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Politics and Poverty: Electoral Clientelism in Latin America

By

Simeon Charaka Nichter

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

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in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor David Collier, Chair
Professor Ruth Berins Collier
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Politics and Poverty: Electoral Clientelism in Latin America

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Abstract

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University of California, Berkeley

Professor David Collier, Chair

In many countries, clientelist parties (or political machines) distribute selective benefits, especially to the poor, in direct exchange for electoral support. Many scholars view clientelism as a political strategy, but fail to distinguish between substantively different patterns of machine politics. Conflating distinct strategies of clientelism poses a serious threat to descriptive and causal inference. This study seeks to increase analytical differentiation of clientelism, building on fieldwork in Brazil, formal modeling, and econometric analyses of survey data.

A fundamental, yet frequently overlooked, distinction lies between strategies of *electoral* and *relational* clientelism. Whereas electoral clientelism involves elite payoffs to citizens during campaigns, relational clientelism involves ongoing relationships beyond campaigns. Electoral clientelism — the primary focus of this study — delivers all benefits to citizens *before* voting, and involves the threat of opportunistic defection by citizens. By contrast, relational clientelism delivers at least some benefits to citizens *after* voting, and involves the threat of opportunistic defection by both citizens and elites.

Scholars often conflate *vote buying* with other strategies of electoral clientelism. Much of what scholars interpret as vote buying (exchanging rewards for vote choices) may actually be *turnout buying* (exchanging rewards for turnout). This study advances research on clientelism by specifying and testing a mechanism by which parties can distribute benefits to mobilize supporters. Formal modeling suggests that turnout buying is incentive-compatible, and also provides several testable predictions: (1) machines focus rewards on strong supporters, (2) they target the poor, and (3) they offer rewards where they can most effectively monitor turnout. Although both strategies coexist, empirical tests suggest that Argentine survey data are more consistent with turnout buying than vote buying. Two other strategies of electoral clientelism are also frequently conflated with vote buying: *double persuasion*

(exchanging rewards for vote choices and turnout) and *negative turnout buying* (exchanging rewards for abstention).

Formal analysis in Chapter 4 — coauthored with Jordan Gans-Morse and Sebastian Mazzuca — suggests that political machines are most effective when combining multiple strategies of electoral clientelism. Machines adapt the size of clientelist benefits to citizens' political preferences and inclination to vote, and are willing to pay relatively more for vote buying because unlike other strategies it both adds votes for the machine and subtracts votes from the opposition. The model also suggests that machines tailor their mix of electoral clientelism to five characteristics of political environments: (1) compulsory voting, (2) machine support, (3) political polarization, (4) salience of political preferences, and (5) strength of ballot secrecy. The model's predictions are consistent with qualitative evidence from Argentina, Brazil and Russia.

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Chapter 1

Strategies of Clientelism

1.1 Introduction

While many of the world's political parties rely on policy platforms and ideological appeals to attract voters, other parties offer selective benefits in direct exchange for electoral support. Such clientelist parties (or political machines) typically focus on distributing benefits to the poor (Scott 1969: 1150; Stokes 2005: 315, 321–2), who may be especially responsive to material inducements in contexts where the state fails to provide a social safety net. The present study examines clientelism in Latin America, a region where the phenomenon is both “extremely influential” and “pervasive” (O'Donnell 1996: 34–5, 40). Yet analysts widely recognize that clientelism is prevalent not only in much of the developing world, but also in various developed countries such as Austria, Italy and Japan (e.g., Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007: 2–3; Nyblade & Reed 2008: 931; Piattoni 2001: 197–8).

For many years, scholars viewed clientelism as a characteristic of traditional societies that would evolve and eventually decline with modernization. Much early research on clientelism, based on anthropological case studies, emphasized the role of traditional patterns of deference as fundamental to patron-client relations (e.g., Boissevain 1966; Mair 1961). In a seminal article, James Scott (1969: 1145–7) argued that modernization would erode such patterns of deference, leading clientelism to rely more heavily on “concrete, short-run, material inducements.” Scott depicted such clientelism as only an interim “phase,” which would eventually give way to class-based, programmatic appeals as countries developed (Scott 1969: 1146–7). Various other studies similarly discussed the transitional role of clientelism (e.g., Weingrod 1968: 381–5; Powell 1970: 422).

In sharp contrast with such research, many recent studies view clientelism as a political strategy (e.g., Shefter 1994; Kitschelt 2000; Piattoni 2001). Shefter's (1994: Ch 2) groundbreaking work argues that parties adopt a clientelist rather than programmatic strat-

egy under two conditions: (1) the party “enjoyed access to patronage at the time it first undertook to mobilize a popular base”; and (2) at that time, a “constituency for bureaucratic autonomy” had not yet formed to oppose clientelism (27–28). Along a similar vein, Kitschelt (2000) explains that political elites explicitly choose whether or not to engage in clientelism when competing for electoral support, and examines how factors such as socioeconomic modernization, electoral laws and ethnocultural cleavages influence this decision (see also Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007). Levitsky (2003), who also views clientelism from a strategic perspective, finds that the Argentine Peronist party shifted from labor-based politics towards clientelism in order to maintain working-class and lower-class support while engaging in substantial economic reforms that were in many ways unfavorable for its traditional trade-union base.

Although the strategic perspective marks a significant advance in scholarly research, I argue that studies adopting this approach have an unfortunate tendency to conflate distinct strategies of clientelism. Unlike previous research that emphasizes the heterogeneity of clientelism across time and space (e.g., Scott 1969; Lemarchand & Legg 1972), more recent studies adopting the strategic perspective tend to be far more reductionist. As a result, analysts often fail to distinguish between substantively different patterns of machine politics. The present study encourages the scholarly community to heighten analytical differentiation of clientelism, because conflating distinct strategies poses a serious threat to descriptive and causal inference. With the goal of motivating further analytical differentiation of clientelism, I first emphasize the fundamental — but frequently overlooked — distinction between *electoral* clientelism and *relational* clientelism. As the present study explores, both electoral and relational clientelism consist of various distinct strategies, which are also frequently conflated.

1.2 Electoral vs. Relational Clientelism

For many years, scholars focused almost entirely on relational clientelism, which involves ongoing relationships of mutual (albeit asymmetric) support and dependence (e.g., Banfield & Wilson 1963; Scott 1969; Powell 1970; Kitschelt 2000; Auyero 2001; Levitsky 2003). In recent years, however, some researchers have begun to study electoral clientelism, which involves elite payoffs to citizens exclusively during electoral campaigns (e.g., Callahan & McCargo 1996; Hicken 2002; Stokes 2005; Lehoucq 2007; Schaffer & Schedler 2007). In order to avoid scholarly confusion, it is important to clarify the distinction between these two patterns of machine politics. Electoral clientelism — the primary focus of this study — delivers all benefits to citizens *before* voting, and involves the threat of opportunistic defection by citizens. By contrast, relational clientelism delivers at least some benefits to citizens *after* voting, and involves the threat of opportunistic defection by both citizens and elites.

To see why this distinction is important, consider Stokes's (2005: 316) assertion that many clientelist practices "make a mockery out of democratic accountability." At first glance, it appears that Kitschelt (2000: 851) would sharply disagree with this assessment, given that he contends it is "imprecise or even misleading" to argue that "clientelist politics undercut democratic accountability, whereas programmatic politics creates it." Yet these scholars' viewpoints need not necessarily conflict. Although neither Kitschelt nor Stokes makes this distinction explicit, they focus on entirely different strategies of clientelism. On the one hand, Stokes focuses on a specific form of *electoral* clientelism — vote buying — that rewards citizens for voting against their preferences during a given election. This focus leads Stokes to argue that clientelism holds citizens, rather than politicians, accountable for their actions: "perverse accountability — the ability of parties to monitor constituents' votes, reward them for their support and punish them for defection — is what sustains machine politics" (325). By contrast, Kitschelt examines ongoing patterns of *relational* clientelism, which he argues involve elite accountability: "Politicians who refuse to be responsive to their constituents' demands for selective incentives will be held accountable by them and no longer receive votes and material contributions" (2000: 852; see also Kitschelt et al. 2010: 292). Overall, this example suggests that the distinction between electoral and relational clientelism deserves further investigation.

In order to clarify the distinction between electoral and relational clientelism, it is important to examine the credibility problems involved in each form of clientelism. As a first step, Figure 1.1 emphasizes that unlike programmatic politics, all forms of clientelism involve issues of citizen credibility. In contrast with programmatic politics, clientelism involves contingent exchange in which voters promise to provide political support in exchange for selective benefits (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007: 10; see also Kitschelt 2000: 849–50; Robinson & Verdier 2003: 1). Politicians are thus concerned about the threat of opportunistic defection by citizens when engaging in clientelist strategies. But while citizen credibility is a key concern for clientelism, it is not for programmatic politics. As Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007: 22) point out: "Programmatic politicians do not engage in contingent exchange and therefore do not try to monitor and enforce conformity of voters with certain party preferences, while clientelist politicians most definitely engage in such practices."

In order to distinguish between electoral and relational clientelism, Figure 1.2 disaggregates the top cell of Figure 1.1. As shown, only relational clientelism — and not electoral clientelism — involves issues of elite credibility.¹ This key difference arises because all ben-

¹To the best of my knowledge, no other study employs issues of credibility to distinguish between strategies of clientelism. On the other hand, numerous studies on clientelism mention issues of credibility. Most exclusively mention citizen credibility (e.g., Stokes 2005; Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007) or elite credibility (e.g., Keefer 2007). However, Robinson & Verdier (2003: 1) and Finan & Schechter (2010: 1) mention the "double" credibility problem of both citizens and elites.

Figure 1.1: Credibility Problem of Citizens: Clientelism vs. Programmatic Politics

Does a Citizen's Credibility Affect Actions of Elites?	Yes	Clientelism <i>How Elites Distribute Benefits <u>Depends on</u> Credibility of Promises of Support by Citizens</i>
	No	Programmatic Politics <i>How Elites Distribute Benefits <u>Does Not</u> <u>Depend on</u> Credibility of Promises of Support by Citizens</i>

Figure 1.2: Credibility Problem of Elites: Relational vs. Electoral Clientelism


Does an Elite's Credibility Affect Actions of Citizens?			
		Yes	No
Does a Citizen's Credibility Affect Actions of Elites?	No	Relational Clientelism <i>How Citizens Act <u>Depends</u> on Credibility of Promises by Elites</i>	Electoral Clientelism <i>How Citizens Act <u>Does Not Depend</u> on Credibility of Promises by Elites</i>
	Yes		

efits are received *before* voting with electoral clientelism, whereas at least some benefits are received *after* voting with relational clientelism. In the case of electoral clientelism, citizens face no risk of opportunistic defection, because politicians deliver all benefits before the citizen votes. Thus, citizen actions do not depend on the credibility of elite promises. By contrast, with relational clientelism, voters look forward to assess the likelihood that a given politician will actually follow through with promises to deliver selective benefits. Given the risk of opportunistic defection, citizen actions depend on the credibility of elite promises.

Based on this discussion of citizen and elite credibility, Figure 1.3 provides a typology of commitment problems across different types of elite-citizen linkages. The row labels match that of Figure 1.1 (issues of citizen credibility) and the column labels match that of Figure 1.2 (issues of elite credibility). Electoral clientelism, which is the primary focus of this study, involves only a citizen commitment problem. That is, citizen credibility affects elite actions, but elite credibility does not affect citizen actions. By contrast, relational clientelism involves a dual commitment problem. Not only does citizen credibility affect the elite actions, but also elite credibility affects citizen actions.

While not the focus of the present study, Figure 1.3 also contrasts the differences of credibility problems involved with different forms of clientelist and programmatic linkages. With prospective programmatic politics, citizens vote partly on the basis of campaign promises (e.g., Kitschelt 2000). There is thus an elite commitment problem: the credibility of elites affects whether citizens believe they will actually follow through with such promises. With retrospective programmatic politics, it is assumed that citizens rationally ignore campaign promises (e.g., Fiorina 1978; Alesina 1988). Given that citizens make electoral decisions

Figure 1.3: Citizens and Elites: Interaction of Credibility Problems



solely based on past performance, retrospective programmatic politics involves no commitment problem.

1.3 Examples from Northeast Brazil

Qualitative evidence draws further attention to the important distinction between electoral and relational clientelism. The present study builds on 18 months of fieldwork in Brazil. During the 2008 municipal elections, I conducted a total of 110 formal interviews on clientelism across the state of Bahia.² Bahia is the most populous state in Northeast Brazil, the poorest region of the country (IBGE 2009). The formal interviews included 55 interviews of community members and 55 interviews of elites. In addition, I lived in a rural municipality of 10,000 citizens for five months, and conducted an additional 350 informal interviews of citizens and elites. This fieldwork focused on small municipalities, as defined by those with 100,000 citizens or fewer. Even though 49 percent of Brazilians live in such municipalities, most scholarly research pays scant attention to the role of clientelism in small communities.

With respect to electoral clientelism, politicians often dole out food, clothing, building materials, and even money during campaigns in Brazil. The prevalence of this practice led over one million citizens to sign a petition in 1999 calling for stricter legislation, resulting in the country's first law passed by popular initiative (*Lei 9840*). Under this law, at least 660 politicians were prosecuted in Brazil between 2000 and 2008 for distributing selective benefits during campaigns.³ In a recent national survey, over 13 percent of respondents admitted voting for candidate in exchange for a benefit.⁴ During my interviews, citizens often gave examples of vote buying during campaigns, and 87 percent (47 of 54 citizens responding) reported that the practice happens in their municipality.

On the eve of the 2008 municipal election, I met with several political operatives who explained how they would work as a team to buy votes the next day. They target poor farmers — whom they find the most amenable to vote-buying offers — on their way to the polling place. An operative approaches a farmer and asks him to come for a drink. The voter is taken to a nearby house, and after some alcohol is offered R\$10 (roughly \$5) to vote for a particular candidate. One operative explained what happens if the voter accepts: “When he goes to vote, you have to go together. When he enters ... you sit there and wait for him to vote.”⁵ Afterwards, the operatives revealed, they employ an unusual test to check whether the recipient actually voted as instructed. Brazil has fully electronic voting, and the polling

²The appendix provides a more detailed description of this fieldwork.

³Movimento de Combate à Corrupção Eleitoral (<http://www.mcce.org.br>), 2009.

⁴Survey conducted by research firm Datafolha in August 2009 included 2,133 respondents across 150 municipalities.

⁵Interview conducted by author in a Bahia municipality with 10,000 citizens on October 4, 2008.

machine shows a candidate's picture only if selected as the vote choice. Therefore, the operatives ask recipients what color shirt the candidate wore in the displayed picture: "If he voted for the guy, he knows. White shirt, striped."⁶ And just as they had described, while sitting by the polling place the next day, I witnessed these and other political operatives intercepting voters, leading them to nearby houses, and soon thereafter accompanying them to the polls.

Although a wide body of evidence suggests that such electoral clientelism is prevalent in Brazil, it is by no means the only form of clientelism employed. Many Brazilian politicians engage in relational clientelism, developing long-term relationships with citizens in which they provide ongoing selective benefits in exchange for political support. The state often fails to provide a basic social safety net, and as a result citizens frequently rely on relationships with politicians to meet their dire needs. For example, although Brazil's 1988 Constitution established a public health system intended to be universal and comprehensive, in practice medicines are often out of stock or otherwise unavailable at the public pharmacy. Many interviewees indicated that politicians buy medicine for their supporters at private pharmacies, either using public funds (especially mayors) or out of their own salaries (especially city councilmen). A city councilman emphasized his provision of medical benefits to supporters when explaining: "If you spend four years in office giving this help to a voter, then you can be more or less certain that he's not going to deny you in the hour that you also need him."⁷ Overall, such ongoing benefits suggest a pattern of relational clientelism that is remarkably different from the episodic nature of electoral clientelism.

These examples from Brazil also provide additional insight about the role of credibility issues in clientelism. Issues of citizen credibility affect both electoral and relational clientelism, but are overcome in different ways. On the one hand, political operatives buying votes on Election Day employ mechanisms such as testing recipients about shirt colors to ensure they follow through with their end of the bargain. By contrast, with relational clientelism, politicians suggest that long-term relationships help to ameliorate issues of credibility. As suggested by the city councilman's quote above, politicians tend to believe that a citizen receiving ongoing help will reciprocate by providing electoral support. A mayor further elaborated that such a citizen "stays loyal" because when "you make a real bond of trust with a certain candidate — city councilman or mayor — you think he can solve all of your problems."⁸

While qualitative evidence provides insights about citizen credibility issues in both forms of clientelism, it also confirms the intuition from Figure 2 that only relational clientelism

⁶Interview conducted by author in a Bahia municipality with 10,000 citizens on October 4, 2008.

⁷Interview conducted by author in a Bahia municipality with 50,000 citizens on November 13, 2008.

⁸Interview conducted by author in a Bahia municipality with 30,000 citizens on December 1, 2008.

involves elite credibility issues. Citizens involved in vote-buying transactions (a form of electoral clientelism) receive all benefits during the campaign, and thus are not concerned with elite credibility. By contrast, citizens pay close attention to elite credibility in the context of relational clientelism, often evaluating past relationships to gauge whether politicians will follow through on their promises of future support. Candidates with a proven track record of providing assistance are deemed far more likely to help in the future. For example, 82 percent of citizens (41 of 50 responding) indicated that they would vote for a candidate who had helped them in small ways over a longer period, rather than a candidate who helped them substantially during a campaign. The latter candidate was viewed as an unreliable source of future assistance. A citizen role-played how this candidate would respond if asked for help once elected: “[The politician] places his hand on his pocket and says: ‘I already paid.’ — [Citizen:] ‘But I voted for you!’ — [Politician:] ‘Ah, but I already paid for that vote!’”⁹ By contrast, ongoing relationships help to overcome such issues of elite credibility, which affect relational clientelism but not electoral clientelism.

Overall, the above discussion has emphasized the importance of distinguishing between electoral and relational clientelism. Yet this distinction only begins to scratch the surface of the analytical differentiation required for the study of clientelism. The present study argues that many scholars also conflate distinct strategies of electoral clientelism, with serious consequences for descriptive and causal inference.

1.4 Conflating Strategies of Electoral Clientelism

As the present study examines, scholars frequently conflate vote buying with other strategies of electoral clientelism. Scholars typically understand vote buying as offering selective benefits in exchange for vote choices. But this depiction of vote buying presents a puzzle: with the secret ballot, what prevents individuals from accepting rewards and then voting as they wish? An alternative strategy of electoral clientelism, which I term “turnout buying” (Nichter 2008), provides one explanation why parties offer rewards even when they cannot monitor vote choices. By rewarding unmobilized supporters for showing up at the polls, parties can activate their passive constituencies. Because turnout buying targets supporters, it only requires monitoring *whether* individuals vote.

Unfortunately, most studies fail to distinguish whether rewards are used to influence vote choices or induce electoral participation. Thus, much of what scholars interpret as vote buying (exchanging rewards for vote choices) may actually be turnout buying (exchanging rewards for turnout). In addition, the present study suggests that two other strategies of electoral clientelism — “double persuasion” and “negative turnout buying” — must also be distinguished from vote buying. Double persuasion distributes benefits to individuals who

⁹Interview conducted by author in a Bahia municipality with 80,000 citizens on November 21, 2008.

have little in the way of ideological preferences or reasons to vote, outside of clientelist reward structures. With this strategy of electoral clientelism, politicians influence vote choices *and* induce participation. By contrast, negative turnout buying delivers rewards to opposing voters for staying home on Election Day, in an effort to reduce the number of votes received by opposition candidates (e.g., Cox & Kousser 1981; Heckelman 1998).

In sum, this study not only emphasizes the importance of analytical differentiation between relational and electoral clientelism, but also underscores the need to distinguish between distinct strategies of electoral clientelism.

1.5 Broader Implications

Stepping back to consider the wider implications of this study, we may observe that the distinction between strategies of clientelism is important in part due to its normative significance. Consider, for example, the distinction between vote buying and turnout buying. Vote buying may be seen as unambiguously pernicious for democracy — the strategy undermines political equality by allowing those who have resources to buy votes of the poor, interferes with free and fair elections, and makes “a mockery of democratic accountability” (Stokes 2005: 316; see also Schaffer & Schedler 2007). By contrast, Hasen (2000: 1357–8, 1370) contends that the normative implications of turnout buying are more ambiguous: “unlike vote buying ... payment for turnout is a mixed case” because it may increase equality of political participation by inducing the poor to vote.¹⁰ Beyond providing incentives for voting in the current election, turnout buying may also stimulate future electoral participation: a recent randomized field experiment suggests that voting is habit forming (Gerber, Green & Shachar 2003). Despite various potential negative consequences of turnout buying — such as the commodification of voting and partisan use of state resources — its overall normative implications therefore remain a point of contention. In fact, some US states (including Alaska, California and Mississippi) even allow parties to offer incentives for turnout during local elections (Hasen 2000: 1326). Such normative questions about distinct strategies of clientelism challenge scholars to increase analytical differentiation.

The findings of this study also have implications extending beyond research on clientelism. Scholars have long debated the logic, mechanisms and motivations behind parties’ distribution of targetable goods (e.g., infrastructure projects and particularistic benefits).¹¹

¹⁰Hasen (2000: 1357–8, 1370) considers three normative criteria — equality, efficiency and inalienability — and argues that incentives for turnout: (1) benefit political equality by encouraging the poor to vote; (2) have ambiguous effects on economic efficiency; and (3) undermine moral claims that the right to vote should be unalienable. Hasen asserts that vote buying undermines all three normative criteria.

¹¹Clientelism is only one of various ways in which parties can distribute targetable benefits. For example, parties can distribute infrastructure projects to targeted districts (i.e., “pork”).

Two major formal studies offer conflicting predictions: whereas Cox & McCubbins (1986) argue that parties will distribute targetable goods to core supporters, Lindbeck & Weibull (1987) contend they will target swing voters. While most of this literature overlooks mobilization, as in the more narrow discussion of clientelism, an important new research agenda motivated by the work of Gary Cox promises to put mobilization at the heart of the debate.¹² In an incisive conceptual paper, Cox (2006) argues that studies focus too narrowly on *persuasion* (changing voters' preferences); when strategies such as *mobilization* (affecting whether citizens vote) are considered, the core-supporter hypothesis is substantially strengthened. The present study is one of the first formal and empirical studies to tackle the mobilization agenda, and thus lays the groundwork for future research.

1.6 Organization of the Study

With the goal of improving our understanding of electoral clientelism, Chapter 2 clarifies conceptual ambiguity about vote buying. Analysts refer to vote buying when describing diverse political phenomena, all too often without explicitly defining the concept. As a result, research on clientelism often conflates vote buying with other forms of electoral clientelism. In order to develop a “systematized concept” of clientelist vote buying (Adcock & Collier 2001), Chapter 2: (1) distinguishes *clientelist* vote buying from other forms of vote buying analyzed in the scholarly literature; (2) examines key differences in how researchers implicitly or explicitly define clientelist vote buying; and (3) clarifies the distinction between clientelist vote buying and other forms of electoral clientelism.

Building on this analysis, Chapter 3 reveals how conceptual ambiguity about clientelist vote buying can have serious consequences for descriptive and causal inference. As discussed above, most studies of electoral clientelism fail to distinguish whether rewards are used to influence vote choices or induce electoral participation. And if researchers overlook the role of mobilization, serious analytical mistakes can arise. Examining the case of Argentina, Chapter 3 suggests that much of what scholars interpret as vote buying (exchanging rewards for vote choices) may actually be turnout buying (exchanging rewards for turnout). Formal and empirical analyses are employed to specify and test a mechanism by which parties can engage in turnout buying. Formal modeling suggests that turnout buying is incentive-compatible, and also provides several testable predictions: (1) machines will focus rewards on strong supporters, (2) they will target the poor, and (3) they will offer rewards where they can most effectively monitor turnout. Although both strategies coexist, empirical tests suggest that Argentine survey data are more consistent with turnout buying than vote buying.

¹²Examples of studies ignoring mobilization are Cox & McCubbins (1986: 374), which assumes in formal analysis “that all voters vote,” and Dixit & Londregan (1996: 1136 fn), which states “we simply follow the literature in assuming that everyone votes.”

Chapter 4 — coauthored with Jordan Gans-Morse and Sebastian Mazzuca — extends this analysis by examining how machines combine vote buying, turnout buying, and other strategies of electoral clientelism. A formal model suggests that political machines *never* optimally expend all their resources on just one strategy. When distributing clientelist benefits, machines adapt the size of rewards to citizens' political preferences and inclination to vote, and are willing to pay relatively more for vote buying because unlike other strategies it both adds votes for the machine and subtracts votes from the opposition. The model also suggests that machines tailor their mix of electoral clientelism to five characteristics of political environments: (1) compulsory voting, (2) machine support, (3) political polarization, (4) salience of political preferences, and (5) strength of ballot secrecy. The model's predictions are consistent with qualitative evidence from Argentina, Brazil and Russia.

Chapter 5 concludes the present study by suggesting productive directions for future research. Key tasks for further formal, quantitative and qualitative analyses of electoral clientelism are identified. In addition, scholars are encouraged to examine linkages between electoral and relational clientelism, as well as other particularistic and programmatic strategies that parties employ to obtain political support. Furthermore, broadening the elite-centric focus of research on clientelism would help to reveal the extent to which *citizens* also engage in strategic behavior. Overall, the combined tools of formal and empirical analysis, along with the specific research strategies enumerated in Chapter 5, can open new avenues for understanding these basic electoral practices.

Chapter 2

Conceptualizing Vote Buying

2.1 Introduction

When parties engage in electoral clientelism by distributing selective benefits during campaigns, scholars typically describe this phenomenon as “vote buying.” But what is vote buying? Although this concept is often assumed to be relatively straightforward, examining the academic literature reveals substantial conceptual ambiguity. Analysts refer to vote buying when describing diverse political phenomena, all too often without explicitly defining the concept. As explored in the present chapter, examples of how the concept of vote buying is employed include: rewarding citizens for switching their vote choices, enticing legislators to support NAFTA, allocating roads to co-ethnic districts, and increasing pensions for the elderly.

To enhance our understanding of electoral clientelism, resolving conceptual ambiguity about vote buying is crucial. As shown below, the concept of vote buying is often used inappropriately, with particularly serious consequences when scholars conflate vote buying with other strategies of electoral clientelism. In order to refine the conceptualization of vote buying, the present chapter: (1) distinguishes clientelist vote buying from other forms of vote buying analyzed in the scholarly literature; (2) examines key differences in how researchers implicitly or explicitly define clientelist vote buying; and (3) clarifies the distinction between clientelist vote buying and other forms of electoral clientelism.

2.2 Distinguishing Forms of Vote Buying

One source of scholarly confusion is that although the concept of vote buying encompasses various distinct phenomena, researchers rarely distinguish what form of vote buying they study. Given the focus of the present study, it is important to differentiate *clientelist* vote buying from other forms of vote buying. Unpacking the concept of vote buying also

contributes to broader research by clarifying how the concept is used in different contexts.

With these goals in mind, the literature on vote buying can be categorized according to two key dimensions: (1) whether selective benefits are delivered to individual citizens; and (2) whether selective benefits are contingent on political support.¹ Based on these dimensions, Figure 2.1 provides a typology of four distinct ways in which academic studies utilize the concept of vote buying, with representative examples. *Clientelist* vote buying, a central focus of this study, distributes contingent benefits to individual citizens in exchange for political support.² Another focus of many researchers is *legislative* vote buying, which also involves contingent benefits but targets legislators instead of citizens. With *non-excludable* vote buying, parties or candidates target districts with benefits such as infrastructure projects in an effort to generate political support. Finally, *non-binding* vote buying delivers benefits to individual citizens, without requiring their commitment to provide political support.

In order to investigate these conceptual distinctions more closely, each subtype of vote buying is now examined. It will be argued below that non-excludable and non-binding vote buying should be considered “diminished” subtypes (Collier & Levitsky 1997: 435), because they do not involve contingent exchange, a defining attribute of vote buying.

2.2.1 Clientelist Vote Buying

Many studies employ the concept of vote buying when discussing the broader context of clientelist linkages between elites and citizens. During campaigns in many countries, clientelist parties (or political machines) deliver material inducements to individuals in exchange for political support. As Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007) emphasize, a defining characteristic of clientelistic exchanges is that “the politician’s delivery of a benefit is *contingent upon* the actions of specific members of the electorate” (10, italics in original). Studies on clientelism that use the term “vote buying” often underscore that the contingency of benefits requires parties to overcome the threat of opportunistic defection by voters (e.g., Schaffer & Schedler 2007: 20; Vicente & Wantchekon 2009: 301).³ In order to ensure that citizens actually comply with vote-buying agreements, analysts frequently contend that machines engage in

¹The present study focuses exclusively on how the concept of vote buying is used in the context of politics at the national or subnational level. Thus, vote buying in international organizations (e.g., Gillispie 2001; Tamura & Kunieda 2005; Kuziemko & Werker 2006) and corporations (e.g., Clark 1978; Cole 2001) is not considered.

²As discussed more extensively below, although broader research on clientelism sometimes includes small groups as recipients (e.g., Gay 1994; Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007), studies that use the term “vote buying” focus exclusively on individuals.

³It should be emphasized that the present chapter focuses exclusively on studies that *explicitly* refer to vote buying. Some scholars who study clientelism, but eschew the concept of vote buying, do not have a strong focus on opportunistic defection. Examples include Auyero (2000) and Levitsky (2003), whose books never employ the term “vote buying.”

Figure 2.1: Common Usage of “Vote Buying” in Academic Studies

		Are Selective Benefits Distributed to Individual Citizens?		
		<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	
Are Selective Benefits Contingent on Political Support?	<i>Yes</i>	Legislative Vote Buying – Groseclose & Snyder (1996) – Evans (2004) – Dekel et al. (2009)	Clientelist Vote Buying – Stokes (2005) – Hicken (2007) – Lehoucq (2007)	<i>Classical Subtypes</i>
	<i>No</i>	Non-Excludable Vote Buying – Magaloni (2006) – Burgess et al. (2009) – Herron & Theodos (2004)	Non-Binding Vote Buying – Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2006) – Chen (2008) – Thames (2001)	

monitoring and enforcement once they distribute selective benefits.

An example of a study that focuses on clientelist vote buying is Stokes (2005), which is examined more extensively in Chapter 3. Stokes argues that during elections in Argentina, the Peronist party distributes rewards to weakly opposed voters in exchange for switching their vote choices. She closely examines mechanisms that facilitate these contingent exchanges. Stokes argues that the Peronist party uses its “deep insertion in voters’ social networks” to violate the secret ballot, and is therefore able to enforce compliance when buying citizens’ votes (315). Similarly, Lehoucq’s (2007) study of clientelist vote buying in nine countries highlights the importance of enforcing contingent exchanges with citizens. Lehoucq argues that “due to the principal-agent problems inherent in vote buying,” parties will only engage in vote buying if they can monitor how citizens vote in order to “ensure that bargains are kept” (42). Another study focusing on this subtype is Hicken (2007), which examines the impact of rules and institutions on clientelist vote buying. Hicken depicts the phenomenon as involving contingent exchanges with individual citizens: “Vote buying involves the *individual, immediate, and private* exchange of goods, services or cash for electoral support” (51, italics in original). Additional examples of clientelist vote buying are discussed further below.

2.2.2 Legislative Vote Buying

Scholars also often employ the concept of vote buying when studying the legislative arena. Whereas clientelist vote buying targets citizens, legislative vote buying targets individual legislators. A wide literature examines how vote buyers — who may include interest groups, presidents, governors, party leaders or committee leaders (Groseclose & Snyder 1996: 304)— deliver selective benefits to legislators in exchange for their votes on a particular bill. Scholars understand such exchanges to be contingent: selective benefits (often called “payments”) are written into a bill before roll-call voting, and in return legislators who receive benefits agree to support the legislation.

For instance, an influential formal study by Groseclose & Snyder (1996) argues that vote buying results in supermajority coalitions in legislatures under most conditions.⁴ They focus exclusively on contingent payments to legislators, explaining that “payments for votes on a bill are typically written into the bill itself (as special conditions, allowances, exemptions, transition rules, and so on)” (304). Likewise, Dekel, Jackson & Wolinsky (2009) also formally examine vote buying of legislators using contingent payments. The authors assume that “vote buying is an ordinary transaction: the lobbyist gets full control of the vote in exchange for an up-front payment to the legislator” (106). Diana Evans’s (2004) book provides empirical

⁴They assume that two vote buyers move sequentially: the first mover buys enough votes to secure a supermajority, because it will not be able to buy additional votes later in response to the second mover.

examples of legislative vote buying. Evans explains that vote buying — which she defines as adding projects for a legislator’s district to a bill, in exchange for obtaining that legislator’s vote — allows leaders to obtain legislators’ support more easily than making substantial, broader revisions to the bill (36). Overall, she argues that “efforts at vote buying with distributive benefits were successful in three major instances in the House of Representatives. On the two highway reauthorization bills and NAFTA, policy coalition leaders evidently succeeded in changing members’ voting intentions by giving them distributive benefits for their districts” (159). Legislative vote buying is also frequently discussed outside the US context. For example, Brazil’s *mensalão* scandal of 2004-2005 involved illegal side-payments from the executive office to individual legislators, and was labeled as vote buying by the press, official investigative committees, and academics (Pereira, Power & Raile 2008: 4). Other studies of legislative vote buying (i.e., distributing contingent benefits to legislators) include Snyder (1991), Diermeier & Myerson (1999), Ansolabehere, Snyder & Stewart (2001), King & Zeckhauser (2003), and Snyder & Ting (2005).

2.2.3 Non-Excludable Vote Buying

Non-excludable vote buying is a third way in which studies use the concept of vote buying. Such studies investigate the allocation of local public goods, such as hospitals and roads, across political districts. Whereas clientelist vote buying targets *individual citizens* and legislative vote buying targets *legislators*, non-excludable vote buying targets *districts*. Scholars who employ this usage do not argue that the phenomenon involves contingent exchange. According to such analysts, neither citizens nor legislators commit to vote in a particular way so that their districts obtain benefits. Rather, it is argued that politicians distribute local public goods as a political investment, with the aim of generating future electoral support from citizens who vote in targeted districts. Observe that once local public goods are delivered to targeted districts, citizens in those districts cannot be excluded from benefits (Estévez, Magaloni & Diaz-Cayeros 2002: 4) — by definition, local public goods are non-excludable within localities. This characteristic of non-excludability is a key reason that vote buying with local public goods cannot rely on contingent exchange: citizens in targeted districts will receive benefits regardless of whether or not they agree to vote in a particular way.⁵

Beatriz Magaloni’s (2006) book on hegemonic party survival and demise in Mexico offers an example of non-excludable vote buying. In a chapter entitled “The Politics of Vote Buying,” Magaloni argues that PRONASOL, a national poverty relief program, “was an effective vote-buying program” (146). By vote buying, she refers to the PRI regime channeling local

⁵Some studies that do *not* employ the concept of vote buying provide examples of local public goods that involve contingent exchange. For example, Gay (1994: 105) discusses a candidate buying votes in (contingent) exchange for a community bathroom in Rio de Janeiro, but never uses the term “vote buying” in his book. The present chapter focuses exclusively on studies employing the term.

public goods disproportionately to municipalities governed by the PRI rather than the opposition (122, 149–150). Magaloni is particularly careful to emphasize that the chapter does not focus on “individual vote buying through excludable benefits, which the literature equates with clientelism,” but instead on “the *geographic allocation* of total PRONASOL resources” (123, italics in original).⁶ Similarly, Herron & Theodos (2004) employ the concept of vote buying in their econometric study of how the Illinois state government allocated “member initiative grants” across districts. The member initiative grants provided community benefits to targeted districts, including ambulances, fire trucks, and playground improvements (288). Herron & Theodos find that before the 2000 election, “Illinois decision makers who allocated member initiative funds sought to distribute them in a way that would be most beneficial in the sense of vote buying,” such as by targeting politically competitive districts (287). Another example is a recent study by Burgess et al. (2009) on the political economy of road placement in Kenya. The study finds that the Kenyan president employs wide discretion when building roads, and channels substantially more paved roads to districts where his ethnicity is dominant (16–17). The authors conduct various analyses to examine whether the president’s targeting of co-ethnic districts with roads is motivated by vote buying, and explain that the “vote-buying hypothesis consists of politicians targeting (or committing to target) public spending so as to maximize their probability of being elected” (4, 17). Overall, these studies provide examples of non-excludable vote buying, which distributes local public goods to districts without contingent exchanges.

2.2.4 Non-Binding Vote Buying

A fourth way in which scholars utilize the concept of vote buying involves distributing selective benefits to individual citizens *without* contingent exchanges. With such non-binding vote buying, parties distribute particularistic benefits in the hopes of generating goodwill that will yield electoral returns during the next election. Some scholars argue that non-binding vote buying targets individuals according to partisanship or other political criteria, while other researchers suggest that this form of vote buying distributes benefits programmatically but nevertheless aims to generate political support among recipients. Given that non-binding vote buying involves benefits distributed to individual citizens, special care must be taken not to confuse this subtype with clientelist vote buying. Unlike clientelist vote buying, citizens do not commit to voting in a particular way in exchange for benefits. Hence, this form of vote buying does not involve commitment problems because citizens do not promise to deliver electoral support. As a result, in sharp contrast with literature on clientelist vote buying, studies on non-binding vote buying do not discuss opportunistic defection.

⁶More specifically, the chapter focuses on the geographic allocation of approximately 70 percent of PRONASOL funds that consisted of “public works targeted to towns, municipalities or regions” (Magaloni 2006: 122–3).

To explore how scholars employ the concept of non-binding vote buying, consider recent work by Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez & Magaloni (2006). Their study finds that two programs distributing individual benefits to the poor, *Oportunidades* and *Seguro Popular*, boosted Calderón’s political support and contributed to his victory in the 2006 Mexican presidential election. On the one hand, they contend that it is “highly implausible” that clientelism affected the distribution of benefits (30). However, Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez & Magaloni indicate that the programs reflect a relatively benign form of vote buying because individuals who received benefits responded favorably and chose to provide political support for Calderón. As they explain: “Favorable beneficiary reaction to the incumbent party, where it occurred, may indicate successful vote-buying by the party in power, but it is likely to be vote-buying of the good sort” (30).⁷ Another example is Chen (2008), which examines the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) distribution of disaster assistance to individuals in the wake of the 2004 Florida hurricane season. Chen employs the concept of vote buying throughout his research, but never argues that FEMA benefits were contingent on individuals agreeing to vote in a particular way. Rather, he finds a “partisan asymmetry in voter responsiveness to FEMA aid,” in that Republicans were more likely than Democrats to deliver electoral support for Bush after receiving individual disaster assistance (21). Chen concludes that “a political party’s most efficient vote-buying strategy is to target pre-election monetary awards to its core partisan supporters in the hopes of increasing their turnout rate, thus enhancing the party’s vote share” (24). Another illuminating example is a contentious editorial written by Cristovam Buarque (2006), a Brazilian Senator and chief architect of the pilot program that evolved into *Bolsa Família*, the largest conditional cash transfer in the world. He claims that *Bolsa Família* “has become a vote-buying scheme” because its payments to the poor have increased political support for President Lula. Buarque does not suggest that the program provides cash benefits to individuals as part of contingent (clientelist) exchange; rather, he asserts that “it turned into a program with a strong electoral appeal since it is seen as aid without counterpart, a kindness received from the government.” In addition, Thames (2001: 67) argues that Yeltsin engaged in vote buying when he expanded overall expenditures on benefits that accrue to individuals (such as increasing pensions and raising student stipends) in order to attract the political support of specific types of voters. In sum, these studies provide examples of non-binding vote buying, which distributes selective benefits to individual citizens without contingent exchanges.

⁷To provide broader context, it should be noted that the ongoing work of Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez & Magaloni (2010: 222) seeks to “measure the vote buying potential of various forms of government transfers — public versus private goods, delivered through clientelistic versus non-clientelistic programs.” See also Estévez, Magaloni & Diaz-Cayeros (2002).

2.3 Risk of Conceptual Stretching

This variegated usage of the concept of vote buying raises the issue of conceptual stretching. This section investigates this issue and emphasizes that only clientelist and legislative vote buying — *not* non-excludable and non-binding vote buying — should be considered classical subtypes that are “full instances” of vote buying (Collier & Levitsky 1997: 435).

Using vote buying to describe diverse phenomena involves potential benefits and risks. Vote buying is an evocative term that can be effectively employed in a variety of contexts, so long as that usage reflects the true underlying meaning of the concept. Disaggregating the concept into subtypes can usefully distinguish between cases that diverge along some characteristics, but nevertheless share defining attributes of the broader concept of vote buying. On the other hand, such diverse usage may also pose the risk of conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970), if scholars call strategies of obtaining political support “vote buying” without carefully considering whether the concept is appropriately applied. This risk is particularly significant if all four subtypes in Figure 2.1 are viewed as “classical subtypes” (Collier & Levitsky 1997: 435). Classical subtypes are based on categorization that “views the relation among categories in terms of a taxonomic hierarchy, with each category having clear boundaries and defining properties shared by all members” (Collier & Mahon 1993: 845). Adopting classical subtypes for all forms of vote buying in Figure 2.1 heightens the risk of conceptual stretching, because such usage assumes that all are “*full* instances of the root definition” of the concept (Collier & Levitsky 1997: 435, *italics in original*).

With the specific goal of investigating which subtypes are “full instances” of vote buying, a root definition of the concept is now developed. At the outset, it should be recognized that some scholars may include or exclude particular attributes in their own root definitions; in fact, an important point of this chapter is to emphasize that such decisions have important consequences for research and should thus be made explicitly and consciously.⁸ The root definition of vote buying used in the present study consists of three attributes: (1) influence on vote choices; (2) *ex ante* benefits; and (3) contingent exchange. First, vote buying is a strategy by which parties or candidates distribute selective benefits in order to influence vote choices. In other words, vote buying exchanges rewards for how — not whether — recipients vote. As this study examines extensively below, vote buying should thus be distinguished from efforts to induce electoral participation. Second, vote buying involves *ex ante* benefits; that is, benefits are received before voting. Recipients deliver their vote choices in return for tangible benefits already received, rather than the possibility of future rewards. Third, vote buying involves contingent exchange, as selective benefits are provided on a *quid pro quo* basis. Recipients agree to vote in a particular way in return for selective benefits.

⁸As Collier & Levitsky (1997: 435fn) explain, the term “root definition” does “not imply that it is the ‘correct’ definition of the relevant concept ... It is simply the definition that, for a particular author, is the point of departure in forming the subtype.”

Given this root definition, only two of the subtypes in Figure 2.1 — clientelist and legislative vote buying — are classical subtypes that possess all three defining attributes of vote buying. Both strategies influence vote choices, provide *ex ante* benefits, and involve contingent exchange. By contrast, the other two subtypes in Figure 2.1, non-excludable and non-binding vote buying, are missing an attribute in the root definition of vote buying: neither subtype involves contingent exchange. Recipients do not agree to vote in a particular way in return for selective benefits. Instead, parties and candidates distribute benefits — local public goods in the case of non-excludable vote buying, and particularistic goods in the case of non-binding vote buying — in the hopes of generating goodwill that will yield electoral returns during the next election. From the perspective of scholars adopting the root definition presented above, it would be inappropriate to depict these two strategies as classical subtypes of vote buying. Given that neither strategy meets all three defining attributes, to do so would entail conceptual stretching.

In order to mitigate the threat of conceptual stretching, Sartori (1970) suggests that scholars can climb a “ladder of generality” by reducing the number of defining attributes included in a concept.⁹ As Collier & Mahon (1993: 846) explain, a “law of inverse variation” applies as one moves up the ladder: reducing the quantity of defining attributes (i.e., “intension”) increases the number of cases to which the concept applies (i.e., “extension”) (see also Sartori 1970: 1041). Applying this approach to the case of vote buying, research may be improved by climbing the ladder of generality and employing a broader concept when cases do not involve contingent exchange or other defining attributes. For example, vote buying can be viewed as form of “electoral investment” (Schaffer & Schedler 2007: 18), which is clearly a more general concept than vote buying. By way of comparison with the root definition of vote buying presented above, electoral investment involves only one of the three attributes: *ex ante* benefits.¹⁰ Thus, shifting from vote buying to electoral investment reduces the number of defining attributes, moves up the ladder of generality, and mitigates the risk of conceptual stretching. Overall, analysts can ameliorate concerns about conceptual stretching by using broader concepts such as electoral investment when referring to cases that do not possess all the defining attributes of vote buying.

Of course, a crucial question when moving up the ladder of generality is whether vote buying is actually a form of the broader concept that is chosen. For example, some prominent scholars such as Cox (2006) and Dunning & Stokes (2008) consider vote buying to be a

⁹Note that Sartori (1970: 1040) originally uses the term “ladder of abstraction.” Collier & Mahon (1993: 853ft) adapt the term, calling it the “ladder of generality” to enhance clarity.

¹⁰To illustrate that the concept of “electoral investment” has fewer defining attributes than vote buying, consider the example of a governor opening a hospital in her bailiwick in the hopes of boosting supporters’ turnout in an upcoming election. The hospital is an *ex ante* benefit, but is not distributed to influence vote choices and is not part of a contingent exchange.

form of “persuasion.” Dunning & Stokes (2008: 3–4) are explicit: they describe vote buying as a form of “‘clientelist’ persuasion” (3), and define persuasion in the context of their study as “changing a person’s vote choice by giving her an individualized reward” (4fn). Cox never explicitly mentions the term “vote buying,” but provides several examples of vote buying when discussing the broader concept of persuasion (2006: 5). Yet there is arguably an important conceptual distinction between buying a vote and persuading a citizen. With respect to the former, the Oxford Dictionary defines “buy” as “obtain in exchange for payment.” By contrast, according to Cox’s (2006: 1) own definition, persuasion is “an attempt to change voters’ preferences between given alternatives.” So, persuasion may well capture the meaning of some works discussed above, such as Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez & Magaloni (2006) and Buarque (2006), which suggest that social programs influence citizens’ voting decisions by generating goodwill. But persuasion arguably does not accurately reflect other studies in which political machines “buy” political support using contingent benefits. In such cases, climbing the ladder of generality to the concept of persuasion is unlikely to yield greater analytic utility.

It should be emphasized that moving up the ladder of generality is by no means the only solution for avoiding conceptual stretching. Collier & Levitsky (1997) discuss several alternatives, one of which is particularly relevant for this analysis. By employing “diminished” subtypes, scholars can mitigate the risk of conceptual stretching while also increasing differentiation (437). Collier & Levitsky underscore two key aspects of diminished subtypes: (1) they “are *not* full instances of the root definition” of the concept; and (2) they typically highlight attributes of the root definition that are either missing or present (1997: 437–8, *italics in original*). Adopting this approach, one way to improve conceptual clarity is to identify the two strategies in the bottom row of Figure 2.1 as diminished subtypes of vote buying. The labels “non-excludable vote buying” and “non-binding vote buying” are thus meant to convey the diminished nature of these subtypes. On the one hand, including the term “vote buying” conveys the idea that these strategies do indeed share some defining attributes with full instances of vote buying. On the other hand, the adjectives “non-excludable” and “non-binding” provide information about the missing defining attribute, the absence of contingent exchange. Contingent exchange is missing with non-excludable vote buying because citizens who reside in targeted districts cannot be excluded from local public goods, and it is missing with non-binding vote buying because citizens who receive benefits make no commitments to deliver electoral support.

Overall, this discussion underscores the importance of paying close attention to conceptual issues when studying vote buying. Avoiding conceptual stretching is crucial when presented with cases that do not meet the full definition of vote buying. Strategies for avoiding conceptual stretching include moving up the ladder of generality and adopting diminished subtypes. To this end, Figure 2.1 explicitly labels two cells, non-excludable and non-binding vote buying, as diminished subtypes.

2.3.1 Implications for Research on Clientelism

Distinguishing between forms of vote buying in Figure 2.1 not only clarifies conceptual ambiguity, but also has the potential to improve descriptive and causal inference. Theoretical predictions and empirical findings from one subtype of vote buying need not necessarily apply to other subtypes. To explore why this issue is important for the study of clientelism, I now examine why findings from legislative vote buying may not be expected to entirely correspond to clientelist vote buying.¹¹ Recall that whereas legislative vote buying influences voting by legislators, clientelist vote buying influences voting by citizens. Of course, there are stark contrasts between voting in legislatures and voting in general elections. At least five key differences suggest that scholars should be cautious when applying insights from legislative vote buying to clientelist vote buying:

(1) *Probability of a vote being pivotal*: One reason that vote buying may involve a different logic in legislative settings is that each legislator is substantially more likely to be pivotal than each citizen in general elections. Whereas millions of citizens vote in most elections, legislative voting rarely includes more than a few hundred.

(2) *Visibility of vote choices*: It is substantially less difficult to observe roll-call voting than voting in general elections, which has important implications for the difficulty of monitoring vote-buying transactions. Even though clientelist parties in practice engage in a wide variety of tactics to violate the secret ballot, at least *de jure* ballot secrecy exists in the vast majority of elections across the world. By contrast, legislative voting is frequently done openly, and roll-call voting, on which studies of legislative vote buying typically focus, is the most publicly observable stage in the lawmaking process (Snyder 1992: 16).

(3) *Frequency of voting*: Roll-call voting occurs much more frequently than general elections. This fact may have important consequences for the enforcement of vote-buying transactions, because there are more frequent interactions to punish defectors with legislative vote buying than with clientelist vote buying.¹²

(4) *Level of voter information*: In many cases, legislators have substantially more information about alternative policy choices than citizens. Information asymmetries are especially likely when clientelist vote buying targets poor citizens (e.g., Stokes 2005). In part due to

¹¹This particular emphasis is chosen for this section because studies of clientelist vote buying tend to cite research on legislative vote buying more than they cite research on non-excludable or non-binding vote buying. For example, a prominent article by Groseclose & Snyder (1996) on legislative vote buying is cited by numerous studies on clientelist vote buying (e.g., Morgan & Vardy 2008: 3–4; Vicente 2008: 5, 7; Vicente & Wantchekon 2009: 295).

¹²Of course, in some cases, vote buying is combined with forms of relational clientelism (see Chapter 1) that involve more frequent interactions beyond electoral campaigns. The present discussion focuses exclusively on vote buying.

greater information, legislators may in some cases be more likely to act strategically than citizens.

(5) *Legality of vote buying*: Whereas clientelist vote buying is illegal in virtually all contemporary societies, some forms of legislative vote buying involve trading of favors that is either permitted by law or subject to unenforced laws (Hasen 2000: 1339–1340). An example of a legal exchange is provided by several studies on legislative vote buying: Marjorie Margolies-Mezvinsky explicitly agreed to vote for President Clinton’s 1993 tax bill, and in exchange Clinton spoke at a conference held by Margolies-Mezvinsky in her district (cf Groseclose & Snyder 1996: 312)

As this non-exhaustive discussion of differences between voting in legislatures and general elections suggests, there are many reasons why vote buying may not be identical across these two arenas. Yet some excellent work on legislative vote buying, such as Dal Bó (2007), applies insights from legislative politics to the study of clientelism without emphasizing many of these and other distinctions. Dal Bó develops a formal model of legislative vote buying, but then discusses “implications for lobbying, *for clientelism*, for decisions in legislatures, boards, and central banks, and for the efficiency of democracy” (2007: 789, emphasis added). The point here is not that studies on legislative vote buying cannot provide useful insights for scholars examining clientelist vote buying. The opposite is true. For example, Snyder’s (1991: 93) prediction that lobbyists focus on legislators who are slightly opposed to proposed bills is consistent with findings in numerous studies on clientelist vote buying, including Stokes’s (2005: 321) contention that Argentine politicians target weakly opposed voters with benefits. Instead, the overall point is that scholars must pay close attention to potential heterogeneity, and should be careful not to assume that predictions and findings apply across subtypes of vote buying.

2.4 Clientelist Vote Buying: Unpacking the Concept

The discussion thus far has identified distinct forms of vote buying examined in the scholarly literature, and emphasized the importance of distinguishing clientelist vote buying from other subtypes of the concept. The next crucial task for the purposes of this study is to develop a “systematized concept” of clientelist vote buying, which refers to “the specific formulation of a concept adopted by a particular researcher or group of researchers” (Adcock & Collier 2001: 530). With the goal of drawing insights that will help develop a systematized concept, this section examines the existing literature on clientelist vote buying, highlighting key similarities and differences in how researchers define the term. Based on this synthesis of the literature, an explicit definition of clientelist vote buying is then derived. It should be emphasized that because clientelist vote buying is further down the ladder of generality than vote buying, the definition developed here will include more attributes than the root

definition of vote buying discussed above.

An overall lack of consistency across studies creates a great deal of scholarly confusion about what constitutes clientelist vote buying. Analysts employ diverse and often conflicting definitions of the concept, or fail to define it at all. Although one might expect clientelist vote buying to be a well-bounded concept, examining the recent literature raises numerous questions. For example, does clientelist vote buying refer strictly to the payment of cash, or does the contingent distribution of goods, services, public program benefits and even employment qualify?

Researchers have markedly divergent views about the answers to such questions. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the defining attributes employed by 15 studies. Given that vote buying is only considered “clientelist” if citizens agree to deliver votes in exchange for selective benefits, studies are only included if their definition of vote buying involves contingent exchange with citizens. Although these studies are not in any rigorous sense a representative sample of research on clientelist vote buying, they include works by all contributors to Frederic Schaffer’s (2007) edited volume on the topic, as well as other recent and/or frequently cited works. Given that these authors’ definitions of clientelist vote buying are sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit, the total counts for each row and column should not be taken as a precise summary. Rather, they are intended to provide an overall sense of the number of attributes considered by these particular authors, and the approximate importance of different attributes in the broader discussion of clientelist vote buying. While many other studies are analyzed in this chapter, the research included in this figure involves relatively explicit conceptualizations of clientelist vote buying.

A key defining attribute of clientelist vote buying is its timing. Scholars typically emphasize that exchanges are not only *ex ante* in that benefits are distributed prior to voting, but also that exchanges occur on or soon before Election Day. All 15 studies in Table 2.1 concur that delivering contingent benefits to citizens during electoral campaigns constitutes vote buying. For example, Lehoucq (2007: 33) argues that “(b)uying a vote is trading something of value — usually, but not only, cash — for someone’s choice on election day.” Similarly, Schaffer (2007: 5–6) explains that “vote buying is a last-minute effort to influence electoral outcomes, typically taking place days or even hours before an election, or sometimes on election day itself.” This temporal focus often reflects citizens’ expectations of selective benefits during campaigns; as one Argentine explains in Auyero’s (2000: 13) broader study on clientelism: “We got a plot of land ... Now we need the bricks, so I will have to wait for the next election.” In fact, some researchers argue that timing is a key element differentiating vote buying from other concepts such as pork or patronage (Hicken 2007: 51; Schaffer 2007: 5–6). For example, Hicken explicitly states his “wish to distinguish vote buying from pork or other forms of particularism” when providing the definition mentioned above: “Vote buying involves the *individual*, *immediate*, and *private* exchange of goods, services or cash

Table 2.1: Attributes in Explicit or Implicit Definitions of Clientelist Vote Buying

Attributes of Clientelist Vote Buying										
	Contingent Exchange with Citizens	During Campaigns	Cash	Goods and Services	Food and Alcohol	Employment	Future Benefits	Public Programs	Rewards for Turnout	Attribute Total
Representative Authors vis-à-vis Different Approaches	Schaffer & Schedler (2007)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	8
	Cornelius (2004)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		7
	Desposato (2007)	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		7
	Brusco et al (2004)	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓		6
	Valenzuela (2002)	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓			6
	Baland & Robinson (2007)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				6
	Lehoucq (2007)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				6
	Stokes (2005)	✓	✓	✓	✓					5
	Finan & Schechter (2010)	✓	✓	✓	✓					5
	Gonzales- Ocantos et al (2010)	✓	✓	✓	✓					5
	Hicken (2007)	✓	✓	✓	✓					4
	Kasper- Rasmussen (2010)	✓	✓	✓	✓					4
	Cox & Kousser (1981)	✓	✓	✓					✓	4
	Vicente & Wantchekon (2008)	✓	✓	✓					✓	4
	Wang & Kurzman (2007)	✓	✓	✓						3
	Number of Authors	15	15	15	12	10	4	3	3	

for electoral support” (51, *italics in original*). At a basic level, researchers concur that vote buying includes the delivery of selective benefits during electoral campaigns.

In contrast with the broad consensus about contingent benefits during campaigns, there is more contention about whether promises of *future benefits* constitute clientelist vote buying. On the one hand, twelve studies in Table 2.1 exclude future benefits in their conceptualization of clientelist vote buying. Such scholars often explain that the very fact that citizens receive benefits before voting is why opportunistic defection threatens clientelist vote buying (e.g., Stokes 2005: 315; Lehoucq 2007: 33, 42; Vicente & Wantchekon 2009: 301). They argue that because citizens vote after receiving benefits, political machines must monitor citizens in order to ensure that they follow through on their side of the agreement. By contrast, three studies in Table 2.1 explicitly state that promises of future rewards constitute vote buying. For example, Desposato (2007: 103) views vote buying to include instances in which candidates promise post-election benefits to individuals only if they win the election. Likewise, Schaffer & Schedler (2007: 24) agree and refer to this tactic as “deferred delivery,” which involves “postponing payment and dispensing it conditionally upon the right candidate winning.” Overall, while most scholars do not consider promises of future rewards to constitute clientelist vote buying, some contend that they do.

Scholars disagree not just about the timing of benefits, but also about what is distributed. As Table 2.1 indicates, all authors agree that offering cash to a citizen at election time in exchange for political support constitutes clientelist vote buying. Beyond this unsurprising result, however, stark differences emerge between authors’ defining attributes of the concept. While the term “vote buying” may well conjure up images of candidates surreptitiously offering money to voters in dark alleys, few authors restrict the concept to such a narrow definition. Clientelist vote buying is typically viewed to include not just cash, but also particularistic goods and services. As Table 2.1 demonstrates, 12 of the 15 studies include goods and services, in addition to cash, in their conceptualizations of clientelist vote buying. For example, Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes (2004: 69) discuss a wide variety of handouts used in Argentina for vote buying, including food, clothing, medicine, mattresses, construction materials, and utility bill payments. Similarly, Schaffer (2007: 1–2) lists cash and a broad range of goods distributed in exchange for votes, as well as services such as haircuts, teeth cleaning and vasectomies.

By contrast, three studies in Table 2.1 explicitly or implicitly conceptualize clientelist vote buying more narrowly as distributing cash in exchange for votes. For example, Vicente & Wantchekon (2008: 3) explicitly define “vote buying as votes-for-cash (before the election).”¹³ In addition, Wang & Kurzman (2007) only mention cash offers to citizens — about

¹³In later work, Vicente & Wantchekon (2009: 293) expand their conceptualization beyond cash, defining “vote buying as votes-for-cash, or votes for other fungible goods, before the election.” Also note that the

\$10 each, and “this price was set by the campaign and was nonnegotiable” (66) — in their analysis of the Kuomintang in Taiwan.¹⁴ Likewise, Cox & Kousser (1981) only mention cash rewards in their prominent study of the historic U.S. (but see the mention of rum in Cox 2006: 5). It should be underscored, however, that neither Wang & Kurzman (2007) nor Cox & Kousser (1981) explicitly state how clientelist vote buying is defined, so it is unclear whether their research findings actually stem from a stricter conceptual definition, if other goods and services simply were not offered in the relevant context, or if in fact they are offered but fall outside the scope of their study. Nevertheless, there remains some conceptual ambiguity with respect to what constitutes clientelist vote buying — although some scholars explicitly include much more than cash outlays, others do not.

Another related source of conceptual variation is that some researchers explicitly or implicitly exclude specific types of goods and services from their definitions of clientelist vote buying. For example, some but not all scholars include offers of food and alcohol. On the one hand, some scholars affirm the role of food and alcohol in vote buying, such as Schaffer (2007: 2) who highlights how George Washington “bought 160 gallons of rum, wine, beer, and cider” to buy citizens’ votes, which was “a practice then known as ‘swilling the planters with bumbo.’” Similarly, Stokes (2007: 84) explicitly includes food as a defining attribute, noting that “the main costs of vote buying” include “the costs of the items actually used to purchase the vote — the cash, the food and drink, the building materials, the articles of clothing, and so on.” In addition, Lehoucq (2007: 38) includes alcohol in his historical analysis of vote buying in the United States, explaining that the price of a vote in Ohio ranged from a shot of whisky to \$25 in 1910. What is surprising is that while many studies highlight food as one of the most frequently distributed benefits (e.g., Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes 2004: 69), five studies in Table 2.1 make no mention at all of food or alcohol. Of course, it is unclear whether this exclusion actually stems from a stricter conceptual definition. Yet Kitschelt & Wilkinson’s (2007: 37ft) broader study on clientelism provides a potential reason why some authors may consciously choose to exclude specific types of goods. They explain that food, alcohol, and other benefits “may be given by politicians to voters on polling day as part of ... generalized networks of reciprocity and exchange but in many cases it would be a mistake to see these gifts as sufficient in themselves to determine voters’ choices.” For this or other reasons, some researchers do not include food and drink in their definitions of clientelist vote buying.

Another example in which some authors are relatively more inclusive in their definitions of clientelist vote buying involves the “service” of transporting voters to polling places. For instance, Heckelman (1998: 437) considers offering transportation to voters to be a form of

authors make an unusual distinction between vote buying and clientelism, defining the latter “as the exchange of votes for favors conditional on being elected (e.g. jobs in the public sector)” (2009: 293).

¹⁴It should be noted that Wang & Kurzman (2007: 66, 68) mention some brokers (not voters) who received non-monetary commissions for their efforts in buying citizens’ votes with cash.

vote buying, explaining that buses used to take voters to the polls “simply act as a more efficient (cheaper) means of bribery for the parties.” Likewise, Cornelius (2004: 49) and Valenzuela (2002: 10) include transportation as a form of vote buying in their studies on Mexico and Chile, respectively. This conceptualization is more inclusive than that of most other scholars, including Cox & Kousser (1981: 656fn), who distinguish transportation to the polls from vote buying and offer it as an example of “more legitimate forms of activity.” So while many authors agree that offering goods and services to voters in exchange for political support constitutes clientelist vote buying, some disagreements persist.

Scholars also differ with respect to whether they include *employment* and *public program benefits* in their definitions of clientelist vote buying. With respect to the former, most scholars suggest that the employment of voters in exchange for political support should be considered “patronage” instead of vote buying (Stokes 2009a: 605–606). Yet four of the 15 studies in Table 2.1 perceive some types of employment as forms of vote buying. For instance, Schaffer & Schedler (2007: 21) discuss one form of vote buying in which candidates offer temporary employment to voters (especially during campaigns) for “rendering some nominal service,” when their real objective is to obtain those citizens’ votes.¹⁵ Baland & Robinson (2007, 2008) examine employment as a form of “indirect” vote buying, highlighting the role of employers as intermediaries. They argue that candidates offer selective benefits to employers, who in turn induce (or in some instances coerce) their workers to vote in a particular way. In addition to employment, another contentious defining attribute is contingent public program benefits. As indicated in Table 2.1, three studies include such benefits in their definition. For example, while Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes (2004) do not analyze public programs, they “acknowledge that the manipulation of ostensibly public programs for electoral support is indeed a form of vote buying” (67). Similarly, Cornelius’s (2004: 52) study of vote buying in the Mexican election of 2000 provides as an example of vote buying “strategically timed distribution of checks to beneficiaries of federal government social programs.” By contrast, 12 studies in Table 2.1 do not discuss public program benefits as forms of clientelist vote buying.

Another source of scholarly confusion is ambiguity about whether distributing contingent benefits to influence *electoral participation* constitutes clientelist vote buying. Most scholars simply overlook the possibility that parties use benefits to mobilize citizens, and for this reason implicitly or explicitly conceptualize clientelist vote buying as distributing benefits in contingent exchange for vote choices (e.g., Hicken 2002, 2–3; Lehoucq 2007, 33; Stokes 2005, 315). Yet three of the 15 studies in Table 2.1 explicitly consider payments for turnout to be a form of clientelist vote buying.¹⁶ For example, Cox & Kousser (1981: 661) indicate that

¹⁵Note that Schaffer & Schedler’s (2007: 21) discussion suggests the goal of providing such employment may be to “generate gratitude” towards vote buyers, which raises the question of whether this phenomenon should be classified as non-binding vote buying (or using another concept such as patronage).

¹⁶Two additional studies in Table 2.1 mention rewards for turnout: Finan & Schechter (2010) and Gonzales-Ocantos et al. (2010). However, they do *not* consider rewards for turnout to constitute vote buying, and

“a good many farmers reportedly demanded payments for merely coming to the polls,” and regard such payments as vote buying. Likewise, Schaffer & Schedler (2007: 18) explain that vote buying “may target either electoral choices or electoral participation.”¹⁷ A central point of this study, which is explored below and in Chapters 3 and 4, is that the political logic of electoral clientelism (including clientelist vote buying) cannot be fully understood without careful attention to turnout.

Overall, the above discussion highlights diverse and often conflicting definitions of clientelist vote buying in the academic literature. While researchers concur that the contingent distribution of cash for political support during campaigns constitutes clientelist vote buying, other defining attributes prove more contentious. These insights are now applied to develop a systematized concept. For the purposes of analysis in this study, clientelist vote buying is defined as the distribution of “rewards” to individuals in contingent exchange for vote choices. Based on the most common attributes in Table 2.1, rewards are defined as cash, goods (including food and drink), and services. By contrast, post-election benefits, employment, public programs, and transportation to the polls are not considered rewards. The next section draws attention to consequences of overlooking a crucial attribute of this definition — the exchange of rewards for vote choices as opposed to turnout.

2.5 Conflating Strategies of Electoral Clientelism

Because scholars often overlook this crucial attribute of clientelist vote buying — the exchange of rewards for *vote choices* — they frequently conflate the phenomenon with other forms of electoral clientelism. Most studies fail to distinguish whether selective benefits are used to influence vote choices or *turnout*. As this section explores, when parties use selective benefits to influence turnout, they are engaging in strategies of electoral clientelism other than clientelist vote buying.

In order to explore this crucial point, Figure 2.2 provides a typology of five distinct clientelist strategies that distribute selective benefits during campaigns. Reward targeting plays a central role in distinguishing between strategies, so the typology emphasizes two key attributes of citizens: (1) inclination to turn out, and (2) political preferences. “Vote buying,” the exclusive focus of most researchers, rewards opposing or indifferent voters for switching their vote choices. By contrast, “turnout buying” rewards nonvoting supporters for showing up at the polls. Another strategy is “negative” vote buying, which rewards indifferent or opposing voters for *not* voting. Parties may also engage in “double persuasion,” a strategy that rewards opposing or indifferent nonvoters for both turning out and for their vote

instead explicitly distinguish between vote buying and “turnout buying” (Nichter 2008; see discussion below).

¹⁷Schaffer & Schedler (2007: 17-18) explicitly conceptualize payments for electoral participation as form of clientelist vote buying, and call such payments “participation buying.”

Figure 2.2: Clientelist Strategies During Campaigns

		Political Preference of Recipient vis-à-vis Party Offering Goods	
		<i>Favors Party</i>	<i>Indifferent or Favors Opposition</i>
Recipient Inclined to Vote or Not Vote	<i>Inclined to Vote</i>	“Rewarding Loyalists”	“Vote Buying” “Negative Turnout Buying”
	<i>Inclined Not To Vote</i>	“Turnout Buying”	“Double Persuasion”

choices. Finally, by “rewarding loyalists,” parties deliver benefits to supporters who would vote anyway. To broaden the scope of analysis beyond clientelist vote buying, these other strategies are now examined in further detail. As is discussed below, all strategies in Figure 2.2 are considered forms of electoral clientelism except for rewarding loyalists.

When parties engage in “turnout buying” (Nichter 2008), they distribute rewards to unmobilized supporters in exchange for showing up at the polls.¹⁸ Whereas vote buying requires monitoring *for whom* citizens vote, turnout buying requires monitoring *whether* citizens vote. Recent elections in the U.S. provide examples of turnout buying.¹⁹ During the 2004 election, five Democratic Party operatives in East St. Louis were convicted in federal court for offering cigarettes, beer, medicine and \$5 to \$10 rewards to increase turnout of the poor. One party official pleaded guilty and testified that operatives offered individuals rewards “because if you didn’t give them anything, then they wouldn’t come out.”²⁰ A local election in Oakland provides another example: campaign workers handed out thousands of

¹⁸I thank Philipp Rehm for suggesting the term “turnout buying.” For all strategies in Figure 2.2, the definition of “rewards” is identical to that presented above for clientelist vote buying. That is, rewards are defined as cash, goods (including food and drink), and services. Post-election benefits, employment, public programs, and transportation to the polls are not considered rewards.

¹⁹All examples of turnout buying in the U.S. are from Nichter (2008).

²⁰This official, Lillie Nichols, served as a government witness and also testified that in her precinct “there were people who would not come out to vote without being paid and that the money provided to her by the St. Clair County Democratic Committee was used to pay them based upon Mr. Powell’s urging.” Charles Powell, Jr., a convicted defendant, was Chairman of the East St. Louis Democratic Precinct Committee.

coupons for free chicken dinners in an explicit and targeted effort to draw voters to the polls. More broadly, observers in various US cities have complained that some politicians use “street money” — small, unreported cash payments ostensibly used for legal get-out-the-vote efforts such as canvassing and transporting voters — as direct payments for turnout.²¹ For example, one journalist examining the use of “street money” in Chicago reports that “members of large families are still ‘hired’ by precinct captains on Election Day for \$30 to \$50 to make sure voters get to the polls.”²² In the case of Argentina, Chapter 3 argues that although both strategies coexist, survey data in Stokes (2005) are more consistent with turnout buying than vote buying. Evidence of turnout buying has also been found in the case of Venezuela (Rosas & Hawkins 2008), as well as Argentina and Mexico (Dunning & Stokes 2008).

In addition to turnout buying, political machines also engage in “double persuasion.” This form of electoral clientelism provides selective benefits to citizens who neither vote nor support the machine. By providing benefits to such citizens, political operatives aim to induce electoral participation *and* influence vote choices. Analysts find that in some contexts, there are substantial numbers of citizens who lack partisan preferences as well as motivation to participate in elections, outside of the reward structures set up by clientelist parties. For example, Chubb (1982: 171) explains in her study of clientelism in Italy that “many among the urban poor remain so totally alienated from the political system that they see no particular reason to prefer one party or candidate over another.” As a Brazilian politician explained during an interview, operatives sometimes target indifferent nonvoters who say: “I am not going to vote for anyone, I will only vote if somebody gives me something.”²³ Studies typically ignore this strategy, and Dunning & Stokes (2008) even call double persuasion a “perverse strategy.” By contrast, formal analysis in Chapter 4 finds that machines optimally devote some resources to this strategy whenever they distribute selective benefits during campaigns. Double persuasion requires monitoring both turnout and voting decisions.²⁴

Another form of electoral clientelism is “negative turnout buying.”²⁵ This strategy dis-

²¹Street money has numerous local names including “precinct money” in Chicago, “walking-around money” in Baltimore and “coffee money” in New York.

²²Citations for these turnout buying examples are, respectively: Federal Case 05-CR-30044-GPM, Document 183, July 19, 2005, p. 12-3; “Whole Lotta Clucking Going On Over Chicken-Dinner Votes,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, February 5, 1999; and “‘Street Money’ Litters US Politics; Spreading Cash on Election Day is Alive, Well and Quite Bipartisan,” *Boston Globe*, November 28, 1993. See also “‘Street Money’ Little More than Voter Bribery,” *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, November 7, 1997.

²³Author’s interview with city councilman in Bahia; November 6, 2008.

²⁴Note that when parties monitor voting decisions, they typically also monitor turnout by default. However, if a party infers votes from aggregate vote tallies (e.g., Chandra 2004; Schaffer & Schedler 2007), then monitoring turnout is a distinct assumption.

²⁵This strategy is often termed “negative vote buying,” but the term “negative turnout buying” is more precise as the strategy influences turnout, not vote choices.

tributes selective benefits to opposing (or indifferent) individuals for *not* voting (e.g., Cox & Kousser 1981; Heckelman 1998; Morgan & Vardy 2008). Similar to turnout buying, this strategy only requires monitoring whether or not rewarded individuals go to the polls, not actual vote choices. For example, Cox & Kousser (1981) report that negative turnout buying in the United States increased after the introduction of the secret ballot. They examine references to rural election fraud in newspapers across New York State between 1879 and 1908, and conclude that “once delivery on the sale of a ballot became nearly impossible to verify, market transactions shifted ... many more people were apparently paid to stay home after than before 1890.” During interviews in Bahia, politicians explained that vote buying is a much more common strategy, but negative turnout buying is occasionally used. As a vice-mayor in Bahia explained, when citizens refuse to go to the polls and switch their vote choices because their “conscience hurts,” operatives sometimes respond by saying: “then do this — don’t go.”²⁶ He added that “your candidate won’t have the vote, but the other candidate also won’t have the number of votes he expected.” Another example comes from the Philippines, where campaign workers rewarded opposition voters for dipping their fingers in ink (thus disqualifying them from voting) or taking bus trips out of town (Schaffer 2002: 78). Despite the existence of negative turnout buying in some contexts, it should be emphasized that the strategy is often not practiced. Schaffer (2007: 188) suggests that “there are many countries in which this particular form of vote buying is largely unknown,” and also adds that it “is not particularly common even in those countries where it is most visible.” In the case of a Brazil, heightened risk of punishment may be one reason this strategy is less commonly used — while candidates caught for vote buying typically lose their right to hold office for several years, those caught infringing on citizens’ right to vote reportedly are more likely to be imprisoned.²⁷

The final strategy in Figure 2.2 is “rewarding loyalists,” which distributes selective benefits to supporters who already intend to vote in an upcoming election. Given that such citizens will already cast a vote for the machine, benefits neither induce electoral participation nor influence vote choices during the present campaign. Rewarding loyalists requires no monitoring. Most scholars suggest that when clientelist parties deliver benefits to supporting voters during campaigns, they do so as part of long-term relationships with clients (e.g., Scott 1969; Auyero 1999). For example, Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez & Magaloni (2010, ch. 4) argue that clientelist parties reward core supporters in order to “prevent the erosion of partisan loyalties” over time. Such explanations suggest that rewarding loyalists is a form of *relational* clientelism, given that the relationships with supporters involve post-election benefits. Because I focus exclusively on *electoral* clientelism, rewarding loyalists is not ex-

²⁶ Author’s interview with vice-mayor in Bahia; November 5, 2008.

²⁷ Author’s interview with city councilman in Bahia; January 12, 2009. The respondent explained that politicians are most likely to enforce negative turnout buying by “renting” citizens’ voting documents. But if authorities catch them with others’ voting documents, they are more likely to be imprisoned.

amined more extensively in this study.²⁸

In sum, scholars must be careful not to conflate clientelist vote buying with other forms of electoral clientelism. As Chapter 3 explores, failing to distinguish between different strategies of electoral clientelism can have serious consequences for descriptive and causal inference. To avoid such consequences, determining whether rewards are distributed to influence *vote choices* or *turnout* is essential.

2.6 Summary

The goal of this chapter has been to clarify conceptual ambiguity about vote buying. The scholarly literature employs the concept of vote buying to describe diverse phenomena. This usage can be categorized into four distinct subtypes of vote buying: *clientelist*, *legislative*, *non-excludable*, and *non-binding*. Although the first two subtypes meet the full definition of vote buying, non-excludable and non-binding vote buying are more appropriately considered diminished subtypes — neither involves contingent exchange, which by most standards is a defining attribute of vote buying. Distinguishing between subtypes of vote buying is important not only for conceptual clarity, but also because descriptive and causal inference may not entirely correspond across different subtypes.

For the purposes of this study, this chapter developed a systematized concept of clientelist vote buying. Building on previous scholarly work, clientelist vote buying is defined as the distribution of rewards to individuals in contingent exchange for vote choices. Rewards are defined as cash, goods (including food and drink), and services. By contrast, post-election benefits, employment, public programs, and transportation to the polls are not considered rewards.

Unfortunately, much of the literature on clientelist vote buying conflates the phenomenon with three other forms of electoral clientelism: turnout buying, double persuasion and negative turnout buying. As the rest of this study investigates further, this problem arises because most studies fail to distinguish whether parties distribute rewards to influence *vote choices* or *turnout*. The next chapter explores how this failure can lead to serious consequences for descriptive and causal inference — much of what scholars interpret as vote buying (exchanging rewards for vote choices) may actually be turnout buying (exchanging rewards for turnout). Then, Chapter 4 extends this analysis further by investigating the logic by which political machines combine all four strategies of electoral clientelism.

²⁸See Chapter 1 for definitions and a discussion of relational and electoral clientelism.

Chapter 3

Vote Buying or Turnout Buying?

3.1 Introduction

When political parties distribute selective benefits to individuals during campaigns, scholars typically depict this phenomenon as “vote buying.” Yet this depiction presents an intriguing puzzle: How can vote buying coexist with the secret ballot? As defined in Chapter 2, clientelist vote buying is the distribution of rewards to individuals in contingent exchange for vote choices.¹ But if parties are unable to monitor voting decisions, why can’t individuals accept rewards and then vote for their preferred candidates anyway?

Susan Stokes’s (2005) insightful article, “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina,” greatly advances scholarly research on vote buying by highlighting this commitment problem and offering a plausible solution. Stokes (2005: 315) argues that the Argentine Peronist party uses its “deep insertion in voters’ social networks” to violate the secret ballot, and is therefore able to enforce compliance when it rewards weakly opposed voters for switching their votes.

However, the assumption that parties can monitor actions within the voting booth is often too stringent. “Turnout buying,” a strategy of electoral clientelism introduced in Chapter 2, provides insight into why parties might offer electoral rewards even if they do not compromise ballot secrecy. By rewarding unmobilized supporters for showing up at the polls, parties can activate their own passive constituencies. Turnout buying offers a solution to the secret ballot puzzle, because the strategy does not require monitoring of specific vote choices. Instead, turnout buying requires monitoring *whether* rewarded individuals vote.

¹Unless otherwise specified, the remainder of this study refers to clientelist vote buying whenever the term “vote buying” is employed. As discussed in Chapter 2, rewards are defined as cash, goods (including food and drink), and services. By contrast, post-election benefits, employment, public programs, and transportation to the polls are not considered rewards.

Unfortunately, as discussed in Chapter 2, the literature on clientelist vote buying rarely considers whether particularistic benefits are distributed to mobilize supporters. In general, scholars implicitly assume that parties offer rewards to influence the vote choices of opposing or indifferent voters, and therefore ignore turnout buying. Unlike some broader research on clientelism, most studies of vote buying, including Stokes's (2005) influential paper, never mention mobilization or turnout. There are a few exceptions: Schaffer & Schedler's (2007: 25) excellent conceptual overview of vote buying briefly mentions "participation buying"; Cox & Kousser (1981) note that US parties in the late 1800s rewarded some farmers for showing up at the polls; and legal scholars (Karlan 1994: 1472–3; Hasen 2000: 1326, 1355–9) discuss normative implications of payments for turnout. But most studies fail to distinguish whether rewards are used to influence vote choice or induce electoral participation. And if researchers overlook the role of mobilization, serious analytical mistakes can arise. Thus, much of what scholars interpret as vote buying (exchanging rewards for vote choices) may actually be turnout buying (exchanging rewards for turnout).

This study advances research on electoral rewards by specifying and testing a mechanism by which parties can distribute particularistic benefits to mobilize supporters. Neither of these analytical tasks has been addressed by the existing literature. Formal modeling suggests that turnout buying is incentive-compatible, and also provides several testable predictions: (1) machines will focus rewards on strong supporters, (2) they will target the poor, and (3) they will offer rewards where they can most effectively monitor turnout. The turnout-buying model thus contrasts starkly with Stokes's (2005: 321) vote-buying model, which predicts that machines target weak opposers. Although in reality both strategies co-exist, empirical tests suggest that Argentine survey data in Stokes (2005) are more consistent with turnout buying.

Of course, parties may in fact engage in a combination of these strategies, complicating both formal and empirical analysis. This chapter focuses on distinguishing the understudied strategy of turnout buying from vote buying, and thus the formal model makes simplifying assumptions to illuminate this distinction. Chapter 4 returns to this issue, considering how parties may combine strategies.

3.2 Turnout Buying in Argentina

In her influential study, Susan Stokes (2005) argues that the Peronist party pays weakly opposed voters to switch their votes. She provides a cogent rational choice model and analyzes one of the most extensive quantitative surveys ever collected on the topic.² The present

²Stokes (2005) discusses two surveys she collected in Argentina in collaboration with Valeria Brusco and Marcelo Nazareno. Her regression analyses are based on a survey of 1,920 voters, conducted in December 2001 and January 2002 in three Argentine provinces. Stokes (2005: 318) also discusses a survey she conducted in

chapter, by contrast, argues that turnout buying offers an alternative explanation for observed patterns in Stokes's (2005) data.

With the goal of developing this argument, a straightforward potential objection to this line of explanation must first be addressed. Given that voting has been compulsory in Argentina since 1914, it might be hard to see how turnout buying would be relevant in this context. However, as Canton & Jorrat (2003: 199) argue in their study on abstention in Argentine elections, "compulsory voting is not particularly enforced any more."³ The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) codes Argentina's enforcement of compulsory voting as "weak" in its international comparison of electoral systems. Although turnout in Argentina is high by international standards, electoral participation reached lows of 78.2% of registered voters in the most recent presidential election of 2003, and 70.9% in the most recent legislative election of 2005 (IDEA 2006; Ministerio del Interior 2006). These levels of electoral participation suggest that compulsory voting does not impose a binding constraint on turnout buying. After all, only 7.4% of respondents in Stokes's (2005) survey reported receiving electoral rewards.⁴ Furthermore, rewards predominantly target the poor, who are significantly less likely to vote in Argentina (Canton & Jorrat 2003: 188, 200; Vitullo 2002: 242-243).⁵

The present analysis of turnout buying relaxes Stokes's (2005: 318) assumption that the Peronist party is able to monitor voting decisions effectively. Voting procedures in Argentina make it far easier for the Peronists to monitor *whether* individuals vote.⁶ Party delegates are permitted within polling places (*mesas*) and are actually expected to supervise electoral officials as they record who shows up at their designated location. As Canton & Jorrat (2003: 190) explain, "the mesa authorities, under supervision of the party delegates, write on the register list, beside the surname of the person who has just voted, in a special column, the word 'cast.'" Individuals' identity documents are signed and sealed to provide proof of

four Argentine provinces in July-August 2003, using multistage cluster sampling techniques based on census tracks, to select 500 adults each in the provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Misiones, and San Luis.

³Officially, nonvoters incur a small fine and require action by a judge to avoid administrative problems. Canton & Jorrat (2003: 199) also note that: "even President Menem (1989-99) declared himself in favor of eliminating the obligation to vote (see de Riz 1998; Onaindia 1998; in addition, comments appeared in a *La Nación* editorial, 2 November 1997, 26; and in *Clarín*, 3 November, 1997, 16)."

⁴This statistic is shown below in Figure 3.1, and reflects rewards received during the 2001 legislative election.

⁵Based on logistic regressions of Argentine election data, Canton & Jorrat (2003: 188, 200) identify a "pattern of class bias" in electoral participation. They find significantly lower voter turnout among the lowest occupational status categories, and significantly higher turnout among the highest occupational status categories. In addition, Vitullo (2002: 242-243) finds that districts in Argentina with lower Human Development Index scores have higher abstention rates.

⁶During elections in Argentina, each individual between the ages of 18 and 69 must show up at a designated polling place, usually within a nearby public school. Each polling place has a register of 300 to 400 citizens.

voting, offering yet another way to monitor turnout.

Turnout buying addresses an unresolved puzzle acknowledged by Stokes (2005: 323). A reexamination of the Argentine survey data she analyzes shows that rewards predominantly target machine supporters.⁷ This crucial point is consistent with turnout buying, but directly contradicts Stokes’s argument that “the machine should not waste rewards” on supporters (2005: 317). Vote buying fails to explain why the Peronist machine — by far the most active distributor of rewards in Argentina (Stokes 2005: 322) — overwhelmingly targets its own supporters.


A descriptive overview of the data in Stokes (2005) provides initial evidence that this line of analysis is worth pursuing. In her Argentine survey, Stokes asked respondents to indicate whether their opinions of the Peronist party were “very good,” “good,” “bad” or “very bad.”⁸ Based on this question, Figure 3.1 reveals that over 20% of respondents who hold a “very good” opinion of the Peronist party received rewards, versus just 5.7% and 2.8% of those who hold a “bad” and “very bad” opinion, respectively. To investigate further, Figure 3.2 compares responses across rewarded and unrewarded individuals, and also suggests that handouts predominantly target individuals with favorable opinions of the Peronists. Nearly 65% of reward recipients hold “very good” or “good” opinions of the Peronist party, compared to less than 35% of nonrecipients. In addition, over three times as many people who *did* receive rewards as those who did *not* receive them rated the Peronists “very good” (8.2% vs. 2.7%). As Stokes carefully points out, this question measures post-reward opinions, which may be “nudged” favorably by rewards (2005: 324). However, the most straightforward interpretation of these data is that rewards predominantly target Peronist supporters—as expected with turnout buying. Regressions below, which control for numerous variables, point even more strongly towards turnout buying: recipients of rewards disproportionately (1) identify the Peronists as their favorite party without prompting, (2) hold “very good” opinions of the Peronist party, and (3) voted for Peronist candidates in the past.⁹ But before turning to further empirical evidence, I first develop a formal model of turnout buying.

⁷When discussing targeting, Stokes (2005: 323) explicitly points out that “in some ways...the findings do not accord well with the predictions.” However, Stokes (2005: 324) incorrectly argues that “the evidence from Argentina does show unambiguously that, among core constituents, the machine discriminates against its most ardent supporters.” Stokes’s (2005: 324) analysis of reward targeting is based on an erroneous bar chart, for which a corrected version is provided in this chapter (Figure 3.2). Stokes states that “three times as many people who did *not* receive rewards as those who *did* receive them rated the Peronists ‘very good’” (2005: 323). In fact, a reanalysis of Stokes’s data (discussed in the next paragraph) shows that the *opposite* is true.

⁸Stokes (2005: 323-4) also uses this survey question to evaluate whether or not rewards target supporters. It is admittedly an imperfect proxy for individuals’ level of support for the Peronist party.

⁹Regressions in Section 3.4 control for numerous variables associated with the probability of receiving rewards. Findings across both descriptive and econometric analyses suggest that rewards predominantly target Peronist supporters.


Figure 3.1: Allocation of Rewards by Opinion of Peronist Party



*Difference from overall average significant at the 99.9% level, using a one-sample test of proportion.

Note: Rewards reflect particularistic benefits received during the 2001 electoral campaign by Stokes' (2005) survey respondents. Individuals coded as receiving rewards if answering "Yes" to this question: "Did you receive goods distributed by a party in the last campaign?" The most frequent reward was food; other rewards frequently mentioned included building materials, mattresses, and clothing (Stokes 2005: 321).

Figure 3.2: Opinion of Peronists Among Recipients and Nonrecipients of Rewards



Note: This figure is a corrected version of Figure 3 in Stokes (2005: 324). Rewards reflect particularistic benefits received during the 2001 electoral campaign by Stokes's (2005) survey respondents. Individuals coded as receiving rewards if answering "Yes" to this question: "Did you receive goods distributed by a party in the last campaign?"

3.3 Formal Analysis

This section takes Stokes’s (2005: 318-321) vote-buying model as a point of departure. To enhance comparability, the specific objective is to make one basic change to Stokes’s model — considering nonvoters — while closely following her assumptions.¹⁰ This adaptation suggests that offering rewards to supporters is incentive-compatible, even if a political party can only monitor *whether* individuals vote. Comparative statics from the turnout-buying model are then contrasted with those of Stokes’s (2005: 321) vote-buying model. Although several comparative statics are similar, a key difference enables the models to be tested empirically. Whereas the turnout-buying model predicts that machines target unmobilized strong supporters, the vote-buying model predicts that they target moderate opposing voters.

3.3.1 Assumptions

Following Stokes (2005: 319), this analysis assumes a one-dimensional policy space. In Figure 3.3, X_1 represents the ideological position of the machine, X_2 represents the ideological position of the opposition, and $X_1 < X_2$. The turnout-buying model considers nonvoters, who are assumed to be “mirror types” of the voters analyzed in Stokes (2005). As shown in Figure 3.3, corresponding voters and nonvoters lie along the ideological spectrum. Similar to Stokes (2005), it is assumed that parties have knowledge of individuals’ ideal points. In other words, parties can distinguish whether—and the extent to which—individuals are supporters or opposers. The model assumes preferences are exogenous; consequently, rewards are presumed to have no effect on individuals’ ideological positions.¹¹ In addition, the model assumes that parties can identify nonvoters.¹²


The turnout-buying model adapts Stokes’s (2005: 319) utility function for voters. She

¹⁰Adapting Stokes’s (2005) vote-buying model enhances comparability, but one consequence is that parties are considered as engaging in *either* turnout buying *or* vote buying. Of course, parties may also engage in a combination of these strategies. Chapter 4 investigates this important point and requires further assumptions not included in Stokes (2005), most importantly specifying a budget constraint.

¹¹As a result, the formal model cannot address Stokes’s (2005: 324) comment that rewards may “nudge” survey respondents to become machine supporters.

¹²Note that Stokes’ (2005: 318-321) vote-buying model requires parties to have knowledge of *opposing* individuals’ ideal points and turnout propensity. Knowledge of voting propensity is necessary even with vote buying, because otherwise parties risk mistakenly providing rewards to individuals for whom “double persuasion” (i.e., additional rewards for turnout) is required. By contrast, the turnout-buying model requires parties to have knowledge of *supporting* individuals’ ideal points and turnout propensity. If parties can more easily obtain information about their supporters than their opposers, then these assumptions are less restrictive for turnout buying.

Figure 3.3: Nonvoters as Mirror Types of Voters in Stokes (2005)



Note: Nonvoters are assumed to be mirror types of the voters in Stokes (2005: 319). Labels refer to the location on a spatial dimension of a political machine (X_1), its opponent (X_2), the median voter (X^*), a hypothetical voter (X_i), and a hypothetical nonvoter (X'_j). Given they are mirror types, note that $X_1=X'_1$, $X_2=X'_2$ and $X^*=X'^*$.

assumes that each voter's utility is given by:¹³

$$u_i = -\frac{1}{2}(X_i - V_i)^2 + b_i \quad (3.1)$$

where X_i reflects voter i 's position on the ideological spectrum, $V_i = \{X_1, X_2\}$ represents a vote for either the machine or the opposition, and $b_i = \{0, b\}$ is the value to the voter of the reward, relative to the value of voting according to his or her preferences.

Whereas Stokes (2005) ignores nonvoters, this analysis assumes that nonvoters may turn out if rewarded. A nonvoter who abstains is assumed to have a reservation utility of 0. A nonvoter who is induced to vote is assumed to have the following utility function:

$$u_i = -\frac{1}{2}(X'_i - V'_i)^2 + b'_i - c \quad (3.2)$$

where X'_i reflects nonvoter i 's position on the ideological spectrum, $V'_i = \{X'_1, X'_2\}$ represents a vote for either the machine or the opposition, $b'_i = \{0, b'\}$ is the value to the nonvoter of the reward relative to the value of abstaining, and c represents a constant cost of voting. The prime notation distinguishes variables from their counterparts in Stokes's (2005) vote-buying model. It should be emphasized that Equation 3.2 generalizes Stokes's (2005: 319) utility function for voters: Equation 3.1 is a special case with $c = 0$. Nonvoters who are induced to turn out face two types of costs incorporated in Equation 3.2. First, they face a material cost c , which includes both the direct (e.g., transportation) and indirect (e.g., forgone earnings) costs of voting.¹⁴ This cost is assumed to be constant across nonvoters who are induced to turn out. In addition, they face an ideological cost of voting, captured by $\frac{1}{2}(X'_i - V'_i)^2$, which is greater for individuals whose preferences diverge more from their preferred party's platform.

The turnout-buying model relaxes Stokes's monitoring assumption. Stokes (2005: 318) assumes that "machines can effectively, if imperfectly, monitor the actions" of reward recipients, thereby enabling machines to condition rewards on vote choices. By contrast, turnout buying assumes that a party can monitor *whether* — not *for whom* — an individual votes. Whereas the vote-buying model assumes that a machine can monitor voting decisions with

¹³In some areas of Stokes' (2005: 319) analysis, this utility function is equivalently written as $u_i = -\frac{1}{2}(V_i - X_i)^2 + b_i$.

¹⁴Of course, all voters incur material costs to voting. However, these costs are not considered by Stokes (2005) and do not affect her substantive results, because all individuals in the vote-buying case are assumed to vote. Although enforcement of compulsory voting is weak in Argentina (IDEA 2006), some costs of abstaining may remain, so c reflects the material costs of voting minus the material costs of abstaining. Some rewards (b'_i) may induce nonvoters to the polls by compensating for material costs of voting (c); e.g., parties may arrange for wages to be paid to supporters while they vote. While offering transportation to the polls may increase turnout by reducing the cost of voting, it is not considered a reward (see Chapter 2) and thus does not constitute turnout buying.

probability p , the turnout-buying model assumes that it can monitor participation with probability q .¹⁵ Intuitively, it may be relatively easier to monitor turnout.

Other modeling assumptions follow Stokes's (2005: 318-21) vote-buying model. An infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game is similarly used, in which credible promises and threats about future rewards can influence current behavior. The turnout-buying model also assumes that "both sides foresee their interaction extending indefinitely into the future" (Stokes 2005: 319). In line with Stokes (2005: 320), the turnout-buying model assumes that the machine engages in a grim trigger strategy, providing rewards to a particular individual until he or she fails to cooperate, after which it never offers another reward.¹⁶ Also, Stokes's (2005: 320) structure of the game as one-sided uncertainty is adopted; therefore, no conditions are analyzed in which a political party chooses not to cooperate. The discount factor, β , corresponds to the value today of a peso to be received one stage later, and is assumed to be sufficiently high to enable sustained cooperation. With these assumptions, a model of turnout buying is now developed.

3.3.2 Model of Turnout Buying

This model explores whether a machine can gain votes by providing incentives to nonvoters for turnout. Given the assumption that vote choices cannot be monitored, the machine will only provide incentives to nonvoters who are expected to vote for the machine upon turning out. A nonvoter who receives a reward (b') and shows up at the polls will vote for the machine (X'_1) if doing so provides greater utility than voting for the opposition (X'_2):¹⁷

$$\begin{aligned} -\frac{1}{2}(X'_i - X'_1)^2 + b' - c &> -\frac{1}{2}(X'_i - X'_2)^2 + b' - c, \text{ or} \\ (X'_i - X'_1)^2 &< (X'_i - X'_2)^2, \text{ or} \\ 2X'_i(X'_2 - X'_1) &< (X'_2 + X'_1)(X'_2 - X'_1). \end{aligned}$$

Since $X'_1 < X'_2$, this inequality can be simplified to:

¹⁵Stokes's vote-buying model does not require the machine to have perfect knowledge of how reward recipients vote. However, in contexts with ballot secrecy, opportunities for vote buying are substantially reduced. As Stokes (2005: 320) explains, if the machine cannot observe a defection by the voter ($p = 0$), then it can only buy the votes of voters who are ideologically indifferent between the parties. Without monitoring, parties may also attempt to influence vote choices of particular groups by promising targetable goods. This strategy of persuasion does not constitute vote buying, as post-election particularistic benefits are not considered rewards (see Chapter 2).

¹⁶Although other Pareto-optimal strategies exist that do not employ a grim trigger strategy, the turnout model makes this assumption to maintain parallelism with the Stokes model.

¹⁷Note that some nonvoters, if induced to turn out, may be indifferent between voting for the machine and for the opposition ($-\frac{1}{2}(X'_i - X'_1)^2 + b' - c = -\frac{1}{2}(X'_i - X'_2)^2 + b' - c$). But if the machine cannot monitor voting decisions, then it cannot ensure that these nonvoters will in fact vote for the machine.

Figure 3.4: Normal Form of Game Between the Machine and a Nonvoting Supporter

		Machine	
		Reward	No Reward
Nonvoting Supporter	Comply	$-\frac{1}{2} (X'_i - X'_1)^2 + b' - c, v - b'$	$-\frac{1}{2} (X'_i - X'_1)^2 - c, v$
	Defect	$b', -b'$	$0, 0$

$$X'_i < \frac{X'_1 + X'_2}{2}. \quad (3.3)$$

Inequality 3.3 suggests that a nonvoter who is induced to vote will cast a ballot for the machine if his or her ideological position is closer to the machine than to the opposing party. Thus, machines can potentially gain votes by offering rewards to these “unmobilized supporters,” who are defined as nonvoters with ideal points closer to the machine than to the opposing party.¹⁸ However, such “turnout buying” is not effective unless interactions are repeated. Without the prospect of future rewards, an unmobilized supporter is better off if he or she simply accepts a reward and does not show up at the polls. Consider the stage game between the machine and an unmobilized supporter in Figure 3.4. This stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium, in which the unmobilized supporter does not vote, and the party does not provide a reward. This outcome of non-cooperation is a clear instance of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and is Pareto suboptimal for both players.

Within a dynamic setting, cooperation is possible. When turnout-buying interactions are repeated, the unmobilized supporter may be induced to show up at the polls, depending on the value of future rewards.¹⁹ Even though no single-stage outcome is a Nash equilibrium, a subgame-perfect outcome exists if the game is infinitely repeated. Following Stokes (2005:

¹⁸In Figure 3.3, unmobilized supporters are nonvoters in the range $[X'_1, X'^*]$.

¹⁹Following Stokes (2005), this analysis focuses exclusively on rewards given during election periods (i.e., electoral clientelism). As discussed in Chapters 1 and 5, these interactions may be embedded within ongoing clientelist relationships, so future rewards may in fact involve particularistic goods outside election periods (i.e., relational clientelism).

320), Inequality 3.4 shows the conditions under which sustained cooperation is possible:

$$\frac{1}{1-\beta}(-\frac{1}{2}(X'_i - X'_1)^2 + b' - c) \geq b' + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}((1-q)(-\frac{1}{2}(X'_i - X'_1)^2 + b' - c) + q(0)) \quad (3.4)$$

The left side of Inequality 3.4 represents the total discounted value of the rewards an unmobilized supporter receives if he or she cooperates during every stage by turning out. The right side of Inequality 3.4 represents the value of the reward an unmobilized supporter receives in a given stage if he or she defects by not showing up at the polls, plus with probability $1 - q$ the discounted value of the future rewards received if he or she is not detected and cooperates in all future rounds. Because the unmobilized supporter's reservation utility is assumed to be 0, if detected with probability q he or she will receive no future utility streams from the payoffs involved in this game. Overall, Inequality 3.4 suggests that turnout buying will be effective when the discounted value of the payoffs from sustained cooperation is greater than or equal to the discounted expected value if he or she defects in a given period. Simplifying Inequality 3.4 shows the reward values (b') for which this condition is satisfied:

$$b' \geq \phi[(X'_i - X'_1)^2 + 2c], \quad (3.5)$$

$$\text{where } \phi = \frac{1 - \beta(1 - q)}{2\beta q}.$$

This inequality will bind, as a political party will use its bargaining power to expend the minimum amount necessary to sustain cooperation in the form of turnout. The turnout-buying model yields numerous comparative statics, but three should be emphasized as they are later contrasted with those from Stokes's (2005: 321) vote-buying model. If it is assumed that a political party has a fixed budget, then turnout buying becomes a less effective strategy for obtaining votes as the cost of rewards increases. Therefore:

1. **Targeting:** Turnout buying is more effective when machines target individuals with ideal points (X'_i) closer to that of the machine (X'_1), for whom the cost of rewards is lower ($\frac{\partial b'}{\partial (X'_i - X'_1)} > 0$). Thus, turnout buying predicts that machines will target unmobilized strong supporters with rewards.
2. **Monitoring:** The effectiveness of turnout buying increases as the machine's ability to monitor turnout, q , increases ($\frac{\partial b'}{\partial q} < 0$).

A third key comparative static is identified by implicitly differentiating Equation 3.5:

3. **Reward Value:** The potential for turnout buying increases when the value of the private reward, b' , increases ($\frac{\partial X'_i}{\partial b'} > 0$).²⁰

These comparative statics are now contrasted with those in Stokes (2005: 321), providing a test by which the turnout-buying and vote-buying models can be evaluated.

3.3.3 Comparison with the Vote-Buying Model

I now turn to the vote-buying model analyzed in Stokes (2005). Stokes (2005: 320) finds that to sustain a voter's cooperation, the following inequality must hold:

$$\frac{X_1 + X_2}{2} \leq X_i \leq \frac{X_1 + X_2}{2} + \frac{b\gamma}{X_2 - X_1}, \quad (3.6)$$

$$\text{where } \gamma = \frac{p\beta}{1 - \beta + p\beta}.$$

From this inequality, Stokes (2005: 321) highlights four key comparative statics. These comparative statics are presented below with quotations from Stokes (2005: 321), and are contrasted to findings from the turnout-buying model.²¹

1. **Targeting:** “Among its core constituents — those whom it can observe well — the machine is most effective when it targets Weakly opposed voters, rather than Loyal or Opposition voters.”²² The vote-buying and turnout-buying models yield conflicting comparative statics for targeting. With turnout buying, the machine is most effective when targeting unmobilized strong supporters — not weakly opposed voters.
2. **Monitoring:** “The more accurately the machine can monitor voters, the greater the potential for vote buying.” The two models yield similar comparative statics for monitoring. Turnout buying is also more effective when the machine can more accurately monitor *whether* individuals vote.

²⁰Note that increases in X'_i represent increases in the potential for turnout buying. Figure 3.3 shows that for any individual X'_i targeted for turnout buying, there also exists a mass of individuals over the range $[X'_1, X'_i)$ who have policy ideal points closer to the machine than X'_i . If X'_i is targeted for turnout buying, then these other unmobilized supporters are also expected to be targeted because they face relatively lower ideological costs of voting for the machine.

²¹Stokes's comparative statics are presented in a different order to highlight testable predictions differing across the two models.

²²Stokes parenthetically describes each type of voter mathematically (excluded here for clarity).

3. **Reward Value:** “As the value of the private reward (b) relative to the value of voting in accordance to one’s policy or ideological preference increases, the potential for vote buying increases.” The two models yield similar comparative statics for reward value.
4. **Ideological Distance:** “As the ideological distance between the two parties ($X_2 - X_1$) shrinks, the potential for vote buying grows.” The two models yield conflicting comparative statics for ideological distance, which has no predicted effect on turnout buying.²³ Predictions for ideological distance cannot be tested with the Argentine data (Stokes 2005: 321).

These comparative statics reveal an important test for evaluating which interpretation — turnout buying or vote buying — provides a better account of the Argentine survey data. Although the turnout-buying and vote-buying models have similar predictions for monitoring and reward value, their predictions for reward targeting diverge sharply.

3.4 Empirical Evidence

Empirical analysis suggests that the Argentine survey data in Stokes (2005: 321-4) are more consistent with turnout buying than vote buying. The turnout-buying model developed above predicts that machines target unmobilized strong supporters, whereas Stokes’s (2005: 321) vote-buying model predicts they target weakly opposed voters.²⁴ Initial descriptive analysis (Figure 3.2) provides evidence that the Peronist party predominantly targets its own supporters — as expected with turnout buying — but does not control for factors such as income level and education that could potentially affect results. Stokes’s (2005) extensive quantitative survey offers an excellent opportunity to evaluate the turnout-buying and vote-buying explanations empirically.

Even without additional analysis, findings in Stokes (2005: 322) are more consistent with a turnout-buying interpretation. In Table 3.1, Column 1 replicates Stokes’s (2005: 322) analysis of factors associated with the probability of receiving rewards. The results of this logit regression show that Peronist sympathizers have a higher probability of receiving rewards than non-Peronist sympathizers, at a 95% level of significance and controlling for numerous factors. The variable *Peronist Sympathizer* refers to respondents who identify the Peronist party as their favorite party without prompting in an open-ended question. Given that the Peronist party is “by far the most active in distributing private rewards” (Stokes 2005: 322),

²³Although ideological distance does not have a direct effect on turnout buying in the model, it may in reality play an indirect role by affecting the machine’s number of unmobilized supporters.

²⁴As mentioned above, the models also have different predictions for ideological distance, but this comparative static cannot be tested with the Argentine survey data. Comparative statics for reward value and monitoring, which are similar across the two models, are also tested below.

Table 3.1: Logit Model Estimations of Electoral Clientelism

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Peronist Sympathizer	0.550 (0.220)*					0.496 (0.221)*	
Opinion of Peronists		0.440 (0.131)**					0.405 (0.138)**
Peronists "Very Good"			0.846 (0.402)*				
Peronists "Good"			0.544 (0.252)*				
Peronists "Very Bad"			-0.341 (0.351)				
1999 Peronist Voter				0.497 (0.217)*			
1995 Peronist Voter					0.609 (0.223)**		
1999 Nonvoter						-0.509 (0.329)	-0.443 (0.354)
Income	-0.195 (0.074)**	-0.204 (0.073)**	-0.203 (0.073)**	-0.204 (0.071)**	-0.205 (0.071)**	-0.200 (0.071)**	-0.213 (0.074)**
Education	-0.212 (0.079)**	-0.214 (0.093)*	-0.211 (0.093)*	-0.211 (0.089)*	-0.239 (0.089)**	-0.205 (0.088)*	-0.201 (0.093)*
Housing Quality	-0.212 (0.131)	-0.155 (0.135)	-0.155 (0.134)	-0.236 (0.136)	-0.232 (0.139)	-0.229 (0.137)	-0.164 (0.141)
Log Population	-0.134 (0.049)**	-0.156 (0.052)**	-0.157 (0.052)**	-0.148 (0.053)**	-0.162 (0.054)**	-0.131 (0.053)*	-0.147 (0.055)**
Ballot	0.577 (0.225)*	0.547 (0.228)*	0.549 (0.228)*	0.558 (0.235)*	0.588 (0.244)*	0.559 (0.238)*	0.520 (0.242)*
Age	-0.015 (0.007)*	-0.014 (0.007)*	-0.014 (0.007)*	-0.018 (0.007)**	-0.020 (0.007)**	-0.018 (0.007)**	-0.017 (0.007)*
Gender	-0.158 (0.195)	-0.206 (0.200)	-0.205 (0.200)	-0.177 (0.202)	-0.141 (0.207)	-0.187 (0.202)	-0.253 (0.209)
Radical Sympathizer	-0.455 (0.371)	-0.530 (0.352)	-0.525 (0.351)	-0.540 (0.353)	-0.415 (0.363)	-0.454 (0.366)	-0.498 (0.356)
Constant	1.583 (0.746)*	0.913 (0.865)	1.704 (0.778)*	1.998 (0.750)**	2.156 (0.789)**	1.768 (0.767)*	1.079 (0.895)
Observations	1618	1521	1521	1525	1462	1525	1442

Note: Entries are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Dependent Variable: "Did you receive goods distributed by a party in the last campaign?" Coded Yes = 1, No = 0. Independent Variables: *Peronist Sympathizer*: Coded 1 if answered Peronist party to open-ended question: "Independently of whom you have voted for in the past, which party do you like the most?," 0 otherwise. *Radical Sympathizer*: Coded 1 if answered Radical party, 0 otherwise. *Opinion of Peronists*: Responses to closed-ended question ("In general, what is your opinion of the Peronist Party?") coded as: 1 = "Very Bad," 2 = "Bad," 3 = "Good," 4 = "Very Good." For this question, *Peronists "Very Good," "Good"* and *"Very Bad"* are dummies for corresponding responses. *1999 Peronist Voter*: Coded 1 if voted for Peronist presidential candidate (Duhalde) in 1999, 0 otherwise. *1995 Peronist Voter*: Coded 1 if voted for Peronist presidential candidate (Menem) in 1995, 0 otherwise. *1999 Nonvoter*: Coded 1 if respondent reported not voting in 1999 presidential election, 0 otherwise. *Income*: Self-reported, 9-level scale. *Education*: 9-level scale, from no formal education to postgraduate. *Housing Quality*: Assessed by interviewer, 5-level scale (1 = poorest quality). *Log Population*: Natural log of population of respondent's municipality (2001 census). *Ballot*: Coded 1 if voted with ballot given by party operative, 0 if voted with ballot acquired in voting booth. *Gender*: Female = 1.

these results suggest that machine *supporters* are most frequently targeted for rewards — as expected with turnout buying.

Reward targeting can be examined further using a different question in Stokes’s (2005) Argentine survey. Column 2 shows results for an *Opinion of Peronists* variable, in which higher values reflect a more favorable evaluation of the Peronist Party. This specification, which similarly employs a logit model and includes control variables, also provides evidence that rewards target machine supporters. Individuals with more favorable opinions of the Peronist party have a higher probability of receiving rewards, at the 99% level of significance. Using categorical variables for the “Opinion of Peronist Party” question provides additional insight (Column 3).²⁵ This specification indicates that individuals with a “good” opinion (*Peronists* “Good”) — and even more so, those with a “very good” opinion (*Peronists* “Very Good”) — of the Peronist party have a significantly higher probability (at the 95% level) of receiving rewards than individuals with a “bad” opinion, controlling for other factors. These estimates suggest that the machine disproportionately targets *strong* supporters with rewards, as predicted by a comparative static of the turnout-buying model. Predicted values from the regression in Column 3 are used to generate a kernel density function (Figure 3.5), which shows that individuals with more favorable opinions of the Peronist party are more likely to receive rewards. Overall, the regressions in Columns 1-3 suggest that rewards target machine supporters — consistent with turnout buying.


Voting behavior in previous elections provides additional evidence about reward targeting. The survey analyzed by Stokes (2005: 321-4) only captures rewards distributed during Argentina’s 2001 electoral campaign, but also specifically asks respondents for whom they voted in previous elections. Rewards disproportionately target individuals who voted for Peronist candidates in the past. As shown in Column 4, respondents who reported voting for the Peronist presidential candidate in the 1999 election (Eduardo Duhalde) have a significantly higher probability of receiving rewards (at the 95% level). Similarly, individuals who voted for a Peronist gubernatorial candidate in 1999 are also more likely to receive rewards, at the 99% level of significance (not shown). Column 5 considers voting behavior in the earlier presidential election of 1995. Respondents who voted for Carlos Menem, the Peronist candidate, have a significantly higher probability (at the 99% level) of receiving rewards. These specifications suggest that the Peronist machine tends to distribute electoral rewards to individuals who have supported the party in the past.

Altogether, the specifications in Columns 1 through 5 provide evidence that rewards target machine supporters.²⁶ Of course, endogeneity is an important consideration. The

²⁵Given the lack of an “indifferent” category and the need to omit one category to avoid perfect multicollinearity, the “Bad” category is excluded. Results are robust to excluding other categories instead.

²⁶Specifications are robust to the inclusion of fixed effects. In addition, findings are robust to alternative codings of the dependent variable. Respondents in the Argentine survey were not specifically asked who gave

Figure 3.5: Probability of Receiving Rewards, Supporters vs. Opposers of Peronist Party



Note: Kernel density function based on predicted values for observations in Stokes's (2005) Argentine survey data, based on logit regression in Column 3 of Table 3.1. "Supporters" include all survey respondents holding "very good" or "good" opinions of the Peronist party, and "opposers" include all respondents holding "bad" or "very bad" opinions of the Peronist party.

specifications in Columns 1-3 examine post-reward opinions, so it is possible that recipients' support for the Peronist party may have been "nudged" favorably by rewards (Stokes 2005: 324). It should be emphasized, however, that *strong* supporters have the highest probability of receiving rewards, and recipients also disproportionately identify the Peronist party as their favorite party without prompting. Another source of potential endogeneity is that vote buying may involve repeated interactions (as modeled by Stokes 2005: 318-9), so reward recipients' past voting (Columns 4 and 5) may have been influenced by rewards in previous elections. Without denying the possibility of such explanations, the most straightforward interpretation of the findings in Columns 1 through 5 is that the Peronist machine targets its own supporters — consistent with turnout buying, not vote buying. As discussed below, panel data would provide more definitive evidence.

The specifications examined thus far suggest that rewards target machine supporters in Argentina, as predicted by the turnout-buying model. In order to test the mechanism of turnout buying developed above more thoroughly, it is important to consider evidence about other comparative statics. Whereas the turnout-buying and vote-buying models have starkly different predictions for reward targeting, they have similar predictions for both reward value and monitoring. Comparative statics predict that the potential for both turnout buying and vote buying increases when the value of private rewards increase. Poorer individuals may therefore be expected to receive rewards more frequently, because the diminishing marginal utility of income implies the poor gain more utility from particularistic benefits (Dixit & Londregan 1996: 1144; Stokes 2005: 315). In line with this prediction, the coefficients on *Income* in all specifications in Table 3.1 provide evidence that individuals with lower income have a significantly higher probability of receiving rewards (at the 99% level). With respect to monitoring, comparative statics predict increased turnout buying when the machine can monitor turnout more accurately, and increased vote buying when the machine can monitor voting decisions more accurately. Both types of monitoring may be expected to be more accurate in small communities (Stokes 2005: 322-3). The coefficients on *Log Population* in all specifications show that respondents in smaller municipalities are significantly more likely to receive rewards (at the 95% level or higher).²⁷ Evidence on reward value and monitoring is therefore consistent with *both* turnout buying and vote buying. Overall, empirical tests yield results consistent with all three comparative statics (targeting, reward value and mon-

them rewards; thus, the dependent variable in both this study and Stokes (2005) captures whether or not respondents received rewards from any political party. Findings on reward targeting in Table 3.1 are robust to coding the dependent variable as 1 only for individuals who received rewards and specifically mentioned the Peronist party as distributing rewards in their neighborhood. Most findings are also robust to an even more restrictive coding, in which the dependent variable is coded 1 only for individuals who received rewards and *exclusively* mentioned the Peronist party as distributing rewards in their neighborhood.

²⁷For monitoring, Stokes (2005: 323) also shows that individuals voting with personally distributed ballots (instead of ballots available in the polling area) are more likely to receive rewards. This finding is also consistent with turnout buying, because party operatives distributing rewards to unmobilized supporters would also be expected to provide ballots.

itoring) of the turnout-buying model presented above.²⁸

Thus far, regression analyses suggest that the Argentine data are more consistent with turnout buying than vote buying. An additional question is whether “rewarding loyalists” also provides a compelling explanation of the Argentine data. The typology presented in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.2) shows that evidence of rewards targeting supporters points away from vote buying, and towards two strategies in the left column: turnout buying and rewarding loyalists. Whereas turnout buying rewards unmobilized supporters for turnout, rewarding loyalists targets supporters who would vote for the machine even without rewards. For example, Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez & Magaloni (2010, Ch. 4) extend a rewarding-loyalists argument in their intriguing study of Mexico: parties may reward core supporters during an election to maintain future support, if partisan loyalties are conditional on particularistic benefits received in the past. Distinguishing between turnout buying and rewarding loyalists requires additional testing: do rewards primarily target individuals who are inclined to vote in the current election, or those who are inclined *not* to vote? Further regressions examine this dimension of reward targeting.

In order to test whether rewards target individuals who are predisposed not to vote in the current election, one approach would be to examine voting behavior in previous elections. One might expect individuals to be less likely to vote if they did not participate in previous elections. Thus, a potential test of turnout buying versus rewarding loyalists would be whether individuals who did not vote in the previous election have a significantly higher or lower probability of receiving rewards. To this end, Columns 6 and 7 add a *1999 Nonvoter* variable — a dummy with a value of one if an individual did not vote in the previous presidential election — to two specifications discussed above. Earlier findings that rewards target machine supporters remain robust: coefficients for *Peronist Sympathizer* and *Opinion of Peronists* are comparable in magnitude and statistically significant. By contrast, *1999 Nonvoter* has no significant effect on the probability of receiving rewards in either specification (the signs are negative). Additional regressions (not shown) find that all interactions of *1999 Nonvoter* with variables used to test Peronist party support are also insignificant. Overall, these specifications suggest that nonvoters in the previous election do not have a disproportionately higher or lower probability of receiving rewards.

²⁸Stokes (2005: 321-323) also provides regression results for three additional dependent variables: (1) whether receiving goods influenced recipients’ votes (*Influence*); (2) whether “a person had turned to a locally important person in the past year (*Patron*)”; and (3) whether “if the head of their household lost his or her job, the family would turn to a party operative for help (*Job*).” Results for the *Influence* variable only suggest that *some* recipients are influenced by rewards. Of the 141 individuals who received rewards in Stokes (2005) survey, 20 acknowledged that receiving goods influenced their votes. Stokes only uses the variables *Patron* and *Job* to detect clientelism and does not discuss their results, so they are not examined here.

At least two reasons explain why the insignificant coefficient on *1999 Nonvoter* is consistent with turnout buying. First, it is important to emphasize that the theoretical mechanism of turnout buying involves distributing rewards to both individuals who *did* as well as those who *did not* vote in the previous election. As modeled above, individuals who receive turnout-buying rewards follow through with their side of the bargain because by turning out, they can receive future rewards. Therefore, for turnout buying to be effective, parties must explicitly target some individuals who were induced to vote in the previous election. Concerns about strategic behavior point to another reason why turnout-buying parties do not actively target individuals who abstained in the previous election. By conditioning rewards on past turnout, party operatives might unintentionally create incentives for unrewarded supporters *not* to vote. These individuals might attempt to increase their chances of future turnout-buying rewards by abstaining. To avoid such strategic behavior, operatives rely instead on their frequent, face-to-face interactions with supporters to identify who is unlikely to vote in an upcoming election, whether that be due to lack of interest, loss of a job, a sick relative, childbirth, or other reasons. For these two reasons, results for *1999 Nonvoter* are consistent with a turnout-buying explanation.

Whereas the overall findings in Table 3.1 are consistent with turnout buying, they point away from a rewarding-loyalists interpretation. Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez & Magaloni (2010, Ch. 4) argue that parties distribute rewards to voting supporters to “prevent the erosion of partisan loyalties” over time: unless operatives provide particularistic benefits, supporters may become swing or opposition voters during the next election. Given this argument, parties would be expected to concentrate on offering rewards to *weak* supporters, whose partisan loyalties are relatively more fragile. But the Argentine data instead show that rewards disproportionately target *strong* supporters — Column 3 shows that individuals holding “very good” opinions of the Peronist party actually have the highest probability of receiving rewards. Furthermore, the insignificant coefficient on *1999 Nonvoter* may be inconsistent with rewarding loyalists. Parties engaging in this strategy might be expected to focus on reinforcing the loyalty of supporters who actually turn out to vote, because previous abstainers have already proven themselves to be unreliable suppliers of votes. Taken together, these two reasons suggest that the data in Table 3.1 are relatively less consistent with a rewarding-loyalists strategy.²⁹

²⁹I would like to thank Susan Stokes for suggesting another potential test between interpretations of turnout buying versus rewarding loyalists: with turnout buying, rewards might be expected to target Argentines aged 70 years and older, who are not required to vote. This test presumes that because such older citizens do not face penalties for nonvoting, they would require more inducements for turnout. However, observe that turnout buying requires greater rewards when the cost of voting increases ($\partial b' / \partial c > 0$). Thus, if older Argentines have higher voting costs, parties may choose not to target them with turnout buying even though their electoral participation is optional. Rodrigo Zarazaga, an Argentine researcher who lived in a *villa miseria* (shantytown) for 15 years and conducted 250 interviews and surveys of brokers and clients, agrees that brokers often distribute goods to generate turnout and provides an illustrative example of why older voters are not targeted with particularistic benefits. In Villa Mitre, brokers often distribute benefits

3.5 Summary

This chapter challenges much of the conventional wisdom about vote buying. Scholars typically assume that parties distribute particularistic benefits — especially to the poor — to influence vote choices. Although such clientelist vote buying is observed in many countries, parties also have another important reason for distributing rewards. Parties can activate their own passive constituencies by rewarding unmobilized supporters for turnout. Turnout buying involves a less stringent monitoring requirement than vote buying — the ability to observe turnout instead of voting decisions — and thus helps to explain why parties might offer rewards even with ballot secrecy. Formal modeling shows that turnout buying is incentive-compatible, and identifies reward targeting as a comparative test of turnout buying and vote buying. Empirical analyses suggest that the Argentine survey data in Stokes (2005) are more consistent with turnout buying. Evidence of turnout buying in Argentina, a country that in any case has relatively high turnout and compulsory voting, forces us to consider whether it may be even more prevalent in other contexts.³⁰ As explored in Chapter 4, turnout buying would be expected to be a more significant potential factor in electoral campaigns in countries where voting is voluntary, or where compulsory voting laws are even more weakly enforced than in Argentina.

This chapter has focused on distinguishing turnout buying from vote buying, and has thus sought to maintain comparability with Stokes’s (2005) influential study: the dimension of turnout is added to her vote-buying model while making as few other changes as possible. One consequence is that machines are modeled as choosing *either* turnout buying *or* vote buying. Of course, reality is far more complicated. If parties are able to monitor both turnout and voting decisions, then they can engage in a combination of both strategies. Empirical evidence from Argentina suggests that the Peronist party may well be engaging in both turnout buying and vote buying. Although the party predominantly rewards its own supporters, it also appears to distribute some particularistic benefits to opposers. For example, Figure 3.1 shows that some individuals with unfavorable views of the Peronist Party

and pick up (younger) supporters to take to the polls in buses at a meeting point in front of a church on the paved road of Padre Manolo Ustarroz. However, the elderly are not similarly targeted for mobilization because of higher costs — many have difficulty reaching the church, and the dilapidated roads to individual homes often cannot be navigated by buses. For more evidence that age-specific costs may influence lower turnout of the elderly, consider Canton & Jorrat’s (2003: 192–3) study of abstention in Argentine presidential elections. Among those in the lowest occupational status category ($N = 7,751$), 23.3% of individuals aged 65–69 — for whom voting is compulsory — did not vote. When considering individuals for whom voting is optional, substantial variation by age is observed: 29.2% of individuals aged 70–74 did not vote, compared to 68.5% for individuals aged 75 or greater. Overall, reward targeting across age-specific compulsory voting laws does not necessarily help to differentiate between turnout buying and rewarding loyalists.

³⁰For example, Roland & Gonzalo Zapata (2000: 3) argue that low turnout may reinforce clientelist practices because fewer individuals are needed to sway elections.

receive rewards, albeit less frequently than others.³¹

Given such empirical evidence, a particularly useful line of formal analysis might therefore ask: how would a machine trade off between allocating resources to turnout buying and vote buying? To examine this question, it is necessary to move away from Stokes's (2005) model by specifying a budget constraint. A machine can be modeled as facing a constrained optimization problem, in which its objective is to maximize the votes obtained, subject to its budget constraint. It conditions the size of rewards on individuals' presumed ideal points, and targets those individuals whose turnout or vote choices it can obtain most cheaply. To provide intuition, consider that the machine would most likely begin with vote buying, targeting indifferent or very weakly opposed voters. After all, these (ideologically) marginal voters do not require incentives for showing up at the polls. Moreover, individuals switching their votes away from opposing parties offer the machine more net votes than turnout buying. Yet as the machine buys more votes, the marginal cost of vote buying increases because it must target individuals with ideal points farther from the machine. Thus, turnout buying becomes a relatively cheaper strategy. Overall, the machine will allocate resources across the two strategies such that it equates the marginal net votes per unit of expenditure for turnout buying and vote buying.

While this discussion is overly simplistic, it illustrates the basic logic about why a party might engage in both turnout buying and vote buying. The next chapter builds on this intuition, and develops a formal model that suggests how machines optimally combine these and other strategies of electoral clientelism.

³¹Stokes (2005) also offers interview quotes about vote buying. In addition, of the 141 individuals who received rewards in Stokes' (2005) survey, 20 acknowledged that receiving goods influenced their votes.

Chapter 4

Varieties of Electoral Clientelism

(with Jordan Gans-Morse and Sebastian Mazzuca)

4.1 Introduction

Despite the prevalence of electoral clientelism in many contemporary societies, we continue to lack a thorough understanding of how political machines distribute benefits during campaigns. Most studies focus exclusively on vote buying — exchanging rewards for vote choices. Yet as Chapter 3 explored, much of what scholars interpret as vote buying may actually be turnout buying — exchanging rewards for electoral participation. How do political machines allocate resources across vote buying, turnout buying, and other forms of electoral clientelism? To what extent does a machine’s choice of strategies depend on characteristics of the political environment?

To investigate such questions, the present chapter develops a formal model that examines how political machines optimally combine strategies of electoral clientelism. The analysis suggests reasons why electoral clientelism is a heterogeneous political phenomenon, and helps to explain observed variation in patterns of machine politics. Political machines consider both individual and contextual factors when deciding how to distribute benefits during campaigns. In line with the typology presented in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.2), two attributes of individuals — political preferences and inclination to vote — determine the prevalence of cheap targets for each strategy. Machines adapt the size of clientelist benefits given to recipients, and are willing to pay relatively more for vote buying because unlike other strategies it both adds votes for the machine and subtracts votes from the opposition. The model suggests that political machines also tailor their mix of strategies to contextual factors. For example, the model predicts that five factors increase vote buying: (1) compulsory voting, (2) weak machine support, (3) low political polarization, (4) low salience of political preferences, and (5) weak ballot secrecy. By contrast, five factors increase turnout buying: (1) optional voting, (2) strong machine support, (3) high political polarization, (4) high salience

of political preferences, and (5) strong ballot secrecy.

In order to explore such predictions, we also examine evidence from Argentina, Brazil and Russia, drawing on fieldwork interviews, local media accounts and academic studies. Each country exhibits a distinct mix of clientelist strategies: (1) predominantly vote buying in Brazil, (2) predominantly turnout buying in Russia, and (3) a relatively balanced mix of vote buying and turnout buying in Argentina. Evidence suggests that the model of electoral clientelism developed below helps to explain this variation.

The present chapter also advances formal research on clientelism. Previous models rely on a one-dimensional voter space, in which citizens are arrayed along a spectrum of political preferences as in the classic Downsian spatial model of political competition. We introduce a second dimension, such that citizen types are defined both by political preferences and voting costs. This innovation facilitates the integration of nonvoters into our analyses. As a result, the present study addresses a major limitation in almost all existing models of clientelism — they examine only *one* strategy. For example, Stokes (2005) provides a model of vote buying, and Chapter 3 develops a model of turnout buying. By contrast, the present chapter analyzes the tradeoffs that parties face when combining strategies. One recent study by Morgan & Vardy (2008) also begins to tackle the key issue of how parties combine strategies, but focuses narrowly on the impact of introducing the secret ballot. We offer a more exhaustive analysis of the range of strategies employed by political machines and, through the model's comparative statics, a fuller assessment of the factors that influence variation of clientelist strategies.¹

4.2 Combining Strategies

A central point of this study is that when political machines distribute benefits during campaigns, they often engage in several distinct strategies of electoral clientelism. To provide intuition and motivate formal analysis of how political machines combine strategies, we first present a stylized example.

Assume that a political machine has \$75 to distribute to citizens during a campaign. The machine seeks to maximize its electoral prospects by influencing vote choices and/or inducing turnout. There are nine citizens whom the machine can target:

- **Opposing Voters:** Veronica (\$10), Victor (\$30), Virginia (\$50)
- **Supporting Nonvoters:** Tomas (\$10), Teresa (\$15), Tonia (\$20)

¹Dunning & Stokes (2008), an unpublished paper on the topic, examines only two strategies.

• **Opposing Nonvoters:** Debora (\$10), David (\$20), Diego (\$30)

We focus here on vote buying (targets opposing voters), turnout buying (targets supporting nonvoters), and double persuasion (targets opposing nonvoters). Observe that different payments (in parentheses) are required to buy each citizen using the relevant strategy. The required payments vary because citizens differ with respect to two key attributes: (1) political preferences and (2) inclination to vote. For example, vote buying is more expensive when a citizen strongly opposes the machine on ideological grounds. Likewise, turnout buying and double persuasion are more costly if the citizen is strongly inclined not to vote.

Given the different required payments, how does the machine allocate its budget? The first crucial consideration is that vote buying benefits the machine more than other strategies. Vote buying provides two net votes — it adds a vote to the machine’s tally, and subtracts one from the opposition. By contrast, turnout buying and double persuasion provide only one net vote because they target nonvoters. To allocate its budget efficiently, the machine should target citizens who offer the most net votes per dollar spent.

Using this metric, the machine should start by vote buying Veronica. For \$10, it earns two net votes (i.e., \$5 per net vote). To vote buy an additional citizen, the machine would need to pay Victor \$30 (\$15 per net vote). Thus, the machine would be better off turnout buying Tomas and double persuading Debora, as each provides one net vote for \$10. The machine now has \$45 remaining, and considers costlier citizens. It should vote buy Victor for \$30 and turnout buy Teresa for \$15. Both options are equally cost-effective (\$15 per net vote), and preferable to the alternative of double persuading David (\$20 per net vote).

This stylized example provides several insights for further investigation: (1) machines optimally combine clientelist strategies; (2) their mix includes turnout buying and double persuasion; (3) their mix depends on citizens’ political preferences and inclination to vote; and (4) machines are willing to pay more for vote buying relative to other strategies. We now develop a model that confirms the intuition gleaned above, and also suggests how machines tailor their mix of clientelist strategies to specific political environments.

4.3 Model

4.3.1 Setup

Consider two political parties, an incumbent machine party (M) and an opposition party (O). Each party offers a platform, x^M and x^O , respectively, on a one-dimensional ideological spectrum ranging from $\underline{X}$ to $\bar{X}$. Without loss of generality, let $x^O < x^M$, and for simplicity,

assume that the parties' platforms are symmetric around zero (that is, $x^O = -x^M$).²

Both parties' platforms are fixed for the duration of our analysis. This simplifying assumption is consistent with our focus on electoral clientelism, and accurately reflects reality during many electoral campaigns: parties may have attributes that cannot be credibly transformed in the short run, such as the personal or ideological characteristics of their leaders.

Each citizen i is defined by her political preferences x_i and voting costs c_i , where x_i and c_i are independent. The citizens' ideal points x_i are distributed over $[\underline{X}, \bar{X}]$ according to $F(x)$, where F has a strictly positive and continuously differentiable density f over $(\underline{X}, \bar{X})$. Costs of voting c_i are distributed over $[0, \bar{C}]$ according to $G(c)$, where G has a strictly positive and continuously differentiable density g over $(0, \bar{C})$.³

A citizen's utility equals the difference between her expressive value from voting and her voting costs.⁴ Formally, a citizen of type (x_i, c_i) who votes for party $P \in \{M, O\}$ receives utility:

$$U^P(x_i, c_i) = -|x^P - x_i| - c_i \quad (4.1)$$

The first term, $-|x^P - x_i|$, captures the notion that the closer the citizen's ideal point to the platform of the party for which she votes, the more utility she receives from casting a ballot. The second term, c_i , represents voting costs, such as transportation, lost wages, or child care needed to reach the polls.

A citizen who chooses not to vote receives no expressive utility from voting and also incurs no direct voting costs. However, in most societies citizens who fail to vote face abstention costs. Such abstention costs range from social disapprobation to fines and penalties in countries with compulsory voting laws. We thus assume that a non-voter incurs a cost $a > 0$.⁵

The objective of the machine is to maximize its net votes — the number of votes it receives minus the number of votes the opposition party receives. Since the machine cannot

²This assumption simplifies the algebra but qualitatively does not affect our results.

³For ease of explication, we focus on the case where the parties' platforms are the endpoints of citizens' ideological spectrum, that is, $\underline{X} = x^O$ and $\bar{X} = x^M$. Additional analysis (not shown) suggests that the main results hold for the case in which $\underline{X} < x^O$ and $\bar{X} > x^M$.

⁴Morgan & Vardy (2008) offer a formal justification for the assumption that voters receive only expressive utility, not instrumental utility (i.e., utility derived from affecting the outcome of the election). Given reasonable assumptions, a citizen's probability of being pivotal converges to zero as the electorate size increases.

⁵We make two realistic assumptions that ensure an interior solution to the machine's optimization problem and monotonicity of comparative statics: (1) some indifferent citizens vote (formally, this requires $a > x^M$); and (2) even with electoral clientelism, there exist strong supporters who do not vote (formally, this requires $\bar{C} - a > b^*$, where b^* is defined below as the most-expensive payment to nonvoters).

adjust its platform during the campaign, its task is to acquire additional votes by distributing selective benefits. We assume the machine cannot afford to buy all citizens, because it has limited resources given by a budget B . Thus, the machine must decide how to allocate its budget optimally across different types of citizens.⁶

We assume that the machine observes citizens' political preferences and voting costs. To illustrate the basic logic of our model, we initially ignore the risk of opportunistic defection by citizens (e.g., a citizen receives a vote-buying payment and still votes against the machine). An extension of the model then considers opportunistic defection. In addition, given that in many contexts parties cannot pay citizens to stay home on Election Day (e.g., Schaffer 2007: 188), we initially assume that machines cannot engage in negative turnout buying. We later relax this assumption to analyze how the machine's optimal allocation of resources changes when negative turnout buying is allowed.

Finally, the model assumes that only the machine, and not the opposition party, has the capacity to offer rewards to citizens. This assumption, which follows models of clientelism such as Stokes (2005), reflects the reality in many contexts where only one party has the infrastructure, access to state resources, and social networks necessary to engage in clientelism. Stokes (2009: 12, 20) offers two explanations for what she calls the "single-machine" assumption: (1) the incumbent party has exclusive access to public coffers, from which clientelist payments are made; and (2) only one party has invested in the "dense organizational structure" and "social proximity" that define a machine. In many contexts where only the dominant machine has party operatives embedded in neighborhoods, other parties find it exceedingly difficult to collect information about citizens' preferences and voting costs, as well as to enforce clientelist exchanges.

4.3.2 Classifying Citizens

Given its knowledge of preferences and voting costs, the machine can classify citizens. If a citizen shows up at the polls, she will vote for the machine if doing so provides (weakly) greater utility than voting for the opposition. That is, a citizen votes if $U_i^M \geq U_i^O$, or equivalently, if $x_i \geq 0$.⁷ Thus, citizens with political preferences $x_i \geq 0$ are supporters of the machine, while those with political preferences $x_i < 0$ are opposers. If a citizen chooses not to vote, she receives no expressive utility from voting and faces no voting costs. However, she incurs abstention costs. Hence, a citizen will choose to vote if she receives (weakly) greater utility from voting than from abstaining. That is, if $\max[U_i^M, U_i^O] \geq -a$, or equivalently, if

⁶Formally, the machine's problem is to maximize its net votes by assigning a reward $b_i \geq 0$ to every citizen, such that total expenditures, $N \int \int b_i g(c) f(x) dc dx$, are less than or equal to budget B , where N is the total number of citizens.

⁷We make the assumption that citizens who are indifferent between the two parties vote for the machine and that citizens who are indifferent between abstaining and voting come to the polls.

$\max[-|x^M - x_i| - c_i, -|x^O - x_i| - c_i] \geq -a$. Overall, the machine can classify the population into four groups of citizens:

- **Supporting Voters:** Citizens with $x_i \geq 0$ and $-|x^M - x_i| - c_i \geq -a$
- **Supporting Nonvoters:** Citizens with $x_i \geq 0$ and $-|x^M - x_i| - c_i < -a$
- **Opposing Voters:** Citizens with $x_i < 0$ and $-|x^O - x_i| - c_i \geq -a$
- **Opposing Nonvoters:** Citizens with $x_i < 0$ and $-|x^O - x_i| - c_i < -a$

Figure 4.1a presents a graphical depiction of these four groups of citizens (from the perspective of the machine). Political preferences are represented on the horizontal axis, while voting costs are represented on the vertical axis. The vertex lines represent citizens who are indifferent between voting and not voting, because they receive the same utility from voting as they do from abstaining.⁸ All citizen types on or below line l_1 vote for the machine; those on or below line l_2 vote for the opposition. All citizen types above l_1 and l_2 are nonvoters.

The vertex shape of the cutoff line between voters and nonvoters reflects the fact that citizens with intense political preferences (i.e., voters for whom x_i approaches either x^M or x^O) receive greater expressive utility from voting, as can be observed in the utility function (Equation 4.1). They are thus more inclined to incur voting costs and turn out to support their favored party. By contrast, citizens who have weak political preferences (i.e., citizens for whom x_i approaches 0) receive lower expressive utility from voting, and thus are less inclined to incur voting costs. Additionally, the vertex intercepts the vertical axis above the origin, which reflects the fact that some indifferent citizens vote.


4.3.3 Payments

In order to determine the machine's optimal mix of clientelist strategies, we first identify how much the machine would need to pay to buy each citizen type. For each strategy, the required payments ($\bar{b}_i$) are as follows:

Vote Buying: Vote buying targets opposing voters, who have a reservation utility of U_i^O . To induce an opposing voter of type $t_i = (x_i, c_i)$ to switch her vote, the machine must therefore pay $\bar{b}_i^{VB}$ such that $U_i^M + \bar{b}_i^{VB} \geq U_i^O$. In an optimal allocation, the machine sets payments equal to a citizen's reservation value, because it will not “overpay” (pay a citizen more than

⁸Formally, these are supporters for whom $-|x^M - x_i| - c_i = -a$ and opponents for whom $-|x^O - x_i| - c_i = -a$. It thus follows that $l_1 = x - x^M + a$ and $l_2 = -x + x^O + a = -x - x^M + a$, where the second equation follows from the assumption of symmetric party platforms, $x^M = -x^O$.

Figure 4.1: The Vertex and Electoral Clientelism



Note: VB = Vote Buying; TB = Turnout Buying; DP = Double Persuasion

her reservation value) or “underpay” (pay a citizen less than her reservation value).⁹ Thus, the inequality binds. Substituting the identities of U_i^M and U_i^O from Equation 4.1 yields: $-|x^M - x_i| - c_i + \bar{b}_i^{VB} = -|x^O - x_i| - c_i$. Then, solving for $\bar{b}_i^{VB}$:¹⁰

$$\bar{b}_i^{VB} = -2x_i \quad (4.2)$$

With vote buying, the machine must compensate a citizen for casting a vote against her political preferences. As shown in Equation 4.2, the machine can vote buy all opposing voters with a given ideal point for the same price, even if they have different costs of voting. Because they already show up at the polls, opposing voters only need to be compensated for voting against their political preferences.

Turnout Buying: Turnout buying targets supporting nonvoters, who have a reservation utility of $-a$ (where a is the cost of abstention). To induce turnout of a supporting nonvoter of type $t_i = (x_i, c_i)$, the machine must pay $\bar{b}_i^{TB}$ such that $U_i^M + \bar{b}_i^{TB} = -a$. Substituting the identity of U_i^M from Equation 4.1 yields: $-|x^M - x_i| - c_i + \bar{b}_i^{TB} = -a$. Then, solving for $\bar{b}_i^{TB}$:

$$\bar{b}_i^{TB} = c_i - x_i + x^M - a \quad (4.3)$$

Supporting nonvoters receive more utility from abstaining than from voting. Thus, with turnout buying, the machine must compensate such citizens for the difference between the utility received from staying home and the utility received from voting for the machine.

Double Persuasion: Double persuasion targets opposing nonvoters, who neither participate in elections nor support the machine. Their reservation utility is $-a$. To induce an opposing nonvoter of type $t_i = (x_i, c_i)$ to turn out *and* vote for the machine, the party must therefore pay $\bar{b}_i^{DP}$ such that $U_i^M + \bar{b}_i^{DP} = -a$. Substituting the identity of U_i^M from Equation 4.1 yields: $-|x^M - x_i| - c_i + \bar{b}_i^{DP} = -a$. Then, solving for $\bar{b}_i^{DP}$:

$$\bar{b}_i^{DP} = c_i - x_i + x^M - a \quad (4.4)$$

Observe that Equations 4.3 and 4.4 are identical, except double persuasion targets opposing nonvoters ($x_i < 0$), while turnout buying targets supporting nonvoters ($x_i \geq 0$). With double persuasion, the machine must compensate opposing nonvoters for: (1) voting against their political preferences; and (2) their disutility from voting relative to abstaining.

4.3.4 Optimal Mix of Clientelist Strategies

Given this information about required payments, we now determine the optimal mix of clientelist strategies. This section provides intuition about how a machine optimally allocates

⁹A previous version of this chapter provided a formal proof of this statement.

¹⁰Recall that by the assumption of symmetric party platforms, $x^M = -x^O$.

resources across vote buying, turnout buying and double persuasion, in order to maximize its electoral prospects. The appendix provides proofs of each proposition.

The machine conditions the size of rewards on citizens' ideal points and voting costs (in accordance with Equations 4.2–4.4), and targets those citizens who deliver net votes most cheaply. Otherwise, the machine would be better off shifting resources to obtain additional electoral support. Observe that the machine is willing to pay twice as much to the most-expensive vote-buying recipient (a payment of b_{VB}^*) as it is willing to pay to the most-expensive turnout-buying and double-persuasion recipients (payments of b_{TB}^* and b_{DP}^* , respectively). After all, vote buying delivers twice as many net votes as the other two strategies. By the same logic, the machine is willing to pay the most expensive turnout-buying recipient exactly as much as it pays the most expensive double-persuasion recipient, because they both yield one net vote. In sum:

Proposition 1: In an optimal allocation of resources, the machine sets $b_{VB}^* = 2b_{TB}^* = 2b_{DP}^*$.

For notational simplicity, analysis below drops the subscripts, letting $b_{VB}^* = b^{**}$ and $b_{TB}^* = b_{DP}^* = b^*$. An important finding follows immediately. Observe in Proposition 1 that if b_{VB}^* , b_{TB}^* , or b_{DP}^* is greater than 0, then all three terms must be greater than 0. Therefore:

Proposition 2: If a machine engages in electoral clientelism, then optimally it allocates resources across *all* three strategies of vote buying, turnout buying, and double persuasion.

Proposition 2 reveals that mobilization is fundamental to understanding the logic of how machines distribute selective benefits during elections. Whereas most studies focus exclusively on vote buying, the model suggests that machines *never* optimally expend all their resources on one strategy. Beyond vote buying, machines should also seek nonvoters who can be induced to deliver votes in exchange for small rewards.

Another important implication pertains to double persuasion. This strategy might not seem intuitive — why distribute benefits to citizens who neither vote nor support the machine? Indeed, Dunning & Stokes (2008) even call double persuasion a “perverse strategy.” Yet our model suggests that it is *always* optimal for machines to engage in double persuasion. When operatives distribute rewards, they find that targeting weakly opposing nonvoters through double persuasion is often more cost-effective than buying votes of strongly opposed voters, or buying turnout of supporting nonvoters with high voting costs.

Given that the machine optimally combines all three strategies, how does it determine *which* citizens to buy? Figure 4.1b provides intuition about whom the machine optimally buys, building on the vertex shown in Figure 4.1a. First, consider who will receive the most-expensive vote-buying payment (b^{**}). Given that the machine neither overpays nor

underpays, it delivers b^{**} to opposing voters who require exactly that level of benefits to switch their vote choices. In accordance with Equation 4.2, these are opposing voters of type $t_j = (x_j, c_j)$ for whom $b^{**} = -2x_j$. Such voters are located on line segment l_3 in Figure 4.1b.¹¹

For turnout buying, the machine delivers the most-expensive payment (b^*) to supporting nonvoters who require exactly that level of benefits to come to the polls. In accordance with Equation 4.3, these are supporting nonvoters of type $t_k = (x_k, c_k)$ for whom $b^* = c_k - x_k + x^M - a$. Such supporting nonvoters are located on line segment l_4 , to the right of the vertical axis.¹² Observe that l_4 is parallel to l_1 , and the vertical distance between the two line segments is b^* .

For double persuasion, the machine delivers the most-expensive double-persuasion payment (b^*) to opposing nonvoters who require exactly that level of benefits to turn out and vote for the machine. In accordance with Equation 4.4, these are opposing nonvoters of type $t_l = (x_l, c_l)$ for whom $b^* = c_l - x_l + x^M - a$. Such opposing nonvoters are located on line segment l_5 , to the left of the vertical axis.¹³ Observe that l_4 and l_5 intercept the vertical axis at the same point, because the most-expensive payments for double persuasion and turnout buying are the same.

Thus far, graphical analysis suggests whom the machine buys with its most-expensive payments (b^* and b^{**}): citizens on l_3 receive vote-buying payments of b^{**} , citizens on l_4 receive turnout-buying payments of b^* , and citizens on l_5 receive double-persuasion payments of b^* . Another key insight is that the machine optimally buys *all* citizens whose required payments are less than or equal to the most-expensive payments for each respective strategy. That is, the machine buys all citizens in the shaded areas in Figure 4.1b. For further intuition, assume that a voter X weakly opposes the machine and requires a vote-buying payment b' , which is smaller than b^{**} . If the machine vote buys an opposing voter Y for b^{**} , then it must also vote buy X, because she provides the same number of net votes for a smaller payment. Otherwise, the machine would be better off buying X instead of Y, and reallocating the savings. Note that the machine optimally pays X exactly her reservation value, as it does not “overpay” in equilibrium. Such logic also applies for turnout buying and double persuasion.

The model also provides insight about whom the machine does *not* buy. In an optimal allocation of resources, the machine distributes *no* benefits to opposing voters who require

¹¹The line segment l_3 is given by the equation $x = -\frac{b^{**}}{2}$, on the range from the horizontal axis to the point where l_3 intersects with l_2 .

¹²The line segment l_4 is given by the equation $c = x - x^M + a + b^*$, on the domain from the vertical axis to X^M .

¹³The line segment l_5 is given by the equation $c = x - x^M + a + b^*$, on the domain from the point where l_5 intersects with l_2 to the vertical axis.

payments greater than b^{**} , or to nonvoters who require payments greater than b^* . That is, the machine buys no citizens outside the shaded areas in Figure 4.1b. For further intuition, assume that a voter Z strongly opposes the machine and requires a vote-buying payment b'' , which is greater than b^{**} . Observe that even the most-expensive vote-buying payment b^{**} “underpays” Z and is not enough to persuade her to switch her vote. Thus, it cannot be optimal for the machine to expend resources on citizens requiring vote-buying payments larger than b^{**} . The logic is analogous for turnout buying and double persuasion.

Taken together, these findings suggest the optimal mix of clientelist strategies:

Proposition 3

- **Vote Buying:** If $\bar{b}_i^{VB} < b^{**}$, the machine pays an opposing voter $\bar{b}_i^{VB}$
- **Turnout Buying:** If $\bar{b}_i^{TB} < b^*$, the machine pays a supporting nonvoter $\bar{b}_i^{TB}$
- **Double Persuasion:** If $\bar{b}_i^{DP} < b^*$, the machine pays an opposing nonvoter $\bar{b}_i^{DP}$
- **No Payment:** The machine makes no payment to all other citizens

The appendix provides a formal derivation of these equilibrium conditions, and shows how the machine determines b^* and b^{**} . In order to explore why this optimal mix differs across electoral contexts, we now examine comparative statics.

4.4 Comparative Statics

Formal analysis reveals how contextual factors shape patterns of clientelism during elections. Machines optimally tailor their mix of clientelist strategies to five characteristics of political environments: (1) compulsory voting, (2) machine support, (3) political polarization, (4) salience of political preferences, and (5) strength of ballot secrecy. This section provides intuition about how each factor influences the optimal mix, based on analytical solutions derived in the appendix. More specifically, the formal analysis indicates how machines optimally change the quantity of citizens bought with each strategy in response to parameter shifts in the model. In response to such changes, machines alter which citizens they buy by reallocating resources *across* and *within* strategies of electoral clientelism. Changes in the political environment affect the number of cheap targets that the machine can buy with each strategy. Thus, machines reallocate resources towards strategies that now offer additional cheap targets. In addition, machines reallocate resources within a given strategy to ensure that they continue to buy the cheapest citizens. For tractability, comparative statics examine the case where x_i and c_i are distributed uniformly.


The introduction of *compulsory voting* increases vote buying ($\frac{\partial VB}{\partial a} > 0$), decreases turnout buying ($\frac{\partial TB}{\partial a} < 0$), and decreases double persuasion ($\frac{\partial DP}{\partial a} < 0$). Within the model, the parameter through which compulsory voting affects electoral clientelism is increased abstention costs (a). Higher abstention costs boost turnout and shift the vertex upwards (see Figure 4.2a). This upward shift increases the number of cheap vote-buying targets, who are weak opposing voters clustered along the vertical axis under the vertex. In order to buy these newly introduced cheap targets for vote buying, the machine: (1) reallocates resources from turnout buying and double persuasion towards vote buying, and (2) reallocates resources within vote buying from the most-expensive recipients towards the newly introduced cheap targets. An important substantive implication is that efforts to boost electoral participation through compulsory voting may well lead to the unintended consequence of increased vote buying, which induces citizens to vote against their partisan preferences.

An increase in *machine support* decreases vote buying ($\frac{\partial VB}{\partial \bar{x}} < 0$), increases turnout buying ($\frac{\partial TB}{\partial \bar{x}} > 0$), and decreases double persuasion ($\frac{\partial DP}{\partial \bar{x}} < 0$). We conceptualize machine support as the proportion of citizens who prefer the machine's platform over the opposition party's platform. To analyze this comparative static, we unpack citizens' political preferences such that $x_i = \bar{x} + \epsilon_i$, where $\bar{x}$ represents the political preferences of the median voter, and ϵ_i captures individual-specific deviation from the median voter.¹⁴ A rise in support for the machine's platform increases $\bar{x}$ and shifts the vertex left (see Figure 4.2b). This leftward shift increases the number of cheap turnout-buying targets, who are supporting nonvoters clustered just above l_1 . In order to buy these newly introduced cheap targets for turnout buying, the machine: (1) reallocates resources from vote buying and double persuasion towards turnout buying, and (2) reallocates resources within turnout buying from the most-expensive recipients towards the newly introduced cheap targets. Substantively, this comparative static suggests that a machine operating in several political districts will optimally tailor its clientelist mix. When distributing benefits in districts with many loyalists, the machine employs relatively more turnout buying. But in opposition bailiwicks, it employs relatively more vote buying.

An increase in *political polarization* decreases vote buying ($\frac{\partial VB}{\partial (x^M - x^O)} < 0$), increases turnout buying ($\frac{\partial TB}{\partial (x^M - x^O)} > 0$), and increases double persuasion ($\frac{\partial DP}{\partial (x^M - x^O)} > 0$). Political polarization reflects the ideological distance between parties (formally, $|x^M - x^O|$). Observe that as polarization increases, voters with moderate ideological preferences receive less expressive utility from voting, because the ideological distance from their preferred party grows. As a result, some voters no longer come to the polls, and the vertex shifts down (see Figure

¹⁴The utility function for machine supporters (Equation 1) thus becomes: $U_i^M = -|x^M - (\bar{x} + \epsilon_i)| - c_i$. Observe that Equation 1 is a special case of this setup, in which $\bar{x} = 0$ (i.e., in the original setup, the machine party and opposition party have equal levels of political support).

Figure 4.2: Comparative Statics of Electoral Clientelism



Note: VB = Vote Buying; TB = Turnout Buying; DP = Double Persuasion

4.2c). This downward shift decreases the number of cheap vote-buying targets, who are weak opposing voters clustered along the vertical axis under the vertex. As the number of cheap vote-buying targets decreases, the machine: (1) reallocates resources from vote buying to turnout buying and double persuasion, and (2) reallocates resources within vote buying from the lost cheap targets towards costlier opposing voters. Overall, the model suggests that machines rely relatively more on mobilizational strategies where political polarization is high, and rely relatively more on vote buying where political polarization is low.

An increase in the *salience of political preferences* decreases vote buying ($\frac{\partial VB}{\partial \kappa} < 0$), increases turnout buying ($\frac{\partial TB}{\partial \kappa} > 0$), and increases double persuasion ($\frac{\partial DP}{\partial \kappa} > 0$). To analyze this factor, we introduce a parameter $\kappa > 0$ to the utility function of citizens (Equation 1): $U_i^M = -\kappa|x^M - x_i| - c_i$.¹⁵ The parameter κ represents the importance of expressing one's political preferences, relative to the cost of voting. As the salience of political preferences rises (i.e., κ increases), the vertex becomes steeper and shifts down (see Figure 4.2d). This downward shift reduces the number of cheap vote-buying targets, who are weak opposing voters clustered along the vertical axis under the vertex. Given that the number of cheap vote-buying targets declines, the machine: (1) reallocates resources from vote buying to turnout buying and double persuasion, and (2) reallocates resources within vote buying from the lost cheap targets towards costlier opposing voters. Overall, when political preferences are more salient, it is relatively more expensive to induce citizens to vote against their preferences, and thus machines shift resources away from vote buying.

4.5 Ballot Secrecy

We also examine how machines tailor their mix of clientelist strategies to a fifth contextual factor — the strength of ballot secrecy. Ballot secrecy affects the risk of opportunistic defection when machines reward citizens for voting against their political preferences. To investigate the effects of ballot secrecy on electoral clientelism, we extend the base model by relaxing the assumption that transactions are fully enforceable.

Machines employ a variety of tactics to compromise the secret ballot. For example, parties in the Philippines give out carbon paper so voters can copy their ballots, and Italian parties lend mobile phones with cameras so reward recipients can photograph how they vote (Schaffer & Schedler 2007: 30-31). The strength of ballot secrecy affects the machine's ability to monitor vote-buying and double-persuasion agreements. Both of these strategies require some ability to violate ballot secrecy, in order to ensure that reward recipients comply by voting against their preferences. By contrast, the strength of ballot secrecy does not affect the machine's ability to monitor turnout-buying agreements. As emphasized in Chapter 2

¹⁵Observe that Equation 1 is a special case of this setup, in which $\kappa = 1$.

and 3, turnout buying involves only monitoring whether — not for whom — a supporter votes.

To capture the effect of ballot secrecy, we build on Stokes (2005) and Chapter 3, adopting a simpler setup that provides the same analytical leverage. If a citizen does not comply with an agreement to vote against her preferences, with probability $p \in [0, 1]$ the machine monitors her vote choice and rescinds the reward. Stronger ballot secrecy reduces p . Employing this setup, we now determine the payments required for vote buying and double persuasion when contracts are not fully enforceable. To prevent defection when engaging in vote buying, the following condition must hold:

$$\begin{aligned} U_i^M + \tilde{b}_{VB}(x_i, c_i) &\geq pU_i^O + (1-p)[U_i^O + \tilde{b}_{VB}(x_i, c_i)] \\ \tilde{b}_{VB}(x_i, c_i) &\geq \frac{1}{p}[-2x_i] = \frac{1}{p} \bar{b}_i^{VB} \end{aligned} \quad (4.5)$$

In words, vote buying will be effective when the payoff from complying with the agreement is greater than or equal to the expected value of defecting and voting against the machine. As above, the machine will not overpay or underpay, so the inequality binds. Observe that $\bar{b}_i^{VB}$ is the required vote-buying payment when contracts are fully enforceable (the base model), whereas $\tilde{b}_i^{VB}$ is the required vote-buying payment when contracts are *not* fully enforceable. When opportunistic defection is possible, the machine pays a premium on every dollar spent on vote buying (that is, $\frac{1}{p} \geq 1$). Analogous logic is employed to determine the required payment for double persuasion when contracts are not fully enforceable: $\tilde{b}_i^{DP} = \frac{1}{p} \bar{b}_i^{DP}$.

These payment equations indicate the party's optimal allocation strategy under the condition of ballot secrecy. The logic underlying Propositions 1–3 continues to apply, and the form of the optimal allocation is unchanged except that the ratio of most-expensive payments reflects the premium payments for vote buying and double persuasion: $\frac{1}{p} \tilde{b}_{VB}^* = \frac{2}{p} \tilde{b}_{DP}^* = 2\bar{b}_{TB}^*$.¹⁶

To examine how ballot secrecy affects the optimal mix, we analyze comparative statics. Enhanced ballot secrecy decreases vote buying ($\frac{\partial \tilde{VB}}{\partial p} > 0$), increases turnout buying ($\frac{\partial \tilde{TB}}{\partial p} < 0$), and decreases double persuasion ($\frac{\partial \tilde{DP}}{\partial p} > 0$). As ballot secrecy increases, the machine's probability p of catching citizens who defect on vote-buying or double-persuasion agreements declines, so it must pay a larger premium to ensure compliance when using these two strategies. Thus, the party optimally shifts resources away from vote buying and double persuasion, and relies relatively more heavily on turnout buying.

Historical studies suggest that the introduction of the secret ballot reduced vote buying, as predicted by our model. Proponents of the secret ballot argued that it would reduce monitoring of vote choices and thereby decrease vote buying, which was relatively common

¹⁶The proof is identical to the proof for Proposition 1, substituting $\tilde{b}_{VB}$ and $\tilde{b}_{DP}$ for b_{VB} and b_{DP} .

with open voting (Campbell 2005: 97). For example, a US newspaper commented in 1888 that “if the act of voting were performed in secret, no bribed voter could or would be trusted to carry out his bargain when left to himself” (cf Campbell 2005: 97). The broad consensus is that vote buying did in fact decrease with secret ballot (e.g., Cox 2006: 5; Hasen 2000: 1328). As Hasen (2000: 1328) explains, “with the rise of the secret ballot and the concomitant increase in the cost of verifying that vote buyers were getting what they paid for, vote buying almost certainly has declined.” Of course, machines still buy votes in many contexts, using various (albeit more costly) methods to monitor vote choices.

4.6 Negative Turnout Buying

In some contexts, machines also engage in negative turnout buying, which rewards opposing voters for *not* coming to the polls. To examine how the inclusion of negative turnout buying affects the optimal mix of clientelist strategies, we adopt the same approach as above. First, the machine determines required payments for negative turnout buying ($\bar{b}_i^{NTB}$). The strategy targets opposing voters, who have a reservation utility of U^O . If such citizens do not vote, they receive payoff $-a$ of a nonvoter. In order to convince an opposing voter of type $t_i = (x_i, c_i)$ to stay home, the machine must offer a reward $\bar{b}_i^{NTB}$ such that: $\bar{b}_i^{NTB} - a \geq U_i^O$. The machine optimally neither overpays nor underpays, so this inequality binds. Substituting U_i^O from Equation 4.1 yields: $\bar{b}_i^{NTB} = -|x^O - x_i| - c_i + a$. Then, solving for $\bar{b}_i^{NTB}$:¹⁷

$$\bar{b}_i^{NTB} = -x_i - x^M - c_i + a \quad (4.6)$$

With negative turnout buying, the machine must compensate opposing voters for: (1) the forgone utility of voting for their preferred party; and (2) the cost they incur by abstaining.

Given these required payments, we now determine the optimal mix of clientelist strategies. Observe that whereas vote buying yields two net votes, negative turnout buying (as with turnout buying and double persuasion) yields only one net vote. As a result, while the machine is willing to pay b^{**} to the most-expensive vote-buying recipient, it is only willing to pay half as much (b^*) to the most-expensive citizens purchased with negative turnout buying, turnout buying, and double persuasion. Thus, when negative turnout buying is a viable strategy, the machine again optimally sets $b^{**} = 2b^*$.

An important finding follows immediately for contexts where negative turnout buying is possible. Observe that if the most-expensive payment for any strategy is greater than zero, then the most-expensive payments for all four strategies must be greater than zero. Therefore, in such contexts, machines distributing benefits during campaigns will optimally engage in *all* four strategies of vote buying, turnout buying, double persuasion, and negative

¹⁷Recall that by the assumption of symmetric party platforms, $x^M = -x^O$.

turnout buying.

To provide intuition about how the machine optimally combines all four strategies, Figure 4.3 builds on the vertex shown in Figure 4.1b. The logic for turnout buying and double persuasion, which target nonvoters, remains the same as in the base model. By contrast, the machine now faces a triple choice with each opposing voter — reward her for staying home (negative turnout buying), reward her for voting against her preferences (vote buying), or provide her no reward. The machine’s decision for each opposing voter can be analyzed in two steps: (1) identify whether vote buying or negative turnout buying is more cost-effective; and (2) identify whether the more cost-effective strategy is preferable to providing no reward. To examine the first step, assume the machine rewards an opposing voter W of type $t_w = (x_w, c_w)$. Intuitively, vote buying yields double the net votes, so it is more attractive to pay W to switch her vote, unless doing so is more than twice as expensive as paying W to stay at home. Therefore, given the required payments for each strategy (Equations 4.2 and 4.6), the machine chooses negative turnout buying under the following condition:¹⁸

$$\begin{aligned} -2x_w &> 2[-x_w - x^M - c_w + a] \\ c_w &> x^O + a \end{aligned} \tag{4.7}$$

This condition is shown in Figure 4.3 as horizontal line segment l_6 .¹⁹ If the machine rewards an opposing voter located above l_6 , negative turnout buying is more cost-effective. If the machine rewards an opposing voter located on or below l_6 , vote buying is more cost-effective.


The next step is to determine whether the more cost-effective strategy is preferable to providing no reward. To this end, we consider the most-expensive payments for each strategy. The machine pays the most-expensive vote-buying payment b^{**} to opposing voters who are located on or below l_6 , and who require exactly b^{**} to switch their votes. Similar to Figure 4.1b, such voters are located on the vertical line segment l_3 in Figure 4.3. With respect to negative turnout buying, the machine pays the most-expensive payment b^* to opposing voters who are located above l_6 , and who require exactly b^* to stay at home. In accordance with Equation 4.6, these are opposing voters of type $t_h = (x_h, c_h)$ for whom $b^* = -x_h - x^M - c_h + a$. Such opposing voters are located on line segment l_7 , which extends from X^O to the point where l_7 intercepts with l_6 .²⁰ The shaded areas in Figure 4.3 reflect the same logic as the base model: the machine buys citizens if and only if their required payments are less than or equal to the most-expensive payment. Taken together, these findings suggest how the machine optimally allocates resources across clientelist strategies, when

¹⁸We assume that if both strategies are equally cost-effective, the machine engages in vote buying.

¹⁹The line segment l_6 is given by the equation $c = x^O + a$, on the range from X^O to the vertical intercept.

²⁰The line segment l_7 is given by the equation $c = -x - x^M + a - b^*$, on the range from X^O to the point where l_7 intercepts with l_6 .

Figure 4.3: Vertex with Negative Turnout Buying



Note: VB = Vote Buying; TB = Turnout Buying;
 DP = Double Persuasion; NTB = Negative Turnout Buying

negative turnout buying is viable:

- **Vote Buying:** Pay $\bar{b}_i^{VB}$ to opposing voters if $\bar{b}_i^{VB} \leq b^{**}$ and $c \leq x^O + a$
- **Negative Turnout Buying:** Pay $\bar{b}_i^{NTB}$ to opposing voters if $\bar{b}_i^{NTB} \leq b^*$ and $c > x^O + a$
- **Turnout Buying:** Pay $\bar{b}_i^{TB}$ to supporting nonvoters if $\bar{b}_i^{TB} \leq b^*$
- **Double Persuasion:** Pay $\bar{b}_i^{DP}$ to opposing nonvoters if $\bar{b}_i^{DP} \leq b^*$
- **No Payment:** Make no payment to all other citizens

4.7 Empirical Evidence

The model of electoral clientelism developed above offers insights into how characteristics of political environments affect the strategies that machines employ. Empirical evidence from Brazil, Russia and Argentina is consistent with the model's predictions. We focus specifically on how two factors — compulsory voting and machine support — affect the relative prevalence of vote buying and turnout buying in each country.

The model predicts, *ceteris paribus*, that whereas machines vote buy more citizens when voting is compulsory, they turnout buy more citizens when voting is optional. Compulsory voting increases overall turnout, including that of weakly opposed voters, who are the cheapest targets for vote buying. The model also predicts, *ceteris paribus*, that whereas machines vote buy more citizens when there is low support for its policy platform, they turnout buy more citizens when there is high support for its policy platform. A popular policy platform increases the number of machine supporters, some of whom do not vote and can be induced to turn out with small payments. Consistent with these predictions, evidence suggests that:

- **Brazil:** Vote Buying Predominant — Strict Compulsory Voting, Low Machine Support
- **Russia:** Turnout Buying Predominant — Optional Voting, High Machine Support
- **Argentina:** More Balanced Mix — Weak Compulsory Voting, Moderate Machine Support

We now examine each case, analyzing fieldwork interviews, academic research, and local media accounts. In Chapter 5, further research strategies are discussed for testing the impact of a broader set of political characteristics on electoral clientelism.

4.7.1 Vote Buying in Brazil

When political operatives distribute benefits during elections in Brazil, they engage in more vote buying than turnout buying. Consistent with the model's predictions, two characteristics of the Brazilian political environment contribute to this pattern of machine politics — strictly enforced compulsory voting and low machine support.

During elections in Brazil, politicians often distribute particularistic benefits. In a recent national survey, over 13 percent of respondents admitted voting for candidate in exchange for a benefit.²¹ Between 2000 and 2008, at least 660 politicians in Brazil were prosecuted and found guilty of distributing benefits during electoral campaigns.²² During the 2008 electoral campaign, 110 interviews of elites and citizens were conducted in the Northeast state of Bahia.²³ Interviewees suggested that vote buying is by far more prevalent than turnout buying. For example, a local party leader explained that vote buying is most prevalent, and that turnout buying represents only “a small proportion” of rewards.²⁴ A former mayor explained that because voting is an “obligation,” politicians “leave turnout to the law.”²⁵ Citizens also suggest that vote buying is predominant: whereas 87 percent (47 of 54 citizens responding) reported that vote buying happens in their municipality, only 14 percent (7 of 51 citizens responding) reported that turnout buying occurs.

The model suggests that strict compulsory voting, as in the case of Brazil, contributes to this predominance of vote buying. The 1988 Constitution compels all Brazilians aged 18 to 70 years to vote, unless they are illiterate. As a politician explains, “everyone knows that if you don't vote, you harm yourself ... your voting document becomes irregular.”²⁶ With irregular voting documents, Brazilians cannot obtain identification cards, work in the public sector, qualify for government loans, or enroll in public educational institutions. Citizens exert substantial effort to avoid such consequences. For example, if voters are out of town and cannot report to their designated polling places, they frequently report to other locations on Election Day to fill out “justification” forms. Although voters cannot cast ballots while away (no absentee voting exists), they avoid all abstention penalties by submitting such forms. Over 7.8 million voters took the time to justify their absence in the 2008 election (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 2010), suggesting that voting is indeed considered obligatory. Partly due

²¹Survey conducted by research firm Datafolha in August 2009 included 2,133 respondents across 150 municipalities.

²²Movimento de Combate à Corrupção Eleitoral (<http://www.mcce.org.br>), 2009.

²³Interviews conducted by Simeon Nichter between August 2008 and January 2009 in municipalities in each of Bahia's seven “mesoregions” (defined by Brazil's national census bureau as areas that share common geographic characteristics).

²⁴Interview with party leader in Bahia conducted by Simeon Nichter on November 5, 2008.

²⁵Interview with former mayor in Bahia, who held office from 2000 to 2004, conducted by Simeon Nichter on December 18, 2008.

²⁶Interview with city councilman in Bahia conducted by Simeon Nichter on January 13, 2009.

to the strict enforcement of compulsory voting, electoral participation in Brazil is remarkably high: turnout reached 83.2% of registered voters in the most recent presidential elections of 2006, and 85.5% in the most recent municipal elections of 2008 (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 2010).

In addition to strict compulsory voting, the model suggests another factor contributing to the predominance of vote buying in Brazil — low machine support on the basis of policy platforms. Clientelism was traditionally the dominant form of electoral competition and political representation in Brazil (Hagopian 1996: 71–72), and continues to eclipse the role of policy platforms in many areas of the country (Nichter 2010). Political machines in Brazil are regionally based and typically controlled by conservative elites who rely heavily on material inducements (Hagopian 1996: 27; Ames 2001: 97). For example, the politician Antonio Carlos Magalhães led the dominant machine in the Northeast state of Bahia until his death in 2007, and explained that “I win elections with a bag of money in one hand and a whip in the other” (cf Ames 2001: 77). Such machines rarely attract voters on the basis of policy platforms, despite their affiliation with political parties. In the Brazilian context, parties are relatively weak and mass partisanship is low, and partisan labels often do not convey effective policy platforms. Various factors, such as open-list proportional representation and high levels of party switching (the latter to some extent mitigated by 2009 reforms), constrain the ability of parties to control what policies their politicians promise or adopt (Mainwaring 1999; Ames 2001). In part due to low credibility of policy platforms, partisanship is low in Brazil (Mainwaring 1999; Ames, Baker & Renno 2009): in national surveys, almost two-thirds of Brazilians express no partisan preference (Samuels 2006: 5), and fewer than 10 percent of Brazilians are affiliated with a political party (TSE 2009: 93). Such characteristics of the Brazilian political environment undermine machines’ ability to obtain support on the basis of policy platforms.

Overall, Brazil exhibits strictly enforced compulsory voting and low machine support. Consistent with the model, in this context vote buying is the predominant form of electoral clientelism.

Turnout Buying in Russia

In stark contrast with Brazil, turnout buying is the predominant form of electoral clientelism in Russia. Consistent with the model’s predictions, two characteristics of the Russian political environment contribute to this pattern of machine politics — non-compulsory voting and strong support for the dominant machine party, United Russia.

In Russia, political elites employ various methods to manipulate elections, including clientelism, fraud, and coercion (Fish 2005; Myagkov, Ordeshook & Shakin 2009). With respect to electoral clientelism, although some vote buying exists, turnout buying is more

prevalent. During campaigns, United Russia often distributes rewards in an effort to mobilize its passive constituencies. Such rewards are often financed from the coffers of federal and local government, and include food, alcohol, haircuts, concert tickets, legal and medical services, and subsidized utility bills.²⁷ As one campaign strategist revealed, party operatives frequently “hire” supporters by offering small payments to ensure that they turn out, with additional rewards provided to constituents who bring relatives and friends to the polls with them. The strategist explained that turnout is the primary focus when distributing particularistic rewards during elections, because “we work according to the principle that it’s more expensive to convince someone to change their mind than to encourage those who already support you.”²⁸ Both election officials and media sources further confirm the key role of turnout buying in recent elections. For instance, Sergei Lunev, head of the Kaliningrad Electoral Commission, warned that much of the recent growth in turnout is due to “the money representatives of various candidates so actively give to voters” and emphasized the need to “alleviate the situation.”²⁹ Likewise, the newspaper *Kommersant* used the succinct headline “Buying Turnout” (“*Podkup Radi Yavki*”) in an exposé about mobilization efforts during the Republic of Yakutsk’s 2001 presidential elections.³⁰

The model suggests that non-compulsory voting, as in the case of contemporary Russia, contributes to this relative focus on turnout buying. Russians now have far more latitude to stay home on Election Day than they did in the past. Voting in the former Soviet Union was not legally mandatory, but in practice Communist Party officials employed “intense psychological and social pressures” to mobilize voters. For example, Communist Party activists were assigned 20 to 30 voters each, and held responsible for ensuring they came to the polls. Citizens would almost always comply, as many feared that abstention could result in serious repercussions such as poor career advancement (Karklins 1986: 453; Mote 1965: 76–83). By contrast, such pressures to turn out dramatically declined following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and many citizens even came to perceive abstention as a way of exercising a newly acquired democratic right (Rose et al. 2001: 427–428). Far fewer Russians now participate in elections: whereas Western analysts estimated that 90 to 95 percent of the electorate in the former Soviet Union voted (and official turnout reached as high as 99.9%) (Karklins 1986: 454), turnout in Russia over the last two decades averaged 69% for presidential elections and 60% for parliamentary elections (Moraski & Reisinger 2008: 16). Especially given that turnout is viewed as a crucial symbol of regime legitimacy by Russian political elites (McAl-

²⁷Anatoly Medetsky, “Getting Out the Vote with Ads, Food, SMS,” *The Moscow Times*, March 5, 2004. “*Regionalnye vlasti budut besplatno prikarmlyvat izbiratelei kolbasoi, khlebom, kashei, i molokom?*” [Regional Authorities to Feed Voters Sausage, Bread, Cereal, and Milk for Free?], www.bankfax.ru, November 20, 2007; Natalya Krainova, “Campaign Violations Rife in Krasnoyarsk,” *The Moscow Times*, April 17, 2007.

²⁸Interview with Moscow-based campaign consultant conducted by Jordan Gans-Morse on July 19, 2010.

²⁹Vadim Smirnov, “*Skupka golosov — nedorogo, zakonno...*” [Votes for sale — cheap, legal...], *Kaliningradskaya Pravda*, September 25, 2008.

³⁰Tuyara Filippova, “*Podkup Radi Yavki*” [Buying Turnout], *Kommersant*, December 21, 2001.

lister & White 2008: 932; Sakwa 2005: 387), turnout buying plays a key role in combating abstention in recent elections.

Beyond non-compulsory voting, the model also suggests another factor that contributes to the predominance of turnout buying in Russia: strong support for the policy platform of United Russia (UR), the dominant machine party. UR has dominated Russian politics since 2003: it controls approximately two-thirds of the seats in the Duma (the lower house of parliament), and held a majority in nearly all regional legislatures in 2008 (McAllister & White 2008: 947; Reuter & Remington 2008: 518–520). Riding the coattails of the popular former president and current prime minister, Vladimir Putin, UR has cultivated substantial support in part through policies that address pragmatic concerns of voters. UR and Putin’s broad policy objectives have included economic growth, political and social stability, and the revival of Russia’s prominence on the international stage. Following the chaos, economic depression, and loss of Russia’s great power status in the 1990s, such policy goals have struck a chord with Russian citizens (McAllister & White 2008: 950–951; Smyth et al. 2007: 124). Throughout the 2000s, UR’s approval ratings increased, reaching 67% in October 2007 after Putin announced that he would officially become the party’s leader. Putin himself has maintained extraordinary levels of political support, with approval ratings in the 70 to 80% range throughout most of the 2000s.³¹ Overall, high support for UR’s policy platform has contributed to the predominance of turnout buying in Russia.

In summary, Russia is a political environment with non-compulsory voting and strong machine support. Consistent with the model, in this context turnout buying is the predominant form of electoral clientelism.

4.7.2 The Intermediate Case of Argentina

In comparison with Brazil and Russia, the dominant machine in Argentina employs a relatively balanced mix of vote buying and turnout buying. Consistent with the model’s predictions, two characteristics of the Argentine political environment contribute to this pattern of machine politics — weakly enforced compulsory voting and moderate machine support.

Electoral clientelism is prevalent in Argentina. Over 44 percent of survey respondents reported that political operatives distributed goods in their neighborhood during a recent campaign, and 7 percent admitted personally receiving goods (Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes 2004). Studies suggest that the Peronist party, the dominant machine in Argentina, frequently engages in both vote buying and turnout buying (Nichter 2008; Dunning & Stokes

³¹Approval ratings are from the Levada Centre and University of Aberdeen’s Centre for the Study of Public Policy “Russia Votes” Project. See <http://www.russiavotes.org/president> and <http://www.levada.ru/reitingi2006.html>.

2008; Zarazaga 2010). In a recently televised interview, two brokers openly admit to vote buying in a Buenos Aires shantytown: they give citizens boxes of food and 50 pesos (approximately US \$15) in exchange for casting pre-filled ballots, which are folded in a specific manner to circumvent the secret ballot.³² Meanwhile, recent interviews of Argentine political operatives conducted by Rodrigo Zarazaga highlight the important role of turnout buying: for example, a broker explained that distributing rewards is important for mobilizing Peronist support, because “whether you win the ‘school’ [precinct] depends on whether you are able to make them turn out.” Overall, evidence suggests that when compared with Brazil and Russia, Argentina exhibits a relatively balanced mix of vote buying and turnout buying.

The model suggests that compulsory voting increases vote buying, while optional voting increases turnout buying. Argentina’s weakly enforced compulsory voting falls in the middle of these two extremes, which contributes to the relatively balanced mix of both strategies. Voting has been compulsory in Argentina since the introduction of the Sáenz Peña Law in 1914. Yet the current fines for abstention were set in 1983 and never adjusted for years of hyperinflation. According to the calculations of a leading newspaper, *La Nación*, the total fines if an adult were to abstain for her entire life would be 25 cents. Scholars of voter turnout in Argentina have concluded that “compulsory voting is not particularly enforced any more” (Canton & Jorrat 2003: 199). Similarly, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA 2006) codes Argentina’s enforcement of compulsory voting as “weak” in its international comparison of electoral systems. Partly due to such weak enforcement, Argentina has the lowest turnout of all 19 countries in the world with compulsory voting: electoral participation reached lows of 71.8% of registered voters in the most recent presidential election of 2007 (Ministerio del Interior 2007).

In addition to weakly enforced compulsory voting, the model suggests another factor contributing to the relatively balanced mix of vote buying and turnout buying in Argentina — moderate machine support on the basis of its policy platform. In Argentina, the Peronist party (PJ) is the dominant machine and by far the most active distributor of rewards (Stokes 2005: 322), with a substantially denser network of political operatives than any other party (Calvo & Murillo 2009: 18). Popular support for policies implemented during the presidency of Néstor Kirchner (PJ) is widely believed to have contributed to the victory of Peronist candidate Cristina Kirchner in the 2007 presidential campaign (e.g., Levitsky & Murillo 2008: 17–18). Yet policy platforms play a less central role in Peronist support than they did in the past. Traditionally, the PJ was a labor-based party that attracted working and lower-class voters on the basis of programmatic appeals, such as an “aversion to free-market capitalism and a commitment to organized labor and a state-led development model” (Levitsky 2003: 28). But the PJ under President Menem undertook dramatic neoliberal reforms, and by the early 1990s transformed into a machine party that relied increasingly on clientelist networks

³²Interview by Teresa Bo, *Al-Jazeera*, October 28, 2007.

for support (Levitsky 2003). Today, the PJ enjoys more moderate support on the basis of its policy platform.

In sum, Argentina exhibits weakly enforced compulsory voting and moderate machine support. Consistent with the model, in this context political operatives engage in a relatively balanced mix of vote buying and turnout buying.

4.8 Summary

The present chapter has provided insight about how political machines combine different forms of electoral clientelism. Although most studies focus exclusively on vote buying, the formal model developed above suggests that political machines maximize their electoral prospects when they engage in a portfolio of strategies. Political machines consider both *individual* and *contextual* factors when distributing contingent rewards during elections. They focus on two key attributes of individuals — (1) political preferences and (2) inclination to vote — when deciding how to allocate resources across strategies of electoral clientelism. Machines find it relatively expensive to influence the vote choices of strongly opposed citizens, or to induce turnout of citizens who are strongly inclined to stay home during the election. They adapt the size of clientelist benefits given to citizens, and are willing to pay relatively more for vote buying because unlike other strategies it both adds votes for the machine and subtracts votes from the opposition. The model also suggests that machines tailor their mix of clientelist strategies to five characteristics of political environments: (1) compulsory voting, (2) machine support, (3) political polarization, (4) salience of political preferences, and (5) strength of ballot secrecy.

Qualitative evidence suggests that the model helps explain observed variation in electoral clientelism: (1) vote buying is predominant in Brazil, a context with strictly enforced compulsory voting and weak machine support; (2) turnout buying is predominant in Russia, a context with optional voting and strong machine support; and (3) a balanced mix exists in Argentina, a context with weakly enforced compulsory voting and moderate machine support. Such findings are consistent with the model and suggest that this line of analysis deserves further investigation. In order to motivate such work, the next concluding chapter identifies directions for future formal and empirical research on electoral clientelism.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

In many countries, clientelist parties (or political machines) distribute selective benefits, especially to the poor, in direct exchange for electoral support. Whereas scholars previously viewed clientelism as a characteristic of traditional societies that would eventually decline with modernization, many analysts now interpret this phenomenon as a political strategy. Unfortunately, researchers adopting this strategic perspective often fail to distinguish between substantively different patterns of machine politics. Given that conflating distinct strategies threatens descriptive and causal inference, increased analytical differentiation of clientelism is an important challenge. The present study responds to this challenge, and this concluding chapter lays the foundation for further responses by suggesting productive directions for future research. Before turning to these suggestions, I first provide an overview of findings in the present study.

5.1 Overview of Findings

The present study emphasizes that a fundamental — yet frequently overlooked — distinction lies between *electoral* and *relational* clientelism. Whereas electoral clientelism exclusively involves elite payoffs of citizens during campaigns, relational clientelism involves ongoing relationships of selective benefits in exchange for political support. These two forms of clientelism involve different risks of opportunistic defection. Electoral clientelism only involves a citizen credibility problem: citizens receive all benefits before voting, and politicians are unsure whether recipients will comply and deliver electoral support. By contrast, relational clientelism involves citizen *and* elite credibility problems: citizens are uncertain whether politicians will deliver future selective benefits, and politicians are unsure whether recipients will provide electoral support.

Although the distinction between electoral and relational clientelism is crucial, more granular analytic differentiation is necessary because both of these patterns of machine politics

consist of numerous distinct strategies. The present study focuses on electoral clientelism, and suggests that much of the recent literature on this topic conflates several strategies. When political parties distribute selective benefits during campaigns, scholars typically depict this phenomenon as “vote buying.” Given substantial ambiguity about this concept, the present study explicitly defines clientelist vote buying as the distribution of rewards to individuals in contingent exchange for vote choices.¹ Although such vote buying is observed in many contexts, parties often have other important reasons for distributing selective benefits during elections.

An important, but frequently ignored, strategy of electoral clientelism is “turnout buying.” With this strategy, parties activate their own passive constituencies by rewarding unmobilized supporters for turnout. Turnout buying involves a less stringent monitoring requirement than vote buying — the ability to observe turnout instead of voting decisions — and thus helps to explain why parties might offer rewards even with ballot secrecy. Much of what scholars interpret as vote buying (exchanging rewards for vote choices) may actually be turnout buying (exchanging rewards for turnout). The present study contributes to the literature on clientelism by specifying and testing a mechanism by which parties can distribute benefits to mobilize supporters. Formal modeling suggests that turnout buying is incentive-compatible, and also provides several testable predictions: (1) machines focus rewards on strong supporters, (2) they target the poor, and (3) they offer rewards where they can most effectively monitor turnout. Although both strategies coexist, empirical tests suggest that Argentine survey data are more consistent with turnout buying than vote buying. Two other strategies of electoral clientelism must also be distinguished from vote buying: *double persuasion* (exchanging rewards for vote choices and turnout) and *negative turnout buying* (exchanging rewards for abstention).

In addition to emphasizing distinctions between strategies of electoral clientelism, the present study also examines why the relative prevalence of each strategy differs across political environments. The formal model in Chapter 4 suggests that political machines are most effective when combining multiple strategies of electoral clientelism, and that the particular mix depends on both individual and contextual factors. With respect to individual factors, two attributes of citizens — political preferences and inclination to vote — influence how political machines distribute selective benefits during campaigns. Machines adapt the size of clientelist benefits given to recipients, and are willing to pay relatively more for vote buying because unlike other strategies it both adds votes for the machine and subtracts votes from the opposition. Political machines also tailor their mix of clientelist strategies to contextual factors. For example, the model suggests five factors that increase vote buying: (1) com-

¹As defined in Chapter 2, rewards are cash, goods (including food and drink), and services. By contrast, post-election benefits, employment, public programs, and transportation to the polls are not considered rewards. Note that although broader research on clientelism sometimes includes small groups as recipients (e.g., Gay 1994; Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007), studies of vote buying focus exclusively on individuals.

pulsory voting, (2) weak machine support, (3) low political polarization, (4) low salience of political preferences, and (5) weak ballot secrecy. By contrast, five factors increase turnout buying: (1) optional voting, (2) strong machine support, (3) high political polarization, (4) high salience of political preferences, and (5) strong ballot secrecy. Qualitative evidence suggests that the model helps explain observed variation in electoral clientelism: (1) vote buying is predominant in Brazil, a context with strictly enforced compulsory voting and weak machine support; (2) turnout buying is predominant in Russia, a context with optional voting and strong machine support; and (3) a balanced mix exists in Argentina, a context with weakly enforced compulsory voting and moderate machine support. These findings are consistent with the model and suggest that this line of analysis deserves further investigation.

Overall, the present study encourages scholars to increase analytical differentiation of clientelism, which consists of various distinct strategies. Productive directions for future research on clientelism are now discussed.

5.2 Further Research on Electoral Clientelism

While the present study makes significant headway in distinguishing between strategies of electoral clientelism, several key tasks would further address this challenge. The first critical task is enhanced data collection. When conducting interviews or surveys, analysts typically focus exclusively on vote buying. As a result, almost all existing studies of electoral clientelism fail to differentiate whether rewards are distributed to influence vote choices or induce turnout. To address this problem, future research should investigate the issue of mobilization when collecting data about why politicians distribute selective benefits. For example, interview protocols and survey instruments should investigate not only whether rewards target citizens who support or oppose the machine, but also whether rewards target voters or nonvoters. Collecting such information would facilitate differentiation across strategies of electoral clientelism.

In order to enhance data collection, researchers should also seek to conduct further panel studies of electoral clientelism. The vast majority of existing quantitative research on electoral clientelism relies on cross-sectional survey data (e.g., Speck & Abramo 2001; Stokes 2005; Bratton 2008). Although such studies offer important insights, the use of panel data would enable more rigorous analysis of distinct strategies of electoral clientelism.² For example, the empirical evidence in Chapter 3 strongly suggests that the Peronist party engages in turnout buying: recipients of rewards during the campaign disproportionately (1) identify the Peronists as their favorite party without prompting, (2) hold “very good” opinions of the Peronist party, and (3) voted for Peronist candidates in the past. Panel data could

²An example of existing panel data on electoral clientelism is the Mexico Elections Panel Study (<http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/mexico06/>).

provide more definitive evidence by addressing two potential forms of endogeneity: (1) post-reward opinions may be “nudged” favorably by rewards (Stokes 2005: 324), and (2) voting behavior in previous elections may reflect repeated vote-buying interactions. Using panel surveys that capture *ex ante* partisan preferences (i.e., opinions before receiving rewards) would further enhance our ability to identify whether rewards target machine supporters or opposers. Furthermore, panel surveys could help to distinguish between turnout buying and rewarding loyalists (a form of relational clientelism). Whereas turnout buying predicts that rewards target individuals who are not inclined to vote, rewarding loyalists predicts they target those who are inclined to vote. Using panel data, one approach to distinguishing between these strategies would be to examine whether respondents who indicate (*ex ante*) they are unlikely to vote end up having a higher or lower probability of receiving rewards. Overall, quantitative analyses of panel data would help to differentiate between strategies of clientelism.

Beyond the usage of panel studies, our understanding of electoral clientelism would also be enhanced by employing improved identification strategies such as experimental methods and instrumental variables. The increased usage of experimental methods could help to identify the causes and effects of different strategies of electoral clientelism. Several excellent studies on the topic employ field experiments (e.g., Vicente 2007; Vicente & Wantchekon 2009; Finan & Schechter 2010), but often fail to differentiate between vote buying and other strategies of electoral clientelism.³ Once additional field experiments of electoral clientelism are conducted, it may also be productive to employ meta-analyses to integrate findings across contexts. Moreover, list experiments could improve the measurement of different strategies by using less obtrusive measures (Gonzales-Ocanto et al. 2010). This consideration is especially important: both citizens and elites may not be entirely forthright in surveys because clientelism is a sensitive topic, often fraught with both legal and ethical concerns. In addition to experiments, instrumental variables may serve to enhance the rigor of ecological analyses of electoral clientelism. For instance, to explore whether selective benefits are used to induce turnout, it may be fruitful to employ rainfall during previous elections as an exogenous source of variation in precinct-level turnout (see Horiuchi & Saito 2009). In sum, identification strategies such as experimental methods and instrumental variables can deepen our understanding of different strategies of electoral clientelism.

When studying electoral clientelism, both quantitative and qualitative researchers should also ensure that they pay close attention to the strategy of double persuasion. Although most studies adopting the strategic perspective ignore double persuasion, the broader literature on clientelism suggests that recipients often have little in the way of ideological preferences or

³Finan & Schechter (2010) is an experimental study on electoral clientelism that distinguishes between vote buying and turnout buying. Also, Wantchekon (2003) is an example of an experimental study of relational clientelism.

reasons to vote, outside of the material reward structures set up by parties and candidates. Rewards may thus play a dual role —influencing vote choices and inducing participation— in a strategy that combines elements of both vote buying and turnout buying. Double persuasion can be distinguished from other strategies of electoral clientelism because it targets indifferent (or opposing) nonvoters. Unlike the swing voters often targeted with vote buying, indifferent nonvoters will not show up at the polls without incentives. And unlike the unmobilized supporters targeted with turnout buying, they do not inherently prefer the machine on ideological grounds. Future studies should examine the strategy of double persuasion more extensively, and should be careful to distinguish it from other forms of electoral clientelism.

Another productive direction for research involves further investigation of variation in electoral clientelism across political environments. Additional empirical and formal analyses are needed to explore why the relative prevalence of strategies differs across contexts. As a first step, it is important to extend the examination of Argentina, Brazil, and Russia in Chapter 4 in order to test other predictions of the model, such the effects of political polarization. The relative prevalence of strategies should also be investigated across a broader set of countries, using quantitative analyses when comparative datasets that distinguish between strategies are available. With respect to formal analysis, the model in Chapter 4 could be productively extended to consider effects of a broader array of factors, such as poverty and inequality, on the portfolio of strategies that political machines employ. Another important extension to the model would involve the consideration of different distributions of citizen-types. In order to facilitate analysis of how contextual factors influence the relative prevalence of strategies, the comparative statics in Chapter 4 assume that political preferences and voting costs (i.e., x_i and c_i) are distributed uniformly. Employing alternative distributions that reflect specific countries would enable the estimation of effects of contextual factors on the *overall* prevalence of electoral clientelism (i.e., total number of citizens bought using all strategies). More broadly, additional formal and empirical analyses could yield valuable further insights about the prevalence of strategies of electoral clientelism across political environments.

In addition to examining the relative prevalence of strategies, further research should also examine the effects of competition among political machines. The present study, in line with most existing research on clientelism, assumes that only one machine has the capacity to offer selective benefits. This assumption reflects the reality in many contexts where only one party has the infrastructure, access to state resources, and social networks necessary to engage in clientelism (Stokes 2009b: 12, 20). However, as Stokes (2005: 324) points out, one might also hypothesize that “dueling machines” would compete to buy the votes of indifferent voters, bidding up the price of vote-buying rewards. The “dueling machines” scenario might also be expected with turnout buying — for example, when one machine offers its supporters rewards for turnout, opposing parties could counteroffer by extending the same

individuals rewards for staying home. But competition between machines may be relatively rare, in part because different machines tend to develop links with different constituents (Stokes 2005: 324). Nevertheless, future studies of electoral clientelism should explore more thoroughly the conditions under which machines are likely to face these kinds of competition, and examine empirical evidence about how such conditions affect the relative prevalence of clientelist strategies.

In order to deepen our understanding of how factors such as competition affect electoral clientelism, qualitative research will continue to be crucial. For example, formal analyses of electoral clientelism employ assumptions that must be evaluated and refined through elite interviews, ethnographies and participant observation. Such qualitative research can also help to identify contexts in which other models, with different assumptions, should be used. For example, in cases where voters demand gifts just to consider candidates, parties may not really be offering “rewards” in exchange for turnout or vote choices. Voters may actually expect to be paid by everyone, and may choose among those parties or candidates who made a “contribution.” Qualitative research can similarly serve to improve quantitative analyses through triangulation. For example, we must be careful when analyzing panel surveys: individuals may change their minds during an electoral campaign for many reasons, and they may not articulate clearly why they do so, especially when rapidly answering questions from interviewers who are perfect strangers. Such concerns can be mitigated by comparing regression results with findings from field research. Overall, qualitative research plays an important role in the study of electoral clientelism.

Qualitative research can also help to determine whether benefits distributed in a given context actually involve clientelist exchanges. In some contexts, politicians distribute particularistic goods without contingent exchanges, a practice that does not involve clientelism. For example, during the 2008 US primaries, Barack Obama distributed 2,000 t-shirts during Iowa’s “steak fry” event, and Hillary Clinton gave out so many free coffee mugs that she needed a tractor-trailer to haul them to individuals’ homes.⁴ Such handouts are by no means limited to primaries — during the 2004 US presidential elections, the *New York Times* reported that candidates distributed “free cookies, tacos, T-shirts and admissions to swimming pools. Even free underwear.”⁵ Few observers would claim that goods were distributed by Obama and Clinton in contingent exchange for vote choices or turnout. Yet whether such benefits are clientelist — that is, whether they involve contingent exchange — depends in large part on the particular context. For example, whereas Obama’s distribution of t-shirts is not viewed to be clientelist, handouts of t-shirts by Brazilian politicians *are* often deemed to be clientelist. Consider that in an effort to stamp out electoral clientelism, Brazil enacted

⁴See “Steak Fry Likened to Music Festival,” *Des Moines Register*, September 17, 2007; and “Obama Plays Online Angle: Has High Tech Edge Over Democratic Foes,” *Washington Post*, December 31, 2007.

⁵“Record Turnout Forecast; Vote Drives Intensify,” *New York Times*, November 2, 2004.

a strict law in 2006 that prohibited the distribution of “free gifts” (*brindes*), such as t-shirts and caps, for three months prior to elections. As the president of the federal electoral commission declared, “If a candidate is caught distributing shirts, he should be put in jail.”⁶ The broader point is that studies on electoral clientelism should carefully consider whether a given type of handout involves contingent exchange in a particular context. Unfortunately, most empirical studies on the topic simply analyze whether citizens received any gift or favor from a politician, without specifying what actually constitutes a clientelist benefit (e.g., Stokes 2005; Vicente 2008; Gonzales-Cantos et al. 2010).

In sum, the specific tasks discussed above, which involve quantitative, formal and qualitative research, would substantially enhance analytical differentiation and deepen our understanding of electoral clientelism.

5.3 Electoral Clientelism and Other Strategies

Of course, it is also crucial to broaden the scope of analysis beyond patterns of machine politics during campaigns. Although the present study focuses primarily on electoral clientelism (i.e., elite payoffs to citizens during elections), an important avenue for further research involves relational clientelism (i.e., ongoing relationships of mutual support). Given that strategies of relational clientelism involve credibility problems of both elites and citizens, further investigation is needed to understand the mechanisms that facilitate such ongoing relationships. For example, what are the various ways in which politicians build trust among citizens that they will actually follow through with promises of benefits after the election? Further formal and empirical research would provide valuable insights. Another key issue is the link between relational clientelism and electoral clientelism. For example, does relational clientelism typically represent a substitute for — or a complement to — different strategies of electoral clientelism? Future studies should examine the factors that influence how parties allocate resources between longer-term relationships and payoffs during elections. More generally, relational clientelism warrants further study.

Another important direction for future research involves the relationship between clientelism and other strategies that politicians employ to obtain electoral support. Although many studies portray parties as choosing between clientelist and programmatic strategies, in reality parties often combine both types of strategies. Clientelist strategies are thus more appropriately viewed as part of a portfolio of tools that political parties can use to obtain electoral support (Estévez, Magaloni & Diaz-Cayeros 2002; Calvo & Murillo 2010: 5–6). This broader perspective suggests several important questions for further analysis. For ex-

⁶ “TSE Deixa Claro que Eleitor Pode Votar com Camiseta, Boné e Broche de Seu Candidato,” Isabel Braga, *O Globo*, September 28, 2006. Although politicians are forbidden from distributing t-shirts, voters may still wear political shirts to the polls.

ample, what factors affect how parties allocate resources between clientelist strategies (such as vote buying) and programmatic strategies (such as campaign advertising)? And when a party chooses to engage in clientelist strategies, what are the potential effects on its choice of policy platforms? In addition to investigating such questions, future research should also continue to examine how parties combine clientelism and other forms of particularism (e.g., pork and patronage) in their efforts to obtain electoral support (Estévez, Magaloni & Diaz-Cayeros 2002; Calvo & Murillo 2004; Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez & Magaloni 2010). Another important consideration is the relationship between electoral fraud and different forms of clientelism. For example, Fox (1994: 180) suggests that when parties experience difficulty enforcing vote-buying agreements, they may increase their reliance on electoral fraud. In sum, future research should examine the role of clientelism in parties' broader panoply of strategies used to win elections.

5.4 Citizen Strategies of Clientelism

However, if future studies focus only on clientelism as an elite strategy for winning elections, they will continue to miss a crucial dimension of the phenomenon. Scholars tend to view machine politics exclusively from the elite perspective, and thus neglect *citizen* strategies of clientelism (Nichter 2009). For example, consider this ongoing, elite-centric debate that entirely ignores the role of citizens: Do parties target core or swing voters when distributing selective benefits? Taking the vantage point of elites continues to offer important insights, but unfortunately also leads researchers to underestimate the extent to which citizens engage in strategic behavior. Whereas the agency of citizens in traditional societies was often severely limited, citizens in many contexts have relatively more freedom to shape their clientelist linkages with elites (e.g., Scott 1972: 105–7; Piattoni 2001: 12). As a result, future research must consider a wider potential set of citizen strategies. To what extent do citizens behave strategically, choosing between several possible actions while anticipating the likely reactions of elites?

In order to illustrate one such citizen strategy of clientelism, consider the example of “declared support” in Northeast Brazil (Nichter 2009). Even with ballot secrecy, a voter may choose to declare support for a candidate publicly before an election. For example, she may campaign for the candidate, attend rallies, place banners on her house, wear a party t-shirt, and so forth. However, declaring support is often risky in contexts with clientelism. If her declared choice wins the election, she may expect favored access to goods, services and employment after the candidate takes office. But, declaring support for a candidate who loses can leave the voter worse off. Respondents from small communities in Northeast Brazil frequently use the term “*marcação*,” which translates to “marking” or “branding,” to describe the ways in which politicians label and disfavor their declared opponents. Given such risks, many citizens choose to remain undeclared, a less risky strategy. When choosing

whether — and for whom — to declare, citizens often assess factors such as: (1) the relative benefits that candidates promise to give declared supporters if elected; (2) the credibility of these promises; and (3) each candidate’s relative probability of winning the election. Overall, the example of declared support suggests that an important direction for future research is considering citizen strategies of clientelism.

5.5 Other Important Considerations

When investigating both elite and citizen strategies of clientelism, scholars should also pay close attention to the role of reciprocity. Many recent studies emphasize that political machines often monitor citizens — frequently by violating the secret ballot — and punish them if they do not follow through with promises of electoral support (e.g., Stokes 2005; Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007; Szwarcberg 2008; Weitz-Shapiro 2009). But as some of these studies point out, only a subset of clientelist exchanges involve monitoring. In many cases, parties also provide clientelist benefits to individuals who feel a “personal obligation” to reciprocate with electoral support (Schaffer & Schedler 2007: 33–4; Lawson 2009). Lawson (2009) provides evidence of such reciprocity in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico using survey data on clientelism. In addition, Finan & Schechter (2010), based on a field experiment and survey data, find that politicians in Paraguay are more likely to distribute rewards to reciprocal individuals, and that these recipients are in turn more likely to vote for the rewarding party. One plausible hypothesis is that reciprocity plays a greater role in relational clientelism (which involves ongoing relationships) than in electoral clientelism (which involves payoffs during campaigns). Further formal analysis, building on existing models of reciprocity such as Rabin (1993), should examine implications for the study of clientelism. Moreover, additional empirical research is needed to explore the conditions in which political machines rely on reciprocity more heavily than monitoring and enforcement.

Another important area for future research involves clientelism in non-democratic polities. As with much of the literature on clientelism (e.g. Scott 1969; Stokes 2005; Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007), the present study has focused on clientelism in the context of democratic linkages between elites and citizens. But of course, clientelism is also often employed by authoritarian regimes. For example, the military regime in Brazil relied heavily on clientelism to bolster electoral support in contested elections (Hagopian 1996), and “vote buying constituted an essential glue for the maintenance of the PRI regime” in Mexico (Magaloni 2006: 149). In the case of Egypt, Blaydes (2006: 5–8) finds that candidates combine strategies of clientelism, engaging in vote buying during electoral campaigns, while also cultivating longer-term relationships of support through the distribution of particularistic benefits. Especially given that some authoritarian regimes eschew clientelism altogether (Evans 1995; Kitschelt 2000: 853), future research should probe deeper into the conditions under which such regimes employ clientelism, and how they choose among distinct clientelist strategies.

Regime type is likely to have important consequences not just on elite strategies, but also on citizen strategies of clientelism. After all, voting in autocracies is substantially different than in democracies, not least because of greater threats of repression and violence, and more monopolistic control of public resources (Magaloni 2006: 19). In addition, the influence of coercion on citizen and elite strategies deserves particular emphasis. Although coercion often plays a major role in authoritarian clientelism (Fox 1994: 158), most studies of clientelism focus exclusively on inducements, rather than instances in which “force or threats of force are the basis of cooperation” (Scott 1969: 1145–6; see also Stokes 2005; Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007). Overall, an important direction for future research involves further analysis of strategies of clientelism in authoritarian regimes.

Another important avenue for further study is how different strategies of clientelism affect development outcomes. In many contexts, politicians manipulate poverty alleviation programs for clientelist purposes, delivering benefits in contingent exchange for electoral support (e.g., Auyero 2000: 103–115; Dinatale 2004; Fox 1994: 152; Penfold-Becerra 2008). Consider an example from Canudos, a small municipality in Northeast Brazil. The mayor and vice-mayor of Canudos were impeached for electoral clientelism after winning reelection in 2004. They were found guilty of manipulating the distribution of a state poverty alleviation program, delivering 65 solar kits and constructing 78 residential bathrooms in exchange for votes during the election.⁷ Given the frequency of such clientelist manipulation of poverty programs in many contexts, future studies should examine effects on development outcomes, building on excellent work by Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez & Magaloni (2010). One issue to be explored more thoroughly is how the effects of clientelism may depend on specific characteristics of a region. For example, in localities with exceptionally high concentrations of poverty, clientelism is relatively unlikely to divert benefits towards the non-poor, even though the phenomenon would be expected to influence which poor citizens receive benefits. Of course, such research should be careful to adopt a broader conception of development than just income per capita, as clientelism has substantial implications for broader objectives such as empowerment (Oxhorn 2009).

Scholarly research on clientelism also has the potential to make important contributions to policy debates. Policymakers would benefit from a thorough understanding of the causes and effects of different strategies of clientelism. Policy shifts may influence the mix of strategies that political machines employ, and different forms of clientelism often entail distinct political and social consequences. For example, the model in Chapter 4 predicts that the introduction of compulsory voting decreases turnout buying and increases vote buying. This shift could have important policy implications, because the normative implications of reward-

⁷Tribunal Regional Eleitoral da Bahia, Acórdão No. 1335/2006 (December 4, 2006). The clientelist benefits had a total value of R\$299,000 (about US\$100,000). Both officials were removed from office and fined R\$10,641 each.

ing unmobilized supporters may well be less pernicious than rewarding citizens for voting against their true preferences (Hasen 2000: 1375–8, 1370). In addition, emphasizing the distinction between electoral and relational clientelism may also draw attention to contexts in which ongoing relationships with politicians stem in part from the failure of the state to provide a social safety net for the poor. In sum, further research on strategies of clientelism could help to inform important policy debates.

Overall, this study has challenged scholars to deepen their understanding about the logic, mechanisms and motivations behind parties' distribution of clientelist benefits. Increased analytical differentiation of clientelism is crucial, because conflating distinct strategies poses a serious threat to descriptive and causal inference. Many questions remain about how and when parties will choose amongst different strategies of clientelism. The combined tools of formal and empirical analysis, along with the specific research strategies enumerated above, can open new avenues for understanding these basic electoral practices.

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Appendix A

Description of Fieldwork in Brazil

While conducting my dissertation research, I lived in Brazil for more than 18 months. Prior to and after the October 2008 municipal elections, I conducted a total of 110 formal interviews on clientelism in the state of Bahia. These formal interviews included 55 interviews of community members and 55 interviews of elites. Each of these interviews was conducted in Portuguese, and lasted an average of 70 minutes. Each interview was taped and transcribed, totaling over 4,500 pages of typed transcripts. In addition, I conducted informal interviews of another 350 citizens and elites, as well as three focus groups of citizens.

My dissertation research focuses on small municipalities, as defined by those with 100,000 citizens or fewer. While much academic research on clientelism focuses on large metropolitan areas, there are relatively few studies on smaller communities. This lack of research is particularly unfortunate in Brazil, given that so much of its population lives in small municipalities. In Brazil, 49 percent of the population lives in municipalities with 100,000 citizens or fewer. In addition, 96 percent of Brazilian municipalities are this size (IBGE 2000). Interviews were conducted in Bahia, the most populous state in the Northeast region of Brazil with nearly 15 million citizens (IBGE 2009). The Northeast is the poorest region of Brazil and one of the most unequal regions in the world. Approximately 41 percent of Bahia's population lives in households below the poverty level, and the state has amongst the lowest social indicators in Brazil (World Bank 2004). The Gini coefficient of income inequality in Bahia is 0.61 (World Bank 2004).


In order to identify potential themes, develop interview questions, and field test my citizen and elite interview protocols, I began qualitative research in a municipality of 10,000 citizens in central Bahia, where I lived for approximately five months. During this time, I selected a stratified random sample of six additional municipalities to conduct further interviews. Overall, the municipalities spanned each of Bahia's seven "mesoregions," which are defined by Brazil's national census bureau (IBGE) as areas that share common geographic characteristics. Figure A.1 shows the geographical distribution of interview locations across

the state of Bahia. The population sizes of the seven municipalities selected were approximately: 10,000; 15,000; 30,000; 45,000; 60,000; 80,000, and nearly 100,000.

Within each selected municipality, individuals for community member interviews were selected randomly using stratified sampling. Inclusion / exclusion criteria for individuals included the following: (1) at least sixteen years of age (the voting age in Brazil), (2) had lived in the municipality since the previous mayoral election in 2004, and (3) not a member of the same household as any other interviewee. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced representation across gender, age, and urban/rural mix. With respect to elites, a range of perspectives were obtained by interviewing ten mayors and former mayors, 28 city councilmen (*vereadores*), three vice-mayors, six party heads, five heads of social services, and several other elites. These interviews were balanced to include a combination of elites both allied and opposed to the current administration. Given that mayors likely face different incentives if ineligible for reelection, the random sample of municipalities was stratified to include several municipalities with second-term mayors.

Informed consent was obtained from all community members and elites before initiating each interview. The citizen and elite interview protocols consisted of both open-ended and closed-ended questions. An iterative research design was employed; pertinent themes emerging during thematic analysis were investigated during ongoing interviews. While the original, core questions in the interview protocols were asked of all respondents, probes about emerging themes were included in later interviews.

Figure A.1: Map of Research Sites in Bahia (Northeast Brazil)



Appendix B

Formal Analysis for Chapter 4

(with Jordan Gans-Morse and Sebastian Mazzuca)

We refer to opposing voters, who are potential targets for vote buying, as C^{VB} ; to non-voting supporters, who are potential targets for turnout buying, as C^{TB} ; and to nonvoting opponents, who are potential targets for double persuasion, as C^{DP} . Also, for notational simplicity, let $h = g(c)f(x)dc dx$, $r = x - x^M + a$, and $s = -x - x^M + a$.

The proofs to Propositions 1 and 3 make use of the following lemma:

Lemma 1: For any allocation of budget B , the machine could buy more citizens if it had additional resources of any positive amount.

Let A be an allocation of budget B . Define $M(A)$ to be the set of citizens who vote for the machine given this allocation: $M(A) \equiv \{(x_i, c_i) : b_i \geq \bar{b}_i\}$, where b_i is the payment received by citizen i under allocation A and $\bar{b}_i$ is the payment required to buy this citizen. Limited resources means that for any allocation A , the machine cannot afford to buy all citizens: $\int \bar{b}_i h > B$. It follows that there exists a set $Q \notin M(A)$ of positive measure such that $\bar{b}_i > b_i$ for all $(x_i, c_i) \in Q$. Let $(\dot{x}_i, \dot{c}_i)$ be any point on the interior of Q and select η sufficiently small such that $\Delta(\eta) \equiv [\dot{x}_i, \dot{x}_i + \eta] \times [\dot{c}_i, \dot{c}_i + \eta] \subset Q$. Let $\theta > 0$ represent some nonzero amount of resources. Then by the continuity of $f(x)$ and $g(c)$, there exists a $\eta_0 < \eta$ such that for any θ , the machine can afford to buy all citizens in $\Delta(\eta_0)$: $\int_{\Delta(\eta_0)} \bar{b}_i h \leq \theta$.

Proposition 1: In an optimal allocation of resources, the machine sets $b_{VB}^* = 2b_{TB}^* = 2b_{DP}^*$.

We will show (i) $b_{TB}^* = b_{DP}^*$ and (ii) $b_{VB}^* = 2b_{TB}^*$.

(i) Let b_{TB}^* and b_{DP}^* be the upper bounds on the machine's payments to C^{TB} and C^{DP} , respectively. For contradiction, assume A is an optimal allocation in which $b_{TB}^* \neq b_{DP}^*$. Without loss of generality, say $b_{TB}^* > b_{DP}^*$. We will show there exists an allocation A' that is

affordable and produces a strictly greater number of net votes. Thus, A cannot be optimal.

Let S be a set with positive measure of C^{TB} such that all citizens in set S have a required payment $\bar{b}_i = b_{TB}^*$. Let $(\hat{x}, \hat{c})$ be any point on the interior of S and take δ small enough such that $\Delta(\delta) \equiv [\hat{x}, \hat{x} + \delta] \times [\hat{c}, \hat{c} + \delta] \subset S$. Recall from Lemma 1 that Q is a set of citizens who remain unbought under allocation A . Let $R \subset Q$ be a set with positive measure of C^{DP} such that all citizens in set R have a required payment $b_{TB}^* > \bar{b}_i > b_{DP}^*$. Let $(\tilde{x}, \tilde{c})$ be any point on the interior of R such that $(\tilde{x}, \tilde{c}) \notin \Delta(\eta_0)$, where $\Delta(\eta_0) \subset Q$ as defined in Lemma 1. Take μ small enough such that $\Delta(\mu) \equiv [\tilde{x}, \tilde{x} + \mu] \times [\tilde{c}, \tilde{c} + \mu] \subset R$ and $\Delta(\mu) \cap \Delta(\eta_0) = \emptyset$. By the continuity of $f(x)$ and $g(c)$, there exists a $\delta_0 < \delta$ and a $\mu_0 < \mu$ such that $\int_{\Delta(\delta_0)} h = \int_{\Delta(\mu_0)} h$ (call this Equation A1). Observe that $\Delta(\delta_0)$ and $\Delta(\mu_0)$ have the same number of C^{TB} , so buying either set produces the same net votes. Let $\theta \equiv \int_{\Delta(\delta_0)} \bar{b}_i h - \int_{\Delta(\mu_0)} \bar{b}_i h$ and note that $\theta > 0$ because the citizens on $\Delta(\delta_0)$ are more expensive than those on $\Delta(\mu_0)$. Consider an allocation A' in which the machine buys all citizens in $\Delta(\mu_0)$, reduces payments to citizens on $\Delta(\delta_0)$ to zero, and redistributes the savings to citizens in $\Delta(\eta_0)$. Recall from Lemma 1 that citizens on $\Delta(\eta_0)$ can be bought with resources θ . Formally, define $\Omega \equiv [\underline{X}, \bar{X}] \times [0, \bar{C}] - (\Delta(\delta_0) \cup \Delta(\mu_0) \cup \Delta(\eta_0))$. Let $A' = A$ for all (x_i, c_i) on Ω , $A' = 0$ for all (x_i, c_i) on $\Delta(\delta_0)$, and $A' = \bar{b}_i$ for all (x_i, c_i) on $\Delta(\mu_0)$ and for all (x_i, c_i) on $\Delta(\eta_0)$. The cost of A' is less than or equal to the cost of allocation A and A' buys $\int_{\Delta(\eta_0)} h$ more citizens. Thus A cannot be an optimal allocation.

(ii) To show $b_{VB}^* = 2b_{TB}^*$ (or, equivalently, $b_{VB}^* = 2b_{DP}^*$), we repeat the proof that $b_{TB}^* = b_{DP}^*$, replacing Equation (A1) with $\int_{\Delta(\delta_0)} h = 2 \int_{\Delta(\mu_0)} h$, where $\Delta(\delta_0)$ is a subset of C^{VB} for whom $\bar{b}_i = b_{VB}^* > 2b_{TB}^*$, and where $\Delta(\mu_0)$ is a subset of C^{TB} for whom $\frac{1}{2}b_{VB}^* > \bar{b}_i > b_{TB}^*$.

Proposition 2: If a machine engages in electoral clientelism, then optimally it allocates resources across all three strategies of vote buying, turnout buying, and double persuasion.

Let $b_{VB}^* = b^{**}$ and $b_{TB}^* = b_{DP}^* = b^*$. In an optimal allocation, the number of vote-buying recipients is $VB = N \int_{-\frac{b^{**}}{2}}^0 \int_0^s h$ (Equation A2), the number turnout-buying recipients is $TB = N \int_0^{\bar{X}} \int_s^{r+b^*} h$ (Equation A3), and the number of double-persuasion recipients is $DP = N \int_{-\frac{b^*}{2}}^0 \int_s^{r+b^*} h$ (Equation A4). By Proposition 1, $b^{**} = 2b^*$, so $b^* > 0 \iff b^{**} > 0$. It then follows from equations A2, A3, and A4 that $VB > 0 \iff TB > 0 \iff DP > 0$.

Proposition 3 If $\bar{b}_i^{VB} \leq b^{**}$, the party pays $\bar{b}_i^{VB}$ to a C^{VB} . If $\bar{b}_i^{TB} \leq b^*$, the party pays $\bar{b}_i^{TB}$ to a C^{TB} . If $\bar{b}_i^{DP} \leq b^*$, the party pays $\bar{b}_i^{DP}$ to a C^{DP} . All other citizens receive no payment.

We prove the VB case; identical logic holds for other strategies. We show (i) if $\bar{b}_i^{VB} \leq b^{**}$, the party pays $\bar{b}_i^{VB}$ to a C^{VB} ; (ii) if $\bar{b}_i^{VB} > b^{**}$, the party offers $b_i = 0$ to a C^{VB} .

(i) Let b^{**} be the upper bound on payments the machine makes to C^{VB} . Define $M(A)$ to be the set of C^{VB} who vote for the machine given the payment allocation A . For contradiction, assume A is an optimal allocation in which the party does not buy all C^{VB} who are cheaper than b^{**} . Formally, there exists a set Z with positive measure of C^{VB} receiving $b_i < \bar{b}_i < b^{**}$. We will show there exists a A' that is affordable and produces a strictly greater number of net votes. Thus, A cannot be optimal.

Let $(\hat{x}, \hat{c})$ be any point on the interior of $M(A)$ and take δ small enough such that $\Delta(\delta) \equiv [\hat{x}, \hat{x} + \delta] \times [\hat{c}, \hat{c} + \delta] \subset M(A)$. Let $(\tilde{x}_i, \tilde{c}_i)$ be any point in Z and select μ sufficiently small such that $\Delta(\mu) \equiv [\tilde{x}_i, \tilde{x}_i + \mu] \times [\tilde{c}_i, \tilde{c}_i + \mu] \subset Z$. By the continuity of $f(x)$ and $g(c)$ there exists a $\delta_0 < \delta$ and $\mu_0 < \mu$ such that $\int_{\Delta(\delta_0)} h = \int_{\Delta(\mu_0)} h$. Observe that $\Delta(\delta_0)$ and $\Delta(\mu_0)$ have the same number of C^{VB} , so buying either set produces the same net votes. Let $\theta \equiv \int_{\Delta(\delta_0)} b_i h - \int_{\Delta(\mu_0)} \bar{b}_i h$ and note that $\theta > 0$ because the citizens in $\Delta(\mu_0)$ are cheaper than those in $\Delta(\delta_0)$. Consider an allocation A' in which the machine buys all citizens in $\Delta(\mu_0)$, reduces payments to citizens in $\Delta(\delta_0)$ to zero, and redistributes the savings to citizens in $\Delta(\eta_0)$. Recall from Lemma 1 that $\Delta(\eta_0)$ is a set of citizens who remain unbought under allocation A , and who could be bought with resources θ . Formally, define $\Omega \equiv [\underline{X}, \overline{X}] \times [0, \overline{C}] - (\Delta(\delta_0) \cup \Delta(\mu_0) \cup \Delta(\eta_0))$. Let $A' = A$ for all (x_i, c_i) on Ω , $A' = 0$ for all (x_i, c_i) on $\Delta(\delta_0)$, and $A' = \bar{b}_i$ for all (x_i, c_i) on $\Delta(\mu_0)$ and for all (x_i, c_i) on $\Delta(\eta_0)$. The cost of A' is less than or equal to the cost of allocation A and A' buys $\int_{\Delta(\eta_0)} h$ more citizens. Thus A cannot be an optimal allocation.

(ii) Recall that b^{**} is the upper bound on payments the machine makes to C^{VB} . Offering b^{**} to a citizen for whom $\bar{b}_i^{VB} > b^{**}$ is insufficient to induce vote switching (i.e., it is an underpayment). Formally, underpayment can be defined as a set of positive measure P of C^{VB} receiving rewards b_i such that $\bar{b}_i > b_i > 0$. For contradiction, assume A is an optimal allocation in which the machine underpays some C^{VB} . We show there exists an affordable allocation A'' that produces strictly more net votes than A . Thus, A cannot be optimal.

Define $\theta \equiv \int_P b_i h$ as the resources the machine devotes to citizens in set P . In allocation A , $\theta > 0$. Observe that since the machine underpays these citizens, it receives zero net votes in return. Recall from Lemma 1 that the machine can purchase all citizens on set $\Delta(\eta_0)$ for resources θ , where $\Delta(\eta_0)$ are citizens who remain unbought under allocation A . Consider an allocation A'' in which the machine reduces payments to citizens on set P to zero and uses the savings to purchase citizens on set $\Delta(\eta_0)$. Formally, define $\Omega \equiv [\underline{X}, \overline{X}] \times [0, \overline{C}] - (P \cup \Delta(\eta_0))$. Let $A'' = A$ for all (x_i, c_i) on Ω , $A'' = 0$ for all (x_i, c_i) on P , and $A'' = \bar{b}_i$ for all (x_i, c_i) on $\Delta(\eta_0)$. Then the costs of A'' are less than or equal to the costs of A and A'' buys $\int_{\Delta(\eta_0)} h$

more citizens. Thus A cannot be an optimal allocation.

Comparative Statics

For analysis of comparative statics, we assume f and g are distributed uniformly. The machine's constrained optimization problem, where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier, is:

$\max_{b_{TB}, b_{DP}, b_{VB}} V^M - V^O - \lambda(E - B)$ The machine maximizes the difference between its votes (V^M) and opposition votes (V^O), given that total expenditures (E) must be less than or equal to its budget B . Note that $V^O = N \int_{\underline{X}}^{\frac{b_{VB}}{2}} \int_0^s h$ and $V^M = VB + TB + DP + S$, where: Vote Buying (VB) = $N \int_{\frac{b_{VB}}{2}}^0 \int_0^s h$, Turnout Buying (TB) = $N \int_0^{\bar{X}} \int_r^{r+b^{TB}} h$, Double Persuasion (DP) = $N \int_{\frac{b_{DP}}{2}}^0 \int_s^{r+b^{DP}} h$, and Supporters (S) = $N \int_0^{\bar{X}} \int_0^r h$. Total expenditures for the machine party are $E = E_{VB} + E_{TB} + E_{DP}$, where: VB Expenditures (E_{VB}) = $N \int_{\frac{b_{VB}}{2}}^0 \int_0^s \bar{b}_i^{VB} h$, TB Expenditures (E_{TB}) = $N \int_0^{\bar{X}} \int_r^{r+b^{TB}} \bar{b}_i^{TB} h$, and DP Expenditures (E_{DP}) = $N \int_{\frac{b_{DP}}{2}}^0 \int_s^{r+b^{DP}} \bar{b}_i^{DP} h$. Solving the problem yields three first order conditions. Solving all first order conditions for λ yields the results from Proposition 1: $b_{VB}^* = 2b_{TB}^* = 2b_{DP}^*$. For the following analyses, let $\Gamma = \frac{N}{(\bar{X}-\underline{X})C}$.

Compulsory Voting

Substitute $b^* = \frac{1}{2}b^{**}$ from the FOCs into the budget constraint. Implicit differentiation yields: $\frac{\partial b^{**}}{\partial a} = \frac{-4b^{**}}{8(a-x^M)+4\bar{X}+5b^{**}} < 0$. Substitute $b^{**} = 2b^*$ into the budget constraint.

Implicit differentiation yields: $\frac{\partial b^*}{\partial d} = \frac{-2b^*}{4(d-x^M)+2\bar{X}+5b^*} < 0$. Comparative statics follow:

$$(1) \frac{\partial VB}{\partial a} = \frac{\Gamma}{4} \left[2b^{**} + (2(a-x^M) + b^{**}) \frac{\partial b^{**}}{\partial a} \right] = \frac{\Gamma}{4} \left[2b^{**} - 2b^{**} \left(\frac{4(a-x^M)+2b^{**}}{8(a-x^M)+4\bar{X}+5b^{**}} \right) \right] > 0. \quad (2)$$

$$\frac{\partial TB}{\partial a} = \Gamma \bar{X} \frac{\partial b^*}{\partial a} < 0. \quad (3) \frac{\partial DP}{\partial a} = \Gamma \frac{b^*}{2} \frac{\partial b^*}{\partial a} < 0.$$

Machine Support

Substituting FOCs into the budget constraint and implicitly differentiating yields: (1)

$$\frac{\partial b^{**}}{\partial \bar{x}} = \frac{-2b^{**}}{4(2(a-x^M)+\bar{X}+\bar{x})+5b^{**}} < 0 \text{ and } (2) \frac{\partial b^*}{\partial \bar{x}} = \frac{-b^*}{2(2(a-x^M)+\bar{X}+\bar{x})+5b^*} < 0. \text{ Comparative statics follow: } (1) \frac{\partial VB}{\partial \bar{x}} = \frac{\Gamma}{4} \left[(2(a-x^M) + b^{**}) \left(\frac{\partial b^{**}}{\partial \bar{x}} \right) \right] < 0. \quad (2) \frac{\partial TB}{\partial \bar{x}} = \Gamma \left[b^* + (\bar{X} + \bar{x}) \frac{\partial b^*}{\partial \bar{x}} \right] = \Gamma \left[b^* - \frac{b^*(\bar{X}+\bar{x})}{2(2(a-x^M)+\bar{X}+\bar{x})+5b^*} \right] > 0. \quad (3) \frac{\partial DP}{\partial \bar{x}} = \frac{\Gamma}{2} \left[b^* \left(\frac{\partial b^*}{\partial \bar{x}} \right) \right] < 0.$$

Political Polarization

Note that by the assumption of symmetric party platforms, $x^M - x^O = 2x^M$. Substituting FOCs into the budget constraint and implicitly differentiating yields: (1) $\frac{\partial b^{**}}{\partial x^M} = \frac{4b^{**}}{8(a-x^M)+4\bar{X}+5b^{**}} > 0$ and (2) $\frac{\partial b^*}{\partial x^M} = \frac{2b^{**}}{4(a-x^M)+2\bar{X}+5b^{**}} > 0$. Comparative statics then follow:

$$\frac{\partial VB}{\partial x^M} = -\frac{\Gamma}{2} \left[\frac{4(a-x^M+\bar{X})+3b^{**}}{8(a-x^M)+4\bar{X}+5b^{**}} \right] < 0. \quad (2) \frac{\partial TB}{\partial x^M} = \Gamma \left[\bar{X} \left(\frac{\partial b^*}{\partial x^M} \right) \right] > 0. \quad (3) \frac{\partial DP}{\partial x^M} = \frac{\Gamma}{2} \left[(b^*)^2 \left(\frac{\partial b^*}{\partial x^M} \right) \right] > 0.$$

Salience of Political Preferences

Substituting FOCs into the budget constraint and implicitly differentiating yields: (1) $\frac{\partial b^{**}}{\partial \kappa} = \frac{b^{**}(12a+5b^{**})}{3\kappa(8a-4\kappa x^M+5b^{**})} > 0$ and (2) $\frac{\partial b^*}{\partial \kappa} = \frac{b^*(6a+5b^*)}{3\kappa(4a-2\kappa x^M+5b^*)} > 0$. (Here we use the fact that $\bar{X} = x^M$ and $\underline{X} = -x^M$). Comparative statics follow: (1) $\frac{\partial VB}{\partial \kappa} = -\frac{b^{**}N(48a^2+b^{**}(40a+5b^{**}+8x^M\kappa))}{48\bar{C}x^M\kappa^2(8a-4x^M\kappa+5b^{**})} < 0$. (2) $\frac{\partial TB}{\partial \kappa} = \frac{b^*N(6a+5b^*)}{6\bar{C}\kappa(4a-2x^M\kappa+5b^*)} > 0$. (3) $\frac{\partial DP}{\partial \kappa} = \frac{b^{*2}N(6x^M\kappa-5b^*)}{24\bar{C}x^M\kappa^2(4a-2x^M\kappa+5b^*)} > 0$ (where $6x^M\kappa - 5b^* > 0$ follows from the fact that $b^* \leq \kappa x^M$ given that $b^{**} \leq -2\kappa x^O = 2\kappa x^M$ and $b^{**} = 2b^*$). Note that given our assumption that some indifferent voters turnout ($a > x^M\kappa$), the denominators of all three comparative statics are always positive.

Ballot Secrecy

Let $\frac{1}{p} = \alpha$. In the constrained optimization problem above, replace b_{VB}^* and b_{DP}^* with $\tilde{b}_{VB}$, $\tilde{b}_{DP}$, $\tilde{E}_{VB}$ with αE_{VB} , and $\tilde{E}_{DP}$ with αE_{DP} . The FOCs become $\alpha \tilde{b}_{VB}^* = 2b_{TB}^* = 2\alpha \tilde{b}_{DP}^*$. Substitute $\tilde{b}_{DP} = \frac{\tilde{b}_{VB}}{2}$ and $\tilde{b}_{TB} = \frac{\alpha \tilde{b}_{VB}}{2}$ from the FOCs into the budget constraint. Implicit differentiation yields: $\frac{\partial \tilde{b}_{VB}}{\partial \alpha} = -\frac{\tilde{b}_{VB}(12(a-x^M+\alpha\bar{X})+5\tilde{b}_{VB})}{3\alpha(8(a-x^M)+4\alpha\bar{X}+5\tilde{b}_{VB})} < 0$. Substitute $\tilde{b}_{VB} = \frac{2b_{TB}}{\alpha}$ and $\tilde{b}_{DP} = \frac{b_{TB}}{\alpha}$ into the budget constraint. Implicit differentiation yields: $\frac{\partial b_{TB}}{\partial \alpha} = \frac{2b_{TB}(3\alpha(a-x^M)+5b_{TB})}{3\alpha(2\alpha(2(a-x^M)+\alpha\bar{X})+5b_{TB})} > 0$. Substitute $\tilde{b}_{VB} = 2\tilde{b}_{DP}$ and $\tilde{b}_{TB} = \alpha\tilde{b}_{DP}$ into the budget constraint. Implicit differentiation yields: $\frac{\partial \tilde{b}_{DP}}{\partial \alpha} = -\frac{\tilde{b}_{DP}(6(a-x^M+\alpha\bar{X})+5\tilde{b}_{DP})}{3\alpha(4(a-x^M)+2\alpha\bar{X}+5\tilde{b}_{DP})} < 0$. Comparative statics follow: (1) $\frac{\partial \tilde{VB}}{\partial \alpha} = \frac{\Gamma}{4} [2(a-x^M) + \tilde{b}_{VB}(\frac{\partial \tilde{b}_{VB}}{\partial \alpha})] < 0$. (2) $\frac{\partial \tilde{TB}}{\partial \alpha} = \Gamma \bar{X} \tilde{b}_{TB}(\frac{\partial b_{TB}}{\partial \alpha}) > 0$. (3) $\frac{\partial \tilde{DP}}{\partial \alpha} = \frac{\Gamma}{2} \tilde{b}_{DP}(\frac{\partial \tilde{b}_{DP}}{\partial \alpha}) < 0$.