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Revere, and a hero with enough bravado to hurl at the British "Give me Liberty or give me death!" Economics—taxation without representation, for instance—is a part of the American picture, but by no means the whole. It's the cultural, ideological elements that take hold in the imagination—ideas of liberty, freedom, heroism, and democracy.

Yet, traditionally, whenever non-Indian historians consider Indian responses, rarely are any such ideological motivations considered. What of Dragging Canoe, the greatest of all Cherokee resistance leaders, who cried, "Should we not therefore run all risks, and incur all consequences, rather than submit?! Such treaties may be all right for men who are too old to hunt or fight. As for me, I have my young men about me. We will have our lands!" Or Onitositah who boldly declared to officials that the Cherokee "are not created to be your slaves. We are a separate people!" These are speeches and sentiments worthy of a retelling comparable to that of American history, motives that reveal ideals more lofty than mere economic determinants. Indeed, Indian nations never saw themselves or their lands as Snapp summarizes them, as "pawns and victims of a struggle among whites for control" (p. 217). What they *did* see was a stronger picture—Indian nations that employed the lack of unity among Europeans and Americans to their own advantage to survive, just as outsiders did to them.

Nevertheless, Snapp's acknowledgment that Indian nations were far from homogenous during the colonial period and that factions did exist represents a refreshing approach and suggests a strong direction for future colonial Indian studies. His model of the southern frontier offers exciting possibilities for those wishing to pursue them into Indian realms, matching the complicated lines of political opinion among colonial whites to factions within the Indian nations. *John Stuart and the Struggle for Empire* is a thought-provoking volume, which is highly recommended.

*Lee Miller*

Native Learning Foundation

**Like a Hurricane: The Indian Movement from Alcatraz to Wounded Knee.** By Paul Chaat Smith and Robert Allen Warrior. New York: The New Press, 1996. 279 pages \$25.00 cloth.

In 1969 American Indian people moved into the national arena of civil rights movements which had heretofore focused on

Black Power and the Chicano/Chicana civil rights struggles. The days of the stoic, silent "red man" were over. American Indian people would continue to capture national headlines and international attention through the 1969 occupation of Alcatraz Island, the Bureau of Indian Affairs building in Washington, D.C. in 1972, and the occupation of Wounded Knee, South Dakota in 1973. In *Like a Hurricane*, authors Smith and Warrior present their interpretations and analyses of these three seminal events in contemporary conflict between the Indian and non-Indian world.

Smith, a Comanche Indian, and Warrior, an Osage, undertook the writing of this book out of a sense of dissatisfaction over the "existing narratives of this crucial period in Indian and American history..." Actually, prior to this book and with the exception of Kenneth Stern's *Loud Hawk*, published in 1994, there has been little to be dissatisfied over, primarily because there has been nothing definitive written about this very important period. The three events that are the focus of this book simply faded, or were pushed into the recesses of the national consciousness. Smith and Warrior, although not involved in any of the events, recount the history, the intense emotionalism, and the political maneuvering and manipulation of that period.

Indian people, primarily young college students, occupied Alcatraz Island on November 9 and again on November 20, 1969. This followed a much earlier and briefer 1964 occupation of the island by five Sioux men who claimed that Sioux people had the right to claim federal property based on their reading of an 1868 treaty between the United States and the Sioux Nation. While the authors state that "the promised lawsuits to acquire title never materialized," Richard McKenzie, one of the occupiers, did in fact file the promised lawsuit. Ramsey Clark, assistant attorney general, in dismissing the suit stated that "... it cannot be said that the Indians had a right to the surplus property..."

While Smith and Warrior provide an excellent history of the November 20, 1969 occupation of Alcatraz Island, they have little good to say regarding the leadership of the organization Indians of All Tribes, or the importance of this nineteen-month stand-off against the federal government. This is strange because they heap praise on the seventy-three-hour occupation of the BIA headquarters building and the seventy-one-day occupation of Wounded Knee. Noteworthy perhaps is the fact that both of the later events were carried out by the American

Indian Movement (AIM), while the Alcatraz occupation was led by a consensus leadership-based group, Indians of All Tribes. As far as importance can be ascribed, Alcatraz was attracting worldwide attention, while AIM was still in its infancy as an urban Indian police force. That is not to denigrate the efforts of AIM, because they were praiseworthy, but it is also important to make the point that it was Alcatraz, and AIM's visit to Alcatraz, which led to AIM becoming an activist group on a national level. A small contingency of AIM leaders visited Alcatraz during the summer of 1970 on two or perhaps three occasions and realized the potential for movement onto the national scene. Alcatraz had tied the government's hands. As a result, AIM could, and did, capitalize on the historic moment.

Richard Oakes, whom the authors seem to take pleasure in attacking, never wanted a position of leadership on Alcatraz. It was the Western press, television, and radio that insisted on a leader or a spokesperson. Oakes, a Mohawk college student, had been involved with other students in the planning for the occupation and had met with Adam Fortunate Eagle (Nordwall), who was the urban leader and planner for the occupation. Because Oakes was knowledgeable regarding the plans and because he had excellent oratory skills, he was singled out by the press and thus involuntarily became, at least in the eyes of the press, the leader.

The authors, when speaking of the planning for the November 20 occupation, seem to make a conspiratorial point that Oakes wanted to exclude Adam Nordwall from the planning process and waited until Nordwall was out of town attending a national conference to carry out the "real assault." This was not true at all. In an interview, Fortunate Eagle stated that the trip had been pre-planned and that he was coordinating his reading of the occupation proclamation with the occupation force. The authors continue their attack on Oakes when they claim, without footnotes, that Oakes was ousted from Alcatraz, hinting that Oakes had taken letters containing money and used it for other than legitimate expenses. The authors devote as much promotional space building up Clyde Warrior, a Ponca Indian leader who died in 1968, prior to the Alcatraz occupation, as they do in attempting to destroy the honor, memory, and efforts of Richard Oakes, who was widely respected by the island residents.

Even so, Smith and Warrior are to be commended for their research into urban relocation, the Bay Area community, and

the Alcatraz occupation. They researched archival holdings and special collections in California, Minnesota, New Mexico, and Washington, D.C. and conducted or had access to more than sixty interviews by their own account. With this wealth of information, one must ask why they chose to emphasize the negative features of the Alcatraz occupation. There were many positive results, and Indian people continue to credit Alcatraz with awakening their activism. The authors themselves state that the 1972 death of Richard Oakes was the rallying point for the Trail of Broken Treaties, which led to the 1972 occupation of BIA headquarters.

The authors provide an excellent overview of the conditions that led to the occupation and near destruction of the BIA building. They are correct that the occupation resulted from frustration, poor communications, and, more than any other reason, poor planning. This was not a failure on the part of the U.S. government, but of the advance party of AIM and the Native American Indian Youth Council (NIYC). They simply failed to provide for adequate housing and accommodations. When temporary facilities were eventually made available, they were too small, too late, and, in some cases, rodent infested.

The authors point also to the frustration that resulted because then-President Nixon was not available to meet and discuss the "twenty points" demands that had been prepared by the Indian people during the cross-country pilgrimage. In fact, however, Leonard Garment had advised Dennis Banks that Nixon would not be in Washington, D.C. at all during that period.

On November 2, 1972, in a disagreement over housing and what the Indian people perceived as more broken promises, some two hundred members of the Trail of Broken Treaties occupied and barricaded the BIA building and presented a list of twenty civil rights demands that had been drawn up during the march. The Indians occupied the BIA building for seven days. Eventually, the government promised to review the demands, refrain from making arrests, and agreed to pay the Indians' expenses home. The occupation was a great moral victory for the Indian occupiers.

While the authors previously pointed out that not all tribal leaders supported the Alcatraz occupation, it may correctly be stated that at least as many tribal leaders decried and denounced the wanton destruction to the BIA headquarters building. Not only was the destruction seen as senseless, but the theft and removal of valuable documents was perceived to

be damaging to the future of Native American claims against the federal government for past wrongs. The reputation of AIM suffered as well as a result of the BIA occupation, and AIM leaders were no longer welcomed on many Indian reservations.

Smith and Warrior's interpretation and presentation of the Wounded Knee occupation are excellent and insightful. The only thing of significance that they miss is the role of the federal government in first creating the situation that led to the warfare on the Pine Ridge reservation. In 1934 the federal government (in one of its many policy reversals) recognized the failure of the allotment and assimilation policy toward Native American people. As a result of the failure of those programs, the government passed into law the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). For the 181 tribes who adopted the IRA, this meant adopting a constitution and IRA governmental body which included an elected tribal council that had virtually exclusive jurisdictional powers within the reservations. From the standpoint of the federal government, the IRA governments established under the act were the only group with which federal, state, and local governments would deal. The IRA governments ran counter to the governmental practices of the traditional tribal members, who were accustomed to consensus leadership. Since the new IRA governments were the only body with which the federal government would negotiate, most traditionalists were left without a voice in tribal governance and had no one to turn to. Worse yet, when funds, jobs, and resources were doled out from Congress, they went to the IRA government representative, usually the IRA tribal chairperson. The traditionalists complained that the IRA tribal chairperson then doled out the money, jobs, and commodities to their own relatives and supporters, further alienating the traditionalists and tribal elders.

It was in this setting that the occupation of Wounded Knee occurred. Dick Wilson resented, if not hated, AIM and its leadership. He forbade AIM from entering the Pine Ridge reservation and stated that if Russell Means set foot on Pine Ridge he would personally cut off his braids. Wilson ignored the traditionalists, and many people who challenged or questioned the Wilson-IRA government were beaten, their homes fire-bombed, or simply disappeared. The traditionalists and their followers demonstrated against Wilson, whom they charged with corrupt practices. Wilson and his Government of the Oglala Nation (GOON)

squads reacted with beatings and shootings to enforce the Wilson-IRA government rule. The traditionalist then called in members of the American Indian Movement as their only hope, and from there the events led to the Wounded Knee occupation.

Despite the negative focus of the Alcatraz occupation and my other comments, *Like a Hurricane* is an important book. For the most part it is well researched, and even though it lacks balance, it is the only book that has been written that focuses on the three major occupations by Native American people of the twentieth century. I recommend this book for Native American studies programs, university libraries, and anyone interested in contemporary Native American issues.

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**The Mi'kmaq: Resistance, Accommodation, and Cultural Survival.** By Harald E. Prins. Case Studies in Cultural Anthropology. Orlando, Florida: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1996. 250 pages. \$16.00 paper.

The task of evaluating this book has not been an easy one. The principal reason for this is that the work is part of a monograph series "intended for use in the classroom" for "beginning and intermediate courses in the social sciences" (p. vii). In presenting contemporary anthropology to students in these courses, the editors of the series are "concerned with the ways in which human groups and communities are coping with the massive changes wrought in their physical and sociopolitical environments in recent decades. [They] are also concerned with the ways in which established cultures have solved life's problems" (p. vii). The author attempts to document some aspects of the "massive changes" that the Mi'kmaq have experienced, and he indicates some of their current "life's problems." But there is little or no attempt to identify the coping and problem-solving mechanisms that make Mi'kmaq culture the dynamic and viable culture it is.

The theory of culture on which the data hangs is presented only implicitly. The reader must intuit how the author conceptualizes the concept of culture and the processes that have made the Mi'kmaq successful in overcoming the threats to their societal and cultural continuity. This is a challenge beyond most beginning (inexperienced) students. Further-