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Living in the Shadow of Deportation: How Immigration Enforcement Maintains Latinx
Commitment to Progressive Politics

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

by

Marcel Roman

2021

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Living in the Shadow of Deportation: How Immigration Enforcement Maintains Latinx
Commitment to Progressive Politics

by

Marcel Roman

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Los Angeles, 2021

Professor Matt Barreto, Chair

Across a number of politically relevant domains, Latinx immigrants and their co-ethnics hold progressive attitudes and preferences relative to Anglo whites despite countervailing pressure to assimilate to Anglo political standards. This dissertation includes three papers that explain the puzzle of relative political progressivism among Latinxs by highlighting the role of an increasingly threatening interior immigration enforcement context after the implementation of Clinton-era immigration restrictions. I posit many Latinx immigrants and their co-ethnics experience a *generalized sense of illegality*, that is, a palpable fear of deportability. I theorize a generalized sense of illegality is motivated by 1) the increasing societal integration of undocumented immigrants, 2) an increasingly restrictive immigration enforcement context, and 3) the development of an ethnicized illegality attached to Latinx ethnic group members. I then demonstrate a sense of illegality maintains Latinx progressivism despite countervailing conservative forces. Chapter 1 demonstrates perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts undercut well-established patterns of attitudinal convergence with Anglo whites on immigration policy preferences. Chapter 2 forwards a *Dynamic Theory of Threat Solution Ownership* to explain how the threat of deportation motivates support for Democratic candidates among Latinxs and partisan defection among Republican Latinxs specifically. Chapter 3 offers a theoretical framework to understand how the threat of deportation may motivate pro-Black political attitudes among non-Black Latinxs despite the perceptible lack of commonality in exposure to immigration enforcement.

The dissertation of Marcel Roman is approved.

Chad Hazlett

Lorrie Frasure-Yokley

Efrén Pérez

Matt Barreto, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2021

For my family

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CHAPTER 1

How Threatening Immigration Enforcement Policies Undercut Attitudinal Assimilation with Anglo Whites

Abstract: Consistent with straight line assimilation theory, prior research demonstrates acculturation generates attitudinal convergence between immigrant group members and host country natives along several policy dimensions, including immigration. However, other perspectives suggest attitudinal convergence is not guaranteed in contexts where immigrant group members experience rebuff from the host country. I reconcile the perspectives and answer the puzzle of persistent pro-immigrant policy preferences among integrated Latinxs. In light of heightened interior immigration enforcement and the increased societal integration of undocumented immigrants in the U.S., I demonstrate perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts forestall attitudinal convergence on immigration policy preferences across 6 nationally representative surveys of Latinxs. Absent deportation threat, Latinx immigration policy attitudes converge with white Anglos. Deportation threat operates net of well-established alternative mechanisms such as discrimination, ethnic context(s), and ethnic identity. These results problematize preexisting conclusions on the political consequences of threat and suggest attitudinal assimilation is not preordained among immigrant group members.

1.1 Introduction

A canonical finding is that immigrant group member attitudes converge with host country natives as they integrate into the national polity via a higher generational status or learning the host country language (Park, 1914; Gordon, 1964; Alba and Nee, 1997).¹ Indeed, prior political science research finds immigrant group member integration produces attitudinal convergence on multiple politically relevant outcomes (Michelson, 2003; Branton, 2007; Citrin et al., 2007), including, immigration policy attitudes (Miller, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 1984; Polinard, Wrinkle, and De La Garza, 1984; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010). However, another perspective challenges the straight-line hypothesis and posits assimilation is not guaranteed via acculturation.² Rather, assimilation is conditional on host country reception contexts (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Telles and Ortiz, 2008; Pedraza, 2014). Contemporary survey data supports this perspective in the United States. Many acculturated Latinxs support liberal immigration policies at rates commensurate with their less acculturated counterparts (Pedraza, 2014).

I adjudicate between the two perspectives and help answer the puzzle of persistent liberal immigration policy attitudes among acculturated Latinx co-ethnics. I theorize perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts foster rebuff from dominant group norms and motivate continued support of liberal immigration policies as a protective mechanism despite integration. Perceived deportation threat may also forestall attitudinal convergence by undercutting anti-immigrant predispositions motivated by conflict between more or less acculturated Latinxs. I corroborate my theory with 6 nationally representative surveys of Latinxs fielded between 2007-2019. I find perceived deportation threat consistently forestalls

¹A refined version of the straight-line hypothesis suggests immigrant co-ethnics may face hurdles toward assimilation yet still approach an assimilative telos in a linear fashion, otherwise known as the “bumpy line” hypothesis (Gans, 1992).

²Throughout this paper, I use the terms “acculturation” or “integration” interchangeably. Consistent with the measures of acculturation used in the main analyses, acculturation and/or integration references a higher generational status or the internalization of the host country language (i.e. English). Likewise, “attitudinal convergence” or “assimilation” refers to the process by which immigrant group member attitudes become more similar to host country natives as they attain a higher generational status or adopt the host country language.

attitudinal convergence on immigration policy via acculturation. Conversely, acculturated Latinxs who do not perceive deportation threat possess attitudes similar to Anglo whites. Moreover, deportation threat operates net of other well-established alternative mechanisms that may forestall attitudinal convergence such as discrimination, ethnic context(s), and identity maintenance.

This paper makes several contributions. First, contrary to some research suggesting Latinxs may “become white” as they integrate in the United States (Alba, 2016), this paper demonstrates Latinxs may not attitudinally “become white” in the face of perceptibly threatening policy contexts that serve as a referendum on their presence in the United States (Mora and Rodríguez-Muñiz, 2017). Deportation threat frustrates well-established sociological patterns of straight-line assimilation among acculturated Latinxs by facilitating the maintenance of attitudes akin to new immigrants. Additionally, this is the first paper to present evidence explicating deportation threat as a mechanism forestalling attitudinal convergence. Although prior work makes reference to the threat of immigration enforcement to explain attitudinal divergence (Vega and Ortiz, 2018), it has not been explicitly tested. Most prior work has emphasized the role of discrimination or ethnic context to explain attitudinal divergence on immigration policy (Pedraza, 2014), often assuming these mechanisms cue concern over immigration enforcement given its ethno-racialized implementation.³ Explicitly testing the role of deportation threat is important since it a) taps into contemporary concerns among immigrant communities over an increasingly threatening immigration enforcement context and b) circumvents measurement error in previously analyzed measures which may epiphenomenally cue deportation threat.

Second, this paper moves beyond assessing how deportation threat influences health (Novak, Geronimus, and Martinez-Cardoso, 2017; Nichols, LeBrón, and Pedraza, 2018), child development (Dreby, 2015), migrant wages (Fussell, 2011), interactions with various aspects of government bureaucracy (Alsan and Yang, 2018; Muchow and Amuedo-Dorantes, 2020a), various forms of political engagement (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura, 2001; Pantoja and

³Over 90% of deportations are of Latin American immigrants.

Segura, 2003; White, 2016; Nichols and Valdéz, 2020), and government trust (Rocha, Knoll, and Wrinkle, 2015). This paper is the first to systematically demonstrate deportation threat also influences immigration policy attitudes among Latinxs, and more specifically, undercuts attitudinal convergence with Anglo whites.

Third, contrary to conventional wisdom, this paper demonstrates deportation threat can be politically consequential for immigrant group members distant from the immigrant experience via what I call a *generalized sense of illegality*. Prior assimilation and/or Latinx politics research assumes acculturated immigrants reduce support for pro-immigrant policy because they are less susceptible to the brunt of restrictive immigration policy and may perceive benefits from undermining new immigration (Newton, 2000; Bedolla, 2003; Jiménez, 2008). However, under certain circumstances, integrative conditions may break down and immigrant group members distal from the immigrant experience may behave more like recent immigrants if they believe they or their proximal social ties are threatened by deportation. Moreover, a political psychological debate remains as to whether threat motivates individuals predisposed to be concerned about the object of threat to shift their political preferences or individuals who are not predisposed to be concerned about the object of the threat (Feldman and Stenner, 1997; Hetherington and Suhay, 2011). This paper provides evidence for the latter perspective by demonstrating threat has stronger political implications for the ostensibly secure.

Fourth, although prior work assesses the determinants of Latinx immigration attitudes, the vast majority of American politics research forefronts Anglo white immigration attitudes instead of those most proximal to the immigrant experience. This is an oversight in light of rising xenophobic rhetoric along with the growth of the Latinx population.⁴ Likewise, most work at the intersection of threat and policy preferences analyzes threats to white people or the American public writ large (e.g. racial demography, terrorism). The emphasis on dominant groups who prefer the status quo may lead to faulty theoretical conclusions, such as the well-established association between threat and conservative policy preferences (Jost

⁴Latinxs are now roughly 20% of the U.S. population, accounting for half of all U.S. population growth between 2010-19.

et al., 2017). By focusing on intra-Latinx opinion, this paper demonstrates strong support for pro-immigrant policy is not preordained among Latinx co-ethnics and preexisting theory on the consequences of threat must account for group position.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews prior research on acculturation and attitudinal convergence. Section 3 develops the concept of a *generalized sense of illegality* among Latinx populations that explains how and why integrated Latinxs may feel threatened by deportation. Section 4 theorizes how deportation threat may forestall attitudinal convergence via acculturation. Section 5 details the research design. Section 6 discusses the empirical results. Section 7 concludes with a discussion on theoretical implications, limitations, and avenues for future work.

1.2 Perspectives on Acculturation and Assimilation

1.2.1 Straight-Line Assimilation Theory

Prior research suggests immigrant group members internalize the norms of the dominant group in the host country in order to attain socio-economic status, reduce vulnerability to discrimination, and distance oneself from stigmatized groups (Alba, 2009). Accordingly, *straight-line assimilation theory* suggests immigrant group attitudes converge with the dominant group via acculturative mechanisms such as a higher generational status, learning the host country language, intermarriage, or residential integration (Gordon, 1964). For Latinxs, there is strong evidence immigration policy preferences become more restrictive as a function of generational status and exhibiting English dominance (Miller, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 1984; Polinard, Wrinkle, and De La Garza, 1984; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010).

Indeed, contemporary survey data demonstrates later Latinx generations possess increasingly restrictive immigration policy preferences, closing the attitudinal gap with Anglo whites. Figure 1.1 displays support for pro-immigrant policy preferences on the y-axis by level of acculturation on the x-axis (proxied via generational status) across a series of surveys each characterized by a different panel. A dashed vertical line separates the policy opinions




Figure 1.1: Acculturation (x-axis, 1G, 2G, 3G+ = 1st, 2nd, and 3rd generation or more Latinxs) is associated with reduced support for liberal immigration policies (y-axis) across multiple surveys. Anglo whites are the last social category on the x-axis, separated by a vertical grey line. All outcomes rescaled between 0-1. Annotations denote mean outcome values and sample size for each social category. 95% bootstrap confidence intervals displayed.

of Latinxs from Anglo whites. Across all surveys, acculturation appears to be associated with a decrease in support for pro-immigrant policies. However, despite the conservative trend, Latinxs do not fully converge with Anglo whites across all surveys. These descriptive statistics raise questions over why Latinxs do not converge, at least by the third+ generation,⁵ and why not all Latinxs who are relatively integrated continue to hold liberal immigration

⁵The “+” denotes third generation or more (e.g. fourth generation).

policy preferences.⁶

1.2.2 Contingent Assimilation Theories

Other interventions problematize straight-line theory and may help explain why some acculturated Latinxs persistently hold liberal immigration policy preferences. I call these *contingent assimilation theories*. Generally speaking, contingent assimilation theories posit group-level characteristics and reception contexts mutually determine whether immigrants assimilate across cultural, attitudinal, and socio-economic dimensions (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Pedraza, 2014; Mora and Rodríguez-Muñiz, 2017; Jones, 2019a). Several factors such as discrimination, limited intra-group social capital, and economic inequality may forestall assimilative processes such that some later generation immigrant group members continue to possess attributes similar to new immigrants (Portes and Zhou, 1993).

A prominent counter-hypothesis to straight-line theory is that discrimination maintains divergence on multiple dimensions of assimilation between immigrant group co-ethnics and host country natives. Telles and Ortiz (2008) find the absence of socio-economic and attitudinal convergence among later generation Mexican-Americans is due to the racialization of Mexican-Americans as inferior to whites, with downstream consequences on integrative mechanisms such as residential integration, public investment in Mexican-American communities, academic achievement, and a sense of belonging to the American polity. Commensurately, in the realm of immigration preferences, Sanchez (2006) finds Latinxs who perceive discrimination hold less restrictive immigration policy preferences regardless of acculturation level. Likewise, Pedraza (2014) forwards a “two-way street” acculturation theory. Attitudinal convergence necessitates host society acceptance for integrated Latinxs. A perceptibly discriminatory context may foster rebuff against mainstream attitudes among acculturated Latinxs since host society reception does not match integrative expectations.

Other mechanisms may forestall attitudinal convergence. An ethnic geographic context may facilitate liberal immigration policy attitudes either through proximity to immigrants

⁶For more information on outcome measures used for Figure 1.1, see Appendix Section 4.1

(Bedolla, 2003), or a stronger sense of Latinx group solidarity (Rocha et al., 2011). An ethnic geographic context may also produce selection into exposure to immigration enforcement (Maltby et al., 2020). The pro-immigrant content of ethnic media may also forestall convergence among later-generation Latinxs who consume it (Abrajano and Singh, 2009), in addition to exposing Latinxs to threatening information on immigration enforcement (Zepeda-Millán, 2017). Age cohorts born during and after the civil rights movement's politicization of Latinx identity may be less inclined to assimilate and adopt mainstream immigration attitudes (Vega and Ortiz, 2018). Moreover, attitudinal convergence may be forestalled by a strong sense of Latinx identity (Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 1997), or accelerated by a strong sense of American identity (Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010).

However, prior insights from various contingent assimilation theories are somewhat limited in explaining the persistent support of the liberal immigration policy preferences displayed in Figure 1.1 among acculturated Latinxs in the contemporary moment. First, most prior assimilation research emphasizes socio-economic or idenitarian outcomes outside the dimension of policy preferences. Second, prior work on the determinants of liberal immigration policy preferences, with some exceptions (Pedraza, 2014), typically does not assess whether such determinants forestall attitudinal assimilation with Anglo whites. Third, prior research on assimilative convergence often identifies the absence/presence of assimilation on multiple dimensions without explicitly testing mechanisms that may undercut/facilitate assimilation.

This paper helps resolve the lacuna by providing evidence on how perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts may moderate attitudinal assimilation on immigration policy preferences. Deportation threat has not been explicitly tested as a mechanism that may forestall assimilation despite prior research theorizing restrictive immigration policies may foster rebuff against mainstream norms (Pedraza, 2014; Mora and Rodríguez-Muñoz, 2017; Vega and Ortiz, 2018). Therefore, one contribution of this paper is to explicitly test perceptible deportation threat as an additional mechanism forestalling attitudinal convergence net of known alternative mechanisms. However, before theorizing how threat may forestall attitudinal convergence, an open question is whether acculturated Latinxs distant from the immigrant experience are exposed to deportation threat and may find it politically

consequential.

1.3 A Generalized Sense of Illegality Among Latinxs

Does deportation threat matter for Latinxs distant from the immigrant experience? I argue large swaths of the Latinx population beyond undocumented immigrants, including relatively acculturated Latinxs, may possess a *generalized sense of illegality* in the contemporary immigration enforcement environment.

Illegality is a political status characterized by a “palpable sense of deportability (De Genova, 2004).” Illegality is not immutable, but the byproduct of legal, political, and social behaviors that serve to assign a restricted social status to an influx of Latin American immigrants, mostly from Mexico, in the latter half of the 20th century. The ascription of illegality toward Latinxs is produced via legal and social mechanisms. Legally, restrictions on immigration which disparately implicate Latinx immigrants generate a population without access to legal rights and protection associated with documented status (De Genova, 2004). Socially, dominant group members and elites may propagate beliefs most Latinxs are illegal or prone to criminal activities regardless of attention to legal or generational status (García, 2017). There are a number of reasons illegality extends to integrated and U.S.-born Latinxs. In this paper, I highlight three key explanations.

1.3.1 Societal Integration of Undocumented Immigrants

The undocumented population is increasingly integrated in the broader Latinx community. The size of the undocumented population has increased up to 11 million in the past 30 years (Figure 1.2, Panel A). Over 70% of undocumented immigrants are Latinx (Figure 1.2, Panel C). The undocumented population is not transient, but permanently rooted in the Latinx community. Heightened border militarization in the past 30 years increased the cost of undocumented migration, undercutting cyclical migration patterns and paradoxically incentivizing long-term settlement (Massey, Pren, and Durand, 2016). Now, 83% of the undocumented population has resided in the U.S. over 10 years (Figure 1.2, Panel B).




Figure 1.2: Deportation threat is salient to the Latinx community. Panel A displays the size of the undocumented population size over time using Pew Research Center estimates (1990-2017). Panel B displays the undocumented population proportion over time using Pew estimates (1995-2017). Panel C displays the undocumented population proportion from various birth regions using Migration Policy Institute estimates. Panel D displays the proportion of Latinxs who know an undocumented close friend or family member across generational status and language-of-interview using CMPS data. Panel E displays the mean Latinx, foreign-born, and non-citizen proportion of the population for CMPS Latinx and Anglo white respondents by generational status. Panel F shows deportation removals over time using Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data (1980-2018). Panel G shows removals over time normalized over the size of the undocumented population using DHS and Pew data (1990-2017). Panel H shows the proportion of deportation removals from a specific region from DHS data tabulated by Asad and Clair (2018) (2005-2014).

Indeed, Latinxs across all acculturative dimensions have strong social ties with undocumented immigrants. 44% of all Latinxs report knowing an undocumented close friend or family member in the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS). Even 30% and 36% of 3rd generation+ Latinxs and English-speaking Latinxs respectively report knowing an undocumented close friend or family member (Figure 1.2, Panel D).

Likewise, Latinxs across all acculturative dimensions are integrated in communities potentially subject to deportation threat. For 1st generation non-citizen and 3rd generation+ Latinxs, the proportion of their zipcode population that is foreign born is 27% and 18% in the CMPS respectively (Figure 1.2, Panel E). For Spanish and English-speaking Latinxs, it is 29% and 21% (12% for Anglo whites). The mean non-citizen zipcode composition is from 16% to 10% between 1st generation non-citizen and 3rd generation+ Latinx respondents. For Spanish and English speaking Latinxs it is 17% and 12% (6% for Anglo whites). Prior evidence suggests Latinxs living in “ethnic cores,” that is, places with a high density of co-ethnics and immigrants, can maintain a durable ethnicity in the face of mainstream pressure to weaken ethnic ties and practices (Telles and Sue, 2019). Perhaps a byproduct of living in ethnic cores is heightened exposure to deportation threat and its consequences on immigration policy attitude formation.

1.3.2 The Expansion of Immigration Enforcement

Additionally, immigration enforcement policies have become both increasingly restrictive and expansive such that they even implicate well-integrated Latinxs. After the Clinton-era 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), legal non-citizens and their friends and/or family (e.g. second-generation children) have to navigate increasingly draconian rules to avoid legal status revocation such as self-sufficiency requirements and an expanded set of minor crimes that subject legal non-citizens to deportation (Morawetz, 2000; Golash-Boza, 2014). Immigration enforcement has also expanded in terms of scale and space. IIRIRA increased both border and interior enforcement via federal cooperation with local law enforcement through programs such as §287(g). Other mandates, such as

Secure Communities, increased data partnerships between federal and local authorities to apprehend undocumented immigrants booked in local jails. Indeed, the mean number of removals increased from 19,000 per year before IIRIRA to 289,000 per year post-IIRIRA (Figure 1.2, Panel F). In tandem with the increased societal integration of undocumented immigrants and non-citizens, an increasingly restrictive immigration enforcement regime may have downstream consequences on the attitudes of even relatively integrated Latinxs. Likewise, immigrants with liminal legal status such as Temporary Protected Status (TPS) or Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) may have friends and family who are concerned about their uncertain legal status (Menjívar, 2006).

1.3.3 The Development of an Ethnicized Illegality

Moreover, notions of illegality are ethno-racialized to the point they extend to integrated Latinxs. Anglo whites conflate the categories “illegal”, “immigrant” and “Latino (Flores and Schachter, 2018),” which may be motivated by xenophobic attitudes (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017; Hopkins, Sides, and Citrin, 2019). Survey evidence suggests whites overestimate the proportion of Latinxs they believe are undocumented by 24 percentage points (40% as opposed to 16%) (Barreto, Manzano, and Segura, 2012). Categorical conflation may not simply influence interpersonal relations, it may also motivate state-sanctioned behavior, including that of social service agencies and the police, potentially in a discriminatory manner (Sáenz and Manges Douglas, 2015; Armenta, 2017). The disparate impact of categorical conflation on Latinxs may have secondary consequences on which groups bear the brunt of immigration enforcement. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data show Latin American immigrants are “over-deported” relative to their proportion of the undocumented population (Figure 1.2, Panel H). Even Latinx *citizens* have been apprehended or detained by federal immigration authorities. From 2006-2017, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) wrongfully detained 3,500 U.S. citizens in Texas. In Rhode Island, ICE issued 462 detainers for U.S. citizens over a 10-year period. Likewise, ICE detained 420 citizens in Florida between 2017-2019 (Cunha, 2019).

Regardless of whether discriminatory intent is involved, Latinxs at all acculturation levels appear hyperaware of their ethno-racialization as “illegal” or “foreign” to the national polity,⁷ which may have downstream consequences on acculturative stress (Asad, 2017), health (Asad and Clair, 2018), and a sense of belonging (Del Real, 2019). Moreover, awareness of a racialized (il)legal status among citizen Latinxs may be increasingly acute in a post-Trump political environment (Asad, 2020). In sum, illegality, or the palpable sense of being deported, may not simply just affect undocumented immigrants, but many members of the Latinx immigrant community writ large regardless of their level of integration.

1.4 How Deportation Threat Forestalls Assimilation

How and why does deportation threat inform immigration policy preferences and forestall attitudinal convergence among Latinxs? Despite a rich literature on the determinants of liberal immigration policy attitudes and the mechanisms forestalling attitudinal convergence, there is limited research clarifying how deportation threat may motivate policy attitudes and forestall assimilation. This is puzzling given extensive research demonstrating anti-immigrant threat mobilizes Latinxs to engage in pro-immigrant political participation (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura, 2001; Pantoja and Segura, 2003; White, 2016; Zepeda-Millán, 2017).

A basic assumption in the threat literature is that human beings seek a sense of security (Maslow, 1958; Huddy, Feldman, and Weber, 2007). Prior American politics research on threat and policy preferences has typically focused on how a mostly-white public responds to terrorism, immigrants, or non-white groups (Tolbert and Grummel, 2003; Rocha and Espino, 2009; Merolla and Zechmeister, 2009a).⁸ Most of this research suggests threat motivates preferences for ideologically conservative policies understood to minimize the

⁷The 2016 CMPS suggests Latinxs are acutely aware of categorical conflation. 45%, 59% 39% and 31% of overall, first-generation, second-generation, and third-generation+ Latinxs agree with the notion “anti-immigrant sentiments are really anti-Latino sentiments.”

⁸Group membership is highlighted here since the group’s relationship to the object of the threat will have different consequences on policy opinion (Davis and Silver, 2004; Brader, Valentino, and Suhay, 2008; Pérez, 2015).

threat and maintain security, however defined (e.g. support for civil liberties restrictions, reducing affirmative action) (Davis and Silver, 2004; Huddy et al., 2005a; Craig and Richeson, 2014b; Jost et al., 2017). Other research suggests the *type* of threat motivates changes in ideological preferences (Eadeh and Chang, 2020), implying deportation threat amongst the Latinx population should increase support for liberal immigration policy positions given their differential vulnerability to deportation on the basis of perceived illegality.

- **H1: Deportation threat is positively associated with liberal immigration policy preferences**

For good reason, prior research suggests deportation threat is more salient for immigrant and/or Spanish-dominant Latinxs. Recent immigrants may be more likely to be targeted by police and immigration authorities (Dreby, 2015; Armenta, 2017), experience insecurity concerning rules over legal status maintenance (Golash-Boza, 2014), and be the subject of discrimination on the basis of illegality (Fussell, 2011). These problems may be exacerbated for Spanish-dominant Latinxs who believe they could be targeted by authorities on the basis of their language (Jones, Victor, and Vannette, 2019). Indeed, deportation threat is higher among Latinxs who are likely undocumented, legal non-citizen immigrants, and even naturalized citizens relative to U.S.-born Latinxs (Asad, 2020).⁹ However, deportation threat may have a stronger influence on the maintenance of liberal immigration policy preferences among acculturated Latinxs, forestalling attitudinal convergence with Anglo whites.

First, pro-immigrant policy preferences have more space to travel among integrated Latinxs. Even in the absence of deportation threat, Latinxs closer to the immigrant experience may have a pro-immigrant disposition. A priori, they benefit from a unrestricted immigration system. Moreover, they may be reminded consistently about how their lives are structured by the immigrant experience, motivating pro-immigrant policy attitudes (Maltby et al., 2020). Conversely, although integrated Latinxs may have ties with others closer to the immigrant experience, their distance from the canonical immigrant archetype may make them

⁹See Section 4.5.2, Table 4.7, which displays the threat distributions by acculturation. Acculturated Latinxs are less likely to perceive deportation threat.

susceptible to attitudinal pressure from the mainstream or conflict with new immigrants (Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010; Jones, Victor, and Vannette, 2019). Bedolla (2003), borrowing from Social Identity Theory, posits acculturated Latinxs may dissociate from newer Latinx immigrants due to stigma associated with the Spanish-language and stereotypical attributes of less acculturated Latinxs. They also find these dissociative incentives may inform restrictive immigration policy attitudes among integrated Latinxs. Additionally, Jiménez (2008) finds continued immigrant replenishment of Mexican-American communities may generate the basis for cultural conflict over who is prototypically Mexican between new Mexican immigrants and acculturated Mexican-Americans. Economic competition, perceived or real, may also generate conflict between acculturated Latinxs and new immigrants given integrated Latinxs may compete against new immigrants within similar occupational strata (Hood III, Morris, and Shirkey, 1997).

Insights from prior political psychological research suggests threat has a stronger influence on those less predisposed to perceive the threat (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011). For Latinx co-ethnics, attitudes on immigration policy among acculturated Latinxs may have more space to travel than less acculturated Latinxs in the presence of deportation threat due to their heightened susceptibility to mainstream pressure and conflict with new immigrants.

Second, threat undermines habitual cues. Prior evidence suggests the emotional substrates of threat increase information-seeking and reduce reliance on internalized norms (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993; Gadarian and Albertson, 2014). Integrated Latinxs may be more likely to perceive themselves as prototypical Americans, predisposing them to hold restrictive immigration policy preferences (Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010). But deportation threat may encourage reflexivity over a perceived sense of integration, encouraging acculturated Latinxs to seek information concerning deportation threat (Gadarian and Albertson, 2014), identify alternative policies to ameliorate the threat (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011), and generate a new set of preferences inconsistent with their relatively mainstream priors (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993; Brader, 2006).¹⁰

¹⁰Prior evidence informed by Affective Intelligence Theory suggests self-reflexivity in response to threat is motivated by anxiety, whereas anger stifles shifts from predispositions (Valentino et al., 2008). Thus,

Third, deportation threat undermines integrative expectations. Pedraza (2014) posits attitudinal motivations on immigration policy for integrated immigrant co-ethnics are a “two-way street.” Integrated Latinxs are subject to pressure to conform attitudinally with the mainstream. However, rebuff from the host society as a result of immigrant group membership undercuts integrative expectations and facilitates attitudinal divergence. Deportation threat, whether personal or through strong proximal social ties (e.g. family, friends), signals rebuff from the American polity since it implies an association with illegality and a reduced sense of belonging. In other words, perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts serve as a referendum on whether Latinxs can be incorporated in the American polity (Mora and Rodríguez-Muñiz, 2017). For integrated Latinxs, the perception they or their proximal social ties are subject to legal exclusion or association with illegality may not correspond to integrative expectations, heightening the weight of deportation threat on immigration policy attitudes relative to less acculturated Latinxs.

Therefore, in the absence of a perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement context that implicates relatively integrated Latinxs or their close social ties, we may expect significant differences in the opinions of less and more acculturated Latinxs as a result of attitudinal convergence. Consistent with the straight-line assimilation hypothesis, less acculturated Latinxs will hold liberal immigration policy preferences whereas increasingly acculturated Latinxs will hold increasingly restrictive immigration policy attitudes. However, inconsistent with the straight-line hypothesis, acculturated Latinxs will continue to hold liberal immigration policy preferences similar to their less acculturated counterparts in the presence of a grave threat demanding protection via open immigration policies. Statistically, we may expect a positive interaction coefficient between threat and acculturation with respect to support for liberal immigration policies.

- **H2: The liberalizing influence of deportation threat on immigration policy preferences is stronger among more acculturated Latinxs**

deportation threat should be associated with anxiety net of anger. I find deportation threat motivates anxiety after adjusting for anger and does not motivate anger more than anxiety (Appendix Section 4.5.5, Table 4.9), suggesting deportation threat facilitates reflexivity.




Figure 1.3: Competing theoretical models on assimilation. X-axis = acculturation level. Y-axis = liberal immigration policy support. Both axes scaled between 0-1. Panel A characterizes the straight-line assimilation model. Panel B characterizes the straight-line assimilation model while disaggregating between Latinxs threatened and unthreatened by immigration enforcement. Panel C is consistent with contingent assimilation theories and the theoretical framework informing H2.

Figure 1.3 displays stylized relationships characterizing different models of attitudinal assimilation. Panel A displays a pattern consistent with the straight-line assimilation model. As immigrants acculturate, they become less supportive of liberal immigration policies. Panel B displays a pattern consistent with straight-line assimilation that we may observe if there is no empirical evidence for H2. Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement may support less restrictive immigration policies at higher rates than unthreatened Latinxs, but attitudinal assimilation still occurs. Panel C displays a pattern consistent with H2 and preexisting theory explicating the contingent nature of immigrant assimilation. In short, deportation threat makes the attitudes of integrated Latinxs more like recent Latinx immigrants, whereas unthreatened Latinxs acquire increasingly conservative immigration policy preferences as they acculturate.

1.5 Design

1.5.1 Data

I use 6 nationally representative Latinx surveys to test my hypotheses. The 2007 (N = 1809), 2008 (N = 1822), 2010 (N = 1236), 2018 (N = 1794), and 2019 (N = 2427) Pew Surveys of Latinos (Pew '07, '08, '10, '18, '19) along with the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (N = 2279, CMPS '16).¹¹ All surveys are administered in Spanish conditional on respondent preferences. All Pew surveys before 2019 are cell phone and landline, use stratified sampling to target Latinx residents, use random digit dialing, use multi-stage weighting procedures to ensure adherence to Census Bureau target demographics, and have margins of error at 2.7% (2007), 3.4% (2008), 3.3% (2010), and 3.1% (2018) respectively. The 2019 Pew survey is derived from a national, probability-based online panel of Hispanic adults implemented by Ipsos Public Affairs and is weighted to account for Census target demographics and non-response via raking. The margin of error is 2.9%. The CMPS is internet self-administered, weighted via post-stratification raking to 2015 1-year ACS estimates for age, gender, education, nativity, ancestry and voter registration within the national Latinx population, and has a margin of error of 1%. These surveys are advantageous to test the hypotheses since they all have items on support for various immigration policies and perceived threat of deportation in addition to having large Latinx samples necessary for evaluating heterogenous effects of deportation threat by acculturation level.¹² Moreover, using multiple surveys to test the hypotheses hedges against the results being a product of statistical artifacts intrinsic to a single survey and may demonstrate the theory is empirically

¹¹Puerto Ricans are excluded from the analysis given their citizenship status and social distance from undocumented immigrants. Only 3% of Puerto Ricans know an undocumented family member compared to 20% of non-Puerto Rican Latinxs. Nevertheless, the results are similar including Puerto Ricans (Appendix Section 4.8.2, Table 4.13). I also re-analyze the results subsetting to only Mexicans, given their predominance in post-1965 immigration patterns and their uniquely racialized status (Telles and Ortiz, 2008). The results are also similar and perhaps even stronger (Appendix Section 4.8.1, Table 4.12).

¹²Given deportation threat or acculturation are not randomly assigned (and are impossible to randomly assign since they are either ascriptive categories or unethically sound to manipulate), it is important to note the term “effect” should not be interpreted causally. “Effect” is used for ease of interpretation. Although I attempt to account for alternative explanations and selection, the paper’s findings are ultimately descriptive.

durable across context, samples, and variable measurement.

The main outcomes of interest are liberal immigration policy attitudes. For each survey, items measuring support for liberal immigration policy are aggregated into an additive index. Examples of items include support for stopping immigration raids and not reducing immigration levels.¹³ The additive index may reduce measurement error due to the binary nature of the respective policy outcomes and generates preference variation among a population highly supportive of liberal immigration policies (Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010; Barry et al., 2011).¹⁴ Although the indices do not contain the same items across surveys, effect consistency may suggest deportation threat is relevant across a variety of policies within the immigration domain.¹⁵

To measure deportation threat, respondents are asked across all Pew surveys how much they worry about they, close friends, or family members being deported regardless of their citizenship status on a 0-3 point scale from “Not at all” to “A lot”. For the CMPS, respondents are only asked about proximal deportation threat on a 0-4 point scale from “Not at all worried” to “Extremely worried.” These measures are similar to prior research on the influence of threat on policy attitudes and capture *personal*, as opposed to *sociotropic* threat (Huddy et al., 2005a; Huddy, Feldman, and Weber, 2007; Hetherington and Suhay, 2011).¹⁶

Across all surveys, acculturation is an additive index of a generational status scale (0 = 1st, 1 = 2nd, 2 = 3rd+), a binary citizenship measure (0 = non-citizen, 1 = citizen), and a binary measure for whether the respondent decided to take the survey in English. Thus, the acculturation index is from 0-4 (non-citizen Spanish-speaking immigrant to third-generation plus English-speaking citizen). Similar scales have been used in prior studies

¹³For an overview of the items characterizing the indices, see Appendix Section 4.2, Table 4.1

¹⁴I derive deportation threat coefficients for each individual liberal immigration policy item across the 6 surveys. Although not all are statistically significant, none are incorrectly signed (Appendix, Section 4.3, Figure 4.1).

¹⁵The Pew '19 outcome is not an index but a binary indicator. There is only 1 immigration policy outcome measuring support for legalizing DACA recipients.

¹⁶For exact wording on threat items, see Appendix Section 4.5.1.

on Latinx immigration policy attitudes (Branton, 2007; Pedraza, 2014; Pérez, 2015).¹⁷ The English interview and generational status components are reliably associated with gold-standard acculturation scales measuring language proficiency, cultural attachments, geographic integration, and ethnic identification (Cruz et al., 2008).¹⁸ Prior work suggests citizenship is a prerequisite to successful acculturation and is positively associated with civic engagement, access to government benefits, public sector positions, education, language skills, and inter-ethnic contact (Portes and Curtis, 1987; Liang, 1994; Yang, 1994; Maehler, Weinmann, and Hanke, 2019). Moreover, political science research suggests citizenship reduces support for liberal immigration policies among European immigrants (Just and Anderson, 2015). I validate the acculturation index by assessing if it operates consistent with preexisting hypothesization that acculturation is negatively associated with support for liberal immigration policies and find concurring evidence (Appendix Section 4.4.2, Table 4.4).¹⁹

To ensure sufficient variation for assessing heterogeneous effects, I demonstrate deportation threat and acculturation are not indistinct constructs. As expected, acculturation is negatively correlated with deportation threat. From a low Pearson’s ρ of -0.2 in the Pew ’19 survey, to a high of -0.46 in the Pew ’08 survey, implying a low-to-moderate correlation. Across all surveys, at least 20% of the most acculturated Latinxs (e.g. third-generation+, English-dominant) indicate they are worried “some” or “alot,” up to 31% in the Pew ’18 survey. Likewise, across all surveys, at least 20% of the least acculturated Latinxs (non-citizen

¹⁷All scale components are positively associated with each other across surveys (Appendix Section 4.4.1, Table 4.2). With the exception of the CMPS, they fall within acceptable ranges of reliability (Appendix Section 4.4.1, Table 4.3).

¹⁸Branton (2007)’s acculturation measure uses a self-reported English-dominance scale instead of the English interview indicator. Cruz et al. (2008) find English interview indicators are good proxies for English dominance. Indeed, English-dominance scales in the 2007 and 2010 Pew surveys are strongly associated with whether the respondent takes the survey in English (Appendix Section 4.4.3).

¹⁹I use several alternative acculturation measures to ensure the results are not sensitive to coding decisions (Appendix Section 4.9, Table 4.14). Including an indicator for legal permanent residency status or excluding the citizenship indicator does not change the results (Table 4.14, Panels A, B). Including an index of English dominance with or without the citizenship indicator, similar to Branton (2007), does not change the results (Panels C, D). The individual components of the acculturation index also moderate the association between deportation threat and support for liberal immigration policy (Panels A-E on Table 4.15).

immigrants, Spanish-dominant) indicate they are worried “not at all” or “not much,” up to 45% in the Pew ’19 survey. In sum, there are sizable proportions of lower-acculturated Latinxs who do not experience deportation threat and well-acculturated Latinxs who do experience deportation threat.²⁰

I attempt to adjust for an exhaustive set of theoretically motivated control covariates in the main estimates.²¹ At the individual level, these include demographic factors (e.g. acculturation, gender, marital status, Catholicism, national origin) socio-economic factors (e.g. income, education, unemployment, homeownership), and political factors (e.g. partisanship, ideology, experienced discrimination, perceived discrimination, ethnic media consumption). Fully specified models also adjust for zipcode and county-level demographic and socio-economic covariates from the American Community Survey administered the year prior to the survey (e.g. logged median household income, % Latinx, % foreign-born, % non-citizen) along with state fixed effects.²²

Importantly, the battery of political and county-level factors include a series of covariates that account for selection into deportation threat such as social ties with a deportee (in Pew ’10, Pew ’19), social ties with an undocumented friend and/or family member (in CMPS ’16, Pew ’19), being stopped by a law enforcement officer because of immigration status (in Pew ’10), the logged county-level total removals via Secure Communities (in CMPS ’16, Pew ’18),²³ the county-level deportation rate via Secure Communities (# removed for every 1000 foreign-born, in CMPS ’16, Pew ’18), and the proportion of removals that are “Level 3,” that is, removals of individuals who have only engaged in misdemeanors or petty offenses,

²⁰See Appendix Section 4.5.3, Tables 4.6 and 4.7 for more information on the correlation between threat and acculturation and the distribution of threat by acculturation level.

²¹To save space, not all controls for each survey are explicated here. See Appendix Section 4.7, Table 4.11 for a full enumeration of the control covariates used for each survey. See Appendix Section 4.7.2 for inclusion justification of each control covariate.

²²Although the Pew ’07 and Pew ’19 surveys only include Census region fixed effects and do not include county or zipcode covariates.

²³Removal data are from a public records request to ICE.

as opposed to felonies, suggesting expansive targeting (CMPS '16, Pew '18).²⁴ None of the covariates accounting for deportation threat selection are associated with immigration policy attitudes (conditional on the perceived deportation threat measure). This suggests the psychological component of deportation threat influences attitudes independent of objective immigration enforcement context, consistent with prior work suggesting Latinxs do not need direct contact with immigration enforcement to experience deportation threat and change their behaviors accordingly (Dreby, 2015; Asad, 2017).

1.5.2 Estimation Strategy

I use the following linear model to assess the association between deportation threat and liberal immigration policy preferences:

$$Y_i = \delta_g + \tau threat_i + \sum_{k=1}^k \beta_k X_{czi}^k + \varepsilon_i$$

Y_i is a liberal immigration policy preference index for respondent i . δ_g are geographic fixed effects. $threat_i$ is perceived deportation threat. $\sum_{k=1}^k X_{czi}^k$ are a battery of individual, county (c), and zipcode (z) covariates. ε_i are robust errors. τ is the coefficient of interest. I use the following model to assess if threat forestalls attitudinal convergence via acculturation:

$$Y_i = \delta_g + \tau^H (threat_i \times acculturation_i) + \beta_1 threat_i + \beta_2 acculturation_i + \sum_{k=1+2}^k \beta_k X_{czi}^k + \varepsilon_i$$

Here, τ^H is the coefficient of interest, characterizing the heterogenous effect of threat conditional on acculturation level. τ and τ^H should be positive if H1 and H2 are confirmed empirically.²⁵

²⁴County-level deportation factors are not used in surveys prior to 2015 since Secure Communities was ongoing between 2008-2015

²⁵The main results are re-estimated using ordered logistic regression and are the same (Appendix Section 4.14, Tables 4.22 and 4.23).

1.6 Results

1.6.1 First-order Association Between Threat and Immigration Policy Attitudes

I first assess the association between deportation threat and immigration policy preferences. Figure 1.4 displays standardized effects of deportation threat with respect to liberal immigration policy attitudes across the 6 surveys, in addition to effects derived from both fixed and random-effects meta-analytic estimates.²⁶ Consistent with H1, deportation threat is positively associated with liberal immigration policy preferences across all surveys ($p < 0.001$ for all estimates except the Pew '19 survey at $p < 0.01$). Meta-analytically, deportation threat has a standardized effect size of 0.17. For comparison, this is as strong as the meta-analytic effect for partisanship (0.17), which is highly prognostic of liberal immigration policy preferences.²⁷

Using tools by Cinelli and Hazlett (2020), I estimate the robustness value (“RV”) for each coefficient, that is, the proportion of the joint variance in the outcome and deportation threat that would need to be explained to reduce the threat coefficients to 0. The RV ranges from 0.12-0.18. These values may be small, but I use observable control covariates as bounds to identify what kinds of covariates would obviate the results. To reduce the effect to 0, there must be an unobservable covariate equivalent to the strength of 2x acculturation, 3x acculturation, 3x acculturation, 7x perceived discrimination, 3x partisan identification and 6x acculturation.²⁸ Given prior literature establishes these covariates as the most prognostic of immigration attitudes and deportation threat among Latinxs (Sanchez, 2006; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010; Pedraza, 2014; Asad, 2020), the bounding exercise suggests the estimates are relatively insulated from omitted variable bias.

²⁶For the random-effects meta-analysis, the Cochran’s Q p-value is 0.81, suggesting limited heterogeneity across survey estimates.

²⁷See Appendix Section 4.5.6, Table 4.5.6 for regression tables characterizing the association between deportation threat and immigration policy preferences.

²⁸These bounding covariates are not chosen arbitrarily. These covariates attenuate the threat coefficient to 0 prior to all others in each respective survey study. Thus, they are the most prognostic observed covariates with respect to both threat and liberal immigration policy attitudes.




Figure 1.4: Standardized deportation threat coefficients on liberal immigration policy preferences (y-axis) across surveys (x-axis) and the inclusion of control covariates (color). Vertical grey line separates survey estimates from meta-analytic estimates. Horizontal red line is the random-effects meta-analytic coefficient estimate. Annotations include estimate, standard error, p-value, how much joint outcome and independent variable variation must be explained by an omitted covariate to reduce the coefficient to 0 (“Robustness Value (RV)”), and how large an omitted covariate must be to reduce the coefficient to 0 based on observable bounds. 95% confidence intervals displayed derived from robust standard errors.

1.6.2 Does Deportation Threat Forestall Attitudinal Convergence?

I now assess whether deportation threat forestalls attitudinal convergence. Table 1.1 displays heterogeneous effects of deportation threat by acculturation level. Across all surveys (columns 1-6) and adjusting for the full set of control covariates, the negative influence of acculturation on liberal immigration policy attitudes is attenuated when deportation threat is perceptibly high. Given Table 1.1 displays coefficients based on acculturation and threat measures scaled between 0-1, going from the minimum to maximum of threat appears to nullify attitudinal assimilation via acculturation with respect to immigration policy preferences. These estimates suggest threat makes highly integrated Latinxs internalize attitudes similar to new immigrants with limited English-language capacities.

To get a stronger substantive sense of the heterogeneous effects, I plot predicted values of support for liberal immigration policies conditional on acculturation and deportation threat (Figure 1.5). Across all studies, there are a few general patterns implied by the predicted values. First, first-generation Spanish-dominant immigrants are highly supportive of liberal

Table 1.1: Association between deportation threat and liberal immigration policy attitudes conditional on acculturation

Liberal Immigration Policy Attitudes						
Panel A: No controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.12 [†] (0.06)	0.23 ^{***} (0.06)	0.17 ^{***} (0.05)	0.09 [†] (0.05)	0.28 ^{***} (0.05)	0.24 ^{**} (0.09)
Threat	0.09 ^{***} (0.02)	0.09 ^{***} (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.13 ^{***} (0.03)	0.06 [*] (0.03)	0.02 (0.05)
Acculturation	-0.15 ^{***} (0.04)	-0.24 ^{***} (0.04)	-0.17 ^{***} (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.20 ^{***} (0.04)	-0.18 ^{**} (0.06)
R ²	0.08	0.17	0.12	0.10	0.14	0.05
N	1809	1822	1236	2279	1794	2427
Panel B: Yes controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.12 [*] (0.06)	0.20 ^{***} (0.05)	0.15 ^{***} (0.05)	0.09 [†] (0.05)	0.15 ^{**} (0.05)	0.22 [*] (0.09)
Threat	0.04 [†] (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.06 [†] (0.04)	0.06 [*] (0.03)	0.02 (0.05)
Acculturation	-0.17 ^{***} (0.04)	-0.22 ^{***} (0.04)	-0.19 ^{***} (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.12 ^{**} (0.04)	-0.16 [*] (0.06)
R ²	0.16	0.32	0.33	0.24	0.32	0.09
N	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Panel A displays coefficients from models with no control covariates. Panel B displays coefficients from models adjusting for a full set of control covariates. Each column characterizes a different survey at use. Geographic covariates below the Census Area level are not available for the Pew 2007 and Pew 2019 surveys. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

immigration policy regardless of perceived deportation threat. Second, for Latinxs without deportation threat, acculturation is negatively associated with support for liberal immigration policy. Third, for Latinxs with a high level of deportation threat, even highly acculturated Latinxs (e.g. third-generation+, English-dominant) hold attitudes on immigration policy similar to first-generation Spanish-dominant Latinxs.

In the Pew '07 survey, Latinxs without perceptions of deportation threat decrease support for liberal immigration policy by -0.17 on the if they are third-generation and English-




Figure 1.5: Predicted values of support for liberal immigration policies (y-axis) conditional on acculturation (x-axis) and threat (min-max, denoted by color). Simulations are from fully specified models with Census region fixed effects, assuming control covariates at their means and a Latinx respondent from the Western Census region. 95% confidence intervals from robust standard errors displayed.

dominant compared to first-generation and Spanish-dominant. Likewise for Latinxs with the highest perception of threat, going from the minimum to maximum of the acculturation scale implies a decrease in support for liberal immigration policy by -0.05. The second difference simulating a shift from the minimum to the maximum of the acculturation and deportation threat scales is 0.12, equivalent to 44% of the outcome standard deviation. The second difference for the Pew '08 survey is 0.18, equivalent to 64% of the outcome standard deviation. For the Pew '10 survey, the second difference is 0.16, equivalent to 76% of the outcome standard deviation. The second difference for the CMPS '16 survey is 0.09, equivalent to 38% of the outcome standard deviation. The second difference for the Pew '18 survey is 0.18, equivalent to 67% of the outcome standard deviation. Finally, the second difference for the Pew '19 survey is 0.22, equivalent to 76% of the outcome standard deviation. Consistent

with H2, these findings suggest deportation threat is more important in determining liberal immigration policy preferences among integrated Latinxs, forestalling attitudinal convergence and making their attitudes similar to new immigrants.

1.6.3 Robustness Checks

I assess the sensitivity of the results via a number of additional analyses. I attempt to rule out alternative mechanisms that may forestall attitudinal convergence. Prior literature has highlighted the role of discrimination (Sanchez, 2006; Telles and Ortiz, 2008; Pedraza, 2014), Latinx identity (Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 1997), American identity (Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010), ethnic geographic context (Bedolla, 2003; Rocha et al., 2011), ethnic media (Abrajano and Singh, 2009), Latinx age cohort (Vega and Ortiz, 2018), national origin (Mexican + Central American), and socio-economic status (Polinard, Wrinkle, and De La Garza, 1984). I attempt to rule out if attitudinal divergence is a product of these factors in addition to exposure to deportation threat outside of the psychological measure of interest (e.g. knowing a deportee, knowing someone undocumented, exposure to an immigration stop, exposure to county-level immigration enforcement via Secure Communities). This is a strong test, since it saturates the model with interactive terms and accounts for potential omitted interaction bias. The results are statistically and substantively similar to the main results (Appendix Section 4.10, Table 4.16).

I conduct several tests to rule out latent liberalism. First, it is important to note partisanship and ideology is unassociated with deportation threat in the 2007 and 2010 Pew surveys, suggesting the empirical dynamic explicated in this paper is not intrinsically tethered to liberal ideology. Second, I use falsification tests on immigration irrelevant policy preferences to rule out liberalism unaccounted for after adjusting for partisanship or ideology. The CMPS includes items on immigration irrelevant policy preferences. Deportation threat is not consistently associated with liberal policy preferences or an index of all policy preferences.²⁹ Including the liberal policy index does not attenuate the first-order association

²⁹In fact, the one statistically significant association is a positive one between threat and support for

between deportation threat and liberal immigration policy preferences (Appendix Section 4.11, Table 4.17). Likewise, with the exception of support for not implementing voter ID laws, the $acculturation_i \times threat_i$ effect is statistically insignificant in relation to liberal policy preferences and the liberalism index. Moreover, including an interaction between acculturation and the liberalism index does not attenuate the $acculturation_i \times threat_i$ effect (Appendix Section 4.11, Table 4.17).³⁰

I attempt to rule out if the results are driven by nativist attitudes. The Pew '07, Pew '08, Pew '10 and CMPS '16 surveys have items measuring the perceived economic and social threat immigrants pose.³¹ I index these measures for each survey.³² After adjusting for nativism in the first set of regression models assessing the first-order association between threat and liberal immigration policy, the results remain the same. I also interact nativism with acculturation in addition to deportation threat to rule out nativism as an alternative mechanism. Although the Pew '07 and CMPS '16 effects for $acculturation_i \times threat_i$ become statistically null, the coefficients are still positive and statistically significant for the Pew '08 and Pew '10 surveys. Moreover, the $acculturation_i \times threat_i$ effect is statistically significant and positive in the Mexican-origin subsample for the Pew '07, Pew '08, and Pew '10 samples. These results suggest, in some cases, deportation threat forestalls acculturation net of nativist predispositions. Although somewhat surprising, prior research suggests deportation threat may be salient to nativist Latinxs because they perceive new immigrants may generate societal and policy backlash to Latinxs writ large without discrimination between old and new generations of Latinxs (Bedolla, 2003; Jiménez, 2008).

banning gay marriage, suggesting threat is not constitutive of liberal ideology among Latinxs.

³⁰However, in the Pew '19 survey, deportation threat and its interaction with acculturation appears to be associated with immigration-irrelevant liberalism (Appendix Section 4.11, Table 4.18). This may be due to ideological sorting on perceived deportation threat in the aftermath of 3 years of Trump's administration. Other surveys are not analyzed since they do not include items measuring immigration irrelevant policy preferences.

³¹In the study of Anglo white opinion on immigration, *nativism* is typically understood as *socio-tropic threat from immigrants*. However, in this paper, socio-tropic threat is measured as deportation threat to the Latinx community.

³²For details on measuring nativism, see Appendix Section 4.12.1

I assess whether the results are driven by *socio-tropic* threat, as opposed to the main measure, *personal* threat (e.g. threat to self, immediate social ties). In prior work on threat, particularly with respect to terrorism, socio-tropic threat is measured as perceived threat to the nation (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011). For Latinxs concerned about immigration enforcement, socio-tropic deportation threat may be interpreted as a threat to Latinxs or immigrants writ large. The Pew '07 and Pew '08 surveys include items that may measure socio-tropic threat.³³ I adjust for socio-tropic threat using these surveys in regressions assessing the first-order association between personal deportation threat and liberal immigration policy preferences. I also adjust for the interaction between socio-tropic threat and acculturation to rule out socio-tropic threat as an alternative mechanism forestalling attitudinal convergence. The empirical conclusions remain the same as the main results, and socio-tropic deportation threat appears to have relatively little influence on immigration policy attitudes (Appendix Section 4.13.2, Table 4.21).

1.7 Discussion and Conclusion

Despite well-established sociological patterns of attitudinal convergence between acculturated immigrants and host country natives, a puzzle remains where immigration policy attitudes do not always converge. The findings help answer the puzzle and suggest that perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts undermine attitudinal assimilation among integrated Latinxs. These empirical conclusions put into context previously unexplored attitudinal dynamics that may arise from a sense of illegality informed by an increasingly restrictive immigration enforcement apparatus, the societal integration of predominantly Latinx undocumented immigrants, and rhetoric conflating Latinxs with an “illegal” status. Moreover, deportation threat appears to forestall attitudinal convergence net of several established alternative mechanisms in preexisting literature, including discrimination, group identity, and various forms of ethnic context. As Latinxs constitute 20% of the American population and the post-Trump context offers a crossroads on immigration policy, these attitudinal

³³See Appendix Section 4.13.1 for details on measuring socio-tropic threat.

dynamics may be increasingly salient in determining the future of Latinx immigration policy preferences.

Contrary to straight-line assimilation theory and prior political science evidence on the subject, this paper teaches us that attitudinal assimilation on policy preferences is not guaranteed, but rather conditional on heterogeneous circumstances experienced by members of immigrant-origin groups. However, consistent with straight-line assimilation theory, immigrant group members hold attitudes similar to host country natives in the absence of threats implicating the group. The notion reception contexts may moderate the prospects of assimilation is not new, but most prior research emphasizes socio-economic convergence and does not explicitly test mechanisms that may forestall convergence on policy preferences (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Telles and Ortiz, 2008). This paper is the first to provide systematic evidence assessing how immigration enforcement contexts moderate the prospect of attitudinal assimilation on immigration policy. The findings presented here bolster perspectives that the prospect of assimilation is conditional on reception context, specifically, a perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement environment (Mora and Rodríguez-Muñiz, 2017). Moreover, these findings strike against new conclusions positing Latinxs will “become white” in norms and practice like other historic immigrant groups (Alba, 2016).

Moreover, this paper problematizes several assumptions concerning threat in the immigration and political psychological literature. The results teach us deportation threat is not only salient for immigrant or undocumented Latinxs, but also citizen, later-generation, and English-speaking Latinxs well integrated in the American polity. Prior deportation threat research tends to focus on less acculturated Latinxs on the (correct) assumption they are differentially exposed to threat. However, if we examine broader Latinx populations, we find deportation threat may be more politically consequential to integrated Latinxs since their distance from the canonical immigrant archetype offers them opportunities to shed commitments to policies benefitting new immigrants. Political psychological research on threat has long debated whether threat has a stronger influence on those more or less predisposed to be concerned over the object of the threat (Feldman and Stenner, 1997; Hetherington and Suhay, 2011). The findings illustrated here, somewhat counter-intuitively, offer support for

the notion threat undermines the predispositions of the ostensibly secure.

Likewise, prior threat research tends to focus on dominant groups (e.g. Anglo whites). Examining groups at the hierarchical margins may offer new theoretical insights that challenge well-established findings. Latinxs, hierarchically marginal and concerned about objects of threat that demand liberal policy solutions (as opposed to whites who are hierarchically superior and concerned about objects of threat that demand conservative solutions), will behave in ways that contradict meta-analytic conclusions on the conservative consequences of threat (Jost et al., 2017). Moreover, studying Latinxs by themselves exposes important heterogeneities, such as acculturation level, that help determine what factors maintain commitment to Latinx immigrants outside of operationalizing Latinxs in a binary fashion that demonstrates otherwise high levels of pro-immigrant support. Future research should continue to take the heterogeneity of the group into account in explaining Latinx political behavior.

Additionally, this paper moves beyond examining how deportation threat motivates Latinx political participation. Surprisingly, little work has been done on how deportation threat influences Latinx immigration policy attitudes, much less how deportation threat may forestall attitudinal convergence. This paper explicates deportation threat not only activates political engagement, but motivates the distinct political preferences of the Latinx community.

This study is not without limitations and there is significant room for future research. The study is observational and subject to omitted variable bias. Although I attempt to account for theoretically motivated alternative explanations and robustness to multiple specifications, unobserved endogeneity may otherwise obviate the results. Future research should attempt to assess the causal effect of plausibly exogenous policy changes in the immigration enforcement environment on perceived deportation threat and immigration policy attitudes differentially among integrated Latinxs.³⁴

³⁴A tough task, given the paucity of Latinx survey data across both small geographic units and acculturation level. One may also induce deportation threat via survey or field experiments. However, serious ethical considerations need to be taken into account, such that any experiment approximating the characterization

Additionally, the study is Latinx focused, which may generate scope conditions on the influence of deportation threat relative to other immigrant groups.³⁵ Future research should analyze the influence of deportation threat on Asian immigrant populations, the fastest growing ethno-racial subgroup in the United States, or Black immigrants, who may experience additional threats via anti-Black discrimination.³⁶ Moreover, future research should extend beyond the United States. For instance, Jamaican co-ethnics in the United Kingdom may have experienced a heightened sense of deportation threat in response to the Windrush Scandal, which may shape immigration attitudes and attitudinal assimilation in profound ways.

Likewise, future research should assess whether the attitudinal dynamics explicated here extend beyond the third generation. The analysis bundles third generation respondents with later generations. It is unclear if this leads to over or under-estimation bias for the heterogeneous effects of interest. Although prior evidence suggests 4th generation Mexicans still face disadvantages preventing assimilative convergence (Telles and Ortiz, 2008), it is unclear if deportation threat forestalls attitudinal assimilation among 4th generation populations given their distance from the immigrant experience. A constraint of this project is that Latinx immigrants have not been in the country for multiple generations like earlier European immigrants. The findings should be replicated in the decades to come to assess potential changes in the immigration enforcement environment or attitudinal context.

Moreover, other well-established findings on the link between threat and predispositions should be evaluated among Latinx populations, such as the role of deportation threat in potentially relaxing ideological or partisan predispositions that motivate preferences for restrictive immigration policy.

In summary, the findings appear somewhat pessimistic for Latinx solidarity with new

of threat measured by the descriptive data may be infeasible.

³⁵I analyze the influence of deportation threat on liberal immigration policy preferences among Asian-Americans in a 2013 Pew Survey (Appendix Section 4.15).

³⁶This is not to deny Black Latinxs in the samples, but to prescribe an explicit focus on both Latinx and non-Latinx Black immigrants.

immigrants. In order for relatively integrated Latinxs to support policies that benefit new immigrants, they must endure a threatening immigration enforcement environment. Although this dynamic may have been exacerbated by an increase in deportations since IIRIRA's passage in 1996, immigration policy may be at a crossroads in a post-Trump context. It remains to be seen whether potential reversals in perceptibly threatening policies may generate the conditions for Latinxs to attitudinally assimilate and shed their political commitments to new Latinx immigrants.

CHAPTER 2

How Threatening Immigration Enforcement Policies Shape Latinx Candidate Preferences

Abstract: I forward a *Dynamic Theory of Threat Solution Ownership* to explain how the threat of deportation motivates Democratic support among Latinxs and the puzzle of partisan defection among Republican Latinxs. I posit group-specific threats will not motivate candidate preferences until the parties effectively differentiate on resolving the threat. I find support for the theory by leveraging 14 nationally representative Latinx surveys. The evidence demonstrates deportation threat does not motivate Latinx support for Democratic candidates or partisan defection among Latinx Republicans until Obama unambiguously commits to reduce the threat of deportation via administrative relief and Trump enters the political arena as an explicitly xenophobic candidate. Moreover, using high-frequency tracking polls of Latinx opinion, I provide plausibly causal evidence a policy reducing deportation threat, *Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents* (DAPA), increases support for Democratic incumbents and motivates partisan defection among Republican Latinxs. These findings demonstrate threatening immigration enforcement contexts play an important role in the candidate preferences of Latinx immigrants and their co-ethnics.

2.1 Introduction

Does the threat of deportation, either personally or proximally, motivate candidate preferences among Latinx immigrants and their co-ethnics? Latinxs tend to support the Democratic party relative to Anglo whites. Moreover, Latinx Republicans are more likely than Anglo Republicans to defect by voting for Democratic presidential candidates and positively evaluating Democratic presidential incumbents. Since 35% of Latinx are foreign-born and a significant proportion of Latinxs are second-generation (Luis and Antonio, 2019), some have suggested immigration, and the threat posed by interior immigration enforcement, is a key issue motivating candidate preferences in favor of Democratic candidates relative to comparably restrictionist Republican candidates (Sanchez, Medeiros, and Sanchez-Youngman, 2012; Barreto and Collingwood, 2015; Sanchez and Gomez-Aguinaga, 2017). However, others suggest immigration issues may not be as relevant in motivating Latinx candidate preferences. Evidence suggests Latinxs are concerned about similar issues as the general population and may determine their candidate preferences on the basis of other considerations such as socio-economic factors, religion or immigration-irrelevant issues (Leal et al., 2008; Abrajano and Alvarez, 2011; Barreto and Segura, 2014; Rakich, 2020). In addition, some have suggested the failure of the Obama administration to reduce the deportation rate and pass comprehensive immigration reform may have undercut Latinx motivations to support Democratic candidates on the basis of concerns over immigration enforcement (Sanchez et al., 2015; Street, Zepeda-Millán, and Jones-Correa, 2015).¹

In light of these perspectives, I introduce a *Dynamic Theory of Threat Solution Ownership* and demonstrate the influence of perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement on candidate preferences is conditional on shifts in the national political context. The theory implies concerns over immigration enforcement are not a priori motivations for supporting Democratic party candidates among Latinxs. The reason is because the parties, and their associated candidates, may not be effectively differentiated on the issue of reducing the threat

¹Deportation relief is salient to significant segments of the Latinx community. 70% of undocumented immigrants are Latinx. 13% of Latinxs are undocumented. Over 40% of Latinxs know an undocumented friend or family member.

of deportation. Historically speaking, there is significant evidence the issue of immigration enforcement is a valence issue (Jones-Correa and De Graauw, 2013; Beinart, 2017; Massey, 2021). Both parties have engaged in commitments and policies that otherwise increase the threat of deportation (Street, Zepeda-Millán, and Jones-Correa, 2015; Beinart, 2017; Golash-Boza, 2018; Thompson, 2020; Massey, 2021). However, in contexts where the parties and their associated candidates make perceptibly credible commitments to either resolve the threat of deportation or exacerbate it, concerns over immigration enforcement will become more important motivations in the evaluation of political candidates and in generating incentives for partisan defection.

Leveraging 14 nationally-representative Latinx surveys from 2007-2021, I find evidence in support of the theory. Prior to Barack Obama's attempt to provide broad deportation relief to undocumented immigrants in 2014 in addition to Donald Trump's entry in the political arena as an explicitly anti-immigrant candidate during the 2016 election, Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement are generally not more likely to vote for or support Democratic candidates. The lack of a clear association between feeling threatened by immigration enforcement and support for Democratic candidates is consistent with perspectives that Obama's acceleration of Bush-era immigration enforcement policies generated political ambivalence among Latinxs (Sanchez et al., 2015; Street, Zepeda-Millán, and Jones-Correa, 2015). Yet, after Obama attempts to provide deportation relief and Trump enters the 2016 election, Latinxs are more likely to support and vote for Democratic candidates. Likewise, Latinxs are more likely to oppose and vote against Republican candidates. In addition, I find the influence of deportation threat on Democratic candidate preferences is *stronger among Latinx Republicans* despite anti-immigrant elements within the Republican party. Moreover, using high-frequency tracking poll data on presidential approval among Latinxs, I provide plausibly causal evidence a policy reducing deportation threat, *Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents* (DAPA), increased positive evaluations of Democratic incumbents regardless of an individual's partisanship.

This paper makes several contributions. It is the first to systematically evaluate the relationship between the threat of immigration enforcement and candidate preferences among

Latinxs with an emphasis on how shifts in the national political context could increase the relevance of threatened dispositions. This paper teaches us the threat of deportation does not have a priori political consequences for Latinx immigrants and their co-ethnics until there are options available that effectively ameliorate (or do not exacerbate) the threat. Moreover, the Dynamic Theory of Threat Solution Ownership, borrowing insights from literature on both threat and *issue ownership* (Petrocik, 1996; Albertson and Gadarian, 2015; Godefroidt, Eadeh, and Adam-Trojan, 2019; Eadeh and Chang, 2020), offers a generalized framework for understanding when a particular threat will or will not be politically relevant. This framework could be extended to other cases and may be particularly helpful for understanding the behavior of non-white groups experiencing political threats that are now at the forefront of American politics due to demographic shifts, the increased representation of non-whites, and increasing partisan polarization on salient threats non-white groups experience (e.g. ethno-racial discrimination, the police, immigration enforcement).

This paper also teaches us, despite the increasing strength of partisanship in determining candidate preferences along with polarization among the mass public over the issue of immigration (Abramowitz and Webster, 2016; Mason, 2018; Baker and Edmonds, 2021), the threat of deportation among Republican Latinxs can generate possibilities for partisan defection. Preexisting research on Latinx Republicans is limited (Jones-Correa, Al-Faham, and Cortez, 2018), and it is often assumed they discount immigration issues (Cadava, 2020). To the contrary, this paper demonstrates the threat of deportation can play an outsized role in Republican Latinx candidate preferences despite partisan predispositions. These findings are consistent with extant work on how threat undermines habitual cues and suggestions Latinx Republicans may defect from the party line in light of doubts about their place in the party (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993; Davis and Silver, 2004; Brader, 2006; Cadava, 2020).

Additionally, consistent with preexisting *policy feedback* research demonstrating policies influence the mass public's politics (Pierson, 1993; Soss, 1999; Mettler, 2005; Soss and Schram, 2007; Weaver and Lerman, 2010; Campbell, 2012; Michener, 2018; Walker, 2020), this paper is the first to demonstrate Latinx candidate evaluations of incumbents are highly

responsive to policies *reducing* the threat of deportation at the national-level.² Latinxs may not necessarily respond favorably toward incumbents in response to policies reducing the threat of deportation. Immigration is usually not the most salient issue for Latinxs (Leal et al., 2008; Abrajano and Alvarez, 2011; Barreto and Segura, 2014; Rakich, 2020). Latinxs are relatively less engaged, knowledgeable, and interested in politics (Neuman and Neuman, 1986; Garza, Falcon, and Garcia, 1996; DeSipio, 1996; Jones-Correa et al., 2007; Fraga et al., 2011; Price, 2017). And, the issue of immigration is increasingly polarized among the mass public (Baker and Edmonds, 2021), which could undercut prospects for an increase in positive incumbent evaluations and partisan defection amongst Republican Latinxs. However, consistent with preexisting research Latinxs are highly attuned to immigration policy contexts and are susceptible to political activation on immigration issues (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura, 2001; Pantoja and Segura, 2003; Barreto and Collingwood, 2015), I demonstrate President Obama’s commitment to DAPA significantly increased his approval among Latinxs of all partisan stripes.

2.2 Motivation

On average, Latinxs vote for Democratic presidential candidates and approve of Democratic presidential incumbents at relatively high rates. Likewise, they disapprove of Republican presidential incumbents. In every presidential election since 2008, roughly 2 out of 3 Latinxs vote for the Democratic candidate. Relative to Anglo whites, the gap in Democratic vote share is 18, 21, 26, and 24 percentage points for the 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020 elections respectively (Figure 2.1, Panel A). Average approval ratings across the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations corroborate the vote share statistics. Latinxs approve/disapprove of Democratic/Republican incumbents more than Anglo whites. Latinx approval of Bush was only 29% compared to 37% for Anglo whites, a 9 percentage point difference. Moreover, average approval of Obama among Latinxs was 56% compared to 39% for Anglo whites, a

²However, there is preexisting research examines how *state-level* immigration policies impact approval of *local* politicians among U.S. immigrants. See Filindra and Manatschal (2020).




Figure 2.1: Latinxs vote for and approve of Democratic presidential candidates/incumbents relatively more than Anglo whites (Panels A-B). Latinx Republicans are less likely to vote for Republican presidential candidates and approve/disapprove of Democratic/Republican incumbent presidents (Panels C-D). Color denotes ethno-racial group (Latinx, white). Data are from the cumulative Cooperative Election Study (CES). Panels A and C use data of Latinx and white adults that voted. Panels B and D use data of the national Latinx and white adult population. Estimates are weighted to represent the national population. 95% bootstrap confidence intervals displayed for each value (absence of confidence intervals is due to large sample size).

larger 17 percentage point difference. Likewise, average approval of Trump was only 31%, compared to 54% among white Anglos, an even larger 23 percentage point difference (Figure 2.1, Panel B). The statistics on Panels A and B are not simply driven by Latinx Democratic partisans. Latinx Republicans are much more likely to defect toward supporting Democratic presidential candidates/incumbents than Anglo whites as well. Latinx Republicans voted for the Democratic presidential candidate at rates of 13%, 17%, 14% and 8% in the 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020 elections respectively, 6%, 11%, 11% and 4% more than Anglo white Republicans (Figure 2.1, Panel C). Moreover, in the last 3 presidential administrations, with the exception of Bush, Latinx Republicans were more likely to approve/disapprove of Democratic/Republican incumbents. On average, 15% of Latinx Republicans approved of

Obama and 80% of Latinx Republicans approved of Trump compared to 5% and 92% of Anglo white Republicans respectively (Figure 2.1, Panel D).

Why are Latinxs relatively supportive/unsupportive of Democratic/Republican candidates? Why do Latinx Republicans defect from the Republican party more than their Anglo white counterparts despite the increasing generalized overlap between partisanship and candidate preferences? High levels of democratic partisanship is one explanation (Garcia Bedolla, Alvarez, and Nagler, 2006), which may be motivated by acculturation (Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner, 1991; Wong, 2000), discrimination (Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz, 2016), Catholicism (as opposed to Protestantism) (Kosmin and Keysar, 1995; Kelly and Kelly, 2005), immigration-irrelevant issues (Alvarez and Bedolla, 2003; Garcia Bedolla, Alvarez, and Nagler, 2006), gender (Welch and Sigelman, 1992; Kelly and Kelly, 2005), socio-economic status (Kelly and Kelly, 2005; Garza and Cortina, 2007), and national origin (Alvarez and Bedolla, 2003; Bishin and Klofstad, 2012). However, partisanship cannot explain Republican Latinx defection nor the behavior of Independent Latinxs (Geron and Michelson, 2008). Research on Latinx candidate preferences at the national-level highlights the role of issue positions (Abrajano, Michael Alvarez, and Nagler, 2008), political ideology (Abrajano, Michael Alvarez, and Nagler, 2008), colorblind ideology (Alamillo, 2019), a strong sense of Latinx identity (Hickel et al., 2021), partisan mobilization (Nuño, 2007), effective cross-racial mobilization (Alamillo and Collingwood, 2017), and enthusiasm for pro-immigrant policies (Barreto and Collingwood, 2015).

However, an underexplored factor that may have potentially motivated Latinx candidate preferences in the past national few elections is the threat of immigration enforcement (Jones-Correa, Al-Faham, and Cortez, 2018). As explicated in Chapter 1, Latinx immigrants and their co-ethnics are highly exposed to threatening immigration enforcement policies. There are over 10 million undocumented immigrants living in the United States, the majority of which have stayed in the U.S. for over 10 years. Latinxs are over 70% of the undocumented population. 13% of Latinxs are undocumented. Over 40% of the general Latinx population know an undocumented friend or family member. Even well-integrated Latinxs are exposed to immigration enforcement. Over 20% of Latinxs that are third-generation or more know an




Figure 2.2: Both Latinx Democrats and Republicans are exposed to the threat of immigration enforcement. Panel A displays perceptions of deportation threat (y-axis, re-scaled between 0-1) by survey (x-axis) and party (color). Panel B displays the proportion of Latinxs that know a deportee (y-axis) by survey (x-axis) and party (color). Panel C displays the proportion of Latinxs that know a friend or family member that is undocumented (y-axis) by survey (x-axis) and party (color). Panel D displays the average zipcode foreign-born composition (y-axis) of Latinxs by survey (x-axis) and party (color). Panel E displays the average zipcode non-citizen composition (y-axis) of Latinxs by survey (x-axis) and party (color).

undocumented friend or family member. Since Clinton passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), the level of interior deportations increased over 1400%. Since 2006, the number of interior deportations has been over 300,000 per year. Moreover, exposure to immigration enforcement cuts across partisanship. Although Latinx Republicans are less likely to perceive the threat of deportation to themselves or family members, there are still sizeable proportions that do (Figure 2.2, Panel A). Moreover, Latinx Democrats and Republicans are relatively balanced in terms of knowing a deportee (Figure 2.2, Panel B). Latinx Republicans are also not much less likely to know an undocumented friend or family member than Latinx Democrats (Figure 2.2, Panel C). In addition, both Latinx Republicans and Democrats live in contexts potentially susceptible to the threat of immigration enforcement, that is, zipcodes with relatively high proportions of foreign-born

and non-citizens (Figure 2.2, Panels D and E).

The salience of immigration enforcement may motivate Latinx candidate preferences in a particular direction. However, this is not guaranteed. Street, Zepeda-Millán, and Jones-Correa (2015) find Latinxs perceive the Democratic party as less welcoming to Latinxs in response to information concerning Obama-era policies maintaining high deportation rates relative to Bush. Therefore, Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement may not use their sense of threat from deportation as a basis for supporting Democratic candidates. Likewise, Sanchez et al. (2015) show Latinxs who know a deportee have lower levels of approval for Barack Obama in 2013. However, they do not examine prospects for partisan defection, the influence of knowing a deportee on vote choice, the effects of policies reducing the threat of deportation on candidate evaluations, nor how shifts in the national political context may inform the influence of knowing a deportee. In contrast, this paper not only seeks to demonstrate the import of threat from immigration enforcement in motivating Latinx candidate preferences, it also seeks to examine how the threat of deportation is dynamically conditional on shifts in the national political context. However, before explicating how shifts in the national political context may condition feelings of threat from deportation among Latinxs, I will provide a generalized overview of research at the intersection of threat and candidate evaluation. I will also forward a theory for understanding how the influence of threat on candidate evaluations may shift over time.

2.3 Perspectives On How Threat Informs Candidate Preferences

2.3.1 Threat and Issue Ownership

At the level of the mass public, issue ownership theory suggests individuals support candidates that are better able to handle issues they find salient (Petrocik, 1996; Egan, 2013). How effective a particular party or candidate is at handling a particular issue will motivate the preferences of the mass public conditional on an issue's salience, a process known as issue priming (Krosnick and Kinder, 1990; Iyengar and Kinder, 2010). By the same token,

preexisting theoretical insights at the intersection of threat and issue ownership suggests threat motivates candidate preferences in a particular ideological or partisan direction among the mass public if a particular party or candidate is perceptibly credible at resolving the source of the threat (Albertson and Gadarian, 2015). Both *ideology-affordance theory* and *threat-ownership theory* imply threatened members of the mass public will support political candidates from parties perceived to have better track records at resolving the source of threat (Godefroidt, Eadeh, and Adam-Trojan, 2019; Eadeh and Chang, 2020; Brandt et al., 2021). In other words, candidates that “own” a perceived capacity to resolve a particular threat will garner support from members of the mass public worried about that particular threat.

A plethora of research corroborates the notion that the influence of a particular threat is conditional on parties and/or candidates “owning” the capacity to resolve that particular threat. In general, preexisting evidence shows threat motivates preferences for candidates from parties with perceptible expertise in resolving the threat or traits that cue the ability to resolve the threat (Merolla and Zechmeister, 2013; Albertson and Gadarian, 2015; Albertson and Gadarian, 2016). Issue ownership can also help candidates overcome electoral costs in the face of crises that threaten the mass public (Merolla and Zechmeister, 2013). Additionally, ownership over a threat’s solution can help candidates overcome trait-based stereotypes that otherwise undermine positive evaluations from a threatened mass public (Albertson and Gadarian, 2016; Holman, Merolla, and Zechmeister, 2016; Holman, Merolla, and Zechmeister, 2017).

2.3.2 A Dynamic Theory of Threat Solution Ownership

However, the preexisting literature is missing a theoretical treatment of the *temporal dynamics* concerning threat, issue ownership, and candidate preferences that take shifts in the national political context into account. Prior research typically assumes partisan ownership over resolving particular threats is relatively stable, easily accessible, and a product of long-term accumulative events that generated a basis for ownership over resolving a particular threat

(Merolla and Zechmeister, 2013; Albertson and Gadarian, 2015; Godefroidt, Eadeh, and Adam-Trojan, 2019; Eadeh and Chang, 2020). For example, in the U.S. context, it may be safe to assume, *on average*, national security threats motivate support for Republican candidates whereas economic security threats motivate support for Democratic candidates (Merolla and Zechmeister, 2013).

Yet, there is nothing natural about these threats to suggest they should *always* motivate candidate evaluations in a particular partisan or ideological direction over time. Although Petrocik (1996)'s issue ownership theory implies partisan ownership over resolving particular threats is relatively stable (see also Walgrave, Lefevre, and Tresch (2014), Seeberg (2017), and Tresch and Feddersen (2019)), they still posit room for realignment. Certain candidates may overcome a perceptible lack of ownership over resolving a particular threat by demonstrating individualized competence in resolving that threat (e.g. Bill Clinton on crime) (Holian, 2004). Candidates may own solutions to threats typically owned by an opposing party by communicating their policy platform (Dahlberg and Martinsson, 2015). Petrocik (1996) calls this a "lease" on another party's issues. New political events could arise that flip the perceptible competencies of each party to resolve particular threats. For example, Democratic party support for civil rights in the 1960s motivated defection from the Democratic party on part of white southerners concerned about rising Black political power (Valentino and Sears, 2005; Kuziemko and Washington, 2018). Moreover, issues that are not owned by either side (e.g. valence issues), could become polarized in their ownership over time, such that the issue now becomes a relevant factor in candidate evaluations among the mass public (Walgrave, Lefevre, and Nuytemans, 2009; Egan, 2013). By the same token, the perceived capacity to resolve certain threats may be increasingly differentiated by partisanship, with potential implications on candidate evaluations. For instance, maintaining high levels of deportations, a threat particularly relevant to Latinx communities, was a valence issue between the two parties (Jones-Correa and De Graauw, 2013; Beinart, 2017; Massey, 2021). However, attempts to reduce the threat of deportation via administrative relief during Obama's second term along with the concomitant rise of Donald Trump and his particular anti-immigrant platform may generate a perceptible basis for ownership over reducing (or not exacerbating) the threat

of deportation.

Therefore, I forward a *Dynamic Theory of Threat Solution Ownership* (DTTSO) to highlight how the dynamic nature of threat solution ownership may inform candidate preferences among the mass public. The DTTSO has a few propositions. First, consistent with research suggesting issue ownership may shift over time, ownership over the ability to resolve a threat may shift over time among parties and/or candidates (Holian, 2004; Walgrave, Lefevre, and Nuytemans, 2009; Dahlberg and Martinsson, 2015; Kuziemko and Washington, 2018). Second, being concerned about a particular threat does not have a priori political consequences. Members of the mass public experiencing a particular threat may not be more inclined to support a particular candidate if their available political options are not differentiated over the question of capably resolving the threat. Third, the same threat may or may not have political consequences conditional on temporal shifts in the political context. In temporal contexts where one party and/or candidate is perceptibly credible at resolving the object of threat, threatened members of the mass public will support that party/candidate. In temporal contexts where neither party and/or candidate is perceptibly credible at resolving the object of threat or owns the issue of resolving the threat, threatened members of the mass public will not be more or less likely to support a particular party/candidate. In the context of threat from deportation and Latinx candidate preferences, we might expect Latinxs to support Democratic candidates if Democratic candidates become perceptibly credible at either reducing the threat of deportation or not exacerbating the threat of deportation. Therefore, I forward the following hypothesis:

- **H1: A threat will not inform candidate preferences when political candidates are not effectively differentiated on resolving the threat during a particular temporal context. However, the same threat will inform candidate preferences when political candidates and/or parties become perceptibly differentiated on resolving the threat in a different temporal context.**

2.3.3 Threat and Partisan Predispositions

Can a threatened individual's partisanship condition the political consequences of threat? The DTTSO might suggest individuals concerned about a particular threat will defect from their party and support an opposing party's candidate if that candidate is relatively credible at resolving the relevant threat. Indeed, prior research on issue ownership suggests voters defect from their own party if they believe the other party is better at resolving issues they deem salient (Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen, 2003; Kaufmann, 2004). However, this is not necessarily guaranteed. While threats whose solutions are owned by opposing parties can generate cross-cutting pressure to defect from one's party, there is also reason to believe the influence of threat is stronger among individuals who are co-partisans with the party that owns the solution to the threat. Two theoretical perspectives can help us assess expectations over the influence of threat conditional on partisanship.

First, is the *partisan lens* perspective, which posits threat reinforces preexisting partisan preferences for political candidates. Prior research suggests partisanship is a predispositional filter by which individuals process information and external stimuli (Campbell et al., 1980; Zaller, 1992; Bartels, 2002). Other evidence suggests partisan predispositions can motivate discounting of stimuli inconsistent with partisan priors (Taber and Lodge, 2006). Therefore, partisanship may undermine the influence of threat on candidate preferences in a particular partisan or ideological direction if that direction is inconsistent with partisan priors. Some research on the political consequences of threat corroborates this perspective. Evidence consistent with *Terror Management Theory* suggests individuals cling to their ideological predispositions in the face of existential threats as a coping mechanism to handle uncertainty (Castano et al., 2011; Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Greenberg, 2015). In addition, threat may prime predispositional beliefs in a way that increases their influence on attitudes consistent with those beliefs (Feldman and Stenner, 1997; Rickert, 1998). In light of increasing polarization and the heightened importance of partisanship in motivating candidate preferences (Abramowitz and Webster, 2016; Mason, 2018), this perspective may serve as a particularly attractive framework for anticipating how threat may motivate candidate preferences among

partisans. Empirically, we may expect Latinx Democrats to increase/decrease their support of Democratic/Republican candidates in light of perceptible Democratic ownership over resolving the threat of deportation. Conversely, we may expect threat to have a relatively weaker influence on Latinx Republicans or independents in motivating support/disapproval for Republican/Democratic candidates. In this case, threat facilitates polarization in candidate preferences between Latinx partisans.

- **H2 (Partisan Lens): The influence of threat on preferences for candidates that own the issue of resolving the relevant threat will be stronger among co-partisans members of the mass public.**

The second perspective on how threat informs candidate preferences conditional on partisanship is the *predispositional shock* framework. This perspective suggests threat will have a stronger influence on candidate preferences among members of the mass public that are not co-partisans with the candidate that ostensibly owns the issue of resolving the threat. Threatened co-partisans may not have much space to travel in their support for the candidate that putatively owns the issue of resolving the relevant threat. But threatened members of the mass public from a different party than the party that putatively owns the issue of resolving the object of threat may be highly responsive to threatening stimuli inconsistent with their worldview (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011). Indeed, prior research suggests threat may undercut predispositional cues. Threat can encourage partisans to seek countervailing information on how to resolve the threat (Gadarian and Albertson, 2014; Merolla and Zechmeister, 2018). In effect, threat can induce doubt over whether one's own political party is acting in their best interest (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993). Thus, partisans may prefer political candidates that are not co-partisan to ameliorate the relevant threat, generating a new set of preferences inconsistent with partisan priors (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993; Davis and Silver, 2004; Brader, 2006). Empirically, we may expect Latinx Democrats will not shift their baseline preference for Democratic candidates dramatically in response to the threat of deportation. Conversely, the influence of threat on support/disapproval for Democratic/Republican candidates will be stronger among Republican or even Independent

Latinxs. In this case, threat facilitates convergence in candidate preferences between Latinx partisans.

- **H3 (Predispositional Shock): The influence of threat on preferences for candidates that own the issue of resolving the relevant threat will be stronger among members of the mass public that are not co-partisans.**

2.4 Deportation Threat and Latinx Candidate Choice

There is a large literature suggesting the threat of immigration enforcement has a powerful impact on Latinx outcomes and behavior. The threat of immigration enforcement or exposure to immigration enforcement has been found to undermine health outcomes (Rhodes et al., 2015; Novak, Geronimus, and Martinez-Cardoso, 2017; Vargas et al., 2019; Wang and Kaushal, 2019), undercut motivations to seek health care (Berk and Schur, 2001; Cruz Nichols, LeBrón, and Pedraza, 2018), produce deleterious outcomes on child development (Dreby, 2015), reduce migrant wages (Fussell, 2011), reduce social service uptake (Watson, 2014; Vargas and Pirog, 2016; Alsan and Yang, 2018), reduce school attendance (Dee and Murphy, 2020), increase educational achievement gaps (Kirksey et al., 2020), and reduce trust in law enforcement (Menjívar et al., 2018a; Muchow and Amuedo-Dorantes, 2020b; Dhingra, Kilborn, and Woldemikael, 2021). Threatening immigration enforcement contexts also have political consequences. A well-established finding is that exposure to immigration enforcement motivates political participation to resolve the political sources of the threat (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura, 2001; White, 2016; Zepeda-Millán, 2017; Walker, Roman, and Barreto, 2019; Nichols and Valdéz, 2020; Walker, Roman, and Barreto, 2020; García, 2021; Maginot, 2021). Additionally, the threat of deportation appears to motivate the acquisition of political knowledge (Pantoja and Segura, 2003), reduced trust in government (Rocha, Knoll, and Wrinkle, 2015), and a stronger sense of linked fate among Latinxs (Maltby et al., 2020).

Despite a rich literature on the consequences of threatening immigration enforcement contexts for Latinx immigrants and their co-ethnics, there is relatively limited research on how the threat of immigration enforcement may motivate Latinx candidate preferences, much

less partisan defection. Older research finds anti-immigrant contexts motivate partisanship. Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura (2006) finds Latinxs were more likely to identify with the Democratic party after the passage of Proposition 187, which restricted access to social services for undocumented immigrants and was pushed by the Republican party. Other research replicates Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura (2006) with a wider array of data in addition to a different set of research designs and finds null effects of Proposition 187 on Latinx partisanship (Hui and Sears, 2018). Hopkins, Kaiser, and Perez (2021) corroborate these null results by demonstrating contexts threatening to immigrants (e.g. the Trump presidency), motivate little movement in partisan affiliation among Latinxs. Yet, these findings do not suggest threat emanating from immigration enforcement is irrelevant to candidate preferences. They may simply suggest threat is insufficient to shift partisanship, a highly stable and durable predisposition (Green and Palmquist, 1990).³ Indeed, prior evidence suggests Latinxs are not necessarily beholden to their partisan predispositions in making candidate evaluations or voting for particular candidates (Geron and Michelson, 2008).

On the subject of candidate evaluations, Michelson (2005) interprets low Latinx support for a co-ethnic Republican relative to an Anglo Democrat in a California congressional race as the result of negative affect toward the Republican party in response to Proposition 187. But, they do not conduct a systematic test of how perceived threat from anti-immigrant policies may have influenced Latinx vote choice net of other factors. Sanchez et al. (2015) finds that knowing a deportee is associated with lower job approval for Obama in 2013. However, they do not analyze how the threat of deportation may influence vote choice nor how the influence of the threat of deportation may shift over time in response to commitments by the parties to reduce or exacerbate the level of deportations. Street, Zepeda-Millán, and Jones-Correa (2015) find Latinxs are less likely to believe the Democratic party is welcoming to Latinxs after being provided information about Obama's high levels of deportations relative to the Bush administration.

³Indeed, Hopkins, Kaiser, and Perez (2021) find candidate evaluations of Trump among Latinxs are relatively unstable in their panel survey analyses.

2.4.1 Partisan Ownership On Reducing Immigration Enforcement Over Time

Although Street, Zepeda-Millán, and Jones-Correa (2015) are not evaluating the influence of deportation threat on candidate evaluations, they offer a framework for understanding how high levels of deportations implemented by Democratic administrations may not motivate loyalties toward a particular party or set of candidates among Latinxs. This is because the two political parties may be perceptibly undifferentiated on the issue of reducing deportation levels (Jones-Correa and De Graauw, 2013). At the national-level, both parties have been associated with policies and commitments that reduce *and* increase the threat of immigration enforcement (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura, 2001; Street, Zepeda-Millán, and Jones-Correa, 2015; Zepeda-Millán, 2017; Olivares, 2020). Ronald Reagan helped pass the Immigration Reform and Control Act, which provided legal status to over 3 million undocumented immigrants. Although the contemporary Republican party appears relatively restrictive, Clinton-era immigration reforms set the stage for an exponential increase in interior immigration enforcement (Fragomen Jr, 1997; Morawetz, 2000; Golash-Boza, 2015). Moreover, although Obama promised to pass comprehensive immigration reform during the 2008 election after Bush's failure to pass a bill, his administration failed to pass a reform bill during his first term while deporting more people in his first 3 years than the entire Bush administration (Wallace, 2012). Indeed, Street, Zepeda-Millán, and Jones-Correa (2015) find Latinxs exposed to information concerning Obama's heightened deportations relative to Bush are less likely to believe the Democratic party serves their interests. In consequence, Latinxs concerned about immigration enforcement may become ambivalent about their political options.

However, shifts in the national political context may prime concerns over immigration enforcement among Latinx immigrants and their co-ethnics, with downstream consequences on their candidate preferences. Obama backtracks on his initial restrictiveness in his second term after Congressional Republicans fail to help pass comprehensive immigration reform. On November 2014, Obama announced his attempt to implement administrative relief from deportation for 4 million undocumented immigrants during primetime television. He also

announced the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), which reduces the scope of Secure Communities (Blumenthal, 2014), a policy that increased Federal-local cooperation on immigration enforcement. Obama's announcement of DAPA and PEP was highly consequential. 4 million undocumented immigrants were covered by the policy. An additional 10 million lived in households with at least 1 DAPA-eligible person, many of whom are Latinxs (Capps et al., 2016). In the month before DAPA was announced (October 2014), Obama's approval rating was 50% among Latinxs, a sharp decrease from an approval rating of 70% at the beginning of his second term. In the month after DAPA was announced, Obama's approval rating was 65%, a 15 percentage point increase. Moreover, after PEP, the number of interior removals decreased from 405,239 in 2014 to 325,668 in 2015, similar to the yearly removal number when Obama began his presidency in 2008.

Concomitantly, Donald Trump enters the political arena as an explicitly xenophobic candidate (Lamont, Park, and Ayala-Hurtado, 2017; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck, 2017). After his election, Trump implements an array of restrictionist policies in addition to rolling back Obama's attempts to provide deportation relief (Pierce, 2019). These rhetorical and policy commitments may have undercut the perception immigration enforcement is a valence issue and allowed the Democratic/Republican party to "own" the issue of decreasing/increasing the threat of deportation (Egan, 2013; Jones-Correa and De Graauw, 2013; Sanchez and Gomez-Aguinaga, 2017). Since the political context increasingly suggests unambiguous issue ownership over the question of reducing/increasing deportations, Latinxs may rely more on their perceived feelings of threat from immigration enforcement in evaluating political candidates. An implication of this logic is that Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement will support Democratic candidates after partisan differentiation on the issue of deportations.

2.4.2 Policy Action on Deportation Threat

How do policies *reducing deportation threat* inform candidate evaluations? Specifically, did DAPA, which was meant to provide deportation relief to over 4 million undocumented immigrants, increase positive candidate evaluations of Barack Obama? Although the Dynamic

Theory of Threat Solution ownership characterizes a priming effect, candidates who commit to reducing the threat of deportation via policy may be poised to garner support from Latinxs, who are differentially affected by immigration enforcement. Moreover, Latinx Republicans may be moved to support a Democratic incumbent more than they otherwise would be given they are also implicated by immigration enforcement.

A large literature suggests “policy makes mass politics,” that is, policies can inform the attitudes and political preferences of the mass public (Pierson, 1993; Soss, 1999; Mettler, 2005; Soss and Schram, 2007; Weaver and Lerman, 2010; Campbell, 2012; Michener, 2018; Walker, 2020). For Latinxs, who are disparately exposed to the threat of immigration enforcement, we may expect policies reducing the threat of deportation would increase support for incumbents as a matter of self-interest (Hopkins and Parish, 2019).

At the same time, there are a number of reasons Latinxs may not respond to DAPA. First, DAPA did not provide immediate relief, only a signal that the government would provide relief 6 months into the future. Ultimately, deportation relief was disrupted by a temporary injunction in 2015 after several states filed lawsuits against the Federal Government. A split 4-4 Supreme Court Decision in 2016 left the injunction in place. Second, DAPA may have not been a salient policy to many Latinxs. Latinxs typically do not consider immigration the most important issue. Rather, they are concerned about similar issues as the general population (Leal et al., 2008; Abrajano and Alvarez, 2011; Barreto and Segura, 2014; Rakich, 2020). Third, Latinxs are relatively less attentive to politics. Prior research suggests Latinxs are less politically interested, knowledgeable, and engaged, which may reduce the level of response to DAPA from the Latinx population writ large (Neuman and Neuman, 1986; Garza, Falcon, and Garcia, 1996; DeSipio, 1996; Jones-Correa et al., 2007; Fraga et al., 2011; Price, 2017). Fourth, the issue of immigration is increasingly polarized (Baker and Edmonds, 2021). For Latinx Republicans, this would suggest their partisan predispositions may rationalize away the positive benefits of DAPA.

However, another strand of research suggests Latinxs are particularly attentive to the politics of immigration even if they are concerned about other issues. Policies that uniquely implicate immigrants and their co-ethnics can have particularly mobilizing consequences on

Latinxs. Moreover, since Latinxs are differentially threatened by immigration enforcement, they may be particularly attuned to policies that implicate the threat of deportation (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura, 2001; Pantoja and Segura, 2003; Barreto and Collingwood, 2015).

- **H4: Policies reducing the threat of deportation will increase positive incumbent evaluations.**

2.5 Data

2.5.0.1 Survey Data on Deportation Threat

I use 14 nationally representative surveys of Latinxs to test the first, second, and third hypothesis. These are the 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2017, 2018, 2019 Pew Latino Surveys (N = 2015, N = 1375, N = 1220, N = 1765, N = 701, N = 1520, N = 1001, N = 2104, N = 3030) in addition to the 2012 Latino Decisions DACA poll (LDD '12, N = 2021), 2013 Latino Decisions Comprehensive Immigration Reform Poll (LDP '13, N = 800), 2016 Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey (CMPS '16, N = 3009), 2021 Univision National Latino Adult Survey (Univ. '21), 2021 Barreto-Segura Latino Poll (BSP '21). The Pew, CMPS '16, Univ '21, and BSP '21 surveys are nationally representative of the entire Latinx population. The LDP '13 survey is representative of the national Latinx registered voter population. The LDD '12 survey is representative of Latinxs in 5 battleground states: Florida, Virginia, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona. All surveys include population weights generated with Census data to ensure representative estimates of the target Latinx population.

I use a variety of dependent variables characterizing preferences for presidential candidates and incumbents. These include vote choice for Democratic presidential candidates (Pew '08, Pew '10, Pew '11, LDD '12, Pew '12, CMPS '16, Univ '21, BSP '21), favorability/unfavorability for Democratic/Republican presidential candidates or incumbents (Pew '08, LDP '13, CMPS '16, Pew '17, Pew '19, Univ '21), approval/disapproval for Democratic/Republican incumbents (Pew '10, Pew '11, LDD '12, Pew '13, Pew '14, Pew '18, Pew

'19, BSP '21), approval/disapproval for the two parties in general (LDP '13, BSP '21), and vote choice for the Democratic congressional ticket (Pew '14). Using multiple outcomes that broadly measure “candidate preferences” is methodologically beneficial since it undercuts the prospect the statistical conclusions I draw are a function of outcome measurement (Cohen, 1999a; Cohen, 1999b; Kioussis, 2003; McAvoy, 2008). Moreover, supplementary analyses demonstrate favorability and approval are strongly associated with vote choice, suggesting the use of multiple outcomes across surveys captures a generalized preference for Democratic candidates. These dependent variables are rescaled between 0-1 for ease of interpretability.

The independent variable of interest is deportation threat. I use two measures of deportation threat. The first is a psychological measure characterizing perceived threat of deportation to either oneself or close social ties (e.g. friends, family). This measure is available and used in the Pew '08, Pew '10, Pew '13, Pew '17, Pew '18, Pew '19, and BSP '21 studies. The corresponding item asks respondents if “Regardless of your own immigration or citizenship status, how much, if at all, do you worry that you, a family member, or a close friend could be deported? Would you say that you worry a lot, some, not much, or not at all?” Respondents then respond on a 0-3 scale from “not at all” to “a lot” scale, which I rescale between 0-1. A variant of this measure that only asks about perceived threat of deportation to social ties is available and used in the CMPS '16 study. The corresponding item asks “How worried are you that people you know might be detained or deported for immigration reasons.” Respondents can then respond on a 0-4 scale from “not at all worried” to “extremely worried,” which I rescale from 0-1. The psychological measure is worded similarly to other measures of threat in preexisting political science literature analyzing other threats (e.g. terrorism) (Huddy et al., 2005a; Huddy, Feldman, and Weber, 2007; Hetherington and Suhay, 2011). The second measure I use is an objective measure of deportation threat in the Pew '11, LDD '12, Pew '12, Pew '14, Univ '21 surveys. The item asks respondents if they “personally know someone who has been deported or detained by the Federal Government for immigration reasons in the last twelve months.” The objective threat measure is an indicator equal to 1 if a respondent says “yes.” Supplementary analyses suggest the objective threat measure is tightly linked to the psychological threat measure. The objective threat measure is prognostic

of the psychological threat measure. Moreover, both measures operate similarly with respect to candidate preferences in surveys where they are both available.

For the second and third hypotheses, partisanship is the moderator of interest. Three binary indicators are constructed characterizing Democrats, Independents, and Republicans. With the exception of the Pew '17 survey, the Democrat and Republican indicators also include leaners. Therefore, Independent Latinxs are “pure” Independents. The Pew '17 survey only asks respondents the 3-category partisanship item. Therefore, Independents include leaners for the Pew '17 survey. Model specifications assessing the heterogeneous influence of deportation threat by partisanship include interactions between deportation threat and indicators for whether a respondent is an Independent or Republican. If the partisan lens hypothesis is correct, we may expect a negative coefficient for the interactions between deportation threat, Independent, and/or Republican. If the predispositional shock hypothesis is true, we may expect a positive coefficient for the interactions between deportation threat, Independent, and/or Republican.

Models assessing the association between threat and candidate preferences across the 14 surveys adjust for a variety of control covariates. I categorize these into demographic controls, socio-economic controls, political controls, zipcode-level controls, county-level controls in addition to census area fixed effects. Importantly, I adjust for covariates that are well-established in the preexisting literature as motivations for candidate preferences among the general population and/or Latinxs. Across the surveys, these include a combination of partisanship, ideology (Garcia Bedolla, Alvarez, and Nagler, 2006), immigration issue salience (Barreto and Collingwood, 2015), acculturation (proxied with indicators for foreign-born status and Spanish interview) (Wong, 2000), perceived discrimination, experienced discrimination (Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz, 2016), denial of racism toward Black people (Alamillo, 2019), generalized ownership over supporting Latinxs, Latinx identity, American identity (Hickel et al., 2021), national origin (Alvarez and Bedolla, 2003; Bishin and Klofstad, 2012), education (Abrajano, 2005), gender (Welch and Sigelman, 1992; Kelly and Kelly, 2005), religion (Kosmin and Keysar, 1995), religiosity (Kelly and Kelly, 2005), personal economic situations (e.g. income, unemployment, homeownership, in addition to perceptual measures

of prospective, retrospective, and current financial situation) (Alvarez and Bedolla, 2003; Garcia Bedolla, Alvarez, and Nagler, 2006; Abrajano, Michael Alvarez, and Nagler, 2008), and moral values (e.g. disapproval of gay marriage, abortion issue salience) (Abrajano, Michael Alvarez, and Nagler, 2008). Importantly, models from some studies account for selection into deportation threat by adjusting for the logged total number of Secure Communities deportations at the county-level, the Secure Communities deportation rate (the deportation count divided by every 1000 foreign-born residents in county), whether the respondent knows someone undocumented, and whether the respondent knows a deportee (for studies where the psychological measure is available).

2.5.0.2 High-Frequency Approval Data

To test the effect of DAPA on candidate evaluations, I use data from daily Gallup tracking polls of presidential approval in addition to a regression discontinuity in time (RDiT) design. The outcome of interest is a binary indicator for whether the respondent approves of Obama's job performance. The primary independent variable is a binary indicator for DAPA's announcement equal to 1 for all survey interviews after November 20, 2014. I generate a running variable, in days, equal to $\{0, 1, 2, 3 \dots\}$ during the day and the days after DAPA is announced and $\{\dots - 3, -2, -1\}$ on the days before DAPA is announced.

The daily data allow me to assess the immediate discontinuous effect of Obama's announcement of DAPA on presidential approval among Latinxs. I use tools from to present mean-squared optimal bandwidth RD estimates. For the sake of brevity, I present estimates where the polynomial for the running variable is equal to 1. I also present estimates using a triangular kernel. Supplementary analyses suggest the statistical conclusions I present are not a function of choice of polynomial degree nor kernel. I also present estimates using the entire Latinx sample in addition to Latinx Democrat, Latinx Independent, and Latinx Republican subsamples. I also present estimates characterizing the effect of DAPA on presidential approval among whites and Black people as a falsification test. Given whites and Black people are not disparately exposed to deportation threat at the degree Latinxs are, we should




Figure 2.3: The threat of deportation informs candidate preferences in favor of the Democratic party after the Democratic party owns the issue of reducing the threat of deportation and the Republican party owns the issue of exacerbating the threat of deportation. The x-axis characterizes survey at use. The y-axis characterizes the coefficient for deportation threat. Positive coefficients denote support/opposition to Democratic/Republican candidates. Color denotes survey at use in addition to the outcome (see legend). Dashed vertical line separates periods before and after DAPA and Trump’s entry into the 2016 presidential election. Annotations denote standardized effects for the period pre- and post- DAPA/Trump derived from pooled random-effects meta-analyses using the Hartung-Knapp-Sidik-Jonkman method. All estimates from fully-specified models. All regressions use population weights to ensure representativeness. All covariates re-scaled between 0-1 for interpretability. 95% confidence intervals displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors.

not expect DAPA to have an effect on their presidential approval.

2.6 Results

2.6.1 Does Threat Motivate Candidate Preferences?

Figure 2.3 characterizes the association between deportation threat and candidate preferences for/against Democrats/Republicans. I find evidence consistent with the first hypothesis and the Dynamic Theory of Threat Solution Ownership (DTTSO). Before Barack Obama’s attempts to reduce the threat of deportation during the second half of his administration and Donald Trump’s entry in the 2016 election, there is either no association between deportation threat and candidate preferences or a negative association between threat and support for Barack Obama. The meta-analytic pooled random-effects coefficient for the coefficient estimates prior to the CMPS ’16 survey is statistically null and small despite

the large number of studies and significant sample sizes of Latinxs (0.03, $p = 0.35$). After partisan differentiation on the issue of resolving the threat of deportation, the meta-analytic coefficient is 0.2 and statistically significant ($p < 0.001$). There is a consistent, statistically significant, and positive association between deportation threat and support/opposition for Democratic/Republican candidates across a variety of outcome measures.

There are two important exceptions to the general pattern to note. The first is that there is a statistically significant and negative association between deportation threat and approval of Obama in the Pew '11 and Pew '14 survey along with vote choice for Obama in the Pew '11 survey. These associations are marginally significant in the Pew '11 surveys ($p < 0.10$), but statistically significant at conventional levels in the Pew '14 survey ($p < 0.05$). These findings are not inconsistent with the theory. In fact, they suggest the Obama administration was perceived as highly restrictionist such that threatened Latinxs reduced their support of him. These findings are consistent with prior work suggesting Obama's continuance of Bush-era interior immigration enforcement reduced a sense the Democratic party was welcoming to Latinxs (Sanchez et al., 2015; Street, Zepeda-Millán, and Jones-Correa, 2015).

The second exception is during the 2008 election. In the Pew '08 study, deportation threat has a positive and statistically significant association with support for Democratic candidates prior to partisan differentiation on resolving the threat of deportation. Deportation threat is positively associated with voting for Obama and favorability of Obama. Going from the minimum to maximum of deportation threat is associated with a 16 percentage point increase in voting for Obama ($p < 0.001$). Moreover, going from the minimum to maximum of deportation threat is associated with an increase in 11 points on the 0-1 favorability scale ($p < 0.001$), equivalent to 38% of the scale's standard deviation. In addition, going from the minimum to maximum of deportation threat is associated with a 6 point increase in McCain unfavorability ($p < 0.10$). There is also no association between deportation threat and Clinton favorability.

Why the discrepancy? Obama may have been able to acquire a "lease" on owning the issue of reducing the threat of deportation during the 2008 presidential campaign. Although the last Democratic presidential incumbent implemented restrictive immigration laws (Bill

Clinton), Obama acquired an edge on being perceptibly less restrictive on immigration vis-a-vis both Hillary Clinton and John McCain. Hillary Clinton did not commit to providing drivers licenses to undocumented immigrants whereas Obama did. Licenses protect undocumented immigrants from being arrested by police and potentially referred to federal immigration authorities. Moreover, Obama was committed to comprehensive immigration reform whereas McCain primarily focused on border security in response to anti-immigrant elements of the Republican party. Obama indicated to prominent Univision TV anchor Jorge Ramos that “We will have in the first year an immigration bill that I strongly support and that I am promising. And I want to move that forward as quickly as possible.” Yet, the goodwill Obama received from threatened Latinxs dissipates in later years when it becomes clear Obama was maintaining Bush-era immigration enforcement. It is not until the 2016 CMPS when threatened Latinxs are more likely to have favorable views of Obama.

2.6.2 Does Threat Motivate Partisan Defection Among Latinx Republicans?

Table 2.1 characterizes the association between deportation threat and candidate preferences conditional on Republican and Independent identification. Panel A displays coefficient estimates prior to Obama’s second-term commitments to reduce immigration enforcement and Trump’s entry in the 2016 election. Panel B displays coefficient estimates after Obama’s pro-immigrant commitments and Trump’s election run. Prior to partisan differentiation on resolving deportation threat (Table 2.1, Panel A, see also Figure 2.4), deportation threat mostly does not motivate candidate preferences in favor of the Democratic party among non-Democratic Latinx partisans. Again, the one exception is during the 2008 election, where Republican Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement are more likely to support Democratic candidates. After partisan differentiation (Table 2.1, Panel B, see also Figure 2.5), deportation threat motivates candidate preferences in favor of Democrats among Republican Latinxs and the influence of deportation threat is stronger among Republican Latinxs than Democratic Latinxs. In many cases, going from the minimum to the maximum of the psychological threat measure or going from not knowing to knowing a deportee nearly offsets the negative influence of Republican partisanship on Democratic/Republican candidate

Table 2.1: Deportation threat generates defections from Republican candidates among Republican Latinxs after partisan differentiation on reducing or exacerbating deportation threat

Panel A: Pre-Trump																		
	Vote Obama (1)	Fav. Obama (2)	Fav. Bush (3)	Fav. McCain (4)	Fav. Clinton (5)	App. Obama (6)	Vote Dems (7)	App. Obama (8)	Vote Obama (9)	Vote Obama (10)	App. Obama (11)	Vote Obama (12)	App. Obama (13)	Fav. Obama (14)	Fav. Dems (15)	Fav. GOP (16)	App. Obama (17)	Vote Dems (18)
Threat x GOP	0.32*	0.25**	-0.01	-0.12	0.28**	0.17 [†]	0.06	0.18	0.07	-0.03	-0.05	-0.03	0.21	0.03	0.04	-0.09	0.05	0.03
	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Threat x Ind.	0.30*	0.06	-0.07	0.05	0.07	0.16	0.14	0.06	0.02	-0.05	-0.17	0.30*	0.11	-0.18	-0.05	-0.23 [†]	0.01	0.03
	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Threat	0.05	0.05 [†]	-0.00	-0.05	-0.06 [†]	-0.04	-0.03	-0.12*	-0.09 [†]	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.06	-0.10*	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
GOP	-0.59***	-0.33***	0.17**	0.21***	-0.31***	-0.30***	-0.60***	-0.29***	-0.42***	-0.75***	-0.58***	-0.65***	-0.47***	-0.64***	-0.60***	0.54***	-0.22***	-0.65***
	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Ind.	-0.39***	-0.05	0.03	-0.04	-0.09*	-0.26***	-0.64***	-0.16**	-0.27***	-0.51***	-0.29***	-0.63***	-0.21*	-0.17*	-0.42***	0.18 [†]	-0.19***	-0.65***
	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.04)
R ²	0.42	0.27	0.22	0.18	0.23	0.22	0.48	0.20	0.19	0.55	0.39	0.45	0.33	0.47	0.38	0.28	0.22	0.45
N	1142	1864	1882	1787	1892	1175	817	1220	1220	2021	2021	1203	621	800	800	800	1520	1041
Survey	Pew '08	Pew '08	Pew '08	Pew '08	Pew '08	Pew '10	Pew '10	Pew '11	Pew '11	LDD '12	LDD '12	Pew '12	Pew '13	LDP '13	LDP '13	LDP '13	Pew '14	Pew '14
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
SES Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	Y	Y	Y	Y	NA	NA
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	Y	Y	Y	Y	NA	NA
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Panel B: Post-Trump																		
	Vote Clinton (1)	Fav. Clinton (2)	Fav. Trump (3)	Fav. Obama (4)	Fav. Trump (5)	App. Trump (6)	App. Trump (7)	Fav. Dems (8)	Vote Biden (9)	Fav. Trump (10)	Fav. Biden (11)	App. Biden (12)	Vote Biden (13)	App. Biden (14)	App. Harris (15)	App. Dems (16)	App. GOP (17)	Vote Dems (18)
Threat x GOP	0.51***	0.27***	-0.28***	0.21***	-0.28**	-0.35***	-0.31***	0.13*	0.31***	-0.20***	0.17**	0.28***	0.26***	0.35***	0.39***	0.29***	-0.12	
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	
Threat x Ind.	0.18	0.18**	-0.10*	0.08*	-0.07	-0.28***	-0.19*	0.11	0.14*	-0.08	-0.03	0.05	0.21**	0.15*	0.25***	0.16*	-0.06	
	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	
Threat	-0.00	0.03	-0.00	0.00	-0.09**	-0.03	-0.06*	0.01	-0.04	0.03	-0.03	-0.05	-0.04	-0.05	-0.07*	-0.02	0.15***	
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	
GOP	-0.59***	-0.37***	0.35***	-0.26***	0.34***	0.51***	0.53***	-0.24***	-0.82***	0.60***	-0.50***	-0.49***	-0.73***	-0.58***	-0.60***	-0.58***	0.45***	
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	
Ind.	-0.20***	-0.24***	0.11***	-0.08**	0.10**	0.25***	0.22*	-0.22***	-0.26***	0.19***	-0.20***	-0.18***	-0.46***	-0.31***	-0.40***	-0.41***	0.06	
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	
R ²	0.57	0.36	0.38	0.38	0.27	0.55	0.49	0.28	0.60	0.40	0.41	0.38	0.52	0.38	0.36	0.35	0.20	
N	1659	2933	2924	2924	896	1895	2925	2924	1397	2070	2084	2208	1682	1764	1764	1764	1764	
Survey	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	Pew '17	Pew '18	Pew '19	Pew '19	Univ. '21	Univ. '21	Univ. '21	Univ. '21	BSP '21	BSP '21	BSP '21	BSP '21	BSP '21	
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
SES Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	NA	Y	NA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	NA	Y	NA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1

approval/disapproval. These findings are consistent with the third hypothesis (predispositional shock), which suggests threat will have a stronger influence on Latinx Republicans, and sometimes Independents, who have more space to travel in their support for Democratic candidates. In sum, deportation threat generates convergence in presidential candidate preferences particularly when candidates or incumbents are perceptibly credible at resolving the threat of deportation or exacerbating the threat of deportation.

2.6.3 Do Policies Reducing The Threat of Deportation Increase Positive Incumbent Evaluations?

Do policies that reduce deportation threat increase positive incumbent evaluations among Latinxs? Figure 2.6 displays Obama's approval rating over time by ethno-racial group. After DAPA, there appears to be a discontinuous increase in perceived job approval for Barack Obama among Latinxs (Panel A, Figure 2.6). The increase in job approval among Latinxs appears to be an intercept shift with a persistent long-term effect. There is no discontinuous increase (or decrease) in perceived job approval for Barack Obama among whites or Black people (Panels B-C, Figure 2.6).

Regression discontinuity estimates corroborate the descriptive statistics. Figure 2.7 displays coefficient estimates characterizing the discontinuous effect of DAPA on Obama's job approval among Latinxs, whites, and Black subsamples by party. DAPA increased Obama's job approval among all Latinxs by 17 percentage points ($p < 0.001$). This is an extremely large effect, equivalent to 1.3 of the pre-DAPA standard deviation for Obama approval among Latinxs. Likewise, DAPA increased Obama's approval among Democratic, Independent, and Republican Latinxs by 17, 9, and 13 percentage points respectively ($p < 0.001$, $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$). Conversely, DAPA has no effect among whites regardless of partisanship with the exception of a very small effect among white Republicans. In addition, DAPA has no effect among Black people with the exception of Black independents. It is unclear why these effects manifest given they do not manifest for Democrats or Republicans. Perhaps the small sample size of Black Republicans is generating a high level of statistical noise that leads to the




Figure 2.4: Latinx Republicans who experience deportation threat inconsistently defect from Republican candidates (pre-Trump data). Each panel characterizes predicted values of various outcomes measuring candidate evaluations (y-axis) by party (x-axis) and deportation threat (min, max, denoted by color). Panel title denotes outcome and survey. All covariates rescaled between 0-1.




Figure 2.5: Latinx Republicans who experience deportation threat consistently defect from Republican candidates (post-Trump data). Each panel characterizes predicted values of various outcomes measuring candidate evaluations (y-axis) by party (x-axis) and deportation threat (min, max, denoted by color). Panel title denotes outcome and survey. All covariates rescaled between 0-1.




Figure 2.6: Obama job approval (y-axis) over time (in days, x-axis) by ethno-racial group (Panel A = Latinxs, B = whites, C = Black people) (2009-2016). Dashed vertical line denotes announcement of DAPA by President Obama. Solid lines denote loess model fits on each side of the DAPA announcement.




Figure 2.7: Regression discontinuity-in-time estimates of the effect of DAPA on Obama's job approval (y-axis) by ethno-racial subsample (y-axis) and party subsample (color). Annotations denote coefficient estimates and the effective N (based on mean-squared optimal bandwidth selection). All estimates are derived from models using a triangular kernel and the running variable to the first degree. 95% confidence intervals displayed derived from robust standard errors.

derivation of large, yet theoretically unmotivated effects. The absence of a consistent effect for non-Latinx groups serves as a falsification test, since it suggests other factors influencing

the general population are not motivating the discontinuous increase in support for Obama among Latinxs (e.g. the 2014 midterm).⁴ These large effects also serve to illustrate the association between deportation threat and Democratic candidate preferences characterized on Sections 2.6.1 and 2.6.2 are not simply driven by Trump, but Obama's attempts to reduce deportation threat during the second half of his administration.

2.7 Discussion and Conclusion

This paper teaches us the threat of deportation may play an important role in motivating candidate preferences and partisan defection among Latinxs. Consistent with prior research, the threat of immigration enforcement does not have a priori political consequences on candidate preferences if available political options are not differentiated on resolving the threat (Sanchez et al., 2015; Street, Zepeda-Millán, and Jones-Correa, 2015). However, consistent with the Dynamic Theory of Threat Solution Ownership, deportation threat will begin to motivate candidate preferences once it becomes clear a party or set of associated candidates are relatively more effective at minimizing the threat of deportation. Additionally, this paper demonstrates the positive influence of deportation threat on Democratic candidate preferences is stronger among Latinx Republicans despite the increasing strength of partisanship in motivating candidate preferences. These findings contradict conventional wisdom Latinx Republicans are less concerned over immigration issues and the anti-immigrant positions their own party espouses. Moreover, this paper shows policies reducing the threat of deportation can increase positive evaluations of incumbents regardless of partisanship among Latinxs.

The *Dynamic Theory of Threat Solution Ownership* (DTTSO) framework may be helpful in studying the political behavior of other non-white groups. Demographic shifts, increased representation, and increased partisan social sorting are putting the issues, and the threats, non-white groups face at the center of American politics. The theory here could be extended to other threats non-white groups experience. For instance, the Democratic

⁴The effect of DAPA on Latinx Republicans also bucks well-established trends that midterm losses are associated with low presidential approval (Erikson, 1988). Thus, the effect occurs *in spite of* a political loss.

party was in favor of expanding the criminal justice system for decades. In this context, Black Americans, who are disparately exposed to the criminal justice system, may not be motivated to support the Democratic party on the basis of the threats they experience from the criminal justice system or the police. However, issues concerning the police and the criminal justice system have become both salient and polarized. The Democratic party is now substantially differentiated from the Republican party on criminal justice issues, such that threats emanating from exposure to the criminal justice system or the police could become motivations for candidate preferences and/or political mobilization. Future research at the intersection of issue ownership, threat, and the study of non-white groups should continue to test implications of the DTTSO.

CHAPTER 3

How Threatening Immigration Enforcement Policies Generate Conditions for Pro-Black Solidarity

Abstract: Survey evidence suggests Latinxs support Black American political interests at rates higher than Anglo whites despite possibilities for the breakdown of cross-group support. Prior explanations for the puzzle suggest perceived ethno-racial discrimination generates a common disadvantaged minority status that precipitates cross-group support. Given increased societal integration of undocumented immigrants and the expansion of interior immigration enforcement, I propose a new explanation for the puzzle and theorize perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts may motivate cross-group support among Latinxs net of discrimination (among other pre-established mechanisms). The empirical evidence suggests perceived deportation threat informs pro-Black beliefs among non-Black Latinxs and generates attitudinal convergence between Black people and non-Black Latinxs. These findings challenge prior theory on the import of similar marginalized experiences for cross-group support among non-dominant groups.

3.1 Introduction

Survey evidence demonstrates Black and non-Black Latinxs support Black American political interests more than Anglo whites (Figure 3.1). The pattern is puzzling. Many Latinxs originate from countries that perpetuate anti-Black socio-economic inequality and racial beliefs (Hooker, 2014; Telles, 2014). Moreover, Social Identity Theory suggests stigmatized groups may derogate similarly situated outgroups to maintain self-esteem and positive distinctiveness for their in-group (Tajfel et al., 1979). However, some research helps explain the puzzle by emphasizing how intra-group linked fate (McClain et al., 2006; Hurwitz, Peffley, and Mondak, 2015), inter-group contact (McClain et al., 2006), and the absence of economic competition engender cross-group support (Wilkinson, 2014). Perhaps the most prominent explanation for the puzzle is perceived ethno-racial discrimination, which may generate solidarity on the basis of a *common* stigmatizing experience (Sanchez, 2008; Richeson and Craig, 2011a; Craig and Richeson, 2012; Craig and Richeson, 2016). However, there is limited research on how in-group threats that are perceptibly *uncommon* experiences inform cross-group attitudes among non-Anglo ethno-racial groups. Understanding how uncommon stigmas may inform cross-group attitudes is particularly important since prior theoretical insights posit commonality in mechanisms of stigmatization are key conditions for cross-group support (Richeson and Craig, 2011a; Craig and Richeson, 2016).

I posit a mechanism that explains the puzzle of pro-Black attitudes among Latinxs, particularly non-Black Latinxs, and challenges the necessity of a generalized common experience to generate cross-group support. In light of the increased societal integration of undocumented immigrants in the Latinx community along with the expansion of immigration enforcement in the past 30 years, I theorize perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts foster rebuff against the attitudinal norms of the dominant group and motivate pro-Black political attitudes among non-Black Latinxs. Leveraging a large, nationally representative sample of non-Black Latinxs, I demonstrate the threat of deportation to close social ties is associated with support for Black political interests and a sense of commonality with Black people net of ethno-racial discrimination, linked fate, inter-group contact, and economic competition. In

effect, perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement environments make the attitudes of non-Black Latinxs more like Black people relative to Anglo whites on Black political interests.

This paper makes several contributions. It challenges preexisting theory on the necessity for common mechanisms of stigma to generate cross-group support. Non-Black Latinxs may not perceive immigration enforcement as a prototypically “Black issue (Zou and Cheryan, 2017).” This perception is exacerbated by resistance among non-Black Latinxs to categorize Black Latinxs as co-ethnics (Haywood, 2017b; Dache, Haywood, and Mislán, 2019; Hordge-Freeman and Veras, 2020). The absence of a perceptibly common stigma may motivate anti-Black derogation to maintain self-esteem in response to the threat of deportation (Tajfel et al., 1979; Richeson and Craig, 2011a). Yet, this paper suggests distinct mechanisms of stigma can generate cross-group support if the source of stigma is perpetuated by the dominant group and serves as a referendum for whether a marginalized group can be fully incorporated in the polity.

This paper also highlights a new mechanism explaining cross-group support for Black people among non-Black Latinxs. Prior evidence suggests the threat of immigration enforcement motivates multiple dimensions of Latinx political behavior (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura, 2001; Pantoja and Segura, 2003; Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura, 2006; Rocha, Knoll, and Wrinkle, 2015; White, 2016). But, there is less evidence on how deportation threat informs pro-Black support among Latinxs and their perceived position in the ethno-racial hierarchy. This paper is the first to provide systematic evidence non-Black Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement are more likely to support pro-Black interests.

Moreover, this paper problematizes prior research demonstrating threat motivates conservatism and outgroup derogation. These empirical conclusions are derived from studies of dominant groups (e.g. Anglo whites), whose objects of threat demand conservative solutions or stem from loss of status vis-a-vis non-Anglo groups (Huddy et al., 2005b; Davis, 2007; Merolla and Zechmeister, 2009b). This chapter demonstrates threat can motivate outgroup support when we broaden our subjects of study to include politically marginalized groups.

Finally, this chapter contributes to a nascent, but small, literature on relations between

non-Anglo groups in the United States. The vast majority of research on anti-Black attitudes focuses on dominant groups. While there is some research on non-Black Latinx attitudes toward Black people and their political interests (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; McClain et al., 2006; Wilkinson and Earle, 2013; Wilkinson, 2014; Hurwitz, Peffley, and Mondak, 2015; Gonzalez O'Brien, Barreto, and Sanchez, 2020; Gomez-Aguinaga, Sanchez, and Barreto, 2021), more research must be done in light of demographic shifts where the salience of relations between non-Anglo groups may increase and the prospect of dissociation from a common “people of color” identity for Latinxs increases (Alba, 2020; Pérez, 2021).

3.2 Puzzle

Although U.S. Latinxs are racialized and/or discriminated against on the basis of language, race, ethnicity, phenotype, skin color, and immigration status, many U.S. Latinxs may still hold anti-Black beliefs. Latinxs originate from countries that, like the United States, sustain anti-Black racial hierarchies. The largest Latinx national origin groups in the United States are from countries and/or territories whose political economies were structured, at least in part, by anti-Black slavery (Curet, 1980; Valdés, 1987; Bergad, 2007). Prior to independence from Spain, colonial territories that compose contemporary Latin American countries imposed *casta* (caste, lineage) systems that structured access to resources on the basis of distance from indigeneity and Blackness (Loveman, 2014; Cespedes, 2019). After independence, many Latin American governments and intellectual leaders propagated notions of *mestizaje* (mixture) to generate a sense of national unity among the racially heterogeneous populations of former Spanish colonies (Wade, 1993). Proponents of *mestizaje* argued the ethno-racial structure of Latin America, through mixture and miscegenation, would lead to the development of a new “race” outside the constraints of racial prejudice plaguing Black-white relations in the U.S. context (Vasconcelos, 1997; Hooker, 2014).

However, *mestizaje* had profound negative consequences. Proponents of *mestizaje* assumed indigeneity and Blackness was undesirable (Stutzman, 1981; Vasconcelos, 1997). According to Jose Vasconcelos, the first Mexican Secretary of Education, *mestizaje* was

necessary to make ‘inferior races...less prolific.’ He also indicated the “black could be redeemed, and little by little, by voluntary extinction, the ugliest lines will give way to the most beautiful (Vasconcelos, 1997).” Moreover, *mestizaje* is often used to downplay discussions of ethno-racial differences, discrimination, and exclusion on the basis of a putative ethno-racial “unity.” The undercutting of these discussions inform color-blind government policies that do not grapple with ethno-racial differences in life chances (Stutzman, 1981; Dulitzky, 2005; Adames, Chavez-Dueñas, and Organista, 2016; Paschel, 2016). Related to *mestizaje* is the notion of *Blanquemento* (whitening). *Blanqueamiento* posits the national population is “improved” as it increases its proximity, via a variety of mechanisms, toward whiteness. For many relevant Latin American contexts, *Blanquemento* was propagated through miscegenation, forced sterilization (Beal, 2008), identity recategorization (Loveman and Muniz, 2007), changing one’s physical appearance (Candelario, 2000), and government sanctioned migration policies (Brehony, 2012). Indeed, despite the purportedly progressive elements of *mestizaje* as an ideological framework for organizing society, darker-skinned people throughout Latin America have lower levels of socio-economic and political access along with reduced life chances vis-a-vis whiter Latin Americans (Villarreal, 2010; Perreira and Telles, 2014; Telles, 2014; Johnson, 2020).

Given the anti-Black contexts U.S. Latinxs are from,¹ one might expect them to hold attitudes over Black people’s political interests similar to Anglo whites. However, Latinxs tend to hold relatively progressive attitudes vis-a-vis Anglo whites. Figure 3.1 displays mean support for Black Lives Matter (BLM) (Panels A, D, F), affirmative action for Black people (Panels B, E), government aid to Black people (Panel C), and a federal apology for slavery (Panel G) by ethno-race using multiple surveys. Consistently, Latinxs occupy a middle position between Black people and Anglo whites in terms of supporting pro-Black policies and/or social movements. The Collaborative Multiracial Postelection Survey (CMPS) has a relatively large sample of Latinxs which allow for disaggregation by race. Black Latinxs are more likely to support BLM (by 14 percentage points) and to support a federal apology for

¹Or already existed in, in the case of Mexican-Americans absorbed after the US-Mexican war. See Bustamante (1991).




Figure 3.1: Latinxs consistently support Black political interests more than Anglo whites. X-axis = identity category. Y-axis = item characterizing support for Black political interest (rescaled between 0-1). Panel A = support for BLM (Pew '20), Panel B = support for Black affirmative action (GSS '00-'18), Panel C = support for government aid to Black people (ANES '16), Panel D = affect toward BLM (ANES '16), Panel E = support for Black affirmative action (ANES '16), Panel F = support for BLM (CMPS '16), Panel G = support for government apology for Black enslavement (CMPS '16).

slavery (by 13 percentage points) than non-Black Latinxs. However, non-Black Latinxs are still more likely to support BLM and a federal apology for slavery by 13 and 17 percentage points respectively than Anglo whites.

Why are non-Black Latinxs more supportive of Black political interests relative to Anglo whites? This chapter posits the threat of immigration enforcement in the United States generates rebuff from dominant mainstream norms (e.g. Anglo white norms) and therefore facilitates support for Black political interests. However, before I explicate the import of

deportation threat in motivating pro-Black attitudes, I provide an overview on the literature concerning stigma, threat, and intra-non-white relations.

3.3 Perspectives on Black-Latinx Relations

3.3.1 Social Identity Theory

Social Identity Theory posits individuals develop a sense of positive distinctiveness from their group membership (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). In response to threats that impugn the worth of the group, individuals can sustain their self-esteem by disparaging similarly situated outgroups (Branscombe and Wann, 1994; Branscombe et al., 1999). In the context of immigration enforcement, Latinxs, particularly non-Black Latinxs, may be particularly resentful toward Black people due to their perceptible access to citizenship. Zamora (2018) finds non-Black Latinx immigrants feel Black people occupy a higher position in the social hierarchy due to their citizenship status.

U.S. Latinx history is replete with examples of anti-Black derogation in order to improve the relative station of Latinxs. Early Latinx attempts to acquire rights and protection from government were assimilationist in nature. For example, Latinx legal activists used the argument Mexican-Americans were “white” by virtue of their citizenship status in desegregation court battles during the 1920s and 1930s (Aja, 2012). Many leaders of early Latinx organizations, such as LULAC and the American GI Forum, expressed negative appraisals of Black people and argued Latinxs were more deserving of rights due to their assimilationist orientation (Foley, 1997; Rochmes and Griffin, 2007; Behnken, 2011). Despite an affinity toward militant Black organizations in the 1960s, even the Chicax movement emphasized a form of “brown power” that emphasized American indigeneity and was divorced from Blackness despite the existence and contributions of Black Mexicans (Hernandez, 2004).

In the contemporary moment, anti-Black racism is a prevalent issue in the Latinx community. Non-Black Latinxs discriminate against or disparage Black Latinxs in day-to-day interactions (Haywood, 2017b). There are instances of anti-Black discrimination among non-

Black Latinxs in purportedly progressive contexts (Rochmes and Griffin, 2007). Even Black Latinxs may engage in internalized anti-Black behavior as a means to distance themselves from Blackness (Hordge-Freeman and Veras, 2020). There is also empirical evidence consistent with the outgroup derogation implication of Social Identity Theory. McClain et al. (2006) find Latinxs engage in racial distancing from Black Americans by expressing a stronger sense of commonality with white people. Latinxs may also buy into an assimilationist American identity by aligning themselves with Anglo whites in order to garner a higher group status on the racial hierarchy (Marrow, 2003). These pursuits may encourage Latinx immigrants and their co-ethnics to express anti-Black attitudes and avoid collaborative political coalitions.

3.3.2 Common In-Group Identity Model (CIIM)

While exposure to stigmatization can generate derogatory comparisons with lateral outgroups, perceptibly common stigmatizing experiences in the United States can motivate cross-group support between individuals of different non-white and non-Anglo groups (Cortland et al., 2017). The common ingroup identity model (CIIM) suggests individuals shift their perceptions of group membership in response to common experiences (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). For example, ethno-racial minorities in the United States may re-categorize themselves under a common minoritized identity. In doing so, non-white or non-Anglo ethno-racial groups may display positive attitudes toward outgroups with the common identity (Gaertner et al., 1993). Gaertner et al. (1993) posit a new common ingroup identity can lead to increased open communication with former outgroup members.

There is empirical evidence for the CIIM. Richeson and Craig (2011a) find exposure to group discrimination among ethno-racial minorities is associated with more positive attitudes toward outgroup members. Specifically, Latinx respondents exposed to anti-Latinx discrimination reported an increase in positive attitudes and a sense of similarity with Black people. They theorize common experiences of ethno-racial discrimination can trigger a “minority ingroup identity” that generates positive affect between non-white groups. Other political science research considers the development of a “people of color” (POC) identity

among racial minorities in the United States. Pérez (2021) finds a strong sense of POC identity among non-Anglo whites writ large is associated with support for BLM and combating police brutality.

However, there are limits to the CIIM, particularly with respect to the threat of immigration enforcement among Latinxs. Prior theory and evidence suggests the CIIM predicts cross-group support in response to common forms of stigma, not *uncommon* forms of stigma (Richeson and Craig, 2011a; Craig and Richeson, 2016). Indeed, consistent with the Social Identity Theory framework, prior evidence suggests ethno-racial discrimination engenders out-group derogation on dimensions outside race (Craig et al., 2012; Craig and Richeson, 2014a). Latinxs, particularly non-Black Latinxs, may perceive immigration enforcement as a non-Black issue. Non-Black Latinxs may perceive deportation disparately affects non-Black Latinx immigrants given the relative visibility of non-Black Latinxs in many U.S. Latinx contexts (Palmer, 2017). Moreover, non-Black Latinxs may deny Black Latinxs access to the category of Latinx or immigrant (Haywood, 2017b; Dache, Haywood, and Mislán, 2019; Hordge-Freeman and Veras, 2020). These dynamics may be exacerbated by a visible presence of Black American citizens without Latin American heritage (Zou and Cheryan, 2017; Zamora, 2018). Therefore, consistent with the framework posed by Gaertner et al. (1993) and Richeson and Craig (2011b), the threat of deportation is a *perceptually* distinct form of anti-Latinx stigma that may not generate a strong basis for cross-group support. In this case, Latinxs experiencing deportation threat may engage in anti-Black derogation in order to distinguish themselves as deserving of the rights of citizenship relative to Black people prototypically perceived as American citizens (Zou and Cheryan, 2017; Zamora, 2018; Menjívar, 2021)

3.4 How Deportation Threat Motivates Support for Black Political Interests

However, deportation threat, despite being distinct in that it is not a perceptibly shared mechanism of stigma between non-Black and Black people, could still generate the possibility for cross-group support and the development of pro-Black beliefs among Latinxs. First, a

perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement context could serve as a referendum on belonging to the national polity (Mora and Rodríguez-Muñiz, 2017). Latinxs experiencing deportation threat may be less motivated to see themselves as American or close to the prototypical American archetype (white people) (Devos and Banaji, 2005). Instead, they may perceive themselves as a distinct group marginalized on the basis of restrictive immigration laws and its disparate enforcement among non-white people (Asad, 2017; Jones, 2019a; Jones, 2019b; Menjívar, 2021). In this context, Latinxs may decide to support other non-white people distant from the prototypical American archetype on the basis of exclusion from that category via illegality.

Second, although deportation threat may be perceptibly unique to the Latinx experience as a form of stigma, it may be understood as perpetuated by the same group (white Americans) perpetuating anti-Black racism against Black Americans. The existence of a common perpetrator in the unique dimensions of stigma Latinxs and Black people experience may generate an alternative basis for commonality outside of shared mechanisms of stigma like ethno-racial discrimination.

Third, related to the prior point, white Americans are much less pro-immigrant relative to Black Americans. Therefore, it may make sense for Latinxs writ large to support Black people since they tend to possess highly pro-immigrant attitudes and are less susceptible to anti-immigrant appeals (Brader et al., 2010; Carter and Pérez, 2016; Carter, 2019).

Fourth, although non-Black Latinxs may perceive immigration as an issue that does not disparately affect Black people, it may still be understood as a perceptibly common experience, particularly at the intersection of criminal justice. Fear of immigration enforcement may constrain movement in a manner akin to fear of the police for many Black Americans (Menjívar et al., 2018b). Moreover, immigration enforcement is operationalized via the police. Jails and prisons throughout the United States cross-reference their arrest records with federal databases in order to identify and detain undocumented immigrants (Corral, 2020). Therefore, exposure to the threat of deportation may be perceived as an experience similar to that of Black Americans concerning the threat of the police. Thus, deportation threat may still generate a basis for common fate and cross-group support for Black political interests among

non-Black Latinxs.

- **H1: Non-Black Latinxs who perceive deportation threat will be more likely to perceive a sense of common fate with Black people and support Black political interests.**

3.5 Data

To test the hypothesis, I leverage data from a large, nationally representative sample of Latinxs, the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) (N = 3003). The survey was fielded between December 3, 2016 and February 15, 2017. The survey was available in Spanish upon interviewee request. The data are weighted to match the Latinx adult population in the 2015 Census ACS 1-year data file for age, gender, education, nativity, ancestry and voter registration status. Post-stratification raking was used to balance each category within 1% of the ACS estimates.

In order to maintain theoretical precision, I only examine the influence of deportation threat on non-Black Latinxs, who may have the most reason to distance themselves from Black people in the presence of deportation threat (Haywood, 2017a). Thus, the sample is truncated (N = 2529). Supplementary analyses suggest the substantive conclusions do not change if Black Latinxs are included in the sample. However, I use the white (N = 1213), Black (N = 3102), and Black Latinx (N = 480) CMPS subsamples to evaluate their mean responses to the outcomes of interest. These mean responses by subgroup will serve as benchmarks for understanding whether deportation threat distances non-Black Latinxs from the attitudinal standards of Anglo whites and increases their proximity to the attitudinal standards of both non-Latinx and Latinx Black people.

I examine the influence of deportation threat on 5 outcomes that either characterize support for the belief that Latinxs and Black people share commonalities or support for Black political interests. The first outcome is common fate. The item asks Latinx respondents “How much does Latinos doing well depend on African-Americans also doing well? A lot, some, a

little, or none at all?” The outcome is coded 1 if the respondent indicates “a lot” or “some” and 0 otherwise. This item is similar to standard linked fate measures in political science and is meant to capture both commitments to Black Americans and belief in utility heuristics that the status of another non-white group is concomitant with the status of one’s own non-white group. Independently, this measure appears to capture pro-Black political commitments. The Black-Latinx linked fate measure is strongly associated with other measures of pro-Black political attitudes net of Latinx linked fate, such as supporting Black Lives Matter and supporting a federal apology for slavery. The second and third outcomes concern support for the Black Lives Matter movement (BLM). One outcome measures general support for Black Lives Matter derived from an item asking if respondents “strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the Black Lives Matter movement activism?” Support for BLM is coded 1 if the respondent indicates “strongly support” or “somewhat support” and 0 otherwise. The other outcome measures belief in the effectiveness of Black Lives Matter derived from an item asking respondents “How effective do you think the Black Lives Matter movement will be in helping Blacks achieve equality in this country—very effective, somewhat effective, not too effective, or not at all effective?” Belief in BLM’s effectiveness is coded 1 if the respondent indicates “very effective” or “somewhat effective,” and 0 otherwise. The fourth outcome is a binary indicator measuring belief in whether the federal Government should apologize for slavery derived from an item asking if “the federal government should or should not apologize to African Americans for the slavery that once existed in this country?”

The main independent variable is perceived proximal deportation threat. It is derived from an item asking Latinx respondents “How worried are you that people you know might be detained or deported for immigration reasons?” Respondents can then respond on a 0-4 scale from “not at all worried” to “extremely worried.” I rescale the outcome between 0-1 for ease of interpretability.

I also adjust for an exhaustive set of demographic, socio-economic, political, zipcode, and county covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. Although I will not discuss all covariates in the main text, I want to highlight key control covariates I adjust for understood

as prominent alternative explanations for pro-Black beliefs among Latinxs. First, I condition on perceived discrimination against both Latinxs and Black people in addition to experienced discrimination. This adjustment is critical, since a prominent explanation for the puzzle of pro-Black beliefs among Latinxs is that discrimination against Latinxs generates a sense of commonality that serves as a basis for cross-group support (Richeson and Craig, 2011a; Craig and Richeson, 2012; Adida, Davenport, and McClendon, 2016; Craig and Richeson, 2016).

Second, I condition on Latinx linked fate, which prior literature has repeatedly established as an antecedent to pro-Black support (McClain et al., 2006; Wilkinson, 2014; Gomez-Aguinaga, Sanchez, and Barreto, 2021). However, this relationship may simply be the result of a generalized pro-sociality as opposed to a phenomenon motivated by a politicized collective identification with the group (McClain et al., 2009; Wilkinson, 2014; Gay, Hochschild, and White, 2016).

Third, I condition on whether the respondents have a darker skin color, which has been found to be associated with pro-Black beliefs (Wilkinson and Earle, 2013).

Fourth, I condition on four measures of contact with Black people. These measures include the objective proportion of Black people in a respondent's zipcode, the perceived proportion of Black people living in a respondent's neighborhood, whether a respondent is married to a Black spouse, and the proportion of a respondent's church that is Black. Prior research finds contact between non-white groups can reduce anti-Black stereotypes and generate a sense of commonality between Black people and Latinxs (McClain et al., 2009; Wilkinson, 2014).

Fifth, I condition on several measures that account for economic and/or political competition between non-Black Latinxs and Black people (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). With respect to economic competition, we adjust for poor economic conditions at both the zipcode and county level (% unemployed, logged median household income). I also adjust for whether the respondent perceives their economic situation as getting worse. In addition, I follow the example of Gay (2006), and generate objective measures of economic competition by interacting the proportion of a respondent's county and zipcode that is black by the

Latinx/Black difference in levels of education, employment, and poverty. I also adjust for political competition by taking the difference in the degree to which respondents believe a Latinx congressional candidate will represent them versus a Black congressional candidate (McClain and Tauber, 1998).

3.6 Results

Table 3.1 displays the coefficients of deportation threat on the outcomes of interest. Panel A displays coefficients without adjusting for covariates, Panel B displays coefficients adjusting for a full set of covariates. Across the board, deportation threat is positively associated in a statistically significant manner with outcomes measuring support for Black political interests and perceptions of common fate with Black Americans among non-Black Latinxs. Since all covariates are rescaled between 0-1, the coefficients should be understood as the influence of deportation threat on the outcomes of interest going from the minimum to the maximum level of deportation threat. Table 3.1, Panel B indicates deportation threat is associated with an increase in belief for Latinx-Black common fate by 23 percentage points, equivalent to 63% of the outcome mean ($p < 0.001$). For the BLM outcomes, deportation threat is associated with an increase in support for BLM and an increase in belief BLM is effective by 10 percentage points, equivalent to 24% and 26% of the outcome mean respectively ($p < 0.05$). Deportation threat is also associated with an increase in the probability a respondent will indicate the government should apologize for slavery by 10 percentage points, equivalent to 23% of the outcome mean ($p < 0.05$).

Figure 3.2 displays predicted values along levels of deportation threat for the relevant outcomes. It also displays benchmarks, when available, for Anglo whites, Black Latinxs, and non-Latinx Black people. Across the board, deportation threat increases distance/proximity from/to white/Black attitudinal standards. 26% of non-Black Latinxs who perceive no deportation threat believe Black people and Latinxs possess a common fate (Figure 3.2, Panel A). 49% of non-Black Latinxs who perceive the highest level of deportation threat believe Black people and Latinxs possess a common fate. Thus, deportation threat generates

Table 3.1: Deportation threat motivates pro-Black attitudes among non-Black Latinxs

	Common	BLM Support	BLM Effective	Apology
Panel A: No Controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat	0.33*** (0.04)	0.28*** (0.04)	0.30*** (0.04)	0.32*** (0.04)
R ²	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.06
N	2538	2538	2538	2538
Panel B: Yes Controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat	0.23*** (0.05)	0.10* (0.05)	0.10* (0.05)	0.10* (0.05)
R ²	0.19	0.26	0.19	0.20
N	2538	2538	2538	2538
Outcome Mean	0.36	0.42	0.39	0.43
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Panel A characterizes threat coefficients without adjusting for control covariates. Panel B characterizes threat coefficients adjusting for gender, acculturation, skin color, age, marital status, Catholicism, national origin, income, education, unemployment, homeownership, experienced discrimination, perceived discrimination (against Latinxs and Black people), partisanship, ideology, Latinx identity, American identity, contact with undocumented immigrants, political interest, Latinx linked fate, the perceived proportion of one's neighborhood being Black, the logged population (zipcode and county), % Latinx (zipcode and county), % Black (zipcode and county), % foreign-born (zipcode and county), % unemployed (zipcode and county), logged median household income (zipcode and county), the rate of Secure Communities deportations per 1,000 foreign-born individuals at the county-level, the logged total number of Secure Communities deportations, the Latino college education, poverty, and unemployment advantage (interacted by % Black) at both the zipcode and county level, marriage to a Black spouse, and the proportion of one's church that is Black. Each model uses a different outcome. The outcomes for Models 1-5 are support for BLM, belief that BLM is effective, support for an apology for slavery, support for notion Latinxs doing well depends on Black people doing well, and support for notion police discriminate against Black people relative to whites. The common fate and BLM effectiveness outcomes have some missing values, but the substantive results are the same if we include the full sample and analyze the effect of deportation threat on binary outcomes characterizing the first and second highest level of support for common fate beliefs and BLM's effectiveness. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for ease of interpretability. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

convergence with Black Latinx attitudes on Black-Latinx common fate (mean = 0.5). 39% of non-Black Latinxs who perceive no deportation threat support BLM. 49% of non-Black Latinxs who perceive the highest level of deportation threat support BLM. Going from the minimum to the maximum of deportation threat reduces distance from non-Latinx Black support for BLM from 31 to 21 percentage points. Likewise, non-Black Latinxs who do not perceive deportation threat believe BLM is effective at 35 percentage points but non-Black Latinxs who perceive the highest level of deportation threat believe BLM is effective at 45 percentage points. Again, this reduces the attitudinal distance on perceptions BLM is effective between non-Black Latinxs and Black non-Latinxs from 26 to 16 percentage points. Moreover, 37% of Latinxs with no deportation threat believe the federal government should apologize for slavery whereas 47% of Latinxs at the highest level of deportation threat believe the federal government should apologize for slavery. These findings confirm the hypothesis that the threat of deportation increases support for Black political interests and generates attitudinal convergence between non-Black Latinxs, Black Latinxs, and non-Latinx Black people.

3.7 Discussion and Conclusion

This paper teaches us the threat of immigration enforcement, a perceptibly unique form of stigma Latinxs experience, generates convergence with Black people in the United States on support for Black political interests and facilitates a sense of common fate between non-Black Latinxs, Black Latinxs, and Black people. This paper demonstrates that perceptibly uncommon forms of stigma can generate a basis for cross-group support if the source of stigma: 1) signals rebuff from the dominant category in the ethno-racial hierarchy, 2) is from a common perpetrator despite differences in stigmatization, 3) is rejected by other groups stigmatized groups could be in solidarity with, and 4) is operationalized similarly to other forms of stigma other groups experience. These findings are important since they suggest exact commonality in marginalized experiences are not necessary to generate a basis for cross-group support.




Figure 3.2: Deportation threat generates attitudinal convergence with Black people among non-Black Latinxs. Predicted values from fully specified models (absent state fixed effects) holding all other covariates at their mean. Dashed horizontal lines characterize the average level of the outcome for respective ethno-racial groups (denoted via annotations). 95% confidence intervals displayed from robust standard errors.

However, there are some caveats. First, is that the threat of immigration enforcement does not generate full attitudinal convergence between non-Black Latinxs and Black people over Black political interests. There are still fairly large gaps on the outcomes characterizing support for Black political interests. This suggests the threat of deportation may serve as a basis for some solidarity, but it may not close the ideological and attitudinal gaps necessary for effective coalition between non-Black Latinxs and Black people. Second, it is unclear whether the attitudinal commitments displayed here among non-Black Latinxs are simply expressive. Even if non-Black Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement have reason to support the political interests of Black people, it is unclear if they would expend resources (e.g. time, money) commensurate with their ideological commitments. Future research should assess if Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement may be willing to engage in stronger forms of commitment to Black political interests or resource trade-offs. Third, although this paper suggests possibilities for solidarity, it is unclear if this paper implies a sustainable solidarity. Latinxs unthreatened by immigration enforcement possess attitudes more similar to Anglo whites. These findings suggest Latinxs will become attitudinally closer to whites if they perceive the immigration enforcement context is less threatening. Only time will tell if efforts to reduce the threat of deportation help facilitate attitudinal convergence with Anglo whites among non-Black Latinxs over Black political interests.

CHAPTER 4

Appendix

4.1 Motivation Plot

4.1.1 Outcome measurement

4.1.1.1 ANES 2008-2016

Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be **INCREASED A LOT**, **INCREASED A LITTLE**, **LEFT THE SAME** as it is now, **DECREASED A LITTLE**, or **DECREASED A LOT**? [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate “decreased a little” or “decreased a lot.”]

- Increased a lot
- Increased a little
- Left the same as it is now
- Decreased a little
- Decreased a lot

4.1.1.2 GSS 2000-2018

Do you think the number of immigrants to America nowadays should be... [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate “reduced a little” or “reduced a lot”]

- Increased a lot
- Increased a little
- Remain the same as it is
- Reduced a little
- Reduced a lot
- Can't choose
- No answer

4.1.1.3 CMPS 2016

Same as the set of measures characterized on Section 4.2. All binary indicators are indexed on a scale from 0-2, rescaled to 0-1 on Figure 1.1.

4.1.1.4 CAS 2004

Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased, decreased or left the same as it is now? [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate “decreased”]

- Increased
- Decreased
- Left the same
- Don't Know
- No answer

4.1.1.5 Pew 2002

The following three items are indexed from 0-2, rescaled between 0-1 on Figure 1.1.

Do you think there are too many, too few, or about the right amount of immigrants living in the United States today? [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate “too many.”]

- Too many
- Too few
- Right amount
- Don’t Know
- Refused

Some people think the United States should allow more Latin Americans to come and work in this country LEGALLY; some people think the US should allow the same number as it does now; and others think it should reduce the number who come and work in this country LEGALLY. Which is closer to your opinion? [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate “reduce the number who come to work in this country legally.”]

- Allow more Latin Americans to come and work in this country legally
- Allow the same number as it does now
- Reduce the number who come to work in this country legally
- Don’t know
- Refused

What would you think of a proposal that would give many of the undocumented or illegal (HISPANIC/LATINO) immigrants working in the U.S. a chance to obtain legal status? Is this something you would favor or oppose? [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate “oppose.”]

- Favor
- Oppose
- Don't know
- Refused

4.2 Outcome measurement

Table 4.1: Outcome items and measurement across surveys.

Survey	Item Text	Choices	Measure
Pew '07	Do you approve or disapprove of workplace raids to discourage employers from hiring undocumented or illegal immigrants?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of states checking for immigration status before issuing driver's licenses?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Should local police take an active role in identifying undocumented or illegal immigrants, or should enforcement be left mainly to the federal authorities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Police take active role • 2) Enforcement left to federal authorities • 3) Don't know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Federal authorities, 0 otherwise)
	Do you think there are too many, too few, or about the right amount of immigrants living in the United States today?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Too many • 2) Too few • 3) Right amount • 4) Don't know • 5) Refused 	Binary (1 = not "Too many", 0 otherwise)
	Should local police take an active role in identifying undocumented or illegal immigrants, or should enforcement be left mainly to the federal authorities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Police take active role • 2) Enforcement left to federal authorities • 3) Don't know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Federal authorities, 0 otherwise)
Pew '08	Should local police take an active role in identifying undocumented or illegal immigrants, or should enforcement be left mainly to the federal authorities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Police take active role • 2) Enforcement left to federal authorities • 3) Don't know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Federal authorities, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following immigration enforcement actions: Workplace raids to discourage employers from hiring undocumented or illegal immigrants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following immigration enforcement actions: A requirement that employers check with a federal government database to verify the legal immigration status of any job applicant they are considering hiring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following immigration enforcement actions: Criminal prosecution of employers who hire undocumented or illegal immigrants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't Know 	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)

4.3 Disaggregating outcomes




Figure 4.1: Coefficients characterizing association between relevant independent variables of interest (x-axis) and disaggregated outcomes that constitute the liberal immigration policy index (y-axis). Panel A displays coefficients for threat. Panel B displays coefficients for the threat x acculturation interaction. Color denotes survey at use, shape denotes whether the outcome is an index. All covariates scaled 0-1. 95% confidence interval from robust standard errors displayed.

4.4 Validating acculturation scale

4.4.1 Determining reliability

Table 4.2: Correlation matrices between acculturation scale components across surveys (unweighted)

Pew 2007	Gen. Status	English	Citizen
Gen. Status	1.00	0.59	0.55
English	0.59	1.00	0.47
Citizen	0.55	0.47	1.00
Pew 2008	Gen. Status	English	Citizen
Gen. Status	1.00	0.61	0.58
English	0.61	1.00	0.48
Citizen	0.58	0.48	1.00
Pew 2010	Gen. Status	English	Citizen
Gen. Status	1.00	0.52	0.57
English	0.52	1.00	0.49
Citizen	0.57	0.49	1.00
CMPS 2016	Gen. Status	English	Citizen
Gen. Status	1.00	0.46	0.58
English	0.46	1.00	0.54
Citizen	0.58	0.54	1.00
Pew 2018	Gen. Status	English	Citizen
Gen. Status	1.00	0.65	0.56
English	0.65	1.00	0.58
Citizen	0.56	0.58	1.00
Pew 2019	Gen. Status	English	Citizen
Gen. Status	1.00	0.48	0.36
English	0.48	1.00	0.39
Citizen	0.36	0.39	1.00

Table 4.3: Cronbach's alpha for acculturation scale across surveys

Pew 2007	Pew 2008	Pew 2010	CMPS 2016	Pew 2018	Pew 2019
0.75	0.77	0.74	0.66	0.77	0.66

4.4.2 Association with immigration attitudes

Table 4.4: Acculturation is negatively associated with liberal immigration policy attitudes across surveys

Acculturation Level	Liberal Immigration Policy Index (by survey)					
	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Acculturation (0)	0.74	0.81	0.77	0.71	0.83	0.93
Acculturation (1)	0.69	0.79	0.73	0.69	0.81	0.94
Acculturation (2)	0.67	0.68	0.72	0.60	0.80	0.88
Acculturation (3)	0.65	0.66	0.72	0.69	0.78	0.90
Acculturation (4)	0.58	0.60	0.58	0.65	0.69	0.84
Max - Min	-0.17	-0.21	-0.20	-0.06	-0.14	-0.10
Bivariate Regression t-val	-7.77	-11.89	-9.08	-3.17	-6.71	-4.52

4.4.3 Demonstrating English dominance = English interview

Table 4.5: The English language interview indicator is a strong proxy for English-language dominance

	English Interview	
	(1)	(2)
English Dominance	0.89*** (0.04)	1.65*** (0.05)
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '10
R ²	0.45	0.64
N	1809	1238

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. All models adjust for generational status, partisanship, income, education and gender.

4.5 Validating and investigating deportation threat

4.5.1 Threat measurement

4.5.1.1 Pew 2007-2019

Regardless of your own immigration or citizenship status, how much, if at all, do you worry that you, a family member, or a close friend could be deported?

Would you say that you worry a lot, some, not much, or not at all?

- A lot
- Some
- Not much
- Not at all

4.5.1.2 CMPS 2016

How worried are you that people you know might be detained or deported for immigration reasons?

- Extremely worried
- Very worried
- Somewhat worried
- A little worried
- Not at all worried

4.5.2 Threat distributions




Figure 4.2: Distribution (y-axis) of deportation threat (x-axis) across surveys. Annotations denote N within each threat level and the corresponding marginal in parentheses. Each panel denotes a separate survey.

4.5.3 Distinctiveness of threat and acculturation

Table 4.6: Correlation coefficients between deportation threat and acculturation scale

Survey	Pearson's Rho	Kendall's Tau	Spearman's Rho
Pew '07	-0.41	-0.33	-0.40
Pew '08	-0.46	-0.38	-0.45
Pew '10	-0.42	-0.34	-0.41
CMPS '16	-0.26	-0.23	-0.27
Pew '18	-0.26	-0.22	-0.27
Pew '19	-0.20	-0.17	-0.20

Table 4.7: Distribution of threat by acculturation across surveys

Survey	Acculturation	Not at all (Not at all worried)	Not much (A little worried)	Some (Somewhat worried)	A lot (Very worried)	— (Extremely Worried)	N
Pew '07	Acculturation (0)	0.15	0.11	0.24	0.49		761
	Acculturation (1)	0.27	0.12	0.20	0.40		419
	Acculturation (2)	0.34	0.15	0.25	0.26		202
	Acculturation (3)	0.53	0.15	0.16	0.17		248
	Acculturation (4)	0.65	0.14	0.11	0.10		179
Pew '08	Acculturation (0)	0.13	0.07	0.19	0.61		729
	Acculturation (1)	0.22	0.12	0.18	0.47		424
	Acculturation (2)	0.39	0.11	0.21	0.29		194
	Acculturation (3)	0.51	0.13	0.17	0.19		243
	Acculturation (4)	0.62	0.13	0.16	0.09		232
Pew '10	Acculturation (0)	0.15	0.08	0.22	0.55		375
	Acculturation (1)	0.24	0.09	0.23	0.44		287
	Acculturation (2)	0.35	0.12	0.18	0.35		188
	Acculturation (3)	0.48	0.15	0.14	0.22		202
	Acculturation (4)	0.69	0.08	0.11	0.11		194
CMPS '16	Acculturation (0)	0.21	0.09	0.20	0.19	0.31	202
	Acculturation (1)	0.23	0.10	0.17	0.23	0.27	229
	Acculturation (2)	0.43	0.09	0.25	0.13	0.10	357
	Acculturation (3)	0.27	0.14	0.27	0.15	0.16	528
	Acculturation (4)	0.53	0.10	0.19	0.09	0.09	1173
Pew '18	Acculturation (0)	0.20	0.12	0.33	0.35		484
	Acculturation (1)	0.28	0.13	0.30	0.29		322
	Acculturation (2)	0.35	0.15	0.21	0.30		227
	Acculturation (3)	0.36	0.14	0.22	0.28		387
	Acculturation (4)	0.56	0.13	0.20	0.11		374
Pew '19	Acculturation (0)	0.24	0.21	0.24	0.31		420
	Acculturation (1)	0.34	0.19	0.24	0.23		638
	Acculturation (2)	0.49	0.17	0.21	0.13		548
	Acculturation (3)	0.41	0.19	0.22	0.18		589
	Acculturation (4)	0.57	0.15	0.18	0.10		232

4.5.4 Correlates of deportation threat

Table 4.8: Correlates of deportation threat

	Deportation Threat					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	-0.25*** (0.06)	-0.39*** (0.06)	-0.33*** (0.08)	-0.41*** (0.06)	-0.34*** (0.06)	-0.19*** (0.04)
Woman	0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Married	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)
Mexican/Central Am.	0.03 (0.03)	0.10** (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.05* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
Income	-0.12** (0.05)	-2.42*** (0.70)	-0.19** (0.06)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)	
Education	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.11** (0.04)
Unemployed	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	
US Born	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.15*** (0.03)	-0.22*** (0.04)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.03)
English	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)
% Non-citizen (zip)		0.16* (0.08)	0.08 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.07)	0.11 (0.07)	
% Non-citizen (county)		-0.09 (0.06)	0.02 (0.07)	0.13* (0.05)	0.00 (0.07)	
Log(Deportations + 1)				-0.00 (0.04)	-0.12* (0.05)	
Deportation Rate				-0.34 (0.25)	0.04 (0.11)	
Know Deportee			0.18*** (0.03)			0.24*** (0.03)
Know Undocumented				0.26*** (0.02)		0.16*** (0.02)
Perceived Discrim.	0.21*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)		
Experienced Discrim.	0.09*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.08** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.36*** (0.03)	
Ethnic Media		0.09 (0.05)	0.16* (0.07)	0.08* (0.04)		
Partisanship	0.03 (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)
Ideology			0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.03)		
Latino ID				0.09* (0.03)	0.08 (0.05)	
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
R ²	0.24	0.32	0.29	0.42	0.25	0.25
N	1809	1822	1238	2279	1794	2427

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

4.5.5 Deportation threat and emotional correlates

Table 4.9: Threat does not motivate anger more than anxiety

	Anxiety	Anxiety - Anger
Threat	0.12*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
R ²	0.44	0.09
N	2768	2768
Survey	CMPS '16	CMPS '16
Anger Control	Y	N
Demographic Controls	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Anxiety and anger are CMPS '16 items asking respondents “During the 2016 election season, how often did you feel the following?” with an inquiry on being “Afraid?” and “Angry?” All covariates rescaled between 0-1. Thus, the anxiety - anger measure is scaled between -1 to 1. All models are fully specified. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

4.5.6 Association between threat and immigration preferences

Table 4.10: Association between deportation threat and liberal immigration policy attitudes

Liberal Immigration Policy Attitudes						
Panel A: No controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat	0.25*** (0.03)	0.36*** (0.03)	0.29*** (0.04)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.32*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.04)
R ²	0.06	0.13	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.03
N	1809	1822	1238	2279	1794	2427
Panel B: Yes controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat	0.14*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)
R ²	0.16	0.31	0.31	0.24	0.31	0.08
Num. obs.	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Geographic controls below the Census Area are not available for the Pew 2007 and Pew 2019 surveys. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

4.6 Descriptive plots characterizing heterogeneous influence of threat by acculturation




Figure 4.3: Association between acculturation and liberal immigration policy attitudes conditional on deportation threat across surveys. X-axis = acculturation scale. Y-axis = liberal immigration policy index. Solid line = linear fit to bivariate association. Dashed line = average on policy index conditional on acculturation category. Color denotes level of perceived deportation threat.

4.7 Control Covariates

4.7.1 List

Table 4.11: Control covariate inclusion in fully specified models by survey

Survey	Controls
Pew '07	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Catholic, Mexican, Salvadorean, Dominican, Cuban, Income, Income (Missing)
Pew '08	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Mexican, Dominican, Salvadorean, Cuban, Income, Income (Missing)
Pew '10	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Skin Color, Catholic, Mexican, Dominican, Cuban, Salvadorean, Income, Income (Missing)
CMPS '16	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Catholic, Mexican, Dominican, Salvadorean, Cuban, Income, Income (Missing)
Pew '18	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Catholic, Mexican, Dominican, Salvadorean, Cuban, Income, Income (Missing)
Pew '19	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Catholic, Mexican, Dominican, Salvadorean, Cuban, Income, Income (Missing)

Blue: demographic controls. Green: socio-economic controls. Red: political controls. Purple: county-level controls. Orange: zipcode-level controls.

4.7.2 Justification

4.7.2.1 Demographic covariates

Age: May be associated with length of stay in the United States, a measure of acculturation (Abraído-Lanza et al., 2006). Moreover, older Latinxs may be more established in the United States, and therefore perceive lower levels of deportation threat, as reflected in the regression table characterizing the correlates of deportation threat (Section 4.5.4, Table 4.8). Older Latinxs may have also migrated to the US prior to key points where undocumented immigrants were regularized (e.g. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986).

Gender: Women may be more likely to perceive risks related to immigration enforcement (Gustafsson, 1998). Moreover, a competing theoretical perspective suggests men may perceive deportation threat more given immigration enforcement disproportionately targets men. However, women may perceive deportation threat more because they are more likely to be concerned about consequences related to the loss of a male breadwinner (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2013).

Marriage: Marriage may offer protection from deportation threat through status regularization, which can influence both threat and support for pro-immigrant policies (Menjívar and Lakhani, 2016). Moreover, marriage may increase deportation threat since marriage implies a loss of strong familial ties through immigration enforcement (Schueths, 2012). Marriage may also motivate conservatism, generating restrictive immigration policy attitudes among Latinxs (Kingston and Finkel, 1987).

National Origin: Binary indicators for Mexican, Salvadorean, Dominican, and Cuban national origin are included in the fully specified regression models. These are the 4 largest Latinx national origin groups (Excluding Puerto Ricans, who, if included in the analysis, would make up the 5 largest national origin groups. Recall that Puerto Ricans are excluded from the analysis because they possess American citizenship.). Prior evidence suggests some national origin groups are more likely to support liberal immigration policies by virtue of

their proximity to the immigrant experience (e.g. Mexicans, Central Americans) (Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010). In some of the surveys, Mexican/Central-American national origin appears to be positively associated with deportation threat (Section 4.5.4, Table 4.8).

Catholic: Catholic Latinxs may be more supportive of liberal immigration policy preferences given the Catholic Church's outspoken pro-immigration reform views (Valenzuela, 2014). Likewise, Catholic Latinxs are more likely to be compelled to engage in pro-immigrant political activism, which may jointly influence liberal immigration policy preferences and deportation threat (Barreto et al., 2009).

Skin Color: Skin color may make one susceptible to immigration enforcement or policing via racial profiling, which may increase perceived deportation threat (Romero, 2006).

4.7.2.2 Socio-economic covariates

Income: Prior evidence suggests higher income Latinxs may be less supportive of liberal immigration policies (Polinard, Wrinkle, and De La Garza, 1984; Bedolla, 2003). Although one may think lower income Latinxs would be less likely to support liberal immigration policies due to competition, this is not supported by prior evidence (Newton, 2000; Jiménez, 2008; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010). For the most part, rejection of liberal immigration policies appears to be a function of assimilation via economic attainment.

Education: A plethora of prior evidence suggests education is associated with more support for immigrants (Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Cavaille and Marshall, 2019). Education could be associated with higher support for immigrants via economic or social channels. However, most evidence on the link between education and immigration attitudes analyzes attitudes among dominant groups. Other research examining Latinxs finds no association between education and immigration policy preferences (Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 1997; Newton, 2000; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010).

Unemployment: Evidence on the link between unemployment and immigration attitudes

is mixed. Some evidence finds contextual measures of unemployment are associated with individual-level support for pro-immigrant policies (Markaki and Longhi, 2013). Other research suggests unemployment increases opposition to immigrants (Palmer, 1996). However, for Latinxs, the preexisting evidence appears to suggest both contextual and individual-level unemployment has no influence on immigration policy attitudes (Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010).

Homeowner: In the immigrant assimilation literature, homeownership is understood as a substrate of assimilation (Alba and Logan, 1992; McConnell and Marcelli, 2007).

4.7.2.3 Political covariates

Partisanship: Prior evidence suggests a strong association between partisanship and immigration policy attitudes. Immigration attitudes have also influenced partisan switching in recent years (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017).

Ideology: Prior evidence suggests a strong association between conservative ideology and restrictive immigration policy attitudes, particularly in the U.S. context (Citrin and Sides, 2008).

Perceived discrimination (against Latinxs): Prior evidence suggests perceived discrimination is associated with pro-immigrant attitudes among Latinxs (Sanchez, 2006). Other research also suggests perceived discrimination forestalls attitudinal assimilation on immigration policy attitudes (Pedraza, 2014). Perceived discrimination also appears to be associated with deportation threat (Section 4.5.4, Table 4.8), perhaps as a function of how illegality is conflated with the Latinx population writ large as a basis for discrimination (Flores and Schachter, 2018).

Experienced discrimination: Prior evidence suggests experienced discrimination is associated with pro-immigrant attitudes among Latinxs (Tucker, 2020).

Ethnic media: Prior evidence suggests ethnic media consumption among Latinxs is asso-

ciated with pro-immigrant attitudes (Abrajano and Singh, 2009). It may also cue Latinxs into possible immigration enforcement threats (Zepeda-Millán, 2017). Indeed, in two of the 6 surveys, ethnic media consumption appears to be positively associated with deportation threat (Section 4.5.4, Table 4.8).

Knowing a deportee: Whether one knows a deportee may influence deportation threat. It either cues in the prospect of oneself being deported or friends/family being deported. In all surveys with an item measuring personal contact with a deportee, knowing a deportee is highly prognostic of deportation threat (Section 4.5.4, Table 4.8).

Knowing someone undocumented: Whether one knows someone undocumented (friends/family in both the CMPS and Pew 2019 surveys) may influence deportation threat given the increasingly restrictive immigration enforcement environment. It may also influence pro-immigrant attitudes via contact and the development of common interests (Cadenas et al., 2018). In all surveys with an item measuring contact with undocumented immigrants, knowing someone undocumented is highly prognostic of deportation threat (Section 4.5.4, Table 4.8).

Immigration stop: Whether one is stopped by immigration officers may induce deportation threat via contact with the immigration enforcement apparatus. Moreover, it may induce support for liberal immigration policies given some respondents may want less restrictive policies to ensure reprieve from possible harassment on part of immigration agents.

Latino identity: Prior evidence suggests the strength of identification with the ethnic group among Latinxs is positively associated with positive attitudes toward immigrants (Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 1997; Sanchez, 2006; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010; Serrano-Careaga and Huo, 2019; Wallace and Zepeda-Millán, 2020). Moreover, Latinx identity may be associated with increased deportation threat, given high group identifiers appear to be more sensitive to anti-group threats (Sellers and Shelton, 2003; Pérez, 2015).

American identity: Prior evidence suggests the strength of identification with the ethnic group among Latinxs is positively associated with positive attitudes toward immigrants

(Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 1997; Sanchez, 2006; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010; Serrano-Careaga and Huo, 2019; Wallace and Zepeda-Millán, 2020). Moreover, Latinx identity may be associated with increased deportation threat, given high group identifiers appear to be more sensitive to anti-group threats (Sellers and Shelton, 2003; Pérez, 2015).

4.7.2.4 Contextual covariates

% Latino/Foreign-Born/Non-Citizen: Prior evidence suggests ethnic contexts increase support for liberal immigration policies among Latinxs (Rocha et al., 2011; Telles and Sue, 2019). However, the acculturation level of the context needs to be taken into account. Places with less acculturated Latinxs (e.g. foreign-born, non-citizens) may have individuals who are more likely to support liberal immigration policies relative to places with more acculturated Latinxs yet are still predominantly ethnic contexts (Bedolla, 2003). Moreover, places with more Latinxs and/or immigrants may be more subject to deportation threat via immigration enforcement actions or a societal concern over a precarious legal status (Maltby et al., 2020).

Median Household Income/Unemployed/% College: Prior evidence suggests Latinxs from higher resourced contexts may be less supportive of liberal immigration policy preferences (Bedolla, 2003). Higher resourced areas may also be less subject to deportation threat since they're less likely to be targeted by immigration enforcement authorities.

Secure Communities Removals/Removal Rate/% Level 3 Removals: Deportation threat may be induced by Secure Communities removals and deportations. If level 3 removals occur at a higher rate (e.g. removals of people who have committed minor crimes), that may increase a sense of injustice that motivates pro-immigrant behavior (Walker, Roman, and Barreto, 2020).

4.8 Alternative samples

4.8.1 Mexicans only

Table 4.12: Association between deportation threat and liberal immigration policy attitudes conditional on acculturation (Mexicans only)

Liberal Immigration Policy Attitudes						
Panel A: No controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.32*** (0.06)	0.23** (0.07)	0.27*** (0.05)	0.11 [†] (0.06)	0.27*** (0.06)	0.25* (0.12)
Threat	0.02 (0.03)	0.10** (0.04)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.11* (0.05)	0.06* (0.03)	0.02 (0.07)
Acculturation	-0.24*** (0.04)	-0.24*** (0.05)	-0.22*** (0.03)	-0.07 [†] (0.04)	-0.20*** (0.04)	-0.17* (0.08)
R ²	0.13	0.18	0.18	0.11	0.14	0.05
N	1196	1220	833	1500	1197	946
Panel B: Yes controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.30*** (0.06)	0.17** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.05)	0.10 [†] (0.06)	0.11 [†] (0.06)	0.25* (0.12)
Threat	-0.01 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	0.07 [†] (0.04)	-0.01 (0.08)
Acculturation	-0.22*** (0.04)	-0.20*** (0.05)	-0.21*** (0.04)	-0.07 [†] (0.04)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.16 [†] (0.08)
R ²	0.18	0.32	0.35	0.26	0.34	0.11
N	1196	1220	833	1500	1197	946
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Panel A displays coefficients from models with no control covariates. Panel B displays coefficients from models adjusting for a full set of control covariates. Each column characterizes a different survey at use. Geographic covariates below the Census Area level are not available for the Pew 2007 and Pew 2019 surveys. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

4.8.2 Including Puerto Ricans

Table 4.13: Association between deportation threat and liberal immigration policy attitudes conditional on acculturation (including Puerto Ricans)

Liberal Immigration Policy Attitudes						
Panel A: No controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.08 (0.06)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.08 [†] (0.04)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.26** (0.08)
Threat	0.09*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)	0.02 (0.05)
Acculturation	-0.15*** (0.03)	-0.23*** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.03)	-0.05 [†] (0.03)	-0.15*** (0.03)	-0.19*** (0.06)
R ²	0.09	0.16	0.13	0.10	0.11	0.06
N	1961	1975	1347	2768	2002	2675
Panel B: Yes controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.09 [†] (0.05)	0.15** (0.05)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.08 [†] (0.05)	0.10* (0.04)	0.22** (0.08)
Threat	0.05* (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.01 (0.05)
Acculturation	-0.15*** (0.03)	-0.19*** (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.17** (0.05)
R ²	0.16	0.32	0.34	0.21	0.29	0.11
N	1961	1975	1347	2768	2002	2675
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Panel A displays coefficients from models with no control covariates. Panel B displays coefficients from models adjusting for a full set of control covariates. Each column characterizes a different survey at use. Geographic covariates below the Census Area level are not available for the Pew 2007 and Pew 2019 surveys. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

4.9 Using alternative acculturation measures

Table 4.14: Re-estimating main results using alternative measures of acculturation (part 1)

	Liberal Immigration Policy					
Panel A: Index (No citizenship)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.12* (0.06)	0.17** (0.06)	0.13** (0.05)	0.10* (0.05)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.19* (0.09)
R ²	0.16	0.32	0.34	0.21	0.31	0.09
N	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Panel B: Index (with LPR)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.13* (0.06)	0.21** (0.06)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.14* (0.06)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.24* (0.10)
R ²	0.16	0.32	0.33	0.21	0.31	0.09
N	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Panel C: Index (w/ English-dominance)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.21** (0.08)	— (—)	0.16* (0.07)	— (—)	— (—)	0.39** (0.13)
R ²	0.17	—	0.33	—	—	0.09
N	1809	—	1236	—	—	2427
Panel D: Index (w/ English-dom., LPR)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.21** (0.08)	— (—)	0.17* (0.07)	— (—)	— (—)	0.39** (0.13)
R ²	0.17	—	0.33	—	—	0.09
N	1809	—	1236	—	—	2427
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$. All models are fully specified. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 4.15: Re-estimating main results using alternative measures of acculturation (part 2)

	Liberal Immigration Policy					
Panel A: Generational Status	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x 2nd Gen.	-0.07 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.07 [†] (0.04)	0.04 (0.07)
Threat x 3rd Gen.	0.16** (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.08 [†] (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.20* (0.10)
R ²	0.17	0.31	0.33	0.24	0.33	0.09
N	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Panel B: US Born	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x US Born	0.07 [†] (0.04)	0.11* (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	0.09 (0.06)
R ²	0.15	0.31	0.32	0.24	0.31	0.09
N	1809	1822	1238	2276	1794	2427
Panel C: English	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x English	0.06 (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.09** (0.03)	0.08 [†] (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	0.14* (0.06)
R ²	0.15	0.31	0.32	0.24	0.32	0.09
N	1809	1822	1238	2276	1794	2427
Panel D: Citizenship	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Citizenship	0.05 (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.09** (0.03)	0.07 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.14* (0.07)
R ²	0.14	0.31	0.32	0.24	0.31	0.09
N	1809	1822	1238	2276	1794	2427
Panel E: Fully Specified Components	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x 2nd Gen.	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.09)
Threat x 3rd Gen.	0.16* (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.08 (0.11)
Threat x English	0.01 (0.05)	0.11* (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.05 (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	0.11 (0.07)
Threat x Citizen	-0.02 (0.04)	0.08 [†] (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.09 (0.08)
R ²	0.17	0.32	0.34	0.24	0.34	0.10
N	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Panel F: Fully Specified Components 2	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x US. Born	0.08 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.09 [†] (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.08)
Threat x English	0.02 (0.05)	0.09* (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.05 (0.06)	0.07 (0.05)	0.11 [†] (0.07)
Threat x Citizen	-0.03 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.05)	0.09 (0.08)
R ²	0.16	0.32	0.33	0.24	0.32	0.10
N	1809	1822	1238	2276	1794	2427
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. All models are fully specified. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

4.10 Ruling out alternative mechanisms

Table 4.16: Acculturation is forestalled by deportation threat net of alternative mechanisms

	Liberal Immigration Policy Index					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Acculturation x Threat	0.13*	0.16**	0.13*	0.09†	0.12*	0.27**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.10)
Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	0.09†	-0.09†	-0.01	0.07*	0.03	0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.02	0.02*	0.05	0.01		
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Acculturation x Latino ID				0.18**	0.19†	
				(0.07)	(0.10)	
Acculturation x American ID				-0.08	-0.28***	
				(0.07)	(0.06)	
Acculturation x % Latino (Zip)		-0.00	-0.20	-0.01	0.07	
		(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.14)	
Acculturation x % Non-citizen (Zip)		0.10	0.26	-0.10	0.20	
		(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.19)	
Acculturation x % Latino (County)		0.04	0.15	0.02	-0.22	
		(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.17)	
Acculturation x % Non-citizen (County)		-0.02	-0.18	0.10	0.21	
		(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.19)	
Acculturation x Ethnic Media		0.26†	0.26*	-0.09		
		(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.07)		
Acculturation x WWII Cohort	0.18*	-0.07	0.06	0.02	0.32**	
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.11)	
Acculturation x Mex/CA	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.04		0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)		(0.07)
Acculturation x Income	-0.13	-0.07	-0.10	0.10	-0.01	
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.08)	
Acculturation x Education	0.07	-0.04	0.08	0.04	0.15†	0.18†
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.04	0.04	-0.03	0.07	-0.04	
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	
Acculturation x Know Deported			-0.03			-0.19*
			(0.04)			(0.09)
Acculturation x Know Undocumented				-0.05		-0.01
				(0.04)		(0.07)
Acculturation x Immigration Stop			0.10			
			(0.07)			
Acculturation x Deportation Rate				-1.69	0.36	
				(1.35)	(1.41)	
Acculturation x Log(Deportations + 1)				0.16†	-0.14	
				(0.08)	(0.10)	
Acculturation x % Level 3 Deportations				-0.27	0.03	
				(0.18)	(0.12)	
R ²	0.17	0.34	0.35	0.26	0.35	0.10
Num. obs.	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. All models are fully specified. Each column characterizes a different survey at use. Geographic covariates below the Census Area level are not available for the Pew 2007 and Pew 2019 surveys. Coefficients of interest are bold. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

4.11 Ruling out alternative ideological considerations

4.11.1 CMPS '16

Table 4.17: Association between threat and immigration-irrelevant outcomes (CMPS '16)

	Gay Marriage	Climate	Obamacare	Tax Rich	Voter ID	Liberalism Index	Immigration Index
Panel A: No Interaction	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Threat	0.08** (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.05† (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
R ²	0.23	0.28	0.19	0.18	0.10	0.29	0.24
N	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276
Panel B: Interaction	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Threat x Acculturation	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.20*** (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.09† (0.05)
R ²	0.23	0.28	0.19	0.18	0.11	0.29	0.25
N	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276
Liberalism Index Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Panel A displays the unconditional association between threat and immigration irrelevant outcomes. Panel B displays the association between the threat/acculturation interaction and immigration irrelevant outcomes. The first outcome is support for banning gay marriage. The second outcome is support for climate change legislation. The third outcome is support for Obamacare. The fourth outcome is support for taxing the rich. The fifth outcome is support for restrictive voter ID laws. The sixth outcome is an index of the immigration-irrelevant liberal policy outcomes. The seventh outcome is the liberal immigration policy index. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

4.11.2 Pew '19

Table 4.18: Association between threat and immigration-irrelevant outcomes (Pew '19)

	Min. Wage	Health Care	Guns	Liberalism Index	Support DACA
Panel A: No Interaction	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Threat	0.05 (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.08** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.08* (0.03)
R ²	0.10	0.15	0.18	0.22	0.13
N	2407	2427	2393	2376	2376
Panel B: Interaction	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Threat x Acculturation	0.07 (0.07)	0.23* (0.11)	0.15* (0.08)	0.13* (0.05)	0.16 (0.10)
R ²	0.10	0.15	0.19	0.23	0.14
N	2407	2427	2393	2376	2376
Liberalism Index Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Region FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Panel A displays the unconditional association between threat and immigration irrelevant outcomes. Panel B displays the association between the threat/acculturation interaction and immigration irrelevant outcomes. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

4.12 Accounting for nativism

4.12.1 Measuring nativism

For the Pew '07 survey, nativism is an index of two survey items. The first asks respondents to indicate whether “Illegal immigrants help the economy by providing low cost labor” or “Illegal immigrants hurt the economy by driving wages down” is closer to their view. This is measured as a binary indicator equal to 1 if they indicate illegal immigrants hurt the economy. The second item asks respondents to give their opinion on the effect of the growing number of undocumented immigrants on Latinos living in the U.S. They can say it is a “positive development,” a “negative development,” or “has had no impact one way or the other.” This item is measured as a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicates undocumented immigration is a “negative development.” The two binary indicators are added up to generate a nativism index.

For the Pew '08 survey, the nativism measure is built from a single item asking respondents whether they think “immigrants increase, reduce, or have no effect on crime in your community.” The measure is a binary indicator equal to 1 if they indicate immigrants increase crime in their community.

For the Pew '10 survey, nativism is an additive index built from 3 items. The first asks respondents if they believe “immigrants strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents,” “immigrants are a burden because they take our jobs, housing and health care,” or “neither.” It is measured as a binary indicator equal to 1 if they indicate “immigrants are a burden.” The second asks respondents if they believe the effect of undocumented immigration on Latinos already living in the U.S. is “positive,” “negative,” or “has had no effect.” The item is measured as a binary indicator equal to 1 if they indicate undocumented immigration’s effect is “negative.” The third item asks respondents if they believe one of the reasons immigrants come to the U.S. illegally is to have a child in the U.S. The measure is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicates “Yes.”

For the CMPS '16 survey, the nativism measure is built from a single item asking

respondents on a 4-point likert scale whether they agree “immigrants take jobs, housing and healthcare away from people born in the U.S.”

4.12.2 First-order association

Table 4.19: Association between threat and liberal immigration policy preferences (adjusting for nativism)

	Liberal Immigration Policy			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat	0.08*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)
Nativism	-0.23*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.02)
R ²	0.21	0.33	0.35	0.28
N	1809	1822	1236	2276
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

4.12.3 Heterogeneity

Table 4.20: Association between threat and liberal immigration policy preferences (adjusting for nativism)

Panel A: Full Sample	Liberal Immigration Policy			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat x Acculturation	0.07 (0.06)	0.17** (0.05)	0.13** (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)
Nativism x Acculturation	-0.20** (0.07)	-0.20*** (0.05)	-0.16* (0.08)	-0.15** (0.06)
Threat	0.05* (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.07* (0.04)
Nativism	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)
R ²	0.22	0.35	0.37	0.29
N	1809	1822	1236	2276
Panel B: Mexicans Only	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat x Acculturation	0.23*** (0.06)	0.14* (0.06)	0.21*** (0.05)	0.05 (0.06)
Nativism x Acculturation	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.23*** (0.06)	-0.15 (0.08)	-0.22** (0.07)
Threat	-0.00 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.08 (0.05)
Nativism	-0.15** (0.05)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)
R ²	0.24	0.36	0.38	0.32
N	1196	1220	833	1498
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

4.13 Accounting for socio-tropic threat

4.13.1 Measuring socio-tropic threat

The Pew '07 measure asks if respondents have observed “more efforts to discourage undocumented or illegal immigration” in their local community in the past year. The measure is converted to a binary indicator equal to 1 if they indicate “more efforts” instead of “no change” or “fewer efforts.” The Pew '08 measure asks if respondents perceive there has been “an increase, decrease, or no change in the number of immigration enforcement actions around the country aimed at undocumented immigrants.” The measure is converted to a binary indicator equal to 1 if a respondent indicates there has been an “increase.”

4.13.2 Adjusting for socio-tropic threat

Table 4.21: Accounting for socio-tropic threat

	Liberal Immigration Policy			
Personal Threat	0.09*** (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
Socio-Tropic Threat	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Personal Threat x Acculturation		0.12* (0.06)		0.20*** (0.06)
Socio-tropic Threat x Acculturation		-0.06 (0.05)		0.01 (0.04)
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '08
R ²	0.15	0.16	0.31	0.32
N	1809	1809	1822	1822
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. All models are fully specified. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

4.14 Using ordered logistic regression

4.14.1 First-order association

Table 4.22: Replicating unconditional influence of threat using ordered logistic regression

	Liberal Immigration Policy					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat	0.65*** (0.12)	0.83*** (0.12)	0.68*** (0.14)	1.41*** (0.16)	1.17*** (0.14)	1.29*** (0.21)
AIC	4851.63	5550.94	4710.40	4123.87	3465.04	1600.55
BIC	4988.86	5781.69	4924.95	4380.89	3680.46	1722.23
Log Likelihood	-2400.81	-2733.47	-2313.20	-2017.94	-1693.52	-779.28
Deviance	4801.63	5466.94	4626.40	4035.87	3387.04	1626.11
N	1789	1797	1222	2544	1851	2427
Survey Model	Pew '07 OLogit	Pew '08 OLogit	Pew '10 OLogit	CMPS '16 OLogit	Pew '18 OLogit	Pew '19 Logit
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Census Area FE used to ensure identification.

4.14.2 Heterogeneity

Table 4.23: Replicating conditional influence of threat using ordered logistic regression

	Liberal Immigration Policy					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.94** (0.32)	1.25*** (0.32)	1.58*** (0.37)	1.33*** (0.32)	1.75*** (0.35)	1.81*** (0.55)
Threat	0.32 (0.16)	0.37* (0.17)	-0.02 (0.22)	0.65** (0.24)	0.36 (0.21)	0.48 (0.32)
Acculturation	-1.17*** (0.20)	-1.45*** (0.22)	-1.77*** (0.27)	-0.64** (0.21)	-1.30*** (0.24)	-1.11*** (0.26)
AIC	4844.66	5537.34	4693.48	4108.43	3441.76	1595.45
BIC	4987.38	5773.58	4913.13	4371.29	3662.71	1722.92
Log Likelihood	-2396.33	-2725.67	-2303.74	-2009.21	-1680.88	-775.72
Deviance	4792.66	5451.34	4607.48	4018.43	3361.76	1615.02
N	1789	1797	1222	2544	1851	2427
Survey Model	Pew '07 OLogit	Pew '08 OLogit	Pew '10 OLogit	CMPS '16 OLogit	Pew '18 OLogit	Pew '19 Logit
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Census Area FE used to ensure identification.

4.15 Asian-American replication

Table 4.24: Replicating influence of deportation threat among Asian-American survey sample

	Liberal Immigration Policy			
Threat	0.07 (0.03)	0.11** (0.03)	0.13** (0.05)	0.12* (0.04)
Acculturation		0.09** (0.03)	0.11** (0.04)	0.09** (0.04)
Threat x Acculturation			-0.14 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.10)
R ²	0.01	0.16	0.03	0.16
Num. obs.	802	802	802	802
Controls	N	Y	N	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. All models adjust for age, gender, national origin, education, and partisanship. Regression weights included to approximate the national Asian-American population. Robust standard errors in parentheses

Here, I present estimates characterizing the influence of deportation threat on liberal immigration policy preferences among a sample of Asian-Americans from the Pew 2013 Asian-American survey ($N = 802$). Liberal immigration policy preferences are an additive index of binary indicators capturing approval for 1) increasing the number of temporary work visas for agriculture and food industry workers, 2) not increasing enforcement of immigration laws at U.S. borders, 3) increasing the number of temporary work visas for highly skilled workers, 4) creating a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants if they meet certain requirements, and 5) not decreasing legal immigration into the United States.

Deportation threat is the same as the measure used in the Pew Latino surveys. However, acculturation is measured differently. The Asian-American survey does not ask about whether parents are born in the United States. Therefore, I cannot identify Asian-Americans who are third-generation or more. I can only identify who is foreign-born. Moreover, I use an item measuring whether English is the only language spoken at home for the respondent as a stand-in for language-of-interview. I construct an additive index of citizenship status, whether the respondent is US-born, and whether the respondent speaks only English at home to measure acculturation.

In all estimates characterizing the influence of deportation threat using the 2013 Asian-American survey, I adjust for age, gender, national origin (binary indicators for Indian, Chinese, Filipino, and Japanese), education, and partisanship.

Table 4.24 displays the unconditional and conditional association between deportation threat and liberal immigration policy preferences. After adjusting for control covariates, namely, acculturation, deportation threat is prognostic of liberal immigration policy preferences. These findings corroborate the first-order association displayed in the main text for Latinxs. However, deportation threat does not appear to have a stronger influence on motivating liberal immigration policy preferences among more acculturated Asian-Americans.

The absence of heterogenous effects may be because acculturation appears to motivate *more liberal* attitudes among Asian-Americans. For Latinxs, deportation threat forestalls a process engendering conservative attitudes. However, for Asian-Americans, acculturation is not an intrinsically conservative process that must be forestalled by deportation threat. This interpretation of the null result begs the question: Why does acculturation generate liberal preferences among Asian-Americans but conservative preferences among Latinxs? Perhaps “forever foreigner” stereotypes along with potentially more visible phenotypical markers that serve as the basis for discrimination make it more difficult for integrated Asian-Americans to distance themselves politically from new immigrants (Zhou, 2004; Lee and Kye, 2016). Moreover, new Asian immigrant cohorts may be relatively conservative on immigration policy since they tend to be of a higher socio-economic status who migrated legally and therefore do not perceive a connection with other immigrants (Park, 2020). Prior evidence corroborates these theoretical insights, with more acculturated Asian-Americans being more likely to support liberal immigration policies and the Democratic party (Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo, 2017; Park, 2020).

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