army official and say, 'General, how could you let this happen?" (Interview with Colonel Velasquez). More problematic than the public shaming of generals was Uribe's tendency to go around the chain of command to issue orders to commanders (police and military) at the battalion level. Commanders came to dread potential phone calls from Uribe, who would issue new directives which they would need to report to their commanding officers. "This was incredibly demoralizing for us [the armed forces]," Velasquez says, "Because orders would be given to lower officers and then be communicated *up* the chain of command to superior officers." Uribe likewise micro-managed the National Police. Oscar Naranjo, then commandant of the police of Calí, recalls that Uribe would call him three or four times a month, to be directly briefed by Naranjo (Sánchez 2017).

Though Uribe was certainly within his rights to exercise such personalized control of the armed forces, it no doubt contributed to much of the early confusion about the role of a defense minister and tensions with Marta Lucía Ramírez. Commanders, rightly so, were dismayed to find the subordinate officers communicating orders from the President. This civilian mismanagement may have served Uribe's goal: to create an environment in which soldiers and police officers knew that their commander in chief "wanted results" in the war against the FARC. Uribe certainly created an incentive structure which rewarded

participation in combat, and in 2005 the defense ministry issued an order which would reward soldiers for combat kills with bonuses. Fear of the executive, combined with a sense of urgency and rewards for participation have all been cited as contributors to the "False Positives" scandal, in which troops killed upwards of 8,000 non-combatants and reported them as FARC soldiers. Once the scandal broke in 2008, it became a black mark both on the armed forces and the Uribe Presidency.

According to Eduardo Pizarro, a defense and human rights experts who has advised several Colombian governments, Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos seemed bewildered by the revelation that soldiers had killed thousands of Colombians in order to receive combat bonuses. "I was called into his office," Pizarro says, "And Santos asked me, 'Dr. Pizarro...what *happened*?" (Interview with Eduardo Pizarro).[160] As Santos has been described as a hands-on defense minister within the Uribe defense ministry (see Sánchez 2017), his personal surprise indicates that the armed forces maintained the capacity to hide information from civilian principals. Both Uribe and Santos denied knowledge of the practice, and ordered the firing 27 officers, among them three generals.

During the Uribe Presidency then, the viability of the National Police contributed to the potential of civilians to involve themselves in the planning of operations. The presence of multiple agents allowed for new fonts of information regarding the conflict to flow to Minister Santos, whose role as an institutional referee necessitated a need to manage. Though competition between the two agents was natural, combined operations proved to be extremely beneficial. His experience as Defense Minister would contribute to

[160] Interview with Eduardo Pizzaro conducted on February 6, 2020, in Bogotá, Colombia.

Santos' presidency, when Santos began pursuing the goals of putting pressure on the FARC with the simultaneous goals of weakening the group and pressuring it to the negotiation table.

Era	Summary
2002-2010	Several conflicts of personality and power resulted in a net gain for civilian management, though these gains were undermined by Alvaro Uribe. The Police, particularly DIJIN and DIPOL, were reoriented towards targeting the FARC. Defense Ministers such as Juan Manuel Santos, used their role to mitigate competition between the two forces, in the process involving themselves in operational oversight and planning. However, prior to Santos' arrival, Uribe personally exercised authority over his security agents, causing conflicts within the chains of command and the Ministry of Defense. While oversight, and the viability of both the military and police increased, the False Positives scandal is evidence that this oversight was not complete.

Kingpin Operations and Peace: The Santos Strategy

Juan Manuel Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2016 for doing what Pastrana could not: successfully reaching an agreement with the FARC. There is some irony in this however, because as President Santos created a defense sector which was wholly oriented towards the dismantling of the FARC's leadership. With his background as defense minister, his longstanding relationships with military and police commanders as

well as his minister of defense, Santos continued the Uribe strategy of never letting senior members of the FARC enjoy a moment's rest, making demobilization far more appealing than continued conflict.

In managing his security agents simultaneous pursue both peace and pressure, Santos benefited from a security team who he knew well. Among them was Oscar Naranjo, who he recommended personally to Uribe to become Director of the National Police in 2007 (Sánchez 2017). Santos came to know Naranjo when the general was the director of DIJIN during the Uribe presidency, and shared a prioritization for human intelligence and counterintelligence. Santos also appointed a confidant to the position of minister of defense, Juan Carlos Pinzón. Pinzón had served as vice minister for defense under Santos, and became both the youngest and longest serving minister of defense in Colombia's history. Though initially Santos named Admiral Edgar Cely as commander of the armed forces, he replaced him with General Alejandro Navas in 2011. Like Naranjo, Navas was known personally to Santos, as were the commanders of each of the three branches of the armed forces.

The Santos Defense Ministry became synergized, though the police and military did operate independently of each other. Because the goal shifted from one of diminishing the FARC's military defenses to one of attacking its leadership and financial networks, the police became far more involved in anti-FARC operations than ever before. Between 2011-2013, the CNP carried out 36 high-value operations against the FARC, both independently and jointly with branches of the armed forces. Of particular importance were operations Sodoma, which saw the death of 'El Mono Joyjoy' and Odiseo, which killed Alfonso Cano.

After Raul Reyes was killed in 2008, El Mono Joyjoy emerged as the next potential leader of the FARC's central command. Joyjoy was the FARC's remaining senior leader, and according to Naranjo his death in 2010 was an enormous blow to the FARC's morale, and was a major motivator in moving guerrillas towards negotiations (Sánchez 2017).

The operation was the product of five years of work, which Naranjo began five years in his capacity as DIJIN director (DIPOL 2015). Police officers began infiltrating the FARC, leading to the death of one uncovered officer (ibid). However, police were able to locate Joyjoy by tracking luxury goods, prostitutes, and diabetes medicine. Through the use of informants and counterintelligence, the police located one of the FARC's last and longest serving leaders. According to Naranjo, he told General Navas to mobilize troops for the raid which would kill Joyjoy (Sánchez 2017). If true, this would mean that the police had a primary and commanding role in the operation. If not, the fact that Joyjoy was located by police, and that the police were present in planning and execution of the raid, is an indicator of the police's importance.

The police also targeted the FARC's regional commanders and financiers, both in Colombia and abroad. Over the same period, the police went after the FARC's regional leadership, with particular attention to leaders abroad. Santos' efforts to smooth over tensions with Venezuela were made, in part, to facilitate cooperation between the Colombian National Police and their counterparts in Venezuela (DIPOL 2015). International operations were also coordinated between the CNP and the Ecuadoran Army as well as Spain (ibid). While neighboring Latin American governments appeared resistant to the presence of the Colombian military in its territory, the CNP had long-held

diplomatic ties to these countries which facilitated cooperation. This meant that FARC targets which could not be reached by the armed forces could be reached by the police. The message was clear, in the depths of jungles and across the Atlantic Ocean: no FARC commander was safe.

Simultaneously, the Santos administration and the Ministry of Defense pursued negotiations in Havana. While Pastrana excluded the armed forces and police from negotiations, leading a perception that there were "two teams" in his administration (Herrera 2009), Santos made sure that the armed forces and police were representatives of the government. Army General Mora Rangel, who led the restructuring effort of the military during the Pastrana years, Marine Infantry General Rafael Colón Torres, famous for both his fights against paramilitaries and for his closeness with civil society groups, and from the police: General Oscar Naranjo, who retired in 2012.

The involvement of these commanders had important impacts on the peace process. The FARC negotiators took their presence as a sign of confidence and commitment from the administration, as even Marulanda said that "when Colombia's military were involved in negotiations, the confrontation between the government and the FARC would be ended" (NOREF). Beyond this, the selection of not only commanders but *storied* commanders sent a signal to members of the armed forces and police: that security forces would remain committed to the peace process. According to General Henry Medina, military confidence in the peace, particularly in the leadership began to increase (interview with Henry Medina). Teams of security force, FARC and civil society actors also created the DDR component of the peace deal, and a new police division: UNIPEP was

created to enforce the peace deal provisions (NOREF). In selling his peace, Santos relied on the National Police's reputation, in particular that of General Oscar Naranjo. As with Rosso Serrano in the Samper administration, Naranjo acted as an "unofficial ambassador," whose reputation as "the world's best police officer" was utilized to sell the peace process to Colombian hardliners in Miami.[161]

The Santos administration, though not without its controversies, oversaw both successful negotiations with the FARC and exercise of operational management of security forces. The same commanders who were skeptical of Pastrana's process became involved in the Santos negotiations, resulting in a deal successfully signed and partially implemented by Santos departed the presidency.[162]

[161] https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/colombia/article88540157.html

[162] It should be noted that General Mora has become a critic of the peace deal. This was expressed to me in an interview with Mora, but is also something he has said quite publicly and often. Mora, and many in the military, say that while they prefer peace to war, that far too much was conceded to the FARC. By contrast, they say, the peace deal has been harder on the armed forces. This is a common sentiment, and has been said about the earlier peace deal with M-19 as well. But Mora has become pointedly critical of government officials involved in the negotiations, particularly Senator Roy Barreras. For more, see: https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/el-general-mora-lanza-el-mas-fuerte-ataque-al-proceso-de-paz-con-las-farc-549897

Era	Summary
2010-2016	Civilian management of security agents intensifies as the Santos administration subordinates operations towards the goal of pressuring the FARC towards negotiations. This included utilizing police intelligence to neutralize FARC leadership and sources of income, as well as joint operations between the police and military to carry out raids against key FARC regional commands. Santos also involved the armed forces and police in negotiations in Havana, giving the negotiations a legitimacy which Pastrana did not.

Case Conclusion: The Results of Within-Case Process Tracing

The following table presents the key findings of this chapter, resulting from a within-case comparison via process tracing.

Table 14: Key Findings

Key findings	
1	The Colombian National Police developed as an ASF in response a diversity of threats and missions. Comparatively, the armed forces limited their internal security missions and were much slower to adapt.
2	Though the viability of the CNP preceded equal access to the executive branch, Presidents often gave deference to the military. This is particularly true in the 1970s, when presidents involved the military in internal repression efforts.
3	The role of the CNP in the internal conflict has been primarily defined by intelligence, rather than combat capacities. Intelligence dramatically increased as a consequence of the simultaneous rise of M-19 and the Cartels of Medellin and Cali.
4	Intelligence capacities against the cartels served as "transferrable skills" against the FARC, and were used to eliminate FARC leaders and put pressure on the group's leadership.
5	Even when police viability was high and when the CNP enjoyed equal access to the President, exceptional circumstances acted as exogenous shocks. President Samper's corruption scandal and Pastrana's peace agenda both gave them incentives to not meet with their commanders. However, both presidents seemed to be slightly more comfortable with the police than the military.
6	Rather than defer to security agents during moments where threats are high, civilian leadership became more interested and involved when threats were highest.

The first finding illustrates how, exactly, the Colombian National Police became a viable military alternative. Though the force began life as the fourth armed branch of the military, it needed to diversify its capacities to respond to threats which the armed forces would not. Because, however, the CNP remained the targets of guerrillas, counter-insurgent capacities remained relevant. Rather than becoming overloaded by threats, the CNP had to diversify, and in doing so developed its intelligence capacities.

However, as the second finding shows: two factors have limited civilian management. The first is that until 1991, the Minister of Defense was an Army General.

The second factor is the personal politics of the president. Though the commander in chief has a legal authority over the armed forces, in any country, there is very little which forces them to assume the responsibilities which come with this role. Even in developed democracies, it has been found that there is an alarming trend for civilians to delegate to their armed forces (see Pion-Berlin, Acácio & Ivey 2018). Colombia is, and was, no exception. Presidents in the 1970s favored internal repression roles for the military, and even went so far as to fire officers who protested this role. There was likewise an eagerness to bring the military into counter-narcotics, even over the protest of officers and the better anti-narcotics capacities of the police.

The third and fourth findings concern how the CNP developed its viability and what made it a more viable option than the military in some cases. The viability of the National Police as an alternative security force, it has been shown, began early and under military direction. Much of the police's capacities as an ASF originated in an eagerness on part of the army to become a professional, peacetime military focused on external defense. Consequently, though the army remained the dominant security force in terms of presence across the country and in terms of prestige, the police had to assume both military and criminal missions. The overlap between these two threats, particularly after the Bonanza Marimbera, meant that by the 1980s, the police actually had the edge over the armed forces in terms of security performance. The size differential between the two forces has grown but remains narrow. The size gap between the CNP and the army, even as early as the 1960s, was a difference of about 2,000 recruits. As of 2006, the gap had widened to 20,000. As of 2020, the army has about 223,150 personnel compared to the CNP's

187,900 (Military Balance 2020). The army remains larger, and because of this is an important actor and the dominant state presence in many areas of Colombia, particularly those where police stations are not present. While Uribe's "Democratic Security" did expand the police's rural footprint, many towns remain without police and many illegal groups continue to exercise de-facto sovereignty over certain areas, particularly the pacific coast (where paramilitaries remain active), and zones where the ELN has a historic presence.

The fifth finding is related to the second, that civilian management capacities were undermined by the presidencies of Ernesto Samper and Andres Pastrana. In these presidents, both the military and the CNP enjoyed equal *lack of access* to the executive. While Samper was reluctant to have any relationship with security force commanders as a consequence of political scandal, Pastrana successfully subordinated security forces to his political agenda: negotiating with the FARC at Caguán. Management of operations was not a priority for Pastrana, who campaigned on the promise of successful negotiations with the FARC and had every incentive to prioritize this as his presidency's greatest legacy. Pastrana and Samper both demonstrate that in Colombia, military and police autonomy has been *civilian given* rather than *military taken.* Though the viability of the CNP certainly endowed executives and their ministers of defense with more power, there is little can thwart the personal politics of a president.

However, the presence of the police did create incentives for civilians to become more hands on managers, particularly once the defense ministry was civilianized. Mitigating disputes between the armed forces and police became a difficult, though necessary function

for ministers of defense and presidents. Though ministers were not always successful in solving disputes, they were able to receive information, order specific operations and even force cooperation. The increasing viability of the National Police has indeed forced civilians to take on a more hands-on control of internal security. That the CNP had capabilities that the military did not was critical, as it meant that civilians needed to make decisions and needed to listen to police commanders. This was not true in Mexico, where though reformers worked admirably at making the Federal Police a more viable ASF, the military had greater size, operational successes, and access to the president. Consequently, the competition between the Mexican military and police forces was far more unequal than that which existed in Colombia.

Curiously, as the sixth finding shows, a within-case comparison challenges Desch's assumption that high levels of internal threat will result in greater delegation. To the contrary, I have demonstrated that Colombian presidents and ministers of defense have been most interested and involved in internal security when threat levels are high. President Gaviria and Minister of Defense Rafael Pardo, inheriting the most violent period of Colombia's internal conflict, made the first steps towards institutionalizing civilian management. Álvaro Uribe may not be credited with respect to human rights standards, must be credited with the further expansion of civilian management and oversight, even if that oversight created a perverse incentive structure. Uribe, like Gaviria, inherited a violent context and a public mandate to restore order. Juan Manuel Santos is exceptional in many ways, but is an outlier of Colombian presidents in that he maintained an intense, personal interest in internal security even as the FARC had greatly diminished as a military threat

during the Uribe presidency. It then appears that civilians have *more* incentives to manage in a high threat environment than a low threat one.

At the time of writing, it appears that the Duque administration is continuing this trend rather than bucking it. This is best exemplified in Duque's first Defense Minister, Guillermo Botero. Though not a subject of this dissertation, many retired officers were outspoken about the minister. "Imagine," General Henry Medina told me, "If you placed a businessman in the position of minister of defense? Someone with no relevant knowledge" (interview with General Medina). Though the military and police both have contributed to an effort to consolidate the nation's peace process, the military through "integral action battalions" and the police through UNIPEP, the Duque administration has appeared to be more interested in forced crop eradication than national development efforts. It is not clear then, to what degree Duque is interested or uninterested in military operations. Despite this, the two-agent model persists and remains available for ministers of defense and presidents alike. Should Duque choose to exert more management, the same levers which worked for Juan Manuel Santos, Rafael Pardo and Álvaro Uribe, Duque's political patrons, still exist.

Chapter 4: Comparing Colombia and Mexico: Evaluating Civilian Management and ASF Viability

Introduction: Lessons from Colombia and Mexico and the Logic of Comparison

This dissertation has shown the limits of a dyadic civil-military relations model. While Peter Feaver has argued that there is "no variety of militaries" for civilian governments to select from, I have demonstrated that this is not necessarily the case (Feaver 2009).[163] Feaver's supposition is perhaps truer for external armed conflicts, but it is decidedly untrue in internal security. Where armed threats have the capacity to push the state out of its own territory, every armed agent becomes a relevant tool for democratic governments to reestablish security and reassert sovereignty. In such a context, the missions of military, police and paramilitary forces overlap. Presidents, as the heads of their central governments and commander in chiefs of their security forces, must decide who should receive resources, prestige, and missions: militaries or the centrally controlled police and paramilitary forces at the president's disposal.

These latter two actors, who I have named "Alternative Security Forces" (ASFs,) complicate the relationship between a government and its military. Because ASFs share the same commander in chief as the armed forces, and because they provide similar services, presidents do indeed have something resembling a "variety of militaries" to consult and deploy in internal conflicts. The presence of an ASF breaks the military monopoly over security services and information, creating a structural competition which grants presidents new opportunities to insert themselves into security policymaking. When correctly

[163] Feaver, P.D., 2009. *Armed Servants*. Harvard University Press.

exploited, presidents may increase their oversight over security, redirect security policy, and narrow the information gap between themselves and their agents.

However, as I have made clear in my theory chapter, the mere presence of an ASF is no guarantee that the management capacity of presidents will increase. Two jointly sufficient conditions must be met in order for presidents to have increased management capacity: (1) an alternative must in fact be viable, and (2) this alternative agent must have equal access to the commander in chief. ASF *viability* concerns not only its ability to provide military-style violence (both to defend itself and to target internal armed groups) but also its ability to provide services which militaries cannot. Indeed, a comparative analysis of Colombia and Mexico will show that the reason the Colombian National Police (CNP) exist today, and the Mexican Federal Police do not is due in part to the CNP's superior intelligence capacities relative to the Colombian military. However, even as the Mexican Federal Police attempted internal reforms during the administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto, their inability to reach the president meant that he was largely unaware of their reform efforts. The military's privileged access during the Peña administration kept the police institutionally marginalized, and diminished both Peña's management capacity and his own awareness of internal security policy.

Whereas proceeding chapters have used within-case process tracing for within-case comparative studies, this chapter will utilize a cross-case comparison to test the hypotheses and rival hypotheses of this dissertation. It will begin with an assessment of the viability of the Colombian National Police relative to Mexican ASFs, in this case the Federal Preventative Police (PFP) and then the Federal Police (PF). It will then assess the level of

access both ASFs have or had to the commander in chiefs. Cross-case comparisons allow the testing of a rival hypothesis: that increased civilian management increases ASF viability. That is, I test for reverse causality, using comparative analysis of the data I have presented in my previous chapters.

While the initial and most important task of any dissertation is to test the causal mechanism of its theory, fieldwork and qualitative data allow an opening of the black box of policymaking which yields surprising and unexpected data. This data in turn may answer relevant questions which were not included in the study's original research agenda. In my case, I found that the *type* of rivalry between security agents to be an important variable in determining not presidential management capacity, which increases regardless, but the success of security operations on the ground. Indeed, fighting armed threats effectively will to an extent rely on the ability of rival agents to coordinate *despite* their rivalry, sharing intelligence and carrying out joint operations when needed. In this chapter, I will use the Colombia-Mexico comparison to present two "types" of rivalries: inter-service rivalries and zero-sum rivalries. I argue that while both rivalries benefit presidential power, inter-service rivalries are more likely to successful security operations than zero-sum rivalries. Zero-sum rivalries can even be detrimental to security on the ground, deteriorating state capacity to respond to an armed threat even as presidents assert new power over their agents.

I will also examine "presidential shirking," and undertheorized concept which may help scholars understand why presidents do not take advantage of the opportunities presented to them. Just as agents may shirk, principals may neglect their responsibilities in managing and supervising their agents. Previous scholarship has argued that principal

shirking may be detected when multiple agents are themselves shirking, arguing that bad performance from multiple agents stems from the top of the p-a relationship rather than the bottom (Braun & Guston 2003). However, the concept remains unexplored in civil-military relations, as discussion regarding presidential responsibilities is often challenged by an insistence that civilians have a "right to be wrong" (Feaver 2003). That is to say, civilian control is predicated on the military accepting orders that it does not agree with, as long as those orders come from a president (ibid). While I agree with this, I found that presidents neglect their responsibilities to oversee their security agents by delegating away their own power. Presidents also took much more obvious measures to abdicate their responsibilities, such as leaving security briefings or avoiding their security leaders entirely. Such behavior goes beyond issuing bad orders, and leads to increased autonomy for all security agents. Through shirking, civilians actually erode their own power over the armed forces. I argue that if civilians do indeed have a "right to be wrong" and misuses this right to erode civilian control over security policy, they are actually doing a greater harm to civil-military relations than simply issuing bad orders.

Instances of shirking can be found both in Colombia and Mexico, and where I will show that there were important case-specific factors which informed presidential behavior. These instances of shirking range from shirking due to personal discomfort and/or embarrassment, to conflict aversion, and competing political agendas. Presidents shirk when they prioritize issues above national security, and these priorities may be personal and/or political. What is most interesting, however, is that presidents do not uniformly shirk when insecurity rises. In fact, shirking seems to take place in contexts where threat

levels are declining. This is a significant challenge to the prevailing wisdom that a principal in crisis is more likely to delegate (see Desch 1998).[164] Instead, it appears that presidents who are confronted with a crisis have more incentives to meet this crisis, meaning that rising levels of violence provides fewer incentives to shirk than decreasing levels of violence.

I conclude this section by re-examining and restating the importance of ASFs by addressing potential criticisms of my theory and case selection. It is true that internal armed threats remain in both Colombia and in Mexico. Scholars may reasonably hesitate to call Colombia a "successful" case, and they may likewise be hesitant to call Colombia's National Police a "viable alternative" to the military based on their poor, brutal performance in recent protests (Al Jazeera 2021).[165] While it is true that Colombia still faces both insurgent and criminal threats, and that the military is still used to fight these threats, my dissertation has proven that Colombian presidents have had much greater ease in inserting themselves into security policymaking than their counterparts in Mexico. Furthermore: Colombia's National Police as a viable military alternative have provided operational successes against the Cartel of Medellín, the Cartel of Calí and the FARC. Viable ASFs provide meaningful results in internal armed conflicts, and in doing so may lower levels of violence in their respective theaters. Though successful operations against

[164] Desch, M. C. (1998). Soldiers, states, and structures: The end of the Cold War and weakening US civilian control. *Armed Forces & Society*, *24*(3), 389-405.

[165] Al Jazeera, "Colombia Police responsible for 2020 'massacre:' Report" December 13, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/13/colombia-police-responsible-2020-protests-massacre-report

national threats excuse any human rights abuses committed against citizens, effectively eliminating national threats is an important step towards establishing a lasting peacetime.

Testing the Initial Hypotheses: The Effects of Viability, Equal Access and Privileged Access in Colombia and Mexico

I begin this section by revisiting the conceptualization of viability and equal access in my theory of ASF-military competition. Once an internal armed conflict begins, every armed state bureaucracy becomes a relevant agent. The missions of police forces, military forces, and other centralized, armed bureaucracies begin to overlap. In this condition of "mission overlap," civilians will be able to consider other, rival agents as alternatives to the military. These "alternative security forces" (ASFs) will be in a relationship of structural competition with the military, due to the fact that both agents directly report to a shared principal and commander in chief. This competition will create disputes between agents, and these disputes will provide presidents with both incentives and opportunities to exert their management over security policymaking. Presidents will need to make decisions regarding how they consume intelligence, and who they issue what orders to.

But the mere presence of an ASF is not a sufficient condition for increased civilian management. ASFs must be viable options, able to defend themselves and carry out successful strikes against armed threats, and they must have equal access to the commander in chief. Though the former will be elaborated first in this section, it is worth restating the importance of the latter. If presidents are unaware of disputes, or are able to distance themselves between military-ASFs conflicts, they will be largely unaware of the full array of

their security policy options. If one agent enjoys privileged access to the president, they are likely to dominate security policy and take a leading role in internal security.

Literature on "hybrid forces" provided my theoretical starting point for assessing and detecting viability. This is because "hybrid forces" have a critical capacity which "normal," preventative police do not: the ability to provide military-like force with police-like sensibilities (Pion-Berlin & Trinkunas 2011; Pion-Berlin 2017).[166] They can combat criminal threats, defend themselves from insurgencies, and also provide preventative policing services. However, once ASFs are in competition with the military, I find that the ability to provide military-style force is less important than the ability to provide security services and goods which the military *cannot provide*. Both militaries and ASFs can for instance, provides services related to the use of state-sanctioned violence. Both ASFs and militaries will have the ability to carry out these services with heavy weaponry, if an ASF is indeed viable. However, if competition with the military is solely defined on the ability to provide lethal force, the military will always win. I then emphasize weaponry of ASFs far less than I do their capacities associated the production intelligence and investigative goods. Scholars, in determining if an ASF is viable or not, must make assessments on both the combat and intelligence capacities of ASFs, while also looking to see if these capacities translate to operational successes. These successes can be in the form of "solo" operations carried out without military assistance, or joint operations in which ASFs contributed a critical service or good which determined the success of the operation.

[166] Pion-Berlin, David, and Harold Trinkunas. "Latin America's growing security gap." *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 1 (2011): 39-53.; Pion-Berlin, David. "A tale of two missions: Mexican military police patrols versus high-value targeted operations." *Armed Forces & Society* 43, no. 1 (2017): 53-71.

In all of these respects, the Colombian National Police have proven to be a more viable ASF than any of their counterparts in Mexico. They demonstrate this viability in the development their own counter-insurgency doctrines independent of the armed forces, developing specialized subdivisions in response to particular threats, and by carrying out strikes and raids against a variety of Colombia's armed threats. In the 1990s, their already superior intelligence capacities were supercharged by the need to respond to Calí, resulting in the creation of the specialized Directorate of Police Intelligence (DIPOL) which became Colombia's foremost intelligence institution. DIPOL has since been relevant in gathering intelligence on high-profile insurgent and paramilitary leaders who constitute Colombia's remaining armed threats. Though the armed forces do have their own intelligence branches, the National Police have a considerable intelligence lead.[167]

In contrast, both the Mexican Federal Preventative Police (PF) and Mexican Federal Police (PF) struggled to become viable alternatives to the military. To begin with: the Federal Preventative Police were handicapped in their powers, unable to investigate or receive criminal complaints. Consequently, the PFP become wholly irrelevant to the fight against drug cartels, and were of no great use to President Calderón when he chose to intensify this fight. Instead, the armed forces dominated counter-cartel operations from the 1999-2006 period, through their own personnel and through operations commanded by the Attorney General's Office, who at the time was an army general. Unable to provide

[167] The most notable such operation was "Operación Jacque" [Operation Checkmate]. Jacque was a high-profile rescue operations, which freed presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt from six years of FARC captivity and other hostages who had been prisoners for nine years. The operation demonstrates that Colombian Army intelligence is not inept, but is one of the few I have found which took place with no police input. For more, see: https://arsof-history.org/articles/v14n3_op_jaque_page_1.html

adequate military force *or* police sensibilities, the PFP languished until the force was ultimately dissolved in 2008.

The Federal Police, by contrast, proved to be more viable than the PFP but not as viable as the Colombian National Police. Under the direction of Genaro García Luna and President Calderón, the Federal Police could boast new intelligence units, combat units and a more comprehensive policing vision than the PFP before it. However, this intelligence gathering capacity under Genaro García Luna did not translate into operational success. Indeed, according to Guillermo Valdés, much of the initial intelligence provided to the Federal Police was not its own: but instead came from CISEN (interview Valdés).[168] Furthermore, though President Calderón did initiate a competition between the Federal Police and the armed forces to take out drug kingpins (see Lessing 2017), the Federal Police were far less successful than the Mexican Navy, which achieved high profile successes towards the end of the Calderón sexenio in the destruction of the Zetas.[169] When joint operations with the military occurred, the police did not contribute vital intelligence. Instead, they conducted arrests as military personnel served as bodyguards, forming a perimeter around police officers.

[168] Interview with Guillermo Valdés, former head of CISEN, Mexico City

[169] Lessing, Benjamin. Making peace in drug wars: Crackdowns and cartels in Latin America. Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Table 15: Comparative ASF Viability in Colombia and Mexico

Alternative Security Force	Viability	Capacity Indicators	Operational Indicators
Colombian National Police	High	Specialized intelligence, counter-insurgency divisions and doctrines	Ability to prepare and carry out operations independent of the armed forces. Contribution of intelligence to joint operations
Mexican Federal Preventative Police	Low	No ability to receive criminal complaints or conduct investigations	None
Mexican Federal Police	Medium	Specialized intelligence, counter-crime divisions and doctrines	Ability to prepare and carry out operations independent of the armed forces. Minimal contribution to joint operations.

While it is true that the Mexican Federal Police were not as viable as the Colombian National Police, it is possible that the organization could have become so over time. Unquestionably, the CNP benefited from a continuity which Mexican ASFs never enjoyed. Unlike police forces in Mexico, there was no question that the CNP continue to exist after presidential turnover. This allowed the CNP to respond to a diversity of threats by augmenting its own institutional capacities, with an understanding that these development efforts would not be undone by the political whims of a president. In contrast, the development (or lack of development) of Mexico's ASFs a stop-and go, erratic and non-linear process. Though Calderón's efforts meant a major step forward in creating a robust military alternative, Peña's institutional marginalization of the PF meant that many of his own reforms would remain half-realized. Mexican presidents have demonstrated they have the power to radically undo the policies of their predecessors, meaning that each presidency can be a radical departure from what came before.

This comparative analysis shows, however, that civilians are far more likely to be attentive to ASFs if they are viable alternatives to the military. For one: if ASFs are a reliable font of intelligence, and information which their competitor cannot provide, then civilians will have far greater need of them. This includes not only consulting them for briefings, but in including them in sensitive, joint operations when intelligence becomes actionable. Overseeing these operations and the planning of them increases civilian management, and de-incentivizes presidential shirking. For another: if the relationship between an ASF and their competing military is particularly hostile, as it was in Mexico, there are also increased opportunities and incentives for presidents to not shirk. However,

this is only the case if a presidents are invested and paying attention. The second variable, levels of access, is particularly important in constructing a scenario where presidents receive new information and opportunities to increase their management over security. And, when it is absent, presidential shirking becomes far more likely.

As my Mexico chapter has shown, the unequal level of access in the Peña administration meant that the Federal Police struggled to articulate their successes to their commander in chief, even if these successes were reforms that he ordered himself. Even as the police increased their intelligence collection capacities, their forensic laboratories, and created a new division in the Gendarmería division, Peña was less interested in security issues and reforms than his economic agendas. Reaching the president in an attempt to gain their attention proved far more difficult for police leaders than the military. This was because there were two, not one, buffers between the police and the president. The military then had a privileged access to the commander in chief which the Federal Police did not.

Table 16: Comparative Equal Access

Case	Level of Access	Elaboration
Colombia	Equal	Equal access established in 1991, when Colombia's first civilian minister of defense is appointed. Both the military and the Colombian National Police report to the Minister of Defense, a civilian buffer between the president and security agents.
Mexico (2000-2012)	Equal	Equal access established in 2000 and maintained until 2012. During this time, the Secretariat of Public Security oversaw control of alternative security forces. Civilian management increased as ASFs became more viable from 2008-2012.
Mexico (2012-2018)	Unequal	Equal access removed in 2012. As a consequence, the military enjoyed unfiltered access to the president while the Federal Police struggled to lobby them. Civilian management decreased, even as the viability of the Federal Police as an ASF increased

Testing the effect of both variables on civilian management, I find that civilians in Mexico and Colombia alike were far more proactive managers when a viable ASF had equal access to a shared commander in chief. According to Rafael Pardo, Colombia's first

minister of defense, regular presidential meetings with security cabinet members began once he entered office (Pardo 1996).[170] Pardo's testimony indicates that the military itself emphasized the importance of receiving police intelligence (ibid). In Mexico, I find that Vicente Fox had a non-viable ASF in the Federal Preventative Police. In the lack of an effective alternative, Vicente Fox continued to lean on the military, even going so far as allowing the military to veto police reform efforts. When Peña inherited the Federal Police, an increasingly viable ASF, he made the decision to remove the police's leadership away from his cabinet. It is only in the Calderón sexenio, where ASF viability was increasing and where ASF leadership had equal access to the president that civilian management was proactive.

This indicates that civilian management is increased in conditions where ASFs are viable and where access is equal. If either variable is, however, not present, civilian management is unlikely to be affected. These two conditions are jointly sufficient to increase management capacity, but as will be discussed later in this chapter, do not guarantee that civilians will take advantage of the opportunity provided to them. Because presidents have a power to shirk, to walk away and delegate to their agents, there is simply no guaranteeing that any structure will force a president to act. However, it has been repeatedly shown that both conditions provide *incentives* for presidents not to shirk. Disputes between agents forced both presidents Fox and Calderón to act, though Fox decided to shirk and Calderón did not. ASF viability and equal access also incentivized both Presidents Gaviria and Samper to make decisions regarding security policy, but while

[170] Pardo, Rafael, 1996. De Primera Mano. Colombia 1986-1994: Entre conflictos y Esperanzas. Grupo Editorial Norma.

Gaviria responded by paying greater attention to security, Samper kept his security forces at arms' length. The reasons why constitute an important, unexpected research finding.

Rival Hypotheses

Rival Hypothesis 1: Civilian Management Leads to ASF Viability

I argue that the viability of an ASF and its level of access to a commander in chief increases the management capacity of civilian presidents. Reverse causality would posit, however, that a high degree of management capacity could predate and lead to the development of a viable ASF. In this theory, civilian management and control over security would already be strong, and strong civilian leaders would create alternatives to the military.

Reverse causality is easily tested through process tracing, and I find that in Mexico and Colombia it is more common that ASF viability predates civilian management. However, it is worth clarifying that I am not arguing that presidents cannot order the creation new security forces. Indeed, they are often the only civilians who can. Furthermore, it is clear that presidential ability to order the creation of an ASF is not sufficient for increased management capacity. We need look no farther than Enrique Peña Nieto's order to create the gendarmerie division of the Federal Police, an order eventuality delegated to civilian advisors to the president. This delegation ultimately undermined Peña's management, even as the gendarmerie division became a more viable alternative.

All of this is to say that testing the rival hypothesis cannot be reduced to looking to see if presidents order the creation of new security forces. Presidents always have this ability, and indeed are the only civilians in government capable of doing so. Scholars must instead pay attention to the process which unfolds following this order and the baseline of

civilian power once the order was issued. Is it the case, for instance, that presidents are already able to manage the military prior to their order to create an ASF? Is their ability to create an alternative security force contingent on their ability to manage the military? Is it the case viable ASFs are the outcome, and in fact civilian management is a dependent variable, a precondition for the creation of viable ASFs?

Evidence from both Colombia and Mexico suggests no, ASF viability is not dependent on pre-existing civilian management capacities. This is particularly true of the Colombian National Police. For one: while the force was created under a civilian presidency (that of Mario Ospina Perez, 1946-1950), its development was taken over by the armed forces during the brief military dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957). In overseeing the recruitment, education and deployment of the police, the Colombian Army created a police designed specifically envisioned as a military alternative, suggesting a military willingness or even eagerness to return to the barracks and focus on external defense. After the transition back to civilian rule in 1958, political elites were very disinterested in exercising any control or oversight of the police. There were exceptions to civilian indifference, such as periods when presidents attempted to redirect the armed forces towards counter-protest and counter-marijuana operations in the 1970s. But this period ended in a military rejection of both operations, indicating that this presidential management was conditional on the military's acceptance of operations.

And it is from 1965-1989, a period when civilian interest in security was sporadic at best, that the CNP built up its counter-insurgent and intelligence capacities. As early as the 1970s, US state department officials were aware that the police's intelligence capacities

outpaced those of the armed forces (Britto 2018).[171] The military itself recognized this police superiority, and informed Colombia's first civilian defense minister of the need to include police leaders in high-level policy deliberations in 1991 (Pardo 1996). This is an indicator that viability *preceded* both equal access and management.

However, the stories of ASF development in Colombia and Mexico are not congruent. Though the Colombian National Police developed in a linear fashion, in response to a diversity of threats rather than presidential interest, ASFs in Mexico developed unevenly across presidential administrations. In only one administration is there evidence of proactive management of all security forces *including* the armed forces, the administration of Felipe Calderón. But, Calderón did order the creation of the Federal Police, and invested considerable political capital in successful and attempted police reforms. Is it the case that civilian management existed in Mexico prior to the creation of this ASF, and that the ability of Calderón to create this ASF was contingent on this management capacity?

We may disentangle this question by looking to see whether civilian management existed prior to the creation of ASFs in Mexico. Is it the case that the Mexican government already had extensive control of the military and security politics? Was this a critical precondition which led to Calderón's success? The answer is a decisive "no." Mexico is a nation where military autonomy is a historical norm, existing throughout the PRI's long dictatorship and lasting well into democracy (Diez & Nicholls 2006).[172] In the democratic

[171] Britto, Lina. Marijuana Boom: The Rise and Fall of Colombia's First Drug Paradise. Univ of California Press, 2020.
[172] Díez, Jordi, and Ian Nicholls. *The Mexican Armed Forces in Transition*. DIANE Publishing, 2006.

era, presidents have exercised their power to give military duties (see López-Gonzalez 2012).[173] Thus, Calderón had no pre-existing powers over the armed forces which his immediate predecessor, Vicente Fox did not have.

Interested presidents can be proactive in putting their political capital behind development alternatives to the military. Indeed, I argue that they *should* if they are truly invested in facilitating the military's return to the barracks. I cannot then dismiss the role of presidents in creating ASFs, but I prove it was not Calderón's decision to create the Federal Police which increased his management capacity. He could have, after all, ordered the creation of a new force and then turned his attention exclusively to the armed forces. It was ensuring equal access, and creating an environment in which Federal Police and military leadership clashed which provided incentives for the president to manage internal security more aggressively. Being the only one capable of resolving and managing disputes, Calderón attended weekly security meetings and appointed even more civilians to his security council. Calderón created a *structural relationship* between his agents which increased his management capacity, and it was this structure which increased his management capacity. While it is true that Calderón evidently had enough power to create this structure, it was the causal mechanism of this dissertation which *increased* his management capacity by providing new opportunities to intervene.

Though proactive presidents may create ASFs, it is not the case that ASF viability requires civilian management. The Colombian National Police became viable in the

[173] López-González, Jesús A. "Civil-Military Relations and the Militarization of Public Security in Mexico, 1989–2010: Challenges to Democracy." In *Mexico's Struggle for Public Security*, pp. 71-97. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012.

absence of civilian management, disproving that ASF viability is reliant on civilian interest. In Mexico however, it is certainly clear that the interest of a president in developing an alternative to the military would be welcome. Thus, though presidents have a role in ASF creation, it is not the case that civilian management is a precondition for ASF viability.

Rival Hypothesis 2: Violence Leads to Principal Shirking

In conducting my fieldwork, I expected that a rival theory of civil-military relations in cases would be the most challenging to disprove. The hypothesis that internal violence would uniformly erode civilian management capacity originates from the work of Michael Desch, who posited that that nations high levels of external threat would unify the interests of civilian and military elites (Desch 1998, 393). In contrast, nations with high internal threats are posited to have very loose control of their armed forces, due in large part to civilian disinterest in national security (ibid).

Desch's theory speaks to the principal agent framework, the civil-military knowledge gap, and the problem of the moral hazard. Militaries have specialized knowledge which civilians do not, precisely because they are "military" agents subordinate to "civilian" principals. This distinction entails specialized training in combat, a hierarchical culture in which orders are issued and followed, and a presence on the battlefield which civilians do not have. While it may be case that some presidents have previous military experience, it is rare for presidents to attend officer schools. Furthermore, creating a prerequisite for previous military experience or knowledge for commander in chiefs creates an undemocratic check on a population's ability to select its own leadership. Consequently,

in normal democratic civil-military relations it is expected that militaries have specialized knowledge which their presidents do not.

At first glance, there is evidence in both Mexico and Colombia for Desch's theory. Colombia's long period of civilian disinterest (lasting from the 1960s to the mid-1980s) in national security could reasonably be interpreted as evidence for high threats leading to civilian delegation and a loss of control. In Mexico, one might interpret AMLO's recent delegation to the armed forces may also be mistaken for evidence of Desch's theory if observers believed AMLO was delegating out of concerns for rising homicide rates. Certainly, the idea that civilians delegate during crisis is logically sound. A commander in chief facing a domestic crisis could, in theory, delegate to security forces who they expect would be the readiest to solve or end this crisis. They could opt to "get out of the military's way" and deploy the armed forces as "problem solvers" with blank checks.

However, this is not what I found. I instead found that not only is an internal armed threat not a death knell for civilian control, but that internal security crises create incentives for civilians to take *more* control, not less. To return to the case of Colombia, it is true that for much of its democratic history, presidents were largely uninterested in internal security. This disinterest was in fact a point of repeated tension between officers who believed the internal security situation could only be resolved through political reform, and civilians who preferred that the armed forces limit themselves to combat solutions to the conflict (see Dufort 2013).[174] It is not the case that this disinterest was generated as the result of a crisis. Rather, my Colombia chapter has gone at length to show that this disinterest was the result

[174] Dufort, Philippe. "Las políticas desarrollistas de Alberto Ruiz Novoa a principios de 1960:¿ Se podría haber evitado medio siglo de guerra." *Estudios en Seguridad y Defensa* 8, no. 16 (2013): 31-46.

of a civilian view that the FARC, ELN and other insurgents were a distant problem, far removed from Bogotá and hardly interpreted national security crisis by civilian political elites. It was in fact in the 1980s, when the Cartel of Medellín and M-19 both became urban threats to the political class, that civilian interest in security rose. And in 1991, amid *rising* homicide rates, civilian management capacities were permanently increased in the form of a civilian defense minister.

In Mexico, a similar, though not identical story takes place. Consider the following chart of homicide rates per 100,000 people, from World Bank. I have edited the chart to demarcate between presidential administrations, noting which presidents shirked and which presidents asserted their management capacities.

Figure 8: Homicide Rates and Shirking in Mexico



Source: "Intentional Homicides per 100,000 citizens, Mexico"- World Bank

Vicente Fox (2000-2006), ascended into the presidency in a context where homicide rates were declining. So too did Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018). It is only

Calderón who entered office in a context where homicides were increasing. And it is only Calderón who regularly attended security cabinet meetings, who oversaw contentious disputes between the Federal Police and the armed forces, and who increased the number of civilian security advisors. Colombian presidents follow a similar trend. President Ernesto Samper (1994-1998), a notorious shirker who granted extensive autonomy to the police and avoided meetings with his military, entered into office as homicides were decreasing. President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010), notorious for inserting himself into military operations, entered into a context where homicides were rising along with the size of the FARC. Levels of internal armed threat then appear, at least in democracies, to create more incentives for civilians to manage their security policy than not. Why?

The answer lies in Desch's theory of why *external* armed threats are conducive to civilian control. Desch writes that external threats create a "harmony" between civilian and military ideas, in essence a shared understanding about the nature and the degree of a threat (Desch 1998, 393). Likewise, when an internal armed threat is able to challenge the sovereignty of the state, civilians and military personnel alike will agree that there is an immediacy of the threat. In Colombia, it took instances such as M-19 seizing the supreme court, and the Cartel of Medellín assassinating government figures, to convince civilian policymakers that there was indeed a crisis worth addressing.

But beyond Desch, crises create moments for civilians to "rise to the occasion." There are political incentives to attempt to reduce insecurity if it is in fact the most pressing issue in a democracy. There are electoral incentives to manage security, as well as political and partisan considerations, which can persuade presidents to assert greater control over

security policymaking. When there is, however, no crisis, there are fewer incentives for civilians to take the initiative. This finding is in line with other research of mine, in which it was found that even in externally threatened democracies civilians still delegated considerable power and authority to the military (Pion-Berlin et al 2019).[175]

Across Colombia and Mexico, there is only one exception to this trend: AMLO. Homicides have continued to rise under AMLO's presidency, and yet the president moved to eliminate the Federal Police, increase the powers of the military, and treat the military as a tool for enacting populist policy rather than a security agent. Why this might be will discussed in the subsequent section on research questions, when the phenomena of presidential shirking will be discussed and analyzed at length.

Addressing Lingering Puzzles

Can Rivalries Cause Harm?

The central causal mechanism of this dissertation has been conceptualized and analyzed through a multi-agent model of the principal agent framework. In my theory chapter, I describe this relationship as a "structural" competition, a consequence of institutional arrangements more than cultural hostilities. Just as any two employees sharing the same supervisor are in competition for bonuses, assignments, and recognition, so are militaries and ASFs. But a clarification which I make early is that while this rivalry may increase civilian management capacity, this will not necessarily translate into desirable

[175] Pion-Berlin, David, Igor Acácio, and Andrew Ivey. "Democratically consolidated, externally threatened, and NATO aligned: finding unexpected deficiencies in civilian control." *Democratization* 26, no. 6 (2019): 1070-1087.

security outcomes on the ground. In fact, the "tone and tenor" of the structural rivalry between militaries and ASF matters significantly.

In this section, I offer two ideal types of rivalries: an inter-service rivalry and a zero-sum rivalry? An inter-service rivalry is akin to that which exists between the branches of a functioning and effective military. Take for instance, the United States, where the army and navy have a long-standing rivalry which has manifested in debates regarding which branch should receive what resources and in more playful ways such as the "army navy football game." This rivalry has been exploited by civilians, namely in congress (Huntington 1961) to establish oversight mechanisms over the armed forces.[176] And while this rivalry continues to this day, the army and the navy are able to share intelligence with each other and carry out joint operations.

A zero-sum rivalry is far more dangerous. It is dangerous for civilian political elites, who have to carefully navigate a rivalry between two armed bureaucracies with deep animosities towards each other, and it is dangerous for citizens, who cannot rely on robust coordination between the security forces supposedly deployed to protect them. Where coordination is impossible, gaps in intelligence could prove fatal. A classic example of this is the "ultimate sibling rivalry" between the FBI and CIA, whose refusal to cooperate resulted in the critical intelligence failures which preceded 9/11 in the United States. A zero-sum rivalry does not challenge the core theory of this dissertation, as tensions between security forces will give civilians new opportunities to exert their management regardless. But will these opportunities, which expand civilian power, always make a country more

[176] Huntington, Samuel P. "Interservice competition and the political roles of the armed services." *American Political Science Review 55*, no. 1 (1961): 40-52.

secure? Will increased civilian management capacity also make a country more secure? The answer is a decisive "no."

Table 17: Rivalry Ideal Types

Rivalry Type	Agent goals	Agent priorities	Coordination possible?	Outcomes
Inter-service	Outperforming the rival agent by providing operational successes, critical intelligence, and arguments to a shared principal.	National security, followed by securing institutional interests.	Yes. Intelligence sharing and joint operations are possible.	Strengthened civilian management, operational successes.
Zero-sum	Undermining the rival agent by providing operational successes, critical intelligence, and arguments to a shared principal.	Securing institutional interests, no evidence of a shared concern for national security.	No. Intelligence is coveted, and any joint operations are superficial in nature.	Strengthened civilian management, few operational successes.

The above table shows the critical differences in rivalry types. Beginning with goals, agents in an inter-service rivalry seek to outperform each other, not undermine each other. This is because the agents share not only a principal, but share a priority of national security which trumps institutional tensions. Because of this, coordination is possible, facilitating greater civilian management and leading to critical operational successes. However, in a zero-sum rivalry the goal of agents is to undermine their rival. Agents prioritize their own institutional interests over national security, and because of this coordination is incredibly difficult. If joint operations occur, they are superficial in nature. Substantive joint operations will entail shared planning and implementation, while superficial operations will merely be the presence of both forces during an operation. While this rivalry may strengthen civilian management, operational successes will be low.

This conclusion, as well as this theoretical typology of rivalries, was not the purpose of this dissertation. However, in examining data gathered from Colombia and Mexico it is clear that there is a marked difference between the cases. Colombia most resembles a case of inter-service rivalry, while Mexico resembles a zero-sum rivalry. Why was this the case and what were the consequences? Why did institutional rivalries between the police and military in Colombia not hinder joint operations? Why did they in Mexico? Who has the most agency in shaping and changing these rivalries, and what lessons may be drawn for civilian policymakers looking to manage a potentially contentious and dangerous relationship?

To begin with Colombia: it is worth noting that the National Police began life as an institution with close proximity to the military. During "La Violencia" the military recruited,

trained, and oversaw the national police. After 1965, when control of the police translated to a graduate of the General Santander Police Academy, the police enjoyed what I called a relationship of "subordinate autonomy" relative to the army. I use this description because though the police were left largely to their own devices, the minister of defense remained an army general, who prioritized the funding and resources of the army over the police. In all of this, however, the military did not perceive the police to be a threat. This is not the case in Mexico, where the military did in fact perceive police forces to be a threat to their continued existence and funding. Why?

Mexican presidents, in creating ASFs, made a mistake which their counterparts in Colombia did not. The first Mexican ASF, the Federal Preventative Police, was made by transferring recruits from the army and navy into a nominally civilian occupation. Even the Federal Police had an unknown number of military transfers.[177] And when again the prospect of transferring military recruits to a potential gendarmerie was floated during the Peña administration, the military made clear it would only agree to do so if civilians could match military benefits and pensions (interview gendarmerie expert 1). In contrast, the Colombian National Police were recruited with all new recruits, who had no previous employment with the armed forces.

The Mexican armed forces perceived ASFs to be a threat because, in fact, they were. ASFs were a threat because they represented a removal of one of the military's most important resources and coveted features, its personnel, and its chain of command. Civilian policymakers would then do well to create new security forces from new personnel

[177] Data on how many soldiers and marines joined the Federal Police has become more difficult to obtain during the AMLO presidency, as the president has handicapped the nation's freedom of information act.

unhindered by the baggage which comes with ties to a pre-existing chain of command. While the transfer of commanders in permissible, and perhaps the only option some nations have, these transferred commanders should be required to leave their post in their previous security force and be rewarded handsomely for accepting their new commissions. Taking resources away from one agent, however, is a certain way to create an environment where agents attempt to undermine or even destroy each other.

Why Do Presidents Shirk?

Having established that presidential shirking occurs, the most challenging task of this dissertation is to establish and test a generalizable theory of why. Testing of rival hypothesis shows that rising levels of violence do not induce presidential shirking, and that in fact civilians become more assertive managers when they have incentives to respond to national security crises. In fact, declining levels of violence may provide more incentives to delegate to the armed forces and ASFs, as national security will not be as high a priority for peacetime presidents.

But presidential shirking is puzzling in cases where there are incentives and opportunities to manage security politics. Facing internal armed threats, presidents will need to establish their sovereignty and their legitimacy, and there are few more potent tools ways to do this than by exerting control over the military. Is there a generalizable reason why presidents shirk, and is there anything resembling a one-size-fits all solution to de-incentivizing shirking?

I provide an answer to this question through the use of data presented in my Colombia and Mexico chapters. I'm limiting this analysis to Colombia after 1991, when a

civilian minister of defense entered office, and Mexico after 2000 when Vicente Fox broke the 71-year hold of the PRI on the presidency. In the following table, I list presidents who shirked during this time period, and describe their shirking behavior.

Table 18: Presidential Shirking Across Cases

President	Case	Term in Office	Description of shirking behavior
Ernesto Samper	Colombia	1994-1998	Samper granted wide autonomy to both the Colombian National Police and the military, even going so far as to avoid security briefings from the leaders of either force.
Vicente Fox	Mexico	2000-2006	Vicente Fox forced the Federal Preventative Police to abandon its reform efforts, and granted the military defacto control over federalized security forces.
Enrique Pena Nieto	Mexico	2012-2018	Pena moved the Federal Police out of his cabinet and delegated security cabinet briefings to his Secretary of Government.
AMLO	Mexico	2018-now	AMLO has eliminated the Federal Police and granted the military enormous power over internal security, and infrastructure projects.

These cases entail a diverse set of shirking behaviors. At its most basic, shirking refers to principals not exercising their responsibilities (Gupta & Romano 1995).[178] But, just as there are a variety of ways in which militaries can shirk (presenting misleading information, slow-rolling orders, etc.) There are several ways which presidents can shirk as well. They may shirk through *abdication,* refusing to exercise their oversight and management powers and through *delegation* by giving powers away. Presidents who abdicate avoid meetings, ignore intelligence briefings, and essentially run away from their responsibilities. Presidents who delegate grant powers to their agents, giving away their own decision-making abilities in the process.

Samper is the clearest example of an executive abdicating their responsibility. By avoiding meetings entirely, Samper gave the Colombian military and national police considerable autonomy. Fox and Peña however both delegated, granting powers to members of their cabinets which should have belonged to the president themselves. AMLO represents the most problematic and puzzling example of delegation, granting the military control of his major construction projects as well as law enforcement.

Examining the context in which these presidents shirked, I find not that trends in violence were not a sufficient condition for principal shirking. In the cases of Samper, Fox, and EPN violence was declining as the entered office. However, this was not the case for AMLO, who entered office as violence was increasing. While a declining level of violence seems to increase incentives to shirk, as presidents may feel allowed to turn their attention

[178] Gupta, Srabana, and Richard E. Romano. "Monitoring the principal with multiple agents." *The Rand Journal of Economics* (1998): 427-442.

away from internal conflict and towards other agendas, presidents may prioritize these agendas even as insecurity is rising.

It is the explanation of competing priorities which offers the only common answer for shirking across cases, and these priorities may be personal, political, and partisan. Take for instance, Ernesto Samper, whose campaign was revealed to have taken large donations from the Cartel Calí shortly after his election into office. The "Processo 8000" scandal implicated Samper's minister of defense, Fernando Botero, as the one who coordinated these bribes, as well as leadership in the National Police who cooperated with the Cartel of Calí to gather intelligence on Pablo Escobar. Samper was personally uncomfortable meeting with either military or police leaders, and as such kept his distance from deliberations.

For his part, Vicente Fox prioritized harmony within his own government more than police reform. Craig Deare quotes Fox as saying: "My philosophy, my style of management and governing is always on the style of peace, harmony, democracy, dialogue, negotiating and not using the stick," (Deare 2017, 1999).[179] Fox also detailed to Deare an earlier reform effort to create a security sub-minister in the presidential cabinet, creating a unified office which would have overseen all security forces on behalf of the president. Fox abandoned the reform once security agents began clashing (Deare 2017, 223). As discussed at length in the Mexico Chapter, Peña delegated in order to mark himself as different from Calderón, and to please the military.

[179] Deare, Craig A. A Tale of Two Eagles: The US-Mexico Bilateral Defense Relationship Post Cold War. Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.

And AMLO, despite rising levels of violence, has subordinated national security to his own populists agendas. AMLO is not alone among populists who use the military to delivery on campaign promises. In this case, Mexico's current president is using the armed forces to create airports and train systems which the military will profit from. He has openly declared that his reason for doing so lies in the military's unique, enduring power across presidential administrations, noting that his projects will be more difficult for a future president to undo if the military is making a profit off of it.

The explanation for presidential shirking then is quite banal: presidents will shirk in overseeing security politics when they have competing priorities. That priority can be their personal comfort, as in the case of Samper, or political in the cases of Fox and Peña. While not a death knell to civilian control of the armed forces, shirking results in increased autonomy for security agents or, in extreme conditions such as AMLO's, the delegations of new powers to the armed forces.

Regrettably, I find that there are limits on what can be done to curb presidential shirking. Though the responsibilities of a presidency warrant attention to security regardless of levels of violence, there is no guaranteeing that presidents will act responsibly. This is true even in consolidated, peace-time democracies (Pion-Berlin et al 2019) and in the United States (Pion-Berlin & Ivey, 2020).[180] Indeed, the presidency of Donald Trump is rife with examples of presidential shirking in a democracy which has some of the most comprehensive and consolidated civilian oversight mechanisms over the armed forces (ibid).

[180] Pion Berlin, David, and Andrew Ivey. "Military dissent in the United States: are there lessons from Latin America?." *Defense & Security Analysis* 37, no. 2 (2021): 193-211.

One theoretical solution is to add another principal which may exercise power over the commander in chief. In a robust democracy, congressional committees may offer a solution to hold a commander in chief accountable for mismanagement of the armed forces. However, congressional oversight likewise is dependent on the willingness of the legislature to hold the executive accountable (Pion-Berlin & Ivey 2020). An unwilling congress is as useful as a disempowered congress, and there is very little which can be done once multiple principals shirk.

I propose that the best way to curb presidential shirking is to create a structure which induces presidential intervention into security politics. Though presidents will always have the authority to delegate, creating more opportunities to intervene can induce presidents to manage aggressively. This is why elevating agencies overseeing ASFs to cabinet-level appointees is so important, as doing so will create more opportunities for ASF leadership to dispute with the military at the highest level, in a context where only the president can intervene.

Revisiting the Benefits of Alternative Security Forces

If Not Soldiers, Then Who?

Having demonstrated that ASFs can strengthen civilian power and the ability to oversee and change security policies according to their preferences, lingering questions remain. What does stronger civilian management mean beyond the expansion of government power of security agents? Does an increase in civilian oversight translate into greater adherence to human rights standards? A greater consolidation of the rule of law? Are ASFs more likely to follow human rights standards than the armed forces?

Responsible scholars must be aware of how their research may be read and interpreted not only by their fellows, but policymakers as well. This is particularly true of a dissertation such as mine, as the actors involved are armed and deployed internally to fight threats which camouflage themselves among a civilian population. While human rights were not the focus of this dissertation, it would be irresponsible to not discuss the performance of ASFs such as the Colombian National Police and Mexican Federal Police in protecting the rights of the citizens they are deployed to protect. Human rights abuses are, after all, among the foremost motivators in calls to remove the military from the streets and to return them to the barracks. It is reasonable then for any reader, or any critic, to ask if alternatives to the military are indeed more conscientious in their use of force.

Regrettably, I cannot make the claim that there will be zero human rights abuses committed by ASFs. Nor did I set out to make this claim. Alternative security forces may substitute for soldiers, but like the military they are armed, coercive state bureaucracies. Their training and socialization biases them towards "the rule of law," and often towards preserving a status quo. This admission should not come as a surprise, however, to scholars of Latin America or residents of United States. The death of George Floyd in the summer of 2020, after all, kicked off a wave of protests in response to police brutality. Over the course of two months of protests, 19 United States citizens died (Forbes).[181] Police brutality is not unique to Colombia or Mexico. It is certainly not unique to "developing" democracies or those facing internal armed conflict. It is worthwhile however, to understand the contexts in some of the most egregious and high-profile abuses occur, and

[181] McEvoy, Jemima. "14 Days of Protests, 19 Dead." Forbes. Forbes Magazine, April 14, 2022. https://www.forbes.com/sites/jemimamcevoy/2020/06/08/14-days-of-protests-19-dead/?sh=59b4aa764de4.

question how these abuses might be prevented. ASFs, after all *should* be able to exercise force with more discretion than the armed forces. It is worthwhile then, to examine the conditions in which they don't.

But discretionary force is not only useful for the cause of human rights. My response to the question of "If not human rights, then what," is that more subtle uses of force have proven integral in successful security operations. The state will struggle against armed threats if its only option is to deploy tanks and missiles, indiscriminately bombing the countryside and moving slowly between narrow and hard to reach places. And while states may equip their armies and navies with lighter arms, and more mobile vehicles, they will find it difficult and ill-advised to train their soldiers to be police. As ASFs are "hybrid forces," straddling the police-military sphere, they will be able to provide a repertoire of services which the military cannot. And, as I will argue in this final section, the provision of these services will translate into operational successes which the military cannot reach alone. Though viable ASFs may abuse human rights, they can also make their respective nations safer. The imperative then, is on civilian governments, who must exercise their own power to oversee operations and punish human rights offenders when necessary. If principals lack the political will to punish their agents for rights abuses, then they are complicit in aiding and abetting lethal impunity for their armed actors.

ASF Human Rights Abuses in Colombia and Mexico

The Colombian National Police and the Mexican Federal Police have both committed gross human rights abuses. Both ASFs were deployed simultaneously to combat internal armed threats and to conduct more routine policing, acting as a cross between

soldiers and police officers in the process. In previous chapters, I have made the case that the Colombian National Police was a more effective ASF than its counterparts in its ability to provide intelligence to civilian principals. Here, I will focus analysis on two cases to demonstrate the extent of human rights shortcomings of ASFs both in Colombia and Mexico, as well as suggest avenues by which human rights excesses could be curbed.

The early deployment (2008-2011) of the Federal Police in Mexico to northern border states was rife with problems stemming from both the newness of the force and the fact that they were far more vulnerable to corruption than the army. While soldiers along the border were housed in barracks, deployed Federal Police officers were forced to stay in hotels, where they were exposed to blackmailing by cartels. A shortsighted decision by President Calderón, these episodes would come to color the reputation of the PF early.

However, even during the Peña sexenio, when reformers within the PF were working to create the Gendarmerie, the force was implicated in episodes of excessive violence. The most prominent example is the Tanhuato massacre, carried out on May 22, 2015. The exact events of the day are still contested. Witnesses from the PF maintain that the force acted appropriately, in response to a shootout with an estimated 70 armed gunmen from the New Jalisco Cartel (HRW).[182] The firefight, according to police, became so intense that backup from Blackhawk helicopters was requested. Witnesses, however, maintain that the majority of the "gunmen" threw down their weapons early into the fighting and attempted to flee the scene. They were, according to this testimony, shot in the

[182] Castellanos, Laura. "'It Was the Feds': How Mexico's Federal Police Slaughtered at Least 16 Civilians in Michoacan." VICE, March 26, 2015. https://www.vice.com/en/article/gy9xw3/it-was-the-feds-how-mexicos-federal-police-slaughtered-at-least-16-civilians-in-michoacan.

back (HRW). Even if the executed were in fact members of a violent criminal cartel, their execution does not speak well to an adherence to international human rights standards.

As grotesque as the behavior of the Federal Police at Tanhuato was, the excesses of the Colombian National Police captured global attention in the summer of 2021. In nation-wide protests against a proposed tax raise by President Ivan Duque, Colombian citizens mobilized in every major city, with major foci in Bogotá and Calí. The Colombian Police previously had proven themselves proficient at war, but their performance as a riot and crowd control force proved was far from satisfactory. At least 68 Colombian citizens were killed, a consequence of police excesses and the inherent chaos of a riot (HRW). But the conduct of the police during the protests cannot be written off merely as the product of instability and uncertainty. Police officers engaged in at least two cases of rape, and 71 other incidents of gendered violence were reported by international observers (HRW). Testimony from participants in the protests seemed to indicate that the police thought themselves at war with internal armed groups, rather than conducting riot control. One human rights activists recalls an officer screaming, "You're not a human rights defender...You're a [expletive] guerrilla fighter, and I'm going to show you how to faint for real."[183]

The behavior of the national police led to widespread international condemnation and reassessment of the relationship between the police and the armed forces. Human

[183] Turkewitz, Julie, and Sofía Villamil. "Colombia's Police Force, Built for War, Finds a New One." The New York Times. The New York Times, May 12, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/12/world/americas/colombia-protests-police-brutality.html.

Rights Watch likewise noticed that the police had proven very effective at war, but made clear a sentiment widely held amongst activists and the victims of police abuses:

> "Colombia needs a civilian force that is trained to respond to protests in a manner respectful of human rights, and whose members are held accountable for abuses, Human Rights Watch said. Establishing a clear separation between the police and the military is a key first step."

Both Tanhuato and the Colombian protests of 2021 represent moments where ASF personnel were confronted with uncertainty. The Mexican Federal Police, if the testimony of officers is to be believed, thought they were facing cartel hitmen and that lethal self-defense was necessary. The Colombian National Police, however, cannot credibly claim that they were facing armed personnel. This is, however, exactly what officers told protestors as they beat them: that they were lying about being unarmed and that they were guerrillas. Colombia's Defense Minister, Diego Molano, defended the National Police by tying protestors to insurgents, saying that ""Colombia faces particular threats from criminal organizations that are behind these violent acts" (Reuters 2021).[184] At the time of writing, Minister Molano has continued to insist that the ELN and FARC dissidents are behind protest violence.

While the contexts of these abuses are different, their aftermaths are quite similar. In Mexico, the Attorney General's Office investigated and found that Tanhuato officers were innocent (HRW). In Colombia, Minister Molano has largely continued the line that police did their duty, that they had respected peaceful protests and had only targeted

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[184] Acosta, Luis Jaime. "Colombia Blames Armed Groups for Protest Violence, Death Toll Still Unclear." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, May 3, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-protests-idAFKBN2CK1MZ.

violent, guerrilla-affiliated actors (Reuters). In neither case did either government, let alone president, issue a forceful statement condemning abuses. In neither case did the legal apparatus of the state work to prosecute offending officers.

There is a clear problem, or at least a risk, of ASFs committing human rights abuses. There is a risk inherent in giving *any* state agent a gun and asking them to turn that gun inward towards civilian population centers. There are preventative measures, such as human rights and legal training, which can be implemented to socialize ASFs to use violence with more discretion. These measures are important, but I would point out that human rights doctrine and training already existed in both cases. Federal Police officers were given far more extensive human rights training than their counterparts in the military, as were the Colombian National Police. Police forces in Ecuador and Chile likewise receive human rights training, but when faced with a similar scale of protests such as those of Colombia in 2021 defaulted to the instrumental use of violence to terrorize protestors (Pion-Berlin & Acácio 2020).[185]

As I conclude this section, I offer an observation, a recommendation, and a warning. In the wake of Colombia's protests, commentators and reformers have called for the Colombian National Police to be moved out of the Ministry of Defense and the Military Justice system (New York Times). The proximity to the military has been blamed for many of the abuses carried out by the police, and commentators have mistakenly taken the presence of the police in the Ministry of Defense to military control of the police. But Colombia is not alone in Latin America as a nation whose police responded brutally to

[185] Pion-Berlin, D., & Acácio, I. (2020). The Return of the Latin American Military?. *Journal of Democracy*, *31*(4), 151-165.

largely peaceful protests. And unlike Colombia, Chile's Carabineros, who carried out their own repression of mass protests in 2019, are not part of the Ministry of Defense. Nor were the Federal Police in Mexico. While moving Colombia's ASF to a Ministry of the Interior would place it in line with a regional norm, it would not curb another, more troubling norm: principal shirking.

Preventative measures, additional training, and oversight mechanisms will only go so far as civilian governments are willing to enforce the standards they themselves regrettably. And, regrettably, it is unclear if governments have an interest in doing so. This dissertation has shown that civilian management is not synonymous with a greater adherence to human rights. Principals, presidents, and other democratically elected officials may very well have a vested interest in ignoring human rights abuses, and are often unwilling to prosecute state agents who violate them. This is a norm not unique to Latin America. Prosecuting police officers in the United States has proven difficult, contentious, and politically divisive. US soldiers likewise are rarely tried outside of the military system, and "mistakes" such as bombing family SUVs often go unpunished.[186] But if standards are to mean anything, then they must be enforced. This means rewarding agents for adhering to human rights abuses and, when necessary, punishing them. Any eagerness for preventative measures must come with a willingness to use punitive measures. Otherwise they will continue with an implicit sanction from civilian authorities.

[186] Schmitt, Eric. "No U.S. Troops Will Be Punished for Deadly Kabul Strike, Pentagon Chief Decides." The New York Times. The New York Times, December 13, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/13/us/politics/afghanistan-drone-strike.html.

Chapter 5: Conclusions: Future Avenues of Research

Introduction

My dissertation has proposed a multi-agent model to analyze the relationships between civilian governments, militaries, and alternative security forces (ASFs) such as centrally controlled police and paramilitary forces. My theoretical framework was designed for nations facing internal armed conflict, as it in these contexts that the missions of police and soldiers will overlap the most. When armed threats are capable of challenging the sovereignty of the state and threatening the lives of citizens, every armed agent available to the central government will become relevant. I have shown that when ASFs are viable alternatives to the military, and when they have the same level of access to their commanders in chief, the ability of civilians to aggressively manage internal security politics increases.

Disputes will occur, and it will become the responsibility of civilians, particularly presidents, to resolve and control these disputes. These disputes create junctures for president, as the commanders in chief of both militaries and ASFs, to assert their own preferences over security policy, or to shirk. Presidents may delegate their responsibilities away, granting all security agents autonomy, or they may use the disputes between their agents to narrow the information gap which would otherwise exist if one agent were to have a security monopoly. The presence of a viable ASF provides a channel for civilian power to be exercised, reducing security force autonomy in the process.

I use the conclusion section of this study to propose new cases for a multi-agent analysis of the relationship between civilian governments and their security forces. I

propose new research agendas, ranging from further use of the multi-agent model, incorporating new cases, and expanding on rival hypotheses. Use of the multi-agent model can now, due to recent decisions in Latin America, go beyond high-threat to low-threat environments. This is the case in Argentina and Chile, where decisions by Presidents Macri (Argentina) and Piñera (Chile) to involve the military in counter-narcotics operations have created new spaces of mission overlap in relatively low threat democracies. A new set of puzzles is generated by mission overlap in each of these cases. While Chile has a two-force security structure, similar to Colombia's, where the Carabineros are a nationalized paramilitary police, Argentina is a "three force model." Argentina then presents cases of potential mission overlap between the military and the gendarmerie, but also the gendarmerie and Argentina's Federal Police, which has paramilitary divisions which should preclude the need to deploy any other force to urban centers. Chile presents an additional puzzle, as unlike Colombia, the Carabineros are under the jurisdiction of the ministry of the interior rather than defense. This provides an opportunity for a cross-case comparison to answer how relationships between security forces change when they no longer share a sub-principal, a question which is relevant to Colombia should the police be moved to the ministry of the interior.

Beyond South America, a general expansion of a multi-agent model across Latin America is the next logical step for this research. The majority of Latin American countries are centralized states with centralized police forces, who could in theory provide an alternative to military deployment. The multi-agent model could be used to analyze a particularly volatile subregion in Latin America: the Northern Triangle. The threat

environments in these countries are more difficult to compare to that of Colombia and Mexico, being that "mid-level" threats such as MS-13 (henceforth referred to as "maras") and the 18th street gang mostly carry out violence against citizens rather than the state.[187] While the grand cartels of Mexico and Colombia both had a capacity for military-style violence, it is less clear that threats such as the maras have these capacities.[188] Instead, the maras routinely threaten the lives of citizens through extortion and kidnapping, creating a security crisis to be sure but not one characterized by high-profile military conflicts. Further research would also focus on the institutionalized cooperation between the military and police, as Guatemala and Honduras alike have more joint police-military task forces than El Salvador, perhaps a contributor to heightened levels of continued violence (Isaacson & Kinosian 2016).[189]

Another possible avenue of future research concerns further comparisons between Colombia and Mexico, born out of previously conducted fieldwork. This section also proposes an expansion of the rival hypothesis regarding the influence of the United States, and contributing to a growing literature on the differences between Plan Colombia and the

[187] For the purposes of this conclusion, I borrow the descriptor "mid-level threats" coined by Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, referring to groups with international connections and the ability to threaten both national and individual security (Pion-Berlin & Trinkunas 2011).
Pion-Berlin, David, and Harold Trinkunas. "Latin America's growing security gap." *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 1 (2011): 39-53.

[188] However: there are credible reports that 'mid-level threats' have been recruiting military personnel, and that these personnel are increasingly involved in the training and education of gang recruits. For more see: Ellis, R. Evan. "The Gang Challenge in El Salvador: Worse than You Can Imagine." War on the Rocks. War on the Rocks, December 18, 2015. https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/the-gang-challenge-in-el-salvador-worse-than-you-can-imagine/.

[189] Isaacson, Adam, and Sarah Kinosian. "Which Central American Military and Police Units Get the Most U.S. Aid?" WOLA. Washington Office on Latin America, September 16, 2019. https://www.wola.org/analysis/which-central-american-military-and-police-units-get-the-most-u-s-aid/#eliteunit.

Merida Initiative. Though general comparisons have been undertaken, a more in-depth look at relationships between the CNP and United States agencies, compared to that between the Federal Police and the United States, could shed light on how foreign aid and support can contribute to better security forces. Lastly, this study proposes moving beyond Latin America, looking in particular to India and the Philippines as fruitful cases. While the Philippines shares much in common with Colombia, India offers a much more difficult puzzle: a preponderance of ASFs (with seven total police forces active in various internal conflicts), a long-standing democracy with *no* period of military rule, and yet a long continuation of uniform autonomy for all security forces. Future research into these cases, particularly India, would look to build off of existing civil-military relations in the country and examine what appears to be a problem of chronic principal shirking.

Interactions Beyond Combat: ASFs in the Southern Cone

As a Latin America centered study, employing a multi-agent analysis is a natural progression from this study. My selected cases, Colombia, and Mexico are certainly unique regional outliers. The two are among the top-three largest economies in the region and are of strategic importance to the United States as a cause of the narcotics trade. Neither country has seen military intervention into politics for over half a century, withstanding a wave of coups which began in the 1960s and continued throughout Latin America during the cold war. Both are contemporary democracies, but face significant armed threats as of the time of writing. The presence high-level threats have necessitated the involvement of the armed forces in internal security affairs, but this deployment has not been fatal for either democracy.

The logic of my comparison rested on a theory of "mission overlap," a supposition that times of conflict muddied the separations between soldiers and centrally controlled police forces. When there are more incentives for national governments to deploy militaries and ASFs alongside each other, there should likewise be more incentives for these two agents to compete. However, there is an opportunity to extend the research of this dissertation from high threat environments to low threat environments. The Southern cone countries of Chile and Argentina provide interesting cases where ASFs are present, viable, and have distinct missions from the armed forces. Argentina's Gendarmerie and Carabineros both share similar mission and capabilities, and both appear to be capable alternatives to the military. Both ASFs began life as frontier forces, deployed to rural and periphery areas of the state. All police divisions in Chile were fused in 1927, created an unusual situation in which the entirety of Chile's police came to be militarized in nature (Esparza 2015). In contrast, the Argentine Gendarmerie was founded in 1938 with the express purpose of replacing army regiments which had previously carried out border patrol and rural policing missions on behalf of the central government in Buenos Aires.[190] Unlike the Carabineros, the Gendarmerie remained outside of police hierarchy and military hierarchy, and maintains a separate hierarchy.

[190] "Argentinian National Gendarmerie: FIEP: International Association of Gendarmeries and Police Forces with Military Statues." FIEP. FIEP, February 12, 2022. http://www.fiep.org/member-forces/argentinian-national-gendarmerie/

Figure 9: Comparative Security Structures in Chile and Argentina



The above figure shows the security structures of both Chile and Argentina. Chile's structure is the most similar to those of Colombia and Mexico, wherein there are two agents: a military and a single ASF, who have equal access to the commander in chief. In Chile's case, the Carabineros report to the Minister of the Interior, and the military reports to the Ministry of defense. An important historical note, however, is that until 2011 the Carabineros were under the control of the Minister of Defense.[191] Argentina's Gendarmerie shares a sub-principal with its nations Federal Police, Argentina's centrally controlled police force. This security structure has less in common with Latin American nations, and more with continental Europe (see Vizcaíno 2018).

[191] "Ministro Hinzpeter Encabezó Ceremonia De Traspaso De Fuerzas De Orden y Seguridad Al Ministerio Del Interior y Seguridad Pública - Ministerio Del Interior y Seguridad Pública - Gobierno De Chile." Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Publica, July 19, 2011. https://www.interior.gob.cl/sitio-2010-2014/n5965_19-07-2011.html.

Table 19: ASFs and Their Origins in Chile and Argentina

Country	ASF	Origins
Argentina	Gendarmerie	Created in 1938 to replace certain army regiments conducting policing and border patrol operations.
Chile	Carabineros	Created in 1927 when all police forces in Chile were centralized.

Unlike Mexico and Colombia, Argentina and Chile face no high-level internal armed threats. There are no nation-wide insurgencies capable of pushing the state out of its own territory, nor are there grand cartels with histories of assassinating political candidates. Though the Mapuche Conflict, a conflict between the Chilean government and the indigenous Mapuche peoples, has at times taken on certain characteristics of an insurgency, the conflict has been isolated to the Aruacanía region. The conflict has likewise not been the purview of Chile's military, both of the Carabineros. In the absence of nationwide conflicts and highly capable armed threats, it is reasonable to classify both Chile and Argentina as relatively low threat environments when compared to Mexico and Colombia. In these cases then, one would expect no mission overlap. Militaries would be externally oriented, focused on national defense, while ASFs would be focused inward on internal security.

Despite a long history of mission separation, recent developments in both countries have seen presidents orient their armed forces inward. In Argentina, though 2006 decree restricted military missions to exclusively external security, military involvement in narco-

trafficking operations began as early as 2011, when President Christina Kirchner authorized Operación Escundo Norte.[192] In 2018 the role of the armed forces seemingly expanded even more, when President Macri passed decrees 683 and 203, which cited the need to use the armed forces to "protect national interests."[193] Though neither decree expressly names narco-trafficking as a national security threat, the implied language allowed for a more aggressive and expansive role for the armed forces in fighting drug threats along the northern borders. The decrees prompted immediate backlash, with critics saying that the law directly violated a 2006 defense law which restricted the mission of the armed forces to fighting other nation's armed forces.[194]

In Chile, President Piñera deployed of troops to the nation's north east borders in 2019, supposedly to fight drug traffickers.[195] This deployment is more curious than Argentina's in that it was met with open hostility by Piñera's own Ministry of Interior, who said that "The police have the know-how, the preparation and the professional work

[192] "Argentine Armed Forces and National Gendarmerie Fight Drug Trafficking." Diálogo Américas, November 6, 2013. https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/argentine-armed-forces-and-national-gendarmerie-fight-drug-trafficking/.

[193] For the text of these decrees, consult the following links:
Boletin oficial republica Argentina - Defensa Nacional - Decreto 683/2018. Boletin oficial republica Argentina , July 23, 2018. https://www.boletinoficial.gob.ar/detalleAviso/primera/188532/20180724.
Boletin oficial republica Argentina - ministerio de defensa - decreto 703/2018. Boletin oficial republica Argentina, July 30, 2018. https://www.boletinoficial.gob.ar/detalleAviso/primera/189076/20180731.

[194] "Peligroso Paso Hacia La Militarización De La Seguridad Interior." CELS. Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, July 26, 2018. https://www.cels.org.ar/web/2018/07/peligroso-paso-militarizacion/.

[195] Van der Spek, Boris. "Piñera Deploys Military Forces to Border to Combat Drug Trafficking." Chile Today, July 11, 2019. https://chiletoday.cl/pinera-deploys-military-forces-to-border-to-combat-drug-trafficking/; "Chile Militarizes Drug War, Ignoring Dangerous Regional Precedent." InSight Crime, August 14, 2019. https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/chile-militarizes-drug-war-ignoring-regional-precedent/.

necessary to fight drug trafficking."[196] Indeed, in many respects the Carabineros present the most elite police force in Latin America, consistently ranked as one of the most professional (see Esparza 2015) and well-equipped forces in the region. Piñera has, in fact, made extensive use of the military for matters traditionally reserved for the Carabineros, including emergency declarations to deploy the military as a migrant-deterrent force and to fight the Mapuche insurgency.[197]

Table 20: Recent Spaces of Mission Overlap in Chile and Argentina

Case	Area of Overlap	Involved Security Agents
Argentina	Drug Interdiction-Frontiers	Military & Gendarmerie
Argentina	Anti-drug trafficking operations-urban	Gendarmerie & Federal Police
Chile	Drug Interdiction-Frontiers	Military & Carabineros
Chile	Mapuche Insurgency	Military & Carabineros
Chile	Migration	Military & Carabineros

[196] Calderón, Narcisa. "El Narcotráfico, La Excusa De Piñera Para Militarizar La Frontera." La Izquierda Diario - Red internacional. La Izquierda Diario, July 13, 2019. https://www.laizquierdadiario.cl/El-narcotrafico-la-excusa-de-Pinera-para-militarizar-la-frontera.

[197] "Chile Declares State of Emergency in North Due to Migratory Crisis." Xinhua English, February 17, 2022. https://english.news.cn/20220217/a3d2bba4e0a5452a805d3b65d328e406/c.html.; "Chilean President Declares State of Emergency over Mapuche Conflict." France 24. France 24, October 13, 2021. https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20211013-chile-president-declares-state-of-emergency-over-mapuche-conflict.

The above table summarizes six cases of mission overlap, two in Argentina and three in Chile. As stressed in previous paragraphs, and as illustrated in my previous figures: Argentina's security structure involves three, rather than two agents. In fact, as the Federal Police and Gendarmerie share a principal in the Minister of Security, I would hypothesize that competition between these two agents is far more frequent and intense than any competition between the military and Gendarmerie. However, recent scholarship from Argentina suggests that the nation's gendarmerie is a reluctant competitor in urban security operations. Historically a rural force, the gendarmerie has seen an increase in urban deployment during the Kirchner years. This has prompted scholars have debated notion that the use of the Gendarmerie in urban areas constituted "militarization" of Argentine public security (see Hathazy 2016 and Kobilanski 2012).[198] Though not at the levels of narco violence of Mexico, Colombia or even Brazil, Argentine scholars and policymakers alike are cautious both of a militarized response to narco activity and of any possible expansion of the army's internal mission. For this reason, Battaglino has directly stated that though Argentines may be uncomfortable with the sight of Gendarmes in urban areas, their presence will be critical to preventing anti-narcotics operations from going to the military (Battaglino 2016). Curiously, evidence suggests that gendarmes do not feel prepared for urban counter narcotics operations, and that they were quite uncomfortable with their expanded mission (ibid).

[198] Kobilanski, Facundo Salles. "¿ Militarización sin militares?: los gendarmes en las calles argentinas durante los gobiernos kirchneristas (2003-2012)." URVIO: Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad 12 (2012): 13-24.
Hathazy, Paul Carlos. "La (re) militarización policial en la Argentina post-crisis: entre intereses organizacionales e instrumentalización política en los campos policiales." (2016).

The Gendarmerie's reluctance has created a new set of questions, unique to the Argentine context: should anti-narcotics be the responsibility of the Argentine Federal Police? The security body, separate from the military and the gendarmerie, does have two divisions with military-like capacities: the Grupo Especial de Operaciones Federales (GEOF) and Grupo Especial Uno. Though these forces are trained as elite counter-terror forces, their military-like capacities should in theory be adequate to counter the nation's narco woes. Why then, involve the Gendarmerie? Is it a question not of the capacity for state violence, but instead a question of intelligence? There is reason to suspect that the Gendarmerie, in its capacities as a border and frontier force, could have greater pre-existing intelligence on narco-trafficking, particularly along the border with Bolivia where drug trafficking is high.[199] As narco-traffickers establish distribution networks in urban environments, there is a rationale in expanding the gendarmerie's mission.

In Argentina, the fear of military deployment is very much informed by past experiences. Unlike Mexico and Colombia, which saw no or very brief military rule during the Cold War, the Argentine military junta became a regional boogeyman, and is still cited by academics, policymakers, and activists as an example of the brutalities of military rule. Whereas Colombia and Mexico are exceptional cases, in that internal missions have not contributed to military rule, Argentina became archetypal, and indeed informed the assumption that the emergence of an internal armed threat would give the military both an opportunity and an excuse to overthrow a democratic government. The question of why

[199] "Argentine Armed Forces and National Gendarmerie Fight Drug Trafficking." Diálogo Américas, November 6, 2013. https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/argentine-armed-forces-and-national-gendarmerie-fight-drug-trafficking/.

President Macri, and indeed President Kirchner before him, sought to use the armed forces to fight drug trafficking is then all the more puzzling, given that such decisions were uniformly unpopular.

A use of a multi-agent model here could explain what options civilian governments have when *both* or *all* security agents are reluctant to tackle a national threat. While it is not unsurprising that the Gendarmerie and the Army would both be reluctant to take on new missions (most security forces usually are), the situation is certainly a puzzling one, and scholars would do well to consider what sort of interactions could take place between security forces in cases of low-threat mission overlap. Is it the case that instead of attempting to "outbid" each other, both forces underperformed? Did the use of the army motivate greater performance by the gendarmerie? Was it necessary to deploy one agent to "whip the other into shape?" Or is it the case that an old and popular hypothesis is true: that pressure from the United States, in this instance the Trump administration, push Argentine towards inappropriate militarization?

Argentina, however, is not the only country which increased the use of its military internally despite legal and public objections. Chile shares much in common with Argentina, particularly the long shadow cast by its own experience with its military rule. While Argentina successfully purged much of the military's political power after a transition to civilian rule, Chile's military has maintained considerable economic and political influence (see Grimes 2021).[200] This would lead observers to believe that Chilean civilians would be even more resistant to the internal deployment of the armed forces than their

[200] Grimes, Collin. "Defense Sector Politics." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 56, no. 4 (2021): 463-484.

counterparts in Argentina, where the prospect of military rule is more a painful and relatively recent memory.

The interactions between security forces in this nation are even more understudied than in Argentina, and there are compelling reasons for this. The nation-wide protests which began in October 2019 shocked not only the Piñera government, but scholars, activists, and citizens as well. Though it has been found that soldiers in fact committed fewer human rights abuses than their counterparts in the police (Pion-Berlin & Acácio 2020), the sight of soldiers on the street created a renewed sense of urgency to address pressing questions regarding interactions between soldiers and protestors. There is an urgency in addressing these questions, compared to the relatively low threat narcotrafficking poses to Chile.

Regardless, interactions between the Carabineros and the Chilean Armed Forces would allow a more in-depth comparison and a greater understanding of what sort of interactions between militaries and other security forces are occur when an internal threat is low, but mission overlap remains. Why would civilians consider expanding the mission of the military when another security force is carrying out its missions adequately? Are these forces supporting each other, or was this mission merely for cosmetic purposes? And if so, for what target audiences?

Future research should question and examine the relationships between the occupants of these offices and their counterparts in other relevant agencies. What relationship exists between a Minister of the Interior and a Minister of Defense in a low threat environment and how does that relationship change when mission overlap occurs?

In both Chile and Argentina, mission overlap is exceptional, activated when the police (Gendarmes and Carabineros) are called upon for war to serve as auxiliaries for the armed forces. However, Latin America has been a "sphere of peace" since the end of the Cold War, and the prospects of an invasion by a hostile foreign power remain low. Thus, the interactions between these two have remained largely theoretical with the notable exception of UN peacekeeping operations, which have seen the participation of gendarmes, soldiers and carabineros alike.

Does Ministerial Jurisdiction Matter?

Regrettably, at the time of writing another comparison between two Latin American cases is warranted, as mass protests in Colombia in 2021 resemble those in Chile in 2019. In Colombia, what began as a protest against a tax increase on the middle class has transformed to a protest against inequality and police brutality.[201] Similarly, what began in Chile as a protest against an increase on public transit fairs morphed into a protest against police brutality, inequality and finally culminated in calls to remove Chile's constitution, the last vestige of the Pinochet dictatorship.[202] Both protests saw a heavy-handed response from state security forces, with human rights abuses such as unlawful detentions, use of force, disappearances and rape used against protestors in both countries.

[201] "Colombia's Duque Seeks to Calm Protest as Grievances Fester." Politics News | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, May 8, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/8/colombias-duque-optimistic-after-meeting-with-protesters.

[202] Watson, Katy. "Chile Crisis: Fearlessness and Anger Drive Protesters." BBC News. BBC, October 23, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-50151323. ; Monsalve, Juan Pablo. ""¡Nueva Constitución!": El Grito Que Se Apodera De Las Protestas En Chile." France 24. France 24, November 5, 2019. https://www.france24.com/es/20191105-nueva-constitucion-protestas-chile-pinera.

In Colombia, these developments have brought renewed attention to the police's presence in the Ministry of Defense. A recent article from the New York Times reads:

> "It [the Colombian National Police] was a force built for war, and now it has found a new one — on the streets of Colombia's cities, where the police stand accused of treating civilian protesters as battlefield enemies."[203]

Colombian police reform advocates now suggest moving the police out of the ministry of the interior, prioritizing human rights training, and trying officers outside of the military justice system (New York Times 2021). The supposition is that (1) this would place Colombia more in line with the Latin American norm, where national police forces are within a ministry of interior or equivalent and (2) this would lead to the "demilitarization" of the National Police. The idea is not a new one in Colombia (see Moreno González 2018), and has been oft repeated since the conclusion of the FARC insurgency. After all, reformers argue, if the police were relevant in the FARC insurgency, trained for war and having warfighting duties, is it more appropriate now to abandon these roles as they become less necessary? And would doing change police identity and culture?

In answering these questions, scholars and policymakers would do well to look to the Chilean case, where the Carabineros were moved to the Ministry of the Interior in 2011, a full 8 years ahead of the 2019 protests. And yet, even when the army was deployed to protect infrastructure during the protests, it was the Carabineros who committed the majority and most heinous human rights abuses (see Pion-Berlin & Acácio 2021). The

[203] Rios, Frederico. "Colombia's Police Force, Built for War, Finds a New One." The New York Times. The New York Times, May 12, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/12/world/americas/colombia-protests-police-brutality.html.

army followed stricter human rights standards and acted with greater restraint. This despite Carabineros having been outside the Ministry of Defense for a full eight years. Why?

Further research into this question would provide answers to important policy questions. Is it even necessary, fruitful, or worthwhile to move a national police outside of the ministry of defense when it appears that the step, where taken before, has done very little to curb police abuses? Is doing so even wise when internal armed actors remain? Is it the case instead that the presence of the police within the same ministry in the armed forces has allowed these two agents to share intelligence with greater ease? Would removing the police from the defense ministry make coordination more difficult? And where, exactly, do incentives to violate human rights during instances of mass protests come from?

For the last, and perhaps most normatively important question, a comparison between the rhetoric of both the commanders-in-chief and the relevant civilian sub-principals may offer some clues. Both President Sebastían Piñera and Ivan Duque may be considered right-wing, though Piñera's National Renewal party may be considered more centrist than Duque's "Democratic Center." At the 2019 Chilean protest, the Carabineros were under the ministerial control of Minister of the Interior, Andrés Chadwick. At the time of the 2021 Colombian Protests, the CNP were under the ministerial control of Diego Molano, the Minister of Defense.

A comparison of the statements of both sub-ministers, as well as their commanders in chief a the time of the protests suggests that the tone set by commanders in chief and their relevant subprincipals matters considerably in the behavior of security forces.

Sebastían Piñera described the protests as "being at war with a powerful enemy," a sentiment echoed by his Minister of the Interior. In an interview in October, Chadwick said: "As a government war, regrettably, is what is taking place against the violence of some vandal groups that all of the citizenry has witnessed, we have all witnessed the danger that they are provoking, the looting, the fires, and the destruction which is taking place."[204] Comparatively, the commander of the Chilean armed forces rejected Piñera and Chadwick's characterization of the protests as "war," saying: "I am not at war with anyone." (Pion-Berlin & Ivey 2021). The result was a far more restrained military compared to a much more aggressive police.

Colombia's Minister of Defense at the time of writing, Diego Molano, has similarly used war-like language to describe protests. Speaking to El Tiempo, Diego Molano insisted that police officers and soldiers alike were respecting human rights, despite evidence to the contrary.[205] Though Molano did say the majority of protests were peaceful, he justified the use of force by state forces, citing the presence of the ELN, FARC dissidents and other "narcocriminals" within the protest crowds as evidence that both police and military force were warranted (ibid). While it is quite possible that the ELN, FARC dissidents, and other violent extremists had indeed infiltrated the protests, Molano's direct tying of protesters to these groups deliberately ignored the broader grievances which mobilized large crowds in

[204] Reyes P., Carlos. "Chadwick y Dichos De Piñera Sobre Estar En 'Guerra': 'Demuestra La Autoridad y Decisión Con La Cual Queremos Combatir Ese Vandalismo y Dar Tranquilidad.'" La Tercera, October 21, 2019. https://www.latercera.com/politica/noticia/chadwick-dichos-pinera-estar-guerra-demuestra-la-autoridad-decision-la-queremos-combatir-ese-vandalismo-dar-tranquilidad/871116/.

[205] "Mindefensa Responde a Denuncias Por Excesos De La Policía." El Tiempo, May 13, 2021. https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/paro-nacional-ministro-de-defensa-se-refiere-a-hechos-de-violencia-en-cali-588057.

the first place. Reminiscent of previous Colombian civilian elites who tended to ignore the causes of social unrest and instead favor a heavy-handed, militarized response, Molano's framing of the issue indicated a widespread conception across the ministry of defense that protests must be tied to guerrilla movements. This seems to have affected police actions, as indicated by the response of one police captain to a human rights volunteer: "You're not a human rights defender," he said, according to Mr. Moreno. "You're a [expletive] guerrilla fighter, and I'm going to show you how to faint for real" (New York Times).

A comparison between Chile and Colombia warrants the following conclusions to be explored in future research: moving any police out of a ministry of defense and into a ministry of the interior is not a sufficient condition to prevent rights abuses. Indeed, that the Chilean military acted with more restraint indicates that the position of a security force in the ministry of the defense has been not incentivized them to carry about abuses. Instead, it seems that signaling from the top matters. War-like rhetoric, whether from a minister of interior or defense, will trickle down to officers on the ground. It is then not the specific ministry, but the characteristics of that ministry, which should be paid more attention to.

As with other studies, such a historical analysis would also determine how moving a hybrid force closer or further away from the armed forces changes their relationship with them. By virtue of putting more distance between the forces, does this decrease competition and/or alleviate tensions? Have the military-like capabilities and culture of the Carabineros changed in any meaningful way, and if so, have these changes benefited

Chilean and security? What lessons, cautionary or otherwise, might Colombian advocates learn from the Chilean transfer.

In conclusion, the temporary mission overlaps in Argentina and the ongoing mission overlap in Chile provides an opportunity to how these actors behave when forced to interact with each other. It opens questions about how Ministry-to-Ministry relations are organized, mitigated and the degree to which the commander in chief and other representatives are involved in them. It also provides an opportunity to test a complicated question: if these ministers, independent of both their subordinate democracies and their commanders in chief, have individual agency of their own. If so, how much and under what circumstances?

More High Threat Environments: Inter-Agent Relations and Cooperation in the Northern Triangle

Another subregion of particular interest in subsequent studies is the immediately South of Mexico: the "Northern Triangle" of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. These countries face high-level internal threats, distinct from cartels and insurgent groups. Each of these democracies has a variety of security bodies, including centralized police forces under the subject of a minister or secretary.

Table 21: ASFs and Their Ministries in the Northern Triangle

Country	ASFs	Authority
Honduras	Policia Nacional	Secretario de Estado
Guatemala	Policia Nacional	Ministry of the Interior
El Salvador	Policia Nacional	Ministry the Justice

The military has played a heightened, public role in internal security operations across the Northern Triangle. In Guatemala, the military has been downsized considerably as a condition of the country's 1996 peace accords. However, the specialized Army "Kaibiles" unit, one of the most notorious participants in the nation's civil war, has become increasingly involved in anti-crime and anti-narcotics operations. That the Guatemalan Police and Military are both involved in counter-narcotics operation suggests that an interaction is taking place, and the theory of this dissertation could be used to dissect these interactions.[206] Scholars have asserted that if the police units of these countries were larger and better trained, that the army deployments of Latin America would "not be a civil-military issue."[207]

The threats facing these nations are well-documented and well-researched. They are, however, some of the most theoretically difficult threats to conceptualize and don't fit neatly into any typology. In 2005, Max Manwaring described the threats posed by gangs

[206] "Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: Guatemala Summary - United States Department of State." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, February 3, 2021. https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-international-narcotics-and-law-enforcement-affairs-work-by-country/guatemala-summary/.

[207] Bruneau, Thomas C. Civil-military relations in Latin America: The hedgehog and the fox revisited. Naval Post Graduate School, 2005.

such as MS-13 as "a new urban insurgence," writing that while gangs have no political ambitions, they shared similar capacities to wreak havoc on government and threaten state sovereignty (Manwaring 2005).[208] This echoes this dissertations logic of comparison between insurgencies and so-called "grand cartels," in that they were both threats to state sovereignty with military-style capacities for violence. However, these groups are a far cry from "grand cartels," lacking both the financial power and international linkages that characterized these organizations. Indeed, a cross-national exposé by the New York Times and El Faro titled their investigation of MS-13 and Barrio 18 "Killers on a Shoestring," referring to their small budget and relatively meager resources.[209] Critical of policymakers who described MS-13 as an existential threat to the United States, the authors damningly wrote:

> "They do not begin to belong in the same financial league with the billion-dollar Mexican, Japanese and Russian syndicates with which they are grouped. If they are mafias, they are mafias of the poor. El Salvador has been brought to its knees by an army of flies." (New York Times 2018).

These two gangs have demonstrated a capacity for high-levels of violence, as evidenced in 2015 when MS-13 enforced a bus strike in San Salvador. One could argue, reasonably, that the ability to shut down bus routes in a national capital is indeed a demonstration of an ability to challenge the state. Furthermore, though the targets of their violence are citizens, rather than the state, gang violence in the Northern Triangle has contributed to national crisis across the region and an immigration crisis across North America. Though perhaps "an army of flies," the reality that these threats have in fact

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[208] Manwaring, Max G. *Street gangs: the new urban insurgency*. Strategic Studies Institute, 2005.

[209] Martínez, Óscar, Efren Lemus, Carlos Martínez, and Deborah Sontag. "Killers on a Shoestring: Inside the Gangs of El Salvador." The New York Times. The New York Times, November 20, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/world/americas/el-salvador-drugs-gang-ms-13.html.

brought nations to their knees cannot be overlooked. And though of an army of flies, the sheer size of MS-13 suggests it is, in fact, an army, if only in size. With some estimates going as high as 70,000 members, this eclipses the FARC's size when the organization reached its peak at 16,000 members. Increasingly aggressive, these groups have also recruited both active duty and retired military personnel for training in military style violence, attacking soldiers and police in the process (Ellis 2016).[210] While MS-13 and the 18th street gang represent less than 1% of gang members in the United States, it is clear that they represent a serious national security threat across the Northern Triangle.

The region is then ripe territory for future research into the relationships between militaries, ASFs, and civilian governments. Regularly, civil-military assessments of the region have been grim. Similarly to Mexico, no northern triangle country has seen a civilian defense minister since the 1980s. More than either Colombia or Mexico, the militaries of these countries have been and remain political forces: having seized control frequently during the cold war and remaining close to right-wing political parties in the present. However, these nations also have centralized police forces, with responsibilities in fighting internal armed threats and providing public security.

It appears that there is actually considerable variance of inter-agent relationships across the Northern Triangle. In Guatemala, several joint police-military groups have been established, such as Grupo Tecún Umán, but relations between the police and military remain "unclear and undefined" (Isaacson & Kinosian 2016). In El Salvador, Grupo

[210] Ellis, R. Evan. "The Gang Challenge in El Salvador: Worse than You Can Imagine." War on the Rocks. War on the Rocks, December 18, 2015. https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/the-gang-challenge-in-el-salvador-worse-than-you-can-imagine/.

Cuscatlán was established in 2012 as a joint task force between police, military, and port authorities to combat gang violence and criminal trafficking in the country (ibid). El Salvador also has developed a rabid-deployment military force called "Thunder," to support overwhelmed police and military units. These forces are more heavily armed than normal police or military companies, and are described as a "last resort" special forces" (ibid). However, in El Salvador, a familiar problem is presented: a general reluctance between security forces to share intelligence (Ellis 2016).

Out of the three, it is Honduras which has appeared to make the most strides in defining military and ASF roles, along with mitigating institutional rivalries to translate combined operations into successes. In 2014, the Special Response and Intelligence Troop (TIGRES) was created under the direction of President Porfirio Lobo Sosa as part of a mano duro campaign promise (Isaacson & Kinosian 2016). The TIGRES are considered to be an elite force, highly regard within Honduras by both other police officers and the army itself (Valle 2018).[211] That is regarded so well by the army is particularly interesting, and the language of army commanders in Honduras echoes that of those in Colombia. Also founded in 2012 under Lobo Sosa was Honduran National Interinstitutional Security Force, a joint security body which represents the police, the military and the attorney general's office (Isaacson & Kinosian 2016). Though this body is currently led by a military commander, it has seemingly facilitated the sharing of information and intelligence, as evidenced by the generation of operational successes against drug trafficking organizations

[211] Valle, Kay. "SOUTHCOM Donation Strengthens Honduran Elite Police Force." Diálogo Américas, July 10, 2018.; https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/southcom-donation-strengthens-honduran-elite-police-force/.

in the country (Valle 2020).[212] These two bodies increased the involvement of the president in internal security, and have mitigated tensions between police and military forces.

Extended the multi-agent framework to the Northern Triangle would follow the steps laid out in this dissertation, utilizing both within-case process tracing and cross-case comparisons. The countries allow for a neat comparison, and a logical most-similar design. All three countries have had militaries which have intervened for long periods of military dictatorship, a key difference between them and the two cases of focus in this dissertation.[213] While Mexico and Colombia have little to no experience with military dictatorship, the Northern Triangle experienced long, sustained periods of military dictatorship during the cold war. All three nations face a similar type of threat, the "mid-level" threats of gangs such as MS-13 and Barrio-18. Of the three: Guatemala is the least violent, having a much lower homicide per-capita rate than either Honduras or El Salvador. None of these countries have seen a civilian minister of defense, and in neither of them is it the case that paramilitary police forces fall directly into the Ministry of Defense chain of command.

Future research into the region would examine in much greater detail the variance in ASF viability and civilian management across these countries. Scholars would expect the high-threat level and previous experience with military rule to contribute to politically powerful armies, that civilian management might be uniformly low across all three countries. This makes any variance between the cases all the more important, as a step

[212] Valle, Kay. "Honduran Security Forces Deal Blow to Narcotrafficking amid Pandemic." Diálogo Américas, July 13, 2020. https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/honduran-security-forces-deal-blow-to-narcotrafficking-amid-pandemic/#.YnszpujMJPY.

[213] Indeed, it was for this reason that the Northern Triangle countries were excluded at the prospectus stage of this dissertation.

forward in one case could be a blueprint for region-wide steps in the right direction. Research would interrogate ASF successes, and the degree to which they are indeed successes. For instance, though the TIGRES police force of Honduras has been lauded by US personnel and by personnel in the Honduran military, there have been repeated scandals involving the Honduran police at the highest levels.[214] In fact, authorities purposefully excluded leaders of the Honduran National Police from participation in "Operacíon Avalancha," precisely because they were considered unreliable or corrupt.[215] It must then be asked if TIGRES is seen as an entity distinct of the police, and therefore more reliable. If so, which actors are determining this (military or civilian commanders in chief) and what is determining this. How has the creation of FUSINA, the inter-security agency in Honduras, alleviated tensions and has this translated into successes? It appears that while perhaps relations between the army and police as a whole are not harmonious, that relations between the army and the TIGRES are much better. And, importantly, such a research agenda would examine whether the creation of FUSINA has yielded successes which might be absent in Guatemala and El Salvador.

Lastly, any comparative research regarding ASFs in these cases would test the degree to which ASF participation in joint police-military task forces affects their

[214] Gagne, David. "Honduras Suspends Ex-Police Directors Implicated in Drug Czar Murder." InSight Crime, October 30, 2017. https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/honduras-suspends-ex-police-directors-implicated-in-drug-czar-murder/.

[215] "En Operación Avalancha No Participó La Policía Porque 'Hay Que Desconfiar De Todos'." www.elheraldo.hn, May 4, 2016. https://www.elheraldo.hn/pais/956548-466/en-operaci%C3%B3n-avalancha-no-particip%C3%B3-la-polic%C3%ADa-porque-hay-que-desconfiar-de.
Curiously, however, reports indicate that the TIGRES did participate in the operation. For more, see: "Honduras: 'Operación Avalancha' Deja Capturas y Aseguramiento De Bienes En Varias Zonas." El Heraldo, February 23, 2016. https://www.elheraldo.hn/pais/932696-466/honduras-operaci%C3%B3n-avalancha-deja-capturas-y-aseguramiento-de-bienes-en-varias-zonas.

relationships with both militaries and presidents. The central logic of my dissertation, built out of conclusions from Colombia, would suggest that the greater leadership role an ASF assumes in joint task forces, the more important its role. Jointness would also work to enable greater coordination between agents, allowing for greater intelligence sharing and trust. Finally, jointness should incentivize greater civilian oversight, as even though the relationship between ASFs and militaries will foster an inter-service rivalry as opposed to a zero-sum rivalry, the relationship will not be harmonious. As police-military joint tasks forces are common in the Northern Triangle, a comprehensive and comparative analysis of jointness, interpreted through the multi-agent model of this dissertation, is warranted.

The Role of the United States in ASF Development and Deployment

Though not a variable in my original theory, the influence of the United States in both Mexico and Colombia is a much-studied background variable. William Áviles, one of the first scholars to critically assess why civilian control of the military persisted in Colombia, laid the blame at the feet of the United States and neoliberal hegemony (Áviles 2009). For Áviles, this meant that though democracy and civilian control persisted in Colombia, these were both subservient to the interests of the United States. These interests, in turn, perpetuate Colombia's status quo as a "violent democracy," and for scholars such as Áviles, undermine the consolidation of a peaceful Colombian democracy.

In Mexico, tensions with the United States have resulted in repeated tragedies. Craig Deare explains that the Mexican army in particular has an anti-yankee culture tied to military defeat in the Mexican American War (Deare 2017). Other scholars have pointed to the United States' pressure campaign on Presidents Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988)

and Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) to deploy the armed forces to fight cartels in the 1970s and 80s.[216]

In both countries, critics allege that the United States has influenced militarization for the worse. The United States has tied itself to the armed forces of both countries, and has sustained this deployment through Plan Colombia in Colombia and the Mérida Initiative in Mexico. Critics though, make a mistake in not disaggregating the relationships between the United States and security forces. There is a mistake, for instance, in ignoring the possibility that the United States may enjoy a more productive relationship with the Colombian National Police than the Colombian Army, or the Mexican Navy than the Mexican Army. My own research, and the research of other scholars (Deare 2017) has proven however that the relationships between the United States and its strategic partners within the same countries are not equal. Thus, future research would engage the question of how the United States, particularly the CIA, Department of Defense, and DEA form relationships with militaries and ASFs, and how these relationships tip the balance of power between militaries and ASFs.

This question is, however, deceptively simple. My dissertation has problematized the civil-military relationship by introducing a third actor in ASFs. Any analytical framework which analyzes the relationships between agents across the United States and its partner countries, however, will need to incorporate a plethora of agents and principals. In the United States, this includes the DEA, CIA, and Ministry of Defense. While each agent is under the control of the executive branch, and engaged in the same sort of competition

[216] Jesús A. López-González, "Civil-Military Relations and the Militarization of Public Security in Mexico," 77.

outlined in this dissertation, they are known to act with autonomy relative to each other. This means that rather than a "bilateral" analysis, an honest analysis of the relationships between US security agents and those in Mexico and Colombia would account not for one relationship which aggregates US agencies together, but many.

For an initial hypothesis, I believe a straightforward causal variable is the degree to which US agents and their counterparts in other nations share interests. For instance, that US agencies and the Colombian National Police had more interest in counter-cartel operations than the Colombian Army and Navy facilitated a more productive relationship between US agencies and the Colombian National Police. However, data collected for this dissertation does not suggest that there was a greater degree of shared interest between security agents in the United States and Mexico. Rather, it appears that the gulf between US agencies and any of their Mexican counterparts remains wide, with the exception of the Mexican Navy. US agencies also appear to have trusted Genaro García Luna, puzzling now because these very agencies have accused Mexico's former top cop of drug trafficking.[217]

I then offer a second causal variable, the inwardness and outwardness of an institution's culture, as a possible explanation for cooperative relationships. "Inwardness" is conceived of as the degree to which an agent desires to operate alone, and the degree to which it mistrusts other agencies. "Outwardness" is conceived of as the degree to which an agent is willing to cooperate, and the degree to which it is willing to trust other agents. The Mexican Navy, as the most outward looking institution in the country, is less "Yankee

[217] Devereaux, Ryan. "The U.S.-Mexico Drug War Façade Comes into Focus." The Intercept. The Intercept, January 26, 2020. https://theintercept.com/2020/01/26/mexico-drug-war-el-chapo-garcia-luna-trial/.

phobic" than the army. More puzzling is the relationship between US agencies and García Luna, and there is little doubt that evidence from his criminal trial will provide relevant and important data regarding how García Luna forged such close ties with US agencies and the degree to which these agencies trusted him.

I would then argue, and seek to prove, that the agent which shares the most interest with the United States and the agent which is the most outward looking will likely benefit the most from US aid. This will include not only financial aid and equipment, but intelligence sharing, critical to converting equipment into operational successes and prestige. Such a proposed project will, however, necessitate further fieldwork in Latin America and new fieldwork to be continued in the United States.

Beyond Latin America

In the prospectus stage of this project, I included two additional cases: India and the Philippines. As a consequence however, of data collection practicalities, these cases were moved from the greater dissertation and would instead become the subject of future comparative research, predicated on the containment of the COVID-19 pandemic. Other practical concerns include language barriers, as while I am fluent in Spanish, I speak neither Tagalong nor any of India's major languages. The Philippines also presented a security concern: as at the time of research and to the time of writing President Duterte has incentivized police participation in a brutal crackdown on political dissidents, journalists, and drug addicts. My own safety prioritized, I decided to allow the Philippines and India to be the subjects of future research, especially given the amount of data collection and

analysis facilitated by a Colombia-Mexico comparison, which has served as the blueprint of all future research agendas outlined in this conclusion.

The cases remain, however, extremely interesting and extremely relevant. The Philippines is a particularly ripe comparison to Colombia, in that both countries are (1) democracies (2) have faced high levels of insurgency for the overwhelming majority of their democratic histories and (3) have police forces which have been active in their respective internal armed conflicts. To be sure, the nature of their threats is different. While they share an experience with leftist insurgency, with the New People's Army (NPA) launching its insurgency in 1960, the bulk of insurgency has been mobilized around ethnic and religious cleavages rather than ideological ones. Violence has been especially fierce across the island of Mindanao, where a Muslim minority is a majority. Like Colombia, the Philippine government has signed and is in the process of implementing a peace agreement with its largest insurgency, the Moro Islamic Liberation front (MILF). The Philippines have a potential ASF in the Philippine National Police, who like their counterparts in Colombia have military ranks and a historical connection to the armed forces. In particular four branches which have been relevant to the internal conflict: The Special Action Force (SAF), the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), the Intelligence Group (IG), and the anti-kidnapping group (AKG). These divisions seem to have parallels in the Colombian National Police, as outlined in the following table.

The Special Action Force in particular presents a ripe comparison. Founded in 1983 by then Lieutenant General Fidel Ramos (who would become president in 1992), the SAF is a highly militarized police division founded with the express purpose of being an

anti-insurgent force (SAF). t's present duties include rapid deployment capabilities to support regular PNP units, the Philippine Armed Forces, hostage negotiations, and participation in combat against insurgencies. It also gained prominence as a coup-proofing force during the transition to democracy, and appears to have been involved in arresting military leaders in latter coup attempts. Like the Colombian National Police, the SAF began life under military control, in this case under Fidel Ramos. Consequently, it has a militarized culture and capabilities. It appears to be an operationally viable ASF, though it is also clear that there is still a role for the Philippine Armed Forces in the internal conflict, as evidenced by the siege of Marawi, a regional capitol, which lasted for six months under the occupation of a coalition of Islamist fighters.

The Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) is the PNP's first and most prominent intelligence division, tracing its history as far back as 1901. While the group has specific intelligence missions related to countering Islamist and Communist insurgencies, the group has expanded as a general anti-criminal-syndicate force.[218] The CIDG echoes Colombia's DIJIN and DIPOL, in its emphasis on intelligence collection and the role of this in the internal conflict. Like the SAF, the anti-kidnapping group (AKG) was signed into law by then President Ramos in 1992. The Intelligence Group (IG) appears to be roughly analogous to Colombia's DIPOL, coordinating intelligence sharing not only across the police but with the armed forces as well.

[218] Andrade, Jeannette I. "CIDG Mulls Unit to Track Drug Money." INQUIRER.net, February 8, 2021. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1393176/cidg-mulls-unit-to-track-drug-money.

India, more than the Philippines, seems to defy expectations. This was the subject of one paper of mine, where I examined the extraordinary autonomy granted to Indian military commanders by civilian authorities. But scholars have long known that India's civil-military relation has been characterized by longstanding deference to commanders and, like Colombia for many years, a disinterest in the internal conflict. Though Indian policymakers quickly devised coup proofing strategies after the end of colonization in 1948 (see Wilkinson 2015), the defense ministry remained and remains staffed by civilians who view their time in the ministry to be temporary (Cohen 1985, Mukherjee 2019).[219] Civilians know very little of defense operations, and increasingly little of defense policy (Mukherjee 2021).[220]

India is distinct from this dissertation's two cases and all other cases mentioned thus far in that faces both external and internal threats. Externally, India faces hostile geopolitical foes in both Pakistan and China, and internal armed threats in Islamists in the Kashmir Valley, the Maoist "Naxalites" in the red corridor and several separatist insurgent groups in the Northeastern provinces. And, just as there is a preponderance of threats, there is also a preponderance of potential ASFs for Indian policymakers to deploy against internal threats. Rather than one centralized police force, India has seven. Of these forces, five the Special Frontier Force, the Central Reserve Police Force, the Border Security Force, and the Indo-Tibetan Police Force. Each of these forces is separate from the

[219] Wilkinson, Steven I. *Army and Nation*. Harvard University Press, 2015.

[220] Mukherjee, Anit. "The Great Churning: Modi's Transformation of the Indian Military." War on the Rocks, May 5, 2021. https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/the-great-churning-modis-transformation-of-the-indian-military/.

military, reporting to the Ministry of the Interior rather than the Ministry of Defense. The Central Reserve Police Force is the largest, active in the "Red Corridor" where the Maoist Naxalites are active. There is also a special paramilitary force in the Northeastern provinces, the Assam Rifles, who are one of the oldest ASFs in India. Each of these forces reports to the Ministry of Home Affairs,

However, a preponderance of security forces has not resulted in any reluctance to use the military internally. On the contrary, the Indian military's internal security missions are expansive, spreading across the subcontinent and in many cases replacing political leadership in conflict-prone regions (Cohen & Dasgupta 2013).[221] The same sort of protections extend to India's police and paramilitary forces, indicating chronic principal shirking which has armed military effectiveness, the upholding of human rights doctrine, and prolonged periods of military rule inside of the world's largest democracy (Mukherjee 2019).[222] Future research would attempt to answer what explains prolonged principal shirking when the option of consulting so many agents is available. Is it the case, for instance, that civilians in general are uninterested in internal security reform, regardless of them being in the Ministry of Home Affairs or the Ministry of Defense? Is it the case that they are uninterested in the conflict in general? If so: what factors would it take to generate this interest? And: what sort of relationships exist between the armed forces and the central armed police forces? Is there a possibility to compete for attention in the case that civilian principals themselves, are at large not interested?

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[221] Cohen, Stephen P., and Sunil Dasgupta. *Arming without aiming: India's military modernization*. Brookings Institution Press, 2013.

[222] Mukherjee, Anit. *The absent dialogue*. Oxford University Press, 2019.

A Preponderance of Principals and the Multi-Agent Model

In this dissertation, I have argued that when ASFs are viable and have equal access to a shared commander in chief, opportunities for civilians to exert their management will increase. This conclusion chapter has offered paths forward for a multi-agent analysis of civil military relations ranging from introducing the model to low threat environments (such as Argentina and Chile), to new high threat environments (such as the Northern Triangle) and taking the model beyond Latin America. The model is also a starting point for disaggregating "bilateral" international ties, by analyzing the relationships between individual agents across borders.

This is a robust series of research agendas, but pursuing them will advance a scholarly understanding of how security forces compete and coordinate, as well as how this competition and coordination can translate to increased civilian oversight as well as operational successes. It will advance an understanding of how separating the internal missions of armed forces from police occurs, as well as how separate their missions should be in times of internal conflict as opposed to times of peace. Lastly, each of these proposed agendas will entail an analysis of how military alternatives are reinforced, how they become effective, and how they can facilitate a military return to its barracks.

At its core, my dissertation has provided an answer to the question of "if not soldiers, then who?" The answer of to this question has implications not only for Colombia and Mexico, but in so-called "consolidated" democracies as well. The United States has seen greater deployment of the military (the national guard) for the purposes of counter-protest and counter-immigration operations. In France, the Army has been deployed

internally since 2015 to support other security forces in counter-terrorist operations.[223] As political tensions increase, creating new opportunities for armed actors to emerge across the democratic world, the implications of this dissertation will more, not less, relevant.

[223] "French Armed Forces Update: 2021." Washington DC: French Defense Attache Office, February 2021. https://franceintheus.org/IMG/pdf/FAFU/FAFU_007c.pdf

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