Title
Power in the Blood: Popular Culture and Village Discourse in Early Modern Germany

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POWER IN THE BLOOD

Popular culture and village discourse in early modern Germany

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

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This book is dedicated

to my mother
MYRNA MAUDE DIXON SABEAN

and to the memory of my father
ELMER CLYDE SABEAN

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Preface

The origins of this book are obscure even to myself, but the occasion of its conception I remember quite vividly. For about fifteen years, I have been piecing together all of the material I can find on the village of Neckarhausen (today part of the city of Nürtingen). The search broadened out several years ago from the rich collection of documents in the Rathaus to include the regional and state archives. About a year ago, I spent a week in the Landeskirchliches Archiv in Stuttgart reading through all of the pertinent information in the church visitation records. At the end of the week, I had three free hours before my train left, which I used to browse through the volumes of the 1580s, looking for more stories of peasant refusal to attend the sacrament of communion to match the two I had found for Neckarhausen. What I discovered makes up the first chapter in this book. It also put me on to the trail of new material to extend the questions and provide new possibilities for experimentation.

The attentive reader will see that although I skip all around Württemberg in this book, I have gained my fundamental understanding of the workings of that rural society through the patient, detailed examination of the mass of sources from Neckarhausen. I have also benefited from daily discussions over the last seven years with my colleagues in the Max-Planck-Institut für Geschichte. Especially close have been my contacts with Hans Medick, who is spending the better part of his life with his own Swabian village. Together with Alf Lüdtke, we have also been debating the exchange between history and anthropology for a long time. Little of what I have written here could have been done prior to my long 'sabbatical' in Göttingen.

Jürgen Schlumbohm read each chapter as it came fresh from the typewriter and provided me with the necessary encouragement to con-

tinue. I also argued every line with Vanessa Maher, Gerald Sider, Jonathan Knudsen, and William Reddy, all of whom brought their own work to the Institute to be discussed. They all know how much I learned from them.

An earlier version of chapter 1 appeared in the Festschrift for Rudolf Vierhaus, the Institute's director (published by Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht). His comments were valuable for revising the argument, but more important has been his continual support for my work and the superb conditions for research which he has provided.

Several people have read and commented on one or other of the chapters. Particularly helpful have been the remarks by Barbara Duden, David Cohen, Anthony La Vopa, Ivan Illich, Kenneth Barkin, Peter Reill, and Georg Iggers.

Towards the end of work on the book, I had a chance to talk with Martin Scharfe, who put me on to the trail of the broadside depicting the Beutelsbach bull sacrifice. I was received most kindly by Dr Irmgard Hampe at the Württemberg Landesstelle für Volkskunde, who gave me permission to make a copy.

In twenty years of visits to the Hauptstaatsarchiv in Stuttgart, I have spent many hours discovering things. I hope that I have been able to convey some of the excitement I have experienced reading documents. It has not always been easy for the staff to answer my needs, but they have always been helpful and encouraging. A quiet oasis in the archive landscape is the Landeskirchliches Archiv in Stuttgart, whose director, Dr Gerhard Schäfer, has arranged for me to use material from Neckarhausen and given me many useful ideas. Hermann Ott, who presides over the reading room, knows better than anyone else how to help the helpless.

During various stages of the book's production, I received important support from Brigitte Bartels and Monika Hammer, who typed the manuscript, and from Hiltrud Mintenig, who entered it into the computer. Manfred Thaller, who will play a prominent role in the introduction to the Neckarhausen book, introduced me to the mysteries of computerized text processing. The diagrams in chapter 5 were drawn by Stefan Mielke.

One night after I had hurriedly cooked a particularly depressing meal, my wife asked if I thought the peasants were worth it. Her irony has kept me sane.

Göttingen
July 1983

Introduction: Perspectives on the analysis of early modern state practice

Where there is no faith, there is no conscience but only the mark of the beast.

Johannes Brenz, 1530

Rebellious opinion: that the external, oral preaching of the Holy Gospel of Christ is only an external action and letter, unserviceable for the inner life of the spirit.

Württemberg Church Ordinance, 1559

Everyone babbles the words, but few obtain thereby a stronger faith.

Johann Valentin Andreae, 1622

In our Evangelical, so-called Lutheran, churches and congregations [there is] one great defect, greater than with all other religions . . . that the majority of teachers [teach] according to the external letter.

Georg Gottfrid Bregenzer, 1699

The freedom which you acquire today is an external freedom of your bodies . . . and not an inner freedom from your consciences.

Superintendent Lang, 1745

The common man has . . . little receptivity for purer notions.

Canzlei Advocat Bolley, 1796

This book is composed of a series of episodes strung out over two and a quarter centuries. All of them deal with village or small town life in the duchy of Württemberg in southwest Germany. The first chapter describes attempts on the part of magistrates during the 1580s to enforce attendance at communion, and shows how for villagers the sacrament revolved around enmity and friendship. In the second chapter, a peasant prophet appears who in 1648, the last year of the Thirty years' War,

met an angel in the vineyard above his village. The angel gave him a message about sin and repentance to take to the duke, but beneath the strongly encoded message there were hints of a tax revolt. The third chapter deals with an incident from the year 1683, when a thirteen-year-old girl spread the rumor that she was a witch. The metaphorical structure of her language opens up central issues about communal life and state domination. The fourth chapter deals with the career of a pastor at the turn of the eighteenth century, whom we would today probably regard as paranoid. His activities put into relief the complex problem of the relation of spiritual to temporal power. Shortly before mid century, the death of another pastor developed into a murder investigation. This story takes us into problems of kinship and conscience, local power and state ideology. The sixth chapter, taken from the very end of the eighteenth century, examines an incident involving a village which sacrificed a live bull to a cattle epidemic. The way the event was related to village discourse takes us further into problems of understanding local power and popular culture.

In every chapter, difficult problems of textual analysis confront us, and it is no simple matter to distinguish what exactly popular opinion on an issue was. Historical sources written by members of the popular classes are hard to come by until well into the nineteenth century, which gives the impression that the vast mass of the rural population remained silent witness to the progress of time. Whatever sources there are for studying peasant culture implicate in one way or another those people who to some extent exercised domination over the peasant.[1] Even court disputes between people at the local level usually involve clerks, notaries, or judges who wrote down what villagers said. What appears as direct testimony in a judicial text may well be a paragraph redaction of something that took quite a long time to say. In addition, evidence about what peasants thought or how they acted is largely anecdotal in character and subject to the distortion that story telling brings to a situation. Such evidence is often so repetitive or deals with trivial details in such a way that the historian has difficulty escaping its banality. These two problems, then – the entanglement of peasant views in sources deriving from various levels of authority and the nature of the evidence as anecdote – present issues of great importance to the student of popular culture.

We might start by pointing out that what is a fact about sources is not necessarily a weakness. Documents which perceive peasants through the eyes of rulers or their spokesmen begin with relationships of

domination. After all, the notion of 'peasant' implies more than just 'rural cultivator' and takes into consideration his involvement in productive, legal, and religious relationships which dominate part of his existence. There is irony in the fact that because we cannot get to the peasant except through the lord, our evidence is often a good starting place for considering the relationships which we want to investigate. The issue is to examine the constitution of peasant notions within the dynamics of power and hierarchical relations, and the chapters in this volume are exercises in the use of sources generated by state authorities to study the peasants' view of this process.

As for the story-like character of the evidence, two kinds of narratives are presented here. Some are repetitive, such as the reports in the first chapter about people in different villages refusing to take part in communion, or the testimony in the last two, where successive villagers were questioned about matters which they all knew about or had experienced. Repetitive stories of this kind are close in form to that of peasant communication, a form which may exist in most communities with 'face-to-face' relationships.[2] This form involves concrete language of symbolic content, which constantly reiterates central aspects of social relationships. Its repetitiveness and its seeming triviality is a pointer to what in fact we want to investigate. The other forms of narrative, non-repetitive in character, lead to much the same end, for close attention to the structures of action or ideas reveals their logic and shows how the logic is remapped on to new situations or is interconnected with other pieces. We will be concerned with examining symbols and metaphors and the language of concrete experience, in order to understand ways in which villagers presented the flow of social processes and the nature of social relations to themselves and among themselves.

This book offers views into particular situations. Since the source material in one case seldom overlaps with that in another, we are confronted with disjunctions that make analysis of the same issues over the whole period difficult. Nonetheless, a goal of the book is to follow changes in village social relations and their representation over time. An issue is whether in fact there are constants in rural structures and culture based on an unchanging productive routine or the conservation of peasant thought.[3] One view seeks to find the essential peasant culture, the underground tradition, so to speak, hidden away from the lords and deeply rooted in the past. We are only offered glimpses into this world from time to time. Another position argues for relatively unchanging structures, which receive different modes of expression over time,

pointing to enduring constraints and the constant reception of elements of high culture. In my view, the social relations inside Württemberg villages were constantly undergoing change during the period under consideration. Inherited items of culture continually changed shape as they were situated in new contexts. We will be taking each case separately and examining the logic of social relations and the pattern of discourse peculiar to it. We will discuss certain of the historical forces which converged at each particular point. We will also examine recurring problems and investigate some of the long term processes which brought about change.

Productive forces and social change in Württemberg

The description below is not meant to be a thoroughgoing introduction to the agrarian or economic history of southwest Germany from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. I will pick and choose only those elements that will be helpful as background to the information and arguments in the chapters that follow. The object is to sketch some of the salient features of the social forces inside the villages of Württemberg and their articulation with the outside, stressing those particular aspects relevant to the story I want to tell. The important fact to emphasize at the outset is that Württemberg was a land of small peasant producers, although the regional towns had an active trading life as service centers for agriculture, and provided locations for professional and administrative elites. Certain areas, notably around Urach on the Swabian Alp and Calw in the Black Forest, developed proto-industrial activity, especially in the eighteenth century. However, our stories are centered mostly in villages dominated by small agricultural producers. There was no nobility as such in Württemberg, at least not after they won status for themselves as Imperial knights in the early sixteenth century. Their territories, occasionally no more than a village, remained foreign enclaves inside Württemberg and could have some importance for such matters as trading. But the nobility itself was not a class situated between the rural population and the duke. It provided no dynamic in the process of expropriation. As far as property rights were concerned, peasants held some land in private ownership, but much of the land in the territory was in a tenure arrangement with the duke of Württemberg or with some institution such as the university or one of the numerous foundations.[4] Already in the sixteenth century, the peasants, for the most part, had inheritable tenures. Tithes on grain, as well as rents,

ended up in one way or another with the duke or with institutions of the territory. Taxes were levied on all land, whether owned privately or held in tenure.

It is important to understand that a large proportion of the 'feudal rent' was levied in kind in Württemberg until well into the nineteenth century. Although there were many small levies and fees, three basic forms of extraction of surplus accounted for the bulk of the approximately thirty per cent eventually taken from what peasants produced. Ten per cent of the grain harvest went for tithes (on all land – tenure and free). Approximately another ten per cent was paid for ground rents, most of which were paid in kind.[5] Both of these parts of the feudal rent did not vary significantly in proportion from the early sixteenth to the nineteenth century. The 'dynamic' element, levied in money and subject to fluctuations and long term rises, was taxes. By the end of the eighteenth century, these too amounted to a rough tenth of the agricultural product.

From the beginning of the sixteenth century, Württemberg had a higher tax burden than the neighboring territories.[6] There was an important rise at the end of the sixteenth century and another associated with the period during and after the Thirty Years' War, both involving costs of the military establishment. Taxes, of course, went directly to the state. A myriad of officials, concerned with the annual movement of considerable amounts of produce and money from villages to central institutions, determined one major way in which the villages interrelated with the state. But officials of the state were not the only ones concerned with expropriation of the peasant surplus, for at the village level the collection of all dues was mostly carried out and supervised by a set of local officials, people who were members of the village itself. A further fact important for local relations is that the pastor in a village often received the small tithe (on garden produce and the like) and was one of the few officials who dealt directly with the primary producer and enjoyed his fruits immediately.[7]

It is often stressed that in Württemberg a strong urban/rural dichotomy never developed. No large agglomeration arose with radically different modes of production or with capital structures capable of effecting transformations in the countryside. No expropriation process characterized relations with the city.[8] Even politically, villages were able to prevent a taxation structure which favored cities.[9] In the small towns, many inhabitants carried on agriculture, and artisans there were often not distinguishable from village artisans. Although town and

village provided no radical disjunction, regional administrative, religious, and economic elites were centered in the towns, and wealthier town dwellers were usually a good deal richer than the wealthiest villagers. The strategy of location gave the artisanal and merchant groups of the town entrepreneurial functions with regard to building trades and the marketing of agricultural production. But probably more important was the fact that the town contained the intermediate church and state administrative officials. The latter were concerned with collecting and channeling twenty or thirty per cent of what villagers produced in agriculture to the more central state distribution centers. They also exercised judicial and political functions. Between the village chief administrative official, the Schultheiss, and the town representative of state authority, the Vogt, the social gap was considerable.

With these structural aspects in mind, we can consider some of the central facts of social and economic change over the period dealt with in this book. The sixteenth century was generally characterized by economic expansion and a rise in rural population until at least the 1580s. Although some of the population increase was absorbed by cities and armies, growth in rural areas was also considerable.[10] It brought pressure to break up the large farms formed in the late Middle Ages, a move which was successfully resisted in such areas as Upper Swabia and the Black Forest.[11] In the central areas of Württemberg, there was some division of the larger farms, but this was generally held within bounds.[12] There too a class of land poor grew up in the villages alongside peasants with relatively large enterprises. In comparison with the eighteenth century, the rise in population and the expansion in agriculture – which was driven on by an enormous rise in agricultural prices, particularly grain – were not accompanied by the growth of a village class of artisans. There were, of course, some regions where spinning or weaving became widespread on the land. But as the price scissors went ever more against the rural producers, they had to be tied to agriculture in order to survive.[13] In general, however, increased regional specialization – wine, flax, milk products, timber, etc. – was specialization in agriculture involving an ever more complex network of interregional trade.[14] But the complexity of the market structure to be found in the eighteenth century did not yet exist.

Peter Kriedte has recently summarized the dynamic and blockage of the sixteenth-century economic expansion.[15] The rise in population was accompanied by a revolution in prices, with agricultural products,

led by grain, at the forefront. More land was brought into cultivation at the cost of reduced marginal returns, leading to rising production but falling productivity. The expansion eventually led to a destruction of the ecological balance – soil exhaustion, harvest failures, depleted resources. As one result, the share in the agrarian product of the feudal classes was constantly threatened, and one way they reacted was by putting restrictions on the partitioning of viable farms by land-hungry heirs. Where feudal rent had been transformed into money terms, new forms of expropriation and arbitrary exaction were necessary. But in Württemberg, with rents and tithes largely in kind, the lord and state institutions participated in the general economic rise. Württemberg did not change the form of tenure from an inheritable one. What drove it to higher money extraction in the form of taxes was the monetization and higher costs of a military force which developed in the sixteenth century.[16] To characterize the market in the sixteenth century in rough terms is to stress the urban/rural differences: commodity production in the city and agricultural production in the countryside, with the market place as the point of exchange. Also, regional specialization emphasized the market place as the location of exchange relations. By contrast, in the eighteenth century, these kinds of markets were overlaid with an internal market, and the *market place* as the mediator between manufactured commodities and agrarian products did not maintain its exclusivity.

By the 1580s, the population growth came to an end or slowed down considerably. The mechanism of this blockage was a series of harvest failures, coupled with waves of epidemic, notably bubonic plague, which began in the 1580s and recurred at the end of the first decade of the seventeenth century and again in the middle decade of the Thirty Years' War. It is hard to avoid the notion that the great waves of mortality were closely related to the limits of expansion in agriculture.[17] The poorest members of the population were subject to a vast decrease in real wages. Wages need not necessarily have been the primary part of their subsistence in order to be used as an indicator of their status, and all the wage series that we have for Western Europe in the sixteenth century show a large and dramatic fall.[18] This is part of what lay behind the increasing use of the social category of 'poor' in the records of the late sixteenth century.[19] Those with few resources confronted those with property and fought battles over the use of forest land and other common rights. Since agriculture formed the basis of the economy, one would expect the links between people to be tied closely to land

ownership, and the reciprocities in a village to be largely mediated through non-monetary links. Illustrating how social relations could be embedded in the daily subsistence activities of agricultural production and exchange, a diary of a pastor from the 1680s shows how much of his day was spent going from meal to meal and collecting rents in kind.[20] This can be contrasted with the eighteenth century, when a large part of pastors' incomes were composed of interest on money lent out to various peasants, salaries, and often expanded and commercialized small tithes.[21]

It is hard to grasp the economic changes associated with the Thirty Years' War. Plague and warfare took their toll so that many Württemberg villages had populations of no more than forty per cent of their pre-war levels.[22] The fall in population and in agricultural prices and the low level of capital savings and available labor led to more extensive farming, but under the burden of heavy taxation. An important consequence of the war seems to have been the stabilization of agricultural production as the dominant basis of social reproduction, but in a way different from that of the sixteenth century.[23] During the subsequent half century, partible inheritance clearly came to dominate the Württemberg villages, and by the end of the period a rural artisan class was firmly established. The artisan class which grew up in the villages may well have been the result of relatively high costs of labor in a depression period, since they could support themselves partly from agriculture. It is also important to see that the conjunction of feudal exactions, in the form of agricultural products, with new heavy taxation helped to support partible inheritance because of the difficulty in maintaining a balance between capital and land. Capital needs of peasants also forced them to accept usurious loans.[24]

It was during this period that the characteristic Württemberg distribution of wealth developed, with no great disjunctions between classes of *Vollbauer* (large peasant proprietors) and cottagers. However, production remained fully oriented to agriculture, and the practices of state domination centered on ground rents or on forms of extraction based on property ownership.[25] Despite economic decline in the second half of the seventeenth century, activity on the part of the state continued to increase. Of course, the presence of the state in the form of competing armies during the Thirty Years' War and the growth of taxation instruments and exactions before, during, and after the war can be seen as fundamental agents of long term economic difficulty. Claims within the structure of the reorganized feudal state based on the needs

of a permanent military force brought permanent heavy taxation. It was not the shock of the Thirty Years' War[26] so much as the heavy, continuing taxation exactions that led to the slow recovery of and reinforced difficulties in peasant reproduction.[27]

The issues of taxation and other forms of transfer stamped relations between state and village ever more clearly. The instruments of the state were local officials in village and town, and the sources give the impression that the post-war period for them was one of corruption and booty. Parallel to growing exacting bureaucracy with control from the center – as any investigation into witchcraft can show – were usurious activities, rake-offs, and conflicts over the spoils of office on the part of officials. In this period, villagers were making room for immigrants, confronting enormous problems of capital formation – borrowing money from officials at high rates of interest – and dealing with the inexorability of taxation.[28] Inside villages, public support of the poor became central issues, and families were less likely to recognize responsibilities to distant relatives.[29] The after effects of the war cut many people loose from their original homes and left them deposited around villages with no effective ties, creating disputes over who belonged where and to whom.[30] Village and town consciousness developed over disputes with state officials about residence rights and public responsibilities to support individuals. Villages and towns also increased their own internal self-regulation with regards to quartering troops and collecting tithes and taxes. As the dialectic between village and state increased its tempo, issues of legitimate authority became more acute. Pastors, for example, devised new forms of discourse against rapacious officials, and the theme of spiritual and temporal power came to be a focal point for many conflicts.[31] While the Thirty Years' War left many clergymen impoverished, they entered the second half of the century with new instruments of power in their hands: institutionally, the village church consistory, and ideologically, a theory of repentance.[32]

To characterize the eighteenth century briefly is not simple either. Looking at the period 1720–50 when the pre-Thirty Years' War population levels were again attained, we can see that the situation had altered significantly. More regular employment in the army for young men took a small but certain percentage of people from the villages for a time. Above all, depending on the size of villages, a more-or-less extensive corps of village artisans had been established, which grew in number with the sharp rise in population after mid century. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, artisans could be found among the

wealthiest members of a village, but by the end this was very seldom the case except for the bakers, butchers, innkeepers, and millers.[33] While at the beginning of the century, artisans had a secure place among the village magistrates, increasingly all such positions came into the hands of landed peasants. The rise of a village artisan class must be distinguished from the growth of proto-industrial producers, such as the spinners and weavers to be found in the Black Forest region around Calw or on the Swabian Alp around Urach and Laichingen. By contrast with the sixteenth century, town and country differences were not so marked, since small commodity production of a complex set of handicrafts had become so well established in the countryside. Although this was a general German phenomenon, nowhere was the class of artisans so large as in Württemberg. There it reached a density and complexity equal to that of an East Elbian city.[34] Around 1730, that class made up about a quarter of the working population, and by the end of the century about a third.

Artisans were clearly among the land poor and were dependent on their handicrafts for survival. Their existence and growth attests to an increasing division of labor and penetration of market relationships,[35] which had two correlative aspects. The growth of the artisan class was closely associated with agricultural intensification and specialization – the production of fruit, wine, and industrial crops, all of which entered the market. At the same time the development of village and small town people dependent on wage labor also provided a market for artisanal commodities.[36] Although this group remained a stable percentage (about fifty per cent) of the population, with the demographic rise its absolute numbers grew considerably.[37] Schultz characterizes the period in terms of a social differentiation taking place inside a homogeneous peasant/small peasant society.[38] According to Kaschuba and Lipp, the process involved a progressive dependence of village producers on market relations and the purchase of commodities, such that commodities subject to long distance trade entered the local economy. This implied a step-by-step substitution of subsistence economy by commodity consumption and production.[39]

A dominant trend was the growth of market relationships and specialization. In central Europe, there was even the appearance of such characters as the one who gathered from hedges wool left by passing sheep – or the other who gathered horsehair.[40] Their products were sold for cash. But it was not just people who specialized; whole villages also came to specialize in various ways. There was, for example, a

village with many varieties of cherries, all with special marketing possibilities – one was sold to wine merchants to darken wine.[41] One village might specialize in growing and selling raw flax, another in preparing flax, and yet another in spinning linen thread.[42] Although any one village would to some degree combine such activities, each gave a special emphasis to its activities. In any event, the trend towards specialization and monetization was perhaps only there to a small degree at the beginning of the century but by the end was in full flower. It coincided with the growing specialization in agriculture, with capitalization, and with marketing. Property holding in villages underwent a series of significant changes, bringing new forms of relations among people.

Agricultural holdings were increasingly subject to fissioning, through inheritance but also through intra-village land sales – considerably more land by the end of the century was sold in ever smaller plots.[43] The slow shift from extensive agricultural methods to intensive ones can be seen in cropping as well as in techniques. By the end of the century, villages were poised to abolish the herd of horses and increase considerably that of cattle, implying new forms of cooperation – one can plow with one horse but two cows or oxen are needed.[44] The capital market also changed its character. Through the fruits of office and inheritance, many state officials and pastors came to expect a considerable portion of their incomes from rents. Widows were also important for the capital market. Interest was officially regulated at five per cent. With time, peasant producers became dependent on this capital market for their loans of 100–300 fl., and depending on the economic situation were more or less burdened with debt. Bankruptcy did not lead to a change of ownership from peasant to bourgeois; rather the peasant's land would be sold at auction to other villagers and the creditors paid off at a loss. Increasingly, money was lent by people no longer in direct contact with each other – the widow of a notary in Stuttgart, for example, to a small farmer thirty or forty kilometers away in a village tucked under the Swabian Alp.[45]

The social forces in the eighteenth century were quite different from those in the sixteenth century. Increasing social differentiation in the later period meant more of a continuum of property holding and income, rather than a disjunction between large property holders and the landless.[46] Specialization made each person more or less describable in unique terms; more people were on the margin and tied together in more complex ways – few people carried on the same kind of work dur-

ing the whole year. It was more necessary to piece together different kinds of income sources. The honor of a person became more of an issue, and competition for place in the society was organized increasingly around such a symbol. This was also true for a village as a whole, for its reputation and honor were perceived as central for the competitive position of its members.[47] Horizontal links involving intercooperation among equals became increasingly well established; connubium became more fractionalized and subject to closer calculation. Vertical links were more subject to interflows of patronage and direct exercise of power. Although blood relations remained important as a mapping exercise – to stress legitimacy (honor) or to attach oneself to more successful relatives – the group of blood kin ceased to function as a cooperative one. Fictive kinship – god-parentage – was more apt to be used to forge new vertical relationships.[48]

Inside this structure, the pastor, always an outsider, was part of an increasingly self-confident, well-to-do class. Within the village, he confronted a likewise increasingly self-confident ruling group of landowners. Issues such as drinking could symbolize the divergent forms of power – pastor/Schultheiss; and the social basis of response to the pastor's message would always be implicated in the articulation of village social structure.

Insiders and outsiders: Village and regional officials

In the chapters that follow, there are a number of matters touching on the nature of village and state institutions and personnel which ought to be made clear to the reader at the outset. Since the time span is from the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century, a good deal of change is involved which I will describe where relevant, but in order to keep the discussion reasonably short, I will give a rather static picture.

To start at the bottom, most of the villages that appear in these chapters were in areas of Württemberg characterized by large nucleated settlements of 400 to 1000 people.[49] A village of this size might well form a parish of its own, with church, pastor, schoolhouse, and schoolmaster. At times there would be a smaller settlement, a hamlet or isolated farmhouse, with its own institutions and land but included as part of a larger parish. In areas closer to the Swabian Alp or the Black Forest, settlements were often smaller and sometimes combined together in more encompassing administrative units which functioned like villages. In amongst a set of villages would be found a central administrative town.

perhaps containing no more than 2000–4000 people. Together the town and villages made up one of the Württemberg administrative units, the *Stadt und Amt*.[50]

Every person born in a village to a *Bürger* had *Bürgerrecht* in a village, that is, the right to live there and participate in the privileges extended to its members.[51] Upon adulthood, an individual might be forced from economic necessity to go elsewhere, but unless he or she forfeited Bürgerrecht or took it up elsewhere, the right to return was maintained. Otherwise Bürgerrecht could only be attained by permission granted by the village magistrates – often on marrying into the community. Movement from village to village was not very great but could take place. Occasionally, a person took up residence without formally becoming a Bürger. He could then be accorded *Beisitzrecht*, the right to live there but not necessarily to share in village common rights. 'Bürger' had another meaning as well, and referred to the adult, married males, all those who had a right to use the commons, to be employed in village work, and to vote for village officials. Every man upon becoming a Bürger was required to take an oath to the duke, promising obedience. Together, the collectivity of Bürger made up the village corporation, or *Gemeinde*.

One way of assessing the strength and quality of the village corporation is through the tax structure. From early in the fifteenth century, Württemberg had a tax system which extended over the whole duchy and was supposed to fall as an equal burden on all inhabitants.[52] Basically, taxes were assessed on wealth, land and buildings, and only in the eighteenth century were assessments on professions included. The amount of the tax was apportioned from the center on each *Amt* (district). Each Amt in turn apportioned the tax to be collected from the town and from each village. Inside each village, the magistrates assessed property, apportioning the tax share accordingly. Part of the political processes at the regional level and between regions and center was played out around the question of how taxes were to be apportioned. In the sixteenth century, the inhabitants of the duchy won the right to be consulted about taxes and established a parliamentary institution called the *Landschaft* or *Landtag*. At the beginning, the Vögte in the cities – the chief regional officials – represented the Ämter, but by 1629, they were excluded from the Landtag. Agitation, started in the sixteenth century, finally made it possible in the period after the Thirty Years' War for village representatives to take part in consultative proceedings, at which representatives of an Amt were sent to the Landtag. Similarly, at the

Amt assembly where the apportionment of taxes for the various villages took place, villages slowly drove back the influence of the city magistracy.

Given these facts, a few conclusions about the overall political position of villages can be drawn. During the sixteenth century when a clear difference between town and village was apparent, with villages relegated largely to agriculture, the towns through the Vogt and magistrates maintained political leadership in the Amt. Even then the collectivity of villages seldom paid more than a third of the Amt's taxes.[53] After the Thirty Years' War, when the strong differences in economic and social structure between town and village largely disappeared, paradoxically not only did the weight of taxes fall more on the villages, but also their political position inside the regional union increased. At the same time lines of state authority were clarified. The fact of communal self-administration did not mean fewer taxes but more, just as stronger communal organization did not mean less domination but more.

Given the peculiar situation in Württemberg whereby feudal rent, in all its forms, in one way or other went primarily to the duke, his central officials, or ducal institutions, and the fact that an important part of the surplus was paid in kind, there had to be a large number of officials and paid workers to handle the annual movement of produce and money from villages to the center. Since so much of the movement involved grain and to some degree wine, problems of collecting, measuring, storing, processing, marketing, and accounting had to be dealt with. To a large extent, the basic collection took place at the village level under the administration of village officials or deputized villagers, who in turn worked under the administration of town officials. Each kind of exaction, whether ground rents, tithes, or taxes, had its own system of collection and set of administrators. Close connections between village and town officials were necessary, and the tenor of their relations was to a large degree tied up with this process of extraction of feudal dues.

The administrative constitution at the lowest level, the village, can be described as one of self-administration with strong external controls. The chief official was the Schultheiss. In the fifteenth century, he was most likely to be appointed by the duke, but in the course of time many villages negotiated the right of election. According to the *Communordnung* of 1758, he was to be elected in all villages, a right that was confirmed in 1770 after some attempts at abrogation.[54] He was elected

by all the adult males (Bürger) in the village as they filed one-by-one before the election official (usually the chief administrator of the Amt). Once elected, the Schultheiss more or less had life tenure. The other chief official in a village was the *Bürgermeister*, who was usually a member of the *Gericht* (court) or *Rat* (council). He was the financial officer, responsible for collecting taxes, paying bills, and keeping financial records. There was often another Bürgermeister, who administered village common lands and buildings, stock piles of grain, and corvées. In addition to the Bürgermeister, there could be other financial officers in a village, such as the poor relief officer (*Heiligenpfleger*), and sometimes the same person held both offices. In a town, the administrator of poor relief could be a very important official, and in both town and village the responsibilities could be quite significant, especially since poor relief was constituted as a capital fund and lent out to Bürger at interest. There were also several posts with mixed administrative and financial duties, such as the *Waldmeister* or *Pförchmeister*. The former administered the village woodlands, which in some places were extensive enough to make them the largest source of village income. Naturally, the position had great possibilities for favouritism and corruption. The Pförchmeister allocated the right to fold the village flock on arable strips, and kept the quite considerable accounts. Often the village Schultheiss held one or both offices.

The other officials of the village composed the Gericht and Rat. A town could have as many as twelve members in the Gericht, while smaller settlements had accordingly fewer *Richter* (or *Gerichtsverwandten*). They were also elected by village Bürger and held life tenure. They met together once a year to select all the village posts that were appointed periodically (mostly for one year), such as field, vineyard, forest, and village police, night watchmen, horseherder, cowherd, gooseherd, shepherd, bullkeeper, and mouse catcher, and once or twice a year for a *Ruggericht*, where all the conflicts and delicts over the year would be dealt with. For the rest, they gathered on an *ad hoc* basis, often after church on Sundays, to deal immediately with some serious offense or pending issue. Another group, usually smaller, of village officials was the Rat, or council. It seems that they did not meet separately but joined the Gericht to form a larger council for certain kinds of business. They appear to have been younger villagers who later assumed places on the Gericht. All the village officials who exercised higher administrative tasks – forest administrator, sheep-fold administrator, markstone supervisor, field supervisor, fire inspector, property evaluator, orphan

court juror, inventory taker, bread inspector, meat inspector, excise official, wine excise official, poor law treasurer, sub-customs inspector, horse and cattle inspector, church consistory elder – were chosen by the Schultheiss and Gericht and Rat from among themselves. The minutes of all meetings were kept by a village clerk (*Gerichtsschreiber*), a position usually held by the Schultheiss if he could write. Otherwise it fell to the schoolmaster or to a clerk from the town administration.

Together, the Schultheiss and Gericht and Rat made up the village *Obrigkeit* or magistracy, and they formed a corporation in opposition to the village Gemeinde. Although elected by Bürger, their tenure was not subject to the will of the Gemeinde, and they could only be removed by higher authority when convicted of crimes – chiefly those against the duke and his officials. The Schultheiss stood in relation to the rest of the magistracy and the village Gemeinde much as an abbot to a monastery or a master of a Cambridge college to the college: although elected, upon election exercising the independent authority of his office. However, carrying out the prerogatives of invested administrative power did not mean that he was not dependent on a certain amount of consensus. After all, he was usually a native of the village where he lived, a farmer, and a family member. His position was tied up with all of the relationships which bound people together as neighbors and kin and was part of the conflicts both real and potential dividing the village. For the success of his office, he was often dependent on his ability to get people to follow his lead. Although villages were always faction-ridden, the denial to any powerful enough group of what they considered to be their just demands could make a village essentially ungovernable, or subject a Schultheiss to an attack on his own or his family's interests. An important part of his income was made up of fees and, of course, bribes, and the everyday exercise of his authority at least skirted along the edge of corruption and self-aggrandizement.

Also in a village were two officials who usually came from outside. The schoolmaster, who was often the son of a schoolmaster or occasionally the son of a pastor or even a villager from somewhere else, usually acquired his job in competition with several other applicants.[55] He was tested in the church in organ playing, singing, and doctrine, and in the *Rathaus* in spelling, reading, and writing and the like, and then elected by the village. He taught school, of course, and often had custodial duties in the church. He played the organ and occasionally took over clerking duties in the village. Although an outsider, through a local marriage and acquisition of some land and enough longevity, he could become more or less integrated and even at times an important village official. Pastors, who usually came from pastoral families and had been trained at the university, were also elected by the village from among those waiting for a position.[56] But in contrast to schoolmasters, they remained outsiders, in that their children seldom married villagers and their own wives came from outside the village from among their own class. They also never became landowners in a village. They depended for their incomes on a salary from the state, small tithes in the village (on garden produce, flax, and hay) fees, and perhaps some garden land, an arable strip, and some pasture. They also received interest on loans given out to agricultural producers.

The position of the pastor was based on several different elements. Every week he was able to speak from the authority of scripture and to offer an interpretation of events, social conditions, the activities of officials, and village affairs. Once a month, he administered communion. Before partaking of the sacrament, a villager was required to attend confession, which was composed of a public service – in which the meaning of communion was explained and parishioners were called upon to confess their sins – and a registration of intent to take communion with the pastor. This latter was called 'appearing before the chair of confession' (*Beichtstuhl*). In this private confrontation, the pastor was not supposed to be taking oral confession in the Catholic fashion but was to call upon the parishioner to confess his sins to God and to show penance. The manner of contrition and preparation was supposed to be left to the individual. But the occasion was one where the pastor could deal with the known activities of the person before him and could point out the differences between real and sham repentance. Real repentance could not be private in that authentic religious experience was supposed to lead to a changed life. At times, pastors were able to deny people access to the sacrament. However, in many villages and at certain periods, the registration for communion was a mere formality. Its potentiality depended very much on the personal inclination of the particular pastor.

After 1644, a new element was added to the pastor's power, namely the village church consistory, which was composed of several elders (usually from the magistracy), the Schultheiss, and the pastor. This was a kind of morals court, which had the power to summon and punish those who swore, got drunk, and quarreled in their families. It dealt with adultery, fornication, witchcraft, magic, profanation of the sabbath, church and school attendance, and the like.

Village officials were controlled periodically from the outside. By the seventeenth century, at least every two years the chief administrative official of the Amt held a *Vogtruggericht*. Every Bürger was called upon to state whether he knew of any delict against the interests of the state. The official examined the records and protocols of the Schultheiss and Gericht and Rat, making sure that the proper fines had been administered, serious cases had been reported, and all orders from the duke and his officials had been recorded and communicated to the village. This was only the most formal control, for the Schultheiss carried on business with the officials of the Amt practically every week. Every year the highest church official (*Superintendent*) of the Amt visited the village, checking on the conduct of the pastor and the schoolmaster and dealing with notorious problems. As for the Bürgermeister, he was required to send in a quarterly report of his accounts and a final accounting at the end of the fiscal year. The accounts were checked minutely, and he was called in to defend them.

The administrative towns had a slightly more complicated constitution, and some of their officials were officials of the Amt at the same time.[57] At the top was the *Stabsbeamte*, usually called a Vogt, later *Oberamtmann*. He was an official of the duke, not elected by the Bürger, and was at the same time the chief administrator of the town and Amt. He was head of the criminal court, which also had appellate jurisdiction over village courts. All reports from the village level to the duke had to go through him, including complaints about the conduct of a Schultheiss or indeed of himself, and in turn he relayed all communications from central officials to village officials. Every two years, he held a Vogtruggericht in each village. As its chief elected official, a town had a Bürgermeister, who was the financial officer but also represented the town's interests, sometimes against the Vogt. The town also had an elected Gericht and Rat. A *Stadt- und Amtspfleger*, elected by an assembly of the Amt, was responsible for the financial records of the Amt. Finally, a very important official was the *Stadt- und Amtsschreiber*, elected by the assembled Schultheissen and confirmed in his office by the ducal council. The office carried on all the clerical duties in the Amt and was therefore closely involved in village life. While the village Gerichtsschreiber kept the protocols from the Gericht and those over taxes and mortgages, the Amtsschreiber carried on all the clerical duties to do with village finances, marriage contracts, civil contracts, testaments, and marriage and *post mortem* inventories. The office of *Schreiber* always had one or two apprentices (*Incipienten*), who were supposed to

be kept on as *Scribenten* for a few years after their apprenticeship. After serving long enough, the Schreiber at his discretion reported to the central authorities in Stuttgart to arrange for a Scribent's examination and promotion to the rank of *Substitut*, which allowed him to carry out the duties of clerk independently. He could also begin to think about getting married. As a group the officials of the *Schreiberei* made up part of the literate town culture – one prerequisite for training being a thorough grounding in Latin. There was always a large enough group available for the considerable work coming from the villages, and they were called in from time to time to take up longer periods of residence. In the phase before marriage, they were a rowdy element, judging from the injunctions against their drinking and carousing.

It would not be proper here to give a detailed accounting of all the relations between village officials and state officials. Only one kind of control system will be outlined in order to provide an example of the articulation of village officials with state administrative machinery. The example is provided by the village Bürgermeister, whose job it was to keep the village financial records and make an annual accounting.[58] All money belonging to the community, payment to officials, costs of quartering troops, income from common land, the sheep herd, and forest use, costs of corvées and repairs to communal property, communal taxes, taxes from the Amt, and taxes collected for the central government came into the village account books. The Bürgermeister was required to keep a notebook with daily transactions (*Rapiat*), an account book with all entries under particular headings, an account book for wood and use of forest, a list of corvées, a list of military exactions, and a list of all fines. He was also expected to keep all receipts, and no entries were allowed without written documentation. At the end of the financial year, the Bürgermeister was required to present all his documents to an accountant of the Amt (either the Amtspfleger or his Substitut) whose job was to examine each entry. Then the whole account book, including the wood and sheep-fold registers, was to be read to the assembled village community word by word in the absence of the Bürgermeister. Any objections were to be reported in writing and investigated. When this process was completed, the entire accounts were then subject to examination by the Vogt or his official, who was to compare each entry with the original receipt or document and examine all notes, registers of tithes, threshing accounts, and the like. He was especially to compare each rubric with the previous year's accounts for changes and unusual aspects. He was to examine costs of trips of local

officials, their daily expenses, the details of tax evaluations, the collection of state taxes, and the accounts of quartering of troops. He was to check back with the state treasury officials to see whether all amounts outstanding had been received. An important part of his job was to note any problem in the margin of the accounts, so that the accounting office would correct their mistakes or take a note of an issue the next year. At the end of his report, the examiner was to note all defects and to communicate them in writing to the Bürgermeister and the Amt accountant, who in turn were expected to answer all queries in writing. Finally, the Vogt carried out an official hearing of the accounts in the presence of the village Bürgermeister, the Stadt- und Amtsschreiber (or his Substitut), and the examiner of the accounts. The village also sent the Schultheiss and four deputies of the Gericht and Rat.

This is only one example of the close intermeshing of state feudal interests and those of the village. With village account books containing both the internal financial organization of the village and records of dues paid to the state, self-administration at the local level was coupled with detailed control from the center. This kind of structure must be seen in the context of a state form in which competing groups such as nobility were missing, and in which local officials were at the same time embedded in the interests of the village and functioned as crucial links in the chain of feudal exaction.

The concept of 'Herrschaft'

There are three notions which continually recur and intertwine in the chapters which make up this book: 'person', 'community', and '*Herrschaft*'. We will not attempt to offer here a history of the construction of the person, or the changing dynamics of communal life, or the development of institutions of state domination. There is such a history, and each case which we will discuss is to be located somewhere specific in time and with relation to the fundamental alternatives suggested by changes in perception and the web of social relations. As we take up each case, we will suggest some of the specifics of place and time and examine, in so far as the material allows, the range of alternatives for construction of the self, patterning social relations, and resistance. We will also be concerned with refining the conceptions which we discuss for the analysis of change. In the conclusion, we will offer an interpretation of the development of state institutions and the implications of that development for the practice of Herrschaft at the village level, and

alternative constructions of the person, using the material from Württemberg as illustration.

Herrschaft is a term which expresses relationships of power, although in a way that is not covered exactly by any of the competing terms in English.[59] It is over-laid by historical specificity on the one hand and by ideological dispute on the other, to the extent that it is helpful to explain the choice of the term here and the use that it might have in clarifying certain processes in the exercise of state power in the period under consideration.

Since any abstract, analytical use of the term is tied in some way to its concrete, institutional position inside feudal relations, we must begin by asking what the common elements of its various meanings are.[60] Herrschaft expresses institutional relationships of authority, such as *Gerichtsherrschaft*, *Leibherrschaft*, and *Grundherrschaft*. Each such term denotes a domain of authority of a specific lord, whether that lord be a single person, such as a duke or a king, or a corporation, such as a monastery, a hospital, or a city council. The term Gerichtsherrschaft referred to the domain of rights and jurisdiction adhering to the exercise of judicial authority. Leibherrschaft defined the relationship of a lord to his collectivity of personal bondsmen (*Leibeigene*). And Grundherrschaft was a matter of ownership and control of land, with various rents and obligations paid by the tenants to the lord. This is far too schematic to catch the complexity of arrangements, the overlapping and conflicting forms of Herrschaft, but it nonetheless suggests several essential points. The relationship was seen as a personal one, above all because an individual could in theory and often in practice be under the domination of one lord as bondsman, of another as tenant, and of yet another as judicial subject. At the close of the Middle Ages, there were some Herrschaft relations which were defined territorially, but most often territoriality was broken up into a kaleidescope of personal relationships. One of the trends from the sixteenth century onwards was the territorialization of some forms of Herrschaft, with the unification of overlapping rights into fewer and fewer hands. In Württemberg, for example, the duke or ducal institutions by and large held the land, exercised justice, collected the tithe, and included the subjects in a more-or-less territorially defined Leibherrschaft, although the specific rights and obligations varied from place to place. Some writers on Herrschaft confuse the 'personal' relation of subject and lord with a set of face-to-face relationships, and suggest that the nineteenth century saw a depersonalization of Herrschaft.[61] In this argument, the personal presence of

the lord is contrasted with abstract, anonymous structures, productive relations, and the like: on the one hand the violence of direct confrontation, on the other the force of circumstance. It is true that there were many forms of Herrschaft in the early modern period where personal relations were part of the apparatus of authority, for instance on the large peasant farm or small junker estate. But there was nothing face-to-face about relations between Württemberg subjects and the duke and his officials in Stuttgart. In chapter 2, the mistake of a peasant who thought he could deal directly with the duke is examined. Although such an argument would take us too far afield, it would also be possible to question whether Herrschaft can be abstracted from the direct personal confrontation of citizens with the apparatus of violence of the modern state.[62] Personal versus abstract Herrschaft does not really seem to be the issue, for in the modern world as well power is experienced in practice in the context of a background of direct violence.

In many of the chapters of this book, we will investigate the problem of Herrschaft and violence. Although we are accustomed to thinking abstractly about the fact that power is masked through various forms of ideology or institutionalization, perhaps it is not so easy to visualize how much open violence is masked by the practice of including it as only one alternative in a situation. Indirect or 'gentle' forms of violence can be exercised alternatively with other forms of Herrschaft.[63] One recurring example (particularly in chapters 1, 5 and 6) has to do with the oath. To take an oath was putting one's eternal salvation at stake, and the state was very careful to stage-manage the situations where such an act would be required. The various possibilities of threat, physical and mental, which surrounded oath-taking ('spiritual torture') provide a useful lesson in the exercise of violence.

As much as Herrschaft has to do with force and violence, there are two essential foundations to that force. On the one hand, each of the forms of Herrschaft we have mentioned more or less clearly expressed a form of surplus extraction. The *Leibherr* had a specific right to death duties – clothes, cattle, or a proportion of the total inventory – a chicken every year, and perhaps a dozen eggs. One of the factors explaining the superb series of *post mortem* inventories in every village of Württemberg was the interest of the duke in collecting the death duties owed to him. *Zehntherrschaft* recognized the right to collect a tithe on grain production. Grundherrschaft involved rents and duties from land holding. Sometimes, in fact, the early formulations of Herrschaft put the relationship into the categories of property, maintaining that the

relationship was one of ownership over things or persons.[64] The lord was only taking what he owned with all due regard for the reproduction of the human material necessary to continue the possibility. Various writers asked whether the subject or servant (*Knecht*) was a person and an end in himself, or a thing, an instrument for the fulfillment of the needs of the dominant, but this was just an extreme statement of the fact that one inner kernel of all Herrschaft relationships was a process of extraction of a surplus.

But the other half of Herrschaft was just as central to the institution, namely the offering of protection (*Schutz und Schirm*), whether in the form of clientage, justice, general tranquility, or military protection. Some forms of Herrschaft may have appeared very unbalanced. It might be asked what services were offered by the Leibherr in exchange for death duties and an annual chicken.[65] To raise the question is to suggest three alternative ways that the practice of Herrschaft could be viewed: (1) subjects sometimes put one or other form of Herrschaft into question precisely because it did not offer any correlative service. (2) The sum total of all forms of Herrschaft could be seen together as offering protection, making it unnecessary to question any one form. (3) Herrschaft as a whole or in its particular forms could be seen as always in part arbitrary, not balanced by an adequate return, too costly, and maintained by some degree of violence.

If the correlative terms lord/servant covered reciprocity in the form of liens on the subject's surplus and services rendered to the subject, the imbalance of power and the everyday practices of force necessitated a continuing process of legitimization. After all, the costs of surplus extraction would have been much too high if regularity of compliance was not forthcoming. Some scholars have suggested that 'legitimacy' of Herrschaft first became a problem with the period of the French Revolution.[66] When one examines the daily practice of Herrschaft, however, it becomes clear that 'legitimization' is integral to it. The problem is raised, for example, in chapter 1, within the structure of several services offered by the state and the state church. The sacrament of communion was provided as a central institution and symbol of religious celebration, but was expressly interpreted by officials in terms of offering obedience to authorities. Villagers demanded a just treatment from magistrates and a fair judicial process as the price of their accepting the service and sharing communion. In chapter 2, a situation is discussed where state taxation was put into question because the activities of rulers had called down the judgment of God.

Our examination of Herrschaft in its concrete historical form has suggested some of the elements of any satisfactory abstract, analytical use of the concept, and at the same time an inner connection between the feudal forms of Herrschaft as concrete institutions and modern Herrschaft in industrial nation states. Words such as 'power' are too amorphous to be of much analytical value for investigating the relationships under consideration here. 'Domination' in turn expresses only the carrying through of one's will. What Weber has offered as the central defining element of 'Herrschaft' at once gives the concept its analytical value and provides a program of research running through Western history – namely Herrschaft as the evocation of obedience.[67] This takes the burden of analysis away from the philosophical enquiry into legitimacy, and concentrates it on practice. It combines the problems of force and the process of legitimization. But the definition of the concept remains historically flat if it does not include in its formulation the fact that Herrschaft is about the distribution of resources, the satisfaction of interests, and the fulfillment of needs. Central to the exercise of Herrschaft is always a process of extraction and a correlative set of services. In that context, legitimization is not a rigid relationship but a continuing process with historical specificity.

We have left the definition of the elements of Herrschaft fairly abstract. That the lord or state has services to 'offer' does not exactly define which services nor how they shall be performed. In the dialectic of relations between lord and subject, the process of legitimization does not just function as a mask to hide the practice of skimming off a surplus. It also covers the nature and extent of services offered, which, after all, are no more within the power of a subject to accept or reject than are obligations of military service or taxes, for example. In part, the exercise of Herrschaft takes place through its power of definition, its ability to say who the subject is and what his needs are. In order to legitimize its activities, it has to ensure that the need structure of the subject is in accord with the services to be offered. Furthermore, whether dominating powers are extracting value or 'offering' a service, coercion is always explicitly or implicitly part of the power. Take the example of communion again. It was not enough to provide the 'service', but the Herrschaft had to define at the same time the nature of the community which would share it, and at an even deeper level the nature of the person who would partake. If ultimate recourse was had to the argument that good order necessitated a unified religious institution, thus harking back to the fundamental service of protection (Luther made much of this), the details in its establishment brought the authorities into a never-ending cycle of legitimizing the specifics of that institution. In the end, force could be used to see that villagers conformed to the rituals of the religious cult, as examples in chapter 1 adequately show. In this way, we can see how community was subject to a massive interpenetration of Herrschaft at many different levels, and that the dynamic in *Herr/Knecht* relationships was not only on the side of surplus extraction but also on the side of rendering services and legitimizing *both* rents and peace-keeping.

'Legitimizing' accepts at the outset that the exercise of power is to some extent arbitrary and that its arbitrariness has either to be justified or masked. This is necessary in part because the needs of the 'lord' do not remain stable, nor does his ability to remain with the forms of extraction. It is also necessary because the forms of extraction have been 'legitimized' in the past, becoming thereby part of the historical consciousness of subjects. At the root of 'protection' is the problematic of protection from the protector. In the dialectic between arbitrariness and legitimizing lies one of the central mechanisms for the continual forming and reforming of historical consciousness. Also tied up in the dynamic of legitimizing is the service-rendering of the lord. Within the lord/subject relationship, new 'needs' are continually being generated and old 'needs' denied. Needs as defined by the lord are at conflict with needs felt by subjects, so that the costs of Herrschaft are not just to be found in the payment schedule of rents but also in the continual round of redefinition of needs and their suppression.

Much of the discussion dealing with the lord/subject relation works with a simple two-part model of the system.[68] 'Those up there' (*die da oben*) confront the rest of the population. Recent work on resistance in early modern society has concentrated attention on the village community as a solidary organization confronting demands from the outside in the form of new or excessive taxes or attacks on village privileges and rights. By narrowly defining resistance, by selecting a specific set of documents, and by neglecting to look at the everyday practice of Herrschaft, the new studies fail to examine how people at different levels of society are implicated in the apparatus of domination. The position of anyone in the hierarchy of the exercise of power is not simple, and there are satisfactions and deprivations at all levels. It is impossible, for example, to examine the practice of Herrschaft in Württemberg without a detailed investigation of the office of Schultheiss. As we shall see in most of the chapters, there were important advantages in the

everyday exercise of power. But it would not do to look only at personal advantage, for the exercise of office could bring satisfactions of duty, honor, self-sacrifice, or support for values. On the other hand, the exercise of power could also have its costs of isolation, risk, fear, dishonor, and ridicule.

Our chief task seems to be to investigate benefits which accrue to those who participate in the apparatus of power. Considering Herrschaft institutionally, abstractly, as a kind of entity, rather than as a practice, tends to lead away from central elements of its reality. As practice, it is delivered daily in the form of coercion and constraint and yet is subject to its own constraints, since eliciting obedience is always part of the goal. As soon as attention is turned to the systematic practice of everyday constraints, it becomes clear at how many levels Herrschaft is exercised and how many levels are available for resistance. We shall see in chapter 5, for example, how the notion of 'householder' sorted out inhabitants of one village as subjects and objects respectively of village Herrschaft. There we shall see how weak a two-part model of state domination can be, and how no discussion of Herrschaft can be adequate without a thorough understanding of how Herrschaft implicates its objects in its practice and indeed often turns them into its subjects.

Recent discussions of rebellion and resistance have confined themselves largely to what fits into the simple model we have been criticizing.[69] Opposition to taxation counts as resistance, but anger with a corrupt village magistrate does not. But just as the exercise of domination must be sought at many levels, so too must one look for resistance. It can lie at the level of a chosen metaphor, as we shall see in chapter 3, or in the reception of biblical knowledge as in chapter 5, just as much as it can in a highly oblique rhetorical attack on state financial practices, as in chapter 2.

The focus on moments of dramatic rebellion tends to shift the viewer's glance away from the inherent dialectic in domination or Herrschaft itself. A consideration of resistance makes clear that whatever negotiations take place, they are not solely or even primarily through 'representatives' of the two sides. The political process is not responsible in that sense, nor is it easily open to inspection to the outside observer. However the process of negotiation takes place – and a consideration of that complex matter cannot be dealt with at any great length here – it is useful to enquire into the manner in which the dominated express their desires. One such way lies in the reaction to a

local event – the momentary popularity of a local hero, the notoriety of some particular occasion. It is hard to stop people from rushing to have a look at whatever is going on. They threaten established authority by posing or suspending belief, by throwing normal categories into question.[70] The issues are dramatized not only by whatever event takes place, but also by the kind of reception it gets. In direct day-to-day confrontations, authorities can take more-or-less clear action, with the balance of power often being on their side. And any popular figure, superstition, or list of demands lies open to the authorities to discredit through the rationality of bureaucratic procedures. The chief weapon on the part of the dominated sometimes lies in the simple activity of gawking, the rush to join the crowd, the excitement of new belief and sudden hope which quickly dissipates, the momentary suspension of assent. A vision or dramatic action can mediate a complex set of values or provide a transitory grasp of an alternative reality. It may vanish quickly as a whole or, even if its memory remains, the internal message may change even as everyday reality changes. Examples of such momentary articulations of social values will be dealt with in chapters 2 and 6.

The concept of community

The following chapters are to a large extent about communities, most of them large, nucleated villages, a few of them collections of hamlets, and several of them small towns. Because these communities are situated in what has been variously designated as 'pre-modern', 'early modern', 'feudal', or 'traditional' Europe, the concept of 'community' or *Gemeinschaft* suggests itself as an organizing element for study.[71] Gemeinschaft as an analytical category has been criticized for its ideological flavor, but nevertheless has become part of the intellectual equipment of most social scientists in one form or another. Whether seen historically as a social form preceding a modern 'Gesellschaft', or as what one finds in the dynamics of small group, face-to-face relationships, Gemeinschaft seems unavoidable. Sometimes, the English word 'community' is given a meaning akin to Gemeinschaft, but it often has been tied more simply to a certain kind of social science practice, namely the concentration on small groups, bounded in one way or another, as units of research. The problem here is that the investigator, by choosing a 'bounded' unit – a community in the second sense

– tends to assume community in the first sense, a group of people with shared goals, purposes, or ends.

It is neither possible nor desirable here to go into the complex literature on community, but it might be helpful to suggest a few distinctions which are central for the analysis in this book. There is an outsider and an insider view of communal processes, and much of what follows is an attempt to analyze the notions from the inside. But we must not expect villagers to provide us with sociological concepts. Even whether villagers think in terms of villages is an open question, for that seems to change with time. It appears to be the case, for example, that in the sixteenth century a sharp dichotomy was drawn between country and city as such, and one does not find many references to a strong identification with a specific village as having a specific character. Such references multiply in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as examples from chapters 4 and 6 show. Inside a village, the way in which relations are perceived and constructed are close to practice, and certain key terms are constantly reiterated. These concepts and terms are what we are looking for. We also want to use villagers' conceptions to refine our own and to subject them to criticism.

There are two guiding principles in my notion of 'community', and here I mean the small town or village community – the Gemeinde. Community is a matter of mediations and reciprocities and it cannot be analyzed apart from Herrschaft. What makes community possible is the fact that it involves a series of mediated relationships. One central form of mediation, of course, is provided by property – the access to resources, the apportionment of rights and claims, and the acceptance of obligations and duties. Other forms of mediation can be found within the spheres of production and exchange or in the sphere of social value – the way, for example, honor is allocated within the constant reflection of villagers upon each other. By emphasizing relationships, it can be seen that community includes both negative and positive elements, both sharing and conflict. From the theologian's or psychologist's point of view, then, community exists where not just love but also frustration and anger exist.[72] In several chapters, we will find that villagers grasped community most centrally under the terms 'envy' and 'hate'.

In some respects there are as many communities as there are mediated relations. This fact is recognized, for example, in such terms as 'marital community'. It suggests the use of the concept for those relationships which contain multiple links and are structured over time. The issue in most of the examples in this book is to what degree a community is a community; in what way a collectivity such as a village or a neighborhood is bound together through mediated relationships involving aid, conflict, aggression, and sharing. In the way that we confront the reality of village life, we see that community was not something 'pre-modern', unchanging, structural, but was constructed, changed with time, and can only be grasped as historical process because those elements through which relations were constructed, whether 'real' or symbolic resources, were constantly in movement.

Notions such as Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft when ordered temporally often cloud important issues in so far as history can only enter when a break in forms of society takes place. It is common with such dichotomous concepts to introduce process only in the transformation from one structure to the other.[73] It is forgotten to begin with that reproduction is also a process and as much subject to historical effort as any other process. But more than that, concepts of this kind have to be useful for grasping both real changes and, where relevant, forces for structural stasis. Since we know that villages were constantly altering their structural relations as the nature of state institutions changed, then concepts are necessary for dealing with this matter. But even here Herrschaft appears to be dynamic while 'community' tends to be historically flat. Perhaps we can avoid historical flatness by stressing changes in the way relations between people were mediated. If, for example, a peasant can get along with one horse for plowing, then relations between households are in part determined by access to this important instrument of production. Horseless peasants will be caught up in daily relationships of dependence in order to ensure adequate plowing at the right time. But if, as was common in Württemberg, many villagers in the late eighteenth century shifted over to cattle, relations would have undergone structural alterations. Two cows or oxen were necessary for plowing, and practically no one could make up a plow team on their own. As a result, interdependence in production had to take quite different forms.

What is common in community is not shared values or common understanding so much as the fact that members of a community are engaged in the same argument, the same *raisonnement*, the same *Rede*, the same discourse, in which alternative strategies, misunderstandings, conflicting goals and values are threshed out. In so far as the individuals in a community may all be caught up in different webs of connection to the outside, no one is bounded in his relations by the community, and boundedness is not helpful in describing what community is.[74] What

makes community is the discourse. In so far as part or much of what people do does not enter in any way into the discourse, to that extent they simply pass each other by. Yet, the problem of inside and outside is complex. What one does outside of community may have enormous implications for one's position inside, and vice versa.

Although it is crucial to introduce mediation into the analysis of community processes, that should not imply that the village community was in any way autonomous. This point was grasped clearly by the peasant prophet in chapter 2. It was no use, he suggested, for the community to do penance as long as dominant outsiders remained unreconstructed. He was making an essential argument, namely that the Gemeinde was constituted within Herrschaft. That does not mean that authorities or magistrates had access to the 'secrets' of the village and intentionally penetrated into its every corner, as discussions in chapters 5 and 6 show. Rather the inescapable fact of appropriation, for example, had implications for the structuring of the web of village relations. This can be seen in the way the good *Hausvater* was evaluated in the context of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century state policy as the essential link in the apparatus. How this was translated into extra-economic power inside the village is the subject of chapter 5.

The implications of Herrschaft for community can even be seen in the metaphorical structure of communal thought. One central idiom, for example, in the period under consideration was witchcraft. It was the vehicle, so to speak, for emotions of envy which were so central for communal life. And in a more general way it also offered a category for mapping the lines of force between male and female, old and young, rich and poor, powerful and weak, kin and non-kin. Yet witchcraft as a dynamic inside village life was not able to withstand the defining power of church and state authorities. The process of constructing social metaphor and the dialectic between community and Herrschaft are examined in chapters 3, 4 and 5.

The concept of person

The concept of 'person' suggests to us the psychodynamics of the individual. It holds out the possibility of studying the emotional experiences and subjective lives of those to whom we give our attention. Yet there are serious objections to the notion that we can reconstruct the emotional life of individuals as they experienced it, a discussion of which would take us too far from our object.[75] Instead of dealing with

individual psychology, the point here is to examine how the person is constituted by his position within a matrix of relations. Our intention is to examine the field in which the self is situated – the social forces and the apparatus of perception of these forces. A further issue has to do with how the different elements of the social map impinge on the individual and his destiny.[76] It makes a difference to the construction of the self, for example, whether an individual finds explanation for his destiny in his own moral capacities, in the ill-will of his neighbors, in the magic practices of kin, in the arbitrary will of God, or in the ineluctable forces of the economy. The positioning of the individual between spirit and flesh, God and the devil, friend and enemy, kin and neighbor is central to the way the person, his cognitive and motivational structures are grasped.

Enmity (*Feindschaft*) is one 'native' category which recurs throughout this book. In the first chapter, we encounter the person inside a field of enemies (*Feinde*) and supporters (*Gutherzigen*), in which envy and hate are central motivations ascribed to certain relationships. In the instances discussed there, it does not appear that hate and envy are emotions ascribed to the evil in people, but they arise from ambiguities or injustices in the apportionment of rights. Enmity was positional and was not understood as embedded in a consistent personality structure or as subject to will.

In the several chapters dealing with situations after the Thirty Years' War, issues of envy, aggression, and fear are raised in the context of kinship and community relationships. The discussions there are largely about how the universe of social relationships was imagined and given structure. A basic distinction was made between villagers and kin, and within kin between 'friends' and 'relatives'. Friends (*Freunde*) were those who were related to an individual through marriage, while 'relatives' (*Verwandte*) were blood relations. In chapter 3, which deals with a young girl suspected of being a witch, a distinction was made between the kind of influences or dangers that one could expect from consanguineal relations and those apt to come from neighbors and affines. It can be noted here that while affines define actual kin, neighbors can be categorized into marriageable and non-marriageable, or potential and non-potential kin, and concomitant dangers distributed accordingly. Marriageable neighbors can sometimes act like affines and can be in a wider sense 'friends'. In the imaginary world of the young girl, aggression of the kind labeled 'enmity' was to be found among neighbors and not among blood relatives. For the pastor in chapter 4,

enmity was central to social relations and was closely tied up with family networks in struggle with each other. To fail to make 'friends', i.e. to make a marriage alliance, was tantamount for him to creating enemies. In chapter 5, a sharp distinction is made between blood relatives and 'friends', and enmity was now placed among the wider network of blood relations. Affinal kin were expected actively to support each other as friends.

This basic dichotomy between blood relatives and affinal kin is one of the central axes along which various dangers were divided up – unintended and intended, pollution and aggression. Leach has argued that it is possible in many societies to map the various types of dangers consistently on to the kinship structure.[77] Such a mapping exercise for Württemberg rural society would associate blood relatives with unintended influence/pollution without great specificity, and affinal kin, close neighbors, and potential marriage partners with intentional, contractural, aggressive behavior. Reciprocities in this latter realm were more subject to continual negotiation. Exactly where 'enemy' fits into this scheme is not so clear to see, but perhaps we can make several distinctions. In a village with rich and poor, the generalized envy of the poor could bring about a person's illness (discussed in chapter 1). The effects do not seem to have been specific – not the particular envy of the poor or specific poor people against a particular person. Rather the general condition of envy could bring about a random illness and even death. In this case, one might speak of pollution, and the village in this case is conceived of as a moral isolate, a kind of family. 'Enemy' does not seem to have been a relevant term here. Enemy comes into play from those with intended aggression and most clearly from one's equals – close neighbors, people with whom one can be in conflict over property and the like, affines. Affines are the quintessential enemies because they define the group in which one finds marriage partners, one's equals, those people whom it is necessary to cooperate with in order to survive but with whom one is in the greatest competition.[78] Witchcraft is interesting here because it has two aspects, the polluting or seduction aspect – getting others to become witches – and the aggression/envy aspect – attacks on animals, causing sickness of children, etc. I cannot claim to see consistency in the symbolism throughout these cases, but would argue that in each case where kinship is examined, some kind of a consistent mapping exercise takes place, distinguishing between affinal and blood relatives, between pollution and aggression, between friend and enemy.

The way the world surrounding the person was mapped played a central role in the way people explained their destinies to themselves and to each other. Two considerations are important for us here, namely a distinction between intended and unintended danger and the locus of explanation for what happens to the individual.[79] In chapter 1, we encounter direct, aggressive danger in the form of witchcraft and unspecific, generalized danger arising from social divisions in the community. The envy by the poor of the rich could bring about some specific individual's sickness just as the direct magical attack on the part of a neighbor could. In the period after the Thirty Years' War, the distinctions between consanguines and affines, and between kin and neighbors, played an important role in the way a fix on social relationships was taken. Blood relationships gave status to the individual in village society and were a 'given'. One could expect pollution or taint in so far as negative danger was to be expected – say in the way alcoholism might be inherited from an uncle or witchcraft run in families. One of the issues in the post-war period was just how far blood relations extended and what responsibilities one had for kin. Attack and conscious aggression, however, were to be found among step-relatives, affinal kin, and neighbors. Neighbor women tested bread borrowed from neighbors for witchcraft, and they made sure they took communion with a dying neighbor to prove they had not caused the death.[80] A husband might be under attack from his wife or a wife from her husband through bewitched meals.[81] By the eighteenth century, in the context of negotiable affinal relations, epithets such as 'witch' were flung about with abandon in case of conflict, but relations between blood relatives, whether close or distant, even when structured by enmity did not have the notion of magical attack.[82]

These distinctions are useful in emphasizing the fact that the person is grasped under different kinds of powers, which in turn are embedded in different kinds of social relationships. If the deep rift between poor and wealthy was an essential aspect of the community in the sixteenth century, so the notion of person and destiny was related to that fact. The sorting out of family obligations and the meaning of family in the social reorganization after the Thirty Years' War was likewise crucial for remapping the position of the person. The split between modest landowners and handicraftsmen and the growing disciplining of the village population within new hierarchical forms of state authority provide the context in which the person was understood in the eighteenth century.

From the cases offered in this book it is not possible to construct a history of the person, yet a few suggestions will be put forward here. In the instances discussed in chapter 1, the person was understood within the categories of community and Herrschaft, both of which posed issues of justice. Envy and hate were emotions determined by external conditions – by injustice, oppression, or legal ambiguity. In this situation, guilt was not so much a feeling as a condition, less a part of consciousness as one of position. Above all emotion was a reflection of external condition and not part of an integrated motivational structure. The role memory plays in integrating such a structure was missing. In this kind of situation, if disaster befell an individual, he knew where to seek for an explanation, namely within the fissures of the community or among those in competition with him over land, inheritance, and the like. He could make himself ritually dangerous by making his own enmity public.

In the aftermath of the Thirty Years' War, Herrschaft and community were again central, but with rather different emphases and slightly different logic. In chapter 2, we encounter a vision where sin was grasped as individual but retribution as collective. But this was not just a matter of sin/retribution inside the community, for the village was grasped in its essential insertion into the wider network of Herrschaft. Retribution for the sins of the lord was visited on the subjects. In this situation guilt was not tied to an inner feeling of remorse and a personal search for salvation – nor was it the external problem of one's position vis-à-vis others in a conflict over rights. Rather guilt was subsumed under the radical, arbitrary power of God to punish. Disaster to the individual was interpreted at once as collective and irrational.

In the fourth chapter all the turning points in the life of the pastor studied were sought by him outside himself and his own moral capacities. Explanation for what happened to him was grasped within the web of kinship relations and the world of partisanship. By offering a radical vision of everyday life as a partisan struggle, he offers an alternative vision to that of the prophet from 1648 discussed in chapter 2. There was no link between the everyday life in the village and the more inclusive political and social structures. The fortunes of the person were not tied to social and economic conditions nor to the dynamics of Herrschaft – a loss from the vision of the prophet. Instead, the pastor reemphasized the Lutheran division between the flesh and the spirit and offered a totally negative view of the former. No longer were social splits capable of general effect, nor was the person tied up in retribution

visited on the community – rather there was no justice at all in the realm of the flesh, and society was a never-ending struggle of will against will, and person against person, inside protective webs of kinship. Every occasion for good or evil had an explanation, and all fortune was the outcome of personal forces. In this situation conscience played little part.

By the mid eighteenth century, we can see that 'conscience' had come to mean different things according to one's position in the social structure. There was as yet no notion of the person as a single, integrated center of awareness. Indeed, one observer noted that villagers 'did not know how to remember'. Thus conscience, in the terms discussed at the time in elite culture – as a steering mechanism of behavior, linked to consciousness as a consistent unity – could have no meaning. Action was not cued by integrated sets of principles. Conscience for everyone was retroactive rather than proactive, just as it had been conceived of in the Reformation.[83] It now became an active device in a set of social relations understood under the rubric of 'fear'.

From this sketch and from the material discussed in the book, it should be clear that the 'person' is an historical construct.[84] The elements we have discussed here – the sense of guilt, conscience, the nature of human power, enmity and friendship, individuality and collectivity – were reorganized continually as shifts in the structure of Herrschaft and changes in the social order took place. It should also be underlined that even inside the small society of the village there were alternative conceptions of the person. It is possible for some to have held the view that the sin of an individual would bring collective punishment from God while others interpreted the signs as evidence of their own personal guilt.

A central issue that emerges from the material is the extent to which the notion of the person entails a bounded and integrated motivational structure. Not only is the problem of the conjunction of belief and action a central problem in this respect, but it also has implications for the way the historian views popular culture or the anthropologist views social structure.[85] We handle the issues in some detail in chapter 6, where there is a confrontation between a commissioner sent from the central authorities in Stuttgart and the villagers under investigation. He expected to find a more-or-less clear set of ideas consistently held, from which the terrible act of burying a live bull emerged. While on the one hand he denied rationality to the villagers – they were not 'used to

thinking about cause and effect' – on the other hand he had no other model of motivation than that rooted in consistent opinion, however false. But the motivational universe of the villagers does not seem to be understandable in terms of a set of ideas but rather in terms of that discourse which takes account of the set of relations and changing positions in village social life. It does not seem that the relation of belief to action is one of principles and action which follows from those principles. Rather action emerges out of the tension between necessity and desire to act and the fluctuating set of relations caught up in argument. The analysis of this problem will take us into the nature of village 'gossip', 'rumor', and 'knowledge' and will show that motivation was at once as plastic and as bounded as the ever changing set of village social relations.

1

Communion and community: The refusal to attend the Lord's Supper in the sixteenth century

Whoever, therefore, eats the bread or drinks the cup of the Lord in an unworthy manner, will be guilty of profaning the body and blood of the Lord. Let a man examine himself, and so eat of the bread and drink of the cup. For anyone who eats and drinks without discerning the body eats and drinks judgment upon himself. That is why many of you are weak and ill, and some have died.

I Cor. 11.27–30

There I met an old man
Who would not say his prayers.
I took him by the left leg
And threw him down the stairs.

English nursery rhyme

The sources for this chapter are the church visitation records for the duchy of Württemberg from the 1580s, available in the Protestant Church Archives in Stuttgart.[1] Records from church visitations were kept from the 1520s to the 1820s, although their character changed radically with time, and there are many gaps. For the sixteenth century, only the decade after 1580 is complete. In general, the records are reports made by the superintendent of each diocese upon the occasion of his annual or semi-annual inspection of his parishes.[2] Each parish received a page or two of attention, with most space taken up with details about the pastor and schoolmaster. Occasionally a particular dispute between pastor and parishioners or a notorious case of unchristian behavior came in for more-or-less extended comment. In the 1580s one such recurrent case involved the refusal to attend communion on the part of some individual or individuals in a village or small town. In each instance, the bare outline of a story was given, and there are no additional documents

inside the village. In the end, a serious fight broke out after the balance of power had been tipped. The faction attacking the Schultheiss could not imagine how the Schultheiss, having so clearly failed in his linking the Sage with action, could nonetheless have emerged with his power and honor enhanced. Whenever outsiders mixed into village affairs, the situation veered off into absurdity.

For the Reformation and for the moral philosophers of the Enlightenment, the accent was always on right belief. Justification, after all, came from faith, which, whatever the nuance of position, brought a noetic element to the first rank. When moral philosophers became concerned with reform, they attacked from the outset crass religious beliefs, uneducated conscience, or corrupting ignorance. Whatever the degree of optimism, it was necessary to attack these matters first before good practice on the part of the mass of the population could follow. Württemberg villagers, on the other hand, were more worldly wise, or perhaps saw under the mask of reforming notions the realities of social discipline and domination; they were more apt to see belief as a kind of matrix from which different sorts of action could flow. This was so because practical action grew out of the situation; it was part of a strategy directed towards maintaining or enhancing one's position in a web of social relationships. A story, a theory, a coherent structure of ideas could be shaped and reshaped in village discourse without anyone necessarily giving assent to them in any specific way. Community members could describe village opinion on a certain point without implying belief or the willingness to take any specific action on the basis of that opinion. What was thought to be the case and what people did were not linked in the definite way that a simplistic hermeneutic would expect. In fact 'mistakes of belief' were considered to be of very secondary importance and carefully distinguished from 'sins of wickedness', the latter being imputable largely to past actions in the light of how they worked out, and in terms of the social relationships that were rearranged.

Conclusion

A central feature of the analysis so far has to do with the dialogue over the nature of the individual carried on between state officials and rural village inhabitants from the second half of the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century. I have tried to show how the historian can draw conclusions about the nature of communal discourse on the subject, but I am well aware of the thinness of some of the results of my 'thick' description. A great deal of work remains to be done on all of the issues raised in this book, and I can only attest to the richness and variety of sources available for analyzing the nature of early modern German popular culture. In the discussion which follows, I want to reflect on some of the ways the exercise of Herrschaft introduced particular notions of the person, and in doing so, I want to confine myself largely to the evidence provided so far. The issues are far more complex than will be handled here, but it is useful not to draw broader conclusions until further spadework has been done on how villagers actually formulated their ideas, conducted themselves, and interacted with their fellows. I do not wish at this point to investigate at any great length books, tracts, and broadsheets which villagers and small town inhabitants possessed and presumably read, because the problem still remains how they understood them and how the ideas of churchmen–administrators, devotional writers, preachers, and folksingers actually entered into village discourse. Anyone who has sat in church long enough knows how difficult it is to draw conclusions about the social life of parishioners from the message of the preacher. But even if we take the popular classes as our object for study, we still have to consider very carefully what the actual message delivered in the village was. We have seen that pastors Schertlin, Bregenzer, Breuninger, and Mauchard all communicated notions which cannot be inferred from their theological training or their libraries.

Sometimes in order to handle large, complex issues, it is helpful to simplify considerably, so that the analysis can be sharpened and certain aspects emphasized. In this case, in encountering officials of the duchy of Württemberg, two broad, fundamental aspects of state practice have emerged, which without too much distortion can be labeled respectively the 'fiscal' and the 'sacral'. I wish to suggest that there were two general sources of state ideology in the early modern period and that they were rooted in different needs of the state. Herrschaft did not just involve a more-or-less well run program of expropriation; it was also heavily into the business of pastoral care. In neither instance was the development of ideology crude or simple. Within the terms of Herrschaft, many needs of village inhabitants were satisfied, and the hierarchy of communal power was entangled in its structures in complex ways. Viewed from above, the two aspects of state power involved separate, although related hierarchies. Sometimes officials were delivering the same message, and sometimes they were at odds with each other. We have seen in chapter 2 how the local pastor had emerged as a stern critic of taxation and various forms of official corruption. Between him and the Schultheiss, there had been a long-standing conflict about the nature of secular power. In chapter 5, the conflict between the two sources of ideology formation and between the two sets of officials seemed almost to take on the flavor of class conflict. In any event, both sides of the hierarchies of Herrschaft in the end were concerned with the well-ordering of the state – and at least by implication with its financial well-being – and with the spiritual/moral natures of subjects. Exactly how the state-church and the sacralized state interrelated is worth examining closely, and we will want to suggest a few aspects of that interaction at the level of the village in the ideology of the individual.

What conditioned the fiscal needs of the early modern state were changes in the nature and organization of warfare, on the one hand, and the problem of maintaining internal security, on the other. Fritz Redlich has provided a thorough analysis of the new military situation confronting central Europe in the sixteenth century and demonstrated how capitalist financial institutions within a structure of feudal expropriation created the conditions for the emergence of the 'military enterpriser'.[1] The competitive situation, driven on by ever-expanding cash flows, eventually radically transformed the nature of statecraft. Either the enterpriser was to become the state (Wallenstein) or the state had to set up and rationalize its own organization and recruitment of military

force. As far as internal security was concerned, the great example of the problem in central Europe was the Peasant War of 1525, which was able to extend so widely and last so long because most of the German princes had overextended themselves in the Italian wars.[2] A glance at the correspondence between the princes shows that their chief concern was about how to get their hands on sufficient funds to pay for military captains and their hirelings to suppress the revolt. In larger territories, the centrifugal tendency inherent in the transformed military organization, 'bastard feudalism', and the new networks of power cemented by cash patronage, help explain the need on the part of princes and monarchs to create an independent officialdom at the cost of offering them ownership of their offices.[3] When by the mid seventeenth century the extension of state competence to the permanent organization of a military force took place, a further expansion of bureaucratic controls as well as financial sources to pay for them was necessary. Similarly, the state became concerned with the systematic exploitation of its population for military personnel. At the beginning of the process of securing a financial base for the new costs of warfare, subjects often resisted new arbitrary forms of taxation and feudal rent payments. Another period of intense conflict occurred during the depression of the seventeenth century when the great reorganization of military power, together with extensive and expensive warfare, was taking place. In the long run, the economic changes brought about by military organization, bureaucratization, and taxation were considerable, but the issue for us here is the ideological development which came as a result of the reorganization of feudal relationships.

The ideological intervention, which is so important to understand in any investigation of the early modern construction of the person, was closely related to the way the fiscal state gained access to the individual. We must be clear on the fact that many kinds of people remained outside the authority of the state until the professional revolution, led by medical bureaucrats, took place in the nineteenth century. Except as murder victims, small children, for example, practically never fell under the protection of the courts. In 8000 court protocols from one village from 1730 to 1870, there is no case of child molestation on the part of parents brought to official attention, and there are only a handful of cases where parents objected to neighbors disciplining their children.[4] Not every kind of behavior and not every kind of person fell under the jurisdiction of civil authority. The innovative grip on its subjects which the state extended grew out of the logic of an ideology

based one way or another on its fiscal needs.[5] In the sixteenth century, this meant clarifying the units responsible for tax payments, assigning correlative rights to various kinds of property, defining more carefully the responsibilities of village hierarchies to outside authorities, and drawing up ever more carefully the rules of property devolution. In fact, one of the greatest innovations of the sixteenth century can be found in its extensive cadastral surveys and inheritance codifications. In the first instance, it was not so much a matter of radically changing any rules as fixing them down in written form. Then one had a way of knowing where some field escaped the attention of the state, or where a bit of waste land could be put to better use, or where the relative production capacity of different plots could be subjected to more sophisticated rates of expropriation. The basis was only laid in the sixteenth century, but the process of remeasuring, revaluing, and optimizing land use stretched over the next two centuries.

In Württemberg, cadastres were first drawn up at the end of the fifteenth century, just about when the crisis in state financing of military power first made itself felt. Tax lists were drawn up on a crude assessment of immovable property in the several decades before the mid sixteenth century, but, on the basis of two cadastral renovations and ever more precise attachment of land to village inhabitants, a first attempt was made at the turn of the century to provide an exhaustive register, not of taxes to be paid but of property valuations on which any particular tax could be apportioned. There is no need to follow the steps of increasingly exact and comprehensive book-keeping represented by the extensive series of marriage and *post mortem* inventories begun in the 1550s, or the records of land sales and mortgages going back well into the seventeenth century. On their basis, whenever a peasant had overextended himself, he could be efficiently put under a guardian or have his land auctioned off, before his creditors suffered or the state watched back taxes disappear on the books. The full implications of the system only developed in the eighteenth century, when this constantly revised form of feudal property and form of exploitation began to show strain. Further rationalization was then only possible under the great wave of liberal law-giving in the nineteenth century, when the individual was fully discovered and set free from the restrictions of tithes, feudal rents, and coordinated village agriculture – at his own expense, of course. But that takes us beyond our problem here. Broadly speaking, we can say that access of the fiscal state to the village in the sixteenth century moved largely around problems of rights of access to

property, and in the eighteenth, on the basis of clearly defined property rights, centered more on raising levels of production/expropriation. But it should be clear that innovation growing out of the logic of the fiscal state took place on a broad front and was not just a matter of increasing taxes. Resistance, therefore, was sometimes frontal in terms of a tax revolt or the like, but was more likely to be partial and involve only some sectors of the population.

To show how varied the ideology could be, we can illustrate the process with two examples of how state officials gained access to village life and how various interests in the population were related to the ideology in different ways. In Württemberg in the second half of the sixteenth century, the prince's officials became concerned with the problems of control of the forest.[6] Sometimes this had to do with a differentiation of rights between village and crown or between village and some ducal institution, whereby villagers were excluded from forests to which they had 'traditionally' had access as the duke began to exploit them to his own advantage. More often, however, concern had to do with the depletion of forest resources as such – under the pressure of population, for one thing – and state officials began to lay down restrictive rules even for village-owned forest land. Recognizing the dependence of the peasant producer on forest for building, firewood, fodder, etc., officials were concerned with maintaining a proper balance in the household economy such that the peasant would remain a viable rent and tax payer. Although rents were seldom on forest products as such, the well-being of a peasant enterprise was determined by the whole set of resources, and the state was concerned with a clear definition of rights to use the varied and complex forest land. At the same time as the state began to intrude in this area, sometimes because of the intrusion and sometimes parallel to it, conflicts developed between peasant proprietors and farm laborers, or between larger peasants and smallholders, or between well-off and poor over access to village forest. The participants fought over the right to gather beechnuts and acorns, to herd geese, goats, pigs, and sheep, to gather grass and kindling, and to cut wood for building and repairing houses, barns, and sheds and for maintaining fences. In this situation, the state then stepped in as a mediator, sorting out the issue of rights to community-held resources by aiding in the closer definition of property. By the eighteenth century, state officials were more clearly involved in the process of optimizing the resource in itself, acting as managers in planting, rotating tree crops, and the like. In this example, one can see how the state was concerned

with broad aspects of peasant production and with sorting out rights to village resources. Although the fulcrum of state interest was the peasant farm as an object of taxation, it both innovated social change and continually adjudicated the conflicting interests of villagers. As a result, the ideology was focussed on the peasant enterprise, farm or household, and a discourse of obligation, duty, claim, and right was created around that productive unit, a discourse which slowly changed its tone eventually to emphasize successful management and productivity.

The second example is the *Spinnstube*, a basic village institution, subjected to numerous ordinances and steady comment by state officials. In essence, it was a kind of spinning bee, a winter evening gathering of unmarried women, which combined work and relaxation. Naturally, such assemblies were the focus of intense interest on the part of unmarried village men. Hans Medick has shown that the many ordinances in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries attempting to control immorality in these gatherings were aimed by-and-large at the vigorous youth culture.[7] The central idea was to make it impossible for young people to arrange marriages on their own and to see that marriage alliances followed the rules of property ownership. By supporting parents and intervening in Spinnstuben activities, the state was concerned with property devolution, inheritance, alliance, and the consequent access to resources. In the eighteenth century, by contrast, economic aspects of the Spinnstube came to the fore. Enlightenment commentators came to see that competition in the Spinnstube for honor among the young women spurred on work and provided a natural selection process for bringing together productive partners. In this example as well, the opening wedge of state contact centered on the issue of obligations and rights derived from institutions distributing access to property. Immorality as an issue was embedded quite precisely in the dynamics of family obligation. In a broad way, the household became a theme here as well, and the authority of the Hausvater was supported at its weakest point – where the problem of transition between generations appeared, when property devolution was at issue. By the eighteenth century, state administrators began to see the possibility of playing the parental role themselves in the interest of greater productivity and a larger tax base.

The fiscal state first created a discourse over the house and householder as a logical step to securing the peasant enterprise on a viable economic footing. A constant barrage of ordinances read in every village and town, either in church or to Bürger assembled for the occasion, promulgated the ideology of the Haus with its Hausvater. They restricted expensive weddings, large outlays at christenings, village dancing, all of the parts of peasant culture which set up among village members horizontal exchanges that could compete with vertical exchanges with the state. The massive attack on peasant culture was aimed at creating an image of the individual as a productive member of a house and cutting many of the ties which bound house inhabitants to their fellows.

In the early modern construction of the individual, the officials of the sacral state also played a central role. It is perhaps rather bold to abstract briefly from a long and complex history, but before the sixteenth century, there seem to have been two crucial turning points which help focus the issues for us here. It appears that the great discovery of the Carolingian period was that people have basic needs.[8] At least this was a central part of the understanding in that period about the nature of church reform. Illich has argued that the churchmen–administrators of the period promoted the idea that certain common needs among men could only be satisfied by professional agents, which in essence was a bid for creating a population dependent on their services. The second stage coincided with the Renaissance, when the final touches were put on the doctrine of individual souls. Pastoral care came to depend on a notion of the soul as having an inherent nature and supported the conception with a series of anti-images, which involved a radical innovation in the ideology of the person. Where there had once been crimes, punishable according to their seriousness, there now appeared individuals with monstrous natures. The heretic, the witch, and the homosexual were recognizable for the first time as intrinsically other, not part of the body of Christ.[9] The simultaneous development of the images and their fluid transitions in meaning can be illustrated with the term 'bugger'.[10] It went from designating 'separated' Bulgarian Christians in the ninth century, to the gnostic sect of Bogumils, to the Albigensian heretics, and finally to people whose natures as sexual beings were 'separate'. The confusion of categories still occurred in sixteenth century Württemberg where villagers referred to sodomy as 'heresy' (*Ketzerei*).[11]

In the history of the emerging notion of the individual, there are three aspects that should be emphasized here. (1) The ideology arose in a framework of professional pastoral care. (2) The complex set of notions came to be mediated through images of consistently 'normal' and 'abnormal' natures. (3) The point of contact between the officials of

the sacral state and the newly defined individual was the house. Illich summarizes the set of connections in his discussion of the Albigensian crusade of the fourteenth century:

> 'The object of the fourteenth-century crusade against heretics in Languedoc was the network of households around Albi, which embraced attractive, *locally* ruled heterodox beliefs. "Cathar" households were perceived as forming infectious cancers within the body of the Church. The inquisition pried into the household to find out if the poison had spread throughout the channels of kinship from a related *domus*. Up until this time, members of households had come to the Church; now the Church moved in the opposite direction, overstepping the house's threshold. The deviant individual became the object of inquisitorial diagnosis and care. Within the heretical household, the theologian sniffed out the bugger, the person smelling of heresy. In this context, the term "bugger" was used in a doubly new way: It imputed a warped nature rather than mere criminal behavior, a monstrosity rather than nature's sinful enjoyment outside the bounds set by God.'[12]

The Reformation, of course, was heir to the notions developed by the late medieval church. In fact, it would not be stretching a point too far to view the Reformation as a revolution in pastoral care. To the extent that this was so, the new conceptions of the individual were of immense service once the first enthusiasm of renewed faith gave way to a long term program of discipline. We have seen how care of souls in Württemberg in the second half of the sixteenth century was centered on the periodic celebration of communion.[13] But villagers attempted to reappropriate the institution and turn it to their own use, emphasizing the insertion of the individual in the set of communal relations. They saw communion as a service which they would come to use when the time was right, which was quite the contrary to the intent of the officials, who considered participation obligatory and used the institution as a tool for putting in practice their program of social and moral discipline, without entertaining the slightest doubt but that the objects of their care needed the proffered services.

The issue that was dealt with by many churchmen at the beginning of the seventeenth century was the relation of external behavior to internal belief. It was felt that while the Reformation had brought true doctrine, a reformation in character was also necessary, and many argued that a true Christian was known by how he lived. A close examination of the theological writings of churchmen–administrators shows that

there was a conjunction between the problem posed by the 'sacral state' and that posed by the 'fiscal state'. Johann Valentin Andreae can serve as an example.[14] The central issue for him was the authentic religious experience, which had two distinct sides, right belief and good behavior, for he considered the super-moral religious person if not following right doctrine as a sham.[15] But correct belief could only be demonstrated by a penitent heart and daily practice of a moral life.[16] He argued that purity of religion had been established with the Reformation, but the task of his century was to establish purity of life.[17] His solution was a program of discipline, which began with communion but went beyond that to a morals court, which would control card playing, swearing, lewd singing, idleness, marital conflict, and insolence of children.[18] He saw all of these delicts as disruptive of a proper life centered in the house. Thus at the same time as the needs of state fiscality were moving in the direction of an ideology of the house and good householder, so also this was taken up as a central element of the church. The individual was grasped by Andreae as fulfilling his religious quest only in his household duties, and in turn the well-functioning household contributed to the well-being of the state. Mediating the relationship of individual/house/state was to be the awakened Christian conscience, which was conceived by him as an instrument of moral discipline.[19]

The program which exercised officials of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was harnessing the well-ordered house to the needs of the state. Yet there was always tension in the legitimacy requirements of the two sides of state activity. As we have seen in the case of Keil and the pastor he was closely tied to, religion could serve as a source of criticism of the activities of the fiscal state.[20] Or the search for authentic religious experience could run in conflict with the official ideology of the house in the way the pastors damned the Drohmann brothers, who fulfilled the secular officials' definition of the good Christian householder.[21] In fact, the complexity of the issues, overlapping interests, and mutual and conflicting ways of seeing reality characterized relations between the two sets of elites.

The issue for us here has to do with some of the ways the notion of the person was developed inside the two parts of state ideology production and the process by which that notion – or better notions – were introduced. We are only offered fleeting glimpses into particular moments of much more complex discussions, and it is often very difficult to see the implications of the choice of images, words, and

metaphors by which people explained or disguised their intentions to each other. What frequently seems to be at issue is an ever developing and ever more precise notion of the individual as an integrated whole, detachable from the matrix of social relations, and definable in terms of a discrete set of needs. In elite culture, the issues were often discussed around the notion of freedom, and each generation offered a different approach to the problem. Indispensable for the discussion were notions of discipline and conscience. To what degree villagers accepted some of the terms of pastoral and official discourse is difficult to say, but we can review the material in the preceding chapters to find some clues. In general, we will find villagers resisting in one way or other a notion of the unique, integrated, more-or-less consistent individual.

It is hard to get away from a notion of the individual to which we have been socialized. Clifford Geertz has remarked:

> 'The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social and natural background, is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures.'[22]

It is perhaps too strong to refer to this as the 'Western' conception of the person and not to recognize the enormous historical change and development. As well, it is important to see that the notion Geertz describes has a strongly normative element and is a way of distinguishing 'pathologies' and exercising power. By no means do all sectors of the 'Western' population share the experience of what the value proposes as norm. Yet we can perhaps use Geertz's neat summary as a touchstone in our discussion to contrast the points of view of ruling powers and ruled subjects.

In the sixteenth-century case, we considered situations where the individual was grasped in terms of an inside/outside dichotomy. Villagers talked about the fleeting impressions of emotional fluctuation in terms of the heart. But these were not a series of emotional states proceeding from a dynamic center of awareness but emotions reflecting external conditions. To be subject to attack from someone exercising witchcraft, or to be locked into a tangle with the authorities, or to be thrown into legal dispute with a neighbor or relative meant to have an unsettled heart. By contrast, clergymen were suggesting that one could

divorce the external from the internal and that subjective experience could build on a bounded, controllable set of emotions. One could forgive before justice was done and compose the heart despite a situation of conflict. This is an important contrast to a way of understanding inner psychological states as undetachable parts of *social* experience.

Officials were able to consider reconciliation as a subjective act, which could take place in spite of whatever situation of conflict in fact existed. In the dialogue with Hans Weiss, the superintendent dissimulated by suggesting he should reconcile himself with his neighbors, putting the various actors in the drama on a horizontal plane.[23] But Weiss, in refusing to see the matter as a problem of neighbors, immediately stressed the facts of power. The people he was in conflict with were not his 'neighbors' but those with power over him. For him, a retreat into subjectivity was a capitulation to the demands of hierarchy. In fact, running through all of the testimony in the cases dealing with communion is a sense that justice was opposed to the clergy's notion of the person. Reconciliation followed after the reestablishment of proper social relations, not before.

By the early seventeenth century, the ideological construct of the person began to undergo significant revision. The split between subjective life and objective behavior was reconsidered and programmatic elements involving a notion of a consistent personality structure began to emerge. Churchmen–administrators such as Andreae or Arndt tended to undervalue the practice of periodic reconciliation as they centered their interest on the conditions for promoting regularized behavior. In fact, they suggested that there was no significant difference between the way a person acted and his internal spiritual condition. Along with this went an understanding that the individual could stand divorced from the community of which he was a part. As Andreae put it, being a Christian meant being held in contempt by one's fellows.[24] Someone really rooted in his community was someone sunk in sin. Constructed in this way, the person was grasped as positive in so far as he served the needs of house, state, and church, which implicitly for Andreae meant an individual who was prepared to cut himself off from essential ties to his community.

Keil understood that the demands of the state were detrimental to community and modeled the person accordingly in two ways.[25] On the one hand, he refused to believe that the consequences of individual action were for the individual himself. The person was not divorceable from his fellows and his sin could have disastrous consequences for his

neighbors. On the other hand, he demonstrated how state activity could lead to individualistic behavior – in the way, for instance, gaming and usury followed from the example of higher officials. Implicit in how he constructed his vision was a counter-attack on a program of discipline. For him, expropriation was the central issue of the age, and he saw in state activity a denial of justice.

The clerical view of the person as individual was mediated in the seventeenth century through two fundamental images: the Christian and the witch. Both models were understood to be anti-communitarian and were in fact mirror images of each other. Both introduced a novel sense of the person into village society. It is difficult to follow in detail the history of popular notions of the witch, since too little close analysis of texts has been done to allow a balanced assessment. But it does seem to be the case that the witch as a consistent, evil person was developed first in elite culture.[26] How far the notion penetrated into village discourse is unclear. But we can see from Anna Catharina Weissenbühler's argument that one could tell that Gall Baum's wife was a witch by her evil face a tendency also to connect the external and internal as consistent with each other.[27] Perhaps therein lies an explanation for the fact that the contagion and seduction models of communication suddenly became so widespread in that society. In village and small town experience, the individual was grasped in community and communication modeled partly on the spoken word. In some way, sharing words with another was to commit oneself to him, to participate in a set of relationships. By grafting on to that experience the notion of a consistent personality, one that does not bend and change shape within shared experience, a unique individual, then the only model available was that of contamination. The word as a source of power when coupled with a notion of consistent evil was easily understood along lines of seduction. Just as God's Word was capable of creating the Christian with sudden force, so the words of the witch were capable of corruption with lightning speed. The witch craze of the seventeenth century can be seen as part of the dialectic between state and population, and one of its effects was to disseminate a notion of the person as detachable from the matrix of local relations. Indeed one of the curious theories developed by Johannes Brenz was that witches were incapable of doing any of the things to other people they supposedly thought they were doing. But because of their inner corruption, they deserved death.[28]

In the conception of a witch as one who simply engages in magic

practices, who seeks to exercise one of the alternative methods of power, there is an implicit notion of the person as part of a set of communal relationships. This is understood because the struggle is over one of the goods in the society: property, honor, and the like. In Favret-Saada's image, the struggle arises where there is not room for more than one person in a particular space or position.[29] Such a notion of magic and witchcraft does not necessarily imply an idea of a witch as a consistent being, as a thoroughly evil nature. For that, a theory was developed by state and church officials and became a matter of everyday practice during the period of the witch craze.

Pastor Bregenzer can perhaps be seen as a transitional figure.[30] In the way that he considered his enemies as thoroughly corrupt, he was working with an image of the person as consistent and integrated motivationally. Part of the force of his metaphors proceeded from the fact that he reduced the individual to his position in a particular house and in this he was centrally concerned with some of the main interests of the fiscal state: alliance, property devolution, and organization of the house. In the way that he saw society as broken up into radically conflicting family groups, he was driving towards individualism, while at the same time stressing the house as the locus of individual self-realization. He offers one example of the possibilities inherent in a conjunction of the pastoral and fiscal view of the person, and in his peculiar vision is captured a profound despair for the possibility of justice in this world.

How far the concept of the individual entered into village discourse and remained a continuing element of it is difficult to see. By the eighteenth century, such notions as good and bad householders suggested that some village members worked with notions of consistent personality structures.[31] The inherent usefulness of such conceptualizations in the daily practice of Herrschaft is plain to see. No longer are the problematic images of the witch (outwardly conforming but inwardly corrupt) or the heretic (outwardly pious but inwardly full of poison) relevant. For officials of the fiscal state as part of a culture slowly defining its autonomous set of values, the outward/inward issue no longer presented a problem. External behavior, what one actually produced, was the measure of the contribution to the state. And under this ideological protection, the local exercise of power took place. On the other hand, those who suffered under the arbitrary imposition of that structure found in conscience a countervailing power, a way of suggesting the legitimacy of their claim to justice and of developing a strategy for defending their own definition of their own needs.

In the final episode, discourse over the person moved on to the level of feelings. Canzlei Advocat Bolley thought of the living world as sentient and animals as subject to feelings analogous to those of humans. He contrasted darkness and brutality with enlightenment and sensitivity, thereby suggesting a new dimension in the discussion of the relation of the internal to the external. A central problem for him was to identify and bring to consciousness the different emotions and feelings one was capable of, to refine them, and to run one's conscious existence in terms of the analogous emotional states in other people and animals. The refinement of one's identity took place not in the web of real relations but in the definition of others as containing the same psychological states as oneself. Such a process of self-identification would take place in an educational program designed to train the conscience and reduce corrupting ignorance and superstition. By contrast, villagers, although not happy about the pain subjected on the bull, did not project their own inner states on to the bull and did not define themselves in terms of reflective sympathy. Rather, they were embedded in a practice whereby the individual and the shared meaning of the community were not set off against each other. They understood clearly what Bolley suppressed, that knowledge could not be abstracted from power or from use. Internalization of values is always the internalization of someone else's values – the issue being to know who the parties to the discourse are.

We have only been able to skim along the surface of the problem of the historical construction of reality. We have not found an essential folk culture located somewhere beneath a veneer of civilization or insulated from dominating powers through a series of protective mechanisms. There have been the bits and pieces of a continuing discourse in which relations between people were framed in this or that set of terms, metaphors, or images. We have studied in part the dialectic between reality and people's perception of reality, and observed the reconstruction of new realities in a round of good faith, dissimulation, self-interest, obligation, hope, and despair. We are all used to organizing the history of our civilization around the progressive emancipation of the individual, but we seldom look closely at the paradoxical costs of dependence on those who have brought the message of freedom. That, of course, is the history of the Württemberg village. In the end, however, there does not seem to be any way of drawing up a balance sheet of costs and benefits. It may have been better for villagers to reconcile themselves with their neighbors as the clergy proposed, but we do not have to imagine that villagers did not have effective

mechanisms to come to terms with the conflicts involved in daily communal life. It is all well and good to condemn the ignorance and savagery of popular witchcraft beliefs, but we might wonder why the tensions between neighbors had to be distorted through the lens of pastoral care. We may wish to place a value on the well-ordered house, but we must not fail to understand its role in the dynamics of appropriation.

Notes

The following abbreviations are used in the notes:

BWKG	*Blätter für württembergische Kirchengeschichte*
LKA	Landeskirchliches Archiv, Stuttgart
RGG	*Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, 3rd edn (Tübingen, 1957ff)
RTK	*Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, 3rd edn (Leipzig, 1896ff)
WA	*D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (Weimar, 1883ff)
WHSA	Württemberg Hauptstaatsarchiv, Stuttgart

Introduction

1 For the problems involved in analyzing texts to study peasant culture, see Peter Burke, *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe* (London, 1978), pp. 65–87, especially p. 66 and pp. 75–9. Burke does not make enough out of the power relations hidden in texts and uses the neutral term 'mediator' rather too freely to describe the redactor of peasant tradition. He is particularly good on the description of the kinds of texts available, their contamination, and the fact that they seldom come from peasants and other members of the popular classes themselves. His description of an 'oblique' approach necessary to analyze them for popular ideas is a penetrating methodological exercise. Carlo Ginzburg also discusses the problem of the study of popular culture through sources generated in dominant culture. He argues for a 'deeply-rooted stratum of basically automonous popular beliefs'. Although his book is essential for anyone studying the issues, I think his view is weak on two counts. He does not provide an understanding of what 'autonomy' could mean given the implications of his otherwise dialectical view of culture. Secondly, he reifies ideas and fails to embed them in a theory of practice. *The Cheese and the Worms. The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller* (New York, 1982), pp. xiv–xxii.

2 A good place to begin when thinking about the process of communication in face-to-face societies is Basil Bernstein (ed.), *Class, Codes and Control* (3 vols., London, 1977), vol. 1, *Theoretical Studies towards a Sociology of Language*. He examines the strong metaphorical contents in what he terms 'restricted codes', which are forms of communication arising in particularist situations, context bound, and rooted in local relationships (pp. 175–8). Ginzburg unduly worries about anecdote and does not problematize the nature of communication; *Cheese and Worms*, p. xx.

3 See the issues discussed by Peter Burke, *Popular Culture*, pp. 23–9, 58ff. Although he argues for an interaction between high and low culture, he still tends to see rural culture as slow moving and traditional, acting as a kind of filter for impulses from outside. The level at which innovation can take place inside peasant culture is not discussed thoroughly.

4 On tenure rights in Württemberg, see Wolfgang von Hippel, *Die Bauernbefreiung im Königreich Württemberg*, Forschungen zur deutschen Sozialgeschichte, vol. 1, parts I and II (Boppard am Rhein, 1977), vol. 1, part I, pp. 120–4. The whole volume is a rich source for the institutions of both the original core areas of Württemberg and the territories which were joined to it during the Napoleonic period. Much of the discussion in this section draws on the volume.

5 *Ibid.*, pp. 125–7, 209–13.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 242.

7 Martin Hasselhorn, *Der altwürttembergische Pfarrstand im 18. Jahrhundert*, Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für geschichtliche Landeskunde in Baden-Württemberg, Series B: Forschungen, vol. 6 (Stuttgart, 1958), pp. 6–13.

8 Wolfgang Kaschuba and Carola Lipp, *1848 – Provinz und Revolution* (Tübingen, 1979), pp. 25–6. This volume contains an important theoretical analysis of the peculiar economic development of Württemberg.

9 See Landkreistag Baden-Württemberg (ed.), *Vogteien, A-mter, Landkreise in Baden-Württemberg* (2 vols., Stuttgart, 1975), vol. 1, Walter Grube, *Geschichtliche Grundlagen*, p. 14.

10 On the economic expansion and the rise in population in the sixteenth century, see the recent summary of the problems in Peter Kriedte, *Spätfeudalismus und Handelskapital* (Göttingen, 1980), pp. 28–44. The waves of mortality are documented in the Württemberg parish burial registers.

11 See David Warren Sabean, *Landbesitz und Gesellschaft am Vorabend des Bauernkrieges. Eine Studie der sozialen Verhältnisse im südlichen Oberschwaben in den Jahren vor 1525*, Quellen und Forschungen zur Agrargeschichte, vol. 26 (Stuttgart, 1972), pp. 36–48.

12 A study of the size of Württemberg farms in the sixteenth century has not yet been made, nor has there been much investigation into the partitioning

of land upon inheritance. A consultation of some of the cadastres (*Lagerbücher*) suggests that partible inheritance did not yet have the effect it would have in the eighteenth century. Compare the data on one village provided by Paul Sauer, *Affalterbach 972–1972. Weg und Schicksal einer Gemeinde in tausend Jahren* (Affalterbach, 1972), pp. 70–9. On the social structure of Württemberg in the middle of the sixteenth century, see Claus-Peter Clasen, *Die Wiedertäufer im Herzogtum Württemberg und in benachbarten Herrschaften. Ausbreitung, Geisteswelt und Soziologie,* Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für geschichtliche Landeskunde in Baden-Württemberg, vol. 32 (Stuttgart, 1966), pp. 204ff.

13 See, for example, the *Zulassungsarbeit* (thesis) of Ingrid Schulte, 'Ländliches Nebengewerbe in Oberschwaben am Vorabend des Bauernkrieges' (Ms, Bielefeld, 1976).

14 For example, see Franz Irsigler, 'Intensivwirtschaft, Sonderkulturen und Gartenbau als Elemente der Kulturlandschaftsgestaltung in den Rheinlanden, 13–16. Jahrhundert', *Atti della XIe Settimana di Studio, Prato 1979* (Florence, 1982); also his 'Gross- und Kleinbesitz im westlichen Deutschland vom 13. bis 18. Jahrhundert: Versuch einer Typologie', in Peter Gunst und Tamás Hoffmann (eds.), *Large Estates and Small Villages in Europe in the Middle Ages and Modern Times* (Budapest, 1982), pp. 33–59.

15 Kriedte, *Spätfeudalismus,* pp. 13ff, 31ff.

16 Hippel, *Bauernbefreiung,* pp. 242–3.

17 On this issue, see Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Les Paysans de Languedoc* (2 vols., Paris, 1966), vol. 1, pp. 187–235.

18 See the summary provided by Kriedte, *Spätfeudalismus*, pp. 67–70.

19 The 'poor' as a social grouping should be distinguished from the notion of the 'poor man' or 'common man', which designated the lower groups in the towns and the peasants as such, whether well-off or poor. The issue is raised in chapter 1. Contrast the use of the 'common man' or 'poor common man' during the period of the Peasant War of 1525: Peter Blickle, *Die Revolution von 1525,* 2nd edn (Munich, 1981), pp. 191–5.

20 A partial transcription of the diary of Pastor Wirsing has been made by Eberhard Elbs. The two extant volumes are in the Fürstenbergische Hofbibliothek, Donaueschingen, Hs. Nr. 676a and b. The selection includes the two months of January and June 1573. I want to thank Eberhard Elbs for providing me with copies and allowing me to cite them.

21 Hasselhorn, *Pfarrstand*, pp. 6–16. The pastors as a class of *rentier* in the eighteenth century can be studied by using the *post mortem* inventories located in village archives. Information on the pastors from one village will be given in my future publications on the village of Neckarhausen.

22 For the disastrous fall in Württemberg population, see the village by village reports in the Württemberg Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart (WHSA), A29 (*Kriegsakten* II) Büschel (Bü) 105.

23 Kaschuba and Lipp, *1848*, p. 20.

24 Examples of some of the problems are dealt with in chapter four.

25 Kaschuba and Lipp, *1848*, p. 20.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 19.

27 Kriedte, *Spätfeudalismus*, pp. 15, 117–18. Reactions of peasants to taxation are dealt with in chapter 2.

28 Examples of the problems can be found in chapters 2, 3 and 4.

29 In one of the cases dealing with witchcraft in the period after the Thirty Years' War, two young children had to be placed in a new home. State officials attempted to force various relatives to take the children; WHSA A209 Bü 1467, 18 May 1658. See also 23 Jan. 1657. The theme of children moving to and fro between various relatives occurs often in these documents. At issue in many cases was what responsibilities relatives of different degree had for each other. The state in this period appears to have expected more from distant family than they were willing to offer. Some of the problems are illustrated in chapter 3.

30 See the evidence in chapter 3.

31 This is one of the themes of chapter 4.

32 For examples, see chapters 2, 3, and 4.

33 Material on the distribution of wealth will be offered in my forthcoming book on family and kinship in the village of Neckarhausen.

34 Helga Schultz, 'Landhandwerk und ländliche Sozialstruktur um 1800', *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, part 2 (1980), pp. 11–50.

35 *Ibid.*, pp. 21–4.

36 *Ibid.*, pp. 27–8.

37 *Ibid.*, p. 28.

38 *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 28.

39 Kaschuba and Lipp, *1848*, p. 26.

40 For an excellent summary of the issues with numerous examples, see Heinz Reiff, 'Vagierende Unterschichten, Vagabunden und Bandenkriminalität im Ancien Régime', in *Beiträge zur historischen Sozialkunde*, 11:1 (Jan.–Mar. 1981), pp. 27–37.

41 Königlicher statistisch-topographischer Bureau, *Beschreibung des Oberamts Nürtingen* (Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1848), entry for Beuren, p. 146.

42 *Ibid.*, entries for Neckarhausen, Neckartailfingen, Wolfschlugen, pp. 117ff, 185ff, 222ff.

43 Statistics on the declining size of plots and the increased commercialization of land will be offered in my forthcoming book on kinship and family in Neckarhausen.

44 See my forthcoming book on Neckarhausen (n. 43).

45 Information for this comes from my study of village records from Neckarhausen and will be dealt with in detail in future publications.

46 See my forthcoming book on Neckarhausen (n. 43).

47 An example is to be found in chapter 6.
48 Examples are offered in chapter 5. See also my forthcoming work on kinship and family in Neckarhausen (n. 43).
49 Friedrich Huttenlocher, *Baden-Württemberg, Kleine geographische Landeskunde*, 3rd edn (Karlsruhe, 1968), pp. 83ff. For statistics from the eighteenth century, see WHSA A8 (*Kabinettsakten* III) Bü 85–92.
50 See Grube, *Geschichtliche Grundlagen,* pp. 10–14.
51 Information on officials and their activities comes from the *Gerichts- und Ratsprotocolle, Vogtruggerichtsprotocolle,* and *Kirchenkonventsprotocolle* from the village of Neckarhausen. I also lean heavily for this section on Grube's work, *Geschichtliche Grundlagen.*
52 Grube, *Geschichtliche Grundlagen,* pp. 11–32.
53 *Ibid.*, p. 14.
54 The *Communordnung* is printed in A. L. Reyscher (ed.), *Sammlung der württembergischen Geseze*, vol. 14 (Tübingen, 1843), pp. 537–777.
55 Information on the election of schoolmasters and their position in the village is taken from the various court and council minutes of the village of Neckarhausen.
56 Hasselhorn, *Pfarrstand*, pp. 30ff.
57 Data from this section come from the *Communordnung* of 1758, Reyscher (ed.), *Sammlung*, and from Grube's discussion, *Geschichtliche Grundlagen,* pp. 10–35.
58 *Communordnung* of 1758, in Reyscher (ed.), *Sammlung*, pp. 730–50.
59 A very useful article on the historical development of the concept 'Herrschaft' is to be found in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, vol. 3 (Stuttgart, 1982), pp. 1–102.
60 For the *herrschaftliche* institutions in Württemberg, the two volumes by Theodor Knapp are still very useful: *Gesammelte Beiträge zur Rechts- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte vornehmlich des deutschen Bauernstandes* (Tübingen, 1902) and *Neue Beiträge zur Rechts- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte des württembergischen Bauernstandes* (Tübingen, 1919; reprint Aalen, 1964). Also useful for the argument here is Hippel, *Bauernbefreiung*, especially for the many details on feudal dues. The modern discussion of Herrschaft is closely tied to the problem of resistance. See the two recent books: Winfried Schulze, *Bäuerliche Widerstand und feudale Herrschaft in der frühen Neuzeit,* Neuzeit im Aufbau, vol. 6 (Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt, 1980) and Peter Blickle, *Deutsche Untertanen, Ein Widerspruch* (Munich, 1981).
61 Article 'Herrschaft', *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, vol. 3, pp. 64ff, 72–3, 76–82, 85–6.
62 Central to a rethinking of violence and the modern state is the work of Pierre Bourdieu. See, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 40–1, 190–7. Also (with Jean-Claude Passeron), *Reproduction in Education,*

Society and Culture (London, 1977), book 1. Much of my thinking on the subject has been developed in discussions with my colleague, Alf Lüdtke, whose recent book is crucial for further debate: *'Gemeinwohl', Polizei und 'Festungspraxis'. Staatliche Gewaltsamkeit und innere Verwaltung in Preussen, 1815–1850,* Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, vol. 73 (Göttingen, 1982).
63 See, Alf Lüdtke, 'The Role of State Violence in the Period of Transition to Industrial Capitalism: The Example of Prussia from 1815 to 1848', in *Social History*, 4 (1979), pp. 175–221. On this point I would take issue with Winfried Schulze, *Widerstand*, who argues for a trend towards rationality in handling peasant opposition, especially in the use of juridical institutions. However, he does not analyze the use of courts as one alternative in the apparatus of violence.
64 Article 'Herrschaft', *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, vol. 3, pp. 11ff, 16ff, 36f.
65 The give-and-take in peasant uprisings and resistance movements constantly makes the point. See the discussions in Blickle, *Untertanen*, and Schulze, *Widerstand.*
66 Article, 'Herrschaft', *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, vol. 3, pp. 51f, 98ff.
67 Article, 'Herrschaft', *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe,* vol. 3, pp. 98ff; Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft,* 5th edn, 1. Halbband (Tübingen, 1976), pp. 122–30.
68 This two-part model is central to the work of Peter Blickle and is illustrated continually throughout his book, *Untertanen*. Schulze, although he attempts to work out a broad strategy of state activity vis-à-vis the peasantry, never develops a satisfactory understanding of the workings of Herrschaft. See his *Widerstand.*
69 See Blickle, *Untertanen* and Schulze, *Widerstand.*
70 An example is the peasant prophet, Hans Keil, discussed in chapter 2.
71 The literature on community and on Gemeinschaft is enormous. A useful overview is provided in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, vol. 2 (Stuttgart, 1975), pp. 801–62. A very useful study of village communities and the relevance of the concept of 'community' can be found in McKim Marriott, 'Little Communities in an Indigenous Civilization', in McKim Marriott (ed.), *Village India* (Chicago, 1955), pp. 171–222. See also Julian Pitt-Rivers, *The People of the Sierra*, 2nd edn (Chicago, 1971), chap. 1.
72 This is the implication, for example, in the article 'Person' in *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, 3rd edn, vol. 5 (Tübingen, 1961), p. 234. The discussion of 'person' as constituted within mediated relationships is also valid for 'community'.
73 The same problem appears in Ivan Illich's recent book, *Gender* (New York, 1982). On the issue of 'community' as an analytical concept and 'tradition' as something that needs to be explained, see the useful overview

by Sydel Silverman, 'The Peasant Concept in Anthropology', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 7 (1979), pp. 49–69, especially pp. 56–7, 63–4.

74 See the stimulating article by Joan Vincent, 'Agrarian Society as Organized Flow: Processes of Development Past and Present', *Peasant Studies*, 6 (1977), pp. 56–65.

75 An excellent discussion of the problem is provided by Clifford Geertz, '"From the Native's Point of View": On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding', in Keith H. Basso and Henry A. Selby (eds.), *Meaning in Anthropology* (Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1976), pp. 221–37.

76 A very important discussion of the person is provided by Marc Augé, *Théorie des pouvoirs et idéologie. Étude de cas en Côte-d'Ivoire* (Paris, 1975), especially pp. 162–233.

77 Edmund Leach, 'Rethinking Anthropology', in his *Rethinking Anthropology* (London, 1961), pp. 1–27, especially pp. 8–16. A critical reading of Leach's argument is found in Augé, *Théorie des pouvoirs et idéologie*, pp. 162–233.

78 Leach, 'Rethinking'.

79 See *Ibid.*, and Augé, *Théorie des pouvoirs et idéologie*, pp. 162–233.

80 The reference to testing borrowed bread for magic by first feeding pieces of it to chickens has been provided for me by my colleague, Hans Medick, who is working on the Württemberg weaving village of Laichingen; see, Pfarramt Laichingen, *Kirchenkonventsprotocolle*, vol. 1754–64, 24 May 1758. An example of neighbor women, even when they have never had anything to do with each other, joining in on a deathbed communion can be found in WHSA A209 Bü 1467, 8 April 1658.

81 An example can be found in the documents from the village of Neckarhausen where a wife repeatedly accused her husband of witchcraft worked during mealtimes. She refused to let him eat with her and the children. She could only digest food when she ate alone. Every time she ate with her husband, she was subject to magical attack. She would not let a son from an earlier marriage take bread from him. *Kirchenkonventsprotocolle*, vol. 2, 22 January 1769, 25 February 1770, 13 July 1770, 11 January 1771. Another example where a man was suspected of poisoning his wife through magical attack can be found in WHSA A209 Bü 1467, 13 October 1656.

82 An examination of the epithets used in kin relations will be contained in my forthcoming book on family and kinship in Neckarhausen (n. 43).

83 A very important analysis of 'conscience' is at present being undertaken by Heinz-Dieter Kittsteiner. He has kindly given me permission to refer to an unpublished paper, 'Von der Gnade zur Tugend. Zwei Beispiele aus einer Kulturgeschichte des Gewissens'.

84 This perspective is lacking in Geertz's article, 'Native's Point of View'. For an important discussion of the 'person', consult Michelle Z. Rosaldo, *Knowledge and Passion: Ilongot Notions of Self and Social Life* (Cambridge, 1980).

85 I am thinking here of Fortes, for example. There are two useful discussions of his way of dealing with belief and action: Marshall Sahlins, *Culture and Practical Reason* (Chicago, 1976), pp. 4–18 and J. A. Barnes, *Three Styles in the Study of Kinship* (Berkeley, California, 1972), chap. 3. A good example of Fortes' thinking on the relationship is 'Kinship and the Axiom of Amity', in his *Kinship and the Social Order* (London, 1970), pp. 219–49. One of the problems with the present investigation of popular culture is that it seeks to get at that culture as if it were a set of ideas, different from but analogous to that of 'high culture'. On the one hand, action and practice are not studied as part of culture. On the other, the ideas and values are not grasped as part of practice but remained reified. This problem, it seems to me, is not overcome in Peter Burke's work, *Popular Culture.* Chapters 2 and 6 above are exercises in the study of culture and practice, belief and action.

1. Communion and community

1 The sources are found in the records of church visitations (*Synodus Protocolle*) in the Landeskirchliches Archiv (LKA) in Stuttgart. They are cited by year, volume (when more than one per year), and folio number.

2 An excellent critical introduction to church visitation practice in the sixteenth century is to be found in Gerald Strauss, *Luther's House of Learning: Indoctrination of the Young in the German Reformation* (Baltimore, 1978), chaps. 12–14. For a useful overview of the context of Württemberg church institutions, see Martin Brecht, *Kirchenordnung und Kirchenzucht in Württemberg vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert,* Quellen und Forschungen zur Württembergischen Kirchengeschichte, vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 1967), pp. 9–52.

3 LKA *Synodus Protocolle* 1587 II, fol. 203.

4 Hermann Ehmer, *Valentin Vannius und die Reformation in Württemberg,* Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für geschichtliche Landeskunde in Baden-Württemberg, Series B: Forschungen, vol. 81 (Stuttgart, 1976), pp. 77–8; Brecht, *Kirchenordnung,* pp. 21, 47, 51–2.

5 Brecht, *Kirchenordnung*, p. 41. *Kirchen-Ordnung von 1559*, in A. L. Reyscher (ed.), *Sammlung der württembergischen Geseze*, vol. 8 (Tübingen, 1834), p. 254.

6 Ehmer, *Vannius*, p. 77; Brecht, *Kirchenordnung*, p. 39.

7 See below p. 52; LKA *Synodus Protocolle* 1584 II, fol. 216.

8 LKA *Synodus Protocolle* 1587 I, fol. 220. Throughout this book, certain parts of the narrative are displayed as quotations. I am following a convention frequently used by French historians and social scientists and Anglo-Saxon

11 *Ibid.*, 2.
12 *Ibid.*, unnumbered, dated 12 August 1733.
13 *Ibid.*, 46.
14 Georgii began his plea against the Drohmanns by quoting Nahum 1.2–3; *Ibid.*, 31.
15 *Ibid.*, 58.
16 The Swabian term *brutal* meant rude, insolent, uncivil, presumptious. It was often coupled with words. In fact, the term *Brutalium* was a rough way of referring to the mouth: 'Ich schlage dich aufs Brutalium' (I will punch you in the mouth). See Hermann von Fischer, *Schwäbisches Wörterbuch* (6 vols., Tübingen, 1904–36), article 'brutal'.
17 See my forthcoming work on family and kinship in Neckarhausen.
18 The discussion here is based on my study of marriage and *post mortem* inventories from the village of Neckarhausen. See also Rolf-Dieter Hess, *Familien- und Erbrecht im württembergischen Landrecht von 1555.* Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für geschichtliche Landeskunde in Baden-Württemberg, Series B: Forschungen, vol. 44 (Stuttgart, 1968).
19 An analysis of the land market will be contained in my study of kinship and family in Neckarhausen.
20 See the discussion in the Introduction, p. 35.
21 WHSA A214 Bü 476, 58.

6. The sins of belief

1 The poem comes from Karl Steiff, *Geschichtliche Lieder und Sprüche Württembergs* (Stuttgart, 1912), no. 288, pp. 1009–10, and is entitled 'Die letzte Hoffnung Demokratie' or 'Wie reimt man das zusammen?'. It was composed in October 1850. The original contains many verses, each involving a rhymed wordplay which is left blank and then substituted with a harmless phrase. In the original stanza, the missing word is *Sparren*; that is, Napoleon (III) has a screw loose. In my translation, I have rather ineptly rhymed 'bull', 'fool', and the missing word, 'normal'.

> Beutelsbach, Zwiefalten, Napoleon,
> wie reimt sich das zussammen?
> In Beutelsbach begrabt man den Farren,
> In Zwiefalten sind die Narren,
> und Napoleon hat einen – sparsamen Geist.
> So reimt sich das zusammen.

2 Hugo Moser, *Schwäbischer Volkshumor. Neckereien in Stadt und Land, von Ort zu Ort,* 2nd edn (Stuttgart, 1981), pp. 346–7. The original term is *Hommelhenker.*
3 Württemberg Hauptstaatsarchiv in Stuttgart (WHSA) Series A214 (*Kommissionen des Oberrats (1579–1817)*), Büschel 810, entitled 'Commissarische Untersuchung wegen lebendig Begrabung eines Farren zu Beutelsbach.'
4 *Ibid.*, Protocol dated 24 October to 5 November 1796 and report dated 7 November (document 10A).
5 For an overview of the regulations and ordinances, see A. L. Reyscher (ed.), *Sammlung der württembergischen Geseze,* vol. 14 (Tübingen, 1843), pp. 1110–11.
6 WHSA A214, 10 December 1796 (document 13).
7 *Ibid.*, 7 January 1797 (document 15).
8 *Ibid.*, 29 September 1801 (document 19).
9 *Ibid.*, 20 August 1801, 22 September 1801 (documents 21, 22).
10 *Ibid.*, 14 September 1801 (document 23).
11 *Ibid.*, 14 September 1801 (document 25).
12 *Ibid.*, 1 October 1801 (document 25).
13 *Ibid.*, unnumbered and undated.
14 Vanessa Maher called my attention to this point. See the essays collected together by M. F. C. Bourdillon and Meyer Fortes (eds.), *Sacrifice* (London, 1980), especially J. W. Rogerson, 'Sacrifice in the Old Testament. Problems of Method and Approach', pp. 45–60, and S. W. Sykes, 'Sacrifice in the New Testament and Christian Theology', pp. 61–83.
15 In fact, he was a very old man, dying just after the first investigation at the age of seventy-nine. The new pastor was appointed in December 1796. *Schwäbische Merkur* (23 November 1796), p. 347; (26 December 1796), p. 375.
16 In Neckarhausen, for example, a boar was first purchased for the village in the 1860s. The growth in the number of pigs kept by villagers and attention to breeding came as a result of farming new root crops after the agricultural revolution.
17 The example is taken from an investigation into the criminal activities of a Schultheiss in the village of Neckarhausen during the first decade of the nineteenth century; WHSA A214 Bü 746.
18 Useful reading on knowledge as power inside a community and the necessity for strategies of concealment and dissimulation can be found in Juliet Du Boulay, *Portrait of a Greek Mountain Village* (Oxford, 1974), pp. 179–229. What she says about communication among villagers is also relevant for that between the inside and outside.

Conclusion

1 Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force. Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschafts-geschichte,* Beiheft 47 (2 vols., Wiesbaden, 1964).
2 For a review of the literature on peasant revolts in Europe and their relevance for state development, see Winfried Schulze, 'Europäische und

deutsche Bauernrevolten der frühen Neuzeit – Probleme der vergleichende Betrachtung', in his (ed.), *Europäische Bauernrevolten der frühen Neuzeit* (Frankfurt, 1982), pp. 10–60. See also his work on central European revolts: *Bäuerliche Widerstand und feudale Herrschaft in der frühen Neuzeit,* Neuzeit im Aufbau, vol. 6 (Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt 1980).

3 See Dietrich Gerhard, 'Amtsträger zwischen Krongewalt und Ständen: ein europäisches Problem', in his *Gesammelte Aufsätze,* Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, vol. 54 (Göttingen, 1977), pp. 71–88; J. Russel Major, 'The Crown and the Aristocracy in Renaissance France', *American Historical Review*, 69 (1963–4), pp. 631–45; Hans Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy. The Prussian Experience 1660–1815* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 1–25.

4 Based on my study of court protocols from the village of Neckarhausen.

5 Two useful works on the fiscal state are: Rudolf Braun, 'Taxation, Sociopolitical Structure, and State-Building: Great Britain and Brandenburg-Prussia', in Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, 1975), pp. 243–327; Gabriel Ardant, 'Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure of Modern States and Nations', in *Ibid.*, pp. 164–242.

6 For this section see some of the conflicts found in the document collection A206 (*Oberrat: ältere Ämterakten (1550–1748)*) in the Württemberg Hauptstaatsarchiv in Stuttgart (WHSA), Büschel 1341a, 1348, 1364, 3871, 3929, 3966, 4233, 4941, 4942, 4950, 4971, 5091, 5099.

7 Hans Medick, 'Village Spinning Bees. Sexual Culture and Freetime among Rural Youth in Early Modern Germany', in Hans Medick and David Warren Sabean (eds.), *Interest and Emotion: Essays on the Study of Family and Kinship* (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 317–39.

8 See Ivan Illich, *Vom Recht auf Gemeinheit* (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1982), pp. 30–48, especially p. 33.

9 Ivan Illich, *Gender* (New York, 1982), pp. 148–57; Jeffrey Burton Russell, *Witchcraft in the Middle Ages* (Ithaca, 1972), pp. 50, 60, 65, 93, 110, 170.

10 Illich, *Gender,* pp. 147–52.

11 See the entries from the village of Neckartailfingen in the collection of *Urfehden* (A44) in WHSA.

12 Illich, *Gender,* p. 152.

13 Chapter 1.

14 Johann Valentin Andreae, *Theophilus,* edited by Richard van Dülmen (Stuttgart, 1973).

15 *Ibid.*, p. 83.

16 *Ibid.*, pp. 57, 89, 109.

17 *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 107.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 105.

19 *Ibid.*, p. 35.

20 Chapter 2.

21 Chapter 5.

22 Clifford Geertz, '"From the Native's Point of View": On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding', in Keith H. Basso and Henry A. Selby (eds.), *Meaning in Anthropology* (Alburquerque, New Mexico, 1976), pp. 221–37, here p. 225.

23 Above, p. 40.

24 Andreae, *Theophilus,* p. 135.

25 Chapter 2.

26 Russell, *Witchcraft,* p. 170.

27 Above, p. 98.

28 H. C. Erik Midelfort, *Witch Hunting in Southwestern Germany 1562–1684. The Social and Intellectual Foundations* (Stanford, 1972), pp. 37–8.

29 Jeanne Favret-Saada, *Die Wörter, der Zauber, der Tod. Der Hexenglaube im Hainland von Westfrankreich* (Frankfurt, 1979), pp. 104ff (published in English as *Deadly Words: Witchcraft in the Bocage* (Cambridge, 1980)).

30 Chapter 4.

31 Chapter 5.

Glossary

Amt district (*pl.* Ämter)
Amtmann district official
Amtsschreiber district clerk
Beisitzrecht right to residence without privileges accorded to Bürger
Bürger enfranchised inhabitant of a village or town; adult married male
Bürgermeister chief financial officer of a village or town; sometimes a second Bürgermeister had charge of community property (*sing.* and *pl.*)
Bürgerrecht residence privileges of a Bürger
Bürgerschaft collectivity of Bürger
Canzlei Advocat legal official of chancery
Contribution war tax
Deputierte *ad hoc* village deputies
Dorfschütz village policeman
Feind enemy (*pl.* Feinde)
Feindschaft enmity
Feldschütz police officer for agricultural land
Freund friend (*pl.* Freunde); affinal relative
Freundschaft friendship (rare); relatives; affinal relatives
Gemeinde village or town community, collectivity of Bürger
Gemeinschaft community
Gericht court
Gerichtsherrschaft lordship or authority arising from the right to exercise justice
Gerichtsschreiber court recorder, clerk of the court
Gerichtsverwandte juror, member of the Gericht; *see* Richter
Geschrei rumor, clamor, stir

Geschwätz gossip
Geschweyh sister-in-law
Gesellschaft society, association
Gevatter godfather; expresses the relation between the godfather and the parent
Grundherrschaft lordship over land, landlordship
Haus house; expresses the juridical and economic whole
Haushalter householder, head of a Haus
Hausvater male head of a Haus
Heckenpfleger administrator of a poor relief fund in Leonberg
Heiligenpfleger administrator of the poor relief fund
Herr lord
Herrschaft lordship; authority; domination; state
Incipient apprentice in the office of the district clerk (Schreiberei)
Knecht servant
Landschaft parliamentary institution in Württemberg
Landtag *see* Landschaft
Leibeigene bondsman; serf
Leibherr personal lord over Leibeigene
Leibherrschaft personal lordship over Leibeigene
Oberamt Württemberg administrative district
Oberamtmann chief administrative officer in an Oberamt (*see* Vogt)
Oberrat High Council in Württemberg
Obrigkeit magistrates
parteiisch biassed, partisan
Pförchmeister administrator of sheep-folding
Rat council, council member (*pl.* Räte)
Rathaus village or town administration building
Richter juror, member of a Gericht
Ruggericht annual or semi-annual village court
Sage rumor, discourse, opinion; tradition
Schreiber clerk, secretary
Schreiberei office of the clerk
Schultheiss chief administrative officer of a village
Schutz und Schirm protection
Schwager brother-in-law
Schwärmer enthusiast, fanatic
Schweher father-in-law
Scribent journeyman clerk

Söhnerin	daughter-in-law
Spinnstube	spinning bee, evening gathering to sew and spin
Stabsbeamte	official exercising jurisdiction in the name of the duke, e.g. Vogt
Stadt und Amt	a Württemberg administrative district, (*see* Oberamt)
Stadt- und Amtspfleger	financial officer of a district
Stadt- und Amtsschreiber	district clerk
Substitut	sub official in the district Schreiberei
Superintendent	deacon; chief church official of a district
Untervogt	deputy Vogt
Verwandte	relatives; blood relatives
Verwandtschaft	group of relatives; blood relatives
Vogt	chief administrative official of a district (*pl.* Vögte)
Vogtruggericht	annual or biennial court of a Vogt held in a village
Waldmeister	administrator of forest land
Weisspfennig	silver coin; tax
Wildschütz	game-keeper
Zehntherrschaft	lordship over tithes

General index

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