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Title
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Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/77f1j206

Journal
American Indian Culture and Research Journal , 33(1)

ISSN
0161-6463

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Publication Date
2009

DOI
10.17953

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AMERICAN INDIAN CULTURE AND RESEARCH JOURNAL 33:1 (2009) 65–87

Negotiating Nacogdoches: Hasinai Caddo-Spanish Relations, Trade Space, and the Formation of the Texas-Louisiana Border, 1779–1819

MARK ALLAN GOLDBERG

In August 1779, members of the Hasinai Caddo confederacy spotted a wave of people trekking through East Texas and heading toward the site of the Mission of Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe de los Nacogdoches, where the migrants eventually settled. The group appeared to be Spanish. Situated among several Hasinai villages, Spaniards had left the mission, and the area, six years prior. Now they returned. This migration "caused a great murmuring among the neighboring Indians," for it occurred during a moment of social and political disquiet for the Caddo peoples. Several Caddo chiefs recently had perished from the latest bout of epidemic disease that struck the region. After the death of these political leaders, the Native people looked to their allies and consulted with Spanish officials during their quest for new leaders who understood Spanish-Indian diplomacy in the Texas colonial borderlands.[1] The Hasinai also were trying to fend off Osage pressures from the North, which required armaments and military support. Like the ravages of disease, Osage raids brought the Caddo-Spanish alliance to the center of Indian diplomacy. Enemy violence made trade with the Spanish that much more crucial to the defense of Hasinai communities.[2] For these reasons, the return of the Spaniards after a six-year hiatus instantly caused murmurs among the Hasinai; however, what the Hasinai did not know was that the Spanish establishment of the town of Nacogdoches would become central to Caddo-Spanish trade relations and diplomacy as well as to Hasinai life on the East Texas frontier.

The 1779 settlement of Nacogdoches and the town's trade networks played a strong role in forming a boundary between Texas and Louisiana. The

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Spanish and Hasinai redirected trade routes in Texas after 1779 and produced new spaces along the Texas and Louisiana corridor.[3] In the late seventeenth century, the general region around East Texas and West Louisiana became part of the shifting borderland between the French and Spanish empires in North America (fig. 1).[4] Although France and Spain, and later the United States and Spain, carved a borderland through treaty and map, the actual production of this space was much more complicated. The reality on the ground conflicted with imperial declarations over territory, as Native peoples outnumbered Europeans and held much influence in the region. In the eighteenth century, both imperial powers could not completely control the area that they claimed, and the Caddo determined the rules of diplomacy. In 1762, the year before the Treaty of Paris concluded the Seven Years' War, France nevertheless relinquished its claims to Louisiana and ceded the territory to the Spanish. For the rest of the eighteenth century, the Spaniards attempted to wrest control of lands from Native peoples for Spanish settlers, soldiers, and missionaries. In the early nineteenth century, the territory of Louisiana again exchanged imperial hands until the French formally ceded the lands to the United States in 1803. Thereafter, the Texas-Louisiana corridor formed a borderland between New Spain and the United States. As they sought to establish territorial sovereignty, Spanish and US officials outlined general boundaries that remained ambiguous, porous, and contested.[5] The treaties and maps that emerged from their geographic visions portrayed fixed landscapes and obscured the human interactions and relationships that helped produce those spaces and borders.[6] State decrees did not depict Native



FIGURE 1. *Spanish-Franco-Indian frontiers in the mid-eighteenth century. Courtesy of David J. Weber,* The Spanish Frontier in North America *(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 185.*

interactions with the land and the peoples that occupied and even claimed it. They erased Native histories of the borderlands, rendering them invisible.

The general placement of these US–New Spain boundaries actually reflected the everyday interactions among individuals on the ground—particularly exchange relationships. New visions of territory grew from the redevelopment of Caddo-Spanish trade routes in the late eighteenth century, which materialized in imperial politics. Through trade and diplomacy, the Caddo shaped the direction of the imperial projects of France, Spain, and the United States. They influenced the creation of geopolitical spaces and the boundaries that separated Texas and Louisiana and ultimately outlined Mexico and the United States.

After the establishment of Nacogdoches, Spanish-Indian trade relations reconfigured the administrative design of New Spain. The Hasinai and Spanish developed an interdependent relationship in which Native peoples initially had the power to determine the rules of negotiation.[7] The Hasinai forced the Spaniards to accommodate Indian trade practices in East Texas. Before the Spanish settled in Nacogdoches, the Caddo Indians in East Texas and West Louisiana traded primarily with French traders from Louisiana. Until the 1770s, the revenue that Spain collected from Texas was minimal and not sufficient to support the region's economy or its settlers. In the Spanish-occupied regions of northern New Spain, the Indians therefore preferred trading with the Louisianans for several reasons: they were not physically forceful with Native peoples, and, occasionally, they married Indian women and learned their language. The Spanish were unable to supply sufficient merchandise because of revenue problems and because of the great distance that separated East Texas from New Spain's colonial capital, Mexico City, and, unlike the Spanish, the Louisiana traders offered weapons to the Indians.[8] With weapons, the Caddo could hunt more efficiently, defend themselves from their enemies, and thus maintain their autonomy.[9] The development of Nacogdoches into a trade post in the late eighteenth century allowed the Spanish to compete effectively with the Louisiana traders and to accommodate Hasinai trade demands.

The Hasinai and Spanish modified the existing economic geography of the Texas-Louisiana borderlands and constructed new trade spaces, or economic zones, that reshaped older trade routes. For the Hasinai, it became easier to trade through the new Spanish post at Nacogdoches because the settlement lay among their villages (see fig. 2).[10] The Hasinai, therefore, shifted from engaging trade in Louisiana to trading primarily through the settlement of Nacogdoches. The Kadohadacho Caddo chiefdom continued to trade in Louisiana while occasionally trading with Spaniards in East Texas. This spatial division that the Caddo produced through relationships of exchange became manifest in US–New Spain imperial negotiations.

Trade networks helped define regional politics, economies, and societies. They also influenced peoples' claims to geographic territories. Through control of trade networks in the eighteenth-century Texas-Louisiana borderlands, the Caddo could hold much autonomy in the region. After the establishment of Nacogdoches in 1779, they chose to reintegrate Spanish



FIGURE 2. *Caddo villages, 1767–1815. Courtesy of F. Todd Smith,* The Caddo Indians: Tribes at the Convergence of Empires, 1542–1854 *(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995), 65.*

traders into their economic realm and, in the process, reshaped Spanish imperial designs. At the turn of the nineteenth century, as the Spaniards and Hasinai Caddo sought to check the expanding United States, the new economic zones began to carry political weight for the competing empires. The boundary that the Spanish and US empires eventually formed corresponded with the geography of exchange in the borderlands. Caddo-Spanish trade practices contributed to the formation of geopolitical spaces that split Texas and Louisiana, with the Sabine River serving roughly as the western end of the divide.[11]

Even though they remained permeable and contested, the boundaries still mattered. This separation between Texas and Louisiana shaped the imperial contests of the early nineteenth century. When the United States acquired Louisiana in 1803, New Spain gained a new neighbor fixated on land acquisition and expansion. The ill definition of the boundaries between the two imperial powers endured, and people maintained economic and social ties that transcended this borderland. The ambiguous division, moreover, helped the Caddo continue to negotiate autonomy, as the United States and New Spain vied for Native allegiances. The US-Spanish power struggles were centered on the geographic separation shaped by Caddo-Spanish trade. The Neutral Ground Agreement of 1806 first revealed the political implications of the new trade spaces. Although it proved to be an unsuccessful attempt at delineating the US–New Spain border, the agreement still followed the general contours of the Caddo-Spanish spaces of trade that separated Texas and Louisiana. The Adams-Onís Treaty later formalized this separation, as it mapped a border between Texas and Louisiana in 1819. With this new boundary, the United States and New Spain further sought to create geopolitical entities defined by ordered, outlined spaces. Throughout the period that followed, however, Texas and US inhabitants subscribed to their own notions of space that did not always correspond with the political intentions proscribed by the boundary; people, ideas, and goods continued to cross the border, and the area remained contested terrain among Native peoples, the United States, and Mexico.[12] Like the Neutral Ground Agreement, the Adams-Onís Treaty followed the general design of Caddo-Spanish trade spaces.

The body of literature on Native American trade relations is quite extensive. In addition to works focused on the Caddo, many historians have analyzed exchange systems among other Indians, Europeans, African slaves, and Anglo-Americans in North American frontiers.[13] These studies emphasize the role of trade in regional politics, economies, and social relations. They highlight the fluidity of power relations on the frontiers, including the development of "frontier exchange economies" in which diverse groups were bound together through ground-level economic relationships that often conflicted with colonial desires.[14] By using space as an analytical tool, the geopolitical implications of trade emerge, as trade influenced the formation of territories and borders. Empires developed zones of exchange into political regions. Native peoples were central to this process of territorial formation and bordering despite their invisibility in imperial decrees.[15]

Formal political agreements and policies, such as maps and treaties, grew from everyday negotiations between various groups; they nevertheless symbolized the power of empires and nations and their claims on space. The decrees that "created" and mapped the Texas-Louisiana border and the New Spain and US territories along that boundary concealed the human interactions and power struggles that produced those spaces. State edicts naturalized the territories and the border with fixed images, moreover, and people and polities continue to live by those geographic readings.[16] Trade on the Texas-Louisiana frontier, however, did not correspond solely with Spanish and US commercial desires. Native visions shaped the development of trade in the

region. Imperial politics and the spatial formation of the New Spanish and US borderlands, therefore, were not top-down processes.[17] Rather, the creation of the Texas-Louisiana boundary grew out of everyday trade relations between the Spanish and the Caddo.

TRADE ON THE TEXAS-LOUISIANA BORDERLANDS

Trade shaped diplomatic relations in the borderlands region and helped to define the boundary separating Texas and Louisiana. For the Caddo, trade in the eighteenth-century borderlands did not simply mean an exchange of goods for economic benefit. It also embodied a political and social act that involved gift giving and receiving, military alliance, and, sometimes, even marriage. In the colonial borderlands, Native peoples had the power to make Spanish and French traders and other European officials subscribe to these practices.

Caddo Indian villages occupied a region along an extensive trade network that stretched well into the North American South and West. Before the Spanish began to clamp down on French traders in their second attempt to establish a presence in East Texas in the 1750s, the Indians of the region had already enjoyed extensive trade relations with the French. Beginning in 1705, the Caddo established trade relations with the French trader Louis Juchereau de St. Denis. St. Denis first traded much-needed guns and ammunition with the Natchitoches Caddo and the Kadohadacho Caddo chiefdoms in return for salt and horses. Later, he lived among the Hasinai Caddo chiefdom for a few months. St. Denis conformed to Caddo trade demands and provided necessary trade goods and, most important, friendship, thus creating a bond between the French and the Hasinai.[18] The strong ties between the French and the Caddo lasted throughout the eighteenth century, undermining Spanish efforts to develop their own trade systems with the Indians.

When the Spaniards finally established relations with the Caddo, Spanish traders had to respect Caddo trade traditions and adopt the trading practices that preceded the Spanish fortification of East Texas. These customs centered on interdependency, gift giving, and compromise between different ethnic and social groups. Trade between the French and the Indians occurred throughout the region but centered on posts in French Louisiana.[19] By the turn of the nineteenth century, the Hasinai reestablished ties with the Spanish and focused the exchange of goods in East Texas. This renewed trade relationship undermined trade between the Indians and the French Louisianans. With these ties, came new spaces of trade—the Hasinai traded with the Spanish out of Nacogdoches, Texas, and the Kadohadacho continued to trade with the Spanish out of Louisiana. The Hasinai are at the center of the story of change in East Texas during this era. Because this article focuses on Nacogdoches as the main center of trade in the region, it covers the period between the Spanish settlement of the town in 1779 and in 1819, the year that New Spain and the United States signed the Adams-Onís Treaty that formally outlined the Texas-Louisiana border.

TRADE BEFORE THE SPANISH RESETTLEMENT OF EAST TEXAS

Before the Spaniards settled Nacogdoches in 1779, Spanish-Indian relations were unstable in Texas, and Caddo trade space included Louisiana only. When the Spanish and Apache developed an alliance in the mid-eighteenth century mainly through central Texas, Native peoples in East Texas—enemies of the Apache—viewed Spanish officials in Texas with suspicious eyes. Most diplomatic negotiations between the East Texas Indians and the Spanish therefore occurred around posts in Louisiana at a distance from the Apache. For example, after Spain acquired Louisiana from the French, Caddo leaders worked with Spanish officials through Natchitoches to negotiate treaties following the political shift in the region. In addition, the Caddo had formed ties with the Spanish through obligations of trade and alliance through the Los Adaes presidio, which lay close to Natchitoches.[20] During much of Spain's control of Louisiana from 1762 to 1800, the Spaniards did not have a strong presence in Texas, particularly because the Indians kept watch of their European neighbors.

Unlike the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the Spaniards worked to respect Caddo traditions of exchange in efforts to develop relations with the Caddo in the latter part of the eighteenth century. They began to provide the amounts and types of goods that the Indians demanded, and they often would not seek out Native trade partners until they could do so. In a letter to Athanase de Mézières, for example, the governor of Texas, Juan María Barón de Ripperdá, described the Native peoples' power in negotiations. He advised that the Spaniards should not approach the Caddo and other Texas Indians until they had the right goods "since it appears that not even the supplies which I have here for my company can be sent, as I had hoped, with cattle and horses, until we have satisfied ourselves of the designs of those nations."[21] The Spanish offered weaponry—muskets, powders, and gunflints—and everyday items such as blankets, cloths, hatchets, knives, and kettles. In addition, when the Spaniards exchanged goods, they conformed to Caddoan concepts of male honor by including Spanish military medals.[22] For instance, Spanish officials decorated a Hasinai leader "because of his well known loyalty of the authority which he exercises over the neighboring pueblos . . . with one of the five medals of his Majesty."[23] These actions by the Spanish did initiate a diplomatic dialogue with the Texas Caddo, but the Indians continued to focus trade on Louisiana.[24]

To create a new economic zone in Texas, the Spaniards tried to limit Louisiana traders. Before the British colonies declared their independence, the Spanish needed the support of Indians in the region during their imperial contest with the British. Even though the Spaniards sought to monopolize trade in Texas, they could not disrupt the close bonds that existed among Native peoples and the French traders from Louisiana. After the Spaniards resettled East Texas in the late 1760s, they aggressively tried to prevent the Louisianans from trading in Texas. In 1767, Hugh O'Conor, interim governor of Texas, banned all Louisiana traders from East Texas settlements and Indian villages.[25] By 1779, when the Spaniards established Nacogdoches,

most Louisiana traders—save those with Spanish wives—were banned from trading in Texas.[26] Spanish officials hoped that these laws, although difficult to enforce, would redirect Indian trade from Louisiana into East Texas.

When the Spanish settlers returned to East Texas, colonial authorities began to recognize the central role of Nacogdoches in the development of a new trade space. After Spain acquired Louisiana in 1762, the colonial government instituted the Bourbon Reforms to strengthen its holdings in the Americas.[27] In accordance with the reforms, Spain's imperial plan in the region centered on defending the territory of Louisiana and northern New Spain from foreign incursions. Hugh O'Conor worried that English traders would penetrate East Texas and trade more weapons with the Indians.[28] Spanish officials backed the new settlement of Nacogdoches because they saw it as an eastern barrier to outsider access to the colony. After they settled Nacogdoches, the lives of the Spanish grew to depend on trade with their Indian neighbors. The Hasinai also began to depend on trade and alliances with the Spanish. Hasinai trade started to center primarily in Texas. The Indians, therefore, began to exchange mainly with the Spanish in East Texas instead of Louisiana, reconfiguring Native and Spanish geographic visions of the region. Their move from trading mainly through Louisiana to engaging in trade chiefly in Texas occurred for several reasons: the Hasinai need for military allies, the Spanish government's strict control of trade, the law against French traders, and the lack of sufficient harvests during the early years of settlement in Nacogdoches. Hence the focus here is on Nacogdoches, the main trading outpost in East Texas, and on trade between the Hasinai and the Spanish.

SPANISH SETTLEMENT OF NACOGDOCHES, 1779–1780

After the colonial government ordered the evacuation of all posts in East Texas in 1773, Spanish settlers brokered a deal to return to the region and settle the town of Bucareli. In 1779, however, the group fled to Nacogdoches without government approval. Several officials in New Spain therefore criticized the settlers' move to the new location. Pedro Galindo Navarro, adviser to the commandant general of the Interior Provinces, expressed his disfavor with the new settlement. Navarro first argued that the settlers should have been brought back to San Antonio.[29] Later, he showed his preference for Bucareli. He argued that Bucareli was a better location because it was near three areas important to the Spanish: Natchitoches in Louisiana, the capital of Texas at San Antonio, and the lands of the Northern Indians (the Tawakoni, Taovaya, and Yscani), or *norteños*, who were part of a larger Indian alliance with whom the Spaniards already had peace treaties. Though Nacogdoches was almost equidistant to San Antonio and even closer to Natchitoches, Navarro still argued that the new settlement was too far from the *norteños*. For Navarro, Nacogdoches was only close to two of the three locations critical to the Spanish project in East Texas. Because the Spaniards relied on alliances with the region's Native peoples, a Spanish settlement near the *norteños* was crucial. Navarro stated further that the Nacogdoches area was not fertile, while "the

settlement of Bucarel[i] was found in a fertile plain near the Trinidad River." He asserted that the settlers "might not be able to inhabit more desirable [lands]" than those around Bucareli.[30] Navarro's preference for Bucareli did not solely involve the former settlement's proximity to the three critical points for the Spanish. He also recognized that Nacogdoches lacked water for agriculture. Barren lands probably worried Navarro, because without farming the settlers would have to depend on outside sources for food. The Spaniards had not yet developed sound trade relations with their Hasinai neighbors when they first settled Nacogdoches. Spanish officials questioned whether the settlers would be able to acquire the necessary provisions. For similar reasons, Athanase de Mézières preferred Bucareli to Nacogdoches.

De Mézières openly disapproved of the new location at Nacogdoches. In a letter to the commandant general, Teodoro de Croix, De Mézières conceded that Nacogdoches had some advantages but went on to argue that "since the lands are very elevated and consequently sterile when the rains do not fertilize them, they have value only for stock ranches, and none . . . for cultivation. This had been the experience of the inhabitants from Bucarely in their removal from the Trinity River to this place; for, seeing their labor to be vain through a total loss of their plantings, they wander scattered among the heathen, offering them clothing for food, and exchanging hunger for nakedness."[31] Like Navarro, De Mézières worried about how the Spanish would survive without growing crops. In addition to his worries about the land, De Mézières expressed anxiety that the Spanish settlers had to exchange clothes for food. De Mézières's unease reflected a European view of Indians in his discomfort with the idea of naked Spaniards exchanging clothes with their "heathen" neighbors.[32] The notion of Spaniards reduced to the level of their "inferior" Indian neighbors worried the Spanish elite colonial officials a great deal. The support of the colonial officers was critical during the establishment of a new settlement on the fringes of the Spanish empire in North America. De Mézières also argued that the settlers still lived in fear of the Comanche. He probably agreed with Navarro that Bucareli offered better prospects for peace, because De Mézières had been partially responsible for establishing peace treaties with the *norteños*. De Mézières died soon after Nacogdoches was permanently settled, which eliminated his opposition to the settlement.[33]

Spanish officials were not the only ones worried about Nacogdoches; Antonio Gil Ibarvo, the leading settler there, also had misgivings. From the outset, Ibarvo expressed disenchantment with Indian relations around Nacogdoches, as he described Native power to dictate diplomacy. Echoing De Mézières, Ibarvo complained about Comanche hostility and described the Comanche that frequented the area as "obstinate" and "insolent."[34] In another letter to Governor Cabello y Robles written months later, Ibarvo offered a similar outlook on Native relations. Demonstrating frustration regarding the Spaniards' efforts to trade with the Indians, Ibarvo wrote that the "Indians are very arrogant, subjecting the traders to what they want. . . . The Indians [should] be made to live in a manner of submission."[35] Like Navarro and De Mézières, Ibarvo was uneasy about depending on his Indian neighbors for food. He was alarmed by the Hasinai attempts to and ability to

negotiate trade based on the group's own needs. Conveying a sense of racial superiority that was prevalent among the Spanish at that time, Ibarvo probably felt that the Spanish should dictate all forms of trade with the Indians. However, they had little to offer the Hasinai. In another letter from October of the same year, Ibarvo commented on the "deplorable state" of relations with the Hasinai. He also perceived that the Hasinai felt threatened by the Comanche.[36] Ibarvo thought he found a sign of Caddo need to which the Spanish could appeal. Military support with trade partners corresponded with the Caddo vision of diplomacy. Ibarvo may have recognized this Native diplomatic tradition, but the settlers at Nacogdoches clearly needed the assistance of the Hasinai for subsistence. By the latter half of 1780, Ibarvo began to realize that the Spaniards could not force the Caddo to trade on Spanish terms, and that the Indians' previous experiences of trade with the French provided a crucial backdrop for whatever success the Spanish could hope to achieve at Nacogdoches.

The Spanish, as Ibarvo's letter suggests, initially sought to dominate and convert neighboring Indians, whereas French traders offered gifts and traded interdependently with Native peoples. Concerning early Spanish-Indian relations, ethnohistorian George Sabo III asserts that "Spanish colonial policy emphasized religious conversion over trade." He further argues that the Caddo had little to gain from Spanish trade goods because the high cost of importation from Spanish imperial centers kept these goods scarce.[37] Moreover, the Caddo resisted Spanish efforts at conversion, which was an important factor in the failure and removal of the missions in East Texas. The Caddo constantly exchanged goods with Louisiana-based French traders throughout the eighteenth century, before and after France lost its holdings in North America in 1762. As long as this trade relationship existed, Caddo trade would aim toward Louisiana instead of East Texas. The establishment of Spanish Nacogdoches and the concurrent Spanish regulation of trade, however, reshaped the region's economic outlook. Trade relations between the Spanish and the Caddo only evolved when Ibarvo and the settlers at Nacogdoches realized that they needed the Indians as much as the Indians needed them.

Subsistence needs at Nacogdoches paved the way for trade with the neighboring Hasinai in East Texas. Ibarvo and other Spanish officials documented and editorialized on the settlers' experiences in Nacogdoches. De Mézières and Navarro both recognized the difficulties of farming in the area. Ibarvo expressed fear of Comanche raids and chronicled the Spaniards' poor relations with the Indians. Ibarvo and De Mézières both articulated the discourse of racial superiority in their writings about the Indians. The Spanish lack of trade relationships with the Hasinai worried Ibarvo, as the "post is new and very sparse in population to be among so many Indians."[38] Once he acknowledged the success of the French-Caddo trade relations and began to use it as an example, exchange between the Caddo and the Spanish increased. Clearly, the settlers at Nacogdoches needed to trade with the Indians for subsistence. They dealt for food and hides. The Hasinai, who had been trading for European goods for decades, suffered from the stringent laws banning

business with the Louisiana French traders.[39] Thus, as the Spanish accommodated Caddo needs, Hasinai-Spanish trade relations finally developed in East Texas and were centered at Nacogdoches.

EARLY FORMS OF TRADE IN NACOGDOCHES

Developing sound trade relations at Nacogdoches required an understanding of Indian trade practices, for the Native groups refused to participate if the Spanish did not respect their trade rituals. Gift giving was a major aspect of Indian trade customs. The Caddo did not consider the exchange of gifts to be merely a business transaction. Rather, the Indians saw the gifts as a symbol of cultural reciprocity. According to historian David La Vere, "The Caddos expected these diplomatic gifts; in fact, they demanded them because diplomatic gifts created kinship ties between European leaders and Caddo chiefs."[40] Thus the Spanish in Nacogdoches used presents to initiate relations with the neighboring Indians.

The paucity of Spanish gifts angered the Native peoples, who were accustomed to the generosity of the French. In November 1780, Ibarvo noted that the Indians were angry because "the business is so terrible that the promises to the Indians have been withdrawn." The Caddo were frustrated that Indians elsewhere fared better with the Spanish: "Their irritation increases when they see Don Atanasio de Mézières pass among the tribes with various loads of goods and give these to the [Tonkawa] and [Tawakoni] nations. The others are becoming jealous of them, especially the [Taovayas], who are the most numerous and daring and who have some connection with the Comanches."[41] The Taovaya, who made peace with the Spanish through De Mézières, were in dire need of ammunition because of the encroaching Osage. The Osage occasionally moved into North Texas from the Arkansas River region (just north of Caddo lands and northeast of the Taovayas) to raid Caddo and Taovaya villages. Because the Spanish in Texas could not offer the necessary provisions promised by De Mézières, Qui Te Sain, the chief of the Taovaya village, pleaded with the governor of Louisiana, Bernardo de Gálvez. The Taovaya, Qui Te Sain explained, were "deprived of everything, and have neither hatchets, nor picks, nor rifles, nor powder, nor bullets, with which to defend" themselves from the Osage.[42] Even though the Spaniards recognized that the Indians needed to engage in trade for defense against the Osage, the Spanish were unable to provide sufficient goods for their Native neighbors.

Spanish settlers struggled in East Texas in the first few years after the establishment of Nacogdoches. Although Spanish officials finally embraced Caddo trade practices, they still could not acquire sufficient funds or merchandise to give the Indians in order to form an economic relationship with their neighbors. They then faced the challenges of regulating trade, reorienting existing trade networks, and creating an economic zone in East Texas.

Much of the historiography on Spanish Texas asserts that the Spaniards tried to pull trade away from the French in Louisiana as part of a larger imperial design.[43] Trade policy reflected New Spain's efforts to establish a strong presence in North America. The control of trade on the Texas-Louisiana

border, however, stemmed from more concrete, pragmatic, and local motivations. The Spanish settlers who had returned to East Texas suffered in the early years at Nacogdoches. In order to acquire the basic necessities of life, the Spanish had to control trade in the region and draw all forms of exchange away from Louisiana. Yet Louisiana traders threatened the Spaniards' plans.

There is evidence of a presence of traders from Louisiana among the East Texas Caddo in the early 1780s, well after the laws were passed banning traders from there. Governor Cabello, for example, sent a letter to the governor of Louisiana in 1783, asking him to respect those laws. Cabello noted illegal traders in Kadohadacho territory and asked the Louisiana governor "to take measures adapted to prevent any individual of that government from entering with purposes of trading or for any other object among the nations belonging to this jurisdiction [Texas] with whom friendly relations will bring about most favorable results."[44] To discourage illegal trade further, Louis de Blanc, the civil and military commandant of Natchitoches, Louisiana, issued an official notice in 1788 that prohibited trade with Texas: "In accordance with the orders of His Lordship Don Estevan de Miró, governor general of [Louisiana] and of West Florida, we are expressly forbidden to give any passport to the provinces of Texas, or to allow entry of any merchandise whatsoever into the kingdom of New Spain since it is contraband. Any person who shall disobey these orders shall be arrested and his trial instituted to ascertain the nature of the goods which he wanted to smuggle."[45] Esteban Miró was a Spanish governor-general stationed in New Orleans who exercised political authority over Louisiana and West Florida. Spain's jurisdiction in Louisiana helped move the space of trade west into Texas, as colonial officials were able to enact policies that redirected trade. De Blanc's order banning Louisianans from trading in Texas made certain that the Hasinai and Spanish would be able to trade primarily in the Texas province—a step toward the creation of a new economic zone in East Texas.

After De Blanc's decree, the Spanish cracked down on the smuggling of goods from Louisiana into East Texas. In late 1790, the Spaniards arrested Joaquín de Córdoba, a prominent Spaniard, for contraband trade. He had smuggled tobacco from Natchitoches and argued that it was for the use of Spanish clergy. Antonio Gil Ibarvo oversaw the legal proceedings, and wrote that Córdoba had "some illicit articles . . . from [Natchitoches] and for clandestine introduction into the city of San Antonio de Bexar."[46] Smuggling continued to be a problem, and settlers in Nacogdoches complained about the Córdoba proceedings, because they believed Ibarvo, the head of the proceedings, also smuggled contraband. Smuggling in Nacogdoches had become such a menace that *nacogdocheños* filed official complaints against the town's most famous settler, and an investigator went to Nacogdoches to explore the problem. This anticontraband activity on the part of the New Spanish government demonstrated its commitment to manage trade in order to redesign existing zones of exchange and develop sound diplomatic relations with Native peoples in the region. The Spanish made another concerted effort to control trade in East Texas right before the turn of the century, as they introduced two new, but experienced, traders to manage all forms of exchange in the region. The new

traders oversaw these transactions from their central office in Nacogdoches, furthering the development of a new trade space.

WILLIAM BARR, SAMUEL DAVENPORT, AND A NEW ERA OF TRADE

In order to maintain its presence in East Texas, the Spanish had to improve relations with the Indians, which they had been trying to do since the settlement of Nacogdoches in 1779. To succeed, they had to continue providing gifts for Native peoples. The Spanish realized that the best way for them to provide those gifts consistently was by bringing in goods from Louisiana. Because the Indians were accustomed to trading with traders from Louisiana, Spanish officials in Texas felt they had to regulate trade in order to build diplomacy with Native peoples, especially the flow of those goods that would be used for gifts. The policing over the movement of goods would help redirect trade into East Texas, as it helped Texas traders control exchange with Indians. To manage this trade with Louisiana successfully, the Spanish hired the established trading firm of Barr and Davenport. Known as the House of Barr and Davenport and headquartered at Nacogdoches, it became the chief agency of exchange in East Texas.

Four men headed this company of licensed traders—William Barr, Peter Samuel Davenport, Luther Smith, and Edward Murphy. Before 1798, their main headquarters were located in Louisiana. The Spaniards used the agency to supplement the trade goods that arrived from Mexico City for exchange with the Indians. They then recognized the firm's potential for bolstering trade in East Texas. The Spanish therefore commissioned Barr and Davenport to set up a trade center in Nacogdoches, while Smith and Murphy took charge of business in Louisiana through Natchitoches. The House of Barr and Davenport fortified Spanish efforts at trading with Native peoples, as the colonial government restricted Louisiana trade. With support of the Spanish crown, the firm offered the Hasinai gifts and goods for exchange, such as guns, pots, blankets, and clothing.[47]

The House of Barr and Davenport enhanced the separation of the Texas and Louisiana trade spaces and the creation of a Hasinai trade space in East Texas. The Spanish granted the agency sole permission to engage in trade between Louisiana and Texas, and colonial officials worked to restrict all nonagency traders in Texas in addition to traders from Louisiana.[48] Barr, an Irishman, and Davenport, an American, set up headquarters in Nacogdoches in 1798. The decision to hire non-Spanish traders seems unusual given the Spanish government's worries about foreigners dealing with New Spain's Indian trade partners. The Spaniards, however, were desperate to regulate trade in the region. In commissioning Barr and Davenport, the Spaniards simply continued their penchant for embracing non-Spanish trade practices, as when they adopted Indian trade customs in the 1780s after the settlement of Nacogdoches. In addition, the traders had been doing business in Louisiana for the Spanish colonial government since the 1770s. The Spanish government's decision to appoint Barr and Davenport to manage trade in East Texas actually strengthened rather than threatened Spain's plan to control trade in the region.

Spain not only sought to control trade in order to ally with the Indians and bolster its East Texas settlements but also to prevent Anglo-American incursions into Texas. For instance, Philip Nolan, an Anglo-American horse trader, received permission from the Spanish government to do business in Texas in the 1790s, before the House of Barr and Davenport was established in Nacogdoches. However, Nolan returned again in 1799, as relations between Spain and the United States deteriorated.[49] Spanish officials at this time were making concerted efforts to prevent Anglo-Americans from entering Texas. Eventually, a small army of Spaniards set out to capture Nolan and his followers, and ended up fighting the traders and killing Nolan. As Nolan's presence suggests, the potential for trade in Texas clearly interested Anglo-Americans. Economic relations with the Hasinai were necessary to help sustain Spanish settlements in the region, and American traders threatened this Spanish-Indian connection. Hiring Barr and Davenport to help regulate trade was a conscious imperial move on New Spain's part.

As the United States thrust westward following the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, the trade firm became entangled in US–New Spain border diplomacy that revealed the political significance of the borderlands trade spaces.[50] Exacerbating the problem of Anglo intrusion, the border between Texas and Louisiana was hotly contested at the turn of the nineteenth century. After the United States acquired Louisiana, President Thomas Jefferson ordered an expedition to survey the Red River region in Texas, establish ties with the Indians, and collect scientific data from the area. Jefferson also had another motive for the expedition. He wanted to draw a border between the United States and New Spain, and he sought to acquire as much land as possible. Two explorers, Thomas Freeman and Peter Custis, headed the journey and were under strict orders to emphasize the scientific nature of the trip to the Spanish. The Spanish recognized the US motivation to expand westward and sent troops to stop the expedition. In 1806, in order to avoid a seemingly imminent clash of arms during the Freeman-Custis expedition of the border region, the US and Spanish governments composed the Neutral Ground Agreement, creating a buffer area to serve as a barrier between the two powers. Though not officially outlined, the Sabine River just east of Nacogdoches served as the general western boundary of the Neutral Ground, and the Arroyo Hondo in Louisiana served as the approximate eastern boundary. According to historian J. Villasana Haggard, the activities of the House of Barr and Davenport revolved around the Spanish understanding that the Neutral Ground between New Spain and the United States served to block Anglo-American westward expansion.[51] Though ambiguous, the neutral area followed the general separation of Texas and Louisiana that the trade spaces outlined. US officials exploited the uncertainty of the Neutral Ground's boundaries, however, and demonstrated that the Neutral Ground was not a barrier.

Ever since the United States had acquired Louisiana, the Americans tried to gain the Texas Indians' allegiance. John Sibley, the US Indian agent in the region, recognized that trade formed part of Indian diplomatic practice. He sent men to barter with the Taovaya, Hasinai, and the Kadohadacho.

According to historian F. Todd Smith, the American efforts swayed some of the Caddo.[52] Moreover, after signing the Neutral Ground Agreement, the Americans stepped up their efforts to ally themselves with the Indians, especially the Kadohadacho, who resided within the Neutral Ground, as well as the Hasinai, who lived just west of the neutral area. The Hasinai leaders remained loyal chiefly to the Spanish. The Kadohadacho, however, developed relations with the United States, at least until the 1820s.[53]

The Spanish authorization of the House of Barr and Davenport in East Texas as well as the Neutral Ground Agreement demonstrated New Spain's efforts to define the spaces in which people could or could not trade. The trade firm was the only agency in Texas legally allowed to conduct business between Louisiana and Texas. It supplied Spanish troops and secured the gifts to be distributed to the Indians west of the Neutral Ground. The House of Barr and Davenport engaged in intense trading from 1798 to 1812. Through the firm, goods consistently flowed back and forth between Texas and Louisiana. Many of those goods had already traveled throughout the North American West and Southwest before reaching Caddo villages.

The Neutral Ground—an area that the United States and New Spain "created" through treaty and through which Barr and Davenport worked—was a trade space largely created by the Texas Caddo. The Caddo were part of an extensive network of exchange that reached as far northwest as present-day Wyoming. They were linked to the West through a trade network that included the Wichita and the Comanche.[54] The Caddo role in this system of exchange involved the movement of deerskins, horses, and the furs of smaller animals. Sometimes, Caddo men killed deer and Caddo women processed the hides. Other times, Caddo acquired deer and buffalo hides from other Indian groups through trade. The Caddo also hunted smaller animals, including foxes and raccoons.[55] They then traded the deerskins and other furs to French or Anglo traders, or other Native peoples. In the early nineteenth century, the Hasinai traded these skins and pelts primarily to traders from the House of Barr and Davenport, indicating an economic focus on Nacogdoches. The Caddo also bartered horses. They received horses from the Comanche and the Wichita, both of whom raided Spanish missions to acquire the animals. The livestock trade in East Texas was quite extensive; one 1803 letter exchanged between Spanish officials described Barr and Davenport trading weaponry for "290 horses and 80 mules" with the Hasinai.[56]

In return for the furs, horses, and deerskins, the Spanish offered the Caddo gifts, including tobacco, gunpowder, cloth, knives, axes, hoes, combs, war paint, wire, metal pots, coats, bells, hats, cotton goods, and rum.[57] The company then introduced the goods it received from the Caddo into the trade market to receive more goods from other traders. The House of Barr and Davenport therefore acquired provisions for the Indians and for Spanish troops through the goods that it obtained from the Caddo.[58] The Indians constantly required arms and ammunition for defense. For example, the Osage threatened the East and North Texas Indians throughout the 1780s and 1790s, and the Caddo sought arms to reduce the threat.[59] The Indians' urgent need for weaponry provided a market for the House of Barr and

Davenport, giving it business from the start. The trade firm thus became an essential component of Spanish-Indian diplomacy.

Barr and Davenport easily entered the trade market in Texas by exchanging weapons and other manufactured goods that the Indians needed. The traders faced several obstacles when trading in East Texas. They constantly felt the threat of American westward expansion. In 1808, for example, Barr experienced a taste of the powerful American presence in the region. As he traveled to Texas from Louisiana with goods for the Indian trade, US officials apprehended Barr and confiscated the goods. Barr's arrest occurred as a result of the US Embargo Act, passed in 1807 by the Jefferson administration to prevent the export of goods.[60] Spanish officials debated how to respond to the Embargo Act and to the confiscation of Barr's merchandise. In Texas, Commandant General Nemesio de Salcedo y Salcedo and Governor Antonio Cordero y Bustamante discussed two options. They first proposed to stop traveling to and from Louisiana to trade. However, this was not a viable option because trade with the Indians secured Spain's existence in Texas, and Louisiana was a source of trade goods for the House of Barr and Davenport. They then discussed sending troops to the Neutral Ground to demonstrate to the Americans that the Spanish would not back down. However, the officials recognized that military action would constitute a legal violation of the Neutral Ground Agreement.[61] The Spanish did not act, and Barr and Davenport could not obtain goods for the Indian trade for almost two years.[62] Fortunately, the 1808 confiscation of Barr's goods did not lead to a major conflict. The United States repealed the Embargo Act in 1809, and Barr and Davenport resumed doing business in the area.

For the United States, the Neutral Ground Agreement defined where Americans could legally settle and trade. The treaty also prevented clashes between Americans and Spaniards in or near the border region. The short-lived Embargo Act defined American space by regulating trade on the American side of the US–New Spain border. For two years, Spanish traders were not allowed to move between Louisiana and Texas, and therefore could not acquire the goods to offer the Indians in East Texas. Even though the Embargo Act lasted for only a short time, the US government limited access to the market economy in Louisiana to Americans only. The Neutral Ground Agreement and the Embargo Act pointed to the emergence of an American political identity asserting its national presence in relation to Spanish Texas west of the Neutral Ground.

Barr and Davenport faced several setbacks in addition to the Embargo Act. Unpaid debts became another obstacle to successful trade. The firm sent licensed traders to Indian villages with weapons, ammunition, and other goods to exchange with Native peoples for hides or furs. Sometimes, however, the Indians had no hides or furs to trade. The traders still offered their goods to continue relations with Native peoples, giving away goods without receiving furs or hides in return. To appease the traders who worked for them, Barr and Davenport occasionally paid them with the firm's own furs, and the Indians then owed peltries directly to the trade firm instead of to the licensed

traders. An example of this kind of Indian debt occurred in late 1801. Barr and Davenport requested permits to visit Tawakoni and Tonkawa Indians to settle accounts with their hired traders, who had failed to collect the hides the Native peoples owed.[63] Many times, however, the trade house failed to recoup their losses.[64] The firm faced many unpaid debts during these years but continued business despite setbacks.

Barr and Davenport confronted this problem by opening new trading posts to expand their business, which also served Spanish-Indian diplomatic agreements. In September 1808, for example, they set up a trading post between Nacogdoches and Natchitoches. In October 1809, Barr petitioned Governor Manuel María de Salcedo for the creation of yet another trade center.[65] The correspondence exchanged between Spanish officials concerning Barr's request does not identify the potential location for the new trade house, but a later request by Davenport discusses a specific site in East Texas along the Trinity River.

In addition to Barr and Davenport, Indians made similar requests. That the Spanish heeded these requests demonstrated Hasinai diplomatic power and their new space of trade. Some Hasinai villages proposed the erection of a new post near Trinidad, located on the Trinity River between San Antonio and Nacogdoches. Davenport wrote to a Spanish official, "The Indians complain that they are very far . . . from the necessary settlement, [and] desire to establish a trading house in Trinidad."[66] It is not clear whether the Spanish actually established such a post. However, the Indians' appeal had important implications for the new space of trade that emerged in Texas. The Hasinai request for a new post in East Texas suggested that the Indians' new trade space centered primarily in Texas and no longer included Louisiana. This geographic shift corresponded to the hopes of the Spanish government. Meanwhile, the Kadohadacho continued relations with Spain but began to negotiate more frequently with the United States. Because of trade, Hasinai social and economic relationships tied them to East Texas, while the Kadohadacho bound themselves mainly to Louisiana. Through their social and economic ties with the competing powers, the two Caddo chiefdoms helped carve economic spaces that shaped borderlands diplomacy.

The settlement of Nacogdoches in 1779 became a major force influencing the Spaniards to create sound trade relationships with their Hasinai neighbors. By the first decade of the nineteenth century, a complex system of trade had firmly linked the Hasinai and the Spanish together. As a result, Hasinai relations with the United States were minimal. Trade in East Texas, moreover, centered on the House of Barr and Davenport in Nacogdoches. Nacogdoches developed into a key factor in the formation of new trade spaces and geographies of empire.

The 1810s saw the closing of the House of Barr and Davenport, the beginning of the Mexican independence movement, and the virtual abandonment of Nacogdoches, altering the bonds between the Spanish and the Hasinai. On 6 September 1810, the Mexican independence movement began in central Mexico with Father Miguel Hidalgo's call to arms against colonial Spain. Texas did not feel the effects of the revolution until 1812, when the Gutiérrez-Magee

expedition sought to expand the insurgency into Texas. Nacogdoches played an important role during the struggle. The two revolutionaries, Bernardo Gutiérrez de Lara and Augustus William Magee, entered Texas with a volunteer army planning to free Texas from Spanish rule and either create an independent republic or form a state within a new republic of Mexico.[67] The movement in Texas lasted almost two years, and the insurgents captured Nacogdoches, La Bahía in south-central Texas, and San Antonio in late 1812. In 1813, the Spanish colonial army headed to Nacogdoches in search of revolutionaries there. Most of the town's inhabitants fled to Louisiana in fear of Spanish reprisals against those who took part in the movement, leaving the town practically deserted for five years.[68] The insurgents managed to kill many Spanish officials, including Governor Salcedo. The royalist army finally defeated them in August of 1813 at the Medina River near San Antonio.

Samuel Davenport's involvement in the independence struggle brought about the closing of the House of Barr and Davenport. After William Barr's death in 1810, Samuel Davenport joined the Gutiérrez-Magee movement, breaking his ties to Spain and the trading firm. In late 1813, the Spanish government offered a reward for Davenport's death, and Davenport fled east. By 1814 the trader was already in Natchitoches, Louisiana. Trade never again centered on Nacogdoches after the House of Barr and Davenport closed. Spain could no longer fulfill its end of the diplomatic relationship in East Texas and offer Indians sufficient trade goods, and the Indians turned from trading to raiding Spanish settlements.[69] The United States and the Spanish still vied for Caddo alliances, and the Kadohadacho remained loyal to the United States while the Hasinai remained bound to the Spanish.

The Spanish government reacted to anticolonial acts in Texas with a swift and cruel hand. The Spaniards used executions and detentions to restore authority. These practices eroded allegiance to Spain even among those civilians who sympathized with the colonial cause. The Indians in Texas struggled against masses of migrating Anglo-American settlers and Native peoples who encroached on their lands. Anti-Spanish sentiment among Spanish and Anglo-American settlers in Texas gave rise to numerous armed expeditions against the colonial government and helped the anticolonial struggle, which culminated in Mexican independence in 1821. An Anglo-American named James Long led one of these movements against the royalist military in East Texas. Long gained the support of three hundred of the region's inhabitants and successfully captured Nacogdoches from the Spanish in 1819. Just as they had fled revolutionary ferment in 1813, the inhabitants of Nacogdoches deserted the town as Long approached. The repeated incursions around Nacogdoches reflected the town's geographic, economic, and social significance in Texas. The settlement existed at the edge of New Spain's colonial holdings in North America and bordered the United States. For the Spanish, the fall of Nacogdoches symbolized New Spain's failure to maintain diplomacy with Indians as well as its tenuous hold on Texas in the face of opposition within the colony and outside the province, directly east of the Texas-Louisiana border.

CONCLUSION

After years of migrating, the Spanish finally resettled in Nacogdoches in 1779, sending ripples along the social and diplomatic fabric of the Texas-Louisiana corridor. The Caddo's power to dictate the rules of diplomacy and the settlers' dire want for basic necessities shaped trade relations in East Texas. Mutual need bound the Spanish settlers in Nacogdoches to the Hasinai chiefdom. Years passed, however, before the Spanish and the Indians could establish firm trade relations. The Indians demanded gifts and forced the Spanish to accommodate to their needs and traditions, but for years, the colonial power suffered from limited funds and merchandise to meet those demands. The Spaniards confronted these obstacles by commissioning William Barr and Samuel Davenport to establish a trade house in Nacogdoches and manage all forms of trade in East Texas. With the introduction of the House of Barr and Davenport in 1798, close ties between the Spaniards and the Hasinai actually emerged within the piney woods of East Texas. With the Spanish-Indian trade relationships that finally developed came new trade spaces that centered primarily on Texas and not on Louisiana as in previous years.

During the formative years of the House of Barr and Davenport in Nacogdoches, Spanish-Indian interdependency flourished. Furthermore, by the early 1800s, the Hasinai and Spanish together had created a new space of trade away from Louisiana, demonstrated not only by the growth of Nacogdoches but also by requests for more trading posts in Texas. The Hasinai and the Kadohadacho both developed relations with New Spain and the United States, respectively, creating distinctive trade spaces—the Hasinai and Spanish in Texas and the Kadohadacho and Americans in Louisiana. Although movement across the boundary continued, people in East Texas produced and lived in newly defined spaces. The Spanish settlers who established Nacogdoches created a new life for themselves in East Texas that revolved around close relations with their Indian neighbors.

The development of profound social and economic ties between the Hasinai and the Spanish influenced the formation of a boundary between Texas and Louisiana. Hasinai-Spanish diplomacy increased trade among the inhabitants of East Texas. It encouraged the Spanish to regulate trade in the region and prohibit all traders from doing business in Texas, except for Barr and Davenport. The Spanish responded to Indian diplomatic demands with attempts to manage trade, which shaped the political and economic separation between Texas and Louisiana. After the United States acquired Louisiana in 1803, the differentiation between Texas and Louisiana had even more significant political implications. The Neutral Ground Agreement in 1806 further separated the two regions, and both the United States and New Spain struggled to establish solid bonds with the Caddo in order to realize their imperial desires in North America. With the Adams-Onís Treaty in 1819, US-Spanish diplomacy formalized a geopolitical border between Texas and Louisiana that reflected the trade spaces that the Caddo and the Spanish created in the late colonial era—a boundary that continues to shape peoples' lives and government policies in the region.

NOTES

I thank Susan Lee Johnson, Ned Blackhawk, Francisco Scarano, Ryan A. Quintana, Lisa Rakusin Goldberg, and the anonymous reviewers of the *AICRJ* for their guidance, insights, and suggestions.

1. Athanase de Mézières to Teodoro de Croix, 23 August 1779, in *Athanase de Mézières and the Louisiana-Texas Frontier, 1768–1780,* ed. and trans. Herbert E. Bolton (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1914), 2:261, 263.

2. F. Todd Smith, *From Dominance to Disappearance: The Indians of Texas and the Near Southwest* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 27; Juliana Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman: Indians and Spaniards in the Texas Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 264–65.

3. Henri Lefebvre argues that space is a social product shaped by multiple, related processes and power struggles, such as social and economic relations and political contests. Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space,* trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991); Rob Shields, *Lefebvre, Love and Struggle: Spatial Dialectics* (London: Routledge, 1999).

4. Historians Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron define borderlands as multicultural contact zones where government functions were weak and empires met and struggled for control and Native peoples negotiated autonomy, as no one culture dominated. See Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North American History," *American Historical Review* 104, no. 3 (June 1999): 814–41.

5. For more on boundaries and territorial sovereignty, see Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Gregory H. Nobles, *American Frontiers: Cultural Encounters and Continental Conquest* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997); Paula Rebert, *La Gran Línea: Mapping the United States-Mexico Boundary, 1849–1857* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001); and Andrés Reséndez, *Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800–1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

6. For more on fixed landscapes, mapping, and nation-states, see Raymond B. Craib, "A Nationalist Metaphysics: State Fixations, National Maps, and the Geo-Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Mexico," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 82, no. 1 (February 2002): 33–68, and *Cartographic Mexico: A History of State Fixations and Fugitive Landscapes* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).

7. Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman,* 7–15.

8. David J. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 159–63, 186–88, 194. Spanish settlers even depended on the French traders for certain provisions, including food: see pp. 173, 178.

9. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America,* 186; F. Todd Smith, *The Caddo Indians: Tribes at the Convergence of Empires, 1542–1854* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995), 53–54; David La Vere, *The Caddo Chiefdoms: Caddo Economics and Politics, 700–1835* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 7.

10. The Caddo Indians were organized into three loose chiefdoms: the Kadohadacho chiefdom, which, in the mid-eighteenth century, occupied the area along the Red River northeast of the town of Nacogdoches; the Natchitoches chiefdom east and south of Natchitoches, Louisiana, east of the Sabine River; and the Hasinai chiefdom in East Texas

surrounding the settlement of Nacogdoches (see figs. 1 and 2). Because of their small numbers and geographic location as well as regional politics, the Natchitoches did not play a major role in the construction of the Texas-Louisiana border.

11. I am grateful to Ryan A. Quintana for discussions of space and practice, which helped me conceptualize Hasinai and Spanish constructions of space. For more on everyday practices and space, see Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*; Shields, *Lefebvre, Love and Struggle*, 141–83; and Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 91–110.

12. Reséndez, *Changing National Identities at the Frontier*, 15–55.

13. Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman*; Smith, *From Dominance to Disappearance*; Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America*; Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Daniel H. Usner Jr., *Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley before 1783* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Elizabeth A. H. John, *Storms Brewed in Other Men's Worlds: The Confrontation of Indians, Spanish, and French in the Southwest, 1540–1795*, 2nd ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996); James F. Brooks, *Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); David J. Weber, *The Taos Trappers: The Fur Trade in the Far Southwest, 1540–1846* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971); Pekka Hämäläinen, "The Western Comanche Trade Center: Rethinking the Plains Indian Trade System," *Western Historical Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (Winter 1998): 485–513. For works on the Caddo, see Smith, *The Caddo Indians*; La Vere, *The Caddo Chiefdoms*; Martha McCollough, *Three Nations, One Place: Comparative Analyses of Comanche and Caddo Social Change* (Hoboken, NJ: Taylor and Francis, 2003); Timothy Perttula, *"The Caddo Nation": Archaeological and Ethnohistoric Perspectives* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992); Daniel A. Hickerson, "Hasinai-European Interaction, 1694–1715," *East Texas Historical Journal* 34, no. 2 (1996): 3–16, and "Historical Processes, Epidemic Disease, and the Formation of the Hasinai Confederacy," *Ethnohistory* 44, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 31–52.

14. Usner, *Indians, Settlers, and Slaves*, 6–9.

15. John R. Wunder and Pekka Hämäläinen, "Of Lethal Places and Lethal Essays," *American Historical Review* 104, no. 4 (October 1999): 1229–34. The essay is a response to the Adelman and Aron article, "A Nationalist Metaphysics," 41–48.

16. Raymond B. Craib, "Cartography and Power in the Conquest and Creation of New Spain," *Latin American Research Review* 35, no. 1 (2000): 7–36.

17. Smith, *The Caddo Indians*, 39.

18. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America*, 159–60, 163.

19. Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman*, 211–12.

20. A copy of Governor Ripperdá's letter appeared in Athanase de Mézières to Unzaga y Amezaga, 29 November 1770, in Bolton, *Athanase de Mézières*, 1:234.

21. Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman*, 212.

22. Athanase de Mézières to Unzaga y Amezaga, 3 July 1771, in Bolton, *Athanase de Mézières*, 1:249.

23. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America*, 184.

24. Donald E. Chipman, *Spanish Texas, 1519–1821* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992), 182.

25. Ibarvo, a prominent trader, allowed some French traders to remain around Bucareli because they had Spanish wives. Herbert Eugene Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century: Studies in Spanish Colonial History and Administration* (New York: Russel and Russel, 1962), 118.

26. With the Bourbon Reforms, the Spanish government sought to centralize the New Spanish political system that stretched from Texas and California to Argentina and collect more revenue for Spain. In northern New Spain, the Spaniards strove for peace and diplomacy with Native peoples to minimize the costs of defense and to use Indians as buffers against foreign intrusion. Thomas D. Hall, *Social Change in the Southwest, 1350–1880* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1989), 110–64.

27. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America*, 205, 222.

28. We do not know the exact date for Navarro's statement. Bolton claims that Navarro wrote it before January 1780. See Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, 444.

29. Pedro Galindo Navarro, 18 January 1780, Béxar Archives, Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin (hereafter cited as BA). All of Navarro's comments on Nacogdoches after his first call to move the settlers back to San Antonio are found in this letter.

30. Athanase de Mézières to Teodoro de Croix, 23 August 1779, Bolton, *Athanase de Mézières*, 2:260.

31. For more on Spanish othering of Indians in colonial northern New Spain, see Ramón A. Gutiérrez, *When Jesus Came, the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500–1846* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 193–206.

32. Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, 444.

33. Domingo Cabello y Robles to Teodoro de Croix, 20 June 1779, BA. The letter discusses Ibarvo's report on Nacogdoches and Indian relations there.

34. Antonio Gil Ibarvo to Comingo Cabello y Robles, 14 January 1780, Archivo General de Mexico, vol. 51, 1774–82, box 3G297, Robert Bruce Blake Papers, 1690–1959, 1969–70, Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin.

35. Domingo Cabello y Robles to Teodoro de Croix, 20 October 1780, BA. This letter remitted Ibarvo's report on conditions in Nacogdoches.

36. George Sabo III, "Reordering Their World: A Caddoan Ethnohistory," in *Visions and Revisions: Ethnohistoric Perspectives on Southern Cultures*, ed. George Sabo III and William M. Schneider (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995), 37.

37. Antonio Gil Ibarvo to Governor Pedro Piernas, 12 October 1780, in *Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 1765–1794, Part 1: The Revolutionary Period, 1765–1782*, *Annual Report of the American Historical Association 1945*, ed. Lawrence Kinnaird (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1949), 2:388.

38. Smith, *The Caddo Indians*, 79.

39. La Vere, *The Caddo Chiefdoms*, 46.

40. Antonio Gil Ibarvo to Governor Bernardo de Gálvez, 1 November 1780, Kinnaird, *Spain in the Mississippi Valley*, 2:390–91.

41. Qui Te Sain to Bernardo de Gálvez, 4 November 1780, Kinnaird, *Spain in the Mississippi Valley*, 2:392.

42. For more on the trade and the Spanish imperial agenda see Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, 446; Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America*, 230–35; Chipman, *Spanish Texas*, 187.

43. Domingo Cabello y Robles to Governor of Louisiana, 15 December 1783, in *Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 1765–1794, Part 2: Post War Decade 1782–1791, Annual Report of the American Historical Association 1945*, ed. Lawrence Kinnaird (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1949), 3:94. It was still unclear at the time whether the Kadohadacho inhabited lands in Texas or in Louisiana. It is evident that even prior to the nineteenth century, the Kadohadacho lay in ambiguously defined territory.

44. Louis Charles de Blanc, "Prohibition of Trade with Texas," 24 June 1788, Kinnaird, *Spain in the Mississippi Valley*, 3:256.

45. Legal proceedings authored by Antonio Gil Ibarvo, 22 September 1790, BA.

46. J. Villasana Haggard, "The House of Barr and Davenport," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 49, no. 1 (July 1945): 71–73.

47. Ibid., 74.

48. Chipman, *Spanish Texas*, 213–14.

49. In 1800, the French once again acquired Louisiana, only to sell it to the United States in 1803. Beginning in 1803, Spain would confront Anglo-American eyes fixed on Texas.

50. Haggard, "The House of Barr and Davenport," 70.

51. Smith, *The Caddo Indians*, 90–91, 93.

52. The 1820s signaled the beginning of the Kadohadacho migration into Texas because of Anglo-American encroachment on the Indians' lands. Thereafter, the Indians lost their negotiating power because major border disputes between Texas and Louisiana ceased. Ibid., 98–103.

53. Hämäläinen, "The Western Comanche Trade Center," 47–50.

54. La Vere, *The Caddo Chiefdoms*, 65.

55. José Joaquin Ugarte, Spanish commander, to Governor Juan Batista de Elguezábal, 26 November 1803, BA.

56. Haggard, "The House of Barr and Davenport," 71–72; invoice of presents sent to Barr and Davenport from Edward Murphy, 25 May 1808, BA.

57. James G. Partin, Carolyn Reeves Ericson, Joe E. Ericson, and Archie P. McDonald, *Nacogdoches: The History of Texas' Oldest City* (Lufkin: Best of East Texas Publishers, 1995), 44.

58. Louis Charles De Blanc to Esteban Miró, 27 March 1790, Kinnaird, *Spain in the Mississippi Valley*, 3:316.

59. Chipman, *Spanish Texas*, 229.

60. The two proposals discussed in Nemesio de Salcedo y Salcedo to Governor Antonio Cordero, [1808], BA.

61. Haggard, "The House of Barr and Davenport," 77.

62. William Barr and Samuel Davenport to Governor Juan Batista de Elguezábal, 5 December 1801, BA.

63. Haggard, "The House of Barr and Davenport," 76.

64. Bernardo Bonavía to Manuel María de Salcedo, 2 October 1809, BA.

65. Samuel Davenport to Manuel María de Salcedo, November 1810, BA.

66. Odie B. Faulk, *The Last Years of Spanish Texas, 1778–1821* (London: Mouton and Co., 1964), 134.

67. Partin et al., *Nacogdoches*, 50.

68. Haggard, "The House of Barr and Davenport," 86–88.