managed to keep itself together during the bombastic years of William Hale (Big Bill) Thompson, Republican. Cermak, before his untimely death, had welded together a strong, centrally controlled machine. It was this that Daley inherited and ruled for so long. Jacob M. Arvey and other oldtimers give the background.

The title comes from the experience of Abner Mikva, later a member of Congress, who in 1948 as a first-year law student, entered the Eighth Ward Regular Democratic Organization headquarters (in the Hyde Park-Kenwood area) and said he wanted to help the Paul Douglas-Adlai Stevenson ticket. When he explained that no one had sent him, he was told, "We don't want nobody nobody sent" (p. 318). It might have been the theme song of the closely knit, by-invitation-only Daley machine. (Mikva never was invited in.)

There are many fascinating interviews. One is with Vito Marzullo (on the council since 1953, its dean, and leader of the Italian bloc) who explains, "I take care of my people like I take care of my own family" (p. 50). From his 25th Ward, West Side, with its blacks and people of Italian, Polish, and Mexican descent, were selected all the precinct captains interviewed here.

Another fine interview is with Marilou Hedlund, the first woman alderman (48th Ward, North Side, 1971), a young Catholic journalist who was treated warily by Daley and "differently by different ethnic groups" (p. 207). Then there is an interview with Jane Byrne, probably before she even hoped to become mayor. With Daley gone, she predicted "a much more fragmented Democratic party," one in which "commitments that are being made won't last" (p. 203). Other discussions are with young Turks, outsiders, excommunicants, reformers, and suburban critics.

Unfortunately, Rakove himself offers only a four-page foreword. The short foreword is given to Richard M. Daley, the son and possible heir, and the epilogue to Michael A. Bilandic, mayor when the book was finished, but who was about to be buried by violent blizzards and Jane Byrne. Perhaps Rakove felt he had said enough in his excellent 1975 analysis of the Daley machine, Don't Make No Waves, Don't Back No Losers, but this book lacks definition. You must make something of it yourself; that is possible if you know a bit of Chicago politics. There is the added weakness of much repetition. Things do get boring if told too often. The lumping of interviewees by category adds to the echo, but some kind of organization was necessary, of course.

The eager inside-dopester should be warned that there are few secrets unlocked here. What you gain are insights into the rather complex Daley character and how the participants, from the divas to the spear carriers, do their jobs.

There is a good picture collection and a helpful glossary of names, but no index to aid the researcher.

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Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen. By Bruce M. Russett and Elizabeth C. Hanson. (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1975. Pp. xiv + 296. $13.00, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

Interest and Ideology is an important book for both substantive and pedagogical reasons. To get right to the point, the authors' conclusion, based on an analysis of different studies, is that there is "weak and rather fragmentary evidence in favor of theories attributing wars to economic interests" (p. 249, italics in original), and strategic and ideological theories contribute more to the explanation of businessmen's (sic) views about foreign policy than do theories of economic motivation. The authors use a multi-method approach to test a number of hypotheses about the nature of and underlying motivations for the beliefs of businessmen about foreign policies. Thus the conclusions boldly stated above are not arrived at lightly but rather are grounded in three different imaginative and carefully constructed studies.

Questionnaires were sent to vice-presidential-level business executives and high-ranking military officers to probe each group's beliefs about foreign policy and their antecedents. Basing their conclusions on approximately 1200 responses, Russett and Hanson found business executives to be less "hawkish" than their military counterparts, though more so than most other categories of civilian elites except Republican party leaders. This latter result was obtained by analyzing the Yale study in conjunction with Allen Barton's study of elite attitudes conducted at Columbia in 1971-72.

Using a less participant-reactive methodology, the authors studied the response of stock market prices to conciliatory, non-conciliatory, and escalatory events during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. For the latter conflict, special analyses of the price fluctuations of defense-related companies and firms with substantial interests in LDCs were undertaken. Generally, by 1967 investors seemed to have turned against the Vietnam War, with investors and companies in defense industries and those with interests in LDCs no more positively inclined toward the war than investors in other firms.

The third investigation involved a content analysis of the comments of the business and military press about U.S. intervention in various interna-
tional crises and the reasons offered to support or oppose such intervention. While space considerations prevent an adequate summary of the findings here, for the most part, this test confirmed that the business press was less "hawkish" than the military press.

The findings of these three studies in their full complexity shed much light on economic theories of foreign policy, and thus the book makes a major contribution. However, the book is also valuable for the authors' success in providing an excellent though not perfect model of a carefully and creatively conceived and executed study. On such an important issue as this, it is instructive to new and old scholars alike to observe how the authors creatively "mine" the data derived from the different methodologies and information sources to study this issue from various perspectives.

Russett and Hanson have been careful to approach each study and the subject in an even-handed manner, although they acknowledge that decisions on the structure of the research design affect the results. For example, in two of the three studies the prime reference group is the military, leaving one to speculate about what the results, or at least what their interpretation, might have been if the reference groups had been quite different — such as labor leaders. The authors readily acknowledge the limitations of correlating international crises with stock market prices, but one can further question the judgment of limiting the stock market reactions to those of the same day or the day following a particular event. Somewhat similarly, the content analysis of the business press assumes too quickly the high correlation between the words of the press and the beliefs of executives. Perhaps an analysis of the speeches of business executives would have been more appropriate as opposed to the statements of those who write about business.

These and other questions can be fairly raised about the book and its various methodologies. However, such questions do not detract from the excellence of the work, for the authors' care in describing their methodologies and indicating their limitations makes the job of questioning their procedures easier for the reader.

The findings are interesting and important. The book is generally well written, though at times the results of the survey analysis become tedious. However, most importantly, the book represents the careful and serious investigation of a major theory of foreign policy. Its scholarship and professionalism are of the highest order.

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This book covers a lot of ground. The eight chapters dealing with Presidents Wilson, Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, Carter, and Secretaries of State Dulles and Kissinger are connected by a series of "interchapters" to provide the historical context in which these architects of American foreign policy have operated. It is Stoessinger's thesis (pp. xvi-xvii) that these individuals are "movers," and not merely "players" on the stage of history who happened to occupy leadership roles when important decisions were made. "The mover's distinctive quality is that he leaves his personal imprint upon history . . . and this imprint . . . stems from the very nature of his personality."

Stoessinger classifies the personalities of these leaders into two types: pragmatists and crusaders. Wilson, Dulles, and Johnson are predominantly crusaders whose foreign policy decisions are inordinately influenced by rigid, preconceived ideas and/or emotional problems; Truman, Kennedy, and Kissinger are pragmatists whose decisions tend to be guided by evidence and common sense. Carter (p. 284) falls somewhere between the crusader and the pragmatist.

The treatment of the Dulles decisions over Suez, Johnson's domination of America's Vietnam policy between 1964 and 1968, and Carter's difficulties with his human rights policies are the stronger parts of the book. However, the analysis of these topics does not break any new ground. The chapters which focus upon Wilson and Roosevelt reach familiar conclusions. President Wilson is the archetype of the crusader, while FDR successfully tempers the idealism of a crusader with the realism of a pragmatist.

The studies of Truman, Kennedy, and Kissinger also reveal little that is new, and they illustrate the difficulties associated with applying the crusader/pragmatist dichotomy to more complex cases. Truman and Kissinger are not universally viewed as pragmatists, and Stoessinger's interpretation of Kennedy as a pragmatist does not always square with the evidence which he offers to support this conclusion. On p. 167, he concludes that JFK's decision making during the Cuban missile crisis "shows us the pragmatic leader at his best." Yet, only a few pages earlier (p. 159), he indict Kennedy "for risking nuclear Armageddon . . . over what appeared to be a side issue . . . . A deeply ingrained reaction against the 'Munich syndrome' and the determination not to appear weak made [Kennedy] risk nuclear war over missile bases in Turkey." Khrushchev's pragmatism, and not