UC Irvine

UC Irvine Previously Published Works

Title

The baltic states: Years of dependence, 1980-1986

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7885d375>

Journal

Journal of Baltic Studies, 20(1)

ISSN

0162-9778

Authors

Misiunas, RJ

Taagepera, R

Publication Date

1989-03-01

DOI

10.1080/01629778800000291

Peer reviewed

THE BALTIC STATES: YEARS OF DEPENDENCE, 1980-1986

Romuald J. Misiunas, *Yale University*
Rein Taagepera, *University of California, Irvine*

In 1983 we published a book entitled *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1940-1980*.¹ The present article represents an update chapter which reviews the years 1980-1986.

Compared to the late 1970s and the early 1980s, a period of stagnation, 1987 was a singularly difficult time for writing recent Soviet and Baltic history. CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev was trying to overcome the general stagnation in which the Soviet Union found itself, and the outcome of his increasingly dramatic effort remains uncertain. Hence, the historical perspective for our interpretation of recent events is missing. Will economic and technological growth in the USSR be achieved without appreciable political changes, or will liberalization be the price for technological progress? If liberalization is needed, will Gorbachev be able to pay the price, or will he maintain the past mix of authoritarian and totalitarian features even at the cost of continued economic stagnation? If Gorbachev chooses liberalization, will more conservative bureaucratic forces eventually topple him? If the Soviet leadership opts for continued economic stagnation, will the Soviet population continue to be submissive indefinitely? As before, Baltic history in the 1980s continues to depend on the interplay of local aspirations with decisions made in Moscow.

POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY

Administration

The administrative *immobilisme* that had set in during the late 1960s and became the hallmark of the Baltic political scene during the 1970s continued into the 1980s with little evidence of substantial change. After the death of CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, however, some indications of change began to appear.

It was still too early to assess the impact of Gorbachev's much heralded campaign to increase economic efficiency of the administration of the Soviet Union. Some of the all-Union attempts to streamline economic administration

already made themselves manifest in the three Baltic republics by late 1985. State Agroindustrial Committees merging several ministries were formed, paralleling an all-Union body formed in November of that year. There were intimations of an intent to streamline the process of economic planning throughout the USSR, increasingly downgrading the bureaucracies of the republics and allowing plant managers to deal directly with planners in Moscow. However, any practical implementation was still at an early planning stage and vulnerable to opposition from entrenched bureaucratic interests throughout the USSR. Some of the reorganization up to 1986 already elicited personnel changes.

Changes in Latvia

Until 1986, the process was most dramatic in Latvia, with the elevation in April 1984 of the republic's KGB chief Boriss Pugo to the post of First Secretary of the LaCP. Incumbent Augusts Voss was promoted to Chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, an honorific position occupied since 1954, with one brief exception, by figures from Latvia and Lithuania prior to their retirement. Pugo, born in 1937, most likely in Moscow, the son of a Latvian communist exile, represented the younger generation of the non-native administrators so prevalent in the Baltic political apparatus. There can be no doubt that personal connections played a significant role in his rapid rise through the Latvian Komsomol and Latvian party apparatus. Reputedly, he is the stepson of the late Arvīds Pelše, First Secretary of the LaCP from 1959 to 1966, and thereafter Chairman of the CPSU Party Control Committee and a full member of the CPSU Politburo. Pugo emerged in 1968 as head of the organizational department of the Riga city party committee. One year later, he was elected First Secretary of the Latvian Komsomol CC and shortly thereafter went to Moscow as Secretary of the all-Union Komsomol. In 1973, he was Inspector in the CPSU CC Department of Organizational Party Work. The following year he returned to Latvia as head of the LaCP CC Department of Organizational Party Work. He was elected First Secretary of the Riga Party Committee in 1975 and became a Candidate Member of the Buro of the LaCP. Pugo went back to Moscow in late 1976, apparently in preparation for appointment as head of the Latvian KGB. He returned in 1977 as First Deputy to the then Chairman of the Committee for State Security in Latvia, Gen. Longins Avdjukevičs, whom he succeeded in 1980. At that point Pugo again became a Candidate Member of the Buro of the LaCP and was still not a full member of that body when he emerged as First Secretary, an apparently unprecedented situation. Although Pugo had begun his political career during the Thaw, his activity does not seem to have reflected much of the "liberalism" of that time. As head of the Latvian KGB, he gained a reputation for unscrupulousness and lack of any moral restraint in the pursuit of objectives. He achieved particular notoriety in the 1983 crackdown on dissident activity.²

It was too early in 1986 to tell whether the accession of Pugo represented a departure from the *immobilisme* of the 1970s. While Pugo lost no time in proclaiming his intention to improve economic performance as well as combatting corruption, at the LaCP CC Plenum of June 1984, the first since his accession, little of note apparently occurred in Latvia during the remainder of Konstantin Chernenko's brief tenure as all-Union First Secretary. With the accession of

Gorbachev, however, personnel changes in the Latvian apparat were announced. While the incumbent Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Jurijs Rubenis, continued in office, certain changes took place at the top levels of government and the Buro of the CC, reflecting Pugo's efforts to introduce younger functionaries, presumably of his own stripe, into the leadership of the republic's apparat. March 1985 saw the early retirement (at age 62) of Imants Andersons from the post of Buro secretary for ideology and his replacement by Anatolijs Gorbunovs. In June 1985, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Pēteris Strautmanis retired and was succeeded by the indigenous party activist Jānis Vagris, who at that point in his career was First Secretary of the Riga party committee. In late 1985 and early 1986, other personnel changes in the government and party leadership were announced. Two deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers and four ministers, five chairmen of state committees, the Chairman of the Supreme Court, two LaCP CC Secretaries and four heads of departments were all replaced in 1985. The most noteworthy was the retirement in November 1985 of Viktors Krūmiņš who had been Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers for a quarter of a century since the purges of 1959-1960 and Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1967. Vladimirs Kaupuzs, Minister of Culture since 1962, was retired in January 1986, apparently under a cloud, and replaced by Jāzeps Barkāns, deputy chief of the CC Department for Culture, an agency headed by an outspoken ideological hard-liner, Aivars Goris.³ The most interesting change in the Council of Ministers was the replacement, announced in *Cīņa* on 31 August 1985, of Mikhail Drozd by Vladimir Egorov as Minister of the Interior. Egorov, who had previously been Deputy Minister of the Interior in the Belorussian Republic, had up to that time not worked a single day in Latvia. While Drozd, like Egorov, was a Belorussian, he had resided in Latvia for a long time. The retirement of Drozd at age 52 suggested removal. The appointment of Egorov appeared to be connected with Gorbachev's drive against ingrained corruption at the local level. It also provided an example of Gorbachev's proclaimed intention to assign cadres according to merit, without any regard for republican national boundaries. Such practice had hitherto been limited primarily to the Central Asian republics. Egorov did not last long in his position, however. On 12 November 1986, *Cīņa* reported that he had been "transferred to other work." His replacement was a native Latvian, militia Major-General Bruno Steinbriks, who had headed the main administration for criminal investigation of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

During 1985, there was apparently a widescale replacement of district party leaders throughout Latvia, which also seemed to reflect Pugo's intention to restructure the party as his own political machine.

The passing or retirement of many of the prominent beneficiaries of the purges of 1959-1960 may have permitted a muted rehabilitation of some of the victims of those purges. In September 1984, the monthly magazine *Liesma* carried an interview with Vilis Krūmiņš, who had been Second Secretary of the LaCP in 1953-1956, and 1958-1960. The purged Minister of Culture of that era, Valdemārs Kalpiņš, also appeared in the press that fall. He wrote about former comrades who had also disappeared from public view since those days. In August 1985, *Cīņa* published a decree awarding the Order of Friendship between the Peoples to Kārlis Ozoliņš, erstwhile Chairman (1952-1959) of the Presidium

of the Supreme Soviet of the LaSSR; Kalpiņš provided the accompanying biographical article.⁴

Changes in Lithuania

Analogous processes occurred in the other two republics as well, although apparently to a considerably lesser degree. In Lithuania, most of the publicized changes consisted of retirement of aged officials. In 1984, Ksaveras Kairys, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, resigned at age 74. His position was assumed by another full Buro member, Vytautas Sakalauskas, First Secretary of the Vilnius city party organization. The following year, the three oldest members of the Council of Ministers were retired and replaced by considerably younger individuals. The most important of these was Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the Lithuanian State Planning Committee, Aleksandras Drobnys, who had served in a ministerial capacity since 1944. None of the three changes, however, appeared to have been more than overdue retirements.

There seems to have been a widespread feeling that First Secretary Griškevičius, an eminent product of the Brezhnev era, would soon be replaced. Such speculation was fanned by the release in August 1984 of Vytautas Sakalauskas from his newly acquired position as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and from the Buro of the CC of the LiCP, in connection with a transfer to an undisclosed position. It was rumored that he had been posted to the CPSU CC in Moscow as an Instructor, a move which seemed to indicate his grooming as a replacement for Griškevičius. In September 1985, the USSR Supreme Soviet addressed to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the LiSSR a resolution with unspecified criticism of Lithuania's economic performance, which by Soviet standards had not been that poor. This resolution seemed to presage imminent personnel changes that in all likelihood had already been decided in Moscow. Sakalauskas did indeed return to Vilnius. However, in November 1985 he reassumed his position in the CC Buro and replaced incumbent Chairman of the Council of Ministers Ringaudas Songaila, who in turn replaced the retiring Antanas Barkauskas as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

In addition to the party and government changes, the replacement of Genrikas Zimanas as editor of the party journal *Komunistas* was worthy of note. His removal, although clearly justifiable on the basis of age, came without public announcement, and his exit seems to have been engineered rather suddenly. Zimanas, who was of Jewish background and had been a Soviet partisan in Lithuania during the German occupation, was a member of the CC of the LiCP from 1949 to 1964. He had been editor of the party paper *Tiesa* from 1945 until his appointment to *Komunistas* in 1971.

It was too early to tell what effect, if any, these changes had on the lower echelons of the Lithuanian party apparatus. The March 1985 Plenum of the LiCP CC was noteworthy for its attention to personnel questions. First Secretary Griškevičius criticized various facets of the selection, training, and appointment process for responsible positions. He particularly decried the lack of qualified personnel. Under normal circumstances, he reasoned, a replacement reserve of qualified individuals should have existed, but such was not the case.

Poorly trained replacements for factory directors who were dismissed for failure to fulfill quotas achieved even worse results. Griškevičius mentioned several dismissals of local officials for wrongdoing. The Chairmen of the Executive Committees of the districts of Trakai and Širvintai and a secretary of the Utena district party committee had been dismissed for illegally constructing cottages on collective orchard land.⁵ However, there did not seem to be any intimation of large-scale replacements of local officials, such as had taken place in Latvia.

Changes in Estonia

Estonian CP First Secretary Karl Vaino was a typical example of the late Brezhnev appointments: stable, unimaginative, and unproductive. As such, he looked like a prime candidate for replacement under the presumably more dynamic Gorbachev, and the ECP congress in February 1986 was a most opportune time for such action. Nonetheless, Vaino survived.

Meanwhile, the struggle between the homegrown Estonians and the Russian-bred "Yestonians" focused on the position of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. As the aging Yestonian incumbent, Valter Klauson, approached retirement, jockeying for the post of First Vice-Chairman intensified. Since 1979, this position had been held by the homegrown agriculture specialist, Arnold Rüütel, who had joined the CP at age 36 (in 1964). In April 1983, Vaino apparently wanted to replace him with his Yestonian crony, ECP secretary Vladimir Kāo, who was notorious not only for his corruption but also his foulmouthed and abrasive treatment of underlings. Rüütel was promoted to ceremonial head of state (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the ESSR), bouncing the Yestonian incumbent, former ECP First Secretary Johannes Kābin, into full retirement. However, opposition to Kāo resulted in a compromise: Not one but two first deputy premiers were appointed, both Kāo and homegrown Heino Veldi.

Incidentally, the appointment of two first vice-premiers required a change in the constitution of the ESSR. Such a fundamental step, which in democratic countries requires a lengthy legal process, was carried out in Soviet Estonia with a speed worthy of the Guinness Book of Records. In the middle of a speech by Vaino, the constitutional issue was pointed out and, without the least discussion, hands were raised in approval.

When Klauson actually retired in January 1984, the picture had changed appreciably. Kāo had apparently lost a patron in Moscow (and his corruption later brought his unceremonial dismissal in March 1985, accompanied by barely veiled personal criticism in the press). Veldi did not advance any further either. Instead, Bruno Saul (b. 1932), one of the third-ranking ECP secretaries since 1983, became the new premier. Estonian-born communications engineer Saul had established his credentials by marrying a Russian in his student days in Leningrad, but he put his son into an Estonian-language school while he gradually advanced from vice-minister to minister of communications, subsequently becoming one of the deputy premiers. The advancement of Rüütel and Saul meant the shift to homegrown Estonians of two major posts (formal head of state and premier), held by Yestonians ever since the 1950s.

The long tenure of Konstantin Lebedev as ECP Second Secretary and, hence, Moscow's chief watchdog, ended in May 1982. He was replaced by Aleksandr

Kudriavtsev and then (in December 1985) by Georgii Vasilevich Aleshin, both Russians with no previous Estonian connection. These changes seemed to have no local cause or effect. The replacement of the Estonian KGB chief, Ado Pork, by a Russianized Karelian, Karl Kortelainen, received attention abroad primarily because of the recent Soviet promotions from the KGB to higher office (as with Andropov and Pugo). In Estonia, however, such a course was very unlikely given Kortelainen's lack of any trace of local ancestry.

After Kõo's promotion to first vice-premier in April 1983, all three third-ranking ECP secretaries were homegrown Estonians: incumbents Rein Ristlaan and Artur-Bernard Upsi, plus newcomer Saul. The latter was replaced in April 1984 by a Russian, Nikolai Ganiushov. Another Yestonian crony of Vaino, Nikolai Johanson, was pensioned off in October 1986. His post as chairman of the Council of Trade Unions was taken by Mati Pedak (b. 1936), former first CP secretary for Tallinn, who was replaced by E.-A. Sillari; both were homegrown Estonians.

Party Membership

These personnel changes apparently did not basically alter the composition of the parties in the three republics. The Latvian party, whose membership was estimated at 172,500 full or candidate members at the time of the 24th Congress of the LaCP in January 1986, seemed to have a more or less constant turnover during the last decade, in spite of the anticorruption drive of the new leadership.⁶ No figures were available on the nationality composition of the Latvian party.

The Lithuanian CP continued to grow at a faster rate than the CPSU. On 1 January 1986, it had 197,283 members.⁷ Its growth rate of 60.5% between 1970 and 1984 was the second highest among constituent republics in the USSR. Nevertheless, in 1984, the percentage of party members among the total population (5.25%) was still lower than the corresponding average for the USSR (6.74%). The percentage of Lithuanians in the party has continued to increase at a slow rate. In 1970, it stood at 67.1%, in 1980 at 69.4%, and in 1986 at 70.4%. That figure was still considerably below the Lithuanian percentage of the population of the republic, which in 1979 was 80%.

In the Estonian CP, the Estonians (including the relatively few aging Yestonians) probably lost their slim majority around 1985. Slowly recovering from Stalin's purges, the Estonian share had surpassed the 50% mark in 1963. The Estonian share peaked in 1969, with 52.5% of the ECP membership, much below the Estonian share of the general population. In 1975, a steady decline had begun, and in 1981 Estonians were reduced to 50.8% of the ECP membership.⁸ This phenomenon could not be completely explained by the continuing flow of immigrants, given that the Estonians still represented more than 60% of the country's population.

SOCIETY

Demography

Immigration continued to represent a long-range threat to the survival of the Baltic nations. For the first time, Lithuania seemed to be as seriously affected as the other two countries. The pattern for the most recent twenty years is shown in Table 1 as follows (in thousands of immigrants over 5-year periods):

Table 1
Immigration Patterns

Year	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Total ⁹
1965-69	45	71	29	145
1970-74	40	64	40	145
1975-79	24	46	31	101
1980-84	31	45	59	135

The trend of the late 1970s toward less immigration was reversed, except in Latvia. In Lithuania, the marked decrease in birth rates of the early 1960s was bound to weaken the local labor supply in the 1980s, but since the same was the case in the RSFSR, only a purposefully imperialist Russification policy could explain the new immigration. The same applies for Estonia, where the increase in immigration was largely caused by the construction of a mammoth new harbor near Tallinn (discussed below under *Economy*)—a prime example of a colonial outpost. Plans for huge new phosphorite mines also seemed to be pushed harder in labor-poor Estonia than in the adjacent Leningrad oblast, which apparently had equally rich deposits.

As a result, the percentage of Latvians and Estonians in their respective republics continued to decrease; the same began to be true in Lithuania for the first time since the deportations of the early 1950s. Since the census of 1979, the following changes, as shown in Table 2, have taken place:¹⁰

Table 2

		Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
Total population (thousands).	1/79	1,466	2,521	3,399
	1/85	1,530	2,604	3,570
Republic nation's % share. Est. for	1/79	64.7	53.7	80.0
	1/85	63.1	52.6	78.7

These percentages could even be somewhat lower if there were appreciable voluntary or forced emigration. It would seem that about 16,000 Latvian-speaking Latvians emigrated to the RSFSR in 1970-1979, reversing previous trends,¹¹ although there was little Lithuanian or Estonian emigration.

Mixed Baltic-Russian marriages seemed to be on the increase, and the offspring of such marriages seemed to opt for the Baltic nationality in more than half of the cases, when the family remained in the Baltic republics. Thus such marriages tended to work rather in favor of the Baltic peoples. In general, however, the immigrants' knowledge of the republican language remained low; the fraction of Russians who deemed themselves fluent in the language of the republic in 1979 was 37.4% in Lithuania, 20.1% in Latvia, and 13.0% in Estonia. The regime's educational policies actively contributed to this lack of

integration. While in the republican-language schools the beginning of Russian study was shifted from third to first grade, and efforts were made to introduce it in kindergarten, no teachers were specifically trained to teach Estonian in the Russian-language schools of the republic until 1982, when a yearly quota of ten teachers was established and a textbook of Estonian for speakers of Russian was published.

Although the Soviet authorities published rather few of the 1979 census materials (as compared to previous occasions), some of their confidential information regarding the nationality composition of individual towns and rural districts in Latvia and Estonia was leaked to the West. In both countries, the population was divided almost equally among the capital city, other urban centers, and rural areas. In both cases, too, the capital was heavily Russian, the provincial urban population had a narrow native majority, and the countryside was solidly Latvian or Estonian in 1979. In Lithuania, where the ethnic ratio of the population is not as sensitive an issue, comparable data have been published. As shown in Table 3, both rural and provincial urban populations were solidly Lithuanian, and the capital city had a large Lithuanian plurality:

Table 3

Percentage of	Capital	Other Urban	Rural	Total
Latvians in LaSSR	38.3	51.5	71.9	53.7
Estonians in ESSR	51.9	56.9	87.6	64.7
Lithuanians in LISSR	47.3	84.6	86.0	80.0

If one combines major cities with their surrounding districts, the following geographical pattern emerges for 1979. Latvians were a minority in two zones: the massive population concentration in the Riga district (over one million, out of the republic's total population of 2.5 million), and three southeastern districts (Daugavpils, Krāslava, Rēzekne). The Latvian majority was precarious (under 60%) in three other districts with major cities (Liepāja, Jelgava, Ventspils). In the remaining nineteen predominantly rural districts, the Latvian proportion ranged from 60% in eastern Ludza, to 88% in northwestern Talsi. Estonians were a small minority (23%) in the Kohtla-Järve oil shale district (including Narva) in the northeast, and a precarious majority in Harju/Tallinn. In the remaining thirteen districts, the Estonian share ranged from 77% for Tartu, to 95% on the island of Hiiumaa. The Lithuanian majority was solid (over 90%) in thirty-four of that republic's forty-four rural districts, while two districts had Polish majorities. (The Vilnius rural district was 68% Polish.) The Russian element reached 20% to 30% in Klaipėda and Vilnius, and in the districts of Ignalina and Zarasai in the neighborhood of the nuclear power plant.¹²

Birth rates in the early 1980s were rather stable—around fifteen per thousand—in all three republics. Death rates in Latvia and Estonia reached a plateau at just below thirteen per thousand, while in Lithuania the death rate was slightly above ten per thousand and rising, mainly because of the changing shape

of the age pyramid. In Lithuania the number of female children per woman decreased to 0.97, i.e., slightly below the population reproduction level. This situation had been reached much earlier in Latvia and Estonia, but the low reproduction rate among the unstable immigrant population was primarily responsible. Latvians and Estonians actually seemed to have maintained a reproduction ratio of slightly more than 1, and the same can be presumed for the Lithuanians as well.¹³

Marriage and divorce rates changed little. Further urbanization slowed in Latvia and Estonia as the rural share of the population fell below 30%. In Lithuania, it fell from 38.4% in 1980, to 34.3% in 1985. The share of the capital cities in the overall population of the republics continued to edge upwards, mainly because of Russian immigration. Estonians lost their majority in Tallinn around 1982 and were down to 48% by 1985, while the Latvians in Riga were reduced to approximately 36%. The increasing Lithuanian share in the population of Vilnius reached 47.3% in 1979.

Life-Style

The food shortages of the late 1970s were alleviated in the early 1980s. Prices of some consumer items were at times raised sharply, without any prior warning. The resulting overall rate of inflation is difficult to estimate. It was rumoured that Gorbachev had ordered the closing of special stores for the *nomenklatura*, but it could not be verified whether such a step had been taken. The introduction of Western-style features into the retail sectors, such as buying on credit and comic books, which had characterized the early 1970s, seemed to stagnate, with a few exceptions. Rock bands proliferated and obtained recognition to the extent that recordings of their music were officially produced and sold. For larger purchases, such as automobiles (around 8,000 rubles), a savings-bank check instead of the traditional cash became mandatory in June 1986. The amount of savings was even more overwhelming in the Baltic republics than in Russia. Estonia had close to one million savings accounts for a population of 1.5 million, and per capita savings amounted to one thousand rubles.¹⁴

The continuing housing scarcity throughout the USSR was highlighted by Gorbachev's promise to supply every family with its own apartment by the end of the millenium. The shortage was reflected in the local Baltic press (which can not be mailed abroad). For example, a reader's letter in the Tartu *Edasi* (12 May 1986) described the family of a war veteran that had waited seven years to get a two-room apartment. Before moving in, it spent a further twenty-four days and one hundred rubles to find a private entrepreneur to smooth and paint the floor. Two weeks after the actual move they still had no electricity, water, or gas.

Some consumer goods, such as color TV sets and cars, became more available. Video-cassettes, though rare, presented special control problems for the Soviet authorities. *Izvestiia* (15 October 1985) reported that four hundred and fifteen underground Western cassettes had been confiscated in Riga alone, while total Soviet cassette production as of October 1985 amounted to only two hundred different programs, issued, on average, in editions of one hundred and twenty-five copies. In October 1984, four Lithuanians were sentenced to up to

two years in prison for showing videotaped Western pornographic films for profit.¹⁵

The need for greater computer skills was recognized in Moscow. (What is called "p.c." in the West, became a "microcomputer" in the USSR where the word "private" was visibly felt to be ideologically pernicious.) The "personal computer" tended to mean a "microcomputer" housed in schools and work-places only. In Estonia, a special computer was devised for school instruction. The elite's unfamiliarity with office duplicators was highlighted by a top establishment writer's high-tech dream: using a computer to print out several copies of the same draft of a novel.¹⁶

Continuing Soviet aggression in Afghanistan aroused fears for the young Balts drafted into the Soviet army, and indeed, a number returned home in sealed caskets.¹⁷ In June 1986, over 10,000 Ukrainian and Belorussian refugees from the Chernobyl disaster area were settled in the Baltic republics. Over 10,000 Baltic youths were sent to the site to do nuclear decontamination work, sometimes with only an hour's notice in the middle of the night. Stories about radiation deaths of these workers abounded (sometimes with names supplied), as did rumors of contaminated food being sent to the Baltic republics. The official press reported that three hundred Estonians had staged a work stoppage when their stay was prolonged from two to six months, and underground sources added that twelve men had been shot.¹⁸

The general mood in the Baltic republics at the beginning of the 1980s was somber, given the stagnating consumer economy and increasing pressure of Russification. However, Andropov's and then Gorbachev's accession aroused the hope for some kind of change. The direction of the change was unclear, but even a change for the worse would have been more stimulating than dull stagnation, and one's mental health better served by hope than by despair. Nonetheless, the first year of Gorbachev's rule offered little that was new. Promises, exhortations to work harder, and crackdown on private entrepreneurship had all been seen before. The only unprecedented move was the crackdown on alcohol.

The restrictions on alcohol came in June 1985, and their impact in the Baltic republics was so marked that the move came to be known in Estonia as "the second changeover of June," the Soviet occupation in June 1940 being the first. The rate of alcohol consumption in the Baltic republics was among the highest in the USSR,¹⁹ constituting a national threat second only to Russian immigration. Being self-inflicted, it enjoyed much greater popularity, and the prohibition of alcohol from office birthday parties was a most unwelcome change for many. Nonetheless, it was clearly in the Baltic national interest that the anti-alcohol campaign succeed at least as well in the Baltic republics as in Russia. Throughout the Soviet Union, however, the longterm effects of the campaign remained uncertain. While less drinking on the job was bound to increase productivity and possibly workers' income, little was offered on which to spend the time and money previously spent on vodka. It was all stick and no carrot, and the consumption of illegally distilled alcohol seemed likely to increase.

The coverage of economic and social problems in the Soviet Baltic press expanded in 1986, making for much more interesting reading than the reporting of the previous decade. Considerably more information about social conditions

and problems whose existence until that time had only been intimated now became available.²⁰ The problems of youth in Latvia were graphically presented in a film by Juris Podnieks, "Is It Easy To Be Young?", which received wide acclaim in the USSR and attention in the international press. In the mid 1980s, several pieces of Hare Krishna samizdat from Lithuania reached the West; and in 1987, one Hare Krishna group in Lithuania attempted to register itself as a religious congregation. In 1986, a manslaughter trial in Vilnius involving an Uzbek guru and his disciples was given prominent coverage in the Soviet Lithuanian press under such headlines as "In the Whirlpools of Extrasensory Perception." The problem of prostitution, too, especially in the port cities of Riga and Klaipėda, was discussed in the press of Latvia and Lithuania.²¹

Whether the new relative openness would translate into changes in actual bureaucratic practice remained to be seen. A Baltic joke of late 1986 claimed that the population had been deprived of its two remaining consolations: Vodka was prohibited, and cursing the administration had been made compulsory.

ECONOMY AND ECOLOGY

Economy

The growth rates of national income and industrial production in the Baltic republics were lower in 1980-1985 than during previous five-year periods. The average yearly percentage growth figures reported by the Soviet authorities were as follows:²²

Table 4

ANNUAL GROWTH (IN PERCENT)

	Produced National Income			Industrial Production			Population ^f		
	EST	LAT	LIT	EST	LAT	LIT	EST	LAT	LIT
1970-75	5.5	5.8	5.7	7.1	6.4	5.1	1.0	0.8	1.0
1975-80	4.2	3.6 ^b	2.9 ^d	4.4	3.7 ^b	4.9 ^d	0.7	0.5	0.8
1980-85	3.0 ^a	3.2 ^c	3.0 ^c	2.5 ^a	3.2 ^c	4.4 ^c	0.7	0.6	0.9

a. *Rahva Hääl*, 26 January 1982, 26 January 1983, 31 January 1984, 29 January 1985, 29 January 1986.

b. *Latvijas PSR tautas saimniecība 1982. gada* (Riga, 1983), p. 28.

c. J. Porietis, "Intensifikācijas stratēģija," *Skolotāju Avīze*, 14 May 1986.

d. *Narodnoe khoziaistvo Litovskoi SSR v 1978 godu* (Vilnius, 1979), pp. 26 and 54; *Tiesa*, 27 January 1980; *Liaudies ūkis*, 1981/3, p. 26.

e. *Tiesa*, 26 January 1982, 26 January 1983, 29 January 1984, 29 January 1985, 22 January 1986.

f. See note 9.

The slowing growth in production reflected industrial maturity, but it came while living standards were still far below those of Western Europe. Hidden inflation played its part, mainly in the form of manipulation of the consumer price index by the central authorities, and manipulation of the producer goods price and

quantity by enterprises. The United Nations' estimates put real growth at about 2 percentage points lower than the official Soviet figures. Close to 1% growth was needed just to stay abreast of the population increase. Thus, an officially reported 3% growth in Table 4 above represented stagnation in real per capita national income or industrial production, and a reported growth rate of 2% definitely represented negative growth.²³

Slow growth also reduced the economic incentive for further immigration. Estonian oil-shale based production of electrical power was a case in point. The work force in this industry consisted preponderantly of immigrants. Oil-shale production reached a peak of 31.3 million tons in 1980, slid to 26.4 in 1985, and was planned to drop still further to 24.9 million tons by 1990. The production of electricity peaked a year earlier (1979), at 19.4 billion kilowatt-hours, and fell to 17.7 in 1985, with the plan calling for 18.1 in 1990. Oil-shale stockpiles were accumulating, but their lower quality resulted in the aging power plants shutting down more frequently for ash removal. The anticipated depletion date of this national resource was thus pushed further into the 21st century, and the reduced manpower needs were a welcome harbinger of more balanced development.²⁴

In Lithuania the energy picture was dominated by the construction of what was billed as the world's largest nuclear power station (6,000 megawatt, compared to 4,000 for the largest Soviet operating plant, near Leningrad). Located at Lake Drūkšiai in the Ignalina raion, the plant was close to the Latvian and Belorussian borders and thus able to supply all three republics with power—and with fallout, if anything went wrong. The four uranium-graphite channel-type reactors were similar to those in Chernobyl, and violations of work discipline and shoddy workmanship were reported in the Soviet Lithuanian press. No public debate preceded the decision to build, which was made at the all-Union level without any input from the republican authorities. Some Lithuanian scientists protested against the construction, especially since the plant lacked cooling towers to contain contaminated water in case of malfunction. Even normal functioning was expected to bring the average temperature of Lake Drūkšiai to 30 degrees Celsius, destroying the existing ecosystem. The first reactor began operating in January 1984, and a second one was scheduled to go on line in 1985. Russians occupied the posts of power station director and executive committee chairman for the newly-built city of Snieckus in the Ignalina raion. As a result of the influx of the new work force, the Lithuanian share in the population of the raion decreased from 79.0% to 64.3% in 1979.²⁵

In Latvia, too, a nuclear power plant was planned (at Pāvilosta, on the Baltic coast between Liepāja and Ventspils). Like Ignalina, it increased the energy capacity for industrial growth in a labor-poor area, as if designed on purpose to induce further immigration.

Port facilities were expanded in Klaipėda, Liepāja and Ventspils, but the main push came at Muuga, 12 km east of Tallinn, where construction began in 1982 and was scheduled to be completed by 1990.²⁶ The Tallinn "New Harbor" was to become the largest and the deepest port on the Soviet Baltic coast, serving primarily as a site for the import of grain and the export of fertilizers. Most of the labor force involved in the construction came from Russia, and such immigration seems to have provided the main rationale for the dinosaurian

harbor. Economic considerations alone would have dictated a more southern location, shortening transport time and avoiding ice in the winter. Estonian economists were not consulted at all. Any public discussion of the project's ecological, demographic, and cultural impact was glaringly absent, and the project was not even mentioned in the general press prior to 1982, when the official opening presented the Estonian public with a *fait accompli*. Much later, the official press poked fun at the rumors about the project that had been circulating since 1976, but it did not bother to explain why the population had been denied better information for six years, and it offered ridiculously low figures for immigration resulting from the project: an alleged total of one hundred persons, including family members. This was no way to build credibility.²⁷

The record of Baltic agricultural production during the period was uneven. Estonia apparently pioneered in the late 1970s in organizing agricultural complexes that coordinated the collective and state farms of an entire district. The partial US grain embargo of 1981 reduced the fodder supply so severely that instructions on how to feed tree branches and fir needles to cattle were issued.²⁸

Workplace Autonomy: "Contractual and Collective Task Acceptance"

Long-term assignments of parts of state or collective farms to self-organized groups began around 1980, but the practice was rarely mentioned in the press. It seemed to represent a marked shift in Soviet farm policy, provided that it lasted. Only by 3 October 1984 did the Estonian main daily *Rahva Hääli* dare to use the term "family farm." More often the euphemism "collective task acceptance" was used.

The traditional brigades had been formed by farm managers and shifted from one field to the next. In contrast, the new teams that chose to work together consisted of family members or close friends. They effectively obtained a long-term rental contract for certain fields or stables and had a personal economic interest in doing a good job during the entire yearly production cycle. Success stories in the Soviet Baltic press stressed not only productivity and personal profits but also the more flexible work schedules. The situation became somewhat similar to that of the mid-1800s, when passive field hands working on large estates coexisted with rental farms offering more autonomy, responsibility, and opportunity for profit. However, the next step taken in the late 1800s—family-owned farms—was not yet in sight. Farmers' motivation to increase profits was limited to their own consumption needs. They still could not invest their profits in a productive way. As in the early 19th century, it was pointless and even imprudent to meliorate the land to a point where the owner would be tempted to evict the tenant. Considerable internal capital to finance reindustrialization could be raised by selling farms to individual farmers, but like the Baltic barons prior to the 1850s, the Soviets did not entertain such an idea. Even the survival of rental farms was not certain. The regime had a reputation for killing the hen that laid the golden eggs as soon it began producing.²⁹

In services, especially repairs, an analogous development was taking place, known as "contractual task acceptance," but it involved individuals rather than groups. A service person would apparently take orders directly from clients, carry out the service, and receive payment. He or she would pay a fixed sum to the enterprise to cover rental and the cost of materials. This setup seemed equi-

valent to private artisans working in the same building and using the same source of raw materials. In Estonia 1,200 service workers were on such contracts in April 1986. Their average yearly production amounted to 6,000 rubles, as compared to 4,400 for traditional service workers. They probably netted some 100 rubles more in average monthly income, even though the profit of the enterprises was higher, too. Some service enterprises which had regularly operated at a 30 to 40% loss were now turning a profit.³⁰ The appearance of officially sanctioned private taxis in all three Baltic capitals was another facet of the same development.³¹

In part, the new measure merely legalized the existing moonlighting practices of repairmen and drivers, enabling the state to have its cut of the profits. Allowing the craftsmen to do this work during official working hours could increase productivity and customer convenience, provided that there was sufficient price flexibility. However, as of summer 1986, the Baltic public did not seem to notice any difference. The measure still fell short of the Hungarian and Chinese experiments in that the artisans were unable to set their own prices or to invest in expanding or improving their means of production. It remained to be seen whether the legislation on private family enterprises in late 1986 would have any effect here.

Ecology

New measures to preserve the environment and fight pollution were taken in old problem areas, only to be stymied by the rise of new problem areas and by managers' need to fulfill production plans. Water pollution was the severest problem in all three republics. Alongside industrial waste and domestic sewage, runoff of agricultural fertilizer was a major contributing factor. Acid rains, largely of central European origin, also began having a harmful effect on local forests. Air pollution was becoming a problem near certain industrial sites, such as the Mažeikiai oil refinery in Lithuania, and in larger cities throughout all three republics, where private cars were becoming more numerous.

In Latvia, severe pollution of the shallow Gulf of Riga by the effluents of the Sloka Pulp and Paper Mill was largely stopped by 1977 as a result of pressure from environmentalists, but in the city of Riga only 4.5% of waste water was receiving proper treatment as late as 1983. Dams slowed the movement of water on the lower Daugava from 50 km a day in 1950 to 50 km a month, reducing the potential for self-purification.³² An oil spill from a tanker near Klaipėda in 1980 spread pollution over a wide area.

Because of Soviet emphasis on the "branch principle," most of the polluting industry was under the control of central ministries in Moscow, while pollution damage was most evident to territorial agencies. The discrepancy forced the republics' governments to assert their limited powers. In particular, the former chairman of the LiSSR Council of Ministers, Juozas Maniušis, called for reform in branch-territorial relations:

In order to create more favorable conditions for the integrated development of a union republic, the USSR State Planning Committee should plan the allocation of funds and material resources for the nonproductive sector and the entire infrastructure not through all-Union

ministries and administrations but through the republic Council of Ministers.³³

The Lithuanian Nature Protection Association grew from 20,000 members in 1971 to 320,000 (close to one tenth of the republic's population) in 1983, reflecting public awareness and heightening it still further. Concern with preserving the natural setting of the republic often looked like nationalism to the Soviet authorities. The sentencing of environmental activist Vytautas Skuodis to seven years prison (plus five years internal exile) for dissident activities in 1980 seemed to be a warning to the environmental movement. More sinister was a report in *Literatūra ir menas* (19 March 1983) that two environmental protection inspectors had been murdered by unidentified persons, and that two others had narrowly escaped the same fate, apparently in two separate incidents. The intimidation seemed intentional, since the Soviet press usually does not report crimes, complete with names of victims, except when announcing that the culprits have been caught, sentenced, and executed.³⁴

Estonian environmentalists prepared a republic-wide plan for the protection and rational use of natural resources and succeeded in publishing a synopsis of it in the popular *Eesti Loodus* [Estonian Nature] in June 1983. The areas of greatest concern were on the northern coast: the oil-shale area, the Kunda cement works, and Tallinn with the nearby Maardu phosphorite mines and new harbor construction. However, the huge phosphorite mines planned at Toolse near Kunda threatened to contaminate water supplies as far as Lake Peipsi, dwarfing by comparison all previous environmental problems.³⁵ A similar republic-wide expression of environmental concern occurred in Lithuania in 1986. In June of that year, the Chairman of the LiSSR Council of Ministers, Vytautas Sakalauskas, revealed at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet that a search for oil had been going on in Lithuania's waters south of Klaipėda. The question evoked public opposition from many prominent figures in the Lithuanian scientific and cultural establishments. In December of that year, it was announced that the drilling projects had been suspended.³⁶

A Soviet decree on "increasing the role of local soviets" ordered the formation of republic committees for protection of the environment and made any polluters (including those subordinate to central ministries) subject to fines payable to the republic. The decree further ordered territorial planning experiments in Latvia, Estonia, and a few Russian oblasts.³⁷ In general, it seemed to widen republican prerogatives to a modest degree.

CULTURE

Continued Modernization and Russification

A stalemate between increasing modernization and westernization of style on the one hand, and exhortations to ideological vigilance on the other, characterized the cultural scene of the three republics during the 1970s and continued largely unchanged during the first part of the subsequent decade. As before, new literary and dramatic production continued to explore the limits of the possible, and occasional transgressions of orthodoxy were met with official reprimands. Still, as in the 1970s, there was no wholesale cultural reaction, and each successful minor overstepping of the bounds seemed to establish a precedent, expanding the

boundaries of the permissible for subsequent efforts. The ideological exhortations came and went, almost in ritual fashion. Cultural life at times appeared almost oblivious to them. In a very slow way, the ideological element appeared to be pushed out of serious literary creation. An apparently more serious problem was the failure of supply to meet demand. Literary works of quality, frequently published in small editions—as opposed to those for political literature—tended to become black market items as soon as they appeared.

Historical topics, which had provided a medium for the discussion of sensitive contemporary political questions during the 1960s, continued to serve that function. *Vilniaus kalneliai* [The Hills of Vilnius] (1986) by Antanas Bieliauskas, for example, sought to examine the options available to Lithuania during the fateful two months, September and October 1939, when its fate hung in the balance between Germany and the USSR. Bieliauskas' not altogether negative portrayal of some prominent interwar figures caused a minor sensation. Likewise, *Paskutinis atgailos amžius* [The Last Age of Repentance] (1986) by Vytautas Petkevičius, of which only the first part has thus far appeared, used settings in various historical periods from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century to discuss the present-day fate of the Lithuanian nation. Such historical approaches were joined by surprisingly frank literary investigations of contemporary urban life. The novels of the Lithuanian Lenin Prize winner, Jonas Avyžius, *Chameleon spalvos* [The Colors of a Chameleon] (1979) and *Degimai* [Burnings] (1982), were praised by some for their daring and castigated by others as little better than sensationalistic imitations of Western soap operas. They did, however, provide an intriguing glimpse into the life styles and social problems of the new Soviet Lithuanian society.

The first novel of Estonian poetess Viivi Luik, *Seitsmes rahukevad* [The Seventh Peacetime Spring, 1985], was acclaimed for its child's-eye rendering of rural life around 1950, including some previously unmentionable aspects of the guerrilla war and deportations. A rather unlikely theatrical success was Valter Udam, a district party secretary. While lacking literary quality, his play *Vastutus* [Responsibility, 1985] was a hit both with Estonian and Russian audiences because of its remarkably blunt description of Soviet bureaucratic tangles.

During the second half of the 1970s, several talented poets appeared on the Latvian literary scene, notably Uldis Bērziņš, Leons Briedis, Māra Misiņa, Velga Krile, Māra Zālīte, and Klāvs Elsbergs. Jānis Rokpelnis emerged as a master of paradox sustained by a truly polyphonic texture of dissonant voices, incongruous word pairs, mocking rhymes, and other sound effects. During the 1980s, a number of young prose writers, chiefly women born in the 1960s, moved to the forefront, among them, Eva Rubene, Aija Vālodze, Gundega Repše, and Andra Neiburga. Particularly worthy of note is Rudīte Kalpiņa, who at the age of twenty-two, has become the voice of a generation that is no longer willing to swallow "the unappetizing porridge" that has been fed to it for so long, a generation that has the courage to ask questions. Her short story "Let's Say Goodbye to Zinc Overcoats" (the reference is to the metal caskets used to transport the remains of soldiers home), is perhaps the first piece of fiction published in the USSR to criticize the war in Afghanistan, although that country is never mentioned by name.³⁸

A campaign of Russification, begun in the late 1970s, was renewed and continued at least until 1986. Its most evident manifestation was increased Russian-language instruction in the school system (including kindergarten) and an increased Russian-language presence in the media of the three republics. It is, however, not possible to assess the actual impact.

In Estonia, the question of Russification emerged prominently in an open debate in the press. In 1985, the Russian-language daily, *Sovetskaia Estoniia* (26 February 1985) published an article by the Scientific Secretary of the Council of Nationalities in the USSR Academy of Sciences, M. Guboglo, which argued that in many places—in Estonia too, by implication—there was a disproportionately large amount of publication in the indigenous language. He proposed an increase in local publication in Russian in the interests of increasing effective bilingualism. The article was widely interpreted by the cultural elite of the republic as an expression of imminent intention on the part of the authorities and came to be seen as a threat to Estonian culture. The wide discussion it provoked, among other places at a meeting of the Writers' Union, received little coverage in the press. However, late in the year, an article published by Savvati Smirnov in the cultural monthly *Looming* [Creativity] (December 1985) took issue with some of Guboglo's contentions. In a particularly graphic passage, Smirnov ridiculed Guboglo's attempt to draw a comparison between the 80% rise in the total number of books printed in Estonian in the 1960s and 1970s and the 4.8% decrease in the number of Estonians fluent in Russian during the same period: "According to this logic the relationship between the rise in the yearly grain harvest and the decrease in the number of wolves should be of equal interest."³⁹

Another facet of the Russification campaign was the stress on Soviet political themes in public events not intrinsically connected with politics. Such politicizing was particularly noted during the song festivals held in all three republics during the summer of 1985. The theme of the anniversary of the Soviet victory in World War II figured prominently at those events. In Latvia, non-Latvian Red Army choruses participated in the program—to a disproportionate degree, according to some observers.

In the early 1980s, a new propaganda approach to Catholicism manifested itself in Lithuania. The earlier line, that religion was a remnant of the past which was dying out, had become scarcely tenable in the face of increasing evidence of an everyday identification of Catholicism with Lithuanian nationalism by many. While the process was far from being as developed as in neighboring Poland, it appeared to cause concern to the ideological establishment. Increasingly, works which stress a historical accidental association between Lithuanian nationalism and Catholicism appeared. This line of argumentation became most pronounced in 1984 during the celebrations of the 500th anniversary of the death of St. Casimir, a sixteenth century prince revered as the country's patron saint. Although the anniversary was celebrated in Lithuania, the Vatican, and among émigré Lithuanians, the regime managed to prevent a joint celebration from taking place. Pope John Paul II revealed publicly that the Soviets had not allowed him to attend the commemoration in Lithuania. Three years later, the Pope was again denied permission to visit Lithuania on the 600th anniversary of its Christianization. A clerical delegation from Lithuania did, however, partici-

pate in the solemn ceremonies in the Vatican, which drew several thousand Lithuanian émigrés from all over the world. A year earlier, an analogous celebration had been held there on the occasion of the 800th anniversary of the introduction of Christianity in Latvia.

The expansion of foreign contacts which had been developing since the 1960s continued. As earlier, the stream of émigré visitors to the homeland brought with it not only material benefits but also living examples of the life styles of non-Soviet societies. The earlier prohibition of foreign visits outside the three capital cities seemed to be relaxed somewhat, and day trips by leased cars including a chauffeur and a guide, all to be paid in foreign currency, became common.

Longer stays for the purpose of study also continued, at least in Lithuania. Individuals managed to arrange sojourns at the universities and other institutes of higher learning, although most of the student visitors were participants in the summer programs for younger émigrés which became an almost annual event, albeit with several interruptions. Most recently, the Latvian program was apparently discontinued for lack of émigré interest. Of the three, it had been the most transparently a Soviet intelligence operation.⁴⁰ The Estonian program took the form of one week every two years, while Lithuania had a yearly three-week program.

Prominent performing artists and cultural figures were able to visit the West on individual invitations, most of them connected with the émigré community. In 1985, for instance, four prominent figures from the Lithuanian literary world were specifically sent, for the first time, as participants in an annual émigré cultural gathering in the U.S. The following spring, several members of the Lithuanian opera and ballet gave an American recital tour. Although their visit was arranged by individuals in the émigré community, they also performed in non-émigré settings where they were joined by émigré performers. Some, however, went for professional reasons not connected with the émigré community. The Estonian conductor, Eri Klas, was named conductor of the Royal Swedish Opera, a post which he assumed in 1985. The previous spring, the Tallinn Opera, under Klas' direction, had visited Stockholm and played eight performances at the Royal Opera House. The Latvian poet Imants Ziedonis visited Lugano, Switzerland as a guest of the local government in connection with the celebration of an anniversary of the sojourn there, during the first part of this century, of the poets Jānis Rainis and Aspāzija. Soviet Baltic scholars also appeared in several West European countries and the U.S. as participants in ongoing educational exchange programs. In contrast to earlier practice, these were not all necessarily specialists in the natural sciences. Historians, for example, were visiting scholars of the Universities of Stockholm and Wisconsin during the 1985-1986 academic year. That same year, a Soviet Lithuanian lawyer was a visitor at Columbia University Law School in the United States.

The regime also continued to use Baltic settings for international gatherings, presumably as a means of asserting the legitimacy of its control of the region. The first prominent occasion of this sort was in 1980, when Tallinn was the site of the yachting events of the Olympic Games held in Moscow. In November 1985, Vilnius was selected as the meeting place for a Soviet-U.S. writers' colloquium, and in September 1986, Jūrmala outside Riga provided the setting

for a Soviet-U.S. Chautauqua-type Town Meeting involving official delegations of citizens from both countries. The U.S. delegation to that latter event included some members of the American Latvian Association.

In 1982, the Soviet Union introduced severe restrictions on the mailing of printed matter to foreign countries. Estonian establishment writer Vladimir Beekman criticized the measure strongly at the Moscow Writers' Congress in June 1986.⁴¹ Indeed, the meetings of all three republics' writers' associations that year were marked by protests against various aspects of censorship.

DISSENT

Cooperation among Baltic dissidents reached a new stage of sophistication in October 1981, with an Open Letter "Concerning the Establishment of a Nuclear-Free Zone in Northern Europe." Latvians were most numerous among the thirty-eight signatories, who asked that their three republics be included in the zone.⁴² The heavy sentencing of Estonian chemist Jüri Kukk at the beginning of the year and his subsequent death in prison seemed to boost rather than dampen the protest. The potentially most serious challenge came when an underground movement called for a "silent half-hour" on December 1, 1981—a brief work stoppage to be repeated once a month until a number of non-nationalist demands were met. Inspired by the Polish Solidarity, the center of the movement seemed to be in Tallinn, but leaflets were distributed as far as Vilnius and Moscow, and the authorities later admitted to being frightened by it. Solidarność was crushed in that same month, and the strike activities in Tallinn were fairly limited in scope. Nonetheless, they supplied a blueprint for potential future action.⁴³

A visible crackdown by the regime on dissident activity took place in 1983. This may have been connected with the elevation of KGB head, Iurii Andropov, to the leadership of the Soviet state.

In Lithuania, clergymen were subjected to arrest and trial for the first time since 1971. Singled out were Alfonsas Svarinskas and Sigita Tamkevičius, two of the most outspoken leaders of the Lithuanian Catholic movement. They had been members of the Catholic Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Believers, which had ceased to function publicly as a result of severe harassment by the authorities. Subsequently, two other members of the group were subjected to physical assault. In August 1985, Vaclovas Stakėnas was thrown into a pond by unidentified attackers and in February 1986, Juozas Zdebskis was killed in an automobile accident that, according to several sources, appeared to have been arranged by the KGB. Evidence from the *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church* suggests that the regime also made a concerted effort to eliminate the underground seminary which was seeking to train the additional clergymen that the limited official seminary was unable to provide. The Commissioner for Religious Affairs in Lithuania, Petras Anilionis, was reported to have threatened a reduction in the number of students in the official seminary for each unofficial graduate to appear.

The repression succeeded in reducing the volume of Lithuanian samizdat. The only such publications to reach the West in 1984 were the *Chronicle* and *Aušra*, the oldest and probably the best organized among them. The two are known to have continued publication through 1985, although copies had greater

difficulty in reaching the West. Indeed, the LiSSR Minister of Foreign Affairs accused the U.S. Embassy in Moscow of abetting their export from the USSR. In 1985, one issue of a new publication, *Juventus Academica*, which claimed to be the organ of a Lithuanian Youth Association, also reached the West.

In the early 1980s the dissident and human-rights movements in Latvia and Estonia appeared to have been crushed. The texts of the appeals of Latvian human-rights activists Lidija Lasmane-Doronina and Jānis Barkāns to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR provide evidence of the crack-down in that republic. Lasmane-Doronina was arrested in January 1983 and sentenced to 5 years of prison and an additional 3 years of exile. Barkāns was arrested on 26 April and later sentenced to four years in a hard labor camp. It was not his first taste of the Gulag; he had spent the years 1971-1981 in a camp near Riga. Later that same year, Gunārs Astra was sentenced to seven years in a strict-regime labor camp, to be followed by five in exile, for dissemination of a samizdat novel, *Piecas dienas*, a fictional account of a tourist visit to present-day Latvia. He was also accused of possession of émigré Latvian literature and a copy of George Orwell's 1984. His final statement to the court that sentenced him, smuggled out to the West in samizdat form, eloquently depicted the effect of the lack of freedom of information in Latvia. The same charge, possession and dissemination of anti-Soviet literature, was levelled at two young baptists, Jānis Rožkalns and Jānis Vēveris. Ints Čalītis, who had signed the appeal for a nuclear-free zone in the Baltic and had earlier signed the protest on the fortieth anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, was also jailed.

Estonian activists Lagle Parek, Heikki Ahonen, and Arvo Pesti were tried and sentenced in late 1983. The following year, the last prominent dissident active in Estonia, Enn Tarto, was sentenced to ten years in a strict-regime labor camp for signing appeals labelled "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," among them the letter on nuclear disarmament. The sentence was harsh even by Soviet standards. In 1985, Lutheran Minister Harri Mõtsnik was arrested and tried for decrying human-rights abuses from his pulpit. According to official Soviet sources, he subsequently recanted.

Nonetheless, dissent reemerged in Estonia and Latvia in 1984, when eight people signed another open letter on world disarmament and the abolition of censorship. In March 1986, an anonymous group of Estonian scientists issued a protest against the port construction and phosphate mining, which, they argued, would lead to Russification.⁴⁴ The Estonian underground journal *Lisandusi...*, published since 1978, put out its 23rd issue in 1986.

There were unconfirmed reports of a riot in Riga in May 1985. Teenage students of polytechnic and other specialized educational institutions who had gathered in Riga for an official convention staged a de facto demonstration, walking from the railroad station to the independence monument carrying posters reading "Down with the Party—Down with the Russians." They were attacked by Russian youths, and the authorities intervened in force. Three hundred were detained, and three Russians who had been thrown into the Daugava River supposedly drowned. In Tartu, hundreds of Estonian and Russian youths clashed during preparations for Soviet Constitution Day in fall 1985.

Among an increasing number of defecting Soviet Baltic functionaries, an Estonian couple received considerable media attention because the Soviets refused

to let them be reunited with their one-year-old daughter. After more than two years of adverse international publicity about "the world's youngest political prisoner," the Soviet authorities let her go in November 1986.

A number of Baltic political prisoners, some of them only recently sentenced, were released in early 1987 as part of a general policy decision in the Kremlin. Among them were the Estonians Parek, Ahonen, and Pesti; the Latvians Rožkalns, Lasmane-Doronina and Barkāns; and the Lithuanians Vladas Lapienis and Antanas Terleckas. However, the most prominent repressed Baltic dissidents—the Estonian Mart Niklus and the Lithuanians Balys Gajauskas, Viktoras Petkus, Alfonsas Svarinskas, and Sigitas Tamkevičius—remained in confinement. Niklus and Tamkevičius were briefly returned to Tallinn and Vilnius, but refused to sign confessions and recantations and so were shipped back to labor camps.⁴⁵

The extent of quiet dissent among the Baltic population was reflected in Vaino's speech to an ECP Central Committee plenary meeting. After commenting on the "multinational" nature of the republic, the ECP first secretary continued:

It is especially important to achieve the understanding among the indigenous population that the historical fate of the Estonian people is inseparably tied to the Soviet state—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—and to the development and strengthening of the great Russian people.⁴⁶

After forty years of uninterrupted rule from Moscow, understanding of subservience to the Russians still remained something to be "achieved" rather than "maintained."

NOTES

- 1 Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1940-1980*, London: Hurst; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
- 2 For a discussion of the emergence of Pugo see Sergei Zamascikov, "The Ascent of Boriss Pugo or Voss's Long Road to Moscow," *Baltic Forum*, I/1 (Fall, 1984).
- 3 Dzintra Bungs, "New Minister of Culture," RL Research, Baltic Area SR/1 (27 January 1986).
- 4 "Berkļavs Group Rehabilitated?" *Baltic Forum*, 11/2 (Fall, 1985), 102-105.
- 5 *Tiesa*, 17 March 1985.
- 6 Dzintra Bungs, "The 24th Latvian Communist Party Congress," RL Research, Baltic Area SR/2 (4 March 1986).
- 7 Pranas Vaitkūnas, "Lietuvos Komunistų Partija," *Svyturys*, 1986/2. Inexplicably he gives the same figure on page 5 for 1986 and on page 6 for 1985.

- 8 *Estonskaia Kommunisticheskaia Partiia v tsifrakh*, 1920-1980 (Tallinn, 1983), 109, 181, 182.
- 9 For 1965-1979, data condensed from Table 1 of Rein Taagepera, "Baltic Population Changes, 1950-1980," *Journal of Baltic Studies* [henceforth, *JBS*] XII/1 (Spring 1981), 35-57. For 1980-1984, based on population and natural increase figures in *Eesti NSV rahvamajandus 1984. a.*, 8, 10, 12; *Latvijas PSR tautas saimniecība 1984. gadā*, 20-21, and *Narodnoe khoziaistvo Litovskoi SSR v 1984 godu*, 7-8.
- 10 See previous note for sources. Without census data for the end of the period, the 1985 figures for immigration and percentages of the republican nationality are perforce estimates. The problem is further complicated by Soviet lateness in publishing certain data on the 1979 census that were published for the 1970 census, such as age cohort numbers by republic and nationality. However, the known total populations and natural increase figures leave little uncertainty.
- 11 Thorough tables on the ethnic aspects of the 1979 census are presented in Egil Levits, "Die demographische Situation in der UdSSR und in den baltischen Staaten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von nationalen und sprachsoziologischen Aspekten," *Acta Baltica*, XXI (1981), 18-142. The number of Latvians and Estonians residing outside their respective republic but speaking their ancestral language was almost the same in 1959 (54,074 vs. 54,304) and 1970 (45,262 vs. 43,963), but a gap of 18,500 developed in 1979 (52,484 Latvians vs. 33,954 Estonians). If attrition through denationalization between 1970 and 1979 was the same, 17,200 new Latvian-language immigrants would be needed to balance the count. Within the RSFSR alone, 15,600 new Latvian-speaking immigrants would balance the count. Levits estimates the emigration to 10,000, which can be taken as the minimum estimate. See also Juris Dreifelds, "Demographic Trends in Latvia," *Nationalities Papers XXII* (1984), 49-84.
- 12 Data reworked from leaked parts of restricted-circulation reports: *Chislennost', sostav i razmeshchenie naseleniia Latviiskoi SSR po gorodam i raionam po dannym perepisi naseleniia 1979 goda*, Riga, Tsentralnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie Latviiskoi SSR, 1980, as reproduced in "Nationality Composition of the Population in Latvia," World Federation of Free Latvians, press release September 24, 1984 and commented upon in *Baltic Forum* II/1 (Spring 1985), 145-49; and *Itogi perepisi naseleniia po Estonskoi SSR 1979*, Tallinn, ESSR Central Statistics Office, no date known, as reproduced and analyzed in Rein Taagepera, "Size and Ethnicity of Estonian Towns and Rural Districts, 1922-1979," *JBS*, XIII/2 (Summer 1982), pp. 105-127. For Lithuania: Petras Gaučas, "Dabartiniai etniniai procesai Lietuvoje," *Mokslas ir gyvenimas*, 1981/3, 27-28.
- 13 *Komunistas* 2/1985: 63; Rein Taagepera, "Baltic Population Changes, 1950-1980," *JBS*, XII/1 (Spring 1981), 35-57, especially 49.
- 14 *Rahva Hääl*, 13 June 1986.
- 15 Ojārs Kalniņš, "Underground Videos—Another Problem for Soviet leaders," *New York City Tribune*, 31 March 1986; *Komjaunimo Tiesa*, 9 October 1984, as reported in *Baltic Forum* II/1 (Spring 1985), 163-165.
- 16 Vladimir Beekman, *Looming* 4/86.
- 17 A blunt interview with an ex-soldier was published in the Estonian underground publication *Isekiri* No. 2 (1984); full translation in Peter Philips, "A Soviet Estonian Soldier in Afghanistan," *Central Asian Survey* V/1 (1986), 100-15. See also *Baltic Forum* II/1 (Spring 1985), 178-82.

- 18 See e.g., Tõnis Avikson, series of articles in *Noorte Hääl*, 12 to 19 August 1986, and Ants Kippar, "Tšernobõl ja Eesti" [Chernobyl and Estonia], *Vaba Eestlane*, 18 November 1986, the elements of which are confirmed by many other reports. Around 4,000 men were dispatched from Estonia to Chernobyl; Latvian and Lithuanian contingents, if proportional, could have been 6,000 and 9,000 respectively. Over 3,000 refugees had been settled in Tallinn alone, displacing locals who were on apartment waiting lists.
- 19 In 1970, expenditures on alcohol per adult (15 and over) were highest in Estonia (189 rubles), the RSFSR (186), Latvia (179), Kazakhstan (164), and Lithuania (142 rubles)—see Vladimir G. Tremblay, *Alcohol in the USSR: A Statistical Study* (Duke University Press, 1982), p.77. By 1979, total Soviet consumption was up by 36%, and the regional distribution had not changed appreciably.
- 20 In the Estonian daily *Rahva Hääl*, the official statistics were shown to be misleading and insufficient (Siim Kallas, 8 August 1986). A republic committee for mineral resources was proposed (Kalju Kask, 27 August 1986), and alleviation of individual producers' fears in the face of official inconsistencies was urged (Ivar Raig, 3 October 1986). The tremendous bureaucratic roadblocks were illustrated in the issue of 28 September 1986: A director faced fines and possibly prison because his plant used diesel oil for cleaning purposes, and this time-honored practice was suddenly declared illegal by a control committee who interpreted a rule in the narrowest sense possible, happily oblivious of the lack of any substitutes. The Estonian cultural weekly *Sirp ja Vasar* published suggestions that the coverage of foreign countries in the Soviet press was distorted (26 September 1986) and that the city of Kuressaare, renamed "Kingissepa" after the Bolshevik leader "in a leftist excess" of the early 1950s, should have its historical name restored. The name of the weekly itself (meaning "Hammer and Sickle") also came under criticism as incompatible with its Latvian and Lithuanian counterparts, entitled "Literature and Arts."
- 21 *Trud*, 12 April 1987; *The Daily Telegraph*, 18 April 1987; *Washington Post*, 2 May 1987; *Baltic Forum*, 1987/1, pp.101-107; *Sovetskaia Latvija*, 16 May, 1987; *Tiesa*, 6 June, 1987; *Komjaunimo Tiesa*, 7 May 1987.
- 22 Data from Misiunas and Taagepera (1983), Appendix, Table 16, unless otherwise indicated. The Soviet sources shown use different definitions at times, so that the figures may not be directly comparable.
- 23 The UN figures in *Economic Bulletin for Europe XXXI/2* (1980) are reproduced by Jan Winiecki, "Are Soviet-Type Economies Entering an Era of Long-Term Decline?" *Soviet Studies XXXVIII/3* (July 1986), 325-48. He considers them minimum estimates of hidden inflation. The 1970-1980 changes in GNP per capita are estimated to be +8% in Lithuania, -1% in Latvia, and +2% in Estonia by George J. Viksnis, "The Latvian Economy: Change under Gorbachev?" *JBS*, XVII/3 (Fall, 1986), 238-55.
- 24 Data mainly from *Rahva Hääl*, 27 January 1980, 26 January 1982, 29 January 1986, and 17 June 1986. The latter carried the report of Chairman of the Council of Ministers Bruno Saul on the 1986-1990 socio-economic plan for the ESSR.
- 25 Augustine Idzelis, "The Socioeconomic and Environmental Impact of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Station," *JBS*, XIV/3 (Fall 1983), 247-54; see also Erik Lettlander, "Baltic states oppose Soviet nuclear reactor, siting of SS-20s," *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 January 1984, 13.
- 26 See Henry Ratnieks, "Soviet Hydrocarbon Exports and the Baltics," *JBS*, XV/4 (Winter 1984), 282-92.

- 27 *Rahva Hää*, 5 March 1982 and 26 August 1986.
- 28 Ülo Oll, *Rahva Hää*, 11 February 1982; see Rein Taagepera, "Why Are We Feeding the Ravenous Russians?" *Los Angeles Times*, 7 November 1982.
- 29 See *Baltic Forum*, II/1 (Spring 1985), 132-34.
- 30 Andres Root, in *Rahva Hää*, 25 June 1986, p.2; see also David Buchan, "Estonia Demonstrates How It's Done," *Financial Times*, 19 March 1986.
- 31 *Izvestia*, 23 January 1987; *Komjaunimo Tiesa*, 1 April 1987.
- 32 Juris Dreifelds, "Participation in Pollution Control in Latvia, 1955-1977," *JBS*, XIV/4 (Winter 1983), 273-95.
- 33 J. Maniušis, *Komunistas*, 1/1983, p.53.
- 34 Augustine Idzelis, "Institutional Response to Environmental Problems in Lithuania," *JBS*, XIV/4 (Winter 1983), 296-306.
- 35 Mare Taagepera, "Ecological Problems in Estonia," *JBS*, XIV/4 (Winter 1983), 307-314.
- 36 *Literatūra ir menas*, 15 November 1986; *Pergalė*, 1987/3.
- 37 *Rahva Hää*, 1 August 1986.
- 38 *Literatūra un Māksla*, 24 October 1986.
- 39 *Looming*, 1985/12, p. 1665; for an overview of the discussion, see *Baltic Forum*, 1985/2 and 1986/1.
- 40 Imants Lešinskis, "Cultural Relations or Ethnic Espionage?", *Baltic Forum*, 1985/1, pp. 26-27.
- 41 *Sirp ja Vasar*, 27 June 1986.
- 42 Rein Taagepera, "Inclusion of the Baltic Republics in the Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone," *JBS* XVI/1 (Spring 1985), 33-51; Rein Taagepera, "Citizens' Peace Movement in the Soviet Baltic Republics," *Journal of Peace Research*, XXIII/2 (1986), 183-192.
- 43 For a more detailed description of Estonian dissent in 1979-1983, see Rein Taagepera, *Softening Without Liberalization in the Soviet Union: the Case of Jüri Kukk* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984).
- 44 See e.g., Bohdan Faryma, "Estonian Scientists Warn of Damage from Planned Soviet Mine Harbor," *New York City Tribune*, 18 July and 24 July 1986.
- 45 Niklus in a letter to his mother, late March 1983; Tamkevičius, Lithuanian Information Center News Release, 10 February, 1987.
- 46 *Rahva Hää*, 25 August 1985.