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By

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Professor Benjamin Porter

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Abstract

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This dissertation presents a new understanding of organized violence, or warfare, on the Greek island of Crete in the Archaic and Classical periods and explores how violence impacted the development of some of the earliest Greek city-states, or poleis. At a crossroads between the Aegean and the rest of the Mediterranean, Crete has the earliest Greek law codes and some of the earliest pieces of the hoplite panoply. However, the relationship between these two developments, war and politics, has never been explored in depth. In part, the hesitancy of the academy is due to the hoplite orthodoxy and a narrow reading of our literary sources. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, scholars have begun to challenge and dismantle these entrenched paradigms. The evidence for violence on Crete between 700 and 400 BCE, what Anthony Snodgrass describes as the Age of Hoplite Warfare, remained immense and disjointed, across many different subfields. To address this complexity, I collected, managed, and studied this evidence using a digital database. Through a detailed analysis of the archaeological, historical, literary, epigraphic, and artistic data, I develop a new model for Greek warfare, propose a new way to bridge the conflicting narratives in our evidence, and trace the history of Cretan warfare over the Archaic and Classical periods.

Through network analysis and statistical modeling, the database for violence on Crete illustrates that Cretan warfare was a collection of beliefs and practices, a series of ideologies. Rather surprisingly, there is no evidence for combatants or real battles on Crete until the very end of this period and a plethora of evidence for wealthy warrior elites. This evidence presents two remarkably different types of combat styles and military practices embedded within two different archaeological contexts – extra-urban versus urban sanctuaries. A third ideology of violence emerged once poleis began to institutionalize ancient warfare in the late sixth and fifth centuries BCE.

All three ideologies of violence promoted certain world views about warriorhood, masculinity, and eliteness both on and off the battlefield. In extra-urban ritual spaces, warriors practiced a collaborative style of warfare in which every warrior, regardless of their political

affiliation, was seen as an equal. These warriors had lighter equipment, omphalos-type shields, and were depicted working together against a common natural or mythological enemy. Artists illustrated these characters with the shield-as-body motif – their shields completely obstructed their torsos, leaving the viewer with the impression that they were inhuman shield people with arms, legs, weapons, and heads. These warriors were identity-less and nonanatomic, meaning that they had no indicators of biological sex such as genitalia or facial hair.

I refer to the ideology evidenced at extra-urban sanctuaries as the "ideology of camaraderie" and argue that the anonymity of warriorhood was tied to the isolation and inaccessibility of extra-urban sanctuaries themselves. Many of these ritual spaces were high in the mountains, far from any urban infrastructure, and participating in rituals within these spaces would have cost a certain amount of starting capital. If someone could afford to travel to an extra-urban sanctuary, make a dedication, and participate in the seasonal rituals, then they were welcome to consider themselves part of this nonanatomic warrior elite.

Warfare in urban ritual spaces, on the other hand, was heavy, exclusive, and individualistic. Urban warriors advertised their personal wealth and prowess in defeating other urban warriors. Their armor celebrated their male anatomic features, especially their torsos and groins. They claimed to be independent juggernauts, and covered themselves with encumbering armor that would have obstructed their mobility, sight, and hearing. To actually fight in this way, they needed to rely on a team of attendants and supporters, but the art in urban spaces never depicts these lower-class individuals. According to the urban ideology of violence, warfare was only accessible to elites.

This highly competitive ideology of violence emerges in our evidence alongside the earliest poleis. Elites, it seems, used organized violence as a means to establish and enforce strict social hierarchies between elites and non-elites. This system used combat as a means to forge positive bonds with non-elites by targeting other elites and celebrating their defeat. In the urban sanctuaries, however, elite warriors excluded non-elites and portrayed violence as an elite-only activity, thereby forging positive bonds with other privileged elites who already had access to these limited ritual spaces. Urban warfare, therefore, was tied to the social functioning of the earliest poleis and created a delicate system whereby elites used inter-elite competition and violence to maintain their privileged status.

Moreover, these elites appear to have navigated both the extra-urban and urban ideologies simultaneously. Although we might expect these ideologies to be at odds, they seem to have complimented each other and even appear in mortuary contexts side-by-side. The consistent thread in both urban and extra-urban spaces was that organized violence was an elite-only activity: only elites could afford the regular pilgrimage to extra-urban spaces and only elites could afford the full bronze armor panoply. I argue that elites monopolized violence both within and beyond their poleis to gatekeep membership into their elite group, what many scholars call the *andreion* and Gunnar Seelentag has recently described as a cartel. They set the entry cost of warriorhood extremely high to maintain control over their communities and retain a monopoly over violence. Although elites could present themselves as egalitarian in extra-urban spaces, they

celebrated their martial skill within their polis to prove that they deserved to be in the elite cartel. Through this cartel, they crafted predatory laws that guaranteed their privileged positions within the community and elicited consent for the continuation of this system from non-elites.

However, the invention of coinage and the economic intensification of the island in the late sixth century BCE led to the gradual institutionalization of elite violence. This process was piecemeal and inconsistent, but several poleis evidently sought to preserve their economic and military security. Elites were enlisted to protect their poleis, and poleis began to control how elites dedicated their war booty, which had become a focal point for elite competition within the urban space. This seems to be an attempt on behalf of the community to direct the economic benefits of organized violence towards sanctuaries that the polis could control and draw from during economic emergencies, rather than distant sanctuaries beyond their reach. This institutionalization of war booty created the third and final system of organized violence that emerges in our evidence in these periods.

Cretan poleis never attempted to control how or where elites committed organized violence. Indeed, the gradual institutionalization of violence follows the ideological trajectory of the earlier systems. But by the late fifth century BCE, Cretan warfare was not a financially beneficial practice for individual warriors because in some cases, all the war booty was seized by the polis. Yet our Athenian sources report that Cretans were particularly focused on collecting war booty and eager to fight for profit. Within the history of the Cretan ideologies of violence, this inconsistency makes sense: for Cretan elites, the accumulation of wealth through violence was the best way to achieve social recognition and prove belonging within elite groups. Rather than a means to impose political will, Cretan warfare was an important avenue for elite competition through the accumulation of war booty.

The ideological history of Cretan warfare and its role in the formation of ancient poleis has dramatic implications for our understanding of violence and politics in ancient Greece. The Weberian model of the ancient city-state requires reassessment, as the earliest Cretan poleis seem not to have had a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Indeed, Cretan elites monopolized violence, and the institutionalization of organized violence was extremely patchwork. Moreover, Cretan warriors had a dramatic impact on mainland Greek communities. In the late fifth and early fourth centuries BCE, elite Cretan warriors fought alongside the Athenians, Spartans, and Persians as highly organized, reliable, and adaptable warriors. They had an outsized influence in ancient conflicts because their socio-political systems incentivized the leisured class to pursue martial success and war booty by conflating eliteness and warriorhood. The success of the Cretans in the armies of the Athenians and Spartans seems to have contributed to the widespread adoption of professional military groups within Greece. Half a century later, Alexander the Great would use an army of professional forces to conquer Persia. The ideologies of violence on Crete are important to this story because they explain why Cretan elites were so committed to organized violence, emphasize the political power of warriorhood within Greek poleis, and illustrate how ancient warfare could directly impact the history of the eastern Mediterranean more broadly.

For my Tutu, Ann Williams née Furlong (1939-2019)

Table of Contents

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ ἀπῆσαν οἱ Ἕλληνες ἔχοντες τὰ ἐπιτήδεια. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν κατάβασιν ἐφοβοῦντο τὴν εἰς Τραπεζοῦντα (πρανὴς γὰρ ἦν καὶ στενή), ψευδενέδραν ἐποιήσαντο: καὶ ἀνὴρ Μυσὸς καὶ τοὔνομα τοῦτο ἔχων τῶν Κρητῶν λαβὼν δέκα ἔμενεν ἐν λασίῳ χωρίῳ καὶ προσεποιεῖτο τοὺς πολεμίους πειρᾶσθαι λανθάνειν: αἱ δὲ πέλται αὐτῶν ἄλλοτε καὶ ἄλλοτε διεφαίνοντο χαλκαῖ οὖσαι. οἱ μὲν οὖν πολέμιοι ταῦτα διορῶντες ἐφοβοῦντο ὡς ἐνέδραν οὖσαν: ἡ δὲ στρατιὰ ἐν τούτῳ κατέβαινεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐδόκει ἤδη ἱκανὸν ὑπεληλυθέναι, τῷ Μυσῷ ἐσήμηνε φεύγειν ἀνὰ κράτος: καὶ ὃς ἐξαναστὰς φεύγει καὶ οἱ σὺν αὐτῷ. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι Κρῆτες (ἁλίσκεσθαι γὰρ ἔφασαν τῷ δρόμῳ), ἐκπεσόντες ἐκ τῆς ὁδοῦ εἰς ὕλην κατὰ τὰς νάπας καλινδούμενοι ἐσώθησαν, ὁ Μυσὸς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν φεύγων ἐβόα βοηθεῖν: καὶ ἐβοήθησαν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἀνέλαβον τετρωμένον. καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ πόδα ἀνεχώρουν βαλλόμενοι οἱ βοηθήσαντες καὶ ἀντιτοξεύοντές τινες τῶν Κρητῶν. οὕτως ἀφίκοντο ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον πάντες σῷοι ὄντες.

The next day, the Greeks came with their provisions. But since they feared the descent into Trapezus (for it was steep and narrow), they set up a fake ambush; and a Mysian man, who was also named Mysos, took ten Cretans, waited in an overgrown bit of country, and pretended to be trying to hide from the enemy; but their bronze shields shimmered through [the bushes] now and again. Then the enemies, seeing these things clearly, were afraid that there was an awaiting ambush; and the Greek army descended [into Trapezus unharmed]. When it seemed that they had already proceeded sufficiently, [the Greeks] signaled to Mysos to flee with all his strength; and he and his companions rose [from their hiding place] and fled. And some Cretans (for they said that they would be destroyed on the path) ran off the road into the woods and saved themselves fleeing through the trees, but Mysos fled down the road and shouted for aid; and they helped him and assisted him when he was wounded. And they all fled by foot as they were coming under attack [from the enemy], and some of the Cretans fired their bows in return. In this way, [Mysos and the other Cretans] came to the Greek camp safe and sound.[1]

– Xen. *Anab*. 5.2.29-32

[1] I have written my translations for ease of reading, while trying to be as close to the original as possible.

In the *Anabasis*, ten Cretan warriors save the Greek army in a harrowing feat of misdirection (Xen. *Anab*. 5.2.29). They carry bronze shields, are weighed down by their equipment and slower than their enemy, and they wield bows and arrows. According to our understanding of Greek hoplite warfare in the late fifth and early fourth centuries,[2] these Cretan warriors are an anomaly. Hanson wrote that Greek archers "were often men from the lower orders of society who could not afford their own body armor,"[3] but Xenophon's Cretans are both armored warriors, or hoplites, and archers. The Cretans, Hanson might continue, were an exception, since they were a "semi-Hellenized" people "who had no stomach for the clash of spears, no desire 'to play by the rules.'"[4] However, the Cretans probably invented, or at least contributed to the invention of, Greek hoplite armor, the Greek polis political system, the Greek alphabet, and many other characteristically Greek institutions.[5] Thomas and Conant argue that Cretans were essential for the dissemination of iron technology, Athenian protogeometric pottery, and heroic cults like the one at Lefkandi.[6] Whose "rules" were the Cretans supposed to play by, their own or ours?

Despite the incongruity between Xenophon's Cretans and the orthodox model of hoplite warfare, the orthodox narrative, which Hanson repackaged and streamlined in 1989, dominated the scholarly discussion of Cretan warfare for much of the twentieth century.[7] Griffith described Crete in the fourth century as "a ready-made nursery for mercenaries" because they were poor, prone to violence, and desperate.[8] When Hoffman surveyed the large collection of Cretan hoplite armor from the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries, he concluded that the armor must have been looted by Cretan archers from a polis that used hoplites.[9] According to his understanding of Greek warfare, successful Cretans were only ever archers so they never would have worn any of the hoplite armor found on the island. Snodgrass argues that Cretan warriors were archery specialists throughout the "Age of the Hoplite."[10] He bases this assertion on Hellenistic literature, Hellenistic Cretan coins, and a type of arrowhead that remained popular on Crete from

[2] All dates are BCE except in reference to modern scholarship.
[3] Hanson 1989, 15.
[4] Hanson 1989, 15.
[5] On armor, see Snodgrass 1964; 1967, 63. On polis systems, see Hansen 2006, 46. On the Greek alphabet, see Lazzarini 1999.
[6] Thomas and Conant 1999, 68, 71, 93-94.
[7] Although most twenty-first century scholars have abandoned Hanson's model, they still treat archers along the same lines. Kucewicz, Lloyd, and Konijnendijk still describe archers as individuals "of low social status: poor, foreign, unfree, or some combination of these categories," because they were "unable to afford hoplite equipment" (Kucewicz et al. 2021, 221-222). Although Davis (2013) rejects the orthodox narratives of archery, he also assumes that archers were lower-class. I will explore the value of the revisionist model for Crete in chapter two. Cretan warriors appear to have been leisure-class hoplite archers.
[8] Griffith 1935, 245. Hornblower (1983, 200) repeated this same sentiment almost fifty years later. He states that Cretans utilized mercenary service as "a kind of alternative to colonization, both being a form of emigration to escape poverty."
[9] Hoffman 1972, 10, 16.
[10] On Cretans as archer specialists, see Snodgrass 1967, 40, 81, 108. On "The Age of the Hoplite," see Snodgrass 1967, 48, 89, and below. This is the title of the third chapter of his second monograph (Snodgrass 1967). His second monograph summarizes the socio-political implications of the arms and armor that he cataloged in his first monograph (Snodgrass 1964).

the Late Bronze Age to the end of the Hellenistic period.[11] Although he characterizes Cretans as archers, Snodgrass also attributes the earliest evidence for hoplite military equipment to Crete.[12]

Hoplite military equipment, specifically bronze plate armor, started to appear in the archaeological record in the late eighth and early seventh centuries, and the earliest closed-face helmets and greaves probably first appeared on Crete.[13] The hoplite was the primary focus of Greek military thought, strategy, and battlefield tactics for about three hundred years, from the end of the eighth century to the end of the fifth century.[14] Several major military innovations, as well as an emphasis on lighter equipment and small groups of highly trained warriors, in the late fifth and early fourth centuries signaled the beginning of the end of the hoplite's dominance.[15] Although warfare was a constantly changing practice, Snodgrass was probably right to highlight 700 and 400 as significant dates in the development of Greek warfare, and these dates also work well for the history of Cretan warfare. Cretan warriors, who used some of the earliest hoplite equipment but did not fight like Athenian or Spartan hoplites, have always been a problem for Classical archaeologists and historians, like Snodgrass and Hanson, because they do not adhere to any proposed paradigm.

Sometimes described as a "miniature continent," Crete is the southern-most island in the Aegean and one of the largest islands in the Mediterranean (see map 1.1).[16] It was probably something of a conduit for eastern Mediterranean culture and technology as it made its way into Greece and the rest of southeastern Europe.[17] Archaic Cretan art is often described as "Orientalizing," a term that raises more problems than it resolves and that I will hereafter avoid.[18] It is an eclectic mixture of Aegean, Levantine, and Egyptian artistic styles.[19] There are clear borrowings from each region, but no mainland Greeks, Levantines, or Egyptians would have identified Cretan art as a direct imitation of their own styles.[20] Crete was not exactly "on the periphery of the Greek world,"[21] but Cretan institutions also did not exactly resemble

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[11] Snodgrass 1964, 147-148

[12] Snodgrass 1967, 63.

[13] Snodgrass 1967, 63. Lebesi (1976, 170-171) and Pautasso (2011) argue that Cretan closed-face helmets post-date the earliest Corinthian-type helmets. This argument contradicts Snodgrass' (1964, 27) Corinthian chronology, but all three authors use art to formulate their arguments. Snodgrass (1964, 22-27) uses artistic depictions of warriors in Protocorinthian pottery to date the Corinthian helmet type to the middle of the seventh century. The Prinias stelai, which Lebesi and Pautasso are using to date Cretan closed-face helmets, probably date to same period. However, the Fortetsa belt has warriors with nearly identical helmets and dates to the late ninth or early eighth century (D'Acunto 2013). If we are going to create a chronology based on artistic depictions of helmets, we should include all the art, including the Fortetsa belt. The earliest closed-face helmets in Greece, therefore, were Cretan.

[14] Konijnendijk 2018, 154-157; Snodgrass 1967, 49, 107.

[15] Snodgrass 1967, 107-110.

[16] Braudel 1972, 148.

[17] Crete was not one of "the more isolated parts of Greece" (Wrightson 2019, 19), as many scholars have claimed.

[18] See Whitley 2013, 410-411 for an illustration of the problems with this term. In general, I will attempt to avoid relative chronologies as much as possible. They remain immensely complicated, controversial, and confusing for Crete, and many scholars have their own ideas about what each relative chronology term really means. See chapter three for further discussion of this problem.

[19] Hurwit 1985, 131, 150, 190.

[20] Prent 2005, 240-242.

[21] contra Chaniotis 2005b, 5.

comparable institutions on the mainland. Crete might be best understood as lying at the crossroads between Greece and the rest of the Mediterranean.

Map 1.1 – A map of the eastern Mediterranean with Crete labelled.

The island has been inhabited since the Paleolithic. It was the center of the Minoan civilization until Mycenaean culture spread to the island in the Late Bronze Age. Following the collapse of the Bronze Age palaces, Crete remained politically fragmented until the Romans conquered the island in 67.[22] Homer describes Crete as a hundred-citied, ἑκατόμπολις, and ninety-citied, ἐννήκοντα πόληες, island with a mixture of different languages and cultures (Hom. *Il*. 2.649; *Od*. 19.174-178). In her contribution to the *Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*, Perlman identifies sixty-three poleis and several additional smaller communities.[23] However we quantify human settlement on the island, both ancient sources and modern commentators agree that ancient Crete was both politically and culturally diverse.

Despite this diversity, Cretan poleis shared a certain number of similarities in terms of material culture, legal institutions, religious customs, and a shared Cretan alphabet and language.[24] We might characterize these commonalities as aspects of a shared Cretan *koine*.[25] Ancient Cretans forged commonalities through a series of personal relationships developed in and oriented through extra-urban sanctuaries.[26] These spaces were usually located in relatively

[22] Chaniotis 2005b, 20.
[23] Perlman 2004.
[24] All of these commonalities will be explored in the following chapters. For overviews of Cretan material culture, see Erickson 2010. For legal practices, language, and alphabet, see Gagarin and Perlman 2016. For religious customs, see Prent 2005.
[25] I will argue in chapter four that this *koine* was concentrated in extra-urban sanctuaries in particular.
[26] Scholars have long associated large regional sanctuaries with state formation (see Prent 2005, 216), but even scholars who study regions of the ancient Greek world without centralized poleis have identified regional sanctuaries as focal points for sociocultural identity crafting (see Blome 2020, 3-4). For a thorough overview of this concept more generally, see Mackil 2013, 147-156. Mackil uses regional sanctuaries to trace the development of the

isolated and hard-to-reach locations, and they were dominated by elites.[27] Many of them had been unifying religious spaces since the Minoan period, and they continued to act as catalysts for interaction and exchange in the first millennium.[28] But we ought not think of extra-urban sanctuaries as inherently peaceful or egalitarian spaces – the high quantity of military equipment and artistic depictions of violence that archaeologists have found in them emphasizes that they were arenas for elite competition (see map 1.2). In many respects, the most prominent extra-urban sanctuaries on Crete, like Ida and Kato Syme, were comparable to the extra-urban religious centers of the mainland, like Delphi and Olympia. Elites dedicated arms, armor, and martial art to ritual spaces on both the mainland and Crete, but we will see that Cretan sanctuaries tended to house very specific types of martial dedications depending on their proximity to a polis.[29]

Map 1.2 – A map of Crete with the most relevant urban and extra-urban spaces highlighted. Yellow markers indicate poleis or presumed poleis and red markers indicate extra-urban sanctuaries.

Achaian, Aitolian, and Boeotian *koina*. Although I cite Mackil's study of Greek *koina* throughout this project, I do not mean to imply that there was a Cretan *koinon* before the Hellenistic period, if at all (contra Chaniotis 2015; Pasek 2014, 76-87; Stefanakis 1999; Viviers 1999, 230-231).

[27] Prent 2005, 421-422. Rural and transhumant pastoralist communities also likely engaged with and participated in rituals at extra-urban sanctuaries, but there is not enough space here to investigate how their involvement may have impacted our evidence and the role of violence in these ritual spaces. The most detailed investigation of pastoralism on Crete, Chaniotis' 1999 *Milking the Mountain* edited volume, assumes that Cretan poleis practiced economic isolationism, which more recent studies have found to be demonstrably false (see Erickson 2010, Erny 2022, Gilboa et al. 2017, Lehmann et al. 2019). This question deserves a dedicated reassessment.

[28] Prent 2005, 638-643.

[29] This is the topic of chapter four.

Unfortunately, the piecemeal state of our evidence requires that I discuss Cretan communities and their relationship to violence, including warfare, in rather broad strokes. The Aphrati armor hoard, for example, is the best published and most discussed collection of armor from Crete, but it comes from a looted context and was sold on the antiquities market.[30] Although archaeologists found an urban sanctuary that was probably occupied in the sixth and fifth centuries where looters claimed to have found the objects,[31] it is highly unlikely that all of the objects in the so-called hoard originated from one location. The collection includes far more armor than scholars have assigned to any other polis but the Aphrati sanctuary itself was one of the smallest, and the hoard also included at least one Minoan object.[32] This sort of inconsistent archaeological history is common on Crete because excavation at most sites began before the first world war. Discussing island-wide practices unfortunately obscures the diversity which we know existed between every Cretan community, but reconstructing specific situations at the polis level remains out of reach.

Brisart, Erickson, Rabinowitz, Seelentag, and Whitley, among others, have argued that cultural and economic changes at the end of the seventh and beginning of the sixth centuries established a rigid social hierarchy that used elite rituals to promote cooperation between elites and non-elites.[33] However, the ancient evidence for organized violence, or warfare,[34] alters this narrative. It is worth examining why the so-called Age of Hoplite Warfare appears to have started on Crete alongside the earliest laws in Europe,[35] but previous investigations of this topic have worked with insufficient data. There is a substantial amount of evidence for violence on Crete, but it has never been studied in a systematic way. My study collects all the evidence for the very first time and challenges the traditional interpretation of Cretan war and polities. In part one, I assemble all the evidence for violence on Crete between 700 and 400 and investigate how well the evidence correlates with or diverges from the current interpretations of Cretan warfare. In part two, I utilize the database that I present in part one to argue that what we call Cretan warfare was in reality a series of at least three distinct elite ideologies in the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries.

In the late seventh century, social and economic changes revealed a new style of Cretan warfare in our evidence. Snodgrass argues that small shields and leather armor were all but abandoned in the seventh century in favor of heavily restrictive bronze panoplies, but I will argue that the transition between these military practices is far more complex.[36] My data suggest that Snodgrass' two phases of organized violence on Crete instead reflect two ideologies of violence

[30] See Hoffman 1972; Prent 2005, 279.
[31] Erickson 2002; Prent 2005, 279.
[32] A neopalatial dagger: Object ID 952, in my database.
[33] Brisart 2014, Erickson 2010, Rabinowitz 2014, Seelentag 2015, Whitley 2013. I have highlighted these authors because their ideas are particularly relevant to my discussion.
[34] Warfare and organized violence are synonymous. As I will explain below, organized violence is a subtype of violence. I collected and studied all the evidence for violence on Crete, but this project is primarily interested in organized violence.
[35] Snodgrass 1964, 1967.
[36] Snodgrass 1964, 189. For a discussion on the problems with dating Cretan violence see below.

that coexisted throughout the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries. At extra-urban sanctuaries, elites commemorated a collaborative style of warfare in which warriors carried lighter equipment that would have been conducive to more open and free-flowing styles of combat. This type of organized violence built on the martial traditions of earlier periods, and it selectively adopted certain pieces of the hoplite panoply and ignored others. Warriors in urban spaces, on the other hand, are represented carrying large round shields and wearing closed-face helmets, large bronze sheet corslets, and bronze mitrai.[37] Altogether, the equipment and armor of urban warriors would have been conducive to a slow and heavy style of combat oriented around a large crowd of armored hoplites. This style emerges in the seventh century alongside the earliest laws of the Cretan poleis and seems to have coexisted with the extra-urban ideology of violence into the sixth or fifth centuries.[38] The contextual distinctions between these two approaches to organized violence illustrate how elites utilized violence for state and identity crafting. In the late sixth century, Cretan poleis started to institutionalize war and warriorhood, and this triggered a third ideology of violence, wherein elites sought to prove their masculinity and status through war booty.

1.1 – Approaching a Methodology

Step I: Trying and Failing to Find Interpolis Warfare on Crete

Twentieth- and twenty-first century scholars typically describe Archaic and Classical Cretan poleis as warrior aristocracies locked in a state of "internecine conflict and interpolity warfare."[39] This idea seems to derive from Polybius who describes second-century Cretans as especially violent (Polyb. 24.3).[40] After a limited investigation of the epigraphic and literary evidence, Willetts argues that Cretans organized themselves into warrior aristocracies.[41] There have been several challenges to Willetts model, but no one has yet incorporated the archaeological evidence for violence into these conversations about the emergence and development of Cretan poleis, despite frequent references to these poleis being in a near permeant state of war. To trace how Cretan warfare influenced the political changes of the

[37] Mitrai are semi-circular sheets of bronze that probably covered a warrior's groin. For a detailed discussion of mitrai, see chapter four.
[38] On the problems with the chronology, see below.
[39] I quote Haggis (2013, 82), who makes this statement without citation, but it is a widespread view (cf. Moody 1992; Kotsonas 2002; Whitley 2009, 284-285; Wallace 2010, 284, 330; Erickson 2010; Lewis forthcoming). I will survey, explore, and challenge the traditional model of Cretan warfare in chapter two.
[40] He writes: and so began the beginning of great troubles on Crete, if it is possible to say there is a beginning of troubles in Crete; for the perseverance of internecine wars and the excess of cruelty towards each other are both the beginning and the end on Crete; κατὰ δὲ τὴν Κρήτην ἀρχὴ πραγμάτων ἐκινεῖτο μεγάλων, εἰ χρὴ λέγειν ἀρχὴν πραγμάτων ἐν Κρήτῃ: διὰ γὰρ τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν ἐμφυλίων πολέμων καὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς εἰς ἀλλήλους ὠμότητος ταὐτὸν ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος ἐστὶν ἐν Κρήτῃ (Polyb. 24.3). Scholars sometimes cite this passage to describe Crete in the Archaic and Classical periods, but it clearly refers to Hellenistic Cretan conflicts. Polybius is certainly talking about "internecine conflict and interpolity warfare" in the second century, but applying this passage to the seventh, sixth, or fifth centuries ignores the important historical changes of the fourth and third centuries.
[41] Willetts 1955, 160, 250.

seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries, I have collated all the evidence for violence into a single database.[42] I included various models for hoplite warfare within this database and determined how well each piece of evidence supported each theory. I developed a controlled vocabulary to test these theories, and I describe terms within this vocabulary as tags. Each tag employs criteria within established arguments about ancient warfare and indicates whether each piece of evidence for violence supports that argument. Many tags are self-explanatory, such as cavalry or archery, but others could be fairly nuanced. A painting of a warrior fighting on a horse, for example, certainly works as evidence of cavalry, but depending on that warrior's equipment, it may not represent a mounted hoplite. Because this process is a bit subjective, I recorded a confidence coefficient every time I positively identified a tag. A detailed discussion of my database, including descriptions of each tag, is the topic of chapter three.

The best represented theory of hoplite warfare, or tag, extant in my data is van Wees' "leisure-class hoplite." He argues that hoplite armies were roughly half leisure-class and half working-class.[43] Leisure-class hoplites dedicated time and money to dressing like a warrior and being prepared for organized violence.[44] Lloyd expands on van Wees' categories for the Early Iron Age and Geometric periods, and defines leisure-class hoplites as "men who could ride to battle on horseback, equip themselves and their allies with the latest bronze armour, and dedicate spoils at interregional sanctuaries."[45] Everyone else in the hoplite battleline was a working-class hoplite – an individual who had the minimum required equipment, did not generally follow the elite-hoplite lifestyle, and did not subscribe to any warrior identity.

Throughout this project, I will use network analysis graphs to illustrate certain facets of my argument. I created these visualizations in Gephi and provide a summarizing graph of all the archaeological evidence in my database in figure 1.1.[46] Each node is an entry in my database, and each node is tied to all the other nodes that share a common typology or feature of ancient warfare. Van Wees' leisure-class hoplite type is clearly the most dominant feature of Cretan warfare throughout the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries – it is the primary cluster of nodes around which the other nodes are oriented. The archery cluster is also significant in figure 1.1, but the dominance of a single object type within this cluster, namely arrowheads, and the relative isolation of the cluster from all the other evidence raises questions as to whether we have captured evidence for organized violence, i.e. warfare, rather than other types of violence like hunting.[47]

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[42] This includes all the archaeological, artistic, epigraphic, and literary evidence.
[43] van Wees 2004, 55-57.
[44] van Wees 2004, 55-57; 2013; van Wees and Fisher 2015, 12. Although I find van Wees' categories useful and compelling, his argument is fundamentally built on the assumption that every hoplite owned property. This is not supported in our evidence, and I provide a different definition of ὁπλίτης in chapter two.
[45] Lloyd 2021, 54.
[46] This visualization was created with the default Fruchterman Reingold setting: area was set to 1000, gravity was 10, and speed was 1. The size of the nodes was set to 15, and they were colored by type.
[47] See the discussion on Cretan archery in chapter two.



Figure 1.1. – A visualization of our archaeological evidence for violence on Crete in the Age of Hoplite Warfare.

Figure 1.1 illustrates a basic pattern – that most archaeological objects from Crete support the notion that Cretan violence involved, to some degree, archery or leisure-class hoplites – but we must be careful not to over rely on these sorts of visualizations. Network analysis makes two basic assumptions about the archaeological evidence that are demonstrably false. The graphing system assumes first that all the evidence is included in the network visualization and, second, that each entry in the database, each node, is of equal value. Of course, archaeologists never have a complete picture, and no two archaeological objects are equivalent. Although network analysis can never give us a clear snapshot of the past, it can help us see the data altogether and can help investigators formulate new questions. In other words, figure 1.1 is flawed, but it raises serious questions about the nature of our evidence for violence on Crete and effectively illustrates a larger reality about that evidence – that what evidence we do have for Cretan warfare is dominated by leisure-class hoplites. Part two of this dissertation attempts to make sense of the ideology of leisure-class hoplite warfare and how it changed over time precisely because it dominates the evidence for Crete in these periods.

There is almost no evidence for working-class hoplites on Crete, especially in the Classical texts from which van Wees built his initial argument.[48] Figure 1.2 presents the evidence for working-class and leisure-class hoplite warfare on Crete. Like a network analysis

[48] See chapter six.

visualization, this graph does not capture a complete picture and each entry is not of equal interpretative value. Nevertheless, it clearly illustrates the significant absence of working-class hoplites in our evidence. I will argue that the supremacy of leisure-class hoplites in our evidence fits into a larger pattern in which elites monopolized Cretan warfare in these periods and appropriated it as a mechanism of elite identity crafting, but the absence of working-class hoplites also suggests that we are simply missing a huge segment of evidence for violence on Crete.



Figure 1.2 – Working-class and leisure-class hoplites over time. There are four entries indicative of working-class hoplites and one hundred and seventy-three of leisure-class hoplites.

The most remarkable feature of our evidence for violence on Crete is that there is no clear indication of interpolis warfare on the island before the mid or late fifth century.[49] The oft-cited claim that Archaic Crete was locked in state of "internecine conflict and interpolity warfare" is not grounded in the evidence.[50] The evidence that we do have for Cretan warfare in the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries could be interpreted as evidence for elite feuding; by definition, leisure-class hoplite warfare does not implicitly necessitate political bodies or larger communities. Like the evidence for working-class hoplites discussed above, I believe that the evidence for inter-polis warfare before the fifth century is simply missing, but it is worth exploring this absence further. Table 1.1 presents all the entry types in my database. Each of

[49] Namely, the Tylissos-Knossos-Argos treaty of the mid-fifth century (Osborne and Rhodes 2017, no. 126) and the joint Athenian-Gortynian-Polichnitian invasion of Kydonia in 429 (Thuc. 2.85). The Tylissos-Knossos-Argos treaty clearly indicates that Tylissos and Knossos had legally recognizable military groups, but the treaty does not specify who was the target of this violence. If this treaty is regulating piracy campaigns, as some scholars have suggested (Beek 2020), then it is not necessarily related to interpolis conflicts. For further discussion of these references to organized violence, see chapter six.

[50] I quote Haggis (2013, 82), but see the discussion above.

these entries has some direct or indirect relevance for the study of violence on Crete, but not every entry has historical value. The counts and percentages are not symptomatic of anything on their own – this list simply illustrates the range of entry types. However, there are some striking absences from this list.

Type	Count of Type	Percentage of Total
Votive Miniature	111	19.271
Spearhead	99	17.188
Arrowhead	71	12.326
Mitra	46	7.986
Sword	36	6.250
Shield	33	5.729
Plaque	23	3.993
Pottery	18	3.125
Inscription	18	3.125
Coin	16	2.778
Stele	16	2.778
Helmet	16	2.778
Applique	16	2.778
Corslet	14	2.431
Text	13	2.257
Building	10	1.736
Figurine	8	1.389
Greave	3	0.521
Frieze	3	0.521
Sling Bullet	1	0.174
Ankle Guard	1	0.174
Tripod Stand	1	0.174
Firedogs	1	0.174
Bow	1	0.174
Sculpture	1	0.174
Grand Total	576	

Table 1.1 – Entry types and their percentage of the whole.

Although archaeological bias is an important factor in the types of entries saved and the types of things published, as is the case in any study of archaeological data, the lacunae in this case are unlikely to be the result of methodological bias. Archaeologists measure organized

violence through skeletal records, urban layouts, destruction layers, and historical accounts.[51] We have limited archaeological evidence of each of these types for Archaic Crete, but none of it conclusively indicates instances of actual warfare. Proponents of the short-chronology warfare theory – the notion that human societies practiced homicide and feuding at a much higher rate than organized violence before the development of complex hierarchical communities – would probably argue that there was no warfare on Crete before the Classical period.[52] At the Orthi Petra cemetery in Eleutherna, archaeologists found the remains of more than one hundred and forty robust males, but none of them had evidence of peri-mortem trauma.[53] Only a small percentage of these individuals even showed signs of ante-mortem trauma.[54] The trauma levels at Orthi Petra appear to have been lower than the expected average, and they are notably lower than the average from mainland Greek or eastern Mediterranean cemeteries.[55] This is just one cemetery, but other Cretan cemeteries have also reportedly found little evidence of trauma.[56]

Architecturally, Cretan communities do not appear to have had fortification walls between the seventh and fourth centuries. According to Coutsinas' survey of fortifications on Crete, the last Geometric-era fortifications were abandoned by 700.[57] Greek communities on the mainland constructed circuit walls throughout these periods.[58] Coutsinas argues that Cretan communities may not have started constructing circuit walls until the fourth century.[59] There are ten fortification walls that might date to the Archaic or Classical periods, and these fortifications also appear in Coutsinas' catalog.[60] In every case, however, there is not enough archaeological material to determine the actual date of the wall. Although we know of several fortification walls that might date to the Archaic and Classical periods, all the sites that have been excavated have walls that only date to the Geometric or Hellenistic periods. This is either significant or an unfortunate coincidence, but it is worth highlighting regardless.

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[51] See Maschner and Reedy-Maschner 1998, 25-26.
[52] See Allen 2014, 19-21.
[53] Agelarakis 2005, 64. Agelarakis describes Orthi Petra as a Geometric-Archaic cemetery. As I will discuss below, the chronologies for the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries are heavily dependent on artistic traditions within Corinthian pottery and may not, therefore, be very reliable.
[54] Agelarakis 2005, 417, 430. Agelarakis (2005, 64) describes the ante-mortem trauma as superficial. So far as I can tell, Agelarakis does not present a grand total for ante-mortem trauma. For a maximum possible total of 176 individuals, he says there are four cases of cranial trauma (2.27%) and nine cases of post-cranial trauma (5.11%). In total, only 7.39% of individuals have evidence for trauma. The expected average for individuals with ante-mortem trauma is 10% (Maschner and Reedy-Maschner 1998).
[55] Maschner and Reedy-Maschner 1998.
[56] Unfortunately, detailed osteoarcheological analyses of cemeteries of the sixth and fifth centuries are still forthcoming.
[57] Coutsinas 2013, 279-280.
[58] Coutsinas 2013, 280; Frederiksen 2011.
[59] Coutsinas 2013, 280-282.
[60] Five walls have never been explored or published systematically, so I have not included them here or in Table 1.1. I include them in my database, however, so there are fifteen walls in total that may date to the Archaic or Classical periods in my database.

Prinias was destroyed and then abandoned in the late sixth century and Azoria in the early fifth, but neither destruction included large quantities of discarded arms and armor.[61] They contrast sharply with the siege of Aptera in the late third century, in which dozens of sling bullets, catapult stones, and arrowheads were discovered.[62] There are no destructions on Crete that were clearly related to warfare before the third century, but this alone is not necessarily an indication that no military destructions occurred. Destruction layers are immensely complex, and in many cases, it is practically impossible to distinguish military destructions from natural or accidental destructions.[63] Moreover, it is worth highlighting that lead sling bullets and catapults are post-fourth century innovations.

Gagarin and Perlman emphasize that despite the island's reputation, there is little evidence of Cretan warfare in the extensive collection of laws from the island.[64] No Cretan inscriptions mention warfare, warriors, military alliances, military campaigns, casualties of war, or war captives before the Tylissos-Knossos-Argos treaty in the mid-fifth century, about two-hundred years after the earliest Cretan laws.[65] It is certainly unfair to assume that Cretan poleis would have published casualty lists or war funds, like Athens and Sparta, but the point here is that we cannot point to Cretan epigraphy to support the claim that Cretan poleis were constantly at war.

The evidence for elite violence on Crete is impressive, but this evidence alone is not necessarily symptomatic of high quantities of organized interpolity violence. At this point, we do not have enough evidence to claim that Cretans experienced high quantities of "internecine conflict and interpolity warfare."[66] Coutsinas reached the same conclusion after studying fortification walls on Crete: there is simply no good evidence to support the orthodox narrative.[67] As Arkush and Tung observe for Andean cultures, the material remains of arms, armor, and art celebrating violence neither perpetuate nor are perpetuated by real interpolity conflicts.[68] Many warriors in the Moche culture, for example, seem to have preferred to capture their enemies rather than kill them outright, and some scholars even believe that "the objective of combat in Moche culture was to knock off the opponent's helmet."[69] We should not assume that there is any direct correlation between the culture of warfare and real wars. That is not to say that I

[61] For Prinias, see Rizza 1991, Rizza et al. 2005. For Azoria, see Haggis et al. 2011. Haggis' team did find fragments of one helmet in the destruction at Azoria, but it was located in a storage room associated with the Communal Dining Building (Haggis et al. 2011, 15-16). This single helmet is not diagnostic of a military destruction. I find it much more likely that natural factors, economic turmoil, and political conflicts led to the destruction and abandonments of Prinias and Azoria, but detailed archaeological analyses are still forthcoming.
[62] Niniou-Kindeli 2008, 26-27.
[63] Fachard and Harris 2021; Karkanas 2021.
[64] Gagarina and Perlman 2016, 117, 122.
[65] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 122.
[66] Haggis 2013, 82. But see the footnote above for a discussion of this quote.
[67] Coutsinas 2013, 287.
[68] Arkush and Tung 2013, 327.
[69] Verano 2014, 286. This is no longer the accepted interpretation, but my larger point remains salient.

endorse a theoretical model like the one proposed for the Intermediate period in Northern Chile – I do not think that Cretans used ritual violence amongst elites to escape inter-polis warfare.[70]

Instead, I argue that inter-polis conflicts and working-class hoplites are simply missing from what survives of the archaeological record. Although I have no doubt that wars must have occurred between Cretan poleis, we cannot say anything definitive about these conflicts with our current evidence. We can, however, explore how our evidence for Cretan warfare perpetuated certain ideologies and accomplished certain politically and ritually charged performances. Due to the nature of this evidence, we are afforded a unique perspective of the individuals that created these objects, namely Cretan elites and the craftspeople that they patronized.[71] Cretan warfare was a mechanism of polity organization, which oligarchs deployed to defend their wealth and status.[72] This, in turn, has far reaching implications about the types of warfare that may have been practiced on the island.

Step II: Establishing Terminologies

The best way to describe the extant evidence for Cretan warfare is to say that we have good evidence for Cretan warriors and little to no evidence for Cretan combatants. In her study of Bronze Age warriors and warfare, Anderson defines a combatant as an individual who participates in warfare, while a warrior is someone who embraces and perpetuates the identity of warriorhood – the identity of a combatant.[73] As Rawlings argued, warriorhood centered on achieving "ideological," rather than real or demonstrable, "excellence in the martial sphere."[74] Anderson notes that "there was a substantive difference between the idealized warrior identity and the reality of an actual warrior," since women and non-elites who took part in organized violence were often only ever seen by their contemporaries as combatants.[75] In many cases, these individuals did not even self-identify as warriors since entry into warriorhood was closely regulated by their communities.[76] At the same time, individuals who claimed to be warriors but never actually acted as combatants – people who never actually fought in a battle – could probably do so without resistance from the community if they were otherwise elite and

[70] cf. Pacheco and Retamal 2017.
[71] Lloyd (2021, 19) makes a similar conclusion in his study of Greek weapons: "they do not directly inform us about warfare, but rather about the emergence of a symbolic system in which objects connected to warfare are valued and significant."
[72] I will explain this interpretation of the evidence in part two.
[73] Anderson 2018.
[74] Rawlings 2016, 6.
[75] Anderson 2018, 225-226.
[76] Anderson 2018, 226. We might think of, for example, the many helots who fought alongside their Spartan masters in the fifth century (see Obert 2018; Pritchett 1971, 49-51; van Wees 2004, 68-71). During the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans executed two thousand helots who deemed that they had served the Spartans well in combat (Thuc. 4.80). This passage emphasizes why helots might avoid associating themselves with warfare or identifying as warriors. It also indicates that many helots chose not to acknowledge their participation in combat publicly, as the figure of two thousand is relatively low. Half a century earlier, there were thirty-five thousand helots fighting as *psiloi* at the battle of Plataea (Hdt. 9.28).

masculine.[77] Ritual appears to be the defining characteristic between combatants and warriors, but ritualistic or symbolic weapons and armor are notoriously difficult to understand archaeologically. The Sikh kirpan is a good example. In the United Kingdom, the kirpan is legally classified as a religious symbol tied to a Sikh individual's personal identity.[78] Archaeologically, the kirpan resembles a small dagger or sword – a weapon. Although martial power is highly regarded within Sikhism, not everyone carrying a kirpan may self-identify as a warrior, and the object does not adhere to the same legal restrictions as a weapon, such as a gun or knife, within the United Kingdom. This example emphasizes the complexities that accompany the interpretation of hoplite arms and armor as symbols of warriorhood and warfare. The preponderance of leisure-class hoplites in our evidence for Crete suggests that most ancient Cretan warriors were elites, but that does not necessarily mean that they self-identified as warriors or that all elites participated in organized violence.

Since ritual appears to be a key factor of warriorhood, the context of a warrior's paraphernalia has significant implications. As we shall see in chapters three and four, the evidence for violence on Crete derives primarily from mortuary and sanctuary contexts. We might be tempted, then, to assume that these were ritualistic items divorced from real violence, but the consistent appearance of real use on Cretan arms and armor, discussed below, suggests that these were real tools of war. Moreover, Kowalzig persuasively argues that odes and performances at regional sanctuaries like Delphi and Olympia in the Archaic and Classical periods echoed the social, economic, and political concerns of ritual participants.[79] As art, they created real or idealized images of social relationships between participants and communal relationships between humans and gods.[80] Chapters four and five will explore how martial dedications to extra-urban and urban sanctuaries functioned as tools for identity and political crafting. Ritual or highly symbolic objects related to warriorhood had complex religious significance within their local archaeological contexts, but they were crafted for a particular audience and subsequently reflected that audiences' worldview, whether it pertained to the nature of the gods or the proper means of enacting violence.

Organized violence is a subtype of violence. Following Galtung, who is generally recognized as the founder of peace and conflict studies, I define violence as an intervention that keeps potential outcomes from becoming actual results through physical harm.[81] Violence has

[77] Anderson 2018, 226.
[78] Juss 2013.
[79] Kowalzig 2007, 9-11.
[80] Kowalzig 2007, 41.
[81] Galtung 1969, 168. Many scholars have criticized Galtung's definition as too broad, whereas other scholars, such as Žižek (2008), have built on Galtung's definition to claim that capitalism itself is a form of violence. This idea probably takes the concept too far, but it illustrates a larger point that our definition of violence, like violence itself, "changes through time and space" (Malešević 2017, 10). For a summary of this debate more generally and how our definitions of violence have changed in the last hundred years, see Malešević 2017, 9-40. Malešević (2017, 15) defines violence as "a scalar social process in which individuals, groups or social organisations find themselves steeped in situations whereby their intentional or unintentional actions generate some substantial coercively imposed behavioural changes or produce physical, mental or emotional damage, injury or death." Although I applaud this definition, I believe that we should frame the enactment of violence as active rather than passive and disagree with

numerous forms, including systems of structural violence, such as slavery, as well as small-scale violence, like hunting. The goal of this project is to track organized violence, which is a specific type of violence in which groups of warriors and combatants commit violence against other warriors, non-warriors, or the property of other communities. For early anthropologists like Malinowski, organized violence was "an armed contest between two independent political units, in the pursuit of a tribal or national policy."[82] Although our terms have become more specific, this definition still holds true for the most part – organized violence typically involves two or more politically independent groups who attempt to overpower each other through the force of arms.[83] Fuchs, a Neo-Assyrian scholar, identifies four types of organized violence: raids, conquest, siege, and naval operations.[84] Evidence for the last two on Crete is almost completely absent before the Hellenistic period.[85] However, I believe that sieges and naval operations are ultimately aspects of conquest, but conquests required different methods of preparation and strategic requirements depending on the intended outcome. In other words, I envision three types of organized violence: raids, conquest with the goal of displacing the inhabitants, and conquest with the goal of ruling over the inhabitants.[86] As I will discuss in chapter two, Cretan warfare was traditionally understood to have been focused on conquest with the goal of ruling over the native inhabitants since the institutionalized poverty of the Cretan polis created a "hunger for land."[87] More recent studies of organized violence have problematized such notions altogether, since any type of conquest actually required a large capital investment with little immediate return.[88] Historically, raiding was much more common since it required little investment, created immediate benefit, and either carried the same risk as conquering or less risk depending on the

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the notion that actors "find themselves steeped" in committing violence. Violence can certainly be an unintended consequence, but it still requires an active agent because violence, by Galtung's original definition, implies the interruption or departure from a potential outcome.

[82] Malinowski 1968, 247.

[83] Compare, for example, Malinowski's definition with Della Porta's (2013, 6) "political violence," Tilly's (2003: 3) "collective violence," or Malešević's (2017, 40) definition of organized violence as a historical process. I prefer Malinowski's outdated definition because I still consider political autonomy to be an important component of organized violence. I agree that groups and organizations within a single political body – what Della Porta, Tilly, Malešević, Foucault, Elias, Weber, and many others would call the State – can operate and enact organized violence against each other, but I think the collective political body temporarily ceases to exist during these conflicts. When Augustus and Mark Antony led organized armies against each other, there was not a single Roman State in which they were both political participants. Instead, I believe that both claimants had political autonomy. This idea, and my definition of the State, will be discussed below.

[84] Fuchs 2011.

[85] But see below for a brief discussion of Cretan naval warfare.

[86] These two different types of conquests required different strategies and degrees of preparation. Fifth-century Athenians, for example, prepared and acted very differently in the conquest of Aegina in 457 than they did when they conquered and expelled the population in 431 (Thuc. 1.108, 2.27). In 457, they stripped the Aiginetans of their military power and forced them to pay tribute. At the start of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians expelled many of the inhabitants of the island and reoccupied the land with Athenian citizens. In the former, the Athenians sieged and then dismantled the Aiginetans' fortifications, whereas this level of destruction is entirely absent from Thucydides' description when the island was conquered for the purposes of colonization.

[87] Viviers 1999, 222.

[88] See Zinkina et al. 2016. A conquering army had to prepare support networks and supply lines ahead of time, and any damage to local infrastructure would have hampered future recovery and exploitation efforts. A raiding army could take what they needed and what they wanted without consequence.

circumstances.[89] I will argue in chapter two that the traditional models of Cretan warfare do not fit our evidence and propose a new model of Cretan warfare in part two of this project. As we shall see, Cretan warfare appears to have been tied fundamentally to raiding and the accumulation of war booty.

My database for the evidence of violence on Crete includes all forms of violence. In theory, I would have included violent ritual activities and violent athletic competitions, like boxing and wrestling, but evidence for these types of violence on Crete in the Archaic and Classical periods is either indirect or inconclusive.[90] Such a broad definition of violence makes the collection of evidence easier, as I was able to include fantastic or mythological scenes of violence that may not directly relate to inter-polis warfare. But this ambiguity also influences how we interpret the evidence.

On Crete, our evidence suggests that elites dominated organized violence, controlled how it worked, and gatekept participation. I define an elite as a member of a community who is eligible for both social and political prestige. Being elite was acted out or achieved rather than prescribed, but, at the same time, it could also be inherited or assumed.[91] However it was acquired, eliteness was a socially and culturally contextual identity tied to the polis and other members within that community.[92] Being elite required economic power, or wealth, but not all wealthy individuals were elites. Economic power could have been converted or exchanged for power in other fields.[93] I will argue in chapter five that Cretan elites converted martial power into economic power on the battlefield, and then converted this economic power into political and social power within their poleis. In every case, the display and conversion of power required

[89] Zinkina et al. 2016.

[90] Plato, for example, includes wrestling and boxing competitions as important institutions within his fictional Cretan polis (see Pl. *Leg*. 6.753b, 755c, 755e-756a; 7.794f, 804c, 815a, 830d-831a; 8.834b). Plato's fictious colony is clearly not a realistic community and does not reflect real Cretan practices (see chapters two and six). That being said, Plato's *Laws* is included in my database because it has important historical value for a discussion of Cretan warfare beyond the fictious Cretan colony.

[91] Defining elite is notoriously difficult. In his book on the Greek symposium, Węcowski (2014, 11) defines the elites as individuals who "belonged to a social group that could afford to spend time, perhaps even a great deal of it, learning, practising, and then deploying various cultural competencies." Duplouy (2006, 12) defines elites as individuals who occupy dominant political, social, and economic positions within the community. He further narrows this definition to say that an elite used his family heritage and wealth to earn his place in society through the acquisition of social prestige (Duplouy 2006, 23). I prefer a definition that places less emphasis on the agency of the elites themselves since both Węcowski's and Duplouy's definitions are heavily inspired by Athenian examples. I agree that eliteness was acted out or achieved rather than prescribed, but I suspect that many less democratic Greek communities put more emphasis on family heritage than wealth. In Cretan poleis, for example, many politically important government positions, over which elites competed, were inherited rather than won through election or lottery. The *poinikastas* decree, dated to the late sixth or early fifth century, is probably our most explicit reference to this practice (see Gagarin and Perlman 2016, Da1). This point of departure from Węcowski's and Duplouy's definitions of elite may stem from the fact that I wholeheartedly agree with Vance's recent work in Archaic finance. As he stated at the 2022 AIA/SCS conference, the Archaic period was probably not a period in which Greek wealth became easier to access, as Węcowski and Duplouy would argue, but instead a period "in which the wealthy stayed wealthy in new and interesting ways."

[92] Duplouy 2006, 289-291.

[93] My understanding of power and how it operates within social fields is derived from Bourdieu and Foucault. See, in particular, Bourdieu 1999, Foucault 1980, Foucault 1991a, and Foucault 1991b.

performance, so although I recognize that eliteness could be passively acquired in certain situations, I will argue in chapters four and five that Cretans had to prove their eliteness through actions to preserve their status within elite groups.[94]

Many scholars have debated whether or not Cretan poleis were States,[95] and I do not intend to contribute to this discussion. This debate is largely a pursuit of a single formula or paradigm to define or explain human communities. As Yoffee persuasively illustrates, these sorts of classifications are useful for explaining why human communities became more complex as they became larger, and they facilitate cross-cultural comparisons.[96] Unfortunately, the term State has accumulated too much baggage at this point and belongs to twentieth-century scholarship. I follow Smith's assessment of this debate:

> In projecting the State back in time and into disparate corners of the globe, archaeologists, ancient historians, and sociocultural anthropologists have not only taken the state-illusion as reality but also bolstered the illusion by cramming a diversity of episodes of political emergence and collapse into a backstory for the modern as profound in its temporal depth as it is thin in its analytical content.[97]

I believe that ancient communities are better understood as networks or constellations of relationships, exchanges, and interactions, and their institutions are fundamentally tied to their geographic context, cultural composition, and technological capabilities.[98] Following the methodological approach of Gagarin and Perlman, I refer to Cretan communities as poleis since this is how they described themselves in their legal inscriptions.[99] I do not accept Hansen's definition of the polis, however, nor Berent's "stateless communities" model.[100] Hansen argues that poleis had a defined territory, a defined people, and institutions that claimed sole legitimate control over certain types of actions between individual community members, such as violence.[101] He cites Weber to make this final point, but, as we shall see in part two of this project, the evidence does not suggest that Cretan poleis held a monopoly over the legitimate use of coercive force. Expanding on this idea, Berent argued that the ability to use violence was relatively equally distributed among the citizen body.[102] Yet in Crete, as we shall see, poleis clearly differentiated between warrior groups and non-warrior groups.

Both Hansen and Berent are too extreme in their definition of the polis, and I prefer to imagine each polis differently. Some poleis monopolized organized violence and some did not. This idea was initially proposed by Gabrielsen, who described these communities as

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[94] Although membership within these groups may have been fairly fluid (see Duploy 2006, 2018).
[95] Most recently at the 2022 AIA/SCS annual meeting: Whitley 2022.
[96] Yoffee 2005.
[97] Smith 2003, 80.
[98] This is a slightly adapted version of Smith's (2003) constellation model for what he calls "early complex polities," and his (2015) later definition of political sovereignty. Smith's theories are in turn built on Renfrew's peer-polity interaction (see Renfrew 1986).
[99] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 56.
[100] Berent 2000, 2004.
[101] Hansen 2006, 64.
[102] See his definition and discussion in Berent 2000, in particular.

"oligopolistic" violent poleis and "monopolistic" violent poleis.[103] The "monopolistic" violent polis resembled something akin to what Weber and Hansen describe – the community claimed to have the sole authority to wield violence and determined how and when community members would be allowed to legitimately perform violence. The "oligopolistic" violent polis, on the other hand, never claimed to have a monopoly on violence, and individual elites within these communities could perform or enact violence as autonomous entities outside the immediate boundaries of the polis. It is not necessarily Berent's stateless community, but his model, as well as Hansen's and Smith's, works within this general framework. Gabrielsen struggles to characterize Greek poleis like Athens and Sparta as either "oligopolistic" and "monopolistic," because every polis fell somewhere between the two extremes.[104] Our best examples for these extremes come from the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Republican Rome, as described and experienced by Cicero, is the clearest example of a "monopolistic" violent community since the senate raised an army, awarded *imperium* to the general of that army, and that general had to relinquish his *imperium* when he returned to Rome.[105] The senate had a monopoly on organized violence and only delegated this power to individual generals temporarily. In the late third century, the Romans asked the queen of Illyria to stop her people from raiding Italian traders. She replied that it was not customary for an Illyrian queen to keep the goods of the sea from her people, ἰδίᾳ γε μὴν οὐ νόμιμον εἶναι τοῖς βασιλεῦσι κωλύειν Ἰλλυριοῖς τὰς κατὰ θάλατταν ὠφελείας (Polyb. 2.8.8). Illyria was operating as an "oligopolistic" violent community, since the queen felt that limiting the violence of private individuals within her community fell outside her role as the leader of that community.[106] Gabrielsen crafted this distinction out of Garlan's distinction between public and private types of organized violence, and he used it to explain piracy in the Hellenistic period – Cretan piracy in particular.[107] I will argue in chapters five and

[103] Gabrielsen 2007; Gabrielsen 2013, 138-139. Gabrielsen uses the term state, but I am avoiding this term for the reasons stated above. In his 2013 piece, Gabrielsen seems to have been a bit uncomfortable with these terms as he always uses scare quotes. I have imitated this style since I also find the terms "oligopolistic" and "monopolistic" a little awkward for a discussion of violence.

[104] Gabrielsen 2007.

[105] Commissions of *imperium* typically had temporal limits or regional objectives attached to them (Cass. Dio 36.23.4). When Pompey was tasked with the termination of piracy in the Mediterranean, he was awarded *imperium* over the whole of the Mediterranean and every coastline for three years (Cass. Dio 35.23.4; Plut. *Pomp*. 25.2). He defeated the pirates quickly and efficiently within the first year of holding *imperium* (Plut. *Pomp*. 28.2), but he never returned to Rome, so he still retained his *imperium*. Returning to Rome triggered the end of a commission of *imperium*. In books 5-7 of *Epistulae ad Atticum* and books 2, 3, 8, and 15 in *Epistulae ad familiares*, Cicero explains that he cannot return to Rome after holding *imperium* in Cilicia because he felt he deserved a triumph. Before the first century, triumphs were only accessible to *imperium*-holding consuls or pro-consuls (Plut. *Pomp*. 14.1). Dismissing his staff or crossing the *pomerium* of Rome required the removal of the axes from his lictors' fasces – the symbolic relinquishing of his *imperium* – which would therefore disqualify him from performing a triumph. The Roman senate was the de jure possessor of all *imperium*, and, before the *Lex Manilia*, the senate only granted *imperium* for specific time periods and specific objectives.

[106] Alternatively, the queen was being facetious, and Illyria was not really an "oligopolistic" violent polis; she just did not want to take responsibility for her people or restrain them from attacking the Romans. Ultimately, the reality of the situation is not relevant here as the imagined Illyria of Polybius' narrative is a sufficient model for an "oligopolistic" violent community.

[107] Gabrielsen 2007, 249; Garlen 1975.

six that Gabrielsen's definition of the "oligopolistic" violent polis also works well to explain the evidence for the Cretan ideologies of organized violence in the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries.

The institutions and identities that made up a polis were simultaneously driven by and perpetuating a series of ideologies. I understand ideologies to be collective self-expressions that promote and legitimate themselves through the consensus of individuals.[108] They are assemblages of ideas and world views that are often curated, sometimes actively and sometimes passively, by the groups within a society that hold power or authority.[109] They are not explicitly tools of the elite, however, as multiple, often conflicting, ideologies operate within a single community.[110] Politics and ideology are inherently intertwined, but the dominant political ideology is not necessarily the most powerful ideology in any given society. Ideologies are fundamentally related to the formation of groups and subgroups both within and across political boundaries.[111] These groups often consist of like-minded individuals, but ideologies exist firmly beyond individual experience.[112] Individuals might adhere to an ideology because they believe in its messaging, but they could also adhere to an ideology because resisting it would be too time-consuming or socially exhausting.[113] Either way, an actor's personal beliefs are not necessarily relevant to the study of ideology. Whether or not they subscribe to an ideology, individuals who acknowledge the existence of an ideology give it legitimacy and perpetuate it within their community.[114] In part two of this project, I argue that different ideologies dominated the display and performance of organized violence within different types of sanctuaries – Cretan elites considered cooperative forms of warfare more appropriate within extra-urban sanctuaries, but expressions of individual martial power were more appropriate in urban contexts. These arguments are trying to show that actors perpetuated and adhered to specific ideologies of violence in specific spaces due to the role of these ideologies within the construction of elite groups and their influence on the development of certain political institutions within Cretan poleis. I do not intend to imply that we fully understand all the complexities of these ideologies, nor do I want to suggest that these were the only ideologies of violence on Crete in these periods. I agree that an ideological system "cannot be wholly explained as a reflection of cultural, spatial, and temporal occurrences, or as a predictable epistemological response to those occurrences,"[115] but I believe that archaeologists and historians can still identify components of an ancient ideology and that these observations have value for our understanding of the past.[116]

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[108] Eagleton 1991, 29.
[109] Gramsci 1971, 12-13, 376-7; Freeden 1996, 16, 22. See also Bourdieu's (1977, 192) concept of "symbolic violence." Abercrombie et al.'s (1980) dominant ideology thesis argues that ruling classes try to create and control a single dominant ideology. I will discuss the merits of this theory and its relevance for the evidence of violence on Crete in chapter five, but not all ideologies operated in this way.
[110] Eagleton 1991, 33-35; Freeden 1996, 19.
[111] Freeden 1996, 22.
[112] Freeden 1996, 106.
[113] Eagleton 1991, 34.
[114] Eagleton 1991, 3, 21.
[115] Freeden 1996, 552.
[116] To borrow Eagleton's (1991, 195) words, material objects "live" within the social ideologies that constructed, used, and disposed of them. See also Eagleton 1991, 205-206.

Although it may seem novel to suggest that organized violence in some part of the Greek world was fundamentally an aspect of an elite ideology, it aligns with what scholars from other areas of the world have also uncovered. Ashby argues that early medieval Scandinavian warfare was "a fundamentally aristocratic pursuit," which was "dependent on the labors of non-elite freemen and slaves: for provisioning, for craft, for technology, for support."[117] Cretan warfare, and Greek warfare more broadly, was potentially even more demanding on the social and economic networks of the combatants. The institution of Greek warfare was fundamentally tied to elite competition and the formation of political identities, but previous investigations into the complex relationship between status, polis formation, and violence have depended too heavily on conjecture and *argumenta ex silentio*.[118]

1.2 – Missing Pieces: Chronologies, Navies, and Women

Most archaeologists working on Crete refer to the period between the seventh and third centuries as the Archaic Gap.[119] This gap was thought to reflect a period of economic recession and cultural contraction brought about by conservativism and a wholehearted dedication to subsistence agriculture.[120] Chaniotis argued that the absence of a clear chronological continuity was too severe to be unintentional or simply an absence of evidence.[121] In his detailed study of Cretan ceramics, however, Erickson argues that Cretans embraced austerity in their art following the seventh century, and that this ideology of austerity made the pottery chronology difficult to decipher.[122] In other words, the gap was a mirage created by the popularization of a more austere and subtle style. More recent analyzes of our pottery chronologies have suggested that there was an economic intensification and expansion on Crete in these periods rather than a recession.[123]

By in large, scholars dated the evidence for violence on Crete using the old chronologies – prior to Erickson's study. Figure 1.3 illustrates this out-of-date chronology for the archaeological evidence of Cretan violence as a whole, and it emphasizes how pervasive the Archaic Gap has been in the study of Archaic and Classical Crete. Figure 1.4 presents the chronology of Cretan arms, armor, and shields exclusively.[124] Many of these objects are tied to the old chronologies due to their findspots, while others were looted and dated based on the now inaccurate chronology of Cretan art. Unfortunately, correcting the chronology and redating all

[117] Ashby 2015, 99-100.
[118] For a summary of this problem, see Kagan and Viggiano 2013. For a rebuttal against the scholarship of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Konijnendijk 2018 and Lloyd et al. 2021.
[119] Perhaps best outlined by Coldstream et al. 1999.
[120] Erickson 2010, 256.
[121] Chaniotis 1999, 210-211.
[122] Erickson 2010, 307 and his chapter twelve.
[123] For evidence of Cretan trade, see Erickson 2010, Gilboa et al. 2017, Lehmann et al. 2019. On the intensification of agricultural spaces, see Erny 2022. For an overview of economic, technological, and political expansions of Archaic Crete, see Whitley 2009, 273.
[124] Arms include arrowheads, bows, sling bullets, spearheads, and swords. Armor includes ankle guards, corslets, greaves, helmets, and mitrai.

the Cretan arms and armor is well beyond the scope of this project. For the purposes of this project, I will argue in chapter four that urban and extra-urban ideologies of violence co-existed to various degrees between the seventh and fifth centuries. I will highlight a collection of objects that depict both ideologies simultaneously and emphasize that our most recent archaeological evidence from Azoria and Anavlochos suggest that these ideologies co-existed into the late sixth or fifth century.[125] At this point, I am no longer convinced that these ideologies existed within distinct phases,[126] although I think it is worth emphasizing that they waxed and waned in prevalence and popularity across Crete to various degrees. I will illustrate in chapter six how aspects of these ideologies permeated into the Cretan legal systems and how elites created a third ideology of violence, emerging in the late sixth century, likely as a response to these institutional adaptations.



Figure 1.3 – Chronology of all the evidence for violence on Crete between 800 and 300 based on the traditional Cretan chronology.

[125] Gaignerot-Driessen 2020, Haggis et al. 2011.
[126] As I argued in previous presentations of this project.



Figure 1.4 – Chronology of Cretan arms, armor, and shields only based on the traditional chronology.

Although it requires reassessment, the old chronology has some value. Namely, archaeologists appear to have dated the extra-urban evidence to the eighth and seventh centuries and the urban evidence to the late seventh and sixth centuries. They assumed that Cretan armor in urban spaces had to postdate the earliest legal inscriptions while the art from extra-urban spaces that incorporated eastern influences must have predated the earliest Greek poleis.[127] Although figure 1.4 is of no use for the mapping of Cretan arms and armor over time, the concentrations of types in each period are worthwhile illustrations of the typological preferences between extra-urban and urban spaces. Archaeologists tended to find shields in extra-urban sanctuaries and armor in urban sanctuaries. Due to these modern prejudices, the earliest Cretan law, which most scholars date to the mid- to late seventh century,[128] emerges as a convenient line of demarcation in my database between two different ideologies of Cretan warfare.

I will explain and discuss these two ideologies in chapter four. Although they appear to be chronologically independent in graphs that follow the traditional chronology, like figures 1.3 and 1.4 above, they probably existed simultaneously since they appear side-by-side in certain archaeological contexts.[129] The extra-urban ideology, what I am calling the ideology of camaraderie, tends to emphasize a lighter form of organized violence that invited cooperation and collaboration. The urban ideology, on the other hand, emphasizes an individual's martial

[127] Hoffman (1972, 35-38, 41-46) explains and utilizes this logic to date all the Cretan armor.
[128] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, Dr1.
[129] These contexts and the objects that depict both ideologies of violence simultaneously will be discussed in detail in chapter four.

prowess through, among other things, the warrior's highly encumbering equipment.[130] The mounted hoplite frieze on temple A at Prinias, an urban sanctuary, appears to meld these two ideologies together by combining the artistic motifs of an extra-urban warrior with a more expensive and limiting form of organized violence, cavalry.[131] Most of the warriors on the Prinias stelai carry large round hoplite shields, the types of shields popular in art from urban spaces, but they wear open-faced helmets which were symptomatic of extra-urban styles of combat.[132] The open-face and high-crested helmets found at Prinias, Aphrati, and Azoria emphasize an open and collaborative type of warfare that was celebrated in extra-urban spaces.[133] The Azoria helmet is especially perplexing as according to the traditional chronology, this type should have ended in the seventh century, but the Azoria helmet dates to the early fifth century.[134] Archaeologists have interpreted this object as an heirloom or archaizing object that was two-hundred years old at the time of deposition. The excavators use the helmet to argue that scholars "need to disaggregate different contexts of production and consumption in stratigraphically definable system assemblages," implying that the helmet had a long life as a tool before it became an ideologically charged heirloom.[135] While I agree with their assessment of archaeological contexts, I would stress that the form of the Azoria helmet facilitated an open style of combat with a relatively high degree of cooperation and communication between warriors. Whether or not these combat practices were still employed on the fifth-century battlefield, the ideological messaging was still evident.[136] The open-faced Azoria and Prinias helmets facilitated warrior cooperation, while the Dreros, Axos, Onythe, Kydonia, and Aphrati helmets, closed-face helmets of the Cretan type, prevented any sort of coordination. These two martial practices and their respective ideologies, cooperation versus individualism, overlapped chronologically, which suggests that two dueling, or co-existing, ideologies dominated Crete throughout the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries. As an identity, warriorhood was a personal

[130] Scholars sympathetic to the orthodox or traditionalist model of hoplite warfare often frame the weight and physical encumbrance of hoplite equipment as evidence that these warriors needed to work collaboratively in disciplined formations. I will argue that they needed to work with others, but not with other elites nor within a structured military formation. Scholars like van Wees (2004) and Konijnendijk (2018) have illustrated the issues with the orthodox narrative and persuasively shown that this narrative is not at all supported in our evidence. I will address this debate directly in chapter two. In terms of Cretan warfare, there is no artistic depictions of hoplites working together beyond difficult-to-decipher processual scenes. I will discuss these scenes in chapter four; since they always depict warriors as nonanatomic figures, they actually fit neatly into the extra-urban, or lighter, ideology of violence. If we set aside the traditionalist narrative, we are left with lightly equipped warriors working together on the one hand and isolated and encumbered hoplites on the other. The latter required support from non-elites, such as attendants and less encumbered warriors, but they claimed through their dedications to operate as individuals in competition with other elites (see chapters four and five).

[131] Prent 2005, 254-259. Temple A will be discussed in detail in chapter five. See figures 5.4 and 5.5.

[132] Only four of fourteen published stelai from Prinias (Lebesi 1976, A6, A8, B3, B7) potentially depict shields of the omphalos type. These depictions are uncharacteristically large and relatively undecorated. See chapter four for further discussion of the Prinias stelai.

[133] Snodgrass (1964, 16-19) describes this as an adapted Kegelhelm, his open-faced type B.

[134] Haggis et al. 2011, 15-16; Snodgrass 1964, 16-19.

[135] Haggis et al. 2011, 15-16.

[136] The Azoria helmet was actually discovered in a storeroom. It may have been the case that the helmet's ideological messaging was no longer relevant for the inhabitants of Azoria in the early fifth century, so they removed the helmet from display and put it in storage.

choice dependent on individual agency, so the paraphernalia of this complex identity crafting are equally subjective. Different warriors preferred different styles, and there was probably little, if any, consistency within a single band of warriors.[137] It should not be surprising that these expressions of identity and ethos produced seemingly opposite messages at times, as they were highly charged and dependent on the warriors' political and social background.

Strangely, these expressions of identity almost exclusively relate to land warfare. Only two entries in my database reference naval warfare: a tripod stand from Ida, an extra-urban sanctuary, and the Tylissos-Knossos-Argos treaty.[138] Outfitting a warship was expensive and required a relatively high-degree of coordination, so it is perhaps illustrative that references to naval warfare do not appear in urban sanctuaries – where arms, armor, and images of violence reflect a highly individualized style of warfare.[139] Cretans would become renowned for naval warfare in the Hellenistic period so we might want to assume that the evidence for naval warfare in the Archaic and Classical periods is simply missing rather than nonexistent. Since we also have no definitive evidence for working-class hoplites or interpolis conflicts in these periods, as outlined above, I am tempted to believe that Archaic and Classic Cretans did in fact practice naval warfare, but we simply have not found the evidence yet.

As I will explain in chapter six, the evidence for organized violence in the fifth century allows us to say something about how Cretan warriors actually committed violence against other combatants. Unfortunately, real violence in the seventh and sixth centuries is much more difficult to reconstruct. Because we have only the arms and armor for these periods, I necessarily orient the discussion of organized violence around ideology and identity, on which the arms and armor have real bearing. This discussion fundamentally relates to the ways in which Cretan elites expressed and celebrated their maleness and masculinity, and in chapter four, I will outline how the urban ideology of organized violence slowly redefined the nature of Cretan masculinity.

Discussions of warriorhood inevitably become androcentric, even in historical communities in which both men and women acted as combatants.[140] Although a portion of this study is dedicated to investigating the maleness or gender of Cretan warfare, it will not address the role of the male sex. Classical philology and archaeology are experiencing something of a methodological awakening in their approach to gender and biological sex, and these movements have had a profound impact on the ways in which this study was conceived.[141] Consequently, I

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[137] As Snodgrass (1964, 264-266) argues for hoplite warfare more generally.

[138] Boardman 1961, 132-133; Osborne and Rhodes 2017, no. 126. There is a third potential reference in Isaeus 11.48-49. The Athenian speaker says that his brother-in-law sold his property, bought a trireme, sailed to Crete, and then died in his trireme during τὸν πόλεμον. The speaker clearly expects his audience to remember the incident and there are no further details regarding Crete. I do not consider this good enough evidence to say that the Athenian fought alongside Cretans or that this episode is describing a Cretan style of organized violence. In general, I do not consider references to warriors travelling by boat as naval warfare – naval warfare is a type of violence that is enacted at sea.

[139] See chapters four and five.

[140] Anderson 2011, 2018.

[141] Archaeologists are now reassessing and challenging the practice, common in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, of using grave goods such as weapons as indicators of gender (Anderson 2018, 219-226; Georganas 2018; Härke 1990, 26-36; Hunter 2005, 56). In many parts of the world, excavators even used weapons to overrule

have drawn a clear interpretative distinction between the male sex, the male gender, and masculinity.

Masculinity "is more a verb than a noun," and it was performed in Cretan communities and ritual spaces through the tools and images of violence.[142] But masculinity, by definition, does not always have to be performed by men.[143] We have no evidence for women warriors on Crete, but I have taken a nontraditional approach to the study of ancient warfare by conceiving of gender, sex, and violence as separate phenomena.[144] As we shall see in chapter four, this approach was worthwhile – while the urban warrior was consistently depicted with the anatomic features of a masculine youth, extra-urban warriors were nonanatomic, meaning they did not have any sex indicators. Although I am confident that both urban and extra-urban ideologies were associated with masculinity and dominated by individuals who adopted the male gender identity, there is some ambiguity regarding the sex of many Cretan warriors in art. Anderson might insist, for example, that the art and armor of Cretan warfare was actually gender-neutral because it did not include any explicitly gendering characteristics or features.[145] Even body armor that accentuated the human anatomy chose features of masculinity that were not necessarily restricted to the male sex, such as pectoral muscles, shoulder blades, the costal margin of the ribcage, and the linea alba. This observation will be discussed at length in chapters

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anatomical assignments – skeletons that appeared "possibly female" were considered incorrectly sexed when they were associated with weapons (Stead 1991, 127). It remains unclear whether this practice was also carried out on Crete, but there has not yet been a reassessment of the osteological data from nineteenth- and twentieth-century excavations such as Knossos and Vrokastro. Within classical philology, many scholars have uncritically associated maleness and violence. Van Nortwick (2008, 1) argues that gender perceptions in the modern West are much the same as they were in ancient Greece. He concludes that "war is the crucible, full of risks and opportunities, where masculinity is forged and expressed most vividly," despite later problematizing this association (Van Nortwick 2008, 89-92, 155). Within the study of ancient warfare, maleness and violence are often equated without discussion. Scholars have been very strict on this point – Hornblower (2007, 44) wrote that "nobody in their right mind would want to suggest that unknown to modern historians women might after all have fought in the hoplite phalanx," and Martinez Morales (2021, 124, 128) more recently argued that women should never be considered combatants even during sieges or other conflicts beyond pitched battle. Of the ten contributors to *Brill's Companion to Land Warfare Beyond the Phalanx*, Martinez Morales is the only person who identifies as a woman. As far as I know, there has not yet been any systematic study of women in hoplite warfare. On the myth and reality of the Amazon mythos, see Mayor 2016.

[142] Martin 2021, 171. Robb (2005, 6) writes that "material things are a medium through which we create ourselves and understand other people and hence an inescapable element of social reproduction."

[143] In archaeology, gender is a personal or individual experience that may or may not depend on an individual's sex (Greene and Moore 2010, 288-290; Gilchrist 1999, 149). The ambiguity of this dichotomy makes anatomical sex less instructive than we might assume, and places deeper significance on archaeological artefacts.

[144] Agelarakis (2005, 66) describes the cemetery at Orthi Petra as "a shrine of heroes, the courageous deeds of whom, both as warriors and leaders, were to be interwoven forever with the existence of ancient Eleutherna." There are one hundred and forty-four individuals at Orthi Petra and most of them were male (Agelarakis 2005). As discussed above, however, there were remarkably low levels of trauma among this population. On the forms they used to record each individual, they included sex categories for males, most probably males, probably males, possibly males, males?, indeterminate, possibly females, probably females, and females? (Agelarakis 2005, 408). They had five categories for males and only three for females, and they did not include a "female" category. The methodological decisions behind this archaeological study raise serious questions about their results. I have therefore decided not to include the sex of the Orthi Petra individuals in my discussions of warriorhood in chapters four and five.

[145] Anderson 2018, 226.

four and five, but the nonanatomic nature of extra-urban warriors in particular raises many interesting questions about the exclusivity of Cretan warrior groups, like the *andreion*, and their socio-political power. Warriorhood was tied to elitenes, masculinity, and the male gender – it is not immediately clear whether it was restricted to the male sex, but further discussion of this interesting absence of evidence falls well outside of my focus here.

1.3 – Chapter Summaries

As mentioned above, part one of this dissertation explains how I approached the complex phenomenon of violence on Crete. In chapter two, I confront the two most significant methodological debates that could potentially derail the viability of my conclusions. Namely, I engage with the Perlman-Link debate over the accuracy of our literary sources, and with the recent revisions to the hoplite orthodoxy. I offer my own insight in both debates. Departing from hoplite revisionists like van Wees and Konijnendijk, I suggest that troop typologies are fundamentally out-of-place in discussions of ancient Greek warfare. In our sources, warriors were often organized and grouped according to their political identities, but this practice is inconsistent. Although some groups were well known for their prowess with particular weapons, these stereotypes were not always a reflection of the actual appearance of the warriors. Ancient authors used what we are describing as troop typologies as a shorthand or literary device, and upon inspection, they have little to do with real military organization. Instead, I characterize ancient armies as small bands of specialists and veterans operating around a large crowd of amateur hoplites.[146]

Perlman and Link remain at odds regarding the value of Plato, Aristotle, Ephorus, and the Hellenistic authors for the study of ancient Crete. Perlman advocates for ignoring them while Link insists that they cannot be ignored.[147] Scholars typically have to choose a side between these two positions. Craven, for example, began her discussion of Hellenistic Cretan warfare by accepting Perlman's criticisms and rejecting the literary sources.[148] Lewis, on the other hand, agrees with Link's interpretation, trusts in the literary sources, and argues that Cretan warfare resembled Homeric warfare.[149] I propose a middle-ground interpretation between Perlman and Link. Perlman argues that our sources are citing a "Cretan πολιτεία," some unknown or lost source that had a narrow perspective of Cretans and their political, economic, and social institutions.[150] Based on Thucydides' and Xenophon's references to Cretans in the late fifth and fourth centuries, I propose that Plato's, Aristotle's, and Ephorus' "Cretan πολιτεῖαι" derive from their knowledge of leisure-class Cretan warriors who fought for the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War and then against them in the Corinthian war. Perlman is looking at the

[146] Building directly on Konijnendijk's (2018) model.
[147] Perlman 1992, 2005; Link 1994.
[148] Craven 2017.
[149] Lewis forthcoming.
[150] Perlman 1992.

political institutions of Cretan poleis in their own law codes and Link is studying Athenian descriptions of the cultural practices of "oligopolistic" warriors operating outside of their poleis. They are looking at two completely different parts of Cretan poleis, and it is no wonder that they cannot agree. However, both perspectives are essential to our discussion of Cretan warfare.

Chapter three presents a detailed description of my database for Cretan violence. The first half of this chapter explores the metadata categories, such as the chronologies, contexts, and different types of evidence included in the database. In the second half of the chapter, I explain each of the tags related to the ancient Greek warfare. Each tag represents a different argument that scholars have proposed regarding Greek warfare. Although I have already outlined the results of my database above, I provide a more complete analysis in chapter three.

Part two of this project outlines the ideological history of Cretan warfare between the seventh and fifth centuries. Chapter four illustrates how Cretans celebrated different types of organized violence in different archaeological contexts. Omphalos-type shields, open-face helmets, and scenes of cooperation between warriors dominate the archaeological record at extra-urban sanctuaries. In urban areas, the opposite appears to be the norm – closed-face helmets, large round shields, and encumbering body armor that emphasized individual prowess dominate. I argue that elites thought of these spaces as different ideological arenas and that organized violence was fundamentally tied to elite identity crafting. Elites used organized violence to advertise their status and masculinity, but the audiences for these expressions changed according to the venue. While elites were nonanatomic defenders in extra-urban spaces, their anatomy defined their masculinity and their martial power in urban spaces.

I explore the significance of the urban ideology of organized violence, what I describe as the army-of-one mentality, in chapter five.[151] Urban spaces on Crete changed dramatically in the seventh and sixth centuries. I argue that the army-of-one mentality was fundamentally related to the recharacterization of urban spaces as the political and economic centers of the polis. Many scholars have attributed these changes to an elite organization called the *andreion*. Although I hesitate to fully embrace this term due to our limited evidence, I argue that elites used organized violence to control membership in an *andreion*-like group and that they competed with each other in this socially sanctioned and highly controlled arena. As a mechanism of elite identity crafting, Cretan warfare was directly tied to the political institutions of the Cretan polis, so much so that we might characterize certain institutional changes within the polis related to elite regulation, ritual dedications, and the military as byproducts of this competition. Elites participated in an internalized arms race within the elite group that also directly impacted social stability between elites and non-elites. Maintaining this balance in turn instigated more complex political, economic, and social institutions.

In chapter six, I explore how these ideologies shifted in the late sixth century as Cretan poleis started to mediate elite violence. Appearing first in Axos, Cretan poleis started to regulate war booty as it came into the community. I argue that these regulations controlled preexisting practices – some booty went to extra-urban sanctuaries and the rest went to urban sanctuaries –

[151] This term is defined in chapter four.

but polis regulations shifted how Cretans came to think about organized violence. As they lost control of where and how war booty would be dedicated, Cretan elites appear to be more interested in acquiring large quantities of booty than in acquiring high quality booty. This third ideology of Cretan warfare, what I call wealth-accumulation warfare, represents a commodification, or perhaps even a monetization, of organized violence. It was the culmination of the ideological practices of the seventh and sixth centuries, and it emerged alongside other major economic and political institutions. Moreover, the Cretan warriors described by our fifth- and fourth-century texts approached organized violence according to this third ideology of Cretan warfare.

I reflect on the significance of my study of violence on Crete in the final chapter. The ideology of Cretan warfare has larger implications for the debates over sourcing and combat styles discussed in chapter two. Our literary sources for the fifth and fourth centuries were probably influenced by Cretan warriors who subscribed to the wealth-accumulation warfare ideology. The emphasis on elite competition in Aristotle's *Politics* and performance in Plato's *Laws* likely reflect the fact that Cretan elites conceived of organized violence as a means of identity crafting (Arist. *Pol.* 2.1269b, 1272b; Pl. *Leg*. 8.834a-d).

Finally, this study of Cretan warfare also has much larger implications about the nature and role of organized violence for the formation of ancient Greek poleis. The implication that armor and artistic depictions of hoplites are expressions of belonging in specific groups within the polis, and that the dedicators of these objects were navigating seemingly contradictory ideological motifs simultaneously, supports the notion that Greek arms and armor have much more complex relationships to their creators, wielders, and findspots than we have otherwise assumed. We have no reason to doubt that Miltiades' helmet and the Siphnian treasury represent real approaches to organized violence, but they are also ideologically charged objects that both present and perpetuate a narrow vision of how Greek communities, and Greek elites, ought to perform organized violence.

Part I – Measuring Violence on Ancient Crete



Visualization of all the archaeological evidence for violence on Crete in the age of hoplite warfare. Created in Gephi 0.9.2.

Chapter 2 – New Approaches to Greek Warfare and the Cretan Πολιτεία

War and politics have always been at the heart of any discussion regarding Archaic and Classical Crete. Suggesting that these institutions were interconnected is neither original nor controversial. After all, Plato first described the Cretan political system as one concerned with the polis' ability to wage war:

> Κλεινίας: οἶμαι μέν, ὦ ξένε, καὶ παντὶ ῥᾴδιον ὑπολαβεῖν εἶναι τά γε ἡμέτερα. τὴν γὰρ τῆς χώρας πάσης Κρήτης φύσιν ὁρᾶτε ὡς οὐκ ἔστι, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν Θετταλῶν, πεδιάς· διὸ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἵπποις ἐκεῖνοι χρῶνται μᾶλλον, δρόμοισιν δὲ ἡμεῖς, ἥδε γὰρ ἀνώμαλος αὖ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν πεζῇ δρόμων ἄσκησιν μᾶλλον σύμμετρος. ἐλαφρὰ δὴ τὰ ὅπλα ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ μὴ βάρος ἔχοντα θεῖν: τῶν δὴ τόξων καὶ τοξευμάτων ἡ κουφότης ἁρμόττειν δοκεῖ. ταῦτ᾽ οὖν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἡμῖν ἅπαντα ἐξήρτυται, καὶ πάνθ᾽ ὁ νομοθέτης, ὥς γ᾽ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέπων συνετάττετο.
>
> Kleinias (The Knossian): I suppose, Stranger, that our customs are also easy for everyone to understand. For it is possible to see that the whole of the Cretan countryside is not a plain like that of the Thessalians; whereas they would rather use horses, we run, since the land is uneven and more suitable for the practice of running by foot. It is necessary to possess light arms and armor in such a land and not to run with a burden; so the lightness of bows and arrows is considered to be a good fit. Therefore, everything for us is oriented around war, and it seems to me that our lawgiver arranged everything with this in mind.
>
> – Pl. *Leg*. 625c-e

In previous studies of Cretan war and politics, scholars tended to treat the literary sources as indisputable first-hand accounts.[1] Certainly, numerous Classical and Hellenistic writers referenced Cretan war and politics, and Plato, Aristotle, and Ephorus' fragments in Strabo's *Geography* explicitly addressed certain political and cultural institutions within ancient Cretan

[1] See, for example, Seelentag's 2015 monograph on Archaic Cretan state formation. Seelentag stresses the chronological distance of the literary sources from the Archaic period, but he does not question their historical accuracy (Seelentag 2015, 19-21, 25). Seelentag relies on literary and epigraphic evidence and intentionally omits the archaeological evidence: "die historischarchäologische Synthese aber möge ein anderer unternehmen" (Seelentag 2015, 21).

poleis. But Cretan archaeology is remarkably inconsistent with the picture provided by the literary and epigraphic evidence. While historians generally find highly competitive warrior aristocracies in the epigraphic and literary traditions, archaeologists have discovered remarkably egalitarian societies in the material culture.[2]

My study attempts to bridge the gap between these different narratives. Collating all the evidence into a single database allowed me to test the strength of each theory and investigate deeper questions related to Greek warfare in the Archaic and Classical periods. However, my database inevitably reflects my own perspectives on certain debates within Cretan history and Greek warfare. Since scholars "no longer need to be in the shadow of Hilda Lorimer, Victor Davis Hanson, and other proponents of the 'orthodox view' of the hoplite phalanx,"[3] I am dedicating the first part of this chapter (2.1) to outlining my understanding of Greek warfare in the Archaic and Classical periods. In part two of this dissertation, I will frame my conclusions within the broader framework that I establish in 2.1. In section 2.2 of this chapter, I will engage with the current models for Cretan warfare in the Archaic and Classical periods. This topic is ultimately tied to the controversy over the reliability of our literary sources – the so-called Perlman-Link debate – so I will propose a new middle-ground solution to this problem in the final section of this chapter (2.3).[4]

After reflecting on the literary sources and epigraphic evidence, Willetts argues that Cretan poleis constantly struggled to establish military supremacy over their neighbors.[5] Violence is a key component of his argument, but he does not detail how exactly Cretan poleis tried to achieve regional hegemony. Over forty years later, Chaniotis argues that Cretan citizens dedicated themselves to warfare and discusses naval warfare at some length for the Hellenistic period, but he never specifies how these Cretans engaged in violence.[6] Both scholars seem to be avoiding the subfield of ancient warfare.[7] This avoidance was probably born out of the hoplite orthodoxy which left little room for the literary, epigraphic, or archaeological evidence of warfare on Crete. Many military historians now reject the orthodox model of Classical warfare, but newer, or revisionist, models still do not sufficiently address the archaeological evidence. I argue that adoption of hoplite equipment was a regionally dependent phenomenon and define hoplite warfare as inconsistent, unpracticed, unpredictable, chaotic, and messy. Like the equipment itself, hoplite warfare was a "piecemeal process" without any consistent or

[2] See Seelentag 2015 as an example of the former and Rabinowitz 2014 as an example of the latter.
[3] Sears 2021, 345.
[4] I describe this academic conflict as the Perlman-Link debate because this is how their arguments developed chronologically. Perlman rejected the Classical literature in her 1992 and 2005 articles, and Link wrote a critical response in 2008.
[5] Willetts 1955, 250.
[6] Chaniotis 1999.
[7] I am using Chaniotis and Willetts as an example, but several scholars claim that the Cretans were highly militarized without further exploring what that might actually mean. See also Davies 2005, Gehrke 1997, and Chaniotis 2005b.

standardized form,[8] and it changed slowly yet continuously over the course of the Archaic and Classical periods.[9]

2.1 – Greek Warfare in the Archaic and Classical Periods: The Piecemeal-Adoption Theory

The hoplite orthodoxy – an idea originally established in the mid-nineteenth century – still has many followers and foregrounds many conversations about ancient Greek culture and politics. The orthodoxy maintains that hoplite warfare emerged very suddenly in the eighth or seventh century alongside the earliest Greek poleis.[10] Aristocratic warriors dismounted from their horses and chariots to fight in a single egalitarian battleline, and poleis politically empowered a "middling" class of farmers to fill out these battlelines.[11] The orthodoxy assumes that hoplite equipment required a very particular style of combat, which Grundy famously compared to a rugby scrum, with highly trained and well-disciplined citizen-soldiers.[12] More recent publications describe this model as the "sudden-change theory."[13]

The numerous scholars writing in opposition to the sudden-change theory have taken many names. Cawkwell first named them "heretics," Kagan and Viggiano labelled their opponents as "gradualists," and Konijnendijk refers to himself and his peers as "revisionists."[14] Kagan and Viggiano challenge opponents of the orthodoxy to offer a new paradigm and do "nothing short of rewriting the history of the early Greek polis."[15] But a new paradigm will just create new problems – we must abandon the notion that the hundreds of Greek poleis located throughout the ancient Mediterranean practiced a single Greek way of war. As Hall recently wrote, "the most secure path forward in the study of warfare amongst the ancient Greeks is through jettisoning universalisms and engaging in detailed regional studies."[16]

I describe myself as a piecemeal-adoption theorist. This is a reference to Snodgrass's initial study of hoplite arms and armor as archaeological objects. He argues that the introduction of hoplite arms and armor was a "long drawn out, piecemeal process" that did not correspond

[8] Snodgrass 1965, 110.
[9] As Lloyd (2014) argues for earlier periods.
[10] The Chigi Vase and the Homeric poems are often cited as markers of a *terminus ante quem* (Kagan and Viggiano 2013b, 15). Although the hoplite orthodoxy was initially proposed over 150 years ago, it was popularized again by Hanson (1989, 1995). García and de Quiroga (2013) argue that Hanson used the orthodoxy to push a far-right political agenda. Hanson retired from academia in 2004 to pursue a career as a conservative political commentator.
[11] Grote 1859, 31. The association between political participation and hoplite warfare ultimately derives from a narrow reading of Aristotle's Politics (4.1297b). The passage in question suggests that political participation was limited to those who could at least afford hoplite armor, and these individuals, τὸ μέσον, were the only men to serve as hoplites on the battlefield. But Aristotle is frustratingly loose with his language. Van Wees (2004, 266) describes these passages as "almost meaningless." He emphasizes that Aristotle uses a different definition of τὸ μέσον in other sections of book four and assigns hoplite service to every economic class except the poorest (Arist. Pol. 4.1289b, 4.1295b).
[12] Grundy 1911, 268.
[13] Kagan and Viggiano 2013a, xiv-xv.
[14] Cawkwell 1989, 375; Kagan and Viggiano 2013a, xiv-xv; Konijnendijk 2018, 22.
[15] Kagan and Viggiano 2013a, xxi.
[16] Hall 2021, 286.

with hoplite tactics or political developments.[17] The labels of heretic and revisionist appear to accept the foundations of the orthodoxy, in particular the notion that there could be a single paradigm for Greek warfare. Unlike the term gradualist, which implies directionality, piecemeal adoption simultaneously accepts that change occurred over time but does not imply that there is an identifiable end point or direction for that change. Moreover, the ideas that I will present below diverge with and challenge the most recent revisionist model of hoplite warfare which was presented in Konijnendijk, Kucewicz, and Lloyd's 2021 *Brill's Companion to Greek Land Warfare Beyond the Phalanx*.

That being said, revisionists have fundamentally altered how we envision and discuss ancient Greek warfare. Expanding on Snodgrass' work, van Wees has shown that different warriors preferred and used different pieces of armor, and there was not any degree of standardization until the end of the Classical period.[18] Military practice did not directly influence political organization and instead indirectly reflected preexisting political conditions.[19] Although certain types of arms and armor facilitated or hindered certain tactical operations, tactics and military equipment did not develop in tandem. Many of the pieces of the hoplite panoply – such as the sword, shield, spear, corslet, greaves, and helmet – were invented as early as the Late Helladic III period.[20] An archaeometallurgical analysis of the bronze shields at Delphi might suggest that some of the round hoplite shields from that site were originally Mycenaean creations.[21] Hoplite tactics, if they existed, were probably tied to the important cultural developments of the late sixth and fifth centuries,[22] and the nature of the hoplite changed dramatically between the fifth and fourth centuries.[23] Moreover, archaeological studies of sixth- and fifth-century arms and armor have shown that the full hoplite panoply was nowhere near as heavy as sudden-change theorists claim.[24] Krentz estimates that a full panoply weighed between twenty and forty pounds.[25] Hoplites were not, therefore, immobile, and hoplite warfare was surely much more than a simple pushing contest. Van Wees argues that each hoplite was capable of running back and forth across the battlefield, and the battleline was spacious enough to afford each person full range of movement with his shield and spear.[26] Warfare was not an *agon* with

[17] Snodgrass 1965, 110.
[18] Snodgrass 1964, 71; van Wees 2004, 50, 195-196.
[19] Echeverría Rey 2011, 47; van Wees 2004, 183.
[20] Snodgrass 1964, 190-92.
[21] Molloy 2018. Molloy compares the Delphic shields to Bronze Age shields in central and western Europe. He suggests a redating of the shields based on the similarities he draws from this comparison. I do not find this argument particularly persuasive, but his larger point and emphasis on material science is worth highlighting. This is one of only a few archaeometallurgical studies of ancient Greek arms and armor.
[22] Echeverría Rey 2011.
[23] This idea was actually started by proponents of the hoplite orthodoxy who were trying to understand Herodotus, Thucydides, and other fifth century references to Greek warfare. It is perhaps best explained by Adcock (1967, 14). Konijnendijk (2018, 24-38) overviews the role that Epaminondas and the battle of Leuctra had in this debate and the controversies' subsequent influence on later opponents of the hoplite orthodoxy.
[24] Krentz 2013, 135; Franz 2002. The inaccurate weight of the armor is at the heart of Hanson's theses (Hanson 1989; Hanson 1995).
[25] Krentz 2013, 135.
[26] van Wees 2004, 169-172.

unwritten rules, and ancient Greeks utilized every means possible to impose their will on others.[27] Combatants still won prestige, glory, and political power on the battlefield, but Greek warfare was also an economic enterprise.[28] Building on all this important research, the piecemeal-adoption theory can neither rewrite the history of the Greek polis nor invent a new paradigm that defines all Greek warfare, but for a topic so complex, the absence of a paradigm is certainly preferable.

Between the collapse of the Bronze Age and the end of the Classical period, warfare in the Greek world took many forms. To imply that there was a single standard of warfare at any given time is counterproductive. Humans engaged in violent conflict with whatever tools and technology they had at hand. They were limited by cultural and economic institutions as well as the local topography, but every violent confrontation was ultimately unique. We can track some of the patterns of warfare in Greece across multiple communities and regions, but there is nothing to suggest that there were accepted models of hoplite warfare in the Archaic and Classical periods. The Spartans relied on large numbers of helots and small groups of leisure-class professional warriors in the fifth century, and the Athenians conscripted huge segments of their community in the same periods.[29] The Thebans created and funded a standing force of three hundred professional warriors in the fourth century, and upland *ethne* used strategic surprise attacks and defense-in-depth to outlast their invaders.[30] All of these groups were Greek, and I propose that they were all practicing hoplite warfare. Hoplite warfare was not orderly or homogeneous in form – it was always a bit chaotic and disorganized. Hoplite equipment did not require certain tactics or warrior architypes, and combatants committed violence however they could and for their own reasons. The terms hoplite, archer, cavalry, and many others were contextually dependent and never literal, adding to the messiness of battle. We must instead think of ancient battle in the simplest terms: one crowd of armed individuals tried to impose their will over another crowd of armed individuals. As the Age of Hoplite Warfare came to an end, combatants in the largest crowd, the hoplite battleline, were increasingly inexperienced and amateur, and ancient generals came to depend on smaller and more reliable groups to support this crowd. These developments and changes, like hoplite armor itself, were adopted piecemeal.

Following the collapse of the Bronze Age, the earliest hoplite-style greaves and closed-face bronze helmets may have been produced on Crete.[31] Some of the earliest double-gripped round shields and bronze cuirasses may have also been from Crete.[32] These pieces of armor were the attributes of hoplites, yet every Classical author described Cretan warriors as archers,

[27] Krentz 2002; van Wees 2011.
[28] Echeverría Rey 2011, 47; Gabrielsen 2007.
[29] For warfare in fifth-century Sparta, see Lazenby 1985, van Wees 2018a, and van Wees 2018b. There is not a good single source for Athenian warfare for the whole fifth century, but I recommend van Wees 2004, Raaflaub 2007, Crowley 2012, Konijnendijk 2018, and Pritchard 2019.
[30] For the Theban sacred band, see Pritchett 1974, 221-225 and Konijnendijk 2018, 154-162. For warfare among upland ethne, see Blome 2020. I am borrowing the term "upland ethne" from Blome, who uses it to describe the Phocians, Aetolians, Acarnanians, and Arcadians.
[31] Snodgrass 1964, 196, 200-201.
[32] Coldstream 1977, 288; Snodgrass 1964, 200-201.

τοξόται.[33] Cretan warfare has never seemed to fit within the rigid definitions of the sudden-change theory, so it is no wonder that Willetts and Chaniotis avoided expanding on the nature or character of Cretan warfare. The piece-meal adoption theory allows for greater interpretative freedom and a more specific regional analysis of ancient warfare. But it requires a new explanation of how hoplites actually used their equipment on the battlefield, and what Greek warfare might have looked like in the Archaic and Classical periods.

I: Professional Amateurism

In 2004, van Wees described Classical Greek armies as "bumbling amateurs" because they consistently lacked training, specialization, and professionalism "in all aspects of military organization."[34] For much of the Classical period, military command structures did not exist outside Sparta, combat groups were disorganized and irregular, and battlefield logistics and tactics were largely improvised.[35] Konijnendijk argues that "the general lack of, and even aversion to, military training" is the most fundamental component of Classical Greek warfare.[36] Greek poleis consistently sent amateurs into battle with little to no weapons training, and Greek culture, Konijnendijk argues, promoted this amateurism. This point emphasizes the nature of hoplite warfare – like the hoplites themselves, skirmishes between hoplites must have been inconsistent, irregular, and unpracticed.

Hoplite amateurism is a key component of the piecemeal-adoption theory, but, as we will see in part two of this dissertation, hoplite amateurism never permeated into Crete. Cretan poleis never adopted a cultural preference for hoplite amateurs. This had a profound impact on the ways in which Cretans and mainland Greeks interacted in the fifth and fourth centuries, both on and off the battlefield. I will argue in chapters four and five that Cretan elites monopolized organized violence as a means of monitoring elite groups. This process likely occurred around the same time that hoplite amateurism started to dominate military thought on the mainland, namely the late sixth and early fifth centuries. When Cretans started fighting alongside and against mainland Greeks in the late fifth and fourth centuries, mainland poleis like Athens were already deploying entire armies of professional amateurs. The dichotomy between these approaches to organized violence is perhaps most stark during the Sicilian Expedition: the invasion force consisted of twenty-two hundred Athenian citizens and only eighty Cretans (Thuc. 6.43).

Several fourth-century authors, such as Xenophon and Aeneas Tacticus, discuss military training and the benefits that go along with these practices, but these discussions assume that their contemporary audience was unfamiliar with or even averse to preparing for war. When our sources discuss training, there was a significant "gap between ideal and reality."[37] In Plato's

[33] Not every Classical author describes Cretan warriors, but they always call them τοξόται when they do.
[34] van Wees 2004, 88.
[35] van Wees 2002, 61.
[36] Konijnendijk 2018, 39.
[37] Konijnendijk 2018, 65.

Laches, Lysimachus asks Socrates, Nicias, and Laches if he should employ a *hoplomachos* to teach his sons how to fight as hoplites, τὸ μαθεῖν ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι (Pl. *La*. 181c). Nicias argues that it is worthwhile because the boys will improve their physical health; be prepared to fight on their own if they are separated from the rest of the hoplites during a rout; and might become inspired to lead men, volunteer for generalships, and pursue a career in the military (Pl. *La*. 181d-182d). Laches counters that skill at arms is naturally acquired rather than learned, the *hoplomachoi* are charlatans, and a man who trains with weapons puts himself at risk of being ridiculed (Pl. *La*. 182d-184c). Both men were famous Athenian generals, and both men led disastrous campaigns against the Sicilians: Laches in the Archidamian War and Nicias in the Decelean War. In Plato's dialogue, everyone eventually agrees that they could all benefit from further education (Pl. *La*. 201a-b). Socrates implores Lysimachus to ignore the ridicule that he will inevitably receive and hire a tutor for himself and his boys. In all his dialogues, Plato encourages citizens, both men and women in the *Laws*, to train for war, but he also seems aware that his audience might find such a proposition ridiculous.

Xenophon encouraged citizens to practice agriculture and animal husbandry to improve their effectiveness as combatants (Xen. *Oec.* 5.1-17). As an overseer of an estate, Greek men could strengthen their bodies through physical labor, become accustomed to waking early in the morning, and familiarize themselves with travelling over uneven terrain (Xen. *Oec.* 5.4; *Eq. mag*. 1.16). If they expected to serve as cavalrymen, riding horses and maintaining horses on their estates could prepare them and their horses for military service (Xen. *Oec.* 5.5; *Eq. mag*. 1.16-20). Xenophon's more technical treatises, *On Horsemanship* and *Cavalry Commander*, illustrate both that there was an audience for pedagogical manuals on warfare and that he expected most Greek armies to be full of unprepared amateurs. In book eight of *Cavalry Commander*, he stresses that his readers will have a marked advantage over their uneducated contemporaries and rivals (Xen. *Eq. mag*. 8.1-3).

In the *Oikonomikos*, Xenophon's Socrates argues that managing agricultural slaves is good practice for commanding men on a battlefield (Xen. *Oec.* 5.14-15). Good order appears to have been the exception rather than the rule, and combatants working together quietly and effectively was the ideal (Xen. *Oec*. 7.7; *Eq*. 11.11-13). Most armies were disorganized without proper preparation (Xen. *Oec*. 7.8-9). Based on the way in which Socrates presents his recommendations, Xenophon's ideas regarding the martial virtues of agriculture and animal husbandry must have been new and original. He eases Kritoboulos into this topic. They had been discussing the roles of wives and husbands in the household when Socrates suggests that a husband should dedicate himself to doing good to improve his household: εὖ μὲν τούτων γιγνομένων αὔξονται οἱ οἶκοι (Xen. *Oec.* 3.15). Kritoboulos pushes for further clarification, but Socrates responds with a question (Xen. *Oec.* 4.4). He asks if they would not be ashamed to imitate a Persian king: μὴ αἰσχυνθῶμεν τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα μιμήσασθαι (Xen. *Oec*. 4.4). Committing to agriculture and warfare are evidently not Greek practices, and Socrates is compelled to speak at length about the wisdom and virtue of the Persian kings (Xen. *Oec*. 4.4-

25) before he can segue into the practical and martial benefits of practicing agriculture (Xen. *Oec.* 5.1-17).

In book eleven, Socrates praises Ischomachos profusely for building his health and strength, ὑγίεια and ῥώμη, so as to be more effective in war (Xen. *Oec*. 11.8-20), but weapons training is manifestly absent from Ischomachos' training regimen. When Xenophon turns to weapons training in *Cavalry Commander*, he has to incentivize both his audience and the men under their command to practice with prizes and promises of public glory (Xen *Eq. mag.* 1.21, 25-26). Aristotle says that mercenaries are superior to citizen hoplites because they have better arms and armor and they know how to use them, δυνάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις (Arist. *Eth. Nic*. 1116b). Although Aristotle appears to acknowledge that experience with weapons led to greater effectiveness with those weapons, Xenophon is inconsistent on this point. Although he promotes weapons training in *Cavalry Commander*, he recommends that hoplites use canes, νάρθηκες, and lumps of earth, βώλους βάλλοντες, in the mock battles held in lieu of training in the *Cyropedia* (Xen. *Cyr*. 2.3.18).

In the *Hellenica*, Xenophon reports that Agesilaus sought to encourage his men to train for war by holding a series of competitions and awarding prizes to the winners (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.16). The archers practiced shooting their bows, the javelin-throwers practiced throwing javelins, the cavalry practiced riding their horses, and the hoplites did physical exercises. While the rest of the army practiced using their weapons, the hoplites set aside their weapons and armor in order to perfect their bodies, ἄριστα σωμάτων. While men with missile weapons were expected to train and practice with their weapons before battle (Pl. *Leg.* 806a-b, Xen. *An.* 3.4.17, Xen. *Cyr*. 2.1.16), the ideal hoplites were physically fit but otherwise untrained and unprepared.[38] This has important implications for how we, and our ancient sources, distinguish between hoplites and non-hoplites. I will argue below that many groups operating outside the hoplite formation were not amateurs and became increasingly vital to achieving victory on the battlefield. They were the minority by far, however, as most ancient combatants were hoplites.

Even the best Greek hoplites never learned how to march, to fight with a sword or spear, or to defend themselves against an enemy.[39] Some athletic and dance competitions had overtly military connotations, but these highly performative activities probably had little practical use on the battlefield.[40] War dances like the pyrrhic dance were not realistic representations of actual military practice.[41] They were not instructional performances, and, although they often included

[38] Konijnendijk 2018, 40-41.

[39] It is worth stating that the public military training of youths in the ephebeia may have created competent and well-trained hoplite combatants. Although the Athenians inscribed ephebic oaths and formal honors for ephebes as early as the mid-fourth century (Rhodes and Osborne 2003, nos. 88 and 89), the ephebeia was a late Classical or early Hellenistic institution (*Ath. Pol*. 42). I believe that the peripoloi included young men in the mid-fifth century (Thuc. 1.105), but the system of training these young combatants, the ephebeia, belongs to the second half of the fourth century. Either way, these sorts of political innovations are good examples of why the so-called Age of the Hoplite probably ended in the first decades of the fourth century. See chapter one for the chronological parameters for the Age of the Hoplite.

[40] van Wees 2004, 92.

[41] Ceccarelli 2004, 117; Wheeler 1982, 230-232.

weapons, they always celebrated agility and spectacle over practical combat techniques.[42] Sweet argues that boxing, wrestling, and the pankration "simulated hand-to-hand combat," but none of these contests involved shields, armor, or weapons.[43] The hoplite running competition, the *hoplitodromia*, tested a man's ability to run relatively short distances with a helmet and shield, but competitors were not depicted carrying weapons and did not wear any clothing.[44] A master athlete was only partially prepared for the battlefield and, despite Plato's idealism (Pl. *Leg.* 4.422b-c), was probably just as ineffective as the unathletic hoplites.[45] But Pritchard argues that this was beside the point. Our sources' association between war and athletics is not about military preparedness or military skill, but instead about perseverance.[46] Athletes were no more likely to know how to use their arms and armor, but they were less likely to drop them and run in the face of danger.

The amateurism of the hoplites must have greatly influenced the structure of ancient battle.[47] Greek generals had little to no formal authority over combatants and had to inspire them with their charisma instead (Xen. *Cyr*. 1.6.24-25; *Oec.* 5.14-15).[48] The amateur combatants formed into a large group that became the central focus of the Classical Greek army.[49] Every other part of the army revolved around this massive crowd of amateur hoplites. Cretans may have fought within this amateur group at times, but they more often appear to revolve around the hoplites (Xen. *Anab*. 3.3.7, 3.4.17, 4.2.28, 5.2.29-32; *Hell*. 4.7.6). In chapter five, I will argue that Cretan elites dedicated themselves to military training to prove their belonging within elite groups, so they were probably better equipped and more familiar with their equipment than mainland Greeks when they started fighting beside them in the fifth century. However, the Cretans' focus on weapons training was a component of their ideologies of violence. As we shall see, these ideologies drove elites to monopolize violence and depend on rather delicate political systems with distinct social hierarchies, which had the potential for political instability.

In the fifth and early fourth centuries, most Greek hoplite formations, with the exception of the Spartans', had no internal order or structure. Hoplites were sometimes deployed into rows at the start of the battle, but these rows quickly broke apart once the battle commenced.[50] This moment of imposed order was only temporary, but it was an important phase in an army's preparation before a battle.[51] At the end of the fifth century, Greek authors began reporting the depth of these preliminary formations. A depth of eight men became common, but in no way was

[42] Ceccarelli 1998, 19-20; Ceccarelli 2004, 116-117; Konijnendijk 2018, 64.
[43] Sweet 1987, 60-62.
[44] Beazley 1951.
[45] Konijnendijk 2018, 63, 69.
[46] Pritchard 2013,183-184.
[47] Konijnendijk 2018, 39.
[48] Konijnendijk 2018, 50.
[49] Echeverría Rey 2011, 47.
[50] Debidour 2002, 45; Hanson 1989, 140-146; Goldsworthy 1997, 7-8, 14-15; Konijnendijk 2018, 55-56; Pritchett 1985, 72-73, Rawlings 2013, 21.
[51] Crowley 2012, 49-53.

it a standard.[52] Konijnendijk presents all the reported depths for the Classical period.[53] In most cases, our sources are concerned about the depth of a hoplite formation not because the depth would directly help the hoplites overcome an enemy, but because the depth was tied to the length of the battleline. Protecting the flanks of the formation and matching the length of the oncoming enemy formation were the primary concerns of ancient generals.[54] At the first battle of Mantineia, for example, Thucydides calculates that the Spartans had sixty-four warriors in the front line of each of their hoplite battalions, λόχοι (Thuc. 5.68). The depths of these battalions were not all the same, however, and Thucydides tells us that the commander of each λόχος deployed his men however he wished: ὡς λοχαγὸς ἕκαστος ἐβούλετο (Thuc. 5.68). Even the Spartans, the great exception to ancient Greek attitudes towards warfare who prioritized military training and practice, did not bother trying to keep their men from amassing into an uneven crowd behind their battleline.

Within every Greek army, including the Spartans, the amateurism of the hoplites was a liability.[55] Pitched battles were relatively unpredictable, and generals tried to avoid them as much as possible.[56] Military campaigns sought to force other people into submission, and armies pillaged and destroyed property with this goal in mind.[57] Greek poleis typically employed irregular warfare practices, such as raiding and targeted skirmishes, to achieve these goals, and large and decisive battles were usually a last resort or an accident.[58] But pitched battles still happened, and poleis still risked everything with armies of untrained amateurs. The idea of military specialization and troop professionalism only gradually developed over the course of the fifth and fourth centuries. I will argue in chapter six that Cretan hoplites, whose military traditions had diverged from mainland poleis and avoided hoplite amateurism, were key catalysts for these developments on the mainland.

II: Battlefield Typologies (or the Lack Thereof)

I will argue in chapter six that Cretan warriors were leisure-class hoplite archers, but describing them in this way, as both hoplites and archers, is perhaps my greatest departure from revisionist models of ancient warfare. Within the chaos of the piecemeal-adoption theory, there is room for individual warriors to be both archers and hoplites – as well as cavalrymen, spear throwers, and slingers – because it assumes that troop typologies are a literary device employed by ancient authors to try and make sense of an inherently chaotic event.

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[52] Matthew 2012, 176.
[53] Konijnendijk 2018, 128.
[54] Echeverría Rey 2011, 75; Konijnendijk 2018, 130-132.
[55] To be fair, most Spartan armies were largely composed of non-Spartans (see Lazenby 1985). True Spartan *homoioi* may have been trained for war from a young age.
[56] Echeverría Rey 2011, 47-48. Thucydides and the author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* describe pitched battle as a huge risk to the security of the polis (*Hell. Oxy*. 1.2; Thuc. 6.16).
[57] Echeverría 2021; Konijnendijk 2018, 194, 214-15.
[58] Echeverría 2021; Echeverría Rey 2011, 75; Osborne 1987, 138-140.

Troop typologies have always been a part of academic discussions of ancient warfare. Many of the earliest commentators on Greek warfare were military veterans who drew more on their personal experiences than historical evidence.[59] Perhaps as a consequence of this methodology, the academic dialogue surrounding hoplite warfare and post-Napoleonic warfare became fairly interchangeable over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[60] By the twentieth century, our reconstructions of hoplite battles resembled Napoleonic battles, and military historians today continue to use post-Napoleonic military terms to describe Greek warfare.[61] Konijnendijk convincingly argues that early military historians were trying to create a single standard, or paradigm, for the whole of Greek history.[62] Eighteenth-century warfare, Napoleonic warfare, and, eventually, trench warfare all functioned in a certain way, had a limited number of troop typologies, and could only support certain types of tactical operations. It was possible to point to one or two battles and create a typology for that battle in that particular era, and this standard subsequently facilitated deeper discussions about larger historical phenomena. Early military historians constructed the orthodox model of Greek warfare to be the foundation for other investigations of Greek economics, politics, and culture. Although revisionists have rejected the hoplite orthodoxy, they continue to use post-Napoleonic military terms to describe ancient battle. I argue that these terms and concepts are anachronistic for hoplite warfare. They help us describe the groups of warriors and combatants that participated in ancient conflicts but should never be understood literally.

In his description of the first battle of Mantineia, Thucydides suggests that we might guess at the length of the Lakedaimonian battleline based on the number of known λόχοι on the field. Each λόχος, band of combatants, had four πεντηκοστύες, fifty-person unit, and each πεντηκοστύς consisted of four ἐνωμοτίαι, groups of combatants bound by oath (Thuc. 5.68). Although most ἐνωμοτίαι were probably not at full strength, it is fair to say that the πεντηκοστύες had ceased being literal headcounts. Thucydides estimates that most ἐνωμοτίαι had about thirty-two hoplites – they were deployed in blocks of four hoplites wide by about eight hoplites deep. That means that every so-called fifty-person unit actually contained an average of one hundred and twenty-eight people. This passage shows that Thucydides and his audience were comfortable thinking of terms like πεντηκοστύες as units on the battlefield that had lost their literal meanings. What should we make, then, of labels like ὁπλῖται, ψιλοί, ἱππῆς, or τοξόται, if πεντηκοστύς no longer meant fifty-person unit?

[59] Hanson (1989, 22) celebrates this fact. See Köchly and Rüstow 1852; Droysen 1888; Delbrück 1920; Kromayer and Veith 1928.

[60] Some scholars might contest the term "post-Napoleonic," and prefer to attribute this theoretical approach to von Clausewitz's *vom Kriege* (2008 in the works cited). Clausewitz's ideas revolutionized the field of military theory, but Clausewitz himself fought in the Napoleonic Wars and his treatise is based on his experiences. The political and economic realities of warfare in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries inadvertently influenced military theory and is therefore responsible for this shift.

[61] This phenomenon has most recently manifested itself in Wrightson's 2019 monograph, which attempts to find a twentieth-century military concept, combined arms warfare, in the ancient world. I discuss this further below.

[62] Konijnendijk 2018, 11-12.

Notably, the Spartans were the only ancient Greeks attested in our sources to break their armies into organized units, and Thucydides explains this system in part, it seems, because he assumes that his audience was ignorant of the Spartan system (Thuc. 5.68). Nevertheless, Thucydides' description of the Lakedaimonians at Mantineia illustrates how ancient Greeks thought about groups of combatants on the battlefield. The hoplites, both the Spartans and their allies, formed a long battle line which was organized by polis. Two cavalry forces, ἱππῆς, stood on either flank of the battle line (Thuc. 5.67). Thucydides' description of the Lakedaimonian army at Mantineia is consistent with most descriptions of ancient armies in the Classical period. Most authors distinguish regular hoplite combatants by polis, ethnos, village, neighborhood, or deme, and they describe other groups that were detached from the main battle line based on some distinguishing feature, like their equipment.[63] Although this may appear to be two distinct naming practices, they are both probably part of the same phenomenon.

In book one of his history, Herodotus says that Cyaxares was the first man in Asia to order his men into λόχοι based on their tactical purpose, πρῶτός τε ἐλόχισε κατὰ τέλεα τοὺς ἐν τῇ Ἀσίῃ, and the first man to separate them based on their equipment, πρῶτος διέταξε χωρὶς ἑκάστους εἶναι τούς τε αἰχμοφόρους καὶ τοὺς τοξοφόρους καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας (Hdt. 1.103). However, Herodotus only describes this system of organization in tandem with segregation by ethnos, as How and Wells noted over a hundred years ago.[64] In Xerxes' army, the cavalry was deployed κατὰ τέλεα except the Arabians, who were deployed in the rear of the column to keep their camels from scaring the horses: οἱ μέν νυν ἄλλοι ἱππέες ἐτετάχατο κατὰ τέλεα, Ἀράβιοι δὲ ἔσχατοι ἐπετετάχατο· ἅτε γὰρ τῶν ἵππων οὔτι ἀνεχομένων τὰς καμήλους, ὕστεροι ἐτετάχατο, ἵνα μὴ φοβέοιτο τὸ ἱππικόν (Hdt. 7.87). In other words, the Persian army was organized both κατὰ ἔθνεα καὶ κατὰ τέλεα, in the same manner as the Greeks at Plataea (Hdt. 9.33). The Spartans were deployed on the right of the Greek line, but, within the Spartan forces, there were ten thousand ὁπλῖται and thirty-five thousand ψιλοί (Hdt. 9.28)

Describing a battle can be difficult, especially if it is just one part of a larger narrative, so our sources probably invented labels to facilitate this process. These military labels, what many scholars call troop typologies, could have conveyed to an ancient Greek audience any number of different characteristics. They could have expressed, for example, a group's political identity, their economic status, their preferred means of fighting, their role on the battlefield, or their martial skill. Or the terms might not have related to the combatants at all. As we shall see, some of the ancient labels that appear rather straightforward were anything but. Although the labels like ὁπλῖται, ψιλοί, ἱππῆς, and τοξόται were fairly consistent across Classical literature, they were not always reliable indicators of the tactics and equipment of each group. Scholars must accept that these labels are literary devices that are potentially misleading, and we must therefore consider these labels on a case-by-case basis.

This has far-reaching implications for the term τοξόται or archers, with which our literary sources typically describe bands of Cretan warriors. I will argue in section 2.2, as well as

[63] Pritchett 1985a, 25.
[64] How and Wells 1912, 105.

chapters four and six, that Cretans were not simply just archers, and we might instead think of them as professional hoplites with diverse skill sets and equipment. The term τοξόται likely has more to do with their economic or social status than their physical appearance.[65] The larger point here, however, and the reason that I seek to distinguish my own model of hoplite warfare from that of revisionists is that troop typologies of the post-Napoleonic style are incongruent with our evidence for ancient Greek warfare.

Several recent studies have collated the historical evidence for ancient Greek warfare and reconstructed ancient hoplite battlefield tactics and military strategies, but these same discussions consistently impose modern ideas about troop specialization and unit organization.[66] Scholars often treat an ancient Greek battlefield like a chess board – a group of men could belong to one of only a few different troop types and, like chess pieces, did not deviate from the operations that were allotted to their type. Kucewicz, Lloyd, and Konijnendijk and Wrightson cite the passage of Herodotus discussed above to argue that troop typologies developed in the Greek world early in the fifth century (Hdt. 1.103).[67] Wrightson further speculates that the first battle to have troop typologies was the battle of Spartolus between the Chalcidaeans and the Athenians (Thuc. 2.79).[68] In Thucydides' description, the Chalcidaean *psiloi* continued to fight separately from the hoplites after they started to flee from the battle. In this same passage, Thucydides describes two groups of *peltastai* from different poleis, so combatants appear to be fighting in groups based on their poleis and their equipment – κατὰ ἔθνεα καὶ κατὰ τέλεα, as Herodotus might say (Hdt. 9.33). Wrightson is trying to argue that combined arms warfare, a firmly twentieth-century military theory, existed in some form in the ancient world. Although he makes many valuable observations, I prefer a cautious reading of Herodotus: Greek armies were organized by national identity and equipment rather than tactical function, but function was contextual and depended on each individual engagement so at times these distinctions overlapped.

With the possible exception of Sparta, Ancient Greek poleis did not regulate how their combatants fought and what equipment they carried into battle. According to Xenophon, Spartan citizens were required to wear a tunic and carry a bronze shield (Xen. *Lac.* 11.3). Spartans could notably choose their own body armor, helmets, and weapons, although Spartan citizens may have been forbidden from practicing archery.[69] Otherwise, every hoplite provided his own equipment and could freely move back and forth between the battleline and his tent.[70] In theory, a single combatant could have switched weapons or changed armor at various points throughout a single battle. Therefore, these typologies must simply remain theoretical possibilities. They are shorthand mechanisms for ancient authors and modern historians to facilitate deeper discussions,

[65] Following Brouwers 2010, 227.
[66] See, for example, Echeverría Rey 2011; Konijnendijk 2018; van Wees 2004. It is worth noting that many of these scholars are aware of the problems with their language. Brouwers made this point in his dissertation after an extended discussion that utilized the traditional typology labels (Brouwers 2010, 220).
[67] Kucewicz et al. 2021, 219-220; Wrightson 2019, 59 and 107. This idea is fundamental to all of the papers in Kucewicz, Lloyd, and Konijnendijk's 2021 edited volume.
[68] Wrightson 2019, 107.
[69] van Wees 2018b, 254
[70] van Wees 2004, 169-172.

and do not convey expectations of behavior or appearance – as we might find in an early-modern army. Combatants certainly formed into independent groups on the ancient battlefield, but there were probably no rules dictating how these groups formed.[71] In the following paragraphs, I will attempt to address some of the most frequent labels and their common characteristics, namely hoplites, *psiloi*, cavalry, *epilektoi*, and attendants.

II.A: Hoplites

In some ways, Thucydides' description of Mantinea is highly unusual. He does not describe any archers or lightly armed combatants who might have wielded missile weapons in either army. Yet, the warriors verged to their right because they fearfully tried to hide behind their companions' shields in order to be as fully protected as possible, εὐσκεπαστότατος (Thuc. 5.71).[72] What were they afraid to protect themselves against, if not missiles? Although Thucydides describes the shields in this passage, he does not actually describe any of the combatants carrying these shields as ὁπλῖται.[73]

Responding to proponents of the hoplite orthodoxy, van Wees argued that service as a hoplite was indeed limited to a select group within the polis. The poorest would not qualify, he argues, because "they could not afford the equipment," and the richest would serve instead among the cavalry or as officers.[74] He distinguishes between two types of hoplites: the "leisure-class" and the "working-class."[75] Both were amateurs, but leisure-class hoplites invested in showy and more expensive equipment while working-class hoplites brought the minimum. Van Wees' typologies fit the evidence, but they are still fundamentally built around the idea that hoplites were a predetermined type with equipment that created a minimum cost of entry into their ranks. I will employ these terms throughout this project to describe the physical appearance of warriors in our evidence, but do not assume that any one piece of the hoplite panoply was required to be a warrior. As we shall see, I associate leisure-class hoplites on Crete with elites and a concerted effort on the part of those elites to gatekeep membership in their elite groups. But the equipment of leisure-class hoplites is inconsistent and irregular across the island, and there appears to be no minimum requirements in terms of equipment. This raises an interesting question: if being a hoplite was not dependent on equipment, then what made a hoplite a hoplite?

[71] The notion that ancient battle did not have any rules directly conflicts with the orthodoxy and is, perhaps, one of the most important developments from the anti-orthodoxy movement. Echeverría Rey 2011, 47; Krentz 2002; van Wees 2011.
[72] Unfortunately, εὐσκέπαστος is a *hapax legomenon*. Cassius Dio otherwise uses it to express a similar meaning: to be well-protected (49.30). Thucydides' word choice should make us hesitate to characterize this passage as emblematic of Greek warfare, more broadly.
[73] He only describes the Athenians as hoplites at Mantinea (Thuc. 5.61). They are just one of many allies assisting the Mantineans and are not named in his description of the armies drifting right.
[74] van Wees 2004, 47.
[75] van Wees 2004, 47.

Answering this question is actually much harder than we might think. Hoplites are, of course, named for their ὅπλα, but this word had a wide range of possible meanings.[76] Homer and Hesiod use it to describe domestic tools and ship tackle far more than they use it to describe arms and armor (Hes. *Op.* 627; Hom. *Il*. 18.409-412; Hom. *Od*. 2.390, 2.430, 3.433, 14.346, 21.390 versus Hom. *Il*. 18.614, 19.21, 10.254, 10.272). Although Herodotus uses the word to describe ropes (Hdt. 7.25, 9.115), the word clearly had a military connotation by the fifth century.[77] When the Boeotians advanced to meet the Athenians before the battle of Delium, the hoplites, *psiloi*, cavalry, and peltasts all advanced together and they all took up their ὅπλα at the same time: καὶ ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα τεταγμένοι ὥσπερ ἔμελλον, ὁπλῖται ἑπτακισχίλιοι μάλιστα καὶ ψιλοὶ ὑπὲρ μυρίους ἱππῆς δὲ χίλιοι καὶ πελτασταὶ πεντακόσιοι (Thuc. 4.93). This passage suggests that the term ὅπλα could include the arms and armor of the peltasts, cavalry, and *psiloi* as well as the hoplites. Ὅπλα must have referred to all military equipment, more generally, by the end of the fifth century. On these grounds, Lazenby and Whitehead argue that "the hoplite was the man comprehensively tooled up, geared up, to fight."[78] Unfortunately, this does not get us any closer to understanding what distinguished a hoplite from a peltast or a *psilos*. As we shall see below, *psiloi* and other small groups of non-hoplites were essential for hoplite warfare and were often more capable of fighting than the hoplites.

In Xenophon's *Anabasis*, the Cretan archers could not match the range of the Persian archers. Xenophon called upon the Rhodians amongst the mercenaries to harass the Persians with sling stones and offered them rewards for assisting the army (Xen. *An*. 3.3.16-19). Some commentators describe these as three distinct troop types: the Cretans, Κρῆτες; javelin-men, βάλλοντες; and Rhodian slingers, σφενδονῆται.[79] We are tempted to imagine that the Rhodians set aside their spears and shields, picked up their slings, and moved to stand in a separate group in a different part of the army. But that is not what Xenophon says. Xenophon emphasizes that the Rhodians are particularly skilled slingers, but he then calls on any man who wishes to use a sling to do so from their current positions within the army, τῷ σφενδονᾶν ἐν τῷ τεταγμένῳ ἐθέλοντι (Xen. *An.* 3.3.18). Following his speech, fifty men step forward to serve as cavalrymen and two-hundred volunteer to be slingers. While the cavalrymen were outfitted with new armor, σπολάδες and θώρακες; given horses; and assigned a commanding officer, the slingers simply appeared, ἐγένοντο (Xen. *An*. 3.3.20). On the following day, a select group of hoplites and peltasts within the large hoplite and peltast formation were ordered to rush out with the cavalry to pursue and rout the Persians. These hoplites and peltasts stayed in their positions until a signal was given, and then they charged the Persians and killed many of them:

> ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ Ἕλληνες διαβεβηκότες ἀπεῖχον τῆς χαράδρας ὅσον ὀκτὼ σταδίους, διέβαινε καὶ ὁ Μιθραδάτης ἔχων τὴν δύναμιν. παρήγγελτο δὲ τῶν τε πελταστῶν

[76] Lazenby and Whitehead 1996.
[77] Pritchett 1985, 22. Thucydides and Herodotus use various forms of this word hundreds of times. I do not believe that providing an exhaustive list here is necessary.
[78] Lazenby and Whitehead 1996, 33.
[79] See, for example, Lee 2008, 84.

οὓς ἔδει διώκειν καὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν, καὶ τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν εἴρητο θαρροῦσι διώκειν ὡς ἐφεψομένης ἱκανῆς δυνάμεως. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ Μιθραδάτης κατειλήφει, καὶ ἤδη σφενδόναι καὶ τοξεύματα ἐξικνοῦντο, ἐσήμηνε τοῖς Ἕλλησι τῇ σάλπιγγι, καὶ εὐθὺς ἔθεον ὁμόσε οἷς εἴρητο καὶ οἱ ἱππεῖς ἤλαυνον: οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἔφευγον ἐπὶ τὴν χαράδραν. ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διώξει τοῖς βαρβάροις τῶν τε πεζῶν ἀπέθανον πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ἱππέων ἐν τῇ χαράδρᾳ ζωοὶ ἐλήφθησαν εἰς ὀκτωκαίδεκα. τοὺς δὲ ἀποθανόντας αὐτοκέλευστοι οἱ Ἕλληνες ᾐκίσαντο, ὡς ὅτι φοβερώτατον τοῖς πολεμίοις εἴη ὁρᾶν.

And when the Greeks were across the gorge and about eight stadia beyond it, Mithradates also proceeded to make the crossing with his troops. And orders were given to the peltasts and hoplites who were charged with pursuing the enemy, and the horsemen were told to be bold in their pursuit, as a sufficient force would follow behind them. And when Mithradates overtook them, and the sling-stones and arrows were already reaching them, the Greeks were signaled with a trumpet, and immediately those who had been notified rushed forward and the horsemen charged; but they did not engage them for [the enemy] fled towards the gorge. In this pursuit, many of the barbarian footmen died and eighteen surviving cavalrymen were captured in the gorge. And the Greeks, unbidden, mistreated the dead, in order to inspire the greatest amount of fear in their enemies.

– Xen. *An*. 3.4.3-5

We can attribute the success of Xenophon's attack to the Greek cavalry and slingers since Xenophon had tried to attack the Persians with his hoplites and peltasts to no avail on the previous day (Xen. *An*. 3.3.8). However, Xenophon does not mention the warriors carrying slings. We might assume, therefore, that the slingers distracted the Persians from their positions in the hoplite and peltast formations while the cavalry and a third group, a select group of footmen, pursued and engaged the Persians in hand-to-hand combat. In other words, Xenophon's description probably indicates that some peltasts and hoplites were using missile weapons like slings while standing in their hoplite and peltast formations.[80] These warriors probably continued to volley their missiles at the Persians while the selected hoplites and peltasts charged their enemy alongside the cavalry.

This reconstruction has dramatic implications for other fifth and fourth century hoplite battles. It could help us locate the missing missile units at the first battle of Mantinea – an

[80] Scholars sympathetic to the hoplite orthodoxy might argue that using a sling would require too much space and could not have been possible from within a tightly organized formation of hoplites. As discussed above, the depth of a hoplite formation was typically only temporary, and orderly rows quickly morphed into crowds after the start of the battle (see Debidour 2002, 45; Hanson 1989, 140-146; Goldsworthy 1997, 7-8, 14-15; Konijnendijk 2018, 55-56; Pritchett 1985, 72-73, Rawlings 2013, 21). If we set aside poorly attested idea that hoplites had to stand in set positions with set amounts of space between them, then it is easy to envision that some of these warriors may have hurled sling stones, thrown javelins, and loosed arrows from within the relatively amorphous crowd of hoplites.

unknown number of hoplites were using missile weapons – but it also dramatically challenges how we conceive of the Classical hoplite. In chapter six, I will argue that we should envision Cretan warriors in mainland conflicts as small groups of highly reliable hoplites, what I will define as *epilektoi* below, rather than as archers. Inconsistency and unpredictability are key to ancient Greek warfare, and the hoplite, as the centerpiece of Greek military thought, probably reflects this variability.

Most scholars assume that a man needed to carry at least a shield and a spear to qualify as a hoplite.[81] In the *Constitution of the Athenians* from the late-fourth century, the Athenians only provided their polis-funded hoplites with a shield and a spear (*Ath. Pol*. 42.4). Other than this single reference, however, there is no explicit description of a hoplite's equipment. At the first battle of Mantinea, Thucydides seems to suggest that most men carried a shield (Thuc. 5.71), and Cleon led his hoplites away from Amphipolis while presenting their unprotected sides to his enemies, τὰ γυμνὰ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους δοὺς ἀπῆγε τὴν στρατιάν (Thuc. 5.10). Most combatants probably carried shields into battle before the invention of hardened-steel plate armor in the High Medieval period, and our ancient sources variously describe peltasts, *psiloi*, and cavalry all carrying shields. Some attempts have been made to argue that shield shape helped distinguished a hoplite from a peltast, but there is ultimately no evidence to support such a claim.[82]

Visual representations of hoplites are equally opaque. Proponents of the hoplite orthodoxy often cite the Chigi vase and Corinthian aryballoi for visual depictions of hoplites,[83] ignoring the chronological problems of citing seventh-century paintings to describe fifth and fourth century warfare. Helmets are also used to identify hoplites in painted pottery,[84] but the Spartan hoplites at Sphacteria were famously wearing caps, πῖλοι (Thuc. 4.34).[85] Many archaic vase paintings seem to show men wearing metallic corslets, and proponents of the hoplite orthodoxy typically argue that most hoplites wore bronze body armor.[86] Based on the number of corslets that survive in comparison to the other components of the panoply, however, Jarva estimates that only one in ten hoplites wore bronze body armor.[87] Ultimately, military equipment appears to be too inconsistent and unreliable to use as a marker of the hoplite.

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[81] Van Wees, who is highly skeptical of the hoplite orthodoxy, accepts this to be true without exploring it much further (van Wees 2004, 48).

[82] Krentz 2013, 136-137. Many scholars still dismiss the historicity of the Boeotian shield and see it as a heroic marker. I will return to this discussion later, but I maintain a very laissez-faire approach to the evidence and find Boardman's interpretation of the shield convincing (Boardman 1983, 27-33). As van Wees has argued, all the impracticalities of the Boeotian shield fall away when we reject the hoplite orthodoxy (van Wees 2004, 50-52).

[83] E.g. Viggiano and van Wees 2013, 67-69.

[84] Lissarrague 1990, 14.

[85] There is some debate about whether these πῖλοι were constructed from bronze or organic material. Thucydides does not specify their material, but a line in Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* refers to a χαλκοῦν πῖλον (Ar. *Lys.* 562). For an interpretation of the Spartan caps as organic, see: Lazenby 1985, 46; Hanson 1989, 83. For an interpretation of the caps as bronze, see: Anderson 1970, 30. I think they were probably organic since Thucydides did not follow Aristophanes and specify their material, but neither a felt cap nor a bronze cap would be able to block a direct strike from an arrow or javelin. The point of this paragraph – that armor pieces like helmets do not help us identify hoplites in art – remains relevant because scholars have never used πῖλοι to identify combatants in fifth-century art.

[86] Hanson 1989, 76-77.

[87] Jarva 1995, 111-113, 124-180.

As discussed above, amateurism was perhaps one of the most important characteristics of the ancient hoplite army. Most hoplites were inexperienced, easily frightened, and vulnerable to flanking attacks from cavalry or missiles.[88] The hoplite formation was one of the least reliable parts of the army, but the outcome of the battle almost always depended on the morale of this formation.[89] When most of the hoplites fled the field, the battle was lost. I propose that we use the purpose, function, or role of the hoplite formation to define hoplites. The hoplite was an armed combatant who formed into a larger group. The hoplite formation was the primary focus of Greek military thought, full of professional amateurs, and the determining factor between defeat and victory. Following this approach to the hoplites, I will define the other literary labels for combatants based on their role on the battlefield rather than their equipment.

Aristotle uses the word ὅπλον to reference scales, shells, or the thick hides of animals. In defending the natural superiority of humans over other animals, he summarizes his opponents' arguments that humans are inferior to other animals because they are born barefoot, naked, and without a ὅπλον in case of a fight: ὡς συνέστηκεν οὐ καλῶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλὰ χείριστα τῶν ζῴων ἀνυπόδητόν τε γὰρ αὐτὸν εἶναί φασι καὶ γυμνὸν καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντα ὅπλον πρὸς τὴν ἀλκήν (Arist. *Part. An*. 687a). The πρός plus an accusative here is a little tricky to convey in English. I interpret this construction as relational or conveying purpose: the ὅπλον is the type of ὅπλον that is used in an ἀλκή. It is a tool for warding off enemies or ἀλέξων, not a weapon to be used against another's defenses. In other words, I think Aristotle describes a ὅπλον as a defensive object – it is a turtle's shell rather than an eagle's talon. By the fourth century, therefore, we might think of hoplites as combatants more focused on defense than offense.[90]

A formation of Greek hoplites became a sort of mobile fortification on the ancient battlefield. All the pieces of the hoplite panoply were designed to withstand offensive attacks, and the spear was a long weapon that could keep enemies at a distance with precise strikes. Not everyone in the group needed to carry this equipment because they formed a collective defense by bunching up into a single group. The role of a group of hoplites was probably to create space for their allies and resist their enemies' advances. There were certainly working-class and leisure-class hoplites, but these important economic distinctions did not alter the fundamental role of the hoplite on the ancient Greek battlefield. A poor man probably came to the battle with less armor and fewer means to preserve himself, but he was still, ultimately, fighting over ground.

As discussed in chapter one, there is no evidence of working-class hoplites or real interpolis warfare on the island of Crete before the fifth century. It was probably the case that something similar to what I am describing here existed nonetheless. As we shall see in chapter five, elites used organized violence to withhold warriorhood from working-class individuals. This suggests that hoplite conflicts, when they did occur on Crete, were probably much smaller

[88] Echeverría Rey 2011, 75; Konijnendijk 2018, 130-132.
[89] Konijnendijk 2018, 105.
[90] Echeverría Rey (2011, 75) also reaches this conclusion following a historical survey of Classical hoplite battles.

scale due to the inaccessibility of warriorhood.[91] Cretan battles probably also employed amateur working-class hoplites fighting as a mobile fortification, but all our evidence points to the elite leisure-class warriors fighting around the hoplite formation – the allies for whom the hoplite formation took ground and created space.

However they were outfitted, a group of hoplites created a physical barrier on the battlefield around which other warriors and combatants operated. The actions of the *psiloi*, cavalry, *epilektoi*, and attendants were always in relation to the position of the hoplites. The flanks of the hoplite formation were weak and susceptible to assault, so Greek generals often deployed smaller groups of better organized combatants in these areas to protect the hoplites.[92] The space behind the hoplites was relatively safe, and it was therefore filled with attendants, combatants using long-range missile weapons, and other combatants who were repositioning themselves.[93] As the hoplites advanced, they created more safe space; as they withdrew, they lost safe space to their enemies and endangered the other components of the army.

II.B: Psiloi

Alongside hoplites, our Classical sources typically reference *psiloi*, cavalry, and more specialized combatants, which I am calling *epilektoi*. Like hoplites, *psiloi* carried a wide range of weapons and armor. Some sources further specify groups within the *psiloi* based on common weapons that they were wielding, such as archers, slingers, and javelin-throwers. It is tempting to think of *psiloi* as specialized missile units, but not all *psiloi* carried missile weapons.

Those *psiloi* that our sources describe as carrying missile weapons also apparently carried and used melee weapons. In the Classical period, *psiloi* often served as reserve forces for the hoplite formation.[94] During the battle of Plataea, the Athenian archers were called upon twice to assist hoplites (Hdt. 9.21-22, 60). In one of these actions, the archers shot a Persian officer from his horse and then engaged him in hand-to-hand combat. Striking his metal corslet with their melee weapons, they were unable to kill him until someone stabbed him in the eye (Hdt. 9.22). Following the Peloponnesian War, Xenophon frequently describes *psiloi* charging into hoplite battlelines.[95] These charges were a battlefield tactic that became increasingly popular over the course of the fourth century.[96] Konijnendijk describes this tactic as a "cascading charge."[97]

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[91] Many scholars claim that Cretan poleis had smaller populations on average than mainland communities, but there is ultimately no evidence to support this idea. Pollard's (2022) recent demography work suggests that Cretan poleis were comparable in size to major poleis in the Peloponnese.
[92] Echeverría Rey 2011, 56-58, 75; Konijnendijk 2018, 132.
[93] van Wees 2004, 169-172. Before the battle of Peiraeus, Xenophon says explicitly that peltasts, javelin-throwers, and stone-throwers planned to stand behind the hoplites and fling their missile at the enemy continuously throughout the whole battle (Xen *Hell.* 2.4.12, 16). This may have been a unique situation, but I argue that the space behind the hoplites must have been filled, at least, with attendants and other hoplites who were moving back and forth between the battle line and their tents.
[94] Konijnendijk 2018, 114-115.
[95] See Konijnendijk 2018, 112 for a complete list.
[96] Konijnendijk 2018, 111-112.
[97] Konijnendijk 2018, 111.

Although Konijnendijk otherwise seems to think of *psiloi* as combatants only capable of ranged warfare, his argument does not work unless Greek generals believed that *psiloi* could effectively engage hoplites in hand-to-hand combat as well. Sending men to be slaughtered right in front of the hoplites would have emboldened the enemy and depressed their allies. In reality, some *psiloi* may have fought as *psiloi* only some of the time and otherwise fought as hoplites, like the Rhodians in Xenophon's army. For these reasons, we must accept that the terms ψιλοί, πελτασταί, ἀκοντισταί, τοξόται, πετροβόλαι, and σφενδονῆται probably have less to say about the weapons that these men carried than we might have hoped.

These descriptions instead seem to imply something about the role of *psiloi* on the battlefield. Drawing insight from later historical periods, we can say with a certain degree of confidence that missile weapons were typically less lethal than melee weapons.[98] In nineteenth-century America, arrow wounds to the arms and legs were almost never lethal and relatively simple to treat.[99] Arrow wounds to the abdomen, chest, and head were more lethal, but arrows were slow enough that many victims had time to raise their arms in self-defense.[100] In the 1860s, American soldiers rarely died from just one arrow wound – a single arrow wound was typically not serious enough to fully incapacitate someone who was not wearing any body armor.[101] Bill argues that adopting a simple leather jerkin to cover a soldier's chest would be enough to eliminate most deaths from arrow wounds.[102] There are many important differences between nineteenth-century America and ancient Greece, but Bill's fascinating study illustrates a larger point about the role of missile weapons in pre-gunpowder warfare.

Ancient Greeks probably used missile weapons to harass or distract an enemy and "drain his fighting spirit."[103] On the third day of the battle at Thermopylae, the Persians showered the Spartans with arrows before their final assault (Hdt. 7.225). Distracting and immobilizing the Spartans with their missiles, the Persians simultaneously encircled what was left of the Spartans. The Spartans were similarly encircled at Sphacteria when Cleon's army continuously attacked with missiles, and then again outside Lechaeum (Thuc. 4.34; Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.13-18). At the Peiraeus, Thrasybulus' army shot arrows, javelins, and rocks at the hoplites of the Thirty as they advanced against their position (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.16). Xenophon compares the hoplites to blind men, ὥσπερ τυφλοὺς, because they continuously carried their shields above their heads and looked to the sky for oncoming missiles. This made them highly susceptible to a melee charge and they were quickly routed. In this situation, the oncoming missiles weakened and distracted the hoplites, but did not actually immobilize them. The Persians' missiles at the battle of

[98] For a detailed study of the lethality of ancient Greek arrows, see Davis 2013, 124-167. Davis and I reach the same conclusion, but Davis surveys all the arrow wounds in the *Iliad*, medieval warfare, and nineteenth-century first-hand accounts. In what follows, I present a particularly illustrative nineteenth-century first-hand account. The Homeric evidence, although fascinating, is obviously exaggerated and fantastic, and I do not find the medieval evidence very persuasive because the material hardness of steel, over bronze and iron, fundamentally changed how ancient warriors used military equipment. That being said, Davis 2013 remains an important resource.
[99] Bill 1862, 369.
[100] Bill 1862, 368-69.
[101] Bill 1862, 369, 386-387.
[102] Bill 1862, 387.
[103] Konijnendijk 2018, 102. See also DeVries 1997, 463; Wheeler 2001, 181.

Marathon seem to have similarly failed to prevent the Athenian hoplites from charging (Hdt. 6.111-114). In this instance, however, Miltiades seems to have intentionally attempted to minimize the impact of the Persians' missiles by deploying his whole army as hoplites (Hdt. 6.112). At Sphacteria and Lechaeum, the Spartans attempted to charge their attackers and failed in both instances (Thuc. 4.34; Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.13-18). Distraction and immobilization were not always achieved, but missiles always damaged an army's morale. The Spartans at Sphacteria ultimately surrendered because they had no hope to defeat the Athenian *psiloi* (Thuc. 4.38). At Lechaeum, the Spartans eventually became desperate and plunged into the sea or fled back to Lechaeum on horseback (Xen. *An.* 4.5.17). In both examples, missile weapons took a lot of time to demoralize the Spartan hoplites completely.[104] However, demoralization – as opposed to immobilization, distraction, or decimation – was certainly the most effective aspect of missile weapons, and Xenophon repeatedly refers to them being used for this reason (Xen. *Hell*. 4.2.14, 4.3.22– 23, 4.6.7– 8).

Most scholars typically downplay the importance of missile weapons in Classical Greek warfare.[105] Admittedly, Herodotus and Thucydides rarely mention men carrying missile weapons. At the battle of Syracuse, Thucydides says that the stone-throwers, slingers, and archers fought in front of the two armies as *psiloi* usually do: οἵ τε λιθοβόλοι καὶ σφενδονῆται καὶ τοξόται προυμάχοντο καὶ τροπὰς οἵας εἰκὸς ψιλοὺς ἀλλήλων ἐποίουν (Thuc. 6.69). But we would be wrong to assume that Thucydides' dismissive tone in this scene should be expanded for all *psiloi*. Earlier in this book, Thucydides explains that the Athenians had chosen a narrow pass between a sheer cliff and a lake to face the Syracusans (Thuc. 6.66).[106] They chose this ground specifically because it would minimize the mobility and effectiveness of the Syracusan cavalry. *Psiloi* were similarly hindered, so the *psiloi* at Syracuse were probably ineffective because they could not maneuver around the hoplites – they were stuck fighting in front, προυμάχοντο. They routed each other at Syracuse and failed to contribute to the battle, but this was probably a consequence of the unusual topographic conditions of the battle rather than the ineffectiveness of *psiloi* more generally. Earlier in his work, Thucydides describes a similar situation in which two groups of *psiloi* fight each other. During Demosthenes' invasion of Aetolia, the Athenian and Aetolian *psiloi* had bloody and exhausting skirmishes over the course of several days (Thuc. 3.97-98). When the Athenian archers were eventually destroyed, the Aetolian *psiloi* routed the Athenian hoplites and destroyed them as well. Thucydides emphasizes that the Athenians were driven into a land that they did not know: χωρία ὧν οὐκ ἦσαν ἔμπειροι διεφθείροντο (Thuc. 3.98). Thucydides' dismissal of the *psiloi* at Syracuse must, therefore, be contextual – the conditions of that particular battle rendered the *psiloi* useless, and Thucydides felt obligated to mention their ineffectiveness in this instance.

Although we should not put too much trust into the various types of *psiloi* mentioned throughout Classical literature, some terms seem to correspond to certain positions on the

[104] Konijnendijk 2018, 101.
[105] E.g. Anderson 1970, 42. Van Wees (2004, 63-64) argues that they were important but Herodotus and Thucydides just did not feel like they were worth discussing because their audience cared about the citizen hoplites.
[106] Konijnendijk 2018, 99.

battlefield. At the battle of the Peiraeus, Thrasybulus stationed πελτοφόροι and ψιλοὶ ἀκοντισταί behind his hoplites, and then he positioned πετροβόλοι behind these two *psiloi* groups (Xen. *Hell*. 2.4.16). All three of these groups shot their missiles simultaneously, so we might assume that the πετροβόλοι could shoot their missiles further than the πελτοφόροι and ψιλοὶ ἀκοντισταί. If we interpret these πετροβόλοι as slingers, then slingers could indeed contribute to a battle from a great distance which in turn helps to explain their importance to Xenophon during the *Anabasis* (Xen. *An*. 3.4.3-5).

However *psiloi* fought, they were clearly vital to hoplite battle in the Classical period. They typically operated around and outside the hoplite formation, but their actions supported and protected these hoplites by hindering or distracting the enemy in some manner. They were just as important to ancient battle as hoplites despite typically being present in smaller numbers and infrequently mentioned in our sources. As we shall see, Cretans often fought in mainland conflicts as *psiloi*. This emphasizes that *psiloi* were not always poorer than hoplites, as the Cretans in our evidence are clearly elites, but it is also worth emphasizing that Cretans seemed to switch at various points throughout a single conflict between being *psiloi* and being something else.[107]

II.C: Cavalry

While *psiloi* could impact the battle from a distance, cavalry could move across great distances very quickly. Like hoplites and *psiloi*, the label of cavalry probably had little to do with the physical equipment that cavalrymen carried. Many cavalrymen had horses, but most groups of Greek cavalry included men that ran alongside the horses (Hdt. 7.158; Thuc. 5.57; Xen. *Eq. mag.* 5.13, 8.19; Xen. *Hell*. 7.5.23-24). At the second battle of Mantinea, the Spartans deployed their cavalry in a neat square formation without footmen (Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.23). Epaminondas deployed his cavalry with footmen in order to strengthen it and smash apart the Spartan cavalry early in the battle (Xen. *Hell*. 7.5.24). This tactic worked and helped secure the Theban victory. In another text, Xenophon emphasizes that footmen make cavalry significantly more effective (Xen. *Eq. mag. 8*.19). Unfortunately, we do not fully understand how these combatants were equipped, what they did standing between the mounted cavalrymen, and how they fought on the battlefield.[108] This practice, however, further emphasizes the ambiguity of our terms and typologies. Thucydides and Herodotus explain that there was one combatant on foot standing beside every combatant on a horse (Hdt. 7.158, Thuc. 5.57), so we should probably assume that only half of the combatants in a cavalry unit were actually riding horses.

We should also not assume that every mounted combatant in the Greek army served in the cavalry. In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon describes a moment when he dismounted from his horse and carried a complaining hoplite's shield for him (Xen. *An.* 3.4.48-49). The point of this passage is to emphasize Xenophon's skill as a leader – he leads and inspires his men through his

[107] See below and chapter six.
[108] Spence 1993, 56-60.

actions – but it also implies that Xenophon was part of the hoplites' formation both when he was on a horse and when he was on foot. Once the complainer is shamed into taking up his shield again, Xenophon remounts his horse (Xen. *An.* 3.4.49). For the rest of the battle, Xenophon leads his men from horseback as far as the topography allowed. When the ground became too uneven, he led them on foot without a shield (Xen. *An.* 3.4.49). Since he was an officer, it is probably fair to assume that Xenophon rode a horse because of his importance for the army as a whole.[109] Nonetheless, the prevalence of horses throughout the whole army remains an open question.

In Xenophon's treatise *On the Cavalry Commander*, Xenophon stresses that the cavalry need to throw javelins from horseback, charge enemy positions, and flee when appropriate (Xen. *Eq. mag.* 1.5-6, 1.16, 3.3, 8.9). He spends some time emphasizing training and preparation, and it seems clear that he expects cavalry to serve as scouts for the larger army (Xen. *Eq. mag.*1.6, 16). They were armed for both ranged and melee combat (Xen. *Eq. mag.* 1.6, 3.3), and they even occasionally fought hand-to-hand within the hoplite formation.[110] Xenophon emphasizes in two different places that a man needs to be able to mount his horse from the ground (Xen. *Eq. mag.* 1.5, 17). This particular emphasis might suggest that a man who brought a horse to battle still occasionally fought on foot. He might expect to dismount and mount his horse at various points throughout the battle, like Xenophon in book three of the *Anabasis* (Xen. *An*. 3.4.48-49)

The most important characteristic of the cavalry was their ability to pursue fleeing enemies and inflict casualties during a rout. Xenophon stresses that every cavalryman needed to be able to judge the distance between himself and a fleeing combatant (Xen. *Eq. mag.* 5.1). After the battle of Syracuse, the Athenians were not able to capitalize on their victory because they did not have any cavalry to counter the overwhelming number of Syracusan cavalry (Thuc.6.70). The Syracusan cavalry protected their hoplites as they fled the battle and returned to Syracuse. Although they lost the battle, they would eventually win the war because of their cavalry. Like the *psiloi*, the effectiveness of the cavalry was measured in their ability to support the crowd of amateur hoplites. Unfortunately, the evidence for cavalry on Crete is inconclusive.

II.D: Epilektoi

Over the course of the Classical period, armies started relying more and more on small groups of combatants tasked with specific objectives. These combatants were chosen for special assignments and expected to fight more competently than the rest of the hoplites. Herodotus and Thucydides often called them λογάδες (Hdt. 9.21; Thuc. 1.62, 2.25, 4.127, 4.129, 6.96, 6.100). They were created from the hoplites and *psiloi* and then tasked with a particular objective, such as capturing an important location, reenforcing a certain part of the battleline, or attacking a specific target. When they completed this assignment, they went back to their original positions – they were temporary groups and our fifth-century sources never mention λογάδες in their

[109] Mather and Hewitt (1962, 359) argue that Xenophon brought his horse with him from Athens.
[110] Konijnendijk 2018, 112.

calculations of army size.[111] Around the end of the fifth century, however, λογάδες gradually became a permanent feature of ancient Greek hoplite armies. According to Diodorus, the first permanent band of λογάδες formed at Argos in 421 (Diod. Sic. 12.75.7). Apparently, the Argives started financially supporting a small group of aristocratic youths so that they could commit themselves to athletic competition and exercise in case of war, but some scholars had accused Diodorus of being anachronistic.[112] These sorts of military bands, small groups of polis-funded and highly trained hoplites, redefined hoplite warfare in the fourth century, and the professional λογάδες of Argos otherwise predate this development by a generation.

In his *Anabasis,* Xenophon calls these small detachments of combatants ἐπίλεκτοι. They were originally part of Cheirisophus' portion of the army, but they were sent to help Xenophon capture a strategic hilltop (Xen. *An.* 3.4.43). It seems that Xenophon did not have his own group of *epilektoi* at the time, but he would by the end of the campaign (Xen *An.* 7.4.11). Xenophon references *epilektoi* throughout the *Hellenica*, and most hoplite armies apparently incorporated permanent groups of *epilektoi* in the fourth century (Xen. *Hell*. 5.3.22-23, 7.1.19, 7.2.10, 7.2.12).[113] In later literature, these terms were interchangeable,[114] but I prefer to refer to these combatants as *epilektoi* rather than λογάδες because it implies permanence.

When Cretans started to fight alongside mainland armies in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, they did so, it seems, as permeant groups of *epilektoi*. In some of our earliest references, it may be the case that the Cretans were fighting within the hoplite formation and only emerged from this group as λογάδες when needed, but they were clearly operating as a permanent band of *epilektoi* when the Spartans invaded Argos in 388 (Xen. *Hell.* 4.7.3-6).[115] In part two of this dissertation, I will explore how the ideologies of violence on Crete in the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries created the Cretan warriors referenced in our Classical literature, who practiced organized violence according to a very particular, notably non-Spartan and non-Athenian, ideology.

Konijnendijk argues that the real value of the *epilektoi* was the group's small size.[116] The mob of amateur hoplites was incapable of complex battlefield operations and when they were attempted, chaos ensued.[117] Generals increasingly relied on *epilektoi* in the fourth century

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[111] For a more thorough discussion of λογάδες and ἐπίλεκτοι, see Konijnendijk 2018, 155-156 and Pritchett 1974, 221-225.

[112] Konijnendijk 2018, 159.

[113] The famous Theban Sacred Band was a unit of *epilektoi* (Xen. Hell. 7.1.19). Romm (2021, 28-29) argues that the Sacred Band was created to imitate the sort of tactics that the Spartans deployed against the Thebans in 382. A small group of Spartan hoplites had seized the Cadmeia and successfully captured the city through a targeted tactical strike (Xen. *Hell*. 5.2.26-31). Both the Spartans seizing the Cadmeia and the subsequent Theban Sacred Band, therefore, operated on the battlefield as *epilektoi*. However, Romm is perhaps giving too much credit to the Spartans. As other scholars have pointed out, the Spartan seizure of Thebes in 382 appears to have been orchestrated more by the Theban oligarchic faction than the Spartans themselves (see Mackil 2013, 67).

[114] Citing Herodotus, Diodorus describes the λογάδες at Plataea as ἐπίλεκτοι (Diod. Sic. 11.30.4, Hdt. 9.21).

[115] This passage will be discussed in detail in chapter 6.

[116] Konijnendijk 2018, 157.

[117] The battle of Amphipolis and the first battle of Mantinea are excellent examples (Thuc. 5.10, 71-72). In both battles, generals tried to move the hoplite formation in an orderly fashion, and, in both instances, the hoplites were put into a weaker position because they could not execute the maneuver effectively.

because they could follow basic instructions without issue. They were relatively small in numbers, but they had a huge impact on the battle.[118] Like the hoplites, most *epilektoi* did not practice marching, standing in formation, or using their weapons before a battle. Tritle argues that they were "not just a volunteer force of eager citizen soldiers, but rather a veteran force best described as shock troops."[119] We might imagine, therefore, the *epilektoi* as wealthier and better prepared than the rest of the amateurs in the hoplite formation but should refrain from conceiving of them as a crack force of trained professionals. Moreover, there is no evidence to support Tritle's claim that *epilektoi* were veterans. If anything, *epilektoi* were simply more reliable combatants who were prepared to follow instructions better than the others, but their consistently small numbers is noteworthy. Cretan warriors, when they start appearing in mainland armies, typically make-up only about one percent of the total army, yet as we shall see, they often had a significant influence on the outcome of battle.[120]

II.E: Attendants

The least visible yet most essential group of people on the battlefield was the hoplite attendants. Both Pritchett and van Wees note the frequency and prevalence of hoplite attendants throughout our Classical sources.[121] Unfortunately, ancient artists infrequently depicted battlefield attendants, and ancient authors only ever mention these interesting characters in passing.[122] Between the late sixth and mid-fourth centuries, every hoplite seems to have had one attendant who followed him into battle.[123] In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon's enslaved attendant abandoned him in the middle of a battle (Xen *An.* 4.2.20-21).[124] In an earlier scene, the army had expelled all the baggage animals and enslaved people from the army (Xen. *An.* 4.1.12-13), so Xenophon seems to think of battlefield attendants as essential components of ancient warfare that were so ubiquitous that he did not need to mention their presence at any point. This is the only time in the *Anabasis* that Xenophon mentions his attendant – when he was failing to fulfill his regular responsibilities. Spartan attendants were typically helots, and they carried arms into battle and often served alongside the Spartiates in the battleline (Hdt. 8.25, 9.10, 9.28-30; Thuc. 4.80). Every Athenian hoplite also had a battlefield attendant. In a speech by Isaeus, a hoplite's poverty is illustrated by the fact that he could not afford a enslaved attendant and had to rely on his own brother to do the job (Isae. 5.11). For a citizen, service as an attendant brought shame

[118] Pritchett 1985a, 27.
[119] Tritle 1989, 57.
[120] Craven (2017, 73) initially made this observation. See chapter six for a deeper discussion and a detailed investigation of the literary evidence.
[121] Pritchett 1971, 49-51; van Wees 2004, 68-71.
[122] Battlefield attendants were the topic of my M.A. thesis, see Obert 2018.
[123] van Wees 2004, 68.
[124] I assume that he was an enslaved person because Xenophon elsewhere says he was accompanied by a boy, παῖς (Xen. *An*. 7.3.20).

and ridicule. Faced with going to war without an attendant or bringing shame to your family, however, fourth-century Athenians apparently felt that shame was preferable.

The primary role of battlefield attendants was to carry equipment and help men flee from combat.[125] Plato and Theophrastus both mention that combatants wounded in battle would immediately return to their tent with the aid of companions or an attendant (Theophr. *Char*. 25, Pl. *Leg*. 944a). They would then receive medical treatment from a surgeon while the battle continued. Since they also had to resupply the hoplites in the field, attendants must have been running back and forth between the army's battleline and camp throughout the course of the battle. Moreover, they also occasionally mingled into the hoplite formation itself. At Thermopylae, the helot attendants fought and died alongside the Spartiates in the hoplite formation on the final day of the battle. Herodotus explains that Xerxes wanted his men to see the Greek dead, so he left the helot and Spartan bodies on the battlefield (Hdt. 8.25). Although Herodotus may have been able to identify a wealthy Spartan hoplite from his helot attendant, Xerxes apparently trusted that his troops would not be able to tell the difference. To the Persians, helots and Spartiates both looked like combatants – the Persians did not see the helot attendants as support troops or non-combatants.

Battlefield attendants are perhaps the most significant counterargument to the hoplite orthodoxy, and, therefore, they have an outsized influence on reconstructions of Greek warfare under the piecemeal-adoption framework. The piecemeal-adoption theory presents violence as logical and utilitarian. Weapons and armor have practical strengths and weaknesses contingent to the particular topography and demographics of each battle. Similarly, political, social, and cultural factors all influenced how these weapons and armor were treated on and off the battlefield. Although the armor was not extremely heavy, it was traditional to have someone else carry it into battle.[126] Weapons training was not prioritized culturally while strength training, athleticism, and courage were valued as the easiest route to military success. For almost two centuries, some scholars have taken these cultural norms as literal history. But, in reality, these presentations were filters employed by our sources to mold a desperate struggle between two groups of armed combatants into a cohesive narrative. Greek combatants strove for every possible advantage during battle and then tried to make sense of the chaos after the fact.

III: The Physical Appearance of War: Crowds not Files

A careful reading of all the evidence suggests that ancient battlefields were not chess boards but spaces across which different groups of combatants moved as crowds. When the Cretans began to participate in these spaces, they appear to have occupied, and perfected,

[125] Carrying equipment into battle: Ar. *Ach*. 1140; Hdt. 5.111; Xen. *An*. 4.2.20; Xen. *Hell*. 4.5.14, 4.8.39. Helping men off the field: Theophr. *Char*. 25; Pl. *Leg*. 944a; Xen. *Hell*. 4.5.14. These are just the examples from our literary sources – there are dozens of attendants in Classical art. The evidence is numerous and complex, and there is not enough space to discuss each reference here.

[126] According to art, the Homeric poems, and fifth and fourth century literature. See Greenhalgh 1973; Obert 2018; Pritchett 1971, 49-51; van Wees 2004, 68-71.

preexisting positions that were oriented around the crowd of amateur hoplites. This crowd of hoplites, what I have been calling the hoplite formation, has typically been described as a phalanx, but the history of this term in nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholarship, as well as its importance for the sudden-change theory, means that it raises more problems than it resolves.

Thucydides never uses the word φάλαγξ, and Herodotus uses it only once to describe blocks or logs of ebony, φάλαγγες ἐβένου (Hdt. 3.97). Aristophanes uses the word only twice to describe small insects, perhaps spiders (Ar. *Ran*. 1314; Ar. *Vesp*. 1509).[127] The term seems to have related to sturdy stone construction before the fifth century,[128] but there is a clear hiatus in its usage in which the term seems to have been adapted and expanded in meaning.[129] We do not fully understand the precise meaning of φάλαγγες when it begins appearing again in a military context in the fourth century.[130] Without further investigation, it is not clear that the term indicates anything about the organization of the hoplite formation.

Many scholars point to the battle of Leuctra as evidence that hoplite formations were closely packed. When the Lakedaimonian cavalry was routed, it retreated into the Spartan hoplite formation and caused chaos (Xen. *Hell*. 6.4.13). But Xenophon emphasizes that these combatants were the weakest and least honorable, οἱ τοῖς σώμασιν ἀδυνατώτατοι καὶ ἥκιστα φιλότιμοι; they collided with the Spartans after the Theban hoplites attacked the Lakedaimonian battleline, ἔτι δὲ ἐνέβαλλον οἱ τῶν Θηβαίων λόχοι; and the confused Lakedaimonian cavalry were attacking the Spartan hoplites as well as the Thebans, φεύγοντες δὲ ἐνεπεπτώκεσαν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ὁπλίταις (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.11, 13). Xenophon uses an ἔτι with an imperfect verb, ἐνέβαλλον, to specify that the two hoplite formations had already engaged when the cavalry collided with them, ἐνεπεπτώκεσαν. This scene does not imply that the Spartan hoplites were an impenetrable wall of shields so much as it implies that the actual conflict between the two hoplite formations was a chaotic mess. Hoplite formations were crowds of disorganized people that functioned like mobile fortifications, but they were not physical walls. As much as ancient

[127] There is some ambiguity about the meaning of these words (see Sommerstein 1983, 247).

[128] Homer uses it to compare warriors to sturdy rock or earthen walls (Hom. *Il*. 13.130-131, 16.215-216). In book thirteen of the *Iliad*, the φάλαγγες stop Hector from rolling down the hill like a dislodged boulder (Hom. *Il.* 13.136-140). In book sixteen, Homer compares the φάλαγγες to a stone wall that will keep out a chill wind (Hom. *Il.* 16.215-216). Hesiod, Mimnermos, and Tyrtaios use the term to describe the first line of hoplites in the battleline (Hes. *Theog*. 676, 935; Mimnermos 13.3; Tyrtaios 12.21-22). These are not the only uses of the term, but Archaic poets clearly felt comfortable using the term to describe warriors.

[129] In the Hellenistic period, Macedonian hoplites who fought on foot were part of a formation called the φάλαγξ (Asclepiodotus 2.10). According to Diodorus, Polybius, and Livy, this Macedonian φάλαγξ was related to the Homeric φάλαγγες (Diod. Sic. 16.3.2, Liv. 33.8.14, Polyb. 18.29). Livy appears to be quoting Homer in translation in order to describe the Macedonian φάλαγξ (cf. Hom. *Il*. 13.130-131). These references probably meant to evoke the metaphorical power of Homer's φάλλαγγες: the Macedonian φάλεγξ was a group of warriors who became a rock wall or terrace on the battlefield (Hom. *Il*. 13.130-131, 16.215-216; see also Janko 1991, 60-61). None of our Hellenistic or Roman sources suggest that the Macedonian φάλαγξ developed out of the Classical period.

[130] Xenophon uses the word to describe any and all groups of combatants, whether they are Greek or Persian (Xen. *Cyr*. 7.5). He usually uses the word in the plural, but occasionally uses it in the singular to describe the whole army's battle line (e.g. Xen. *An*. 4.8.10). There does not appear to be any clear indication that the term retained its meaning as a stone block construction for Xenophon. When we cite the Macedonian φάλαγξ to describe Xenophon's phalanx, therefore, we are probably completely missing the logic that inspired early fourth-century authors to revive the term in the first place.

generals tried to control these combatants, they ultimately fought however they wanted and with whatever equipment they had brought to the field.[131]

At the beginning of a battle in the Classical period, ancient Greek generals usually ordered their men to form into files. This gave a commander the ability to survey the strength and weaknesses of his line, and it probably increased the morale of the amateur hoplites in the moments leading up to the conflict.[132] The combatants then charged into battle, however, and quickly bunched up into an amorphous crowd. Even the Spartans did not attempt to maintain consistently shaped battle lines. As discussed above, each λόχος at the first battle of Mantinea deployed its hoplites in different depths, and the smallest administered unit within the Spartan army formed a block of hoplites rather than a file (Thuc. 5.68). There is no way to know how much space within the formation each hoplite occupied in the Classical period, and the space that they did use probably varied from hoplite to hoplite.[133] Instead, I suggest that we should think of the hoplite formation as a crowd of amateur combatants with attendants moving about within the line and behind it. The cavalry moved as a crowd across the battlefield, both on horseback and on foot. The *psiloi* and *epilektoi* were smaller and better equipped crowds of combatants running to wherever they needed to be. Opposing crowds crashed into each other during the battle, but there was not a literal push, ὠθισμός, between heavily armed infantry. Instead, crowds of hoplites metaphorically pushed each other across the battlefield and created more or less space for the other crowds that made up their army.

Before the hoplites advanced and engaged their enemies, there was often a period of minor skirmishes between various components of the opposing armies. Leading up to the battle of Plataea, the Persian cavalry harassed the Greek battleline and raided their supply lines (Hdt. 9.39-40, 49-50). The Greeks and the Persians were both in advantageous positions and neither army wanted to attack the other at a disadvantage. The Persians sought to force the Greeks to commit to an engagement in a poor position or significantly disrupt their battleline to the extent that they could no longer benefit from the topography. These sorts of preliminary skirmishes were probably a common feature of organized violence in the Classical period. Unfortunately, our sources rarely discuss the minor skirmishes that led up to a pitched battle.[134] We should not, however, mistake invisibility or neglect in the surviving literature for irrelevance. These early skirmishes probably determined if, where, and how the hoplites would ultimately engage. Mardonius' cavalry successfully dislodged most of the Greek forces from their advantageous position (Hdt. 9.51). The Spartans faced the Persians alone and Artabazus' betrayal largely contributed to a Spartan victory. Artabazus was leading forty thousand Persians, but he held them back from the battle and then withdrew his forces without engaging with any of the Greeks (Hdt. 9.66). Supply and positioning were key components of ancient warfare, and generals

[131] Konijnendijk 2018, 50, 124-125.
[132] Konijnendijk 2018, 55; Krentz 1994, 45.
[133] Pritchett (1971, 134-154) argues that each man had three feet and Matthew (2009, 406) proposes one and a half feet. I do not see how either of these would have been practical or possible.
[134] As mentioned above, the *psiloi* might be our most explicit reference to these sorts of actions (Thuc. 6.69), but Thucydides probably only mentioned them here because they were so uniquely ineffective (Konijnendijk 2018, 99).

always tried to deploy their armies in such a way as to guarantee their success.[135] Mardonius used his cavalry to strip the Greeks of their tactical advantage, and all Greek battles probably included prolonged periods of pre-battle skirmishing that was trying to achieve the same goal. This example emphasizes how important *psiloi*, cavalry, and *epilektoi* were in ancient warfare, as they largely determined how and where the hoplites would fight. When we turn to the evidence for Cretan warriors, therefore, their small numbers, role as *epilektoi*, and outsized influence on battle is not necessarily a feature unique to the Cretans, but rather a consequence of the role they occupied in ancient battle.

Depending on the conditions and context of each battle, the transition from minor skirmishes to intense hand-to-hand combat may have been rather sudden and unexpected. Most scholars think of battlefield sacrifices and trophies as moments of marked transition from one phase of battle to another, but there is some important ambiguity here. Battles were often day-long affairs. Some battles, like Thermopylae, paused in the midst of heavy melee combat only to start anew on the following day (Hdt. 7.210-212). There was enough time in a single battle for an injured person to flee the field or for a group of people to run from one side of the battleline to the other.[136] Many pre-battle sacrifices were quick and favorable.[137] They were psychological rituals meant to prepare an amateur hoplite for killing.[138] Notably, however, they often occurred after numerous people had killed and been killed (Hdt. 9.61, Thuc. 6.69), and they always occurred after pre-battle skirmishing. In reality, the battlefield sacrifice might have done little to signal some sort of change in fighting and tactics. Trophies, similarly, were always constructed after battle – the moment that won a battle for one side or another was determined well after the fighting had stopped. Moreover, a rout in one part of a battleline did not always cause the whole line to withdraw (e.g. Thuc. 5.72). Most battles no doubt had speeches, sacrifices, charges, and retreats, but the conditions of each battle probably made the timing and performance of each of these activities rather unpredictable.

During the battle, combatants and attendants continuously pulled their wounded and slain from the field. In his *Laws*, the Athenian stranger discusses the virtue of a law that punishes someone for leaving their arms on the field. He argues that the law cannot apply to someone who is wounded in battle and carried back to his tent for medical treatment, thereby leaving his arms to be seized by the enemy (Pl. *Leg.* 12.944a). Plato emphasizes that countless combatants had experienced a situation just like this, οἷον δὴ μυρίοις συνέπεσεν, and that these evacuations of the wounded were happening continuously throughout the battle. We might even go so far as to imagine that the fiercest and most intense fighting occurred in places where combatants fought over the bodies of their fallen comrades. Herodotus describes the fight over Leonidas' body at

[135] Konijnendijk 2018, 139.
[136] van Wees 2004, 169-172.
[137] Jameson 1991, 204-205.
[138] Jameson 1991, 204; Parker 2000, 309.

Thermopylae as a bitter struggle, ὠθισμός (Hdt. 7.225).[139] The Spartans had to push back the Persians four times before they could recover their king's corpse. When Brasidas fell at the battle of Amphipolis, the combatants around him picked him up and carried him off the field (Thuc. 5.10). Kleombrotos was carried off the field at Leuctra while the Spartans had the upper hand, and Xenophon stresses that he was only saved because he was wounded before the Thebans began to push them back (Xen. *Hell*. 6.4.13). According to Diodorus, there was intense fighting between the Thebans and Lacedaimonians over Epaminondas after he was incapacitated, but not killed, by a spear wound (Diod. Sic. 15.87.1, 5). These scenes all reference, in some capacity, the epic fight over Patroclus' body (Hom. *Il.* 17.274-275), but, setting aside this literary device, thinking about hoplite combat as a struggle over bodies fits our larger understanding of how Greeks thought of organized violence.

Recovering war dead was an extremely important aspect of Greek warfare.[140] After a battle, the losing side typically negotiated with the victors to recover their dead. This appears to have been a formal acknowledgement that the losers were not prepared to recover their dead through force.[141] Although they eventually relented, some Spartans reportedly wanted to fight for their dead following the battles of Leuctra and Haliartos (Xen. Hell. 3.5.25, 6.4.14). Together with our understanding of battle as a long-drawn-out affair, it is possible to imagine that generals concentrated and redirected their forces, perhaps even groups of *epilektoi*, to certain parts of the battleline where the most combatants had fallen and the heaviest fighting was occurring. This emphasizes how porous hoplite battlelines needed to be, as warriors rushed within and through the formation as they aided their companions and recovered their bodies.

Eventually, one side collectively felt that they had lost the battle and decided to run for their lives. Some historians see this final phase of the battle as the most important.[142] It was certainly the most lethal; most combat deaths probably occurred during the final rout. The Ambraciotes were so utterly destroyed in the final rout following the battle of Idomene that Thucydides does not disclose their casualties because the number was so incredible (Thuc. 3.113). He does say, however, that the Athenians could have seized the city without any resistance because so many combatants had perished. Cavalry, *psiloi*, and *epilektoi* were vital to the success or failure of an army in the final moments of the battle. They could screen retreating hoplites or pursue fugitives. Most Greek armies, therefore, consisted of several different crowds of combatants working around the hoplites in every phase of the battle – even in defeat.

Envisioning hoplite warfare as a conflict between groups of amorphous crowds frees the study of Greek warfare from the rigid rules and paradigms of the hoplite orthodoxy, but it is also allows us to imagine that an especially talented or well-equipped warrior could occupy various positions or roles within a single battle. As we shall see in chapter six, the eighty Cretans at

[139] The exact meaning of this word is viciously contested, but Herodotus seems to use it to describe a fierce struggle. Elsewhere he uses it to describe contentious rhetorical debates (Hdt. 8.78, 9.26). We might say that modern debates about the word ὠθισμός have become an ὠθισμὸς λόγων (Krentz 1994).
[140] Kucewicz 2021a and 2021b, Low 2006.
[141] Konijnendijk 2018, 212.
[142] Konijnendijk (2018, 201) argues that it was "a central aspect of Greek tactical thought."

Syracuse may have fought as *psiloi* in the initial skirmishes of the battle, and then fallen back into the hoplite formation as their efforts became futile.[143] By definition, battle was messy, disorganized, and relatively unpredictable. Some combatants probably did stand a foot and a half from their comrades, and some combatants probably used their round shields to push the combatant in front of them into their enemy. But none of these practices became the standard methods by which Greek combatants enacted organized violence against one another. Each region of the Greek world adopted certain pieces of the hoplite equipment and deployed them within their own regional practices. This hodgepodge of violence developed into what we call hoplite warfare.

IV: The History of Hoplite Warfare

At the start of the Classical period, hoplite equipment had probably already existed in Greece for approximately two centuries. Our limited evidence suggests that what I am calling *epilektoi* had a larger role in Archaic warfare than the amateur hoplites of the Classical period. Archaic *epilektoi* fought in front of the regular battleline as πρόμαχοι.[144] These warriors were small groups of well-equipped professional combatants with an outsized influence on the battle due to their martial prowess and experience.[145] As we shall see, *epilektoi*, rather than amateur hoplites, dominated hoplite warfare both before the Persian Wars and after the Peloponnesian War – hoplite amateurism probably peaked in prevalence during the fifth century. I will argue in part two of this dissertation, that Cretans fought in the fifth century as *epilektoi*, but I do not want to suggest that they preserved or revitalized an Archaic style of combat. Cretan warfare shifted and evolved at the same rate as warfare on the mainland, and the Cretan warriors of the seventh and sixth centuries fought very differently than Cretan warriors in the fifth and fourth centuries. The same is true on the mainland – Archaic *epilektoi*, or πρόμαχοι, did not look or fight like *epilektoi* in the fourth century.

Most pieces of the hoplite panoply were invented or imported into Greece in the ninth and eighth centuries. Jarva concludes "that the 'panoply' was a variable phenomenon."[146] Snodgrass also illustrated that this process was slow and inconsistent, and that art from these periods suggests that warfare was still very much an individual affair.[147] Although there were certain repeated motifs, artistic depictions of warfare typically took two forms. There were chaotic depictions of battle with combatants carrying their own combination of equipment and doing a range of activities on the battlefield, or dueling scenes between two heavily armed and

[143] Thucydides lists the Cretans as participants in the expedition (Thuc. 6.25) and indicates that they are allied to the Athenians (Thuc. 2.85), but he does not actually specify their position or role in the battleline (Thuc. 6.67). Based on how he describes the Cretans in 6.25, I argue that they fought as *psiloi* initially and then fought in the left wing once the hoplite formations engaged.
[144] Pritchett 1985a, 18-19; Pritchett 1985b 25-26, 39-41; see below.
[145] Tritle 1989, 57.
[146] Jarva 1995, 115.
[147] Snodgrass 1965, 110; Viggiano and van Wees 2013, 57.

armored hoplites.[148] Perhaps heavily armed πρόμαχοι typically fought other πρόμαχοι, and larger battles were chaotic and messy – perhaps Archaic warfare had two faces: the aristocratic competition and the larger non-aristocratic competition between crowds of combatants.

The nature of our evidence obscures the contributions of non-elites,[149] but even elite engagements involved numerous additional combatants. Archaic departure scenes typically depict "a mounted hoplite, his young squire, and a handful of friends or dependents."[150] These supporters, dependents, and attendants were so important for this style of fighting that they were one of the most prevalent features of Archaic warfare. They helped the πρόμαχοι to the battlefield, carried extra equipment for them, helped them retreat from the battle, and even occasionally engaged the enemy in combat.[151] By the early sixth century, artists started simply painting floating spears or an extra horse to signal their presence.[152]

Pritchett argues that πρόμαχοι fought as a separate group of combatants in front of the regular hoplites.[153] These warriors rode into battle on a horse and then dismounted to fight as leisure-class hoplites.[154] He likens Archaic Greek πρόμαχοι to fourth-century Assyrian πρόμαχοι, who rode chariots into battle but dismounted to fight on foot (Xen. *Cyr*. 3.3.60).[155] According to Pritchett and Greenhalgh, Archaic πρόμαχοι were covered in bronze armor, relied on horses to get around the battlefield, and operated independently from the rest of the hoplites – much like the heroes in Homer's *Iliad*.[156] But πρόμαχοι were not all simply epic heroes and instead seem to have been a collection of important political figures and wealthy aristocrats within their communities.[157]

Greenhalgh, a proponent of the hoplite orthodoxy, believed that his mounted hoplites gradually fell out of use following the sudden adoption of hoplite warfare.[158] Pritchett was less keen to abandon the πρόμαχοι, but he notes that the term lost its military connotations in the Classical period.[159] Expanding on Pritchett's work, I propose that these units were eclipsed by the crowd of hoplite amateurs in the last decades of the sixth century and evolved into Classical λογάδες and ἐπίλεκτοι over the course of the fifth century. If this model is correct, then it is worth stressing that the predecessors of the *epilektoi* already had higher-quality equipment and higher degrees of professionalism well before they were fighting at Plataea or alongside Xenophon (Hdt. 9.21, Xen. *An.* 3.4.43). Moreover, this creates precedence for the Cretans when

[148] Van Wees 2004, 166-172. There are many ways to interpret these artistic depictions, and they remain central to the sudden-change theory (see Viggiano and van Wees 2013, 66-67. I prefer Lloyd's (2021, 36-27) more skeptical reading that these are meant to be chaotic scenes and we are imposing order.
[149] Which is true for Crete as well.
[150] van Wees 2004, 97.
[151] Greenhalgh 1973, 3, 59; Obert 2018.
[152] Greenhalgh 1973, 106; Lorimer 1947, 83.
[153] Pritchett 1985a, 18-19; Pritchett 1985b 25-26, 39-41.
[154] Greenhalgh 1973, 60.
[155] Pritchett 1985b 26. This is the only time that Xenophon uses a version of the word πρόμαχος, προμαχίζω, or προμάχομαι.
[156] Greenhalgh 1973, 60-63; Pritchett 1985b 26, 41.
[157] Greenhalgh 1973, 59, 86; Pritchett 1985b 25-26.
[158] Greenhalgh 1973, 62.
[159] Pritchett 1985b, 85-89.

they start fighting as *epilektoi*. The history of violence on Crete did not follow the same trajectory as violence in Athens or Sparta, but the Cretans' preferred martial practices still had an important place in those mainland systems.

In the late eighth and early seventh century, πρόμαχοι and leisure-class hoplites were symbols of the elites' economic, political, and physical superiority. By the beginning of the fifth century, hoplites were still at the forefront of military practice, but they were no longer just *epilektoi* or πρόμαχοι and now dominated the crowd of regular combatants. At the end of the sixth century, many Greek poleis probably underwent a series of institutional changes. At Athens and Sparta, these reorientations seem to have placed a newfound focus on the demos.[160] More people gained access to the arms and armor of the πρόμαχοι, but, at the same time, many aspects of this panoply were being phased out in favor of maneuverability, visibility, and communication. Untrained, unprofessional, and minimally equipped hoplites became the bulwark of the battleline. As we shall see in chapter five, Cretan elites forged a different path by monopolizing violence as an aspect of their identity. This directly impacted how Cretan elites interacted with their poleis, but it also meant that Cretans probably did not employ large numbers of amateur hoplites.[161]

Already by the start of the Classical period, many mainland poleis were fielding huge numbers of amateur hoplites. The successful Greek armies in the Persian Wars had relatively small numbers of cavalry, large numbers of *psiloi*, and huge numbers of untrained hoplites (e.g. Hdt. 9.28-30). Their successes at Marathon and Plataea probably justified this new system and the culture of hoplite amateurism.

During the Pentecontaetia, the Athenians further relied on their amateur citizens. Around 460, the Athenians had two hundred fully staffed triremes in Egypt and an army of fourteen thousand on Aegina when the Corinthians suddenly invaded their allies in Megara (Thuc. 1.104-107). They raised an emergency army from the oldest and youngest left in Athens, τῶν δ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὑπολοίπων οἵ τε πρεσβύτατοι καὶ οἱ νεώτατοι, to face the Corinthians, and they won a great victory (Thuc. 1.105). This victory reinforced the Athenians' confidence in their amateur hoplites. Although their *psiloi* killed the largest number of Corinthians (Thuc. 1.106), the battle was hailed as proof of the Athenian hoplites' military prowess (Aesch. *Eum*. 913-921),[162] perhaps more proof for us as scholars that these terms were subjective. Their subsequent victory in the battle of Oenophyta and the conquest of Boeotia was a tremendous economic and political boon to the Athenians.[163] We should probably assume that the Athenians' fifth-century land empire only reaffirmed the importance and power of their amateur army.

Spartan armies are more difficult to reconstruct in this period. The high casualties of the cavalry at Tanagra might have influenced their decision to withdraw from Attica following that

[160] Athens: Forsdyke 2005, Hoekstra 2016, Ober 2004, Ober 2007, Wallace 2007. Sparta: Davies 2018, Hodkinson 2000, Hodkinson 2018, Low 2006, Millender 2018, Nafissi 2018, van Wees 2018a, van Wees 2018b. See below for further discussion of this development.
[161] Although our evidence is absent either way.
[162] See Asmonti 2015, 117; Kagan 1989, 81-82.
[163] Mackil 2013, 34.

battle.[164] Perhaps they, like the Athenians, deployed an army of relatively untrained hoplites that needed *psiloi* and cavalry to protect its flanks.

At the start of the Peloponnesian War, most Greek armies consisted of small crowds of combatants, operating as *psiloi*, cavalry, or *epilektoi*, fulfilling specific objectives and actions in support of a much larger crowd of unprepared hoplites. By this time, mobility had become more important than defensive equipment. Body armor had largely fallen out of fashion and combatants seemed to prefer open-face helmets over the closed-face helmet typologies that had been popular in the sixth and early fifth centuries.[165] We might attribute this transition in hoplite equipment to the expanding militarization and lower economic expectations from conscripted hoplites, since closed-face helmets were probably more expensive than open-face helmets.[166] There is, however, the possibility that this gradual lightening of the panoply was also due to changes in Greek tactics. In the Persian Wars, hoplites were typically deployed in defensive positions (Hdt.7.175, 9.25). Marathon is the great exception, but Herodotus stresses that Miltiades' charge was considered unusual and risky at the time (Hdt. 6.109-110, 112). According to Herodotus, the Athenians at Marathon were the first Greeks to attack an enemy at a run, πρῶτοι μὲν γὰρ Ἑλλήνων πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν δρόμῳ ἐς πολεμίους ἐχρήσαντο (Hdt. 6.112). But they were certainly not the last, and running into battle would become commonplace. As generals came to expect greater degrees of mobility from the hoplites and experimented with more sophisticated battlefield tactics, cumbersome and restrictive armor became less common. Closed-face helmets became a symbol of the Archaic past and open-face helmets, which allowed their wearers to hear orders and survey the battlefield, became much more popular.

With the Athenians' defeat at the end of the fifth century, Spartan warfare became the model for the rest of the Greek world. Perhaps due to their dwindling citizen population, the Spartan military increasingly relied on small units of *epilektoi*.[167] Although there is some debate about the nature of the Skiritai at Mantinea,[168] they were stationed on the left flank of the Spartans' battleline, and they were initially part of their larger Lakedaimonian hoplite formation (Thuc. 5.57). In addition, Thucydides names Βρασίδειοι στρατιῶται and νεοδαμώδες beside the Skiritai. Whether or not any of these groups were *epilektoi*, the Spartans were clearly more comfortable with independently administered small crowds of combatants than the Athenians. As we shall see in chapter six, Cretan warriors may have been the exception for the Athenians, and they became regular feature of Spartan armies as early as the Corinthian War (Xen. *Hell*. 4.2.12). The Cretans appear to have been fighting as proto-*epilektoi* already at the start of the fourth century.

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[164] See Papazarkadas and Sourlas 2012. Plant (1994) convincingly argues that Thucydides' explanation for Sparta's actions before and after the battle of Tanagra is completely untrustworthy. Instead, he argues that the Spartans specifically wanted to pressure the Athenians into a ceasefire but had to withdraw after their Pyrrhic victory at Tanagra.

[165] Everson 2004, 135-136; Jarva 1995, 111-113, 124-180.

[166] Everson 2004, 136. Closed-face helmets probably had to be fitted for each user.

[167] Figueira 1986, van Wees 2018a.

[168] Anderson 1970, 249-251; Sekunda 2014, 60-64; Shipley 2004, 577.

In the middle of the fourth century, professionalism and weapons training became more important to the ethos of Greek warfare. Many poleis created permanent groups of *epilektoi* and some communities even paid for their training and provisioning.[169] For the most part, these professional soldiers still subscribed to the Classical mindset that eschewed formation training and weapons practice.[170] However, this newfound focus on *epilektoi* directly influenced Philip's Macedonian reforms.

As we shall see, Cretans forged a different path from the major poleis of southern and central Greece. They did not participate in the Persian Wars, and they were largely absent from the conflicts of the Pentecontaetia. They did not adopt amateur hoplites and probably more closely resembled πρόμαχοι than Athenian hoplites, but that does not suggest that their own military practices were unchanged.[171] In part two of this dissertation, I will investigate the history of hoplite warfare on Crete and show how political, economic, and cultural power warped warriorhood for the Cretans. Cretan warriors morphed into something new and different, so much so that Athenians would call them τόξοται and ἐπίλεκτοι rather than πρόμαχοι, and their unique ideologies of violence are at the heart of these developments.

2.2 – The Problem of Cretan Warfare

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Cretan warfare never neatly fit within the rigid definitions of the hoplite orthodoxy, and this probably explains why important investigations of Crete seem to have avoided exploring how Cretans practiced organized violence. Although violence is central to Willetts' arguments, he does not discuss the equipment or styles of fighting that are prevalent in our archaeological evidence. He argues that most of Crete was inhabited by Dorian Greeks by the eighth century and the political institutions of Cretan poleis were dedicated to maintaining "their military supremacy" over non-Dorians and other Dorian poleis.[172] Chaniotis foregrounded his arguments about Cretan poleis with the idea that they should be characterized by their strict social hierarchies, their communal meals, and the "dependence of the citizenship on military training."[173] For Chaniotis, war was the most important component of the Cretan economy, and, in some instances, the economy was simply an afterthought or a byproduct of military conflict.[174] He concludes that "the adequate economic system for such a social organization was a subsistence economy based on farming and animal husbandry."[175] In the same volume, Viviers further elaborates on Chaniotis' argument. He says that Chaniotis' conclusion "implies that the Cretan cities' hunger for land, reflected in the nearly

[169] Pritchett 1974, 221-225; Tritle 1989, 54-55.
[170] Konijnendijk 2018, 159.
[171] contra Lewis forthcoming, among many others.
[172] Willetts 1955, 250.
[173] Chaniotis 1999, 182.
[174] Chaniotis 1996, 170; 1999, 185.
[175] Chaniotis 1999, 182. This idea is also central to his later book on Hellenistic warfare, where he also seems to avoid discussing Cretan practices in detail (see Chaniotis 2005b).

permanent state of war in the island, was not only connected to the ideology of power or to the lack of arable land, but stemmed from the balance of the entire economic system – and of animal husbandry in particular."[176] However, the evidence does not support such a claim, as there is no evidence for conquest on the island until the third century.[177]

As discussed in chapter one, there is shockingly little epigraphic, literary, and archaeological evidence for "internecine conflict and interpolis warfare" on Crete before the fifth century.[178] To some degree, the traditional narrative derives from later Hellenistic sources. Many scholars have used third- and second-century material to discuss eighth- and seventh-century Crete – they assume that Cretan institutions did not change between the eighth and second centuries.[179] Chaniotis and Viviers, for example, cite the oath of the Drerian youth (IC I.9.1), which dates to the late third or early second century, when they argue that Cretan poleis had an institutionalized system of military training in the sixth and fifth centuries.[180] Fisher cites Aristotle, Polybius, Strabo, Pindar, Pausanias, and the Tylissos-Knossos-Argos treaty to claim that "small-scale wars, raiding and internal *stasis* in many of the Cretan cities were frequent in the Classical period."[181] He argues that the institutional framework of Cretan poleis "produced warrior citizens."[182] Prent refers to "later literary sources" without further elaboration to argue that miniature votives in the eighth and seventh centuries were tied to the military training of young citizen boys.[183] We can probably assume that she is referring to Plato, who describes comparable military training programs for his fictitious Cretan city in the *Laws*, a fourth century work (Pl. *Leg*. 8.794c-d).

For scholars like Prent, Fisher, Viviers, and Chaniotis, Cretan warfare is a major problem. They are sympathetic to the hoplite orthodoxy, but they also want to trust our literary sources. Thucydides and Xenophon both describe Cretan warriors as τοξόται, and Plato provides a geographic explanation for the Cretans' association with archery in book one of the *Laws* (Pl. *Leg*. 1.625c-d).[184] Hanson wrote that archers "were often men from the lower orders of society who could not afford their own body armor, or semi-Hellenized recruits from outlands like Crete."[185] Building on this idea, Morrow wrote that Crete was something of a backwater that "contributed very little to the development of Greek culture."[186] Proponents of the hoplite orthodoxy attempted the impossible task of trusting Thucydides, Xenophon, and Plato on the one

[176] Viviers 1999, 222.
[177] For further discussion of this phenomenon, see chapter one.
[178] Citing Haggis 2013, 82. See chapter one.
[179] Lewis (forthcoming) has made this argument most recently. See also Fisher 2017, 110-111.
[180] Chaniotis 1999, Viviers 1999.
[181] Fisher 2017, 107-109. Arist. *Pol*. 1269a.29–1269b.6, 1272b.7–22; Polyb. 4.53-544, 24.3; Strabo 10.4.11; Pind. *Ol*. 12; and Paus. 6.4.11. For the inscription. see Osborne and Rhodes 2017, no. 126. All of these texts will be discussed in detail below.
[182] Fisher 2017, 112.
[183] Prent 2005, 635.
[184] A detailed overview of the literary sources will be covered in chapter six. This passage from the *Laws* was quoted at the beginning of the chapter and will be discussed further below.
[185] Hanson 1989, 15.
[186] Morrow 1960, 17. See also Snodgrass 1967, 63-64; Vos 1963, 59; Whitely 2013, 411-412.

hand, and validating Willetts' model, which was based on Aristotle and Polybius, on the other. And this conflict has led to some rather problematic arguments.

Some archaeologists have recently acknowledged that Cretan "warfare may not have been of the standard hoplite type."[187] Kotsonas suggests that the drop in weapons in burials at the start of the seventh century might correspond with a large-scale increase in interpolis warfare.[188] Whitley argues that "inter-city wars in Crete were as endemic as they were in any other part of Greece" but "Cretan equipment lacks one crucial element – the shield."[189] He suggests that the Cretans practiced a more open style of warfare – an idea that has since become widely cited and quoted.[190]

Whitley builds his argument about the open style of Cretan warfare on two observations: closed-face helmets of the Cretan type do not typically have nose guards, and no shields have been found on Crete.[191] There are major problems with building an argument from these observations, most obviously because archaeologists have in fact discovered large quantities of shields on Crete.[192] Mitaki compiles a list of at least seventy-five shields from Crete,[193] and I have seventy-two votive miniature shields and thirty-six full-sized bronze shields in my database. Closed-face Cretan helmets may not have nose guards, but they had large visors and fitted cheek pieces that would have obstructed the bearer's peripheral vision (see figure 2.1). Moreover, they would have fully obstructed the bearer's hearing, making coordination immensely difficult if not impossible. Wooden shields do not survive archaeologically anywhere in Greece and, as Whitley himself admits, there are dozens and dozens of shields in Cretan art. My database further illustrates this point: although nine of our twelve literary sources that reference Cretan warriors in the Archaic and Classical periods describe them as τοξόται,[194] there is relatively little evidence for archery unless we count every arrowhead individually (see figure 2.2). If we count every arrowhead, then archery obviously dominates. Shields are much more consistent in our evidence and roughly split between the two popular shield types, the omphalos-type and the large round shield. Figure 2.2 presents the evidence for archery and shields in art, literature, epigraphy, and archaeology. We should interpret this data cautiously as most excavators did not consistently

[187] Whitley 2009, 284-285. I am quoting his 2009 paper, but Whitley actually established this idea in an earlier work. See Whitley 2001, 252.
[188] Kotsonas 2002, 55.
[189] Whitley 2009, 284-285.
[190] Whitley 2009, 285. Lewis (forthcoming) extends Whitley's argument into the Hellenistic period. Disagreeing with Craven's (2017) reconstruction of Cretan warriors in the Hellenistic period, Lewis argues that Cretan warriors practiced an open or Homeric style of warfare continuously from the late seventh century through to the first century. Lewis' argument is based primarily on Whitley 2009 and an incomplete survey of the evidence.
[191] Whitley 2009, 284-285.
[192] Whitley (2009, 284-285) says "no bronze shield has been traced to Crete," but this is just demonstrably incorrect.
[193] Mitaki 2003, 55. It is not entirely clear how she reaches this number, because she cites huge ranges of the old site reports. To reach this number, it seems clear to me that she must have included small votives as well as full-sized shields.
[194] These references will be discussed in chapter six. Sources that identify Cretans as τοξόται: Aristophanes, *Frogs*; Homer *Iliad*; Homer, *Odyssey*; Mnesimachos, *Philip*; Pindar *Pythian 5*; Plato, *Laws*; Thucydides; Xenophon, *Anabasis*; Xenophon, *Hellenika*. Sources that do not reference Cretans as τοξόται: Aristotle, *Politics*; Plato, *Protagoras*; Plato *Republic*.

publish all the arrowheads, all the shield miniatures, or the large quantities of amorphous bronze sheets that likely originally formed shields and body armor which were found alongside weapons and armor in urban sanctuaries. The graph in figure 2.2 captures a general trend and is not a quantitative snapshot of the real situation.

Figure 2.1 – A partially restored closed-face Cretan helmet from Aphrati (Metropolitan Museum in New York, no. 1989.281.50).



Figure 2.2 – The total counts of published evidence for archery and shields, both in art and real objects. Note that these numbers should not be considered absolute since many nineteenth- and twentieth-century archaeologists only published the diagnostic arrowheads and votive shield miniatures.[195]

Archery was certainly an important component of warriorhood for the Cretans, but the role of archery within Cretan warfare has probably been overstated. Traditionally, scholars have interpreted Cretan arrows as weapons of war first and hunting implements second – the opposite approach that scholars studying mainland Greece have adopted – due to the consistent references to Cretan warriors in Classical literature as τοξόται.[196] Bow hunting and warfare were certainly tied together, and Xenophon emphasizes the importance of hunting as a means to practice for war (Xen. *Cyr*. 1.6.28–29, 39-41). But he is clear that hunting benefits warriorhood, not the reverse. He encourages his readers to practice shooting a hare in order to become a great combatant, not to practice during combat to become a great hunter. This suggests that the same type of bow was used in both arenas, but the purpose of that bow was for hunting first and warfare second. On Crete, archaeological evidence, such as the appliques from Kato Syme (figure 2.3), seems to further illustrate that archery was fundamentally associated with hunting

[195] i.e., Halbherr (1888, 764) published only one type 1d arrowhead although he discovered a "considerevole numero" of arrowheads and spearheads. It is impossible to know whether he found only one 1d arrowhead or hundreds.

[196] cf. Hablherr 1901, 397-398 and Snodgrass 1967, 40, 81. Snodgrass (1967, 81) states that the Cretans perfected the "science of archery," but later admits that discovery of Cretan arrowheads at archaeological sites across the whole Greek world is too frequent, "perhaps, for it to indicate the presence of Cretan archers in every case." The approach to Cretan archery as evidence for warfare is occasionally justified with references to Artemis Toxsota and images of an armed Athena (IC 1935, 9), but this sort of religious iconography existed outside of Crete as well. We have not, for example, defined Spartan warriors based on their cults to Athena Promachos, Athena Chalkoikos, the Armored Aphrodite (see Flower 2018). Indeed, Spartans appear to have been directly discouraged from or even prosecuted for wearing bronze armor or fighting as *promachoi* (see van Wees 2018a, Lazenby 1985, and the example of Aristodemus of Sparta: Hdt. 9.71).

first. After the eighth century, there are no images of archers firing at humans or using bows in combat, but there are hundreds of depictions of archers or arrowheads with hunted animals.

Figure 2.3 – A bronze applique from Kato Syme (Louvre, no. MNC 689).

Most of the archaeological evidence for archery on Crete probably relates to hunting rather than organized violence. Figure 2.4 shows all the object types with evidence of archery on Crete. Arrowheads are by far the largest source, but we cannot reliably distinguish hunting and inter-personal arrowheads, if such a distinction even existed on Crete, without understanding the size and weight of the shaft of the arrow.[197] The weight of an arrow and the length of an arrowhead's cutting edge impacted an arrow's piercing ability. A hunting arrow that lodges into an animal staunches its bleeding and increases the likelihood that the animal will escape. Hunting arrows, therefore, probably sought to pass all the way through an animal to create a mortal wound. War arrows, on the other hand, were meant to intimidate and disrupt enemy formations.[198] They did not need to be heavy or to have extended cutting edges, and an arrow that lodged into a combatant would have likely removed that individual from the battlefield regardless. Moreover, smaller and denser arrowheads were more likely to penetrate bronze

[197] Kucewicz et al 2021.
[198] DeVries 1997, 463; Konijnendijk 2018, 102; Wheeler 2001, 181. See above.

armor,[199] and as discussed above, even unarmored individuals could usually survive a single arrow wound.[200] The cheapest arrowhead was ideal for organized violence, but hunting arrows had to achieve a certain level of penetration to be effective.



Figure 2.4 – All the types of archaeological evidence that relate to archery on Crete between the eighth and the fourth centuries.

The most common arrowhead on Crete is Snodgrass' type 1D.[201] Snodgrass also noticed this phenomenon and preemptively rejected the notion that it was a uniquely Cretan type, since it also appears around the ancient Mediterranean.[202] It was one of the widest and heaviest arrowheads in Greece with a large cutting edge, and most were made in bronze rather than iron. Of the various arrowhead types that Snodgrass identifies, the 1D type was probably the most expensive to produce.[203] It is our best candidate for a hunting arrowhead.[204] This arrowhead was also heavy enough to be mounted on a long-distance arrow,[205] but the Cretan τοξόται in the *Anabasis* were unprepared and unpracticed long-distance archers (Xen. Anab. 3.4.17).[206] The

[199] All the arrowhead types in the first half of the first millennium were cast or forged from bronze or iron (see Snodgrass 1964, 144). Stone and obsidian arrowheads are generally considered to have been a Bronze Age phenomenon. Admittedly, Snodgrass' typologies should probably be revisited. Several recent studies have shown, for example, that metalsmiths in the Bronze Age actually used arsenical copper and other copper alloys besides bronze for certain object types. So far as I know, there has never been an archaeometallurgical study of ancient arrowheads.
[200] Bill 1862, 386-389; Davis 2013, 9-10.
[201] Snodgrass 1964, 147; 1967, 40.
[202] Snodgrass 1967, 81.
[203] Snodgrass 1964, 147.
[204] Craven (2017, 111) also concluded that the Cretan arrowhead was designed for hunting rather than warfare.
[205] see Davis 2013.
[206] They had to practice shooting Persian arrowheads to try and match their distance. The threat of long-distance Persian archers inspired Xenophon to arm the Rhodians in his army with slings, side stepping archery altogether.

archaeological and literary evidence for archery on Crete seemingly misalign and present two different narratives, so we must approach the question of Cretan archery carefully.

Ultimately, the term τοξόται in Classical literature probably had more to say about the combatants' status than their preferred means of performing violence, as practicing archery was probably a leisure-class activity.[207] Recent reassessments of archery in ancient Greece have shown that the orthodox narrative – that archers were more cowardly and typically non-Greek – is incorrect.[208] Within the Homeric poems, the disdain that Diomedes espouses against archers after being struck in the foot by one of Paris' arrows is directly contradicted by Homer's praise of Teucer, Pandarus, and Odysseus (cf. Hom. *Il*. 11.384-395 and Hom. *Il*. 5.166-295, 11.266-335; *Od*. 21). As Davis notes, Diomedes suffers from his arrow wound for the rest of the poem, so despite his claim, Paris' arrow was effective.[209] After about 470, the Athenians relied on a group of enslaved Scythian archers as a sort of police force.[210] Scholars typically cite Pausanias in order to argue that archery was never practiced by Greeks at any point in antiquity (Paus. 1.23.4),[211] so the Athenians acquired the Scythians because they considered archery to be something only worthy of slaves and foreigners.[212] The basis for this argument is Attic vase painting,[213] but more recent studies have shown that the Scythian outfit in painted pottery has nothing to do with cultural identity or Scythian heritage.[214] There are numerous depictions of Paris and Herakles, for example, in Scythian outfits and carrying bows.[215] Instead of an indication of otherness, the outfit seems to indicate that Paris and Herakles were skilled archers using sophisticated equipment – Scythianness was an artistic device to emphasize skill or expertise.[216] In all of the Athenian evidence for archery, the archers are highly trained warriors dedicated to martial arts. Scholars have simply misattributed their weapons to their contextual status as secondary characters.[217] Within the context of the amateur-hoplite narrative, this phenomenon has added weight, as the primary focus of Athenian military thought in the fifth century was an untrained and minimally equipped warrior.

I will argue in part two of this dissertation that Cretan warfare was dominated by wealthy elites as it was a means to control membership within elite groups. It was an ideological tool that certain individuals utilized to perform, achieve, or invest in their eliteness. As we shall see, the paraphernalia of violence, including the arrowheads, were strategically displayed in certain archaeological contexts to advertise and confirm elite status and masculinity. When these warrior

[207] Brouwers 2010, 227.
[208] cf. Hanson 1989, 15 and Kucewicz et al. 2021.
[209] Davis 2013, 3.
[210] Plassart 1913, 115; Bäbler 2005, 118; Ismard 2017, 44-45.
[211] Pausanias' observation is not supported by any other sources, see Frazer 1965, 277.
[212] Vos 1963, 59.
[213] See Vos 1963.
[214] Ivantchik 2006, Davis 2013.
[215] Ivantchik 2006, 203-208.
[216] Davis 2013. Davis (2013, 210) argues that the Scythians in Attic art "are not depicted as archers because they are Scythian," but rather "they are depicted as Scythian because they are archers."
[217] Brouwers 2010, 227.

aristocrats fought alongside Athenians and Spartans in the late fifth century, they looked very different from the standard amateur hoplite and also fought in a different style.
On the question of Cretan warriorhood and organized violence, scholars have approached the archaeological and historical evidence with the wrong definition of τοξόται in mind. Yes, archery was important to the Cretans, but they probably thought of these weapons as symbols of their status rather than markers of their place and role on ancient Greek battlefields. In other words, the problem of Cretan warfare is ultimately a problem created by our literary sources and a desire on the part of researchers, both subconscious and conscious, to prove them accurate. This approach to our literary sources has faced serious criticism in the last thirty years, and some scholars have even advocated for ignoring our literary evidence altogether.

2.3 – Deciphering the Cretan Mirage, *la communauté crétoise*, and the Perlman-Link Debate

The study of ancient Crete is split between two disciplines that infrequently interact: ancient history and archaeology.[218] Archaeologists are interested in burial evidence and the ceramic chronology, while ancient historians are applying new theoretical models, like game theory, to predict and make sense of gaps in the literary and epigraphic records.[219] Attempts have been made to repair this fissure, but none have had much success. The conflict ultimately stems from a series of articles written in the 1990s and 2000s by Paula Perlman and Stephen Link that discuss the reliability of the literary texts for our reconstruction of pre-Hellenistic Crete.

Our literary evidence for Archaic and Classical Crete describes the numerous poleis across the island as politically homogeneous with a single pan-Cretan institutional framework. In Plato's *Laws*, Kleinias, a Knossian, speaks for all Cretans just as Megillus speaks for all Spartans (Pl. *Leg.* 3.702c). Aristotle, similarly, discusses what he calls the Cretan πολιτεία as if it were a single recognizable system that was used across the whole island and compares the Cretan political system to that of the Lakedaimonians (Arist. *Pol.* 2.1269a, 1271b). According to Aristotle, the Cretan constitution was headed by a board of *kosmoi*, but only specific elite families could serve in these government positions (Arist. *Pol.* 2.1272a). These aristocratic families were constantly vying with each other, so the Cretan constitution was a fragile political system which was always dangerously close to dissolution and civil war (Arist. *Pol.* 2.1272b). Conflicts between Cretan poleis were resolved by the aristocratic class to preserve the socio-political status quo, and the institutions of the polis reflected these rigid political and economic balancing acts (Arist. *Pol.* 2.1269b, 1272b). Aristotle claimed that Cretan poleis controlled large numbers of dependent people within rigid social hierarchies (Arist. *Pol.* 2.1271b-72a), fed their populations with regular state-funded *syssitia* (Arist. *Pol.* 2.1272a), and oriented their laws

[218] This was the topic of a joint AIA/SCS panel entitled *Bridging the "Gap": Interdisciplinary Approaches to the Cretan polis in the Archaic and Classical Periods* that I hosted alongside Grace Erny and Dominic Pollard.
[219] cf. Erickson 2010, Rabinowitz 2014, Erny 2022 in archaeology and Meister and Seelentag 2020, Ober 2022, Seelentag 2020 in ancient history.

around preparing and maintaining their military (Arist. *Pol.* 7.1324b). Aristotle's description of Crete is dramatically different from Plato's in some key points. Plato describes Crete as politically diverse (Pl. *Leg*. 1.624a-625a, 629c, 636e; 3.712e), denies that *stasis* was common on Crete (Pl. *Leg*. 1.628a-e), and argues against the notion that Cretan laws were oriented around war (Pl. *Leg*. 1.630e, 632e).[220] Aristotle says that the fragility of the Cretan's political system only began to become apparent in his own day, when Cretans became involved in foreign wars (Arist. *Pol.* 2.1272b). Disagreeing with Plato, he implies that civil war and civil conflict were common concerns on the island, but inter-state warfare was not present until ξενικοί πόλεμοι came to Crete.[221]

Perlman first began to challenge the Aristotelean model in 1992. She argues that Aristotle and his contemporaries had no first-hand experience of the island so they "invented the idea of the Cretan πολιτεία."[222] She also observes that Willetts fully embraced Aristotle's comparison between Crete and Sparta (Arist. *Pol.* 2.1271b), to the extent that he used Spartan institutions to explain the less well-attested Cretan laws and practices.[223] Our understanding of Spartan society has changed dramatically since the middle of the twentieth century. Regardless of whether scholars choose to accept Aristotle's description, recent reevaluations of Spartan *syssitia*, politics, and helotage independently call for a revision of Willetts' model for Crete.[224]

For Perlman, the Cretan πολιτεία was a missing link between the poleis on Crete and our Athenian sources.[225] It was the political system of Minos rather than the Cretans – an imagined or mythologized Crete rather than a real political system.[226] She defines the traditional interpretation of a single Cretan πολιτεία that held true for the entire island as the "unitarian view" and frequently references it by citing van Effenterre, who argued that our literary sources describe Cretans operating like a single political body, *la communauté crétoise*. Building on *la communauté crétoise*, Chaniotis, Viviers, Pasek, and Stefanakis argued that a Cretan *koinon* began to emerge in the fifth century despite the abundant epigraphic, numismatic, and archaeological evidence that speaks to the contrary.[227]

Link agrees that Plato, Aristotle, and Ephorus, as preserved by Strabo, probably reference a single shared source, but he argues that this now-lost source was just one of several reliable

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[220] As far as I know, no one has closely analyzed, or even noticed, the discrepancies between Plato and Aristotle.
[221] It is possible to read the referenced passage (Arist. *Pol.* 2.1272b) in such a way as to argue that Aristotle saw a distinction between πόλεμοι and ξενικοί πόλεμοι – that Cretan and non-Cretan warfare were two different phenomena. But this narrow interpretation of the text requires a substantial leap in interpretation. It is not impossible, but highly unlikely.
[222] Perlman 1992, 204.
[223] Perlman 1996, 237.
[224] For syssitia, see van Wees 2018b; for Spartan politics, see Ducat 2018, Hodkinson 2000, Millender 2018, van Wees 2018a; for helotage, see Figueira 2018, Hodkinson 2003, Luraghi 2008. This is just a small sample of recent work that directly challenges Willetts' reconstruction of ancient Sparta. In many ways, both Link (1994) and Seelentag (2015) attempt to redo Willetts' book. I will address these important contributions in subsequent chapters, including the problems raised by their disregard for the archaeological evidence (see, in particular, Seelentag 2015, 21).
[225] Perlman 2005, 287.
[226] Perlman 2005, 284.
[227] Chaniotis 2015; Pasek 2014, 76-87; Stefanakis 1999; Viviers 1999, 230-231.

sources at the disposal of these writers.[228] He insists that the Cretan πολιτεία must have included the historical Cretan poleis themselves as there are too many similarities between our literary evidence and the epigraphic and archaeological records to be a coincidence. Yet this is a circular argument: most of the archaeological and epigraphic evidence was published before Perlman's 1992 article, so much of this evidence supports the narrative present within our literary sources because that was already the established academic consensus in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As epigraphists and archaeologists reassess the evidence, the academic divide between Link and Perlman continues to widen.

Archaeologists now tend to side with Perlman, while historians tend to agree with Link and rely heavily on the literary sources.[229] I advocate a middle-ground position. Perlman and Link both make impactful arguments, and I suggest that the sources utilized by Plato, Aristotle, and Ephorus, among others, were the Cretan warriors themselves who fought and lived alongside the Athenians and Spartans in the late fifth and early fourth centuries.

Cretan warriors fought alongside the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War. They fought with them in 429 outside Kydonia (Thuc. 2.85), and they joined the Athenians in the Sicilian expedition from 415 to 413 (Thuc. 6.25, 6.43, 7.57). Cretans fought for Cyrus alongside Athenians, Spartans, and others between 401 and 399 (Xen. *Anab*. 1.2.9, 3.3.7, 3.4.17, 4.2.28, 5.2.29-32). Between 394 and 362, Cretans were regularly fighting and living alongside the Spartans in the Peloponnese (Xen. *Hell*. 4.2.16, 4.7.6, 7.5.10).[230] The surviving ancient authors encountered Cretan warriors as both enemies and allies throughout their lives, and many of the stories about the political and social institutions of Crete probably originated from interactions with these warriors. These interactions created something of a mirage, a τοξόται mirage.[231] I will argue in chapter six that these warriors practiced what I am calling wealth-accumulation warfare – an ideological approach to organized violence that characterized war booty as a means to express social and political belonging. I believe that Plato's references to Crete confront and problematize a series of stereotypes that developed locally, in Athens, surrounding these foreign warriors; that Aristotle's writings are reacting to Plato's claims to create a single Cretan paradigm that embraced the stereotypes; and that Ephorus' fragmentary accounts pertain to elite ritual practices within the military camps of Cretan warrior elites.[232]

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[228] Link 2008, 470-471.

[229] Gaignerot-Driessen (2014, 18) wrote that "an archaeological approach free from Aristotle's account would be the way forward to reconsider *polis* formation and transformation on Crete." Within the study of Cretan warfare, Craven (2017) takes Perlman's position and largely sets aside the literary sources, while Lewis (forthcoming) accepts Link's argument and centers his argument around literary references.

[230] All of these references are essential for my argument in chapter six. I discuss each of them in detail below.

[231] I use the term mirage here with great intention. Whitley (2009, 274) wrote that "just as there is a Spartan mirage, an optical illusion of Spartan austerity diffracted through Athenian idealization, antiquarianism, and disdain, so a fog of ancient misconception hangs over archaic Crete."

[232] In what follows, Ephorus will receive the least attention. This is due to the extremely fragmentary nature of his writing and complex problems related to his work. He is only preserved by Strabo. Willetts (1955, 17) assumes that since Strabo's description of Cretan education aligns so closely with Plato's description in the *Laws*, they must have been an "unchanged institution" that survived over four centuries. But Plato is describing his fictional colony, not Crete itself. Morrow (1960, 22-23) argues that Ephorus was actually commenting on Plato's Crete, not the real Crete. Ephorus was probably adapting what he had experienced of Cretan warriorhood with his own reactions to

Two of Plato's works discuss Cretan laws and institutions: *Minos* and *Laws*. In the *Minos*, Socrates and an unnamed companion define law – the first words of the dialogue are ὁ νόμος ἡμῖν τί ἐστιν; – and then Socrates presents an encomium of King Minos. The *Minos* was probably an introduction to the *Laws*,[233] and indeed Socrates' unnamed companion in the *Minos* could be the unnamed Athenian in the *Laws*. For Perlman, the *Minos* frames the Crete of the *Laws* within a mythical setting: Plato's Crete is the land of Minos.[234] This is probably correct, but we should not overlook the fact that Plato could have set his dialogue anywhere in the Greek world. As Hutchinson observes, the interlocutors of the *Laws* are traveling from Knossos, the mythical capital city of Minos' empire (Hdt. 3.122), to Ida, the great sanctuary of Zeus where Minos met with Zeus every ninth year to discuss law (Pl. *Leg*. 1.624b-625b).[235] The *Minos* establishes laws as human constructs that are both real and imagined as well as both true and false.[236] They both reflect the community and prescribe new communal practices. This understanding of νόμος and its connection to Crete are surely intentional, and Plato appears to be playing with his audiences' expectations and assumptions. Minos, for Athenians, is a villain from the tragedies and not a lawgiver, so Socrates must confront the consensus about the mythical king of the Cretans and prescribe a new mindset (Pl. *Minos* 318d-321d). In the voice of Socrates, the criticism of the theater's ability to create false narratives is particularly poignant as Plato has him make similar criticisms of Aristophanes' *Clouds* in his defense speech (Pl. *Minos* 320e; Pl. *Ap.* 18b-d).

Luraghi once observed that "Plato is not misinformed, he is misleading."[237] In the *Laws*, Plato is confronting his audiences' stereotypes, critically examining them, and then prescribing a new way of thinking. In his recent book, Ober argues that Plato, like other philosophic writers in the fifth and fourth centuries, engages with a folk-theory of rational thought which had, by the Classical period, become a generally accepted convention or stereotype that explained how individuals and communities acted.[238] Ober uses several scenes in Plato's *Republic* to illustrate his point, and in every case, Plato first presents his readers with a folk-theory and then proceeds to test and deconstruct that folk-theory through responses from Socrates or another interlocutor.[239] The best example of this pattern in the *Laws* was quoted at the top of this chapter – Kleinias says that Cretan customs are easy for everyone to understand, παντὶ ῥᾴδιον ὑπολαβεῖν εἶναι τά γε ἡμέτερα, since the Cretan countryside is not a plain like that of the Thessalians, τὴν

Plato's fictional Crete, blurring, perhaps intentionally, the line between the Cretan warriors' Crete and the Platonic Crete – the real Crete and the imagined Crete.

[233] Morrow 1960, 37. However, it is worth noting that the authenticity of the *Minos* is a longstanding debate.

[234] She does not discuss the *Minos*, but she does make this claim for Plato's and Aristotle's works more generally (Perlman 2005, 284).

[235] Hutchinson 1997, 1307.

[236] Hutchinson 1997, 1307-1308.

[237] Luraghi 2008, 180.

[238] Ober 2022, 9-10. Ober defines this folk-theory and illustrates how it influenced early Classical thinkers. For my purposes, the substance of the folk theory is secondary to the important observation that a folk theory existed at all. If Plato and Aristotle assumed that their readers already subscribed to these theories, then the structure and content of their prose must reflect their expectations.

[239] See Ober 2022.

γὰρ τῆς χώρας πάσης Κρήτης φύσιν ὁρᾶτε ὡς οὐκ ἔστι, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν Θετταλῶν, πεδιάς, but rugged mountains (Pl. *Leg*. 625c-e). Kleinias says that the Cretans must use light weapons like bows and run around on foot because the geography demands it – to borrow Ober's terminology, Kleinias adopts a "Conventionalist variant of the folk theory" in which *nomos* and *phusis*, human customs and natural laws, align.[240] Cretans choose to fight as archers because their island is naturally more conducive to archery. But the Athenian does not accept this geographically deterministic explanation and spends the rest of book one dismantling it (Pl. *Leg*. 1.632e-634d). For the Athenian, the Cretans run up hillsides and practice archery because these are difficult tasks that take leisure and practice. The Cretan and Spartan πολιτεῖαι are not designed to create the best warriors but rather to encourage ἀρετή (Pl. *Leg*. 1.630e, 632e), a subtle but vital distinction.[241]

Kleinias' geographically deterministic summary of Crete is probably an Athenian folk-theory about Cretans based on their experiences of Cretan elites and Cretan warriors. Cretans, it seems, did not participate very frequently in the Olympic games but the most famous Cretan athlete was Ergoteles, a runner, who won multiple times (Paus. 6.4.11).[242] In 384, a Cretan named Sotades won the long-distance race (Paus. 6.18.6). These are the only Cretan athletes mentioned by Pausanias, and they were both famous runners. Thucydides and Xenophon consistently describe Cretan τοξόται as highly disciplined and reliable *epilektoi* capable of achieving specific tasks on the battlefield (Thuc. 6.25, 6.43; Xen. *Anab.* 3.3.7, 3.4.17, 4.2.28, 5.2.29-32; Xen. *Hell*. 4.2.16, 4.7.6).[243] Already by the time of Plato's writings, Crete had developed a reputation as the land of skilled runners and aristocratic warrior archers in the same way that Minos had become known in Athens as a mythical villain of the theater.

Morrow argues that Plato had "taken pains to inform himself" about the physical landscape and social practices of Crete,[244] but this seems unlikely. Plato clearly knows more about Sparta than Crete (Pl. Leg. 3.712c-e). The whole notion that three older men could walk from Knossos to the Ithaio Adro in a single day at a leisurly pace with regular breaks is unbelievable.[245] It is possible that Plato never set foot on Crete and instead built his perception of the island based on interviews and interactions with Cretan warriors. His version of Crete, therefore, might better reflect how aristocratic Cretans thought of their own poleis, rather than the institutional functioning of the poleis themselves. Plato's Cretans are warrior aristocrats and

[240] Ober 2022, 26.
[241] Hodkinson (2006, 125) reaches the same conclusion about the *Laws*, although he is primarily concerned with Plato's' description of the Spartan polis.
[242] Pindar implies that Ergoteles participated in the Olympics only because he was an exile living in Himera and that he would not have participated if he still lived in Knossos (Pindar *O*. 12).
[243] All of these references will be discussed in further detail in chapter six.
[244] Morrow 1960, 30.
[245] Today, this hike would take approximately twelve hours without breaks. Regular breaks are essential, however, because the hike ascends approximately 1500 meters. If their goal was the Diktaion Adron, as some scholars have suggested, the hike would take about ten and a half hours and ascend 1000 meters. This raises the question that I alluded to above in my discussion of the *Minos*: does Plato expect us to know that this journey was unreal and imaginary from the outset?

the products of Athenian stereotypes; as such their perspectives on aristocratic institutions are so heavily warped so as to be incomparable with the actual archaeological and epigraphic evidence.

Perlman has stressed repeatedly, most recently alongside Gagarin, that the Platonic and Aristotelean models of Crete have little in common with our extensive collection of Cretan laws.[246] Regarding Plato specifically, Griffith pointed out that he makes no mention of the Cretans' extensive epigraphic tradition even though this surely would have been an important component of founding a new Cretan city.[247] But Cretan laws also very infrequently mention the Cretan *andreion*, or *syssitia*,[248] which Plato, Aristotle, and Ephorus each discuss at length (Pl. *Leg*. 6.780e, 8.839d, 8.847c; Arist. *Pol.* 2.1272a; Strabo 10.4.11). If Plato's and Aristotle's Cretan πολιτεία are expressions of the cultural νόμοι of warrior elites, then this discrepancy makes sense: the literary sources present the views of individuals specifically operating outside the jurisdiction of the Cretan laws, who were more concerned with cultural and ideological νόμοι than legal νόμοι.

As we shall see in chapter six, the ideology of violence prevalent in the fifth and fourth centuries, what I call wealth-accumulation warfare, incorporated important aspects of earlier Cretan ideologies of violence. One of these, which we find in extra-urban contexts, emphasized a pan-Cretan *koine* that framed warriorhood in extremely broad terms in order to promote egalitarianism between elites across political boundaries. In chapter four, we will see that these warriors even lacked human anatomy, and this ideology projected warriorhood as a one-sized-fits-all identity. I will argue in the same chapter that Cretan warriors had to navigate this egalitarian ideology simultaneously with the more individualistic and competitive ideology that dominated urban contexts. However, the extra-urban egalitarian ideology might explain why Aristotle describes Crete as a single homogenous system – Aristotle has conflated elite institutions at regional sanctuaries with elite institutions at urban sanctuaries. For a Cretan operating within this ideological arena, this dichotomy made sense, but it may not have for fourth-century Athenians who grew up within the Attic system.

The literary sources present a different, and highly biased, perspective of ancient Crete. Archaeology and epigraphy reveal to us what was actually happening in ancient Cretan communities, while Plato, Aristotle, and Ephorus present imagined idealisms described through the perspective of warrior elites. Aspects of the latter seem to have some truth – Plato, for example, seems to be aware that Crete was politically diverse (Pl. *Leg*. 1.624a-625a, 629c, 636e; 3.712e) – but it is probably impossible to reconcile fully the two sides of the Perlman-Link debate. To some degree, the literary texts, archaeology, and epigraphy will always misalign since they probably reveal different institutions and practices within the ancient Cretan poleis. For this study, however, all sources of evidence are vital as both the real experiences of Cretans and the imagined experiences of Cretans fighting beside the Athenians and Spartans have something valuable to say about the role of violence on Crete.

[246] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 16, 117, 122.
[247] Griffith 2016, 4.
[248] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 5, 93-95.

By assembling all of the evidence for Cretan violence, this study attempts to reconstruct how Cretan combatants, warriors, and poleis approached organized violence. Due to the incomplete nature of this evidence, we are left with a patchwork of conclusions. Part two of this project presents three distinct ideologies of violence that seem to have existed in different spaces. The consistent theme between them, however, is that Cretan warfare was fundamentally related to the experiences and identities of elites.

Chapter 3 – The Database for Violence on Crete

As discussed in the previous chapter, most scholars who have approached the question of violence on Crete inevitably find themselves working with only a portion of the evidence. This phenomenon is due in part to the disagreement over the value of later literary sources for our understanding of Cretan poleis, exemplified by the Perlman-Link debate,[1] but it is also a consequence of the fact that the evidence is spread across dozens of publications that range in date from the late nineteenth century to the present day. Moreover, the evidence for violence spans multiple disparate fields such as ancient history, archaeology, art history, epigraphy, philology, and philosophy. To confront and manage all the evidence for violence on Crete, I have created and utilized a database. Each entry represents a piece of evidence for violence, and each piece of evidence is linked to any relevant Google, Pleiades, or online museum catalog pages. Although this sort of linked open data study should, in theory, reduce the influence of creator bias, it is impossible to remove bias completely. And it is also impossible to predict how this data might be useful for future studies.[2] To address some of these concerns, I attempted to record as much metadata as possible for each entry. In addition to these objective data, I included a controlled vocabulary for ancient warfare, or tags, that test the likelihood of each type of organized violence discussed in chapter two. There are additional tags to measure specific questions about the evidence, and future studies are invited to create additional tags.

Each archaeological, epigraphic, and literary reference to Cretan warfare has been given only a single entry in my database. This includes literary sources or objects with multiple references to Cretan warfare – like a Cretan helmet with artistic depictions of hoplites. Multiple entries for a single object would have skewed database analyses. However, this methodology strips the argumentative weight of each entry – one entry with little historical value and another with immense value appear side by side in my database, as if they are equivalent.[3]

In many instances, archaeologists and conservators have altered objects based on how they envision that object looked originally. This is especially true for mitrai that were discovered before the middle of the twentieth century: in almost every museum, mitrai from these eras have been mounted onto plaster thereby warping the original curvature of the metal. In other cases, scholars have reconstructed damaged objects based on their similarities to other objects and, in the process, inferred the original presence of material that could be relevant to this sort of study. Figure 3.1, for example, is the Fortetsa belt, a famous golden applique from Knossos. In the central scene, six archers face outwards from a building aiming their weapons at oncoming

[1] See chapter two.
[2] As emphasized by Gonzalez-Perez (2018, 20).
[3] I discussed this issue above in chapter one.

chariots. A stone plaque from Kydonia has a comparable scene (figure 3.2): four warriors face outwards from a building and an oncoming chariot approaches from the right. Every major discussion of the Kydonian plaque assumes that the warriors depicted on the stone are archers since it is so similar to the image on the Fortetsa belt.[4] However, the Fortetsa belt dates to the ninth century and the Kydonia plaque dates to the seventh century.[5] Although I will discuss the Kydonian plaque in my discussion of the Cretan hoplite in chapter four, my database does not include it as evidence of archery as the bows are not actually preserved.

Figure 3.1 – The Fortetsa belt.[6]



Figure 3.2 – A stone plaque from Kydonia (Chania Museum, no. 92).

In this case, I find it likely that the Kydonian plaque did indeed include archers originally, but other examples illustrate how our assumptions can warp the data. As will be discussed at length in chapter four, Prent claims that there are a considerable number of mold-made warrior figurines across Crete in the seventh century, but she does not provide a citation to support this claim.[7] In a section about mold-made plaques and figurines, she groups and then conflates "warriors and generic youths."[8] There is clearly much more evidence for the latter than

[4] Blome 1982, 7; Boardman 1991, 11; Rolley 1994, 123-125; D'Acunto 2013.
[5] D'Acunto 2013; Rolley 1994 123-125.
[6] See D'Acunto 2013. This piece is on display at the Heraklion Museum.
[7] Prent 2005, 423.
[8] Prent 2005, 415.

the former. Numerous plaques include warriors, but when she turns to figurines, she cites the upper portion of a figurine from Gortyn (see figure 3.3).[9] The Gortynian figurine has no clear indication of warriorhood. Indeed, many male figures in Cretan art have been described as warriors despite the absence of any clear indication to support this assessment.[10] For these reasons, I decided to err on the side of caution and only included and tagged evidence that directly depicts or was used for violence, in any form. Objects that merely allude to violence, or required some level of assumption, have been excluded from this dissertation.[11]

Figure 3.3 – A figurine from Gortyn that is sometimes described as a warrior.[12]

In some cases, one entry represents an unknown number of archaeological objects. The excavators at Ida, for example, only published one of each type of arrowhead.[13] At Gortyn, Levi only published images for fourteen diagnostic votive miniature shields, but Prent reports that Levi actually discovered "several hundreds."[14] The Heraklion Museum displays four of the votives that Levi published and an additional six miniatures that were part of this same collection but were not included among the diagnostic fourteen. In other words, my database has twenty votive shields from Gortyn, fourteen from Levi's publication and six from the Heraklion Museum. This patchwork publication practice, which occurred again and again at sites across Crete, further deflates the value of numerical comparisons.[15] Throughout this project, I have been explicit when I know that my results and theories involve incomplete data.

My database was created and managed using FileMaker Pro 18. Since it was saved and stored as a CSV, I did not use commas in any descriptive fields. I analyzed my data using

[9] Prent 2005, 415.
[10] The Lato excavations in the 1920s are a good example of this practice: they typically describe every vaguely male figurine as a warrior. See Demargne 1929.
[11] In many cases, they have been included in the database but not tagged. None of these entries were included in the statistical analyses that I present in this project.
[12] For the original publication, see Rizza and Santa Maria Scrinari 1968.
[13] Halbherr 1888, 764. This issue was mentioned above in chapter two.
[14] Levi 1955-6, 224-261; Prent 2005, 269.
[15] As discussed in chapter one.

predictive modelling, R-Studio, and Microsoft Excel. As stated in chapter one, network analysis visualizations were created with Gephi, version 0.9.2.

The database for violence on Crete has 948 rows and 70 columns. Each row is an entry. Nineteen columns are metadata and the other fifty-one are tags, a tag's associated confidence coefficient, and a final descriptive field for justification of those tags. The metadata records quantitative data about each entry. The metadata columns are a unique identification number for each entry, the type of object being recorded, all bibliographic information, a description of the entry, the absolute chronology, the relative chronology, the material, the measurements or dimensions of the entry, its weight, the archaeological context of the entry, its geographic origin, the Pleiades ID associated with that location, the entry's current location, its museum number, a URL to that museum page, a Google image link, an image of the entry,[16] a drawing, and notes regarding future study of that entry.

The tags represent different types of warfare which scholars have proposed for ancient Crete or ancient Greece more generally, as well as qualitative observations about each entry. They are intended to answer specific questions about the data, and each tag has an associated confidence coefficient. This number, out of three, represents my confidence that the entry does indeed support the associated observation. A one indicates low confidence, a two represents moderate confidence, and a three represents high confidence. If the tag was not attributed to an entry, then the confidence coefficient was left blank. In other words, tags function as presence or absence indicators – I do not provide a confidence coefficient if I do not detect evidence for a tag and only indicate my confidence where I have determined that the entry supports the existence of that particular tag. I did not use any zeros in the database because some CSV conversions might represent the absence of a number as a zero. The tag columns are quality, preservation, true usage or reliability as evidence for real organized violence, working-class hoplites, leisure-class hoplites, cavalry, psiloi, attendants, mercenaries, mounted hoplites, epilektoi, archers, orthodox hoplites, mobility restrictions, auditory restrictions, visual restrictions, evidence of repair, evidence of ancient damage or use, evidence for large round shields, small omphalos shields, single combat, group combat or combined arms warfare, segregation of warriors based on weapon types, open-face helmets, and closed-face helmets. All of these columns will be explained in the following sections.

3.1 – Metadata

I: Unique Identification Number

Every entry has a unique identification number. Several entries are nearly, if not outright, identical due to the fact that they were published together. The unique identification number ensures that each entry is unique and can be counted separately.

[16] Unfortunately, images and drawings are only available in the FileMaker version and do not convert to the CSV format.

Although there are 947 entries, the highest unique number is 1022. This resulted from the fact that I inadvertently created numerous duplicates over the course of this project as many authors mention objects without citing them completely. Many museum numbers appear to have changed since Kunze's 1931 study of Cretan shields, for example. Moreover, many of Kunze's more fragmentary pieces have disappeared. In some cases, they were probably attached to larger shields or combined in order to reconstruct a single shield. Unfortunately, most museums that I visited did not have detailed legacy data recording when or how this process occurred. But Kunze's shields were not the only issue. Hoffman reported that there are "a pair of undecorated helmets from Delphi,"[17] citing Perdrizet.[18] Perdrizet published two images of one helmet and numbered it 493 and 493a, attempting, it seems, to capture how the helmet changed in conservation. This became clear to me when I visited the Delphi Museum in 2022: there is only one 493.[19] Despite the prestige and importance of the Cretan arms and armor, their cataloging and referencing has been remarkably inconsistent over the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries. It is probably true that several duplicates remain in my database – the database is meant to be a fluid and adaptable resource, so this outline is probably already out-of-date by the time you are reading it.[20]

II: Entry Type

There are twenty-seven total entry types in my database: an ankle guard, appliques, arrowheads, ax heads, a bow tip, buildings, coins, corslets, figurines, firedogs, friezes, greaves, helmets, inscriptions, mitrai, painted or relief pottery, plaques, a sculpture, shields, sling bullets, spearheads, a stamp, stelai, swords, texts, a tripod stand, and votive miniatures. Table 3.1 presents the counts and percentages of each entry in my database that are relevant from the eighth to fourth century.[21] I included Early Iron Age and Hellenistic objects in my database, in part, because I find the traditional dating conventions unreliable and expect the Cretan ceramic chronologies to be updated soon.

[17] Hoffman 1972, 22.
[18] Perdrizet 1908, 99, nos. 493 and 493a. He also cites "Kunze 61 ff, nos. 9-10, figs. 29-30," but I investigated everything of Kunze's that he references and could not track down this citation. Kunze and Heilmeyer (1972, 61-63) discuss Cretan typologies and mention that there are some on the mainland, but this discussion does not have any associated object numbers or figures.
[19] Delphi Museum, no. 3097. It also became clear that this helmet is not Cretan; it is far too heavy and unlike any other Cretan examples in thickness and design. It remains in my database as an untagged entry, and it was not included in any of the statistical analyses presented in this project.
[20] Up-to-date copies of the database are currently stored on multiple hard drives in my possession, on Google Drive, and on computers at the University of California, Berkeley. Please contact me for access: jesobert@berkeley.edu.
[21] See above regarding the problems with quantification. See chapter one regarding the problematic dating of Cretan artefacts.

Row Labels	Count of Type	Percentage
Votive Miniature	111	19.27
Spearhead	99	17.19
Arrowhead	71	12.33
Mitra	46	7.99
Sword	36	6.25
Shield	33	5.73
Plaque	23	3.99
Pottery	18	3.13
Inscription	18	3.13
Coin	16	2.78
Stele	16	2.78
Helmet	16	2.78
Applique	16	2.78
Corslet	14	2.43
Text	13	2.26
Building	10	1.74
Figurine	8	1.39
Greave	3	0.52
Frieze	3	0.52
Sling Bullet	1	0.17
Ankle Guard	1	0.17
Tripod Stand	1	0.17
Firedogs	1	0.17
Bow	1	0.17
Sculpture	1	0.17

Table 3.1 – Statistics for entry types between the eighth and fourth centuries.

The database includes literary texts and inscriptions, but these entries were always removed before any statistical analyses. Including these types of evidence means that the database can be fully comprehensive. It is a database with all evidence for organized violence on Crete in a single location, so it is a reference tool as much as it is a means to study violence.

By assigning entries a type, however, I have introduced bias and imposed my own perspective. When I describe a sheet of bronze as a corslet rather than an applique, I make a basic assumption about the purpose and use of that bronze. In most cases, my type identifications

follow a specific author. The main exception to this rule is omphalos-type shields and miniature votive shields, for which there remains an open debate.

Englezou persuasively argues that round and highly decorated terracotta discs make more sense as lids of other highly decorated vessels than as miniature votive shields.[22] Building on this idea, Stampolidis and others have argued that many full-sized omphalos-type shields were probably lids to even larger bronze cauldrons rather than real shields.[23] In part, this argument is rooted in the observation that no other armor pieces have appeared at extra-urban sanctuaries, and the most popular dedications to these contexts were full-sized omphalos-type shields and bronze cauldrons.[24] They may indeed have been associated or used together. This is an important point, but omphalos-type shields remain remarkably under-studied and under-published. Both bronze cauldrons and omphalos-type shields also appear in urban contexts alongside real armor, but they do not always appear together. This discussion is heavily skewed because the omphalos-type shields in extra-urban sanctuaries have been published and discussed extensively and most of the omphalos-type shields in urban contexts have been overlooked.[25] Xanthoudides, for example, claimed to find fragments of an omphalos-type shield at Dreros, but he did not publish these fragments and there are boxes of bronze sheets from the western acropolis that have never been published.[26] Bosanquet reports to have found fragments of a shield on Altar Hill at Praisos.[27] Benton dated all the Praisos bronzes to the seventh century – when Altar Hill transitioned from an extra-urban to an urban sanctuary – but some scholars think they are earlier.[28] The excavators at Azoria found a boss of an omphalos-type shield, and indeed this part of the shield is preserved in various urban spaces across the island.[29] While many of the miniature shields are probably lids, they are clearly associated with other armor votives or in spaces with real omphalos-type shields. Therefore, I have included all the objects that were published as shields, since this problem requires a more detailed investigation that is not possible here. If discs were published as miniature shields, then they are described as such in my database. Both miniature shields and discs fall under the Votive Miniature type.

Sakellarakis and Sapouna-Sakellarakis argue that the omphalos-type shields are ritual objects, rather than real evidence of violence.[30] This argument will be discussed below in the section regarding shield tags, but I ultimately think the constructed purpose of a shield, as a votive or as a tool, is peripheral to its ideological power as a symbol of violence. Both votive shields and real shields speak to the ways in which the culture that produced these objects thought about and performed organized violence.

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[22] Englezou 2011.
[23] Stampolidis 2011, 411.
[24] Stampolidis 2011, 411.
[25] Prent 2005, 368-383.
[26] Prent 2005, 284; Xanthoudides 1918, 28. I ultimately never had an opportunity to view the Dreros bronzes. As far as I could deduce, the bronzes remain in storage at the INSTAP Study Center in East Crete.
[27] Bosanquet 1901-02, 258-59.
[28] Prent 2005, 305 ft. 493.
[29] Haggis et al. 2011. See, for example, the recent discovery at Anavlochos (Gaignerot-Driessen 2022).
[30] See Sakellarakis and Sapouna-Sakellarakis 2013, 33-34.

III: Absolute and Relative Chronology

Due to the inconsistent use of relative chronologies in past studies of Crete, I avoided using any one author's relative chronology in the database. This was ultimately an easier task to accomplish than I feared as most scholars who rely on relative chronologies provide absolute dates for those chronologies. The database includes two metadata columns to record an entry's date. The first is a range of dates or a single date, the absolute chronology. The second is a relative chronology.

Since both the Early Iron Age and Hellenistic period are outside the focus of this study, I divided centuries into four segments and used these periods as relative chronologies. For the periods between 900 and 300, I used nineteen relative chronological phases:

- early eighth
- mid-eighth
- late eighth
- late eighth/early seventh
- early seventh
- mid-seventh
- late seventh
- late seventh/early sixth
- early sixth
- mid-sixth
- late sixth
- late sixth/early fifth
- early fifth
- mid-fifth
- late fifth
- late fifth/early fourth
- early fourth
- mid-fourth
- late fourth

I created these relative chronologies with the intention of studying how Cretan warfare changed overtime. While some individual objects can be dated with some certainty, I discovered over the course of this project that the vast majority of our evidence for violence is incorrectly or unreliably dated. As discussed in chapter one, the entire chronological system for Cretan arms and armor needs to be revisited, and I have neither the space nor time to revise the chronologies

here.[31] I have intentionally avoided presenting a table with evidence counts for each of these chronologies and attempted to avoid discussing the evidence for organized violence on Crete in terms of chronology as much as possible. I will not use chronological patterns to justify the conclusions proposed in part two. The relative chronologies in my database reflect the dates offered by each individual publisher and will, I hope, facilitate a revision of the Cretan chronologies in some future project.

As we shall see in part two of this dissertation, the three ideologies of violence that I have identified do seem to follow a broad chronological framework. The extra-urban ideology clearly built on military practices that were popular in the Early Iron Age, while our evidence for the urban ideology emerged alongside Cretan poleis in the seventh century. These ideologies co-existed into the fifth century, but a third ideology of violence emerged as poleis began to institutionalize organized violence in the late sixth and fifth centuries. This process and broader pattern will be discussed at length in part two.

IV: Context

Context ultimately became the most important metadata category for my analysis of Cretan warfare. For the periods of this study, my database has nine contexts, listed by count in Table 3.2. Urban sanctuaries had the most evidence followed closely by mortuary contexts. Most of the entries in the mortuary contexts were swords, spears, and arrowheads found in eighth century burials – objects that have little to say about the means by which combatants engaged in organized violence – while urban sanctuaries had a relatively eclectic mixture of evidence types (see figure 3.4). The concentration of artistic themes and means by which these themes were performed in urban and extra-urban spaces is the topic of chapters four and five.

[31] Until 2011, scholars thought that Snodgrass' Cretan kegelhelm type ended in the mid-seventh century. The excavators at Azoria (Haggis et al. 2011), however, discovered one of these helmets in the fifth-century destruction layer alongside a shield boss and a relief pithos which Snodgrass (1964) and Hoffman (1972) both thought ended in the seventh century. As discussed in chapter one, the excavators suggest that these objects may have been heirlooms but their archaeological context indicates that they were still ideologically significant in the fifth century.

Row Label	Count of Context	Percentage
urban sanctuary	180	32.37
mortuary	154	27.70
extra-urban sanctuary	111	19.96
unknown	64	11.51
urban	18	3.24
mainland sanctuary	13	2.34
sub-urban sanctuary	12	2.16
mortuary/sanctuary	3	0.54
domestic	1	0.18
Grand Total	556	

Table 3.2 – The contexts for the archaeological evidence of violence on Crete.



Figure 3.4 – Pie charts with entry types within urban sanctuary and mortuary contexts.

The terms urban sanctuary, extra-urban sanctuary, and sub-urban sanctuary are borrowed from Prent, who developed and cataloged every known Cretan site in her investigation of ritual spaces on Crete in the first half of the first millennium.[32] I will explore the extra-urban and urban sanctuaries with evidence of violence in chapter four.

[32] Prent 2005.

An important component of Prent's thesis was that sub-urban sanctuaries were public, but extra-urban and urban sanctuaries, or "hearth temples," were exclusive. Extra-urban spaces were exclusive because of their isolation and urban sanctuaries were exclusive because they housed the so-called *andreion*.[33] The latter argument is borne out of a very narrow reading of some portions of Aristotle and Strabo. I will explore the Cretan *andreion* in chapter five and argue that this institution is poorly understood and not very well attested. Prent describes sub-urban sanctuaries as "major community sanctuaries,"[34] which were typically less than one kilometer away from an urban center.[35] She defines the western acropolis at Dreros, the Profitis Ilias hill at Gortyn, and Altar Hill at Praisos as sub-urban sanctuaries, but all of these spaces became urban sanctuaries by the seventh century.[36] Moreover, the excavations at Azoria have shown that the types of dedications made at sub-urban sanctuaries continued to be dedicated in urban sanctuaries.[37] The excavations at Azoria further problematized Prent's model, as they found dedications characteristic of Prent's urban sanctuary and sub-urban sanctuary typologies mixed together at various ritual spaces within the urban center of the community. In other words, both Prent's sub-urban and urban sanctuaries appear to have existed within urban spaces in the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries, and her distinction between these two types, one being exclusive and the other public, was a construct of her own making. Gaignerot-Driessen also noticed this problem and further notes that both of Prent's urban and sub-urban sanctuaries are dedicated to and designed to accommodate commensality.[38] This makes them difficult to distinguish archaeologically from domestic spaces, but scholars typically make this distinction based on the number and quality of bronze and terracotta objects deposited in the space. This idea and its implications will be discussed further in chapter five.

For the purposes of data entry, I reserved the sub-urban sanctuary context for only those sites that were clearly sub-urban in Prent's original sense, namely eighth-century Vrokastro and other smaller sites in eastern Crete where archaeologists found evidence of open-air ritual activities.[39] At Aphrati and Panagia Kofina, several weapons were discovered within spaces that had been used previously for burials.[40] Archaeologists have argued that these spaces were both ritual sanctuaries and mortuary spaces.[41] For Prent, these spaces looked very much like extra-urban sanctuaries, but due to their close proximity to urban centers, they also do not quite fit that typology. I labelled these archaeological contexts as sanctuary/mortuary since the nature of the deposited objects and the typology of these sorts of spaces remains in question.

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[33] Prent 2005, 629; 2007.
[34] Prent 2005, 477.
[35] Prent 2005, 501.
[36] Prent 2005, 306.
[37] Haggis et al. 2011. The excavators at Azoria found seventh and sixth century figurines in the fifth-century destruction level.
[38] Gaignerot-Driessen 2014, 17.
[39] Whitley 2014.
[40] Snodgrass 1964, 96, 99, 100, 126.
[41] See Desborough 1952, 253-4; Levi 1927, 400; Snodgrass 1964, 126.

Finally, Cretan objects with evidence for organized violence in mainland sanctuaries, like Delphi and Olympia, received their own categorical type. Technically these were extra-urban sanctuaries, but they were also non-Cretan spaces so I thought they should be distinguished as such. As will be discussed in chapter four, the assemblages of objects at mainland sanctuaries actually correspond to urban sanctuary assemblages on Crete, rather than extra-urban sanctuaries.

V: Origin

I followed Perlman's polis naming conventions except at sites like Prinias and Aphrati where the ancient name is not confirmed.[42] In these cases, I used the modern name.

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The rest of the metadata columns – Bibliography, Description, Material, Measurements, Weight, Pleiades Origin ID, Current Location, Museum Number, Museum Link, Google Image Link, Images, Drawings, and Note for Future – are self-explanatory.

3.2 – Tags

I: Quality and Preservation

The quality and preservation tags relate to questions of survivability. For each entry, I assessed whether the state of preservation was low, adequate, or high. These assessments were based on the objects' original publications, as virtually all of the armor has been conserved and reconstructed. I judged the majority of my entries as adequately preserved (see figure 3.5).

[42] See Perlman 2004.



Figure 3.5 – Preservation of entries.

I judged the quality of each object along similar parameters. An object's quality depends on how it was constructed, the material used in its construction, and its presumed appearance at the time of deposition. Ultimately, this is a subjective observation that varies object-to-object.

Like the preservation tag, the quality tag was primarily of adequate or medium quality. Percentages for each quality rating are presented in figure 3.6. The preponderance of adequate or medium quality objects supports Erickson's assessment of the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries as a period of "austerity" in Cretan art and material culture.[43] Ultimately, there was only one object tagged as low quality: an oddly formed iron arrowhead from Aphrati.[44] This either illustrates archaeological and publishing bias – only the higher quality objects made it into final publications – or it reflects the prevalence of elite warriors and absence of lower-class combatants in our evidence.[45] Figure 3.7 presents the entry types for high quality and well preserved objects. The range of object types is diverse and type does not appear to reflect any major biases or cultural practices. This is similarly illustrated when the types marked as high quality and well preserved are presented as percentages of all the entries of that particular type (figure 3.8). Two-thirds of all published friezes were high quality and well preserved, but this is not very surprising as an object's ability to qualify as a frieze requires certain parameters that would not necessarily be identifiable in low quality or poorly preserved friezes.

[43] Erickson 2010.
[44] Snodgrass 1964, 147.
[45] As discussed in chapter one.



Figure 3.6 – The evidence for violence divided by quality.



Figure 3.7 – High quality and well-preserved entries by type.



Figure 3.8 – Percentages of each entry type that are high quality and well preserved.

II: Reliability of Evidence for Real Organized Violence (True Usage)

The true usage tag measures my confidence that the entry represents a real, rather than imagined or intentionally inaccurate, representation of organized violence. When I began this project, I expected this tag to be frequently negative – I expected to find lots of evidence for unreal or imagined violence. An example of imagined violence would be clearly mythological scenes. What I found was quite the opposite – most depictions of violence were realistic or believable. Unlike Corinthian and Attic vase painting, mythological scenes tended not to include overt violence. That being said, mythological scenes in general are very rare.[46] Nevertheless, there was much less mythical or imagined violence in urban sanctuaries than in extra-urban sanctuaries (see figure 3.9). This pattern probably relates to the different ways in which these contexts presented violence, which I will explore in chapters four and five.

[46] Erickson 2009, 373.



Figure 3.9 – The true usage tag for entries sorted by context: extra-urban versus urban sanctuaries.

III: Working-Class versus Leisure-Class Hoplites

One of the primary objectives of this investigation was to explore who engaged in organized violence on Crete. Van Wees' terminologies proved to be the best way to explore this question. When the Athenians first invaded Sicily, they raised fifteen hundred Athenian hoplites from the lists, ἐκ καταλόγου, and seven hundred *thetes* hoplites (Thuc. 6.43).[47] Based on this passage, most scholars assume that the top three Athenian property designations – *zeugitai*, *hippeis*, and *pentakosiomedimnoi* – were obligated to serve as hoplites from the lists, and the lowest citizen class, the *thetes*, could serve as volunteers.[48] Based on his calculations for agricultural produce and property value in the Classical period, van Wees argues that *zeugitai* had enough income to live a life of relative luxury.[49] Therefore, *zeugitai*, *hippeis* and *pentakosiomedimnoi* were leisure-class hoplites, a term he describes by citing Plato's *Republic* (8.556c-d). These men were more likely to be overweight, out of shape, and unused to toil. Working-class hoplites, on the other hand, were wiry, muscular, and tanned from having spent their time toiling in the sun. These men were typically volunteers as there was often significant economic opportunities that came along with military service in the Classical period.[50] Van Wees argues that a version of the Athenian model probably existed for all the ancient Greek poleis – the wealthy and politically obligated hoplites were typically less prepared for hoplite

[47] van Wees considers this ratio between hoplites from the lists and volunteers to be unusual, considering the monumentality of the Sicilian Expedition. He envisions that most armies were half wealthy hoplite citizens and half poorer volunteers (van Wees 2004, 55-57).
[48] van Wees 2004, 56.
[49] van Wees 2004, 56.
[50] van Wees 2004, 56.

service than the poor volunteers so they more often relied on expensive equipment to help them survive battle.[51] Following van Wees' descriptions of these two typologies, I have tagged hoplites with minimal equipment – a shield, spear, and simple helmet – as working-class hoplites and hoplites with full panoplies – decorative or multi-piece helmets, breastplates, shields, greaves, swords, and spears – as leisure-class hoplites.[52]

There are major issues with van Wees' model of leisure-class and working-class hoplites, and I disagree with components of his model. Van Wees calculates the cost of the working-class hoplites' equipment based on Pritchett's calculations, a third-century inscription (IG XII.5 647), and a passage from Plutarch (*Mor*. 233c).[53] For the cost of the leisure-class hoplites' equipment, he simply cites Hanson.[54] Hanson cites Connor, who guesses based on estimations for the price of bronze in fifth-century Athens.[55] Connor simply doubles the estimate for workmanship and adds twenty-five to fifty drachmae for the additional iron, wood, and fabric. Neither of van Wees' figures should be trusted, and I disagree with van Wees' claim that every hoplite needed at least a shield and a spear.[56] Although I do not think that these categories existed in the ancient world, the terms leisure-class and working-class hoplite are still useful because they address phenomena that exist beyond the scope of ancient Greek history. Some individuals went to battle without much equipment, while others invested in their equipment and prepared themselves for combat. In other words, van Wees' leisure-class and working-class hoplites are roughly equivalent to Anderson's warrior and combatant distinctions.[57] Since it is generally impossible to determine the occupation or status of Cretan warriors in archaeology and art, the tags of leisure-class hoplite and working-class hoplite became convenient stand-ins for well-equipped warriors and poorly equipped combatants.

There was almost no evidence for working-class hoplites on Crete in the Archaic and Classical periods. Part two of this dissertation will explore the elite ideologies of violence because our evidence overwhelmingly indicates that Cretan warriors always invested in their equipment and prepared themselves for battle – they were leisure-class hoplites. I argued in chapter one that working-class hoplites and real wars likely occurred on Crete, but we are simply missing this evidence.

IV: Cavalry, Psiloi, Archers, Attendants, and Mercenaries

I have included many terms that traditionally appear in discussions of ancient warfare. Van Wees argued that Greek armies consisted of cavalry,[58] light infantry or *psiloi*,[59] battlefield

[51] van Wees 2004, 57.
[52] van Wees 2004, 52.
[53] Pritchett 1956, 253is.
[54] Hanson 1995, 291, 293.
[55] Connor 1988, ft. 30.
[56] See chapter two.
[57] Anderson 2018.
[58] van Wees 2004, 65-68.
[59] van Wees 2004, 62-65.

attendants,[60] and mercenaries.[61] In my discussion of Greek warfare in chapter two, I elaborated on van Wees' typologies but did not change the fundamental parameters of each type. Van Wees, for example, argues that Greek cavalry primarily used missile weapons.[62] Konijnendijk offers a slightly different interpretation and argues that they were essential for his reconstruction of the "cascading charge."[63] My model for Greek cavalry, explored above, is broad enough to accommodate both interpretations without fundamentally changing the nature of this typology. The cavalry, *psiloi*, and attendants' tags similarly reflect my own broader definitions of these literary devices.

In the ancient Mediterranean, foreign groups of warriors regularly interfered in military conflicts that did not directly impact them or their poleis.[64] These warriors were not quite mercenaries, in the traditional sense, but their participation in these conflicts was often economically or socially awarded. When the Athenians attacked Aegina in 491, for example, one thousand Argives voluntarily fought on Aegina's behalf (Hdt. 6.92). These men were not associated with their polis, which explicitly rejected the Aiginetans' call for aid. Although they all perished in the war, Herodotus comments on their virtue and bravery, and they were renowned for their actions. Cretans were renowned mercenaries in the Hellenistic period, but, as I will discuss in chapter six, there is almost no evidence of Cretan mercenaries before the late fourth century.

The Cretans were also renowned archers in later periods. As discussed in chapter two, hunting arrows could have been used for war, but cheap war arrows were ineffective for hunting. This makes determining the purpose of an arrowhead nearly impossible. Nevertheless, any study of ancient Cretan violence must address the fact that they are consistently described as τοξόται in our fifth and fourth century literary sources. In my database, I have chosen to tag an object as evidence for *psiloi* when I observed evidence of *psiloi* operating on the battlefield. Since it is impossible to determine the difference between a hunting arrowhead and a war arrowhead, I did not tag *psiloi* unless there was clear evidence of archery being used in combat. Although almost all the textual evidence has evidence for both archery and *psiloi*, only one archaeological object, a tripod stand from Ida, has evidence for both.[65]

V: Mounted Hoplites and Epilektoi

In 1973, Greenhalgh argued that sixth- and fifth-century Attic art revealed battlefield attendants who helped hoplites to battle and watched their horses during the battle.[66] These hoplites dismounted from their horses to fight on foot. They were leisure-class hoplites, to use

[60] van Wees 2004, 68-71.
[61] van Wees 2004, 71-75.
[62] van Wees 2004, 66.
[63] Konijnendijk 2018, 111-112.
[64] van Wees 2004, 71-75
[65] Boardman 1961, 132-133.
[66] Greenhalgh 1973, 63.

van Wees' terminology, but they were even more performative and lavish with their wealth. They were socially at the top of the leisure-class group.

Greenhalgh's model is out of date. He consistently refers to hoplites as "knights" and their attendants as "squires," and the focus of his argument is to prove that warfare in the Homeric texts reflected real Athenian practices in the sixth century.[67] Nevertheless, his model helps to explain the mounted hoplites that appear throughout Attic vase painting in the seventh and sixth centuries. As discussed in chapter two, Pritchett calls these warriors πρόμαχοι,[68] and several modern scholars refer to artistic depictions of mounted hoplites as the "knight and squire" motif.[69]

Mounted hoplites all but disappear in the late sixth and early fifth centuries. As van Wees writes, the balance between leisure-class and working-class hoplites stabilized in the fifth century to the extent that nearly every hoplite force was half leisure class and half working class.[70] As discussed in chapter two, a new group of warriors began to dominate hoplite warfare in the late fifth and early fourth centuries. These individuals were variously called λογάδες and ἐπίλεκτοι, but they functioned in a similar way to mounted hoplites. They travelled across the battlefield quickly and accomplished specific objectives beyond the capabilities of the crowd of hoplites.[71] I choose to use the term *epilektoi* in my database because this is how Xenophon describes them. Moreover, λογάαδες tended to be more temporary than *epilektoi*, which appear to have become permeant parts of hoplite warfare in the first half of the fourth century. I will discuss in chapter six how Cretan warfare, and the Cretan ideologies of violence, probably contributed to the gradual popularization of *epilektoi* on the mainland, as Cretans were fighting as *epilektoi* at least a generation before any other known group.

VI: Orthodox Hoplites, Mobility Restrictions, Auditory Restrictions, Visual Restrictions, and Open-Face versus Closed-Face Helmets

Although I disagree with the orthodox model, or sudden-change theory, for hoplite warfare as maintained by Kagan, Vigianno, and Hanson, I included a tag in my database that looks for orthodox hoplites.[72] I define orthodox hoplites in two ways – they wore extremely restrictive equipment that limited their ability to commit violence, and they fought within highly disciplined formations that sought to physically push their enemies off the battlefield with large round shields.[73]

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[67] Greenhalgh 1973, 3.
[68] Pritchett 1985a, 18-19; Pritchett 1985b, 25-26, 39-41.
[69] e.g. Brouwers 2007.
[70] van Wees 2004, 55-57.
[71] Konijnendijk 2018, 157.
[72] Hanson 1989, Hanson 1995, Kagan and Viggiano 2013. See chapter two.
[73] See below for the tags measuring the existence of group combat.

The restrictiveness of hoplite military equipment is much discussed and well attested.[74] I measured restrictiveness and encumbrance in three ways: mobility, hearing, and sight. Helmets of the Cretan type, for example, covered an individual's ears and obstructed their peripheral vision, both horizontally and vertically. Large round shields, mitrai, stiff bronze corslets, and tall crests all limited a warriors ability to move freely. When worn altogether, the Cretan panoply would have made free movement more difficult – not as much as Hanson claims, but still much more than an unarmored warrior.[75]

Ultimately, none of the Cretan evidence supports the hoplite orthodoxy. This conclusion is not surprising and has been an existing problem for scholars sympathetic to the orthodoxy.[76] Restrictive equipment was fairly common, but there are very few examples of multiple hoplites working together. When they do appear together, they rarely carry the same equipment. Auditory and visual restrictions were significant enough to justify two additional tags, open-face and closed-face helmets, which will be fundamental to the arguments I present in chapters four and five. Open-face helmets restricted hearing but left the warrior's horizontal peripheral vision unobstructed. Closed-face helmets, on the other hand, obstructed both a warrior's hearing and vision. Closed-face helmets in mainland Greece began to have ear holes in late sixth century,[77] but there are no known examples of this design innovation on Crete. The encumbrance of Cretan hoplite warfare will be discussed at length in chapters four and five.

VII: Evidence for Repairs and Use

Due to the importance of violence to the traditional narratives of Cretan history, I was surprised to discover that no one has yet studied the use, damage, or repair of armor. Hoffman claimed that one of the Aphrati helmets had evidence of ancient repairs, but I was able to examine this object in October of 2022.[78] The repairs are clearly modern, not ancient. There was no other evidence for ancient repairs.

Twenty-four objects had evidence of use. For swords and spears, I followed Witowski's terminologies, and several spearheads had U-shaped notches, V-shaped notches, and tip pressure.[79] Several pieces of armor – helmets, corslets, and mitrai – had gashes and concentrated denting indicative of damage sustained in combat. This evidence will be explored further in chapters four and five, but figure 3.10 presents the twenty-four objects with evidence of use by type. All these objects were found in urban sanctuaries. Although many of these objects have been restored by conservators, enough of the objects have evidence of use that we can say with some confidence that most of the arms and armor in urban sanctuaries were probably real objects

[74] Lloyd 2021.
[75] See Krentz 2013.
[76] See chapter two.
[77] Neither Snodgrass nor Jarva address this feature directly, but within Snodgrass' typologies, helmets with ear holes begin in the late sixth century (1967, 69-70).
[78] Hoffman 1972, no. H3.
[79] Witowski's dissertation is forthcoming, but see Witowski 2021 for an introduction to his methodology.

used in combat. Unfortunately, determining the difference between organized violence and other forms of violence, like dueling or hunting, remains a problem.[80]



Figure 3.10 – The evidence for use. There were twenty-four objects with evidence of use.

VIII: Large Round Shields versus Small Omphalos Shields

In his 1964 survey of Greek armor and weapons, Snodgrass notes that there were two popular shield types on Crete in the Archaic period: the omphalos-type and the large round shield.[81] The large round shield is the *porpax-antilabē* variety, which scholars have variously described as the hoplite shield, the aspis, or the hoplon. These traditional terms are insufficient if we simply define a hoplite as a warrior, as I did in chapter two, so I use the term large round shield instead. A series of terracotta plaques from the late sixth and fifth centuries depict a hoplite with this sort of shield, and the *porpax* and *anti-labe* are clearly visible.[82] Although these are the only clear indications of a *porpax* and *antilabē*, we should probably assume that all the large round shields on Crete were of this type. In other words, they probably did not have a *telemon* like many large shields in Bronze-Age Greece.

Although Snodgrass noticed that the Cretans used both omphalos-type and large round shields, he did not notice that these typologies were largely concentrated in different archaeological contexts. Omphalos-type shields dominate extra-urban sanctuaries, while large round shields dominate urban sanctuaries. The significance of this pattern will be explored in chapters four and five.

[80] See chapter one.
[81] Snodgrass 1964, 52-53, 65.
[82] Dohan 1931, 226; Erickson 2009, 371-372; Halbherr 1901, 390; Schefold 1978, 203-208. These plaques will be discussed at length in chapter six. See figure 6.2.

Sakellarakis and Sapouna-Sakellarakis argue that Cretan shields were votive objects rather than true military tools.[83] They suggest that all of the Cretan arms and armor were related to male ritual rather than real violence – that they were *veri armi* more closely related to maleness than combat.[84] Although I will argue that masculinity was an important component of Cretan warriorhood in chapters four and five, the variability of Cretan shields in extra-urban, mortuary, and urban contexts, as discussed above, seem to suggest that neither shield type was explicitly ritualistic. Moreover, Sakellarakis and Sapouna-Sakellarakis' argument is primarily built on Spartan history and Strabo's references to Ephorus. It is a poorly supported argument, to say the least, but it is still certainly possible that many Cretan shields were originally constructed for ritual purposes. If this was the case, their shape, as a shield, still provides valuable evidence regarding the ways in which Cretans approached and envisioned organized violence.

IX: Single Combat, Group Combat, and the Segregation of Warriors into Bands Based on Weapon Type

In a recent monograph, Wrightson argues that ancient Greeks practiced combined arms warfare.[85] This strategy or tactic, depending on the scale of its implementation, was extremely prevalent in nineteenth- and twentieth-century warfare. To defeat an enemy, generals deployed troops with different equipment and coordinated their attacks to pinpoint multiple types of attacks on a single defensive position or a single group of combatants. I remain skeptical that combined arms warfare existed in the ancient world, as I do not think generals organized their combatants by their equipment.[86] Nevertheless, I included tags to measure the factors that serve as the basis for Wrightson's argument. Numerous objects in extra-urban sanctuaries depict warriors working together against a common enemy, but I hesitated to judge these as examples of group combat as the enemy is always mythological or natural. Single combat is only evidenced in an unprovenanced object at the Chania Museum, and the segregation of troop typologies is not evidenced at all. For these reasons, I cannot confirm Wrightson's arguments but have also not found any evidence that manifestly disproves his theories.

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As we shall see in the coming chapters, all these tags allowed me to trace the social, political, and regional development of Cretan warfare between the seventh and fifth centuries. The evidence for violence in these periods reveals how the performance of organized violence differed in different ritual contexts. Our evidence suggests that violence and warriorhood was closely guarded and controlled by wealthy Cretans, and that they used this monopoly to

[83] Sakellarakis and Sapouna-Sakellarakis 2013, 34.
[84] Sakellarakis and Sapouna-Sakellarakis 2013, 33.
[85] Wrightson 2019.
[86] See chapter two.

influence and control the institutions of the polis. However, several Cretan poleis started institutionalizing certain aspects of organized violence for the purposes of economic and defensive stability. This, in turn, shifted how Cretan elites thought about and enacted organized violence.

Our evidence for Cretan warfare is extensive yet diverse. The database created for this project facilitated a large-scale analysis of Cretan violence over the Archaic and Classical periods, but our evidence remains incomplete. As scholars continue to explore Crete in these periods, both archaeologically and historically, our picture will become clearer. Unfortunately, this means that the interpretations of the evidence presented in part two of this project must also change. The conclusions presented in the following chapters reflect my assessment of the evidence as of the submission of this dissertation.

Part II – Interpreting Cretan Violence: The Ideologies of Cretan Warfare

A late seventh century stele of a warrior from Prinias (Lebesi 1976, no. B6, pl. 24).

Chapter 4 – Cretan Arms and Armor: The Dualistic Identities of Cretan Warriorhood

Part one of this project outlined how I approached the problem of violence on Crete; synthesized the archaeological, artistic, epigraphic, and textual evidence; and investigated trends across this diverse dataset. Our evidence for violence on Crete will inevitably expand as excavations and research continues. The conclusions I will present in part two, therefore, should be the foundation for future discussions. The current state of the evidence for violence on Crete suggests that Cretan warfare was primarily an ideological performance in which elites advertised their masculinity and status. As new evidence emerges, the specificities and characteristics of these ideologies might become clearer, and one day we might even be able to speak about real interpolis conflicts on the island.

As discussed in chapter one, the evidence has much less to say about combatants and more to say about the identity of warriors. In the late eighth and early seventh century, Cretans adopted the encumbering equipment traditionally associated with hoplites alongside their much earlier approaches to organized violence. As argued in chapter two, warriors adopted hoplite equipment in a piecemeal fashion, choosing certain types of equipment depending on the cultural, political, and geographic conditions that existed already. Cretan warfare evolved continuously over time, and the emergence of hoplite equipment accompanied a gradual ideological shift rather than a revolution.[1] This chapter traces how this process began and the state of Cretan warriorhood in the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries – the first half of the so-called Age of Hoplite Warfare. As we shall see, certain types of hoplite equipment were concentrated in certain archaeological contexts, which suggests that at least two different perceptions of warriorhood existed concurrently.

Extra-urban spaces retained an older ideological approach to violence, what I am calling the ideology of camaraderie, which continued to trickle into urban spaces into the sixth and fifth centuries. The ideology of camaraderie celebrated a lighter and more open style of combat that emphasized egalitarianism between warriors. These warriors were often depicted fighting shoulder-to-shoulder against a common, often mythological, foe.[2] However, warriors preferred a different form of organized violence in urban spaces. Cretan warfare in urban spaces was an

[1] contra Hanson 1989, 1995, et al. See chapters one and two.
[2] The Lion Hunt Shield is the best example (figure 4.10), and I will discuss this object in detail below.

individualistic style of combat in which warriors covered themselves in encumbering hoplite armor.

On the surface, these two ideologies seem to be at odds with one another – egalitarianism in extra-urban spaces versus individualism in urban spaces – but I will argue that they complimented each other in interesting ways. They perpetuated two different systems of beliefs regarding eliteness and masculinity and reflect how elites crafted their religious and political identities in the Archaic and Classical periods.

By the beginning of the seventh century, elites were already monopolizing violence.[3] But elite violence in the Early Iron Age was markedly different from elite violence in the late eighth and early seventh centuries, when the earliest pieces of the hoplite panoply emerged.[4] After the Early Iron Age, the evidence for violence appears in hearth temples, urban acropoleis, extra-urban sanctuaries, and mortuary contexts.[5] Although there are serious concerns about the current Cretan chronologies,[6] the seventh century appears to represent a moment of profound socio-economic change on the island. These changes likely accompanied shifts in the ways in which elites approached organized violence. Feasting rituals, like the *andreion*, adopted aspects of these dueling ideologies, and different poleis embraced different aspects of Cretan warfare.[7] Some elites preferred egalitarian styles of combat over the rising popularity of individualism that accompanied heavy hoplite equipment, while other elites used the new armor types to express their identities, reaffirm their status, and celebrate their roles within their own communities.

Chapter five will explore how elites navigated these seemingly polarized ideologies. Central to this later discussion, however, is the question of Cretan masculinity. While the ideology of camaraderie conceived of a warrior as a nonanatomic protector, the armor and art of warriors in urban spaces celebrated anatomical features that would come to define the male kouros.[8] This distinction appears to reflect the ideologies of violence prevalent within each archaeological context. Elites in extra-urban spaces celebrated their role as defenders of their communities. Within their communities, however, they had something to prove – they advertised their own bodies, fitness, and natural abilities.

[3] See Lloyd 2014, Lloyd 2021, and the discussion in chapter five.
[4] Snodgrass 1964; 1967, 63
[5] See chapter three for a detailed discussion of the terms used in my database.
[6] See chapter one.
[7] For a discussion of the *andreion*, see chapter five.
[8] Such as the costal margin and linea alba.

4.1 – Outfitting the Cretan Hoplite

Violence was already closely intertwined with the elite male identity on Crete by the beginning of the seventh century.[9] But since the evidence is almost entirely mortuary,[10] we should probably assume that we have an incomplete picture of Cretan warriors and Cretan warfare in the tenth, ninth, and eighth centuries.[11] Mythological scenes of warriors and hunting scenes were common motifs, and we can also attribute three battle scenes, two of which I discussed in chapter three, to this period.[12] The scenes are remarkably similar despite their ranges in date, mid-ninth to early seventh century, and origin, Eleutherna, Knossos, and Kydonia.[13] They are the only known battle scenes on Crete between the Minoan and Roman periods. Although there is much debate regarding the nature and implications of this early style of warfare, organized violence was already a popular venue in which warriors and artists could explore status and masculinity.[14]

Following Snodgrass' hoplite equipment typologies, Cretan hoplites started to emerge in the late eighth and early seventh centuries.[15] These warriors used swords, spears, axes, and arrows to commit violence. They also may have used sling stones, but there is no archaeological, artistic, or textual evidence for slinging between the Late Bronze Age and the Classical period.[16] Javelins also remain something of an unknown as there is no convincing method to distinguish a spearhead from a javelin head.

Snodgrass argues that many early Greek hoplites used javelins, and Harris has shown that Greek hoplites continued to use javelins throughout the Archaic, Classical, and Hellenistic periods.[17] In his forthcoming dissertation, Witowski suggests that significant tip pressure damage might indicate that a weapon was thrown, implying, perhaps, that Cretan spearheads with

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[9] The complex interplay between masculinity, identity, and warriorhood was at least as old as the Middle Minoan period (Alberti 2004, Molloy 2010, Molloy 2012).

[10] Knossos: Hutchinson and Boardman 1954, Brock 1957, Coldstream 1963, Boardman 1960, Catling 1996, Snodgrass 1996, Coldstream et al. 1999, Kotsonas 2018; Orthi Petra: Fadelli 2020, Stampolidis 2020; Vrokastro: Hall 1914.

[11] As I also argued in chapter one for the seventh, sixth, fifth, and fourth centuries.

[12] D'Agata 2013, 211; Whitley 2001, 96-97. See chapter three for images of these objects and further discussion.

[13] D'Acunto 2013. For a detailed discussion of the Fortetsa belt, see D'Acunto 2013. For a discussion of the comparable battle scene from Eleutherna, see Stampolidis 2020, 188-9; Metake 2019, no. 8. The third battle scene from Kydonia is too fragmentary to make out the attacking warriors, see chapter three. See also, Rolley 1994 123-125. I discussed the Fortetsa belt and Kydonia plaque in chapter three.

[14] For a comparative overview of warfare in Attica, Euboea, the Argolid, and Knossos between the eleventh and seventh centuries, see Lloyd 2014 and Lloyd 2021.

[15] Snodgrass 1964, 30.

[16] The earliest Cretan sling stones date to the Middle Minoan (Kelly 2012, 304, no. 38) and Late Minoan periods (Kelly 2012, 304-305; Evans 1928, 344-345). Evidence for slinging does not reappear on the island until the fifth or fourth century. In the *Laws* (Pl. *Leg*. 8. 834a-d), the Athenian locutor suggests that learning how to wield a sling should be part of every citizen's education, but this passage probably reflects a Platonic ideal rather than a Cretan reality. Evans acquired a sling bullet that Boardman tentatively dates to the fifth century, but this date seems too early (see Boardman 1961, 127). Most Cretan sling bullets date to third, second, and first centuries (see Kelly 2012, 301-304).

[17] Snodgrass 1964, 138-139; Harris 1963.

significant tip pressure ought to be understood as javelins rather than spears.[18] In my database, only four spearheads are recorded as having tip pressure damage – a bronze spearhead from Aphrati dated to the early sixth century, two iron spearheads from Eleutherna dated to the late eighth century, and an iron spearhead from Gortyn without a clear chronological context.[19] It must be stressed, however, that the Eleutherna and Gortyn spearheads are exceptional as most iron spearheads are too badly damaged by corrosion to reveal any evidence of use.

In theory, the most diagnostic difference between a spearhead and javelin is the total weight and balance of the shaft and tip. There is only part of one spear or javelin shaft preserved on Crete, and it is clearly an exceptional object. This weapon, figure 4.1, is traditionally dated to the late eighth or the early seventh century.[20] It was discovered in a cult building at Vrokastro, and it was probably immensely expensive to construct.[21] Its shaft, now mostly corroded, was probably entirely iron.[22] Iron was likely more expensive than wood, but wood shafts were by no means cheap or even lighter than iron. A lot depends on the type of wood used in the weapon – something we simply do not know.[23] It is probably impossible, therefore, to determine the difference between a javelin and a spear with our current evidence and methodologies.

[18] Witowski's dissertation is forthcoming, but see Witowski 2021 for an introduction to his methodology.
[19] Aphrati: Hoffman 1972, 14. Eleutherna: Stampolidis 2004, 281 (nos. 359A and 359B). Gortyn: Levi 1955, 262.
[20] Snodgrass 1964, 132.
[21] Prent 2005, 294; Snodgrass 1964, 132.
[22] Hall 1914, 104.
[23] Matthew (2012, 6) argues that all Greek spears were made from ash or cornelian cherry wood. His argument is based on Ap. 6.122, 6.123; Hom *Il*. 4.47, 19.390; Pliny *HN* 16.228; Tyrt. 1; Xen. *Eq*. 12.12; and Xen. *Cyr*. 6.2.32. I do not find the literary evidence particularly compelling. Xenophon's treatises, for example, are probably attempting to convince Classical readers to adopt new practices.



Figure 4.1 – The bronze spearhead mounted onto an iron shaft from Vrokastro.[24]

Most scholars describe Cretan warriors as archers, following Plato's description of the island (Pl. *Leg*. 1.625c-625d). As I stressed in chapter two, we ought to be cautious with this passage of the *Laws*, as the Athenian locutor ultimately argues against this claim and convinces his companions that their assumptions about Crete are incorrect. We must instead turn to the archaeological evidence for Cretan warfare. Unfortunately, the problems of identification raised above for javelins apply equally to arrowheads – it is currently impossible to distinguish hunting arrows from war arrows, if such a distinction even existed in the eighth, seventh, sixth, fifth, and fourth centuries. Arrowheads remained prevalent in both extra-urban and urban sanctuaries in the seventh and sixth centuries, but we have no evidence that Cretans used bows and arrows in battle between the eighth and fifth centuries.[25] In chapter six, I will argue that the Cretan τοξόται in our literary sources carried bows into battle but that, following Brouwers, the term τοξόται actually has more to do with the warriors' economic and social status than their preferred form of violence.[26] In the fifth and fourth centuries, Cretan hoplites used every known means of

[24] see Prent 2005, 294; Snodgrass 1964, 132.
[25] There are hundreds of arrowheads in extra-urban and urban sanctuaries, as well as mortuary contexts, but these all could be related to hunting. Archaeologists on the mainland typically describe arrowheads in sanctuaries and graves in this way. The Fortetsa belt depicts archers in combat in the eighth century (D'Acunto 2013), but Cretan archers do not appear in a military context again until Thucydides' and Xenophon's histories (Thuc. 6.25, 6.43; Xen. *Anab*. 1.2.9, 3.3.7, 3.4.17, 4.2.28, 5.2.29-32).
[26] Brouwers 2010, 227.

committing violence,[27] so we have good reasons to wonder if this diversity in practice also existed in the seventh and sixth centuries. Van Wees refers to the eighth and seventh centuries as periods of "predatory warfare," driven by leisure-class hoplites.[28] Although this may be true on Crete, our evidence remains too patchwork to make such an assessment.[29]

The most common armor pieces in the seventh and sixth centuries were helmets, corslets, and mitrai. Most excavations also found large quantities of bronze sheets, but very little of this material has been published. According to Snodgrass, the excavators at Praisos found an ankle guard, which is probably the earliest ankle guard in Greece, but this piece was never fully published.[30] Archaeologists have only discovered four greaves from Crete: fragments of one pair from Kavousi and two individual examples from Altar Hill at Praisos.[31] Of the five stelai from Prinias that preserve the warriors' lower legs, three are wearing ankle guards.[32] Only one warrior appears to be wearing greaves, and this is the only clear evidence for greaves in Cretan art.[33] Although Crete had the earliest ankle guards and greaves in the Greek world, they do not appear to have been very popular on the island. These objects were likely optional accessories secondary to the helmet, shield, corslet, and mitra.

Cretans continued wearing bronze helmets throughout the Late Minoan and Early Iron Age periods. In the latter, helmets tended to be tall, narrow, and open-face.[34] Snodgrass associated this style with the kegelhelm type.[35] The earliest extant Cretan kegelhelm is from Aphrati and is typically dated to the mid-seventh century (figure 4.2), although there are some major issues with this assessment.[36] There are two other fragments of helmets of this style, one from Prinias and another from Azoria,[37] and a complete and extremely well preserved example that was looted in the nineteenth century.[38] These four objects are the only surviving open-face helmets from Crete between the eighth and the fourth centuries,[39] but open-face helmets are common in artistic depictions of warriors or as votive miniatures. In urban spaces, closed-face helmets appear to have been more popular on Crete in the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries than open-face helmets. There are ten closed-face helmets from Axos, Aphrati, Delphi, Dreros,

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[27] Following the definition of hoplite that I proposed in chapter two. I will further explore this point in chapter six in my investigation and discussion of the third ideology of violence that I have identified in this project.
[28] van Wees 2021.
[29] But see later discussion on this topic in chapter five.
[30] Snodgrass 1964, 240.
[31] Benton 1940, 57; Snodgrass 1964, 87
[32] Lebesi 1976, 26-27, 30-31, 36 (nos. B1, B7, and Γ2).
[33] Lebesi 1976, 23-24.
[34] D'Acunto 2013, 481; Stampolidis 2004, 282.
[35] Snodgrass 1964, 16-19.
[36] For a discussion on the problems with dating Cretan armor, see chapter one. This object, in particular, is extremely fragmentary and underwent at least two separate reconstructions which were not recorded in any publication.
[37] Gigli Patane 2011, 163-164; Haggis et al. 2011, 15-16.
[38] It is known as the Weller Helmet. It was originally purchased by Joseph Weller in Germany in the late nineteenth century. It was sold anonymously by Sotheby's on December 7th 2005 as Lot 54. On June 9th 2010 it was sold on Christie's as Lot 69. Its current location is unknown, but it briefly went on display at the Kallos exhibit in London in 2016. For details on purchase history and state of preservation, see: https://www.christies.com/en/lot/lot-5321771.
[39] There is a ninth-century open-face helmet from Orthi Petra (D'Acunto 2013, 481).

Onythe, Palaikastro, and Praisos.[40] Some of these objects are poorly preserved, but they all appear to have been of Snodgrass' so-called Cretan type – two-piece helmets with accentuated cheek guards, visors, and impractically small nose-guards.[41] A crest was typically mounted onto the top and tied to rings on the front and back. At Azoria, excavators even found the preserved remains of a horse-hair crest.[42] The winged-figure helmet from Aphrati is perhaps our best example of the closed-face Cretan type since it preserves its visor (figure 4.3).

[40] Hoffman 1972, 4-6, 21-22; Snodgrass 1964, 22.
[41] Snodgrass 1964, 28-31.
[42] Haggis et al. 2011, 15-16. This crest was associated with an open-face helmet of the adapted kegelhelm type, but both open- and closed-face helmets had crests in art.

Figure 4.2 – The Cretan kegelhelm from Aphrati (Hamburg Museum für Kunst und Gewerbe, no. 1970.26e. Image from Hoffman 1972, pl. 13).

Figure 4.3 – The winged-figure helmet from Aphrati (Metropolitan Museum in New York, 1989.281.50).

There are fourteen bronze corslets from Crete: ten from Aphrati, one from Axos, two from Olympia, and one from Praisos.[43] Hoffman and Snodgrass describe these corslets as bell-corslets, but only two corslets, back plates from Aphrati, preserve their bottom edges (figure 4.4). In both cases, the corslets are tubular with remarkably reduced curvatures that emphasize the torso and restricted horizontal grooving at the very bottom edge of the corslet. Snodgrass describes these characteristics as typical of later, sixth-century, typologies.[44] The earliest bell-corslets, such as the one from Argos, have horizontal grooves at the naval which mark the beginning of the curvature.[45] It is also noteworthy that the Cretan corslets are between five and ten centimeters smaller than mainland bell-corslet varieties, on average. We might wonder if their reduced size and reduced curvature had something to do with mitrai, which probably hung

[43] Hoffman 1972; Snodgrass 1964, 8, 10, 73, 89.
[44] Snodgrass 1964, 75. Hoffman (1972) dates the Cretan corslets to the late seventh century based on the Argos corslet, which Courbin (1957) dates to the late eighth century.
[45] Courbin 1957.

below the corslet. But it is also theoretically possible that Cretans simply preferred accentuating the upper part of the torso, where they could emphasize the warrior's chest and ribs, over creating a protective curve over the warrior's waist.

Figure 4.4 – Two back plates from Aphrati (Hamburg Museum für Kunst und Gewerbe, nos. 1970.26b and 1970.26c).

Perhaps the most identifiable feature of Greek hoplites was their large round shields. On Crete, however, there were two important shield types: the omphalos and the large round type. Traditionally, scholars assumed that omphalos-type shields disappeared in the seventh century with the widespread adoption of hoplite warfare because the protome and small size of the omphalos-type shield would have been detrimental to the orthodox model of hoplite combat.[46] In general, the identification of shields other than the large round type as mythical or archaizing is ultimately rooted in the hoplite orthodoxy.[47] Since we now reject the hoplite orthodoxy, we ought also to reassess the historical potential of dipylon, Boeotian, and omphalos-type shields. Sakellarakis, the most recent excavator at Mount Ida, has already questioned whether omphalos-type shields ever actually disappeared on Crete. Sakellarakis has suggested that the dedication of omphalos-type shields at Ida may have continued into the first century CE.[48] It is possible, for example, that the shields at Ida adopted a certain artistic style – as Hurwit argues, a mixture of Aegean, Levantine, and Egyptian motifs – which continued well beyond the seventh century.[49]

[46] i.e. Matthaus 2011, 122; Snodgrass 1964. For a discussion of hoplite warfare, see chapter two.
[47] van Wees 2004, 51-52.
[48] Sakellarakis 1988, 174.
[49] Hurwit 1985, 131, 150, 190.

In almost every case, omphalos-type shields are dated based on their artistic style, and most scholars assumed without good evidence that quasi-Levantine or Egyptian influences indicated that these objects were constructed before the earliest poleis. These authors accepted Willett's assessment of Cretans as Dorian and therefore assumed that Cretan art followed the same stylistic movements as Corinthian art.[50] In reality, the only omphalos-type shield that has been found *in situ* was discovered in the middle of the cave at Ida under more than two meters of collapse and beside a Roman coin from the first century CE.[51] Archaeologists at Azoria discovered a bronze shield boss of the type typically attributed to omphalos-type shields in an early fifth-century destruction level, and archaeologists at Phaistos discovered a bronze protome of the omphalos type in the late seventh-century urban sanctuary.[52] It may be the case that the omphalos-type shield developed into a votive shape or they were used for generations after their construction as heirlooms,[53] but it is equally possible that different hoplites simply preferred different types of shields.[54]

Perhaps the most unique pieces of armor on Crete were mitrai, which were probably belly or groin guards that attached to the bottom of the corslet. Although they appear in greater numbers than corslets and even helmets, we know very little about these objects because they rarely appear in art. A figurine from Mborje, Albania (figure 4.5) and several Etruscan figurines and reliefs depict Greek hoplites with mitrai, but mitrai do not otherwise appear in art.[55] It is tempting to compare them to Thracian mitrai, one of which is preserved *in situ* attached to the front of a Thracian corslet (see figure 4.6).[56] However, there are clear morphological differences between Thracian and Cretan mitrai. The best-preserved Thracian mitra is constructed from two pieces of bronze and connected with a hinge.[57] Although Ogneova considers it to be an Archaic style, it was discovered in a fourth-century tomb.[58] Cretan mitrai are only ever a single sheet of bronze. The far majority of Cretan mitrai are dated to the sixth century, but as discussed in chapter one, these dates are unreliable. There is the final issue that Thracian corslets are about sixty percent smaller than most Cretan corslets.[59]

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[50] See Hoffman 1972, 35-38, 41-46.
[51] Mylonas 1984, 108; Sakellarakis 1984, 537-540.
[52] Azoria: Haggis et al. 2011, 7. Phaistos: Prent 2005, 265. The attribution of these protomes as evidence of the omphalos-type shield was initially proposed by Kunze (1931, 13-14). Kunze was specifically discussing the Phaistos protome.
[53] Haggis et al. (2011) make this argument for several of the objects in their communal dining room, but they are still operating within the hoplite orthodoxy and the notion that these shields could not have functioned within the hoplite warfare (contra van Wees 2004, 51-52). As stated above, rejecting the hoplite orthodoxy means that we need to reassess the military equipment that scholars traditionally disregarded as impractical.
[54] As I argued in chapter two.
[55] Jarva 1995, 57-60.
[56] Ogneova 1961.
[57] Ogneova 1961, 522. There is another Thracian mitra on display at the Olympia Museum which also has these distinguishing features, see Jarva 1995, 57-60.
[58] Ogneova 1961, 527.
[59] Ogneova 1961, 522.

Figure 4.5 – A bronze warrior figurine with a closed-face helmet, a bell-cuirass, greaves, and a mitra. This object was discovered at Mborje, Albania in a late Archaic context.[60]

[60] Jarva 1995, 58.

Figure 4.6 – A Thracian corslet with a mitra attached.[61]

Furtwänger cataloged the Olympian mitrai as additional armor pieces whose purpose remains unknown.[62] He suggested that they were hung from the bottom of the breastplate, but he does not fully explain his reasoning. Poulsen named them mitrai,[63] but conceded that this was probably not the correct name for them because ancient inscriptions always refer to them with neuter or masculine demonstratives.[64] The term mitra derives from Homer. Following Menelaus'

[61] see Ogneova 1961.
[62] Furtwanger 1890, 158. He calls them "Rüftungsftücke."
[63] Poulsen 1906, 373.
[64] SEG 52.831, Συνήνιτος τόδε | ὁ Ευκλώτα; 52.833, Γισοκάρτης | τόνδε; 52.835, Νέων τόνδ' ἦλε; 52.837, Οπριφς ὸς τόνδε ἦλε; 52.838, Αἰσονίδας τόνδ' ἦλε ὁ Κλοριδίο; 52.839, Καρισθένης ὁ Πειθία τόν | δ' ἀπήλευσε; and 52.840, Εὐώνυμος ἦλε τόδε ὁ Ἐ[ρ] | ασιμένιος. Jarva (1995, 57-58) is convinced that mitra is the correct term and justifies this position with a narrow reading of the *Iliad*, which I do not find persuasive. He argues that the neuter and

duel with Paris, Athena convinces Pandarus to shoot Menelaus with an arrow and break the truce (Hom. *Il*. 4.134-140). Despite Athena's efforts, the arrow penetrates Menelaus' belt, ζωστήρ; corslet, θώραξ; and mitra, μίτρα. The implication being that the arrow hit Menelaus where his belt and corslet overlapped, and his mitra was below both the corslet and belt. It makes more sense to imagine that the objects which we describe as mitrai were belts, ζωστῆρες, a masculine word.[65] Moreover, large and highly decorated belts have a history in Crete dating back to at least the ninth century.[66] It seems likely, therefore, that mitrai are especially aristocratic armor accessories related to the Cretan warrior identity that protected the lower torso, below the corslet.

The relatively high quantity of mitrai on Crete proportional to the other armor pieces may suggest that a single warrior used more than one mitra. Figure 4.7 shows the total quantities of each part of the Cretan panoply. Cretan corslets, unlike Thracian corslets, usually have a front and back plate. The back plates were often intricately decorated, and artists typically molded shoulder blades and spines onto the bronze. Benton observes that a Cretan corslet at Olympia had a ring preserved at the bottom of the back panel which could have been used to suspend a mitra.[67] Snodgrass disagrees and thinks that the ring was somehow used to fasten the backplate in place.[68] If Benton is correct and some warriors wore two mitrai on their front and back, then we might need to reassess how we conceptualize the early hoplite.[69]

masculine demonstratives refer to "τὸν χαλκόν or τὸ ὅπλον" (Jarva 1995, 58). This is certainly possible, but I remain convinced that mitra was not the correct ancient term for these objects. I find ζωστήρ a far more likely candidate.

[65] An idea that the excavators at Olympia mention in passing at least as early as the 1970s (see Kunze and Heilmeyer 1972, 62-63).

[66] D'Acunto 2013

[67] Benton 1939, 82.

[68] Snodgrass 1964, 73, 89.

[69] There is an idea prevalent in Greek literature that warriors would never turn their backs to the enemy and did not need to protect their backs (see Hanson 1989; 1995; and Sears 2019, 34; among others). Many scholars would interpret back armor, or even a second mitra over the lower back or rear, as an admission of cowardice – an admission which never would have happened according to the traditional orthodoxy. Although turning to flee was considered cowardly by archaic poets (Archilochus F5, Tyrtaeus F8), we might wonder if these texts are actually suggesting that fleeing was commonplace. Plato does not include a cowardice law in his ideal city because it was normal practice to flee in the face of overwhelming odds (Pl. *Leg*. 944a). Konijnendijk (2018, 94) illustrates that ancient generals regularly ordered withdrawals in the face of defeat. Perhaps Archaic poets felt a need to pressure young men to stand their ground because turning one's back and fleeing battle were normal practices in the sixth and fifth centuries.



Figure 4.7 – Total number of armor pieces on Crete dated between the eighth and fourth centuries.[70]

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, many scholars have associated mitrai with archery, or, rather, an attempt to defend against arrows.[71] They argue that mitrai must have been a defense against arrows since most mitrai are from Crete or Thrace and these parts of the Greek world were renowned for archery. This is a circular argument without basis. This project and Craven's investigation of Hellenistic Cretan warfare illustrate that Cretan τοξόται were not necessarily archers in the literal sense, but rather elites.[72] The concentration of mitrai on Crete and their relative absence on the mainland outside of Olympia and Delphi remains something of a mystery, but this phenomenon emphasizes the important larger point that Cretan hoplites did not look the same as Peloponnesian or Attic hoplites.

Snodgrass associates mitrai with other armor accessories, like upper-arm guards, thigh guards, ankle guards, and foot guards.[73] For Snodgrass, mitrai were reactions to the limitations of corslets. For much of the first millennium, the most vulnerable part of a warrior's defense was his neck and groin.[74] Many seventh-century Cretan corslets have large neck guards, which extend vertically from the collar of the corslet. Mitrai may have been comparable to these pieces, but instead of rigidly extending from the corslet, they dangled on three rings. I will explore this oddity further in chapter five, but it is nevertheless clear that mitrai were luxury armor additions that extended from the corslet. Mitrai were part of the leisure-class hoplite's panoply rather than

[70] Note that for the sake of completeness, this graph includes two helmets that I did not mention above: a fragment incorrectly attached to the Cretan kegelhelm from Aphrati which is too poorly preserved to determine whether it was open- or closed-face and a Corinthian helmet in the Mitsotakis collection in Chania that is only nominally described as being from Crete.
[71] e.g. Hoffman 1972, 10.
[72] Craven 2017; see chapters one, two, and six.
[73] Snodgrass 1967, 56.
[74] Salazar 2000, 9-16.

the working-class hoplite's panoply.[75] Viggiano and van Wees argue that only about one in every ten hoplites wore corslets in the fifth century and only about one in three wore greaves.[76] We should probably assume that this estimation is not accurate for seventh-century Crete, but the irregularity of corslets and greaves in the later periods emphasizes that mitrai were likely not worn by everyone, and instead a symbol of the leisure-class hoplite.

4.2 – Warfare in Extra-Urban Sanctuaries: The Ideology of Camaraderie

Although mitrai were the most common piece of armor discovered on Crete, no mitrai have been found in extra-urban sanctuaries. Cretan extra-urban sanctuaries were important centers of economic and cultural exchange since at least the Minoan period.[77] Prent identifies ten extra-urban sanctuaries on Crete, of which only five have evidence for violence between the seventh and fifth centuries.[78] Some scholars highlight the caves on Mount Ida and Mount Dikti as the two most important extra-urban sanctuaries, and the sanctuary at Ida certainly has the largest quantity of archaeological evidence (see map 4.1).

Map 4.1 – Map of the extra-urban sanctuaries from the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries with evidence for violence.

Extra-urban sanctuaries were regional centers that likely enjoyed a degree of political autonomy – although there is a debate over when this changed, most scholars argue that they were not managed or controlled by a single polis before the fourth or third century.[79] The earliest

[75] Van Wees 2004, 52-57. For further discussion of these typologies, see chapters one and three.
[76] Viggiano and van Wees 2013, 62.
[77] Prent 2005, 159, 216, 314, 560-569.
[78] Prent 2005, 154,
[79] Chaniotis 2006, 202-203; Sakellarakis 1988, 210.

reference to a Cretan extra-urban sanctuary as a pilgrimage site is in Plato's *Laws* (Pl. *Leg*. 1.625a-b), but this practice probably started much earlier.[80] Like Minoan peak sanctuaries, extra-urban sanctuaries tended to be relatively remote. Those that were not at high elevations tended to be located in the ruins of Minoan palaces.[81] In both cases, the infrastructure surrounding extra-urban sanctuaries was minimal, so traveling to these spaces required preparation and planning on behalf of the ritual participant or dedicant.[82] Like many regional sanctuaries in the Greek world, Cretan extra-urban sanctuaries were probably ideal spaces for transhumant pastoralists, and many of these sites are still used for seasonal pastoralism to this day.[83] They were venues for the exchange of ideas, customs, institutions, and technology between elites outside the political and social purview of their poleis.[84] These spaces ultimately created two distinct groups within ancient communities: those who could afford to travel to these spaces and those who could not.[85] Most extra-urban sanctuaries started functioning as catalysts of elite interaction in the tenth century, and continued to have an important influence on elite identity into the sixth and fifth centuries.[86]

Extra-urban sanctuaries were focal points for elite ideologies throughout these periods. Prent argues that they were exclusively elite spaces before the eighth century, and these elites made dedications that perpetuated an ideology concerned primarily with inter-island competition. In the tenth and ninth centuries, local proto-Geometric pottery styles remained unique at each polis.[87] They lacked stylistic overlap, which suggests to Prent that extra-urban sanctuaries were not yet functioning as places for cultural exchange, and it was only in the eighth century, when ceramic styles started to appear across multiple poleis, that extra-urban sanctuaries became the principal venue for cultural identity crafting. But an absence of stylistic overlap does not necessarily signal a lack of cultural interaction, as some communities may have simply rejected the artistic styles of their neighbors.[88]

Bronze tripod production tells a different story about extra-urban sanctuaries in the first three centuries of the first millennium, but the eighth century also stands out. Although proto-Geometric pottery in urban spaces remained locally inspired, bronze tripods developed a

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[80] Ida is frequently mentioned by Homer, for example, but no passages in particular imply that it was a pilgrimage site.
[81] Prent 2005, 638-643.
[82] Prent 2005, 154-155.
[83] see Mackil 2013, 178-184, who argues that Thermon emerged as a point of exchange for hunters and pastoralists in the mountains of Aitolia. Unlike this example, however, extra-urban sanctuaries on Crete include both summer pastures high in the mountains and winter pastures down on the coast. This may be a uniquely Cretan phenomenon since Minoan ruins, which may have dissuaded economic intensification, still dotted the coastal plains well into the historical period. Unfortunately, Chaniotis' (1999) treatment of transhumant pastoralism on Crete is out-of-date. The relationship between transhumant pastoralism and extra-urban sanctuaries requires reassessment now that scholars have rejected the hoplite orthodoxy, challenged the Platonic folk-theory of rational thought, and discovered evidence of economic intensification rather than recession on the island.
[84] Chaniotis 2006, 202-203; Morgan 1993, 18; Renfrew 1982, 289; Renfrew 1986; Snodgrass 1986, 49-54.
[85] See Morgan 1990, 3-4; De Polignac 1994, 11-12; and Morris 1997, 30.
[86] Prent 2005, 223; Sakellarakis 1988, 210.
[87] Prent 2005, 225-226.
[88] Desborough 1952, 259-260, 270-271. See Graeber 2013 for an explanation of "culture as creative refusal."

southern Aegean style in the tenth and ninth centuries.[89] In the eighth century, Cretan bronze tripods were eclipsed in popularity by objects with stylistic influences from the southern Aegean, Syria, Phoenicia, the southern Levant, and Egypt.[90] Certain mythological features from the east, like the vertically spread wings of winged genies or the Master-of-Animals motif, started appearing on characters with Aegean clothing and armor. The wealth and ideological power of the dedications at extra-urban sanctuaries did not necessarily change in the eighth century, they just shifted from looking north to looking north and east.[91] The recent attribution of Ionian ware pottery to central Crete further suggests that elite Cretan ideologies were constructed within and reacting to Cretans' shifting economic interests abroad, although this pottery style probably post-dates the eighth century.[92] The art at extra-urban sanctuaries began to forge a middle-ground path between the artistic traditions of the Aegean and the traditions of the eastern Mediterranean. Although these ideas gradually permeated into other parts of the Greek world, they emerged first on Crete and seem to have had a lasting impact. Within the artistic environment at Cretan extra-urban sanctuaries, a new cultural and artistic system, distinguishable from both the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean, began to emerge. Taken together with the ceramic evidence, the bronze tripods seem to indicate that a Cretan *koine* was developing at extra-urban sanctuaries at the start of the Age of Hoplite Warfare.

In this moment of stylistic expansion and ideological experimentation – the late eighth century – Cretan warriors started to appear in the art of the dedications to extra-urban sanctuaries. In many ways, these Cretan warriors perpetuate an us-versus-the-world mentality, what I am calling the ideology of camaraderie. They used various weapons, wore an open-face helmet with little other armor, and carried a smaller shield typically of the omphalos type. Omphalos shields are by far the most prevalent object type in extra-urban sanctuaries, both in full-sized and miniature forms.[93] Compared to large round shields, the other main shield type in this period, the concentration of omphalos shields to extra-urban sanctuaries is noteworthy (see figure 4.8). This lighter shield probably facilitated higher degrees of mobility and versatility, but it is also noteworthy that omphalos-type shields only ever depict warriors wearing open-face helmets.

[89] Matthaus 2011, 112.
[90] Matthaus 2011, 114, 118,
[91] Matthus 2011, 124-125. As mentioned in chapter one, it is probably incorrect to identify these objects as imports, as they represent a hybridization of eastern and northern styles (Prent 2005, 240-242).
[92] Gilboa et al. 2017, Lehmann et al. 2019.
[93] There are thirty-two votive miniatures and twenty-three shields in my database. For further discussion of the object types, see chapter three.



Figure 4.8 – Evidence for large round shields and omphalos-type shields at extra-urban and urban sanctuaries.[94]

As Xenophon emphasizes in *On Horsemanship*, open-face helmets did not obstruct vision and were therefore essential for warriors that needed to communicate with other combatants and move quickly across the battlefield (Xen. *Eq*. 12.3). Open-face helmets appear across the island – in extra-urban, mortuary, and urban contexts – but the Cretan open-face type was primarily popular in eighth-century Gortyn, Praisos, and Knossos.[95] Although Snodgrass's claim that this helmet type disappeared by 650 has been disproven, he was right to emphasize the importance of the open-face Cretan helmet for eighth century elite ideologies.[96] Altogether, the equipment depicted at extra-urban sanctuaries facilitated a lighter and more open style of combat, which in turn emphasized cooperation and collaboration between warriors rather than individual skill. This indicates that just as extra-urban sanctuaries were becoming less interested in inter-elite competition or competition with the mainland,[97] they began to celebrate warriors fighting in a collaborative style.

This observation is subtle, but significant for our understanding of ancient Crete. Extra-urban sanctuaries are dominated by evidence for a cooperative style of warfare and have little to no evidence for individualism on the battlefield. This phenomenon distinguishes extra-urban sanctuaries from urban sanctuaries on Crete, but it also differentiates them from important regional sanctuaries on the mainland, where individualistic styles of combat were emphasized. Archaeologists found Cretan closed-face helmets, a corslet, and mitrai at Olympia and Delphi,

[94] The relatively high number of large round shields at extra-urban sanctuaries is almost exclusively related to processual scenes, which will be discussed below and in figure 4.9.
[95] Snodgrass 1964, 17.
[96] Snodgrass 1964, 35. Note that Snodgrass frames his argument within the notion of "Orientalism," to which I expressed concerns in chapter one. On the Azoria helmet, see Haggis et al. 2011.
[97] Matthaus 2011, 112, 114, 118; Prent 2005, 225-226.

but none of these types of objects have been found at extra-urban sanctuaries on Crete.[98] The material at Olympia and Delphi corresponds to assemblages at Cretan urban sanctuaries, which will be discussed below. The few depictions of cooperation that exist in urban sanctuaries, moreover, are clearly meant to evoke the same themes that are prevalent at extra-urban sanctuaries. Perhaps most significantly, they include an exclusionary theme which emphasizes that war was only practiced by the wealthiest Cretans: Cretans who could have afforded to visit extra-urban sanctuaries regularly.[99]

Images of multiple warriors walking in step, running off the frame, standing together, and fighting together are common at extra-urban sanctuaries (see figure 4.9).[100] But the lion hunt shield is perhaps our best example of the ideology of camaraderie (see figure 4.10). This object is a beautifully decorated and well-preserved omphalos-type shield from Ida.[101] There are two groups of figures which all depict the same sort of scene – a conflict between lions and humans. There are eleven lions or lion-like creatures, six warriors with swords, four mounted archers, three archers, two ibexes, and a large bird perched on the back of one of the lions. The warriors with swords are all in a desperate situation – three of them are pinned under attacking lions and two have their heads in the jaws of lions. The mounted and foot archers, on the other hand, are coming to their aid and firing their bows at the lions. All the human figures have open-face helmets of Snodgrass' Cretan kegelhelm type,[102] and most characters have a shield. Two warriors and one mounted archer have Boeotian-type shields while everyone else has the omphalos-type. Although it is a hunting scene, all the warriors are equipped for war, and the particularly desperate warriors are brandishing swords rather than bows or spears, the weapons we would expect in a hunting scene. Based on the style of art, most scholars have attributed this piece to a non-Cretan craftsman, but as discussed above, this assessment is probably not quite right since there appears to be an eclectic mixture of both Syrio-Palastinian and Aegean motifs.[103] Blome dates the object to 650-630 based on eastern artistic traditions.[104]

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[98] Sakellarakis 1988, 172. Delphi: Hoffman 1972, 22, 27. Olympia: Hoffman 1972, 23, 26, 27, 73, 89. There might be one exception at Palaikastro: fragments of a helmet, number 38 in my database. There are no major settlements around Palaikastro in the Archaic and Classical periods and all the other votives from Palaikastro in these periods are comparable to other extra-urban sanctuaries (Prent 2005, 350-353). Hoffman dates the helmet to the late seventh century – when the site was an extra-urban sanctuary – based on their similarity to two of the Aphrati helmets (Hoffman 1972, 22). I agree that the helmets have remarkably similar cheek designs, with a crescent cut out for the mouth, but the eyes on the Palaikastro fragments have a very broad horizontal curvature. The eyes on the Aphrati helmets, on the other hand, curve vertically very sharply. I believe further study is required to determine the date of the object, as it could be a fourth-century helmet. In the fourth century, detailed cheek pieces were common, but helmets were also typically much thicker. Moreover, Palaikastro was no longer an extra-urban sanctuary and had become what Prent would describe as a sub-urban or urban sanctuary. Unfortunately, Hoffman never had an opportunity to inspect the Palaikastro helmet fragments, and the Heraklion Museum was unable to locate them in November 2021, when I visited their collection.

[99] This aspect of violence in the art from urban sanctuaries will be discussed at length in chapter five.

[100] e.g., Boardman 1961, 132-133; Sakellarakis 1988, 177-182.

[101] Blome 1982, 19; Kunze 1931, no. 6.

[102] See Snodgrass 1964, 17.

[103] Prent 2005 240-242.

[104] Blome 1982, 19.



Figure 4.9 – Four gold-foil appliques from Ida. They depict warriors moving or fighting together.[105]

[105] Sakellarakis 1988, 177-182



Figure 4.10 – The Lion Hunt Shield from Mount Ida.[106]

The Lion Hunt Shield illustrates two important components of the ideology of camaraderie: all the warriors are depending on each other to face a common foe, and each warrior is unique in subtle ways but ultimately nonanatomic, meaning they have no clear indicators of biological sex. The former observation is the easiest to understand. Every defeated and flailing warrior in the outer register is being rescued by an archer or a mounted archer. But these characters are not invulnerable, and an archer in the upper right side of the drawing of the shield is surrounded by two creatures. The archer squats with their back to what appears to be a tree, and a lion stands behind – as if ready to pounce on the unsuspecting archer. In the inner register, the central archer is being overwhelmed and surrounded by wild animals. As desperate as the archers' situations are, however, the warriors with swords have it worse as they are all in their final moments of struggle. It is a pessimistic study of humanity's power over nature, but one that emphasizes the threat of fighting alone and the importance of camaraderie.

[106] Blome 1982, fig. 7.

The second important observation is that the warriors themselves are rather identity-less. There are subtle differences between each warrior – either in the pattern or aesthetic design of their clothing and equipment – but they are otherwise remarkably similar. They have a sword or a bow, and they all have the same helmet type. Moreover, none of them are actually carrying their shields. Instead, the shield simply replaces their upper body. However, it is also clear that the artist decided both to include shields and to show each warriors' arms and hands, thereby confirming that none of them are carrying the shields that replace their torsos.[107] The themes on the Lion Hunt Shield represent a distinct approach to organized violence, in which collaboration and equality between warriors were paramount.

Depending on our interpretation of the votive miniature shields,[108] shields were the most frequent dedication related to violence at extra-urban sanctuaries (see table 4.1). They are, therefore, our best medium for understanding the ideology of camaraderie.[109] The earliest bronze shields probably date to the ninth or eighth century.[110] Most are dated to the seventh century, but, as mentioned above, the Cretan chronology needs to be revisited. Sphinxes appear on 24.2 percent of the shields. Lions are the second most common motif at 15.2 percent. Besides the Lion Hunt Shield, only two other shields depict warriors. One is poorly preserved but appears to depict the same sort of scene as the Lion Hunt Shield – a warrior with a shield for a body sprawls out across the frame while two lions stand over and consume the fallen warriors.[111] The other is a well preserved large round shield from Ida, which is now on display in the Heraklion Museum.[112] The central figure holds aloft a lion and steps upon a bull with his left leg, in a motif borrowed from Assyrian art.[113] It is reminiscent of the Master-of-Animals, lion-tamer, or *potnios theron* motif, which was popular in Cretan art in the ninth and eighth centuries.[114] Winged deities surround the warrior and carry circular shields or discs, which Metake interprets as ritual dancers.[115] This shield has less to say about cooperation and collaboration than the Lion Hunt Shield, but the human-versus-nature or us-versus-them theme continues to be prominent.

[107] We can probably assume that they are all carrying their shields on a telamon, as was the case for body shields in the Mycenean period. That being said this artistic choice is consistent across all depictions of warriors in extra-urban sanctuaries, not just hunting scenes. I will discuss this idea further below.
[108] See the discussion in chapter three as well as Englezou 2011 and Stampolidis 2011.
[109] Prent 2005, 369.
[110] Prent 2005, 269-370.
[111] Kunze 1931, 6, no. 3.
[112] Kunze 1931, no. 74. Museum number 5.
[113] Prent 2005, 372; Metake 2003, 265.
[114] D'Acunto 2013. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholars usually describe these pieces as eastern imports, but more recent studies have pointed out that they meld Greek and eastern ideas and would be out-of-place within southwestern Asian or northeastern African artistic traditions. See Prent 2005, 372-377.
[115] Metake 2003.

Type	Count
Votive Miniature Shields	31
Arrowheads	27
Shields	23
Spearheads	11
Appliques	11
Plaques	2
Figurines	2
Votive Miniature Helmet	1
Tripod Stand	1
Helmet	1
Frieze	1
Grand Total	111

Table 4.1 – The entry types at extra-urban sanctuaries.

The ideology of camaraderie was prevalent at extra-urban sanctuaries and, in many ways, recalls the earlier ideologically charged depictions of organized violence in the tenth, ninth, and eighth centuries. As discussed above, Prent interpreted the shift away from unique styles of proto-Geometric pottery in the eighth century as proof that extra-urban sanctuaries became focal points of ancient Cretan culture.[116] The ideology of camaraderie implies that this transition was perhaps more than just a shift in preference. These spaces had been venues of elite interaction throughout the tenth and ninth centuries. They continued to have this role in the eighth century, but the ideology of camaraderie also began to dominate in this period. Extra-urban sanctuaries became spaces where participants could celebrate their similarities as Cretans, irrespective of their political allegiance.[117] In the expanding connectivity of the eighth century, Cretan elites sought to build bridges between themselves – bridges that spanned across political affiliations and geographically across the whole island. They chose to emphasize the notion that they fought side-by-side as Cretan elites against common enemies rather than as individuals. The Cretan *koine* became something unique to celebrate in the face of external – Aegean, northeast African, and southwest Asian – cultural practices. The objects dedicated to extra-urban sanctuaries were typically created by elites for an audience of other elites, many of whom were not part of the dedicators' polis. As we will see within urban spaces, the ideology of camaraderie was not accessible to every level of Cretan society and remained limited to the wealthiest class – those who travelled to, made dedications to, and participated in rituals at extra-urban sanctuaries.

4.3 – Warfare in Urban Spaces: The Army-of-One Mentality

The type of organized violence celebrated at urban sanctuaries was very different than the type of violence that dominated dedications to extra-urban sanctuaries. At urban sanctuaries (see

[116] Prent 2005, 225-226.
[117] Erickson argued this point in his 2022 AIA/SCS paper. In many ways, it dovetails with his argument for Cretan austerity in the sixth century, see Erickson 2010.

map 4.2), Cretan warfare was usually depicted as individualistic, heavy, and restrictive. Cretan warriors represented at these sites typically wore closed-face helmets, stiff bronze corslets, and mitrai, and they carried a large round shield.

Map 4.2 – A map of the poleis on Crete with evidence of violence in the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries. The green marker indicates poleis where archaeologists have yet to locate an urban sanctuary with evidence of violence (Kydonia, Tylissos, Knossos, and Lyktos).

On Crete, urban centers always included ritual spaces and sanctuaries. In several cases, ritual activities appear to have been secondary to dining and other social activities.[118] Prent identifies several different types of urban sanctuaries but has difficulty distinguishing them from large ritual dining spaces in earlier periods.[119] The evidence for Cretan violence is often associated with Prent's hearth temple – free standing buildings centrally located within poleis that housed large hearths.[120] The purpose of hearth temples remains unclear, but Lato's hearth temple probably developed into their Hellenistic *prytaneion*.[121] Prent argues that hearth temples became important centers of Cretan culture and politics in the eighth and seventh centuries.[122] According to Prent, hearth temples emerged as a response to the cultural dominance of extra-urban sanctuaries. They became exclusive spaces for a new generation of Cretan elites to express themselves outside the view of non-elites.[123]

[118] Such as at Azoria (Haggis et al. 2011).
[119] Prent 2005, 126-127, 441-442. For a discussion of Prent's typologies, see chapter three.
[120] Prent 2005, 441-442. There are several problems with Prent's urban sanctuary typologies (see chapter three). I will explore the implications of the evidence in these spaces in chapter five.
[121] See chapter five. On Lato's hearth temple and *prytaneion*, see Miller 1978.
[122] Prent 2005, 448-451.
[123] Although the number of dedications to extra-urban sanctuaries appears to have declined in the seventh and sixth centuries, they were never completely abandoned (see Sakellarakis 1988).

Like extra-urban sanctuaries, all urban sanctuaries were venues for aristocratic competition between wealthy dedicants, but unlike extra-urban sanctuaries, the audience in urban spaces was much broader. Prent argues that certain types of urban sanctuaries were exclusive spaces reserved for elites, but the archaeological excavations at Azoria have suggested a different arrangement.[124] Regardless, the objects and art associated with urban sanctuaries appear to be consistent across Crete, and they reveal very limited means by which warriors prepared for and enacted organized violence. Comparable two-piece, highly decorated, and closed-face Cretan helmets appear in poleis across the island, from Onythe in western Crete to Dreros in eastern Crete.[125] There is some local variability regarding findspot – the armor at Axos was in a public temple at the edge of the polis, and the Aphrati armor hoard was in the hearth temple at the center of the polis– but all of the Cretan armor appears to reflect the same ideology of organized violence.[126] The urban ideology associated with Cretan warfare appears to have operated beyond local specificities regarding the location of sanctuaries within the polis, their use, and their accessibility.

Prent argues that wealthy dedicants expressed their commitment to organized violence through bronze dedications to urban sanctuaries and less wealthy dedicants expressed this same commitment through terracotta figurines of warriors.[127] Based on this observation, she argues that martial values permeated every level of the polis community.[128] However, she is overstating the evidence for warrior figurines.[129] At Axos, Rizza only found one terracotta head that may have a crudely formed helmet.[130] The Gortynian figurine she cites, discussed in chapter three, does not wear armor or carry weapons at all. In other cases, so-called warrior figurines have their hands raised but their hands are always empty, and they are too abstract to make out any armor like a helmet. I have only three terracotta figurines in my database: Rizza's head, a large idol of Athena from Gortyn on display in the Heraklion Museum, and the head of a warrior from the Samaria Gorge now on display in the Chania Museum.[131] The evidence for female figurines is much more abundant at urban sanctuaries, numbering in the hundreds.[132] Prent considers these as evidence of non-elite participation, but more recent studies of the female nude in art suggests that these too might be elite dedications.[133] Although both non-elites and elites may have participated

[124] Haggis et al. 2011; Prent 2005, 629; 2007. It is clear from the material culture at Azoria's hearth temple that it was open to less wealthy dedicants. See chapters three and five.
[125] Hoffman 1972, 21-22.
[126] See Hoffman 1972.
[127] Prent 2005, 353-359, 407, 415-416, 422-424.
[128] Prent 2005, 422-424.
[129] In her defense, she is not the first scholar to identify male figurines without arms or armor at Cretan sites as "warriors". This is also what Demargne (1929) did at Lato: he describes all the "primitive" figurines as warriors. Moreover, Murray's (2022) recent book has found that nude warriors were relatively common at certain Cretan sanctuaries, like Kato Syme, in the Early Iron Age. Muray's data is included in my database, but firmly before the Age of Hoplite Warfare.
[130] Rizza 1967-68, 22, fig. 4.
[131] Entries nos. 811, 979, and 1005.
[132] Prent 2005, 414-415, 422-424. For a discussion of these figurines, see chapter five.
[133] Prent 2005, 481-487; but see also Cassimatis 1982. For the study of nude female figurines and sculpture, see Daniels 2022.

in ritual practices at urban sanctuaries, overt references to organized violence were limited to elites and wealthy elite dedications.

As discussed above, archaeologists have found no armor other than the shields at extra-urban sanctuaries.[134] This absence is especially stark in comparison to the large number of armor pieces preserved in urban sanctuaries. Warriors dedicated both full-sized and miniature helmets, corslets, and mitrai to urban sanctuaries (table 4.2). While warriors at extra-urban sanctuaries wore little or no armor, warriors at urban sanctuaries were weighed down by their panoply and had their hearing and vision significantly impaired. They were not able to coordinate with each other and instead fought as individuals.

Type	Count
Votive Miniature, Shield	31
Mitra	30
Votive Miniature, Corslet	30
Votive Miniature, Mitra	13
Spearhead	12
Votive Miniature, Helmet	12
Plaque	11
Helmet	11
Corslet	11
Arrowhead	4
Shield	4
Pottery	3
Figurine	2
Greave	2
Sword	1
Building	1
Frieze	1
Ankle Guard	1
Grand Total	180

Table 4.2 – Evidence at urban sanctuaries by type.

I describe this approach to organized violence as the army-of-one mentality. “Army of One” was the slogan of the US military from 2001 to 2006, through the beginning of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. The US military hoped to attract young men and women who wanted to retain their individuality and found military service dehumanizing, but it was criticized for ignoring the importance of teamwork and camaraderie.[135] This aligns fairly well with our evidence for Cretan warfare in urban sanctuaries – elite men represented themselves as

[134] Prent 2005, 384-385. There is one possible exception: the Palaikastro helmet fragments. See footnote ninety-eight and the discussion above.
[135] Dao 2001; Moskos 2001.

individual warriors who did not need any assistance, but the type of warfare that they practiced and the equipment that they used, such as closed-face helmets and heavy shields, implicitly required teams of supporting freemen and enslaved battlefield attendants to be effective. As discussed in chapter two, Greek hoplite warfare was similarly dependent on lower classes for provisioning, recruitment, and support. At the Battle of Plataea, in which the Greek cities won their freedom from the Persian Empire, over eighty percent of the Spartan army were helots (Hdt. 9.28-29). In the late fifth and early fourth century, Athenian warriors probably had enslaved people fighting beside and supporting them in the battle line (Isaeus 5.11; Xen. *Anab*. 4.2.20-21).[136] These enslaved combatants were armed, carried extra equipment, and were ready to help their masters in case they were wounded, but our historical sources like Thucydides and Xenophon never explicitly outline the role of enslaved individuals in Greek warfare. Although there is even less evidence for battlefield attendants on Crete than there is on the mainland, the army-of-one mentality seems to have functioned in much the same way: elites claimed to be self-sufficient warriors fighting in a highly individualistic combat style, but really relied on the support of non-elites both within their communities and on the battlefield.[137] Through their dedications to urban sanctuaries and public display of arms and amor, they claimed to be an army of one – they sought to emphasize their individuality despite the teamwork and camaraderie that this type of organized violence would have required.

According to the evidence for organized violence in urban sanctuaries, warriors did not need to use their hearing or their peripheral vision to be effective. Figure 4.11 presents the evidence for mobility, sight, and hearing restrictions in the archaeological evidence in urban and extra-urban sanctuaries. Although extra-urban contexts had some evidence for more encumbered warriors, urban sanctuaries clearly stand apart as spaces for a heavy and impaired style of organized violence.

[136] Obert 2018, van Wees 2004, 68.
[137] This idea will be explored in more detail in chapter five.



Figure 4.11 – Mobility, sight, and hearing restrictions within the evidence for violence, separated by context.

There is some debate regarding the reliability of the dedications to urban sanctuaries as evidence for real military practice. Perlman wonders if the large quantity of armor in urban sanctuaries was built to be displayed or constructed as *aides-mémoire* to commemorate an individual warrior.[138] Unlike the dedications to extra-urban sanctuaries, which admittedly tend to be extremely fragmentary, many urban-sanctuary dedications have real evidence of use.[139] The best visual evidence for use-wear is on a fragment of a helmet from Dreros and a mitra from Aphrati (figure 4.12). Both objects preserve perforations which Hoffman describes as wounds "sustained in combat,"[140] and I concur with this assessment. These diagonal gashes are diagnostic of real combat damage and clearly distinguishable from the sort of square or circular perforations created in the metal when the objects were mounted for display.[141] Overall, only 16.4 percent of the armor in urban sanctuaries had clear evidence of use like the objects in figure 4.12. However, most armor from urban sanctuaries has been heavily restored and reconstructed by modern conservators.[142]

[138] Perlman 2010, 101.
[139] Hoffman 1972, 13. See, also, chapter three.
[140] Hoffman 1972, 21-22.
[141] See, for example, the square punction alongside two dents from the inside on a helmet at Delphi, which Hoffman incorrectly attributed to Crete (Hoffman 1972, 22), or the square puncture in a fragment of a Cretan corslet from Aphrati (Hoffman 1970, 136).
[142] Even pieces that have never been on display, like the mitrai from Dreros or the Aphrati armor at the Harvard Art Museums, has been heavily reconstructed or mounted to plaster casts.

Figure 4.12 – A fragment of helmet from Dreros and a mitra from Aphrati with gashes caused by a bladed weapon.[143]

In addition to their evidence of use, several armor pieces from urban sanctuaries have inscriptions which probably indicate that these objects were taken from enemies as war booty. Table 4.3 presents the inscriptions, which are inscribed retrograde – or boustrophedon, where relevant – and in the Cretan dialect. There are a total of fifteen armor inscriptions: three on helmets, three on corslets, and nine on mitrai.[144] One of these mitrai is from Axos, while the rest are from Aphrati.[145] Most of the inscriptions preserve a name in the nominative, and some names appear on multiple objects. At Aphrati, a man named Συνήνιτος inscribed his name on both a helmet and a mitra. A man named Γισοκάρτης, the Cretan version of Isocrates, inscribed his name on a helmet, corslet, and mitra – a full Cretan panoply.[146] Seven of these inscriptions include a verb: six have ἦλε and number 22 (SEG 52.839) has ἀπήλευσε. Both words are Cretan forms of the Attic Greek αἱρέω. They have variously been interpreted as indications that the armor was worn by the dedicant or that it was taken as booty by the dedicant.[147] Pritchett states

[143] Ebbinghaus 2014, 152-153; Hoffman 1972, 21-22.

[144] Helmets: nos. 1 (SEG 52.829), 2 (SEG 52.830), and 4 (SEG 52.832). Corslets: nos. 10 (SEG 52.834), 11 (No SEG number), and 12 (SEG 52.836). Mitrai: nos. 17 (SEG 52.831), 19 (SEG 52.838), 22 (SEG 52.839), 23 (SEG 52.840), 24 (SEG 52.833), 25 (SEG 52.841), 26 (SEG 52.837), 27 (SEG 52.835), and 29 (SEG 52.842).

[145] No. 26 (SEG 52.837). Marinatos (1966, 104) says that this is from Axos but Hoffman includes it in the Afrati material as his M9. Tegou (2014) says it is from Axos and was found in the sanctuary on the east slope. She dates it to the mid-eighth century, which seems way too early. I think this must be the other mitra that Platon reported in 1951 (450). He reports that it is from Axos and dates it to the mid-sixth century.

[146] Συνήνιτος: nos. 2 (SEG 52.830) and 17 (SEG 52.831). Γισοκάρτης: nos. 4 (SEG 52.832), 11 (no SEG number), and 24 (SEG 52.833). The inscription on nos. 10 (SEG 52.834) and 27 (SEG 52.835) are often attributed to the same person, Νέων, but only [- -]ων is actually preserved on 10 (SEG 52.834). A mitra from Axos (No. 26, SEG 52.837) is inscribed with the name ΟΠΡΙΦΣ and a corslet from Aphrati (no. 12, SEG 52.836) has the name ΟΠΡΙΚΣ. One of these could be a misspelling. The Aphrati hoard is a collection of looted objects, so it is possible that some Axian objects made their way into the collection. Alternatively, the Axian mitra could be incorrectly attributed (see previous footnote).

[147] The word αἱρέω is very frequent in Classical literature and it has a range of meanings, including to take, acquire, seize, win, bear, etc. Unfortunately, I have found no good comparanda in epigraphy – as far as I can tell, the word seems to be used mainly in recording payments. Homer uses the word to describe how Chryseis was taken as war booty for Agamemnon: ἐκ δ᾽ ἕλον Ἀτρεΐδῃ Χρυσηΐδα καλλιπάρῃον (Hom. *Il.* 1.369). In the *Odyssey*, he uses a form of αἱρέω to describe Penelope taking up her own clothes after a bath: ἡ δ᾽ ὑδρηναμένη, καθαρὰ χροῒ εἵματ᾽ ἑλοῦσα

that the former interpretation, dedications of armor worn into battle by the dedicant, is unattested in Greece before the third century.[148] The latter interpretation depends on the ἀπο- prefix on number 22 (SEG 52.839).

Number	Object	Origin	Inscription
1 (SEG 52.829)	Helmet	Aphrati	Νεόπολις
2 (SEG 52.830)	Helmet	Aphrati	[Σ]υνήνιτος [τοδε] | ὁ Εὐκλώτα
4 (SEG 52.832)	Helmet	Aphrati	Fισοκάρτης | τόνδε
10 (SEG 52.834)	Corslet	Aphrati	[Νέ]ων | τόνδ' ἦλε
11	Corslet	Aphrati	[F]ι[σο]κ[άρτης][149]
12 (SEG 52.836)	Corslet	Aphrati	Οπρικς | ο [---]νο
17 (SEG 52.831)	Mitra	Aphrati	Συνήνιτος τόδε | ὁ Ευκλώτα
19 (SEG 52.838)	Mitra	Aphrati	Αἰσονίδας τόνδ' ἦλε ὁ Κλοριδίο
22 (SEG 52.839)	Mitra	Aphrati	Καρισθένης ὁ Πειθία τόν | δ' ἀπήλευσε.
23 (SEG 52.840)	Mitra	Aphrati	Εὐώνυμος ἦλε τόδε ὁ Ἐ[---] | ασιμένιος.
24 (SEG 52.833)	Mitra	Aphrati	Fισοκάρτης | τόνδε
25 (SEG 52.841)	Mitra	Aphrati	ἦλε
26 (SEG 52.837)	Mitra	Axos	Οπριφς ὁς τόνδε ἦλε
27 (SEG 52.835)	Mitra	Aphrati	Νέων τόνδ' ἦλε[150]
29 (SEG 52.842)	Mitra	Aphrati	ὁ Κάλανος or[151] ὁ Κάρανος

Table 4.3 – The armor inscriptions

In 1971, Pritchett stated that war booty was "the property of the state."[152] He provides a citation for this statement, but his footnote just contains a discussion of the Roman army and Polybius' description of war booty distributions among Roman soldiers. As discussed in chapter one, I follow Gabrielsen's distinction between "oligopolistic" and "monopolistic" violent communities.[153] The Romans are the best example in antiquity of a "monopolistic" violent community. Cretan poleis, on the other hand, were much more "oligopolistic," and elites likely

(Hom. *Od*. 17.58). These examples illustrate the range of possible interpretations for αἱρέω. Although I strongly suspect that the Cretan armor was looted – that we should translate αἱρέω on the armor in the same way that we translate the word in book one of the *Iliad* – the word has too broad a meaning to say for certain.

[148] Pritchett 1979, 249-250. I wonder how Pritchett would explain the Miltiades helmet at Olympia. The Miltiades helmet is the outlier or exception for most of our models of war booty, violence, and religion. Pritchett is probably justified in excluding it.

[149] Hoffman's (1972) reconstruction seems likely considering that Fισοκάρτης appears on two other pieces of armor, nos. 4 (SEG 52.832) and 24 (SEG 52.833).

[150] Λεμπέση (1969) read Νλών τόνδ' ἦλε, but I agree with Hoffman's (1972) reading.

[151] Hoffman (1972) read κάλανος, but Kritzas (2014) read κάρανος after the mitra was cleaned by conservators. I was unable to closely inspect this object and have not been able to make my own determination.

[152] Pritchett 1971, 85. He repeats this idea in his later work, and cites his earlier discussion, see Pritchett 1991, 68. See also, Suk Fong Jim 2014, 181-202.

[153] Gabrielsen 2007, 2013.

made dedications of war booty whenever and however they wanted.[154] If the inscribed armor from Axos and Aphrati were war booty, then they were probably captured and displayed by the individuals named in the inscriptions, which are always in the nominative.[155]

Both readings of ἦλε and ἀπήλευσε, as objects worn or taken as war booty, have interesting implications for our understanding of the army-of-one mentality. Cretan warriors were either dedicating their armor to their communities, or they were collecting the armor from their enemies to dedicate to their communities. If it was the former and these objects were worn into battle by their dedicants, then we could interpret these objects as proof of masculinity and belonging. Since the corslets artistically emphasized the anatomical features of a kouros and the mitrai protected the groin, these warriors were both advertising and performing the anatomy of their masculinity in urban spaces – warriors risked their own bodies to protect the elites and non-elites in their communities and they displayed their bodies in urban sanctuaries to commemorate their performance. If it was the latter and these are enemy armor pieces that were stripped during battle, then Cretan elites were stripping their enemies of their anatomy and masculinity to prove that they were elites worthy of their privileged status.[156] They displayed their foes' bodies in urban sanctuaries to celebrate what they had achieved as warriors. In practice, we should probably assume that aspects of both interpretations probably occurred to various degrees throughout the dozens of independent polities that inhabited Crete. The larger point remains, however: the inscriptions on armor in urban sanctuaries emphasizes individual rather than collective prowess.[157]

The votive and functional objects that make up urban-sanctuary assemblages provide evidence for the operation of an ideology of violence that is quite distinct from the ideology of camaraderie at extra-urban sanctuaries. Unfortunately, the problems with the Cretan chronology discussed in chapter one prevent us from demarcating a chronological range for the army-of-one mentality. As discussed above, the eighth century was an interesting period of change within the Cretan material culture that accompanied the emergence of the ideology of camaraderie at extra-urban spaces. The ideology of camaraderie also operated within urban spaces between the eighth and fifth centuries, but this ideological approach to organized violence existed alongside the army-of-one mentality. The army-of-one mentality emerged in the material culture with the maturation of the hearth temple in the seventh century, yet it is impossible to know with the current state of our evidence whether this ideology predated the widespread adoption of hearth temples.

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[154] For further discussion of this idea and the evidence supporting it, see chapters five and six. In chapter six, I will discuss two inscriptions from Axos and Tylissos which appear to be the first regulations on the distribution and dedication of war booty to religious spaces within the community.

[155] As we shall see in chapter six, this probably changed in the fifth century for some poleis. Poleis probably started making dedications on behalf of their warriors (see Osborne and Rhodes 2017, no. 126). However, fifth-century dedications by poleis as a whole were likely monetary, so they are much more difficult to distinguish in the archaeological record.

[156] For *comparanda* in other parts of the Greek world, see Lloyd 2021, 50.

[157] As argued by Perlman 2010, 101-102. See chapter five for further discussion of these interesting objects.

Our evidence suggests that the ideology of camaraderie and the army-of-one mentality were co-existing ideologies in the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries. Cretan elites, it seems, had to navigate both styles of organized violence simultaneously – both cooperative and individualistic violence. This complex reality is best illustrated through the ways in which the two ideologies depicted the human body. Warriors and warriorhood looked very different in extra-urban and urban sanctuaries, but they were both broadly defined enough that a single Cretan elite with the time and money to travel to isolated extra-urban sanctuaries and wear the full bronze panoply could claim to be a warrior.

4.4 – The War over the Warrior's Body

In her study of the Prinias stelai, Lebesi observes that the Cretan warriors in these scenes appear to be more shield than human.[158] She describes this as the man-as-citizen motif which was common in art from other parts of the Greek world throughout the first half of the first millennium. Warriors depicted in this style have helmeted heads, legs, and occasionally an arm or two, but all their extremities appear to be extensions of the shield rather than the limbs of a human, since their torso is seemingly replaced by a shield. This motif is prevalent within the evidence for the ideology of camaraderie, and almost all the warriors on the Lion Hunt Shield could be described as shields with heads, arms, and legs (see figure 4.9, above). An added feature which is seemingly unique to Crete, is that none of the warriors depicted at extra-urban sanctuaries have beards or visible genitalia – there are no clear indications that they are anatomically male or female.

The evidence for the army-of-one mentality presents a dramatically different picture. The armor dedicated to urban sanctuaries celebrates and accentuates anatomical features that would become central to the design of kouroi sculpture. Cretan corslets outlined the warriors' pectoral muscles, ribs, stomach, and shoulders. These are the same features that would become paradigmatic of southern Greek kouroi statues, but the current dates for Cretan armor predate these statues by at least one hundred years. In particular, Cretan corslets most closely resemble kouroi in either Richter's Sounion Group (615-590) or Anavysos-Ptoon 12 Group (c. 540-515).[159] It is also possible that the attention and stylization of the costal margin, the bottom of the rib cage, on kouroi may have been inspired by Cretan armor, rather than the other way around, so it is likely not possible to draw a direct connection between Cretan armor and south Aegean kouroi.[160] Mitrai, moreover, drew attention to the groin, without outlining the anatomy explicitly. Together, the Cretan panoply celebrated the features of maleness and youth, without delving too deeply into anatomical accuracy or distinguishing individual features.

[158] Lebesi 1976, 170-171.
[159] Richter 1942. But see chapter one for an overview of the problems with the Cretan armor chronologies.
[160] This idea often comes up in personal conversations with art historians and during the Q&As at conferences, but so far as I know, it has never been stated in print.

As discussed in chapter one, masculinity and violence are frequently paired.[161] In other parts of the Greek world, elites struggled with the ways in which they depicted the normal human body in the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries.[162] It was not a monolithic concept, and definitions of masculinity and maleness probably fluctuated dramatically between poleis.[163] This conflict manifested itself in elite art and poetry, and it had a real impact on the political and social development of Greek poleis. Like violence, athletic competitions, or oral poetry, masculinity was acted out and performed.[164] I will argue that the evidence for violence on Crete fits this mold: Archaic art conceptualized gender in more abstract terms, but gender and maleness developed into two distinct types, or "normates," depending on its context and its associated ideology of violence.[165] The two ideologies of violence that I have identified in this chapter appear to have had two different ways of celebrating masculinity throughout the Archaic and Classic periods.

These two distinct methods of depicting warriors probably have deeper indications about the meaning and role of warriors more broadly. Thomson defines the socially acknowledged normal human body as the normate.[166] This categorization does not actually exist and instead dominates the social conscious and art of a community; it is a consensus about how the ideal human should dress, act, or appear.[167] The normate was intentionally non-descript.[168] In highly patriarchal societies like those on ancient Crete, we ought to assume that the normate was male, but it was a vague maleness with which most regular community members could associate themselves. The shield-as-body motif, what Lebesi describes as the man-as-citizen motif,[169] was a normate, but the accentuation of male anatomical features in urban spaces was also a normate. Like later kouroi, the anatomy of the armor was "basically meaningless – or rather, its significance must lie in only distinguishing characteristics, namely, its nudity, its youth, its beauty, its autonomy, and its immutability."[170] It was intentionally unspecific so that no one could fit within it exactly, but everyone could strive to achieve this false normality. This suggests that there were two normates operating side by side on Crete, two definitions of how a normal warrior should look, one associated with an ideology of camaraderie and the other with the army-of-one mentality.

This observation directly contradicts Thomson, who argues that there is only ever one normate within each society.[171] She is discussing disability in American culture in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and how the disabled individual or the disabled body is characterized in

[161] Van Nortwick (2008) has an entire chapter dedicated to this relationship.
[162] Hurwit 1985, Van Nortwick 2008.
[163] Rubarth 2014.
[164] Martin 2021, 171.
[165] I am quoting Thomson 1997, see below.
[166] Thomson 1997, 8.
[167] Thomson 1997, 8, 19-20, 32, 136.
[168] Thomson 1997, 40. She reaches this conclusion and builds her theory of the normate more generally through a discussion of Foucault 1961, 1980, and 1991a.
[169] Lebesi 1976, 170-171.
[170] Stewart 1990, 109.
[171] Thomson 1997, 8.

literature and cultural performances as the antithesis to the normate. In 2020, Reynolds characterized the normate as "the hegemonic phantasm ableism carves out of the flesh."[172] Both Reynolds and Thomson discuss the normate, as a theory, within the context of black, feminist, and queer studies – in a sense, I have done the theoretical concept a disservice by adopting it here and using it so far outside of its intended contexts. I still use the term because I find that it effectively summarizes how the anatomy of warriorhood appears to be operating within different archaeological contexts on ancient Crete. For Thomson, "the freak" established the boundaries of the normate through performance of their disability, and this allowed "the average man" to fit himself within the normate and identify as normal.[173] I will argue in chapter five that Cretan elites used the borders of their normates as a gatekeeping mechanism to monitor participation in elite groups – the Cretan normates, for lack of a better term, were intentionally constructed to be more exclusive than the normate body in nineteenth- and twentieth-century America. This limitation and instrumentality may explain, to some degree, why there were two anatomical normates on Crete in the Archaic and Classical periods. Different groups operating in different spheres – within and beyond the polis – expressed warriorhood and the means by which warriors performed organized violence in different ways.

The lived experience of Cretan elites in these periods seems to be one in which a single individual had multiple avenues of defining their status. This idea, that elites navigated two socially constructed normates, is not so unbelievable if we think about other examples. In a modern context, we would likely use the term code switching which is often referenced in conversations around African American Vernacular English and the lived experience of Black Americans.[174] In this context, code switching includes changes to speech, appearance, and behavior. These changes depend on the audience: many Americans code switch between the speech and demeanor that wins them social recognition within their local communities and the speech and demeanor expected of them in spaces dominated by white Americans. Thompson and critical race theorists might characterize whiteness as the normate in these spaces. The complex duality of an individual's identity and the means by which they navigate these social constructs aligns very well with what I have observed in the evidence for organized violence on Crete. Cretan warriors presented themselves as one type of warrior to one type of audience and as another type of warrior to another type of audience. We might say that they were code switching, presenting themselves differently in different spaces to maximize their social recognition and the amount of power that they might acquire. Thompson's normate, therefore, helps us understand how warriorhood became an important tool for Cretan elites and how depictions of organized violence could intervene in existing power dynamics, especially because the extra-urban normate existed beyond the political borders of the polis. In some cases, elites even sought to navigate both of these social normates simultaneously.

[172] Reynolds 2020, 243.
[173] Thomson 1997, 63-67.
[174] See McCluney et al. 2019.

Figure 4.13 is a significantly restored bronze corslet, but it clearly celebrated the urban-sanctuary normate. It is characteristic of all our surviving corslets from Crete: the pectoral muscles, lower edge of the ribs or costal margin, and shoulders are all accentuated with repoussé. In many cases, the linea alba and naval are also incorporated into the decoration through embossing. Depicting the costal margin in this way is an artistic trope popular in all corslets and kouroi statues in Richter's Sounion and the Anavysos-Ptoon 12 Groups.[175] It emerged as an important male feature in Cretan art sometime in the eighth century, and has no direct ancestor in the Minoan periods.[176] In this way, the corslets perpetuate a popular motif of maleness, but one that departs from the non-anatomical maleness of the shield-as-body motif – the normate that dominated extra-urban sanctuaries. At the same time, however, this corslet also includes the shield-as-body motif. Under each arm, two warriors are running in the Knielauf position towards the middle of the corslet,[177] and these warriors are depicted as shields with helmeted heads and large legs (see figure 4.14). They are beardless and they have open-face helmets of Snodgrass' Cretan kegelhelm type.[178] The circle of their shields completely replaces their torsos and their arms, and the warriors do not appear to carry any weapons.

[175] Richter 1942. The earliest accentuated costal margin does indeed originate from Crete in the the famous Apollo figurine from Dreros (Boardman 1961, 137; Prent 2005, 285). This figurine is typically dated to the first half of the seventh century. The figure, who is probably not actually Apollo since he looks nothing like the Cretan Apollo, assumes a very Minoan pose, but Minoan figurines never accentuate the costal margin.
[176] See Weingarten 2000.
[177] Hoffman 1972, no. C1.
[178] Snodgrass 1964, 17.

Figure 4.13 – The bronze corslet from Aphrati (Hamburg. Museum fur Kunst und Gewerbe, 1970. 26a.).

Figure 4.14 – A close up of the running warriors under each arm on the Aphrati corslet. [179]

Stated another way, the corslet from Aphrati presents both the shield-as-body normate, and the kouros or anatomical normate. Rather than envisioning the ideology of camaraderie and the army-of-one mentality as conflicting ideologies, the duality of the Cretan warriors within art suggests that these ideologies simply coexisted or even operated in tandem. Although they dominated different archaeological contexts, perpetuated different styles of combat, and presented masculinity in starkly different terms, Cretan artists felt comfortable presenting them

[179] Hamburg. Museum fur Kunst und Gewerbe, 1970. 26a.

side-by-side. Unlike modern code switching, there were probably no negative social consequences for presenting the urban or extra-urban ideology in the wrong arena. The audiences for these ideologies were different, but not incompatible.

The Aphrati corslet is typically dated between 640 and 630, around the same date as the emergence of the Cretan polis and the earliest Cretan law: the Dreros constitution.[180] This was a period of profound institutional change within the social and political make-up of Cretan poleis. As we shall see in chapter five, Cretan elites reacted to these changes by institutionalizing competition within the polis in order to retain their privileged status.[181] The duality of the ideology of camaraderie and the army-of-one mentality, as well as the differences and similarities between their normates, indicates that elites conceptualized their identities as inhabiting at least two different spaces: the urban and the extra-urban. These spaces coexisted rather than conflicted, and there was seemingly nothing wrong with celebrating the more cooperative extra-urban normates and ideologies within urban arenas. The two ideologies of violence that I have detected in the evidence were so independent within Cretan culture that they even adopted different definitions of what a normal warrior looked like. But these ideologies coexisted, and Cretan elites may have had to be both types of warriors at the same time.

One of the Prinias stelai illustrates how this duality could manifest itself for an individual warrior (figure 4.15). Traditionally dated to the late seventh century or perhaps a decade after the Aphrati corslet, this funerary stele depicts a warrior facing right with a spear.[182] We might safely assume that this warrior is a man, but the artist actually omitted any features that would indicate his biological sex. The hoplite does not have a beard or genitals, although he is naked below his corslet. He wears a closed-face helmet, a corslet, and a decorative undershirt which appears to go to his wrists. He does not appear to carry a shield, but a large round circle surrounds his torso. He wears a corslet which emphasizes his pectoral muscle, and scales cover his upper arm.

[180] On the corslet, see Hoffman 1972, no. C1. On the law, see Gagarin and Perlman 2016, no. Dr1. This law will be presented and discussed in chapter five. The Cretan polis emerged in the seventh century, but many scholars believe that it formed earlier in the Early Iron Age, see Chaniotis 2011, 430; Haggis 2013, 65; Whitley 1991.
[181] This is the standard reading, but I will be exploring the most recent model in chapter five: Seelentag's cartelization model (Meister and Seelentag 2020, Seelentag 2020).
[182] Lebesi 1976, 29-30.

Figure 4.15 – A late seventh century stele of a warrior from Prinias.[183]

[183] Lebesi 1976, no. B6, pl. 24.

In the other preserved Prinias stelai, warriors face left with their shields obstructing their torsos in the shield-as-body motif. Lebesi argues that this stele stands out from the rest because it is a hybridization of two artistic practices: the Archaic Greek warrior advancing left and the Eastern warrior holding his spear in two hands facing right, like the warriors in Persepolis.[184] For this reason, she believes that the warrior is carrying the spear with both hands and his shield is behind him.[185] Pautasso wondered if the warrior was a foreigner since he wears a closed-face helmet, does not have any symbols on his shield like the other warriors from the Prinias stelai, and faces right.[186] However, both of these arguments divorce the stele from the other evidence for violence on Crete.

While the left facing Prinias warriors have open-face helmets and carry omphalos-type shields, the right-facing warrior has equipment reminiscent of urban sanctuaries. His closed-face helmet and corslet are probably not representations of a foreigner and instead reflect a different ideological approach to organized violence: the army-of-one mentality. Perhaps the artist chose to make his shield invisible in order to emphasize his corslet and anatomic features. The rim of his shield overlaps his body at his neck and his knees, so he would have looked like a shield-as-body warrior from another perspective. Unlike his body, his weapons overlap the rim and stick out from behind the shield, and this feature further emphasizes this point by alluding to the countless shield-as-body warriors with spears poking out from behind their shields. At the same time, we can see the warrior's armor and anatomy, and he is clearly a normal urban warrior. Like the artist of the Aphrati corslet, the artist of the right-facing warrior is trying to present features of both the shield-as-body normate and the kouroi normate simultaneously.

Within our evidence for organized violence on Crete, the conflict between the shield-as-body warrior and the urban anatomical warrior illustrates the complex dichotomy between the ideology of camaraderie and the army-of-one mentality. The ideology of camaraderie promoted an open style of combat in which warriors relied upon each other to defeat a common enemy, while the army-of-one mentality promoted an individualistic style of combat in which warriors fought on their own to acquire war booty that they could later display with their own names carved into the metal. Most Cretan artists depicted one ideology or the other, but their consistency and overlap suggests that they existed side-by-side. Being a warrior meant working with other elites against common obstacles and fighting to win recognition from non-elites in the political arena. Although these ideologies appear at odds, the consistent thread between them is that warriorhood cost money, time, and energy: it was dominated by elites. Cretan warfare was a performance of masculinity, authority, belonging, and identity. As we shall see, these elite ideologies and their coexistence within seventh and sixth century Cretan communities dramatically impacted how elites operated, influenced, and manipulated the institutional frameworks of ancient Cretan poleis.

[184] Lebesi 1976, 171.
[185] Lebesi 1976, 29-30.
[186] Pautasso 2011, 98.

Chapter 5 – Separate and Unequal: Crafting Poleis through Violence

Van Wees argues that the iconography of Greek warriorhood both "reflected and affected the development of the state,"[1] and this was certainly the case for Cretan poleis. As I outlined in chapter four, expressions of warriorhood in art and ritual were concentrated in the evidence from extra-urban and urban sanctuaries. While an ideology of camaraderie dominated extra-urban sanctuaries, an army-of-one mentality was concentrated in urban spaces. I argued that both types of sanctuaries acted as arenas for expressions of masculinity, individuality, and power, but these expressions assumed a different set of beliefs about warriorhood in each context. Cretan warriors navigated these seemingly contradictory ideologies throughout the Age of Hoplite Warfare. In this chapter, I will explore how these ideologies influenced the political and social development of Cretan poleis in the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries.[2] To some extent, the ideologies of violence functioned according to the "dominant ideology thesis:" they were created by and for elites, but their integration with eliteness had dramatic and lasting impacts on political and cultural practices within the greater community.[3] Both historians and archaeologists agree that Cretan poleis promoted egalitarianism in the Archaic and Classical period through their laws and institutions.[4] The army-of-one mentality, therefore, appears to contradict this narrative.

Cretan poleis emerged in the historical record in the mid-seventh century, but many of the institutions of the polis probably formed much earlier.[5] Scholars typically describe the arms and armor from urban sanctuaries, as well as the urban sanctuaries themselves, as evidence for Cretan *andreia*.[6] Indeed, many of these urban spaces probably developed into the council rooms for public officials and the permanent venues for *andreion* meetings in the fifth and fourth centuries.[7] For example, a small storage room within the fourth-century *prytaneion* at Lato had a

[1] van Wees 1998, 334.
[2] On the question of Cretan poleis being states, see chapter one.
[3] See Abercrombie et al. 1980 and below.
[4] See, for example, Link 2009, Erickson 2010, Rabinowitz 2014, Seelentag 2015, and Meister and Seelentag 2020.
[5] Most scholars assume that Cretan poleis formed during the Early Iron Age, see Chaniotis 2011, 430; Haggis 2013, 65; Whitley 1991. The Dreros constitution, typically dated to 640 and considered the earliest Greek legal inscription, is generally recognized as the earliest evidence for the Cretan polis (Gagarin and Perlman 2016, Dr 1). This inscription is discussed below.
[6] Aphrati is a good example. See Hoffman 1972; Vivers 1994, 244-249.
[7] IC 2.15.2; Miller 1978, 26; Prent 2005, 630. As Whitley (2009, 290) observes, these spaces are probably too small for the whole *andreion*. See the discussion below.

collection of arms and armor.[8] The academic narrative for these objects and spaces suggests that the army-of-one mentality was tied to the *andreion* by the fifth century, if not significantly earlier.

Scholars typically describe the *andreion* as a communal-dining club for citizens.[9] The connection, therefore, between the army-of-one mentality and the *andreion* suggests that the arms and armor in urban sanctuaries were politically charged, in addition to their importance as symbols of eliteness, masculinity, and martial superiority.[10] I will argue that the dedications related to violence in urban spaces were a means for Cretan elites to convert economic and martial power into social and political power. Although these spaces may have been open to the public, warriorhood was not.[11] Wealthy warriors identified themselves as members of this exclusive club, thereby establishing firm boundaries between elites and non-elites, but within this club, each member tried to outperform the other. Although Cretan elites embraced the ideology of camaraderie and the Cretan *koine* more generally, warriorhood remained an arena of intense competition throughout the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries.

5.1 – Confronting the *Andreion*

But what exactly was the Cretan *andreion*? How do we define it, who participated in it, and what sort of institutional mechanisms maintained it? Aristotle and Ephorus, as referenced by Strabo, describe fourth-century *andreia* as communal meals for citizens that were similar to the Spartan *syssitia* (Arist. *Pol*. 1272a, Str. 10.4.16-22). According to Aristotle, Cretan *andreia* were open to men, women, and children (Arist. *Pol*. 1272a). Ephorus does not mention women and instead characterizes *andreia* as important male-only spaces for ἐρασταί and ἐρωμένοι (Str. 10.4.16-22). Unlike the Spartan *syssitia*, in which the participants were required to provide food and drink for the group, Cretan *andreia* were provisioned through tributes from *perioikoi* and public land (Arist. *Pol*. 1272a).[12] It was a service provided by the poleis themselves to support their people and foster relationships between them.

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[8] Miller 1978, 97-98; Picard and Ducrey 1972. Demargne (1903, 218) reports that "cette pièce communique au Nord avec une petite chambre, dans laquelle ont été trouvés des débris de lances et d'armes, ainsi que de grandes jarres (πίθοι)." As far as I know, this is the only mention of the arms and armor from Lato, and the objects have not been fully published.

[9] As will become clear further into this chapter, I find the term citizens highly problematic in discussions of ancient poleis due to this term's important political and social implications for later Mediterranean history. There is no historical or epigraphic evidence indicating that a political body of individuals we might term "citizens" existed within Cretan poleis (see Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 79-80). Many poleis had *demoi*, but we do not know who was counted among or excluded from the *demos*. Many scholars readily use the word "citizens" in discussion of the *andreion* and assume that it was limited to these "citizens." However, the epigraphic evidence suggests that some *andreia* were open to non-residents. I will discuss all the evidence for the *andreion* below.

[10] Discussed in chapter four.

[11] Prent (2006, 629; 2007) says that urban sanctuaries were exclusive, but Seelentag (2015, 33) and the Azoria evidence (Haggis et al. 2011) suggests otherwise. See below.

[12] There is much debate regarding Aristotle's meaning of *perioikoi* in this passage (e.g. Perlman 2000, Lewis 2018, Link 1994, van Wees 2003, van Wees forthcoming, Willetts 1955). As discussed in chapter two, I find Aristotle's word choice to be inconsistent and unreliable, so I do not put much weight on it and interpret the word literally.

Epigraphically, the *andreion* is mentioned in only five texts before the fourth century: one from Axos, one from Datala, one from Eltynia, and two from Gortyn.[13] These references confirm that the *andreion* was an important institution within certain Cretan poleis in the late seventh and sixth centuries, but they do not paint a clear picture. It is clear, however, that the epigraphic and literary evidence for *andreia* do not align.

The earliest epigraphic reference to the *andreion* is from Gortyn. A small fragment dated to approximately 600 preserves the words ἐν ἀνδρήιοι, but the context is lost.[14] The other reference to the Gortynian *andreion* appears in a mid-fifth century text. This fragmentary inscription preserves a list of nouns, within which whatever the leader provides to the *andreion* is listed: ἐ<κ>ς ἀνδρείο ὄτ<τ>᾽ ὸ ἀρκὸς παρέκει κατ᾽ ἀνδρεῖον.[15] Scholars have traditionally interpreted this inscription as a list of things that cannot be used as security – so whatever the leader provided to the *andreion* could not be put up as security for a loan.[16] The list of nouns is preserved on two joining blocks with three other inscriptions: one stipulates how to pledge property as security, one pertains to receiving security on someone's behalf, and one explains how to collect payments for legal procedures.[17] The list mentioning the *andreion* does not preserve a verb, so it is impossible to know how the list relates to the other provisions. Gagarin and Perlman are not convinced that it is a list of objects that could not be used as security and suggest instead that it is a list of objects that could be used.[18] The first items listed are the arms of a free man whatever he has for war, except a cloak and footwear: [ὅ]π̣λ̣α ἀνδρὸς ἐλευθέρο ὅττ᾽ ἐνς πόλεμο̣ι̣ ἴσκει, πλὰν ϝέμας κ᾽ ἀνπιδέμας. Van Effenterre argued that a free man's weapons could not be seized, since they were probably provided by the city and were the property of the polis.[19] However, there is no evidence that Cretan poleis provided individuals military equipment,[20] and it is far more logical to assume that a free man could not have his cloak and footwear seized. It is more likely, therefore, that this is a list of things that could be used as security, and whatever was provided to the *andreion* could be used as security.

The Eltynian inscription, which probably dates to about 500, outlines a series of monetary fines in cases of assault. The text is very fragmentary, but line six appears to list a series of places or events which are somehow related to the assault, the assailant, or the victim: [---] τ̣ον | ἢν ἀνδρηίοι | ἢν ἀγ[έ]λα[ι] | ἢ(ν) συν[β]ωλήτραι | ἢ ‘πὶ κορῦι | ἢ ‘πὶ [. .]ο[. . . .] | η [---].[21] The *andreion*, *agela*, and *symboletra* are all listed with the preposition ἤν, or "or in," but the dancing ground, the *choros*, is listed with ἐπί, or "at." Gagarin and Perlman interpret

[13] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, nos. A1, Da1, Elt2, G4, G75.
[14] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, G4.4; IC 4.4; SEG 45.1277 et al.
[15] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, G75.B.7-9 (IC 4.75). Gagarin and Perlman correct ἐπς to ἐ<κ>ς and ὅτ᾽ to ὅτ<τ>᾽.
[16] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 432-433.
[17] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, G75.A, C, and D.
[18] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 433.
[19] van Effenterre 1993, 7-10.
[20] As far as we can tell, Greek poleis on the mainland only started to provide individuals with military equipment in the fourth century (see van Wees 2004, 47-48). The best example is Athenian *ephebes* in Pseudo-Aristotle's *Constitution of the Athenians* (Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*]) of the late fourth century.
[21] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, Elt2.6 (IC 1.10.2; SEG 60.986 et al.).

these prepositions as distinctions between open and closed structures.[22] They argue that the *andreion*, *agela*, and *symboletra* had to meet within physical buildings whereas the *choros* met outdoors. Neither *agela* nor *symboletra* is otherwise attested in Cretan epigraphy.[23] *Agelaos* is elsewhere used to describe an individual, so it must have been a club or group.[24] The word *symboletra* is related to συμβάλλω, but it includes the rare -τρα suffix indicating place.[25] Scholars have suggested that it was an exercise ground or a location where deliberation occurred.[26] This inscription, therefore, seems to indicate that the Eltynian *andreion* was a set location or organization within the community.

The reference to the *andreion* from Datala comes from the Spensithius Decree – a late sixth- or early fifth-century inscription on a flattened mitra detailing Spensithius' appointment to the position of *poinikastas*.[27] Since side A is not relevant to the following discussion, I will not reprint it here. Side B of the mitra lists the legal responsibilities and benefits of a *poinikastas* (see figure 5.1).

[22] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 259.
[23] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 259.
[24] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 92.
[25] Smythe 3.20.57.
[26] Bile 1997, 116; Mandalaki 2010, 17.
[27] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, Da1; SEG 27.631 et al.



Figure 5.1: Side B of the Spensithius Decree.[28]

Gagarin and Perlman provide the following translation:

> (1-6) The *poinikastas* is to obtain the equal; wheresoever the *kosmos* should be, so too the *poinikastas* is to be present and attend at both sacred and secular (activities), and for whatever god there should be no clear (?) priest, the *poinikastas* is to perform the public sacrifices and to have the revenue from the sanctuary (?). (6-11) There is to be neither seizure of the person nor of the property of the *poinikastas*. As for a trial, whichever the *poinikastas* wishes, he is to use, just as the others, or his trial will be before a *kosmos*, but not any other

[28] I have presented an image of Gagarin and Perlman's (2016, 184) text in order to preserve their unique presentation of the non-Attic letters.

way. (11-16) (As) *dikaia* to the *andreion* he shall give ten axes of meat when the others offer the first fruits (?) and the yearly obligation (?); but he will collect (?) the *laksion*. Nothing other is to be required unless he should wish to give. (16-17) The sacred matters are to be for the [---].[29]

Lines eleven through sixteen indicate that the *poinikastas* had a special role within the *andreion*, but the exact nature of this role is dependent on words we do not understand, δίκαια and λάκσιον. The term λάκσιον is a mystery.[30] The δίκαια may have been what was normally required of citizens to contribute to the *andreion*. Gagarin and Perlman argue that since Spensithius was awarded rations for the *andreion* on side A of the inscription, his δίκαια contribution to the *andreion* must be something different.[31] They connect the meaning of this word to the temporal clause, ἄι κα ϙὼι ἄλϙ[ι ἀπ]άρϙωνται καὶ τὸ ἐπενιαύτιον, suggesting that the *poinikastas* would give both what was expected and ten axes of meat when others contributed their first fruits and yearly obligation.[32] However we translate δίκαια and λάκσιον, the Spensithius decree is illuminating because it shows that certain individuals gave food to the *andreion*, ἐς ἀνδρήιον δώσει δέξα πέλερυς κρέων.[33]

We cannot overlook, moreover, the fact that the Spensithius Decree is inscribed on a mitra. It is clearly not a functional piece of equipment, and unlike the nine inscribed mitrai discussed in chapter four, the mitra of the Spensithius decree was hammered flat prior to the recording the inscription rather than warped during the act of inscription.[34] The letters are very small, and would have been difficult to read at a distance.[35] Viviers proposes that the decree was displayed within the regular gathering space of an *andreion*, but this assumes that the *andreion* was concentrated in a particular physical space.[36] Gagarin and Perlman argue that the text was "written for and possibly even by Spensithios as a personal copy for himself and his family, perhaps copied from a public inscription in the city."[37] It is tempting to imagine that the choice of a mitra as the venue for this record added to its political and social significance. This does not necessarily help us understand how *andreia* functioned, but it confirms that military equipment were powerful objects within Cretan communities and further associates political power with martial power.

[29] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 184-185.
[30] Jeffery and Morpurgo-Davies (1970) suggest that it derives from λάξις, or "portion of land;" Beattie (1975, 43) ties it to λῆξις, or "ballot;" and van Effenterre (1973, 43) posits that it is related to λάχνος, or "wool."
[31] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 195.
[32] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 195-196. Gagarin and Perlman (ibid.) argue in favor of this clause being a temporal rather than a conditional or comparative clause. I agree that a comparative would not make a lot of sense, but I remain open to it either being conditional or temporal. The point was that the responsibilities of the *poinikastas* were a reaction to the actions of others, ἄλϙ[ι].
[33] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, Da1.Side B.11-12.
[34] Raubitschek 1972.
[35] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 181-182.
[36] Viviers 1994.
[37] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 182.

The reference to the *andreion* from Axos does not help us understand how the *andreion* was sustained, but it does indicate that meals in the *andreion* were not available to everyone in the community.[38]

[---]ϝκος | ἵναντι τῶν ε̣ἰ[---]
[---]ιν δοκῆν ἀκσία ἦμεν τᾶς τ[ε τροπᾶς]
καὶ τᾶς ἀτελείας <τ>ὰ τέκνα τῶ ἰνυμέ̣[νο ---]
[---] κατ᾽ ἀμέραν ζαμιῶμεν. | αἰ δ᾽ἐπέλ-
θοιεν ἰν ταῖσι πέντε, αἰ μὴ λέοι[εν ---]
[---]ν, | τᾶν δ᾽ ἀμερᾶν | πέντ᾽ ἀμέρας ϝεργακσα[. .]
[. . . . .]ς τᾶι πόλι ἀμίστος. τῶ δὲ μις[τῶ ---]
[--- τ]ᾶ̣ς ἰν ἀντρηίοι διάλ̣σιος | [.] ΙΔΙΑ
Λ̣ΟΙ ἐπὶ σποϝδδὰν | ΕΚΣΟΑΙ . [---]
[--- ἀ]ϝ̣τὸς | ϝεκάστος μὴ ἰνθέ̣μεν |
τᾶι πό[λ]ι. περὶ δὲ̣ τῶ μιστῶ |αἰ πον[---]
[--- . τά]δε δὲ τελίοντι· | ἴσς τε τὰν ἐκατόνβαν
τὰν μεγάλαν | καὶ τὸ θῦμα | καὶ̣ [. .]δ[- c.3-5 -]ν[---]
[---]ρηιον διδόμεν· | τῶν δ᾽ ἄλον πάντον
ἀτέλειαν καὶ τροπὰν ἰν ἀντρηίοι κα[---]
vacat

1 – in the presence of the –
2-3 – the children of the (?) are deemed to be worthy of both [sustenance] and tax exemption –
4-5 – is to fine per day. If they should come forward within five (days), unless they should wish –
6-7 –, and of the days, work (?) five days for the city without pay. Of the wage –
8-9 – of the *dialsios* in the *andreion* . . . . . for serious work (?) –
10-11 – each one himself is not to give to the city. Concerning the wage, if –
12-13 – They pay the following: for the Great Hekatomb and the sacrificial offering, and –
14-15 – to give; but (they are to be) tax exempt from all others and (are to receive) sustenance in the *andreion* –

In late sixth-century Axos, the *andreion* was a place where individuals consumed sustenance, τροπὰν.[39] This space must not have included everyone, as the polis of Axos awarded participation in the *andreion* to individuals within the community as payment for some sort of service. Van Effenterre argues that the recipients must have been non-citizens, on the assumption that citizens automatically had access to the *andreion*.[40] Perlman, however, observes that the

[38] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, A1; IC 2.5.1; SEG 62.633 et al.
[39] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, A1.15.
[40] van Effenterre 1985.

recipients of this honor also appear to have been involved in the ritual sacrifices described in lines twelve to thirteen.[41] She, therefore, argues that they must have been citizens, which suggests that not all citizens were automatically enrolled in the *andreion*.

It is unclear what exactly van Effenterre and Perlman mean by the term citizen.[42] As mentioned above, the word citizen is a bit out of place and anachronistic in a discussion of ancient Crete. Scholars often interpret the term δρομεύς as citizen in the Cretan context,[43] but the word only occurs clearly in three inscriptions from Datala, Eleutherna, and Gortyn.[44] In each of these contexts, the term may relate to a member of the *andreion*. Δρομεῖς appear to have had certain privileges, but it is unclear whether these privileges, such as being able to become intoxicated in a certain ritual space,[45] were tied to their participation in the *andreion* or to their status as δρομεῖς. Many scholars, moreover, associate the term with warriorhood citing Plato's *Laws* (625c-e), in which the Knossian locutor claims that Cretans run up hills and use bows and arrows because of the topography of Crete. As discussed in chapter two, however, Plato clearly indicates that the Cretan penchant for running was related to the orientation of their laws around *arete* rather than organized violence (Pl. Leg. 1.630e, 632e). The term δρομεύς, therefore, does not ultimately help us understand the *andreion*.

Whitley argues persuasively that *andreia* were closely tied to elite male identity, and that many of these males likely participated in the proper functioning of the Cretan polis.[46] But this does not necessarily presuppose that *andreia* were exclusive spaces limited to political participants. Whitley speculates that there may have been multiple *andreia* in each polis and suggests that we might think of them as sub-groups of citizens within a decentralized political community,[47] but the term *andreion* only ever appears in our evidence in the singular. Although many members of the *andreion* probably participated in the polis, there is no indication whether this is simply a coincidence or if "citizenship," if we choose to employ that term, was a prerequisite to membership in the *andreion*. The evidence we do have seems to suggest that the *andreion* was an exclusive space in which membership was limited and controlled by either the members of the *andreion* themselves or the polis, or some combination of these two. They were not de facto citizen bodies, and we should probably avoid conflating membership in the *andreion* with political participation, even if many *andreion* members did indeed participate in running the polis.

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[41] Perlman 2004.

[42] Most scholars seem to be using Runciman's definition of citizenship (see Whitley 2014). Runciman (1990, 348) defines citizens as individuals who "share amongst themselves the incumbency of central government roles, and who subscribe to an ideology of mutual respect." He defines non-citizens as individuals "whose labour is controlled by the citizens."

[43] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 78-79. The term we might expect for citizen, the Cretan word πολιάτας, only appears in two inscriptions (Gagarin and Perlman 2016, G72, L2). The Lyktian text is highly fragmentary, and the Gortynian usage seems to relate to specific civic duties within the polis.

[44] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, Da1, Eleutherna1, G72.

[45] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, Eleutherna1.2-5

[46] Whitley 2018. See also Whitley 2014 for a summary of the debate.

[47] Whitley 2018.

As we shall see, the institution which we are calling the *andreion* was likely a space for performing status and identity, so it may have indeed included citizens if we adopt a narrow version of Duplouy's definition of citizenship. He also believes that citizens controlled government powers but envisions citizenship "as a performance, rather than as a granted status enshrined in legal criteria."[48] Unfortunately, this definition raises new issues, because it is immensely difficult to distinguish between performances of citizenship and performances of eliteness. Duplouy immediately recognizes this problem and argues that the difference is one of scale: if owning a horse was a characteristic of citizenship, then the elite would own many horses.[49] Of the fifteen inscribed armor pieces discussed in chapter four, there are at least ten distinct names – at most, four individuals took and displayed more than one piece of armor.[50] According to Duplouy's definition, this would suggest that roughly forty percent of the *andreion* members were elites and the rest were citizens. While this is an intriguing line of thought, there are serious problems with our evidence that impede any further inquiry. Namely, the Aphrati hoard is a collection of looted objects which probably did not originate from one single polis,[51] and the quality of the armor varied piece-by-piece. Along with the lack of evidence for interpolis warfare discussed in chapter one, we can probably assume that there were hierarchical distinctions within the citizen body or the *andreion*, in the same way that hierarchy existed within Spartan syssitia,[52] but the nature of our evidence is so piecemeal and incomplete that we cannot proceed without depending on *argumenta ex silentio*.[53] Distinguishing between elite and citizen will require more evidence, so it is probably better to think of *andreia* at this stage as elite organizations within which elites performed their status and indirectly influenced the institutions of their poleis.[54] By the end of the fifth century, groups of Cretan warriors, organized perhaps into *andreia*, were operating well beyond the borders of their poleis. The literary evidence that starts emerging in the late fifth century, as a narrow perspective of Cretan νόμοι seen through the eyes of warrior elites fighting on the mainland, also makes sense within these parameters.

As we shall see in chapter six, Axos has the earliest evidence for the regulation of war booty and this too might be an indication that the Axian polis directly controlled their *andreion*.[55] This late sixth-century text, A5+6, is fragmentary, but it appears to name two

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[48] Duplouy 2018, 250.
[49] Duplouy 2018, 271-273.
[50] Συνήνιτος appears twice (SEG 52.830 and SEG 52.831) and Γισοκάρτης appears three times (SEG 52.832, SEG 52.833, and no. 11 in table 4.3 (no SEG number)). The inscriptions on SEG 52.834 and SEG 52.835 are often attributed to the same person, Νέων, but only [- -]ων is actually preserved in SEG 52.834. A mitra from Axos (SEG 52.837) is inscribed with the name ΟΠΡΙΦΣ and a corslet from Aphrati (SEG 52.836) has the name ΟΠΡΙΚΣ. One of these could be a misspelling.
[51] See the discussion in chapter one.
[52] See van Wees 2018a and 2018b.
[53] As Whitley (2018) ultimately has to do in his argument that there were multiple *andreia* in each polis. He bases this argument on narrow readings of Athenaius and Strabo and the uncited claim that Cretan poleis had small citizen bodies.
[54] An idea that Duplouy initially proposed in the conclusion to his 2006 book: elites were not at odds with or subjugated by their communities, as a rule, but rather shaped the institutions of their communities through their competition and pursuit of power (Duplouy 2006, 291).
[55] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, A5+6; Perlman 2010.

sanctuaries as depositories for war booty. I will argue in chapter six that this law assumes control over an existing elite institution and regulates elite dedications to extra-urban and urban sanctuaries. Together with the inscription above, A1, which treats sustenance in the *andreion* as a reward for service, we might conclude that Axos was institutionalizing both elite competition within the *andreion* and the rules that regulated who was allowed into the *andreion*. This line of reasoning will become clearer later in our discussion. In the late sixth century, the Axian *andreion* appears to have become a component of the polis itself. Unfortunately, no other polis appears to have developed such a close connection to their *andreion* before the middle of the fifth century. Without further comparanda and given the existing chronological problems with all the archaeological material from Axos,[56] it remains difficult to speculate why these changes suddenly started to occur at Axos in the late sixth century, if that is even the correct dating for A1 and A5+6.[57]

Altogether the epigraphic evidence suggests that *andreia* were ritual activities, such as eating and drinking, which met in certain locations and had limited capacities or membership within some Cretan poleis. Some *andreia*, like the one at Datala, required their members to contribute to this meal (contra Arist. *Pol*. 1272a). Although the Axian law indicates that they were exclusive events, we cannot determine at this point whether they included elites, non-elite locals, or other non-elites. Commensality and feasting were central components of *andreia*, but these features were not exclusive to the *andreion*.[58] We cannot, therefore, use archaeological evidence for feasting to locate *andreia*. Unfortunately, *andreia* remain significant but mysterious institutions within the socio-political make-up of Cretan poleis.

Building on the preposition ἤν in the Eltynia inscription, many scholars have assumed that the *andreion* was a physical space within the polis. This interpretation may also derive from the notion that *andreia* were proto-*prytaneia*,[59] which Prent seemingly confirmed by classifying the most prominent urban sanctuaries in her study as hearth temples – buildings that developed into *prytaneia* in the fourth century.[60] However, some scholars, who accept that *andreia* were physical spaces, hesitate to identify hearth temples with *andreia* because of their size: they were simply too small to accommodate a large group of ritual participants and diners.[61] Prent expressed a similar concern when she first identified the hearth-temple typology.[62] The excavations at Azoria and the discovery of the communal dining building on the upper west slope of the site initially seemed to resolve this problem.

[56] These issues are discussed in chapter one.
[57] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 52. The authors have privately expressed concerns about the dating of these inscriptions and look forward to an updated pottery chronology.
[58] Prent 2005, 441-71; Prent 2007; Whitley 2018.
[59] Miller 1978.
[60] Prent 2005, 630-632
[61] Whitley 2009, 290.
[62] Prent 2005, 631-632.

In early reports, the excavators at Azoria described the communal dining building as an "*andreion* complex,"[63] but they jettisoned this term in subsequent publications.[64] The communal dining building is a large complex with storage facilities, a kitchen, and dining spaces (see plan 5.1).[65] One of the dining spaces (A2000) was relatively open and accessible, albeit through a narrow door which likely provided a degree of privacy. The other dining space (A800) was square and more exclusive. Entry into this second dining space required passing through a room with an altar. The altar was elevated and the room, in general, was probably open to the larger dining space. Bronze armor, including the crest of an open-faced helmet and an omphalos, was discovered in the storerooms associated with the communal dining building.[66]

[63] i.e. Haggis et al. 2004.
[64] Haggis et al. 2011, 4-6.
[65] Haggis et al. 2011, 7-13.
[66] Haggis et al. 2011, 14-15.



Plan 5.1 – A site plan of Azoria.[67] I have circled the Hearth Shrine, Monumental Civic Building, and Communal Dining Building in red.

Lower down the west slope of Azoria, archaeologists found a hearth shrine (D900, D1000, and D1400) and a monumental civic building (D500).[68] The hearth shrine appears to be something of a hybrid between Prent's hearth temples and suburban sanctuaries – confirming the

[67] Haggis et al. 2011.
[68] Haggis et al. 2011.

concerns about Prent's typologies discussed in chapter three.[69] Like the communal dining building, the monumental civic building had evidence of feasting and ritual activities. Moreover, the monumental civic building more closely resembles something akin to a proto-*prytaneion*.[70] Framed another way, the monumental civic building and the communal dining building could equally be characterized as the architectural home of Azoria's *andreion*, depending on our perspective. They both had private dining facilities, and they were both associated with urban ritual. The excavators at Azoria summarize this problem eloquently:

> The reductive tendency to shape our perception of public spaces – such as *ekklesiasteria*, *bouleuteria*, *prytaneia*, and *andreia* – around individual, epigraphically documented buildings, normative fifth- and fourth-century architectural forms, or perceived (culturally Greek) civic institutions is quickly confounded by the sheer variety of archaeological and cultural contexts and sociopolitical configurations evinced throughout the Greek world, especially in the Archaic period where the evidence is sparse at best. The situation becomes even more complicated when diachronic developments are considered, such as the emergence of new Cretan civic institutions that probably continued to integrate ritual dining into changing and expanding spheres and scales of social display and political interaction.[71]

In our pursuit of the *andreion*, we have made several assumptions about Archaic and Classical Crete that we know to be incorrect. We cannot use fourth-century authors to reconstruct seventh- and sixth-century Crete, and we should not assume that cultural practices at one site are representative of all Cretan sites. Since this has been the *modus operandi* of scholarship on Cretan violence and the *andreion*, we must proceed with caution.[72]

With our current evidence for and understanding of Archaic and Classical Crete, the *andreion* has little to offer and much to distract. It is probably true that the army-of-one mentality directly impacted and interacted with Cretan *andreia*, but we do not yet understand how. We know that *andreia* included socially and politically charged rituals, like those practiced at most urban sanctuaries, but we cannot point to a single building within the ancient polis and call it the *andreion*. The *andreion* at Azoria could have met in the communal dining building, the

[69] Haggis et al. (2011, 37) note that the hearth shrine represents something of a hybrid between Prent's urban and suburban sanctuaries because it was not exclusive and Prent (2006, 629; 2007) characterizes urban sanctuaries as exclusive spaces. In addition, Haggis et al. correctly observe that Prent's suburban sanctuaries, which she describes as "major community sanctuaries," are all in poorly excavated or unexcavated sites. See chapter three for further discussion. If Haggis et al. had found any evidence of violence in their hearth shrine, I would have labelled it as an urban sanctuary. However, the only evidence for violence at Azoria was associated with the communal dining building, which had an altar that was open to the larger dining space.

[70] Haggis et al. 2011, 39.

[71] Haggis et al. 2011, 39.

[72] Paraphrasing Hansen and Hansen-Fischer (1994, 37), Haggis (2015, 223) writes, "if Stephen Miller knew what [a *prytaneion*] actually looked like, as a type of building, he would have illustrated one on the cover of his seminal work." See Miller 1978. Haggis' criticism is rooted in an important point: by searching for the physical spaces in which important political institutions occurred, we assume that these spaces had a recognizable and consistent form. That assumption is not necessarily valid.

monumental civic building, the hearth shrine, or all of these.[73] Moving forward, we should learn from the excavators at Azoria and be cautious when employing the term *andreion*. In what follows, I orient my discussion around groups of warrior elites, who tended to be privileged individuals indirectly and directly involved in the management of the polis, and who used ritual, feasting, and celebrations of warriorhood to forge socio-political bonds. In many cases, these warrior elites may have organized themselves into an *andreion*, but our limited evidence prevents any consistent definition of this complex term.

5.2 – Gatekeeping Warriorhood

There is no evidence that any Cretan polis attempted to regulate or influence how elites enacted organized violence for about one hundred years after the earliest Cretan law, from the late seventh to the late sixth century. Gagarin and Perlman found this odd, and describe the popular assumption that Crete was plagued by organized violence as a mirage produced by Hellenistic evidence.[74] The omission of warriors from the legal texts suggests that these individuals belonged to a political group that was either unregulated or regulated through its own institutions, disconnected from the polis. Celebrations of warriorhood, which typically embraced the ideology of camaraderie or the army-of-one mentality, took various forms, but there was one consistent pattern within all the evidence: warriors were leisure-class hoplites.[75]

I presented this initial observation in chapter one alongside a network analysis visualization of my dataset. When we limit this data to just extra-urban (figure 5.2) and urban (figure 5.3) sanctuaries, the same pattern holds true. In both contexts, leisure-class hoplites are prominent. This is clearly much more the case in urban sanctuaries (5.3), but as I argued in chapters one and two, our evidence for archery in extra-urban sanctuaries (5.2) likely also represents an elite or leisured-class approach to violence.[76] Cretans, like many groups in Ancient Greece, probably considered archery to be a symbol of eliteness and economic privilege.[77]

[73] Haggis et al. 2011.
[74] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 122-124.
[75] For a definition of leisure-class hoplite, see chapters one and three.
[76] All the arrowheads are Snodgrass' type 1d, which is our best candidate for a hunting arrowhead, and most of the artistic depictions of archers on Crete include hunted animals. See the discussion in chapter two.
[77] Brouwers 2010, 227.



Figure 5.2 – Network analysis graph for the evidence of violence in extra-urban sanctuaries. Created with the Fruchterman Reingold setting in Gephi 0.9.2.



Figure 5.3 – Network analysis graph for the evidence of violence in urban sanctuaries. Created with the Fruchterman Reingold setting in Gephi 0.9.2.

Urban sanctuaries are the only spaces with evidence of cavalry, and the evidence for archery in these spaces is completely disconnected from any other type of organized violence. This indicates that none of the entries with evidence for archery at urban sanctuaries also serve as evidence for any other type of violence. Archery at extra-urban sanctuaries, on the other hand, made up a huge portion of our evidence but remains distinct from shields and leisure-class hoplites, which overlap. Elites and their artists appear to have been much more interested in hunting in extra-urban sanctuaries than in urban sanctuaries – where organized violence was fundamentally expensive, elite, and hand-to-hand. Warriors who were committed to the army-of-one mentality fought with spears and swords, potentially alongside non-elites, to protect their poleis. In extra-urban sanctuaries, the ideology of camaraderie tried to create homogeneity between elites from different political backgrounds through common elite experiences.

Through their dedications to both extra-urban and urban sanctuaries, Cretan warriors seem to have had a monopoly over organized violence. At extra-urban sanctuaries, announcing one's status as a warrior required traveling to an isolated sanctuary and dedicating gold or bronze depictions of warriorhood.[78] Organized violence in urban sanctuaries was enacted by leisure-class hoplites against other leisure-class hoplites. Claiming to be a warrior required expensive equipment that made hearing, seeing, and moving difficult. Both ideologies of violence required some starting capital, and this must have created an ideological divide between those with enough wealth to afford the necessary military equipment and those who could not afford to become a warrior. Interestingly, celebrations of the ideology of camaraderie in urban sanctuaries, where the army-of-one mentality was the norm, highlight more costly forms of organized violence despite the equipment being lighter and less metallic overall. This phenomenon is perhaps best illustrated at Prinias – an urban settlement where warriors celebrated both the ideology of camaraderie and the army-of-one mentality concurrently.[79]

Temple A was a hearth temple near the ancient agora of Prinias. The building was destroyed around the middle of the seventh century, along with the rest of the polis.[80] Figure 5.4 presents the most popular reconstruction of this building. For the study of organized violence, the long horizontal frieze over the doorway is the most significant detail. It preserves a line of mounted hoplites moving from right to the left. A picture of these warriors is provided in figure 5.5. The warriors carry shields and spears, and they appear to wear no armor. Their shields completely obstruct their torsos; the artists used the shield-as-body motif to depict these warriors.[81] They probably carry large round shields, rather than omphalos-type shields, since they are carrying the reins of their horses in their left hands. This probably indicates that their shields have *porpakes*, and the warriors are resting their shields on their forearms.

[78] Prent 2005, 154-155.
[79] Another excellent example, a corslet with anatomical male features and hoplites depicted in the shield-as-body motif, was discussed in chapter four.
[80] Erickson 2010, 240-243
[81] See chapter four.



Figure 5.4 – A reconstruction of temple A at Prinias.[82]

[82] Watrous 1998, fig. 8.1.

Figure 5.5 – A photograph of the frieze taken at the Heraklion Museum.

These warriors are potentially good examples of Greenhalgh's mounted hoplites.[83] As I argued in chapter two, there are some issues with Greenhalgh's methodology, but he identifies a type of warrior, what we might call a πρόμαχος, which existed in some parts of the Greek world in the seventh and sixth centuries.[84] The warriors all move to the left and carry their spears at the ready, indicating a collaborative effort on the part of each warrior. As nonanatomic shields with striking limbs and beardless heads, these warriors also adhere to the normate version of warriorhood that I proposed in chapter four, which was prevalent in extra-urban sanctuaries. Although temple A presents a version of the ideology of camaraderie, the camaraderie remains restricted to the wealthiest warriors who rode to battle and fought in prominent positions on the battlefield. Not everyone encountering the frieze on temple A would have been able to afford a horse, prepared to fight in the forefront, or capable of participating in this type of warfare. The artistic frieze on temple A was attached to the agora, the economic center of the community, and it presented organized violence as a rich man's activity. It probably actively excluded some of its viewers and reinforced the notion that becoming a warrior required a large amount of wealth and economic power.

Of course, not all the ideologies associated with temple A related to organized violence and warriorhood. As discussed in chapter four, Prent argues that many urban sanctuaries, like temple A, functioned as equalizing spaces that made ritual activity and dedication more

[83] They may not qualify as they do not wear any armor.
[84] Pritchett 1985b, 25-26, 41.

accessible.[85] They alleviated the unequal system of dedication that was created by the immense distance and isolation of extra-urban sanctuaries.[86] Moreover, she argues that the large quantity of terracotta figurines at urban sanctuaries represents a leveling off between elites and non-elites – that elite and non-elite values began to align in the seventh century with the widespread construction of urban sanctuaries.[87] This argument depends on warrior terracotta figurines and non-elite or low-cost objects that celebrate violence, but as discussed in chapters three and four, Prent is probably overemphasizing our evidence for warrior figurines. Cretan warriors make up much of Murray's recent investigation of the male nude in Early Iron Age art, but these objects appear in extra-urban sanctuaries and significantly predate Prent's urban sanctuary.[88] Instead, I am struck by the large quantity of female figurines in urban sanctuaries and the restriction of the evidence for violence to arms, armor, or relatively high-quality bronze miniatures.[89] The evidence at these urban spaces, therefore, suggests that organized violence was monopolized by elites making more expensive dedications, and this arrangement was tacitly accepted by non-elites who conspicuously refrained from depicting warriors or organized violence in their dedications.

Prent argues that the majority of female terracotta figurines at Cretan urban sanctuaries represent an "elementary concern with (young) female sexuality."[90] The majority of these terracotta female figurines are nude, and many are also pregnant.[91] Additionally, several terracotta figurines and plaques from these spaces also depict male figures gripping young naked female figures by their arms or heads.[92] Cassimatis and Prent interpret these objects as evidence that women must have participated in these cult spaces, and they tie the figurines to Ephorus' description of Cretan initiation rituals (Str. 10.4.16-22).[93] The participation of women in these cults, however, was fundamentally male-oriented, and represent a "distinct male claim to female sexuality."[94] In other words, they capture instances of sexual or gendered violence between men and women.[95] Daniels offers a more insightful perspective that challenges the notion that female nudity was inherently erotic or related to fertility.[96] Within the artistic milieu of the Eastern

[85] Prent 2005, 422-424.
[86] Prent 2005, 502.
[87] Prent 2005, 422-424.
[88] Like Prent, Murray (2022, 226) ties the prevalence of nude warrior figurines to Ephorus' fragments in Strabo – a literary description written almost one thousand years after the figurines were crafted. For further discussion of Cretan nude warrior figurines, see Murray 2022, chapters three and four.
[89] Böhm's (1990) catalog of nude female figurines and plaques has far more entries from Crete than from any other region in the Greek world.
[90] Prent 2005, 479. See also Böhm 1990 and Cassimatis 1982.
[91] Böhm 1990, 78-79; Cassimatis 1982, 450; Prent 2005, 412-413.
[92] Prent 2005, 412.
[93] Cassimatis 1982; Prent 2005, 481-487.
[94] Prent 2005, 489. See also Sourvinou-Inwood 1973.
[95] Even if these are mythological scenes, they capture and normalize sexual or gendered violence. For comparandum, we might think of the Lokrian practice of sending young girls to be suppliants in Troy as repentance for the rape of Cassandra (see Fritz 1978). In this case, the enforcement of ritualized chastity was justified and set within a broader narrative about sexual violence, and the art prioritized that violence over the innocence of the victims.
[96] Daniels 2022.

Mediterranean, nude female figurines operate as connections between elite males and female divinities, who use their bodies to empower heroes. Whether we prefer to follow Daniels or the older models, these cult objects were oriented around the male experience and perpetuated a patriarchal worldview, and the evidence for non-elite participation in organized violence within urban cult assemblages remains absent.[97] Instead, organized violence remained the practice of the wealthy and the elite, and when expressions of violence did appear in urban sanctuaries, they took the form of real arms and armor or high-quality bronze art – media that Prent defines as the dedications of the wealthy.[98]

By avoiding organized violence, the terracotta figurines perhaps counter-intuitively perpetuate the ideologies of violence discussed in chapter four, both the ideology of camaraderie and the army-of-one mentality, because they implicitly accept that organized violence was an elite-only activity. As Eagleton argues, avoiding certain ideologically charged practices is a form of acknowledging the existence of that ideology, which in turn perpetuates it further.[99] Even if we imagine that many non-elites were combatants themselves, they perpetuated the notion that warriorhood belonged to the elites by refraining from making dedications that depicted or represented violence within their own social fields. The notion that young girls dedicated images celebrating their lack of agency is much more disturbing,[100] but this example illustrates the pervasive power of an ideology on individual experience. The near complete absence of violence in terracotta or non-elite dedications could suggest that the elite monopolization of organized violence was so complete that most Cretans simply associated warriorhood with eliteness.

5.3 – Warriorhood and the Emergence of the Polis

This association, between eliteness and warriorhood, was probably tied to the institutional structure of the Archaic Cretan polis. Most scholars assume that Cretan poleis were warrior aristocracies, but what exactly does that mean? For Willetts, Cretan poleis were created and protected by a class of wealthy warrior elites, who were maintained through social and political institutions so that they could continuously engage in organized violence with neighboring poleis.[101] This group was ethnically and culturally different from local Cretans – they were Dorian invaders. As discussed in chapter two, Chaniotis and Viviers expanded this model to argue that the economic and legal policies of Cretan poleis were oriented around maintaining this warrior class.[102] There is little to no evidence for this model in the Archaic

[97] The absence of evidence for non-elite types of organized violence was discussed in chapter one.
[98] Prent 2005, 421.
[99] Eagleton 1991, 3, 21, 34.
[100] As Cassimatis (1982) and Prent (2005, 481-487) suggest for nude female figurines and plaques. It is worth emphasizing that Daniels (2022) makes a more persuasive and compelling argument that nude female figurines actually had little to do with the lived experience of women and more to do with elite male identity. Under her model, it seems likely that female figurines are not evidence of female participation in cult, but rather yet another avenue for elite male participation.
[101] Willetts 1955, 250.
[102] Chaniotis 1999, Viviers 1999.

period, but it is probably correct that organized violence was a key aspect of Cretan polis formation.

At the same time that Cretan poleis were emerging in our archaeological and epigraphic evidence – the late seventh century – the evidence for violence on Crete suggests that organized violence was ideologically associated with elite identity in both urban and extra-urban spaces. Although he uses different terms to study a different chronological period, Tilly persuasively illustrates how violence between elites and autonomous communities in Medieval and Early Modern Europe led to a centralization of force and a concentration of capital, which political leaders utilized in turn to create more complex systems of administration and control.[103] Since there is no conclusive evidence of territorial conquests on Crete before the Hellenistic period, Cretan poleis would most closely qualify as Tilly's "tribute-taking empires," but there are obvious anachronisms preventing us from applying Tilly's model further.[104] However, the absence of conquest also eliminates other important models of complex-polity formation. Carneiro's circumscription theory, for example, does not apply since it depends on territorial conquest as the catalyst for the formation of complex polities.[105] Forsdyke's "politics of exile" system, which she defines after an investigation of four Archaic poleis from across the Aegean, similarly falls short for the Cretan context since it hinges on the notion that elites used violence to hoard agricultural land, both locally within the polis and through territorial conquest.[106]

For Crete specifically, Haggis argues that Cretan proto-poleis developed out of nucleated and institutionalized households.[107] The elites, in this instance, were the central-most and oldest family unit in the community, around whom the other households coalesced. By the Archaic period, "circumscribed lineage-based" elites formed a ruling class.[108] These families controlled most of the agricultural and pastoral resources, and they sought to maintain this control by managing social and economic identities and through the monopolization of opportunity.[109] In this model, warriorhood was probably a guarded status of elites, and the ideology of camaraderie and the army-of-one mentality were mechanisms for controlling who could and who could not identify as elite.[110]

Whitley agrees with Haggis for communities that were stable over long periods, like Knossos.[111] He argues that the generational and highly diverse burials at Knossos reveal a "Nuristan" type community, in which elite competition created a stagnant hierarchy with lineage-based elites in positions of power.[112] Whitley cites the high quantity of weapons in

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[103] Tilly 1990, 76-91.
[104] Tilly 1990, 20-21.
[105] See Carneiro 1970 and 2012.
[106] Forsdyke 2005, 25.
[107] Haggis 2013, 65.
[108] Haggis 2013, 82. See also Wallace 2010, 347-348.
[109] Bintliff 1982: 108; Haggis 2013, 82; Jameson 1992.
[110] In chapter one, I defined elite as a member of a community who was eligible for both social and political prestige; and who acted out, achieved, inherited this power. See chapter one.
[111] Whitley 1991, 346, 361.
[112] Whitley 1991. "Nuristan" is a reference to the work of Schuyler Jones. Jones studied the people of the Waigal Valley in the Nuristan province of modern Afghanistan. See Jones 1974.

Knossian burials as evidence for this claim – claims to warriorhood became so intertwined with elite identity that warriorhood was divorced from participation in actual organized violence.[113]

On the other hand, Whitley argues that unstable proto-poleis like those around modern Kavousi were created by big men.[114] In these types of communities, the leader of a single household became a focal point for the surrounding communities.[115] Through their control of people rather than land, they accumulated the most stuff.[116] Violence, both structural and organized, is key to Whitley's version of Binford's big man model.[117] Big men used structural violence to control their followers, and organized violence inevitably erupted between communities when these leaders died. Cretan poleis that formed through this model were archaeologically inconsistent with frequent changes in cultural practice. Within Whitley's big man model, organized violence was an important pathway to political power. This probably made warriorhood something to manage, control, and guard, since access to organized violence meant access to becoming a big man.

All three of these models depend on hereditary privilege or inherited wealth, which van Wees and Fischer rightly argue are more likely the ideal than the reality in the Archaic period.[118] Although the Spensithius Decree, discussed above, indicates that certain positions or honors within Cretan poleis were hereditary,[119] the systems of inheritance preserved in our historical record would have quickly fragmented fortunes and family estates over several generations.[120] Duplouy argues that individual elites had to prove their status through active participation and performance in the public space, and even privileges received through inheritance had to be actively accepted.[121] These observations certainly apply to our model of Cretan polis formation.[122] As will be discussed below, Seelentag and Meister argue that Cretan poleis, and then all Greek poleis, developed out of the institutionalization of elite competition.[123] Their model envisions the early polis as a network of interpersonal interactions that through monumentalization and normalization, developed into legal and cultural νόμοι.

[113] Whitley 1991, 355-356.
[114] As defined by Binford (1983, 219).
[115] Whitley 1991.
[116] Whitley 1991, 349.
[117] See chapter one for the definitions of violence, structural violence, and organized violence.
[118] Van Wees and Fischer 2015, 3-4.
[119] Many scholars argue that the Spensithius decree is the exception that proves the rule since Datala was "a small, apparently insignificant community" (Hawke 2011, 123). We have not located this polis, and there is no reason to assume it was small. Anyone who has visited Aphrati, Prinias, or any other important Cretan poleis, would not assume that they were any different in size than mainland poleis.
[120] Van Wees and Fischer 2015, 6-7.
[121] Duplouy 2006, 290-291; 2015; 2018.
[122] Unfortunately, conversations about polis development among historians, such as Duplouy (2006) and van Wees and Fischer (2015), rarely intersect with comparable conversations among archaeologists, such as Haggis (2014) and Whitley (1991, 2014).
[123] Meister and Seelentag 2020, Seelentag 2020.

As discussed in chapter one, I prefer a version of Smith's constellation model of polity formation.[124] Ancient communities were networks, or constellations, of economic and political interactions, which were in turn limited by geography and technology. I find Haggis' model of household nucleation, Whitley's "Nuristan" type communities with highly competitive elites, Whitley's adaption of Bintlif's big man model focused on individual leaders, and all the other proposed methods by which poleis formed all equally plausible to various degrees for the hundreds of ancient Cretan communities. Building on Whitley's "Nuristan" type community, Forsdyke argues that elites in some poleis gradually shifted their competition from burial contexts to political spaces, and it is easier to envision how social practices and rituals might migrate into new arenas with a more fluid constellation model.[125] Whitley proposed another system, the "citizen state" model, in which mobile and transient citizens, who established bonds of commensality through ritual feasts in hard-to-reach natural spaces, built the administrative institutions of their communities through a constellation of social relationships oriented around their ritual dining.[126] The constellation model allows us to fit all of these proposed models, despite their potentially anachronistic terminology, to the evidence that best supports that model without requiring a large, more rigid, paradigm for all human communities. While Whitley's "Nuristan" and big man models work for numerous poleis across Crete, his "citizen state" model only works for Praisos, a site he excavated. This inconsistency is not a major issue, and is even expected to a degree, within the constellation model.

The geography of Crete is the forum for these constellations, but it does not necessarily dictate their form. The consistent point in all the models that have been proposed for the formation of Cretan poleis is that elites held and managed the economic and political authority within each polis, and these elites organized themselves within groups that celebrated different ideologies of warriorhood in different ritual contexts. Moreover, the trappings of organized violence and paraphernalia of warriorhood are consistently associated with elite power and the elites' ability to control the institutions of the polis. Eliteness was something that had to be proven, but the performance of elite power, especially in the form of organized violence, had a serious and immediate impact on the functioning and the safety of the polis.

Cretan warriorhood did not look the same in every polis (see Map 5.2). Praisos and Gortyn had evidence of both the ideology of camaraderie and the army-of-one mentality.[127] Prinias and Azoria, the only poleis destroyed and then abandoned in the periods under

[124] See Smith 2003 and 2015. There are many more models of Cretan polis formation than those discussed here. For an overview, see Haggis 2014, Whitley 2014, Wallace 2010, and Wallace 2014. Haggis is more sympathetic to post-processualist theory, Whitley is more sympathetic to processualist or neo-processualist theory, and Wallace more sympathetic to the literary or historical evidence.
[125] Forsdyke 2005, 24.
[126] Whitley 2014. As outlined above, I have serious concerns about the terms "citizen" and "state" in a conversation about ancient Cretan poleis.
[127] For Praisos, cf. the encumbering hoplite armor (Snodgrass 1964, 10, 28, 74) and the looted terracotta plaques with shield-as-body warriors carrying omphalos-type shields (Dohan 1931, 214). For Gortyn, cf. the miniatures of encumbering armor (Snodgrass 1964, 74) and the warrior plaque discovered at the base of a Byzantine wall below the terraced altar on the acropolis (Rizza and Santa Maria Scrinari 1968, 176).

investigation here, only had evidence of the ideology of camaraderie.[128] The Orthi Petra cemetery at Eleutherna also only had evidence for the ideology of camaraderie.[129]Axos, Dreros, Onythe, and Aphrati, on the other hand, only had evidence for the army-of-one mentality.[130] In every instance, violence remained limited to elites and the leisured class. Although we may not be able to agree on how exactly each of these poleis formed, it seems clear that organized violence became an aspect of elite identity by the seventh century. Moreover, Cretan warriors appear to have closely guarded access to and membership in their warrior group.

Map 5.2 – The poleis relevant for the current discussion. This map does not include poleis with evidence of violence if that evidence does not reliably relate to the two ideologies of violence identified in chapter four.

This is not a new idea within the study of ancient Greek warfare. Lloyd argues that political and military power was restricted to leisured elites in the Early Iron Age.[131] Pre-Archaic Greek communities included groups of elites who dedicated themselves to the warrior identity, and these communities tried to make warriorhood more accessible to elites and less accessible to non-elite or foreign combatants. For Lloyd, elites forged and managed this new identity as older fora of elite competition became less prevalent, the elite group grew smaller numerically, and elite competition generally shrank to just the wealthiest class.[132] This is very similar to Tilly's "tribute-taking empires" of the Medieval and Early Modern periods – political organizations in which organized violence, what Tilly describes as coercion, was highly centralized into the

[128] Haggis et al. 2011. There is evidence for the army-of-one mentality in the mortuary contexts outside of Prinias (see Lembesi 1976), but not within the urban center of the polis.
[129] Specifically, an omphalos-type shield and figurines of naked warriors with shields-as-bodies (see Stampolidis 2003, 2007).
[130] Hoffman 1972.
[131] Lloyd 2021, 51-54.
[132] Lloyd 2021, 53-54.

hands of very few individuals.[133] Something similar probably happened on Crete in the tenth, ninth, and eighth centuries. On the mainland, Lloyd argues that warriorhood became more accessible as populations increased and the Mediterranean became more interconnected.[134] On Crete, ideologies of violence enforced the notion that warriorhood was limited to the elite warrior group and inaccessible to everyone else. It is worth hypothesizing that the ideology of camaraderie, which promoted a Cretan *koine* and notions that Crete somehow stood apart from the rest of the eastern Mediterranean, may have contributed to the continued inaccessibility of warriorhood within Cretan poleis.

Cretan elites probably monopolized organized violence so that they could control who could qualify as a warrior within each Cretan polis. By the late seventh century and the emergence of the Cretan polis, warriorhood was intertwined with eliteness. This further incentivized elites to monitor warriorhood, since warriorhood was a pathway to real political and economic power within the community. In a rather roundabout way, Tilly's "tribute-taking empire" model is the most applicable for Cretan poleis.[135] Due to the piecemeal state of our evidence and the complete absence of evidence for actual battles, we should probably refrain from making further assertions about the role of violence within seventh and sixth century poleis. But there is still much to say about the ways in which the monopolization of violence impacted elite identities and risked political instability and *stasis*.

5.4 – Competition and Collaboration within the Cartel

Building on a modified versions of Haggis' nucleated-household model or Whitley's "Nuristan" model, Prent and Seelentag argue that the warrior group, what they call the *andreion*, centered around a single household initially and became more egalitarian over the course of the first millennium.[136] This idea has been discussed at length, since it seemingly explains the so-called Archaic Gap – a dramatic decrease in material culture in the late seventh and early sixth centuries.[137] During the Archaic Gap, votives declined in number and quality, and the drinking vessels typically associated with elite dining suddenly became plain and undecorated.[138] Erickson argues that this transition is a cultural choice comparable to fifth-century Sparta – what he describes as Cretan austerity.[139] Rabinowitz argues that Cretan elites abandoned large mixing bowls, symbols of a host's ability to provision a large number of guests, in favor of larger personal mugs at the start of the Archaic Gap.[140] He interprets this shift in material culture as a shift in the ideology of warrior elites, wherein elite individuals stopped trying to compete with

[133] Tilly 1990, 21.
[134] Lloyd 2021, 55.
[135] Tilly 1990, 21.
[136] Prent 2007; Seelentag 2015, 33.
[137] Discussed in chapter one. The Archaic Gap is probably an archaeological construct.
[138] Erickson 2010, 309, 320; Matthaus 2011, 125.
[139] Erickson 2010.
[140] Rabinowitz 2014, 95.

each other and started promoting an ideology of egalitarianism within the warrior group.[141] Rather than having the host provide for the group and win recognition for his generosity, each person had an equal share.

Seelentag argues that Cretan elites organized themselves through a process of cartelization.[142] They agreed amongst each other to limit their political and economic competition in order to retain their overall status within the hierarchy of their polis. They sought to reduce, or even eliminate altogether, social mobility by creating institutional mechanisms to preserve their monopolization of economic and political power.[143] According to this line of argumentation, seventh-century institutions limited inter-elite competition in burial practices and drinking rituals, but elites assigned the enforcement and agency of these restrictions to the demos.[144] By incorporating the demos, they elicited non-elites' consent to and acceptance of the unequal hierarchy. Thus, Seelentag argues, elites prevented *stasis* from erupting between elites through egalitarianism and between elites and non-elites through legal institutions.[145]

Citing Simmel's sociology of competition, Meister and Seelentag describe these ancient cartels by comparing them to economic cartels.[146] Wealthy elites limited their competition with one another in order to take advantage of everyone else in the community in the same way that economic cartels limit competition between members of the group to keep prices for the consumer high.[147] Simmel's sociology of competition is based on the classic prisoner's dilemma. This idea is illustrated in table 5.1, within which Person A and Person B are either competing or collaborating. When they compete, one person could win more but also risks getting nothing. By collaborating, both people earn something, but they typically stand to gain less overall. Choosing to collaborate guarantees benefits for both parties, but this choice requires forgoing the opportunity for more benefit.

	A Victory	**A Defeat**	**Collaboration**
B Victory	-	A = 0 B = 2	-
B Defeat	A = 2 B = 0	-	-
Collaboration	-	-	A = 1 B = 1

Table 5.1 – the prisoner's dilemma applied to elite competition on Crete.

[141] Rabinowitz 2014, 114.
[142] Meister and Seelentag 2020, Seelentag 2020.
[143] Seelentag 2020, 63.
[144] Seelentag 2020, 76.
[145] Seelentag 2015, 22, 29-30.
[146] Meister and Seelentag 2020, 19; Simmel 1992, 340-342.
[147] Meister and Seelentag 2020, 19-20; Seelentag 2020, 63.

For Crete, the cartelization model suggests that warrior elites promoted the ideologies of violence in order to make violence financially inaccessible to the lower segments of society and thereby maintain their monopoly over violence within the community. If versions of Whitley's big men communities existed,[148] then elites chose to forego being big men in favor of collective rule in which each individual had less power. But these elites were monopolizing violence, and violence carries additional risks. Elites no doubt committed violence against non-elites, but our evidence only ever records incidents of elite-on-elite violence – according to the iconography of the army-of-one mentality, elites were both the sole perpetrators and sole victims of organized violence.

This observation is initially surprising, especially in the context of Crete, which has traditionally been characterized as an island of constant warfare between organized armies rather than individual elites. But it makes sense within the cartelization model if we envision the cartel as a group of competing peers. Studying high-school bullying, Faris et al. argue that aggressive actions against individuals within the same friend group are typically instrumental.[149] Although these individuals consider themselves peers, they utilize aggression, confrontation, and hostility "to exact retribution, achieve prominence, or vanquish a rival."[150] The smaller and more exclusive the friend group, the higher the intensity and frequency of aggression, since these peers compete for fewer social positions and relationships.[151] Although Cretan elites organized themselves into cartels that promoted egalitarianism, limiting and monitoring membership into the cartel likely increased the rate of potential conflicts between the existing members. By institutionalizing certain arenas of competition, such as burial contexts and drinking rituals, other arenas, like warriorhood, would have become dramatically more competitive. The social, economic, and political positions at stake impacted both elites and non-elites, so non-elites were often implicated and incorporated into these inter-cartel competitions.

One key aspect of cartelization is the need to concede certain powers to non-elites in order to monitor elite competition. This phenomenon is perhaps best illustrated in the so-called Dreros constitution of approximately 640:[152]

1	ἄδ' ἔϝαδε | πόλι· | ἐπεί κα κοσμήσει, | δέκα ϝετίον τὸν ἀ-
1a	θιός. ολοιον
2	ϝτὸν μὴ κοσμῆν· αἰ δὲ κοσμήσιε, ὄπε δικάκσιε | ἀϝτὸν ὀπῆλεν | διπλεῖ | κἀϝτὸν
3	ἄκρηστον | ἦμεν | ἃς δόοι, | κὅτι κοσμήσιε | μηδὲν | ἦμην. *vac.*
4	Χ ὀμόται δὲ | κόσμος |κοὶ δάμιοι | κοὶ ἴκατι | οἰ τᾶς πόλ̣[ιο]ς̣.

1a	God. *oloion*
1-3	Thus has the polis decided: when someone has been *kosmos* the same person is not

[148] Whitley 1991.
[149] Faris et al. 2020.
[150] Faris et al. 2020, 674.
[151] Faris et al. 2020, 676, 682.
[152] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, Dr1; SEG 27.620 et al.

to be *kosmos* (again) for ten years. But if he should serve as *kosmos*, whenever he should give judgement, he is to owe double, and he is to be without rights as long as he lives, and whatever he should do as *kosmos* is to be void.

4 The oath-swearers (are) the *kosmos* and the *damioi* and the twenty of the polis.

In seventh-century Dreros, the polis decided to punish people who served as *kosmos* more than once within ten years. This rule limited members of the elite class and, since the law was created by the polis, we can imagine that elites also had a hand in creating it.[153] One of the oath-swearers is the *kosmos* himself, so this official, presumably a member of the elite, is consenting to being regulated by other elites.[154] They made the demos, the *damioi* in the local dialect, swear to uphold the law, but the law itself does not create new pathways for the demos to acquire political power.[155] Instead of empowering the demos, the law gives existing elites, who already have the wherewithal to become the *kosmos*, more opportunities for this position.[156] It ensures that one person could not hold the title multiple years; it does not directly make candidacy more accessible if there were already more than ten candidates.[157] As Seelentag might say, the cartel created a law that made local politics fairer, but it maintained the uneven hierarchy. By including the demos as an oath-swearer, elites had the demos consent to this *status quo* and promise to keep things fair for the pre-existing ruling class. Cartelization and the institutionalization of elite competition created political stability both between elites and between elite and non-elite groups, while simultaneously maintaining preexisting hierarchical distinctions between elite and non-elite.[158]

According to Seelentag, the cartel of egalitarian warrior elites created politically stable poleis in the seventh century that would survive relatively unchanged until the fourth century.[159] This system was built on egalitarianism and homogeneity between elites, but the army-of-one

[153] As Papakonstantinou (2008, 68) writes following a detailed discussion of Greek laws, Archaic laws were "a complex social construct, the result of negotiation and compromise" between various groups within the polis. We should probably imagine that the *andreion* was just one of these groups.
[154] This interpretations of ὀμόται δὲ, "the oath-swearers are," is the most popular one. See Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 206-207.
[155] We must remember that these laws were displayed alongside other laws and therefore interacted within a broader context of their publication (Papakonstantinou 2008, 54-56). Even if we one day find a law that did indeed empower the Drerian demos as early as the seventh century, then the absence of any such stipulation in Dr1 is noteworthy.
[156] Hawke 2011, 285.
[157] Many scholars argue that the office of *kosmos* was a rotating position between a set board of tribal leaders in the Hellenistic period. Gagarin and Perlman (2016, 66) suggest, with some hesitation, that a dating formula on the Gortynian Great Code (G72.5) may indicate that this system of rotation existed as early as the fifth century. It is possible to imagine, for example, that the Drerian *kosmos* here in Dr1 rotated between a select committee of ten or more individuals. Perhaps the twenty of the polis, mentioned at the end of the text, was the full board of eligible *kosmoi* (see Hawke 2011, 185). However, there is no clear indication in our evidence that the office of *kosmos* was on a set rotation in any polis in the Archaic and Classical periods. Regardless, the absence of a structured rotation does not mean that limited expansions of the office, like Dr1, would have dramatically impacted the social hierarchies and inequalities within ancient Cretan poleis. Hawke (2011, 185) is probably correct that "the primary beneficiaries of the law will have surely been those individuals who wanted to ensure the rotation of the office and its influence among themselves."
[158] Seelentag 2015, 33.
[159] Seelentag 2015, 22, 33, 57.

mentality appears to reveal that the opposite was true. Since organized violence was ideologically limited to the wealthiest groups of Cretans, expressions of individual prowess represent claims of superiority against other elites. The armor that appeared in urban sanctuaries with individual elites' names further illustrate this point. If we imagine that these objects were war booty taken in battle, as I argued in chapter four, then they were proof of one elite's superiority over another elite, and they were being displayed in major sanctuaries within the polis. The cartels appear to have been far from egalitarian in poleis that celebrated the army-of-one mentality, but conflicts between the members of these cartels was still ultimately oriented within the hierarchical distinctions between elite and non-elite that the ideologies of violence established.

Prent argues that most urban sanctuaries were exclusive spaces,[160] so the celebration of war booty and expression of individual prowess may have occurred in private. But elites had good reasons to include non-elites, and established competitive media do not always need to be accessible to their audience to still be powerful.[161] Meister and Seelentag argue that elite competition had both a real and an imagined audience.[162] If urban sanctuaries were exclusive spaces, then expressions of individual martial prowess had a real audience in those who were allowed into the space and an imagined audience in those that were excluded. The imagined audience, and the ever-present risk that they might gain access to the real space, made a dedication even more powerful and, to a certain degree, even threatening to both other elites and the stability of the polis. Framed within Faris et al.'s study of aggression within friend groups, threats to the exclusivity of the group threatened each existing member's privileged status.[163] Whether or not anyone from the imagined audience actually saw the dedication, its construction for an imagined audience increased its competitive power for the real audience. Following the excavations at Azoria, however, it appears that Prents' categorization of urban sanctuaries as exclusive and suburban sanctuaries as inclusive is inadequate.[164] Even if some of the urban sanctuaries that had arms and armor adhering to the army-of-one mentality were exclusive spaces, the competitive power of these objects illustrates how the cartelization model incorporated passive non-elites.

Although Seelentag did not review the evidence for violence on Crete before formulating his model, I find it persuasive for our understanding of Cretan poleis in the late seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries.[165] The evidence for individualistic ideologies of violence only modifies his theory slightly. Based on the high number of examples over the whole of Crete, and for the whole chronological period in focus, it appears that elites used the army-of-one mentality to compete with each other within the limited social group that constituted Seelentag's cartel. By

[160] Prent 2005, 629; 2007.
[161] Werron 2011, 252-255.
[162] Meister and Seelentag 2020, 26.
[163] See Faris et al. 2020.
[164] See Haggis et al. 2011 and above.
[165] In his 2015 monograph, he states that he is not an archaeologist and leaves synthesizing the archaeological evidence to others. See Seelentag 2015, 19-20.

dedicating either their own arms and armor or elite war booty from their enemies, they advertised their own martial prowess and their superiority over their fellow elites. The goal of this competition was social, economic, and political positions within the community, and elites included non-elites in this competition to gain an edge over their peers.

If Cretan warriors fought in battles with large numbers of combatants, as I believe they did although our evidence is absent, then celebrations of success created bonds between the participants in the battle – both elites and non-elites.[166] Moreover, hoplite warfare, as I outlined in chapter two, required large numbers of free and enslaved attendants. A single hoplite depended on a network of supporting individuals that helped him get to the battle, fight in the battle, survive if he was wounded, and pursue the enemy or flee after the battle. This hoplite, if he was a Cretan elite, depended on this network of non-elites, and although he did not acknowledge their contributions directly, they shared in his success. In a discussion of ancient New World people, Brumfiel argues that elite competition established horizontal bonds between elites and vertical bonds between elites and their followers.[167] Forsdyke applied this model to the ancient Mediterranean in order to argue that elite competition probably contributed to the development of certain Greek poleis, as elites formed horizontal and vertical bonds.[168] Dedications perpetuating the army-of-one mentality may be similarly establishing bonds horizontally and vertically, but they are also expressions of hostility both horizontally and vertically (see figure 5.6). Elites established positive bonds by memorializing shared effort and trauma, such as a battle, with non-elites but hostile bonds with other elites whom they attacked and stripped of their armor. When this war booty was dedicated and celebrated within the context of the cartel, however, they reinforced the predatory socio-political hierarchy and the elite monopolization of organized violence. This, in turn, established positive bonds with other elites, since it reaffirmed their right to be in the cartel, but negative bonds with non-elites whose contribution as combatants or supporters was ignored.

[166] Seelentag (2015, 33) suggests that this was a fundamental and immensely successful feature of Cretan poleis, but he assumes that elites fought alongside non-elites without any distinguishing equipment.
[167] Brumfiel 1994, 11.
[168] Forsdyke 2005, 22.



Figure 5.6 – A visualization of the horizontal and vertical bonds that can form in battle versus the memorialization of that battle through the dedication of war booty.

Another way to think about these horizontal and vertical bonds is to frame Cretan dedicatory practices in urban sanctuaries within Winters' model for ancient oligarchies. Winters argues that elites living in communities without institutions that guaranteed those elites' claims to property, what he describes as "property rights," tended to be more heavily armed, more violent, and less organized into a single group.[169] Elites in these communities, Winters argues, were focused on "property defense," the notion of acquiring and then protecting their property from actors below, beside, and above them on the socio-economic ladder.[170] As they became more organized and less armed, they eventually won "property rights:" institutional assurances that their property would not be seized from below, the side, or above.[171]

There are numerous issues and inconsistencies within Winters argument,[172] but I think his model helps to explain how horizontal and vertical bonds could be both positive and negative simultaneously. Elites were defending their wealth against both elites and non-elites and therefore saw both groups as competitors. At the same time, their positions and status depended on these groups' consent. Their socio-political position above non-elites was only possible because other elites and non-elites accepted their claims to property and membership within the warrior group. And elites needed non-elites both to protect their property from other elites, but also to perform violence and justify this non-elite support. Although I think Winters' four

[169] Winters 2011, 20-26. Winters presents four types of oligarchies, which represent four extremes on a scale of elite armament versus elite collaboration. Cretan poleis, as I have been describing them – i.e. as adapted versions of Seelentag's cartel model – would fit somewhere between Warring Oligarchies and Ruling Oligarchies. As I explain below, I do not think Winters' typologies are accurate or helpful. I mention his work here because his theories regarding property defense and income defense are instructive.
[170] Winters 2011, 21-22.
[171] Winters 2011, 208. Winters argues that this happened in tandem over the course of history.
[172] He uncritically cites old-fashioned and out-of-date theories about ancient Athens and Sparta, for example, to build his one-size-fits-all model of oligarchy. Despite these methodological problems, his approach to oligarchy as a political institution and his investigation of the agency of oligarchs within this institution is insightful.

typologies of oligarchy are too rigid, his emphasis on elite violence and elite collaboration as conduits for institutional power underscores the delicate balance that elites had to navigate by forging both positive and negative relationships with elite and non-elite groups.

One danger with Winters' model is that it allows for a teleological explanation of ancient oligarchies. Historically, successful oligarchs set aside their weapons and worked together to establish institutions that protected their property,[173] so many ancient oligarchies, we might suppose, worked towards this goal over time. Like many scholars before him, Seelentag argues that Cretan elites achieved something of an oligarchic utopia in the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries, in which elites' property was secured through political institutions, something akin to Winters' "property rights."[174] Certainly, the second half of the sixth century appears to have been a period of increasing prosperity and intensification on Crete. The Azoria and Priniatikos Pyrgos excavations have characterized the late sixth century as a period of increasing economic success.[175] Erny's recent reanalysis of the Messara survey data suggests that the late sixth century was a period of settlement expansion and agricultural intensification.[176] The attribution of Band-Painted pottery, a popular fifth- and fourth-century style that is found in dozens of sites across the eastern Mediterranean, to the Messara implies that this region was producing large quantities of goods for export by at least the middle of the fifth century.[177] But I hesitate to go so far as to suggest that this increased economic activity reflects any sort of stability for Cretan elites themselves. The ideologies of violence, and the positive and negative bonds that they established between elites and non-elites, suggest that each individual elite was stuck in a constant tug-of-war between collaboration and confrontation with his (or her) peers. Although many elites surely benefitted from the changes of the sixth century, we will see in chapter six that war booty became an increasingly important component of elite identity, and this reorientation likely pushed elites to intensify their commitment to violence. If Aristotle is any indication (Arist. *Pol.* 2.1269b, 1272b), the complexities and dangers of being a warrior elite likely continued to be difficult to navigate even as Cretan ideologies of violence shifted over time.

Sastre notes that warriors can "destroy the unity of the society," as a warrior was "constantly competing with himself and others."[178] Indeed, the positive and negative bonds that Cretan elites established through their dedications probably created real conflicts within certain poleis, but only two of the poleis with evidence of violence in this period were actually abandoned.[179] The abandonment of a settlement is rare and typically indicates that numerous

[173] Winters 2011, 208.
[174] Seelentag 2015, 22, 33, 57.
[175] Haggis et al. 2007, Haggis et al. 2011, Hayden and Tsipopoulou 2012.
[176] Erny 2022.
[177] Gilboa et al. 2017 and Lehmann et al. 2019.
[178] Sastre 2008, 1025.
[179] As mentioned above, Prinias and Gortyn has evidence of both the ideology of camaraderie and the army-of-one mentality; Azoria only has evidence of the ideology of camaraderie; and Axos, Dreros, Onythe, and Aphrati only have evidence for the army-of-one mentality.

economic and political problems plagued the inhabitants.[180] Prinias was destroyed and abandoned in the seventh century, and Azoria was destroyed and abandoned in the early fifth century.[181] Both of these poleis had evidence for the ideology of camaraderie, and there was no evidence for the army-of-one mentality at Azoria. At Prinias, there is no evidence for the army-of-one mentality in urban sanctuaries but some in the mortuary contexts associated with the seventh-century polis. Although the army-of-one mentality must have created conflicts between elites within the cartel, the only poleis that were abandoned had no evidence for the army-of-one mentality within their urban sanctuaries. I interpret this phenomenon as an indication that competition within the cartel was intense and potentially life-threatening to the elite victims of violence, but these conflicts were fundamentally instrumental and depended on the existence and political dominance of the cartel. This is not to say that Prinias and Azoria did not have cartels of warrior elites, but rather I am suggesting that competition between cartel members was simply a constant feature of the cartel.

This is perhaps best illustrated through the observation that many legal institutions appear to have been oriented around the preservation of the warrior group.[182] The Gortyn code, for example, appears to include systems that were explicitly designed to alleviate conflicts between cartel members, but within the context of a law that was enacted by and directly impacted both elites and non-elites. In the decades leading up to the code, Gortyn experienced profound political changes that probably indicate that the polis was on the verge of, if not fully ingrained in, *stasis*.[183] It would be an oversimplification to call the ideologies of violence major factors in these civil and regional conflicts, but these ideologies certainly influenced how both cartel members and outsiders framed polis institutions.

By the fifth century, the Gortynians were probably institutionalizing components of the ideology of camaraderie, namely the commitment to collaboration between elites, to preserve the stability of the community. This suggests that there was indeed a need for legal commitments to collaboration, and that the ideological ideal was far from reality within the polis of Gortyn. This observation is best outlined within the system of property inheritance outlined in the Great Code. The relevant passage is on column four:[184]

4.31 ἕ δέ κ᾽ ἀποθάνει τις,
‘τέγανς μὲν τὰνς ἐν πόλι κἄ-
τι κ᾽ ἐν ταῖς ‘τέγαις ἐνẽι αἳ-
ς κα μὲ ϝοικεὺς ἐνϝοικẽι ἐπ-
4.35 ὶ κόραι ϝοικίον καὶ τὰ πρόβατα κα-
ὶ καρταίποδα ἄ κα μὲ ϝοικέος ἕι,

[180] Mackil 2004.
[181] Azoria: Haggis et al. 2011. Prinias: Erickson 2010, 240-243.
[182] Several examples of this observation will be discussed in chapter six. I have decided to focus here on the Gortyn Code, but further examples from Gortyn, Axos, Tylissos, and Knossos will be the focus of chapter six. This is also part of the folk theory of rational thought, as both Plato and Aristotle make this claim.
[183] Perlman 2000; Prent 2005, 270-271.
[184] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, G72; Osborne and Rhodes 2017, no. 125; IC 4.72; SEG 66.1009 et al.

ἐπὶ τοῖς υἱάσι ἔμεν, τὰ δ’ ἄλ-
λα κρέματα πάντα δατεῖθθα-
ι καλῶς, καὶ λανκάνεν τὸς μ-
4.40 ὲν υἱύνς, ὀπόττοι κ’ ἴοντι, δύ-
ο μοίρανς ϝέκαστον, τὰδ δ-
ὲ θυγατέρανς, ὀπόττ̣αι κ’ ἴον-
τι, μίαν μοῖραν ϝεκάσταν. δ̣-
ατεῖθ[θ]αι δὲ καὶ τὰ ματρῶια, ἦ
4.45 κ’ ἀποθά̣[νε]ι, ἄ̃ιπερ̣ τὰ [πατρῶ]ι’
ἔγ̣[ρατ]̣ται. αἰ δὲ κρέματα μὲ εἴ-
ε, στέγα δέ, λακὲν τὰθ θ[υ]γατέ-
ρας ἄ̃ι ἔγρατται. *vac.*

4.31-43: And when one (of the parents) dies, the houses in the city and whatever is inside the houses, those in which a *woikeus* who lives in the country is not residing, and the livestock, small and large, that are not those of the *woikeus*, are to be in the hands of the sons; and all the rest of the property is to be fairly divided, and the sons, however many there are, are to receive two shares each, and the daughters, however many there are, (are to receive) one share each. The maternal estate too is to be divided, when she dies, in the same way as is written for the paternal estate. And if there should be no property but (only) a house, the daughters are to receive their share as written.[185]

Several scholars have characterized these laws as mechanisms to keep wealth in the hands of young male elites.[186] Gagarin and Schaps, on the other hand, argue that this and other passages in the Code were designed to bolster women's economic power.[187] Link argues against this idea. He quotes fragments of later literary sources and frames the Code within his understanding of the *andreion* to argue that the law actually reduced the economic status of women in order to boost male's contributions to the *andreion*.[188] However we interpret these provisions, the polis was clearly concerned with the stability of the warrior group and sought to use legal systems to monitor the power certain members of the community, both male and female, might acquire through property inheritance.[189]

The Gortynian system of inheritance – each daughter receiving half of a son's inheritance – probably served as a mechanism to reduce social mobility and preserve the social and economic power of wealthy warrior elites.[190] The Gortynian system of property inheritance is

[185] Adapted from Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 362.
[186] Bresson 2016; Link 1994, 91; Link 2009; Mackil 2017; Willetts 1967, 18-27.
[187] Schaps 1979, 58–60; 87–8; Gagarin 1994, 61 –71.
[188] Link 2009.
[189] Mackil 2017, 76.
[190] Mackil 2017, 75-76.

often compared to the Spartan system, perhaps because the law in Sparta is not preserved and literary sources describe fourth-century Sparta as a *gynaikokratia*.[191] While this comparison can be fruitful, Bresson rightly emphasizes that there must have been some important differences between Gortynian and Spartan property laws.[192] Hodkinson argues that fifth-century Spartans had the same system as fifth-century Gortynians but the Gortynian regulations on gifts to daughters and women did not apply to Sparta.[193] Lines 4.31-37, for example, emphasize that sons receive the houses in the city, their furnishings, and the livestock before the estate is further divided between the surviving children, ξ δέ κ' ἀποθάνει τις, 'τέγανς μὲν τὰνς ἐν πόλι κἄτι κ' ἐν ταῖς 'τέγαις ἐνẽι αἷς κα μὲ ϝοικεὺς ἐνϝοικèι ἐπὶ κόραι ϝοικίον καὶ τὰ πρόβατα καὶ καρταίποδα ἄ κα μὲ ϝοικέος ἦι, ἐπὶ τοῖς υἱάσι ἔμεν. This clause probably ensured that Gortynian women only inherited land and slaves, while Gortynian men inherited twice as much land and slaves and most, if not all, of the moveable property.[194] Bresson calculates that the Gortynian and Spartan property laws would have left about thirty-two percent of landed property in the hands of women.[195]

Link argues that the Code was a restriction on women, assuming that the Gortynians must have used another system – like equal inheritance – before adopting the Code in the middle of the fifth century.[196] If this is true, and the other laws for heiresses remained the same, then roughly forty percent of landed property would have been owned by women before the Code.[197] The Code, therefore, dropped female ownership of landed property by only eight percent. If the Gortynians really sought to maximize male property ownership, we might wonder why they did not adopt a system similar to the Athenians, in which landed property was primarily held by males.[198] If the Code was designed to maximize male contributions to the *andreion*, why give women any economic power at all?[199]

One possible interpretation of the Gortynian inheritance regulations in the Great Code is that the Gortynians sought to incentivize marriages between the propertied class at Gortyn to

[191] See Hodkinson 2000 and 2004. Bresson (2016) persuasively shows that Sparta's *gynaikokratia* was a myth.
[192] Bresson 2016, 17-18. See also Osborne and Rhodes 2017, 142.
[193] Hodkinson 2004, 104.
[194] Osborne and Rhodes 2017, 147.
[195] Bresson 2016, 22.
[196] Link 1994 and 2009.
[197] Bresson (2016) uses the following calculation based on statistical averages of human populations: (41 × 1/3) + ((21 × 1/3) + 21 × (2/3 × 1/2)) + (17 × 1/4). Forty-one percent of families had both sons and daughters, so the daughter received one third of the property. Twenty-one had no daughters and twenty-one had no sons. Since heiresses' guardians maintained the regular one-third portion for the daughter and was allowed to use the two-thirds usually awarded to the son until the heiresses' children matured, the two-thirds portion of their inheritance would likely decrease by as much as half. Roughly seventeen percent of families died without an heir, and Hodkinson (2000, 111) and Bresson (2016, 22) agree that somewhere around a quarter of this property would end up in the hands of women. If we adjust this calculation for an equal distribution of property and retain the heiress laws, we will get (41 × 1/2) + ((21 × 1/2) + 21 × (1/2 × 1/2)) + (17 × 1/4) = 20.5 + (10.5 + 5.25) + 4.25 = 40.5%.
[198] Foxhall 1989.
[199] As Millender (2018) observes, we should not misinterpret these regulations as evidence of anything approaching gender equality. So far as we know, Ancient Greek women had less individual sovereignty than men in every known polis.

keep wealth localized within Gortyn's elite warrior group.[200] Later in the Great Code, the text stipulates that unmarried heiresses should marry family relatives first, then members of their tribe.[201] There appears to be a deep concern to keep property from fragmenting beyond certain community members, which speaks perhaps to the ways in which systems of property inheritance could potentially impoverish elites.[202] Although some scholars have tried to draw a direct line between these provisions in the Code and the warrior group, our evidence remains too incomplete to support such a claim.[203] However, the provisions concerning inheritance and marriage still seem to be oriented around preserving elite wealth and by extension, elites' capacity to participate in the Cretan ideologies of violence.

Around the same time as the Gortyn Code, the Periclean law limited citizenship to individuals born to two Athenians (Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 26.4). Humphreys interprets this as an attack on elites, who may have pursued marriages with other elite families in other poleis to increase their economic and political power.[204] The Gortynians, then, like other Cretan cartels, may have been trying to incentivize collaboration and intermarriage between elite families within the polis itself. This interpretation aligns with the collaborative ideas promoted within the ideology of camaraderie, but it reorients these ideas into a local and urban space, rather than a regional and extra-urban space. Moreover, it represents a significant shift in the ways in which the polis itself sought to mitigate the power of elites.[205] The Gortynian polis incorporated mechanisms of the ideologies of violence directly into their legal systems.[206] The conflicts and bonds, both positive and negative, that emerged between elites and non-elites due to the ideologies of violence created real problems for Cretan poleis in the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries. But neither one of these ideologies existed on its own. As discussed in chapter four, the ideology of camaraderie and the army-of-one mentality coexisted. In the fifth century, Gortyn appears to be using components of the ideology of camaraderie to alleviate the competitive dangers of the army-of-one mentality. In the process, the Gortynians appropriated elite systems into the broader legal systems of the polis itself. Perhaps Cretan poleis found stability by the time of Plato and Aristotle by selectively embracing more or less of each ideology and conflating the boundary between elite cultural νόμοι and political νόμοι.

Scanlon posits that Cretan poleis adapted political institutions towards regulating organized violence in the seventh or sixth century.[207] As we will see in chapter six, this process

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[200] Hodkinson (2004, 116) discusses this interpretation in his discussion of Spartan women.
[201] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, G72.7.15-8.20.
[202] van Wees and Fisher 2015.
[203] For discussions of the Code as evidence for maximizing property ownership among warrior elites, see Bresson 2016; Link 1994, 91; Link 2009; Mackil 2017; Willetts 1967, 18-27. These arguments depend heavily on the notion that the πυλά described in G72.7.15-8.20 is the same as the στάρτος, which Chaniotis (2005a, 181) and Kristensen (2002, 71-74) determine to be military in nature. Their arguments are rooted ultimately in the etymology of the word, as there is no indication in Cretan epigraphy that στάρτος does indeed have a military connotation. For further discussion of στάρτος, see chapter six.
[204] Humphreys 1974, 93-94. There are many other interpretations of this law. See Walters 1983.
[205] see Mackil 2017.
[206] This observation will be discussed in greater detail in chapter six.
[207] Scanlon 2002, 74.

appears to have occurred much later in the late sixth and fifth centuries. Starting at Axos in the late sixth century,[208] poleis began to regulate participation in the *andreion* and the dedication of war booty through legal inscriptions. The Gortynian Code seems to suggest that the ideologies of violence manifested themselves in other ways during this period of institutional change, but it simultaneously emphasizes that this was not a neat or easy process.

The fifth century was an important period of institutional change, and ideas that continued to dominate the ideology of camaraderie and the army-of-one mentality found their way into the political and legal foundations of Cretan poleis. The ideology of camaraderie promoted collaboration between Cretan elites across political boundaries and the army-of-one mentality tied non-elite groups to elite groups through aristocratic celebrations of warriorhood. Erickson argues that "the very survival of Archaic Cretan communities may have depended on elites redirecting their competitive energies away from lavish display toward the defense of the community."[209] Although the ideologies of violence may have been crucial for this transition, they also created divides between otherwise collaborative elites and bridges between individual elites and the demos which benefitted from the elite's dedication to martial prowess. Seelentag's cartel approach suggests that elites successfully redirected their competitive energies, but they did so by monopolizing violence within the community, institutionalizing inter-elite violence, and making themselves the only legitimate target for this violence.

5.5 – Creating Space and Commemorating Power

As discussed in chapter four, I interpret the fifteen inscribed pieces of armor from Aphrati and Axos as evidence that Cretan elites were dedicating war booty to urban sanctuaries.[210] In addition to its material or economic value,[211] war booty was a commemoration of success and a confirmation of belonging within the warriorhood group.[212] Victory in battle was momentary, but the power acquired in battle could be long-term.[213] However, the power that could be derived from a victory was dependent on the audience of that victory.[214] Hölscher argues that the commemoration of victory is relatively muted in ancient Greek communities because an individual warrior's ideal audience was present at the battle and his success was experienced immediately.[215] This success was converted into social or political power at the battle or in the immediate aftermath of the battle. Roman victories, on the other hand, had to be commemorated in Rome to a politically significant audience that had no personal experience of

[208] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, A1 (discussed above) and A5+6.
[209] Erickson 2010, 307.
[210] Some of these pieces were probably worn by the warriors in the inscriptions, but the verb used in the inscriptions, the Cretan αἱρέω, is more likely to indicate that these objects were war booty. See the discussion in chapter four.
[211] To be discussed further in chapter six.
[212] Rawlings 2016.
[213] Hölscher 2006.
[214] Hölscher 2006.
[215] Hölscher 2006.

the victory. By dedicating proof of their victory to urban sanctuaries, Cretan warriors brought their victory into their polis and converted their temporary success into a more permanent form.

If we envision that Cretan warriors achieved temporary successes in interpolity conflicts – despite the absence for these conflicts in the evidence – then trauma may also have contributed to the social influence or power of Cretan war booty. The persistence of ideologies of violence in elite competitive arenas probably reflects the degree to which violence had become normalized within the day-to-day lives of elites. Organized violence, in all its forms, is inherently traumatic, and individual responses to this trauma, both physical and mental, are highly variable and potentially life-threatening.[216] One means of dealing with this trauma in the modern world is Narrative Exposure Therapy, in which patients create a narrative or autobiographical story about their trauma in a group setting.[217] By retelling the events and incorporating positive thoughts or positive reactions from the group into the memory, the patient diminishes negative experiences and associates new positive thoughts with the event. It is of course impossible to know how Cretan warriors dealt with their trauma, but it is interesting to speculate that the display of and interaction with war booty within the elite warrior group could have had a mental health benefit as well as a political or social benefit. Moreover, elite warriors experienced and confronted their trauma within the ideologies of violence – they curtailed and limited how they created physical memories of their experiences. They dedicated objects and art that celebrated their sacrifice to each other in extra-urban sanctuaries and items celebrating their sacrifice to their community in urban sanctuaries. These institutions helped warriors live with their trauma, but we know of no equivalent institutions for combatants. Indeed, the elite monopolization of violence would have made the reintegration of combatants back into day-to-day life difficult. This untreated trauma probably permeated into the larger community in the form of violence.[218] As we shall see in chapter six, Classical Cretan poleis had a reputation for frequent *staseis*, and these civil conflicts might explain the frequency of Cretan warriors fighting in Spartan armies in the fourth century. Perhaps the elite monopolization of warriorhood and their resistance to creating institutions for combatants, more generally, led to real violence within the community.

The most common piece of armor in urban sanctuaries was the mitra, an inherently elite or leisure-class armor accessory.[219] Cretan warriors were either dedicating the piece of metal protecting their groins to their communities, or they were collecting the groin guards of their enemies to later dedicate to their communities. Whether elites were dedicating symbols of their own masculinity and belonging or of their enemies' vanquished masculinity, these objects have several important implications for our understanding of the elite identity on Crete.

Levi suggested that mitrai quickly became obsolete as Cretans started using lighter and longer body armor that covered their abdomens.[220] In theory, the mitra was redundant – it protected a part of the body that was already highly defended – yet mitrai appear to have been

[216] Scandlyn and Hautzinger 2019.
[217] Lely et al. 2019.
[218] Scandlyn and Hautzinger 2019.
[219] See chapter four.
[220] Levi 1930, 78.

extremely popular. They are the most common armor piece found on Crete and appear in poleis across the island.

Perhaps mitrai were ideologically charged objects tied to the fact that they protected the groin and genitalia. Alternatively, the very fact that they were unnecessary may have contributed to their popularity as symbols of eliteness and wealth. Since they were only attached to the warrior by three bronze rings, it is also possible that mitrai were popular because they were the easiest piece of armor to strip from a warrior. Wearing one through a battle may have been a symbol of martial prowess since nobody was able to seize it. Whatever the reason, mitrai appear to have been popular elite dedications at urban sanctuaries probably into the late sixth century.[221] This in turn, may explain their frequency – within the competitive cartels of ancient Crete, mitrai and other hoplite armor may have perpetuated something of an arms race. Elite warriors may have been compelled to wear the whole panoply regardless of its practicality, because the social expectations were greater than the practical need.

As the ideologies of violence came to characterize both organized violence and elitenenss within Cretan poleis, actual combat must have changed as well. Unfortunately, we have no idea what combat may have looked like before the fifth century.[222] We can assume, however, that battle was ideologically charged and high stakes. Warrior elites not only risked their lives, but they also risked their normate bodies, their political status, and their position within the social hierarchy of their polis. But, in turn, this risk contributed to and confirmed their status and, when successful, won them future support for their lifestyle. The power they put into preparing for this risk eventually became invested in perpetuating their lifestyle and status. This idea is explored further in figure 5.7.

[221] Based on artistic style.

[222] I prefer van Wees' (1994a and 1994b) model, but this system is ultimately rooted in the Homeric poems. The only ideology of violence that has evidence of combat is the third phase, wealth-accumulation warfare, which I will discuss in chapter six.



Figure 5.7 – The cyclical flow of power for warrior elites on Crete.

When warrior elites on Crete had free time and leisure, they could have dedicated themselves to preparing for war. Because their status depended on violence and their self-identification as warriors, it is reasonable to assume that they may have actually prepared for battle. As discussed in chapter two, hoplites did not generally prepare for war in the fifth and fourth centuries, and this practice was likely tied to a larger notion that hoplites should be brave amateurs.[223] However, there is no evidence for this amateur hoplite narrative on Crete.

Van Wees argues that mainland Greek warfare was dominated by leisure-class hoplites in the eighth and early seventh centuries.[224] Around the middle of the sixth century, this system changed, and the working-class or amateur hoplite was born. In particular, he argues that Greek poleis flourished due to greater access to resources, expanded Mediterranean trade, and regional economic specializations. This economic success led to civil conflict, which dismantled the political and military hegemony of leisure-class hoplites. Crete has a different story. Although recent studies of sixth-century Crete have found evidence for dramatic economic intensification, elites seemed to have retained their positions at the top.[225] So far as we can tell, the Cretans never adopted the amateur hoplite narrative. By the fifth century, Cretan warriors emerge in our literary evidence as highly skilled τοξόται. As I explain in chapter six, this term probably relates to their leisure-class status: they had enough free time to practice with a bow. Athenian authors

[223] See Konijnendijk 2018, 39; van Wees 2004, 88.
[224] van Wees 2004, 47.
[225] Erny 2022. This period remains understudied because of the so-called Archaic Gap.

probably characterized Cretans as τοξόται because they were antithetical to the amateur hoplite narrative, which dominated fifth and fourth century Athens.[226]

By committing themselves to their training, Cretan warrior elites converted their economic power into physical preparedness and greater control over their bodies.[227] Their bodies became "a machine whose effect will be maximized by the concerted articulation of the elementary parts of which it is composed."[228] When they went into battle, they converted this invested power into a greater chance of success. Victory led to war booty. War booty was a type of economic power, and the victorious warrior then converted it into religious or social power by dedicating it to an urban sanctuary. Warrior elites won social and political power from their peers – other warrior elites who considered themselves members of the ruling group within the polis. The social or religious power of the dedication, therefore, became social and political power through the dedication's exposure to an audience. Depending on the polis and the historical context, the warrior's audience may have included non-elites or even the whole community. As Duplouy would say, elites acquired their status through performances in socially and politically charged arenas, spaces which may have been both private and public.[229] Regardless, the social or political power won through the display of a memory of combat allowed warriors to reinvest their power into preserving their warriorhood lifestyles. And this lifestyle and privilege is what started this process in the first place.

This cyclical system of power flow might explain the prevalence of mitrai across Crete, but it also helps to explain the ideologies of violence and their prevalence in the cartels of Cretan elites. Warrior groups developed this system while institutionalizing elite competition, monopolizing organized violence, establishing real barriers between elites and non-elites, and creating self-regulating laws. Despite the political risks associated with orienting competition within elite groups around organized violence, as discussed above, the economic requirements for practicing organized violence as a leisure-class hoplite ensured the exclusivity of the elite groups. These ideological systems emerge in our archaeological and epigraphic records in the late seventh and sixth centuries, but they probably developed out of earlier periods. Although the adoption and use of hoplite equipment was piecemeal,[230] these patterns began to emerge in our evidence when hoplite equipment became infused with the Cretan ideologies of violence.

Another way to frame the Cretan ideologies of violence is to do so through Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner's dominant ideology thesis.[231] The dominant ideology thesis states,

> that in all societies based on class divisions there is a dominant class which enjoys control of both means of material production and the means of mental production. Through its control of ideological production, the dominant class is able to supervise the construction of a set of coherent beliefs. These dominant beliefs of the dominant class are more powerful, dense and coherent than those of

[226] Brouwers 2010, 227; Kucewicz et al. 2021. See also chapters two and six.
[227] Markula and Pringle 2006, 78.
[228] Foucault 1991a, 164.
[229] Duplouy 2018.
[230] Snodgrass 1965, 110. See chapters one and two.
[231] Abercrombie et al. 1980.

> subordinate classes. The dominant ideology penetrates and infects the consciousness of the working class, because the working class comes to see and to experience reality through the conceptual categories of the dominant class. The dominant ideology functions to incorporate the working class with a system which is, in fact, operating against the material interests of labour.[232]

Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner argue that Marxist scholars have assumed the existence of dominant ideologies, but these ideologies were never actually achieved.[233] After a survey of Medieval and Early Modern Europe, they conclude that dominant ideologies are "fractured and even contradictory in most historical periods."[234] The dominant ideology thesis aligns very closely with the ideologies of violence on Crete: they were fractured and inconsistent ideologies that tried to present eliteness as a restricted and limited status in order to maintain elite control over social and political institutions. An elite warrior group used art, laws, and the economy – the means of both material and mental production – to present warriorhood as synonymous with eliteness, and they wielded these creative, legalistic, and material media to manipulate the demos into agreeing to and maintaining the unequal status quo. Elites gatekept warriorhood because it was a dense, coherent, and powerful group within the community, but organized violence, as a venue for identity and state crafting, introduced its own set of disrupting and socially damaging factors. Since our evidence is so limited and we have little idea how non-elites felt about this arrangement, we should probably assume that the dominant ideologies of Cretan elites were just as inconsistent and ineffective as Medieval and Early Modern elite ideologies.

As outlined above, I do not agree with Seelentag's idea that Cretan poleis enjoyed political stability for four hundred years.[235] As the excavations at Azoria have illustrated, many Cretan communities rose and fell in these centuries. Cretans did not participate in the Persian Wars (Hdt. 7.169), but they were hugely impacted by the larger economic and social shifts within the Eastern Mediterranean.[236] Throughout the course of these complex histories, Cretan poleis adopted aspects of the ideologies of violence – either the ideology of camaraderie, the army-of-one mentality, or both simultaneously – which required certain equipment and cultural practices, but also certain architectural features within the polis. Scholars may never fully understand how and where the elite warrior group, or *andreion*, interacted with urban sanctuaries and public spaces within the polis, but we cannot ignore the ideological influence of violence both within this group and within the whole community.

Cretan elites created a monopoly over warriorhood, expressed this monopoly through display and dedications in both extra-urban and urban sanctuaries, and slowly built bonds with non-elites in limited ways. Groups of these warrior elites probably operated outside, alongside, or even within the polis with their own sets of institutions and customs, their own νόμοι. In response to this group, poleis slowly began to institutionalize organized violence, focusing, in

[232] Abercrombie et al. 1980, 1-2.
[233] Abercrombie et al. 1980, 7-29.
[234] Abercrombie et al. 1980, 156.
[235] Seelentag 2015, 22, 33, 57.
[236] Erickson 2005.

particular, on the economic consequences of warfare. In chapter six, I argue that this reoriented the focus, values, and goals of Cretan warfare. These warriors appear in our late-fifth and early-fourth century sources as Cretan τοξόται, and they would ultimately have an important role in the development of ancient Greek warfare more broadly. For the first two centuries of the age of the hoplite, however, Cretan warfare influenced the ways in which warrior elites organized themselves, how these elites participated in Cretan poleis, the dynamic divide between elites and non-elites, and how poleis conceived of violence within their own communities. These developments occurred slowly and inconsistently across the island.

Chapter 6 – Wealth-Accumulation Warfare: Cretan Warfare in the Classical Period

In the previous chapters, I examined how Cretan elites and craftspeople commemorated and utilized violence in extra-urban and urban spaces. Aspects of the Cretan ideologies of violence remained prevalent into the fifth century, but the archaeological evidence for Cretan arms and armor disappears after the mid-sixth century. As discussed above, the traditional dating of these objects probably requires a concerted reassessment.[1] Despite the gaps in our evidence, it seems clear that wealthy Cretans continued to utilize organized violence as a means of crafting their identity into the fifth century; urban sanctuaries still operated as real and imagined spaces for the conversion of economic, political, and military power; and Cretan elites still used violence and warriorhood to maintain unequal political hierarchies in which their cartels, retained positions of authority through the manipulation of non-elite groups.[2]

As mentioned in chapter five, some Cretan poleis, such as Axos, started to institutionalize warfare by regulating warriorhood and war booty in the late sixth and fifth centuries. Eventually, these regulations shifted how Cretan elites used violence and the relationship between Cretan poleis and their "oligopolistic" warrior aristocrats.[3] For the periods under investigation in this study, these institutional developments triggered the third and final ideology of Cretan warfare visible in our evidence, which I am calling wealth-accumulation warfare.

The three ideologies that I have identified in this project appear to have numerous crossovers and continuities between them. However, the majority of our evidence for wealth-accumulation warfare emerges from literary texts rather than archaeology, and these texts provide some insight regarding the ways in which wealth-accumulation warfare impacted real combat.[4] While the army-of-one mentality and the ideology of camaraderie pertain to the ways

[1] See Erickson 2010; Erny 2022; and the discussion in chapter one. The excavators at Azoria, for example, found the crest of an open-face helmet of Snodgrass' adapted-kegelhelm type, which he dates to the late eighth and early seventh centuries, in a fifth-century destruction level (Haggis et al. 2011, 15, 16; Snodgrass 1964, 16, 19). This particular example may have been an heirloom, but open-faced helmets had clear ideological implications that continued to be important to Cretans well into the fifth century.

[2] As I argued in chapters four and five.

[3] I am referencing Gabrielsen 2007 and 2013. He argues that "oligopolistic" violent poleis did not limit or attempt to control organized violence that was committed by community members outside the communities' political boundaries. For further discussion of this concept, see chapter one.

[4] Cretan warriors are mentioned in Aristophanes' *Frogs*, Aristotle's *Politics*, Plato's' *Laws*, Plato's *Republic*, Thucydides, Xenophon's *Anabasis*, and Xenophon's *Hellenica*. These texts will be described in more detail below. See also Table 6.2 below for more detail regarding each textual reference. Homer also mentions Cretan warriors in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, but these references probably describe the urban ideology of Cretan warfare, the army-of-one mentality, as discussed in chapters four and five.

in which elites claimed to be violent actors, wealth-accumulation warfare primarily manifested itself abroad on non-Cretan battlefields.

The third ideology of Cretan warfare is likely a consequence of the institutional, political, and economic changes of the sixth and fifth centuries. These changes include the enactment and public display of property and inheritance laws, the economic intensification of Crete towards an export economy, and the widespread adoption of coinage.[5] Many of these changes are not restricted to Crete, and we might tie the rise of wealth-accumulation warfare to comparable ideological shifts in mainland poleis, such as Athens and Sparta, that fundamentally changed how these communities thought about and practiced organized violence in the late sixth century.[6] As an ideology, wealth-accumulation warfare contained mechanisms of self-perpetuation and self-confirmation in order to promote its spread and social preservation, especially in regards to the ways in which economic and political capital moved through society.[7] These mechanisms impacted how Cretan elites performed organized violence and how this violence was preserved in our evidence.[8]

In the late sixth and fifth centuries, some Cretan poleis started to control the mechanisms of Cretan warfare in urban and extra-urban spaces. It is unclear whether this practice began in the sixth century or merely emerged in our evidence at this time, but most scholars interpret it as a new phenomenon.[9] As we shall see, the fifth-century poleis of Axos, Tylissos, Knossos, and Gortyn were directing dedications of war booty or the profits from warfare to extra-urban and urban sanctuaries themselves. They had assumed control over the procedures for expressing belonging within the ideology of camaraderie and the army-of-one mentality. I will argue that these institutional developments further confirmed elites' monopolization of organized violence, validated violence as a mechanism of elite identity crafting, recognized war booty as a legitimate medium of expression, and created demand for elites to commit more violence or to intensify their existing levels of violence. In other words, the third ideology of Cretan warfare was a response to the institutionalization and incorporation of organized violence within the polis system. But this process was gradual and uneven. In Gabrielsen's terms, Cretan poleis remained "oligopolistic" violent communities, in which private individuals retained the ability to form military bands and commit violence.[10] Alongside other economic innovations that spread through Crete in the late sixth and early fifth centuries, like coinage and credit, elite violence appears to have been redefined as an economic practice. Organized violence was institutionalized only insofar as the economic consequences of violence impacted the political integrity of Cretan poleis. Cretan warfare shifted from being a means for elites to establish

[5] For the laws, see Gagarin 2008, Gagarin and Perlman 2016. For economic intensification, see Erickson 2005, Gilboa et al. 2017, Lehman et al. 2019, and Erny 2022. For coinage, see Stefanakis 1999, Carbone 2016, and Carbone 2020.
[6] For Athens, see Ober 2004 and Ober 2007. For Sparta, see Lazenby 1985, van Wees 2018a, and van Wees 2018b.
[7] Fuchs 2020. For a definition of ideology and a discussion of its relevance to this project, see chapter one.
[8] See chapter five.
[9] See Perlman 2010 and the discussion below.
[10] Gabrielsen 2013, 128.

themselves within the community to an important and politically legitimate method for elites to acquire wealth for the community.

Cretan warriors regularly participated in mainland Greek conflicts by the late fifth century. Some scholars attribute their appearance on the mainland to *stasis* and institutionalized poverty on Crete, which drove warriors to seek opportunities abroad.[11] While it is true that acquiring war booty and other wealth was important to Cretan warriors and the defining characteristic of wealth-accumulation warfare, these practices had been important components of Cretan warfare since the emergence of the army-of-one mentality in the seventh century. The inscriptions on armor in urban sanctuaries, discussed in chapter four, indicate that many of the symbols of the army-of-one mentality were war booty, likely stripped or looted from a battle. In chapter five, I argued that stripping war booty was a key way in which warriors justified their status through positive and negative bonds with other elites and non-elites. We should probably characterize wealth-accumulation warfare, therefore, as a continuation of pre-existing Cretan practices rather than a symptom of poverty or political turmoil. Cretan elites did not fight abroad for the highest bidder, and instead managed networks of personal relationships and alliances with mainland groups. When called upon, they fought for profit and social recognition rather than political necessity. That being said, the institutional developments outlined in chapter five and the dramatic political divide between elites and non-elites probably contributed to political conflicts within Cretan poleis in the late sixth and fifth centuries.

In the late fifth and fourth centuries, Cretan warriors fought as leisure-class hoplites for the Athenians, Persians, and Spartans. Although Cretans fought for wealth, Cretan warriors still practiced wealthier types of warfare – they were not working-class hoplites.[12] Moreover, warfare was not profitable financially for many Cretan warriors, because their poleis seized all the war booty and dedicated it on their behalf.[13] In the early fourth century, Xenophon describes Cretan warriors fighting as *epilektoi*, small groups of highly reliable warriors who performed narrow objectives on the battlefield (Xen. *An*. 3.3.7, 4.2.28, 5.2.29-32; *Hell*. 4.2.16, 4.7.6).[14] This suggests that Cretan warriors may have been some of the earliest *epilektoi*, or proto-*epilektoi*, on the Greek mainland, and that the ideologies of violence on Crete may have had a dramatic impact on the history of Greek warfare more broadly.

6.1 – Institutionalizing Elite Violence

As mentioned above, the earliest evidence for a Cretan polis attempting to regulate or control elite violence emerges at late sixth-century Axos.[15] Perlman persuasively argues that an

[11] cf. Beek 2020, 100; Chaniotis 2005b, 135-6; Hornblower 1983, 200.
[12] See chapters one and two for my definitions of leisure-class and working-class hoplites, terms borrowed from van Wees (2004, 55-57).
[13] See Rhodes and Osborne 2017, no. 126 lines B.9-11. This passage will be discussed below.
[14] For a more detailed definition of *epilektoi*, see chapter two. See also Konijnendijk 2018, 157-159; Tritle 1989, 57.
[15] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, A5+6.

inscription from Axos, which probably preserves rules regarding dedications to sanctuaries following organized violence, is the first text in a series of island-wide war booty regulations.[16] Although only two texts of this series are preserved before the fourth century, and only nine in the Hellenistic period, these types of regulations were probably common on Crete in the Hellenistic period.[17] Chaniotis argues that the similarities between the nine Hellenistic texts, which name eleven different poleis from across the whole island, suggest that they must have been part of a larger epigraphic tradition.[18] He posits that many more of these types of regulations existed than what has survived, and that they became commonplace as early as the fifth century.[19] War booty regulations began a process of institutionalization that continued well beyond the chronological focus of my study – Cretan communities remained "oligopolistic" violent poleis until at least the end of the fourth century, but some cities may have started to convert into "monopolistic" violent poleis as early as the late sixth century.[20] These institutional changes altered how Cretan elites used violence as a mechanism of identity crafting in urban and extra-urban sanctuaries.

In the nineteenth-century excavations on the acropolis of Axos, Halbherr discovered a small temple,[21] and two limestone blocks that were used in the construction of this building preserve the earliest war booty regulation.[22] Figure 6.1 is a drawing of the text, A5+6. There are several interesting features in this text, but, for my purposes, the repeated reference to πολέμο emphasizes the military character of this inscription.

[16] Perlman 2010.
[17] Chaniotis 2005b, 134-5; Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 166. For the texts, see Chaniotis 1996, nos. 11, 26, 28, 38, 46, 59–61; and SEG 50.936.
[18] Chaniotis 2005b, 134-5. The eleven named poleis: Aptera, Eleutherna, Gortyn, Hierapytna, Lato, Lyttos, Malla, Olous, Phalasarna, Polyrhenia, and Priansos.
[19] Chaniotis 2005b, 111; Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 166.
[20] For a discussion of the difference between Gabrielsen's (2007 and 2013) "monopolistic" violence poleis and "oligopolistic" violence poleis, see chapter one.
[21] Halbherr 1899.
[22] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, A5+6; Perlman 2010; SEG 60.986 et al.



Figure 6.1 – A drawing of A5+6. A5 is on the right and A6 is on the left. The text is boustrophedon.

[έν] Fίḍạι, κα[ὶ] Ποτειδᾶνι ο[---]
[---]εθεν ἦμεν | τõ πολέμ̣[ο].
| τὰ ἀϝτῆ μὲν τõ πολέμο | [---]
[--- τ]õ δ’ ἄλο δεκάτο ϝ̣ιεν ἢ λογ̣κί̣-
ον ὄνς αἰέ | τὸ μ̣ὲν δέκατον [---]
[---]εν τὰ θῖνα. | αἰ δ’ α[ὶ] ἀσταὶ ἦ ἄ-
λ̣οιτο ạ̣π̣ẹ̣[.]πεσπ̣ạ̣ι ὸ κόσμο[ς ---]
ọ̣ . ατ[---]

--- [on Mt.] Ida, and to Poseidon ---
--- from the war are to be ---
The things here from the war ---
--- of the other *dekaton* a *wien* or a spear
the ones which at the time the *dekaton* ---
--- the sacred things. But if the women,
after it was seized, [. . . . .],
the *kosmos* ---

The left side of A6, the left side of the complete inscription, is broken, so it is difficult to reconstruct the full content of this regulation. The word πολέμο on lines two and three indicate that the law relates to organized violence, and there is good reason to assume that rest of the inscription describes war booty. Gagarin and Perlman argue that lines four and five specifically mention war booty that was divided into portions before dedication.[23] They interpret δεκάτο as a

[23] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 166.

tenth, but not necessarily a religious tithe since the word ἄλο suggests that there were at least two.[24] Perlman discusses whether the neuter *dekaton* was indeed a synonym of *dekate*, for which there is extensive scholarship, and concludes that the Cretan *dekaton* probably operated slightly differently than the *dekate*.[25] According to Gagarin and Perlman's reading, the *dekaton* in A5+6 included various weapons, similar to *dekatai* in later war booty regulations.[26] Perlman suggests that ϝιεν is a projectile point and hypothesizes that it is "a nominal derivative of Indo-European *wiH- 'pursue,' from which both ἴς 'strength' and ἵημι 'send' derive."[27] Her reading of λογκίον in lines four and five is dependent on the existence of a gamma rather than a digamma as the third-to-last letter in line four. Guarducci saw a damaged tail of a digamma and Jeffery did not.[28] If we accept Perlman's definition of δεκάτο and ϝιεν, then Jeffery's reading makes the most sense, but the poor preservation of the stone encourages caution.

Guarducci interprets the text as a treaty, perhaps even an alliance, between two poleis,[29] and this would make it our earliest inter-polis agreement on Crete.[30] Perlman reads the phrase [τ]ὸ δ' ἄλο δεκάτο in line four as evidence that war booty was being distributed between two sanctuaries that are referenced in line one.[31] She speculates that the Axians controlled Ida in the late sixth century, and accepts Guarducci's reading of Ποτειδᾶνι as shorthand for an extra-urban sanctuary for Poseidon on Mount Juktas (see map 6.1).[32] The latter may have been controlled by the Knossians, making the references to Ida and Poseidon in the first line of A5+6 references to two extra-urban sanctuaries controlled by two independent polities: Knossos and Axos.[33] As mentioned in chapter four, however, there is no evidence to suggest that extra-urban sanctuaries were ever controlled by Cretan poleis.[34] In the late sixth and early fifth centuries, Ida appears in inscriptions from Eleutherna, Gortyn, Tylissos, and Knossos. The argument that A5+6 involves two political bodies which control two extra-urban sanctuaries is rather unconvincing. Indeed, Gagarin and Perlman suggest alternatively that Ida was synonymous with Zeus and the law regulates dedications to two gods.[35] Rather than mediating between two political bodies, A5+6 might be regulating the distribution of war booty between two religious bodies, perhaps even

[24] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 166.
[25] Perlman 2005, 95-98. In Classical literature, the *dekate* was a tithe set aside for the gods after every military conflict. It took various forms, including land, enslaved people, and money (see Pritchett 1971, 96).
[26] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 166; Pritchett 1971, 96. The Tylissos-Knossos-Argos war booty regulation, for example, may specify that certain weapons had to be dedicated to certain temples (Osborne and Rhodes 2017, no. 126; see below).
[27] Perlman 2010, 88.
[28] IC 2.5.5-6; Guarducci 1939, 54; Jeffery 1949.
[29] Guarducci 1939, 55.
[30] Gagerin and Perlman 2016, 166.
[31] Perlman 2010, 96.
[32] Guarducci 1939, 55; Perlman 2010, 95, 108-109. It is worth noting that the temple of Poseidon has never been located archaeologically. It is mentioned in the Tylissos-Knossos-Argos treaty, described below, as being at Ἰυτός, and most scholars assume that this was the ancient name of Juktas. For further discussion, see Perlman 2010, 95.
[33] Perlman 2010, 108-109.
[34] Perlman (2010) makes this point as well. Her conclusion merely speculates that Axos might have controlled Ida; she does not push this idea.
[35] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 166-167.

urban sanctuaries, within a single polis. If A5+6 was not a treaty but rather a law, then it is possible to see how it helped to establish war booty regulations. Later treaties that regulated the distribution of war booty between two or more poleis probably recycled the language and style of existing laws that regulated war booty distributions within a single community.



Map 6.1 – Map of north-central Crete. Poleis are marked with the yellow (diamond) icons, and extra-urban sanctuaries are marked with the blue (star) icons.

There is a third possible interpretation: that line one of A5+6 references an urban sanctuary and an extra-urban sanctuary, spaces that had different types of martial dedications. As I argued in chapters four and five, Cretan elites made dedications to both urban and extra-urban sanctuaries throughout the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries. Dedications to extra-urban sanctuaries tended to reference the ideology of camaraderie, while those at urban sanctuaries tended to reference the army-of-one mentality.[36] The epigraphic evidence from the fifth century, however, suggests that some dedications of war booty were the responsibility of the polis as a whole rather than individual elites or elite groups.[37] It is possible that this was always the case to some degree, but scholars traditionally interpret extra-urban sanctuaries as spaces for individual dedicants in the seventh and sixth centuries due to the high quantity of smaller metal sheets and appliques.[38] Urban-sanctuary dedications were clearly made by individual dedicants since many of them include individual's names.[39] In other words, there appears to have been a shift at certain poleis sometime in the late sixth or early fifth century, in which dedications to extra-urban and urban sanctuaries stopped being made by individual elites or elite groups and started being made

[36] There are important exceptions, see chapter four. It is worth emphasizing that this pattern only pertains to Cretan sanctuaries. Cretan dedications to mainland extra-urban spaces emphasize the army-of-one mentality rather than the ideology of camaraderie.
[37] Rhodes and Osborne 2017, no. 126; see discussion below.
[38] Prent 2005, 421-422.
[39] For a discussion of the inscribed armor, see chapter four.

by the polis itself on behalf of those groups. A5+6 is potentially a missing link between individual dedications of war booty and polis dedications of war booty. If this interpretation is correct, then line one, [έν] Ϝ̣ίδ̣αι, κα[ὶ] Ποτειδᾶνι ο[---], is not referencing two political bodies nor two religious bodies, but rather it references the extra-urban sanctuary of Ida and an urban sanctuary for Poseidon within the polis of Axos.

In the late sixth century, Axos appears to have introduced a series of regulations that controlled elite practices and conventions regarding organized violence. Another law found on the acropolis which is contemporary to A5+6, discussed in chapter five, regulates who can participate in the *andreion*, the elite cartel that met for regular ritual feasts.[40] Rather than changing how these institutions operated, the Axian polis appears simply to have adopted the gatekeeping mechanisms of warriorhood – they started to regulate how war booty was dedicated, not who got to be a warrior. This shift threatened to blur the lines between warrior and combatant, so elites had to seek other means to fortify their social and political status within the institutional framework of war booty regulations. Our literary evidence, discussed below, suggests that elites turned to acquiring more war booty as a means of maintaining the unequal social hierarchy of Cretan poleis.

Perlman highlights the term ἀσταί in line six of A5+6, and Gagarin and Perlman end their discussion of this text by suggesting that it draws a direct link between female worshippers and war goddesses on Crete.[41] Gagarin and Perlman argue that ἀσταί were probably local Axian citizens on the basis of a Hellenistic text that distinguishes between [ξέ]νας ἢ ἀστάς.[42] The masculine form with a digamma, ϝαστός, appears in only two other texts where it seems to identify a type of trial.[43] More generally, Hansen and Nielsen argue that the term "designates a person of citizen birth,"[44] but, setting aside my discomfort with the term "citizen,"[45] Gagarin and Perlman wonder how valuable such a strict definition might be for Crete considering our limited evidence.[46] Perhaps ἀσταί in A5+6 refers to captured or newly enslaved women from a rival city who made up some part of the war booty being distributed and dedicated. A series of terracotta plaques from East Crete, discussed below, depict a warrior dragging a smaller naked individual, perhaps an enslaved woman, by the wrist, but there is no evidence of this type from Axos itself.[47] The context of Cretan warfare as an ideological practice; the proximity of ἀσταί to the other types of war booty, ϝιεν and λογκίον; and the verb α̣π̣ε̣[.]πεσπ̣α̣ι raises the possibility that the ἀσταί were part of the war booty This is a radical reading that is even less supported by our evidence than the other possible translations of ἀσταί, but thinking about this term in this context challenges us to consider just how radical and complicated the institutionalization of war

[40] See Gagarin and Perlman 2016, A1. For a discussion of the *andreion*, see chapter five.
[41] Perlman 2010; Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 167.
[42] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 167; SEG 23.566, line 7.
[43] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, G13, G64. No form of ἀστός, without a digamma, appears outside A5+6.
[44] Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 47.
[45] Discussed in chapter five.
[46] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 79.
[47] Dohan 1931, 226; Erickson 2009, 371-2. See below for further discussion of these objects and figure 6.2.

booty would have been. Although I argued in chapters four and five that much of the armor in urban sanctuaries was indeed war booty, not all war booty would have taken this form. When poleis began to institutionalize war booty, they were taking on an immensely complicated and variable process. We might expect, therefore, that this institutionalization both standardized war booty dedications, to some degree, and elevated war booty as a particularly public means to celebrate warriorhood.

However we interpret ἀσταί, A5+6 represents a dramatic shift in the way that war booty was handled on Crete. The polis of Axos appears to have taken over certain elite practices and interrupted the preexisting system – the cyclical power flow discussed in chapter five.[48] As poleis institutionalized the mechanisms by which elites propagated their identity, elites had to shift how they preserved their cartels and their privileged lifestyles. Although the distribution of war booty was regulated, war booty itself remained an important aspect of elite violence. The accumulation of wealth through violence shifted from being a mechanism for expressing social belonging and masculinity to the goal of organized violence. This becomes more evident in the fifth century as war booty regulations spread to other poleis.

The second preserved war booty regulation dates to the mid-fifth century and outlines a series of economic regulations between Tylissos, Knossos, and Argos.[49] The treaty is preserved in two inscriptions, one at Tylissos, on Crete (see map 6.1, above), and another at Argos in the Peloponnese. The smaller of the two texts, the Tylissos inscription (A), was initially discovered in multiple fragments.[50] They were associated with an altar and temples which the excavator described as being Ἑλληνιρρωμακῶν χρόνων.[51] The Argos inscription (B), the longer version of the treaty, was uncovered in the Argive agora in two large pieces.[52] No part of the Tylissos inscription appears in the Argos inscription. Vollgraff argues that an unpublished fragment from Tylissos probably preserves some lines from the Argos inscription, but Jeffery and Meiggs and Lewis disagree and believe that this unpublished fragment is unrelated.[53] Osborne and Rhodes assume that the two texts were part of the same series of documents if not different sections of the same document.[54] Based on the letter forms, the texts are dated to around 450.[55] The following text and translation is based on Kyriakidis' work – Osborne and Rhodes rely on Volgraff who filled in most of the lacunae.[56] I prefer the more conservative reading.

Tylissos Inscription (A)

Col. I [. . . .]εχόντο τοὶ πα-
[. . . .]ον, δέρματα δὲ φ-

[48] One of the pieces of armor from Axos was inscribed (SEG 52.837). This piece was probably dedicated by an individual warrior before the late sixth century, so A5+6 is probably altering pre-existing practices at Axos.
[49] Meiggs and Lewis 1969, no. 42; Osborne and Rhodes 2017, no. 126; IC 1.30.1; SEG 62.643 et al.
[50] Hazzidakis 1914.
[51] Hazzidakis 1914, 95.
[52] Kyriakidis 2012; van Effenterre and Ruzé 1994, 222-233; Vollgraff 1948, 3-5.
[53] Jeffrey 1961, 165; Meiggs and Lewis 1969, 102; Vollgraff 1948, 17.
[54] Osborne and Rhodes 2017, no. 126. Otherwise, they agree with Vollgraff 1948.
[55] Osborne and Rhodes 2017, no. 126.
[56] Kyriakidis 2012; Osborne and Rhodes 2017, no. 126.

[. . . Κν]ό*h*ιοι. πρὸ Ταυ-
[. . . .]ν ἐν Τυλισõι ϝ-
[. . . 12 . . .]νὰν δὲ καὶ δι-
[. . . 11 . . .] σπονδὰς νεοτ-
[έρας] μὲ τιθέσθαι μεδατέρο-
[νς, αἴ] μὲ συνδοκοῖ τõι πλέθε-
[ι, συνβ]άλλεσθαι δὲ τὰν τρίτ-
[αν αἶσ]αν τõς Ἀργείος τᾶν ψά-
[φον · καὶ] τινας τõν εὐμενέον
Col. II δυσμενέας τιθείμεθα καὶ τ-
õν δυσμενέον εὐμενέας, μὲ θ-
έσθαι, αἰ μὲ συνδοκοῖ τõι πλ-
έθει, συνβάλλεσθαι δὲ τὸνς
ἐκ Τυλισõ τᾶν ψάφον τὰν τρί-
ταν αἶσαν. αἰ δὲ μάχα γένοιτ-
ο μὲ παρέντον τõν ἀτέρον, σπ-
ονδὰνς θέσθο ‘ν τõι δεομένο-
ι πέντε ἀμέρανς. αἰ στρατήα
ἐνσ[ιείε] ἐνς τὰν γᾶν τὰν Κνο-
*h*ίαν, [. . . 9 . . .] ὀφελẽν παντ-
Col. III ι σθένει [. . . 15 . . .]
παρεχόν[το . . . 15 . . .]
ς Ἀργείο[ις . . . 13 . . . Ἀργ]-
εῖοι τοῖ[ς . . . 15 . . .]
ιεν στρα[τήαν . . . 9 . . . ἀμ]-
ερᾶν · αἰ δ[è . . . 14 . . .]
ίμεν τὰν [. . . 15 . . .]
ς. κὲν Τυλ[ισõι . . . 11 . . .]
ε κα ϝαρθ[. . . 15 . . .]
-πάγεσθα[ι . . . 14 . . .]
να. αἴ κ’ἔνθ[. . . 14 . . .]
- - - - -

(1-6) [. . .] shall provide the [. . .], and the skins [. . . Kno]ssians. Before the Tau[. . .], in Tylissos [. . .] and also [. . .]. (6-20) New treaties shall not be made by either party, except with the agreement of the others,[57] and the Argives shall cast the third part of the votes. And if we make any friend an enemy and any enemy a friend, we shall not do so, save with the assent of the others, and those from Tylissos shall cast the third part of the votes. And if a battle takes place with the other party not present, it shall be lawful to make a truce in necessity for five

[57] Kyriakidis (2012, 119) translates τõι πλέθει both here and in lines 14-15 as “of the federal assembly” but this is an anachronistic use of the term federal. Osborne and Rhodes (2017) translate them as “by the majority (?),” but this also seems unsatisfactory.

days. (20-23) If any army enters the land of the Knossians, the [. . .] shall help with all their strength as far as possible. [. . .]
(24-33— — — — —)

Argos Inscription (B)

νες [. . . 10 . . .]
[. . . 23 . . .] τõν χõ[ρον τõ]ν Ἀ[.]α-
[. . . 11 . . . ἐξẽμ]εν ξύλλεσθαι πλὰ[ν] τ-
[. . . 17 . . .]τέλλοντα ἐνς πόλιν. *h*ό τ[ι]
[δέ κα ἐκ δυσμενέ]ον *h*élομες συνανφότεροι, δα[σ]-
[μõι τõν κὰτ γ]ãν τὸ τρίτον μέρος ἔχεν πάντον, τ[õ]-
[ν δὲ κὰτ] θάλασαν τὰ *h*émισα ἔχεν πάντον · τὰν δὲ [δ]-
[εκ]άταν τὸνς Κνοσίονς ἔχεν, *h*ό τί χ᾽ ἔλομες κοι[ν]-
[ã]ι · τõν δὲ φαλύρον τὰ μὲν καλλ<ι>στεῖα Πυθόδε ἀπ[ά]-
γεν κοινãι ἀμφοτέρονς, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα τõι [. . . 8 . . .]-
õι ἀντιθέμεν κοινãι ἀμφοτέρονς. ἐξ[αγογὰν δ᾽ εἶ]-
μεν Κνοσόθεν ἐνς Τυλισὸν κὲκ Τυλι[σõ Κνοσόνδ]-
ε α[ὶ] δὲ πέρανδε ἐξάγοι, τελίτο *h*όσσα [περ *h*οι Κν]-
όσιοι · τὰ δ᾽ ἐκ Τυλισõ ἐξαγέσθο *h*όπυ[ί κα χρẽι. τõ]-
ι Ποσειδᾶνι τõι ἐν Ἰυτõι τὸν Κνοσίο[ν ἰαρέα θύ]-
εν. τãι *h*éραι ἐν Ἐραίοι θύεν βõν θέλει[αν ἀμφοτ]-
έρον[ς κ]οινãι, θύεν δὲ πρὸ ϝακινθ[ίον . . . 8 . . .]
.κο [. . .]κ [. . . ? . . .]
[. . . ? . . .]
[. . . ? . . .]
[. . . 14 . . .]ανοντο[. . . 14 . . .]ρ[α]-
τομενίαν ἄγεν κατὰ ταὐτ[ὰ . . . 11 . . .] τὸ ἀμ[φ]-
οτέρον. χρέματα δὲ μὲ ‘νπιπασκέσθο *h*ο Κνόσιο[ς]
ἐν Τυλισõι, *h*ο δὲ Τυλίσιος ἐν Κνοσõι *h*ο χρέιζ[ο]-
ν. μὲ δὲ χόρας ἀπο τάμνεσθαι μεδατέρονς μεδ᾽ ἄ[π]-
ανσαν ἀφαιρῖσθαι. ὀροι τãς γãς· *h*υõν ὄρος καὶ Α-
ἰετοί κἀρταμίτιον καὶ τὸ τõ Ἀρχõ τέμενος κα[ὶ]
*h*ο ποταμὸς κὲλ Λευκόπορον κἀγάθοια, *h*ãι *h*ύδο-
ρ ῥεῖ τὄμβριον, καὶ Λãος. *h*ῖ κα τõι Μαχανεῖ θύομ-
ες τὸνς ϝεξέκοντα τελέονς ὄϝινς, καὶ τãι *h*<é>ραι
τὸ σκέλος ϝεκάστο διδόμεν τõ θύματος. αἰ δὲ συ-
μπλέονες πόλιες ἐκ πολεμίον ἔλοιεν χρέματα,
*h*όπαι συνγνοῖεν *h*οι Κνόσιοι καὶ τοὶ Ἀργεῖοι,
*h*ούτο ἐμεν. τõ Ἄρει καὶ τἀφροδίται τὸν Κνοσί-
ον ἰαρέα θύεν, φέρεν δὲ τὸ σκέλος ϝεκάστο. τὸν Ἀ-
ρχὸν τὸ τέμενος ἔχεν τὸν Ἀχάρναι · τοῖς θύονσι
ξένια παρέχεν τὸνς Κνοσίονς, τὸνς δ᾽ Ἀργείονς
τõι χόροι. ἐν Τυλισõι αἴ και καλẽι *h*ο Κνόσιος πρ-
εσγέαν, *h*έπεσθαι *h*όπυί κα δέεται, καἴ χὸ Τυλίσ-

ιος, τὸν Κνόσιον κατὰ ταὐτὰ · αἰ δὲ μὲ δοῖεν ξένι-
α, βολὰ ἐπαγέτο ῥύτιον δέκα στατέρον αὐτίκα ἐ-
πὶ κόσμος, κὲν Τυλισõι κατὰ ταὐτὰ *h*ο Κνόσιος. *vacat*
*h*α στάλα ἔσστα ἐπὶ Μελάντα βασιλέος. ἀϝρέτευ-
ε Λυκοτάδας *h*υλλεύς. *vacat* ἀλαίαι ἔδοξε τãι τõν *vacat*
ἰαρõν · *vacat* ἀ(ϝρέτευε) *vacat* βολᾶς *vacat* Ἀρχίστρατος Λυκοφρονίδας
τοὶ Τυλίσιοι ποὶ τὰν στάλαν ποιγραψάνσθο τάδε ·
αἴ τις ἀφικνοῖτο Τυλισίον ἐνς Ἄργος, κατὰ ταὐτὰ
σφιν ἔστο *h*ᾶιπερ Κνοσίοις · *vacat*
vacat

(2-4) [. . .] the territories of the A[.]a[. . .] permitted to plunder except [. . .] in the city [. . .]. (4-11) Whatever we take together we shall have in a division a third of all which is taken by land, and half of everything which is taken by sea, and the Knossians shall keep the *dekate* of whatever we take jointly; and of the spoils both shall send the finest jointly to the Pythia, and the rest both shall dedicate jointly to […].[58] (11-14) There shall be export from Knossos to Tylissos and from Tylissos to Knossos; but if any (Tylissian) exports goods beyond, he shall pay as much as the Knossians pay; and goods from Tylissos may be exported wherever he [may desire]. (14-17) The [priest<?>] of the Knossians shall sacrifice to Poseidon at Iytos; both shall sacrifice jointly a cow to Hera in the Heraion and they shall sacrifice before the Hyakinthia [. . .]. (21-23) They shall keep the first day of the month at the same time [according to the decision] of both. (23-25) A Knossian may not possess property at Tylissos, but a Tylissian who wishes (may do so) at Knossos. (25-29) Neither party shall cut off any of the land or take it as a whole. The boundaries of the land: Boar's Mount and the Eagles and the Artemision and the plot of Archos and the river, and through Leukoporon and Agathoia following the course of the rainwater and Laos. (29-31) When we sacrifice to Machaneus the sixty full-grown rams, to Hera too shall be given the leg of each victim. (31-34) If several cities together capture property (χρέματα) from the enemy, as the Knossians and the Argives agree, so shall it be. (34-35) The priest of the Knossians shall sacrifice to Ares and Aphrodite, and shall receive the leg of each victim. (35-38) Archos shall keep his temenos at Acharna; the Knossians shall provide gifts to the sacrificers, and the Argives to the chorus. (38-42) If the Knossian calls for an embassy in Tylissos, it shall follow wherever he wishes, and if the Tylissian, the Knossian shall follow likewise. If they should not offer hospitality, let the Council forthwith impose a fine of ten staters on the

[58] The stone preserves ΤΟΙ [. . . 8 . . .]ΟΙ. Kyriakidis (2012, 119) wrote "[… at Knoss]os," but this reconstruction is misleading. Osborne and Rhodes (2017, no. 126) wrote "Ares at Cnossus" without discussion or justification. They are using Volgraff's (1948, 45) reconstruction. I will argue below in support of reconstructing an urban sanctuary in this *lacuna*, but I do not want to misrepresent the original text.

> kosmoi, and the Knossian similarly at Tylissos. (43-44) The stele was erected when Melantas was king and Lykotadas of the tribe Hylleis was in office. (44-48) Thus was the decision of the assembly for the sacred business; Archistratos of the Lykophronid phratry was president of the Council; let the Tylissians add to the stele these words: 'if any Tylissian comes to Argos, he shall have the same rights as the Knossians'.

Although the preserved texts primarily pertain to the relationship between Tylissos and Knossos, Minon suggests that they were probably written and enforced by the Argives.[59] She argues that the dialect of the text, as well as the provisions it covers, suggest that Argos was acting as an arbitrator between Tylissos and Knossos.[60] Many scholars point to the inequality regarding land-ownership expressed in lines B.23-25 – that a Knossian cannot own land in Tylissos but a Tylissian can own land in Knossos – to say that Tylissos was a protectorate of the Argives.[61] The implication is that Tylissos was too small and insignificant to make an unequal treaty with Knossos without Argive backing. Scholars generally assume that Knossos was the larger and more powerful of the two Cretan poleis even though we know little about either Tylissos or Knossos in the fifth century – the city-centers of fifth-century Knossos and Tylissos have never been excavated systematically.[62] It is possible that Tylissos was the more powerful polis in this period and used this treaty to legitimize its control over Knossos, a smaller and weaker polis. The Archaic Gap was initially postulated to explain the dramatic drop in ceramic and burial evidence at Knossos in the sixth century.[63] The Tylissos-Knossos-Argos treaty is the first piece of evidence following the sixth century to confirm that Knossos still existed in the fifth century.[64] There is no reason to assume that the Knossians were as powerful in the sixth and fifth centuries as their seventh-century ancestors or Hellenistic successors.[65]

The Argives had the power to veto treaties proposed by the Knossians and the Tylissians (lines A.6-11), so no polis could make a treaty without the consent of the others. In lines A.11-17, the Tylissians are given veto power over the three poleis' ability to switch enemies into friends and friends into enemies. The Knossians, on the other hand, are never given veto powers in the preserved text.

The political strength and economic power of Tylissos and Knossos, as well as the history of north-central Crete in the fifth century more generally, remain extremely difficult to

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[59] Minon 2007.
[60] Minon 2007, 169, 207-208.
[61] i.e. Charneux 1950; Kahrstedt 1942; Kyriakidis 2012, 121. Perlman (2010, 96) argues that Tylissos was subordinate to Knossos instead of Argos.
[62] Kyriakidis (2012, 122) describes Tylissos as "a much smaller city," which "was historically weaker than Knossos," without citation or explanation. Osborne and Rhodes (2017, 152) describe the two cities as "the larger Cnossus and the smaller Tylissus" without further discussion.
[63] Coldstream et al. 1999.
[64] I have been reassured by excavators at Knossos that they have unpublished fifth-century ceramics.
[65] Erickson (2009; 2010, 307-308) argues that Knossos was reduced in size and significance by Gortynian and Lyktian aggression in the sixth century and was unable to rebuild in the fifth century due to the economic dominance of the Delian League.

reconstruct. For my purposes, however, the Tylissos-Knossos-Argos texts illustrate how Cretan poleis viewed and then regulated organized violence in the fifth century. Most of our evidence for regulation comes from the Argive version of the treaty rather than the Cretan one, but the last preserved lines of the Tylissos inscription probably suggest that the Argive perspective is still relevant. In lines A.20-22, the treaty specifies that some third party, presumably Tylissos or Argos, should react to an invasion of Knossian territory. The word στρατήα is Argive and demonstrably not Cretan,[66] but the line indicates that organized bands of warriors could have attacked the Knossians by land. This supports the interpretation of the military regulations in the Argos inscription as valid restrictions on Cretan violence since both texts seem to relate to the way in which Tylissians and Knossians conducted organized violence in the mid-fifth century.

A key part of the Argos inscription regulates how much war booty the Tylissian, Knossian, and Argive poleis would receive after a battle against shared opponents (lines B.4-11). In particular, poleis received different portions of loot depending on whether the battle was fought on land or at sea. The Knossians always received a tithe, δεκάταν, which could be the same word that the Axians used in their late sixth-century war booty regulation.[67] The best spoils went to the Pythia, probably Delphi, and the rest of the spoils went somewhere else (lines B.9-11). Vollgraff assumed that the second location named in lines ten and eleven was the temple to Ares at Knossos, [Ἄρει Κνοσ]õι, which was an important sanctuary in the Hellenistic period.[68] This reading is highly unlikely,[69] but it is probably correct to identify τοι [. c.8 .]οι as the placename of a sanctuary in the dative, rather than a group or individual, because the booty was being dedicated in common, ἀντιθέμεν κοινᾶι ἀμφοτέρονς. This suggests that none of the war booty actually went to the warriors themselves and further emphasizes that many Cretan warriors did not personally profit from their participation in organized violence.

This final point is worth discussing further. Pritchett and Suk Fong Jim assume, with good reason, that war booty personally benefitted both individuals and their poleis.[70] In most cases, war booty was first collected into a common pool; a portion, the *dekate*, was set aside for the gods; and then the rest of the pool was divided between the generals and the combatants.[71] The Tylissos-Knossos-Argos treaty and the Axos inscription discussed above, A5+6, appear to break this convention.[72] The Tylissian and Knossian poleis started to control how their warriors advertised and celebrated their military successes through war booty, but they also made Cretan warfare unprofitable for individual combatants. This would have further limited who could

[66] Cretans typically switched -ρα- to -αρ-, and often wrote ε instead of η (Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 48). Although the word is never used in the preserved texts, the Cretan equivalent of στρατήα would be σταρτέα. As I will discuss below, the Cretan term σταρτός seems to reference a certain group of individuals within the Gortynian polis, and this group was led by a σταρταγέτας. Although this *startagetas* appears to have been an important government official with a large amount of power, there is no reason, beyond the word's etymology and usage on the mainland, to assume that this was a military position. Gagarin and Perlman (2016) translate the term σταρτός as gens or tribe.
[67] Perlman 2010; Gagarin and Perlman 2016, A5+6. See above.
[68] Vollgraff 1948, 45.
[69] Discussed below.
[70] Prtichett 1971, Suk Fong Jim 2014.
[71] Pritchett 1971, 82-84; Pritchett 1991, 363-438.
[72] Neither Pritchett nor Suk Fong Jim discussed these inscriptions in detail.

participate in organized violence. In other words, Tylissos and Knossos were institutionalizing certain aspects of Cretan warfare but also preserving the uneven hierarchies and gatekeeping mechanisms that had enabled elites to monopolize warriorhood in the first place.

Scholars who disagree with Vollgraff's reconstruction variously interpret the missing second destination for the spoils, lines B.10-11, as an extra-urban sanctuary on Crete, an urban sanctuary on the mainland, or an urban sanctuary on Crete.[73] Because the first destination, lines B.9-10, is an extra-urban sanctuary, I predict that the second destination in lines B.10-11 was an urban sanctuary on Crete. If this is right, then the Tylissos-Knossos-Argos inscription was dedicating spoils to both an extra-urban and an urban sanctuary, as I suggested for line one of the Axos inscription, A5+6. Regardless, these lines continue the regulating practices that Perlman identified at Axos: warriors were required to dedicate their booty to two organizations, one of which was a prominent extra-urban sanctuary.

Before the fifth century, the role of organized violence within Cretan communities, both socially and politically, was largely determined by elite organizations.[74] The late sixth-century inscriptions at Axos, and war-booty regulations more generally, represent a radical shift in this system. Cretan poleis started to control how elites performed violence and how elites would benefit from their violence. By dedicating war booty collectively and in common, ἀντιθέμεν κοινᾶι ἀμφοτέρονς, Cretan poleis diluted the ideological power of war booty as symbols of individualism and egalitarianism among elites, but these same laws also sought to preserve the social hierarchies and inaccessibility of warriorhood that was established in earlier periods.

6.2 – Cashing in on Elite Violence

Much has been written on the idea that the Cretan polis was a battleground between elites and non-elites.[75] The earliest Cretan inscription, the so-called Dreros Constitution,[76] lists three seemingly independent oath-swearers: the κόσμος; the demos, δάμιοι; and the twenty of the polis, κοὶ ἴκατι | οἰ τᾶς πόλ̣[ιο]ς̣.[77] For Gagarin, legal inscriptions were measures taken to prevent disagreements within a community, and they expanded in frequency and complexity as communities grew larger and more diverse.[78] Gagarin and Perlman describe Cretan legal inscriptions as equalizing initiatives – attempts by the demos, or non-elites, to rein in elites and establish a common identity for the whole community.[79] These laws almost exclusively related to domestic policies that could affect the local economy, the financial stability of the community, and inheritance.[80] Despite the frequent characterizations of Cretan poleis as highly militarized

[73] cf. Kyriakidis 2012, 119; Meiggs and Lewis 1969, no. 42; van Effenterre and Ruzé 1994, 225-228.
[74] See chapters four and five.
[75] An idea that originates from Aristotle (*Pol*. 2.1272b). See chapters two and five.
[76] Discussed in chapter five.
[77] See Gagarin and Perlman 2016, Dr1.
[78] Gagarin 2008, 67-109.
[79] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 131.
[80] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 86, 131-132.

societies, organized violence was not generally considered part of the polis' legislative responsibility.[81] As argued in chapter five, organized violence was likely so integrated into elite identity that regulating organized violence directly was analogous to regulating elite display or the elite lifestyle.[82] But Cretan warfare still must have had a dramatic impact on local and regional economies, both negatively and positively depending on the outcome, locality, and participants of the violence. War booty regulations, like those in A5+6 and the Tylissos-Knossos-Argos treaty, probably represent a convergence between two seemingly independent phenomena – between elite identity crafting and the mediation of local economies by both elites and non-elites through the institutionalization of economic practices such as property management, distribution of inheritance, and trade.

Perlman cites the Tylissos-Knossos-Argos inscription as a parallel to argue that the Axos inscription, A5+6, is concerned with regulating the profits of violence rather than violence itself.[83] Following the rules regarding the distribution of war booty in the Tylissos-Knosssos-Argos treaty (B.4-11), the text outlines regulations on trade (B.11-14) and property (B.23-25). But the Tylissos text also mentions joint defense in the case of a land invasion of Knossos (A.20-28), so there is a concern for both creating positive economic policies and protecting them. Through war booty regulations, Cretan poleis institutionalized the defense of the polis and how war booty was distributed.

Gabrielsen argues persuasively that Cretan poleis in the Hellenistic period were "oligopolistic" violent communities in which the polis did not attempt to mediate or control how or where Cretan elites performed violence outside their own political boundaries.[84] However, the war booty regulations suggest that some poleis did attempt to control how elites managed the economic benefits of organized violence. Why did Cretan poleis refrain from extending their control further – why did they not become "monopolistic" violent poleis, like Sparta and Athens?[85] We cannot say for certain due to the fragmentary state of our evidence, but we might suppose that the elite ideologies of organized violence outlined in chapters four and five provided some benefits to Cretan poleis themselves. Extra-urban sanctuary dedications earned the community and the dedicant prestige and regional recognition. Urban sanctuary dedications, in both exclusive and public spaces, carried additional implications since they operated within the political contexts of elites and non-elites. Several important technological innovations in the late sixth and fifth centuries, such as coinage, may have also changed how Cretan ideologies of violence operated at the local level.

[81] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 117, 131. Contra Beek 2020; Gehrke 2009, 407. See chapters one and two.
[82] As discussed in chapter five, the *andreion* appears epigraphically in five inscriptions from Axos, Datala, Eltynia, and Gortyn. These texts suggest that the *andreion* was a space for dining and feasting between warrior elites, but its political or social role within the community is difficult to interpret (see Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 93-95).
[83] Perlman 2010, 97-98.
[84] Gabrielsen 2001. For further discussion of Gabrielsen's arguments, and its relevance to the current topic, see chapter one.
[85] Gabrielsen 2013, 138.

In the late fifth century, the Gortynians demanded that the Rhittenians pay three-hundred and fifty staters to Ida on a regular basis.[86] Gortynians used λέβητες to pay fines in the late sixth century and only switched to staters in the early fifth century.[87] It is unclear whether any other polis, besides the Gortynians, dedicated silver coinage to extra-urban sanctuaries in the fifth century, but the widespread adoption of silver coinage on Crete in this period may help to explain the larger institutional changes related to elite dedications.[88] As we shall see, this regular payment to Ida functioned like an extra-urban sanctuary dedication. The Rhittenians made the dedication, but they did so under obligation to the Gortynians.[89]

On the mainland, the Corinthians proposed borrowing money from Olympia and Delphi at the start of the Peloponnesian War to fund the conflict (Thuc. 1.121, 143). This is the earliest textual reference to a temple loan, and Thucydides seems to imply that borrowing funds from extra-urban sanctuaries to fund military enterprises was commonplace.[90] In the epigraphic record, some fifth-century sanctuaries, like those in Argos and Athens, functioned as economic institutions, financing both public and private organizations.[91] On the mainland more generally, sanctuaries recycled dedications to finance sanctuary maintenance, kept stores of wealth which polities could draw upon in moments of emergency, and gave out funds as loans.[92] These transactions were occurring primarily in silver coinage, and several Attic sanctuaries appear to have become heavily monetized by the middle of the fifth century.[93] Although these practices may have been normal on the mainland and throughout the islands, there is no evidence that they occurred on Crete.

Perhaps Axos, Tylissos, and Knossos sought to regulate the distribution of war booty because they wanted to ensure that their extra-urban or urban sanctuaries would have a steady income in an increasingly monetized world. The Knossians started minting their own coinage around the same time as, or a little after, the Tylissos-Knossos-Argos inscription, and it is

[86] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, G80. This inscription will be discussed further below.
[87] Λέβητες: Gagarin and Perlman 2016, G1, G6, G7, G8, G10, G11, G14, G21. First Gortynian staters: Gagarin and Perlman 2016, G46.
[88] Stefanakis 1999, 254-257; and below.
[89] It is interesting to note that this is also how tribute seemed to work within the Delian League before the treasury was moved to Athens. Poleis made tribute payments to Apollo at Delphi initially, and the Athenians enforced and directly benefitted from these payment. This is a complex topic that deserves much further attention than what I can offer here.
[90] McGlin 2019, 7.
[91] McGlin 2019, 206. For epigraphic evidence of sanctuaries operating as financial institutions at Athens, see Samons 2000; Meiggs and Lewis 1969, no. 53. For the evidence at Argos, see Lazzarini 1976, no. 938, 939; IG 9 I^2 3,609; IG 4, 554; Vance 2022.
[92] Frielinghaus 2006, 36; Lindenlauf 2006; Papalexandrou 2008.
[93] see Pafford 2006. The earliest inscription revealing the collection of fees in coin is IG I^3 6. After a detailed study of this text and other comparable texts from the across the Aegean, Pafford (2006, 200) concludes that cult fees were not ultimately about raising revenue. This argument stems from the observation that some Athenian sanctuaries appear to have maintained multiple accounts, of which only certain accounts made loans (Pafford 2006, 75-78). Paying cult fees, she argues, was an older, religiously charged act, and therefore fit within normal ritual practice (Pafford 2006, 78, 200). If Pafford is correct, then making dedications in coin was already common in Attica by at least 460.

interesting to speculate that the two institutional developments might be somehow related.[94] Already in the late sixth century, large segments of Western and Central Crete were inundated with Aeginetan coinage.[95] Monetization and the financial powers of the sanctuary may have placed particular emphasis on war booty as a means of ensuring the financial well-being of the community. Indeed, we might wonder if this shift began at the sanctuaries themselves as they started accumulating large sacred treasuries.[96] Although the best pieces, τὰ καλλιστεῖα, could be displayed in a temple to accrue social and political prestige, the rest of the war booty – including provisions, armor, weapons, and captives – could be converted into silver coins before being dedicated. By the end of the fifth century, it had become regular practice to convert war booty into coinage. In our literary sources, war booty took various forms, but was typically sold and distributed to the combatants as coins or bullion.[97] Merchants who bought war booty followed armies on campaign (Xen *Hell*. 4.1.26). Officials in charge of collecting and selling war booty, λαφυροπῶλαι, are attested in several fourth-century armies, and these officials were formally attached to the king's staff at Sparta (Xen. *Lac*. 13.11).[98] Numismatists often stress the convenience that coinage provided for paying warriors' wages,[99] but coinage permeated nearly every level of society, even in communities without ready access to silver or gold.

Since war booty was a memory of success and a confirmation of status,[100] its form was dependent on its social, economic, and political contexts. For a Cretan polis that may have depended on loans from certain sanctuaries, elite dedications of armor or dedications to distant extra-urban sanctuaries may have been a real liability. Monetary dedications may have simultaneously alleviated this concern and created a new means by which elites could compete with each other over their right to belong within the warrior group. It is easy to imagine how this may have played out within urban sanctuaries, but the newfound emphasis on coinage would have also elevated the visual power of the most beautiful objects, τὰ καλλιστεῖα,[101] that were dedicated to extra-urban sanctuaries after major victories.

The Gortynians were some of the first Cretans to adopt silver coins, started minting some of the earliest coins on Crete, and were probably the next Cretans to institutionalize aspects of organized violence, following the Axians, Tylissians, and Knossians.[102] Although the Gortyn-Rhitten treaty does not regulate war booty, it includes institutional mechanisms that were probably initially controlled by warrior groups. The treaty outlines a dependent relationship

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[94] Devoto 2019.
[95] Holloway 1971; Le Rider 1966, 155-166; Stefanakis 1999, 254, 257. There is an important hoard of seventy Aeginetan staters from sixth-century Matala (IGCH, 1).
[96] As Pafford (2006) argues for Attic.
[97] Pritchett 1971, 75-84. See Pritchett 1991, 363-401 for a detailed discussion of the evidence.
[98] Pritchett 1971, 90. See Pritchett 1991, 401-438 for a detailed discussion of the evidence.
[99] see Crawford 1970; Crawford 1985, 696-707; Howgego 1990; Kroll 2012.
[100] Rawlings 2016. See, also, the discussion in chapter five.
[101] As the Tylissos-Knossos-Argos inscription puts it (Osborne and Rhodes, no. 126 B.9).
[102] Le Rider 1966, 155-166; Stefanakis 1999, 254, 257. The Kydonians started minting coins before the Gortynians, see Robinson 1928 and Stefanakis 1999. In addition to the Gortyn-Rhitten treaty discussed below, I argued in chapter five that the Gortynians incorporated aspect of the ideology of camaraderie into the Great Code.

between two poleis, wherein the Gortynians dominate the Rhittenians.[103] The word choice in lines twelve to fifteen seems to imply that there had been violent confrontation between the Gortynians and the Rhittenians in the past:[104]

θιοί. ἐπὶ τοῖδε [‘Ρ]ι[ττέν]ι[οι Γ]ορ[τυνίοις αὐτ]όνο̣μ[ο]ι κ’ αὐτόδικοι τὰ θ[ύ-]
ματα παρέκοντες ἐς Ϝί̣δαν τρί[τ]οι [ϝέ]τει τριακατίονς <σ>[τ]ατῆρανς καὶ πεν-
τέκοντα. στέγαν δ’ἄν κα ϝοικοδομές[ει c. 6]ς ἢ δένδρεα πυτεύσει, τὸν
ϝοικοδομέσαντα καὶ πυτεύσαντ[α] καὶ πρίαθαι κ’ ἀποδόθαι. *vac.* Τὸν δὲ σταρτ-
αγέταν και τὸν κοσμίονται ὅς κ’ ἄγε[ι] ‘Ρ[ι]τ̣τ̣ενάδε κοσμῆν πεδὰ τõ ‘Ριττενίο
κόσμο τὸν μὲ πειθόμενον τό πορ̣ίμ̣[ο, δ]αμιόμεν δὲ δαρκνὰν καὶ κατακρέθαι πεδ-
ά τε τό σταρτό καὶ πεδὰ τõν ‘Ριττενίον· πλ[ίο]ν δὲ μὲ δαμιόμεν· αἰ δὲ πλίον δαμιόσ-
αι ἔ μὲ κατακρίσαιτο, κσενείαι δίκα[ι δι]κάδδεθαι. ἐνεκυραστὰν δὲ μὲ παρέρπε-
ν Γορτύνιον ἐς τõ ‘Ριττενίο, αἰ δέ κα ν[ικ]αθ̣ῆι τõν ἐνεκύρον, διπλεῖ καταστᾶσ-
αι τὰν ἀπλόον τιμὰν ἃι ἐν τᾶι πόραι ἔ[γρα]τται, πράδδεν δὲ τὸν ‘Ριττένιον κόσμ-
ον, αἰ δέ κα με πράδδοντι, τὸνς πρειγ[ίς]τονς τούτονς πράδδοντας ἄπατον
ἔμεν. *vac.* τὰ ἐγραμμέν’, ἄλλα δὲ μέ. *vac.* ὅτι δέ [κα αὖ]τ[ι]ς ἀνπιπαίσοντι τὸ κοινὸν
οἱ ’Ρι-
ττένιοι πορτὶ τὸνς Γορτυνίον[ς προκαλῆ]ν τ̣ὸν κάρυκα ’Ριττενάδε ἐν ταῖδ <δε> έ-
κα παρέμεν ἢ αὐτὸνς ἢ ἄλλονς π[ρ]ὸ [τούτον ἀπ]οκρίνεθθαι κατ’ ἀγορὰν ϝευμέν-
αν τᾶς α[ὶ]τίας ἃς κ’ αἰτι[ά]σ[ονται, τὰν δ]ὲ κρίσιν ἔ[με]ν ἃ̣περ ταῖς ἀ[---]]

(1-3) Gods. On the following terms, the Rhittenians are to have their own laws and their own judicial system independent of the Gortynians, furnishing every third year 350 staters for Ida. (3-4) And a house which (someone) builds [c. 6] or plants trees, the builder or planter (is allowed) to buy and sell *vac.* (4-8) The (Gortynian) *startagetas* and the *kosmos* who goes to Rhitten, together with the Rhittenian *kosmos*, are to set straight the one who does not obey the *porimo*;[105] and he is to levy a fine of one drachma and is to use the money with the *startos* and with the Rhittenians; but they are not to fine him more. And if he should fine him more or should not use (the fine correctly), he is to be tried in a foreigners’ trial. (8-12) A Gortynian is not to go and take security from a Rhittenian. And if he is convicted in a case involving security, he is to pay double the simple value, as is written in the *pora* (*porimo* place?), and the Rhittenian *kosmos* is to exact payment. And if they do not exact payment, there is to be immunity for the elders who exact it from them. *vac.* (12) The things that are written (are valid), but other things

[103] Perlman 2004, 1186. The inscription is Gagarin and Perlman 2016, G80; IC 4.80

[104] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 445. The provided text and translation are adapted from Gagarin and Perlman (2016, G80), with the exception of a reading of a digamma in Ϝί̣δαν in line two, the apostrophes before πορ̣ίμο in line six, and πόραι in line ten. I disagree with their reading of a Gortynian ephor in these lines, see the following footnote.

[105] I follow Wein’s (2022) pre-Classical definition of κοσμεῖν, meaning to organize or facilitate the smooth functioning of some process, and understand τὸν μὲ πειθόμενον to be the object of κοσμõν, which usually takes an object in Archaic poetry. The word *porimo* is unknown but scholars have variously suggested a government position, a policy, a tax, or some feature in the landscape (see Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 442). I do not find Guarducci's (1935, 50) reconstruction of ἐφορίμου or van Effenterre’s and Ruze’s (1994) ἐφορίσμος particularly convincing.

are not. *vac.* (12-15) And whatever matter the Rhittenians as a community again fight about with the Gortynians, the herald is to summon (?) (the Gortynians), either they themselves or others on their behalf, to Rhitten in ten (days) to be present in the agora with the people gathered to answer the charge of which they are accused; and the decision will be made in the same way as ---

In the opening line of the treaty, the Rhittenians are required to pay three-hundred and fifty staters to the extra-urban sanctuary at Ida every third year. Although the Rhittenians were [αὐτ]όνο̣μ[ο]ι and αὐτόδικοι, they clearly had less power than the Gortynians. Gagarin and Perlman interpret the rules regarding a Gortynian taking security from a Rhittenian in lines eight to twelve as a reference to another law in Gortyn.[106] This law, G81, states that creditors can enter their debtors houses to seize security.[107] By explicitly earmarking this procedure as illegal for a Gortynian to do to a Rhittenian, it indicates that the laws regarding debt and seizure between Gortynians could have, at one point, also applied to the Rhittenians.

Lines four to six seem to indicate that the Gortynian *startagetas* and *kosmos* had as much power as the Rhittenian *kosmos* to deal with dissidents within the city of Rhitten. The word *startagetas* is difficult to understand, but it appears to have been a specific official within the Gortynian system. The *kosmos* was probably the highest official in each Cretan community, so the pairing of the Gortynian *startagetas* and the *kosmos* within Rhitten (line 4-6) probably indicates that the *startagetas* had special or elevated powers in Rhitten. Many scholars consider *startagetas* to be a military term, based on the assumption that the word is a Cretan form of στρατηγός.[108] Dialectically this makes some sense, so the *startagetas* may have had special powers because the treaty between Gortyn and Rhitten followed a major military conflict. However, there is ultimately no evidence for this line of reasoning. The term *startos* is equally controversial. It also appears in the Great Code,[109] where it seems to indicate the tribe, clan, or gens of the Gortynian *kosmos*.[110] Again, there is no indication that this term relates to violence in any way. Unfortunately, the terms *startos* and *startagetas* raise more problems than they resolve – although I imagine that these terms related to organized violence and *andreia* in some way, the evidence is too piecemeal to indicate how.

That being said, the Gortyn-Rhitten treaty resembles the Axian law, A5+6, and the Tylissos-Knossos-Argos treaty in a number of interesting ways. The text begins with a reference to a specific sanctuary. If we imagine that lines twelve to fifteen reference real interpolis warfare,[111] then perhaps the three hundred and fifty staters mentioned in line two are a consequence of that violence. Here, as in chapter five, we see patterns within early Cretan poleis

[106] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 444.
[107] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, G81 lines 16-22.
[108] i.e. Effenterre and Ruze 1994.
[109] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, G72.5.5-6.
[110] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 64-67.
[111] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 445.

that are remarkably reminiscent of Tilly's "tribute-taking empires."[112] Pushing this point further would unfortunately require a high degree of speculation since our understanding of the internal organization of the Gortynian polis remains so incomplete. We can say, however, that Gortyn was regulating dedications to an extra-urban sanctuary in the same sorts of ways as Axos, Tylissos, and Knossos. The Gortynians took it a step further perhaps by establishing a regular tributary system, but they seem to have been building on earlier practices. As previously discussed in chapter five, the Gortynians also incorporated aspect of the ideology of camaraderie into their Great Code. Like sixth-century Axos, fifth-century Gortyn appears to have been integrating aspects of the ideologies of violence and elite warriorhood identities into their polis system.

Whether or not fifth-century Gortynians used organized violence to establish the Gortyn-Rhitten treaty, the payments to Ida are reminiscent of earlier elite dedicatory practices. Indeed, many Cretan poleis probably adopted some of the conventions of their elites' ideologies of violence when they institutionalized or "monopolized" organized violence. By assuming control over these processes, however, poleis left Cretan elites in a tenuous position as they no longer could control membership into their group and needed a new means to establish dominance and preserve their status. Warriorhood was not profitable, so elites probably turned to specialized equipment and training to distinguish themselves from other combatants. Unlike the army-of-one mentality and the ideology of camaraderie, in which elites could claim belonging through ritual acts, wealth-accumulation warfare pushed elites to practice real violence on the battlefield.

6.3 – With Bow, Spear, and Shield: Why Cretans Fought in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries

The divisions of war booty outlined in the Tylissos-Knossos-Argos treaty are not tied to the number of warriors that each polis contributed, but rather established ahead of time. The inconsistent distribution of war booty between the three poleis may suggest that different communities specialized in different types of organized violence. Unfortunately, the inscription is too confusing in its current state to draw any solid conclusions. If the three poleis participated in a land battle, then each polis probably received an equal portion: δα[σμõι τõν κὰτ γ]ãν τὸ τρίτον μέρος ἔχεν πάντον (lines B.5-6). Vollgraff and Graham argue that Tylissos received one third and Knossos received two thirds, but there is nothing on the stone to support this reading.[113] If the three poleis fought in a sea battle, then two poleis split the booty: τ[õν δὲ κὰτ] θάλασαν τὰ *h*έμισα ἔχεν πάντον (lines B.6-7). In the next lines, Knossos receives the *dekate*, τὰν δὲ [δεκ]άταν τὸνς Κνοσίονς ἔχεν (lines B.7-8), which was probably a tenth portion with significant

[112] Tilly 1990, 21.
[113] Vollgraff 1948, 44-45; Graham 1964, 242-243. Osborne and Rhodes (2017, no. 126) follow Vollgraff's problematic reconstructions and translate the line in such a way so as to imply that the Tylissians get one-third by land and half by sea. They assume without basis that the Tylissians are the subject of lines B.4-11. As I will explain below this is one possibility, but there is no reason to assume it is the correct one.

ritual and religious significance.[114] The last lines in this section, hó τί χ' ἔλομες κοι[νᾶ]ι (lines B.8-9), seem to reiterate that this uneven distribution of booty, including Knossos' *dekate*, applied to any and every conflict that the three poleis fought together. However, it is not specified whether the *dekate* was set aside before distributing everything, τõν πάντον, or if the *dekate* was included in the distribution already. If it was awarded after distribution, then the victorious poleis first split ninety percent of the war booty and then Knossos received the final ten percent. If it was included in the initial distribution, then Knossos must have always received a portion if the battle occurred at sea. These possible distributions are outlined in table 6.1.

Dekate awarded after distribution

	Land	Sea
Tylissos (T)	**0.30**	**0** if K and A split *or* **0.45** if T splits with K or A
Knossos (K)	**0.40**	**0.10** if T and A split *or* **0.55** if K splits with T or A
Argos (A)	**0.30**	**0** if T and K split *or* **0.45** if A splits with T or K

Dekate included in initial distribution

	Land	Sea
Tylissos (T)	**0.33**	**0** if K and A split *or* **0.50** if T and K split
Knossos (K)	**0.33**	**0.50** (K will always be included)
Argos (A)	**0.33**	**0** if T and K split *or* **0.50** if K and A split

Table 6.1 – Two tables illustrating how booty would be distributed under the Tylissos-Knossos-Argos agreement.

Ancient naval powers tended to require greater participation in military enterprise as a single trireme is generally thought to have required approximately two hundred combatants,[115] so the answer to this conundrum has significant implications for the ways in which organized violence was controlled and utilized within these Cretan poleis. Lines six and seven specify that the distributions by land and sea derive from the total, πάντον, but there is no such specification for the *dekate*. This suggests to me that the *dekate* was awarded after the distribution, from

[114] Perlman 2010, 88. It is worth noting again that the word is in the feminine here and the neuter in A5+6. This distinction may relate to the fact that the Tylissos-Knossos-Argos treaty is in an Argive rather than Cretan dialect. Regardless, the Cretan *dekate* or *dekaton* did not function in the same manner as the *dekate* of Classical literature (Perlman 2010, 95). For a full description of the term in Classical literature, see Pritchett 1971, 93-97.
[115] Rutishauser 2019; Ober 2007.

whatever portions were allotted. In other words, I think it is more likely that the victorious poleis split ninety percent of the booty before Knossos received the *dekate*. The Knossians would always receive some portion of booty and would always receive the most booty when they participated in combat, since they split the total with all parties and then collected the *dekate* in addition. Therefore, the treaty appears to be incentivizing Knossians with war booty and the *dekate* to practice and prepare for organized violence both by land and sea, rather than just by sea as some have argued.

The fifth-century ideology of Cretan violence, wealth-accumulation warfare, was oriented around acquiring wealth, but it was born out of the army-of-one mentality and the ideology of camaraderie. Sixth- and fifth-century Knossos probably had a small group of warriors dedicated to performing the ideologies of violence in extra-urban and urban sanctuaries. After the Tylissos-Knossos-Argos treaty, the Knossians probably expanded warriorhood and constructed warships. Since the booty was gathered together and redistributed collectively, there was little incentive for warriors to fight individually as πρόμαχοι.[116] Cretan warfare required a large initial investment and appears to have produced no financial return, so it probably remained accessible only to elites.[117] In this sort of environment, the physical form of war booty probably became less important, since the quantity or price of the booty led to the largest dedication.

A series of terracotta plaques from eastern Crete illustrate these ideological parameters and are probably our best visual depiction of wealth-accumulation warfare (figure 6.2).[118] There are minor differences between the three plaques, and they do not appear to have been constructed by the same hand. The best-preserved examples are about twenty centimeters tall and twelve centimeters wide. The Praisos plaque was looted from the archaeological site following Halbherr's excavation of Altar Hill, and the Roussa Ekklesia plaque was discovered a hundred years later during excavations of an open-air sanctuary halfway between Praisos and Palaikastro.[119] The Agios Georgos plaque is at the Agios Nikolaos museum, but reports to be from the village of Agios Georgos, just west of ancient Praisos.[120] In the image, a leisure-class hoplite drags a naked individual, perhaps a young child or woman, and walks to the right. The warrior walks with strong legs and arms, his back straight and tall, while the smaller individual pushes back against the warrior, as if they are trying to get away. Halbherr and Rouse identified these smaller characters as enslaved individuals due to their stature and posture, but there is no explicit indication of their status.[121] Several scholars have identified this as a scene from the Homeric Cycle, but Erickson rightly points out the issues with this interpretation as Cretan artists

[116] For a definition and discussion of πρόμαχοι, see chapter two.
[117] Line B.31-34 of the Tylissos-Knossos-Argos treaty may imply that the Knossians could distribute booty differently than what is stated earlier in the treaty. If multiple poleis fought together and the Argives agreed to the new distribution method, then the Knossians may have been able to take some of the booty for themselves. But this reading still requires a fair bit of assumption. I read these lines as precautions should conflict arise over the original distribution method. Either way, they emphasize the military power that Knossos has in this treaty, as they need only negotiate with Argos rather than all three partners.
[118] Dohan 1931, 226; Erickson 2009, 371-2.
[119] Dohan 1931, 226; Erickson 2009, 372-373.
[120] Erickson 2009, 371-2.
[121] Halbherr's 1901, 389; Rouse 1902, 134.

rarely employed the same sorts of religious motifs as other parts of the Greek world.[122] In the context of the sixth- and fifth-century war booty regulations and the Cretan ideologies of violence, these plaques at the very least seem to depict successful warriors acquiring war booty.[123]

Figure 6.2 – Plaques probably depicting wealth-accumulation warfare. They are not represented here to scale. The plaque on the left is from Praisos,[124] the one in the middle was discovered in Roussa Ekklesia,[125] and the one on the right is reportedly from Agios Georgos.[126]

The wealth, in this case, was a war captive. Slavery and the enslavement of defeated peoples were common features of Greek warfare.[127] The Cretans had a reputation for being slave-traders in the Hellenistic period,[128] but there is no evidence that this was also the case in the Classical period. If my interpretation of the east Cretan terracotta plaques is correct, then they depict warriors performing wealth-accumulation warfare at a time when the island was experiencing dramatic legal, political, and economic expansions. Cretan warriors still sought to reinforce their masculinity and status through organized violence, but the currency of these

[122] Erickson 2009, 373. See Buschor 1914, 133; Dohan 1931; Hartwig 1893, 550.
[123] There are no known war booty regulations from Praisos. The ideology of camaraderie and the army-of-one mentality, on the other hand, are well attested. For the ideology of camaraderie, there are plaques (Dohan 1931, 212) and a plate (Erickson 2009, 388). For the army-of-one mentality, there are an ankle guard (Snodgrass 1964, 240), corslets (Snodgrass 1964, 74), greaves (Snodgrass 1964, 87), helmets (Snodgrass 1964, 22), miniatures (Benton 1940, 57; Bosanquet 1902, 258; Snodgrass 1964, 28 ft. 98, 74, 76), mitrai (Benton 1940, 57, 82), and plaques (Dohan 1931, 214; Erickson 2009, 372; Halbherr 1901, 392; Snodgrass 1964, 52).
[124] Dohan 1931, 226; Halbherr 1901, 390.
[125] Erickson 2009, 371-372.
[126] Erickson 2009, 371; Schefold 1978, 203-208.
[127] Pritchett 1971, 80-82. See Pritchett 1991, 223-312 for a more detailed discussion of the evidence. This phenomenon is not just limited to ancient Greece, see Cameron 2019.
[128] Beek 2020, 100; Kvist 2003, 212.

expressions became material wealth. Within the cyclical power scheme proposed in chapter five, war booty became less of an optional tool for elites to acquire power and more of an institutionalized requirement necessary to retain their identity and social status.

6.4 – Wealth-Accumulation Warfare and its Influence on Mainland Greece

Like the previous ideologies of violence, wealth-accumulation warfare was not restricted to the island of Crete itself. Cretan elites had always had a high level of interconnectivity with the mainland. There are at least four pieces of Cretan armor at Delphi and nine at Olympia.[129] Of course, dating these objects is highly controversial – although they have been traditionally dated to the seventh and sixth centuries, there is good reason to distrust the Cretan armor chronology. It is possible, for example, that the Cretan objects at Delphi could be the finest spoils described in the Tylissos-Knossos-Argos inscription as being set aside for the Pythia, τõν δὲ φαλύρον τὰ μὲν καλλ<ι>στεῖα Πυθόδε ἀπ[ά]γεν κοινᾶι ἀμφοτέρονς (B.9-10).[130] Moreover, many Cretans probably travelled to the games and festivals at mainland sanctuaries.[131] In the fourth century, Plato emphasizes that his fictionalized Cretan colony would require citizens to make regular pilgrimages to Olympia and Delphi (Pl. *Leg*. 12.950b), and Cretans were involved in mainland Greek conflicts at the end of the fifth century.[132] It seems likely, therefore, that Cretans warriors were interacting and engaging with mainland Greeks throughout the Archaic and Classical periods.

As we shall see, Classical Cretan warriors were elites trained in a wide range of martial arts, and they fought in small and well-organized bands.[133] They only appear in mainland conflicts in small numbers – making up about one percent of the total force. These warriors probably went abroad to search for new arenas to acquire war booty. Some may have been exiles fleeing *stasis* or allies fighting on behalf of a social obligation, and, although historians have overemphasized this point, some Cretans may have also left Crete to fight as mercenaries.[134]

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[129] Delphi: Hoffman 1972 22, 27; Snodgrass 1964, 52. Olympia: Hoffman 1972, 23, 26, 27; Snodgrass 1964, 73 and 89.

[130] Interestingly, dedications to mainland sanctuaries resemble urban-sanctuary dedications on Crete – symbols of the army-of-one mentality – rather than extra-urban dedications which emphasized the ideology of camaraderie. Following the argument I presented in chapter five, extra-urban sanctuaries were probably tied to a Cretan *koine* and meant to express camaraderie between Cretan elites. Since the real and imagined audience at mainland sanctuaries included large quantities of non-Cretans, we might imagine that individuality and personal prowess were the most important ideological objectives.

[131] For the earliest reference to a Cretan competing in the Olympic games, see Pindar's twelfth *Olympian* (Pind. *Ol*. 12). Pausanias (6.4.11) confirms Pindar's poem, and there is a bronze plaque commemorating the same athlete that probably dates to the mid-fifth century (SEG 11.1223a).

[132] The first reference to Cretan warriors fighting in a battle on mainland Greece is actually at the battle of Nemea in 394 (Xen. *Hell*. 4.2.16), but Cretans joined the Athenians in their attack on Sicily in 415 (Thuc. 6.43).

[133] They were not poor and desperate non-elites (contra Beek 2020).

[134] See Craven (2017) who explores Cretan mercenaries in the Classical and Hellenistic periods. Cretans certainly became renowned mercenaries, but they did not fight as mercenaries in every conflict. Craven argues that historians are often too quick to label Cretan warriors mercenaries. The list of scholars who have assumed without evidence that all the Cretans mentioned by Thucydides and Xenophon are mercenaries is too long to include here.

Regardless of their initial objectives, they approached organized violence through the ideological lens that I have outlined here. War booty, rather than the objectives of some general or polity, was always the goal of Cretan warfare in the Classical period. These same ideological biases made Cretan warriors rather unique in the Classical world.[135] As military specialists, Cretan warriors became renowned for their professionalism and skill. Unfortunately, for the reasons discussed above, there is no archaeological evidence at Cretan extra-urban or urban sanctuaries that can be directly attributed to Cretans fighting overseas. If the warriors fighting with the Athenians, Spartans, and Persians brought home any wealth, this wealth was likely monetary.

Although wealth-accumulation warfare changed how elites celebrated their status, warriorhood remained out of reach for anyone outside of the elite class. Those who could afford the full panoply and who had the time and leisure to practice warfare monopolized organized violence and became powerful and impressive warriors skilled in a range of weapons. Seeking to accumulate wealth rather than prove individual prowess, these Cretans fought in small closely associated groups, unlike the crowds of untrained amateurs that had become standard in Athens by the last quarter of the fifth century.[136] The Cretan approach to organized violence in the fifth century was deeply connected to the ideological history of Cretan warfare. Most Cretans fought as leisure-class hoplites for whom warriorhood was a marker of status that needed to be performed and recognized socially, and they sought to collect as much material wealth through violence as possible because war booty was a confirmation of their warriorhood.

It is tempting to interpret Cretans practicing wealth-accumulation warfare as financially desperate or overly committed to mercenary service, but the island's reputation as a hotspot for mercenaries developed over the course of the Hellenistic period.[137] In chapter two, I discussed the Perlman-Link debate regarding the Cretan πολιτεία and the reliability of our fifth and fourth century textual sources.[138] I argued that the Cretan πολιτεία was a mirage created in part due to the frequency of Cretan warriors fighting for and against the Athenians in the fifth and fourth centuries. I proposed a middle ground between the arguments of Perlman and Link,[139] in which we use the biases of our literary sources to understand how the Cretan elites fought and conceived of their own poleis. In this section, I will discuss the evidence for Cretan warfare in our Classical texts and largely ignore the Hellenistic authors. Alexander's campaigns had a

[135] Historians sometimes claim that the Arcadians and the Aitolians also fought for profit. According to van Wees (2004, 27), "the Arcadians, according to Xenophon, rode on Sparta's coat-tails, joining Spartan campaigns only when they promised easy booty – which was all they wanted, he claims." He cites Xen. *Hell*. 3.2.26 and 5.2.19. Based on his experiences in the *Anabasis* and his pro-Spartan inclinations, we perhaps ought to be a little more cautious with Xenophon's offhand remarks before promoting the notion that Arcadian warriors only fought to accumulate wealth. The Aitolian's reputation as profit-seeking warriors was probably constructed in the third century (see Scholten 2000). For further discussion, see Blome 2020.
[136] Konijnendijk 2018, 40-41. See chapter two.
[137] Craven 2017, 2-28; Kucewicz et al. 2021, 226. Craven argues that this reputation is based on only a few select sources and an *argumentum ex silentio*. That silence, the absence of archaeological evidence for the fourth and third centuries thereby implying that the Cretans were poor and did not participate in trade, has now been corrected (see Gilboa et al. 2017).
[138] Link 2008; Perlman 2005.
[139] Link 2008; Perlman 2005.

profound impact on how Cretans engaged in organized violence, why they chose to fight, and how poleis attempted to benefit from the violence of their own community members. Numerous scholars have emphasized that Hellenistic Crete was much more violent than Archaic and Classical Crete, and there are dramatic shifts in the patterns of settlement organization, ritual practice, and economic technology.[140] For these reasons, I am setting aside all post-Classical evidence.

Herodotus mentions Cretan warriors in the prelude to the Persian wars and explains that they did not participate in the conflict because of a Delphic oracle (Hdt. 7.169).[141] Herodotus is careful to emphasize that the Cretans were eager to fight alongside the other Greeks: ἡ μὲν δὴ Πυθίη ὑπομνήσασα ταῦτα ἔσχε βουλομένους τιμωρέειν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι (Hdt. 7.171). This could suggest that the Cretans' absence from the allied-Greek armies was rather surprising for Herodotus' audience. Cretan prowess in war was referenced in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*,[142] so the Cretans may have had something of a reputation by the beginning of the fifth century.

In 362, a Cretan informed Agesilaus that Epaminondas was on his way to Sparta from Tegea (Xen. *Hell*. 7.5.10). Epaminondas had camped within the Tegean city walls in order to keep his intentions hidden from the Spartans, τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐν ἀδηλοτέρῳ ὅ τι πράττοιτο (Xen. *Hell*. 7.5.8). Agesilaus was marching the Spartan army to Mantinea, so Sparta itself was unguarded and vulnerable (Xen. *Hell*. 7.5.9-10). Xenophon emphasizes just how miraculous the Cretans' message to Agesilaus was, Κρὴς θείᾳ τινὶ μοίρᾳ προσελθὼν, but he does not explain how a Cretan would have known Epaminondas' plans. Diodorus describes this moment differently (Diod. Sic. 15.82.6-15.83.2). He suggests that the Cretans were long-distance runners, ἡμεροδρόμοι, perhaps even scouts for the Spartans. But he also says that Agis was king of Sparta at the time so we might question the nature of his sources. If Xenophon's description is correct – that Epaminondas kept his army within the Tegean walls to keep his intentions secret – then the Cretan who informed Agesilaus must have been within or very close by Tegea. Pottery studies have shown that wealthy Cretans were deeply connected to several Peloponnesian poleis,[143] so we might wonder if the Cretan was a merchant or an aristocrat visiting Tegea. Other passages in book four of the *Hellenica*, which I will discuss below, might imply that many Cretans were simply living in the Peloponnese in the first quarter of the fourth century (Xen. *Hell*. 4.2.16, 4.7.6). There is nothing in our sources that suggests that these Cretans fought as mercenaries, and it is perhaps more likely that they fought alongside the Athenians and Spartans as allies. In other words, the traditional interpretation of Cretans in our fifth- and fourth-century sources as poor

[140] See Coutsinas 2013, Chaniotis 1999, Stephanakis 1999, Gagarin and Perlman 2016 for more specific discussions of these socio-political changes.
[141] Photius' summary of Ktesias' history of the Persian Wars mentions Cretan archers fighting for the Athenians during the battle of Salamis (72.26), but Ktesias' history is unreliable and most modern scholars question his authenticity (see Burn 1984, 11). Ktesias presents a version of Persia that greatly conflicts with the archaeology and epigraphy, and he places the battle of Plataea before the battle of Salamis. It seems likely, therefore, that the Cretans did not fight in the Persian Wars.
[142] Hom *Il*. 13.249-345, 23.850-897; *Od*. 13.250-286, 14.199-408.
[143] Erickson (2010) dedicates an entire chapter to the connections between the Peloponnese and Crete.

non-elites is likely a misreading. Instead, these small bands of Cretan warriors were heavily armed elites fighting according to the Cretan ideologies of violence.

It is possible that many Cretan warriors fighting on the mainland were exiles living in Athens and the Peloponnese in the late fifth and early fourth centuries. Arcenas recently argued that the average Classical Greek polis experienced more than one *stasis* every decade.[144] This result is remarkably high, but scholars estimate that only about half of *staseis* led to expulsions.[145] Noting that Arcenas' model included small-scale conflicts or "micro-*staseis*," Mackil argues that the each polis actually experienced *stasis* between 1.5 and 5 times on average over the whole Classical period.[146] I find Mackil's calculations more convincing, but even this lower frequency of *stasis* probably implies that significant numbers of exiled Cretan elites were living abroad, due to the high number of poleis on Crete.

Following Aristotle (Arist. *Pol*. 2.1272b), most scholars assume *stasis* was endemic on Crete.[147] However, there is only one known *stasis* that occurred on Crete in the Archaic and Classical periods, referenced indirectly by Pindar (Pind. *Ol*. 12).[148] Herodotus might describe a *stasis* at Kydonia in the late sixth century (Hdt. 3.58-59),[149] and Whitley has suggested that the Athenian raid on Kydonia in the late fifth century was part of a *stasis* (Thuc. 2.85),[150] but none of these episodes are conclusive. Forsdyke argues that several communities with intra-elite competition and factionalism in the Archaic period became dominated by the "politics of exile," a system in which elites used their political power to expel their rivals.[151] The patterns that Forsdyke traced for Mytilene, Megara, Samos, and Corinth certainly echo the epigraphic histories of some Cretan poleis. Outside of Crete, however, high levels of elite competition often

[144] Arcenas 2018, 9-10.
[145] Berger 1992; Fouchard 2013, 26; Mackil 2022. See Mackil 2022 for a summary of the pitfalls in Arcenas' methodology.
[146] Mackil 2022.
[147] Aristotle says that staseis derived from uneven power dynamics between oligarchs and the demos and the totalitarian control of the kosmoi over military affairs, τὴν ἡγεμονίαν οἱ κόσμοι τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον ἔχουσιν… εἰώθασι δὲ διαλαμβάνοντες τὸν δῆμον καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἀναρχίαν ποιεῖν καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ μάχεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους (Arist. *Pol*. 2.1272b). Plato's *Laws* (1.628a-e) directly contradicts Aristotle's version of Crete, see below. For a discussion of the oft-cited idea that Cretan poleis were plagued by internecine violence, see chapter one.
[148] For discussion of this poem as evidence for a Knossian *stasis*, see Bonacasa 1992,133-150; Barrett 1973, 25-26.
[149] Herodotus describes three different factions vying for control of the Kydonian polis – the Samians, the Aeginetans, and the Zakynthians. In his narrative, the Samians first drove out the Zakynthians, and then they were enslaved by a combined force of Aeginetans and Cretans. Strabo called Kydonia an Aeginetan colony (Str. 8.6.16), but there is no evidence that this was the case in Herodotus' or Thucydides' works (Hdt. 3.59; Thuc.2.27, 2.85, 4.56-57). In Thucydides work, the Kydonians were fighting against the Athenians. The Athenians hated the Aeginetans, expelled them from Aegina, and then exterminated them on the Peloponnese, so it is weird that Thucydides does not describe the Kydonians as Aeginetan colonists if that was really the case. Kydonia's first coins, which were probably minted shortly after this conflict in the late sixth or early fifth century, are smaller denominations of the Aeginetan stater, but they incorporate the Zakynthian half crescent within the reverse (Robinson 1928). Aspects of these factions appear to have remained within the polis beyond the conflict described by Herodotus, thereby implying that the conflict might have been within the polis rather than outside the polis.
[150] Whitley 2009, 275.
[151] Forsdyke 2005, 30-78.

led to tyrannies, and there is no evidence for tyranny on Crete in the Archaic or Classical periods.[152]

In the *Laws*, Plato seems to suggest that Cretan poleis were generally stable. If Cretan poleis were in fact oriented around the military, the Athenian argues, then they would be in a constant state of civil war (Pl. *Leg*. 1.628a-e). Kleinias and Megillos argue that the Athenian must be right, then, and that Cretan poleis were not oriented around the military. This argument only works if Plato's audience understands that Cretan poleis were stable and not locked in perpetual civil conflict. Aristotle, on the other hand, argues that Cretan poleis were always in a state of civil war, a cold *stasis* perhaps, but inter-polis conflicts were resolved by elites so as to avoid uprisings from non-elites (Arist. *Pol*. 2.1272b). Following my arguments in chapter two, I interpret the differences between Aristotle and Plato as differences of individual perspective. Plato's narrative seems to suggest that Cretan poleis had a reputation for being stable. Aristotle counters that their stability was extremely fragile and susceptible to foreign intervention, ξενικοί πόλεμοι, as a way of dismissing Plato's praise of Cretan poleis (Arist. Pol. 2.1272b).[153] By qualifying his teacher's claims, Aristotle effectively confirms the reputation of Cretan poleis as politically stable. That being said, it was probably the case that some poleis experienced *staseis* in the Archaic and Classical periods and others did not. As outlined in chapter five, the systems by which the ideologies of violence were performed in urban sanctuaries likely created real tensions between elites and non-elites. I suspect that many of these fragile communities likely struggled with *stasis*, but the evidence is simply absent. Some Cretan warriors fighting with the Athenians and Spartans were probably exiles and others were not. Regardless, all the Cretans in our literary sources have a particular approach to organized violence that did not align with the practices of the Athenians and Spartans: they fought exclusively as leisure-class hoplites and *epilektoi* rather than professional amateurs.

For the Hellenistic period, Craven argues that Cretans typically fought overseas as σύμμαχοι rather than mercenaries, μισθοφόροι.[154] This distinction is important in our discussion here because although our sources emphasize that Cretans fought for wealth, they did so within the ideological parameters of wealth-accumulation warfare. They probably redirected their spoils to Crete rather than fighting for personal gain. Unfortunately, Craven's linguistic distinction is not as helpful for the Classical period as it is for the Hellenistic period. Thucydides references μισθοφόροι, men working for a μισθός, and σύμμαχοι throughout his work. Although μισθοφόροι and σύμμαχοι appear to be different, most warriors, including σύμμαχοι, received a

[152] Forsdyke 2005, 78. Some of Crete's mythical kings were considered tyrants. King Minos was frequently described as a tyrant in Athenian literature, but this was probably related to his persona as a villain on the Athenian stage. For a detailed discussion of Plato's *Minos*, see chapter two. It may be the case that Cretan tyranny looked very different than the types of tyranny described by Herodotus. Unfortunately, a more detailed investigation of this topic is beyond the scope of this project.

[153] For further discussion of Aristotle's and Plato's uneven treatment of Crete, see chapter two.

[154] Craven 2017, 32. Her argument is oriented around the epigraphic evidence and she highlights in particular the Rhodian "mercenary" treaties with Ierapytna and Olous (IC 3.3.3A; SEG 23.547).

μισθός.[155] Xenophon occasionally describes groups of μισθοφόροι as σύμμαχοι and records speeches in which generals refer to their own μισθοφόροι as σύμμαχοι (cf. Xen. *Hell*. 4.2.3-5). For Xenophon, a σύμμαχος may not have carried any deeper political or legal meaning, so we should be careful not to put too much weight on it. As we shall see, there is good reason to assume that the Cretan warriors fighting with the Athenians and Spartans had some measure of political allegiance to these poleis when they fought for them. Although they sought to prove themselves as warriors and as elites by collecting war booty, Cretans were not simple brigands or mercenaries willing to fight for the highest bidder. Their eagerness to fight and repeated appearance in mainland conflicts was instead a consequence of their ideological approach to organized violence and their continuous need to prove their status through the acquisition of war booty.

In the late fifth and early fourth centuries, approximately seven groups of Cretan warriors appear in our literary sources (see Table 6.2).[156] Only five of these groups are tied to specific military conflicts. The Cretans in Xenophon's *Anabasis* and the Sicilian Expedition are often described as mercenaries, but there is room in our sources for different readings. In both cases, the Cretans are presented through the filter of our Athenian authors, who do not discuss the warriors' relationships with their Cretan poleis – they are only ever called Cretans, and their political origin is never revealed. Nevertheless, all these Cretan warriors were wealthy and well-equipped elites proficient in wide a range of martial skills, who pursued war booty above all else.

Author, Work	Citation	Conflict	Number of Warriors	Specification
Thucydides	2.85	Kydonian Raid	-	-
	6.25	Sicilian Expedition	80	τοξόται
	6.43			τοξόται
	7.57			τοξόται
Aristophanes, *Frogs*	1356-8	-	-	τοξόται
Xenophon, *Anabasis*	1.2.9	March of the Ten Thousand	200	τοξόται
	3.3.7			τοξόται
	3.4.17			τοξόται
	4.2.28			-
	5.2.29-32			τοξόται

[155] Pritchett 1971, 4-6. While Thucydides certainly criticizes the warriors in Sicily who worked for pay (Thuc. 7.13), the Egestans had funded the first month of the expedition by paying the Athenian forces a μισθός (Thuc. 6.8; Pritchett 1971, 23-24). Jarva (1995, 154) argues that all Athenian hoplites received a μισθός after the Potidea campaign. Μισθοί were common in fifth-century Athens and even Athenian politicians received a μισθός (Thuc. 8.97). Following Pritchett, I cannot deduce any sort of subtle correlation between all the occurrences of μισθός and therefore believe it simply translates to a payment or wage for service.

[156] These are all vague references, so it is possible that one group of Cretans could have fought in multiple conflicts.

Xenophon, *Hellenika*	4.2.16	Battle of Nemea	300	τοξόται
	4.7.6	Aegesipolis' Invasion of Argos	-	τοξόται
Plato, *Laws*	625c-d	-	-	τοξόται, ἀκοντισταί, ἱππεῖς, σφενδονῆται, and τοξόται
	794c			
	804c	-		τοξόται and ἄλλοι ἀκροβολισμοί
	834a-d	-		ἀκοντισταί, ψιλοί, ὁπλίται, σφενδονῆται, and τοξόται

Table 6.2 – All references to Cretan warriors in the Classical period, listed in approximate chronological order.

Questions about the political and social status of Cretan warriors are worthwhile, but it is likely a misreading to call them mercenaries, in the traditional sense. Wealth-accumulation warfare may have looked very much like mercenary service to an Athenian, but there is no reason to assume that Cretan warriors fighting in this manner were transgressing their obligations to their poleis. According to Duplouy's and Whitley's definitions of citizenship, Cretans fighting in mainland armies as mercenaries could still qualify as citizens back home on Crete because they performed their status, maintained personal relationships with other citizens, and remained part of some sort of warrior group, or *andreion*.[157] In what follows, I will show that none our literary references to Cretan warriors indicate that these Cretans were ever at odds with their institutions and ideologies. Indeed, they seem to be adhering very closely to the ideological systems outlined above.

Despite their specificity, both Thucydides and Xenophon emphasize that accumulating wealth through violence was the Cretan warriors' central motivation. For these authors, the ideology of Cretan warfare probably resembled that of a mercenary. Looting and pillaging were important components of organized violence, but for the Cretans, looting outweighed loftier political goals like conquering. As discussed in chapter one, conquering and raiding should be envisioned as at least two distinct forms of organized violence since they required different preparation and looked very different both strategically and tactically.[158] There is no evidence for conquests or sieges on Crete before the Hellenistic period, and the evidence discussed above suggests that war booty was the primary goal of Cretan violence. While the Athenians and the Spartans used violence to impose their political will or conquer other poleis, Cretans, so far as our evidence reveals, used violence to accumulate wealth.

[157] See Duplouy 2018 and Whitley 2018.
[158] See Fuchs 2011.

The Athenian invasion of Kydonia in 429 seems to perplex and frustrate Thucydides, and this might illustrate how Cretan warfare differed from the types of organized violence practiced on the mainland (Thuc. 2.85). Hornblower notes that the Athenian assembly had little agency in this episode.[159] They are convinced to sail against the Kydonians, ἐπὶ Κυδωνίαν πλεῦσαι, instead of reinforcing Phormio's navy in Naupactus. Heavily outnumbered, Phormio had just won a great battle at Chalcis and was in desperate need of more ships (Thuc. 2.83-84). The campaign to Kydonia caused the Athenian reinforcements to miss Phormio's second battle at Naupactus (Thuc. 2.90-92). Although Naupactus was a great victory for the Athenians, Thucydides seems displeased that the reinforcements never made it and says that the Athenians wasted their time at Kydonia, ἐνδιέτριψεν οὐκ ὀλίγον χρόνον (Thuc. 2.85). His flippancy has inspired similar responses in modern scholarship: Lendon describes the Athenian invasion of Kydonia as "a tiny strategic gain in a rather distant place."[160] But even to consider it a strategic gain is perhaps an overstatement.

The Athenians dispatched their navy to sail against the Kydonians, but the Gortynian proxenos who convinced them to invade really sought to aid the Polichnitai, ἐπῆγε δὲ Πολιχνίταις χαριζόμενος ὁμόροις τῶν Κυδωνιατῶν (Thuc. 2.85). Whitley suggests that the Polichnitai were a tribe within the Kydonian polis, and the Athenians and Gortynians, therefore, were actually supporting a faction in a Kydonian *stasis*.[161] Although this is one possible explanation, it does not explain why the Athenians only pillaged the Kydonian countryside and never moved against the polis. This is the only violent act that the Gortynians, Polichnitai, and Athenians committed against the Kydonians. Pillaging, δηιών, is fairly common in Thucydides' work and it probably specifically refers to the seizure of movable property. In Perikles' speech, he urges the Athenians to let the Spartans ravage their homes and their land, αὐτὰ δῃῶσαι, because men own property and property does not own men, οὐ γὰρ τάδε τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ἄνδρες ταῦτα κτῶνται (Thuc. 1.143). The implication is that pillagers took the things that people owned, κτῶνται. Athenians were not unaware of raiding as a practice, but raids were typically only carried out as the first phase of a pitched battle or a siege.[162] The Athenians were experienced and skilled besiegers (Hdt. 9.70, Thuc. 1.102), yet they refrained from assaulting the city of Kydonia. Rather than aiding the Polichnitai in achieving a political goal, the Gortynians and the Athenians appear to have helped the Polichnitai achieve an economic goal. Although Thucydides himself may not have seen the point, the invasion and raiding of Kydonia perfectly aligns with what we already know about Cretan warfare – the goal of Cretan warfare in this period was to acquire movable property, and they considered the performance of organized violence to be an ideologically legitimate means to acquire wealth.

[159] Hornblower 1991, 366.
[160] Lendon 2010, 200. Lendon characterizes most conflicts of the Peloponnesian War as ideologically motivated.
[161] Whitley 2009, 275.
[162] Echeverría 2021, 254-259. Echeverría (2021, ft. 260) considers the invasion of Kydonia to be an *epistrateia*, and raiding was the first stage of an *epistrateia*. The Athenians never proceeded to stage two: making an attempt on the urban center.

Thucydides does not tell us much about the Cretan warriors in this episode, but we might wonder if this was ultimately a conflict among Cretan elites. After all, a single Gortynian *proxenos* persuaded the Athenian assembly to invade in the first place (Thuc. 2.85).[163] Although Thucydides never calls the Gortynians σύμμαχοι, the *proxenos* convinces them to attack the Kydonians as they would an enemy, φάσκων προσποιήσειν αὐτὴν οὖσαν πολεμίαν. If they were not officially σύμμαχοι, then the Athenians and the Gortynians were at least coordinating military campaigns like allies in the opening years of the Archidamian War.

The Cretans fighting for the Athenians during the Sicilian expedition, in the Decelean War, are often described as mercenaries (Thuc. 6.25, 6.43, 7.57),[164] but we have good reasons to assume that they were still operating allies. At times, Thucydides seems to imply that they are σύμμαχοι, and at other times, they appear to be mercenaries. Being pressured in the assembly, a reluctant Nikias outlines the force that he would need to invade Sicily and requests Cretans specifically (Thuc. 6.25). He says that he needs at least one hundred ships from the Athenians and their allies, Ἀθηναίων… καὶ ἄλλας ἐκ τῶν ξυμμάχων; at least five thousand hoplites from the Athenians and their allies, Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων; archers, τοξόται, from Athens and from Crete, τῶν αὐτόθεν καὶ ἐκ Κρήτης; and slingers. There is nothing in this passage to suggest that the Cretans were μισθοφόροι,[165] and we might instead be tempted to assume that they are σύμμαχοι based on the structure of the sentence. If Nikias wanted ships from Athens and her allies and hoplites from Athens and her allies, why not archers from Athens and her allies? Thucydides does not name a specific Cretan polis, and this is potentially significant considering that he named three during the Athenian raid of Kydonia in 429: the Kydonians, Gortynians, and Polichnitai (Thuc. 2.85). Perhaps their origin, as Cretans, was enough for the Athenian assembly to immediately understand their political or legal relationship to Athens.[166] The eighty Cretans in Sicily may have been a mixture of Gortynians and Polichnitai – the Cretans who had fought beside the Athenians in 429. The Polichnitai, Π[ολ]ιχνῖται, are listed on the Athenian Tribute Lists in 454/3, but this entry might reference another group outside of Crete.[167] It is possible that the Cretan Polichnitai were well-known to the Athenians as σύμμαχοι, so Thucydides felt it was unnecessary to specify which Cretan poleis joined the expedition.

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[163] There is some ambiguity in this passage and Connor (1976) argues that the proxenos was an Athenian, possibly even the famous Nikias himself, rather than a Gortynian speaking to the Athenian assembly. For his argument to work, we have to change Thucydides' Greek and assume someone made an error. Herman (1989) convincingly argues that Connor's emendation is illogical and does not fit Thucydides' writing style.

[164] Erickson (2005, 625) writes that "Cretan mercenary soldiers make their first appearance in the later stages of the Peloponnesian War," citing Thuc. 6.25 as the "earliest appearance of Cretan mercenaries."

[165] contra Erickson 2005, 625; Dover 1965, 36.

[166] I question the argument that describing a warrior as Cretan referenced a specific style of fighting (as Craven argues for the Hellenistic period, see Craven 2017, 135-136) since Nikias specifies that they are τοξόται. I will argue below that this word has a special meaning in this context.

[167] IG I^3 259, 5.11-12; Osborne and Rhodes 2017, no. 119; Meiggs and Lewis 1969, no. 39. Book two of Thucydides' work is the only reference to Polichnitai on Crete, so many scholars believe that Thucydides made a mistake. Whitley (2009, 275) suggests that the Polichnitai were a tribe within the Kydonian polis, and Rhodes (1988, 257) suggests that Thucydides might have been misremembering the Polyrrehenians. If the Polichnitai are named on the Athenian Tribute Lists, then they are the only Cretans that gave tribute, as far as we know. The Gortynians are not on the lists.

On the other hand, it is possible that Nikias may not call the Cretans allies because the Athenians were no longer allied with any Cretan poleis by 415 (Thuc. 6.25). Instead, Nikias might be referencing personal associates or local *metoikoi* – a small group of Cretan exiled elites who were living in Athens in the late fifth century.[168] Only eighty Cretans went to Sicily with the Athenians (Thuc. 6.43), which is a remarkably small group. Despite their small number, Nikias clearly considers them to be one of the more important groups in the invasion force (Thuc. 6.25). Perhaps his emphasis reflects the fact that they were highly trained and highly reliable warrior elites.

When Thucydides summarizes the motivations for all the warriors who participated in the Sicilian expedition, he starts with three main groups: the Athenians' subjects, οἱ μὲν ὑπήκοοι; the independent warriors from the allies, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ ξυμμαχίας αὐτόνομοι; and the mercenaries, οἳ μισθοφόροι (Thuc. 7.57). He then mentions the Cretans.[169] He does not list them as mercenaries, but he says that they were persuaded to fight for payment, Κρῆτες δὲ καὶ Αἰτωλοὶ μισθῷ καὶ οὗτοι πεισθέντες. The term μισθῷ does not directly indicate that they were mercenaries since the Athenians regularly paid their hoplites a μισθός after the siege of Potidaea in the 430s.[170] In this particular case, the Athenians intended to give the whole expeditionary force to Sicily, both σύμμαχοι and Athenian residents, a μισθός for the first month of the campaign (Thuc. 6.8).[171] It seems likely that the eighty Cretans were indeed not mercenaries, but instead fighting in Sicily to acquire wealth. Thucydides appears to be making a distinction in 7.57 between the μισθοφόροι, referenced with the demonstrative οὗτοι, and the Cretans and Aitolians. The only groups he names as μισθοφόροι are the Mantineans and other Arcadians, Μαντινῆς δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι Ἀρκάδων μισθοφόροι. He then offers, perhaps, a definition of μισθοφόροι: warriors who simply attacked whoever was pointed out to them, ἐπὶ τοὺς αἰεὶ πολεμίους σφίσιν ἀποδεικνυμένους ἰέναι εἰωθότες. The Cretans, it seems, were not so motivated and despite their desire for a μισθός, fought at Sicily for something more than just convenience.

Thucydides mentions the eighty Cretan warriors in Sicily three times. During the battle of Syracuse, the Mantinean and the Arcadian μισθοφόροι make up the right wing of the Athenian battle line; the Athenians are in the center; and the other allies are on the left, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο οἱ

[168] See Connor 1976.
[169] He also references the Aitolians in this passage (Thuc. 7.57) alongside the Cretans, and this is rather surprising. This is the only time Thucydides references Aitolians outside of Demosthenes' invasion of Aitolia in book three. The Aitolians in Sicily are not Naupactians, who are listed separately (Thuc. 7.57), so they may have been exiles living in Athens as *metoikoi*, mercenaries, or allies from some unnamed and unknown Aitolian polis.
[170] Jarva 1995, 154.
[171] It is possible to read the μισθός in this passage as a reference to the costs of maintaining a warship rather than as μισθοί for the warriors on the warships. I find this reading highly selective. The assembly tasks this force with aiding the Egestians against the Selinuntians, restoring the Leontine exiles, and bolstering support for Athens among the Sicilians (Thuc. 6.8). Surely this would have required a substantial fighting force that was not ransacking, or living off, the land. They must have intended to pay the soldiers a μισθός. IG I^3 1032 suggests that Athenian triremes were manned by both citizens and slaves, and Thucydides (7.13) seems to confirm that this was the case (see Graham 1992, 1998; Hornblower 2008, 563). The sixty talents of uncoined silver designated as a month's pay, μηνὸς μισθόν (Thuc. 6.8), must have been intended to pay the sailors and combatants on those vessels.

ξύμμαχοι οἱ ἄλλοι (Thuc. 6.67). He does not reference the Cretans by name.[172] Although we can assume that Cretans fought alongside the Athenians in the Archidamian War as σύμμαχοι (Thuc. 2.85), it is simply not clear whether they fought in the Decelean War as allies, *metoikoi*, or something else (Thuc. 6.25). We cannot know for certain, therefore, what these Cretans intended to do with their μισθός. Regardless, Thucydides seems to think of the Cretans as something else besides mercenaries. They were highly reliable warriors who fought for different reasons than the Athenians, and in different ways.

In the years following the Peloponnesian War, two hundred Cretans fought as mercenaries for Cyrus of Persia. These men were certainly mercenaries by the time they arrived with Clearchus at Sardis (Xen. *Anab*. 1.2.9), but we do not know whether they joined Clearchus as mercenaries, as allies of Sparta, or as Cretan exiles living in Sparta. Xenophon explains that Clearchus raised a Spartan army and led it to Thrace following the Peloponnesian War (Xen. *Anab*. 2.6.2). He was recalled by the ephors, but he ignored their command and continued to lead his men into Thrace (Xen. *Anab*. 2.6.3). He was condemned to death for his disobedience and turned to Cyrus for financial support (Xen. *Anab*. 1.1.9, 2.6.4), but it is unclear what happened to the men under his command. The Spartans supported Cyrus in his bid for the throne and sent a relatively small force of seven hundred hoplites led by Cheirisophus to aid him (Xen. *Anab*. 1.2.21, 1.4.2,1.4.3,2.1.1). Clearchus joined Cyrus with one thousand hoplites, eight hundred Thracian peltasts, and two hundred Cretans (Xen. *Anab*. 1.2.9). It is possible that Clearchus' hoplites and Cretans may have started serving him as allies or exiles in Sparta, well before they were mercenaries in Thrace and Asia Minor. For these Cretans, their personal relationship with Clearchus may have been more important than their relationship with Sparta, especially if they could continue to acquire wealth through being a warrior. Unfortunately, we do not know what happened to the Cretans after the expedition, but many of them may have returned to Crete with whatever wealth they had acquired along the way.[173]

By 394, Cretan warriors were regularly fighting alongside the Spartans. It is still unclear whether they were exiles or σύμμαχοι, but they were still fighting in small groups of leisure-class elites. In the days leading up to the battle of Nemea, Aristodemos raised an army in Sparta and rushed towards the isthmus without any mercenaries or allies, αὐτοὶ μόνοι εἰσί (Xen. *Hell*. 4.2.12). As the army advanced towards Nemea, they recruited allied poleis along the way, προϊόντες δὲ καὶ παραλαμβάνοντες τὰς πόλεις πλείους τε καὶ δυσμαχώτεροι γίγνονται. When the battle commenced, the Cretans were the only non-Peloponnesians fighting alongside the Spartans (Xen. *Hell*. 4.2.16).[174] Xenophon does not say when these Cretans joined Aristodemos, but it

[172] Thucydides also does not say where the τοξόται are. I argue in chapter two that they would have been in the hoplite battle line, and they only fight as *psiloi* in Thuc. 6.69 temporarily before falling back into the battle line. The more traditional reconstruction, however, is that they would have been in front of, behind, or to the sides of the hoplites, and Thucydides simply omitted them from his description.

[173] Xenophon made the army abandon their war booty and baggage animals during their march to the Black Sea (Xen. *An*. 4.1.12-13), so the surviving Cretans may not have had much by the end.

[174] Admittedly, Xenophon's list is incomplete. He omits the Tegeans, Mantineans, and Achaeans who are named in other parts of this section (Xen. *Hell*. 4.2.13, 18). However, these are all still Peloponnesian peoples.

seems likely that they were already in the Peloponnese. Perhaps they were living locally or in Lacedaemonia – unfortunately, Xenophon is silent on the matter.

When Agesipolis invaded Argos in 388, he led a band of Cretan warriors (Xen. *Hell.* 4.7.3-6). Agesipolis marched his army up to the Argive wall and, at one point, forced the Argives to strand a group of Boeotian horsemen outside their walls (Xen. *Hell*. 4.7.6). Agesipolis could not capitalize on this situation, however, because the cavalry were protected by the Argives on top of the walls and the Cretans were away pillaging Nauplia. This is the only time we hear about the Cretans in this conflict, and Xenophon mentions them explicitly because they left their posts to acquire war booty.[175] Had they been present, they could have killed many of the Boeotians and perhaps changed the outcome of the conflict. Although Xenophon does not describe Cretan warfare as a waste of time, he illustrates how it occasionally conflicted with the goals and ideologies of hoplite warfare on the mainland.

This episode outside Argos implies that Cretan warriors were talented archers who operated as a well-organized unit. As Konijnendijk has persuasively argued, cavalry were typically the most dangerous warriors on the ancient battlefield.[176] Xenophon seems to imply that the Cretans were even more dangerous. As archers, they must have been extremely skilled to hit the cavalrymen at a distance.[177] Brouwers argues that archery in Classical warfare was a leisure-class occupation that required a huge amount of skill.[178] His argument is convincing, and archery, as a leisured activity, fits neatly into the ideological parameters of Cretan warfare that I have outlined here.[179] Moreover, the 1D type arrowhead, the most popular arrowhead type on Crete, was heavy and broad and would have been an excellent long-distance arrow, but Xenophon seems to suggest that the Cretans were not practiced long-distance fighters: καὶ διετέλουν χρώμενοι τοῖς τῶν πολεμίων τοξεύμασι καὶ ἐμελέτων τοξεύειν ἄνω ἱέντες μακράν (Xen. *Anab*. 3.4.17).[180] Although Cretans tended to be renowned and skilled archers, their equipment was designed for hunting first and warfare second. This mismatch, between the archaeological and literary evidence, emphasizes that Cretan warriors were leisure-class elites who spent their free time hunting and who fought in mainland conflicts in order to acquire wealth.

When Aristophanes, Plato, Thucydides, and Xenophon describe Cretans as τοξόται, they probably mean to say both that they carried bows and arrows and that they belonged to the

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[175] Xenophon does the same thing with his slave in the *Anabasis*: he only mentions that he had an enslaved attendant during the campaign when his attendant abandons his post (Xen. *Anab*. 4.2.20-21).
[176] Konijnendijk 2021.
[177] Alternatively, we could imagine that Agesipolis would have them fire at the defenders on the walls as his own forces engaged the cavalrymen, but this seems more risky and less likely.
[178] Brouwers 2010, 227.
[179] See chapter two, however, for a full discussion of the evidence for archery on Crete in the Archaic and Classical periods. As I state above, archery probably existed, but all of our evidence before the fourth century is more likely related to hunting than organized violence. Scholars are incorrectly trusting Kleinias' claims in the opening pages of Plato's *Laws* (1.625c-d), which the Athenian locutor then refutes almost immediately (Pl. *Leg*. 1.632e-634d). Plato says that the Cretans run up hillsides and practice archery because they are difficult tasks that take time, practice, and economic freedom; he does not say that archery was somehow an ethnic feature of the Cretan people.
[180] Davis 2013, 10; Snodgrass 1964, 147; Snodgrass 1967, 40.

leisure-class and could therefore afford to be skilled bow-hunters. Plato felt comfortable establishing a fictious Cretan colony in which the polis required its leisured-class citizens to train with hand-to-hand weapons, short-range missile weapons, and unarmed combat (Pl. *Leg*. 6.753b, 755c, 755e-756a; 7.794f, 804c, 815a, 830d-831a; 8.834b). All our Classical literary sources describe the Cretans as highly trained specialists capable of fighting anywhere on the battlefield, and they always describe them operating as a single group. At the walls of Argos, Agesipolis could not command them to fire upon the Boeotians because they were absent. This level of coordination, one general commanding an entire group within his army to do a specific task, is remarkable for the Classical period.[181] The Spartans deployed armies that were segmented into many groups, but the only time a general gave specific commands to groups within the army, at the battle of Mantinea, those groups failed to achieve their objectives (Thuc. 5.71). Indeed, Spartans had a reputation for resisting the commands of their superiors (Hdt. 9.53). The Cretans, on the other hand, were organized, efficient, and competent enough to carry out specific tasks and assignments on the battlefield without being disrupted. This did not happen at Argos because they were absent, but even when they deserted the army to go looting they did so as a single body of warriors.

Konijnendijk says that *logades*, what I am calling *epilektoi* following Xenophon's language, "were formed to complete missions that a large, slow, barely controllable mass of warriors such as the hoplite levy could not carry out."[182] They acted "as a reserve or as a strike force to seize the tactical initiative."[183] The Theban Sacred band, instituted in 375, is probably the earliest permanent band of *epilektoi* within any mainland army.[184] The Cretans in Xenophon's *Anabasis* and *Hellenica*, therefore, appear to have been fighting as proto-*epilektoi* about a generation before the earliest *epilektoi* in Thebes.

Based on our evidence for Cretan warriors in the Classical period, Craven argues that they probably fought at close quarters among the hoplites in the hoplite battleline.[185] Lewis takes a similar, but more orthodox, position and envisions Cretan warfare as Homeric warfare.[186] He thinks that they fought in fluid crowds around the hoplites. I propose that wealth-accumulation warfare was sometimes one of these, sometimes both, and sometimes neither: Cretan warriors were leisure-class hoplites fighting as *epilektoi* with a large range of weapons and skills. For the most part, they were outfitted in hoplite equipment, like the terracotta plaques from eastern Crete (see figure 6.2, above), but they also carried bows.

In the *Anabasis*, ten Cretan warriors hide in some bushes and pretend to wait in ambush (Xen. *Anab*. 5.2.29). They use their bronze shields, πέλται... χαλκαῖ, to reflect the sun and appear

[181] Konijnendijk 2018, 39, 154, 157.
[182] Konijnendijk 2018, 157. For my definition of *epilektoi*, see chapter two.
[183] Konijnendijk 2018, 157.
[184] Cartledge 2020, 190, 192; Konijnendijk 2018, 159. See also Romm 2021. According to Diodorus (12.75.7), the Argives created a band of λογάδες in 421. Konijnendijk (2018, 158-159) argues that Diodorus is untrustworthy in this passage since his narrative directly conflicts with Thucydides'. I argued in chapter two that Diodorus' report of Argive *epilektoi* in 421 is probably anachronistic.
[185] Craven 2017, 56-57, 103-104.
[186] Lewis forthcoming. He cites van Wees 1994a and 1994b as evidence of Homeric warfare.

more numerous. Once they had sufficiently delayed the enemy and the Greek army had moved into a safer position, they suddenly jump from the bushes and rush to safety (Xen. *Anab*. 5.2.30-32). The Cretans expect to be outrun by their enemy on the road, ἁλίσκεσθαι γὰρ ἔφασαν τῷ δρόμῳ, and indeed their commander is wounded, τετρωμένον (Xen. *Anab*. 5.2.32). To give him time to escape, some Cretans use their bows against the enemy, ἀντιτοξεύοντές τινες τῶν Κρητῶν. As in the *Hellenica*, these Cretans appear to be outfitted as heavily encumbered hoplites and archers simultaneously – they carry bronze shields and are weighed down by their equipment so much so that outrunning an opponent is difficult, but they are also proficient archers who can fire their weapons while fleeing. Perhaps even more significantly, however, they are completing a specific objective on the battlefield, like *epilektoi*, and they complete this objective without losing a single man (Xen. *Anab*. 5.2.32).[187] Xenophon's ten thousand were saved by just ten Cretans. In total, there are only two hundred Cretans among the Greek forces (Xen. *Anab*. 1.2.9), yet they are mentioned five times over the first five books. The Cretans repeatedly saved the army from sustaining massive casualties against the Persians and the Carduchians (Xen. *Anab.* 3.3.7, 3.4.17, 4.2.28), and Xenophon himself describes the Cretans as exceedingly useful, οἱ Κρῆτες χρησιμώτατοι ἐγένοντο (Xen. *Anab.* 4.2.28).

In all our Classical sources, Cretans fought in small yet impactful groups. As a percentage of the whole Athenian army at Sicily, the Cretans were only 1.2 percent of the total.[188] The Cretan warriors in the *Anabasis* were 1.6 percent of the total, and those at Nemea totaled only two percent of the Spartan army.[189] These percentages are remarkably low, and are well below what van Wees estimates for the typical number of leisure-class hoplites in Athenian and Spartan armies.[190] We might imagine, therefore, that Cretan warriors were something more than a contingent of leisure-class hoplites. The three hundred Cretan τοξόται at Nemea were the same size as the elite Spartan *hippeis*.[191] When the ephors raised that army to counter the threat in Corinth, Agesilaos had the main Spartan army in northern Greece, and Aristodemos was acting as the guardian of Agesipolis, who was still a boy (Xen *Hell*. 4.2.8-9). It seems likely that the *hippeis* were in northern Greece with Agesilaos at the time, so the Cretans may have been a convenient stand-in for Aristodemos, who was also a regent and did not warrant leading the king's guard. Cretan warriors were probably a vital asset to the Spartans in the first quarter of the

[187] Their wounded commander was not a Cretan, and he survived.
[188] Craven 2017, 73.
[189] Craven (2017, 73) incorrectly calculates the percentage of the Cretans in the *Anabasis*. She calculates the Cretans as a percentage of Clearchus' band, rather than as a percentage of the whole Greek force. This is possible, but highly unlikely according to Craven's own model – it is a major outlier for her. My corrected percentage would still be an outlier for her model, since she is primarily focused on Hellenistic Cretan warriors, but aligns much more closely with the pattern she traced for Cretan warriors in Classical armies. Although I argued above that some portion of Clearchus' band may have joined him in Sparta, that does not necessarily mean that all of his original army stayed on with him as he joined with Cyrus. Perhaps those Spartan allies that only conceived of organized violence as a means to impose political will left Clearchus after he was exiled, and those warriors who sought profit from violence, like the Cretans, stayed on to fight at his side. Either way, Clearchus' force is clearly part of Cyrus' total army and not an independent army.
[190] van Wees 2004, 56-57.
[191] Figueira 2006.

fourth century, and it is worth wondering if the success and resilience of these Cretan warriors had a lasting impact on the way mainland Greeks practiced organized violence. Although they may have looked and fought like other leisure-class hoplites – like perhaps even the Spartan *hippeis* – Cretan warriors were ultimately the product of the ideological history of Cretan warfare.

6.5 – "Oligopolistic" Warriors

Wealth-accumulation warfare was a culmination of both the ideology of camaraderie and the army-of-one mentality. These ideologies of violence engrained certain expectations and attitudes into the practices of Cretan elites that only manifested themselves clearly in our late fifth and early fourth century textual sources. As poleis institutionalized the dedicatory mechanisms of Cretan warfare, they commodified expressions of masculinity and belonging – pushing elites to acquire more wealth through violence. When these warrior elites fought abroad, they likely did so as proto-*epilektoi*: they were highly trained warriors who were skilled in many different types of warfare, and they were deployed to accomplish specific tasks on the battlefield.

The ideology of Cretan warfare probably also had dramatic consequences for Cretan poleis. The more success Cretan elites had abroad, the more wealth they brought into their communities. Even if the Cretans fighting for the Spartans in the first quarter of the fourth century were exiles, it is not difficult to imagine that some portion of their wealth eventually returned to Crete. Unfortunately, it is impossible to trace this wealth archaeologically due to the inconsistency of the evidence for Cretan poleis in the fifth and fourth centuries. Cretan warfare and Cretan poleis more generally looked very different after the collapse of the Spartan hegemony around 370. By the end of the fourth century, dozens of Cretan poleis had started minting their own coinage and constructing their own fortification walls.[192] In the Hellenistic period, Cretan warfare shifted its structural focus from raiding to conquering.[193] Over the course of the fourth, third, and second centuries, often only a small number of families within each Cretan polis came to control agricultural property and the financial resources required to be elite.[194] Like Classical Sparta, Hellenistic Cretan poleis faced severe population problems as wealth and the warrior-elite lifestyle became further and further out of reach to everyone except the most wealthy.[195] These problems clearly emerged in the Hellenistic period. Cretan warfare in earlier periods was certainly dominated by elites, but the delicate balance of horizontal and vertical bonds established by the army-of-one mentality probably created something like a cold *stasis* or perpetual arms race for elites in the Classical period.

In the Hellenistic period, Kvist argues that Cretans committed violence in order to gain plunder; earn attention from larger political factions; and expand their diplomatic, political, and

[192] Coutsinas 2013; Stefanakis 1999.
[193] Chaniotis 1996, 170.
[194] Chaniotis 1996, 169-175.
[195] Davies 2018; Hodkinson 2000; Hodkinson 2018; van Wees 2018b.

economic opportunities.[196] Many of these motivations probably derive from Cretan ideologies of violence discussed here, but they also represent an entirely new ideological approach to organized violence. Cretan warriors still fought as leisure-class hoplites, incorporating both archery and other specializations, but they probably had a more open style of combat following Alexander's conquests.[197] They were successful mercenaries that adapted to the new logistical and tactical challenges of Hellenistic warfare just as they had adapted to political, economic, and technological changes in earlier periods. But their immense economic and martial success in the Hellenistic period as mercenaries for the *diadochoi* likely also contributed to the large-scale inter-polis conflicts on Crete of the second and third century. Crete became an island of empires, Cretan elites enjoyed more power and privileges than they had before, and Cretan poleis retained a degree of political independence into the first century BCE, well after the destruction of Corinth and the Roman subjugation of Greece. Cretan warfare, as an ideology, helped establish a foundation for these later developments.

[196] Kvist 2003, 212.
[197] Craven 2017; Lewis forthcoming.

Chapter 7 – Conclusions

Assembling and assessing all the evidence for violence on Crete between the seventh and fifth centuries confirms what scholars working with other bodies of evidence have also discovered: there is very little evidence for real interpolis conflicts on the island before the Hellenistic period.[1] Working-class combatants are practically absent, and our evidence instead reveals certain socio-political ideologies of violence that had a dramatic impact on elite identity. Cretan warriors performed and commemorated different styles of combat in extra-urban sanctuaries and urban sanctuaries which suggests that these were two separate, yet co-existing, arenas for expressions of warriorhood. In both cases, I argue that these ideologies were instrumental and helped Cretan elites influence and control socio-political power within the emerging poleis of the seventh and sixth centuries. Yet, Cretan poleis started to erode these elite monopolies on organized violence in the late sixth and fifth centuries, and the late fifth-century ideology of violence practiced by Cretans fighting on the mainland was oriented around war booty as the primary means of expressing masculinity and proving belonging within the warrior group.

I describe the three ideologies that I have identified in the evidence as the ideology of camaraderie, the army-of-one mentality, and wealth-accumulation warfare. The ideology of camaraderie manifests itself primarily in the archaeological evidence from extra-urban sanctuaries, and it promoted a cooperative style of combat.[2] Warriors were depicted as nonanatomic and identity-less individuals with the shield-as-body motif. I argue that this ideology was related to the changing material character of extra-urban sanctuaries, which began in the eighth century and continued into the Hellenistic period. Something that we might call a Cretan *koine* was developing throughout these periods, and the ideology of camaraderie was fundamental to building bridges between elites who otherwise had no common political allegiance.

The army-of-one mentality, on the other hand, was oriented around the polis and elites' roles within these emerging political systems. Most Cretan elites organized themselves into a group, cartel, or *andreion* within each community and used warriorhood and organized violence

[1] Coutsinas (2013, 287) made this observation after surveying the evidence for fortifications, and Gagarin and Perlman (2016, 117) made it after compiling the epigraphic evidence.
[2] See chapter four.

to monitor access to this group.[3] They used violence to justify their own economic, social, and political privileges, and some of the earliest laws encapsulate the uneven arrangements that they forged between their elite group and non-elites. I argued that elites used war booty to convert economic power into political power and established a cyclical system of power conversion to preserve their way of life. These practices, both on the battlefield and in urban sanctuaries, created positive and negative horizontal and vertical bonds between elites and non-elites – Cretan poleis were indeed fragile, but fragility does not necessarily imply instability.

The final ideology of violence that appears in our evidence emerged in the fifth century after poleis began to institutionalize the mechanisms of the ideology of camaraderie and the army-of-one mentality.[4] These changes appear not to have altered who got to be a warrior or how these warriors enacted violence. Rather they changed why warriors fought. As warrior elites lost their ability to dedicate war booty to extra-urban and urban sanctuaries as individuals, they became more concerned with acquiring larger quantities of war booty to prove their status. They fought for pay and for plunder because these were perfectly valid means of proving eliteness, not because they were poor and desperate. Indeed, Cretan warriors continued to be leisure-class hoplites into the fourth century and may even have been some of the first *epilektoi* fighting in mainland armies – a generation before the Theban Sacred Band.

These arguments and the evidence that supports them has been the focus of the previous three chapters. In this chapter, I will reflect on how these ideologies of violence relate to the academic debates over the institutional character of Cretan poleis. I argued in chapter two that the epigraphic and literary evidence for Crete does not align because the former reveals Cretan legal practices and the latter reflects the customs of the "oligopolistic" elites performing violence outside and beyond the purview of their poleis.[5] But how do the ideologies of violence identified here fit into this conflict?

7.1 – A Πολιτεία of *Epilektoi*

In the first half of the Peloponnesian War, some Cretan poleis were allied with the Athenians. Although it is impossible to produce a list of Cretan poleis who joined this alliance, it seems likely that the Gortynians and the Polychnitai were among them since they all raided Kydonia in 429 (Thuc. 2.85). As discussed in chapter six, this is the last time that our sources explicitly name any independent poleis and they instead simply refer to Cretan warriors as Cretans. I argued above that these warriors could have been allies, exiles, or mercenaries, although the latter seems to be the least likely in most cases.

The Cretans who would have been interacting with Plato and Aristotle in the fourth century were surely these same allies, exiles, or mercenaries. We know, and Plato seems to know

[3] See chapter five.
[4] See chapter six.
[5] I used this argument in chapter two to justify using both types of evidence for the study of violence.

(Pl. *Leg*. 1.624a-625a, 629c, 636e; 3.712e), that dozens of politically independent poleis inhabited the island, but the "Cretan πολιτεία" – the shared source for Plato, Aristotle, and Ephorus – refers to Crete as a culturally unified island.[6] This probably does not indicate that Crete was in fact unified politically,[7] and instead suggests that the Cretans had something like what I have been describing as a Cretan *koine*. This *koine* probably emerged first at extra-urban sanctuaries in the late eighth century.[8] It created a single artistic and material practice that gradually spread to the poleis, and within the *koine*, artists depicted warriors in the shield-as-body motif and warriors working together against common foes. This was the ideology of camaraderie.

Although the ideology of camaraderie would continue to be prevalent in urban sanctuaries and mortuary contexts well into the fifth century, the army-of-one mentality quickly became the dominant ideology of violence in urban spaces. Dating this shift is immensely difficult due to the inconsistent dating practices of scholars studying Cretan material culture and art.[9] However, the urban ideology of violence probably emerged with the earliest Cretan laws, such as the Dreros Constitution in approximately 640,[10] as this ideology of violence was closely associated with political and social power within the community.[11] These two ideologies dominated elite social arenas, elite art, and Cretan warfare well into the sixth century. One promoted elite collaboration and the other celebrated a warriors' individuality. Even the anatomy of warriorhood, the normate, was different within each ideology. And yet Cretan elites and craftspeople seem to have had no difficulties navigating this sociocultural dichotomy. The lived experience of the elite Cretan warrior was contextual and, at times, dualistic.

As discussed in chapter five, the Cretan ideologies of violence were both dangerous for elites and influential on early political institutions. Elites embraced these ideologies in order to preserve their leisured lifestyles and promote themselves in the spaces where they stood to win the most political and social power. Unfortunately, our limited evidence prevents any further understanding of how these ideologies hampered or, conversely, benefited the social stability of the polis. It seems clear, however, that Cretan poleis felt that it was in their collective interests to begin incorporating aspects of both the ideology of camaraderie and the army-of-one mentality in the late sixth and fifth centuries. As I argued in chapter six, these institutional changes, alongside the economic innovations and intensifications of the sixth century, shifted how Cretan elites thought about and performed organized violence.

The Cretan warriors that Plato, Aristotle, and Ephorus knew and referenced were products of this complex ideological history. Their emphasis on elite feuding (Arist. *Pol.* 2.1272b; Pl. *Leg*. 1.630e, 632e) and dining in the *andreion* (Arist. *Pol*. 1272a, Str. 10.4.16-22) likely reflect the importance of these cultural practices within the warrior group. These

[6] On the "Cretan πολιτεία," see Perlman 1992 and 2005.
[7] contra Chaniotis 2015; Pasek 2014, 76-87; Stefanakis 1999; Viviers 1999, 230-231.
[8] Prent 2005, 225-226.
[9] As discussed in chapter one.
[10] Gagarin and Perlman 2016, Dr1.
[11] As discussed in chapter five.

institutions had largely lost their political relevance on Crete by the fifth and fourth centuries, but they remained important to the elite warrior identity. Unlike the earlier ideologies of violence, wealth-accumulation warfare is not very well reflected in the material culture of Crete. As I argue in chapter six, warriors probably shifted to monetary dedications or dedications in coin as coinage became the standard medium of economic and religious power on the island. As the Cretans became more closely intertwined with the Eastern Mediterranean, following their intensification in exports and trade in the fifth century, their ideologies of violence became less uniquely Cretan.

By the late fourth century, the Cretans had become regular mercenaries and a major military power.[12] This was not the Crete of the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries. Their styles of combat were much more rooted in what was needed from them in the armies of the *diadochoi*. They continued to be specialists and *epilektoi*, but Cretan ideologies of violence also continued to adapt and change with the political, cultural, and economic developments of the Hellenistic period.

7.2 – No Amateurs Here: The Story of Cretan Warfare

Athens became a democracy in the late sixth century, and Sparta's political reforms probably also date to this time.[13] Both new systems of government celebrated the athleticism and courage of hoplites rather than their martial skill. The Persian Wars and the conflicts of the Pentecontaetia made hoplite warfare a numbers game. Poleis were pushed to field large numbers of amateurs and abandon mounted hoplites and πρόμαχοι. But the Cretans did not participate in the Persian Wars (Hdt. 7.169), and working-class hoplites never became the focus of Cretan warfare. As far as we can tell, the Cretans never subscribed to the amateur-hoplite ethos.

The origins of Cretan warfare developed well before the periods studied in this project. Emerging from the Late Bronze Age, Crete appears to have been dominated by "predatory warfare" in the first centuries of the first millennium.[14] In the eighth century, extra-urban sanctuaries emerged as venues for interpolity interaction between leisured elites. As warriors slowly started adopting hoplite equipment, they limited the ideological messaging of their dedications, in the form of both art and military equipment, within extra-urban sanctuaries. Whether or not these depictions of violence were rooted in reality, warriors celebrated a loose and open style of combat in these spaces.

With the emergence of urban sanctuaries in the seventh century, a new ideology of violence and a new style of combat appeared alongside the older and more open style. The armor of urban warfare was heavy, metal, and encumbering. Warriors fought and celebrated their

[12] Craven 2017.
[13] For the late sixth-century institutional changes at Athens, see Forsdyke 2005, Hoekstra 2016, Ober 2004, Ober 2007, Wallace 2007. For the late sixth-century institutional changes at Sparta, see Hodkinson 2000, Low 2006, Davies 2018, Hodkinson 2018, Millender 2018, Nafissi 2018, van Wees 2018a, van Wees 2018b.
[14] Van Wees 2021. See chapter four.

victories as individuals at the expense of the support networks that helped them get to and survive combat. Both combat styles existed simultaneously, and it is unclear whether real organized violence looked anything like the ways in which elites claimed through their art and equipment. It is clear, however, that Cretan warriors looked very different than their Athenian and Spartan counterparts when they started fighting on mainland battlefields. They fought with different equipment, they adhered to different ideologies of violence, and violence had a different role in the political make-up and functioning of their homeland. These differences did not make the Cretans any less Greek.[15] In fact, Greekness in the ancient world was something adaptive and resilient. The Cretans created ideologies and systems of violence that fit the technological, geographic, religious, and cultural parameters of their island and of their world. When the Cretan ideologies of violence, what Hanson might have called the Cretan way of war, spread to the mainland in the late fifth and early fourth century, they had a dramatic impact on non-Cretan communities. But these ideologies were never divorced or isolated from the Eastern Mediterranean. After all, the ideology of camaraderie was likely a response to the island's increasing economic and cultural interconnectivity with the rest of the Mediterranean in the eighth century. The story of Cretan warfare is unique, but the ways in which ideologies form and then permeate human society is not. The Peloponnesians, Eubeaons, Cypriots, Southern Italians, and many others all had to confront the ideas, technology, and people that moved throughout the Mediterranean in the first centuries of the first millennium. Ideologies formed as groups within these communities seized power or lost it, and all of these ideologies would come to define the Mediterranean story. Crete is just one island in this story, but it was an island at an economic and cultural crossroads.

[15] contra Hanson 1989, 15, who describes Crete as "semi-Hellenized."

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